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The Psychology of Globalization: Identity, Ideology, and Action
 9780128121092, 0128121092

Table of contents :
Cover
Title
Copyright
About the Authors
Preface
Part I: Globalization and Global Concern
1 Globalization and Global Concern
A Few Words to Begin
The Complex Nature of Globalization
An Overview of the Social Psychology Perspective of Globalization: Why Do We Need to Care?
2 Globalization, Culture, and Consumerism
The Story of Globalization: Where Does It Begin?
The Economic, Political, and Sociocultural Processes of Globalization
Globalized Western Culture
Globalizing Sociocultural Conditions and Transformations of Selfhood
A Cross-Cultural Perspective on Selfhood
The Conjoined Trajectories of Culture and Selfhood
Contradictions of Different Value Systems
The Consumerist Architecture of Sociocultural Globalization
Consumer Culture: A Primer
Market Logic
From Market to Consumer (Culture)
Tensions of Globalized Values
Summary
Part II: Psychology of Globalization: Basic Processes
3 Consumer Identities, Consumer Selfhood, and the Stability of Consumer Societies
The Role of Marketing in Restructuring Societies for Consumption
Consumer Selfhood
The Psychological Architecture of Consumer Selfhood and Its Consequences
Consumer Selfhood and Normative Narcissism
Materialism as the Most Conspicuous Form of Consumer Selfhood
Evidence From Experimental Primes of Consumerism
The Segmentation of Consumer Societies
Consumer Lifestyle Identities
Consumer Selfhood and the Stability of Globalized Consumer Culture
Summary
4 The Interplay Between Social Identities and Globalization
Foundations of the Social Identity Approach
The Structure and Content of Social Identities
The Contextual Relevance of Social Categories
Social Identity, Mobility, and Social Change
The Normative Basis of Group Behavior
Collective Emotions
Beyond the Social Identity Approach
Does an Ingroup Require an Outgroup?
Multiple Functions of Social Identification
The Dynamics of Multiple Social Identities
The Impact of Globalization on Social Identities
Globalization and Acculturation
Globalization and Emotional Experience
Effects of Globalization on Local and National Identification
From Local to Globalized Social Identity
The Promise of Global Identification
Limitations of Global Identification
Summary
5 A Political Psychology of Responses to Globalization
What Is the Appeal? The Stability and Legitimacy of the Global Social Order
Who Is Disenchanted? Vectors of Opposition to Globalized Western Culture
Individuals’ Ideological Inclinations and the Political Reactions to Globalization
SDO—Social Dominance Orientation
SDO and Support for Globalization
Globalization’s Potential Impact on Levels of SDO
SDO and Contact With Other Cultures
RWA—Right-wing Authoritarianism
RWA and Perceptions of Globalization
RWA and Societal Change
RWA and SDO in Concert
The Increased Polarization of Political Views
Consumer Culture and Politics
Summary
6 Collective Action in a Global Context
A Psychological Perspective on Collective Action
The Social Identity Model of Collective Action (SIMCA)
The Encapsulation Model of Social Identity in Collective Action (EMSICA)
A Dynamic Model of Normative and Nonnormative Collective Action
Solidarity-Based Collective Action
Bringing Collective Action Into Context
New Identities, New Collectives, New Solidarity
Impacts of Global Connectedness on Group Formation and Identification
Does Global Connectedness and Online Activism Matter?
Collective Action and Consumerism
The Allure of Inaction
Summary
Part III: Issues in Depth
7 Social Identity and Responses to Global Environmental Crises
What’s the Matter? Global Environmental Issues
Global Climate Change—From Humans for Humans
Dimensions of Proenvironmental Action
Impact of Proenvironmental Behavior on the Environment
Social Identity and Responses to Climate Change
The Social-Identity Model of Proenvironmental Action
Ingroup Identification, Efficacy, and Norms as Core Social Identity Variables
Emotional and Motivational Responses to Global Climate Change
Processes of Social Identity in Transnational Negotiations
The World Wide Web and Environmental Issues
Summary
8 Social Identity and the Challenges of Migration and Multiculturalism
Globalization and Migration
Multiculturalism, Acculturation, and Social Identity
The National and Global Contexts: Ideology, Nationalism, and Threat
Expanding the Acculturation Framework
Meanings of National Identity
Perceived Threat and Reactions to Migrants
Populism and Prejudice: Being Closed in a Connected World
From Identity Threat to Identity Enhancement—Accepting a World in Motion
Conclusion: Migration, Multiculturalism, and Security
Part IV: Conclusion
9 Psychology in the Nexus of Global Governance, Economies, and Sustainability
Globalization, Connection, and Cooperation
The Potential for Global Collective Action: Sustainable Development Goals
The Nexus of Psychology, Sustainability, and Economy
Systems Thinking
Future Research Questions
Economic (De)Growth & Economic Inequality
Future Research Questions
Globalization, Digitization, and the Rise of Conspiracy Theories
A Few Last Words
References
Index

Citation preview

The Psychology of Globalization

The Psychology of Globalization Identity, Ideology, and Action

GERHARD REESE University of Koblenz-Landau, Germany

AMIR ROSENMANN University of Haifa, Israel

JAMES E. CAMERON Saint Mary's University, Halifax, Canada

Academic Press is an imprint of Elsevier 125 London Wall, London EC2Y 5AS, United Kingdom 525 B Street, Suite 1650, San Diego, CA 92101, United States 50 Hampshire Street, 5th Floor, Cambridge, MA 02139, United States The Boulevard, Langford Lane, Kidlington, Oxford OX5 1GB, United Kingdom Copyright r 2019 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. Details on how to seek permission, further information about the Publisher’s permissions policies and our arrangements with organizations such as the Copyright Clearance Center and the Copyright Licensing Agency, can be found at our website: www.elsevier.com/permissions. This book and the individual contributions contained in it are protected under copyright by the Publisher (other than as may be noted herein). Notices Knowledge and best practice in this field are constantly changing. As new research and experience broaden our understanding, changes in research methods, professional practices, or medical treatment may become necessary. Practitioners and researchers must always rely on their own experience and knowledge in evaluating and using any information, methods, compounds, or experiments described herein. In using such information or methods they should be mindful of their own safety and the safety of others, including parties for whom they have a professional responsibility. To the fullest extent of the law, neither the Publisher nor the authors, contributors, or editors, assume any liability for any injury and/or damage to persons or property as a matter of products liability, negligence or otherwise, or from any use or operation of any methods, products, instructions, or ideas contained in the material herein. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress ISBN: 978-0-12-812109-2 For Information on all Academic Press publications visit our website at https://www.elsevier.com/books-and-journals

Publisher: Nikki P. Levy Acquisition Editor: Emily Ekle Editorial Project Manager: Barbara Makinster Production Project Manager: Mohanapriyan Rajendran Cover Designer: Matthew Limbert Typeset by MPS Limited, Chennai, India

ABOUT THE AUTHORS Gerhard Reese Gerhard Reese is Professor of Environmental Psychology at the University of Koblenz-Landau, Germany, investigating processes of social identity, collective action, social inequality, and environmental behavior, in the frame of globalization. Amir Rosenmann Amir Rosenmann is a research fellow at the Cultural Psychology Lab, the University of Haifa, Israel, now residing in Detroit, Michigan. His research focuses on issues of gender, social power, and social identity, as those intersect with the processes of globalization and consumerism. He serves as an Associate Editor at the Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology. James E. Cameron Jim Cameron is Professor of Psychology at Saint Mary’s University in Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada. He is interested in social identity processes with respect to collective action, multiculturalism, well-being, and globalization.

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PREFACE “This is a book we need to write!” said the German to the Israeli and the Canadian, standing there, in a chilly Baltic night. This is not a beginning of a joke, but of the book before you—a book about a globalized world, which was largely unimaginable only a few decades ago. Much has been written about this new world we live in, but a detailed analysis of how its changing landscapes interact with human psychology has not been presented until now. This integrative treatment of globalization’s net of bidirectional influences on and by our identities, ideologies, and actions is thus completely novel. This integration is also urgently needed, if we are to rise to the truly global challenges we all face. In an age of instability—climate change, technological disruptions, transcontinental migration, and socioeconomic-political fault lines—human reactions (and the science of psychology) must be brought to the fore. This is because globalization is not something that is happening to us. It is something we are shaping, as it shapes us; it is the constantly changing backdrop of our lives as well as the nonlinear sum of the ways we change our lives. Taking a systems thinking perspective, which defines globalization as a complex net of interacting processes of accelerating interdependencies across social arenas and geopolitical realities, this book sheds new light on a buzzword that had already become an obsolete cliché. This book is thus a must for those who have had enough, as well as those who have not had any. Because psychology has been so disconnected from the shifting macrocontexts of globalization, we start by introducing some key concepts to the uninitiated reader, who may wonder why globalization should interest psychologists, and why psychological science should interest students of globalization. We offer a narrative of what globalization is, and how it relates to virtually every facet of contemporary human societies and psyches. This narrative includes a primer on consumer culture, placing it within a crosscultural psychological perspective on the co-constituting mechanisms of culture and psychology, where each level populates and manifests the other. This novel conceptualization of consumer selfhood, as the psychological correlate of consumer culture, is informed by contemporary psychological science while informing our discussion of the macrodynamics of globalization and globalized societies. Following this presentation of xi

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our meta-theory of globalization, we introduce the social identity approach as our chosen psychological meta-theory. Through its lens, we detail group-based reactions to globalization’s multifarious presence in social life, as those reciprocally develop as fields of political contention and human agency. This discussion of the political psychology of globalization then sets the ground for our exploration of collective in-/action in this age of shifting allegiances and unrealpolitik. Following this transdisciplinary depiction of the psychology of globalization and the globalized psyche, we apply our perspective to two more narrowly defined issues. First, we bring it to bear on the colossal challenges of climate change, as our environmental in-/actions in the present moment promise (and threaten) to reverberate across our future horizons. Second, we take a closer look at the issue of mass migration, as cultural chasms appear within our societies as well as our inner dialogs. In both instances, we go beyond simply describing the psychology that informs these two ongoing crises, to highlight how psychology could offer a constructive way forward from the current moment. We conclude the book with attempts to reimagine globalization and psychology, as we envision a future outside our collective tunnel vision. We are grateful for the opportunity to write this book, and we owe our thanks to the team at Elsevier, in particular Emily Ekle, Jackie Truesdell, Barbara Makinster, and Mohana Priyan Rajendran who made this project possible and supported us professionally throughout the process. We thank Dr. Claudia Menzel from the University of KoblenzLandau, who made a tremendous and short notice effort in editing and proofreading the manuscript, and Christoph Dolderer, Moritz Hoffmann, Irmela Kauertz, and Lara Kerschl for their commitment and assistance. Finally, writing a book is always a matter of time and space, taking those away from the people with whom we are fortunate to share our lives. Thus, we are grateful to our beloved partners, children, and families, who persevered with us, and helped us find equanimity along the way. Amir wishes to thank his mother, Hannah Rosenmann, for the breadth of breath that gulps down a world in wonder.

CHAPTER 1

Globalization and Global Concern A FEW WORDS TO BEGIN Readers of this book are likely well acquainted with the concept of globalization. It is certainly a prominent topic of scientific discourse. It also forms the fabric of everyday experience: what we do, what we consume, what we read, what we know. If you live in Canada, you may realize that the clothing you wear is largely produced in countries such as China, India, or Bangladesh, and transported over land and sea; nonetheless making your attire more affordable. As a person living in Malaysia, you may have visited a local McDonald’s restaurant to eat a cheeseburger, realizing that the owner of McDonald’s comes from the United States while some of the products may be imported from countries far away. These examples—written in a German village on a computer from a North American company that was assembled in China using single components produced in South Korea with chemical elements extracted from mines in various African countries, and so on. . . (we think you get the idea)—show that globalization pervades the lives of virtually all humans, in virtually all aspects of life. More formally, globalization reflects the “widening, deepening and speeding up of worldwide interconnectedness in all aspects of contemporary social life” (Held, McGrew, Goldblatt, & Perraton, 1999, p. 2). Globalization is a complex set of phenomena, and our aim in this book is to engage with that complexity from a social psychological point of view. We will explore how worldwide interconnectedness involves not only transnational economic and political institutions, but also myriad effects on our actions, our views of the world, as well as our self- and collective identities. To approach this still-developing conceptual domain, we review and integrate various strands of psychological research that— often implicitly—deal with the issue of globalization and its ramifications. However, psychology alone will not be able to explain every aspect of globalization. We need approaches that attend to various aspects of globalization, and we will try to connect the psychological perspective with other levels of analysis. To do so, we begin here (and in Chapter 2) by establishing globalization as a multilayered and historically situated set of The Psychology of Globalization DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-812109-2.00001-X

© 2019 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

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processes, and by introducing a systems approach as a useful framework for thinking about globalization.

THE COMPLEX NATURE OF GLOBALIZATION By definition, globalization involves a large, dynamic, and intertwined system. It spans the global and the local, as well as innumerable and constantly evolving interactions between its (natural and human-made) elements. Globalization therefore challenges us to adopt an analytic approach and an action program that can accommodate these complex interdependencies. We believe that one such approach is particularly appropriate in this conceptualization: systems thinking (cf. Hester & Adams, 2017; Meadows, 2008; Werhane, 2008). In parallel to globalization, a systems approach presumes that human perception, thinking, and action are interrelated and interconnected on various societal levels. On a fundamental level, a system refers to a complex set of self-organized elements that interact with each other, producing their own pattern of behavior (i.e., emergent effects) over time (Meadows, 2008). Consequently, any action within the system has an impact on the system by affecting (an)other element or elements, such that “almost no phenomenon can be studied in isolation from other relationships with at least some other phenomenon” (Wenhane, 2008, p. 467). A systems-based perspective on globalization guides us to simultaneously attend to the actions of individuals, institutions, nation states, businesses, and other entities operating in the global system—with their coinciding or conflicting worldviews, interests and goals. The latter, in turn, are connected on different levels of analyses, from micro structures such as neighborhoods or local environment groups up to macro structures such as global corporations and institutions. When dealing with such complex systems, we must constantly remind ourselves that by focusing on one specific component, we run the risk of obscuring its position, function, and position in an intricate web of reciprocal relationships with other components, and indeed, the system as a whole. For example, let us consider the incredible global transformations associated with the increased centrality of social networking services (SNS; e.g., Facebook or Twitter) to contemporary social life. SNS were introduced to most of us a little more than a decade ago, as platforms designed to help us to communicate with one another, no matter how near or far. On a more communal level, they promised to help us

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organize new forms of communities, where people may more easily cooperate as they address issues close to their hearts. They also aimed to help people sharing their worldviews with those who might be receptive to hearing them by democratizing and decentralizing the exchange of ideas. Recently, however, the more sinister aspects of exactly these communal features of SNS life have drawn public attention and concern. You might have read about radical religious or neo-fascist groups using these platforms to organize their potentially harmful actions and to reach new members who might further disseminate their hateful messages. In more mainstream settings, the same features are used to create mass campaigns of disinformation and the systematic manipulation of public opinion. It is a mistake, therefore, to claim that SNS are either “good” or “bad,” as their effects depend entirely on the way they are utilized by various actors, and interact with other elements of the system. Put simply, globalization has made many aspects of social and political life more complicated. As we discuss these issues later in the book, we will show how these features are embedded in a particular socioeconomic system. This macrosystem creates both the opportunities and the incentives for the type of innovative thinking and remarkable technological achievements provided by SNS. At the same time, new business models were also needed to help SNS flourish within this profit-driven economic environment. As a result, SNS are constantly learning who we are, and what kind of lifestyle we follow, so that they can market to us exactly the products we are most likely to be interested in and to buy. And citizens’ data, in turn, define the directions these corporations and the internet as a whole continue to develop. Understandably, SNS’s social architecture must accommodate these marketing goals as a means for the technology corporations to thrive. These features of the social settings of SNS both reflect and further entrench the macroeconomic system. They now serve as a perfect venue for marketers where not only products are offered to those who are most likely to buy them, but also specifically tailored ideas, ideologies, truths, and forms of political action. These latter aspects, of course, directly impact the social, economic, and regulatory environment in which SNS operate, as well as the world we live in. Nowadays, social media oftentimes have cascading geopolitical effects that are constructive or disruptive on a truly global scale (e.g., World Economic Forum, “The Global Risks Report,” 2018). At the same time, social media have a profound impact on our thinking and acting when it comes to discussing and responding to

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the global issues that we face. As you will see throughout this book, there is a growing body of research addressing this. While we aim to enrich the thinking about globalization by offering a psychological perspective, we again stress that globalization, with its plethora of interconnected phenomena, requires that we adopt various perspectives. Inspecting an issue from only one disciplinary angle will often result in an incomplete picture and a biased or even plain wrong analysis of the problem and its solution. An ancient story found in various different cultures illustrates the necessity of a systems-based, interdisciplinary view of globalization and its consequences. This ancient parable, apparently originating from a Buddhist text (but also found in various other religious traditions), describes a group of blind men who had never encountered an elephant before. Given the opportunity to touch the elephant, each of the men feels a different part of its body. Based on this limited experience, they come to very different conclusions about what an elephant actually is. A 19th century poem by John Godfrey Saxe popularized this fable in the West: It was six men of Indostan To learning much inclined, Who went to see the Elephant (Though all of them were blind), That each by observation Might satisfy his mind The First approached the Elephant, And happening to fall Against his broad and sturdy side, At once began to bawl: God bless me! but the Elephant Is very like a wall! The Second, feeling of the tusk, Cried, Ho! what have we here So very round and smooth and sharp? To me ‘tis mighty clear This wonder of an Elephant Is very like a spear!

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The Third approached the animal, And happening to take The squirming trunk within his hands, Thus boldly up and spake: I see, quoth he, the Elephant Is very like a snake! The Fourth reached out an eager hand, And felt about the knee. What most this wondrous beast is like Is mighty plain, quoth he; ‘Tis clear enough the Elephant Is very like a tree! The Fifth, who chanced to touch the ear, Said: Even the blindest man Can tell what this resembles most; Deny the fact who can This marvel of an Elephant Is very like a fan!? The Sixth no sooner had begun About the beast to grope, Then, seizing on the swinging tail That fell within his scope, I see, quoth he, the Elephant Is very like a rope! And so these men of Indostan Disputed loud and long, Each in his own opinion Exceeding stiff and strong, Though each was partly in the right, And all were in the wrong!

The lesson we can take from this fable and apply to the analysis of globalization (and many other systems-based phenomena) is simple: The way a system behaves cannot be inferred by knowing only about the behaviors of its constituent elements (Meadows, 2008).

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Positioning globalization in a systems-based perspective reminds us that a focus on specific elements alone may not be sufficient to understand the system, and that without such systems-based understanding, it is impossible to make complete sense of any specific element. For the same reason, no single disciplinary perspective, including that of psychology, can alone account for the dynamics and effects of globalization. Nonetheless, in this book we will show why psychological processes are crucial considerations when we think about the effects of globalization. Even as we draw from a broad, multidisciplinary literature, we note that psychology itself is well positioned to define and incorporate multiple levels of analysis (e.g., Doise & Mapstone, 1986; Turner & Oakes, 1986): that of the individual, the social group, and the dynamics of society at large. This book will try to do justice to these varying perspectives, and we hope to make clear that our psychological perspective can uniquely add to the understanding of globalization. The book will delineate how globalization affects individual dispositions and decisions. It will focus on social group processes and how globalization may contribute to developing attachments and sympathies that go beyond parochial group boundaries. Furthermore, it will examine how changes in society at large are changing humans’ lives, and how individuals contribute to societal and global change. Simply put, this book aims to bring the psychology of individual and collective behavior into the systemic equation of globalization.

AN OVERVIEW OF THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY PERSPECTIVE OF GLOBALIZATION: WHY DO WE NEED TO CARE? Processes related to globalization have so profoundly changed the world that they have implications for virtually every aspect of psychology. They have not only changed the contexts in which identity, attitudes, and behavior are shaped and operate, but they have also created new forms of identities, new threats, new attitude objects (including globalization itself), new domains of behavior, and new targets of action. Indeed, one way to characterize the effects of globalization in psychological terms is in terms of a “crisis of identities” (Kennedy & Danks, 2001). This “crisis” can be interpreted in terms of a turning point where individuals reposition and reevaluate their national and local self-definitions within a global context (Arnett, 2002; Giddens, 1999) but also as a point of difficulty, where global interdependence can tip from enhancing to threatening human

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security (Commission on Human Security of the United Nations, 2003). Thus, globalization processes bring unprecedented opportunities for international engagement and intercultural openness, for the promotion of human rights, and collective actions that serve global causes. In contrast, contemporary globalization provides resurgent examples of the tightening or closing of national borders to the movement of people as well as the exchange of goods and ideas and the nativist defense of identity and culture. Such reactions have led to speculations about a new era of social and political “deglobalization,” with the ideological right bringing cynicism and outright antipathy to bear on notions of international and intercultural openness, as leftist movements come to distrust globlalization’s economic and ideological infrastructure. At the time of writing this book, these processes are particularly visible in the United States where the political divide between Democrats and Republicans has widened immensely (Pew Research Center, 2017e). Naturally, the scope of this book allows neither an exhaustive review of the literature, nor a treatment of every psychological theory that may be related to globalization. Rather, we derive our key analytic themes from an influential meta-theoretical perspective in social psychology known as the social identity approach (e.g., Reicher, 2004; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). This framework is particularly helpful in crafting a psychology of globalization because it is sensitive to the interactive, interconnected, and interdependent nature of human life, and is able to facilitate a theoretically sophisticated understanding of collective actions and inactions in a globalized world. As we describe in more detail in Chapter 4, the social identity approach takes as a starting point people’s self-conception as group members (e.g., seeing oneself as Chinese or French, as liberal or as conservative), and the conditions under which group members act for the good of a particular ingroup, or for reasons that transcend that group’s interests. One intensifying feature of globalization is that people around the world face similar and overlapping threats to their security, such as climate change, terrorism, cyberattacks, and the global economy (e.g., Pew Research Center, 2017b). These threats are collective not just because they are globally shared—albeit to different extents in different regions— but also because no nation alone can deal with them effectively (e.g., Held & McGrew, 2002). Thus, a perspective on human relations that attends to cooperation, conflict, solidarity, varying worldviews and common goals is necessary in order to engage with the big issue(s) of

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globalization, and to develop a sound basis for developing strategies for addressing global challenges. To foreshadow one of the themes in this book, take, for example, the issue of how and why we respond to global climate change (see Chapter 7). There is overwhelming evidence that globalization processes have a massive impact on the natural environment, in large part because of the strain they put on planetary resources (Rockström et al., 2009). Although there is a near consensus among scientists worldwide that climatic change is primarily driven by anthropogenic (human-made) causes, there are various groups of people that nonetheless refute or ignore this information. Regardless of the nature of the scientific information, there are underlying reasons for opposition to it that are rooted in social processes. Social groups may form through shared opinions (“Climate change is a hoax!”) that can develop a group-specific worldview. As a consequence, members of a group whose core is a definition of climaticchange-as-hoax will very likely refrain from any action or policy support that would counteract that view. While these processes are neither surprising nor new, globalization amplifies them through unprecedented avenues of opinion dissemination. The development of communication technologies that span the globe allows any group of people to spread their word to an enormous number of potential receivers. It is thus not only a matter of ingroup behavior, directed at those who are part of the group or share its belief system, but also a matter of communication, as it affords a mouthpiece directed towards anybody using these channels. As a consequence, these contemporary forms of communication have the potential to transcend group boundaries, while at the same time widening gaps between different groups. They also allow us, as social scientists, to explore the different worldviews, opinions, and orientations that are out there. These accelerated processes of globalization may feed conflict-laden relations between countries. For example, it is estimated that climate change— substantially fueled by globalization—will result in conflicts about scarce resources such as access to freshwater (Gleick, 1993, 2014). As a consequence, we can expect large movements of people migrating out of blighted zones to other regions or countries, seeking refuge from resource scarcity or violent conflicts. Then, we need to ask how potential host countries deal with environmental migrants—would they receive them as victims in need of urgent attention, solidarity and care? Or would environmental migrants be seen as security threats, further undermining national

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sovereignty and challenging established social orders? Could those migrants also be seen as adaptive agents, willing and able to relocate physically and psychologically to a new home? These are just some potential framings (for a review, see Ransan-Cooper, Farbotko, McNamara, Thornton, & Chevalier, 2015) people, institutions, or governments may use to interpret and respond to environmental migration. As we will explicate, the social identity approach is useful in understanding the conditions under which each of those frames would become more or less likely to be adopted, resulting in potentially cooperative or conflictual behavioral outcomes. While these paragraphs propose escalating conflicts as the bleak consequence of globalization, it is worthwhile considering globalization’s potential for cooperation, the promotion of solidarity, or quality of life improvements. One prominent and highly discussed example refers to the question of whether globalization is responsible for a decrease in absolute poverty. Recent research suggests that globalization may indeed be responsible for an overall reduction of poverty (Bergh & Nilsson, 2014). While this conclusion clearly depends on how these outcome constructs are measured, this leaves some room for optimism. The main argument here is that economic globalization fosters economic growth through mechanisms of specialization, innovation, and international competition (e.g., Agénor, 2002), which in turn can decrease poverty. A stronger integration into the global economic system may also result in higher educational achievement in poorer countries (Stark, 2004), which may result in long-term reduction of poverty. Of course, economic growth is limited by the abundance of planetary resources, and it is debatable for which countries or societies economic growth is “helpful” in redressing poverty, keeping in mind that the global economic system has been fragile at times. We get back to this particular issue in Chapter 9. Another example drawing from the social psychological underpinnings of globalization refers to the increased opportunities of cross-cultural friendships. In times of global communication technologies, it has become incredibly easy to connect with people from other parts in the world. To the extent that international contact has become virtually boundary-free, one could argue that people become acquainted with lifestyles and cultures completely different to their own. This may broaden peoples’ cultural perspectives, and perhaps provide a basis for cooperation. Over the course of the book, we hope to provide readers with a sound, empirically driven argumentation, on which they may base their own views on these and many other consequences of globalization.

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This introduction marks many of the issues and perspectives this book will explore. More specifically, we will formally introduce globalization in Chapter 2, as we argue against a prevailing notion among many psychologists who seem to believe globalization is “someone else’s problem,” and its research some other disciplines’ prerogative (Kasser, Cohn, Kanner, & Ryan, 2007). Hence, before tackling globalization as a psychological phenomenon, the term itself will be defined and explicated. This systematic overview will follow Dreher and Gaston’s (2008) classical discussion of economic, political, and social globalization. We pay special attention to the emergence of globalized cultures, and the propagation of a consumerist understanding of human lives and wellbeing (e.g., Rosenmann, Reese, & Cameron, 2016). We explore some of the psychological conditions associated with this global consumerist culture in Chapter 3. Many of the challenges and societal problems that arise through globalization find their roots in the consumption of goods and services. Furthermore, through globalization, consumerism rewrites cultural norms worldwide. In this chapter, societal and psychological ramifications of this mostly invisible form of globalizing cultural influence will be discussed. Chapter 4 elaborates the social psychological perspective we apply to the psychology of globalization, as it changes the way people think of who and what they are, and where they belong. We thus outline the social identity approach (e.g., Reicher, 2004; Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and provide a concise introduction to its main premises and predictions, accompanied by empirical examples and illustrative cases from the world stage. We delineate the idea of self-categorization from the smallest local groups to the largest social groups, and explain how these different levels of social identity relate to processes of globalization (e.g., through internet-based group formation). Building on this analysis, we discuss the potential as well as the (psychological) perils of multigroup collectives (e.g., Europe, humanity). Closely linked to “what we are” is “what we believe.” In Chapter 5, we therefore introduce the basic concepts of attitudes and ideologies as these are strongly intertwined with, and embedded in, the context of changing social identities and the global social order. Employing a political psychological perspective, we will discuss how globalization shapes local and transnational politics. In Chapter 6, we go a step further, looking at the processes that motivate people to change societies, or alternatively, resist such change.

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We review contemporary theory of collective action, before turning to its application in the context of pressing global issues (Chapters 7 and 8). Responding to theoretical challenges posed by contemporary social movements (e.g., the “Occupy Movement”; Smith, Gavin, & Sharp, 2015), we attend to the transformative nature of communication technologies in this context. Conversely, while social movements seem to flourish in the current social climate, effective collective action (at least in more globalized contexts) seems surprisingly sparse. Because collective inaction is a valid, and often realized, form of political behavior, it warrants discussion within this context as well. In Chapter 7, we focus more specifically on the topic of climate change, integrating our theoretical framework to bring it to bear on this pressing issue. Global environmental deterioration and climate change are some of the greatest challenges to humanity’s future, and require unprecedented collective efforts. Globalization is certainly one process that facilitated these environmental crises through transnational mobility, high levels of consumerism, and resource exploitation. But globalization also allows the development of mitigation efforts across national and continental boundaries, therefore allowing people to construct identities that have the power to affect policies and global political decision making. Thus, this chapter provides an analysis of how we appraise global environmental change, and how our social identities could be helpful in responding to it. These processes will be used to explain how and why largescale international campaigns may or may not work, and the conditions that may facilitate proenvironmental action. Mass movements of people mark significant moments in human history; the nature of such movements, and the individual and collective reactions of global observers, are subject to the “compression of time and space” (Harvey, 1992) often ascribed to globalization. In Chapter 8, we examine the social psychological dynamics that unfold when large numbers of people are displaced by conflict within or between nations, or by ecological or economic crises. Migration is both a feature and a result of globalization. Patterns of migration reflect some of the asymmetries of globalization, in terms of socioeconomic development; in turn, historical global migration patterns have led to modern efforts to manage cultural diversity. Thus, processes associated with globalization play a role in impelling migration, but also in formulating social and political avenues to successful resettlement of migrants, whether their movement is chosen or forced.

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Finally, we conclude with a synthesis presented in Chapter 9, in which we integrate the core issues of a psychology of globalization that addresses issues of identity, ideology, and action. We give psychology a prominent position in a systems-based perspective on the complex challenges facing humanity. We look at the Sustainable Development Goals formulated by the United Nations as a framework for potentially effective societal action. We then wrap up the book with some suggestions for further research and theorization. We identify three strands of research, and provide a brief overview of what is there and what is missing.

CHAPTER 2

Globalization, Culture, and Consumerism THE STORY OF GLOBALIZATION: WHERE DOES IT BEGIN? Like psychology itself—to borrow Ebbinghaus’s (1908) well known phrase—globalization can be said to have a long past but only a short history. Its story of transformation can be told in many ways, and we choose to begin in Henry Ford’s factory in Highland Park, Michigan, early in the 20th century, where assembly line production was introduced to the Anglo-American automotive industry. In a matter of a few decades, mass production became widespread across industries, greatly increasing the efficiency of industrial production lines and resulting in an overabundance of cheaply manufactured consumer goods. This surplus could no longer be absorbed by traditional modes of consumption, which were generally limited to a geographically localized clientele of upper-middle and upper class costumers (Ewen, 2008). Instead, because mass production requires mass consumption, it required the opening of new markets. As the 20th century progressed, international trade grew rapidly to supply the raw materials needed for mass production, as well as new, “virgin” markets, not yet saturated with goods designed for mass consumption. These commercial interests coincided with the political idea, energized by the widespread strife of the era, that international relations require systems of regulation, arbitration, and governance that can be supplied only by transnational political institutions. The emergence of these largescale changes to transnational economic and political arrangements heralded the interlocking processes we now refer to as “globalization.” Regardless of how we trace the history of globalization, it has brought us to the rapidly transforming and unpredictably tumultuous present. Indeed, one of the few constants of globalization is that it is “a deeply divisive and, consequently, vigorously contested” set of processes (Held & McGrew, 2002, p. 1), and this is apparent now more than ever. This can be linked in large part to technological developments in which globalization processes are embedded, and from which they emerge. Although The Psychology of Globalization DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-812109-2.00002-1

© 2019 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

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globalization has always gone hand in hand with the evolution of technology in transportation, production, communication, and information, “Technology is often treated as a separate force to globalization. In reality they are the same thing” (Luce, 2017, p. 55). Today the economic, political, and sociocultural aspects of globalization are manifested in ways that were largely unforeseen even at the turn of the 21st century. For instance, relatively young companies such as Google and Facebook have become the new transnational business elite worth billions; nation building occurs in digital space (e.g., Heller, 2017); and digital media open virtual windows onto global places and events in real time. The societal changes that come along with globalization are tremendous. In the following we look at how this happens.

THE ECONOMIC, POLITICAL, AND SOCIOCULTURAL PROCESSES OF GLOBALIZATION There are a number of ways to describe the changes associated with globalization. Kennedy and Danks (2001) described six interdependent and mutually reinforcing facets: (1) a shift in the management of economic relations from national to transnational bodies; (2) an increasing interdependence among nations that is facilitated by advances in technologies of transportation, communication, and information; (3) an expanded awareness and imagination by individuals of places other than their own; (4) the presence and awareness of global problems; (5) a “shared concern with ‘humanity’” (p. 12); and (6) the formation of an international civil society network. These can be contextualized in terms of the economic, political, and sociocultural aspects of globalization (Dreher & Gaston, 2008). Economic globalization. Economic globalization refers to phenomena such as increased international trade, the lifting of restrictions on movements of commodities, workforce, and capital, as well as the rise of multinational corporations with economic girth far exceeding that of many nation states (Kasser et al., 2007). The concomitant withdrawal of state regulation from markets has completely transformed national markets and curtailed national autonomy. In many places, this has left large portions of the population ill-adapted to the changing demands of the marketplace at a time of diminishing governmental support (Griva & Chryssochoou, 2015). Generally speaking, this process has made the world’s economies more interdependent and richer than ever before—with aggregated global wealth nearly doubling in just a decade between 2002 and 2012, despite

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the Great Recession of the late 2000s—but also more stratified by economic inequality (United Nations Development Programme, 2011; see also Babones, 2002; Milanovic, 2006). Indeed, in much of the world this inequality is so severe that it now hinders the potential for further economic growth (Cingano, 2014), and has tremendous consequences for individual and collective wellbeing (Wilkinson & Pickett, 2009). In many Western nations, the dissatisfaction of those who feel “left behind” by globalization has been transformed into a potent political force, with implications that go beyond the economic realm. Thus, for example, stances toward refugees and asylum seekers (and immigration in general) are expressed alongside attitudes toward economic and trade connections with other countries, and in Europe, are part of the debate about the merits of continental integration. Political globalization. Even before these more recent events, the process of political globalization has had strong connections with its economic counterpart, leading some to argue that its de facto function is to ensure the smooth operation of the global corporate economy (Kasser et al., 2007). Undeniably, however, institutions of transnational governance, such as the United Nations, facilitate political cooperation, and coordinate humanitarian efforts by national, international, and nongovernmental organizations. There is also a related political and public awareness of global challenges, even when their impacts are felt most severely in geographically distant places (e.g., climate change, pandemics, and other natural or anthropogenic crises of global scale; see, e.g., Batalha & Reynolds, 2012). Sociocultural globalization. These economic and political processes shape the features of contemporary sociocultural globalization, which is of focal importance to our discussions here. Unprecedented numbers of individuals visit other countries, migrate to them, or otherwise interact with foreign cultures via consumption of products, information, and media. These intercultural interactions often occur in people’s home countries, as representations of foreign cultures abound almost everywhere around the world (Chiu, Mallorie, Keh, & Law, 2009). The grand migrations of the current decade, with millions of people from Syria, Afghanistan, or Iraq seeking refuge in Europe, or similarly large numbers of people from Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, or South Sudan seeking (and receiving) refuge in Uganda show different and more difficult conditions of intercultural interaction than smaller and potentially more systematic movements. Local cultures are themselves transformed through this unavoidable exposure to once remote cultural worldviews.

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Interestingly, the views of social scientists and lay people largely overlap when it comes to understanding globalization, even as scholarly and lay discussions evince different emphases depending on the immediate context (Griva & Chryssochoou, 2015). Depending on who is asked and when, people tend to emphasize different aspects of globalization. In a study conducted in the Ladakh region in India, Ozer and Schwartz (2016) found that for Ladakhis, globalization was regarded as Westernization or modernization. At the same time, this did not necessarily result in defensive responses, as globalization in this region is seen as a multifaceted process that strengthens local cultural identities by either adopting or rejecting selected elements of globalized culture. In a study with undergraduate students from the United States, China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong, Yang and colleagues (2011) showed that globalization is seen as related, but not identical, to Westernization, modernization, and also Americanization. Indeed, globalization is often associated with a Westernized cultural worldview, its liberal ideas, and a consumerist way of living. As a consequence of globalization, this meta-lifestyle has reached across cultural and geographic boundaries to influence the most remote human societies. As we will elaborate in the following, this interlocking set of worldviews is strongly related to the processes of globalization and some of its more problematic consequences.

GLOBALIZED WESTERN CULTURE Typical Western values and cultural content form the basis of contemporary globalized culture (e.g., Arnett, 2002; Moghaddam, 2009; for a more nuanced discussion see Yang et al., 2011). Moreover, because the United States has often been seen as the forerunning economic, military, and political global superpower as these processes unfolded, specific attributes of the Anglo-American version of Western culture most clearly manifest in globalized culture. Indicatively, American English is the lingua franca of globalization (Aneesh, 2012), and the US dollar is the most widely recognized currency. Of course, this does not say that globalized Western culture (Rosenmann et al., 2016) is synonymous with Anglo-American culture. Whereas American pop culture and brand names are available worldwide, it is their form, format, and consumerist function that are truly ubiquitous (Ram, 2004). As an illustration, “YouTube Turkey” loads lists of songs in Turkish, and lifestyle channels clearly referencing

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Turkish fashions; the format, however, is distinctly American. Tellingly, typing www.youtube.com into a browser address line brings up the American site, decorated with snowmen during winter months. For the “local” (i.e., non-American) sites, the nation’s abbreviation is added (in this case, youtube.tr). In other words, the United States is the default that requires no additional qualification. Evan as more online services use real-time data to geolocate mobile devices and load the appropriately localized service, these accommodations are often mounted onto the default American platform. American culture is also not synonymous with globalized Western culture. Rather, this globalized culture incorporates simplifications of American/Western cultures’ most universalistic elements. Hence, while Christian symbolism and rituals are evident in current globalized culture (e.g., New Year’s Eve), their meaning is secularized so as to not interfere with non-Christians’ ability to join the festivities (and accompanying consumer activities; see Schmitt, Davies, Hung, & Wright, 2010). The emergence of globalized Western culture is thus a noteworthy phenomenon with regard to not only its scope, but also its cultural content: the values and worldviews it represents to different people around the world. As an extension of core Western/Anglo-American values, it emphasizes an individualistic worldview, stressing individual autonomy, self-expression, and free choice in the pursuit of personal happiness (Fu & Chiu, 2007; Inglehart & Baker, 2000). This culture prioritizes not only personal autonomy but also pleasure seeking and hedonism, which are key elements of consumerism (Kasser et al., 2007; Rindfleisch, Burroughs, & Wong, 2009). Through globalization, commercial interests gain immense power, and because consumer hedonism is a useful marketing tool, it is emphasized (Ahuvia, 2005). Globalized Western culture additionally enshrines a free market system, which stresses competitiveness, innovation (Shokef & Erez, 2006), and the pursuit of quantifiable gains (Kasser et al., 2007; Ritzer, 2009). In service of the ongoing optimization of efficiency, abstract services and goods have to be operationalized as quantifiable variables (e.g., hard work into number of items produced an hour). This quantification simplifies operations across domains and encourages bottom-line thinking. It follows then, for instance, that corporations are beholden to maximize the wealth of their stake holders, as opposed to nonobjectively measurable goals such as the societal good or moral virtue.

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This system as a whole is governed by this idea of the free market, which facilitates and justifies the creation of a social order defined by economic inequalities and a steep social hierarchy (Nafstad, Blakar, Carlquist, Phelps, & Rand-Hendriksen, 2009). In this global meritocracy— that is, a global system that orders individuals by their quantifiable accomplishments and merit—all individuals (regardless of their ascribed background) are ostensibly free to acquire self-worth and social status based on fame, money, or other extraordinary personal achievement (e.g., a high amount of likes for an Instagram selfie). These features of globalized Western culture are tied to a set of liberal political ideals rooted in Western traditions as safeguards for personal autonomy, as unconstrained actors in the free market. Beyond ensuring individuals’ formal equality and freedom, they include a liberal tolerance for human diversity (Shokef & Erez, 2006). For example, research participants experimentally induced to identify with this cultural frame expressed less bias against gay people (Rosenmann, 2016), a group that has benefited from the global movement towards greater civil liberties and societal tolerance (Encarnación, 2014). With increased awareness of the “imagined community of humanity” (cf. Anderson, 1983) presented in global media, globalized culture may also foster an all-encompassing sphere of moral sensibility and encourage a sense of cosmopolitanism and global citizenship (see Chapter 4 for more detail). This resonates with another set of Western ideals, those of humanism and the inalienable dignity of human beings, whereby human lives are imbued with inherent worth and value (Leung & Cohen, 2011). Globalized Western culture thus promulgates the discourse of universal human rights (McFarland & Mathews, 2005)— reflected in efforts among Western nations to manage cultural diversity via official policies of integration or multiculturalism (Kymlicka, 2012; see Chapter 8)—and a sense of shared human fate (Rosenmann et al., 2016). Many of the United Nations’ charter documents reflect these sentiments: All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood. . . Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. . . (The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 1 & 2; UN, 1948)

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Of course, there are numerous contemporary reminders that the liberal, cosmopolitan, and internationalist ideals that were codified after World War II are far from universally realized. Indeed, among Western nations themselves, there are prominent counterexamples. Along all of the dimensions of globalization, we can, for example, identify the reassertion of protectionist stances on international trade (i.e., economic/political), restriction of immigration (i.e., political/cultural), nativist definitions of national identity and citizenship (i.e., cultural), along with the corresponding success of populism in Western politics. In later chapters, we examine how social identities (Chapter 4) and their politicization (Chapters 5 and 6) are crucial aspects of these sociocultural processes. After reviewing these basics of globalization, we have argued that globalization is accompanied by a spreading of selected Western cultural worldviews and economic stances. In order to bring globalization into the focus of a psychological analysis, we now provide a foundation for the psychology of the self in different cultural contexts, with a focus on the consumerist manifestations of globalized Western culture.

GLOBALIZING SOCIOCULTURAL CONDITIONS AND TRANSFORMATIONS OF SELFHOOD As we have started to see, globalization has radically changed the economic, political, and sociocultural environments around the world, and with them, the life circumstances of most (if not all) individuals. Within psychological science, the cross-cultural perspective has yielded an impressive body of literature explicating how different sociocultural environments shape individuals’ selfhood (Rosenmann & Kurman, 2019). We thus turn to this literature as we start delimiting globalization’s psychological ramifications.

A CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE ON SELFHOOD In the following, we use selfhood to refer to the social construction of the self, or “partially shared representations of the self and its relation to others, created and maintained through interactions and practices within a given cultural context” (Vignoles et al., 2016, p. 969). Historically, the cross-cultural perspective on forms of selfhood gained momentum as part of the wider fascination within (Western) psychological science with the very different cultural constructs native to East Asia (Matsumoto, 1999).

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This cultural distinction became codified into Hofstede’s (1980) individualism-collectivism dimension, and popularized in this form.1 Put simply, this conceptualization contrasted Western prioritization of the individual (as the basic social unit) with the “Eastern” emphasis on the group (such that collective goals are paramount). Against this backdrop, Markus and Kitayama (1991) offered their influential account of cultural variations of selfhood. According to this account, a minority of (individualist, Western) cultures encourage individuals to define themselves as bounded, unitary entities, complete unto themselves, and clearly separable from others. While interpersonal relationships, social roles, and membership in groups are obviously important to individuals everywhere, those with this independent sense of self define themselves in terms of their internal attributes, individual goals, and uniquely integrated personalities. This self is perceived to be stable across time, as the essence of the individual’s personality encapsulated within it remains unchanged. Furthermore, it should exhibit a great deal of invariability across situations and social roles, as the same inner attributes are expected to consistently manifest in an individual’s actions, habits, and interpersonal behaviors. It is in the context of these individualistic sociocultural systems constituted by and for autonomous individuals, that each person is afforded a measure of inherent worth. This basic sense of inalienable dignity is not contingent on others, as individuals’ dignity could only be jeopardized by failing to live up to one’s own internal standards (Leung & Cohen, 2011). Because of this emphasis on the individual’s immutable core, epitomized by idioms such as “to thine own self be true” (Shakespeare, 1994), selfactualization and self-expression become primary goals (Illouz, 2008). Here, individuals aim to increase their sense of self-worth by asserting their uniqueness and celebrating their personal achievements (e.g., Oishi & Diener, 2001). In large parts of the world, however, selfhood is construed in a very different way, as it manifests the wider cultural emphasis of collectivism (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). People with an interdependent self-construal 1

For the sake of simplicity, we use the individualism and collectivism terms as shorthand to the many other terms and conceptualizations offered since Hofstede’s work (e.g., Triandis, Bontempo, Villareal, Asai, & Lucca, 1988). We will also use these terms to refer both to types of cultures (or cultural syndromes, in Triandis’s words), and to forms of selfhood which presumably manifest these cultural priorities on an individual level (i.e., independent vs interdependent variations of self-construal; Markus & Kitayama, 1991).

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view themselves as inherently embedded within a network of interpersonal relationships and assumed social roles. This widespread cultural understanding of selfhood does not rest on some illusive essence to be discovered and expressed. Instead, the self is made unique by its specific constellation of relationships, roles, and social obligations. Hence, the interdependent self is never “an island unto itself,” as representations of significant others and their relationships with the individual make up an indispensable part of the self. Neuroimaging data support this interdependency with an inclusion of others in the self in certain cultures. For example, self-referential regions of the brain (the medial prefrontal cortex and rostral anterior cingulate cortex) were similarly activated in Chinese and Americans who were instructed to think about themselves. However, Chinese (but not American) individuals showed this same pattern of activation when thinking of their mothers as well (Zhu, Zhang, Fan, & Han, 2007). Within collectivist contexts, individuals are not expected to consistently express their uniqueness, but rather to fit in and adapt their behaviors to the changing demands of the situation. Whereas for the independent self, consistency between inner attributes, expressed opinions, and observable behavior is valued, the interdependent self is valued for its ability to flexibly accommodate different social expectations. An individual’s self-worth is put in the hands of others, and these others’ judgment of the appropriateness of the individual’s behaviors to her/his place in the social hierarchy and network of social obligations. This notion of face requires others to either affirm or deny an individual’s worth, and stands in sharp contrast to the internality of dignity-based worth. For these reasons, self-restraint and humility are encouraged for the sake of preserving interpersonal harmony (Leung & Cohen, 2011). Undoubtedly, the distinction between collectivist and individualist suggests a cultural dichotomy that is too limited to encompass the world’s cultures. Yet, much of the research addressing cultural forms of selfhood rely on this binary distinction. More recently, researchers have suggested to add “South” to the oft-cited East versus West dichotomy. Cohen, Nisbett, and colleagues (e.g., Cohen & Nisbett, 1994, 1997; Cohen, Nisbett, Bowdle, & Schwarz, 1996) identified this third type of culture, arranged around principles of honor. Honor cultures typically originate in frontier societies, where lawlessness and low or absent governmentality necessitate effective alliance building in order to secure resources and ensure safety. In these highly stratified contexts, individuals (and among them, primarily men) put on airs of resolute assertiveness and unflinching

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willingness to defend their ground against any encroachment. If this projected image wins the respect of wards and serves to deter competitors or would-be aggressors, it validates the individual’s claim for status and social power. While this type of cultural arrangement is clearly evident in many regions of the world, and is markedly different from both previously described cultural architypes, its implications for selfhood have not been thoroughly researched or theorized as of yet.

THE CONJOINED TRAJECTORIES OF CULTURE AND SELFHOOD A basic premise of this cross-cultural perspective is that the manifestations of selfhood are inseparable from the surrounding cultural context. Whatever direction culture is headed, individuals’ selfhood will follow, over time reinforcing the cultural trajectory in a mutually constitutive loop. Thus, transformations of cultures and societies around the world, fueled by globalization, require us to consider possible changes to prevalent forms of selfhood. Because cultural change occurs over time, and selfhood develops through personal experience and cultural socialization, direct empirical investigation of this intriguing issue is not readily available. Nonetheless, scholars have suggested different—and at times conflicting—theoretical predictions. These are discussed in the following in terms of theories of modernization, the increase in intrasocietal heterogeneity, and the cultural effects of the socioeconomic system instilled by globalization. Theories of modernization. The most theoretically developed response to the question regarding the direction this transition may take follows the controversy between proponents and critiques of theories of modernization. According to these theories, individualism, and its accompanying independent selfhood, is primarily driven by economic and technological advances (e.g., Hamamura, 2012). As societies adjust to new levels of affluence and technological sophistication, smaller social units become functionally superior. For instance, while in premodern agricultural settings survival cannot be guaranteed without the safety net provided by reciprocal reliance on an extended kinship group, this is no longer the case for most humans living in contemporary, economically developed settings. With increased affluence, subsistence ceases to be a preoccupation for many, freeing people to pursue the interests of the smallest social unit of all—the individual (e.g., Fukuyama, 2006; Inglehart & Baker, 2000). Indeed, in a

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large multilevel analysis, Santos, Varnum, and Grossmann (2017) analyzed data from 51 years and 78 countries, and convincingly showed that increasing individualism is not only a theoretical possibility or an anecdotal process. Their findings suggest that individualism has increased over time in most of the tested societies, and that this increase is mostly attributable to socioeconomic development. According to this theoretical perspective, globalization, with its spreading affluence and distancing technologies, would inevitably lead to less communal social structures, and thus, more individualistic forms of selfhood (Matsumoto, 1999). In response to these predictions, critics cite the perseverance of core cultural differences as evidence for the resilience of local cultural syndromes, even within fully economically developed nations (e.g., saving or giving face in Japan, see above). If economic modernization does not invariably bring cultural homogenization, as simplistic modernization theories imply, then the proposed process of cultural evolution culminating in individualism is not universal (e.g., Chiu, Chiu, & Hong, 2006). Indeed, data suggests that the cultures’ value systems mostly reflect their particular histories and traditional worldviews, and not their current level of economic development. These data, however, also show that while equally economically developed cultures differ in their value systems, they mostly follow along the same trajectory over time, leading to more self-centric and rationally organized societies; that is, a vector of modernization (Inglehart & Baker, 2000; Santos et al., 2017). Intrasocietal cultural heterogeneity. Another significant social phenomenon of the current age is the increased cultural heterogeneity of societies, especially within the affluent West (Oyserman, 2017). In this context, some point to the fact that the very act of voluntary immigration is highly congruent with independent selfhood (i.e., breaking from established social ties in order to independently pursue personal goals). According to this line of reasoning, voluntary immigrants are a highly self-selected group; regardless of where they came from, they are those whose self is most congruent with individualism (Hamamura, 2012).2 In light of these increased population flows, others have emphasized the creation of subcultural enclaves within these more globalized social settings, where immigrant communities can retain their heritages and accompanying forms of 2

What is perhaps missing from this account is the increasing prevalence of sojourners, who elect to maintain their affiliation to the homeland to which they hope to return as well as their filial loyalty to those waiting behind.

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nonindividualistic selfhood (e.g., Oyserman, 2017). Illustrative of such subcultural enclaves, Leung and Cohen (2011) were able to recruit samples of adherents of all three types of cultures from within the student body of a single Midwestern American university. Economic structure. As these immigrant enclaves often coincide with lower socioeconomic position, they bring us to the more general effects of social structures that characterize the current globalizing age. As reviewed above, while globalizing processes have resulted in unprecedented economic growth, its fruits are not evenly distributed. Through establishing this economically stratified system (as well as the propagation of social beliefs that legitimize it) globalization has counterintuitively decreased the social mobility and future prospect of many. Despite the myths of meritocratic prosperity available for all, social class becomes social destiny once again for growing segments of the populous of this globalized world (see Oyserman, 2017). These worsening social conditions for those who occupy the lower rungs of the socioeconomic ladder foster cultural adaptations that veer away from classic individualism, even in the affluent West. Oyserman (2017) argues that these social conditions share important features with those linked with the cultural syndromes of collectivism (e.g., the need for networks of reciprocal interdependencies) and honor (e.g., fending for one’s self as the rule of law and role of the State diminish), and their accompanying forms of selfhood. This social class perspective may also be used to integrate the disparate predictions discussed above. This attention to socioeconomic position may suggest that the individualizing cultural vector predicted by modernization theories applies mainly to those who occupy (or ascend to) middle class positioning. As the class requirements of formal education and professional specification become applicable to the quickly growing urban middle class in the world’s developing countries (Fukuyama, 2006), local variants leaning toward more independent selfhood may emerge.

