The Power of Narrative: Climate Skepticism and the Deconstruction of Science 2020019171, 2020019172, 9780197542101, 9780197542125

Table of contents :
Cover
The Power of Narrative
Copyright
CONTENTS
Preface
Acknowledgments
1. Introduction
2. Ideology as Narrative
3. When Skepticism Became Public
4. Skeptics without Borders
5. Unpacking the Genetic Metanarrative
6. The Social Construction of Climate Science
7. Ideological Narratives and beyond in a Post-​Truth World
Appendix: List of articles analyzed for Chapter 3
Notes
Bibliography
Index

Citation preview

 

The Power of Narrative

 

 

The Power of Narrative Climate Skepticism and the Deconstruction of Science

R A U L P. L E J A N O A N D S H O N D E L J.   N E R O Illustrations by Michael Chua

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1 Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the UK and certain other countries. Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press 198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America. © Oxford University Press 2020 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, by license, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reproduction rights organization. Inquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above. You must not circulate this work in any other form and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer. Library of Congress Cataloging-​in-​Publication Data Names: Lejano, Raul P., author. | Nero, Shondel J., author. Title: The power of narrative : climate skepticism and the deconstruction of science /​Raul P. Lejano and Shondel J. Nero. Description: New York, NY : Oxford University Press, 2020. | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2020019171 (print) | LCCN 2020019172 (ebook) | ISBN 9780197542101 (hardback) | ISBN 9780197542125 (epub) Subjects: LCSH: Climatology—​Social aspects. | Climatic changes—​Effect of human beings on. | Anti-​environmentalism. | Rhetoric—​Social aspects. Classification: LCC QC981.45 .L45 2020 (print) | LCC QC981.45 (ebook) | DDC 577.27/​6—​dc23 LC record available at https://​lccn.loc.gov/​2020019171 LC ebook record available at https://​lccn.loc.gov/​2020019172 1 3 5 7 9 8 6 4 2 Printed by Integrated Books International, United States of America

 

CONTENTS

Preface  vii Acknowledgments  xi

1. Introduction   1 2. Ideology as Narrative  17 3. When Skepticism Became Public  38 4. Skeptics without Borders  81 5. Unpacking the Genetic Metanarrative  95 6. The Social Construction of Climate Science  113 7. Ideological Narratives and beyond in a Post-​Truth World  129 Appendix: List of articles analyzed for Chapter 3  149 Notes  155 Bibliography  169 Index  183

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P R E FA C E

Early one March morning in 2017, the press gathered in Washington, DC, in anticipation of one of the first public statements by Scott Pruitt, the newly appointed director of the US Environmental Protection Agency. If they were hoping for headlines, they were not to be disappointed. Responding to a question about the scientific consensus around CO2 and climate change, he said: “No, I would not agree that it’s a primary contributor to the global warming that we see.” Pausing a bit, perhaps to take in the stunned silence of the reporters, he added: “We need to continue the review and the analysis.” Several months later, President Donald Trump would announce a plan to pull out of the Paris Climate Accord, stating that it was a misguided initiative and, worse, part of a global conspiracy to attack the US way of life. With the United States’ withdrawal, the agreement’s inherent weaknesses stood out in bold relief. As of this writing, pledged carbon reductions would amount to barely a third of what scientists estimated would be needed to keep the increase in mean global temperature to under two degrees centigrade. Reaction to this came fast and furious from all sectors (even from within Trump’s own Republican party) and all corners of the globe. It was as if the sky had literally fallen, and the entire climate agenda that Obama, Merkel, and others had carefully and painstakingly crafted together had been taken apart overnight. The truth is that this was an outcome long in coming. There had been, all throughout Obama’s two-​term presidency, and well before, a rising tide of antagonism to climate change science. Rather than a sudden wave of disenchantment with the climate change agenda, climate skepticism was a movement that grew steadily and surely over decades, refining (and coarsening) its discourse and expanding its network of sympathizers. Anne and Paul Ehrlich had documented its early beginnings more than twenty years ago. More recent commentators, such as Aaron McCright, Riley Dunlap, Naomi Oreskes, Erik Conway, and vii

 

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others, noted the political lobbying that was gaining in power and influence, fueled by funding from the coal industry and other power players. And the lobbying efforts took root. In a Pew survey in 2016, 66 percent of all moderate Republicans and 85  percent of all conservative Republicans polled rejected the idea that global warming was mostly caused by human activity.1 The 2019 Pew survey reported these numbers as 63 percent and 84 percent, respectively,2 which suggests this narrative has a degree of resilience. A number of scholars have written about the political lobbying and financing of the climate skeptical movement. But there is something more, and deeper, to it than the self-​interested machinations of the coal and gas industry and their cronies in Washington. One cannot but observe that there was something powerful about the climate skeptical movement. Their message resonated with people somewhere deep in their psyches, deep enough for the story of colluding, self-​serving climate scientists to challenge the primacy of science as the font of empirical truth and knowledge. Deep in the US heartland, conviction about a global conspiracy promoting a “decarbonized” world ran as strong as beliefs in democracy. For some, it was an essential truth that was part of a raging battle between falsehood and the right way. In short, it was a narrative that confounded its critics and captured the public’s soul. Millions of US citizens (and, as also discussed, those in other nations as well) profess the belief that climate change research is, in Sarah Palin’s words, “snake oil science.” This book is an exploration of the strength of that narrative. In a way, it is also an inquiry into the nature of a new fundamentalism that has captured not just a segment of the US public but also other ideologically torn nations in the developed and developing worlds. The discussion traces the evolution of the narrative over the decades. The climate skeptical narrative was not just a memorable story spun well. It was, as we argue in this book, a narrative that resonated with the most fundamental aspects of modern culture and the everyday lives of millions of people. It resonated because it was foundational. This book illustrates how, exactly, the narrative operates on the ideological level. Interestingly, the climate skeptical narrative, we argue, is founded upon a more basic (meta)narrative that is not even about climate itself. The book also explores how the narrative helps create a network of policy actors, business interests, and members of the public. It binds the network and gives it its identity and its playbook. More deeply, we elucidate how certain properties of the narrative have served to isolate this network so that it now precludes dialogue. Climate skepticism is an ideological watershed that has become a core belief for millions of people. It is also a coherent movement that has the power to bind powerful actors into a loose but effective coalition.

 



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In the following chapters, we demonstrate how the narrative can do this—​ create a network and hold it together against a scientific consensus around climate change. We also demonstrate the inextricable link between the narrative and how it is narrated. We employ narrative and critical discourse analyses to illustrate the properties of the climate skeptical narrative that provide it with power and with a moral coherence that can bind people to it. To the best of our knowledge, there has been no such systematic exploration of climate skepticism as storytelling. This volume builds on previous work on how narrative can forge community, especially Lejano’s co-​authored book The Power of narrative in environmental networks, where the concept of the narrative-​network was introduced. This present book is thus the second feature in what hopefully will be a continuing Power of Narrative series. Our analysis brings out another interesting dynamic. The ideological discourse and reactionary stance taken up by climate skeptics is beginning to engender similar reactions on the part of some in the scientific community. As we will further describe, ideology seems to beget more ideology in the political discourse overall. The tragedy of this sequence of action and reaction is that progress on deliberation around these contentious issues seems ever beyond reach. The book asks another tantalizing question: Is it possible that the narrative of climate skepticism shares with other narratives a more elemental (or genetic) metanarrative that is common to all of these? What would that genetic plot look like? Perhaps the most important question taken up is how to understand the ongoing conflict between science and its counter-​narrative, an issue that goes beyond climatological concerns. An ideological struggle is raging in every society today. This book is an attempt to not just explain how we arrived at this point but also, though less directly, how we might move beyond it. It speaks to the interests of public policy, both the researchers of policy and political science as well as the practitioners. It speaks to a growing scholarly community around science and technology studies, scholars of the cultural aspects of science who have yet to fully appreciate the narrative properties of scientific discourse. This book aspires to reach a general audience, as well—​members of the public who, along with scholars, woke up one morning to find themselves in a different world, and wondered how we got here.

Postscript As the book goes to press, the world faces the specter of a global pandemic in the form of the novel coronavirus, COVID-​19. Initially, President Trump opted to respond to it with a bit of an ideological narrative of denial, using terms like

 

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“fake news” and the “new hoax” (and possibly even linking it to immigration),3 contrary to what health experts were saying. This is related to what we study in this book, which has to do with the social construction and deconstruction of science. Given that both climate change and the coronavirus are ultimately crises of humanity, we can only hope that, over time, consensus and more reasoned narratives prevail.

 

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The authors wish to thank Sarah Humphreville, senior editor at Oxford University Press, for her vision and guidance in shaping the book. We were also helped considerably by the insights of the reviewers who evaluated the book proposal and draft manuscript. We also thank Emma Hodgdon at Oxford University Press for managing the production of the book. We acknowledge the assistance of New  York University, which provided a research challenge grant that allowed us to hire research assistants to help in this endeavor, namely Brian Robinson, who sifted through a large amount of text, and Ching Chit Chau, Shreya Sanjeev, and Ma Loisa Tong, who helped us with the preparation of the final manuscript. The grant also allowed us to engage Michael Chua, architect and cartoonist. We acknowledge the work of Jennifer Dodge who co-​authored (with Raul Lejano) an article, “The narrative properties of ideology: The adversarial turn and climate skepticism in the USA,” that provided some of the analytical method used to trace the evolution of climate skeptical narratives over time. Chapter 2 makes use of some empirical material first featured in this article in Policy Sciences, published by Springer Science+Business Media. Similarly, some textual data used in ­chapter 5 first appeared in an article in the journal Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society, “Ideology and the narrative of climate skepticism,” authored by Raul Lejano and published by the American Meteorological Society. Some of the conceptual roots of this book trace back to Lejano’s long-​standing collaboration with Helen Ingram and Mrill Ingram, most notably on their book The power of narrative in environmental movements (MIT Press, 2013). The present book is the second installation of what will hopefully be a continuing collection on the power of narrative. Another foundation for this work was Lejano’s first book Frameworks for policy analysis:  Merging text and context (Routledge, 2006), notably its relational and textual perspectives on public policy. Raul xi

 

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would like to thank his wife, Dr. Wing Shan Kan, professor and social worker, for her love and support, and Baobao too. The other strand of scholarship, which was key to this book, is Shondel Nero’s work in applied linguistics, specifically discourse analysis within and beyond the classroom. This work, which has its roots in studying language acquisition and vernacular use in the classroom (e.g., Vernaculars in the classroom, co-​authored with Dohra Ahmad, Routledge, 2014), has provided valuable insights into the evolving language of climate skepticism and the ways in which critical discourse analysis can help to unpack the sociopolitical context that gave rise to it. It should be obvious that the study of narrative and discourse should occur together, but it isn’t, and it only happened through the chance collaboration of two scholars approaching a common topic from different directions. Finally, Shondel Nero would like to thank her spouse, Louis Parascandola, for calling her attention to new climate change articles and being her sounding board for every new development in the climate change debate.

 

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Introduction

This book is about how words become edifices; how they come together like brick and stone, and people set them down, layer upon layer, building structures and neighborhoods and cities. And the villages that people settle into are the stories that these words build up into alleys that connect and walls that set apart. There is a legend among the Seneca about a boy who wandered into the forest and stumbled upon a talking stone. In exchange for everything he had, the stone would tell stories from the beginning of the world. Amazed, the boy would spend his days in the forest listening to the storytelling stone. He told others of the stone and soon others came, to listen to it. Their numbers grew, until the elders told everyone to see the stone and listen and before long the entire village had gathered there. The stone told story after story and after it had told all the stories in the world it said, “I have finished.” And it told the people: “You must keep these stories as long as the world lasts; tell them to your children and grandchildren, generation after generation.” It was time for them to become a storytelling people. And this is how the Seneca were sustained, as they are today, as a tribe.1 It’s the magic of stories that we take up, how they bind people to one another so they come to constitute a community. Or maybe the better term is co-​ constitute. For just as the Seneca kept their stories alive, at the same time the stories kept the Seneca tribe and its traditions intact. This coming together of community and story seems to be two sides to one coin. Some researchers have referred to this twin relationship as a narrative-​network, where the stories need a community to maintain them, and the community needs the stories to give it identity.2 The power of the narrative to co-​constitute has not escaped the attention of scholars of collective action and social anthropology. For example, researchers studied storytelling traditions within the Aeta (or Agta), an indigenous nomadic tribe in the Northern Philippines.3 The tribe was scattered across a number of separate communities, and the researchers began by inquiring into which of the The Power of Narrative. Raul P. Lejano and Shondel J. Nero, Oxford University Press (2020). © Oxford University Press. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197542101.001.0001.

 

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communities had better storytellers than the others. They concluded that the stronger the tradition and practice of storytelling in a community, the better organized and better performing it was. Scholars seem to naturally gravitate toward traditional and indigenous communities when studying the power of storytelling, which is understandable. Traditional communities are thought of as having kept their traditions alive through the strength of oral history, telling stories across generations. But it’s not as if the centrality of narrative in community has dissipated in modern society.4 Scholars in the field of organization studies have looked at the role of narrative in corporations as well.5 What they found is that narratives serve much of the same purposes in Wall Street that they do in traditional communities. In organizations like IBM, the World Bank, and Wells Fargo, great stories and storytellers help organize the company, stamping its blueprint on the minds and hearts of its employees and selling it to the rest of the world. Corporations maintain themselves because, just like the Aeta or the Seneca, they are a storytelling people. The organizing power of narrative in society isn’t far removed from Ricoeur’s point about narrative allowing the individual to organize a multitude of experiences and motivations into a coherent sense of personhood.6 Rather than a jumble of people, things, and events, storytelling (Ricoeur uses the word emplotment) gathers them together into a coherent, even memorable, logic. In this day and age, what is most striking about these investigations is not so much the point about narrative being an ubiquitous part of the workings of society—​this has become, by now, a truism. It’s also not even the insight that narrative, just as it organizes a novel’s characters, places, and events into a story, can organize a group of people into an organization or a tribe. Rather, the most significant thing is that, in this postmodern age, when all convention has supposedly dissolved into thin air, when we use terms like post-​truth to capture the unsettledness of the moment; with all this, that apparently people continue to be able to tell the good story from the bad. Some stories are great, and people gravitate to them. Whether they be ancestors huddled around a storytelling rock, or post-​millennials watching a YouTube video on their phones, people can recognize great stories and are still moved by them. Which brings us to the question at hand. Every year, various research centers around the world poll the public regarding their attitudes surrounding climate change. Most of these organizations, but not all,7 don’t hide the fact that the people behind these surveys firmly believe the science of climate change, its anthropogenic causes, and the urgency of decarbonization. And, so, these surveys are awaited with not a little bit of anxiety. One recent survey, polling a random sample of the US public, says that, first, a majority (70%) of the US public does believe that climate is changing and, furthermore, that anthropogenic carbon emissions are the main culprit.8 The

 

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report goes on to say, as if breathing a collective sigh of relief, that “A majority of Americans (58%) understand that global warming is mostly human-​caused, matching the highest level since our surveys began in 2008.”9 But the tables also show another interesting thing, that while a majority are decidedly on the side of climate science, there is a persistent minority, in fact 28%, of the public who do not believe climate is changing or, if it is, that human activities are causing it. This is the segment of the public that describes itself as climate skeptics (though, as we will discuss, other scholars prefer the term climate deniers). Of these skeptics, half in fact believe that climate scientists are part of a grand conspiracy. It is, to be sure, a minority, but what a minority. And the striking thing about this is that despite the august testimony of the great majority of the scientific community, almost a fifth of the US public think it is all fake news. Later in the book, we will examine climate skepticism in other countries as well, but the US example illustrates this phenomenon most clearly. For us, the rise of climate skepticism is most interesting because we wonder how this is possible. How is it, that a significant portion of the public, hearing and reading about all the data and scientific reports about the changing climate, can take all that and decide, this is all wrong, and the truth is clearly the opposite? How is it possible for significant numbers of people to take a position contrary to most of the scientists on a matter of science? There are different ways to try and understand this. One is to ascribe climate skepticism to a radical fringe—​i.e., what Barack Obama christened the “flat-​ earth society.”10 But one would simply dismiss a significant segment of the public at one’s peril. Recall, not that long ago, when supporters of Donald Trump were dismissed as part of an illogical fringe group. As it turns out, there was a real groundswell behind him, and the movement was strong enough to convince almost half of the electorate (and more than half of the electoral college) and, fast forward a few years later, the rest is history. More to the point, if we are to take the notion of civil discourse seriously, when members of the public express strongly held beliefs, they deserve to be at least listened to. It should not be so easy to simply dismiss the public. Much of the commentary on climate skepticism has increasingly taken a dismissive stance, arguing, for example, that the idea of balance leads journalists to give minority views more credence than they deserve.11 This should be enough to give the reader pause. One of the authors recalls, an engaging conversation not long ago with a young entrepreneur starting up a new business. He was, quite obviously to the reporter, an intelligent, thoughtful person. He was also a climate skeptic. He was not, by any stretch, a “flat-​earther.” Toward the end of the conversation, he made a point of saying there are a lot of people who, out of political correctness, mainly want to point fingers at you and tell you you’re wrong about

 

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climate, and they never care to discuss it; most of them have never read anything about the science. Consider this for a moment. A significant portion of the public, at least in the United States,12 is taking a position on a matter of science that runs counter to the strongly held position of most of the scientific community. And so, we ask: what is it about the climate skeptical view that is convincing, even compelling, to many members of the public, perhaps most of whom are not so different from the thoughtful but skeptical entrepreneur? How do we explain the phenomenon of the intelligent climate skeptic?13 A central premise of this book is that there is something about the narrative of climate skepticism that is compelling. Narrative, as we know, takes hold of people’s ideas and feelings and help build allegiances among them. There is a wealth of scholarship on the power of narrative in constructing individual identity14 and group solidarity.15 Not everything is about narrative, of course, and there is more to the phenomenon of climate skepticism than just this. But most certainly, and this is something that will be explored in this book and not merely claimed, the strength of the narrative is an important reason behind the resolute skepticism of many. In this book, we foreground narrative, while not forgetting other contributing factors. There are new insights that emerge when we focus on narrative more closely than is found in the literature, which examines climate skepticism from the more conventional focus on pluralist politics and industry lobbying. Scholars have done extensive investigations into the action of political entrepreneurs in promoting the climate skeptical view.16 It is in these political agents’ self-​interest to maintain a carbon-​emitting economy. But whatever self-​interested motives can be ascribed to politicians and industry lobbyists, the same cannot be said for members of the public. Whatever one feels about climate science and skepticism, the healthiest approach is to take members of the public at their word when they express their beliefs. When a significant portion of the public tells pollsters that they don’t believe in climate change, the safest bet is to assume that this really is the case. If the skeptical public really, secretly believed that the science behind the theory of climate change was right and that their children’s and their grandchildren’s future were imperiled, they would rally behind climate action. The narrative of climate skepticism is repeated by members of the public because, we presume, it rings true to them. If the reader is willing to, at least provisionally for now, consider that the anti-​climate science movement owes much to the narrative itself, what are the properties of the narrative that make it so compelling? Consider what this narrative has been able to do. It has been able to create a counter-​narrative to that maintained by most in the scientific community in what is, on its face, a matter of science. Who can claim authority on matters of

 

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empirical fact any more than the scientist, whose territory this is after all? And yet, the climate skeptical narrative is somehow able to mount its own perch and stake out its own territory. A narrative approach will help us understand how.

Good Narratives In 2007, a documentary entitled The Great Global Warming Swindle was released.17 Here is an excerpt from the beginning of the video: Narrator (N): Each day the news reports grow more fantastically apocalyptic. Politicians no longer dare to express any doubt about climate change. Lord Lawson, former UK economic minister: There is such intolerance of any dissenting voice . . . this is the most politically incorrect thing possible, is to doubt this climate change orthodoxy. N: Global warming has gone beyond politics; it is a new kind of morality. (Cut to BBC news report: Well, the prime minister is back from his holiday, unrepentant and unembarrassed about yet another long-​haul destination . . .) Narrator: . . . Yet, as the frenzy of a man-​made global warming grows shriller, many senior climate scientists say the actual scientific basis for the theory is crumbling. Prof. Nir Shaviv (Univ. of Jerusalem): It appears for example in earth’s history when we had three times as much CO2 as we have today, or ten times as much CO2 as we have today, and if CO2 has a large effect on climate, then you should see it in the temperature reconstruction. Professor Ian Clark (Univ. of Ottawa): If you look at climate from a geological time frame, we would never suspect CO2 as a major climate driver. Dr.  Piers Corbyn, Forecaster, Weather Action: None of the major climate changes in the last thousand years can be explained by CO2. Clark (Ottawa): We can’t say that CO2 will drive climate. It certainly never did in the past. Prof. John Christy (IPCC author): I’ve often heard it said that there’s a consensus of thousands of scientists on the global warming issue and that humans are causing catastrophic change to the climate system. Well, I am one scientist, and there are many that simply think, that is not true. N: Man-​made global warming is no ordinary scientific theory. It is presented in the media as having the stamp of authority from an impressive international organization, the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change or IPCC. Prof. Philip Scott (Univ. London): The IPCC, like any UN body, is political. The final conclusions are politically driven.

 

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Prof. Paul Reiter (Pasteur Institute, IPCC): This claim, that the IPCC is the world’s top 1,500 or 2,500 scientists . . . you look at the bibliographies of the people, and it’s simply not true. There are quite a number of non-​scientists. Prof. Richard Lindzen (MIT): And to build the number up to 2,500 they have to start taking reviewers, and government people, and so on, anyone who ever came close to them. And none of them are asked to agree. Many of them disagree. Reiter (Pasteur): Those people who are specialists but don’t agree with the polemic and resign, and there have been a number that I know of, they are simply put on the author list and become part of this 2,500 of the world’s top scientists. Lindzen (MIT): People have decided you have to convince other people, that since no scientist disagrees, you shouldn’t disagree either. But that, whenever you hear that in science, that’s pure propaganda. N: (narrator continues) . . . This is a story of how a theory about climate turned into a political ideology. Patrick Moore, former founder of Greenpeace: See, I don’t even like to call it the environmental movement anymore, because really it is a political activist movement, and they have become hugely influential at a global level. N: . . . It is the story of a distortion of a whole area of science. Dr. Roy Spencer, NASA: Climate scientists need there to be a problem in order to get funding. Christy: We have a vested interest in creating panic because, then, money will flow to climate science. Lindzen: There’s one thing you shouldn’t say, and that is: this might not be a problem. N: .  .  .  It is a story of how a political campaign turned into a bureaucratic bandwagon. Prof. Patrick Michales (Univ. VA): Fact of the matter is, that tens of thousands of jobs depend on global warming right now. It’s a big business. Scott (London): It’s become a great industry in itself, and if the whole global warming farrago collapsed, there would be an awful lot of people out of jobs and looking for work. N: . . . This is a story of censorship and intimidation. Nigel Calder, Editor, New Scientist: I have seen and heard them spitting fury at anybody who disagreed with them, which is not the scientific way. N: . . . It is the story of Westerners invoking the specter of climatic disaster to hinder vital industrial progress in the developing world. James Shikwati, Economist and Author: One clear thing that emerges from the whole environmental debate is that there is somebody keen to kill the African dream, and the African dream is to develop.

 

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Moore (Greenpeace): The environmental movement has evolved into the strongest force there is for preventing development in the developing countries. N: . . . The global warming story is a cautionary tale of how a media scare became the defining idea of a generation. Calder: The whole global warming business has become like a religion, and people who disagree are called heretics . . . The reader can disagree (or agree) with the above, but a good exercise is, for a short time, to set aside the issue of agreeing or disagreeing with it and just pay attention to the narrative. Observe how it weaves a premise, entices the listener by building dramatic tension, even a foreboding sense of wrong being perpetrated as the participants speak, and populates the story with voices, people, events, twists, and turns—​in short, how it emplots. If you, the reader, keep coming back to your disagreement with the narrative, just consider it as you would a fictional work of art. You might begin to appreciate that it is an engaging narrative well told. Observed purely in terms of emplotment, it’s a skillful narrative. For much of this book, we will set aside the matter of fact, which is establishing what the science is and what it proves. We can eventually get back to this important question in due course. Our main concern, for now, is what the narrative is and how it does what it does. If the narrative of climate skepticism has the power to move many, then we can say that it is, in literary terms, a good narrative. The good narrative, as scholars like Jerome Bruner, Martha Nussbaum, and Walter Fisher point out, enwraps, engages, delights, enrages, and surprises. It has a coherence that holds the many parts together and, through the power of emplotment, keeps it all from breaking apart into chaos.18 But the narrative of climate skepticism doesn’t exist in a vacuum. It has to contend with its alter ego which, in this case, is the narrative of the science of climate change. And, in that public space where op-​ed pieces and online blogs move about, the skeptics are able to wrestle with the scientist’s narrative and provide a counter-​narrative that is compelling to at least some members of the public (and quite a few politicians). And the question is, how does the narrative do that? Through what logical and rhetorical devices did skepticism respond to the overwhelming logic of the scientist? It is not just about the power of the logic of a narrative, since narrative is able to combine logic with the emotional, aesthetic, moral, and other dimensions as well. So how did it combine emotion, persuasion, cognition, and logic into something that challenges the narrative of climate science?

 

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This is a book of narrative analysis. Literary scholars will parse the fine distinctions between narrative and its kindred terms—​story, discourse, plot, or sujet. In this book, we will not need to make these distinctions and can interchange all these terms without much effect on our core arguments.19

Narratives can be carefully crafted, and they can evolve over a period of time, improving each time they are retold. Or they can be spun faster than spiders spinning webs. Even tweets are narratives. But not all tweets constitute complete narratives; they only become narratives if one or more tweets describe a logical set of ideas or sequence of events that constitute a coherent chain. To do this, tweets can connect with other tweets or other texts (spoken, written, or thought) outside it. Otherwise, they might just be a set of random, haphazard utterances. Which brings us to the question, what is a narrative? While we don’t dwell on fine categorical distinctions in this book, the reader deserves at least some definition of terms. Narrative is, most plainly, story. But, more deeply, as Ricoeur says, it is the way we experience time and lend coherence to the disparate events, things, and persons that we encounter.20 Thus, we regard narrative as the form by which people emplot different aspects, events, and characters (e.g., related to climate science) and make everything connect into a meaningful whole (i.e., a plot). Narrative takes the otherwise inchoate things, events, and places in a novel (or a life) and makes everything fit together. Narrative is also a story told by a narrator. The same basic story can be told in different ways by different narrators. Later in the book, we will talk about how sometimes a narrative becomes all the more powerful when it develops into a systematic ideology. An ideology is a body of ideas that constitutes a coherent, systematic belief system (of the world, society, climate, etc.). By connecting the two ideas of narrative and ideology, as other scholars have done, we suggest that ideologies can, most often, be represented in the form of a narrative. Another term that needs some explanation is skepticism—​specifically, why we choose to use this term more often than another term in common use, which is denial. Skepticism is simply doubt over the truth or reasonableness of statements about facts and norms. In this book, skepticism specifically refers to expressing

 

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doubt over the accuracy of climate change science and/​or arguing against carbon mitigation. We use the term skepticism rather than denial as the latter is politically charged and presumes that skeptics are misguided and, more than that, intentionally misguiding. We also aim to avoid the kind of absolutist language (such as denial) that shuts off dialogue or more nuanced understandings of the issue at hand. Instead, we find it best to try and examine skeptical narratives more objectively to better understand how they work as narratives, much like one would review a movie’s plot regardless of whether it was one of fiction or nonfiction. Later in the book, we use the same analytical lens to study narratives on the “other” side, which is that of the climate scientists and climate activists.21 We make a conscious effort to be open to the public’s views on climate as reflecting sincere beliefs, while at the same time being aware of how many politicians, lobbyists, and other actors say things that are not so sincere. As some writers point out, what is a healthy skepticism in the scientific enterprise can be misused by some to deliberately misinform.22 We also recognize how the lack of healthy discussion among differently minded members of the public can reinforce siloed ideas about climate—​e.g., what some authors refer to as pluralistic ignorance, which is when people keep silent in the company of those with opposing viewpoints.23 We will take an expansive view on skepticism and consider a whole continuum of positions.24 For example, while most climate skeptical positions will overlap over their opposition to carbon reduction, there is a range of opinions on the idea that human-​induced carbon emissions are causing climate change. This includes skeptics who do not completely debunk climate science but point to uncertainties in it and the need for more research before action should be attempted. When we consider these nuanced positions later in the book (such as when we compare climate skepticism in other countries to that in the United States), we will be clear about which particular skeptical narratives we are describing. Climate skepticism is not just a single monolithic narrative and includes a range of possible variations. Moreover, as we will discuss later in the book, these narratives have evolved over time and continue to do so. We acknowledge that some writers are more dismissive of skeptics, preferring to use terms like contrarians and deniers.25 The surveys also say important things about the question of action. The previously cited survey showed that a majority of the US public do subscribe to the findings of climate science. But, when asked whether they would take an action, such as contributing $10 a month to fight climate change, most (68 percent) say no.26 They may side with the science, but not strongly enough to act.27 The importance of the narrative goes beyond the numbers. Regardless of however many of the public subscribe to the climate skeptical narrative, it continues to be used, in its varied forms, in the discourse against action on

 

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climate. This ranges from a critic’s claim that “Strong global climate action would cause far more hunger and food insecurity than climate change itself ”28 to President Trump when asked if he had seen his own administration’s climate report (“Yeah. I don’t believe it . . . I don’t believe it”29). Any kind of doubt can be used to forestall action. After all, if one is convinced that the jury is still out on climate change, then why exert so much effort and expense? Why not just wait till more evidence is in? If one doubts the feasibility of carbon mitigation, why not direct efforts elsewhere? If something is not certain and, moreover, not due to really become a problem till sometime in the future, then just focus on the problems here and now, critics will say. And if one is not just uncertain about climate science but convinced that climate scientists are in fact part of a global conspiracy, then doubt can even turn to outrage.

What the Literature Says Scholars and journalists have investigated how industry and conservative think tanks began mounting a challenge to climate science. Oreskes and Conway traced the history of how industry lobbyists and a handful of scientists, espousing free market principles, crafted a critique.30 Others have pointed to the considerable funding from the oil and gas and other industries toward public relations efforts revolving around a counter-​narrative.31 A steady source of support came from industries that had a stake in continued dependence on fossil fuel.32 In many cases, industry channeled support to contrarians through politically aligned think tanks.33 An essential cog in this machine was the conservative media, contributing to the so-​called echo chamber that describes how people can self-​ select media that support their views and tune out other voices.34 This literature focuses on the political entrepreneurship, lobbying, and corporate funding. Less attention has been paid to how climate skepticism captures the hearts and minds of the public. Media influence, partisan funding, and the like ultimately have a great effect on the public psyche. But this does not allow us to completely understand the power of the climate skeptical agenda over segments of the general public, as glimpsed in the slew of comments seen daily in online blogs and social media. Free market ideology is only part of this, as many display negative attitudes toward ideas consistent with the free market, such as the free flow of labor across borders.35 What we need to account for is the ability of a story to move them. In this book, we focus on the power of the narrative of climate skepticism. The actions of political actors can always be attributed to vested self-​interest, but not so easily for members of the public. In other words, there has to be something powerful about the story of climate skepticism to earn their allegiance.

 

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Much of the scholarship on climate skepticism/​denial has examined political processes and determinants such as political affiliation and other factors associated with climate skepticism.36 Others focus on the role of the media in deepening the divide around climate change.37 Relatively little attention has been paid to the narrative itself. Climate skepticism is what we have referred to as a narrative-​network. Perhaps, if the existing literature has emphasized the network aspect of climate skepticism, our work demands the spotlight be also shone on the narrative. Some authors have studied the discourse and framing of climate denial.38 But most often, by discourse and frames these authors mean more abstract themes that do not quite rise to the level of story. While narratives are complete stories, frames are more like generalized concepts (e.g., conspiracy) that can be summarized in a short label or phrase. A frame is a conceptual scheme that helps us interpret a situation in a certain way.39 A narrative is also a conceptual scheme, but it takes a specific form, involving a sequence of connected events, characters, and setting. For example, while the idea “climate science is a conspiracy” is a theme (or frame), the whole saga of “Climategate” involves a plot, a set of characters, a sequence of events, a point of conflict, and other elements of a coherent story. To be clear, narrative is not everything. As some of the research has shown, political and cultural factors all work to band people together. For some, the initial motivation to join a movement may stem more from socialization than attraction to an ideology.40 But, invariably, social and political factors work in conjunction with the appeal of a movement’s narrative.41 There are psychological factors that can predispose people to be receptive to the climate skeptical narrative. The theory of cognitive dissonance tells us that people might be more willing to dismiss climate science if accepting it means acknowledging that their lifestyle is wrong.42 There is also psychological distance: phenomena that seem removed from our personal lives (spatially, temporally, cognitively) seem less tangible and credible.43 Other researchers, building on the theory of self-​ affirmation, posit that people can downplay the risk of climate change if it poses a threat to their own well-​being.44 Nonetheless, while these factors make one more susceptible to doubting climate change, one still must actively buy into the narrative. We will examine how climate skeptical narratives evolved and began to influence the public over time, first in the United States, then also in other parts of the world (with a focus on Western Europe and Asia-​Pacific). The book will investigate the two conjoined aspects of the phenomenon: (1) the evolution of the narrative in the public realm, and (2) the accompanying establishment of a social movement. At times, we will refer to this symbiosis between story and socio-​ cultural movement as the narrative-​network.45 One interesting phenomenon,

 

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which the book will trace, is the emergence of a transboundary social movement involving the diffusion of the climate skeptical narrative from community to community, country to country. The narrative of climate skepticism does not simply replicate from place to place; rather, it takes on diverse forms in different contexts—​an intriguing phenomenon that the book will explore (comparing narratives across the United States, Western Europe, and Asia-​Pacific). While many investigators use public opinion surveys as their primary data,46 narrative analysis requires a different kind of data (e.g., text from online blogs and op-​eds) and a different type of analysis (i.e., narrative and critical discourse). The book makes the case that climate skepticism has become a full-​fledged ideology that engenders strong belief among the public. We need to understand the phenomenon of ideology and how it endows the climate skeptical narrative with logical necessity and universal meaning, which, in turn, add to its power for persuading the public. This ideological foundation has helped enable the climate skepticism narrative to lodge in the public psyche and, consequently, challenge the normally privileged position of science. We use narrative and critical discourse analyses to show why the climate skeptical narrative is such a powerful idea and why it helps solidify a network of actors around it. We uncover the role of myth and symbol in endowing the narrative with a moral resonance and logical coherence. Our analyses also show how the evolving story of climate skepticism uses effective rhetorical strategies to deconstruct climate science.

What We See Through a Narrative Lens What insights do we gain from going into the narrative, studying its properties, and then examining how it evolved over time? We deliberately set aside other aspects of climate skepticism (e.g., the political determinants) to focus squarely on narrative. This allows us to examine what it is about this particular narrative that resonates with many and, in fact, wins their allegiance. Narratives and spin doctors come and go, and most of these do not take hold of the public’s imagination. Most fall by the wayside, but a few are recognized by significant numbers of people as good narratives—​good in the sense of being memorable, compelling, and resonant. But this is what the book has to investigate. What properties of this narrative makes it good? Why is its plot compelling and others not? And, most interestingly, how did this narrative manage to contend with, and become a formidable counter-​narrative to, the narrative of science? The analysis draws from a long tradition of narrative and discourse theory, using methods for analyzing text that are uniquely tailored for unpacking ideological dimensions of narratives in everyday speech.47 This type of narrative analysis helps to reveal underlying beliefs. It also helps analyze how the narrative

 

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can grow more extreme over time, to the point of excluding other points of view altogether. At some point, it starts making dialogue impossible. Critical discourse analysis48 enriches the narrative focus by taking into account the sociopolitical context within which these narratives evolve and the extent to which the discourse reflects and reproduces societal power relations. Discourse analysis closely examines the language used. Even if the basic storyline remains somewhat constant over time, the changing language used in its narration can make a difference. It is one thing to call scientists biased and another to call them conspirators. This book speaks to scholars with an interest in the role narratives play in public life. Indeed, there has been a resurgence in interest in narrative and public administration, policy, and governance.49 It may also resonate with scholars in the area of science and technology studies. Since the work of Kuhn50 and Latour and Woolgar,51 scholars have pursued the theme of the social construction of science—​i.e., the idea that facts emerge from scientific work in much the same way that any other social convention emerges:  a community of like-​minded people agree that certain findings and theories are from that point on to be considered established fact. Somehow, climate skepticism has, in its narratives, some version of this idea of science as socially constructed. The question is, how does the narrative, and its narrators, manage this sleight of hand? Later in this book, we will examine the issue of the social construction of the narrative of climate science. As scholars of science and technology studies remind us, the scientific community, after all, can be portrayed as a tribe of storytellers, just like any other.52

Foreshadowing Elements The rest of the book builds several ideas. First, the narrative of climate skepticism has evolved, becoming increasingly divisive over time. It has also coincided, by no accident, with increasing polarization and hardening of positions. In part, it is because the narrative itself has taken on features of an ideology. An important part of the appeal of the narrative is that it taps into deeply rooted sentiments and, in fact, is built upon a more fundamental metanarrative that is even more basic than the climate question itself. Lastly, we can see some of these ideological aspects on the other side, which is the discourse of the climate scientists themselves, maybe partly in reaction to the rise of the anti-​climate science movement. In this introduction, we foreshadow some of these claims in a general way but leave it to the succeeding chapters to develop them. The first general idea is that, at least in part, the strength and persistence of the climate skeptical movement draws much from the narrative itself, and we should be able to show how and

 

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why the narrative has been as effective as it is. We also began this chapter with a note about how narratives and the coalitions behind them were co-​constitutive; a second general idea is that the climate skeptical community, as a social movement or social network, gets some of its organization and structure from the narrative. As to why the climate skeptical narrative resonates with some segments of the public, we suggest that part of the reason lies in the roots of this particular narrative being in a more foundational narrative (or, as we will refer to later, meta-​narrative) that was not about climate change to begin with, but more fundamental social issues. The book’s chapters represent a logical progression of important themes, but they need not be read through in sequence. The reader is free to jump to whichever chapter has the most immediate appeal. In ­chapter 2, we describe a narrative approach to studying the ideology of climate skepticism (and why it constitutes an ideology). The chapter also discusses how the narrative develops properties that reinforce tendencies of the movement to isolate itself and view opposing narratives in fundamentalist ways. An ideology is a special kind of story, and we describe a set of characteristics that can be used to identify when and how stories start becoming ideological. These characteristics include the degree of closedness and self-​encapsulation of a story, such that it precludes openness to other stories. They also include the degree to which a story becomes a universal, almost mythical tale. The chapter further examines another interesting phenomenon, which is that these characteristics that serve to transform a good story into a hardened ideology are also those that serve to isolate the narrative community and build walls that prevent dialogue. And, so, we trace in the literary characteristics of the narrative those properties that foster phenomena like the echo chamber effect. In c­ hapters 3 and 4, we use narrative analysis, bolstered by critical discourse analysis to trace the evolution of the climate skeptical narrative in the United States (­chapter 3) and contrast this narrative with those that evolved in other countries (­chapter 4). Chapter 3, which is the longest chapter in the book, examines the evolution of the present-​day climate skeptical narrative over time, looking at popular and conservative media outlet stories over several decades. The historical account traces the co-​evolution of the climate skeptical narrative and social movement in the United States (reserving a discussion of climate skepticism outside the United States for the c­ hapter 4). To do this, c­ hapter 3 examines the developments and shifts in the narrative longitudinally. In order to capture how the climate skeptic narrative has taken root in the public psyche, we select and analyze texts that reach a large swath of the general public. For this reason, we are more interested in popular op-​ed pieces and online blogs than we are in Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and other reports.

 

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Climate skepticism should not be thought of as strictly a US phenomenon. Chapter  4 takes a cross-​sectional approach, looking at present-​day narratives in different countries, the intent being to trace differences (however fine) between narratives in the United States and other contexts (United Kingdom, China, Australia, Sweden, etc.). While c­ hapter 3 focused mainly on the growth of the climate skeptical narrative within the US public, similar phenomena were occurring elsewhere. For example, in a review of public survey data, Poortinga and colleagues show that doubt over the climate change hypothesis can be as high as 40 percent among the European and UK public.53 Skepticism over climate science is highest in the United States, United Kingdom, and Australia, but it is present in other countries as well.54 Looking toward Asia, skepticism over the human cause of climate change can be roughly as high in India and Singapore as in the United States.55 Chapter 4 focuses on the narrative in other continents, paying close attention to Western Europe and the Asia-​Pacific region. In this analysis we see the effect of norm diffusion, but also a kind of contextuality of the skeptical narrative. Chapter  5 takes up the interesting aspect of narrative parallelism:  how the anti-​climate science narrative overlaps in intriguing ways with narratives told by conservative groups in other issue areas. The chapter, evoking Propp’s work on elemental folktales, develops the idea that these different issue narratives may be founded on a common (“genetic”) metanarrative. What is this metanarrative like, and does it form the foundation for other narratives? How does it help the climate skeptical narrative fit with other narratives influencing the public? What is the storyline of this genetic metanarrative? Chapter 5 sketches the outlines of these foundational metanarratives and discusses how, in certain respects, the critique of climate science may not even be fundamentally about the science. Of all the chapters in the book, ­chapter 5 may be the most steeped in literary analysis. The narrative treatment would be incomplete if it did not apply the same analysis to climate scientists’ discourse, as well, and this is the focus of ­chapter 6. In this chapter, we turn the critical, interpretive lens on the other side. The narrative approach is applicable to any discourse, and one of the merits of the narrative analytic demonstrated in the book is its ability to treat different sides of the issue in a similar (though not identical) way. We do this, tracing the narrative arc of discourse from scientists and organizations like the IPCC and then analyzing elements of ideology in them. As scholars in science and technology studies have pointed out, scientists are an interpretive community too, engaged in the social construction of scientific knowledge. As will be argued, there is ideological thinking behind how scientists present climate science, as well, an ideology founded on a separation between expert and public, technology and culture, and the colonial versus the native. The chapter raises important points that will be taken up in the conclusion of the book—​namely, that some of the impasse in the

 

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dialogue around climate results from the way that scientific talk can alienate the public, especially when it conflates science with social policy and feeds rumors of a global conspiracy. Of all the chapters in the book, climate activists will perhaps find this one the most surprising. Extending the insights from the previous chapters, in ­chapter 7 the authors discuss implications for addressing the policy impasse around climate action, particularly in the United States. The properties characterizing ideological narratives, described in ­chapter 2, create a challenge for structuring dialogue that fosters genuine exchange across battle lines. In ­chapter 5, other issues were seen to converge around a genetic metanarrative that also characterizes the climate skeptic narrative, and that, when examined explicitly, deal with more elemental issues of social and cultural change. This suggests that responses to anti-​climate science discourse will require discussions that lie outside the scientific domain and are responsive to these more fundamental questions.56 The book ends with a discussion of prospects for moving the debate forward and broader lessons learned from examining the climate skeptical narrative. To some extent, the analysis of narrative and discourse leads us to some ideas for reducing the impasse. As the reader may have intuited by now, we believe that language matters, and matters greatly, so part of any solution necessarily resides in the language. This is and isn’t a book about climate. What is at stake goes beyond even the climate issue. It’s about our most cherished institutions, founded upon a presumption that we build them upon the ground of truth and knowledge. Indeed, as this book is being completed, the world is in the grip of a mass pandemic. But this is connected to what this book is talking about, as well. Counter-​ scientific discourse, especially in the early stages of the 2020 novel coronavirus pandemic, accusations of the politicization of international health agencies, and other disputes have some parallels with the narrative struggles around climate, except the events around the public health crisis were condensed, intensely so, into a time frame of months, even days. We talk about contending narratives without forgetting that these conflicts take place in the material world. As we have seen, the struggle to delineate scientific truth from politics (and the contending discourses over science) is not just an ideological debate but a matter of life and death.

 

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Ideology as Narrative Don’t forget it used to be called Global Warming, that wasn’t working. Then it was called climate change and now it’s actually called extreme weather because with extreme weather you can’t miss. —​Donald Trump, US president ( June 5, 2019)1 Beware the pronouncement, “the science is settled.” It’s the spirit of the Inquisition, the thought-​police down the ages. Almost as bad is the claim that “99 per cent of scientists believe” as if scientific truth is determined by votes rather than facts. What the “science is settled” brigade want is to close down investigation by equating questioning with superstition. —​Tony Abbott, former Australian prime minister (October 10, 2017)2

The literature on civic engagement and deliberative democracy tells us a lot about how a healthy citizenry is supposed to behave.3 Public deliberation doesn’t sweep disagreement under the rug but, rather, works through differences. Through active debate, people on opposite sides of the aisle can better understand each other’s views. They can reconcile differences or, at least, come to tentative agreements over how to move forward despite their differences. The political scientist Charles Lindblom had great faith in the power of opposing camps to move forward amid disagreement, even if the march of progress resembles something of a random walk—​what he called partisan mutual adjustment.4 Unfortunately, the opposing sides of the climate debate seem not to have read Lindblom or the literature on civic engagement. Instead of reasoned debate, climate activists and climate skeptics have taken to name-​calling and verbal abuse. Instead of mutual understanding, opposing sides have grown farther apart. In this chapter, we examine how climate skeptics have become increasingly walled off from public discourse. Some writers have attributed this to the insulating effect of social media, where people self-​select narrow information bandwidths to tune in to. Jamieson and Capella refer to an “echo

The Power of Narrative. Raul P. Lejano and Shondel J. Nero, Oxford University Press (2020). © Oxford University Press. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197542101.001.0001.

