The Prevent Strategy and Right-wing Extremism: A Case Study of the English Defence League [1 ed.] 1138320676, 9781138320673

Table of contents :
Dedication
Contents
List of illustrations
Preface
Introduction
1 The right response?
2 Putting the Prevent in preventing right-wingextremism
3 Luton: “where it all began”
4 Newcastle: rolling out the welcome mat
5 Waltham Forest: into “the lion’s den”
6 The policy muddle
7 Back to basics
Appendix: methodology
Index

Citation preview

The Prevent Strategy and Right-­wing Extremism

In 2011 the U.K. Government reviewed its counter terrorism Prevent Strategy to include “all forms of extremism” with an emphasis on right-­wing extremism. This book – written by the former Head of Strategy and Policy at the Office of the National Coordinator for Prevent – provides the most detailed assessment yet of this shift in emphasis. It explores how the inclusion of right-­wing extremism within the counter ­terrorism Prevent Strategy impacted local responses to the English Defence League. This is explored through numerous interviews and several case studies which were carried out by the author while he was serving as a senior police officer within the Counter Terrorism Command of the Metropolitan Police Service. The book balances empirical research with practical recommendations for policymakers and practitioners from a unique “insider” perspective. This book will be of appeal to an array of audiences including scholars and students of Terrorism Studies, professionals working in the areas of counter terrorism, public order policing and the promotion of community cohesion, and to those who have an interest in wider non-­political responses to right-­wing extremism. Dr Craig J.J. McCann is an independent counter terrorism consultant and researcher. He was previously Head of Strategy and Policy at the Office of the National Coordinator for Prevent.

Routledge Studies in Extremism and Democracy Series Editors: Roger Eatwell University of Bath

and Matthew Goodwin University of Kent

Founding Series Editors: Roger Eatwell University of Bath

and Cas Mudde

University of Antwerp-­UFSIA This new series encompasses academic studies within the broad fields of ‘extremism’ and ‘democracy’. These topics have traditionally been considered largely in isolation by academics. A key focus of the series, therefore, is the (inter-)relation between extremism and democracy. Works will seek to answer questions such as to what extent ‘extremist’ groups pose a major threat to democratic parties, or how democracy can respond to extremism without undermining its own democratic credentials. Routledge Studies in Extremism and Democracy includes books with an introductory and broad focus which are aimed at students and teachers. These books will be available in hardback and paperback. 40 Anti-­Islamic Protest in the UK Policy Responses to the Far Right William Allchorn 41 Anti-­System Parties From Parliamentary Breakthrough to Government Mattia Zulianello 42 Extremism, Free Speech and Counter Terrorism Law and Policy Edited by Ian Cram 43 The Prevent Strategy and Right-­wing Extremism A Case Study of the English Defence League Craig J.J. McCann For more information about this series, please visit: www.routledge.com/politics/ series/ED

The Prevent Strategy and Right-­wing Extremism A Case Study of the English Defence League Craig J.J. McCann

First published 2019 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2019 Craig J.J. McCann The right of Craig J.J. McCann to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-­in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-­in-Publication Data A catalog record has been requested for this book ISBN: 978-1-138-32067-3 (hbk) ISBN: 978-0-429-42465-6 (ebk) Typeset in Times New Roman By Wearset Ltd, Boldon, Tyne and Wear

Dedicated to Hannah, Robyn, Georgina & Hugo. For being My World.

Contents



List of illustrations Preface



Introduction

viii ix 1

1 The right response?

13

2 Putting the Prevent in preventing right-­wing extremism

33

3 Luton: “where it all began”

63

4 Newcastle: rolling out the welcome mat

88

5 Waltham Forest: into “the lion’s den”

110

6 The policy muddle

132

7 Back to basics

151



174 185

Appendix: methodology Index

Illustrations

Figure 7.1 Demonstrating the policy escalation process

159

Table I.1

Table depicting site selection criteria

7

Preface

Since the U.K. Government reviewed its counter terrorism Prevent Strategy in 2011 to encompass “all forms of extremism” with an emphasis on the right-­wing variant, there has been no empirical research undertaken to explore the impact of this decision on local responses to the phenomenon. In the absence of relevant, objective and timely research, we have been left with a plethora of unresolved definitional issues, muddled policy responses, political posturing, and the continued fuelling of inter-­community tensions. Frontline practitioners from a range of statutory and non-­statutory services have been left to navigate this interminable white noise against a backdrop of working within the most contentious area of the U.K.’s counter terrorism strategy. The international literature on responses to right-­wing extremism has thus far focussed on its various political manifestations, particularly in relation to both extreme right-­wing and populist political parties and the ideology that underpins them. From a U.K. perspective, the emphasis over the last 30 years has been very much on attempting to understand the causal factors underpinning the extreme right-­wing, the composition of these groups and how they compare with similar groups throughout Europe. It is striking that there is very little material available which provides a platform for debate as to how the state should actually respond to movements such as the English Defence League (EDL) who do not seek legitimacy through the ballot box. As a movement at the zenith of its power and influence in 2011 the EDL mobilised thousands of people through its street protests, and although its ability to galvanise large numbers of people to turn out to protest has waned since 2013, the sentiment from which it gained its legitimacy and drew its strength has not, as evidenced by the 15,000 strong “Free Tommy Robinson” movement that protested on the 9 June 2018, highlighting how this constituency of protestors is still very much alive.1 This is the first book exploring how the U.K.’s counter terrorism Prevent Strategy has been used to respond to right-­wing extremism and shines a light on hitherto unexplored accounts utilising data yielded through more than 80 interviews with frontline practitioners spanning the police service, local authorities and third sector partners in the three case study areas of Luton, Newcastle and Waltham Forest. The book’s origins lay in doctoral and postdoctoral research

x   Preface started at the University of Nottingham (2013–2015) and completed at the University of Kent at Canterbury (2015–2017).2 I conducted this research on a part-­time basis while serving as a senior police officer within the Metropolitan Police Service’s Counter Terrorism Command. I had joined the Metropolitan Police Service in 2002 and served in a range of policing disciplines including the criminal investigations department and neighbourhood policing, before moving into counter terrorism policing in 2010. I then worked across various portfolios delivering the Prevent Strategy; as a Channel Coordinator for East London, the Head of the Muslim Contact Unit, and as Head of the Extremism Disruptions Team. In 2013 I was seconded to the National Counter Terrorism Policing Headquarters as the Deputy to the National Strategic Lead for Channel, which led to me taking on the role of Head of Strategy & Policy for the national Prevent Policing portfolio where I led on setting the strategy for Prevent Case Management across England and Wales. I then took the difficult decision to retire from the police service in 2016 having reached the rank of Detective Chief Inspector. References to the academic literature have been mostly consigned to endnotes and a description of the methodology, including my considerations as an insider researcher can be found in the Appendix. Based upon four years of fieldwork the major conclusions presented in this book are that; (1) the impact of the decision to explicitly include right-­wing extremism within the Prevent Strategy has been minimal. With the exception of the Channel intervention programme, there are for instance no specific counter narratives that have been created as a response to the expansion of the policy to include “all forms of extremism”. Instead, this has led to a generalised approach to countering extremism without a clear understanding of right-­ wing extremism as a distinct phenomenon, separate and non-­contingent upon Islamist extremism; (2) the EDL is understood by local actors as a threat to the public order and community cohesion, but not as a terrorism threat. Notwithstanding this position, the case studies highlight the continued role of counter terrorism Prevent officers in the pre, during and post phases of EDL attendance in maintaining community cohesion and providing reassurance with reference in particular to Muslim communities; and (3) right-­wing extremism is poorly understood and articulated at a national policy level. There is a lack of synergy on this issue between the integration, cohesion, hate crime, the Prevent Strategy and Counter Extremism policy areas, the interpretation of which at a local level has led to inter-­agency tensions that have been further negatively impacted by Government imposed austerity measures on public sector resourcing since 2010. Studying for a PhD part-­time and writing this book have been a challenge not only for me, but for my family and friends, none of whom signed up for this. I will be forever profoundly grateful to my long-­suffering (her words) wife, Hannah, for her unending patience, encouragement and belief in me during the dark days, and for keeping my feet on the ground when I needed it. I’d like to express my thanks to our beloved children; Robyn, Georgina and Hugo, for making me smile and reminding me of what is important. Words cannot express

Preface   xi how grateful I am to my parents, my brother and sister for the start they gave me in life. I am where I am today in large part because of you all. I would like to thank my academic supervisors both from where I started this PhD at the University of Nottingham, and latterly, the University of Kent at Canterbury, namely Dr Philip Cowley of the University of Nottingham and Dr Laura Sudulich of the University of Kent. I would like to express my special appreciation and thanks to Professor Matthew Goodwin for his direction and encouragement throughout my work. I am also grateful to the three anonymous reviewers who provided valuable suggestions for improving the manuscript. Finally, I have to thank all those front-­line practitioners who allowed me to interview them and for trusting me with their accounts. The responsibility I have had to accurately depict their experiences and observations and critically analyse them within the parameters of my research has weighed heavily on me. I hope I have done them justice. I have found police officers, safeguarding practitioners, members of local authorities, politicians and local activists to be incredibly open about these issues and extremely passionate in their desire for their voices to be heard by those authoring policies governing their operational roles. In keeping with promises made during my fieldwork, their names have been kept anonymous. Craig J.J. McCann October 2018

Notes 1 BBC News (09/06/2018) “Police Officers hurt at ‘Free Tommy Robinson’ protest”. 2 C.J.J. McCann (2017) How did the U.K. Government’s decision to include right wing extremism within its counter terrorism “Prevent” Strategy in 2011 impact on local responses to the English Defence League?

Introduction

This book analyses how the U.K. Government’s decision to explicitly add right-­ wing extremism (RWE) within its counter terrorism “Prevent Strategy” impacted on local responses to the English Defence League (EDL). As the first research into this subject matter, through data yielded from more than 80 qualitative interviews with frontline practitioners across three case study areas conducted by a serving counter terrorism police officer specialising in the Prevent Strategy, it will explore the ways in which this shift in the strategy played out at a local level among statutory actors interpreting and implementing it in their operational roles against the backdrop of central government imposed austerity measures since 2010. While I will briefly address the political responses of mainstream political parties to RWE manifested by populist groups across Europe who seek legitimacy at the ballot box this book will focus on the non-­political means of responding to RWE in the U.K. as set within the wider political context including engagement, prevention, and enforcement when identifying and managing individuals and groups carrying out activities in furtherance of their extreme right-­wing world view. While the discourse regarding the threat posed by RWE has steadily gained prominence in the U.K., the focus has thus far been on the British National Party (BNP)1 and latterly the radical right populism of the U.K Independence Party,2 and has followed the same narrow focus on how to respond to party-­political manifestations of right-­wing extremism as is the case for similar parties across Europe such as the Front National in France,3 Jobbik in Hungary,4 Vlaams Blok in Belgium,5 the Danish People’s Party in Denmark,6 and the Swedish Democrats.7 This book however, focuses on the non-­political state responses to the EDL, a movement forged in 2009 from the response of local Luton residents to Islamist extremist marches and demonstrations in the town. There are now several similar groups that have developed as off-­shoots to the EDL or that have been established in parallel and include The Infidels, The Casuals, Britain First and more recently the Football Lads Alliance. These groups, unlike the BNP and UKIP, have no such desire to engage in the political process, but instead articulate their views through a nation-­wide street protest movement that is increasing linked with similarly minded “counter Jihad” groups across Europe and the United

2   Introduction States.8 It is this international dimension to the RWE movement, as well as right­wing motivated incidents such as the 2011 attacks committed by Anders Breivik in Norway, and the campaign of right-­wing motivated terrorism carried out by the National Socialist Underground (NSU) movement in Germany, whose very existence was only identified in late 2011, as well as data from the Global Terrorism Database depicting the true scale of RWE-­related incidents,9 that have challenged the continued dominance of preventative measures against Islamist extremism in the post 9/11 counter extremism landscape.10 The Europol Terrorism Situation and Trend Report for 2018 references the EU Security Commissioner Sir Julian King who in March 2018 highlighted the growing “menace” of RWE and that he was not aware of a single EU Member State that is not affected in some way by the phenomenon.11 Recent EU-­funded research undertaken to explore “lone actor” terrorism found that;  the threat stemming from far-­right lone actor terrorism across Europe is significant … right-­wing lone actors were less likely to have been under active investigation by authorities than religiously inspired individuals. Policymakers and the police must give greater consideration to the threat from far-­right lone actor terrorism, and not underestimate its capacity when compared with Islamist extremism.12 From a U.K. perspective, the recognition that threats of extremism emanate from non-­Islamist forms of extremism has been emphasised by recent extreme right-­wing motivated attacks such as the 2013 murder of Mohammed Saleem, an 82-year-­old British Muslim from Birmingham, killed by Pavlo Lapshyn, an extreme right fanatic who went on to bomb mosques in Walsall, Wolverhampton and Tipton. In January 2015, Zack Davies attempted to murder Dr Sarandev Bhambra in a racially motivated attack in a supermarket in North Wales and was sentenced to life in prison. He had claimed the attack was “revenge for Lee Rigby”, and extreme-­right publications were found at his home.13 In June 2016 Jo Cox, the British Labour Party Member of Parliament for Batley and Spen was murdered by Thomas Mair while she was on her way to meet with her constituents at a routine surgery. Mair was motivated by his belief that Cox was a “collaborator” in the betrayal of white people because of her pro-­European Union stance in the run-­up to the 2016 referendum on the U.K.’s membership of the European Union.14 Amid a wave of Islamist extremist attacks in 2017, on the 19th June Darren Osborne drove a van into pedestrians near Finsbury Park Mosque targeting the group of Muslims as they were leaving Ramadan night prayers, killing Makram Ali and injuring 12 others.15 In late 2016 we also saw the U.K.’s first proscription of a far-­right group, National Action, using counter terrorism legislation.16 Over the last two years there have been a slew of arrests of individuals, including members of the British Army, for offences ranging from membership of the organisation through to planning terror attacks such as a plot to murder Labour MP Rosie Cooper.17 As an indication of the increased threat profile emanating from right-­wing extremism, in February 2018 the U.K.’s

Introduction   3 head of counter terrorism policing, Assistant Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police Service, Sir Mark Rowley, announced that since the Finsbury Park Mosque attack four further terror plots that demonstrated a level of organisation not seen before within the far-­right had been thwarted.18

What is “right-­wing extremism”? Throughout this book, I will use the term “right-­wing extremism” as this is how it is articulated within the Prevent Strategy, although it is not defined within the strategy.19 Definitions of right-­wing extremism are subject to wide variation with some scholars grounding the term within illiberal forms of ultra-­nationalism, which at the most extreme take the form of fascism, neo-­fascism and neo-­ Nazism.20 Others define right-­wing extremism in the modern context more expansively, capturing less extreme but still “far right” groups and political parties who may not necessarily ostensibly reject democracy as they operate within political systems but nonetheless continue to galvanise populist sentiment in relation to key issues associated with “far right” narratives.21 For the purposes of this book, amid the lack of consensus on terminology to be used, I will be using the definition presented by Carter, which consist of two elements: (1) A rejection of the fundamental values, procedures and institutions of the democratic constitutional state, and (2) A rejection of the principle of fundamental human equality.22 It is important to highlight this as a fundamental issue that needs to be addressed in devising an effective response, that is, to clearly define the problem. I have adopted Carter’s definition of right-­wing extremism as in my view it very simply distinguishes the necessary ideological components of the phenomenon without being overly distracted by the wider discourse concerning populist political parties. More expansive definitions risk conflating the rejection of democratic institutions and fundamental human equality as necessary components of right-­wing extremism with wider issues such as immigration, integration and social cohesion, rendering them operationally irrelevant when considering the stark reality facing practitioners. The term “right-­wing extremism” is used as an umbrella concept encompassing a plethora of actors, including legitimate political parties with a “right-­wing” mandate, most notably in relation to immigration and integration policies, those groups who have rejected the ballot box and articulate their views through street protest movements, and those lone actors who perpetrate acts of terrorism acting upon the ideology of the “extreme right-­wing”.23 It is therefore exceptionally difficult to identify a singular policy response which effectively meets the challenges to a liberal democracy as posed by each of these groups in turn.24 It has become increasingly challenging to define the actors within this new extremism “scene”. Due to the proliferation of different ideologies, movements and leaders that are available through the internet, we now live in an age of Supermarket Extremism, with individuals shopping around the marketplace of ideas for narratives that conform and/or build upon their pre-­existing world view, selecting content for instance from the AfD in Germany, the alt-­right in the U.S. and

4   Introduction Britain First in the U.K., re-­interpreting it and making it their own. There is as yet very little understanding as to how inter-­connected organisations and individuals are within the extreme right-­wing milieu that now extends internationally, not just operationally but significantly from an ideological perspective. Mudde describes the “terminological chaos” evident in academic literature in this area, whereby numerous definitions of the target group are used interchangeably, creating an ambiguous platform on which to develop further thinking.25 In exploring how we define “far right” parties as opposed to “anti-­immigration” parties, this argument is endorsed by Spanje who emphasises that “such conceptual problems create methodological difficulties, for example, they are conducive to the violation of the assumption of unit homogeneity, which is a key assumption for drawing valid causal inferences”.26 Jamin explored the concepts of “populism” and “the extreme right” and highlighted the difficulties caused by how these concepts are used just as much to pass judgement on a reality as to describe it.27 The truth of it is that nowadays, it’s very difficult to talk about subjects like uncontrolled immigration or child sexual exploitation without being dragged into and unwittingly contributing to the very polarisation of debate we are seeking to avoid, which is only further aggravated by the identity politics driven value judgements we find chipping away at the centre ground. In a world in which we have shifted from fact-­ based to emotion-­based discourse, we’re all extremists. Why the EDL? At an organisational or movement level, the EDL does not subscribe to RWE ideology or fulfil the criteria as set out in Carter’s definition discussed earlier.28 The EDL website contains their mission statement, setting out its role in “protecting and promoting human rights”,29 framing the EDL as a “human rights organisation”.30 The movement distances itself from the label of “the far right”, stating; “The EDL are, in fact, one of the best safeguards this country could have against the rise of the far right”.31 Adrian Tudway, the former National Coordinator for Domestic Extremism was quoted as saying;  In terms of the position with EDL, the original stance stands, they are not extreme right wing as a group, indeed if you look at their published material on their web-­site, they are actively moving away from the right and violence with their mission statement etc.32 That is not to say that the movement has not attracted individuals who do adhere to this ideology, indeed its leader, Tommy Robinson (real name Stephen Yaxley-Lennon), left the movement in 2013 citing his concerns that it was being infiltrated by the far-­right.33 However, there was evidence that for many frontline practitioners, in the absence of experiencing smaller, less visible RWE groups such as National Action and The Aryan Strikeforce, the EDL is the only manifestation of the extreme right-­wing that they would be likely to recount. Treadwell describes the EDL as being synonymous with the “face of the far right”34

Introduction   5 since 2009. During my preliminary research it became clear just how true this was. Frontline practitioners had very little experience of responding to extreme right-­wing groups, organisations, movements other than the EDL and subsequently the movement had become a shorthand for referencing the practitioner experience of the “extreme right-­wing in the U.K”. The definition of the EDL matters because it determines not only the policy response but also provides direction for state actors who are responsible for implementing this policy within their operational context. We can see how the definitional difficulties surrounding the movement presented themselves even within the public consultation which fed into the Prevent Review in 2011. Of note, in reference to the EDL; “some respondents viewed this threat as distinct from terrorism, but others saw no barrier to dealing with counter-­terrorism and the EDL under the same Prevent Strategy”.35 It is significant that the EDL was presented as the only example of the “right-­wing extremism” that should be included within the updated strategy. Subsequent commentary including statements from senior politicians, academics and commentators has referenced the EDL as “extreme right-­wing” and an example of “the new far right”36 in the U.K. It is significant that in a speech entitled “The new far right” in 2013, the then Security Minister, James Brokenshire MP, depicted “the far right” only by way of reference to the EDL,37 a group who fit within the category of an organisation who have rejected political legitimacy through the ballot box and utilise street-­based protest as a means of articulating their mandate. However, later in the same speech he went on to state that the EDL would not be subject to the Prevent Strategy but to work led on by the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG). And herein lays the contradiction. If the EDL are referred to as “extreme right-­wing” and/or the “far-­right” and yet the movement does not fall within the “right-­wing extremism” to which the Prevent Strategy now refers, then what are the implications for state actors interpreting this highly contentious policy area for their local communities? How representative the EDL are of RWE more broadly and the implications of devising policy responses that cater for this one manifestation of RWE will be explored further in this book. Given the problematic identification of the EDL within the RWE categorisation and the perceived normalisation or “mainstreaming” of the narratives that underpin its support,38 going forward it will be vitally important for policy makers and practitioners to demonstrate a comprehension of the strata within “the extreme right-­wing” scene when developing effective response tactics. It is within this context that I have used the movement as the entry point to explore how the Prevent Strategy has been utilised to respond to this form of extremism. This book explores practitioner experiences of the EDL as the movement most likely to have precipitated local response strategies, and to have been conceptualised as a RWE group for the purposes of the revised Prevent Strategy, through which an analysis to assess the impact of the Prevent Review is possible. Although many believe the English Defence League to be a spent force, there has never been a definitive end to the movement, brought about either by social

6   Introduction change or policy innovation. The broad constituency of people who turned out for EDL events has not simply disappeared, and we are reminded of this during flashpoints such as the protests of June 2018 in support of its former leader, Tommy Robinson. In framing the responses to the EDL solely through the prism of reactive public order policing the movement will continue to limp on in one guise or another, awaiting a perceived social injustice or the anointing of a charismatic and influential leader in the mould of Tommy Robinson to once again galvanise social grievances and expose the absence of strategic thinking at both the central and local government levels in ensuring white working class communities are not left behind by social change. Site selection This book makes use of case studies to explore the experiences and perceptions of frontline practitioners regarding how they have responded to the Government’s decision to explicitly include RWE within its counter terrorism Prevent Strategy in 2011. It is the very nature of the central “how” that makes this methodology so appropriate within the context of the research question. A case study is an empirical enquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-­world context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context may not be clearly defined.39 This book explores the impact of this policy direction within the context of governmental Prevent Strategy prioritisation in relation to local resource allocation to realise the aims of the Prevent Strategy, namely to challenge RWE ideology, to support vulnerable individuals and to work with key sectors and institutions. This is only possible through the exploration of the real-­world accounts of those frontline practitioners who are charged with the management of risk, threat and vulnerability for their communities. A case study allows investigators to focus on a “case” and retain a holistic and real-­world perspective, such as in studying individual life cycles, small group behaviour, organisational and managerial processes, neighbourhood change, school performance, international relations, and the maturation of industries.40 In identifying the three sites which are central to this book I used two variables to triangulate those local authorities which most aptly demonstrate the operational environment which possesses the following characteristics; 1) Those local authorities which are afforded Prevent prioritisation, “Prevent Priority Areas”. 2) Those local authorities with significant experience of responding to the EDL. The research underpinning this book does not seek to attain findings which are generalisable to the larger population. The very fact it is focussed on the two variables discussed instead marks the case study areas as “crucial” or “extreme” cases,41 thereby telling us something of a phenomenon from where it is most

Introduction   7 Table I.1  Table depicting site selection criteria

Prevent Priority Area Non-Prevent Priority Area

Significant experience of responding to the EDL

Lack of significant experience of responding to the EDL

Site 1 Site 2

Site 3 X

likely to occur.42 If we were to consider the external validity of the research supporting this book, i.e. to what populations, settings and variables can this effect be generalised, it is clear that it is of most relevance in those locations where the variables converge.43 I have not included a fourth case study area to explore a non-­Prevent Priority Area without significant experience of responding to the EDL as in my view a negative case would not contribute to the thinking on statutory service response strategies. Prevent prioritisation was set out in the 2011 Prevent Strategy with reference to the additional funding (in addition to ring-­fenced staff ), which would be made available with which to deliver specific project work;  Funding will be made available by the Home Office to the 25 priority areas for project work on a grant basis and for activities which address specific local risks and are designed to establish specific Prevent benefits. OSCT will have oversight of funding for projects and will work with local authorities to agree associated evaluation and monitoring procedures.44 In identifying those local authorities with significant experience of responding to the EDL, I have used data depicting the number of EDL demonstrations over the period of June 2011 to June 2015 with the expectation that those areas which have accommodated the most EDL demonstrations, both in terms of frequency and numbers attending, would have developed appropriate response strategies. My rationale for selecting this time span is that the Prevent Strategy review was published in June 2011. The review for the first time explicitly set out that the Prevent Strategy was applicable to “all forms of extremism”45 and drew out its utility in responding to RWE. As this book is intended to explore the impact of this shift in policy, its date of being published is a sensible starting point. That is not to say that the applicability of the Prevent Strategy to RWE pre-­2011 will not be explored, as it will be vitally important to understand how service delivery changed if at all as a result of the review, and so participants were also asked about their responses to RWE pre-­2011 to provide this context. The end date was selected as the Prevent Strategy statutory duty was enshrined into law as of June 2015 by virtue of the Counter Terrorism & Security Act 2015. The impact of this statutory duty is that all local authorities now have a legal obligation to “have due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism”.46 While the “Prevent Priority Area” system of prioritisation is still in

8   Introduction place (and the sites remain under review by the Office for Security and Counter Terrorism (OSCT) within the Home Office), the scope of this duty extends to all non-­priority local authorities who will be held to account on their delivery of the 2011 Prevent Strategy, despite for the most part not receiving any further resources in the form of staff and/or funding. This therefore represents a natural break for the purposes of this book as although there will still be differentiation between priority and non-­priority sites, the level of Prevent Strategy related activity conducted in each will likely not be as markedly different given the increased level of government scrutiny on local authorities to deliver Prevent Strategy related outcomes. Structure of this book It is within the context of the definitional issues surrounding the EDL that this book explores how local practitioners interpret the new breadth of focus for the Prevent Strategy, drawing upon unique first-­hand accounts of those mandated to safeguard their communities while managing not only public expectations but also those of local politicians and media when responding to the attendance of the EDL, a movement which acts as a “stressor”47 to even the best community cohesion plans when it comes to town. Chapter 1 sets out the broad context of known responses to right-­wing extremism in Western Europe and the United States, drawing on research into political manifestations of the phenomenon and exploring non-­political responses spanning counter extremism, hate crime and public order approaches. Chapter 2 serves as an introduction to the evolution of the U.K.’s Prevent Strategy with a particular emphasis on its utility in responding to right-­wing extremism, drawing upon the perspectives of policy makers and practitioners. It was necessary to dedicate a chapter of this book to an exploration of the Prevent Strategy in order to provide the reader with an understanding of what has been the most controversial area of U.K. counter terrorism policy since 9/11, and the years of development that culminated in the review published in June 2011. Even though the Prevent Strategy has existed in a number of iterations since 2006, it is still a relatively new area of policy provision. Furthermore, since its expanded mandate to address “all forms of extremism” in 2011, there is very little in the way of empirical research into its applicability to non-­Islamist forms of extremism, which had been the focus thus far. Chapters 3, 4 and 5 focus on the three areas selected as case studies to explore in more depth the impact of the policy shift on frontline practitioners delivering the Prevent Strategy through analysing how they have incorporated RWE into their work streams, how they relate to their work under associated policies in this area, and whether the threat and/or service delivery varies according to location. It is important to note that the organisations mandated to safeguard the public are very much entrenched in far ranging Crime and Reduction Partnerships (CDRPs), often referred to as “Community Safety Partnerships”. Under the Crime and Disorder Act of 1998 these partnerships were placed on a legislative

Introduction   9 footing in recognition of the fact that no one organisation could deal with crime and disorder in isolation. These partnerships increased information sharing and risk management coordination across organisations such as the police service, local authorities, probation services and a range of voluntary services. My research has cut across these collaborative responses and intends to identify how the state responds to the challenges posed by the EDL with an emphasis on the applicability of the Prevent Strategy. It is the essence of these inter-­ organisational responses to this phenomenon that are brought to life in this book through the first-­hand accounts of those charged with managing risk, threat and vulnerability under the auspices of this contentious and high-­profile area of public safety policy provision. Chapter 6 summarises and compares the findings of the case studies and the final chapter offers a set of firm conclusions and associated policy recommendations based upon the rich data gathered and analysed in support of this book which is intended to contribute to the wider debate not only on how we respond to non-­political forms of right-­wing extremism but also on the relationship of the Prevent Strategy with policy areas governing integration, social cohesion and counter extremism in the U.K.

Notes   1 See for example: Copsey, Nigel, Contemporary British Fascism: the British National Party and the Quest for Legitimacy (Palgrave Macmillan, 2004); Goodwin, Matthew J. “The extreme right in Britain: still an ‘ugly duckling’ but for how long?” The Political Quarterly 78.2 (2007): 241–250; Bowyer, Benjamin. “Local context and extreme right support in England: The British National Party in the 2002 and 2003 local elections”. Electoral Studies 27.4 (2008): 611–620; Rhodes, James, “The political breakthrough of the BNP: The case of Burnley [U.K]”. British Politics 4:1 (2009): 22–46; Goodwin, Matthew J. (2010) “Activism in contemporary extreme right parties: the case of the British National Party (BNP)”. Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties 20.1 (2010): 31–54; Copsey, Nigel, “Sustaining a mortal blow? The British National Party and the 2010 general and local elections”. Patterns of Prejudice 46.1 (2012): 16–39; Goodwin, Matthew and Jocelyn Evans. “From Voting to Violence”. Far Right Extremism in Britain (2012); Cutts, David, Robert Ford and Matthew J. Goodwin, “Anti-­immigrant, politically disaffected or still racist after all? Examining the attitudinal drivers of extreme right support in Britain in the 2009 European elections”. European Journal of Political Research 50.3 (2011): 418–440.   2 See for example: Goodwin, Matthew and Robert Ford “Why UKIP and the radical right matter for progressives” (Policy Network 2014); Goodwin, Matthew and Robert Ford, Revolt on the Right – Explaining Support for the Radical Right in Britain (Routledge 2014).   3 Mayer, Nonna, “From Jean-­Marie to Marine Le Pen: Electoral change on the far right”. Parliamentary Affairs 66.1 (2013): 160–178.   4 Kovács, András. “The post-­communist extreme right: The Jobbik party in Hungary” In Right-­Wing Populism in Europe: Politics and Discourse. (Bloomsbury Publishing 2013): 223–234.   5 Coffé, Hilde, Bruno Heyndels, and Jan Vermeir, “Fertile grounds for extreme right-­ wing parties: Explaining the Vlaams Blok’s electoral success”. Electoral Studies 26.1 (2007): 142–155.   6 Pedersen, Karina, “Driving a Populist Party: The Danish People’s Party”. Institut for Statskundskab, Københavns Universitet, 2006.

10   Introduction   7 Mulinari, Diana, and Anders Neergaard, “We are Sweden Democrats because we care for others: Exploring racisms in the Swedish extreme right”. European Journal of Women’s Studies 21.1 (2014): 43–56; Aylott, Nicholas. “The Party System”. The Oxford Handbook of Swedish Politics (Oxford University Press, 2015): 152.   8 See Goodwin, Matthew J., David Cutts, and Laurence Janta-­Lipinski, “Economic losers, protestors, Islamophobes or xenophobes? Predicting public support for a counter-­Jihad movement”. Political Studies 64.1 (2016): 4–26.    9 START – National Consortium for the study of terrorism and responses to terrorism website. www.start.umd.edu/. 10 See Kundnani, Arun (2012) “Blind Spot? Security narratives and far-­right violence in Europe” – International Centre for Counter-­Terrorism (ICCT), The Hague, ICCT Research Paper, June 2012; Lambert, Robert, and Jonathan Githens-­Mazer (2010) “Islamophobia and anti-­Muslim Hate Crime: U.K Case Studies 2010 – An introduction to a ten-­year Europe-­wide research project”. European Muslim Research Centre and University of Exeter. 11 The Europol Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2018, p. 51. 12 Smith, Melanie, Sabine Barton, and Jonathan Birdwell (2016) “Countering Lone-­ Actor Terrorism Series” No. 7 Lone-­Actor Terrorism Policy Paper 3: Motivations, Political Engagement and Online Activity, p. 1. 13 Counter Extremism Strategy (Cmnd. 9148, p. 10). 14 Telegraph Online (17/06/2016) “It’s time to call the killing of Jo Cox what it is: ‘An act of far-­right terrorism’ ”. 15 The Guardian (02/02/2018) “Darren Osborne jailed for life for Finsbury Park terrorist attack”. 16 “National Action becomes first extreme right-­wing group to be banned in UK” (16/12/2016) www.gov.uk/government/news/national-­action-becomes-­first-extreme-­ right-wing-­group-to-­be-banned-­in-uk. In September 2017 the Government proscribed Scottish Dawn and NS131 (National Socialist Anti-­Capitalist Action) as aliases of National Action – see www.gov.uk/government/news/further-­extreme-right-­winggroups-­banned-in-­the-uk. 17 The Independent (23/02/2018) “National Action: Suspected neo-­Nazi arrested in terror raid amid crackdown on extremist group”. 18 The Independent (26/02/2018) “Four far-­right UK terrorist plots foiled since Westminster attack, police reveal”. 19 “Extremism” is defined as vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs. We also include in our definition of extremism calls for the death of members of our armed forces, whether in this country or overseas. Prevent Strategy Review (Cmnd. 8092, June 2011) p. 107, Appendix A: Glossary of Terms 20 See Griffin, Roger, (ed.) Fascism, Totalitarianism and Political Religion. (Routledge 2013); Roberts, David, Fascist Interactions: Proposals for a New Approach to Fascism and Its Era (Berghahn Books, 2017): 379–381. 21 Mudde, Cas, and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser. Populism: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford University Press 2017). 22 Carter, Elisabeth. “The Extreme Right in Western Europe – Success or Failure?” (Manchester University Press 2004): 17. 23 See Chermak, Steven M., Joshua D. Freilich, and Zachary Shemtob “Law Enforcement Training and the Domestic Far Right” Criminal Justice and Behaviour V36.12 (December 2009) 1305–1322; Bowen, John. “Commentary on Bunzl”. Amer­ican Ethnologist 32.4 (2005): 524–525; Mouffe, Chantal; “The ‘End of Politics’ and the Challenge of Right-­Wing Populism”, in F. Panizza (ed.), Populism and the Mirror of

Introduction   11 Democracy (Verso 2005); Maussen, Marcel, “Anti-­Muslim sentiments and mobilization in the Netherlands: Discourse, policies and violence”. In Cesari, Jocelyne, “Securitization and Religious Divides in Europe: Muslims in Western Europe after 9/11: Why the Term Islamophobia is More a Predicament than an Explanation”. Report Submitted to the Changing Landscape of Citizenship and Security 6th PCRD of European Commission, Paris (2006). 24 See also Goodwin, Matthew, Vidhya Ramalingam and Rachel Briggs (2012) “The New Radical Right: Violent and Non-­violent Movements in Europe”. Institute for Strategic Dialogue. 25 Mudde, Cas. Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe (Cambridge University Press, 2007): 12. 26 Spanje, Joost Van “The wrong and the Right: A comparative Analysis of ‘Anti-­ Immigration’ and ‘Far Right’ Parties”. Government and Opposition, Vol. 46, No. 3 (2011): 296. 27 Jamin, Jérôme. ‘Two different realities’ in Mammone, Andrea, Emmanuel Godkin, and Brian Jenkins. .“Varieties of Right-­Wing Extremism in Europe”(Routledge 2013): p. 39. 28 Lord Macdonald’s review counselled against expanding the scope of proscription legislation in order to capture movements such as the EDL (and Hizb ut-­Tahrir) as “labelling their activities as ‘terrorism’ risks the negation of society’s values for the sake of remote threats which are better dealt with by other means” – see Home Affairs Committee – Nineteenth Report: “Roots of violent radicalisation” (HC 1446, 2012) p. 19. 29 Mission Statement on the EDL website www.englishdefenceleague.org.uk/. 30 Note 29, Introduction, supra. 31 Response to James Brokenshire speech on the English Defence League website, Note 29, Introduction, supra. 32 The Guardian (02/09/2011) “Muslims criticise Scotland Yard for telling them to engage with the EDL”. 33 BBC News (08/10/2013) “EDL leader Tommy Robinson quits group”. 34 Treadwell, James. “Controlling the new far right on the streets: policing the English Defence League in policy and praxis”. In Chakraborti, Neil and Jon Garland, Responding to Hate Crime: The Case for Connecting Policy and Research (Policy Press 2014): 127. 35 “Prevent Review: Summary of Responses to the Consultation” p.  9 – https://assets. publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/ 97978/prevent-­summary-consultation.pdf. 36 See Jackson, Paul and Feldman, Matthew, 2011. “The EDL: Britain’s ‘New Far Right’ social movement”. http://nectar.northampton.ac.uk/6015/ 37 Brokenshire, James MP – Security Minister, speech for ICSR on 13 March 2013 – “What is the new Far Right?”. 38 See Kassimeris, George and Leonie Jackson. “The ideology and discourse of the English Defence League: ‘Not racist, not violent, just no longer silent’ ”. The British Journal of Politics & International Relations 17.1 (2015): 171–188; Kassimeris, George and Leonie Jackson. “The English Defence League’s ‘rational Islamophobia’ is a racist discourse, but it is not confined to the EDL”. Democratic Audit Blog (2014). http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/57545/ 39 Yin, Robert K., Case Study Research: Design and Methods (Sage Publications, 2014): 16. 40 Yin, Robert K., Note 39, Introduction, supra, p. 4. 41 See Gerring, John (2007) “Is there a (viable) crucial-­case method?” – Comparative Political Studies 40 (2007): 231; Yin, Robert K., Note 39, Introduction, supra, p.52. 42 Flyvbjerg, Bent. “Five misunderstandings about case-­study research”. Qualitative Inquiry 12.2 (2006): 229.

12   Introduction 43 Campbell, Donald Thomas, Julian C. Stanley, and Nathaniel Lees Gage, Experimental and Quasi-­Experimental Designs for Research (Houghton Mifflin, 1963): 5. 44 See Section 11.17, p.  98. The list of Prevent Priority Areas was listed as follows: (Prevent Strategy, Cmnd. 8092 p. 97). •  Barking and Dagenham •  Birmingham •  Blackburn with Darwen •  Bradford •  Brent •  Camden •  Derby •  Ealing •  Hackney •  Hammersmith and Fulham •  Haringey •  Kensington and Chelsea •  Lambeth •  Leeds •  Leicester •  Lewisham •  Luton •  Manchester •  Newham •  Redbridge •  Stoke-­on-Trent •  Tower Hamlets •  Waltham Forest •  Wandsworth •  Westminster 45 The Prevent Strategy, Note 19, Introduction, p. 60, para. 9.30. 46 Prevent Statutory Duty Guidance 2015 p. 2. 47 Interview 61 – Walthamstow MP, May 2014.

1 The right response?

When we consider the international research, it is evident that the emphasis for the last 30 years has been on better understanding and responding to right-­wing extremism through its various political manifestations, particularly in relation to political parties and the ideology that underpins them.1 There is comparatively very little material in relation to movements such as the EDL, who do not seek legitimacy through the ballot box. Latterly there has been a growing body of research into PEGIDA (“Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes” (Patriotic Europeans against the Islamization of the Occident)), a street-­based movement that was founded in Dresden in 2014 but this has tended to follow the same pattern, with little thinking about how state actors should respond to non-­political manifestations of right-­wing extremism.2 Although political responses are not the subject of this book, it is important to note their significance, especially in relation to issues that have become synonymous with RWE such as immigration and social cohesion when considering how statutory and non-­statutory services respond to this form of extremism, especially as Ford highlights that “the British public is more negative about immigration than that of the other countries surveyed by Transatlantic Trends Immigration”.3 Research by McLaren suggests that “concern about immigration may be having potentially devastating consequences for the British political system as a whole by undermining trust in British politics”.4 Indeed, concerns regarding high levels of uncontrolled immigration were a significant factor in the U.K.’s decision to leave the European Union in 2016.5 It is within this context that we turn now briefly in this chapter to political responses to RWE in addressing the prevailing political discourse on issues such as immigration, integration and social cohesion, and the backdrop against which frontline practitioners implementing responses to RWE are operating. There are numerous studies that explore the ways in which political parties respond to RWE as manifested by groups who seek legitimacy at the ballot box,6 covering an array of methods by which mainstream parties can respond to this perceived threat to the status quo and the strengths and weaknesses of each, ranging from outright exclusionary approaches such as Cordon Sanitaire through to direct engagement with the issues or even adoption of populist standpoints to safeguard votes from non-­mainstream parties. Rydgren explores through case

14   The right response? studies in France and Sweden the impact of “radical right populist parties” on not only mainstream political parties but the wider public, presenting the theory that the very presence of such parties may “lift the latent popular xenophobia to a manifest level”.7 This is an interesting theory, presenting the possibility that the existence of RWE groups within politics do not simply act as a vent for “latent” xenophobia, therefore negating the demand for non-­political bodies, but actually build a critical mass which fuels the creation of groups such as the EDL and PEGIDA. Links between political and non-­political forms of RWE may in fact be more inter-­dependent than has thus far been established.

What has been the focus of research into right-­wing extremism in the U.K. thus far? Even against the backdrop of this being an under-­developed area of study, in reviewing the existing literature in respect of the U.K. response to RWE, it is apparent that the focus has thus far been very much on attempting to understand the causal factors underpinning the extreme right-­wing,8 the composition of extreme right-­wing groups9 and how they compare with similar groups throughout Europe.10 However, it is striking that there is very little material available which provides a platform for debate as to how statutory and non-­statutory services should respond to RWE. We know the players, we know the groups, we know the issues that act as drivers to membership, but what do we do about it? How do those bodies mandated to safeguard the public respond to an issue as nebulous as RWE, which manifests itself in a broad spectrum of ways, ranging from street-­based protest as part of the EDL, to voting for radical right and/or extreme right-­wing parties? It is these very questions that form the conceptual basis for me venturing on this book and which I intend to answer with the assistance of my actor-­orientated research. Specifically, in relation to the EDL the literature has focussed on the drivers to participation and composition of extreme right-­wing groups.11 Building on this work, there are a range of ethnographic studies that have pursued these themes further by directly observing EDL activists conducting street protests.12 Against the backdrop of developing a better understanding of the movement, some studies have gone further still and challenged commonly held stereotypes of the movement.13 There has been much in the way of highlighting the movement’s impact upon Muslim communities,14 and more recently how the EDL may not be a symptom of Islamic extremism, but of the increasingly socially acceptable discourse of “problematic Muslims”.15 There is very limited research on the way in which the EDL has been policed, with the notable exceptions of those that have focussed on its street activism and how the police service has responded using public order tactics.16 However, research on viable response strategies remains critically under-­developed, particularly in relation to the EDL being perceived as an “extremism” issue, requiring a more holistic set of responses than a reactive public order policing strategy would allow. It is within this context that there has yet been no research on the applicability of the Prevent

The right response?   15 Strategy on the EDL since the strategy was broadened in its scope to explicitly include right-­wing extremism in 2011.

What do we know about how the state currently responds to right-­wing extremism? The academic discourse in this area is extremely under-­developed. There is little by way of a body of research into the basis for policies in respect of how they can be used to respond to RWE, which is a rather nebulous and wide-­ranging expression. This is evident in the way in which responses to issues such as racism, hate crime and extremism are articulated in several different policy documents belonging to separate disciplines. It is important to note that state responses are hugely dependent upon local dynamics. As noted by others who have sought to identify, assess and evaluate state responses to RWE, this is an extremely complex undertaking, further compounded by local politics and relevant legal frameworks.17 There are however, broad trends that can be identified from reviewing responses in both Western Europe and the United States that provide a useful framework for exploring U.K. responses to RWE. Prevention These responses comprise measures which seek “to prevent radicalisation and extremism by reducing vulnerability among specific groups and increasing community resilience”.18 In the U.K. context, these “preventative measures” are delivered primarily under the auspices of the Prevent Strategy as part of the overarching counter terrorism strategy, “Contest”. Given that the strategy has only very recently been expanded to explicitly encompass forms of extremism other than Islamist extremism, there is very little research on its applicability and therefore its effectiveness in countering right-­wing narratives that could be considered “extreme”. There was concern about how under-­developed this understanding and therefore response would prove to be.19 Indeed, it was even explicitly acknowledged in the Prevent Review (2011) that “our understanding of how people become involved in extreme right-­wing terrorism is inevitably less developed than it is for terrorism associated with Al Qaida”.20 There is some limited discussion on the use of the Prevent Strategy to counter RWE, most notably Gable and Jackson in their work on “Lone Wolves” point out that;  What is noticeable with the historical development in tandem of Prevent and Connecting Communities policies is a trend towards tackling far-­right threats separately from issues of violent extremism found within Muslim communities. Such an approach can augment the assumption that these are more dissimilar than related phenomena.21 They instead point to “striking structural similarities between the push and pull factors found in Al-­Qaeda inspired and far right violent extremism”.22 Eatwell

16   The right response? and Goodwin also highlight how the public policy response to RWE has been different to that for Islamist extremism due to the different nature of the threat, and that “it has largely been seen in terms of ‘lone wolves’, such as David Copeland”.23 The perceived different nature of the RWE threat is echoed in the Prevent Strategy; extreme right-­wing plots have predominantly been undertaken by people acting on their own or with one or two associates … people involved in extreme right-­wing terrorism have not received the same training, guidance or support as many of those who have engaged with Al Qa’ida or Al Qa’idainfluenced organisations. Nor have they ever aspired or planned to conduct operations on the scale of those planned by their Al Qa’ida counterparts.24  What is clear is that when the government made the decision to expand the mandate of the Prevent Strategy to encompass RWE, it did so on the basis of very little empirical evidence as to what the threat consisted of and indeed how best to respond to it. At a broad societal level, work with the far right, and preventative work with fragile white communities, had been conducted as part of CLG’s25 Connecting Communities programme, which was launched with £12 million funding in October 2009 but later discontinued by the Conservative-­Liberal Democrat coalition government in June 2010.26 The annual review of the policy stated; The absence of clear and active leadership which addresses local grievances can be exploited by those who promote community division, as we have seen in some areas targeted by far-­right extremist groups. The CLG Connecting Communities Programme has increased the resources available to develop community leadership which can tackle difficult issues and increase community awareness of local opportunities including in employment and housing.27 This initiative responded to the threat of RWE by understanding it as a community cohesion issue in the first instance, which could be addressed through open dialogue on community grievances that would otherwise provide sustenance to extremist groups. With regard to statutory services, there have been specific measures adopted such as the development of courses and training for elected officials, police officers, lawyers, prison and probation officers, and for future school teachers.28 Chermak et al. explored law enforcement training in the United States with regard to domestic extremism. They recognised that terrorism-­related training as focussed on the domestic far right remains relatively unexplored despite an appreciation of the nuances of RWE-­based criminality.29 They discovered that the amount and types of crimes committed by far-­right groups vary as much as the groups themselves and that these differences are important because various segments of the movement could represent different types of threats. For

The right response?   17 example, far right lone wolves may commit crimes that are different from those of organised far right groups or far right perpetrators who act with others but are not part of a group.30 Gable and Jackson’s work highlighted U.K.-based training for police officers, specifically in relation to domestic extremism in a training package entitled “Confronting the Enemies of Democracy”,31 which was delivered to Metropolitan Police Officers under the auspices of “Operation Overture”. This training no longer exists but there have been further instances where bespoke training on right wing extremism has been delivered to police services; however, this has not been widespread and has not occurred systematically. For instance, the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG) funded Special Interest Group “Managing Far Right Activity Toolkit” makes reference to the “Increasing Awareness of the Far Right 18–88 Training Package”, which was delivered within Lancashire Constabulary. The package aimed to “increase awareness of front line staff of indicators of extreme right-­ wing ideologies and behaviours to enable them to identify potential offenders and vulnerable individuals”.32 Further, the “Far Right Aware” training course which was developed at the University of Northampton has been delivered to Avon & Somerset Police, among other statutory partners.33 This is listed within the Governments official “Prevent Training Catalogue”34 of March 2016 where it is described as a “bespoke, interactive workshop package, designed to develop awareness of the extreme right wing”. It is designed to augment existing WRAP (“Workshop to Raise Awareness of Prevent”, a Home Office devised training product) training on extremism issues, focussing on how they relate to the extreme right. Public order responses These responses cover existing reactive work undertaken by the police and local authorities in addressing RWE, most notably in relation to the policing of marches.35 In the British context, it is the public order acts that have been of most relevance in discussing initiatives that the state might take or has taken against those active on the extreme right. However, a number of other pieces of legislation include provisions that could be, and sometimes have been, invoked against extreme-­right activists and organisations if there was evidence that they were inclined to illegality or terrorism.36 Given the nature of RWE groups such as the EDL and its description as a “Street Army”,37 the threat has been interpreted as one posed against the public order by way of violent street protests rather than as an extremism and/or terrorism issue. It is within the context of the EDL being problematised as a public order threat that we find examples of police enforcement tactics that have been used as the primary means of responding to the street-­based activities of the movement,38 most notably through the use of public order legislation, namely the Public Order Act 1986, which includes specific offences such as incitement to racial hatred and the prohibition of public processions.39 Furthermore, recent legal measures include the use of Criminal Anti-­Social Behaviour Orders (CRASBOs), which serve as a means of influencing

18   The right response? an individual’s behaviour through proscribing activities such as associating with groups/individuals or entering specified areas.40 Due to instances of perceived inaction on behalf of the state (principally the police service) in maintaining neutrality41 with regard to the content of demonstrations, state actors have to be cognisant of the civil society response to perceptively RWE groups engaging in street-­based demonstration activity. EDL activity has precipitated community responses in the form of sizeable counter EDL demonstrations, notably led in many instances by “Unite against Fascism” (UAF ) and now dwarfs the EDL demonstrations. Hagtvet points out that if anti-­ racist organisations resort to threats and to physical methods to prevent right-­ wing groups from spreading their noxious message, they will not prevent right-­wing violence, but rather provoke it. Thus, racist and anti-­racist groups feed on each other and contribute to a sub-­culture of political violence,42 a reciprocal relationship that has also been described as “Cumulative Extremism”.43 In a debate piece, Renton argued “that in the absence of state intervention to ban EDL events … simple, basic, human solidarity dictates the activists’ response”.44 In reply, Goodwin suggested that a more effective tactic is to take the issue away from anti-­fascists altogether and encourage authorities to explore more seriously the underlying evidence base on what drives anti-­immigrant hostility, anti-­ Muslim sentiment and racial prejudice.45 Treadwell highlights that the practices of policing the EDL cannot easily be separated from broader considerations of perception. In adopting a more managed and conciliatory public order strategy, there is a danger that some sections of the public simply come to see the police as apologists for the EDL, or worse still, as sympathetic to the movements’ cause.46 It is also important to be aware of the wider context of the implications of the HMIC Report “Adapting to Protest”, which reviewed public order policing methodology in the wake of the 2009 G20 Summit, notably the use of containment and the manner in which force was used by police, emphasising the future commitment to better communicate with all parties rather than seeking the prohibition of protest activity.47

Responses to hate crime In the U.K., the policy responses to “extremism” and “hate crime” are articulated as separate entities. Within the policy documents governing the response to hate crime, it is clear that there has been very little thinking about the hate crimes that may be perpetrated by or in the name of RWE groups, which may be evidence of not only a lack of understanding of the extreme right-­wing scene, but a siloed approach to policy creation.48 Definitions of “racism” vary across Europe. Agencies record hate crimes and acts of violence in different ways, making comparative analysis impossible.49 Definitions of hate crime even differ across jurisdictions in the United States.50 Only France, Germany and Sweden collect official criminal justice data on recorded crime with an extremist right-­wing motive.51 The U.K. has a victim-­centred approach to hate crime,52 and largely borne out of recommendations which originated in the Macpherson Inquiry in

The right response?   19 1999, police information on recorded hate crimes is now being centrally collected and is now part of the Crime Survey for England and Wales.53 However, there remains a distinct lack of reliable research on right-­wing extremist violence, non-­electoral groups like the EDL and the drivers of racially and/or religiously motivated crimes more generally. The underlying drivers of these crimes and any possible links to right-­wing extremist groups or ideologies remain seriously under-­researched.54 The authorities have prioritised “victim-­focussed” data capture to determine patterns of repeat offending based on the profiles of victims and yet a suspect-­focus in data collection could provide much needed insights into the relationships between individual and group activities, allowing for a better understanding of the role of RWE groups in contributing to the world view of so called “lone actors”. Proscription These measures include severely restricting the way in which RWE organisations can disseminate their literature and can also consist of banning organisations outright.55 As a limited example of this particular state response in operation within the U.K., the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) issued a ban on BNP membership in 2004 for Police forces as it was held to be in conflict with the force’s duty to promote race equality.56 Due to the focus on RWE as a street-­based phenomenon in the U.K., there has been discussion with regard to banning the activities of RWE groups or even banning the groups themselves using the relevant legislation,57 but nothing that could be considered a thoroughly research-­based study on the benefits or otherwise of banning such groups. Some have argued against banning the group on the basis that allowing them to protest and demonstrate is an important way to ensure the group does not become more extreme.58 In December 2016 the white supremacist National Action group was proscribed using counter terrorism legislation. It is to date the only RWE group to have been banned using this legislation. This group differs from the EDL in that it more than fulfils the RWE definition as set out by Carter, explicitly adhering to a white supremacist ideology and undertaking planning for terror attacks. It is within public order discourse that there is much debate on how many people the EDL is capable of mobilising and how this relates to the varied strata of RWE supporters. This is especially relevant to senior police officers and local authority chief executives in deploying resources in response. Allen refers to a blog on the Casuals United U.K website, which suggested that in addition to the 2,000–3,000 people regularly marching, the EDL has a further 30,000 who actively support the organisation and often act as “armchair warriors” forming more and more blogs, putting together YouTube videos to spread the message. Indicating support for the EDL is therefore not only multilayered but also, in some ways, invisible.59 Hirschi and Widmer point out that physical violence motivated by right-­wing orientations, or the display of right-­wing symbols are among the visible, manifested aspects; right-­wing attitudes or beliefs are by contrast latent.60 The extreme right vote has been described as

20   The right response? “socially unstructured and transient”,61 making repressive models of response extremely difficult to implement and to measure in terms of effectiveness. Intervention This includes “de-­radicalisation programmes” that generally aim to re-­integrate individuals that have become radicalised back into society. There are a range of country-­specific intervention programmes that have been developed to prevent individuals being drawn into terrorism. In Sweden, the “EXIT, Sweden” programme is a “long-­term cognitive treatment, helping individuals to disengage with white supremacist groups and reintegrate into society”.62 This approach focuses on voluntary participation and consists of bespoke interventions that are led by former members of white supremacist groups, although they are complemented by others, including a physician and psychotherapists.63 In Germany, the Violence Prevention Network runs a programme working with individuals in prison who have been convicted of violent crimes linked to the far right and more recently religious extremism, and has been running for over ten years. The Violence Prevention Network is funded by the Federal Agency for Civil Education, which is part of the Federal Ministry of Internal Affairs, but the project is run on an entirely independent basis.64 In Norway, counter extremism efforts are coordinated through the Ministry of Justice & Public Security’s “Action Plan against Radicalisation and Violent Extremism” (2014), which includes reference to “Empowerment Conversations”, conducted by the Norwegian police since 1998 in order to help young people who are starting to become involved in political extremism, anti-­social behaviour, criminality and violence to guide them back towards the mainstream.65 The Netherlands has a high profile with regards to de-­radicalisation efforts despite it not having experienced a terrorist attack on the same scale as other European countries. Under the auspices of its “Polarisation and Radicalisation Action Plan” it has developed the programme entitled “Personal Intervention against Young People in Right-­Wing Extremist Circles” to support those on the fringes of right-­wing extremist groups to exit from these movements.66 The Danes have developed what is often referred to as “the Aarhus Model” after its second largest city and host of its initial pilot. Its objective is to develop tools that can be adapted to the individual needs of young people and provide the long-­term support and advice that is needed in order to break with and stay out of extremist circles.67 In the U.K., the identification of individuals who are vulnerable to extremist narratives, and the management of tailored interventions to meet their needs and disengage them from radicalising influences, is achieved via the Channel programme.68 Channel aims to provide support to individuals at risk of being drawn into violent extremism. It draws on existing collaboration between local authorities, the police, statutory partners (such as the education sector, social services, children’s and youth services and offender management services) and the local community and has three objectives: to identify individuals at risk of being drawn into violent extremism; to assess the nature and extent of that risk; to