CONTRADICTIONS OF DIFFERENT VALUE SYSTEMS In an attempt to empirically address these divergent predictions, Hamamura (2012) performed an extensive analysis of cross-temporal trends (1950 2008) of indices of collectivism versus individualism in the United States and Japan. Whereas this analysis yielded somewhat inconsistent patterns (i.e., between the two nations and between indices analyzed), some consistencies were observed. These commonalities were

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mostly in demographic trends (e.g., diminishing size of households), as opposed to more attitudinal indices. Nonetheless, one of the very few attitudinal indices that demonstrated a consistent pattern across nations was the belief in the importance of effort in success. In both Japan and the United States, this belief increased over time, even though it had previously been theoretically and empirically linked to collectivistic cultural frameworks. This is an unexpected finding, given that predictions were to find either a modernization trend towards individualism, or persistence of cultural heritages—none of which could explain the increase of this collectivistic feature in the individualistic United States. We suggest that though this pattern is not consistent with a uniform trend toward individualism per se, it is highly consistent with the spread of consumerism in both nations. Within consumerist contexts, belief in personal effort is crucial—individuals have to believe that if they only apply themselves and commit fully to pursuing material success, they can achieve the “good life” they so “richly deserve” (Dittmar, 2007). Thus, even as the role of effort is appreciated primarily in collectivistic settings as a means of maintaining social and interpersonal harmony, it may find a different function in contemporary contexts, where it spurs individuals to persist in their consumeristic pursuits. In Chapter 3, we will explore this “consumer selfhood” in more detail. The overall picture that emerges in globalizing societies combines elements of globalized homogenization, alongside intrasocietal heterogenization. In simpler terms, within nations, society often becomes more diverse, as foreign cultures are introduced directly through cultural products (e.g., TV shows, online video channels) or through the arrival of immigrants. On the other hand, many societies around the world are becoming more similar one to another, at least in some respects. Moreover, because the explicitly Westernized content of globalized culture is highly contested and often resisted (e.g., Chiu et al., 2006), this processes of globalized homogenization may be based more on the widening cultural infrastructure of consumerism (Ram, 2004). Because consumerist forms can easily coopt local heritages and thus accommodate local preferences (e.g., Traditional Chinese Mooncake vs American Christmas Cookie Latte in the respective Starbucks branches), consumerism appears culture-neutral or disappear from sight altogether. This perception notwithstanding, these consumerist forms are in fact required for the functioning of the globalized socioeconomic order and thus are becoming the standard template for societal and psychological realities (Kasser et al.,

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2007). In this, consumerism becomes a central cultural theme that prescribes, organizes, and legitimizes a host of social and individual behaviors; i.e., a cultural syndrome (Triandis, 1996) on a new global scale.

THE CONSUMERIST ARCHITECTURE OF SOCIOCULTURAL GLOBALIZATION As we have briefly described, a great deal of what has been most consistently and prolifically globalized is a cultural worldview defined by a Westernized way of “doing business,” and the ensuing consumption. In order to better understand this cultural worldview, we return to the social, economic and cultural transformation that began with Ford’s assembly line revolution in Michigan.

CONSUMER CULTURE: A PRIMER Ford’s dream to “. . .build a motor car for the great multitude. . . so low in price that no man making a good salary will be unable to own one, and enjoy with his family the blessing of hours of pleasure in God’s great open spaces” (Ford & Crowther, 1922, p. 73), required a new and expanded type of market. This market had to expand both horizontally (by mobilizing resources and manufactured goods to faraway places), and vertically (by incorporating a wider range of social classes into the marketplace; Ewen, 2008). The horizontal expansion of markets allowed for firms and corporations to compete more freely in an integrated national market (and later, in the international market). The vertical expansion, however, brought on more than an improvement of modes of transportation and shopping venues: it necessitated a fundamental change to economic arrangements and social ideology. The working class could only participate in nonsubsistence consumption if wages were greatly increased, and leisure time granted. Indeed, Ford’s Michigan factories were revolutionary not only in their early application of mass production techniques, but also in guaranteeing improved labor conditions (Raff & Summers, 1987). These improved conditions freed laborers to serve the economy in an additional role, that of discretionary consumers, which was previously reserved only for the upper classes. In this initial stage, the rising sector of advertisement was seen as holding a complementary role to that of the line manager. The line manager’s challenge was to devise an optimally efficient process of mass production, in

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which employees and machines were fully utilized. “Social managers” (i.e., advertisers) were charged with creating a homogenized public, utilized to mass consume said products. In this early process of consumer homogenization, it became important “to create an ideological bridge across traditional social gaps”—region, taste, need and class—“which could otherwise needlessly localize the market and reduce its size” (Ewen, 2008, p. 25). Here, we define consumer culture as the cultural system supplying that ideological bridge, traversing traditional social divides (such as those based on geography, culture, gender, or social class), as these pose barriers to trade, consumption, and ultimately, entrepreneurial profit. Within consumer cultures, an unprecedented variety of human needs and desires are shaped and then satisfied by the acquisition and use of commodities (in the form of material goods or services), which are sold for profit in the marketplace (Hovland & Wolburg, 2014). These include not only practical and utilitarian needs, but also a host of social and psychological motivations, which become dependent on consumer symbols dynamically generated by marketers and market responses (Ahuvia & Izberk-Bilgin, 2013). Whereas the emergence of this type of social arrangement can be traced to the late industrial age (as detailed above), it gained significant momentum later in the 20th century, with the transition to postindustrial societies. By “postindustrial” we refer to relatively affluent societies whose economies are no longer heavily dependent on material production supplied by the extraction of natural resources or their industrial and agricultural sectors. Rather, these societies are characterized by a large service sector, with material production and resource exploitation outsourced to less wealthy economies. Given this overall affluence, the population’s basic survival needs are generally met. Freed from subsistence concerns, individuals tend to devote their resources to less immediate, and more intangible, pursuits (e.g., Inglehart & Baker, 2000). In these settings, almost every rung of the social ladder is incorporated into the marketplace as consumers and costumers. Indeed, this crosscutting participation in consumptive behavior within the dynamic and ever expanding market is necessary in order to supply the constant demands needed to offset production surplus. Without mass consumption to absorb the fruits of mass production, postindustrial economy would grind to a halt (Hovland & Wolburg, 2014). Kasser and colleagues (2007) compared these socioeconomic systems to sharks who must swim to breathe—these systems too must always push forward, pulling in untapped resources and “fresh” consumers, or else they stagnate, sink, and drown.

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Given that the survival of these systems depends on copious consumption, consumption itself becomes extolled, as commercial, cultural, and communal interests become inseparably intertwined (Ahuvia & IzberkBilgin, 2013; Hovland & Wolburg, 2014). This idea is explicitly articulated in mainstream American political discourse. Former U.S. President G.W. Bush linked national security, economic growth, and individual consumption in this demonstrative example from a 2006 news conference regarding US military involvement in Iraq: As we work with Congress in the coming year to chart a new course in Iraq and strengthen our military to meet the challenges of the 21st century, we must also work together to achieve important goals for the American people here at home. This work begins with keeping our economy growing [. . .] And I encourage you all to go shopping more.

MARKET LOGIC With the increased centrality of the marketplace as the hub of social life, its mechanisms and logic are applied to other forms of social and cultural exchange. Advanced trade requires a shared system of valuation, allowing qualitatively different commodities to be assigned quantitative values— their price. This process of monetization puts a numeric price tag on material and natural goods, human labor, ideas, human interactions, and indeed, animal and human lives (e.g., life insurance, see also Fig. 2.1). If all these material and human goods have an assigned monitory price, they are legitimately conceived of as commodities, to be potentially acquired, consumed, and discarded. This pervasive commodification necessarily objectifies aspects and segments of human corporality, subjectivity, and communality (Appadurai, 1988). Whereas extreme examples of this readily come to mind (e.g., human trafficking), these processes are in no way restricted to the macabre underbelly of contemporary life. Indeed, quite the opposite is true: the commodification of humanity is so ubiquitous, it generally goes unnoticed. Think of a restaurant server’s smile and cordial affectations: they are often not accurate reflections of these individuals’ inner emotional state or authentic desire for social interaction. Instead, they are firstly an essential part of the job requirements. Secondly, they are valuable components of restaurant patrons’ “dining experience,” which is monetized at the end of the interaction-transaction as gratuity, service fee, or tip.

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Figure 2.1 Road sign in the Upper Peninsula, Michigan (20.8.2018)

This unprecedented abundance of monetized commodities is the prerequisite for a postindustrial marketplace. The optimal functioning of the marketplace itself, however, is guaranteed by the distinctly industrial-age mechanics of free competition. In the mercantilist English speaking world, the revolutionary philosophers of the early industrial age (i.e., the Age of Enlightenment) took a keen interest in the proper functioning of society and the economy. The mainstay of these ideas, which shape much of our global world even to this day, fall under the umbrella term of “liberalism.” In liberalism, individual freedom is safeguarded as a way of furthering the common good. Prioritizing liberty thus rests on the belief that freedom of choice opens the widest avenue for continued progress and advancement of human individuals and societies (Illouz, 2007). Within this philosophical framework of liberalism, the autonomous, rational individual is defined as the indivisible atom of society. All political and social systems are hence reframed as social contracts whose sole purpose is to ensure individuals’ freedom to pursue their idea of happiness (Locke, 1689/2014). Moreover, with liberty (e.g., from tyranny, dogma,

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prosecution) granted, people, ideas, and businesses are free to compete fairly, ensuring the success of the most meritorious variant over its inferior competitors. Importantly, this process of selection is not based on the biased and subjective judgements of the ruling elite, but is preformed instead by the evenhanded laws of the free market and the objectivity of its “invisible hand” (Smith, 1776). Free competition, liberated from constraints and undue social regulation, is thus celebrated as a sacred principle governing social and cultural life (Ahuvia, 2015). This belief in the ultimate utility of free competition underlies and justifies the most central social institutions, such as those associated with liberal democracy (e.g., the competitive marketplace of ideas in the work of John Stuart Mill), or the capitalist economic system (e.g., Adam Smith’s influential work). Furthermore, if free competition is canonized as the only way forward, then it may follow that all social institutions should be subjected to the impartial guidance and judgment of its “invisible hand.” Logically, then, this optimal mode of market operation applies to an ever-increasing number of privatized governmental functions and public services. The market thus expands not only vertically and horizontally, but also in depth, as it grows to incorporate previously noncommodified services (e.g., public education and health systems, private security contractors, and prisons), interactions, and resources (e.g., drinkable water in developed countries). Importantly, the goal of all of this, from political liberalism to market economies, is the optimization of individual pursuits of self-interest. More specifically, the mechanisms of the market ensure that every actor (from an individual—the unbounded, indivisible social atom—to the multinational corporation) is free to make the most rational transactional decisions in service of its self-interest (Kasser et al., 2007). It is only through this pursuit of different actors, with competing self-interests, that an equilibrium is struck, and the system optimized. While the phrases “self-interest” and the “pursuit of happiness” may have had a wider meaning at some point, they were gradually restricted to the realm of economic rationality (Hirschman, 1977). Within contemporary consumer cultures these terms are almost exclusively interpreted in narrow terms of quantifiable gains versus losses (Oishi & Schimmack, 2010). This market-derived, monitory system of valuation thus colors both the ends (i.e., seeking profit) and the means (spending money or other commodified resources) of many previously noneconomic interactions, turning them into transactions instead.

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FROM MARKET TO CONSUMER (CULTURE) As described above, the rational market, free from bias, prejudice, and superstition, was meant to liberate human societies from the tyrannies of sectarian irrationality. In consumer cultures, however, the mundane rationality of the marketplace becomes sacred, and as such, is used to rewrite even religious events (Ahuvia & Izberk-Bilgin, 2013). In this context, many holidays have been transformed from religious celebrations to secularized (yet “special”) retail events. Unlike their religious predecessors, these retail events do not have to remain restricted to those who follow a specific faith, but could be enjoyed instead by consumers of every nationality and religious affiliation. Valentine’s Day, for example, is not known in North America (or around the world) as the feast commemorating Saint Valentinus’s martyrdom. Instead, it is a secular ritual where an individual’s love for their romantic partners is demonstrated by lavish acts of joint consumption and ceremonial gift exchange. This exchange of gifts is not only a mandatory holiday ritual; it also allows for the monetary quantification of such abstracts as the amount of care felt by the giver toward the receiver, their commitment to the romantic relationship, and their willingness to invest in its future (Close, 2012). It is in this secularized and consumptive form that Valentine’s Day has become an influential element within the globally circulating mass culture and has reached countries all over the globe, often enriched with a local flavor (e.g., in Ghana; Fair, 2004 or in Japan; Creighton, 1993). Valentine’s Day was completely stripped of its original religious meaning, and restructured instead by the commercial interests of card companies, makers of heart-shaped boxes of chocolates, etc. However, it never achieved full canonical status in Christianity, and its secularization is not often cited as a blow to the faith. This is not the case when it comes to Christmas. Many devout Christians lament the fact that the symbolic presence of Christ in Christ-Mass is now overshadowed by the jubilant silhouette of Santa Claus’s sleigh full of the promise of newly acquired presents (Gibson, 2006). Notably, the most iconic representation of Christmas was popularized by advertisers to adorn their employer’s Yuletide commercials: This version of the jolly white-bearded man dressed in red was first widely depicted in the 1930s, and he was holding a matching, red and white bottle of Coca-Cola (Belk, 2001).3 3

The original drawing of a white-bearded Santa can be traced back to the German caricaturist Thomas Nast. He drew a depiction of Santa Claus for Harper’s Weekly in 1863 (Harper’s Weekly, 1863, January 3).

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This intermingling of the sacred and the mundane occurs in locales around the world and affects every religion, not only Christianity. With the increase in global tourism, holy sites are reinvented as religiously-themed commercial venues. The Mamilla commercial corridor, for example, provides a reimagined segue between modern Jerusalem and the biblical City of David. As it leads tourists to the gates of the Old City, and its many religious sites, it affords them the opportunity to purchase upscale religious memorabilia and Judaica artifacts (Shtern, 2016). In other places, sacred commerce is geared towards local costumers, as in Turkey, where historic venues of Iftar festivities (the breaking of the daily fast after sunset during the month of Ramadan) become annual markets, in which vendors offer their special holiday wares. In this process, the symbolic meanings of the sacred and the profane intermingle as well. These contemporary Iftar evenings, traditionally celebrated with family and friends in private homes, are now held in the public sphere, in commercial settings. The market logic of these settings dictates a transformation of meaning, from the unity and equality of all Muslims before God, to the lavish earthly delights of those who can afford to feast like an Ottoman Sultan (Sandikci & Omeraki, 2007). Importantly, this transformation is happening a world apart from the inclusive liberal rationale that justified the commercialization of Western holidays. Instead, this commercialization of the sacred has been led by Turkey’s long-governing Islamic “Justice and Development Party.” This shift of emphases is also apparent in the reworking of many religions’ doctrine so that it may better accommodate consumerist mindsets. Theological interpretations which equate material success with divine favor are increasing in popularity (e.g., from Christianity in the developing world and Islam, see Izberk-Bilgin, 2015; in the Hindu diaspora, see Mitra, 2016). Reciprocally, market forces engage with faith-based markets to better cater to their demands. In the process, faith-based commodities also sometimes acquire new symbolic meanings for new markets (“Kabbalah” wrist strings, “Om” symbol necklaces, etc.). For believers and eclectic consumers alike, these habits of consumption become important manifestations of their divergent identities, affiliations, and claims for status (Izberk-Bilgin, 2015; Mitra, 2016). While we delve deeper into these consumerist transformations of sociocultural and psychological landscapes in the next chapter, these illustrations are intended to show that consumerism and globalization

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are inseparable. Even in the seemingly antithetical context of religion, the mechanisms of the market and consumer society reign. Within globalized Western culture, what were once religious holidays, celebrating the community of the faithful, are now secularized consumer events. As such, their appeal is universal, as consumerism transcends the bounds of religious affiliations. Anecdotally, in Israel and the Palestinian Territories many Christians and non-Christians alike celebrate Christmas as it was imported back from contemporary American consumer culture. Even in these lands from which Christianity emerged, where the Nativity is said to have occurred, Christmas is represented by distinctly nonnative reindeer ornaments, Christmas trees, fake snow, and the image of Santa Claus. These are now symbols of not only the Holiday, but of the affiliation with globalized Western culture, and its consumerist fashions. These originally Christian holidays seem to be less commonly celebrated in places where globalized Western culture is not necessarily a source of affiliation. While in these contexts, the aforementioned global celebrations are viewed as being incongruent with non-(Western) Christian religious observances, the impact of global consumerism is felt nonetheless. Because there is nothing explicitly Christian or Western about these market mechanisms, they are easily incorporated into the religious practices of those who may oppose more direct affiliation with the globalized Western culture. Under the rule of a devoutly Muslim government, Islam’s most sacred Holidays are rewritten as consumer events as well. This is the power of consumerism as a globalizing force in a nutshell: to reformat cultures which may resist other, more explicit forms of global cultural influence.

TENSIONS OF GLOBALIZED VALUES As this chapter has demonstrated, globalization is never singular or unitary. It is not one thing or the other, but a dynamic clustering of forces of change and resistance to that change. These interdependent contradictions were noted before (Rosenmann et al., 2016), as they mark tensions between different facets of globalization (e.g., hierarchy-enhancing economic processes vs hierarchy-attenuating political processes of global beneficence). Furthermore, these are reflected by the values espoused by globalized Western culture. Examining the content of this culture reveals that some of its value priorities (e.g., the maximization of personal gains)

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can be pursued only at the expense of other priorities (e.g., caring for all human beings). Mapping these value priorities onto the circumplex model of values (Schwartz, 1992) demonstrates this culture’s internal contradictions. According to the model, values represent motivational priorities that are either compatible or antagonistic with one another. Table 2.1 provides a summary of the values globalized Western culture emphasizes, alongside their antagonist values. The value contradictions demonstrated in Table 2.1 can be understood from several perspectives. First, any static description of culture is limited, and the treatment of any culture, let alone a global one, as a monolithic entity is necessarily incomplete (Hammack, 2008; Wan, Chiu, Peng, & Tam, 2007). Second, the traits and values associated with any social category cannot themselves provide a full explanation of individual or collective behavior, because they need to be explicated within an intergroup system (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001). Thus, a discussion of the content of globalized Western culture requires careful attention to the way it is construed and negotiated within local contexts. This is especially true in light of its inherent ambiguity, which allows for vastly different understandings of what it actually promotes, and whose interests it serves. Nonetheless, the content of globalized Western culture is consistent with moving away from local, particularistic traditions and onto more transnational, fuzzy forms of cultural identification. Unless contemporized to fit into the consumer frames of globalization, particularistic heritages are viewed as potential obstacles to the smooth operation of intercultural exchange (Aneesh, 2012). Scholars maintain that economic globalization operates best when particularistic traditions are flattened sufficiently to create a local flavor that can be easily added to global commodities (Ram, 2004). For example, travelers can literally sample these local flavors in McDonald’s branches around the world (e.g., McArabia Kofta Burgers in Egypt). Even within the United States, particularistic traditions are likewise subsumed by consumerism, to add an exciting folkloristic flare to generic commodities. Keeping with the McDonald’s example, the Irish holiday of Saint Patrick’s Day is commemorated by the seasonal offering of the signature green “Shamrock Shake,” while Yuletide is celebrated by the yearly introduction of “Egg Nog Shake,” which “will keep you feeling festive all season long.”

Table 2.1 Schwartz values emphasized and deemphasized by globalized Western culture (GWC), and some of their specific manifestations Value emphasized Examples of specific manifestations Contradicting values, Examples of specific manifestations by GWC deemphasized by GWC

Power and Achievement

Hedonism, Stimulation, and Self Direction

Universalism

• The pursuit of financial gains and status • The pursuit of individual success and increasing levels of narcissism • Consumerism’s emphasis of pleasure and sensation-seeking; temptations for instant gratification • Advancement of individual freedoms from social constraints based on gender, sexuality, religious affiliation, or race • More options for personal mobility • Emphasis on individual uniqueness and the voluntary construction of her/his lifestyle choices • Solidarity within the international community: governmental and nongovernmental efforts to address global challenges manifesting elsewhere around the globe • Commitment to human rights in faraway countries, at the expense of immediate political expediency

Universalism and Benevolence

• The commodification of interpersonal relationships

Tradition, Conformity, and Security

• Decline in job security and laborers’ lifetime commitment to employers • Influxes of labor immigrants, displaced people, and refugees • Cultural threat reactions: Religious fundamentalism and nationalist revitalization efforts to counter perceived GWC’s eroding effects on local traditions. • New forms of consumer conformity (to trends, fashions, and consumer identities)

Power and Achievement

• Preference for short term financial gains over ecological sustainability or distributive justice

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SUMMARY In this chapter we presented the economic, political, and sociocultural aspects of globalization. We paid specific attention to the interconnections between them, and the ways they come to bear on changes to societies and cultures around the world. Within this sociocultural prism, we reviewed the rise of globalized Western culture, and the values it espouses. These are interwoven with the emergent cultural syndrome of globalized consumer culture. We therefore briefly introduced consumer culture as the ubiquitous form of sociocultural globalization. In the next chapter we explore how these forms of consumer culture reformat both individual psychology and social structures.

CHAPTER 3

Consumer Identities, Consumer Selfhood, and the Stability of Consumer Societies The first two chapters were intended as an introduction to the various dimensions of globalization, with a focus on the rise of consumerism and the spread of a globalized Western culture—elements that are central to the psychological dynamics of globalization. Now that we have established the pivotal role of consumerism in globalization’s sociocultural effects, we turn our attention to the social and psychological ramifications of this new global cultural syndrome. This is not only because we believe consumerism is a core feature of globalization, but also because consumerism may be the key driver of several global challenges (e.g., Alfredsson, 2004; Carlsson-Kanyama & González, 2009). In this chapter, we begin by considering the impact of marketing as a form of social engineering in greater detail. We then elaborate on the way consumer culture transforms individuals’ psychologies and social realities, as we prepare the ground for our discussion of the social identity framework in Chapter 4.

THE ROLE OF MARKETING IN RESTRUCTURING SOCIETIES FOR CONSUMPTION The market, both as an idea of how society and individuals should be hierarchically ordered, and as the sum of private economic endeavors, depends heavily on its verb form: marketing. If much of the social order is designed around the incentive of financial gain, it is marketing that allows this motivation to be fulfilled. Most directly, marketing creates the consumer needs, which then can be met by the market. In doing so, it simultaneously shapes human psychology and human society, infusing both with what we have called the global consumer culture. The claim that marketing’s primary goal is to inform clients of the consumer possibilities open to them seems naïve, if not disingenuous. The Psychology of Globalization DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-812109-2.00003-3

© 2019 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

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While this claim has been used to advocate for marketing’s beneficial social role (see e.g., O’Shaughnessy & Jackson O’Shaughnessy, 2002), it is doubtful that many professionals inside the industry actually believe in it. As early as the 1930s, marketing professionals were explicitly looking for ways to create new consumer needs, thus opening new opportunities for their employers (Ewen, 2008). To achieve this, marketers have to instill the idea that individuals’ lives before consumption are lacking, and that they themselves are somehow incomplete. Indeed, by the early 20th century, this strategy was explicitly discussed in trade journals: “advertising helps to keep the masses dissatisfied with their mode of life, discontented with ugly things around them. Satisfied customers are not as profitable as discontented ones” (Dickinson, 2017; cited in Ewen, 2008, p. 39). In this turn away from the specific product and towards would-be consumers, marketing began to deal with abstracts—the fears and aspirations of the public. As an example, consider the history of an innocuous household brand: Listerine. Originally, this signature blue liquid was marketed as a disinfectant, and offered as a remedy for gonorrhea and dirty floors. In 1925, brand managers decided to expand their product’s market, and came up with the now classic tagline, “always a bridesmaid, but never a bride.” This iconic ad campaign featured a fetching, pensive young woman with a sad expression on her face. The accompanying text explained that this woman was on the verge of getting married, but that this happy prospect was foiled because of bad breath. Utilizing societal fears (of failing to get married, of being socially excluded) this ad campaign was immensely successful in boosting sales (Combs, 1979). Additionally, it has had a resounding and long-lasting social effect: it created a new fear in the minds of the public, the fear of halitosis. Thus, the sizable market of mouthwash was largly invented by this ad campaign, which taught people everywhere that they should be insecure about the ever-lurking possibility of bad breath (Levitt & Dubner, 2014). More generally, much of the great diversity of marketing messages that inundate contemporary consumer cultures is reducible to one short take-home message: “You, and your life, are insufficient; consume this to be complete.” The specifics of that insufficiency vary, as do the products or services offered to remedy it, but the recurring theme is clear. Obviously, none of these commodities actually have the power to permanently transform and complete consumers’ lives and selves. This recurring message nonetheless defines the self as perpetually incomplete, inadequate, or otherwise unsuitable for true happiness, success, intimacy, health, and

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so on. This “empty self” (Cushman, 1990) cannot hold without turning outwards—to consumer culture—to find its momentary fill.

Consumer Selfhood In Chapter 2, we reviewed how cultures foster very different forms of selfhoods to match the social structures and value worldviews indigenous to them. We further pointed out that scholars have made conflicting suggestions regarding the type of selfhood that might be gaining currency as a result of globalizing processes. Relatedly, studies tracking longitudinal, macro changes in societies around the world show a degree of divergence as well, with some reporting mostly uniform increases in individualism (e.g., Santos, Varnum, & Grossmann, 2017), while others yield more mixed patterns (e.g., Tse, Belk, & Zhou, 1989). Across studies, however, societies most consistently show changes congruent with the spread of globalized consumer culture (e.g., the importance of effort; Hamamura, 2012). It thus stands to reason that the emergence of a globalized consumer culture would coincide with the emergence of a new form of selfhood: a consumer selfhood. We define this consumer selfhood as the structuring of who and what a person is, and should ideally be, by the mechanisms of consumer culture. Within this context, proper selfhood and identity are to be established, communicated, and validated through various modalities of consumption. These performances of consumer selfhood utilize symbolic options devised by marketers, which are then presented and interpreted by media outlets targeting individuals’ referent lifestyle groups. Because of the dynamic nature of these symbols, individuals are expected to be aware of consumerist trends relevant to their social position and chosen lifestyle, and utilize them appropriately. Proper consumer selfhood hence hinges on combining brand images and habitual consumptive behaviors to cultivate a socially legible lifestyle that supports individuals’ claims for group affiliation, social status, individual distinction, and personal worth (if you remember the latest personalized ads you received on Facebook or Instagram, you are familiar with this). Those who fail to acquire proper selfhood in this context are marginalized as they are rendered invisible and insignificant “nobodies” (Saatcioglu & Corus, 2014). When imagining the type of consumption that can be used to constitute this selfhood, what comes to mind are the trappings of the wealthy materialist (e.g., Prada, Gucci shoes, Rolex watches). These are undoubtedly

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conspicuous exemplars of consumer selfhood. Nonetheless, consumer selfhood can be established using very different forms of consumption, as consumer selfhood pervades every corner of consumer cultures. More generally, specific consumer choices are both idiosyncratic and contingent on the particularity of the immediate social context (e.g., choosing a Rolex vs the newest Apple Watch), while the process by which selfhood becomes defined by performances of consumption is not. Furthermore, while the more commonly recognized option of signaling status through symbolic consumption of luxury items is paramount within this frame (Shrum et al., 2013), consumer selfhood recognizes the potential symbolic power of any and all forms of consumption. Within this framework, even the most mundane, habitual, and seemingly utilitarian consumptive behaviors serve to construct a lifestyle identity and consumer selfhood (as market research is quick to point out; e.g., consuming cereals as part of a health-conscience lifestyle; Bogue & Yu, 2016). Thus, consumer selfhood applies equally to individuals who subscribe to widely different referent groups, and whose consumptive habits span the incredible range of available lifestyles. It underlies the consumer choices of underprivileged urban youths who display baggy pants and extravagant “bling” as part of their intersectional racial and gendered identities. It also captures the trend-conscious adaptation of this “Hip-Hop lifestyle” by affluent teenagers in Hong Kong who wish to signify their rebellion against traditional Chinese values (Callier, 2016), as well as the very different performances of consumption exhibited by a Fairtrade adhering, organic coffee-shop dwelling Yucci (“young urban creatives”; Florida, 2014). Stated more generally, even though the coupling of selfhood and a specific brand symbol or lifestyle marker is always tentative and context-dependent, within consumerist societies the need for such an association remains constant and largely uncontested (Holt, 2002). Because this process of consumer updating and upgrading is embedded within a (Western) perception of linear time, it is often framed as a process of self-growth and self-actualization. What was once a relatively simple task—of achieving and stabilizing a mature selfhood—is now made into a lifelong quest (Featherstone, 2007). This rarefication of mature selfhood is a product of psychology’s influence on mainstream culture. By defining normal development as deeply traumatic, psychology has rendered the normative self unsatisfactory, thus carving a market-niche for its expertise, services, and products (Illouz, 2008). On a more immediate level, however, this type of selfhood has proven to be most lucrative for

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manufacturers of products and services, and is therefore actively cultivated by their marketing endeavors, as shown earlier. The inherent incompleteness of consumer selfhood is the backdrop against which consumerist pursuits are set. Different products are offered on the market to supply symbolic scaffolding for the self, now needed to shore-up individuals’ sense of coherent selfhood and identity. Given the psychological meaning attached to these acquisitions and their indispensable symbolic functions, they become extensions of the self (Belk, 1988), and come to play a role in many self-functions. For example, experimental studies have demonstrated that individuals consider brand choices as expressive of their personal and social selves (C˘at˘alin & Andreea, 2014). Other studies have shown the importance of brand consumption as a vehicle for the manifestation and reification of self-worth (Shachar, Erdem, Cutright, & Fitzsimons, 2011). Research has also demonstrated that the symbolic link between self and consumer products is such that threats to a cherished brand are experienced as threats to the self, eliciting defensive reactions from those whose self is structurally fragile (Lisjak, Lee, & Gardner, 2012). Conversely, consumption of high status goods mitigates the effects of threats to the self by affirming self-worth or compensating for its loss (Sivanathan & Pettit, 2010). Indeed, researchers have recently argued for the inclusion of brand ownership as an integral part of contemporary self-worth (in a sample of British adolescents; Isaksen & Roper, 2016). Another branch of experimental literature has demonstrated that consumption has metaphysical functions as well. When human beings are confronted by the certainty of their eventual death, they tend to bolster their support of the prevailing cultural worldview and their personal value within it. Within consumer culture, the existential insecurity evoked by thinking of one’s impending death had been shown to drive individuals to believe their future is full of consumerist promises and delights (Arndt, Solomon, Kasser, & Sheldon, 2004). For instance, compared to individuals not reminded of their mortality, those who were reminded expected greater financial success and intended to spend more on pleasurable acquisitions (Ferraro, Shiv, & Bettman, 2005). They also tended to behave in greedier, more selfish ways in a social-dilemma simulation, grabbing as many resources as they could, without considering others’ share, or the sustainability of the system (Ferraro et al., 2005). Other studies have replicated the findings such that under conditions of mortality salience participants intended to buy more (e.g., Das, Duiven,

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Arendsen, & Vermeulen, 2014), exceed their budget by a greater sum (Mandel & Smeesters, 2008), and spend more money on luxury items (Chopik & Edelstein, 2014). These effects were later shown not to extend to participants who follow frugal, anticonsumeristic lifestyles (Nepomuceno & Laroche, 2016). This finding is not surprising from the current perspective, however, as that variant of consumer selfhood builds on consumption of niche products (Fairtrade items, urban farming supplies, etc.) and rejection of mainstream consumptive practices. The study’s operationalization of consumerism as intent to buy into the dreams of mainstream luxury therefore does not capture the motivations of this alternative type of consumer selfhood. There is ample evidence, then, to support our contention that within consumer contexts, consumptive behaviors fulfill many self-functions and needs, such as those relating to the desire for high self-regard, selfexpression, affiliation, embeddedness within a cultural frame, and mitigation of existential or personal insecurities. With the virtually unlimited access offered by globalization, consumer goods can satisfy the needs mentioned above more directly and immediately than ever.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ARCHITECTURE OF CONSUMER SELFHOOD AND ITS CONSEQUENCES As demonstrated above, the commercial interests that are served by the globalizing context of consumerism make it their business to perpetuate dissatisfaction in consumers. This is achieved by bombarding individuals with images of variants of the “good life” (Dittmar, 2007; see also Chapter 2), and of those who allegedly achieved it. Regardless of their specific appeal (in terms of lifestyle grouping), these images set the bar unrealistically high, while also instilling the notion that everybody can and should strive to reach it (Richins, 1995). While high self-ideals are instrumental in inspiring individuals to improve themselves (Heine & Lehman, 1999), when set unrealistically high they can be detrimental to psychological, relational, and societal wellbeing (Bushman, Moeller, Konrath, & Crocker, 2012; Crocker & Park, 2004). Likewise, setting happiness as individuals’ ultimate goal actually diminishes subjective wellbeing (Schooler, Ariely, & Loewenstein, 2003). Furthermore, by giving individuals freedom of choice regarding which brand to identify with, and which version of the consumerist good life to

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aspire to (through constructing their consumer lifestyle identities, as we will see below), this culture ensures that no one is left without a (largely unattainable) fantasy to chase. This seemingly autonomous decisionmaking additionally serves to strengthen individuals’ engagement with and commitment to their chosen variant of consumerist pursuits (Moller, Ryan, & Deci, 2006; Thompson & Loveland, 2015). The constant stimulation to elaborate and ruminate on an ideal version of the consumer self, prompts individuals to draw comparisons with their actual, current self and always find it deeply deficient. These self-discrepancies then motivate consumption (Halliwell & Dittmar, 2006), as individuals strive to come closer to their chosen life-styled ideal. These ideals, however, are always changing as commercial interests introduce and market new consumer images. Consumer selfhood itself is anchored in the quicksand of brand images, lifestyle depictions, and other consumer symbols dynamically generated by marketers and market responses. Because these are in constant flux, consumer selfhood is never securely achieved but instead must be constantly reformed to accommodate the fluctuating nature of consumer symbols, as new symbolic meanings crowd out the old. Combined with consumer culture’s emphases on externalities of presentation and appearance (Kasser et al., 2007), this inherent dependency on others to provide ongoing validation for individuals’ self-worth and lifestyle performances renders consumer selfhood structurally unsound. Divergent lines of psychological research have documented the psychological vulnerabilities that result from such an unstable, externally grounded selfhood (see review in Crocker & Park, 2012). Reciprocally, psychology has also shown that these structural attributes of the self increase its susceptibility to marketing endeavors and consumer pressures (e.g., Mittal, 2015). All and all, decades of research have almost invariably demonstrated that this type of psychological need-driven consumption does not lead to sustainable increases in genuine self-esteem or general wellbeing. In fact, those who buy into this prevailing consumer myth that a better self and a better life is just around the corner, are generally worse off for it (Ahuvia, 2008; see discussion below).

CONSUMER SELFHOOD AND NORMATIVE NARCISSISM In order to ground the psychological characterization of this emerging form of selfhood, we first turn to studies on what is plausibly the most firmly established consumer culture—the United States. In the last half century, as

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consumerism became an endemic cultural syndrome in American society, individuals’ sense of self-esteem has increased. Based on a recent hierarchical linear modeling analysis specifically designed to identify cohort effects, Twenge, Carter, and Campbell (2017) demonstrated that self-esteem rose in later cohorts of their representative national sample. This finding supports similar conclusions from earlier meta-analytical and large-scale studies demonstrating an inflation of self-esteem ratings among Americans (e.g., Twenge, Konrath, Foster, Campbell, & Bushman, 2008). Contrary to common sense, however, these increases in self-worth have not been accompanied by an improvement in individuals’ psychological wellbeing or mental health—in fact, the contrary can be observed. Meta-analyses have documented a concomitant rise in pathological personality tendencies (Twenge, Gentile, DeWall, Ma, Lacefield, & Schurtz, 2010). We interpret this as a decline in adaptive, genuine self-worth which is masked by two interlocking processes: avoidance of the social failure associated with presenting a flawed self-image, and the rise of narcissism with its compensatory defensive dynamics. First, American consumer culture incessantly evokes an image of a better, happier, more worthy self (Hockley & Fadina, 2015). Within this frame, presenting the self in an unqualified positive way is a normative requirement, and the display of anything less than unmitigated self-love is a social failure (Cushman, 1990; Heine, Lehman, Markus, & Kitayama, 1999). Moreover, the properly achieved consumer self is supposed to be maximally fulfilled and self-assured. Hence, admitting self-doubt is a deeply disconcerting personal failure as well. Indicatively, US American’s scores on self-esteem measures typically form highly asymmetrical distributions, with a majority of responses clustered near the highest possible score. Within this frame, an individual could be deemed to possess an abnormal, “low self-esteem” even with scores well above the scale’s midpoint (e.g., Heine et al., 1999). This process could also account for the reporting of overwhelmingly high subjective wellbeing in Western consumer societies, which is paradoxical coupled with unprecedented levels of depression, for instance (Bushman et al., 2012). If happiness and self-worth are the trophies awarded to the “winners” who fully commit to the dream of consumption, then admitting self-doubt is tantamount to admitting defeat. Besides evoking an image of a better, happier, more worthy self, the second process suggested here is the gradual substitution of genuine

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self-worth with artificially inflated self-esteem (Hoyle, Kernis, Leary, & Baldwin, 1999). While the former is the fully internalized, relatively stable, and underlying sense of an individual’s own value, the latter is a less well-integrated and internalized construct, and as such marked by instability, uncertainty, and vulnerability. According to Hoyle et al. (1999) and other researchers, only genuine self-esteem is indicative of and conducive to individuals’ psychological adjustment. In contrast, defensively inflated self-esteem is a defining feature of narcissistic tendencies, and is associated with a wide range of psychological, as well as societal, dysfunctions (e.g., Kernis, 2003). Support for this interpretation comes from the pronounced increase in indices of narcissism in more recent cohorts of US Americans, in which an elevated level of such tendencies, previously considered indicative of psychopathology, had become the new norm (e.g., Twenge et al., 2008). Indeed, contemporary Americans describe their own national character as highly narcissistic, a view shared by others around the world (Miller et al., 2015). Many scholars have suggested that consumer culture promotes narcissistic tendencies. This seems to be the case because consumer cultures instill individuals with an insatiable hunger for validation, which in turn feeds a porous, structurally fragile sense of self-worth. Personal worth within consumer selfhood is hence dependent on constant reinforcing feedback from other individuals. In light of this need from others to bolster the self, an aggrandizing self-image must be projected at all times (Cushman, 1990). These concerns over image and other externalities, now implicated in individuals’ preoccupation with their self-worth, are a core feature shared by consumer selfhood and narcissistic personalities. Within this framework, other people are instrumental only if they can be used as mirrors that reflect back a glorified image of the self. Such an exploitative view of others hollows out interpersonal relationships and diminishes the capacity to empathize with and care for other people (Kasser et al., 2007). Recent meta-analytical studies offer strong support for this contention. For example, American college students’ ability to empathize with others has declined between 1979 and 2009, with the sharpest decreases occurring in the later cohorts (Konrath, O’Brien, & Hsing, 2011). Employing a very different theoretical and operational framework (i.e., attachment theory), Konrath and colleagues (Konrath, Chopik, Hsing, & O’Brien, 2014) have also documented a decrease in psychological adjustment (i.e., secure attachment) in samples of American college students between 1988 and 2011. This decrease in psychological

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adjustment was due to a decline in regard of other people, coupled with an increasingly positive view of the self. In a universe populated only by the self and its mirroring objects, feelings of exaggerated entitlement are only natural. One of the repeated themes in American consumerism is that you, specifically, are a unique, special, and extraordinary human being (Hockley & Fadina, 2015). In light of this extraordinary uniqueness, the self deserves every consideration, any special treatment, and instant gratification of all needs, even when those are not accorded to less “special” people. The theme of exaggerated entitlement, propagated by consumer culture and manifested in narcissistic individuals, is so central to the characterization of the contemporary American psyche that it appears in the title of Twenge and Campbell’s (2009) influential book “The narcissism epidemic: Living in the age of entitlement.” Continuing with the pandemic metaphor, the contagion of narcissism has spread beyond the borders of American society, carried by the vectors of globalized consumer culture. Thus, other Western societies have seen an increase of narcissistic tendencies over cohorts (Brown, 2012), a trend that now appears even in collectivist societies that were previously mostly immune to this psycho-social pathology. Within the rapidly globalizing context of Chinese society, individuals from more globalized sections of this society (those who are wealthier, more urbanite, and endorse individualistic values) exhibited greater narcissistic tendencies when compared with their more traditional counterparts (Cai, Wu, Shi, Gu, & Sedikides, 2016). Relatedly, samples of Indian and Chinese students (who represent the globalizing vanguard of their respective societies) exhibited higher levels of vanity even when compared to their Western counterparts. The Asian students were relatively more concerned about their appearance and achievements, and while all samples felt like they fell short of their ideals in those areas, this tendency was more pronounced in the Asian student samples (Durvasula & Lysonski, 2008). Other studies reported progressive increases in favorably-biased perceptions of the self in such collectivistic settings. Recent research demonstrated that Chinese individuals are more likely to actively bolster their self-image the more they identify with contemporary (i.e., globalizedconsumerist vs traditional) Chinese culture. This bolstering of the self also increased when such identification was experimentally primed, as opposed to simply measured (Zhang, Noels, Guan, & Weng, 2017). Lastly, the use of such self-enhancing mechanisms to bolster the self seems to increase in

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later generations, as recent evidence showed their pronounced manifestation amongst Chinese secondary school students (Hu, Zhang, & Ran, 2016). The use of these mechanisms stands in stark contrast to the abundance of findings which indicate their relative absence in traditional collectivistic cultures (see review in Rosenmann & Kurman, 2019). These favorably-biased perceptions of the self, however, can either represent normative and adaptive facets of selfhood within increasingly individualistic contexts, or a more defensive self-aggrandizing dynamic (Rosenmann & Kurman, 2019). It is therefore unclear if these findings, in and of themselves, indicate a rise in narcissistic tendencies, or an adoption of more benign Westernized forms of selfhood. Nonetheless, an individualist account of selfhood would have been supported if the increased usage of these self-enhancing strategies in collectivistic settings had coincided with higher levels of self-esteem, compared with earlier generations. However, research has documented the opposite trend, with self-esteem scores decreasing across cohorts both in China (e.g., Liu & Xin, 2015) and Japan (e.g., Ogihara, Uchida, & Kusumi, 2016). This pattern suggests the fracturing of genuine self-esteem as consumerism takes hold in these cultures, in which the presentation of a blatantly self-promoting and self-loving image (typical of American culture) was highly nonnormative until recently (Rosenmann & Kurman, 2019). The current perspective could also contribute to the hotly debated relationship between selfishness and individualism (e.g., Welzel, 2010). According to our perspective, individualism per se may not necessarily lead to selfish, nonprosocial behavior. In fact, the precepts of individualism grant value to every human life, and accord it with inalienable worth. This shared claim to human dignity underlies the discourse of universal human rights, and many humanitarian efforts (see Chapter 2). It is consumer selfhood with its fragile, uncertain, and externally contingent sense of worth that prepares the ground for narcissistic tendencies to develop, as it eventually leads to more selfish behaviors. Taking this to heart, researchers have recently started to look for ways to elicit prosocial behaviors from these normative narcissists, instead of fighting the rising tide of narcissism within consumer cultures (Konrath, Ho, & Zarins, 2016; Naderi & Strutton, 2014). In summary, we have argued that the global cultural syndrome of consumerism generates a new form of selfhood. While this consumer selfhood had originally developed within individualist contexts, it departs from the independent form of selfhood classically associated with such contexts and

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has increasing influence in collectivistic contexts as well. Within consumer selfhood, peoples’ sense of self-worth and identity depends on socially appropriate utilization of consumptive symbols. This selfhood is therefore externally grounded, and structurally unstable, plausibly linking it with the raise of normative narcissism seen around the world.

MATERIALISM AS THE MOST CONSPICUOUS FORM OF CONSUMER SELFHOOD This conceptualization of consumer selfhood is novel, and relies most directly on scholarly work done outside of empirical psychology. As demonstrated, however, psychological science provides ample support for this conceptualization, as well as the means to explore its manifestations in individuals’ lives and, in an aggregated form, in social life. Terms such as “materialism,” “consumerism,” or “capitalism” rarely appeared in quantitative psychological discourse before the 1990s, but today they are widely used within the field. Most prolific is the amassed literature on materialism as an individual-level variable. Integrating the various definitions, Dittmar, Bond, Hurst, and Kasser (2014) suggested it is the “individual differences in people’s long term endorsement of values, goals, and associated beliefs that center on the importance of acquiring money and possessions that convey status” (p. 880). From the current perspective, the materialist individual is the conspicuous exemplar of consumer selfhood, one that ascribes to consumer culture’s most conventional representations. Paralleling the scales devised to measure forms of selfhood related to individualism or collectivism as an individual-difference variable (e.g., Singelis, 1994), measures of materialism can be considered as proxies of conventional consumer selfhood. Indeed, individuals scoring high on materialism tend to be highly susceptible to normative influences (Chang & Arkin, 2002) as they also score high on indices of conformism, conventionalism, and desire for cognitive simplicity (Elphinstone & Critchley, 2016; Kasser et al., 2007; see also Kasser, 2016). They also tend to exhibit higher levels of internalization of and investment in consumeristic conventions, such as those which define body ideals (Guðnadóttir & Garðarsdóttir, 2014; Vansteenkiste, Soenens, & Duriez, 2008). At least within established consumer contexts, these individuals also exhibit high levels of political conservatism (Duriez, Vansteenkiste, Soenens, & De Witte, 2007), and tend to endorse socially prevalent forms of stereotyping and prejudice (Roets, Van Hiel, & Cornelis, 2006).

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Not surprisingly then, highly materialistic individuals watch more TV and do so more attentively (Shrum, Burroughs, & Rindfleisch, 2005). They also show greater interest in explicitly materialistic media genres and commercials, as they perceive those to be valid sources of self-relevant information (Gurel-Atay, Kahle, & Ring, 2011; Lewallen, Miller, & Behm-Morawitz, 2016). Lastly, the consumer decisions of highly materialist individuals seem to be more vulnerable to even the bluntest marketing ploys. In one study, participants had to make a hypothetical choice between an expensive “plus” and a cheaper “basic” cable package. The preference of participants scoring high on materialism for the “plus” alternative held regardless of whether its utility was superior to the “basic” option, seems to stem simply from its premium label (Goodman & Irmak, 2013). In short, highly materialist individuals seem to buy into consumer culture’s promises hook, line, and sinker (Sirgy, 1998), as they continually attempt to secure a better self through consumption (Dittmar, Long, & Bond, 2007; Richins, 2011). As such, research has shown that the materialist form of consumer selfhood strongly manifests the psychological correlates of consumer culture we have proposed here. In a recent theoretical paper, Donnelly, Ksendzova, Howell, Vohs, and Baumeister (2016) reviewed evidence demonstrating that highly materialist individuals tend to espouse selfenhancement and hedonistic values, and prioritize self-interest over concern for other people, the collective good, or moral considerations. They are highly willing to make substantial sacrifices to temporarily elevate their standard of living and level of hedonic enjoyment, which they feel are chronically lacking. Concomitantly, these individuals tend to be highly conscious of what others may think of them, as they are hypervigilant about the risk of social exclusion. Despite this strong desire to be accepted, they tend to feel lonelier, and have strained relationships with others. Highly materialistic individuals tend also to engage in extensive upward social comparisons, contrasting themselves, their accomplishments, and their standard of living to more successful others as well as to media ideals (which they tend to see as relatively credible). They are envious of others for their apparent success and prosperity, and tend to feel like they deserve more than they have. These feelings of anger over not getting their share are tempered by their belief in meritocracy and social mobility. They thus place the blame for falling short of these unrealistic ideals on their own shortcomings. This leads to the finding that those scoring high

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in materialism experience an acute discrepancy between who they are and who they are supposed to be. These individuals additionally tend to worry more about their financial situation and future security, but have a harder time delaying gratification. They tend to engage in impulsive buying and other forms of impetuous consumption, which prioritize immediate rewards over avoidance of future costs. This is plausibly because they tend to believe further purchases would make them happy and finally complete. When these dreams are deferred, highly materialistic individuals feel disappointed, guilty and are prone to self-blame. The desire to escape these negative emotions and aversive self-ruminations then drives them to consume more. In this escapist “consumption mode” they tend to focus on the concrete and tangible, exhibiting highly simplified, rigid thought patterns while tuning out more abstract mental processes. This frame of mind disinhibits their behavior, leading to questionable decision-making which in turn feeds the next cycle of self-blame and aversive self-awareness, to be quelled again by consumption (Donnelly et al., 2016). Indeed, Dittmar et al.’s (2014) meta-analysis of hundreds of samples from around the world demonstrated that a higher level of materialism is robustly associated with lower overall wellbeing and poorer psychological adjustment. The maladjustment related to materialism is both significant and highly generalized, as it incorporates life-outcomes which are not directly related to consumption (e.g., greater propensity to engage in health-risk behaviors and suffer from lower overall health). This metaanalysis also demonstrated that levels of materialism are associated with deficiencies in self-worth. While this connection was evident with regard to overall self-esteem (r 5 .19), it was even more substantial when negative self-evaluations (e.g., persistent self-doubts, high discrepancy between the ideal and actual selves) were tested (r 5 .27). An illustration of this association between materialism and lower genuine self-worth comes from Chaplin and John’s (2007) influential study of children and adolescents, where materialism was the outcome, and not the predictor. In their experimental study, levels of materialism dropped when participants received a boost to their self-esteem from their peers. Importantly from our perspective, this boost did not only make participants feel good about themselves, but also decidedly better than others (Chaplin & John, 2007). In line with our proposed conceptualization here, the positive feedback given in this study seems to have bolstered participants’ narcissistic, self-aggrandizing tendencies and not just their

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self-esteem. Thus, when others already recognize the uniquely valuable nature of an individual, materialistic pursuits become redundant. Finally, these findings are complimented by the results of an ambitious research project linking higher levels of materialism in early adulthood to decreases in individuals’ wellbeing over time (Kasser et al., 2014). This project also included an experimental component, in which a subgroup of participants was educated about consumer culture’s psychologically most damaging influences. Those who discussed these injurious effects of consumerism showed decreases in levels of materialism and increased psychological wellbeing, months after the intervention. This study supports the claim made here and elsewhere, that consumer selfhood, and especially materialism as its most extreme manifestation, has a deleterious effect on wellbeing and psychological health. In sum, the psychological literature describes highly materialist individuals as captured in a series of vicious feedback loops (Sirgy, 1998). They desire to be included and accepted, yet their absorbed self-focus leaves them lonely and detached. They believe they can and must “make it big” by ascending the socioeconomic ladder, but their consumptive behaviors are wasteful and irresponsible. They believe in the fantasies propagated by consumer culture, and when those do not come true, blame themselves but continue to endorse the consumerist system. Finally, these pursuits of unrealistic ideals set these individuals up for repeated failures. They turn to conspicuous consumption to bolster their insecure sense of self-worth, but remain fraught with self-doubts. They put great emphasis on having a highly enjoyable, happy life, but end up less satisfied with the lives they lead, and suffer from poorer wellbeing, relative to less materialist individuals. In line with the current perspective, maladaptive materialism is increasing in prevalence, and spreading around the world, as globalized consumer culture takes hold. Thus, researchers have documented the increase in levels of materialism in more recent cohorts of US Americans (e.g., Kasser et al., 2007). In fact, more dramatic inter-generational effects have been observed elsewhere, where globalized consumer culture was only relatively recently introduced into the local cultural environment (e.g., Gupta, 2011). While these increasing materialistic tendencies strongly exhibit all the psychological correlates postulated here to accompany consumer selfhood, it is important to note again that the two are not synonymous. Materialistic identities are perhaps the most conventional and pernicious variant of this form of selfhood, and as such received the lion’s share of

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scholarly attention (Shrum et al., 2013). Nevertheless, even individuals scoring low on materialism may be captured by the broader conceptualization of consumer selfhood. Without a doubt, the pursuit of material possessions and luxury items to signal status and success is an important part of consumer selfhood. The latter, however, includes also the consumption of nonmaterial goods, and nonluxury items, and their use not only to signal social status, but instead to communicate and reify every facet of selfhood and identity. Thus, lifestyle choices are not limited to material possessions. For example, the kind of vacation people decide to purchase, and the kind of gym they choose to join, are all parts of their respective consumerist lifestyles. While psychological research has demonstrated that such experiential consumption is more conducive to subjective wellbeing than acquisition of material possessions (Gilovich, Kumar, & Jampol, 2015), it is nonetheless integral to the lifestyle (at least of those who can afford it) and thus consumer selfhood of individuals. Moreover, unlike the focus on pricy, highend luxury items in the classic conceptualization of materialism, consumer selfhood is not constrained to a specific class of goods, as any product at every price range can be used in a symbolic capacity and thus be part of the construction of a lifestyle and matching consumer selfhood.

Evidence From Experimental Primes of Consumerism Above, we demonstrated that individuals’ score on measures of materialism can be regarded as proxies for their adoption of conventional consumer selfhood, much like scales of self-construal measure adoption of individualistic and collectivistic forms of selfhood. Beyond devising an individual-difference approach to forms of selfhood, cross-cultural psychology has also demonstrated that different forms of selfhood may coexist within a single individual, and become activated by situational cues (Oyserman, 2017). A large body of research has shown that simple primes, such as attending to a text which uses first-person singular pronouns (e.g., I, mine, my) versus first-person plural pronouns (e.g., we, us, our), creates individualistic versus collectivistic experimental effects (Oyserman, 2017). Borrowing again from this approach, we next review some experimental findings, which we interpret as primes of consumer selfhood, and show that situational cues that momentarily put individuals in a consumerist frame of mind produce effects congruent with our conceptualization of consumer selfhood.

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For example, Bauer, Wilkie, Kim, and Bodenhausen (2012) demonstrated in four experiments that consumerist primes lead individuals to automatically associate the self with self-enhancement values and concomitantly experience higher negative affect. Primed participants also tended to view other individuals not as potential cooperative partners, but as competitors who must be bested. The researchers concluded that “in general, it is clear that the consumer identity did not unite—it divided” (p. 522), to the momentary detriment of those primed. Importantly, the experimental primes used in this study closely resembled stimuli ubiquitous in everyday life within consumer cultures, such as exposure to advertisements, or the simple framing of self and others as “consumers” instead of “individuals.” Another recent project demonstrated that after consumerist primes individuals tend not only to see others as competitors, but also to feel that they themselves are not getting what they deserve in comparison. In these studies, Chinese participants who were unobtrusively cued with reminders of conspicuous consumption (e.g., by responding in front of a palatial Prada store) were more likely to feel like they deserve more than they have, relative to others (Zhang & Zhang, 2016). Consumerist cues additionally affect how individuals relate to their own body, as they come to view it as an aesthetic object submitted to the judgment of others. For example, Chinese and American women’s level of such self-objectification increased after viewing ads for luxury items, even though these ads did not include any portrayal of or reference to the human form (Teng, Poon, Zhang, Chen, Yang, & Wang, 2016). This and other studies (Rosenmann, Kaplan, Gaunt, Pinho, & Guy, 2017) empirically support the contention that consumerism leads to the objectification of the human body (and especially women’s bodies), as was postulated by the feminist scholars who first formulated this important psychological concept (Fredrickson & Roberts, 1997). Another type of stimuli that bombards individuals in consumer cultures is the promise of quick cash, easy money, and windfall earnings. Research shows that being given a lottery ticket, or merely imagining the act of buying one, is enough to make individuals think of specific luxury consumer goods and induce a more concrete cognitive style (i.e., lower-level construal; after all, there is nothing abstract about a luxuriating afternoon spent on the yacht purchased with the winnings). Construing the world in this way, these individuals found it harder to delay gratification and exercise self-control in making consumer decisions (Kim, 2013).