 

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chamber” effect where people on one side of the divide communicate only with similar-​minded parts of the country, thus building ever more entrenched and polarized views.5 Others point to a counter-​environmental movement supported by political agents bent on protecting the industrial-​capitalist economy from criticism. The term McCright and Dunlap use to describe this is “anti-​reflexivity,” which is a conservative reaction against reformists including climate advocates.6 To understand how and why climate skeptical communities have further shut themselves off, we treat the anti-​climate science position as a story to be interpreted.7 As we will discuss, we can trace, in climate skeptical narratives, both the origins and consequences of this polarization. We will see, in the narrative, strategies for insulating climate skepticism from the broader arena of civic discourse and, ultimately, the roots of the organizing logic that walls off contending parties instead of bringing them together. Crafting narratives involves tactics that serve to protect conservative ideological views on climate from moderating forces. A literary sensibility is required for analysis, as these tactics come from writers’ tools of trade. Stories are the perfect vehicle for conveying the messages of climate denial (or belief) in the public arena. And the stories that people tell are not just about climate but also about who they are versus the “other.” To be sure, the insulating action of echo-​chamber-​like forums and political lobbying is an important underlying strength of the climate skeptical movement. But if we want to more deeply understand the power of the movement, we should also study the narrative itself and examine how skeptics weave a story that stands out. These stories have the power to bind and the power to move. Earlier, we used the term narrative-​networks8 to describe how stories not only are told by a community of like-​minded people but also help form and organize such a community. And, in so doing the narrative also helps keep the community cohesive by separating it from other communities. In this chapter, we study how the narrative does all this. Climate skepticism is a story. It tells a story about what is happening (or not) to our climate. But it’s also about the different groups in society vying for the public’s imagination, making claims about who and what is right and who and what is wrong, and why this particular story is better than other contending stories. On the surface, these stories are about what people should believe as fact regarding climate. But why a story moves people goes beyond its factual accuracy, and sometimes stories resonate regardless of their basis in fact. Hayden White, writing about history, describes it as not so much establishing a factual account of the past but more about constructing a plausible fiction that gives a compelling, coherent account of things.9 The same is true with narratives around

 



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climate skepticism. They appeal to people primarily because they resonate with them emotionally and morally, such that the strength of the evidence behind them becomes secondary. Regardless of how well or poorly a story conforms with empirical evidence, there is something about it that takes hold of people’s minds and hearts and earns their allegiance. We will see how climate skeptics use different rhetorical and narrative strategies for crafting compelling stories that can resonate with people. As the quotes at the beginning of the chapter suggest, this involves framing ideas (counter to those of the climate action community) around some train of logic, invoking an air of right-​mindedness that can appeal to a like-​minded public. The quote from President Trump in the epigraph diminishes the strength of scientific evidence by portraying scientists as “fudging” the science. And the quote from Prime Minister Abbott appeals to people’s aversion to totalitarianism. These draw from a “cultural toolkit” that groups in society use to interpret social phenomena.10 Studying narrative is an effective route to understanding what movements people identify themselves with and why. As Ricoeur suggested, identity is most aptly understood as a running narrative that people continually write about themselves.11 In short, identities have scripts. As we will discuss, these scripts can sometimes become more and more rigid over time such that people become closed off to the other and walled in inside their group.12 As we will discuss, a narrative can, at times, become such a strong representation of right and wrong and provide such a definitive portrayal of the state of the world that it can constitute something like a belief system. Such a strongly wrought narrative can demand adherence from its proponents, to the point of setting them resolutely apart from other groups and other ideas. It forms an ideology of sorts. We refer to an ideological narrative as a form of representation that takes on the nature of a belief system, which is closed to other beliefs and, thus, resistant to change or persuasion.16 There is no clear dividing line over which the story crosses to become an ideology. But we can describe properties of the narrative that make it more and more ideological. In this chapter, we describe these narrative properties and show how they mark the transition to ideology. This approach is then used to show how climate skeptical narratives turn ideological and, in so doing, resonate more strongly with significant portions of the public. As an example, we analyze texts from a popular climate skeptical forum, the online op-​ed pieces from the Heartlander Institute, a conservative think tank in the United States. Of course, narrative can be found anywhere, even snippets of text such as found in online comments from the public.13 But we chose to examine op-​ed pieces as these are long enough to provide more complete narratives.

 

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Climate Skepticism as Ideology In this chapter, we examine climate skeptical narratives in the United States because this example illustrates so well the power of narrative. As we discussed in the previous chapter, climate skepticism (or denial) is firmly espoused by a minority of the public in the United States. But it is an important minority. Its strength is not completely found in its numbers. Thus far, the climate skeptical narrative has gotten a foothold in the White House and in Congress and has reversed action, from the Obama era, on climate change. Despite a clear consensus from the scientific community14, the conservative movement has launched an effective counter-​narrative that has stymied national climate policy. The Clean Power Plan (CPP), which would have reduced carbon emissions from power plants, has been scrapped, and the United States has withdrawn from the Paris Agreement. Government websites have been “cleansed” of any mention of climate change, and the leadership positions in federal agencies have been filled with climate deniers and fossil-​fuel friendly business leaders. This impasse on climate change also occurs at the global level.15

 



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Our focus, in this chapter, is the strength of this counter-​narrative and how it is able to stitch together political coalitions along with broad segments of the public. We will show how the climate skeptical narrative can become so close-​ minded that it precludes positive dialogue with other groups. Narratives can become rigid and inflexible, shunning any consideration of alternative views.16 This can happen when a group’s narrative can take the form of a rigid ideology that prevents the exchange of ideas with those outside the fold. We are not referring to situations where groups disagree (sometimes very emotionally) over issues of public policy, which is normal in healthy political systems, but those situations where rejecting the other side is so complete that no conversation is allowed. It is this turn to ideology that signals when dialogue ceases to be an option. We can spot, in the group’s narrative itself, the beginnings of an “adversarial turn,” when healthy debate becomes entrenched warfare. In the following discussion, we will further work out what we mean by ideology, and how we might spot ideological thinking in narrative terms. We will identify those textual-​linguistic features that distinguish ideological narratives from others. Our overall purpose, in this chapter, is to craft a mode of analysis that allows us to: (1) evaluate how features of a group’s narrative signals the shift toward ideology, and (2) show how the narrative helps foster groups that are strongly insulated from others, to the point of completely excluding voices outside the group from being heard. It will help us appreciate how much the roots of polarization and policy impasse can be traced, at least partly, to the narrative itself.

Ideology and Narrative What is an ideology? Mannheim defines it as a comprehensive worldview or Weltanschauung.17 Sargent defines an ideology in these terms:  “a system of values and beliefs regarding the various institutions and processes of society that is accepted as fact or truth by a group of people. An ideology provides the believer with a picture of the world both as it is and as it should be, and, in doing so, organizes the tremendous complexity of the world into something fairly simple and understandable.”18 But whether you prefer defining it as a system of beliefs or a worldview, in what form is it transmitted from person to person? The most convenient representation of ideology is as a narrative—​specifically, a system-​ constituting narrative.19 Scholars of social movements have shown how common stories can organize people into a collective force.20 We can characterize an ideology as a narrative around which a community of like-​minded believers has formed. A good story can inspire people and mobilize them to act. The strongest of these stories can

 

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be thought of as an ideology. Any ideological system of thought should be representable as a good story. For example, Ayn Rand’s ideology of individualism took shape in the form of the novel The Fountainhead. Sartori makes a distinction between ideological belief systems and more pragmatic ones in that the former tend to be more fixed, strongly affective, and closed to other beliefs.21 This gives us a helpful clue for identifying ideological narratives, as this property of being closed off from other (contrary) ideas should be evident in the narrative itself. The affective properties of a narrative should be evident when we examine the text as well as the performance of the text. And if a story is reactionary and resistant to change, we should be able to find this in the narrative as well. This shouldn’t be surprising. Ideologies purport to be unwavering, absolute truths, and so they tend to be closed off from revision. To take one example, believers find no common ground between capitalism and communism, and they cannot imagine a conversation between these. This is more likely when each narrative is formulated as the antithesis of the other. It is still true, in the twenty-​first century, that the staunch capitalist is invariably an anti-​ communist, and vice-​versa. Ideological narratives are convenient templates around which to frame policy. The language of the cold war resurfaces time and again, in varying forms because it is a useful storyline to recycle and repurpose for different diplomatic contexts over time. For example, when asked about the United States’ evolving relations with China, a former director at the State Department, Kiron Skinner, spoke about the need to craft a strong narrative. “You can’t have a policy without an argument underneath it,” she began, and went on to discuss how “this is a fight with a really different civilization and a different ideology22,” as she evoked the narrative of a “clash of civilizations.”23 Later in this book, we will have more to say about how basic plots are repurposed and deployed in different situations.

Analyzing Narratives What is a narrative? Simply, it is a story told by one or more storytellers. These stories are plots, or trains of logic, that connect a series of events, characters, and key ideas. If we take any given situation, we find people and things, encounters and events, none of them adding up to any meaningful whole until the human mind connects them all through what Ricoeur called emplotment.24 To simply say “The queen sat. The child sang” is not telling a story. But when you connect otherwise disparate characters, events, and ideas through emplotment—​ e.g., “The queen sat in her drawing room. Somewhere a child was singing, her voice faint in the distance. And she thought, I was once that child, so happy and free”—​you construct a narrative.

 



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Table 2.1 Narrative Properties of Ideological vs. Non-​Ideological Texts Ideological Texts

Non-​Ideological Texts

Autopoiesis—​remains closed to exchange with other narratives; self-​contained, self-​referential; high degree of internal coherence.

Intertextuality—​contains references to other narratives; open.

Decontextuality—​lack of reference to events or conditions in the outside world; insulated from the modifying effect of context.

Contextuality—​contains reference to events or conditions in the outside world; suggests connection between text and context.

Invariance—​makes universal claims that apply in perpetuity; exhibits high degree of generalizability, objectivity across time and place.

Contingency—​makes claims that are particular to some situations (not others); modifiable over time and place.

The world of policy involves acts of narration as policy actors try to make sense of complex issues and convince society that their particular narrative interpretations are beyond doubt.25 These political narrators make use of strong rhetorical elements aimed at convincing decision-​makers and the public to support their initiatives. Often, such narrative goes beyond mere rhetorical devices to the extent of painting a picture of the world in absolutist terms, where the issue at hand becomes a fight between good and evil, a choice between right and wrong. Such a story, when well crafted and well told, takes hold of its listeners, who then go on to tell the story to others. In what follows, we describe a number of properties of narratives that can be used to discern when a narrative is taking on the form of an ideology. We will illustrate these properties, using text from a climate skeptical blog site, to show, first, how the narrative both draws people to itself and, second, how it sets them apart from others. While the terminologies are technical in nature, the ideas behind them are simple, and this type of analysis should be useful to anyone wanting to show how narratives enchant people to allegiance. The properties are summarized in Table 2.1.

Autopoiesis versus Intertextuality In our discussion, we will refer to the body of a narrative as a text. The text can be either written or spoken. Texts convey meaning as listeners or readers of the narrative interpret these texts. Julia Kristeva, in describing the idea of intertextuality,

 

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drew a contrast between a text that contains all its meaning in itself versus a text that requires reference to other texts to be complete in its meaning.26 For example, in 2008, Al Gore gave a speech urging the world’s nations to begin the task of reducing global dependence on carbon-​based fuel. He said: “Our entire civilization depends upon us now embarking on a new journey of exploration and discovery. Our success depends on our willingness as a people to undertake this journey and to complete it within 10 years. Once again, we have an opportunity to take a giant leap for humankind.”27 Alluding to a giant leap, Gore was making a reference to a different, heroic journey undertaken decades earlier—​ the mission to the moon. This rhetorical strategy turns the story of climate action into a similarly heroic mission that can be accomplished. It doesn’t just refer to another event but imports the entire story of Apollo 11, from Kennedy’s speech in 196228 to the moon landing in 1969. This ability of a text to draw meaning from other texts is what Kristeva referred to as intertextuality.29 In other words, a highly intertextual speech or story does not exist by itself but, instead, connects the reader to other speeches and other stories. It is open to other texts and other stories and, in fact, is insufficient without these other texts. A good analogy is to think of the primary narrative as having a running conversation with other texts. In contrast, some other texts are closed in. Rather than having a “conversation” with other texts and voices, these closed texts are complete in themselves. In extreme form, they can exclude or deny that there are other narratives or truths outside themselves. Highly ideological texts are self-​ contained, purporting to possess the entire truth on a matter and not needing to be open to other perspectives. We call these texts autopoietic, using a term that Luhmann used to describe self-​contained systems.30 An autopoietic text is a self-​contained whole. The different ideas contained in it are coherent, or logically consistent with each other. For example, the two statements “It is arrogant to presume that humans can change the climate” and “The idea of anthropogenic global warming is a hoax” are consistent with each other and both support the contention that climate science is mistaken. Intertextuality and autopoiesis are two ends of a continuum, ranging from texts that are very open (to other texts) at one end to those that are closed off and self-​contained on the other. How do we assess degrees of intertextuality (or, conversely, autopoiesis)? One indicator is the presence of direct references, in the text, to other texts.31 The greatest degree of openness is seen when the text will refer even to other texts that offer an opposing view. Another is to find words or passages, what Barthes called indices32, that allude to other texts in a more indirect way. The more a text can be self-​contained and complete, i.e., autopoietic, the more it can serve as a full-​fledged ideology.

 



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Contextuality versus Decontextuality Quite literally, an ideological text can create not just a worldview but a world of its own. It creates, in its narrative, a world of characters, things, and ideas that serve as a model of society and the world. When it is completely self-​contained, then it has less need to refer to the larger world outside its narrative. By this, we mean not just referring or not referring to texts outside it but referring to physical and social realities outside it. In the extreme, an ideological text can be so all-​encompassing that it serves as a universal narrative. Such universal (or grand) narratives refer to every place and every situation and, as a result, need not refer to particular places and contexts. They are completely decontextualized. Contextuality refers to a narrative’s sensitivity or awareness of conditions outside the narrative itself, especially in the real world. In contrast, a highly decontextualized narrative need not refer to anything outside itself. For this reason, an overtly ideological climate skeptical narrative can make claims about what is true and false without needing to refer to empirical conditions outside the narrative. Universalizing stories are like this—​they can say sweeping statements about other societies, nations, races, etc. without introducing the listener to what these societies, nations, races are like in the actual world.

Invariance versus Contingency A highly ideological narrative makes transcendent claims that hold for all times and places—​they are invariant. In contrast, contingent texts are particular to certain situations and not others, are modifiable over time, and open to revision. Invariant texts have a high degree of generalizability, signaling closedness versus openness. When a narrative exhibit’s both decontextualization and invariance, it becomes an ideology that encompasses all times and places—​a universal story. We will refer to this as saturation, where the narrative becomes absolute.

Illustrating the Method We now illustrate how these properties can be used to analyze how a narrative becomes ideological. Our example consists of climate skeptical blogs taken from a conservative outlet, the Heritage Foundation. These include several op-​ ed pieces written by Alan Caruba on climate change science and policy and one written by Paul Driessen on President Obama’s CPP.33 The essays/​columns are

 

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The Power of Narrative

usually short, so we combined several to create a larger body of text to analyze. Subsequent chapters provide a fuller analysis of the climate denial narrative. The text come from the Heritage Foundation’s blog, The Heartlander. The foundation is a known conservative think tank, funded in part by Exxon Mobil, the Koch Family Foundations, and the Scaife Foundations. It has, with the Cornwall Alliance, co-​sponsored “climate denial conferences” that bring together climate skeptics from academia and other sectors. Ideological narratives exhibit certain patterns or rules.16 In the following discussion, we will illustrate two of them.

Rule 1: An Ideological Narrative Shows Limited or No Intertextuality A narrative that is highly ideological tends to suppress other narratives or ideas not consistent with it. So being, this type of narrative can refer to texts outside it, but only to those texts that support its central message. Another way of saying this is that intertextuality is limited to a corpus of texts that belong to the same ideology. In contrast, a more open narrative will be more inclusive in its intertextuality, referencing even texts that run counter to it. At times, an ideological narrative will refer to an opposing view, but it will not reflect the latter in any faithful way, instead, merely inserting a degraded form of it. At times, bits and pieces of the opposing narrative are used, but such parsing is done selectively so as not to reflect the opposing narrative in any satisfactory way. We do not actually hear any opposing voices because they are not allowed to speak. Here is a passage from one of the columns: On February 1st, NOAA and NASA held a joint press conference in which they released data about 2013’s global surface temperature. They made reference to a “pause” in the temperature that began in 1997. Dr.  David Whitehouse, science editor for the BBC, noted:  “When asked for an explanation for the ‘pause’ by reporters, Dr. Gavin Schmidt of NASA and Dr. Thomas Karl of NOAA spoke of contributions from volcanoes, pollution, a quiet Sun, and natural variability. In other words, they don’t know.” This is an example of parsing of text because it leaves out the actual message/​text of the “other.” What is left out is the scientists’ real message, which was: Those longer trends show the world has seen “fairly dramatic warming” since the 1960s with “a smaller rate of warming over the last decade

 



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or so,” said Thomas Karl, director of NOAA’s National Climatic Data Center in Asheville, NC.34 Here is another snippet from Caruba’s columns: Between 1300 and 1850 the northern hemisphere went through a mini-​ ice age. After that it began to warm up again. So, yes, there was global warming, but it was a natural cycle, not something caused by human beings. Nature doesn’t care what we do. It is far more powerful than most of us can comprehend. This brings us back to the sun, which determines, depending on where you are on planet Earth, how warm or cold you feel. The sun, too, goes through cycles, generally about eleven years long. When it is generating a lot of heat, its surface is filled with sunspots, magnetic storms. When there are few sunspots, solar radiation diminishes and we get cold. Scientists who study the sun believe it may encounter another “Maunder minimum,” named after astronomer Edward Maunder, in which the last “Little Ice Age,” between 1645 and 1715, occurred. The Thames in England froze over as did the canals of Holland froze solid. The latter passage shows invariance. The cycling of temperatures is natural, the author says, something that happened between 1300 and 1850 and afterward (and, similarly, a mini-​ice age between 1645 and 1715). It is literally a universal, eternal narrative—​a story that does not ever change. In these passages from the online op-​ed piece, we already find quite a complete narrative, with a train of logic (i.e., a plot) that ties the different ideas together, a set of characters, places, and events. A related narrative strategy is that of hybrid intertextuality, where text from the opposing view is merged with other text, which does not actually belong to it. For example, the author writes: Anyone familiar with my writings knows that a lot of research is involved. In my case, it dates back to the late 1980s when the global warming hoax began to be embraced by politicians like Al Gore who made millions selling worthless “carbon credits” while warning that “Earth has a fever.” The narrative paints Al Gore as an opportunistic politician. This is partly accomplished by a hybrid text combining quotes from Gore himself (“carbon credits,” “Earth has a fever”) with other text not from Gore (“the global warming hoax,” “made millions”). The critique casts doubt on the claims of not only Al Gore

 

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but all those sharing the climate change narrative. This practice of caricature is enabled by selective or hybrid intertextuality. Ideological narratives are self-​contained (or autopoietic). When they refer to opposing narratives, they position the other texts in a way that presents a caricature of the other side. They deny the other a genuine voice. Instead of real intertextuality, which requires actively paying attention to the climate scientific community’s narrative, these passages refer to the “other” in a reductionistic way. Words like “hoax,” “conjured,” and “dubious” describe the climate community narrative, and words like “real” are used to describe selective empirical information in support of climate denial. Done in a totalizing way, characters and themes in the narrative take on an archetypal quality. The properties of the narrative reflect, or foster, properties of the group itself. As much as the narrative is self-​referential and autopoietic, so is the group closed off. And the lack of intertextuality reflects the reluctance to engage in dialogue. We can point to two effects of the narrative on the group. First, having a shared narrative helps the group coalesce. Second, this helps set the group apart from others. In reality, these are two sides to the same coin.

Rule 2: Ideological Narratives Tend to Be Decontextualized and Invariant Ideological texts can universalize conditions, so that their ideas apply to all times and places. And, since the things claimed by the texts are universal or eternal truths, there is little need to refer to conditions in the empirical world. Take the following passage from Caruba’s essay: So, yes, there was a global warming, but it was a natural cycle, not something caused by human beings. Nature doesn’t care what we do. It is far more powerful than most of us can comprehend . . . . The sun, too, goes through cycles, generally about eleven years long. When it is generating a lot of heat, its surface is filled with sunspots, magnetic storms. When there are few sunspots, solar radiation diminishes and we get cold. Scientists who study the sun believe it may encounter another ‘Maunder minimum,’ [a mini ice age]. In this narrative, any changes in climate are part of a natural condition and not due to human action. Situating climate changes within larger cycles climatic temperature swings, the author attributes the earth’s cooling and warming as having “nothing to do

 



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with carbon dioxide . . . and everything to do with the sun.” The narrative takes on the form of scientific evidence without actually referring to empirical data. Ideological narratives can involve a form of decontextualization that uses selective material conditions that support the narrative. What is absent is any weighing of evidence. There is no testing or verifying of claims against empirical evidence, as Popper required of scientific claims.35 In these passages, we find a story that exhibits invariance. The author’s message is that this story never changes and that any transient change is part of a longer cycle. The narrative of the “long cycle” is an invariant, decontextualized one—​a universal story that applies regardless of time or place. We referred to the combination of invariance and decontextualization as a kind of narrative saturation, since the story pervades all situations. Saturation can encompass all issues as well. Take the following passage: In a world threatened by the rise of radical Islamism, by the outbreak of diseases like Ebola, and other actual problems to be addressed, the notion that thousands would March in the belief that they and the entire rest of the Earth’s population have any effect on the climate is appalling . . . . This shows another interesting feature of ideological texts, that their universal story is not confined to the one particular issue but, rather, saturates all other issues as well. It is a common occurrence for ideological texts to apply their universal logic to other issues (radicalism, disease outbreaks, etc.) that one would think lies outside the scope of the narrative. In a universal story, nothing lies outside its scope. Ideological texts exhibit saturation. One hallmark of saturation is when the narrative (about what’s right, wrong, good, bad) is applied not just to the issue at hand but to all other issues. Universal logics apply to everyone, everywhere, every time. They also apply to all the other problems of society. In the ideological text, it is easy to couple otherwise disparate themes together (climate, crime, terrorism, viruses) under one flag. Binaries, such as “us” versus “them” and “true” versus “false” are absolute and are good to go for whichever issue, beginning with climate, but other issues simultaneously as well. The conflating of issues in narrative also applies to how characters in the story are depicted. In the previous blog post, Al Gore is not only remiss in the specific issue of climate, his entire character is questioned. This is part of saturation: when binaries like “us” versus “them” are used, they are general purpose literary devices, applicable to not just the specific dimension (climate) but all others (jobs, morality, values, intelligence, etc.).

 

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We also see issue saturation in another essay by the same author: I do not like people crying “racism” every time the commission of a crime goes badly for a black perpetrator  .  .  .  [These] are people I  do not like. People in high office who use these events to exacerbate racial divisions are high on my list of those I don’t like . . . While I see no practical or even moral way to deport the eleven million illegal aliens among us, that doesn’t make them any less illegal . . . A group of people I  have not liked for decades are the environmentalists. The reason is very simple. They lie about everything they champion in the name of “global warming” or “climate change” . . . . Saturation isn’t just about conflating different issues; it’s also about lumping the “others” in the same narrative. In this passage, we see multiple actors—​civil rights advocates, illegal aliens, environmentalists. They are all “them” because of the strength of the narrative. The moral tale applies regardless of context, issue, time, or place. It’s easy to see how this happens, when you have a narrative that is strong enough to be a worldview. It is not just a particular story anymore but a lens (whether rose-​colored or otherwise) that can be used to view the world. Looking through that lens, everything is colored with the same hue, painted with the same brush. The concept of the narrative-​network helps us see how the narrative reflects properties found in the group itself. In constructing the world as “us” and “them,” the ideological narrative actually defines the groups as coherent and separate. The polarization found in the narrative reflects back on the polarizing tendencies of the group. This precludes conversation. There is a notion, sometimes referred to as relationality36, that associates conversation with a willingness to see the other as one’s self and to see one’s self in the other’s shoes. But a narrative that paints the divide so starkly, such that the other is absolutely different from one’s self, acts against this desire to relate. We are not sure why ideological narratives are so resonant with people, and we simply observe that they are. It is possible, maybe, that these narratives conform to tendencies people display even very early in life. Young children show, even in their infancy, a tendency toward “transductive reasoning,” which is the tendency to assume that if a person is different (or alike) in one aspect such as the color of one’s skin, then that person is different (or alike) in all other aspects as well, and this goes along with a tendency toward “in-​group” bias.37 The examples cited are just illustrations of how we analyze when and how a narrative becomes ideological. One last example comes from the same website, and it refers to the now-​defunct CPP that was hatched during President Obama’s tenure. The passage says that the plan would

 



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hammer everything we make, grow, shop, eat and do. It will impair our livelihoods, living standards, liberties and life spans . . . . Under the CPP, everything business owners, workers families and communities strived for their entire lives will be at risk. Millions of workers will lose their jobs, leaving more families destitute and welfare dependent, their sense of self-​worth destroyed. Many will have to choose between buying food and gasoline, paying the rent or mortgage, and going to the doctor, giving to their church, or saving for retirement . . . . In this passage, we see how the issue of climate would pervade “everything.” The passage goes on to say, if we wish to remain who we are in the face of threats and declamations meant to force us to honor intellectual and moral falsehoods, we have no alternative but clearly and loudly to distinguish between true and false, and fully make the case for what we believe is right . . . We must not mince words regarding the evils that energy and climate totalitarianism inflict on families, industries, communities and nations. We must confront the deceit and deceivers, abuses and abusers—​and present the hard, ugly realities of what life would be under conditions imposed by eco-​extremists. Right now, we have too many taxes and regulations, too much secrecy and fraud, too many extremists, and far too little accountability in EPA. There is too much eco-​religious fervor, too little science and humanity. Poor and minority families are hurt most of all. Our governors, state and federal legislators, attorneys general, courts, next president, and citizen, industry and scientific groups need to take action. We again see how ideological narratives broker no middle ground, as concepts are made absolutely. The binaries are too strong, and the narrative does not allow any sort of conversation between opposing views. The passage actually tells what the ideological narrative does, which is to “clearly and loudly distinguish between true and false,” which is not a call to dialogue but to division. The all-​or-​nothing quality of ideological narrative works against co-​existence with the “other.” The preceding example illustrates how ideological properties in a group narrative can be analyzed to deepen our understanding of the role of narrative in policy impasse. While we apply this approach to climate skeptical narratives, we could as readily apply it to the narratives of proponents of climate change science, and of scientists themselves.

 

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Coherence We touched on the matter of coherence, which Ricoeur associates with the way a good plot can smoothly weave together disparate things, events, and people into one story. Different things have to fit inside the narrative and connect in a logical way.38 Some climate science writers use the word incoherence when they describe the climate skeptical narrative.39 By this, they refer to inconsistencies between denialist arguments and empirical data or scientific theories. These authors might critique a narrative for claiming that climate change is associated with sunspots when, in fact, there is no empirical evidence for this. By coherence, these authors mean a consistency (whether logical or empirical) with other things outside the narrative. But, in this book, we refer to coherence within the narrative. That is the function of autopoiesis and decontextualization. The narrative is a self-​ contained whole that either does not refer to contradicting data outside it or, when it does, selectively parses out external information. What remains in the narrative is internally consistent, even if it is at odds with other narratives that lie outside the body of texts to which the ideological narrative belongs. What remains is a good story that ties the different pieces together in a logical way. In ­chapter 1, a segment of narrative (from the documentary The Great Global Warming Swindle) was discussed. Part of that narrative involves a thread about the climate scientific community being motivated (by profit, funding, etc.) to keep the climate change hypothesis going. The fix is in, the video is saying. Now, this is responding to the need to maintain narrative coherence. This thread is a necessary rejoinder to the contention that most of the scientific community supports the theory of anthropogenic climate change. The theme of conspiracy keeps the whole narrative intact and coherent. This is necessary because it is impossible to keep the climate skeptical narrative completely autopoietic. It is most often the case that the narrative espoused by a countermovement takes form in opposition to that of the conventional narrative (in this case, that of climate science). We illustrate how a skeptical narrative might be constructed through opposition with the conventional or dominant narrative of climate science. Table 2.2 is a “dialectic” table where elements of the climate change narrative are shown in the column on the left. On the right, opposite each element on the left, is a contrary argument that counters the climate argument. Now, the right-​hand column contains what we might refer to as narrative fragments, or bits and pieces of the ideas that will form the climate skeptical narrative. The task of emplotment, then, is to weave these disparate fragments into a coherent story, with a logical arc that connects them all. It’s not hard to imagine a narrative that connects all the elements in the counter-​narrative in a coherent

 



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Table 2.2 Juxtaposing Climate and Anti-​Climate Ideas Climate Narrative

Climate Counter-​Narrative

Mean global temperatures are rising.

Climate has always been changing.

Carbon dioxide has also been rising at the same time as mean global temperature.

Carbon dioxide is a natural substance, necessary for life on the planet.

The great majority of the world’s climate scientists agree over climate science.

There are material incentives to conspire to maintain the stream of funding flowing into climate research.

Climate models confirm climate change theory to a high level of confidence.

Climate models show uncertainty.

Action requires reducing carbon footprints Proposed actions are an intrusion into our most basic way of life. to a great degree. Climate scientists are the authority on this Climate scientists are dismissive of the public. issue.

way. In the next chapter, we examine this in more detail, looking at how different elements come together over time. We differentiate a notion of a global kind of coherence (where a story has to fit empirical evidence and other things outside it) with the more local kind of coherence that lies within the narrative. This does not mean that we do not recognize the importance of this larger sense of coherence. But our focus is mainly on trying to understand what makes a narrative resonate with people.

The Common Tongue We have seen some aspects of how a narrative can bind a group together and strengthen the bond by closing it off from voices outside the group. But is it enough to build ideological markers into the narrative, using saturation and decontextualization? Is it enough to construct a coherent plot? Clearly, this is just the beginning (or the end). Not every ideologue builds a movement. For a story to move people, it has to be a good one (at least for them). It’s not easy to spell out the recipe for a great and memorable story. The plot has to make sense and even capture people’s imagination. To spark interest, stories about climate need not even engage empirical evidence so much; all that is required is plausible fiction. But some plots seem to register more deeply than others. Vladimir Propp, the Russian narratologist, studied more than a hundred Russian folktales and suggested that there are fundamental storylines that hold great appeal for

 

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people,40 and that memorable stories tap into this reservoir of basic plots. In ­chapter 5, we explore the possibility that climate skeptical narratives share, with narratives from other issues, a common (or genetic) meta-​narrative. But the point is simple: by tapping into ingrained reservoirs of moral outrage (or quixotic idealism or other deeply felt sentiments), narratives can stoke the embers of long-​felt passions. But a good narrative cannot simply repeat a formula slavishly. There’s something to be said for novelty. Jerome Bruner, a theorist of narrative and autobiography, suggested that a good narrative is able to build in some element of canonical breech, which simply means a twist on the age-​old formula.41 It is about an old story told in new ways. Think of West Side Story as a variation of Romeo and Juliet or Miss Saigon as a variation of Madama Butterfly. For the same reason, one might say that Rocky I was a great movie, and Rocky III, IV, and V not as much. Ultimately, there is something that also involves the language itself. In his treatise, The Postmodern Condition, Jean Francois Lyotard wrote about two fundamental languages used to communicate in the modern world.42 The first, the language of the technical, divides people into those who send the messages and those who receive them. Not everyone can be an expert and, so, speaking the language is reserved for a few. The second mode of communication, narrative, uses the language of the everyday. Rather than divide, narrative can create community. With narrative, the person listening becomes equipped to be the next storyteller, who tells the story to another, who then becomes a storyteller, and so on. We will return to Lyotard in c­ hapter 6 but, for now, his insight into language informs our discussion of effective narration. Clearly, some ideologues resonate more than others. Even before he became president, Donald Trump’s tweets would spread at the speed of light. And people would take on the ideas (or fragments of ideas) and repeat them in blogs and letters to the editor and, most importantly, everyday conversation. Part of these tweets’ effectiveness is found in the language. It is the language of the everyday, the kind of talk that ordinary people tell each other and use to share everyday things. And, before Trump, another conservative voice, Ronald Reagan’s, seemed to be able to capture the public’s attention at will. Reagan spoke the language people spoke to each other. To be sure, one president’s language is blunt and heckling and the other’s was warm and homespun, but they both spoke like people spoke, and felt. What is the aim of this kind of speech? Simply, to simulate the kind of speech that people who know each other use when talking face-​to-​face. This is the kind of talk that builds relationships, and a social network is, more than anything, a tapestry of relationships.43 This property of understanding how social movements, programs, and other institutions are founded upon relationship is referred to

 



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as relationality.44 Scholars have shown how scientific climate discourse can alienate.45 Indeed, one of the strengths of the climate skeptical movement is its use of everyday talk and the obvious contrast between it and scientists’ talk about climate. But more on this in ­chapter 6.

Moral and Emotional Engagement As we discussed, theorists of narrative have pointed out how coherence of the plot is a necessary element of a good narrative. But simply having a logically coherent plot isn’t enough. A movie can tell a story where everything fits but still the audience finds it boring. So, what stories move their audience? Simply put, the effective story is one that engages people not just intellectually but also emotionally. When people are moved by a story, they care about it, and they get invested in it. This is how a good story can rally people around it. So, what kinds of stories touch people? Different things can be important, but one is the moral dimension. Stories that pit right and wrong against each other, especially moral themes that people identify with, move people. One universal, moral theme is that of the weak and oppressed versus the strong and overbearing. The underdog versus the favorite, David versus Goliath, the lamb versus the wolf. The video, The Great Global Warming Swindle, makes use of this, as climate skeptics are portrayed as the underdogs going up against the global climate change conspiracy. The oppression of the weak by the strong is evoked in the video by alluding to the Spanish Inquisition. Moral engagement arouses people’s sense of justice, their outrage, and their convictions. Sports stories make use of the underdog theme time and again, to great success (e.g., Rocky Balboa). The moral and affective dimensions of a narrative are not just window dressing. They tell the readers or listeners why they should care. This is what Labov, an earlier scholar of narrative, referred to as evaluation and, for him, this is what set apart a good narrative from a plain sequence of events or ideas with a beginning, middle, and end.46 Every good narrative has, whether explicit or implied, an account of why the story matters, why people should care, and why it is about good and bad. Another way to get people emotionally invested is by having real characters in the story and making them really human. If you can identify with a character, then it is more likely that you will sympathize with what that character is up against or experiencing. For liberals, Roger Moore’s movies are great experiences, in part because he comes across as an everyday guy who shows up for an interview in clothes that seem like he bought them from a used clothing store. Conversely, it is easier to rally people against something by embodying it in a real person

 

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who arouses their antipathy. For conservatives, associating climate action with Al Gore, who has a long history of aggravating the right, was an effective way of arousing people’s emotions. Importantly, getting involved in a character does not even depend upon that character being similar to ourselves (what the literature calls homophily). She or he just has to be going through experiences and emotions that we can identify with. This holds true even when the characters are fictional or nonhuman. People who enjoy the movie Finding Nemo find themselves emotionally invested in a clownfish of all things. Getting back to the idea of coherence, a moving story does not require the global kind of coherence that demands a fit with things outside the story (such as scientific evidence). This is related to what Green and Brock refer to as narrative transportation, or the ability of a story to take us away to another world and imagine inhabiting that new place.47 Science fiction stories rely on narrative transportation; otherwise, all those movies about time travel, which probably violate all known laws of physics, would never gain an audience.

Concluding Thoughts In this chapter, we describe a kind of analysis that examines a group’s narrative to discern when and how it turns into a rigid ideology. The text of the narrative will have properties that mark it as ideological. In the next chapter, we trace the evolution of climate skeptical narratives and study how ideology-​fostering properties (autopoiesis, decontextualization, saturation) deepened over time. The narrative and the network of people who espouse it reinforce each other. The narrative helps organize the movement, and at the same time, it defines the group in juxtaposition to other groups and isolates it from them. We can trace, in the changing narrative, the transition into what we might call an “adversarial turn” where the group no longer attempts dialogue with countering views but, instead, closes itself off to that possibility. This has implications for progress on climate policy. The property of issue saturation is interesting in and of itself. The ease by which the narrative can merge, even conflate, different issue areas, is something that we can explore further later in this book. Are the narratives in these different domains somehow similar? Perhaps, at some level of expression, the narratives really trace back to a common master (or meta) narrative. We will discuss this in ­chapter 5. An effective, movement-​sustaining narrative does not simply appear in a flash. Rather, it is a product of many storytellers telling varying but related

 



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stories. The narrative properties we described in this chapter do not just switch on one day; rather, they develop over time. This is parallel to (and, as we have been suggesting, part of) the growing social movement. The historical trend of increasingly ideological discourse around climate has been documented.48 In the next chapter, we focus on the evolution of the narrative over time.

 

3

When Skepticism Became Public

In a now famous interview on NBC’s weekly news show, Meet the Press, on January 22, 2017, presidential advisor Kellyanne Conway used the phrase “alternative facts” to defend then White House Press Secretary Sean Spicer’s false statement about the attendance numbers at President Trump’s inauguration two days earlier. Conway was on to something. Her phrase immediately caught on like wildfire in public discourse because it intuitively spoke to the power of a narrative that can be coherently crafted and believed devoid of what we typically think of as facts, given a set of conditions and pre-​dispositions, within a particular time and context. More importantly, such a narrative can be persuasively retold multiple times. Just as Conway’s alternative facts on President’s Trump’s inauguration numbers reflected a counter-​narrative already inclined to be believed by a segment of the population for various historical, political, and personal reasons, so, too, does the climate skeptical narrative. Oreskes and Conway’s1 well-​known book, Merchants of Doubt, provides a clear historical account of the counter-​narrative challenging climate science. The authors point out that even though research on climate change has been ongoing for more than 150 years, and that scientists have agreed for at least forty years that humans play a part in it, many US citizens still doubt or even flat out reject the notion of human induced climate change. They note that “a public opinion poll reported in Time magazine in 2006 found that just over half (56%) of Americans thought that average global temperatures had risen, despite the fact that virtually all climate scientists thought so.” Since then, public opinion has shifted, according to a 2018 survey by Leiserowitz and colleagues,2 showing that 73 percent of US citizens now think that global warming is happening but only 62 percent believe it is mostly caused by humans. In other words, 38 percent of the US population—​a not-​so-​insignificant minority—​still believe in a persistent set of alternative facts (a powerful counter-​narrative) on human induced climate change. What accounts for such persistent skepticism around human induced climate change, despite scientific evidence to the contrary? How did the The Power of Narrative. Raul P. Lejano and Shondel J. Nero, Oxford University Press (2020). © Oxford University Press. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197542101.001.0001.

 



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counter-​narrative against anthropogenic climate change develop so fiercely over time and come to be embraced by such a sizable minority of the general public? This chapter critically examines the emergence of the narrative challenging climate science, specifically focusing on its evolution over time among the general public. The historical account traces the co-​evolution of the climate skeptical narrative and social movement in the United States (reserving a discussion of climate skepticism outside the United States for the succeeding chapter). We examine the development and shifts in the narrative chronologically from the early years of the current century to the present, through summary plots of articles and accompanying comments in mostly conservative media outlets over five periods of time, and provide textual evidence of how the narrative grew increasingly ideological over each period. First, we briefly contextualize the climate skeptic narrative within the broader anti-​environmental movement that has made dramatic inroads into political action in a number of fronts, particularly in the United States but also in Western Europe, and especially in the area of federal policy. We focus on how the story crept incrementally into the public psyche and began to be echoed and embraced by a broad range of climate skeptics, especially among average citizens. We look more intently at how the narrative is told and retold among members of the public, the focus not being debates about science per se but how the larger story evolved. Here, the larger story includes some scientific argumentation, but much more than that. And, beyond current scholarship, we employ the tools of narrative and critical discourse analysis to examine selected publicly authored texts that have persuasive appeal to a large section of the population and also fuel the climate skeptical narrative.

A Brief Historical Perspective The mid-​1990s witnessed a “green backlash”3 or “brownlash”4 movement that resisted the environmental movement and downplayed the importance and magnitude of environmental problems, just as evidence for these was mounting. The backlash movement developed anti-​science ideas related to climate change and many other issues, but did not take an ideological turn. Some scholars argued that this movement consisted of “an outpouring of seemingly authoritative opinions in books, articles, and media appearances that greatly distort what is or isn’t known by environmental scientists.”5 Through relentless repetition, these opinions have won an appearance of credibility that create confusion about environmental science and facts and build resistance to environmental policies. Similarly, there were connections between the anti-​environmental movement and ideological groups such as the Christian Coalition, the Sagebrush Rebellion

 

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(which fostered resentment over federal ownership of public lands), free enterprise and small government advocates, second amendment rights groups, various militia groups and business associations, and the think tanks they funded.6 These connections strengthened the movement’s ideological core, and for example, many adherents began to argue that all environmental protections were threats to liberty and freedom. The anti-​climate science movement was fueled, in part, by the financial backing of businesses in carbon extraction industries, tobacco and petroleum industries, and others, and directed at rising conservative media outlets (e.g., Breitbart News) and think tanks (e.g., Heritage Foundation).7 New forums emerged such as the International Conference on Climate Change (ICCC) organized by the Heartland Institute, a major conservative non-​profit think tank founded in 1984, which facilitated gatherings of scientists, politicians, and media consultants and led to a strong and coherent climate skeptical narrative. Rising populism and fundamentalism in present-​day politics undoubtedly contributed to the reactionary attitude of skeptics toward climate science.8 But we argue here that the power of the underlying narrative is central to the effect of these factors. Thirty years after the emergence of the climate skeptic movement, the literature on the public views of climate change demonstrates that political affiliation is one of the most consistent predictors of climate change views in the United States.9 Conservatives are much more likely than liberals to indicate that global warming is exaggerated in the news and much less likely to say that global warming has begun, is caused by human activity, poses a serious threat to our way of life, or that scientists agree over the science.10 Beyond political affiliation, cultural worldview explains skepticism or belief in climate science, that is to say, people form an opinion toward climate science that is consistent with their individual beliefs and those of the social groups in which they participate.11 But a coherent worldview is exactly what we mean by ideology. While many scholars examine the growth of political and social movements, we focus on the nature and substance of the underlying narrative(s) told by members of the skeptical movement. Several scholars rightly examine the political and sociological aspects of these movements, but we focus on the narrative within the larger sociopolitical climate. And so, whereas Kahan and colleagues12 would measure worldview by testing a set of attitudes, we characterize worldview by the narrative that represents it. Some studies of public opinion suggest that public skepticism over climate science (which is distinct from ignorance of its existence) began increasing sometime in the mid-​2000s.13 But opinion polls measure certain indicators and do not reflect the climate skeptical narrative itself, which is the central focus of our investigation.

 



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How We Selected and Analyzed the Material In order to capture how the climate skeptical narrative has taken root in the public psyche, we chose texts that reach a sizable swath of the general public and have instant and powerful appeal. Thus, we selected and analyzed articles and accompanying comments from popular, mostly conservative, media outlets (print and online) between 2001 and 2018 consistent with the aforementioned tendency of conservatives to be climate skeptics. This included fifty op-​ed pieces from a monthly newsletter, Environment and Climate News (E & C), published by the Heartland Institute; fifteen from three online media outlets combined—​Washington Times, Breitbart, and the Daily Caller, plus fifteen respective accompanying comments, for a total of eighty texts. We grouped the articles into five time periods showing individual article plots as well as summary plots for each period, tracing how the story became more ideological over time, using narrative and critical discourse analysis of the texts. All articles were chosen from what we identified as focal years since the turn of the century, i.e., those years in which significant national or world events took place that might have a bearing on the evolving climate narrative from the public’s point of view. We surmised that the climate change narrative should change significantly in the years of, or immediately following, those events for various reasons: political, such as the election or re-​election of a president, which would likely shape climate policy reflective of the new administration; environmental, e.g., Hurricane Katrina or the BP oil spill, which literally destroyed the environment, significantly disrupted people’s lives, and had grave economic consequences; sociopolitical, e.g., the release of Al Gore’s groundbreaking documentary film on climate change An Inconvenient Truth, “Climategate,” the “Paris Climate Agreement,” or the IPCC’s latest report on climate change, all of which spurred contentious national and international debate about the science and research around climate change; or technological, e.g., the launch of smartphones, which made it possible for information on any subject, including climate change, to go viral and travel around the world rapidly. Selected articles must have as their main theme climate change/​global warming, carbon mitigation, climate litigation, or policy and must contain at least one statement that can be interpreted as criticizing climate science or climate mitigation policy. An example would be the article titled “Global Warming Science Uncertain,” authored by James Taylor in August 2001.14 In the case of the three online news outlets, we selected and analyzed articles and accompanying reader comments starting in 2008 because by then the arrival of the smartphone in 2007 had begun to have an effect of in the proliferation of information via the internet, tweets, blogs, etc. on a large scale among the

 

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general public, including information on climate change.15 From these online media outlets, we found articles with sensational climate skeptical titles such as, “Climate Change: One of the Biggest Scams Perpetrated on the People of the World,” (Rush Limbaugh, The Daily Caller, 2015).

Narrative and Critical Discourse Analysis The climate skeptical narrative has steadily developed and spread over more than two decades with all of the normal elements of a good story—​plot, actors, time, place, breach, conflict, moral, etc.—​but it has evolved into something more profound and compelling—​an ideological narrative, which can be defined as a system representational narrative that strongly exhibits four properties—​ autopoiesis, decontextuality, invariance, and univocity (or the absence of their opposites: intertextuality, contextuality, contingency, and plurivocity), as noted in ­chapter 2. We analyzed the selected texts along a spectrum from ideological to non-​ideological, based on these four properties. Also, as mentioned earlier, this type of narrative has two distinct features: (1) coalescence around a group ideology; (2)  group isolation from others’ influence. The intransigent nature of these features has created a hostile turn in public discourse and has stymied policy development such that we believe they merit deeper examination. We took a two-​pronged analytical approach to trace the evolution of the climate skeptical narrative into its current state as seen in public texts. First, we looked at these texts just in terms of their elements as stories or narratives; hence, a narrative analytic approach. But we also needed to understand how they developed ideological properties that have become so entrenched through language. This required a deeper and critical look at how this ideological discourse was constructed within a larger sociopolitical context that fosters isolated and deeply invested coalitions fighting for spheres of influence in the public space. We employed Fairclough’s critical discourse analysis (CDA16) for this purpose, which involves analysis of relations between discourses and other objects, elements, or moments, as well as analysis of internal relations of discourse. It is focused on the effect of power relations and inequalities in producing social wrongs and critiquing the ways in which “discourse is internalized in power and power is internalized in discourse.”17 For our purposes, CDA also includes textual analysis. Ideology is also important for a scientific understanding of discourse. Social institutions contain diverse speech communities, which are associated with different groups within the institution. A  speech community has its own discourse and ideological norms, one of which is usually dominant. In this vein, we consider human induced climate change the dominant ideological discourse in the United States, yet climate skeptics, though a minority, have constructed

 



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a forceful counter-​narrative forming an alternative ideology. We might think of climate skeptics as a speech community with particularly entrenched views about climate change. Fairclough asserts that an important characteristic of a dominant speech community is the capacity to “naturalize” ideologies, to win acceptance for them as “common sense.”18 The goal of CDA is to “denaturalize” these ideologies and show how social structures determine discourse and discourse determines social structures. So we might ask, for example, “what are the naturalized ideologies around climate change and how did skeptics effectively denaturalize them through narrative?” Finally, discourse also claims language use to be intertwined with social relations, reflected in variation in the linguistic forms that appear in texts. In the selected texts, we traced when adjustments to the narrative began becoming popular and when elements of the discourse began to take an ideological turn. We did so by drawing on Fairclough’s three-​dimensional framework (micro, meso, macro) for CDA. Briefly, the micro component of the framework analyzes the text at a linguistic level looking at syntax, words, metaphors, rhetorical devices, argumentation etc. For example, at some point, the counterclaim that “climate is not changing” gave ground to the slightly different claim that “climate has always been changing.” The meso level looks at production and consumption, such as which media outlet or institution produced the text and who is the target audience (e.g., an article produced by Breitbart both reflects and reinforces discourses that appeal to Breitbart readers/​viewers), creating an echo chamber and isolation of ideas. Finally, the macro level examines intertextual

Critical Discourse Analysis Central issue/social wrong Actors/social agents

Narrative Analysis Plot Characters Time Place Narrator(s) & Audience Narrative properties of ideological texts (autopoiesis vs. intertextuality; invariance vs. contingency; univocity vs. plurivocity) Decontextuality vs contextuality Moral

Time Plot Characters Time Place Speaker/ Audience Discourse Ideology Context Conclusion

Place Author/speaker & Audience Textual evidence of claims, references and their framing Degree of power of voices included/excluded larger social structures/societal currents Takeaway and remedy

Figure 3.1  Shared components of narrative and critical discourse analyses.  Source: Adapted from Lejano & Dodge (2017) and Fairclough (2010).

 

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elements; broader societal currents (the sociopolitical context) such as fundamentalism or populism; and social wrongs and remedies referenced in the text that help to cohere the narrative. We found important overlaps in narrative and critical discourse analyses, as illustrated in Figure 3.1.

