The Praxis of Indirect Reports: Cognitive, Sociopragmatic, and Philosophical Issues [1st ed.] 978-3-030-14268-1;978-3-030-14269-8

Table of contents :
Front Matter ....Pages i-xvi
Preliminaries (Mostafa Morady Moghaddam)....Pages 1-19
Sociocognitive vs. Structural Issues (Mostafa Morady Moghaddam)....Pages 21-47
Philosophical Considerations (Mostafa Morady Moghaddam)....Pages 49-79
Direct and Indirect Reports (Mostafa Morady Moghaddam)....Pages 81-95
Indirect Reports and Translation (Mostafa Morady Moghaddam)....Pages 97-117
Principles Governing Indirect Reports (Mostafa Morady Moghaddam)....Pages 119-135
Politeness in Indirect Reporting (Mostafa Morady Moghaddam)....Pages 137-158
Trust and Indirect Reports (Mostafa Morady Moghaddam)....Pages 159-172
Reported Speech in Persian (Mostafa Morady Moghaddam)....Pages 173-196
Conclusion and Future Concerns (Mostafa Morady Moghaddam)....Pages 197-200

Citation preview

Perspectives in Pragmatics, Philosophy & Psychology 21

Mostafa Morady Moghaddam

The Praxis of Indirect Reports Cognitive, Sociopragmatic, and Philosophical Issues

Perspectives in Pragmatics, Philosophy & Psychology Volume 21

Editor-in-Chief Alessandro Capone, University of Messina, Barcelona, Italy Consulting Editors Keith Allan, Monash University, Melbourne, Australia Louise Cummings, The Hong Kong Polytechnic University, Hung Hom, Hong Kong Wayne A. Davis, Georgetown University, Washington, USA Igor Douven, Paris-Sorbonne University, Paris, France Yan Huang, University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand Istvan Kecskes, State University of New York at Albany, Albany, USA Franco Lo Piparo, University of Palermo, Palermo, Italy Antonino Pennisi, University of Messina, Messina, Italy Francesca Santulli, Ca’ Foscari University of Venice, Venice, Italy Editorial Board Members Noel Burton-Roberts, University of Newcastle, Newcastle, Australia Brian Butler, University of North Carolina, Asheville, USA Marco Carapezza, University of Palermo, Palermo, Italy Felice Cimatti, Università della Calabria, Cosenza, Italy Eros Corazza, Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada Marcelo Dascal, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israel Michael Devitt, Graduate Center, City University of New York, New York, USA Frans van Eemeren, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands Alessandra Falzone, University of Messina, Messina, Italy Neil Feit, State University of New York, Fredonia, USA Alessandra Giorgi, Ca’ Foscari University of Venice, Venice, Italy Larry Horn, Yale University, New Haven, USA Klaus von Heusinger, University of Stuttgart, Stuttgart, Germany Katarzyna Jaszczolt, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK Ferenc Kiefer, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest, Hungary Kepa Korta, ILCLI, Donostia, Spain Ernest Lepore, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, USA Stephen C. Levinson, Max Planck Institute for Psycholinguistics, Nijmegen, The Netherlands Fabrizio Macagno, New University of Lisbon, Lisbon, Portugal Jacob L. Mey, University of Southern Denmark, Odense, Denmark Pietro Perconti, University of Messina, Messina, Italy Francesca Piazza, University of Palermo, Palermo, Italy Roland Posner, Berlin Institute of Technology, Berlin, Germany Mark Richard, Harvard University, Cambridge, USA Nathan Salmon, University of California, Santa Barbara, USA Stephen R. Schiffer, New York University, New York, USA

Michel Seymour, University of Montreal, Montreal, Canada Mandy Simons, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, USA Timothy Williamson, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK Anna Wierzbicka, Australian National University, Canberra, Australia Dorota Zielińska, Jesuit University of Philosophy and Education Ignatianum, Kraków, Poland

More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/11797

Mostafa Morady Moghaddam

The Praxis of Indirect Reports Cognitive, Sociopragmatic, and Philosophical Issues

Mostafa Morady Moghaddam Shahrood University of Technology Shahrood, Iran

ISSN 2214-3807     ISSN 2214-3815 (electronic) Perspectives in Pragmatics, Philosophy & Psychology ISBN 978-3-030-14268-1    ISBN 978-3-030-14269-8 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-14269-8 © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG. The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

In memory of my father, and dedicated to those whose good hearts and existence are a comfort in the times of despair.

Foreword

Indirect reporting is a promising field of study that has attracted a lot of attention, largely from philosophy, syntax, semantics, and pragmatics. In recent years, there have appeared a couple of voluminous works on different aspects of indirect reporting, wherein close attention is given to issues such as de re/de dicto constructs, de se attitudes, the semantics/pragmatics interface, syntactic idiosyncrasies, and logic, among other things (Capone, 2016). That said, the deeper we go into the topic, the more unresolved areas that pop out, each suggesting that their excavation will lead us to further intricate and interesting results. As an example, gender seems to be quite irrelevant to the practice of direct and indirect reporting, yet recent research has shown that the use of masculine and feminine forms plays an important role in giving an air of subjectivity to direct reports in the Japanese language (see Itakura, 2018). Indirect reports are now extended to doctor-patient interactions (Basile, 2018), bilingual language production (Kecskes, 2016), and workplace context (Marra & Holmes, 2016). This specific area of study is expanding swiftly, and there is still much to say about indirect reporting as conceptualised in different social contexts (e.g., in news talks and among politicians) and in the different languages of the world (we know little about the process of indirect reporting in languages such as Persian, Arabic, Turkish, African languages, etc.). Increased knowledge about reported speech in different languages will help researchers uncover whether there are some universal features underlying the practice of direct and indirect speech. The present volume, The Praxis of Indirect Reports: Cognitive, Sociopragmatic, and Philosophical Issues, written by Mostafa Morady Moghaddam, is an extensive work that takes into consideration various issues and interdisciplinary discussions, some of which are presented for the first time in the literature of reported speech (e.g., issues such as ‘politeness’ and ‘trust’). The author has used thought-provoking examples with very interesting illustrations, which will help the reader come to a better understanding of the intricate issues revolving around indirect reporting. The book consists of ten chapters, in which a great deal of information is provided regarding the sociocognitive, philosophical, and structural characteristics of indirect reporting. The strength of this work is in its coverage of an amazing amount of literature. Moreover, the content reads very well when the author discusses intricate issues, vii

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Foreword

such as translating/reporting slurring, disagreement and impoliteness, evidentials and modal logic, principles underlying the practice of indirect reporting, etc. Overall, the readability of the content, the interdisciplinary discussions, the coverage of the book, and the interesting illustrations and examples have made this book a userfriendly piece of work, which is both illuminating and thought-provoking. I am very happy to have commissioned this book to Dr. Moghaddam, who has fully deserved my high esteem and has confirmed that there are new areas of research within this field of study. I am confident that many will find this book interesting to read and will capitalise on the brilliant insights produced by the author. To be sure, Dr. Moghaddam has produced a monograph which will not be easily forgotten and will trigger many responses. With his expertise and example of hard work, Dr. Moghaddam has been a perfect ambassador for his country, Iran. Professor of Linguistics University of Messina Messina, Italy January 2019

Alessandro Capone

References Basile, G. (2018). Indirect speech in dialogues with schizophrenics: Analysis of the dialogues of the CIPPS corpus. In A. Capone, M. Garcia-Carpintero, & A. Falzone (Eds.), Indirect reports and pragmatics in the world languages (pp. 419–438). Cham, Switzerland: Springer. Capone, A. (2016). The pragmatics of indirect reports: Socio-philosophical considerations. Cham, Switzerland: Springer. Itakura, H. (2018). Accuracy in reported speech: Evidence from masculine and feminine Japanese language. In A. Capone, M. Garcia-Carpintero, & A. Falzone (Eds.), Indirect reports and pragmatics in the world languages (pp. 315–332). Cham, Switzerland: Springer. Kecskes, I. (2016). Indirect reporting in bilingual language production. In A. Capone, F. Kiefer, & F. Lo Piparo (Eds.), Indirect reports and pragmatics: Interdisciplinary studies (pp. 9–30). Cham, Switzerland: Springer. Marra, M., & Holmes, J. (2016). Indirect reports and workplace norms. In A. Capone, F. Kiefer, & F. Lo Piparo (Eds.), Indirect reports and pragmatics: Interdisciplinary studies (pp. 151–166). Cham, Switzerland: Springer.

Preface

This monograph discusses various social, pragmatic, and cognitive issues around the concept of indirect reporting. In this work, I attempt to present some state-of-­the-art discussions in a friendly tone, allowing the readers to follow the intricate issue of indirect reporting at their own pace. I chose the topic of indirect reporting as I believe that there are still many things to be unravelled in this particular area of inquiry, especially with regard to the social and cognitive features that are involved in the process of indirect reporting. Indirect reports are of particular importance in the philosophy and pragmatics of language, since the practice of indirect reporting is closely germane to issues such as logic, modality, de re/de dicto constructs, and the semantics/pragmatics interface, among other things. Indirect reports also have the potential to be relevant to social issues such as how gender differences, context, politeness, and facework are dealt with in interaction. The range of studies considering indirect reporting is expanding swiftly, and several scholarly volumes have been exclusively devoted to the social, philosophical, and linguistic features of indirect reporting in recent years (the most recent of which was published in 2018). The topic has attracted the attention of great scholars from different fields, such as psychology, philosophy, linguistics, cognitive linguistics, and sociology. On this account, the topic is now quite well-established among scholars whose works concern interdisciplinary studies at the intersection of sociolinguistics, philosophy, and linguistics. The book is intended to be of use for those with diverse interests and from diverse academic fields, but it also certainly aimed at a research-level academic audience. Some of the strongest points in this book (according to reviewers’ comments) are the setting of indirect reports in multiple disciplinary areas in order to give a more multifaceted and broadly informed investigation of the phenomena. Moreover, the amount of literature covered in this book is of advantage to different audiences, especially in the fields of philosophy, linguistics, and intercultural communication. I hope that this work will lead to novel insights for researchers in different academic fields around the world. I welcome any enquiries about the book to be sent to my personal email address: [email protected] or m ­ [email protected]. Shahrood, Iran

Mostafa Morady Moghaddam ix

Acknowledgements

Indirect reporting encroached on me while I was doing some research about the feasibility of adding a cognitive particle to Grice’s Cooperative Principle. It was at that time that I came across Alessandro Capone’s Paraphrasis/Form Principle, and I immediately recognised its relevance and importance to my research on strategic talk. This inspiration led me to write a review on Capone’s (2016) monograph on indirect reports, which was published in Lingua. My curiosity to know more about the pragmatics of indirect reporting, and my sporadic conversations with Capone regarding the complexities around the practice of indirect reporting, revived my interest and motivated me to challenge myself, and I dared to begin writing my own monograph on the topic. Therefore, very special thanks are extended to Capone for his consistent encouragement and elaborations. The broad nature of this text encouraged me to recruit the help of several friends and colleagues who shared their precious time by sending their scholarly works to me and by reading different drafts of this book (I learned much from their invaluable works and comments). In this regard, I am most grateful to Penelope Brown, Cristiano Castelfranchi, Jonathan Culpeper, Kirk Ludwig, Rich Thomason, and Howard Wettstein. My special thanks also go to Amber Muhinyi for rigorously reading this book and providing very useful comments and corrections. I would like to use this opportunity to thank Professor Reza Pishghadam who first got me acquainted with the topic of pragmatics and discourse analysis when I was studying at Ferdowsi University of Mashhad. And many thanks to Jolanda Voogd and Helen van der Stelt for editorial assistance and to the anonymous reviewers for their insightful and valuable comments. I should mention that I take full responsibility for any possible flaws that have remained unnoticed in this work. Finally, a belated and heartfelt ‘thank you’ to my wife, Shirin, who patiently tolerated me and encouraged me during the time when I was extremely busy reading and writing every day to complete this monograph. She has played a key role in helping me finish this work. It is not me in here and her out there. It is us. It is always us.

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Contents

1 Preliminaries............................................................................................ 1 1.1 Introduction....................................................................................... 1 1.2 The Nature of Indirect Reporting...................................................... 3 1.2.1 Indirect Reports as Pragmemes............................................. 4 1.2.2 The Issue of Failed Interpracts.............................................. 7 1.2.3 The Semantics/Pragmatics Interface..................................... 9 1.2.4 Philosophical Aspects........................................................... 12 1.2.5 Cognitive Aspects................................................................. 14 1.3 The Outline of the Present Volume................................................... 16 1.4 Conclusion........................................................................................ 17 References.................................................................................................. 17 2 Sociocognitive vs. Structural Issues........................................................ 21 2.1 Introduction....................................................................................... 21 2.2 Social Issues...................................................................................... 22 2.2.1 Indirect Reports and the Cooperative Principle.................... 22 2.2.2 Dramaturgical Sociology and Indirect Reports..................... 25 2.2.3 Metafunctions of Indirect Reports........................................ 30 2.3 Cognitive Issues................................................................................ 32 2.3.1 Sperber and Wilson’s Relevance Theory.............................. 32 2.3.2 Appraisal Theories of Emotion............................................. 35 2.4 Where Society and Cognition Meet Each Other............................... 37 2.4.1 Indirect Reports as a Dialogic Action................................... 37 2.4.2 The Mixed Game Model....................................................... 38 2.4.3 Individual Differences........................................................... 39 2.5 Structural (Syntactic and Semantic) Issues....................................... 40 2.6 Conclusion........................................................................................ 44 References.................................................................................................. 44

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3 Philosophical Considerations.................................................................. 49 3.1 Introduction....................................................................................... 49 3.2 Some Logical Points......................................................................... 50 3.3 Dialogism in Indirect Reports........................................................... 52 3.4 Epistemology of Indirect Reports..................................................... 53 3.5 Indirect Report as a Method of Inquiry............................................. 59 3.6 The Basic Triad: I, You, and the ‘Third Party’ in Indirect Reports............................................................................. 61 3.7 Indirect Reports as Signs.................................................................. 65 3.8 A System of Signifiers...................................................................... 66 3.9 Hermeneutics and Indirect Reports................................................... 68 3.10 Evidentiality...................................................................................... 70 3.11 ‘De re’ and ‘De dicto’ Constructs..................................................... 73 3.12 ‘De se’ Beliefs and Propositional Attitudes...................................... 75 3.13 Conclusion........................................................................................ 75 References.................................................................................................. 76 4 Direct and Indirect Reports.................................................................... 81 4.1 Introduction....................................................................................... 81 4.2 Similarities and Differences Between Direct and Indirect Reports.......................................................................... 82 4.3 Objectivity and Subjectivity in Direct and Indirect Reports............. 86 4.4 Transformations in Direct Reports.................................................... 87 4.5 Transformations in Indirect Reports................................................. 89 4.6 The Rationale Behind Direct and Indirect Reports........................... 92 4.7 Conclusion........................................................................................ 94 References.................................................................................................. 94 5 Indirect Reports and Translation........................................................... 97 5.1 Introduction....................................................................................... 97 5.2 Similarities Between Translation and Indirect Reports.................... 98 5.3 Differences Between Translation and Indirect Reporting................. 100 5.4 Rationality in Reporting and Translating.......................................... 101 5.5 Paraphrasis/Form Principle............................................................... 102 5.6 The Issue of Footing......................................................................... 104 5.7 The (Complicated) Case of Accountability in Reporting Slurring........................................................................ 105 5.8 The Role of the Hearer/Reader......................................................... 109 5.9 Non-verbal Communication.............................................................. 111 5.10 Conclusion........................................................................................ 115 References.................................................................................................. 115 6 Principles Governing Indirect Reports.................................................. 119 6.1 Introduction....................................................................................... 119 6.2 Macro Principles............................................................................... 119 6.2.1 Principle of Politeness........................................................... 120 6.2.2 Principle of Prudence............................................................ 122

Contents

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6.3 Micro Principles................................................................................ 122 6.3.1 Single Micro Principles......................................................... 123 6.3.2 Combined Micro Principles.................................................. 133 6.4 Conclusion........................................................................................ 134 References.................................................................................................. 134

7 Politeness in Indirect Reporting............................................................. 137 7.1 Introduction....................................................................................... 137 7.2 Ethics in Indirect Reports.................................................................. 138 7.2.1 Dynamic Dialogic Ethic........................................................ 139 7.3 Conceptualisation of Politeness........................................................ 141 7.4 Politeness and Indirect Reports......................................................... 144 7.5 Face and Impoliteness in Indirect Reporting.................................... 147 7.6 Reporting Derogatory Words (Slurring)........................................... 151 7.7 Disagreement in Indirect Reporting.................................................. 152 7.8 Decision-Making............................................................................... 154 7.9 Conclusion........................................................................................ 155 References.................................................................................................. 156 8 Trust and Indirect Reports...................................................................... 159 8.1 Introduction....................................................................................... 159 8.2 Sensitivity to (Mis)Information........................................................ 160 8.3 Trust as a Sociocognitive Phenomenon............................................ 161 8.4 First- and Second-Order Trust.......................................................... 164 8.5 Initiation of Trust Through Indirect Reporting................................. 165 8.6 Indirect Reports and Taking Risks.................................................... 166 8.7 Mutual Trust in Indirect Reports....................................................... 168 8.8 The Nature of Mistrust in Indirect Reporting................................... 169 8.9 Conclusion........................................................................................ 171 References.................................................................................................. 171 9 Reported Speech in Persian.................................................................... 173 9.1 Introduction....................................................................................... 173 9.2 Is There Any Common Core?........................................................... 174 9.3 Works on Persian Reported Speech.................................................. 176 9.4 The Study.......................................................................................... 178 9.5 Phonosyntactic Properties................................................................. 178 9.5.1 Quasi-Quotations in Persian................................................. 185 9.5.2 Self-Quoting in Persian Reported Speech............................. 188 9.6 Change of Perspective in PRS.......................................................... 189 9.7 Social Aspects of the PRS................................................................. 192 9.7.1 Phatic Function..................................................................... 193 9.7.2 Informative Function............................................................. 193 9.7.3 Expressive Function.............................................................. 193 9.7.4 Aesthetic Function................................................................ 194 9.7.5 Directive Function................................................................. 194 9.8 Conclusion........................................................................................ 194 References.................................................................................................. 195

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10 Conclusion and Future Concerns........................................................... 197 10.1 Introduction..................................................................................... 197 10.2 A Snapshot of the Book.................................................................. 197 10.3 Indirect Reporting as a General Theory of Pragmatics................... 198 10.4 My View on Indirect Reports.......................................................... 199 10.5 What Does Future Research Have to Offer?................................... 199 10.6 The Moving Finger......................................................................... 200 References.................................................................................................. 200

Chapter 1

Preliminaries

1.1  Introduction Indirect reports are closely related to Frege’s concept of ‘opaque contexts’,1 and his distinction between ‘sense’ and ‘reference’, which led to a sui generis realisation of abstracta that intuitively refers to different modes of representation. The view I adhere to throughout this book is closer to Frege’s conceptualisation of indirect discourse, which put emphasis on the concept of ‘sense’ (the sense of words, or what they express, is the underlying force behind indirect reports). According to Parson (1982), Frege’s perspective towards quotation is very close to a theory of indirect reference, which, in turn, guides us towards the concept of indirect reporting. Parson writes: Frege makes it clear that in his view the use of quotation to report someone’s words runs closely parallel to the use of that-clauses to report the sense of their words. So his theory of quotation might shed some light on his famous theory of indirect reference. (1982, p. 316)

The concept of ‘sense’ is the idea that shapes most of my discussions in this work, which decently guide us towards a semantico-pragmatic view of indirect reports. Despite the criticisms levelled at Frege’s theory of sense and reference (Davidson, 1979; Garcia-Carpintero, 1994), I believe that Frege’s conceptualisation of ‘sense’ has many things to offer in developing a sound theory of indirect reporting (since it inspires researchers to consider both cognitive and social aspects of indirect reporting).

1  In line with Anderson (2016, p. 255), substituting co-referential expressions may affect the truthvalue of the utterance. Opacity focuses on simple sentences (Clark Kent went into the phone booth and Superman went out). We normally expect simple sentences not to be opaque, yet apparently (according to some authors) some simple sentences, known as ‘Superman sentences’, have the potentiality to be opaque. Opacity is normally relevant to embedding in a verb of propositional content through a complementiser (Morady Moghaddam, 2018).

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019 M. Morady Moghaddam, The Praxis of Indirect Reports, Perspectives in Pragmatics, Philosophy & Psychology 21, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-14269-8_1

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1 Preliminaries

Frege’s theory of sense is of interest in the discussion of indirect reports, as it shares huge commonality with them. The concept of sense has been a strong denominator in shaping researchers’ minds towards the cognitive significance of (opaque) sentences (Carl, 1994). Frege argues that sentences can have different senses, regardless of the similarity of their references. For this reason, sentences such as ‘the morning star is the morning star’ and ‘the morning star is the evening star’ express different thoughts, although they share the same reference (the planet Venus). Put differently, Hesperus and Phosphorus cannot be used interchangeably since they have different cognitive values. Frege’s distinction (it is not clear-cut though) between the ‘use-mention’2 aspects of quotation is probably the first conceptualisation of the underlying mechanism of indirect reports (referring to self-referential statements). More specifically, Gochet and Gribomont (2006, p. 144) say: In indirect (oblique) discourse we speak of the sense, e.g. of the words of someone else. From this it becomes clear that also in indirect discourse words do not have their customary nominate; they name what customarily would be their sense.

Although Frege’s theory of sense and reference was castigated by Donald Davidson’s Quotation and Gareth Evans’s The Varieties of Reference (to name a few), Frege has been very influential in bringing to light an organised way of dealing with direct/ indirect quotations based on the use-mention distinction. Moreover, he showed us quite brightly that reported speech is a hard-to-understand (cognitive) concept. In this regard, Jacob L. Mey has interestingly conceptualised the byzantine nature of quotations, comparing them to “a battlefield for chevaliers of diverse plumage, such as literary scholars, philosophers, text theorists, and so on” (2013, p. 493). The journey started with Frege, but the field was expanded and received a steady flow of attention in the twentieth century, when the frontline of almost all studies on quotation was engaged with a rapid outburst of logical and philosophical specifics. This fusillade of gunfire was the driving force behind the waxing and waning of different theories of reported speech. The impulse was generated by Quine/Tarski’s Proper Name Theory (Quine, 1940; Tarski, 1933). However, criticisms levelled at this theory led to Geach’s Description Theory (Geach, 1970). Despite its strength, Geach’s theory lost its attraction when Donald Davidson, widely acknowledged as the most important figure in twentieth-century literature on quotation (Cappelen & Lepore, 2012), proposed his Demonstration Theory (Davidson, 1979). This theory, also known as the Paratactic Theory, is comprehensively analysed in Clark and Gerrig (1990) and Seymour (1994). In Quotation, Grammar, and Opacity, Mark Richard proposes his widely acknowledged Disquotational Theory. The most recent paradigm is the Identity Theory, which was developed by Washington (1992). Each of these theories has strengths and weaknesses. For those interested in a detailed appraisal of these theories, some very good reviews exist (see Cappelen & Lepore, 2012). Suffice it to say that the theories proposed up to now have been of paramount 2  When we say ‘the cat is on the mat’, the word ‘cat’ is being used, for it refers to something other than itself (Saka, 2017). On the other hand, in ‘the word cat has three letters’, the italic word is being mentioned because the word does not refer to any particular cat. It is the concept of the word that is important.

1.2  The Nature of Indirect Reporting

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importance in shaping our understanding of the complicated nature of quotations in general and indirect reports in particular. Research on indirect reports is in its infancy, but recent studies on this issue seem to herald a prosperous future that resonates with those interested in the social, philosophical, and structural aspects of reported speech. The work co-edited by Capone, García-Carpintero, and Falzone (2018) entitled as Indirect Reports and Pragmatics in the World Languages, the monograph written by Capone (2016) as The Pragmatics of Indirect Reports: Socio-philosophical Considerations, the volume co-edited by Capone, Kiefer, and Lo Piparo (2016) entitled as Indirect Reports and Pragmatics: Interdisciplinary Studies, and Reported Discourse: A Meeting Ground for Different Linguistic Domains compiled by Güldemann and Von Roncador (2002) are among the works that have extensively expanded the boundaries of indirect reporting, as well as revealing cross-cultural manifestation of reported speech and its intricacies. Likewise, Florian Coulmas’s volume on Direct and Indirect Speech that is published in 1986 has been also valuable in revealing the syntactic features of reporting speech across languages; as discussed by Coulmas in the volume’s introductory note, a cross-linguistic approach is the volume’s raison d’être. Although the first instances of indirect reporting date back to 414 BC (as described by Jacob L.  Mey in the Preface section of The Pragmatics of Indirect Report: Socio-philosophical Considerations), the foregoing works are pioneering in their assembly and analysis of different aspects of indirect reporting in the form of a book or an edited collection. The works presented in this paragraph have been influential in pushing back the boundaries of reported speech in general and indirect reporting in particular. So then, why do we need another work on indirect reports? I believe that the previous works done on the topic have been very influential and thought-provoking. That said, the current work is more comprehensive, proposing some new ideas and topics (such as politeness and trust management, among other things) that are vitally important (and not yet covered by previous studies) for understanding the true nature of indirect reporting and reported speech.

1.2  The Nature of Indirect Reporting Because of its interdisciplinary nature, an indirect report is a notoriously difficult concept to define. It is a complex phenomenon (Kecskes, 2014), drawing its rationale mostly (but not completely) from areas such as pragmatics, semantics, philosophy, and cognitive psychology, which are the building blocks of its construction. Indirect reporting is a byzantine event since it is conceptualised based on both pragmalinguistics and sociopragmatics (refer to Marmaridou, 2011, for a comprehensive definition of these two terms). Although indirect reporting is a pragmalinguistic practice (because it deals with illocutionary meaning), it is also a sociopragmatic practice since it takes into consideration “assessment of participants’ social distance, the language community’s social rules and appropriateness norms, discourse practices, and accepted behaviours” (Marmaridou, 2011, p. 77). In what

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follows, I will briefly explain the complexities around pragmatic, philosophical, and cognitive aspects of indirect reporting, which will set the scene for a more detailed discussion of each of the issues dealt with in the following chapters of this book.

1.2.1  Indirect Reports as Pragmemes In advocating that indirect reports are complex language units, one may also conceptualise them as they are considered by Capone (2016), that is, as pragmemes. Originally proposed by Mey (2001), the notion of pragmeme brings to light the complexities of situated speech acts (such as indirect reports). Using an integrative framework, the theory of pragmeme can clearly show how indirect reports work as a theory of human communication. By proposing a ‘theory of everything’, Mey (2009) argues that interaction is a versatile activity, an oscillatory system that represents variation against a central value, reminiscent of a completely homogeneous speech-communication (as proposed by Noam Chomsky). Indirect reports, therefore, should be viewed based on the interaction of the user’s profile in the form of a myriad of constants and variables related to “cognitive, psychological, emotional, behavioral, and linguistic patterns of interaction as situationally shaped by cultures and societies, as processed and externalized by individuals at various moments during the dialogue game” (Vasilescu, 2016, p. 306). Considering indirect reports as a pragmeme brings us to a better realisation of how the variables and constants come into play – in an oscillatory system. Indirect reporting is a particular pragmeme (a social event) that is actualised based on individual’s pragmatic acts (or practs). Therefore, an indirect report may be instantiated as cases of phatic communication, gossiping, insulting, requesting, etc. What I intend to suggest here is that based on the dynamics of the situation, and based on the individuals’ frames,3 indirect reports can take on many roles. In this regard, Candlin, Crichton, and Moore (2017, p.  88) rightly state that “[d]ifferent participants can assume different perspectives and interpretations of the context of the events in which they find themselves, according to, for example, the roles they play in such an event.” If we accept indirect reporting as a social event, which is indeed the case, then there is no doubt that indirect reports have both practs and allopracts. In this regard, Vasilescu (2016, p.  323) argues that “[Jacob L.] Mey placed pragmemes on an abstract level, practs on an intermediate level of abstraction between the abstract pragmeme and the concrete allopracts, and allopracts on the immediately perceptual empirical level.” Therefore, an allopract refers to “a concrete and different realization of a particular realization of a particular instantia3  Frames are individuals’ experiences, based on Erving Goffman. As argued by Goffman (1974, p. 155), frames are conceptualised as “the organization of experience or the structure of experience individuals have at any moment of their social lives.” Likewise, Fairclough (2013, p. 41) states that “the institution provides them (the members) with a frame for action, without which they could not act, but it thereby constrains them to act within that frame.”

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tion of a particular pragmeme” (Mey, 2002, p.  221). Indirect reports have practs because they can be interpreted in different ways. Therefore, each pract comprises an allopract (Mey, 2002). Although practs are said to be functionally equivalent, that is, they have the same communicative value (see Vasilescu, 2016), the practs that refer to the same pragmeme may be interpreted differently. One case in point is topicalisation. Consider the following practs of the same pragmeme of complimenting in indirect reports: (1) a. b.

John said that Amber is a good student. John said that a good student is Amber.

Although (1a) and (1b) refer more or less to the same issue (that Amber is a good student), (1b) is different from (1a), in that (1b) is an emphatic utterance that implies that ‘Amber is the only good student’ (an exaggerated or a thick compliment), whereas (1a) is understood as a mild compliment of Amber’s academic achievements (a thin compliment). Therefore, one can conclude that different practs of the same pragmeme may not share similar deep structures represented via different allopracts. The ramification underlying (1b) directs us towards a different representation of Amber in contrast to what observed in (1a). In this case, as Strawson (1952) states, changing the order of the clauses may change the truth-conditions. What’s more, reactions to a particular indirect report may be different regarding the discussion on practs and allopracts. Indirect reports may have more than one pract. Let me go deeper into the issue. Consider the following sentences: (2) a. b.

Ahura said that he was waiting for that bastard. Be serious. I know Ahura. He never uses offensive words.

(3) a. b.

Ahura said that he was waiting for that bastard. It is really offensive. He shouldn’t have talked like this.

The two interpretations in (2) and (3) clearly communicate that the same pragmeme (indirect report) is perceived to have two different practs. In (2b), the hearer considers the report as being insincere and, therefore, flippant. The hearer in (2b) knows Ahura very well, and is sure that Ahura would never use such insulting words. Thus, (2a) is considered an insincere report by the hearer. In (3), however, the hearer interprets the report as an assertion and blames Ahura, the original speaker, for not using a much finer-grained epithet. Reports such as the ones revealed in (2) and (3) raise an interesting issue concerning indirect reports. To consider indirect reports as having different practs, the hearer’s previous experience with the original speaker and the reporter is crucial. Returning to the examples above, in case (2), the hearer probably knows that the reporting speaker often brags during interaction, while also knowing perfectly well that Ahura is a venerable person who never uses insulting words (the hearer may be a close friend of Ahura). In case (3), the hearer does not know the reporting speaker (that s/he is notorious for bragging) and accepts the report as an assertion (not a joke or insincere comment). What’s more, in case (3),

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the hearer does not know Ahura or may have little information about Ahura’s personality, and thus jumps to conclusions based on the evaluative load of the utterance. Capone (2016, p. 10) has addressed this issue by arguing that “something has to be introduced (or recognized) as being part of the pragmatic practice to forbid replacements of NPs with NPs which turn out to be insulting (or obscene, etc.) or problematic anyway.” As a realisation of this impeding practice, Capone introduces two principles: the Principle of Rationality and the Principle of Prudence. The former, according to Capone (2016, p. 317), warns us that there might not be “a correspondence between the NP used by the speaker and the one used by the subject whose belief we are reporting”, and the latter refers to the fact that the original speaker should respect H. P. Grice’s Maxim of Manner, in that the speaker should avoid speaking non-seriously or ambiguously (I discuss further the principles governing indirect reports in Chap. 6). Therefore, the hearer would bring into play (it is expected) various sociocognitive remarks to ensure the sincerity of the report. Of course, I argue that this sociocognitive load is activated based on ‘situational necessity’. If the original speaker is someone the hearer cares for, and the report is of interest to the hearer as well, then we can anticipate that the hearer would do his/her best to know which parts of the indirect report are related to the reporting speaker’s voice and which parts are related to the original speaker’s voice4 (in order to make proper judgement). Therefore, another principle is important in the picture: the Principle of Relevance (note that this principle will be further elaborated in Chap. 6).5 Accordingly, the person who hears an indirect report has a crucial role in determining the different practs related to the same report. It is the hearer (through mental collaboration with the reporting speaker and the original speaker) who determines the perlocutionary effect of the report since the hearer can actually determine the consequences of the report (i.e., the hearer can reject the report as being insincere). In toto, the above discussion on the pragmeme of indirect reports (as well as practs and allopracts) convinces us that, as stated by Vasilescu (2016, p. 305), indirect reports account for ‘generative pragmatics’. Vasilescu defines ‘generative pragmatics’ as: [A] principled account of the mechanisms that underlie the dynamics of speech acting as part of human social practice. Its aim would be to explain how situated speech acts are generated in the mind, creatively voiced by speakers in the public arena of a particular community of practice, and negotiated among interlocutors who co-generate interpracts according to conversational states at unique moments of interaction. (2016, p. 305) 4  In this regard, Capone (2012, p. 609) argues that “the picture of indirect reporting which does not consider transformations, voicing, cues and clues is deeply flawed.” 5  Further to this discussion, the different interpretations in (2b) and (3b) lead us to denounce the premiss made by the Parallelism Principle, hence advocating François Recanati’s contextualist standpoint in virtue of adhering to the fact that “the propositional content of an utterance depends on the context and not just on the linguistic meaning of the sentence” (Recanati, 2004, p. 158). In consonance with Recanati, proponents of Parallelism Principle believe that “a variation of propositional content has to be accounted for in terms of a variation in linguistic meaning” (2004, p. 158).

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7

The above definition clearly shows how indirect reporting as a social event is manufactured and generated through interaction among interlocutors. It is this negotiative and creative nature of indirect reporting that has made it a complex language game in the way described by Ludwig Wittgenstein – i.e., as a language game.6

1.2.2  The Issue of Failed Interpracts In addition to the discussion on the practs and allopracts of the indirect reports, the issue of ‘failed interpracts’ is also of key importance to indirect reports. The concept of failed interpracts is applicable to indirect reports in that the hearer may not acknowledge the implicature proposed by the reporting speaker, and, for this reason, may generate a misunderstanding of the report. There should be mechanisms accessible to both the hearer and the reporter as a justification for the creation of failed interpracts. Failure to acknowledge the same pragmeme as having the same pract can be traceable to individuals’ cognitive and social idiosyncrasies. On the cognitive part, ‘false-consensus effect’ (FCE), also known as ‘false-consensus bias’ (FCB), suggests that based on opinions, beliefs, preferences, values, and habits, individuals form appraisals based on which they generalise about how others should behave (Marks & Miller, 1987). According to Bauman and Geher (2002, p. 299), FCE “exists when people who support a particular position estimate that a greater number of their peers also support this position relative to individuals who are opposed.” Generally speaking, most individuals like to be admired by others, and this fantasy influences the way those with FCB see the world or interact with others (Aronson, Wilson, Akert, & Sommers, 2015). Based on FCB, both the hearer and the reporting speaker generate ideas that they expect to be acknowledged or respected. If there is no consensus between the hearer’s and the reporter’s beliefs and values, consensus clash would occur, hence the report would fail to be properly communicated. In this case, one of the two parties that are closely germane to indirect reports (i.e., the hearer or the reporting speaker) has (illicit) bias with regard to the original speaker’s utterance. That said, FCB is almost unconscious, meaning that individuals who suffer from or take advantage of this bias do not know, even in their back stage,7 that they are biased towards a particular way of thinking. A person 6  In this regard, Capone (2010, p. 378) argues that “indirect reports are language games whereby in reporting that P, the speaker offers two voices: the current speakers’ own, and that of the original speaker. The reporter does not take responsibility for the latter’s embedded voice.” 7  In dramaturgical performance, Goffman (1956) differentiates between three stages as front, back, and outside. He puts forward that in each ‘region’, individuals behave in a certain way that matches a particular setting. On the front stage, the focus is on the audience. The speaker knows that he or she is being watched and acts in a way to impress the audience. In this kind of interaction, the interlocutors wear different masks during interaction. On the back stage, on the other hand, the performer can relax because there is no observant. The only important thing to satisfy is the self. On the outside stage, the actor meets the audience members independently and the individuals are not involved in the performance.

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who is biased thinks that others are wrong rather than challenging their own beliefs. Different interpretations in (2) and (3) show that the hearers have realised the situation differently. In line with FCB, there are two social theories: ‘social perception’ (Aronson et al., 2015) and ‘projection’ (Gilovich, 1990), both of which can add to the complexity surrounding indirect reports. These two theories help us to understand why the implicature proposed by the report is not always acknowledged by the hearer. Social perception is defined by Aronson et al. (2015, p. 86) as “the study of how we form impressions of and make inferences about other people.” Keeping this definition in mind, and based on the FCB, the hearer creates an understanding of the reporting speaker (e.g., the reporting speaker usually talks insincerely) as well as an instantiation of the original speaker (e.g., the original speaker is a respectable person). This accumulative knowledge will give the hearer the ability to either take the report seriously or cast doubt on it as being a kind of verbosity on the part of the reporter. Biased processing and social perceptions, I argue, are among the key factors that explain why a report is taken seriously or rejected as being a case of verbosity or insincere attitudes towards the original speaker. These two mechanisms (FCB and social perception) underlying indirect reports (among other things) are reminiscent of Sigmund Freud’s ‘defense mechanism of projection’. Social projection is the process whereby “people attempt to validate their beliefs by projecting their own characteristics onto other individuals” (Bauman & Geher, 2002, p. 294). The following example shows how ‘social perception’ and ‘projection’ work in indirect reports: (4)

Homa: Mary said that the government should not permit abortion. Shirin: I don’t think Mary would have such a view towards women.

The case presented in (4) can be accounted for based on social perception and projection. According to the social projection view, Shirin supports a given position (that women should have the right of abortion) and believes that other people should be in favour of this position (free will). Shirin advocates women’s free will (an example of cognitive bias) and thinks that others should have the same view as her own (social projection). Moreover, based on social perception, Shirin makes inferences about Mary (Shirin may know something about Mary’s personality) and perceives that the idea proposed by Homa (as an indirect report of Mary) does not make sense (e.g., because she knows that Mary is a Westerner, and hence she must be an open-minded and democratic person). The social perception view directs us towards another important social praxis, which is defined under the term thin-slicing (Ambady & Rosenthal, 1992; Rule, Krendl, Ivcevic, & Ambady, 2013; Slepian, Bogart, & Ambady, 2014). The concept of thin-slicing is elaborated on as “[d]rawing meaningful conclusions about another person’s personality or skills based on an extremely brief sample of behavior” (Aronson et al., 2015, p. 93). Regarding (4), Shirin’s snap judgement about Westerners is anchored in her thought that Western women advocate free will and have the right to choose their own way of living unimpeded. In this case, thin-slicing reveals that Shirin has picked up meaningful

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9

information based on her knowledge of a typical Westerner and generalises this knowledge to Mary (i.e., believing that Mary must act and think like a Westerner).

1.2.3  The Semantics/Pragmatics Interface Another topic that has muddied the waters of indirect reporting is the collaboration between semantics and pragmatics, and how these two can address the idiosyncrasies underlying reported speech. As has been argued by De Brabanter (2010, p. 107), “quotation has become one of the battlegrounds where the dispute on the semantics-­ pragmatics distinction is fought.” Indirect reports, as a type of quotation, very well reveal the byzantine bond between semantics and pragmatics. Although some authors, such as Levinson (1983), have argued that these two are clearly independent modules, others claim that the distinction between them is not clear-cut and that they collaborate closely with each other (Barba, 2007). According to Cappelen and Lepore (2012), “as with all issues in the philosophy of language, theories of quotation harbor assumptions about how best to draw the distinction between semantics and pragmatics, and they do so in a particularly illuminating way” (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy). The debate over the semantics-pragmatics interface has entered into the realm of indirect reporting as well. As argued by Capone (2016), indirect reporting is a phenomenon that brings together elements of semantics and pragmatics as a way to understand the locutionary and illocutionary meaning of indirect reports. He writes that the indirect reporter is expected to convey the features of the context of utterance, but “in the presence of insufficient clues, an indirect report may be taken to minimally report the locutionary content of what was said” (2016, p. 2). It seems that Capone advocates a semantic view of indirect reports where there are not sufficient contextual clues. Elsewhere, however, he explains that he has “recognize[d] that sentential semantics (as well as lexical semantics) is of importance, as it provides a track around which pragmatic interpretation is built” (Capone, 2016, p. 2). In this case, Capone’s argument is very close to that of Barba (2007) – semantics and pragmatics are closely interconnected. Although Barba believes that “formal semantics can’t give us the right truth conditions of a sentence”, he shows that semantics provide a framework for pragmatics: semantics keep us from going awry. I am not a segregationist, but I believe that the practice of indirect reporting is somewhat able to distinguish between the blurred boundaries of semantics and pragmatics. As I conceptualise it, indirect reporting is a reflective process,8 a social event that is decoded and encoded based on semantic and parasemantic features. Semantic encoding and decoding are automatic processes, which are generated 8  Capone (2016, p. 4) argues that “[a]n utterance is usually produced with a speaker’s intention and it is the job of the hearer to reconstruct what the speaker meant in that context (as well as in a default context).”

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effortlessly (at least for those who are expert users of the target language), while pragmatics requires non-automatic reasoning (Recanati, 2004) and is processed more laboriously (interlocutors have to resort to various sociocognitive factors to grasp the implicature (Morady Moghaddam, in press)). In this regard, Borg (2004, p. 95) argues that “semantic understanding is almost unbelievably fast.” Borg also states that “it does seem that there is the option for pragmatic interpretation to take time, in a way which does not hold for minimal semantic interpretation” (2004, p. 96). Since indirect reports are the regeneration of someone else’s utterances, and an explicit acknowledgement of indirect reports requires an understanding of reconstructed utterances, I argue that indirect reports are cases of pragmatic (re/de)generation. As suggested by Capone, indirect reports are ‘manufactured’, as they are not ‘natural’ products emerging from a bio-program (2016, p. 5). Therefore, indirect reports are not a natural language (they are language games to quote Ludwig Wittgenstein). But the locutionary meaning (semantic decoding) can be regarded as being a particle of the mind,9 and thus, an automatic process (Morady Moghaddam, in press). My intention is that even in reporting sentences that show a ‘fact of history’, semantics should be conceptualised in terms of pragmatics, thereby leading to the argument that indirect reports are largely a pragmatic manoeuvre. Consider the indirect report below: (5)

Davoud said that Letizia de Ramolino was the mother of Napoleon.

One may claim that (5) can be completely encoded based on propositional meaning. Although I would agree that the sentence introduced by ‘that’ in (5) does not need any pragmatic knowledge to be deciphered, I believe that it gains its complete meaning through the pragmatic intrusion (whereby modes of presentation of propositions are fully conceptualised through pragmatics). Questions such as ‘who is Davoud?’, ‘what is the relation between Davoud and the reporting speaker?’, ‘what is the relation between Davoud and the hearer?’, and ‘why is the indirect report made?’ would help us discover the rationale (and the proper meaning) behind the indirect report made in (5). Indirect reports are not produced in a vacuum; rather, they are a reaction to a succeeding or preceding discourse event, hence they can change the state of affairs (Capone, 2016). Indirect reports are not isolated sentences ready to be analysed by our knowledge of syntax and semantics. Indirect reports are discursive practices that can only be fully acknowledged when their pragmatic properties are identified. I do not intend to say that semantics has no place in indirect reports. I think it is fair to say that the difference between semantics and pragmatics (in the case of indirect reports) is in their cognitive processing, the former being largely automatic (a particle of the mind) while the latter is strategic (and non-automatic). I argue, then, for an ‘automatic-nonautomatic’ dimension of the indirect report, which distinguishes between semantics and pragmatics. By stating 9  As Chomsky (2004) states: “The biolinguistic perspective views a person’s language in all of its aspects – sound, meaning, structure—as a state of some component of the mind.”

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that semantic processing is largely automatic whereas pragmatics is a non-­automatic process, it is eo impso safe to say that semantics requires lower-order cognitive processes whereas pragmatics requires higher-order cognitive processes. As has been argued by Sowa (2007, p. 32): For many language games, the semantics could be logically simpler than anything required for a general theory of everything. But when new circumstances require changes in the old games or the invention of a totally new game, more complex logical features may be required.

The above quote rightly reveals that when idiosyncrasies enter the language game, higher cognitive processes are required. The practice of indirect reporting is a case in point wherein the interlocutors change the old games and bring into existence their appraisals of the situation, adhering to strategic thinking to refine the utterance in such a way as to meet the complex logical features of the context. It is also possible to conceptualise the semantics/pragmatics debate based on the Markedness Differential Hypotheses or ‘markedness theory’. In this regard, semantics, I think, is engaged with ‘what is meant’, while pragmatics is ‘what is really meant’. Therefore, semantics is unmarked but pragmatics is marked. Celce-Murcia and Hawkins (1985, p. 66) have argued that “the marked member of a pair contains at least one more feature than the unmarked one. In addition, the unmarked (or neutral) member of the pair is the one with a wider range of distribution than the marked one.” By analogy, utterances are first analysed based on semantic features (or simpler processes in terms of cognition), yet to properly interpret the meaning of the utterance, pragmatics comes into play. I do not mean that semantics and pragmatics are sequentially applied for interpreting sentences. The relationship between semantics and pragmatics is cyclic and in no clear order. What I wish to say is that automatic processes are more readily activated, while nonautomatic processes are involved to counterbalance the fecklessness of the ‘old games’ or fixed rules. Eckman (1981) also argues that linguistic items that are marked are more difficult to process than unmarked ones. In line with Carston (2002), Sperber and Wilson (1986), and Wilson and Sperber (2002), Capone (2016, p.  2) acknowledges that “linguistic semantics provides skeletal information to be fleshed out in context.” Further to our discussion on the semantics-pragmatics interface, Donald Davidson has proved that the meaning of a sentence is reducible to its truth conditions, illustrating that the meaning of ‘snow is white’ is snow is white IFF it is true that snow is white (Davidson, 1967). Yet there has been opposition to this way of approaching meaning. Dummett (1996) has criticised Davidson’s idea on the grounds that truth-conditionality does not sufficiently explain what it is that a speaker needs to know so that they understand a sentence. Moreover, Dummett states that the speaker must know three components of a sentence to understand its meaning: a theory of sense, which “is needed to characterize that in which a speaker’s knowledge of the meanings of expressions of the language” (Dummett, 1996, p. 85); a theory of reference, which refers to claims about the world made by the sentence; and a theory of force, which reveals the kind of speech act the expression intended to perform. We can fairly safely conclude that indirect reports can prop-

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erly accommodate the semantics-pragmatics interface without creating too much confusion.

1.2.4  Philosophical Aspects Indirect reports are not cases of ‘perfect language use’ and are not void of any artistic or strategic manipulations. They are also far from innocence and unsophistication. Ludwig Wittgenstein warns us about the metaphysical environment, arguing that language is attached to necessary landmarks and contextual clues that are essential in approaching the ‘rough ground’ of authentic language in use (Kanterian, 2007). Therefore, as realised by Wittgenstein, in probing the indirect report one should be careful not to fall into the trap of frictionless ice, reminiscent of the idea of ‘perfect language’, which is ignorant of the dynamics of human abilities (Weigand, 2010). To elaborate more, ‘frictionless ice’ refers to a situation [W]here the conditions are apparently perfect for a philosophically and logically perfect language – the language of the Tractatus – where all philosophical problems can be solved without the muddying effects of everyday contexts; but where, precisely because of the lack of friction, language can in fact do no work at all. (Gibney, 2012, p. 196)

Human abilities lead us to a holistic theory towards interaction, which is transformed through discourse, which, in turn, is mediated by abilities such as thinking, speaking, perceiving, etc. Indirect reporting likewise deals with the transmission of (mediated) knowledge (Capone, 2016), which is affected by human abilities, as well as the principles that govern these abilities. For Wittgenstein, language is dialogue. Dialogue, in my view, is decently presented in the way conceptualised by Weigand (2010). For Weigand, dialogue means unpredictability, probability, and a mix of order and disorder. Thus, indirect reports are cases of ‘dialogic talk’ that are affected by a myriad of linguistic, cognitive, philosophical, and social features that all come into play (more or less) simultaneously to create the complicated phenomenon of the indirect report. An indirect report, then, is a clash between noumenon and phenomenon. This distinction was made by Immanuel Kant, as a way of studying the construction of knowledge that helps us to understand the ‘thing-in-itself’ as opposed to the ‘thing as it appears to an observer’ (Robert, 2009). Noumenon offers a world without perception or sense, whereas phenomenon deals with the relational quality of meaning, leading us to recognise the unstable nature of language. The noumenon/phenomenon distinction shows that indirect reporting is a case of the dialogic action game (Weigand, 2010), and one which is basically a sociocognitive practice being affected by individuals’ peculiarities as social and emotional beings. To use the terminology of Kant, indirect reports are ‘irrefutable’ phenomena, transformations that are hardly (or never) proved wrong and which must be accepted (unless there is a good reason to deny the sincerity of the report). Some may (rightly) say that it is a naive viewpoint to take the validity of reports for granted, but as I later

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discuss (Chap. 3, Sect. 3.4), there is no great danger in setting up the default status for accepting rather than rejecting the validity of the indirect report. Suffice it to say that human beings tend to approach each other based on trust rather than distrust. In this regard, Hurford (2007, p. 325) states that “[l]inguistic behaviour is typically trusting behaviour. As a speaker, you trust the hearer not to use to your cost what you tell him. And as a hearer, you believe or do what the speaker says.” Moreover, according to Weitzl (2017, p. 19), “trust is positive and essential to human beings, since it is part of the essential ingredients of life such as love and friendship, and different kinds of meaningful relationships seem to depend on this notion.” That said, one should bear in mind that irrefutability requires complex sociocognitive manipulations, both on the part of the hearer and the reporting speaker. As I discuss in the following chapters, human communication is strategic and is not governed by a set of static rules. In indirect reporting, trust has different meanings and depends on many factors. The hearer can trust the reporter and can consider the report as a genuine linguistic behaviour. However, the hearer should be cautious when s/he is going to take action based on the illocutionary force of the report, and should not naively report someone else’s report since there is a possibility that some parts of the original speaker’s utterances would be badly distorted. Therefore, indirect reporting is a bridge between trust and doubt. The hearer should commute between states of trust and doubt based on different sociocognitive factors. In line with the philosophical aspect of indirect reporting, Capone (2016, p. 147) provides us with an operational definition of indirect reporting in terms of a ‘theory of knowledge’. He states: When we deal with the purpose of an indirect report, we are implicitly discussing the theory of knowledge. This is the point where a theory of knowledge and a theory of communication intersect, since knowledge often is and must be transmitted and its transmission can be effected only by means of speech acts. Indirect reports are cases in which you transmit knowledge of what another person said and what another person said is the only way or one of the ways in which you can gain knowledge about a certain situation or event s.

In order to better understand Capone’s viewpoint towards indirect reports as the ‘transmission of knowledge’, one should first clarify the meaning of knowledge. Should we define knowledge as sending and receiving information? The answer is an unequivocal ‘no’. Knowledge in indirect reports, as I think Capone has in mind, is the sociocognitive manifestation of linguistic elements encoded and decoded by the reporting speaker, and the way in which those elements are acknowledged by the hearer. Therefore, knowledge is structured and restructured by the reporting speaker and the hearer through employing different strategic games, which require manipulation of the context. ‘Transmission’, which should also be defined, is the encoding and decoding of information based on the reporting speaker’s and the hearer’s idiosyncrasies, as well as on contextual factors. The above discussion clearly shows the complex nature of indirect reporting as related to the philosophical sphere. More will be said on this issue in Chap. 3.

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1.2.5  Cognitive Aspects Indirect reporting is a case of pragmatic intelligence, since it requires an acknowledgement of complicated situational factors by the reporter to distinguish between two rather controversial axioms of being loyal to the original speaker’s utterances and at the same time being economic (or strategic) in terms of the sociocognitive characteristics of the hearer and the original speaker. Moreover, in terms of the Fregean concept of sense, indirect reporting is germane to creativity, since it deals with speakers’ ‘thoughts’ and ‘expressibility’. Creativity requires pragmatic competence. According to Hall (1995), participating in social events (such as indirect reports) requires the reconstruction of knowledge and interactional practice. The reconstruction of information is likely to increase the cognitive load of both the reporting speaker and the hearer. It is the reporter’s role to analyse the situation and decide (almost immediately) which parts of the original speech should be reported, which parts should be edited, and which parts should be deleted (among other things). The hearer, likewise, must decide (painstakingly) whether to take the report seriously and react based on the illocutionary force of the report, or whether to think more conservatively, allowing for some degree of mismatch between the original speaker’s intentions and the reported speech. As argued by Taguchi (2009, p. 249), “[s]peakers have the option of expressing themselves in a variety of forms, both directly and indirectly.” The author continues that “[p]ragmatic competence entails the ability to recognize speakers’ intentions conveyed in a variety of conventional and non-conventional forms and to make accurate inferences of their communicative intentions.” The foregoing discussion about the transmission of knowledge in indirect reports advocates that there are complex cognitive processes at play, which control the production and comprehension of indirect reports. Interlocutors react to indirect reports based on their pragmatic competence. Not everybody is able to provide a fair or strategic report of the original speaker and, likewise, the hearer of the report may not be able to distinguish between the reported speaker’s and the original speaker’s voice. Therefore, indirect reports are akin to what J. William Fulbright refers to as ‘unthinkable thoughts’, in that the interlocutors should explore, using all their (sociocognitive) abilities, the options and possibilities that confront them in a dialogic action game. Indirect reports, as made clear by the earlier discussion, are good cases of showing how the Faculty of Language (FL) works, as a rule-governed (and at the same time a strategic) phenomenon. The FL, originally proposed by Noam Chomsky, assumes that there are some ‘genetic components’ independent of sensory experience. Chomsky refers to these genetic components as the universal properties of natural human languages. The idea seems simple, but it is challenging for some researchers working on human languages, who claim that Chomsky’s view regarding the FL is short-sighted and pseudoscientific (Sampson, 2005). I do not labour to enter the issue of the innate hypothesis and the criticisms levelled at the concept by empirical research findings. Additionally, in referring to the FL, I do not imply that

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indirect reports are restricted by a certain set of structural rules as the FL might have us conceptualise them. Chomsky states that the development of language is germane to three factors: “genetic endowment, which sets limits on the attainable languages, thereby making language acquisition possible; external data, converted to the experience that selects one or another language within a narrow range; principles not specific to the Faculty of Language” (2007, p. 3). What is interesting here is that Chomsky has advocated that it is not only innate capacities that account for the development of language. Besides the structural elements, experience and the quality of input are also important. On the other hand, Hauser, Chomsky, and Fitch (2002, p. 1569) have suggested that “an understanding of the faculty of language requires substantial interdisciplinary cooperation. We suggest how current developments in linguistics can be profitably wedded to work in evolutionary biology, anthropology, psychology, and neuroscience.” What is the relationship between the FL and indirect reports? A good question. Indirect reports, as a linguistic theory, are complex syntactic and pragmatic representations that can be conceptualised based on the principles of the FL. The structure of indirect reports is under the control of genetic endowments (i.e., particular rule-governed representations), which can be under the influence of anthropology, psychology, and neuroscience. The ‘syntactic adaptation’ can be considered the universal construct of indirect reports (of course, cross-cultural studies should verify or reject this claim). The universal (syntactic) rule of indirect reporting, as I conceptualise it here, is akin to what Capone (2016, p.  24) has argued as the structural idiosyncrasies of indirect reports: The reporter X will report what was said by Y (Y usually distinct from X, but sometimes coinciding with X) by using a predicate such as ‘say’ that makes reference to a verbal event of some kind (an utterance), by applying it to Y (the participant whose speech is being reported) and by letting the direct object of the predicate ‘say’ express the content of the utterance by Y (at some prior time) by way of paraphrasis, that is by letting the that-clause refer to the same situation or event e that the utterance u reported was actually used (by Y) to refer to, without necessarily using the modes of presentation (of objects and participants) which were actually used by Y in u, and in fact allowing context to play a pervasive role in making reference to objects, activities, and participants thereof.

If we consider this rule as the genetic endowment of indirect reports (almost all languages have verbs of saying, and the that-clause [complementiser that] expresses the content of others’ speech), then individuals’ experiences shape the way that this genetic endowment (syntactic representation of indirect reports) is both created and interpreted by the reporting speaker and the hearer, respectively. That said, as argued by Hauser et al. (2002), the FL embraces interdisciplinary cooperation, taking into consideration tenets from anthropology and cognitive psychology (among others). Therefore, there are both organism-external and -internal factors related to the FL. The organism-external factors embrace ecological, physical, cultural, and social issues, whereas organism-internal factors are related to the FL in the broad sense (known as FLB), as well as in the narrow sense (known as FLN). Hauser et al. have also argued that sensory-motor, conceptual-intentional, and other possible systems are embraced by FLB, whereas FLN, which is uniquely related to human beings,

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includes recursion. Indirect reports, thus, embrace both organism-external (social) and –internal (cognitive) factors of the FL.

1.3  The Outline of the Present Volume The present monograph aims to discuss the concept of indirect reporting (and it’s complexities) based on the key factors surrounding it. It is not my intention (and it is not possible) to cover all issues related to indirect reports; however, I have done my best to include important social, structural, philosophical, and cognitive points that are challenging and essential to my discussion of indirect reports, as well as dealing with several state-of-the-art (and largely neglected) topics with regard to indirect reports. I should confess, however (thanks to one of the reviewers of the book for reminding me), that the present work is more aimed at audiences in the fields of pragmatics and intercultural communication than to audiences in the fields of philosophy and syntax. There is no definite purpose behind this inclination, but maybe my background in pragmatics and intercultural communication has unconsciously directed me away from elaborate philosophical and syntactic discussions (and I see no reason to be demotivated by this self-disclosure), though I have done my best to be neutral in assigning equal portions to issues that would be a concern for audiences in the fields of pragmatics, semantics, syntax, philosophy, (intercultural) communication, and cognitive linguistics. Throughout this book, I use the term ‘indirect report’ rather than ‘indirect speech’ or ‘indirect discourse’. Indirect speech and indirect discourse can also refer to ‘indirect speech acts’, such as ‘can you pass the salt?’ (Terkourafi, 2014). After the introductory chapter, Chap. 2 deals with sociocognitive and structural accounts of indirect reports that take into consideration Grice’s Cooperation Principle and Sperber and Wilson’s Relevance Theory, among other things. Chapter 3 provides a rather comprehensive overview of the philosophical points in indirect reporting (epistemology of indirect reports and their photosynthetic procedure are discussed in this chapter). Chapter 4 discusses direct and indirect reports and their similarities and differences, with a focus on the neglected role of the hearer in indirect reports. Chapter 5 is dedicated to an extensive comparison of translation and indirect reports. An interesting case of ‘non-verbal communication’ and ‘accountability in slurring’ are discussed in this chapter. Also in this chapter, I elaborate on Capone’s idea about the issue of responsibility in reporting slurring and taboo words, stating that accountability should be addressed based on different factors. In Chap. 6, I discuss the main principles governing the use and interpretation of indirect reports. I propose principles such as the Principle of Commitment and the Principle of Immunity that can greatly contribute to a theory of reported speech. Chapter 7 discusses ‘politeness’ issues in indirect reports, and I argue that politeness is closely related to topics such as reporting slurring and flippant speech. Chapter 8 is about the important topic of ‘trust’ in indirect reports. I argue that indirect reporting can both generate trust and is affected by trust, among other things. In Chap. 9, I talk about the idea of ‘common

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core’ and cross-cultural studies in reported speech. The great bulk of the chapter is devoted to the analysis of Persian reported speech, using authentic data from the  natural occurring talk in interaction. Research on Persian reported speech is scarce, and the few studies that are done on this issue have misrepresented Persian reported speech. Finally, Chap. 10 engages briefly with how indirect reports can contribute to a theory of pragmatics. Moreover, I would discuss my own perspective towards indirect reports and propose some promising areas for future research.

1.4  Conclusion The preliminaries in this chapter perhaps herald an interesting journey, involving many challenging issues and state-of-the-art topics regarding indirect reporting. I tried in this chapter to make some terse remarks regarding the complex nature of indirect reports, in an attempt to explain to the reader why we need more scholarly works on the topic. I also showed what will be dealt with throughout this book. What we read in this chapter succinctly depicts indirect reporting as both a versatile and complicated practice, to the extent that its foundation is not simply reduced to pragmatics, but also includes syntax, semantics, philosophy, and cognitive psychology (among other things). This is one reason why although indirect reporting can be compared to many other things (translation, speech acts, etc.), it is, in fact, distinct and enjoys its own idiosyncrasies. Indirect reports are distinct because they can be accounted for and empirically justified based on some specific rules and principles. At the least, I believe that indirect reporting is, using Edda Weigand’s terminology, a mixed game. Indirect reporting, then, can generate an ultimate theory – one that is all-encompassing and powerful to show the bonds between the atoms of the human communication in general and pragmatics in particular.