The right response?   21 develop the most appropriate support for the individuals concerned.69 In common with the rest of Europe, there is very little available literature on the analysis of de-­radicalisation efforts undertaken in the U.K., let alone those with a particular focus on RWE. Although it is beyond the scope of this book there is still much to understand about how interventions delivered at an individual level are measured, if the thresholds for identification of vulnerability are comparable across different forms of extremism and whether there are methodological lessons that can be learned across interventions into different forms of extremism. Where are the gaps in the literature on the state response to right-­wing extremism? The lack of emphasis on responses to RWE is particularly acute given the wealth of studies into state responses to Islamist extremism, principally through the Prevent Strategy and the impact of these response strategies on Muslim communities.70 This lack of focus on responding to RWE is by no means specific to the U.K., but has been evident throughout Europe and the United States. This has been described as a potential blind spot for both policy makers and practitioners in that while the Jihadist threat is seen as “strategic”, the far right is regarded more as a public order problem, a problem of “lone wolves” or disturbed individuals; and so governments have thus absolved themselves of a broader reflection on the social and political contexts from which far-­right violence draws its sustenance.71 That said, we can see how only over the last seven years, the international perception of the threat posed by RWE has changed. ­Following the attacks committed by Breivik in Norway in 2011 and the discovery of the right-­wing terrorist group, the National Socialist Underground (NSU) in Germany in 2011, as well as the increasing links72 between far-­right groups such as the “European Freedom Initiative”73 and “Stop Islamisation of Europe”, there is an increased impetus to understand and respond to RWE as it increasingly conforms to the perception of an international threat.74 Lambert and Githens-­Mazer observe that; arguments we have heard from politicians and public servants involved in Prevent policy that the threat from violent extremist nationalists in the U.K is local and lesser when compared to the al-­Qaeda threat which is global as it unfolds. In fact, the evidence is already sufficiently clear to conclude that violent extremist nationalists in the U.K take inspiration from propaganda that is every bit as global in nature as that which promotes al-­Qaeda.75 The 2016 Europol EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report highlighted that the migration issues currently gripping the European Union are likely to provide sustenance to the “extreme right-­wing scene” seeking to portray asylum policies in a polarising manner to exploit the debate to suit their own narratives.76 Given that this area of study is still embryonic as compared with that looking at Islamist extremism, there are significant gaps in the current thinking that must be

22   The right response? resolved before effective policies to combat the “threat” from the extreme right-­ wing can be devised. It should be borne in mind that the assessment of counter terrorism strategies generally, which include responses to extremism as a contingent part, are an area in much need of further research77 so perhaps it should not be surprising that the thinking in relation to state responses to RWE is under-­ developed, especially when compared with that for Islamist extremism. Is it appropriate to use the Prevent Strategy as a policy devised to respond to religiously-­motivated extremism for non-­religious forms of extremism? There has been much focus on forms of religiously motivated extremism, namely Islamist extremism given its status as the most prevalent threat to the U.K. and our interests abroad, but against this backdrop there has been little emphasis thus far on solid policy responses to RWE. It could be argued that notwithstanding the threat-­based assessment, the case for developing the state response to extreme right-­wing groups has increased importance given the international emphasis on understanding and countering the threat of RWE. In the 2011 Europol EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report, in the section dedicated to “right wing terrorism” it stated that right-­wing extremist incidents raised public order concerns, but have not in any way endangered the political, constitutional, economic or social structures of any of the member states. They can, however, present considerable challenges to policing and seriously threaten community cohesion.78 However, in the 2013 edition, there is a notable shift in the importance of capturing state activity mounted in response to RWE. Specifically noting the impact of Breivik as an “influential figure”, the report states that in 2012 this led to a greater number of law enforcement measures than in previous years.79 From a U.K. perspective, incidents such as the 2010 conviction of a father and his son for plotting a terrorist attack using ricin to further their neo-­Nazi ideology,80 and the conviction of an extreme right-­wing inspired 19-year old Russian student, Vladimir Aust, after a highly explosive chemical was found in his room on the Newcastle University campus in June 201481 give some indication of the increased sense of threat emanating from this form of extremism. There is a lack of specific research into how individuals are “radicalised” by far-­right narratives, as compared to Islamist extremist narratives.82 In considering these separate forms of extremism I am reminded of Eatwell’s concept of “Cumulative Extremism”, and yet, while there is merit in comparing and contrasting the state responses to RWE and Islamist extremism it is difficult to justify these responses being solely contingent upon the interaction between the two forms of extremism. This is especially the case given the Government’s commitment through the reviewed Prevent Strategy to cater for “all forms of extremism”, with an emphasis on RWE, thereby indicating this form of extremism requires a commensurate response as is the case for Islamist extremism, tailored to fit the specific narratives that find resonance with those vulnerable to RWE. A large gap in the current thinking on how the state responds to RWE is in how the threat is perceived and which policy if any should take primacy. There is very little academic material which explores the inter-­relationship between

The right response?   23 “racism” and “extremism”. In the U.K. there are separate policy responses to these concepts within the “Hate Crime Action Plan”,83 the “Prevent Strategy” and the “Extremism Strategy” with no apparent linkages between them. Research conducted in the U.K. to establish if regional variation in cases of racist violence may be explained by the effect of far-­right strongholds concluded that it is difficult to draw conclusions from the data as the political success of the BNP in areas with high violence could be read as the party choosing to focus on areas where there is already racial tension.84 Some support the argument that all racially motivated violence should be treated as a form of terrorism as in many cases it fits the standard definition of terrorism as violence aimed at instilling fear in a population to advance a political cause.85 For thinking on racism as a form of RWE, we have to look to the United States to find a much more extensive body of research on the relationship between hate crime and RWE.86 Here, the academic literature engages with the issue of “hate group activity”87 as opposed to “hate crimes”. Blazak argues that the two concepts are distinct and is significant to the way in which hate groups develop their recruitment tactics. He identifies “culturally strained youth” in “the middle of cultural change without the tools to navigate it” as being susceptible to recruitment by “hate groups”, identifying parallels to gang recruitment and the tactics used by cults.88 Iganski makes reference to the perceived linkages between “hate crime” and “domestic terrorism” in the United States in his exploration of the justifications for hate crime attracting higher sentences based upon the rationale that they “provoke retaliation and communal tension”. He identifies that hate crimes arguably send out a terroristic message to members of the victim’s group in the immediate neighbourhood and beyond and goes on to highlight that in order to justify the greater punishment of hate crimes as a separate class of crimes, it needs to be demonstrated that the terroristic impact of the hate crime usually goes above and beyond the perceived threat behind the underlying crime without the bias motivation, but concludes that there is very little empirical investigation to determine whether this is so.89 It is worth highlighting here that unlike the U.K, in the United States there has been much literature on the introspection over the justification, impact and effectiveness of using “hate” as an aggravating factor in criminal conduct as balanced against the freedom of speech enshrined in the First Amendment.90 Work has also been undertaken to understand the transition from hate crime offender to membership of “hate organisations” such as the Ku Klux Klan and neo-­Nazi skinhead hate groups.91 In comparison, very little work has been undertaken in the U.K. with respect to our versions of “hate organisations”, i.e. what we would term RWE groups. The hate crime strategy in the U.K. is very much victim-­focussed. However, the Amer­ican studies point to the benefits in identifying trends within suspect profiles, particularly in understanding the group dynamic in the commission of hate crimes. Limited work has been undertaken in the U.K. context by the Tell MAMA organisation to demonstrate links between instances of online hate crime directed at Muslims and the perpetrator’s membership of a RWE group, most notably the EDL. However, it is acknowledged within the data that the finding;

24   The right response? “the far right is more clearly associated with the majority of online cases” of hate crime directed towards Muslims lacks significant empirical evidence.92 Linkages between increased levels of racially motivated hate crime and organised extreme right-­wing groups have been difficult to measure empirically, not least as the concept of membership has not been quantified in a useful way. Research on racial violence carried out by the Institute of Race Relations in 2009 revealed that only 24 of the 660 cases they analysed were recorded as belonging to an extreme far-­right party or of using fascist symbols.93 In considering Home Office records on hate crime, Husbands posits that such crimes are committed by a far wider stratum of the population than those active, or even particularly sympathetic to the extreme right. In analysing the large figures as recorded as hate crimes, he theorises that when one considers how well known it is that such crimes are under-­reported and/or under-­recorded it is self-­evident in the British context that there are just not enough extreme-­right activists to be committing them. Instead, there is a wider penumbra of hate-­crime perpetrators, outside formal mobilisation by the extreme right.94 In order to commit a racially aggravated crime you do not necessarily have to subscribe to all elements of an extreme right-­wing ideology and so, wider research would be required in order to find a way of differentiating between these “one-­off ” hate crimes and those committed by “card-­carrying” members of RWE groups. In the U.K, the policy responses to “hate crime” and “extremism” are articulated as separate entities but there is no rationale for why this should be the case, with very little thinking in terms of the latter existing as a progression of the former. However, what would be the implications of perceiving hate crime offenders as potential “extremists”, given the use of the term “extremist” as a stage in the radicalisation process towards ultimately becoming a “terrorist” in a U.K. context? It is this relationship between these terms as well as how this activity manifests at an individual or group level that challenges the conventional wisdom of framing state responses within separate and distinct policy areas.

Conclusion The research presented in this book is important to both practitioners and the wider literature on the subject as it is the first insight into the applicability of the Prevent Strategy to right-­wing extremism as envisaged by the review of the strategy in 2011. Given that the extension of the remit of the strategy to include “all forms of extremism”95 with an emphasis on RWE was seen as a fundamental shift, since 2011 no research has yet sought to examine its implications. It is also of great importance against the backdrop of wider identity politics within the post-­EU referendum climate in the U.K, which has focussed on reported increases in hate crime and extremism due to the perceived linkages with concerns over immigration which are seen by many as the principal driver to the leave vote.96 Our “victim-­orientated” focus does not preclude targeted efforts towards “hate groups”97 and yet the links between individual offending and those

The right response?   25 offences carried out as a result of wider group activity remain unexplored in a U.K. context. A weakness in the work undertaken thus far is its over-­dependence on top-­level data as produced by the Office of National Statistics, which does not capture the key relationships between individual and group activity. To evaluate the potential linkages between those committing racist crimes, and the ideology acting as a driver to that criminality, this can be better assessed through engaging with the practitioner experience in interpreting the various policies working in this area and translating them for a local context. The research thus far has focussed on the strategic political dimension to right-­ wing extremism without reference to detailed frontline service delivery. My intention for this book is to explore the ways in which the state responds to the activities of the EDL as an entry-­point to the thinking as to how the Prevent Strategy has been applied to RWE. There is been very little research to explore the connections between the policy areas which are applied to this phenomenon so I can think of no better place to start than by examining the responses of those frontline practitioners who must make sense of this fractious policy landscape in order to carry out their roles in managing risk, threat and vulnerability. Given the plethora of ways in which RWE can be interpreted and manifested, engaging in empirical research to inform the way in which the state responds comprehensively and holistically to identify threats is vitally important. The Prevent Strategy which governs the U.K. response to “extremism” now explicitly references RWE and by implication the EDL, but apparently without any research basis for concluding that this strategy is appropriate for any form of extremism other than Islamist extremism, for which it was originally devised. Is a “one-­size-fits-­all” approach to combating extremism appropriate, or indeed effective? As a strategy, Prevent itself is relatively young and its applicability to forms of extremism other than Islamism is of too much importance to continue un-­researched.

Notes   1 See for example: Merkl, Peter H., and Leonard Weinberg, Right-­Wing Extremism in the Twenty-­First Century (Routledge, 2003); Eatwell, Roger, “Ten theories of the extreme right”. In Right-­Wing Extremism in the Twenty-­First Century. (Routledge, 2003): 45–47; Van Donselaar, Jaap, “Patterns of response to the extreme right in Western Europe”. In Right-­Wing Extremism in the Twenty-­First Century. (Routledge 2003): 272–292; Mudde, Cas, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe (Cambridge University Press, 2007); Hainsworth, Paul, The Extreme Right in Western Europe (Routledge, 2008); Mudde, Cas, “Three decades of populist radical right parties in Western Europe: So what?” European Journal of Political Research 52.1 (2013): 1–19.   2 See Malte, Thran, and Lukas Boehnke, “The value-­based Nationalism of Pegida”. Journal for Deradicalization 3 (2015): 178–209; Vorländer, Hans, Maik Herold, and Steven Schäller. “Who’s going to PEGIDA and why”. (2015) An Empirical Study of PEGIDA protesters in Dresden. Writings on constitutional and democratic research. Centre for Constitutional and Democracy Studies, Dresden.   3 Ford, Robert (2012) “Parochial and Cosmopolitan Britain: Examining the Social Divide in Reactions to Immigration” – Transatlantic Trends: Immigration Focus Papers p. 7.

26   The right response?   4 McLaren, Lauren M., “Immigration and Perceptions of the Political System in Britain” – The Political Quarterly, 84.1, (January–March 2013): 90.   5 See for example: Goodwin, Matthew, and Caitlin Milazzo, “Taking back control? Investigating the role of immigration in the 2016 vote for Brexit”. The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 19.3 (2017): 450–464; Clarke, Harold D., Matthew Goodwin,. and Paul Whiteley, “Why Britain voted for Brexit: an individual-­ level analysis of the 2016 referendum vote”. Parliamentary Affairs, 70.3 (2017): 439–464; Eatwell, Roger, and Matthew Goodwin, National Populism: The Revolt Against Liberal Democracy (Pelican Books, 2018).   6 See for example; Bale, Tim, Christoffer Green-­Pederson, Andrea Krouwel, Kurt Richard Luther, and Nick Sitter, “If you can’t beat them, join them? “Explaining social democratic responses to the challenge from the populist radical right in Western Europe” Political Studies 58 (2010): 410–426; Goodwin, Matthew (2011) “Right Response: Understanding and Countering Populist Extremism in Europe” – Chatham House Report; Merkl, Peter H. and Leonard Weinberg, Note 1, Chapter 1, supra.; Art, David. “Reacting to the Radical Right Lessons from Germany and Austria”. Party Politics 13.3 (2007): 331–349; Eatwell, Roger, and Matthew J. Goodwin, The New Extremism in 21st Century Britain (Routledge, 2010); Goodwin, Matthew, and Robert, Ford. Note 2, Introduction, supra; Eatwell, Roger, and Matthew Goodwin, Note 5, Chapter 1, supra.   7 Rydgren, Jens, “Meso-­level reasons for racism and xenophobia: Some converging and diverging effects of radical right populism in France and Sweden”. European Journal of Social Theory 6.45 (2003): 52.   8 See for example: Eatwell, Roger, and Matthew J. Goodwin, Note 5, Chapter 1, supra; Ford, Robert, and Matthew J. Goodwin, (2010) “Angry white men: Individual and contextual predictors of support for the British National Party”, Political Studies 58 (2010): 1–25; Cutts et al., Note 1 supra; Art, David, Inside the Radical Right: The Development of Anti-­Immigrant Parties in Western Europe (Cambridge University Press, 2011).   9 See for example: Treadwell, James, and Jon Garland, “Masculinity, marginalization and violence: A case study of the English Defence League”. British Journal of Criminology 51.4 (2011): 621–634; Goodwin, Matthew J., New British Fascism: Rise of the British National Party (Routledge, 2011). 10 See for example: Mudde, Cas, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe (Cambridge University Press, 2007); Hainsworth, Paul, The Extreme Right in Western Europe (Routledge, 2008). 11 See for example: Copsey, Nigel (2010) ‘The English Defence League: Challenging our country and our values of social inclusion, fairness and equality’ – Report on behalf of Faith Matters; Goodwin, Matthew, Note 6, Chapter 1, supra.; Treadwell, James, and Garland, Jon, “Masculinity, marginalization and violence: A case study of the English Defence League”. British Journal of Criminology 51.4 (2011): 621–634; Goodwin, Matthew (2013) ‘The Roots of Extremism: The English Defence League and the Counter-­Jihad Challenge’ – Chatham House Briefing paper; Goodwin et al., Note 8, Introduction, supra.; Busher, Joel, “Grassroots activism in the English Defence League: Discourse and public (dis)order”. Extreme Right-­Wing Political Violence and Terrorism (2013): 65–84; Busher, Joel, “Anti-­Muslim populism in the U.K: The development of the English Defence League” (2013): 207–226; Copsey, Nigel. “Multiculturalism and the Extreme Right Challenge in Contemporary Britain”. In Multicultural Challenges and Sustainable Democracy in Europe and East Asia (Palgrave Macmillan, 2014): 155–175; Joyce, Peter, “English Defence League” (2014). In Joyce, Peter, and Wain Neil, Palgrave Dictionary of Public Order Policing, Protest and Political Violence (Palgrave Macmillan, 2014). 12 See for example: Garland, Jon, and James Treadwell (2010) “No Surrender to the Taliban! Football Hooliganism, Islamophobia and the Rise of the English Defence League” Papers from the British Criminology Conference 2010. Vol.  10; Garland,

The right response?   27 Jon, and James Treadwell, “The new politics of hate? An assessment of the appeal of the English Defence League amongst disadvantaged white working-­class communities in England”. Journal of Hate Studies 10.1 (2012): 123; Treadwell, James, and Jon Garland, “Masculinity, marginalization and violence: A case study of the English Defence League”. British Journal of Criminology 51.4 (2011): 621–634; Busher, Joel, The Making of Anti-­Muslim Protest: Grassroots Activism in the English Defence League (Routledge, 2015); Pilkington, Hilary, Loud and Proud: Passion and Politics in the English Defence League (Manchester University Press, 2016); Pai, Hsiao-­Hung, Angry White People: Coming Face-­to-Face with the British Far Right (Zed Books, 2016). 13 See for example: John, Peter, and Helen Margetts, “The latent support for the extreme right in British politics”. West European Politics 32.3 (2009): 496–513; Bartlett, Jamie, and Mark Littler, (2011) “DEMOS Report – Inside the EDL: Populist politics in a digital age”. www.demos.co.uk/files/Inside_the_edl_WEB.pdf; Goodwin, Matthew, Note 11, Chapter 1, supra. 14 See Fekete, Liz, “Anti-­Muslim racism and the European security state”. Race & Class 46.1 (2004): 3–29; Allen, Chris, “Fear and loathing: The political discourse in relation to Muslims and Islam in the British contemporary setting”. Politics and Religion 2.4 (2010): 221–236; Allen, Chris, “The Islamophobia industry: How the right manufactures fear of Muslims”. Ethnic and Racial Studies 38.8 (2015): 1423–1425; Jackson, Paul (lead author) (2011) “The EDL: Britain’s ‘New Far Right’ Social Movement” – University of Northampton’s Radicalism and New Media Research Group; Institute of Community Cohesion (iCoCo) “Far Right electoral and other activity: the challenge for Community Cohesion” – March 2011; Husbands, Charles, and Yunis Alam, Social Cohesion and Counter-­Terrorism: A Policy Contradiction? (Policy Press, 2011); Lane, H.S. and reviewed by Feldman, Matthew (2012) “A study of the English Defence League: What draws people of faith to right-­wing organisations and what effects does the EDL have on community cohesion and interfaith relations?” Report on behalf of Faith Matters. 15 See for example: Zúquete, José Pedro, “The European extreme-­right and Islam: New directions?” Journal of Political Ideologies 13.3 (2008): 321–344; Adib-­Moghhaddam, Arshin, “The Arab revolts, Islam and postmodernity”. Middle East Journal of Culture and Communication 5.1 (2012): 15–25; Kundnani, Arun, The Muslims are coming! Islamophobia, Extremism, and the Domestic War on Terror (Verso Books 2014); Hafez, Farid, “Shifting borders: Islamophobia as common ground for building pan-­European right-­wing unity”. Patterns of Prejudice 48.5 (2014): 479–499; Kassimeris, George, and Leonie Jackson, “The Ideology and Discourse of the English Defence League: ‘Not Racist, Not Violent, Just No Longer Silent’ ”. The British Journal of Politics & International Relations 17.1 (2015): 171–188. 16 See for example: Lowles, N, “Policing the EDL”, Searchlight 428 (2011): 6–7; Treadwell, James, “Controlling the new far right on the streets: policing the English Defence League in policy and praxis”. In Responding to Hate Crime: The Case for Connecting Policy and Research (2014): 127; Allchorn, William (2016) “When anti-­ Islamic protest comes to town: Political responses to the English Defence League”. 17 Hirschi, Christian, and Widmer, Thomas (2012) “Approaches and challenges in evaluating measures taken against right-­wing extremism”. Evaluation and Program Planning 35 (2012): 171–179. 18 Ramalingam, Vidhya (2012) “Policy Briefing on Far-­Right Extremism: Trends and Methods for Response and Prevention” – Institute for Strategic Dialogue, p. 11. 19 See for instance; Copsey, N. (2011) “Article for Soundings – Policy matters for Muslims in Britain”. 20 Prevent Strategy Review, Note 19, Introduction, supra, p. 20. 21 Gable, Gerry, and Paul Jackson (2011) “Lone Wolves: Myth or Reality?” – Searchlight. p. 105. www.lonewolfproject.org.uk/

28   The right response? 22 Gable, Gerry, and Jackson, Paul, Note 21, Chapter 1, supra. 23 Eatwell, Roger, and Goodwin, Matthew J., Note 6, Chapter 1, supra, p. 211. 24 The Prevent Strategy Note 19, Introduction, supra, p. 15, para. 5.10–11. 25 Communities and local government. 26 Briggs, Rachel (2010) “Community Engagement for counterterrorism: Lessons from the United Kingdom”. International Affairs 86.4 (2010): 978. 27 Contest: Pursue Prevent Protect Prepare – The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering International Terrorism Annual Report published March 2010 p. 13. 28 Ramalingam, Vidhya, Note 18, Chapter 1, supra. 29 Chermak et al., Note 23, Introduction, supra, p. 1313. 30 Chermak et al., Note 23, Introduction, supra, p. 1313. 31 Gable, Gerry and Jackson, Paul, Note 21, Chapter 1, supra, p. 10. 32 DCLG funded Special Interest Group “Managing Far Right Toolkit”. 33 See the University of Northampton’s “Research Excellence Framework 2014” impact case study document regarding the “Radicalism and New Media Research Group” – http://impact.ref.ac.uk/casestudies2/refservice.svc/GetCaseStudyPDF/39094. 34 See Prevent Training Catalogue 2016 disseminated via http://educateagainsthate.com/ download/9. 35 See for example: Lowles, N. (2011) “Policing the EDL”. Searchlight 428: 6–7; Treadwell, James, “Controlling the new far right on the streets: policing the English Defence League in policy and praxis”. In Responding to Hate Crime: The Case for Connecting Policy and Research (2014) p. 127. 36 Husbands, Christopher T., Strategies for Combating Right-­Wing Extremism in Europe (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2009): 269. 37 Goodwin, Matthew, Note 11, Chapter 1, supra, p.  3; Garland, Jon, and Treadwell, James (2010) “No Surrender to the Taliban: Football Hooliganism, Islamophobia and the Rise of the English Defence League”, p. 31. 38 See for example Copsey, Nigel, Note 11, Chapter 1, supra. 39 For an example of the use of this legislation to ban an EDL demonstration see; www. gov.uk/government/news/home-­secretary-agrees-­march-ban. 40 For an example of the use of a CRASBO as a response to EDL demonstrations see; “Plaistow EDL demonstrator banned from Islamic venues” (29/02/2012) – www. newhamrecorder.co.uk/news/crime-­court/plaistow-­edl-demonstrator-­banned-from-­ islamic-venues-­1-1223260. 41 See for instance; Merkl, Peter H., and Leonard Weinberg, Note 1, Chapter 1, supra, p. 277. 42 Hagtvet, Bernt, “Focus on: Right-­Wing Extremism in Europe”. Journal of Peace Research 31.3 (1994): 243. 43 Eatwell, Roger, “Community cohesion and cumulative extremism in contemporary Britain”. The Political Quarterly 77.2 (2006): 205; See also Gable, Gerry, and Paul Jackson, Note 21, Chapter 1, supra. 44 Renton, David, and Matthew Goodwin, “How can the rise of the far right in the U.K be halted?” Political Insight 1.3 (2010): 88. 45 Renton, David, and Matthew Goodwin, Note 44, Chapter 1, supra, p. 89. 46 Treadwell, James, “Controlling the new far right on the streets: Policing the English Defence League in policy and praxis”. In Chakraborti, Neil, and Jon Garland (eds.), Responding to Hate Crime: The Case for Connecting policy and Research. (Policy Press, 2015): 137. 47 HMIC Report: “Adapting to Protest” (p.  10) The most relevant recommendations were as follows; 1) In planning future public order operations for protest the police should: Demonstrate explicit consideration of the facilitation of peaceful protest throughout the planning process and the execution of the operation or operations. The right to

The right response?   29 freedom of assembly places obligations on the police. The starting point for the police is the presumption in favour of facilitating peaceful assembly. However, the police may impose lawful restrictions on the exercise of the right provided such restrictions are lawful, have a legitimate aim (such as the interests of public safety or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others) and are necessary and proportionate. 2) In relation to communication with protest groups the police should: Seek to improve dialogue with protest groups in advance where possible, to gain a better understanding of the intent of the protesters and the nature of the protest activity; to agree how best to facilitate the protest and to ensure a proportionate policing response. When protesters are not forthcoming to the police, the police should consider informing and warning the protesters and the public that this may result in some additional disruption, that restrictions may be placed on protesters and that particular tactics may be employed to reduce disruption and the threat of disorder. 48 The only reference within the Hate Crime Strategy was as follows; The Extremism Analysis Unit is carrying out extensive research on a range of areas of extremism, including extreme-­right groups who seek to incite racial and religious hatred. Policymakers will use this research, and commission further work, to build our understanding of the connections between neo-­Nazi and extreme-­right groups across Europe. This will help us to understand how such groups share information and support each other to promote hatred and sow civil disorder. Action against Hate: The UK Government’s Plan for Tackling Hate Crime (June 2016) p. 17, para. 119 49 See for instance; Watts, Meredith W., “Aggressive youth cultures and hate crimes: Skinheads and xenophobic youth in Germany” Amer­ican Behavioral Scientist 45 (2001): 60; Goodey, Joanna, “Racist Crime in the European Union: Historical Legacies, Knowledge Gaps and Policy Development”. Hate Crime 57 (2006): 16–28; Bleich, Erik, “Responding to racist violence in Europe and the United States” Hate Crime 57 (2006): 9–15; Goodwin, Matthew, et al., Note 24, Introduction, supra. 50 Boeckmann, Robert J., and Turpin-­Petrosino, Carolyn, “Understanding the harm of hate crime”, Journal of Social Issues, 58.2 (2002): 207–225. For the U.K. the issue of under-­reporting was highlighted in “Action against Hate: The UK Government’s plan for tackling hate crime” (June 2016) p. 9; According to the independent Crime Survey for England and Wales, there were an estimated 222,000 hate crimes on average each year from 2012/2013 to 2014/2015. This represents a decrease of 56,000 since the previous period covered by the survey. However, despite an increase in the number of hate crimes recorded by the police – from 44,471 in 2013/2014 to 52,528 in 2014/2015 – the difference between police figures and the crime survey show that hate crimes continue to be significantly underreported. 51 Goodey, Joanna, Note 49, Chapter 1, supra, p. 24. 52 See Goodey, Joanna, Note 49, Chapter 1, supra.; Chakraborti, Neil, “Re-­Thinking Hate Crime Fresh Challenges for Policy and Practice”. Journal of Interpersonal Violence 30.10 (2015): 1738–1754. 53 Challenge It, Report It, Stop It: Delivering the Government’s hate crime action plan (2012) p. 11. 54 Goodwin, Matthew et al., Note 24, Introduction, supra, p. 75. 55 See Ramalingam, Note 18, Chapter 1, supra, p. 12 who points out that “this approach has seen varied outcomes across Europe. In Germany, repression has not led to a reduction of far-­right extremism”.

30   The right response? 56 See for example; Husbands, Christopher T., Note 36, Chapter 1, supra.; Eatwell, Roger, and Goodwin, Matthew J., Note 6, Chapter 1, supra, p. 214. 57 Merkl, Peter H., Weinberg, Leonard, Note 1, Chapter 1, supra.; Eatwell, Roger and Goodwin, Matthew J., Note 6, Chapter 1, supra. 58 See for instance Bartlett, Jamie, and Littler, Mark, Note 13, Chapter 1, supra, p. 7. 59 Allen, Chris, “Opposing Islamification or promoting Islamophobia? Understanding the English Defence League”. Patterns of Prejudice, 45.4 (2011): 285. 60 Hirschi, Christian, and Widmer, Thomas (2012) “Approaches and challenges in evaluating measures taken against right-­wing extremism”. Evaluation and Program Planning 35 (2012): 172. 61 Merkl, Peter H., and Leonard Weinberg, Note 1, Chapter 1, supra, p. 52. 62 www.counterextremism.org/ website – “EXIT Fryshuset”. 63 “EXIT Fryshuset” Note 62, Chapter 1, supra. 64 “Violence Prevention Network” Note 62, Chapter 1, supra. 65 Vidino, Lorenzo, and James Brandon (2012) “Countering radicalization in Europe”. International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, p. 62. 66 Butt, Riazat, and Henry Tuck (2014) “European counter-­radicalisation and de-­ radicalisation: a comparative evaluation of approaches in the Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark and Germany”. Institute for Strategic Dialogue, p. 5. 67 Butt, Riazat, and Henry Tuck (2014) Note 66, Chapter 1, supra, p. 17. 68 “Channel: Protecting vulnerable people from being drawn into Terrorism” (2012) – www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/118194/channel­guidance.pdf. See also the Channel statutory guidance released in June 2015 – www. gov.uk/government/publications/channel-­guidance. 69 www.counterextremism.org/website – “Channel process”. 70 See for example: Spalek, Basia, and Lambert, Robert, “Muslim Communities, counter-­terrorism and counter-­radicalisation: A critical reflective approach to engagement” International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice 3 (2008): 257–270; Kundnani, Arun (2009) “Spooked! How not to prevent violent extremism”. Institute of Race Relations; Pantazis, Christina, and Simon Pemberton, “From the ‘old’ to the ‘new’ suspect community examining the impacts of recent U.K counter-­terrorist legislation”. British Journal of Criminology 49.5 (2009): 646–666; Stevens, David, “In extremis: A self-­defeating element in the ‘Preventing Violent Extremism’ strategy”. The Political Quarterly 80.4 (2009): 517–525; Lambert, Robert, and Githens-­Mazer, Jonathan, Note 10, Introduction, supra.; Thomas, Paul, Failing to Prevent? Responding to the threat of Violent Extremism (Bloomsbury, 2012); Vertigans, Stephen, “British Muslims and the U.K government’s ‘war on terror’ within: Evidence of a clash of civilizations or emergent de-­civilizing processes?” The British Journal of Sociology 61.1 (2010): 26–44; Richards, Anthony, “The problem with ‘radicalisation’: The remit of ‘Prevent’ and the need to refocus on terrorism in the U.K”. International Affairs 87.1 (2011): 143–152; Heath-­Kelly, Charlotte, “Counter-­terrorism and the counterfactual: Producing the ‘radicalisation’ discourse and the U.K PREVENT strategy”. The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 15.3 (2013): 394–415; Kundnani, Arun, Note 15, Chapter 1, supra.; O’Toole, Therese, et al. “Governing through Prevent? Regulation and contested practice in State–Muslim engagement”. Sociology 50.1 (2015): 160–177; Stuart, Hannah (2015) “Community Policing and Preventing Extremism: Lessons from Bradford” – Centre for the Response to radicalisation and terrorism, Policy Paper No. 4 – The Henry Jackson Society. 71 Kundnani, Arun, Note 10, Introduction, supra, p. 27. 72 Hope Not Hate website http://hopenothate.org.uk/ – the website records details of how the English Defence League is developing links with like-­minded groups across Europe and North America. 73 European Freedom Initiative Facebook site (accessed 20/10/2016). Its previous website listed defence league affiliates from England, the United States, Norway,

The right response?   31 Denmark, Finland, Italy, Sweden, Germany, Australia, Serbia, Greece, Indonesia, Poland, the Philippines, Belgium, Czech Republic, Romania and Luxembourg. 74 See Lambert, Robert, and Jonathan Githens-­Mazer, Note 10, Introduction, supra.; Kundnani, Arun, Note 10, Introduction, supra.; Caiani, Manuela, and Patricia Kröll. “The transnationalization of the extreme right and the use of the Internet”. International Journal of Comparative and Applied Criminal Justice 39.4 (2015): 331–351. 75 Lambert, Robert, and Jonathan Githens-­Mazer, Note 10, Introduction, supra, p. 81. 76 Europol Terrorism Situation and Trend Report for 2016 p. 8. 77 See for example; Lum, Cynthia, Leslie W, Kennedy, and Alison Sherley, “Are counter-­terrorism strategies effective? The results of the Campbell systematic review on counter-­terrorism evaluation research”. Journal of Experimental Criminology 2 (2006): 489–516. 78 Europol Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (2011) p.  29. In addition, the report noted how in this year, there were a total of 3 Islamist terrorist attacks, 179 arrests of individuals for Islamist terrorist offences and 89 arrests of individuals for preparing attacks against EU member states. Meanwhile, there were a total of 160 attacks by violent separatist groups and 349 arrests of individuals for engaging in, or planning, such acts. In stark contrast, Europe witnessed not a single act of right-­wing extremist terrorism. The comparatively weak challenge from the latter was attributed by the security services to a combination of poor internal cohesion, a low degree of coordination, lack of public support and effective law enforcement. 79 Europol Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (2013) p. 36. 80 BBC News (14/05/2010) “County Durham terror plot father and son are jailed”. 81 BBC News (17/10/2014) “Newcastle University student Vladimir Aust jailed over bomb scare”. 82 See for example; Kundnani, Arun, Note 10, Introduction, supra, p. 10. 83 The “Hate Crime Action Plan” was published in July 2016. It makes reference to the Extremism Strategy but there is no discussion of how these concepts are separated and there no reference to the Prevent Strategy. 84 Isal, Sarah, Robin Oakley, and Kjartan Sveinsson, “Preventing racist violence in the United Kingdom”. Rechtsextremismus, Rassismus und Fremdenfeindlichkeit in Europa 35 (2011): 40. 85 Kundnani, Arun, Note 10, Introduction, supra, p. 29. 86 See for example: Green, D.P., and A. Rich, “White supremacist activity and cross burning in North Carolina”. Journal of Quantitative Criminology 14 (1998): 263–282; Freilich, J.D., S.M. Chermak, and Caspi, D., “Critical events in the life trajectories of domestic extremist White supremacist groups: A case study analysis of four violent organizations”. Criminology and Public Policy, 8, 497–530; Freilich, J.D., and S.M. Chermak, “Preventing deadly encounters between law enforcement and Amer­ican far­rightists”. Crime Prevention Studies 25 (2009): 141–172; Freilich, J.D., and S.M. Chermak, “Hate crimes: Problem-­oriented guides for police” (Problem-­Specific Guides Series, No. 72). Office of Community Oriented Policing Service. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice; Adamczyk, Amy, et al. “The relationship between hate groups and far-­right ideological violence”. Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice 30.3 (2014): 310–332. 87 Blazak, Randy, “White boys to terrorist men: Target recruitment of Nazi Skinheads”. Amer­ican Behavioral Scientist 44 (2001): 982. 88 Blazak, Randy, Note 87, Chapter 1, supra, p. 989. 89 Iganski, Paul, “Hate crimes hurt more”. Amer­ican Behavioral Scientist 45.4 (2001): 635. 90 See Uviller, H. Richard, Review Article: “Making it worse: ‘Hate’ as an aggravating factor in criminal conduct” Ethnic and Racial Studies 23.4 (2000): 761–767; Phillips, Nickie D., “The prosecution of hate crimes: The limitations of the hate crime typology”. Journal of Interpersonal Violence 24 (2009): 883 and for a Netherlands

32   The right response? p­ erspective; Ringnalda, Allard, and Kool, Renee, “The prosecution of bias crime in the Netherlands and the problem of net-­widening: fundamental limits to criminal liability” Crime, Law and Social Change 58 (2012): 53–74. See also: Levin, J., Rabrenovic, G., Ferraro, V, Doran, T., and Methe, D., “When a crime committed by a teenager becomes a hate crime: Results from two studies”. Amer­ican Behavioral Scientist 51 (2007): 246. This work explored whether membership of an organised “hate group” (for example, the Ku Klux Klan, which in the U.K. would be termed an “extremist group”) was an aggravating factor in the prosecution of teenagers committing hate crimes. 91 Boeckmann, Robert J., and Carolyn Turpin-­Petrosino, “Understanding the harm of hate crime”. Journal of Social Issues, 58.2 (2002): 207–225. For an exploration of skinhead participation in racist violence see also; Watts, Meredith W., “Aggressive youth cultures and hate crimes: Skinheads and xenophobic youth in Germany”. Amer­ ican Behavioral Scientist 45 (2001): 60. 92 See Copsey, Nick, Janet Dack, and Matthew Feldman (2013) “Anti-­Muslim Hate Crime and the Far Right”. Teeside University, p. 21. 93 See Athwal, Harmit, Jenny Bourne, and Rebecca Wood. “Racial violence: The buried issue”. Institute of Race Relations (2010): 15. 94 Husbands, Christopher T., Note 36, Chapter 1, supra, p. 264. 95 The Prevent Strategy, Note 19, Introduction, supra, p. 60, para. 9.30. 96 Goodwin, Matthew J., and Oliver Heath, “The 2016 referendum, Brexit and the Left Behind: An aggregate-­level analysis of the result”. The Political Quarterly 87.3 (2016) 323–332. 97 Blazak, Randy, Note 87, Chapter 1, supra, p. 982.

2 Putting the Prevent in preventing right-­wing extremism

This chapter sets out the evolution of the Prevent Strategy within the context of the U.K.’s over-­arching counter terrorism strategy, known as “Contest”. It is important to explain the recent history of the Prevent Strategy as a state response to extremism before we go on to explore the impact of the Government’s decision to add RWE explicitly to the scope of the strategy in 2011, as it is in this area that the thinking around countering extremism has been developed. In this chapter I also examine the development of Contest and whether considerations around RWE were present both in the iterative process that led to the strategy and the most recent Prevent Review. To this end I conducted 20 semi-­structured interviews with senior police officers, local authority practitioners, policy makers and politicians working within this field to provide real-­life perspectives on how the state response to extremism has evolved since the first incarnation of the U.K. counter terrorism strategy. “Contest” drew together and built upon the existing counter terrorism legislative architecture and has been developed by the Home Office since 2003. Governance for the strategy sits with the Office for Security and Counter Terrorism (OSCT), which was created in 2007 and sits within the Home Office. The first version of the strategy was published and made available to the public in 2006 with the stated aim “to reduce the risk from international terrorism, so that people can go about their daily lives freely and with confidence”.1 Looking at the U.K in a European context, in some ways the U.K is one of the most developed; it is the most developed in terms of its counter terrorism and counter extremism strategies. The Prevent Strategy, Contest and associated strategies have served as models for many other countries.2 The strategy was revised in March 2009 under Gordon Brown’s Labour Government and came to be known as “Contest 2”. There was little in the way of practical changes introduced, however, it was a significantly larger document than its predecessor, in line with the Government’s stated desire to be as open as possible on counter terrorism and security matters and to put as much information as possible into the public domain3 and it was deliberately conceived as a different kind of document from its predecessor. OSCT stressed that it contained

34   Preventing right-wing extremism as much material that could be left unclassified as possible; and also included historical analysis, in order to provide context for readers.4 The strategy was divided into four distinct work-­streams. These when taken together are known as “The Four P’s”: Prevent, Pursue, Protect and Prepare.5 The last three work-­ streams have proved relatively un-­contentious, possibly because they represent more traditional means by which the state responds to terrorism, i.e. pursuing terrorists, protecting the public and preparing for the consequences of acts of terrorism. The Prevent Strategy, however, has proved extremely controversial primarily due to its impact upon Muslim communities in the U.K. within the context of the heightened threat assessment from international terrorism, and the inherent issues with being seen to overly “securitise” community engagement efforts in this area. It’s worth remembering that Prevent, when it was being discussed early on, it was meant to be quite an enlightened, progressive idea. It was really about working with Muslim communities rather than against them. It was trying to bring more people into the counter terrorism fold.… We’d try to understand the grievances that people had, and we’d deal with them at root cause. There was nothing sinister or nasty about it. But I just feel that there was an inevitable mission creep with something like that.6 The focus on Muslim communities was explicit throughout the Prevent Strategy and indeed the wider Contest Strategy. The rationale for this is based upon the prevailing threat assessment of the time, shortly after the 9/11 Al Qaida attacks in the United States and the assessment that similar attacks were likely in the U.K. A senior civil servant who worked on the original Contest Strategy acknowledged; The whole idea of a U.K Counter Terrorism strategy was driven by 9/11. Without that event the strategy would not have been written.7 It is however important to remember that prior to 9/11 the last terrorist attack that had taken place in the U.K. was that carried out by David Copeland, the London nail bomber who set off bombs in Brixton, Brick Lane in the East End and Soho over 13 days in April 1999.8 However, an interesting insight into the thinking at the time is that; There was a slight tension within the Home Office. OSCT [Office for Security and Counter Terrorism] did not exist at that time. The section dealing with counter terrorism were of the view that right wing issues did not come under them as this was dealt with by the police. This was seen as a public order policing issue, not terrorism.9 This is a theme we will return to later but this dichotomy of response to RWE, i.e. in perceiving it either as a form of terrorism/extremism or a public order

Preventing right-wing extremism   35 issue, is an enduring theme throughout the albeit limited commentary in this area. It is within the arena of the Prevent Strategy, the most contentious of the four P’s that the battle for hearts and minds was waged, and it is here that these differences of opinion and community expectations have come to the fore.

Prevent pre-­2011 The aim of the Prevent Strategy10 is “to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism”.11 The concept of preventing an individual becoming a terrorist is predicated on the thinking that “radicalisation is usually a process not an event. During that process it is possible to intervene to prevent vulnerable people being drawn into terrorist-­related activity”.12 Given that the prevailing threat to the U.K. and interests abroad emanated from Islamist extremism, the Prevent Strategy was directed towards Muslim communities to increase the state’s engagement with these communities and to play a role in the “battle of ideas”13 through supporting mainstream views and countering extremist narratives. These objectives were later developed and expanded upon within the 2009 version of Contest.14 The delivery of the Prevent Strategy has primarily been the mandate of local authorities and police services across the U.K. The presence of counter terrorism police officers in what is a community engagement programme was contentious and the Prevent Strategy was launched to various newspaper headlines presenting it as a “spying exercise”.15 The following view was seen to be representative of those surveyed as part of the Home Affairs Communities and Local Government Committee reviewing the Prevent Strategy; The real problem with the Prevent agenda is simply that it is presently situated within a counter-­terrorism strategy and implemented by a team dedicated to counterterrorism and is therefore viewed through this lens with suspicion and apprehension; there is a strong belief that the community will be spied upon, wrongly accused and treated unfairly; or simply that the community is made guilty by association with terrorism.16 Charles Farr, then the Director General of OSCT responded to spying allegations to a Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) Select Committee Hearing by stating;  for the avoidance of doubt, surveillance is not part of the Prevent programme and intelligence gathering is not a feature of the Prevent programme. It does not say so in the strategy and does not say so in our guidance documents. What we have said is what you get.17 Notwithstanding these assurances, the Prevent Agenda has been beset by allegations that community engagement has been overly securitised to the point at which the state only engages with Muslim communities through the prism of what is ostensibly a counter terrorism strategy.

36   Preventing right-wing extremism One of the greatest challenges to the service delivery of the Prevent Strategy has been the over reliance on ‘community engagement’ as a metric of success, without consideration to what the terms or criteria of this engagement should be.18 In the wake of 7/7, the government hurriedly set out objectives for community engagement, which in retrospect were too centric in nature, giving the impression that communities had no say on what that engagement should look like. This was reflected by the introduction of NI35, a national indicator set by central government relating directly to preventing violent extremism.19 NI35 was a means of dictating how Prevent Strategy money was to be used by local authorities to “build communities resilient to violent extremism” and was allocated on the basis of the number of Muslims living within a particular area.20 The imposition of centralised indicators to ensure compliance bred resentment of the strategy, and rather than foster trust with partner agencies, it precipitated a backlash, typified by the creation of the “Reading Muslim Preventing Violent Extremism Crisis Group”, in response to the Council’s acceptance of PVE funding.21 However, research has suggested that the most effective engagement programmes are not imposed on communities but inspire those communities to develop their own means of engagement.22 This specific focus on Muslim communities and its subsequent perceived detrimental impact on the relationship between those communities and the state23 also highlighted considerations as to whether the mandate of the Prevent Strategy should be widened in order to encompass other forms of extremism, particularly in light of the street-­based demonstration activities of the English Defence League (EDL). The way in which government money was being disproportionately allocated to the Muslim communities over others was also highlighted through the CLG Committee; The fact that Prevent only focuses on al-­Qaeda-inspired terrorism has both added to feelings of alienation and stigma in Muslim communities and brought about deep resentment in non-­Muslim communities on the basis that funding is being given to Muslims and not other communities in need.24 This raises the question as to whether the inclusion of RWE within the scope of the Prevent Strategy would be justified in terms of the risks associated with this form of extremism at that time, or whether this is motivated more by the stigma created within Muslim communities as a result of the way in which the Prevent Strategy has been delivered thus far. When Contest was originally conceived, the way in which RWE was considered demonstrates the thinking in terms of the threat assessment at the time; The single purpose of Prevent was to deal with the radical Islamist threat. We did think about the right wing but only in terms of inter-­communal violence. The thinking was that if we were seen to privilege the Muslim communities with funding, building youth centres etc. in deprived areas, we had

Preventing right-wing extremism   37 better watch out for a possible right-­wing counter reaction. We set out to organise the distribution of money so that areas of deprivation would receive emphasis, so that if a Mosque were funded locally, we would also fund a youth centre for the wider community, so we didn’t marginalise different groups.25 The extreme right-­wing response was considered in terms of “inter-­communal violence” as a by-­product of the huge scale of community engagement and funding being afforded to Muslim groups. However, there is a question of proportionality here as the perceived alienation brought about by the specific focus on Muslim communities would not have been enough on its own to justify the inclusion of RWE within a counter terrorism strategy which is ostensibly based upon the national threat-­assessment. In the absence of a threat-­based rationale, the state response risks being conflated with a political desire to appease a section of the community who have reportedly suffered stigmatisation as a result of the application of the Prevent Strategy thus far. And it remains unclear as to whether the inclusion of RWE and other forms of extremism within the scope of the Prevent Strategy has actually remedied this stigmatisation. An interesting perspective is the exploration of historical state responses to forms of extremism other than that borne out of the Al Qaida ideology, i.e. Irish terrorism and RWE and the rationale for a significantly different state response. This was articulated in the House of Commons Communities and Local Government report on “Preventing Violent Extremism”; The evidence of the bias and disproportionately in relation to the application of the PVE programme is particularly evident when comparing the government’s response to Irish terrorism and far-­right extremism. Neither threats were accompanied by the overwhelming securitisation of public services, the burgeoning of the state security apparatus, the doubling in the number of intelligence officers and the attribution for the blame for extremism, presumed to be the penultimate step in the journey towards active terrorism, on all Irish or all white people in the way that Muslim communities have been maligned.26 However, the opposing view, within the same forum, highlighted the very different nature of the terrorist threat posed by Islamist groups, and therefore the requirement for a bespoke response; The current international terrorist threat is quite different from the terrorist threats we faced in the past. Contemporary terrorist groups claim a religious justification for their actions and have a wide-­ranging religious and political agenda … many seek mass civilian casualties and are prepared to use unconventional techniques (including chemical or radiological weapons); they conduct attacks without warning; they actively seek to recruit new members in the U.K and elsewhere around the world.27

38   Preventing right-wing extremism When we consider that the risks associated with right-­wing extremism in Western Europe have increased in the public consciousness over the last seven years, it could be perceived as odd that this would not have formed part of the decision making for the Committee or those reviewing the Prevent Strategy. However, the incidents that have most captured the public’s attention around RWE occurred after the review of the Prevent Strategy had ended and the new strategy had been published. In the absence of these high-­profile incidents, the movement most associated with “the extreme right wing” in the U.K. was the EDL, who in 2011 were at the zenith of their power in being able to command large public demonstrations and reach out to similarly minded groups on the continent. Arguably, it is this experience and the apparent need to strike a sense of parity with representatives of some Muslim communities who felt disproportionately targeted by the Prevent Strategy that precipitated RWE being explicitly added to the scope of the strategy.28

The Channel programme “Channel” is a Government programme for “protecting vulnerable people from being drawn into terrorism”29 and sits within the Prevent Strategy. The Channel guidance as issued in October 2012 (and later made a statutory requirement of specified authorities by virtue of the Counter Terrorism and Security Act 2015) does not specifically make reference to right-­wing extremism, but in the section dealing with the identification of vulnerable people, it states; Channel is about protecting people from radicalisation into all forms of terrorism, but the most significant threat to this country is from Al Qaida affiliated, influenced and associated groups and many Channel referrals will therefore relate to this threat. However, the principles set out in this section apply equally to other terrorist groups.30 Even within what is an extremely controversial policy area the Channel programme has attracted significant criticism in relation to the way in which information is shared between statutory bodies with the intention of identifying those vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism and putting in place interventions to move them away from radicalising influences. This brings into stark contrast the delicate balance between preserving an individual’s freedom of speech, with the need to safeguard them and others from the influence of extremist narratives which, when coupled with vulnerabilities such as social exclusion, mental ill-­ health, family breakdown, drug and alcohol dependency, can lead to them being drawn into terrorism. One viewpoint on the way in which this balance is struck was articulated during the House of Commons, Communities and Local Government Committee review of the Prevent Strategy; I think it is a serious human rights issue that people are being identified to the police simply on the basis of expressing opinions that some of us are

Preventing right-wing extremism   39 uncomfortable with, but which are legal opinions to hold. I think for that reason the Channel Project in particular is deeply flawed and should not be in existence in the way it is at the moment.31 A contrary perspective, again, provided within the same forum, indicates that;  there is a legitimate aim, which I would say would be recognised in all sorts of crime prevention areas, of trying to identify particularly young people who may be in danger of being drawn into more serious crime. It is something that would be absolutely taken for granted if we were looking at gun and knife crime or other areas of crime. The attempt to identify those who are vulnerable and steer them in one way or another is a legitimate aim.32 Efforts to draw parallels between preventative efforts undertaken within counter terrorism and those carried out in response to other forms of crime soon became a regular staple of the authorities in response to criticism of the intent behind Channel, and the Prevent Strategy more broadly; such a preventative approach more reflects changes in the nature of policing generally, i.e. looking into the drivers behind crime and seeking to intervene at an early stage to prevent onward progression.33 The concept of an individual becoming “radicalised” has become synonymous with Islamist extremism and there has been much commentary on the merits of the concept in creating policy in this area.34 But are RWE adherents “radicalised” in the same way? In the United States, there is research into the recruitment process for Nazi Skinheads,35 but there are no comparable studies from the U.K. that explore the similarities and/or differences between how an individual is radicalised within the right-­wing extremism space as opposed to Islamist extremism. The focus has been very much more on studies to understand the drivers for membership of RWE groups, not the process by which members can progress to more extreme ideologies. It is surprising that no such research has been conducted within the U.K, given the expansion of the Prevent Strategy to include RWE since 2011. However, it is apparent that practitioners working on the Channel programme, rather than focussing solely on the Islamist threat, have in fact been working with individuals who have been assessed as vulnerable to being drawn into RWE for some time; Channel had always operated with one eye on far-­right extremists and so I think there was an element of the Prevent programme that had always picked up the hardcore people.36 Notwithstanding the Prevent Strategy’s wider societal focus on Muslim communities, it is clear that the targeted Channel programme which was in place specifically to address vulnerable individuals was working with RWE referrals

40   Preventing right-wing extremism pre-­2011. As a former Channel Coordinator myself I can confirm that I was managing RWE cases in 2010 as like my colleagues, I was basing assessments on risk and threat rather than the prevailing political winds of the time; Channel and Prevent didn’t really talk about the extreme far right strategically or in policy documents so much, but they were still being dealt with through Channel as and when required.37 It is also interesting to find that further to the work undertaken under Channel, there were areas which were dealing with RWE issues under the auspices of the Prevent Strategy even pre-­2011. The criticism of the Prevent Strategy in its focus on the Islamist threat and not explicitly addressing RWE issues does not perhaps take sufficient account of the experience of those frontline practitioners with responsibility for managing risk and threat across communities; I think it always was part of the agenda, but it wasn’t given the same emphasis. I think for Local Authorities and other areas, I mean in Birmingham through the Pathfinder Programme and other programmes, where they were putting in interventions for AQ related stuff, they also did work around the far right. It’s just that the strategy wasn’t that clear, therefore the impression that was given to people, and to local practitioners was that Prevent is only about Al Qaida related extremism and we will only think about far right extremism if the risks are high enough, whereas I think the new strategy makes it absolutely clear that all risks that lead to violence or potential terrorism are part of the Prevent Agenda.38 This experience of responding to RWE issues under the mandate of the Prevent Strategy is significant when considering the rationale for drawing out and emphasising the addition of RWE to the scope of the strategy in 2011. For practitioners responding to risk and threat for their areas, they already saw utility in the Prevent Strategy for non-­Islamist forms of extremism, notwithstanding that there was a general acceptance that the strategy’s main focus was Islamist extremism.