Tracing the Evolving Narrative In the following sections, we illustrate through our analyses of selected public texts (articles and accompanying comments) how the climate skeptical narrative evolved over five periods of time in this century up to the present. We found a set of emerging and recurring themes over time in the story that showed its becoming more ideological. Note that the summary plots of selected articles in the boxes that follow are written from the point of view of climate skeptics.

Period 1: 2001–​2004—​Misrepresenting and Politicizing Uncertain Science During the first four years of this century—​the early George W. Bush years—​we saw a robust debate on the science of climate change, prompted in part by different interpretations of studies commissioned by the Bush administration and Congress, and reports by bodies such as the United Nations (UN) IPCC, the National Academy of Science (NAS), as well as policy and research institutes like the Cato Institute.

 



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Some examples follow. June 2001 (E & C) Title of article: “IPCC Report criticized by one of its lead authors” (pp 4–​5) by Paul Georgia Quote beneath the title: “Politics, not science, drives the United Nations’ work on climate change, warns Dr.  Richard Lindzen, one of the world’s leading atmospheric physicists.”

Richard Lindzen, one of the authors of UN’s IPCC Third Assessment Report (TAR, 2001) criticized its findings, stating that it is focused more on politics than science. He claimed the IPCC uses various strategies to mislead and alarm the public about global warming in order to justify action: They use summaries of scientific studies rather than the actual document to misrepresent the work of scientists to the public; give a false impression of consensus among scientists; exaggerate scientific accuracy; and prey on the public’s ignorance of science and statistical knowledge. Lindzen claimed that the report summarized in one sentence his own thirty-​five-​page chapter on physical processes showing problems with computer models on water vapor. The IPCC does not follow the normal scientific peer review process by taking reviewers’ criticism into account and revising articles before they are published; instead they ignore criticism from reviewers, misrepresent the propositions that scientists agree on, downplay uncertainties, and worst of all, manipulate statistical information, including publishing reports with lower confidence levels than would be acceptable in other scientific forums. Many climate scientists respond to financial incentives and winning prestigious prizes like Nobel not for research alerting the world, but alarming it. The IPCC process has become politicized and meaningless.

  

The title of the article, “IPCC report criticized by one of its lead authors” sets the context for an insider critique of the report, but not just by any insider; it is by Richard Lindzen, “one of the world’s leading atmospheric physicists,” thus, the audience is given criticism by an expert in the field, which is likely to make the story more believable. Lindzen makes a universal claim (signaling the element of invariance) that “Politics, not science drives the United Nations work on climate change,” which, in effect, dismisses not only this particular report, but all work done by the UN on climate change. Note that he also introduces the idea of IPCC strategies to “alarm” the public. The context is set for a skeptical reading or, worse, outright rejection of the report by the audience and an openness to Lindzen’s criticism.

 

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The story is dominated by elements of univocity and autopoeisis, as Lindzen is the main actor, and only his perspective is heard. In the full article, we are told that the TAR was expected to be released sometime in 2001 and was “already coming under heavy criticism from “various directions,” which are nameless, faceless subjects. Lindzen’s criticism is singled out as the most “devastating,” and given his stature in the field, opens the door to pay close attention to his criticism, especially given that no other dissenter’s point of view is offered in the story. Finally, to reiterate his claim that the IPCC report is driven by politics more than science, Lindzen lists a range of problems with the report, using words like “alarm,” “misrepresent,” “exploit,” and “exaggerate” which collectively paint a picture of the IPCC process as deceptive and intentionally misleading. In the absence of a countervoice, these charges, stated repeatedly, stand, and so the story maintains a high degree of internal coherence. September 2003 (E & C) Title of article: “Alarmists’ claims defy global warming science” (p.  4) by Fred Singer.

A press release from the National Center for Atmospheric Research (NCAR) claiming that new satellite data support the global warming trend is false and based on the wishful thinking of global-​warming promoters who support the Kyoto Agreement, rather than any sound science. The lead author, Ben Santer, is a well-​known promoter of global warming and is ethically challenged (he’s known for secretly altering the text of a chapter of the 1995 IPCC report on climate change). So, there is good reason to question the validity of the data. The NCAR study, based on analysis of weather satellite data from researchers at Remote Sensing Systems (RSS), concludes that there is a warming trend of about 0.1 degrees centigrade per decade between 1979 and 1999, but it is at odds with previous analysis of the same satellite data by two University of Alabama-​Huntsville (UAH) scientists who found virtually no warming over the same time period. The data from the NCAR report have likely been manipulated. Congress should not buy into this “shell game” and should change its position on the Kyoto Agreement.

  

From the outset, this article has a harsh tone, labeling believers of global warming as “alarmists” in the title and arguing that their beliefs contradict scientific fact. Here again, we see the alarmist theme being reinforced. The headline stems from an NCAR report which claims that weather satellite data support a global warming trend. Singer immediately dismisses these findings as false,

 



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based on the “wishful thinking of well-​known global warming promoters.” He places the study in the context of the Kyoto Protocol Agreement, stating that supporters will use the press release as evidence that the United States should join the agreement. Questioning the RSS data, and disparaging Ben Santer as an unethical climate alarmist who “became notorious for surreptitiously altering the text of a crucial chapter” in the 1995 IPCC Report on Climate, Singer doubled down on the “manipulation” narrative and cautioned Congress not to buy into it. The text itself shows some evidence of selective intertextuality. Singer mentions the1995 IPCC report, although negatively, since it was compromised by Santer’s alteration of a chapter. He also noted research at UAH and the National Research Council 2000 report, the latter two more favorably viewed. Even when the RSS results were a close match with the National Research Council’s conclusion that the “global atmosphere might be warming more quickly near the ground than higher up,” he continued to question whether the results are correct. Still, Singer tried to show himself as someone who listens to the other side of the story by attending a talk given by RSS lead researcher, Frank Wentz, who was “kind enough to give me a copy of his full paper so I can study it.” Singer called the paper a “careful piece of work that must be taken seriously; but of course, that does not make it correct” (p. 4). In one fell swoop, Wentz is characterized as well intentioned, but wrong. The text is mostly univocal. The critique of the climate science is primarily Singer’s. The only other voice included in the text is that of science journalist Ron Bailey, a climate skeptic who says that Santer’s strategy is “if their models don’t agree with the data, then change the data.” Santer is effectively discredited. What are our takeaways from the story? The NCAR study is based on contaminated data; the study’s author is unethical; he manipulates data for political gain, and will likely do so again; politicians and the public should not fall for this “shell game.”

Period 1—​Emerging Narrative Climate change believers and certain governmental agencies use scientific studies to alarm the public and force change in policy such as restricting use of electricity or reducing carbon emissions. The believers focus more on politics than on sound science. The IPCC is complicit in this regard because their reports usually present only the summary of the studies rather than the studies themselves, glossing over disagreement among scientists. The mainstream media, Democratic lawmakers, climate believers, and especially some scientists, deliberately manipulate or misrepresent the data in science reports to mislead a gullible public into believing that human induced

 

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climate change is settled science, when, in fact, it is not. We skeptics repeatedly call out believers for what they really are—​unethical alarmists, who selectively use science as a forceful authority over political opponents and the public. We have challenged findings from climate science studies by citing findings from other studies showing there’s no definitive causality between global warming and human activity   

Three themes begin to emerge in the narrative from this period • Climate change is politicized for policymakers, not based on science • Climate change scientists misrepresent and manipulate data • Climate change scientists and activists are deliberately alarmist ***

Period 2: 2005—​2008 Arguing beyond Science: Moral Crusade and Global Battles by Any Means This period—​the second term of Bush’s presidency—​continued to reinforce the claim of politicizing climate science, but the story began to take shape as a battle of wills in the public arena. Environmentally speaking, the period was highlighted by Hurricane Katrina, which affected thousands of ordinary citizens, and the release of Al Gore’s movie, An Inconvenient Truth, which brought climate science into public discourse on a large scale, paving the way for differing opinions and public relations battles. January 2005 (E & C) Title of article: “Environmentalists call for drastic reductions in greenhouse emissions” (p. 3) by Steven Milroy

A number of environmental activist groups (including Greenpeace, Rainforest Action Network (RAN), and others) called for more drastic reductions in the greenhouse emissions way beyond that required by the Kyoto Protocol. Although the Kyoto Protocol was rejected by US President George Bush and the Senate, the groups asked for cuts in emissions that would significantly increase gas and electricity prices and for developed countries to financially help developing countries combat climate change.

 



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Despite the uncertainty about the extent of human influence on climate change, which is a known and natural fact, these groups launched aggressive campaigns against major banks like Citigroup and Wells Fargo to insist that their loans and investments in developing countries exclude projects that adversely affect the environment and also to require greenhouse gas emission reports from power projects. These campaigns by climate change activists could hamper economic growth in developing countries and just turn them into their “green” playgrounds to visit.   

Environmentalists’ calls for drastic reductions in greenhouse emissions beyond the requirements of the Kyoto Protocol are likely to cause major economic damage to both developed and developing countries. We have three sets of actors in this story:  environmentalists, who are actively trying to reduce greenhouse emissions through economic means in developing countries; large banks and corporations who are complicit in financially supporting environmentally harmful policies in these countries; and developed countries who must help developing countries save the environment through financial support. How they work together (or not) depends on how each group thinks about climate change. The actual debate about human induced climate change is dispensed with very early in the story. The author asserts, “While it is still unclear to what extent humans may be affecting global climate, climate change is a known and natural fact.” By foregrounding the uncertainty about the human link, it weakens the connection to the known and natural phenomenon—​climate change itself. Which leaves a lot of room to argue that drastic actions such as those advocated by environmentalists are not worth the steep economic cost. There is a reference early on to the Kyoto Protocol, but only to argue that it was rejected by President Bush and the US Senate—​an example of selected intertextuality. We are told that cuts in greenhouse emissions “could raise electricity prices 86% and gasoline prices 53%.” For average US citizens who use a lot of electricity and own cars, even the possibility (“could raise”) of such price hikes is scary and therefore likely to dissuade any action that might lead to such a hike. The story is now having a direct effect on people’s personal lives. Furthermore, the fact that RAN can successfully influence the lending policies of banking powerhouses like Citigroup and Wells Fargo shows the impact of their power, and their ability to use economic leverage to advance a climate change agenda. The author frames the environmentalists’ agenda in hyperbolic terms—​ “nothing short of colonialism . . . people who would rather see African people starve than eat genetically enhanced food like Americans do”—​an outlandish claim that shows environmentalists to be at once ideological, condescending, and heartless.

 

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The narrative is univocal in the sense that we hear a scathing critique of environmentalists only from the author’s perspective, but the criticism is done in the name of presumably silenced, disempowered citizens in the developing world, whose environmental and economic fate are being determined by powerful, unknown environmentalists in developed countries. The story ends by reiterating the two key claims, thereby giving it internal coherence:  (1) the uncertainty of human induced climate change—​“ humans may or may not be playing a role in any ongoing climate change”; and (2) the certainty of negative economic consequences caused by aggressive environmentalist policies, especially in developing countries. The remedy for the developing world is to emphasize that it doesn’t need the Kyoto Protocol and “could use some sort of protection from global warming activists.” October 2005 (E & C) Title of article: “Recent hurricanes not caused by warming, scientists conclude” (pp. 1, 8) by Sterling Burnett.

Climate change activists, who are not experts in science, continued to make baseless, alarmist accusations. Spawned by Hurricane Katrina, they renewed their claim that human activity is causing global warming and more frequent, intense hurricanes, even though physics and historical data from climatologists show little evidence linking global warming and hurricanes. There is no debate on the issue. Atmospheric scientists claim that the hurricane cycle is due to naturally occurring ocean circulation patterns and not human induced warming. A published paper in the Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society states that the scientific consensus is that there’s no connection between greenhouse gas emissions and hurricane behavior, and that future hurricane intensities will be modest. But scientists fear that the pressure by climate change alarmists to link hurricanes to climate change will undermine climate research and lead to ineffective policies in mitigating the impact of hurricane. At least two climatologists resigned from their positions because their area of expertise had become politicized by climate change activists.

  

In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, climate skeptics pushed back strongly against claims by environmental activists that there’s a link between the increased frequency and severity of hurricanes and climate change. The article opens with the claim that Hurricane Katrina became a catalyst for some environmental activists to renew claims about the purported link, which sets the tone of alarmism among climate change proponents. Their evidence—​Robert Kennedy Jr.’s blog accusing Governor Haley Barbour of derailing the Kyoto Protocol on the very day

 



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that Katrina hit land, which shows climate change supporters to be both desperately partisan and insensitive. It appears that they would use any excuse to drive home the claim made by Kennedy and like-​minded environmental activists that “increasing prevalence of destructive hurricanes is linked to global warming.” Thus, the partisan political context is heightened in the midst of a national tragedy. The story gives pointed rebuttals to the claimed link, using three strategies: (1) flat out rejection of the link in invariant claims—​“No connection has been established between greenhouse gas emissions and observed behavior of hurricanes”; (2)  selective intertextuality, which, as we discussed, creates a more isolated narrative—​citing Kennedy’s blog, alongside a university scientist who explains that hurricane cycles are part of natural forces—​“periodically changing ocean circulation patterns;” and (3) repeating the “natural forces” rather than human influence storyline, selectively citing language from various scientists (e.g., natural changes, natural variability, etc.). An “us vs. them” frame begins to shape the story’s ideological core. Two climate scientists resigned to protest perceived bias against those who don’t agree with human induced climate change, framing these scientists as victims of a partisan agenda. At the same time, climate change believers are repeatedly called “alarmists” and nonscientists. These strategies give the story a strong internal coherence. The takeaway from this article is that climate change activists would use a national disaster to advance their political agenda, despite scientific evidence to the contrary. This can be remedied by environmentalists being less aggressive and paying more attention to science. August 2006 (E & C) Title of article: “Global warming” (pp. 14–​15) by Richard Lindzen.

  

Climate change activists used the release of Al Gore’s documentary film, An Inconvenient Truth, to reinforce their claim that human induced global warming is an emergency unless we change our lifestyles. Gore’s claim that the debate on global warming in the scientific community is over is both false and alarmist. He and other climate change advocates who are nonscientists are ignoring “inconvenient facts” about rising temperatures and sea levels, carbon dioxide, etc. Scientists have emphasized that the climate has always been changing and have not settled on human activities as the primary cause of global warming. Reports by the IPCC and National Academy of Science “ambiguously” attribute global warming to both humans and the natural variability in climate change, but promote human attribution for policymakers. The alleged settled debate on human induced global warming by climate change proponents is essentially a moral crusade achieved through persistent repetition of claims, not supported by science.

 

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Al Gore’s film, Inconvenient Truth, is used as a metaphor for the larger agenda of climate change proponents to claim human induced global warming as a settled debate among scientists that requires an urgent response in terms of lifestyle change. As Lindzen tells the story, Gore’s film suggests that “we’re in for a planetary emergency,” followed by a litany of possible “cataclysms—​unless we change the way we live now.” The dramatic characterization of Gore’s film and climate change message allows the author to frame Gore and his supporters as “shrill” alarmists who will go to any lengths, including ignoring or manipulating scientific information, to push their agenda, a claim for which he offers many examples. Lindzen criticizes former president Bill Clinton for becoming “the latest evangelist” for Mr. Gore, the religious reference implying a kind of moral crusade. Note that this “evangelical” message on climate change is coming from a former US president and vice-​president, people with tremendous power, which exponentially affects the scale of its impact. Lindzen builds on the us vs. them element of the story by dividing his characters into two broad camps:  (1) the climate change activists who are advancing a political agenda through alarmist propaganda and don’t understand science; and (2)  climate change skeptics and some scientists who are more nuanced in their thinking and diligent about seeking out scientific facts. From his perspective, it is the climate change activists and their enablers like the media who are making invariant or absolute claims, e.g. words/​phrases like “the debate in the scientific community is over” (Gore); “all scientists agreed” (Newsweek issue on global warming); Clinton claims “he and Gore were right about global warming”; “unanimous decision that global warming is real” (CNN reporter on the NAS report). On the other hand, he presents climate skeptics and scientists as more doubtful about attributing the natural changes in climate to human activity, stating, for example, “We do not understand the natural variability in climate change; this task is currently impossible.” In fact, one of Lindzen’s central arguments is that climate scientists have argued that the climate has always been changing (as if to suggest that natural change cannot co-​occur with human induced change) and that it is still unsettled whether such change can be definitively attributed to human activities, specifically greenhouse gas emissions. Lindzen references a number of other texts in this article, evidence of intertextuality, but they are all mentioned as examples of false claims, misrepresented scientific information, or even scientific bodies succumbing to the political pressure of the climate change activists. Thus, although there are a number of voices mentioned in the article, by dismissing those voices, the thrust of the narrative is univocal. Given that the article is written after the release of Gore’s high profile film, the larger political context of the impact of the film on the general public must be

 



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taken into account. The takeaway is that Gore and other climate change activists are forcing an alarmist political agenda on the public through movies like Inconvenient Truth, by repeatedly spreading non-​science-​based propaganda on climate change. Lindzen writes, “There is a clear attempt to establish truth, not by scientific methods but by perpetual repetition.” Ironically, climate skeptics also employ the strategy of perpetual repetition (e.g., calling climate change believers alarmists). The implied remedy is to ignore such propaganda or challenge it with scientific facts, which is the real truth, ostensibly coming from climate skeptics. This harks back to Kellyanne Conway’s alternative facts. It’s just a matter of whose facts you choose to accept. February 2008 (E & C) Title of article: “Bali conference highlight global warming divisions” (p. 13) by Dr. Vincent Gray.

The UN Climate Conference in Bali was used by the media to showcase Nobel Peace Prize heroes like Al Gore (who attacked his own government) and the IPCC. But a small delegation of climate skeptics, myself included, formed a new organization called the International Climate Science Coalition, (ICSC) and attended the conference determined to fight back against the powerful and famous. Many attendees accepted the view that there was scientific proof that carbon dioxide emissions are harming the environment, but several of us skeptics questioned this premise, the measures proposed to reduce such emissions, and the persistent alarmist agenda by climate proponents. Despite the fact that we were not able to book a stall, we found an unoccupied stall and displayed some pamphlets. Climate skeptical organizations such as Oxfam gave out leaflets labeled “Stop Climate Poverty” arguing that climate change measures are likely to increase poverty in developing countries while fattening the Swiss bank accounts of climate proponents; others organized lectures and distributed DVDs showing that the carbon dioxide consequences claimed by IPCC are exaggerated. The conference ended with a deadlock in negotiations, a rejection of Al Gore by his own government, and a refusal by some Americans to be railroaded by climate change activists. For skeptics, this outcome made attending the conference worthwhile.

  

Vincent Gray positions himself as part of a “small” delegation putting up fierce resistance—​a stark contrast to the grandeur of a mostly climate activist event sponsored by the UN—​a “show” (implying a performance) where media “heroes”—​Nobel Prize winners IPCC and Al Gore—​were spotlighted. Given that the Nobel Prize signals the highest recognition in a field, the context is

 

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one in which climate change science is being affirmed on a grand scale. Gore is framed as arrogant and hostile (“Al Gore, who turned up, attacked his own government”) but his arrogance was soundly rejected by his fellow US citizens (“and was sharply disowned by United States delegates”). The contrastive framing of “small” (skeptics) vs. “large” and powerful (the UN or Al Gore) permeates the article as an ideological battle on the world stage—​skeptics taking on the anthropogenic climate science messengers. The conference attendees on each side of the climate change debate feel strongly about their positions and show a high degree of agency; hence, the title of the article “Bali conference highlights global warming divisions.” The author views the majority of the attendees (“almost everybody”) as “greenwashed by the view that science has proved emissions of carbon dioxide are harming the climate and have to be reduced,” but affirmed that “there were many reservations voiced about the sort of measures being advocated to reduce carbon dioxide emissions.” Skeptics make a two-​fold argument—​(1) climactic consequences of carbon dioxide are “grossly exaggerated,” according to one skeptic in attendance, Lord Christopher Monckton; (2) the proposed measures to combat it would have devastating economic consequences, especially with regard to forestry in developing countries. Skeptics thus appear to be on the side of climate justice, looking out for the economic interests of developing countries. The takeaway is that despite the significant accomplishments of climate change activists (evidenced in winning the Nobel Prize) and their grand showing and support at the Bali conference, climate skeptics’ attendance at the conference presented a strong countervoice, forcing a partial deadlock of negotiations. The rejection of Al Gore by his own government, and the refusal of the Americans to be railroaded into the economic disasters demanded by climate activists gave comfort to climate skeptics who succeeded in rejecting the ideology that climate change is settled science.

Period 2—​Ideological Traits Emerge in the Narrative Climate activists who are not scientists continue to manipulate climate science data, using them to alarm the public to advance a political agenda and change human behavior by any means necessary, which will have devastating economic consequences for US citizens as well as citizens in developing countries. Despite the science on climate change showing natural variability

 



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in temperatures and no definitive link to human behavior, activists continue to claim a such a link, taking it upon themselves to embark on a global, moral campaign on climate change that would hurt impoverished people, but likely increase activists’ bank accounts; exploit Hurricane Katrina to ramp up public attention to their agenda, while showing little sensitivity to its victims; and use Al Gore’s famous movie, An Inconvenient Truth, and an international conference to continue their propaganda campaign of alarmist climate science as “truth.” Skeptics, though small in number, pushed back against the powerful climate activists’ crusade with our truth, showing the dire economic consequences of their agenda. We and like-​minded scientists are the ones looking out for the economic interests of average citizens at home and abroad.   

We see in this period the clear emergence of ideological camps engaged in public battles—​us (the ethical climate skeptics) vs. them (the alarmist, unethical climate change proponents who manipulate data for their own political agenda). Binary character framing and personal attacks begin to harden emotions—​ moral crusaders vs. uninformed public; environmentalist bullies vs. victims; colonialists vs. “real” protectors of climate justice; the “little man” vs. the powers-​ that-​be. Selected use of intertextuality isolates the narrative and reinforces invariant claims. Repetition of claims and charges begin to create alternative truths and traits of an emerging ideological narrative. Continuing theme reiterated: • Climate change scientists and activists are deliberately alarmist New themes emerge: • Scientists who challenge climate change with alternative data are silenced or punished • Climate change is not settled science; major uncertainties remain • Climate change activists and politicians exploit climate science for personal and financial gain • Climate change regulations will negatively affect the economy at home and abroad • Climate skeptics are taking the fight to powerful alarmists ***

 

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Period 3: 2009–​2012—​Climate Science Wars Go Viral: Fraud, Sinister Motives, Truth, and Freedom The election of President Barack Obama and the arrival of the smartphone just prior to this period affected the evolving narrative. During this period, Obama’s environmental policy was more climate friendly, and climate change science began to be discussed more widely among ordinary citizens in addition to climatologists. Advances in technology provided spaces for various media outlets to publish videos and op-​eds online disseminating climate change stories, to which a wide spectrum of people could respond in real time on their smartphones via social media. Audiences could selectively choose the media outlet and storyline in which to participate and the stance they wished to take. This allowed for an unlimited array of articles and unfiltered comments. Articles took on a more combative stance with battles lines drawn between climate change proponents, essentially seen as self-​serving conspirators, and skeptics seen as fighting back. August 2009 (E & C) Title of article:  “Scientists, economists challenge alarmism at Climate Conference” (p.4) by Dan Miller.

At the Third International Conference on Climate Change, a group of elite scientists joined forces with economists to refute the decade long alarmist claims pushed by the media and climate change proponents that global warming is man-​made. The scientists used evidence from the literature to question the causes of global warming while the economists argued that the Democratic sponsored cap-​and-​trade energy plan would add huge costs to business, which would be passed on to the consumer. George Marshall Institute president Jeff Kueter cited studies showing that diverting capital to emission permits will result in the loss of more than a million jobs a year up to 2030 with only a negligible reduction in global temperatures. Two Republican congressmen spoke out strongly in opposition to the “cap-​and-​ tax” plan which would be a total capitulation, economically speaking, for US workers. Ben Lieberman, an energy scholar at the Heritage Foundation showed that the plan would raise gas, electricity, and heating oil costs by more than 50  percent. Meanwhile, prominent scientists like Richard Lindzen challenged the science and premises underlying global warming “doomsday” alarmism, blaming it in part on the complicit mainstream media who simply accept authority and do not fact check. British Lord Monckton, former science advisor to Margaret Thatcher, hit the nail on the head when he said that the climate change conspirators underestimate us, but we will

 



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not let the truth go. The United States was founded on freedom and we will win this battle.   

Here, the climate skeptical narrative invokes a war metaphor. The divisions highlighted in the previous period are now in full battle mode. The author notes that skeptics added new “ammunition” to their arsenal at the conference. This time “us” includes elite climate scientists from conservative think tanks and foundations, who “join forces” with skeptical economists against “them”—​ implied non-​scientist alarmists (for only such persons could produce alarmism). These alarmists include the mainstream media who spread “doomsday predictions” about climate change. Caught in between the two sides is what Lord Monckton, science advisor to former British prime minister Margaret Thatcher, referred to as “you”—​the climate skeptic audience in the room, but also largely understood as all ordinary citizens who have the right to question science and authority. The Democratic sponsored Waxman-​Markey cap-​and-​trade bill is attacked by skeptical economists as a job killer and dubbed a “cap-​and-​tax” plan in a rhetorical sleight of hand by Republican congressmen. They put its economic damage to ordinary US citizens in more stark, warlike terms:  it amounts to “unilateral disarmament in the economic sphere for American businesses and workers,” a strongly invariant claim. A litany of skeptical voices—​including economists, both local and international—​pile on “dire projections” of the economic fallout from Waxman-​Markey—​“58%” hike in the price of gasoline at the pump; “90% to the typical family of four’s annual cost of electricity”—​scaring the average citizen. Add to this blaming the “compliant mainstream media” that propagate inaccurate climate science information and are not fact checked. Climate skeptics’ attribution of sinister motives (i.e., ginning up unnecessary alarm/​fear) to the mainstream media and climate change proponents is a consistent and growing theme throughout the narrative. This strategy demeans and alienates those voices and closes ranks around the skeptic storyline, increasing its ideological stance. Lord Monckton closed this part of the story with a kind of rhetorical call-​ to-​arms to the audience that went beyond climate science. First, he suggested that his audience has been underestimated:  “The highly placed conspirators who seek to ride the climate ‘scare’ to world domination have reckoned without one thing. You.” The capitalization of “You” gives the audience importance and stokes up their defiance in the face of the sinister motives and bullying tactics of climate change proponents. Monckton urged the audience to stand for truth: “You are here; you will not let truth go.” This is how they can right the social wrong. Second, and more importantly, he reframed the climate debate

 

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around foundational values of truth and freedom, principles on which the United States was founded. He says, “In the end, it will be here in the United States that the truth will first emerge (implying that everything thus far on climate change has not been the truth) . . . Not in Europe, for we are no longer free. It is here, in this great nation founded upon liberty, that the battle for the world’s freedom will be won.” By essentially dissing his own European background and praising the United States, Monckton effectively becomes one with his US audience in the place where he assures them that the battle for “the world’s freedom” will be won. The skeptic side of the battle prevails. Here’s a poignant example of an emotionally resonant narrative, which, as we noted in c­ hapter 1, can capture hearts and minds. March 2010—​Washington Times (online) Title of article: “Editorial: Global Warming Winners”

Climate change activism has become a profitable industry—​one of the greatest frauds and scandals of our time—​and Al Gore has been the biggest financial winner. He has sold millions of books, given countless paid speeches, released a widely seen science-​fiction movie, and won the Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts. All the while, Gore has been amassing a fortune by investing in “green” companies (most notably the carbon trading industry) that profit from increased government regulations and sweetheart deals from connected politicians and bureaucrats. The media has helped Gore by giving him “a free pass” to spread his propaganda without ever challenging him on the profits he has made sounding the alarm on climate change, while leaving the world’s largest carbon footprint. Gore and his ilk, like IPCC Chairman, Rajendra Pachauri, have clear conflicts of interest and therefore their Nobel Peace Prize should be rescinded.

  

This scathing op-​ed by the Washington Times editorial board is not only skeptical of climate change and critical of Al Gore, who they see as the greatest financial beneficiary of climate activism, but also adds a deeper level of cynicism to the climate skeptical narrative: Climate change is dubbed a “fraud”—​an emotionally charged word that can quickly cement opinion and harden ideology. Gore is branded a “fear monger” and “alarmist” who whips up “hysteria” over climate change in books, speeches, and movies. Notably, the author referred to Gore’s documentary An Inconvenient Truth as “science fiction” (and in so doing diminished its “truth” value). Gore’s being awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts is seen as a social wrong, given his perceived conflicts of interests including investments in “green” firms. His New York Times op-​ed, in which he advocates for his position on climate change is framed as an “unpaid

 



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advertisement,” illustrating that the media is complicit in Gore’s “climate-​change hysteria,” helping him to profit from it. It is also used to criticize him for having “the largest carbon footprint in the world.” Like Gore, IPCC chairman Rajendra Pachauri, with whom he shares the Nobel Prize, is also framed as a “climate fraud” profiting from his “alarmism” and scare quotes. The op-​ed calls for their Nobel Prize to be rescinded given their “clear conflicts of interest.” There are several examples of absolute claims in this article, using superlatives or hyperbolic language. First, “the greatest scandal connected to global warming is not exaggeration, fraud, or destruction of data to conceal the weakness of the argument (a not-​so-​subtle reference to Climategate). It is those who are personally profiting from promoting this fantasy at the expense of the rest of us. Al Gore is the most visible beneficiary.” To suggest that Al Gore’s profiting from climate change is a bigger scandal than Climategate is a bold and remarkable claim. Second, the authors call out the stalled cap-​and-​trade bill that will make quick fortunes for the “carbon brokers” assisting companies with reducing their carbon footprints. This, of course, also implicates the Obama administration in the politicizing of climate science for profit. Dedicating an entire op-​ed to tarnishing the reputation of Al Gore is an example of what Michael Mann19 calls the Serengeti strategy, named after the predators of the Serengeti Plain in Africa who hunt their prey by picking off the vulnerable from the herd, making them an example to the rest to beware. By singling out Al Gore (someone with global stature and power) as essentially a self-​promoting climate profiteer, the narrative has made an example of him as the face of the climate change movement, and by so doing brings the entire movement into disrepute.

Online Responses All of the comments, except one, in response to this article were critical of Al Gore and strongly supported the position of the authors. By setting up a story line of “fraud-​and-​abuse” on the part of climate alarmists, especially one as powerful as former vice president Al Gore, those who commented (mostly skeptics) responded in kind, using several rhetorical strategies listed here to diminish Gore’s power and stature and those like him, creating an echo chamber effect. Repetition of Words Suggesting Fraudulent Activity and Ginned up Alarm

• Fraud—​15  times • Scam—​9  times

 

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• Hoax—​4  times • Alarmist/​alarmism—​3  times Examples:

• “Al Gore has spent his entire life being a complete fraud” • “In addition to Gore and a few we know about, it would be interesting to find out who else benefited from this fraud” • “With their [the media] support, Obama & Co can and do ignore reality and charge right ahead with their global warming scam as the tool with which to grab total control of the economy” • “To many people, even from the onset of all the hype, the AGW hoax was an obvious ploy for power and money” • “Murari Lal, who wrote the glacier section of the 2007 IPCC report admitted that the alarmist claims were not backed by peer review science” Attributing Sinister Motives

• “It’s difficult not to be cynical when these ‘protectors of the world’ are just political (sic) operatives in a money making scheme and self-​promotion . . . . They have zero moral authority yet they paint themselves as being so illuminated and self-​aware.” • “No one researching climate issues or with big investments in energy products should be allowed anywhere near this issue. Gore and the UN are only in this for the $$$$$$$ coming in.” Name Calling/​Demonizing Activists (and Uneducated Voters Who Support Them)

• “Did u see that UT-​Knoxville is about to give Al only their 3rd honorary doctorate ever? This planet is doomed . . . Not from man-​made global warming, but from man’s stupidity.” • “It’s not Algore’s (sic) fault, it is the uneducated and incapable of critical thinking masses who have gone through our public school system that are responsible for the success of the Hoax.” • “What was it . . . something about ‘stupid is as stupid does?’ Or ‘we have met the enemy, and he is us?’ And then you wonder how BO could POSSIBLY get re-​elected in 2012 . . . I say to you, NEVER underestimate the ignorance or stupidity of the American voter.”

 



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Sarcasm

• “What you people and the writer of this editorial don’t seem to understand is that Global Warming has now led to Global Cooling which in turn will lead to even more Global Warming which in turn will lead to even more Global Cooling.” • “Don’t be so cynical people. Mr. Gore, President Obama, the Democratic Party, the progressives within the Republican Party (i.e. McLame), the UN, and the Generation Investment Management LLP company only have our best interests at heart! Truly they do! *wink**wink*.” One Rare Dissenting Voice

• “I will side with Gore on this one. All your sarcasm and nastiness aside, its vital that we be good stewards of the earth. It appears that republicans feel laissez-​ faire economies and their irresponsible corporations should be free to destroy the environment and that they’re behavior has no consequences to the forests, rivers, ecology, or our way of life. There is a balance to be had between the pursuit of economic growth and preserving the earth for the future.” June 2012—​Daily Caller (online) Title of article: “Professor fired after expressing climate change skepticism” by Stephanie Wang

Chemistry Professor Nicholas Drapela was fired suddenly and without warning or reason from Oregon State University (OSU). Drapela was a well-​ liked professor rated 4.3 out of 5 by OSU students and had not been involved in any scandal or wrongdoing. The only possible reason the school could have released him was his outspoken skepticism of climate change. In 2007, Drapela began giving talks on his skepticism, often and openly questioning the science behind man-​made global warming. A colleague of Drapela’s, who drafted and circulated a letter of support on his behalf, suggested the director of OSU’s Climate Change Research Institute was at least partly responsible for the firing, out of fear it could threaten his business empire.   

The firing of OSU chemistry professor Nicholas Drapela, an outspoken climate change skeptic, for no apparent reason is yet another example of the unfair treatment of skeptics. Not only did this firing happen at the end of the semester, interrupting instruction for students at a critical time, but also most universities

 

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had gone through their hiring cycle, thus, Drapela was unable to prepare for the job market by applying to other schools. Drapela’s colleague and fellow climate skeptic Gordon Fulks believed he was fired because of his climate change position—​“To Fulks, it seemed obvious that Drapela’s global warming skepticism was the reason behind the firing.” He drafted a letter of support for Drapela and circulated it among the university community. Fulks believed that another professor and the director of the Climate Research Institute, Dr. Mote, played a role in the firing. Fulks engaged in a now familiar ideological, rhetorical strategy of assigning ulterior motives to the opposition by arguing that Dr.  Mote was “highly intolerant” and opposed Drapela’s ideas because they “could potentially threaten his business empire.” The suggestion here is that Dr.  Mote is a climate activist and an ideologue, who is using climate change to make himself wealthy—​similar to the critique of Al Gore. The author notes that “Speculation has abounded that Drapela was fired for being a global warming critic.” Of course, just who is speculating is left undefined. The university declined to comment when the media outlet reached out to them, further hardening their image as intolerant and unwilling to be questioned. We can imagine the target audience as readers who already have a negative perception of higher education institutions as generally intolerant of views that are not part of the dominant orthodoxy, i.e., human induced climate change. Therefore they are likely to perceive this story as a confirmation of their beliefs (confirmation bias) and conclude that Drapela was most likely fired for being a climate change skeptic. An implied accusation here is the suppression of free speech by universities and climate change supporters, which ties in to larger metanarratives of institutions suppressing personal freedoms. Although the story is narrowly confined to OSU, and the article does not make reference to events or institutions beyond the text, we can imagine a similar scenario at other universities. The appeal of the story is emotional—​imagine being fired just for your views. It feels unfair, and therefore resonates with average people.

Social Media Response The comments in response to this article appeared to run the gamut in the sense that respondents included both climate skeptics (the majority) and climate activists. However, diverse perspectives were not really engaged, so it was essentially a tense back-​and-​forth of closed arguments and trading insults between the two sides. The arguments included three common themes: climate change science is not settled; climate activists manipulate scientific data for grant funding and financial gain; and universities are essentially bastions of brainwashing

 



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liberalism, intolerant of dissent. We see two dominant rhetorical strategies used:  selective intertextuality and demonizing the other side, which isolates groups and impedes real dialogue, further developing an ideological narrative. Using Intertextuality to Support One’s Position

• “I expected nothing less from someone spouting ACC [anthropogenic climate change] propaganda. I have study this for over 10 years. Is there warming, yes. It caused by people, possibly. Is it at the force factor stated by ACC alarmist, we don’t know. Some say it is 1.5% (deniers) and others say 3.0% (alarmist).” • In one thread The following comments are quoted without corrections: Commenter 1: Your wrong, global warming is settled, read this https://​www.pnas.org/​content/​early/​2010/​06/​22/​1003187107.abstract Commenter 2: No, its not settled. Read this . . . https://​www.dailymail.co.uk/​sciencetech/​article-​2055191/​Scientists-​ said-​ c limate-​ c hange-​ s ceptics-​ p roved- ​ w rong-​ accused-​ h iding-​ t ruth-​ colleague.html https:// ​ w ww.wsj.com/​ a rticles/​ n o- ​ n eed- ​ t o- ​ p anic- ​ a bout- ​ g lobal-​ warming-​1386195856?tesla=y Commenter 3:The only thing settled is that the hockey-​stick graph is a fraud. Demonizing the Other Side by Various Means Insults

• “Universities are supposed to embrace diverse ideas. The cause of global warming is not settled, nor is the future about climate change predictable. Therefore, opinions about global warming are merely that: opinions. But elites build organizations, be it government or university campuses, where they believe their ideas or opinions should not be questioned. Elites: over educated, thoughtless idiots.” Attributing sinister motives

• “The global warming scientists that went to the summit a few years ago were expecting government grants to ‘further their studies.’ They sold out in order

 

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to get those grants. Their data was altered to make it look like global warming was destroying the planet. And why would governments and some businesses back the data? Because there is big money in green businesses.” • “How naive can you be? The only way some of these scientists survive is by publishing their ‘findings’ so they can get another grant!! If they have to ‘cut corners,’ they just might do that!” Using ALL CAPS to amplify the point about motives

• “PROFESSORS ARE NOT THERE TO ‘TEACH’  .  .  .  THEY ARE THERE TO SPECIFICALLY INDOCTRINATE AND BRAINWASH. PERIOD. BUT THEN . . . THE PEOPLE ALLOW THESE ASSWIPES TO INFILTRATE AND DO THEIR DIRTY DEEDS AND THEN GET PAID A FORTUNE IN RETIREMENT FOR THEIR DEVIOUS WORK!!! WAY TO GO PEOPLE!”

Period 3—​Ideological Traits Harden—​The Climate Skeptical Narrative is Entrenched

  

Climate change activists have been perpetuating one of the biggest hoaxes of our time on the population. The only thing worse than the hoax itself is the fact that they’ve done so for their own financial and political gain, aided and abetted by the mainstream media. They have not only been manipulating science in the name of truth, they have used every lever of power and influence—​the mainstream media, environmental policies (most notably cap-​and-​trade), economic pressure, major conferences, silencing or punishing dissenting voices—​to advance their alarmist agenda, while secretly enriching themselves through huge profits from “green” businesses. Al Gore, the face of the so-​called inconvenient truth, has been the chief beneficiary of this hoax. However, climate skeptic scientists, economists, academics, and ordinary people have been fighting back fiercely on multiple fronts (with data, letters, and on social media) against the hoax and bullying by elitist climate activists who underestimate us. This is a battle between truth tellers and conspirators who manipulate science for their own power, profit, and fame, and scare or bully people into action; those who want to wreck the economy vs. those of us who want to save it; those who want to regulate our lives and silence our voices vs. those who will fight to maintain our freedom.

 



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This period brought the ideological divide in the country into the open. The us vs. them binary became more pronounced; battle metaphors were invoked, and claims became more absolute. Social media provided unfettered ways to make outrageous statements including the indictment of the whole climate change enterprise as a hoax, and the story moved into a larger metanarrative as an attack on truth and freedom. Themes that continued and hardened: • Climate change scientists and activists are deliberately alarmist • Climate change is politicized for policymakers, not based on science • Climate change scientists misrepresent and manipulate data • Climate change is not settled science; major uncertainties remain • Climate change activists and politicians exploit climate science for financial and personal gain • Scientists who challenge climate change are silenced or punished New themes that emerged: • Climate change is used to take away our people’s freedom • Climate activists are elitist bullies who underestimate ordinary citizens • Climate change is a hoax created by power-​grabbing liberals and the media ***

Period 4: 2013—​2016: The Hoax that Consumes Us—​Politics, Policies, Daily Life The articles in this period reflect the politics and policies of the time. With the Obama administration in its second term, the sense is that the hoax has consumed all aspects of life. Skeptics reject the concept in absolutist terms as a matter of politics and principle. May 2014—​Daily Caller (online) Title of article: “Skeptical scientists debunk white house global warming report” by Michael Bastasch

The Obama White House released their National Climate Assessment report, a work of fiction, essentially a marketing tool to scare citizens into action, which was swiftly debunked by a group of fifteen prominent scientists and

 

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meteorologists. The climate report claimed that the United States was already feeling the effects of climate change, global warming, or whatever they call it now. However, the models used are flawed and produced by government paid scientists to advance a political agenda, which renders the entire report unworthy of participation in the climate change debate, and should not be used a basis for policymaking. Even the IPCC has been toning down its apocalyptic claims on climate change. The fact is that there is no evidence of man-​made climate change impacting the environment, and despite President Obama’s insistence, the debate is far from over and the science is far from settled.   

The rebuttal letter penned by a group of fifteen scientists to the Obama administration’s National Climate Assessment (NCA) report—​which asserted that the United States was already experiencing the effects of climate change through droughts and hurricanes—​included typical skeptic arguments, mainly that the climate is always changing. But they went further. They accused climate scientists of being paid by the government to produce evidence to support the political agenda: “Science derives its objectivity from robust logic and honest evidence repeatedly tested by all knowledgeable scientists, not just those paid to support the administration’s version of ‘Global Warming.’ ” We are reminded that skeptics paint climate change as one version of an ongoing story. The author does not put a heavy thumb on the scale, but it is clear that he’s at least sympathetic to the skeptical arguments of the scientists. He gives them lengthy paragraphs to rebut the report. The scientists’ letter is filled with absolute claims, such as, “We are asked to believe that humans are drastically changing the earth’s climate by burning fossil fuels. . . It is NOT true.” “ ‘Global Warming’ has not been global and has not set regional records where warming has occurred.” But President Obama’s position is equally absolute: “Climate change is a fact.” We are left to conclude that the White House report is just a marketing campaign, not based on scientific facts, to drum up support for the Obama Administration’s climate agenda.

Online Responses The comments contained fierce arguments among respondents and continued trading of insults between climate skeptics and climate activists. In that sense, there were heavy doses of demonizing the other side. There was also a lot of intertextuality used to support a particular position, although we cannot easily verify the authenticity of cited references.

 



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Consider the following strategies that were used to make stories resonate in response to the summary of this and subsequent online articles in the boxes. These strategies, based on our analysis of the data, are our characterizations of the ways in which the public participates in the ongoing narrative on climate science in online spaces. We found that commenters often made statements or provided a link without explicitly providing any context for it to suggest to the audience that (a)  the commenter’s position is based on, or supported by, the content in the link and/​or (b) the audience should read the content in the link, implying that the commenter thinks the audience is arguing from a less or ill-​ informed or contrary position that can be corrected by reading the link. It’s as if commenters already assume a finite array of positions have already been staked out on climate science in online discursive spaces and respond accordingly. In that vein, we have reproduced examples of these strategies here verbatim with no explanation or correction, to keep the spirit of the commenters’ varied discursive positions. Using Intertextuality to Support Position

http:// ​ arctic.atmos.uiuc.edu/ ​ c ryosphere/ ​ I MAGES/ ​ g lobal.daily.ice.area. withtrend.jpg Raw data, showing fluctuations, but no trend. In fact, last year and again this year, the arctic ice pack expanded by a good bit. Demonizing the Other Side

It’s kinda hard to debate with stupid people and boy you folks are surely stupid. Global warming is real and all the denying in the world isn’t going to stop it. You folks are amazingly ignorant. Attributing Sinister Motives to an Entire Group

Liberal handbook: 1. Invent a controversy 2. Make money off anyone gullible enough to believe you 3. Call anyone who doesn’t believe you a racist, sexist, etc 4. If anyone still believes you, go to step 2. 5. If no one believes you any longer, go to step 1. If the name of your invented controversy loses its appeal, change the name.

 

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August 2015—​Breitbart (online) Title of article: “Climate Change—​the hoax that costs us $4 billion a day” by James Delingpole

The climate change industry is the most expensive hoax in US life designed to take away our freedom and benefit dishonest activists. Every year the industry snookers US citizens out of $4 billion, roughly the same amount US citizens spend annually on online shopping. The only difference is when we shop online, we buy products we actually want. With the climate change industry, our choice is taken away. It’s already priced into higher taxes, airfare, gas, and electric bills, and we get nothing in return. Worse, we actually get less than nothing. We get stuff we don’t want and never asked for that intrude on our lives like “bat-​chomping bird slicing eco-​crucifixes” solar panels, and teachers feeding our kids propaganda science, feel bad documentaries, and more! Moreover, there’s a whole industry of professionals whose livelihood is now based on the spurious climate change argument—​carbon traders, academics, environmental non-​governmental organizations (NGOs), etc—​ to the tune of $1.5 trillion! These shysters don’t deserve our hard earned money so they can perpetuate their hoax, which is a despicable abuse of power and resources.

  

From the outset, the article has a contemptuous, tell-​it-​like-​it-​is tone. The storyline is about us, the US public whose free choice to live our lives, and spend our money as we like, is being eroded by them, self-​serving climate change activist charlatans who have used the climate change hoax to make us pay higher for taxes for important things in our lives like gas and electricity, while forcing things on us things we don’t want, like solar panels. The us vs. them frame of the storyline forcefully supports group coalescence and self-​isolation, which advances an ideological narrative. Delingpole contrasts the forced costs of climate change that are “priced into your taxes, your electricity bills, the cost of your airfare” to the online shopping industry where readers choose to purchase “a nice shirt, smart shirt . . . things that they actually want.” He uses this article to persuade readers, who likely don’t need much persuading, that the climate change industry is robbing them of their hard-​earned money for a cause that (a) is based on a shaky premise (“spurious grounds”), (b) isn’t worth it, and (c) in which they have no say. His univocal narrative does not hide his contempt for climate change activists and their efforts to mitigate climate change. He saves his most stinging critique for those he claims benefit financially from the “$1.5 trillion climate change industry,” drawing on a litany of degrading adjectives, word play, and sarcasm for maximum effect: the carbon traders; the

 



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dodgy academics; the “vulture capitalists pecking on the bloated carcass of renewable energy.” The personal assault is further hammered home by demonizing the work and moral character of activists:  “the “work” these “utterly useless parasites” do every day is pointless. They are rather “shysters and bludgers and charlatans and scroungers” who might as well be “paid the same amount of money by the government to dig holes in the ground and fill them up again” because it amounts to the same thing. A parasitic and immoral strain permeates the narrative, which completely debases the character of climate activists. The main takeaway is that climate change industry is a despicable abuse of power and scarce resources to which we should not be forced to contribute. Placing the narrative within the larger US concept of free choice (e.g., shopping online for things we want) vs. forced or no choice (paying higher taxes for climate change for policies or products), Delingpole is able to effectively appeal to the US public as being stripped of fundamental rights/​choices while being grossly exploited at the same time by people who are essentially crooks. The story is now about choice, rights, and freedom, not science, which resonates with people because it challenges deeply held US values.