References Ambady, N., & Rosenthal, R. (1992). Thin slices of expressive behavior as predictors of interpersonal consequences: A meta-analysis. Psychological Bulletin, 111, 256–274. Anderson, L. (2016). When reporting others backfires. In A. Capone, F. Kiefer, & F. Lo Piparo (Eds.), Indirect reports and pragmatics: Interdisciplinary studies (pp.  253–264). Cham, Switzerland: Springer. Aronson, E., Wilson, T. D., Akert, R. M., & Sommers, S. R. (2015). Social psychology (9th ed.). London: Pearson Education. Barba, J.  (2007). Formal semantics in the age of pragmatics. Linguistics and Philosophy, 30, 637–668. Bauman, K.  P., & Geher, G. (2002). We think you agree: The detrimental impact of the false consensus effect on behavior. Current Psychology, 21(4), 293–318. Borg, E. (2004). Minimal semantics. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. Candlin, C. N., Crichton, J., & Moore, S. H. (2017). Research and practice in applied linguistics: Exploring discourse in context and in action. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

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Capone, A. (2010). The social practice of indirect reports. Journal of Pragmatics, 42, 377–391. Capone, A. (2012). Indirect reports as language games. Pragmatics & Cognition, 20(3), 593–613. Capone, A. (2016). The pragmatics of indirect reports: Socio-philosophical considerations. Cham, Switzerland: Springer. Capone, A., García-Carpintero, M., & Falzone, A. (Eds.). (2018). Indirect reports and pragmatics in the world languages (Vol. 19). Cham, Switzerland: Springer. Capone, A., Kiefer, F., & Piparo, F.  L. (Eds.). (2016). Indirect reports and pragmatics: Interdisciplinary studies. Cham, Switzerland: Springer. Cappelen, H., & Lepore, E. (2005[2012]). Quotation. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/quotation/. Carl, W. (1994). Frege’s theory of sense and reference: Its origin and scope. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Carston, R. (2002). Thoughts and utterances: The pragmatics of explicit communication. Oxford, UK: Blackwell. Celce-Murcia, M., & Hawkins, B. (1985). Contrastive analysis, error analysis, and interlanguage analysis. In M. Celce-Murcia (Ed.), Beyond basics: Issues and research in TESOL (pp. 60–77). Rowley, MA: Newbury House. Chomsky, N. (2004). Biolinguistics and the human capacity. https://chomsky.info/20040517/. Chomsky, N. (2007). Approaching UG from below. In U.  Sauerland & H.  M. Gärtner (Eds.), Interfaces + recursion = language? Chomsky’s minimalism and the view from syntax-­semantics (pp. 1–29). Berlin, Germany: Mouton de Gruyter. Clark, H. H., & Gerrig, R. J. (1990). Quotations as demonstrations. Language, 66(4), 764–805. Coulmas, F. (Ed.). (1986). Direct and indirect speech (Vol. 31). Berlin, Germany: Mouton de Gruyter. Davidson, D. (1967). Truth and meaning. Synthese, 17, 304–323. Davidson, D. (1979). Quotation. Theory and Decision, 11, 27–40. De Brabanter, P. (2010). The semantics and pragmatics of hybrid quotations. Language and Linguistics Compass, 4(2), 107–120. Dummett, M. (1996). The seas of language. Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press. Eckman, F. R. (1981). On the naturalness of interlanguage phonological rules. Language Learning, 31(1), 195–216. Fairclough, N. (2013). Critical discourse analysis: The critical study of language. London: Routledge. Garcia-Carpintero, M. (1994). Ostensive signs: Against the identity theory of quotation. Journal of Philosophy, 91, 253–264. Geach, P. (1970). Quotation and quantification. In his logic matters. Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell. Gibney, E. (2012). Evolutionary philosophy. Morrisville, NC: Lulu Press. Gilovich, T. (1990). Differential construal and the false consensus effect. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 59(4), 623–634. Gochet, P., & Gribomont, P. (2006). Epistemic logic. In D. M. Gabby & J. Woods (Eds.), Handbook of the history of logic (Vol. 7, pp. 99–196). Amsterdam: Elsevier. Goffman, E. (1956). The presentation of self in everyday life. New York: Doubleday. Goffman, E. (1974). Frame analysis: An essay on the organization of experience. New  York: Harper Row. Güldemann, T., & Von Roncador, M. (Eds.). (2002). Reported discourse: A meeting ground for different linguistic domains. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Hall, J. K. (1995). “Aw, man, where you goin?” Classroom interaction and the development of L2 interactional competence. Issues in Applied Linguistics, 6(2), 37–62. Hauser, M. D., Chomsky, N., & Fitch, W. T. (2002). The faculty of language: What is it, who has it, and how did it evolve? Science, 298(5598), 1569–1579. Hurford, J.  (2007). The origins of meaning: Language in the light of evolution. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. Kanterian, E. (2007). Ludwig Wittgenstein. London: Reaktion Books.

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Kecskes, I. (2014). Intercultural pragmatics. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. Levinson, S. C. (1983). Pragmatics. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Marks, G., & Miller, N. (1987). Ten years of research on the false-consensus effect: An empirical and theoretical review. Psychological Bulletin, 102(1), 72–90. Marmaridou, S. (2011). Pragmalinguistics and sociopragmatics. In W.  Bublitz & N.  Norrick (Eds.), Foundations of pragmatics (pp. 77–106). Berlin, UK: Mouton de Gruyter. Mey, J. L. (2001). Pragmatics. Oxford, UK: Blackwell. Mey, J. L. (2002). Pragmatics. An introduction (2nd ed.). Oxford, UK: Blackwell. Mey, J. L. (Ed.). (2009). Concise encyclopedia of pragmatics (2nd ed.). Oxford, UK: Elsevier. Mey, J.  L. (2013). Across the abyss: The pragmatics-semantics interface revisited [Review of the book Pragmatics: An introduction, by B.  Birner and Truth-conditional pragmatics, by F. Récanati]. Intercultural Pragmatics, 10(3), 487–494. Morady Moghaddam, M. (2018). Review of the book The pragmatics of indirect reports: Sociophilosophical considerations, by A. Capone. Lingua, 204, 134–141. Morady Moghaddam, M. (in press). Appraising and reappraising of compliments and the provision of responses: Automatic and non-automatic reactions. Pragmatics. Parson, T. (1982). What do quotation marks name? Frege’s theories of quotations and that-clauses. Philosophical Studies, 42, 315–328. Quine, W. V. O. (1940). Mathematical logic. Boston: Harvard University Press. Recanati, F. (2004). Literal meaning. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Robert, H. (2009). Completing the picture of Kant’s metaphysics of judgment. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-judgment/supplement5. html. Rule, N. O., Krendl, A. C., Ivcevic, Z., & Ambady, N. (2013). Accuracy and consensus in judgments of trustworthiness from faces: Behavioral and neural correlates. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 104, 409–426. Saka, P. (2017). Blah, blah, blah: Quasi-quotation and unquotation. In P.  Saka & M.  Johnson (Eds.), The semantics and pragmatics of quotation (pp. 35–64). Cham, Switzerland: Springer. Sampson, G. (2005). The ‘language instinct’ debate: Revised edition. London/New York: Bloomsbury Academic. Seymour, M. (1994). Indirect discourse and quotation. Philosophical Studies, 74, 1–38. Slepian, M. L., Bogart, K. B., & Ambady, N. (2014). Thin-slice judgments in the clinical context. Annual Review of Clinical Psychology, 10, 131–153. Sowa, J. F. (2007). Language games, a foundation for semantics and ontology. Game Theory and Linguistic Meaning, 18, 17–37. Sperber, D., & Wilson, D. (1986). Relevance: Communication and cognition. Oxford, UK: Blackwell. Strawson, P. (1952). Introduction to logical theory. London: Methuen. Taguchi, N. (2009). Comprehension of indirect opinions and refusals in Japanese as a foreign language. In N.  Taguchi (Ed.), Pragmatic competence (pp.  249–274). Berlin, Germany: Mouton de Gruyter. Tarski, A. (1933). The concept of truth in formalized languages. In A.  Tarski (Ed.), Logic, semantics, metamathematics (2nd ed., pp. 152–278). Indianapolis, IN: Hackett. Terkourafi, M. (2014). The importance of being indirect: A new nomenclature for indirect speech. Belgian Journal of Linguistics, 28, 45–70. Vasilescu, A. (2016). Towards a “theory of everything” in human communication. In K.  Allan, A.  Capone, & I.  Kecskes (Eds.), Pragmemes and theories of language use: Perspectives in pragmatics, philosophy & psychology (Vol. 9, pp. 305–322). Cham, Switzerland: Springer. Washington, C. (1992). The identity theory of quotation. Journal of Philosophy, 89, 582–605. Weigand, E. (2010). Dialogue: The mixed game. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Weitzl, W. (2017). Measuring electronic word-of-mouth effectiveness. Cham, Switzerland: Springer. Wilson, D., & Sperber, D. (2002). Truthfulness and relevance. Mind, 111, 583–632.

Chapter 2

Sociocognitive vs. Structural Issues

A sociocognitive structure is defined by the cognitive and social elements in a given way of knowing. The term sociocognitive emphasises the fact that a way of knowing, social thought, is not composed purely of cognitive elements, but of both cognitive and social elements. In the realm of social thought, unlike formal thought, the social and the cognitive are indissociable. (Windisch, 1990, p. 14)

2.1  Introduction The literature on indirect reporting largely gravitates towards the discussion of its social and structural aspects. By contrast, the cognitive aspects of indirect reporting have not been given their due attention. Indirect reports are complicated language games that require (intricate) online cognitive processing, social awareness, and structural complexities (e.g., verbs of propositional attitude and opacity). The importance of cognition in indirect reporting is well acknowledged by some researchers (Capone, 2012; Cummings, 2016), but there have been no extensive studies specifically dealing with sociocognitive aspects of indirect reporting. More often than not, discussion about context in indirect reporting is reduced to social idiosyncrasies, and hence little attention is paid to cognitive processes. In this regard, as stated by Clift and Holt, “[m]uch research in recent years, aiming to pursue the interactional motivations for the use of reported speech, has shown the influence of the sociologist Erving Goffman’s observations on social interaction” (2007, p. 7). However, since we are talking of individuals in indirect reports, it is inevitable that both cognitive and social factors be considered more seriously. Regarding the social aspects of indirect reporting, I will discuss Grice’s Cooperative principle, Goffman’s dramaturgical sociology, and Halliday’s functions of language (and their relation with indirect reports). With regard to the cognitive issues, I take issue with

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019 M. Morady Moghaddam, The Praxis of Indirect Reports, Perspectives in Pragmatics, Philosophy & Psychology 21, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-14269-8_2

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Relevance Theory as well as the appraisal theory of emotion1 (under the rubric of social appraisal theory, mental processes help individuals manage the way in which they interact with one another). In line with the structural features of indirect reporting, I will talk about structural issues such as tense, pronoun, complementiser that, and verbs of saying (as compared to verbs of propositional attitude). I will also discuss how cognition and society come into play to manage the practice of indirect reporting.

2.2  Social Issues 2.2.1  Indirect Reports and the Cooperative Principle Indirect reports are a replica of Grice’s (1975) Cooperative Principle as a rational tool. Rationality can be conceptualised within the Gricean maxims of quality, quantity, manner, and relevance. According to Leech (1983), interlocutors employ these conversational maxims to communicate (whether explicitly or implicitly) their intended meaning. Grice (1975, p. 48) states that in order to have reasonable cooperation, one should be cognisant of the peculiarities of conversational practice: I would like to be able to think of the standard type of conversational practice not merely as something that all or most do in fact follow but as something that it is reasonable for us to follow, that we should not abandon.

From the quote above, it can be implied that indirect reports are cases of conversational practice since they are guided by Grice’s Principle of Rationality, or the Cooperative Principle. Indirect reporting acts as a tool to create conversational implicature (by distinguishing what is said from what is implied). Indirect reports respect the maxim of quantity by constraining the reporter to report as informatively as required (although this maxim can be violated). The maxim of quality urges the reporter to make a contribution that is true (this is violated in cases of backstabbing). The maxim of relation emphasises the fact that the indirect report should be relevant to the conversation (this too can be violated in cases of unsolicited indirect reports that do not respect situational necessity2). Regarding the maxim of manner, the reporter should be clear on distinguishing his/her voice from that of the original speaker. Capone (2016) rightly states that the reporting speaker should unambiguously communicate which transformations are his/her own, and which parts are related to the original speaker. In fact, Capone puts this responsibility not only on the shoulder of the reporting speaker but also on the hearer of the report. He states: “[do] not take everything that appears in the that-clause of the indirect report as 1  According to Manstead and Fischer (2001, p.  221), “[a]ppraisals are considered to reflect the meaning of an event for the individual and its implications for his or her personal well-being and are thus located outside the realm of the social environment.” 2  This is elaborated more in the chapter related to accountability (Chap. 5).

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belonging to the voice of the original speaker whose speech act is being reported” (Capone, 2016, p. 45). Capone complements the above-mentioned rule by stating that the perspective of the original speaker should be separated from the perspective of the reporter by using sufficient contextual clues. Therefore, indirect reporting can be considered a cooperative event in the same way Grice conceptualises the Cooperative Principle, which “assumes a tacit understanding between interlocutors to co-operate in an interactive event in a meaningful way” (Bousfield, 2008, p. 22). Grice (1975, p. 45) refers to a “rough general principle”, whereby he tries to encourage interlocutors to take into account “the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange” (Grice, 1975, p. 75). This general principle proposes the notion of interlocutors’ expectation(s). These expectations have realisations in indirect reports as well. The original speaker expects to be reported fairly and in line with the Principle of Charity3 (Capone, 2016). The reporting speaker tries to impress on the hearer an illocutionary effect that matches the reporter’s expectation. Similarly, the hearer expects to hear a report that is genuine and benevolent, as well as being related to the aim and objective of the interaction. One should bear in mind, however, that ‘cooperation’ is a tricky word in Grice’s ideology. There have been many researchers who have tried to come to a sound realisation of what is meant by ‘cooperation’ by proposing amendments and extensive modifications (Apostel, 1980; Bollobas, 1981; Corliss, 1981; Kasher, 1977; Kiefer, 1979; Pratt, 1977, 1981; Sampson, 1982). These are joined by Fraser (1990), Fish (1999), and Watts (2003), all of whom have made an effort to clarify the mysteries around the term ‘cooperation’, while having various conflicting views on this topic. On one hand, ‘cooperation’ is argued to be a social goal-sharing event that primarily is aimed at sharing “with their intended addressee some common goal or purpose” (Bousfield, 2008, p. 25). Notwithstanding this goal sharing definition, this way of dealing with ‘cooperation’ is a misrepresentation of Grice’s original ideas. Grice himself has addressed this issue by stating that: While the conversational maxims have, on the whole been quite well received, the same cannot, I think, be said about my invocation of a supreme principle of conversational cooperation. One source of trouble has been that it has been felt even in the talk-exchanges of civilized people browbeating disputation and conversational sharp practice are far too common to be offenses against the fundamental dictates of conversational practice. Another source of discomfort has perhaps been the thought that, whether its tone is agreeable or disagreeable, much of our talk exchange is too haphazard to be directed toward any end cooperative or otherwise. Chitchat goes nowhere, unless making the time pass is a journey. (Grice, 1989, pp. 368–369)

Therefore, as advocated by Bousfield (2008), the social goal sharing view is distorted and is contradictory to what Grice intended to convey by using the term ‘cooperation’. According to Bousfield, even in uncooperative behaviour, there are traces of communication that can be justified through a ‘linguistic view’ of 3  Capone (2016, p. 14) argues that “principle of Charity operates in the language and compels the reporter to offer an image of the original speaker which is acceptable.” Conforming to Capone, this principle imposes amendments to obviate possible deficiencies or patent contradictions.

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cooperation. Bousfield refers to linguistic cooperation as the substitute for social cooperation, whereby it is argued that “the only goal of a given communication is the transmission of information” (Bousfield, 2008, p. 29). By advocating a linguistic conceptualisation of cooperation, Bousfield suggests that this view helps us to “correctly establishing the speaker’s illocutionary intent and getting the hearer(s) to understand the proposition which is being expressed or implied” (2008, p. 29). This linguistic conceptualisation of the Cooperative Principle (CP) has implications for indirect reports as a cooperative event. Indirect reports cannot and should not be regarded as harmonious with the aims and expectations of the reporting speaker (and the hearer, with regard to expectations). The linguistic view of the CP proposes that there might be conflict(s) during the interaction, but that the contradictions are not important since the goal of the cooperation is the transmission of conversational implicatures. To that end, this view challenges Capone’s (2016) Paraphrasis/Form Principle. Capone argues that “my form/style principle predicts that forms should be as close as possible to those of the original utterances” (2016, p. 188). Linguistic cooperation is useful in accounting for the problematic part of Capone’s definition of the Paraphrasis/Form Principle. The reporting speaker may deviate from the original utterance based on the consequences s/he expects to receive from the conversational partner. That said, I do not argue that social goal sharing view has no place in indirect reports. I consider indirect reports as a way to reconcile a social goal-sharing view with linguistic cooperation, by taking into consideration language use and language user(s). Therefore, if we imagine indirect reports as cases of linguistic and social cooperation, we should also be convinced that the claim made by Leech and Thomas regarding the CP must be rejected. They observe that the CP “[…] makes no claims about the good intentions of the speakers” (Leech & Thomas, 1990, p. 181). Leech and Thomas’s view of the CP is not strategic and ignores interlocutors’ diplomatic stances conveyed in cases of face-threatening acts, such as reporting someone’s slurring and taboo words. To revert to Capone’s Principle of Charity, it is clear that interlocutors know and care about each other’s face. To summarise this issue here, I believe that interlocutors analyse the situation based on sociocognitive factors, and decide whether it is necessary to consider the intentions of the speaker. This view is more logical and in line with the dialogic nature of discourse. I believe that, in the case of indirect reports, social and linguistic views of cooperation are not diametrically opposed, but rather, they represent two complementary perspectives on how cooperation takes place. During indirect reports, therefore, the reporting speaker must be careful to be socially cooperative by conveying what the hearer wants to hear (e.g., the hearer may not want to hear slurring or taboo words), and at the same time must make himself/herself understandable to the hearer (i.e., linguistic cooperation). Concomitant with the modifications the CP underwent, Attardo (1997, p. 753) proposed the Perlocutionary Cooperative Principle (PCP), which “directs speakers to be cooperative in practical non-linguistic actions.” Attardo distinguishes between Locutionary Cooperation (LC) and Perlocutionary Cooperation (PC). He states that the former concept is related to the underlying assumptions of the CP, whereas the latter is anchored in “the amount of cooperation two speakers must put into the text/

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situation to achieve the goals that the speaker (and/or the hearer) wanted to achieve with the utterance” (Attardo, 1997, p. 756). Nonetheless, this distinction is problematic in cases of reporting irony. According to Ghita (2001, p.  143), there are some acts that “cannot be ‘perlocutionary’ validated by an actual fulfilment of the speaker’s intention.” As stated by Ghita (2001, p. 143)): If we apply this distinction [distinction between LC and PC] to irony, then the locutionary cooperation regards the understanding of irony, the processing of the relevant information that turns the literal into pragmatic meaning. The perlocutionary cooperation refers to the adequate verbal response to irony, preserving it as a game where meaning is pretended to be inoffensive while being offensive – deeply or playfully. An ironic utterance may be successful at the locutionary level if it is properly understood transliterally, but fails at the perlocutionary level if the conversational reaction does not respect the ‘literal complicity’ of the ironic game.

The above quote shows that in reporting irony (in cases where the irony is closely related to the hearer), communicating at the perlocutionary level is face-threatening and may not be welcomed by the hearer. Therefore, regarding indirect reports, both social and linguistic goal sharing are relative and at the service of contextual (and even cognitive) factors. It is the reporting speaker who should immediately decide whether to transfer the intended meaning of irony (which may be face threatening), or to be more strategic while respecting appropriateness of the discourse through communicating at the locutionary level, adhering to the “good Samaritan principle4” proposed by Attardo (1997, p. 776). Thus, my stance towards indirect reports is that they are rather chaotic, conveying a mixed game that cannot be restricted to a fixed pragmatic view. I do not intend to argue that there are no principles behind indirect reports. The words of Jason Mohaghegh can help me explain my thoughts with regard to the nature of ‘chaos’, where it is argued that ‘chaos’ “works in smokescreens, disassembles the unity of the real, unfazed before the arrival of a writhing, hyperfictive age” (Mohaghegh, 2010, pp. 20–21). The role of the hearer is to change the state of disequilibrium to the state of (relative) certainty and equilibrium. Overall, I consider indirect reports as a process of meaning-making rather than as a tool for transferring others’ linguistic products. I think that I have discussed the issue of the Cooperative Principle ad nauseam. Suffice it to say that indirect reporting is a form of cooperative practice, which decently takes into consideration Grice’s maxims of cooperation.

2.2.2  Dramaturgical Sociology and Indirect Reports Drawing on the works of William Shakespeare, Erving Goffman metaphorically referred to the term dramaturgy, using the theatre as a metaphor to show how speakers constantly try to convey the intended impression in the course of interaction. In 4  The ‘good Samaritan principle’ states that the interlocutors should do their best to serve their conversational partner’s goal(s).

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dramaturgical sociology, the agent who is of utmost importance in the process of meaning-making is the self, defined as an individual’s sense of identification towards themselves, that is, who they are (Ritzer, 2007). The self is ‘masked’, as Goffman advocates, and this mask is created by the roles individuals assign to themselves during the interaction. Goffman refers to ‘sign-vehicles’ as clues that provide speakers with more refined ammunition in order to convey an intended impression. An important caveat that has been proposed by Goffman is that if hearers “know, or know of, the individual by virtue of experience prior to the interaction, they can rely on assumptions as to the persistence and generality of psychological traits as a means of predicting his present and future behaviour” (1956, p. 1). Therefore, in indirect reports, the reporter and the hearer act collaboratively to convey a particular kind of impression or a given definition of a situation. Goffman (1974) states that “[w]hat is important is the sense he [a person or an actor] provides them [the others or audience] through his dealing with them of what sort of person he is behind the role he is in” (p. 298). Indirect reports are also affected by the participants’ roles in the interaction. Not only is the reporter’s role important, but also the reporter should be on the qui vive for the original speaker’s role. As Wierzbicka (1974, p.  272) explains: The person who reports another’s words by quoting them temporarily assumes the role of that other person, ‘plays his part,’ that is to say, imagines himself as the other person and for a moment behaves in accordance with this counter-factual assumption.

The kind of impression the reporting speaker is going to convey to the hearer is also influential in shaping indirect reports. Of course, my intention is to show that indirect reporting is under the influence of ‘human dynamics’, meaning that the role one assigns to oneself or the kind of impression one intends to convey to others is not stable but changes during interaction. In this sense, the reporting speaker can verify or amend himself/herself based on the kind of reaction s/he receives from the hearer. To that end, there is a myriad of coping strategies that allow the reporting speaker to fix unsolicited ramifications or to obviate misunderstandings. For instance, in the following conversation, Fred reports to Janet a sentence from his friend John: (1)

Fred: John said that women should not compete for jobs that are masculine. Janet: Oh, maybe he has problems with women. Fred: Don’t worry. I know that John is not biased against women.

The conversation above shows how coping strategies help Fred to establish a dramaturgical perspective. Fred’s last sentence is an attempt in line with Capone’s Principle of Charity, for it saves John’s positive face. Moreover, and more subtly, Fred’s coping strategy (his last sentence) is a case of a dramaturgical action  – a social action that is produced to be seen by the hearer as a sign to improve one’s public self-image. By reporting John, Fred may share some complicity, since Janet may think that Fred has reported John to convey the impression that Fred may support what John has said. Fred’s last sentence in (1) is also an attempt to respect the Principle of Charity and to perform a dramaturgical action that allows Fred to

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distance himself from the trespasser (the original speaker). The coping sentence ‘I know that John is not biased against women’ acts to improve both Fred’s and John’s public self-image. The roles of individuals in society supply them with obligations that set boundaries for them to act properly and also to maintain the public self-­ image of others. For Goffman, therefore, social interaction is akin to performing on stage, where protean attitudes towards others (by putting on different masks) serve as a way to convey an intended impression. By analogy, indirect reports share commonality with ‘social dramaturgy’. The principles that govern social dramaturgy are also directly or indirectly observed in indirect reports. Let me explain. To move further with other shared points between dramaturgy and indirect reporting, I believe that this is the time and place to cite Goffman’s (1956) defensive techniques, which are introduced as the building blocks of ‘impression management’. These techniques are named as (1) dramaturgical loyalty; (2) dramaturgical discipline; and (3) dramaturgical circumspection. To find out how these techniques benefit my discussion on indirect reports, I should first operationalise the meaning of these three techniques. By dramaturgical loyalty, Goffman (1956, p. 135) states that: It is apparent that if a team is to sustain the line it has taken, the team-mates must act as if they have accepted certain moral obligations. They must not voluntarily betray the secrets of the team, whether from self-interest or principle. They must not exploit their presence in the front region in order to stage their own show, as do, for example, marriageable stenographers who sometimes encumber their office surroundings with a lush undergrowth of high fashion. Nor must they use their performance time as an occasion to denounce their team.

‘Dramaturgical loyalty’ can be linked to indirect reports in that while reporting someone, the reporting speaker should be chary not to ‘betray the secrets of the team5’, and should not report sentences that denounce the team. According to Capone (2016, p. 78), “[t]he real problem for the reporter is to master a practice which has, as its most welcome result, the effect of making reports of utterances that are acceptable not only to the reporter but also to the original speaker.” Capone clearly states, just as Goffman argued, that there are obligations on the part of the reporting speaker to be faithful to the original speaker. Elsewhere, Capone (2016, p. 78) clarifies that the reporting speaker should “make a report which is faithful to the intentions of the original speaker.” Goffman also propounds that through ‘dramaturgical discipline’ the performer should be cognisant not to get carried away. He argues that: I refer to the fact that while the performer is ostensibly immersed and given over to the activity he is performing, and is apparently engrossed in his actions in a spontaneous, ­uncalculating way, he must none the less be affectively dissociated from his presentation in a way that leaves him free to cope with dramaturgical contingencies as they arise. He must offer a show of intellectual and emotional involvement in the activity he is presenting, but must keep himself from actually being carried away by his own show lest this destroy his involvement in the task of putting on a successful performance. (Goffman, 1956, p. 137)

5  By ‘team’, Goffman means groups of individuals who cooperate with each other during the interaction.

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It is interesting to note how dramaturgical discipline is related to indirect reports. Goffman argued that the performer should avoid undue involvement in the performance. Comparing it to indirect reports, the reporter should do his/her best not to provide reports that have undergone disproportionation, where it is not possible to see the boundaries between the original speaker’s and the reporter’s perspective. Likewise, as argued by Capone (2016), under the rubrics of the Decoupling Principle, the reporting speaker should do his/her best to separate his/her voice from that of the reported speaker. Moreover, Capone (2016, p. 6) continues that “[i]t may be reasonable to expect that … the reporting speaker will use words maximally reflecting the point of view of the reported speaker.” If the reporting speaker does not acknowledge this rule (s/he should be careful not to be carried away by his/her show), s/he deserves to be blamed since s/he does not respect “the general purpose of the activity” (Capone, 2016, p. 6). Further to this, Capone states that the reported speaker’s and not the reporting speaker’s voice should be prevalent. The idea of dramaturgical discipline is not working against the strategic manipulation of the discourse (by ignoring complexity). In the quote above, Goffman has rightly stated that there should be some space for intellectual and emotional involvement, but the performer should not indulge in these. Therefore, in both social dramaturgy and indirect reports an emphasis is placed on a ‘calculated performance’. The last defensive technique is ‘dramaturgical circumspection’, which is conceptualised by Goffman (1956) as a strategy whereby “the members of the team exercise foresight and design in determining in advance how best to stage a show” (p. 139). Goffman believes that dramaturgical circumspection helps the performer to minimise the risks by preparing for unsought problems. To put it differently, it is a predictive technique that encourages the performer to be strategic and conscious in the way s/he chooses the conversational partner(s) and in the venue of performance. Likewise, similar techniques govern the practice of the indirect report. The reporter should predict the eventualities of the report. The reporter should decide whether it is the right time and place to use indirect reporting. What parts should be deleted and what parts should be modified? What is the consequence of the report? These questions represent some important challenges with which the reporter is confronted during indirect reporting. As discussed by Norrick (2016, p. 102), “the mode of constructed dialogue” is of key importance in indirect reports, since “the differences between modes of telling can be seen to bear interactional consequences.” Therefore, dramaturgical circumspection suggests that some filters should be applied to the report before transferring it to others. Interestingly, what we can learn from Goffman’s three dramaturgical techniques is that indirect reporting is a process – it is neither a product nor an utterance that is somehow a neutral manifestation of the original speaker’s perspective (semantic opacity vs. pragmatic opacity). Another important issue is that, using Goffman’s dramaturgical techniques, the reporter is involved in the process of reporting even before s/he decides to utter the report. Based on Goffman’s dramaturgical perspectives, I propose three different phases of indirect reporting, which are schematised in Fig. 2.1.

2.2  Social Issues

Beforereporting

Whilereporting

Afterreporting

29

•Take into account the consequence of your performance. •Choose the right hearer, a proper mood, and the suitable time (and even place). •Select the parts that need to be reported/deleted/changed.

•Respect the dramaturgical loyalty. •Consider dramaturgical discipline.

•Use coping strategies based on the perlocutionary effect(s) of the report.

Fig. 2.1  The process of indirect reporting

As shown in Fig. 2.1, indirect reporting is not an end-product, yet it has a rather complicated process that starts with contemplation and ends with possible ramifications. The reporting speaker is encouraged to use coping strategies based on the hearer’s reaction. For instance, the hearer may show strong emotional reactions to a malicious report. In this case, the reporting speaker may apply coping strategies to defuse a tense situation. The following conversation reveals how the after-reporting phase can be useful in reducing tensions: (2)

A: Mary said that she doesn’t like to speak to you anymore. B: I knew this would happen to me. Nobody likes me. A: Come on! She said that you are a kind man. You know better that she has her own issues.

The foregoing conversation clearly shows how Speaker A uses coping strategies to relieve Speaker B, since Speaker B is upset at being rejected by a beloved (Mary). Based on Speaker A’s indirect report, Speaker B forms a generalisation that ‘nobody likes him’ or possibly ‘everybody hates him’. This interpretation is the result of Speaker A’s reporting Mary (‘no one likes to be a bearer of bad news’). Therefore, Speaker A uses statements such as ‘she said that you are a kind man’ and ‘she has her own issues’ to show that Speaker B’s generalisation (that ‘nobody likes him’) is not correct. Moreover, in fact, Speaker A tries to convey that Mary has something wrong with her, which is why she has rejected Speaker B as a lover. Speaker A is trying to convey that although Mary refuses to see Speaker A, she would also refuse to see any other person because of her own (complicated) problems. Mary is not ready to start a romantic relationship since there is something wrong with her – not

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the lovers. What I attempt to argue in this part is that indirect reports are perfect examples of dramaturgical performance, taking into account social bonds and interdependence that provide the reporter and the hearer with strategies to perform as decently (and tactfully) as possible in the social practice of indirect reporting.

2.2.3  Metafunctions of Indirect Reports In the previous section, I talked about the processes underlying indirect reports and argued that indirect reports are not a prefabricated extrapolation of someone’s utterances. Indirect reports enjoy pre-, while-, and after-report stages, as was discussed in the previous section. In this section, I intend to show that indirect reports serve different functions in interaction. According to Michael Halliday, and based on a social semiotic view, language is “one of the semiotic systems that constitute a culture” (1978, p. 2). Based on this view, there are three acts of communication that are regarded as the metafunctions of language. These metafunctions are called ideational, interpersonal, and textual meaning. Halliday (2003a, p. 351) defines these metafunctions as: The ideational component is that part of the grammar concerned with the expression of experience, including both the processes within and beyond the self – the phenomena of the external world and those of consciousness – and the logical relations deducible from them. The ideational component thus has two sub-components, the experiential and the logical. The interpersonal component is the grammar of personal participation; it expresses the speaker’s role in the speech situation, his personal commitment and his interaction with others. The textual component is concerned with the creation of text; it expresses the structure of information, and the relation of each part of the discourse to the whole and to the setting.

By proposing his now-renowned Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL), Halliday introduced his theory of language through a functional and semantic perspective – the metafunctions mentioned above directly contribute to the theory of speech acts. By ‘interpersonal’ metafunctions, Halliday refers to interpersonal encounters (Halliday, 2003b, p. 16), whereby individuals regulate their relations with others. Interpersonal encounters include micro- and macro-encounters. Micro-encounters embrace those activities that people do every day in greetings, asking for directions, etc. Macro-encounters are institutionalised relationships that are manifested through marriage rituals, funerary rites, etc. These two kinds of encounters work in tandem to create a social bond. Indirect reports too are cases of social bonds that are closely related to individuals’ interpersonal encounters. According to Gregoromichelaki and Kempson (2016, p. 119), “reported speech appears as only one aspect of a general phenomenon that is regularly encountered in the analysis of everyday conversation.” To this end, indirect reports are manufactured based on individuals’ interpersonal encounters. Indirect reports, thus, are directly influenced by experiences and logical thinking (referring to Halliday’s ideational function). Indirect reports also convey emotions and attitudes (interpersonal function), as human

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beings are social beings that act based on their appraisals of the situation (Roseman & Craig, 2001). Indirect reports embrace the ‘textual’ function, in that they are cohesive and coherent semantic units. Although there are many factors affecting the way indirect reports are manufactured, there are some constraints that govern the construction of indirect reports. As suggested by Capone (2016, p.  55), indirect reports are language games “where both the speaker and the hearer have to adhere to a social praxis, consisting in a number of constraints.” These constraints are rule-­ governed and are presented under specific principles. Accordingly, the practice of indirect reporting embraces Halliday’s three metafunctions. I have illustrated their relationship in Fig.  2.2, which reveals the interconnections between the three functions. The direction of metafunctions within indirect reporting is from ideational to interpersonal, and then to textual functions. Experiences (the ideational phase) shape emotion (the interpersonal phase), and emotions and attitudes shape the way in which principles are employed (the creation of the text by the reporter). Here I provide an example in order to better conceptualise this schema. I intend to start with one of the constraints of indirect reporting presented by Capone (2016). He refers to Paraphrasis/Form Principle as a principle that “predicts that forms should be as close as possible to those of the original utterances” (Capone, 2016, p. 188). This constraint affects the textual features. All the same, take the following situation as the point of departure. Mary says to Fred about John in a moment of anger: ‘That bastard makes me so nervous’. Fred in reporting to John may say: ‘Mary said that you make her so nervous’ (rather than ‘she said that you are a bastard who makes her so nervous’). Therefore, in this instance, Fred has deliberately (or strategically) ignored the Paraphrasis/Form Principle. This is because Fred has appraised Mary’s insulting comment (by logic or by previous encounters with Mary) as having occurred in a moment of anger and being something that Mary may regret having said. Although the Paraphrasis/Form Principle would force Fred to issue an indirect report as close as possible to the original words, Fred forms a particular emotion and Fig. 2.2  The relationship between Halliday’s three metafunctions Ideational

Interpersonal

Textual

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attitude towards Mary’s comment about John (which is a socially benevolent act), and thus changes Mary’s words, deleting the crucial word ‘bastard’, as Mary would be grateful for this once her anger is over. Thus, experiences and social interdependence influence constraints. As argued by Halliday, it is the textual metafunction that permits individuals to delicately amalgamate the experiential and the interpersonal metafunctions, which, in turn, makes it possible for them to “put any interactional ‘spin’ on any representational content” (Halliday, 2003b, p. 17).

2.3  Cognitive Issues 2.3.1  Sperber and Wilson’s Relevance Theory Based on the ‘code model’ of conversation (simple coding and decoding processes), Sperber and Wilson’s (1986) Relevance Theory is proposed to deal with individuals’ intentions and attitudes, directing us towards the role of cognitive processes. Relevance Theory is generally a cognitive view of human communication that expands on both the ‘code model’ of communication and Grice’s Cooperative Principle.6 Sperber and Wilson refer to an interesting case of ostension that accounts for the set of assumptions individuals make with regard to their cognitive environment. By ostension, Sperber and Wilson argue that “[h]uman beings are efficient information-processing devices” (1986, p. 46). Moreover, Sperber and Wilson state that ostensive behaviour must attract the attention of the audience as being relevant to the audience’s interest. On this account, as Sperber and Wilson state, “ostension helps focus the attention of the audience on the relevant information, and thus contributes to the fulfilment of the informative intention” (1986, p. 61). Having said that, ostensive communication is not without its issues. In some cases, Speaker A may recognise Speaker B’s ostensive behaviour, but may be unable 6  Among the Neo-Gricean linguists, Horn and Levinson have been the key characters in improving Grice’s Cooperative Principle. Levinson (2001) reduced Grice’s four maxims to three and named them the Q-Principle, the I-Principle, and the M-Principle. The Q-Principle states that “[d]o not provide a statement that is informationally weaker than your knowledge of the world allows unless providing an informationally stronger statement would contravene the I-principle. Specifically, select the informationally strongest paradigmatic alternative that is consistent with facts” (Levinson, 2001, p. 76). The second principle is summarised as “‘say as little as necessary’; that is, produce the minimal linguistic information sufficient to achieve your communicational ends” (Levinson, 2001, p. 114). Levinson’s last principle, the M-Principle, is anchored in the first and third submaxims in relation to Grice’s maxim of Manner. However, in contrast to Levinson’s trilogy, Horn substituted two principles (the Q-Principle and the R-Principle) for Grice’s four maxims. Horn’s Q-principle is read as “[m]ake your contribution sufficient” and “[s]ay as much as you can (given R)” (Horn, 1996, p. 385). This principle is a combination of the first and the second submaxims of Grice’s maxim of Manner and the first maxim of Quantity. On the other hand, the R-Principle which is made up of “Grice’s Maxim of Relation, the second Quantity Maxim and the last two submaxims of Manner” (Röhrig, 2010, p. 16) is defined by Horn as “[m]ake your contribution necessary” and “[s]ay no more than you must (given Q)” (1996, p. 385).

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to decipher Speaker B’s intentional behaviour (or Speaker A is uninterested in doing so), and therefore, there would be no ‘mutual manifestness’. There is no argument over the presence of ostension. The bone of contention is that things may get abstruse in the process of interaction (Morady Moghaddam, in press). What Sperber and Wilson propose shows that ostensive behaviour is mutually intelligible or interesting for the interlocutors during the interaction. Let me further elaborate on this issue by first citing an example from Sperber and Wilson (1986, p. 52): Two prisoners, from different tribes with no common language, are put in a quarry to work back to back breaking rocks. Suddenly, prisoner A starts putting some distinct rhythm into the sound of his hammer – one-two-three, one-two, one-two-three, one-two – a rhythm that is both arbitrary and noticeable enough to attract the attention of prisoner B. This arbitrary pattern in the way the rocks are being broken has no direct relevance for B. However, there are grounds for thinking that it has been intentionally produced, and B might ask himself what A’s intentions were in producing it. One plausible assumption is that this is a piece of ostensive behaviour: that is, that A intended B to notice the pattern. This would in turn make manifest A’s desire to interact with B, which in the circumstances would be relevant enough.

By the example above, Sperber and Wilson presuppose that the ostensive behaviour of prisoner A is properly interpreted by the prisoner B as a desire for interaction. Of course, prisoner A may have this kind of intention in his mind, but there are also other possibilities (such as B might be bored or might want to mimic the rhyme of a known song without intending to communicate).7 In addition, Sperber and Wilson have also presupposed that the ostension is mutually understandable by the two parties. They have argued that “humans automatically turn their attention to what seems most relevant to them” (1986, p. 50), while ignoring the fact that individuals may deliberately not pay attention to the things that are relevant to them, or may not grasp the ostensive behaviour at all. I would like to elaborate more on this issue by providing the example of the girl and the old man (Sperber & Wilson, 1986, p. 51). The example is cited below: Suppose a girl is travelling in a foreign country. She comes out of the inn wearing light summer clothes, manifestly intending to take a stroll. An old man sitting on a bench nearby looks ostensively up at the sky. When the girl looks up, she sees a few tiny clouds, which she might have noticed for herself, but which she would normally have paid no further attention to: given her knowledge – or lack of knowledge – of the local weather, the presence of these tiny clouds is not relevant to her. Now, however, the old man is drawing her attention to the clouds in a manifestly intentional way, thus guaranteeing that there is some relevant information to be obtained.

Again, in this example, it is presupposed that the girl would clearly grasp the old man’s ostensive behaviour. However, it is quite possible that the girl does not acknowledge the ostensive behaviour of ‘looking up at the sky’. The girl may not even notice the old man, or may consider his looking up to the sky as a neck exercise, or as looking at a bird or the nearby high buildings, etc. That being the case, if the girl does notice the man’s ostensive behaviour, it is quite possible that she would 7  Returning to Weigand’s Mixed Game Model, I try to show that human beings act and react based on their emotion, experience, needs, background knowledge, social context, and so forth, which might not be properly acknowledged by others.

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misinterpret the old man’s intention. In this case, an ‘interpretation clash’ happens, although the ostensive behaviour is acknowledged. Sperber and Wilson have discussed associations between an ostensive behaviour and the formation of patterns within individuals. Nonetheless, associations happen only for those who have a shared knowledge of the same cognitive background. Interaction among individuals, one should bear in mind, is not always shaped by associations (whether they be cognitive or social). I should say that the above-mentioned ostensive examples concern non-verbal communication. Therefore, it would be more likely that misinterpretation happens in nonverbal interaction. Sperber and Wilson confess that (1986, p. 60): Non-verbal communication tends to be relatively weak. One of the advantages of verbal communication is that it gives rise to the strongest possible form of communication; it enables the hearer to pin down the speaker’s intentions about the explicit content of her utterance to a single, strongly manifest candidate, with no alternative worth considering at all.

Although verbal communication may be stronger than non-verbal communication in understanding the kind of ostension that is intended to be conveyed and the proper interpretation of the ostensive behaviour, it is quite possible that the ostensive (verbal) behaviour would be misinterpreted (verbal communication can get quite sophisticated too). On this account, the creation of relevance is not guaranteed, the way took for granted by Sperber and Wilson. The communicative intention, one may argue, may not be mutually manifested to the audience and communicator. Or if manifested, it may not be grasped as an informative intention. By analogy, one can also criticise Sperber and Wilson for arguing that “impressions fall squarely within the domain of things that can be communicated, and their very vagueness can be precisely described” (1986, p. 59). In fact, Sperber and Wilson restrict the domain of impression to things that are relevant to the cognitive abilities of individuals, while, as argued by Goffman (1956), an impression is how the interlocutor intends to present himself/herself. Therefore, in some situations, individuals may deliberately attempt to be vague in order to convey a particular impression to the interlocutor (for a discussion on irony and vagueness refer to Ghita, 2001). Yet, Relevance Theory is of importance since it combines performance and competence in a specific theory of communication. Indirect reports, as a mixed game, can be conceptualised as a sociocognitive event that takes into account Sperber and Wilson’s Relevance Theory. Indirect reports are cases of ostensive behaviour (see García-Carpintero, 1994) because, by reporting others, the reporting speaker has an intention in mind (we do not cite others without any specific reason) that he/she wants the audience to notice. This intention, however, could be fake, meaning that the reporting speaker may deliberately change the original speaker’s utterances to provide a particular intention (to convey a certain impression, according to Goffman). Therefore, as Sperber and Wilson rightly state, most human communication is intentional. Indirect reports are intentional too, in that they are produced to convey an intention. Indirect reports are cases of mutual manifestness, to use Sperber and Wilson’s terminology, in that the hearer or the addressee should con-

2.3  Cognitive Issues

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struct the communicator’s intention either through the immediate physical environment or based on previous assumptions/experiences (of course, interpretation clash may happen in indirect reports as well).

2.3.2  Appraisal Theories of Emotion In line with individuals’ attitudes and in the same vein as Sperber and Wilson’s concept of ostension, there are also ideas of appraisal theories that are of key importance in the discussion of indirect reports. Appraisal theorists believe that “emotions are elicited by evaluations (appraisals) of events and situations” (Roseman & Craig, 2001, p.  3). Therefore, appraisals are the prerequisite for emotions. Of course, although there are controversies regarding the idea that emotion is created without an intervening process of evaluation, many others strongly argue that appraisals precede emotions (Lazarus, 1964). Smith and Lazarus (1990) distinguished between molecular and molar approaches to appraisals, arguing that the former is composed of discrete units (appraisal components) that are strung together to make up a complex performance, and that the latter takes into account “gestalts of relational meaning” (Roseman & Craig, 2001, p.  14). Molecular approaches take into account personal meaning, whereas molar approaches consider situational encounters. According to Smith and Lazarus (1993, p. 237), the molar approach is conceptualised “much in the way a sentence captures a complex idea that goes beyond the meanings of its individual words.” Based on this distinction, it is now clear that indirect reports can target both molecular and molar approaches to emotion. If we consider the reporter as an ‘island’, having an individualistic approach towards emotion, we take a molecular view of emotion. However, if we consider the reporter as a ‘peninsula’, working towards the manufacturing of emotion with the help of others, we take a molar view of emotion. Thus, by considering both self- and other-­ interest towards the fulfilment of emotion, indirect reporting forms a bridge between the molecular and molar way of viewing emotion. Indirect reports are strongly influenced by individuals’ appraisals. Both the hearer and the reporting speaker participate in indirect reports based on their appraisals of the event. The reporting speaker quotes others based on his/her appraisal of the original speaker, the hearer, and the situation. The hearer too will judge the report based on his/her appraisal of the reporting speaker, the original speaker, and the situation. What makes the relationship between appraisals and indirect reports inevitable and unequivocal is the realisation of the components underlying appraisals (Smith & Kirby, 2001), and their role in shaping the practice of indirect reports. The first component of appraisals is ‘motivational relevance’, which refers to an evaluation regarding the importance of the situation for the ­individuals involved. Indirect reports are also cases of motivational relevance since both the hearer and the reporting speaker can attach varying degrees of importance to the reporting sentence. The second component of appraisals is ‘motivational congruence’, which is an estimation of goal-consistency/inconsistency. In indirect

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reports, both the hearer and the reporting speaker behave in a way that is based on the importance that they attach to the original speaker and to the utterance being reported. If the report is not important to the hearer, for instance, it will be ignored (or weakly acknowledged) as having no consistency with the hearer’s goal. The third component is ‘problem-focused coping potential’, which is an attempt by the individuals to increase or maintain the desirability of the situation, summoning a variety of sociocognitive factors into play. The reporting speaker, as also advocated by Capone (2016), should do his/her best to provide a report that is desirable both to the hearer and the original speaker. The fourth element is ‘emotion-focused coping potential’, which is conceptualised as “one’s perceived ability to psychologically adjust to and deal with the situation should it turn out to not be as desired” (Smith & Kirby, 2001, p. 123). The reporting speaker should be ready to reduce the (possible) negative consequences of the report (for example, s/he should not report face threatening utterances, unless justified by situational necessity). The reporting speaker should transfer related cues and clues to provide the hearer with the necessary information so that s/he would be able to separate the reporter’s voice from that of the original speaker. Moreover, the reporter can use the coping strategies should the report turn out to be undesirable. The fifth category is ‘self-accountability’, which refers to the degree to which one is responsible8 for the situation. The sixth component is ‘other-­accountability’, which deals with the degree to which someone or something else is responsible. This component is closely related to the fifth component and will be discussed more in Chap. 5. However, to give a brief idea of what other-­accountability is, it refers to the locus of control or to a person who accepts the responsibility for what is reported. It is possible to assign the responsibility of the reporting both to the reporter and the original speaker. Lastly, there is a component of ‘future expectancy’, which is an assessment of the degree to which the person expects the circumstances to become more or less desirable. Indirect reporting is a perfect example of how ‘future expectancy’ works. The reporter adjusts the report (does deletions, additions, etc.) based on an online analysis of the possible appraised ramifications and makes amendments beforehand.

8  The issue of responsibility is a challenging debate within the realm of indirect reports. The literature in this regard represents conflicting viewpoints. In one stance, the idea is that the responsibly of reporting slurring is on the shoulder of the original speaker (Capone, 2016). However, Capone argues that the reporting speaker can be responsible too if not observing the rules that are the sinews of indirect reporting. In the other stance, such as the one proposed by Wayne Davis (2005), the view is that the reporting speaker is guilty of reporting slurring. I will discuss my own view regarding the reporting of slurring and responsibility in due course (Chap. 5).

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2.4  Where Society and Cognition Meet Each Other 2.4.1  Indirect Reports as a Dialogic Action Weigand (2010, p. 3) argues that language as dialogue “is based on human nature and on the inherent integration of speech and other human abilities in dialogic interaction.” Elsewhere, Weigand defines human abilities in terms of “speaking and thinking and perceiving which are integratively used for communicative purposes” (2010, p. 13). Language as dialogue means language as conceptualised in a non-­ rule-­governed, open-ended world. Understanding, thus, is relative to the peculiarities of social and cognitive backgrounds. Indirect reports also work based on the Principle of Probability (Weigand, 2010). This principle states that one cannot predict what will happen in a conversation, since individuals enjoy different sociocognitive features and, thereby, would act based on their perceptions and experiences. By stating the Principle of Probability, Weigand does not attempt to suggest that dialogue is a chaotic process, but rather, to show that it is a mixture of order and disorder. Language as dialogue means language as ‘discourse’. By ‘discourse’, I direct the reader’s attention to the concept of ‘a mixed game’. The concept of language as ‘a mixed game’ is germane to Ludwig Wittgenstein’s idea of ‘language-­ game’. As Wittgenstein says, “[h]ere the term ‘language-game’ is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life” (1953, p. 11). It is interesting that indirect reports are both cases of a mixed game and a language-game. If we take for granted that indirect reports are cases of language games (which is indeed the case), it is also possible to conceptualise indirect reports as ‘a mixed game’. The concept of the mixed game, as defined by Weigand, amazingly leads us towards a sound conceptualisation of indirect reports. As reported by Weigand (2010, p. 72), “[t]he mixed game and its principles of probability go beyond regularities and norms and include individual techniques and strategies.” She further says that, in principle, individuals are free to conform to rules and conventions or they can act based on their appraisal of the situation. The end product, Weigand argues, is always enshrouded in individuals’ free will who decide how to proceed in the complex. Therefore, it is true that indirect reports are governed by specific principles (Capone, 2016), but individuals are free to breach the rules and maintain their own justifications in producing (strategic) indirect reports. Above all, rules are made to be broken. Indirect reports are cases of a complex social event. Sometimes rules are not broken, rather, they are manipulated to suit contextual factors (refer to the concept of opacity discussed by Capone, 2018). The words of Pablo Picasso best fit my argument here: “Learn the rules like a pro, so you can break them like an artist” (cited in Elkaim, 2015, p. 282). By referring to a breaching of the rules, I do not intend to say that there are no rules at all when producing indirect reports (or any other language game). What I intend to convey here is that individuals break the rules based on their perceptions of the situation (situational necessity) and based on their experiences. There is always a possibility that individuals will change the rules

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as a matter of self-interest or as a matter of politeness (or other-interest). Considering (the differences between) Wittgenstein and Weigand discussion on the concept of the game, Wittgenstein’s notion of the language game is realised in social interaction (DeAngelis, 2007) and is a rule-governed process, whereas Weigand approaches the language game as conceptualised through a ‘sociocognitive paradigm’, which is less confined to rules. To this end, I acknowledge that Wittgenstein’s notion of language game is product-oriented, something we can see, for it comes into existence, fades, or outdates. Weigand, on the other hand, pays attention to the process of meaning-making during interaction (the language game is cyclic, never-ending). For Wittgenstein, there is a “speaking outside language games” (Cavell, 1988, p. 73), which means “repudiating our shared criteria” (Cavell, 1988, p. 73), whereas for Weigand there is no speaking outside language games; speaking outside language games is impossible.

2.4.2  The Mixed Game Model In this section, I will talk about Weigand’s (2010) Mixed Game Model and Dialogic Principle proper to shed light on new horizons in the study of indirect reports. This part, then, asks for the inclusion of cognitive and affective factors, which are largely neglected in the literature of indirect reporting. As argued by Kecskes (2016, p. 11), “[l]ooking at indirect reporting as an ability, the act of reporting the speech of others comprises the interplay of cognitive, linguistic and pragmatic factors.” Among the researchers who have dealt closely with indirect reports more or less based on a cognitive view, I have come across research by Cummings (2016), Wieland (2016), and Jaszczolt (2016), all of which advocated the importance of cognitive aspects of indirect reporting. However, issues such as individuals’ appraisals and emotional processes have not been considered in the literature of indirect reports. Human beings are not emotionally neutral during the interaction. Accordingly, they resort to the emotional and judgemental sides of their personalities (whether consciously or subconsciously) in reacting to a specific social event (in this case, indirect reporting). Therefore, based on the Dialogic Principle proper, language is action and reaction. Individuals act and react based on both societal and affective filters. Accepting this argument as undisputable, one can easily grasp that indirect reporting is an unpredictable sociocognitive event since it relies on affective, social, and judgemental factors (among other things) as its underlying structure. As has been argued by Weigand (2010, p. 74), “meaning and understanding are different for different individuals and open for negotiation.” Weigand’s viewpoints towards the Dialogic Principle proper can be applied to indirect reports as well. Indirect reports are dialogic since one cannot determine a single linguistic pattern for them, given that the cognitive and social processes underlying indirect reports are largely anchored in individual differences (be they social or cognitive). Therefore, each individual would have a particular way of conceptualising and perceiving the original speaker. Likewise, the hearer would have

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his/her own interpretation of the reporting speaker and the reported utterance. Indirect reports, therefore, are cases of ‘value judgement’ that fill the gap between competence and performance (cognition and society). There is a double impact in the process of indirect reporting. Competence both affects performance and is influenced by performance. On this account, discourse is not only socially manipulated, but it is also cognitively mediated in an endless game and during a chain of actions and reactions emanated by the interlocutors. The competence/performance interface and the role of sociocognitive processes in discourse are both useful in a sound discussion on indirect reports. On the other hand, Sperber and Wilson’s (1986) Relevance Theory provides a point of departure, whereby it is possible to connect appraisal theories and individual differences with indirect reports.

2.4.3  Individual Differences The practice of indirect reporting is largely influenced by sociocognitive factors discussed earlier in this chapter. Individual differences play an important role in the formation of indirect reports. By individual differences, I mean both social and cognitive idiosyncrasies that are capable of manipulating how someone is reported and how the hearer reacts to the report. There are some general principles underlying indirect reports, as well as some unique aspects underlying their use. The uniqueness relates not only to individuals’ minds, but also to the sui generis social features such as class distinction, social power, and social perception that modify the practice of indirect reporting. One of the variables that has a significant influence on the practice of indirect reports is ‘creativity’. Indirect reports are cases of creative manipulations. Just knowing the syntactic rules does not guarantee a successful report. There are situations where the reporter should go beyond simple syntactic manipulations of the original speaker’s utterances in order to provide strategic comments or to convey a particular impression (for example, in the case of reporting face threatening utterances). Not only should the reporter be creative, but the hearer also should be an active participant and analyse the report, deciding whether to accept the report as being sincere or ask for further clarification as a way to facilitate the process of analysing the indirect report. Some questions addressing creativity are closely related to the practice of indirect reports. As for the reporting speaker, questions that may require creativity can be put forward as: ‘Is it situationally necessary to report someone else’s utterances?’, ‘is the report timely?’, ‘what are the moral and social constraints underlying the report?’, ‘how will the hearer interpret the report?’, and other similar questions. The hearer can also use creativity to deal with the following questions: ‘what is the relation of the report to the hearer?’, ‘is the report genuine and face-­ saving?’ (the reporter may suffer from schadenfreude, and report insincerely to ruin the original speaker’s character), ‘what does the report try to convey?’, ‘what is the most appropriate reaction?’, and so forth. These questions require creativity, among other things, to be dealt with properly. Of course, it is possible that one may not take

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advantage of creativity to approach the foregoing questions. Nevertheless, in order to have a good reaction to these questions, creativity can open a yawning gap between a constructive and naive engagement with the report. Social power and social distance are other variables that can have a great influence on the praxis of indirect report. Little is known about the effect of social power or social distance on indirect reports. For instance, whether it makes any difference that the original speaker is a boss, and the hearer and the reporting speaker are his/ her employees. Whether it makes sense to claim that a high degree of social distance between the reporter and the original speaker can lead to a more conservative report. Should the reporting speaker consider factors such as class, gender, and race (among other things)? These and other challenges would help us to understand the intricate nature of indirect reporting. Individual differences are pregnant with crucial information that they deserve a full chapter to be acknowledged properly. That said, although the discussion on individual differences (and their relationship with indirect reports) is compelling, I will refrain from going further into the topic here. I hope that a fuller account of this topic will soon be provided elsewhere.

2.5  Structural (Syntactic and Semantic) Issues The previous sections mainly discussed the sociocognitive issues underlying indirect reports. In this section, I create a balance between the presentation and discussion of sociocognitive vs. structural issues. In this section, some syntactic and semantic aspects of indirect reports (e.g., tense, pronoun, complementiser, and semantic/pragmatic opacity) are considered to provide a general sense of the structural properties underlying indirect reports. In line with Capone (2016, p. 75), it is argued that “it would be naïve to believe that an indirect reporter has a duty to report what was said verbatim. If she had such a duty, then we would not be able to make any difference between indirect and direct reports.” On this account, there are some rules regarding the possible transformations allowed in indirect reports. The basic transformations required in an indirect report are the change of the pronoun and tense (and adverbs of time and place, if any); therefore, the direct report ‘she said, I am happy’ will turn to an indirect report ‘she said (that) she was happy’. That said, “[i]t is possible to omit adverbs, adjectives, modifiers, in a sentence, without distorting it, if the purpose served by the indirect report is fulfilled by the omission of certain words” (Capone, 2016, p. 75). With regard to pronouns, things are complicated. In this sense, Capone (2016) provides the following example: (3)

Mary said ‘You are an idiot’.

Considering (3), there are two modes of representation: ‘you’ and ‘idiot’. As was presented earlier in this section, the indirect reporter is free to change and modify some elements of the speaker’s utterance. However, the replacement of the words

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‘you’ and ‘idiot’ will change the truth-conditionality of (3), and that is not satisfactory. Imagine replacing ‘you’ with ‘John’ and ‘idiot’ with ‘handicapped’. According to Capone (2016), the replacement is unsatisfactory because the mode of representation ‘you’ is changed to a proper name ‘John’, whereas the pronoun used in (3) does not warrant such a replacement (it is not clear whether ‘you’ represents ‘John’). Changing ‘idiot’ into ‘handicapped’ is unsatisfactory too, since “the speaker meant to insult John, rather than describe or characterize him, whereas the replacement of ‘idiot’ (which is normally used to insult) with ‘handicapped person’ seems to involve a transition from an insult to a description or characterization” (Capone, 2016, p. 56). Pure direct reports admit semantic opacity,9 whereas indirect reports admit a pragmatic kind of opacity, which is (or seems to be) intended to accommodate a certain flexibility and variability as a function of the context of utterance (in some cases substitutions of NPs having the same extension are not permitted, whereas in other cases they seem to be permitted). Another structural feature of indirect reports that has attracted substantial attention is the complementiser that, which gained its importance after the seminal work of Donald Davidson regarding the distal demonstrative that in sentences such as ‘John said that Columbus is in Ohio’ (example from Gutiérrez-Rexach, 2016, p. 553). According to Davidson (1968), a sentence such as ‘John said that Columbus is in Ohio’, where ‘that’ acts as a complementiser, can be paraphrased as ‘John said that, Columbus is in Ohio’, where ‘that’ is the distal demonstrative. Although this functional shift from a complementiser that to a demonstrative that is regarded as the starting point for a linguistic account of indirect reports (Gutiérrez-Rexach, 2016), Davidson’s Demonstration Theory, also known as the Paratactic Theory, is criticised on different grounds that require close attention (Seymour, 2016). The complementiser/demonstrative dichotomy attracted a great deal of attention from philosophical and linguistics aspects, yet it is not the only issue surrounding this mysterious element of indirect reports. There are some controversies regarding the dropping of the complementiser that. There have been some scholarly works in this regard, and interesting results have been obtained. For example, Giorgi and Haroutyunian (2018) distinguished between the subjunctive complementiser and the indicative one and argued that only the former is deletable in Modern Eastern Armenian. Although it is argued that the complementiser that is a syntactic marker that distinguishes between direct and indirect reports (Li, 1986), research studies (see Itakura’s [2018] study on Japanese language) show that this is not reliable evidence to distinguish between direct and indirect reports, since the complementiser that can be deleted from indirect reports without affecting the proposition underlying the report. It seems that each language has its own regularities for treating the complementiser that in indirect reports (and possibly for tense shift as well). It is interesting to compare languages in this regard, but for the matter of space I will not pursue this topic anymore and instead refer the reader to Güldemann and Von

9  Opacity, according to Capone (2016, p. 56), “is strictly the consequence of a view of ‘said’ which amounts to interpreting ‘said’ as ‘exactly said’.”