Connecting Communities programme Before we go on to explore the implications of the 2011 review into the Prevent Strategy, it is important to first highlight the work that was being done in relation to RWE as it was understood at that time. In October 2009 John Denham MP, then the Secretary of State for Communities & Local Government launched the £12 million “Connecting Communities” programme. This was shortly after the BNP victories in two Northern seats in the European Elections, and so there was a political imperative to address community cohesion and discord in the community. This was designed to “reinvigorate and connect with those communities that are feeling the pressure from recession most acutely and ensure

Preventing right-wing extremism   41 they are well placed to share fully in future prosperity and emerge stronger and more cohesive”.39 This chimes with the view of the respondent earlier in this chapter whereby the threat of “inter-­communal violence” as a by-­product of lavishing funding on Muslim communities was assessed as necessitating a wider piece of funded engagement, to restore a sense of balance locally. The allocation of funds was designed to address specific areas where a sense of grievance was more prevalent; there was a widespread problem of alienation, disempowerment, whatever you might call it, in white working-­class communities that nobody has ever addressed. The whole period of dealing with multicultural policies, community cohesion policies and so on, there had been activities with minority communities, particularly obviously post the Northern riots, and some parts of the Muslim community … but there has been no attempt to say what are the issues within white working-­class community.40 It is important to note that the focus of this work was not the violent extremism as covered within the Prevent Strategy, but rather the political manifestations of right-­wing extremism of the time, principally in the form of the British National Party; really we were talking about the “ballot box extremism”, we weren’t really trying to deal with nail bombers or people like that. But, if you could undercut the base that supports their world view, there will be less support for them.41 The rationale for a separate response, i.e. to retain the Prevent focus on Islamist extremism was consistently articulated in terms of the national threat assessment. Outside of this, there was a suggestion that “any area facing far right or racist extremist problems which divide communities should have a strategy and resourcing for addressing those problems”.42 This is the only place in which the terms “far right”, “racism” and “extremism” actually appear together. There are in fact different strategies and funding streams for each and very little in the way of coordination between the respective policy areas. The Connecting Communities programme was discontinued early into the new Coalition Government of 2010 in favour of a different strategic approach to responding to extremism as was defined with the 2011 review of the Prevent Strategy.

2011: The year of the Great Divorce The Prevent Review was commissioned by the Conservative/Liberal Democrat Coalition Government and was published on 7 June 2011. Much of this review was predicated on the need to mitigate the perceived detrimental impact the implementation of the Prevent Strategy was having on Muslim Communities in some areas43 by drawing a clear distinction between the Prevent Strategy and

42   Preventing right-wing extremism social cohesion, separating the two policy areas and setting out isolated funding streams.44 The Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG) were to take primacy for the social cohesion aspects of the Prevent Strategy, while the OSCT retained the counter terrorism mandate. In many quarters this is a welcome shift, as the merging of these policies has been one of the main drivers behind mistrust in the Prevent Strategy.45 However, the impact on frontline practitioners delivering in these policy areas shows a somewhat different picture as covered by Chapters 3, 4 and 5. Another objective was to emphasise a conceptual convergence between “extremism” and “violent extremism”.46 In Prime Minister David Cameron’s speech at the Munich Security Conference in February 2011, he described the thinking in this area as “muddled”,47 necessitating a fundamental rethink on defining the threat. The previous Prevent Strategy included the objective to “challenge the ideology behind violent extremism and support mainstream voices”;48 however, the Coalition Government had the view that extremism must be countered, whether violence is a component part or not. This is not a simple task, as there is very little research on how these two concepts relate and/or feed into one another. Unmesh Desai, writing in the Guardian, sought to provide an example; Non-­violent extremism encompasses those who condemn terrorist attacks in this country but are happy to justify suicide attacks against British troops in the Middle East. These views poison the minds of young people for whom the next logical step is to translate their anger into violence. ‘Non-­violent’ and ‘violent’ extremism are different sides of the same coin, and both have to be fought together.49 Although it was not necessarily the focus of Cameron’s Munich speech, there is an equally poor understanding of any form of connection between violent and non-­violent forms of right-­wing extremism. The inclusion of RWE in the new Prevent Strategy During the Prevent Review, the approach to RWE was, for the first time drawn out explicitly.50 The origins of this decision are not immediately apparent but on analysing the findings of the House of Commons, Communities and Local Government Committee on “Preventing Violent Extremism”,51 the Home Affairs Committee report “Roots of violent radicalisation”52 and Lord Macdonald’s “Review of Counter-­terrorism and Security Powers”,53 there are indications that this was not necessitated by the national terrorism threat assessment of the time, but was primarily driven by a need to demonstrate a parity of response to Muslim communities alienated by the previous iterations of the Prevent Strategy, as well as the increasing mobilisations of the EDL. When we consider the rationale for the explicit inclusion of right-­wing extremism within the revised Prevent Strategy, we do not find any publicly available documentary evidence of an increased threat from this form of extremism in the U.K. pre-­June 2011. The

Preventing right-wing extremism   43 thrust of the documentary evidence gathered from these reports points instead to the sense that a parity of response needed to be brought out within counter terrorism policies principally to balance the approach to Islamist extremism with other forms of extremism in order to mitigate against the negative impact that previous iterations of the Prevent Strategy had on some Muslim communities. This conclusion was certainly drawn by the Prevent Strategy practitioners that I interviewed in the three case study areas. Given that in 2011 the EDL was at the zenith of its power, with its leaders able to mobilise street protests of thousands of people, principally to counter the “Islamist threat”, it is therefore entirely likely that the policy shift within the Prevent Strategy could be attributed more to the impact the EDL movement was having on some Muslim communities and the need for Government to respond to this, rather than there being an increase in the terrorism threat level associated with right-­wing extremism. Significantly, the EDL was the only example of RWE cited from a U.K. context within the Prevent Review consultation54 and yet the movement is never defined as having an extreme right-­wing ideology, it is not proscribed under counter terrorism legislation,55 and under the new division of responsibilities, it was to fall to DCLG to lead on, suggesting it is not a Prevent Strategy (i.e. counter terrorism) issue that calls into question the rationale for the inclusion of RWE within the Strategy, as the movement that forms the basis of this policy shift is not in fact to be addressed through the strategy going forward. It is unclear how the conclusion has been drawn that the Prevent Strategy can be applied to RWE more broadly. Where is the basis of empirical research for the assertion that the strategy is applicable to extreme right-­wing groups? Some leading academics in this area recommended drawing on the Prevent Strategy “more fulsomely”56 in adding the response to RWE to that which was in place for Islamist extremism, however they did not engage in a research-­based exploration of why this position is desirable, and the support for the Prevent Strategy being used to counter RWE seems to be borne out of a sense of ethical fairness in the state delivery of counter extremism, rather than there being a firm set of thoroughly researched recommendations for this to be the case. This approach is not without its critics and for some the loss of the explicit Prevent Strategy focus on Islamist extremism has created a lack of clarity as to what the strategy is actually seeking to address;  are we not moving in the wrong direction now by saying, “actually, we will include all types of extremism” when in reality the focus is still on Islamic terrorism, so we are getting vaguer in our targeting, for what reason I do not understand other than political correctness possibly; and yet we are sending out completely the wrong messages, both to the Muslim community who may think they are being tarred with a particular brush and to perhaps the wider community who are puzzled about what this programme is actually about.57 Is the inclusion of RWE with the Prevent Strategy borne simply of a need for a parity of response to different forms of extremism, based upon some sense of

44   Preventing right-wing extremism political correctness or is the Prevent Strategy truly applicable to these other forms of extremism? The appropriateness of utilising the existing Prevent Strategy for responding to RWE requires further exploration. It is explicitly acknowledged in the Prevent Review that “our understanding of how people become involved in extreme right-­wing terrorism is inevitably less developed than it is for terrorism associated with Al Qaida”58 and this position has not changed since 2011; We don’t have the understanding of the threat from far-­right extremism that we do with regard to AQ-­inspired extremism. The police say the threat is low. There is not yet a clear idea as to ownership of this issue, i.e. the police (in the form of the National Domestic Extremism and Disorder Intelligence Unit) or OSCT in the Home Office…. It is not thought of in the same strategic sense that the threat from AQ-­inspired extremism is. It is more difficult as from what we understand; the threat from the far right is more individual than from those aligned with groups so we need a greater understanding of this.59 The understanding of RWE and its inter-­relationship with Islamist extremism may be under-­developed but already similarities are being identified, seeming to further support the position that the Prevent Strategy is equally applicable to RWE issues. This view was posited by the Security Minister, James Brokenshire, speaking at the far-­right Special Interest Group Conference in September 2013;  Although the threat they pose is very different, Al Qa’ida inspired terrorism and domestic terrorism share a number of similarities. In both cases there is no single pathway to radicalisation, but the vulnerable people that domestic extremists prey upon can share many of the same characteristics exploited by Al Qa’ida radicalisers. They both look for the same sense of alienation; the same questions of identity; and the same feelings of anger and injustice. And once they’ve found these psychological hooks, Al Qa’ida and domestic extremists use ideologies with similar features to justify their perverse violence.60 What is interesting here is that these parallels between RWE and Islamist extremism were already known to Prevent practitioners prior to the 2011 review and yet the idea that they pose different threats is potentially a nod to the fact the policy response to the most common manifestation of RWE, the EDL, actually sits with DCLG rather than the Prevent Strategy. This continued confusion around the “owning” policy area for RWE has done nothing to bring clarity to Cameron’s “muddled thinking”, which if anything has become further muddled by the separation of counter extremism efforts across different departments of Government.

Preventing right-wing extremism   45 The Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG) response to the Prevent Strategy review The desire to separate social cohesion policy from that of counter terrorism was realised in the Prevent Strategy review. This had been the most prevalent and enduring area of contention within the service delivery of the Prevent Strategy, leading to views such as; “the current breadth of focus of Prevent, from community work to crime prevention, sits uncomfortably within a counter-­terrorism strategy”.61 The review responded to this feedback and goes some way to differentiating the two policy areas, affording primacy to separate government departments going forward; whereas Prevent is part of Contest, a counter-­terrorism strategy, and deals with terrorism, the Government will address the challenge of extremism, and extremist organisations in particular, primarily through other means. They include: the Government’s new approach to promoting integration, which DCLG is leading; other parts of the criminal justice system, notably legislation regarding religious and racial hatred; and debate and civic challenge.62 This seems to very clearly set out the separation of terrorism and extremism into two work streams, the first falling under the Prevent Strategy, the second, DCLG. However, it later goes on to state: “Prevent needs to deal with extremism where terrorism draws on extremist ideas; and where people who are extremists are being drawn towards terrorism-­related activity”.63 While the strategy very succinctly states that counterterrorism policy will be decoupled from social cohesion policy, it is much less clear on the relationship between terrorism and extremism. How can “extremism” be further broken down into sub-­categories of “extremism where terrorism draws on extremist ideas” (OSCT) and “extremism” per se (DCLG)? This is unfortunately a theme throughout the new Prevent Strategy, which does very little to clarify the use of the terms “extremism”, ­“radicalisation”, “violent extremism” or “vulnerability”. This seems to have been lost in the clear desire to simply replace “violent extremism” with the broader “extremism”. If the very terminology of the strategy cannot be articulated in a meaningful way, how are front-­line practitioners and communities to interpret its meaning? The Prevent Review separated out the social cohesion objectives and moved these into the mandate of DCLG. Specifically, the original Prevent Strategy (in the 2009 version of Contest) had five objectives, including to “increase the resilience of communities to violent extremism”, and “address the grievances which ideologues are exploiting”. These objectives were deemed to be less about terrorism and more about social cohesion and so primacy for their service delivery has been afforded to DCLG. In response to this, in February 2012 DCLG published the new approach to integration entitled; “Creating the Conditions for Integration”.64 I explored what this meant with DCLG in relation to primacy

46   Preventing right-wing extremism being afforded to them for the EDL in particular, to find that an operational gap in the understanding of this group still pervades the state response in this area; Our response to the EDL falls under the last section [Tackling intolerance and extremism65]. We are the lead department regarding the EDL. We look at how groups like the EDL undermine integration and/or prey on the lack of integration. OSCT looks at groups which are explicitly violent such as the Aryan Strikeforce, Blood & Honour and other groups which share a neo­Nazi ideology are dealt with under the XRW banner.66 There is an important distinction to be drawn from this approach. The EDL are not assessed as being an “extremist” group akin to the Aryan Strikeforce. The threat they pose is perceived as being a community cohesion issue rather than a potential terrorism issue. However, there is an appreciation here of the risks around the “lone actors” which we will return to later; So, clearly, my view on groups like the EDL and the National Front, Infidels, etc., their Prevent interest is really from the point of view of the impact they have on Muslim communities. Now clearly, having said that, there is the potential that you might get individuals who are linked to them who may then be radicalized, but again my understanding is that the violent lone actors, they’re a separate phenomenon.67 As the EDL are viewed primarily as being detrimental to community cohesion, so DCLG take primacy for the state response. This approach requires further clarity as on the one hand, the Prevent Strategy now includes RWE, but it is almost contradictory that the state response to the EDL (in the form of DCLG), falls under one of those two objectives that have been transferred from the Strategy. The rationale for what initially appears to be a disparity is explained in terms of the group’s proclivity to violence; Before the Prevent Review, the far-­right threat was thought of as emanating from groups like the Aryan Strikeforce, and OSCT owned that anyway as it sat within the “violent” space. Our interest only really emerged post EDL when we saw its damaging impact on community cohesion. We didn’t do any work on the right wing before the EDL turned up. The main right-­wing threat on the political landscape was the BNP but there is not much you can do about a political party.68 This division of responsibilities across Government departments demonstrates the clear lack of engagement with practitioners on the frontline who would have to use these national strategies in their day-­to-day roles. To separate violent and non-­violent, group activity and that of lone actors, activity that impacts community cohesion and that which could be defined as reciprocal radicalisation, all indicate how far removed the policy makers were from the realities of what was

Preventing right-wing extremism   47 happening in communities. This continued confusion at a policy level permeated frontline service delivery; I guess most local authorities almost felt when it first came out that groups like the EDL and others would be tackled by the wider Integration Strategy, and as Prevent was reviewed we were still waiting for the Integration statement to the House, and when the statement was made there was no resource that followed.69 This response is significant as, especially within a climate of central-­Government imposed austerity measures, frontline practitioners were essentially being asked to deliver the Prevent Strategy and community cohesion efforts separately and yet whereas the Prevent Strategy budgets in priority areas were protected, they did not receive any resource to continue delivering the cohesion work outside of this, which ultimately impacted upon the non-­Prevent Strategy work-­streams that would have developed responses to the EDL.

The Prevent Strategy and the English Defence League Although the inclusion of right-­wing extremism within the Prevent Strategy could be seen as achieving the goal of demonstrating a parity of response across all forms of extremism, an unforeseen by-­product has been the lack of consensus over where the EDL sit in terms of policy response. This has brought into sharp focus the issue raised in earlier around the lack of clear definitions of actors within the extreme right-­wing. There are a range of agencies with overlapping responsibilities for service delivery across both the Home Office (OSCT) and DCLG policy areas, and yet among respondents there was a general consensus that the EDL are not considered to be extreme right-­wing; There is a misconception I believe, at Government level, that the EDL are extreme right wing, and they’re not, very much not actually. And the reason I say that is because actually the extreme right-­wing groups don’t subscribe to them at all, they see them as cop-­outs.70 Where this assessment was based upon a detailed understanding of the strategic intentions of the EDL, many respondents also had direct experience of EDL demonstrations where extreme right-­wing adherents had been removed for fear of their views being conflated with the movement. This emphasises how practitioners in contact with the EDL are aware that it is far from a homogenous group of right-­wing extremists, which poses difficulties to the formulation of good policies by way of response which can be interpreted by frontline practitioners in a way that reflects the reality of what they are seeing on the ground; I’ve never met, I think I’ve met one EDL supporter who even knew what the 14 words71 are. Most of them have got no clue. That’s how far removed

48   Preventing right-wing extremism they are from it … and to see them included in the far-­right extremists category I think is a bit, you know, crazy, because they’re not. I’ve sat in … EDL meetings, I’ve gone to demonstrations to observe, and yeah you’ll get a few guys that are proper, you know, hardcore racists, but it’s got to be said, on more than one occasion, I’ve seen them ejected from the demos by EDL stewards, and on a couple of occasions by Tommy Robinson and Kevin Carroll themselves, literally thrown them off the demo.72 What is clear from interviews with frontline practitioners is that their experience of how the “extreme right-­wing” is manifested locally is through the EDL staging a demonstration about a particular issue only because of their distinct lack of experience of dealing with extreme right-­wing groups. Many local authorities were managing the “peak of EDL activity in 2011”73 with existing mainstream resources rather than those associated with the Prevent Strategy; Most of the practitioners that we interviewed in the U.K actually were thinking about far right extremism less in the … I would say that actually the Combat 18, Aryan Strikeforce, that side of the spectrum was more obscure to them and not as relevant. Most of the practitioners I interviewed were really looking at the EDL and looking at anti-­Muslim, Islamophobia, or even anti-­Semitic groups.74 This disconnect between the intentions of policy makers and the experience of local practitioners is brought into sharp focus when we consider that their only experience of dealing with the “extreme right-­wing” was by virtue of their role of maintaining community cohesion in response to an EDL demonstration. If the rationale for emphasising right-­wing extremism within the Prevent Strategy was the increasing EDL activity of the time, then why was primacy afforded to the DCLG to deal with the response to the EDL? Indeed, where was the extreme right-­wing threat that is to be catered for within the Prevent Strategy? This lack of clarity in terms of the expectations of the Prevent Strategy in responding to the extreme right-­wing, leads some to question whether this particular response sits within this policy area; I think it’s been pushed into the CT space for whatever political reasons that exist but I’m not necessarily sure that the likes of the EDL sit in the Prevent space at all. I’m not convinced by it at all, any more than I am that putting extreme right wing, Blood & Honour types in the Prevent space. Prevent wasn’t designed for the extreme right wing, and it certainly wasn’t designed for the EDL. Its tactics and its strategy was never a good fit for it.75 The practitioners contributing to this phase of my research all agreed that the EDL is predominantly a public order issue rather than one necessitating a counter terrorism response. That is not to say that individuals associated with the EDL could not pose a terrorism threat, however, when devising policy in

Preventing right-wing extremism   49 response to the threat assessment as was the case in 2011, it is clear that the street mobilisations of the EDL were perceived as a manifestation of the “extreme right-­wing” that could not go unchallenged when considered alongside the impact of the Prevent Strategy on Muslim communities. However, the desire for responding by way of the Prevent policy review was not based on any evidenced rise in the threat from right-­wing extremism, but of the heightened aspirations of the EDL, a movement problematised by local actors as principally a threat to community cohesion. The implications of how state actors interpret the “threat” from the extreme right-­wing ultimately affect the way in which they respond and this is especially significant when allocating resources during a period of austerity. There are real risks around the interplay between political aspirations for the Prevent Strategy and the delivery of the strategy at a local level and there were indications of increased expectations from OSCT around the use of the Channel programme to deal with RWE referrals as a means of demonstrating its balanced approach to Muslim communities which could in itself lead to the same “securitisation” of the state’s relationships with white working class communities as occurred to Muslim communities under the earlier iterations of the Prevent Strategy; I think to a certain extent the politics behind it … the fact that Channel was seen as a spying tool and stigmatising Muslim communities, I think we maybe have engineered cases to become Channel cases sometimes when potentially they can be dealt with under the local authority’s Hate Crime Strategy and different cohesion policies. […] You know, there isn’t really the same danger that they’re going to go on and commit terrorist offences in my opinion. You do get the odd occasion, your Lewingtons, your Harrisons and the David Copelands, but I think the AQ inspired, there’s definitely more of a trajectory towards violent outcomes than membership of the EDL or some of these social groups.76 It was interesting that notwithstanding the general view that the EDL should not be addressed within the Prevent Strategy, the “lone actor” terrorist phenomenon was seen as something quite separate, but that had been conflated with the EDL response, which was perceived more as a community cohesion issue; When Lapshyn77 popped his head up, it was all this, right so […] what was his right-­wing affiliation? Well, he was a racist, there’s no doubt about that. You know from the transcripts of his interviews he was a racist…. He had no affiliation to U.K right wing whatsoever, so he hadn’t aligned himself to EDL, yet the rhetoric was that he was an EDL supporter. No he wasn’t. How he came to be in the U.K was very much dusted over, you know, because was he attack planning? No, we funded him to come here, he was a PhD student and he won an award to come out here, and within three days of being here, or four days, he murdered Saleem Mohammed, for no reason other than being Asian. But was he EDL influenced? No.78

50   Preventing right-wing extremism Although there were attempts to establish a link between Lapshyn and the EDL this was not borne out. Ostensibly, the state management of this incident should have been relatively straightforward; a murder followed by detonating a series of bombs outside Mosques in the area should have necessitated a counter terrorism response, and yet initially it was treated as a hate crime, which was criticised as being indicative of the state and media perception of Muslim suspects as terrorists, and non-­Muslim suspects as racists.79 This again reminds us of the highly politicised environment that state actors delivering national strategies in ways that are reflective of the local context are operating within.

How has the Prevent Strategy been delivered with regard to right-­wing extremism post-­2011? These definitional problems have real implications for the way in which practitioners respond to extreme right-­wing issues. Nowhere is this more prevalent than in devising ways of engaging with communities to build resilience to extremist narratives. However, since 2011, it is difficult to see what the Prevent Strategy engagement with communities under the extreme right-­wing mandate has looked like; so we’ve now got far right extremism mentioned in the Prevent Strategy but in terms of action that comes out of that, it’s still very hard to see, besides Channel, it’s very hard to see what action has taken place … from either the Home Office or CLG on this issue. And I think there are a few key problems, and one is that I’ve found in conversations with the Home Office and CLG that, first of all, there’s a very blurred distinction between what either department is doing.80 From a practical perspective, there is a significant lack of statutory services engagement with those who may be vulnerable to RWE narratives, as opposed to engagement with Muslim communities with tight knit community structures ultimately held together by the shared membership of a Mosque; It was never that tangible as to what it meant. Delivery within the Muslim community was a little more tangible, you could see what you were dealing with and you focussed on that because of the nature of the threat. Right wing, we didn’t really know the threat, we didn’t know where to look, and we didn’t know how to engage in right wing issues […] we didn’t understand it. There was no pre-­determined space or work we could rely on.81 This lack of direction as to who the target audiences are, and the form of the engagement, were expressed by all the practitioners working in this area. Aside from the public order policing work undertaken in relation to EDL demonstrations, the wider engagement work on extreme right-­wing issues in the Prevent Strategy space was very difficult to quantify;

Preventing right-wing extremism   51 Where we lack […] is the engagement with communities around those specific issues, and that’s something that I think local authorities and Government can focus more on, as to how we develop our engagement. You see with the Far Right it’s a very difficult one. The white population, or the indigenous population, it’s hard to get groupings from within. […] whilst there’s an organised Church in the U.K, the Church of England, there isn’t necessarily an organised differentiation between people whereas in the Muslim community there are Pakistani networks that get set up, there are Bangladeshi networks, there are Churches, Sunni, Shia, different sects. It’s very difficult to do that engagement with the indigenous population. Who do you engage with? And often, you know these conversations tend to be had at the pub rather than in the community centre, so do we then engage with pubs and if so, how do we do that engagement? How do we get in?82 It was clear that for many respondents, especially given the impact of wider austerity measures on the public sector during this period, the issue of bespoke funding for such engagement work was extremely contentious. While the policy response to the EDL sat with DCLG, no additional funding flowed to those areas suffering most from EDL attendances in ways that could be analogous to Prevent Priority Areas receiving additional funding to respond to the similar activities of groups such as Muslims Against Crusades (MAC), formerly Al-­Muhajiroun (ALM). However, there is a difference in the interpretation of what engagement with communities on issues synonymous with right-­wing extremism looks like when we consider the policy maker perspective; The police already have engagement plans in place with local people in planning for demonstrations. And much of the engagement that could take place would constitute business as usual for the local authority, rather than requiring additional funding.83 However, this view fails to consider what engagement with communities looks like outside of demonstrations, which leads to a solely reactive means of engaging with communities on issues synonymous with the EDL rather than taking a longer-­term strategic view. It may prove difficult to justify the position that for areas who have hosted national EDL demonstrations this engagement should take place as “business as usual” given the clear time and funding implications. In response to requests for specificity on the delivery of the Prevent Strategy with regard to RWE the Security Minister, James Brokenshire MP, when addressing the Far Right Special Interest Group conference, provided some details on efforts undertaken thus far, most notably the Home Secretary banning representatives of the anti-­Muslim “Stop The Islamization of America” group from entering the U.K. in June 2013, and in relation to Channel, that part of the Prevent Strategy service delivery that has always been capable of producing results that can be analysed quantitatively;

52   Preventing right-wing extremism About 15% of all the referrals you have made to Channel have been due to concerns that someone may be vulnerable to radicalisation by the far right, that is hundreds of people being protected from being drawn into hate and extremism. And concerns about the far right are becoming an ever-­larger part of Channel’s workload”.84 Indeed, the utility of Channel in responding to RWE was echoed by a DCLG respondent who suggested; “I think Channel is the only place at the moment where Prevent is really biting on the extreme right wing”.85 However, this figure only depicts the number of people referred to the programme, indicating only that awareness of extreme right-­wing issues is increasing, rather than the number of people actually adopted onto the programme in order to participate in intervention activity. Given this potentially misleading position, should Channel in fact be the only aspect of the Prevent Strategy that is “biting” on the extreme right-­wing, then this fundamentally calls into question the Government’s commitment to applying the strategy to “all forms of extremism” as was suggested. Police figures suggest that only 20% of those referred to Channel actually go on to participate in some form of intervention.86 More granular data pertaining to the attrition rate between referral and adoption within Channel is not currently publicly available, however, this data would be useful to draw comparisons within the Channel caseload, for instance between cases involving other forms of extremism, particularly Islamist extremism. In August 2017 the Security Minister Ben Wallace MP stated his intention to “order the release of more information to increase understanding of the Prevent Strategy and its successes to get more people to engage with it”87 but it remains to be seen as to whether this indicates an intention to release more comprehensive data on the Channel intervention programme in particular with which useful research on such comparisons could be conducted.

The Extremism Taskforce In May 2013 the then Prime Minister, David Cameron launched a new “Extremism Taskforce” in the wake of the murder of Drummer Lee Rigby near the Woolwich Barracks in London earlier that month. Two Islamist extremists were subsequently convicted of his murder. This attack precipitated a number of retaliatory attacks on Mosques across the U.K. and linkages have been sought to demonstrate an organised RWE motivation behind these acts. The Taskforce sought to informally review the Prevent Strategy of 2011 and identify where it could be developed further. Part of this work resulted in recommendations which ultimately led to the Prevent Strategy-­specific elements of the Counter Terrorism and Security Act 2015 which introduced a statutory duty for specified agencies to have “due regard to the need to prevent people being drawn into terrorism”88 as well as placing Channel on a statutory footing. The Taskforce also gave rise to the establishment of an Extremism Analysis Unit within the Home Office “to support all government departments and the wider public sector to understand

Preventing right-wing extremism   53 extremism so they can deal with extremists appropriately”.89 Another notable work stream was that exploring the relationship between RWE groups and Islamist extremists; Post Woolwich we are looking at the effects of “reciprocal extremism” and how the actions of one extreme group can ignite the opposing side and radicalize them further. For instance, an EDL march in a particular location has a detrimental impact on community cohesion but it also adds further weight to extreme Islamist narratives in marking differences between communities.90 The notion of diametrically opposed extremist groups feeding one another follows on from Eatwell’s “Cumulative Extremism”91 and this was reflected in the 2013 review of Contest; we have seen how far right groups have developed an Islamophobic and white supremacist ideology, which is also anti-­democratic, intolerant and conducive to violence. We know these extreme Islamist and far right organisations feed off one another and try to create enmity, suspicion and hatred between our communities.92 However, there has been very little work as yet which explores the relationship between groups like the EDL and Islamist extremists such as Muslims Against Crusades, which is manifested in street protest activity and increasingly through social media. The thinking in this area is not new, but much is based upon perceived historical parallels and supposition rather than rigorous empirical study.93 Does this not entail that the response to RWE is in some way contingent upon the response to Islamist extremism? What are the practical implications of perceiving them as “joint actors”? This does pose certain practical issues in how primacy is afforded to statutory agencies in responding to these forms of extremism. I explored these conceptual issues, specifically in relation to the National Domestic Extremism and Disorder Intelligence Unit (NDEDIU) assessment that the EDL are not an extremist group with a DCLG representative who stated that; I would agree with the view that the EDL is not a violent organization but they impact on community cohesion as they are extremely divisive. There is a distinction between groups that operate violently vs. those that do not. This makes sense from a policing perspective. Fundamentally the EDL works within the law. We don’t have an agreed definition of extremism. There is an attempt within Prevent to do so but there is no formal definition. From a DCLG perspective, we believe that broadly speaking, an extremist group is one which targets an individual group with hate, and so the EDL would fit within this definition.94 More research is required to explore the existence of the apparent environment of permissibility that exists within extremist groups which allow them to act as

54   Preventing right-wing extremism incubators for terrorism and therefore increases this potential for violence but challenges arise around groups which are not overtly violent and yet violence is carried out in their name.95 These difficulties in the division of operational responsibility are further brought into focus on the MI5 website, which states; domestic extremism mainly refers to individuals or groups that carry out criminal acts in pursuit of a larger agenda, such as “right-­wing extremists”. They may seek to change legislation or influence domestic policy and try to achieve this outside of the normal democratic process. For the most part, they pose a threat to public order but not to national security and are investigated by the police, not MI5.96 This approach is reminiscent of the earlier thinking which prevailed in the development of the original Contest Strategy, i.e. that RWE is predominantly a policing issue which falls into the wider responses to racism and preserving public order, rather than terrorism.

The Prevent Strategy and counter extremism The perceived lack of progress in relation to countering “extremism” since the Prevent Review of 2011 was highlighted during the second reading of the Counter Terrorism & Security Bill by Labour MP Hazel Blears, former Secretary of State for CLG who oversaw the early development of the Prevent Strategy; the Department for Communities and Local Government was charged with producing just such a strategy three years ago, but it has not done so. My big concern about the Bill is that it appears to have a gaping hole at its centre. We have a lot about action on individuals who are radicalised, but it has little to say about countering the narrative and countering extremism in general.97 Further to this, Yvette Cooper MP pointed out that; The Home Secretary has talked many times … about the fact that she has passed some of the Prevent work to the Department for Communities and Local Government, but it is of considerable concern to us that there is no evidence that it is doing significant work on it. The community-­led programme to counter radicalisation simply does not seem to be strong or effective enough.98 It is this criticism that has led not to the review of how responses to extremism, and significantly, responses to the EDL, had been undertaken under the auspices of the Integration Strategy but rather to the creation of a separate Extremism Strategy.99 The review of 2011 aimed to focus more expansively on non-­violent

Preventing right-wing extremism   55 forms of extremism and yet the Extremism Strategy would appear to have the same strategic intention at its heart, implying that the policy distinction between OSCT and DCLG has failed. These are potentially overlapping policy areas that risk confusion between funded counter extremism staff, designated “Community Coordinators” working alongside those delivering the Prevent Strategy at a local authority level. On the front line how are practitioners to navigate this terminological chaos? It is also notable that the EDL is not referenced once within the Extremism Strategy and so it is difficult to envisage whether its national implementation will initiate any significant changes to the state responses to the EDL, and so this operational gap is likely to persist.

The moving target The research underpinning this book has been described as focussing on what is essentially a moving target in exploring state responses to RWE. This description is nowhere more appropriate than when considering the contentious and fast-­ moving Prevent Strategy, particularly in relation to its relationship with the DCLG Integration Strategy and latterly the Extremism Strategy. The national implementation of the Prevent Strategy statutory duty as well as the continued debate over the definition of “extremism” within the new Extremism Strategy will ensure that there are still many twists in the Prevent Strategy story to come. The discussion around the Prevent Strategy and extremism more broadly was rekindled in the wake of a series of terror attacks in the U.K. between March and June 2017.100 As a result, Prime Minister Theresa May set out plans for the creation of a Commission for Countering Extremism, which would be established as a statutory body, legally compelled to identify extremism in communities where it threatens to undermine British values”.101 This Commission and its mandate are taking shape but when we consider the difficulties being experienced around the way “extremism” is defined at a policy level and the implications for the definition of right-­wing extremism in particular, coupled with the work of the Extremism Analysis Unit which is also exploring links between far right extremists in the U.K. and European counterparts102, its scope is difficult to determine as it will of necessity cover policy areas including the Prevent Strategy, the Extremism Strategy as well as the wider concept of British Values, and, like the Extremism Analysis Unit, will advise cross-­Government departments. With regard to the EDL, in October 2013 its leader, Tommy Robinson, stepped down, citing his fears that far right extremists were infiltrating the movement. What remains of the movement is not able to coordinate the large national demonstrations it once could, and without a galvanising leader, much of its activity has moved into the online social media space. It is particularly interesting that with the resultant diminishing activity of the EDL since the departure of its leader, there is recognition of the wider sentiment that underpins the group; So the thinking we’re doing and how we are responding in policy terms is trying to shift our focus away from worrying so much about the EDL as an

56   Preventing right-wing extremism organized protest group, partly on a threat basis, you know, they can’t mobilize the people they could even two years ago or even this summer. And partly also because what we do see as the organized far right is shrinking and fracturing, there is still the wider sentiment out there that certainly the new far right has fed off.103 This direction of travel would seem to be in keeping with those researchers who have challenged the commonly held stereotypes of EDL supporters, to find a wider base of support for their values, if not their tactics.104 It is perhaps ironic that this goes back to the work undertaken by the Connecting Communities initiative in terms of the wider societal challenge to “drain the pool”105 of the wider support for extremist parties and organisations. It is clear that more work is required to clarify ownership of these various issues from an over-­arching policy perspective. When we consider the identification of the National Action group as a proscribed far-­right terrorist organisation, and the ensuing level of counter terrorism policing activity and public attention on the RWE phenomenon, we must not forget about the more difficult challenge posed by the EDL. National Action represents a clear example of a far right terrorist organisation that necessitates a counter terrorism response, and yet the definitional and operational challenges surrounding the EDL as a result of years of ineffective policies are not as straightforward to resolve.

Notes    1 Contest Strategy (Cmnd. 6888, 2006) p. 9 para. 42.    2 Interview 16 – researcher specialising in RWE, August 2014.    3 House of Commons Home Affairs Committee – Project Contest: The Government’s Counter-­Terrorism Strategy – Ninth Report of session 2008–2009 (HC 212, 2009) p. 4 para. 2.    4 CONTEST: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism – Annual Report (Cmnd. 8583, March 2013) p. 9 para. 24.    5 The Four Pillars of Contest are as follows: Preventing terrorism by tackling the radicalisation of individuals; Pursuing terrorists and those that sponsor them; Protecting the public, key national services, and UK interests overseas; and Preparing for the consequences – Contest Strategy (Cmnd. 6888, 2006).    6 Interview 16 – researcher specialising in RWE, August 2014.    7 Interview 1 – retired Home Office senior civil servant, September 2013.    8 Gable, Gerry and Jackson, Paul, Note 21, Chapter 1, supra. p. 24.    9 Interview 1 – retired Home Office senior civil servant, September 2013.   10 In the original Contest Strategy, the Prevent Strategy objectives were: (1) tackling disadvantage and supporting reform – addressing structural problems in the UK and overseas that may contribute to radicalisation, such as inequalities and discrimination; (2) deterring those who facilitate terrorism and those who encourage others to become terrorists – changing the environment in which the extremists and those radicalising others can operate; and (3) engaging in the battle of ideas – challenging the ideologies that extremists believe can justify the use of violence, primarily by helping Muslims who wish to dispute these ideas to do so (Contest Strategy (Cmnd. 6888, 2006) p. 1).   11 Prevent Strategy Review, Note 19, Introduction, supra, p. 6 para. 3.8.

Preventing right-wing extremism   57   12 Prevent Strategy Review, Note 19, Introduction, supra, p. 8 para. 3.29.   13 Contest Strategy (Cmnd. 6888, 2006) p. 13 para. 53.   14 The revised objectives were to; (1) Challenge the ideology behind violent extremism and support mainstream voices, (2) Disrupt those who promote violent extremism and support the places where they operate, (3) Support individuals who are vulnerable to recruitment, or have already been recruited by violent extremists, (4) Increase the resilience of communities to violent extremism, and (5) Address the grievances which ideologues are exploiting. (Contest Strategy (Cmnd. 7547, 2009) p. 83).   15 “The perception that Prevent funding is targeted at projects which ‘spy’ on Muslims was shared by a large number of our witnesses and is seen to be a major failing of the programme” – House of Commons, Communities and Local Government Committee: “Preventing Violent Extremism” – Sixth Report of session 2009–2010 (HC 65, March 2010) p. 13 para. 25.   16 HC 65, March 2010, p. 8 para. 11.   17 HC 65, March 2010, p. 15 para. 31.   18 See for instance: Kundnani, Arun, Note 70, Chapter 1, supra.; Maher, Shiraz, and Frampton, Martyn (2009) “Choosing our friends wisely” – Criteria for engagement with Muslim groups; Klausen, J., “British counter-­terrorism after 7/7: Adapting community policing to the fight against domestic terrorism”. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 35.3 (2009): 403–420; Croft, S. and Moore, C., “The evolution of threat narratives in the age of terror: understanding terrorist threats in Britain”. International Affairs 86.4 (2010): 821–835; Lowndes, V. and Thorp, L. “Preventing violent extremism: Why local context matters”. In The New Extremism in 21st Century Britain (Routledge, 2010): 123; Bartlett, J. From Suspects to Citizens: Preventing Violent Extremism in a Big Society (Demos, 2010).   19 See also Heath-­Kelly, Charlotte. “Counter-­terrorism and the counterfactual: Producing the ‘radicalisation’ discourse and the U.K PREVENT strategy”. The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 15.3 (2013): 394–415.   20 See for example Maher, Shiraz and Martyn Frampton, Note 18, Chapter 2, supra.   21 Maher, Shiraz and Frampton, Martyn, Note 18, Chapter 2, supra.   22 For more on this topic see: Spalek, Basia, and Robert Lambert, Note 70, Chapter 1, supra.; Gartenstein-­Ross, D. and Grossman, L., 2009. Homegrown terrorists in the US and UK: An empirical examination of the radicalization process. FDD Center for Terrorism Research, 11; Kundnani, Arun, Note 70, Chapter 1, supra.   23 For more on this topic see: Spalek, Basia, and Robert Lambert, Note 70, Chapter 1, supra.; Kundnani, Arun, Note 70, Chapter 1, supra.; Pantazis, Christina, and Simon Pemberton. “From the ‘old’ to the ‘new’ suspect community examining the impacts of recent U.K counter-­terrorist legislation”. British Journal of Criminology 49.5 (2009): 646–666; Stevens, David, “In extremis: A self–defeating element in the ‘Preventing Violent Extremism’ strategy”. The Political Quarterly 80.4 (2009): 517–525; Lambert, Robert, and Jonathan Githens-­Mazer, Note 10, Introduction, supra.; Thomas, Paul, Failing to Prevent? Responding to the Threat of Violent Extremism (Bloomsbury, 2012); Vertigans, Stephen, “British Muslims and the U.K government’s ‘war on terror’ within: Evidence of a clash of civilizations or emergent de–civilizing processes?” The British Journal of Sociology 61.1 (2010): 26–44; Richards, Anthony, “The problem with ‘radicalisation’: the remit of ‘Prevent’ and the need to refocus on terrorism in the U.K” International Affairs 87:1 (2011) 143–152; Heath-­Kelly, Charlotte. “Counter-­ terrorism and the counterfactual: Producing the ‘radicalisation’ discourse and the U.K PREVENT strategy”. The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 15.3 (2013): 394–415; Kundnani, Arun, Note 64 supra.; O’Toole, Therese, et al. “Governing through prevent? Regulation and contested practice in State–Muslim engagement”. Sociology (2015); Stuart, Hannah (2015) “Community Policing and Preventing Extremism: Lessons from Bradford” – Centre for the Response to radicalisation and terrorism, Policy Paper No. 4 – The Henry Jackson Society.

58   Preventing right-wing extremism   24   25   26   27   28   29   30   31   32   33   34

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HC 65, March 2010, p. 22 para. 53. Interview 1 – retired Home Office senior civil servant, September 2013. HC 65, March 2010, p. 20 para. 45. HC 65, March 2010, p. 20 para. 46. The EDL were the only group noted as an example of the extreme right wing within the “Prevent Review: Summary of Responses to the Consultation” p. 9. The Prevent Strategy, Note 19, Introduction, supra, p. 55. Channel: Protecting vulnerable people from being drawn into Terrorism (2012) p. 11. HC 65, March 2010, p. 14 para. 30. HC 65, March 2010, p. 17 para. 37. Interview 2 – civil servant, OSCT, September 2013. For more on this topic see; Silber, Mitchell D., and Arvin Bhatt – Senior Intelligence Analysts NYPD Intelligence Division (2007) “Radicalization in the West: The Home-­grown Threat”; Horgan, J. “From profiles to pathways and roots to routes: Perspectives from psychology on radicalisation into terrorism”. The Annals of the Amer­ican Academy of Political and Social Science 618 (2008): 1, 80–94; Neumann, Peter R. (2008) ‘Introduction’, in Perspectives on Radicalisation and Political Violence: Papers from the First International Conference on Radicalisation and Political Violence, London 17–18 January 2008 (London: International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence): 3–7; Neumann, Peter R, “The trouble with radicalisation”. International Affairs 89.4 (2013): 873–893; Mandel, D.R. ‘Radicalization: What does it mean?’, in T. Pick, A. Speckhard and B. Jacuch (eds.), “Home-­ Grown Terrorism: Understanding and Addressing the Root Causes of Radicalisation among Groups with an Immigrant Heritage in Europe” (IOS Press 2009), 101–113; Githens-­Mazer, J. (2010) ‘Rethinking the causal concept of Islamic radicalization: Political concepts’, Committee on Concepts and Methods Working Paper Series, 42; Lambert, Robert, and Jonathan Githens-­Mazer, “Why conventional wisdom on radicalisation fails: the persistence of a failed discourse”. International Affairs 86.4 (2010): 889–901; Richards, Anthony, “The problem with ‘radicalisation’: the remit of ‘Prevent’ and the need to refocus on terrorism in the U.K” International Affairs 87.1 (2011) 143–152; Heath-­Kelly, Charlotte, “Counter-­terrorism and the counterfactual: Producing the ‘radicalisation’ discourse and the U.K PREVENT strategy”. The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 15.3 (2013): 394–415; Martin, Thomas, “Governing an unknowable future: the politics of Britain’s Prevent policy”. Critical Studies on Terrorism 7.1 (2014): 62–78. See for example; Blazak, Randy, Note 87, Chapter 1, supra, p. 989. Interview 11 – John Denham MP, former Secretary of State for Communities & Local Government, July 2014. Interview 17 – Channel practitioner, August 2014. Interview 15 – local authority Prevent practitioner, July 2014. HC 65, March 2010, p. 58 para. 157. Interview 11 – John Denham MP, former Secretary of State for Communities & Local Government, July 2014. Interview 11 – John Denham MP, former Secretary of State for Communities & Local Government, July 2014. HC 65, March 2010, p. 20 para. 47. See for example: Spalek, Basia, and Robert Lambert, Note 70, Chapter 1, supra.; Spalek, Basia, “Community Policing, Trust, and Muslim Communities in Relation to the ‘New Terrorism’ ” Politics & Policy, 38.4 (2010): 789–815; Choudhury, Tufyal, and Helen Fenwick (2011) “The Impact of counter-­terrorism measures on Muslim Communities” – Equality and Human Rights Commission Research report 72; Innes, Martin, Roberts, Colin and Innes, Helen with Lowe, Trudy and Lakhani,

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  46

  47   48   49   50

Suraj (2011) ‘Assessing the effects of Prevent Policing – a report to the Association of Chief Police Officers’ – Universities’ Police Science Institute, Cardiff University. For an example of where these funding streams have become blurred and precipitated significant backlashes from communities see; Lewis, Paul (17/06/2010) The Guardian; “Birmingham stops camera surveillance in Muslim areas”. See Kundnani, Arun, Note 70, Chapter 1, supra.; Maher, Shiraz and Frampton, Martyn, Note 18, Chapter 2, supra.; Richards, Anthony, “The problem with ‘radicalisation’: The remit of ‘Prevent’ and the need to refocus on terrorism in the U.K”. International Affairs 87.1 (2011): 143–152. See for example; Saggar, Shamit, “The one per cent world: Managing the myth of Muslim religious extremism”. The Political Quarterly 77.3 (2006): 314–327; Kundnani, Arun, Note 70, Chapter 1, supra.; Maher, Shiraz, and Martyn Frampton, Note 18, Chapter 2, supra. Prime Minister David Cameron’s speech at the Munich Security Conference – Saturday 5 February 2011. Contest Strategy (Cmnd. 7547, 2009) p. 80. Desai, Unmesh (14/06/2011) The Guardian; “No, you cannot treat violent and non-­ violent extremism separately”. See Prevent Strategy Review, Note 19, Introduction, supra, p. 21 para. 5.43; Extreme right-­wing terrorism, like Al Qaida-­influenced terrorism, is driven by a supremacist ideology, which sanctions the use of extreme violence as a response to perceived social injustice and dysfunction. That ideology is a response to and reflects a perception that identity itself is under threat from social change. People can be drawn to right-­wing terrorist ideology through the rhetoric and language of apparently non-­violent right-­wing extremist groups.

  51 House of Commons, Communities and Local Government Committee: “Preventing Violent Extremism” – Sixth Report of session 2009–2010 (HC 65, March 2010).   52 Home Affairs Committee – Nineteenth Report: “Roots of violent radicalisation” (HC 1446, 2012), notably para. 28; We accept that Prevent resources should be allocated proportionately to the terrorist threat and that to an extent we must rely upon the intelligence and security services to make this judgement. However, we received persuasive evidence about the potential threat from extreme far-­right terrorism. The ease of travel and communications between countries in Europe and the growth of far-­right organisations, which appear to have good communications with like-­minded groups within Europe, suggest that the current lack of firm evidence should not be a reason for neglecting this area of risk. The Prevent Strategy should outline more clearly the actions to be taken to tackle far right radicalisation as well as explicitly acknowledge the potential interplay between different forms of violent extremism, and the potential for measures directed at far-­right extremism to have a consequential effect on Islamist extremism, and vice versa.   53 Lord Macdonald, Review of Counter-­terrorism and Security Powers (Cm 8003, London, 2011).   54 “Prevent Review: Summary of Responses to the Consultation” p. 9.   55 Lord Macdonald’s review Note 53, Chapter 2, supra.   56 Jackson, Paul (lead author), “The EDL: Britain’s ‘New Far Right’ Social Movement” – University of Northampton’s Radicalism and New Media Research Group p.  62. See also Briggs, Rachel, “Community engagement for counterterrorism: Lessons from the United Kingdom”. International Affairs 86. 4 (2010): 971–981.   57 HC 65, March 2010, p. 21 para. 48.   58 Prevent Strategy Review, Note 19, Introduction, supra, p. 20.

60   Preventing right-wing extremism   59 Interview 2 – civil servant, OSCT, September 2013.   60 Security Minister’s speech for the Far-­Right Special Interest Group conference delivered on the 5 September 2013.   61 HC 65, March 2010, p. 3.   62 Prevent Strategy Review, Note 19, Introduction, supra, p. 24 para. 6.2.   63 Prevent Strategy Review, Note 19, Introduction, supra, p. 39 para. 7.1.   64 This contains the Secretary of State’s view on what makes an integrated community and consists of five parts: Common ground, Responsibility, Social mobility, Participation and empowerment, and Tackling intolerance and extremism – “Creating the Conditions for Integration” – Department for Communities and Local Government, p. 5.   65 The DCLG approach to tackling intolerance and extremism consists of the following work streams: (1) Setting a tone publicly, i.e. Ministers talking about the EDL and influencing public debate, (2) Helping academic experts to develop the research and thinking in this area, and (3) This is underpinned by funding specific projects to undermine the EDL. There are three such “Demonstration Projects”, namely (a) The Special Interest Group (SIG) on the EDL was set up by Blackburn with Darwen Borough Council and Luton Borough Council, working with DCLG. DCLG allocated £200,000 of funding to the group for project work (which largely consisted of workshops to share best practice). The group was launched in January 2013 and had a series of seminars and a conference which took place in September 2013, (b) Searchlight has been funded £66,000 and have run pilots in four neighbourhoods, producing newspapers that are pro-­integration, and support the voluntary sector and development of social capital/ communities who see the benefits of increased integration, and (c) “Show Racism the Red Card” has been given £200,000 to deliver workshops to young people. The theme of the workshops is to address the EDL narrative directly.   66 Interview 3 – civil servant, DCLG, September 2013.   67 Interview 8 – civil servant, DCLG, February 2014.   68 Interview 3 – civil servant, DCLG, September 2013.   69 Interview 15 – local authority Prevent practitioner, November 2014.   70 Interview 14 – senior police officer, National Domestic Extremism & Disorder Unit, May 2014.   71 The “14 words” are as follows; “We must secure the existence of our people and a future for White children”. This is the motto of Pro-­White activists worldwide and first coined by David Lane. The 14 words were derived from Volume 1, Chapter 8 of Adolf Hitler’s Mein Kampf ; What we must fight for is to safeguard the existence and reproduction of our race and our people, the sustenance of our children and the purity of our blood, the freedom and independence of the fatherland, so that our people may mature for the fulfilment of the mission allotted it by the creator of the universe. (Source: Stormfront website, www.stormfront.org/)   72   73   74   75   76   77

Interview 5 – far right intervention specialist, June 2014. Interview 9 – former head of local authority, February 2014. Interview 16 – researcher specialising in RWE, August 2014. Interview 20 – senior police Prevent practitioner, September 2014. Interview 17 – Channel practitioner, August 2014. In October 2013, Ukrainian born terrorist Pavlo Lapshyn was convicted for racially-­ motivated murder and for plotting a campaign of terror against mosques in the UK. Source: Ramalingam, Vidhya, “Government responses to far-­right extremism: Learning from 10 European states”. Journal Exit-­Deutschland. Zeitschrift für Deradikalisierung und demokratische Kultur 1 (2014): 258–293.   78 Interview 14 – senior police officer, National Domestic Extremism & Disorder Unit, May 2014.

Preventing right-wing extremism   61   79 For a content analysis of U.K. newspapers comparing responses to the Lee Rigby and Saleem Mohammed murders see Awan, Imran, and Mohammed Rahman. “Portrayal of Muslims Following the Murders of Lee Rigby in Woolwich and Mohammed Saleem in Birmingham: A Content Analysis of U.K Newspapers”. Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 36.1 (2016): 16–31.   80 Interview 16 – researcher specialising in RWE, August 2014.   81 Interview 20 – senior police Prevent practitioner, September 2014.   82 Interview 15 – local authority Prevent practitioner, July 2014.   83 Interview 10 – civil servant, OSCT, August 2014.   84 Security Minister’s speech for the Far-­Right Special Interest Group conference delivered on the 5 September 2013.   85 Interview 8 – civil servant working within DCLG, February 2014.   86 National Police Chief ’s Council Channel statistics – www.npcc.police.uk/Freedom ofInformation/NationalChannelReferralFigures.aspx.   87 BBC News (19/08/2017) “UK terror threat increased by IS losses, security minister says”.   88 Prevent Duty Guidance in England and Wales, 2015 p. 2.   89 www.gov.uk (17/09/2015) “PM’s Extremism Taskforce: tackling extremism in universities and colleges top of the agenda” – www.gov.uk/government/news/pms-­ extremism-taskforce-­tackling-extremism-­in-universities-­and-colleges-­top-of-­theagenda.   90 Interview 2 – civil servant, OSCT, September 2013.   91 Eatwell, Roger, “Community Cohesion and Cumulative Extremism in Contemporary Britain”. The Political Quarterly 77.2 (April–June 2006):  205. See also: Busher, Joel, and Graham Macklin. “Interpreting ‘cumulative extremism’: Six proposals for enhancing conceptual clarity”. Terrorism and Political Violence 27.5 (2015): 884–905.   92 Contest: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism, Annual Report (Cmnd. 8583, March 2013) p. 22 para. 2.47.   93 For instance, as posited during the Home Affairs Committee on the “roots of radicalisation”; The potential for a spiral of violence between different forms of extremism. What I mean by that is something that we have not seen since Northern Ireland, which is the potential for far-­right extremisms to enact violence or confrontation against, for example, an AQ-­inspired group, to bomb a mosque or something of that nature and then for that action to be retaliated. It wouldn’t really take too long for a spiral of violence to emerge. (HC 1446, 2012) para. 45   94 Interview 3 – civil servant, DCLG, September 2013.   95 This view was echoed during the Home Affairs Committee discussion on “the roots of radicalisation”; I think even though far right parties and movements like the EDL are not overtly violent in their ambitions to the same extent that Al Qa’ida-inspired groups are, I would make a case that this movement contains the potential for violence. It gives its followers a specific set of narratives that under certain conditions validate the use of violence. (HC 1446, 2012) para. 44   96   97   98   99

MI5 website – “Domestic Extremism” section; www.mi5.gov.uk/terrorism. House of Commons Debates; HC Deb, 02/12/2014, c209. House of Commons Debates; HC Deb, 02/12/2014, c219. Counter Extremism Strategy, Note 13, Introduction, supra.

62   Preventing right-wing extremism 100 BBC News (19/06/2017) “London Bridge Attack; Timeline of British Terror Attacks”. 101 The Independent (27/05/2017) “Theresa May to set up commission for countering extremism”. 102 The Guardian (06/02/2017) “UK Government hires M&C Saatchi to fight far-­right threat”. 103 Interview 8 – civil servant, DCLG, February 2014. 104 See: John, Peter, and Helen Margetts, Note 13, Chapter 1, supra.; Bartlett, Jamie and Mark Littler, Note 13, Chapter 1, supra.; Goodwin, Matthew, Note 11, Chapter 1, supra. 105 Interview 11 – John Denham MP, former Secretary of State for Communities & Local Government, July 2014.