Online Response Most of the comments on this article were from the climate skeptical perspective. Comments accusing the other side of being brainwashed, stating climate change was a hoax, and arguing the science of climate change were most common. There was some attempt at meaningful debate between users who disagree, and one who challenged skeptics to question “what if ” they’re wrong. Here’s a look at some of the strategies. Complimenting Any Person Who Reinforces Your Point of View

• Thank you. You have done a beautiful job in demonstrating that correlation does not imply causation and have argued successfully that “follow the money (and the power)” is the most valid explanation of this crazy climate change mania foisted upon us. Name Calling/​Demonizing the Other Side

• Gallas, Al “Capone” Gore is an idiot. Unfortunately though there are people way more stupid than he, that would have you think he’s brilliant. One thing’s for certain, one can be obviously way beyond nuts and still make many millions of dollars fooling gullible people.

 

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• You sheeple that follow behind the flat earth mindset politicians and snake oil salesman thinking that my tax dollars can do ANYTHING are truly a sad bunch of bleaters. I do agree with one thing. It is not funny. It is truly pitiful. Climate is Always Changing (or Nullifying the Anthropogenic Argument)—​ Create a New Truth

• blockmenow-​We don’t deal with “What Ifs” Only what is truth and AGW is not truth and not happening. Climate change is always happening naturally and we must adapt and live with what nature provides. Enjoy the good weather now before it gets colder again. Sarcasm

• Algore (sic) is smart; he invented the internet [too]. • If I could make $200 million a year like AlGore (sic), I too would be preaching the evils of capitalism and the coming of global warming. Can you here me brother, Amen! Now pass the plate! Other Side Is Brainwashed

• Good article sir, but is it too late to save the situation? Schools have been brainwashing children for years in this ideology (I should know, only a few years ago I was at school myself and am still at university). • Don’t give up hope of turning him away from the dark side, although it is a difficult job. When he gets older he may well see why his fuel bills are so expensive, although as you say he has been brainwashed throughout school and university. Was it Goebbels who said to indoctrinate them young and turn them against their parents? Claims of a Hoax

• Anyone who looks at the data on both sides will come to the conclusion that Catastophic (sic) Man Made Warming is a complete hoax. However, the Warmists will not only refuse to listen to any contrary arguments, they will also fight to prevent others from hearing anything that contradicts their dogma. Dissenting Opinion—​An Honest Exchange

• Have you considered the risk of both paths of action? i.e. is it more risky to do something than it is to do nothing considering it’s true versus the same considering it’s false?

 



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• If we don’t do anything there’s risk, if we do something there’s risk. Either way you look at it there’s a downside (or an upside). Most people seem so confident that they “know” and I really don’t understand why. The whole AGW crowd don’t “know” and I don’t think the anti-​AGW crowd “know” either . . . are you confident? Do you have any concerns about being wrong?

Period 4—​The Climate Skeptical Narrative Is Not about Science; It’s about Losing Our Freedom The billion dollar climate change hoax industry continues, forced on us directly by the government who pay scientists to report incorrect findings that scare and force us to change our lifestyles with support from activists and the media. The climate activist Obama administration is (ab)using their power to take away the choice in how we spend our money; brainwashing our kids in school; and taking over every aspect of our lives to advance their agenda.

  

The story rejects all scientific reports and claims on human induced climate change as untrue, and also climate activists as suspect, effectively closing off dialogue about science. What we must do to mitigate climate change disrupts our lifestyle and takes away our freedom. Only this version of the story is allowed, creating an echo chamber effect. The narrative in this period doubles down on the following themes: • Climate change is used to take away our people’s freedom • Climate change activists and politicians exploit climate science for financial and personal gain—​now they are shysters • Climate change is a hoax created by power grabbing liberals and the media ***

Period 5: 2017—​2018: Radical Change: When the Government Legitimizes Skepticism The election of Donald Trump in 2016 marked the most explicit legitimizing of the climate skeptical narrative at the highest levels of government, Trump (an unabashed climate skeptic) made explicit from the beginning of his administration that he will reverse the Paris Climate Accord. The articles in this period alternatively vilify and nullify climate change.

 

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January 2017 (E & C) Title of article: “Trump vows changes in nation’s energy, climate policies” (pp 1, 4) by H. Sterling Burnett

The election of Donald Trump ushered in an administration drastically different from the Obama administration. President-​elect Trump vows to cancel US participation in the Paris Climate Accord and eliminate Obama-​era regulations and the CPP, which will be a victory for hardworking US citizens. Trump also plans to reverse an EPA (Environmental Protection Agency) finding that carbon dioxide is a dangerous pollutant, clearing the way to ridding the country of most climate regulations. These regulations are burdensome to US businesses and energy companies. The US people are ready for a pro-​energy president like Trump as opposed to Obama whose environmental policies and regulations created roadblocks for infrastructure and raised costs for energy. We are tired of our lives being dictated by Washington bureaucrats. “The Trump presidency will be a welcomed change from the “power-​grabbing, energy-​strangling, economy-​crushing legacy” of Obama.

  

H. Sterling Burnett’s article, written on the verge of Trump’s inauguration conveys optimism about the impending Trump presidency and how it will be drastically different from Obama’s, specifically as it relates to energy and environmental policy. Obama was a climate activist president who called climate change “an urgent and growing threat to our national security.” The Obama administration EPA imposed many regulations designed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and protect infrastructure, land, water, and other natural resources from human impact. Of course, Obama’s signature climate accomplishment was signing on to the Paris Climate Agreement pledging to reduce the nation’s carbon emissions by 2025. Trump, on the other hand, an unabashed climate change skeptic, articulates his position plainly as follows: “I’m not a believer in man-​ made global warming. I mean, Obama thinks it’s the number one problem of the world today, and I think it’s very low on the list. We have much bigger problems.” By promising to eliminate many, if not all, Obama-​era EPA regulations and withdraw from the Paris accord, Trump made it clear from the very beginning of his presidency that his environmental policies will effectively nullify all of Obama’s. The story here, told within the larger context of a newly elected administration, is about radical change—​in government, policies, and actions. Trump and his policies will be everything Obama is not; hence, the language is one of contrasts. Throughout the article, Trump’s impending presidency and his promised environmental policies are framed optimistically, while Obama’s are framed negatively by the author as well as various policy analysts. “Pro-​energy”

 



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Trump is contrasted with the implied “anti-​energy” Obama. Policy analyst, Dan Simmons predicts that “during a Trump administration, we will see federal lands and waters opened for energy production and a quick end to the coal-​leasing moratorium on federal lands . . . a reduction of subsidies for inefficient sources of energy production like wind and solar” as well as the end of the greenhouse gas regulations. This bold prediction would find resonance with coal miners and others who work in similar industries, making a more persuasive story, as it speaks to their needs. Another analyst, Paul Driessen, believes the US people are ready to turn the page on the Obama administration and his “power-​ grabbing, energy-​strangling, economy-​crushing legacy”—​a scathing dismissal of the Obama legacy that will be remedied by a “pro-​energy” President Trump. He contends that “Trump’s victory shows many among the public were tired of politicians ignoring their need and desire for affordable energy:  This election shows that hardworking Americans in what the media and ruling classes dismissively refer to as ‘flyover country’ finally had enough of unelected, unaccountable Washington, DC bureaucrats dictating every aspect of our lives.” The adjective “hardworking” presumes a class of US citizens who work hard (as opposed to the implied ones who don’t) and are not well served by Obama’s policies. In the same vein, “flyover country” echoes familiar talking points regarding the 2016 election: that it was about the so-​called forgotten man and woman. The reference to “unelected, unaccountable” bureaucrats is a classic conservative characterization of so-​called big government and of government workers who make decisions about how to enforce the law through regulations, which is perceived as dictating how ordinary people live their lives. The change thread in the storyline, then, suggests that hardworking US citizens in flyover country will now be given their due, which was not the case under the Obama administration. Driessen is forthright about his skepticism with respect to climate change and his optimism regarding the Trump presidency when he says “the Paris climate treaty will be repudiated and delusions and assertions about ‘dangerous manmade climate change’ will no longer dictate our energy, economic, and national defense decisions. America will again produce and utilize the fossil-​fuel blessings that lifted billions out of poverty, disease, and early death and created jobs, prosperity, health, living standards, and lifespans unimaginable barely a century ago.” In one broad swipe, the storyline both dismisses climate change and creates a romanticized view of fossil fuels as the savior from poverty; though lost, this will be regained—​a univocal perspective that does not mention the health dangers of fossil fuels. Lastly, the article ends by returning to a character who appeared earlier in the story—​Lord Monckton, the British climate skeptic who gives unsolicited advice on how the United States could “easily end its participation in the Paris climate agreement” by simply seceding from the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Ending the story with

 

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advice to the United States from a high-​profile, foreign climate skeptic on how to withdraw from the most recent significant international climate accord, is a symbolic turning of the page on the Obama era and its policies, and the beginning of a new storyline on government-​sanctioned climate skepticism in the Trump era. Breitbart 2018 (online) Title of article: “It’s over. Now even democrats give up on ‘climate change’ ” by James Delingpole

The battle is over. Climate change is a non-​issue. No one is talking about it anymore. President Trump, in his first State of the Union (SOTU) address, didn’t bring up the subject at all. But even more importantly, neither did any of the Democrats in their rebuttals. The Huffington Post called out Representative Joe Kennedy of Massachusetts and Senator Sheldon Whitehouse of Rhode Island for not mentioning climate change in their speeches responding to the president. Bernie Sanders, independent senator from Vermont and favorite of the progressives, was the only one still beating the climate change drum and calling out the president for not addressing it. Times are very different now for those who believe in climate change. During his presidency, Obama would always include language during his SOTU address sounding the alarm on the so-​called dangers of climate change, forcing the rest of us to act. This year though, “crickets.” We’re winning the climate war. #winning!

  

The war metaphor (us fighting them) in the climate skeptical narrative is taken to its logical conclusion here. Skeptics declare victory (“It’s over”). It’s important to consider the context. Presidents deliver the nationally televised SOTU address annually and use it as an opportunity to articulate their policy agenda to the US people, showing its importance. The fact that neither Trump nor any of the Democrats in their responses to SOTU mentioned climate change is framed by skeptics as a diminishing of its importance. Of course, we know that the absence of reference to climate change in this context is equivalent to a loud silence. Far from climate change no longer being an issue (not likely given Trump’s explicitly stated goal of reversing Obama’s environmental policies and the Democrats’ commitment to the issue), the silence suggests Trump’s deliberate dismissal of the issue in this context—​a nationally televised event by the most powerful person in the country to a broad swath of the US public—​for maximum effect. Given that SOTU is more about politics than policy, and who controls the narrative, Trump’s “just say nothing” approach on climate change was a rhetorically winning strategy. Saying nothing, in fact, said everything.

 



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This “winning strategy” is evidenced in the first and clearest example of invariance in the article—​its title: “It’s over. Now even Democrats give up on climate change.” Whether the claim is actually true or not isn’t relevant. In fact, we know it isn’t. It’s merely daring to make such a definitive statement that makes it true for skeptics—​it’s an alternative fact. The climate battle is declared over with an implied loss by Democrats—​that’s a rhetorical win. Given Trump’s mantra is “winning,” this signals that the climate skeptic position has won. The declaration of victory, ironically, comes from the absence of any reference to climate change in SOTU, which implies a total surrender. The rhetorical strategy of claiming victory is persuasive in framing the story as a done deal from the get go, so that even when Senator Bernie Sanders, the only one to offer a rebuttal on this issue after SOTU, counters with an equally definitive claim, that “climate change is not a ‘hoax.’ . . . It is a reality all over our country and all over the world,” he’s framed as a lonesome fighter whistling in the dark in a battle that’s long over. The use of Trump’s “#winning” at the end can also be seen as a taunt to the opposing side, signaling a new ideology has prevailed.

Online Comments The comments in response to this article reflected two separate but related storylines:  (1) The celebration of Trump’s dismissal of climate science and the repudiation of Obama’s and others’ support of it. By extension, Trumpism is linked to the climate skeptical narrative, encapsulated in the repeated use of Trump’s signature acronym, MAGA. (2) The linking of climate science to another controversial science narrative—​evolution—​fortifying an anti-​science ideology. Strategies Used to Support the First Storyline Legitimizing the Person You Support

Did President Trump cover all he has done for energy independence over the past year in the SOTU? Pipelines opened . . . Federal Lands opened . . . more offshore opened . . . regulations cut. MAGA!

 

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Taking a Swipe at Another Group to Legitimize the One You Support

• loved the optics of the congressional black caucus sitting on their hands when Trump described low black unemployment rates. 1 year down, 7 to go Combining the Hoax Narrative with Demonizing the Other Side

• Climate Hoaxsters, Race Hustlers and Poverty Pimps are having a real bad year. • Its a stupid fraudulant [sic] ponzi scheme with the ultimate pipe dream of trying to charge people to breathe while exempting themselves of everything having to do with their own oppressive policies they tried to implement under that Marxist selfish narcissist sorry excuse of a leader Obozo being the HYPOCRATS they have always been! • Speaking of the climate scheme hucksters, I wonder if Bizarre Bernie issued his Chicken Little-​esque response from one of his 3 large homes? I wonder how large the “carbon footprint” is produced by his 3 large homes? Conspicuously absent from this article was Al Gore’s response. I wonder if he was hanging out in one of his huge carbon-​spewing homes. Perhaps he was in his Malibu beach house filling sandbags trying to stem the rising tide and save his $9 million mansion replete with its 6 carbon spewing fireplaces. Not sure who I detest more, the hypocritical leaders of the climate BS or their stupid followers who are too intellectually dishonest to call out their leaders. Sarcasm

• The planet is definitely getting cooler!!! Get out in your 4x4s and try to reverse the effect !!! LOL MAGA • RELAX. If Triumphant Trump listed ALL of his first year accomplishments he would still be talking. MAGA is here! Second Storyline Linking to Other Controversial Science Narratives (Evolution)

• Nothing has ever evolved. The false doctrine of Evolution is what is driving the false doctrine of Global Warming

 



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• Ooo, an idiot—​so are you casting doubt on the whole Flintstones theory as well? How about heliocentricity? • So ad hominem is the best you got to support your belief in Evolution? Even Richard Dawkins has admitted:  “Evolution hasn’t been observed while it’s happening. That means it failed the scientific method”

Period 5—​The Climate Skeptical Ideological Narrative Lives on as an Alternative Fact Climate skeptics have won the battle. President Trump has finally ended the false narrative forced on us by Obama, the media, climate activists, and so-​ called scientists. The president has stopped the hoax that was used by hypocritical people to control our lives and harm our economy by removing all the Obama-​era environmental regulations and ending the Paris accord. Now, no-​one is talking about climate change.

  

The current period has cultivated the most fertile ground for the climate skeptical narrative. The legitimizing of the climate skeptical position by President Trump and his administration through reversal of Obama-​era climate policies has allowed the story to take hold, even as climate change evidence continues to mount. The framing of the story as a war between two sides helps it to coalesce around one side—​the side that removes “roadblocks” from ordinary people’s lives, making them ostensibly freer. Claims are only absolute, whether true or not; characters are wholly supported or demonized; and science is dismissed. The battle is declared over by skeptics, signaling the belief that their narrative has prevailed. Themes that are reiterated in this period: • Climate change takes away our freedom • Climate change negatively affects the economy • Climate change is a hoax New twist to the story • Change has finally come! • Climate change is no longer relevant; skeptics have prevailed

 

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The Evolution of the Climate Skeptical Narrative The evolution of the skeptic narrative in the texts that we analyzed began with the questioning of science. Mann20 argues that “skepticism in the sense of critical consideration of evidence is intrinsic to the scientific enterprise.” But Mann, citing Bertrand Russell,21 also notes that in science skepticism can be abused. In the context of anthropogenic climate change, skepticism has become an ideology as it moves beyond questioning scientific practice (for which there has been a long tradition, especially on controversial issues like evolution) to questioning the motives and characters of climate scientists and activists as they relate to ordinary citizens. And so from period 1, we already see texts that raise the notion of the alarmist nature of climate science in the United States, advanced by the manipulation of data. For example, the term, alarmism, is used 119 times in the total corpus of E & C articles and thirty-​two times in online articles and comments. While some invariant claims are made, such as “climate change is not caused by humans,” some ground is given to the idea that, at the very least, the science is unsettled, which is supported by producing counterevidence. At this stage, the argument is still about science. When we move to period 2, however, we see skepticism begin to take on more explicit ideological dimensions—​skeptics see climate scientists as waging a moral crusade on a global scale to save the planet, which goes beyond science. Former Vice President Al Gore becomes the face of the moral crusade—​ highlighted by the release of An Inconvenient Truth—​that goes something like this:  Climate change is caused by humans and can ruin the planet; humans must change their lifestyles to stop or curb it; it’s a moral issue. If you don’t change your lifestyle, you’re contributing to ruining the planet, therefore your actions are immoral. For skeptics, this is an intrusion into lifestyle choices and freedom, which is not based on science, or is based on science that shows natural variability in temperatures not due to human influence—​and an intrusion that comes at an economic cost. The narrative on climate change at this point is becoming more self-​enclosed (autopoietic) and framed by skeptics in binary terms: climate change is due to natural variability in temperatures or human action; you have to choose which side you’re on, which forces more group coalescence. Of course, as Mann notes, it’s possible for the climate to change naturally and to be further changed by human action, but such contingencies do not comport with an ideological narrative. And so the skeptical narrative advances with the idea that scientists and activists are waging moral battles to change people’s lives based on science that has nothing to do with humans, and we must fiercely fight back.

 



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By period 3, there’s less focus on skepticism about science per se and a sharper focus on the (sinister) motives of scientists, activists, and the mainstream media. It is now both a moral and financial issue, i.e., forcing us to change our lifestyles at a cost to our pocket books. Battle lines are drawn between us (climate skeptics) and them (climate scientists, proponents, politicians, and the media). Climate science is declared a “hoax” (or a “scam”), perpetuated by activists for their own financial gain. The primary means of disseminating this absolute claim is by constant repetition, aided by the proliferation of social media. The word “hoax” was used a total of forty-​two times and “scam” fifty times in the articles and comments in the online texts. Mann22 contends that “a lie that is repeated often enough without refutation becomes perceived by many to be true.” In this day and age of “alternative facts,” we now understand how “other” truths are deliberately constructed. Ideological narratives tell other truths, and as we said in c­ hapter 1, good narratives are often shared within a community but are retold many times. The online media community provides a context for such sharing. Most comments posted online in response to articles during this period and later reinforce the skeptical narrative of the climate change hoax, accompanied by the sinister motives and/​or unethical (or even evil) character of climate activists who are often demonized and targeted with sarcastic comments. The online comments reveal an audience of like-​minded individuals as can be seen in the textual examples, creating an echo chamber effect, of us vs. them, which strengthens ideology. The narrative in period 4 doubles down on the framing of anthropogenic climate change as a hoax (now a billion-​dollar industry) but links science more directly to politics, specifically to the Obama administration. By so doing, we see the reiteration of the thread of science in a diabolical marriage with politics being used to control or regulate people’s lives. The Obama-​era environmental policies and regulations (including reducing carbon emissions) is exhibit A as an example of control, as skeptics see it. Now, the narrative is firmly ideological—​ you’re for the government controlling your life or you’re not. Articles and comments in this period advance this ideology by constantly referencing the political context, led by Obama and the Democrats. The narrative reinforces the us vs. them binary by simplifying the choices for the audience. Finally, in period 5, a victory for skeptics. The Trump administration explicitly legitimizes climate skepticism or outright denial as a policy agenda. No longer is climate skepticism relegated to the fringe world of conspiracy theorists on social media; it is now firmly legitimized in the highest level of government. Articles in this period, especially online, openly vilify or nullify climate change, repeating the mantra of alarmism and hoax, but with reference to the current political context as a contrast to the previous one: economic and personal freedoms are

 

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regained, championed by the government. The narrative-​network of skepticism is legitimized. And so we see how the deconstruction of climate science proceeds through a sequence of stages illustrated by themes that emerge, recur, and harden. It begins with questioning the strength of the science. At some point, the narrative goes beyond the bounds of science and scientific evidence and critiques to actively fight back against the moral and financial dimensions of climate activism. Eventually, the narrative focuses on climate scientists themselves, questioning their integrity and making claims about a grand conspiracy of scientists to take away our freedoms.

Conclusion We mentioned in this chapter that speech communities have their own discursive norms, becoming dominant by naturalizing their particular ideology. If we take anthropogenic climate change as settled science as a naturalized dominant ideology, then skeptics have effectively unsettled climate science, linking it to politics and fundamental US values of freedom and choice to denaturalize it and build a persuasive alternative ideological narrative. They have done so, through language, over time as evidenced in the foregoing textual analysis and summary plots, making effective use of invariance, repetition, alternative data, the creation of binary frames, and the attribution of sinister motives to, and demonizing of the other side, as well as reinforcing these positions by sharing the narrative with mostly like-​minded or like-​storied people. The following chapter takes a look at the climate skeptical narrative beyond US borders.

 

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Skeptics without Borders

Introduction Ideas do not simply float around in the ether. Rather, they must be taken up and literally passed around or they disappear. If not communicated constantly and broadly, any idea (norms, strategies, narratives) is like a flower that blooms in the middle of a forest. But when its pollen is taken up by the wind, or a bee, then the idea of it travels, taking root and blooming in many places. The blooming of knowledge would not have been possible were it not for the medium of writing and, most especially, print, with the earliest block prints in Korea and China and later printing press in Germany.1 And it blooms to an unprecedented degree today, when these ideas need not even require printing to be broadcast through digital media. In the 1960s, Everett Rodgers began describing the process by which innovations (for him, primarily technological ones) took root.2 The spread of an innovation is not automatic. Rather, active processes of norm diffusion have to take place, requiring the ability of different communities to take an idea and translate it into reality in their own contexts. Some twenty years later, organizational theorists generalized this into a theory of institutionalism. Technology, after all, is an institution, since it has to be piloted, practiced, and maintained in a place. And, so, DiMaggio and Powell wrote about how norm diffusion, which is the spread of ideas across social or national boundaries, creates a type of isomorphism, where practices, ideas, and technologies in different places start to resemble each other.3 But these ideas do not simply travel, en toto and unchanged, from place to place. There can also be process of contextualization, as ideas (and texts) are modified when imported to one place them from another. New organizations or institutions developed to accommodate these new ideas have to fit the context that the ideas are being implanted in.4 For this reason, such institutions can also exhibit a kind of polymorphism; generally, we should find that such new The Power of Narrative. Raul P. Lejano and Shondel J. Nero, Oxford University Press (2020). © Oxford University Press. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197542101.001.0001.

 

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institutions are shaped by both processes of isomorphism and polymorphism, a dialectic between text and context.5 They should resemble each other, from place to place, but display differences and nuances that result from their fitting into the local ways of thinking and doing. As we discussed earlier, climate skepticism is a set of ideas and norms that congeal together into a coherent narrative through acts of emplotment. For the narrative to persist, as with any idea, it must be constantly told and retold, passed on from person to person. This is necessary in order for it to build communities of like-​storied people (or, what we referred to earlier as narrative-​networks). Climate skepticism is a living document that is passed from one person to the next and one community to the next. But as it travels, people can write into it their own particular ideas and tell the story in their own particular way. In c­ hapter 3, we studied the evolution of climate skeptical narratives primarily in the United States. The reason, as earlier explained, is that it is there we find the narrative to be strongest. The United States is an exemplar, in this regard, that illustrates the properties and growth of climate skepticism in the clearest way. This is why we confined the discussion to the United States in the previous chapter. However, the presence of climate skepticism in other countries is important, too. In this chapter, we examine climate skepticism across borders and study how, as this idea took root in different places, it maintained many aspects of the storyline while developing parts of it that are particular to each place. This process of diffusion with variation is of great interest inasmuch as we can surmise that for the narrative to take root in a new place, it has to be compatible with the other stories and particulars of that place, to some extent. It cannot clash strongly with long-​held values or beliefs if it is to be adopted. It is in this light that we can understand Garrard and colleagues who write: “ In the USA, climate science attracts the conspiracist language of ‘hoax’, whereas in the UK, where there is cross-​party support for the IPCC process, sceptics see themselves as ‘heretics’ resisting an overweening orthodoxy. German climate sceptics frequently adopt a similar rhetoric, albeit with a Lutheran spin, while in France, the term ‘imposture’ is used by critics who claim to be following in the great tradition of French philosophical rationalism by revealing the ‘untruths’ of climate change science.”6 Why do some narratives thrive in a new place, while others do not? What makes the public take to a new narrative and further it among themselves. As Benford and Snow discuss, the narrative has to resonate with people, which requires at least three elements: it has to be consistent with the groups’ prior beliefs;7 it needs empirical credibility, meaning a fit with events and things in the world; and it must be salient, meaning a resonance with the local culture and centrality of the issue to people’s everyday lives. This increases the need for climate skeptical narratives to be fitted to the local context. For this reason, we

 



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should expect to find an ongoing dialectic between isomorphism and polymorphism as we examine the narrative across boundaries. While ­chapter 3 focused mainly on the growth of the climate skeptical narrative within the US public, similar phenomena also occurred elsewhere. For example, in a review of public survey data, Poortinga and colleagues show that doubt over the climate change hypothesis can be as high as 40 percent among the public in Europe and the United Kingdom.8 The level of climate science skepticism is highest in the United States, United Kingdom, and Australia, but it is present in other countries, as well.9 Looking to Asia, the level of skepticism over the human cause of climate change is roughly as high in India and Singapore as in the United States.10 At least until 2011, some writers suggest there was some level of skepticism in China, as well.11 In this chapter, the authors focus on the narrative in non-​US contexts. The prevalence of climate skeptical voices in the media shows cross-​country differences, with some researchers suggesting that climate skepticism is more evident in anglophone countries. Table 4.1 is taken from Painter and Ashe, who measured the prevalence of climate skeptical quotes of ideas in climate related articles in six countries.12 They suggested that one factor behind the greater prevalence of skepticism in the United States and United Kingdom was the greater play Climategate had in the media in those two countries. Analyzing news content from forty-​five countries, Vu, Liu, and Tran13 found that climate change was framed differently depending on contextual factors—​ e.g., higher GDP nations with more pluralist polities reported climate as a contested local political issue, something noted by earlier researchers.14 Their explanation partly attributes this to the presence of a news media environment where reporting both sides of an issue is the norm.

Table 4.1 Cross-​Country Comparison of Prevalence of Climate Skepticism in the Media Country

Percentage of Climate Change Related Articles Containing Skeptical Quote or Perspective, 2009–​2010 (%)

United States United Kingdom China India France Brazil Source: Painter and Ashe (2012).

34 19 7 6 6 3

 

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Climate skepticism, in some form, is to be found in any country. In this chapter, we inquire into the differences in the climate skeptical narratives found in different countries. We hypothesize that there will be differences, since narratives are not simply transmitted from place to place but are molded to fit the perspectives, beliefs, cultures, and political climate of each context.

A Quick Comparison Having studied climate skepticism in the United States, we now ask how and in what ways the story of climate skepticism is told in other countries. It is impossible to pin down one representative climate skeptical narrative for a country, of course, but we can find some broad patterns that characterize one place in ways that differ from another. Dunlap and McCright have examined climate skepticism in other countries and suggest that, besides the United States, skepticism was also strong in the United Kingdom, Australia, and Canada.15 These authors suggest that behind this is a link to political affiliation (namely, conservatism) as each of these countries have had conservative governments and leaders in its recent past. Schmidt and colleagues conducting a survey on media attention to climate change, found attention in Australia, Great Britain, and Canada to be the highest.16 In addition, several surveys have found climate skepticism to be most prevalent in anglophone countries.17 In Figure 4.1, we juxtapose essential themes found in climate skeptical narratives in the aforementioned countries (apart from the United States). This quick analysis is not meant to definitively trace a narrative in a country but just to illustrate the point about polymorphic isomorphism. The figure charts the proportion of plot elements found in climate skeptical op-​ed pieces from each country. The method used, along with the thematic analysis used to generate the themes, is described in more detail in the appendix to this chapter. We see some broad differences. For example, the UK newspaper op-​eds tend to emphasize the economic dimensions of the climate science debate, while downplaying the plot element regarding a conspiracy or hoax among scientists. In Figure 4.1, we see the UK newspapers sampled to put greater emphasis (compared to the others) on the cost feasibility of climate action. The Canadian op-​eds sampled, on the other hand, put the greatest emphasis on scientists’ exaggeration of the data, while the Australian op-​eds put greatest emphasis on contrary evidence. The United States stands out in its claims about a global conspiracy, as expected, and it also exhibits a high preponderance of statements regarding the natural origins of climate change, which was also expected. These are not meant to be definitive snapshots of climate skeptical narratives in these different countries. But this scant examination is suggestive of the

 



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30% 25% 20% 15% 10% 5% 0%

1

2

3 AU Herald

4

5 UK Daily Mail

6 Canada

7

8

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USA

Figure 4.1  Comparing Plot Elements  Legend: Theme 1. Climate scientists exaggerate/​ misinterpret data, fake news.  Theme 2. Even if the science is true, the cost of the response is too much.  Theme 3. The country loses competitive advantage, while other countries don’t act.  Theme 4. Scientists have assembled a conspiracy.  Theme 5. There is contrary evidence to the global warming hypothesis.  Theme 6. Climate change is natural and historical, humans do not affect it.  Theme 7. The Paris accord will have little effect on global temperature.  Theme 8. This is part of a plot to control the world order.  Theme 9. Even if we follow the Paris (or other) agreement and cut carbon, the effect will be miniscule.

possibility, even the likelihood, that some themes related to climate skepticism are more emphasized in some places compared to others. For example, a lower prevalence of the science conspiracy theme in one place may suggest a greater attitude of respect or faith in the scientific community on the part of the public. Similarly, emphasis on the economic argument against climate action may suggest a more practical or technocratic outlook among the public in that place. A greater emphasis on the global socialism theme may reflect a more entrenched capitalist philosophy in a place. Why the skeptical narrative might shift from place to place is easily explained—​for it to thrive in a place, it has to fit in. This narrative exhibit’s what Kristeva referred to as intertextuality—​i.e., it reflects ideas from other texts that pertain to aspects of society even outside the climate issue.18 This intertextuality is examined more closely in the next chapter.

 

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Skepticism in Different Contexts In this section, we peruse the literature for insights into the forms of climate skepticism (or belief) that exists in different countries. Often, we gain deeper insight from comparison between cases and, so, it will be instructive to compare each case with the US example.

The United Kingdom A number of studies suggest that a measured form of climate skepticism may be most common in the United Kingdom. For example, Johnston describes survey results that suggest that many in the public may challenge aspects of climate science while being open to or convinced of the idea that global mean temperatures may be rising.19 Another way of saying this is that some in the United Kingdom are skeptical less about trend (i.e., whether temperatures are changing or not) and more about attribution (i.e., what the underlying cause of global temperature change is), while others are skeptical about response (i.e., that policy recommendations are extreme). For example, one prominent climate skeptic laid out a version of the narrative as one that acknowledges climate change but claims that politicians and scientists exaggerate risk and ignore the benefits of using fossil fuels.20 Capstick and Pidgeon also found attribution uncertainty to go hand-​in-​hand with skepticism over the efficacy of any responses to climate change.21 Related to this is a sort of folk psychology wherein there is doubt over the willingness or readiness of society to respond to climate change. In addition, there seems to be a prevalent notion among the U.K. public that there is less certainty among scientists about climate change than they acknowledge. We might contrast this to the US case where the credibility and authority of the scientist is strongly challenged (including charges that the scientific community is part of a conspiracy). Public sentiment in the United Kingdom seems to still maintain the authority of science and the scientist. A survey conducted by Lack of skeptical organizations in the United Kingdom suggests that many of these believe there is no scientific consensus,22 but this is nowhere near the US narrative of scientists involved in a global conspiracy. Moreover, there is a common view that the market, and not the government, holds the answers to the problem. Thus, in the United Kingdom, there is less talk of a global conspiracy among scientists, as compared to the United States, and more of a questioning of the supposed consensus. As Garrard and colleagues write: “The American rhetoric of the climate ‘hoax’ is distinct from the prevalent British sceptical identity as ‘the heretic’ primarily because climate change is more politicized in the United

 



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States—​the liberals are trying to get one over the conservatives—​but also because of conspiratorial tendencies that have long prevailed in political discourses there.”23 Perhaps a reasonable representation of climate skepticism in the United Kingdom can be found in an essay by Nigel Lawson, a former member of parliament: In short, the effect of carbon dioxide on the earth’s temperature is probably less than was previously thought, and other things—​that is, natural variability and possibly solar influences—​are relatively more significant than has hitherto been assumed. But let us assume that the global temperature hiatus does, at some point, come to an end, and a modest degree of global warming resumes. How much does this matter? The answer must be that it matters very little. There are plainly both advantages and disadvantages from a warmer temperature, and these will vary from region to region depending to some extent on the existing temperature in the region concerned. And it is helpful in this context that the climate scientists believe that the global warming they expect from increased atmospheric carbon dioxide will be greatest in the cold polar regions and least in the warm tropical regions, and will be greater at night than in the day, and greater in winter than in summer. Be that as it may, studies have clearly shown that, overall, the warming that the climate models are now predicting for most of this century is likely to do better than harm. . . . This puts into perspective the UK’s commitment, under the Climate Change Act, to near-​total de-​carbonisation. The UK accounts for less than 2% of global emissions; indeed, its total emissions are less than the annual increase in China’s. Never mind, says Lord Deben, chairman of the government-​appointed Climate Change Committee, we are in the business of setting an example to the world. No doubt this sort of thing goes down well at meetings of the faithful and enables him and them to feel good. But there is little point in setting an example, at great cost, if no one is going to follow it; and around the world governments are now gradually watering down or even abandoning their de-​carbonisation ambitions. . . . However, the greatest immorality of all concerns those in the developing world  .  .  .  Asking these countries to abandon the cheapest available sources of energy is, at the very least, asking them to delay the conquest of malnutrition, to perpetuate the incidence of preventable disease, and to increase the numbers of premature deaths. Global warming orthodoxy is not merely irrational. It is wicked.24

 

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As we can see in this transcript, the narrative is less about refutation or condemnation of climate scientists than about questioning the policy responses being debated and the decision to act unilaterally. It is less about conspiracy and more about irrationality. There have been important historical trends in the timeline of climate skepticism in the United Kingdom. Just as c­ hapter  3 described in the United States context, the tide of opinion has been influenced by important watershed events. One such event in the United Kingdom was passage by parliament of the Climate Change Act (CCA) in 2008. Ironically, skepticism was seen to increase subsequent to passage of the CCA. Garrard and colleagues attribute this to a confluence of events, including the 2008 financial crisis, the failure of the 2009 Copenhagen conference, the “Climategate” incident, and a series of cold winters.25 Furthermore, these same authors characterized the skeptical movement to as “mild and reasonable” in the beginning but becoming more “shrill and defensive” as the IPCC asserted climate science with greater confidence and the narrative of anthropogenic climate change seemed to become more hegemonic.26

Germany Climate skepticism is not as widely held among the public and media in Germany as the countries mentioned earlier. Contrarian articles are much less prevalent in Germany than in the United Kingdom and United States, for example,27 though one survey found 10 percent of the respondents to be doubtful about climate change.28 Another found only 4 percent of survey respondents in Germany could be classified as climate deniers, compared to 12 percent in the United States, 10 percent in the United Kingdom, and 17 percent in Australia.29 However, another study found climate denial to be higher in Germany than in the United Kingdom (16 versus 12 percent); attribution skepticism, which is doubt about the human causes of climate change, to be similar (9 versus 11 percent); while denial of a scientific consensus the same (31 percent).30 A recent cross-​country survey found Germany to score lower on both trend skepticism and attribution skepticism than the United Kingdom.31 Unlike in the United States, trend skepticism (i.e., challenging the idea that temperatures are rising) is rare in Germany; skeptics lean more toward asserting that the urgency of the climate problem has been exaggerated.32 It is more likely that a skeptic accepts the scientific consensus, on the one hand, while characterizing appeals for aggressive action as hysteria and calling for evidence-​ based policy. On the other hand, Kaiser and Rhomberg, analyzing newspaper articles following COP17, found that their climate skeptical themes are essentially the same as those found in other countries.33

 



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Jasanoff contrasts the German case, unlike the United States and United Kingdom, as one where a technically grounded public consensus has been possible.34 Goodbody characterizes the movement in Germany as less opposed to environmentalism as in anglophone countries and more geared toward the rational critique of overly zealous climate ideologues.35 There is an intellectual strain to German climate skepticism, as the skeptics see themselves as defenders of intellectual freedom from ideology. Part of the reason behind the lesser importance of climate skepticism in Germany might be the lack of political outlets for skeptics to build a constituency around.36 Pro-​ environmentalism has become mainstream in Germany, especially with the rise of the Green Party. Only recently has a political party espoused climate skepticism—​the relatively small Alternative fur Deutschland (Af D).37 Even on the edges of far-​right movements in Germany, climate skepticism does not seem to mimic that found in the United States For example, Forchtner, Kroneder, and Wetzel suggest that much of the communication among the far-​ right contains less skepticism about the evidence or anthropogenic nature of climate change but more on decision-​making and policy.38 Climate skepticism fits the pro-​nature orientation that some of these far-​right groups exhibit. Even the climate denialist position of the far-​right party, Af D, is less about scientific conspiracy and more about the feasibility of decarbonization. The following text, taken from the organization’s website (translated into English), reveals some hint of the ecological modernization theme, as well: For good reason, we doubt that man has significantly influenced or even managed the recent climate change, in particular the current warming. Climate protection policy is therefore a mistake. Without CO2, a major component of photosynthesis, there would be no plants, animals or humans. Not least due to the rising CO2 content in the atmosphere, world food harvests have increased significantly. The Af D rejects the Paris Climate Agreement, which provides as a non-​binding memorandum of understanding without sanctions a shift of funds from the highly industrialized countries to underdeveloped countries. Furthermore, the Af D rejects all EU measures that justify the reduction of CO2 emissions with the protection of the climate. The trade in CO2 certificates should cease because it only causes a further increase in energy prices. The de-​carbonisation aimed at by the EU and the German government, now propagated as the “Great Transformation of the Economy and Society,” will not only reduce Germany’s economic power, but will

 

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increasingly develop into an illegitimate social turn towards an ecological planning and coercive state with wanted scarcity economy. For years, the EU has been driving forward the conversion of electricity grids between consumers and energy producers into so-​called smart grids. Behind this is the goal of converting the previously demand-​oriented energy market into a supply-​oriented one, i.e., electricity consumption should be adjusted to the constantly fluctuating power generation through the “renewable energy sources.” . . .39

China Gaging the public’s sentiments regarding climate change poses some challenges. First, there is the language barrier (neither of the authors can read Chinese), and less accessible social media (as compared to the United States, for example). But there is invariably some text to be had, and some examples of what amount to op-​ed pieces. According to some sources, there was (and, perhaps, is) a climate skeptical narrative held by some in China. In a recent survey, 4,025 responses from the public were received concerning attitudes toward climate change.40 Of this group, 5.3 percent expressed an opinion that climate change is not happening. A larger percentage, 11.1, believed climate change was happening but that this was due to natural (not anthropogenic) causes. This is significantly lower than an earlier survey, wherein 27 percent of respondents believed that climate change was natural,41 and another wherein 38 percent of the respondents attributed it to natural causes.42 Surveys do not give us a handle on narrative; for the latter, we turn to op-​ ed and similar articles in the popular media. There is some literature suggesting there has been vocal criticism in China of the climate change agenda in the past, and that it is possible that such criticism may have waned most recently. Dembicki writes that public pronouncements of climate skepticism seemingly vanished after 2011,43 which he suggests may be coincident with the state’s decision to adopt a pro-​climate action agenda.44 We do not know if this is primarily due to dissuasion of criticism of climate action, a real shift in sentiment, or both. One scholar suggests that this is less due to government pressure and more about the lack of a thriving network of think tanks and nonprofits such as might be found in the United States.45 At any rate, we will focus on a few texts from around the period 2010–​2011 to discern possible similarities and differences in the climate skeptical narrative(s) found in China. In 2010, a writer named Gou Hongyang published a book entitled Low-​carbon plot, in which he described climate science as a US-​led ploy to demonize carbon

 



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and hinder the growth of developing countries.46 In a subsequent article on climate skepticism in China,47 a speech by one academic, Larry Hsien Ping Lang, is quoted, in which Lang described climate science as the “great swindle.” The author of this article, Liu, includes online comments posted following Lang’s speech, with quotes such as “[The weather] is obviously getting colder and colder, but they are still lying through their teeth. These disgusting Westerners never stop trying to topple China,” which Liu attributes to the larger cultural trope of China’s “aggrieved nationalism.”48 Liu talks about the aggrieved nationalism of China in reference to the failed Copenhagen (COP15) negotiations, after some criticized China of sabotaging the talks. Liu writes: The accusation from the West was a slap in the face and seriously damaged the already fragile trust. China felt insulted by what it perceived as unfair criticism. The belief that China was humiliated at the Copenhagen summit produced the archetype of China’s native climate change skepticism—​seeing climate change as a Western plot to undermine China.”49 A central element in the aforementioned climate skeptical narratives is mistrust of the West, especially the United States. This is an example of what Benford and Snow call narrative fidelity, as suspicion of the West is a common trope in the larger culture.50 The themes of nationalism and foreign climate conspiracy were echoed or mirrored years later by Trump’s claim that climate science was a plot by the Chinese meant to hurt the United States economically. Though this idea of Trump’s was never really taken seriously in the United States and elsewhere, the international conspiracy theme may be found in other nations but in forms fitted to the local context. And, so, we should look out for “us-​versus-​them” themes that might appear in future climate discourse from China and other non-​ Western nations, including more recent discourse supportive of climate action. The confluence of “aggrieved nationalism” and suspicion of climate data seems a natural fit. Take, for example, the following passage in The empire of carbon brokers: “One day in the future, we will discover that the planet is not getting any warmer, but colder; meanwhile, we will also realize that we are already tightly controlled by the United States, becoming their new slaves.”51 According to Liu, focus on the science of climate features less in climate skepticism in China, compared to the United States One book, for example, critiques climate science not so much because of uncertainty in the data but more so because of mistrust of Western scientists: “But after all, they have the data, which gives them the authority to speak  .  .  .  and therefore, we need more resources

 

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devoted to climate research, so that we can use our own hard data to counter the Western hoax.”52 Authority is perhaps still maintained by the scientist, as evinced in the celebration of earlier research by the Chinese academic Coching Chu whose treatise, A preliminary study on the climatic fluctuation during the last 5000 years in China, laid out a climate change theory based on natural fluctuation. In China, the any deconstruction of the science may be associated with critique of the Western scientist, not the scientific community per se. But rather than the theme of global conspiracy among climate scientists to champion a global socialist system, as is often heard in the United States, here the conspiracy may be the opposite: subduing China’s hybrid economy under the West’s brand of capitalism. No matter, what we find across countries is a common use of the conspiracy plot element but in a way that fits the local ideological and cultural milieu. Another theme seems to be an association of climate change with local/​regional air pollution. This has to do with the fact that many of the same culprits behind carbon emissions, such as power plants, are also major emitters of criteria air pollutants and air toxics. There is, likewise, a double-​benefit from control. This association of climate with air pollution is not a frequent theme in climate skeptical narratives among the US public. In the 2017 survey, 72.6 percent of the respondents believed that climate change and air pollution were interrelated. The association of air pollution with climate change makes sense considering how the former has been one of the foremost issues plaguing large Chinese cities like Beijing. In the same survey, respondents pointed to air pollution as the most important issue more than any other issue.53 This is found in skeptical discourses that critique mainly the policy response and decarbonization as a stand-​alone policy. Instead, what is called for is a co-​benefits approach, where reducing air pollutants is the foremost aim, while coincidentally addressing the carbon issue at the same time. All this is not to say that we have a handle on the state of climate skepticism in China. Though previous surveys suggest that it exists to some extent,54 we just cannot be sure how prevalent skepticism is in this context. For various reasons, it is harder to gage public sentiment and extract text for narrative analysis there, as opposed to a polity like the United States, where online blogs, nonprofit websites, and media outlets like Twitter, most abound.

Conclusion It is clear, even from the short excerpts provided here, that norm diffusion occurs, and the climate skeptical narrative is being shared across boundaries. All the usual tropes are found in each place: the “othering” of a natural thing,

 



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carbon dioxide; the conspiracy of elites and powerful; the uncertainty of the science; and others. But they appear in differing forms, each tailored to its specific context. In one context (the United States), climate change is a plot to impose a global socialist order upon the nation. The conspiracy theme may have appeared in China, as well, but fitted to that context, where at least some writers evoke a narrative with a theme of Western capitalists trying to control the international financial order and keep developing nations in a subordinate position. While many of the plot elements can be found in each place, they are downplayed or foregrounded depending on what resonates with the context. In one place, the emphasis may be on the science and the excesses of an imperious scientific community. In another place, the emphasis might be on the excesses of policymakers and corporations who use the limited scientific evidence to transform entire economies and carve out new markets. In another, it may be that of an external agenda being imposed upon the global South. Not that this allows us deep insight into how norm diffusion is occurring. Much of it may be due to transnational organizations, but perhaps equally due to social media. And it is even possible that this kind of story arises almost organically, as some people naturally frame current issues a certain way. The general plot appears everywhere. But it is on a level of generality that is an abstraction removed from the specific narratives found in each place. It is the same basic story, about climate science and carbon dioxide, told from the perspective of very different narrators. We can even think of an even more elemental plot, where the same basic story appears in its most abstract form, where the story does not even need to be about CO2 but is an order of abstraction even above this. We refer to this most elemental of plots as a metanarrative. In the next chapter, we take up the elemental (or, as we will refer to it, the genetic) metanarrative and examine what it might look like. We do this with a purpose in mind, which is to see if the metanarrative somehow taps into fundamental themes that resonate with people. We do this so we can further understand how climate skepticism captures minds and hearts of publics all over.

Appendix The objective was to obtain op-​ed pieces in new outlets in different countries for a common period of time (2015–​2016) and to compare the relative proportion of narrative climate skeptical themes found in the different contexts. To do this, one news outlet was identified in Australia, the United Kingdom, and Canada, with one from the United States as a reference point. These outlets are:

 

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Herald (Australia) National Post (Canada) Daily Mail (United Kingdom) Wall Street Journal (United States) These newspapers were selected because they were identified as conservative, right-​of-​center news outlets, where there would be a greater chance to find climate skeptical articles. We identified all climate-​themed articles over the time period in each periodical and then identified those articles that were both op-​ ed in nature and climate skeptical in tone. We used ProQuest to search for the articles. We defined “op-​ed” as an article that does not just report something about climate change but also inserts the writer’s opinion. We define a “climate-​ skeptical” article as one where the writer adopts any version of climate skepticism as her/​his position and/​or presents the position of any climate skeptic. We then conducted a thematic analysis on the transcripts of each op-​ed piece, highlighting sentences that corresponded with any of the following themes: 1. Climate scientists exaggerate/​misinterpret data, fake news. 2. Even if the science is true, the cost of the response is too much. 3. The country loses competitive advantage, while other countries don’t act. 4. Scientists have assembled a conspiracy. 5. There is contrary evidence to the global warming hypothesis. 6. Climate change is natural and historical, humans do not affect it. 7. The Paris accord will have little effect on global temperature. 8. This is part of a plot to control the world order. 9. Even if we follow the Paris (or other) agreement and cut carbon, the effect will be miniscule. These themes are commonly occurring ideas found in climate skeptical discourse and represent a range of plot elements that may or not appear in any one article. When a theme is found in an op-​ed piece, that is recorded as one theme. If the theme is found multiple times in the same piece, it is still considered a single theme finding. We then summarized/​tabulated the analysis by calculating the total number of instances that themes were identified for a newspaper and calculating the percentage each particular theme is of the total number of passages listed for all the themes. Comparing across newspapers/​countries involves comparing the different percentages constituted by each theme of each newspaper’s total. All the percentages for one newspaper add up to 100 percent, so the resulting bar charts are normalized.