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Roncador (2002), where an amazing amount of information is presented with regard to how different languages treat the complementiser that in indirect reports. The structure of the indirect report can influence the information embedded in the that-clause of the report. One case in point is the difference between verbs of propositional attitude (e.g., ‘believe’, ‘remember’, ‘know’, ‘want’, etc.) and verbs of saying. Indirect reports can be expressed through either the verb ‘say’ or the verbs of knowledge, such as ‘believe’ and ‘know’. On this account, Capone (2016, p. 17) states that “‘John knows that p’ is an accurate report of John’s having said ‘p’, given that his saying ‘p’ counted as ‘I know that p’.” That being the case, Capone further elucidates that ‘John said that p’ is different from ‘John knows that p’. The issue is that “in the case of ‘John knows that p’, he did not merely utter the words ‘p’ but committed himself to their truth (to the truth of the proposition expressed by those words)” (Capone, 2016, p.  17). In toto, this justification holds true for all verbs of propositional attitude. There is some controversy regarding the question of whether verbs of propositional attitude refer to the mental representation of the person whose belief is reported. According to Capone (2018), the (not-appealing) accepted view (in line with the pragmatic theories) is that verbs of propositional attitude refer to the mental representation of the speaker who reports this belief (not the mental representation of the person whose belief is reported). However, Capone states that it is more economical to consider verbs of propositional attitude as referring to the mental representation of the original speaker. It is true that verbs of propositional attitude provide an evidential comment (they show degree of uncertainty). The same limitation is applicable to verbs of saying such as ‘said’. Consider ‘X said that P’; it is not clear whether the reporter has heard from someone else that X said that P or the reporter himself/herself has heard directly from X who said that P. On this account, using a verb of saying instead of a verb of propositional attitude does not refer to a more fine-grained indirect report. On the contrary, using a verb of propositional attitude helps the reporter to show better the degree of precision or uncertainty. In this regard, there is no difference between verbs of saying and verbs of propositional attitude. There are serious controversies with regard to the substation or addition (based on intuitions) of NPs into the indirect report (with regard to semantics). Scholars such as Jonathan Berg (2018, p.  100) distinguish between Expansion View and Explicit View and state that a sentence such as ‘Jill said: Everybody is wearing a hat’ should be interpreted (unrestrictedly) in line with the Explicit View as ‘everybody in the whole universe is wearing a hat’ and not ‘everybody she sees is wearing a hat’ (the Expansionist view). On this account, Berg (2018, p. 101) argues that although conventional wisdom accepts the Expansionist view, “upon closer and more careful examination, intuition actually favors the Explicit View over the Expansion View.” Berg questions the logic underlying the Expansion View and argues that the Expansionists do not consider whether ‘what is meant is what actually said’. On this account, Berg argues against Intuitive Semantics10 by suggesting  “The truth-conditions yielded by a semantic theory should match our ordinary judgments; what’s said is what intuitively seems to be said” (Berg, 2018, p. 104).

10

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that the ordinary judgement lacks consistency and rigour. Although Berg says that the answer to the Expansion/Explicit dichotomy comes out of pragmatic intrusion, he rejects the Expansion View and suggests that this view falls short of accounting for the practice of samesaying11 in indirect discourse reports. Capone (2012) also shares his concern in this regard. He reports that “a good practice of indirect reporting should rest on literal meaning or whether one should recognize the reporter’s duty to report (mainly) the speaker’s meaning and not to confine herself to the literal meaning” (Capone 2018, p. 9). Capone (2016) has a more powerful explanation when it comes to confusion between the speaker meaning and the literal meaning: Suffice it to say for the time being that I am inclined to accept a view that indirect reports, usually or normally, report an interpreted utterance and thus encapsulate features of the context of utterance, although I would probably have to concede that in the presence of insufficient clues, an indirect report may be taken to minimally report the locutionary content of what was said. However, this is not the default interpretation of an indirect report, and we need abundant clues to discard the default interpretation involving a reference to the (original) speaker’s meaning. Intuitively, one reports an uninterpeted locutionary act only if there are ambiguities and one is not able to settle the ambiguity by coming to a plausible (preferred) interpretation. Proffering an indirect report that is very close to the literal act amounts to a surrender: one is not able to report the speaker’s meaning because there are irreducible ambiguities and one wants to get the hearer involved in settling the ambiguity, requiring an investment in responsibility. (Capone 2016, p. 2)

It is clear from the quote above that we cannot say for sure which view is more accurate: Expansion or Explicit. But what is clear is that, based on the ‘principle of economy’12 and considering Capone’s (2016) Principle of Prudence (see Chap. 5, Section 5.7), the reporter can use (relevant and sincere) contextual clues to avoid transferring information that is syntactically or semantically ambiguous. This is quite justified based on pragmatic opacity (as opposed to semantic opacity) discussed by Capone (see Capone, 2018). Returning back to ‘Jill said: Everybody is wearing a hat’, the reporter’s inclination towards Expansion or Explicit View (it is not easy to argue which view is more sound merely based on logic) is something that can be accounted for based on the sociocognitive factors underlying indirect reports. For sure, taking for granted that the reporter has had access to the source information, it is logical to assume that the meaning underlying the report is the most reliable realisation of the original utterance and should be trusted (unless there is evidence against the sincerity of the report).

 Capone (2016, p. 24) defines samesaying as “the report and the speech to be reported have some broad content in common.” 12  According to Sperber and Wilson (1986, p. vii): “[h]uman cognitive processes, we argue, are geared to achieving the greatest possible cognitive effect for the smallest possible processing effort.” 11

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2.6  Conclusion In this chapter, I showed that it is unfair to approach the indirect report merely as a situated speech act being directed only by restricted syntactic and semantic rules. Restricting indirect reports to a set of syntactic transformations is an underestimation of the complexities revolving around them.13 The literature on indirect reporting is replete with philosophical considerations and little attempt is made to cover the sociocognitive and structural complexities that underlie the practice of indirect reports. If we agree that indirect reports can observe and violate the Cooperative Principle, we can likewise confirm that what is regarded as licit and illicit in indirect reports is also controlled by the individuals’ sociocognitive idiosyncrasies. Therefore, indirect reports take into account not only Grice’s principle of cooperation, but they also hinge on Sperber and Wilson’s (1986) Relevance Theory. Indirect reports fit well with the two general principles of Relevance Theory (the ‘principle of relevance’ and the ‘principle of economy’). For this reason, I conclude here that indirect reports are perfect cases of what Foucault (1966) refers to as a ‘representation of a representation’. The first use of representation is related to performance, whereas the second use of the term refers to competence. Representation of a representation is conceptualised as Foucault’s idea of ʻprononcer les idées’, advocating a view of human communication that values expressing or uttering ideas. Moreover, indirect reports closely embrace the features underlying appraisal theories of emotion. In fact, indirect reporting is a good replica of how emotion is orchestrated during the different phases of indirect reporting (before, while, and after phases). I hope that I have been able to enlighten the reader about the importance of social, cognitive, and structural features underlying indirect reporting. Although I do not claim to have been comprehensive in my analysis of these features presented in this chapter (and it would not have been possible even if I had wished to, considering the space that would be required to deal with all the complexities), I feel confident that I have provided an illustration (a general picture) of how social, cognitive, and structural factors work during the practice of indirect reporting. I believe that in the future we will hear more about the sociocognitive and structural complexities of indirect reporting, and that such knowledge is within walking distance.

References Apostel, L. (1980). De l’ intérrogation en tant qu’ action. Langue Française, 52, 23–42. Attardo, S. (1997). Locutionary and perlocutionary cooperation: The perlocutionary cooperative principle. Journal of Pragmatics, 27, 753–779.  What I argue here is as a staunch ally of Capone’s argument (2016, p. 8), where he states that “disguised indirect reports usually correspond to statements of feelings, states of mind, attitudes the speaker (the reporter) could not have access to without the experiencer’s giving voice to his/ her emotions, feelings, attitudes, etc.”

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Berg, J.  (2018). Intuitions and the semantics of indirect discourse. In A.  Capone, M.  Garcia-­ Carpintero, & A.  Falzone (Eds.), Indirect reports and pragmatics in the world languages (pp. 99–108). Cham, Switzerland: Springer. Bollobas, E. (1981). Who’s afraid of irony? An analysis of uncooperative behaviour in Edward Elbee’s Who’s afraid of Virginia Woolf? Journal of Pragmatics, 5, 323–334. Bousfield, D. (2008). Impoliteness in interaction. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Capone, A. (2012). Indirect reports as language games. Pragmatics and Cognition, 20(3), 593–613. Capone, A. (2016). The pragmatics of indirect reports: Socio-philosophical considerations. Cham, Switzerland: Springer. Capone, A. (2018). On the social praxis of indirect reporting. In A. Capone, M. Garcia-Carpintero, & A. Falzone (Eds.), Indirect reports and pragmatics in the world languages (pp. 3–20). Cham, Switzerland: Springer. Cavell, S. (1988). Declining decline: Wittgenstein as a philosopher of culture. Inquiry, 31(3), 253–264. Clift, R., & Holt, E. (2007). Introduction. In E. Holt & R. Clift (Eds.), Reporting talk: Reported speech in interaction (pp. 1–15). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Corliss, R. L. (1981). What determines a pragmatic implication? Southern Journal of Philosophy, 19, 37–48. Cummings, L. (2016). Reported speech: A clinical pragmatic perspective. In A. Capone, F. Kiefer, & F. Lo Piparo (Eds.), Indirect reports and pragmatics: Interdisciplinary studies (pp. 31–54). Cham, Switzerland: Springer. Davidson, D. (1968). On saying that. Synthese, 19, 130–146. Davis, W. (2005). Non descriptive meaning and reference: An ideational semantics. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. DeAngelis, W. J. (2007). Ludwig Wittgenstein-a cultural point of view: Philosophy in the darkness of this time. Cornwall, UK: Ashgate. Elkaim, Y. (2015). The all-day fat-burning diet: The 5-day food-cycling formula that resets your metabolism to lose up to 5 pounds a week. Emmaus, PA: Rodale. Fish, A. (1999). Careless lives cost words: Catch 22: The uncooperative principle, ritualised conflict and subversion. Paper given at the Pragmatics and Stylistics Research Group, Lancaster University, Lancaster. Foucault, M. (1966). Les mots et les choses: Une archéology des sciences humaines [The order of things: An archeology of the human sciences]. New York: Pantheon. Fraser, B. (1990). Perspectives on politeness. Journal of Pragmatics, 14, 219–236. García-Carpintero, M. (1994). Ostensive signs: Against the identity theory of quotation. The Journal of Philosophy, 91(5), 253–264. Ghita, A. (2001). Negotiation of irony in dialogue. In E. Weigand & M. Dascal (Eds.), Negotiation and power in dialogic interaction (pp. 139–148). Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Giorgi, A., & Haroutyunian, S. (2018). Indirect reports in Modern Eastern Armenian. In A. Capone, M. Garcia-Carpintero, & A. Falzone (Eds.), Indirect reports and pragmatics in the world languages (pp. 277–298). Cham, Switzerland: Springer. Goffman, E. (1956). The presentation of self in everyday life. New York: Doubleday. Goffman, E. (1974). Frame analysis: An essay on the organization of experience. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University. Gregoromichelaki, E., & Kempson, R. (2016). Reporting, dialogue, and the role of grammar. In A. Capone, F. Kiefer, & F. Lo Piparo (Eds.), Indirect reports and pragmatics: Interdisciplinary studies (pp. 115–150). Cham, Switzerland: Springer. Grice, H. P. (1975). Logic and conversation. In P. Cole & J. L. Morgan (Eds.), Syntax and semantics (pp. 41–58). New York: Academic. Grice, H. P. (1989). Study in the way of words. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Güldemann, T., & Von Roncador, M. (Eds.). (2002). Reported discourse: A meeting ground for different linguistic domains. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

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Gutiérrez-Rexach, J.  (2016). Indirect reports, information, and non-declaratives. In A.  Capone, F.  Kiefer, & F.  Lo Piparo (Eds.), Indirect reports and pragmatics: Interdisciplinary studies (pp. 553–572). Cham, Switzerland: Springer. Halliday, M. A. K. (1978). Language as social semiotic: The social interpretation of language and meaning. London: Arnold. Halliday, M. A. K. (2003a). On language and linguistics (Vol. 3). London: Continuum. Halliday, M.  A. K. (2003b). Introduction: On the ‘architecture’ of human language. In M.  A. K. Halliday & J. Webster (Eds.), On language and linguistics (pp. 1–29). London: Continuum. Horn, L. (1996). Presupposition and implicature. In S. Lappin (Ed.), The handbook of contemporary semantic theory (pp. 299–310). Oxford, UK: Blackwell. Itakura, H. (2018). Accuracy in reported speech: Evidence from masculine and feminine Japanese language. In A. Capone, M. Garcia-Carpintero, & A. Falzone (Eds.), Indirect reports and pragmatics in the world languages (pp. 315–332). Cham, Switzerland: Springer. Jaszczolt, K.  M. (2016). The syntax-pragmatics merger: Belief reports in the theory of default semantics. In A. Capone, F. Kiefer, & F. Lo Piparo (Eds.), Indirect reports and pragmatics: Interdisciplinary studies (pp. 383–404). Cham, Switzerland: Springer. Kasher, A. (1977). What is a theory of use? Journal of Pragmatics, 1(2), 105–120. Kecskes, I. (2016). Indirect reporting in bilingual language production. In A. Capone, F. Kiefer, & F. Lo Piparo (Eds.), Indirect reports and pragmatics: Interdisciplinary studies (pp. 9–30). Cham, Switzerland: Springer. Kiefer, F. (1979). What do the conversational maxims explain? Linguisticae Investigationes, 3(1), 57–74. Lazarus, R. S. (1964). A laboratory approach to the dynamics of psychological stress. American Psychologist, 19, 400–411. Leech, G. N. (1983). Principles of pragmatics. New York: Longman. Leech, G. N., & Thomas, J. (1990). Language, meaning and context: Pragmatics. In N. E. Collinge (Ed.), An encyclopedia of language (pp. 173–206). London: Routledge. Levinson, S. C. (2001). Presumptive meaning: The theory of generalized conversational implicature. Cambridge, MA: A Bradford Book. Li, C.  N. (1986). Direct speech and indirect speech: A functional study. In F.  Coulmas (Ed.), Direct and indirect reports: Trends in linguistics, studies, and monographs (pp. 29–45). Berlin, Germany: Mouton De Gruyter. Manstead, A.  S. R., & Fischer, A.  H. (2001). The social world as object of and influence on appraisal processes. In K. R. Scherer, A. Schorr, & T. Johnstone (Eds.), Appraisal processes in emotion (pp. 221–232). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. Mohaghegh, J. B. (2010). New literature and philosophy of the Middle East: The chaotic imagination. New York: Palgrave. Morady Moghaddam, M. (in press). Appraising and reappraising of compliments and the provision of responses: Automatic and non-automatic reactions. Pragmatics. Norrick, N. R. (2016). Indirect reports, quotation and narrative. In A. Capone, F. Kiefer, & F. Lo Piparo (Eds.), Indirect reports and pragmatics: Interdisciplinary studies (pp. 93–113). Cham, Switzerland: Springer. Pratt, M. L. (1977). Toward a speech act theory of literary discourse. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press. Pratt, M. L. (1981). The ideology of speech-act theory. Centrum, 1(1), 5–18. Ritzer, G. (2007). Contemporary sociological theory and its classical roots: The basics. New York: McGraw-Hill. Röhrig, S. (2010). The acquisition of scalar implicature. Göttingen, Germany: Universitätsverlag Göttingen. Roseman, I. J., & Craig, A. S. (2001). Appraisal theory: Overview, assumptions, varieties, controversies. In K. R. Scherer, A. Schorr, & T. Johnstone (Eds.), Appraisal processes in emotion (pp. 3–20). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

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Sampson, G. (1982). The economics of conversation: Comments on Joshi’s paper. In N. V. Smith (Ed.), Mutual knowledge. London: Academic. Seymour, M. (2016). Indirect discourse and quotation. In A.  Capone, F.  Kiefer, & F.  L. Piparo (Eds.), Indirect reports and pragmatics (pp. 355–376). Cham, Switzerland: Springer. Smith, C., & Kirby, L. D. (2001). Toward delivering on the promise of appraisal theory. In K. R. Scherer, A.  Schorr, & T.  Johnstone (Eds.), Appraisal processes in emotion (pp.  121–138). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. Smith, C. A., & Lazarus, R. S. (1990). Emotion and adaptation. In L. A. Pervin (Ed.), Handbook of personality: Theory and research (pp. 609–637). New York: Guilford. Smith, C. A., & Lazarus, R. S. (1993). Appraisal components, core relational themes, and the emotions. Cognition and Emotion, 7, 233–269. Sperber, D., & Wilson, D. (1986). Relevance. Oxford, UK: Blackwell. Watts, R. J. (2003). Politeness. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Weigand, E. (2010). Dialogue: The mixed game. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Weiland, N. (2016). Reporting practices and reported entities. In A. Capone, F. Kiefer, & F. Lo Piparo (Eds.), Indirect reports and pragmatics: Interdisciplinary studies (pp. 541–552). Cham, Switzerland: Springer. Wierzbicka, A. (1974). The semantics of direct and indirect discourse. Papers in Linguistics, 7, 267–307. Windisch, U. (1990). Speech and reasoning in everyday life. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Wittgenstein, L. (1953). Philosophical investigations (G. E. M. Anscombe, Trans.). Oxford, UK: Blackwell.

Chapter 3

Philosophical Considerations

Ordinary language is a part of the human organism and no less complicated than it is. It is humanly impossible to get the logic of language out of it directly. Language disguises thought. And in just such a way that it is impossible to draw any conclusions from the external form of the costume, the disguise, about the form of the disguised thought; because the costume’s external form is made for purposes quite distinct from that of making known the form of the body. The implicit adjustments for understanding ordinary language are immensely complicated. (Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus, cited in Von Kutschera, 2012, p. 217)

3.1  Introduction The indirect report is an important topic in the philosophy of language. It is not entirely clear why there is a conspicuous literature on indirect reports in philosophy but not in linguistics. It probably has to do with the fact that, in philosophy, the issue of indirect reports was mainly addressed by Donald Davidson in a seminal paper, which obtained a surprising number of critical replies (see Ludwig, 2003). Davidson attempted to deal with the alleged opacity of indirect reports (utterances such as ‘John knows that Mary is in Paris) by insisting on semantic innocence and by stressing the important parallel between direct and indirect reports (Capone, 2018; Zwicky, 1971). Both types of reports seem to be characterised by opacity, even if the difference is mainly a matter of degree, as pure direct reports admit semantic opacity (refer to Garvey [2000] for an interesting account of semantic opacity), whereas pragmatic opacity in indirect reports allows for some degree of flexibility and variability as a function of the context of utterance. The various theories and ideas proposed within the field of philosophy have directly influenced and shaped our knowledge of language and its logic. Indirect

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019 M. Morady Moghaddam, The Praxis of Indirect Reports, Perspectives in Pragmatics, Philosophy & Psychology 21, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-14269-8_3

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reporting, as cases of language games,1 is a rich linguistic phenomenon that is manufactured within the course of interaction. Therefore, any discussion on indirect reporting that claims to be all-inclusive is actually lame without a discussion on philosophical components.2 This chapter has been specifically devoted to the discussion of philosophical underpinnings of indirect reporting. I have proposed different viewpoints with regard to indirect reporting including, among other things, a theory of knowledge, semiotics, and a ‘photosynthetic’ view of indirect reporting. In this chapter, I have tried to discuss important philosophical points that regulate the practice of indirect reporting and provide some historical context on the issue.

3.2  Some Logical Points The logic of indirect reports is very much under the influence of the semantics of proper names (and the discussions it generated afterwards), which is first discussed by Gottlob Frege. By distinguishing between ‘the morning star is the morning star’ and ‘the morning star is the evening star’, Frege argued that although the morning star (der Morgenstern) and the evening star (der Abendstern) refer to the same thing (they have the same reference), the planet Venus, the sense is different, in that the former is self-evident and a priori whereas the latter is derived by reasoning and seems a posteriori. Frege distinguishes between these two sentences in Begriffsschrift (Section 8): […] signs are mere proxies for their content, and thus any phrase they occur in just expresses a relation between their various contents […]. Thus, along with the introduction of a symbol for equality of content, all symbols are necessarily given a double meaning – the same symbols stand now for their own content, now for themselves. (Frege, 1879)

Elsewhere, Frege states (from ‘On Sense and Reference’): If words are used in the ordinary way, what one intends to speak of is their reference. It can also happen, however, that one wishes to talk about the words themselves or their sense. This happens, for instance, when the words of another are quoted. One’s own words then first designate words of the other speaker, and only the latter have their usual reference. We then have signs of sings. In writing, the words are in this case enclosed in quotation marks. Accordingly, a word standing between quotation marks must not be taken as having its ordinary references. […] In direct quotation, a sentence designates another sentence, and in indirect quotation a though. (pp. 58–65)

By referring to the use of that-clauses for reporting the sense of the words (Parsons, 1982), Frege was the first known author to systematically account for the practice of indirect reporting:

1  In line with Wittgenstein (1997, Section 23), “language game” is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or a form of life. 2  Clift and Holt (2007) acknowledge the importance of philosophy in indirect reporting, referring to Mikhail Bakhtin’s notion of ‘polyphony’ as an instantiation of the idea of indirect reporting.

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The case of an abstract noun clause, introduced by ‘that’, includes the case of indirect quotation, in which we have seen the words to have their indirect reference coinciding with what is customarily their sense. In this case, then, the subordinate clause has for its reference a thought, not a truth-value; as sense not a thought, but the sense of the words “the thought, that…”, which is only a part of the thought in the entire complex sentence. This happens after ‘say’, ‘hear’, ‘be of the opinion,’ ‘be convinced’, ‘conclude’, and similar words. (p. 66)

Frege’s general semantic theory has another important thing to offer regarding the use-mention distinction. As reported by Harnish (2007, Section 6), “[…] there is no reason to suppose that the occurrence of the quoted material changes from its usual type interpretation in mention use to a token occurrence in quotation reports.” On this account, a distinction can be made between direct and indirect reports. That is, in direct quotation the quoted words refer to themselves, whereas in indirect quotation the quoted words refer the word’s customary sense. Being inspired by Frege’s work on quotation, and specifically the ‘use-mention’ distinction, Donald Davidson proposed his much-debated ‘demonstrative theory’, whereby he argues that in quotations, what comes between the quotation marks is discharged from the sentence containing the quotation (see Davidson, 1979). Davidson tried to restore semantic innocence through his famous paratactic treatment that separates the utterance produced by the original speaker from the utterance that reports it: ‘John said that. Mary is in Paris’. In this example, there are not shifts in senses, as argued by Frege, and yet the opacity effect is achieved (for a detailed analysis of Davidson’s hypothesis, refer to Seymour, 1994). By separating the different portions of the utterance, a sentence such as ‘John said that Mary is in Paris’ could be seen as having the logical form in ‘John said that. Mary is in Paris’. Volosinov’s view is more linguistic, rather than philosophical, yet at least it is in line with the eminent philosophical tradition introduced by Davidson. Davidson’s treatment has the merit of explaining opacity in a direct way. If one replaces paraphrases of the portion ‘Mary is in Paris’ into ‘John said that. Mary is in Paris’, the truth-conditions may change, as one may always object that, in fact, given the different words, John did not say that. If Davidson’s treatment has the advantage of highlighting the analogies between direct and indirect reports, it also obscures the differences. In direct reports, opacity is semantic and admits no exceptions (if the direct report is pure and NOT an indirect report in disguise). In indirect reports, opacity seems to be to a greater extent a pragmatic matter. Much depends on how the portion ‘Mary is in Paris’ of ‘John said that. Mary is in Paris’ is to be interpreted. If it is intended as quasi-quotation, then opacity follows. If it is interpreted more liberally, as Davidson himself suggests, as expressing the content of what John said, then (semantic) opacity need not follow, but only a pragmatic one is admitted, more or less along the lines of Capone’s treatment of indirect reports, which will be discussed later. It is not surprising, therefore, that Davidson’s treatment raised a myriad of replies, many of which were very critical, and that there is a consensus nowadays that Davidson’s position at least needs to be expanded and improved (some scholars, in fact, are even skeptical about whether it explains anything). However, with modern theories about pragmatic intrusion, some pragmatic expansions of ‘John

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said that. Mary is in Paris’ could easily respond to the objections raised by Davidson’s critics. It seems obvious to us that Davidson’s formulation admits pragmatic expansion and that in some contexts it can be equated with literal quotation, whereas in others it need not be equated to literal quotation, from which it follows that semantic opacity is not admitted, but a kind of pragmatic opacity along the lines proposed by Capone (2010) is to be admitted. Davidson’s treatment can be rescued and, in fact, is an important basis for a linguistic theory of polyphony.

3.3  Dialogism in Indirect Reports Language is art, or to be more exact, a philosophy of existence (Wettstein, 2016). Arguing that indirect reports are cases of dialogism, I tend to see them as bringing to light a view that embraces “the whole human existence in the world” (Björklund, 2011, p. 42). This view originates from Mikhail Bakhtin’s idea of ‘voice’. According to Bakhtin, “[t]o be means to communicate dialogically. When the dialog is finished, all is finished. […] One voice alone concludes nothing and decides nothing. Two voices is the minimum for life, the minimum for existence” (Bakhtin, 1973, p. 213).3 Bakhtin, who proposed the idea of dialogism, believes that a single voice does not make any sense, for communication is mostly a dynamic and relational process. Bakhtin introduces the concept of ‘voice’ and distinguishes between single-­ voiced discourse (odnogolosoe slovo) and double-voiced discourse (dvugolosoe slovo). He argues that all utterances are dialogic and consist of two voices. Furthermore, he uses the term ‘polyphony’ (simultaneity of voices) to emphasise the dialogic nature of discourse, suggesting that there are several consciousnesess present in discourse (Bakhtin, 1973). Indirect reports, besides being cases of language games (Capone, 2016), are hybrid constructions,4 to use Bakhtin’s terminology. The idea of the hybrid construction suggests that every sentence can be regarded as an indirect report since, if we take Bakhtin’s view of dialogue for granted, human beings’ interactions are not neutral and are always attached to belief systems that are shaped and filled with the presence of others (we do not speak in a vacuum). Viewing indirect reporting as a hybrid construction, we can also argue that individuals’ utterances are an indirect report of belief systems that are formed by the way in which individuals have been educated, raised, nourished, and emotionalised. Bakhtin was, therefore, the first philosopher to refer to the idea of reporting other’s voices in the process of dialogue through intertextuality. Intertextuality is conceptualised by Kristeva (1980, p. 66) as the fact that “any text is constructed as a mosaic of quotations; any text is the absorption and transformation of another.”  Jakobson’s (1971) concept of ‘speech within speech’ also refers to the combination of voices.  Bakhtin argues that “a hybrid construction is an utterance that belongs, by its grammatical (syntactic) and compositional markers, to a single speaker, but that actually contains mixed within it two utterances, two speech manners, two styles, two ‘languages’, two semantic and axiological belief systems” (1981, p. 304). 3 4

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Through active participation, Bakhtin argues that the narrator and the narratee participate in a purposeful process that is made up of orientations and impressions. Indirect reporting is a case of narration that takes into account the concepts of ‘orientation’ and ‘impression’. Through indirect reports, the reporting speaker and the hearer try to impress one another, and the interlocutors are oriented towards (or act based on) their counterparts’ reactions, expectations, and critical thinking. The above discussion indicates that indirect reports are not just a social event, but rather, the whole individual participates in the process of indirect reports. On this view, factors such as emotion, world view, experience, upbringing, and many other related factors are among those that play a role in the picture, suggesting that indirect reporting is not merely influenced by the immediate environment. While making an indirect report, the reporting speaker must resort to a myriad of factors to decide how, why, when, and where an indirect report should be uttered. A report, for instance, is uttered because one intends to provide evidence as a justification for a claim. The (more or less) authoritative role of the indirect report, in this instance, requires that the hearer acknowledges the original speaker as a reliable source of information. The hearer must also accept the sincerity of the report. Keeping this in mind, the reporter should provide enough information so that the hearer would be able to ascertain the reporting speaker’s main goal or intent. In other words, the indirect report should target ‘mutual advantage’ if it is going to be fecund. Moreover, indirect reports are a kind of mental formation, whereby the hearer and the reporting speaker assign values to the original speaker. The reporter not only assigns values to himself/herself but also to the original speaker (it provides new commitments) and to the hearer. It is a mental formation of the reporting speaker, since the hearer will form a judgement about the reporter based on the hearer’s perception of the report, the situation, and the original speaker. For instance, the hearer may decide (based on one’s knowledge and background information about the original speaker) that the reporting speaker is a liar, sympathetic, cunning, or jealous. The reporter may also form a mental image of the hearer based on the perlocutionary effect of the report (hearer’s reaction). The reporter may perceive the hearer to be naive, smart, indifferent, or emotional, based on the reactions of the hearer after hearing the report. In this case, accordingly, one can argue that indirect reports are cases of dramaturgical perspective. This means that indirect reports assign values to interlocutors, for the report shapes our knowledge about the actors on stage.

3.4  Epistemology of Indirect Reports Indirect reports manifest a theory of knowledge by advocating the entry points and key elements that may lead to an understanding of how knowledge works and what its sequences are. Indirect reports embrace different ‘ways of knowing’ by resorting to linguistic, cognitive, social, and philosophical concepts, such as sense perception, reason, emotion, faith, imagination, intuition, memory, language, and so forth. In order to fully understand the practice of indirect reporting, one should bear in mind

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that it interacts with different ways of knowing as its building blocks. Thus, interlocutors take advantage of different ways of knowing to justify and manage the practice of indirect reporting. Why is it important to discuss the ‘knowledge base’ underlying the practice of indirect reports? Such a knowledge base would help the hearer or the reporting speaker to approach indirect reports based on individual characteristics, thus rendering the practice of indirect reporting a subjective phenomenon5 (more will be said in this regard in Chap. 4). Suffice it to say that despite all the principles and parameters that have established restrictions for the practice of indirect reports (refer to Capone, 2016; also see Chap. 6 of this volume for a comprehensive overview of the issue), the reporter can impose his/her perspective upon that of the original speaker (Kiefer [2016, p. 77] states that “the speaker may also express her subjective evaluation of what is being reported”). Although there are some constraints on indirect reports (and I believe that without such constraints the practice would go awry), individuals give themselves the right to ignore the rules based on their different ways of knowing. One individual may approach the report based on an emotional stance, whereas another individual may deal with it logically. Faith can also play an important role in dealing with indirect reports. One case in point is ‘gossiping’. For Muslims, gossiping is considered a deadly sin and people who commit themselves to obey Islamic rules do their best not to unfairly circulate information about someone’s tawdry behaviour. Therefore, religion can act as a ‘self-control force’ or ‘abstinence management’ for Muslims and unfaithful comments about other’s hauteur are frowned upon and not welcomed among them. Faithful comments about other’s wrongdoing should pass the situational necessity (the divulgence should be licit and warranted, and hence provide positive results). On this account, faith forces individuals to refrain from reporting (or even listening to) utterances that may reveal the wrongdoing or misdemeanours of others. Besides embracing the ‘ways of knowing’, indirect reports also take into consideration ‘areas of knowledge’. Among the most related ‘areas of knowledge’ that directly influence the practice of indirect reporting are human sciences, ethics, arts, and logic. Rules of logic are useful for pinpointing the underlying processes of indirect reports. Indirect reports are highly dependent on the rules of ethics, and the principles governing the practice of indirect reports, in fact, show the way ethics work. Indirect reports represent an artistic work, whereby the reporting speaker and the hearer should take into consideration the stylistic devices and arrangements of the utterances. For this reason, the reporter sometimes resorts to aesthetics to convey a particular impact. Needless to say, indirect reports are closely related to human sciences in areas such as culture, society, and even biology (refer to Weigand [2010] for an insightful discussion on the relationship between biology and language). Despite issues such as ‘ways of knowing’ and ‘areas of knowledge’, there are also areas that transcend individuals’ ‘ways of knowing’. Nature of knowing (differences between forms of knowledge such as belief, faith, opinion, etc.), knowledge communities, knowers’ perspective (the effect of age, education, etc.), and 5  In line with Seymour (2016, p. 373), “the reporter chooses to represent the saying in the subjective perspective of the agent or from his own objective perspective.”

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k­ nowledge claims (responsibility of knowledge) are all areas that go beyond ‘ways of knowing’ and influence indirect reporting. This discussion would become far too technical if I were to go over each of these areas one by one (however, for further study refer to Cross, 2006; Kelly, McDonald, & Wickman, 2012). Instead, I have chosen to discuss the more related topic of the distinction between knowledge and belief. This distinction and the relationship of knowledge and belief with indirect reports are elaborated on in next section. Besides being a process of formation by way of assumptions, indirect reports closely embrace a theory of knowledge, for they can provide a distinction between believing and knowing. The epistemology of indirect reports reveals that there is always a conflict in the knowledge/belief dimension. The knowledge/belief dichotomy was conceptualised by Austin (1979) under his analysis of the notion of knowledge. Knowledge means claiming something based on one’s own official right to say that things are so (Austin, 1979). Knowledge, therefore, means to assert that something is definitely right when that assertion is testable and reliable.6 Belief, on the other hand, is tentative and outside individuals’ experiences. Indirect reporting, as I argue, is a case that reconciles this distinction and solves the puzzle of the knowledge/belief dimension. Claiming that indirect reports should be formed based on a ‘factive sense’ (or knowledge base) is too ideal an interpretation, and hence unreal. In some situations, the factive sense is not (or cannot be) observed by the reporting speaker. The factive sense, as related to knowledge, means that ‘one cannot know something that is not the case’. By analogy, the factive sense implies that ‘one cannot report something that is not the case’. To elaborate further, and to better reveal my own thoughts on this matter, I believe that the reporter can use his/her knowledge to make sure that the report is faithful and belongs to the original speaker’s perspective (rather than to that of reporting speaker). However, the factive sense is disputable, since there are situations where the reporting speaker intends to be strategic, by changing the syntax of the original speaker’s utterances to avoid unwanted consequences. On this account, same-saying (content match) is not always respected. Indirect reporting allows for subjective manipulations. Let me illustrate this by using the concept of appraisal discussed earlier. Appraisals are immediate judgements about an event in the course of interaction. In reporting an utterance, the reporter’s as well as the hearer’s appraisal of the context and situation can form the report. However, Capone’s Paraphrase/Style Principle tells us that the “forms should be as close as possible to those of the original utterances” (2016, p. 188). To illustrate this contradiction, imagine that Mary said to Fred about John in a moment of anger: ‘That bastard makes me so nervous’. Fred in reporting to John may say: ‘Mary said that you make her so nervous’ (rather than she said that you are a bastard who makes her so nervous). This is related to Fred’s appraising Mary’s insulting comment as h­ aving 6  In this regard, Austin (1962) distinguishes between locutionary and illocutionary acts. In ‘John said: p’, John performs the action (locutionary act) but in ‘John said that p’, John is being described as uttering something (illocutionary act). In this case, as reported by Davis (2016, p. 308), “[i]llocutionary saying is much like asserting, but asserting is stronger.”

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occurred in a moment of anger and being something that Mary may regret having said. Of course, Capone’s principle does not push the reporter towards complete objectivity, but the principle would force Fred to issue an indirect report as close as possible to the original words. Fred may decide to be ‘diplomatic’ (and hence subjective), and thus change Mary’s words, deleting the offensive word ‘bastard’, as Mary would be grateful for this modification once her anger has subsided. On the other hand, Capone argues that indirect reports are dependent upon creativity and narrative abilities, which shows rather clearly that Capone does not counterargue subjectivity in indirect reports. This dependence can endanger the “sameness of content” (Capone, 2016, p. 27) and consequently puts at risk the Paraphrase/Form Principle, since individuals have different skills with regard to creativity and narrative abilities, and therefore, subjectivity is exercised differently. It seems that Capone only warrants transformations that deal closely with politeness issues. Capone argues that “the original speaker would like to see herself reported in a way that does not attribute her offences, impoliteness, rudeness, obscenity, and also slurring” (2016, p. 150). That said, subjectivity is different from inadvertent transformations. Capone states that there should be a constraint on the replacements of co-referential NPs in indirect reports. Accordingly, it is problematic to change ‘Mary said that John is an idiot’ to ‘Mary insulted John’ or ‘Mary offended John’. By saying something, it is not clear to the hearer whether the reporter has heard the information directly from the original speaker or the information has been received from a secondary information (for example, from another reporter). ‘Mary insulted John’ or ‘Mary offended John’ does not communicate the uncertainty that is manifest in ‘Mary said that John is an idiot’. ‘Mary insulted John’ or ‘Mary offended John’ are assertions, whereas ‘Mary said that John is an idiot’ is ambiguous with regard to its relevance to semantic or pragmatic opacity. Semantic opacity refers to verbatim reports where Paraphrase/Form Principle is respected, whereas pragmatic opacity embraces some degree of subjectivity. When the reporting speaker trespasses on his/her knowledge base and resorts to his/her belief system (subjectivity is observed), a knowledge/belief conflict occurs. In this situation, the reporting speaker may not be certain whether to be faithful to the original speaker or change the utterance based on his/her judgement of the situation. Additionally, the conflict arises in two situations based on the factive sense. The first case of knowledge/belief conflict occurs when the reporting speaker is not sure whether the hearer is regarding the report as a transmission of fact or belief. In this case, the conflict happens because the reporting speaker is not confident about the hearer’s conceptualisation of the report. The second kind of conflict, which is a more baroque one, happens when the hearer is not sure whether to accept the report as knowledge or belief. In this case, the hearer may not know the original speaker very well or may not trust the reporter. Consequently, the hearer cannot make up his/ her mind whether to accept the report as knowledge or belief. This clash, I should confess, is not something unnatural, for it is actually built into the process of indirect reporting. In other words, the hearer’s doubt is anticipated, since the reporter may add his/her voice to the report in order to be impressive or cooperative. In this

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Fig. 3.1  The place of the indirect report in relation to the knowledge/belief dichotomy

Knowledge

Indirect Report

Belief

way, indirect reports can be a compromise between knowing and believing. Figure 3.1 shows the interaction between knowledge and belief, and where indirect reports fit into the design. The practice of indirect reporting is not constrained by pure knowledge, but rather, by a mélange of knowledge and belief. In an ideal scenario or in a vacuum, in order to deal with the conflict, the reporter should transfer the knowledge of the situation; however, things can become tangled in the complicated language game, and the boundary between knowledge and belief may be blurred by sociocognitive factors. The knowledge/belief distinction and the way in which it is represented by the hearer and the reporting speaker show that indirect reports cannot be easily assessed as being true or false. As cited in Wettstein (2016, p. 422), Quine argues that: Commonly the degree of allowable deviation [from the original utterance] depends on why we are quoting. It is a question of what traits of the quoted speaker’s remark we want to make something of; those are the traits that must be kept straight if indirect quotation is to count as true.

‘Why we are quoting’ can be addressed differently by different people. People approach each other based on various sociocognitive factors that lead to a blurred manifestation of truth and falsehood in indirect reporting. Objectivity and subjectivity that can be reminiscent of the knowledge/belief distinction are very well presented in indirect reports. Although there are some objective rules that set limits to the practice of indirect reports, individuals can subjectively manipulate these objective rules to be cooperative, or strategic. There is always a conflict either on the part of the hearer or the reporter. The conflict is somehow elevated if we view indirect reports as cases of performative utterances,7 in the way Austin (1962) conceptualises them. In visualising indirect reports as performatives, I put emphasis upon the act of doing something by way of indirect reports and the related perlocutionary effect. It is logical to argue that the perlocutionary effect of the indirect report is of importance for the reporter, since the aim of indirect reporting is, or should be, the transfer of certain impacts (for example, when the reporter is going to impress the hearer) by manipulating the illocutionary force of the reports. It is the perlocutionary effect of the indirect

7  Considering indirect reports as speech acts, the reporter not only conveys someone else’s utterances but also ‘promises’ that the report is genuine and faithful.

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reports that turns them into what Austin (1962) calls performative utterances. According to Sbisà (2011, p. 34), “saying that someone has done something (has performed a certain action) amounts to ascribing to him or her some kind of responsibility for what he or she has brought about.” The hearer of the indirect report, therefore, can take it for granted that the reporting speaker knows (not believes) what is being reported, and hence the reporter is held responsible for monitoring the sincerity of the report. In other words, by uttering an indirect report, the reporter incurs a debt on himself/herself (s/he performs something) to be faithful to the original speaker and to respect the original speakers’ positive face. Saving the original speaker’s face is desirable, and this is also advocated by Capone (2016) when he proposed the Principle of Charity. The best realisation of indirect reports, where the knowledge/belief dichotomy conflict is largely elevated, is when the following (ideal) constraint is applied to them: The hearer knows (is sure) that the reporting speaker knows what is being reported is genuine or benevolent, while the reporter also knows that what is being reported is based on knowledge not belief.

On this account, the ideal is that the reporting speaker reports knowledge not belief, and that the hearer takes it for granted that the reporter is reporting knowledge not belief. That said, indirect reports can sometimes distort the ideal and resort to belief systems. In this case, the hearer’s trust in the reporting speaker’s faithfulness to the original speaker will not be compromised if the hearer knows that what is being reported is relevant or benevolent (to create a positive change). The conflict on the part of the reporting speaker would also be settled by changing the role of indirect reporting from a mere statement of knowledge to an act of moral and legal commitment (therefore, belief reports are warranted as far as moral and legal issues are taken into consideration). In this situation, the reporting speaker would reassure the hearer that what is being reported is a moral and legal act. The reporter not only reports something but also ‘promises’ that what is being reported is knowledge while beliefs can be reported too as far as the ethics and situational necessity are taken into consideration (e.g., testimony in a court of law). Accordingly, I would like to change the maxim above to the following: The hearer knows (is sure) that the reporting speaker knows that what is being reported is a moral, legal, and relevant8 act, while the reporter also knows that what is being reported is a moral, legal, and relevant act.

8  One should bear in mind that by ‘relevant’, I do not mean ‘effusiveness’. I simply want to show that the information can be negative or positive. However, this positivity or negativity has been the most relevant information regarding a sociocognitive filter.

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3.5  Indirect Report as a Method of Inquiry The foregoing discussion on indirect reports channels our attention towards the concept of ‘pragmatism’. As stated by William James (1922, pp. 46–47), the principle of pragmatism pushes us towards the fact that: To attain perfect clearness in our thoughts of an object, then, we need only consider what conceivable effects of a practical kind the object may involve—what sensations we are to expect from it, and what reactions we must prepare. Our conception of these effects, whether immediate or remote, is then for us the whole of our conception of the object, so far as that conception has positive significance at all.

Figure 3.1 convinced us that indirect reports are not merely a reflection of other’s utterances and perspective, for that would be an underestimation of the true mechanism of indirect reports. Indirect reports should be conceptualised based on their practical uses that focus on the importance of human experiences in action (practical success of the utterances). This premiss suggests that indirect reports can be accounted for based on the tenets of pragmatism. The main contributors to pragmatism are Charles Sanders Peirce, William James, and John Dewey. Pierce has been the most influential of all with regard to introducing the concept of pragmatism. Pierce’s concept of fallibilism, which is at the heart of pragmatism, refers to the doctrine that knowledge is never indubitable, but always hypothetical and susceptible to correction. Referring back to the schematisation in Fig. 3.1, I showed that indirect reports are not cases of pure knowledge or pure belief but a mixture of both. The report embraces both the original speaker’s utterances and the reporter’s belief system as the intervening variable. On this account, we should expect some uncertainty in the reported speech. Indirect reports are logical cases, I mean logic as the way Charles Sanders Peirce uses the term. For Pierce, the first and the sole rule of logic is to wonder; as a result, ‘one should not block the way of inquiry’, as Pierce argues (refer to Haack [2014] for further discussion). Further to this, Pierce also postulates that there are four major barriers to inquiry: (1) assertion of absolute certainty; (2) maintaining that something is absolutely unknowable; (3) maintaining that something is absolutely inexplicable because absolutely basic or ultimate; (4) holding that perfect exactitude is possible. These four barriers form the building blocks of fallibilism. As a case of logical manipulation, indirect reports do not show absolute certainty, since they are chaotic, in the way Pierce advocates (1897). For Pierce, chaos does not mean sheer hopelessness (a radical philosophical scepticism), for there is always the chance of finding the reality after enough inquiry (scientific scepticism). By reality, I mean the act of separating the voices of the reporter and the original speaker. Of course, reality is relative (perfect exactitude is not possible) and dependent upon some rudimentary factors. One factor is that the hearer knows the reporting speaker very well and accepts him or her as a reliable reporter. Another factor is the accessibility of the original speaker, so that the hearer would be able to juxtapose the reported utterance and the original one in order to come close to reality (the reported utterance). Metaphorically speaking, there is not a ‘God’s eye view’ (there is no

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certainty) with regard to indirect reports. Nonetheless, belief should be changed to knowledge as doubt should be changed to certainty (the events are not absolutely unknowable). The means to reach this (relative) ‘God’s eye view’ passes through inquiry. To reach certainty, there can be both internal and external inquiry. By internal inquiry, I mean searching for the logic of affairs through cognitive processes that target the ego. The key feature of this internal inquiry passes through psychoanalysis, ‘any of a number of the theories of the human personality that attempt to examine a person’s unconscious mind to discover the hidden causes of their mental problems’ (Cambridge Online Dictionary). Besides this internal inquiry, there is also external inquiry, which is resorted to when the forces of internal inquiry fall short of providing a reasonable realisation of reality (genuine indirect reports can be a representation of reality). In this case, the hearer would resort to the knowledge of situation and context. Pragmatism refers to ‘practical consequences’9 that put emphasis on experiences rather than a priori knowledge (Dewey, 1908). Trial through doubt shows us that perceptual beliefs are not reliable (Hookway, 2012), but the pragmatists argue that just in case there is a sound justification one should doubt propositions while in other cases (when there is no evidence) doubt is not necessary. Hence, assumptions should be taken for granted unless there is a convincing (positive) reason that they should be questioned. Of course, inquiries should be made within a context. According to Hookway (2016): We tend to treat our established beliefs as innocent until ‘proved guilty’. We need reasons for our beliefs when we propose to change them, or when they have been challenged. It is doubt that needs a reason, and we trust our everyday beliefs until given a positive reason for doubting them. The mere lack of a conclusive reason for belief does not itself provide us with a reason for doubt. The Cartesian strategy adopts an unorthodox, revisionary understanding of reason for belief and reason for doubt. (refer to https://plato.stanford.edu/ entries/pragmatism/)

The process of indirect reporting can be regarded as a method of science, based on the argument made above. Indirect reports are tentative and probabilistic, in that they are not based on ‘settled beliefs’ (Kasser [2011] has a very interesting article is this regard) but function as continued revision and falsification, in line with the tenets of empiricism (Shelley, 2006). According to Kasser (2011, p. 226), “[a] belief is settled if it resists being undermined too readily by experience and reflection.” Indirect reports, therefore, are dependent on the experiences contributing to a gradual improvement of the understanding of the situation. Based on pragmatism, indirect reports act as a belief-formation procedure, in which the hearer is expected to trust the reporter while there is no certain evidence contributing to the faithfulness 9  As reported by Nicholson (2016, p. 112), “[t]he philosophical perspective associated with learning practical knowledge and skills is known as Pragmatism.” The author continues that “Pragmatism comes from the Greek word pragma, meaning ‘action.’ Pragmatic is also defined as ‘practical.’ Three American philosophers (Charles Sanders Peirce, William James, and John Dewey) conclude that education should focus on learning how to solve practical problems.”

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of the reporter to the original speaker. In other words, as far as there might be no certain evidence that directs the hearer towards the identification of the sincerity of the belief reported, the belief should be regarded as being reliable (according to Isaac Levi [2016, p. 247], “[i]nquirers ought to change beliefs for good reason”). Of course, I do not insist that the hearer should blindly accept the report. On this account, doubt is warranted too. But one should bear in mind that doubt is not economical  – to revert to practical matters of Relevance Theory. Moreover, no one wants to be a ‘doubtaholic’, for that would make life an excruciating and a salutary experience. Of course I am content that doubt is necessary in high-stakes contexts where acting based on the illocutionary force of the report would lead to serious consequences. Therefore, as pragmatists argue, exigencies of experience and practice would help us to realise the structure of the world. Through indirect reporting, individuals should make an effort to change the states of disequilibrium to equilibrium through the ‘Method of Science’ proposed by Isaac Levi (2012). In other words, through experimental interventions, individuals are able to test hypotheses and theories during the practice of indirect reporting, rather than resorting to a priori reasoning, intuition, or revelation. Accordingly, both indirect reports and pragmatism emphasise learning through action and experience by applying online strategies. As argued by Pierce in his classic paper The Fixation of Belief, inquiry changes doubt with the ‘settled belief’ by way of reflection and resorting to the ‘Method of Science’. Through this method, as advocated by Pierce, the agent intervenes in the environment to manage the events through experience. By analogy, indirect reports are cases of experimentation that act to facilitate action or increase understanding. Indirect reporting is a scientific theory that has practical advantages and is self-­ divulging rather than self-covering. Indirect reports have the power to uncover, despite all the complexities that are attached to their practice.

3.6  T  he Basic Triad: I, You, and the ‘Third Party’ in Indirect Reports One of the perfect ways to show the mechanism underlying indirect reporting is to link it to the Foucauldian concept of ‘enunciation’ or énoncé. Following E. Benveniste who first instigated the notion into linguistics theory, Brandt (2013, p. 38) defines enunciation as “the act of producing an utterance or text, an act which leaves behind its traces in the resultant utterance (l’énoncé).” Accordingly, “enunciation is a speech act where an I or a we situated ‘here and now’ speaks with a you (singular or plural) about a third party, which can be characterized by the third grammatical person” (Gignac, 2016, p. 190). ‘I’ is the enunciator while ‘you’ is the enunciatee. As argued by Gignac, “[t]he pair ‘enunciator/enunciatee’ is close to the pair ‘narrator/narratee’ of a narrative” (2016, p. 190). Gignac schematises the relation between the enunciator and the enunciatee as follows (2016, p. 190):

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enunciator→ I or we→

enunciatee You [sing. or pl.]

(→ third party) (→ s/he or they)

I would like to link Gignac’s schematisation to indirect reports by comparing the enunciator/enunciatee pair with the reporter/hearer one. The scheme created by Gignac fits well with the actors contributing to the indirect reports. The enunciator/ hearer can also implicitly refer to the existence of the enunciatee/reporter. However, in indirect reports, as is the case with narration, there is a possibility that the narrator/reporter talks to a fictive or bona fide narratee/hearer. It is quite possible that the reporter reports someone not as an attempt to address the ‘real other’ but as self-talk or an ego-enhancement tool. In this case, the intention of the reporter is not to create some perlocutionary effect within the hearer, but as a confirmation of the existence of the reporter or as a reaction to some mental reasoning. Consequently, indirect reporting can embrace a fictive hearer: (1)

I am an unhappy person but Hafez said that one should be thankful for what one has.

The above report clearly shows the meaning of a fictive hearer. In (1), there is no specific addressee; in other words, the hearer’s identity is blurred, yet it seems that the reporter is addressing himself/herself as the hearer (that s/he should be positive). The case in (1), therefore, represents a monologue. The concept is defined by Nikulin (2006, p. 195) as: A monologue, first, is an unaddressed discourse. It is a discourse that is not really addressed to anybody because the real other is not there and is neither presupposed not needed. Thus, monologue is univocal and monophonic. As an unaddressed speech, a monologue does not even address itself, for in order to be able to do so, the monological subject would have to recognize the other as that which is not himself, i.e., as that which is other than being and which is not immanently within being, for the monological being is taken (e.g., by Hegel and Schelling) as inseparable from nothing and as pure negativity. However, the monological subject is hesitant to recognize the other as one who is independent and equal, as one with whom the subject might enter into dialogue, because the monological subject portrays himself as substance, as res cogitans.

Nikulin (2006, p. 190) further states that “the monologue is still a dialogue: Hamlet speaks to himself as the other, seeing himself from without, to which his temporal mental disorder is an appropriate aid.” As a result, a distinction should be made between the ‘addressee’ and the ‘recipient’ of the indirect report. The addressee is the person to whom the message is meant for, while the recipient can be all the people who hear the message. In (1), the recipient is the person to whom ‘I’ is conversing with and the one who hears the report, while the addressee is the person who utters (1) – the speaker himself/herself. The fictive hearer refers to Bakhtin’s metalinguistic model of voices through which the narrator manages the utterances so that they align with the fictive hearer to convey some impressions and orientations. Therefore, the reporting speaker (or the narrator) is not a neutral or uncaring mimic of the original speakers’ utterances.

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The hearer is also an active participant who has the power to alter the practice of indirect report. Impressions and orientations are represented within indirect reports. The reporter may try to convey an intended expression or to elicit a reaction, either positive or negative (positive as in ‘admiration’ and negative as in ‘contempt’). The intentional conveying of a negative impression is what is referred to as Dostoevsky’s paradoxical monologists (Schmid, 2010). Similarly, the same kind of discussion presented above can be accounted for by the distinction between the allocator, allocutary, and delocuted of a message. The allocator is the person who is sending a message (the one who speaks). Allocutary is the one who receives a message (decodes it), and delocuted is the one mentioned in the message (the dislodged person). The one who speaks (allocator) can be at the same time the allocutary (when one talks to oneself, in a monologue, for example). Moreover, the allocator can be the (implied) delocuted too (one may refer to a third party in order to represent oneself). For instance, in narration, the narrator refers to some characters, or talks about a third party, in order to represent the narrator’s thought or personality. Being that as it may, the delocutary can be a grammatical person that is not a physical person who is delocuted (one can talk about his/her imagination or an anthropomorphic persona). The most interesting and relevant issue raised with regard to the practice of indirect reports is the allocator’s judgement of his/her utterance(s). According to Sambre (2013, p. 189), “no locutor speaks without making himself in advance allocutary.” By analogy, before reporting someone, the reporting speaker should reflect upon the illocutionary force of the report, should contemplate (possible) transformations, and should refine the utterances (if necessary). Keeping all these in mind, the locutor (speaker) also lurks behind waiting for the best moment to use an indirect report. Besides this, there are cases where more than one hearer is present in the context of indirect reporting but the reporter may have one particular hearer in mind as the intended addressee. It is taken for granted in the realm of indirect reporting that the default setting consists of just one hearer and one reporter. That said, it is also quite possible that two reporters provide various manifestations of an original speaker’s utterances, and the hearers too can decide to attend to one particular report rather than another. Thus, in the case of the hearer, we can distinguish between the attentive (allocutary) and the non-attentive (non-allocutary) hearer. For instance, ‘Mo’ who is a professor of pragmatics is talking with two of his colleagues at the faculty – I will name his colleagues John and Fred. Mo intends to communicate a message to John rather than Fred. Mo may use some paralinguistic codes (a wink or a smile) to show that it is John who is the addressee of the message, while Fred is the recipient. In this case, Fred can also hear the message, but only John may understand the real meaning of the utterance based on his previous encounters with Mo (John knows that, for example, when Mo winks it means that he is joking). That being the case, John is the attentive hearer while Fred is the non-attentive hearer. Or, in another case, Mo may say something about Fred in his presence. In this case, Fred would be the delocutary as well as the allocutary. The roles slide-away for as long as the three participants continue communicating. Therefore, there might be dynamic roles in the process of indirect reporting. The process of indirect reporting

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Hearer’s Role

Attentive Hearer Original Speaker’s Utterance

(Justified) Indirect Report

Refinery Process

Non-attentive Hearer Original Speaker

Coping Process

Reporting Speaker 1

Reporting Speaker 2

Fig. 3.2  The process and elements of indirect reports

is better conceptualised as a ‘cyclic structure’, in which participants can take up ­different roles as the communication goes on. The following scheme shows the relationship between the hearer, the reporter, and the original speaker. Figure 3.2 shows the indirect reporting and its underlying process, as well as its elements. The tentative role-patterns (dashed lines under Hearer’s role) are also presented. As shown in Fig. 3.2, before reporting someone, the reporter applies a refinery process as a filter to decide which part of the original speaker’s utterance should be reported or which parts are in need of transformation. The filter originates mainly from sociocognitive factors and takes into account many elements, such as background knowledge, social distance, judgements, emotions, context, and social norms. Refinery processes act like filters that make the product purer. It is also possible for there to be a second reporter (tentative), and the same process of fortification (filtration) can happen for the second reporter too. There is also the possibility of the existence of more than one hearer (attentive and non-attentive hearer). The original speaker is not necessarily a passive element in the process of indirect reports – the original speaker is not always regarded as the third person. The original speaker may be present at the time when the report is made. The hearer can be the original speaker as well since it is quite possible that the reporting speaker uses the hearer’s sentences as evidence (source utterance) in reporting. The scheme in Fig. 3.2 clearly shows that the process of indirect reporting is tortuous and cyclic, and one in which fixed roles can hardly be assigned to participants before the report. The reporter is also able to modify the report based on the hearer’s reaction. Accordingly, there is also a possibility for a coping filter after the report is formed (coping processes). Figure 3.2 reveals that the process of indirect reporting takes time. That being the case, as argued by Pierce, all thoughts take time and “we think only in signs” (Peirce, 1931 [1958], Section 2.302).

3.7  Indirect Reports as Signs

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3.7  Indirect Reports as Signs In conceptualising indirect reports as a theory of pragmatics, it is also possible to conceptualise them as a theory of signs (Morris, 1971). Indirect reports can be regarded as being accounted for by semiotics since they include both an ‘interpreter’ and an ‘interpretant’. A sign should be interpreted in order to signify, and the meaning that a sign signifies lies within the kind of interpretation that the sign users generate. The interpretant is the effect of a sign on someone who reads or comprehends it. According to Liszka (1996), the interpretant is the translator of a sign that provides a deeper understanding of the sign’s object. When we are concerned about the value of indirect reports, we are actually curious about their interpretant. The relation between signs and the interpreters is an integral part of indirect reporting. Ferdinand de Saussure states that a sign is comprised of a ‘signifier’ (signifiant) and a ‘signified’ (signifié). Chandler (2007, p. 14) also says that “[c]ontemporary commentators tend to describe the signifier as the form that the sign takes and the signified as the concept to which it refers.” Linguistic signs are not a linkage between a thing and a name. They are to be conceptualised as a link between a concept (signified) and a sound pattern (signifier), where the sound pattern has not a bona fide entity in that the “sound pattern is the hearer’s psychological impression of a sound, as given to him by the evidence of his senses” (Chandler, 2007, p. 14). In considering indirect reports as signs, I have suggested that the reported utterance (form or signifier) can refer to a psychological concept (content or signified). This mind-world relationship is conceptualised as ‘signification’. Indirect reporting is regarded as a sign that can stand for a different signified in each context (they can be used to persuade, cheat, start a conversation, etc.). The signified and signifier are dependent on each other in the process of meaning-making, in that one determines the other. The same process is realised in the formation of indirect reports. The hearer and the reporting speaker are both essential parts contributing to the way in which the indirect report is conceptualised and interpreted. The interpretant of indirect reporting is under the influence of the hearer and the reporting speaker. However, it is not only the content that influences the force behind indirect reporting but rather the knowledge of the reported and the reporting speaker as well as the hearer’s world knowledge each helps the hearer to come to a best possible realisation of the report. It is true that the reporting speaker act as a ‘proxy’ for representing the original speaker, yet this representation should be acknowledged as both authoritative and reliable by the hearer if the interpretant is going to be properly acknowledged by the hearer. The interpretant or the ‘interpretant sign’ can be one of three types: ‘immediate’, ‘dynamic’, or ‘final’ (normal). The immediate interpretant can be observed at the level of locutionary meaning of an indirect report (its usual meaning in the immediate environment). The dynamic interpretant refers to the perlocutionary effect of the indirect report. The final or normal interpretant refers to an ideal end. The ‘ideal’ in the indirect report is conceptualised as a situation in which the intended impression

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is conveyed by the reporter and acknowledged by the hearer, while at the same time, the reporter has been faithful to the reported speaker. Based on the sign-system model, the reporting speaker does not simply report ready-made and prefabricated utterances of the original speaker simply to represent him/her. The reporting speaker constructs reality through logico-cognitive aspects. The relation between the signified and the signifier is arbitrary but not chaotic when it comes to indirect reports. It can be regarded as the rationale behind the praxis of indirect reports. As advocated by Saussure: The fundamental principle of the arbitrary nature of the linguistic sign does not prevent us from distinguishing in any language between what is intrinsically arbitrary – that is, unmotivated – and what is only relatively arbitrary. Not all signs are absolutely arbitrary. In some cases, there are factors which allow us to recognize different degrees of arbitrariness, although never to discard the notion entirely. The sign may be motivated to a certain extent. (de Saussure, 1983, p. 130)

3.8  A System of Signifiers Under the notion of semantic underdetermination, it is stated that “the encoded meaning of the sentence employed by a speaker underdetermines the proposition explicitly expressed by an utterance of that sentence” (Bianchi, 2011, p. 53). Some authors believe that semantics is truth-conditional (Cappelen & Lepore, 2005), that is, when one knows the meaning of a sentence, one knows what the world has to be like for a statement of that sentence to be true. Other authors believe that semantics is too gappy to be truth-conditional (Carston, 1991), and that pragmatics provides full truth-conditional meaning through pragmatic intrusion. Authors such as Ward and Birner (1993) have also proved that full truth-conditionality requires pragmatic inference. In any case, even if semantics is largely truth-conditional, pragmatics provides full truth-conditional meaning, for it expands the meanings of semantics into full propositions (rather than minimal propositions). The following example shows how truth-conditionality works with regard to semantics and pragmatics: (2)

He is happy: Semantics: If ‘he’ refers to x, x is happy. Pragmatics: John is happy.