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The effects of priming mundane aspects of consumer culture led Donnelly et al. (2016) to assert that these “momentary bursts. . . corresponded to greedy selfishness reflective of loosened moral standards” (p. 307), a conclusion which is also upheld by a growing body of research on the effects of money primes. In more than 165 priming experiments, conducted in many different parts of the world, subtle reminders of money (such as having a stack of Monopoly money placed within participants’ visual periphery; Vohs, Mead, & Goode, 2006) had discernable effects on individuals’ frame of mind, motivational priorities, social judgment, and even perception of physical temperature. Both literally and figuratively, these studies show that money primes make people cold. Primed individuals come to value self-sufficiency and independence over social contact or interpersonal care. They are less willing to help others, or indeed, tolerate the expression of emotions, as they adopt a utilitarian, business-minded approach. This self-focused utilitarianism in turn increases individuals’ task perseverance and performance, and bolsters their support of the “free market” and other hierarchical, unequitable social systems (reviewed in Vohs, 2015). More generally, many studies in psychology have shown the power of such a business-minded approach, epitomized by the adage “nothing personal, it’s just business” to dampen individuals’ feelings of social responsibility and care for the wellbeing of others (e.g., Molinsky, Grant, & Margolis, 2012). When put in such a frame of mind, individuals are also more likely to behave in unethical ways, as the desire to win and acquire resources takes precedence over moral considerations (e.g., Aquino, Freeman, Reed, Lim, & Felps, 2009). Tellingly, bankers induced to think of their professional identity were more likely to behave in dishonest ways than their non-primed colleagues (Cohn, Fehr, & Maréchal, 2014). Taken together, this considerable body of experimental work lends support to many of the contentions raised above about the effects of consumer culture and its accompanying socioeconomic systems. While the specific effects of these primes differ, they have themes of independence, self-focus, and competitiveness in common. Cues most relevant to the workplace, such as thinking of money or even just being in a business setting (Kay, Wheeler, Bargh, & Ross, 2004), seem to foster a narrowing of self to the confines of utilitarian professionalism and bottom-line thinking, which trumps moral or interpersonal considerations. Conversely, primes more prevalent in consumerist settings, like images of luxury items, opulent stores, or evocations of a sudden financial windfall, trigger lapses in

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self-control, judgments based on externalities (even of the self), and feelings of frustrated entitlement, as people compare the realities of their lives with those promised to them by consumer culture. The spread of consumerism through globalization is thus an important phenomenon, with repercussions that affect the health and wellbeing of individuals, societies, and the natural world. We have drawn from various lines of psychological science to begin describing this new form of selfhood associated with the emerging cultural syndrome of global consumerism. It seems as if every generation in living memory comes to perceive the younger generation as being outlandishly different. This is perhaps truer than ever, as younger cohorts around the world may indeed depart from their predecessors in the very way their selves are constructed and organized. Based on the extant literature, we have sketched a rather alarming depiction of this transition. Perhaps we are simply showing our age. Nonetheless, toward the end of this chapter we will try to explain why this form of selfhood, which seems to frustrate so many of our most basic human needs, is expanding across different cultures. Furthermore, and as we will discuss in detail in Chapter 7, the type of socioeconomic systems associated with this global rise of consumerism is directly responsible for the depletion of our physical environments. In order to constantly produce, consume, and discard, this shark of a system (if you recall Kasser et al.’s (2007) metaphor from Chapter 2) needs to devour ever-increasing amounts of resources, and excrete ever-growing piles of garbage. In the following section, however, we expand on the changes to the social structure accompanying these consumerist transitions. As we will see, these societal shifts are responsible for the changing landscape of politics and collective action in this age of globalization (elaborated in Chapters 5 and 6, respectively). They are also part and parcel of the increasing social tolerance in more globalized societies we have noted in Chapter 2.

The Segmentation of Consumer Societies Going hand-in-hand with these effects of consumerism on forms of selfhood are its effects on individuals’ identities. Within consumer cultures, the increased marketing utility of consumer characteristics and their aggregation into market-segment profoundly impacts the basic process of social categorization and group formation. In Chapter 2 we described the

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nascent consumer culture as requiring the incorporation of multiple social classes and categories within the ranks of the mass-consuming public. Stated bluntly, there is profit to be extracted from every consuming individual, regardless of their membership in different social categories (such as those of race, gender, or social standing). This vested economic interest in ensuring the freedom to consume has joined other globalizing processes to destabilize hierarchies based on ascribed social categories: within consumer cultures these social categories are being increasingly redefined as more or less acceptable lifestyle options, which, in order to be realized, require consumption. With more nuanced knowledge accumulating in the social sciences, the consuming public started to be segmented along demographic lines, allowing advertisers to more precisely target their audiences. In this process, social categories became demographic characteristics of individuals, which then could be regrouped into defined market-segments of the consumer public. With time, these groups became increasingly specific, and included not only basic demographic categories, but groupings based on behavioral tendencies as well. This process is coming to full fruition online, as social science, marketing, and technology synergized to make advertising increasingly personalized. Extrapolating from the personal information many people freely report, the content most of us eagerly post online, our online search histories, and the sum of our recorded online behavior, advertisers now rely on psychographics to guide their marketing efforts. Psychographics supplement demographic market segmentation by taking into account consumers’ psycho-social profiles, constructed from indices of their personality, attitudes, interests, opinions, values, and general worldviews (Vyncke, 2002). This psychographic information can then be used to strategically mobilize the most effective source of social influence (which varies between segments; Krishnan & Murugan, 2006), and project a brand image which would be optimally congruent with the segment’s worldview, values, and desires (e.g., Vyncke, 2002). Gathering psychographic data to deliver scientifically guided marketing messages to users, or sell to third-party companies, is how social network sites (and many other online platforms) generate profits (Enders, Hungenberg, Denker, & Mauch, 2008). This business model therefore shaped much of the online world to accommodate the marketing and the commercial interests that underlie it.

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Consumer Lifestyle Identities This dynamic process of using demographic and psychographic characteristics to define market segments has changed the nature of the social identities that were once based on these characteristics. Through targeting consumers by their lifestyle, marketers endeavor to reciprocally create these lifestyles as identity options open to individuals through consumption. Before offering a formal definition for these consumer lifestyle identities, and exploring their significance in understanding selfhood, collective identity, and collective action in consumer cultures, we will illustrate our use of the term. The first illustration comes from the recent history of sexual identities. Sex has ascended within modern and then consumer cultures to an unprecedented status as a core, at times definitive, feature of selfhood. Within the past century and a half, many non-mainstream sexualities were transformed from being abominations in God’s eyes, to crimes against nature, and then to mental disorders (Foucault, 1990). Within consumer cultures, this transformation takes another step, as sexual proclivities become redefined as clusters of consumer habits, that is, consumer lifestyles. A prime example of this collective transformation is the contemporary recoding of homosexuality into a discernable lifestyle: the “gay lifestyle.” While some scholars point to the Stonewall Riots of 1969 as the birthplace of gay collective identities (e.g., Kissack, 1995), others argue that these identities only became widely available later, and for different reasons. While post-Stonewall, a nascent gay identity was embraced by a small subset of socially and politically active individuals, it was only after same-sex attracted men were collectively targeted as a market-segment by commercial forces that it became widely applicable. Starting in the early 1970s, marketers became interested in same-sex attracted men, because of a (largely debunked) image of them within marketing circles as loyal consumers with a great deal of discretionary money to spend (i.e., DINKs— “Double Income, No Kids”). However, effectively marketing to this market-segment proved challenging, as targeted ads could not be run on mainstream media without alienating large segments of the heteronormative society. This lead to the financing of niche media outlets—the first mass-circulated gay journals—developed to cater only to this specific audience and thus allow marketers to safely deliver their targeted messages. These journals could then foster a sense of shared belonging to an

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ephemeral gay community, validate individuals’ incipient gay identities, and further galvanize them through calls for collective political action. According to this account of gay history, its emergence as a viable identity and communal option for same-sex attracted men is largely due to efforts of marketers to effectively target this market-segment (Campbell, 2015). With the consolidation of this social-category/market-segment, and the installment of effective marketing avenues, commercial interests could offer increasingly specialized commodities and services to those who partake in this gay lifestyle: gay resorts, gay nightlife, gay TV shows (and niche channels), gay gyms, and a host of material and cultural products and services designed to cater to “gay sensibilities.” Reflecting these marketing myths and interests, the idealized gay lifestyle is also highly stylized and aestheticized, as gay individuals are casted as connoisseurs of refined tastes and high-end design (Clarkson, 2005). Nowhere is this aesthetic rigor more evident than in relation to the male form, which has become thoroughly objectified, just as the female form has been for ages (Rosenmann & Kaplan, 2014). All these features of this idealized lifestyle now become a part of many individuals’ sense of what it means to be gay, as the consumption of these targeted products and services reifies individuals’ gay identities (Tsai, 2011). Notably, the process of codifying an identity into the rubrics of consumption is always reciprocal, and dependent on consumers’ willingness to engage marketers in cogenerating a lifestyle option. Within the current context, the redefinition of (sexual) minority status as a lifestyle is indeed appealing to many, as it promises greater social inclusion and minority empowerment. As described earlier, the development of this lucrative lifestyle had been crucial to the galvanization of gay identities, communities, and collective actions (d’Emilio, 1983). Furthermore, being integrated into the marketplace as valuable consumers normalizes being gay, and makes its status equal to those of other forms of acceptable human diversity, such as being Jewish or being of Irish ancestry in this American context (Tsai, 2011). This lifestyle formulation of gay identities does not accommodate the diversity of same-sex attracted men as it excludes those who are unable or unwilling to consume it. As the gay lifestyle became established as a mainstreamed identity, adopted mainly by affluent Whites (who were the desired market-segment from the beginning), spin-off lifestyle identities emerged. The “bear lifestyle” option, for example, targets predominantly working class men as well as those who do not conform to the hairless,

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taut, and sanitized body ideals of mainstream gay culture. While these subsidiary identities can be seen as stemming from a rejection of the consumerist gay lifestyle, they nevertheless become hubs for marketing endeavors themselves (e.g., Wright, 2016). For our second set of examples we return to the very different social categories based on religion, which were introduced in Chapter 2. There, we discussed how Christianity has become embroiled with consumer habits in contemporary North America. Minority religions have undergone the same process by which they became increasingly codified into a discernable consumer lifestyle variant. Beyond the cliché of American Jews going out to have a Chinese dinner on Christmas Eve, American Jews were quick to adopt consumer lifestyles (Howe, 2017), including for instance the adaptation of Hanukah to Yuletide consumption (e.g., giftgiving, the “Hanukah Bush”; Hirschman & LaBarbera, 1989) or buying Israeli products (Izberk-Bilgin, 2015). These adaptations were perhaps instrumental in rising within the ranks of American society. Comparably, Hindi traditions manifest in using statues of selected deities as elements of home décor, fashion preferences, and only buying “authentic” ritualistic items imported directly from India (Mitra, 2016). Furthermore, in both cases, various artifacts originating from these religious traditions have found new markets outside of the minority community. Both the Om symbol and Kabballah bracelets were reintroduced as components of consumer lifestyles that bear little resemblance to those of the religious minorities and retain little of their original religious meanings. Because these signifiers originate in nonmajority culture, they carry an air of exotic authenticity, which can be combined with other elements to create, for instance, a spiritually-awakened or New Age consumer lifestyle. As these examples illustrate, consumer lifestyles become an increasingly important source of collective identities for people around the world. We thus define consumer lifestyle identities as an assemblage of everyday consumer practices and performances, which denotes voluntary affiliation with a specific group of consumers (i.e., a market-segment; after Featherstone, 2007). This clustering of consumer practices is subjectively coherent, and provides guidance not only about what products or services are acquired, but also where and how they are consumed. A lifestyle thus delineates the range of appropriate consumer tastes, their specific aesthetics, as well as the rules of their display. These are parts of the form and fashion in which a specific consumer lifestyle (as the name suggests) is

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stylized. Often, these extend also to the bodily dispositions of the consumer: its shape, appearance, and utilization. As the gay versus bear lifestyles demonstrate, this connection to the body, and other less malleable aspects of personhood, may limit an individual’s ability to choose a consumer lifestyle identity for him- or herself. Indeed, biological sex is plausibly the most influential of these aspects of personhood, but by no means the only one. Age, ethnicity, race, and body shape are more or less ascribed factors which limit an individual’s ability to achieve a specific consumer lifestyle identity. Nonetheless, each opens a range of lifestyle possibilities catering to members of that social category. Stated more generally, consumer lifestyle identities are never ascribed. For every ascribed social category, consumer culture affords many different lifestyle variants. It is up to individuals to voluntarily commit to their chosen lifestyle, and obtain its legitimate consumptive enactment. This process redefines many ascribed statuses into achieved consumer statuses, whose successful enactment depends on the individual’s financial and cultural capabilities. This element of volition manifests two precepts of consumer culture: its emphasis on individuals’ freedom of choice, and the ostensibly meritocratic nature of its hierarchies. This consumerist framework thus promotes a form of egalitarianism, as an extension of the social tolerance granted by liberalism. In North America, gays, Jews, Hindus, and the dazzling array of “others” previously excluded because of their ascribed membership in stigmatized minorities, can now find a place in the consumerist mainstream. Moreover, within consumer culture, they can celebrate their previously stigmatized status as it is transformed to give an authentic and exotic flavoring of diversity to their consumer identity. Nonetheless, this equality is always contingent on their ability to mainstream their identities and secure the resources needed to properly enact these lifestyles. This directs our attention to three core aspects of consumer lifestyle identities: their (perhaps limited) ability, as collective identities, to satisfy individuals’ psychological needs, the way they are hierarchically ordered, and how they interact to affect collective action and the stability of the social system itself. These issues require that we expand on the psychological bases of collective identification—an issue we explore further in Chapter 4. Indeed, issues surrounding the psychology of collective identification are essential to this discussion of globalization even beyond their role in shaping consumer cultures’ structures (e.g., Arnett, 2002).

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CONSUMER SELFHOOD AND THE STABILITY OF GLOBALIZED CONSUMER CULTURE Given the pervasive dissatisfaction and frustration which seem inherent to human experience within this cultural framework, we must ask why these systems of social and psychological structuring not only persist, but expand. Beyond the obvious appeal of a system so capable of fostering innovation and technological advances, the answer to this question lies in basic psychological processes, as well as in their interaction with the macro structures of consumerism. On the most basic level, people are surprisingly poor judges of what does and could make them happy and satisfied (Ahuvia, 2008). Because we tend to recall events in ways that are congruent with our lifenarratives, we often fail to learn our lessons, when those run contrary to the teachings of our culture and the way it had shaped our selfhood. Thus, when anticipating the results of a culturally elaborate event (e.g., finally being able to buy the classic car we have always wanted), we tend to rely on that cultural knowledge, and not our prior experiences, when imagining how life-altering this event would be. Given that this promise of completeness (achievable through consumption) is ubiquitous in consumer cultures, all of us come to expect great things from what amounts at the end to just things. More generally, any prevailing cultural system defines and confines what is socially legible, what to expect, and how to make sense of the world. This cultural way of viewing the world and relating to it becomes so engrained in individuals’ psychology (i.e., consumer culture into consumer selfhood) that breaking away from this cultural default is difficult. And yet, the general mechanism by which cultures and forms of selfhood reconstitute one another seems especially efficient within consumer culture. This is firstly because consumer culture is uniquely adept at coopting oppositional ideas and re-presenting them as part of the myriad options it affords. The unconventionality and authenticity of such oppositional ideas often inspire a process of market translation, whereby they become reformed as unconventional consumptive trends with an authentic flare (Featherstone, 2007). These can then be safely reintegrated into the system as new elements and incorporated into a select set of consumer lifestyle identities. These new elements, and the lifestyles they suit, may certainly retain their oppositional stance vis-à-vis other consumptive

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practices; in this form, however, they no longer challenge the system. If any form of anticonsumer ideology can be transformed over time into a consumer lifestyle, then macro challenges to these systems are short-lived, as they are quickly reabsorbed to become a new set of micro identity options for individuals to choose from (Kasser et al., 2007). As reviewed above, this act of autonomous choice is vital to individuals’ continued engagement with and maintenance of their preferred consumer lifestyle identities. What may have started as a challenge to the consumerist system ends up being another facet of its palliative allure. Second, defining globalized consumer culture as the unavoidable result of the “way the world works”—and thus simply the way things are and will continue to be—greatly impoverishes the potential for imagining alternatives to it (Kasser et al., 2007). As we elaborate in the next chapters, this possibility of envisioning a cognitive alternative to the system is a prerequisite for any form of collective action aimed at fundamentally challenging the status quo. It furthermore mobilizes powerful psychological processes to the aid of this cultural system. This is because individuals’ motivation to perceive the social world as just, predictable, and hence controllable become dependent on perceiving the system as legitimate and stable (Jost & Major, 2001). This individual-level desire to justify the system is served by consumer culture’s prevailing myths and internal logic. Within this cultural system, constant consumption wards off existential insecurities and replaces them with an assurance of a better tomorrow lying within everyone’s reach, supplementing religion as the “opium of the people” (Shachar et al., 2011). Complementing these personal beliefs are the social ideologies extoling the importance of effort, which combined with meritocracy, make those promises seem plausible (Ledgerwood, Mandisodza, Jost, & Pohl, 2011). Indeed, ample research has shown that both belief in meritocracy and the evenhanded fairness of the free market serve to boost the system’s legitimacy, and quell perceived threats to the system’s stability (Day & Fiske, 2017). This (arguably illusory) sense of personal control and mastery over future life outcomes is most appealing to those who find their current social standing ungratifying. Indeed, for members of disadvantaged groups, belief in color-blind meritocracy predicts increased physical and mental wellbeing, an effect mediated by a greater sense of personal mastery (McCoy, Wellman, Cosley, Saslow, & Epel, 2013). Simultaneously, however, it dampens individuals’ resolve to oppose this social order, even as it

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positions them at a collective disadvantage (Wiley, Deaux, & Hagelskamp, 2012). These meritocratic ideologies embedded within the globalizing consumer culture thus have a strong palliative function for those who are individually or collectively disadvantaged by the social order (McCoy & Major, 2007). Finally, this cultural framework also promotes a specific understanding of social reality that further stabilizes the social order it enshrines (CostaLopes, Dovidio, Pereira, & Jost, 2013; Kasser et al., 2007). Studies have thus demonstrated that the perception of a meritocratic reality (i.e., meritocracy as a descriptive norm) drives the palliative, system-legitimizing functions described above (Son Hing, Bobocel, Zanna, Garcia, Gee, & Orazietti, 2011). Nonetheless, the seemingly factual perception of meritocracy as a social reality is itself subject to cultural and motivational biases. Thus, Americans tend to grossly overestimate the potential for upward social mobility in the United States, which studies show is abysmally low (World Economic Forum, 2016a, 2016b). This pronounced bias is motivationally driven—it goes above and beyond similarly framed estimation biases, and increases further in magnitude when participants are probed about the upward social mobility potential of people who “are similar to you in terms of goals, abilities, talents, and motivations” (Kraus & Tan, 2015). It lastly increased as a function of participants’ perception of their own socioeconomic class (regardless of whether it was only measured, or experimentally manipulated). This suggests again that these beliefs serve to justify the system and the adoration of those who are positioned highly within it (Kraus & Tan, 2015), by both dominants and subordinates. Another recent study has demonstrated this link between descriptive beliefs in social mobility and prescriptive acceptance of income inequality both cross-culturally and experimentally (Shariff, Wiwad, & Aknin, 2016). These palliative functions combine to create highly a adaptive social system, able to reabsorb dissent, and prevent it from becoming a collective challenge to the status quo. As we will see in Chapter 4, group-level challenges to a social order require: (1) that social mobility of individuals is perceived to be unattainable (i.e., individuals cannot realistically hope to exit their inferior position and enter into the dominant one); and (2) that lower-status group members can envision an alternative to an illegitimate social order (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001; Simon & Klandermans, 2001; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Contemporary consumer culture frustrates both prerequisites, as it ostensibly provides opportunities for the social mobility

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of meritorious individuals, and defines the status quo as an inevitable (and thus stable and legitimate) state of affairs. The optimal efficiency of this type of social system is not surprising, given the fact that it represents market logic writ large. As such, it is the outcome of the pursuit of self-interest by competing actors, who use state-of-the-art empirical knowledge in the social, political, and economic sciences to guide their efforts. A dazzling array of talents (e.g., in science, technology, creative problem solving) is recruited by these efforts, which in turn loop back into consumer culture and its shaping of human societies and individuals. Consumer culture hence represents the culmination of the precepts of individualistic societies. Nonetheless, the societies and psychologies fostered under its auspices are no longer individualistic, in the strict sense of the term. As reviewed above, individualism is rooted in an ethics of dignity as an internal and inalienable source of basic human worth. Only individuals themselves are capable of jeopardizing their own dignity by failing to live up to their internal standards, or, as Eleanor Roosevelt is purported to have said, “no one can make you feel inferior without your consent.” Within consumer culture, these self-standards become nearly impossible to achieve. Instead, internal dignity as a source of self-worth is substituted by the externalities of an individual’s competitive standing vis-à-vis relevant others, and the self’s reflection in their evaluating gaze. The resultant narcissistic tendencies thus run contrary to individualism in at least two ways: they deny the self its unconditional, internal source of worth, while also denying others that same measure of dignity. Those tendencies, however, are fully compatible with consumer selfhood. Because of these departures from strict individualism, consumer culture can more seamlessly be integrated into non-individualistic social settings. It is perfectly adept at manifesting culturally appropriate content (e.g., tailoring commercials to collectivistic audiences; Han & Shavitt, 1994), as those are absorbed into its formats and mediums. To reiterate, global consumer culture does not eliminate local cultures to make room for some literally homogenized global content. Instead, the accommodations it requires of different cultures and societies are largely made on an infrastructural level, and those seldom attract opposition. These, nonetheless, have profound effects on both the macro level of social systems and the micro level of individuals’ psychology and forms of selfhood. Around the world, then, individuals are becoming acculturated into global consumer culture, and develop their consumer selfhood as a result.

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Similarly to macro cultural influences, acculturative transformations introduced by this new cultural framework do not overwrite preexisting frameworks, but supplement them, enabling individuals to fit into their changed cultural surroundings. A study of cultural patterning of behaviors on SNS media illustrates this (Qiu, Lin, & Leung, 2012). This study utilized a kind of natural cultural prime, documenting the differential use of Facebook and Renren (the Chinese-language SNS) by the same individuals. The Chinese-speaking participants of the study seemed to flexibly switch between platforms and corresponding modes of selfhood. When interacting on Renren, participants behaved in typical collectivistic, othercentered ways, such as sharing information that may be useful for their friends (e.g., travel tips). In contrast, those same individuals’ posts on Facebook were self-focused and somewhat narcissistic, as activities were aimed at self-disclosure or self-promotion. This study thus demonstrated the ability of individuals to go back and forth between behavior patterns expressing elements of the selfhoods which were most congruence with the salient cultural context (as represented by the two SNS platforms). More generally, this study adds to the research reviewed above, showing that when elements of consumer culture become situationally salient, they cue corresponding elements of individuals’ consumer selfhood to produce culturally appropriate forms of emotion, cognition, and action.

SUMMARY As various societies around the world turn increasingly consumeristic, the prevalence of these situational cues is bound to increase as well, leading individuals to elaborate and refine their consumer selfhood. With consumer selfhood gaining significance as a structuring principle of people’s daily lives and their forms of engagement with their surrounding social environment, more self-functions and needs become channeled into the furrows allotted by consumer culture. This in turn further entrenches consumer selfhood in the lives of individuals, and the framework of consumer culture in the macro social systems in which they live.

CHAPTER 4

The Interplay Between Social Identities and Globalization We have now presented an overview of globalization, and how globalization affects our everyday lives. We have provided some initial work suggesting that globalization affects the way we think and act, building upon research that demonstrates the relation between globalization and consumerism. Various definitions of globalization have in common two themes—interconnection and change—which are seen to intensify in their speed and global reach. From a social psychological point of view, these implicate identity as playing a fundamental role in globalization processes, and indeed identity is itself a core theme in the social science of globalization. According to Arnett (2002), for example, “the central psychological consequence of globalization is that it results in transformations in identity” (p. 777). In Chapter 3, we have already focused on globalized consumerism as a broad context in which self-construal and selfevaluation are shaped, along with people’s priorities, worldviews, and lifestyles. “Identity” can be defined and applied in various ways, however, and until relatively recently, identity processes have not been systematically explored in the context of globalization. In this chapter, we outline the social identity approach in order to understand these psychological dynamics. It is important to emphasize at the outset that this framework is more than just a psychological account. Crucially, social identities provide conceptual bridges linking individual experience and behavior to (inter) group processes, societal structure, and macrosocial changes associated with globalization (our focus in Chapter 2). As social group members, people’s perception and behavior are collectively shaped, such that these both reflect and transform societal organization and functioning. Thus, people are, via their social identities, representatives of society: “the living, self-aware embodiments of the historical, cultural and politico-ideological forces and movements which formed them” (Turner & Oakes, 1986, p. 249).

The Psychology of Globalization DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-812109-2.00004-5

© 2019 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

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In elaborating the identity dynamics connecting the macrosocial level to the micro (or psychological) level, we first review some basic processes of social identification: how social groups and categories shape individuals’ sense of who they are, their understanding and negotiation of the social world, and ultimately, the ways they may strive to change it. Following this general review, we will explore the dynamics of social identities as they shape and are shaped by the processes of globalization. For example, some social identities (e.g., human or global identifications) emerge or are made increasingly salient by changes associated with globalization, whereas others (e.g., national or more local identities) may be waning for some individuals, even as they become even more central for others. Here we also provide a conceptual foundation for subsequent chapters in which we focus on the processes that motivate people to assert their social identities, and to pursue the different possibilities—even different versions of the world—that they contain, inform, and motivate. But first, let us delineate the social identity approach.

FOUNDATIONS OF THE SOCIAL IDENTITY APPROACH Human lives are fundamentally inscribed by patterns of social relationships, in the context of communities, social networks, and memberships in social groups and categories. Social categories such as nationality, gender, stage in life, religion, cultural heritage, or ethnicity comprise ascribed ingroups that can be highly self-defining. We also have political orientations, opinions, and worldviews, which may direct us to identify with a social movement, political camp, or as supporters of a certain candidate or policy. Moreover, we may follow a certain lifestyle, and identify as consumers of a certain brand (e.g., Apple fanatics, or fans of a sports team, band, or celebrity). These are achieved, or non-ascribed, ingroups—groups we voluntarily chose to be a part of, and are usually free to leave at will. The importance of social groups to the self is the conceptual starting point of the social identity approach (e.g., Reicher, 2004), which encapsulates social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and self-categorization theory (Turner et al., 1987). Individuals self-categorize within different levels of inclusiveness, from the most immediate social category to the most abstract and distant. For example, you may identify with the people of your specific neighborhood or with the city in which you live. Going further up in orders of abstraction, you may identify with the county or state the city is in, as well as with your country of nationality. Ultimately, you could

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identify with all of humanity, which represents the highest-order (or most superordinate) level of social identification (McFarland, Webb, & Brown, 2012; Rosenmann et al., 2016; Reese, 2016)—a possibility we consider in more detail later in this chapter. Together, self-categorizations contribute to social identity, which was defined by Tajfel (1978) as “that part of an individual’s self-concept which derives from [. . .] knowledge of [. . .] membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership” (p. 63).

THE STRUCTURE AND CONTENT OF SOCIAL IDENTITIES Whereas the theories of social identity and social categorization outlined the architecture of the social self-concept (i.e., the distinction between personal and social identity, and the nested nature of self-categorizations), subsequent work elaborated the structure of social identification. Following Tajfel’s (1978) definition, social identification can be conceptualized and measured in terms of (1) the importance and centrality of the group to the self-concept; (2) a sense of belonging, closeness, and solidarity with the group and other group members; and (3) the relatively positive or negative feelings and self-esteem derived from group membership (e.g., Ashmore, Deaux, & McLaughlin-Volpe, 2004; Cameron, 2004; Jackson, 2002; Leach et al., 2008). Leach et al. (2008) referred to these as dimensions of self-investment in the group, whereas another higher-order factor in their model reflects group-level self-definition (i.e., perceived similarity of self to group, and perceived similarity of group members with each other). In addition to the strength of identification along one or more dimensions, the ideological content and meaning of group membership is important in terms of understanding the direction of group behavior. For example, politicized collective identities (Simon & Klandermans, 2001) are specifically framed in the context of power struggles, and therefore can be expected to energize political participation and protest (e.g., Cameron & Nickerson, 2009; Kelly & Breinlinger, 1996; Simon et al., 1998; Stürmer & Simon, 2004; see Chapter 7). In such contexts, opinion-based groups—in which identification reflects shared opinion rather than necessarily being a simple function of preexisting social category membership—are a useful way to conceptualize the consolidation of concern into a platform for political action (e.g., Bliuc, McGarty, Reynolds, & Muntele, 2007; McGarty, 2006). National identities (see Chapter 8) provide

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another illustration of how the meaning of group attachment is as important as its strength.

THE CONTEXTUAL RELEVANCE OF SOCIAL CATEGORIES Theoretically, any element of human variability could provide a basis for social categorization and social identity, but only contextually meaningful ones inform social perception and behavior. Which self-categorization an individual adopts in a specific situation depends on several factors. According to Turner et al. (1987), a specific self-categorization becomes likely when two or more social groups (i.e., an ingroup and an outgroup or outgroups), become salient in a given situation, and when that distinction carries social meaning. First, this means that a specific categorization is activated when the perceived similarity among members of the ingroup is high while their perceived similarity to the “others” (i.e., members of an outgroup) is low. This is called the comparative fit of a social contrast within a situation (Turner et al., 1987). For example, if you and a group of other undergraduate students have a discussion regarding a recent exam with assistants of a professor, who are graduate students, the stage is set for an undergraduate vs. graduate, or course participant vs. assistant contrast. However, if from that classroom you all leave to cheer for the home team in a match against their arch-rivals from another school, all of you— undergraduates and graduates alike—suddenly become members of the same ingroup. In this example, the contrast changed from one situation to the next, and with it, the salient self-categorization. In the classroom discussion, the social division that made sense the most was along seniority lines, while the superordinate category of “students of our school” was irrelevant and thus muted. That same higher-order category, however, became the only one that mattered when pitted against students from another school. This example also points to a second principle that guides individuals’ level of self-categorization. In both settings, the salient self-categorization was also the most informative one. As course participants, all of the undergraduate students were bound together by a common goal (e.g., to convince the teaching assistants to raise everybody’s grades because the exam was too difficult and unfair) and by a set of common features (e.g., stalwart advocates of fairness and justice in exam-grading). These features and goals are also very different from those of the (unfair, power-hungry, needlessly strict) teaching assistants. Stated more generally, the level of

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categorization that is the most informative and socially meaningful in a specific context would be chosen. This categorization has a high normative fit within the given situation (Turner et al., 1987). Beyond these two types of comparative and normative fit between the level of categorization and a given situation, individuals’ activated selfcategorization may also reflect the pre-existing strength of their different social identities. If in the classroom example above, some undergraduate students have an especially strong affiliation with the school as a whole, this superordinate category could be personally salient for them, even as it is situationally muted for others. These students could, for instance, evoke that common higher-order identification to deescalate the discussion by reminding everyone involved that they are all on the same side, and attend that school because they all want to learn and realize their potential. Indeed, research has demonstrated that reframing competing social identities as discrete—rather than distinct—yet equally valuable elements of a shared superordinate group is conducive for intergroup cooperation (Gaertner, Dovidio, Anastasio, Bachman, & Rust, 1993); another point we will revisit in detail later on. Whereas self-categorization theory emphasizes the momentary salience of identifications, social identity theory highlights the dynamics of relations between groups that differ in status and power. In this larger-frame context, however, many of the theory’s predictions reflect the assumption of a basic motivation for positive self-esteem. It follows that people generally seek to hold social identities that are positively evaluated (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Such positive regard is defined relative to other social groups. Because groups compete with each other for symbolic and objective resources, social identities are always established in contrast to salient outgroups. Social identity theory specifies a number of individual and collective routes that group members may take to achieve a more satisfactory identity, which are highly relevant to global relations of dominance and inequality.

SOCIAL IDENTITY, MOBILITY, AND SOCIAL CHANGE For members of high-status or dominant groups, positive collective regard is granted by society at large. In most contemporary societies, for example, having a light skin tone and being very wealthy entitles an individual to a highly positive social identity. Others may look at the individual and fellow members of that social class with awe and envy. The individual’s

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lifestyle may be depicted in TV shows about the lives of the rich and famous, offering viewers a glimpse into that fantasy life. This is because the dominant group’s interests are generally served by society. Their members have the social power to define the terms of social comparisons, so that the dominant group comes out on top. Keeping with this example from the mainstream of consumer societies, wealth can serve as a dimension along which groups are compared and ranked. If groups are thus compared, the very wealthy are indeed those who rank as the most worthy, most positively regarded group—according to the wealthy. However, when an individual is a member of a lower-status group, such positive regard is much harder to achieve. Not many outsiders would look up to you if you lived in a poor neighborhood. Because everyone wants to be valued and regarded as worthy, an individual member of a low-status group could try to escape this hindering social identity, either by psychologically distancing themselves from the group (not identifying with it, because “I am not like the rest of them”) or by leaving it to gain membership in another, higher-status group. This option of individual mobility (referred to originally as social mobility; e.g., see Turner, 1999) becomes possible if the lines between groups are permeable, that is, flexible enough that individuals can move out of one social category and into another. For example, let us turn our attention to Diasporic Jews in the West (e.g., Western Europe and the U.S.). In the centuries leading up to the 20th century, antisemitism was institutionalized in many European countries (Reinharz & Shapira, 1996). To escape this discrimination, many Jews became secularized, or even converted to Christianity, discarding the religious aspect of their social identity to become more socially mobile. Others left Europe altogether for the New World, where North America promised a refuge from persecution. Although Jews were often considered inferior in North America as well, many of them were able to amass capital and achieve a middle class position in the—at that time—relatively classless American society. This position offered an alternative social identification; instead of strongly identifying as Jews, they started identifying mostly as Americans, an identity that did not outright exclude them, and through which they could become a valued part of society (Gans, 1979). These “loopholes” through which Jews were able to exercise individual mobility (e.g., religious conversion or economic upward mobility) created an anti-Semitic backlash. In Germany, where this backlash was most virulent, membership in the Jewish group was redefined as a matter of race

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and not religion. This redefinition can be seen as a way of rendering impermeable the boundaries separating the Jewish group from the dominant group. If the boundaries defining the lower-status ingroup are not permeable, individual mobility is not a viable way to achieve a positive social identity. According to social identity theory, individuals may then turn to collective strategies to either realistically or symbolically improve their position. Among these collective strategies, the most straightforward option is to try to effect social change, through which ingroup members can renegotiate their inferior status. In the context of the Jewish diaspora, Zionism could be considered such a collective endeavor. Given Zionist leaders’ belief that Jews were reviled in Europe because they did not fit into the mold of modern nationality, their solution was to develop a Jewish nation-state—Israel. They reasoned that once such a change occurred, Jews would be accepted among the nations (Reinharz & Shapira, 1996). Other attempts to effect social change aimed at improving Jews’ social status occurred through alignment with either radical (i.e., Marxist) or non-radical (e.g., Jewish labor union—the Bund) social movements. While these movements espoused very different end states, both aimed to solve the problem of Jewish social inferiority (by eliminating all divides within the international proletariat, or being accepted as equals within their native countries, respectively; Shohat, 1960). These types of direct collective strategies, which attempt to renegotiate the ingroup’s social inferiority via social change, can only be effective if minority members reject their inferiority, and are able to imagine a different state of affairs. However, when the societal status quo is perceived to be stable and legitimate, no such “cognitive alternatives” are readily available (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). In their absence, ingroup members can turn to symbolic measures to enhance their collective self-evaluation. Tajfel (1978) described a number of such strategies of social creativity, which can enable ingroup members to achieve a positive social identity despite societal disadvantage. One type of social creativity strategy de-emphasizes the dimensions of social comparison that render the ingroup inferior. This could, for instance, disregard the social comparisons prevalent in wider society, and instead utilize comparative dimensions on which the ingroup excels. Jews have had a long history of suffering from socially ascribed inferiority and persecutions. Under such adverse conditions, whereby on any widely accepted dimension of social comparison they were found lacking in

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relation to other groups, they could nonetheless fashion a positive social identity by means of comparing their status, as “God’s chosen people,” with others. They may have lived in abject poverty compared with their Christian neighbors, and in many cases at their mercy, but on the scale of God’s favor, they perceived themselves decidedly higher. A second set of socially creative strategies accepts the validity of the unfavorable social comparison, but changes the object against which the ingroup is measured. This type of strategy includes, for instance, choosing to compare with an outgroup which is even more flawed then the ingroup, or comparing the ingroup at the present with its even worse past (Mummendey, Klink, Mielke, Wenzel, & Blanz, 1999). By the early 20th century, many Jews in central and Western Europe had made great strides towards integrating into their respective countries. They were, nevertheless, accosted by anti-Semitic rhetoric defining them as dangerous savages lurking under a thin patina of European civility. For some, this ascribed inferiority was projected outwards, towards the “Asiatic hordes” of poor, uneducated, and altogether “primitive” Eastern European Jews. This new comparison allowed the better-integrated Western Jews to deflect inferiority away from themselves and onto their ignominious past, and onto their brethren whose conditions have not changed since. While still not quite as “good” as the non-Jewish elites of their countries of residence, these Jews achieved some measure of social identity positivity by drawing comparisons with those Jews who were worse-off than themselves (Khazzoom, 2003). For members of groups like the Eastern European Jews, who are at risk of being compared negatively to their more mainstream counterparts, a combination of the two types of socially creative options is possible. They may achieve a positive social identity by exhibiting horizontal hostility (White & Langer, 1999) towards the more assimilated segments of their superordinate group (i.e., Western European Jews who are still members of the Jewish superordinate group, even as they have become much more similar to their non-Jewish compatriots). By changing both the values assigned to the poles of the social comparison (redefining “primitive” as custodians of holy traditions, righteous in the eyes of God, etc.) and redirecting the comparison to those seen as weak enough to be enticed away from strict observance, members of the beleaguered ingroup can view themselves positively. It is these social identity dynamics that spurred the development of Jewish fundamentalism (what is known today as UltraOrthodox Judaism) in Eastern Europe (Almond, Appleby, & Sivan, 2003).

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According to social categorization theory (Turner et al., 1987), comparisons between the ingroup and an outgroup occur in the context of a superordinate group, which encompasses both. Because individuals are motivated to evaluate any group they belong to favorably, this superordinate group is usually positively regarded. Because this superordinate group is positive, similarity to it becomes the standard against which the ingroup and outgroup are measured: The group that compares most favorably is seen as more prototypical of the superordinate group (i.e., is more representative of its core aspects). Fig. 4.1 illustrates this process using the abovementioned Jewish examples: The mainstream Jews might use “Europeans” as the superordinate group (with whom they share their perceived enlightened modernity). Against this “European” backdrop, the Eastern European Jews are seen as relatively uncivilized and primitive. The more traditional Eastern European Jews, on the other hand, could use the superordinate group of the Jewish people. In this comparative context, the mainstreamed, Western Jews may be judged negatively, as they willfully disregard their appointed role of carrying out God’s will in the world. In summary, the companion theories of self-categorization and social identity span levels of analysis from the cognitive to the macrosocial, and thus are positioned to explain both moment-to-moment changes in group perception and behavior and the longer-term dynamics of intergroup conflict. Whereas disadvantaged group members can improve collective self-evaluation via strategic social comparisons, as we have discussed, more

Figure 4.1 Diasporic Jewish example of social comparisons

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direct efforts to advance collective goals have greater implications for politicized behavior and social change (see Chapters 6, 7, and 8). In a more general sense, the social identity approach describes how group memberships guide perception, behavior, and emotion via social norms.

THE NORMATIVE BASIS OF GROUP BEHAVIOR Social norms are rules of behavior. They inform group members how to construe a given situation, how to feel about it, and how to behave in it. They exert social influence on group members by prescribing which reactions are appropriate, and which are not (Abrams, Wetherell, Cochrane, Hogg, & Turner, 1990). Social norms hence direct individuals’ cognitions, emotions, and behaviors. They also serve as evaluative standards, against which individuals’ reactions are judged. Quite evidently, social norms are subject to consensus within specific groups—eating with a fork is appropriate in some groups while eating with sticks is more appropriate in others. While people sometimes behave in accordance with norms of salient groups they are not members of (e.g., taking one’s shoes off when entering a Hindi temple as a Christian tourist), social norms exert their full influence and are internalized only when they originate from ingroups. Because adhering to an ingroup’s social norms is a major component of what it means to be a member of that social group, this kind of normative pressure increases in tandem with identification with the group. Individuals who identify strongly with an ingroup in a specific situation are likely to exhibit the normative behaviors prescribed by that group (e.g., fans chanting together as their team’s mascot enters the field). This referent informational influence (see also Hogg & Turner, 1987) is a marker of social identification, enabling people to distinguish between members and non-members of a group, and between groups on the basis of their observably different norms. This difference in norms is a part of the normative fit referred to in the social identity approach: a group’s norms are contextually informative and socially meaningful. Because norms also supply group-members with an evaluative standard, they can contribute to a process known as group polarization. The result is that norms within the ingroup can shift to more extreme positions, as members observe their peers acting in increasingly extreme ways, and expressing more extreme versions of the original norm (Isenberg, 1986). This process may sound familiar to anyone who has participated in

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an online discussion of a political (or any other charged) issue: Individuals quickly organize themselves into opposing camps, and often end up competing with each other at slinging insults at the other camp. Unfortunately, this dynamic has very real implications to contemporary political life, an issue we explore in detail in Chapter 5.

COLLECTIVE EMOTIONS Collective emotions also play a role in the group scenario of political debate: As individuals become mostly concerned with their ingroup peers’ support for their camp’s “party line,” they often also become increasingly angry at members of the other camp, or frustrated with their inability to “get it.” You may have also experienced collective emotions such as collective shame if tourists from the same country as yours behave badly at their holiday destination (e.g., drunk and disorderly Germans complaining that no one speaks German). Such group-based emotions are based on individuals’ self-categorization as group members and often occur in response to events affecting the ingroup. Group norms not only set the evaluative context against which emotions develop (e.g., enjoy and cherish nature without harming either it or your fellow hikers’ ability to do the same), but in some cases, prescribe them directly. In Israel, for example, a strong norm within the JewishIsraeli group dictates that during Memorial Day, group members should be sad as they contemplate the fallen. As night falls, however, the normative collective emotion changes to joy, as Independence Day celebrations start. Contrarily, among Palestinian citizens, the normative collective emotion for that day is sadness or anger, as they commemorate the ingroup’s Nakba (national catastrophe). Because collective emotions are intimately linked to a group’s norms, they also serve to delineate its boundaries. In this Israeli example, they express group affiliations, recount the collective narrative of the ingroup, and thus galvanize the ingroup in opposition to the outgroup. This also serves to illustrate how emotional content can be contained in group-based nostalgia, which functions to preserve a sense of collective history and continuity (e.g., Wildschut, Bruder, Robertson, Tilburg, & Sedikides, 2014). Collective emotions are hence an especially important facet of social identities, as they often direct intergroup dynamics (Bar-Tal, Halperin, & De Rivera, 2007) and energize collective action. For example, the experience of inequality between groups may elicit different emotional

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responses. If you are a group member and your group is legitimately better off than another group, it is likely that you experience pride in your group. However, if your group is better off but for illegitimate reasons, you may feel guilt towards the other group, or feel sympathy for them (Harth, Kessler, & Leach, 2008). In Harth and colleagues’ study, pride and sympathy in particular predicted intergroup behavior, such that stronger pride increased intergroup hostility while stronger sympathy increased outgroup support. In more naturalistic settings, Imhoff and colleagues found that the ingroup’s past atrocities may evoke guilt as well as regret— two distinct emotions with the former being aversive and self-focused and the latter being less aversive and more other-focused (Imhoff, Bilewicz, & Erb, 2012). Regret was related to positive outgroup attitudes and intention to seek contact with the outgroup, while guilt was related to making amends for past wrongdoings of the ingroup. The strength and consequences of collective emotions depend on how strongly people identify with their ingroups (van Leeuwen, van Dijk, & Kaynak, 2013), showing again that they are closely linked to how strongly one is invested in the group.

BEYOND THE SOCIAL IDENTITY APPROACH Since the 1970s, the social identity approach has emerged as an influential framework for the analysis of group processes and intergroup relations. It has also been elaborated—and in some cases its premises challenged—in a number of ways that are relevant to an understanding of the dynamics of globalized identities. Here we consider: (a) the necessity of a salient outgroup for ingroup formation; (b) the primacy of self-esteem as a motivational force in group behavior; and (c) the dynamics of multiple social identities.

DOES AN INGROUP REQUIRE AN OUTGROUP? The social identity approach casts the existence of a salient outgroup as a prerequisite for the formation of any social identity or sense of “groupness.” As we have seen, one exception to this requirement was pointed out by some researchers (e.g., Cinnirella, 1998; Mummendey et al., 1999) who suggested that comparisons with regard to social identity can be carried out not only between the ingroup and an outgroup, but also between the ingroup in the present vs. the past. A positive social identity

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can thus be created not only in relation to contemporaneous others, but by recalling “how far we have come” (i.e., the advances made by the ingroup, in and of itself). Other researchers disagree with the premise that all social identity processes are comparative and competitive by nature, thus necessitating an outgroup. According to these accounts, under certain extreme conditions, an ingroup can form and elicit self-categorization even without any contrasting outgroups (e.g., Campbell, 1957). Indeed, this type of setting is often depicted in TV shows, movies, and literature: a small band of complete strangers become bonded together as they have to confront adversity by cooperating with one another. Thus, in psychological terms, an emergent sense of mutual dependency and common fate could lead to group-based identification and action in the absence of an outgroup (see also Gaertner, Iuzzini, Witt, & Oriña, 2006; Postmes, Spears, Lee, & Novak, 2005). Later in this chapter, we will argue that analogous conditions and challenges on a global scale could facilitate identification with the all-inclusive social category of humanity (Batalha & Reynolds, 2012; Reese, 2016).

MULTIPLE FUNCTIONS OF SOCIAL IDENTIFICATION Social identity theory posits that the pursuit of positive self-esteem underlies ingroup-favouring social comparisons (i.e., ingroup bias) and efforts to improve the individual or collective status. However, researchers working both within and outside the social identity approach have suggested a number of other functions that are served by social identification. Groups act as a social resource for their members (Correll & Park, 2005; Haslam, Jetten, Postmes, & Haslam, 2009), providing social support, a sense of belonging, hope, and self-efficacy (e.g., Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Cameron, 1999; Deaux, 1996; Deaux, Reid, Mizrahi, & Cotting, 1999; Hogg & Abrams, 1990; Johnson et al., 2006;). In a comprehensive attempt to go “beyond self-esteem,” Vignoles and colleagues (Vignoles, Regalia, Manzi, Golledge, & Scabini, 2006) offered an empirically validated typology of six identity motivations: • Self-esteem—The need to maintain and enhance a positive evaluation of the self. • Efficacy—The need to maintain or enhance feelings of competence and control. • Belonging—The need to maintain or enhance feelings of closeness to, or acceptance by other people.

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Distinctiveness—The need to establish and maintain a sense of differentiation from others. • Continuity—The need to maintain a sense of consistency across time and situations. • Meaning—The need to find significance in and purpose for the self’s behaviors and existence. According to this model, the degree to which a social identity satisfies these motivations determines its centrality to an individual’s sense of self. As individuals most strongly identify with the social identities that maximally fulfill these needs, they also come to cherish them emotionally, and enact them often in daily life. These affective, behavioral, and cognitive facets of a strong social identity (i.e., emotional and behavioral investment coupled with increased cognitive accessibility) could then reinforce each other, and strengthen the social identity over time. It is important to note, however, that Vignoles et al.’s (2006) conceptualization of social identities can be readily integrated within the social identity approach introduced earlier. Such an integration would hold that membership in a group would become a strong social identity to the degree that it satisfies individual needs. Once established, the processes described in the social identity approach dictate how and when a social identity would become situationally activated. This approach also helps us to understand how individuals deal with undesirable social identities, and why low-status groups persist despite the pressures to assimilate and disappear. Multiple functions of social identification, including a sense of continuity (see also Sani, 2008), support the point made above, namely that the psychological meaningfulness of ingroups does not rest entirely on comparison and competition with other groups. Indeed, a recent extension of the social identity approach to health (e.g., Haslam, 2014; Haslam et al., 2009) reflects the more fundamental importance of social identities in fostering mental and physical wellbeing. These perspectives become vitally important later, as we discuss the implications of social identities that may transcend national and cultural borders.

THE DYNAMICS OF MULTIPLE SOCIAL IDENTITIES In classical terms, social identity theory describes the dynamics of relations between a clearly defined ingroup and its opposing outgroup; that is, unipolar or binary intergroup situations (Hornsey & Hogg, 2000). Similarly, self-categorization theory describes the cognitive processes that “switch

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on” a single social identification, at the expense of the expression of other possible identities (i.e., the principle of “functional antagonism”; Turner et al., 1987). However, a focus on discrete social categories does not easily capture the blurring of boundaries that often occurs via acculturation, or the hybridization and hyphenation of identities that people negotiate in globalized and multicultural settings (e.g., see Doucerain, Dere, & Ryder, 2013). In an interconnected world, in other words, “dualities of the global and the local, the national and the international, us and them, have dissolved and merged together in new forms that require conceptual and empirical analysis” (Beck & Sznaider, 2006, p. 3). A number of social psychological models have been proposed that elaborate the dynamics of multiple social identities, in terms of both self-conception and evaluations of others (Crisp & Hewstone, 2006). Prominent among these are models describing processes that may attenuate intergroup bias. For example, the common ingroup identity model (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000) involves “recategorizing individuals formerly seen as members of different groups within a common, superordinate group identity” (Dovidio, Saguy, Gaertner, & Thomas, 2012, p. 245). Alternatively, subgroup distinctiveness can be retained within the boundaries of a shared inclusive category (e.g., ethnocultural groups within national boundaries); such dual identities can be simultaneously salient, and have the benefit of retaining distinctiveness at the subordinate level (e.g., Hornsey & Hogg, 2000). In multicultural societies, individuals are likely to have more complex social identities that offer multiple opportunities for differentiation between their ingroups (Roccas & Brewer, 2002).

THE IMPACT OF GLOBALIZATION ON SOCIAL IDENTITIES As discussed in Chapter 2, globalization creates new socio-political conditions that allow people from different countries, cultures, and worldviews to interact. At the same time, they are exposed to and derive shared experiences from global events (Ariely, 2012; Arnett, 2002). This process may enable common social representations so that people from various countries and cultures become more similar. Simultaneously, these new and changing conditions “demand that people review the way they see the world and as a consequence the way they define themselves” (Chrysochoou, 2004, p. 19). The constant redefinition of the self—as we have seen in Chapter 3, with particular visibility when it comes to consumer identities—makes it evident that globalization affects people’s

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feelings, thoughts, and actions (Chen et al., 2016). The dynamics of social identities under globalizing circumstances is also a by-product of globalization’s consumerist form.

GLOBALIZATION AND ACCULTURATION As we have seen, groups and social categories are important aspects of our identity. But how are such groups and their social functioning affected by globalization processes? There are various approaches to this question. One of the most influential theoretical accounts of transnational interaction stems from acculturation research (e.g., Berry, 1984), which argues that transnational migrants go through a process of cultural transition as they invest or divest in both their heritage and host culture streams (we elaborate on these processes in Chapter 8). While this research tradition primarily focused on migrants physically relocating into another culture, more recent accounts argue that it may also explain how we respond to globalization (Jensen & Arnett, 2012). Yet, globalization and its effects on people may be more complex than acculturation processes describing the migration from one relatively homogeneous society into another (Ozer & Schwartz, 2016). Therefore, it seems plausible to differentiate between immigrationbased acculturation and globalization-based acculturation (Chen et al., 2008): While the first is a process that occurs after international relocation (e.g., by immigrants, sojourners, or refugees), the second more explicitly acknowledges the direct and indirect intercultural contacts (e.g., through media, social networks, consumer behavior) that result in adopting ethnic and worldwide cultural practices (Chen, Benet-Martínez, Wu, Lam, & Bond, 2016; Ferguson & Bornstein, 2012; Ozer & Schwartz, 2016; see also Chapter 8). This view takes into account that effects of globalization are not merely effects of migration, but rather complex interplays of international contact, media use, and consumption of globally produced consumer goods (see also Chapter 2). These effects can occur in the absence of a physical transition from one society to another, as culture itself becomes transient. Indeed, surprisingly little psychological research has focused on individuals’ specific responses to globalization. From the existing research, it becomes clear that globalization’s influences on individuals, groups, and societies are complex and subject to dynamics that are difficult to delineate in isolation (Chen et al., 2016; Torelli, Chiu, Tam, Au, & Keh, 2011;

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Yang et al., 2011). One recent approach to the understanding of how people respond to globalization focuses on global orientation (Chen et al., 2016), or the overarching mode of response people adopt as they acculturate to a globalized world. Specifically, the authors argue that people may either respond pro-actively, namely seeking to acquire multicultural experiences and connections, or they respond defensively, resulting in ethnic protection. In multiple studies and across both Eastern and Western cultures, the authors showed that a pro-active global orientation related to higher selfesteem, self-efficacy (i.e., a person’s perceived ability to change things), cross-cultural efficacy (i.e., a person’s perceived ability to engage in positive cross-cultural encounters), and higher openness to experience and integration of different cultures into the self. A defensive global orientation, in contrast, was related to lower self-esteem, lower cross-cultural efficacy, weaker openness to experience and integration of different cultures in the self. As Chen and colleagues (2016) showed, global orientation also has political dimensions: The more leftist their participants were, the stronger was their pro-active global orientation (multicultural acquisition). In contrast, the more conservative participants indicated to be, the more defensive their global orientation (ethnic protection).