 

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Unpacking the Genetic Metanarrative

In previous chapters, we traced the evolution of the climate skeptical narrative and how it gained political allies, financiers, and faithful adherents. As the movement evolved, so did the narrative until, at some point, it attained what we described as a coherent ideology. This parallels the transformation, as described by Lewandowsky and colleagues, from skepticism to outright denial, from charges of subjectivity to charges of global conspiracy.1 As we discussed, as the climate skeptical narrative took shape, it constructed a denatured climate science, using various literary strategies such as parsing, narrative inversion, and others, to great effect.2 In the halls of academia, the foundations of science itself began to be critically examined. Scholars began writing about the decentering of science and, with it, the scientific subject. In their depiction, the scientific community was a particular type of cultural community.3 Like other cultural systems, science was subject to the mediation of language and social convention. For the poststructuralists. science was merely one among multiple, competing language games.4 Along with the deconstruction of climate science came the corollary deconstruction of the climate scientist herself. As will be discussed later in the book, discourse emerging from some in the climate science field may actually be providing grist for the mill. In an ironic twist, scientific talk itself has begun employing some of the rhetorical strategies of the climate skeptics. We will return to this theme in the next chapter, where we examine discourse from a segment of climate scientists and observe that this, too, has taken on aspects of the ideological. Along with much-​publicized anecdotes about the fungibility of science (e.g., Climategate), this has led to the questioning of what Haraway calls the “modest witness” who is seen as objective in that “he guarantees the clarity and purity of objects. His subjectivity is his objectivity. His narratives have magical power.”5 As some scientists have, by necessity, turned to political activism, their roles as modest witnesses become increasingly precarious.6 We will turn to these issues in the next chapter. The Power of Narrative. Raul P. Lejano and Shondel J. Nero, Oxford University Press (2020). © Oxford University Press. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197542101.001.0001.

 

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For now, we address one remaining point about the power of climate skepticism (or denialism): how it continues to attract a plurality of staunch adherents to its fold and take hold of them. We have seen how it has the moral force of a belief system, enough to challenge the hitherto dominant perch of science. But also intriguing is the fact that while the movement is fiercely exclusive of alternative narratives (e.g., anthropogenic climate change), it is at the same time somehow broadly inclusive of a wide spectrum of political allegiances. How does the climate skeptical narrative achieve this discursive feat? As some researchers note, many climate skeptics are not even primarily concerned with the science itself but are drawn to the movement from other issue areas.7 So we ask: What is the magic of this narrative, that it draws to itself such an array of advocates? In this chapter, we work out an important piece of the puzzle, the property of the climate skeptical narrative that allows it to blend in with select other social narratives. Earlier, we described the literary properties of plurivocity and saturation. Plurivocity refers to when a narrative is told in different ways by different narrators and, yet, remains coherent. Saturation refers to a narrative going beyond a single-​issue domain and suffusing into almost every other issue in social life. Taking the climate skeptical narrative as an example, we showed how the narrative thread easily weaves from the theme of climate to evolution to immigration to race to other issues. Climate deniers will often invoke the idea of a global conspiracy behind climate science, involving a concerted effort to pull off a hoax on the general public. But the conspiracy talk does not stop there; it spills over onto conspiracies involving the liberal media, voter fraud, birther issues, and others. It is a general narrative, encompassing all aspects of society. How is this possible? As we will work out, in narrative terms this is facilitated because all these issue-​specific accounts share a common narrative thread, building on the same, basic metanarrative. Consider the spectrum of people under the flag of climate skepticism—​these include not just climate reactionaries but also those impassioned by other issues as well (e.g., guns, taxes, illegal immigrants). As we will demonstrate in this chapter, to some extent one can understand narratives in these different issue areas as repeating the same basic story albeit in varying ways. These narratives are based on the same elemental storyline. If we conceptualize the idea of an elemental, or genetic, narrative, it is easy to see how such a general storyline can be put to use to capture specific issues. And since they are all the same story told in different ways, it is no wonder that they can come together so easily under one roof.

Genetic Metanarratives In his book, Morphology of the folktale, Vladimir Propp sought to make sense of the variety of tales from Russian folklore.8 In trying to trace patterns and

 



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commonalities across about a hundred such tales, he hit upon a key insight: on the plane of metanarrative, which speaks to the more general plotline of the story, these tales each conformed to one of just a few generic storylines. He characterized these generic plots in terms of key functions of the story’s main characters (what he refers to as dramatis personae). For example, a large set of tales are found to all share the following sequence of plot elements: A. Preliminary misfortune. B. Hero dispatched. C. Hero or seeker takes counteraction. D. Hero is tested, interrogated by potential donor. E. Hero acquires the magical agent or helper. F. Hero finds the object of the search. H. Hero and villain do battle. I. Misfortune is liquidated. J. Hero returns. Propp discovered that this basic sequence formed the foundation of a multitude of tales, each a particular variation of this schema. The hero can be a Greek warrior, a Spanish conquistador, or Sherlock Holmes. The villain can be a Spartan champion, scurvy, or the evil Dr. Moriarty. The point is that the basic scheme can be employed and re-​employed to spin out any number of interesting stories. And here, Propp suggests, lies part of the power of the generative structure. It is the universal appeal of these basic narrative schemes that resonates with each one of us and touches the fibers of our being. The schema is a universal story that is told and retold, in myriad ways, to great effect. True, the plots are never simply identical—​in every memorable story, convention is often breached to some degree, as Jerome Bruner suggests.9 But the elemental story is the same. And it works. Working independently from Propp, Algirdas Julien Greimas constructed a similar system for classifying the basic structure of a story.10 He used the term actant to designate a character or thing in a story that serves a key role in the plot. A simple actantial model is shown in Figure 5.1, which depicts a set of binaries that give the story a driving force. There is the binary of subject/​object, wherein the subject aspires to attain or fulfill an object. Another is the helper/​opponent, wherein the opponent is a person, thing, or circumstance that impedes the subject’s attainment of the object, whereas the helper assists or facilitates. The relationship of the object, opponent, and helper to the subject are said to be contrary, contradictory, and complementary, respectively, and characterizing these relationships can illumine the analysis. As we will see, we can use this basic scheme to develop a sense of commonalities in plot.

 

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helper

subject

opponent

Figure 5.1  Greimas Actantial Theory

The schematic in Figure 5.1 can be used to organize the structure of a narrative. In our case, we will use this model to delineate the primary actants of each narrative and then look for commonalities in the types of characters or things that fit each actantial role, the relationships between actants, and themes that each narrative build on. Greimas’s structural approach suggests how different issue narratives can intertwine—​how a single deep (or paradigmatic) structure can generate multiple surface (or syntagmatic) structures. We can have many different stories, each on a different theme with different characters, all building on the same scheme. Taking it to one less level of abstraction, we might imagine a movement that draws a diverse constituency (e.g., gun advocates, immigration reformists, Tea Party members), each one of them responding to some common story that they each have to tell. Sure enough, each particular story is narrated in different terms and in a different style, but they are all building on the same foundation. This common foundation is what we will refer to as the generic metanarrative. This metanarrative can be constructed, as Propp and Greimas did, in its most elemental, abstract form. But it can also be cast in more particular ways, such that the underlying metanarrative can be about real people, places, and conditions. As we will see, the relationships between the different actants (in Figure 5.1) can have strong similarities from story to story. Applying this to climate skepticism, we might say that it is possible that the primary impetus behind the climate skeptical movement is a story that, taken at its core, is not even about climate science itself, but about more basic issues that drive people to action. And what might this elemental, genetic story be about? It includes, but is not simply about, the tribalism of in-​group vs. out-​group. While it remains to more carefully work out its narrative properties, we can sketch out a basic storyline even now. In the following, we use short examples, taking texts from a conservative blog website that features strident skepticism about climate science, to construct a basic sketch of it.

Saturation As previously discussed, some narratives possess key characteristics that mark them as ideological. Climate skepticism, as we have seen, attains such status by

 



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virtue of the properties discussed in the previous chapter. Ideological narratives create a comprehensive “system,” an all-​encompassing view that purports to explain everything in a society. In particular, an ideological narrative will display saturation—​i.e., the system constructed by the narrative pervades all or many aspects, contexts, and instances of social life. Saturation can appear in the plot or the characterization of a narrative. Saturation in the plot occurs when a narrative pertains to multiple places and times and, in the extreme, is universal and non-​contextual (i.e., it applies regardless of time or place). Propp suggested that all good narratives have embedded in them the genetic storyline of classic fables.11 By universality of plot, we mean use of a specific narrative outside its specific contextualization. As an example, we can see how fiscal and social conservatives might take the general plot of the book Atlas Shrugged, a libertarian favorite, and assume that it applies to all times, places, and issues. It can form the universal plot upon which particular narratives, such as climate skepticism, build. Universal plots can display saturation not only when characters are cast into dichotomous, polar binaries (e.g., good and evil, false and true prophets) but also when such characterization is absolute—​permeating the entire being of the character and extending into all facets of social life. For example, someone cast as a “liberal” will be so in every aspect of social life (e.g., fiscally, socially), not just one. Saturation is illustrated in this passage from a conservative op-​ed blog: In a world threatened by the rise of radical Islamism, by the outbreak of diseases like Ebola, and other actual problems to be addressed, the notion that thousands would march in the belief that they and the entire rest of the Earth’s population have any effect on the climate is appalling.12 It would not be untoward for an ideological narrative to allude to other, seemingly non sequitur, issues (e.g., climate, Islamism, Ebola) outside the specific domain under discussion, since the narrative saturates all facets of society. Saturation also applies when characterizations of rightness and wrongness are not limited to just one specific issue but applied to all other issues. Binaries are articulated—​such as us vs. them or truth vs. lies—​that take on an absolute rather than reflexive quality. Instead of weighing the scientific evidence as it claims to do, the narrative draws boundaries between us and them, making victims out of climate deniers—​ who prefer to be called skeptics—​and liars out of believers in global warming. It uses words like hoax, conjured, and dubious to describe the science that supports the climate change narrative without providing a serious critique of that science. And it uses real to describe the empirical information that supports

 

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the climate denial narrative. This is done in a totalizing way such that people and places take on an archetypal quality. Saturation can be seen in another essay from the same online column: I do not like people crying “racism” every time the commission of a crime goes badly for a black perpetrator [. These] are people I do not like. People in high office who use these events to exacerbate racial divisions are high on my list of those I  don’t like  .  .  .  While I  see no practical or even moral way to deport the eleven million illegal aliens among us, that doesn’t make them any less illegal . . . A group of people I  have not liked for decades are the environmentalists. The reason is very simple. They lie about everything they champion in the name of “global warming” or “climate change.” Here, saturation amounts to a conflation of multiple issues and actors. In ideological texts, characterization can take on all-​encompassing (or binary) qualities: environmentalists not only lie, they “lie about everything they champion in the name of ‘global warming’ or ‘climate change.’ ” Environmentalists are also likened to those people “crying ‘racism’ every time the commission of a crime goes badly.” This all-​encompassing quality lumps together, in one text, otherwise diverse issue domains. Producing absolutes is aided by techniques of caricature discussed earlier because the multiple others—​those “I do not like”—​ are not represented in the text beyond overly simplified references. This has important implications for the policy realm. First, the all-​or-​nothing character of ideological thinking mitigates against co-​existence with competing systems. It is, then, no surprise that ideological systems will invariably have strident political programs associated with them. There is a second important implication, which is the main focus of the chapter, and that is the possibility that ideological climate skeptical narratives are based on a more foundational, genetic narrative that addresses issues even more basic than climate (much like Propp’s genetic fables). In this case, to address deep skepticism over climate science, it may not be enough to talk about science. We develop these ideas further below.

 



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A Brief Example We now take a look at what saturation looks like in a text before moving on to the question of the genetic metanarrative. In the following, we take passages from a conservative news site featuring online discussions of different political and social issues of the day. While a full narrative analysis requires a more systematic analysis of a greater corpus of texts, the following will suffice to underscore the points made earlier. Here are some passages taken from threads concerning climate science from the blog: Those projections are based solely on computer climate models that can be, and are being, manipulated to get the desired results, i.e., warming in the next 100 years when everyone alive today will not be around to see if these computer projections are correct. The long-​range goal of those politically motivated junk scientists in order to keep the government grants coming from leftist politicians whose goal is to control every aspect of our lives. . . . The goal of all liberal programs is to produce ever-​increasing numbers of poor and ignorant people dependent on government handouts. This is not the point of Climate Change. The Left is claiming it is Manmade. This is the whole point of Climate Change. Man is causing this and the only way to prevent this is tax everyone. If you own a SUV, you will be taxed. If you own this or you own that, you will be taxed. Soon you will be taxed for exhaling every day. This is the reason for the Left supporting their Climate Change Hoax.”13 And, to add another, here is a thread on proposed civil action against climate science skeptics in which the blogger overlaps climate action with movements against gun ownership (or second amendment) rights: Fortunately, I believe this will never get any traction. To me, it would be no different than an attack on the 2nd amendment. My response would be the same . . . Any attack on the bill of rights, is an attack on all Americans, and worthy of fighting against IMO . . . Roll Eyes . . . They are trying to break our constitution, get rid of it step-​by-​step. Free speech is an important right granted by the first amendment.14 It is obvious, as we will work out, that these are strongly ideological comments that display common themes. Probing further into the blogs, we find issue saturation, where the ideological framework expands into a systemic, universal

 

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narrative.15 In other words, if there is an underlying metanarrative that cuts across all issues of society, multiple issues can be addressed by the same text (and sometimes merged into one text). This is illustrated by blog comments such as the following: There are a few liberal ideas I cannot get out of my daughter’s head, and this is one of them. Global warming, gay marriage, rape culture, etc. are a few in an otherwise very smart young lady’s head that I am having trouble with!16 We now proceed to analyzing commonalities in structure across different multiple issue domains as we piece together the generative story.

Uncovering the Genetic Metanarrative Let us examine two threads, discussing two separate topics, and find the commonalities in narrative structure. The first pertains to the US EPA’s proposal to reduce carbon from power plants: That will hammer everything we make, grow, ship, eat and do. It will impair our livelihoods, living standards, liberties and life spans . . . everything business owners, workers, families and communities strived for their entire lives will be at risk. Millions of workers will lose their jobs, leaving more families destitute and welfare dependent, their sense of self-​worth destroyed . . . We must not mince words regarding the evils that energy and climate totalitarianism inflict on families, industries, communities and nations. We must confront the deceit and deceivers, abuses and abusers—​and present the hard, ugly realities of what life would be under conditions imposed by eco-​extremists. Right now, we have too many taxes and regulations, too much secrecy and fraud, too many extremists, and far too little accountability in EPA. There is too much eco-​religious fervor, too little science and humanity.17 We see, in this text, the property of saturation in which the claims of the climate denying narrative apply across multiple domains (what we refer to as invariance), not only with respect to the effects of climate and its consequences but simply to “everything” for businesses, families, and communities. Saturation means that issues such as climate are treated, in one fell swoop, by the same basic storyline as other issues in society. The ideological narrative is universal and can take on the nature of a categorical imperative. What this means is that we should

 



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find elements of a common narrative in texts about other, non-​climate related issues. For example, here is an entry, taken from the same conservative outlet mentioned above: Also, at a grocery store I go to, a Latina girl working the cash register born here and speaks perfect English but by illegal Mexican parents started speaking fluent Spanish to what I assume was a fence jumper. I  commented on her Española and she informed me that she only speaks Spanish to her children because she wants that to be their first language. I  had to bite my tongue to keep from causing a scene, but I wanted to break something when I was walking out of the store. They are trying to change every aspect of American culture. No assimilation completely changes this to a multi-​cultural multilingual society.18 Applying Greimas’s structural model to the two narrative excerpts gives us ample insight. The two narrative schemes are shown side-​by-​side in Figure 5.2. Filling in the actant roles is straightforward enough. Of particular interest is the route by which the opponent impedes the subject’s progress, also shown in Figure 5.2. Laying out the two narratives in the manner shown in the figure makes it easier to find commonalities in plot structure. In the climate narrative, the subject is the everyday citizen trying to eke out survival in a very difficult economic time. The object to which the subject aspires is the kind of lifestyle and livelihood that was taken for granted in the past but is now threatened. The threat comes from a new form of regulation, where the vilification of carbon means that many of the elements of the conventional way of life is now being rebranded as wrongful. In other words, what used to be normal has, seemingly overnight, now been cast as unacceptable. And the opponent comes in the form of the eco-​ extremists who stand for, and are, the very opposite of the subject. In the narrative scheme on the right-​hand side of Figure 5.2, we find the subject to be the archetypal conventional American (assumed to be white) desiring to retain or reclaim conventional US culture and way of life. The threat, in this case, comes from the intrusion into US life of foreign cultures.19 In this case, Spanish is assumed to represent the foreign element, and the opponent is embodied by the Hispanic immigrant. We do not comment on the social significance or stereotypical codes found in the narrative, though the reader is free to do it. Our main focus is on the structure of the narrative, especially juxtaposed with that of the climate narrative. Levinas described the encounter with the Other as a moral imperative imposed on the Self, an interruption of introspection. The Other says “Do not kill me” and demands a response from the Self, who chooses to accept or deny.20 This is a common element of the two narratives depicted in Figure 5.2. The

 

Anglo American culture

conventional lifestyle

conservatives

citizens

eco-extremists

carbon regulations critique of consumerist society

Figure 5.2.  Actantial Model Applied to Two Issue Narratives

anti-immigrant lobby

racial majority

minorities

Spanish language Hispanic ethnicity/culture

 



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threat to the subject’s aspiration toward the object comes from the intrusion of the other. In one instance, it is the racial other, signified by the Hispanic woman contrasted against the white narrator (as the authors rightly or wrongly assume). In the other narrative, it is the intrusion of the eco-​activist. In either case, the action is similar: it is that of the foreign intruding into the ordinary, what the narrator depicts as conventional society, and threatening to transform it. In the one instance, this literally takes the form of a different language encroaching upon the conventional, making “everyday English” seem insufficient or incomplete. In the second case, it is the regulation of carbon and, with the vilification of carbon, a judgment against cars, gasoline, industry, commodities, and other taken-​for-​ granted elements of the conventional lifestyle that are dependent on carbon. In short, what the narrators take for granted as ordinary US culture is now being threatened by the imposition of the alien, which in turn makes the conventional seem inadequate. One narrative threatens to alienate the ordinary and the other threatens to regularize the alien, but both play on the same elemental plot. Just as subject/​opponent relationships dovetail, so we find that the subject/​ object relationships in the two narratives also parallel each other. In both cases, it is the subject yearning for life as the subject has always known it. Here, the idea of US culture is wrapped up in the image of archetypical small-​town US life, where communities tended to be relatively homogeneous, and everyone spoke the same language and shared the same “American dream” of a house and a two-​ car garage. But decarbonization threatens to turn much of what made up this idealized lifestyle into prohibited or sanctioned things—​overconsumption, cars, and brightly lit homes. What used to be ordinary now comes into question. And so, it is with the other narrative, as well. Here it is the entry of another language, which encapsulates race and culture, that threatens to supplant the assumed convention. The sound of Spanish being spoken is destabilizing and speaks, to the narrator, to overturning the world that the subject once took for granted. It does not matter so much whether or not idealized American small-​town life actually existed. The point is that times are changing to the point that this narrative is losing its dominance and, with it, the dominance of its narrator. In other words, both narratives speak to the threat of social change. And change is being imposed upon the unwilling. In both cases, it is the narrator protesting, “Who are you to say there is something wrong with the way I am and the way I live?” and “Who are you to say I have to change?” It is the Other imposing upon the Self and the Self wanting to banish the Other. Social change has been the story of the twenty-​first century in the United States thus far. The last decade has seen extraordinary change in many US communities. Real household income in the United States dropped from around $58,000 per year in 1999 to a post-​recession low of less than $53,000 in 2012, and it is, as of this writing, still below the 1999 level.21 While real weekly wages have

 

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gone up appreciably for the upper ten percentile income level and slightly for the upper twenty-​five percentile, it has stagnated for everybody else.22 And the basket of goods used to correct wages for purchasing power do not include costs like college tuition and healthcare. After correcting for inflation, average private nonprofit college tuitions rose from $19,920 in 1997 to $33,480 twenty years later.23 In 1995, the United States spent about 13 percent of GDP on healthcare; twenty years later, this figure would be greater than 17 percent.24 Despite the improved job numbers under the Obama administration, the standard of living in Main Street USA took a downward turn, and people are starting to feel it may never come back up. Writers such as Joseph Stiglitz have chronicled what seems to be the entrenched decline of the middle class.25 In hermeneutic terms, this is the context that lends meaning to the text.26 Social change is the overshadowing condition that gives rise to the metanarrative. What is the contrary relationship between subject and object? In the first narrative, it is the gap between the idealized conventional US lifestyle and the state the subjects find themselves in. This gap is, literally, the decline in the standard of living and self-​esteem of the middle-​class family in the United States. In the second narrative, it is also a gap, between the idealized, homogeneous US community and the demographically transitioning society the subjects are living in. On the plane of metanarrative, both of these subject/​object relationships correlate with each other. It is the distance between reality and utopia, the loss of a paradise that needs to be reclaimed. What is the contradictory relationship between subject and opponent? In both cases, we find the same basic structure, which is that of the alien Other inserting itself in between the subject and object. It speaks to both intrusion and alien-​ness. And, so portraying both narratives structurally, we find relationships across actants to be essentially the same. In working out the metanarrative, it helps to look at other common elements that are found across these passages. There is, as mentioned, the fear of intrusion into one’s private domain, whether that is of government or outsiders coming to one’s chosen community. Coupled with that is the element of change (social, economic, etc.) and fear of loss of control of one’s domain. And, lastly, there is suspicion of the unknown, the foreign, the new. Similarly, what used to be commonplace and familiar (e.g., white majority, carbon dioxide) is now being redefined as problematic. These elements all come together to create a general uncertainty about the subject’s place in the world. We can sum it up into a concise elemental plot, which might be described in these terms: “Home, in the beginning, was the land of plenty. But now comes the alien Others, who are nothing like us, threatening our homes and our lives. We have become the forlorn in our own land. Our future is in peril. They are

 



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working together to defeat us. We must fight the intruders and take back the life we knew.” This can be further contextualized into a metanarrative of Main Street USA as shown here. Note that similar metanarratives might be functional in climate skeptical movements elsewhere (e.g., Germany and the Brexit-​era United Kingdom) but, for now, we keep to the US-​centric context of the blogs: Life in the United States used to be good. We were on top of the world. But the world is changing. Our own neighborhoods are changing. Things just keep getting worse, and the future seems so uncertain. And those very different from us, who don’t appreciate the US way of life, are forcing us to change. They are not like us—​ they want to change the way we think, the way we speak, the way we work. All of a sudden, we are the losers. We’re losing to China, Mexico, and others who want what we had. They are all working together to do this to us: the liberals, the global elite. They are all ganging up on us. This place was a fine community when it was just us and no one interfered in our affairs. We have to take our town and country back. It is the story of the decline of the US middle class and the alienation of the middle-​income, wage-​earning, white majority social stratum. It is also about the pace of change in a world where volatile markets and demographic transitions exhaust the ordinary citizen’s capacity to cope. It is a loss of faith in the future in an uncertain, post-​911 (and post-​COVID) United States. The threat of the alien other brings other metaphors into play such as that of “the salt on the land” and “paradise lost.”27 The action of the opponent is common to both the climate skeptical and anti-​immigrant blogs shown earlier—​it is the insertion of the Other in between the subject and object. The theme of intrusion is an important part of the genetic metanarrative that allows conflation of climate change action, pro-​immigration policy, gun control, etc., as a threat to the private realm and personal freedom. It is not just alienation of the subject but the imposition of the Other into the canonical lifeworld. It is no wonder, then, that slogans about “taking back” or “making the country great again” resonate with so many. In this light, climate skepticism has associated with it the same basic apprehension over loss of a familiar way of life and social order. The familiar can be associated with cars, industry, consumption, development—​all intimately linked with a carbon-​centered economy. At the same time, the element of intrusion, translated into global terms, feeds into as elemental fears of big government, a global social elite, or other universalized threat, and this feeds into the idea of conspiracy. The genetic narrative is the “DNA” underlying subsequent, particular ideological claims made in diverse situations. One should be able to look at other narratives, such as the movement to protect gun ownership rights, and fit the same structural model to them.

 

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Scholars of government have noted how moral stories, myths, and fables are routinely employed by administrators and elected officials.28 The motif of the Other invading one’s home is a powerful one. It is the story told of an United States victorious in the great world war against the foreign peril, and politicians and agenda-​makers have used this motif time and again. It fuels anti-​immigrant sentiments in Europe and the Brexit movement. And it is flexible enough to be applied to a multitude of issue areas. For example, it is the same motif employed by President Ronald Reagan as he sold the nation on his war on drugs: I will announce tomorrow a series of new proposals for a drug-​free America. Taken as a whole, these proposals will toughen our laws against drug criminals, encourage more research and treatment, and ensure that illegal drugs will not be tolerated in our schools or in our workplaces  .  .  .  My generation will remember how America swung into action when we were attacked in World War II. The war was not just fought by the fellows flying the planes or driving the tanks. It was fought at home by a mobilized nation—​men and women alike—​ building planes and ships, clothing sailors and soldiers, feeding marines and airmen; and it was fought by children planting victory gardens and collecting cans. Well, now we’re in another war for our freedom, and it’s time for all of us to pull together again.29 In this text, the Other takes the form of the drug user, who is now portrayed as a criminal and, moreover, conflated with the alien threat of World War II. The theme of intrusion into the home takes the form of drugs and criminals spreading into schools and workplaces. The link to the theme of conspiracy (of global proportions) is straightforward. Both narratives refer to “them” or “they” as a group conspiring together to bring down the narrative subject. One narrative further describes them as “deceivers” and “abusers.” Conspiracy is required for the wholesale transformation of US life. The narrative also ineluctably brings in the foreign (the Chinese, the Russians, the EU), as the alien Other is seen to cross over the nation’s borders (and onto the threshold of one’s home). Immigration, climate change, etc.—​these are easily recognized as outcomes of globalization. The motif of conspiracy is a powerful one that adds to the alien threat of the Other. To those with whom the alien conspiracy motif resonates, talk of a “97 percent consensus” among climate scientists only adds to, not mitigates, the belief in the conspiracy.30 The resonant theme of the alien Other is important because the skeptical movement has managed to lump climate scientists into the role of the Other,

 



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along with other actors in the global cabal seeking to institute a worldwide hegemony. The issue of motivation, in the case of the climate scientist, is addressed narratively by painting a picture of lucrative research grant funding fueling climate research. Material reality is not the issue, and the main point is the effectiveness of these narrative motifs in constructing a tellable story. A key to slotting climate science into this metanarrative is constructing the alien otherness of the Other. Part of this is achieved by characterizing the science itself as unnatural. Some years ago, the Competitive Enterprise Institute sponsored an ad that shows a woman hacking at the ground with a hand tool. The narrator says:  “The fuels that produce CO2 have freed us from a life of backbreaking labor. Carbon dioxide: They call it pollution. We call it life.”31 The generative role of the genetic metanarrative brings up an important point to ponder. Many of the climate skeptics are not really concerned, at least not primarily so, with climate science (or, for that matter, climate). As we discussed earlier, climate skeptical discourse most often does not actually take up the actual science (and, when it does, parses the science to a non-​representative fragment). One reason (aside, of course, from the sheer difficulty of reading the science) for this seems to be that climate is not the primary concern of the skeptic. Rather, it is social change and the devaluation of one’s take-​for-​granted position in society. It is an attack on one’s very self.

Some Considerations for Public Discourse Our brief look at online discussion boards makes the point made earlier, namely, that the ideologically driven narratives adopted by people about a certain issue may be based on a story that is not primarily about climate. The brief illustration provided here suggests it has its basis in things like an apprehension, on the part of some segments of society, over social change and the intrusion into what was a familiar, conventional social order, of the foreign, alien, and novel. It is the fear of the loss of a habituated way of life and social order and the dawn of a new, uncertain age where the familiar (white majorities, carbon-​based industry) seems to be, all of a sudden, suspect and even vilified. While the literature on echo chambers suggests that ideological differences related to climate change are reinforced and protected from outside, moderating influences by a highly coordinated media strategy,32 the logic of our research emphasizes the features of ideology itself. Ideological narratives support group coalescence and self-​isolation, which can lead to adversarial inter-​group dynamics and impede dialogue and action. A coalition tends toward coalescence/​ isolation when its narrative takes on ideological properties. These properties are reflected in parallel properties in the group itself.

 

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So then, how might one respond to the mistrust of climate science? The conversation would need to go beyond the science, and onto what lies underneath, which is mistrust of change and fear of a changing social order.

Point 1. Climate Skeptics Need to Be Listened to, Taken Seriously, and Respected Advocates of climate action might easily dismiss the actions of political entrepreneurs and lobbyists for those with vested interests in the carbon economy. But beyond these political actors, there lies the larger, general public, some of whom are genuinely unsure about climate science and who, perhaps, cannot be so easily disregarded. Whatever the failings or omissions of the positions (and interpretations of the science) taken up by climate skeptics, it is clear that these positions harden with the perception that the scientific and environmental community disregards them. The perception of being dismissed leads too easily to the idea that there is a conspiracy “out there” to suppress the truth. Dialogue does not begin until the other position is respected. Climate scientists have to make greater efforts not to seem dismissive or overbearing and, furthermore, to carefully consider contending perspectives on climate science. It begins with acknowledging that it is completely reasonable to continue wondering if factors other than greenhouse gases might be driving climate change. This means responding, patiently, to questions brought up by the public—​e.g., explaining why the scholarly community would not be capable of conspiring around an artificial consensus in order to further careers and grant monies. As we shall see, some of the talk coming from the scientific community is, in fact, becoming more dismissive of the skeptics, further alienating them and feeding into the charges of a conspiracy of elites.

Point 2. Communities Need to Have Ownership of Change and Social Responses to Climate and Other Issues There is a perception of being “put upon” in the area of climate, immigration, and a host of other issues. Social groups feel that their lifestyles are being questioned, which leads to the perception that they are being forced to change. This is part of what drives the rhetoric against government intrusion. The need to take back their lives is part of what drives the vigorous advocacy of the second amendment and personal rights to defend one’s turf. There has to be an earnest willingness, on the part of policy advocates, toward dialogue, resisting the tendency to pre-​ prescribe solutions (such as carbon taxation) without discussion.

 



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Point 3. Climate Communication Has to Speak to the Ideologically Driven Fears The example of immigration can provide an analogy. While it is undoubtedly true that a significant part of anti-​immigration sentiment is driven by racism, there is also an ideological perspective on immigration that is more about the loss of control (over one’s domain), security, and respect. Immigration and local agendas cannot simply be an either/​or proposition. As an example, perhaps immigration advocates might begin championing the strengthening of local industry, traditional US lifestyles, and local communities at the same time as they fight for immigrant rights. In similar fashion, climate mitigation advocates need to be champions of the same issues, at the same time as they begin a dialogue around climate science. Advocates of climate action need to realize that their proposals are too easily mistaken for an injunction on people’s aspirations for a better life. Carbon taxes are a prime example of this, and the discourse may need to broach small, positive steps (reducing energy use, walking more) that people can identify on their own and willingly take on. Small steps, in the right direction, may be the best option of engaging communities, notwithstanding the urgency of the problem. These points may seem innocuous in the face of the strident, openly divisive discourse found in the United States today. However, and this is a leap of faith, sincere efforts to open up the dialogue may begin to improve the level of discussion. This is not an easy task. The scientific community can very understandably conclude that, as one scientist put it:  “We cannot debate them, because they have no programs, no data, no formulas. There’s nothing but ideology.”33 And yet, even so, the need for sincere discussion becomes all the more important. There is a continuing need for so-​called boundary agents who bridge the communication gap between scientists and communities.34 At the same time, open questions exist regarding how to maintain the canonical separation between science and policy.35 How does one begin a conversation with an ideologically hostile community? Perhaps it begins with finding members of the community who are willing to talk with their own people and negotiate relationships with scientists and other outsiders. Establishing relationships is the first step in overcoming an ideological divide. We will take up these points in succeeding chapters.

Conclusion In this chapter, we suggested that different issue streams take on parallel plot structures perhaps because they all share an underlying genetic metanarrative. This is why bloggers can so easily mix and match diverse themes like

 

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immigration, gun rights, and others, with discussions of climate. Indeed, it is not a stretch to suppose that the same metanarrative lies behind the initial response by some quarters to the threat of the novel coronavirus that was just emerging in early 2020. At the time this book is being finished, we have already seen some social commentators talking about the “coronavirus hoax” in the same breath as the “climate hoax.”36 What we are suggesting is that, perhaps, people turn to the same genetic plots to make sense of complex realities, perhaps more so in times of crisis.

 

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The Social Construction of Climate Science

In a short public outreach video, popular television personality Bill Nye, best known for his science programs for kids, stands in his white lab coat with an acetylene torch in one hand, a globe of the earth in his right, and a fire extinguisher to his left. He begins his video with the announcement: “I’ve got an experiment for you.” He then puts on his safety glasses and proceeds to set the globe on fire. Speaking to the camera, he continues: “By the end of this century, if emissions keep rising, the average temperature on Earth could go up another four to eight degrees. What I’m saying is . . . the planet is on f-​-i​ ng fire.” He then addresses politicians and skeptics dragging their feet on climate action: “There are a lot of things we could do to put it out. Are any of them free? No, of course not. Nothing’s free, you idiots!”1 This was out of character for the usually congenial Nye, and it was done with a little bit of tongue-​in-​cheek. But the anger behind the humor was unmistakable. Bill Nye is angry—​how else to explain such an off-​character video? These were the words of someone on a crusade, with the zeal of a modern-​day crusader. Many, if not most, climate activists, would excuse Nye for his righteous anger and assert that this is entirely appropriate. After all, what cause is more urgent, what threat more dire, than that of a planet heating up? In this chapter, we again employ our narrative lens to delineate how a discourse becomes an ideology. In previous chapters, we used it to analyze the appeal (for some) of the climate skeptical movement. Now we turn the same lens onto the other side: that of the climate scientist and climate activist. The same narrative properties that marked ideological thinking should be useful in studying the discourse. There is another marker for ideological thinking that is invariably present, and that is “othering” talk—​i.e., absolutist constructions of the other.

The Power of Narrative. Raul P. Lejano and Shondel J. Nero, Oxford University Press (2020). © Oxford University Press. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197542101.001.0001.

 

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To many climate scientists, the other is personified by Judith Curry, a climatologist who has criticized the IPCC for not acknowledging the uncertainties in its projections. She has certainly drawn the ire of climate scientists and activists. A sampling of headings of online blogs and articles mentioning Curry: “How Judith Curry has embarrassed all women by joining the climate denial machine as a useful idiot”2; “Judith Curry’s brain goes on hiatus”;3 “Judith Curry hides the decline . . . in her own self-​respect.”4 And so on. An editorial piece in Scientific American quotes another climate skeptic on Curry: “She’s been hugely criticized by the climate science community for not maintaining the fatwa [against talking to outsiders].”5 Curry has become public enemy number one for the climate science community. But what was her crime? More than anything, it was to treat the skeptics as other than lunatics on the fringe edges of society and have a conversation with them, repeating some of the claims they make—​essentially, a form of scientific treason. Curry herself accepts the basic theory of how carbon dioxide can affect climate change. The difference, in her case, is that she believes the uncertainties in the findings of climate science are greater than climate scientists will admit. But this defies dogmatic thinking—​dogma, after all, is defined by its incontrovertibility, the property of not admitting doubt. For this, she has become the other. To be sure, there is something sexist in the ad hominem criticism of Curry, but there may also be, at the same time, a reaction that suggests that it is also partly about the social construction of science (more on this later).6 As seen in previous chapters, this type of “othering” discourse, combined with an all-​or-​nothing perspective, is a sign of ideology formation. The other marker of ideological discourse is when the narrative takes on the character of an all-​encompassing or saturating, worldview. Saturation (see c­ hapter 2) means extrapolating the issue at hand to encompass all other aspects of society, such that it demarcates one culture or people from another. Moralizing can be a sign of issue saturation, when the single issue becomes the “defining issue of our times” and draws a line between the good of this world and the bad. This is not to say that scientists, even scientific zealots, should try to completely divorce morality from science. Science points us toward options for human action that most always have a moral dimension. The point is, when the story told by science begins to resemble a morality play, where the world is neatly divided into good and evil, that is when the narrative becomes ideological. But the notion of the scientist as ideological is dangerous. It opens up the possibility of assuming that the scientist can be other than the authority on matters of science, the purveyor of truth. And even more dangerous is the proposition that science might be, in some respects, considered ideology. This, of course, conflicts with the presumption that science is nothing but objective, and that scientific findings are always open to refutation and the alternative view. In

 



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short, the proposition is that, to some degree, science involves what Berger and Luckmann called social construction, which evokes a social process of negotiation and creative interpretation to arrive at a consensus on what is true and false or good and evil.7 But that would make the scientific endeavor seem to be determined by social convention and social networks and not just the uncovering of external realities in nature. As discussed next, this idea has roots in sociological theories about science and technology.

The Sociology of Science The issue at hand is not whether scientists can be ideological—​certainly, personal beliefs are part and parcel of being human. Scientists can be motivated in their work for ideological reasons. Presumably, physicists working on the Los Alamos project were spurred on by the idea (whether true or false) that in winning the race to unleash nuclear energy they would be protecting the world from fascism. Public health experts toil in the study of sanitation and infectious disease because they believe in a more just and equal world. There would be much less groundbreaking science were scientists not moved by their belief in something. Rather, the issue is whether the scientist (and the science advocate) can be ideological in the conduct and presentation of science itself. Science, as an enterprise, is guided by the fundamental concept that knowledge emerges from the free exchange of ideas, their competition in the arena of testing and refutation, and openness to contending arguments. But is it possible for the scientist to herself or himself exhibit a closedness and universalist type of thinking that we earlier characterized as markers of ideological thinking? What does it mean to ideologize science? Somehow, it involves taking a scientific finding and treating it not as testable and refutable but as dogma. Is wholesale rejection of a contrary opinion a sign of dogmatic thinking? Is asking such a question not a questioning of the scientific enterprise? Is it a questioning of the august authority of science (at least in matters empirical) and, consequently, a questioning of the privileged role of the scientist in matters of science? Does doing so risk representing the scientific community as less a fact-​ seeking, truth-​testing, agonistic society and more a community of believers? It may come as a surprise, to some readers, that there has been, by now, a long scholarship in which science and the scientist emerges as something resembling both. Thomas Kuhn was among the first to study how science was conducted by the establishing of convention—​i.e., a community of scientists coming to an agreement on what the best “truths” of the science were. Conventions (or, as Kuhn, put it, paradigms) guide scientists in their craft and allow the systematic

 

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production of science with a certain efficiency. Once a paradigm has been established, there can be considerable amount of closedness vis-​à-​vis a contradictory idea. In his essay “The function of dogma in scientific research” Kuhn writes: Though the scientific enterprise may be open-​minded, whatever this application of that phrase may mean, the individual scientist is very often not. Whether his work is predominantly theoretical or experimental, he usually seems to know, before his research project is even well under way, all but the most intimate details of the result which that project will achieve. If the result is quickly forthcoming, well and good. If not, he will struggle with his apparatus and with his equations until, if at all possible, they yield results which conform to the sort of pattern which he has foreseen from the start. Nor is it only through his own research that the scientist displays his firm convictions about the phenomena which nature can yield and about the ways in which these may be fitted to theory. Often the same convictions show even more clearly in his response to the work produced by others. From Galileo’s reception of Kepler’s research to Nageli’s reception of Mendel’s, from Dalton’s rejection of Gay Lussac’s results to Kelvin’s rejection of Maxwell’s, unexpected novelties of fact and theory have characteristically been resisted and have often been rejected by many of the most creative members of the professional scientific community.8 As Kuhn points out, ideological thinking is most evident in the rejection of the alternative view. But, if this is the case, then it is the error of the individual scientist, not the scientific enterprise. In the passage just quoted, Kuhn seems to separate the scientist from the science, so as to still maintain the open-​mindedness of the scientific endeavor. But later in the same essay and, in particular, his longer treatise, the Structure of scientific revolutions, he clarifies his position regarding scientific paradigms (or provisional dogma):  “commitment and the apparent consensus it produces are prerequisites for normal science, i.e., for the genesis and continuation of a particular research tradition.”9 In other words, science is all about not just agonistic contestation but mostly consensus building within a like-​minded community. Changes to established dogma can and do happen, but with considerable resistance from protectors of the status quo. If Kuhn directs our attention away from the agonistic process toward that of consensus maintenance, Latour and Woolgar bring back the process of establishing dogma or, in their terms, scientific fact in the laboratory.10 The idea, brought up earlier by Knorr-​Cetina, is that of science as a constructive enterprise rather than a descriptive one11—​e.g., physics can be seen more as an interpretation of the world than an explanation of it. What Latour and Woolgar proceeded

 



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to do was to follow scientists in the lab and observe, as an anthropologist might observe a different culture, the processes and rituals by which they constructed scientific knowledge. Observing one particular laboratory, they described it as a system of literary production in which some authored texts come to be classified as fact through a process of routine and negotiation. If Kuhn focused on the canonical dimensions of science, Latour and Woolgar shone a light on the process of establishing canon, which involves creative writing, interpretation, and negotiation. Subsequent work traces the act of social construction to processes of boundary maintenance—​i.e., marking off phenomena that are classified as natural from those that are cultural. The first area is the domain of objective science, and the second, the domain of the social sciences and humanities.12 What emerges from the literature is a perspective on the scientific establishment as an interpretive community, a cultural tribe even, whose culture is not unlike that of a tribe with its rituals and practices. This opens up a view to the scientific community as less the supreme authority on matters of fact and natural phenomena and more of a narrative-​network. But doing so places this network in a field where other networks can vie for attention, which is problematic, because broaching the idea that the scientific community’s word on matters of science may not be absolute is also to question the sincerity of scientific pronouncements that are absolutist in nature (and, so, ideological). Deconstruction involves uncovering the process by which the scientific establishment and the role and position of the scientist in society is socially constructed. This is a view in which the privileged position of the scientist—​in understanding the natural world—​and the authoritative claims regarding established, canonical scientific findings—​e.g., anthropogenic climate change—​are seen as actively maintained through discourse. Scientists must talk the talk to maintain their authoritative voice on matters of science. To the extent that this can involve closing off the conversation to contrary narratives, then this discourse begins displaying textual properties that mark off ideological talk. This provides a different view of the strength by which climate scientists maintain their positions and, often, a hesitance to bring up the issue of uncertainty. There is, first of all, the contention that the science of climate change is really conclusive. But then there is also the gnawing suspicion that any admission of uncertainty (which, after all, is unavoidable) will be pounced upon by the other side and twisted to fit its agenda. But, more fundamentally, as the scholars of science and technology studies impress upon us, it is the need to actively maintain the social construction of the scientist and the scientific enterprise. There is always work, in any field, that revolves around boundary maintenance. This applies to academia. Much of what goes on in scholarly life (publishing, hiring,

 

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citing) is often at least partly about the maintenance of social networks, which involves both letting in and leaving out. What this book adds to this literature is a closer focus on the complex process of social construction that goes on in the public sphere. If Knorr-​Cetina, Woolgar, and Latour focus on the negotiations and contestations that go on in the laboratory, this book points to an equally crucial process now going on in public discourse, where the privileged roles of science and the scientist in society are being challenged. And what may be going on is that some in the scientific community, in response to the strong ideological narratives being espoused by the skeptics, are beginning to make use of ideological discourse themselves. It is a war being waged around the issue of climate change. But, as c­ hapter  5 impresses upon us, it is an ideological battle that goes even beyond and behind the issue of climate.

The Denial of Denial In what follows, we will illustrate how climate scientists’ talk (and climate science advocates’) can take on properties of ideology. We do not examine a large corpus of texts to try and illustrate how widely pervasive such properties might be—​by now, readers have probably had their share of textual analysis. Rather, we sketch out what a more systematic analysis might look for.