Full truth-conditionality, as Récanati (2001) argues, is conceptualised by the proposition that is accompanied by pragmatic processes of enrichment and transfer. The radical view of this perspective, which is accounted for under the concept of radical contextualism, suggests that “no sentence of a natural language expresses a complete proposition” (Bianchi, 2011, p. 57). Therefore, the full truth-conditionality of a sentence is jointly determined by semantics/pragmatics enrichment. In line with the full truth-conditional meaning is the idea that texts are not neutral or pure. On this account, there is a view towards language that says “a subject can never finally

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3.8  A System of Signifiers

Reporting Speaker Origianl Speaker

Photosynthesis

Hearer

Fig. 3.3  The photosynthetic model regarding the elements of indirect reports

control or limit meaning” (Schirato, 2011, p. 72). This view is accounted for under the rubrics of ‘deconstruction’, which refers to assumptions and implied meaning. Under the concept of ‘deconstruction’, Saussure refers to ‘a system of signifiers’ whereby he creates a system of interdependent signifiers. Based on this chain of signifiers, therefore, God can mean ‘no devil’. In fact, God and devil are semantically dependent on one another. The sine qua non of deconstruction is the concept of différance that calls attention to the fact that meaning cannot be regarded as fixed or static, but is constantly evolving. The practice of indirect reporting can be regarded as a system of signifiers based on the interdependence of the elements underlying it. In this case, each of the basic elements of the indirect reports (original speaker, reporting speaker, and hearer) is surrounded by different sociocognitive trajectories (the unlabelled bubbles in Fig. 3.3) that make it very difficult to definitely predict what would be the end product—the consequence of indirect reporting. Thus, as argued by Schirato (2011, p.  74), deconstructionists always argue for “an antiteleological and antilinear approach to language and meaning.” In Fig. 3.3, I have schematised a ‘photosynthetic model’ that accounts for the interrelationship between the signifiers in indirect reports based on a deconstructionist view: As Fig. 3.3 indicates, the three signifiers (original speaker, reporting speaker, and hearer) work interdependently and supplement each other. One without the other has no value, and the whole system crashes down. The three signifiers have a strong gravitational effect, in that they absorb and direct different sociocognitive factors (the unlabelled bubbles) towards the middle of the ‘photosynthesis process’, or the end product, which surely influence the nature of the photosynthesis. The product of the photosynthesis is energy that has many forms and is shapeless. By analogy, the process of indirect reporting is similar to photosynthesis, in that it has no fixed

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e­ ndpoint10 (it has different forms of life, to use Wittgenstein’s words), but is rather a potentially infinite process. Just like the individualisation of the meaning-making process and its non-fixed entity, photosynthesis is performed differently by different species. The unlabelled bubbles in Fig. 3.3 account for the intricacies underlying the indirect reports, for there are residuals (unlabelled bubbles) and sociocognitive elements that accompany the labelled bubbles and make it hard to properly grasp the paramount elements of indirect reports. The residuals are so important and effective that they should be regarded as a crucial part of the photosynthesis process of indirect reporting.

3.9  Hermeneutics and Indirect Reports Indirect reports are closely related to interlocutors’ interpretation of expectations based on cognitive and social factors. The interpretation is ‘constructive’ in the way the reporter and the hearer help one another to come to a situated understanding of the report. Therefore, indirect reporting is closely connected with the tenets of hermeneutics. According to folk etymology, there was a mythological Greek deity named Hermes, who was the messenger of the gods (Couzen, 1981), and “[h]e had to understand and interpret for himself what the gods wanted to convey before he could proceed to translate, articulate, and explicate their intention to mortals” (Muller-Vollmer, 1985, cited in Van de Craen, 2011, p. 126). By analogy, the reporting speaker acts as a messenger, analogous to Hermes, in that s/he should first understand and interpret the original speaker’s utterances and then, after sufficient deliberation on the accuracy of the interpretation, transfer the reported speaker’s intention to others (the hearer). In the same line as Michel Foucault views language as a ‘representation of a representation’ (Rojo & Pujol, 2011), which is conceptualised as ʻprononcer les idées’ (speaking is uttering ideas), hermeneutics shows that language is the interpretation and understanding of speakers’ ideas and intentions. Van de Craen states that hermeneutics and embodiment (a term proposed by George Lakoff) are closely related to each other in that: [W]hen humans categorize the world, be it verbally or otherwise, an interpretive process based on embodiment and imagination is at work. Consequently, cognitive processes are hermeneutic in nature in the sense that experiential realism cannot be reached without the interpretation of the surrounding world. (Van de Craen, 2011, p. 129)

Considering the above discussion, meaning-making and interpretation are processes through which various degrees of embodiment take place. A clash of interpretations happens when there is a considerable gap between interlocutors’ conceptual systems. However, interpretation is usually considered to take place within each individual, while I believe that interpretation is something that is constructed during  Not all species produce the same product in the process of photosynthesis. There are many varieties of anoxygenic photosynthesis observed among certain types of bacteria. These bacteria consume carbon dioxide but do not release oxygen.

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interaction with a conversational partner. Thus, I argue for a ‘social constructivism’ view of interpretation, in which interlocutors interact with each other using sociocognitive features to improve their interpretation and understanding. In this regard, just as Lev Vygotsky proposed the idea of ‘zone of proximal development’11 (ZPD), there is a ‘zone of proximal decoding’ (henceforth, ZPD2), whereby interlocutors are able to improve their interpretation of a particular speech event by the help of others. Thus, ZPD2 refers to the gap that exists between the interlocutors in the process of meaning-making. This gap can be realised through Krashen’s (1981) concept of i + 1 where i means the speaker’s current level of understanding, ‘+’ means the process of scaffolding, and ‘1’ implies the mediated interpretation of the speech event in the process of interaction. For Krashen, understanding takes place when the input is just beyond an individual’s current level of competence. Consequently, the interpretation clash does not occur at the level of i + 1, while such misinterpretation is probably observed when the input is overwhelmingly difficult and ambiguous (i + 2) or too simplistic (i + 0) that it may fall out of interlocutors’ attention (there is no relevance). Interlocutors construct meaning by filling the gaps that exist in the process of interpretation by adhering to communicative strategies such as ‘appeal for help’ or ‘non-linguistic signals’ (to name a few). In indirect reporting too, the hearer can use communication strategies to find out the reporter’s intention (or the hearer can separate the reporter’s voice from that of the original speaker). The hearer may use strategies to make sure that what is reported is sincere and to check that his/her interpretation of what the reporting speaker said is correct. Likewise, the reporting speaker should transfer essential cues and clues to help the hearer’s understanding through ZPD2. For the indirect report to be appealing and intelligible to the hearer, the report should be just relevant and informative enough (the reporter can use evidentials [this topic is dealt with in the next section]). If the report is far less relevant, the hearer loses interest in the report and may even be misled (i + 0). If the information is too ambiguous and more-than-informative (i + 2), so much so that the hearer would not be able to interpret the illocutionary force of the utterance properly, the report loses its effectiveness. In fact, in accordance to Grice’s Modified Occam’s Razor, “[s]enses are not [to] be multiplied beyond necessity” (1978, pp. 118–119). To put it differently, one should avoid reporting ambiguously/non-seriously unless it is deemed necessary (e.g., in the case of face-threatening utterances). Therefore, I define the ZPD2 as follows: The reporter should use sufficient linguistic or paralinguistic cues and clues to make sure that the hearer is able to decode the original speaker’s intention properly. The reporter should avoid using ambiguous and ironic utterances because they are likely to put additional cognitive force on the hearer. If the reporter is not ostensive enough, the hearer should use communicative strategies to make sure that the report is intelligible (and clear) for ­him/her.

 ZPD can be equalled with scaffolding, arguing that individuals can reach their true potential by the aid of the peers.

11

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3.10  Evidentiality As noted by Ifantidou (2001, p. 2), “the notion of evidential is basically a functional one: that is, it is applied to linguistic expressions in virtue of their pragmatic function.” Ifantidou continues by stating that “evidentials are devices used by speakers to mark the source and the reliability of their knowledge” (2001, p. 3). On this account, evidentiality refers to “things people are less sure of, and some things they think are only within the realm of possibility” (Chafe & Nichols, 1986, p. vii). More deeply, Mithun (1986, p. 89) states that evidentials show “the reliability of information communicated in four primary ways. They specify the source of evidence on which statements are based, their degree of precision, their probability, and expectations concerning their probability.” Although there is some controversy with regard to the scope and boundary of evidential markers, Ifantidou (2001) states that evidentials have a functional role in context. With regard to written direct reports, recognising evidential markers is not a serious issue, since the quotation marks enable the hearer to find out the source of the information, yet in oral interactions it would be burdensome to trace evidentiality in direct reports (although the prosodic features can be a great help in this regard). It seems that indirect reports better allow for the inclusion of evidential markers, since the indirect reporter has more freedom to manipulate the utterance in line with pragmatic opacity (refer to Sections 3.1 and 3.2). Both direct and indirect reports are ‘hearsay’ functions, “indicating that the information being offered was obtained from someone else” (Ifantidou, 2001, p. 161). On the other hand, ‘hearsay adverbials’ (e.g., apparently, allegedly, reportedly, etc.) and ‘hearsay parentheticals’ (e.g. Bill says, the newspaper reported yesterday, etc.) “indicate that the views being interpreted are not the speaker’s own”12 (Ifantidou, 2001, p. 161). Hearsay markers are a form of evidentials (Palmer, 1986), whereby the speaker shows uncertainty and lack of enough evidence. Hearsay markers, or “degree-of-commitment indicators,” as Palmer tends to call them (1986, p.  51), contribute to the truth-conditional content of the utterance. However, Ifantidou (2001) believes that ‘hearsay’13 adverbials are complicated and one cannot

 Ifantidou (2001, p. 149) argues that these two are the same by stating that “the parentheticals we have been considering above, e.g. I think, we all agree, Bill says, have the same function as hearsay adverbials: they mark the proposition that falls within their scope as being interpretively rather than descriptively used.” The author further adds that “parentheticals such as Bill says, the newspaper reported yesterday, which we might call ‘hearsay parentheticals’, are exactly like hearsay adverbials in that they specifically indicate that the views being interpreted are not the speaker’s own” (Ifantidou, 2001, p.  149). Therefore, according to Ifantidou, the two sentences ‘John is, allegedly, a spy’ and ‘John is, you say, a spy’ are considered parallel to each other. 13  The ‘out-of-court statement’ or ‘hearsay’ is not unlike what Capone (2016) argues as ‘samesaying’. Donald Davidson has been a strong influence on Capone’s in the development of the concept of samesaying (refer to Davidson [1968] for further study). The term ‘hearsay’ is at the heart of ‘samesaying’ since the latter refers to the fact that “the report and the speech to be reported have some broad content in common” (Capone, 2016, p. 24). Thus, in order to perform a ‘hearsay’ function, one of the samesayers (the reporting speaker) should use the words of someone else (the original speaker). In order to fully grasp the practice of ‘samesaying’, one should understand the ‘hearsay’ function. 12

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state that they a hundred per cent contribute to truth-conditional status. Based on the discussion on ‘hearsay’, Palmer (1986, pp. 53–54) refers to quotative verbs, such as ‘say’ and ‘explain’, as a sign of the degree of speakers’ commitment: The Quotative, … looks prima facie to be wholly objective, indicating not what the speaker believes, but what has been said by others. But if this is taken together with other evidentials, e.g. those that indicate the kind of observation (e.g. visual versus non-visual) on which the statement is based, it becomes clear that their whole purpose is to provide an indication of the degree of commitment of the speaker: he offers a piece of information, but qualifies its validity for him in terms of the type of evidence he has. In this sense evidentials are not indications of some objective modality, but are subjective in that they indicate the status of the proposition in terms of the speaker’s commitment to it.

An important point to discuss is that parentheticals14 (e.g., I think) distinguish between direct and indirect reports, since it is possible to add an attitudinal phrase to the dependent clause of an indirect report (whereas it is not logical to add parentheticals to direct reports, for direct reports meant to be objective and unintrusive). Consider the following sentences: (3)

a. b.

Mary: John said, I think, “Cyrus is sitting alone.” Mary: John said that, I think, Cyrus was sitting by himself.

Using direct reports implies that the reporter is sure of the exact words uttered by the original speaker, whereas the use of parentheticals such as ‘I think’, ‘I conclude’, or ‘I guess’ in (3a) creates a conflict since it shows uncertainty. However, in (3b) such a conflict does not arise since indirect reports allow the reporter to include parentheticals. The use of parentheticals in indirect reports is complicated though. As argued by Ifantidou, there are two kinds of parentheticals (‘genuine’ and ‘main-clause’). The following examples make this distinction clear: (4)

a. b.

I think that Alessandro lives in Italy. Alessandro, I think, lives in Italy.

Sentence (4a) is an example of ‘main-clause’ adverbial, since I think is the main clause and the rest of the sentence is the subordinate clause. That being the case, I think in (4a) is descriptive and acts as a truth-conditional indicator (i.e., to change the meaning of the subordinate clause). This kind of parenthetical, in other words, contributes to the explicit rather than implicit aspect of the sentence. However, I think in (4b) is not embedded in the main clause, and acts as an ‘evidential’ that shows ‘degrees of certainty’. For this reason, I think in (4b) is non-truth-conditional and does not contribute to the propositional meaning of the sentence. According to Ifantidou (2001, p. 152), parentheticals like the one in (4b) represent “the speaker’s

 As reported by Ifantidou (2001, p. 201), the use of parentheticals “indicates that the views being interpreted are the speaker’s own.”

14

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degree of commitment to the proposition expressed.” By analogy, both ‘main-­ clause’ and ‘genuine’ parentheticals can be used in indirect reports, but only the ‘main-clause’ parentheticals are descriptive and truth-conditional. ‘Genuine’ parentheticals function as evidentials and thus refer to the type of evidence (e.g., good, moderate, poor, etc.) that the reporter has in mind with regard to the assertions made. The distinction between ‘main-clause’ and ‘genuine’ parentheticals can also alter the meaning of indirect reports: (5)

a. b.

Mary: I think that John said that Cyrus was setting alone. Mary: John said that, I think, Cyrus was setting alone.

The ‘main-clause’ parenthetical in (5a) is descriptive and changes the meaning of the proposition, whereas the ‘genuine’ parenthetical in (5b) is non-truth-conditional since it only indicates that Mary’s describing of the event is poor and unsubstantiated. For this reason, (5a) and (5b) are not stylistic variants of each other. Ifantidou proposes an awfully good test to discover how the two alternatives in (5) should be conceptualised. I would like to call it the ‘under-what-circumstances’ test. Ifantidou argues that in order to distinguish between the truth-conditional indicators and non-truth-conditional ones, we should ask under what circumstances is the speaker claiming that X is doing Y in sentences like “If I think that John is abroad, he will not come to the meeting” (Ifantidou, 2001, p. 126). The preferred interpretation in (5a) and (5b) is different because the proposition in (5a) is true IFF Mary thinks that X said Y, whereas in (5b) such an interpretation does not hold true. Evidential markers can be used to show ‘the source of knowledge’ and ‘degree of certainty’. These features of evidential markers indicate their importance in dealing with ‘opacity’ in indirect reports. Evidentials can show the source of knowledge by providing markers that help the hearer distinguish between the reporter’s and the original speaker’s voice. Consider the following example: (6)

Trump suggested that Russians be ready for, according to him, the ‘beautiful and smart’ American missiles.

I noted (6) while I was watching news talks on a national TV programme (I translated the report from Persian into English). In (6), the phrase ‘according to him’, is an evidential marker that shows rather clearly that the two adjectives ‘beautiful’ and ‘smart’ are a verbatim report of some parts of Trump’s utterances. Another feature I observed was the use of nonlinguistic evidentials by the reporter. While pronouncing ‘beautiful and smart’, the reporter raised his voice, putting stress on the phrase with a discernible pause just before pronouncing ‘beautiful and smart’. Linguists such as Blakemore (1994) have also put emphasis on nonlinguistic evidential, such as intonation, prosodic features, and the two-index-fingers quotation marks to indicate the quoted words. In my example in (6), the stress on ‘beautiful and smart’ accompanied by a meaningful pause shows that the phrase is marked and pregnant with extra information (helping the hearer to identify to whom the phrase ‘beautiful and smart’ should be assigned).

3.11  ‘De re’ and ‘De dicto’ Constructs

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Evidentials can get quite complicated. In indirect reports, it is usually not the norm to add ambiguous words and phrases after ‘that’. As argued by Capone (2016), in this case, it would be difficult to determine whether the vague information after ‘that’ should be assigned to the reporter or to the original speaker. Let me illustrate with an example: (7)

John said that, in any case, he would cancel his trip.

Regarding (7), ‘in any case’ is an evidential marker that indicates the degree of certainty. The phrase ‘in any case’ means ‘whatever happens or may have happened’. It is an indication of uncertainty, since it is not clear to the hearer what is meant by whatever happens or may have happened. Moreover, it is not clear whether this phrase should be interpreted based on the reporter’s or the original speaker’s perspective. Regarding (7), the degree of certainty indicated by the proposition underlying the report can be pragmatically inferred. Granting that this is so, evidentials provide a pragmatic framework that helps the hearer come to an understanding that the original speaker has not specifically pinpointed in which case he would cancel the trip. In this regard, Ifantidou (2001, p. 14) states that “[a]s regards the definition of evidentiality, I shall take the broadest possible approach, allowing myself to consider both semantically encoded and pragmatically inferred aspects of meaning.”

3.11  ‘De re’ and ‘De dicto’ Constructs Not all ambiguities happen as a result of parenthetical or ‘hearsay’ constructs. While reporting, the reporter sometimes includes his/her interpretation of the original speaker’s utterances, which lead to ‘de dicto’ and ‘de re’ interpretations of descriptive terms in opaque contexts (Partee, 1973). Considering the report ‘Oedipus said that his mother was beautiful’, the de dicto interpretation would be that ‘Oedipus mother is beautiful’ (the direct report Oedipus said, “My mother is beautiful” has only de dicto interpretation). However, with regard to de re reading, Oedipus could mean that ‘Jocasta is beautiful’, ‘his wife is beautiful’, or ‘the mother of his children is beautiful’ (Coulmas, 1986, p.  4). Likewise, Capone exemplifies that “‘John believes he is clever’ (‘He’ used here to refer to someone other than John, whom the speaker is pointing to), in which the pronominal has a ‘de re’ interpretation” (2016, p. 227). In both Coulmas’s and Capone’s example, the deictic centre plays a role in determining whether a sentence should be read ‘de re’ or ‘de dicto’. In Coulmas’s example, if we say that the deictic centre comes back to Oedipus, it means that the NP is within the scope of the intentional verb, and thus ‘his mother’ should mean ‘Oedipus’s mother’. On the other hand, ‘de re’ meanings require wider scope over the verb of propositional attitude. Hence, the pronominal in Capone’s example and ‘his mother’ in Coulmas’ sentence can be ‘de re’ if they refer to someone other than ‘John’ and ‘Oedipus’s mother’. As argued by Coulmas (1986, p. 5), there are de dicto and de re indirect reports. The former is conceptualised in (8a) and the latter in (8b):

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a. b.

X said that ____________ complement clause. X said something which in conjunction with what I, the speaker, know about the world, and about the subject of X’s utterance in particular, justifies the statement that ____________ complement clause.

Therefore, as elaborated by Coulmas (1986, pp. 4–5): The reporter’s analysis can be de dicto or de re. In the former case it consists in adjusting the original utterance to the deictic center of the report situation without changing any other part of its linguistic form. De re analysis, on the other hand, allows the reporter to alter the form of the original utterance in accordance with what it means on the basis of this knowledge of the world in such a way that it may include inferences of which the original speaker is unaware.

On this account, ‘de re’ reports cannot specify the semantic contents of original speech acts (Stojnic & Lepore, 2013). Stojnic and Lepore argue that “these reports in effect merely describe the content of the original utterance” (p. 30). They continue that with regard to ‘de re’ reports, “we can merely infer that there is some (singular) proposition the speaker expressed, but, crucially, we cannot retrieve what it is. This is not sufficient since our aim is to retrieve the semantic content of the source speech act” (p. 30). The discussion of the ‘de re’/‘de dicto’ distinction is very relevant to propositional attitude reports, such as belief reports, where verbs of opacity provide environments that do not allow the substitution of co-referring terms salva veritate. This is part of Frege’s puzzle, which is commonly applied to ‘identity statements’ (Hesperus is Phosphorus vs. Hesperus is Hesperus) and propositional attitude reports. Although Phosphorus and Hesperus both refer to the same planet (Venus), sentences such as ‘John believes Hesperus is visible in the evening’ and ‘John believes Phosphorus is visible in the evening’ pose a problem in that the latter is not correct considering the proposition underlying the belief. However, sentences such as ‘John believes Phosphorus is visible in the evening’ can be addressed through pragmatic intrusion (for example, using a telescope to see Phosphorus in the evening). On this account, in some cases, substitutions of NPs having the same extension are not permitted, whereas in other cases they seem to be permitted. For a matter of space, and because of the byzantine nature of de re/de dicto readings, I won’t pursue the issue further (a full chapter would be required to address the issue fully), but there is very interesting literature in this regard and I encourage the reader to consult Chisholm (1976), Lewis (1979), Taylor (2002), and Maier (2009) for a comprehensive overview of the de re/de dicto dichotomy.

3.13 Conclusion

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3.12  ‘De se’ Beliefs and Propositional Attitudes A special case of verbs of propositional attitudes are ‘de se’ belief reports, which require pragmatic intrusion, in that “as a first-personal component is injected into the proposition expressed through pragmatics” (Capone, 2016, p. 18). ‘De se’ readings embrace ego-like concepts. In this regard, Capone refers to sentences such as ‘The editor of Soul believes that he* is a millionaire’ as ambiguous with regard to ‘de se’ and ‘de re’ interpretation. In line with Higginbotham’s (2003) viewpoints, Capone states that ‘de se’ attitude entails ‘de re’ attitude. It is also argued that ‘de se’ constructs comprise immunity to error through misidentification, and that sentences like ‘I remember walking in Oxford’ endorse ‘de se’ attitude through showing that “the agent of the walking is identical with the agent of the remembering” (Capone, 2016, p. 235). Capone also refers to utterances such as ‘John thought he was clever’ as pragmatically ‘de se’, for they incorporate ‘I’ inasmuch as “the believer uttered a statement about his/her belief” (p.  238). ‘De se’ readings are argued to require a greater cognitive load than ‘de re’ attitudes, since the former require greater cognitive effects. Capone concludes that “pragmatics promotes the most informative interpretation” of the contradiction between ‘de se’ and ‘de re’ interpretations. Refer to Capone (2016) for comprehensive discussion on ‘de se’ constructs.

3.13  Conclusion This chapter has dealt with some of the philosophical underpinnings of indirect reporting. My aim was to provide a thought-provoking rather than comprehensive text (previous books on indirect reporting are more powerful with regard to comprehensiveness). The chapter provides a user-friendly discussion of the philosophical aspects of indirect reporting, while proposing some state-of-the-art issues that have not been addressed in the literature of indirect reporting. The epistemology of indirect reports provided a framework to address the knowledge/belief dichotomy. Indirect reports are under the influence of individuals’ experiences, and the practice of samesaying should never be regarded as being completely factive (but a mélange of knowledge and belief). Moreover, indirect reports are not just a paraphrase of others’ speech. There are some refinery processes that take place before the report is uttered. This process is under the influence of the sociocognitive idiosyncrasies discussed in Chap. 2. The chapter is not fully-fledged, yet the philosophical discussions provided show the intricacies (and the delicacy) of indirect reports and reported speech. I showed that parentheticals are not allowed in direct reports, whereas indirect reports embrace the inclusion of such constructs. I distinguished between main-­ clause and genuine parentheticals, and discussed that only main-clause parentheticals change the truth-functionality of sentences and should not be included in

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indirect reports, as they change the meaning of the clause following the parenthetical. And finally, I analysed ‘de re’ and ‘de dicto’ constructs, and discussed how indirect reports can get complicated by the fact that they do not distinguish between ‘de re’ and ‘de dicto’ constructs in reports such as ‘John said that he* is a good student’. In this case, ‘he’ can be read as both ‘de re’ and ‘de dicto’. Capone (2016) argues that ‘John said that he* is a good student’ should be regarded ‘de se’ by default, since all ‘de se’ constructs embrace ‘de re’ interpretations, and pragmatics helps individuals to come across the best and the most informative interpretation. For a matter of space, I could not go into further details regarding some important issues I raised in this chapter (verbs of propositional attitude, ‘de dicto’, ‘de re’, and ‘de se’). I believe that some of the philosophical concepts proposed in this chapter are more interesting than others (of course, the reader can certainly judge better than I can in this regard), and it is my hope that these concepts will be expanded or challenged in the near future. These more interesting, state-of-the-art concepts are the refinery process, the coping process, the photosynthetic system, and zone of proximal decoding.

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Chapter 4

Direct and Indirect Reports

Utterances can be made the subject of other utterances. They can be criticized, questioned, commented on, or simply be reported. Language can be used to refer to language. We can talk about talk. This is true for all natural languages and is, indeed, a fundamental feature whose absence disqualifies any sign system as a human language. However, there are different ways of reporting the speech of another. (Coulmas, 1986, p. 2)

4.1  Introduction In this chapter, I study the distinction between direct and indirect reports, arguing that there is no clear-cut boundary between them (although they differ in several ways, as I later discuss). The differences between direct and indirect reporting are both compelling and challenging for researchers. According to Clift and Holt (2007, p.  3), “[o]f structural linguistic studies, a major focus has been the distinction between so-called direct reported speech (DRS) and so-called indirect reported speech (IRS).” I would argue that although there are some rules governing the practice of direct and indirect reporting, the reporter is unbothered to deviate from these rules in strategic ways for the purpose of providing conversational implicatures. In the literature on reported speech, there have been sporadic discussions on direct reporting, whereas one can hardly find a lengthy chapter or article that is devoted to the various features of direct reporting and how it differs from indirect reporting (but refer to Capone [2018] and Itakura [2018] for some interesting discussions on this regard). Therefore, in this chapter, I try specifically to deal with direct and indirect reports, and in so doing, present various examples and justifications to show how that the two constructs are both similar and different. As the reader progresses, s/he should discover that direct reporting has many things to offer, and is indeed a byzantine phenomenon, just like indirect reporting. Throughout the chapter, I © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019 M. Morady Moghaddam, The Praxis of Indirect Reports, Perspectives in Pragmatics, Philosophy & Psychology 21, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-14269-8_4

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discuss the notion that direct reports are not just a verbatim repetition of others’ words and utterances. Direct reports too can possess some properties of indirect reports and can even be used where indirect reports are incapable of intervening. I also discuss subjectivity and objectivity in indirect reports.

4.2  S  imilarities and Differences Between Direct and Indirect Reports The practice of indirect reporting is closely connected to that of direct reporting. Coulmas (1986) distinguishes between two kinds of quotations as direct (oratio recta) and indirect (oratio obliqua). Direct quotations (direct quotes and direct reports can be used interchangeably) are conceptualised as using the exact words1 and utterances of someone else woven into one’s speech. Direct reports can be quotes from a written piece or from oral discourse. Individuals use direct quotations as a powerful tool to “spice up” their speech, or to appeal to authority, and, among other things, to justify a thought or idea. As reported by Ebert (1986, p.  145), “[f]urther, thoughts, intentions and other cognitive acts are also represented in the form of direct speech.” Since the use of direct reports requires higher cognitive processes (Kecskes, 2016), they are used sparingly (in comparison to indirect reports). Direct quotes are a more reliable and authoritative tool (“because of their capacity to instantiate directly the expressive character of language” [Lucy, 1993, p. 19]), which convey a more powerful impression on the interlocutors (assuming that the reporter is faithful to the original speaker’s utterances, and that the hearer makes sure that the direct report is clear and genuine). Capone (2016, p. 54), likewise, advocates that “[i]ndirect reports seem to allow the speaker (and prepare the hearer for) a lower degree of accuracy than direct reports.” However, although the use of direct quotes is readily recognisable in written discourse (they are always offset with quotation marks), they are not easily traceable in the authentic talk (but some authors, such as Capone [2016] argue that this is not a serious issue). Li (1986) has also talked exhaustively about the differences between direct and indirect reports based on syntactic and semantic features. As is the case with syntactic differences (which are the most obvious ones), direct (1) and indirect reports (2) are dissimilar with regard to the following factors: [F]irst, the pronouns in (1) and (2) are different; second, the tenses in (1) and (2) are different; third, (2) but not (1) may have the complimentizer “that”. Finally, Longacre (1976) noted that the immediate constituent grouping in terms of phonological pause and intonation pattern is different between (1) and (2). (cited in Li, 1986, p. 29)

1  Later, I discuss how individuals can manipulate direct reports by using several subtle strategies, in order to be manipulative.

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Another syntactic difference, which is not considered by Li, is that in direct reports it is expected that the reporter does not change the word ‘said’, since if s/he uses another plug (i.e., a word that expresses speech or introduces a quotation, such as utter, say, ask, etc.), it will overshadow the meaning of the direct report. Therefore, replacing ‘said’ with ‘claimed’, for instance, can signal a change of meaning. With regard to semantics, direct reports pay attention to the exact meaning of the original speaker’s utterances (semantic opacity), whereas indirect reports leave some space for manipulations and, more often than not, focus on strategic meaning (sociocognitive manipulation of the meaning [pragmatic opacity]). Moreover, indirect reports are more baroque, for they are cases of ‘free enrichment’.2 On the other hand, I would like to discuss the similarities between direct and indirect reports based on the following aspects: (i) both embrace the word ‘said’3; (ii) there is both a signifier (form) and a signified (content) in direct and indirect reports; (iii) direct and indirect reports are cases of sociocognitive manoeuvre; (iv) there is both a referent and a reference in direct and indirect reports; (v) the issue of voice is applicable to both direct and indirect reports. The basic form of direct and indirect reports comprises the verbs said or says,4 signalling the start of a new clause (the reported clause). Both direct and indirect reports have subjective and objective rules that guide their practice (this similarity will be discussed in more detail in Sect. 4.3). As shown in the example below (cited in Li, 1986, p. 29), in both cases, there is a person called ‘John’ who is reported, and there is both a signifier (form) and a signified (content). (1)

a. b.

John said, “I’m tired.” John said (that) he was tired.

Another similarity between direct and indirect reports is that they are cases of sociocognitive manoeuvre. Although many believe that direct reports are cases of the verbatim representation of an original speaker’s utterances, the reporter can inject an air of subjectivity to the direct report. These manipulative acts originate from sociocognitive factors that influence individuals during interaction. For example, ‘where’, ‘when’, and ‘with whom’ the direct report should be used can be a matter 2  In line with Recanati (2004, p. 18), ‘free enrichment’ is “the process responsible for making the interpretation of an utterance more specific than its literal interpretation (as when ‘jumped’ is contextually understood as ‘jumped over the cliff’).” 3  I argue later in this chapter that it is, of course, not a fixed rule, and that individuals change plugs based on sociocognitive factors. 4  The use of ‘says’ is not sufficiently dealt with in the literature of (in)direct reporting. The default form of the verb used within the main clause in (in)direct reporting seems to be ‘said’, although I believe that in some situations, the reporter may use the verb ‘says’ instead of ‘said’ to show immediacy of action. One case in point is to refer to oral interpreters. In consonance with Peirce’s ‘triadic’ theory of the sign, interpreting is an interpretant of someone else’s words because the interpreted utterances refer to what the interpreter represents. Of course, the present form of the verb ‘say’ can be used in indirect reports as well, as if the reporter has just heard the original utterance.

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of subjectivity. It is true that the reporter can be objective in being faithful to the exact words of the original speaker, the reporter can apply some strategic changes to imply some extra information through direct reporting to show ostensive behaviour (see Itakura, 2018). Likewise, as argued by Capone (2016), borrowing the idea from Ludwig Wittgenstein, indirect reports are cases of language games. Being a language game means that the practice of indirect reports is under the control of Dialogic Principle proper that was proposed by Weigand (2010) and refers to a cyclic procedure of action and reaction. According to this principle, there is no simple speech act, since every act is situated in individuals’ social lives. Thus, as Weigand argues (2010, p. 82), the principle “allows us to differentiate step by step the complex notion of ‘coming to an understanding’ from which the principle starts.” Therefore, both direct and indirect reports are under the influence of individuals’ sociocognitive idiosyncrasies. Moreover, direct and indirect reports both embrace a referent and a reference. As discussed in the previous chapter, there is a distinction between a referent and a reference. Reference (in the shape of many forms) is a relationship in which a symbol or a sign (a word, for example) signifies something; the referent (content) is the thing signified (e.g., what a word refers to). The referent may be a person or an object, or something more abstract, such as a set of actions (Ogden & Richards, 1989). Both direct and indirect reports refer to a third person or some states of affairs. As a result, they signify something, and the signified is the product of a language game, a strategic plan that is best represented and manufactured during the interaction. Last but not least is the issue of voice considering the similarities between direct and indirect reports. Since it is presupposed that direct reports completely acquiesce to faithfulness on the part of the original speaker’s words, it may also be considered that there is only one voice communicated through direct reports. Thus, one can claim that direct reports differ from indirect reports in that indirect reports embrace more than one voice. However, I believe that direct reports can be a good replica of ostensive behaviour that embrace the reporter’s voice as well. Wierzbicka suggests that by adhering to a direct quotation, the speaker “does not say what the content of the quote is (i.e. what was said) – instead he does something that enables the hearer to see for himself what it is, that is to say, in a way, he shows this content” (1974, p.  282). According to Wierzbicka, even the direct quote welcomes intentionality. This is not the only evidence for the intentionality of direct quotes. Let me explain more on this issue. It is true that it is more economical to accept that there is just one voice communicated through direct reports, but in line with the argument made in relation to the sociocognitive idiosyncrasies, it is not hard to acknowledge the existence of different voices in direct reports. Although it is true that by adhering to direct reports, the reporter produces a verbatim report without any syntactic manipulations, it would seem preposterous to suggest that the existence of another voice in the direct report is infeasible, hence impossible. Inevitably, the reporter must make decisions in the process of direct reporting. They must choose from among the myriad of ‘temporospatial alternatives’ the best time and space to use the direct report so that an intended impression is conveyed. Time and space (both geographical and

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PUBLIC

SOCIAL

PERSONAL Fewer cases of reporting

INTIMATE

1.5 to 4 ft

More cases of reporting

4 to 12 ft 12 to 25 ft

Fig. 4.1  Hall’s spatial model (1966) and the possibility of reporting

psychological/social) are factors that influence when, where, how, and to whom a report is provided. The following paragraph looks more deeply into this issue. Edward Hall (1963) has referred to proxemics, which describes humans’ use of space as a specialised elaboration of culture that is categorised into four distinct zones: ‘intimate’, ‘personal’, ‘social’, and ‘public’. It is not hard to imagine that any distinct zone would not necessarily be a good place to use a(n) (in)direct report. In public space, where there is a public appearance of remoteness from others, there is surely less gravitation towards the use of reporting, since there is no strong sociocognitive bond between the speaker and the audience (the interlocutor). However, on the other hand, in social and personal spaces, it is more likely that reports will be used, since people know each other better and have clearer picture of what would be the outcome of the report (we should not forget that the report, whether direct or indirect, is used for a specific interactional purpose). And in intimate space, there are fewer exchanges of talk, hence less chance of using reports (intimate space is strongly correlated with embracing, touching, or whispering). To put it differently, people rarely get extremely close to one another (physically) for the purpose of interaction, but rather, for haptic communication (e.g., for hugging or kissing). Based on the above argument, I compare Hall’s spatial model and the provision of direct and indirect reports in Fig. 4.1. As schematised in Fig. 4.1, there must be a greater chance of reporting occurring in personal and social spheres, while there must be a much smaller possibility of it occurring in intimate and public spheres. On this account, applying the above discussion on the issue of voice, one should bear in mind that people will include their own voice within both direct and indirect reports based on factors such as time and place. Although it is inevitable that the direct reporter uses the exact words of the original speaker, the reporter can add his/her voice to the report by choosing the

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right participant at the right time and place. Therefore, the idea of voicing is also applicable to direct reports. All in all, direct reports are not completely different from the indirect reports with regard to voice.5 Capone (2016, p. 54) suggests that direct reports “more or less report the same things as indirect reports, but they are required in different contexts.”

4.3  O  bjectivity and Subjectivity in Direct and Indirect Reports It can be argued that direct reports are more objective than indirect reports, but it would seem meretricious to claim that direct reports are completely objective since they can be regarded as ‘subjective manipulation of objective utterances’ (this claim is proved by empirical research findings in studies such as Itakura, 2018). It is the reporter who decides when to use the direct quote, or chooses a specific hearer as the addressee of the report. In addition, it is the reporter who decides which part of the original speaker’s utterances should be reported. Thus, direct reports are not a hundred per cent objective. They are simply more objective than indirect reports. Referring to Hungarian language, Fónagy (1986, p. 275) argues that “[i]n Hungarian direct quotation, the reporting verb can be considerably extended even in week position, and offers wide possibilities for subjective characterization of the reported verbal process.” Therefore, in direct reports there is some room for subjectivity. Moreover, Itakura (2018, pp. 328–329) refers to an interesting distinction between direct and indirect reports in this regard: This study has shown that direct report in Japanese is similar to indirect report in the level of accuracy and freedom shown by the reporter. The direct reporter does not necessarily intend to reconstruct the pragmeme or the original embedded context accurately. The original speaker’s indexical expressions for identities, affective meaning, and attitude toward the context are often exaggerated or dramatized. However, the reporter is required to provide clues that will enable the hearer to distinguish the narrating reporter’s voice and the original speaker’s content and speech act. This is similar to how indirect reporters have been described as having the freedom to summarize the reports in their own voices but without substantially changing semantic meanings or functions in the speech acts and thus misleading the hearer.

The differences between direct and indirect reports with regard to objectivity and subjectivity are a matter of degree rather than principles. Additionally, subjectivity and objectivity can be related to cognitive manipulations as well. In other words, one can also define subjectivity or objectivity as cognitive processes that happen in the minds of the interlocutors. It is true that direct reports are objective with regard to their complete reliance on the original speakers’ utterances (and perspective), yet the reporter can still be subjective with regard to when, where, and to whom the 5  In some languages such as Persian (see Chap. 9) and Hungarian (see Fónagy, 1986), the distinction between direct and indirect reports is not clear-cut.

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report should be appeared. Indirect reports too can be objective, regardless of their subjective nature. The reporter should choose the right participant as the addressee. That being the case, not everybody will find the report appealing or consider it important since the report will not be acknowledged equally by every person (refer to Hall’s spatial model). Moreover, the reporting speaker cannot use indirect reports whenever s/he likes. The report should match contextual suitability and situational necessity otherwise it would seem out of place and less-than-impressive. For instance, the indirect report in (2) is completely otiose and is, therefore, likely to lose its effectiveness: (2)

a. b.

Are you sure about the news? John said that Cyrus is a great teacher.

Although it can be claimed that speaker B may have deliberately deviated from speaker A’s question in order to provide a conversational implicature, examples or deviations like the one in B are rare cases and requires common background knowledge. On this account, deciding how, when, and with whom the report should be appeared are important factors that cannot be taken for granted in indirect reports.

4.4  Transformations in Direct Reports In written discourse, it is not hard to acknowledge direct reports since they are marked by quotation marks. The words that come between the quotation marks should be the exact words of the original speaker. Although the direct report should be in accordance with the original speaker’s exact words, the reporter can change the plugs in order to provide an explicature. Consider the following direct report: (3)

President Nixon declared, “I am not a crook.”

In (3), instead of using the word ‘said’, which is quite more common in direct reports, the term ‘declared’ is used to suggest that President Nixon did not say these words in his ‘ivory tower’, but rather, in public (this extra meaning is obtained from the word ‘declared’). What we can further understand from (3) is that President Nixon is accused of being a criminal, or he thinks that others see him in this way. Although the reporter should use the exact words uttered by the original speaker in direct reporting, it is possible to use another plug in an attempt to be more manipulative. The report in (3) can be changed as follows: (4)

President Nixon claimed, “I am not a crook.”

The comparison between (3) and (4) shows how complicated the direct reports can be. In (3), using ‘declare’ instead of ‘said’ is not a big issue since one can trace the reliability of the statement while using the verb declare has no conflict with the

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rules underlying the direct report. However, by analogy, using the word ‘claim’ instead of ‘declare’ is tricky. How did the reporter understand that President Nixon was ‘claiming’ something rather than ‘officially stating’ it? The more neutral verb is to say President Nixon has ‘said’ something instead of ‘declaring’ or ‘claiming’. That said, the use of the term claimed is more complicated and challenging than the verb declared. When someone declares something, it suggests that there has been a public event. One could trace whether President Nixon gave a speech before people at a public event. By contrast, the situation is different regarding the verb claim. This plug (‘claim’) is a subjective word and influences the meaning that is inferred from the reported utterance. It suggests that the utterance may not be true (it is just a claim, and was not declared in a public speech). In this case, the reporter directly reports someone’s utterances but strategically substitutes the verb declare with claim to convey that it is possible that President Nixon is a ‘scoundrel’ despite the confession made by President Nixon. Therefore, one can conclude that using one plug instead of another in the main clause of the report can modify the meaning of direct reports (and in this way they are similar to indirect reports). I would argue, then, that ambiguity is not only observed in indirect reports, as was claimed by Coulmas (1986). Coulmas (1986, p. 1) has stated that ambiguity “arises because in indirect speech the speaker is free to blend information about an utterance with information about the world not conveyed by that utterance.” Although it is true that the reporter cannot change the original speaker’s utterances in direct reporting, it is possible to change the plug, and in so doing, strategically exert subjectivity into the quote. Moreover, it is argued by Capone (2016) that the mutability of the sequence of sentences (I intend to refer to ‘rearrangements’, borrowing the word from Keith Allan) in direct reports can change the meaning of the sentence (Capone calls this innocent change). Although this transformation is not considered a seismic shift, rearrangements can both represent individuals’ intentions and an alteration of meaning, based on ‘possible world semantics’ (Allan, 2016). Take the following transformations as an example (extracted from Gochet, 2011, p. 249): (5)

a. b.

She said, “It might be raining. It does not rain.” She said, “It does not rain. It might be raining.”

At the first glance, the two sentences seem similar but, in fact, the rearrangement in (5b) is not possible.6 According to Gochet (2011), ‘update semantics’ as opposed to truth-conditional semantics, is capable of accounting for the acceptability of cases such as (5a) and non-acceptability of sentences such as (5b). Based on update semantics, (5b) is wrong because it reduces the set of possibilities; therefore, ‘it does not rain’ does not provide a proper path for the sentence ‘it might be raining’, whereas in (5a), “the might-sentence acts as a test which has to be passed successfully for the sentence ‘It does not rain’ to perform the expected update” (Gochet, 6  In this regard, Partee (1973, p. 411) states that “it is not the meaning of the quoted sentence that is contributing to the meaning of the whole, but rather its surface form.”

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4.5  Transformations in Indirect Reports Table 4.1  Features governing the practice of direct reports Rule Faithfulness to original speaker’s exact words Changing the plugs The sequence of the sentences Temporospatial alternatives The linguistic context surrounding the reported speech a

Status Criticala Uncriticalb Uncritical Uncritical Uncritical

Implicature-making No Yes Yes Yes Yes

The reporter is expected to observe this rule The reporter is not expected to observe this rule

b

2011, p. 250). As a result, (5a) is a normal sequence, whereas (5b) is not logical based on the ‘update semantics’. Based on the arguments above, the range of transformations is limited in direct reports (in comparison to indirect reports). As shown in Table 4.1, there are some rules that are applicable to direct reports. Some of these rules seem irrelevant to the practice of direct reporting, but they can change the implicature underlying the report. Each of the rules mentioned in Table 4.1 has either a ‘critical’ or an ‘uncritical’ status, based on the fact that whether it is crucial for the reporter to observe the rule. As the table reveals, only the first rule in the list is non-implicature-making, in that adhering to the exact words and utterances of the original speaker (and using the neutral plug ‘said’) only manifests the proposition underlying the original utterance. As discussed in the foregoing sections, using different plugs, changing the sequence of sentences, temporospatial alternatives, and the linguistic context surrounding the reported speech are implicature-making. That is, they are likely to change the meaning and the illocutionary force of the report.

4.5  Transformations in Indirect Reports Like direct reports, indirect reports are also (or at least expected to be) under the control of some transformations. Li (1986) discusses a challenging issue of substitutions from direct reports to indirect reports, and argues that authors such as Partee (1973) and others believe that “transformational derivation of indirect speech from direct speech” (cited in Li, 1986, p. 30) is rejected since it would lead to an upheaval in examples such as the following: (6)

a. b.

John said, “This theorem is false.” John said that this theorem was not true.

If we consider the transformation in (6), the two adjectives in (a) and (b) (‘false’ and ‘true’) are non-gradable antonyms (also called complementary pairs [Yule, 2010]). Based on non-gradable antonyms, something which is false is definitely ‘not true’;

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on this account, the claim made by Partee can be challenged regarding the discussion of non-gradable antonyms. What’s more, it is quite possible to account for the feasibility of the transformation in (6a) and (6b) by the modal logic. Using modal operators: The classical notation for a modal operator is □, often pronounced “necessarily” (and thus □φ is read as ‘φ is necessarily true’). The dual modal operator is ◇, often pronounced ‘possibly,’ and is typically related to the necessity operator by the formula ◇φ ≡ ¬□¬φ.7 (Shoham & Leyton-Brown, 2010, p. 413)

Based on the formula above, there are two alternatives: (7)

a. b.

◇φ ↔ ¬□¬φ □φ ↔ ¬◇¬φ

According to (7a), it is possible that something will be true or take place IFF it is not necessary that that thing will not be true or take place. By analogy, (7b) argues that it is necessary that something will be true or take place IFF it is not possible that that thing will not be true or take place. Moreover, based on ‘accidental necessity’, everything that is past and true is ‘necessary’.8 The past is fixed, or necessary, in a way that the future is not. Therefore, referring back to (6), we can say that ‘it is necessary that something will be false IFF it is not possible that that thing will not be false’. In other words, it is not possible for something which is necessarily false to be true. Based on this, we can conclude that there is no conflict between (6a) and (6b), and they can be regarded as referring to the same proposition (considering that the adjectives true and false are non-gradable antonyms). The two expressions in (6a) and (6b) can be considered salva veritate. In line with the tenets of formal logic, the kind of transformation observed in (6) is quite possible and correct: ‘something which is false is not true’. In the case of (6), φ is true now and will always be true in the future. On this account, if a theorem is false now, it will always be false. It is not possible that that thing be true either now or at some time in the future. On this account, the modal logic represented above rejects the statement made by Partee (1973) regarding the non-feasibility of transformation observed in (6a) and (6b). Of course, one should bear in mind that the kind of transformation observed  in (6) is palatable only if the content of (6a) is genuine, considering that John has not been drunk when he said such a thing (that the theorem is false) or he is not an illogical person. We are dealing with the genuineness of the report not the content of the original utterance. If the reporting speaker doubts the 7  To provide a simple illustration of the formula, it is correct to assert that it is necessary that it will rain today if and only if it is not possible that it will not rain today, and it is possible that it will rain today if and only if it is not necessary that it will not rain today (Hughes & Cresswell, 1996). Likewise, Damian (1998, p. 352) argues that “it is not true that so long as something exists, it is possible for it not to exist. In like manner, for something that will happen, it is impossible for it not to happen.” 8  As argued by Conee and Sider (2005, p. 32), “everything we ordinarily regard as being in the past is fixed and settled—accidentally necessary.”

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sanity of the original speaker, the reporter can modify the word ‘said’ and use other connotative plugs such as ‘claim’ or ‘allege’. Since the change of plugs is a kind of subjective manipulation of the original speaker’s words, it is better to use an indirect report in cases of opaqueness. The argument above scrapes the vagueness off the surface of indirect reporting regarding its ability to compromise between knowledge and belief (refer to Chap. 3, Section 3.3 for a comprehensive discussion of the issue). To recap, and as a flashback to the heart of my discussion above, it is not logical to assert that the transformational derivation of the indirect report from the direct report is always wrong. We should look at the possible worlds9 whereby it is possible to report both the utterances and the particular world that that utterance represents. Consequently, indirect reports are not only the reporting of the original utterance but also the reporting of the possible world(s) related to that linguistic event. According to classical modal logic (Palmer, 1986), if something is necessarily false, it is impossible for that thing not to be false (therefore, that thing is not true). Of course, this formulaic relationship works for non-gradable antonyms, and one should cast doubt on the possibility of the classical modal logic proposed in (7) when it comes to gradable antonyms (opposites along a scale), such as big/small, old/new, etc. Consider: (8)

a. b.

He said, “My car is not new.” He said that his car was old.

We can definitely assert that something that is ‘not new’ is not necessarily old (‘not new’ does not imply ‘oldness’). In line with ‘axiomatic system’—which refers to something that is obviously true and, therefore, not needing to be proved—two positions can be valid: (9)

a. b.

□ φ (necessarily φ) is equivalent to ¬◇¬φ (not possible that not-φ) ◇φ (possibly φ) is equivalent to ¬□ ¬φ (not necessarily not-φ)

By applying (9a) to the transformation observed in (8), we come across the position below: (10)

a. b.

Something that is necessarily not new is not possible that not be not new. Something that is possibly not new is not necessarily not new.

9  Possible worlds or propositions show the conditions under which utterances are true. For instance, 2 + 2 = 4 is always true irrespective of the kind of world we are referring to. However, the sentence ‘Alessandro is taller than himself’ seems an impossible proposition, since one cannot literally be taller than oneself in any possible world. That said, there is one possible world in which Alessandro can be taller than himself, and that is when he stands on a stool. In this case, it is possible to say ironically that ‘Alessandro is taller than himself’. Therefore, it is possible that Alessandro be taller than himself IFF he stands on a stool (referring to possible worlds). It is true (but weird) that Alessandro can be taller than himself at least in one possible world (a world with a stool). By possible worlds, it means that the meaning of a sentence is true where it is known that “in which of the possible cases it would be true and in which not” (Carnap, 1956, p. 10). The sentence ‘Alessandro is smarter than himself’ is an impossible proposition, since it cannot be true in any possible worlds.

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The relation that is presented in (10a) refers to a possible world under which something that is ‘not new’ is true. On this account, (10a) shows that it is not possible for something that is ‘not new’ not to be ‘not new’ (but we cannot say it is ‘old’ either). This equation does not account for the kind of transformation presented in (8). Using ‘old’ instead of ‘not new’ is not a good substitution since ‘not new’ does not necessarily show ‘oldness’. It is possible that the car is ‘not new’ and ‘not old’, but something in the middle—(8b) is not capable to account for this ‘middleness’. On the other hand, (10b) is also incapable of accounting for the transformation observed in (8). Something that is possibly ‘not new’ equals with something that is not necessarily ‘not new’ (if something is possibly ‘not new’, it does not mean that that thing is necessarily not new). As a result, (8b) is wrong since ‘old’ is neither accounted for by (10a) nor (10b). Of course, the kind of transformation observed in (8b) is not a completely false proposition (false in the actual world), but a possible proposition (the proposition is true at least in one possible world). The transformations observed in (6a) and (6b) are correct in all possible words. There are also transformations that can better show the distinction between direct and indirect reports. The following transformations are only applicable to indirect reports: substitution, elimination, summarising, and elaboration. However, not all of these transformations happen at the same time. There are situations in which the reporting speaker decides to use one kind of transformation instead of the others. Whatever transformation is used, the original speaker’s utterances should not be manipulated so much that it would not be possible to distinguish between the reporting speaker’s and the original speaker’s voice and perspective. Likewise, as a comparison between direct and indirect reports with regard to transformations, Lee (1993, p. 371) argues that there are certain constructions that are only acceptable in direct discourse. These constructs are: exclamations; verbless exclamatory constructions; exclamatory sentences; repetitions and hesitations; incomplete sentences; subjectless imperatives; and direct address. Referring to our two kinds of antonyms in this section, I showed that something that is ‘false’ and past is always ‘false’ or ‘not true’ in every possible world (we cannot say something is a little true or a little false). Nevertheless, something that is ‘not new’ is not necessarily ‘old’. Only in one possible world it can be ‘old’, but in other worlds other interpretations may hold true. A faithful report is one which decently targets and approaches the kind of world that is intended by the original speaker.

4.6  The Rationale Behind Direct and Indirect Reports The previous section dealt closely with the transformations within direct and indirect reports. In this section, I discuss the reason behind using direct and indirect reports. Previously, I showed that there are many complexities revolving around direct and indirect reporting. One may wish to know the justifications behind using one specific construct (direct or indirect report) instead of another. I would like to cite Kiefer (2016, p. 79) as a point of departure:

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The speaker may prefer using indirect reports instead for [sic] direct reports for several reasons: (i) Direct reports may be more difficult to integrate into an ongoing discourse than indirect ones. Typically, they are used when the exact wording of an utterance is at stake. (ii) In direct reports the speaker of the original message remains in the background. On the other hand, indirect reports may carry information about the speaker’s attitude toward the reported event. The speaker may indicate his attitude by his choice of the reporting verb or, more importantly, by the appropriate reformulation of the reported clause. (iii) Cognitively it is more expensive to use direct reports than indirect ones. That is, memorizing verbatim requires more memory space than providing a report which concentrates on the propositional content of the message or on part of it.

In addition to those outlined by Kiefer, I think that there is a fourth reason (and maybe even more). Using indirect reports requires that the reporter has a fuller understanding of the situation. In other words, the reporter should have more control over the contextual factors, so that s/he would be able to apply proper transformations and at the same time show fidelity to the original speaker’s utterances. By situation, I mean sociocognitive variables that alter individuals’ choices of words and utterances. The reporting speaker should analyse, before any report, the possible effects of the report on the hearer (for further reading on the ‘refinery process’ refer to Chap. 3, Fig. 3.2). The reporter should also decide whether s/he should make any deletion, substation, elaboration, or summarisation as s/he decides to report the original speaker’s utterances. Furthermore, it is not true to claim that “[s] ome languages which have both direct and indirect speech allow the use of indirect speech only if the reporter speaker is unsure about the original speech” (Li, 1986, p.  41). As we saw throughout this chapter, individuals use indirect reports for a myriad of reasons, including strategic manipulations of the original speakers’ words as well as reducing the cognitive load on the part of the reporter and the hearer. However, one cannot claim that individuals always tend to use indirect reports. Although it is more economical on the basis of both cognitive and social factors to use indirect reports, individuals may use direct reports instead of the indirect ones for some (good) reasons. One important feature of the direct reports is their authoritative power in providing the hearer with first-hand information. Therefore, direct reports are more convincing and persuading (they came straight from the horse’s mouth). As an advocate of this feature, Li (1986, p. 41) says that “[a] direct quote communicates a more authentic piece of information than an indirect quote in the sense that a direct quote implies a greater fidelity to the source of information that an indirect quote.” Direct reports are also more emphatic and highlight that the reporter is serious and should be taken more seriously. Another reason that tempts individuals into using direct reports instead of indirect ones is that they want to avoid shouldering the responsibility of what is quoted. In this case, the report is a ‘hearsay’ marker (this will be discussed in the next section), whereby the reporting speaker channels the responsibility of reporting (asserting) to someone else. The reporter wants to emphasise that it is someone else’s exact words, and s/he is just reporting someone else’s words.10 Another less-obviously recognised reason that  That is, of course, if the reporter exactly utters the original speaker’s words and based on situational necessity. Otherwise the reporter – even by adhering to verbatim report – should be held responsible for not being faithful to the reported speaker’s perspective.

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shows why individuals prefer direct reports is the ability of direct reports to give credit to the original speaker (implying that it is the exact utterance of the original speaker and not that of the reporter). In the same vein, some prefer to use direct reports for aesthetic reasons, as they believe that changing the words and utterances would decrease the beauty and effectiveness of the original words. These are some tentative reasons as to why individuals may prefer direct reports instead of the indirect ones.

4.7  Conclusion In this chapter, I dealt extensively with direct and indirect reports. I discussed that a transformation from a direct report (that comprises a non-gradable antonym) to an indirect report does not always end in failure, and these kinds of transformations are justifiable based on ‘axiomatic systems’ and modal logic. I also stated that subjectivity and objectivity can be represented in direct and indirect reports, regardless of the subjective nature of indirect reports and objective nature of direct reports. I talked about Edward Hall’s spatial model and linked each space with the possibility of reporting others during the interaction. I also discussed the type of transformations found in direct and indirect reports. Such transformations were not discussed as only relating to syntactical features, but pragmatic manipulations were also taken into consideration. One of the interesting things about this chapter is the discussion of rules governing direct reports. I mentioned rules related to changing the plugs, the sequence of sentences within the report, temporospatial alternatives, and the context embracing the report. These features are not adequately discussed in the literature of reported speech, but they can help us to generate interesting information about the mechanism of reported speech.

References Allan, K. (2016). The reporting of slurs. In A. Capone, F. Kiefer, & F. Lo Piparo (Eds.), Indirect reports and pragmatics: Interdisciplinary (pp. 211–232). Cham, Switzerland: Springer. Capone, A. (2016). The pragmatics of indirect reports: Socio-philosophical considerations. Cham, Switzerland: Springer. Capone, A. (2018). On the social praxis of indirect reporting. In A. Capone, M. Garcia-Carpintero, & A. Falzone (Eds.), Indirect reports and pragmatics in the world languages (pp. 3–20). Cham, Switzerland: Springer. Carnap, R. (1956). The methodological character of theoretical concepts. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. Clift, R., & Holt, E. (2007). Introduction. In E. Holt & R. Clift (Eds.), Reporting talk: Reported speech in interaction (pp. 1–15). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Conee, E., & Sider, T. (2005). Riddles of existence: A guided tour of metaphysics. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

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Coulmas, F. (1986). Reported speech: Some general issues. In F. Coulmas (Ed.), Direct and indirect reports: Trends in linguistics, studies, and monographs (pp.  1–28). Berlin, Germany: Mouton De Gruyter. Damian, P. (1998). The letters of Peter Damian 91–120 (O. J. Blum, Trans.). Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press. Ebert, K. (1986). Reported speech in some languages of Nepal. In F.  Coulmas (Ed.), Reported speech: Some general issues (pp. 145–159). Berlin, Germany: Mouton De Gruyter. Fónagy, I. (1986). Reported speech in French and Hungarian. In F.  Coulmas (Ed.), Direct and indirect speech (pp. 255–309). Berlin, Germany: Mouton De Gruyter. Gochet, P. (2011). Possible worlds semantics. In M.  Sbisà, J.  O. Östman, & J.  Verschueren (Eds.), Philosophical perspectives for pragmatics (Vol. 10, pp. 244–252). Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Hall, E.  T. (1963). A system for the notation of proxemic behavior. American Anthropologist, 65(5), 1003–1026. Hall, E. T. (1966). The hidden dimension. New York: Anchor Books. Hughes, G. E., & Cresswell, M. J. (1996). The new introduction to modal logic. London/New York: Routledge. Itakura, H. (2018). Accuracy in reported speech: Evidence from masculine and feminine Japanese language. In A. Capone, M. Garcia-Carpintero, & A. Falzone (Eds.), Indirect reports and pragmatics in the world languages (pp. 315–332). Cham, Switzerland: Springer. Kecskes, I. (2016). Indirect reporting in bilingual language production. In A. Capone, F. Kiefer, & F. Lo Piparo (Eds.), Indirect reports and pragmatics: Interdisciplinary studies (pp. 9–30). Cham, Switzerland: Springer. Kiefer, F. (2016). Indirect and direct reports in Hungarian. In A.  Capone, F.  Kiefer, & F.  Lo Piparo (Eds.), Indirect reports and pragmatics: Interdisciplinary studies (pp. 77–92). Cham, Switzerland: Springer. Lee, B. (1993). Metalanguages and subjectivities. In J. A. Lucy (Ed.), Reflexive language: Reported speech and metapragmatics (pp. 365–391). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Li, C.  N. (1986). Direct speech and indirect speech: A functional study. In F.  Coulmas (Ed.), Direct and indirect reports: Trends in linguistics, studies, and monographs (pp. 29–45). Berlin, Germany: Mouton De Gruyter. Lucy, J. A. (1993). Reflexive language and the human disciplines. In J. A. Lucy (Ed.), Reflexive language: Reported speech and metapragmatics (pp.  9–32). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Ogden, C. K., & Richards, I. A. (1989). The meaning of meaning. San Diego, CA: Harcourt. Palmer, F. (1986). Mood and modality. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Partee, B. H. (1973). The syntax and semantics of quotation. In S. Anderson & P. Kiparsky (Eds.), A festschrift for Morris Halle (pp. 410–418). New York: Holt. Recanati, F. (2004). Literal meaning. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Shoham, Y., & Leyton-Brown, K. (2010). Multiagent systems algorithmic: Game-theoretic, and logical foundations. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Weigand, E. (2010). Dialogue: The mixed game. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Wierzbicka, A. (1974). The semantics of direct and indirect discourse. Papers in Linguistics, 7, 267–307. Yule, G. (2010). The study of language (4th ed.). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Chapter 5

Indirect Reports and Translation

5.1  Introduction Translating and indirect reporting are closely related to each other (Capone, 2016), and both embrace the concept of ‘samesaying’ (the report and the original utterance share some broad content). Issues such as adaptation, community interpreting, and multilingualism (among other things) have expanded the scope of translation beyond verbatim encoding and decoding of information. Although there are more limitations in translation than indirect reporting, new developments in translation studies given the translator a lot of freedom to make subjective changes based on sociocultural features. On this account, translation, just like indirect reporting, is not a ‘zero-sum game’. According to Cronin (2001, p. 91): This is a game where there are two players, the game ends after certain number of moves have been made, there is always a winner and a loser and there is one strategy that allows the player who makes the first move to win irrespective of the moves made by the other player. Formal game theory also operated on the assumption that players act rationally.