GLOBALIZATION AND EMOTIONAL EXPERIENCE Acculturation research suggests that globalization and its mediums may homogenize emotional experience across cultural divides. We know from previous research that people who interact with each other on a daily basis tend to become more emotionally similar over time (e.g., Anderson, Keltner, & John, 2003; Totterdell, 2000) because “people’s emotions become attuned to their enduring social relationships” (De Leersnyder, Mesquita, & Kim, 2011, p. 451). This conclusion was based on de Leersnyder et al.’s (2011) study of immigrants, whose emotional concordance with natives of their host society increased both with the time spent in this new culture, and the extent of their social relationships with host natives. To our knowledge, there is no research explicitly focusing on globalization processes and emotional concordance, but it is plausible that transnational cooperation and social contact can have a similar effect on emotional acculturation. It is thus likely that, as people from different cultures interact positively through social media, they build up a common rapport, which may include shared forms of emotionality (cf. Roempke et al., 2018). Furthermore, because these transnational social contacts are

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often carried out in a distinctly globalized setting (e.g., on SNS, in fan communities of international consumer brands and icons, called fandoms), they are suffused with Western-globalized culture’s values and accompanying emotional norms. Research has shown that those who participate in more globalized fandoms tend to embrace globalized culture’s values (i.e., valuing diversity), and exhibit globalized collective emotions, such as empathy for outgroup members (Plante, Roberts, Reysen, & Gerbasi, 2014). The emergence of globalized collective emotions is both a consequence and antecedent of awareness of and emotional connectedness with others, no matter how geographically remote (Reysen & KatzarskaMiller, 2013). As such, globalized collective emotions are intimately linked both to forms of globalized identities, and global collective action; two topics we will revisit in Chapter 6. These globalized collective emotions are not necessarily mediated by direct interpersonal contact, however. Often, they are disseminated by mass media, which inform viewers around the world about ongoing events, and how these events should be received, emotionally. In an early example of this, many have written about the importance of 1985’s “Live Aid” concerts addressing African famine, to the development of shared global emotions, and the incipient global community, more generally (e.g., Urry, 1999). Others, however, argue that similar highly marketed events such as “Live 8”—a set of benefit and charity concerts that took place in the G8 states in 2005—use such emotional narratives to produce “global citizens” that follow and shape the neoliberal facets of globalization (Biccum, 2007). Hence, globalized emotions are also shaped by the less interpersonal acculturative processes tied with shared exposure to the global media and structures of consumer culture. Global mass media, with its formats of news, fiction, and commercials, is a powerful source of emotional acculturation. As mentioned above, global news coverage informs viewers how to feel about local and global events (e.g., by the tone of commentary or the carefully orchestrated change in anchors’ facial expression). Fiction likewise models appropriate emotional reactions, both directly (by the protagonists) and by setting the cinematic scene to evoke the desired viewer response. Commercials, in particular, target viewers’ emotions (Bagozzi, Gopinath, & Nyer, 1999), and cumulatively instill emotional norms (Illouz, 2007). We all know how delighted we should feel if we are fortunate enough to buy the “right” car, eat at the “right” restaurant, or go on a “dream” cruise (see also Chapter 3).

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Indeed, as marketing science demonstrates, some emotions sell better than others: we usually look for something new to excite us and titillate our senses (Holbrook & Hirschmann, 1982). In a Western cultural framework, that seems almost self-evident. However, psychological research has shown that different cultures idealize different emotional states that prescribe what members should seek in their daily lives. For example, while Americans tend to rank states high on arousal and positivity (e.g., excitement) as optimal, in East Asian cultures, the preference is for lower arousal positive emotions (e.g., calm; Tsai, 2007). Because hedonism is so central in contemporary consumerism (see Chapter 3), preference for this Western type of emotional experience may be increasing around the world as consumer culture globalizes. Here again we see how consumerist forms, ostensibly separate from the more explicitly value-laden influences of globalized Western culture, may slowly affect cultural changes around the world. So, while some scholars point to globalization eliciting both positive (through exchange of ideas, goods, and practices) and negative (through uncertainty or loss of local cultures) emotions (e.g., Hermans & Dimaggio, 2007), there is little empirical research investigating the (collective) emotional reactions that are elicited by globalization-related information. Clearly, it depends on how globalization is framed: When globalization is depicted as a process that makes the job market more competitive, students reported fewer positive emotions, lower global identification, and increased desire to reject outgroups, compared to a depiction of globalization as a process that fostered a culturally diverse world (Snider, Reysen, & Katzarska-Miller, 2013). Yet, for the time being, we know little more about the effects of globalization on emotional responses.

EFFECTS OF GLOBALIZATION ON LOCAL AND NATIONAL IDENTIFICATION One of the longstanding assumptions in social scientific theory about globalization is that national and other local identities become weaker in the context of globalization forces (e.g., “increasingly global culture becomes the dominant source of our identity as national/ethnic differences dissolve,” Teeple, 2000, p. 22). Miller (1995) identified four reasons for the putative decline of nations, all of which have been linked to globalization: (a) the emergence of global markets and culture, with a

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corresponding loss of national distinctiveness; (b) increasing geographical mobility and subsequent awareness of and contact with other cultures; (c) a strengthening of identification with subordinate (e.g., ethnic) and superordinate (e.g., global) groups and categories; and (d) a shift in political and economic organizations from nation states to supranational structures. In contrast, Anthony Smith’s observations of the state of the world are as apt today as they were more than two decades ago: We are witnessing a rebirth of ethnic nationalism, of religious fundamentalisms and of group antagonisms which were thought to have been long buried [. . .] In the era of globalization and transcendence, we find ourselves caught in a maelstrom of conflicts over political identities and ethnic fragmentation [. . .] For many people a ‘narrow,’ fissiparous nationalism has become the greatest source of political danger in the contemporary world, while everywhere ethnic and national identities remain highly charged and sensitive political issues Smith, 1995, pp. 2-3.

In general, there are two competing hypotheses about the effects of globalization on social identities. Buchan and colleagues (Buchan et al., 2009) labeled these two ideal types as cosmopolitan or reactant individuals. The cosmopolitan ideal experiences heightened identification on a global community level, through their engagement in global networks and intercultural experiences. In contrast, the reactant individual bolsters attachments to local and national communities, as globalization threatens to blur the boundaries between parochial ingroups and outgroups (Castells, 2004). This might foster identification with national or fundamentalist groups (e.g., fundamental religious groups; Arnett, 2002; Grimalda et al., 2015; see also Rosenmann et al., 2016). In summary, globalization affords possibilities for both a “softening” of identity, given a potentially expanded range of affiliations and associated meanings, and a “hardening, as fundamentalist ideologies of various stripes take on an attractive certainty for many people living in what they perceive as a world in flux” (Short, 2001, p. 175). In a direct test of these competing hypotheses, Buchan and colleagues (Buchan et al., 2009) found evidence that globalization tends to work in the direction of cosmopolitanism. In a large international study (comprising samples from Argentina, Iran, Italy, Russia, South Africa, and the United States) they found that the extent and endorsement of globalization at both collective (national) and individual levels were related to global cooperation. Specifically, the more globalized a nation, the broader were people’s group boundaries, and the more they cooperated on a

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global scale. While these data are consistent with other analyses in suggesting that globalization may foster international cooperation and more expansive identification (e.g., Inglehart & Norris, 2009), they are not conclusive; the data represented only a subset of the global community, and the results cannot be interpreted in causal terms. Also, Pichler’s work (2012) suggests that the relations between globalization and cosmopolitanism are not linear, and depend on which countries are observed. For example, it is possible that people who are already broad-minded and cooperative engage in globalization-related behaviors such as seeking global social networks. There are indications of other complexities involving the relationship between globalization and national identification. In an analysis of survey data from 63 countries, Ariely (2012) found that in higher globalized nations, people tended to be less patriotic, place less importance on ethnic criteria for national identity, and express less willingness to fight for their country. However, respondents’ levels of national identification (i.e., “How close do you feel to [country]?”) and nationalism were unrelated to indexes of globalization. Thus, although global integration may diminish national attachment in some ways (and on average), it still leaves room for a striving for national superiority. In a set of yet unpublished studies, one of the authors sought to test causal effects of globalization on identity and behavior (Reese, 2018). As we have seen above, there are two prominent directions of globalization effects on identity—either a softening or a hardening of identities. However, there is a third option, such that globalization acts as moderator of identification’s effects on behavior. Specifically, this attenuation hypothesis states that globalization has to be salient in order to make a global level of identification a relevant basis for behavior. In other words, global identity should result in higher pro-social and pro-environmental outcomes only when globalization is salient. To test this assumption, two studies were designed in which research participants either received a highly (or the opposite) globalized description of a day (Study 1) or event (Study 2). When globalization was made salient, by asking people to imagine a highly internationalized and interconnected day (e.g., skyping with international colleagues, eating international produce for lunch, browsing the internet for news etc.), there was a significant relation between global identity and pro-environmental (Study 1) and promigration (Study 2) intentions. However, this effect was not replicated when globalization was not made salient (i.e., by asking people to imagine a highly localized day—working in a nearby office, eating local produce

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from the farmers market, and reading the local newspaper). While these studies provide a first glimpse into the causal processes between globalization and identity, there are obviously still a lot of open questions on this end.

FROM LOCAL TO GLOBALIZED SOCIAL IDENTITY Although the globalized world is often portrayed as “shrinking,” such that global events are increasingly local ones (Marsella, 1998), this potentially entails an expansion at the psychological level. Thus, globalization provides a broad context in which identification as a human being (as opposed to, e.g., a Canadian, a woman, or a member of an ethnic group) increasingly “makes sense.” It also highlights various ways in which humans can feel interdependent and can have a sense of common fate with respect to global issues such as climate change. This has been recognized by sociologists (e.g., Kennedy & Danks, 2001; Scholte, 2000), political scientists (e.g., Miller, 1995), and the United Nations—whose Commission on Human Security (2003) included “clarifying the need for a global human identity” (p. 141) as one key to future global wellbeing. However, it is only relatively recently that varieties of human-level or global identification have been operationalized and empirically explored. As explicated before, we can identify with groups at various levels of abstraction—up to the highest possible level of human identification. This expansive and potentially global identification has become more accessible as international travel, trade, the internet, and the spread of social networks allow interaction and consumption that transcend geographic boundaries. More and more people have access to similar news or entertainment via global media, and this “participation in global networks reshapes individuals’ social identity by expanding the number and inclusiveness of groups to which individuals experience a sense of belonging and identification” (Grimalda et al., 2015, p. 6). Put differently, the processes of globalization expand the options to emotionally and psychologically attach to other people, even in remote parts of the world. Ultimately, this could result in an ingroup encapsulating all groups—a global social identity. Or, as Giddens (1991) put it, humankind would become a “we” without “the others.” International survey research suggests that identifying as a global citizen is indeed becoming a more accessible and popular self-definition. In early 2016, a poll of over 20,000 people in 14 countries found that 49% of

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respondents agreed with the statement, “I see myself more as a global citizen than a citizen of my own country” (Globescan, 2016). Although there was considerable variability across countries—ranging from a low of 24% in Russia to 43% in the U.S. to a high of 73% in Nigeria—people in emerging economies were more likely to think about their citizenship in global terms. In psychology, research over the last decade has arrived at different conceptualizations of what exactly makes individuals globally identified. Thus, identifying as a global citizen (Reysen & KatzarskaMiller, 2013), a cosmopolitan (Faulkner, 2018), or with a common humanity (McFarland et al., 2012; Reese, 2016; Reese, Proch, & Finn, 2015) has become a widely debated research theme. Even earlier, in his seminal work on prejudice, Gordon Allport described identification with all humans as a “hopeful possibility” (1954/(Allport (1979)), p. 43) for harmonious intergroup relations and global cooperation (see also Messner, Guarín, & Haun, 2013). Theoretically, this hope makes sense: As we learned above, we care for our group and its members when we identify with them. Thus, if we identify strongly with the group of all humans, we should be keen to act on behalf of humanity, even for people at geographically remote places and for culturally distant subgroups.

THE PROMISE OF GLOBAL IDENTIFICATION In recent years, various research groups across the world investigated identities that span national, continental, and cultural boundaries. A number of studies confirm that people who identify strongly with the group of all humans tend to act on behalf of this whole group. Some of these findings will be described in more detail in the following paragraphs. Among the first to systematically elaborate the construct of a humanlevel identification, McFarland and colleagues (McFarland, Webb, & Brown, 2012) introduced the identification with all humanity (IWAH) measure. This measure asks people to rate various statements related to perceiving all humans as one family and how much they would be willing to act on behalf of those in need. People who scored highly on the IWAH measure tended to be more supportive of human rights policies, were more prone to donate to charity, and showed more empathy and concern for those in need (McFarland et al., 2012; McFarland, Brown, & Webb, 2013). Based on these findings, Reese and colleagues analyzed the underlying structure of IWAH (Reese, Proch, & Finn, 2015), revealing that two dimensions underlie IWAH—a more cognitive self-definition

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dimension, and a more action-oriented self-investment and solidarity dimension (following the identification model by Leach et al., 2008). Their studies showed that the latter dimension in particular predicts the pro-social and globally responsible outcomes of identification with all humans. In other words, if solidarity with others in the world is part of our identifying with humanity, it is more likely that we act accordingly. Indeed, Reese and colleagues (2015) found causal evidence for this effect of self-investment. Using different posters representing multinational collectives, they increased participants’ self-investment, which in turn led them to donate more (real) money to a global—rather than a local—organization. Subsequent research (e.g., Barth & Reese, 2018; McFarland & Hornsby, 2015; Reysen & Hackett, 2016) confirmed the twodimensional structure of IWAH. Similarly, in a multinational study on cooperation (Buchan et al., 2011), participants had the opportunity to cooperate with others by investing money in either local, national, or global common accounts. Those who indicated they identified on a global level were more willing to contribute to the global rather than the local fund. This finding led the authors to the conclusion that “an inclusive social identification with the world community is a meaningful psychological construct and [. . .] plays a role in motivating cooperation that transcends parochial interests.” (p. 825). Research employing other behavioral outcomes and measures of global identification came to very similar and encouraging conclusions. Reese and Kohlmann (2015) showed that global identification also related to consumer decisions. In their study, participants first completed a questionnaire including a global identity measure (adapted from Buchan et al., 2011). At the end of the study, participants were free to choose a chocolate bar as a compensation for their participation. They had the choice between either a big conventional chocolate bar or a small, Fairtrade chocolate bar. In line with the idea of global identity, the more strongly people identified with all humans, the more likely they were to choose the Fairtrade chocolate bar. This effect could be explained by high identifiers’ sense of and desire for global justice (see also Reese, Proch, & Cohrs, 2014, for responses to global inequality). Global identification is also indirectly related to action on behalf of the human ingroup. Evidence from various studies reveals that global identification is also related to pro-environmental attitudes and action. For example, in their conceptualization of global citizenship, Reysen and Katzarska-Miller (2013) showed that stronger identification on the

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human-level (or global citizenship identification as they term it) predicted sustainability attitudes. This was also shown in the representative sample of the World Value Survey in which global citizenship identification predicts stronger support for NGOs focusing on conservation, willingness to pay higher taxes for environmental issues, and active NGO membership (Rosenmann et al., 2016). Similarly, Renger and Reese (2017) showed that global identification predicted pro-environmental intentions, even when controlling for pro-environmental attitudes, norms, and perceived behavioral control. Applying these findings to the geo-political realm, Batalha and Reynolds (2012) suggested introducing the formation of superordinate human identity in global climate change conferences. They argued that through a stepwise process of forming like-minded groups across national boundaries, a common, superordinate identity could be formed that would ultimately bring together politicians from various countries (for more detail on this process, see Chapter 7). Such a superordinate group, in turn, could help reaching global goals such as mitigating climate change (for a similar, justice oriented approach to global identity, see Reese, 2016). But how do we become global citizens, cosmopolitans, or highly identified members of the human ingroup? This is not yet satisfyingly answered, as research devoted to this question is still very scarce. Nevertheless, several potential pathways have been discussed in the literature. First, some scholars argue that a deep feeling of identification with all humans relies on socialization processes in youth and adolescence (McFarland et al., 2012; McFarland, 2011). Second, Renger and Reese (2017) showed that experiencing respect (i.e., mutual recognition as equals) from other human beings was related to higher global identification. While this finding is preliminary, it opens up research avenues testing causal mechanisms of experiencing respectful treatment by others. At least among members of smaller groups (e.g., working groups), respect is causally linked to ingroup identification (Simon, Mommert, & Renger, 2015). Third, and potentially most promising, is the following key aspect of globalization—the opportunity and ubiquity of international contacts. We know from decades of social psychological research on intergroup contact (for a review, see Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006) that positive contact with outgroup members improves intergroup attitudes, and helps crafting common bonds with people from other groups (Turner, Hewstone, Voci, & Vonafakou, 2008; Wright & Richard, 2010). Based on this argument, a

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set of studies by Roempke and colleagues (Roempke, Fritsche, & Reese, 2018) showed for the first time that transnational contact via social media indeed increased global identification. In their studies, international contact was manipulated using a simulated chat paradigm. After a chat with a simulated person from another continent (compared with various control groups), participants indicated stronger global identification, which in turn related to stronger global and pro-environmental concern. Fourth, deRivera (deRivera, 2018; deRivera & Carson, 2015) suggests that we need globally-shared rituals in order to feel like a global community. In a cross-national study with more than 2,000 participants from 25 different countries (deRivera, 2018), a majority of people indicated that they would be willing to partake in celebrations of a global community, in particular when these would relate to themes such as justice for future generations. It is yet to be determined, however, whether participation in such celebrations would have an impact on community experience, identification with all of humanity, or, ultimately, behavioral responses. Finally, it has been argued that the lack of a strong symbol representing one human ingroup may pose a problem in communicating a common human identity (Reese, 2016; see also Allport, 1954). All nations in the world, as well as religions and other transnational institutions make use of such symbols (e.g., through flags) that are strongly connected to their groups’ beliefs, worldviews, and loyalty (Becker, Enders-Comberg, Wagner, Christ, & Butz, 2012). These symbols often carry a strong emotional charge, such that disrespecting them (e.g., burning a nation’s flag) is considered a moral, and potentially criminal offence in many contexts (Becker et al., 2017). Developing and promoting such a symbol encapsulating humanity as a whole could help us to overcome the challenges that affect all humans alike (for an illustrative attempt, see www.flagofplanetearth.com/). To briefly summarize, identifying on a global level is related to various attitudes, intentions, and behaviors designed to benefit the group of all humans. Stronger global identification encourages stronger support of human rights, global justice motivation, donations for charity, and sustainable behavior, among others. At the same time, much is still unknown about the conditions in which people adopt a global identity. Socialization processes, mutually respectful interaction, and transnational contact are potential pathways to global identity, but much more work is required.

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LIMITATIONS OF GLOBAL IDENTIFICATION While there would seem to be much promise in establishing a global identity, there is also reason for skepticism about whether a global identity is a feasible pathway to global cooperation and concern. Much like the promising research above, here too, more work is needed. Below we suggest four conceptual problems which may limit the utility of these inclusive global identities. First, as Allport (1954) already noted, the “hopeful possibility” of all humans identifying as one ingroup is dampened by the “special difficulty in fashioning an in-group out of an entity as embracing as humankind” (p. 43). A human ingroup with currently 7.5 billion group members would be characterized—besides its sheer size—by enormous heterogeneity of worldviews and beliefs that may be impossible to subsume into one category. Even if we could negotiate a common identity, it would likely be too large and abstract to fulfill needs for belonging, meaning, and distinctiveness (cf. Brewer, 1991; Vignoles et al., 2006; see Rosenmann et al., 2016). These limitations arise in the context of contemporary debates about globalization, as in British Prime Minister Theresa May’s rejection of global identity: “if you believe you are a citizen of the world, you are a citizen of nowhere” (Bearak, 2016). A monolithic variable like “identification with all humanity” may be ill-suited to capturing people’s multifaceted social, cultural, and political realities. Second, and directly related to the first issue is the fact that the actual content and meaning of a human social category cannot be easily defined. As can be seen above, some conceptualizations of global identity already explicitly include pro-social content (e.g., helping those in need in the IWAH measure; McFarland et al., 2012) while others are more generically assessing identification (e.g., through shared commonalities, similarities; e.g., Buchan et al., 2011; Reese & Kohlmann, 2015). While some of these measures have been applied in various countries in the world (beyond Western countries typically sampled in mainstream psychological research) it is evident that the ingroup “all humans” would be very loosely defined if it can be applied equally to individuals all over the world (Rosenmann et al., 2016). Certainly, global identity as conceptualized in social psychology relates to helping, charity generosity, and support of universal human rights. Yet, even universal human rights are subject to various scholarly debates about whether these are truly universal, or bound to the individual-centered traditions of primarily Western liberal

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humanism. So, if even these apparently fundamental, universal rights may not be culturally neutral (Twose & Cohrs, 2015), how can a global identity be? A third issue refers to the situational activation of global identification. According to the social identity approach, a social category becomes salient when it can be contrasted to other relevant social categories (Haslam & Reicher, 2012; Turner et al., 1987). How could a human-level ingroup stand out? Appiah (2006) summarized the problem this way: “the trouble with humanity, as an identity, is that, until the War of the Worlds begins, there is no out-group to generate the binding energy that every human ingroup needs [. . .]. Humanity isn’t, in the relevant sense, an identity at all” (p. 98). Thus, it remains an open question whether a global identity could be a relevant representation of an ingroup in many situations; it is simply not as ubiquitous as more particularistic identities. However, it is possible that global identity may be a relatively stable, individual characteristic so that for some people, it may be a chronically accessible representation of the self. Also, as we learned above, a contrasting outgroup is not always necessary for a sense of identification to develop (Gaertner et al., 2006). Fourth, and finally, we have to be aware of the fact that recategorization into superordinate categories can be problematic for many groups. On the one hand, research on the common ingroup identity model (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000) shows that a common superordinate identity can alleviate intergroup tensions. On the other hand, such superordinate categories can also be used by members of high-status subgroups to stabilize the power relations within the superordinate group, and thereby legitimize potential inequalities within its boundaries (Dovidio et al., 2012). In a global context, high-status groups could make use of a global human ingroup by defining it using their standards, which would lead them to perceive other groups within the human ingroup as less representative, which in turn would legitimize existing inequalities between groups. There is empirical evidence for such a process; in various studies, using different measures of prototypicality as well as behavioral outcomes, Reese and colleagues (Reese et al., 2012, 2016) showed that the more people from high industrialized countries perceived they—but not others—defined the group of all humanity (i.e., perceive their local ingroup as highly prototypical of the superordinate human group), the more they believed that inequality between developed and developing countries was legitimate, and the less willing they were to engage in action against global inequality.

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These challenges to crafting a truly global identity should not prevent us from thinking in global terms and opening our “sphere of moral inclusion” (Opotow, Gerson, & Woodside, 2005) to distant and different people and cultures. On the contrary, they provide insight into the contextual, political, and discursive (e.g., Croucher, 2014) sensitivities of global identifications. In a world where many competing or complementary identities can be simultaneously available, this is an issue that deserves serious attention. Globalization provides manifold reminders of Tajfel’s maxim that social identities do not occur in a vacuum; rather, they take on meaning and force in specific contexts and ideological conditions. Here we agree with Reicher and Hopkins (2001) that “the attempt to find generic relationships between the level of identification (at whatever level; personal, national, or supranational) and behavior will fail if, as happens all too often, the situated historical and cultural context is ignored and specific meanings are not incorporated into process” (p. 36). In the subsequent chapters, we expand on this view, beginning in Chapter 5 with an explication of the political dynamics of globalization at both individual and collective levels.

SUMMARY Taken together, Chapter 4 introduced the social psychological perspective we apply to the psychology of globalization: the social identity approach. We introduced its conceptual framework with some illustrative examples, and described the fundamental distinction between “us” and “them” that underscores the approach. We then delineated how globalization changes the way people think of who and what they are and where they belong, and we discussed identifications at different levels of inclusiveness, from the smallest local groups to the largest social categories, and how their emergence relates to processes of globalization (e.g., through internetbased group formation). Finally, we discussed the potential as well as the psychological limitations and perils of large transnational collectives.

CHAPTER 5

A Political Psychology of Responses to Globalization From the first four chapters, it should be evident that the processes of globalization are inherently political. Most directly, they deal with questions of political authority (e.g., national governmentality vs. market forces vs. transnational bodies) and political power (Griva & Chryssochoou, 2015). More generally, as they engender profound changes to social, economic, and cultural arrangements, globalizing processes transform human lives and ways of living. The prioritization of certain societal aims and cultural values over others is often the bedrock of political discourse. At least partly because of this, we imagine, psychologists have largely steered clear of these areas of study. Scientific objectivity (and thus authority) is liable to become suspect if the science in question is seen as taking sides in a political discourse. It is fortunate then, that these processes of globalization are both complexly interdependent and contradictory enough as to elude any attempt to be mapped onto the single dimension of right-wing versus left-wing political orientation (Rosenmann, 2017).

WHAT IS THE APPEAL? THE STABILITY AND LEGITIMACY OF THE GLOBAL SOCIAL ORDER As discussed in Chapter 4, social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) posits that those disadvantaged by any social order may express agency on either a personal or collective level; that is, by striving for a better position as individuals or as a group. It seems that although the current global social order disadvantages many, the overwhelming reaction to it is positive. Perhaps because of this perplexing complexity, simplified by many as the only conceivable way forward (Kasser et al., 2007), people around the world have a favorable overall view of globalization. According to the Pew Global Attitudes Project (2003), for example, “people almost everywhere like globalization.” Even as much has changed in the years since that report, most people around the world seem to still approve of globalization. A more recent report from 2014 queried sentiments about The Psychology of Globalization DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-812109-2.00005-7

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globalization’s maligned economic aspects only to conclude that “publics across a diverse range of advanced, emerging and developing economies overwhelmingly say that international trade and global business ties are good for their country” (Pew Research Center, 2014). This highly approving response (median of 81%) is especially noteworthy as many people (especially in developed countries) seem to have become increasingly more skeptical of whether these processes could indeed deliver on their promises (of lowering prices, creating jobs, stimulating growth, etc.). Why then do so many people and groups around the world hold globalization, and globalized Western culture, in high regard? First, given disproportionate Western access to, and control of, global resources (e.g., financial, military, and diplomatic power), it is clear that globalized Western culture is dominant. Aligning with it thus yields great benefits for groups and individuals, in terms of access to both objective resources and a sense of symbolic worth or superiority. This sense of superiority rests on the prevailing portrayals of globalized Western culture as the route to enlightenment, progress, modernity, and prosperity (Moghaddam, 2009; Rosenmann, 2016). As we have already seen in previous chapters, most media outlets around the world feature globalized Western images of the individual “good life” (Dittmar, 2007), and the collective “good world” (of technological innovation and social progress). By identifying with globalized Western culture, every person and group can ostensibly buy into these promises of consumer bliss. Second, in social identity theory’s terms, globalized Western culture creates a relatively stable and legitimate social order, where even subordinates often accept their inferior position. This “consensual inferiority” (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, p. 37) seems especially likely if rival outgroups are perceived to be further still from the top of the global ladder. Indeed, some groups use level of participation in globalization itself to rank themselves as superior to their rivals. Several studies demonstrate that alignment with globalized Western culture drives the exclusion of “backwards” outgroups, above and beyond contributions of political and demographic variables. In a recent series of studies of Jewish Israelis (who ally themselves with globalized Western culture; Ram, 2004), measured and manipulated identification with this global culture was associated with exclusionary reactions toward local outgroups who are perceived to be less aligned with it (e.g., Palestinian Arabs; Rosenmann, 2016). Similarly, a 2002 survey of a large probability sample of Turkish adults showed that secularism,

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neo-liberal economic attitudes, and favorable attitudes towards globalization predicted the belief that Kurds have a deleterious impact on Turkish society (Dixon & Ergin, 2010). The researchers discussed these findings as indicative of the then prevailing Turkish desire for cultural modernization and greater global integration. In this context, participants perceived the mostly traditional Kurdish minority as a “cultural impediment” to Turkey’s global ascension (p. 1343). While circumstances within Middle Eastern societies may have since changed, these studies are important demonstrations of the social identity functions of alignment with globalized Western culture. Thirdly, on a more individual level, globalized Western culture promotes the channeling of self-expression, self-worth, and other psychological needs into the furrows allotted by consumer culture. Within this cultural system, constant consumption wards off existential insecurities and replaces them with an assurance of a better tomorrow lying within everyone’s reach (Shachar, Erdem, Cutright, & Fitzsimons, 2011). These meritocratic and consumeristic ideologies—as we have outlined in Chapter 3—have a strong palliative function even for those who are individually or collectively disadvantaged by the social order (McCoy & Major, 2007). In sum, this system is likely most appealing to those positioned as inferior (e.g., because of their race, gender, or religion) in “old,” particularistic social hierarchies. However, whereas in many cases these minority group members retain their inferior position in the “new” social order as well, globalized Western culture largely quashes the potential for collective action outside the confines of consumerism. For others, alignment with globalized Western culture offers access to important resources, or a sense of superiority over collective rivals. Support for globalizing processes thus rises from three types of interlocking considerations (see Fig. 5.1). First, globalization is the dominant force shaping the world, and it favors the interests of Western nations. The bounty available to those who align with the powerful includes both symbolic status and access to actual resources. Second, the cultural dominance of the West within the emergent globalized culture serves to promote its specific values and worldviews, as well as their superiority and universal applicability. Third, the dynamic forms of globalization are seen by many as inescapable, rendering resistance a futile endeavor. Likewise, the propagation of consumerist forms of culture and selfhood, which are integral to these processes, further naturalizes this changed state of affairs. Through this, globalization is defined as inevitable progress, while simultaneously allowing potentially

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Figure 5.1 Summary of factors driving support for globalization and the global social system.

oppositional reactions to be discharged without fundamentally challenging the system (see discussion in Chapter 3).

WHO IS DISENCHANTED? VECTORS OF OPPOSITION TO GLOBALIZED WESTERN CULTURE Because the prevailing social order maximally serves the interests of only a few global “winners,” in almost every cultural group a conflict exists (albeit to varying degrees) between the global order and the interests of self and ingroup. Despite the relative stability of this system, then, individuals and collectives do oppose globalized Western culture, as recent events have made clear. We suggest that two distinct options of dissent are evident: a particularistic opposition and a universalistic opposition. Whereas these vectors of opposition stem from different motivations, they both result in rejection of the global social order, but not necessarily of globalized Western culture’s content. Particularistic opposition. As described above, globalized Western culture may undermine heritage cultures and threaten their vitality or survival.

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Maintaining the vitality of particularistic cultures is arguably a global human interest. Because they offer a unique way of constructing and responding to the world, their partial or full disappearance impoverishes human possibilities and wisdom. This loss of cultural diversity, seen in recent decades, is similar to the catastrophic reduction in natural biodiversity—both types of diversity are treasure troves of evolved responses to different challenges, now made inaccessible by mass extinction (Moghaddam, 2006). Individuals and groups who perceive such a threat to their heritage culture often times voice particularistic opposition to globalized Western culture. Heritage cultural identities are not only central to many individuals’ sense of self, but they also root the individual within a coherent and meaningful world. Members of cultural groups are thus often eager to maintain the vitality of their heritages in the face of assimilatory pressures from the dominant culture (Berry, 1997). In the global arena, “reaffirmation” or “revitalization” efforts are clearly evident in response to pressures imposed by globalized Western culture (Berry, 2008). These particularistic rejections buttress a local cultural enclave, “harden” its boundaries (Short, 2001), and position it in opposition to globalized Western culture. Such opposition exists both as a “knee-jerk” reaction to the cultural intermixing globalization brings (Chiu et al., 2009; Chiu, Gries, Torelli, & Cheng, 2011; Torelli, Chiu, Tam, Au, & Keh, 2011), and as a more collectively elaborated response against globalized Western cultural values and social order. Much of the scholarly and lay discussion of particularistic opposition has focused on religious fundamentalism and nationalism as platforms for the rejection of globalized Western culture and the existential uncertainties it brings (e.g., Arnett, 2002; Kinnvall, 2004). From the perspective of social identity theory, this particularistic rejection of globalized Western culture allows lower-status cultural groups to disengage from the global intergroup comparisons (e.g., in terms of progress and modernity) that render them inferior (e.g., “backwards”). Instead, these groups employ alternative comparison dimensions (e.g., cultural authenticity and distinction, adherence to God’s commands) on which they rank superior to more globalized rivals. Studies conducted in predominantly Arab-Muslim societies, widely seen as adversaries of globalized Western culture and interests (Alexander, Levin, & Henry, 2005), provide indirect support for these ideas. For example, even students of the American University of Beirut

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most commonly ascribe a barbarian image to the Western world. This understanding acknowledges the global dominance of the West, yet defines it as transient because of Western culture’s substantive inferiority to the local culture (Alexander et al., 2005). In such adversarial settings, globalized Western culture’s universalistic aspirations are recast as missionary, and its value inconsistencies understood as a hypocritical and cynical masking of Imperialist power (Moghaddam, 2009). Furthermore, because the global social order is so highly polarized, those who advocate societal egalitarianism define globalized Western culture as an apparatus of global dominance to be opposed whenever and however possible (Alexander et al., 2005; Levin, Henry, Pratto, & Sidanius, 2003; Sidanius, Henry, Pratto, & Levin, 2004). In these settings, preferences for egalitarianism predicted support for violence against the West (including the 9/11 attacks as discussed further below; Levin et al., 2003). Understanding these extreme, potentially violent reactions is undoubtedly of great importance, but this oppositional sentiment is by no means limited to them. In fact, available data shows that in most nations around the world, a majority of the sampled public shares this oppositional sentiment: Even in many places where American movies, television, and music are quite popular, people essentially say they have too much America in their lives and they worry about losing their own cultures and traditions to Americanization. In 37 of 46 countries (excluding the United States) at least half of those surveyed said the spread of American ideas and customs is having a negative impact on their own societies. Pew Research Center (2008)

Repeating this analysis with the most recent data from the Pew Global Attitudes Project (2012 13) demonstrates that in 20 out of the 31 sampled nations a majority considers American culture a bad influence. This sentiment indeed seems strongest amongst Muslim nations (e.g., 83% in Egypt), but resonates with many other publics (69% in Russia, 61% in Argentina), including in Western Europe (e.g., 72% in Germany). Even where these cultural reservations were not voiced by an absolute majority of the sample, they still, at times, outnumber those who welcome the globalization of their culture. Only in about a quarter of the countries surveyed (9/31) this positive sentiment outweighs reservations (e.g., 43% vs 34% in China, 58% vs 37% in Japan, 57% vs 27% in South Africa; respectively), but how these sentiments react to changes in local political

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discourse and other geo-political shifts remains a subject for speculation for the time-being. Universalistic opposition. Although perhaps less visible, a second vector of opposition does not reject the values of globalized Western culture as a whole, but rather strives to apply its humanist, inclusive elements more vigorously by challenging the global social order. As described above, globalized Western culture perpetuates a hierarchy based on neo-liberal economics and a global consumer culture (Nafstad & Blakar, 2012). This conflicts with other elements of its cultural content, such as its emphasis on universal human welfare and a sense of global citizenship (Reysen & Katzarska-Miller, 2013). Indeed, if global citizenship is to be taken seriously, it is impossible to disregard concerns about the (un)sustainability of global economic development. The march of economic globalization, which lies at the core of the global social order, has incurred great costs to the natural environment, and the distributive justice of global resources (e.g., Babones, 2002; Korczeniewicz & Moran, 1997; cf. Olson, 1997; see also Chapter 7). In other words, whereas globalized Western culture’s neo-liberal practices mandate little concern for the effects of economic activities on the environment or people in the global periphery, humanistic values inherent in the same culture promote such concerns. Thus, universalistic opposition to globalized Western culture entails the rejection of its social order, but not necessarily the rejection of its entire cultural frame. In support of this, research shows that in globally aligned, Western settings, endorsement of egalitarianism predicts involvement with “antiglobalization” protest and universalistic opposition of global injustices (Cameron & Nickerson, 2009). In summary, reactions to globalized Western culture may be schematized in terms of cultural identification and rejection, and acceptance of, or opposition to, its social order. In many cases, the dominant actors on inter- and intranational levels align themselves with globalized Western culture, contributing to its power, while availing themselves of its resources (Ram, 2004). Dissenting stances toward globalized Western culture may take the forms of particularistic or universalistic opposition. The latter vector coincides with other emerging strands of cooperative global identities, such as identification with all of humanity or the global community (e.g., McFarland, Webb, & Brown, 2012), which has received detailed empirical attention (see Chapter 4).

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INDIVIDUALS’ IDEOLOGICAL INCLINATIONS AND THE POLITICAL REACTIONS TO GLOBALIZATION As the preceding discussion illustrates, globalization and globalized Western culture pose both realistic and symbolic threats to individuals around the world, or alternatively, affords them with both types of opportunities. Moreover, the perception of globalizing processes, and the accompanying political reactions to it, depend on the local social context, its level of perceived compatibility with the values of globalized Western culture and positioning in the globalized social order. Within these local contexts, reactions additionally vary as a function of individuals’ worldviews and ideological inclinations. These individual-level variables are discussed in political psychology mainly in terms of two complementary ideological inclinations which underscore specific political attitudes, judgments, and policy preferences (Duckitt, 2001). These correspond to the two facets of conservative right-wing ideologies: traditionalist and dogmatic social conservativism measured by the RWA scale (right-wing authoritarianism; Altemeyer, 1998) and power-hungry desire for group dominance captured by the SDO scale (social dominance orientation; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994). These two facets strongly correlate with each other (especially within the context of established democratic political systems; Duriez, Van Hiel, & Kossowska, 2005), but nonetheless represent different motivational concerns, and therefore underscore different political sensitivities. The dynamics of individuals’ ideological inclinations and the sociocultural context in which they are embedded not only invoke specific political reactions toward globalizing processes, but may also be reciprocally shaped by them. Both RWA and SDO are ideological inclinations, which reflect not only individuals’ personalities, but also their specific beliefs about the nature of the social world, and the values that should govern it (Duckitt, 2001). These ideological inclinations can thus change in response to macrolevel sociocultural changes or shifts in position within these systems (Liu, Huang, & McFedries, 2008). Importantly, these ideological inclinations manifest fundamental social worldviews and value priorities, which are transmitted within communities from one generation to the next (Duriez & Soenens, 2009). Because of this, endorsement of RWA and SDO ideologies (by individuals, and aggregated on a community level) may respond to the social conditions of globalization, while they also direct the political responses toward them.

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SDO—SOCIAL DOMINANCE ORIENTATION SDO is a generalized preference for a hierarchical (vs. egalitarian) social order. It indexes a desire for group dominance and legitimizes such dominance and concomitant distributive injustice by whatever ideological means available in a specific societal discourse (Guimond et al., 2013). Stemming from a competitive worldview, where the strong flourish at the expense of the weak, SDO predicts identification with dominant groups, and endorsement of policies that promote and stabilize hierarchical social order (Pratto et al., 1994). Economic conservatism, the preference for minimal state regulation of free-market economic activities, is a prominent example of such policies, as unrestricted capitalism both creates and legitimizes a steep social hierarchy (Costa-Lopes et al., 2013). Indeed, Duckitt (2001; Duckitt & Sibley, 2009) cite economic conservatism as one of the conceptual forerunners of SDO. Across many studies, SDO was found to be a unique predictor of economic conservatism (e.g., Feldman & Johnston, 2014; Perry & Sibley, 2013; Pratto et al., 1994).

SDO AND SUPPORT FOR GLOBALIZATION As reviewed above, globalizing processes establish exactly this kind of socioeconomic system, in which to the victor go the spoils. Additionally, globalized Western culture and consumer culture have powerful palliative properties in legitimizing this type of steep social hierarchy, as they enshrine free competition as the only mechanism for progress (see Chapters 2 and 3). Thus, studies have linked higher SDO with endorsement of meritocracy (Pratto, Stallworth, & Conway-Lanz, 1998) and racial “color blindness” (e.g., Levin et al., 2012), which are also hallmark features of globalized Western culture. Indeed, this path leading from SDO to economic conservatism and from it to positive emotional reactions towards globalized Western culture received empirical support in a recent study of Jewish Israelis. This path was counteracted, however, by SDO’s links with conservative opposition to globalized Western culture’s more socially liberal emphases (Rosenmann, 2017). Other studies found a more unequivocal link between higher SDO and support of globalization and globalized Western culture, as well as between lower SDO and the rejection of the economic and sociocultural aspects of globalization. If, as some maintain, sociocultural globalization is reducible to a “belief system [that] portrays some human groups as

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possessing agency, in contra-distinction with the natural environment and other human groups, and legitimizes the domination by the agentic groups of both the natural environment and human others” (Kashima, 2007, p. 134), then its compatibility with high SDO becomes undebatable. In this view, globalization supplies higher SDO individuals with both the ideological legitimization for the exploitive domination of others, and a world of opportunities to do so. This holds true for members of globally disadvantaged groups as well, as higher SDO dampens identification with low-status ingroups and is linked with desire for social mobility out of them (Pratto et al., 2006). In the global context, less developed countries are lower in status, and therefore higher SDO drives individuals to identify less with them, and more with the global hegemony as evinced by globalized Western culture’s social order (Sidanius, Henry, Pratto, & Levin, 2004) and its more selfserving content. Within the globally lower-status context of Arab societies, higher SDO predicted lowered levels of local (Arab) identification (Levin, Henry, Pratto, & Sidanius, 2003) and more favorable emotional reaction to, diminished stereotyping of, and decreased support for violence against Americans (Levin, Pratto, Matthews, Sidanius, & Kteily, 2013). Conversely, the same studies show that those who scored lower on SDO within this context showed greater anger towards America, more prejudicial responses to Americans and greater support for terrorist attacks against America and American civilians. This support of terrorism is understood locally as counter-dominance measures taken by those subjugated by the global social order (Sidanius et al., 2004; see also Chapter 6). Endorsement of this kind of violent counter-dominance is further fueled by perceptions that globalized Western culture’s hegemony is blameworthy for its conflicts with the Muslim world and is responsible for the latter’s economic underdevelopment (Zhirkov, Verkuyten, & Weesie, 2012). Arguably, while this low SDO violence seeks to further particularistic aims (e.g., to deter Western governments and global businesses from further encroachment into the ingroup’s territory, culture, or social systems), its rhetoric incorporates universalist and global elements (Sidanius, Kteily, Levin, Pratto, & Obaidi, 2016). Historically, this has allowed these terrorist resistance movements to build alliances with like-minded movements in other regions of the world, and mount coordinated attacks (see, e.g., the activities of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine in the 1970s; BBC, 2014). Since then, however, terrorism originating from

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the Middle East has mostly substituted this type of secular-universalist rhetoric with the rhetoric of the universality of Islam1. In fully globalized contemporary contexts, lower SDO seems to motivate a more clearly universalistic opposition to the globalized social order, stressing instead the beneficent aspects of globalized Western culture content. Indeed, lower SDO is associated with identification with social movements that focus on global issues of social-inequality and ecological sustainability, as well as intention to protest against these aspects of globalization (Cameron & Nickerson, 2009). In these contexts, lower SDO indexes a desire to change the status quo created by the globalized social order, and legitimized by globalized Western culture’s more hierarchyenhancing emphases, while plausibly endorsing more egalitarian and humanistic forms of global identifications (e.g., Cohrs & Asbrock, 2009; Reese et al., 2014). Indeed, some studies suggest that lower SDO scores are related to stronger identification with all humanity and other forms of cooperative global identity (McFarland et al., 2012; Reese et al., 2015). It is additionally possible for lower SDO to energize violent counterdominance measures in universalistic opposition to globalized Western culture (e.g., eco-terrorism, anarchical riots). However, Cameron and Nickerson (2009) found that while lower SDO predicted normative, nonviolent forms of protest against globalization, it did not predict nonnormative (and potentially violent) protest amongst their sample of individuals from developed countries. The available (albeit scant) psychological research does not seem to support this possibility then, as the association between lower SDO and violent collective actions against globalized Western culture has only been documented in the context of particularistic opposition to globalized Western culture, found in less globalized settings. Contrarily, within economically developed contexts, potentially violent particularistic opposition to globalized Western culture may be driven by high SDO, in line with its general association with political and intergroup violence (e.g., Pratto et al., 1998). In this strain of particularistic rhetoric and action in opposition to globalized Western culture, globalization is but a euphemism for a “New World Order” that conspires to 1

Note that the preceding section focuses on Arab and/or Muslim societies solely because of their disproportionate representation within available literature. Islam may not be much different than other proselytic religions, which can all serve as platforms for particularistic opposition to globalized Western culture. This point is revisited later.

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subjugate previously dominant groups. In the American context, such feelings of frustrated entitlement have been implicated in terror attacks carried out by White Christian men, who feel their hegemonic place was usurped by outsiders and traitors from within (Crenshaw, 2000). Notably, these understandings of the meaning of globalizing processes stand in stark contrast to each other. Whereas outside of fully globalized societies, particularistic movements see “globalization” as shorthand for American/Western cultural Imperialism (Sidanius et al., 2016), for large sections of the American right it represents a campaign to weaken America. This nowadays mainstream understanding sees the new order of the globalized world as serving the interests of transnational “Davos Men,” whose lofty ideals of cosmopolitanism are but ploys to maximize their exploitative control at the expense of “regular Americans.” For them, globalization ironically threatens America’s hegemonic global position, which is increasingly challenged by its global competitors (Tett, 2017).

GLOBALIZATION’S POTENTIAL IMPACT ON LEVELS OF SDO Sociocultural position does not only determine the kind of response to globalization potentiated by high versus low SDO motivations, but may also form a feedback loop with SDO levels, and the worldviews which underlie them. While scholars originally suggested that the belief that the social world is governed by cut-throat competition causally leads to SDO tendencies (Pratto et al., 1994), subsequent studies have demonstrated that this link is bidirectional (e.g., Sibley & Duckitt, 2013). Those higher on SDO tend to perceive events as more threatening (Matthews, Levin, & Sidanius, 2009), thus confirming and further entrenching their competitive worldview over time. This confirmation bias does not seem to be entirely symmetrical (for those high vs. low on SDO), as once SDO levels increase, they may remain at their elevated state even if the circumstances which brought on this increase have since changed (Liu et al., 2008). Various studies have shown that such an increase is a common response to ingroup gains of social power and status (e.g., Schmitt, Branscombe, & Kappen, 2003). For those at the top of the societal “food chain,” beliefs that legitimize intergroup dominance are usefully self-serving. If the social world is ruled by ruthless competition, those who emerge victorious cannot be blamed for their victory and subsequent exploitation of those who lost. While

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much of the research has shown this mechanism in action within national communities, its rationale may hold for the global arena as well. For example, the finding that an American sample scored slightly higher on SDO in relation to a Lebanese sample was interpreted in light of the former’s position of global dominance (Levin et al., 2005). Other cross-cultural studies, however, did not replicate this pattern. For example, a Swedish sample scored lower on average than a Latvian sample. In this case, the findings were attributed to Sweden’s wellestablished democratic system, coupled with a long-standing cultural emphasis on egalitarianism, both of which were absent in the recently democratized Latvian context (Dimdins, Sandgren, & Montgomery, 2016). Meta-analysis of available research (Fischer, Hanke, & Sibley, 2012) has supported this line of reasoning, citing democratic governance and egalitarian ideologies as the most important societal-level variables associated with lower mean levels of SDO. This same analysis did not find effects for indices of income inequality or national GDP, but given the high correlations between the included societal variables, this null conclusion is suspect. Indeed, an ad-hoc analysis showed that income inequality is associated with higher mean levels of SDO, but only within democratic nations (Fischer et al., 2012). Other anecdotal accounts support this contention that within western nations, the adoption of the globalized economic system (and the competitive inequality it brings) was responsible for longitudinal increases in SDO (Duckitt & Sibley, 2009).

SDO AND CONTACT WITH OTHER CULTURES Adding another layer of complexity is the body of research on intergroup contact and SDO. As discussed earlier, in the globalizing world, individuals are increasingly likely to come into contact with members of other ethnicities, nations, and cultures. Moreover, these processes of globalization tie disparate groups together in a complex web of interdependencies. Based on both experimental and longitudinal data, scholars have demonstrated that recurring positive contact with members of outgroups reduces individuals’ SDO (Dhont, Van Hiel, & Hewstone, 2014). Interdependency with such outgroups also fosters more liberal political outlook and boosts counterdominance ideologies (van der Toorn et al., 2014), the kind of which lowers SDO. Tempering these optimistic accounts are other studies showing the higher SDO predicts less tolerance of outgroups’ divergent

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point of view (e.g., Pratto et al., 1994; Unger, 2002) and greater expectation from them to assimilate into mainstream culture and way of life (Guimond et al., 2013). These may dampen the potential for positive intergroup contact and interdependency, for those predisposed to view outgroups only as potential competitors. Additionally, mounting evidence shows that the gap in SDO between members of dominant versus subordinate subgroups is greatest in societies that are more globally integrated (i.e., are richer, have more liberal institutions, and emphasize individuality more; see meta-analytic review by Lee, Pratto, & Johnson, 2011). Plausibly, within these contemporized settings, the disparity between the formal ideology of liberal equality and the realities of inequality faced by subordinates is particularly glaring. Under these conditions, subordinates are more likely to challenge the hierarchy which frustrates their socially-sanctioned demand for equality. Because higher SDO tendencies are specifically linked with dominants’ reluctance to share their power and privilege, these challenges to the social hierarchy are likely to feed into their competitive understanding of social reality. Armed with this reconfirmed worldview, higher SDO energizes prejudice and maltreatment of exactly those who are denigrated by the system or dissent to it (Lee et al., 2011). As a result, this dynamic contributes to the increasing polarization of political views and discourse, as different groups within nations not only pursue conflicting goals but also become more divergent in their basic understanding of social reality (as we describe in detail below). Nonetheless, the same meta-analysis also showed that within these fully globalized settings, average levels of SDO have decreased over time (Lee et al., 2011). This finding possibly resolves the question raised above, by pointing to the steady march of social equality propagated by globalization as it spreads liberal values and systems of governance. Others, however, believe this is more an issue of style rather than substance. If higher desire for social dominance generally manifests as support for whatever antiegalitarian stance is most culturally appropriate, it is possible that the measures of SDO itself have lost some of their social relevance. The original SDO scale was developed in the early 1990s, and many of its items seem out of step with contemporary (liberal) discursive norms. Endorsement of items such as “some groups of people are simply inferior to other groups” (Pratto et al., 1994) belies the strong normative pressure, within these social contexts, to appear unprejudiced and nonracist (e.g., Norton, Sommers, Apfelbaum, Pura, & Ariely, 2006). Much like blatant

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sexism and racism before (Swim, Aikin, Hall, & Hunter, 1995), it is likely that this measurement of SDO has become too contrary to the politically correctness mandate, resulting in its entanglement with social desirability biases and decreased overall scores. Recently, the SDO scale was revised to include a more subtle facet of social dominance (SDO-E) which “manifested itself in an affinity for ideologies and policies that maintain inequality, especially those that have ostensibly different purposes (such as economic efficiency and meritocracy).” (Ho et al., 2015, p. 1005). This facet, and not its more blatant counterpart, was most predictive of political conservatism as well as opinions vis-à-vis policy issues within the contemporary American context (Chow & Knowles, 2016). It also maximally captured the expected gap between dominants’ (White) and subordinates’ (People of Color) scores. The researchers conclude that “as the role of coercive force in maintaining inequality is arguably decreasing on a global scale (Pinker, 2011), subtle justifications of inequality may rise to take its place, thereby increasing the role to be played by SDO-E in the future, and making the role of hierarchical motivations in society harder to track.” (p. 1022). In light of the afore-mentioned discussion, this indeed seems likely, as the processes of globalization require the instillment of a liberal and nondiscriminatory consensual framework, which could accommodate diverse groups and individuals. Within this formal setting of egalitarianism, however, the pursuit of dominance through competition is enshrined.

RWA—Right-wing Authoritarianism While SDO is assumed to stem from belligerently competitive roots, RWA emerges from a basic belief that the social world is unpredictable and inherently dangerous. In such a world, social order must be maintained and the ingroup, if it is to survive, must stand united in safeguarding its heritage (Van Hiel & Kossowska, 2007). RWA therefore indexes concern over issues of security and lawfulness, as well as over more symbolic threats, which may undermine the cohesion of the ingroup, the vitality of its heritages, or the stability of the extant social order (Altemeyer, 1998; Duckitt & Sibley, 2009). These preoccupations with group cohesion and maintenance of the status quo necessarily come at the expense of personal autonomy and individual rights, all the more so when these are seen to threaten the traditions of the ingroup (Duckitt & Sibley, 2009). RWA thus drives a variety of socially conservative political

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reactions, as well as staunch opposition to any form of social change or destabilization of the established status quo (Duckitt & Sibley, 2010). It is because of this sanctification of the social status quo, whatever it may be, that the relationship between RWA and globalization varies as a function of local context.