 



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Ideological discourse is often found in its most strident when one side talks about the other. Observers outside the United States, for example, might have found the absolutist language used by conservatives against Hillary Clinton in the 2016 US presidential election to be extreme. As shown in c­ hapters 2 and 3, this is “othering” talk, when discourse moves away from dialogue and into diatribe. This is what allows the fostering of a self-​contained, universalist, worldview. On the side of climate activists, this is most readily seen in the portrayal of the other as a “climate denier.” Take, for example, the following commentaries: “what they’re doing is a criminal act,” said Dr. Suzuki, a former board member of the Canadian Civil Liberties Association. “It’s an intergenerational crime in the face of all the knowledge and science from over 20 years.”13   In the debate over climate change, pseudoscience or antiscience is too often allowed to masquerade as science, and denialism is allowed to pose as skepticism.14 Some commentators have noted that such talk fosters exclusion of critics and precludes dialogue.15 Ideological discourse, as seen in ­chapter 2, is self-​contained (or autopoietic). Does the language of a body like the IPCC exhibit ideological properties? For all the wrath unleashed on this body by its critics, it is certainly not true that the IPCC does not acknowledge uncertainty. In fact, each of its major findings is couched in language that admits some degree of uncertainty (e.g., “likely,” “strongly likely,” etc., are the categorical equivalents of probabilistic estimates). But the language of the IPCC is, to be sure, autopoietic (meaning it excludes other narratives and other voices). Its summary reports do not allow for discussion of contrary evidence; except perhaps indirectly incorporated as part of the larger store of bibliographic material or sometimes in supporting documents such as the expert reviews—​when there is a skeptical voice on the panel. It is not reflective in the sense of being able to take a critical analysis of its own processes. In this case, autopoiesis is found through the absence of the “other” in its text. Saturation is another important property of an ideological text.16 This is seen when the issue of climate science bleeds into and eventually pervades all the other issues of society, such that it becomes the test for right and wrong, good and evil. This is most evident not in scientific publications but in the way scientists expound on what climate science means for the rest of society. Saturation can be found in the following examples:

 

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Climate change is the defining issue of our time and we are at a defining moment.17 Climate change is the challenge of our generation.18 Arguably, [the fossil fuel industry’s media campaign] is the most villainous act in the history of human civilisation, because it is about the short-​term interests of a small number of plutocrats over the long-​term welfare of this planet and the people who live on it. So, once again, to be in a position to be fighting on the right side of a battle between good and evil—​which frankly it is—​is a privilege.19 Coal is the single greatest threat to civilization and all life on our planet.20 For most of 20 miles there were trains parked, engine to caboose, half of the cars being filled with coal. If we cannot stop the building of more coal-​fired power plants, those coal trains will be death trains—​no less gruesome than if they were boxcars headed to crematoria, loaded with -​ uncountable irreplaceable species.21 There’s a fire in the house, almost a literal one. But even as the evidence has become unmistakable, and even though the alarm has been sounded several times, public policy has been paralyzed—​sometimes from ignorance, sometimes from uncertainty, but often from a campaign of deliberate misinformation. This is the madhouse of the climate debate. We have followed Alice through the looking glass.22 When climate science is said to become “the defining issue of our time,” then it becomes part and parcel of the narrative—​a scientific “fact” of sorts. It is a signal that climate change discourse is taking an ideological turn. When the narrative of the scientist becomes part of the battle between good and evil, this is a signal toward issue saturation, invariance, universalism, and other markers of ideological speech. The turn of the climate change narrative toward morality play is perhaps no more explicit than the quote about coal trains, which is from climate scientist James Hansen. The boxcar metaphor refers, of course, to the Holocaust. The short form of this analogy is using the term climate denier as an allusion to Holocaust denial. The discursive strategy is to connect the issue at hand with the issue that is recognized as the one that most defined good vs. evil in the last century. It is equating climate skeptics and the carbon industry with that which epitomized evil, the Nazi regime. And, so, there is a strain of anti-​denialist discourse that imports this other narrative into its own. This is an example of what Kristeva referred to as intertextuality, wherein a text derives meaning not just

 



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in and of itself but through other texts that it signals to and is informed by.23 How does a text draw in these other texts? Often, it involves what Barthes called indices—​words or passages (such as denial) that lead the reader away from the text at hand and to the larger corpus of texts.24 And, so, we have seen how ideologizing discourse can involve importing storylines from the larger sphere of society into the narrative. This example also brings closely upon it another theme, which is that of war. The war narrative is often used by political entrepreneurs to turn their issue of focus into a morality play. In the previous chapter, Ronald Reagan’s War on Drugs speech was seen to use the WWII metaphor extensively. Similarly, the war narrative is deliberately woven into climate change discourse. Sometimes, Barthes’ index needs nothing more than a word (“eco-​warrior”) or a line (“losing the war”) to trigger such intertextuality. Sometimes, it is invoked as a full-​blown narrative, as for example, in the following passage from environmentalist, Bill McKibben: In the North this summer, a devastating offensive is underway. Enemy forces have seized huge swaths of territory; with each passing week, another 22,000 square miles of Arctic ice disappears. Experts dispatched to the battlefield in July saw little cause for hope, especially since this siege is one of the oldest fronts in the war. “In 30 years, the area has shrunk approximately by half,” said a scientist who examined the onslaught. “There doesn’t seem anything able to stop this.” . . . World War III is well and truly underway. And we are losing.25 As some see it, climate is an existential question for the scientific community. The Union of Concerned Scientists devoted a report to the conflict between the current administration and the scientific community: The Trump administration is waging a war on science and on science input in the policymaking process, endangering the nation’s health, economy, environment, and leadership in the world. This administration and its allies in Congress are undermining science-​based policies, violating the principles of scientific integrity, showing contempt for the role of science in general, and seeking to dismantle the very processes by which science informs public policy. The attacks will severely worsen the nation’s health and safety, with the greatest impact on the nation’s most vulnerable populations.26 For scholars of science and technology studies, this may be a defining time and climate a defining issue because, just as Kuhn and others described the gradual

 

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process by which science (and the role of the scientist) is constructed, so might the climate wars be part of a reflexive phase, involving a critical process of deconstruction. Or perhaps this is part and parcel of what Funtowicz and Ravetz call a post-​normal science, where facts and values are inextricably discussed together, all the while acknowledging fundamental uncertainties in the science.27 Another sign of ideological thinking is the exclusion of the other or demarcation of us vs. them. This is especially true in the construction of the scientist as the sole purveyor of knowledge regarding matters of the natural world. Some in the scientific community have maintained that only climate scientists can comment on matters of climate science.28 Which is why Curry’s alternative view is considered so treasonous—​she is, after all, an insider, a member of the climate science community (or perhaps, an ostracized member). As Yanow pointed out, in maintaining the myths of organizational life, there are the necessary silences of realities that cannot be spoken.29 In this case, the myth is the infallible authority of the scientist on matters of climate, and the unspeakable is the proposition that (maybe, just maybe, the theory is wrong). One can think (it) but can never speak (it). To do so would be heresy. On the other hand, what is taking place today is not just a community (of scientists) upholding the social construction of science and scientists as authority. There is also the very real specter of misinformation. It is not unusual for politicians, such as US Senator Daniel Inhofe, to perform stunts like tossing a snowball in the Senate and declaring this as scientific proof that global temperatures are not rising. The March for Science in 2017 (held in different cities across the world) was in part a reaction to the present age of false news and alternative facts. In a sobering demonstration of these dangers, recent research published in the journal Science has shown that false news travels faster and more widely than legitimate news stories.30 So, how do we discern the difference between an ideological reaction to climate skepticism versus a justifiable response to what scientists perceive as misinformation? Sometimes, of course, it is hard to categorize discourse in black and white terms, since ideological talk spans a continuum. But, as we suggest in ­chapters 2 and 3, we can use the same markers of ideological talk, which we used on climate skeptical texts, to discern ideological thinking in pro-​climate action texts. In other words, we look for the same textual properties (saturation, autopoiesis, universalism).

A Deeper Look at Discourse What is modernism? We can’t give a definitive description of such a complex, and contested, concept. But there are some general characteristics that many

 



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would ascribe to the modernist way of thinking and speaking. First, there is a general tendency to turn away from long-​standing culture and tradition. This often means rejecting the past and whatever bonds have held people together since time immemorial and freeing the individual from the errors of tradition, community, and collective life. There is a kind of liberal ideal that is modernist, as it seeks to pursue a radical type of individualism (such as that espoused by Ayn Rand).31 The result is a way of life that seeks to reject what, to the present day, has been recognized as culture, norm, and history. In terms of discourse, the result is a grand narrative, which is a dominant, hegemonic representation of reality that displaces all other accounts. In a most general sense, there is something modernist about the discourse of climate action. We can discern traces of it in the speech of climate change advocacy. But even more telling are the reactions of those who feel they are outside the fold—​i.e., the other. Often, the other voice comes from the global South, and these voices often decry a kind of talk that is Western, modern, acultural, ignorant of context. Climate discourse is, after all, a universalist kind of talk. Climate change and carbon-​induced warming is a global phenomenon, transcending all boundaries, political demarcations, cultures, languages, etc. In other words, the climate issue is universal—​it is so regardless of context. One of us began reflecting on this at a recent trip to a refugee camp in southeast Bangladesh, working with refugee families to identify how they are vulnerable to extreme weather and other impacts of climate change and reflect on what could be done about it. Being, after all, a US scholar, the immediate impulse was to begin talking about climate, resilience, hazard, and carbon footprint. But when standing there in front of the group, there came the sudden realization of how such talk was somehow out of place, dismissive of what these refugees had gone through, and, for lack of a better word, Western. Who was this American to be talking about hazards, when these people have been through hell and back? What more can we say about the risks of extreme weather when these people have weathered tropical cyclones, mudslides, and along with that, desertification? What is the climate advocate to say when the refugees say they have to hope in Allah and each other and pray for better times? And what to say when they say, with love and faith we can conquer all the trials? The modernist impulse is to shy away from culture, religion, tradition, social life, and to think, isn’t love a silly thing to bring up in the face of carbon-​induced global catastrophe? These are not the words the modern uses who thinks, better to be talking about carbon sequestration. And what can one say about reducing carbon footprints in the face of a community that has no running water, electricity, cooling, refrigeration, and people who have subsisted on barely a thousand calories a day? How irrelevant must these words sound. After all, who has known more about low-​carbon lifestyles

 

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than this community? And would the climate advocate talk about how there is a global crisis? This, before a community whose lives have been crisis-​filled in ways much beyond what the expert can ever understand. The West is saying, you have to listen to us, this is a global catastrophe. And the global South is saying: we have had to deal with catastrophe all our lives; where were you when our world was spinning out of control? Perhaps the modern, Western, climate expert would do better to sit and listen. And, to those who would speak, they might pause and reflect on how culturally barren and alienating their speech has been. Religion and faith, community and love, these are concepts that one will not find in an IPCC report. Formally, these are scientific documents, and those elements are not part of the scientific frame of mind. You can’t really fault the authors of these documents for writing this way—​it would not be acceptable to their community to do otherwise. But these are what Barthes called writerly texts; they mean what they mean to the readers regardless of the authors’ intentions. More subtly, it is because the modern mind eschews tradition and culture and seeks, instead, a universalist frame of reference that erases community, neighborhood, tribe, and everything outside its discourse. The tendency of the modernist representative of the West is to tell the peoples of the global South, we talk, you listen. What the other has to say, after all, with their concerns about tradition and culture, with their own experiences, is irrelevant to the liberal modern. You have to reduce carbon, plain and simple, so why the need to even bring up culture? You don’t need culture. The modern’s impulse is to tell people, here’s how you need to live, what you should eat, how you should travel. And, so, missing from most climate policy discussions is the voice of the Other.32 There is something about the speech of the Western climate expert that can alienate.33 Jean Francois Lyotard, in his treatise on postmodernity, talked about the distinction between the speech of the modern technocrat and the speech of community. One language was technical—​abstract, noncontextual, universalizing, and expert-​driven. This type of talk is one-​directional—​i.e., the expert speaks and the listener listens. In contrast, the language of community is a narrative language—​this type of talk is couched in everyday language. It talks to people where they live—​their relationships, their faith, their culture. This kind of talk is dialogic—​everybody gets to talk, and everybody is an expert.34 In a way, the way experts talk is irrelevant—​in the sense that it abstracts away everything that makes life meaningful. But this is not just an issue for the global South. Even in the West, climate talk can alienate members of the public. When the climate advocate talks, the issue is that of reducing carbon. Carbon is, well, exactly what it is (carbon). But to some in the public, “carbon” means a way of life, and reducing carbon, as innocent as it sounds, means questioning the gas-​powered automobile and the culture

 



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around it, the use of plastics and the saran wrap associated with bake sales and home-​cooked food. Carbon is about families grilling hot dogs and hamburgers on a bright summer’s day. For some parts of the country, decarbonizing means ending industries associated with fossil fuels, as if there were something wrong with the hard-​earned livelihoods of parents or grandparents who worked at the coal mine or steel mill. “Reducing carbon footprints” means changing the life, culture, and traditions communities have had over generations—​removing many of these activities (or, what is just as bad for some, taxing them). In the words of the expert, it’s carbon pure and simple. In the minds of many members of the public, it’s life and community. As we saw in ­chapter 5, climate action may seem to some to be part of an existential threat to their ways of life. Now, the present-​day modern is not tone-​deaf. There is always, as in IPCC reports, language that speaks of the other (e.g., the poor of the world). And, yet, we never hear the other speak. It’s always the West deciding and speaking for the global South. And, so, we ask, why not ask the other what she thinks of climate change, carbon, and the new social order climate advocates wish to impose on her and her community? Why not have a series of IPCC reports written by those not represented in these expert summaries? These are rhetorical questions. But the quick answer is, because this is not the way moderns work. They don’t listen to, they talk to, the other. Their message is universal, applying to all peoples and cultures, so why the need for other voices? The world is a mass balance, plain and simple—​carbon in, carbon out. The solution is, in the bloodless words of the climate advocate, to change the world so there is less carbon out: To stabilize global temperature at any level, “net” CO2 emissions would need to be reduced to zero. This means the amount of CO2 entering the atmosphere must equal the amount that is removed. Achieving a balance between CO2 “sources” and “sinks” is often referred to as “net zero” emissions or “carbon neutrality.” The implication of net zero emissions is that the concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere would slowly decline over time until a new equilibrium is reached, as CO2 emissions from human activity are redistributed and taken up by the oceans and the land biosphere. This would lead to a near-​constant global temperature over many centuries.35 Modernism is about grand narratives that supplant everything. If the refugee says, don’t talk to us about calamity, because we have to deal with hunger, persecution, displacement, and a host of other calamities that you know nothing about, the climate advocate will reply, but climate affects everything, and the side issues you talk about will all be affected and exacerbated by climate. But this is the modernist grand narrative at work. The folly is to insist, whatever the grand

 

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narrative is about, it’s everything. This is the ideology of modernity. One cannot help but discern a fundamentalism in some of the climate discourse. Increasingly, advocates for climate action speak as if one is either for climate science or against it. The “other” is a diametrically opposed opponent. But this is part of the defining features of the ideological narrative, as we saw in earlier chapters. With ideological discourse, everything is literally black or white. Climate discourse often seems to say: yes, we know you are dealing with issues in your community, but our climate agenda trumps everything. Climate talk is acultural. But, more accurately, it would be better described as the culture of the Western, liberalist, technocratic, modernist mind. We say this not as a critique of this particular culture: we point out that this is one culture among others. Lyotard’s view of this was the bleakest. He thought of these contending cultures and discourses as language games, each establishing truths and legitimacies within the confines of their own language communities. And, he maintained, these language games exist independently of each other, never actually exchanging across boundaries—​in short, never achieving dialogue which, in the case of climate, brings us to an impasse. He referred to this condition, where parties do not engage in dialogue but instead talk past each other, as paralogy. But this derails any prospect of debate, let alone civic engagement. We take up this theme of impasse in the succeeding (and final) chapter.

Conclusion For many who read this book, most of its propositions will be accepted without much argument. Its main points, that narrative matters and that ideologies need to be good narratives, should be acceptable to anyone. Early on, scholars pointed out the need for a fundamental reflexivity to climate science and decision-​making.36 But, at some point, some of the content of this book will be rejected. For the climate advocate, it is perfectly reasonable to analyze ideological properties in the climate skeptic’s narrative. But to turn the same analytic lens upon the climate scientist-​advocates themselves is another thing. It would be like doubting the indubitable. Or maybe something like counterespionage. The language of denial can, as shown in previous chapters, constitute an ideology. Ideological discourse, as argued in c­ hapter  2, involves shutting out the voice of the other. This was seen to be the case, in ­chapter 3, when climate skeptical talk exhibited autopoiesis and other telltale properties. But why would this not also be applicable to another type of denialist discourse, this time that of the scientists who would deprive the voice of their other? We hold this to be the most reasonable proposition—​for the social scientist (and maybe the mathematician), this is simply the reflexive attitude. But this is not acceptable in an

 



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ideological battlefield where one is asked to choose sides. It is a culture war37—​it does not actually matter whether one has read any of the science at all because, in a culture war, one simply decides where one lies, with the in-​group or the out-​ group. To make the wrong choice would be to go back to school and find oneself sitting at the wrong lunch table with the other social pariahs. In the United States and many places outside it, to be a modern, liberal, progressive means to accept the narrative of anthropogenic climate change without hesitation. It does not require thought or deliberation or research, one simply wears it like wearing the right workout clothing to the gym. And to be a conservative means to likewise question climate change science (and its scientists) without hesitation. There can be much about ideology that is about fashion.38 We have to analyze climate-​scientific and climate-​activist discourse for its ideological properties. It seems clear that there is ideological thinking going on when climate change is associated with the other cultural themes that make up the social construction of the “progressive liberal.” Not that this is wrong or right. What would seem wrong is choosing sides (which is choosing ideology) without reflection, because what is de rigueur today may be a passing fancy tomorrow—​but again, we do not presume to know or judge the inner realities of the individual psyche. All we can do is to analyze what words people use, and what narratives they tell, in the public arena. This chapter takes up the idea that, in response to climate skeptical discourse, climate science advocates can begin talking in ways that become ideological as well. We should point out that there is a whole range of effects on climate discourse. As some literature points out, in some cases, scientists’ discourse can exhibit an openness to climate denialist narratives, to the extent of overcompensation. One group of researchers used the word “seepage” to describe how scientific discourse changes to reflect skeptical ideas—​e.g., discussing the “pause” in global temperature rise when, in fact, the data may not actually indicate a pause.39 Others have pointed to the inherent conservatism in scientific discourse, where scientists might downplay the strength of the data or lean toward the “least drama.”40 Climate scientists can and do engage with climate skeptical discourse in positive, non-​ideological ways even while trying to refute it. Testing claims against empirical evidence is a valid way of engaging in a constructive dialogue. Some work to counter climate skeptical discourse by pointing out the various ways that scientific information can be distorted—​what some refer to as inoculation.41 Such practices constitute positive ways at actively engaging with the narrative of the other. In the following, concluding chapter, we turn to other important questions, such as:  Where does this leave us? Knowing how ideological narratives are fashioned and maintained, what should be done about it? But, to sum up the

 

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discussion thus far, we find much solace in thinking that, by this point in the book, there will have been something for everyone, but also the converse. To the climate advocate who finds herself agreeing with the analysis in ­chapter 3, there is, then again, the present chapter. And to the climate skeptic, vice-​versa. By this point in the book, the reader will have seen something somewhere in it that causes a little consternation. But this is to be expected, as this is how ideology works. The point is not to make what some decry as a “false equivalence” between the two sides. There is no attempt to do this; the two sides could not be less equivalent. The point is that the narrative analytic could and is applied to both. It should be a type of analysis that is applicable to everything. And, invariably, it will find patterns that it looks for in some form, because ideological thinking is everywhere. It is embedded into most aspects of daily life and often works unnoticed and, so, deeper analysis can trace it everywhere. Ideological thinking seeps into everyday life, drawing on genetic metanarratives that tap deep into the public’s psyche. As alluded to in c­ hapter 2, there is something about ideology begetting ideology. As, understandably so, climate science advocates point to the ideological straitjackets of their critics, there seems to be a counter-​reaction, with some scientists and climate activists beginning to take on ideological discourse themselves. Rather than constructive dialogue, which the public would benefit from, the situation today has opposing sides pointing at each other and accusing the other of being an ideologue. If there is anything like a general condition of the age, it is that of a deep-​ seated suspicion of the other. As Alexander Pope wrote, commenting on criticism in the eighteenth century: “All seems infected that th’ infected spy, as all looks yellow to the jaundic’d eye.”

 

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Ideological Narratives and beyond in a Post-​Truth World

Words, Language, Stories, and Communities We began this book by talking about the alchemy and importance of words—​ words as the fundamental building blocks of language and ultimately of narratives or stories that bring people together to form a community, or in other cases, set them apart. We argued that stories and communities are co-​constitutive, that is to say, stories keep a community alive, and communities keep stories alive by their retelling. But how stories are told matters, as the telling reflects the thinking/​ worldview of an individual storyteller or a larger community and influences how both story and community are received and perceived. It is through the deliberate assemblage of particular words/​phrases delivered in particular ways that people language1 their stories for particular purposes and audiences. What is remarkable about the power of words with respect to the subject of this book, is how they have been assembled and used persuasively (and echoed by as much as a quarter of the US population and segments of populations in other countries) to create a counter-​narrative that has challenged the traditional authority of science, specifically regarding anthropogenic climate change, for more than three decades. That is no small feat. Throughout this book, we’ve seen how words have been used to construct what we call a climate skeptical narrative, reflecting and reinforcing the views of what has coalesced into a veritable climate skeptic community (also often referred to as climate deniers). Linking language to worldviews has a long tradition in the anthropological literature. In the early to mid-​twentieth century, linguistic anthropologist Benjamin Lee Whorf took up the exploration of the link between language and thought initially begun by his mentor Edward Sapir. Whorf2 proposed the linguistic relativity principle, which posits (in its strong version) that the structure of a language determines the thoughts or worldview of the person The Power of Narrative. Raul P. Lejano and Shondel J. Nero, Oxford University Press (2020). © Oxford University Press. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197542101.001.0001.

 

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or culture characteristically associated with it, but this view of language has been challenged as being too deterministic. A weaker version of the principle suggests language influences thought. While the Sapir-​W horf hypothesis (as the principle came to be commonly known) may be in simple terms a chicken-​and-​egg scenario, its relevance for us relates to the links among language, worldview, and culture or community. After all, it’s not as if the climate skeptical community has always existed as a distinctly recognizable speech community speaking a particular language reflecting a particular worldview. Rather, a community was constructed by a desire to create a counter-​narrative to the dominance of climate science, which turns out to be more than about science, and a language was fashioned with particular use and delivery of words and rhetorical strategies to accomplish it. As discussed in this book, anti-​climate science communities stretch far and wide across the United States, and internationally, a motley mix of people in the fossil fuel business; the oil, gas, and energy industries; contrarian scientists, politicians, the media, and ordinary citizens. And while they may all be skeptical of anthropogenic climate change for various reasons and to various degrees, they have managed to craft a remarkably similar language to tell their story. So what kinds of words/​phrases mark a skeptical narrative? As Oreskes and Conway3 have noted, the climate skeptical narrative was initially built on casting doubt on the science itself, couched in the language of uncertainty, e.g., “There are major uncertainties around whether human activity has caused any warming of the planet” or “Climate science is not settled”; and later by framing scientists who claimed climate change was human induced as spreading unnecessary alarm. As noted in ­chapter 3, the words “alarmist” or “alarmism” have been the most frequently and consistently used in the United States to characterize climate change scientists and supporters.4 Just to make one final point about the importance of words, Mann5 tells the story of how back in 1995 during the IPCC’s final plenary meeting in Madrid for the Second Assessment Report on climate change, a fierce argument broke out between scientists writing the report and delegates from Saudi Arabia and other oil producing countries “that profit greatly from societal dependence on fossil fuel energy” because the scientists stated that “the balance of evidence suggests an appreciable human influence on climate.” The Saudi delegate objected to the sentence, stating that the word appreciable was too strong. After two whole days of fierce debate, the IPCC chair found a word that both sides could accept as a compromise. The sentence was changed to “the balance of evidence suggests a discernible human influence on climate.” That two entire days were spent choosing a word shows how contentious is the debate on this subject, and more importantly, how a delegation of nonscientists were able to prevail over scientists (at least in getting the language changed). But words/​phrases strategically used

 



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do not explain the whole picture of the power of the climate skeptical narrative. A narrative has to express ideas, belief systems, and experiences that find resonance with people in their particular contexts so that it takes hold and comes to represent or be linked to an identifiable community. We have argued that the climate skeptical narrative found its power by coming to function as an ideology.

The Climate Skeptical Narrative as Ideology Let’s first establish the fact that the climate skeptical narrative emerged in response to the dominant narrative of anthropogenic climate change, the latter arguing scientifically that humans have contributed significantly (in a negative way) to the changes in the climate over centuries, and therefore we have to do something about it, i.e., change our lifestyles in some way. This put climate change squarely into the messy nexus of the science-​public policy debate, similar to previous, hot-​button issues like the effects of second-​hand smoking and the fights with the tobacco industry. This is important because the climate skeptical narrative had an already well-​established context of resistance or skepticism toward science on which to build, in the sense that science was increasingly being perceived as intruding on public policy and personal lifestyles. In fact, studies have shown that the strongest predictor of climate science denial is political ideology and political affiliation, and the main reason is aversion to the policies proposed to mitigate human induced climate change.6 Some background on this intrusion into policy and the resistance to it is warranted here. McCright and Dunlap situate the climate skeptical narrative within the larger anti-​reflexivity stance of the American conservative movement, which they argue is one of its most powerful forces.7 Anti-​reflexivity really came of age after World War II in response to reflexive modernization (RM), which called for critical self-​examination of the dominance of the industrial capitalist order and the unanticipated ecological and technological crises that it produced. RM is anathema to the conservative movement in the United States—​some of the staunchest defenders of the industrial capitalist order, which generated innovative science and technologies to increase production and allow more control of human and environmental resources. That type of technological production science,8 dominated the first half of the twentieth century and led to putting a man on the moon, Big Oil, Big Pharma, the auto industry, etc., creating a pro-​industrial, capitalist success narrative in which most conservatives are deeply invested. But the post–​World War II reflexivity movement began to challenge the dominance of technological production science and saw the rise of environmental social impact science, which set about identifying and remedying the impact of science and technology, especially as it relates to the environment. Impact science began to

 

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take hold as a core part of modern scientific understanding, its chief messengers being climate scientists, social movements, especially the environmental movement, policymakers, politicians, activists, the media, and academics—​people with a lot of power and influence. Their narrative was to raise public awareness of the negative effects of the industrial capitalist order, especially on the environment, and to develop policies and action plans to address them—​such as recycling, reducing the use of fossil fuels, alternative energy, etc. Climate science now took center stage as a serious player in public policy, much to the chagrin of the conservative movement. A counter-​narrative had to be quickly developed in a forceful way. And so the climate skeptical narrative essentially emerged to denaturalize the dominance of climate science as a serious influencer of public policy, especially because it had direct consequences on business, the economy, politics, and most importantly, people’s lifestyles. Like any compelling narrative, the climate skeptical narrative includes a plot, characters/​actors, events, twists and turns, and some kind of resolution, but there is also some central binding idea. In this case, it’s skepticism. It’s important to note that skepticism in and of itself is quite healthy and necessary for robust debate and checks and balances on major issues. In science, skepticism is fundamental for producing sound scientific findings. It takes place in the give-​and-​take of scientific meetings, where scientists present their findings and then address questions, criticisms, and challenges from their colleagues in the audience. It also takes place in the form of peer reviews where work submitted to scientific journals is critically evaluated by other scientists with expertise in the field.9 With regard to the climate skeptical narrative, though, skepticism is different; it’s a strategy to stake out ideological turf. In fact, Michaels notes that a key strategy of anti-​reflexivity is manufacturing uncertainty. Taking their cues from the tobacco industry, climate skeptics have learned that “debating the science is much easier and more effective than debating the policy.”10 We saw in ­chapter 3 how uncertainty was manufactured in lines like, “Despite the uncertainty about the extent of human influence on climate change, which is a known and natural fact . . . etc.” or “physics and historical data from climatologists show little evidence linking global warming and hurricanes.” The climate skeptical narrative slid down a slippery slope from there—​skepticism in the form of manufactured uncertainty went from legitimate questioning of climate science to outright denial or rejection of science, and the disparaging of scientists as a group and of all those who support their work. Thus, at the extreme end of the skepticism continuum, debate is foreclosed. This is where we enter the realm of ideology. In c­ hapter 2, we defined ideology as a system constituting narrative, or put another way, a narrative that forms a coherent systematic view of the world. So

 



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while normal narratives are dynamic, open to change, and can be retold in many forms, ideological narratives are closed (not open to new information) and require fierce systematicity in their conception and delivery. Normal narratives bind people together; ideological narratives isolate people from each other. They form different types of communities—​the former bonding; the latter, adversarial. An important organizing principle of an ideological narrative is the formation of binaries, especially us vs. them, which not only isolates groups, but forces central ideas to coalesce forcefully. We saw in the texts we analyzed a consistently skeptical worldview of climate science articulated in different ways. But central to the narrative is the idea that science/​scientists and their supporters are on one side of the divide and everyone else is on the other. As the narrative took on a moral dimension, sides were construed as inherently “wrong” or “right” or worse, “good” or “evil.” We also saw in c­ hapter 6 that in some instances the presentation, language, and rhetorical strategies of climate scientists could also be construed as ideological, as they “othered” anyone who called climate science and its recommendations into question. Thus we caution that different people and groups can fall prey to adopting ideological stances. The question arises:  do people really hold the beliefs expressed by their narratives? While we analyze meaning in their narratives, and even in deeper meta-​narratives that may support them, we have taken care not to separate false from true belief. What, after all, constitutes a true belief? More than this, all we have at our disposal are the narratives spoken in the public domain. We do not see into the inner realities of the individual; nor do we make any strong assumptions equating these realities with the narratives people construct. Perhaps it is excusable to make pre-​judgments about political entrepreneurs and lobbyists, who have a clear material incentive in taking the positions they do, as “spinning” narratives, but this is much less the case with the public. Do conservatives really believe scientists are lying about the consensus around anthropogenic climate change? Do scientists really believe that their theory is that conclusive? Is Bill Nye really angry, or is he hamming it up to boost his ratings? We don’t need to judge people either way. It is even possible (or probable) that people can act out of pure belief and strategic self-​interest at the same time.

 

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Still, narratives speak and do a lot. Individuals can fit their lifestyles to these narratives. We can see that groups and movements coalesce around them. We can see them guiding policies and other public actions. Institutions can be founded upon such narratives (e.g., think of deregulation, or markets and the invisible hand). And the war around climate science is, at least partly, a war around narrative.

Climate Skeptical Narratives in the United States and Abroad If the goal of the climate skeptical narrative is to denaturalize the dominance of anthropogenic climate science and/​or link it to other metanarratives, as we discussed in ­chapter 5, then the United States presents a textbook example of how to do so. In terms of the larger context, the United States has a long history of skepticism toward science, sometimes with good reason and others not. For example, the Tuskegee Study of Untreated Syphilis in African American men conducted between 1932 and 1972 was an unethical study because researchers knowingly failed to treat patients appropriately after penicillin was validated in the 1940s as an effective cure for the disease. This fostered strong skepticism toward the scientific establishment among some in the African American community, and understandably so. On the other hand, some forms of skepticism may be harder to rationalize. Skepticism toward vaccines has existed since the invention of vaccines, and is alive and well today in another constructed speech community known as anti-​vaxxers—​an unlikely mix of Hollywood types, some extremely religious groups, and general conspiracy theorists who believe vaccines were created to spread disease—​a spurious, unscientific, and untrue claim, such as, for example, vaccines cause autism.11 Another example is the tobacco industry, which has fought the science against secondhand smoke primarily for economic reasons—​it cost billions to the industry in terms of cigarette sales. But, unfortunately, the various reasons for skepticism toward science (reasonable or not) have been cleverly conflated into one as a basis on which to craft a persuasive climate skeptical narrative. We saw in the analyzed articles how the narrative evolved through a sequence of stages to systematically deconstruct science, becoming more ideological over time. It began with the questioning of science, suggesting manipulation of data. At some point, the narrative moved beyond the critique of scientific evidence toward actively fighting back against the moral and financial dimensions of climate

 



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activism. In this process, climate scientists, supporters, and the presumed complicit mainstream media became framed as the collective other against whom the battle is being waged. Their integrity and motives were called into question. Eventually, the narrative characterized the entire climate change enterprise as a hoax and a grand conspiracy of scientists. Examining climate skeptical texts in countries outside the United States, we find evidence of both the diffusion of norms and narratives across boundaries as well as the fitting into local context of these same narratives. What we find is the simultaneous presence of isomorphism and polymorphism vis-​a-​vis climate skepticism. Thus, while themes are common across boundaries, they exhibit differences in their degree of emphasis as well as variations in shades of meaning. According to some scholars, skepticism in China, at least some years back, may have been tinged with anti-​imperialism, with a narrative that evoked suspicion of the West. In our very limited sampling, we found a lesser prevalence of text in the United Kingdom characterizing the scientific community as a conspiracy. And in Germany we found some evidence of the influence of ecological modernization, as climate skepticism was more about questioning the feasibility of carbon mitigation measures. These cursory observations are, of course, to be taken with a grain of salt, given the limited corpus of texts.

Where Are We Now? Our longitudinal analysis of climate skeptical texts ended in 2018 but a plethora of climate change stories continue to appear literally every day in printed and online news sources, social media, and on television, if only because of more frequent instances of flooding, tornadoes, wildfires, excessive rainfall and heat, etc., which are negatively affecting the economy and people’s lives, even those who are climate skeptics. But the climate skeptical narrative is alive and well thanks to the continued force and persistence of the conservative movement’s attack on climate science, having perhaps the greatest proponent of the narrative in the most powerful person in the United States, President Donald Trump. A decade ago, McCright and Dunlap12 identified four strategies used by the US conservative movement to make climate change a non-​issue, inject doubt into climate science, and stymie climate policy: 1. Manipulate, misrepresent, and/​or suppress scientific research 2. Intimidate or threaten to sanction individual scientists 3. Invoke or create new rules and procedures in the political system 4. Invoke media bias

 

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Sound familiar? That’s because these strategies have continued to the present, as we saw in the articles and social media comments we analyzed. The fifth strategy, not in this list, is the boldest of all, which is to accuse climate change scientists and proponents of all of these, a strategy we call reverse accusation. We saw this strategy in the recurring themes throughout the evolving climate skeptical narrative. When you accuse the other side of the very thing that they’re accusing you of, they become the story; you upend the plot or, at least, you distract from the current storyline by starting a new story. Trump was a master of distraction, a classic strategy in the post-​truth world;13 reverse accusation is one type of distraction. One need only think of how many people Trump had accused of all manner of negative behavior—​lying, being racist, etc.—​even as he’s been charged with the same behavior on several occasions. Trump made reversal of Obama-​era environmental regulations a signature part of his policy agenda, recasting environmental policies as “Energy Dominance,” underscored by an explicit denial of human induced climate change. Thus, throughout Trump's tenure in the White House, the climate skeptical narrative has had a fertile context to coalesce and harden as an ideology, as the discourse of climate change skepticism has been amplified and legitimized at the federal governmental level. The administration fostered this legimitization using three distinct strategies: 1. Nullify or roll back Obama administration policies The US withdrawal from the Paris Climate agreement in June 2017 is the most glaring and consequential example of this. The Trump administration has also been rolling back Obama-​era EPA regulations to reduce greenhouse pollution, while emphasizing the expansion of coal and oil production. 2. Ignore, dismiss, or say you don’t believe climate change reports Visible examples of this are the administration’s dismissal of the most recent UN IPCC Report14—​which predicted that anthropogenic emissions are likely to continue in the next three decades with devastating consequences for natural and human systems—​and of the government’s own 1656-​page National Climate Assessment,15 which included a depressing top line prediction that 10 percent of the US economy could be knocked off by the year 2100 if climate change is not addressed. The report was deliberately released on the day after Thanksgiving when no one was paying attention. Trump simply shrugged it off with a curt, “I don’t believe it” response, which allowed the legitimizing of the public dismissal of science. Here’s a sample of articles describing dismissal of the National Climate Assessment report by the Trump administration in mainstream and conservative online media outlets:

 



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• Trump administration’s strategy on climate:  Try to bury its own scientific report • 7 pieces of fake news about the latest US climate report • How big government hijacked the federal climate report16 3. Actively undermine scientific research • In an effort to wrestle control of the ongoing climate change narrative, the administration has now explicitly adopted an offensive strategy to undermine climate change research. The White House has ordered that the US Geological Survey office only use “computer generated climate models that project the impact of climate change through 2040 rather than through the end of the century as had been done previously” and “worst case scenarios will not automatically be included in the National Climate Assessment.”17 • A front page story in the New York Times laid out in stark detail the administration’s intentional eroding the role of science in government, including funding and staff cuts. According to the authors, “Political appointees have shut down government studies, reduced the influence of scientists over regulatory decisions and in some cases pressured researchers not to speak publicly. The administration has particularly challenged scientific findings related to the environment and public health, opposed by industries such as oil drilling and coal mining.”18 • A more direct focus on climate skeptic language was reported in a New  York Times article detailing the intentional insertion of misleading language into the Interior Department’s scientific reports, spearheaded by a longtime staffer named Indur Goklany. The wording, dubbed, “Goks uncertainty language” (based on Goklany’s name), “inaccurately claims that there’s a lack of consensus among scientists that the earth is warming.”19 In the social media world, climate skeptics continue to frame climate change in conspiratorial terms—​as a “hoax,” or “made-​up hysteria . . . by the deep state,” or “fake news” as mentioned earlier—​and repeatedly vilify climate change proponents with debasing adjectives or biting sarcasm, hardening an us vs. them ideology.

What Can Be Done? We inevitably get to the “so what?” question in writing a book of this nature. The reader may be asking how do we begin to break the impasse around

 

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ideological narratives such as climate skepticism since we’ve seen that they often heighten divisions, foreclose dialogue, and prevent any constructive response to climate change. Climate skeptical ideological narratives are, in fact, misinformation stories, and Cook and colleagues,20 remind us that misinformation can undermine a functioning democracy. While we would not be so naïve as to think we have the magic bullet solution to a complex issue such as climate change skepticism, we do believe there are promising avenues to move beyond the current state of affairs. Just as we considered the macro level—​larger sociopolitical currents—​in our analysis of how the climate skeptical narrative evolved in conservative texts and comments, it stands to reason that we would need to take these same currents into account in proposing a way forward. Lewandosky and colleagues,21 argue that any confronting of the climate skeptical narrative must consider the larger political, technological, and sociological context of what has now been recognized as our post-​truth world. Given the complexity of the issue, we believe it will require an interdisciplinary approach to address it, harnessing the best theories, resources, and methods from several disciplines including environmental science, psychology, technology, journalism, education, linguistics, discourse analysis, and ethnography. Some of these approaches have been already been used in various studies, and we also propose others here. First, though, it’s important to characterize the larger problem underlying the climate skeptical narrative: i.e., a visceral aversion by many in the conservative movement to the proposed solutions to climate change, specifically carbon mitigation, which is seen as disrupting lifestyles and the free market system—​ a big part of anti-​reflexivity.22 So when you don’t like the solution, your only choice is to dismiss or deny the problem and its causes, and diminish its impact. Here, we enter the realm of creating alternative realities, mostly through a series of strategies that promote alternative facts and misinformation. Rahmstorf23 mentions some typical denial strategies used by climate skeptics: (1) trend—​ global warming is not happening; (2) attribution—​humans are not causing it; (3) impact—​the impact is not so bad. We saw evidence of all of these strategies in our texts, part of constructing a post-​truth world, which is now our larger sociopolitical context.

Trends and Characteristics of the Post-​Truth World Lewandowsky and colleagues24 give us an insightful analysis of the interrelated trends that led to the emergence of our post-​truth world, as well as some of its current characteristics. They are:

 



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• Decline in social capital and shifting values • Growing inequality • Increasing polarization • Declining trust in science • Asymmetrical political beliefs • Changing media landscape It is not difficult to imagine how a decline in social capital—​i.e., in goodwill, empathy, and civic engagement and trust in other people and public institutions—​ would lead to social isolation. If we don’t trust each other or our institutions, we’re more likely to be suspicious of each other’s motives and to not believe information coming from those with whom we disagree. Growing income inequality naturally breeds resentment and leads to political polarization, which leads to the us-​vs.-​them world that we saw permeate the climate skeptical narrative, an index of the larger societal polarization. People now choose to live in places and socialize only with people that look like and/​or think like them. Declining trust in science is just one example of not trusting traditional institutions or those who would traditionally be considered experts. Finally, the changing media landscape with its twenty-​four-​hour news cycle, cacophony of voices, and unfiltered social media space allows citizens to cherry-​pick information sources aligned with their political ideology, creating the echo chamber effect, as we saw in the online responses to the articles featured in ­chapter 3. The ability to circulate information in a hyperpartisan space in a politically polarized country makes creating alternative facts relatively easy. This gives us, then, a snapshot of our post-​truth world: • Facts don’t matter • You can create and disseminate your own facts • Large swaths of the population live in an alternative epistemic space removed from facts and not easily penetrated • Conventional criteria for evidence abandoned • No political consequence for lying • Trust in the media has eroded • The fake news narrative has taken hold If there was any doubt that we are now in a post-​truth world, we noted that NBC dedicated its final episode of Meet the Press on December 29, 2019, to “Alternative Facts” and the role of the media in understanding and countering them. The phrase “weaponization of disinformation” was used on the show to draw attention to the intentionality of spreading misinformation as a political strategy and the dangers it presents. Misinformation can lead to poor decision-​making, and/​

 

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or not believing in facts altogether, especially when trust is already eroded. In political discourse in the post-​truth era (and climate change can now be considered political discourse), there’s no consequence for lying or spreading misinformation; in fact, it is rewarded. You get more “likes” and followers. Thus, conventional criteria for evidence are not necessary; the goal is not actually to make an argument based on facts, but rather to connect with like-​minded people through a more persuasive story using any or all of the four “D”s—​Dismiss (the other side’s evidence); Distort (e.g., cherry-​pick your own climate data); Distract (accuse the other side of sinister motives or start a new storyline like evolution); Dismay (threaten or intimidate the other side).25

Research Already Done Countering Climate Skepticism With such a gloomy picture of the post-​truth world, it might be tempting to see no way out. Thankfully, several types of studies have been done by scholars using different methodological approaches to fight against the damage caused by misinformation in a post-​truth world, specifically focused on climate science. Here we focus on three types of studies: inoculation, frames, and narratives.

Inoculation Inoculation theory26 offers a framework for pre-​emptive strategies for countering misinformation. Drawing on research in psychology, inoculation theory posits that attitudes and beliefs can be protected against influence, in the same way that people build up resistance to an actual virus by getting weak forms of the virus. Using this approach several scholars27 have conducted studies on inoculating the public against misinformation about climate change. A major target of such inoculation is the significant disparity between the scientific consensus on climate change (97  percent) and the public’s perceived consensus (57–​67  percent). This work focuses on combatting the techniques of spreading misinformation rather than the intention of the misinformer.28 The idea is to try to “pre”-​bunk misinformation before it takes hold by exposing logical fallacies and challenging existing beliefs. This is based on two principles:  an inoculation text requires (a) a warning or threat of being misinformed; (b) counterarguments explaining how the misinformation is false. In one study, Cook and colleagues29 explored the impact of misinformation on climate change, testing several pre-​emptive interventions designed to reduce the influence of misinformation. They found that pre-​emptively explaining the false-​balance message (giving equal time to

 



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climate scientists and contrarian views) was effective in neutralizing the effect of misinformation on perceived consensus about climate change. Another example is the study conducted by van der Linden and colleagues30 exposing the flaws in the so-​called Oregon Global Warming Petition Project of 2007, a bogus study that claimed 31,000 signatory scientists questioned climate change. Turns out less than 1 percent of the signatories had a bachelor’s degree in science. When the flaws in this study were exposed, the misinformation was neutralized. Cook’s aforementioned work on combatting misinformation advocates two approaches to inoculation: (1) misconception based learning such as teaching science by addressing scientific misconceptions: (2) technocognition—​an interdisciplinary approach that uses technology to influence attitudes, e.g., real-​ time fact-​checking. Inoculation benefits include building up resistance to all forms of science denial and misinformation and speaking more openly about climate science, which breaks down climate science silos.

Frames Another set of experimental studies examined the effectiveness of various climate change frames against denial counterframes. McCright and colleagues31 examined how US citizens’ views on climate change are influenced by four frames for action on it:  economic opportunity, national security, Christian stewardship, and public health. These four positive frames were found to have little to no effect on climate change beliefs. The study authors did find some small promise in the economic and national security frames (probably linked to anti-​reflexivity); however, negative frames—​climate change denial—​had more of an effect on beliefs, especially for conservatives. Taking a slightly different approach to framing, Bain and colleagues32 started from the presumption that changing attitudes through science is unlikely since climate skepticism is based on ideological positions. Climate believers and deniers evaluate information through different lenses; their attitudes represent their values. The study authors approached the issue from the position that you might get people to engage in mitigation efforts that do not rely on accepting climate change science. A more promising approach would be to identify mitigation efforts that deniers find important, based on the assumption that people have strong interests in the welfare of their society. Therefore, deniers might be more open to a story that they believe will have positive societal effects, make them feel good about themselves, and engage in what they call environmental citizenship. These researchers hypothesized that climate deniers will act more pro-​environmentally when they believe such action will lead to a society that is more caring (warmth frame) and where there is greater technological and economic development (development

 

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frame), rather than on the reality of climate change (real frame) and averting its risks. Testing the three frames as a predictor of environmental citizenship among 155 climate deniers, the warmth frame ranked the highest, confirming the identity benefits of acting on climate change.

Narratives In contrast to the experimental studies just discussed, Phillips and Dickie33 used social psychology to explore how ordinary people narrate stories to themselves about their understanding and actions related to the environment. They avoided the deficit interpretation of studies on transitioning from high carbon dependency, which assumed that residents’ inaction on mitigation was based on being unaware of, or unconcerned about, climate issues. They studied how residents of four rural communities in England with heavily carbon-​dependent lifestyles storied the environment. They found that residents were able to develop self-​ justifying narratives to rationalize the dissonance between their awareness and concern about the environment with their lack of action to mitigate carbon. Reasons for inaction (narratives of stasis) ranged from not wanting to change the stability of their lifestyles, to feeling overwhelmed by the scale of the problem and the necessary response, to blaming climate change on others—​the Chinese, Russians, and Indians. For those who storied a narrative of transition, they ranged from a grudging acceptance of change (but not welcomed), to believing that change is inevitable and would have to be accepted. Only a minority accepted change from carbon dependency. Their research showed that understanding how ordinary folk talk about the environment can provide a better pulse for researchers on how to address the issue.

Our Recommendations Based on our analysis of climate skepticism in the current sociopolitical climate, and building on work already done, we offer our own proposals to move beyond the entrenched ideological climate narratives.

Change the Language Evidence from our analysis of climate skeptical articles leads us back to language. We saw, for example, that absolutist language (invariance), which might include superlatives and/​or hyperbole—​such as skeptics’ framing environmentalists and their work as “nothing short of colonialism . . . people who would rather see

 



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African people starve than eat genetically enhanced food like Americans do” or climate scientists stating, “Coal is the single greatest threat to civilization and all life on our planet”—​does not move the needle in any way. It either insults people while dismissing the problem (as in the “colonialism” example) or overstates the problem to a level that might seem ridiculous to the average person (as in the “coal” example). Neither statement brings us any closer to addressing climate change. Neither does repeatedly calling it a “hoax” nor scientists, “alarmists.” Both approaches lead to stasis. One way out of the impasse is to start by changing the language. And that includes the larger messaging as well as some of the messengers around climate change. This is a modest proposal on our part, but one that we believe can begin to yield dividends. If climate change is indeed a significant issue of our time, then we need to talk about it in ways that can reach ordinary people. In fact, some scientists have already begun to do so. In an article in Politico Magazine entitled “The new language of climate change,”34 scientists and meteorologists discuss a new strategy, to talk about climate change by taking the politics out of it, especially in more conservative parts of the United States where climate skepticism is prevalent. The strategy involves avoiding the phrase “climate change” altogether because it is “so loaded with partisan connotations.” Their messaging approach is to “stop talking about who or what is most responsible. And focus instead on what is happening and how unusual it is—​and what it is costing communities,” an approach they believe is likely to be more relatable for people: “The new language taking root is meant to instill this sense of urgency about what is happening in ways in which everyday citizens can relate—​ without directly blaming it on human activity:  The spring blossoms keep coming earlier, seasonal allergies are worsening and lasting longer; extreme heat is upending the kids summer camp schedules; crops are drying up or washing away at alarming rates.” The feeling is that people in rural, farming communities are seeing these issues firsthand, so there’s already an acknowledgment that the climate is changing, but “they just don’t think humans [as a group] are that impactful.” However, as one meteorologist contends, if we relate it to people’s families, homes, or communities, the language might also be more relatable:  “It’s a job story; it’s an agriculture story; connect it to the farm bill: boom!” It’s a start to build relations and trust, necessary ingredients for dialogue and eventual action. People generally do not listen to people they don’t trust. Also, speaking to people about climate change where they are, in their communities, as opposed to only via mainstream media pronouncements also builds trust in an environment where trust has been eroded. It’s part of what we call retail policy work.

 

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Choose the Right Messengers or Storytellers Climate messaging has to cross many communities if we are to make any headway with it nationally and internationally, and here is where the messenger is as important as the message. The loudest or most extremist voices on any subject are usually not the most effective messengers, except to those already predisposed to the message. That only works for the echo chamber effect, which is unhelpful for public discourse. In the political world (think the upcoming general election in 2020 and future environmental policies) and in ordinary people’s lives, then, climate change messengers and their message must be able speak credibly to a broad swath of people. We can envision regular townhall meetings on climate change in local communities (urban and rural) with panels of both local and visiting speakers from a range of backgrounds (age, class, gender, ethnicity) and range of political ideological positions discussing the issue. This is more likely to build trust, as ordinary people feel an investment in their own communities and visitors can discuss shared concerns. The goal should be to create more inclusive discursive spaces.

Change the Communication Strategies in Mainstream and Social Media The greatest headwind in changing the language of climate change is the media culture in which we find ourselves. Traditional print and broadcast journalism find themselves behind the eight ball in the post-​truth era. The need to fill the twenty-​four-​hour news cycle leads to giving airtime to issues of a wide range or import (from very trivial to seriously consequential), perpetuating the false-​ balance coverage phenomenon. The media tendency to focus on the latest number of tweets or falsehoods by President Trump (over 15,000 at last count according to the Washington Post) rather than the phenomenon of tweeting as a communication strategy misses the mark. The ethical responsibility of the media to report fairly on important issues of the day—​climate change, politics, the economy, culture wars, etc.—​must be balanced with thoughtful coverage of what led to the post-​truth era and developing counter communication strategies to combat ideological storytelling to connect with voters, which is what Trump’s tweets are really about. Connections in the Trumpian sense are not always (nor need not be) based on facts. They are emotional connections to people’s identities and concerns. Thus, fact-​checking alone will not be enough to combat this. Journalism of the twenty-​first century has to develop new paradigms and strategies for truth telling that are fair and transparent and speak to the hearts and minds of all citizens.

 



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Change is much harder in the unfiltered space of social media, talk radio, and online media outlets where, as we saw in the texts we analyzed, invariant language, personal invectives, and conspiracy narratives abound in the name of freedom of expression. In the fast-​moving twenty-​four-​hour news cycle, extremists find fertile ground on and offline for language that further divides. Also, social media play into the hyperpartisan divide where participants of like minds, really like ideologies, self-​select and contribute to the conversation. The strategies they employ for discussing climate change are the same for any controversial topic. So, in fact, the truth value of the content is not at issue. It’s the strategies to perform ideology that matter, as we’ve discussed in this book. But we have seen, in our data, the occasional dissenting voice or legitimate exchange among ordinary citizens that begins to create a more productive narrative on climate change. Perhaps we need to start with the strategies of those citizens to break the impasse. In the spirit of freedom of expression at its best, we hope to see more of those.

Conduct More Ethnographic Work on Climate Ethnographic work can supplement experimental studies on climate by offering ground-​up, culturally sensitive descriptions and analyses of climate change in various communities as well as residents’ attitudes and responses to it. Building on Phillips and Dickie’s research on how rural residents story the environment, we call for longer term ethnographic work on climate that can track changes in the environment and accompanying attitudes and actions in various communities locally and internationally to help build a broader narrative of shared interest and responsibility. Ethnography has the added benefit of researchers spending extended time in local communities building trust and shared funds of knowledge and expertise, while bringing citizens into the dialogue. This can lessen the framing of scientists or researchers as elitist and out of touch with ordinary people or dismissing them as fake experts. We hope such work can foster a democratizing of knowledge.

Teach Climate Change Cook’s suggestion of misconception based learning is already happening in many K–​12 schools, and should be required in all science teaching, especially on topics where misconceptions are rampant, such as climate science, evolution, or vaccines. Misconception based learning has shown great promise in debunking myths and stopping the spread of misinformation while enhancing understanding and developing critical thinking. We were encouraged to see

 

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that the Winter 2019 issue of the American Educator listed “Teaching climate change” on its cover page and that misconception based learning was foregrounded as a necessary approach to the subject.35 That the teaching of climate change was given such prominence in an education journal shows the importance of the topic and the critical role that educators can play in advancing knowledge on climate science. In a sense, good teachers are good storytellers. To the extent that science teachers are able to present to the next generation of learners across the country a climate story that engages rather than forecloses dialogue, that might be our best chance to move beyond ideological narratives. Teaching should be coupled with longitudinal research on the long terms of effects of misconception based learning on climate science and carbon mitigation action. Ultimately, addressing climate change will require collective political will, mobilization, and action.

Implications for Science and Beyond In a real sense, this book is not just, or even fundamentally, about climate change. Chapter 5 discussed how climate touches on issues that are part of an even deeper core of values and beliefs. If there is a war being fought, it is not just a war around the climate narrative. But, in another sense, the analysis of climate narratives has implications that go beyond climate. Scholars in the field of science and technology studies would agree—​the real issue is how we understand science and its processes, its role in society, and the relationship of the scientist to the public. This is the stage where society finds itself today, where the “old comfortable assumptions about science, its production and its use, are losing their force.”36 What the climate skeptic (and the reader is free to insert the word denialist) is really challenging is the privileged voice of the scientist in matters of modeling the natural world. In previous chapters (especially ­chapter 3), we see that part of the evolution of climate skeptical discourse is the evolving of a narrative challenging the status of the scientist. While the Climategate saga contributed much ammunition to this attack on science, it was simply one of many parts and pieces of the process of constructing an alternative narrative. As Oreskes and Conway point out, some of the pieces were laid down even earlier, when debating issues such as tobacco smoke and ozone.37 Moving forward, what strategies would the analyses found in this book suggest? Should it be to reaffirm and even restore the privileged voice of the climate scientist? Should it be to acknowledge the doubt (of some members of the public) and change the way scientists deal with doubt? Funtowicz and Ravetz

 



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discussed a notion of science in the public realm where there is an ongoing public dialog, even debate, around scientific findings that are never completely settled and never just a matter of empirical data-​gathering.38 But the key to their idea, we think, is the word dialogue. What is happening now, as we hope to have shown in our analysis, is the ideological war of words, in which there is never an exchange (unless you can call the lobbying of grenades between troops in opposing trenches an exchange). As we have suggested, the increasingly ideological nature of the debate around climate science involves a closing off of one side to the other, precluding actual exchange. The climate advocate might object, saying, do you sincerely believe that lobbyists for the coal industry are interested in real dialogue? Again, this book does not focus on the political entrepreneur or the industry lobbyist—​the primary concern is for the disenchanted public who feel shut off from the wheels of policy (and science). Perhaps there is, in these times, an even greater need to democratize knowledge.39 Nor do we suggest that, on the side of climate science, the scientist is not uniquely qualified to speak on the strength of the data and the findings. A great danger exists in entertaining the idea that scientists have no more purchase on empirical evidence than lobbyists in Washington, Canberra, or New Delhi. At the same time, it is not right to simply wave away people’s doubt. We can acknowledge the privileged voice of the climate scientist on matters of evidence while, at the same time, pointing out how dismissive talk on the part of climate scientists and advocates can close off discussion and relegate the public debate to ideological missives. Expertise is not hegemony. We have argued that science is a narrative, even an ideological one. That is not to say that it contends with other ideologies on an equal basis, but it invariably has to interact with other systems of thought. What happens, moving forward, with the climate question will have implications that go beyond climatology. It will say a lot about how our global communities manage the intricate exchange between contending narratives—​whether society is able to integrate them and make sense of them together, maybe even formulating sensible metanarratives that reconcile them, or forever keep them divided like warring tribes. But if the tide of events thus far this century is any indication, gulfs continue to widen not narrow. Should a democracy tolerate the present impasse, trusting in the process to guide society toward action later on? On the other hand, as the columnist Thomas Friedman suggested, we may be the first generation for whom “later will be too late.”40 And what has become of the public sphere and civil discourse? This is, after all, an age of moral involution, digital self-​absorption, and snarky tweets. Perhaps, at least for a time, we may see increasing division. Or perhaps this is an unalterable

 

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feature of the era in which we live. However one chooses to judge this age, it just seems fitting to end the book with the haunting words of William Butler Yeats: Turning and turning in the widening gyre The falcon cannot hear the falconer; Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold; Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world41

 

Appendix

L I S T O F   A RT I C L E S A N A LY Z E D FOR CHAPTER 3

Environment & Climate (E & C) (n=50) 2001 June

“IPCC report criticized by one of its main authors” by Paul Georgia (p.4) August “Global warming science uncertain” by James Taylor (p.1) September “Bonn delegation passes Kyoto lite” by James Taylor (p.1) October “Why the arsenic standard should not be changed” by Gerhard Stöhrer (p.3) December “High latitude studies refute global warming” by James Taylor (p.1)

2003 “Global warming is Not responsible for this drought” by Patrick Michaels (p.8) March “Private companies take action against global warming” by James Taylor (p.7) July “Computer models and the need for more research” by Jay Lehr & Richard Bennett (p.12) September “Alarmists’ claims defy global warming science” by Fred Singer (p.4) October “Senator refutes global warming hypothesis” (Editorial on Senator Inhofe, p.1) January

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2005 January

“Environmentalists call for drastic reductions in greenhouse emissions” by Steve Milloy (p.3) February “New Jersey seeking to cap CO2 emissions” by James Hoare (p.5) August “Climatologists reject media claims of global warming consensus” by Alan Caruba (p.6) October “Recent hurricanes not caused by warming, scientists conclude” by Sterling Burnett (p.1) November “Federal judge rejects global warming suit against utilities” by James Hoare (p.9)

2006 February

“NOAA:  Hurricane upsurge is normal, not linked to global warming” by Kerry Jackson (p.10). April “Health risks of ozone are exaggerated” by Joel Schwartz (p.10) August “Global warming” by Richard Lindzen (p.14) November “Number of Atlantic hurricanes below normal” by James Taylor (p.9) December “Inhofe speech ignites a media firestorm” (Editorial on Senator Inhofe, p.14)

2007 March

“Climate alarmist quits British government” by Sterling Burnett (p.3) April “IPCC reduces global warming projections” (p.1) July “ ‘Unbiased’ advisory group exposed” by James Taylor (p.16) October “Floridian’s rebel against governor’s plans to fight global warming” by James Taylor (p.1) December “Economists warn congress against energy legislation” by Natasha Altamirano & Peter Sepp

2008 February April

“Bali conference highlight global warming divisions” by Vincent Gray (p.13) “Cap and trade would stifle economy, delay transition to cleaner fuels” by William O’Keefe & Jeff Kueter (p.12)

 



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May July

“From climate alarmism to climate realism” by Vaclav Klaus (p.8) “Maryland House and Senate reject global warming measure” by Ivory Hecker (p.1) September “IPCC author selection process plagued by bias, cronyism: Study” by James Taylor (p.10)

2009 March August October

“John Holden as science advisor? He’s anti-​science critics say” by James Taylor (p.1) “Scientists, economists challenge alarmism at climate conference” by Dan Miller (p.4) “EPA scientist Carlin explains his dissent on endangerment finding” by Krystle Russin (p.13)

2010 September “Global warming sham shirts” (advertisement, p.4) October “Environmental extremism takes ugly turn” by James Taylor (p.1) November “Green jobs dwindle as Obama policies backfire” by Bonner Cohen (p.4)

2012 January

“Global warming not a national security threat” by Brady Nelson (p.15) February “Climategate2 reveals further scientific misconduct, doubts” by James Taylor (p.1) April “Gleick, other alarmists poison climate discussion” by Cheryl Chumley (p.1) September “Minority believe in global warming crisis” by Cheryl Chumley (p.2)

2016 February April

“Supreme court blocks Obama administration clean power plan” by Sterling Burnett (p.1) “Questions arise whether the GOP candidates remain climate skeptics” by Kenneth Artz (p.3)

 

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May November

“Wikipedia and the climate non-​ debate” by Ron Arnold (p.18) “Goldstein suit targets climate alarmism enterprise” by Sterling Burnett (p.6)

2017 January June October

“Trump vows changes in nation’s energy, climate policies” by Sterling Burnett (p.1) “ICCC panel critiques Obama’s ‘social cost of carbon’ by Timothy Benson (p.5) “Trump administration proposes repealing Obama-​era fracking law” by Kenneth Artz (p.6)

2018 February April May

“We must not give up” by Vaclav Klaus (p.10) “Nations failing to keep Paris climate commitments” by Kenneth Artz (p.17) “Trump admin. eases coal-​ash disposal regs” by Bonner Cohen (p.3)

Media outlet online articles (n=15) + selected accompanying comments Washington Times 2010, March 3 “Global warming winners” (Editorial) 2014, November 14 “The democrats’ climate change agenda is a loser” by Tom Borelli 2015, October 28 “Energy department smashes pumpkins for causing climate change” by Jennifer Pompi 2017, March 9 “Pruitt starts staring people away from climate change, more toward clean water and air” by Ben Wolfgang 2018, January 4 “Meteorologist blasts those linking brutal blizzard to climate change” by Valerie Richardson

 



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Breitbart 2013, February 25 2014, September 22 2015, August 8 2018, January 31 2018, March 26

“Liberals claim global warming causing violent unrest in Middle East” by Kerry Picket “Litterbug climate marchers leave behind piles of trash” by John Nolte “Climate change: The hoax that costs us $4 billion a day” by James Delingpole “It’s over, now even Democrats give up on climate change” by James Delingpole “Nothing unusual happening in climate change, over 40 new scientific papers confirm” by James Delingpole

The Daily Caller 2012, June 20

“Professor fired after expressing climate change skepticism” 2014, May 16 “Skeptical scientists debunk White House global warming report” by Michael Bastasch 2015, April 20 “Limbaugh: Climate change:  One of the biggest scams ever perpetrated on the people of the world” by Al Weaver 2016, December 7 “Solar power actually made global warming worse, says new study” by Andrew Follett 2018, November 20 “Blaming California wildfires on global warming ‘has little grounding in fact,’ scientist says” by Michael Bastasch

 

 

NOTES

Preface 1. https://​www.pewresearch.org/​science/​2016/​10/​04/​the-​politics-​of-​climate/​ps_​2016-​10-​ 04_​politics-​of-​climate_​1-​15/​. 2. https://​w ww.pewresearch.org/​science/​2019/​11/​25/​u-​s -​public-​v iews-​on-​climate-​and-​ energy/​. 3. https://​ w ww.theguardian.com/ ​ u s- ​ n ews/ ​ 2 020/​ f eb/​ 2 8/​ t rump-​ c alls-​ c oronavirus-​ outbreak-​a-​hoax-​and-​links-​it-​to-​immigration-​at-​rally.

Chapter 1 1. “The origin of stories.” A Seneca Myth. http://​www.native-​languages.org/​senecastory6.htm. Accessed November 30, 2019. 2. Ingram, Mrill, Helen Ingram, and Raul Lejano. “What’s the story? Creating and sustaining environmental networks.” Environmental Politics 23, no. 6 (2014): 984–​1002; Ingram, Mrill, Helen Ingram, and Raul Lejano. “Environmental action in the anthropocene: The power of narrative-​networks.” Journal of Environmental Policy & Planning 21, no. 5 (2019): 492–​503. 3. Smith, Daniel, Philip Schlaepfer, Katie Major, Mark Dyble, Abigail E. Page, James Thompson, Nikhil Chaudhary et  al. “Cooperation and the evolution of hunter-​gatherer storytelling.” Nature Communications 8, no. 1 (2017): 1853. 4. “The origin of stories.” 5. Weick, K. E. Sensemaking in organizations. Vol 3. Sage Publications, 1995; Brown J. S., L. Prusak, S. Denning, K. Groh. Storytelling in organizations: Why storytelling is transforming 21st century organizations and management. Routledge, 2005; Boje, David M. Storytelling organizational practices: Managing in the quantum age. Routledge, 2014. 6. Ricoeur, Paul. Oneself as another. Trans. Kathleen Blamey. U of Chicago P, 1992. 7. Heritage Foundation. 8. Leiserowitz, Anthony, Edward Maibach, C. Roser-​Renouf, and N. Smith. Climate change in the American mind 2010. Yale University and George Mason University, 2018. 9. Leiserowitz et al. Climate change in the American mind 2010. 10. Barack Obama, speech at Georgetown University, June 26, 2013. https://​www. washingtonpost.com/​ v ideo/​ national/​ obama-​ calls- ​c limate- ​c hange- ​deniers- ​f lat- ​earth-​ society/​2013/​06/​25/​ba59942e-​ddc6-​11e2-​b797-​cbd4cb13f9c6_​video.html. 11. Obama, speech at Georgetown University; Fahy, Declan. “Objectivity, false balance, and advocacy in news coverage of climate change.” In Oxford research encyclopedia of climate science. 2017. 12. While the conversation will often focus on the US case, the book aspires not to be simply US-​centric. Later in the book, we will examine climate skepticism in other countries as well. 155

 

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If we focus most closely on the United States at certain points in the book, this is because it is, in case study terminology, an exemplar—​that case where climate skeptical narratives are seen most clearly. 13. We should caution the reader, however, not to overestimate the numbers of climate skeptics. This group has always been a definite minority in each country that has been surveyed. And there is some evidence that the percentage of people espousing climate skepticism may be shrinking. For example, the Climate Opinion Maps prepared by Yale University show a decrease of adults in the United States who don’t believe in global warming from 18 percent in 2014 to 16 percent in 2019 (see, https://​climatecommunication.yale.edu/​visualizations-​ data/​ycom/​). If extrapolated to the entire population, 16 percent does represent millions, but not hundreds of millions, of people. 14. Fisher, Walter R. “Technical logic, rhetorical logic, and narrative rationality.” Argumentation 1, no. 1 (1987):  3–​21; Bruner, Jerome. The autobiographical process. The culture of autobiography:  Constructions of self-​representation. Robert Folkenflik, 1993; Polletta, Francesca. “Contending stories:  Narrative in social movements.” Qualitative Sociology 21, no. 4 (1998): 419–​446. 15. Benford, Robert D. “Controlling narratives and narratives as control within social movements.” Stories of Change: Narrative and Social movements (2002): 53–​75; Lejano, Raul, Mrill Ingram, and Helen Ingram. The power of narrative in environmental networks. MIT Press, 2013. 16. Dryzek, J., Norgaard, R., Schlosberg, D., E. Dunlap, R., & McCright, A. “Organized climate change denial.” In Oxford handbook of climate change and society: OUP, 2011. https://​ www.oxfordhandbooks.com/ ​ v iew/ ​ 1 0.1093/ ​ o xfordhb/ ​ 9 780199566600.001.0001/​ oxfordhb-​9780199566600-​e-​10; Frumhoff, P., and Naomi Oreskes. “Fossil fuel firms are still bankrolling climate denial lobby groups.” The Guardian (2015); “Big Oil’s Real Agenda on Climate Change.” influencemap.org, March 2019. https://​influencemap.org/​report/​ How-​ Big- ​ O il- ​ Continues- ​ to- ​ O ppose- ​ t he-​ Paris-​ A greement- ​ 3 8212275958aa21196dae 3b76220bddc. 17. Video available at https://​www.youtube.com/​watch?reload=9&v=oYhCQv5tNsQ. 18. Fisher. “Technical logic, rhetorical logic, and narrative rationality”; Bruner, Jerome S. Actual minds, possible worlds. Harvard UP, 2009; Nussbaum, Martha C. Love’s knowledge: Essays on philosophy and literature. OUP, 1990. 19. For more on narratology, see Bal and Van Boheemen (2009). Bal, M., and C. Van Boheemen. Narratology: Introduction to the theory of narrative. University of Toronto Press, 2009. 20. Ricoeur. Oneself as another. 21. Several scholars argue, however, that the anti-​climate science movement is extreme enough that it is misleading to use the term, skepticism, to refer to it (see e.g., Lewandowsky et al., 2016; Odenbaugh, 2017. Lewandowsky, S., M. E. Mann, N. J. Brown, and H. Friedman. “Science and the public: Debate, denial, and skepticism.” Journal of Social and Political Psychology, 4, no. 2 (2016): 537–​ 553; Odenbaugh, J. On the contrary: How to think about climate skepticism. Walter Powell-​ Linfield College Philosophy Lecture Series [Video file], 2017. 22. Mann, Michael E., and Tom Toles. The madhouse effect: How climate change denial is threatening our planet, destroying our politics, and driving us crazy. Columbia UP, 2016. 23. Geiger, Nathaniel, and Janet K. Swim. “Climate of silence: Pluralistic ignorance as a barrier to climate change discussion.” Journal of Environmental Psychology 47 (2016): 79–​90. 24. As some scholars point out, the continuum includes many positions beyond the “belief ” versus “denial” dichotomy (see, e.g., Corry and Jørgensen 2015). Corry, O., and D. Jørgensen. “Beyond ‘deniers’ and ‘believers’: Towards a map of the politics of climate change.” Global Environmental Change 32 (2015): 165–​174. 25. Odenbaugh, Jay. “On the contrary:  How to think about climate skepticism.” (2017): 1436834265882. 26. Leiserowitz et al. Climate change in the American mind 2010. 27. That’s not to say that all of these are not committed to action. When environmental activists organized the People’s Climate March in New York City in 2014, more than a hundred thousand people took to the streets.

 



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28. Lomborg, B. “How the war on climate change slams the world’s poor.” New  York Post, August 26, 2018. https://​nypost.com/​2018/​08/​26/​how-​the-​war-​on-​climate-​change-​ slams-​the-​worlds-​poor/​ accessed April 20,  2019. 29. https://​www.youtube.com/​watch?reload=9&v=z-​2RpydEEnc. Accessed April 20, 2019. 30. Oreskes, Naomi, and Erik M. Conway. Merchants of doubt: How a handful of scientists obscured the truth on issues from tobacco smoke to global warming. Bloomsbury Publishing, 2011. 31. Brulle, Robert J. “Institutionalizing delay:  Foundation funding and the creation of US climate change counter-​movement organizations.” Climatic Change 122, no. 4 (2014):  681–​ 694; Farrell, Justin. “Corporate funding and ideological polarization about climate change.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 113, no. 1 (2016): 92–​97. 32. Goldenberg, Suzanne. “Leak exposes how Heartland Institute works to undermine climate science.” Guardian (2012); Painter, James. “Communicating Uncertainties: Climate skeptics in the international media.” PIÑUEL, José Luis et  al.:  Communication, Controversies and Uncertainty Facing the Scientific Consensus on Climate Change. Cuadernos Artesanos de Latina 30 (2012): 187–​218. 33. Dryzek et al. “Organized climate change denial.” 34. Jamieson, Kathleen Hall, and Joseph N. Cappella. Echo chamber: Rush Limbaugh and the conservative media establishment. OUP, 2008. 35. Wright, Matthew, Morris E. Levy, and Jack Citrin. “Conflict and consensus on American public opinion on illegal immigration.” American University School of Public Affairs Research Paper 2014-​0006 (2014). 36. McCright, Aaron M., Riley E. Dunlap, and Chenyang Xiao. “Increasing influence of party identification on perceived scientific agreement and support for government action on climate change in the United States, 2006–​12.” Weather, Climate, and Society 6, no. 2 (2014): 194–​201. 37. Carmichael, Jason T., Robert J. Brulle, and Joanna K. Huxster. “The great divide: Understanding the role of media and other drivers of the partisan divide in public concern over climate change in the USA, 2001–​2014.” Climatic Change 141, no. 4 (2017): 599–​612. 38. Jacques, Peter J., and Claire Connolly Knox. “Hurricanes and hegemony: A qualitative analysis of micro-​level climate change denial discourses.” Environmental Politics 25, no. 5 (2016): 831–​ 852; Hulme, Mike. Why we disagree about climate change: Understanding controversy, inaction and opportunity. Cambridge UP, 2009. 39. Goffman, Erving. Frame analysis: An essay on the organization of experience. Harper & Row, 1974. http://​books.google.com/​books?id=7oRqAAAAMAAJ. 40. Lejano, Raul, Ernest Chui, Timothy Lam, and Jovial Wong. “Collective action as narrativity and praxis: Theory and application to Hong Kong’s urban protest movements.” Public Policy and Administration 33, no. 3 (2018): 260–​289. 41. Polletta, Francesca, and Pang Ching Bobby Chen. “Narrative and social movements.” In The Oxford handbook of cultural sociology. 2012. 42. Stoll-​Kleemann, Susanne, Tim O’Riordan, and Carlo C. Jaeger. “The psychology of denial concerning climate mitigation measures:  Evidence from Swiss focus groups.” Global Environmental Change 11, no. 2 (2001):  107–​117; Kollmuss, Anja, and Julian Agyeman. “Mind the gap:  Why do people act environmentally and what are the barriers to pro-​ environmental behavior?” Environmental Education Research 8, no. 3 (2002): 239–​260. 43. Lorenzoni, Irene, and Nick F. Pidgeon. “Public views on climate change: European and USA perspectives.” Climatic Change 77, no. 1–​2 (2006):  73–​95; McDonald, Rachel I., Hui Yi Chai, and Ben R. Newell. “Personal experience and the ‘psychological distance’ of climate change: An integrative review.” Journal of Environmental Psychology 44 (2015): 109–​118. 44. Sparks, Paul, Donna C. Jessop, James Chapman, and Katherine Holmes. “Pro‐environmental actions, climate change, and defensiveness: Do self‐affirmations make a difference to people’s motives and beliefs about making a difference?” British Journal of Social Psychology 49, no. 3 (2010): 553–​568. 45. Lejano, Raul P., Helen M. Ingram, and M. Ingram. “Introduction: The stories environmental networks tell us.” The Power of Narratives in Environmental Networks (2015): 1–​26. 46. Dunlap, Riley E., Aaron M. McCright, and Jerrod H. Yarosh. “The political divide on climate change:  Partisan polarization widens in the US.” Environment:  Science and Policy for Sustainable Development 58, no. 5 (2016):  4–​23; Leiserowitz, Anthony, Edward Maibach,

 

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Connie Roser-​Renouf, Seth Rosenthal, and Matthew Cutler. Climate change in the American mind: May 2017. Yale University and George Mason University, 2017. 47. Lejano, Ingram, and Ingram. The power of narrative in environmental networks; Lejano, Raul P., and Jennifer Dodge. “The narrative properties of ideology: The adversarial turn and climate skepticism in the USA.” Policy Sciences 50, no. 2 (2017): 195–​215. 48. Fairclough, Norman. Critical discourse analysis: The critical study of language. Routledge, 2010. 49. Ospina, Sonia M., and Jennifer Dodge. “Research methods: Narrative inquiry.” In Encyclopedia of public administration and public policy (pp. 1–​4). 5 vols. Routledge, 2015. 50. Kuhn, Thomas. The structure of scientific revolutions. Chicago UP, 1962. 51. Latour, Bruno, and Steve Woolgar. Laboratory life. Beverly Hills. Sage, 1979. 52. Bowker, G. C., F. Millerand, D. Ribes, and K. Baker. Making an issue out of a standard: Storytelling practices in a scientific community. 2012. 53. Poortinga, Wouter, Alexa Spence, Lorraine Whitmarsh, Stuart Capstick, and Nick F. Pidgeon. “Uncertain climate:  An investigation into public scepticism about anthropogenic climate change.” Global Environmental Change 21, no. 3 (2011): 1015–​1024. 54. “Climate change as a result of human activity.” Ipsos Global Trends, Ipsos. https://​www. ipsosglobaltrends.com/​climate-​change-​as-​a-​result-​of-​human-​activity/​. Accessed November 30, 2014. 55. Pelham, Brett W. “Awareness, opinions about global warming vary worldwide.” Gallup, April 22, 2009, https://​news.gallup.com/​poll/​117772/​awareness-​opinions-​global-​warming-​vary-​ worldwide.aspx. 56. Corner, Adam, and Jamie Clarke. “A fresh approach to public engagement.” In Talking climate (pp. 1–​13). Palgrave Macmillan, 2017.

Chapter 2 1. h tt p s : / / ​ w e b. a rc h i v e.o r g / ​ w e b / ​ 2 0 1 9 0 6 0 5 1 5 2 0 4 8 / ​ h tt p s : / / ​ w w w. i t v.c o m /​ goodmorningbritain/​news/​donald-​trump-​prince-​charles-​climate-​change. 2. http:// ​ tonyabbott.com.au/​ 2 017/​ 1 0/​ t ranscript-​ h on-​ tony-​ abbott-​ m p-​ address-​ g lobal-​ warming-​policy-​foundation-​westminster-​london/​. 3. Susskind, Lawrence E., Sarah McKearnen, and Jennifer Thomas-​Lamar. The consensus building handbook:  A comprehensive guide to reaching agreement. Sage Publications, 1999; Moser, Susanne C., and C. O. Boulder. “Communicating climate change—​motivating civic action:  Opportunity for democratic renewal?” Climate Change Politics in North America, Wilson Center Occasional Papers 2 (2006); Brulle, Robert J. “From environmental campaigns to advancing the public dialog:  Environmental communication for civic engagement.” Environmental Communication 4, no. 1 (2010):  82–​98; Held, David, and Angus Hervey. “Democracy, climate change and global governance: Democratic agency and the policy menu ahead.” The Governance of Climate Change (2011): 89–​110; Jasanoff, Sheila. “Cosmopolitan knowledge: Climate science and global civic epistemology.” In The Oxford handbook of climate change and society. 2011; Niemeyer, Simon. “Democracy and climate change: What can deliberative democracy contribute?” Australian Journal of Politics & History 59, no. 3 (2013): 429–​ 448; Blue, Gwendolyn. “Participatory and deliberative approaches to climate change.” In Oxford research encyclopedia of climate science. 2017. 4. Lindblom, Charles Edward. The intelligence of democracy: Decision making through mutual adjustment. Free Press, 1965. 5. Jamieson, Kathleen Hall, and Joseph N. Cappella. Echo chamber: Rush Limbaugh and the conservative media establishment. OUP, 2008. 6. McCright, Aaron M., and Riley E. Dunlap. “Anti-​reflexivity.” Theory, Culture & Society 27, no. 2–​3 (2010): 100–​133. 7. Norgaard, Kari. “Climate denial: Emotion, psychology, culture, and political economy.” Oxford handbook on climate change and society, pp. 399–​413. 2011; Sarbu, Mihai. “Narratives of denial: Examining how climate change deniers convince their audiences.” (2013); Jacques, Peter J., and Claire Connolly Knox. “Hurricanes and hegemony: A qualitative analysis of micro-​ level climate change denial discourses.” Environmental Politics 25, no. 5 (2016):  831–​852;

 



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33. http://​ n ews.heartland.org/​ e ditorial/​ 2 014/​ 0 2/​ 1 5/​ t here-​ n o-​ g lobal-​ w arming-​ a nd​will-​be-​none-​decades. 34. Seth Borenstein, an Associated Press reporter, quoting Dr. Thomas Karl: http://​theadvocate. com/​news/​ 8162122-​123/​noaa-​world-​in-​2013-​was. 35. Popper, Karl R. The logic of scientific inquiry. Hutchinson, 1959. 36. Lejano, Raul P. “Climate change and the relational city.” Cities 85 (2019): 25–​29. 37. Patterson, Meagan M., and Rebecca S. Bigler. “Preschool children’s attention to environmental messages about groups: Social categorization and the origins of intergroup bias.” Child Development 77, no. 4 (2006): 847–​860. 38. Ricoeur. Hermeneutics and the human sciences:  Essays on language, action and interpretation (p. 179). 39. Lewandowsky, Stephan, John Cook, and Elisabeth Lloyd. “The ‘Alice in Wonderland’ mechanics of the rejection of (climate) science: Simulating coherence by conspiracism.” Synthese 195, no. 1 (2018): 175–​196. 40. Propp, Vladimir. Morphology of the Folktale. 2nd edn. Trans. Laurence Scott. Rev. and ed. Louis A Wagner. The American Folklore Society, Inc, and the Indiana University Research Centre for the Language Sciences, University of Texas Press, 1968. 41. Bruner, Jerome. “The narrative construction of reality.” Narrative Intelligence 1 (2003): 41–​62. 42. Lyotard, Jean-​François. The postmodern condition: A report on knowledge. Vol. 10. University of Minnesota Press, 1984; See, also:  Czarniawska-​Joerges, Barbara. “Narration or science? Collapsing the division in organization studies.” Organization 2, no. 1 (1995): 11–​33. 43. Lejano, Raul, Jia Guo, Hongping Lian, and Bo Yin. A phenomenology of institutions: Relationality and governance in China and beyond. Routledge, 2018. 44. Laird-​Benner, Wendy, and Helen Ingram. “Sonoran Desert network weavers: Surprising environmental successes on the US/​Mexico Border.” Environment 53, no. 1 (2010): 6–​17; Lejano et al. A Phenomenology of institutions. 45. Lejano, Raul P., Joana Tavares-​Reager, and Fikret Berkes. “Climate and narrative: Environmental knowledge in everyday life.” Environmental Science & Policy 31 (2013): 61–​70. 46. Labov, William. “The transformation of experience in narrative syntax.” In Language in the inner city (pp. 354–​396). 1972. 47. Green, Melanie C., and Timothy C. Brock. “The role of transportation in the persuasiveness of public narratives.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 79, no. 5 (2000): 701. 48. Chinn S, Hart PS, Soroka S. Politicization and polarization in climate change news content, 1985–​2017. Science Communication (2020 Jan 29): 1075547019900290.

Chapter 3 1. Oreskes, Naomi, and Erik M. Conway. Merchants of doubt: How a handful of scientists obscured the truth on issues from tobacco smoke to global warming. Bloomsbury Publishing, 2011. 2. Leiserowitz, Anthony A., Edward Maibach, Connie Roser-​Renouf, Geoff Feinberg, and Seth Rosenthal. Climate change in the American mind. University of Washington Press, 2018. 3. Rowell A. Green backlash: Global subversion of the environmental movement. Routledge, 1996; Switzer, Jacqueline Vaughn. Green backlash: The history and politics of the environmental opposition in the US. Lynne Rienner, 1997. 4. Ehrlich, Paul R., and Anne H. Ehrlich. Betrayal of science and reason: How anti-​environmental rhetoric threatens our future. Island Press, 1996. 5. Ehrlich and Ehrlich. Betrayal of science and reason. 6. Rowell, Andrew. Green backlash: Global subversion of the environment movement. Routledge, 2017. 7. Brulle, Robert J. “Institutionalizing delay:  Foundation funding and the creation of US climate change counter-​movement organizations.” Climatic Change 122, no. 4 (2014): 681–​694. Oreskes, Naomi, and Erik M. 8. Brown, Mark B. “Climate science, populism, and the democracy of rejection.” In D. Crow and M. Boykoff (eds.), Culture, politics and climate change: How information shapes our common future (pp. 129–​145). Earthscan, 2014.

 



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9. McCright, Aaron M., Sandra T. Marquart-​Pyatt, Rachael L. Shwom, Steven R. Brechin, and Summer Allen. “Ideology, capitalism, and climate:  Explaining public views about climate change in the United States.” Energy Research and Social Science 21 (2016): 180–​189. 10. Dunlap, Riley E., Aaron M. McCright, and Jerrod H. Yarosh. “The political divide on climate change:  Partisan polarization widens in the US.” Environment:  Science and Policy for Sustainable Development 58, no. 5 (2016): 4–​23. 11. Kahan, Dan M., Ellen Peters, Maggie Wittlin, Paul Slovic, Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Donald Braman, and Gregory Mandel. “The polarizing impact of science literacy and numeracy on perceived climate change risks.” Nature Climate Change 2, no. 10 (2012): 732. 12. Kahan et al. “The polarizing impact of science literacy and numeracy on perceived climate change risks.” 13. Capstick, Stuart, Lorraine Whitmarsh, Wouter Poortinga, Nick Pidgeon, and Paul Upham. “International trends in public perceptions of climate change over the past quarter century.” Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change 6, no. 1 (2015): 35–​61. 14. For a complete list of the titles of all articles selected, see appendix at the end of the book. 15. Mann, Michael E. The hockey stick and the climate wars: Dispatches from the front lines. Columbia UP, 2013. 16. Fairclough, Norman. Critical discourse analysis: The critical study of language. Routledge, 2010. 17. Fairclough. Critical discourse analysis (p. 6). 18. Fairclough. Critical discourse analysis (p. 30). 19. Mann. The hockey stick and the climate wars. 20. Mann. The hockey stick and the climate wars (p. 78). 21. Russell, Bertrand. History of western philosophy. Collectors’ ed. Routledge, 2013. 22. Mann. The hockey stick and the climate wars (p. 80).

Chapter 4 1. Goodrich, L. Carrington. “Printing: Preliminary report on a new discovery.” Technology and Culture 8, no. 3 (1967): 376–​378; Eisenstein, Elizabeth L. The printing press as an agent of change. Cambridge UP, 1980. 2. Rodgers, E. Diffusion of innovations. 1st ed. Free Press, 1962. 3. DiMaggio, Paul J., and Walter W. Powell. “The iron cage revisited: Institutional isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields.” American Sociological Review (1983): 147–​160. 4. Hannan, Michael T., and John Freeman. “The population ecology of organizations.” American Journal of Sociology 82, no. 5 (1977): 929–​964. 5. Lejano, R. Frameworks for policy analysis: Merging text and context. Routledge, 2006. 6. Garrard, Greg, Axel Goodbody, George B. Handley, and Stephanie Posthumus. Climate change scepticism: A transnational ecocritical analysis. Bloomsbury Publishing, 2019. 7. Benford, Robert D., and David A. Snow. “Framing processes and social movements: An overview and assessment.” Annual Review of Sociology 26, no. 1 (2000): 611–​639. 8. Poortinga, Wouter, Alexa Spence, Lorraine Whitmarsh, Stuart Capstick, and Nick F. Pidgeon. “Uncertain climate:  An investigation into public scepticism about anthropogenic climate change.” Global Environmental Change 21, no. 3 (2011): 1015–​1024. 9. Ipsos. Global Trends Survey. 2014. https://​www.ipsosglobaltrends.com/​climate-​change-​as-​ a-​result-​of-​human-​activity/​. Accessed on November 17, 2017. 10. Pelham BW. Awareness, opinions about global warming vary worldwide. Gallup World. April 22, 2009. 11. Dembicki, Geoff. “The convenient disappearance of climate change denial in China.” Foreign Policy, 2017. https://​foreignpolicy.com/​2017/​05/​31/​the-​convenient-​disappearance-​of-​ climate-​change-​denial-​in-​china/​. 12. Painter, James, and Teresa Ashe. “Cross-​national comparison of the presence of climate scepticism in the print media in six countries, 2007–​10.” Environmental Research Letters 7, no. 4 (2012): 044005. 13. Vu, H. T., Y. Liu, and D. V. Tran. “Nationalizing a global phenomenon: A study of how the press in 45 countries and territories portrays climate change.” Global Environmental Change 58 (2019):101942.

 

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14. Boykoff, M. T., and S. R. Rajan. “Signals and noise.” EMBO Reports 8, no. 3 (2007): 207–​11. 15. Dunlap, R. E., and A. M. McCright. “Organized climate change denial.” In J. Dryzek, R. Norgaard, and D. Schlosbert (eds.), The Oxford handbook of climate change and society (pp. 144–​160). OUP, 2011. 16. Schmidt, Andreas, Ana Ivanova, and Mike S. Schäfer. “Media attention for climate change around the world:  A comparative analysis of newspaper coverage in 27 countries.” Global Environmental Change 23, no. 5 (2013): 1233–​1248. 17. Jacques, Peter J. Environmental skepticism:  Ecology, power and public life. Routledge, 2016; Painter, James, and Teresa Ashe. “Cross-​national comparison of the presence of climate scepticism in the print media in six countries, 2007–​10.” Environmental Research Letters 7, no. 4 (2012):  044005; Niederer, Sabine. “‘Global warming is not a crisis!’:  Studying climate change skepticism on the Web.” NECSUS. European Journal of Media Studies 2, no. 1 (2013): 83–​112. 18. Kristeva, Julia. The Kristeva reader. Columbia UP, 1986. 19. Johnston, I. Vast majority of UK accept climate change is real, finds new poll. 2017. http://​www. independent.co.uk/​environment/​uk-​climate-​change-​real-​accept-​majority-​global-​warming-​ poll-​finds-​a7909841.html. Accessed November 8, 2017. 20. Johnston, I. Vast majority of UK accept climate change is real. 2017. 21. Capstick, Stuart Bryce, and Nicholas Frank Pidgeon. “What is climate change scepticism? Examination of the concept using a mixed methods study of the UK public.” Global Environmental Change 24 (2014): 389–​401. 22. Lack, Martin. The denial of science:  Analysing climate change scepticism in the UK. AuthorHouse, 2013. 23. Garrard et al. Climate change scepticism. 24. Lawson, Nigel. “The trouble with climate change.” Global Warming Policy Foundation, 2014. 25. Garrard et al. Climate change skepticism (p. 60). 26. Garrard et al. Climate change skepticism (p. 89). 27. Brüggemann, Michael, and Sven Engesser. “Beyond false balance: How interpretive journalism shapes media coverage of climate change.” Global Environmental Change 42 (2017): 58–​67. 28. Metag, Julia, Tobias Füchslin, and Mike S. Schäfer. “Global warming’s five Germanys: A typology of Germans’ views on climate change and patterns of media use and information.” Public Understanding of Science 26, no. 4 (2017): 434–​451. 29. Tranter, Bruce, and Kate Booth. “Scepticism in a changing climate: A cross-​national study.” Global Environmental Change 33 (2015): 154–​164. 30. Steentjes, Katharine, Nicholas Frank Pidgeon, Wouter Poortinga, Adam J. Corner, Anika Arnold, Gisela Böhm, Claire Mays et  al. “European Perceptions of Climate Change (EPCC): Topline findings of a survey conducted in four European countries in 2016.” 2017. 31. Poortinga, W., L. Whitmarsh, L. Steg, G. Böhm, and S. Fisher. “Climate change perceptions and their individual-​level determinants:  A cross-​European analysis.” Global Environmental Change 55 (2019): 25–​35. 32. Garrard et al. Climate change scepticism. 33. Kaiser, Jonas, and Markus Rhomberg. “Questioning the doubt: Climate skepticism in German newspaper reporting on COP17.” Environmental Communication 10, no. 5 (2016): 556–​574. 34. Jasanoff, Sheila. “Cosmopolitan knowledge: Climate science and global civic epistemology.” In The Oxford handbook of climate change and society. 2011. 35. Goodbody, A.  “Chapter  3, Klimaskepsis in Germany.” In G.  Garrard, A.  Goodbody, G.  B. Handley, and S. Posthumus (eds.), Climate change scepticism: A transnational ecocritical analysis (pp. 91–​131). Bloomsbury Publishing, 2019. 36. Engels A, Hüther O, Schäfer M, Held H. Public climate-​change skepticism, energy preferences and political participation. Global Environmental Change. 23, no. 5 (2013): 1018–​27. 37. Garrard et al. Climate change scepticism. 38. Forchtner, Bernhard, Andreas Kroneder, and David Wetzel. “Being skeptical? Exploring far-​ Right climate-​change communication in Germany.” Environmental Communication12, no. 5 (2018): 589–​604. 39. Wissenschaft versus Ideologie. https://​www.afd.de/​energie-​klima-​technik-​infrastruktur/​. Accessed May 22, 2019.

 



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40. Wang, B., M. Lyv, J. Xing, Q. S. Zhou, M. Ding, and Y. Shen. Climate change in the Chinese mind: Survey report 2017. China Center for Climate Change Communication, 2017. 41. Yu, Hao, Bing Wang, Yue-​Jun Zhang, Shouyang Wang, and Yi-​Ming Wei. “Public perception of climate change in China: Results from the questionnaire survey.” Natural Hazards 69, no. 1 (2013): 459–​472. 42. Liu, J. C. “Low carbon plot:  Climate change skepticism with Chinese characteristics.” Environmental Sociology. 1, no. 4 (2015):  280–​292, citing China Public Climate Change Awareness and Climate Change Communication in China. Center on Climate Change Communication, 2013. 43. Dembicki. “The Convenient Disappearance of Climate Change Denial in China.” 44. In its 2011 Five-​Year Plan, China’s government adopted a goal of reducing carbon intensity (defined as carbon emissions per unit GDP) by 17 percent during the period 2011–​2015. In its 2020 Action Plan for Air Pollution, the government extolled the co-​benefits of reducing greenhouse gases and criteria pollutants simultaneously. 45. Wang et al. Climate change in the Chinese mind: 2017. 46. Gou, H. Low-​carbon plot: China and the U.S. and Europe Shengsizhizhan (Chinese Edition). Shanxi Economic Publishing House, 2010. 47. Liu. “Low carbon plot: Climate change skepticism with Chinese characteristics.” 48. Low carbon plot, or why Cancun has already failed. November 15, 2010. https://​ ourmaninsichuan.wordpress.com/​ 2 010/​ 1 1/​ 1 5/​ low-​c arbon-​plot- ​or-​w hy- ​c ancun-​has-​ already-​failed/​. Accessed April 22, 2019. 49. Liu, J.  C. E.  “Low carbon plot:  Climate change skepticism with Chinese characteristics.” Environmental Sociology 1, no. 4 (2015): 280–​292 (quotation is taken from p. 285). 50. Benford and Snow. “Framing processes and social movements.” 51. The empire of carbon brokers (p. 2). 52. In the name of CO2 (p. 214). 53. Yu et  al. “Public perception of climate change in China:  Results from the questionnaire survey.” 54. For example, Yu et al. “Public perception of climate change in China: Results from the questionnaire survey.”

Chapter 5 1. Lewandowsky, Stephan, Michael E. Mann, Nicholas JL Brown, and Harris Friedman. “Science and the public: Debate, denial, and skepticism.” Journal of Social and Political Psychology 4, no. 2 (2016): 537–​553. 2. Lejano, Raul P., and Jennifer Dodge. “The narrative properties of ideology:  The adversarial turn and climate skepticism in the USA.” Policy Sciences 50, no. 2 (2017):  195–​215; McCright, Aaron M., and Riley E. Dunlap. “Anti-​reflexivity.” Theory, Culture & Society 27, no. 2–​3 (2010): 100–​133; Cordner, Alissa. “Strategic science translation and environmental controversies.” Science, Technology, & Human Values 40, no. 6 (2015): 915–​938. 3. Callon, Michel. “Some elements of a sociology of translation.” The Politics of Interventions (2007):  57–​ 78; Stenger, Isabelle. Cosmopolitics II. Trans. R. Bononno. University of Minnesota Press, 2011; Latour, Bruno, and Steve Woolgar. Laboratory life: The construction of scientific facts. Princeton UP, 2013; Kuhn, Thomas S. The structure of scientific revolution. University of Chicago, 1970. 4. Lyotard, Jean-​François. The postmodern condition: A report on knowledge. Vol. 10. University of Minnesota Press, 1984. 5. Haraway, Donna Jeanne. Feminism and technoscience (p. 24). Routledge, 1997. 6. Wesselink, Anna, and Rob Hoppe. “If post-​normal science is the solution, what is the problem? The politics of activist environmental science.” Science, Technology, & Human Values 36, no. 3 (2011):  389–​412; Grundmann, Reiner. “‘Climategate’ and the scientific ethos.” Science, Technology, & Human Values 38, no. 1 (2013): 67–​93. 7. Hoffman, Andrew John. “Climate science as culture war.” Stanford Social Innovation Review 10, no. 4 (2012): 30–​37.