In this chapter, I deal with the intricacies and idiosyncrasies underlying the relationship between indirect reporting and translation. Although some authors believe that these two concepts are closely similar (Capone, 2016), I argue that they have also features that are at variance with each other and should be taken into close consideration if we are going to propose a sound account of the two terms and their relationship. I also discuss an interesting case of non-verbal communication and talk about its relation to indirect reports and translation.

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5.2  Similarities Between Translation and Indirect Reports The practice of indirect reporting is closely related to translation. With the refutation as well as the bad reputation of a ‘businesslike manner of writing’, and with the advent of new concepts such as ‘adaptation’ and ‘compensation1’ in translation, an emphasis is put upon the dialogic nature of translation. Maybe the most outstanding feature that places indirect reporting and translating under the same national anthem is effectiveness. Effectiveness is strong both within indirect reporting and translating, whereby it is possible for the reporting speaker and the translator to channel the target audience towards an intended effect. Effectiveness, however, is a complicated issue, and it does not mean that by merely resorting to the application of some strategies one can guarantee fecundity (it is relative). Goffman (1956) defines ‘effectiveness’ in terms of the roles participants take on during the interaction. Effectiveness changes as the roles vary. Thus, it is not possible to assign a distinct definition to effectiveness since it receives its meaning from the interaction that hinges on social and cognitive factors. Goffman used the term ‘mask’, or the ‘front stage’, to point to the variability of roles. Effectiveness, one can say, is reducible to the sphere of individuals’ appraisals. Being effective is not a big issue in indirect reporting since the domain of impacts between individuals is restricted. For translating, however, things become complicated since the translator should satisfy a larger audience than compared with indirect reporting (considering the domain of impact). Although the translator can guess who will be the potential reader, it is a truly excruciating task for the translator to interact with some elusive readers. Be that as it may, because of sociocognitive differences, the translator has a much more baroque task in targeting and satisfying the expectations of all the potential readers. Unlike indirect reports, translating does not allow for the inclusion of online coping strategies. For this reason, the reporter can easily make amendments based on the feedback s/he receives from the hearer, whereas the translator does not have access to the reader(s) and, for this reason, cannot provide any coping strategies. The reader would surely consider the translation as an end product, i.e., something that is fixed and unchangeable (although, of course, the translator can make amendments in the subsequent editions). On the other hand, indirect reports are not considered the end products. The reporter can make modifications even after the report. Despite what is discussed above, I argue that the translator can use some strategies in order to make things even. The translator can guess or predict what the reaction of the reader(s) is likely to be and provide extra information in the ‘footnote’ or the ‘endnote’ to take into account dramatisation.2 According to Schäffner (2001, p. 3), both indirect reporting 1  “Compensation is a technique which involves making up for the loss of a source text effect by recreating a similar effect in the target text through means that are specific to the target language and/or text” (Harvey, 2001, p. 37). 2  Dramatisation can be conceptualised as the mutual evaluative work that is accomplished by both the performer and the audience, thus manifesting the inseparable connection between performer (reporting speaker/translator) and audience.

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and translation have the same end product: “a text which is capable of functioning appropriately in a specific situation and context of use.” Moreover, just like the reporting speaker who uses indirect reports with a purpose not only for the sake of the transmission of the original speaker’s words, “the translator is unilaterally committed to the target situation because it is primarily the message and the commission, rather than the text itself, that have to be rendered for the client” (Schäffner, 2001, p. 3; 2017, p. 120). There are also similarities between indirect reports and translation with regard to the transformations that regulate them. Capone (2016) refers to the basic transformations as addition, replacement, elimination, syntactic adjustment, and clarification that translation embraces. By analogy, the same transformations can also be observed in indirect reports. In addition, another important transformation is bestowed to translating and indirect reports. Through ‘summarising’, the translator is free to modify the original text to seem more natural and effective, while the reporting speaker rather than the translator is less restricted to apply extensive summarisation in the reported utterance. That said, there are still features of the text that the translator is not able to deviate from. In translation, summarisation is more strategic and is applied rarely (since translation is a scientific practice), whereas in indirect reports, the reporter can summarise the original utterance and mention the gist of it (but it should be a fair paraphrase). Another less acknowledged similarity that in my view makes reporting and translating very close to one another is the idea of ‘relevance’. Referring to the ‘principle of relevance’, which is conceptualised as a tool for achieving maximum benefit and at the same time minimising the processing cost, Gutt (1991, pp. 101-­ 102) argues that: If we ask in what respect the intended interpretation of the translation should resemble the original, the answer is: in respects that make it adequately relevant to the audience—that is, that offer adequate contextual effects; if we ask how the translation should be expressed, the answer is: it should be expressed in such a manner that it yields the intended interpretation without putting the audience to unnecessary processing effort.

In this regard, both indirect reports and translating can be regarded as a cognitive process in which the translator/reporter tries to take into consideration the reader’s or hearer’s judgements and expectations, so as to provide amendments to make the report/translation more cognitively effective. The cognitive features underlying (indirect) reporting and translating can be represented by the distinction between the monolingual and the translator. As stated by Bell (2001), the primary goal of the monolingual is to gather information while the translator should recognise translation- or message-relevant elements besides gathering information. As the quote above implies, the translator does not approach the text just for the mere sake of decoding the text, but also for encoding it. This is exactly what happens in an indirect report. The reporter should first know the point being communicated by the original speaker and then polish the report based on the sociocognitive factors (refer to Chap. 3, Sect. 3.8 for further reading on this issue). ‘Decision making’ is a desperately important issue in indirect reports and translating. No decision-making starts from the scratch. To put it differently, there is no

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tabula rasa in the decision-making process underlying reporting and translating. Strictly speaking, both translating and indirect reporting operate and are surrounded by declarative knowledge (know ‘what’). This pool of stored knowledge (Ryle, 1949) is what shapes the rudimentary processes underlying both reporting and translating. This is not the end, however. There should be a second type of knowledge as a backup for when declarative or background knowledge falls short of dealing with the strategic moments in interaction. The type of knowledge that helps the reporter/translator manage strategic moments is procedural knowledge (know ‘how’). To obtain the desired goal, therefore, declarative and procedural knowledge should work in tandem. Problem-solving, a residual of procedural knowledge, is an inseparable and inevitable part of both translating and indirect reporting. The points discussed above clearly manifest that indirect reports and translating are sisters of the same mother. However, admitting that they share the same mother does not mean that they are not different. It is quite possible that they change their behaviour based on the cognitive processes underlying their behaviour and the social values they respect. In what follows, the main differences between translating and indirect reporting are discussed.

5.3  Differences Between Translation and Indirect Reporting Despite the similarities, translating and indirect reporting are not completely the same. First, the issues of face and politeness are much more sensitive in indirect reporting since it allows for more manipulations and strategic transformations (Morady Moghaddam, 2018). Indirect reporting involves the hearer, the reported speaker, and the reporter to the extent that personal issues are drawn to attention and likely to have a greater impact on individuals’ characters. On the other hand, translation is more general and does not usually deal with personal issues, as is the case in indirect reporting. Second, indirect reporting is ‘immediate’, meaning that faster cognitive processes are involved in indirect reporting, whereas translation is non-­ immediate and the cognitive load is lighter. Indirect reporting is more stressful and the reporter feels more cognitive constraints in that s/he should decide online (and rather swiftly) and take into consideration possible transformations and updates needed to make the indirect report more fine-grained and effective. Third, in translation, one has access to the original text whereas in indirect reporting one might not have access to the original speaker (the original speaker may be dead or not accessible in the time of reporting, for example). This property of indirect reporting may encourage the reporter to do whatever transformations s/he wishes to convey without the fear of being recognised, whereas, on the other hand, the translator should be aware not to diverge extensively from the original text (translation can be verifiable). This distinction is realised in what occurs in backstabbing whereby the reporting speaker (consciously and maliciously) manipulates the original utterances as a way to ruin the reported speaker’s character (one can also consider cases of

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‘malicious joy’ or reports that thrive on schadenfreude). Fourth, social features underlying translating and indirect reporting are not the same. In indirect reporting, issues such as social distance and power relationship make a great deal of difference, and thereby it is strongly probable that the report would be produced under a different situation than what is in progress in translating. Translating is sensitive to politeness, but it is not as critical as is the case with indirect reporting. That being the case, indirect reporting moves beyond the appropriateness of the text and politeness, taking into account affective and personal issues, such as the degree of familiarity, appraisals and judgements, social class, background knowledge, etc. Lastly, the relationship between participants in indirect reporting and translating is a strong determinant in conceptualising the differences between the two concepts. In translating, there is the translator(s), the reader(s), and the writer(s). Due to the remoteness of the three elements of translating, these roles rarely change. In translation, usually, we cannot expect to see all of these individuals interacting with each other in the presence of one another. However, indirect reporting allows for the presence of the original speaker during reporting (this will be further discussed in Sect. 5.8). Of course, the presence of the original speaker is possible in interpreting, where the reporter orally translates someone else’s words and utterances into the target language. Further to this, in indirect reporting, the hearer can be also the original speaker. The reporter can use the hearer’s utterances and return them back to the hearer in the form of reporting. Although one may claim that the writer can be the reader of his/her work that is translated, this is not usually the case in translation. In translation, the writer, the translator, and the reader are attached to each other through the translated book while in indirect reporting, individuals interact during a speech event that allows for amendments and communication strategies. On this account, the role-relationships are more dynamic in indirect reporting, whereas in translating the boundaries are clearer.

5.4  Rationality in Reporting and Translating Indirect reporting and translating are rational procedures that are guided by some specific principles. According to Wallsten (1980), rational behaviour should meet four requirements: ‘verifiability’, ‘plausibility’, ‘situational adequacy’, and ‘value-­ orientedness’. Each of these concepts can be related to both reporting and translating. Verifiability points to the issue that the text manufactured through translating or reporting should pass a test of whether what is presented to the audience can be proved to be false or true. For this reason, verifiability is closely connected to ‘falsifiability’. To pass the test of verifiability, the idea underlying translating or indirect reporting should be undistorted by emotion or personal bias. Closely related to verifiability is the idea of ‘plausibility’, which refers to reasonable or probable transformations. As a result, the practice underlying indirect reporting and translating should be well-spoken and apparently (but often deceptively) worthy of confidence

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or trust. Besides, situational adequacy plays an important role in whether the transformations observable in indirect reports and translating are logical or threatening the original speaker’s face. To make the issue clearer, I provide an illustration: (1)

Mary: I think John must be a very polite man. Fred: I doubt that. He said the other day that his friends are all bastards. Mary: Really? Maybe I should have a second thought about him.

In (1), Fred’s disclosure of John acts at the service of interaction and is closely related to the topic at hand. Fred’s reporting is a (blunt) reaction to Mary’s complimenting John as being polite. In this case, Fred can be acquitted of complicity; but Fred can also claim that he has tried to be informative. On the other hand, however, if we replace ‘polite’ with ‘clever’, for instance, then Fred’s reporting of John (he said that his friends are all bastards) would be unfair and dishonest since the report is not a logical reaction to Mary’s complimenting John as being clever (breaching situational adequacy). John is responsible for this disclosure since he did not respect the Principle of Prudence and generalised the offensive word bastard to all his friends. Of course, Fred should have been more strategic in reporting John. I believe that Fred could have used a less-direct report to divulge John’s impoliteness (e.g., John insulted all his friends the other day). Moreover, since Mary is not going to make an important decision based on her realisation of John as a polite man, Fred should have been more reserved and not have disclosed a face-threatening fact about John. In this regard, Capone rightly asserts that “a reporter who makes cuts adopts the footing as author as he decides which part of the text is more relevant and seems to adapt the indirect report to the purpose of the discourse” (2016, p. 109). Therefore, ‘situational necessity’ and ‘situational adequacy’ are important factors that govern the practice of translating and indirect reporting. Last but not least is value-­ orientedness. To be considered a rational practice, indirect reporting and translating should be guided by the community values, which make it possible for them to be effective and gain acceptance by an individual or a social group. Above all, the manufactured discourse of translating and indirect reporting is not a neutral practice. In both cases, it is directed towards a particular audience and should respect their values so as to be impressive and effective. In other words, the reporter/translator should manage the allocation of resources to self- and other-interests.

5.5  Paraphrasis/Form Principle Although I will deal extensively with the principles underlying the practice of indirect reporting in the next chapter, this seems a good time and place to discuss the Paraphrasis/Form Principle since it governs both reporting and translating. Let us start with a (rather challenging) definition of the Principle proposed by Capone (2016, p. 64):

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Should Y hear what X said he (Y) had said, he would not take issue with it, as to content, but would approve of it as a fair paraphrasis of his original utterance. Furthermore, he would not object to vocalizing the assertion made out of the words following the complementizer ‘that’ on account of its form/style.

Based on the principle above, Capone argues that “my form/style principle predicts that forms should be as close as possible to those of the original utterances” (2016, p. 188). Some researchers, such as Wayne Davis (2005), have proposed objections to the Paraphrasis/Form Principle (Capone, 2015) on the grounds that it is possible to breach ‘the soul of the agreement’ in spite of the fact that the paraphrase would be fair and there would be no objection by the original speaker. The soul of the agreement refers to the fact that one should respect the ethics of paraphrasing regardless of the original speaker’s consideration of the paraphrase as being fair and satisfactory. Accordingly, changing ‘the first black person’ to ‘the first nigger’ is a false paraphrase in line with Davis (2005) and not in accord with the soul of Paraphrasis/Form Principle, notwithstanding the fact that the original speaker considers the transformation to be fair. As the Principle shows, for Capone, the main building blocks of indirect reports are the reported speaker and the reporting speaker, while little attention is paid to the role of the hearer (of course, Capone does show an awareness of the important role of the hearer by proposing The Hearer Principle, for example). The important role of the hearer is advocated through the concept of appraisal, as well as the strategic nature of indirect reports. Appraisals are speakers’ judgements about an event. In reporting an event, it is the reporting speaker’s and hearer’s appraisal of the situation and event that shape the practice. On this account, it is not clear how the Principle can take into consideration the strategic moments that arise during the interaction (sometimes the reporter changes the original utterances based on his/her appraisal of the situation). Take the following situation as an example. Mary said to Fred about John in a moment of anger: (2)

That bastard makes me so nervous.

Fred in reporting to John may say: ‘Mary said that you make her so nervous’ (rather than ‘she said that you are a bastard who makes her so nervous’). This is because Fred has appraised Mary’s insulting comment about John as a moment of anger, and Mary may regret having said those words. Although the Paraphrasis/Form Principle would force Fred to issue an indirect report as close as possible to the words used, Fred wants to be ‘diplomatic’ and thus changes Mary’s words, deleting the offensive word ‘bastard’ as Mary would be grateful for this once her anger is over. Paraphrasis/Form Principle is the objet d’art of the praxis of indirect reporting, but some objections have been raised with regard to its effectiveness in different contexts. However, the Principle seems to be a perfect starting point for understanding the nature of transformations in indirect reports. Alessandro Capone has clearly discussed in his Pragmatics of Indirect Reports (2016) that the reporting speaker has the upper hand to change the wordings of the original utterance as far as s/he is faithful to the reported speaker’s utterances as well as considering the original

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speaker’s positive face. The objections made here do not show negligence on the part of the Principle since Capone has been aware of the possible shortcomings. He has also advocated that the Principle is less-than-perfect by stating that “[i]t is easy to imagine that the theory will have to be revised and improved in many ways” (2016, p. 363). The problem of the Principle originates from the fact that it refers more or less to an ideal situation. However, in practice, there might be situations that do not acquiesce to the constraints made by the Principle. It can be concluded, therefore, that the Principle is more applicable (and related) to translating than indirect reporting. The immediacy of the indirect reports and the need for faster cognitive processes may force the reporting speaker to deviate from obeying the Principle. The reporting speaker should be aware of the dynamics of the situation. It is true that the practice of indirect reporting is also constrained by the same principles that are observable in translating; however, in indirect reports the reporting speaker can be more strategic in considering the dynamics of the situation. One such dynamic is the degree of familiarity shared among the hearer, the reporting speaker, and the original speaker. Another variable is whether the original speaker is available to check for verifiability. In translating, the original text is always accessible and it is possible to provide a background check against valid criteria (the original text). In indirect reporting, the original speaker may not be as easily accessible as the original text.

5.6  The Issue of Footing Generally speaking, the idea of masking or “ventroquilizing a different person” (Capone, 2016, p. 113) is a very crucial issue that is very relevant to the concept of ‘footing’ in indirect reporting and translating. According to Goffman, footing is the “alignment we take up to ourselves and the others present as expressed in the way we manage the production or reception of an utterance” (1981, p. 128). The concept of ‘footing’ is in line with and connected to the idea of ‘masking’. The issue of ‘masking’ is accredited to Goffman’s concept of dramaturgy. The emphasis in dramaturgy is on performance; the reporter/translator is considered a performer. The rationale behind the term ‘performer’ is expressiveness. To express others, sometimes the individual should wear different masks and play strategic games to change the alignment. Based on the idea of dramaturgy, individuals take up different alignments during the interaction so as to be able to impress others in an intended way. On this account, communication is turbulent since every context has its own features. The performer takes on a role in accordance with the contextual factors and the audience. As the setting changes, the roles will change too. Effectiveness changes as the roles vary. Thus, it is not possible to provide a distinct definition for effectiveness since it receives its meaning from interactions that hinge on social and cognitive factors. Goffman used the term mask to point to the variability of roles. The notion of role that is advocated by Vygotsky (Lantolf, 2000) is also accentuated in Goffman’s theory of dramaturgy. Goffman, like Vygotsky, believes that roles

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are constructed during interaction. As reported by Kramsch, “human personalities are made up of different roles that get played out in dialogic situations” (2000, p. 152). Goffman’s theory of dramaturgy shows that identity is not fixed and is not psychologically independent, but rather is shaped and reshaped during interaction with others and by different roles one ascribes to himself/herself. As exemplified by Goffman (1956, p. 22): A professional man may be willing to take a very modest role in the street, in a shop, or in his home, but, in the social sphere which encompasses his display of professional competency, he will be much concerned to make an effective showing.

Based on the description above, it can be argued that indirect reporting is more relevant and representative of the idea of masking since it is more immediate and dialogic than translating. However, both the reporter and the translator work towards conveying a particular impression based on the sociocognitive dynamics of the situation. Verifiability and non-immediateness of the relationship between the translator and the hearer are two important variables that do not allow the translator to go awry.

5.7  T  he (Complicated) Case of Accountability in Reporting Slurring Closely related to the idea of accountability is the Principle of Prudence (one should be cautious not to speak insincerely, where there is the possibility of being subjectively reported by others) presented by Capone (2016). Capone states that one should not report/translate slurring words, for in doing so, one would share some complicity with the original speaker. The key passage is: The original speaker is credited with having said something which may objectionable in the language and culture of the hearer. And the translator is possibly held complicit, because he could have avoided the slurring expression, but did not do so. There is obviously a tension between the two problems. The translator cannot be both faithful to literal meaning and politically correct. She is confronted with a hard choice. (Capone, 2016, p. 179)

Contrary to the statement above, I believe that reporting slurring in indirect reports differs from what is observed in translating. In a literary text, the author’s attitude or position towards the action, characters, narrator, subject, and even readers of the story are of importance and come under the general concept of ‘tone’. Taboo words, slurring, and derogatory words can reveal the author’s tone in the story. In translating literary texts that include taboo or derogatory words, transferring the author’s tone is of importance. To that end, reporting taboo words, slurring, and derogatory words that may be objectionable in some cultures may be part of translating the author’s tone and attitude (hence they should not be deleted or euphemised). In the case of translation, therefore, the responsibility of reporting slurring should be on the shoulder of the original speaker (not the reporting speaker). In the case of translation, by translating slurring, the translator has been faithful to the original writer, and s/he should not blame herself/himself for conveying taboo or derogatory words

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provided that the translator is competent enough and the translating of slurring is not intended to ruin the writer’s character but rather to better transform the tone and viewpoints of the writer. In indirect reporting, on the other hand, since there may be no evidence to prove that the slurring word is related to the original speaker, and since the interaction revolves more around the personal issues, the hearer may attach some complicity to the reporting speaker. Even if there is evidence, the reporter should be conscious not to report slurring if there is no situational necessity (this condition is not applicable to translating). By ‘situational necessity’, I mean the obligation that is put upon the reporter/translator to report slurring, and the relation of this reporting/translating with the aim of interaction. In translating, the translator should not worry about situational necessity since there is no other choice but to translate the original text as closely as possible (to properly transfer the original speaker’s tone and attitude). In indirect reporting, however, the reporting speaker can completely delete the offensive part of the original speaker’s speech in line with the Principle of Charity (considering the positive face of the original speaker). To clarify the issue, I would like to refer to a sentence extracted from ‘You’re Ugly, Too’ by Lorrie Moore3: (3)

Did you see that secretary out front? I finally f**ed her.

Referring to (3), the translator can substitute the f-word with other less poignant words, such as ‘having sex’ or ‘making love’. Nevertheless, one should consider whether these two phrases have the same meaning as the f-word. The answer is ‘no’. There is no doubt that euphemisms such as ‘having sex’ or ‘making love’ are more polite and less offensive than the f-word, but they are surely not as informative as the f-word. The f-word in Moore’s (2000) You’re Ugly, Too is a demonstration of short-term paroxysm, which can be interpreted as an achievement, an action that is void of love or deep feelings towards others. As Capone (2016, pp. 178–179) states: “one cannot always replace a word with a coextensive expression in the that-clause of an indirect report.” Accordingly, in translation, the translator should feel less embarrassment in reporting slurring and derogatory words since the nature of literary texts and the scientific practice of translating obviate the danger of being considered as complicit (i.e., one should be informative and rather objective in translating the original speaker’s sentences). In line with Simms (1997), translating a sentence referring to sex organs, for example, is quite innocuous in a medical textbook. This shows that translation is a technical expertise and should not be equalled with informal reporting. In indirect reports, however, reporting slurring should be done with more caution since the hearer will judge the reporting of slurring based on situational necessity. In indirect reporting, the attempt is not to be an objective representation of someone else’s technical words, as in translation, but the reporter may try to be strategic or summarise many scattered sentences into an informative one. Therefore, in indirect 3  Lorrie Moore is an American fiction writer known mainly for her humorous and poignant short stories.

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reports, the reporting speaker can provide the gist of what is originally said (including bad language) while in translation one is debarred from deleting some parts of the original writer’s utterances tactically, no matter how ugly the words are. It seems prima facie that reporting and translating slurring are completely governed by the same principles. Capone argues that some basic transformations apply to both translation and indirect reports. He talks about the convoluted case of translating slurring while arguing that “[t]he translator is a cultural mediator” (2016, p. 179). Drawing on Searle’s (1979) Principle of Expressibility, Capone states that the responsibility of reporting slurring inclines more towards the reported speaker than the reporting speaker. He introduces the concept of ‘mixed quotation’, whereby the dilemma of translating slurring is somehow alleviated. Through a revised version of the Form/Style Principle, which is embedded in the Principle of Translation,4 Capone asserts his stance (regarding the objections raised by Wayne Davis, 2005) on the accountability of the original speaker in reporting slurring. Using the tenets of societal pragmatics (Dascal, 2003; Mey, 2001), Capone discusses the interplay of voices and the task of the hearer that helps us to separate voices in the polyphonic language game of indirect reporting. He suggests that in order to fully grasp indirect reports, the hearer should be able to recognise (distinct) voices by taking into account cues and clues. A very challenging issue is raised by Capone regarding “[w]ho is responsible for a slur: the original speaker or the indirect reporter” (2016, p. 74)? Although it is stated that the reporter should be cautious not to report insincerely, Capone (2016, p. 74) argues that “the original speaker is (held) responsible to a greater extent.” In Capone’s view, the original speaker should be blamed for the reporting of slurs and taboo words, while the reporter should at most be considered ‘complicit’. Based on Dascal and Weizman (1987), Capone argues that cues and clues are essential in meaning augmentations, as indirect reports are deviant in the absence of such ostensive signs. Considering Capone’s discussion on the complicated issue of accountability in reporting slurring, I would like to state that no reporter wants to or attempts to out-­ Herod Herod by accepting the responsibility of someone else’s offensive words. If s/he does so, s/he would breach the Paraphrasis/Form Principle (proximity of the report and the original utterance). However, if one takes into account the ‘situational adequacy’ and the seriousness of reporting slurring, the issue of responsibility becomes more manageable. In determining responsibility, it is ‘contextual factors’ and ‘situational necessity’ that are important. According to Allan (2016, p.  212) “(im)politeness is never a depersonalized, decontextualized absolute but always a perception or judgment of appropriate behaviour on a given occasion.” As a general rule of thumb, I believe that, in line with the Principle of Prudence (Capone, 2016), it is the original speaker who should be careful not to expose himself/herself to unfair reporting by avoiding the use of derogatory or ambiguous words. That said, 4  As reported by Capone (2016, p. 189), the Principle is defined as: “Do not translate an expression occurring in the original utterance (reported) with a word giving the impression that the original speaker was slurring, using foul language, insulting, etc. unless the original speaker was indeed slurring, using foul language, insulting, etc.”

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the reporting speaker should also ask a very basic question before reporting others’ offensive words: Is disclosing someone else’s derogatory words more important than ruining the character of the reported speaker? In some cases (such as in courts of law, or when someone’s life is going to be threatened) the answer is ‘yes’. For this reason, in high-stakes cases, reporting slurring can be warranted. In non-serious situations, where reporting slurring is not sufficiently justified by contextual factors, the disclosure of someone else’s derogatory words should be castigated. If the reporter does not take into account the ‘seriousness criteria’, s/he is also responsible for reporting slurring. That being the case, in answering whether the reporter/translator should use interpolations or neutral words (instead of the derogatory ones in the original utterance), or whether the slurring should be reported intactly, two scenarios are applicable as guiding principles. The first scenario is that reporting slurring is less poignant in translating since the derogatory words of the original text are already seen by many readers (in their original form). The text in which the slurring word is mentioned has become part of the history and is thereby fixed in the world (no matter whether the slurring word would be translated or not). However, with indirect reporting, the case is a little different in that in oral discourse no trace will be left unless someone records the interaction and files it for future use. This property of speech, namely ‘rapid fade’, refers to the fact that language signals (speech) are produced and would disappear rapidly (Yule, 2010). This property combined with ‘prevarication’, which refers to the fact that language signals can be true or false (and, therefore, they can deceive), also shows that reporting slurring should be done with more caution.5 In translation, situational necessity should be respected by default, whereas in oral discourse the case is different since one should always evaluate situational necessity. In translating, the responsibility of slurring is almost always on the shoulder of the original writer, provided that the translator is competent enough. The second scenario is technicality. The reporter (and not the translator) should always take into account whether it is (really) necessary to report offensive words. If reporting bad language adds no valuable information (but merely ruins the original speaker’s character), the reporter should either omit the bad language or else use a more fine-grained word instead of reporting slurring. Thus, a testing bed for the reporting of slurring is at hand now. Translating slurring is a case of technicality, meaning that it is related to the conventions of translation and faithfulness. A translator should closely observe the tone and the cognitive level of the text. On this account, in translating, technicality should be respected and the writer’s tone should 5  Prevarication can also be a property of written text but my point here is that when someone translates a text (or reports someone else’s written utterances), the responsibility of the content is to a large extent on the shoulder of the original speaker, not the translator. Of course, my argument is true only in case when the translator is competent enough and takes into account faithfulness to the original text (the translator should not change a non-derogatory word in the original text with a derogatory one).

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be properly transferred even if the translator is obliged to keep derogatory words in the translated text. All in all, the responsibility of translating bad language is on the shoulder of the writer unless the translator is incompetent or does not take into consideration faithfulness. However, in indirect reporting unlike translating, conventions and faithfulness are less important than situational necessity and degree of seriousness. Sociocognitive factors are more important in determining whether it is necessary to report slurring. For instance, C is going to employ A as a preschool teacher (a preschool teacher should be careful not to use foul language in front of children). C thinks that A is a polite person who would never use offensive words in the class. Nevertheless, B has seen by chance that A uses bad language in front of children. Consequently, B will report A’s derogatory remarks to alert C that A is not a good choice for a preschool teacher. We cannot be indifferent when we talk about the education of children, and, therefore, it is worth showing the real personality of A, even if the reporter is obliged to report A’s bad language.

5.8  The Role of the Hearer/Reader It seems that the hearer/reader role has not been given due attention in the discussion on reporting/translating. A rather naive view to consider is that both hearer and the reader approach the report/text based on some fixed presuppositions or on a particular set of mental states. According to Kecskes and Mey (2008, p. 2), “pre-­ existing psychological entities” are a less-than-informative representation of the interlocutors. Yet, they have also argued—being influenced by cognitive researchers such as Barr and Keysar (2005) and Colston (2005)—that individuals are not pre-­ wired to engage in interaction based on a stimulus-response relationship. On this account, the role of the hearer/reader is not only to encode information during interaction, but rather, the hearer/reader also represents himself/herself through an egocentric behaviour that is anchored in sociocognitive characteristics. In the discussion of indirect reporting, Capone (2016) defines the role of the hearer as if s/he is only an analyser of the reporter’s utterances. Capone (2016, p. 142) describes the Hearer’s Duty as follows: The hearer of an indirect report has the duty to ascertain whether the reported utterance was intended to be literal or whether it was said as a joke (or as part of a joke). Furthermore she has duty to understand whether the reporter is transforming the utterance (reported) by deliberate deletions of the transformations (cues and clues), given that the report has been provided as part of an accusation.

This principle puts an extra cognitive load on the hearer. Moreover, the hearer has a more vibrant role that goes beyond the analyser of someone else’s speech, but as the person who can also change the way the reporting speaker reproduces the original speaker’s utterances. For this reason, the hearer should be regarded as having a more

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Writer

Translator

Reader

Original Speaker

Reporter

Hearer

Fig. 5.1  The participant’s role in translating and reporting

determining role. The hearer can adjust the perlocutionary effect of the reports since s/he can actually determine the consequences of the report (e.g., the hearer can reject the report as being insincere). Another important issue that advocates the importance of the role of the hearer as a determining factor is the concept of ‘appraisal’. Appraisals are speakers’ judgements about an event. In reporting an event, it is the reporting speaker’s and hearer’s appraisal of the situation and event that shape the practice of indirect reporting. Accordingly, the reporter’s expectation of hearer’s reaction can change the way the report is manufactured. Generally speaking, the hearer is not just a watcher. Referring to Goffman’s concept of dramaturgy (see Sect. 2.2.2), it can be stated that the hearer has a direct and unequivocal impact on the way an impression is transferred by the reporter. In order to transfer the right kind of impression, the hearer should be taken more seriously; that is, not just as a bystander but as a person who is actively participating in the construction of the report. In translating too, the reader plays an active role in the selection of syntactic and cultural specifics. The following scheme shows the different roles of the participants in translating and indirect reporting: As indicated in Fig.  5.1, in translating, the translator can only influence the reader. It is less likely that the writer acts as the reader. It is taken for granted that the reader and the writer do not know each other’s languages. However, in reporting, the hearer can be the original speaker too (in cases where the reporter refers to one of the hearer’s utterances as authority). Likewise, the original speaker can be the hearer of the report as well. The original speaker can be the reporter and vice versa. Someone else can re-report the reporter.6 Based on this argument, the hearer can be the reporter and the reporter can hear someone else’s report.

6  In this regard, Bamgbose (1986) argues that this phenomenon is called ‘hearsay reports’ whereby “the reporter is repeating something which has been passed down from one or more previous reporters” (p. 94).

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5.9  Non-verbal Communication Despite the importance and usefulness of non-verbal communication as proved by research findings across different fields of study (Remland, 1994; Zeki, 2009), Sperber and Wilson argue that: Non-verbal communication tends to be relatively weak. One of the advantages of verbal communication is that it gives rise to the strongest possible form of communication; it enables the hearer to pin down the speaker’s intentions about the explicit content of her utterance to a single, strongly manifest candidate, with no alternative worth considering at all. (1986, p. 60)

Elsewhere, they argue that “descriptions of non-verbal communication have been marred by spurious attributions of ‘meaning’” (Sperber & Wilson, 1986, p. 60). Be that as it may, it is not clear how Sperber and Wilson would account for the positive role of non-verbal communication in the creation of ostensive behaviour. A conflict arises here with regard to the triviality of non-verbal behaviour and ostensive communication. Of course, they are right in suggesting that non-verbal communication is weaker than verbal communication since the latter would surely reduce the cognitive load needed to grasp the ostension (the action of showing, exhibiting, or making manifest). However, non-verbal communication contributes significantly to utterances meaning and should not be underestimated. In indirect reporting, the role of non-verbal behaviour is highlighted by researchers such as Jaworski and Galasiński (2002) and Hall and Knapp (2013). Non-verbal communication has not been given due attention in areas of indirect reporting and translating. Capone (2016) has paid some attention to the use of gestures. He states that gestures “will provide the referents and in particular certain objects demonstrated (by movements of the eyes or of some finger through the gesture of pointing)” (2016, p. 66). Likewise, Capone suggests that sometimes the “pronominal is accompanied by a demonstrative gesture” (2016, p. 315). Poyatos defines non-verbal communication as “[t]he emissions of signs by all the nonlexical, artifactual and environmental sensible sign systems contained in a culture, whether individually or in mutual co-structuration, and whether or not those emissions constitute behavior or generate personal interaction” (1997, p. 1). As reported by Poyatos (1997), translation embraces both interlinguistic practices and intercultural interactions. Factors such as the period of publication, style of writing, specific characteristics of the environment (such as temperature and lighting), and personal circumstances (e.g., anxiety) should be considered by the translator as important factors in shaping the text. In indirect reports too, non-verbal communication plays an important role. In agreement with Capone (2016, p. 68), “even subtle differences in voice can signal a distinction.” Ignoring non-verbal signs in reporting or translating largely endangers the practice of fair paraphrase and risks distorting the intended impression of the original speaker/writer. Non-verbal communication is not a big issue in indirect reports since the reporting speaker can explain, mimic, or mention instances of it while she is conveying what the original speaker has said. For instance:

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(4)

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John: Mary said that Fred was making fun of his friend, although Mary’s voice showed a sign of uncertainty.

However, in translating, conveying, and interpreting paralinguistic features are problematic. For many translators, translation is just regarded as the decoding and encoding of linguistic signs. However, translation studies show that non-verbal signs play an important role in translating texts (Mueller-Vollmer & Irmscher, 1998; Varela, 1997). Issues such as the long time span between the publication of the original text and the translation, deciphering discursive signs such as hyphens, Em dash, italics, and quotation marks in translation, and conveying the tone and sociopolitical atmosphere of the original text make the process of translating excruciating (and interesting, of course). However, the translator can have recourse to a lot of extralinguistic information that would help him/her to properly take into account information that would contribute to utterance proposition. One of the paralinguistic phenomena that has been so challenging in the debate on non-verbal communication is the interjection.7 Some argue that interjections should be taken seriously since they substantially contribute to the semantics-­ pragmatics interface (Ameka, 1992; Besemeres & Wierzbicka, 2003; Wilkins, 1992). On the other hand, however, Goffman (1981) argues that an interjection “doesn’t seem to be a statement in the linguistic sense.” For Goffman, an interjection is “a ritualised act, in something like the ethological sense of that term” (1981, p.  100). Reporting interjections is indeed a perplexing issue. Some researchers argue that interjections are conceptualised differently in direct and indirect reporting (Capone, 2016), whereas Keith Allan (2016) believes that interjections can be used in indirect reports without creating a serious problem (refer to Capone [2016] for further information). What makes interjections abstruse is that it is not possible to determine easily to whom the interjection should be ascribed: the reporting speaker or the original speaker. Be that as it may, in order to approach this bewildering concern, one should first come to terms with an operational definition of interjections. Referring back to the two rather opposing perspectives discussed above regarding the two possible standpoints about interjections (either a conceptualist stance or a Goffmanian semiword viewpoint), Wharton points out that the two conflicting viewpoints reconcile by considering interjections as “mental or emotional attitude or state” (2009, p. 74). On this account, interjections are descriptive, for they change the meaning of a report. Considering this argument towards interjections, and based on the Paraphrasis/Form Principle, interjections that are observed after a that-clause are bound to be related to the original speaker (since they change the meaning of that-­ clause), whereas interjections that are used before the that-clause are expected to be related to the reporting speaker. That said, the issue is not without its controversies.

7  There are controversial issues surrounding the nature of interjections (refer to Wharton [2009] for a comprehensive discussion on interjections). Suffice it to say that the paralinguistic nature of interjections is not advocated by some researchers.

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Using interjection in the that-clause is a rare incident since interjections are more often than not conveyed by paraphrasing (and this makes the issue more perplexing). For instance, the interjection in (5) can be conceptualised in different ways because of the various meanings that can be attached to wow. (5)

Mary: “Wow, he is back” (pointing to John).

One way to change Mary’s utterance to an indirect report is to say: (6)

Mary said that she thinks it is very good that John was back.

Or, (5) can be reported as: (7)

Mary said that she wouldn’t have thought she would know that John was back.

The various instantiations of (5) observed in (6) and (7) prove that interjections can change the meaning and the logic of indirect reporting. The various interpretations of (5), as observed in (6) and (7), manifest that the interjections paraphrased in the that-clause of indirect reports should be assigned to the reporter, for it is not possible to decide whether the reporter has been correct in paraphrasing the interjection in the original utterance. Since the reporter has paraphrased the interjection (and the paraphrase may be fallacious, for interjections can have more than one meaning), the responsibility of indirectly reporting the interjection is on the shoulder of the reporter, for it was the reporter who (subjectively) interpreted the meaning of the interjection and paraphrased it for the hearer. Only when the interjection is directly (and fairly) quoted, can the reporter be acquitted of the responsibility of reporting the interjection. Seeing interjections in this way would unravel the perplexing mysteries and ambiguity surrounding to whom they should be assigned. In line with Capone (2016), I believe that in indirect reports, the responsibility of paraphrasing interjections should be assigned to the reporter rather than the original speaker because it is the reporter who interprets the various senses of the interjection in order to avoid the ambiguity inherent in the interjections. However, it is not possible to account for the interjections based on the Paraphrasis/Form Principle. Because interjections may be interpreted differently by individuals, it is not clear how the Paraphrasis/Form Principle would account for the (possible) problematic interpretation of the interjection in indirect reports. I do not intend to obfuscate the issue, but interjections are sometimes too sketchy and unpredictable. A question arises here with regard to the reporter’s ability to distinguish between different interpretations of a specific interjection. Consider: (8)

John said, “Ah, Mitra is not a good teacher”.

In direct quotes, the reporting of interjections would create no commitment for the reporter. However, if the reporter is going to use an indirect report instead of a direct one, s/he should interpret what is really meant by ‘Ah’ in (8). The interjection should

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be interpreted so that the hearer’s cognitive load is reduced and the relevance is established. In addition, the report should not be ambiguous (we usually do not report what we believe to be vague). Chierchia and McConnell (1990, p. 32) argue that “ambiguity arises when a single word or string of words is associated in the language system with more than one meaning.” Ambiguity can be created when one is going to interpret (8). The direct quote in (8) is open to argument since it could be interpreted differently, as in: (a) John said that he was surprised that Mitra was not a good teacher. (b) John said that he was aware that Mitra was not a good teacher. (c) John said that he was sad that Mitra was not a good teacher. In cases where the original speaker provides enough contextual factors, it is logical that the reporter would be able to pick up the right interpretation. However, interpretation becomes burdensome if the contextual factors fall short of accounting for the proper proposition underlying (8). In agreement with the Relevance Principle, individuals would rarely report interjections that they themselves have not been able to decipher since this would put unnecessary cognitive burden both on the reporter and the hearer. Indeed, research has advocated that interlocutors try to avoid ambiguity based on the idea that individuals’ “comprehension processes can sometimes detect linguistic-ambiguity before producing it” (Ferreira, Slevc, & Rogers, 2005, p. 263). Ferreira et al. have also stated that “[s]peakers almost always avoid nonlinguistic-­ ambiguity” (2005, p. 263). Based on Relevance Theory, ambiguous use of interjections in the indirect report would rarely occur since the reporter would not produce nonlinguistic parts that are hard to interpret (the reporter tries to be relevant) or ambiguous. If the report is blurred, this would be blamed on not having considered various senses of the ambiguous word. The process of meaning-making is broken down if one fails to acknowledge various senses attached to a particular word (Owen, 1965). To wrap up my discussion on reporting interjections, I believe that in order not to miss the meaning of interjections (and to avoid ambiguity), they should be indirectly reported. A direct report is a neutral one and almost void of any contextual factors. By an indirect report, the reporter would be able to convey his/her own evaluation of the interjection (based on contextual factors) and make the meaning of the interjection clearer for the hearer. Since the reporter has had direct contact with the source speaker, s/he is the best possible candidate to interpret the meaning of the interjection. Interjections such as ‘Ah’ in (8) are ambivalent and have various meanings. Even by directly quoting them, the reporter cannot guarantee a clear interpretation on the part of the hearer. The reporter has been present when the original speaker uttered the interjection, and this is the reporter who has also observed the original speaker’s tone, the gestures and facial expressions (if any) related to the interjection. It is crystal clear that by directly reporting the original speaker, all these clues and cues would be lost since the reporter would only report the linguistic context, not the paralinguistic one. Indirect reporting allows the reporter to add paralinguistic cues and clues in terms of more syntactic elaborations, therefore, allowing the hearer to come to a better understanding of the interjection.

References

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5.10  Conclusion Although it can be argued that reporting and translating share some commonality with each other, they also have some idiosyncratic features that make them quite distinct. Both constructs can be checked against the four requirements of ‘verifiability’, ‘plausibility’, ‘situational adequacy’, and ‘value-orientedness’, which come under the umbrella term of rationality. Translating can get a better mark in the test of rationality since it can better address the four requirements presented above. I discussed the perplexing Paraphrasis/Form Principle and mentioned some shortcomings related to the axiom. Amongst them, I can refer to the inadequacy of the Principle to account for the reporting of interjections. I also considered how indirect reporting is a better realisation of the concept of ‘footing’. A topic that has received much less attention, that of the ‘hearer’ in indirect reporting, was also discussed extensively in this chapter and I pointed out that the hearer, just as other participants in indirect reporting, can take on different roles based on the process of indirect reporting. And finally, I discussed an interesting case of non-verbal communication in translating and indirect reporting, elaborating on a complicated case of interjections and suggested that they would be understood much more easily if they were re-interpreted during indirect reporting (with conveying all the clues and cues). Although I should expect some opposition, I believe that using interjections in direct reporting would increase the ambiguity of the report, while based on the Paraphrasis/Form Principle, indirect reporting allows the reporter to interpret the interjections based on the most relevant linguistic and nonlinguistic elements of the original speaker. For this reason, there would be fewer cases of ambiguity when the reporter takes advantage of the cues and clues to help the hearer find the best interpretation of the interjections.

References Allan, K. (2016). The reporting of slurs. In A. Capone, F. Kiefer, & F. Lo Piparo (Eds.), Indirect reports and pragmatics: Interdisciplinary studies (pp. 211–232). Cham, Switzerland: Springer. Ameka, F. (1992). Interjections: The universal yet neglected part of speech. Journal of Pragmatics, 18, 101–118. Bamgbose, A. (1986). Reported speech in Yoruba. In F. Coulmas (Ed.), Direct and indirect speech (pp. 77–99). Berlin, Germany: Mouton De Gruyter. Barr, D. J., & Keysar, B. (2005). Making sense of how we make sense: The paradox of egocentrism in language use. In H. L. Colston & A. N. Katz (Eds.), Figurative language comprehension (pp. 21–43). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. Bell, R. T. (2001). Psycholinguistic/cognitive approaches. In M. Baker (Ed.), Routledge encyclopedia of translation studies (pp. 185–190). London/New York: Routledge. Besemeres, M., & Wierzbicka, A. (2003). The meaning of the particle lah in Singapore English. Pragmatics and Cognition, 11, 13–38. Capone, A. (2015). Indirect reports, slurs and the polyphonic speaker. Reti, Saperi, Linguaggi, 2(2014), 13–36.

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Capone, A. (2016). The pragmatics of indirect reports: Socio-philosophical considerations. Cham, Switzerland: Springer. Chierchia, G., & McConnell-Ginet, S. (1990). Meaning and grammar: An introduction to semantics. Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Colston, H. L. (2005). On sociocultural and nonliteral: A synopsis and a prophesy. In H. L. Colston & A. N. Katz (Eds.), Figurative language comprehension (pp. 1–20). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. Cronin, M. (2001). Game theory and translation. In M. Baker (Ed.), Routledge encyclopedia of translation studies (pp. 91–93). London: Routledge. Dascal, M. (2003). Interpretation and understanding. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Dascal, M., & Weizman, E. (1987). Contextual exploitation of interpretation clues in text understanding: An integrated model. In J. Verschueren & M. Bertuccelli-Papi (Eds.), The pragmatic perspective (pp. 31–46). Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Davis, W. (2005). Non descriptive meaning and reference: An ideational semantics. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. Ferreira, V. S., Slevc, L. R., & Rogers, E. S. (2005). How do speakers avoid ambiguous linguistic expressions? Cognition, 96(3), 263–284. Goffman, E. (1956). The presentation of self in everyday life. New York: Doubleday. Goffman, E. (1981). Forms of talk. Oxford, UK: Blackwell. Gutt, E. A. (1991). Translation and relevance: Cognition and context. Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell. Hall, J. A., & Knapp, M. L. (Eds.). (2013). Nonverbal communication (Vol. 2). Berlin, Germany: Walter de Gruyter. Harvey, K. (2001). Compensation. In M. Baker (Ed.), Routledge encyclopedia of translation studies (pp. 37–40). London/New York: Routledge. Jaworski, A., & Galasiński, D. (2002). The verbal construction of non-verbal behaviour: British press reports of President Clinton’s grand jury testimony video. Discourse & Society, 13(5), 629–648. Kecskes, I., & Mey, J. L. (Eds.). (2008). Intention, common ground and the egocentric speaker hearer. Berlin, Germany: Walter de Gruyter. Kramsch, C. (2000). Social discursive constructions of self in L2 learning. In J. P. Lantolf (Ed.), Sociocultural theory and second language learning (pp.  133–154). New  York: Oxford University Press. Lantolf, J.  P. (2000). Sociocultural theory and second language learning. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. Mey, J. L. (2001). Pragmatics: An introduction. Oxford, UK: Blackwell. Moore, L. (2000). You’re ugly, too. In J. Updike & K. Kenison (Eds.), The best American short stories of the century (pp. 652–670). Boston/New York: Houghton Mifflin Company. Morady Moghaddam, M. (2018). Review of the book The pragmatics of indirect reports: Sociophilosophical considerations, by A. Capone. Lingua, 204, 134–141. Mueller-Vollmer, K., & Irmscher, M. (Eds.). (1998). Translating literatures, translating cultures: New vistas and approaches in literary studies. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Owen, G. E. L. (1965). Aristotle on the snares on ontology. In R. Bambrough (Ed.), New essays on Plato and Aristotle (Vol. 3, pp. 69–96). London/New York: Routledge. Poyatos, F. (1997). Introduction. In F. Poyatos (Ed.), Nonverbal communication and translation: New perspectives and challenges in literature, interpretation and the media (pp.  131–141). Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins. Remland, M. S. (1994). The importance of nonverbal communication in the courtroom. Atlantic Journal of Communication, 2(2), 124–145. Ryle, G. (1949). The concept of mind. London: Hutchinson. Schäffner, C. (2001). Action (theory of ‘translation action’). In M. Baker (Ed.), Routledge encyclopedia of translation studies (pp. 3–5). London/New York: Routledge. Schäffner, C. (2017). Criticism of functionalist theories. In M.  Baker & G.  Saldanha (Eds.), Routledge encyclopedia of translation (2nd ed., pp. 120–121). New York: Routledge.

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Searle, J. (1979). Expression and meaning. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press. Simms, K. (1997). Introduction. In K. Simms (Ed.), Translating sensitive texts: Linguistic aspects (pp. 1–27). Amsterdam: Rodopi. Sperber, D., & Wilson, D. (1986). Relevance: Communication and cognition. Oxford, UK: Blackwell. Varela, F.  C. (1997). Translating non-verbal information in dubbing. Benjamins Translation Library, 17, 315–326. Wallsten, T. S. (1980). Preface. In T. S. Wallsten (Ed.), Cognitive processes in choice and decision behavior (pp. ix–xvi). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Wharton, T. (2009). Pragmatics and non-verbal communication. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Wilkins, D. (1992). Interjections as deictics. Journal of Pragmatics, 18, 119–158. Yule, G. (2010). The study of language (4th ed.). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Zeki, C.  P. (2009). The importance of non-verbal communication in classroom management. Procedia-Social and Behavioral Sciences, 1(1), 1443–1449.

Chapter 6

Principles Governing Indirect Reports

6.1  Introduction Although indirect reports are not completely rule-governed phenomena (they are cases of complex language games), there are some principles that make life easier for those who participate in indirect reporting (the original speaker, the reporter, and the hearer). Without these principles, indirect reports would lose their effectiveness. Principles are not proposed here (in this chapter) as being fixed and impervious. Rules are made to be broken. However, several principles would be useful to account for the practice of indirect reports. So far, many studies have investigated the principles governing discourse organisation (Givön, 1983, 1993; Hickmann, 1995; Lambrecht, 1994), and it has been advocated that some universal rules govern the formation of sentences. Indirect reports as an instantiation of discursive practices are governed by some axioms as well. In this chapter, I attempt to pinpoint ‘macro’ and ‘micro’ principles, and how they work during the process of indirect reporting. Macro principles can be considered the general rules that govern the whole process of indirect reports, embracing all three participants of indirect reports (original speaker, reporter, and hearer); micro principles target either one or two of the participants in indirect reports, hence their domains of impacts are limited. Moreover, in the discussion of micro principles, I distinguish between ‘single’ and ‘combined’ micro principles.

6.2  Macro Principles The most important feature of macro principles is that they regulate the whole process of indirect reporting. To that end, they can be observed or ignored by all the members participating in the indirect report. Macro principles are therefore © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019 M. Morady Moghaddam, The Praxis of Indirect Reports, Perspectives in Pragmatics, Philosophy & Psychology 21, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-14269-8_6

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‘all-inclusive’, omnivorous in that they can absorb and influence all the participants in indirect reporting. Among them, the Principle of Politeness and the Principle of Prudence stand out. In what follows, the macro principles of indirect reporting are discussed.

6.2.1  Principle of Politeness Life without politeness is excruciating, and “being polite is regarded as an important symbol of human culture” (Kádár & Haugh, 2013, p. 231). Politeness is important so much so that one cannot imagine any progress being made in conversation without first taking into consideration the proper way of talking and behaving (Culpeper, Haugh, & Kádár, 2017; Terkourafi, 2011). Weigand (2010, p.  94) has provided a general definition of politeness, which is applicable to my discussion of indirect reports. She states that “[p]oliteness, at its core, means ‘the wish to respect the other human being’. The speaker necessarily has to balance their self-interest and the interests of fellow beings.” Elsewhere, she discusses another aspect of her definition of politeness: “[t]he speaker might even completely disregard respect and use means of politeness exclusively in their self-interest” (Weigand, 2010, p. 94). Therefore, politeness is part of the action games in which interlocutors are engaged. The definition put forward by Weigand shows that politeness does not only mean “to be a good Samaritan1” (Attardo, 1997, p. 766), but it is a strategic manipulation over interlocutors’ needs and wants. I argue that indirect reports are a replica of how politeness is manoeuvred during interaction among individuals. Politeness in indirect reporting shows that there should be a myriad of strategies that help the reporter to avoid threatening positive and negative face, and at the same time help people to pursue their own needs and wants. Indirect reports can decently take into account both positive and negative (im)politeness. What happens in indirect reports can influence the way politeness is managed by the participants. As a result, indirect reports can threaten the negative face of all members since it imposes responsibility on the shoulder of all the participants. When X reports Y to someone who is called Z, then X imposes an unsolicited responsibility on Y since the reporter can create new commitments for the original speaker. X’s negative face is also threatened, for X would be responsible for respecting faithfulness to the original speaker and making his/her transformations as close as possible to the original speaker. The hearer’s negative face would also be threatened on the grounds that a burden has been put on him/her since s/he should try to find out whether the report is sincere or unfaithful. This burden is (possibly) not what the hearer wished for. The hearer is, thus, engaged in a situation in which s/he needs to decide whether to ignore the report or take it seriously. In other words,

1  A good Samaritan encourages the speaker or hearer to do his/her best to satisfy the conversational partner’s needs or wants.

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indirect reporting limits the hearer’s freedom of action. On this account, indirect reporting is inherently a face-threatening act (FCT). On the other hand, indirect reporting maintains the positive face of the original speaker and the hearer as well. By indirect reporting, the reporter gives credit to the original speaker as a person who can change the state of affairs, or as an authority whose words are valuable to be transferred to someone else. The hearer is also given credit by conveying that s/he is worthy as a confidant. In this sense, indirect reports are (expected to be) face-saving acts (Capone, 2016). Based on the discussion above, I would like to define the Principle of Politeness as follows: Indirect reporting is inherently a face-threatening act, whereby the report culminates in the creation of unsolicited imposition and commitments. Therefore, the reporter should use contextual clues and cues to separate his/her voice from that of the original speaker (to reduce the imposition on the part of the hearer). Moreover, the report should be fair (the reporter should consider faithfulness) and respect the positive face of the hearer and the original speaker.

The reporter is the main subject manipulating imposition and communication strategies. The imposition can be placed upon both the hearer and the original speaker in that the hearer should distinguish between the original speaker’s and the reporter’s voice while the original speaker is given a new commitment. The commitment is largely met when the reporter takes into consideration faithfulness to the original speaker and situational necessity. Additionally, the reporter should use clues and cues that would help the hearer distinguish between the voices intermingled into the report. In this case, the imposition will be largely reduced on the part of the hearer. The Principle of Politeness is an ideal motto, a ‘signpost’ that directs the participants towards the ultimate good. The Principle is quite virtuous. In this case, what the Principle is trying to communicate approaches what Attardo (1997) argues as the ‘the good Samaritan’. As stated by Attardo (1997), this ‘good Samaritan’ (speaker or hearer) will do his/her best to satisfy the conversational partner’s (hearer and original speaker) needs or wants. Of course, ‘situational necessity’ and the ‘sensitivity of the topic’ are among the determinant factors that encourage the reporter to deviate from the Principle of Politeness. All the same, the Principle is not without its issues. Weigand (2010) argues that the interlocutors may forget politeness and act based on self-interest (or ‘situational necessity’, for example). Based on this argument, it is possible to change the Principle of Politeness into the Principle of Strategic Politeness, whereby faithfulness to the original speaker is compromised if someone’s face is at stake or a more important aim is to be achieved (consider, for example, revealing a face-threatening sentence in a court of law). The Principle of Strategic Politeness also shows us that the reporter can decide to report a face-­ threatening sentence if s/he warrants such divulgence. It is the situational factors that can regulate (im)politeness.

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6.2.2  Principle of Prudence The Principle of Prudence refers to a sensible and diligent attitude that forces us to avoid unnecessary risks. Capone (2016, p. 137) has discussed this principle extensively and defines it as follows: In case you do not know whether the Hearer is unable to distinguish your intentions or you do not know whether the Hearer will deliberately use transformations to delete all cues and clues available in the context (that were utilized by the speaker), thus being ready to report an utterance verbatim, although it was not intended to be available for verbatim report, AVOID speaking non-seriously.

As reported by Capone, the Principle is applicable mainly to the original speaker. Although what Capone argues is a logical rule that should be respected in high-­ stakes contexts, the Principle is not democratic and encourages conservativeness on the part of the original speaker. Besides, the Principle of Prudence should be maintained for all members of indirect reports. Accordingly, not only should the source speaker be conscious not to speak non-seriously, but also the reporter should be careful not to convey someone else’s non-serious speech in such a way that it seems like serious speech. On the other hand, the hearer should be alert to distinguish the reporter’s voice from that of the original speaker, and at the same time find out which interpolations are related to the reporter and which to the original speaker. If unsuccessful, the hearer should not trust the report for any high-stakes decision-­making and should not re-report (this concept will be discussed later in this chapter). The reporter plays an important role in the application of the Principle since the reporter is a mediator between the original speaker and the hearer. The reporter uses someone else’s utterances through indirect reporting in order to convey an impression or to change the states of affairs. Therefore, the reporter attempts to create some perlocutionary effect in the hearer. On the other hand, the hearer should not be a passive recipient of the report and should be aware of the licit and illicit transformations made by the reporter. To recap, the original speaker should be conscious not to speak non-seriously, and if s/he does so, s/he should make sure that the hearer (the wouldbe reporter) has understood that s/he is joking, for example. The reporter should also be aware not to omit clues and cues that are considered tell-tale signs (a mark that helps the hearer to distinguish voices), and not to get carried away while reporting.2

6.3  Micro Principles Macro principles refer to the general principles underlying the whole process of indirect reporting, and as such, they embrace all members of the indirect report (original speaker, reporter, and hearer). On the other hand, micro principles refer to 2  The reporter should distinguish between his/her voice and that of the original speaker in a way that is easily identified by the hearer.

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principles that include one or two participants rather than all of them. By micro, I mean those rules that specifically refer to individual participants or a combination of them so long as they do not outnumber two. In what follows, single and combined micro principles are discussed respectively.

6.3.1  Single Micro Principles Among the single micro principles, some specifically deal with one individual. In the following sections, principles referring to the original speaker, the reporter, and the hearer are discussed respectively. 6.3.1.1  Principles Referring to the Original Speaker The Principle of Immunity is a safeguard against the Principle of Prudence. The latter forces the original speaker to be conservative and not to produce non-serious speech since there is a danger of it being reported as a serious speech because of the reporter’s omission of all the clues and cues that might help the hearer grasp that it is in fact the non-serious speech. I mentioned that the Principle of Prudence is not democratic and it pushes the speaker towards conservativeness. I suggest that there should be a Principle of Immunity that allows the (original) speaker to interact freely without having the fear of being (unfairly) reported. The immunity principle suggests that the original speaker can always deny what has been reported by refuting the reporter’s evaluation of the source information as being unfair and prescriptive (unless there is strong evidence against this refutation). The Principle of Immunity indirectly communicates that the responsibility of indirect reporting is on the shoulder of the reporter since s/he has been the one who has had direct connection with the original speaker and possibly has noticed all the clues and cues related to the original text. If there is not enough evidence, the reporter has a burdensome task to convince the hearer that what is being reported is genuine. That said, concomitant with the report, the reporter can convey all the extralinguistic cues and clues embraced by the original utterance and let the hearer decide for himself/herself whether to accept the illocutionary force of the report. Above other things, we are not in this world to convince everybody. By the Principle of Immunity, I do not intend to argue that the original speaker is free to say whatever s/he fancies without being held responsible. The main point of my discussion is that the responsibility of an utterance is held by its creator, unless someone else decides to cater some changes and reproduce that utterance through indirect reporting (which may be based on false interpretations). If indirectly reported, the original speaker is immune and justifiably right to argue that s/he has been unfairly reported, provided that the reporter cannot justify others that the report is genuine. We can see many cases of indirect reporting in the press regarding the personal lives of celebrities and sports stars, which have had their sincerity ques-

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tioned or have been considered a misinterpretation by the original speaker (in this way, the original speaker denies accepting the responsibility of the report). In reporting offensive words, the reporter can escape from accepting the responsibility if s/he takes into consideration the situational necessity and relevance of the report. However, if there is situational necessity to unravel other’s offensive words through reporting, the reporter should try to directly quote the sentence in which the offensive word is used so as to escape from complicity or unfair reporting. Moreover, the reporter should divide his/her voice with that of the original speaker and provide all clues and cues that are germane to the source information. The second principle in my list is the Principle of Expressibility, which is defined by Capone (2016, p. 180) as “the idea that the original speaker is responsible for the slur, because if this was not the case, it would never be possible to attribute a slurring expression to anyone.” On this point, my view differs from what Capone, as influenced by Searle (1979), is trying to show us in the above quote. There is no argument about the fact that if there was no original speaker, there would be no slurring at all; but this analogy is like arguing that ‘if there was no money, there was no theft’. Money by itself is not a problem, but the way in which some people want to earn it can be problematic. In the case of reporting slurring, one can argue that if there was no reporter, no one – except the hearer of the slur – would have known that such a slur had been produced.3 In the direct report, IFF the report is justifiable and genuine, and the situational necessity and relevance are also considered, the responsibility can be assigned to the original speaker. Regarding the reporting of obscenity, Capone (2016, p. 185) states that “a speaker must be in a position” so that he would be able “to impute the offensive phrase to the reported speaker.” However, Capone argues that the reporting of derogatory words should be indirectly reported in situations that require a giveaway of others’ obscenity (for instance, in a court of law). That said, I can show that there is a better alternative when it comes to reporting derogatory words in a ‘court of law’. Rather than indirectly reporting someone’s offensive words (in such a case it would not be clear whether the original speaker has been interpreted correctly), I would argue that the foul language should be reported ‘directly’ (if possible), through the provision of contextual evidence (through indirect reporting) that shows what is being reported are indeed the original speaker’s intact utterances. Sometimes, a combination of direct and indirect discourse is applicable, which is called ‘free indirect discourse’ (FID).4 Indirect reporting would not be a good choice in critical situations (such as in a court of law) since it may be recognised as a distorted or counterintuitive representation of the 3  This view is more logical considering that we cannot tell others what to say as far as it is ‘them’ that should be held responsible for what they utter. However, if the reporter indirectly reports someone else’s utterances as a reference, it means that the responsibility of that report is not completely on the shoulder of the original speaker (in ‘translation’, the case is different though). 4  As mentioned by Gregoromichelaki and Kempson (2016, p.  132), “Free indirect discourse is similar to indirect reporting in that there is potential shift of tenses and indexicals.” They continue by stating that, “usually there are no overt reporting indications and some features of direct discourse (such as direct questions and vocatives) are maintained so that there is only a partial shift of perspective towards the reportee.”