RWA AND PERCEPTIONS OF GLOBALIZATION In most sociocultural contexts around the world, globalization sets in motion processes of social change, which destabilize the local status quo as well as pose a challenge to prevailing traditions and particularistic worldviews. While social change per-se is anathema to those high on RWA, this aversion is exacerbated further by globalization’s delocalizing influences. By their very nature, globalizing processes put piercing pressure on the boundaries of closed identity communities as they introduce new identity options and foreign cultural practices (Kinnvall, 2004). In this, globalization’s sociocultural processes erode the axiomatic certainty of local heritages and the social order they establish. Furthermore, these sociocultural pressures push local settings away from the conservative, traditionalist values that lie at the core of RWA ideologies. As reviewed in Chapters 2 and 3, globalized Western culture and its consumerist correlates promote hedonistic, individualistic pursuits as well as a societal tolerance of human diversity and cultural pluralism (albeit in a narrow, liberal sense). These values clearly conflict with RWA’s emphasis on the importance of tradition, conformity and security, as well as the exclusionary societal reactions it mobilizes against cultural outgroups and those who diverge from social norms (Duckitt & Sibley, 2009). Lastly, RWA is linked with heightened perceptions of symbolic threat from immigrant groups and terrorist attacks (Onraet, Dhont, & Van Hiel, 2014), which represent two vastly different social phenomena nevertheless connected to globalizing processes (see Chapter 8). The perceptions of these social phenomena additionally point to a more general propensity of high RWA individuals to be hypervigilanct about societal threats and overestimate their impact. These perceptional biases in turn confirm high RWA individuals’ basic belief that the social world is unsafe. This revamped worldview is the bedrock on which RWA tendencies develop and are maintained, thus completing a feedback loop (Onraet et al., 2014).

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Indeed, the two have been shown to feed into each other over time (e.g., Sibely & Duckitt, 2013), In sum, for high RWA individuals who live in less than fully globalized settings, the boundless nature of the globalizing world is seen to be fraught with symbolic perils and essential instabilities. Worse still, for them this world is becoming increasingly more dangerous and unsettled, reciprocally reinforcing the need to block the floodgates of globalizing influences. These dynamics are plotted in Fig. 5.2. All of this potentiates a backlash of acute particularistic opposition against globalization and the interconnected world it had created. The link of RWA and rejection of globalization’s sociocultural influences were supported by the afore-mentioned study of Jewish Israelis. Within the context of this westernizing majority group, RWA levels predicted negative emotional reactions to the globalized Western culture (Rosenmann, 2017). Across the border, in Lebanon’s more oppositional context, RWA predicted the perception of America’s globalizing influences as a threat to local values. Because globalized Western culture is considered to be inferior to the time-honored local heritages, its contaminating influences are morally repugnant, and elicit disgust reactions in those high in RWA (Levin et al., 2013).

Globalizing processes Social change and destabilization of local status quo

Exposure to foreign cultures and new, delocalized identity options

Cultural emphases on hedonistic, individualistic pursuits and liberal tolerance of diversity

Social phenomena: • Immigration • terrorism

Heightened perceptions of threat

Belief that the social world is Instable, unpredictable and dangerous

RWA

Figure 5.2 Summary of reciprocal relationships between globalizing processes, perceptions of the social world, and RWA.

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These dynamics seem to drive reactions not only toward the main agents of globality, but towards those perceived to be their local allies as well. The difficult conditions of Christian communities in the radicalizing Muslim Middle East are well known (Griswold, 2015). Perhaps less known is their increased plight outside of the Muslim world. In India, for instance, the number of violent attacks on Christian minorities rose from around one a year in the decades preceding 1997 to well over 200 annually. This rise is attributable to local Hindis perception that their Christian neighbors are too aligned with globalized Western culture, and thus a vanguard of the global cultural threat (Bauman, 2013).

RWA AND SOCIETAL CHANGE Other studies speak more directly to the bidirectional dynamic between RWA and globalization. As social conditions change, the world can be seen as more or less intimidating, as new norms and institutions may make RWA ideologies more or less socially acceptable (Duckitt & Sibley, 2009). Because RWA is strongly linked with conventionalism and conformity, its endorsement on a population level should reflect prevailing societal value priorities. Within the globalizing world, social values have shifted away from those enshrined in RWA, rendering it somewhat oldfashioned (Duriez & Van Hiel, 2002) and out of step with contemporary liberalism and consumer culture’s hedonistic pursuits. Nevertheless, before this process establishes a new status quo, periods of intense social transition may evoke threat responses which manifest in heightened RWA levels. Thus, a sample of Afrikaaners was shown to endorse exceptionally high levels of RWA. For this group, the most immediate social change was the end of the Apartheid system, less than a decade before (Duckitt, 2004). This social change was arguably the result of globalization, the increasing strength of the international community, and the spread of globalized Western culture’s liberal social values. Conceivably then, as globalized Western culture’s encroachment had unsettled nonegalitarian local social arrangements, an increase in RWA occurred as a form of social backlash. Even where globalization unsettled more egalitarian social systems, relatively high levels of RWA were observed. This was the case in Latvia after the fall of the Soviet Block (Dimdins et al., 2016). As the social system re-stabilized, however, globalized Western culture values could become the new status quo to be safeguarded by those most concerned with preserving it (see Liu et al., 2008 for a similar argument

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after a regime change in Taiwan). For example, a study by Reese (2012) suggested that under certain conditions, aspects of RWA predict proenvironmental actions, which are more commonly associated with leftist worldviews, incompatible with RWA (Schultz & Stone, 1994; Sabbagh, 2005). In contemporary Germany, proenvironmental beliefs and actions had become normative over previous decades, resulting in policies that spurred the extension of renewable energies and, later, renunciation of nuclear energy. In this context, where authorities strongly engage in proenvironmental policy making, people high in RWA adhere to this newer definition of acceptable social behavior. The element of RWA which mandates submission to authorities was thus linked with higher proenvironmental beliefs and actions, while other facets of RWA still predicted lower endorsement of such attitudes and behaviors. A similar safeguarding process seems to be the case in regard to some American “Tea Party” rhetoric, which re-casts contemporary corporate capitalism as a traditional American value under threat nowadays (Tea Party Platform, 2015). In other ways, however, this right-wing movement, and others like it, reject globalization as the source of these threats to the ingroup’s traditions. These oppositional strands coalesce with those motivated by high SDO (as reviewed above), to create a substantial antiglobalization sentiment in many countries.

RWA AND SDO IN CONCERT Similar anti-globalizing sentiments emanate from the left side of the political landscape. While earlier we defined the left-leaning universalistic opposition to globalization as distinct from its particularistic rejection, in actuality the two are often inseparable. As mentioned before, studies from the Middle East have shown lower SDO to fuel support for counterdominant violence, which nowadays mixes both universalistic and particularistic motivations. Within globalized contexts, the same impetus drives support for clearly universalistic antiglobalist movements, but perhaps also sympathy for the cause of movements of particularistic resistance elsewhere. Contrarily, high SDO motivations seem to muster support for globalization where it is not fully established, but its rejection in some Western contexts. Here, the real and symbolic threats to hegemonic groups’ dominance (from competition abroad as well as minorities at home) trigger social dominance reactions against globalization. These reactions may also

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resonate with lower-class members of the national majority, given their competitive losses. In a climate of economic instability and social insecurity, threats to the status quo are additionally activated, potentially energizing a “cultural backlash” as majority traditionalists rally to protect their heritage from further erosion. The result of this right-wing synergy between high SDO and RWA concerns within local majorities is likely behind the recent rise of populist-nationalist movements in the globalized West. The recent electoral success of Brexit in Europe and President Trump in the US demonstrate the wide appeal of this brand of particularistic opposition to globalization (Blyth, 2016). It further combines with (universalist) antiglobalist left-wing movements to fundamentally destabilize the political systems and establishments in these parts of the world. Notably, while such synergies are plausible in the globalized West, the relationship between RWA versus SDO responses is itself contextdependent. In established democratic systems, the two are highly correlated, fueling each other as political systems become increasingly polarized. Elsewhere, however, this relationship varies in intensity and even direction (Duriez et al., 2005), as do their respective responses to globalization. In Lebanese samples, for instance, high SDO predicts more proglobalizing responses, while high RWA predicts the opposite (e.g., Levin et al., 2013). Fig. 5.3 offers a schematic summary of these complex interactions between local social systems and individual ideological inclinations apropos reactions to globalizing processes. Panel A depicts the case of fully globalized societies. Here, RWA’s core concerns with social stability and ingroup traditionalism manifest as a checkered reaction to globalization. In times when these social systems are stable, aspects of globalization may be embraced as integral aspects of the local system (e.g., Reese, 2012). Other aspects, however, seem to be more antithetical to RWA’s dogmatic belief in the ingroup’s traditions, such as the liberal-consumerist inclusion of those who do not conform to gender-norms (see Chapter 3). Particularistic opposition against these hierarchy-attenuating aspects of the globalizing process is likely to be driven by RWA concerns. Because of the strong interrelation between RWA and SDO present in these contexts, such oppositional reactions may be further fueled by social dominance concerns of national majority groups. The sanctification of free competition is embraced by those who desire to dominate, at least as long as they are winning. Once competitive challenges emerge to threaten the position of society’s dominants, SDO would motivate the

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Globalizing processes Global social order (hierarchy between societies)

Economic and individual competition (hierarchy within societies)

Universalistic opposition

GWC’s hierarchy enhancing ideologies and social institutions

GWC’s hierarchy attenuating ideologies and social institutions

Particularistic opposition additionally energized by competitive threats to dominants’ position

High

High SDO

RWA Low

Low

(A)

Globalizing processes Global social order (hierarchy between societies)

Economic and individual competition (hierarchy within societies)

GWC’s hierarchy enhancing ideologies and social institutions

Counter-dominant opposition in support for particularistic movements

Particularistic opposition

High

High SDO Low

GWC’s hierarchy attenuating ideologies and social institutions

RWA Low

(B)

Figure 5.3 Panel A: Summary of vectors of opposition to globalization by SDO and RWA in more fully globalized settings. Panel B: Summary of vectors of opposition to globalization by SDO and RWA in less fully globalized settings. Panel A Notes: solid arrow—vector of universalistic opposition; hollow arrow—vector of particularistic opposition; dashed two-sided arrows—high covariance between levels of SDO and RWA in these settings. Panel B Notes: solid arrow—vector of universalistic opposition; hollow arrow—vector of particularistic opposition.

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utilization of the most effective ideological tool to mitigate this threat. In current times this seems to be the particularistic opposition to globalization mobilized by populist-nationalist movements. Lower SDO concerns for equality drive a universalist sentiment against the distributive injustice ingrained in globalizing processes, as we know them. The rejection of globalization’s liberal, pluralistic emphases by the right, and its enshrined practices of unfettered capitalism by the left, has led to a precipitous decline in centrist political power and its support for laissez faire globalization (Blyth, 2016). These societies are left with an extremely polarized political system, which will be discussed shortly. The dynamics that govern reactions to globalization are very different in sociocultural settings where globalization is not well established, and globalized Western culture is seen by many as the contemporized manifestation of the West’s ever-present imperialist drive (see Panel B). Within these contexts, RWA is connected today with the most acute, sometimes violent (and downright genocidal; e.g., Boko Haram’s attacks in Nigeria, BBC, 2016) opposition to globalization and anything connected to its (secularized Christian, Western) values and operations. Research has shown that these virulent strands of particularistic opposition are at times supported and further energized by the counter-dominant motivations of those low in SDO. Certainly, in less adversarial settings this same egalitarian impetus would result in nonviolent universalistic opposition to the rampant injustices of the globalizing world, but this has not been empirically recorded yet. Contrarily, in all of these settings there is reason to believe that higher SDO would drive proglobalizing attitudes, as high SDO predicts both identification with the strong, as well as the desire to share in the spoils of exploitation. Reciprocally, these reactions to globalization, as well as the social conditions created by it, may influence the worldviews that underlie SDO and RWA. In both cases, extant research seems to most strongly suggest an ongoing process of societal polarization as well. Meta-analytic research has shown that the social conditions propagated by globalizing influences increase the disparity in SDO levels between dominants and subordinates (Lee et al., 2011). There is also reason to believe that this growing disparity, alongside the enshrinement of competition as the mechanism for economic, social and individual progress, would feedback to the type of dog-eat-dog worldview which underlies social dominance inclinations.

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With regard to RWA, these reciprocal dynamics are more speculative. Nonetheless, extant research does support some intriguing propositions. Globalizing influences push social values and structures away from the kind of steadfast dogmatism to ingroup traditions which higher RWA individuals crave. Because of this, globalization could be expected to decrease levels of RWA in more willingly globalizing sections of society, while creating the conditions for a cultural backlash in those who are predisposed to value RWA’s concerns. Furthermore, as globalization potentiates both objective and symbolic societal instabilities, it may heighten these individuals’ sense of the world as a threatening, dangerous place. In such a world, RWA levels increase as collective survival becomes hinged on the defensive closure of the ingroup. Levels of RWA then bias perceptions of events, so that they reconfirm the view of the world as unsafe, thus closing a feedback loop which pulls individuals and communities further away from the globalizing world and its dangers.

The Increased Polarization of Political Views As this summary illustrates, while research suggests opposing vectors as regards to globalization’s effects on aggregated levels of RWA and SDO, it more consistently points to their increased variability within societies. Owing to their complex, interdependent nature, globalizing processes encourage some to view the social world as becoming more dangerous or competitive, while others find increasing support for their contradictory worldviews. In this, globalization undercuts the political power of centrist views, while empowering the more extreme ends of the political spectrum (Blyth, 2016). These extremes come to disagree not only on matters of policy, but also on a deeper level, as their basic understanding of the social world becomes decreasingly compatible with one another. Indeed, these trends of political radicalization (on both global, intersocietal and national, intrasocietal levels) are cited by many as endangering human progress and global peace. In a recent Global Risk Report, for example, The World Economic Forum (WEF, 2018) lists increased political polarization, defined as “inability to reach agreement on key issues within countries because of diverging or extreme values, political or religious views” (p. 62), as a worrisome trend which exacerbates global risk. This polarization within national societies resonates onto the global arena as governmentality diminishes, and international behavior becomes more erratic and extreme (WEF, 2018). Unfortunately, this trend is likely to

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strengthen as globalizing processes not only breed discordant political preferences and societal worldviews, but also undermine the consensus on factual matters. The growing dissensus surrounding actual events in reality is further fueled by the consumerist turn of globalizing societies.

Consumer Culture and Politics In the previous chapters, we have shown how market logic and consumer culture affect the structure and content of various social and psychological constructs. Political institutions and individuals’ political behaviors are no exception. Importantly, while the explicitly value-laden influences of globalized Western culture often spark intense political reactions and debates, because consumerism is first and foremost a matter of form, a structural element of globalization, it seems to encounter less organized resistance. As with other structural aspects of globalization (e.g., computer-mediated communication), this consumerist turn affects the infrastructure of cultures and societies around the world, reorganizing them to better fit into the globalizing world. As such, this consumerist turn is often seen as an apolitical, naturally occurring social process, undergone by all contemporary societies. In this social climate, those who attempt to politicize consumerism can only be trapped in a quixotic battle, or worse, simply reveal their Luddite, anachronistic ideas. The consumerist turn is nonetheless a profoundly political process, as it subtly alters the values, structure, and priorities of societies. It also becomes an important medium through which political affiliations are shaped and enacted (as we discuss in Chapter 6). As we detailed in Chapter 3, the increasing segmentation of society is an important aspect of contemporary consumerism, one which threatens to lead to the segmentation of perceived reality. Without some level of societal consensus about credible sources of information, different groups adhere to local truths, coming from ingroup sources they trust (Harsin, 2015). This lack of basic agreement on what is real and what is not likely undermines constructive political discourse, which in turn may increase polarity and the reluctance to assign credibility to any generally agreed upon “truth” (WEF, 2018). This process appears to be inextricably linked with the rise of consumer culture and the marketing goals which restructure its architecture. Once marketers begin using psychographic profiles to target audiences, political affiliations became important markers of market segments

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(Vyncke, 2002). This has provided much of the financial impetus for the creation of the multiple news TV channels: tailoring the information they disseminate to their audiences’ political proclivities, while marketing to their specific consumer lifestyle (Chan-Olmsted & Cha, 2008). Today of course, this process is more fully realized by online social networking sites (e.g., Facebook), as they gain prominence in both commercial and political marketing. In SNS, individuals voluntarily link themselves to others (individuals, communities, and entities—such as political parties or commercial brand pages) they find interesting or useful. Reciprocally, SNS’s use state-ofthe-art algorithms to predict from users’ psychographic data which additional links (or “stories” on their “feed”) may be of interest to them, and subsequently suggest them (Bessi, 2016). This results in individuals’ interacting mainly with others who share their consumer lifestyle identities, and are thus uniquely able to validate those, and influence their further consumptive elaboration. Within the current context, however, the result is an “echo chamber” where individuals are primarily exposed to views, information, and suggested political action which conforms to their preexisting political inclination, and confirms their political worldview (Sunstein, 2009). In this emerging context, individuals consume information and persuasive messages (as the two become interchangeable) specifically developed for them, based on their consumer lifestyle. Psychological science has demonstrated that under such conditions, a slew of group processes come into play, resulting in increased extremism of views. Based on their analysis of the online behavior (i.e., Tweets and Retweets) of 3.8 million Americans, Barberá, Jost, Nagler, Tucker, and Bonneau (2015) concluded that individuals are much more likely to respond to political messages emanating from sources whose ideological positioning is at the polar extreme of their camp. This pattern was not demonstrated for nonpolitical issues, but once an issue becomes politicized, its discourse becomes increasingly polarized and segmented. Thus, the mass shooting of students and faculty at the Sandy Hook Elementary School in Newtown, Connecticut (14/12/2012) started out as a national conversation but quickly bifurcated into separate echo chambers, as the hotly debated and highly political issue of gun control came into play. As suggested earlier, it is not only opinions that are becoming increasingly polarized, but also perceptions of actual events, as individuals are exposed to sectarian news, which cite different, and at times fictitious, facts as basis for their analyses (WEF, 2018). Even when “fake news” can

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be objectively shown to be based on half-truths, hoax, or misinformation intentionally spread by interested parties, it tends to persist. This tenacious irrefutability likely results from a synergetic interaction between individuals’ cognitive biases (see review Flynn, Nyhan, & Reifler, 2017) and rising mistrust of information originating from outside of the local truth market (Harsin, 2015). Furthermore, because of the social-psychological dynamics governing these echo chambers, these alternative accounts of reality are very difficult to reconcile with one another, opening a nearly insurmountable chasm between camps (Del Vicario et al., 2016). Indeed, this era has been dubbed the “Post-Truth” age of politics (e.g., Harsin, 2015). Fig. 5.4 depicts these processes of market segmentation feeding back into the dynamics of political polarization noted in our discussion of individuals’ ideological inclinations. While these processes suggest the increased radicalization of any political/ideological position, they may operate more strongly within a right-wing context. Earlier we noted that

Ideological worldview and beliefs about the nature of the social world

Consumer lifestyle identity/political affiliation

Participation in consumer lifestyle/political communities

Individuals: motivational-cognitive biases Communities: socio-psychological dynamics

Tailored marketing massages (informative-persuasive, political-commercial)

Perceptions of reality confirming more extreme worldviews

SDO/RWA

Lifestyle/political Echo Chambers: selective exposure to extreme versions of confirming realities

Figure 5.4 Summary of the integrative argument regarding increased political polarization within consumer cultures.

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right-wing inclinations and worldviews tend to more easily increase than diminish (e.g., Liu et al., 2008). Similarly, while psychological research on online echo chambers demonstrated their existence in left-leaning audiences, those were not as insular as their right-wing counterparts (Barberá et al., 2015). Finally, this discussion clearly references recent developments in American and European politics. Nonetheless, it seems reasonable to assume that this dynamic represents a more global trend, as it is rooted in the structural features of the globalizing consumer culture (Harsin, 2015; Kasser et al., 2007). Indeed, the rise of populist-nationalist movements of the sort discussed above was recently identified as another global risk trend. These movements feed from, as well as further exacerbate, a state of profound social instability and plummeting trust in social and political institutions (WEF, 2018). In many ways, then, globalization leads to increased radicalization of populations, even as it homogenizes aspects of many sociocultural contexts.

SUMMARY To conclude, in this chapter we explored some vectors of ascent and dissent to different aspects of globalization (e.g., globalized Western culture, the hierarchical social order it establishes between and within societies), as those relate to emergent globalized worldviews (see Chapter 2), and individuals’ social identities (see Chapter 4). We then introduced SDO and RWA, the dual ideological frameworks which underlie individuals’ psychological responses in the political arena, and discussed how they determine responses to different globalizing processes, and are reciprocally determined by them. We have shown that globalization facilitates the increased polarization of political views, as people react differently to its challenges and opportunities. This polarization is further entrenched by the segmentation of societies around consumer lifestyle choices (which include political inclinations; see Chapter 3). Within this consumer social architecture, echo chambers emerge where individuals’ social encounters largely reinforce their preexisting worldviews, political allegiances, and ways of making sense of social reality. Alarmingly, political reality itself seems to become increasingly fragmented, as adherence to local truths come to replace a more widely shared sense of what is real and what is not.

CHAPTER 6

Collective Action in a Global Context The previous chapters have outlined the basic psychological processes that are associated with globalization, as well as some of its sociopolitical antecedents and consequences. Given globalization’s profound effects on the ways in which individuals and collectives construe the world and their place within it, we turn next to the psychology of collective action. We will ask how, when, and why people engage in social protest or join collective movements. Under which conditions do people collectively respond to experienced inequalities or maltreatment, and equally as important, when do they chose collective inaction? Human history has seen countless groups of people engage in social protest in order to improve their own conditions or the treatment of others. Examples of collective action in the contemporary globalized era include the “Wir sind das Volk (We are the people)” movement in the former German Democratic Republic, which ended the communist regime and led to the reunification of Germany in 1990. In 2010, the “Arab Spring” represented a revolutionary wave of antigovernmental protests that began in Tunisia and engulfed many Arab countries in North Africa and the Middle East. In the United States, the “Black Lives Matter” protest addressing the inequality and systemic racism towards the black minority began in 2013 after the shooting death of Trayvon Martin, an African American teen. In Argentina in late 2017, a small but visible movement of people took to the streets to protest against a new pension scheme that would particularly affect poor and disabled retirees. These and countless other social protest movements share the feeling that something is wrong with the world and something needs to be done about it. As you will read in this chapter, this feeling is indeed one key component of collective actions—and the energy that fuels them. Confirming the observations of many, recent data show a pronounced uptick in social protest which coincides with globalization’s progressively destabilizing processes (WEF, 2018).

The Psychology of Globalization DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-812109-2.00006-9

© 2019 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

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Whereas various definitions have been offered for collective action, we use that of Wright, Taylor, and Moghaddam (1990): “a group member engages in collective action any time that she or he is acting as a representative of the group and the action is directed at improving conditions of the entire group” (p. 995). This definition makes clear that collective action is group-based behavior, rooted in social identity, and motivated by group members’ desire to effect a social change that improves their circumstances. For example, the movement that led Germany to become reunified was, according to this definition, collective action motivated by the desire of citizens of the former socialist German Democratic Republic to improve their quality of life. In the current chapter we focus on the effects of globalization and identity on collective action and inaction—that is, the conditions under which people are willing to engage in behavior potentially leading to social change; or, conversely, to forgo such a potential. To do so, we will review and summarize some particularly influential models of collective action. We pay special attention to how the interconnectedness enabled by the internet affects who participates in social protest, and how social protest develops and persists. First, let us illustrate an extreme example of collective action that has come into global focus dramatically over the preceding decades—terrorism. Some readers may be surprised that we treat terrorism here as a specific form of collective action (Becker & Tausch, 2015), but according to the previous definition, it is exactly that. It is an attempt by individuals to achieve social change in the interest of their ingroup. In an attempt to distinguish terrorism from other forms of intergroup violence, Crenshaw (2000) states that “In principle, terrorism is deliberate and systematic violence performed by small numbers of people, whereas communal violence is spontaneous, sporadic, and requires mass participation. The purpose of terrorism is to intimidate a watching popular audience by harming only a few, whereas genocide is the elimination of entire communities. Terrorism is meant to hurt, not to destroy. Terrorism is preeminently political and symbolic, whereas guerrilla warfare is a military activity. Repressive ‘terror’ from above is the action of those in power, whereas terrorism is a clandestine resistance to authority” (p. 406). While terrorism has a long tradition, it has risen to prominence in the global political and social discourse since the 9/11 attacks, and is widely viewed as a threat to individual and global security (WEF, 2018). The psychological perspective on terrorism has long been dominated by research focusing on the

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supposed psychopathological and maladaptive characteristics underlying it. These explanations, however intuitively appealing, gained little empirical support, as there does not seem to be a single “terrorist” psychological profile (Horgan, 2014). What all the vastly different acts of terrorism have in common is a strong social and political component that goes beyond idiosyncratic personality profiles. Rather than being a “syndrome,” terrorism can be seen as an extreme form of social and political influence (Kruglanski & Fishman, 2006), and thus be understood as a form of collective action (see also Becker & Tausch, 2015).

A PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE ON COLLECTIVE ACTION Across many different disciplines, collective action was often attributed to groups being objectively disadvantaged, that is, having less tangible resources relative to other groups (see Van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008). Because this definition is too narrow to apply to many clear instances of collective action, researchers shifted their focus to the psychological and experiential antecedents of collective action (e.g., Green, Glaser, & Rich, 1998). This refocusing of the conceptualization of collective action within the social identity approach was solidified by the publication of the influential social identity model of collective action (SIMCA; Van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008).

The Social Identity Model of Collective Action (SIMCA) According to the SIMCA, social identity plays a key role in explaining collective action via both collective efficacy beliefs (i.e., the belief that “we as group can reach our goals”; see Bandura, 2000), and perceived injustice. Zooming in on these concepts most often examined across different traditions in research on collective action—Van Zomeren et al. (2008) conducted a literature search of quantitative studies of collective action that measured feelings of injustice, collective efficacy, and a sense of identity with a group. They also extracted from these studies any information about the impact of different types of injustice, identity, and disadvantage, as well as about the role of causality and the way collective action was measured (i.e., as an attitude, intention to act, actual behavior, or a mixture of those). The researchers thus collected 182 samples and 245 effects, which were then meta-analyzed—a statistical method that aggregates findings from numerous studies. The results indicated substantial predictive effects on collective action for all three variables. Most

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importantly, the findings supported these researchers’ simple but conceptually powerful model, and confirmed that social identity predicts collective action both directly and indirectly, via a sense of grievance or injustice, and a belief of effective group-based action (see Fig. 6.1). Interestingly, the effects in the model were most pronounced when identities were politicized rather than nonpoliticized. Thus, their model makes an important contribution to the understanding of the social psychological conditions that foster group-based actions. Taken together, the SIMCA states that collective action arises from feelings of injustice, beliefs about the group’s efficacy, and identification with a specific group. Returning to one of the examples above, the SIMCA would explain the collective protest in the Arab Spring as resulting from individuals’ high identification with their ingroup (e.g., the people of Tunisia), which facilitated their shared perception of injustice (e.g., the feeling that regular Tunisians were treated unjustly by the regime) as well as their beliefs in group-based efficacy (e.g., the belief that Tunisians could do something about the situation). Together, these three predictors substantially fuelled Tunisians’ motivation to engage in the social protest against the regime. A subsequent extension of the SIMCA includes an additional variable that could influence collective action intentions—“participatory efficacy.” While collective efficacy refers to the belief that “we as group can reach our goals,” participative efficacy refers to the belief that one’s own actions will contribute to achieving group goals (van Zomeren, Saguy, &

Perceived Injustice

Identity

Efficacy Beliefs

Figure 6.1 The SIMCA model.

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Schellhaas, 2013). While both efficacy concepts refer to the achievement of group goals, only participative efficacy addresses the incremental contribution of one’s own action to the group goal. In fact, once participative efficacy is included in the SIMCA, the effect of collective efficacy vanishes (van Zomeren et al., 2013; see also Bamberg, Rees, & Seebauer, 2015; Mazzoni, van Zomeren, & Cicognani, 2015). A qualitative study by Martínez, Peñaloza, and Valenzuela (2012) also showed that young activists’ perceptions of their contribution to society helped to reinforce their sense of belongingness to and identification with the goals of the organizations they work for. To date, there are only a handful of studies investigating the parallel effects of these different forms of efficacy. Irrespective of this nuance, empirical studies in various societal contexts and cultures have provided support for the SIMCA assumptions.

The Encapsulation Model of Social Identity in Collective Action (EMSICA) While the SIMCA represents a very influential social psychological approach to collective action, it does not stand alone. A somewhat different perspective on the causal relations between identity, efficacy, injustice, and action was suggested in the form of the encapsulation model of social identity in collective action (EMSICA; Thomas, McGarty, & Mavor, 2009). It claims that social identification can be a consequence of experienced injustice and efficacy beliefs, thus acting as a mediating variable between those two variables and collective action (see Fig. 6.2). In other words,

Perceived Injustice

Identity

Efficacy Beliefs

Figure 6.2 The EMSICA model.

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whereas the SIMCA assumes that social identification precedes and feeds into feelings of injustice and beliefs about a group’s efficacy, the EMSICA assumes that strong affective reactions to injustice (e.g., anger) and beliefs about the efficacy of collective efforts precede and precipitate group formation. Social identity would thus be a consequence of shared injustice and efficacy-related reactions, instead of their antecedent (Thomas, Mavor, & McGarty, 2012). In short, both models agree that social identity processes play a central role in the prediction of collective action, albeit through different causal sequences. According to Thomas and colleagues (Thomas et al., 2012), both models have comparable and strong predictive value for collective action. This claim was also borne out in their study which was designed to directly compare the two models. In the context of antipoverty collective action—specifically, addressing the United Nations’ “Water for life” initiative—they administered measures of the core variables to several samples. Both SIMCA and EMSICA were predictive of collective action: identification with a group or a social movement can fuel efficacy beliefs and feelings of injustice, which in turn predict collective action, or can itself be fueled by these feelings and beliefs and turn them into collective action. In another study comparing the two models, Bamberg and colleagues (Bamberg et al., 2015) assessed both the SIMCA and EMSICA among student and community samples, which included people from a local climate protection initiative and participants of a climate protection event. They come to very similar conclusions, namely that both SIMCA and EMSICA consistently predict collective action, with the extended SIMCA model again suggesting that participative efficacy is more important for collective action than collective efficacy.

A Dynamic Model of Normative and Nonnormative Collective Action A third model addressing the psychological conditions under which people engage in collective action distinguishes between forms of collective action, while offering an additional focus on potential dynamics within collective movements. Becker and Tausch’s (2015) conceptualization has its basis first in the distinction between normative collective action (i.e., behavior conforming to the norms of the existing social system) and nonnormative collective action (i.e., behavior that violates norms, rules, and laws within an existing social system). For example, in democratic societies, normative acts of collective action include political participation,

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peaceful protest, or the signing of online or offline petitions. Violent rioting, terrorism, or vandalism are examples of nonnormative forms of collective action. A second point of departure from both SIMCA and EMSICA concerns a more nuanced focus on different emotional antecedents of collective action. The previous models primarily associated anger or moral outrage with perceived injustice but Becker and Tausch argue that contempt—a strong feeling of dislike and lack of respect for someone or something—is an affective reaction particularly relevant to nonnormative collective action. Finally, beyond the previously described models, the authors included a dynamic component in their model that takes into account the experiences of people engaging in collective action, and how these feedback into their engagement. As can be seen in Fig. 6.3, these conceptualizations provide a more complex explanation of collective action. As in the SIMCA, Becker and Tausch’s (2015) integrated model positions efficacy beliefs, perceived injustice, and identity as predictors of collective action. However, it leads to more specific predictions about affective reactions to experienced injustice and how those influence different types of collective action. Specifically, perceived injustice could give rise to both anger and contempt: While anger fuels more normative protest, contempt energizes nonnormative forms of collective action. In line with Fischer and Roseman (2007), the authors of the model argue that anger is a constructive emotion. One of its functions is to uphold accepted behavioral standards and to correct potential wrong-doings. Thus, anger would motivate collective action that is characterized by the expression of

Perceived Injustice

Anger

Normative collective action

Contempt

Non-normative collective action

Identity

Efficacy Beliefs

Figure 6.3 The model of Becker and Tausch (2015), simplified.

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discontent but not behavior that would break normative societal standards. Contempt, on the other hand, serves a different function. While it often co-occurs with anger, it is less action-focused than anger, and is evoked when others’ behavior is seen as stable (i.e., attributable to internal qualities of the others’ wrongdoing) and uncontrollable. Unlike the approach-focus of anger, which also allows for reconciliation (Weber, 2004), contempt motivates psychological disengagement from its target and thereby legitimizes more radical, extreme behaviors towards it. Studies in various contexts, such as student protests against tuition fees in Germany, Indian Muslims’ action against ingroup disadvantage, British Muslims’ responses to British foreign policy, or Indonesian Muslims’ responses to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, lend support for both the differentiation of normative versus nonnormative collective action, and their respective mediating pathways via anger and contempt. A second major extension of Becker and Tausch’s (2015) integrated model is the dynamic component. Not depicted in Fig. 6.3, for the sake of simplicity, collective action behavior can result in qualitatively different experiential outcomes that feedback and inform further collective action. To illustrate this, imagine participating in a rally calling for a resolution of the immigration crisis in your country. If you feel at home with the other protestors and chant slogans in unison with them, you are probably going to experience emotional synchrony with the group, which in turn could result in stronger collective emotions (see Chapter 4) and stronger support for the cause (Páez, Rimé, Basabe, Wlodarczyk, & Zumeta, 2015). If, however, the rally veers in a direction you did not expect, and the slogans chanted or actions taken become out of sync with your opinions, you are likely to feel alienated from the crowd and may terminate your participation. Furthermore, if you come to believe that none of your actions could result in social change, this hopelessness is likely to lead to weaker perceived efficacy and thus decreased probability of further engagement. Alternatively, feeling joy and happiness after having achieved a certain protest goal could result in a stronger inclination to engage in future collective action, given that these positive emotions are key factors of empowerment (Drury & Reicher, 2005). In summary, Becker and Tausch’s (2015) integrated model offers a useful extension of the earlier models by offering a differentiation between different types of collective action and the emotional routes to them. The models presented so far primarily focus on collective action initiated by group members who share a sense of disadvantage or grievance in

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the context of an intergroup system. In these contexts, collective action often includes a competitive component that divides an “us” from a “them,” pitting, for instance, “us, the people” against “them, the servants of the corrupt status quo.” This type of collective action is likely to be associated with negative emotions such as anger or contempt. However, in less polarized social settings, where the issue is not one of acute political conflict, such as the case of climate protection in Germany, the goal is often cooperative instead. So, rather than improving one’s ingroup status, these movements involve a conversionary component that aims to bring “them, the nonactivists” to “us, the activists” (Bamberg et al., 2015; Wright & Lubensky, 2009). We will elaborate on this context of collective action in Chapter 7.

Solidarity-Based Collective Action Finally, the context of contemporary globalization requires us to consider the phenomenon of solidarity-based collective action. This refers to collective action by members of advantaged groups on behalf of the disadvantaged, even as those are not members of the ingroup. It has received recent attention particularly in contexts involving humanitarian action (e.g., Thomas, McGarty, Reese, Berndsen, & Bliuc, 2016; Thomas et al., 2018), such as when people join in to help victims of natural disasters in faraway places. This was the case after Haiti was devastated by an earthquake in 2010. In the years following this calamity, American citizens, communities, and businesses donated close to half a billion US$ to the Red Cross relief efforts alone (The Red Cross, 2018). Those who donated had nothing tangible to gain from this action, and the affected were not even fellow Americans. Therefore, models emphasizing the role of potential objective gains or ingroup status in motivating collective action fail to account for this, and similar, instances of noteworthy collective action. This model of solidarity originates from Duncan’s (1999, 2012) work, which suggests that collective action results from the interplay of personality, life experiences, and a group consciousness. Personality and life experiences as intrapersonal variables contribute to the emergence of a group consciousness that in turn motivates collective action. Yet, as Duncan argues, intrapersonal variables can also directly affect motivation for collective action. According to Duncan (2012), group consciousness is a relatively broad concept capturing dimensions related “to group identification and common fate, critical analysis of a group’s position in society,

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and a collective orientation toward redressing power imbalances between groups” (p. 781) (Fig. 6.4). In her original studies, Duncan (1999) used right-wing authoritarianism (Altemeyer, 1998) and political salience (i.e., the tendency to attach political events to one’s identity; see also Duncan & Stewart, 2007) as well as education and life experiences of oppression as intrapersonal variables predictive of group consciousness. She showed that lower scores on authoritarianism, as well as higher scores on political salience and life experiences increased feminist consciousness, which in turn predicted women’s rights activism. Later studies in various domains of civic engagement lended further support to Duncan’s model; in particular, work on global solidarity and global humanitarian action has benefited from and extended Duncan’s work. In a world where global awareness is possible, new models must explicate the social psychological processes that encourage humanitarian action out of solidarity with victims of natural and human-induced tragedies. Thomas and colleagues (Thomas et al., 2016, 2018) built on Duncan’s model of collective action to address this issue. In a longitudinal study conducted over 3 years, with roughly 400 participants recruited through global antipoverty NGOs, the researchers evaluated how individual differences predict group consciousness, which in turn energized humanitarian action (Thomas et al., 2016). Three aspects of their results are particularly noteworthy. First, they found that individual difference variables (specifically, human rights attitudes, political salience, social dominance orientation, and universalist values) form a “prosocial orientation” that predicts group consciousness (i.e., identification as an antipoverty supporter, along with beliefs about the group’s efficacy), which in turn was associated with

Group consciousness

Personality and life experiences

Figure 6.4 The model of Duncan (2012).

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higher donation allocation, self-reported actions, and signing a support letter. Second, the findings suggest a great deal of stability of both prosocial orientation and group consciousness over time: People do not seem to give up easily their prosocial orientation or group consciousness as an antipoverty activist. Third, and quite surprisingly, this was only found within each of the time points—but not across time points. Looking at the effects over time, Thomas and colleagues’ study revealed a negative relation between prosocial orientation, group consciousness, and humanitarian action. A prosocial orientation negatively predicted group consciousness the subsequent year; similarly, a higher group consciousness was related to lower self-reported humanitarian action 1 year later. One possible explanation for this unexpected pattern is that a general prosocial orientation may reflect caring about others and the disadvantaged of the world in general, thus diluting subsequent engagement with specific causes which were in focus one year, but less so in subsequent years. Another study by Thomas and colleagues (Thomas et al., 2018) lends further support for Duncan’s model. They collected data from six countries (Hungary, Romania, Germany, United Kingdom, United States, and Australia) to directly assess the impact of events transmitted through social media as the source of rapid mobilization of a transnational movement. Specifically, the authors measured exposure to the widely disseminated picture of Aylan Kurdi (see following paragraph), which created a shared sense of grievance and feelings of injustice. For those predisposed accordingly (i.e., individuals with lower social dominance orientation), exposure to this picture resulted in a strong group consciousness, which in turn predicted stronger solidarity with Syrian refugees. Alan Shenu—or Aylan Kurdi, the name more commonly used (Slovic, Västfjäll, Erlandsson, & Gregory, 2017)—was a 3-year old Syrian boy whose lifeless body was discovered on a Turkish beach on September 2nd, 2015. He drowned during his family’s attempt to cross the Mediterranean Sea, as they were fleeing the Syrian conflict. While many others died in similar circumstances, it was the iconic picture of Aylan Kurdi washed to the shore that resulted in a surge of social media activity that in turn was followed by unprecedented expressions of solidarity with those seeking refuge in Europe. The picture was retweeted more than 30,000 times within the first 12 hours of appearing online, reaching at least 20 million people around the globe (Smith, McGarty, & Thomas, 2018; Vis & Goriunova, 2015). Google Trends registered “Syrian refugees” as the most dramatic uptick of any search term in years. This social media storm

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seemed to change the debate about refugees and immigration, galvanizing public opinion in many countries, and sparking action by civil society groups, ordinary citizens, activists, and governments to organize and direct the resettlement of refugees (Amnesty International, 2016; Vis & Goriunova, 2015). The case of Aylan Kurdi shows the tremendous impact of global interconnectedness on how we perceive, process, and respond to events we have not experienced firsthand. The speed with which this iconic image traveled around the world was unprecedented, as was the ensuing uproar of global solidarity that prompted policy changes in favor of refugee resettlement, at least in some countries. This is a powerful illustration of how the processes described by models of collective action can emerge and gather momentum—sometimes unexpectedly—as they play out on and are mediated by exposure to global media. Globalization allows the transformation of individual experiences by iconic (as well as more ordinary) events, via the rapid transmission of social and political information. Through this, it changes us and how we see and act in the world.

Bringing Collective Action Into Context This review, while not exhaustive, presented several contemporary psychological models of collective action that have been shown to be at least partially applicable to various national contexts (e.g., Fattori, Pozzi, Marzana, & Mannarini, 2015; Thomas et al., 2018; for yet another approach, see Knab & Steffens, 2018), including non-Western ones (see, e.g., Harlow & Harpe, 2012, on a comparison of activism in United States vs Latin American contexts), with some exceptions. In the context of collective action against sexism, for example, an international study by Fischer and colleagues (Fischer, Becker, Kito, & Zamantılı Nayır, 2017) with participants from Germany, Turkey, and Japan suggests that additional aspects need be taken into account. Specifically, their study revealed that female students from Turkey and Germany were more likely to show collective action intentions rather than indirect conflict management styles (such as avoiding and outflanking). Japanese female students, however, showed the reverse pattern, suggesting that although prone to acting collectively, these students decided against open confrontation—probably to maintain ingroup harmony. Collective action, thus, depends heavily on local cultural norms (e.g., the demarcation of normative vs nonnormative

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actions in Becker & Tausch’s (2015) conceptualization). Stewart and colleagues (Stewart et al., 2016) argued that one of the shortcomings of the models reviewed here is that they reflect democratic sociopolitical contexts. In a globalized world, foreign forces (e.g., foreign governments, social movements originating in other countries) may also influence political discourse and divide people along ideological lines. Therefore, they formulated an extended model to predict collective action in support of the “Arab Spring” uprisings in various countries. In a large cross-cultural study conducted in a diverse group of 12 countries (Belgium, Canada, China, Greece, Italy, Lebanon, Netherlands, Poland, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the United States), Stewart et al. (2016) found evidence that both individuals’ social dominance orientation and the SIMCA antecedents of collective action predicted such support. As can be seen in Fig. 6.5, the higher peoples’ social dominance orientation, the lower their solidarity with the Arab Spring and perceived competence of affected Arab populace. These in turn had direct and indirect effects on collective action. To summarize, various social psychological models of collective action offer complimentary accounts of the antecedents of collective action as well as the intraindividual, interpersonal, and group dynamics that fuel and sustain them. Because globalizing processes have dramatic effects on individuals’ social identities (see Chapter 4), as well as social structure (see Chapter 2), and political discourse (see Chapter 5) around the world, we next focus more specifically on their implications for collective action.

Solidarity

Efficacy Beliefs

Lower SDO

Collective action

Group competence

Figure 6.5 The SDO-SIMCA model.

Anger

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NEW IDENTITIES, NEW COLLECTIVES, NEW SOLIDARITY The processes underlying collective action and social movements are relatively well understood, but they take on new forms and new dynamics as they interact with features of the globalizing world. Most prominently, the interconnectedness engendered by various digital media impacts the issues people focus on, the dynamics of protest, and the nature of collective action itself. By the illustrative case of Aylan Kurdi, the Syrian refugee crisis was transformed into a relatable story of needless human tragedy, eliciting empathy for migrants who were previously an abstract and easy-toignore problem. This emergent solidarity created the impetus for an impromptu social movement. Although this movement started online, as people from around the world expressed their identification and called for collective action, it quickly entered the offline world as both the public and its representatives took action. In this case, and others like it, social media has had a tremendous impact on political activism (Kende, van Zomeren, Ujhelyi, & Lantos, 2016). Through its potential for instant dissemination of information, and by platforms for new politicization of identities via online communities and discussions (see also Alberici & Milesi, 2013; Thomas et al., 2015), social media have the power to bring issues forward, and rapidly mobilize large groups of people (McGarty, Thomas, Lala, Smith, & Bliuc, 2014). Much of contemporary research focuses on this influential social phenomenon, and on how collective identities and movements emerge and take shape through online engagement.

Impacts of Global Connectedness on Group Formation and Identification In Chapters 3 and 5, we discussed how social media are organized around consumer lifestyle identities, and how these online groupings come to reflect and reinforce political opinions and ideological worldviews. This consumer architecture also changes the way people access information and form opinions on social issues. Within this decentralized setting, informal forms of social influence gain prominence, and even unlikely role models can exert influence on collective action and opinion formation (Bilali, Vollhardt, & Rarick, 2016). For example, US actor Leonardo DiCaprio’s 2016 Oscar acceptance speech—focussing on climate change—was seen as “a major moment for climate change advocacy, inspiring record levels of social media engagement and near record levels of online information

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seeking for climate change” (Leas et al., 2016, p. 6). After the speech, tweets and Google searches related to climate change surged to unprecedented levels, far surpassing social media and other online activities associated with more formal events such as the United Nations Conference of the Parties or the Earth Day celebrations. Whether or not this speech made a difference in the objective realities of the world, it certainly sparked a discussion that drew in people who were previously uninterested in the subject. According to Smith, Thomas, and McGarty (2015), it is through such discussions, in which people communicate about social and political issues, that new opinion-based ingroups and social identities may develop. The key to the formation of such new identities lies in the normative conflict between perceptions of the way things are, and the way they should be. When people share their ideas about perceived gaps between the “is” and the “ought,” the “what should be done” becomes the topic of conversation. If they are to function as a basis of a shared social identity, these ideas must first be articulated by an individual, and then negotiated within interpersonal interaction. If these ideas are accepted, they will be validated and a consensus will be built around them, forming a new group of likeminded individuals. Through this process, individuals’ social and political views become socially validated representations of the world as it is and as it should be, resulting in a common identity. Because social media is constructed to bring like-minded individuals together, it is the perfect platform for the development of these identities, which can transcend geographical, demographic, and cultural divides. Smith and colleagues’ (2015) study offers a compelling illustration of this process. Focusing on the “Occupy” movement (a global movement that addressed socioeconomic inequality in the wake of the Great Recession), they conducted a thematic content analysis of Facebook posts. As people shared their distress about the widening gap between the very rich (“the 1%”) and everyone else (“the 99%”), the conflict between the state of the world and how it should be became apparent. Because this basic perception was shared by many, a discussion ensued between participants as they negotiated the current versus ideal state of affairs, and the way forward. As a consensus started to emerge, discussants received validation for their views of the world and the social change they wished to enact. Through this dynamic of interpersonal exchange of ideas, a new shared identity emerged, linguistically marked by an increased use of firstperson plural forms (i.e., “we,” “us,” “our”).

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Another study in the context of the Occupy movement suggested that the cost associated with different types of collective actions matter as well. Morgan and Chan (2016) collected data from active and nonactive supporters of the Occupy movement. They found that these protesters distinguished between high- and low-cost collective action, and that each type was predicted by a different set of variables. While identification with the movement and anger were more strongly related to low-cost collective action, efficacy beliefs were more strongly related to the more costly courses of collective action. Reasonably, protestors were less willing to engage in behaviors carrying great personal costs if they did not believe those would actually be able to bring about the desired social change. The distinction between low versus high cost collective action seems especially relevant in the context of online behavior. It is hard to imagine collective action that requires less effort or incurs less cost than clicking support. It literally costs nothing to “like” a campaign on Facebook or retweet a message. This is especially true when it comes to less politically contentious issues, where endorsing a campaign does not signal a contentious ideological stance, which might carry interpersonal costs in some cases. The “Kony 2012” campaign represents one such example. Kony 2012 was a global campaign that sought to bring Joseph Kony, at that time leader of the Ugandan Lord’s Resistance Army, to justice. The campaign started with the viral dissemination of a 30-minute film about this militia, and its practices of kidnaping children to be indoctrinated into service. Regardless of whether the campaign was a success or not (Taylor, 2014), in this case, the gap between the actual and ideal is very clear. A study by Thomas and colleagues (Thomas, McGarty, Lala, Stuart, Hall, & Goddard, 2015) showed that engagement in the online campaign against Kony (e.g., by posting information and other social media actions) was driven by social identity processes. Identification with the Anti-Kony campaign predicted Anti-Kony action—both via perceived injustice, anger and efficacy beliefs (as SIMCA would predict) but also as a consequence of anger and efficacy (as EMSICA would predict). In short, it seems that the models formulated for local, offline collective action also apply to online action regarding global issues. Emerging research is exploring how global identities inform these types of collective actions. In the illustrations above, collective action was tied with identification with the social movement itself (e.g., the Occupy movement or the Kony 2012 campaign). As we discussed in Chapter 3, however, globalization does not only make information and identity options available for those who would not have had access to them (e.g.,

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raising awareness about the wrong-doings of Joseph Kony outside of Uganda), but also facilitates identification with more diffuse, transnational collectives (e.g., such that humanity could become a psychologically meaningful ingroup). Many of the studies reviewed there show that prosocial and proenvironmental attitudes and actions go hand-in-hand with identification on the global level. That is, when people identify with a global collective—as global citizen or with humanity as a whole—they are more likely to express solidarity with the disadvantaged, and more prone to act for the greater good. Based on this reasoning, Merle, Reese, and Drews (2018) examined these links in online communication. Specifically, they harvested tweets from Twitter that included the hashtag #globalcitizen—as a proxy for support of a global ingroup. Over the course of half a year, 30,000 tweets were collected. The researchers then evaluated how strongly #globalcitizen was associated with prosocial and proenvironmental hashtags, and whether the #globalcitizen hashtag was related to emotionally positive or negative discussions. In line with expectations, the #globalcitizen was most strongly associated with prosocial hashtags such as #refugeeswelcome, #levelthelaw, and #fundededucation as well as with proenvironmental hashtags such as #hlpwater and #safesludge. The content of #globalcitizen tweets most commonly included thematic words such as education, women, pledge, aid, and support, and tended to have a relatively positive emotional tone, probably indicating an empowerment function (Drury & Reicher, 2005) of the hashtag. These findings illustrate that the idea of a solidarity-oriented global collective manifests across the World Wide Web.

Does Global Connectedness and Online Activism Matter? We have suggested that the internet as the most globalized means of communication facilitates transnational identities and movements. Still, the question remains: do these processes have a meaningful impact on people’s construal of themselves and the world, and on their offline behavior? Many scholars believe so, and claims that social media play a central role in fostering activist identities have received empirical support (cf. Gerbaudo & Treré, 2015). Indeed, social media are the primary launching point for slogans, icons, collective names, and other symbolic representations of social movements (Gerbaudo & Treré, 2015). Smith, McGarty, and Thomas’s (2018) study provides an optimistic view on the psychological consequences of social media activism. In their longitudinal study of the effects of the iconic emergence of Aylan Kurdi’s

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images (see above), they analyzed more than 40,000 tweets that were posted 1 week before (time 1), as well as 1 week (time 2) and 10 weeks (time 3) after their appearance. Using various hashtag searches such as #refugeecrises, #migrantcrises, or #sysrianrefugees, the refuge-related tweets harvested at time 1 did not predict whether people tweeted about Aylan Kurdi, but were associated with greater solidarity with refugees at time 3. Most importantly, the tweeting about Aylan Kurdi had an indirect effect on solidarity with refugees 10 weeks later (time 3) through the discussion of the dangers and potential harm refugees face. The dissemination of these iconic images through social media therefore enlisted new supporters for the refugee cause and shifted the public discourse towards solidarity with their plight. On the other hand, social media movements are not always relevant or goal-directed, and often fail to create collective action outside of the online “echo chambers” where it originated (see Chapter 5). In a comparison of Twitter feeds of three active social movements, Theocharis and colleagues (Theocharis, Lowe, van Deth, & García-Albacete, 2015) assessed whether Twitter was utilized in mobilizing offline protest action. They found that Twitter was used extensively for political discussion and information dissemination. However, there was relatively little evidence of activating communication. Only very few of the tweets were related to actual protest organization and the coordination of protest. In a similar vein, the antigovernmental protests in Iran in 2009, dubbed the “Twitter revolution,” occurred at a time when about 0.026% of the population in Iran had Twitter accounts (Morozov, 2011). The sentiment automatically linking social change movements to the advent of social media thus seems clearly exaggerated. As Gladwell (2011, February 2nd in Sifry, 2011) aptly commented: “People protested and brought down governments before Facebook was invented. They did it before the internet came along.” In light of this, should we use the language of collective action when discussing these types of online campaigns? Indeed, some have even argued that online activities such as posting information, “liking” critical posts, or signing online petitions hinder the development of actual social movements by replacing costlier offline collective action with online lipservice. Proponents of this “slacktivism” argument maintain that low-cost and low-risk online activism may satisfy individuals’ motivation to act, and therefore forestall engagement in more impactful actions that require more risk and incur greater costs (Lee & Hsieh, 2013). This critical account, however, does not seem to be well supported by empirical

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findings. Harlow and Harp (2012), for instance, conducted a cross-cultural study of activists from the United States and Latin America to investigate the potential for social media to mobilize online and offline supporters. Across both regions, the mode of activism (i.e., online, offline, or both) did not significantly affect supporters’ actions. A meta-analysis of 36 studies (Boulianne, 2015), also did not find support for the slacktivism hypothesis, but rather an overall positive relationship between social media use and participation in civic and political life. Nevertheless, these associations were generally weak and dependent on the issues involved. Similarly, a longitudinal study surrounding a Chilean election found weak effects of prior use of SNS to share political information and views on later offline political engagement (Halpern, Valenzuela, & Katz, 2017). Nevertheless, and as noted before, many forms of online collective action carry very low costs for the activist. They thus may serve more as lifestyle identity signifiers than focused attempts to effect change in the world. As we have seen, however, identities do matter a great deal when it comes to collective action, especially once they become politicized (Van Zomeren et al., 2008). It is this potential for meaningful identity enactments that links social media campaigns with impactful collective action. As McGarty and colleagues (McGarty, Thomas, Lala, Smith, & Bliuc, 2014) argue, the use of social media does not cause the emergence of transnational identities and subsequent social movements. Rather, it makes them more feasible, therefore potentially acting as a facilitator of societal change. Social media accelerate the dissemination of politicized frames of global (and more local) events, and provide space to discuss what should be done about them. Major societal changes and processes probably would have occurred much more slowly without the catalyzing functions of digital media. In the instance of the Arab Spring, while social media activity did capitalize on existing social networks and preexisting structures, it also facilitated the formation of additional activist networks, helped build social capital, and organized actual protest (Howard & Hussain, 2011). Digital media thus represent a “social scaffolding” (McGarty et al., 2014, pp. 727) for social movements, as it does “not produce social change but bypasses the mechanisms that block the growth of opposition” (p. 727). Of course, even galvanized social movements often fail to bring about the desired change, but this was just as true before these globalizing processes were introduced. Taken together, these findings suggest that online activism does matter, although it seems to be more of a facilitator rather than a cause of societal change.

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COLLECTIVE ACTION AND CONSUMERISM Another important aspect of collective action in the context of globalization is that of political consumerism, which is the employment of individuals’ consumer decisions to achieve political objectives (Holzer, 2006). In Chapter 3, we discussed how consumerism reshapes social and psychological structures, and specifically, how social identities become rebranded as consumer lifestyle identities. We claimed that this transformation can be detrimental to the mobilization of collective action on behalf of the ingroup, by encouraging individuals to exit unwanted ingroups, or else reinterpret collective disadvantage as individual failure. Nonetheless, by defining an increasing number of social identities as lifestyle choices, this system also creates the basis for collective consumer action. In the case of same-sex attracted men, for instance, the advent of the “gay lifestyle” has meant a flurry of attempts to dissuade men from “choosing” this stigmatized lifestyle (i.e., exit the gay minority and move into the straight majority). Concomitantly, however, it galvanized gay communities (see Chapter 3) and paved the way for collective action to benefit the status of the ingroup, including consumer boycotts of brands perceived to be hostile to it (Kates, 2004). In other words, if consumer cultures identities are constructed, expressed, and validated through the mechanics of consumption, then this should apply also to political, ideological, or ethical identities, and the collective action they encourage. In this way, consumer lifestyle identities can become vehicles for political action: “In these settings, to be receptive to the claims of the environmental movement does not merely mean to vote for the Green party but also to pay attention to environmental criteria in other areas of everyday life—as a consumer. . . for instance” (Holzer, 2006, p. 410). Much like in the context of classic political participation (e.g., as a voter or protestor), a single individual generally does not carry the clout to affect the economic or political decision-making process. For example, if, as a result of concern for the natural environment in Southeast Asia, a consumer decides to boycott any product using unsustainably harvested palm oil, this decision is guided by her ethical-political principles (Wilcove & Koh, 2010). Nevertheless, this consumer decision is not going to affect any economic or political change if done in isolation. To qualify as political consumerism, an act has to be public and collective; that is, it must be a “collectivized individual choice” (Holzer, 2006, p. 406). While a single consumer’s decision is inconsequential, consumer movements are

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able to mobilize collective consumer actions and signal their aims. Then they can indeed incentivize businesses to change their practices, and extend their political aims further (Holzer, 2006). This type of collective action is certainly increasing in frequency and influence, as it fits perfectly with the social and psychological structures of consumer culture (Micheletti & Stolle, 2008). It also flourishes on social media. Because it is built to capitalize on consumer lifestyle identities, social media is the perfect platform for the creation of these consumer movements and the mobilization of collective consumer action (de Zúñiga, Copeland, & Bimber, 2014). Furthermore, because engagement in this type of collective action is directly related to the expression and reification of individuals’ consumer lifestyle identities, it becomes easily interwoven into daily life, fostering continued engagement with the project of social change (Haenfler, Johnson, & Jones, 2012). This consumerist perspective also helps explain the appearance of solidarity-based collective action. These types of actions, where the relatively privileged act on behalf of a disadvantaged outgroup, pose an apparent challenge to the notion that people act collectively to benefit their ingroup only (Wright et al., 1990). In the current context, a person’s consumer lifestyle identity may include elements of solidarity with specified others. When their needs are made salient within the context of the lifestyle community, solidarity and collective action on their behalf become manifestations of the person’s allegiance to the lifestyle ingroup. In other instances, solidarity and consumer action could result from the recategorization of those others as members of the same superordinate group as the individual (Subaˇsi´c, Schmitt, & Reynolds, 2011).

THE ALLURE OF INACTION Throughout this chapter, we have focused on the conditions that bring people together to demand social change for their own sake, or even for the benefit of distant others. Paradoxically, the same digital means that facilitate mobilization may also exaggerate, in the global public eye, the extent to which people and interest groups engage in collective protest. However, this is only part of the story. Just as important are the social and psychological conditions that foster collective apathy and inaction. The allure of inaction can be attributed first to the social identity dynamics we outlined in Chapter 3. There we claimed that in the context of globalization, which proports to allow individuals to seek and obtain

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the lifestyle they choose, group boundaries become increasingly permeable. This meritocratic worldview emphasizes the potential for individual mobility out of a disadvantaged group, thus motivating people to work as individuals, and not collectives. Even in the absence of this individual option, groups may fail to translate their demands for social change into collective action. In terms of social identity theory, disadvantaged groups often resort to socially creative strategies as they seek to improve their subjective status. In the current context, these strategies, which are collective yet inactive, often use positive stereotypes to compensate for objective disadvantage. For example, the adage of “poor but happy” should help poor people come to terms with their economic disadvantage, that is, dissuade them from taking collective action to better their objective situation (Becker & Tausch, 2015). This adage is an example of a complementary stereotype, which defines a group as possessing a distinctive set of strengths and weakness that offset one another. Complimentary stereotypes make societal disadvantage more palatable to both the disadvantaged and the privileged (Jost, Kivetz, Rubini, Guermandi, & Mosso, 2005). These sets of stereotypes thus serve to justify a system of inequality, and reduce the likelihood it would be effectively challenged by collective action. Another set of such prevailing stereotypes balances groups’ competence and power with their warmth and moral virtue: for example, poor people may be seen as incompetent and powerless, but they make up for it by being “down to Earth” and inherently kind and moral (Becker & Tausch, 2015). Conversely, the rich may be seen as competent yet cold and immoral. While the perception that an adversarial outgroup is immoral is a strong predictor of collective action against it, the extent to which this character flaw is seen as inherent undermines such challenges. If the powerful are by definition corrupt, there is nothing much to be achieved by acting against them, at least not within the realm of normative and lawful collective action. This notion received support from a study conducted during the 2011 summer of social upheaval in Israel. Those who perceived that immoral groups are generally unable or unwilling to change, tended to feel that protest is useless, and were less engaged in this movement for social change (Cohen-Chen, Halperin, Saguy, & Zomeren, 2014). Those with closer ties to outgroup members may hold less negative views of them, and put more faith in their ability to change. There is a long empirical tradition that shows that intergroup contact can reduce

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intergroup hostility and stereotyping (for a meta-analysis, see Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). Nonetheless, cross-group friendships of people from both disadvantaged and advantaged groups can undermine the motivation for collective action (Wright & Baray, 2012). One reason for this is that improved attitudes towards an advantaged group through positive intergroup contact reduces feelings of anger in response to injustice. This may hinder collective action intentions among disadvantaged group members (Tausch et al., 2015; Wright & Lubensky, 2009). Additionally, such interpersonal contact often reduces the importance of ingroup identification. As we saw earlier in this chapter, this is a crucial component of collective action. Possible solutions to overcome this dilemma between contact and reduced collective action intentions may be found in focusing on the illegitimacy of status differences (Becker, Wright, Lubensky, & Zhou, 2013), or in establishing superordinate groups that include both advantaged and disadvantaged groups (e.g., Roempke et al., 2018). Beyond the social identity dynamics that may hinder collective action, the psychology of system justification creates additional barriers to collective action and social change (Jost & Banaji, 1994). According to this perspective, people are motivated to perceive the social systems around them as essentially just and society as a whole as fair. This set of motivations to support and sustain the status quo are linked with the tendency to underperceive systematic discrimination of groups. If disadvantaged groups are not seen as being treated unfairly, there is no logic in perusing social change (e.g., Becker & Wright, 2011; Jost, Chaikalis-Petritsis, Abrams, Sidanius, van der Toorn, & Bratt, 2012). When confronted by clear instances of injustice towards those disadvantaged by the system, the motivation to justify the system may enlist additional discounting techniques. For example, individuals could refer to expected future events that would compensate for current inequalities or injustices (e.g., Gaucher, Hafer, Kay, & Davidenko, 2010). This “all will be well” outlook reduces interest in collective action designed to challenge the system in the present (Stroebe, 2013). Given that the promise of a better tomorrow is endemic to globalization’s consumeristic and meritocratic worldviews (see Chapters 2 and 3), this dynamic is especially important in the current context. This can indeed become problematic for disadvantaged groups as Becker and Tausch (2015) argued compellingly. As social identity theory posits, members of disadvantaged groups could improve their situation through individual upward mobility by leaving the group, through social creativity strategies, or—as seen in this chapter—by engaging in collective

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action. The latter is certainly the most costly, and thus, other options are often more attractive. According to Becker and Tausch, people may lose interest in or fail to develop collective action for various reasons. The first strategy that could hamper engagement in social change action is to select a new dimension of comparison. People from disadvantaged groups could simply claim that “yes, we are poor, but we are more happy than the others.” A second strategy is to change the comparison standard, and compare to those groups of people who are even worse off. And third, members of disadvantaged groups could reevaluate a negative group attribute such as being poor by changing its valence. “Being rich” may then become less desirable because it is more important to be “down-to-earth” (see also Galinsky, Hugenberg, Groom, & Bodenhausen, 2003; Jackson, Sullivan, Harnish, & Hodge, 1996). So, while these identity management strategies are certainly of value for group members’ psychological functioning, they may be detrimental in the long run. A study by Becker (2012b) suggests that engaging in social creativity can reduce the need for collective action, and thereby hinder changes in the underlying structure of inequality. In her study, she had psychology students read about financial cuts that would hit the psychology department but no other departments within their faculty. They were told that this would result in decreased reputation, prestige, external funding, with graduates ultimately being denied important skills. Afterwards, participants were randomly assigned to one of five conditions in which they were either informed about a comparably higher life satisfaction (i.e., new dimension of comparison), another department that was even worse off (i.e., downward comparison), that it would be negative if all students had the same skills (i.e., downplaying), or that it would be positive to have different skills (i.e., reevaluation). Participants who were assigned to a control condition did not receive any information. In a nutshell, results revealed that compared to the control condition, participants had lower collective action intentions when they engaged in downward comparison, used a new comparison dimension, or when they downplayed the importance of the attribute. According to Becker (2012b, see also Becker & Tausch, 2015), this finding could be replicated with groups other than students (e.g., women, the unemployed, migrants, and middle class people). Beyond these rather psychological barriers, there are of course structural boundaries that may hamper collective action—even if the psychological conditions are met. In the case of Egypt, for example, Bou

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Zeineddine and Pratto (2017) argued that politically fragile states may be particularly prone to uncertainty and mistrust among people. The complexity of such states, paired with little adherence to official law, insufficient infrastructure and tenuous economic opportunities would produce such psychological conditions that in turn may spur very different and sometimes ambivalent emotions about change, and thus influence whether people engage in collective action at all.

SUMMARY We began this chapter with some selective examples of collective action from various parts of the world. The reader will surely think of additional examples that show people engaging in collective protest or movements. In recent years, the social identity approach to collective action has been a particularly vital research area, bringing conceptual clarity to the psychological factors—identification, injustice, and efficacy—that drive social protest. We elaborated on the specific, globalization-related influences on collective action and its predictors. In particular, we highlighted the dramatic impact of the internet on how, when, and why people form transnational groups. We presented various empirical studies showing the powerful effects of social media on group identity and behavior. Much of this research suggests that through global interconnectedness, people can now mobilize and achieve connection via new groups and identities that were hardly possible to obtain before. We finished this chapter, however, with a brief look at the allure of collective inaction, primarily claiming that certain psychological but also structural barriers exist that prevent people from acting collectively. Finally, as we noted earlier, collective action is not only relevant in contexts where disadvantaged groups seek to enhance their position, or when people act in solidarity on behalf of other groups. There is also the type of broad societal change that requires action on the part of virtually everyone. Given this, it is not surprising that collective inaction is one of the main barriers to climate change and climate mitigation behaviors. We focus on this truly global issue in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 7

Social Identity and Responses to Global Environmental Crises In Chapters 7 and 8, we turn our attention to two topics that are arguably the most pressing contemporary global challenges: Climate change and migration. Both comprise a vast array of layers, causes, and effects, and are intertwined in ways that are only beginning to be understood. For example, along with the debate about how climate change affects civil unrest, there is evidence that deviations from moderate temperatures correlate with migration. When other things are kept constant, continued warming predicts an accelerated annual increase in asylum applications from non-OECD countries to the European Union (Missirian & Schlenker, 2017). This increase might reach close to 100,000 people per year by the end of the century. The patterns and consequences of both climate change and migration also underscore some of the fundamental inequities of globalization (Czaika & de Haas, 2015). Clearly, no disciplinary approach is sufficient to apprehend these dual challenges. But as we have already outlined, the social identity approach is uniquely positioned to link multiple levels of analysis, and to provide an inherently contextualized framework for collective perception and action. In the current chapter, we focus on the state of our planet’s environment, and explore the way humans perceive, appraise, and respond to global environmental issues such as climate change. In doing so, we hope that this chapter will contribute to our understanding of the ways in which human (in)action can be a key to global sustainability issues.

WHAT’S THE MATTER? GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES Environmental degradation can be observed on various levels and dimensions. As an inhabitant of a small island in the Pacific Ocean, you may experience how rising sea levels wash away your garden more often than in previous years (see Beyerl, Putz, & Breckwoldt, 2016, for the role of perceptions in climate mitigation management). Or you can walk through the local forest and realize that some fellow citizen dumped their old The Psychology of Globalization DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-812109-2.00007-0

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refrigerator next to the walking path. Or perhaps you sit on top of a building and around you, concrete and asphalt surfaces dominate the view. Or you may observe that a river once feeding a flourishing meadow has dried out, due to a hydroplant constructed in a neighboring country. These examples, which might be observable in various places all over the world, show that environmental degradation is omnipresent. An increasingly interconnected world means that environmental degradation is no longer a local problem. The actions of people and societies in one part of the planet have significant and possibly disproportionate consequences on other parts. Even the abandoned refrigerator may reflect a global problem, by, for example, being produced in another part of the planet. The malfunction that led to its disposal will likely result in the consumption of a new one, which in turn means that more resources are used. Or, the plastic of the refrigerator will eventually become microplastic, going into the soil, and ultimately, into ground water, rivers, and oceans. In this chapter, we cannot address every environmental problem (because there are too many). Therefore, we focus on global climate change as one particular and multifaceted “case study” that highlights how globalized societies contribute to environmental issues. First, we briefly summarize what we know about global climate change before we engage the psychological processes that determine how we perceive and respond to such an environmental issue.

GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE—FROM HUMANS FOR HUMANS Global climate change—the change in average weather patterns over the world—impacts virtually every human society (Rockström et al., 2009), and most climate scientists believe that it is largely caused by humans and human activity (i.e., it is more due to anthropogenic processes, than to naturally occurring biotic, solar radiation, or plate tectonic processes; International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 2013). Global climate change takes a particularly important position among the many environmental issues worldwide (within the planetary boundaries, a scientific concept that provides risk and safety zones of various core parameters of planetary health; see Steffen et al., 2015). It is one of the 17 Sustainable Development Goals formulated by the United Nations (we get back to these in more detail in Chapter 9), and one of the challenges most often debated in the media. Majorities in most countries see it as a strong threat

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to their security (Pew Research Center, 2017b). This is probably not surprising as scientists tend to attribute extreme weather conditions that expose people to health and security threats to the rapid changes of our climate (e.g., Hulme, 2014; Ornes, 2018). Looking at global climate change in the context of globalization, it is evident that globalization can be seen both as a driver of climate change and a facilitator of policies that may mitigate it. So, how exactly does climatic change relate to globalization? And what are the psychological dimensions of environmental crises, and climatic change in particular? First and foremost, globalization involved a tremendous rise in international trade and mobility—aspects of globalization that very much depend on transportation. Transportation, in turn, relies on fossil fuels, which leads to emissions of, among other components interacting with the climate, CO2 (Chapman, 2007). It is evident, then, that globalization is responsible for much variance in climate change (McMichael, 2013; O’Brien & Leichenko, 2000). For example, analyses by Robbins (1996) revealed that transnational corporations are a major contributor to climate change. In a similar vein, research on international mobility shows that the aviation sector—one of the sectors allowing us to travel and connect with people worldwide—is responsible for substantial amounts of CO2 emissions. In the United States, for example, aviation is responsible for at least 12% of the transport emissions, resulting in about 3% of the total CO2 emissions in the country (Environmental Protection Agency, 2016). Similarly, in the United Kingdom, aviation seems responsible for at least 6% of the total human CO2 emissions (Committee on Climate Change, 2017). While these numbers may not appear to be extremely high, it is noteworthy that they are produced by a relatively small number of frequent flyers from socioeconomically advantaged countries. Moreover, accounting for other factors such as the formation of cirrus clouds or the effects of contrails can easily increase the estimates and thus make aviation an even more significant piece of climate change policy (Macintosh & Wallace, 2009). Also, many estimates, in particular those from aviation associations, tend to ignore or downplay the effect of CO2 emissions in higher levels of the atmosphere (Aviation Environment Federation, undated). Another key driver of modern globalization—the internet—is similarly impactful on the planet. Indeed, every search you make on Google or every message you send via a social media is sent to vast server farms or data centers, which need energy to process that internet activity. Also,

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due to the enormous power these data centers use, the heat they generate requires cooling which requires additional energy. While it is certainly not simple to quantify the exact amount of CO2-equivalents emitted by internet usage, estimates suggest that the share of the internet’s contribution to global CO2 emissions lies between 2% and 4% (Gombiner, 2011) and is thus relatively comparable to aviation. It is worth noting that at the time of writing this book, only 2.5 billion out of around 7.5 billion people regularly used the internet (Climatecare.org, 2015). In summary, this necessarily brief review suggests that globalizationrelated mobility as well as internet use itself (to name but two) significantly impact global climate change, leading to severe consequences for communities worldwide (see also Chapter 3 on consumerism more generally, as a resource depleting social system). However, some facets of globalization may boost climate mitigation policies and behavioral patterns that may help in promoting them. As we learned in Chapters 4 and 6, globalization opens avenues for transnational cooperation and collective action for global causes. Specifically, group identification at various levels of abstraction may be particularly fruitful in understanding how individuals respond to global challenges (see Chapter 4). In recent years, a number of scholars have worked towards an understanding of the impact of group identities on proenvironmental action and psychological responses to global climate change. Before we describe this work in more detail, it is necessary to understand the meaning of “proenvironmental action” or climate change mitigation behavior.

DIMENSIONS OF PROENVIRONMENTAL ACTION Proenvironmental action refers to behaviors that harm the environment as little as possible, or even benefit the environment (Steg & Vlek, 2009). Similarly, climate change mitigation refers to behaviors or behavioral tendencies that aim to act to prevent climatic change (cf. Gifford, 2008). Stern’s (2000) widely used model of proenvironmental and climate change mitigation actions classifies such behaviors as being either private or public, and activist or nonactivist. Private-sphere environmental behavior refers to the purchase, use, and disposal of personal and household goods that have at least some environmental impact (technically, everything). This impact usually is rather small and environmentally insignificant on the individual level. Activist environmental behavior in the public sphere refers to behavior that reflects active involvement in environmental organizations

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or participation in demonstrations. More broadly speaking, any participation in social movements would qualify for public activist behavior. Finally, nonactivist behavior in the public sphere refers to behaviors that can be relatively active (e.g., signing petitions for environmental issues) or more indirect (e.g., supporting or accepting public policies). Examples of the latter include accepting environmental regulations, electing parties that seek environmental protection in their party programs, and willingness to pay higher taxes for environmental causes. These distinctions of proenvironmental behaviors are important because different behavioral domains correspond with different outcomes. Nonactivist public sphere behavior may be more effective in protecting the environment than direct private behavior because, for example, supporting public policies can alter and influence the behavior of other people in the long run, as they gain normative momentum. Private sphere behaviors, however, can be very effective as their outcomes may be directly visible, experience-laden, and even impactful if carried out by larger collectives. Beyond this distinction, it is noteworthy that other environmentally significant behaviors exist that can be both impactful and relevant on a global scale. Imagine a Burmese engineer developing a product that is much more energy efficient and clean than any other comparable product. Through the means of the internet and international trade, she may be able to distribute this product in various nations and to many individuals. Her engineering behavior would thus be highly proenvironmental, with a strong impact that goes beyond individual recycling or the signing of petitions. Similarly, a large organization may decide to invest their money in environmentally friendly stock markets and thereby stimulate the influence of those products (for an overview about green economy and alternatives, see Chapter 9).

IMPACT OF PROENVIRONMENTAL BEHAVIOR ON THE ENVIRONMENT Looking at different dimensions of proenvironmental action is important, but it is also necessary to understand which of the actions that individuals choose to make are the most impactful. While many studies in environmental psychology investigate broad attitudes and behavioral intentions towards the environment (for a meta-analysis, see Bamberg & Möser, 2007), there is much less research about the actual impact specific

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behaviors have on the environment. What are the choices that would result in the highest reduction of one’s contribution to climate change? According to an analysis by Wynes and Nicholas (2017), many of the everyday behaviors we deem to be proenvironmental have a very low impact on CO2 reductions. For example, hang drying clothes, switching to LED light bulbs, or recycling are often used as examples for individual proenvironmental action. However, these are also the behaviors that have low impact on an individual scale. Unsurprisingly, more impactful are behaviors that may be more difficult to achieve as they require longlasting psychological efforts. Specifically, a plant-based diet, purchasing green energy, avoiding flights, and living car-free are relatively uncontested, high-impact behaviors that reduce individuals’ contribution to climate change. Moreover, having less children, according to Wynes and Nicholas (but not others, see Stern & Wolske, 2017; van Basshuysen & Brandstedt, 2018), also translates into a high-impact reduction of CO2-equivalents. The impact of certain behaviors on global climate change reveals the effects of globalization on our actions. For example, international transportation, and in particular flying, contributes starkly to climate change (see above). Similarly, a meat-based diet that requires food for animals (often produced in areas formerly covered by native forest), its transportation around the globe (e.g., soy beans transported from Brazil to Europe) and raising life stock, which is processed and again shipped around the world. Finally, owning a car means owning a product that is manufactured with parts (e.g., steel, electronics, cushions) that come from many different countries and is powered by world-wide-globallyshipped gas. Then, some of those behaviors that most strongly rely on transnational, interconnected economies produce the highest impact on climate. This brings us to the core of the problem, namely that individual proenvironmental actions alone will very rarely have visible consequences for the environment. For an individual, it is virtually impossible to see the impact of not flying or adopting a vegan diet. While there certainly is an impact of each individuals’ actions on the environment, it is miniscule on its own. If you are the only person deciding to take on a vegan diet— probably the most effective measure every single individual could adopt to make a difference (Obersteiner et al., 2016)—you will not see a specific environmental consequence. It is nonetheless a mistake to say that individual behavior is futilely ineffectual vis-à-vis climate change mitigation or

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proenvironmental action. Rather, we want to stress that there is the need of many individuals engaging in these behaviors so that they become both visible and impactful. Therefore, we believe it is necessary to focus on the conditions under which individual behavior becomes group behavior (see also Chapter 6 where we make a similar argument with regard to consumption). It should be obvious by now that globalization affects how each of us deals with the environment. Specifically, we want to point to the fact that proenvironmental action—whether it is private, activist, or nonactivist—becomes more effective the greater the number of people engaging with it. This is why recent research on psychological antecedents of proenvironmental thinking and action has begun to focus on the social processes involved in how individual behavior becomes group behavior. The previous chapters presented the frame of acting and thinking in collectives. The current chapter delineates how this plays out in responses towards local and global environmental degradation. This is important in understanding why humanity as a whole seems oblivious to acting against planetary degradation.

SOCIAL IDENTITY AND RESPONSES TO CLIMATE CHANGE The key message of the previous section is that individual human behavior related to climate change and environmental degradation has only limited impact, at least as long as it is not part of a larger movement. An additional obstacle to action is that individuals are generally unable to perceive complex environmental crises. For example, climate change often cannot be observed directly (in some regions, however, its consequences can clearly already be observed) but requires trust in information that institutions—such as the scientific community or the policy makers— convey (Fritsche, Barth, Jugert, Masson, & Reese, 2018). Furthermore, temporal and geographical distance often separates between those people who cause the crisis and those who see and experience its consequences (Barth, Jugert, Wutzler, & Fritsche, 2015). Moreover, no single person is accountable for global-level environmental degradation. Just as any proenvironmental action is but a drop in a huge bucket, any environmentally damaging behavior is another tiny crack in the bucket’s side. The issue is that numerous individuals, institutions, and companies are involved in causing environmental crises as a matter of daily operation. Consequently, these crises can only be solved on a collective level. This again resonates

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with the arguments we presented in Chapter 6. In order to achieve social change, it is necessary to establish a movement of many—to shift the critical mass towards conservation. Until quite recently, psychological approaches relied on individual decision making processes explaining how individuals respond to largescale human-made environmental crises. These approaches (e.g., Bamberg, 2013; Bamberg & Möser, 2007; Hines, Hungerford, & Tomera, 1987; Klöckner, 2013) have provided important insights into what makes people act more or less proenvironmentally. Yet, we as humans are embedded in larger social collectives, and these collectives determine how we perceive, appraise, and respond to environmental crises such as climatic change (e.g., Amel, Manning, Scott, & Koger, 2017; Fielding & Hornsey, 2016; Fritsche et al., 2018). At the same time, global environmental crises such as climate change are large-scale and have the structure of common good dilemmas (Hardin, 1968). Thus, they can only be solved by collective efforts. Consequently, attention to the social and global factors related to acting proenvironmentally has been increasing. In the following paragraphs, we will elaborate on how these social factors contribute to the explanation of proenvironmental behavior. As presented in details in Chapter 4, the social identity approach describes the dynamics of thinking and acting as “we” (Reicher, Spears, & Haslam, 2010; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner et al., 1987). Depending on situationally salient comparison contexts and enduring social identification, people define their self either in terms of their idiosyncratic person or as interchangeable members of a group. The latter state of “social identity” makes people more likely to adopt collective appraisals, goals, and behavioral tendencies that are shared within their ingroup. This is how individual actors psychologically transform into collective actors (see also Chapter 6)—they internalize the relevant groups into their self-concept and act, accordingly, in the name of their group. Thus, the social identity approach is a powerful framework for understanding the collective dimensions of proenvironmental action (Amel et al., 2017; Fielding & Hornsey, 2016; Fritsche et al., 2018). In a first systematic application of the social identity approach to proenvironmental behaviors, Fielding and Hornsey (2016) argued that assimilation to ingroup norms, the influence of intergroup conflict, and the flexibility of social identity determine if and how people respond to global climate change.

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Assimilation to ingroup norms. As we discussed in Chapter 4, similarities between members of one’s ingroup, and differences between the ingroup and the outgroup, become accentuated when social identity is salient. As a consequence, ingroup members assimilate to ingroup norms. Assimilation to such norms results in attitudes and behavior that align with the collective goals and worldviews of the ingroup. An example typically mentioned for this process in the climate change discourse is political party affiliation. In many countries, such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia, Democrats, Labour Party supporters, and Liberals, tend to have greater belief in and concern about climate change than Republicans, Conservatives or National Party supporters (Fielding, Head, Laffan, Western, & Hoegh-Guldberg, 2012; McCright & Dunlap, 2011; McCright, Dunlap, & Marquart-Pyatt, 2016; Pew Research Center, 2006). At the same time, it is likely that people with specific and independently construed views regarding climate change and its causes are drawn to political groups that share these views. In other words, political identities provide attitudes, beliefs, and norms that tend to align with their (potential) supporters’ views on such issues (Fielding & Hornsey, 2016; Unsworth & Fielding, 2014). Moreover, norms are also a powerful predictor of proenvironmental and climate change mitigation behavior beyond the political sphere. A plethora of research suggests that social norms at various group levels have a profound impact on individuals’ and group members’ behavior (Bamberg & Möser, 2007) as they relate to the support of climate change policies (Alló & Loureiro, 2014). From numerous social settings, we know that our own behavior is influenced by information about how other people who share our identity behave. These social norms can either be descriptive or injunctive. Descriptive norms refer to norms that describe what a majority of group members actually does, while injunctive norms describe what is approved or desired among group members (Cialdini, Reno, & Kallgren, 1990). Both descriptive and injunctive norms have independent and combined effects on various proenvironmental behaviors. For example, social norms influence our littering behavior (Cialdini et al., 1990; Fritsche, Jonas, Kayser, & Koranyi, 2010) and whether we reuse towels while staying in a hotel (Goldstein, Cialdini, & Griskevicius, 2008; Reese, Loew, & Steffgen, 2014), recycle our garbage (Fornara, Carrus, Passafaro, & Bonnes, 2011), conserve energy (Dwyer, Maki, & Rothman, 2015; Nolan, Schultz, Cialdini,

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Goldstein, & Griskevicius, 2008), or use stickers to communicate that ads are not welcome in our mailboxes (Hamann, Reese, Seewald, & Loeschinger, 2015). The latter study provides a nice illustration of how social norms affect our everyday behavior. In this field experiment, Hamann and colleagues tested the effect of both injunctive and descriptive norms on the decision to attach an antiads sticker to one’s mailbox. They argued that reducing these (often ignored) paper advertisements would result in substantial reductions of paper and ink usage, and transport and production emissions. In fact, by manipulating descriptive norms (i.e., by putting highly visible antiads stickers on other mailboxes) and injunctive norms (i.e., providing information about what should be done), the combination of salient proenvironmental descriptive and injunctive norms caused the highest sticker attachment rates 3 weeks later. This finding suggests that social norms are particularly helpful in motivating behavioral change when descriptive and injunctive norms are aligned; however, when they are not, proenvironmental behaviors may be undermined (Smith, Louis, Terry, Greenaway, Clarke, & Cheng, 2012). Such a norm conflict is clearly visible in the context of individual E-mobility (i.e., the use of cars running on electricity rather than fuel). While on the one hand, many scientists as well as political institutions claim that E-mobility can be a substantial aspect of climate change mitigation behavior and should be supported (i.e., an injunctive norm), the actual number of E-vehicles on the road (i.e., the actual descriptive norm) shows that only a minority uses these cars. This may in turn explain why descriptive norm information may not be predictive of behavioral intentions to use or buy an E-car (Barth, Jugert, & Fritsche, 2016). Taken together, Fielding and Hornsey’s (2016) work highlights social norms as one facet of social identity which is important in understanding people’s proenvironmental actions (see also Chapter 3 for details on the specific role of ingroup norms). Influence of intergroup conflict. Many environmental and natureprotection issues are highly contested and involve various stakeholders’ views and goals. For example, local farmers may feel particularly threatened by governmental institutions that aim at regulating fertilizing practices or nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that seek stricter plant crop sequences. As Fielding and Hornsey (2016) argue, such intergroup relations are often characterized by status asymmetries—in our

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example, a powerful state institution may unilaterally decide about issues that affect comparably powerless local farmer initiatives. Such status discrepancies are often visible when it comes to the fair and just distribution of burdens and outcomes. In the globalized society of the 20th and 21st centuries, a wide gulf in status emerged between richer and poorer countries. These were often referred to as countries of the global north (or developed countries), and countries of the global south (or developing countries). Beyond this geographical divide, we can easily imagine a temporal one between those generations that are currently living on the planet and future generations. The consequences of climate change will tend to be experienced more strongly in developing countries (Mendelsohn, Dinar, & Williams, 2006) and by future generations. The consequences and injustices of global climate change affect peoples’ concern, beliefs and actions. In the United States there is a recent increase in concern about climate change, likely because more and more US citizens believe that climate change affects them personally. In a nationally representative, large-sample survey, nearly half of the respondents reported experiencing effects of global warming (Leiserowitz, Maibach, Roser-Renouf, Rosenthal, Cutler, & Kotcher, 2017). Resonating with the expected consequences for future generations and developing countries, many Americans believe that future generations (75%) and people in developing countries (71%) will be harmed. While these findings focus only on the United States, it is likely that people in societies worldwide have similar or even stronger concerns. The intergroup dimension of all this then becomes particularly visible in international efforts to agree on climate change policy, where the question is whether “we” have to change our impact on the environment, or “they,” and whether “we” have to reduce our standard of living or whether “they” have to reduce their economic growth. This is even more striking in the context of the ideological and political divides described above. Flexibility and dynamics of social identity. The effects of group affiliations on environmental thinking and acting clarifies that social identities are not fixed or stable. Identities and their relevance change as a function of the context in which they are situated (i.e., depending on their “comparative fit”, see Chapter 4). In earlier chapters, we described how globalization can foster various transnational and transcultural identities that may

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become activated both across situations and over time. In fact, through globalization and international relations, the comparative contexts may become particularly visible, and thus relevant. For example, in a study by Rabinovich and colleagues (Rabinovich, Morton, Postmes, & Verplanken, 2012), British participants perceived their own group to be more proenvironmental when an ostensibly less environmental group (US citizens) was a salient outgroup comparison. However, when compared to an ostensibly more environmental nation (Sweden), participants perceived Brits to be less environmental. Similarly, a temporal comparison that makes a past or future ingroup salient can also result in different judgements about the ingroup’s environmentalism (Ferguson, Branscombe, & Reynolds, 2011). Extrapolating from the latter finding, it is likely that the group of all humans may be perceived as more proenvironmental when it is compared to humanity in the past, but less proenvironmental when compared to humanity in the future (cf. Rosenmann et al., 2016). The dynamic and flexible nature of social identity suggests that these processes may also interact. As described above, the group of conservatives may be less concerned about climate change than the group of liberals. However, this does not necessarily mean that this well-supported political divide is immutable and will always be true. When climate change is framed in a way that speaks to conservatives—for example, through focusing on the past in environmental comparisons—conservatives may also be willing to act against climate change (Baldwin & Lammers, 2016). These processes allow flexibility not only in terms of the comparison standard but also in terms of which social identity is relevant in a given situation. As we described in detail in Chapter 4, various levels of social identification are possible, so that at any given time one or more identities can become salient and relevant to our behavior. For example, if you engage in collective celebrations as a global citizen (DeRivera, 2018; DeRivera & Carson, 2015), the social group of all humans will be activated, and with it the ideas, norms, and beliefs that all humans may share. Of course, the content of a global identity is culturally dependent, and thus potentially implicated in the existing global status differentials (Rosenmann et al., 2016). Research in the realm of proenvironmental action and global citizenship, had nonetheless suggested that the salience of a global identity may motivate proenvironmental action (Merle, Reese, & Drews, 2018; Renger & Reese, 2017; Reysen & Katzarska-Miller, 2013; Running, 2013).

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The focus on social group processes is both desirable and inevitable as long as we accept that human efforts to deal with climate change ultimately need to align in concert. It is therefore vital to our understanding of climate change-related appraisals and responses to further elaborate the social psychological conditions that prevent or catalyze action in the environmental sphere. A more detailed approach dealing with the specific psychological processes involved has been proposed by Fritsche and colleagues (Fritsche et al., 2018). It focuses on the basic distinction between appraising a problem and responding to a problem. These two processes are at the core fueled by social identity processes. In the following section we describe the social-identity model of proenvironmental action (SIMPEA; Fritsche et al., 2018) in more detail.

The Social-Identity Model of Proenvironmental Action The SIMPEA elaborates the role of social identities in the context of large-scale environmental crises. Specifically, it makes the important distinction between what humans perceive and evaluate as an environmental problem (i.e., their appraisal) and how humans respond to it (i.e., their response). Why is this distinction important? Based on earlier work on protection-motivation by Rogers (1983), Homburg and Stolberg (2006) delineated two types of appraisals to determine problem-focused coping with environmental crises that would ultimately result in proenvironmental action: demand appraisals and resource appraisals. Demand appraisals describe the extent of threat or expected personal harm resulting from an environmental problem (e.g., air pollution, climatic change). Resource appraisals are people’s general beliefs in their ability to cope with the environmental problem (e.g., self-efficacy in reducing pollution or CO2 emissions). How do these appraisals relate to proenvironmental action? Homburg and Stolberg (2006) as well as Chen (2015) found that only resource appraisals of collective efficacy (i.e., the belief that “we as a group” are capable of dealing with the problem) predict problem-focused coping and proenvironmental behavior. Personal efficacy beliefs, according to these studies, did not predict proenvironmental action, suggesting that the collective dimension of such appraisals is what drives proenvironmental action, and ultimately, responses to global climate change and other global environmental crises. However, such personal efficacy beliefs are not unrelated to proenvironmental action. On the contrary, it seems that both collective and personal efficacy beliefs are

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vital to the implementation of proenvironmental intentions and actions. Yet, it seems that beliefs about collective efficacy fuel personal efficacy beliefs. A study by Jugert, Greenaway, Barth, Buechner, Eisentraut, and Fritsche (2016) showed that through experimentally increasing collective efficacy beliefs, stronger proenvironmental intentions emerged. However, and most importantly, this effect was indirect and subject to changes in personal efficacy beliefs. In other words, increasing people’s sense of capability to change on a collective level resulted in stronger beliefs in one’s individual capability to achieve change. In the context of plastic reduction intentions, Reese and Junge (2017) replicated this finding. In a field experiment, the authors distributed cards that presented a plastic reduction challenge (e.g., going shopping without plastic bags or packaging) that was either simple, moderately difficult, or very difficult to achieve. Once people participated, they could pass the cards on, and subsequently complete an online questionnaire. Similar to the study by Jugert and colleagues, stronger collective efficacy beliefs predicted stronger personal efficacy beliefs that in turn predicted behavioral intentions (e.g., to reduce plastic consumption). Importantly, collective efficacy was strongest among those who participated in a moderately difficult challenge. In other words, appraising a problem as too easy or too difficult may hinder collective efficacy beliefs and thereby impede proenvironmental action. With collective efficacy being a particularly powerful and relevant predictor of social action (see also Chapter 6), such findings offer hope. This is hope that the planet surely needs, given that only 5% of US Americans—collectively one of the largest contributors to climatic change—say that humans can and will successfully reduce global warming (Leiserowitz et al., 2017). Such findings call for a “collective psychology” of responses to climate change. We know quite a lot about the individual barriers and catalysts of proenvironmental behavior. This research is summarized in various integrated models, such as the theory of planned behavior (Ajzen & Fishbein, 2005; Nigbur, Lyons, & Uzzell, 2010), the norm-activation model (Schwartz & Howard, 1981; Steg & de Groot, 2010), value-beliefnorm theory (Stern, 2000), goal framing theory (Lindenberg & Steg, 2007), the comprehensive action determination model (Klöckner & Blöbaum, 2010), and the stage model of self-regulated behavioral change (Bamberg, 2013). Some of these models also consider the role of personal habits (Verplanken & Wood, 2006; Verplanken, Aarts, & van

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Knippenberg, 1997) and generally describe people’s environmentally significant behavior as the result of a personal decision-making or action process. However, one may ask whether individual-centered models can account for the challenges presented by globalization. As we have seen in the introduction of this chapter, consequences of individual behaviors may have relatively small impact and limited visibility. Rather, it is social identification that can transform individual behavior to collective—and possibly more consequential—action (Reicher, Spears, & Haslam, 2010; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Then appraisals and actions do not emerge out of idiosyncratic cognitions and motivations related to the person but on the basis of collective cognitions and motivations. Let’s illustrate this argument with the following example. Imagine a devoted climate change activist in contemporary Northern Europe. She would unlikely be personally threatened by climate change. Also, her personal motivation to act would not likely hinge only on normative pressures and the behaviors of others around her. Instead, for her, the threat manifests itself in conjecture with her collective self (e.g., the future security of humankind), and her motivation to act emerges from her selfdefinition as a climate change activist, committed to the environmental cause. In other words, people often think and act as if they were collectives and not as individuals affected only by other individuals. According to the SIMPEA model, this collective thinking is a crucial platform for effectively tackling large-scale environmental crises. As illustrated in Fig. 7.1, Fritsche and colleagues (2018) argued that social identity processes both influence and are influenced by appraisals of an environmental event (e.g., global climate change). For example, if you

Response (Proenvironmental behavior)

Ingroup identification (e.g., as environmentalists, citizens)

Environmental crisis

Collective efficacy beliefs

Appraisal

Emotions & motivations (both personal and collective)

Ingroup norms and goals

Figure 7.1 Social identity model of proenvironmental action (SIMPEA).

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are a member of an ideologically defined group, this may blur your recognition of climate change-related scientific evidence. Or, that membership may guide your perceptions of whether global warming is threatening, and motivate you to engage in collective action (or not). In addition, the model includes processes of ingroup identification, perceived ingroup norms and goals, and collective efficacy as joint motivators of individuals’ private and public sphere proenvironmental action. The model describes how environmental crises elicit people’s relevant responses through environmental appraisal and group-based cognition and motivation. Specifically, this response is often indirectly elicited by an initial appraisal of an environmental crisis or of distinct elements of crisis: These can be specific (e.g., local water shortage or acidic lakes) or broad (e.g., global climate change, land-use conflicts, or the extinction of species). If the appraisal leads the perceiver to evaluate the environmental crisis as relevant for either oneself or one’s group, he or she will express emotions and general motivations on either (or both) the personal or the collective level. Such emotions and motivations, in turn, fuel collective processes. In line with social identity theory, these processes reflect three central social identity variables: ingroup identification and selfcategorization, collective efficacy beliefs, and ingroup behavior norms and goals. These three variables are supposed to interact in affecting both appraisals of environmental crises and people’s responses in the private and the public spheres, which may be either nonactivist or activist in nature. Similar to the social identity approach outlined by Fielding and Hornsey (2016), the SIMPEA model positions proenvironmental behavior next to ingroup norms, social identification, and the intergroup context. Yet, the SIMPEA model provides more fine-grained explanations of proenvironmental actions. Its core processes and predictions are elaborated in the following section, along with some examples.

Ingroup Identification, Efficacy, and Norms as Core Social Identity Variables A prerequisite for group-based action is that people identify with a group. That means that they have categorized the self in a group and feel invested in that group (Leach et al., 2008). People can either identify with groups that are intrinsically related to environmentalism (Bliuc et al., 2015; Fielding, McDonald, & Louis, 2008; Reese & Junge, 2017) or groups that are not.

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So, what are the conditions that make groups worth identifying with? As we have already learned, groups provide meaning and purpose, and guide action via specific norms. In terms of appraising and responding to environmental issues, it is logical that proenvironmental norms will increase group members’ inclination to act in a proenvironmental fashion (Nolan, Schultz, Cialdini, Goldstein, & Griskevicius, 2008). As Masson and Fritsche (2014) showed, this is particularly pronounced among highly identified group members. Acting in line with ingroup norms and goals becomes even more likely when those members think that the group is able to attain its goals (i.e., collective efficacy beliefs; Jugert et al., 2016; Reese & Junge, 2017; Van Zomeren et al., 2008; see also Chapter 6 on collective action); this interaction is depicted in Fig. 7.1 by the circled X. The interactive affect of these variables is relevant when we look at the concepts of ingroup identification, environmental ingroup norms, and collective environmental efficacy, because it is likely that proenvironmental responses are never based on a simple “when x, then y” relation. In other words, while each of the three critical social identity variables might be expected to have unique effects on proenvironmental responses when the other two variables are held constant (i.e., in an experimental setting), the SIMPEA model suggests that the effect of each variable is amplified by high values on the other two variables. For instance, imagine members of an environmental campaign that combats against a state’s decision to cut down a forest. Even strong group norms (“We have an obligation to stand against the decision”) and strong collective efficacy beliefs (“Through our protest, we will really have the chance to alter the decision”) may not result in proenvironmental action when group members are not sufficiently identified with that group. In other words, one of these variables can catalyze the potential effects of the others. Similarly, high levels of ingroup identification may only increase people’s proenvironmental behavior or intention when environmental ingroup norms are salient and/or when members perceive their ingroup as likely to reach its goals. The SIMPEA does not stop here, as it acknowledges that the core social identity variables are subject to emotional experiences and motivations. Specifically, the model predicts that emotions and motivations mediate the effect of environmental crisis appraisals on group-based processes.

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Emotional and Motivational Responses to Global Climate Change When we appraise climate change or other environmental crises as a source of threat and danger, we will probably feel that some of our more basic psychological needs are also threatened. Perceiving climate change as problematic will likely result in feelings of uncertainty and uncontrollability (Fritsche, Cohrs, Kessler, & Bauer, 2012; see also Doherty & Clayton, 2011; but see Hornsey et al., 2015). It may also threaten our sense of continuity and efficacy (see Vignoles, Regalia, Manzi, Golledge, & Scabini, 2006, for additional motives). These threats may be experienced at the personal level, the collective level, or both. Depending on the level of subjective threat, people will focus on different consequences and thus experience different emotions. For example, when people focus on the personal consequences of climate change (e.g., perceiving that rising sea levels will destroy one’s home) they may perceive emotions or self-related motivational states such as personal helplessness. A focus on the perceived collective consequences of climate change, however, is more likely to lead to group-based emotions. One such emotion could be collective guilt. For instance, when Germans compare themselves in the context of climate change with people from Bangladesh, it is likely that they experience guilt. A cyclist in the Danish capital of Copenhagen may experience anger when she compares herself with SUV drivers. Group members can also experience threat that arises from unfavorable intergroup social comparisons, for example when one’s government is considered ineffective in bringing about change in the face of severe crises. Such emotions are directly related to proenvironmental intentions (e.g., Reese & Jacob, 2015). The inclusion of emotional and motivational responses to environmental crises such as climate change also reveal that many of these challenges are strongly psychologically interlinked. While there are direct consequences of emotional responses on proenvironmental action goals (e.g., pursuing the collective goal of reparation or proenvironmental action in response to eco-guilt; e.g., Ferguson & Branscombe, 2010; Harth, Leach, & Kessler, 2013; Mallett, 2012; see path from emotions/ motivations to norms in Fig. 7.1), emotional responses could also fuel other, more distalreactions. One issue likely to have growing consequences in the future is the spread of conflict as a consequence of adverse

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changes in sociocultural conditions (e.g., migration movements, resource scarcity; Anderson & DeLisi, 2011; IPCC, 2007; see also Burke, Miguel, Satyanath, Dykema, & Lobell, 2009, for a case of civil wars in Africa). For example, Fritsche et al. (2012) showed in a series of studies that people increase ethnocentric responses (an epistemic primacy of one’s ingroup; Kessler & Fritsche, 2011) after being confronted with potentially threatening environmental information. In other words, environmental threat makes a contextually-relevant group identity salient (e.g., the national ingroup), which might lead to negative consequences for intergroup relations. What does this mean on a global scale? Very generally, it shows that global environmental problems do not remain environmental problems. Instead, and consistent with the notion of climate change as a “threat multiplier” (e.g., Missirian & Schlenker, 2017), they amplify other pressures, and evolve into even more complex problems that may ultimately erode societal structures and peaceful cohabitation. When increasingly confronted by perceived climate change-related threats— either subjectively through consuming news and media, or objectively through quantifiable data that show the actual impact on living conditions—people may respond by reclaiming parochial and ingroup-centered values and beliefs. These in turn can fuel societal conflicts, especially when resources become scarce. When we think of globalization in traditional terms, focusing on the political and economic drivers that are often key to the globalization narrative, one could ask: are these psychological dimensions relevant? Does individual or group behavior have an impact on global environmental change—in a globalized world that is characterized by bigger than ever macro-level structures, governance, and economic processes? The answer to these questions is yes. Societal change—and reaching a more sustainable society certainly requires a tremendous societal change—is often propelled by collective changes in identities, beliefs, and actions. Indeed, and particularly on a global scale, efficient change can occur in no other way. There are two spheres of behavior and decision-making that are especially relevant in the context of global proenvironmental action. The first relates to global transnational negotiations and development of global policies. The second returns our focus to communication via the internet. We elaborate about these two in the remainder of the chapter.

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Processes of Social Identity in Transnational Negotiations There is some research indicating that psychological processes—and social identity processes in particular—may play a prominent role in transnational negotiations and global decision-making aimed at climate change mitigation. In Chapter 4, we described a particular level of social identity that is important here: global identity or global citizenship. In this section we explore how this supranational identity can be achieved, and perhaps enlisted in environmental collective action. Recent history has shown a lack of coordinated action against climate change. For example, the United Nations climate conference in Copenhagen in 2009 was heavily criticized for its lack of binding results (Dimitrov, 2010), and according to an influential article in The Guardian, it amounted to “a big failure” (Vidal, Stratto, & Goldenberg, 2009). While subsequent meetings, such as the COP21 in Paris in 2015, yielded some binding international agreements, the results were limited and not sufficient to reach climate goals. In fact, many observers claimed that this kind of agreement was a step backwards (see Haber, 2016). Batalha and Reynolds (2012) suggested that the lack of coordinated action against climate change reflects the neglect of the socialpsychological processes we discuss in this book. They argued that largescale international meetings, such as the United Nations meetings on climate change, could be more effectively structured by forming subgroups of like-minded nations. On this basis, a higher superordinate identity would more likely emerge, and then promote aligned and coordinated global action. Specifically, an iterative process of group formation may encourage a superordinate identity in the context of complex intergroup settings which are characterized by diverging subgroup interests (Batalha & Reynolds, 2012). These adversarial settings are typical in transnational negotiations when partners share few common but many opposing interests (e.g., in terms of economic decisions or carbon pricing). An iterative process of group formation requires several steps. First, it is necessary to understand the social identities people hold within a relevant social group or organization (e.g., identification within a ministry body or conservation organization). Based on these identities, higherorder subgroups are formed that articulate relevant, shared goals of these social groups or organizations. With regard to negotiations on global climate change policy, Batalha and Reynolds (2012) suggest that within

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each nation, such lower-level identity resources based on common and shared goals need to be ascertained, and then followed by the creation of nation subgroups that capture shared concerns and goals. Once these subgroups have become meaningful and the interests of their different nations have been combined, the subgroups should seek to form a superordinate group framework. In other words, this bottom-up process of bringing shared goals through various steps together should result in more sustainable commitment because there is a genuine shared definition of “who we are” (Batalha & Reynolds, 2012, p. 8). Indeed, previous research suggests that when people see that their input is valued in a superordinate group setting, it becomes more likely for negotiations on the subgroup level to be handled successfully (Eggins, Haslam, & Reynolds, 2002). As Huo and colleagues (Huo et al., 1996) showed, higher identification with a superordinate group (e.g., all humans) leads to focusing on the greater good, in which we all have a share. A shared definition of the social group “humans” could thus provide a viable option for reaching global consensus about the way we collectively need to act. Prior experience suggests that this may not be easily achieved. Yet, an analogous and successful (though not entirely uncriticized) attempt of such an iterative negotiation resulted in the creation of the International Criminal Court (ICC). In building the ICC, subgroups that shared common goals and concerns were part of an institutionalized process of forming a recognized transnational court. The negotiations occurred under the auspices of the United Nations and included primary individual actors and collectives (i.e., government delegations, NGOs). Specifically, the element of forming like-minded groups—groups with similar views of certain topics and principles—was an important prerequisite for negotiating the final features of the ICC (Washburn, 1999; see also Reese, 2016). The work by Batalha and Reynolds (2012) illustrates how social identities can form a basis for meaningful agency in global decisions and transnational cooperation in the environmental realm (see also Buchan et al., 2011). Nonetheless, these findings apply to a very limited pool of decision makers in the political arena. In another, much broader, domain—the internet—a growing number of people worldwide gain the opportunity to share their views and interests, and engage in online decision-making (e.g., via online campaigning and networking). In the following section, we look at the psychological and behavioral

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consequences of information dissemination and environmental communication through the internet.

THE WORLD WIDE WEB AND ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES As we have noted throughout the book, modern globalization relies strongly on digital interconnectedness. The way we act with regard to our environment and global climate change is no exception. In fact, a plethora of research shows that the internet is not only a database for people seeking information about climate change and other environmentally related information, it is a means of communicating about and acting against climate change. We use the internet to learn about other people’s views on climate issues, we read and share information about campaigns, and we engage in those debates by actively expressing our views. Whatever we post at any given time can be immediately responded to by people virtually anywhere in the world. Many of these behaviors are subject to social psychological processes, and have an impact on individual and collective views of climate change. We already mentioned Leonardo DiCaprio’s 2016 Oscar acceptance speech in Chapter 6 that sparked a discussion that drew in people who were previously less involved in the subject. Another example is certainly the Twitter activity of the 2016-elected US president Trump who used this forum to disparage the Environmental Protection Agency (who responded with environmental tweets nonetheless). Even more worrying, the influence of social bots (i.e., automated computer programs spreading information) on debates with global dimensions has increased, and requires more research and policy attention (Ferrara, Varol, Davis, Menczer, & Flammini, 2016). As is the case for many political topics, interest in environmental issue ebbs and flowsover time. The internet provides a very useful tool for assessing which themes become more or less relevant, and for which themes a certain dynamic exists. Indeed, Google search volumes correlate substantially with public participation in political issues (Reilly, Richey, & Taylor, 2012). Some scholars argue that data-mining tools such as Google Trends provide more valid psychological indexes than survey-based data (Ripberger, 2011). They may be more useful for understanding relations between attitudes and actual behavior since they reflect a decision already made rather than an intention not yet formed (Vosen & Schmidt, 2011).