 

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8. Propp, Vladimir. Morphology of the folktale (p. 21). Trans. Laurence Scott. University of Texas Press, 1968. 9. Bruner, Jerome. “The narrative construction of reality.” Critical Inquiry 18, no. 1 (1991): 1–​21. 10. Greimas, Algirdas Julien. Structural semantics: An attempt at a method. University of Nebraska Press, 1983. 11. Propp. Morphology of the folktale. 12. https://​ w ww.heartland.org/​ n ews-​ o pinion/​ n ews/​ s ome-​ u seful-​ f acts-​ a bout-​ g lobal-​ warming-​and-​climate-​change?source=policybot. 13. These extracts are cited in Lejano, R. P. “Ideology and the narrative of climate skepticism.” Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society 100 (2019): ES415–​ES421. 14. See Lejano. “Ideology and the narrative of climate skepticism.” 15. Lejano and Dodge. “The narrative properties of ideology.” 16. See Lejano. “Ideology and the narrative of climate skepticism.” 17. Driessen, Paul. “EPA’s incredible Clean Power Plan.” Jefferson Policy Journal, August 19, 2015. https://​www.jeffersonpolicyjournal.com/​epas-​incredible-​clean-​power-​plan/​. 18. http://​ w w w.conser vativesfor um.com/​ c gi-​ b in/​ c onser vatives-​ f or um/​ YaBB. pl?num=1423248777. Accessed January 21, 2017. 19. See, for example: http://​foreignpolicy.com/​2009/​10/​28/​the-​hispanic-​challenge/​. 20. Levinas, Emmanuel. Time and the other (p. 47). Trans. Richard A. Cohen. Duquesne UP, 1987. 21. https://​fred.stlouisfed.org/​series/​MEHOINUSA672N. 22. http://​www.pewresearch.org/​fact-​tank/​2014/​10/​09/​for-​most-​workers-​real-​wages-​have-​ barely-​budged-​for-​decades/​. 23. https://​trends.collegeboard.org/​college-​pricing/​figures-​tables/​tuition-​and-​fees-​and-​room-​ and-​board-​over-​time-​1976-​77_​2016-​17-​selected-​years. 24. http://​data.worldbank.org/​indicator/​SH.XPD.TOTL.ZS?locations=US. 25. Stiglitz, Joseph. The great divide. Penguin, 2015. 26. Ricoeur, Paul. From text to action:  Essays in hermeneutics, II. Vol. 2. Bloomsbury Publishing, 2008. 27. Roe, Emery. Narrative policy analysis:  Theory and practice. Duke UP, 1994; Ingram, Helen. “The power of narratives in environmental action: New approaches.” Environment: Science and Policy for Sustainable Development 56, no. 2 (2014): 4–​5. 28. Neufville, Judith I. de, and Stephen E. Barton. “Myths and the definition of policy problems: An exploration of home ownership and public-​private partnerships.” Policy Sciences 20, no. 3 (1987): 181; Roe. Narrative policy analysis; Borins, Sandford. Governing fables: Learning from public sector narratives. IAP, 2011. 29. Reagan R. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Ronald Reagan. 1986 (p. 1180). US Government Printing Office, 1989. 30. http://​www.iflscience.com/​environment/​science-​climate-​change-​only-​feeds-​denial-​how-​ do-​you-​beat/​. 31. Competitive Enterprise Institute. Global warming—​“Energy”. YouTube video. https://​www. youtube.com/​watch?v=7sGKvDNdJNA. 32. Jamieson, Kathleen Hall, and Joseph N. Cappella. Echo chamber: Rush Limbaugh and the conservative media establishment. OUP, 2008. 33. See Dr. Michio Kaku, http://​cnnpressroom.blogs.cnn.com/​2014/​02/​23/​climate-​change-​is-​ not-​debateable/​. Accessed January 23, 2017. 34. Lejano, Raul P., and Helen Ingram. “Collaborative networks and new ways of knowing.” Environmental Science & Policy12, no. 6 (2009):  653–​662; Hoffman. “Climate science as culture war.” 35. Sundqvist, Göran, Ingemar Bohlin, Erlend AT Hermansen, and Steven Yearley. “Formalization and separation: A systematic basis for interpreting approaches to summarizing science for climate policy.” Social Studies of Science 45, no. 3 (2015): 416–​440. 36. See, for example, one radio commentator’s suggestion that the novel coronavirus was “the health version of global warming.” https://​www.dailymail.co.uk/​news/​article-​8115401/​ Coronavirus-​Alan-​Jones-​slammed-​doubting-​seriousness.html. Accessed April 5, 2020.

 



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Chapter 6 1. Bill Nye climate change (grow the f*ck up!). YouTube, 2019. https://​www.youtube.com/​ watch?v=fnLZ6slvxBA. 2. Naumer, Tenney. “Climate change: The next generation: How Judith Curry has embarrassed all women by joining the climate denial machine as a useful idiot a La Roy Spencer.” Climate Change (blog), April 29, 2010. http://​climatechangepsychology.blogspot.com/​2010/​04/​ how-​judith-​curry-​has-​embarrassed-​all.html. 3. Open Mind. “Judith Curry’s brain goes on hiatus.” July 20, 2018. https://​tamino.wordpress. com/​2018/​07/​20/​judith-​currys-​brain-​goes-​on-​hiatus/​. 4. Thetracker. “Idiot tracker: Judith Curry hides the decline . . . in her own self-​respect.” Idiot Tracker (blog), August 20, 2015. http://​theidiottracker.blogspot.com/​2015/​08/​judith-​ curry-​hides-​decline-​in-​her-​own.html. 5. Scientific American. “Climate heretic: Judith Curry turns on her colleagues.” https://​doi.org/​ 10.1038/​scientificamerican1110-​78. Accessed on May 26, 2019. 6. We should also mention that, to some extent, Judith Curry and others have self-​identified with the climate skeptical camp and separated themselves from the mainstream climate science community. One example of this is by appearing in forums dismissive of climate science, such as a hearing on Capitol Hill revolving around the Republican Party’s drive to roll back environmental regulations. https://​prospect.org/​power/​republican-​climate-​science-​witch-​hunt/​. 7. Berger, Peter, and Thomas Luckmann. “Society as a human product.” In The social construction of reality: A treatise in the sociology of knowledge (pp. 51–​61). First Anchor, 1966. 8. Kuhn, Thomas S.  “The function of dogma in scientific research.” In A. C. Crombie (ed.), Scientific change: Historical studies in the intellectual, social and technical conditions for scientific discovery and technical invention, from antiquity to the present (pp. 347–​369). Basic Books, 1961. 9. Kuhn, Thomas S. The structure of scientific revolutions. Chicago UP, 1962. 10. Latour, Bruno, and Steve Woolgar. “Laboratory life: The construction of scientific knowledge.” Princeton UP, 1986. 11. Knorr-​Cetina, Karin D. “Social and scientific method or what do we make of the distinction between the natural and the social sciences?” Philosophy of the Social Sciences 11, no. 3 (1981): 335–​359. 12. Stengers, Isabelle. Cosmopolitics I. Trans. Robert Bononno. University of Minnesota Press, 2010. 13. Offman, Craig. “Jail politicians who ignore climate science: Suzuki.” National Post. February 6, 2008. http://​www.nationalpost.com/​Jail+politicians+ignore+climate+science+Suzuki/​ 290513/​story.html. Accessed May 25, 2019. 14. Mann, Michael E., and Tom Toles. The madhouse effect: How climate change denial is threatening our planet, destroying our politics, and driving us crazy. Columbia UP, 2016. 15. See, for example, commentaries by Saruk Bender, Bryan. “The new language of climate change.” Politico Magazine. https://​politi.co/​2FVA863; “Why we should stop labelling people climate change deniers.” https://​phys.org/​news/​2018-​12-​people-​climate-​deniers.html. Accessed May 25, 2019. 16. Lejano, Raul P., and Jennifer Dodge. “The narrative properties of ideology: The adversarial turn and climate skepticism in the USA.” Policy Sciences 50, no. 2 (2017): 195–​215. 17. “Climate change.” United Nations. January 11, 2016. https://​www.un.org/​en/​sections/​ issues-​depth/​climate-​change/​. 18. “Climate change is the challenge of our generation.” UNFCCC. https://​unfccc.int/​news/​ climate-​change-​is-​the-​challenge-​of-​our-​generation. Accessed May 26, 2019. 19. Cosmos Magazine. “‘The most villainous act in the history of human civilisation.’ Michael E Mann speaks out.” https://​cosmosmagazine.com/​climate/​the-​most-​villainous-​act-​in-​the-​ history-​of-​human-​civilisation-​tyler-​prize-​winner-​michael-​e-​mann-​speaks-​out. 20. A-​Z Quotes. “Top 25 quotes by James Hansen (of 79).” https://​www.azquotes.com/​author/​ 6230-​James_​Hansen. Accessed May 26, 2019. 21. James Hansen quoted in Randerson, James. “Comparing climate change to the Holocaust.” Guardian, sec. Science, November 30, 2007. https://​www.theguardian.com/​science/​blog/​ 2007/​nov/​30/​comparingclimatechangetoth.

 

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22. Mann and Toles. The madhouse effect. 23. Kristeva, Julia. Desire in language: A semiotic approach to literature and art. Columbia UP, 1980. 24. Barthes, Roland, and Honoré de Balzac. S/​Z: An essay. Trans. R. Miller. Hill and Wang, 1974. 25. McKibben, Bill. “A world at war.” New Republic, August 15, 2016. https://​newrepublic.com/​ article/​135684/​declare-​war-​climate-​change-​mobilize-​wwii. 26. Carter J., G. Goldman, G. Reed, P. Hansel, M. Halpern, and A. Rosenberg. “Sidelining science since day one.” Union of Concerned Scientists, 2017. https://​www.ucsusa.org/​resources/​ sidelining-​science-​day-​one. Accessed December 18, 2018. 27. Funtowicz, Silvio O., and Jerome R. Ravetz. “Science for the post-​normal age.” Futures 25, no. 7 (1993): 739–​755. 28. Brettschneider, Brian. “Climate change skeptic or denier?” Forbes. https://​www.forbes. com/​sites/​brianbrettschneider/​2018/​08/​03/​climate-​change-​skeptic-​or-​denier/​. Accessed November 30, 2019. 29. Yanow, Dvora. “Silences in public policy discourse: Organizational and policy myths.” Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 2, no. 4 (1992): 399–​423. 30. Vosoughi, Soroush, Deb Roy, and Sinan Aral. “The spread of true and false news online.” Science 359, no. 6380 (2018): 1146–​1151. 31. Rand, Ayn. The Fountainhead. Samuel Merrill, 1943. 32. Hoffman, Andrew John. “Climate science as culture war.” Stanford Social Innovation Review 10, no. 4 (2012): 30–​37. 33. Biermann, Frank, and Ina Möller. “Rich man’s solution? Climate engineering discourses and the marginalization of the Global South.” International Environmental Agreements:  Politics, Law and Economics 19, no. 2 (2019): 151–​167. 34. Lejano, Raul P., Joana Tavares-​Reager, and Fikret Berkes. “Climate and narrative: Environmental knowledge in everyday life.” Environmental Science & Policy 31 (2013): 61–​70. 35. Rogelj, J., D. Shindell, K. Jiang, S. Fifita, P. Forster, V. Ginzburg, C. Handa et al. “Mitigation pathways compatible with 1.5°C in the context of sustainable development (pg 132).” In Masson-​Delmotte, V., P. Zhai, H.-​O. Pörtner, D. Roberts, J. Skea, P. R. Shukla, A. Pirani et al (eds.) Global Warming of 1.5°C. An IPCC Special Report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-​industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas emission pathways, in the context of strengthening the global response to the threat of climate change, sustainable development, and efforts to eradicate poverty. In Press, 2018. 36. Rayner, S., and E. Malone. Human choice and climate change. Batelle Press, 1998. 37. Hoffman. “Climate science as culture war.” 38. “Hanson, Robin. Are beliefs like clothes?” http://​mason.gmu.edu/​~rhanson/​belieflike clothes.html. 39. Lewandowsky, Stephan, Naomi Oreskes, James S. Risbey, Ben R. Newell, and Michael Smithson. “Seepage: Climate change denial and its effect on the scientific community.” Global Environmental Change 33 (2015): 1–​13. 40. Brysse, Keynyn, Naomi Oreskes, Jessica O’Reilly, and Michael Oppenheimer. “Climate change prediction: Erring on the side of least drama?” Global Environmental Change 23, no. 1 (2013): 327–​337. 41. Bolsen, Toby, and James N. Druckman. “Counteracting the politicization of science.” Journal of Communication 65, no. 5 (2015): 745–​769.

Chapter 7 1. García, O. Bilingual education in the 21st century: A global perspective. Wiley-​Blackwell, 2009. 2. Whorf, B. L. Language, thought, and reality:  Selected writings of Benjamin Lee Whorf. MIT Press, 1956. 3. Oreskes, N., and E. M. Conway. Merchants of doubt: How a handful of scientists obscured the truth on issues from tobacco smoke to global warming. Bloomsbury Publishing, 2011. 4. As the book is being completed, the world is still struggling to get through the COVID-​19 pandemic. It is perhaps not surprising that, at least in the beginning, the same terms (like “alarmist” and “hoax”) were being used to describe the rising concern about the novel coronavirus by

 



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President Trump and others—​e.g., https://​www.businessinsider.com/​trump-​dismissed-​azar-​ coronavirus-​warnings-​as-​alarmist-​wapo-​2020-​4. Accessed April 5, 2020. 5. Mann, M. E. The hockey stick and the climate wars: Dispatches from the frontline (p. 2). Columbia University Press, 2014. 6. Cook, J. “Understanding and countering climate science denial.” Journal & Proceedings of the Royal Society of New South Wales 150, no. 2 (2017): 207–​219; Hornsey, M. J., E. A. Harris, P. G. Bain, and K. S. Fielding. “Meta-​analysis of the determinants and outcomes of belief in climate change.” Nature Climate Change 6, no. 6 (2016): 622–​626; McCright, A. M., M. Charters, K. Dentzman, and T. Dietz. “Examining the effectiveness of climate change frames in the face of a climate change denial counter-​frame.” Topics in Cognitive Science 8 (2016): 76–​97. 7. McCright, A. M., and R. E. Dunlap. “Anti-​reflexivity: The American conservative movement’s success in undermining climate science and policy.” Theory, Culture & Society 27, nos. 2–​3 (2010): 100–​133. 8. Schnaiberg, A. The environment. OUP, 1980. 9. Mann, M. E., and T. Toles. The madhouse effect: How climate change denial is threatening our planet, destroying our politics, and driving us crazy. Columbia UP, 2018. 10. Michaels, D. “Manufactured uncertainty: Protecting public health in the age of contested science and product defense.” New York Academy of Sciences 1076, (2006): 151. 11. Godlee, F., J. Smith, and H. Marcovitch. “Wakefield’s article linking MMR vaccine and autism was fraudulent: Clear evidence of falsification of data should now close the door on this damaging vaccine scare.” BMJ: British Medical Journal 342 (2011): 64–​66. 12. McCright, and Dunlap. “Anti-​reflexivity.” 13. Lewandowsky, S., U. Ecker, and J. Cook. “Beyond misinformation:  Understanding and coping with the post-​truth era.” Journal of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition 6 (2017): 353–​369. 14. United Nations. IPCC Special Report: Global Warming of 1.50 C, 2018. https://​report.ipcc. ch/​sr15/​pdf/​sr15_​spm_​final.pdf. 15. United States Global Change Research Program. Fourth National Climate Assessment Report Vol II, 2018. https://​nca2018.globalchange.gov/​. 16. Davenport, C. “Trump administration’s strategy on climate: Try to bury its own scientific report.” New  York Times, November 2018. https://​www.nytimes.com/​2018/​11/​25/​climate/​ trump-​climate-​report.html; Nolte, J. “7 pieces of fake news about the latest US climate report.” Breitbart.com, November 2018. https://​www.breitbart.com/​the-​media/​2018/​11/​30/​ 7-​pieces-​of-​fake-​news-​about-​the-​latest-​u-​s-​climate-​report/​; DeVore, C. “How big government hijacked the latest climate report.” Dailycaller.com, December 2018. https://​dailycaller. com/​2018/​12/​02/​deep-​state-​climate/​. 17. Davenport, C., and M. Landler. “Trump administration hardens its attack on climate science.” New  York Times, May 2019. https://​www.nytimes.com/​2019/​05/​27/​us/​politics/​trump-​ climate-​science.html. 18. Plumer, B., and C. Davenport. “Trump eroding role of science in government.” New  York Times, December 2019, pp. A1, A16. 19. Tabuchi, H. “A Trump insider embeds climate denial in scientific research.” New  York Times, March 2, 2020. https://​www.nytimes.com/​2020/​03/​02/​climate/​goks-​uncertainty-​ language-​interior.html. 20. Cook, J., S. Lewandowsky, and U. Ecker. “Neutralizing misinformation through inoculation:  Exposing misleading argumentation techniques reduces their influence.” PLOS ONE 12, no. 5 (2017): 1–​21. 21. Lewandowsky, S., U. Ecker, and J. Cook. “Beyond misinformation:  Understanding and coping with the post-​truth era.” Journal of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition 6 (2017): 353–​369. 22. Cook, J. “Understanding and countering climate science denial.” 23. Rahmstorf, S. The climate sceptics. Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research, 2004. http://​w ww.pik-​potsdam.de/​stefan/​Publications/​Other/​rahmstorf_​climate_​sceptics_​ 2004.pdf. 24. Lewandowsky, Ecker, and Cook. “Beyond misinformation.”

 

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INDEX

For the benefit of digital users, indexed terms that span two pages (e.g., 52–53) may, on occasion, appear on only one of those pages. Note: Tables, figures, and boxes are indicated by an italic t, f, and b following the page/​paragraph number.   absolute, 22, 25, 29, 30, 52, 59, 65, 66, 77, 79, 99, anthropogenic climate change, 32, 38–​39, 53–​54, 100, 117 63, 78, 79, 80, 88, 96, 117, 126–​27, 129–​30, absolutist language, 8–​9, 119, 142–​43 131, 133, 134 academics, 64b, 68b, 68–​69,  131–​32 anti-​environmental movement,  39–​40 actant, actantial, 97, 98, 98f, 103, 104f, 106 anti-​reflexivity, 17–​18, 131–​32, 138, 141–​42, activist, 6, 8–​9, 15–​16, 17–​18, 48, 48–​49b, 50b, 158n6, 163n2, 167n7, 167n12 50–​51, 51b, 52–​54, 53b, 54–​55b, 55, 60, articles, xii, 39–​40, 41–​42, 45b, 56, 63, 65, 71, 61–​63, 64b, 65, 66, 68b, 68–​69, 71b, 71, 72, 78, 79–​80, 83, 88, 90, 94, 114, 134–​35, 136, 77b, 78, 79, 103–​5, 113, 114, 119, 127, 128, 139,  142–​43 131–​32, 156n27, 163n6 atmospheric physics, 45b, 45 actors, viii, 9, 12, 23, 30, 42, 43–​44, 49, 100, atmospheric scientists, 50b 108–​9, 110, 132 attitudes, 2, 10, 40, 90, 140–​42, 145 administration, 9–​10, 13, 41, 44, 59, 65, 66, auto industry, 131–​32 71b, 71, 72b, 72–​73, 77, 79–​80, 105–​6, autopoiesis/​autopoietic, 22, 23–​24, 28, 32, 36, 121, 136, 137, 157n40, 158n49, 166n29, 42, 43–​44, 78, 119, 122, 126–​27, 159n19 167n16, 167n17   advocate, 17–​18, 30, 39–​40, 49, 51b, 54, 58–​59, Bali conference, 53b, 54 96, 98, 110, 111, 115, 118, 123–​26, 127–​28, battle lines, battles, 16, 48–​54, 55, 78, 79 140–​41, 147, 160n34 bias, 13, 30, 51, 62, 135 agency, vii, 54, 72b, 158n3 binaries, 29, 31, 97, 99, 132–​33 alarm, 45b, 46, 47–​48b, 54–​55b, 58b, 59–​60, 130 binary, 55, 65, 78, 79, 80, 97, 100 alarming, alarmism, alarmist, 45b, 46b, 46–​47, blogs, bloggers, 7, 10, 12, 14, 25–​26, 34, 41–​42, 47–​48b, 48, 50b, 50–​51, 51b, 52–​53, 53b, 90, 92, 101–​2, 107, 111–​12, 114 54–​55b, 55, 56–​57b, 57, 58–​59, 60, 63, 64b, boundary agents, boundary maintenance, 65, 78, 79–​80, 130, 142–​43, 166–​67n4 111,  117–​18 alienate, alienation, 15–​16, 34–​35, 57, 103–​5, brainwash, 62–​63, 64, 69, 70, 71b 107, 110, 124–​25 Breitbart, 39–​40, 41, 43f, 68b, 74b alternative facts, 38–​39, 52–​53, 79, 122, bureaucrats, 58b, 72b,  72–​73 138,  139–​40 Burnett, Sterling, 50b, 72b, 72 ambiguous, 51b   American dream, 105 Cap-​and-​Trade, 56–​57b, 57, 59, 64b An Inconvenient Truth, 41, 48, 51b, 54–​55b, capitalist, 17–​18, 22, 68–​69, 84–​85, 93, 58–​59,  78 131–​32 183

 

184 I n d e

carbon, vii, 2–​3, 4, 8–​10, 20, 23–​24, 27–​29, 33t, 39–​40, 41, 47–​48b, 51b, 53b, 54, 58b, 58–​ 59, 68b, 68–​69, 72b, 72, 76, 79, 85f, 87, 90–​ 93, 94, 102, 103–​5, 106, 107, 109, 110, 111, 114, 120–​21, 123–​25, 138, 142, 145–​46 carbon dependency, 142, 168n33 carbon dioxide, 28–​29, 33t, 51b, 53b, 54, 58b, 72b, 87, 92–​93, 106, 109, 114 carbon emissions, 2–​3, 4, 9, 20, 47–​48b, 79, 92 carbon footprint, 58b, 58–​59, 76, 123 carbon mitigation policy, 41, 138 challenging, 38–​39, 58b, 88, 140–​41, 146 character, 2, 8, 11, 22, 25, 27, 28, 29, 35–​36, 43–​ 44, 52, 55, 68–​69, 73–​74, 77, 78, 79, 96–​97, 98, 99, 100, 113, 114, 132 claims, 13–​14, 18–​19, 23t, 25, 27–​28, 29, 42–​43, 46b, 50–​51, 51b, 52, 55, 56–​57b, 59, 60, 65, 65–​66b, 66, 68–​69, 70, 71, 77, 78, 80, 84, 86, 99–​100, 102–​3, 107, 114, 117, 127, 137 Clean Power Plan (CPP), 20, 25–​26, 30, 31, 72b climate denial, 11, 18, 25–​26, 28, 88, 89, 99–​100,  127 climate hoax, 76, 111–​12 climate models, 33t, 87, 101, 137 climate science, 2–​3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9–​10, 11, 13, 15, 18, 32, 33t, 38–​40, 47, 47–​48b, 48, 53b, 54, 54–​55b, 55, 56–​64, 65, 71, 75, 78, 79, 80, 82–​83, 84, 86, 88, 90–​92, 93, 95–​96, 98, 100, 101, 109–​11, 113, 114, 118, 119, 120, 122, 125–​26, 127, 128, 129–​30, 131–​33, 134, 135, 140, 141–​42, 145–​46, 147 Climategate, 11, 41, 59, 83, 88, 95, 146 Clinton, Bill, 52 coal, vii–​, 120–​21, 124–​25, 137, 142–​43, 147 coalesce, 28, 129–​30, 132–​33, 134, 136 coalescence, 42, 68, 77, 78, 109 coalitions, 13–​14, 21, 42 community/​ies, ix, 1–​3, 4–​5, 11–​12, 13–​14, 15–​ 16, 18, 19, 20, 21–​22, 28, 31, 32, 34, 42–​43, 51b, 52, 61–​62, 79, 80, 81–​82, 84–​85, 86, 92, 93, 95, 102–​3, 105–​6, 107, 110, 111, 114, 115–​16, 117, 118, 121, 122–​25, 126, 129–​31, 132–​33, 134, 135, 142, 143, 144, 145, 147 computer, 45b, 101, 137 conservative, vii–​viii, 10, 14, 15, 17–​18, 19, 25–​26, 34, 35–​36, 39–​40, 41, 57, 72–​73, 84, 86–​87, 94, 98, 99, 101, 102–​3, 119, 126–​27, 131–​ 32, 133, 136, 137–​38, 141–​42, 143 conservative movement, 20, 131–​32, 135, 138, 167n7 conspiracy, conspiratorial, conspirator, vii, 2–​3, 9–​10, 11, 15–​16, 32, 35, 79–​80, 84–​85, 85f, 86–​87, 88, 89, 91, 92–​93, 94, 95, 107, 108, 110, 134–​35, 137, 145 conspirator, 13, 56, 56–​57b, 57–​58, 64b, 86–​87,  137

x

contaminated data, 47 contextuality/​contextualization, 15, 23t, 25, 39, 42, 43–​44, 81–​82, 99 contingency, 23t, 25, 42, 43–​44 controversial, 75, 76–​77, 78, 145 Conway, Kellyanne, 38, 52–​53 coronavirus, COVID-​19, pandemic, ix–​x , 16,  111–​12 counterarguments,  140–​41 counterframes,  141–​42 counter-​narrative, ix, 4–​5, 7, 10, 20, 21, 32–​33, 33t, 38–​39, 42–​43, 129–​30,  131–​32 countervoice, 46, 54 coverage, 144, 155n11, 162n16, 162n27 critical discourse analysis (CDA), ix, 12, 13, 14, 39, 41, 42–​44 criticism, 17–​18, 45b, 45, 46, 50, 90, 114, 128, 132 cross-​country (comparisons), 83, 83t Curry, Judith, 114, 122   decarbonization, 2, 89, 92, 105 decontextuality, 23t, 25, 42, 43–​44 decontextuality/​decontextualization, 25, 29, 32, 33, 36 democratizing, 145 Democrats, 74b, 74, 75, 79 denaturalize, 42–​43, 80, 132, 134 denial, ix–​x , 8–​9, 11, 18, 20, 25–​26, 28, 79–​80, 88, 95, 99–​100, 114, 118–​22, 126–​27, 131, 132, 136, 138, 140–​42 developing countries, 7, 48–​49b, 49, 50, 53b, 54, 54–​55b,  90–​91 development, xii, 7, 14, 39, 42, 107, 141–​42 dialogue, viii, 8–​9, 12–​13, 14, 15–​16, 21, 28, 31, 36, 62–​63, 71, 109, 110, 111, 119, 126, 127, 128, 137–​38, 143, 145–​47 diffusion (of knowledge), 11–​12, 15, 81, 82, 92–​93,  135 discourse, vii–​viii, ix, 3–​4, 8, 9–​10, 11, 12–​13, 14, 15–​16, 17–​18, 34–​35, 36–​37, 38, 39, 41, 42–​44, 43f, 48, 86–​87, 92, 94, 95, 109–​10, 111, 113, 114, 117, 118, 119, 120–​21, 122–​27, 128, 136, 138, 139–​40, 144, 146,  147–​48 discourse analysis, ix, 12, 13, 14, 39, 42–​44, 138, 158n48, 161n17, 161n18 discursive space, 144 discussion, viii, 9, 14, 16, 21, 23–​24, 26, 34, 39, 82, 99, 101, 109, 110, 111–​12, 119, 124, 127–​28,  146–​47 disinformation, 139–​40, 168n25 dismay, 140–​42, 168n25 dismiss/​al, 3–​4, 11, 45, 46–​47, 52, 72–​74, 75, 77, 110, 136, 138, 139–​40, 142–​43, 145 disseminate/​ion, 56, 79, 139 dissenting voice, 5, 61–​62, 64b, 145

 



Index

distort, 39–​40, 127, 139–​40 distract, distraction, 136, 139–​40, 168n25 divide, 11, 17–​18, 30, 34, 65, 111, 114, 132–​33, 145, 147 dominance, 89, 105, 129–​30, 131–​32, 134, 136 doubt, 5, 8–​10, 11, 15, 23, 27–​28, 38–​39, 77, 83, 86, 87, 88, 89, 114, 126, 130, 135, 139–​40,  146–​47   echo chamber, 10, 14, 17–​18, 43f, 59, 71, 79, 109, 139, 144 ecological, 89–​90, 131–​32, 135 economic opportunity, 141–​42 economy, 4, 17–​18, 55, 60, 64b, 72b, 72–​73, 77b, 77, 89–​90, 92, 107, 110, 121, 132, 135, 136, 144 education, 62, 138, 145–​46 electricity, 47–​49b, 49, 56–​57b, 57, 68, 90,  123–​24 elites, 63, 92–​93, 110 emissions, 2–​3, 9, 20, 47–​49b, 49, 50b, 51, 52, 53b, 54, 72, 79, 87, 89, 92, 113, 125, 136 emplotment, 2, 7, 22, 32–​33, 81–​82 energy, 31, 56–​57b, 60, 68–​69, 72b, 72–​74, 75, 87, 89, 90, 111, 115, 129–​30, 131–​32,  136 Environment and Climate (E&C), 41 environmental movement, xi–​xii, 6, 7, 17–​18, 39–​40,  131–​32 environmental policy, 56, 72 environmental science, 39–​40, 138, 160n45, 163n6, 164n34, 166n34 environmentalists, 30, 48b, 49, 50, 51, 100,  142–​43 evidence, 18–​19, 28–​29, 36, 56–​57b, 66, 78, 80, 99–​100, 119, 120, 127, 130–​31, 132,  139–​40 evolution, viii, 11–​12, 14, 36, 37, 39, 42, 75, 76–​77, 78–​80, 82, 95, 96, 116, 140–​42, 145–​46 exaggerate, exaggeration, 40, 45b, 46, 53b, 54, 85f, 86, 88, 94 exchange, 1, 16, 21, 23t, 70–​71, 93, 114–​15, 145, 147 experimental studies, 141–​42, 145 exploit, 46, 54–​55b, 55, 65, 69, 71   fable, 99, 100, 108 fact-​checking, 140–​41,  144 fake news, ix–​x , 2–​3, 85f, 94, 137, 139–​40 false balance, equivalence, 128, 140–​41 fear, 50b, 57, 58–​59, 61b, 106, 107, 109, 110, 111 financial gain, 55, 62–​63, 79 flaws,  140–​41 folktale (Russian), 15, 33–​34, 96–​97 foreclose, 132, 137–​38, 145–​46 fossil fuels, 66, 73–​74, 86, 124–​25, 131–​32

185

fragment (narrative), 32–​33, 109 frames, 11, 49, 80, 140–​42, 167n6, 168n31 fraud, 31, 56–​64, 58b, 76, 96, 102, 167n11 freedom, 39–​40, 56–​64, 56–​57b, 64b, 65, 68b, 69, 71, 77, 78, 79–​80, 89, 107, 108, 145   genetic metanarrative, ix, 15–​16, 33–​34, 96, 98, 99, 100, 102–​9, 111–​12, 128 Germany, 81, 88, 89–​90, 107, 135 Global South, 93, 123–​24, 125 global warming, vii, 2–​3, 5, 6, 7, 17, 24, 27–​28, 30, 32, 35, 38–​39, 40, 41, 45b, 46b, 46–​47, 47–​48b, 50, 50b, 51b, 52, 53b, 54, 56–​57b, 58b, 59, 60, 61b, 61–​62, 63–​64, 65–​66b, 66, 67, 70, 72, 76, 85f, 87, 94, 99–​100, 102, 132, 138, 140–​41 Gore, Al, 23–​24, 27–​28, 29, 35–​36, 41, 48, 51b, 52, 53b, 53–​54, 54–​55b, 58b, 58–​59, 60, 61–​62, 64b, 76, 78 grand narrative, 25, 122–​23, 125–​26 green companies, 58b greenhouse emissions, 48–​49b, 49 group isolation, 42 gun, gun rights, Second Amendment, 2nd amendment, 39–​40, 96, 98, 101, 107, 110,  111–​12   Hansen, James, 120–​21, 165n20, 165n21 Heartland Institute, 39–​40, 41, 157n32 Heartlander Institute, 19 Heritage Foundation, 25–​26, 39–​40, 56–​57b historical account, 14, 38–​39 hoax, ix–​x , 24, 27–​28, 60, 64b, 65–​71, 68b, 71b, 75, 76, 77b, 77, 79–​80, 82, 84, 86–​87, 91–​92, 96, 99–​100, 101, 111–​12, 134–​35, 137,  142–​43 hockey stick, 63 human induced climate change, 38–​39, 42–​43, 47–​48b, 49, 50, 51, 62, 71, 131, 136 Hurricane Katrina, 41, 48, 50b, 50–​51,  54–​55b hyper partisan divide, 145   ideological discourse, ix, 36–​37, 42, 114, 118, 119, 125–​27, 128 ideological narrative, 19, 21, 22, 25, 26–​31, 55, 62–​63, 68, 77, 79, 98–​99, 102–​3, 109, 118, 125–​26, 127–​28, 132–​33, 137–​38, 145–​46,  147 ideology, definition of, 8, 19, 21–​22 immigration, immigrant, ix–​x , 96, 98, 103, 107, 108, 110, 111–​12, 157n35 impact, 49, 50b, 52–​53, 65–​66b, 72, 121, 123, 131–​32, 137, 138, 140–​41 impact science, 131–​32 impasse, 15–​16, 20, 21, 31, 126, 137–​38, 143, 145, 147 implications, 16, 36, 100, 146–​48

 

186 I n d e

industry, vii–​, 4, 6, 10, 31, 58b, 68b, 68–​69, 71b, 79, 103–​5, 107, 109, 111, 120–​21, 131–​32, 134, 147 inequality, 139 influence, vii–​viii, 10, 11–​12, 42, 48–​49b, 49, 51, 64b, 78, 87, 88, 89, 109, 129–​32, 135, 136, 137,  140–​42 Inoculation, inoculate, 127, 140–​41, 167n20, 168n27, 168n29 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 14, 41, 44, 45b, 45, 46, 46b, 47, 47–​48b, 51b, 53b, 53–​54, 58b, 59, 60, 65–​66b, 82, 88, 114, 119, 124, 125, 130–​31,  136 internal coherence, 23t, 46, 50, 51 International Conference on Climate Change (ICCC), 39–​40,  56–​57b interpretive (community), 15–​16, 117 intertextuality, 23–​24, 23t, 26–​28, 42, 43–​44, 47, 49, 51, 52, 55, 62–​63, 66, 67, 84–​85,  120–​21 intertextuality/​intertextual, 23–​24,  43f intimidate, 135, 140–​42 invariance, 23t, 25, 27, 29, 42, 43–​44, 45, 75, 80, 102–​3, 120,  142–​43 investment, 48–​49b, 58–​59, 60, 61, 144 invoke, 57, 65, 96, 121, 135 IPCC, 5, 6, 14, 15–​16, 41, 44, 45b, 45, 46b, 46–​47, 47–​48b, 51b, 53b, 53–​54, 58b, 59, 60, 65–​66b, 82, 88, 114, 119, 124, 125, 130–​31,  136 IPCC report, 45b, 45, 46b, 46–​47, 60, 124, 125, 136   journal, xi, 94, 122, 132, 145–​46 journalism, 90, 138, 144   knowledge, viii, 15–​16, 45b, 81, 115, 116–​17, 119, 122, 145–​46, 147 Kuhn, Thomas, 13, 115–​17, 121–​22 Kyoto Protocol Agreement, 46–​47, 48–​49b, 49,  50–​51   language, xii, 13, 16, 34, 95, 103–​5, 119, 124, 126, 129–​30, 137, 142–​43, 145 legitimization, 136 lens, lenses, 8–​9, 12–​13, 15–​16, 30, 113, 126,  141–​42 liberals, 35–​36, 40, 65, 71, 86–​87, 107 lifestyles, 51b, 71b, 78, 79, 110, 111, 123–​24, 131, 132, 134, 138, 142 Lindzen, Richard, 6, 45b, 45, 46, 51b, 52–​53,  56–​57b linguistic relativity principle, 129–​30 linguistics, xii, 138 lobbying, vii–​, 10, 18, 147 lobbyist, 4, 9, 10, 110, 133, 147

x

longitudinal research, 14, 44–​80, 145–​46 Lord Monckton, 56–​57b, 57–​58,  73–​74 lying, 90–​91, 133, 136, 139–​40   macro, 42–​43, 43f,  137–​38 mainstream media, 47–​48b, 56–​57b, 57, 64b, 79, 134–​35,  143 “making the country great again,” 107 manipulate/​tion, 45b, 46b, 46–​47, 47–​48b, 48, 52, 54–​55b, 55, 62–​63, 64b, 65, 78, 101,  134–​35 Mann, Michael, 78, 79, 130–​31 March for Science, 122 McKibben, Bill, 121 media, 10–​11, 39–​40, 41, 43f, 52, 56, 57, 64b, 65, 79, 83t, 84, 137, 139–​40, 144, 145 media landscape, 139 media outlets, 39–​40, 41–​42, 56, 136, 145 meso, 42–​43, 43f message, viii, 18, 26, 29, 34, 52, 125, 140–​41, 144 messaging, 143, 144 messenger, 53–​54, 131–​32, 143, 144 metanarrative, ix, 8, 15, 93, 96–​97, 98, 102–​9 metaphors, 43f, 65, 107 meteorologist, 65–​66b, 143 micro, 42–​43, 157n38, 158–​59n7 misconception, 140–​41,  145–​46 misinformation, 120, 122, 137–​38, 139–​41,  145–​46 mislead, 45b, 46, 47–​48b, 137 misrepresent/​ation, 44–​47, 45b, 47–​48b, 48, 52, 65, 135 mitigate/​tion, 8–​10, 41, 50b, 68, 71, 100, 108, 111, 131, 135, 138, 141–​42, 145–​46 models, 33t, 45b, 47, 65–​66b, 87, 101, 137 modernism, modernity, modernist, 97, 122–​23, 124,  125–​26 moral, ix, 7, 12, 30, 31, 33–​34, 35–​36, 42, 43–​44, 48–​54, 51b, 54–​55b, 55, 60, 68–​69, 78, 79, 80, 96, 100, 103–​5, 108, 114, 132–​33, 134–​35,  147–​48 moral crusade, 48–​54, 51b, 55, 78 motives, 4, 56–​64, 67–​69, 78, 79, 80, 134–​35,  139–​40   name calling, 60, 69–​70 narrative, definition of, 7, 8, 11, 19, 22 narrative-​network, 1, 11–​12, 18, 30, 82, 117 narrative properties of ideology, 23t, 23–​25,  33–​34 narratives of stasis, 142 narratives of transition, 142 National Center for Atmospheric Research (NCAR), 46b National Climate Assessment (Report), 65–​66b, 66, 136, 137 national security, 72, 141–​42

 



Index

naturalized ideology, 42–​43 New York Times, 58–​59, 137 “97 percent consensus,” 108, 140–​41 Nobel Peace Prize, 53b, 58b,  58–​59 norm diffusion, 15, 81, 92–​93 Nye, Bill, 113, 133   Obama, Barack, vii, 3, 20, 25–​26, 30, 56, 59, 60, 61, 65, 65–​66b, 66, 71b, 72b, 72–​74, 74b, 75, 77b, 77, 79, 105–​6, 136 oil, viii, 10, 41, 56–​57b, 70, 129–​32, 136, 137 online media outlets, 41–​42, 136, 145 op-​ed, 7, 12, 14, 19, 27, 41, 56, 58–​59, 84, 90, 93, 94, 99 op-​eds, 12, 56, 84 Oregon Global Warming Petition Project,  140–​41 Other, The, 19, 22, 30, 103–​5, 107, 108–​9, 113, 114, 123, 124, 125, 126–​27, 128 othering, 92–​93, 113, 114, 119   pandemic, ix–​x , 16 paradigms, 115–​16, 144 Paris Climate Agreement, 41, 72, 73–​74, 89, 136 phrases, 52, 129, 130–​31 place, 2, 7, 8, 11–​12, 16, 23t, 25, 27, 28, 29, 30, 36, 41, 42, 43–​44, 46–​47, 57–​58, 67, 81–​83, 84–​85, 92–​93, 98, 99–​100, 106, 107, 117, 122, 123, 126–​27, 132, 139 plot, ix, 8–​9, 11, 12, 22, 27, 32, 33–​34, 35, 39, 41, 42, 43–​44, 80, 84, 85f, 90–​91, 92, 93, 94, 96–​97, 99, 103–​5, 106–​7, 111–​12, 132, 136 plurivocity, 42, 43–​44, 96 polarization, 13, 18, 21, 30, 139 policy, viii, 13, 15–​16, 20, 21, 22, 23, 25–​26, 31, 36, 39, 41, 44, 47–​48b, 56, 72–​73, 74, 79–​80, 86, 88, 89, 92, 100, 107, 110, 111, 120, 121, 124, 131–​32, 136, 143, 147 policymakers, 48, 51b, 65, 93, 131–​32 political beliefs, 139 political discourse, ix, 86–​87, 139–​40 politicians, 4, 5, 7, 9, 27, 39–​40, 47, 55, 58b, 65, 70, 71, 72–​73, 79, 86, 101, 108, 113, 122, 129–​30,  131–​32 politicized, 45b, 48, 50b, 65, 86–​87 Politico Magazine, 143, 165n15 politics, 4, 5, 16, 39–​40, 45b, 45, 46, 47–​48b, 65–​71, 74, 79, 80, 132, 143, 144 pollution, 26, 92, 109, 136 post-​truth world, 129, 136, 137–​40 poverty, 53b, 73–​74, 76 power, 13, 42, 43–​44, 49, 59, 64b, 68–​69, 72–​73, 129, 130–​32, 136 power grabbing, 71 power of narrative, xi–​xii, 2, 4, 7, 39–​40, 96, 97, 129

187

pre-​emptive,  140–​41 production science, 131–​32 pro-​energy, 72b,  72–​73 profitable, 58b propaganda, 6, 52–​53, 54–​55b, 58b, 63, 68b proposal, xi, 102, 143 psychology, 86, 138, 140–​41, 142 public awareness, 131–​32 public discourse, 17–​18, 38, 42, 48, 118, 144 public health, 16, 137, 141–​42 public policy, ix, 21, 120, 121, 131–​32   Rand, Ayn, 21–​22, 122–​23 reader comments, 41–​42 Reagan, Ronald, 34, 108, 121 recurring, 44, 136 reflexive modernization, 131–​32 refugee, 123, 125–​26 regulations, 31, 55, 58b, 72b, 72–​73, 75, 77b, 79, 102, 103, 136, 165n6 repetition, 39–​40, 51b, 52–​53, 79, 80 research, viii, 2, 9, 11, 27, 33t, 38–​39, 41, 44, 45b, 47, 50b, 92, 108–​9, 115–​16, 122, 126–​27, 135, 137, 140–​41, 142, 145–​46 reversal, 77, 136 rhetorical devices, 7, 23, 43f roll/​ing back, 136, 165n6 rural, 142, 143, 144, 145, 168n33   Sanders, Bernie, 74b, 75 Santer, Ben, 46b,  46–​47 Sapir-​W horf hypothesis,  129–​30 sarcasm, 61, 68–​69, 137 scam, 60, 79 scientific report, 3, 71, 137 scientists, viii, 2–​3, 5–​6, 13, 15–​16, 17, 19, 31, 33t, 38–​39, 45b, 47–​48b, 48, 50b, 51–​52, 54–​55b, 55, 56–​57b, 63–​64, 65, 65–​66b, 66, 78–​79, 80, 84, 85f, 86–​87, 94, 95, 101, 108–​9, 110, 111, 114–​18, 119, 122, 126–​28, 129–​33, 135, 136, 137, 140–​43, 145,  146–​47 selective intertextuality, 47, 51, 62–​63 settled, 17, 47–​48b, 51b, 52, 54, 55, 62–​63, 65, 65–​66b, 80, 130, 146–​47 Singer, Fred, 46b sinister motives, 57–​58, 63–​64, 79, 80, 139–​40 skepticism, definition of, 8–​9 smartphone, 41–​42, 56 social agents, 43–​44 social construction, ix–​x , 13, 15–​16, 81–​82, 114–​15, 117–​18, 122, 127 social media, 10, 17–​18, 56, 64b, 79–​80, 90, 93, 135, 136, 137, 139, 145 social movements, 11–​12, 13–​14, 36–​37, 39 social wrong, 43–​44, 57–​59 sociopolitical climate, 40, 142

 

188 I n d e

speech community, 42–​43, 129–​30, 134 stories, 1, 2, 11, 14, 18–​19, 21–​22, 23–​24, 25, 33–​34, 35, 36–​37, 42, 56, 66, 82, 97, 98, 108, 122, 129, 135, 137–​38, 142 storyline, 13, 15, 22, 51, 56, 57, 68, 72–​74, 82, 96, 98, 99, 102–​3, 136, 139–​40 storytelling, ix, 1–​2, 144 strategy/​ies, 12, 18, 19, 23–​24, 27, 45b, 45, 47, 51, 52–​53, 57, 59, 61–​63, 67, 69, 74, 75, 81, 95, 109, 120–​21, 129–​30, 132–​33, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139–​41, 143, 144, 145,  146–​47 sujet, 8 summary plot, 39, 41, 44, 80 survey, vii–​viii, 2–​3, 9, 15, 38–​39, 83, 84, 86, 88, 90, 92 syntax, 43f, 160n46   “taking back,” 107 talk radio, 145 teaching, teach, 140–​41, 145–​46 technology/​ical, ix, 13, 15–​16, 41, 56, 81, 114–​ 15, 117–​18, 121–​22, 131–​32, 137–​38, 140–​42,  146 The Daily Caller, 41–​42 The Function of Dogma in Scientific Research, 115–​16,  165n8 The Great Global Warming Swindle, 5, 32, 35 theme, 11, 13, 32, 35, 41, 46–​47, 55, 57, 84–​85, 89, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 98, 107, 108–​9,  121 Third Assessment Report, 45b threat, 11, 40, 72, 103–​5, 107, 108, 111–​12, 113, 120, 124–​25, 140–​41,  142–​43 threaten, 61b, 61–​62, 135, 140–​42 tobacco, 39–​40, 131, 132, 134, 146 tobacco industry, 131, 132, 134 trend, 36–​37, 46b, 46–​47, 67, 86, 88, 138 Trump, Donald, vii, 3, 9–​10, 17, 19, 34, 38, 71, 72b, 72–​74, 74b, 75, 76, 77b, 77, 79–​80, 91, 121, 135, 136, 137, 144, 152b trust, 139–​40, 143, 144, 145

x

truth, vii–​, 2, 3, 8–​9, 16, 17, 21, 24, 52–​53, 54–​ 55b, 56–​57b, 57–​59, 63, 64b, 65, 70, 99, 110, 114–​15, 136, 137–​38, 139–​40, 144, 145 Tuskegee study, 134 tweets, 8, 34, 41–​42, 144, 147–​48   U.K., UK, 5, 15, 82, 84, 86, 87 uncertain/​ty, 9–​10, 48–​49b, 49, 50, 86, 91, 92–​93, 106, 107, 109, 117–​18, 119, 120, 130, 132, 137 United Nations, 5, 44, 45b universal narrative, 25, 27, 28, 29, 35, 97, 99, 101–​3, 115, 119, 123, 124, 125 universal, univeralist, universalism, 12, 14, 23t, 25, 27, 28, 29, 35, 45, 97, 99, 101–​3, 120, 122, 123, 125 univocity, 42, 43–​44, 46 US Geological Survey, 137 us vs. them, 51, 52, 65, 68, 79, 99, 122, 132–​33, 137   vaccine, anti-​vaxxer, 134, 167n11 values, 21, 29, 57–​58, 69, 80, 82, 121–​22, 139, 141–​42,  146 variability, 26, 51b, 52, 54–​55b, 78, 87 variation, 34, 42–​43, 82, 97   war, war metaphor, 22, 57, 74b, 74, 77, 97, 108, 118, 121, 126–​27, 134, 146, 147 war of words, 147 war on drugs, 108, 121 warmth frame, 141–​42 Washington, vii, 41, 58b, 58–​59, 72b, 72–​73, 144, 147 Washington Post, 144 Washington Times, 41, 58b,  58–​59 welfare, 31, 102, 120, 141–​42 words, viii, 1, 10, 23–​24, 26, 28, 31, 38–​39, 43f, 46, 52, 99–​100, 101–​2, 103, 105, 113, 116, 120–​21, 122, 123–​25, 127, 129–​31, 147–​48 World War II, 108, 131–​32 worldview, 21, 25, 30, 40, 114, 119, 129–​30, 132–​33