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original speaker’s utterances. Thus, regardless of the individual’s position to report obscenity, the responsibility of reporting derogatory words is shared between the original speaker and the reporter, a claim that is also justified by the Principle of Immunity. Therefore, the Principle of Expressibility should be revised as: The original speaker is responsible for the use of derogatory words IFF the reporter considers the situational necessity, genuineness, and justifiability. Moreover, to shirk the responsibility of reporting obscenity, the reporter should be careful not to use an indirect report in the case where a direct one is possible. That said, extralinguistic cues and clues can be reported indirectly to empower the soundness and interpretation of the direct report.

This principle is mostly warranted in serious cases, such as in a court of law. The Principle of Expressibility can be challenged when the situation is not critical (e.g., an informal conversation). Nonetheless, the Principle delicately addresses this challenge by referring to ‘situational necessity’. If the reporting of derogatory words is worth threatening the original speaker’s face, the disclosure is warranted and the reporter can be acquitted of complicity. 6.3.1.2  Principles Referring to the Reporter One of the most challenging principles related to indirect reports is the Paraphrasis/ Form Principle. According to Capone (2016), this principle argues that the reported speech should be as close as possible to the source information. It seems that this principle does not devote any space for pragmatic intrusion, but Capone has been cognisant not to reject the possibility of the indirect reporter’s subjective manipulations. The reporter can even transform a neutral word such as ‘black’ to an offensive word as ‘negro’ during a report when s/he has sufficient evidence that the original speaker has had the preconception in his/her mind to use an offensive word – for instance, the original speaker says the word ‘black’ with a grimace of disgust. Of course, there is one important issue here, and that is the responsibility of reporting the derogatory words in instances of subjective transformations such as my example of the black/negro distinction. As I discussed earlier, derogatory words should be reported directly if the reporter wishes to keep away from complicity (of course, situational necessity and justifiability should be taken into consideration). If the derogatory word is indirectly reported, or when the reporter says s/he has guessed (for instance, from the original speaker’s countenance) that the reporter had the preconception in his/her mind to use the derogatory word, s/he should also be held responsible for what is being indirectly reported. The Paraphrasis/Form Principle is an ideal premiss, walking with a prim strut in critical cases where changing the original words with less emphatic or less derogatory ones may change the meaning or mislead the hearer (such as in a court of law). In ordinary talk, reporting derogatory words should be avoided unless one decides to report the offensive word for some good (and benevolent) reason. What’s more, in doing so, the reporter should not (or it is better not to) change the derogatory words into euphemisms in critical situation. Sometimes, using euphemisms instead

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of the derogatory words does not clearly show the main intention of the original speaker and may even mislead the hearer. As a result, the rule of the thumb is to avoid reporting derogatory words altogether, but if one is obliged to report a derogatory word, direct reporting should be used instead of indirect reporting, so as to be as informative as possible (of course the reporter should transfer all cues and clues related to the derogatory word through indirect reporting). In this case, situational necessity and relevance forces the reporter to divulge the original speaker’s dirty language through a direct report. If the reporter cannot exactly remember the original words, s/he should change the main clause before the direct report using phrases such as ‘I think’ or ‘I guess’. Therefore, when it comes to situational necessity or when we are talking about high-stakes situations, a direct report of the offensive word as well as transferring cues and clues would be logical, for it helps the reporter to provide an objective account of the source information. The second principle is the Principle of Relevance, which is defined as requiring that “one should avoid ambiguities and NOT put the hearer to undue and unnecessary processing efforts” (Capone, 2016, p. 92). Drawing on Sperber and Wilson’s (1986, p. 50) Relevance Theory, one should bear in mind that “humans automatically turn their attention to what seems most relevant to them.” Through ostensive-­ inferential communication, Sperber and Wilson argue that a stimulus should both be related to the previous assumptions of the audience, and at the same time should be closely related to the audience’s zone of proximal development.5 If not, the interlocutor may lose grasp on the ostension or may be misled by the stimulus (verbal or non-verbal stimulus). Thus, based on the Principle of Relevance, the reporter should ensure that his/her voice is properly distinguished from that of the original speaker in order to respect the ‘principle of economy’ by putting the hearer to undue processing efforts. Moreover, the Principle of Relevance argues that the report should be most relevant or “have a substantial contextual effect” (Sperber & Wilson, 1986, p. 116) and should get the attention of the hearer. However, ‘relevance’ is not a neat and clean concept. In other words, relevance can embrace irrelevant assumptions as well. In line with Sperber and Wilson, “[r]elevance may be achieved by expressing irrelevant assumptions, as long as this expressive behaviour is itself relevant” (1986, p. 121). One important implication of the concept of irrelevancy in Relevance Theory is that the transformations made in the indirect report need not be (more or less) syntactically and semantically similar to original utterances. As long as the intended assumptions are transferred and the original speaker’s meaning is conveyed, the indirect report is justifiable. On this account, if the report is not semantically or syntactically similar to the original speaker’s utterance (hence irrelevant) but the interpolations would create the same effect on the hearer, then the report is warranted and in line with the Principle of Relevance. As a result, based on Relevance Theory, the two transformations below refer to the same thing (based on contextual factors) and are, therefore, legitimate: 5  The ostensive behaviour should be matched with the ability and the preferences of the audience. Refer to Chap. 3, Sect. 3.8, for further information.

6.3  Micro Principles

(1)

a. b.

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John said, “Alessandro is a good teacher.” John said that Alessandro never asks difficult questions.

The transformations made in (1b) seem irrelevant and fallacious. However, the context would prove that both (1a) and (1b) can refer to the same thing. By convention, the reporter (X) and the hearer (Y) know that a teacher who ‘never asks difficult questions’ in the class is indeed ‘a good teacher’ (many of us liked easygoing teachers when we were at school). Based on shared knowledge between X and Y, X has been both relevant and ostensive, for both X and Y conventionally know that a teacher who never asks difficult questions is a good teacher. The concept of relevance fully supports the practice of indirect reporting in that the report does not need to report syntactically and semantically similar constructs in line with the original utterance. In fact, the three assumptions put forward by Sperber and Wilson help us to understand what is considered irrelevant information: (1), the assumption may contribute new information; but this information does not connect up with any information present in the context. In the second, illustrated by (2), the assumption is already present in the context and its strength is unaffected by the newly presented information; this newly presented information is therefore entirely uninformative and, a fortiori, irrelevant. In the third type of case, illustrated by (3), the assumption is inconsistent with the context and is too weak to upset it; processing the assumption thus leaves the context unchanged. (1986, p. 121)

The last principle is the Non-serious Speech Injection Principle, which is defined by Capone (2016, p. 129) as: Do not (indirectly) report the literal meaning of an utterance if you know that the utterance had a non-literal meaning (according to the speaker’s intentions) unless you know that the hearer has clues allowing her to reconstruct the intended meaning.

In fact, this principle reinforces the Relevance Principle presented by Sperber and Wilson. Capone refers to the complicated case of original speaker’s intentions, arguing that, in this case, the direct report would be misleading because certain clues (e.g., facial expression, gesture, etc.) cannot be transferred through direct quotes. Non-serious speech can be regarded as an ostensive behaviour that embraces clues and cues in order to communicate something relevant to the speaker. However, there is a danger that the clues and cues are not fully taken into consideration in indirect reporting, so much so that non-serious speech is reported literally. Ignoring the Non-serious Speech Principle would also breach the Relevance Theory, in that it would lead to a distortion of the original speaker’s assumptions. Reporting non-­ serious speech as a serious speech would impose a burden on the hearer who must decipher the true intention or goal of the original speaker. Thus, Capone is right when he says that “indirect reporting is a way of creating a balance between the information possessed by the reporter and that possessed by the hearer and to fill the gap between them” (2016, p. 131). The Non-serious Speech Injection Principle is a supplementary principle to Relevance Theory. Both these principles shape our understanding of how intentions and manifestations are communicated in indirect reports.

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My aim here is not only to deal with the transformations necessary in the reporting of the serious/non-serious speech, but also to provide an illustration that non-­ serious speech is a kind of ostensive behaviour embracing two layers of information. The first layer is about the literal or causal meaning underlying the non-serious speech, and the second layer is anchored in the kind of (intended) meaning that is hidden at the heart of the information proffered by the first layer. It is the second layer—where the speaker is trying to ‘show something’ (Sperber & Wilson, 1986)— which Capone (2016) is trying to reveal by adhering to Non-serious Speech Injection Principle. Therefore, a comparison can be made here regarding the ‘natural’ and ‘non-natural’ meaning proposed by Paul Grice. Meann, or meaning as information, deals with the causal relationship between the utterance and meaning. Meannn, or meaning as purpose, includes recognition and expression of intentions. Regarding Meannn, context plays a key role. Individuals use the context in which a sentence is uttered as an extrapolation of its meaning, or to put it differently, as an estimation of the speaker’s intentions. That said, in the contextless vacuum where a sentence is presented, individuals are inclined to interpret an utterance in the way that would be most relevant to them, requiring the least processing effort to infer the meaning (Sperber & Wilson, 1986). Regarding the discussion on natural/non-natural meaning, the Non-serious Speech Injection Principle is mostly concerned with the non-natural meaning of utterances—or meaningnn. The Principle leads us to consider indirect reports as presuppositions, being defined as “private commitments the speaker makes in using an utterance but expects the listener to recognize based on mutual information” (Thomason, Stone, & DeVault, 2006, p. 1). On this account, the conversation is not just under the control of the positive effects of interlocutors’ utterances but also the retrospective insight interlocutors obtain about others’ mental states comes to the forefront. According to ‘possible world semantics’, propositions should be conceptualised as instantiated only by entire possible worlds. Hence, a proposition comprises a set of possible worlds, the worlds in which the information is more relevant and meaningful. In this regard, David Lewis says that a proposition is true at a world. Lewis continues that “[t]he Proposition is the same thing as the property of being a world where that proposition holds; and that is the same thing as the set of worlds where that proposition holds” (Lewis, 1986, pp.  53–54). Based on what Lewis says, non-serious speech should be reported based on one of the possible worlds known to the original speaker and the hearer through a process of mutual relationship between the reporter, the hearer, and the original speaker. 6.3.1.3  Principles Referring to the Hearer The role of the  hearer is not given due attention in the discussion over indirect reporting. The general view is that the reporting speaker and the original speaker are the main participants in indirect reporting, and that the hearer is simply the analyser of someone else’s utterances (i.e., the hearer has a passive role). Throughout the previous chapters, as well as in my reference to natural/non-natural meaning and the

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ostensive behaviour in this chapter, I tried to show that indirect reporting is a manufactured process, bearing into existence hidden intentions and desired impressions as its driving mechanism. These intentions and impressions redefine the role of the hearer as an active participant in the process of indirect reporting. The most relevant principles that embrace the hearer as their locus of attention are Decoupling Principle, Epistemic Hygienics Principle, Principle of Rationality, Hearer’s Duty, and Principle of Commitment. The first four principles are discussed extensively and clearly by Capone (2016); therefore, I do not spend time here reiterating his elaborations on them. However, because I deal with some of these principles critically, a brief introductory note would be of advantage for the readers. The Decoupling Principle points out that “[s]peakers intend their addressees to recognize different voices belonging to the indirect report and, in particular, to separate voices attributing them to the original source, the current speaker (the indirect reporter) or some other person involved in context” (Capone, 2016, p. 146). Although I consider the Decoupling Principle as a hearer’s principle, the reporting speaker’s role in helping the hearer to separate voices should not be underestimated. However, the definition proposed by Capone provides us with a picture that shows us rather clearly that the (unenviable) task of separating voices is largely on the shoulder of the hearer (according to Capone [2018, p. 5], “the main problem for indirect reporting is how to separate voices”). One may claim that the task can be refined by using a myriad of rich contextual cues and clues, allowing the hearer to better separate the voices attributable to the reporter and the original speaker. That said, this is not how Capone sees the issue. He states that “the richer the cues and clues allowing speakers to interpret transformations, the more complex are the transformations involved in the indirect reports” (2016, p. 145). Therefore, how is it possible for the addressee to separate voices when even the rich cues and clues of the speaker do not seem to bury the hatchet? Of course, Capone has acknowledged that the task of the hearer to separate the voices is very difficult (‘a Herculean task’). The water becomes even muddier when we consider cases where the reporting speaker deliberately decides to obfuscate the distinction between voices in an attempt to be ironic, for example. In agreement with Ghita (2001), in the case of irony, the speaker may not desire an actual fulfilment of his/her intention. Ghita writes that “[t]he indirectness of irony has always to be strategically exploited as an out whenever the conversational partner thinks that the ironic remark is too risky for his/her self-image” (2001, p.  144). To put it differently, sometimes the speaker intentionally muddies the water to protect his/her or someone else’s face. The Decoupling Principle puts undue pressure on the hearer to reconstruct the original speaker’s voice (and intention) by resorting to a source that may not be dependable. I think that a more economical way to conceptualise the Decoupling Principle is to describe it as follows: While being ostensive enough, speakers expect their addressees to recognise different voices belonging to the indirect report and, in particular, to separate voices attributing them to the original source, the current speaker (the reporter), or some other person involved in context. It is also expected that the hearer and the reporter both work towards manufacturing meaning based on possible worlds mutually shared between them.

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Now we have a more economical view of the Decoupling Principle that shares the responsibility of separating voices equally between the hearer and the reporter. The hearer expects the reporter to provide clear (and genuine) clues and cues, so that the hearer is able to see the difference between the reporting speaker’s and the original speaker’s voices. I do not suggest that I have made the decoupling process any easier, but I argue that the updated version is a more democratic and logical view of decoupling voices. Another rather thorny principle relating to the hearer’s responsibility is the Hearer’s Duty. Capone (2016, p. 142) argues that “[t]he hearer of an indirect report has the duty to ascertain whether the reported utterance was intended to be literal or whether it was said as a joke (or as part of a joke).” He also states that the hearer “has duty to understand whether the reporter is transforming the utterance (reported) by deliberate deletions of the transformations (cues and clues), given that the report has been provided as part of an accusation” (Capone, 2016, p. 142). Distinguishing between whether the reporter is talking jokingly or seriously is very difficult and sometimes impossible when there is poverty of stimulus, and, in addition, when the original speaker is not accessible to be referred to as a reference. One can even ask whether the hearer (any hearer) should be expected to observe the Hearer Duty discussed above. The answer should be ‘no’. According to Recanati (2004, p.  11), analysis of “ʻwhat is literally said’ and ‘what is implied’ is the linguist’s task, not something that is incumbent upon the normal language user.” Just like the Decoupling Principle, the Hearer Duty is somewhat idealistic, imposing undue burdens on the hearer. It is not always possible for the hearer to ask the reporter for the non-­ seriousness or seriousness of the report since, as Capone (2016) states, it would be annoying to conduct a ‘seriousness check’ for every indirect report. That being the case, the default is to accept the report as being serious (Capone, 2016) unless there is strong evidence against the seriousness of the report. The Decoupling Principle and the Hearer Duty are not democratic enough and have made the task of the hearer cumbersome and arduous. I can say that for the most part, these principles have made the role of the hearer the most difficult one (regarding the reporter’s and the original speaker’s responsibilities), considering the poverty of stimulus and all the cognitive processes the hearer should undergo to recognise the (non)seriousness of the report or to separate the voices (of the reporter and the original speaker). Therefore, I argue that we need to make things even by stating that instead of focusing on these two principles, which are very challenging and to some extent impossible to respect, we should pay attention to two more democratic principles. I would call them the Principle of Doubt and the Principle of Commitment. I am sure that these two principles will make the hearers happier (regarding their roles during indirect reports). The Principle of Doubt, which is inspired by Capone’s Principle of Rationality, works towards the fact that “[t]he Rational subject uses his own resources with parsimony and aims at expansions of his resources that are in line with his needs” (Capone, 2016, p.  310). Accordingly, Capone argues that less cognitive effort is needed when someone represents the mental belief of the one to whom the belief is attributed, rather than representing the mental state of the one who reports the belief. That said, Principle of Rationality looks on the bright side of the issue. There are

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cases where the Principle can play a trick on us, leading us to believe that the reporter is representing the belief attributed to the original speaker, while it could be quite possible that the reporter would ignore the Principle of Rationality and would try to cheat the hearer through subjective manipulation of the original report. Capone has not been ignorant of this fact and has argued quite clearly that “the contextual situation can at most alert us as to the awareness that the principle of Rationality does not predict the interpretation of the sentence in a correct way” (Capone, 2016, p. 316). At the heart of the Principle of Rationality, is the Principle of Doubt. The Principle of Doubt, not unlike the Epistemic Hygienics Principle,6 warns us that contextual factors can be quite misleading, obfuscating in a way to muddy the mental states included in the belief report so much so that it would not be possible to distinguish between the reporter’s and the original speaker’s mental states. The Principle of Doubt, thus, shows that: It is quite possible that the reporter, consciously or subconsciously, intermingles the voices, so much so that it would not be possible to distinguish whether the reported utterance originates from the reporter’s or the original speaker’s perspective. Therefore, the hearer should not make an important decision based on the report unless there is sufficient evidence that the report is not apocryphal.

This Principle warns the hearer that it is quite possible that the report does not properly represent the original speaker’s perspective. Some may say that it is a pessimistic view and one that is at variance with Relevance Theory. However, I am adamant that (in indirect reports) ‘doubt’ is the activator of all cognitive and social resources accessible to the hearer. It is doubt, not acceptance, which provides us with immunity. Doubt will provide the hearer with the impulse to seek more information, and to seriously consider situational clues and cues that would escape his/her attention if s/he has accepted the report blindly. According to Davidson (2004, p. 6), “even a doubt is a thought, and it is impossible to have a doubt without knowing that it is a doubt.” Of course, doubting is useful if the report is of importance for the hearer or the report deals with high-stakes consequences (e.g., for issuing a legal verdict). If the report does not establish any proximity to the hearer’s sphere of attentiveness, then there is no need for the hearer to use his/her cognitive fuels. The Principle of Doubt puts the hearer in a safe zone, at least until there is a loud-voiced sign showing that the report is genuine. Asserting that the hearer should (arduously) try to distinguish between the voices puts the hearer in an unsought situation and places undue stress on the hearer. The Principle of Doubt, however, is soothing, as it gives the right to the hearer to be impartial and conservative. In some cases, the hearer should decide whether to accept the report as a sincere one and, thereby, act accordingly. In such cases, the hearer can act in line with the 6  As reported by Capone (2016, p.  157), Epistemic Hygienics Principle is defined as: “Do not accept sentences that could mislead your future selves, it is clear that creating indirect reports by resorting to inferential steps that can mislead our future selves is illicit.” Although this principle is originally about the reporter, it can be related to the hearer’s role as well. Therefore, based on the Principle of Doubt, the hearer should not accept reports that would mislead his/her future behaviour.

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Principle of Rationality and assign the belief reported to the one the belief is attributed to, acquitting him/herself from accepting the responsibility of the reporting. The hearer should, however, be careful to act based on the illocutionary force of the report as long as it does not have negative consequences for him/herself or someone else (e.g., the original speaker). Let me clarify the issue with an example. Imagine that A informs B that C has said that C intends to kill all the bearded men in the neighbourhood (and B is a bearded man). This is indeed a high-stakes report and B should take A seriously, otherwise, B might face dangerous consequences in the future. That said, B should be cautious not to blindly ‘re-report’7 A to other bearded fellows in the neighbourhood, unless B is quite sure that A is a trustworthy person and has been genuine8 in reporting C (for instance, B knows A very well or B himself sees by chance that C is chasing a bearded man along a deserted street carrying a dagger in his hand). For this reason, another principle enters into the picture. I call this important axiom the Principle of Commitment. The Principle of Commitment keeps the hearer from the temptation to naively report other’s report. The Principle can be defined as: The hearer should not re-report what someone else has reported unless there is substantial evidence that what has been reported is genuine and based on benevolent intentions. The hearer is committed to save the original speaker’s face by considering relevance and situational necessity when s/he is going to address others through ‘hearsay reports’.

In fact, the Principle of Commitment is more user-friendly, allowing the hearer to escape from complicity and naive acceptance of the report (we hear many cases of flippant speech every day). Moreover, the Principle of Commitment helps the hearer not to risk accepting the responsibility for distributing a potentially unfaithful and ingenuine report. In the example of the ‘bearded man’, B should not blame him/ herself for not re-reporting A based on insufficient evidence, even though it may turn out that A has been sincere. However, I would relieve B by suggesting that blaming oneself is much better than ruining someone else’s face by a potentially wrong report (add possible re-reporters too). The re-reporter would feel abashed when s/he would learn that what s/he has reported has been wrong. The first reporter is the main person responsible for reporting the original speaker since s/he has been the one who has had face-to-face contact with the original speaker and s/he is the one who is more likely to know the sociocognitive factors attached to the original utterance(s). The hearer (the re-reporter) has received the original speaker’s utterances through the first reporter’s sieve. No one should expect the hearer to re-report the first reporter unless the hearer has clear evidence that the first reporter is sincere. In this case, A is the main reporter and B can be a secondary reporter who has access to secondary (and potentially flawed) information.

7  According to Bamgbose (1986), this phenomenon is called ‘hearsay reports’ whereby “the reporter is repeating something which has been passed down from one or more previous reporters” (p. 94). 8  Capone (2016) states that there is always a danger that non-serious speech is reported seriously, omitting all clues and cues that show the flippancy of the original speaker.

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6.3.2  Combined Micro Principles Single micro principles are mainly related to one participant in indirect reports. On the other hand, there are combined micro principles that embrace two participants engaging in indirect reporting. A principle at play here is the Principle of Charity. Although Capone (2016) argues that the Principle of Charity relates only to the reporter, I will show that this principle can relate to the hearer as well. Sharing some tenets of the Principle of Commitment, the Principle of Charity can be applicable to the hearer as well. Not only should the reporter take into account the positive face of the original speaker, but also the hearer must be careful not to disclose face-­ threatening information conveyed by another reporter to someone else (through re-­ reporting). Through a process of re-reporting, the hearer who has heard someone else’s report may act as a second reporter and re-report what has been reported to him/her. On this account, the hearer (the re-reporter) should take into account the Principle of Charity in re-reporting the original speaker in that s/he should not report face-threatening information and ruin the original speaker’s good image when s/he cannot separate the reporter’s voice from that of the original speaker (or when the hearer is not sure whether the report is genuine). Additionally, the hearer should take into account the reporter and ‘amend possible logical deficiencies’ that exist in the report. It is true that the hearer is reporting the original speaker, but the re-­ reporter may also be considered responsible for what is being reported. Through re-reporting, the positive face of both the reporter and the original speaker can be threatened. Re-reporting is an under-researched area in the literature of indirect reporting. Re-reporting occurs rarely since it is not common among individuals. One reason for this may be the Principle of Commitment. The hearer may not trust the first reporter and, therefore, avoids referring to the report in future interactions. Another more interesting possible reason is a phenomenon that I will call ‘the reference overload’, referring to the fact that it is not (easily) possible for the hearer of re-­ reporting to determine to whom the information should be assigned. I am sure that the reader would agree with the idea of ‘the reference overload’ when considering the difficulty of separating the voices. Now with the addition of the second reporter, it would be almost impossible (and excruciating) to separate the voices between the re-reporter (the hearer), reporter, and the original speaker. The problem of ‘familiarity’ is another issue. The re-reporter should find someone who knows both the original speaker and the first reporter. This would surely decrease the chances of re-reporting. Be that as it may, re-reporting is of importance when the re-reporter has enough evidence that the first reporter has been genuine. Re-reporting would show the impression and consequences of the first report. Recursion would allow the speakers to provide as many subsequent reports as possible. Therefore, re-­ reporting is linguistically justifiable. Nevertheless, this recursive feature of reporting, which allows speakers to put sentences inside other sentences (Yule, 2010), does not mean that speakers are pragmatically and cognitively neutral during re-­ reporting. Re-reporting shares common sociocognitive denominators with indirect reporting.

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Each of these principles discussed in this chapter can be ignored during the process of indirect reporting, but that does not reduce their effectiveness. Nonetheless, ignorance does not mean chaos and disorderliness. In other words, I am referring to the ‘strategic ignorance’ that is in line with the Cooperative Principle presented by H. P. Grice (for creating implicatures during the interaction). I would like to finish this chapter by quoting Bilmes (1986, p.  51) regarding any rule-governed phenomenon: In fact, the possibility of using the rules or of deliberately violating the rules in order to promote certain interpretations enhances communication. Only when the violations get out of hand, thus obscuring the rules, does communication break down. We cannot regularly break all the rules. These observations apply as well to the rules governing speech acts. It is only when the breaches become too frequent that the rules are obscured, that the breaches are no longer recognized as such, and the communication process approaches chaos.

6.4  Conclusion This chapter worked extensively towards an elaboration on the principles underlying the practice of indirect reporting. I divided the principles into macro and micro principles, distinguishing them on the basis of their inclusiveness of participants in the process of reporting. In this chapter, a long-expected Principle of Politeness was introduced, which regulates the whole process of indirect reporting. Another macro principle discussed in this chapter was the Principle of Prudence. Micro principles are divided into single and combined micro principles. And finally, an intricate case of re-reporting was debated that advocated the two principles relating to the hearer: Principle of Commitment and Principle of Doubt. The principles discussed in this chapter showed rather clearly that indirect reporting is a rule-governed phenomenon, where individuals should respect certain caveats. The rules mentioned in this chapter are not written in tablets of stone, for they can be ignored by the participants involved in the practice of indirect reporting. We can see at the end of the day that this breaching of the rules adds to the complexities of indirect reporting, and we can find out why the practice of indirect reporting is always attached to complicated philosophical discussions.

References Attardo, S. (1997). Locutionary and perlocutionary cooperation: The perlocutionary cooperative principle. Journal of Pragmatics, 27, 753–779. Bamgbose, A. (1986). Reported speech in Yoruba. In F. Coulmas (Ed.), Direct and indirect speech (pp. 77–99). Berlin, Germany: Mouton De Gruyter. Bilmes, J. (1986). Discourse and behavior. New York/London: Plenum Press. Capone, A. (2016). The pragmatics of indirect reports: Socio-philosophical considerations. Cham, Switzerland: Springer.

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Capone, A. (2018). On the social praxis of indirect reporting. In A. Capone, M. Garcia-Carpintero, & A. Falzone (Eds.), Indirect reports and pragmatics in the world languages (pp. 3–20). Cham, Switzerland: Springer. Culpeper, J., Haugh, M., & Kádár, D. Z. (2017). Introduction. In J. Culpeper, M. Haugh, & D. Z. Kádár (Eds.), The Palgrave handbook of linguistic (im)politeness (pp. 1–8). London: Palgrave. Davidson, D. (2004). Problems of rationality (Vol. 4). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. Ghita, A. (2001). Negotiation of irony in dialogue. In E. Weigand & M. Dascal (Eds.), Negotiation and power in dialogic interaction (pp. 139–148). Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Givön, T. (1983). Topic continuity in spoken discourse. In T.  Givön (Ed.), Topic continuity in discourse: A quantitative cross-language study (pp. 255–311). Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Givön, T. (1993). English grammar: A function-based introduction. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Gregoromichelaki, E., & Kempson, R. (2016). Reporting, dialogue, and the role of grammar. In A. Capone, F. Kiefer, & F. Lo Piparo (Eds.), Indirect reports and pragmatics: Interdisciplinary studies (pp. 115–150). Cham, Switzerland: Springer. Hickmann, M. (1995). Discourse organization and the development of reference to person, space, and time. In P. Fletcher & B. MacWhinney (Eds.), The handbook of child language (pp. 194– 218). Oxford, UK: Blackwell. Kádár, D.  Z., & Haugh, M. (2013). Understanding politeness. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Lambrecht, K. (1994). Information structure and sentence form: Topic, focus and the mental representations of discourse referents (Cambridge Studies in Linguistics, 71). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Lewis, D. K. (1986). On the plurality of worlds. Oxford, UK: Blackwell. Recanati, F. (2004). Literal meaning. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Searle, J. (1979). Expression and meaning. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press. Sperber, D., & Wilson, D. (1986). Relevance: Communication and cognition. Oxford, UK: Blackwell. Terkourafi, M. (2011). From politeness1 to politeness2: Tracking norms of im/politeness across time and space. Journal of Politeness Research, 7, 159–185. Thomason, R., Stone, M., DeVault, D. (2006). Enlightened update: A computational architecture for presupposition and other pragmatic phenomena. In D. K. Byron, C. Roberts, S. Schwenter (Eds.), Presupposition accommodation (pp. 1–44). Rutgers and the University of Michigan. Weigand, E. (2010). Dialogue: The mixed game. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Yule, G. (2010). The study of language (4th ed.). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Chapter 7

Politeness in Indirect Reporting

7.1  Introduction Politeness is quintessential in discussing a sound theory of social interaction in general and pragmatics in particular. A sound theory of language use is lame without a justified view of politeness. Of course, reaching a consensus about a theory of politeness is difficult, for there are conflicting issues revolving around the term. The concept of politeness is an underdeveloped area of study in indirect reporting. The most recent comprehensive research publication on politeness (a co-edited volume by Culpeper, Haugh, & Kádár, 2017) is void of any discussion on politeness as manufactured during the reported speech. To date, almost all studies conducted on quotation in general and on indirect reports in particular have been largely engaged with structural, pragmatic, or philosophical aspects, while the topic of politeness and facework have remained unnoticed by the researchers. Indeed, many studies have been conducted on different aspects of indirect reporting without even devoting a brief section to politeness issues. There is always a conflict within the process of indirect reporting. It is a conflict between knowledge and belief – equilibrium and disequilibrium in a protean context of interaction. In indirect reporting, therefore, the hearer and the reporter should reach a modus vivendi, since the practice of indirect reporting may require the interlocutors to react based on unsubstantiated assumptions. Of course, the practice of indirect reporting relies on the hearer and the reporter to respect a myriad of principles (refer to Chap. 6 for a comprehensive overview). Conflict may arise if the participants do not take into consideration the principles governing the practice of indirect reporting. One of these essential principles is politeness. Indirect reporting is a suitable platform for the activity of (im)politeness since indirect reports closely take into account issues such as face, benevolence, and etiquette, among other things. In Chap. 6, I proposed the Principle of Politeness to herald the relevance and importance of politeness in my discussion of indirect reports. In this chapter, © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019 M. Morady Moghaddam, The Praxis of Indirect Reports, Perspectives in Pragmatics, Philosophy & Psychology 21, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-14269-8_7

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t­herefore, I intend to discuss rather comprehensively how politeness and rules of etiquette can regulate the practice of indirect reporting. I will argue an important case of Collectivist Ethics and how this shapes participation in indirect reports. Since indirect reporting is closely related to issues such as transferring taboo words, slurring, and derogatory utterances, I will talk about how such language should be dealt with during reporting. I will also provide a brief note on (im)politeness and will propose my own stance towards it. Moreover, re-reporting is re-introduced here, but with an elaboration on politeness issues.

7.2  Ethics in Indirect Reports Interlocutors are confronted with situations where they are exposed to ethical challenges during the interaction. This confrontation is strongly guided by moral rules and principles in a dynamic context of interaction. When one is talking on behalf of someone else, one should take into account ethics (it is like citing an author in a research article). However, by ethics, I do not mean a fixed definition that is prescriptive and void of considering the interlocutor’s experiences and reflections, but rather, a mediated definition of ethics through interaction. Put differently, my approach towards ethics considers the individual as a peninsula, not an island (individuals are connected to groups and societies). In the same vein, Thompson (1998) rejects ‘monology’ – an individualistic discovery of truth or falsity – and advocates ‘ethical collectivism’, whereby a process-oriented view towards collective agreement is proposed. The key passage is: What I will argue is that she ought nevertheless to accept it as true, so long as she has reason to think that the procedures for reaching the result are rational, that her point of view and all other cogent views have been taken into account, and provided she has reason to believe that the conclusion agreed on, judged in the light of the standards of the procedure, is better than any other proposal that has been considered. (Thompson, 1998, p. 2)

The idea of ethical collectivism is not dissimilar to the deconstructionism discussed in Chap. 3. To refresh the reader’s mind, deconstructionists believe that there is no fixed endpoint, for there is constant evolution and mutability (Schirato, 2011). According to ethical collectivism, values are constructed and discovered collectively. The concept of ethical collectivism closely approximates Kádár and Haugh’s approach towards politeness. They argue that “[o]ne of the most important findings in politeness research to date is that politeness does not reside in particular behaviours or linguistic forms, but rather in evaluations of behaviours and linguistic forms” (2013, p. 57). Politeness, Kádár and Haugh state, is always situated, which is significantly anchored in the participants’ understanding of the situation and the conversational partner. Likewise, Flanagan (1991) states that there is no fixed and accepted way of behaving in ethics. Taking this issue into consideration, one may argue that the Principle of Politeness I proposed in Chap. 6 is endangered and marginalised.

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However, I am relieved since the Principle of Politeness does not talk about the endpoint, but instead considers the process of obviating the possible threats to others’ face, which is frequent in indirect reports. In other words, the interlocutors’ judgements and appraisals are given priority when considering ethical issues in interaction. In this sense, I am close to the ethical collectivism defined above. The idea of ethical collectivism does not intend to show us that individuals have no role in shaping morality (the name of the theory somewhat communicates this kind of interpretation). On the contrary, ethical collectivism argues that ethics should pass through the individual’s filter of experiences and reflections. Thompson writes: Judging from her own point of view it may still seem to her that her own position is right. She nevertheless accepts the collectively arrived at conclusion because constructive discourse has revealed that this is the position which best incorporates the ethical insights of all participants. (1998, pp. 5–6)

Moral judgement in indirect reporting is supposed to be maintained by rules of ethics that are both individually and collectively shaped. The reporter and the hearer are confronted with many ethical issues during indirect reporting. For instance, on the part of the reporter, s/he may come across different challenges, such as whether to report the original speaker’s bad language, or whether s/he is permitted to change some parts of the original speaker’s utterances in order to take advantage of the report, in line with Kasper’s (1990) ‘politic’ behaviour (will be discussed in Sect. 7.5). The reporter may ask whether it is legal to use some parts of the original speaker’s utterances without acknowledging the source, or whether it is ethical to divulge the original speaker’s utterances to someone else without the permission of the original speaker. These and many other questions require moral judgements on the part of the reporter. On the other hand, the hearer too must face several issues requiring moral judgement. The hearer must decide whether it is ethical to accept the report as genuine and whether or not to react based on someone else’s indirect utterances, or indeed whether it is ethical to re-report what s/he has heard from someone else. How should the hearer ensure that the report is being made with good rather than ill intentions? Therefore, ethics is closely related to the practice of indirect reporting. By discussing some moral issues in indirect reporting, the importance of politeness and ethical issues is highlighted. In what follows, I will propose an operational definition of ethics that properly considers the nuances of moral standards in indirect reporting and at the same time respects the interactive nature of indirect reporting.

7.2.1  Dynamic Dialogic Ethic My approach towards addressing the ethical issues in indirect reporting is informed by what I call the Dynamic Dialogic Ethic (DDE). This principle is close to the notion of ethical collectivism, but there are also some major differences. According to Thompson (1998), ethical collectivism holds the view that the product of

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constructive discourse is always clear and unambiguous. However, the dynamics of conversation may endanger this generalisation. Moreover, Thompson argues that conversational partners should always reach a consensus, and yet it is not clear exactly what ‘consensus’ is, or how it is possible to reach that consensus, if one indeed exists.1 Therefore, although one may deviate from a particular topic, this does not mean that one has reached a consensus with one’s opponents. Therefore, the DDE suggests that ethics is relative and dependent on sociocognitive factors. Participants in the dialogue may use many (insincere) strategies to target ethical issues during interaction. However, there is no definitive end product, and the interlocutors can always change their position regarding ethics. A moral consensus may suddenly change to an amoral one, based on individuals’ appraisals of the given situation. Moral consensus is not fixed or even unambiguous. It can turn into upheaval and chaos when things get abstruse. One may respect ethical issues as far as his/her expectations are met in the interaction. When threatened by a possibly face-threatening act or when something very important is going to be achieved, ethics may be compromised. Imagine that one is seeking to reconcile a couple. In this case, the intervener may tell a white lie to set the scene for such reconciliation. Ethical issues are cyclic, ever-changing in the course of interaction. We must always be alert not to trust our previous ethical contracts and conclusions. At least, the reader would agree with me that the distance between love and hatred is literally ‘nothing’. Every new context has its own ethics. This is the main proposition behind the DDE.  Ethics is a culture-specific concept, but ‘culture-specificity’ is a broad term that does not show the intricacies of such a sensitive concept as ethics. We should go deeper and view ethics in the realm of individuals and the idiosyncrasies of the situation. This situated conceptualisation of ethics leads us to the Goffmanian definition of face, which is described by O’Driscoll (2017, p. 95) as “a phenomenon of interaction, indeed of ‘particular’ instances of it, the precise nature of a person’s face at any one time being the result of that person’s behaviour up to that point in a particular encounter.” By adhering to a dynamic dialogic understanding of ethics, it is clear that a scientific definition of ethics should pass through individuals’ viewpoints as the selfand other-regulatory entities in interaction based on sociocognitive factors2 (I will elaborate more on this in the next section). This sociocognitive aspect is regarded as 1  Interlocutors do not always reach an agreement, for there might be some conflict, such as when the topic is not interesting enough to maintain the attention of one or both of the interlocutors. When there is no interest in the topic, or when the interests of one of the interlocutors are at stake, any attempt to reach a consensus would certainly be regarded as ‘much ado about nothing’. One may believe that ‘the earth is flat’, while many others would counter argue such a claim. However, one may not be interested in opposing views, and/or may choose not to discuss this issue with others since the topic is not something that s/he will necessarily want to talk about (the flatness/roundness of the earth may not be an interesting topic for a linguist, for example). 2  I consider the underlying process of ethics as the universal feature, rather than the way in which these assumptions are manipulated in different cultures during interaction. Whatever the definition of ethics may be, it cannot escape individuals’ sociocognitive processes. Thus a sound theory of ethics should be based on the sociocognitive features underlying interaction.

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the heart of the DDE, and it is the focus of my conceptualisation of ethics as an interactive entity. Since individuals’ sociocognitive filters are universal, the DDE is universal too. A key passage by Erving Goffman shows that this filter is of paramount importance in visualising a universal aspect of human nature: If persons have a universal human nature, they themselves are not to be looked to for an explanation of it. One must look rather to the fact that societies everywhere, if they are to be societies, must mobilize their members as self-regulating participants in social encounters. (1967, p. 44)

The mobilisation of self-regulatory processes on the part of interlocutors is manifested through the DDE. Each individual approaches ethical issues based on self-­ regulatory factors. However, Goffman did not talk about other-regulatory factors that are really constructive in shaping ethics. One important other-regulatory factor is the way in which others can influence individuals’ appraisals of events. One’s expectation and judgement of others play a leading role in one’s behaviour during interaction. Therefore, ethics can be influenced by both self- and other-regulatory factors.

7.3  Conceptualisation of Politeness Politeness has been a very important topic in sociology and philosophy. According to John Gumperz, politeness “is basic to the production of social order, and a precondition of human cooperation, so that any theory which provides an understanding of this phenomenon at the same time goes to the foundations of human social life” (cited in Brown & Levinson, 1987, p. xiii). A myriad of approaches have waxed and waned throughout the history of politeness. Brown and Levinson (1978), standing as quintessential figures in this realm, define politeness as adhering to individuals’ positive and negative face wants. Although this rather simple definition has provoked many follow-up revisions and critical notes, Brown and Levinson’s original proposal can be regarded as a useful theory of politeness (Grainger, 2018). Politeness is not just a matter of sociocultural factors3 (as advocated by Mills, 2003; Spencer-Oatey, 2000; Watts, 2003) or of pragmatic intrusion (as proposed by Leech, 2014). More specifically, politeness should be defined as a sociocognitive factor (I believe that this stance was acknowledged by Brown and Levinson in their original work, although some postmodernists would disagree with this claim). Studies on politeness have not paid due attention to the cognitive factors that may shape politeness. The so-called ‘discursive approaches’ to politeness (which rely on a lay interpretation of politeness) try to show that they consider the cognitive side of individuals, but what they really propose is a version of cognition that is shaped through social interaction (cognition is at the service of society). Postmodernists 3  There is a distinction between first-order politeness (i.e., how politeness is conceptualised by the layperson) and second-order politeness as defined by researchers (Watts, 2005[1992]).

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ignore the fact that interaction can also be manipulated by cognitive factors such as emotion and the appraisal of the situation. That being the case, few attempts have been made to integrate different human abilities into a definition of politeness in the way argued by Weigand (2010). In agreement with Kádár and Haugh (2013), if one is going to come close to a sound realisation of the concept of ‘politeness’, one should take into account the ‘sociocognitive’ locus of interpersonal evaluations, among other things. Such an attempt to mix human abilities with politeness has been made by Terkourafi, who incorporates “an awareness of Self” (2007, p. 313) to the definition of face. By emphasising the recognition of speakers’ intentions in particular contexts, Terkourafi has been cogent that a comprehensive view of face embraces human mental states. She introduces a withdrawal/approach dimension of face, which she regards as the building blocks of human emotion. To quote her exactly, Terkourafi (2007, p. 323) argues that this dimension “serves as the common substratum of all human emotions.” On the other hand, however, appraisal theorists adhere to another viewpoint, one which seems to contradict Terkourafi’s stance. Appraisal theorists argue that it is the individual’s appraisal of an event that underlies all their emotions (the withdrawal/approach dimension is affected by individual’s appraisals), not vice versa. As Roseman and Smith (2001, p. 3) discuss, “[…] emotions are elicited by evaluations (appraisals) of events and situations.” Therefore, withdrawing or approaching is affected by one’s appraisals of an event and is of secondary importance with regard to our judgements of a situation. The dimension of approach/ withdrawal is a reaction to emotions and, by itself, cannot generate emotions. If we consider appraisals as the genesis of emotions, which is indeed the case, then one should cast doubt on the universal nature of the approach/withdrawal dimension of face since appraisals are context-specific. Terkourafi also states that this dimension of face “is tied up with the evaluation of a stimulus” (2007, p. 322) as being positive or negative. In fact, this ‘evaluation of stimulus’ is acutely defined as ‘appraisal’ by emotion theories. Another ambiguity of Terkourafi’s viewpoint is that she sees face, as also argued by Bousfield (2008), as exclusively constituted externally. Terkourafi argues that face is “in the eye of the beholder” (2007, p. 326) and that “face is an inherently collective goal” (2007, p. 318). Therefore, there is a contradiction in her account with regard to how evaluations (a cognitive trait) can be linked to this inherently collective goal (a social trait). As rightly said by Bousfield (2008, p. 39) with regard to the external state of face, individuals “approach interactions with expectations as to how we would like our face(s) to be constituted. Such expectations of how face should be constituted are, necessarily, internal.” In addition to Terkourafi’s state-of-the-art conceptualisation of face and its scope, researchers such as Arundale (2006) and Haugh (2007) have put an emphasis on the interactional aspects of politeness that closely approaches the ‘ethical collectivism’ delineated in Sect. 7.2. In consonance with Arundale (2006, pp. 200–201): [S]ocial selves exist only in relation to other social selves, not as separate, monadic individuals. Alternatively, the implication is that using the single term ‘persons’ is equivalent to using the compound term ‘persons-in-relationship-to-other-persons’.

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The attempt to define politeness based on a ‘constructivist’ view has been a big step forward, and yet cognitive factors have not been given due attention, having been ignored or given a secondary place on the designation of face-saving and face-­ threatening acts. As stated in Arundale (2006, p.  200), the ‘social-self approach’ towards face is “a radical departure from the Cartesian cogito ergo sum.” Therefore, it is clear that the ‘social self’ view of the face is detached from the cognitive sphere of human interaction. Referring back to the DDE, I am inclined to propose a view of face that is capable of achieving reconciliation between cogito ergo sum and communicamus ergo sumus. By taking into account individuals’ emotional stances and judgements, we will encounter a stronger view of face that embraces both cognition and communication. Certainly, any theory of face that does not consider both cognitive and social features would be impaired. Viewing politeness as a matter of sociocognitive filtering, I come to a definition of politeness that is closely inclined towards Penelope Brown’s conceptualisation of the term. Brown (2001, p. 11620) argues that politeness is “a matter of taking into account the feelings of others as to how they should be interactionally treated, including behaving in a manner that demonstrates appropriate concern for interactors’ social status and their social relationship” (my emphasis). Everything that threatens this general axiom is considered ‘impoliteness’. Although Brown and Levinson (1987, p. 4) state that “the distribution of politeness (who has to be polite to whom) is socially controlled”, it is clear that they had the preconception in their mind that ‘emotion’ has a significant impact on politeness as well. Appraisal theories of emotion posit that individuals’ judgements of each other during interaction are a strong determiner of how the interaction will progress. Therefore, politeness is more a trade-off between individuals’ expectations and social norms (Geyer, 2008). By seeing politeness in this way, it is possible to unpick the intricacies that revolve around the term – as long as we deal with emotional beings in interaction, politeness is a blurred and problematic concept to maintain. Needless to say, politeness and face are interactionally treated. In recent work elsewhere (Morady Moghaddam, 2018), I provide some examples of Persian speakers using derogatory words as address terms. For instance, I discuss that in Persian, one may overhear teenagers in friendly conversations referring to each other with seemingly face-threatening words such as ‘kesɒːfæt’ (‘the dirt’) and ‘diːvɒːne’ (‘crazy’), but the intended meaning indicates intimacy and the degree of friendship which are in contrast to the literal meaning of the two offensive words. Specifically, ‘the dirt’ can mean that ‘one is cool’ or ‘cunning’, and ‘crazy’ can mean ‘strange’ or ‘cool’, depending on the context. However, this implicature is conveyed in particular situations and among close friends. On the other hand, some Persian speakers use epithets such as ‘xoʃti:p’ (‘handsome’) or ‘mohændes’ (‘engineer’) that seem to denote positive meaning prima facie, when in fact they connote negative meaning in some special contexts. In some contexts, ‘xoʃti:p’ and ‘mohændes’ seem to convey dislike, representing a sign of social distance between the speakers (more often than not, such epithets are observed among people of lower social class during interaction with people of higher social class). Therefore, politeness can also be a matter of expectation. Even derogatory words from a close friend can be appraised

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as a temporary outburst of anger on the part of the speaker, and generate sympathy from the hearer. Or, on the other hand, a seemingly positive utterance may be appraised as sarcasm, and could create detachment on the part of the hearer. Moreover, politeness does not mean that we should be ‘a good Samaritan’ (which would state that interlocutors should do their best to serve their conversational partner’s goal, as advocated by Attardo, 1997). Revealing someone else’s derogatory or offensive words to others is impolite since it threatens the original speaker’s positive face. However, the dynamics of the situation are determinant in defining what is regarded as politeness. Let me refer to two cases: a court of law and translation. In these two situations, the meaning of politeness is changed to ‘commitment’. An eyewitness in the courtroom and a translator are committed to be faithful in presenting to others what they have observed. Commitment allows the individuals to be impolite as long as they are representing someone else based on ‘situational necessity’. Therefore, an eyewitness can report obscene or offensive word(s) as a matter of informativeness in a courtroom.4 This kind of impoliteness is licit in the court of law. In a courtroom, decisions are high-­ stakes matters that influence the lives of individuals. Hiding or modifying derogatory words and sentences as a matter of politeness is not acceptable in such a context. The translator is also committed to the same obligations. A translator should respect faithfulness to the original text and transfer the original writer’s tone and style of writing. Although translators should consider the readers’ cultural norms and conventions, this does not mean that they should make the text more polite according to the reader’s cultural norms. If the original author intends to be impolite by his/her style of writing, the translator may refrain from changing the original text into a more polite one, since, in doing so, the translator would in fact change the tone and style of the original writer that is way beyond the duties of the translator as a participant in the scientific enterprise of translation (refer to Chap. 5, Sect. 5.7 for further elaboration).

7.4  Politeness and Indirect Reports Indirect reports (as a complex language game) can act as a powerful tool to manipulate politeness. Indirect reports provide a suitable platform for the reporter to delete or modify derogatory as well as face-threatening words during the report. Terkourafi and Culpeper (2017, pp. 27–28) argue that: It is tempting to assume that the adoption of the Gricean account by the classical politeness models partly reflects the fact that, at least in middle-class British English culture, ­indirectness, inexplicitness, circumlocution, incompleteness, obliquity and so on are often associated with being polite. 4  As advocated by Jay and Janschewitz (2008, p. 269), “[o]ver time, speakers learn that politeness is not always the norm, as in situations where rudeness is warranted (e. g., courtroom discourse or venting negative emotions).”

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That said, Terkourafi (2014) suggests that indirect speech is not necessarily more polite than direct speech. It is true that indirect speech is not always considered more polite, yet indirect reports (as an oblique discourse) provide a powerful apparatus for the reporter to deviate from possible impoliteness. Indirect reports allow the reporter to take advantage of the sociocognitive filter discussed above. The battery of strategies and substitutions available to the indirect reporter is helpful in providing a more fine-grained version of the original speaker’s utterances. Of course, it is not always necessary to polish the original speaker’s utterances, and indeed, situational necessity can force the reporter to keep the original utterance intact. The reporter can, however, change an impolite utterance to a polite one whenever s/he thinks that this alteration is justifiable based on contextual factors. Politeness in indirect reporting is applicable to both the reporter and the hearer. In Chap. 6, I proposed many principles, some of which are closely related to politeness. I also proposed the Principle of Politeness (Sect. 6.2.1), which was defined as follows: Indirect reporting is inherently a face-threatening act, whereby the report culminates in the creation of unsolicited imposition and commitments. Therefore, the reporter should use contextual clues and cues to separate his/her voice from that of the original speaker (to reduce the imposition on the part of the hearer). Moreover, the report should be fair (the reporter should consider faithfulness) and respect the positive face of the hearer and the original speaker.

In this definition, it is clear that the main emphasis is on the reporter. The reporter is the mediator between the hearer and the original speaker. It is the reporter who should create a clear link between the original speaker and the hearer. It is expected that the reporter distinguish between his voice and that of the original speaker (Capone, 2012), so that the hearer can figure out which parts of the report belong to the original speaker. The reporter should not assign inappropriate commitments to the original speaker. Therefore, the reporter should not mix his/her voice with that of the original speaker, as though his/her voice belongs to the original speaker. Moreover, as stated by Capone (2016), the reporter should not delete cues and clues, or report a non-serious speech seriously or vice versa. More importantly, the reporter should take into account situational necessity in reporting the original speaker’s face-threatening sentences as well as offensive words. The reporter can report offensive words that threaten the original speaker’s face in cases where something more important is going to be achieved by such divulgence (for example, if in a courtroom the divulgence might save someone from life imprisonment). The hearer may be considered a bystander in the process of indirect reporting, and hence void of any responsibility. That said, the hearer also has some duties. However, there is one important issue that may provide some commitments for the hearer, and that is the issue of ‘re-reporting’. By re-reporting, I mean the reporting of the reporter’s utterances – when the report is of importance to a third party who may be closely connected to the report. This is called re-reporting because the hearer has reported someone else’s report through second-hand information. In this case, the same politeness strategies as previously mentioned for the reporter are also applied to the hearer. However, there is one important difference. The reporter has

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had a first-hand encounter with the original speaker, and as such, s/he is the one who has observed any paralinguistic cues and clues, and other sociocognitive hints. That said, by contrast, the hearer has understood the affairs through a mediator (the reporter). Therefore, the hearer should be careful not to report a mediator’s utterance when there are not enough cues to help the hearer discern the integrated voices in the report. Innocent re-reporting is a face-threatening act since it is quite possible that the mediator is wrong or has deleted some important cues and clues, which would distort the original speaker’s utterances. I would call reports of this kind the ‘tell-tale reports’, meaning that the report is likely to create a concatenation of circulating false information by re-reporters. Tell-taling has the potential to destroy the original speaker’s character, especially when the first reporter has consciously or unconsciously misrepresented the original speaker’s utterances. Therefore, innocent re-reporting should be avoided. The first reporter can report to whomever s/he wishes. The first reporter is free to do this since s/he is the one who has had face-to-­ face communication with the original speaker and has observed cues and clues attached to the utterance. However, for the hearer, reporting is risky; the hearer has been linked to the original speaker through a mediator. Therefore, the hearer is not allowed to re-report unless s/he has good reasons for it to be warranted (for example, the hearer talks to the original speaker directly or realises something through first-hand experience). The main part of my discussion here relates to the reporter and the hearer since their roles are very important in the process of indirect reporting. However, note that the reporter can even fake a report, that is, produce a report where there is no original speaker. The reporter could simply invent something and assign it to an imaginary speaker. Or in some cases, the original speaker is not accessible and the reporter may insincerely brag about interactions that s/he had with the original speaker to take advantage of some fictitious relationship. A property of language known as ‘rapid fade’ (Yule, 2010) allows speakers to talk without restraint. The reporter, therefore, is faced with a challenging job to convince the hearer that what is being reported is genuine. In this way, we are led to the Principle of Expressibility (refer to Sect. 6.3.1.1 for further discussion): The original speaker is responsible for the use of derogatory words IFF the reporter considers the situational necessity, genuineness, and justifiability. Moreover, to shirk the responsibility of reporting bad language, the reporter should not change the original speaker’s utterances since the original speaker can claim that s/he has not been reported fairly. In other words, in the case of reporting bad language, the use of direct reporting is preferred over indirect reporting if possible.

Politeness is largely manipulated by the reporter and the hearer in the process of indirect reports. The Principle of Immunity (discussed in Chap. 6) shows that the speaker is free to talk in whatever manner s/he desires, yet s/he is the one who must accept the consequences of his/her utterances. However, reporting someone else is another story. As a representative, the reporter is not permitted to report others in any way s/he likes (the Principle of Immunity is not applicable to the reporter). The original speaker is entitled to reject the sincerity of the report unless the reporter has strong proof that what is being reported is genuine and in line with a fair paraphrase.

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The original speaker should respect others’ positive and negative face; but the reporter should take into consideration individuals’ face wants as well as the principles governing the practice of indirect reporting.

7.5  Face and Impoliteness in Indirect Reporting Indirect reporting closely embraces individuals’ appreciation of self-image (positive face), and their claim for personal preserves (negative face), using Brown and Levinson’s (1978) terminology. Indirect reporting may impose an undue burden on the shoulder of the original speaker, the reporter, and the hearer (indirect reporting can assign inappropriate commitments to the original speaker). The original speaker’s negative face is threatened since the report will impose responsibility on the shoulder of the original speaker. The reporter may not be able to properly report what s/he has heard, creating undue problems for the original speaker. Moreover, the reporter’s negative face is also threatened. The reporter is responsible for distinguishing between his voice and that of the original speaker as clearly as possible (Capone, 2016), transferring all useful ostensive cues and clues to help the hearer divide the voices. It is clear that the hearer’s negative face is also threatened by indirect reporting. Referring to Capone’s Hearer’s Duty, the hearer should do his best to distinguish between the voice of the reporter and the original speaker, and (arduously) figure out the implied meaning based on second-hand information. On the other hand, indirect reporting maintains the positive face-wants of the original speaker and the hearer, for they have been included in the report. As such, indirect reporting improves solidarity. The original speaker and the hearer are linked to each other through the report. Put differently, both are included and indirectly mentioned in the reporter’s speech. The introductory discussion in this section leads us to the issue of impoliteness as well. In consonance with Bousfield (2008, p. 33), “[c]entral to many of the classic and postmodern approaches to politeness and impoliteness is the concept of ‘face’.” That said, according to Brown and Levinson, “certain kinds of acts intrinsically threaten face” (1987, p. 65). These are called Face-Threatening Acts (FTAs). Face-Threatening Acts are generally evaluated based on social norms and conventions. In this regard, Mitchell and Haugh state that “evaluations of impoliteness inevitably involve those recipients construing the speaker’s action as a particular kind of social action, and holding them accountable for that particular kind of social action with respect to particular dimension(s) of the moral order” (2015, p. 207). Mitchell and Haugh are cogent in referring to the concept of ‘moral order’, but it seems that they see politeness as a specifically social action. However, they reason and acknowledge that some important aspects of impoliteness, such as speaker intentions and evaluations, remain unresolved in the literature of (im)politeness. The ramification of these unresolved aspects of impoliteness is to force us to be cautious not to assign (im)politeness merely to social norms and conventions. Mills (2017, p. 58) has more to say in this regard:

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[A]nalysis of politeness and impoliteness cannot be simply focused on the individual and their linguistic choices, because those choices themselves are fundamentally informed by social forces, and the individual’s perceptions of what norms of appropriateness are in play. In turn those social norms are modified or maintained because of the linguistic behaviour of individuals. This more interactive sociocultural model of politeness and impoliteness allows us to describe the role of social forces without assuming either that the individual is solely the originator of their language, nor does it force us to assume that the individual is a pawn at the mercy of social forces. It is the engagement with or orientation to what is considered to be in play that constitutes appropriate behaviour.

Some important aspects of Mills’s description stand out. For Mills, the individual and society work in tandem. One supplements the other in a mutual relationship. Individuals’ orientations are a key concept in defence of what I will propose as a sociocognitive manifestation of impoliteness. But before dealing with this, let me elaborate on the impoliteness strategies proposed by Jonathan Culpeper (2016, p. 425): Bald-on-record impoliteness: the FTA is performed in a direct, clear, unambiguous and concise way in circumstances where face is not irrelevant or minimized. Positive impoliteness: the use of strategies designed to damage the addressee’s positive face wants, e.g. Ignore, snub the other – fail to acknowledge the other’s presence. Negative impoliteness: the use of strategies designed to damage the addressee’s negative face wants, e.g. Frighten – instill a belief that action detrimental to the other will occur. Off-record impoliteness: the FTA is performed by means of an implicature but in such a way that one attributable intention clearly outweighs any others. Withhold politeness: the absence of politeness work where it would be expected. For example, failing to thank somebody for a present may be taken as deliberate impoliteness.5 Impoliteness Meta-Strategy: Sarcasm or mock politeness: the FTA is performed with the use of politeness strategies that are obviously insincere, and thus remain surface realisations.

Impoliteness, just like positive and negative face, is applicable to indirect reporting. However, impoliteness is conveyed through ‘third-person-report impoliteness’.6 More often than not, bald-on-record impoliteness also happens in the case of direct reports in order to emphasise that the offensive word is exactly what the original speaker – not the reporter – has said (and hence, the reporter should be acquitted of complicity). I discussed in Chap. 6 that it is better that the reporter not use obscene or derogatory words in indirect reports since there is a danger that the hearer would assign the bad language to the reporter, or at least, that the reporter may be considered complicit. Through positive impoliteness, the reporter may ostensively use some clues and cues to imply that the original speaker has excluded the hearer from 5  In consonance with Culpeper, the paradigm example of withhold politeness is when someone is silent when they should be doing politeness work. 6  Leech (2014, p. 18) argues that in third-person politeness, “the ‘target’ of politeness is not the addressee but some third person(s), i.e., neither the speaker not the addressee.” That said, this kind of definition does not fit for the kind of (im)politeness I have proposed here. The indirect reports in (1–6) are ‘third-person-report politeness’, in which the reporter addresses the hearer but the (im) politeness is done by a person who is (usually) absent and thus “incapable of appreciating the [im] polite remark” (Leech, 2014, p. 18).