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For example, McCallum and Bury (2013) investigated the expression of environmental interest between 2004 and 2010. As a proxy for interest in environmental issues, the authors measured internet search trends via Google. Using a previous version of Google Trends (Google Insights for Search, a tool to access search data), the authors examined internet activity for 19 environmental-related search terms (e.g., conservation, environment, biodiversity) and phrases (e.g., endangered species, bird conservation). Across all words and phrases used, except for climate change and sustainability, McCallum and Bury found a decrease in search activity. A more recent analysis using these tools provided a more nuanced picture, suggesting that whereas some terms show a steady decline, others do not (Nghiem, Papworth, Lim, & Carrasco, 2016). These findings suggest that search trends are quite volatile, and are likely also responsive to disastrous environmental events (McCallum & Bury, 2013). An important qualification is that these searches were conducted with English search terms only, limiting the generalizability of the findings. Relatedly, Ficetola (2013) argued that rather than a specific loss of interest in environmental topics, there was a general decline in interest in scientific terms (compared to, e.g., leisure-related terms). Various other means of big data analyses also show that social media are used to disseminate, discuss, and receive information about environmental-related issues. One study (Newman, 2017) assessed the activity on Twitter following the release of the 5th Report of the IPCC. In more than 17,000 relevant tweets after publication of the summary report for policy makers, independent bloggers and concerned citizens were the most active tweeters, with the main theme being the public understanding of the issue. Looking at this research, the question is how such findings relate to psychological processes. Using Twitter, Google, and other social media and search engine data does not equal what researchers might reveal when directly asking participants about their views. Rather, we can infer from tweets, feeds, and searches what cognitions, emotions, and other behaviors are related to these internet activities (see also the related work presented in Chapter 5). Studies show that Twitter use reflects public interest in climate change (Kirilenko & Stepchenkova, 2014; Kirilenko, Molodtsova, & Stepchenkova, 2016); the way we deal with such media information also seems to be a matter of group membership. We have already described how the perception of environmental problems is a function of group membership and social identification.

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Not surprisingly, group processes also affect how relevant social media information is perceived and disseminated. In one study, Jang and Hart (2015) examined Twitter discussions across four countries (the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia) over the course of 2 years. Using an elegant technique, they analyzed different frames related to climate change. Specifically, they classified single tweets as having a real frame (i.e., tweets that included the terms “global warming” or “climate change” together with “real” or “fact”), a hoax frame (i.e., tweets that included the same environmental terms along with “lie” or “fraud”), or other frames (e.g., referring to cause, impact, or action). The results indicated that hoax frames were more frequent in the United States than in other countries, and were particularly prominent in traditionally Republican-leaning US States (see also McCright & Dunlap, 2008). Interestingly, when users discussed climate change within a hoax frame, they more often used the term “global warming” rather than “climate change.” Also, US citizens approached climate change more on a “real vs lie” dimension, while in the other countries climate change causes, impacts, and actions were comparatively stronger frames. The psychological consequences are apparent: When polarized views are shared primarily among like-minded citizens, attitudes and views about climate change are likely to become more and more polarized (see also Colleoni, Rozza, & Arvidsson, 2014 and in Chapter 5). Similarly, an analysis of Twitter conversation and associated hashtags following the 2013 IPCC report identified three communities of tweeters (supportive, unsupportive, and neutral) whose members were most likely to converse with others in their respective communities (Pearce, Holmberg, Hellsten, & Nerlich, 2014). These findings show that the communication through social media affects psychological processes and how people perceive climate change issues. In Chapter 5, we described how social media use such as Twitter activity is related to psychological outcomes and collective action in the nonvirtual realm. For environmental issues such as climate change, it is very likely that similar psychological processes (as delineated in Fritsche et al.’s SIMPEA; see also Bamberg et al., 2015) are at work. However, to date, there is little empirical evidence of how social media activity promotes action in the environmental realm. The study by Merle and colleagues (Merle et al., 2018) on the “#globalcitizen” hashtag described in Chapter 6, for example, showed that various proenvironmental causes

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were tweeted together with this hashtag, suggesting again that a viable link exists between global identities and environmental actions. One experiment looking at the causal influences of climate change information transmitted via social media found that social media channels may deliver normative social cues to users (Spartz, Su, Griffin, Brossard, & Dunwoody, 2017). American participants watched a Youtube video about climate change that was tagged with either a low or a high number of views. In line with what we described earlier in the section on social norms, participants in the high number condition perceived other Americans as seeing climate change as a more important issue, relative to participants in the low-number condition. However, there was no effect on the perceived importance for the self, suggesting that the mere “consumption” of social media content may not be sufficient to motivate action.

SUMMARY In this chapter, we briefly described global climate change as a case-inpoint for the human-made environmental degradation, followed by an overview of psychological research addressing proenvironmental behavior. As an increasing threat, climate change transcends national, cultural, and even temporal borders so that large-scale coordinated action is necessary. We stressed that a social identity perspective on responses to global climate change is consequentially vital as individual behavior can only have an impact if conducted by many. Our description of the social identity models show that people appraise environmental problems through a group lens, and that people respond to such problems as a function of group membership. We highlighted that emotions and beliefs about one’s group’s efficacy also contribute to whether people engage in proenvironmental action. Finally, we discussed the impact of globalization on how people communicate about climate change through social media.

CHAPTER 8

Social Identity and the Challenges of Migration and Multiculturalism In 2015, the world contained 65.3 million forcibly displaced people— about 1% of the global human population—including 21.3 million recognized as refugees (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2016). Those fleeing Syria (4.9 million), Afghanistan (2.7 million), and Somalia (1.1 million) comprised approximately half of the refugees. Children under the age of 18 accounted for more than half of the global refugee population, many of them unaccompanied by, or separated from, their family. Media attention (primarily in Western countries) focused on the precarious and often life-threatening situations encountered by those among the more than 1 million migrants who entered Europe by land and sea in 2015. However, millions more remain for decades in protracted refugee situations. Such ongoing predicaments, along with the continuous evolution and expansion of international humanitarian efforts since the mid-twentieth century, “[speak] to the reality that mass flight is a perpetual challenge, not a temporary crisis, and a core feature of a more globalized world” (Welsh, 2016, p. 127). The mass migration of people—whether provoked by conditions of systematic persecution, generalized violence, economic collapse, or environmental change—presents some of the greatest challenges of an integrated world. Of course, movement of people between countries is motivated by various factors (e.g., work, study, family reunification), and many of the same social psychological processes unfold when individuals, groups, and cultures come into contact via voluntary migration. Mass flight, however, accelerates and amplifies these processes, not just because the humanitarian and resettlement needs are more acute, but also because refugees, asylum seekers, and other migrants—including those who have crossed international borders and/or who are working in another country without authorization—are a lightning rod for issues concerning the identity and security of people in potential receiving countries. As a result, The Psychology of Globalization DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-812109-2.00008-2

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responses to mass migration contain the possibilities for starkly different outcomes, including individual and collective efforts to accept and accommodate, as well as those to close borders, and to deport migrants who have already arrived within them. In this chapter, we consider processes involving social identities—their coexistence, transformation, meaning, and context—that underlie these responses. We review the social psychological underpinnings of multiculturalism, with a focus on how contextual features involving perceived threat and the ideological climate of potential receiving societies affect receptivity to, or rejection of, cultural diversity.

GLOBALIZATION AND MIGRATION Mass movements of people often mark tumultuous moments in history, but migration has of course always been a feature of human existence, making a dynamic contribution to the development, vitality, and cultural diversity of societies. There are various ways to characterize the globalization of migration (e.g., Castles & Miller, 2009; Czaika & de Haas, 2015). Some are linked to the increasing mobility afforded by socioeconomic development, and the push and pull of economic requirements and opportunities, including the needs of wealthier countries to fill different, and increasingly skilled, roles in evolving global labor markets. Others concern transnational responses to large-scale migration, involving coordinated humanitarian and resettlement efforts on the part of governments and civil society groups, but also human trafficking operations, and evolving security arrangements (e.g., detention centers) that expose migrants to additional risks (e.g., Médicins sans Frontières, 2015; York, 2017). More generally, globalization brings changes that give people windows onto the rest of the world, ways to imagine themselves in other places (often where family and friends already are), and potential means to get there and get settled. Modern migration is thus transformed in various ways by developments in information and communications technology: “People in northern Iraq use WhatsApp and Viber to talk to friends who have made it to Germany; UNHCR uses iris scans for identification in camps in Jordan and Lebanon; migrants on flimsy boats in the Mediterranean use satellite phones provided by people-smugglers to call the Italian coastguard; and geeks in Europe teach refugees how to code so that they can try to get jobs” (“Migrants with mobiles,” 2017, p. 49).

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Early in 2017, in a “tweet heard around the world” (Lukacs, 2017), Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau reached out to global migrants via social media: “To those fleeing persecution, terror & war, Canadians will welcome you, regardless of faith. Diversity is our strength. #WelcometoCanada.” Trudeau was responding to US President Donald Trump’s executive order, a day earlier, to ban travel from several Muslimmajority countries (as well as the entry of refugees from any country); though critics wondered whether the hopefulness the tweet might give to migrants would be matched by the will and capacity of Canadians to receive them. The next day, a gunman killed six people in a Québec City mosque, saying later that he was moved to action by his fear of terrorism, and by Trudeau’s expression of openness in contrast to the US antiMuslim policy: “I was watching TV and I learned that the Canadian government was going to take more refugees. . . who couldn’t go to the United States, and they were coming here.” Around the same time, a White House official justified the US travel ban with reference to the mosque shooting, mistaking it for Islamist terrorism (Perreaux, 2018). These events provide a particularly intense example of cascading connections between geographically distant people and events: migrants who might imagine a new home in Canada, Canadians who would welcome them, those who feel threatened by them, and others targeted for their perceived cultural similarity to them. They also show the rapid reverberations of formal and informal politicized information, with sometimes unpredictable effects on individual and collective behavior. And in the following months, the effects of different political climates and policy developments in Canada and the US continued to unfold: more than 50,000 people sought asylum in Canada in 2017, the largest number in decades (Pew Research Center, 2018), including around 20,000 who walked across the border from the United States (most of these were Haitians who were at risk of deportation from the United States after impending changes to their protected status were announced). This prompted a tweet from the Canadian immigration department that was more qualified than Trudeau’s: “There are no guarantees you can stay in Canada” (“A tale of two tweets,” 2018). Processes associated with globalization thus make contemporary migration a truly modern phenomenon, not least because global observers (including members of potential receiving nations) can have a simultaneous awareness of migration-related events via traditional and social media. As we discussed in Chapter 6, one of the pivotal global events of

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recent years was the widely disseminated photo of the body of Aylan Kurdi, who drowned with his mother and brother while trying to cross from Turkey to Kos, Greece, in September 2015 (The Kurdis were among more than 3700 migrants who died at sea that year). On the other hand, patterns of global migration depart from expectations generally associated with the “flattening” effects of globalization (cf. Freidman, 2005). Indeed, Czaika and de Haas (2015) refuted the assumption that the globalization of migration operates in the direction of greater volume of movement and greater diversity of both origins and destinations; instead, from 1960 to 2000, “migrants from an increasingly diverse array of non-Europeanorigin countries have been concentrating in a shrinking pool of prime destination countries” (p. 315). Thus, migration patterns reflect some of the broader asymmetries and inequities of globalization, including the fact that industrialized nations compete for skilled migrants while they work to keep “unauthorized” or “illegal” ones out. Given this, it is unsurprising that low and middle income countries such as Lebanon and Jordan host the large majority of refugees (in 2015, the only higher income countries in the top 10 refugee-per-capita nations were Sweden and Malta; UNHCR, 2016). Nevertheless, historical migration patterns have coincided with the evolution of efforts to manage cultural diversity within national boundaries, both in traditionally immigration-based countries (e.g., the United States, Canada, and Australia) and, more recently, in the “global migration magnet” that Europe has become (Czaika & de Haas, 2015, p. 314). The need to accommodate newcomers, which is particularly acute during mass flight crises, poses enormous challenges for receiving countries, and speaks to larger issues regarding the management of cultural diversity in contexts where various notions of multiculturalism are already strained. Given this, the integration of migrants is a defining and divisive political issue for many countries. It also contains the opportunity to strive for social cohesion in the midst of nativist reactions to economic and cultural threat.

MULTICULTURALISM, ACCULTURATION, AND SOCIAL IDENTITY Through globalization, culture is transferred and transformed—and embraced, integrated, or rejected—in many ways (e.g., via products and mass media), but migration is the most intimate driver of cultural contact and change (Dickinson, 2017). It is also a reminder that in a world

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sometimes characterized as increasingly “borderless,” nations remain key geopolitical units, and regulators of the permeability of their boundaries (Esses, Dovidio, Semenya, & Jackson, 2005). Within those boundaries, migration results in processes of acculturation involving both newcomers (immigration-based acculturation) and members of receiving societies (globalization-based acculturation; Chen, Benet-Martínez, & Harris Bond, 2008). The outcomes of these processes have profound results for nations and their members. What makes cultural diversity “work”? Conversely, how does multiculturalism come to be seen as a “failure”? These questions need to be addressed in terms of social identity processes at multiple levels of analysis, and with attention to historical and dynamically changing national and global contexts. Multiculturalism can be defined in various ways: as the cultural diversity of a nation, as social policy, as ideology endorsing the value and expression of cultural pluralism (e.g., Berry, Kalin, & Taylor, 1977; Guimond, de la Sablonnière, & Nugier, 2014), and as embodied by culturally complex or blended (e.g., hyphenated) social identities (e.g., Hong, Morris, Chiu, & Benet-Martínez, 2000). It also has flexible meanings in popular and political discourse, reflecting the particularities of individual and local experiences and tensions (e.g., multiculturalism as a discursive negotiation of social identities, or as a source of cultural threat; e.g., Hopkins, 2011; Verkuyten, 2004). These distinctions are an important starting point, because they have very different psychological and political implications. If multiculturalism is interpreted simply as the presence of cultural diversity and the encouragement of its expression, for example, then it can emphasize the separateness of various cultural communities, and the potential to undermine a broader sense of cohesion (e.g., Berry, 2006; Kymlicka, 2010). Indeed, for many contemporary Western observers, multiculturalism represents a model—emerging from the evolution of human rights concerns in the mid-twentieth century and assuming more concrete forms in the 1970s—that has already failed for these reasons (e.g., Vertovec & Wessendorf, 2010). Different meanings of multiculturalism are also located at multiple levels of analysis: individual, collective, and institutional. Social psychological perspectives attend to all these levels, in the sense that multiculturalism concerns the coexistence, meaning, and possible transformation of social identities in contexts characterized by particular intergroup ideologies and policy frameworks. The psychology of acculturation provides some frameworks for understanding how migrants—whether temporary or permanent, voluntary or

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involuntary—might adapt within a new setting. Berry’s (e.g., 1984, 1997) influential model places degrees of engagement with the culture of origin and with that of the receiving society along two dimensions, resulting in four general strategies of acculturation: (1) assimilation (engagement with the receiving society, without a desire for the maintenance of origin culture); (2) integration (engagement with both the origin culture and the “new” culture); (3) separation (maintaining origin culture without engagement with the mainstream of the receiving society); and (4) marginalization (a disengagement from both the origin and receiving cultures). These strategies are inseparable from corresponding inclinations for cultural engagement on the part of the receiving society, and indeed can be constrained by, or result from, the attitudes and politics at play in that larger context. In Berry’s model, if the receiving society—its members, normative climate, and policies—also allows or encourages the maintenance of origin culture, and the participation of migrants and their descendants in mainstream social and political life, then integration corresponds to multiculturalism. Thus, integration and multiculturalism are, in several senses, facets of each other. Conceptualized in terms of social identification, they are consistent with a cognitive and emotional attachment to both cultures, the achievement and maintenance of such a dual identification, or bicultural identity integration (e.g., Benet-Martínez & Haritatos, 2005). Berry’s (1997) integration hypothesis—that a meaningful engagement and identification with both the heritage culture and that of the receiving society is associated with more adaptive outcomes in terms of sociocultural functioning and mental health—is empirically well-supported in cross-national studies (e.g., Berry, Phinney, Sam, & Vedder, 2006; Nguyen & BenetMartínez, 2013; Zhang, Verkuyten, & Weesie, 2018). These psychological operationalizations notwithstanding, “integration” also has flexible and contested meanings in political discourse and policy formulations (e.g., King & Lulle, 2016), and is often used as shorthand for the myriad challenges and opportunities associated with accommodating cultural diversity. In psychology, too, there is a considerable amount of ambiguity, with theory, research, and measurement complicated by different emphases on intercultural contact, cultural maintenance, social identification, and cultural adoption strategies (e.g., Bourhis, Moïse, Perreault, & Senécal, 1997; Matera, Stefanile, & Brown, 2012; Ward & Kus, 2012). Cultural adaptation plays out in many domains—political, socioeconomic, family, neighborhood, and migrant community—with multidimensional

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consequences, which do not necessarily map neatly onto a 2 3 2 taxonomy of strategies and identities (e.g., Green & Staerklé, 2013; Leong & Liu, 2013). For example, distinctions between “blended” and “alternating” integration capture different ways in which dual identifications are held and negotiated, with the former variety reflecting a coherent and harmonious mix of cultural practices, and the latter requiring conscious adaptation in order to behave culturally appropriately in specific situations (Phinney & Devich-Navarro, 1997; Schaefer & Simon, 2017). Perhaps most tellingly, in some highly multicultural (e.g., “super-diverse”; Vertovec, 2007) urban settings, the complex and hybridized mix of cultural identifications defies a two-dimensional scheme, and throws into question the meanings of “heritage” and “mainstream” cultures (Doucerain et al., 2013). It is likely that no single model can capture important nuances concerning a host of moderating and mediating influences on acculturative processes, reflecting shifting situational factors, the idiosyncrasies of national and local contexts, and the circumstances, motivations, personalities, gender, and histories of migrants themselves (e.g., Bornstein, 2017; Deaux & Verkuyten, 2014; Sam & Berry, 2010). Nonetheless, there is agreement that “acculturation is a two-way interaction, resulting in actions and reactions to the contact situation” (Sam & Berry, 2010, p. 473), such that responses to migrants within the receiving society are particularly crucial to understanding how the process unfolds.

The National and Global Contexts: Ideology, Nationalism, and Threat Whereas integration may be preferred by most, but not all, immigrants (Berry et al., 2006), options for migrants are facilitated or constrained by the contexts in which majority attitudes are formed and sustained. Indeed, majority attitudes themselves are a key aspect of the acculturation climate; arguably, successful “integration of migrants in society requires, as a minimum precondition, that public opinion not be against them” (King & Lulle, 2016, p. 68). Clearly, this is not the case in many nations that might receive refugees and other migrants, and where attitudes toward minority group members already living there might also be negative. But majority attitudes can differ dramatically across countries, and are dynamically tied to threat perceptions, political climate, and the ideological content of national policies and identities. For example, while many European countries responded to large numbers of migrants by establishing stricter border

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controls and expanding antiasylum policies, the government of Uganda offered hundreds of thousands of South Sudanese refugees working opportunities and plots of land to cultivate—of course, not without tensions between the locals and the refugees (Schiltz & Titeca, 2017). Such situations illustrate the need for an explicitly intergroup analysis of the factors that underlie openness or opposition to migrants (e.g., Brown & Zagefka, 2011; Green & Staerklé, 2013).

Expanding the Acculturation Framework Acculturation and adaptation occur in multilayered contexts, textured not just by prejudice and discrimination, but also majority expectations and perceptions about the cultural maintenance preferences of migrants themselves (e.g., Bourhis et al., 1997; Brown & Zagefka, 2011; Piontkowski, Rohmann, & Florack, 2002; Tip, Zagefka, González, Brown, Cinnirella, & Na, 2012; Van Oudenhoven, Prins, & Buunk, 1998; Zagefka & Brown, 2002). Thus, for example, whereas minority members’ inclinations to integrate can be encouraged by their perception that this is also supported by the majority (Zagefka, Brown, & González, 2009), in some contexts there is a prevailing misperception that immigrants prioritize separation rather than integration (e.g., Van Oudenhoven et al., 1998; Zagefka & Brown, 2002). Indeed, in the summer of 2016, majorities in most European countries felt that Muslims want to be distinct from the larger society instead of adopting the “customs and way of life” of the mainstream (Pew Research Centre, 2016). The interactive acculturation model (Bourhis et al., 1997) specifies how the congruence or mismatch between acculturation orientations of migrants and those of the receiving society can promote or undermine intergroup harmony. There is a corresponding wealth of evidence that preferences for different cultural maintenance strategies are correlated with other intergroup variables, such as desire for contact, ingroup bias, and discrimination (see Brown & Zagefka, 2011, for a review). The model also recognizes the role of public policy in framing the normative context of cultural adoption preferences. Indeed, these preferences can be conceptually reframed in terms of intergroup ideologies (see Guimond et al., 2014), including multiculturalism, which in turn predict intergroup attitudes. In one compelling example of these links in the context of anti-Muslim prejudice, Guimond et al. (2013) demonstrated that: (1) attitudes toward Muslims were more positive in countries with stronger

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prodiversity policies (e.g., Canada compared to Germany); (2) across countries, diversity policies corresponded systematically with perceived norms reflecting assimilation and multiculturalism; and (3) the personal endorsement of those norms were in turn predictive of prejudice, particularly when the norms were salient. Nations have unique historical and contemporary experiences with immigration, and evolving institutional features that reflect those experiences, as well as responses to new demands. To a large extent, social policy determines the sorts of outcomes, including citizenship, that are possible for migrants. Exclusion can assume a number of institutional forms, including poor prospects for long-term employment, social security, and permanent residency, the denial of basic political liberties, structural barriers to family reunification, inaccessibility to education and health care, and inadequate access to language training (Migrant Integration Policy Index, 2015). Together, these provide substantial and potentially insurmountable barriers to integration for some newcomers. Of course, migrants can be, and are, excluded outright based on policies regarding immigration, admissibility of asylum seekers, and refugee resettlement. Based on various social policies (e.g., related to migrants’ labor market mobility, education, health, family reunion, access to citizenship, and protection from discrimination) historically immigration-based countries (e.g., Australia, Canada, New Zealand) tend to be more institutionally conducive to the integration of migrants than European Union countries (as ranked by the Migrant Integration Policy Index, 2015). In turn, Northern and Western European countries with established minority populations rank more highly then those in Southern and Eastern Europe, where experience with immigration and migrants is more recent. These differences roughly correspond to patterns of public opinion in the context of contemporary debates about migration (European Social Survey, 2016). For example, the Pew Research Center (2016, July) found that majorities in Hungary (72%), Italy (69%), Poland (66%), and Greece (65%) expressed negative attitudes toward Muslims, compared to the Netherlands (35%), Sweden (35%), France (29%), Germany (29%), and the United Kingdom (28%). In summary, majority attitudes and expectations act reciprocally with social policy to reflect and reinforce an ideological climate that may be more or less accepting of migrants. This climate is also closely tied to the promotion of particular meanings of national identity, which have direct

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implications for whether (and which) migrants are able to enter, and to aspire to rights, residency, or citizenship.

Meanings of National Identity Recall from Chapter 5 that according to self-categorization theory (Turner et al., 1987), the consensual definition of a social category provides the normative basis for group-based perception and behavior. Thus, collective action “depends[s] on the content ascribed to the category and whether particular proposals for action are construed as consonant or dissonant with that content” (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001, p. 38). Particular expressions of nationalism therefore embody different meanings, symbols, and narratives that inform perception and action in the context of migration. For example, restricting the entry of migrants is more consistent with a sense and structure of nationality that is inherently exclusive (e.g., defined in terms of criteria such as ethnicity or religion) than a civic version, in which citizenship can be achieved by adopting shared values, rights, and responsibilities. This ethnic/civic distinction (e.g., Smith, 2001) shapes the boundaries of the national category and the restrictiveness of citizenship policies (e.g., Ariely, 2013), and informs attitudes toward immigrants (Pehrson, Vignoles, & Brown, 2009), along with which categories of migrants are considered desirable (Pehrson & Green, 2010). The inclusiveness (or exclusiveness) of national identities also allow (or constrain) the extent to which dual ethnic/national identifications (i.e., those encouraged by some multiculturalism policies) are feasible. The distinction between ethnic and civic forms of nationality and nationalism can obscure other important differences across nations. For example, Koopmans and Michalowski (2017) found that a nation’s history of colonization (as colonial power, or as a former colony and settler society) predicts immigrant citizenship rights, whereas civic- versus ethnic-nationalist roots do not. Different models of civic integration also variously prioritize multiculturalism, “colorblindness” (which espouses ignoring group differences), or assimilation ideologies and policies (e.g., Canada, France, and the US, respectively; Guimond et al., 2014; Kymlicka, 2012) and many national identities reflect blends of ethnic and civic notions (e.g., Yogeeswaran & Dasgupta, 2014). Moreover, ability to speak the majority language is widely regarded as an especially important criterion for belonging, even where civic forms of nationalism predominate (e.g., Pew Research Center, 2017d). Of course, representations of

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national identity are inextricable from fluctuating sociocontextual factors, particularly those that might enhance feelings of competition with potential newcomers, along with other fears associated with culture or safety.

Perceived Threat and Reactions to Migrants At the height of the “migrant crisis” in 2016, European public opinion data indicated high levels of concern in many countries about the implications of admitting refugees (Pew Research Center, 2016). For example, in 8 of 10 counties, more than half of those surveyed believed that refugees would increase domestic terrorism in their country (median 5 59%). In some countries, particularly in Eastern Europe, there was a majority sense that “refugees are a burden because they take our jobs and social benefits” (this concern was lower in Sweden and Germany, where relatively greater numbers of migrants were being admitted). Early in 2017, concern about “extremism in the name of Islam” in one’s country was pervasive in Europe and North America (Pew Research Center, 2017c). In June 2018, a tweet from US President Donald Trump—“A country without borders is not a country at all. We need borders, we need security, we need safety” (Bump, 2018)—suggests that it is less the need for borders, than whom and what they are perceived to defend against, that informs collective responses to migrants. Perceived threat among members of receiving societies is a key driver of opposition to the entry of migrants. Indeed, a great deal of social psychological theory and research supports a basic tenet: “when one’s identity is threatened, people will reject others” (Berry, 2006, p. 729). This is the heart of intergroup threat theory (Stephan & Renfro, 2002; Stephan & Stephan, 2000; Stephan, Ybarra, & Morrison, 2009), which distinguishes between two broad categories: realistic threats—those that might diminish “a group’s power, resources, and general welfare” (Stephan et al., 2009, p. 44)—and symbolic threats to the group’s ideology, cultural values, or worldview. The link between perceived threat and negative intergroup attitudes, emotions, and behavior is well established as an explanation of majority attitudes toward immigrants and refugees (e.g., Esses, Jackson, & Armstrong, 1998; Fasel, Green, & Sarrasin, 2013; Green, 2009; Louis, Esses, & Lalonde, 2013; Schlueter, & Scheepers, 2010; Stephan, Ybarra, Martinez, Scharzwald, & Tur-Kaspa, 1998; Van Rijswijk, Hopkins, & Johnston, 2009; Velasco González, Verkuyten, Weesie, & Poppe, 2008). For example, concerns among Americans that Syrian refugees coming to the

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United States (as well as Muslims already living there) are “disruptive to the norms and values of American society,” are “dangerous because they might include potential terrorists,” and will “take resources away from Americans in need,” are very strongly correlated with the endorsement of both moderate and extreme anti-Muslim policies (Dunwoody & McFarland, 2018). Refugees and asylum seekers are likely to heighten perceptions of both cultural and realistic threats, especially in circumstances of mass flight. These perceptions are (mis)informed and magnified by political discourses that refer to being “submersed,” “invaded,” or “flooded” by “waves” of migrants, and media portrayals of migrants as competitors for jobs and social benefits, as well as potential sources of physical threat, via terrorism or disease (see Esses, Medianu, & Lawson, 2013, for a review). Media stories also tend to highlight “bogus” refugee claims that imply the possible entry of potential terrorists, or illegitimate access to the nation’s resources. On social media such as Twitter, people rejecting refugees (e.g., by using a #refugeesnotwelcome hashtag) also tend to depict them as unwanted criminal outsiders (Reis, 2017). In 2015, the refugee crisis prompted concerns, by the UNCHR among others, that even the ostensibly neutral term “migrant” was being widely interpreted as someone who is economically motivated, with the implication that, unlike “refugees,” they are not impelled to leave their homeland (Kingsley, 2017). While this distinction can often be blurred in practice, it does have implications for public attitudes and social policy. Perceiving migration as involuntary may elicit more humanitarian considerations for some members of the receiving society, but for those who see immigration as an important topic it can also heighten concern about societal impact (Verkuyten, Altabatabaei, & Nooitgedagt, 2018). A study of British newspaper coverage of migrants and immigrants between 2010 and 2012 found that migrants, refugees, and immigrants all tended to be described in terms evocative of threats: “terrorist,” “suspected,” and “sham” consistently appeared in stories about immigrants, with “illegal” the most common descriptor. “Economic,” jobs,” and “benefits” tended to appear in stories about migrants, and “illegal,” “criminals,” and “stay” in articles about asylum seekers (The Migration Observatory, 2013). Together, these threat-evoking themes problematize the migration issue, and are facilitated by a generalized uncertainty about the “migrant situation” (Esses et al., 2013) and a low sense of control (Greenaway, Louis, Hornsey, & Jones, 2014; Harell, Soroka, & Iyengar, 2017). Early in 2016, for example, a French official at the European Council on Foreign

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Relations said, “In France, there is this Islamophobic dimension, entrenched for some, that has grown with the terrorist threats. . . One of the big arguments against taking in more people is ‘We don’t know who they are’” (MacKinnon, 2016, p. F3). Value-based threats are likely to arise when the cultural, racial, and/or religious differences of migrants are greater and visible (e.g., Esses, Jackson, Dovidio, & Hodson, 2005), and are linked to the perception on the part of members of the receiving society that minority members want to retain their difference (e.g., Tip et al., 2012). Religion can be a particularly strong indicator of difference from the national category, and a potentially salient source of cultural threat, partly because religion is a fundamental aspect of social identity and worldview. As noted by Verkuyten (2007), in Europe especially (but also in North America), “questions of multiculturalism are increasingly questions of religious differences, and Islam in particular” (p. 290). One thread of cultural threat is the belief that Islamic religious practices are offensive to liberal and secular norms (Van der Noll, Saroglou, Latour, & Dolezal, 2018). This is enhanced by a perceived incompatibility between minority ethnic/religious identification and national belonging (a perception sometimes shared by Muslims and other minority members as well; e.g., Verkuyten & Zaremba, 2005), and beliefs on the part of majority members about the unwillingness or inability of religious minorities to integrate. Moreover, high levels of perceived cultural threat can lead to further distancing of the migrant group by their impact on majority members’ views about how they should adapt (i.e., endorsement of exclusion or separation rather than integration; Florack, Piontkowski, Rohmann, Balzer, & Perzig, 2003; Kunst, Sadeghi, Tahir, Thomsen, & Sam, 2016). Realistic and symbolic threats, and their effect on various responses to migrants—including prejudice, discrimination, dehumanization, and attitudes toward policies regarding immigration, refugees, and asylum seekers—need to be placed in specific ideological contexts that incorporate individual and collective levels of analysis. According to the unified instrumental model of group conflict (Esses et al., 2005), for example, perceived competition from migrant groups reflects the mutually reinforcing effects of contextual insecurities (e.g., unemployment, threats of crime or terrorism) and ideological variables. The dual process model of prejudice (e.g., Duckitt, 2001; Duckitt & Sibley, 2010) posits that worldviews involving competition reinforce and elicit a social dominance orientation, whereas high authoritarianism is motivationally consistent with maintaining security, order, and stability. Thus, discriminatory responses to refugees on the

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part of high-SDO individuals can be seen as assertions of the status and security of the majority group in the face of competition, as well as a reinforcement of outgroup disadvantage (e.g., Costello & Hodson, 2011; Louis, Esses, & Lalonde, 2013). In a meta-analysis, Cohrs and Stelzl (2010) found that different ideologies had distinctive relationships with attitudes toward immigrants across countries. SDO was a strong predictor of prejudice where the unemployment rate of immigrants was relatively high (indicating social disadvantage), and the effect of authoritarianism was related to perceptions that immigrants would increase the crime rate, and be detrimental to the economy (see also Chapter 5). Perceptions of threat can also mediate the effects of majority members’ national identification in ways that reflect local intergroup contexts (e.g., Riek, Mania, & Gaertner, 2006; Velasco González et al., 2008; Verkuyten, 2009). As discussed earlier, national identity is an ideologically-saturated construct, such that antimigrant sentiment can be expected to be particularly focused when identity context is defined in exclusive (e.g., ethnic or nativist) terms. In such contexts, nationalism can be viewed as an expression of “blind patriotism” (Staub, 1997), or a defensive and dogmatic loyalty (e.g., “America First,” “Italians First”). That such a stance may itself arise from collective cultural or economic insecurity suggests that the conceptual role of threat can be difficult to position causally with respect to other contextual and psychological variables, including antipathy toward migrants (see Green & Staerklé, 2013). In this context it is worth noting that “baseline” perceptions and stereotypes of immigrants tend toward the negative: people in Western nations overestimate the proportion of immigrants in their country, sometimes drastically (e.g., an average estimate of 36% among American respondents, compared to just over 10% in reality), and see them as being poorer and less-educated than they actually are (Alesina, Miano, & Stancheva, 2018).

POPULISM AND PREJUDICE: BEING CLOSED IN A CONNECTED WORLD Whereas factors eliciting threat may be specific to certain national or regional settings, in the context of contemporary globalization they are increasingly likely to be shared, due to macroeconomic conditions (Abrams & Vasiljevic, 2014; Cameron, Berry, & Kocum, in press; Green, 2009; Sibley & Duckitt, 2013), or broad cultural and geopolitical dynamics. Indeed, there is some agreement (though as yet, relatively little empirical psychological research) that contemporary social and political

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responses to migration—most starkly apparent in the success of populist movements and isolationist political stances in Europe and the United States—are one facet of broader insecurities linked to globalization. This reflects a number of interrelated factors, including the global economic recession triggered in 2007 2008, deindustrialization, automation, shifts in political and economic decision-making to transnational bodies, the rise of the global knowledge economy, and rising income inequality within countries (e.g., Inglehart & Norris, 2016). Moreover, as we have elaborated in previous chapters, globalization is often associated with a sense of rapid and profound change, provoking uncertainties about people’s traditional sense of place and their future individual and collective prosperity. This corresponds to one side of a divide between people who feel “left behind” by globalization, and those—sometimes referred to as the “global elite,” who are generally seen as including the political and economic establishment—who are positioned to benefit. Ideologically, these conditions resonate with both social dominance orientation and authoritarianism, because they involve a scenario involving competitiveness, as well as threats to predictability and security (e.g., Duckitt & Sibley, 2010). This provides fertile ground for populist political movements, which reflect an “ideology that separates society into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ and ‘the corrupt elite,’ and that holds that politics should be an expression of ‘the general will’ of the people” (Mudde, 2016, n.p.). Thus, for example, some right-wing populists frame the political landscape in terms of an exclusive “patriotism” versus “globalism”; that is, a defense of national interests by turning away not just from refugees and other migrants, but also from international connections and engagement with global concerns (e.g., “the French want to live in France like Frenchmen”; “French election: Le Pen is mighty,” 2017). Within this frame, nativism provides a reinforcing discourse of exclusion that protects the integrity (and therefore security) of the nation, and authoritarianism provides an ideological platform for mobilization (e.g., Mudde, 2007). Analyses of the insecurities underlying the dynamics of contemporary populism mirror the focus in the intergroup relations literature on realistic and symbolic (or value-based) threat. In their analysis of World Values Survey data collected in 31 European countries, Inglehart and Norris (2016) found that whereas there was some evidence for the role of economic insecurity (e.g., unemployment), cultural factors (e.g., attitudes toward traditional social values, law and order, multiculturalism, minority rights, and religious principles) were more consistently linked to the

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appeal of populist sentiments, including xenophobia. They interpreted this as a cultural backlash in response to the ascendancy of liberal values, institutions (including multiculturalism), and social movements in Western societies, which have threatened the traditional status and security of older, majority members. Social psychological research suggests that the factors driving the appeal of extreme political parties (on the right or left) can be characterized even more broadly; that is, as not emanating from particular economic or cultural threats, but as a diffuse sense of decline, or collective discontent (van der Bles, Postmes, LeKander-Kanisl, & Otjes, 2018). This is likely linked to nostalgia for a past in which “we” (e.g., the national ingroup) were more clearly defined (Mols & Jetten, 2014; Smeekes & Verkuyten, 2015), and a sense that the historical continuity of the “essential” ingroup is threatened (e.g., Sani, 2008). More specific to debates regarding immigration, Mudde (2012) identified two primary themes used by the ideological right in Europe and North America: (1) a cultural threat, which is often expressed within a religious (and Islamophobic) frame; and (2) a security threat, which associates migrants with possibilities of criminality and terrorism. Since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, these have fostered a securitization of intergroup relations, such that policies regarding immigration and refugees are evaluated through the lens of state protection. Whereas this continues to focus on Arabs and Muslims in particular, securitization has widespread and evolving implications for all migrants. These include the justification of legal action against hundreds of thousands of undocumented immigrants in the US (including threats of militarized deportation; e.g., Pilkington & Gambino, 2017), the criminalization of asylum seekers, and a general European and American focus on border control rather than strategies to safely relocate and ultimately resettle refugees. The Western climate of public opinion on migration and refugees is consistent with these political dynamics and their alignment with different social identities. European survey data show a high degree of polarization between the highly educated and the less educated (an average gap of 21 percentage points across 21 countries), and between younger and older people, in terms of willingness to allow migrants from poorer countries outside Europe (European Social Survey, 2016). Moreover, Europeans on the right of the political spectrum (along with those who are older and less educated), are more likely to express prejudice toward Muslims; to think that increasing cultural diversity makes their country a worse place to live; to believe that refugees will increase domestic terrorism and be

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bad for the economy; and to express nativist beliefs (e.g., to believe that certain attributes, such as being born in the country and being able to speak the majority language) are important to someone being considered a “true” national (Pew Research Center, 2016). In France, for example, 41% of National Front supporters surveyed by the Pew Research Center in the spring of 2016 said that being born in the country was “very important” to being considered truly French, compared to 21% of Socialist Party supporters. Perceptions of terrorist-related threats were even more polarized: 85% of those affiliated with the National Front thought refugees would increase terrorism, compared to 31% who identified with the Socialist Party. In the United Kingdom, the difference in opinion between the supporters of the right-wing UK Independence Party and those of the Labour Party was very similar (Pew Research Center, 2016). In the United States, a substantial minority (close to 20%) said they would support denying Muslim Americans the right to vote in 2018, against a backdrop of extreme political polarization: 80% of Republicans agreed with travel restrictions on Muslims, compared to 5% of Democrats (“Nearly one-fifth of Americans would deny their country’s Muslims the right to vote,” 2018). Psychological research confirms that people at the ideological extremes are more certain about their preferred (and simplified) solutions to domestic migration issues (e.g., admitting all refugees versus admitting none; van Prooijen, Krouwel, & Emmer, 2017; see Chapter 5 on the risks of political polarization). The relative absence of explicitly proimmigration political parties in Western countries means that the concerns of the ideological right can easily occupy mainstream discourse. Mobilization of right-wing support is aided by attention to migrant and integration issues by the media and other political actors, which in turn increases the public legitimacy and appeal of the political claims (e.g., Koopmans & Muis, 2009). There are other indications that the Western political landscape tends to slope in favor of eliciting support, via national identification, against cultural pluralism. For example, expressions of nationalism and cultural homogeneity in the platforms of European political parties predicted the salience of ethnic and (to a lesser extent) civic national identification among the general population, whereas inclusive political mobilization had no effect (Helbling, Reeskens, & Wright, 2016). Thus, national attachment, even of the civic variety, is generally more easily harnessed by appeals to exclusivity and cultural homogeneity. Similarly, right-wing ideological climates appear to have more power to mobilize individual attitudes in the

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direction of prejudice toward outgroup members (Van Assche, Roets, De keersmaecker, & Van Hiel, 2018). Right-wing populist appeal in Western countries reflects a paradox: whereas globalization cooccurs with socioeconomic development and liberalization of values, it also may engender a defensive reactivity, at least among some segments of society (in an additional irony, discrimination can be justified as a defense of liberal-democratic values; Mudde, 2010). Analyses of International Social Survey Program data from 2003 showed that (1) the positive relationship between nationalism and xenophobia was stronger in more highly globalized countries than in less globally integrated countries (Ariely, 2011); and (2) national identification was positively related to chauvinism (i.e., a conflictual orientation toward international engagement) only for more globalized countries (Ariely, 2016). Green (2009) reported an analogous effect with respect to GDP (which is highly correlated with extent of globalization), such that the threat perceived by individuals more strongly predicted attitudes toward immigration in high-GDP countries compared to low-GDP ones. The processes underlying these patterns are not entirely clear, but they suggest that experiences with globalization may sensitize some people to the effects—and potential threats—of migration. Thus, to be highly globally connected is also to be (at least potentially) vulnerable. For nationalists, in other words (Ariely, 2011), “exposure to globalization might reinforce. . . feelings that the national group is superior to migrants” (p. 544). Thus, there is some support for a backlash effect associated with globalization processes, whether it is rooted in a defense of traditional values and identities, or intensified global economic and migration connections (e.g., Ariely, 2011; Inglehart & Norris, 2016). Rapid economic and cultural change can threaten traditional social identities and heighten nationalistic reactions to international trade and migration. At the same time, as we discussed in Chapter 4, globalization potentially opens cultural and psychological avenues to forms of global identification and concern. Thus, if global connection is conceptualized in terms of global identification, then a different pattern might emerge. Indeed, in large samples collected by the ISSP, the European Values Survey, and the World Values Survey involving 86 countries and more than 150,000 respondents, stronger global identification was associated with less xenophobia (i.e., less antiimmigrant prejudice, and lower levels of migrant-related threat; Ariely, 2017). These relationships replicated across different operationalizations of global identity (e.g., “I feel more like a citizen of the world than of any

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country”), and are consistent with a growing body of research on the effects of such an expansive identification on globally responsible behavior (see Chapter 4). In summary, the dynamic effects of globalization processes on xenophobia and other defensive postures regarding international engagement are complex and not well understood, but they appear to be many-edged. One set of conceptual and empirical challenges lies in untangling various aspects of globalization—including modernization, GDP, global economic integration, and socioeconomic development (e.g., as indexed by the United Nations’ Human Development Index)—at different levels of analysis (e.g., see Ariely, 2011, 2017).

From Identity Threat to Identity Enhancement—Accepting a World in Motion Acute political responses to migration obscure a growing acceptance of integration and multiculturalism policies in Western countries over the last few decades, particularly with respect to migrant groups with historical ties to those countries (Kymlicka, 2012). Even in recent years, during 2010 14, “integration policies continue[d] to improve little-by-little, sometimes with great effects on specific aspects of people’s lives,” such as changes to citizenship and voting rights in Germany (Migrant Integration Policy Index, 2015). Public opinion in some European countries shows corresponding changes in terms of attitudes toward cultural diversity, and perceptions of the acculturation preferences of religious and other minorities. For example, between 2015 and 2016, the percentage of people who believed that Muslims want to adopt national customs and ways of life (instead of wanting to remain distinct) increased by 23 points in Germany, 12 in the United Kingdom, 11 in the Netherlands, and 7 in France (Pew Research Center, 2016). Similarly, results of the European Social Survey (2016) showed modest increases between 2002 and 2014 in the percentage of people who believed that migration made their country a better place to live; in only 2 of 21 countries (Austria and the Czech Republic) did attitudes toward migration become more negative. The success of nationalistic political movements can overshadow the mobilization of people and politicians on the left, who may promote more inclusive or integrationist versions of national identity (e.g., Louis, Duck, Terry, & Lalonde, 2010; “The new Europhiles,” 2017), and who may experience more self-efficacy (e.g., confidence in knowledge) about the “refugee crisis” (van Prooijen et al., 2018). Indeed, in Germany and

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the United Kingdom, the shift in majority attitudes about the willingness of Muslims to integrate was driven largely by those identifying with the ideological left between 2011 and 2016 (Pew Research Center, 2016). Such trends belie the prevailing European narrative of the “failure” of multiculturalism, and are more consistent with its mundane social reality: “former colonials, guest workers, refugees, and their descendants. . . are now woven into virtually every aspect of European public life” (Chin, 2017, p. 298). But alongside a general trend toward acceptance of migrants who are already integrated or who are ethnically similar to the majority, there is increasing resistance in some quarters to those who are culturally different or are seen as an economic drain (e.g., migrants from poorer countries outside Europe; European Social Survey, 2016). The presence and influence of the populist right in fostering this resistance resonates with the debate about the extent to which convergence toward multicultural integration (at least in Western countries) has occurred. For example, an analysis of 10 European countries found evidence for the long-term (1980 2008) consistency of national distinctiveness regarding citizenship rights, reflecting the reciprocal influence of local policy traditions and trends in voting (Koopmans, Michalowski, & Waibel, 2012). More recently, integration and diversity policies have weakened or become institutionally ill-supported in some countries (e.g., as indicated by significant drops by the United Kingdom and the Netherlands on the Migrant Policy Index between 2010 and 2014). A key question—one most acutely realized during crises of mass displacement—is whether integration and multiculturalism policies can be successfully sustained in “high-risk” conditions (Kymlicka, 2012) involving elevated economic and cultural insecurity, rapid social and technological change, and political movements endorsing exclusive definitions of national identity. One answer is that multiculturalism policies themselves help to provide a normative context in which acceptance toward migrants is fostered. There is little empirical research on this question, but it is illuminating. As summarized by Guimond et al. (2014), it suggests that “a strong diversity policy will have a positive effect on intergroup attitudes to the extent that it succeeds in creating a norm that values cultural diversity. Countries claiming that multiculturalism is creating problems of intergroup relations probably did not succeed in creating such a norm” (p. 178). Contexts with broad normative and institutional support for cultural diversity—and with a recognition that migrants carry social, cultural,

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and economic benefits—can also be expected to buffer the effects of threat on intergroup attitudes. Other research similarly locates receptivity to refugees, asylum seekers, and other migrants in specific normative settings (e.g., Louis, Duck, Terry, Schuller, & Lalonde, 2007), and there is evidence that these are dynamically linked to changes in the national political sphere. Earlier in this chapter, we described some events that connected contrasting sociopolitical contexts in Canada and the United States. In 2015, Canadians elected a Liberal government, which had highlighted a commitment to sponsoring 25,000 Syrian refugees. In three waves of nationally representative data spanning that election, Gaucher, Friesen, Neufeld, and Esses (2018) found a shift toward more positive stereotypes of migrants, which was moderated by individual differences in justification of the Canadian sociopolitical system. Following the US election in November 2016, the ideological climate shifted in the opposite direction, increasing the perceived normative acceptability of prejudice, directed particularly at groups targeted in campaign rhetoric (e.g., immigrants, Mexicans, Muslims; Crandall, Miller, & White, 2018). In 2017, the number of refugees resettled by the US decreased more than in any other nation (Connor & Krogstad, 2018). Another key question is whether national identity can be defined in such a way that multiculturalism is understood as an “identity option for society as a whole” rather than just for immigrants and ethnic minorities (Verkuyten, 2007, p. 282). Consistent with the common in-group identity model (Gaertner et al., 1993), majority group members who identify with their nation as a category that also includes immigrants tend to have more positive attitudes toward them (e.g., Esses et al., 2005). More important, an inclusive national category can also promote active concern, on the part of majority members, for minority integration efforts and outcomes, including socioeconomic equality (Kunst, Thomsen, Sam, & Berry, 2015). If integration at a psychological level can be viewed as successfully negotiating a balance between different cultural and religious spheres (Ward, 2013), then incorporating cultural diversity into national identity requires an analogous balancing act at the societal level. This is perhaps clearest in Canada, where multiculturalism, as social policy and demographic reality, is a source of both collective self-definition and national pride (e.g., Adams, 2007; Cameron & Berry, 2008). Whereas Canada’s “exceptionalism” (e.g., Bloemraad, 2012) can be qualified by geographical and historical circumstances, including its long history of

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immigration, and its distance from contemporary influxes of massmigration, it is nonetheless an example of how multiculturalism can, over time, be part of the process of nation-building (e.g., Kymlicka, 2012; Thompson, 2018). Moreover, an inclusive variety of patriotism is consistent with rooted cosmopolitanism (e.g., Appiah, 2006), such that national identity can act as a platform for global concern and engagement (Kymlicka & Walker, 2012).

CONCLUSION: MIGRATION, MULTICULTURALISM, AND SECURITY Given complexities of national contexts and history, multiculturalism and integration policies surely “grow in different ways where the seeds of its origins are different” (Leong & Liu, 2013, p. 661). For the same reasons, their evolution is subject to different vulnerabilities, though these increasingly have global dimensions as well. Clearly, however, progressive normative transformation requires institutional change over time, via political leadership, focused and informed policy development, public education, routes to permanent residency and citizenship for migrants, and their presence and participation in the political life of the (transformed) “mainstream.” As migrants comprise larger proportions of the voting population, their concerns occupy more of the political terrain, which over time encourages the establishment of equality rights (Koopmans et al., 2012). A fundamental assumption of multiculturalism as social policy is that fostering the security of people’s cultural identities allows for mutual acceptance and intergroup tolerance (Berry, 1984). Conversely, common themes of a “backlash” against multiculturalism reflect various perceived threats: that multiculturalism stifles free speech, undermines national identity and common values, encourages unacceptable cultural and religious practices, fosters the socioeconomic dependence of newcomers, and allows the development of “home-grown” terrorism (Vertovec & Wessendorf, 2010). But as Kymlicka (2010) has argued, “it is precisely when immigrants are perceived as illegitimate, illiberal, and burdensome that multiculturalism may be most needed” (p. 46). For example, whereas resistance to multiculturalism (and migration) is often motivated by a desire to “keep terrorists out,” barriers to full participation in society (or to entry in the first place) may themselves create conditions conducive to separatist identification or radicalization (e.g., Simon & Ruhs, 2008).

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Thus, whereas “multiculturalism” on the one hand, and “cohesion” or “security” on the other, are often portrayed as reflecting incompatible interests, they go hand in hand. The alternative is the perpetuation of exclusion of minorities within national boundaries and migrants outside them. Multiculturalism—as cultural pluralism, ideology, and social policy— will inevitably be contested, because it is inherently about the politics of social identity. This is true even where multiculturalism policies are longstanding and generally regarded as a success (e.g., Kymlicka, 2003). But there are broader advantages to explicitly viewing multiculturalism as a contested—instead of discarded—notion, to question in a discursive and public sphere the mutual accommodation of cultural diversity, and the evolving possibilities of what it means to be a citizen of one’s country (Chin, 2017). This discussion will surely remain a crucial part of the context in which debates about migration take place.

CHAPTER 9

Psychology in the Nexus of Global Governance, Economies, and Sustainability In the previous chapters, we examined the psychological implications of a highly interconnected world, using the social identity approach as a conceptual framework. In various contexts—the consumer marketplace, the political sphere, migration, and global predicaments such as climate change—globalization processes exert pervasive effects on identity, perception, worldview, and ultimately, behavior. These, in turn, affect those vary same processes. Because globalization is after all a set of human-made changes, it manifests changes to human psychology even while it causes these changes. While each chapter discussed a different topic, they all relate back to our key argument: that social identity is crucial to the psychological analysis of globalization. Social identities orient people in the world, and serve as guides for perception, judgment, and action. As we discussed in Chapters 4 and 6, social identities also provide the basis for imagining different possibilities—“cognitive alternatives,” in terms of social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979)—and thus are key psychological mechanisms for collective action and social change. But mobilization can also act in the service of retrenching the status quo, and the preservation and protection of traditional group identities and privileges. If, as we have argued, social identities contain the keys to progressive social change, they also shape the contours of exclusion, conflict, and inaction in the face of collective problems and threats. These chapters lead us to the fundamental question of how to situate psychological processes in a globalized world. Basic social psychological processes (e.g., those underlying the dynamics of attitudes and discrimination toward outgroup members) can be expected to operate similarly in different historical periods. But the world itself has clearly not stayed the same. As we have previously stated, we believe that collective beliefs and behaviors are keys to understanding the impacts of, and responses to, globalization, but these processes themselves do not exist in a vacuum The Psychology of Globalization DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-812109-2.00009-4

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(see also Reese, Rosenmann, & McGarty, 2015). Indeed, as we suggested in Chapter 4, globalization is perhaps the biggest (indeed, world-sized) reminder that social identities are defined and expressed in particular contexts. It follows that human cognition, experience, and actions are constrained or catalyzed by social institutions or market processes, for example.

GLOBALIZATION, CONNECTION, AND COOPERATION At the end of 2015, Médicins sans Frontières published a report heavily critical of the European Union’s management of the refugee crisis. It argued that by creating an “obstacle course” of deterrence and closed borders rather than safe and legal routes for asylum seekers, the humanitarian crisis arose largely from a failure of policy, and not simply from the sheer number of migrants. United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki Moon summarized the problem the same way: “Above all, this is not just a crisis of numbers; it is also a crisis of solidarity” (UNHCR, 2016). Since then, the number of migrants has abated, but the political crisis, and the populist appeal of closed-border policies, has continued. Like other collective predicaments such as climate change, this reflects one of the paradoxes of a globalized world: the same interconnectedness that offers opportunities and mechanisms for cooperation also creates the conditions for insecurity and insularity. The starting point of this book, and the premise for a psychology of globalization, is the idea that humankind has become increasingly interconnected in economic, cultural, political, and technological terms. As we have seen, these connections bring multiple forms of transformation as well as multiple reactions, so it should not be surprising that rapid change does not operate in a linear fashion. But the nature and scope of many contemporary responses to globalization have indeed been surprising to many observers. In the months preceding and during the writing of this book, some of the strategic political and economic bonds that evolved over decades—sometimes referred to as the post-Second World War (Western) liberal consensus, or the internationalist world order—seemed to decay very quickly. In late 2016, The Economist summarized it this way: “As globalization has become a slur, nationalism, and even authoritarianism, have flourished” (“The future of liberalism,” 2016). Whereas globalization has always had its detractors (e.g., in the antiglobalization movement that gained prominence in the late 1990s), this

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pervasive economic and political deglobalization is unprecedented, and not easily explained in terms of traditional left-right political distinctions (see Chapter 5). It seems as if globalization may have reached its climax, a peak that not long ago seemed in the far distance, blurred by the wealth gains of trading goods around the world and the ease of travels for many (Willmroth, 2018). These processes appear to be changing, as various countries impose tariffs on foreign products and express skepticism about transnational trade agreements. In 2016, a small majority of the citizens of Great Britain voted to leave the European Union, a decision that led large companies to re-think their future investments. Protectionism—or, in psychological terms, economic nationalism (i.e., ingroup-favoring economic policies and decisions by nations and their citizens; Baughn & Yaprak, 1996)—has regained momentum and its economic and political consequences are likely to be far-reaching. The deceleration of globalization did not begin with the Trump administration in the United States, though that has caused the largest reverberations. Some argue that China’s entry into the World Trade Organization in 2001 as well as the Great Recession beginning in 2008 fueled national economic concerns and support for the reassertion of national governance over national economies (Willmroth, 2018). In any case, it seems that some core aspects of globalization itself—not just as an economic system, but as a set of shared identities and values—are in a state of crisis of unforeseen magnitude and amplitude. In this sense, and as we argued in Chapter 5, globalization is not simply a broad, many-layered, and rapidly evolving context in which social psychological processes operate; rather, it is itself a politicized construct around which social identities are organized as it reorganizes around them. For example, one of the striking features of contemporary debates about migration is that they are intertwined with psychological and political responses to various facets of globalization (see Chapter 8). Thus, Western stances toward refugees and asylum seekers (and immigration in general) are expressed alongside attitudes toward economic and trade connections with other countries, and in Europe, are part of the debate about the merits of continental integration. Indeed, attitudes toward various social and political issues coalesce around the common—if sometimes vaguely defined and poorly understood—core of globalization. Underlying many responses to globalization that are related to social identity are the twin themes of security and threat. For example, the perception of threat, or the preservation of security, are core features of the

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ideologies that motivate different kinds of opposition to the global social order (see Chapter 5), and to the movement of people, ideas, and products across national borders. And as we have seen, globalization processes themselves have created new sources of insecurity as a result of technological and economic developments (e.g., digitization, automation, and rising income inequality). From an intergroup perspective, these processes have created a dynamically changing field of social comparison and selfevaluation, both in the intra-national and global arenas. Responses to globalization (and its political correlates) are not necessarily a direct reflection of people’s personal economic circumstances, but rather a sense of their future prospects and their nation’s economic prosperity, and how these compare to the (perceived) status of other groups. In this context, Inglehart and Norris (2016) contrasted populism and cosmopolitanism as clusters of opposing values: “populism favors mono-culturalism over multiculturalism, national self-interest over international cooperation and development aid, closed borders over the free flow of peoples, ideas, labor and capital, and traditionalism over progressive and liberal social values” (p. 7). Clearly, then, global interconnectedness does not on its own lead to cohesion or agreement, even if it provides new identities and domains of action that may facilitate the achievement of transnational goals. Similarly, the fact that global or human-level identifications are increasingly accessible and relevant does not mean that they are politically attractive or psychologically meaningful for people. Nevertheless, what appears to be an unraveling of a long trend toward liberal global engagement may just be another phase of a much longer process that is not necessarily linear or teleological. As Anthony Smith (1995) speculated about another volatile modern period, “It may be that we are witnessing another turn in the long cycle of formation and dissolution of human associations [involving] the oscillation of competing kinds of social and political units, with larger units being forged out of the conquest or union of smaller units, or dissolved again into their constituent parts” (pp. 143 144). In Chapter 4, we noted that expanding the “circle of the we” (cf. Hollinger, 1995) brings challenges in terms of meeting psychological needs for meaning, distinctiveness, and belonging, and this can also limit its appeal in political rhetoric (e.g., Croucher, 2015). This suggests that “postnationalism” will be achieved not by relinquishing national (or other local) identities, but by redefining them with respect to broader values and responsibilities. Despite right-wing populist claims to the contrary, patriotism is not

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inherently inimical to globalism. For example, constructive varieties of patriotism involve a balancing act analogous to the successful management of cultural diversity within national boundaries (see Chapter 8); that is, a balance between “attachment to and consideration for the well-being of one’s own group [and] an inclusive orientation to human beings, with respect for the rights and welfare of all people” (Staub, 1997, p. 214). It is clear, however, that such a “worldminded” balance—and more generally, an openness to the global movement of people, ideas, and products—is difficult to achieve under conditions of cultural and economic insecurity, and amidst a widespread sense of decline (e.g., van der Bles et al., 2018). Efforts to facilitate globally-minded action continue, nevertheless, on the part of traditional transnational institutions such as the United Nations (see below), as well as a loosely-defined global network of governmental and civil society groups. The function of cities in this network—as primary destinations of migrants (Saunders, 2011), cosmopolitan spaces, engines of productivity, and platforms for collective action on climate change and other issues (e.g., Muggah, Sargent, Nourbakhsh, & Dille, 2017)—is likely to be crucial. In any case, effective action requires a reframing of global problems (e.g., the global refugee crisis, or global climate change) from something caused by “external” factors (e.g., political instability in other countries, or other nations’ carbon emissions), to one that highlights shared responsibility, and shared consequences for a failure to intervene (e.g., see Welsh, 2016). This also reframes “security” (broadly defined) as linked to successful collective engagement with a shared set of problems.

The Potential for Global Collective Action: Sustainable Development Goals We intended this book to be not only another piece of academic discourse or a review of findings. While we believe that the theoretical arguments we made and the conceptual models we presented are important in understanding the psychology of globalization, we also think that we made a strong case for what could be done to achieve societal change. It thus makes sense to put this book on globalization into a truly global perspective. One framework that has both broad political legitimacy and potential impact is the United Nations’ formulation of 17 sustainable development goals (SDGs, UN, 2015). An overview of the SDGs is presented in Fig. 9.1.

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Figure 9.1 Overview of the sustainable development goals formulated by the United Nations.

The SDGs were formulated as a response to key global challenges and problems. Leaders from 193 countries came together under the auspices of the UN ensuring that the SDGs represent a truly global approach. It is thus an illustration of how globalization can shape cooperation and common ground across many different nations and cultures. It also shows that nations remain essential (if imperfect) mechanisms for progressive global engagement. Naturally, the formulation and the final arrangement of the SDGs are subject to various and partly contradictory political goals and views. In other words, the SDGs can be seen as a “global compromise.” Nevertheless, the framework represents an unprecedented attempt to enlist so many countries in collective action. The basis of the SDG framework focuses on the question of how the contemporary world could be transformed into a sustainable world. According to the UN, the agenda of the SDGs “. . .is a plan of action for people, planet and prosperity. It also seeks to strengthen universal peace in larger freedom. [It] recognize[s] that eradicating poverty in all its forms and dimensions, including extreme poverty, is the greatest global challenge and indispensable requirement for sustainable development. [. . .]. The 17 Sustainable Development Goals and 169 targets [. . .] demonstrate the scale and ambition of this new universal Agenda. They seek to build on the Millennium Development Goals and complete what they did not achieve.

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They seek to realize the human rights of all and to achieve gender equality and the empowerment of all women and girls. They are integrated and indivisible and balance three dimensions of sustainable development: the economic, social and environmental” (UN A/RES/70/1, preamble). These goals are undoubtedly ambitious, but they have the potential to stimulate action in many of the areas we focused on in this book (for progress reports regarding the SDGs, please refer to the updates through www.un.org/). While we cannot focus on each of the 17 SDGs and all of their specific targets, we will briefly describe some exemplary SDGs to show how they resonate with what we have described in this book.

One SDG that is inextricably related to our theme of globalization and identity is goal number 12—responsible consumption and production. Early on in this book, we directed the reader’s attention to the development of global consumption and consumer identities. These are particularly relevant when we consider that a large segment of the world population is consuming too little to meet their basic needs while a global minority consumes a disproportionate amount of products. SDG 12 formulates a future in which everybody gets what they need to survive and thrive in a way that is ecologically sustainable. In other words, this goal is strongly linked to questions of intergenerational justice and of course, intergroup conflict. It focuses on the division between those who consume much more than they need, and those who can’t satisfy even basic needs for survival through consumption. When we look at behavioral options on the psychological level, this relation will ultimately be—if it is not already—conflictual. People from relatively wealthy regions in the world will need to scale back their lifestyle and change their consumer choices and habits. How should this work? We know from the copious research on loss aversion that people have great difficulties with accepting the lose of what they already own (Tversky & Kahneman, 1991). The SDGs themselves provide guidance with specific targets, for example, by reducing per capita global food waste by half by 2030 (SDG target 12.3) or by educating people worldwide about more sustainable patterns of consumption (12.8). Yet, in their formulation, these goals remain relatively abstract. We suggest that psychological processes should be taken into account in further delineating these targets as specific (and manageable) attitudinal and behavioral changes. For example, target 12.3 could be fostered by motivating people to engage in local food-sharing initiatives, through the exertion of normative influence suggesting that many desirable others have commited to do the same (Reese & Lemke, 2018).

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For SDG 10—reducing inequalities—there is similarly strong reason to assume that psychological processes will be found to hold the key. Interrelated with many other SDGs, SDG 10 acknowledges the stark divide between the poor and the rich, both between and within countries. Prominent research by UK scientists Wilkinson and Pickett (e.g., Pickett & Wilkinson, 2015; Wilkinson & Pickett, 2006, 2009) shows the drastic consequences of inequality within societies. Using publicly available data from the World Bank and other global institutions, they show that inequality is accompanied by various indicators of social dysfunction. These include higher crime rates, shorter life expectancies, and higher infant mortality, as well as psychological outcomes such as rates of mental illnesses and deminished trust among people. Recalling our main theme in Chapter 8, there is also evidence that higher levels of economic inequality are associated with opposition to immigration, as societal cohesion is seen as buckling under both internal and external pressures (Jetten, Mols, & Postmes, 2015). Thus, although economic differences may not be inherently good or bad, economic inequality increases the importance of social stratification for how people think of themselves and others (Cheung & Lucas, 2016). It also seems to elevate social status threat and stress (Wilkinson & Pickett, 2017), increase individualization (Beck, 2007), and is strongly related to higher poverty rates (Brady, 2003; Naschold, 2002). It is particularly noteworthy that economic inequality seems to affect all levels of society. While people at lower income levels quite certainly suffer most from inequality, the research from Wilkinson and Pickett suggests that the quality of life of middle and (to a lesser extent) upper class people is also diminished in high inegalitarian societies. High inequality may put pressure on middle and upper class people to avoid socio-economic descent and to prevail in competition (Jetten et al., 2015). While the UN formulates SDG 10 primarily from the perspective that inequality is a global problem that requires global solutions (e.g., by regulating financial markets, sending development aid to countries in need, or adopting policies to achieve greater equality), it is evident that subjective experiences of inequality represent key drivers of inequality perpetuation. It is the perception of inequality as problematic or unproblematic, or as legitimate or illegitimate, that motivates responses towards inequality (see also Chapter 3; e.g., Harth et al., 2008; Reese et al., 2012). As we saw in Chapter 6, perceived illegitimacy or injustice is one of the routes to collective action. In Chapter 7, we noted that justice beliefs on various levels

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(i.e., global, intergenerational, ecological) relate to emotional responses (e.g., anger) that in turn predict proenvironmental intentions (Reese & Jacob, 2015). From sociocognitive research, we know that the way inequality is framed affects perceptions of inequality and whether it is seen as more or less legitimate (Bruckmüller, Reese, & Martiny, 2017; Chow & Galak, 2012; Lowery, Chow, & Crosby, 2009). Thus, what we believe is needed here is an articulation of the macro-oriented approach for addressing inequalities in a psychological, more person-sized level that ultimately predicts whether people engage in collective action or find their (and other's) quality of life satisfactory. The extent to which these responses depend on common identities or common ground has been discussed throughout our book. Finally, there is SDG 17 that calls for the formation of strong, global partnerships in the pursuit of these goals. Quite certainly, this goal is at the heart of what globalization may achieve: a truly international, globally shared set of cooperative partnerships within and across boundaries and with various stakeholders. The level of interconnectedness humanity has reached could be helpful in coordinating the implementation steps necessary to reach the goals and individual targets. Again, we can see in most of the targets attached to this goal the macro-oriented framework of the SDGs. Yet, these again can be subject to psychologically relevant processes in terms of coordinating and motivating policy actions. For example, in Chapter 7 we described how large-scale cooperation is served by the formation of a superordinate identity among policy makers (Batalha & Reynolds, 2012). Similarly, transnational contact could foster superordinate identities that in turn spur motivation for global coordinated action (Roempke et al., 2018). Of course, the SDGs do not come without criticism. We will not discuss each of these, but formulating 17 goals shared by 193 nations does not come without heavy compromises, and partly, mutually exclusive formulations. For example, we leave it up to the reader to decide whether SDG 8—economic growth—is compatible with many of the other goals that seek to protect global resources and reduce inequality. So, while it is certainly worthwhile and important to consider the SDGs as serious attempts to generate sustainable change on a global scale, the formulation of these goals alone will not suffice. As we have argued throughout the book, knowledge and awareness alone will not inspire behavioral change. In a similar vein, Norström and colleagues (Norström et al., 2014) argued that the formulation of the SDGs is a first and vital step, but that the key

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challenges lie in moving toward those goals. In line with our own perspective in this book, Norström and colleagues highlighted three insights that the implementation of the SDGs requires. The first of these is the systemic nature of the challenges faced by humanity. Human behavior and ecological systems are intertwined so that each goal must be seen in the context of a social-ecological system. In other words, people belong to and shape the ecosystem and at the same time depend on its provisioning, regulating, and supporting services. Second, the feasibility of the SDGs should be taken into account. When the goals are too ambitious, people and governments will not act. When they are too easy, they will have no effect. Finally, the efforts to reach the goals should be guided by state-ofthe-art knowledge about the social change processes that are needed. We believe these are driven by psychological processes involving social identity, efficacy beliefs (which themselves relate to the issue of feasibility), and collective action tendencies. Ultimately, the key question regarding the SDGs is: How can such large-scale goals or visions be achieved? Can globalization be helpful in crafting solutions? According to Norström et al. (2014), the rapid development of information technologies—as we have seen at multiple points in the preceding chapters—may indeed help to build cross-cultural networks engaging in global-scale collaboration. The authors provide an example of such an online process that is led by the UN. On the webpage http://www.worldwewant2015.org/, various stakeholders, including citizens, were invited to participate in nation-wide but also global consultations. Here, people could become influencers or actively engage in policy discussion groups. On the webpage www.globaldevhub.org/, several other E-Discussions were available at the time of writing this book.

The Nexus of Psychology, Sustainability, and Economy After all of this is said and done, these topics reviewed, and strands integrated, we wish to conclude with three parting ideas. In the remainder of this book, we would present three strands of research that we believe are crucial in the face of accelerating planetary interconnectedness. First and foremost, while we have demonstrated that contemporary human wellbeing, social functioning, political integrity, and ecological viability are all informed by the psychology of globalization, it cannot stand alone. Any analysis of the interconnectedness that marks globalization requires a broader viewpoint than any one discipline can provide.

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Throughout this book, we have advocated for psychology to contribute to a more holistic understanding of the challenges faced by contemporary societies. To address these enormously complex problems, scholars from various fields have fruitfully adopted a systems thinking mindset. As the label suggests, it refers to considering the complex relationships and patterns of change that could better inform decision-making in our globalized world (e.g., Meadows, 2008; Thibodeau, Frantz, & Stroink, 2016). Addressing issues in a planetary system characterized by immense complexity requires a holistic understanding of how these systems work. This necessitates a better understanding of the information processing techniques needed for this type of holistic problem-solving, and how to best foster them. Taking such an interdisciplinary viewpoint, a second strand of suggested research focuses on alternatives to the economics of constant growth, and the social possibilities those may afford. As we discussed in Chapter 3, globalization is inextricably linked to consumption patterns— patterns that are sustained by, and feedback into these economic systems of constant growth. Indeed, the economic model of constant growth could be said to have been replicated in a psychological model of consumer selfhood, where constant material improvement of the self through acquisition becomes an existential necessity. In final analysis, however, the planet, and we, as individuals inhabiting it, are all systems of finite resources, so alternative conceptualizations to these material growth models are sorely needed. Therefore, we briefly describe several alternative economic approaches, the forms of societies they may depend on, and whether public understanding of the growth debate may result in collective agency for societal change. Lastly, we will return to the question of shared reality and our place of it from a slightly sleight-sighted perspective.

SYSTEMS THINKING Some scholars maintain that the current threats to global wellbeing have emerged largely as a result of actions taken within vastly complex systems, without actors possessing a full realization of how these systems operate (Thibodeau et al., 2016). Because of the interconnectivity inherent in complex systems, such actions can have counterintuitive results, as interlocking processes often behave in non-linear and thus unexpected ways. Adding urgency to this discussion, humanity now is confronted by an

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array of intensifying and interconnected challenges that are truly global, rapidly dynamic, and unprecedented in their scope. They extend across environmental, economic, and social facets of human activities, and affect security issues, migration, social justice, and the psychological wellbeing of individuals and collectives, and also other living beings. As described above, the SDGs try to take this into account, although the formulation of 17 individual SDGs suggests less interconnection between these challenges than there actually is (Norström et al., 2014). To address these interconnected challenges, systems thinking refers, on the most basic level, to a transdisciplinary construct that is able to better conceptualize complex socioecological challenges (Davis & Stroink, 2016; Fazey, 2010). According to Davis and Stroink (2016), systems thinking is “a cognitive paradigm that involves an implicit tendency to recognize various phenomena as a set of interconnected components that interact with one another to make up a dynamic whole” (p. 577). It allows perceiving and understanding complex systems, and is understood as a worldview that includes beliefs and assumptions about the world (Thibodeau et al., 2016). While a complete account of the methods and concepts of systems thinking is beyond the scope of this book, some elements seem particularly relevant to the psychology of globalization. When we look at the interconnectedness and dynamics that characterize globalization, it is evident that the distribution of the costs and benefits of globalization can only be approached from a systemic perspective that clearly defines the system boundaries. If we want to understand how and when globalization exerts positive or negative influence on our thinking, our identities, and our behavior, we must clearly define the factors involved in the system, and understand that cross-boundary effects occur. In a similar vein, the concept of systems behavior states that systems act as a function of their own intrinsic properties. That means that the behavior of a global system cannot simply be deduced or extrapolated from the actions of its individual components. Again, globalization is a vivid example here since the effects of globalization in one particular society will very likely be different in other societies, and for the whole global system. Finally, the concept of non-linearity is highly visible in globalization effects. Non-linearity is a critical feature in many systems, given the dynamics within a system and its interactions with other systems. Thus, we cannot expect that change through globalization will be gradual or steady, and thus predictable. In terms of migration or digital security, unanticipated shocks

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(e.g., cyber-attacks, unprecedented migration movements) have occurred, requiring flexibility, resilience, and risk management. This breeds a great deal of psychological strain on individuals and societies because nonlinearity is associated with conditions of uncertainty. Uncertainty, in turn, is related to various psychological consequences such as psychological stress (Greco & Roger, 2003), political polarization (Hogg, 2014), and feeling peripheral in social groups (Hohman, Gaffney, & Hogg, 2017). Thus, proactively coping with uncertainty may be a particularly important requirement consideration within systems thinking conceptualizations. In Chapters 2 and 3, we focused on consumerism, which from a systems thinking perspective can be seen as one of the key drivers of climate change and related issues. It has strong linkages to waste (e.g., plastic residue from packaging), land use (e.g., farming crops at the cost of native forests for feeding animals), transportation, water management, the economy, and so on. It is also connected to questions of social justice and ethical considerations (Andorfer & Liebe, 2012) so that any approach seeking to change consumption patterns will inevitably result in environmental, social, or economic fault lines. It may thus be fruitful to think about the psychological characteristics that could foster systemic decision making. In fact, we know surprisingly little about the psychological antecedents of systems thinking. Although there is a long tradition of systemic thinking in psychology and the social sciences (e.g., Luhmann, Baecker, & Gilgen, 2013), it is only recently that scholars have engaged in empirical analysis of the capability to think in systems. As Thibodeau and colleagues (Thibodeau et al., 2016) claim, “people who engage in systems thinking attend to and process system-related information more broadly and recognize complex causal relationships and patterns of change; as a result, they are more likely to make decisions that enhance the well-being of the systems they interact within and depend on” (p. 753). In order to test these assumptions, Thibodeau and colleagues used a 15-item measure of systems thinking (introduced by Davis & Stroink, 2016) that captures people’s tendency to perceive and understand relevant phenomena as emergent from complex, dynamic, and nested systems (e.g., “Everything is constantly changing,” “When I have to make a decision in my life, I tend to see all kinds of possible consequences to each choice”). They found that systems thinking was substantially related to decision-making such that systems thinkers attended more to the full breadth of a system, identified complex causal relationships, and recognized dynamic patterns of change. Analysis of demographic data revealed that systems thinking was more

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common among females compared to males, among liberals compared to conservatives, and among people who were more highly educated. With regard to personality and ideology, it seems that systems thinking goes along with a higher need for cognition, an interdependent self-construal, higher openness to experience, and lower authoritarianism. Systems thinking was also related to a stronger connectedness to nature, suggesting that systems thinkers feel a stronger bond to, and express more concern for the Earth system. Indeed, Davis and Stroink (2016) argued that systems thinkers should also be those who understand that human beings will very likely never possess the ability to fully control the earth system—an argument that parallels basic tenets of the new environmental paradigm (NEP, Dunlap, 2008). They found that systems thinking correlated highly with ecological worldviews, biospheric and altruistic motives. A set of studies by Lezak and Thibodeau (2016) nicely complement these findings. These authors showed that systems thinkers were more likely to believe in scientific consensus, be more cognizant of climate change risks, and be more willing to support policies that address climate change mitigation. They also ascribed more value (monetary, social, and ecological) to the natural world, which provides hope that systems thinking may indeed be a fruitful avenue towards tackling global challenges. In one of our own labs, a recent series of studies investigated the extent to which systems thinking relates to social identification at various levels of abstraction. Most importantly, we assumed that people who are strong systems thinkers would also be those who would identify on a broader, more inclusive level. As we have learned in Chapter 4, identification on a global level (i.e., global identity or common human identity) is associated with proenvironmental intentions. Thus, if systems thinking and global identity were related, this would suggest a useful conceptual integration of social identity research and systems thinking. Across three studies with very different samples (i.e., student samples and public convenience samples), we assessed systems thinking (Davis & Stroink, 2016) as well as identification at local, national, and global levels (McFarland et al., 2012). Across the studies, results suggested that the higher people scored on systems thinking, the stronger they identified on a global level. While these correlations were moderate (between r 5 .16 and r 5 .30), they were consistent, and suggest that identifying on a global level has at least some conceptual overlap with the ability to think in systems. In one of the studies, we also assessed attitudes towards refugees, as well as the perceived

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probability of a terror attack nearby. Both were related to systems thinking, such that systems thinkers had more positive attitudes towards migrants, and judged the probability of a terror attack to be lower. Such findings suggest that systems thinkers may indeed have a broader and more integrated view with regard to global challenges. As we discussed in Chapter 8, these challenges include how host countries respond to migrants, and how threats are construed in association with newcomers. Taken together, this brief review of research suggests that systems thinking may represent an important addition to the conceptual tools for addressing the globalization-related issues. These findings notwithstanding, we do not know the conditions that might facilitate systems thinking ability. In other words, as of yet there is no causal evidence that system thinking generates global concern—or, alternatively, whether such concern encourages a systems thinking mindset. Research so far suggests that education is an important and malleable predictor of system thinking (Thibodeau et al., 2016), but future research is necessary to address the question of whether there are other more efficient ways to enhance individuals’ systems thinking capacity and motivation. In terms of identity, ideology, and action in a globalized world, it is evident that systems thinking promises to make an important contribution. Given what little we know about the psychological foundations of systems thinking, however, many questions remain. Without being exhaustive, we believe that the following key questions should be addressed by that future research.

FUTURE RESEARCH QUESTIONS • • • • •

How do systems thinkers perceive globalization and its consequences? Do they take into account various dimensions of globalization in their assessment? Do globalization and the awareness of living in a globalized world affect the ability and capability of thinking in systems terms? Is systems thinking merely a cognitive paradigm or can it feed into collective action? If so, under which conditions? Does systems thinking allow for more inclusive identification? In other words, does an increase in systems thinking facilitate global identification? Do system thinkers have the propensity to seek information that goes beyond their own expertise?

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Is systems thinking restricted to liberals, and thus a restricted concept itself, as the research by Thibodeau et al. (2016) suggests? Or is it a matter of framing the issue?

ECONOMIC (DE)GROWTH & ECONOMIC INEQUALITY In various chapters, we have argued that consumption patterns made globalization possible while at the same time globalization fuels mass consumption and steadily growing economies. Thus, much hinges on issues of economic growth and how modern societies subscribe to the goal of limitless growth and a free-market ideology. Closely related are the social and economic disruptions produced by economic growth. Yet, economic growth and its potential alternatives, as well as economic inequality, have attracted relatively little attention among psychologists. In a global society that has become more and more unequal (e.g., with only 1% of people owning roughly 50% of global wealth, Oxfam, 2018), we believe that psychological processes including social identity and ideology are indispensable in efforts to envision an achievable societal change. While this book cannot answer the question of whether economic growth is inherently good or bad, let us briefly acknowledge the fact that economic growth has become a highly contested issue in the social sciences (Drews & van den Bergh, 2016a, 2016b). Indeed, as Drews and van den Bergh argue, there has been a long-standing debate about the effects of economic growth on environmental quality, inequality, and prosperity in general. This debate reached a broader global audience after the publication of the report, “The Limits to Growth” (Meadows et al., 1972), and has recently gained renewed attention (e.g., Turner, 2008). Even some influential economists have begun expressing doubts about continuous economic growth (Gordon, 2014; Rogoff, 2012; Stiglitz, 2009), presuming that endless economic growth is largely unsustainable (cf. Demaria, Schneider, Sekulova, & Martinez-Alier, 2013). The debate has also reached psychology and communication research that addresses which label would be most (or least) useful when debating about economic alternatives (Drews & Reese, 2018). In the frame of globalization, it becomes evident that any single society (e.g., a nation) would have a hard time following a non-growth economic model, while all other societies remain in the growth paradigm. The interconnectedness of economies and digital financial routes would make it virtually impossible for any single economy to step out of line.

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How then could a global change of the economic system emerge or be encouraged? There are some attempts to promote the idea of a global ungrowth economy, and some of these have gained considerable attention in the second decade of the 21st century. The book “Prosperity Without Growth” (Jackson, 2011), as well as advocates of the “degrowth” movement (e.g., Demaria et al., 2013; Kallis, 2011), have made the point that human societies can prosper and develop without continual economic growth. One of the main questions, however, is whether this idea could be adopted by larger groups so that it potentially becomes a global movement. At the time of writing this chapter, the degrowth movement has gained momentum through more than 100 academic articles, various international conferences, and newspaper articles (Drews & van den Bergh, 2016a, 2016b). Beyond this academic discussion, the degrowth proponents aim to establish a social movement (Kallis, 2011). In Chapter 6 in particular, we presented research that shows the conditions under which collective movements develop and gain momentum. These processes could also become relevant in the context of a global movement that strives for an alternative economic system. The SIMCA model (Van Zomeren et al., 2008) and others (Smith et al., 2015) propose several key antecedents of collective action, including a perception that the current state of affairs is unjust or wrong. If the degrowth movement could persuasively communicate this sense of injustice, along with the notion that things could be otherwise, it has a chance to expand its appeal. As we outlined previously, the likelihood of collective action and social change increases when people strongly identify with a movement, through sharing and communicating their cognitions, beliefs, and opinions. Finally, it is important that members of a degrowth movement have a feeling that they can achieve something through their actions. The feeling of collective efficacy (see also Fritsche et al., 2018; Reese & Junge, 2017) then becomes a main driver for collective action and ultimately, may fuel support for degrowth policies. Of course, this is simpler in theory than in practice. Still, it is a hopeful analysis of how the public could become engaged in a movement that promotes a more sustainable and just economic system. Also, such an analysis is timely in a global society that realizes that endless growth and associated inequalities are highly problematic for the environment and people alike (Wilkinson & Pickett, 2007). In fact, the public has become aware that change is necessary, at least according to some studies. In the German “Umweltbewusstseinsstudien” (Environmental Awareness

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Studies) funded by the Federal Ministry of the Environment, a majority of respondents agreed that environmental protection should take precedence over economic growth, and that the standard of living must change to ensure a sustainable future. The question is whether such local attitudes could ultimately result in more pervasive change. Can people who believe that the growth levels in industrialized countries are destructive build a global movement? The chapters on social identity and collective action provide the psychological pathways that could contribute to the formation of such a movement, and ultimately, social change. Again, we acknowledge that the nexus of psychology, economy, and global governance requires multiple perspectives and a systemic analysis of the issues. One problem that any growing movement would eventually face is that many societies—affluent or not—may be reluctant to change. As the SDGs indicate, economic growth is a key goal for the United Nations; for many less affluent countries in particular, economic growth may indeed be important to develop education, reduce poverty, and gain funds to effectively engage in environmental protection.

FUTURE RESEARCH QUESTIONS • • • • •

Do the perceived consequences of globalization affect whether people view economic growth as desirable or problematic? When do people support certain policies that would lead to a degrowth society? What are the psychological consequences if we move from a growthbased economy to an economy that focuses more strongly on other indicators of wealth? How can a model of economic degrowth be communicated in a global society that sees economic growth as a necessity for wellbeing and progress? Can a “degrowth-identity” emerge that fuels comprehensive collective action for a new economic paradigm?

GLOBALIZATION, DIGITIZATION, AND THE RISE OF CONSPIRACY THEORIES Finally, we return to the metaphysical question regarding the nature of reality, as we note that increasing digitalization is one of the most promising but at the same time one of the most uncertainty-laden aspects of

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globalization. It is promising as it may improve the lives of many people through providing access to much of humanity’s knowledge and allowing us to stay in touch with the people we love (and sometimes with those we don’t). It is uncertain as we can only partly foresee the consequences of an ever increasing interconnectedness of people, minds, enterprises, stock markets, transport systems, etcetera. More specifically, sovereignty of nations’ citizens may be at stake when elections become manipulated through falsehoods and automated influencing through social media, or cyber-attacks directed at nations’ internal security systems. Again, we deal here with a large and complex system that can only be partly understood when approached from single disciplines or perspectives. About 10 years before the first edition of this book appeared, Lazer and colleagues (Lazer et al., 2009) bluntly stated what is simply standard today: “We live life in the network” (p. 721). Virtually every aspect of our lives has been or can be transferred into the internet—not only email, Twitter, or Weibo communication, but also our geolocations through GPS, lunch dishes purchased with a credit card, or navigation apps for local and national transport services leave traces online. These traces are used, and could be used, in many different ways. At the least, their aggregation enables the construction of relatively comprehensive pictures of individual and group identities. These data also represent a challenge to scientists who would like to make use of them. As we described throughout the earlier chapters, social science and psychology in particular has taken up research activity with big data, assessing hashtags and social networks, providing sentiment analysis and other exciting findings about communication and psychology in the digital world. Yet, we are only at the beginning of this era of bringing big data into social science research. It is evident, however, that such data can tell us a lot about the expression of worldview and debates. When it comes to contemporary political debate and expression of views, online life has contributed to some interesting and disturbing communication developments. One of these is the rise of conspiracy theories. Conspiracy theories are not new in the sense that the internet created them. Even before the rise of the internet, more and more people tended to believe in them (Goertzel, 1994). Conspiracy theories are alternative explanations of events, deliberately deviating from official explanations and often directed against authorities such as politicians (Jolley, Douglas, & Sutton, 2017). A classic example of such a conspiracy theory is the formulation of the 9/11 attacks as an “inside job.” Rather than being caused

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by two airplanes crashing into the World Trade Center, conspiracy theories claim that bombs in the underground of the center caused the Twin Towers to disintegrate. Those responsible for the bombs, may be any number of candidates, depending on the specific according to conspiracy theorists. Tellingly, such theories are not necessarily bound to the political realm, as the proponents of “Elvis is still alive” show. Contrasting these two examples of conspiracy theories shows that some may be less plausible than others, even appearing largely grotesque (such as the one that Reptiloids from outer space managed to hide and strive among mankind, now leading geopolitically relevant governments). Others appear much less bizarre, so that many people are willing to believe some elements. Once a conspiracy theory gains traction, it becomes extremely difficult to falsify it, as each attempt to do so can be seen as proof that it is true (Räikkä, 2009). While it may be easy to dismiss conspiracy beliefs and believers as dubious, they can become politically and culturally problematic. Together with the World Wide Web’s boundary-free means of communication, conspiracy theories that victimize minorities, compromise individuals or decision makers, or appeal to extremist groups have the potential to erode societal wellbeing, and incite genocidal violence (see also Chapter 5). An illustrative study that addresses the inherently problematic side of conspiracy theories by va Prooijen and colleagues (van Prooijen, Krouwel, & Pollet, 2015) suggests that political extremism relates to conspiracy beliefs. In a set of studies, these researchers assessed individuals’ political orientation as well their belief in conspiracy statements, or how likely they believed these were. The results showed that the more extreme people’s political orientation (regardless of whether “right-extreme” or “leftextreme”), the more strongly they believed in conspiracy theories. Interestingly, this relation was primarily explained by extremists’ stronger belief in simple political solutions for societal problems. There was also some evidence that a higher belief in conspiracy theories related to lower self-esteem. The reason for why this theme is relevant in the context of globalization is that there is, at least at face value, a significant correspondence between those who believe in these theories and those who resist change. In Chapter 5, we looked at the psycho-political underpinnings of maintaining the societal status quo. Similarly, it seems that those who believe in conspiracy theories are at their core concerned about too much change; they want to keep the system stable (Jolley et al., 2017). Therefore, it is

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likely that globalization may be a double-edged sword for conspiracy theorizing, as globalization both enables and facilitates the dissemination of these theories, while at the same time, globalization is characterized by those changes conspiracy believers resist. This can certainly only be a brief look on the nature of conspiracy beliefs and how they may be positioned in an interconnected world. There is a growing body of research addressing these issues and their consequences (cf. Douglas, Sutton, & Cichocka, 2017; van Prooijen & Douglas, 2018). Future Research Questions: • How do big data contribute to understanding people’s responses to globalization? • When do people show concern about the use and distribution of their personal data in the World Wide Web? • Does globalization transmit conspiracy beliefs across cultures or is this a phenomenon of the globalized Western world? • Is opposition to globalization related to conspiracy beliefs, and if so, for whom? • Can conspiracy beliefs fuel the emergence of a “conspiracy identity” that could ultimately result in collective action among believers?

A FEW LAST WORDS Before concluding this chapter—and this book—a few last comments deserve space. Throughout, we tried to incorporate various examples of real-world phenomena, such as political issues, migration movements, and environmental crises. We have done this in the belief that the conceptual and psychological analysis that is key to this book is not merely abstract and theoretical. Rather, we hope to have made clear that these processes actually play out in the real world, with concrete social, economic, political, and cultural implications. The psychology of globalization is thus, ultimately, the psychology of how we perceive and respond to the grand challenges of a dynamic, interconnected world. The world might even depend on it.

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INDEX Note: Page numbers followed by “f” and “t” refer to figures and tables, respectively.

A Acculturation, 86 87, 186 196 framework expansion, 190 192 Activist environmental behavior, 160 161 Advertising, 41 42 Allure of inaction, 149 153 American consumer culture, 48 American culture, 19 Anglo-American version of Western culture, 18 “Antiglobalization” protest, 107 “Arab Spring”, 129, 140 141 Assembly line production, 15 Attenuation hypothesis, 91 92 Attitudinal indices, 26 27 Automation, 211 212

B

“Bear lifestyle”, 62 64 “Black Lives Matter”, 129 Bund, 77

C Capitalism, 52, 109, 119, 122 Capitalist economic system, 32 Climate change, 9 10, 92, 158 160, 174 175, 179 180 emotional and motivational responses to, 174 175 mitigation, 160 161 social identity and responses to, 163 178 core social identity variables, 172 173 emotional and motivational responses to global climate change, 174 175 processes of social identity in transnational negotiations, 176 178 SIMPEA, 169 172, 171f CO2 emissions, 159 “Cognitive alternatives”, 77, 209

Collective action, 129 131, 134, 137, 142, 148 149 behavior, 136 into context, 140 141 dynamic model of normative and nonnormative, 134 137, 135f psychological perspective, 131 141 EMSICA, 133 134, 133f SIMCA, 131 133, 132f solidarity-based, 137 140, 138f Collective(s)/collectivism, 22 23, 142 147 efficacy, 132 133, 169 170 emotions, 81 82 psychology, 170 171 thinking, 171 Collectivized individual choice, 148 149 Color blindness, 109 Communication technologies development, 10 Comparative fit, 74, 167 168 Competitive component, 136 137 Complementary stereotype, 149 150 Concrete cognitive style, 57 Connection, 210 219 economic (de)growth and economic inequality, 224 226 nexus of psychology, sustainability, and economy, 218 219 SDGs, 213 218 systems thinking, 219 223 Consensual inferiority, 102 Conspiracy theories, rise of, 226 229 Consumer(ism), 41, 47 48, 52, 148 149, 221 culture, 28 30 and politics, 124 127, 126f evidence from experimental primes of, 56 59 hedonism, 19 homogenization process, 28 29

269

270

Index

Consumer(ism) (Continued) lifestyle identities, 61 64 market to, 33 35 segmentation of consumer societies, 59 60 selfhood, 43 46 and globalized consumer culture stability, 65 69 materialism as conspicuous form of, 52 64 and normative narcissism, 47 52 psychological architecture of, 46 47 Consumerist architecture of sociocultural globalization, 28 Consumption, marketing role in restructuring societies for, 41 46 Contemporary consumer culture, 67 68 global challenges, 157 globalization, 8 9 globalized culture, 18 Contextual relevance of social categories, 74 75 Conversionary component, 136 137 Cooperation, 9 11, 210 219 economic (de)growth and economic inequality, 224 226 nexus of psychology, sustainability, and economy, 218 219 SDGs, 213 218 systems thinking, 219 223 Cosmopolitan individual, 90 Cosmopolitanism, 20 21 “Crisis of identities”, 8 9 Cross-cultural efficacy, 86 87 perspective on selfhood, 21 24 psychology, 56 Cultural/culture arrangement, 23 24 backlash, 119 120, 123 conjoined trajectories of selfhood and, 24 26 diversity, 186 187 dominance, 103 104 forms of selfhood, 23 24 products, 27 28

syndrome, 27 28 system, 65 threat, 194 195, 198 value systems, 25 Cyberattacks, 9 10

D De facto function, 17 Deglobalization, 8 9, 210 211 Demand appraisals, 169 170 Demographic reality, 203 204 Descriptive norms, 165 166 Digitization, 211 212, 226 229 Dogmatic social conservativism, 108 “Double Income, No Kids” (DINKs), 61 62 Dual identities, 84 85 Dynamic(s) model of normative and nonnormative collective action, 134 137, 135f of multiple social identities, 84 85

E E-mobility, 166 Eastern European Jews, 78 79 “Echo chamber”, 125 Economic conservatism, 109 economic, 224 226 globalization, 11, 107 growth, 226 nationalism, 210 211 process of globalization, 16 18 structure, 26 Efficacy, 172 173 Emotional experience, globalization and, 87 89 Emotional responses to global climate change, 174 175 Encapsulation model of social identity in collective action (EMSICA), 133 134, 133f Environment degradation, 157 158 migrants, 10 11 proenvironmental behavior impact on, 161 163

Index

Environmental Protection Agency, 178 European Council on Foreign Relations, 194 195 European Values Survey, 200 201 “Europhiles”, 201 202 Exceptionalism, 203 204

F Facebook, 4 5, 15 16, 124 125 Faith-based commodities, 34 Fandoms, 87 88 Fiction likewise models, 88 Fossil fuels, 159 Free competition, 31 32 Free-market economic activities, 109 Functional antagonism, 84 85

G Gay lifestyle, 61 62, 64 Genocide, 130 131 German Democratic Republic, 129 Global citizenship, 20 21 Global compromise, 214 Global connectedness, 145 147 impacts on group formation and identification, 142 145 Global consumer culture, 41 Global contexts, 189 190 collective action in allure of inaction, 149 153 collective action and consumerism, 148 149 new identities, new collectives, new solidarity, 142 147 psychological perspective on collective action, 131 141 Global cultural syndrome of consumerism, 51 52 Global economy, 9 10 “Global elite”, 196 197 Global environmental crises, 164 dimensions of proenvironmental action, 160 161 global climate change, 158 160 global environmental issues, 157 158

271

proenvironmental behavior impact on environment, 161 163 social identity and responses to climate change, 163 178 world wide web and environmental issues, 178 181 Global human population, 183 Global identification, 93 96, 222 223 limitations of, 97 99 Global interconnectedness, 212 213 Global interdependence, 8 9 Global mass media, 88 Global meritocracy, 20 Global migration magnet, 186 Global orientation, 86 87 Global resources, 102 Global social order, stability and legitimacy of, 101 104 Global warming, 167, 179 180. See also Climate change Globalization, 3 4, 6, 13, 15 16, 71, 99, 101, 103 104, 130, 149 150, 159, 184 186, 196 197, 210 219 and acculturation, 86 87 complex nature of, 4 8 conjoined trajectories of culture and selfhood, 24 26 consumer culture, 28 30 consumerist architecture of sociocultural, 28 contradictions of different value systems, 26 28 cross-cultural perspective on selfhood, 21 24 digitization and rise of conspiracy theories, 226 229 economic, political, and sociocultural processes of, 16 18 economic (de)growth and economic inequality, 224 226 future research questions, 226 effects on local and national identification, 89 92 and emotional experience, 87 89 globalized Western culture, 18 21 globalizing sociocultural conditions and transformations of selfhood, 21

272

Index

Globalization (Continued) impact on social identities, 85 86 limitations of global identification, 97 99 from local to globalized social identity, 92 93 market logic, 30 32 from market to consumer, 33 35 nexus of psychology, sustainability, and economy, 218 219 potential impact on SDO levels, 112 113 processes, 141 profound effects, 129 promise of global identification, 93 96 SDGs, 213 218 SDO and support for, 109 112 social psychology perspective of, 8 14 sociocultural conditions, 21 systems thinking, 219 223 tensions of globalized values, 35 37 Globalized collective emotions, 88 Globalized consumer culture, 43 stability, 65 69 Globalized consumerism, 71 Globalized homogenization, 27 28 Globalized Western culture (GWC), 18 21, 34 35, 37t, 41, 102 103, 111 vectors of opposition to, 104 107 Google, 15 16, 159 160, 179 Group behavior, normative basis of, 80 81 Group consciousness, 137 139 Group formation and identification, connectedness impacts on, 142 145 Group polarization, 80 81 Group-based emotions, 81 Guerrilla warfare, 130 131 GWC. See Globalized Western culture (GWC)

H Hashtag searches, 145 146 Heritage cultural identities, 105 “Hip-Hop lifestyle”, 44 Honor cultures, 23 24

Horizontal hostility, 78 Human identity, common, 222 223 Human(s), 72 for humans, 158 160 trafficking, 30 variability, 74

I ICC. See International Criminal Court (ICC) Identification with all humanity (IWAH), 93 94, 97 98, 107 Identity/identities, 71, 142 147 Identity-Nexus model, 225 materialistic, 55 56 multiple social, 84 85 nascent gay identity, 61 62 national, 191 193, 196, 203 204 threat to identity enhancement, 201 204 In-group identity model, 98, 203 204 Income inequality, 211 212 Individual mobility, 76 Individualism, 22 25, 51 Individualism-collectivism dimension, 21 22 Individualist hedonism, 89 Individualistic sociocultural systems, 22 Individuals’ ideological inclinations, 108 Inequality economic, 224 226 income, 211 212 Information and communications technology, 184 Ingroup identification, 172 173 Ingroup identity model, common, 84 85 Injunctive norms, 165 166 Injustice, 134 Integrated models, 136, 170 171 Integration, 188 189 hypothesis, 188 migrant, 186 Interactive acculturation model, 190 191 Interconnectedness, 3 of economies and digital financial routes, 224 225 humanity, 217

Index

Interdependent self, 22 23 Interdependent self-construal, 22 23, 221 222 International Criminal Court (ICC), 177 International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 158 159 International Social Survey Program data, 200 International trade, 21 Intrasocietal cultural heterogeneity, 25 26 IPCC. See International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) IWAH. See Identification with all humanity (IWAH)

K

“Knee-jerk” reaction, 105

L Left-extreme”, 228 Legitimacy of global social order, 101 104 Liberal government, 203 Liberalism, 31 32, 34 35, 118 “Limits to Growth”, The, 224 “Live 8” event, 88 “Live Aid” concerts (1985), 88 Local identity to globalized social identity, 92 93

M Maladaptive materialism, 55 Market(ing) to consumer, 33 35 forces, 34 logic, 30 32 messages, 42 43 role in restructuring societies for consumption, 41 46 consumer selfhood, 43 46 science, 89 segmentation process, 126 127 Mass flight, 183 184, 186, 194 Mass movements of people, 13 Mass production techniques, 28

273

Materialism, 52 as conspicuous form of consumer selfhood, 52 64 consumer lifestyle identities, 61 64 evidence from experimental primes of consumerism, 56 59 segmentation of consumer societies, 59 60 materialistic identities, 55 56 Meat-based diet, 162 Migrant crisis (2016), 193 Migrants integration, 186 perceived threat and reactions to, 193 196 Migration, 13 globalization and, 184 186, 204 205 Mobility, 75 80 Monetization process, 30 Motivational responses to global climate change, 174 175 Multiculturalism, 186 196, 204 205 expanding acculturation framework, 190 192 national and global contexts, 189 190 national identity, 192 193 perceived threat and reactions to migrants, 193 196 Multiple functions of social identification, 83 84 Multiple social identities, dynamics of, 84 85 Mutual respectful interaction, 96

N Narcissistic tendencies, 48 49 Nascent gay identity, 61 62 National contexts, 189 190 National identity, 191 193, 196, 203 204 Nationalism, 105, 189 190 NEP. See New environmental paradigm (NEP) New environmental paradigm (NEP), 222 NGOs. See Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) Non-linearity, 220 221 Non-normative collective action, 134 135

274

Index

Nonactivist behavior in public sphere, 160 161 Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), 166 167 Nonnormative collective action, dynamic model of, 134 137, 135f Normative basis of group behavior, 80 81 Normative collective action, 134 135 dynamic model, 134 137, 135f Normative fit, 74 75 Normative narcissism, consumer selfhood and, 47 52 Norms, 172 173

O

“Occupy Movement”, 12 13, 143 144 Online activism, 145 147 Opinion-based groups, 73 74 Opinion-based ingroups, 143 Opinions vis-à-vis policy, 115

P Participatory efficacy, 132 133 Particularistic opposition, 104 105 Perceived threat, 193 196 Personal efficacy beliefs, 169 170 Pew Global Attitudes Project (2012 13), 101 102, 106 107 Pew Research Center (2016), 198 199 Political psychology of globalization individuals’ ideological inclinations and political reactions, 108 RWA and perceptions of globalization, 116 118 RWA and SDO in concert, 119 127 and societal change, 118 119 SDO, 109 globalization’s potential impact on levels of, 112 113 SDO and contact with other cultures, 113 116 and support for globalization, 109 112 stability and legitimacy of global social order, 101 104

vectors of opposition to globalized Western culture, 104 107 Political/politics authority, 101 consumer culture and, 124 127, 126f consumerism, 148 extremism, 228 polarization, 123 124, 198 199 politicized collective identities, 73 74 process of globalization, 16 18 reactions to globalization, 108 salience, 138 Populism, 196 204, 211 212 from identity threat to identity enhancement, 201 204 populist political movements, 197 Post-Second World War (Western) liberal consensus, 210 “Postindustrial” economy, 29 Postnationalism, 212 213 Prejudice, 196 204 Primer, 28 30 Private sphere behaviors, 161 Private-sphere environmental behavior, 160 161 Proenvironmental action, 169 170 dimensions, 160 161 behaviors, 161 impact on environment, 161 163 Prosocial hashtags, 144 145 Prosocial orientation, 138 139 Protectionism, 210 211 Psychographics, 60 Psychology/psychological, 44 45 architecture of consumer selfhood and consequences, 46 47 factors, 153 perspective on collective action, 131 141 process, 129, 176 science, 125

R Reactant individual, 90 Reaffirmation, 105

Index

Realistic threats, 193 194 Referent informational influence, 80 Religious fundamentalism, 105 Resource appraisals, 169 170 Revitalization, 105 “Right-extreme”, 228 Right-wing authoritarianism (RWA), 115 116 and perceptions of globalization, 116 118 scale, 108 and SDO in concert, 119 127 consumer culture and politics, 124 127, 126f increased polarization of political views, 123 124 and societal change, 118 119 Right-wing populist appeal in Western countries, 200 RWA. See Right-wing authoritarianism (RWA)

S Scientific objectivity, 101 SCT. See Self-categorization theory (SCT) SDGs. See Sustainable development goals (SDGs) SDO scale. See Social dominance orientation scale (SDO scale) Security, 204 205 threat, 198 Segmentation of consumer societies, 59 60 of society, 124 Self-actualization process, 44 45 Self-categorization theory (SCT), 72 75, 79, 84 85, 192 Self-efficacy, 86 87 Self-esteem, 83 Self-growth process, 44 45 Self-interest, 32 Self-investment, 73 Self-objectification, 57 Selfhood conjoined trajectories of culture and, 24 26

275

cross-cultural perspective on selfhood, 21 24 globalizing sociocultural conditions and transformations of, 21 SIMCA. See Social identity model of collective action (SIMCA) SIMPEA. See Social-identity model of proenvironmental action (SIMPEA) SIT. See Social identity theory (SIT) “Slacktivism”, 146 147 SNS. See Social networking services (SNS) Social categories, 72 contextual relevance of, 74 75 membership, 73 74 Social change, 75 80 Social creativity, 77 Social dominance orientation scale (SDO scale), 108 109 and contact with other cultures, 113 116 RWA, 115 116 globalization’s potential impact on levels, 112 113 and RWA in concert, 119 127 SDO-E, 115 and support for globalization, 109 112 Social groups, 10, 74 Social identity approach, 9 12, 71 73, 82, 98, 164 collective emotions, 81 82 dynamics of multiple social identities, 84 85 foundations, 72 73 globalization impact on social identities, 85 86 ingroup requires outgroup, 82 83 mobility, social change and, 75 80 multiple functions of social identification, 83 84 normative basis of group behavior, 80 81 structure and content of social identities, 73 74 Social identity model of collective action (SIMCA), 131 134, 132f SDO-SIMCA model, 141f

276

Index

Social identity theory (SIT), 72 73, 77, 101 102 Social identity/identification, 71, 73, 131 132, 134 flexibility and dynamics of, 167 168 globalization and migration, 184 186 migration, multiculturalism, and security, 204 205 multiculturalism, acculturation, and, 186 196 multiple functions of, 83 84 populism and prejudice, 196 204 processes, 171 172, 176 in transnational negotiations, 176 178 and responses to climate change, 163 178, 184 variables, 172 173 Social managers, 28 29 Social media, 149 Social mobility, 76 Social movements, 142 Social networking services (SNS), 4 6, 124 125 Social norms, 80, 165 166 Social policies, 191, 203 204 Social psychological models, 84 85, 138 139 Social psychology perspective of globalization, 8 14 Social scaffolding, 147 Social self-concept, 73 Social-identity model of proenvironmental action (SIMPEA), 169 173, 171f Socialization processes, 96 Societal change, RWA and, 118 119 Sociocultural globalization, 109 110 consumerist architecture of, 28 Sociocultural process of globalization, 16 18 Solidarity, 142 147 Solidarity-based collective action, 137 140, 138f State-of-the-art algorithms, 124 125 Sustainable development goals (SDGs), 213 218

Symbolic threats, 193 194 “Syrian refugees”, 139 140, 193 194, 203 System boundaries, 220 221 System thinkers, 222 Systems behavior, 220 221 Systems thinking, 4, 219 223 future research questions, 223 224

T Tensions of globalized values, 35 37 Terrorism, 9 10, 110 111, 130 131 Theories of modernization, 24 25 Traditional Kurdish minority, 102 103 Traditionalist conservativism, 108 Transformations of selfhood, 21 Transnational contact, 96 governance, 17 social identity process in transnational negotiations, 176 178 Twitter, 4 5, 179 181, 194 revolution, 146

U Uncertainty, 220 221 UNHCR. See United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Unified Instrumental Model of Group Conflict, 195 196 United Nations meetings on climate change, 176 sustainable development goals, 158 159 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 183 United States (US) anti-Muslim policy, 185 “Black Lives Matter”, 129 Universalistic opposition, 104, 107

V Value contradictions, 36 systems, 26 28

Index

W

X

Western cultural framework, 89 Western societies, 197 198 World Economic Forum (WEF), 5 6, 123 124 World Values Survey, 197 198, 200 201 World wide web and environmental issues, 178 181

Xenophobia, 197 198, 200 201

Z Zionism, 77

277