3 Luton: “where it all began”

Luton has been selected as a case study due to its status as a Prevent Priority Area and having significant experience of responding to the EDL. Additionally, Luton is particularly significant as it is also accredited with being the birthplace and “spiritual home”1 of the movement and its leadership in the form of Stephen Yaxley-­Lennon (aka “Tommy Robinson”) and his deputy, Kevin Carroll, who were based there between 2009 and 2013. As a result, Bedfordshire Police Service, Luton Borough Council and wider partners have accumulated a wealth of experience and expertise in responding to the EDL, elevating the status of this chapter as a “crucial” or “extreme” case study. Based on this experience, Luton practitioners were called upon to inform the DCLG funded Special Interest Group. Luton was the site of the Royal Anglian Homecoming March on the 10 March 2009, where troops returning from Iraq marched through Luton town centre and faced an abusive demonstration led by a group of Muslims known as Al-­ Muhajiroun, a proscribed2 organisation of Islamist extremists; there was a small demonstration of Muslims near to the Town Hall that were holding up placards with things like; “Butchers of Basra”, “British soldiers – baby killers”, all provocative things like that … I don’t think we dealt with it right on the day … the issue was obviously a number of … previous football risk nominals were there, took a grievance to this. There were no arrests … but within the next couple of months there were a couple of demonstrations, low level, local demonstrations to Luton where it was people complaining about that, and they called themselves “United People of Luton” (UPL). This is where … your Yaxley-­Lennons were starting to become more prominent within the group, and there were a couple of demonstrations that got a bit bigger and there was a bit of a run around the town a couple of times with the Police chasing this new group of “right wing” people, fearful because obviously Luton with a big Asian community, anything like this could spark an absolutely mammoth riot, so it was very important to keep the two … opposing sides apart.3 Research undertaken on behalf of the Special Interest Group on far-­right activity points out that rather than this being a “standalone incident”, tensions between

64   Luton: “where it all began” Luton’s ethnic and religious minority groups had been building since the 1980s. By way of context they also highlight that the scale of demographic change in Luton has been particularly acute, with a growth of 230 per cent in its minority population since 1991, coupled with a decline of the white British population of 20.4 per cent since 2001, making Luton a “majority minority town”4 The scale of change is exacerbated by a perceived failure to integrate new and existing communities; We’ve got a very diverse population, but they very much are siloed within their own areas. There’s not much integration. You walk around the town centre and you’ll see a mixture of people but in terms of real integration, there’s none there.5 This incident has become “an iconic image6”, which has galvanised community sentiment around the perceptions of the “Islamist threat”, so elevating Luton’s status as the focal point for English Defence League mobilisations and activists use the “Where It All Began7” tag to promote EDL demonstrations in the town; It’s almost seen as being symbolically important for let’s say far right groups or groups with grievances, to come to Luton.8 It is potentially through the culmination of these environmental factors that the surprisingly rapid growth and national reach of the EDL movement can be attributed. The perceived failure in the way the March 2009 protest was managed fed into existing grievances within the town and how this exacerbated the sense of disparity in the way public authorities reacted to this event was echoed by respondents; A protest was allowed by these … you have to say extremists now, given the banners that they were holding up, right in the town centre, it was an absolute recipe for disaster, it was a real dropping of the ball by Bedfordshire Police.9 Within the context of wider demographic changes and community cohesion challenges, it is unclear whether had Bedfordshire Police been more proactive and made arrests on the day of the demonstration, that that would have been enough to prevent what then followed with the birth of the EDL. It is entirely possible that this one event was able to take root in the fertile ground of poorly integrated communities that had been developing for some time. Given the subsequent issues around reciprocal radicalisation in Luton as manifested between EDL adherents and young Muslim males, this view is also acknowledged by Prevent practitioners; we always tread on eggshells around these kind of things, if they’d have been dealt with as any other group that was promoting that kind of hate out

Luton: “where it all began”   65 in the open, they’d have been arrested at the time and they did get arrested but they didn’t get arrested at the time did they? … I think that was where the EDL was born from really because what they saw was that people were not being policed fairly and said; you’re looking after them, you’re protecting them. I think that was the general feeling in the town at the time in 2009 after that particular demonstration.10 This is particularly important within the context of responses to the EDL because what began ostensibly as a community cohesion issue very quickly escalated into public order and counter terrorism issues, the latter by virtue of the movement’s role in further radicalising both those of a potential extreme right-­wing and Islamist persuasion due to the high profile of their street-­based protests across the U.K. The need to address the issues driving extremism in Luton was captured in the 2012 “SoLUTiONs” Partnership (formerly the Crime & Disorder Reduction Partnership) Strategy which set out that one of the challenges was “Luton’s vulnerability to extremism – including EDL demonstrations and known Muslim extremist activity”.11 Luton has become synonymous with both Islamist extremism and the EDL, being described as “the epicentre of the global clash of civilisations12” and has played host to a number of local and national EDL demonstrations. I think people assume it’s going to be a hotbed of EDL living alongside a large Muslim population and I don’t think that’s the case.13 Concern about the reputational impact of this reciprocal EDL/Islamist activity on the town was emphasised by a police Prevent practitioner with extensive experience of engaging across a range of Luton’s communities; Most people in Luton were just really peed off with that, saying that every time something happens in Afghanistan, Sky News comes and asks what’s happening in Luton.14 It is perhaps not surprising that given the scale of the manifest community cohesion issues in Luton that the town is seen as a barometer for wider community tensions across the U.K. Many of the respondents voiced frustration about the reputational damage of the EDL on Luton. This was a particularly interesting position to take when referring to a group that was actually forged from inter-­ community tensions in the town, rather than being something alien and therefore not representative of the people living and working there. Rather than recognising that something needed to change locally, many respondents distanced the activities of the EDL from Lutonians with views that were not representative of local people, despite the recognition that many of those attending EDL demonstrations actually lived in the town.

66   Luton: “where it all began”

Protest activity Luton has hosted large national EDL demonstrations and a plethora of smaller protests focussing on local issues. In this section I will make reference to the learning from the most significant events where respondents participated and were able to recount their experiences. The first took place shortly after the March 2009 demonstration which was a planned response in the form of an inaugural EDL march on the 30 August 2009; It was all still very much localised, relatively low numbers of demonstrators and it all then culminated in the first what we’d call the big demonstration. And that was where the EDL had said that they were going to come and march through Luton and we had to go to the Home Office for a banning order to ban any marches within Luton. And that was granted for three months. It was all very new because this wasn’t happening anywhere else in the country. This was the birth of the EDL. They had now called themselves the EDL.15 It was clear from the police and local authority understanding of the origins of the EDL that there was a lot of concern about the movement’s intentions and how this would play out within Luton, particularly with the Muslim community in terms of inter-­communal tensions. A factor in driving these tensions was the EDL’s stated intention to march through Bury Park, home to a sizeable Muslim population. This location has taken on special significance both to the communities who reside there in terms of the existential threat the EDL represents, as well as feeding the EDL narrative that Bury Park represents how Muslim communities are poorly integrated and insular. It is important to highlight that although Luton does not have a significant history of responding to far right political parties and anti-­fascist organisations (as is the case in Newcastle – see Chapter 4) the EDL were not the first with an ambition to march through Bury Park as in 2006 the National Front were banned from marching through the area for very similar reasons as were later articulated by the EDL.16 Later, on the 5 February 2011 following a number of smaller protests across the country, the first large national EDL demonstration took place in Luton; The EDL called their first march in Luton, their homecoming parade, their big march.17 Given the projected scale of the demonstration and the fact the EDL were perceived to be “at their peak”,18 Bedfordshire Police Service mounted Operation Missouri, bringing together a range of statutory partners to deal with everything from road closures to tactics to divert young people from participating; I think to this day, it was probably the biggest EDL march in Great Britain because contrary to the reports at the time saying there were about

Luton: “where it all began”   67 1,500–3,000 EDL on that march, there wasn’t, there were at least 5,000 EDL on that march.19 Then on the 5 May 2012 Luton hosted its second large national demonstration under the auspices of Operation Jersey; The policing operation itself must have cost a fortune because literally, it was like battalions of police coming from as far as Warwickshire. We had Met[ropolitan Police] up there, we had Northampton, we had more police officers than I think we had people in the town. So that must have cost a huge amount of money. The loss to the town centre economy was huge because when you see those levels of policing, and the reality is … the town centre was absolutely empty. There was a big economic hit to the town which put the Chief Exec’s nose out of joint a little bit. The people who were paying their business rates were saying; one of my biggest trading days has gone, what are you going to do about it? And they’re right.20 Practitioners highlighted how it was through the policing of these two large events that the costs of EDL protest started to be realised. Within a climate of austerity measures across the public services in the U.K, local authorities managing EDL protest activity pushed back against the scale of the policing operations necessitating further negotiation with the EDL and counter demonstrations regarding demonstration routes in order to minimise the impact on local residents and businesses. In stark contrast to the large national protests, as much of the leadership of the EDL resided in Luton, there was also a continuous presence of the movement through smaller demonstrations, for example in relation to a “Goals 4 Gaza” football tournament in August 2013,21 and a protest outside an Islamic bookshop in 2012.22 The EDL became a feature of the landscape in Luton, albeit that these smaller protests usually attracted no more than a handful of protestors. We will now explore some of the more specific tactics employed by the police service, working with the local authority and statutory and non-­statutory partners before during and after EDL demonstration activity in Luton.

Tactics employed in response to the English Defence League In determining the tactics employed by state actors in responding to EDL activity it is first necessary to explore practitioners’ perceptions as to the threat represented by the movement. It is significant that not one of the interviewees believed the EDL were a terrorism threat necessitating a counter terrorism response. They were instead perceived by frontline practitioners to be principally a public order issue, and one which negatively impacted upon community cohesion. From a policy perspective, the response to the EDL would seem to then principally reside with the DCLG “Creating the Conditions for Integration” statement;

68   Luton: “where it all began” In terms of the threat that the EDL actually present, my experience if I’m completely honest would be that whilst we probably saw a fair bit of public order offences from them in the early days, as things progressed, it was more the reaction to the EDL that presented as a public order threat than the EDL themselves. And quite frequently it’s been the counter demonstrations that have led to more violent offences and public order matters than the actual EDL themselves.23 There were some particularly interesting perspectives from those police officers who had significant experience in managing public order situations involving the EDL. When discussing the threat profile of the EDL one interviewee stated that; I didn’t even really believe they were a public order threat. The number of arrests and the profile of the crimes that they get arrested for, I think would support the view that they’re not really a public order threat, although they do draw out actions and communities from elsewhere who have opposing views and that conflict of opposing views in itself can cause reactions from all the groups involved that ultimately ends up in public (dis)order. With regard to the 2011 event I didn’t see anything from the EDL themselves that led me to believe they were a particular public order threat. They are a threat to community cohesion because clearly they’ve got extreme views of the world which are in significant conflict with a number of our communities across the U.K, which those communities will mobilise against.24 If the EDL do not pose a public order threat in of themselves, but through the fact their presence precipitates a community reaction which requires a heightened public order police response, then this poses questions around the way in which bans of the EDL are portrayed through the media. It is important to be open about the decision making behind bans of the EDL where the main driver is not in fact the actions of the EDL but the actions of others that underpin the rationale for the application to ban the demonstration. This is extremely significant in that it suggests that the EDL do not pose a public order threat by their own agency, but rather through the counter demonstration they inevitably precipitate when they attend an area to demonstrate. It also has further reaching consequences in that while the police service has a mandate to facilitate peaceful protest, and not to pass value judgements on demonstrations or counter demonstrations on any issue; local authorities have wider responsibilities around community cohesion and political representation. Within the context of how much the policing of EDL marches costs local areas within a climate of austerity, there may be space here for a reflection on the relative numbers involved when comparing the demonstration and the counter demonstration and consideration of wider civic engagement measures that do not involve demonstrations explicitly countering the actions of the EDL, particularly given the reduction in the frequency and scale of the demonstrations the movement is now able to mobilise. Building on this, from a public order and community cohesion perspective, there

Luton: “where it all began”   69 were a number of tactics employed to ensure the demonstrations did not precipitate disorder.

Protest Liaison Teams (PLT) What was clear from the interviewees is that direct engagement with the EDL is only conducted through the police “Protest Liaison Teams” (PLT25). This could be seen as a form of securitised engagement in of itself as the EDL do not have a means of engaging with the local police service and/or local authority outside the parameters of the demonstration planning framework. In support of the overarching strategy for the day of the protest, the PLT will be the dedicated police resource for interfacing directly with the protest organisers working to secure a “no surprises approach”26 as set out in the HMIC guidance27 governing the police management of protests. It was striking that against the backdrop of the EDL being seen as a loutish group of football hooligans,28 those responsible for managing their protest activity portrayed positive accounts of their ability to comply with instructions and effectively self-­steward their own protestors, with one public order commander commenting that “the standard of stewarding was exceptional”;29 They were very switched on; they listened to the briefing and complied with everything that we asked for. But like I say, it was the other side that caused the problem.30 In the absence of any other formal means of engagement between statutory services and the EDL, the views of those police officers directly interacting with EDL representatives are extremely rare and are particularly valuable in gaining a better understanding of the EDL movement and its relationship with local government; The problem we have in Luton in particular … is the perception that they were just a load of football hooligans, meatheads, getting pissed, having a fight … and all that does is feed their agenda that they’re not being taken seriously. And they should be. There are the meatheads and the piss-­heads without a doubt within the group but actually there are a significant number of people there that are articulate, can hold a debate, and should have been listened to. And if they were listened to we would have prevented a lot of the problems we had in Luton.31 We will return to the theme of engaging with the EDL but it is important to emphasise that although it is apparently effective from the perspective of police commanders on the day of the protest, this form of engagement with the EDL is, by its very nature, short term and event driven. This poses a challenge around the reactive nature of the engagement with the EDL rather than there being an appetite to think more strategically and longer term about what this engagement should look like.

70   Luton: “where it all began”

Community messaging and reassurance The emphasis on perceiving the EDL as an external threat against which Lutonians must be protected, extended into the recruitment of “community mentors” to augment the policing response and to exert influence on predominantly young Asian males during protest activity; Working with the council and all of our key partners from the community, we identified mediators. They were trained, as they have been in the past, on the history of the EDL, the history of the tensions, how to keep themselves safe, what was expected of them. And we had about 30 mediators who went out, accompanied by police, and acted as a go-­between between the community and the police.32 This continued emphasis on minimising the impact of EDL attendance on Lutonians, specifically Muslim communities, only highlights the lack of political appetite to engage with wider communities, particularly those who may align themselves with EDL narratives, who, in the absence of effective counter narratives would take to the streets. The focus on dissuading young Muslim males from attending the counter protest was couched as a means of minimising the prospect of them engaging in disorder and being arrested by the police, thereby becoming criminalised through the actions of the EDL; During the day, there were groups of young Asian males who were walking down to the counter protest to support the cause, and the mediators were stopping them, and speaking to them, saying; what are you doing? Where are you going? And then they’d have a dialogue, and it turned out they didn’t even know what they were going to stand for. They didn’t know who was at the counter demonstration. As such, they were able to turn them away … the person I was with said; don’t be so bloody stupid, go away, go home, you’re not going there. He had the air of influence … the community policed themselves.33 While these community mediators were recognised as being operationally necessary, given the frequency of EDL attendance in Luton, respondents highlighted that this has led to many questioning how long such tactics are sustainable; It’s frustrating. And then they came a third time, and by then the community said; we don’t want to waste our time leading in this matter, being community mediators, because if they keep coming again and again, it’s affecting our businesses, affecting our people, it’s like we’re just entertaining them each time and the meetings … I literally took a whole week off work to accommodate meetings. There were about 20 people there all week meeting after meeting and strategizing, so you can imagine, and when it’s not your full-­time role and you’re expecting community members to be

Luton: “where it all began”   71 there, you just think; we’re all just doing this to entertain the EDL, you know?34 It is difficult to see how the police, in the absence of community mediators, could exert influence over members of the local community to dissuade their participation in counter protests thereby minimising the potential for disorder. This also calls into question whether this is a legitimate tactic without a commensurate effort to dissuade EDL adherents from attending the demonstration. However, there was consensus among the respondents that attempts to draw people away from the need to protest is not a role for the police service and is one for local elected representatives to make the case that residents are appropriately represented in order to dissuade them from seeking some form of political expression through street protest. Similar tactics have been utilised elsewhere, for instance the “Keep it Kalm for Keighley” Network was developed in Bradford in response to an EDL demonstration in 2012. Here, community activists were paired with local authority staff (youth service) and police officers to steward key access points into the demonstration area and to encourage people to turn away and not rise to provocation.35 In addition to the mainstream public order tactics, an array of supplementary tactics has also been employed in order to divert people from taking part in either the demonstration or the counter demonstration.

Youth diversionary tactics Within the context of the wider public order operational planning, and aside from the community mentors, there is a particular focus on engaging and deterring young people from involvement on the day of the EDL protest. This was articulated as being necessary due to the potential “criminalisation”36 of young men from both Muslim and non-­Muslim communities; On the day, we identified all the young people that were living both in the areas on the route of the march, and then looked at ways of diverting them. We have community reparation projects. So on the day of the march, kids that were living in that area that we felt could just get involved in it, not through any kind of ideologies, but just get swept along with it because it’s a big group of people drinking and waving flags. So we got them on community projects in parks a mile or two away from the march, supervised by staff. The 16+ team, the social care team that looks after 16–18-year-­old looked after children, they put on a trip … they did a Thorpe Park trip where they took people out, so real bog-­standard diversions like that.37 There was a recognition among practitioners, particularly on the local authority side that this tactic did not seek to address the underlying grievances that may have indicated a potential susceptibility to RWE narratives as it was intended to cater for the “boredom factor”,38 i.e. those individuals who lived in the locality

72   Luton: “where it all began” of the planned march who may have attended out of curiosity only to then be drawn into public disorder. While this initiative did successfully divert a number of young people away from the route of the march, the tactic was not without its detractors; Young people aren’t that stupid, they knew what was going on. And it didn’t work that well … the people on the trips that we took wouldn’t have gone to the march anyway. And even if you target them, they’re still going to go, because that’s where they want to go, or they make an excuse that they can’t go, and then they go down to the town.39 In addition to the targeted work to divert young individuals from participating in the protest, during the planning for the February 2011 EDL march, a public education exercise was launched comprising of “Consequence Cards”. These were business cards that were disseminated to schools and youth groups in order to “show young people the legal and personal ramifications of engaging in far-­ right extremist activity through user-­friendly cards distributed at key events”.40 The intention of this initiative was to send a message to young people who may have been interested in attending the march that there may be severe consequences to their attendance that they may not have anticipated; And the message we were trying to give to young people in particular was consequences. The consequences of the actions; yes we know its hurtful, but by you acting in a silly manner, and it was very much angled towards young men in particular, you will end up being charged, you will end up having a tarnished reputation, both in the eyes of the community and as well as when you go into work, you will have a criminal record, so don’t be provoked. And we worked very hard with the community to stop that.41 Again, this was a broad stroke strategy which was not focussed upon the ideological underpinnings of young people who could be swept up into an EDL protest. For specialist support in this regard we turn to the local application of the Prevent Strategy.

The role of the Prevent Strategy Luton is resourced by a Regional Prevent Coordinator (RPC) and a number of regional Prevent practitioners. These are allocated to Forces within the region dependent upon the local threat assessments, notably the Counter Terrorism Local Profile (CTLP). Luton, given its status as a priority area within the Prevent Strategy Review of 2011, has dedicated Prevent Strategy and Channel staff both from a police and local authority perspective. Against the backdrop of the public order policing response it was evident there was a divergence of views along organisational lines on the identification of the EDL and its adherence to extreme right-­wing ideology. One of the most prevalent themes throughout the interviews

Luton: “where it all began”   73 with practitioners was around the definitional issues touched upon in the introduction of this book. In line with the National Domestic Extremism and Disorder Unit (NDEDIU) assessment, the local police Prevent Strategy team conceptualise “Defence Leagues” as a category separate to RWE/far right extremist groups. This understanding was vocalised in a range of ways by the police practitioners and rather than them necessarily being aware of the NDEDIU assessment, the evidence suggests they reached this determination based upon their own personal experience of dealing with EDL-­related issues, coupled with training inputs and wider exposure to thinking in this area due to their status as a Prevent Priority Area; They are not what I would call proper right-­wing individuals who are politicized by issues of race to the degree that they’re an Amer­ican right-­wing group or as far as the Clan or anything like that.42 However, there were differing perspectives from the Luton Council. Whereas on the policing side there was an appreciation of there being a broad spectrum of “extreme” right-­wing adherence, the local authority instead treats the EDL as an extremist organisation which falls within the remit of the Prevent Agenda; I think the council still sees the EDL as an extreme right-­wing group and when they do their presentations they say; we have problems in the town, we have to balance this with extreme right-­wing groups like the EDL. I don’t know about other councils, but I think Luton Borough Council still considers them as a right-­wing issue which would fall under Prevent.43 Despite the differing views and the inter-­agency “tension”44 that arises on this point, there was consensus among the interviewees that the principal management of the EDL is carried out through public order policing. In relation to the role of the Prevent Strategy on the day of the EDL demonstration, this was seen by Prevent Police practitioners as an opportunity to promulgate an understanding of the Prevent Strategy through briefing the public order officers taking part with an emphasis on them being aware of the Channel programme for vulnerable individuals attending the demonstration.45 Significantly though, rather than Prevent officers being deployed to undertake Prevent-­specific activity in response to an EDL demonstration, they are instead utilised to engage with existing community contacts to monitor tensions and feedback community sentiment, therefore arguably playing the community cohesion role that was theoretically divorced from the Prevent Strategy in 2011; We get involved in some of that obviously because of our community contacts and we’ve got contacts in a lot of the mosques and places like that, so we can help out. And the other thing is, if we’re seen to be directly involved, there would be a suggestion that there are bigger CT issues around the march coming to Luton.46

74   Luton: “where it all began” This is particularly relevant from a definitional perspective as Prevent officers were acutely cognisant of the impact of their involvement in any form of interaction with the public, and the way their presence could be seen as an indication of wider counter terrorism concerns. It was also acknowledged by Prevent police officers there is a danger that police officers working under the auspices of the Prevent Strategy could “securitise” relationships with the white working-­class population in the same way as took place with Muslim communities. When considering the wider impact of the explicit inclusion of RWE to the Prevent Strategy in 2011, the interviews in Luton corroborate the findings discussed in Chapter 2, in that this did not precipitate a fundamental change in the way the Prevent Strategy was delivered with respect to RWE and there were similar concerns raised as to how a target audience for the Prevent Strategy engagement around right-­wing issues could be identified. There was however a beneficial by-­ product in that the inclusion of RWE had been used as a means of increasing engagement with Muslim communities who had thus far been resistant due to the way The Prevent Strategy had been seen to target their communities. The sensitivities around the Prevent Strategy “brand” were evident in the “Building Cohesion in Luton” report of 2011, where one of the findings was; In Luton, as in similar areas across the country, the Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) Grant is frequently accused of stigmatising the Islamic faith and the wider Asian community. The Commission found evidence that PVE was regarded by some outside of the Asian community as special treatment for a problematic group of people.47 In being able to point to a RWE case study within the updated Home Office WRAP (version 3) product, practitioners were able to demonstrate a balanced response and this was seen as being extremely important to building trust and confidence as the desire for a parity of response was evident; We tried to set up a community group to tackle the Al Maj boys and the only way we could engage with them was well, they said; we want you to tackle the EDL as well.48 Practitioners acknowledged that this is potentially problematic in that the inclusion of RWE within the Prevent Strategy has therefore created a community expectation that the Prevent practitioners will now address the EDL as this is seen by Muslim communities as the predominant RWE issue. However, if the police service does not categorise the EDL as being extreme right-­wing, but as a “Defence League” who do not subscribe to right-­wing ideology, then this expectation is not being met. It is as a result of these community expectations that Prevent officers have been drawn into the planning around EDL demonstrations, but significantly not to engage around issues synonymous with the “extreme” right-­wing, but rather to utilise existing relationships with Muslim communities to provide reassurance and promote community cohesion;

Luton: “where it all began”   75 I would say they are treated almost as a far-­right group, but they’re not actually a far-­right group in classification terms. The reason we respond to it in that way is the impact it has on the town. Because if BNP came to town or some far right group came to Luton, it would have the same community impact and the same ripple effects and response as would an EDL demo, because I think they’ve got that sort of status so I think in the legal definition they’re not but in terms of a response and how they’re seen, they are perceived as one.49 It is important to note that although the EDL movement itself was not perceived to subscribe to extreme right-­wing ideology, there was recognition that individuals with such allegiances were attending the demonstrations; There is no surprise for us that at English Defence League demos there are people who are actively in the far right that will be there. And it is likely … there’s going to be an issue of grievances that then become protest and then how people look at that.50 Infiltration by extreme right-­wing groups is what the EDL’s leader, Tommy Robinson, claims was the reason for him standing down.51 However, the presence of extreme right-­wing adherents within the ranks of the EDL should be viewed within the context of the front-­line practitioner experience, which demonstrates that the EDL is a broad church of views and grievances, the conflation of which have contributed to the blurring of the lines between the Prevent Strategy and DCLG’s Integration Strategy. Channel It was clear that dedicated Channel practitioners in Luton had been working with referrals demonstrating vulnerabilities to being drawn into non-­Islamist forms of extremism even pre-­2011, albeit that they were fewer in number. In exploring with them whether the addition of RWE explicitly within the Prevent Strategy brought about any changes to the way they did business, the evidence suggests that it did not. It did not precipitate an increase in individuals who were vulnerable to being drawn into right-­wing extremism being managed within the Channel programme. This was attributed to the definitional issues whereby individuals referred to Channel may have had allegiances to the EDL but this was seen as being some way from them subscribing to an extreme right-­wing ideology; Most of the ones I’ve dealt with, if you asked them what they thought about the 14 words, they’d look at you blankly, like; what’s that? If you asked about Tommy Robinson they’d say; yeah he’s a good lad, he’s a top man.52 Practitioners believed that the programme was equally applicable to individuals identified as being vulnerable to being drawn into right-­wing orientated extremism as it was for those of an Islamist mind-­set;

76   Luton: “where it all began” if we were dealing with somebody who was of a far-­right ideology the process we would go through would be exactly the same as if we were dealing with somebody who was of an Islamic extremism ideology in that we would identify it, we would identify if there are any other vulnerabilities that were contributing to that ideology, we would consider referral to Channel and we would consider an intervention.53 The process is the same but the form of the intervention is where there are differences. The Home Office has a number of accredited intervention providers who specialise in identifying susceptibility to extreme right-­wing ideology. However, among these service providers there was a consensus that the EDL as a movement did not subscribe to extreme right-­wing narratives. There was also a particularly interesting stance on the EDL being seen as a gateway to right-­wing extremism, in much the same way ALM is perceived as an incubator of Islamist terrorism; It is possible and I’m sure there are some people who have been involved in the EDL and they have gone on to the further right stuff, I’m sure of that but I can’t say that’s the norm because you could counteract that by saying some young guys will turn up and they’ll never go again. I used to say, during my youth work days, we’d talk about drug use. Just because someone’s smoking Cannabis doesn’t mean they’re going to go on to be a Heroin user. It could. But it doesn’t mean they’re going to.54 Further to this, one practitioner stated that his experience was of; “the EDL not being hard line enough for people”.55 It is this differentiation between the EDL as a movement of people who do not subscribe to extreme right-­wing ideology and the acceptance that there are individuals in its number who do have this mindset that explains what appears first as a contradictory position, i.e. that Luton, as the birthplace of the EDL, has very low numbers of RWE referrals to the Channel programme. The expectation that Luton would be a high yielding identifier of individuals vulnerable to right-­wing narratives is not borne out from the practitioner experience; We’ve done a huge amount of training in schools and social services, frontline workers, mental health workers, and we’re not getting those referrals, but we’re getting masses of the others, so that would suggest to me that that problem isn’t there and it’s something the government have only put in because of pressure from Muslim communities.56 There was a general consensus among respondents that the politicised nature of counter terrorism, coupled with the way in which the first iteration of the Prevent Strategy was criticised for its focus on Muslim communities, has led to a perceived need to demonstrate explicitly there is a parity of response across all forms of extremism rather than there being an operational requirement based upon risk and threat emanating from right-­wing extremism in particular. All of

Luton: “where it all began”   77 the work undertaken to raise awareness of the Prevent Strategy has not precipitated a commensurate increase in referrals of individuals identified as vulnerable to being drawn into right-­wing extremism; Whenever they do a presentation, I think because they feel a need to make a political balance, they really hammer home about right wing issues in the town. But I don’t see it, in the sense of Channel. I think they’ve got a very big issue with the EDL because obviously two of the main leaders came from Luton and they fear it impacts badly on the town … but I do think they highlight the problem and it’s not as severe as they make out, or as I would understand it to be.57

The cost of protest In Luton there were marked differences in approach between the police service and the local authority on how responses to the EDL were packaged and articulated to the public. Within the interviews there were some really valuable insights that depict the scale of the challenges posed by EDL protest activity, which goes to the very heart of political representation, inter-­agency collaboration and how engagement with communities is prioritised. We can see from the stance of senior officials within Luton Borough Council that the actions of the EDL are perceived as not only unrepresentative of Luton residents but also damaging to both community relations as well as the local economy. In reference to the planned 5 May 2012 demonstration, Hazel Simmons, leader of the Labour-­ controlled Luton Council, said: Recent conversations with many people in Luton conveyed the impact of reduced business and disruption to our town centre caused by previous EDL demonstrations. It is clear the majority of people in Luton do not want the EDL or any other protest group causing this sort of disruption again. This is a tough economic climate and we should support our businesses so they can trade as normal over the Bank Holiday weekend.58 In response, Tommy Robinson, then-­leader of the EDL, said the ban had nothing to do with the economy and the group was suffering discrimination; Our protest is against Luton Borough Council and we want to march peacefully through St George’s Square and around the town hall but we will do what the police tell us. The Muslims were able to march bare-­chested through the town when they held a demonstration, but now because of a counter march by UAF the council has surrendered and denied Lutonian men and women access to our own town centre.59 In preparation for the 22 November 2014 demonstration, Councillor Hazel stated; “I am extremely proud of the way our communities united to respond to

78   Luton: “where it all began” previous protests by the EDL. Through their dignified actions, our communities showed the strength and cohesion of spirit that exists in Luton”.60 She went on to say; “while people do have the right to peaceful protest, my message is clear; ‘the EDL is simply not welcome in Luton’ ”.61 Further to this, Councillor Khtija Malik, Portfolio Holder for social justice, said: Luton cannot afford to have its reputation further tarnished by the antics of the EDL. These events seek only to further embed certain false perceptions and damage our potential for economic growth. Based on the current situation it is very regrettable that we do not have any legal tools or powers at our disposal to ban the EDL from Luton.62 What Councillor Simmons refers to as “the real Luton”63 clearly does not include those who subscribe to the views of the EDL. The use of this language is problematic from a statutory agency perspective in that those who are protesting under the auspices of the EDL are by definition not “real” Lutonians, thereby denying the movement’s origins in the town, and contributing to their world view that they are being treated as “second class citizens”64 by their own elected officials. There was a consensus, particularly among non-­council interviewees, that due to the way in which the EDL has been problematised locally, the local authority has not only failed to address the grievances that act as a driver to support for the movement, but has exacerbated them, affording its leadership enhanced credibility in being seen as the voices of an ignored majority; I have said before, even to the Chief Executive, it might be unpalatable but actually, these are residents of your town, and they need to be listened to, if not agreed with obviously, but at least listened to because by not listening to them, you’re feeding their rhetoric. You’re giving them more ammunition. You’re better off sitting and listening, even if you don’t do anything; at least you can say; you can’t say we never met with you because we have.65 This raises difficult questions around representative local government as politicians seek to distance the EDL movement from “the real Luton”, demonstrating how they have not only failed to speak to all sections of the communities they purport to represent, but worse, contributed to the polarisation within communities through delegitimising debate around salient issues such as integration in the town. This is highly reminiscent of the Connecting Communities initiative (see Chapter 2) which sought to create “safe spaces” in order to foster confidence to expose and challenge extreme views. Without such a programme of work, Luton is evidence of how disconnected local politics has become. Separating the EDL movement from Luton could be seen as the local council rejecting any form of responsibility for the movement’s continued existence; If it was another town like Birmingham, or Tower Hamlets, they can say; these are not our guys. Ours is slightly different because they were Lutonians

Luton: “where it all began”   79 so we can’t shout out about that bigger disconnect and say; actually it’s got nothing to do with Luton. It was founded from here … and morally it’s not right either because other places probably have a bigger right to say that because it wasn’t founded there whereas we understand and appreciate it was founded here.66 Of relevance to the reporting around EDL numbers, the idea that the EDL movement is a broad church, made up of a plethora of different agendas, was common among interviewees. The need for a more nuanced approach to the movement, rather than to see them purely as an extreme right-­wing organisation was articulated most frequently by those police officers with direct experience of policing the demonstrations, having processed among the participants and engaging them in conversation; I think they’re quite a difficult community if you were to call the EDL a community, they’re quite a difficult community to define. And I suppose most people think of them as being white working-­class communities. I think that is their heartbeat, but it is wider than that because when I was … amongst the EDL, I was actually walking amongst them as part of the policing plan. There were old veterans there, with their WW2 medals, with their Korea medals. There were a lot of old national servicemen with their medals proudly on show. And some of them had grandchildren there with them. So it’s not just that archetypal football hooligan demographic that turns up at EDL demonstrations. There is a wider demographic as well. There were actually an awful lot of dads and lads from all over the U.K, who are essentially honest, hardworking law-­abiding people. I think where the EDL get their bad name from I suppose is the figureheads have always had that sort of football hooligan type demographic to them. I think they are so much more than that really.67 Many practitioners, particularly from the police and the voluntary sector, highlighted the negative consequences of the Council’s policy of non-­engagement with the EDL; It’s council policy not to talk to the EDL. It’s a bit short sighted because when there’s a march they kind of have to but they tend to leave it with us. Their stated policy is; we won’t talk to the EDL.68 The stance of local politicians was seen by practitioners as being a significant driver to the sense of grievance experienced by those whose views aligned with the EDL. In being seen to favour Muslim communities over white working-­class communities69 and to deny the EDL what they see as their right to protest only fed into the celebrity status of individuals like Tommy Robinson, who were allowed to seize and shape the narrative of white working-­class communities being seen as second-­class citizens;

80   Luton: “where it all began” It’s sad because it feeds Tommy and the group’s view of this so-­called two-­ tier system where they have the belief or the perception that Muslims can get away with everything and if it’s a white working-­class lad or group they just can’t, that’s what they think.70 The tensions within the multi-­agency framework were evident in that many of the public order commanders interviewed voiced their concerns over the local politicians’ lack of understanding of the principles of the Human Rights Act 1998, particularly around the “proportionality”71 of putting restrictions on groups. They spoke of their role as “guardians of the ECHR” (reference to the European Court of Human Rights)72 in the way that they felt they had to defend the rights of what are a minority group from the actions of the local authority seeking to undermine their albeit qualified right to protest. On this role, one stated; I think it does go to our core values of who we are and what we’re about.73 This depiction of the police service acting without fear or favour does however show how policing acts within a sterilised bubble of objectivity, and this is arguably correct. What it does draw out locally however is a tension between the police trying to balance the rights of all involved, and the council who are managing local political pressures. An interesting observation on the role of the police is found in the Luton Borough Council’s “Early Help” strategy for 2014–2017, it points out that; “black and minority ethnic children have negative attitudes towards the police who are perceived to be supportive of the EDL”.74 This view was not borne out in interviews with practitioners but does highlight the difficult operating environment the police find themselves in with regard to EDL protest. The politicking around the EDL is further demonstrated by Luton’s MP Gavin Shuker who stated; It puts Bedfordshire Police in a very difficult position. They are facing major budget cuts, but they have to spend their money not on what people really care about; [instead] we’re standing around in a car park watching 12 idiots shouting. The far right will always find their expressions, but I don’t want them to find it here in this town.75  Further to this and within the context of the Luton Council having to make 50% cuts, a Luton Councillor suggested; “this is now affecting frontline services and the last thing we want to do in my opinion is accommodate a far-­right group”.76 However, in response, an EDL spokesman said: The cost of the policing etc would not be as much as it is if we were allowed to do what we set out to do and that is to protest peacefully. Every time we arrange to highlight issues we have United Against Facism (UAF ) and their ilk countering us … it is more often these people who cause the problems, but the media prefer to make it look like the EDL at fault.77

Luton: “where it all began”   81 This is an interesting point and it is one that was echoed by a public order commander as another example of how the sensitivities around the EDL and the perceived impact the movement has on community cohesion extends to the way in which numbers of protestors are reported; You normally get, typically in Luton, you’d get the EDL versus UAF and a group called “We are Luton”, so the opposing side. If the violence comes from the UAF or the “We Are Luton”, politically, when we do any Press release, or anything around it, we would just relate it to the EDL demonstration, because it would be a very very sensitive issue if we were to put blame on the “home group” if you like. And that also causes us issues where we report things like crowd numbers as well. So we would say maybe that 1,000 EDL have turned up and there are 500 counter demonstrators, which could be very accurate. Even if those figures were 100% accurate, the public might take exception to those because it gives the impression that the EDL have more support in Luton than there is against the EDL. So it all becomes very political. So it can be a bit of a nightmare.78 This is particularly significant in depicting the way in which the EDL are problematised locally and how in fact, efforts to diminish the impact of the movement actually feed into the victim narrative as crafted by its leadership to further demonstrate how local structures of government are not only unrepresentative of those with views aligned to the EDL, but also seek to demonise them as being “right-­wing extremists”, an ideology rejected by the movement. There is very little discourse on the role of the UAF in opposing the EDL but for those policing EDL protests and the inevitable counter protest, this national group is increasingly prominent in supporting supposedly “grass roots” demonstrations against the EDL, and has attracted hardened demonstrators to augment their campaign.

Conclusion Luton’s positionality on the EDL is particularly interesting as the movement is framed as an external threat despite this being a movement that was created within the town, which raises questions around representative government and the need for integration policies that serve all communities. There was very little evidence of work undertaken to better understand the EDL within the context of the wider right-­wing extremism scene and there remain real definitional issues in relation to how the movement is problematised by local actors. The confusion over how the EDL is defined was more evident in the local authority than the police service, which does not categorise the movement as adhering to an extreme right-­wing ideology. There was little evidence that Luton’s status as a Prevent Priority Area has yielded a more developed response to the EDL. It was clear that across Prevent practitioners in both the police service and the local authority, the impact of the

82   Luton: “where it all began” Government’s decision in 2011 to emphasise its utility in addressing “all forms of extremism”, including extreme right-­wing, has been minimal. Although there are more funded staff delivering training to partners, there was no evidence of targeted engagement with white working-­class communities on RWE, or the development of specific counter narratives or the funding of projects to address RWE sentiment. Rather, the emphasis thus far has been on weaving RWE into existing products, such as WRAP3 to cater for a range of extremist narratives, rather than developing bespoke initiatives. The factors for this were (1) the lack of definition around what a broad societal application of the Prevent Strategy would consist of in relation to right-­wing extremism, (2) the overriding counter terrorism threat profile in Luton between 2011 and 2015 was associated with Islamist terrorism, particularly ISIS in Syria rather than that of the extreme right­wing, and (3) with reference to the EDL, the movement is not generally seen as a counter terrorism issue by state actors working in this area. From a policing perspective the EDL are a public order and community cohesion issue, not a counter terrorism threat. There are differing assessments on the correct policy response between the police service and the local authority, with the latter more likely to perceive the EDL as a Prevent, and therefore counter terrorism issue. However, rather than having a specific Prevent mandate, the role of Prevent Strategy staff in the planning for a demonstration is restricted to (1) utilising existing relationships of trust and confidence in order to disseminate community reassurance and gauge tensions, and (2) briefing frontline staff to be aware of the Prevent Strategy with regard to identifying individuals who may be vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism, i.e. for the Channel programme. From a community perspective, as articulated by elected officials and council staff, there was a clear desire for a parity of response to demonstrate even handedness in state interactions with those manifesting extreme Islamist ideologies and those on the extreme right-­wing, which is seen by many to include the EDL. Notwithstanding differences of opinion on the Prevent/DCLG policy area issue, statutory partners work together to minimise the impact of EDL demonstrations on Luton’s communities. Aside from public order tactics and the use of Community Mediators to act as brokers between the police and Muslim communities, many of the initiatives undertaken have had a particular focus on diverting young people from attending the demonstration but these were of questionable effectiveness. There was an absence of a nuanced understanding of any underlying ideological adherence to extreme right-­wing narratives that may be present, with these diversionary initiatives instead catering for the “boredom factor” to prevent young individuals who are already receiving support from statutory agencies, from being drawn into polarised protest activity and potentially committing criminal offences as a result. The explicit inclusion of RWE within the Prevent Strategy in 2011 did yield a beneficial by-­product in Prevent practitioner engagement with Muslim communities. Due to the perceived parity in the way extremism issues are managed, this was seen to challenge the view that the strategy was disproportionately focussing on Muslim communities. Prevent practitioners reported significantly

Luton: “where it all began”   83 better experiences of engaging with previously resistant Muslim communities by being able to refer to the fact the strategy covers all forms of extremism. There was however little evidence of how the Prevent Strategy has been embedded around extreme right-­wing issues at a broad societal level. Many practitioners acknowledged that efforts of state actors have been focussed on engaging with minority groups and that there has been a subsequent neglect of prioritised engagement around non-­minority white working-­class communities. The most demonstrable impact of the inclusion of RWE within the Prevent Strategy can be seen in the Channel programme. A number of referrals have been made to this programme post-­2011, but it is also notable that Channel practitioners had been managing RWE cases through Channel before the 2011 review. There was consistent evidence from practitioners that the majority of those who are referred to Channel do not in fact subscribe to RWE ideologies, but rather the street protest ambitions of the EDL and some practitioners expressed concerns that RWE referrals were made to Channel in the absence of any other engagement strategies to deal with what are community cohesion issues, rather than necessitating a counter terrorism response. This view was endorsed by intervention providers specialising in right-­wing extremism as their assessment was that most of the referrals made to them to work with did require some form of support, but that this should not be carried out under the auspices of a counter terrorism strategy, with many referrals not even understanding the most basic aspects of extreme right-­wing ideology. It could be argued that in Luton there is not a shared understanding of the counter terrorism risk, given the divergence of views between the police service and the local authority in relation to the definition of the EDL as an extreme right-­wing group or otherwise. However, despite the lack of shared consensus on where the EDL sits in terms of a policy response, the movement is managed principally as a public order issue, and so partners work towards the objective of minimising the impact of protest activity before, during and after the planned events. In relation to the public order paradigm through which the EDL are currently policed, tactics employed are responsive to imminent need rather than demonstrating strategic thinking about the risk/threat over the longer term. There are also inter-­agency tensions around the use of public order legislation with the police being in favour generally of facilitating protest and the Council taking an opposing view that the police should apply to the Home Secretary to ban the EDL from protesting. This often plays out in the media with senior council officials being very open about their views on the EDL, framing the movement as an external threat to the “real Luton”, denying the very historical roots of the movement in the town. Luton has benefited from being a contributor to the DCLG funded SIG. It is significant that although funded by DCLG in line with its ownership of the EDL response from a community cohesion perspective, the SIG has drawn heavily on the expertise and experience of Luton-­focussed Prevent practitioners, further demonstrating the overlap between these policy areas at an operational level. The SIG produced the “Managing Far Right Activity Toolkit”,79 which highlights examples of how statutory services have

84   Luton: “where it all began” responded to the public order dimension of EDL attendance, and a research paper titled; “The evolution of anti-­Muslim protest in two English towns; a report for the Special Interest Group on Far-­Right activity”, which sets out a number of recommendations, the most notable being; If we want to dissipate some of the anger that has underpinned mobilisations by groups like the EDL, the cultivating a belief among residents that they can genuinely have their voices heard and listened to should be seen as a priority.80 It is this longer-­term strategy for addressing genuine grievances and the perceived lack of political representation for what are local issues around community integration that requires more strategic consideration than is currently in evidence. The EDL is currently managed through public order policing, but this constitutes a series of short-­term tactical plans that are event driven, rather than a coherent longer-­term strategy for dealing with grievances that draw people into the EDL movement in the absence of any other outlet to move issues forward. Most practitioners agreed that the EDL are a broad church of people, with a plethora of motives for joining the street protest or “liking” a comment on the movement’s Facebook page. These actions are not in of themselves indicative of an adoption of an extreme right-­wing ideology, but they are potentially calls for more representative government which is willing to engage in challenging debates; The only way we’re going to stop these demonstrations locally, not nationally, but locally is to say; look, there are a number of people who feel they don’t have a voice in this town and we really need to engage with that and understand why that is.81 The SIG report has assisted the council to understand there is an “undercurrent”,82 and that “the EDL were a manifestation of some people’s frustrations within Luton, but you could also talk about nationally, people who don’t feel they’re being engaged with”.83 However, this should not be seen as being particularly revelatory as in 2011 the “Building Cohesion in Luton: Report of the Luton Commission on Community Cohesion” called for  leaders in the borough to re-­connect over the day-­to-day problems. Citizens and community groups must be able to share their experiences in an open and honest way with those who are responsible for creating wealth and balancing inequalities during difficult economic times, to ensure stability and tranquillity in Luton.84 It could be argued that the warning signs have been there for some time, and yet what has been lacking is the will from the local authority to have the challenging conversations, to go into the difficult places, and engage with the issues of most importance to the communities it serves.

Luton: “where it all began”   85

Notes   1 Interview 27 – police Prevent practitioner, December 2014.   2 See Home Office “Proscribed Terrorist organisations”; Under the Terrorism Act 2000, the Home Secretary may proscribe an organisation if she believes it is concerned in terrorism. For the purposes of the Act, this means that the organisation: • commits or participates in acts of terrorism; • prepares for terrorism; • promotes or encourages terrorism (including the unlawful glorification of terrorism); or • is otherwise concerned in terrorism.   3 Interview 25 – senior public order police officer, November 2014.   4 Harris, Gareth, Joel Busher, and Graham Macklin (2015) “The evolution of anti-­ Muslim protest in two English towns: A report for the Special Interest Group on Far-­ Right activity”, p. 47.   5 Interview 28 – youth worker, Luton Council, March 2015.   6 Interview 29 – police Prevent practitioner, February 2015.   7 Harris, Gareth et al., Note 4, Chapter 3, supra, p. 39.   8 Interview 35 – local authority Prevent practitioner, August 2015.   9 Interview 28 – youth worker, Luton Council, March 2015. 10 Interview 29 – police Prevent practitioner, February 2015. 11 Luton 2012: “Making Luton a safer place in which to live, work, learn and have fun” p. 25. 12 The Independent (14/12/2010) “How Luton became the epicentre of the global clash of civilisations” www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-­news/how-­luton-became-­theepicentre-­of-the-­global-clash-­of-civilisations-­2159578.html. 13 Interview 24 – police Prevent practitioner, November 2014. 14 Interview 27 – police Prevent practitioner, December 2014. 15 Interview 25 – senior public order police officer, November 2014. 16 Luton Today (28/06/2006) “Home Secretary bans National Front march” – www. lutontoday.co.uk/news/home-­secretary-bans-­national-front-­march-1-1017129. 17 Interview 22 – senior police Prevent practitioner, October 2014. 18 Interview 25 – senior police officer, public order policing, November 2014. 19 Interview 34 – senior public order police officer, May 2015. 20 Interview 28 – youth worker, Luton Council, March 2015. 21 5-a-­side.com report; “How Two Clashing Football Tournaments Led to an EDL March” – www.5-a-­side.com/news/how-­two-clashing-­football-tournaments-­led-to-­anedl-­march/. 22 Interview 34 – senior public order police officer, May 2015. 23 Interview 36 – senior public order police officer, June 2015. 24 Interview 34 – senior public order police officer, May 2015. 25 For more detail on the use of PLT see; College of Policing: “The use of Police Liaison Teams in the policing of events: A review of practice” May 2015. 26 Interview 25 – senior public order police officer, November 2014. 27 Communication with protest groups: In relation to communication with protest groups the police should seek to improve dialogue with protest groups in advance where possible, to gain a better understanding of the intent of the protesters and the nature of the protest activity; to agree how best to facilitate the protest and to ensure a proportionate policing response. When protesters are not forthcoming to the police, the police should consider informing and warning the protesters and the public that this may result in some additional disruption, that restrictions may be placed on protesters and that particular tactics may be employed to reduce disruption and the threat of disorder – Adapting to Protest (2009) HMIC p. 10.

86   Luton: “where it all began” 28 For research on challenging the stereotypes of EDL members see Goodwin, Matthew, Note 11, Chapter 1, supra.; John, Peter, and Helen Margetts, Note 13, Chapter 1, supra.; Bartlett, Jamie and Littler, Mark, Note 13, Chapter 1, supra. 29 Interview 25 – senior public order police officer, November 2014. 30 Interview 25 – senior public order police officer, November 2014. 31 Interview 25 – senior public order police officer, November 2014. 32 Interview 30 – police officer, community engagement team, March 2015. 33 Interview 30 – police officer, community engagement team, March 2015. 34 Interview 32 – Luton Borough Councillor, March 2015. 35 “Managing Far Right Activity Toolkit” – www.preventforfeandtraining.org.uk/sites/ default/files/Managing%20Far%20Right%20Activity%20Toolkit.pdf. 36 Interview 32 – Luton Borough Councillor, March 2015. 37 Interview 28 – youth worker, Luton Council, March 2015. 38 Interview 28 – youth worker, Luton Borough Council, March 2015. 39 Interview 39 – youth worker based in Luton, June 2015. 40 See Ramalingam, V (2014) “On the Front Line: A guide to countering far-­right extremism” – Institute for Strategic Dialogue p. 38. 41 Interview 32 – Luton Borough Councillor, March 2015. 42 Interview 27 – police Prevent practitioner, December 2014. 43 Interview 27 – police Prevent practitioner, December 2014. 44 Interview 38 – police Prevent practitioner, June 2015. 45 Interview 22 – senior police Prevent practitioner, October 2014. 46 Interview 38 – police Prevent practitioner, June 2015. 47 Building Cohesion in Luton: Report of the Luton Commission on community cohesion – January 2011, para. 5.30 p. 29. 48 Interview 29 – police Prevent practitioner, February 2015. 49 Interview 22 – senior police Prevent practitioner, October 2014. 50 Interview 21 – local authority Prevent practitioner, September 2014. 51 BBC News (08/10/2013) “EDL leader Tommy Robinson quits group”. 52 Interview 27 – police Prevent practitioner, December 2014. 53 Interview 24 – police Prevent practitioner, November 2014. 54 Interview 31 – far right intervention specialist, March 2015. 55 Interview 37 – far right intervention specialist, July 2015. 56 Interview 29 – police Prevent practitioner, February 2015. 57 Interview 27 – police Prevent practitioner, December 2014. 58 BBC News (26/04/2012) “EDL and UAF banned from Luton town centre”. 59 BBC News (26/04/2012) “EDL and UAF banned from Luton town centre”. 60 Luton Today (20/11/2014) “Appeal for calm as EDL march looms”. 61 Luton Council Website (12/11/2014) “Leader’s pledge on EDL demonstration: ‘Luton will remain united and open for business’ ”. 62 Luton Council Website, Note 61, Chapter 3, supra. 63 BBC News (05/05/2012) “Luton protest: EDL and WAL marchers kept apart”. 64 Interview 38 – police Prevent practitioner, June 2015. 65 Interview 31 – far right intervention specialist, March 2015. 66 Interview 32 – Luton Borough Councillor, March 2015. 67 Interview 34 – senior public order police officer, May 2015. 68 Interview 27 – police Prevent practitioner, December 2014. 69 Interview 34 – senior public order police officer, May 2015. 70 Interview 31 – far right intervention specialist, March 2015. 71 Interview 36 – senior public order police officer, June 2015. 72 Interview 34 – senior public order police officer, May 2015. 73 Interview 34 – senior public order police officer, May 2015. 74 Luton Borough Council “Early Help Strategy” 2014–2017 p. 32. 75 BBC News (05/02/2015) “Luton MP Gavin Shuker tells EDL ‘stop targeting town’ ”.

Luton: “where it all began”   87 76 Interview 32 – Luton Borough Councillor, March 2015. 77 BBC News, Note 75, Chapter 3, supra. 78 Interview 36 – senior public order police officer, June 2015. 79 “Managing Far Right Activity Toolkit” – www.preventforfeandtraining.org.uk/sites/ default/files/Managing%20Far%20Right%20Activity%20Toolkit.pdf. 80 Harris, Gareth et al., Note 4, Chapter 3, supra, p. 97. 81 Interview 35 – local authority Prevent practitioner, August 2015. 82 Interview 35 – local authority Prevent practitioner, August 2015. 83 Interview 35 – local authority Prevent practitioner, August 2015. 84 “Building Cohesion in Luton: Report of the Luton Commission on community cohesion” (January 2011) p. 6.

4 Newcastle Rolling out the welcome mat

Newcastle was a non-­Prevent Priority Area, which has had a significant level of experience of responding to the EDL. In terms of why it is the seat of such frequent EDL protest activity, it is seen as “the regional capital, it’s the place where you’re going to get your biggest bang for publicity”.1 Newcastle has hosted frequent local protest activity as well as nationally coordinated demonstrations. There could in fact have been many more of a national nature but there was a perception among practitioners that the EDL were responsive to the way they were policed at their first demonstration in 2010; The EDL, the first time they came in 2010 were so impressed with the policing of their protest, that they said; we won’t come back here because actually what we do is we tend to target places that give us a bit of a problem and where police forces don’t treat us very well. So therefore, there was a break of 3 years before they came back.2 This is significant in trying to understand why it is that the EDL select sites to host national demonstrations and we will explore this particular point further in the next chapter with regard to Waltham Forest. More broadly there was a consensus among respondents that Newcastle offers not just a platform for protest, but also a social environment for those making the journey from the South-­East; I do think there’s a real acknowledgement that Newcastle is seen as a party city, so they want to give some support to their North-­East brothers or however they may want to see them, and we can then go out on the piss in a great party town as well.3 When considering the drivers for EDL protest, it is clear that Newcastle presents the necessary socio-­economic factors, coupled with a lack of social integration as we saw in Luton, that affords the EDL movement the fuel it requires to galvanise local support from white working-­class communities who feel as if they are bearing the brunt of austerity measures; What I see in Newcastle are really well self-­resourced Asian and Muslim communities that provide community facilities for members of their

Newcastle: rolling out the welcome mat   89 c­ ommunities and nowt for white young men. And that is increasing in our city because traditionally it’s been the public sector that has provided those opportunities for white young people, and those services are being cut locally, but because they are self-­funded, the ones for Asian and Muslim communities are continuing. So the stories of who gets what and why and who is to blame are becoming more prevalent.4 This perceived sense of disparity is especially relevant in explaining why the EDL maintains a significant foothold in Newcastle. The council’s own public facing literature makes this point; “Government cuts, heavily skewed against Newcastle and the North East, are having a damaging impact on our capacity to deliver public services and support the economy of the city”.5 The way in which central government austerity measures have disproportionately affected the north of England was a consistent theme; per capita, the cuts to public spending in Newcastle have been amongst the most severe in the country. It is estimated that there is a reduction of £153 per person compared with a national average of an £80 per person reduction. We anticipate that the continued reduction to public funding forecast for future years will increase the likelihood of public disorder.6 In addition; this is a region that is hosting a number of high profile trials regarding the sexual exploitation of children by what are perceived as “Muslim grooming gangs”.7 This is particularly relevant in exploring responses to the EDL in that most practitioners agreed that the EDL as a movement is in decline, one describing it as “dying on its feet”8 post the departure of Tommy Robinson as its national leader. However, after the national media attention attracted by the Rotherham child abuse cases of 2015,9 nationally child sexual exploitation investigations have acted as a lightning rod for further EDL protest activity, albeit on a smaller scale than when the EDL were able to attract much larger numbers. The Northumbria Police Service mounted Operation Sanctuary10 to investigate these allegations and there have been regular EDL protests outside the courts to draw public attention to the trials. In the wake of the Rotherham allegations becoming public, the town has hosted a series of EDL protests with the intention of maintaining the public’s attention on the issue and notionally to support the victims. In this case the police service was unsuccessful in their attempts to have EDL demonstrations banned on the basis of financial pressures11 (see Chapter 5 for a discussion regarding the experiences of banning applications in Tower Hamlets and Waltham Forest boroughs). Newcastle is particularly significant as it is also the place of residence for the leader of the North­East Division of the EDL, Alan Spence. However, rather than the EDL enjoying a strong basis of support locally, many of the respondents highlighted that the extreme right-­wing activity in Newcastle was comprised of a breadth of different groups including those seen as subscribing to RWE ideologies such as PEGIDA12 and the now-­proscribed National Action. Contrary to the accepted wisdom that

90   Newcastle: rolling out the welcome mat street-­based protest groups are disparate and parochial, there is evidence of them supporting each other’s demonstrations and we can see in Newcastle how the splintering of extreme right-­wing groups does not necessarily mean that we have seen the end of large demonstrations, particularly as they display unity in relation to themes on which they share common ground, such as the sexual exploitation of children trials. Of the three areas covered in this book, Newcastle is additionally significant when considering the local community context of anti-­fascism movements. The Tyne and Wear Anti-­Fascist Association (TWAFA) was created in the 1980s in response to the British National Party (BNP) indicating their intention to march through the city centre. The nascent form of the TWAFA coordinated an “anti-­ fascist mobilization” comprising local trades councils, the labour and trade union movement, the community relations council and community groups. Although the BNP march was cancelled, there was a broad consensus that the anti-­fascist association should continue “to campaign and educate against racism and fascism”.13 An analysis of non-­statutory services responses is beyond the scope of my research. However, it is important to note that the TWAFA has received funding and support from not only Newcastle City Council but also the councils of Gateshead, Sunderland, South Tyneside and North Tyneside for the last 30 years.14 The continued council funding of the TWAFA highlights an important cultural significance around how the wider Newcastle constituency may perceive extreme right-­wing narratives within the historical context of local engagement with these issues over the last 30 years. The ways in which this local sentiment has been galvanised in order to respond to the attendance of the EDL is explored further in this chapter. Against the backdrop of all these issues, and notwithstanding that Newcastle is not a Prevent Priority Area, the local authority includes an aim to; “prevent people from being radicalised by terrorist and extremist groups” within its Safe Newcastle Plan 2015–2018,15 therefore seeing radicalisation as a significant issue, even if not receiving central government Prevent Strategy funding towards resources in the same way as Luton.

Protest activity Like Luton, Newcastle has hosted a number of large national EDL demonstrations as well as smaller demonstrations directed at local issues. The most significant national demonstration took take place in Newcastle on the 25 May 2013. The EDL had notified the authorities of their intention to protest against the sale of the premises that had been used by the BBC to film the popular Byker Grove TV series, to an Islamic foundation who intended to convert it into an Islamic school16 There’s a lot of love for the place and it was around about the start of the austerity stuff and there were things that were being sold off and the local community had a few ideas as to what this place should be used for, some local facilities, and see it more or less being given at very low cost to the Muslims, which is the way that it was perceived, to be turned into another

Newcastle: rolling out the welcome mat   91 Mosque, which is what the community thought it was going to be, it was gut-­wrenching to them. So there was a lot of local sympathy in relation to protest activity.17 In response, Northumbria Police launched Operation Cygnet and for months had been working with Newcastle City Council and partners to make the necessary arrangements. Although the EDL were perceived to be “at the peak of their power”,18 the local police anticipated approximately 500 demonstrators on the day. However, on the 22nd May, Drummer Lee Rigby of the 2nd Battalion, Royal Regiment of Fusiliers was murdered in Woolwich, London by two Islamist extremists.19 The impact of this was massive and the outpouring of public grief became conflated with the EDL demonstration and so swelled its numbers to several thousand on the day; I remember my Sergeant going out on the streets and calling me and feeding me information on what was going on and who was there, and he said; I’ve just seen this chap who was obviously a Second World War veteran, marching with the EDL, and he said it was quite clear that he didn’t know who the EDL were, he didn’t really know what he was marching for, he was just appalled by what happened to Lee Rigby and wanted to show his stance against that and so thought; I must support the EDL.20 This was, however, seen by interviewees as being driven more out of sympathy with Lee Rigby than being indicative of a mass-­subscription to the ideology of the EDL; I think it’s been a mistake in thinking the huge numbers that attended the Rigby rally was some kind of groundswell of support for the EDL when actually I don’t believe that for a minute and it didn’t bear itself out in what we’re finding from meetings.21 Although they reported high numbers of EDL supporters travel into Newcastle from across the country to attend demonstrations, whereas in Luton, practitioners saw the EDL as an external threat (despite the movement being created in the town), in Newcastle, there was an acknowledgement that there was a local constituency for the EDL; Newcastle and the NE have got a good number of racists or people with that ideology. And what you said there, yes, it is a combination of both. So there will be a lot from Newcastle and to make up the numbers we’d get a lot from the region as well, County Durham, Sunderland, South Shields, people from neighbouring areas who will join the demonstration as well.22 There was recognition that there are “a number of key individuals who are very politically enthusiastic about what they believe the EDL is, does and stands

92   Newcastle: rolling out the welcome mat for”.23 However, in terms of the “organised” extreme right-­wing, like Luton, a distinction was drawn between the EDL and “further right” groups; We have had cases where the EDL leaders up here have point blank told Combat 18 and National Front that they’re not welcome, or the BNP that they’re not welcome. And you actually get infighting. So, we have had occasions where you’ve actually had splinter protests elsewhere because they have not been allowed to join in the EDL protest.24 As was the case in Luton, it was generally accepted by all respondents that the trend in EDL mobilisation and participation is decreasing, and many practitioners attributed the departure of the movement’s leader, Tommy Robinson in October 2013 as being the main driver to this decline. Since that time there has been a further splintering of EDL support into newer factions such as the North-­ East Infidels and PEGIDA. It is yet to be seen whether the EDL maintain their historic “distancing” from these “further right” groups or if they become drawn into the loose patchwork of extreme right-­wing groups that are active across the U.K, albeit in far smaller numbers than the EDL were able to mobilise due to their lack of mainstream appeal.

Tactics employed in response to the EDL When considering the threat represented by the movement, like Luton, practitioners perceived the EDL principally as a public order issue which threatens community cohesion. An interesting observation of one public order commander25 was that he did believe there was a counter terrorism aspect to the policing of the EDL but only in reference to the threat posed to rather than by the group. He referenced the plot by a group of Islamists to attack an EDL demonstration in nearby Dewsbury on 30 June 2012 with an arsenal of weapons including two shotguns, swords, knives, a nail bomb and a partially-­assembled pipe bomb.26 Due to the very low numbers turning out for the EDL when compared to the well organised counter demonstrations in Newcastle, similar to Luton, the police have found themselves in the position of having to remain objective and balancing the requirements of both sides; My experience of policing the EDL operationally is that the police are more there for the EDL’s safety from attack from the counter demonstration, than necessarily keeping communities safe from the EDL. Because as they try to exercise their right of freedom of speech, that would be quickly stopped by pressure groups who are actually left wing, extreme left wing around their views.27 From the perspective of those charged with preserving the public order and maintaining community cohesion their direct experience of managing EDL protest contrasted vividly with the wider perception of the movement, corroborating

Newcastle: rolling out the welcome mat   93 the views in Luton that this is more about managing the community reaction to the EDL than it is about managing the movement itself. The implications of this within Newcastle are more significant than was the case in Luton given the historical context of anti-­fascism in the city. For the local council to reflect on the demand on policing created by the EDL attending as compared with the demands associated with the counter demonstrators, would necessitate a wider dialogue on the balance between the financial implications of countering the EDL and the community’s (and local politicians’) appetite for being seen to protest against a movement they perceive to be a modern incarnation of fascism; I don’t think the threat per se is that the EDL are going to wreck the place. The threat is it unsettles communities. Communities feel threatened. They see the TV pictures from elsewhere, where, as I say, we’ve not had anywhere near the sort of disruption and disorder that has been seen in the past at other EDL events.28 Community messaging and reassurance There was wide recognition among the interviewees that the focus of community engagement and messaging before, during and after EDL attendance is on the mitigation of its impact, particularly for Muslim communities, although a small number also noted the impact on the business community. However, an officer on the community engagement team highlighted the expansive nature of the engagement work undertaken due to the local experience of mis-­targeted hate crime offences that had been intended for Muslims but through a lack of ­cultural/ religious awareness, had actually been directed at the Sikh and Hindu communities; within our small area in the West End of Newcastle, which is only about 2.5 square miles, we have about 18 mosques/mashtids, we’ve got one Sikh temple and we’ve got one Hindu temple. The only premises that has been damaged, graffitied in the last 2–3 years have been the Sikh temple, the Gurdwara, and the Hindu temple … they’ve been daubed with “Fuck Muslims”, “Pakis Out” and “Muslim Rapists” and stuff like that, which is strange. So all BME communities, all non-­white communities get the same treatment in relation to these issues; it’s not just the Muslim communities that we go out to.29 There is an important point here around the prioritisation of community engagement in relation to EDL protest activity. Like Luton, there was acknowledgement that there was not any engagement undertaken with white working-­class communities who could potentially have aligned themselves with the movement, in order to better understand the motivations of local people which could have been indicative of wider community tensions. In debriefing the 2013 Operation Cygnet a senior public order police officer reflected that;

94   Newcastle: rolling out the welcome mat We are exceptionally good at engaging with our Asian communities, we are exceptionally good at engaging with our political leaders. The one group that we do not engage with is the white indigenous male population. We do not go into the working man’s club and say; what do you think about politics etc, so our model has now been refined to reflect that. And I said that it’s not a popular thing to say but invariably a lot of our engagement had previously been with the minority population and politicians and hadn’t really focused on the white indigenous population but we’ve now addressed that.30 This observation led to the creation of a new engagement policy which intends to deliver more breadth to community engagement undertaken as part of a public order policing plan, to include all communities and not focus so heavily on ethnic minority groups. However, like the experience of the Prevent officers in Luton, practitioners here encountered great difficulties in identifying means of engaging “white” communities; This is very much the most difficult area of our engagement and we’ve identified that you’ve got the white working-­class majority in the area who don’t all necessarily congregate in the same place or go to the same club or do the same thing … how do we engage with them to find out what their fears and expectations are in a particular area? That’s a real challenge … it’s an emerging area that we know if we can get that engagement and dispel some myths about what their expectations are around say Syrian refugees coming into the region, then we think that we can maybe defuse some of the desire for protest”.31 This echoes Chapter 2, which highlighted the inherent difficulties of engaging with the white working-­class demographic because for so long agencies have prioritised engagement with ethic minority groups, most notably the Prevent practitioners working predominantly with Muslim communities. Issues such as the re-­settlement of Syrian refugees have highlighted how little has been done by local statutory agencies to redress this balance in how they service all communities. Counter protest What was particularly interesting in Newcastle was the strength of the counter protest movement. Rather than the local authority seeking to apply pressure on the police to ban EDL marches, there was much more emphasis on the idea that although the views of the EDL were not representative of Newcastle residents, they had a right to express them, and others had an equal right to oppose them through a sizeable and well organised counter demonstration movement; The EDL do continue to try and make inroads up here, but they’re not doing that successfully. I don’t know if that’s down to the organisation or how they’re pitching it. Because it appears that the left wing are far more

Newcastle: rolling out the welcome mat   95 o­ rganised with far smaller numbers but able to generate more around the media and that kind of thing.32 Whereas in the Luton case study practitioners highlighted their efforts to divert young people from joining either side of the demonstration activity, Newcastle practitioners, particularly from the council side emphasised that there was active encouragement to join the counter demonstration. An interesting difference in the approach to Luton was the presence of a number of Newcastle City Councillors who spearhead the counter demonstration movement, supported by community groups and organisations such as the TWAFA; We haven’t discouraged any young people from coming along because we need to encourage our young people to be active citizens and active people in condemning any sort of hate.33 It was clear that although there was not an emphasis necessarily on banning EDL demonstrations, non-­council respondents in particular emphasised that there was no appetite to engage with the group with a view to building dialogue and addressing grievances that could deny the movement its wider following. Rather than engagement with the EDL or the issues synonymous with the movement, the council’s energy is; very much focused on facilitation of counter-­protest, and liaison with counter-­protest groups as a way of ensuring community cohesion but there isn’t that dialogue with the EDL.34 While community mentors had been successfully utilised in Luton, here there was a view that when the police attempted a similar approach in the city, they were in fact acting subversively to prohibit young Muslims from exercising their rights to demonstrate against the EDL as the participation of young people in these events was seen as a healthy manifestation of liberal democracy. The emphasis in Newcastle is not only on supporting the mobilisation of a counter protest but playing a role in negotiating what are perceived to be the most prominent routes. Where the EDL applied to be allowed to showcase their views at what are considered to be iconic locations, the counter protest would lobby for routes to be changed so the views of the EDL would not be seen to be representative of all Newcastle residents; In 2013 when they had a national demonstration, EDL managed to persuade the police to have a better route, even laying a wreath on the cenotaph. And I thought; hold on a minute, you’re actually allowing them to lay a wreath on the cenotaph? Where was our discussion on this? We feel at times as if they accommodate the EDL more than the counter demonstration.35 This approach, while more in keeping with allowing people to express their views within a healthy liberal democracy, fails to address the underlying issues

96   Newcastle: rolling out the welcome mat driving protest activity. The reciprocal nature of this protest and counter protest activity doesn’t give any sense of a longer-­term view as to how any of the issues driving people onto the streets to protest will actually be resolved. Like Luton, the risks here are around those who align themselves with EDL narratives being further pushed from the mainstream discourse as local politicians, rather than conducting outreach work to engage with all sections of the community, instead contribute to the polarisation of local discourse through very visibly rallying counter demonstration activity against them.

The role of the Prevent Strategy In relation to local police Prevent resourcing, Newcastle is serviced by a Regional Prevent Coordinator (RPC) and a number of regional Prevent practitioners. These are allocated to Forces within the region dependent upon the assessment of risk/threat. Significantly, as a non-­Priority Area this means Newcastle was not allocated a local authority Prevent coordinator which could act as a counterpart to the police Prevent resources in working on collaborative pieces of work, such as the provision of the CTLP and prioritised engagement efforts. This has meant that before the Counter Terrorism & Security Act 2015 prescribed statutory duties for all agencies with a responsibility for delivering the Prevent Strategy in June 2015, the local counter terrorism unit, working with local police, had led on delivering the strategy; Of course, that statutory duty in the years previous came in the form of me nagging in my area. That was just a pre-­cursor if you like to what came in as a statutory duty. Well that’s fantastic because we started them on a path and whether they like it or not they’ve got to remain there.36 In line with the National Domestic Extremism and Disorder Unit assessment, the local Prevent Strategy team conceptualise “Defence Leagues” as a category separate to RWE/far right extremist groups and they had reached this determination based upon their own personal experience of dealing with EDL-­related issues rather than them having knowledge of the NDEDIU assessment. Unlike Luton however, they had not received bespoke training inputs and wider exposure to thinking in this area due to their status as a non-­Priority Prevent Area. This assessment differs from that of the local authority who, like Luton counterparts perceive the EDL to be an extreme right-­wing group, and yet not a counter ­terrorism issue. This largely falls then within the DCLG policy area and yet to date there is no evidence of any activity being directed towards the EDL other than the counter protest movement described earlier. I think that local authorities misunderstand that and I think it suit’s their purpose to cluster them as an extreme right wing group because they’re seen as that by, certainly the Muslim community, and others, they are seen as extreme right wing.37

Newcastle: rolling out the welcome mat   97 However, when considering the wider impact of the explicit inclusion of RWE to the Prevent Strategy in 2011, the interviews in Newcastle corroborate the findings discussed in Chapter 2, in that not one of the practitioners noticed a discernible impact on their response. There were similar concerns raised as to how a target audience for the Prevent Strategy engagement around extreme right-­wing issues could be identified; There is no geographical base as such is there? What you’ve got is a movement which is being facilitated online; it’s in this global village. It is made up of people who would never ever have come into contact with one another.38 From a policing perspective the local authority is “complacent”39 around extreme right-­wing extremism despite the clear issues locally. Reference was made to the 19-year-­old Russian student, Vladimir Aust, who was arrested after a highly explosive chemical was found in his room on the Newcastle University campus in June 201440 and had displayed adherence to extreme right-­wing ideology. Most interesting here was the general consensus of views that the counter terrorism risk in Newcastle emanates from the extreme right-­wing; I know that the NE has a greater risk from far-­right extremism than Islamist extremism, but I don’t know if that’s still highlighted. In Luton it’s the Islamist extremists who are more likely to cause problems but in the NE it is the far right who are the greater danger.41 This makes it even more problematic that the 2011 review of the Prevent Strategy to explicitly include “all forms of terrorism”42 has not been translated into a local delivery of the Prevent Strategy that prioritises this form of extremism with tangible programmes of engagement and bespoke training products focussing on extreme right-­wing narratives. Since 2011, despite the local threat profile, Prevent Strategy delivery appeared to be aligned to the national threat profile rather than the local threat. This may be due in part to the absence of funded local authority personnel to deliver Prevent. However, if Newcastle’s most visible manifestation of the “extreme right-­wing” is the EDL, the lack of Prevent and DCLG Strategies in favour of a public order/counter demonstration response, underlines how the response to the EDL has fallen between the policy areas due to the definitional issues surrounding the movement. Police practitioners did highlight that there was however a beneficial by-­product in that the inclusion of RWE had been used as a means of increasing engagement with Muslim communities who had thus far been resistant due to the way the Prevent Strategy had been seen to target their communities. Within the context of the societal impact of the Prevent Strategy, it was acknowledged there is a danger that in engaging with communities around extreme right-­wing issues, police officers working under the auspices of the Prevent Strategy could “securitise” relationships with the white working-­class indigenous population in the same way as took place with Muslim communities;

98   Newcastle: rolling out the welcome mat Prevent is a very effective body around delivery, but because of the securitized nature of the work, has to be seen as a small proportionate part of wider work around our duties under equality legislation.43 Similar to Luton, in responding to the EDL, Newcastle practitioners generally do not perceive the movement to be a counter terrorism threat and therefore accord primacy to the public order policing response rather than the Prevent Strategy. The value added by Prevent practitioners in the planning around an EDL demonstration is through their utilisation of existing community contacts to monitor tensions and feed back community sentiment, rather than engage in any Prevent Strategy-­specific activity; We have a role where we engage with certain members of the community, the local Mosques; we’d go and do a round of visits leading up to a major event to the local mosques to make sure they are fully briefed. We work with neighbourhood officers to try and give them some form of briefing, or a form of words if there’s going to be a demonstration running past a particular mosque in the area. But it’s a public order arrangement and we fit in with many other areas of policing on that day.44 The issue here is that in the absence of a wider effort to promote integration, and against a backdrop of austerity, with the Prevent Strategy resources being effectively ring-­fenced to engage with communities around counter terrorism issues, they have suffered from role drift and been utilised for engagement around public order and community cohesion issues, the latter being especially problematic given the aims of the 2011 Prevent Review. It is clear that due to the depth and longevity of relationships, particularly between individual Prevent officers and representatives with Muslim communities, that there is a dependency on them in the absence of local authority counterparts to act as a conduit for reassurance and messaging in the run up to an EDL demonstration. You’ll find that these main players who come from the far right hijack any sort of local movement, like Byker Grove for example. If the council were a little more open about what was happening, rather than it appear all of a sudden on the front page … and then you get the far right movers and shakers come in and hijack the issue and local people will align with them because they think they are their voice. And then some of them will actually join the movement and this is the risk here, that local people get radicalised by them. I think more things could have been done by the local authority and the police to engage with these people who are sometimes rightly worried about their community.45 There were a number of concerns raised by participants in relation to individuals who align themselves with the EDL movement by virtue of protest activity but who subscribe to ‘further’ right ideologies. From a Prevent Strategy perspective,

Newcastle: rolling out the welcome mat   99 there was evidence of an individual using EDL demonstrations as a means of talent spotting others to move them on to more extreme ideologies. This goes further than the confusion at the policy level as to how best to define the EDL, principally whether the actions of individuals under the auspices of EDL protest activity can be used to determine how the movement is framed as a counter terrorism issue or a threat to community cohesion, or both. The current position does not provide any level of clarity with regard to the relationship between group and individual actions; There was somebody who was referred onto Prevent who was certainly using EDL rallies as an opportunity to try and radicalise these people away into darker areas shall we say.46 What needs to be determined here is whether the EDL in of itself should be treated as a counter terrorism “Prevent” issue or whether, as was stated in Chapter 2, the movement should sit within the DCLG community cohesion space. And if it is the latter then service delivery with regard to community cohesion will need to be more tangible than is currently the case because the evidence suggests that without the Prevent Strategy, this engagement around issues of salience to the EDL demographic is not being carried out in any meaningful way. This is a situation that is only exacerbated by central Government imposed austerity measures; There will always be a specific issue that they’re talking about. Now that might be immigration, schools, access to schools, access to jobs, but if you find out what it is and you can dispel myths and educate in that area then sometimes you can … that’s when we lean more heavily on our local authority partners in our community safety partnership. We’re seeing in austerity that they’re being stripped bare. They’re a non-­essential department so they’re not marked out for longevity, put it that way. But we have leaned heavily on their ability to do conflict management in that area.47 Channel Due to Newcastle’s non-­Prevent Priority Area status, it was very difficult to identify practitioners with experience of identifying and managing individuals identified as being vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism who may be appropriate for the Channel programme. There are six local authority areas within the Northumbria Police area and they are serviced by a Channel police practitioner who assesses referrals and liaises with relevant partners in order to identify the most effective intervention strategy on a case by case basis. Rather than setting up a bespoke panel, local practitioners instead adopted a mainstreaming approach, utilising existing safeguarding structures through which Channel cases were managed. This was changed in early 2016 as the Newcastle City Council was brought into line with the new obligations enshrined within the Counter

100   Newcastle: rolling out the welcome mat ­ errorism & Security Act 2015 and a separate panel has been created, chaired by T a senior local authority officer. The focus thus far has not been on delivering focussed interventions on individuals but on broader awareness raising inputs; There was some extreme right-­wing activity that had been identified within a school. Once we’d done a vulnerability assessment around that it was clear that there wasn’t a strong radicalizing factor, and therefore we just undertook to do some anti-­discriminatory anti-­racist work within the school environment and it was all very low key and we treated it as business as usual really.48 Newcastle practitioners were more aware of the interplay between the concept of racism and that of right-­wing extremism whereas this was not as evident in the other case studies. It does raise the possibility that conceptualising “low level” RWE activity as racism rather than extremism may be acting as a barrier to individuals being referred and subsequently assessed through the Channel programme. However, there is a proportionality argument here around individuals being referred into a counter terrorism programme, which albeit is supportive in nature, still carries with it “branding” issues around the securitisation of state relationships with the public in the absence of wider integration efforts. The police Prevent practitioners confirmed, like their counterparts in Luton, that although RWE was not emphasised within the pre-­2011 Prevent Strategy, they were still very much dealing with RWE referrals on a risk/threat basis, further emphasising how the review did not precipitate a wholesale change to the way that the Prevent Strategy has been delivered in relation to “all forms of terrorism”. The formal Channel programme did not roll out in Newcastle until 2012 so vulnerable people were being managed through mainstream safeguarding provision prior to this; So, it’s always been very much part of the activities we were doing so when the 2011 review came in it was just a blessing and an acceptance that what we had been doing had been correct and we now had the backing of a national document to say it has to be done.49 Many of the youth engagement workers interviewed were not aware of the Channel programme let alone its applicability to right-­wing extremism. Although Newcastle is not a Prevent Priority Area this is problematic as respondents all highlighted that despite the national threat being seen to emanate from Islamist forms of extremism, principally Islamic State, locally the threat profile that caused most concern was the young, white disenfranchised male with previous convictions and potentially mental health issues. This being the case, I would have expected to find greater awareness and more developed understanding of the Channel programme within a safeguarding context, with bespoke initiatives and training products to aggregate between racism and vulnerability to being drawn into extremism but this was not the case. When exploring the referrals

Newcastle: rolling out the welcome mat   101 into Channel it was evident that there have been a number of RWE referrals to the programme, but the issue here is around the quality of referrals, i.e. whether local statutory agencies are aware of the differentiation between someone attending an EDL rally and someone demonstrating adherence to extreme right-­wing ideology while being vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism. Looking back over to 2012 when we started with Channel here, I would say the majority of ours have been right wing referrals rather than the Islamist stance.50 However, most of these referrals have not progressed on to be adopted as Channel cases who receive interventions as part of the programme. This would seem to suggest that wider than the police Prevent team there remain definitional issues for other statutory agencies around the positioning of the EDL on the spectrum of the “extreme” right-­wing scene; quite a few of the EDL referrals that came through, when we did the assessments you’d look and think; Joe Bloggs, age 16, yes he’s been to a few rallies, yes there are one or two issues of concern, there’s nothing for Prevent. Out of all the referrals we had there was a small handful who were EDL/moving onto the more extreme versions, who needed that intervention and engagement”.51 This is an important point as it suggests the referrals of a RWE nature to the Channel programme are just that, referrals around concerns that an individual may be vulnerable to being drawn into extremism. However, at the information gathering and vulnerability assessment stage of the process, most of these referrals are deemed unsuitable for progression to a Channel panel to be adopted as a case and we should be mindful of this quality vs. quantity dynamic when considering announcements such as that of James Brokenshire MP when he highlighted that 15% of referrals to Channel emanate from RWE.52

The “right” to protest There was a marked difference in the stance taken by senior council officials in relation to the EDL’s right to protest, when compared with the last case study in Luton. There, the emphasis was very much on banning the EDL from protesting. Conversely, what was consistent among the Newcastle interviewees was an emphasis on the local authority and a number of activist councillors seeking to instead mobilise local people to mount a counter demonstration to show the EDL that they are not representative of the people of Newcastle, rather than ban the EDL from protesting altogether. The view of one respondent, who had been present throughout the planning meetings between senior council officials and senior police officers stated that the stance was very much that;

102   Newcastle: rolling out the welcome mat we’re all in this together and there was joint support through each other’s decision making and the local authority was very much part of the police Silver and Gold command groups and it was a real joint effort with some real joined up activity with partners and we never had those issues where one side was doing one thing and the other was doing the other.53 The police stance on EDL protest was that it should be permitted rather than banned in keeping with their mandate to facilitate public order situations, regardless of the subject matter at issue; Northumbria Police without fear or favour will allow protests to take place unless criminal offences are taking place. We as an organisation have come under considerable pressure around the EDL protests in the past over Rigby etc etc. You can imagine huge resources were spent to allow people to voice their views, no matter how reprehensible but within the scope of the law. On that note, organisationally wise, the Left were quite adept at trying to muster support to make complaints and challenge and to say to local councillors etc; these people should be banned. The response back was actually; hang on a second, we are a tolerant society. We will allow this as long as the law isn’t being broken. Just because you find it offensive, as do a lot of people, they have the right to say what they want to say, which was very challenging.54 Rather than there being a tension between the police and the local authority over the question of whether or not to apply to the Home Secretary to ban the EDL under public order legislation, there was a perception of a unified front among the statutory agencies; The message that comes out is one of support for the police; it’s not that we should ban these people.55 Given the emphasis on mounting counter demonstration activity there were however tensions between elected officials whose objective was to effectively oppose the EDL through mimicking their tactics, by staging larger and more organised protests, and public order commanders who had a mandate to balance the needs of both sides in order to facilitate peaceful protest; It’s a real balancing act between individuals who are elected Councillors playing to an audience, and then also teetering on the brink of committing public order offences.56 In relation to the planned EDL demonstration on the 17 May 2014 the Northumbria Chief Constable Sue Sim QPM stated that; “The Police and Crime Commissioner and I are in regular dialogue to ensure that those who wish to protest are able to do so whilst respecting the wishes and needs of the local communities”.57

Newcastle: rolling out the welcome mat   103 This would appear to be a balanced response, seeking to balance the needs of protesters and counter protesters. However, there are obviously contrary views within the partnership. In contrast, the leader of Newcastle City Council, Councillor Nick Forbes (talking about the May 2014 demonstration) stated that;  The extremist views of groups like the English Defence League have no place in a modern, welcoming city like Newcastle where everyone regardless of colour, creed or ethnicity is treated with respect. Their presence here is a huge concern to businesses and communities alike.58 This stance is more in keeping with his counterpart in Luton, Council leader Councillor Hazel Simmons who announced; “the EDL is simply not welcome in Luton”.59 Like Luton, this is a position that portrays the EDL as an external threat to Newcastle and ignores the reality that the leadership and many of the EDL protesters are actually Newcastle residents. The leader of the council taking this position could be seen as problematising or “othering” the views of albeit a minority of local people, distancing them further from mainstream discourse by labelling them as “extremist” while failing to understand how the movement is comprised of a breadth of views and motivations that do not all necessarily fit within the RWE lexicon. In addition, within the context of Police practitioners clearly setting out their role in balancing the human rights of the protesters and acting impartially, there was a clear red line when it came to the EDL seeking to demonstrate in the West End of Newcastle. Chief Constable Sue Sim QPM stated that; The EDL expressed an intention to march in the West End of the city through a highly populated, residential area. We have made our position clear that we do not support this as the impact on the local community is too great. It poses a risk to public safety, will cause people fear in their own homes and create significant disruption as people try to go about their daily lives.60 The public order commanders interviewed highlighted that the EDL have always intended to march through the West End of Newcastle, the highest concentration of Muslim residents in the city. This has been met with strong resistance from the police and the local authority due to the perceived increase in community tensions that would be precipitated from such direct action. That there is a no-­go area for the EDL in Newcastle is reminiscent of the stance taken by Bedfordshire Police in relation to the Bury Park area of Luton; Our previous Chief had made a statement that the EDL would not be permitted to march in the West End in any circumstances.61 There was real concern that if the EDL were permitted to protest at this location, that this would provoke a violent response from the Muslim community who

104   Newcastle: rolling out the welcome mat would perceive this as being a direct attack, over and above the movement’s protest activity in the centre of Newcastle; the reality was, if we had allowed that to take place, there would have been race riots similar to Bradford, and that’s against the backdrop of a very moderately minded Asian community in the West End, but there is almost a feeling amongst that community that they are just sick to the back teeth with it all and their patience is wearing thin so community intelligence was telling us that there was a significant threat around that and that’s why we ran the operations that we did.62 While this position makes sense operationally it does raise a further question around integration efforts within Newcastle. The presence of a “Muslim area” in the West End of the city plays into the EDL perception of communities living together but separately. In failing to understand the galvanising role played by the existence of siloed communities, much like their counterparts in Luton, the local authority has allowed the EDL to control the narrative for their own purposes.

Conclusion In Newcastle, local actors perceived that the most significant threat profile was that emanating from right-­wing extremism rather than Islamist extremism. This makes the marked absence of initiatives, training and community engagement focussed on RWE issues under the auspices of either the Prevent Strategy or the DCLG Integration Strategy all the more difficult to explain. Further to this, the EDL are perceived as a threat to the public order and community cohesion but not as a counter terrorism threat, even by the non-­police respondents who actually conceptualise them as being extreme right-­wing in nature. This raises questions about how an extreme right-­wing movement can be perceived as such without then falling under the auspices of the counter terrorism Prevent Strategy. It is difficult to see how this can be reconciled from a policy perspective and is a further indication of the definitional issues surrounding the EDL. There was a collective understanding that although the EDL do not necessarily represent the views of Newcastle residents, unlike Luton, the movement is generally not framed as an external threat. What was significant here were the views that the activities of the EDL should be controlled through the rubric of public order policing. Further to this, rather than seeking to ban the EDL, the favoured response was to galvanise local residents to counter demonstrate against the EDL, the success of which was determined through the numerical superiority that could be brought to bear on the ever-­diminishing numbers of EDL supporters. There was little evidence that Newcastle’s status as a non-­Prevent Priority Area has yielded a less developed response to the EDL. Despite Newcastle not being as developed as Luton in terms of its Prevent Strategy awareness and

Newcastle: rolling out the welcome mat   105 training, this did not negatively impact upon the local responses to the EDL. This is due to the way that the EDL has been problematised locally, being seen as a public order and community cohesion issue rather than a counter terrorism threat. With regard to the Prevent Strategy, in the absence of local authority counterparts, it was clear that for the police Prevent practitioners, the impact of the Government’s decision in 2011 to emphasise its utility in addressing all forms of extremism, including the RWE, has been minimal. This is especially interesting as the consensus of views from practitioners was that the threat in Newcastle emanates from RWE rather than Islamist extremism. If this assessment has been made and given the significant presence of the EDL, why then has this not translated into more work being done to respond to right-­wing extremism? The factors for this were (1) the lack of definition around what a broad societal application of the Prevent Strategy would consist of in relation to right-­wing extremism, and (2) the most visible manifestation of RWE is the EDL, which is not seen as a counter terrorism, and therefore a Prevent Strategy issue by state actors working in this area. Much of this may be due to Newcastle not being seen as a Prevent Priority Area which could then benefit from non-­ police resources to support the development of this work. It was evident that in the absence of these resources, the local counter terrorism police have struggled to deliver an agenda which was never intended to be led by the police service. While many of the non-­statutory service providers were aware of the broadened scope of the Prevent Strategy from 2011, before the Counter Terrorism & Security Act 2015, this was not perceived to be mainstreamed into local service provision and they had not even heard of the Channel programme. Unlike Luton, there was a consensus across practitioners that the threat profile in Newcastle emanates from RWE. This has not, however, followed through in the form of broader societal engagement around issues synonymous with the RWE and many recognised a gap in the relationships between state actors and indigenous white working-­class groups. In fact, given the highly organised and influential counter demonstration movement in Newcastle, there are potentially heightened risks of increasingly polarised communities manifesting their views through street activism, rather than through representative government and balanced engagement across all communities. As was the case in Luton, there was no evidence of targeted engagement with white working-­class communities, the development of specific counter narratives or funding of projects to address RWE sentiment. Again, the emphasis thus far has been on weaving RWE into existing products to cater for a range of extremist narratives (such as WRAP3), rather than developing bespoke initiatives. The EDL is seen as a counter terrorism threat only within the context of the existing Islamist threat from the reciprocal radicalisation perspective, rather than as a threat in of itself requiring a tailored Prevent Strategy response. Rather than there being a bespoke mandate for Prevent police before, during and after the EDL demonstration, the role of Prevent staff is restricted to (1) utilising existing relationships of trust and confidence in order to disseminate community reassurance and gauge tensions, and (2) briefing frontline staff to be aware of the Prevent Strategy with regard to

106   Newcastle: rolling out the welcome mat identifying individuals who may be vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism, i.e. for the Channel programme. There was clear evidence of statutory partners, notwithstanding differences of opinion on the Prevent/DCLG policy area issue, working together to minimise the impact of EDL demonstrations on Newcastle’s communities. Whereas in the other case studies there was a tension between the police and the local authority over the issue of banning the EDL, in Newcastle, the tension was more around the stance of a number of activist councillors who saw it as their role to oppose the EDL through the medium of street protest. As a result of the policing of EDL protests, public order policing practitioners have identified the need for more effective engagement with indigenous white communities and have called upon the local community engagement team to increase engagement in this area. However, this emphasis on more expansive community engagement has not been transferred to Prevent practitioners which is all the more problematic given the local perception of the counter terrorism threat and the need to develop relationships locally that will increase corporate understanding of the extreme right-­wing scene. Whereas in Luton, many of the initiatives undertaken had a particular focus on diverting young people from attending the demonstration, there was evidence that Newcastle’s counter protesters, e.g. Newcastle Unites, were more proactive in recruiting as many people as possible to oppose the EDL. The focus on meeting the EDL on their terms, i.e. through street protest, was very much a reactive response and there was no sense of a longer-­term strategy as to how to better engage on the salient issues so to draw the wider EDL supporters away from its leadership. Like Luton, there was evidence that the explicit inclusion of RWE within the Prevent Strategy in 2011 did yield a beneficial by-­product in Prevent practitioner engagement with Muslim communities due to the perceived parity in the way extremism issues are managed, challenging the view that the strategy was disproportionately focussing on Muslim communities. However, there was little evidence of how the Prevent Strategy has been embedded around RWE issues at a broad societal level, i.e. not focussed on individual referrals to the Channel programme and there is little by way of a demonstrable state commitment to engaging with issues that ultimately drive individuals to join the EDL movement. Regarding the Channel programme, there was consistent evidence from practitioners that very few of these referrals actually subscribe to RWE ideologies, but rather the street protest ambitions of the EDL. Although this was also the case within Luton, here, there were even fewer referrals that progressed on to be adopted onto the Channel programme leading to concerns about the veracity of the referrals to Channel as those assessed by the police practitioners were found to be lacking in RWE ideology. A Channel Panel was only established in Newcastle in early 2016 as a result of the Counter Terrorism and Security Act 2015 and so now the local authority chairs this multi-­agency group. It remains to be seen as to whether this will re-­orientate local efforts to increase awareness of the programme and to refer appropriate individuals for Channel assessment. Despite the lack of shared consensus on where the EDL sits in terms of a policy response, the movement is seen principally as a public order issue, and so

Newcastle: rolling out the welcome mat   107 p­ artners work towards the objective of minimising the impact of protest activity before, during and after the planned events. It was striking that there were views within the local authority that the EDL are in fact an extreme right-­wing group, but conversely not a counter terrorism threat that should be addressed through the Prevent Strategy. It is exactly this murky delineation between the Prevent Strategy and DCLG Integration policy areas that contributes to this muddled understanding at the front line. There were similar frictions between police service and locally elected and accountable councillors and council officials as we saw in the Luton case study. However, they were not as prominent as they are in Luton and this may be due to the way these anti-­EDL energies are channelled into the counter demonstration in Newcastle, rather than lobbying the police service to ban EDL demonstrations. It was clear that across the statutory and non-­statutory partnerships that there are processes in place to respond to the EDL on a case by case basis whereby the EDL notify the police service of an intention to demonstrate, negotiations are carried out, a memorandum of understanding is drawn up, setting out expectations around the route, etc., the demonstration takes place, it is debriefed and the resources are stood down until the next notification is received. However, there was a distinct lack of thinking around a longer-­term plan to respond to the EDL. This was mainly attributed to a lack of political will to engage with challenging issues locally that drive grievances which could ultimately lead to individuals being pushed into the RWE orbit of different organisations and movements in the perceived absence of any other more legitimate vent for those grievances. And most leaders of large public organizations don’t necessarily have a desire to surface latent conflict within communities. They would like to maintain a sense of status quo, and not go looking for trouble, shall we say.63 It is exactly this latent conflict that the EDL is so proficient in bringing to the surface. It was recognised that there is a need for increased engagement on challenging topical issues such as integration and the re-­settlement of Syrian refugees and that if the local authority continues to fail to enter into dialogue on these issues, then they will only add to the numbers of isolated and disenfranchised individuals seeking a voice through groups like the EDL; it’s a big problem for us, particularly in Northumbria as a whole, the disenfranchised do not have focal points and it’s really difficult because they can be seduced by the likes of the EDL and the far right. Often, a lot of the individuals haven’t been part of these organisations but you can see in their views and their thoughts that they’re extreme right wing in their concerns. And I’ve put that to local authorities, we need to come up with ways of how we can engage and address their concerns.64 This is particularly important within the context of practitioners recognising the  most significant counter terrorism threat profile locally is associated with

108   Newcastle: rolling out the welcome mat right-­wing extremism. Elected officials have not only failed to recognise their role in representing all sections of the community, but worse, have contributed to further polarising communities in meeting the EDL on their own terms through mobilising counter street protests. This strategy is short sighted and fails to move the dialogue any further forward. Opposing a set of entrenched views with their diametric opposition on different sides of the street has failed to reach a common ground and success in defeating the EDL argument is not measured through how many people you were able to encourage onto the street to demonstrate against them, as is currently the case. It is only through bridging this gap through the local authority taking risks in entering into what may be at times very challenging dialogue that they can reclaim control of the narrative from the EDL leadership and draw people from the extremes back into mainstream discourse.

Notes   1 Interview 45 – police Prevent practitioner, September 2015.   2 Interview 49 – senior public order police officer, August 2015.   3 Interview 43 – senior Prevent police officer, June 2015.   4 Interview 48 – community safety officer, Newcastle City Council, September 2015.   5 Newcastle 2016 Proposal and Integrated Impact Assessment Informing our approach to fairness (November 2012).   6 Newcastle’s submission to the Riots Communities and Victims Panel (2012) p. 1.   7 For further on the way these issues were reported in the media, see; Telegraph online (25/06/2015) “Report about Asian grooming gangs was suppressed to avoid inflaming racial tension”.   8 Interview 45 – police Prevent practitioner, September 2015.   9 See Tufail, Waqas, “Rotherham, rochdale, and the racialised threat of the ‘Muslim Grooming Gang’ ”. International Journal for Crime, Justice and Social Democracy 4.3 (2015): 30–43. 10 Chronicle Live (05/02/2015) “Northumbria Police have charged 20 people with sexual offences as part of Operation Sanctuary”. 11 The Star (22/02/2017) – “Home Office refuses to grant powers to stop EDL marches in Rotherham”. 12 The Guardian (28/02/2015) “Far-­right Pegida eclipsed by its opponents at first UK demo”; PEGIDA stands for “Patriotic Europeans against the Islamisation of the West”. The group was formed in Dresden in 2014 and it campaigns against what it perceives as the growing influence of Islam in Europe and increasing immigration. 13 Tyne and Wear Anti-­Fascist Association website. 14 Note 13, Chapter 4, supra. 15 Safe Newcastle Plan 2015–2018 Tackling Crime, Protecting Communities p. 13. 16 The Daily Mail Online (15/12/2012) “Setting of Byker Grove youth club to become an Islamic school after council approved plans”. 17 Interview 53 – police officer, community engagement team, October 2015. 18 Interview 46 – senior public order police officer, July 2015. 19 BBC News (19/12/2013) “Two guilty of Lee Rigby murder”. 20 Interview 43 – senior police Prevent practitioner, June 2015. 21 Interview 42 – senior police officer, Northumbria, July 2015. 22 Interview 56 – Newcastle City Councillor, December 2015. 23 Interview 48 – community safety officer, Newcastle City Council, September 2015. 24 Interview 49 – senior public order police officer, August 2015.

Newcastle: rolling out the welcome mat   109 25 Interview 50 – senior public order police officer. September 2015. 26 The Yorkshire Post (10/06/2013) “Islamists get long jail terms for Dewsbury EDL bomb plot”. 27 Interview 41 – senior Prevent police officer, May 2015. 28 Interview 49 – senior public order police officer, August 2015. 29 Interview 53 – police officer, community engagement team, October 2015. 30 Interview 50 – senior public order police officer, September 2015. 31 Interview 52 – police officer, community engagement team, October 2015. 32 Interview 42 – senior police officer, Northumbria, July 2015. 33 Interview 56 – Newcastle City Councillor, December 2015. 34 Interview 45 – police Prevent practitioner, September 2015. 35 Interview 56 – Newcastle City Councillor, December 2015. 36 Interview 43 – senior police Prevent practitioner, June 2015. 37 Interview 41 – senior police Prevent practitioner, May 2015. 38 Interview 45 – police Prevent practitioner, September 2015. 39 Interview 43 – senior police Prevent practitioner, June 2015. 40 BBC News (17/10/2014) “Newcastle University student Vladimir Aust jailed over bomb scare”. 41 Interview 60 – community engagement worker, February 2016. 42 Prevent Strategy Review, Note 19, Introduction, supra, p. 23. 43 Interview 48 – community safety officer, Newcastle City Council, September 2015. 44 Interview 44 – police Prevent practitioner, July 2015. 45 Interview 60 – community engagement worker, February 2016. 46 Interview 45 – police Prevent practitioner, September 2015. 47 Interview 52 – police officer, community engagement team, October 2015. 48 Interview 55 – senior safeguarding practitioner, Newcastle City Council, December 2015. 49 Interview 43 – senior police Prevent practitioner, June 2015. 50 Interview 44 – police Prevent practitioner, July 2015. 51 Interview 43 – senior police Prevent practitioner, June 2015. 52 Security Minister’s speech for the Far-­Right Special Interest Group conference delivered on the 5 September 2013. 53 Interview 43 – senior police Prevent practitioner, June 2015. 54 Interview 42 – senior police officer, Northumbria, July 2015. 55 Interview 42 – senior police officer, Northumbria, July 2015. 56 Interview 42 – senior police officer, Northumbria, July 2015. 57 Northumbria Police & Crime Commissioner Update on the 16/06/2014 EDL demonstration (PCC website). 58 Chronicle Live (17/05/2014) “English Defence League march through Newcastle City Centre”. 59 Luton Borough Council website; “Leader’s pledge on EDL demonstration: ‘Luton will remain united and open for business’ ” (12/11/2014). 60 In preparation for the May 2014 demonstration – see The Chronicle Live website; “Police plan to stop English Defence League march through Newcastle’s West End”. 61 Interview 50 – senior public order police officer, September 2015. 62 Interview 50 – senior public order police officer, September 2015. 63 Interview 48 – community safety officer, Newcastle City Council, September 2015. 64 Interview 42 – senior police officer, Northumbria, July 2015.

5 Waltham Forest Into “the lion’s den”

Waltham Forest has been selected as a case study due to its status as a Prevent Priority Area and, while having experienced EDL protest activity, this is significantly less in terms of scale and frequency compared with Luton and Newcastle. Waltham Forest is a borough with a recent history of association with Islamist terrorism as well as acting as a base for members of the now-­ proscribed ALM organisation. In 2006 it was the scene of high-­profile arrests and house searches in relation to Operation Overt,1 the Islamist plot to launch suicide bomb attacks on a succession of transatlantic airliners using liquid bombs disguised as soft drinks. This heightened awareness of the home-­grown Islamist threat did not however precipitate any demonstration activity at the time in the absence of the EDL movement which had not yet found its origins in Luton; In 2006 we had a number of arrests and high-­profile raids and national & international media. There was then a real concern about the far right responding to that, but that didn’t transpire. It didn’t lead up to the end of 2009 to any protests, any organised activity, maybe some small examples of leafleting, there was some evidence of that from the National Front and some racist graffiti, but relatively speaking for a borough of Waltham Forest’s nature and its crime profile which was significant, it wasn’t up there.2 It may be the case that, unlike Luton, the Islamist presence in Waltham Forest could have been seen to be addressed through high profile counter terrorism operations and so the perceived need to augment the policing response which galvanised support in Luton in the wake of the policing response to the ALM protest in 2009 was absent at that time. However, more recently and against this backdrop of association with Islamist terrorism, the now-­proscribed ALM group established a significant foothold on the borough. The presence of the ALM movement’s leader, self-­styled Sheikh Anjem Choudhry and the actions of his followers locally, most significantly the group’s “Sharia Controlled Zone” campaign,3 were seen by respondents as being the attraction for the EDL to demonstrate on the borough. There was a strong belief among the respondents that this reputation as “a heartland of Islamist activity”,4 as

Waltham Forest: into “the lion’s den”   111 emphasised by the movement’s leader, Tommy Robinson, in referring to the borough as “Islamist Bandit Country”,5 acted as a magnet to the EDL; You had the Omar Brooks episode,6 I was actually at that meeting where he shouted down John Reid about what are you doing coming into a Muslim area? That kind of thing gives some succour to the far right to potentially exploit. More recently now, the individual that may be Jihadi John is potentially a resident of Walthamstow. And there’s also the recent confidence motion by the council of Mosques in Waltham Forest against the Prevent Agenda, which I think is the first of its type. So if you’re in the far right and thinking strategically about risks and opportunities, Walthamstow has ample opportunity to go in and cause discontent.7 All of these factors play into the EDL narrative that they must defend their communities against “creeping Sharia”, and act in the absence of a police service in their view cowed by political correctness.8

Protest activity From a Waltham Forest perspective, practitioners referred to three large demonstrations, one of which was in fact banned. Significantly, there have not been, as in Luton and Newcastle, any smaller demonstrations around more localised issues. The borough does not host an indigenous EDL leadership and so the movement’s attendance here is more to be seen to oppose the activities of perceived Islamist extremist groups active in this community. One respondent described the EDL perception of Waltham Forest as “the lion’s den”,9 emphasising how the movement see it as their role to demonstrate that there are no “no-­go zones” for patriots exercising their human rights. Although the EDL had visited the borough in 2011 in response to the ALM march (now calling themselves “Muslims Against Crusades”), the first EDL demonstration in Waltham Forest took place on the 1 September 2012; Initially, when they notified us of their intention to do this march, they wanted to follow the exact route that had been used by Muslims Against Crusades the year before … now the difficulty with that was from the outset the Council who owned the town square said; we’re not happy with them going in there. Behind the scenes there were a lot of people within the local authority that were mobilising opinion, so for example, I can’t remember which mosque it was along the route but whichever one it was, they were mobilising opinion to them to sort of agitate to the police about getting this banned.10 This is an important perspective in relation to the parity of state responses to extreme groups given the community and local authority reaction to the proscribed ALM group. This group had marched through Waltham Forest in July

112   Waltham Forest: into “the lion’s den” 201111 and not only was there a perceived absence of calls to ban this march but there was no counter-­balancing counter demonstration. A local authority respondent voiced frustration at the lack of visible opposition to the activities of Anjem Choudhry, the group’s leader; The Muslim community didn’t come out and have a go at him, which was a disgrace.12 It is this perceived disparity in the way that extreme Islamist group activity is managed by local actors that feeds the sense of grievance for the EDL and its adherents and is reminiscent of the conditions in Luton that gave rise to the EDL in 2009. There was a clear sense among all respondents as to why it was that the EDL were coming to Waltham Forest; Without a doubt, Anjem Choudhry was living in Waltham Forest and other high-­profile individuals like Trevor Brooks and Jordan Horner, so they were involved, you may have seen some of the video clips that were being taken primarily in Tower Hamlets where they were targeting individuals around “Sharia Law”, some of it was also done in Waltham Forest. So that’s why the EDL focused on Waltham Forest as well.13 It is interesting that not one of the respondents looked at opportunities to dissuade the EDL from coming to the borough through proactive messaging around the fact that the Metropolitan Police Service, working with several local authorities had removed the Sharia Patrol posters extremely quickly and had made arrests for any criminal offences reported across the affected boroughs. For a borough apparently in the grip of Islamist extremism there was little emphasis on trying to dispel this perception through proactively publicising the partnership activities that had been undertaken in response to the actions of the Islamists. This demonstration ended in some minor disorder and based upon the way the EDL felt they had been unfairly treated by the Police, i.e. in not being permitted to march to the agreed staging area due to the actions of the counter demonstration breaching the police lines, this did nothing to assuage their concerns and instead served as further motivation to the EDL to return to Waltham Forest; They felt that they were stitched up when they went there by the way that it was policed … I think they felt probably that they’d been quite helpful in changing their plans to fit in with what the police wanted. But ultimately, they didn’t then get what they were promised.14 Other respondents recognised the real sense of grievance from the EDL and their desire to return to the borough to exact “revenge”15 for the way they had been treated by the counter demonstrators and the police. This sense of the EDL having “unfinished business”16 was exacerbated by the UAF taking to social media to celebrate their success in denying the EDL a platform. The planned

Waltham Forest: into “the lion’s den”   113 return to Waltham Forest was scheduled for the 27 October 2012. However, based on “specific intelligence and information” that gave reason to believe the demonstration could result in serious disorder, serious damage to property or serious disruption to the life of the community”17 the Metropolitan Police applied for a ban of the demonstration under Section 13 of the Public Order Act 1986.18 This was analogous to the experience in neighbouring Tower Hamlets in 2011 where the EDL announced their intention to march through the borough on the 3rd September. Provocative videos were uploaded onto the internet that focussed on birth rates within the Bangladeshi community and the existence of alleged ‘militant Islamic’ groups within the borough. This announcement caused significant concern among the local community against the backdrop of the bombing and mass shootings by Anders Breivik in Norway on 22 July. On this occasion the Home Secretary banned the march upon the application by the Executive Mayor of Tower Hamlets and the Metropolitan Police Service.19 The EDL did eventually return to Waltham Forest and marched on the 9 May 2015; they didn’t actually get to complete what they wanted to do … from my understanding, the EDL feel that; we’re Englishmen, we want to walk, march, demonstrate, express an opinion in our nation of England in our city of London. We were not allowed to because of the violence against us. So the police hemmed us in for hours and we were not allowed to complete our mission, you might say. So the reason they came back was to finish what they had started in 2012.20 There was an acceptance among the Police practitioners that the EDL response to the way they were policed during each of these engagements, largely driven by the influence of the counter demonstration, actually fed into their sense of grievance in that they felt as though their rights were being infringed when balanced with what they perceived as being militant left wing groups countering their demonstration. Conversely, the local authority did not see this as being as much of an issue in that the EDL was comprised of non-­Waltham Forest residents, and so, their sense of grievance was not something the local authority felt responsible for addressing.

Tactics employed in response to the English Defence League It is significant that not one of the interviewees believed the EDL were a terrorism threat necessitating a counter terrorism response. In line with the findings in Luton and Newcastle, the movement were seen as a direct challenge to community cohesion and given that they are a street protest movement, to public order. However, there was a view that while the EDL did not in themselves pose a counter terrorism threat, there were concerns that their presence may precipitate such a threat from local Islamists seizing the opportunity to use the attendance of the EDL to further their Islam vs. the West narrative;

114   Waltham Forest: into “the lion’s den” I think it lay with the reciprocal. I don’t think there was necessarily a terrorism threat from EDL walking through Waltham Forest but I think it was about how they made the communities feel and how it would ramp up their feelings. And the fact that actually what they were doing was they were offering Islamist extremists the opportunity to recruit.21 It is important to note that in keeping with the findings in both Luton and Newcastle, public order practitioners in Waltham Forest emphasised that the EDL do not pose a public order threat in themselves, but the threat is presented through the more numerous and less easily predictable counter demonstrations, typically orchestrated by groups such as Unite Against Fascism: I think the EDL as a group of people don’t generally engage in that much violent behaviour. What generally happens is the violent behaviour is brought to them and you have the EDL which are typically a much smaller group than the opposing group, and therefore they are much easier to deal with and manage.22 Unlike their Luton and Newcastle counterparts, practitioners did not generally see the EDL that attends Waltham Forest as a broad church of individuals with varying motivations. The tone here was much more confrontational, the EDL were coming to Waltham Forest to prove something. In exploring this dynamic with the interviewees, those who policed the demonstrations had very different experiences of the EDL to their counterparts in Luton and Newcastle and there was a perceived absence of other motivations for the demonstration. These were not disenfranchised members of local white working-­class communities, using the demonstration as a vent for wider grievances; these were “hardcore” EDL members with a very specific agenda, to show that they could march through Waltham Forest, just as the Islamist extremists had done previously. In my experience of dealing with them, that kind of support doesn’t turn out on the street. On the street you’ll get your hardcore lot and what you’ll see is often, and obviously everyone knows there’s a clear link to football, and it will depend what’s going on with the football as to what their turnout gets sometimes, but I think those more moderate views or those people that feel they have genuine grievances don’t tend to attend the demonstrations, sometimes they do, but they’re certainly not at the forefront of it.23 It is within the context of this particular motivation for attending Waltham Forest that we also see the impact of the incoherence of the movement’s messaging around its opposition to Islamism rather than Islam itself; Communities just looked at them and said; they hate Muslims. That was it, and that was how they were perceived. They were big horrible football

Waltham Forest: into “the lion’s den”   115 h­ ooligan type people and they hate Muslims and that’s why they’re walking through Waltham Forest.24 More evident in Waltham Forest than the other case studies (particularly Newcastle with its history of anti-­fascism activism), possibly due to local actors’ stances on the external nature of both the EDL and counter demonstrations, were questions around the representativeness of the counter demonstration and how much they actually spoke to local residents’ concerns within the context of being national in their mandate and mobilisation. In response to the attendance of the EDL a local group called “We Are Waltham Forest” was created to oppose them. However, it quickly became clear that the group had actually been coordinated by the national Unite Against Fascism group, and the UAF logo was evident on their pamphlets. This conflation between the UAF, with their own agenda, and Waltham Forest residents who had little experience with anti-­fascist organisations previously, added further complexity to an already volatile situation; What would be really interesting to understand about that would be to what extent the group WAWF [We Are Waltham Forest] was influenced by UAF. You’ve got a localised group saying; we don’t want this, we’re not happy about that … and then all of a sudden you’ve got thousands upon thousands of left wing activists that are happy to engage in disorder with police trying to get people away. I wonder if that’s what that resident from Waltham Forest envisaged they would get.25 From a Waltham Forest perspective, due to the external nature of the threat posed by the EDL and the lack of local constituency for the movement, practitioners, particularly from the local authority, did not see the value in engaging with the EDL. Some had the view that should the application for a ban be unsuccessful, then the advice from the council should be to ignore the EDL. However, this was difficult to reconcile with the desire among some communities (and locally elected members) to be seen to counter the EDL demonstration as an external and unrepresentative attack on the borough. Clearly, as the EDL were seen principally as a public order issue, and in the absence of any other engagement with them, it again fell to the police Protest Liaison Team to facilitate a dialogue around the routes, stewarding and general conduct of the demonstration. Engaging with the EDL Like Luton and Newcastle, it was again made clear by the interviewees that the only direct engagement with the EDL is conducted through the Protest Liaison Teams (PLT) under the auspices of the public order policing plan in response to a specific demonstration. It was highlighted by public order practitioners that unlike the experiences in Luton and Newcastle, Waltham Forest does not host an

116   Waltham Forest: into “the lion’s den” EDL regional or national leadership and so, outside of a protest situation, the authorities do not have a local access point into the movement. In support of the overarching strategy for the day of the protest, the PLT were the dedicated police resource for interfacing directly with the protest organisers. When the EDL come to Waltham Forest, there was a recognition, particularly among public order police officers that they are heavily policed, largely due to them being the smaller group in the face of a significantly larger and less manageable counter demonstration from a policing perspective, simply by virtue of the different moving parts within the countering group; Why does that happen? That happens because they’re the smaller group. In fact, who is causing the breach of the peace? They’re saying; we’re going to march up this road and we’re going to stand outside that mosque and demonstrate, which they claim it is their human right to be able to do. And then what you get is, 5,000–7,000 UAF coming, ask yourself the question; who’s causing the breach of the peace?26 There are questions here around how value judgments are formed in relation to EDL protest. Further to the Luton experience, the significant public order risks associated with the EDL are manifested not necessarily through the group itself but through the counter demonstration. The views of the EDL precipitate a wide range of feelings within communities and so the countering force is invariably disparate and less willing to engage with the police, as emphasised in the accounts of public order police officers in both Waltham Forest and Newcastle, due to the influence of the national UAF movement. However, if it is in fact the actions of the counter demonstration rather than the EDL that cause the risks to increase which results in EDL demonstrations being banned or curtailed, then this only adds to the victim narrative of the movement in portraying themselves as protestors denied a voice because it disagrees with the majority. This raises questions around how the conduct of EDL protests is reported and how there may need to be a clearer attribution of actions in order to dispel the idea that EDL are the sole or principal drivers for disorder. Community messaging and reassurance The official stance taken by local authority respondents was that for those protests where they were unsuccessful in lobbying for a ban of the demonstration was to limit the number of people attending the counter demonstration. The emphasis on perceiving the EDL as an external threat against which Waltham Forest residents must be protected also extended to the way in which the counter demonstration was perceived by local actors; I said that we should go for a ban, if we don’t get that, ignore. Now, the ignoring wasn’t sustainable because I knew that people were coming from outside anyway. But our argument was; this is not a Waltham Forest issue,

Waltham Forest: into “the lion’s den”   117 so that was a powerful argument; this is only about people coming from the outside stirring it up. Our community doesn’t want to be stirred up. You’re best to ignore them. We stopped them from going through the main town centre; we kept them on the fringes, out of the way. But nonetheless, I still had mosque leaders, some councillors, other activists who were out there and wanted a fight.27 The priority was not to engage with communities with whom the EDL narrative may resonate, so to reduce the numbers attending the EDL rally. In fact, the focus was very much on engaging with Muslim communities to dissuade them from attending the counter demonstration; It was more around speaking to the Imams and getting Imams to talk about it at the mosque. It was more about stopping them retaliating and actually making the whole situation worse”.28 In terms of engagement with the wider non-­Muslim communities to address EDL attendance and to explore its impact on them from a community cohesion perspective, there was some activity but this was not seen as being the priority for statutory agencies. The theme of local actors failing to address the societal drivers that may encourage individuals to align themselves to the EDL and join the protest, instead prioritising mitigating the impact on Muslim communities, has been prevalent in all three case studies; I think that was done with the wider community meetings that we held, because they were attended not just by the Muslim community but by other residents, as you rightly say, white working, middle class residents of the community in Waltham Forest who were concerned about what was happening. So yes, some of that was done but the main focus was on the Muslim community without a doubt.29 Diversionary activity In line with the Luton experience, for the 2012 demonstration, the statutory agencies attempted to divert the wider public from contributing to the spectacle of the EDL attending the borough. The diversionary activities were intended to draw away spectators to prevent them being swept into public disorder; What we tried to do, on the first occasion, the EDL wanted the town centre, so the local authority put on a family fun day and put bouncy castles and roundabouts and things like that into the town centre, 1, to stop them going there and 2, to divert individuals. On the second occasion there was already some art festivals and other things on in the borough that we were able to dictate where they could march and where they couldn’t march actually because of some of these things that were ongoing. That helped us, yes.30

118   Waltham Forest: into “the lion’s den” However, as was generally the experience in the other two case studies, these attempts to draw away emphasis from the fact the EDL are demonstrating nearby, was that such activities are not effective in avoiding the issue that a national movement is protesting about the borough being a hotbed of Islamist extremism. Significantly in Luton, a town hardened to EDL protest, the emphasis is much more on “business as usual”. There are no staged events and residents are encouraged instead to go about their lives as usual in the town. From a Waltham Forest perspective though, this was the first big national demonstration on the borough and the residents had not developed a similar resilience to such confrontational activity. In 2012 we took a diversionary approach, and at the time of the EDL coming down, we set up a big funfair type of event in the town square to act as an alternative thing for people to get involved in and it didn’t really work to be honest with you because you had all of these kids in the town square on all of these rides and about twenty feet behind them you had people marching and holding banners and so it didn’t work at all. We decided not to do that this time around and it is going to be more of a low-­key campaign so there’s not going to be the full on campaign of Waltham Forest stand together type thing that we had in 2012. It’s going to be a bit more low-­key.31

The role of the Prevent Strategy Against the backdrop of the public order policing response it was evident there were a range of views on the identification of the EDL and its adherence to RWE ideology. This is significant as the definition of the movement ultimately determines the policy area which governs the state response and more importantly the local resource that can be allocated to deal with it. It was interesting that the theme of the EDL being seen as an external threat also traversed into Prevent Strategy delivery considerations locally; It’s a matter of fact that the Prevent Agenda concentrates on Muslim extremism, simply because that is the issue in the borough. Any other group is very difficult to find. If we found them we would adopt the same position. Historically Waltham Forest has had very little engagement with right wing organisations, going way back to the National Front.32 In 2006 Waltham Forest was selected as a pilot borough for the Prevent Strategy. Since then its practitioners have accumulated a wealth of experience in delivering the strategy both before and after the 2011 review. It is these perspectives that are vitally important to understand how the review was implemented at a local level. Of the themes covered within Chapter 2, most notable here was the appreciation of how the reduction in non-­Prevent Strategy community cohesion work occurred at the same time as the strategic emphasis on the Prevent Strategy being focussed on “all forms of terrorism”.33

Waltham Forest: into “the lion’s den”   119 The focus on the far right within Prevent coincided with the withdrawal of all of that resource really. All of that resource that had been there around cohesion and Prevent, the area-­based grant and all that capacity.34 It is clear from the accounts of practitioners who were present during the 2010–2011 period that the strategic desire to de-­couple wider community cohesion efforts from the “securitising” impact of the Prevent Strategy took place at a time where central government-­imposed austerity measures led to much of the resource that would have then led on the response to the “Creating the Conditions for Integration” policy area being disbanded. This disconnect between the political agenda playing out within the Prevent Strategy, i.e. to redress the balance away from Muslim communities and the realities of frontline delivery with diminishing resources led to the neglect of the intended policy response to the EDL; It doesn’t really filter down to a local level because of the fact that we no longer have a cohesion element within the Council. Prior to 2011 we used to have a Community Cohesion Team who used to deal with community/ voluntary sector issues and when that split was made, if we still had that team, the EDL and far right would have gone there but that team’s been dissolved. So, essentially, as a local authority we don’t have any community cohesion response, so that by default comes to us in Community Safety … I think that’s part of the argument against national strategies and national policies being put in certain boxes because when its being delivered at a local level, those boxes no longer exist.35 Based on the perceptions of practitioners present during this transition, this was perhaps felt more acutely in Waltham Forest than the other two case study areas due to the length of time the Prevent Strategy had been operating on the borough, and the relative expertise that has been built up here in relation to the strategy’s inter-­relationship with other policy areas. In relation to Prevent Strategy resourcing, Waltham Forest, like Luton, is serviced by a Regional Prevent Coordinator (RPC) who covers London and a number of Prevent and Channel practitioners. These are allocated to London boroughs dependent upon the assessment of risk/ threat as depicted within their respective CTLP. Waltham Forest, given its status as a priority area within the Prevent Strategy Review of 2011, has dedicated Prevent and Channel staff both from a police and local authority perspective. In common with the Luton case study, those practitioners who had been in post since 2006 highlighted that they had been considering other forms of extremism even pre-­2011, with examples of referrals of individuals assessed as being vulnerable to being drawn into RWE as well as Irish Republicanism to the Channel programme before the Government made the decision to explicitly draw out RWE within the revised Prevent Strategy; I was surprised because we were given the brief that it was any kind of violent extremism so we weren’t only dealing with the Islamist extremism,

120   Waltham Forest: into “the lion’s den” we were also dealing with right wing, left wing. But there wasn’t a great deal of work for that at that time. The majority of it was the Islamist extremism.36 Similar to both the Luton and Newcastle case studies, practitioners articulated that engagement at a broad societal level was very difficult with regard to right-­ wing extremism. However, the difference here was that Waltham Forest practitioners could not identify conduits through to potentially target communities within the context of the general understanding that although there may be individuals who subscribe to RWE narratives, there is no organised or structured extreme right-­wing operating on the borough; It’s difficult on this borough because although there will always be individuals, there’s no places, there’s not a certain pub or a certain hall or venues where you would target some resources at certain times, or where they might have an EDL version of a Dawa stall on a Saturday afternoon, where there’s three blokes from the EDL or some affiliated group handing out leaflets in the town square – these things don’t exist.37 Like Luton and Newcastle none of the practitioners could point to any specific work they had undertaken under the auspices of the Prevent Strategy to engage at a community level around RWE issues. In relation to the Prevent Strategy training products used, again, they could not identify any that were RWE specific and instead pointed to how the Home Office WRAP (version 3) product had incorporated RWE along with other forms of extremism in a more generalised way. Wider than this, although the original pilot team referred to a bespoke input they received from a former right-­wing extremist around the positioning of the EDL within the spectrum of the RWE pre-­2011, there has not been any such training and/or focus on bespoke initiatives since. Specifically in relation to the response to the EDL, there were concerns that this lack of definition of the EDL and therefore the policy response, translated into confusion at the practitioner level when considering the movement alongside the prevalent extremist group on the borough, “Muslims Against Crusades”, and how from a parity of response perspective, if this group were deemed to be a Prevent Strategy issue and the EDL were not, then how this case could be made to the public and specifically Muslim communities; At the time there really seemed to be a view that whilst they were a right wing organisation, the view was that they weren’t necessarily extremists and they weren’t a CT threat so therefore they didn’t appear to be dealt with, and in my opinion, still aren’t being dealt with on the same level and with the same robustness as we were dealing with MAC.38 The respondents in Waltham Forest shared the view that the impact of adding RWE explicitly into the Prevent Strategy did not lead to a clearly defined Prevent

Waltham Forest: into “the lion’s den”   121 role in responding to the EDL. There was no focussed engagement around the group and in preparation for EDL demonstrations, where the PLT engaged with the EDL on specific issues such as the route, traffic arrangements and stewarding, the funded Prevent staff were instead utilised in the role of tension monitoring with existing contacts within Muslim communities in the borough; It was actually pretty clear at the time that there was a bit of a gulf between policy and reality. If the policy was for the EDL to be included under the Prevent Strategy, they certainly weren’t being dealt with in that fashion on the ground. There were strong links into the community for Prevent issues and the other P’s of the Contest Strategy but there weren’t anywhere near that level of knowledge, contact, monitoring on the right wing side of things.39 As we found with the Luton and Newcastle case studies, there was however the same beneficial by-­product of explicitly adding RWE to the Prevent Strategy in its impact on Prevent practitioners engaging with Muslim communities; It gave us a lot of leverage in terms of the conversations that we were having with the community because one of the issues for us in the delivery of Prevent was getting community groups on board and one of the sticking points was always around the fact that Prevent just focused on AQ. So it did give us a lot of leverage in terms of saying that’s not the case, the review has incorporated far right extremism, and it is something that we can make reference to.40 This is a particularly interesting dynamic as given the threat profile of the borough, Prevent resources have been directed towards Islamist extremism. In order to build trust and confidence with Muslim communities who have lived through the previous iteration of the Prevent Strategy and now seek a more equitable state response, not singling them out as a suspect community, both police and local authority practitioners suggested the fact that the strategy now explicitly includes other forms of extremism has been well received. However, as the borough does not host an RWE “constituency” it is very difficult from Prevent practitioners to actually prove this is the case as there have been very few referrals of an extreme right-­wing nature accepted by the Channel programme and there is an absence of tangible community engagement, training or initiatives focussing on RWE. Channel It was clear that Channel practitioners in Waltham Forest had been working with referrals demonstrating vulnerabilities to being drawn into non-­Islamist forms of extremism pre-­2011. That the programme was already managing individuals who were vulnerable to RWE narratives emphasises how it is applicable to

122   Waltham Forest: into “the lion’s den” forms of extremism other than the Islamism it was originally created to counteract. In exploring with them whether the addition of RWE explicitly within the Prevent Strategy brought about any changes to the way they did business, the evidence suggests that it did not; I think in terms of Channel there’s always been the notion that it is an open process and that anybody, regardless of what part of the spectrum they’re coming from, can be referred into Channel. That was the understanding that we were working on prior to 2011 and that was how we were communicating it to frontline staff through training.41 This position was replicated in Luton (and to a lesser extent, Newcastle) and is indicative of frontline practitioners managing risk, threat and vulnerability in a proportionate way. There was however a recognition that pre-­2011 Channel practitioners struggled to identify effective and credible RWE intervention providers for those cases they were managing. After 2011 this did change because the Home Office now had the mandate to fund non-­Islamist extremism theological and ideological intervention providers. However, if there was a prediction that the addition of RWE explicitly to the Prevent Strategy in 2011 would precipitate a large number of referrals, this was not borne out in Waltham Forest; For me, there was never a huge amount of right wing referrals so the fact that it was included in 2011 didn’t see the floodgates open, far from it.42 We can see from the discussions at the time that the parity of response was a significant issue for frontline practitioners in being seen to be applying the Channel programme to RWE cases despite the scarcity of information to differentiate between an individual subscribing to the views of the EDL and those with whom RWE narratives resonated, justifying their inclusion on the programme; There was the big debate about the EDL back then, whether someone showing support or allegiance to the EDL would meet the threshold for a Channel referral. At the time, the referrals we were getting were where someone had “Liked” something on a Facebook page or were wearing a badge at school that showed allegiance to the EDL. The thought at the time was that on its own that wouldn’t be sufficient for a Channel referral. However, if it formed part of a wider picture of extreme right-­wing support or vulnerability, then it may be another vulnerability factor.43 This corroborates the findings in Luton in particular, where practitioners have demonstrated a more nuanced understanding of the RWE ideology and the position of the EDL within this continuum; It depends on the individual and how much knowledge and how deeply involved they are, because the EDL, as you know, could just be the start of

Waltham Forest: into “the lion’s den”   123 the interest. Once they’re sucked into that they can be taken deeper into that extreme right wing view. It’s an early indicator, but I don’t think that all those flirting with the EDL would necessarily make a Channel referral.44 This understanding, rather than being promulgated by way of the NDEDIU definition of the EDL, shared its origins with practitioners in Luton in that it was borne of the experience of managing cases and interacting with Channel specialist intervention providers to form the assessment that it would be inappropriate to place everyone who expressed support for the EDL on the counter terrorism Channel programme. However, it may be the case that such an adherence to the EDL movement may be indicative of wider vulnerabilities to being drawn into the extreme right-­wing, so context and holistic assessments of individuals’ needs are necessary.

The external threat An important characteristic of this case study is that the respondents collectively perceived the EDL to pose an external threat rather than protest activity being seen as indicative of wider community issues through which EDL protest was being used as a vent. This is particularly interesting within the context of themes thus far with regard to representative government and the need for integration policies that serve all communities. From the perspective of the local actors interviewed, the EDL did not tap into any groundswell of indigenous support for their views in Waltham Forest; There’s never been … right back to the point where the far right tried to get traction through the electoral process in a local place, they seem to have barely even tried in any way that was significant in Waltham Forest, compared to many other London areas, you look at Tower Hamlets and Barking & Dagenham, which are only just down the road.45 Many respondents referred to the comparative electoral success of the British National Party in the neighbouring Barking & Dagenham borough and distanced Waltham Forest from such a base of activity. There was a wide acknowledgement that far right-­wing political parties had historically struggled to gain purchase in the borough, with notable exceptions with regard to the National Front achieving albeit limited success in Borough Council by-­elections in the late 1970’s and the more recent experience of the BNP attempting to gain seats in the 1990’s. But this rather misses the point of EDL protest. As we saw within the Luton and Newcastle case studies, EDL protest is not necessarily contingent upon the presence of local actors, it is based on a perceived need to defend a way of life against the threat of “creeping Sharia”. The fact that the local actors engaged with Waltham Forest communities and did not find evidence of a potential pool of support for the EDL is largely irrelevant in dissuading the movement from attending given the boroughs difficult recent historical association with

124   Waltham Forest: into “the lion’s den” Islamist extremism which acted as a lightning rod to confrontational EDL protest. It’s come in as a response and a threat to other threats that are in the borough. It’s been seen to be a place of interest because there have been other community tensions and community conflicts which the far right could potentially exploit, rather than having an existing base there to work within.46 With regard to the first demonstration in September 2012, the respondents each recognised the limitations of multi-­agency working where partners approached the problematisation of the EDL in very different ways. For one police practitioner; And I think part of the problem for them was there were council elections the following year and a lot of them were concerned about their re-­election or otherwise and had to be seen to be speaking out against it.47 In relation to the planned march on the 27 October 2012, the leader of Waltham Forest’s Council, Councillor Chris Robbins said: Knowingly putting our borough’s residents in harm’s way is not an option and I will do everything in my power to ensure the EDL is not able to spout its words of hatred in this borough. While we agree everyone has the right to protest, this latest stand by people with no connection to our borough is an abuse of that right.48 Allowing the EDL to protest was seen as an “injustice to allow a group with a violent past and attitude towards protesting to be allowed to intimidate any community”.49 When this demonstration was subsequently banned the local MP’s reacted in a joint statement. Of particular relevance was the following section; We understand that the Police have told the EDL that if they wish to carry out a static protest this must be outside the House of Commons on Saturday 27th October and will uphold this condition on their activities robustly – ensuring that the far-­right group does not enter Waltham Forest.50  Here, the EDL are referred to not only as an RWE organisation but “far right”, demonstrating how these terms are used interchangeably without any real understanding of their connotations in describing the various strata of the right-­wing scene in the U.K. For the most recent demonstration in May 2015, many of these organisational tensions between the police service and the local authority were again evident; I would say that whole build up to that march and the engagement process we had really tested my relationship with the local authority. It was put

Waltham Forest: into “the lion’s den”   125 under immense pressure, because all they had in their sights was banning … and I even got to the point of saying at some occasions; you make the laws, we work within the parameters to uphold them. This is not a debate for here and now, this is a debate to take back to government. Because they just don’t see it. You couldn’t even rationalize with them the benefits of putting conditions on and things like that. That’s the second time around, because we’d lived and breathed it a couple of years before.51 This is reminiscent of the Luton experience where local public order commanders felt as though they were drawn into a position where they were acting as “guardians” of albeit qualified rights to protest in the face of entrenched council views that the EDL should be banned. Given that the EDL were seen as an external threat to the borough, the council felt sidelined during the process whereby they sought to ban the march; The status of the local council’s view should be to a much higher degree, because we were just people that happened to be around, helping. We had no status at all, and that clearly was wrong, because we had to pick up the pieces after everybody’s buggered off, particularly as the police have been run from the Met, it’s not even our local police who are involved, so we’ve got to look after the mess that’s been created.52 There was an interesting perspective on the way that the public, and the local authority, viewed the police role in maintaining a balance of the rights of all parties at times of EDL attendance. In order to prevent the police service being demonised as if tacitly supporting the views of the EDL through being seen to counter the views of the local authority in not applying to the Home Secretary to ban the march using public order legislation, there was a view that it is the council who should be empowered to make this application. Based upon the experiences in Luton and Waltham Forest it is likely that should this have been the case, the EDL would face blanket bans from these locations, raising serious questions about the way in which the albeit qualified rights of this section of society are managed, particularly when considering the actions of extremist Islamist groups who failed to invoke such opposition from the local authority; It was a pressure. We take the view that it should be for local Councils to take that decision. What we argued and would continue to argue is that it’s our responsibility as much as it is a police responsibility. But we wanted to ensure that our local police didn’t end up being the enemy and being drawn into that.53 The community perception of the police service as being seen to support the EDL’s rights over their own through their maintenance of an objective stance was also recognised by police officers;

126   Waltham Forest: into “the lion’s den” There was a little bit of sentiment that; you’re protecting them, you’re part of the problem. But only by a fraction of the community. Individuals actually, not even a fraction of the community.54 Such sentiment was evident in reference to the planned march on the 9th of May 2015 where local MP Stella Creasy tweeted; “angry & disappointed Police not listening 2 concerns of local residents and banning EDL from coming 2 Walthamstow-­hope Home Sec sees sense!”55 There was however some sympathy for the position of the Police in balancing the competing demands of the EDL demonstration; I think we’re all intelligent enough to recognise that the local police have their hands tied in this, it’s not an easy job. But you’ve got to be mature to have that view. And if you’re an anti, and you want to stir it up, and you want to make the police look like a bunch of arseholes, it’s there for you isn’t it?56 It is clear that although there is a process in place to safeguard the qualified rights of anyone attempting to protest, there are those who have differing views as to how much liberal democracy should be afforded to those who do not share their own views. With such emotive issues as the subject of street demonstrations, having the police service acting as arbiters “without fear or favour”, and most importantly without political influence, may be the only way of preserving the rights of fringe groups acting within the law, regardless of the content of their message.

Conclusion For Waltham Forest there was a shared perception across the agencies that the EDL do not have a base within the borough’s communities and so poses an external rather than a “home grown” threat. This contrasts vividly with the position in Luton and Newcastle where there was an appreciation that the EDL does exist within these areas, even though local political actors maintain a policy of non-­engagement with the movement. This position in Waltham Forest followed through into the externally manufactured counter protest movement which was viewed as contributing to a polarisation of views within communities which only exacerbated community tensions as a result. Due to the borough’s recent history of association with Islamist extremism, another important dynamic is that its experience of the EDL is different to that of Luton and Newcastle. Here, practitioners did not see the EDL that attends Waltham Forest as a broad church of individuals with varying motivations but as an aggressive and invading force seeking confrontation with what they perceive to be a community harbouring Islamist extremism. There was little evidence that Waltham Forest’s status as a Prevent Priority Area has yielded a more developed response to the EDL. Although there are

Waltham Forest: into “the lion’s den”   127 more funded staff delivering training to partners, there was no evidence of targeted community engagement, the development of specific counter narratives or funding of projects to address RWE sentiment. The emphasis thus far has been on weaving RWE into existing products to cater for a range of extremist narratives (such as WRAP3), rather than developing bespoke initiatives. The extreme right-­wing, which here includes the EDL is seen as a counter terrorism threat only within the context of the existing Islamist threat from the reciprocal radicalisation perspective, rather than as a threat in of itself requiring a tailored Prevent Strategy response. It was clear that across Prevent practitioners in both the police service and the local authority, the impact of the Government’s decision in 2011 to emphasise its utility in addressing “all forms of extremism”, including RWE, has been minimal. The factors for this were (1) the lack of definition around what a broad societal application of the Prevent Strategy would consist of in relation to right wing extremism, (2) the overriding threat profile locally is associated with Islamist terrorism, particularly ISIS in Syria rather than that of RWE, and (3) the EDL do not enjoy a local constituency and are not seen as a counter terrorism, and therefore a Prevent Strategy issue by state actors working in this area. From a policing perspective the EDL are a public order and community cohesion issue, not a counter terrorism threat. However, it was noted that there were concerns that the presence of the EDL could precipitate a counter terrorism threat in their attendance being utilised by their diametric opposition to radicalise vulnerable young Muslims to their cause. There was a collective understanding among police and local authority actors that the EDL do not enjoy a foothold on the borough in terms of support but instead choose to demonstrate at the borough due to its perceived status as an “Islamist Bandit Country”.57 Therefore, the role of Prevent staff in the planning for a demonstration was restricted to (1) utilising existing relationships of trust and confidence to disseminate community reassurance and gauge tensions, and (2) briefing frontline staff to be aware of the Prevent Strategy with regard to identifying individuals who may be vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism, i.e. for the Channel programme. Notably within Waltham Forest, given the level of practitioner longevity in Prevent Strategy roles, there were significant perspectives regarding the impact of contradictory governmental intentions in the delivery of policy. By removing community cohesion from the Prevent Strategy while driving austerity measures that ultimately led to the removal of the resource that would have been responsible for delivering this work (which included the DCLG response to the EDL), this led to the community cohesion element of the response to the EDL being removed as well. Unlike Luton and Newcastle there was actually a consensus across the police and local authority that the EDL were not a Prevent Strategy issue. Once the differences of opinion around whether or not to seek a ban of the demonstration were resolved, agencies worked together under a public order policing mandate to minimise the disruption to Waltham Forest residents. This took the form of negotiation around the route of the demonstration, the stewarding and necessary road closures. In addition, there was an emphasis on preserving community

128   Waltham Forest: into “the lion’s den” cohesion by reducing the participation of Waltham Forest residents in what was presented as an externally manufactured counter demonstration which risked drawing the borough into a proxy battle between the EDL and the UAF which has been replicated across the country. In Waltham Forest there was a blend of the responses evident in Luton and Newcastle in that the local authority did appeal for calm and attempted to dissuade members of the local community from joining the counter demonstration, but there was an acceptance that despite this intention, many councillors and community activists ignored this appeal and took to the streets. For the 2012 demonstration, the local authority did attempt to divert local residents from the demonstration by staging a family event but this was recognised to be ineffective and was not repeated for future EDL attendances. It has been difficult for local practitioners to engage around issues synonymous with the EDL due to the impact of community cohesion funding being reduced. In the absence of a financial commitment in this area, in the lead up to an EDL demonstration, Prevent resources are called upon to engage with communities with an obvious community cohesion mandate, therefore conflating these two policy areas and demonstrating how these policy intentions have unravelled due to the impact of austerity. Like Luton and Newcastle, there was evidence that the explicit inclusion of RWE within the Prevent Strategy in 2011 did yield a beneficial by-­product in Prevent practitioner engagement with Muslim communities due to the perceived parity in the way extremism issues are managed. There was however little evidence of how the Prevent Strategy has actually been embedded around RWE issues at a broad societal level as separate from the work focussed on individual referrals to the Channel programme, for example through targeted engagement with communities or the development of counter narratives. There was a consensus that the threat profile on this borough emanates from Islamist extremism rather than the RWE. Although from a policy perspective the Prevent Strategy now draws out RWE, there is very little evidence of this playing out at a local level due to the lack of an existing organised extreme right-­wing. In line with the local thinking that the EDL do not have a natural constituency in Waltham Forest, the number of referrals to Channel of an extreme right-­wing nature has been very low. Of these referrals, as was the case in Luton and Newcastle, practitioners expressed concern that many individuals did not in fact subscribe to RWE ideologies, but rather the street protest ambitions of the EDL. It is important to highlight that the Prevent Strategy had been operating in Waltham Forest as a pilot site since mid-­2006. Practitioners there had been working on referrals of an extreme right-­wing nature, again, small in number, even before the 2011 review when RWE was drawn out explicitly within the Prevent Strategy. This is significant as local actors were making decisions on such referrals on a risk/threat basis rather than to be seen to be acting with a sense of parity, cognisant of the way the Prevent Strategy was playing out within some Muslim communities. There were suggestions from some practitioners that RWE referrals were made to Channel in the absence of any other engagement strategies to deal with what are community cohesion issues, rather than necessitating

Waltham Forest: into “the lion’s den”   129 a counter terrorism response. This view was endorsed by intervention providers specialising in right-­wing extremism whose assessment was that most of the referrals they worked with did require some form of support but that this should not be carried out under the auspices of a counter terrorism strategy, with many referrals not even understanding RWE ideology. While an impact can be demonstrated through the increased awareness of RWE at the Channel panel level, this did not precipitate an increase in referrals which were adopted for ideological RWE intervention work. This emphasises that even within an element of the strategy that is measurable in terms of the numbers of referrals and cases, the Channel programme, while demonstrating capacity to manage RWE cases, has only been of limited use. In Waltham Forest the EDL are seen as a public order issue and a threat to community cohesion. The various partners across the police and local authority did not however see the group as a counter terrorism threat. Within the Community Safety Partnership there were strong disagreements over whether or not to apply to the Home Secretary to ban the march in 2012. The sense of inter-­ agency disagreement between the police service and the local authority was more evident here than in Luton and Newcastle. This was due to the way in which the EDL were perceived as an external threat to the borough, rather than representing a home-­grown issue which had attracted like-­minded people from across the country to join their cause. Risks were prioritised by the various agencies in different ways; for the local authority there were clear political risks, however for the police, there was more of an objective approach and notwithstanding the content of the demonstration, they approached the issue from a resourcing perspective to ensure they could police the demonstration it in a way that was safe and minimised disruption to local communities. In relation to the public order paradigm through which the EDL are currently policed, tactics employed are responsive to imminent need rather than thinking strategically about the risk/threat over the longer term. However, unlike in Luton and Newcastle where respondents recognised a need to think more strategically around how they respond to the EDL, for Waltham Forest this was not seen as being necessary. Practitioners in the other case study sites saw the need to develop longer-­term thinking in relation to the EDL as they identified the need to more effectively address the issues that underpin EDL street protest activity through increasing community engagement with white communities who feel marginalised and disconnected from local politics. However, certainly from the Waltham Forest Council perspective, such outreach work in relation to themes feeding into the RWE narrative was not necessary due to; (1) the lack of local constituency for the EDL within the borough. As the movement do not have a foothold on the borough, the local authority does not see it as their role to engage with them. They are an external issue and one which not only rarely attends the borough but does not enjoy an organisational structure or a natural constituency for its views given the demographic makeup of the borough, (2) the assessment that general community cohesion efforts were already part of the business as usual for the council, and (3) the priority, given the demographic makeup of the

130   Waltham Forest: into “the lion’s den” borough, from an extremism perspective, was around better engagement with Muslim communities especially against the historical backdrop of Islamist extremism on the borough.

Notes   1 BBC News (07/09/2009) “The Liquid Bomb Plot: What happened”.   2 Interview 79 – former Waltham Forest Council official, January 2016.   3 The Guardian (06/12/2013) “Muslim vigilantes jailed for ‘Sharia Law’ attacks in London”.   4 Interview 73 – senior public order police officer, December 2015.   5 Waltham Forest Guardian (05/05/2015) “EDL confirm Walthamstow march through ‘Islamist Bandit Country’ ”.   6 In 2006 a local former member of the then-­proscribed ALM group, Omar Brooks, had heckled the Home Secretary, John Reid at a public meeting being held in Leyton on Waltham Forest borough. See BBC News (20/09/2006) “Home Secretary John Reid has been heckled during a speech about targeting potential Muslim extremists”.   7 Interview 79 – former Waltham Forest Council official, January 2016.   8 See Treadwell, James, “Controlling the new far right on the streets: policing the English Defence League in policy and praxis”. Responding to Hate Crime: The Case for Connecting Policy and Research (2014): 131.   9 Interview 65 – former police Channel practitioner, July 2015. 10 Interview 66 – former senior police officer, July 2015. 11 Waltham Forest Guardian (30/07/2011) “Extremists march through borough”. 12 Interview 80 – Waltham Forest Councillor, January 2016. 13 Interview 76 – senior police officer, January 2016. 14 Interview 66 – former senior police officer, July 2015. 15 Interview 62 – local authority Prevent practitioner, April 2015. 16 Interview 62 – local authority Prevent practitioner, April 2015. 17 Waltham Forest Guardian (26/10/2012) “Police ‘ban’ EDL static protest”. 18 Section 13 of the Public Order Act 1986 – “prohibiting public processions”; 13 (4) If at any time the Commissioner of Police for the City of London or the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis reasonably believes that, because of particular circumstances existing in his police area or part of it, the powers under section 12 will not be sufficient to prevent the holding of public processions in that area or part from resulting in serious public disorder, he may with the consent of the Secretary of State make an order prohibiting for such period not exceeding 3 months as may be specified in the order the holding of all public processions (or of any class of public procession so specified) in the area or part concerned. For more information see “Public Order Legislation”, U.K Government website (search: section 13 Public Order Act). 19 “Managing Far Right Activity Toolkit” – www.preventforfeandtraining.org.uk/sites/ default/files/Managing%20Far%20Right%20Activity%20Toolkit.pdf. 20 Interview 64 – community engagement officer, May 2015. 21 Interview 68 – former police Prevent practitioner, October 2015. 22 Interview 73 – senior public order police officer, December 2015. 23 Interview 73 – senior public order police officer, December 2015. 24 Interview 68 – former police Prevent practitioner, October 2015. 25 Interview 73 – senior public order police officer, December 2015. 26 Interview 73 – senior public order police officer, December 2015. 27 Interview 80 – Waltham Forest Councillor, January 2016. 28 Interview 68 – former police Prevent practitioner, October 2015. 29 Interview 76 – senior police officer, January 2016. 30 Interview 76 – senior police officer, January 2016.

Waltham Forest: into “the lion’s den”   131 31 Interview 62 – local authority Prevent practitioner, April 2015. 32 Interview 80 – Waltham Forest Councillor, January 2016. 33 Prevent Strategy Review, Note 19, Introduction, supra, p. 23. 34 Interview 79 – former Waltham Forest Council official, January 2016. 35 Interview 62 – local authority Prevent practitioner, April 2015. 36 Interview 68 – former police Prevent practitioner, October 2015. 37 Interview 64 – community engagement officer, May 2015. 38 Interview 70 – counter terrorism police practitioner, November 2015. 39 Interview 70 – counter terrorism police practitioner, November 2015. 40 Interview 62 – local authority Prevent practitioner, April 2015. 41 Interview 62 – local authority Prevent practitioner, April 2015. 42 Interview 63 – former police Channel practitioner, May 2015. 43 Interview 63 – former police Channel practitioner, May 2015. 44 Interview 63 – former police Channel practitioner, May 2015. 45 Interview 79 – former Waltham Forest Council official, January 2016. 46 Interview 79 – former Waltham Forest Council official, January 2016. 47 Interview 66 – former senior police officer, July 2015. 48 Waltham Forest Guardian (21/09/2012) “Waltham Forest Guardian and council launch joint campaign to ban English Defence League march”. 49 Waltham Forest Guardian (29/08/2012) “Waltham Forest Police say they have no intelligence to suggest an EDL march in Walthamstow will result in violence”. 50 Walthamstow Networker (26/10/2012) “Local MPs react to EDL march ban in Walthamstow”. 51 Interview 76 – senior police officer, January 2016. 52 Interview 80 – Waltham Forest Councillor, January 2016. 53 Interview 80 – Waltham Forest Councillor, January 2016. 54 Interview 76 – senior police officer, January 2016. 55 Waltham Forest Guardian (06/05/2015) “Waltham Forest community condemns EDL march as counter-­demo planned”. 56 Interview 80 – Waltham Forest Councillor, January 2016. 57 Waltham Forest Guardian (05/05/2015) “EDL confirm Walthamstow march through ‘Islamist Bandit Country’ ”.

6 The policy muddle

This highlights, I think, a significant problem when discussing the terrorist threat that we face. There is so much muddled thinking about this whole issue. Prime Minister David Cameron – Munich Security Conference, 5 February 20111

The last three chapters depict a complex set of operational demands on the police service, local authorities and community organisations navigating policy areas that remain highly contentious, fiercely politicised and subject to constant change. They demonstrate a disconnection between central government policy provision and local government, working with policing partners to interpret national policies in a way that services local demands. Much of this tension originates from the lack of clarity as to the identification of the EDL as an extreme right-­wing issue or as a public order threat due to its manifestation through street protest in the absence of sufficient political representation against a backdrop of rapid community change, the impact of austerity and political parties being seen as increasingly elitist and leaving their traditional voting base behind.2 Generally, this is a muddled area of policy provision and it appears that through the lack of coordination between DCLG and the OSCT, the policy response to the EDL has for the most part been neglected. Fundamentally, with regard to the Prevent Strategy, the lack of a strategic response to the EDL is attributable to; (1) the lack of understanding as to how to deliver the Prevent Strategy at a broad societal level (not including the bespoke Channel intervention programme) with regard to RWE, (2) the lack of prioritisation of the response to RWE against both the backdrop of the prevailing Islamist threat and the perception that the extreme right-­wing threat emanates principally from lone actors3 rather than any wider network of supportive ideology as a basis of justifying the actions undertaken by individuals, and (3) the EDL in particular is problematised by local actors as a public order (largely by virtue of its ability to generate visceral opposition in well organised and large scale counter demonstrations) and community cohesion threat but not one of counter terrorism, which further emphasises the failure of the DCLG Integration Strategy to make any substantial contribution in this area. There are a lot of reasons why we might expect Prevent Priority Areas to have a more developed response to the EDL. After all, when we consider the origins

The policy muddle   133 of the Government’s decision to add RWE to its Prevent Strategy in 2011, the EDL was the only example presented as evidence of RWE in the Home Office led consultation supporting the review of the strategy.4 Further to this, due to the scarcity of organised RWE groups in the U.K, for practitioners in Luton, Newcastle and Waltham Forest, notwithstanding the obvious definitional issues, the EDL was the only manifestation of “the extreme right-­wing” they had experienced. And yet, the areas priority status was significantly less of a factor in how local responses to the EDL were formulated than the local authorities’ stance on the movement. There was for instance little evidence that Luton’s status as a Prevent Priority Area had yielded a more developed response to the EDL. Although there are more funded staff with experience in dealing with these issues who were delivering training to partners to raise awareness of the Prevent Strategy, there was no development of specific community engagement initiatives, counter narratives or funding of projects to address RWE sentiment further to its explicit inclusion within the Prevent Strategy in 2011. From a policing perspective the EDL are principally a public order issue which is perceived to negatively impact upon community cohesion, but it is not conceptualised as a counter terrorism threat. However, there are differing assessments on the correct policy response between the police service and the local authority, with the latter more likely to perceive the EDL as a Prevent Strategy issue but interestingly not as a counter terrorism threat. Similarly, for Newcastle as a non-­Prevent Priority Area, despite it not being as developed as Luton and Waltham Forest in terms of its Prevent Strategy awareness and training, this did not negatively impact upon the local responses to the EDL which is problematised as a public order and community cohesion issue rather than a counter terrorism threat, much in keeping with the Luton experience. For Waltham Forest, the Prevent Priority Area without significant EDL activity; there was a much less developed response to the EDL, principally because; (1) the local threat profile emanates from Islamist extremism, (2) the EDL being seen as principally an external threat to public order and community cohesion, and (3) there was a consensus that there is no local constituency for the EDL and/or other extreme right-­wing groups in the borough. Therefore, although there are more funded staff delivering training to partners, there was no evidence of a commitment to engage with communities on RWE issues and local practitioners had not developed specific counter narratives or funded projects to address RWE sentiment. The emphasis thus far has been on weaving RWE into existing products to cater for a range of extremist narratives rather than developing bespoke initiatives. The extreme right-­wing, which here includes the EDL, is seen as a counter terrorism threat only within the context of the existing Islamist threat from the reciprocal radicalisation perspective, rather than as a threat in of itself requiring a tailored Prevent Strategy response. When considering the findings across all three areas, it is clear that for Prevent practitioners in both the police service and the local authority, the impact of the Government’s decision in 2011 to emphasise its utility in addressing “all forms of terrorism”, including RWE, has been minimal. The emphasis thus far

134   The policy muddle has been on weaving RWE into existing products, such as WRAP3 to cater for a range of extremist narratives, rather than developing bespoke initiatives. The factors for this were (1) the lack of definition around what a broad societal application of the Prevent Strategy would consist of in relation to right-­wing extremism, and (2) the overriding threat profile locally is associated with Islamist terrorism, particularly ISIS in Syria and Iraq rather than that of the right-­wing. The exception to this being Newcastle where there was a consensus across practitioners that the threat profile here emanates from the extreme right-­wing, which makes it even more difficult to understand why there has been so little activity to draw out tailored responses to right-­wing extremism in this area. The counter terrorism aspect of EDL attendance is principally that the presence of the movement could precipitate a terrorism threat in their attendance being utilised by their diametric opposition to radicalise vulnerable young Muslims to their cause. The role of Prevent staff in the planning for a demonstration is restricted to utilising existing relationships of trust and confidence in order to disseminate community reassurance messages and gauge tension; and briefing frontline staff to be aware of the Prevent Strategy with regard to identifying individuals who may be vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism, i.e. for the Channel programme. In the absence of sufficient resources and local emphasis within the community integration policy area, this role has largely fallen to Prevent police officers during the pre, during and post phases of EDL protest. It is this role drift across two complex policy areas that is particularly significant as it demonstrates how the Government’s intention to separate community integration efforts from the delivery of the Prevent Strategy has not been reflected in local delivery. There are many reasons for this, principal among them is that even though there may be clear strategic intent behind the “Creating the Conditions for Integration” policy statement within DCLG around it’s “ownership”5 of the EDL in terms of policy response, this has not been translated to local practitioners, many of whom within the local authority, while not perceiving the EDL as a counter ­terrorism threat still believe it should be addressed at an organisational level through the Prevent Strategy. For the police service, where Prevent officers have been working in areas for a number of years they have established relationships of trust that are readily called upon during times of EDL protest, further blurring the line between these two policy areas. Also significant was that within the context of operating against a backdrop of austerity measures, many of the officers within the local authorities who would otherwise have been dedicated to specific areas are now managing numerous portfolios, raising the possibilities of role drift between policy responses, most notably here between the Prevent Strategy and community integration efforts. From a community perspective, as articulated by elected officials and council staff, there was a clear desire for a parity of response to demonstrate even handedness in state interactions with those manifesting extreme Islamist ideologies and those on the extreme right-­wing, which is seen to include the EDL due to their more high-­profile street protest activity. For the police, it was viewed as a political rather than operational demand that led to the addition to right-­wing

The policy muddle   135 extremism to the Prevent Strategy. The desire to demonstrate parity of response and defuse the criticisms from some Muslim communities that the Prevent Strategy was unduly targeting them was seen to be the principal rationale for the policy amendment, rather than there being an evidence-­based increase in extreme right-­wing activity. It was clear that due to the lack of local authority commitment in this area, through their stance of non-­engagement with the EDL, most of the work around the movement is conducted by the police service. Given the police stance on the EDL’s position within the spectrum of right-­wing extremism, this may provide a rationale for the lack of development around RWE specific counter narratives and training products with the focus of the policing response being weighted towards public order and community cohesion efforts. Prevent practitioners also recognised that within the context of the EDL not being assessed as a counter terrorism threat, the potential implications of their engagement on issues synonymous with the movement that traverse into wider community integration work, particularly around immigration and multi-­culturalism. There were concerns that their engagement on these issues could be seen to be repeating the mistakes of the past in “securitising” state engagement with white working-­class communities in the same way the first iteration of the Prevent Strategy was seen to with some Muslim communities.

A parity of response? It was universal across all three areas that the explicit inclusion of RWE in the Prevent Strategy realised a beneficial by-­product in community engagement efforts undertaken by Prevent officers in relation to Muslim communities. The inclusion of RWE was seen by practitioners as a very positive contribution to the way in which they delivered the Prevent Strategy against a backdrop of suspicion among many Muslim communities that this was a strategy designed to target them. Due to the perceived parity in the way extremism issues are managed post-­2011, this was seen to challenge the view that the strategy was justifying “spying” on Muslim communities. There was however little evidence of how the Prevent strategy has been embedded around RWE issues at a broad societal level. Many practitioners acknowledged that efforts of state actors have been focussed on engaging with ethnic minority groups and that there has been a subsequent neglect of prioritised engagement around non-­minority white working-­class communities and highlighted the practical difficulties they experienced in both identifying target communities with whom extreme right-­wing narratives may resonate and devising bespoke counter narratives in this area. Given the sensitivity around the Prevent Strategy brand it is potentially damaging to have artificially raised community expectations that the strategy caters for all forms of extremism as there is very little evidence of it actually being used in this way. This was most evident in Luton where, notwithstanding the emphasis of RWE within the Prevent Strategy, there remain criticisms of the way in which counter terrorism legislation is still seen to apply differently to

136   The policy muddle Muslim communities. Within facilitated WRAP3 sessions practitioners reported the perceived disparity in the way counter terrorism policies are applied, notably through the example of the 2014 murder of Mohammed Saleem by Pavlo Lapshyn, which was initially investigated as a hate crime but later reoriented to a counter terrorism investigation6 when further evidence came to light. Notwithstanding that the Prevent Strategy states that the extreme right-­wing risk emanates from “lone actors” rather than organisations,7 we could nonetheless expect to see a broad societal application of the Prevent Strategy in order to raise public awareness of and to counter extreme right-­wing narratives. However, without explaining why it is that most communities’ experience of “right-­wing extremism” in the form of the EDL is not assessed as a threat in the same way as Islamist extremist groups who have been proscribed using counter terrorism legislation,8 especially since the strategy now caters for “all forms of terrorism”, this risks reversing the beneficial by-­product reported by practitioners as the policy intention has not translated into the application of the Prevent Strategy in the extreme right-­wing space, with the notable exception of the bespoke Channel programme which is focussed on individually tailored intervention work. Post-­2011, Prevent practitioners did not break new ground on forming wider relationships with white communities to carry out the mandate to apply the Prevent Strategy to “all forms of terrorism”. Instead, they expressed a universal lack of understanding as to what engagement with white communities under the auspices of the Prevent Strategy would consist of. Where, comparatively they found engagement with Muslim communities more straightforward due to the existence of community structures centred around Mosques, they found that engagement with “white communities”, in the absence of equivalent community structures to be considerably more challenging. The focus since the review appears to have been to raise awareness of the strategy’s increased scope within Muslim communities, rather than actually undertake work to deliver the Prevent Strategy in non-­Muslim communities. This exposes a lack of definition, ownership and governance of how the Prevent Strategy is to be applied to non-­Muslim communities in order to realise the vision of the 2011 review. Especially important was the escalation from hate crime to “extremism”, which in the non-­ Muslim space appeared to be more difficult to distinguish. This issue was again raised as a result of the murder of Jo Cox MP, where the suspect was charged with murder as opposed to terrorism, therefore inviting the criticism from Muslim communities that if the suspect were in fact Muslim, this would have been seen through the lens of terrorism, therefore maintaining what is seen by some as double standards,9 notwithstanding the fact that those who killed Drummer Lee Rigby were also convicted of murder, although in each instance they amounted to terrorism-­related offences.10

The impact on Channel The most demonstrable impact of including RWE within the Prevent Strategy can be seen through the Channel programme as a subset within the wider Prevent

The policy muddle   137 Strategy. Channel is a targeted intervention programme, focussing on identified individuals who are vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism11 and it is here that one can find tangible evidence of work to address RWE issues. In Luton, Waltham Forest and Newcastle, Channel practitioners demonstrated a nuanced understanding of RWE ideology and the position of the EDL within this continuum. Here, dedicated practitioners benefited not necessarily from bespoke training on right-­wing extremism but from experience borne of managing referrals which necessitated assessment and expert advice from accredited RWE intervention providers who contributed to their understanding. It was significant that in all three areas the number of RWE cases that had been managed within Channel was very low. Although this would seem counter-­intuitive, more so in Luton and Newcastle than Waltham Forest, this was attributed to a wider lack of understanding among partners of the differences between a susceptibility to right-­wing extremism, and participation in EDL street protest activity. Information regarding an individual’s presence at an EDL demonstration and/or online activity on EDL associated social media, rather than being seen as an automatic justification for referral to a Channel panel, were instead seen as part of a picture of vulnerability, requiring further exploration that did not necessitate referral to what is in essence a counter terrorism programme. It was also significant that in Luton and Waltham Forest there was evidence of the Channel programme managing individuals assessed as being vulnerable to being drawn into right-­wing extremism before the 2011 strategy review. Clearly, practitioners were making decisions based upon risk and threat assessments of individuals associated with this form of extremism before the review, despite the wider perception that all activity was undertaken around Muslim communities to the detriment of other forms of extremism.12 There was acknowledgement that since 2011 there has been pressure on practitioners to increase the number of RWE Channel referrals bringing into question the veracity of the reported increase in RWE referrals, especially since only one in five referrals go on to be accepted by the Channel panel to undertake some form of intervention.13 The 2011 Prevent Strategy review did not in fact precipitate any structural changes to the way in which the Channel programme was delivered. The only difference that the explicit inclusion of right-­wing extremism brought about was borne of a recognition that there were a range of community organisations working as intervention providers specialising on Islamist extremism but none that were accredited to deal with extreme right-­wing interventions, although the police service had been working informally with the few that existed on cases pre-­2011. This is corroborative of the accounts of practitioners in that there was consensus among them that the Channel programme was applicable to right-­ wing extremism just as it was to Islamist extremism and that the vulnerability factors that comprise the Vulnerability Assessment Framework are universal rather than only applying to one form of extremist narrative. It should be noted that although practitioners saw the operational benefit of managing individuals vulnerable to being drawn into RWE through Channel, the programme has not  yet been independently reviewed, and so its effectiveness in managing

138   The policy muddle i­ndividuals demonstrating vulnerabilities to different ideologies has not been assessed. Due to the lack of evidence of wider societal initiatives and training products focussed on right-­wing extremism, particularly in those areas where it is the prevailing threat (as was the case in Newcastle), it is only through Channel that we find demonstrable evidence of the utility of the Prevent Strategy to counter all forms of extremism. However, the impact of the 2011 review was in this instance to endorse and formalise the use of Channel for non-­Islamist referrals and to fund the use of RWE specialist intervention providers, rather than it bringing about a wholesale change to the way this programme was being used.

United we stand There was clear evidence of statutory partners, notwithstanding a lack of understanding and/or differences of opinion on the Prevent Strategy/DCLG policy area issue, working together to minimise the impact of EDL demonstrations on communities. Primacy in all areas was afforded to the public order policing response and to mitigating the impact of the protest on community integration. Many of the initiatives undertaken in Luton had a particular focus on diverting young people from attending demonstrations but these were of questionable effectiveness. There was an absence of a nuanced understanding of any underlying ideological adherence to RWE narratives that may be present, with these diversionary initiatives instead catering for the “boredom factor” to prevent young individuals who are already receiving support from statutory agencies, from being drawn into polarised protest activity and potentially committing criminal offences as a result. This was also present in Waltham Forest in the form of wider briefings to community leaders and local schools but this was not as sophisticated as Luton, possibly due to the markedly less frequent EDL activity on the borough. Notably, the experience of Newcastle was very different in this regard. Here, for activist local authority Councillors, the emphasis was more on harnessing the energies of young people as part of the counter demonstration to highlight that the views of the EDL are not representative of Newcastle. Local authorities now have a collective experience of responding to the EDL. From the initial shock of its origins in Luton and its meteoric rise between 2009 and 2013, statutory partners have shared their learning and now have systems and processes for responding to EDL protest that have become industrialised, even being described as “pretty slick”14 over this time period; And one of the things about the EDL that is quite surprising … basically you go from 3 blokes talking shit in a pub to 3 months later they’re giving speeches at Ground Zero, you know, really it took them by surprise let alone the council.15 The most significant finding here was that the community engagement priority for statutory agencies was around local Muslim communities in order to provide reassurance that the EDL would be effectively managed, and to dissuade young

The policy muddle   139 Muslim males from joining the counter protest. There were concerns that individuals could be swept up in the confrontational counter protest and make themselves liable for arrest, and presentationally this is not something that statutory partners wanted to happen. To this end, in Luton and Waltham Forest there was significant work undertaken to identify, train and deploy “Community Mediators” who would have more traction with young Muslim males in order to dissuade them from attending the EDL counter demonstration. While this was recognised as an effective means of preventing young Muslims from being goaded into committing criminal offences, there were concerns about how sustainable this was as it largely depended upon civic minded members of the public taking on this role. Through my fieldwork I identified that from a policing perspective, it was seen as potentially hugely damaging for an EDL demonstration to take place and there be a number of arrests from the counter demonstration. Notwithstanding that the use of arrest may have been completely justified, this was seen as problematic for the police, as being seen to be acting objectively could be perceived as being supportive of the EDL rather than applying the law equally. It was highlighted that media reporting around EDL demonstrations did not accurately reflect the role of the counter demonstration as contributing significantly to public disorder and often to the number of reported arrests. The community engagement efforts were therefore directed principally towards Muslim communities, but also other ethnic minority groups due to the perceived non-­discriminatory way in which the EDL target all minority groups through incorrectly identifying Sikhs and Hindus as Muslims, and there was evidence of this occurring in Newcastle for example. There was very little in the way of understanding as to what engagement with the demographic most likely to form the basis of EDL support would consist of and this extended wider than the Prevent Strategy as discussed earlier. Local authorities and police officers recognised that structured engagement with white working-­class communities didn’t exist as they have instead prioritised engagement with perceptively “harder to reach” ethnic minority communities. The lack of understanding on the part of statutory actors with regard to this demographic translated into a lack of activity with those communities with whom EDL rhetoric would most likely resonate in the planning for a demonstration. The deployment of counter terrorism Prevent officers within the context of EDL protest was not to fulfil a counter terrorism mandate, but to draw upon existing relationships with Muslim communities to gauge tensions and disseminate reassurance messaging. Given the operational context of their work, Prevent practitioners were cognisant of the “branding” sensitivities of their involvement in any form of community engagement, particularly with Muslim communities.

Divided we fall Although there was a recognition across statutory partnerships that a multi-­ faceted and joined up approach was required, EDL attendance drew out the inter­agency tensions in how statutory partners both understand risks associated with

140   The policy muddle the EDL and their role in mitigating these risks in different ways. Though there is shared statutory ownership of the response to the EDL, even within what are complex policy areas to interpret for a local context, it was clear that there were stark differences in the way police officers and local authority officers problematised the EDL, and therefore conceptualised the risks in ways that were in line with their organisational cultures. different agencies use different sorts of logic. So, when I was talking to the Police for example, the police would talk about it in terms of public order management, but they’d also talk about it in terms of facilitating democratic right to protest. When you talk to some of the more old-­school councillors, they talk about it in a moral way; “these people are racist, we can’t have them on our streets”.16 Local authorities, trying to manage local politics and cognisant of how their response to the EDL will play out among the electorate, cannot be seen to endorse the views of the EDL through allowing the movement to demonstrate unhindered. However, it is the role of the police service that is most interesting here. There was a strong sense through the interviews with public order commanders of their perceived role as “guardians”17 of human rights legislation, and the need to remain objective in its application rather than being drawn into the politics of the EDL counter protest. While there was evidence of the police and local authorities setting aside these tensions to maintain a unified front when confronted by local Muslim communities in particular, it was clear in the case of Waltham Forest and to a lesser extent Luton, that the police service found themselves alone in defending the decision not to approach the Home Secretary to apply to ban the EDL demonstration while the local authorities took a stance of siding with the local Muslim leaders and the counter demonstration to publicly apply pressure on the police to change this position. There was a broad consensus among practitioners that the EDL poses a threat to both the public order and community cohesion but is not a counter terrorism threat. However, in Luton the police interviewees emphasised that there was pressure from the local authority to target and disrupt the EDL under the auspices of the Prevent Strategy as an extremist movement. This view was not reflected in Waltham Forest as the EDL was seen as a transitory issue who rarely came into the borough and did not enjoy a local constituency of supporters with whom the police service and local authority could or indeed should engage with. Newcastle practitioners were in line with the Waltham Forest view that the movement did not enjoy broad support locally notwithstanding that the leadership of the North-­East Division was actually based in the West End of the city. The most significant difference between these areas was not borne of Prevent Strategy prioritisation, but the stance of the respective local authorities in relation to the EDL. In Luton, the spiritual birthplace of the movement, the EDL were perceived as an external threat and not one whose roots lay in the very town which sought to ban it from protesting. In Newcastle, there was less

The policy muddle   141 emphasis on seeking to ban the group. Here, local Councillors and activists favoured strong counter mobilisations to demonstrate that the EDL are not representative of the city. For Waltham Forest, the EDL did not have a footprint in terms of leadership and/or organisation and were perceived as a wholly external threat. The movement has been attracted to Waltham Forest due to its recent history of Islamist activism, which it sought to oppose through demonstrating that there are no “no go” zones in the U.K. These individualised responses to the EDL have crystallised within the context of the movement being perceived primarily as a threat to community cohesion, and with respect to its provocative message, a public order threat due to the larger counter demonstrations its presence evokes. Given the scope of this book and its exploration of state responses to the EDL under the auspices of the movement being seen as an extreme right-­wing movement and therefore a Prevent Strategy issue, it is most interesting that the debates around what to do about the EDL are not within the mandate of the Prevent Strategy. It is therefore especially problematic that more has not been done within the DCLG policy area to emphasise that the EDL is a community integration issue, notwithstanding that individuals associated with or moving through the movement may go on to be a counter terrorism issue. Definitional issues Further to the definitional issues associated with RWE highlighted in my introduction to this book, during my fieldwork there was significant evidence of practitioners referring to the EDL using the terms “right-­wing”, “extreme right-­wing” and “far right” interchangeably within the interviews. The terms were used expansively without any real understanding of what they meant. There were instances of members of local authorities calling for the EDL to be proscribed under counter terrorism legislation not because the movement posed a counter terrorism threat, but this was seen as necessary to demonstrate a parity of responses across Islamist and right-­wing extremism. It is problematic that statutory services are using the terms in this way and there was recognition among participants that to apply the right-­wing extremist “label” to those who may be protesting about the proliferation of gangs exploiting young children for example, many of whom are comprised of Asian males, and are therefore labelled by the EDL, other groups and the media as “Muslim grooming gangs”18 in the absence of effective council messaging, could actually exacerbate community tensions, further adding to the polarisation within communities through conceptualising grievances as extreme right-­wing sentiment and pushing debate away from the centre ground. This further demonstrates how the confused policies in this area have been translated to local practitioners who not only have to make sense of them within their organisational context, but also for their interactions with communities. This is extremely significant within this contentious policy area as we have seen how the way which the initial police response to the murder of Mohammed Saleem was articulated in a way that only exacerbated

142   The policy muddle community tensions and feelings of grievance associated with the Prevent Strategy. In defining right-­wing extremism expansively and conflating concerns about all views as RWE there is a risk that policy makers over-­simplify the issues and fail to understand the complexities of the extreme right-­wing “scene” in the U.K. which may not be “systematic or organised”19 but comprises a patchwork of small groups, movements and individuals which traverse the current Prevent Strategy, integration and hate crime policy areas. Striking the right balance for community engagement From a community integration perspective, it was interesting that the practitioners in Luton and Newcastle, when discussing the impact of EDL attendance referred extensively to “Muslim areas” in Bury Park and the West End respectively. The community engagement undertaken in support of an EDL attendance is principally focussed on mitigating its impact on communities, particularly Muslim communities, rather than seeking to address the grievances, real or perceived that drive the demonstration. The theme of segregated communities was highlighted in Dame Louise Casey’s 2016 review of integration in the U.K. and one of the key findings was that people of Pakistani and Bangladeshi ethnicity tend to live in more residentially segregated communities than other ethnic minority groups,20 an important point as the theme of segregated communities fits neatly within the EDL narrative. These locations have become heartlands for Muslim communities in these areas and actors within local statutory services were acutely conscious of how these communities not only perceived the EDL but also held them to account on their management of the movement. In both instances, the EDL had made clear their intentions to march through these areas as they were perceived to fit within the movement’s narrative that white Englishmen should be able to walk freely and exercise their right to freedom of speech anywhere in the country, and so densely populated Muslim areas provide the ideal theatre for this narrative to be played out. However, in each instance the local police commanders had reached a position with their respective local authorities that they would not entertain the idea of the EDL marching through these densely populated Muslim areas due to their concerns that this would have precipitated serious public order issues. When considering how communities are integrated these areas have taken on a symbolic significance for both the communities living there as well as feeding into the EDL narrative that opposes communities living in perceived siloes with little integration. Significantly, with regard to Waltham Forest, there was a greater sense of communities being integrated and there being less of an issue with isolated ethnic minority groups concentrated in particular areas. While practitioners recognised that there are likely to be residents who do subscribe to EDL narratives living in Waltham Forest, unlike Luton and Newcastle, the movement does not have an organisational structure on the borough, and so exists as a purely external threat. This is a key difference as the EDL actually knows the Luton and Newcastle areas because it enjoys a constituency there, whereas it doesn’t understand Waltham Forest in the

The policy muddle   143 same way and fails to find resonance there due to its disconnect from local communities. In the Prevent Priority Areas of Luton and Waltham Forest, the Prevent police officers had built up working relationships with Muslim communities over many years. Notwithstanding the wider issues with the Prevent Strategy brand, local communities still had trust and confidence in police officers they had come to know over their years of work in these areas. It was evident that in support of the public order planning for an EDL attendance, these officers, rather than being deployed for a Prevent Strategy-­specific role, were in fact called upon to utilise their community contacts to promulgate reassurance messaging and to act as a conduit for information regarding community tensions. Given their focus on cultivating and maintaining contacts within Muslim communities under the auspices of the Prevent Strategy, these officers were afforded primacy in this community engagement over non-­Prevent community engagement officers. However, in Newcastle, the non-­priority area, with far fewer Prevent resources, the police investment in a community engagement team has yielded similarly effective working relationships with Muslim communities and they fulfil the same functions around protests. Arguably in the absence of the Prevent Strategy prioritisation this has not led to a diminished community engagement response from the police service, as this function is seen as being an important aspect of any public order event planning. There is a challenge around how local government prioritises engagement with communities around the salient topics that may underpin EDL protest activity. It was exactly this emphasis on dialogue and instilling frontline workers with the confidence to challenge that formed the basis of the Connecting Communities programme. In local government distancing itself from these issues largely as a result of political imperative as well as operating within a climate of austerity with far fewer staff to undertake this work, the risk is that this only serves to further polarise communities as grievances and perceptions become conflated with and labelled as “extreme right-­wing” sentiment. Without effective local representation that speaks for all sections of the community, this could actually push people into the extreme right-­wing through the perceived de-­legitimisation of their world view, which only further exacerbates the grievances of isolated and disenfranchised individuals within communities. “The EDL experience” It is important to emphasise that generally the experience of public order commanders and Police Liaison Teams in negotiating with the EDL was positive and that the protest organisers complied with police instructions, which counters the accepted wisdom that the movement is comprised entirely of drunken football hooligans.21 The organisers are experienced in their interactions with the police and will sign up to Memoranda of Understanding governing the route, timings and conduct on the day of the demonstration. They will bring their own stewards who are generally well trained and maintain what are reported to be good levels

144   The policy muddle of control of those taking part on the day. However, when the counter demonstration, which often included UAF and other affiliated groups, was involved this was perceived as being problematic due to their general unwillingness to engage with the police around planning routes, largely due to the fractious nature of these groups and their different ambitions on the day. The presence of these groups was seen to precipitate often violent clashes with the EDL, with each jockeying for the most iconic destinations for their demonstrations. Whereas the EDL would engage with the police and had a good understanding of public order legislation due to the way in which they have professionalised in this area, the counter demonstration would often frustrate the police by refusing to furnish them with the requisite information on numbers of protesters and routes to be followed. There was also a consensus that much of the counter demonstration against the EDL is coordinated nationally by the UAF, and is not, as is portrayed, the result of grass roots campaigns in each of the affected areas. Many public order commanders were of the view that given the numbers of EDL supporters who will actually turn out on the streets, they were relatively straightforward to police and the issues arose from them having to protect the EDL from the counter demonstration. They found that the larger and less compliant counter demonstration is what necessitated greater policing numbers, which ironically is then used as a financial justification by local politicians for banning the EDL. There is a question of proportionality here around the reaction to the EDL being used as a means to justify banning the group, especially as this only serves to further polarise sections of communities and feeds into the grievance narrative of the EDL. Wider than the organisers with whom the Police Liaison Team engaged under the auspices of public order legislation, those police officers who policed the demonstration presented a picture of the EDL not as a homogenous group of like-­minded right-­wing extremists, but of a broad church of people expressing different views and representing different sections of society. They were motivated by a number of grievances ranging from the murder of Drummer Lee Rigby, the sale of the Byker Grove premises to build an Islamic Centre in Newcastle, the sexual exploitation of children and the general sense of no longer being listened to by a political class who are increasingly distant from the things that matter to them. While this was the experience in Luton and Newcastle, the exception was Waltham Forest. The EDL that turned out to the first demonstration in September 2012 may have reflected that of Luton and Newcastle, but the following demonstrations were depicted by practitioners as being less willing to engage with the police. This perhaps speaks to the way in which the EDL have conversely problematised Waltham Forest as an “Islamist Bandit Country”22 necessitating a more combative approach. Public order commanders spoke of the more confrontational style of the EDL, particularly when they returned after having in their view been denied their due process on the first occasion, largely due to the actions of the counter protest as opposed to the conduct of the EDL. An interesting point to highlight is in reference to the perceptions of public order commanders recounting their experiences of managing EDL protest activity.

The policy muddle   145 Across all three areas, each made reference with professional pride that they had been involved in what was the “biggest” EDL demonstration in the U.K. It’s clear that they could not all have been involved in the biggest demonstration but given the scale and complexity of the work they undertook for each, these operations dwarfed much of what they were used to dealing with at a local level. They also emphasised that the response to the EDL has decreased in scale commensurately to the fall in numbers attending demonstrations over the last six years. It was generally accepted by all respondents that the trend in EDL mobilisation and participation is decreasing, and many practitioners attribute the departure of the movement’s leader, Stephen Yaxley-­Lennon in October 2013 as being the main driver to this decline. It was also clear that with years of experience of managing EDL and counter protest activity, coupled with the parallel requirement to meet challenging austerity measures imposed by the Government, the police service has had to adopt more cost-­effective means of policing the movement. The reducing participation in EDL demonstrations has allowed the respective constabularies flexibility to test more efficient ways of policing protest. One such incidence in Luton in 2013 led to a small protest of three individuals being monitored by two PCSOs, whereas previously this would have attracted a more extensive policing requirement. Additionally, in Newcastle respondents made reference to a culture of trying to police the EDL with as few resources as possible. There was recognition that in the early days of the EDL, the spectre of the movement precipitated more community concern, and therefore political pressure on the constabularies to respond to the movement in line with the public perception of them rather than the reality. This, coupled with the early numbers of protesters, and often more importantly, the numbers of counter demonstrators from whom the EDL protesters had to be kept separate and protected from led to high numbers of police officer deployments; I think it got too much. It got to the stage where it looked like the town centres were fortified basically, and we were preventing members of the public going about their normal … again, that’s flipped completely on its head, and the message has gone out constantly that these city centres are open, we want you to come into town, and to carry on shopping, and the likes. And that’s a big change. CBRN barriers are still being used, which is fantastic because it cuts down on police resources, so it meets all the budget requirements as well, but there’s ways and means of using them.23 Within the context of the discourse of the financial impact of EDL protest activity it is important to emphasise that for many public order commanders, discussing the policing of the EDL through the prism of public finance considerations was inherently wrong, as if placing a value on democracy. This objective view is at odds with many elected officials (including Police and Crime Commissioners) who have suggested that EDL protests should be banned based on the disproportionate financial burden they place upon local authorities and police services within the context of challenging central-­government imposed austerity ­measures

146   The policy muddle which have been all the more difficult to reconcile for those areas where this represents a significant proportion of policing funding when balanced with that funding accumulated from local council taxes. If the EDL had not suffered such a decline in street-­based activity, when considering the impact of austerity measures on the police service, it is likely that the policing of its demonstrations would have received much more media attention and political scrutiny. Should Tommy Robinson be replaced by an equally charismatic and galvanising individual to breathe new life into this street-­based protest movement and unify the various splinter groups, it is unclear as to whether this may precipitate the routine banning of EDL protests and what this would mean for protest activity more broadly in the U.K.

A longer-­term strategy? Notwithstanding the national reduction in the frequency and scale of EDL protests since the departure of the movement’s leader in 2013 there was an appreciation among respondents that the sentiment that underpinned the EDL has not diminished, particularly in the online community.24 Many also referenced the increased political success of the U.K Independence Party as being a potential contributory factor to the diminishing presence of EDL protest activity. Their view was that now the themes synonymous with the EDL brand, around sovereignty, “creeping Sharia”, British identity and concerns about uncontrolled immigration, have attained political legitimacy through a political party, they have been provided with a vent for their views that otherwise had no other means of expression than EDL street protest activity. There was recognition that the systems and processes currently in place were largely reactive in that local actors awaited contact from the EDL who would inform them of their intention to demonstrate, which would initiate the public order planning procedures, the Police Liaison Team would be deployed to facilitate dialogue, memorandums of understanding would be agreed, the demonstration would take place, and then statutory partners would wait for the next call from the EDL.25 Although the EDL was perceived to be a diminishing force, it is clear from what is happening across the country that new street protest groups have formed, such as Britain First, PEGIDA, the Football Lads Alliance26 and notably the now-­proscribed National Action, many of whom identify with the very extreme right-­wing ideologies rejected by the EDL. The thinking in Luton is more advanced on this point as beneficiaries of focussed research being funded through the Special Interest Group. The findings of this research set out recommendations around fostering dialogue with all sections of communities and creating truly representative government that are corroborated by the findings of this book. In the void created by the departure of the Connecting Communities programme, and the failed “Creating the Conditions for Integration” policy area, this disconnect between communities and what they perceive as an increasingly distant “elite”, which has been the subject of much commentary in the wake of the June 2016 referendum of the U.K’s membership

The policy muddle   147 of the European Union, demonstrates the need for a local government engagement strategy that re-­balances how communities are represented. This was perhaps understandably not seen as viable by practitioners in Waltham Forest. During my fieldwork they questioned how increased engagement with those who may subscribe to EDL narratives would be effective there as the movement does not enjoy a base of support on the borough. However, as a borough which has attracted EDL demonstrations, it has done little to counter the narrative of the EDL in depicting it as an “Islamist Bandit Country”. A lot of work has been undertaken by the police service and local authority to disrupt local extreme Islamist groups, including through the use of arrests and anti-­social behaviour legislation. However, none of these initiatives, including the fact Anjem Choudhry no longer lives there are used effectively to counter the EDL’s depiction of the borough. Rather than recognising the borough’s Islamist past and efforts that have been undertaken to remedy this, the emphasis through the media is instead on framing the borough as being unified in the face of EDL protest, which only further exacerbates polarisation within communities. Arguably, if the police service and local authority had been so proactive in Luton in 2009 by making expeditious arrests, therefore being seen to deliver fair and impartial justice, the EDL may not have gained so much traction in the face of such a positive alternative narrative of liberal democracy in action. 27

Conclusion Were there any discernible differences as a result of Prevent Strategy prioritisation between the local responses to the EDL? The findings in this book suggest that due to the way in which the EDL has been problematised in each case study area as a threat to public order, more due to the associated counter demonstration than directly, and community cohesion, rather than a counter terrorism threat, the Prevent Strategy prioritisation variable has had very little impact on the local responses to the EDL. So, if the EDL are not a Prevent Strategy issue, but pose a threat to community cohesion, we should expect to have identified clear primacy of local authority actors in delivering the DCLG Integration Strategy. However, this was not the case. Effectively, the state responses to the EDL have fallen between these two policy areas, and are indicative of a wider problem of non-­ representative local government. With the notable exception of Waltham Forest, practitioners in the other two case study areas recognised the pressing need to engage with communities on subjects synonymous with the EDL brand, as otherwise the initiative is handed to groups like the EDL to act as the only means by which people can find expression. By entering into the discourse, challenging as it may be for local actors; this would effectively prevent extremist groups from controlling the narrative. This was highly reminiscent of the Connecting Communities programme and supported by the findings of the Special Interest Group. Waltham Forest faces a slightly different issue, that of recognising the Islamist extremism that has existed in the borough and emphasising what has been done to counter it, rather than appearing to close ranks in a way that provides succour

148   The policy muddle to both the Islamists and the EDL. Although there was a consensus across practitioners that the EDL does not enjoy a constituency in the borough, failure to engage with communities on the issues could in fact be seen to be indicative of support for Islamist extremist elements residing in the borough, which only invites further confrontation as being framed as an “Islamist Bandit Country”.28 The case studies in the Prevent Priority Areas present evidence of the difficulties arising from the Government’s decision to separate community cohesion from the Prevent Strategy, while at the same time, reducing funding for local authority officers who would otherwise have had responsibility for leading on community cohesion efforts under the auspices of the “Creating the Conditions for Integration” policy. There is no evidence of this policy being delivered locally with regard to the EDL, despite the views of DCLG staff that it was envisaged as owning the EDL in terms of policy response. Instead, local authorities have distanced themselves not just from engagement with the EDL but with those who share their views, leaving the police service as the only statutory agency interacting with them through the public order planning paradigm. As a result, the evidence suggests that Prevent officers continue to play a role in community cohesion efforts. Although the rationale for separating community cohesion from the Prevent Strategy was based upon the negative “securitising” impact counter terrorism officers were seen to have had on what should have been basic community cohesion initiatives, it is difficult to see how this could be achieved when engagement with communities is a necessary basis for the delivery of Prevent. The delineation between the Prevent Strategy and community cohesion efforts is only meaningful if there is a commensurate level of government commitment and funding into community cohesion work that is not to be carried out under the auspices of the Prevent Strategy. In the absence of such commitment, it is clear that community cohesion efforts, including engagement around the planning for an EDL demonstration, will continue to draw upon those Prevent practitioners in priority areas who have built relationships with Muslim communities. We should also be cognisant of the impact of the Government’s separate Extremism Strategy. It is unclear as to how this will remedy the policy deficit created by the “Creating the Conditions for Integration” statement and risks overlaying another policy area into what is an already crowded pitch. It is unfortunate that rather than reviewing the policies already in place in order to identify the gaps and overlaps therein, the Home Office has instead through the introduction of the Extremism Strategy, adding further confusion into what is an already conflicted policy space. While we may accept that (1) right-­wing extremism is not manifested in a cohesive and organised way in the U.K. as is evident in the rest of Europe, (2) the main threat from a national counter terrorism perspective emanates from Islamist extremism, (3) there is a lack of understanding as to how the Prevent Strategy can be applied at a broad societal level of challenge and counter narrative perspective in relation to RWE, and (4) central government imposed austerity measures have dramatically reduced community integration resources from local authorities; when we consider the Newcastle case study, it is difficult to justify that when the local threat assessment prioritises lone actors

The policy muddle   149 associated with RWE as the overriding threat, that notwithstanding all these points, there is not a more developed application of the Prevent Strategy with regard to right-­wing extremism for this operational context.

Notes   1 www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pms-­speech-at-­munich-security-­conference.   2 See for example; Goodwin, Matthew, and Robert Ford, Note 2, Introduction, supra.   3 Prevent Strategy Review, Note 19, Introduction, supra, p. 15 para. 5.10.   4 “Prevent Review: Summary of Responses to the Consultation” p. 9.   5 See Note 66, Chapter 2.   6 See the ITV News timeline in relation to the murder of Mohammed Saleem (21/10/2013).   7 Prevent Strategy Review, Note 3, Chapter 6, supra.   8 See Home Office “Proscribed Terrorist organisations”; Under the Terrorism Act 2000, the Home Secretary may proscribe an organisation if she believes it is concerned in terrorism. For the purposes of the Act, this means that the organisation: • commits or participates in acts of terrorism; • prepares for terrorism; • promotes or encourages terrorism (including the unlawful glorification of terrorism); or • is otherwise concerned in terrorism.   9 Telegraph Online (17/06/2016) “It’s time to call the killing of Jo Cox what it is: ‘an act of far-­Right terrorism’ ”. 10 See www.cps.gov.uk/terrorism. 11 Prevent Strategy Review, Note 19, Introduction, supra, p. 55. 12 For further on this point see the Prevent Strategy Review, Note 19, Introduction, supra, p. 25 para. 6.9. 13 See www.gov.uk/government/statistics/individuals-­referred-to-­and-supported-­throughthe-­prevent-programme-­april-2016-to-­march-2017 – The attrition rate between referral to acceptance at a Channel panel is around 1 in 5 (increasing from 14% to 19% between 2015 and 2016). This indicates that for every five individuals referred to the programme, one is discussed by the panel, and even then, they are not necessarily adopted as a case requiring intervention. RWE referrals represent 16 per cent of the overall referrals to Prevent, yet this increases to 24 per cent at the Channel panel stage, and then increases again (37%) for those actually receiving Channel support. Further exploration is required to better understand these variances. 14 Interview 33 – police Prevent practitioner, April 2015. 15 Interview 26 – researcher, December 2014. 16 Interview 26 – researcher, December 2014. 17 Interview 34 – senior public order police officer, May 2015. 18 For further on the way these issues were reported in the media, see the Telegraph Online (25/06/2015) “Report about Asian grooming gangs was suppressed to avoid inflaming racial tension”. 19 Prevent Strategy Review, Note 19, Introduction, supra, p. 15. 20 The Casey Review: A review into opportunity and integration (2016) p. 10. 21 For research on challenging the stereotypes of EDL members see Goodwin, Matthew, Note 11, Chapter 1, supra.; John, Peter, and Helen Margetts, Note 13, Chapter 1, supra.; Bartlett, Jamie, and Mark Littler, Note 13, Chapter 1, supra. 22 Waltham Forest Guardian (05/05/2015) “EDL confirm Walthamstow march through ‘Islamist Bandit Country’ ”. 23 Interview 40 – Protest Liaison Team officer, July 2015.

150   The policy muddle 24 See Bartlett, Jamie, and Mark Littler, Note 13, Chapter 1, supra. 25 See Treadwell, James, “Controlling the new far right on the streets: policing the English Defence League in policy and praxis”. Responding to Hate Crime: The Case for Connecting Policy and Research (2014): 127; Lowles, N. (2011) “Policing the EDL”, Searchlight 428: 6–7. 26 BBC Three Online (01/05/2018) “Football Lads Alliance: ‘We could have a civil war in this country’ ”. 27 See Smith, Dennis (2016) blog: “Reflections on a referendum”; Prospect Magazine “Brexit: a win for ‘proper’ people?” – 30 June 2016; Eatwell, Roger and Matthew Goodwin, Note 6, Chapter 1, supra. 28 Waltham Forest Guardian (05/05/2015) “EDL confirm Walthamstow march through ‘Islamist Bandit Country’ ”.

7 Back to basics

A failure to talk about all this leaves the ground open for the far right on the one side and Islamist extremists on the other The Casey Review: A review into opportunity and integration (2016)1

This book has provided an insight into an area previously beyond the reach of empirical research. It has intentionally focussed on state actors in order to better understand the complexities of responding to EDL protest activity and has yielded a number of valuable insights on the local delivery of the Prevent Strategy, the impact of austerity, how state actors respond during times of “stress”2 and the relationships between statutory agencies all within the context of responding to the EDL movement. As explored in Chapter 1 there is very little comparative literature regarding responses to non-­political manifestations of right-­wing extremism, the Prevent Strategy responses more generally and responses to right-­wing extremism under the auspices of the Prevent Strategy. The emphasis within political science literature not only in the U.K. but internationally has been on political parties, voting patterns, the composition of parties and their electoral base, and fairly simplistic supply/demand relationships. To address these gaps I have collected and analysed an unprecedented amount of primary data from 80 qualitative interviews with frontline practitioners across three case study areas. The resulting analysis has drawn out a range of issues, from the lack of connectivity between national policy areas and the continued lack of clarity around the definitions used to describe the right-­wing extremism phenomenon, to how local practitioners have responded to policy changes within the context not only of their local communities and engagement with right-­wing extremism, but also while operating within a climate of central government imposed austerity measures since 2010. It is surprising that since 2011 there has been so little research conducted in relation to the impact of the Prevent Strategy review, particularly given its high profile and contentious nature with regards to its impact on Muslim communities. While this study for the first time draws out rich accounts from those at the frontline delivering this government strategy with a focus on right-­wing extremism, there are of course a wide range of further research questions that arise from this work given the scarcity of the literature

152   Back to basics available, some of which are discussed in the next sections. While the topics covered in this book remain under-­researched it is hoped that it will provide a useful insight into how local actors incorporate these policy areas in their work and use them to respond to the EDL. What is clear is that frontline practitioners have a wealth of perspectives that require not only further study but also an increased emphasis in future policy creation. The findings as summarised in the last chapter form the basis of the following conclusions.

1)  The term “right-­wing extremism” is poorly understood and defined by both policy makers and local actors This book has explored the applicability of the Prevent Strategy to the EDL, the definitional difficulties surrounding the movement and the impact this has on statutory agencies responding to it. Much more work needs to be done in the U.K. around the public understanding of the definitional issues surrounding the term “right-­wing extremism”. Throughout my fieldwork, the terms “right-­wing”, “extreme right-­wing” and “far right” were used interchangeably (often within the same interview) by the respondents. They collectively did not have a clear sense of how to define the EDL other than to agree that the movement does not in of itself pose a counter terrorism threat. In exploring local actors’ experience of responding to RWE, there was very little evidenced experience of them having dealt with groups such as the Aryan Strikeforce or Blood & Honour. This is because these groups are small and fail to galvanise broader appeal than their core supporters in the way that made the EDL so successful during the period 2009–2013. In the absence of experience of responding to these far right groups, practitioners instead relayed their experiences of managing EDL protest, demonstrating how the movement has become shorthand for right-­wing extremism in the U.K, despite the definitional difficulties surrounding it. The focus of work on right-­wing extremism has thus far has been on the constituency of the groups and their impact on main stream politics. There has however, been no empirical research on how extreme right-­wing groups interact with one another on an ideological and/or organisational level as manifested through street protest activity. This book has highlighted that there are risks in using the phrase “right-­wing extremism” expansively in order to encompass all views ranging from social conservatism, racism and extremism. Further work therefore needs to be done to better understand the strata of extreme right-­wing sentiment in the U.K. and how the term “extremism” is differentiated from other normative behaviours. This will also have wider ramifications in supporting similar government policies internationally, particularly for those European countries responding to “right-­wing” populist extremist parties and street protest movements. There should be particular emphasis on the rationale for “Defence League” activity being seen as separate to right-­wing extremism. From a policing perspective this separation was clear, but a similar level of clarity was not evident for non-­police partners and communities, indicating there is much work to do to evidence why the right-­wing extremism to which the Prevent Strategy

Back to basics   153 now applies, does not include the most evident manifestation of the “extreme right-­wing”, i.e. the EDL, as this is difficult to reconcile and we have seen the impact of perceived differences in the application of counter terrorism strategies for Muslims and non-­Muslims. Police practitioners interacting with EDL representatives portrayed the movement as being misunderstood by their respective local authority counterparts as well as policymakers. They acknowledged that the EDL is a broad church of people with motivations for either turning out for a street protest or “liking” pages on its Facebook site spanning from local grievances generated by the pace of social change and/or the impact of austerity measures, through to hardcore extremists seeking a platform to present their views and to expand their networks. There was also evidence of the EDL “leadership” attempting to distance the movement from extreme right-­wing elements through removing anyone subscribing to these views from their meetings, demonstrating the complexity of its “membership” when considering how to categorise the movement. In collectively grouping the various camps constituting large EDL demonstrations and conceptualising them as an amorphous “extreme right-­wing” group over-­simplifies what is actually taking place within these communities. We can see this demonstrated in speeches such as that of Don Foster MP (speaking to the Special Interest Group in January 2013), where he referred to the EDL as “the far right” and suggested that they be “isolated, undermined, outflanked and subject to the ridicule they deserve”.3 My research with practitioners indicates that this stance risks further polarising communities as at no point did Mr Foster explore the possibility of increasing engagement on the salient issues in order to effectively sap the extremes of their support. And we have seen how the confusion at the Government level has permeated into the thinking of local authorities in the case study areas in adopting policies of non-­ engagement with the EDL. Without a tangible and effective integration strategy with local statutory services empowered to encourage dialogue on key issues such as immigration, Syrian refugees and community cohesion, what is in fact happening is the narrative is being seized by others, such as those in leadership roles within the EDL and other “further” right groups. Therefore, the risk posed by the expansive and poorly understood use of the term “right-­ wing extremism” by central and local government as well as through the media is that the safe spaces in which issues can be debated and ideas posited and challenged becomes ever smaller as ideological battle lines are drawn, placards painted, and speeches written. Without engagement with communities on these issues, they become increasingly polarised as either side pushes the other further from the centre ground. It is clear that care must be taken in determining the rules of engagement around public debate. However, to delegitimise debate in relation to salient issues such as Islamist extremism, community cohesion, child sex exploitation, the Syrian refugee crisis and immigration to the U.K. through defining them as the preserve of right-­wing extremism actually risks pushing those unable to find a voice to engage on these issues into the very phenomenon that local statutory partners are trying to oppose.

154   Back to basics

2)  There was little evidence that the expansion of the Prevent Strategy in 2011 to explicitly include “all forms of terrorism” has led to an increase in delivery targeted at right-­wing extremism This book presents the view that the impact of the Government’s decision in 2011 to emphasise Prevent Strategy’s utility in addressing “all forms of terrorism”, with an emphasis on right-­wing extremism, has been minimal. There is little evidence of bespoke training for frontline staff and the wider public on right-­wing extremism. We have not seen campaigns, products or counter narratives generated around the issue in the same way as has been the case for Islamist extremism. The focus thus far has been on a broad stroke approach through products such as WRAP3 which makes reference to case studies spanning different forms of extremism. There has been very little in the way of training around the various groups that make up the extreme right-­wing “scene” in the U.K., their ideological positions and how this potentially impacts on statutory services’ delivery of anti-­racism/hate crime initiatives. The current Prevent Strategy perceives the extreme right-­wing as primarily a lone actor issue4 without an appreciation of the wider right-­wing scene which is made up of a number of disparate groups through which individuals move. When the Prevent Strategy was revised to explicitly include RWE, it was noted that “the extreme right-­wing threat is much less widespread, systemic or organised”5 than Islamist extremism. It was made clear that this would be reflected in the amount of focus placed upon the extreme right-­wing. However, in the instance of Newcastle this was especially problematic as Prevent delivery here was in keeping with the national threat assessment which affords primacy to the Islamist threat, notwithstanding the broad consensus among statutory partners and the voluntary sector that the highest threat locally is associated with lone actors adhering to an extreme right-­wing ideology. The strategy is comprised of three pillars, known as “the three I’s”; challenging the Ideology, supporting sectors and Institutions and supporting Individuals who may be “vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism”.6 With regard to tailored work to support individuals, this is delivered through the Channel intervention programme. However, given the local threat profile, there is no evidence of Prevent Strategy work around challenging extreme right-­wing ideology or supporting institutions through the provision of bespoke training or awareness raising products to better equip frontline staff to understand and identify risk associated with RWE. Additionally, I found no evidence of efforts to engage with white communities on the themes that are synonymous with right-­wing extremism. Practitioners highlighted the difficulties of even identifying the right communities to co-­create a Prevent Strategy response to RWE and drew comparisons with the relative ease with which they identified Muslim communities with whom to partner when responding to Islamist extremism. Many articulated that the target group would consist of “white working-­class communities” but acknowledged that they were unclear as to how they would

Back to basics   155 translate their Prevent Strategy role in engaging with Muslim communities to white working-­class communities. Many practitioners also presented the view that there is not an organised extreme right-­wing issue in the U.K. that would justify its inclusion within the Prevent Strategy. This was portrayed as a clear disparity between intelligence led policy creation and that borne of political necessity, in this case for Government to demonstrate a commitment to Muslim communities that they were not disproportionately targeted by its counter terrorism strategy. Although the broadening of the scope of the Prevent Strategy has yielded a beneficial by-­product in the increased engagement with Muslim communities, there is little in the way of evidence to support the assertion that it has been delivered at a broad societal level in the same way in relation to forms of extremism other than Islamism. There is a point here on the RWE referred to within the Prevent Strategy being in some way different to the experience of local communities. If, from a policy perspective, the EDL are not an extreme right-­wing group (in line with the NDEDIU assessment of the EDL as a movement that does not ascribe to extreme right-­wing ideology), then this point needs to be made much more clearly than is currently the case, particularly to Muslim communities. Practitioners reported that the need for a parity of response across all extreme ideologies remained very important to these communities, with the high-­profile murders of Mohammed Saleem7 and Jo Cox MP8 being cited as incidences of how, should the suspect have been a Muslim, they would have been conceptualised as terrorists much sooner than was the case in both these examples. This is especially problematic as the impact of a failure to respond to “all forms of terrorism” could only exacerbate the narrative whereby Muslim suspects are problematised as terrorists whereas those who are perceived to be acting upon an extreme right-­wing ideology are first being filtered through a racism paradigm before their actions are conceptualised as terrorism. As an indication of the muddled policy response with regard to the response to extremism more broadly, it should be noted that the current stance within the Prevent Strategy is that the challenge to “extremist organisations” will be led by DCLG.9 There is, however, a clear risk to the credibility of the Prevent Strategy if the right-­wing extremism to which it alludes is different to that experienced by Muslim communities. While I am not suggesting that the EDL should be redefined as an extreme right-­wing movement, there is scope here for an informed debate around what groups should be prioritised in the extreme right-­wing space, especially as some are registered political parties, such as the British National Party and Britain First, which limits the activities of the police service in responding to them. There must also be an informed debate around whether there should in fact be policy distinctions between individual, group and societal extremism spanning both the Prevent Strategy and DCLG policy areas. This book has highlighted the lack of direction around what a broad societal application of the Prevent Strategy to right-­wing extremism would comprise. This is most problematic to justify in those areas, like Newcastle, where the threat profile is significantly different to the national threat picture. For these areas

156   Back to basics there should be further development of a broader based Prevent Strategy specifically to prioritise efforts to counter right-­wing extremism that is not solely reliant upon the Channel programme for managing vulnerable individuals. Prevent practitioners have a role in developing the wider understanding of the extreme right-­wing spectrum and separating out the narratives and ideologies in order to disentangle the current way in which all similar sentiment is conflated as being “extreme right-­wing”. If Newcastle is indicative of Prevent Strategy delivery in other areas which share its local threat profile, then this demonstrates that the necessary balance between central government direction and local government responses has not been struck and this requires a review across all local authorities, with particular emphasis on Prevent Priority Areas.

3)  The most demonstrable evidence of the government’s intention to expand the scope of the Prevent Strategy is found through the Channel programme When considering the impact of the Prevent Strategy review in terms of Channel’s expanded mandate to cater for “all forms of terrorism”10, the conclusions here are threefold; 1) There was clear evidence of individuals having been identified as vulnerable to being drawn into right-­wing extremism being managed within Channel pre-­2011, with practitioners basing their decision making upon risk and threat rather than the need to demonstrate parity of response to all forms of extremism. This was particularly evident in the Waltham Forest case study where the Prevent Strategy had existed as a pilot and Channel delivery had been embedded for longer than the other case study areas. While it was acknowledged that extreme right-­wing cases were being managed on a risk/ threat basis pre-­2011,11 “the common perception is that the Prevent Strategy has dealt solely with terrorism associated with Al-­Qa’ida”.12 To support this policy “emphasis”, since the review a number of RWE specialist inter­ vention providers have now been registered with the Home Office and are being utilised to deliver tailored interventions as is the case for Islamist extremism. 2) My data demonstrates that practitioners working in this area did believe that Channel was applicable to all forms of extremism, and that despite its origins in addressing Islamist extremism, there was evidence that the programme was of equal utility in managing individuals vulnerable to non-­ Islamist extremism. Practitioners emphasised that the Vulnerability Assessment Framework and the process they used to identify and manage those assessed as being vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism were not unique to one form of extremism. However, it should be noted that there has been no independent review of the effectiveness of the Channel programme. Although practitioners generally agreed that Channel could and should be used for individuals vulnerable to being drawn into RWE, there

Back to basics   157 is no available evidence base demonstrating the programme’s utility in this regard. 3) However, practitioners did voice concerns about the veracity of RWE Channel referrals. There were many instances of referrals being made purely on the basis of attendance at an EDL rally, but with little other corroborative information to suggest a vulnerability to being drawn into right­wing extremism. This finding brings into question some of the reporting around the number of cases within the programme exhibiting a vulnerability to being drawn into the extreme right-­wing as this very much depends upon the thresholds being applied.13 Intervention providers in particular were explicit on this point and differentiated between the various strata of adherence to right-­wing ideology which counters the DCLG perception that the Channel programme is “biting”14 on the EDL, a view largely based on the supposition that individuals subscribing to the mandate of the EDL present vulnerabilities that are to be managed through Channel. There should be independent research conducted on how the Channel programme is used to deliver interventions for those identified as being vulnerable to being drawn into RWE. Contrary to ministerial statements around the significant increases of referrals to Channel being of an extreme right-­wing nature,15 police practitioners and intervention providers presented a more nuanced account whereby referrals did not necessarily translate into cases to be managed. There should be a particular focus on the attrition rate between referral and adoption and the rationale as to why Channel practitioners go on to manage very few RWE referrals in this programme when compared to the numbers of initial referrals. Further to this, the Channel programme should now be reviewed in order to understand how RWE referrals are managed as compared to those demonstrating vulnerabilities to being drawn into Islamist extremism. Since the policy review, we now have a wealth of data that can be analysed in order to enhance the wider understanding of how Channel interventions work and how outcomes compare across different types of extremism but as of yet this data has not been made publicly available for researchers to analyse. There are, of course, the obvious data protection considerations around those individuals who are being managed through what is one of the more contentious areas of government policy. But these considerations are abundantly reconcilable with the objectives of sound research, undertaken with appropriate safeguards and oversight. To review the utility of the Channel programme regarding forms of extremism that are not associated with Islamism, this data should be made more readily accessible, as ultimately this is intended to be an overt supportive programme, and as such its results should be more open to public scrutiny than has thus far been the case.

158   Back to basics

4)  There is little evidence of work undertaken under the auspices of the DCLG “Creating the conditions for integration” policy statement to respond to the EDL at a local level Despite the view from DCLG that the Integration Policy takes primacy for the response to the EDL this does not play out at local level and the intention of policy makers is contrary to the stance taken by the local authorities in the case study areas. Rather than carrying out any form of engagement to establish the common ground as envisaged by the “Creating the Conditions for Integration” policy statement, local authorities have been driven by political pressures to be seen to reject any dialogue with the EDL. In the absence of engagement on the salient issues, this serves to further alienate and isolate those who align themselves to the movement. This raises questions around the definition of extreme right-­wing groups, and the limits of representative local government and its commitment to delivering the integration policy. The “gaping hole”16 reflected in the recent criticism of the integration strategy does not only apply to Muslim communities post the 2011 schism between the Prevent Strategy and community cohesion efforts. It also reflects what is happening to a range of non-­Muslim communities and this requires a commitment to understanding the threats to cohesion posed by the cumulative neglect of individuals who remove themselves from the mainstream by virtue of embracing populist ideologies in the absence of effective political representation. The Prevent Strategy states that it is not the government’s intention to securitise its relationship with communities.17 While the focus at the time of the review was the negative impact of the Prevent Strategy on Muslim communities, it could be argued that the way in which local authorities respond to issues synonymous with the EDL, has led to a securitisation of their relationships with white working-­class groups as the main but not sole demographic constituency of EDL activity.18 Due to the way that the EDL has been problematised as a public order and community cohesion threat it is clear that the police service is the only statutory agency proactively engaging with the EDL through the Protest Liaison Role in support of its public order policing mandate. Outside of this work there is no formal dialogue with the movement and this has resulted in a largely event-­driven short-­term response. Further, through elected officials speaking against the EDL and seeking to ban them from protesting, they risk de-­legitimising informed debate around issues such as the scale of demographic change in communities, child sexual exploitation, and counter terrorism, thereby forcing individuals into the categorisation of right-­wing extremism. There has been a notable lack of commitment in the way that local authorities engage in particular with white working-­class communities on the issues most synonymous with the EDL, namely perceptions of “creeping Sharia” and the sexual exploitation of children by “Muslim grooming gangs”19 due to the way that they have become conflated with the movement. This is especially significant as the issues championed by the EDL have a wider resonance with many voters as reflected by the 2010 British Social Attitudes (BSA) survey which indicated British public attitudes to Islam were uniquely negative. At the time of the 2010

Back to basics   159 election, less than 25% of respondents held positive views about Islam, by far the lowest figure of the religions surveyed.20 When confronted with these issues, it appears that the instinct of local authorities is to not only suppress debate but to actively promote the concept that anyone straying into this area of discourse fits within their frame of “extreme right-­wing”. Attempting to keep the lid on insecure situations without addressing core reasons for dissent will not work.21 This is especially problematic as this response feeds into the “two tier system”22 narrative of the EDL and provides political legitimacy to the further polarisation of communities. From a policy response perspective, this is reminiscent of the intentions of the Connecting Communities programme discussed earlier. This programme was developed to address just these very issues, promoting effective dialogue and training for frontline staff to empower them to have difficult conversations and to challenge extreme views with facts. Since the funding for Connecting Communities was discontinued in 2010 by the then Conservative-­Liberal Democrat coalition, there has not been a replacement. The only place that challenging conversations are taking place is under the auspices of the Prevent Strategy. Is it really appropriate for the first challenge to take place within the framework of a counter terrorism programme? This is a by-­ product of a lack of emphasis on engagement at the earliest opportunity through a broad societal integration strategy and there are risks that in relying instead on more security-­focussed forms of engagement, such as through counter extremism or counter terrorism strategies that this will only further ostracise members of local communities rather than seek to enter into a dialogue and find commonality. This is corroborated by the findings of the Special Interest Group which touched upon the wider issues of the perceived inequality and community impact of austerity measures and non-­representative local government that feed the sentiment underpinning the EDL movement. This book supports the view that white working-­class communities are being left behind in having the way in which they can articulate grievances re-­framed in order to problematise them as racists and extremists in the absence of structured debate and representative government which speaks to all sections of communities.23 •

Figure 7.1 depicts how the hollowing out of the strategic response to community integration has created a situation whereby those communities who have genuine grievances which have only been exacerbated through a climate of austerity, are not engaged with on their issues but are rather problematised in a way that requires a hate crime or counter extremism response. It is through this escalation process that the individual further adopts the mantle of the “other” and finds they are no longer part of the citizenry but a target of the

Integration strategy

Hate crime action plan

Extremism strategy

Figure 7.1  Demonstrating the policy escalation process.

Prevent strategy (counter terrorism)

160   Back to basics security apparatus, which unless resolved will likely lead to an expansion of the counter extremism mandate which is increasingly resembling the cuckoo in the nest of U.K. policy provision. It has crept into the nest of government policy and proceeded to gobble up resources, time, energy and, ultimately, legitimacy from other policy areas which should be delivering all the pre-­ cursor work that, if done right, would ultimately diminish its need for being.

5)  Community engagement in relation to EDL attendance affords primacy to ethnic minority communities and is carried out by Prevent practitioners in the absence of an effective integration policy When considering how statutory agencies respond to the EDL it could be assumed that there would be a strategy to address the mainstream appeal of the movement through engaging with “at risk” communities around the issues driving EDL attendance to erode broader support from the movement away from the core nucleus of its leadership. However, this book has evidenced that this is not the case. The focus of local statutory partners is not to better understand the drivers to local support of the EDL movement, but on mitigating the impact of its attendance on ethnic minority communities, particularly Muslim communities. When the EDL announce their intention to demonstrate in an area in relation to an exploitation of children trial for instance, it is significant that the reaction of the local authority is not to engage with those who may align themselves with the movement, but instead, to prioritise engagement with Muslim communities to manage its impact. Despite the intended schism of 2011, there was clear evidence of Prevent practitioners being called upon to utilise their existing community contacts in supporting the policing plan around an EDL demonstration without a specific Prevent Strategy mandate. This suggests that the Government’s intention to decouple counter terrorism from wider community cohesion efforts24 has not been realised due to both the unclear separation between community cohesion and the Prevent Strategy, as well as the timing of this separation and the introduction of central Government imposed austerity measures on local authorities. The result is that from a community cohesion perspective, Prevent officers are often the only community cohesion resource available due to their continued funding, and even where there are wider non-­counter terrorism resources available, there is recognition that Prevent officers, through the focus of the strategy to date, have secured longstanding and effective working relationships with Muslim communities that are more readily called upon during times of need. It could be argued that this policy direction risks repeating the mistakes of the past, with contentious topics being discussed through the lexicon of extremism rather than general integration, further “securitising” the relationship between the state and communities. It is also clear that the delivery of these policy areas has been further crowded with the introduction of the Extremism Strategy with its funded Community Coordinators. It is currently unclear as to how the Government is differentiating between integration,

Back to basics   161 extremism and Prevent Strategy delivery and local practitioners are picking up the pieces. It is likely that Prevent officers will continue to play a community cohesion role, which while from a pure policy perspective sits outside of their mandate, is operationally required in the absence of funded community cohesion practitioners within local authorities delivering services in a climate of austerity. One of the most prevalent themes within this book is that local statutory agencies have had very little in the way of focussed interactions with their white working-­class communities. Thus far, most of their structured engagement has prioritised ethnic minority communities. However, when challenged as to how they would engage with white working-­class communities on the themes synonymous with the EDL, practitioners acknowledged that these communities are much more difficult to identify due to the lack of focal points and organisational structures that they have become dependent on, particularly in relation to engaging with the Muslim community with its more accessible entry points through local Mosques. In order to demonstrate how local government is truly representative of all communities, there must be a renewed effort to engage with non-­ ethnic minority communities. This goes to the very heart of representative government in that sentiment deemed to be contrary to existing understandings of multi-­culturalism was isolated to the point at which local authorities failed to understand their role in engaging with all communities in order to find the common ground, rather than contribute to the escalation of the aggrieved towards “further right” forms of extremism.

6)  The delivery output of the “Creating the conditions for integration” policy area should be reviewed and understood in the context of associated policies such as the Hate Crime Strategy, the Prevent Strategy and the new Extremism Strategy In the absence of a coherent integration strategy, this book argues that there are risks in only engaging with white working-­class communities through strategies that were never intended for broad societal application. The hate crime, extremism and Prevent Strategy are focussed on escalating levels of risk, so using them in the absence of the foundation of integrated communities could lead to further securitisation of what should be general policies delivered by non-­security state actors. This is particularly evident with regards to the Prevent Strategy, with counter terrorism police officers being deployed to engage with Muslim stakeholders to minimise the impact of EDL street protest activity. The question must be asked, where is the counter terrorism mandate? This book demonstrates that in the absence of a central government commitment to fund local authorities to conduct integration work it has fallen to those state actors with the best existing relationships to fill the gaps. This is contrary to the intent of the Prevent Strategy which stated that; “the Government will not securitise its integration strategy. This has been a mistake in the past”.25 The review goes on to stipulate that; “Prevent will depend on a successful integration programme”,26 and yet, due to

162   Back to basics the failure of the “Creating the Conditions for Integration” policy area, if statutory actors continue to utilise other strategies as vehicles for community engagement, then this risks securitising the terms of that engagement. We have seen through the experience of the police service taking a leadership role in the delivery of the Prevent Strategy, that there is a perception that it has counter productively securitised relationships with Muslim communities. While it may be argued that the police service is not the best agent of delivering integration as the terms of their engagement with communities is more associated with crime prevention than the promotion of community integration, given that local authorities have suffered cuts to funding, this role is being fulfilled by the police service in the absence of dedicated local authority staff. It is apparent that the responses of statutory agencies can more easily contribute to the polarisation of views than to carry out their intentions to foster better relationships between communities. We have yet to see the impact of the Extremism Strategy on community engagement but it is already difficult to differentiate the “extremism” to which it alludes from the “extremism” catered for within the Prevent Strategy. It is significant that there is no reference to work to understand the links between extremism and hate crime within the Hate Crime Action Plan and vice versa, further indicating how these policy areas appear to have been developed in isolation without an appreciation for the complex nature of extremism which transcends each of them. The Joint Committee on Human Rights, when considering the Extremism Strategy put forward the view that; “any undermining of the relationship between the authorities and Muslim communities would make the fight against terrorism even harder”.27 It is interesting that the focus remains very much on Muslim communities. However, this book argues that the relationship between the state and white working-­class communities also risks being undermined by policies designed to counter extremism. Without there being a clear sense of the extreme right-­wing scene in the U.K., views and behaviours falling within an overly expansive interpretation of extremism risks criminalising and labeling white working-­class communities just as easily as Muslim communities. This book has highlighted how the integration and Prevent Strategies not only intersect but overlap around the EDL. Given the projected scope of the Extremism Strategy it is highly likely that this will add further confusion to this area of policy provision. There should be a review of the integration strategy, and fundamentally this must include its relationship with the hate crime, the Prevent Strategy, and extremism policy areas to ensure there is much needed synergy between them.

7)  The EDL are perceived as a threat to public order and community cohesion but not, significantly as a counter terrorism threat This book has demonstrated how the EDL movement has been perceived as a threat to public order, not always in of themselves, but often through the resulting counter demonstration. The EDL precipitates strong opposition to their views

Back to basics   163 and when they visit a location they are invariably met by a counter demonstration far exceeding their number. Public order commanders identified that given this disparity the EDL, as the smaller group, were policed in ways to prevent disorder from the larger. There was clear evidence to counter the perception that the “We Are” brand of countering the EDL are a grassroots campaign as they were heavily influenced by the national Unite Against Fascism movement and others who specialise in orchestrating local counter demonstrations. It is significant that the policing of the EDL is contingent upon the scale of the counter demonstration as this raises questions around the proportionality and necessity of policing and local authority activity which is targeted towards the smaller group based on the relative ease with which they can be managed in comparison to the larger and disparate collective of the counter demonstrators. The way in which local actors respond to the EDL through their street protest activity has the potential to feed into their victim narrative due to the perception that they are not being allowed due process in the face of a sizeable counter demonstration seeking to encroach upon their right to freedom of speech and assembly. Wider than the public order considerations, the EDL are perceived as a threat to community cohesion. EDL attendances are considered “times of stress”28 in that they magnify otherwise dormant grievances and draw wider national attention to an area which is seen as damaging to local cohesion efforts.29 However, rather than local authorities seeing this as an opportunity to engage on the salient issues and to draw support away from the EDL, they contribute to the polarisation of views due to the short-­term way in which the EDL are perceived as a threat. Instead of seeing the EDL as a vent to latent local community cohesion issues (particularly in Luton and Newcastle) that may be bubbling beneath the surface, it was instead seen as a threat for the time period of the demonstration, indicating a lack of willingness to truly understand the drivers to the movement’s activities. There were views from a local authority perspective that although the movement is not a counter terrorism threat, there remains a Prevent Strategy role around EDL protest due to the way in which it could be used a means of extreme right-­ wing individuals identifying those who may be vulnerable to their message and recruiting them to the cause. There was actually very little evidence of this being the case but it does pose the wider challenge around the lack of understanding of the RWE scene in the U.K. The Prevent Strategy refers to “the absence [in the U.K] of extreme right-­wing terrorist organisations and formal groups”30 but also acknowledges that the understanding is “inevitably less developed than it is for terrorism associated with Al Qa’ida”.31 This book presents the view that the lack of clarity and ownership at a policy level rather than contributing to a better understanding of the extreme right-­wing in the U.K., has instead created a situation where state responses to the EDL are confused and disparate which does not then form a sound conceptual basis for exploring the relationships between extreme right-­wing organisations and actors. As the EDL sits within the albeit expansively used “extreme right-­wing”, coupled with the Prevent Strategy setting out that the threat emanates not from groups but individuals,32 this poses questions around how the extreme right-­wing is conceptualised in the U.K. The distinction between

164   Back to basics group and individual activities risks downplaying the significance of the influence of groups who act as an echo chamber for extremism, which can then negatively influence individuals who may not have overt allegiances to any one group, but who subscribe to ideological elements of each which resonate with them personally. There is a challenge to the idea that lone actor terrorism in the extreme right-­wing space is separate to the wider extreme right-­wing scene. Though not “organised”,33 this disparate and fractious34 tapestry of associations does however create a permissive atmosphere for the transfer and development of RWE narratives that are sufficient for some to act alone, while not aligning themselves to a particular group. There should be more thinking at a policy level on the radicalising influences of groups sitting in the extreme right-­wing space, and the justification for the policy response to so called “lone actors” existing separately to the activities of the groups operating in this space. In addition, if the policy response to “groups” sits within the DCLG policy area, one whose frontline delivery mechanism in the form of council officers delivering community integration has been dramatically scaled back due to central government-­imposed austerity measures, then it is difficult to see how this can be achieved. There was very little understanding of how local individuals and groups relate to the national RWE scene and this remains a significant operational gap in how statutory services respond to right-­wing extremism. The relevant policy areas must be reviewed in concert to ensure that the responses to individuals and groups are not separated across different government departments with little coordination and/or governance and accountability.

8)  State responses to the EDL are highly politicised and cause tensions within community safety partnerships Specifically, in relation to the public order response to the EDL, this book provides a valuable insights into the reputational risks around the police service acting as “guardians”35 of human rights legislation, applying it in an albeit proportionate and measured way, but in apparent (often public) opposition with the local sentiment as reflected by elected officials representing the views of their constituents. For local politicians there is much political capital associated with them being seen by sections of the electorate to be proactively opposing the EDL.36 It was particularly apparent in the Waltham Forest case study that in the police service maintaining an objective stance and complying with its mandate around facilitating peaceful protest, that this actually risks damaging trust and confidence in the police service with elected officials being able to frame themselves as the true spokespeople of communities in the face of the police service failing to understand local issues. This position ignores the reality that if Councillors on behalf of their electorate wanted more power over the use of banning legislation then it is entirely within their power to lobby the government to bring this about. In the meantime, they are able to lay the blame for the apparent unwillingness to use this legislation at the door of the police. Waltham Forest was an unusual case study in this regard in that this position was largely driven by the unique situation that the EDL did not enjoy a constituency in this

Back to basics   165 borough, and so the community safety partnership was put under significant strain with the organisational priorities for the police service and the local authority coming into direct conflict. Currently the police service shoulders much of the community resentment for being seen to allow EDL protest by not applying more frequently to the Home Secretary to ban demonstrations using Section 13 of the Public Order Act 1986. It is clear that local authorities play a fundamental role before, during and after the “policing” of EDL protest activity. It could be argued that they should therefore enjoy a more substantial role in negotiations with the Home Secretary around the exercise of legislation to ban the EDL. However, we should be cognisant of the organisational priorities of each of the statutory agencies. For the police service, the protest is a logistical demand which, through mutual aid from surrounding Forces can be facilitated in line with their obligations under the Human Rights Act 1998.37 For local authorities however, there are wider considerations around not just how the protest will impact on community groups but how these align to political priorities locally. There is a current vogue of framing EDL protest activity as placing unnecessary financial burdens on local authorities, with Luton being an example. However, using the climate of austerity and increased scrutiny on public service expenditure does not appear to be in keeping with the police role as the “guardians of the ECHR [European Court of Human Rights]”.38 Significantly, it is not senior public order police officers but elected officials who are linking budget pressures with the policing of protest, with notable examples of the MP for Bedfordshire and the Police & Crime Commissioner for West Yorkshire.39 However, these calls have met resistance, with the latter’s position being questioned by public order expert Dr Clifford Stott, of the University of Leeds, regarding the lack of detail given by the PCC. He said: It’s difficult to see what additional powers could be given to the police given the existing powers they have. It sounds like he wants powers to impose blanket bans – who would be subject to it? Would it just be those from a particular political ideology or everyone?40 Further to similar commentary with regard to another Yorkshire force calling for a ban of the EDL, Public order expert Dr Niall Hamilton-­Smith, from the University of Stirling, said: Unpleasant as many of these far right ‘demos’ are, it’s certainly regrettable to frame the debate in terms of curbing public protest on cost grounds … it’s a fine line, but on occasions banning or placing restrictions on processions or static demonstrations on public order grounds is absolutely the right thing to do. But we should be assessing events on these grounds, not on the basis of cost.41 This is a particularly important aspect of the statutory services response to the EDL as from a purely financial perspective; it is generally the policing of the

166   Back to basics larger counter demonstration which is the more financially demanding. There was evidence of ostensibly grassroots community counter demonstrations being orchestrated by the national Unite Against Fascism movement, necessitating a much larger policing response than would have been the case for the EDL demonstration alone. There should be a review of the decision-­making and accountability relating to the decision to either facilitate or ban an EDL demonstration, with the statutory services each contributing from their own organisational standpoints rather than the Home Office solely relying on the assessment of the police service. Such an approach must be safeguarded from wider political intrusion on financial grounds. Further to this point, reporting around EDL demonstrations should be more balanced to draw out the role of the counter demonstration and the effective reciprocal activity that is taking place so not to further exacerbate tensions and feed into the victim narrative of the EDL. It is an oversimplification to report on the activities of the EDL without considering more fulsomely the context of street-­based protest where counter demonstrations have such an impact on the smaller group’s ability to exercise their freedom to protest.

9)  We should not presume the decline of the English Defence League is indicative of a reduction of the constituency with whom EDL narratives have resonated There was broad consensus among practitioners that the scale of EDL protest activity is decreasing, or in the words of one respondent, it is “dying on its feet”.42 Since 2013 practitioners have perceived that both the frequency and numbers attending demonstrations has fallen. They recounted their experiences of policing large EDL demonstrations when the movement was at the zenith of its power from 2009 through to 2013. These required commensurately large policing operations with mutual aid requirements spanning many forces. Practitioners did not attribute this decrease in activity to anything they or their respective community safety partnerships had done, and there certainly was not any nationally coordinated activity around the EDL. Rather, this downward trajectory was largely due to the departure of the movement’s leader, Tommy Robinson, in 2013. However, there were also practitioners who theorised that the views of the EDL have attained a form of political legitimacy with the rise of UKIP, which took on this contentious subject matter within the context of its general stance on the erosion of the British culture.43 While organisationally UKIP distanced itself from the EDL,44 it is yet to be seen how influential the provision of a politically articulate vent for social apprehension and grievances associated with “creeping Sharia” (in addition to its lobbying for a referendum on the U.K.’s membership of the European Union) contributed to the decrease in the EDL’s street protest attendance from 2013 onwards. However, given UKIP’s dismal performance in the 2017 General Election, it is unclear how much longer this vent for grievance will be in existence in any event.

Back to basics   167 Although the EDL movement may be “on the wane”, this should not be cause for complacency and mainstream parties must address issues of identity and belonging, as well as opportunity and economics.45 We should not presume the decline of the English Defence League is indicative of a reduction of the constituency with whom EDL narratives have resonated. Many of the respondents during my fieldwork for this book were of the view that although the EDL has diminished, the grievances that drive support have never been addressed and this is particularly evident in the online community.46 The EDL are not the only group in this space, with many smaller groups forming, breaking apart and re-­ forming under new leadership over the same period. One of the hallmarks of groups within “the extreme right-­wing” is their factitious nature which makes them vulnerable to inter and intra-­group fighting. Most of these groups have not been as successful as the EDL at securing mainstream support so it is unlikely we will see them being able to assemble large demonstrations in the way that the EDL did. However, it must be remembered that the EDL did not dissolve as a movement because its objectives had been satisfied; it declined due to the departure of its leader, leaving behind the same collective of grievance and political isolation.47 Research conducted in the wake of the June 2016 referendum decision to leave the European Union suggests that there remain deep divisions in society based along social, education and geographical lines,48 which are ripe for exploitation. This phenomenon is national in its scope and therefore requires a national strategy, rather than a series of disparate local authority-­level responses based upon local threat assessment, demographic landscape and/or political climate. If policy makers continue to fail to recognise the need for mainstream discourse on these issues, then they risk swelling the ranks of the extreme right-­ wing and bestowing legitimacy on individuals presenting themselves as the spokespeople of those who have been left behind. Focussed research on the fall in EDL street activity would be needed in order to ascertain whether the views of practitioners are in fact correct, i.e. that this is due to the Tommy Robinson factor or whether the increased mainstream support of UKIP and its resultant impact on the mainstream parties has contributed to the decrease in nationalist street protest aspirations. There are real risks in complacency and efforts to understand the drivers to mobilisation in the extreme right-­wing space continue to be de-­prioritised due to the collective perception that the EDL is a diminishing force, which is particularly salient against the backdrop of a poorly defined understanding of right-­wing extremism in the U.K.

10)  There should be investment in local engagement around issues synonymous with EDL street protest activity Local actors respond to EDL demonstrations reactively and do not have a longer­term strategic view on how better to manage the movement’s street protest ambitions. Although the movement may be in a visible decline, this was not as a result of anything that statutory agencies did necessarily. While there was clearly evidence of local authorities honing their partnership responses over time, even

168   Back to basics being described as “pretty slick”,49 there was little in the way of developing a longer-­term view. Although there was broad consensus around the decline of the EDL movement, practitioners did recognise that the sentiment that underpinned EDL protest still remains. Without a longer-­term strategy to respond to this form of street mobilisation, local actors felt that this sentiment, if harnessed by an equally “charismatic”50 and politically astute leader, could again lead to individuals taking to the streets. It is clear that Tommy Robinson, in reaching out to similarly minded groups across Europe is trying to realise a more strategic ambition to garner mainstream support to effect change across borders, although notably his attempt to establish a U.K. branch of the German PEGIDA movement was doomed to failure when he decided to host its first demonstration in Newcastle with its more mature counter protest arrangements.51 Practitioners in Luton and Newcastle, where there is a local constituency for the EDL, acknowledged that acting reactively in this way does not take the conversation any further forward. Unless there is a political emphasis on re-­engaging with this section of society, and to demonstrate that local politicians speak to all sections of their communities, rather than in preserving the public order Police Liaison Team as the only means of dialogue with the EDL, this only reinforces the movement’s narrative that they are different to others. This was particularly evident in Luton where practitioners benefited from having participated in the Special Interest Group which demonstrated the disconnection between local government representation and local residents who align themselves to EDL protest activity not necessarily due to adhering to a particular ideology, but because they have no other means of articulating grievances that have become increasingly taboo, particularly with the local authority. This book has produced a breadth of views from statutory and non-­statutory partners which support the findings of the Special Interest Group, notably that; If we want to dissipate some of the anger that has underpinned mobilisations by groups like the EDL, the cultivating a belief among residents that they can genuinely have their voices heard and listened to should be seen as a priority.52 The fact that the EDL as a movement has diminished in terms of its street protest ambitions, does not justify complacency. Concerns were voiced by practitioners that latent sentiment can easily be galvanised by the right leader exploiting the right set of conditions, as was the case in Luton. The focus here should be on increasing political dialogue on challenging issues to penetrate the spectre and mythology that surround the EDL. Local authorities should be providing people with platforms for debate on sensitive issues such as immigration, child sexual exploitation, the impact of austerity on local service provision, housing, integration and the pace of change in communities. In order to do so, there must be a re-­balance of community engagement to include all communities and reduce the focus solely on ethnic minorities. The apparent normality of many of the demonstrators as observed by public order officers policing the EDL indicates how

Back to basics   169 there are real risks in conflating general grievances with affiliation to extreme right-­wing ideology. This goes to the very heart of local political representation. If local people do not feel as though they have a voice due to the de-­ legitimisation of their concerns and grievances, then the risk is that they will in fact become further removed from the mainstream.53 Policy should aim to split radicals off, not force the mainstream into their arms.54 But the implications of resetting the terms of engagement on these issues are much wider than the U.K. and as “Brexit” becomes a reality, it is a chance for Europe’s leaders to take control of the conversation, particularly around immigration, from the populists.55 This is reminiscent of the Connecting Communities Programme, which focussed on training local authority actors to encourage them to engage in debate on these issues and to debunk some of the misconceptions of the impact of immigration as an example. The Special Interest Group extended this thinking in advocating the creation of “safe spaces” for debate on salient issues rather than suppressing them and affording ground to extremist recruiters. This work should be re-­visited as there should be a much better understanding within local authorities of the social issues that lend themselves to exploitation by groups such as the EDL. The perceived failure of the authorities to effectively manage the activities of Islamist extremists is a galvanising factor with groups mobilising to fill what they believe to be a gap in the local authority and policing response. If communities are to have confidence in local statutory partners, these groups must be seen to be effectively “policed”. In addition, especially within a climate of austerity, the building of mosques and community facilities by and for Muslim communities at a time where local statutory service provision is being scaled back only exacerbates underlying tensions and feeds into the grievance narrative of white working-­class communities being left behind. There is a need for much better communication from local authorities to encourage dialogue on these issues, rather than suppressing them through a lack of willingness and/or confidence to have what can be challenging interactions.

Concluding remarks This book has focussed upon a previously un-­researched area of U.K. security policy application. It has explored the impact of the Government’s decision to explicitly add right-­wing extremism to its counter terrorism Prevent Strategy in 2011 through analysing localised responses to the EDL. The findings across all three case study areas suggest that for Prevent practitioners in both the police service and the local authority, the impact of this decision has been minimal. The associated Channel programme has utility in managing interventions for those vulnerable to being drawn into right-­wing extremism but much more research is required in this area to determine the actual number of individuals who have received support rather than simply being referred to the programme. Due to the poor coordination between OSCT and DCLG this has led to policy areas, namely the Prevent Strategy, the Hate Crime Action Plan, the Integration Strategy, and latterly the Extremism Strategy, that have been developed in isolation with little

170   Back to basics in the way of synergy between them, despite the much-­needed clarity this would bring in relation to responses to right-­wing extremism. For instance, the decision to afford primacy to DCLG rather than the Prevent Strategy for the policy response to the EDL did not lead to any allocation of resources or meaningful work that practitioners could point to as having made a difference since 2011. When we consider the application of this strategy on right-­wing extremism in the widest sense, practitioners articulated the challenges of conducting work in this area primarily due to the difficulties of defining right-­wing extremism and what a broad societal application of the Prevent Strategy to respond to this form of extremism would look like operationally. This has led to a generalised approach to “all forms of extremism” rather than the creation of specific counter narratives and tools to understand and combat right-­wing ideology. None of the respondents in the case study areas could point to a RWE-­specific counter narrative, nor had they received bespoke training in identifying RWE issues associated with terrorism. This was exacerbated by a general lack of understanding of and communication with white working-­class communities. Many practitioners acknowledged that efforts of statutory services have been focussed on engaging with ethnic minority groups and that there has been a subsequent neglect of prioritised engagement around non-­minority white working-­class communities. They also recognised that the expansive use of the term “right-­wing extremism” encompassed a vast array of issues from citizens expressing concerns due to poor social integration of Muslims through to hardcore Neo-­Nazi ideology. The conflation of these issues has contributed to the formation of movements such as the EDL and there was clear evidence that local officials have surrendered the narrative on contentious issues such as integration and immigration to surrogate representatives in the form of the EDL and like-­minded groups. Local officials have thereby contributed to tensions within communities through their lack of willingness to engage with these topics which has led to further polarisation on issues that should remain in the centre ground. There are significant lessons to be learned in relation to political representation which creates a permissive environment for engagement, debate and challenge in order to prevent individuals from being pushed into the very extremism we are seeking to avoid, rather than accelerate this process through policies of non-­engagement on the salient issues.56 Further, the overriding national threat profile is associated with Islamist terrorism rather than that of the extreme right-­wing and so efforts to devise an appropriate response have been challenging against a backdrop of prioritisation of Islamist extremism predominantly associated with Islamic State in Syria and Iraq. Despite the political imperative in 2011 to limit the perceived negative impact of the Prevent Strategies on Muslim communities, there is very little evidence of how the strategy has been applied to right-­wing extremism. The EDL is problematised by local actors as a public order (largely by virtue of its ability to generate visceral opposition in well organised and large-­scale counter demonstrations) and community cohesion threat but not one of counter terrorism. The police service and the local authority approach the EDL from differing standpoints. The police, exercising their functions under the Public Order Act

Back to basics   171 1986, and complying with Human Rights legislation, see the EDL as a logistical challenge in terms of the numbers attending, and significantly, the numbers of counter demonstrators that their presence in the area precipitates. However, local authorities have a political mandate and reflect the views as they see it from locally elected representatives. Tensions between the police service and the local authority were evident in all three case study areas, with the police often being portrayed as being in some way supportive of the EDL through discharging their obligations under the Human Rights Act 1998 rather than seeking to ban demonstrations. We can see the way in which local officials have failed to engage on the salient issues of their constituents through their responses to the EDL. This has led to an entirely reactive response to the movement’s street protest activities in the absence of a much-­needed longer term strategy to re-­balance civic engagement and political representation which could reduce the need for demonstrations as a vent for locally held frustrations. If policy makers persist in their failure to recognise the need for mainstream discourse on issues that underpin support for, and have become synonymous with, the EDL then they risk swelling the ranks of the “extreme right-­wing” and bestowing legitimacy on individuals presenting themselves as the spokespeople of those who feel left behind by political representatives who no longer represent them. The threats posed by the various forms of extremism are not contingent upon one another. We must start talking about them on their own merits because otherwise we will persist with a bland one-­size-fits-­all approach to counter terrorism. We have to be clear as to the nature of these threats and the role of the various state actors in responding to them. Furthermore, if we respond to Muslim communities’ concerns about the impact of counter terrorism policies by simply stating how we’re also now responding to right-­wing extremism, this does nothing to resolve those issues. Worse than this, it avoids them. This book has sought to navigate a path through the interminable white noise that surrounds state responses to right-­wing extremism in the U.K. It is clear that this is an area that is home to a range of government policies which represent a dangerous confluence between political necessity, strategic intent and operational reality which is only set to endure for frontline practitioners interpreting them and the communities subject to the work flowing from them.

Notes   1 The Casey Review: A review into opportunity and integration (2016) p. 6.   2 Interview 61 – Walthamstow MP, May 2014.   3 Integration Minister, Don Foster MP Speech to the Special Interest Group in January 2013; “Why we must continue to tackle far right extremism head on”.   4 The Prevent Strategy, Note 19, Introduction, supra, p. 15, para. 5.11.   5 The Prevent Strategy, Note 19, Introduction, supra, p. 15, para. 5.10.   6 HM Government: “Channel Duty Guidance; protecting vulnerable people from being drawn into terrorism – Statutory guidance for Channel panel members and partners of local panels” p. 5.   7 See the ITV News timeline in relation to the murder of Mohammed Saleem (21/10/2013).

172   Back to basics   8 Telegraph Online (17/06/2016) “It’s time to call the killing of Jo Cox what it is: ‘an act of far-­Right terrorism’ ”.   9 The Prevent Strategy, Note 19, Introduction, supra, p. 24, para. 6.3. 10 The Prevent Strategy, Note 19, Introduction, supra, p. 60, para. 9.30. 11 This is referenced in the Prevent Strategy review; “Channel needs to deal with all types of terrorism. We note in practice this is already happening at the initiative of the police and local authorities. We welcome this and it should continue” p.  60, para. 9.30. 12 The Prevent Strategy, Note 19, Introduction, supra, p. 25, para. 6.9. 13 Security Minister’s speech for the Far-­Right Special Interest Group conference delivered on the 5 September 2013. 14 Interview 8 – civil servant working within DCLG, February 2014. 15 Note 13, Chapter 7, supra. 16 House of Commons Debates; HC Deb, 02/12/2014, c209. 17 The Prevent Strategy, Note 19, Introduction, supra, p. 23. 18 See; Goodwin, Matthew, Note 11, Chapter 1, supra.; John, Peter, and Helen Margetts, Note 13, Chapter 1, supra.; Bartlett, Jamie, and Mark Littler, Note 13, Chapter 1, supra. 19 For further on the way these issues were reported in the media, see the Telegraph Online (25/06/2015) “Report about Asian grooming gangs was suppressed to avoid inflaming racial tension”. 20 See Goodwin, Matthew and Robert Ford, 2014; 80, quoting Voas, David, and Rodney Ling writing in Park, Alison et al. (eds.) British Social Attitudes: The 26th Report (Sage Publications, 2010). 21 Rogers, Paul, “Losing Control” (2000). 22 Interview 31 – far right intervention specialist, March 2015. 23 See also; Collins, Michael, The Likes of Us (Granta Publications, 2005); Collins, M. (2006) “Sinking … poor white boys are the new failing class”, The Times, 19 November; Cowles, James, et al. Sources of Resentment, and Perceptions of Ethnic Minorities among Poor White People in England (National Community Forum/Department for Communities and Local Government 2009); Liddle, R. (2006) ‘We’re all working class now’, The Times, 7 May – Liddle, R. (2010) ‘Labour’s contempt for the white working class’, The Spectator, 28 April 2010; Jones, Owen, Chavs: The demonization of the white working class (Verso, 2012); Goodwin, Matthew, and Robert Ford, Note 2, Introduction, supra. 24 The Prevent Strategy, Note 19, Introduction, supra, p. 27, para. 6.23. 25 The Prevent Strategy, Note 19, Introduction, supra, p. 6, para. 3.14. 26 The Prevent Strategy, Note 19, Introduction, supra, p. 30, para. 6.31. 27 Joint Committee on Human Rights: Counter Extremism, Second Report of session 2016–17 – HL Paper 39, HC 105, published on 22 July 2016, p. 4. 28 Interview 61 – Walthamstow MP – 19/05/2014. 29 Lowles, N. “Policing the EDL”, Searchlight 428 (2011): 6–7. 30 The Prevent Strategy, Note 19, Introduction, supra, p. 20, para. 5.42. 31 The Prevent Strategy, Note 19, Introduction, supra, p. 20, para. 5.42. 32 The Prevent Strategy, Note 19, Introduction, supra, p. 15, para. 5.10. 33 The Prevent Strategy, Note 19, Introduction, supra, p. 15, para. 5.10. 34 For evidence of the fractious nature of the EDL see the EDL News (19/01/2014) “EDL fall apart due to bitter infighting”. 35 Interview 34 – senior public order police officer, May 2015. 36 BBC News (22/03/2015) “Tory candidate Afzal Amin denies ‘fake EDL march’ claim” – A Conservative election candidate who has been suspended by his party has said he did not seek a “fake” English Defence League march to win votes. The Mail on Sunday reported Afzal Amin plotted to persuade the EDL to announce a march in Dudley North and then to scrap it to allow him to take credit.

Back to basics   173 37 See “Adapting to Protest” (2009) – HMIC. 38 Interview 34 – senior public order police officer, May 2015. 39 West Yorkshire PCC website (29/07/2015) “Call for greater powers to be able to consider banning protests in the county”; The West Yorkshire Police and Crime Commissioner Mark Burns-­Williamson has repeated his call for greater powers to be able to consider banning protests in the county. The renewed call comes after figures show that more than £750,000 was spent by West Yorkshire Police policing just one EDL demonstration. 40 Police Oracle (03/08/2015) “Call for increased police powers to ban protests”. 41 Police Oracle (11/09/2015) “Chief wants to ban protests”. 42 Interview 45 –police Prevent practitioner, September 2015. 43 Craig Woodhouse; “UKIP leader condemns radical Islam ahead of Wilders visit”, Press Association, 05/03/2010, quoted in Goodwin, Matthew and Robert Ford, Note 2, Introduction supra, p. 83 44 See Goodwin, Matthew and Robert Ford, Note 2, Introduction supra, p. 80. 45 The Guardian (17/11/2011) – Writing in the “Response” column, Matthew Collins and Sunder Katwala question the paper’s report on recent research from the Demos thinktank on the rise of the far right in Europe. 46 See for instance; Bartlett, Jamie, and Mark Littler, Note 13, Chapter 1, supra. 47 Oaten, Alexander. “The cult of the victim: an analysis of the collective identity of the English Defence League”. Patterns of Prejudice 48.4 (2014): 331–349. 48 See for instance; Goodwin, Matthew J., and Oliver Heath, “The 2016 referendum, Brexit and the Left Behind: An aggregate-­level analysis of the result”. The Political Quarterly 87.3 (2016): 323–332. 49 Interview 33 – police Prevent practitioner, April 2015. 50 See Eatwell, Roger, Note 1, Chapter 1, supra, pp. 45–70; Zaslove, Andrej. “The dark side of European politics: Unmasking the radical right”. Journal of European Integration 26.1 (2004): 61–81; Carter, Elisabeth, Note 22, Introduction, supra. 51 Deardie, Lizzie (01/08/2018) The Independent; “Tommy Robinson is richer and has more international support after two-­month imprisonment, research shows”. 52 Harris, Gareth et al., Note 4, Chapter 3, supra, p. 97. 53 Kenny, Michael, “The political theory of recognition: The case of the ‘White Working Class’ ”. The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 14.1 (2012): 24. 54 The Economist; 26 March–1 April 2016 – “The new normal”. 55 The Economist; 25 June–1 July 2016 – “Commented Out”. See also; Eatwell, R. and Goodwin, M., Note 6, Chapter 1, supra. 56 For a notable change in stance on the issue of “Muslim Grooming Gangs” see Modhin, Aamna. The Guardian (20/10/2018) “Sajid Javid lambasted for ‘Asian paedophiles’ tweet”.

Appendix: methodology

The central question guiding the research underpinning this book was; How did the U.K. Government’s decision to include right-­wing extremism within its counter terrorism “Prevent” Strategy impact on local responses to the EDL? Because of this actor-­orientated approach, this book has of necessity explored the views, working practices and perceptions of those frontline practitioners charged with delivering this national strategy. The primary data consisted of 80 qualitative interviews with a range of subject matter experts who are delivering responses to RWE across the U.K. Given that the themes at issue within this book are specialist areas for policing and local authorities, there are even in Prevent Priority Areas, only a small pool of individuals past and present who can speak authoritatively on these subjects. My shared community membership has therefore been extremely useful in identifying specialists in Luton, Waltham Forest and Newcastle. Utilising these initial contacts within the Prevent Strategy network I then snowballed into public order commanders, local authority personnel, and community organisations working on these issues to give each of the chapters dedicated to these areas a breadth of perspectives to produce a balanced account, drawing out the complexity of the relationships between statutory partners jointly responsible for service delivery of national policies within a local context. The resultant findings are a data set and associated analysis which are an exceptionally rare contribution to this body of research, further evidencing the benefits of insider research to improving the visibility and scrutiny of statutory agencies delivering national policies.

The use of interviews This research draws upon in-­depth qualitative semi-­structured interviews with frontline practitioners delivering the HMG Prevent Strategy across policing, the local authority, local government and the third sector who all contribute in their own way in responding to the EDL. Due to the nature of the EDL as a street protest movement, the research also extends to those statutory actors with a mandate to preserve the public order. I adopted the qualitative approach as my epistemological position is that this method is a meaningful way to generate data from actors’ perspectives.1 I utilised a “template” method whereby the interview

Appendix: methodology   175 data was analysed through the use of a codebook, which sets out the themes that underpin the central research question. Each interview was fully transcribed and the data coded for themes and patterns while remaining flexible to cover additional themes which arose through the fieldwork. The intention of this research was to obtain data-­rich accounts of practitioners’ experiences and perceptions of how they respond to the EDL within their professional capacities. The semi-­ structured interview is well suited to this task in that it allows the interviewee to reconstruct personal experiences that cannot be corroborated easily by any other method than by conducting similar interviews with the actors referred to in the interview. The findings of qualitative interviews may not yield the “hard” scientific evidence associated with statistical analysis of survey data3 but they are more agile and provide ample opportunity for participants to elaborate more expansively on their views, motivations, and interpretation of strategies4 Limitations associated with the generalisability of interview data5 should be balanced against their utility in drawing out in-­depth and rich accounts which expose layers of contextual understanding that would otherwise remain hidden to survey techniques, leading us to a greater insight into the world of participants, not at an aggregate level but from a uniquely individual perspective.6 2

Interviewing “elites” I formulated the design of my interviews based upon the general description of “elites” found in the academic commentary on this field of qualitative interviewing. There are numerous interpretations of an “elite” for interviewing purposes, such as those with a close proximity with power,7 those who are highly skilled, professionally competent, and class-­specific8 or those with a particular expertise.9 There are even those with the view that there are hierarchies within “elites”, such as those who are particularly powerful or prestigious influentials.10 As a result, there are commentaries focussing on methodological considerations such as access and power dynamics which are unique to this area of research interviewing11 as well as validity and sample representativeness issues.12 There is however, very little in the way of literature on the researcher who is part of the “elite” establishment which is the very subject of their research, particularly within a policing context. Through conducting interviews, I have determined that the most effective are those that are semi-­structured, given the status of the interviewees, their knowledge of the subject matter, and their previous experience in being interviewed by journalists and academics. My experience in interviewing senior civil servants and senior police officers is that they prefer my use of “Grand Tour Questions”, where I allow the interviewee to give a verbal tour or something they know well.13 With this method, much is reliant on the interviewee’s capacity to verbalise, interact, conceptualise and remember.14 Elites especially, but other highly educated people as well, do not like being put in the straitjacket of close-­ended questions. They prefer to articulate their views, explaining why they think what they think.15 Due to the unique nature of my position as an “elite” researcher interviewing “elites” within the same area of

176   Appendix: methodology speciality, my experience of conducting interviews is somewhat at variance to the view that elite interviewing is characterised by a situation in which the balance is in favour of the respondent.16 Given this power dynamic within the interviews, they more resemble “conversations with a purpose”.17 As practitioners we rarely pause for thought and introspection, and so I have found my interviews have also taken on an exploratory nature for both myself and the interviewees to engage with the issues in an informal setting based upon the mutual generation of knowledge. I particularly like the idea of the “co-­ production of knowledge involving interviewer and interviewee”18 where we are able to explore concepts as peers, testing new ideas and approaches that we may not otherwise have considered. I am acting not as an individual creative scholar, a knowing subject who discovers, but more as a material body through whom a narrative structure unfolds.19 Given my proximity to the subject matter it would be difficult for me not to have an opinion within the interview. Indeed, it would feel like a very false interaction to my interviewee if I did not have a position, as the Head of Strategy and Policy within the Office of the National Coordinator for Prevent, they would expect me to have very well-­informed views on the subjects being discussed. The process of transcribing my tape-­recorded interviews provided me with a platform for evaluating my own impact on the interviews which I was able to monitor throughout the fieldwork phase.20 While maintaining the flow of the interview, in order to prevent the interviewees from taking control in order to pursue their “verbal tour” of a topic with which they are comfortable and authoritative, and to maintain a semi-­structured approach I anchored our “conversations with a purpose” around pre-­prepared questions, much like the “points to prove” methodology applied within police interviews to ensure all areas of central importance to the research supporting this book were covered. It is also worthy of note that I have been interviewed by researchers and think tanks many times as part of my role. This experience as an “elite” interviewee also assisted in how I approached the arrangement of the interviews, building in sufficient flexibility around busy people with ever changing calendars, as well as how I crafted interview questions to their particular discipline to ensure they could add the most value. Another consideration throughout the interviews was the fact that in many instances I became conscious of the power relationship implications of my senior rank when interviewing more junior officers. While there is material on power relationships where the interviewee holds the power,21 there is very little methodological research that is analogous to my position of being a senior officer conducting research with junior officers within a hierarchical organisation. To mitigate against this power dynamic unduly influencing my participants I was conscious to emphasise the informed consent process as well as ensuring they understood that during the interview our respective ranks were left outside the room, and that they could relate to me as a well-­informed researcher embarking on the pursuit of knowledge with them.

Appendix: methodology   177

Data collection Contrary to the access issues highlighted by others researching such sensitive subject matter, as I was working within the counter terrorism environment, I had unfettered access to both frontline practitioners and policy makers and in many cases I already had a professional relationship with many of the interviewees and I leveraged these existing professional contacts to broker my initial introductions to practitioners in other disciplines and geographies. This use of “insider” ­credentials greatly facilitated access with people I had not met before. However, where my position and rank were relayed to the prospective interviewees, I was conscious of the impact this may have upon them, in that this may already have precipitated them forming preconceptions of who I am and what I was seeking to achieve.22 For those case study areas where I did not have existing links, I used the snowballing technique23 to make use of my contacts to identify potential interviewees from the three case study areas that were outside my existing network, such as police public order commanders, local authority Prevent practitioners and community cohesion teams. There are weaknesses in the technique, as in being based in the first instance upon one’s own networks this introduces bias in the way that the sample is identified due to the non-­random way in which the subsequent turns of the snowball identify individuals that are more likely to endorse or corroborate the views of those who referred the researcher to them.24 It should also be noted that the delivery of responses to the EDL is very specialised work and there is in fact a very small practitioner community with whom to engage for the purposes of this research. Because of these potential biases, snowball samples are typically seen as “convenience samples” that lack any valid claim to produce unbiased and consistent samples. However, through “targeted sampling”25 the impact of these biases could be mitigated through field researchers using ethnographic mapping to first identify the target population and then recruit a pre-­specified number of subjects ensuring they are from different areas and subgroups.26 This approach is analogous to that adopted for the research supporting this book in that through ethnographic mapping I devised what I believe to be a representative sample in each case study location consisting of 20 qualitative interviews spanning the breadth of both policing and non-­policing disciplines required to sufficiently mitigate any biases that may have dictated the initial sample. In traversing disciplines such as local authority safeguarding and public order policing, there is in my view sufficient organisational diversity to dilute what may have been a biased position had I only targeted police officers delivering the Prevent Strategy. This is actor-­orientated research and so I focussed my interviews on those frontline actors with statutory responsibilities to deliver community safety functions, including the Prevent Strategy, community cohesion and preservation of the public order. I have not included members of Muslim communities who have been critical of the Prevent Strategy as this would distract from the intentions of the research, i.e. to explore the impact of the inclusion of RWE within the Prevent Strategy on local responses to the EDL. Community leaders, spokespeople,

178   Appendix: methodology NGOs and researchers have a range of views in relation to the Prevent Strategy but they are not ultimately held to account by the U.K. Government and/or the public as to how risk, threat and vulnerability is identified and managed at a local level. This research prioritises the experiences and perceptions of those delivering public services and provides rich insights into the ways in which local actors attempt to interpret and deliver national policies. The views of those members of Muslim communities who are critical of the Prevent Strategy are the subject of other research and while frontline practitioners are cognisant of these views, as borne out through my fieldwork, they do not in themselves add value to this research.

Ethnological considerations My research used ethnographic principles through conducting 80 qualitative semi-­structured interviews with Members of Parliament, senior civil servants, local authority practitioners and counter terrorism police officers who work within my field of specialism, all of whom constitute the “system” or “community” of which I was a member. I could not ignore my own preconceptions both prior and during carrying out this research. Given the ethnographic properties of this research any efforts to achieve objectivity are foiled from the outset because ethnographers always come with ideas that guide what they choose to describe and how they choose to describe it27 and that are grounded in a set of intellectual assumptions and constitutive interests.28 I have considered the research need addressed through this book since 2011 when the Prevent Strategy was reviewed. At the time of completing the research underpinning this book I had worked within the field of this counter terrorism strategy for over six years. During that time, I observed how this strategy had become a highly controversial nexus point between political aspirations and local delivery and yet there remains a distinct paucity of research into its application across the U.K. I have considered the identification of my research as a “self-­ethnography” as defined as a study and a text in which the researcher-­author describes a cultural setting to which s/he has a “natural access,” is an active participant, more or less on equal terms with other participants. The researcher then works and/or lives in the setting and then uses the experiences, knowledge and access to empirical material for research purposes.29 It is difficult to identify myself as a “detached observer”30 in the sense of the positivist tradition as there is much of me in the field research. During the interviews it is evident that I am not detached in that I am native to the work of the interviewees. Additionally, it is again challenging to subscribe to the hermeneutic tradition in the purest sense as I have embarked upon this research to test pre-­conceived hypothetical propositions, borne of my own subject matter expertise in this field, coupled with exploratory interviews with peers. In the truest sense, if this were an ethnographic study, the theories would unfold during the fieldwork phase.31 It has been observed that the police service is an extremely powerful organisation which begs revelation of its public and private face by first-­hand observation, risky as that observation may be.32 Others have highlighted the difficulties

Appendix: methodology   179 for researchers in gaining access to police organisations.33 In my view it is the “closed” nature of policing that necessitates the facilitation and exploitation of “insider” researchers in order to overcome these barriers and deliver mutual benefits to both policing and the wider understanding of policing methodology and practices. There is an albeit limited body of international ethnographic research available on policing and its methods. It is interesting from a methodological perspective that within much of the available literature that explores ethnography in a policing context there is an emphasis on the quite negative portrayal of how the non-­police officer researcher is faced with a multitude of ethical considerations in dealing with issues such as excessive violence34 and corruption.35 In terms of content, there is a range of policing subject matter that has been subjected to ethnographic enquiry including police leadership,36 policing culture,37 responses to organised crime,38 covert surveillance39 and policing transformation.40 In determining the “best fit” for how I have conceptualised my research I have found Brannick and Coghlan’s definition of “insider research” to be the most accurate, i.e. research by complete members of organisational systems and communities in and on their own organiaations.41 I would also fit the category of an “outside insider”; as “a researcher either serving or retired making observations on their colleagues. Having had some academic training, by studying for degrees, and in some cases entering academic careers, they could combine two vital skills. Their “insider” knowledge, combined with their ability to observe, analyse and recount the activities, beliefs and in some cases misdemeanours of their co-­workers led to a much-­enhanced understanding of the police officers’ world”.42

The dynamics of insider research Insofar as many of my interviewees are peers, in particular, the shared community membership and the continuing relationship make it resemble participant observation rather than the traditional survey interview.43 Indeed, I have considered the view that the hallmark of participant observation is long-­term personal involvement with those being studied, including participation in their lives to the extent that the researcher comes to understand the culture as an insider.44 As an “insider” I am aware of the impact of my dual role within this research and have been cognisant of the need to remain reflexive throughout this process, capturing these considerations throughout the fieldwork as well as through the analysis of the research findings. If I were to frame my study as a form of “participatory research”, this carries with it an emphasis on self-­reflexivity and critique.45 This emphasis on self-­ awareness or “methodological self-­consciousness”46 has already highlighted some considerations in relation to my role within the interview process, as discussed earliere. In embarking on this research, I was acutely aware that some of my own biases may be drawn out through the fieldwork. My “pre-­understanding” which is described as referring to such things as people’s knowledge, insights and experience before they engage in a research programme,47 without a conscious separation

180   Appendix: methodology of practitioner and researcher could lead to these biases influencing, as an example, my choice of interviewees as those most likely to share these biases.48 However much of this influence is mitigated through the use of the snowballing technique to broker contact with interviewees unknown to me and from outside my area of expertise, namely public order policing and local authorities to contribute their perspectives in order to present a far-­reaching and balanced data-­set. I was also aware of the potential for wider stakeholder concerns in that as a researcher/practitioner, the findings of my study may be seen to be representative of a wider counter terrorism policing “position” on the issues, particularly in relation to the differing ways in which the EDL are problematised by different statutory actors. The findings and commentary, while rooted in my practitioner experience, are my own and are demonstrative of the value of collecting the views of the various stakeholders operating within multi-­agency statutory service partnerships. In my view this is an area of weakness in the available literature that extends far beyond the delivery of the Prevent Strategy but permeates into every facet of the collaborative delivery of Government policies. The findings of this research may also have a wider societal impact as the Prevent Strategy is a particularly sensitive area of counter terrorism, not just for policing, but for all statutory agencies now falling within the Prevent Strategy statutory duty. While I have been aware of the potential impact of my findings, these have not guided the research, and I have presented a balanced set of conclusions and associated recommendations. The Prevent Strategy is not a police-­led initiative, with the police being one of a number of statutory partners mandated to safeguard individuals from being drawn into terrorism. Therefore, where this research highlights areas for development in the application of the strategy, these should be considered across all statutory partners rather than singling out any one agency in particular. The level of access I have enjoyed does present data quality considerations arising from both the conduct and product of the interviews. In interviewing contemporaries, it is clear from the outset that I am a practitioner with considerable experience in this field. I have identified within interview transcripts that this level of “insider” knowledge risks creating an environment within the interview where assumptions are made on shared understandings and issues are not explicitly discussed.49 Particularly within policing, it is clear that we use a whole range of acronyms when discussing our work which are mutually understood to the point at which they have become part of our language. In addition, there is a shared understanding of what we would consider minor or superfluous issues that we may accept are not necessary for discussion within the interview. This can have implications for the reader who is not a practitioner and who may in fact find real value in material that we had unconsciously rejected as being irrelevant to the subject under examination. However, through starting the process of transcribing interviews early rather than waiting until all had been completed, I have been able to maintain a focus not only on the themes of central importance to this study, but have maintained flexibility to identify and incorporate others as presented through the course of the interviews so not to unconsciously “filter” details that contribute to the richness of the data yielded from my fieldwork.

Appendix: methodology   181 Shared community membership is enormously helpful in some ways, but it implies personal relations which carry social obligations that can make the normal impersonal and instrumental use of the interview difficult.50 Interviewing my peers does raise ethical issues, particularly when interviewing practitioners within a vetted environment, where common parlance among vetted colleagues can cause procedural issues for the interviewer, such as when sensitive subjects are discussed that are not within the public realm. I considered how to handle such products of my tape-­recorded interviews, in recording only non-­restricted transcripts as the unlawful disclosure of sensitive information (as set out in The Official Secrets Act 1989) could have serious consequences for both me as the researcher and my interviewees. As a practitioner who is conversant with these issues, this imposes an additional duty on me to safeguard my interviewees from such disclosure. This also has implications for the intended readership of the research findings. My intention was to produce findings for dissemination to interested parties within a non-­vetted environment and so I devised a system for dealing with situations where sensitive information forms part of the interview. However, on being clear on this point within the pre-­interview discussions with my respondents and all of them, being conversant with the interview process, were sufficiently acquainted with the parameters of the interview and unintended disclosures of more sensitive information were avoided. The ethnographic considerations I have set out demonstrate how I do feel a tension within the practitioner/researcher role, not that I would describe this as “fracturing”,51 but a useful vent for my ongoing inner dialogue on the delivery of the Prevent Strategy. I had a general desire for more of our working practices to be based upon sound empirical evidence and this research has allowed me to step outside of my role as the Head of Strategy and Policy for the police service delivery of the Prevent Strategy and look at the delivery of the strategy holistically across all partners and with a specific focus on the interaction between statutory services and the EDL. It is clear from my initial research that the inclusion of RWE within the mandate of the Prevent Strategy, a counter terrorism strategy, was more politically motivated than borne of practitioner-­based need or threat assessment. This could potentially lead to the securitisation of state relationships with white working-­class groups in the same way that some Muslim communities perceived that they were targeted by the first iteration of the Prevent Strategy. These preliminary findings only increase the sensitivity and potential impact of my work, leading me to think even more in terms of my position within the research. This book represents the first account of the inter- and intra-­ agency tensions in the delivery of responses to the EDL, entirely from the perspective of frontline practitioners traversing several disciplines including the Prevent Strategy and public order.52 I hope there is utility in the findings and recommendations set out in this book and that it provides a platform for the conversations that need to be had.

182   Appendix: methodology

Notes   1 See for instance; Mason, Jennifer, Qualitative Researching 2nd Edition (Sage Publications, 2002): 83, and Teske, Nathan, Political Activists in America: The Identity Construction Model of Political Participation (Cambridge University Press, 1997): 25.   2 See Crabtree, Benjamin, and William Miller, “A template approach to text analysis: Developing and using codebooks”. In Crabtree, Benjamin, and William Miller (eds.) Doing Qualitative Research (Sage Publications, 1992): 93–109.   3 See for instance; Hellevik, Ottar, Introduction to Causal Analysis: Exploring Survey Data (Norwegian University Press, 1984), and De Vaus, David, Surveys in Social Research (Routledge, 2013).   4 See; Canter, David, Jennifer Brown, and Michael Brenner (eds.), The Research Interview: Uses and Approaches (Academic Press, 1985); Tewksbury, Richard, “Qualitative versus quantitative methods: Understanding why qualitative methods are superior for criminology and criminal justice”. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology 1.1 (2009): 38–58.   5 Bryman A. (1988) Quantity and Quality in Social Research (Unwin-­Hyman, 1988): 84–85.   6 See; Fielding, N. “Qualitative interviewing”. In Gilbert, G. Nigel (ed.), Researching Social Life (Sage Publications, 130–145). (1993); Harvey, Lee, Critical Social Research Vol. 21. (Unwin Hyman, 1990).   7 Lilleker, Darren G., “Interviewing the political elite: Navigating a potential minefield”. Politics 23.3 (2003): 207.   8 McDowell, Linda, “Elites in the City of London: Some methodological considerations”. Environment and Planning A 30.12 (1998): 2133–2146.   9 See Burnham, Peter, et al. Research methods in Politics (Macmillan International Higher Education, 2008). 10 Zuckerman, Harriet. “Interviewing an ultra-­elite”. Public Opinion Quarterly 36.2 (1972): 159–175. 11 Morris, Zoë Slote, “The truth about interviewing elites”. Politics 29.3 (2009): 209–217; Harvey, William S., “Strategies for conducting elite interviews”. Qualitative Research 11.4 (2011): 431–441; McDowell, Linda, Note 8, Appendix, supra. 12 See for instance; Aberbach, Joel D., and Bert A. Rockman, “Conducting and coding elite interviews”. PS: Political Science & Politics 35.4 (2002): 673–676; Berry, Jeffrey M. “Validity and reliability issues in elite interviewing”. PS: Political Science & Politics 35.4 (2002): 679–682. 13 Leech, Beth L., “Interview methods in political science”. PS: Political Science & Politics 35.4 (2002): 664. 14 Mason, Jennifer, Qualitative Researching 2nd Edition (Sage Publications, 2002) p. 64. 15 Leech, Beth, Note 13, Appendix, supra, p. 663; Zuckerman, Harriet, Note 10, Appendix, supra, p. 167. 16 Burnham, Peter, et al., Note 9, Appendix, supra, p. 205. 17 Burgess, R.G., In the Field: An Introduction to Field Research (Allen and Unwin, 1984): 102. 18 Mason, Jennifer, Note 1, Appendix, supra, p. 63. 19 Richardson, L. “Writing: A method of inquiry”. In Denzin, Norman K., and Yvonne Lincoln (eds.), Handbook of Qualitative Research (Sage Publications, 1994): 523. 20 See; West, C., “Ethnography and orthography: A (modest) methodological proposal”. Journal of Contemporary Ethnography, 22.3 (1996): 345; Colosi, Rachela, Dirty Dancing: An Ethnography of Lap Dancing (Willan, 2010). 21 Note 11, Appendix, supra. 22 Zuckerman, Harriet, Note 10, Appendix, supra, p. 162. 23 Goodman, Leo A., “Snowball sampling”. The Annals of Mathematical Statistics (1961): 148–170.

Appendix: methodology   183 24 Heckathorn, Douglas D., “Respondent-­driven sampling: A new approach to the study of hidden populations”. Social Problems 44.2 (1997): 174–199. See also Erickson, Bonnie H., “Some problems of inference from chain data”. Sociological Methodology 10 (1979): 276–302. 25 See also; Watters, John K., and Patrick Biernacki., “Targeted sampling: Options for the study of hidden populations”. Social Problems 36.4 (1989): 416–430. 26 Heckathorn, D, Note 24, Appendix, supra, p. 175. 27 Wolcott, H. F., Ethnography: A Way of Seeing (AltaMira 1999). 28 Stivers, C. “Reflections on the role of personal narrative in social science” Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society, 18.2 (1993): 410. 29 Alvesson, Mats, “Methodology for close up studies – struggling with closeness and closure”. Higher Education 46.2 (2003): 174. 30 Brannick, Teresa, and David Coghlan, “In defense of being ‘native’: The case for insider academic research”. Organizational Research Methods 10.1 (2007): 63. 31 See Brannick, Teresa, and David Coghlan, Note 30, Appendix, supra, and Hammersley, Martyn, and Paul Atkinson. Ethnography: Principles in Practice (Routledge, 2007): 4. 32 Holdaway, Simon, Inside the British Police: A Force at Work (Blackwell, 1983): 5. 33 See also; Lundman, Richard J., and James C. Fox. “Maintaining research access in police organizations”. Criminology 16.1 (1978): 87–98; Fox, James C., and Richard J. Lundman, “Problems and strategies in gaining research access in police organizations”. Criminology 12.1 (1974): 52–69; Westmarland, Louise, “Police ethics and integrity: Breaking the blue code of silence”. Policing and Society 15.2 (2005): 145–165. 34 Westmarland, Louise, “Blowing the whistle on police violence. Gender, ethnography and ethics”. British Journal of Criminology 41.3 (2001): 523–535; Jauregui, Beatrice, “Dirty anthropology: Epistemologies of violence and ethical entanglements in police ethnography”. In Policing and Contemporary Governance (Palgrave, 2013): 125–153. 35 Rowe, Michael, “Tripping over molehills: Ethics and the ethnography of police work”. International Journal of Social Research Methodology 10.1 (2007): 37–48. 36 See; Rowe, Michael, “Following the leader: Front-­line narratives on police leadership”. Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management 29.4 (2006): 757–767; Murphy, Steven A., “The role of emotions and transformational leadership on police culture: an autoethnographic account”. International Journal of Police Science & Management 10.2 (2008): 165–178; Caless, Bryn, “Policing at the Top: The Roles, Values and Attitudes of Chief Police Officers (Policy Press, 2011). 37 See for example; Young, Malcolm, An Inside Job: Policing and Police Culture in Britain (Oxford University Press, 1991); Waddington, Peter AJ, “Police (canteen) sub-­culture. An appreciation”. British Journal of Criminology 39.2 (1999): 287–309; Cockcroft, Tom, Police Culture: Themes and Concepts. (Routledge, 2012). 38 See for example; Sheptycki, James, “Police ethnography in the house of serious and organized crime”. In Transformations of Policing (Routledge, 2017): 65–92. 39 See for example; Mac Giollabhuí, Shane, Benjamin Goold, and Bethan Loftus. “Watching the watchers: Conducting ethnographic research on covert police investigation in the United Kingdom”. Qualitative Research 16.6 (2016): 630–645. 40 See for example; Marks, Monique, “Researching police transformation: The ethnographic imperative”. British Journal of Criminology 44.6 (2004): 866–888. 41 Brannick, Teresa, and David Coghlan, Note 30, Appendix, supra, p. 59. 42 Brunger, Mark, Stephen Tong, and Denise Martin (eds.), Introduction to Policing Research: Taking Lessons from Practice. (Routledge, 2015): 165. 43 Platt, Jennifer, “On interviewing one’s peers”. The British Journal of Sociology 32.1 (1981): 82. 44 Davies, Charlotte Aull, Reflexive Ethnography: A Guide to Researching Selves and Others 2nd Edition (Routledge, 2008): 81.

184   Appendix: methodology 45 Pain, Rachel (2004) “Social geography: Participatory research”. Progress in Human Geography 28.5 (2004): 660. 46 Lynch, Michael. “Against reflexivity as an academic virtue and source of privileged knowledge”. Theory, Culture & Society 17.3 (2000): 29. 47 Gummesson, Evert, (2000). Qualitative Methods in Management Research 2nd edition (Sage Publications, 2000). 48 Stephenson, John, and L. Greer. “Ethnographers in their own cultures: Two Appalachian cases”. Human Organization 40.2 (1981): 123–130. 49 Note 43, Appendix, supra, p. 79. 50 Note 43, Appendix, supra, p. 78. 51 Colosi, Rachela, Dirty Dancing: An Ethnography of Lap Dancing (Willan, 2010). 52 There are no other studies conducted by practitioners researching the application of the Prevent Strategy save for Bettison’s work, which focussed on information sharing and community policing at a strategic level rather than local responses – see Bettison, Norman, “Preventing violent extremism: A police response”. Policing 3.2 (2009): 129–138.

Index

Aarhus Model 20 Al Muhajiroun (ALM) 51, 63, 74, 76, 110, 111 Al Qaida (includes Al Qa’ida/AQ) 15, 16, 34, 37, 38, 40, 44, 49, 121, 156, 163 Aryan Strikeforce 4, 46, 48, 152 Aust, Vladimir 22, 97 Barking & Dagenham 123 Blears, Hazel MP 54 Blood & Honour 46, 48, 152 Breivik, Anders 2, 21, 22, 113 British National Party (BNP) 1, 19, 23, 40, 41, 46, 75, 90, 92, 123, 155 Brokenshire, James 5, 44, 51, 101 Brown, Gordon 33 Cameron, David 42, 44, 52, 132 Carroll, Kevin 48, 63 Casey, Louise 142, 151 Casuals, The 1, 19 Channel 10, 20, 38, 39, 40, 49, 50, 51, 52, 72, 73, 75, 76, 77, 82, 83, 99, 100, 101, 105, 106, 119, 121, 122, 123, 127, 128, 129, 132, 134, 136, 137, 138, 154, 156, 157, 169 Channel police practitioner 99 Choudhry, Anjem 110, 112, 147 Combat combat 18, 48, 92 Commission for Countering Extremism 55 Community Coordinators 55, 160 community mediators 70, 71, 82, 139 Community Safety Partnership 8, 99, 129, 164, 165, 166 Connecting Communities programme 16, 40, 41, 143, 146, 147, 159, 169 Consequence Cards 72 Contest Strategy 34, 54, 121

Cooper, Rosie MP 2 Cooper, Yvette MP 54 Copeland, David 16, 34, 49 Counter Terrorism & Security Act 2015 7, 96, 105 Counter Terrorism Local Profile (CTLP) 72, 96, 119 Cox, Jo MP 2, 136, 155 Creating the Conditions for Integration 45, 67, 119, 134, 146, 148, 158, 161, 162 Crime and Disorder Act of 1998 8 Crime and Reduction Partnerships (CDRPs) 8 Criminal Anti-Social Behaviour Orders (CRASBOs) 17 Cumulative Extremism see Reciprocal Radicalisation Danish People’s Party in Denmark 1 Denham, John MP 40 Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG) 5, 17, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 63, 67, 75, 82, 83, 96, 97, 99, 104, 106, 107, 127, 132, 134, 138, 141, 147, 148, 155, 157, 158, 164, 169, 170 European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) 80, 165 European Freedom Initiative 21 Europol EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2, 21, 22 EXIT, Sweden 20 Extremism Analysis Unit 52, 55 Extremism Taskforce 52 Football Lads Alliance (FLA) 1, 146 14 Words, The 47, 75

186   Index Hate Crime 8, 15, 18, 19, 24, 49, 50, 93, 136, 142, 154, 159, 161, 162, 169 Hate Crime Action Plan 23, 159, 162, 169 Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabularies (HMIC) 18, 69 Home Office 7, 8, 17, 24, 33, 34, 44, 47, 50, 52, 66, 74, 120, 122, 133, 148, 156, 166

Prevent Priority Area 6, 7, 51, 63, 73, 81, 88, 90, 99, 100, 104, 105, 110, 126, 132, 133, 143, 148, 156, 174 Prevent Review 5, 15, 33, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 54, 98 Protest Liaison Team (PLT) 69, 115, 116, 121

Infidels, The 1, 46, 92 Islamic State (including ISIS) 100, 170, 82, 127, 134

Reciprocal Radicalisation 18, 22, 46, 53, 64, 105, 127, 133 Regional Prevent Coordinator (RPC) 72, 96, 119 Rigby, Lee 2, 52, 91, 102, 136, 144 Robinson, Tommy see Yaxley-Lennon, Stephen Rotherham 89

Jobbik 1 Ku Klux Klan 23 Lapshyn, Pavlo 2, 49, 50, 136 Managing Far Right Activity Toolkit 17, 83 MI5 54 Muslims Against Crusades (MAC) 51, 53, 111, 120 Muslim grooming gangs 89, 141, 158 National Action 2, 4, 19, 56, 89, 146 National Domestic Extremism and Disorder Intelligence Unit (NDEDIU) 44, 53, 73, 96, 123, 155 National Front 46, 66, 92, 110, 118, 123 National Socialist Underground (NSU) 2, 21 Neo-Nazi 3, 22, 23, 46, 170 Newcastle Unites 106 Office for Security and Counter Terrorism (OSCT) 7, 8, 33, 34, 35, 42, 44, 45, 46, 47, 49, 55, 132, 169 Operation Cygnet 91, 92 Operation Jersey 67 Operation Missouri 66 Operation Overt 17, 110 Operation Overture 17 Operation Sanctuary 89 PEGIDA (Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes) 13, 14, 89, 92, 146, 168

Saleem, Mohammed 2, 49, 136, 141, 155 Sharia Controlled Zone 110 Special Interest Group (SIG) 17, 44, 51, 63, 83, 84, 146, 147, 153, 159, 168, 169 Stop Islamisation of Europe 21 Swedish Democrats 1 Tower Hamlets 78, 89, 112, 113, 123 Tyne and Wear Anti-Fascist Association (TWAFA) 90, 95 U.K. Independence Party (UKIP) 1, 166, 167 Unite Against Fascism (UAF) 18, 77, 80, 81, 112, 114, 115, 116, 128, 144, 163, 166 United People of Luton (UPL) 63 Vlaams Blok 1 Vulnerability Assessment Framework 137, 156 We Are Waltham Forest 115 Workshop to Raise Awareness of Prevent (WRAP version 3) 17, 74, 82, 105, 120, 127, 134, 136, 154 Yaxley-Lennon, Stephen 4, 6, 48, 55, 63, 75, 77, 79, 89, 92, 111, 145, 146, 166, 167, 168