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some state of affairs, hence threatening the hearer’s positive face. Negative impoliteness is an important issue in indirect reporting. I discussed earlier that the degree of imposition is rather high in indirect reporting. The practice of indirect reporting creates responsibilities for all participants in indirect reporting. The reporter can use some parts of the original speaker’s speech to frighten the hearer, impose something upon him/her, or limit his/her freedom. In this case, indirect reporting is a paradigm example of negative impoliteness. The reporter can do the FTA indirectly or off-­ record, by reporting a derogatory or face-threatening act. Moreover, the FTA can occur when the reporter deliberately deletes cues and clues from reports (be they verbal or nonverbal) to withhold politeness. The reporter can also report the original speaker’s sarcastic points as an attempt to mock politeness. Based on the discussion on the different impoliteness strategies by Culpeper, the following are examples of ‘third-person-report impoliteness’ in indirect reports: ( 1) John said that you are a bastard (bald-on-record impoliteness); (2) Mary said that she is not going to invite you to the party (positive impoliteness); (3) Mary said that she is going to fire you (negative impoliteness); (4) Mary said that one should not trust gamblers (off-record impoliteness); (5) Mary said nothing when I gave your gift to her (withhold politeness)7; (6) Mary said that you are a perfect fit for the army (mock politeness). Sentences (1–6) clearly show how third-person-report impoliteness can take place in different kinds of impoliteness. Some of them may be tricky and the impoliteness work may not be recognised easily. Therefore, some further elaboration on the examples above is needed to illustrate more clearly the issue of impoliteness in indirect reports. In (1), using the term ‘bastard’ clearly and unambiguously destroys the hearer’s positive face. This is bald-on-record since the use of ‘bastard’ in the reported speech is too strong and definitely threatens the hearer’s face. In the second example, the implied meaning behind the that-clause threatens the hearer’s positive face. In other words, Mary has neglected to include the hearer in her party. This exclusion is regarded as a threat to the positive face. In (3), the reporter has frightened the hearer by reporting bad news. More than this, the hearer’s negative face is threatened because (3) shows that the reporter knows something belonging to the hearer’s personal sphere (the hearer may be annoyed to hear some personal news from the mouth of his/her friend and not directly from the boss or an official agent). In (4), the reporter is talking to her friend who is a risky investor. Therefore, by using the term ‘gambler’, the reporter tries to show that the hearer is not a trustworthy person since the hearer is considered a gambler by the original speaker. Sometimes the original speaker tries to be economical with politeness and maintains silence. In (5), ‘Mary said nothing’ is an indirect report that ostensively directs 7  Thanks to Jonathan Culpeper for making this clear for me. In this case, there is no reciprocal politeness, and this is a case of withholding politeness. However, this kind of indirect reporting (said nothing) is rare but not impossible. In (5), ‘said nothing’ is an ostensive sign that helps the hearer find out the impoliteness.

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the hearer towards figuring out the impoliteness at work. The hearer expects acknowledgements of his/her benevolent act (giving a gift). Thus, ‘reticence’ on the part of the original speaker (Mary) is a case of withholding politeness. In some instances, such as (6), the reporter uses an insincere compliment (perfect fit for the army), which could imply mocking if the complimentee is a lazy and weak person. In this context, ‘a perfect fit for the army’ is a sarcastic comment, for the original speaker means quite the opposite. Jonathan Culpeper’s impoliteness strategies are the building blocks of how impoliteness works during the interaction. As discussed above, the impoliteness strategies proposed by Culpeper are flexible enough to fit different contexts such as indirect reporting. Nonetheless, by regarding Goffman’s (1967, p. 5) definition of ‘face’ as “the positive social value a person effectively claims for himself by the line others assume he has taken during a particular contact … [and] an image of self delineated in terms of approved social attributes”, we can define a new impoliteness strategy based on the dynamics of positive/negative face wants: Strategic (im)politeness: The FTA is performed as a result of situational necessity, in an attempt to convey a particular impression or achieve the desired result, blurring the boundaries so that the hearer would not be clear which FTA is being used.

Strategic (im)politeness is not dissimilar to the ‘photosynthesis process’ presented in Chap. 2, which suggests that the end product is a mixture of different sociocognitive factors interacting with each other in a meaningful way. Moreover, strategic impoliteness is germane to ‘strategic rudeness’ (Beebe, 1995; Lakoff, 1989) and ‘politic’ behaviour (Kasper, 1990). Robin Lakoff argues that rudeness is warranted when something valuable (based on the individual’s criteria) is going to be achieved. Therefore, strategic rudeness has manipulative power, enabling the speaker to bring about some intended changes to the environment. Beebe also advocates that rudeness is instrumental, enabling the speaker to take control of the situation. Likewise, Kasper defines ‘politic behaviour’ as a concept that is “constituted by deviation from whatever counts as politic in a given social context, is inherently confrontational and disruptive to social equilibrium” (1990, p. 208). Strategic impoliteness is by scope a rather inclusive and logical conceptualisation of the dyadic nature of interaction. Based on strategic (im)politeness, the reporter decides to withhold (im)politenes deliberately in order to convey a particular impression on the hearer or provide a particular illocutionary force. By strategic (im)politeness, I do not mean ‘reverse (im)politeness’, which is a deliberate attempt by the speakers to act against an expected (im)politeness strategy. Simply, I mean that (im)politeness is at the service of sociocognitive factors (Bousfield, 2007; Culpeper, 1996; Locher & Watts, 2005). In some situations, even seemingly impolite utterances turn out to be polite and vice versa. For example, as discussed before, among Persian speakers, members of the younger generation may address each other through an offensive word ‘kesɒːfæt’ (‘the dirt’), but it is not regarded as a bald-on-record impoliteness; rather, it is considered a sign of solidarity and friendship. The meaning here contrasts with the ordinary usage of the word ‘kesɒːfæt’. Among teenagers, and in informal contexts

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among close friends, ‘kesɒːfæt’ shows friendliness. This example helps us to conceptualise the view that “evaluations of politeness do not reside only in what people say. They are more often than not embodied in prosody, facial expressions, gestures and the like” (Kádár & Haugh, 2013, pp. 59–60). Moreover, as argued by Kádár and Haugh, “we need to appreciate there are inevitably multiple ways of understanding politeness” (2013, p. 60). Sometimes, strategic (im)politeness refers to ‘reverse (im) politeness’. In this case, the reporter does the FTA that is contrary to the expected (im)politeness strategy. The purpose of the report can be manifold, depending on the reporter’s benevolent or malicious intentions. For example, the reporter can use reverse (im)politeness to ruin the original speaker’s character in the eyes of the hearer. Generally speaking, doing an FTA to gain an advantage for oneself is referred to as backstabbing. Backstabbing is an unfaithful report of the original speaker’s utterances. This is the negative side of strategic impoliteness. On the other hand, however, the reporter may hide the original speaker’s impolite words and utterances as a strategic judgement of the situation. This is the positive side of strategic impoliteness.

7.6  Reporting Derogatory Words (Slurring) Reporting slurring and derogatory words is a very challenging issue in the literature of indirect reporting (refer to Sect. 5.7 for further information). The main ‘bone of contention’ is the issue of responsibility in slurring. There are controversial issues with regard to reporting offensive words in indirect reporting. Is it polite to report others’ offensive words and utterances to someone else? This is a question that can be answered by the ‘strategic (im)politeness’ discussed in the previous section. Politeness is not an absolute concept, for it gains its meaning during the interaction. The literature on reporting slurring shows conflicting results. Drawing on Searle’s (1979) Principle of Expressibility and the Paraphrasis/Form Principle, Capone (2016) states that the responsibility of reporting slurring weighs more on the original speaker than on the reporting speaker, although there are some objections (see Davis, 2005). I believe that, based on the issue of strategic (im)politeness, the responsibility of reporting slurring is not a straightforward case. Reporting offensive words threatens the original speaker’s positive face, but at the same time, may save someone else’s positive face. Therefore, in this case, there is a problem of ‘trade-off’ in reporting slurring. In this situation, there is one (rather reasonable) rule of the thumb. In the cases of ‘trade-off’ politeness, the reporter can evaluate the situation and decide whether to refuse reporting slurs or reveal them. ‘Criticality’ has an important role in the picture. The FTA should be done in cases where the criticality of the situation is greater than threatening others’ face wants. Let me explain. Imagine a courtroom. Someone is going to be wrongly issued a sentence of life imprisonment, and there is an eyewitness who was present at the crime scene. The eyewitness may report someone’s bad language as evidence to rescue the wrongly-accused person. In this case, politeness means the revelation of someone’s

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impolite utterances to rescue an innocent person. If there is no criticality, it is much better not to report someone’s offensive words. Therefore, reporting derogatory words is highly contextualised. Based on Jay and Janschewitz (2008, p. 267), the “appropriateness of swearing is highly contextually variable, dependent on speaker-listener relationship, social-physical context, and particular word used.” On this account, not every offensive word is considered impolite. Impoliteness varies depending on contextual factors. Thus, “[a]ssessing whether swearing in discourse is rude involves the difficult task of determining participants’ identity, relationship, social norms, intentions and motivations” (Jay & Janschewitz, 2008, p. 269). Impoliteness in indirect reporting is closely related to the concept of ‘sense’. In this regard, once again the sociocognitive alignment of impoliteness is emphasised. The notion of ‘sense’ refers to the ‘feelings’ generated by the offensive words. Based on the concept of ‘sense’, not every individual reacts to offensiveness in the same way. People will approach offensiveness differently and based on their sense of the context. For example, the use of offensive language is less threatening (and more tolerable) in informal than in formal contexts.

7.7  Disagreement in Indirect Reporting Disagreement is considered a face-threatening act by Brown and Levinson (1987), but others have argued that disagreement can improve solidarity among interlocutors (Kakavá, 1993; Schiffrin, 1984; Tannen, 1990). Research on disagreement in indirect reporting is scarce, yet the issue of ‘disagreement’ is a crucially important topic in indirect reporting, for it shows whether the practice of samesaying has been done properly or whether the report is fair based on the hearer’s judgement. Disagreement is defined as “if you think belief B is true and I don’t – I either think B is false or I have withheld judgement on B – then we disagree” (Frances, 2014, p. 18). The hearer is not a neutral bystander in the process of indirect reporting. The hearer can reject the report or question its sincerity. I propose several kinds of disagreement in indirect reporting, namely sincerity disagreement, logic disagreement, source disagreement, reporter disagreement, didactic disagreement, and withhold disagreement. Let me deal with each of them in turn. Sometimes, the practice of samesaying is not in line with the perspective of the original speaker and the hearer/original speaker clearly disagrees with the interpreted information. In this case, the hearer/original speaker rejects the report as being insincere: (7)

Reporter: She said that the morning star is the evening star. Hearer: She didn’t say such a thing.

In ‘logic disagreement’, the hearer is sure that (or does not consider whether) the report is sincere (the original speaker has really said such an utterance), yet s/he

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does not agree with the logic of the reported information. In this kind of disagreement, the report acts as a piece of evidence. (8)

Reporter: She said that politeness is not an oblique construct. Hearer: I think she is wrong.

In other cases, the hearer has no problem with the logic but expresses doubt about the source speaker’s ability to fulfil what is reported (source disagreement). This kind of disagreement originates from familiarity between the hearer and the original speaker: (9)

Reporter: She said that she has been to Antarctica once. Hearer: Really? She is not strong enough to do that.

More often than not, the hearer doubts the reporter’s faithfulness to the original speaker (reporter disagreement). In this case, the hearer knows the reporter very well, and this knowledge helps him/her to assess what is said by the mediator (reporter) based on what s/he knows about the original speaker: (10)

Reporter: She said that John is a lazy student. Hearer: I don’t think so. You may have misunderstood her.

‘Didactic disagreement’ refers to cases where the hearer deliberately disagrees with the reporter in a strategic way, so as to be ostensive. The aim here is to convey an impression, provide a moral lesson, or give insight to the reporter. Didactic disagreement is not dissimilar to the concept of ‘deliberative democracy’. According to Wertheimer (1999, p. 172): Both deliberation and accommodation have their rightful place in a fully developed deliberative democracy. The parties should deliberate about moral issues insofar as deliberation is likely to lead them to agree on what they think is a better or more correct answer, although they may reasonably want to circumscribe that process, since deliberation has its own costs (in time, energy, divisiveness).

Based on the didactic view of disagreement, deliberation is a risky process that does not always lead to positive results. However, this deliberation is warranted since it has been the most relevant choice accessible to the hearer at that time (based on the Relevance Theory). The last type of disagreement in my list is ‘withheld disagreement’. This happens when the hearer knows that the report is wrong or unfaithful, but decides not to disagree immediately or decides to postpone it to a better time. Withholding means not to provide any disagreement since doing so might not provide any positive results in a given context (as appraised by the hearer). Another scenario is that the reporter may not have enough evidence to reject the report; therefore, s/he waits to receive more information during the interaction so as to be able to provide reasonable disagreement. In addition, power relations and social distance may not allow

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the hearer to disagree with the reporter. Sometimes, the hearer does not provide disagreement as a matter of politeness. Direct rejecting may be considered an impolite and embarrassing act (Izadi & Zilaie, 2015). Disagreement carries possible threats to individuals positive face wants (Kong, 2014; Myers, 1991).

7.8  Decision-Making Disagreement and decision-making are closely interconnected8 (Scheerhorn, 1991[1992]). A big part of indirect reporting concerns decision-making. This rather non-automated process delineates the way in which the indirect report is shaped and grasped by the hearer. Almost all reports require decision-making on the part of the reporter and the hearer. The reporter should decide which parts of the original speaker’s utterance to report, which parts to delete or amend, and to whom, when, and how the report should be projected. In consonance with Scheerhorn (1991[1992], p. 253), “[t]he assumption that goals drive messages is the foundation of all rational/ strategic approaches to language production and comprehension.” As a rule of thumb, Scheerhorn conceptualises the relationship between disagreement and decision-­making as follows: [T]he prediction is that decisions perceived to be important by the decision-makers will prompt clearer (and less polite) cases of disagreement than decisions deemed unimportant or less important. Conversely, decisions which are unimportant will prompt less clear (and more polite) cases of disagreement than decisions perceived as important or more important to the decision-makers. (Scheerhorn, 1991[1992], p. 257)

The above-mentioned relationship is a very important part of my argument about decision-making in indirect reporting. Although Scheerhorn’s study shows that the importance of decisions shared with a decisional partner does not direct us towards a specific politeness stance, the author seems to advocate the existence of a relationship between the importance of decisions and variation in politeness. According to Holmes and Stubbe (2015), in situations where there is a remarkable degree of power distance between interlocutors, there is less emphasis on (im)politeness. The key passage is that the “[p]articipants in a workplace where authority relationships and relative statuses are emphasised and regarded as paramount will more readily accept a unilateral decision on a contentious issue” (my emphasis) (Holmes & Stubbe, 2015, p.  77). They also mention that in more egalitarian workplaces the emphasis in on negotiation and equal participation. Based on Holmes and Stubbe, in contentious or high-stakes contexts, and where power relations are not equally distributed, it is more likely that politeness would be compromised. This is a much better realisation of the politeness/decision-making dichotomy since the inclusion of a modifier (power relations) would make it much 8  Some authors believe that disagreement is negatively correlated with decision-making (Schacter, 1951), while others opt for the essentiality of disagreement in the improvement of individuals’ decision-making (Maier, 1967).

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easier to deal with politeness and decision-making. In Scheerhorn’s study, on the other hand, the politeness/decision-making dichotomy is conceptualised based on decisional importance and politeness, without including any other variables. Contrary to what is advocated by Scheerhorn, I believe that in high-stake contexts (which may lead to a high degree of disagreement), the reporter and the hearer do not necessarily use less polite sentences since contextual factors vary based on individuals’ own evaluations of the context. Indirect reporting is a sociocognitive practice that is highly dependent on (im)politeness. My view is that, in indirect reporting, decisional importance can alter (im)politeness. In situations where decisional importance is high, (im)politeness is defined based on the most relevant appraised reaction. There is a possibility of observing either a polite or an impolite reaction. However, there is no one-to-one relationship between decisional importance and (im)politeness as endorsed by Scheerhorn. It is quite possible to observe a polite reaction on a contentious issue (such as reporting offensive words). Reporting someone else’s offensive words, as an example of a critical situation, would endanger the credit of the original speaker and threaten his/her positive face. This is a very controversial situation that requires a proper decision on the part of the reporter, namely whether to report the derogatory word(s) or omit them from the report. This is indeed a very important decision. However, it is not clear whether the reporter would choose to be polite and omit the original speaker’s derogatory word(s), or rather, choose to be impolite, judging that impoliteness is worthy given the contextual factors and situational necessity. The answer to this dilemma is not an easy one. There is a myriad of sociocognitive features that may interact with each other in addressing the criticality of the situation. Among them, I can name appraisals, impression management, sociocultural norms and convention, power relations, and distance among individuals. In conclusion, it is easy to recognise that the relationship between decisional importance and (im)politeness is both dynamic and sociocognitively oriented. However, whatever decision is made, it is warranted based on the assumption that it was the most relevant and accessible choice for the interlocutors (at a particular time). Speakers may blame themselves later if they realise that they could have made a better decision, but at a particular point in time and place, their choices are warranted.

7.9  Conclusion In this chapter, an underdeveloped issue of politeness in indirect reporting was discussed. The discussion is neither complete nor final (but inspiring). We should expect counter-arguments and further clarifications in the near future. In this chapter, the concept of ethics was elaborated on and its relationship with indirect reporting addressed. I proposed the DDE to refer to the constructive nature of ethics during the interaction. I discussed different viewpoints with regard to politeness and showed that a cognitive element should be added to its scope to make it more

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inclusive. In this regard, Penelope Brown refers to the consideration of ‘feelings’ in the conceptualisation of face. I referred to the ‘tell-tale report’, whereby there is a concatenation of unfaithful reports that originates from blindly re-reporting the first reporter, who has had direct access to the original speaker. Culpeper’s impoliteness strategies were discussed and applied to the practice of indirect reporting. I proposed ‘strategic impoliteness’ as an extension of Culpeper’s impoliteness strategies. The idea closely approximates Lakoff’s and Beebe’s strategic rudeness and Kasper’s politic behaviour. The challenging issue of reporting derogatory words was dealt with, and it was argued that impoliteness in reporting derogatory words should be defined based on the ‘sense’ speakers receive from the offensive words. Moreover, disagreement and decision-making are two inevitable parts of indirect reporting. I referred to different versions of disagreement (i.e., ‘sincerity’, ‘logical’, ‘source’, ‘reporter’, ‘didactic’, and ‘withhold’ disagreement), and applied each one to the case of indirect reports. Lastly, the relationship between decisional importance and (im)politeness was discussed, and I commented that there is no one-to-one correspondence between impoliteness and decisional importance. This is why it is so hard for the hearer to trust the reporter, and for the reporter to trust the hearer (as a potential re-reporter). Perhaps we will find the answer in the realm of trust and how it is shaped among interlocutors.

References Arundale, R.  B. (2006). Face as relational and interactional: A communication framework for research on face, facework, and politeness. Journal of Politeness Research, 2(2), 193–217. Attardo, S. (1997). Locutionary and perlocutionary cooperation: The perlocutionary cooperative principle. Journal of Pragmatics, 27, 753–779. Beebe, L.  M. (1995). Polite fictions: Instrumental rudeness as pragmatic competence. In J.  E. Alatis, C.  A. Straehle, B.  Gallenberger, & M.  Ronkin (Eds.), Georgetown University round table on language teachers: Ethnolinguistic, psycholinguistic, and sociolinguistic aspects (pp. 154–168). Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. Bousfield, D. (2007). Beginnings, middles, and ends: A biopsy of the dynamics of impolite exchanges. Journal of Pragmatics, 39(12), 2185–2216. Bousfield, D. (2008). Impoliteness in interaction. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Brown, P. (2001). Politeness and language. In N. J. Smelser & P. B. Baltes (Eds.), International encyclopedia of the social and behavioral sciences (pp. 11620–11624). Oxford, UK: Elsevier. Brown, P., & Levinson, S.  C. (1978). Universals in language usage: Politeness phenomena. In E.  Goody (Ed.), Questions and politeness: Strategies in social interaction (pp.  56–311). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Brown, P., & Levinson, S. C. (1987). Politeness: Some universals in language usage. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Capone, A. (2012). Indirect reports as language games. Pragmatics & Cognition, 20(3), 593–613. Capone, A. (2016). The pragmatics of indirect reports: Socio-philosophical considerations. Cham, Switzerland: Springer. Culpeper, J. (1996). Towards an anatomy of impoliteness. Journal of Pragmatics, 23(3), 349–367. Culpeper, J. (2016). Impoliteness strategies. In A. Capone & J. L. Mey (Eds.), Interdisciplinary studies in pragmatics, culture and society (Perspectives in Pragmatics, Philosophy & Psychology) (Vol. 4, pp. 421–445). Cham, Switzerland: Springer.

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Chapter 8

Trust and Indirect Reports

The importance of the ability to trust, and the act of trusting, is that it enables an energetic rest; a rest from thinking and being aware that when an individual recognizes another as a party for a collaborative exchange, the other is doing precisely the same. Trust is necessary for reciprocal altruism, an important source of our sociability. (Santibáñez, 2012, p. 490)

8.1  Introduction Everyday interaction is replete with situations where individuals must decide whether they should trust their conversation partner. Interaction is a kind of gamble, in which individuals cannot accurately predict the consequences of their action and must take risks. Risk-taking closely embraces the concept of ‘trust’ as its bedrock. According to Weber and Carter (2003, p. 3), “[t]rust’s premise is the belief that the other will take one’s perspective into account when making a decision and will not act in ways to violate the moral standards of the relationship.” Yamagishi (1998, p. 17) argues that “trust is a social lubricant promoting interpersonal and social relations.” Trust is important in the formation of interaction. One interlocutor must trust another, as personal information is shared, which inevitably could be used against his/her public image in the future. Of course, one should not mix “reciprocal true altruism” with a mentally expected advantage or reciprocation: the latter is necessary for “exchange” and for aware/intentional “cooperation”. Vice versa, trust is and is expected to be reciprocated, and it elicits reciprocity. Indirect reporting is a social phenomenon that is fundamentally a risk-taking process. The original speaker must take risks and trust the reporter as a faithful transformer of the source information. On the other hand, the reporter must trust the original speaker as a trustworthy source of information. In other words, when the reporter bases his/her report on the information emitted by the original speaker, it © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019 M. Morady Moghaddam, The Praxis of Indirect Reports, Perspectives in Pragmatics, Philosophy & Psychology 21, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-14269-8_8

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shows that the reporter trusts the original speaker as an authority (or at least decides that trusting is the best alternative at the time). In addition, the reporter must also trust the hearer as a trustworthy person with whom to share information, that is, as a faithful analyser and transformer of the reporter’s utterances. The hearer must also trust the reporter as a genuine agent who is reliable enough to be taken seriously. The perlocutionary effect of the reporter’s utterance depends on the degree of trustworthiness shared between the hearer and the reporter. Therefore, trust is an indispensable part of indirect reporting. However, to show what trust is and how it is shaped among individuals is a complex issue that needs a careful analysis of the different aspects of trust and trustworthiness.

8.2  Sensitivity to (Mis)Information Trust and sensitivity to (mis)information are closely connected. A conflict may arise when individuals are sensitive to the soundness of the information they receive from their conversational partner. The conflict lies between being optimistic and hence trusting others, or being pessimistic, that is to cast doubt on the input and the speaker as being trustworthy. Individuals have different opinions and viewpoints when interacting with each other, “and from the point of view of those who hold a particular perspective, the others may be distortions” (Edelman, 2001, p.  56). Human beings are generally curious about the stability of the information they receive (Lorini & Demolombe, 2009), and there is a myriad of strategies accessible to speakers for analysing the genuineness of the information they receive from the environment (Takash, 2008). Therefore, the uncertainty of the information emitted through individuals’ sensitivity to misinformation is a precondition for trust (Yamagishi, 1998). Trusting someone can mean to decrease sensitivity to misinformation and uncertainty, by giving the trustee1 a fiduciary duty to act in the best interest of the beneficiary. However, this view of trust can be seen as malicious for several good reasons. Even if one trusts the information source as revealing the truth and respecting social norms, this does not necessarily mean that the information will be in ‘one’s best interest’, or that one should expect that. For example, is it always in one’s best interest to be exposed to (all) the truth? A large part of social ‘fiction’ and theater is based on useful misinformation or lies. This serves institutional (acting ‘as if’) or cooperative needs, or courtesy, politeness, affect, etc. Besides this, there are social norms regulating the right deceptions. The truth can even be the cause of ‘insulting’. One expects that real friends would protect one another from bad news, stressing information, suffering, and so forth in certain situations. Therefore, ‘to act in the best interest of the beneficiary’ is an ideal situation, and is what is generally expected by the truster (a person who trusts). But there is a trade-off in this case: one should trust so as to be able to participate in social 1  A person to whom property is legally committed to be administered for the benefit of a beneficiary.

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activities, but trusting may be risky, like a gamble, because there is a possibility of misinformation on the part of the trustee. In this regard, in line with Castelfranchi and Falcone (2010, p. 11), “to trust Y (according to trust as decision), X is necessarily accepting the risk of becoming vulnerable by Y, since there is uncertainty both in X’s knowledge (incomplete, wrong, static) and in the (unpredictable, unknown) dynamics of the world.” In indirect reporting, uncertainty and sensitiveness to wrong information become apparent in different ways. One scenario is that the hearer of the report takes the report for granted and acts based on the information s/he receives from the reporter (the hearer may ignorantly re-report what s/he has heard based on the information received from the trustee). This is what I call a ‘naive view’ of trust towards the report. In consonance with Gargiulo and Ertug, “trust diminishes information gathering and processing costs…, but it can lead also to blind faith, which substantially increases the risk of malfeasance” (2006, p.  165). There is still another scenario whereby the hearer trusts the reporter as reporting genuine information but does not act based on the illocutionary force of the report. This is the ‘conservative view’ of dealing with trust in indirect report. The hearer may first search for other extra information, such as appealing to an authority, in order to ensure that the information is sound enough, and may then react based on the report. The third scenario is that the hearer does not trust the reporter’s sincerity and casts doubt on the information transmitted as being less-than-informative or even misleading. This is the ‘tough view’ towards trust in indirect reporting. Mistrust may occur for three main reasons. Firstly, the hearer may know the original speaker very well, and this knowledge may help him/her to judge whether the reporter can be trusted as a beneficiary. Therefore, familiarity with the original speaker is something that may create sensitivity to misinformation. Secondly, the hearer may not give credit to the reporter as being a trustee; therefore, the hearer disregards the report as misinformation. Lastly, the hearer trusts both the reporter and the original speaker, but cannot deal properly with the information presented in the report. This last case relies heavily on the hearer’s common sense about what is right and wrong, and on his/her expectations and world knowledge (among other things). Therefore, trust is a sociocognitive phenomenon.

8.3  Trust as a Sociocognitive Phenomenon Trust and sensitivity to misinformation can be regulated on the basis of both social and cognitive characteristics. As related to the social aspect, two perspectives can be effective in the formation of trust: social stratification (macro features) and social relations (micro features). It is self-evident that “all human behavior is cultural to some extent” (Berry, Poortinga, Segall, & Dasen, 2002, p.  53), and since human beings are fundamentally social beings (Hoorens & Poortinga, 2000), it is of paramount importance to take into consideration social stratifications and their effect on

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trust. Hofstede (1980) argues that most Third World countries are located in the large power distance/low individualism cluster (‘dependent collectivism’), and most Western industrialised nations are in the small power distance/high individualism cluster (‘independent individualism’). On the other hand, Bond and Smith (1996) argue that “conformity was higher in societies that held values of conservatism, collectivism, and a preference for status ascription, while it was lower in societies valuing autonomy, individualism, and status achievement” (cited in Berry et al., 2002, p. 59). Putting all together, it can be formulated that in societies with a higher degree of conservatism (e.g., in some Eastern societies), there is more sensitivity to (mis) information and people are less inclined to take risks. On the other hand, in societies with a higher degree of individualism, trust is more easily dealt with. Another social category that is important in my discussion of trust is the distinction between low- and high-context societies proposed by Edward Hall. By outlining specific characteristics of each value system, Hall (1976) defines high- and low-context societies based on a myriad of characteristics. According to Hall, high-­ context societies are less verbal and rely more on imaginary (in such societies, individuals try to use language metaphorically to please others and to improve social bonds and relationships). In high-context societies, “people believe few things have to be spelled out, and so few things are in fact spelled out” (Malina, 2009, p. 168). This ‘art-form’ communication is more common in Eastern societies that represent a high-context community (Hall, 1976). However, in low-context societies, as is the case in the Western societies, communication is more direct and language is used to exchange information, ideas, and opinions. McMahon (2004) illustrates a situation whereby trust is dealt with in high- and low-context societies. McMahon states that “low context business persons may lose patience during the long process of socialization and trust-building before a contractual agreement is reached in a high context society” (2004, p. 121). It is clear that in high-context societies it takes a longer time for the interlocutors to build trust. Another model of social stratification was proposed by Pelto (1968). He defines societies based on a dimension called tight-loose, suggesting that: “[i]n the stratified and tight societies the pressure to carry out one’s roles leads to a high level of role obligation, while in less tight societies, there is much less pressure to oblige” (cited in Berry et al., 2002, pp. 56–57). The dimension has been utilised by Lomax and Berkowitz (1972) to analyse numerous cultural variables. Jackson (1997, p.  68) argues that in tight groups, individuals stick to “clear and definite systems and procedures” while in loose groups people “work flexibly and adaptively according to the needs of the situation.” Therefore, in tight societies, establishing trust is likely to be more excruciating, given the close system underlying the formation of society. Three more bipolar dimensions are proposed by Schwartz (1994) for cross-­ cultural investigations: conservatism versus autonomy, hierarchy versus egalitarianism, and mastery versus harmony. To clarify what these three dimensions concern, Berry et al. (2002, p. 62) provide the following description of basic elements of each category:

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These three dimensions deals with three basic concerns of all societies: the first is how individuals relate to their group (whether they are embedded or independent); the second is how people consider the welfare of others (whether relationships are vertically or horizontally structured); and the third is the relationship of people to their natural and social world (whether they dominate and exploit it, or live with it).

Based on the definition above, forming trust takes longer among individuals who are categorised to represent a culture with an air of conservatism, hierarchy, and mastery. The other three features (autonomy, egalitarianism, and harmony) represent those people who can more easily deal with trust in interaction. Armed with the discussion on macro-social features, variation in trust can be traceable to micro-social relations within each of the social categories presented above. Power relations, distance, and situational necessity are among the factors that can influence the formation of trust among interlocutors. Some researchers have proposed variables that may affect trust-building. For instance, Herreros (2004) suggests that educational level and income are two important variables in shaping trust. According to Herreros, the greater the level of income and education, the greater the likelihood of trusting unknown people. Gambetta and Hamill (2005) conducted an interesting study on how drivers trust passengers in a racially varied context such as New York. They argue that age, body decorations such as tattoos, clothing, and the way passengers speak are among the main social reasons taxi drivers choose to pick up or to ignore a passenger. Luhmann (1979) argues that trust is closely related to power and familiarity. Based on Luhmann, there is an unimaginable superabundance of realities and possibilities in the world we live in. Therefore, ‘unmanageable complexity’ would make difficult the smooth assimilation with the environment. Luhmann sees trust and power as a means to reduce the complexity of the environment. The social variables that are likely to influence trust are countless, considering the dynamics of interaction. There is no fixed set of variables that would sufficiently account for the degree of trust during interaction since trust is an ongoing process that emerges from ongoing interaction (Möllering, 2006). Regarding the cognitive features underlying trust, individuals must decide whether they should trust others and take risks, or rather, be more sensitive, searching for cues and clues to ensure that the conversation partner is trustworthy. This decision-making process underlying the formation of trust is at the heart of my discussion on the cognitive aspects of trust. Hill and O’Hara O’Connor (2006, p. 1735) show that “[t]rust reduces the assessor’s sensation of uncertainty and complexity by enabling her to believe that the possibility of harm is lower and the likelihood of beneficial conduct is high.” Individuals assess trust in different ways based on a battery of cognitive features such as emotional stance and expectation management. In this regard, there are two kinds of trust: specific and residual (Hill & O’Hara O’Connor, 2006). Specific trust embraces a situation-specific definition of trust, whereas residual trust deals with the general instantiation of trust when there is lack of situation-specific trust. In this case, trust is closely related to background knowledge and is formed through previous encounters that the truster has had with

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the trustee. Trust is not only a matter of previous encounters with someone, for there are instances where individuals have to trust others through an online (i.e., in real time) assessment of others’ behaviour. Hill and O’Hara O’Connor (2006, p. 1741) propose a rule of a thumb in this regard: Many, and perhaps most, people in their ordinary day-to-day interactions take the default position to act in a trusting fashion with others unless and until they receive cues that distrust might instead be appropriate. Only when there are sufficiently large clues that distrust may be appropriate (or when the stakes are sufficiently high) does a conscious decision about trust come into play.

Sometimes online assessment during interaction is necessary to ascertain whether the conversational partner is trustworthy. Individuals may make online assessments based on different sociocognitive elements, such as considering social class, social distance, power relations, emotion, expectations, and so forth during an ongoing process. In agreement with Castelfranchi and Falcone (2010, p.  139), “[i]n fact, evaluations allow one to make subtle distinctions between similar (but not identical) goals and means, and to find out the right means for some new goal, never pursued in the past.” Therefore, emotion, evaluation, and expectation are among cognitive factors that influence how individuals build trust.

8.4  First- and Second-Order Trust Trust can be interpreted based on discursive as well as conventional rules. With regard to first-order trust (T1), the discursive features of dialogue determine how trust is created or degraded during the interaction. This kind of trust is anchored in the lay interpretation of trust. Individuals can build their own definition of trust based on interpersonal relationships and their background knowledge. On this account, trust can mean dependence for an employee when talking to his/her boss, yet it can also mean courage when considering a player talking to his/her coach about how to aim for a goal. However, besides these situation-specific realisations of trust and trustworthiness, there is a second-order conceptualisation of trust (T2) that deals with the analysts’ interpretation of trust. This kind of trust is delineated from the elites and analysts in society. That said, for societies that encourage conservatism, trust and trustworthiness mean respecting social distance, power relations, and established rules, whereas for more democratic societies trust is conceptualised as transparency and bluntness. Social stratifications and conventions provide stereotypes for individuals on how to approach their conversational partner. That said, personal judgements and viewpoints play an important role in how individuals form trust. In this regard, T2 creates a kind of filter for T1. To reduce the cognitive load, individuals first evaluate the state of affairs based on the general picture, for in the initial phases of interaction the degree of familiarity is not sufficient to resort to T1. If there is sufficient back-

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ground knowledge, individuals can deviate from T2 and build their own version of trust based on situational necessity. That said, T2 is a backup strategy when there is not enough familiarity between the interlocutors.

8.5  Initiation of Trust Through Indirect Reporting Establishing trust is important for those who do not have strong relationships with each other and whose interaction is, more often than not, formed because of necessity (such as doctor-patient and teacher-student interactions). Based on McKnight and Chervany (2006, p. 29) “[a]lmost every relationship begins with an initial phase. The initial phase can be characterised by uncertainty and doubt, in which parties feel around for the right level of trust to accord the other.” It is very important to establish trust since this early trust makes the process of interaction smooth and painless. It is argued that trustworthiness and suspicion “are derived from past history of relationships pervaded with trust or distrust, primarily in the family and later in other groups, associations, and organizations” (Sztompka, 2003, p. 70). Be that as it may, trust and mis/distrust2 are not always fixed concepts that are activated by past memories. Trust can be initiated and reshaped during the interaction. Trust can be negotiated as well. People may come to an agreement about how trust should be considered during the interaction. Weber and Carter (2003) refer to three factors of ‘social structure’, ‘power’, and ‘time’ as the important elements in the construction of trust among individuals. Social structure refers to status-role positions that are dictated by the cultural conventions in a society. Power relations can also affect the way people trust each other. In consonance with Weber and Carter (2003, p. 24), “those with less power in the relationship do not appear to trust the other or, if they do, it is a blind or naive trust.” Likewise, ‘time’ is important in trust-building. People need time to establish trust, as the passage of time provides opportunities for individuals to examine the degree of their conversational partner’s trustworthiness as well as proving their own trustworthiness for others participating in the interaction. Besides the foregoing factors, Weber and Carter (2003) argue that initial encounter and self-disclosure are influential in creating trust. Of course, researchers such as Buchan, Croson, and Solnick (2008, p.  466) comment that the impact of gender cannot be ignored in the formation of trust in that “[t]he relationship between expected return and trusting behavior is stronger among men than women, suggesting that men view the interaction more strategically than women.” They also stated that women felt more obligated both to trust and reciprocate. Appealing to someone else’s utterances is another strategy for trust-building. The indirect reporter’s revealing of someone else’s utterances indicates that s/he is 2  The difference between mistrust and distrust is based on epistemological features. Mistrust is something metaphysical, a general sense of unease towards something; by contrast, distrust is something experimental, which is formed based on solid evidence.

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trying to consider a third party as evidence for the reporter’s trustworthiness. Indirect reporting can be considered a type of self-disclosure, where the reporter shares some personal experiences with someone else (the hearer). It is important for the reporter to create trust before sharing others’ utterances through indirect reporting. If it is their first encounter, individuals can use ‘metalinguistic comments’ (linguistic devices that refer to individuals’ monitoring themselves during the interaction) to show that they are right. For example, to build trust in indirect report, reporters can use metalinguistic devices such as ‘taking an oath’ (‘I swear to God’), using emphatic words (‘Believe me!’), or else use direct reporting instead of indirect reporting to convey that they are serious.3 However, these are not the only factors that can manipulate trust. Trusting others can also be influenced by ‘institutional talk’. In some contexts, for example, real estate agency, trust takes more time to be built. Therefore, reporting a speaker who, for example, works as an estate agent is less likely to be considered trustworthy than reporting a university professor. Generally, we trust academicians more than businessmen (at least, the country I live in conveys such an interpretation). The reporter’s as well as the hearer’s profession can influence the way in which trust is built during the indirect report. Trust in indirect reporting can also be affected by the degree of familiarity with the topic. Some topics generate more suspicion and are considered less trustworthy because of the weight given to some topics in a particular community or society. For instance, as showed by LeBlanc (1999, p. 70) in a study of the Parent-Teacher Association (PTA) in Japan, discussing political interests could be disruptive and create unnecessary tension. A person who brings up this topic in this context would create a feeling of untrustworthiness among others and may even negatively influence his/her future relations with other members of PTA, for instance.

8.6  Indirect Reports and Taking Risks In the previous section, I argued that indirect reporting can create trust in the initial phases of interaction. However, as argued by Luhmann (1979, p. 33): The clues employed to form trust do not eliminate the risk, they simply make it less. They do not supply complete information about the likely behaviour of the person to be trusted. They simply serve as a springboard for the leap into uncertainty.

Indirect reporting is a social practice that is closely connected to the concept of trust. Indirect reporting embraces trust because the hearer must decide, based on social and cognitive factors, whether s/he should take a risk and act based on the report (which may be infelicitous). This is indeed a matter of trust since it is quite possible that the reporter may change the speakers’ sentences and exploit the source 3  Note that there is no reliable study reporting on this in detail, but a comprehensive analysis of Persian reported speech can be found in Chap. 9.

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information to take advantage of that fake report. There is always a question of trust in the mind of the hearer, which is ‘can I trust him/her? It may be hard for the hearer to trust the reporter as being a genuine transformer of the original speaker’s utterances. On the other hand, without trust, interaction is very difficult. Trust can be changed to mistrust or even suspicion when sociocognitive factors suggest the hearer that s/he should be more conservative. Trust is not an absolute entity, something that should be either completely present or completely absent (trust is relative). It is not clear whether the reporter or the hearer has trust in his/her interlocutor during the report. There is always a ‘degree of mistrust’ in the process of indirect reporting. Therefore, the reporter and the hearer act based on their appraised level of the interlocutor’s trustworthiness in the interaction. This formation of trust is pseudological. The reporter’s degree of self-disclosure is germane to the hearer’s level of trustworthiness. In this regard, Castelfranchi and Falcone (2010, p.  107) argue that “[t]rust is never certainty: always it retains some uncertainty (ignorance) and some probability of failure, and the agent must accept this and be willing to run such a risk.” Likewise, Luhmann (1979, p. 24) adds an element of risk to the definition of trust, for “[t]rust is a gamble, a risky investment.” Therefore, both reporting someone else’s utterances and acknowledging the report involve taking some risks. I believe that this risk is necessary, and I would call it ‘facilitative risk’, as opposed to ‘debilitative risk’. Facilitative risk includes ‘experiences’, and helps the hearer/reporter to forecast desired outcomes during the interaction. Facilitative risk allows the hearer/reporter to be continually alert during the interaction, and act based on the Principle of Prudence discussed in Chap. 6. On this account, this kind of beneficial risk-taking warns the hearer/reporter to consider more seriously the issue of trustworthiness and faithfulness. Beneficial risk also warns the hearer/reporter to consider possible distortions in reporting/re-reporting. Moreover, the original speaker should also be cautious not to divulge revealing information that would endanger some state of affairs or someone’s face wants. In other words, facilitative risk-taking means ‘facilitative doubt’: the original speaker and the reporter should consider the possibility of future mischievous behaviour. That said, risk-taking should be judicious, and based on factors such as social distance, power, and individuals judgements and evaluations of both the situation and the conversation partner. Debilitative risk-taking, on the other hand, means going to extremes, relying too much on previous contracts and background knowledge. This type of risk-taking is void of judicious conservativeness on the part of the original speaker or the reporter. In this case, the original speaker or the reporter do not consider possible unsatisfactory reportings/re-reportings and unfaithful behaviour, and thus presumes that the conversational partner is a reliable trustee who is faithful to the original utterances/ reported utterances. I have called this ‘debilitative’ because this kind of behaviour is not logical, and it exposes the original speaker or the reporter to possible unfaithfulness and misuse. Indulgence in taking risks during the interaction exposes the speaker to undue exploitations. Even long-standing friendships do not protect individuals from the dangers of debilitative risk-taking. Trust is different from debilitative risk-taking. One can trust others without compromising his/her public face or

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threatening someone else’s face wants. Debilitative risk-taking means ‘no’ or ‘a little’ doubt. I am content that the interlocutors may have known one another for quite a long time, and that there may be an unequivocal trust between them. Yet, it is quite possible that a naive trust may threaten the original speaker’s or the reporter’s public face. To understand the factors that inform us about when we should be debilitative or facilitate in risk-taking, and to understand how trust finds its way into indirect reporting, we must address the issue of ‘mutual trust’.

8.7  Mutual Trust in Indirect Reports Indirect reporting requires mutual trust. Trust is contagious; one must trust others in order to be considered a trustworthy person (Demolombe, 2001). However, background knowledge and experiences, as well as online assessment, helps individuals to manage the amount of trust that they place in somebody during the interaction. Therefore, “trust emerges out of the interactions between individuals and it serves to order these relationships by influencing interaction” (Weber & Carter, 2003, p. 5). Indirect reporting is a perfect regulator of trust among individuals, in that each participant in the practice of indirect reporting leaves a trace in the process of trust-­ making. The original speaker should consider his/her conversation partner as a trustworthy reporter, but should also act based on the Principle of Prudence and facilitative risk-taking. The reporter should acknowledge this trust properly and be faithful in reporting the original speaker’s utterances, keeping in mind that s/he himself/herself is exposed to potential re-reporting by his/her conversation partner. Therefore, if not genuine in reporting the original speaker, the reporter puts his/her own public face at danger because the reporter’s trace is also left in the reporting process (the reporter can be regarded as a complicit). The reporter should both be trustworthy and trust the hearer too. In this case, a sequence of ‘trust formation’ takes place, starting from the original speaker and extending to the reporter and possible re-reporters. However, in indirect reporting, the default version is that individuals trust others, and hope that the reporter/hearer will respect faithfulness in reporting/re-reporting. Castelfranchi and Falcone (2010, p. 124) propose the ‘by-­ default trust’ of the hearer and the speaker as follows: The speaker’s default rule: ‘except you have specific reasons for deceiving, say the useful truth’. The hearer’s default rule: ‘except you have specific reasons for being diffident, believe the speaker’.

I would agree with Castelfranchi and Falcone when they say that people must trust each other by default. However, trust should also be conceptualised based on cultural characteristics and politeness (a lay person’s interpretation). As I argued in Sect. 8.3, societies have different conceptualisations of trust that are based on various social structures. Sztompka (2003, p. 69) states that “[i]n some societies people are more ready to grant trust, in other societies they are suspicious and distrustful.” In Eastern countries, for example, the formation of trust is a rather slow process and

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people tend to be more conservative in their interaction. Therefore, mutual trust in Eastern countries is a more complicated process because misinformation and conservatism are more common issues. Where misinformation and conservatism dominate truthfulness, mutual trust is compromised. Therefore, based on cultural features and individuals’ positive and negative face, I would like to modify the hearer’s and the speaker’s ‘by-default trust’ as: The speaker’s default rule: either you have specific reasons for deceiving or you are not sure about it, say the useful truth as far as your public face or someone else’s face are not at stake. The hearer’s default rule: if there are no specific reasons for casting doubt on the sincerity of the speaker, believe the speaker but do not act based on the illocutionary force of the speaker’s utterance unless there is clear evidence to do so.

Mutual trust is not automatically created in the course of interaction. People may have different reasons for postponing the trust. That said, indirect reporting can help individuals build trust more easily. Reporting someone else’s utterances implies that the reporter has trusted the original speaker as an authoritative agent who can change some state of affairs in a way favoured by the reporter/hearer. The reporter also trusts the hearer to be a trustworthy person with whom information can be shared.

8.8  The Nature of Mistrust in Indirect Reporting In line with the Principle of Prudence, the reporter/hearer should approach one another with some doubt. This should help them to escape the trap of unfaithful report/re-reporting. According to Hardin (2006, p. 32): A commonplace argument in contemporary writing on trust is that we would all be better off if we were all more trusting, and therefore we should all trust more (Hollis, 1998; Uslaner, 2002). If we found a society in which distrust was endemic, we might readily conclude that its members would all or almost all be better off if we would somehow lead them to be more trusting by inducing them to be more trustworthy, perhaps by creating institutions that would substitute for trustworthiness while educating them to behave better. Yet we would plausibly recognize that it would not be in the interest of any individual in that society to simply start trusting (if that would even be possible conceptually), because unstrategically acting as though one trusts can open oneself to exploitation.

Mistrust is as common as trust during indirect reports. Put differently, indirect reporting is a compromise between trust and mistrust. On the one hand, the original speaker trusts the hearer as a faithful analyser of his/her utterances, but, on the other hand, the original speaker tries to respect the Principle of Prudence, taking into account possible distortions of his/her utterances by the reporter. Therefore, mistrust is justified. The reporter can consciously or unconsciously deviate from the original speaker’s utterances; and therefore, the original speaker has the right to mistrust the hearer’s faithfulness to original utterances. This kind of mistrust has preventive force, allowing the original speaker to guide the reporter away from issues that are critical. It is always possible that the reporter may distort the original

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speaker’s utterances to take some advantage. However, the original speaker’s mistrust would not allow him/her to share information that s/he thinks would provide the reporter with critical information to manoeuvre. ‘Preventive mistrust’ is a kind of relative trust: the original speaker trusts the reporter as far as non-critical issues are concerned. This is what Castelfranchi and Falcone (2010, p. 119) call Negative Trust-2 or Diffidence/Suspicion: Negative Trust-2 or Diffidence/Suspicion it is more than this. At the explicit level it is some sort of ‘paradoxical trust’: X believes that Y has powers and abilities, and also that he can intend and realize something; but something bad (for X)! X is not simply predicting a failure (X cannot rely on Y), but probable harms from Y, because of Y’s bad powers or dispositions.

In the Negative Trust 2, the original speaker would not divulge critical issues that would compromise others’ face-wants or his/her own public image. The original speaker may deliberately obfuscate the message so as to prevent the would-be reporter from clearly understanding the critical details since the reporter may have abilities and powers that would help him/her to misuse the original speaker’s information. It is also possible that the reporter may cast doubt on the faithfulness of the original speaker. In this case, which I call ‘author mistrust’, the reporter uses ‘hedges’ in his/her report to show that s/he cannot completely trust the original speaker’s utterances. In Chap. 4, I discussed that if the reporter is not sure whether the original speaker is genuine or whether the reporter is likely to be accused of complicity, the reporter should use direct instead of indirect reporting (if possible) in order to show that s/he is simply reporting someone else’s verbatim utterances without any manipulation. The use of hedges would make it even worse. One should not report something when one is not certain about its reliability (unless one thinks that the hearer has enough knowledge to help him/her obviate the ambiguity of the source information). In the case of uncertainty, the reporter should clearly convey that s/he is not sure about the reliability of what is being reported by using clear syntactic features. If not, the reporter would be held responsible for reporting non-certain information. Likewise, the original speaker may choose not to accept the sincerity of a report and may accuse the reporter of distorting the original message. In the case of author mistrust, it is better to use direct quotation if the exact words are retrievable. The reporter him/herself can also be a source of mistrust. ‘Reporter mistrust’ can originate from ‘author mistrust’ on one hand, and from the hearer’s mistrust in the report or the reporter on the other hand. If the reporter does not trust the original speaker, and shows this mistrust in his/her report, it is quite possible that the hearer would doubt the sincerity of the report. Therefore, not only is trust contagious, but mistrust is also easily transferred from one person to another. This kind of mistrust is called Negative Trust-1 or Mistrust by Castelfranchi and Falcone (2010, p. 119): Negative Trust-1 or Mistrust it is when X believes that Y is not competent or able, or that his behavior is not predictable and reliable. X isn’t afraid of Y being malevolent, indifferent, irresponsible, or with other defects; she is just convinced that Y cannot/will not realize her goal g effectively. He doesn’t have the needed qualities and virtues (powers of).

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Lack of confidence in the reporter or the reporter’s message may or may not originate from the hearer’s belief that the reporter is not competent or reliable. This kind of mistrust can also originate from the hearer’s knowledge about the original speaker or from the hearer’s world view. The reporter may be regarded as competent, but the bone of contention may be the message itself. When there is a conflict, lack of trust can show itself as a lack of confidence in the speakers. This ‘bottom-up’ mistrust is a judgemental kind of mistrust that is based on the accuracy/falsity of information the reporter provides during interaction. In another case, namely ‘top-down’ mistrust, the hearer’s lack of confidence originates not from a conflict in the topic, but rather, from the hearer’s negative background knowledge towards the reporter. Therefore, there is a pessimistic view towards the reporter, and whatever is mentioned by the reporter is judged based on the distorted image that has been shaped in the mind of the hearer. Unless strong evidence is provided that s/he is right, the reporter is likely to be ignored, being considered an insincere representative of the original speaker’s utterances.

8.9  Conclusion This chapter discussed that trust is an emergent, situational, and reflexive practice among the individuals who participate in indirect reporting. Although the formation of trust requires some degree of risk-taking, in order to form trust during the interaction, individuals rely on sociocognitive factors hinged on social stratification and situational necessity. Moreover, decision-making processes are important in the formation of trust. Decision-making during online cognitive processing is mediated by situational factors, and therefore, situation-specific trust is built by interlocutors. The practice of indirect reporting is a good initiator of trust among individuals since it requires some degree of self-disclosure and risk-taking. Trust and mistrust are essential parts of indirect reporting, and these two variables account for the degree of disclosure and transparency in indirect reports.

References Berry, J. W., Poortinga, Y. H., Segall, M. H., & Dasen, P. R. (2002). Cross-cultural psychology: Research and applications. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Bond, R., & Smith, P. B. (1996). Culture and conformity: A meta-analysis of studies using Asch’s line judgment task. Psychological Bulletin, 119, 111–137. Buchan, N.  R., Croson, R.  T. A., & Solnick, S. (2008). Trust and gender: An examination of behavior and beliefs in the investment game. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 68(3–4), 466–476. Castelfranchi, C., & Falcone, R. (2010). Trust theory: A socio-cognitive and computational model. Chichester, UK: Wiley.

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Demolombe, R. (2001). To trust information sources: A proposal for a modal logical framework. In C. Castelfranchi & Y. H. Tan (Eds.), Trust and deception in virtual societies (pp. 111–124). Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer. Edelman, M.  J. (2001). The politics of misinformation. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Gambetta, D., & Hamill, H. (2005). Streetwise: How taxi drivers establish their customers’ trustworthiness. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. Gargiulo, M., & Ertug, G. (2006). The dark side of trust. In R. Bachmann & A. Zaheer (Eds.), The handbook of trust research (pp. 165–186). Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar. Hall, E. T. (1976). Beyond cultures. Garden City, NY: Anchor Books/A Division of Random House. Hardin, R. (2006). Trust. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press. Herreros, F. (2004). The problem of forming social capital: Why trust? London/New York: Palgrave/Macmillan. Hill, C., & O’Hara O’Connor, E. (2006). A cognitive theory of trust. Washington University Law Review, 84, 1717. Available at https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/faculty_articles/180 Hofstede, G. (1980). Culture’s consequences: International differences in work related values. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. Hoorens, V., & Poortinga, Y. (2000). Behavior in social context. In K. Pawlik & M. Rosenzweig (Eds.), International handbook of psychology (pp. 40–63). London: Sage. Jackson, D. (1997). Dynamic organisations: The challenge of change. London: Macmillan. LeBlanc, R. M. (1999). Bicycle citizens: The political world of the Japanese housewife. Berkeley, CA/London: University of California Press. Lomax, A., & Berkowitz, N. (1972). The evolutionary taxonomy of culture. Science, 177, 228–239. Lorini, E., & Demolombe, R. (2009). From trust in information sources to trust in communication systems: An analysis in modal logic. In J. C. Meyer & J. Broersen (Eds.), Knowledge representation for agents and multi-agent systems (Lecture notes in Computer Science, vol. 5605). Cham, Switzerland: Springer. Luhmann, N. (1979). Trust and power. New York: Wiley. Malina, B.  J. (2009). Social-scientific approaches and the gospel of Matthew. In M.  A. Powell (Ed.), Methods for Matthew (pp. 154–193). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. McKnight, D.  H., & Chervany, N.  L. (2006). Reflections on an initial trust-building model. In R. Bachmann & A. Zaheer (Eds.), Handbook of trust research (pp. 29–51). Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar. McMahon, T. F. (2004). Ethical leadership through transforming justice. Lanham, MD: University Press of America. Möllering, G. (2006). Trust: Reason, routine, reflexivity. Oxford, UK: Elsevier. Pelto, P. J. (1968). The difference between “tight” and “loose” societies. Transactions, 5, 37–40. Santibáñez, C. (2012). The principle of relevance in the light of cooperation and trust: Discussing Sperber and Wilson’s theory. Pragmatics and Cognition, 20(3), 483–504. Schwartz, S. H. (1994). Are there universal aspects in the structure and contents of human values? Journal of Social Issues, 50, 19–45. Sztompka, P. (2003). Trust: A sociological study. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Takash, J. (2008). Results through relationships: Building trust, performance, and profit through people. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley. Weber, L. R., & Carter, A. I. (2003). The social construction of trust. New York: Springer. Yamagishi, T. (1998). The structure of trust: An evolutionary game of mind and society. Tokyo: Tokyo University Press.

Chapter 9

Reported Speech in Persian

9.1  Introduction Reported speech is a widespread phenomenon among languages, for the trace of others’ voices in interaction is frequent and inevitable (Bakhtin, 1984). Culture-­ specific issues have three main implications for a theory of reported speech. Two are implied by Istvan Kecskes (2014). The first relates to the importance of linguistic pragmatics for intercultural pragmatics. A theory of reported speech is closely connected with a theory of pragmatics. Conforming to Güldemann and von Roncador (2002, p. vii), “scholars have increasingly shifted their interest towards the question of how grammatical, semantic, and pragmatic problems associated with functional and formal properties of reported discourse have repercussions in other linguistic domains of language.” The second relates to the need to understand how production and comprehension are co-constructed in intercultural encounters. Finally, the third implication is the need to investigate the commonalities (if any) that exist among languages when the language system is put to use for constructing reported speech. The analysis of direct and indirect reports provides a rich source of information for the study of linguistic pragmatics within a particular language, and the results are useful in understanding how a language system is co-constructed in intercultural encounters. Moreover, the culture-specific realisation of reported speech can help researchers find out whether there is a common core related to reported speech that can be generalised across different cultures and languages. In this chapter, after reviewing some studies on reported speech in different languages, I present my own study on Persian reported speech (henceforth, PRS), which is an underdeveloped area in the literature of reported speech. The findings of my study are useful in understanding the nature of reported speech among Persian speakers in particular and for the formation of a theory of reported speech in general.

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019 M. Morady Moghaddam, The Praxis of Indirect Reports, Perspectives in Pragmatics, Philosophy & Psychology 21, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-14269-8_9

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9.2  Is There Any Common Core? A cursory glance into the vast research on reported speech across languages shows that there is hardly a set of common features applied to all languages of the world. However, as advocated by Kecskes (2014, p. 3), “[n]obody denies that human communication contains several universal features. However, a close look at bi- and multilingual language production and comprehension, as well as intercultural interaction, demonstrates that not all features are universal.” Therefore, although we can expect some universal elements, the existence of culture-specific features would require a thorough analysis of various languages to uncover the underlying features of reported speech. The vast literature on reported speech proves that there is no consistency in the structure of reported speech across cultures and languages. The four volumes titled Direct and Indirect Speech (edited by Florian Coulmas, 1986b), Reported Discourse (co-edited by Güldemann & von Roncador, 2002), Indirect Reports and Pragmatics (co-edited by Alessandro Capone, Ferenc Kiefer, and Franco Lo Piparo, 2016), and Indirect Reports and Pragmatics in the World Languages (co-edited by Alessandro Capone, Manuel García-Carpintero, and Alessandra Falzone, 2018) are among the most significant and voluminous studies conducted on cross-cultural issues of reported speech. With regard to structure, finding a common core among languages seems impossible since languages differ in the way reported speech is formed (verbal tense, time adverbials, and grammatical persons). However, studies conducted in different languages have discussed extensively four main aspects of cross-cultural variation: tense rules, mood, complementiser, and word order. Although a great bulk of research has advocated the culture-specific nature of reported speech, some studies (Ebert, 1986; Massamba, 1986) have shown that there may be some universal aspects. One of the key issues that has attracted the attention of researchers in analysing reported speech among different languages relates to the ‘verbal tense’ rules. The literature does not show a consistent paradigm with regard to the tense formation in reported speech. In English, for example, back-shifting of tenses is respected rigorously, and the change from direct to indirect report involves some changes in the form of the verb. However, Sakita modifies the idea of firm tense-shifting and suggests that “in spoken English, tenses of reported verbs are naturally determined by the reporter’s perspective” (Sakita, 2002, p. 173). In some languages such as Russian (Coulmas, 1986a) and Japanese (Suzuki, 2002), back-shifting in tenses does not occur and the verb in the indirect report remains the same as in original. Van der Wurff (2002, p. 128) also states that “Bengali is unlike English in not having tense-­ shift in indirect discourse embedded under a reporting verb in a past tense.” On this account, he argues that the verbs referring to speech activity are in the form of the present tense. Boeder (2002) also studied the Kartvelian languages and found that Georgian and Svan share some commonalities. Boeder generalised the trend to the languages of the Near East and of Europe, the main features of which are the existence of a conjunction before direct and indirect speech, the preservation of local and temporal indexicals, and the avoidance of the tense-shift (among other things).

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Kiefer (2016) likewise argues that tense-shifting is not applicable to Hungarian since this language has only one ‘past tense’ form. Among German speakers, Golato (2002) states that the German quotative is always given in the form of ‘present perfect’. Another issue that has been under investigation in cross-cultural studies is the distinction between the direct and indirect report. Haberland (1986) argues that in many languages, there is a clear line separating direct and indirect speech, yet the claim of universality is far-fetched. According to Massamba (1986, p. 118), “[w]e have seen that although in languages such as English sometimes it is impossible to tell, out of context, whether a piece of reported speech is direct or indirect, in Swahili we can always tell, on the basis of grammatical devices, whether a given piece of reported speech is direct or indirect.” Likewise, Sakita (2002) believes that the difference between the direct and indirect report is not structural. The key passage is: “[t]he main argument of this article will be that speakers often choose to maintain discourse coherence by reporting from their own perspective rather than to maintain syntactic integrity” (Sakita, 2002, p. 173). Sakita’s point is interesting because she puts emphasis on cognitive processes as a potential reason for the distinction between different kinds of reported speech. Moreover, she argues that “the formal tense rule has overlooked pragmatic information, which is important for successful communication” (Sakita, p.  174). Therefore, conforming to Declerck (1990), the pragmatic and semantic should be intermingled in tense theory. Put differently, instances of authentic communication will determine interlocutors’ perspectives, which may directly influence tense-shifting in indirect reports. Based on research on Romance languages, Haßler (2002, p. 145) puts emphasis on the speakers’ perspective on the distinction between direct and indirect reports and suggests that: The criterion for the bipartition of reported speech is the speaker’s perspective: in direct speech the perspective of the speaker is maintained, in indirect speech, perspective and deixis switch to the position of the reporter. That is why direct speech maintains the most important features of the original utterance, while indirect speech changes pronouns, tenses, deictic elements, intonation and even referential words.

In Bengali too, as shown by Van der Wurff (2002), there is no consistency with regard to the use of quotation marks. Cross-cultural studies show that the distinction between the direct and indirect reports is not only related to syntactic or phonological features. Moreover, some other researchers (Coulmas, 1986b; Haberland, 1986) argue that there is a blurred distinction between direct and indirect reported speech. The studies mentioned in this part show that different languages have both direct and indirect reporting, yet there might be some ambiguities with regard to how speakers distinguish between them (if such distinction is important at all). As argued by Coulmas (1986a), forms of speech reporting may be culturally loaded. The distinction between the direct and indirect report is a promising area of reported speech that can be claimed to be universal. However, one important issue should be taken into consideration, and that is the nature of the distinction between the two. The distinction should not be only regarded as related to syntax, for there are numerous studies that categorise direct and indirect speech as tendencies (for example,

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Haberland, 1986). The emphasis on tendencies directs us towards a more important issue in the distinction between the direct and indirect report. More often than not, the reported speech is conceptualised based on syntactic and semantic features, which divert attention from the pragmatic and cognitive features underlying the recognition of the direct and indirect report. Research in this regard is scarce, but studies by Haberland (1986) and Coulmas (1986a) provide a hint that the distinction between direct and indirect report is not so simple that it can be completely accounted for by syntax and semantics. Another universal aspect may be the number of participants in the reported speech, in that in all kinds of reported speech, there are three participants (i.e., the original speaker, the reporter, and the hearer). Even in cases of ‘self-talk’, one can refer to the existence of the hearer and the original speaker. That is, one can report to oneself (the hearer) an utterance whose origin is the reporter himself/herself (original speaker). For example, one may report one’s utterance to oneself as a reminder or castigation (among other things). In any case, self-talk is a common phenomenon and yet research in this regard is rare. Above other things, there might be some commonalities between two languages, but with regard to the universal features of indirect reporting, we should wait for more evidence. Studies such as the one conducted by Massamba (1986, p. 18) show that “there seems to be a lot in common between indirect speech in Swahili and English”, tempting us to conclude that “indirect speech has indications of being a universal phenomenon.” However, further cross-cultural research is needed to prove this statement.

9.3  Works on Persian Reported Speech Persian reported speech have not been given due attention in the literature of reported speech. Not many studies have been conducted on PRS, and that makes the comparison of works difficult. Among the earliest studies on PRS is that of Karen Ebert (1986). To summarise briefly, Ebert argues that “there is no ‘indirect speech’ in Nepali’s close relatives, the Indian languages (including Sanskrit), and that it is rarely used in Farsi [known also as Persian]” (Ebert, 1986, p. 153). However, the argument made by Ebert is not verified through research findings. In recent years, Salmani Nodoushan has pursued PRS in his works. Capone and Nodoushan (2014) use Persian evidence1 as support for Capone’s Paraphrasis/Form Principle (PFP).2 Through a semantico-pragmatic explanation of reported speech, they argue that the PFP can decently account for Persian indirect reports. This idea is interesting, yet lack of authentic data and the presence of several anecdotal claims have led to a

 Of course, the statements and claims are not clearly and explicitly supported by authentic data.  Refer to Chap. 5, Sect. 5.5 for further explanation.

1 2

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prescriptive kind of argumentation as the justification for the main thesis behind their study (henceforth, Study 1). I have mentioned the main findings of their study below: (Highlighted issues in Study 1) A. English uses certain syntactic transformations (like the choice of tense) in indirect reports [but] Persian does not (p. 33). B. Samesaying3 is 100% perfect in Persian quotations and indirect reports (p. 34). C. Persian indirect reports and quotations seem to lend support to that of Davidson in that, in Persian, whatever fills the ‘quotative slot’ after ‘ke’ (or is wrapped inside ‘giume’ following a colon) is a demonstration of the original speaker’s assertions. A reporter may choose to paraphrase the original speaker’s message, but Persian does not allow a change of pragmatic force or message form (p. 35). D. The original speakers are always held responsible for foul language in Persian (p. 36). [supporting Capone’s theory of reporting slurs] E. If the original speaker has not avoided foul language, he is a ‘rule breaker’. The reporter should not be his accomplice. He should avoid depicting his speech; rather, he should describe it in polite language (p. 38). I will refute these claims by resorting to empirical research findings in the next sections. But before that, let me discuss the second study on Persian reported speech. In the second study (Study 2), Nodoushan (2018) uses evidence from Persian to support the semantico-pragmatic nature of indirect reports he had previously posited. Although theoretically interesting, the paper has a prescriptive tone and there are many unsubstantiated claims with regard to PRS. Again, the data of his study are not authentic, but rather, prefabricated and selected for the specific purpose of the study. Let me cite some of his findings that are extracted from Study 2: (Highlighted issues in Study 2) A. As I will show in my analysis of Persian reported speech (below), there is no ‘that’ in indirect reports in standard Persian (p. 80). B. In Persian, ‘quotation’ and ‘paraphrasis’ are exactly the same unless the reporter uses an on record appositive statement to tell the audience that he is not reporting the exact wordings of the original speaker (p. 89). C. It is no surprise that the Persian audience always holds the original speaker responsible for the explicatures and implicatures that are expressed in the content sentence (in both DD [direct speech] and DI [indirect speech]) (p. 89).

3  ‘Samesaying’ refers to the fact that “the report and the speech to be reported have some broad content in common” (Capone, 2016, p. 24).

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D. It seems as if Persian DIs are monophonic in that only the voice of the original speaker permeates all aspects of content sentences in DI reports. This stands in sharp contrast to the notion of ‘polyphony’ that Capone (2010) found in English DI reports where the content sentence represents the voices of both the original speaker and the reporter (p. 89). E. In spoken Persian, where mechanics of writing are absent, the pauses that speakers insert between the plug (i.e., verb of the report sentence) and the content sentence are the only ‘clues’ which tell hearers that they should compute content sentences as a direct quotations (p. 90). F. In Persian, when DDs are converted into DIs, there is no change in verb tense, pronouns, adverbs, and so on in the content sentence (p. 92). These two studies form the main existing works on PRS. They contain interesting information about the complexities of PRS, although my empirical research would refute some previous findings on this account which I return to in Sect. 9.5. My approach towards investigating indirect reports is based on the analysis of authentic talk during interaction. My argument is based on what really happens during the interaction as related to PRS. In this regard, Kecskes (2016, p. 27) suggests that “[f] uture research in indirect reports should use both introspective and corpus based, naturalistic data if we want to understand the real nature of this complex phenomenon.” Therefore, I approach the study of PRS based on the analysis of naturally occurring talk.

9.4  The Study Most importantly, my analysis of indirect and direct reported speech is based on authentic data from native Persian speakers. I gathered data for this study from a TV programme series called Special News Talk, which was held every night at 10:45 on Channel 2 of Iranian National TV. The talks and the videos are archived and available on the following website: http://www.telewebion.com/program/5094 [retrieved August 2018]. In the next section, I deal with the analysis of PRS as occurred during authentic talk. In my analysis, I discuss several rudimentary issues essential to PRS. Having conducted this analysis, I attempt to address some basic characteristics of PRS, both in order to provide a sound account of reported speech in Persian and to provide a clear picture for those who are interested in the study of the universal features of reported speech in general and PRS in particular.

9.5  Phonosyntactic Properties My categorisation of the data into different kinds of reported speech was based on syntactic and prosodic features (stress and intonation). I did not categorise the data only based on classical syntactic features, for there were cases where the distinction

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was not syntactically realised (some speakers used prosody to show direct speech). To set the scene, and to operationalise different kinds of reported speech, the definitions of various cases of reported speech are provided below: Direct Report: “Direct speech is a mode of reporting in which all deictic and pragmatic elements are based on the speech situation which is purportedly that of the ‘original’ speech situation as defined in the embedding context.” (Kammerzell & Peust, 2002, p. 293) Indirect Report: In indirect reporting, We preserve the integrity of the original message by formally marking the boundaries between the main message and the embedded reported message, or we eliminate the boundaries by focusing on the information content and constructing our report the way we find it appropriate taking into account one, some or none of the following factors: actual situational context, illocutionary force of original message, evaluative load of original message and reportee/s. (Kecskes, 2016, p. 10) Free Indirect Discourse: “In the case of free indirect discourse, in addition to the free non-­ lexicalised introduction of an echoing demonstrating event, with or without shift of grammar, there is also a (non-lexicalised) shift in the CONTENT world parameter”. (Gregoromichelaki, 2017, p. 246)

As discussed earlier, it is very difficult to distinguish between direct and indirect reports in the oral language (Itakura, 2018) since the most salient characteristic of direct speech (i.e., the quotation mark) is not present in speech. Therefore, it is better to consider both syntactic and prosodic features in distinguishing between direct and indirect reports. In cases where reporters employed syntactic features, the direct report was mostly used to appeal to authority or to emphasise persuasiveness. In this regard, keywords and key phrases are frequently reported verbatim to convey an intended impression, as shown below4 (‘R’ is reporter and ‘S’ is the original speaker): (1) R:   •

xod-e iːʃuːn mifærmɒːjænd: ‘pædiːde-je ævæl-e belɒː-ɒːxær’ jɒː ‘sæhrɒːje biː-pɒːjɒːn’. He himself says ‘the first phenomenon without an end’ or ‘an endless desert’. (episode5: dʒɒːjgɒːh-e iːrɒːn dær enqelɒːb-e sænʔæt-iːje tʃehɒːrom)

In (1), the reporter uses the exact words and phrases of an authority both in order to appeal to a reliable source, and at the same time, to prove that the reporter should be taken seriously since s/he has resorted to the verbatim utterances of an authority. Moreover, the reporter wants to mention (indirectly) that it is not only him/her that

4  International Phonetic Alphabet is used to transcribe Persian language pronunciation. Refer to https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Help:IPA/Persian for further information. 5  Episodes are the title of the Special Talks held every night. I have provided the name of the episodes to allow the readers to better track Persian reported speech.

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has this kind of interpretation, but it is also the specific interpretation of an authority. In (1), the reporter increased the stress on the two quoted phrases ‘pædiːde-je ævæl­e belɒː-ɒːxær’ (‘the first phenomenon without an end’) and ‘sæhrɒː-je biː-pɒːjɒːn’ (‘an endless desert’) to show emphasis and attract attention. The word ‘xod-e’ (‘himself’) is a syntactic feature manifesting that the reporter is directly quoting the source without changing the words. Moreover, the stress on the two quoted phrases shows that prosodic features can indicate a direct report. Another situation where direct reporting can be used is in appealing to official rules and legislation. In this case, the reporter adheres to an official rule or a piece of scientific writing, for example, in order to justify his/her viewpoint. This kind of direct reporting is rare but it was observed in one of the talks extracted from the data of this study: (2) R:

  •

mætn-iː ke ɒːqɒːje terɒːmp emzɒː kærd-e iːn mæsʔæle-ro mætræh miːkone. engiːliːsiːʃ-o miːgæm ke dæqiːq bɒːʃe: ‘The United States cannot and should not admit those who do not support the constitution’. The paper that Mr Trump has signed shows this issue. I read the English version to be more exact: The United States cannot and should not admit those who do not support the constitution. (episode: bæræsiː-je siːjɒːsæt-hɒːje dʒædiːd-e ɒːmriːkɒː væ tæbæʔɒːt-e ɒːn)

The data prove that Persian speakers use technical vocabulary and key phrases from authorities both to justify their stance and to appeal to authority. The direct report in (2) is very clear evidence that the reporter should be taken seriously since he is directly reporting an American legislative rule. The use of ‘ke dæqiːq bɒːʃe’ (‘to be more exact’) in (2) is a syntactic feature showing that the reporter has transferred the exact words of the original source to be more persuasive. Moreover, the data show that Persian speakers also use Arabic proverbial sentences or phrases (known as Hadith [/ˈhædiːθ/], which is a source of religious teachings and moral guidance among Persian speakers) to justify their arguments and empower them in the discussion. The following report is extracted from one of the talks: (3) R:   •

goft: ‘æl-nɒːso ælɒː diːn-e moluːkehem’. Said: ‘people are more similar to the authorities’. (episode: tʃehɒːrom-iːn sɒːle siːjɒːsæt-hɒːje eqtesɒːde moqɒːvemæt-iː æz bærnɒːme tɒː edʒrɒː)

The prefabricated phrases such as the one in (3), are informative fillers that help the reporter to justify his/her viewpoints (‘Hadith’ is considered a reliable source of information among Persian speakers). In the talks, only three cases of the direct report were observed, each of which portrays a particular aspect of direct reporting in Persian.

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With regard to indirect reporting, I distinguish between explicit (on-record) and implicit (off-record) indirect reporting. In explicit indirect reporting, the reporter changes the syntax of the original speech but, to refer to Kecskes’s (2016) definition of indirect reports, the three key factors of actual situational context, illocutionary force of the original message, and the evaluative load of original message and reportee/s remain intact (as in the original). In other words, in explicit indirect reporting, the original speaker does not disagree with the pragmatic load of the report, no matter what transformations are made to the original words. In this case, Persian explicit indirect reports conform to Capone’s (2016) Paraphrasis/Form Principle. Capone (2016, p. 27) states: The that-clause embedded in the verb ‘say’ is a paraphrasis of what Y said that meets the following constraints: should Y hear what X said he (Y) had said, he would not take issue with it, as to content, but would approve of it as a fair paraphrasis of his original utterance. Furthermore, he would not object to vocalizing the assertion made out of the words following the complementizer ‘that’ on account of its form/style.

When indirect reports are viewed in this way, the evaluative load of the reporter is very close to that of the original speaker.6 The transformations done on the syntactic features serve to reduce the cognitive load on the part of the reporter (the transformations do not change the illocutionary force of the report). In this way, Persian speakers do not have to memorise the exact words of the original speaker. The following SR pairs are some examples of this: (4) S:   •  R:   •

ælɒːn ægær kæsiː modiːr-e kol-e sænɒːje-ʔe ʃiːmiːjɒːjiː-e, fæqæt mæsʔuːle toliːd niːst. Now, if someone is the chief executive of chemical industry, s/he is not just responsible for the production. ælɒːn miːgæn uːn ʃæxs-iː ke sænʔætiː fekr miːkone, tedʒɒːriː hæm fekr miːkone. Now he says, that person who thinks industrially thinks commercially as well. (episode: tæfkiːk-e vezɒːræt-xɒːne hɒːje bɒːzærgɒːniː væ sænʔæt væ mæʔdæn)

6  According to Haßler (2002, p. 145), “[t]he criterion for the bipartition of reported speech is the speaker’s perspective: in direct speech the perspective of the speaker is maintained, in indirect speech, perspective and deixis switch to the position of the reporter.” Haßler continues: “That is why direct speech maintains the most important features of the original utterance, while indirect speech changes pronouns, tenses, deictic elements, intonation and even referential words” (Haßler, 2002, p. 145).

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do, se mɒːh qæbl ʃoruː ʃode æfzɒːjeʃ-e qejmæt-hɒː, mæxsuːsæn æfzɒːjeʃ-e qejmæt dær bæxʃ-hɒːje omde-je mæsɒːleh. Two, 3 months ago, the increase in prices has started, especially the increase in the price of the main parts of the building materials. jek nokte-jiː ro hæm ke dʒenɒːbe ɒːqɒː-je … færmuːd-ænd ke uːn æfzɒːjeʃ-e hæziːne sɒːxt-e. One point that Mr … said is the increase in the construction fee. (episode: bɒːzɒːr-e mæskæn, nævæsɒːn-e bejne recuːd væ roʃd-e dʒozʔiː)

(6) S:   •  R:   •

jek muːje ʃomɒː bær hæme-je ɒːn kɒːxneʃiːn-hɒː væ ɒːn-hɒːjiː ke dær iːn enqelɒːb hiːtʃ fæʔɒːliːjæt-iː nædɒːʃtænd… jek muːje ʃomɒː bær ɒːn-hɒː tærdʒiːh dɒːræd. One hair of you [commoners] … to all those aristocracies and those who never had any activity in [Islamic] revolution, one hair of you [commoners] is preferred to them [aristocracies]. emɒːm-e ʔæziːz-o æl-ʃæʔn færmuːd-ænd: mæn jek muːje iːn kuːxneʃiːn-hɒː ro be hæme-je uːn, nemiːduːnæm … nemiːdæm. The great Imam said: I don’t give one hair of you commoners to all those …, I don’t know… (episode: ʔedɒːlæt-e edʒtemaʔ-iː, dæstuːr-e ræhbær-iː væ motɒːlebe-je mærdom-iː)

(7) S:

  •  R:   •

soɒːl-e mæn æz ʃomɒː iːn æst ke rævɒːbet-e uːruːpɒː væ ɒːmriːkɒː dær dorɒːn-e riːjɒːsæt dʒomhuːriːje terɒːmp dotʃɒːr-e nævæsɒːnɒːt-e dʒediː buːd-e væ æxiːræn hæm ʃɒːhed-e dʒæng-e tedʒɒːriː bejne do tæræf hæst-iːm. My question is that the relationship between Europe and the US during Trump’s presidency has experienced serious fluctuations and recently there has been a commercial war between the two sides. hæmɒːntor ke dær soɒːl-etuːn hæm goft-e ʃod, jek dʒæng-e bozorg-e eqtesɒːd-iː donɒːld terɒːmp bɒː uːruːpɒːjiː-hɒː rɒːh ændɒːxt-e. As you mentioned in your question, Trump has created a big economic war with the Europeans. (episode: bærkenɒːriː-je væziːr-e omuːr-e xɒːredʒe-je ɒːmriːkɒː væ tæsiːrɒːt-e ɒːn)

The SR exchanges in (4–7) all involve explicit indirect reports, in which the reporter changes the syntax of the report while keeping intact the pragmatic perspective of the original speaker, who may be present (eyewitness-to-eyewitness) or absent (eyewitness-­to-outsider) at the time of the report. In (4), the reporter alters ‘fæqæt mæsʔuːle toliːd niːst’ (‘is not just responsible for the production’) to ‘tedʒɒːriː hæm

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183

fekr miːkone’ (‘thinks commercially as well’) in order to report the other aspects of the original speaker’s intention (e.g., selling). Persian speakers are cognisant of ‘what is said’ as well as ‘what is implied’ during the interaction, and they show this in their reports. The reporter interprets some implied messages from the previous information the original speaker had provided and mentions the original speaker’s intention in the report (the original speaker tried to show that a manager does not only deal with production, but there are other aspects, such as selling the products, which are equally important). In (5), ‘æfzɒːjeʃ-e qejmæt dær bæxʃ-hɒːje omde-je mæsɒːleh’ (‘the increase in the price of the main parts of the building materials’) is transferred to ‘æfzɒːjeʃ-e hæziːne sɒːxt-e’ (‘the increase in the construction fee’), which is in line with the pragmatic load of the original speaker’s utterances. The reporter interprets that the ‘building materials’ are used for ‘construction’. Therefore, instead of repeating the exact words of the original speaker, the reporter adds his/her voice to the report by closely paraphrasing the original message. In (6), ‘jek muː’ (‘one hair’) has remained constant from the original speaker to the report, yet ‘bær ɒːn-hɒː tærdʒiːh dɒːræd’ (‘is preferred to them’) in the original speaker’s speech is transferred to ‘nemiːdæm’ (‘I don’t give’) in reporter’s speech. The reporter in (6) uses ‘I don’t know’ in the report, which implies that the reporter cannot remember the proper word (‘kɒːxneʃiːn-hɒː’ or ‘aristocracies’) to complete the quote. One interesting point is that Persian speakers ‘change the voice’ in reports. In (6), the passive verb ‘is preferred’ is changed to an active verb (‘I don’t give’). On this account, this study manifests that Persian speakers adapt the voice in indirect speech. In (7), ‘dʒæng-e tedʒɒːriː’ (‘commercial war’) is changed to ‘dʒæng-e bozorg-e eqtesɒːd-iː’ (‘big economical war’) in the reported speech. The transformations observed in examples above point out that the reporter can change the syntactic features without manipulating the illocutionary force of the original utterance. What is clear from the data on Persian indirect report is that speakers are quite active during the process of reporting, and they try to reduce the cognitive load by remembering the main points and transforming the original speaker’s utterance in line with the original speaker’s perspective and according to Paraphrasis/Form Principle. The reporter in (7) has omitted the phrase ‘nævæsɒːnɒːt-e dʒediː’ (‘serious fluctuations’) and added the word ‘bozorg’ (‘big’) to ‘economic war’, where ‘big’ can be considered pragmatically equivalent to ‘serious fluctuations’. In (4–7), the original speaker’s intention and the illocutionary force of the utterance are given priority over subjective manipulations by the reporter, yet the reporter has changed the syntax of the original utterance to reduce the cognitive load and to add his/her voice to the report. Persian speakers also used free indirect discourse (FID) frequently. This type of report includes both direct and indirect speech as its building blocks. As mentioned by Gregoromichelaki and Kempson (2016, p. 132): Free indirect discourse is similar to indirect reporting in that there is potential shift of tenses and indexicals. However, usually there are no overt reporting indications and some features of direct discourse (such as direct questions and vocatives) are maintained so that there is only a partial shift of perspective towards the reportee.

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The data show that Persian speakers resort to some verbatim vocabulary and phrases of the original utterance during the indirect reports. The following are cases of FID: (8) R:   •

terɒːmp mætræh kærd ke ruːs-hɒː ɒːmɒːde-je muːʃæk-hɒː-je be qol-e xod-eʃ ‘ziːbɒː væ huːʃmænd-e’ ɒːmriːkɒːjiː-hɒː bɒːʃænd. Trump brought up that Russians be ready for, according to Trump, the ‘beautiful and smart’ American missiles. (episode: dʒædiːd-tæriːn tæhævolɒːt-e suːriːje)

(9) R:   •

dolæte ɒːmriːkɒː miːxɒːd hæme-je keʃvær-hɒː-ro, jæʔniː fæqæt uːn hæft keʃvær-æm niːst-eʃ, hæme-je, ‘every country’, hær keʃvær-iː ro miːxɒːd mædʒbuːr bokon-e. The American government wants to oblige every country, that is, not only those seven countries, ‘every country’. (episode: bæræsiː-je siːjɒːsæt-hɒːje dʒædiːd-e ɒːmriːkɒː væ tæbæʔɒːte ɒːn)

As shown in (8) and (9), the reporter uses words and phrases from the source utterance and adds them to the indirect report in order to provide evaluative feedback on the report and, at the same time, directly points to the important features in the original utterance. In (8), the reporter says that Americans should be ready for Russian missiles, yet the reporter adds (and puts the stress on) the adjectives ‘ziːbɒː væ huːʃmænd’ (‘beautiful and smart’) to imply that the reporter is aware and has seen President Trump’s exact words (the reporter also uses ‘be qol-e xod-eʃ’, meaning ‘according to him’, to show that it is a verbatim report) in threatening Russian military forces in Syria. In (9), the reporter code switches from Persian to English and uses the English phrase ‘every country’ to put emphasis on the idea that Trump is indeed forcing every country to act against Iran. All in all, syntactic transformations are observed in PRS. One observed transformation is the change of a passive verb to an active one. In (6), for example, the voice in the original speech is passive while the reporter changes it to an active verb in his report. In (6), the original speaker uses the passive verb ‘is preferred’, while the reporter changes it to ‘I don’t give’. Therefore, in Persian, just like English, the changing of tense is quite possible. Regarding the distinction between direct and indirect reports, Nodoushan (2018) argues that a pause between the plug and the content is the only clue to the introduction of the direct report. My data do not support this claim. ‘Pausing’ may be a strategy but it is not the only one. Other strategies such as stress and intonation are used frequently among Persian speakers to show a direct speech. Moreover, cases in (1–2) manifest that Persian speakers use syntactic clues to help the hearer become aware that they are introducing a direct report. For example, in (1) and (2), the reporter applies words and phrases such as ‘himself’ or ‘to be more exact’ to show verbatim speech. These examples of syntactic clues substantiate the idea that Persian speakers have a battery of strategies to

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Table 9.1  Persian reported speech and its main features Transformations Adaptation of verbal tense Omission of ‘that’ Change of plug Change of locative and temporal indexicals

DR − + − −

IR + + + −

FID + + + −

introduce a direct report. Moreover, it is not always possible to distinguish between direct and indirect reports in the flow of speech, for there may be no pauses or linguistic clues to help the hearer distinguish which parts are directly quoted. Although there might be some syntactic clues that lead the hearer to recognise the introduction of direct reports, Persian speakers did not introduce indirect reports in the same way as they introduced direct reports. On this account, direct reporting is ‘marked’, whereas indirect reporting is ‘unmarked’. It is not necessary for speakers to state that they are reporting someone indirectly. In my data (unlike that of Nodoushan, 2018), no case of articulating the introduction of indirect reports was found. Direct reporting is marked, in that the originality of the message should be noticed by the hearer (showing that the exact words of the original speaker are uttered in the report) otherwise the direct report loses its effectiveness. Therefore, no extra-syntactic element is needed to introduce indirect reporting. The data in this study also showed many cases (see examples [8] and [10]) where the complimentiser ‘that’ is included in the indirect report. Having refuted several claims in the literature regarding PRS, as well as having shown the intricacies of PRS in many aspects, a summary of transformations applicable to PRS is provided in Table  9.1 (DR = Direct Reporting; IR = Indirect Reporting; FID = Free Indirect Discourse). In Table 9.1, ‘plus’ means that the transformation is observed in the transcripts, whereas ‘minus’ indicates that the feature is not observed in the transcripts. In what follows, I will discuss two cases where phonosyntactic properties can help the reporter to either report himself/herself or communicate uncertainty through the report.

9.5.1  Quasi-Quotations in Persian Persian speakers used metalinguistic comments in their indirect reports to indicate that they are monitoring themselves while producing the report. These comments are manifested in terms of contextual cues in the indirect reporter’s utterance, which can communicate the functions of metapragmatic expressions: The functions of metapragmatic expressions include monitoring, commenting on, or assessing the appropriateness of one’s own or another speaker’s discourse, expressing a negative or positive attitude toward a portion or aspect of the discourse, […] and negotiating potentially problematic stances. (Blackwell, 2016, p. 619)

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Reflexivity is a crucial element of indirect reporting, for it helps the reporters to show uncertainty in producing opaque structures. Persian speakers implied, by using popping-out expressions (a marker of uncertainty), that the message was not strictly quoted. Consider the following examples from the data: (10) R:   •

ɒːqɒː-je … miːgæn ke, be hær hɒːl, sænʔæte xodro hæsɒːs-e. Mr … says that, in any case, the automobile industry is sensitive. (episode: tæʔrefe-je vɒːredɒːt-e xodro, hɒːmiː jɒː bælɒːjɒː-je sænʔæt-e dɒːxel-iː)

(11) R:   •

ʃomɒː miːgiːd mɒː bɒːjæd beriːm be sæmt-e reqɒːbæt-iː kærdæn-e bɒːzɒːr? You say we should move towards a competitive market? (episode: tæʔrefe-je vɒːredɒːt-e xodro, hɒːmiː jɒː bælɒːjɒː-je sænʔæt-e dɒːxel-iː)

(12) R:   •

diːruːz hæm væziːr-e mohtæræm-e keʃvær, xodeʃ-uːn færmuːd-ænd ke hɒːlɒː æz læhɒːz-e qɒːnuːn ʃɒːjæd tʃeniːn dʒɒːjgɒːhiː niːst. Yesterday, the venerable Minister of the Country himself said that, now, maybe there is no such place according to law. (episode: emruːz væ færdɒː-je mobɒːreze bɒː qɒːtʃɒːq-e kɒːlɒː)

(13) R:   •

ælɒːn miːfærmɒːjiːd ke ælɒːn bædæne-je vezɒːræt-e bɒːzærgɒːn-iː, iːmiːdro, iːrɒːn xodro, tʃiː, tʃiː, tʃiː,… Now you say that the body of the Ministry of Commerce, IMIDRO, Iran Xodro, blah, blah, blah, … (episode: tæfkiːk-e vezɒːræt-xɒːnehɒːje bɒːzærgɒːniː væ sænʔæt væ mæʔdæn)

(14) R:   •

be ebɒːræt-iː miːgæn iːn mænɒːbeʔ qɒːbele tæhæqoq niːst. In other words, he says these resources are not achievable. (episode: hædæf-giːriːje bærnɒːme-je ʃeʃom bærɒːje qælæbe bær biːkɒːr-iː)

(15) R:   •

jæʔniː miːgiːd sæbɒːt tuː tæsmiːm-giːriː niːst? That is, you say there is no consistency in decision-making? (episode: tæʔrefe-je vɒːredɒːt-e xodro, hɒːmiː jɒː bælɒːjɒː-je sænʔæt-e dɒːxel-iː)

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187

The popping-out marks and expressions in (10–15) are perfect examples that show how syntax can help individuals distinguish between direct and indirect reports. The inclusion of hedges and paraphrasing marks may highlight the reporter’s uncertainty in using source information. In (10), the reporter uses ‘be hær hɒːl’ (‘anyway’) as a metalinguistic comment to imply either a slight change of the original information or to show that some details are ignored in the report. In (11), the rising intonation means an uncertain report, which indirectly manifests that the report may not be based on accurate information (that the report is not directly quoted). The word ‘hɒːlɒː’ (‘now’) in (12) is another popping-out remark. The literal meaning of the word ‘now’ has nothing to do with the context of the reported speech in (12), yet ‘now’ here is a gap filler, which suggests that the reporter is trying to retrieve the source information. In (13), using ‘blah’ three times [tʃiː, tʃiː, tʃiː…] in succession implies that the reporter has paraphrased the original information or is uninterested in quoting certain parts of the source message. As reported by Saka (2017, p. 47), ‘blah’ “connote[s] uninterest on the part of the reporter: material is omitted not just because it is irrelevant but, especially in the case of blah, because it is tedious, and the original source is portrayed as a blatherer.” In (14) and (15), the reporters use ‘be ebɒːræt-iː’ (‘in other words’) and ‘jæʔniː’ (‘that is’) respectively to indicate that the reports are a paraphrase of the original speech. Persian indirect reports, like English ones, allow for some popping-out expressions that help the reporter show that s/he is not strictly quoting the original speaker. Saka (2017, p.  36) suggests that “[t]he English language possesses a variety of quasi-quotational devices: expressions that, when appearing inside of quotation marks, conventionally trigger a temporary ‘popping out’ of the quotation, alerting the audience that the expression is not being strictly quoted.” However, this is not something that Persian speakers do frequently in indirect reports. Sometimes it is very hard to descry the transformations made in the indirect report. This may be the reason why indirect reports are sometimes hard to be distinguished as a report, for the reporter may omit all cues and clues, paraphrasing the original speaker without acknowledging the source information, and even without using any ‘that-clause’ or ‘verbs of saying’. The data in this study proved that Persian speakers may not use ‘that’ in the report, paraphrasing others without even acknowledging the source. On this account, one can cast doubt on the premiss that “the picture of indirect reporting which does not consider transformations, voicing, cues and clues is deeply flawed” (Capone, 2012, p. 609). In consonance with McCullagh (2017, p. 10): One can hear some words uttered but not know what language they’re in; or who is uttering them; or where the speaker is. In such a case one doesn’t know enough about the utterance to be justified in selecting any particular lexicon (the first case) or giving any particular values to the contextual parameters (the other cases).

188

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9.5.2  Self-Quoting in Persian Reported Speech Among Persian speakers, self-quotation was frequent. In Persian, self-quotation happens when the reporter and the original speaker are the same, and where the original speaker reports one of his/her own previous utterances using the verb of saying ‘ʔærz kærdæm’ (‘I said’) or a different form of this verb. The following cases are examples of self-quoting in Persian: (16) R:   •

mæn miːxɒːm ʔærz bokonæm ke mɒː lozuːmæn bæxʃ-iː æz iːn zændʒiːr-e rɒː toliːd koniːm. I want to say that we necessarily produce part of this cycle. (episode: tæʔrefe-je vɒːredɒːt-e xodro, hɒːmiː jɒː bælɒːjɒː-je sænʔæt-e dɒːxel-iː)

(17) R:   •

ʔærz mæn iːn æst ke mɒː je bɒːr qɒːnuːn-gozɒːr-iː kærd-iːm… I am saying that we settled the rules once… (episode: æz tʃerɒː-jiː ræde tærh-e ʃæfæfiːjæt-e dærjɒːft-iːje modiːr-ɒːn)

Self-quotation acts as a paraphrase of some previous speech. It may be direct or indirect. However, the use of direct speech in self-quotation has not been observed among Persian speakers. Self-quotation is mostly used to refresh the mind of the hearer, to buy some extra time for further cognitive processing, or to attract the attention of the hearer towards a particular issue. Persian speakers self-quote in two situations. First, they may self-quote when the reporter does not provide a faithful paraphrase of their utterances. In this case, the self-quote acts as a further explanation, letting the hearer acknowledge the exact intention and perspective of the original speaker. Second, they may self-quote when the original speaker wants to put emphasis on some of his/her previous remarks or to refresh the mind of the hearer. A distinction between ‘ærz’ (in [16–17]) and ‘færmuːd’ (in [12]) is useful in showing how cultural differences can alter syntactic properties. Both of these terms are different verbs of saying in Persian, but there are two main differences between them. First, ‘ærz’ is most often observed in the original speaker’s utterances and refers back to the original speaker’s sentences (in this case, the reporter and the speaker are the same), whereas ‘færmuːd’ is mostly employed in the reporter’s speech and refers back to the original speaker’s utterances (in this case, the reporter and the speaker are not the same). Second, ‘ærz’ is a marker of the Persian cultural schema of shekasteh-nafsi (i.e., ‘treating others better than oneself’), which manifests meekness on the part of the reporter, whereas ‘færmuːd’ is considered a face-­ giving act and a sign of politeness, whereby respect is shown for the original speaker by the reporter, being advocated by the Persian cultural schema of ‘adab-va-ehteram’ (i.e., ‘courtesy and respect’).

9.6 Change of Perspective in PRS

189

9.6  Change of Perspective in PRS Besides the syntactic features underlying PRS, I observed cases where the data provide evidence for Borg’s (2012) discussion on ‘free pragmatic enrichment’, which refers to interpretations that are not characterised by any lexico-syntactic element of the source information (I would call them ‘implicit indirect reports’). These kinds of ‘implicit arguments’ (Capone, 2013) are frequently seen in Persian indirect reports. In the following examples extracted from the data of this study, the original speaker disagrees or challenges the interpretation made by the reporter, and attempts to correct the implicit arguments on the part of the reporter: (18) R:   •   S:   •

ʃomɒː miːgiːd mɒː bɒːjæd beriːm be sæmt-e reqɒːbæt-iː kærdæn-e bɒːzɒːr? You say we should move towards a competitive market? mæn miːxɒːm ʔærz bokonæm ke mɒː lozuːmæn bæxʃ-iː æz iːn zændʒiːr-e rɒː toliːd koniːm. I want to say that we necessarily produce part of this cycle. (episode: tæʔrefe-je vɒːredɒːt-e xodro, hɒːmiː jɒː bælɒːjɒː-je sænʔæt-e dɒːxel-iː)

(19) R:   •   S:   •

færmuːd-e buːdiːd jek miːljuːn tomæn hær metr kɒːheʃ dɒːʃt-e dær tehrɒːn. You had said it has been decreased by one million Toman in each meter in Tehran. mæn tʃeniːn ʔærz nækærd-æm. væliː dær mædʒmuːʔ miːʃe goft æz sɒːl-e 1392 be bæʔd miːtuːnæm ʔærz bokonæm ke mɒː æfzɒːjeʃ-e qejmæt-e mæhsuːs dær qejmæt-e mæskæn nædɒːʃtiːm. I didn’t say such a thing. But, overall, it is possible to say that from 1392 onwards I can say that we didn’t have tangible increase in the housing price. (episode: rɒːhkɒːr-hɒːje xoruːdʒ-e mæskæn æz rokuːd)

(20) R:   •   S:   •

dær bæxʃ-e qæbl-iː goft-iːd moxɒːlef-iːd. In previous section, you said that you disagree. næ, mæn ʔærz kærd-æm mætluːb væ mætluːb-tær æst. No, I said desirable and more desirable. (episode: bæræsiː-je bærnɒːme-je ʃeʃom dær mædʒles, elhɒːq-e mænɒːteq-e ɒːzɒːd be vezɒːræt-e eqtesɒːd)

190

(21) R:

  •   S:   •

9  Reported Speech in Persian

je nokte-jiː tuːje hæste-je mætlæb-e iːʃuːn iːn buːd ke ægær modiːr-iː ro ke xejliː hæm bɒː kefɒːjæt hæst, mɒː bærɒːje iːn-ke negæh-eʃ dɒːriːm bɒːjæd be-heʃ hoquːq-e bɒːlɒː-tær bediːm. iːndʒuːriː buːd? One hint in the centre of his discussion was that if we are going to keep a manager who has many qualifications, we should pay a higher salary to him/her. Am I right? næ, næ, tæfsiːr-e mæn lɒː-jærzɒː mo’ælef nækon-iːd. ʔærz mæn iːn æst ke mɒː je bɒːr qɒːnuːn-gozɒːr-iː kærd-iːm, modiːriːjæt-e xædæmɒːt-e keʃvær-iː æz tuːʃ dær ɒːvord-iːm. No, no, I am not satisfied with this kind of interpretation. I am saying that we settled the rules once, and the management of national service came out of it. (episode: æz tʃerɒː-jiːje ræde tærh-e ʃæfæfiːjæt-e dærjɒːft-iːje modiːr-ɒːn)

The indirect reports in (18–21) are all instances of manipulation beyond the original speaker’s perspective. These cases would refute the constraint underlying indirect reports where “transformations are only licit if they do not modify the illocutionary point of the message” (Capone, 2018, p. 8). The original speaker in (18) self-reports himself, using the phrase ‘mæn miːxɒːm ʔærz bokonæm’ (‘I want to say…’) in order to imply that the report is not in line with the original speaker’s perspective. In (19), the original speaker clearly disagrees with the reporter’s evaluation, saying ‘mæn tʃeniːn ʔærz nækærd-æm’ (‘I didn’t say such a thing’) in order to strongly oppose the insincere report. Another case of self-report happens in (20), where the original speaker corrects the reporter by providing further information, i.e. ‘mæn ʔærz kærd-æm’ (‘I said…’) in line with his perspective and intention. Finally, in (21), the original speaker directly states ‘tæfsiːr-e mæn lɒː-jærzɒː mo’ælef nækon-­ iːd’, which is an Arabic proverbial that means ‘I am not satisfied with this kind of interpretation’, in order to criticise the report as an unfaithful paraphrase. In all these cases (18–21), where the original speaker is present during the report, the original speaker has provided feedback and expressed dissatisfaction with the report. The examples in (18–21) show that the implicit indirect reports can be contradictory to the illocutionary force and the evaluative load of the original utterance. These cases do not support Capone’s Paraphrasis/Form Principle (where it is claimed that the paraphrase should be as close as possible to the original words [or perspective]). In (18–21), the illocutionary force argued by the reporter is not accepted by the original speaker. The reporter’s deviation from the original speaker’s perspective can originate from the following reasons: 1 . The information is generally known or part of some tradition; 2. The speaker has indirectly learned the fact he communicates from a third person or by hearsay;

9.6 Change of Perspective in PRS

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3 . The content of the message has been deduced; 4. The content of the message is the result of reflection. (Haßler, 2002, p. 152) In this case, implicit indirect reports are perfect examples of the ‘straw man fallacy’, where a person’s actual argument is substituted by a distorted, exaggerated, or misrepresented version of the argument made by the original speaker. In consonance with Macagno and Walton (2017), “[t]he possibility and the problem of distorting or misrepresenting another’s view are inherently dependent on the divergence between the speaker’s utterance and the hearer’s reconstruction thereof” (p.  35). They discuss that the straw man “consists in a distortion of the Original Speaker’s commitments, relying on the possible ambiguity of his statements” (p. 110). Both semantic and pragmatic ambiguity can lead to a straw man fallacy, giving the reporter the free hand to report in whatever way s/he desires. In this case, Capone (2016) argues that in order to avoid possible misinterpretations, the original speaker should be cognisant not to speak non-seriously. The key passage is: In case you do not know whether the Hearer is unable to distinguish your intentions or you do not know whether the Hearer will deliberately use transformations to delete all cues and clues available in the context (that were utilized by the speaker), thus being ready to report an utterance verbatim, although it was not intended to be available for verbatim report, AVOID speaking non-seriously. (Capone, 2016, p. 137)

In (18–21), the reporters have (mis)interpreted the original speaker’s intention according to their own perspective where they re-state the original speaker’s utterances based on a regeneration of the illocutionary force of the utterance (either consciously or subconsciously). In (18–21), the original speaker is present during the report and rejects the interpretation made by the reporter. The underlying feature of those sentences is the reconstruction of the reasoning by the reporter, and the regeneration of the original speaker’s utterance, both of which are based on the reporters’ presumptions regarding an interpreted utterance (it is not clear whether the reporters have changed the original perspective deliberately, or whether the wrong interpretation is just a matter of cognitive load and forgetfulness on the part of the reporters). A counter straw man is possible when the original speaker is present in the situation (eyewitness-to-eyewitness), yet it would be difficult to figure out misinterpretations in a report when the original speaker is absent (eyewitness-to-­ outsider) since there is no original speaker to react against the reporters’ wrong interpretations. However, the straw man can be neutralised when the hearer has enough contextual clues to exempt the original speaker from the misinterpreted commitments. The role of the hearer to refute the reporter’s wrong interpretation is shown in the following example (refer to Sect. 7.7 for more discussion on the topic of ‘disagreement’): (22)

Reporter: She said that John is a lazy student. Hearer: I don’t think so. You may have misunderstood her.

Referring back to the highlighted issues of Study 1, my data contrast sharply with the idea of ‘samesaying’ suggested by Capone and Nodoushan. Specifically, my

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data clearly show that samesaying is not a hundred per cent perfect in Persian quotations and indirect reports. The existence of the original speaker and his/her act of ‘gainsaying’ vividly suggests that Persian speakers may change the content so much so that the illocutionary force of the reported utterance radically loses its originality. In this case, Persian speakers can regenerate new commitments for the original speaker during indirect reporting. Therefore, the quotative slot after ‘that’ can deviate from the original speaker’s assertions. Based on this argument, Nodoushan’s (2018) claim regarding the fact that Persian indirect reporting is in stark contrast to Capone’s (2010) idea of polyphony (simultaneity of points of view and voices) is also wrong. Instead, the data from my study showed that Persian indirect reporting is a perfect example of polyphony, where the report represents the voice of both the original speaker and the reporter. Even in cases where the original speaker was present during the interaction, polyphony was clearly observed in Persian indirect reporting. Put differently, Persian speakers are not a hundred per cent committed to the words and the content of the original speaker in indirect reports. In some cases, even conflicting views were integrated into the reported speech as a means to change the evaluative load of the original message. Regarding implicit indirect reports and the possibility of deviations from the original speaker’s intention, we are justified in assuming that we should not always consider the original speaker to be responsible for foul language in Persian. The issue of ‘polyphony’ warns us that we should not consider the original speaker as the only culprit of foul language. The data from this study imply that the original speaker can always reject the reporter’s evaluative load considering cases of quasi-­ quotations and straw man fallacy. Capone and Nodoushan’s claim regarding the fact that the original speaker should always avoid using foul language is not democratic. The use of foul language is quite warranted in some situations. Evidence, in this case, is not rare. Jay and Janschewitz (2008), for example, argue that swearing in very informal contexts may be considered polite and a sign of solidarity. Therefore, saying that one should never use foul language is both far from reality and prescriptive. The original speaker can use bad language, but the reporter should evaluate whether it is necessary to mention the offensive word (for example, when it is necessary to report the foul language in the court of law or for other scientific reasons). Therefore, the reporter may choose to report the bad language used in the original speaker’s utterances because of situational necessity or for other personal reasons, which may be concomitant with ‘strategic (im)politeness’ (refer to Sect. 7.5 for further information).

9.7  Social Aspects of the PRS Language arises and develops within society. I have discussed throughout this book that indirect reports are devices used to resort to authority or justify one’s stance. In this regard, indirect reports represent others’ speech, which is sometimes an interpreted account of the original utterance. That said, reported speech can play

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different roles during interaction. It is not clearly stated in the literature of reported speech why individuals resort to reported speech. There is not much said in the literature in this regard, but I would like to refer to different functions of reported speech that can manifest the reasons why individuals employ reported speech. Considering the nature of the different kinds of reported speech discussed in this chapter, various functions of reported speech are presented as follows.

9.7.1  Phatic Function Reported speech can help individuals start a conversation and keep communication lines open. Phatic communication is also a good strategy to help the reporter buy time for further thinking (see Morady Moghaddam, in press). In this case, reported speech acts as a prefabricated comment that is not intended to put emphasis on someone’s previous speech, but rather, simply acts as filler. In addition, reporting someone else’s utterances can generate trust among interlocutors. In this case, reporting can act as a self-disclosure tool, serving to create a friendly atmosphere between individuals.

9.7.2  Informative Function More often than not, Persian speakers used reported speech to provide new information that relies on truth and value sets. Most of the cases of PRS in this study are placed in this category. That said, the report should take into consideration fair paraphrasing, otherwise, the report can be ignored as being fictitious. This is not a big problem for interlocutors since sociocognitive factors allow them to analyse the situation and provide information that is relevant and ostensive. In this case, Relevance Theory helps explain why interlocutors try to be as informative as possible based on situational factors and background knowledge.

9.7.3  Expressive Function Reported speech can be used to express feelings and attitudes. In (23), for example, the reporter shows a certain attitude towards the information about the referent: (23) R:

He said that he was unhappy that day.

The practice of indirect reporting is under the influence of individuals’ emotional states and subjective attitudes. In this sense, two scenarios are applicable. It is quite possible that the reporter realises something about the original speaker’s attitudes

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implied through verbal or nonverbal features. Or, on the other hand, the original speaker may directly demonstrate his/her attitude, through linguistic communication, which may emotionally involve the reporter as well.

9.7.4  Aesthetic Function In some cases, it was observed that Persian speakers used reported speech for the sake of the linguistic artefact itself. In this case, reported speech adds colour and vigour to utterances. Among Persian speakers, there are so many well-known expressions and sayings that can be used in reported speech. For example, indirect reports presented in this study indicated that speakers employ ‘Hadith’ or other fixed expressions from the authorities to add flavour to their speech. The direct reports referred to earlier in examples (1–3) provide further information in this regard.

9.7.5  Directive Function Reported speech is a powerful device for influencing the attitudes and/or behaviour of others. Here, the illocutionary force of the reported speech requires the hearer to act accordingly. In addition, the voice of others, which is included in the reported speech, empowers the reporter to take control of the situation. For example, in (18), the reporter says ‘you say we should move towards a competitive market?’ in an attempt to direct the attention of the original speaker towards a specific aspect of the argument. In this case, the interrogative tone of the report forces the original speaker to react and provide more clear information about the issue raised in the report.

9.8  Conclusion I began this chapter by discussing the ‘common core’ of reported speech across languages, arguing that there is no consistency in the practice of reported speech across cultures to claim universality. Although there are commonalities between some languages (such as verbal adaptations), there are also exceptions that discourage researchers from proposing a universal aspect of reported speech. I then discussed some previous studies done on PRS, and argued that PRS is an underdeveloped area of investigation that is in need of further work. I presented some authentic data regarding the practice of direct and indirect reporting among Persian speakers, showing that they employ three kinds of reported speech (i.e., direct, indirect, and free indirect speech) in daily interactions. With regard to ‘phonosyntactic’ features, Persian speakers employed prosody and specific syntactic devices that can help the

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hearer to differentiate between direct and indirect reports. Additionally, Persian speakers applied popping-out remarks to indicate uncertainty in presenting the source information (these cases are called quasi-quotations). Moreover, self-­ quotation, which is an attempt to correct an unfaithful report or to refresh the mind of the hearer, was also observed among Persian speakers. Cases of straw man were also observed among Persian speakers (i.e., where the reporter changes the illocutionary force of the original utterance, either consciously or unconsciously, to convey a specific perspective that is at variance with that of the original speaker). These cases show that Persian indirect reports may not be in line with the Paraphrasis/ Form Principle, where the indirect reporter interprets the original utterances in a way that is not in accord with the illocutionary force of the utterance (samesaying may not be perfectly observed among Persian indirect reports). In line with the sociocultural aspects of reported speech, I briefly discussed the functions of reported speech, and proposed five different functions that will be useful in better conceptualising different social realisations of the reports.

References Bakhtin, M. (1984). Problems of Dostoevsky’s poetics. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. Blackwell, S.  E. (2016). Porque in Spanish oral narratives: Semantic Porque, (meta)pragmatic Porque or both? In A. Capone & J. L. Mey (Eds.), Interdisciplinary studies in pragmatics, culture and society (pp. 615–652). Cham, Switzerland/Heidelberg, Germany: Springer. Boeder, W. (2002). Speech and thought representation in the Kartvelian (South Caucasian) languages. In T. Güldemann & M. von Roncador (Eds.), Reported discourse: A meeting ground for different linguistics domains (pp. 3–48). Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins. Borg, E. (2012). Pursuing meaning. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. Capone, A. (2010). The social practice of indirect reports. Journal of Pragmatics, 42, 377–391. Capone, A. (2012). Indirect reports as language games. Pragmatics & Cognition, 20(3), 593–613. Capone, A. (2013). Consequences of the pragmatics of ‘de se’. In A. Capone & N. Feit (Eds.), Attitudes ‘de se’: Linguistics, epistemology and metaphysics (pp.  209–244). Stanford, CA: CSLI. Capone, A. (2016). The pragmatics of indirect reports: socio-philosophical considerations. Cham, Switzerland: Springer. Capone, A. (2018). On the social praxis of indirect reporting. In A. Capone, M. Garcia-Carpintero, & A. Falzone (Eds.), Indirect reports and pragmatics in the world languages (pp. 3–20). Cham, Switzerland: Springer. Capone, A., & Nodoushan, M. A. S. (2014). On indirect reports and language games: Evidence from Persian. Rivista Italiana di Filosofia del Linguaggio, 8(2), 26–42. Coulmas, F. (1986a). Reported speech: Some general issues. In F. Coulmas (Ed.), Direct and indirect speech (pp. 1–28). Berlin, Germany: Mouton. Coulmas, F. (1986b). Direct and indirect speech in Japanese. In F. Coulmas (Ed.), Direct and indirect speech (pp. 161–178). Berlin, Germany: Mouton. Declerck, R. (1990). Sequence of tenses in English. Folia Linguistica, 24, 513–544. Ebert, K. (1986). Reported speech in some languages of Nepal. In F. Coulmas (Ed.), Direct and indirect speech (pp. 145–160). Berlin, Germany: Mouton.

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Golato, A. (2002). Self-quotation in German: Reporting on past decisions. In T. Güldemann & M. von Roncador (Eds.), Reported discourse: A meeting ground for different linguistics domains (pp. 49–70). Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins. Gregoromichelaki, E. (2017). Quotation in dialogue. In P. Saka & M. Johnson (Eds.), The semantics and pragmatics of quotation (pp. 195–258). Cham, Switzerland: Springer. Gregoromichelaki, E., & Kempson, R. (2016). Reporting, dialogue, and the role of grammar. In A. Capone, F. Kiefer, & F. Lo Piparo (Eds.), Indirect reports and pragmatics: Interdisciplinary studies (pp. 115–150). Cham, Switzerland: Springer. Güldemann, T., & von Roncador, M. (2002). Preface. In T.  Güldemann & M. von Roncador (Eds.), Reported discourse: A meeting ground for different linguistics domains (pp. vii–vix). Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins. Haberland, H. (1986). Reported speech in Danish. In F. Coulmas (Ed.), Direct and indirect speech (pp. 219–253). Berlin, Germany: Mouton. Haßler, G. (2002). Evidentiality and reported speech in romance languages. In T. Güldemann & M. von Roncador (Eds.), Reported discourse: A meeting ground for different linguistics domains (pp. 143–172). Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins. Itakura, H. (2018). Accuracy in reported speech: Evidence from masculine and feminine Japanese language. In A. Capone, M. Garcia-Carpintero, & A. Falzone (Eds.), Indirect reports and pragmatics in the world languages (pp. 315–332). Cham, Switzerland: Springer. Jay, T., & Janschewitz, K. (2008). The pragmatics of swearing. Journal of Politeness Research, 4(2), 267–288. Kammerzell, F., & Peust, C.  P. (2002). Reported speech in Egyptian. In T.  Güldemann & M. von Roncador (Eds.), Reported discourse: a meeting ground for different linguistics domains (pp. 289–322). Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins. Kecskes, I. (2014). Intercultural pragmatics. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. Kecskes, I. (2016). Indirect reporting in bilingual language production. In A. Capone, F. Kiefer, & F. Lo Piparo (Eds.), Indirect reports and pragmatics: Interdisciplinary studies (pp. 9–30). Cham, Switzerland: Springer. Kiefer, F. (2016). Indirect and direct reports in Hungarian. In A.  Capone, F.  Kiefer, & F.  Lo Piparo (Eds.), Indirect reports and pragmatics: Interdisciplinary studies (pp. 77–92). Cham, Switzerland: Springer. Macagno, F., & Walton, D. (2017). Interpreting straw man argumentation: The pragmatics of quotation and reporting. Cham, Switzerland: Springer. Massamba, D. P. B. (1986). Reported speech in Swahili. In F. Coulmas (Ed.), Direct and indirect speech (pp. 99–120). Berlin, Germany: Mouton. McCullagh, M. (2017). Scare-Quoting and incorporation. In P. Saka & M. Johnson (Eds.), The semantics and pragmatics of quotation (pp. 3–34). Cham, Switzerland: Springer. Morady Moghaddam, M. (in press). Appraising and reappraising of compliments and the provision of responses: Automatic and non-automatic reactions. Pragmatics. Nodoushan, M.  A. S. (2018). Which view of indirect reports do Persian data corroborate? International Review of Pragmatics, 10, 76–100. Saka, P. (2017). Blah, blah, blah: Quasi-quotation and unquotation. In P.  Saka & M.  Johnson (Eds.), The semantics and pragmatics of quotation (pp. 35–64). Cham, Switzerland: Springer. Sakita, T. I. (2002). Discourse perspectives on tense choice in spoken-English reporting discourse. In T. Güldemann & M. von Roncador (Eds.), Reported discourse: A meeting ground for different linguistics domains (pp. 173–198). Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins. Suzuki, Y. (2002). The acceptance of ‘free indirect discourse’: A change in the representation of thought in Japanese. In T. Güldemann & M. von Roncador (Eds.), Reported discourse: A meeting ground for different linguistics domains (pp. 109–120). Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins. Van der Wurff, W. (2002). Direct, indirect and other discourse in Bengali newspapers. In T. Güldemann & M. von Roncador (Eds.), Reported discourse: A meeting ground for different linguistics domains (pp. 121–139). Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins.

Chapter 10

Conclusion and Future Concerns

Success in not final, failure is not fatal: it is the courage to continue that counts. (Winston Churchill)

10.1  Introduction In this book, I have discussed some key issues and topics that are essential in accounting for the practice of indirect reporting. This chapter provides a general summary of the book. In addition, I talk briefly about how indirect reporting can help us better conceptualise pragmatics. Importantly, this book has shown that indirect reporting has many things to offer our understanding of pragmatics and discourse studies. Similarly, I provide a discussion on how I generally see indirect reporting, referring to a ‘generative element’ underlying its construct. Finally, I make an argument for what is still missing from our knowledge of indirect reporting, and how future research can help bridge the gap.

10.2  A Snapshot of the Book The book is divided into ten chapters, nine of which elaborate on a specific aspect of indirect reporting. The first six chapters extensively discuss the function and the underlying processes of indirect reporting. I have tried to show that indirect reports are complicated and elaborate constructs that are closely germane to intricate social, cognitive, and philosophical factors. More specifically, indirect reporting is not just the syntactic regeneration of other’s utterances, but rather, it involves intricate issues such as logic, emotion, social distance, power, competence, and creativity. Additionally, I have compared and contrasted direct and indirect reports to better conceptualise the features of indirect reporting. Although it is not difficult to distinguish between direct and indirect reports in written discourse, it is much harder to draw a distinction between these two constructs in natural talk since the reporter may not use any clear-cut mark to signal the introduction of direct or indirect report. © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019 M. Morady Moghaddam, The Praxis of Indirect Reports, Perspectives in Pragmatics, Philosophy & Psychology 21, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-14269-8_10

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To provide researchers with a detailed picture of how indirect reports work, I have discussed the principles underlying them, as well as proposing some new principles that were missing in the literature of reported speech. My general view is that all the participants of indirect reporting are equally important in the formation of the ultimate force of the report. In other words, we should not focus just on the reporter, but the hearer and the original speaker can change the way a report is made. Besides, online contextual factors are also important in the transformations observed in indirect reporting. In Chaps. 7 and 8, I discussed the interesting issues of ‘politeness’ and ‘trust’ in indirect reporting, which are underdeveloped areas of investigation in reported speech. It is surprising that these two issues have not been addressed in the literature of reported speech, yet I do believe that the practice of indirect reporting is lame without a close consideration of politeness or trust. In Chap. 9, I comprehensively addressed the issue of ‘common core’ in cross-cultural research on reported speech. In addition, I discussed Persian indirect reports extensively, using naturally-­ occurring talk as the data gathering tool. This part was essential and long-awaited since there have been several unsubstantiated accounts of Persian indirect reports which needed to be polished and refined. I both addressed the shortcomings of previous research and provided a clear account of how indirect reports are formed among Persian speakers. I believe that this chapter provides a good yardstick for other researchers interested in Persian reported speech and intercultural communication.

10.3  Indirect Reporting as a General Theory of Pragmatics The approach I adhered to in this book is that indirect reports are not just syntactic and semantic extrapolations, but rather, they take into consideration the ‘dynamics of human abilities’ (refer to Weigand [2010] for further elaboration). For Weigand, dialogue means unpredictability, probability, and a mix of order and disorder. The same traits are applicable to indirect reporting as well. The dynamics of the situation and human abilities such as ‘thinking’ and ‘perceiving’ (among other things) have a great impact on the way indirect reports are formed and regulated during interaction. On this account, indirect reporting takes into account ‘dialogism’ where all the human existence is involved in the process of semantic or pragmatic opacity. As has been argued by Capone (2013), research on indirect reports is crucial to expanding our understanding of the pragmatics of language. Indirect reporting contributes towards a general theory of pragmatics by emphasising the concept of the ‘language game’ and the ‘Principle of Probability’ (refer to Chap. 2, Sect. 2.5 for further information). On this account, indirect reporting targets automatic (semantic) processes and the strategic choices (individuals’ intentions based on evaluations), taking into consideration subtle aspects of the interaction. Pragmatics too approaches interaction based on situation-specific assumptions that are provisional,

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establishing them anew in different contexts. That said, this does not mean chaos. There are rules, but interlocutors can breach those rules based on their evaluation of the situation as well as based on their appraisal of their own role and that of the conversation partner. Indirect reports embrace a ‘generative element’, enabling speakers to generate implicature through pragmatic opacity. As a result, the hearer should be able to distinguish between ‘what is said’ and ‘what is implied’, since indirect reports are not just about paraphrasing others’ utterances; rather, they include the evaluative load and the perspective of both the reporter and the original speaker (Capone, 2012; Haßler, 2002). Indirect reporting as a burgeoning field of study has much to offer in terms of pragmatics, and I have attempted to show its potential in this book by attaching indirect reports to intricate processes regulating speech.

10.4  My View on Indirect Reports I do not see indirect reports only as syntactic and semantic transformations. They are cases of sociocognitive manoeuvres. Weigand (2010, p. 74) says that “meaning and understanding are different for different individuals and open for negotiation.” On this account, individual differences are highlighted as affecting the practice of indirect reporting. Individuals act not only based on social norms and conventions but also according to their rational and cognitive characteristics. In this case, each individual would have a particular way of conceptualising and perceiving the original speaker, the hearer, the source information, and even himself/herself. Likewise, the hearer of the report may interpret the reporter and the original speaker (source information) based on sociocognitive/contextual factors. Indirect reports, therefore, are cases of ‘value judgement’ that fill the gap between competence and performance (cognition and society).

10.5  What Does Future Research Have to Offer? With regard to linguistic/philosophical aspects of indirect reporting, much has been published recently. That said, issues such as ‘politeness’, ‘trust’, and ‘cognitive factors’ have not been given due attention. Additionally, indirect reporting has been mostly viewed as an end-point or the final product. However, on the other hand, indirect reports can be used as a method towards argumentation, reasoning, and persuasion. In Chap. 8, I discussed that indirect reports can generate trust. In addition, besides being an informative tool, indirect reports can have other functions, such as ‘phatic’ and ‘expressive’ (refer to Chap. 9 for further study). On this account, indirect reports are not the end products, but rather, they can be used as a communication strategy to create a specific impact during the interaction.

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As a result, research in the future should move away from classical syntactic or semantic analysis, and approach indirect reporting as a communication strategy, a cognitive manoeuvre, or an argumentative tool (among other things). Research is scarce regarding the ‘politeness’ issues of reported speech, and I hope that this area will be expanded in future works on reported speech. I also hope that more empirical studies will emerge, which put into use the theoretical underpinnings elaborated on in this book (the process of indirect reporting in Chap. 2; knowledge/belief distinction; refinery and coping strategies discussed in Chap. 3; Hall’s spatial model and reporting in Chap. 4; Principle of Politeness; and disagreement, among other things).

10.6  The Moving Finger The journey is done, and what had to be accomplished is now accomplished. The attempt is neither final nor sufficient, and more needs to be said and written about reported speech (specifically on issues such as trust, politeness, and cognition). Time marches on, and I have recorded something that is now related to the past. We need to move forward and explore the untouched areas of reported speech. What I have done is only part of a bigger picture, a piece of the puzzle; but I believe that the Moving Finger (fate) will have many things to show us about this intricate topic in the future. The Moving Finger writes; and, having writ, Moves on: nor all thy Piety nor Wit Shall lure it back to cancel half a Line, Nor all thy Tears wash out a Word of it. — Omar Khayyám

References Capone, A. (2012). Indirect reports as language games. Pragmatics & Cognition, 20(3), 593–613. Capone, A. (2013). The pragmatics of quotation, explicatures and modularity of mind. Pragmatics and Society, 4(3), 259–284. Haßler, G. (2002). Evidentiality and reported speech in romance languages. In T. Güldemann & M. von Roncador (Eds.), Reported discourse: A meeting ground for different linguistics domains (pp. 143–172). Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins. Weigand, E. (2010). Dialogue: The mixed game. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins.