The Populist Radical Right in Central and Eastern Europe: Ideology, Impact, and Electoral Performance 9780415791205, 9781138839878, 9781315733159

Table of contents :
Cover
Title
Copyright
Dedication
Contents
List of figures
List of tables
Acknowledgements
List of abbreviations
1 Introduction
The populist radical right in Central and Eastern Europe
Theory and hypotheses
Research design and methodology
Notes
References
PART I Context and text
2 The context and issues of the prophets of the patria
Introduction
A matter of context
The declension of the populist radical right ideology in Central and Eastern Europe
Towards an analytical framework
Notes
References
3 The ideology of the populist radical right in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Slovakia
Introduction
Political Party Attack (Ataka)
Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik)
Slovak National Party (SNS)
Comparative perspectives
Notes
References
PART II Supply and demand
4 Exploring the dimensionality and assessing the impact of populist radical right parties
Introduction
The impact of populist radical right parties
Measuring interactions in Central and Eastern Europe
Minority issues
Economy and corruption
The European Union
Clerical issues
Concluding remarks
Notes
References
5 Demand and supply: the electoral performance of the populist radical right
Introduction
Demand and supply of post-communist issues
Data and analysis
Discussion
Notes
References
6 Conclusions
Introduction
Ideology, impact, and electoral performance
Last words
Notes
References
Appendix A List of consulted country experts
Appendix B Country expert questionnaire
Appendix C Expert surveys’ scores
Appendix D List of survey questions
Index

Citation preview

The Populist Radical Right in Central and Eastern Europe

Often neglected in the study of far right organisations, post-communist Europe has recently witnessed the rise and fall of a number of populist radical right parties. The Populist Radical Right in Central and Eastern Europe is the first comparative study to focus on the ideology, impact, and electoral performance of this party family in the region. The book advances a series of arguments concerning the context and text of these parties and systematically analyses the demand-side and supply-side of populist radical right politics. Whilst populist radical right parties in Central and Eastern Europe maintain broad similarities with their Western European counterparts, they come across as a distinct phenomenon worthy of study in their own right. Parties like Ataka (Bulgaria), Jobbik (Hungary), and the SNS (Slovakia) resort to historical legacies and contextual idiosyncrasies to frame their ideology; interact with other parties over a number of policy areas; and ultimately compete for public office on the basis of their nativist agenda. The book provides a novel framework for the analysis of different aspects of populist radical right politics, notably enhancing the understanding of this phenomenon by means of primary data such as personal interviews with party leaders and original expert surveys. Using the ideological features of these parties as an overarching analytical tool, this book is essential reading for students and scholars researching the far right, post-communist issues, and European politics in general. Andrea L. P. Pirro holds an MA in Politics from the University of Sheffield and a PhD in Comparative and European Politics from the University of Siena. He is joint convenor of the European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR) Standing Group on Extremism & Democracy. His research interests include populist and radical politics, Euroscepticism, and social and political change in Europe. His work has appeared, amongst others, in Government and Opposition, East European Politics, and a number of edited volumes.

Routledge Studies in Extremism and Democracy Series Editors: Roger Eatwell, University of Bath and Matthew Goodwin, University of Nottingham Founding Series Editors: Roger Eatwell, University of Bath and Cas Mudde, University of Antwerp-UFSIA

This new series encompasses academic studies within the broad fields of ‘extremism’ and ‘democracy’. These topics have traditionally been considered largely in isolation by academics. A key focus of the series, therefore, is the (inter-)relation between extremism and democracy. Works will seek to answer questions such as to what extent ‘extremist’ groups pose a major threat to democratic parties, or how democracy can respond to extremism without undermining its own democratic credentials. The books encompass two strands: Routledge Studies in Extremism and Democracy includes books with an introductory and broad focus which are aimed at students and teachers. These books will be available in hardback and paperback. Titles include: Understanding Terrorism in America From the Klan to al Qaeda Christopher Hewitt

New British Fascism Rise of the British National Party Matthew Goodwin

Fascism and the Extreme Right Roger Eatwell

The End of Terrorism? Leonard Weinberg

Racist Extremism in Central and Eastern Europe Edited by Cas Mudde

Mapping the Extreme Right in Contemporary Europe From Local to Transnational Edited by Andrea Mammone, Emmanuel Godin and Brian Jenkins

Political Parties and Terrorist Groups (2nd Edition) Leonard Weinberg, Ami Pedahzur and Arie Perliger The New Extremism in 21st Century Britain Edited by Roger Eatwell and Matthew Goodwin

Varieties of Right-Wing Extremism in Europe Edited by Andrea Mammone, Emmanuel Godin and Brian Jenkins

Right-Wing Radicalism Today Perspectives from Europe and the US Edited by Sabine von Mering and Timothy Wyman McCarty

Revolt on the Right Explaining support for the radical right in Britain Robert Ford and Matthew Goodwin

Routledge Research in Extremism and Democracy offers a forum for innovative new research intended for a more specialist readership. These books will be in hardback only. Titles include: 1 Uncivil Society? Contentious politics in postCommunist Europe Edited by Petr Kopecky and Cas Mudde

8 Extreme Right Activists in Europe Through the magnifying glass Bert Klandermans & Nonna Mayer

2 Political Parties and Terrorist Groups Leonard Weinberg and Ami Pedahzur

9 Ecological Politics and Democratic Theory Mathew Humphrey

3 Western Democracies and the New Extreme Right Challenge Edited by Roger Eatwell and Cas Mudde 4 Confronting Right Wing Extremism and Terrorism in the USA George Michael 5 Anti-Political Establishment Parties A comparative analysis Amir Abedi 6 American Extremism History, politics and the militia D. J. Mulloy 7 The Scope of Tolerance Studies on the Costs of Free Expression and Freedom of the Press Raphael Cohen-Almagor

10 Reinventing the Italian Right Territorial politics, populism and ‘post-Fascism’ Carlo Ruzza and Stefano Fella 11 Political Extremes An investigation into the history of terms and concepts from antiquity to the present Uwe Backes 12 The Populist Radical Right in Poland The patriots Rafal Pankowski 13 Social and Political Thought of Julius Evola Paul Furlong 14 Radical Left Parties in Europe Luke March

15 Counterterrorism in Turkey Policy choices and policy effects toward the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) Mustafa Coşar Ünal 16 Class Politics and the Radical Right Edited by Jens Rydgren 17 Rethinking the French New Right Alternatives to modernity Tamir Bar-On 18 Ending Terrorism in Italy Anna Bull and Philip Cooke 19 Politics of Eugenics Productionism, population, and national welfare Alberto Spektorowski and Liza Saban 20 Democratic Extremism in Theory and Practice Power to the people Paul Lucardie 21 Populism in Western Europe Comparing Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands Teun Pauwels

22 Extreme Right Parties in Scandinavia Anders Widfeldt 23 Catholicism and Nationalism Changing Nature of Party Politics Madalena Meyer Resende 24 Populists in Power Daniele Albertazzi and Duncan McDonnell 25 The Politicisation of Migration Edited by Wouter van der Brug, Gianni D’Amato, Joost Berkhout and Didier Ruedin 26 Transforming the Transformation? The East European Radical Right in the Political Process Edited by Michael Minkenberg 27 The Populist Radical Right in Central and Eastern Europe Ideology, Impact, and Electoral Performance Andrea L. P. Pirro

The Populist Radical Right in Central and Eastern Europe Ideology, impact, and electoral performance Andrea L. P. Pirro

First published 2015 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2015 Andrea L. P. Pirro The right of Andrea L. P. Pirro to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by her in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Pirro, Andrea L. P. The populist radical right in Central and Eastern Europe : ideology, impact, and electoral performance / Andrea L.P. Pirro. pages cm. — (Routledge studies in extremism and democracy ; 27) 1. Right-wing extremists—Europe, Eastern. 2. Right-wing extremists— Europe, Central. 3. Populism—Europe, Eastern. 4. Populism—Europe, Central. 5. Political parties—Europe, Eastern. 6. Political parties— Europe, Central. 7. Europe, Eastern—Politics and government—1989– 8. Europe, Central—Politics and government—1989– I. Title. HN380.7.Z9P57 2015 305.520947—dc23 2015001362 ISBN: 978-1-138-83987-8 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-315-73315-9 (ebk) Typeset in Times New Roman by Apex CoVantage, LLC

For Filippo and Stijn

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Contents

List of figures List of tables Acknowledgements List of abbreviations 1

Introduction The populist radical right in Central and Eastern Europe Theory and hypotheses 11 Research design and methodology 17 Notes 22 References 23

xi xiii xv xix 1 3

PART I

Context and text

31

2

The context and issues of the prophets of the patria Introduction 33 A matter of context 34 The declension of the populist radical right ideology in Central and Eastern Europe 39 Towards an analytical framework 46 Notes 47 References 48

33

3

The ideology of the populist radical right in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Slovakia Introduction 53 Political Party Attack (Ataka) 57 Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik) 67 Slovak National Party (SNS) 86

53

x

Contents Comparative perspectives Notes 107 References 109

101

PART II

Supply and demand 4

5

6

115

Exploring the dimensionality and assessing the impact of populist radical right parties Introduction 117 The impact of populist radical right parties 118 Measuring interactions in Central and Eastern Europe 123 Minority issues 126 Economy and corruption 135 The European Union 145 Clerical issues 152 Concluding remarks 155 Notes 159 References 159 Demand and supply: the electoral performance of the populist radical right Introduction 167 Demand and supply of post-communist issues 167 Data and analysis 172 Discussion 188 Notes 189 References 190 Conclusions Introduction 194 Ideology, impact, and electoral performance Last words 200 Notes 201 References 201 Appendix A Appendix B Appendix C Appendix D Index

List of consulted country experts Country expert questionnaire Expert surveys’ scores List of survey questions

117

167

194 197

203 204 208 215 219

Figures

4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6 4.7 4.8 4.9 4.10 4.11 4.12 4.13 4.14 4.15 5.1 5.2 5.3

Position of Bulgarian parliamentary parties on ethnic minorities, 2006–12 Position of Hungarian parliamentary parties on ethnic minorities, 2006–12 Position of Hungarian parliamentary parties on national minorities abroad and relative salience of the issue, 2012 Position of Slovak parliamentary parties on ethnic minorities, 2006–12 Position of Bulgarian parliamentary parties on economic issues, 2006–12 Position of Bulgarian parliamentary parties on additional anti-corruption measures and relative salience of the issue, 2012 Position of Hungarian parliamentary parties on economic issues, 2006–12 Position of Hungarian parliamentary parties on additional anti-corruption measures and relative salience of the issue, 2012 Position of Slovak parliamentary parties on economic issues, 2006–12 Position of Slovak parties on additional anti-corruption measures and relative salience of the issue, 2012 Position of Bulgarian parliamentary parties on European integration, 2006–12 Position of Hungarian parliamentary parties on European integration, 2006–12 Position of Slovak parliamentary parties on European integration, 2006–12 Position of Hungarian parliamentary parties on clerical issues, 2006–12 Position of Slovak parliamentary parties on clerical issues, 2006–12 Diagram of the electoral performances of populist radical right parties Ethnic minorities: party positions and salience, 2006 and 2010 European Union: party positions and salience, 2006 and 2010

127 130 132 134 138 139 141 142 144 145 147 149 151 153 155 170 186 187

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Tables

1.1 2.1 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 B.1 B.2 B.3 B.4 B.5 B.6 B.7 B.8 B.9 B.10 B.11 C.1 C.2

Electoral results of populist radical right parties in national elections, 2005–14 Declension of the populist radical right ideology in Central and Eastern Europe Typology of party positions on Europe Electoral performance of Ataka by type of election Electoral performance of Jobbik by type of election Electoral performance of the SNS by type of election Summary table of ideological features per party as of the year 2013 Electoral performance of parliamentary populist radical right parties per country, operationalisation Salience of ‘Roma issues’ in Hungary, media and public, 2006–9 Demand-side and supply-side of anti-minorities and populist radical right electoral performances by country Demand-side and supply-side of anti-corruption and populist radical right electoral performances by country Demand-side and supply-side of Euroscepticism and populist radical right electoral performances by country Position on economic issues Position on European integration Salience of European integration Position on religious principles Salience of religious principles Position on additional anti-corruption measures Salience of additional anti-corruption measures Position on ethnic minorities Salience of ethnic minorities Position on national minorities abroad Salience of national minorities abroad Ethnic minorities: position and salience Ethnic minorities: position and salience

12 44 56 60 70 88 105 174 176 179 181 185 204 204 205 205 205 206 206 206 207 207 207 208 209

xiv C.3 C.4 C.5 C.6 C.7 C.8 C.9 C.10 C.11 C.12 C.13 C.14 C.15

Tables Ethnic minorities: position and salience National minorities abroad: position and salience Economic issues: position Economic issues: position Economic issues: position Anti-corruption: position and salience Anti-corruption: position and salience Anti-corruption: position and salience European integration: position and salience European integration: position and salience European integration: position and salience Religious principles: position and salience Religious principles: position and salience

209 209 210 210 210 211 211 211 212 212 213 213 214

Acknowledgements

As often happens in the social sciences, an author’s first monograph generally stems from a doctoral research project. In this sense, this book is no exception. I embarked on this journey out of curiosity, and I had the luck and privilege to be able to nurture this interest throughout. This book has been conceived, written, and edited across three countries, five cities, and eight different flats. Thus, the number of people involved, emotionally and professionally, went far beyond my initial expectations. I am grateful to my alma mater, the University of Siena, which has provided me with the financial means to sustain myself whilst carrying out this research project. However, those resources would have been of very little use without the skills that I developed at the Centre for the Study of Political Change (CIRCaP). I would like to thank Luca Verzichelli, Paolo Bellucci, Maurizio Cotta, Pierangelo Isernia, Kaat Smets, Nicolò Conti, Giliberto Capano, Jean Blondel, and Michael Lewis-Beck for lending their experience and instilling conceptual and methodological rigour into a young researcher’s mind. The University of Siena was also instrumental in allowing me to cross paths with trusted friends such as Claudius Wagemann and Simona Guerra; though for different reasons and in different ways, they have always been generous with useful suggestions. During my time in Siena, I took (much-needed) breaks from work with my friends and fellow colleagues Andrea de Angelis, Direnç Kanol, and Rossella Borri, with whom I could share joys and sorrows without reservation – this is certainly worth a million thanks. The expert surveys included in this book were made possible thanks to the incredible support of Francesco Olmastroni and the Laboratorio Analisi Politiche e Sociali (LAPS) of the University of Siena. Crucial in the success of this research strategy were the 29 experts themselves (Appendix A), who were kind enough to spare some of their time to complete the country questionnaires sent to them (Appendix B). If this book has contributed to advancing knowledge on the populist radical right in any way, this is certainly thanks to the collaborative spirit of the people involved in this part of the project. I have incredibly fond memories of my visiting period at Central European University (CEU) in Budapest. I would like to thank Carsten Schneider for making it possible and Kriszta Zsukotynszky for arranging my research stay. Upon arrival,

xvi Acknowledgements I took advantage of the valuable insights of Zsolt Enyedi, Lea Sgier, and Gábor Tóka, whose briefings and tips made my research path clearer from then onwards. My life in Budapest would have been completely different without the friendship of Csilla Volford, Bojan Bilić, Mladen Ostojić, Lilla Balázs, Igor Guardiancich, Katarina Kušić, Tina Magazzini, and Artak Galyan – just to name a few. There are countless people who made my stay worth it, and it would be impossible to try to thank them all individually – I hope you can forgive this terrible omission. Amidst ceaseless wandering, Budapest served as a base during my fieldwork. I want to thank Márton Gyöngyösi and Georgina Bernáth of the Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom (Movement for a Better Hungary, Jobbik) and Andrej Danko and Zuzana Kohútková of the Slovenská Národná Strana (Slovak National Party, SNS) for offering availability for the interviews lying at the heart of this research project. I am grateful to Matej Kurian for joining me at the SNS headquarters through a blizzard and acting as an interpreter. For similar reasons, I owe a lot to Magdalena Tsankova and Blagoy Kitanov for their devoted assistance with Bulgarian translations. My gratitude also extends to Andrej Nosko of the Open Society Think Tank Fund, Oľga Gyárfášová of the Institute for Public Affairs (IVO), and Péter Krekó of Political Capital, whose cooperation proved to be essential for my research endeavours. Michael Minkenberg has had a central role in my professional activity during the past few years. He invited me to the European University Viadrina (Frankfurt/ Oder) in December 2012 for the ‘Transforming the Transformation? The Radical Right in the Political Process in East Central Europe’ conference; took me on board for the book project that stemmed from the conference; invited me to spend a proper visiting period at Viadrina; and finally agreed to come to Siena to be one of the external examiners on my committee. It has been an honour and a privilege to relate to such a bright and rigorous advisor and celebrate, together with my friends in Firenze, the end of my doctoral journey. Michael is also responsible for a substantial amount of feedback, particularly on a portion of Chapter 4 (included in his edited volume, Transforming the Transformation? The East European Radical Right in the Political Process, also published by Routledge) and an article, eventually published by the Taylor & Francis Group as ‘Digging into the Breeding Ground: Insights into the Electoral Performance of Populist Radical Right Parties in Central and Eastern Europe’, East European Politics, 30:2 (2014), pp. 246–70, and reproduced in this book as Chapter 5. All omissions and errors are obviously mine. Material from parts of Chapters 1, 2, and 3 was first published as ‘Populist Radical Right Parties in Central and Eastern Europe: The Different Context and Issues of the Prophets of the Patria’, Government and Opposition, 49:4 (2014), pp. 599–628, published by Cambridge University Press. I presented various excerpts of this book at different conferences and workshops throughout Europe. Whilst it would be impossible to list them all here, I am indebted to all the colleagues who provided insightful and constructive feedback on my work. On these occasions, it was rewarding getting to know some of the finest souls that our discipline has to offer. My mind goes to the wonderful Liz

Acknowledgements xvii Carter, Matteo Rooduijn, and Sarah de Lange – incidentally, the predecessor (the first) and fellow co-convenors (the latter) of the European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR) Standing Group on Extremism & Democracy. It is a pleasure teaming up with you and reassuring having had the opportunity to meet you all. I want to thank Roger Eatwell and Matthew Goodwin, editors of the Routledge Book Series on Extremism and Democracy, for showing immediate interest in my project and urging me to pursue publication with them. Peter Harris and Emma Chappell were both extremely helpful throughout the different stages of the publication process. Endless love goes to my former flatmates in Firenze and the extended Via Chiarugi family, who welcomed me as their younger brother, supported me, bore with me, and cheered with me throughout. I am grateful for all the love received during my stay in Berlin from old and new friends alike; they spiritually contributed to the finalisation of the first draft of this book. Though inadvertently, Daniele Valentini and Raoul Tonachella heard about this book taking final shape in our weekly gatherings in San Basilio; it was through these afternoons together that I managed to reach the end of this process. And I am forever thankful for the friendship of Sean Loughlin and John Goodwin – always by my side. There are things that no written acknowledgement can possibly express. Last but not least, all this would not have been possible without the unconditional support of my family. For each result achieved, they enthusiastically received it as something unique and extraordinary; for each failed attempt, they were never short on words of consolation. Finally, I believe that two people deserve special credit: Filippo Tronconi, my PhD supervisor, for being the nicest and most straightforward supervisor anyone could ever ask for – gentle and humble, clever and knowledgeable, his feedback and responsiveness were always priceless; and Stijn van Kessel, my good friend and academic partner in crime, who I have seen more than my own family whilst living away from Roma. I have grown stronger from his empathy and understanding words. The encouragement of these two people has been indispensible to get to this point, and it is to them that I dedicate this book. A.L.P.P. Roma, 18 December 2014

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Abbreviations

Bulgaria Ataka

BKP BSP DPS DSB GERB KB NDSV

NFSB ODS PF RZS SDS VMRO

Natsionalen Sayuz Ataka (2005) National Union Attack Politicheska Partiya Ataka (2005–) Political Party Attack Bulgarska Komunisticheska Partiya Bulgarian Communist Party Bulgarska Sotsialisticheska Partiya Bulgarian Socialist Party Dvizhenie za Prava i Svobodi Movement for Rights and Freedoms Demokrati za Silna Bulgaria Democrats for a Strong Bulgaria Grazhdani za Evropeisko Razvitie na Bulgaria Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria Koalitsia za Bulgaria Coalition for Bulgaria Natsionalno Dvizhenie Simeon Vtori (2001–7) National Movement Simeon II Natsionalno Dvizhenie za Stabilnost i Vazhod (2007–) National Movement for Stability and Progress Natsionalen Front za Spasenie na Bulgaria National Front for the Salvation of Bulgaria Obedineni Demokratichni Sili United Democratic Forces Patriotichen Front Patriotic Front Red Zakonnost Spravedlivost Order Law Justice Sayuz na Demokratichnite Sili Union of Democratic Forces Bulgarsko Natsionalno Dvizhenie Bulgarian National Movement

xx Abbreviations

Hungary Fidesz

Jobbik KDNP LMP MDF MIÉP MSZP SZDSZ

Fiatal Demokraták Szövetsége (1988–95) Alliance of Young Democrats Fidesz – Magyar Polgári Szövetség (1995–) Fidesz – Hungarian Civic Union Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom Movement for a Better Hungary Kereszténydemokrata Néppárt Christian Democratic People’s Party Lehet Más a Politika Politics Can Be Different Magyar Demokrata Fórum Hungarian Democratic Forum Magyar Igazság és Élet Pártja Hungarian Justice and Life Party Magyar Szocialista Párt Hungarian Socialist Party Szabad Demokraták Szövetsége – a Magyar Liberális Párt Alliance of Free Democrats – Hungarian Liberal Party

Slovakia KDH ĽS-HZDS ĽSNS Most-Híd OĽaNO PSNS SaS SDKÚ-DS Smer-SD SMK-MKP SNS SP

Kresťanskodemokratické Hnutie Christian Democratic Movement Ľudová Strana – Hnutie za Demokratické Slovensko People’s Party – Movement for a Democratic Slovakia Ľudová Strana Naše Slovensko People’s Party – Our Slovakia Most-Híd Bridge Obyčajní Ľudia a Nezávislé Osobnosti Ordinary People and Independent Personalities Pravá Slovenská Národná Strana Real Slovak National Party Sloboda a Solidarita Freedom and Solidarity Slovenská Demokratická a Kresťanská Únia Slovak Democratic and Christian Union Smer – Sociálna Demokracia Direction – Social Democracy Strana Maďarskej Komunity – Magyar Közösség Pártja Party of the Hungarian Community Slovenská Národná Strana Slovak National Party Slovenská Pospolitost’ Slovak Community

1

Introduction

The literature on the far right has increased at an exponential rate over the span of the last two decades, generally concentrating on the fortunes of the ‘usual suspects’ in Western Europe.1 The 2014 European Parliament elections confirmed a favourable – though heterogeneous – trend for nationalist, populist, and Eurosceptic forces across Europe. Despite these results, the scholarly attention remained very much focused on Western Europe, leaving recent developments in Central and Eastern Europe largely uncharted. Starting from the mid-2000s, populist radical right parties in Central and Eastern Europe came to prominence as rather successful contestants in their respective political arenas.2 The achievements of the Politicheska Partiya Ataka (Political Party Attack, Ataka) in Bulgaria; Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom (Movement for a Better Hungary, Jobbik) in Hungary; and Slovenská Národná Strana (Slovak National Party, SNS) in Slovakia add to the performance of other Western European populist radical right parties and demonstrate the pervasive appeal of this party family across the whole continent. Notwithstanding potential similarities across Europe, one should be wary of drawing conclusions about the populist radical right on the basis of its manifestations in Western Europe. Research on the populist radical right in Western Europe emphasised the role of specific structural and sociocultural factors in the performance of prototypical parties such as the French Front National (National Front, FN) or the Austrian Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (Freedom Party of Austria, FPÖ). Amongst the most prominent hypotheses, the rise of populist radical right parties has been interpreted as a reaction to a ‘silent revolution’ (Ignazi 1992, 2000) – an argument difficult to translate to post-communist Europe. Moreover, the ascription of populist radical right parties in Central and Eastern Europe to a ‘third wave’ of right-wing extremism may come across as inadequate, as the concerns expressed by this party family in post-communist Europe surpass the phase of ‘unemployment and xenophobia’ originally identified by von Beyme (1988). Instead, the populist radical right in Central and Eastern Europe seems to retain features sui generis, introducing a combination of old and new politics. In general terms, our quest for conceptual clarity has greatly benefited from the professionalisation of the study of the radical right (Mudde 2011: 12). The

2

Introduction

progressive recognition of the populist radical right as a self-standing new party family (e.g. von Beyme 1985, 1988; Ware 1996; Mair and Mudde 1998; Gunther and Diamond 2003) has, at the same time, stimulated scholarly attention to this phenomenon and potentially contributed to the resolution of a ‘war of words’ (Mudde 1996). The ground for discussion is thus set with the identification of a populist radical right party family that shares ideological and structural features across Europe. Populist radical right parties present a common ideological denominator of nativism, authoritarianism, and populism (Mudde 2007); abide by the rules of parliamentary democracy and try to win public office; and adopt organisational strategies that resemble both political parties and social movements (Gunther and Diamond 2003: 188). Notwithstanding these similarities, this study argues that historical legacies and contextual idiosyncrasies prompted a different declension of the populist radical right ideology in Central and Eastern Europe.3 On the basis of these premises, this study seeks to answer questions relative to the dimensionality, impact, and electoral performance of populist radical right parties in Central and Eastern Europe through the lens of their ideology. Hence, the book is guided by the following research questions: what features lie at the core of the populist radical right ideology in Central and Eastern Europe? How do populist radical right parties exert influence on post-communist party systems? What factors account for the electoral performance of populist radical right parties in Central and Eastern Europe? This study first resorts to a historical and contextual analysis to frame the populist radical right ideology in the region. Then, the analysis moves on to the systematic comparison of three radical right parties of the populist variant: Ataka in Bulgaria, Jobbik in Hungary, and the SNS in Slovakia. Investigation in this field is admittedly complicated by a number of factors. Above all, with the only exception of the SNS, the populist radical right parties examined in this book are recent additions to their respective national arenas; it follows that the scientific literature on these parties is still meagre, making this study predominantly explorative in nature. In fact, whilst some authors addressed the issues of racist extremism (Mudde 2005a, b) or Euroscepticism (e.g. Taggart and Szczerbiak 2001, 2004; Kopecký and Mudde 2002; Szczerbiak and Taggart 2008a, b) in the region, very little systematic comparative work appeared on populist radical right parties in post-communist countries (see Mudde 2000a; Minkenberg 2002b). On the whole, this book satisfies at least two criteria of social enquiry (King et al. 1994). First, it advances hypotheses important to the understanding of a growing real-world phenomenon: the limited information available on populist radical right parties in Central and Eastern Europe does not clear doubts about their raison d’être, their impact on respective party systems, or the potential threats they may pose to liberal democracy. Second, it seeks to understand and explain this phenomenon by making a specific contribution to the literature: this study aspires to go beyond the hypotheses advanced to explain the same phenomenon in Western Europe and broaden the scope of investigation on the populist radical right to postcommunist countries.

Introduction 3 The remainder of this chapter will, in turn, refer to the existing literature and account for the scientific contributions to the debate; draw attention to the importance of the research questions and hypotheses of this work; and, finally, discuss the research design and methodology of this book.

The populist radical right in Central and Eastern Europe Numerous contributions on the populist radical right in Western Europe have appeared in the past two decades; the volume of work released over the years has thus rendered this party family an extremely successful object of study (e.g. Mudde 2007: 2). Acknowledging the appeal of the populist radical right (Bale 2012), however, does not concede the notable lack of attention to this phenomenon in post-communist countries. What is more, the limited number of volumes focusing on Central and Eastern Europe (e.g. Hockenos 1993; Ramet 1999b; Mudde 2005b; Minkenberg 2010) may easily appear ‘outdated’ because of the recent (and at least equally interesting) developments within the populist radical right camp in the region. Indeed, since the mid-2000s, new or regenerated populist radical right parties in Central and Eastern Europe have either outshined or paralleled the performance of their Western European counterparts. Defining the populist radical right The professionalisation of the discipline has surely contributed to defining and thus delimiting the object of this book (Sartori 2004: 786). When reference is made to this party family, the term ‘radical right’ has largely supplanted ‘extreme right’, for extremist organisations position themselves “against the free democratic constitutional order and outside the democratic consensus” (Minkenberg 2011: 38). This differentiation essentially draws on the official definition of the German state, which distinguishes between extreme and radical organisations. Whilst the first are those opposed to the constitution (verfassungswidrig), the latter are simply hostile towards its principles (verfassungsfeindlich) (Mudde 2000b: 12). Although legal and political constraints vary across countries, rightwing parties are deemed radical for their “rejection of the established sociocultural and social-political system . . . without, however, openly questioning the legitimacy of democracy in general” (Betz 1994: 4). In this regard, they cannot be defined as ‘anti-system parties’ in a strict Sartorian sense, in that they do not seek to overturn the democratic system (Sartori 1976). They do not participate “in order to destroy” (Daalder 1966: 64), but rather to delegitimise and remould (certain aspects of) the liberal-democratic system. At the structural level, these are partisan organisations that straddle “the conceptual space between ‘party’ and ‘movement’” (Gunther and Diamond 2003: 188). In spite of its hostility to parties and the establishment, the populist radical right participates in elections and tries to win public office; yet populist radical right parties resemble social movements in that they try to mobilise public support and offer interpretative frames for particular issues (Lucardie 2000; Minkenberg

4

Introduction

2002b). In other words, what brings them together “is the way that they organize, their broad anti-institutional ideology and their location on the far right of the ideological spectrum” (Taggart 2000: 86). The present work draws on the conceptualisation of the populist radical right party developed by Cas Mudde (2007) and praises ex post the travelling capacity of his definition (Sartori 1970). The three parties analysed in this work (Ataka, Jobbik, and the SNS) match the populist radical right profile, for they display a combination of nativism, authoritarianism, and populism – as stated previously, ideological components also shared by other parties of this famille spirituelle across Europe (e.g. von Beyme 1985; on core concepts, see Ball 1999). Nativism holds that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group and that non-native elements (persons and ideas) are fundamentally threatening to the homogeneous nation-state; authoritarianism refers to the belief in a strictly ordered society; and populism considers society to be divided into two homogeneous and antagonistic camps (i.e. ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’), arguing that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale of the people (Mudde 2007). Appraising this party family as the expression of a radical, exclusionary version of nationalism (i.e. nativism) perhaps represents the least disputed portion of Mudde’s conceptualisation. As a whole, however, this definition is not without contention (e.g. Lucardie 2009; Zaslove 2009; in response to these, Mudde 2009). In the process of reviewing the literature on this party family, the term ‘radical right’ is certainly the most employed in studies on Central and Eastern Europe (e.g. Ramet 1999b; Minkenberg 2002b, 2010; Beichelt and Minkenberg 2002); yet the definitions proposed by these contributions are also not exempt from problems. For example, Ramet (1999a: 4) appraises the radical right as a form of organised intolerance, which emerged as a dimension of cultural ‘irrationalism’; is inspired by intolerance towards the ‘outsiders’; is hostile to the notions of popular sovereignty; emphasises the restoration of traditional values of the nation or community; and aspires to impose them on the entire nation or community. In articulating the portion of ‘hostility to popular sovereignty’, however, the author creates conceptual tension between the authoritarian component (“hostility to the democratic process”; Ramet 1999a: 15) and one of its claimed aspects or sub-features – that is, populism. Understanding authoritarianism in narrow procedural terms would then be at odds with its populist component which, inter alia, exalts the soundness and health of (native) peoples’ insights (MacRae 1969: 160) and ultimately appeals to the popular will as the only legitimate source of a ‘pure’ democratic regime (e.g. Mény and Surel 2002). As a matter of fact, the present discussion suggests that authoritarianism is not the least controversial feature of the radical right ideology (cf. Ramet 1999a: 15), for it may lend itself to different interpretations. In order to make sense of authoritarianism as an ideological component of this party family, it is important to stray from the strict political institutional connotation that studies on non-democratic regimes had associated to it (Linz 1993, 2000) and adopt a looser ideational meaning of the concept. Mudde (2007: 23) points exactly in this direction when he

Introduction 5 defines authoritarianism as “the belief in a strictly ordered society, in which infringements of authority are to be punished severely”. Hence, authoritarianism is stripped of its institutional and procedural connotations and appraised as a worldview that could also be attached to populism. In practical terms, these parties do not challenge democracy in principle (Mény and Surel 2002: 4), and the authoritarian portion of their ideology is mostly reflected in their security and ‘law and order’ agenda. Michael Minkenberg (2000: 174, 2002b: 337) defines right-wing radicalism as “a political ideology, whose core element is a myth of a homogeneous nation, a romantic and populist ultranationalism directed against the concept of liberal and pluralistic democracy and its underlying principles of individualism and universalism”. Although this definition closely resembles the one adopted in this study, Minkenberg includes under the radical right umbrella different ideological variants, depending on the image of collective homogeneity and the exclusionary criteria adopted by these organisations. These versions of right-wing radicalism are authoritarian-fascist, classical racist (including colonialist), xenophobic or ethnocentric, and religious-fundamentalist (Minkenberg 2002b). The inclusion of the ‘authoritarian-fascist’ variant would at least cause problems as far as our initial distinction between extreme and radical right is concerned. Authoritarian-fascist organisations would be naturally identified as extreme and thus ‘anti-system’ in that they are opposed to the constitution (verfassungswidrig) and seek to subvert democratic government. This reasoning is largely in line with the scholarship on this party family, which first recognised the (populist) radical right in Europe as a new phenomenon unrelated to fascism (e.g. Ignazi 1992). Such a clear-cut distinction is perhaps easier to make in Western than in Central and Eastern Europe, since post-communist populist radical right parties draw parts of their ideological baggage from the interwar authoritarian experience of their countries. This prompted some authors to argue that the populist radical right parties in Central and Eastern Europe are generally more anti-democratic and militant than their Western European counterparts (e.g. Mudde 2000a; Minkenberg 2002b). This notwithstanding, the ‘nostalgic’ discourse of populist radical right parties in Central and Eastern Europe is still employed within the framework of parliamentary democracy and, at least nominally, abides by its rules. This overview would suggest a lack of widespread agreement. Whereas in some cases conceptual tension could be problematic, in other cases the excessive inclusiveness of the radical right category could limit the discriminating power of this container (Sartori 1970: 1039). Despite the lack of universal agreement, this book does not refrain from delineating borders, for ‘defining’ essentially helps to identify who or what should be considered part of this party family. For instance, the definitions discussed up to this point seem to emphasise the presence of a populist component attached to the nativist ideology of these parties. This certainly encourages a systematisation of the ideological features of this party family. Hence, this study argues that by adding populism to the core ideological features of the radical right, the definition of this party family gains clarity and

6

Introduction

precision. Having delineated a ‘radical right’ category of reference, this study differentiates a sub-category by adding the ‘populist’ attribute to it. This entails a movement down the ladder of abstraction (Sartori 1970: 1040ff.; ‘ladder of generality’ in Collier and Mahon 1993) and results in a more specific ‘populist radical right’ category. In turn, this category has more limited extension compared to the ‘radical right’ but at the same time bears greater intension.4 Although populism remains a problematic, vague, and yet abused concept (e.g. van Kessel 2015; Laclau 1977; Arditi 2005; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2012), the populist radical right stands out as a party family of its own kind in that it also embodies a form of “resistance against the political establishment in defence of popular sovereignty”; thus, “it would be impossible to characterise such parties without taking their populist anti-establishment discourse into account” (van Kessel 2015: 11). Populism has generated considerable academic debate, and recent attempts to define it in social scientific terms have given new impetus to this scholarship. The appearance of populist (radical right) politics in Europe in the 1980s is mainly responsible for this renewed interest. Although engaging in similar debates goes beyond the scope of this study, it is important to delineate the borders of the populist component in the radical right ideology and systematise, inasmuch as possible, its usage beyond vernacular understandings (e.g. Bale et al. 2011). In line with a number of recent contributions (e.g. Mudde 2004, 2007; Stanley 2008; Albertazzi and McDonnell 2008), this work appraises populism as a ‘thin’ ideology displaying a Manichaean tendency (Taggart 2000). The ‘us versus them’ division that informs these parties also reflects in the populist portion of their ideology, juxtaposing a good (or pure) people and a bad (or corrupt) elite.5 Populist (radical right) parties understand politics as an expression of the general will of the people, exalting the common man and his allegedly superior common sense (e.g. Betz 1994; Wiles 1969; Canovan 1981; Mudde 2004). Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2012: 8–9) have recently argued that the distinction between ‘the (corrupt) elite’ and ‘the (pure) people’ is in essence moral, further justifying the interpretation of populism as an ideology made up of three core concepts (i.e. the people, the elite, and the general will) and two direct opposites (i.e. elitism and pluralism). Taggart (2000) emphasises the chameleonic nature of populism, in that it adopts aspects of the environment in which it finds itself: put differently, populism constitutes a ‘thincentred ideology’ (Freeden 1998: 750) that adapts to context and could be combined with other ‘thin’ or ‘thick’ ideologies (e.g. nationalism, environmentalism; liberalism, socialism) (Mudde 2004: 543–4). Conceptual challenges Having defined the conceptual contours of the populist radical right, a number of qualifications now appear necessary. The classification of this famille spirituelle is defined on the basis of the ideology of these parties (von Beyme 1985; Ware 1996; Bugajski 2002). Although more time consuming and conceptually demanding, this criterion was preferred for comparative purposes. Indeed, the core ideological features of this party family have been identified as defining traits of a

Introduction 7 number of parties across the whole European continent. However, if this typology satisfies the conditions of exhaustiveness and mutual exclusiveness (Sartori 1984; Marradi 1990) at the broader European level, its specific application to Central and Eastern European party systems may not be without problems. In this regard, the terms ‘populist’ and ‘right’ pose a number of issues. On the one hand, populism may retain a poor discriminating power in the post-communist context. In all three cases analysed in this study, populist radical right parties’ mainstream competitors (but, in fact, also other parliamentary parties) seem to convey varying degrees of populism. It has been argued that “the ideological chaos created by the collapse of state socialism [left] populism as the most convenient and frequently the most appealing ersatz ideology” (Tismaneanu 2007: 36). In general terms, the added value of the ‘populist’ element could be questioned in a context where populism appears to be rather diffuse. On the other hand, this would prompt the researcher to return to the original ‘radical right’ definition. Even so, traditional divisions between ‘left’ and ‘right’ in the post-communist context may lack the same coherence of Western Europe (e.g. Evans and Whitefield 1998; PopEleches and Tucker 2010), and opponents and voters often see those who operate under those labels as belonging somewhere else on the spectrum (Judt 1994: 6). In other words, Central and Eastern European politics may be structured in terms of distancing from communism rather than left-right dimensions.6 This would ultimately leave the researcher with the term ‘radical’, which inevitably comes across as too broad a container for the purposes of this work. Incidentally, ‘radical’ and ‘patriotic’ are terms often employed by populist radical right parties in the region in their self-definition. Parties of this famille spirituelle do not want to be publicly perceived as populist, mostly because of derogatory connotations attached to the term (e.g. Mudde 2004: 542). Moreover, the populist portion embedded in their ideology also prompts them to dissociate from the traditional left-right divide that characterises established politics. All in all, the ‘radical patriotic’ self-definition provided by some of these parties could perhaps serve the purpose. However, two reasons were relevant in the decision to avoid this terminology. The first pertains to the approach of this study, which privileges the ideology of these parties over their names or labels as the identifying criterion (e.g. Mair and Mudde 1998); the second, both practical and didactical, lies in the explicit attempt not to add further terminological confusion to the definition of these parties. Therefore, it is important to stress that the definition hereby adopted only presents a preliminary framework for the analysis of this party family. The identification of three combined core ideological features (nativism, authoritarianism, and populism) simplifies the task of inclusion/exclusion of single political parties in/ from the populist radical right category. As parties are included in the populist radical right category on the basis of the simple presence of these features, potential differences within this party family are ascertained through the analysis of the issues (i.e. the ‘declension’ of the populist radical right ideology) advocated by these parties. Other questions concerning the sincerity of these contents are and will remain without answer. Addressing the genuineness of the populist message or the

8

Introduction

radical stance (i.e. simple hostility to constitutional principles) of these parties is often impossible without: a) getting into the populist radical rightist’s head (e.g. Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2012: 9); or b) having these parties enjoying full government responsibilities.7 Similar questions are raised in a recent study by Caiani et al. (2012), which focuses on a number of extra-parliamentary parties and organisations in Germany, Italy, and the US. The authors suggest that the populist discourse of the extreme right may in fact bear an elitist and exclusivist conception of the people. On the one hand, ‘the pure people’ are portrayed as unable to act politically, leaving the extreme right as the only possible guide of the nation; on the other hand, the extreme right excludes from ‘the people’ not only ‘the corrupt elite’ but also ethnic minorities, political adversaries, and supranational actors (Caiani et al. 2012: 204). Although these observations may relate to certain themes of the populist radical right, extreme right (e.g. neo-fascist and neo-Nazi) organisations are undemocratic and elitist by definition, and it would be erroneous to confound the populist ideology of the first with the anti-system attitudes of the latter. The extreme right is generally non-populist, and its elitist and exclusive worldview is reflected both in its ideology and in the means through which it seeks to achieve its political ends. In addition, parliamentary populist radical right parties are generally more wary of the electoral, political, and legal consequences of a certain kind of rhetoric and, as far as the populist portion of their ideology is concerned, their potential elitist traits are likely to remain unspoken. This work recognises these as well as other limitations and still appraises the populist radical right category as the best possible conceptual tool at disposal. What is more, this research project overcomes some of the shortcomings highlighted in the application of these concepts to Central and Eastern Europe (Minkenberg 2009: 451). As will be shown in due course, this is done by performing a fine-grained analysis of their ideology and by putting this to the test. Having delineated the borders of what constitutes the populist radical right in Europe (i.e. their common ideological ground), the study moves on to outline the differences between this party family in Western and post-communist Central and Eastern Europe. Western versus Central and Eastern Europe: a matter of context? The emergence of populist radical right politics in Western Europe is largely associated with the sociocultural changes of 1968 (e.g. Ignazi 1992, 2000; Kitschelt and McGann 1995; Minkenberg 2000). This view became prevalent for at least two reasons. On the one hand, populist radical right parties that appeared after this watershed discarded the fascist rhetoric and anti-system attitudes of their predecessors (the textbook case being the Italian Movimento Sociale Italiano, MSI); on the other hand, their platform emphasised new issues, such as security and immigration (Ignazi 1996). According to Ignazi (1992), the ‘post-materialist’ shift described by Inglehart (1971, 1977) not only prompted the emergence of a silent revolution of the new

Introduction 9 left8 but also a ‘silent counter-revolution’ of the populist radical right. To put it differently, they represent two sides of the same coin: the New Politics is the ‘New’ Protest of the left while the New Populism is the ‘New’ Protest of the right. (Taggart 1996: 1–2) Moving from this hypothesis, any attempt to draw similarities between the populist radical right in Western and post-communist Central and Eastern Europe becomes problematic. This study argues that in the absence of a full-fledged silent revolution, it is hard to conceive the emergence of populist radical right parties of the ‘post-industrial’ type. As a result, change in Central and Eastern Europe would move along different lines. In general terms, embracing the view of a mobilisation of the populist radical right “in times of accelerated social and cultural change” (Minkenberg 2002b: 339), or “circumstances of particular social tension” (Bobbio 1994: 84), proves valuable for a number of reasons. First, it extricates this phenomenon from a series of explanations that may not hold for Central and Eastern Europe. Second, it still places the emergence of these parties within a sociocultural interpretive framework. Indeed, the populist radical right emphasises nativism and authoritarianism – two aspects that place a specific vision of society at the core of its ideology. Third, it draws attention to the aspect of change with its own specificities. Whereas the populist radical right in Western Europe reacts to the revolution of 1968, the populist radical right in Central and Eastern Europe stems from the transformations of 1989. In other words, the collapse of the Communist Bloc seems to have annulled traditional demarcations and projected Central and Eastern Europe into a crisis of values and authority. Above all, the rise of the populist radical right in Central and Eastern Europe is linked to a far-reaching process of sociocultural, political, and economic change with high or very high costs attached to it. At the regional level, this process prompted the formation of new cleavages centring on citizenship, ethnicity, divisions between church and state, resource distribution, and so forth (e.g. Kitschelt 1992; Williams 1999; Whitefield 2002). This is ultimately reflected in the declension (or framing) of the populist radical right ideology in Central and Eastern Europe, which appears to be indebted to the historical legacies and idiosyncrasies of the post-communist context. In post-communist politics, legacies offer the primary framework for the analysis of the populist radical right because they represent “the structural, cultural, and institutional starting points of ex-communist countries at the outset of the transition” (Pop-Eleches 2007: 910). In this regard, Minkenberg (2009) noted that legacies can be interpreted as both contextual and textual factors. With the former, he refers to the structural and cultural opportunities for the emergence of the populist radical right; with the latter, to “the ideological baggage of the past which is revived – and reinterpreted – by the radical right” (Minkenberg 2009: 454).

10

Introduction

So construed, legacies offer at least a number of preliminary cues. On the one hand, the transformation process has led to “the resurgence of neo-romantic, populist, anti-modern forces in the region. . . . In all these societies, movements and parties have emerged that romanticize the past [and] idealize authoritarian traditions” (Tismaneanu 1998: 3). On the other hand, it has been noted that Central and Eastern Europe could be affected by a ‘post-communist syndrome’, as public expectations were high after the revolutions of 1989, yet many promises made since then have been left unfulfilled (Williams 1999: 32–3). As a result, populist radical right parties in the region tap into high discontent and address the dilemmas of the post-communist transformation. Post-communist nativism is a multifaceted political and ideological phenomenon drawing on different experiences. The analysis of populist radical right politics in Central and Eastern Europe usually distinguishes between a ‘return to Europe’ and a ‘return of history’. When the accent is put on the increasing resemblance between Eastern and Western European politics, the populist radical right becomes part of a broader process of a ‘return to Europe’; then, populist radical right parties in post-communist countries would progressively resemble their Western counterparts, especially as far as their ideological core, organisation, or electoral performance is concerned. When analogies are drawn between the populist radical right and interwar fascism (in terms of a return of a pre-communist, ultranationalist, or fascist past), the role of legacies points to a ‘return of history’ (Minkenberg 2009). In this regard, populist radical right parties in Central and Eastern Europe are deemed a phenomenon sui generis that sits somewhere between these lines of thought. Growing disillusionment has favoured the rise of populist radical right parties, whose ideology draws inspiration from a pre-communist and communist past as much as from the challenges posed by the post-communist transition. In addition, when reference is made to the different reasons behind the emergence and electoral performance of these parties vis-à-vis their Western counterparts, this study suggests the presence of a ‘generation’ rather than a ‘period’ effect.9 For the purposes of this study, acknowledging the existence of a period effect would mean that populist radical right parties in Central and Eastern Europe have skipped stages of development experienced by similar parties in Western Europe; from this perspective, parties in post-communist countries would be in the process of ‘catching up’ with their Western counterparts. Conversely, a generation effect entails an ‘alternate route’ to populist radical right politics, without convergence on the standards set by parties in Western Europe; populist radical right parties in Central and Eastern Europe would then resemble a phenomenon sui generis. The different context and issues of the populist radical right in Central and Eastern Europe seem to point in this direction. By underlining the role of ‘continuity’, some commentators argued that, in 1989, Central and Eastern Europe returned to a place that had never been vacated. “Stalin’s ‘socialism in one country’ was the first ideologically formulated justification of what would eventually become known as ‘national communism’” (Shafir 1999). In turn, ‘national communism’ evolved into a form of ‘national messianism’, which “had more in common with fascism than with a doctrine that claimed

Introduction 11 to be internationalist” (McNeal 1997: 31). This interpretation could help explain the blurring distinction between radical politics of the left and right in the postcommunist context. Parties belonging to these camps are generally differentiated on the basis of their reference to national communism or their appeal to the traditions of interwar extreme nationalism (Shafir 1999). This notwithstanding, it has not been uncommon for ‘successor parties’ in the region to become involved in ethnic politics, “either by embracing national issues or by allying themselves with populist and radical nationalist parties” (Janos 1993: 21). Resorting to a number of preliminary explanations for the populist radical right phenomenon in the region (i.e. regime change, legacies, transformation costs, and deprivation), the next section moves on to outlining the theory and hypotheses of this book.

Theory and hypotheses This comparative study aims to shed light on the populist radical right phenomenon in Central and Eastern Europe. It does so by focusing on the ideology of these parties (or the different declension thereof) and uses the issues advocated by these parties to explore the dimensionality of national policy competition, assess the impact of these parties, and interpret their electoral performances. Particular attention is devoted to Bulgaria, Hungary, and Slovakia – countries where populist radical right parties are either on the rise or have been seemingly influential actors. This book advances hypotheses on the context and text of the populist radical right in post-communist countries (Part I) as well as the demand-side and supplyside of populist radical right politics – considered either individually or together (Part II). The analysis will initially focus on the Central and Eastern European context and provide a framework for the analysis of populist radical right parties’ text. As the discussion moves forwards, attention turns to the ideology of Ataka, Jobbik, and the SNS, restricting the time span of analysis to the mid-2000s onwards. Successively, the issues of the populist radical right are used to explore the dimensionality of national policy competition and the specific impact of this party family. Finally, the issues of these parties are placed at the core of an interactive framework between the demand-side and supply-side, arguing that the emergence and electoral performance of these parties could also be explained by their ability to ‘dig into a fertile breeding ground’. This book concludes by summarising the most important findings, addressing the implications of the populist radical right’s activity for liberal democracy in post-communist countries, and advancing avenues for future research. Case selection Ataka, Jobbik, and the SNS are believed to represent the state of the populist radical right in Central and Eastern Europe at the present time. These organisations satisfy the minimal criteria for inclusion in the populist radical right party family

12

Introduction

in that they match the aforementioned ideological profile. Moreover, these organisations are, at the time of writing, the principal representatives of the populist radical right in their respective countries. The criteria for selecting these parties are different. First, the context of these parties is taken into account. On the one hand, this study aspired to include parties from countries with different communist legacies (i.e. patrimonial in Bulgaria, national consensus in Hungary, and bureaucratic in Slovakia), each potentially conducive to different pathways to transformation (Kitschelt et al. 1999; Ishiyama 1995). On the other hand, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Slovakia also embody three distinct nation types (respectively, cultural, ethnic, and in flux), depending on the main axis of conflict developed in the process of state formation (Beichelt and Minkenberg 2002). Despite the presence of particular legacies and conditions in Central and Eastern Europe, this work seeks to demonstrate that these parties could be fairly ‘like-minded’. Previous contributions emphasised how different legacies could affect the emergence and electoral performance of populist radical right parties in the region (e.g. Bustikova and Kitschelt 2009; Beichelt and Minkenberg 2002). As will be shown in due course, recent electoral results would bring into question interpretations exclusively based on these factors. Second, there are chronological reasons for circumscribing the period of analysis of this book to the mid-2000s onwards. The first and perhaps most obvious is that two of the three cases at hand are recent additions to their respective political arenas; indeed, Ataka contested its first elections in 2005; Jobbik did so in 2006. The third party, the SNS, re-emerged as a unitary political force only in 2006; internal disputes within the party led to a split in 2001. The second reason is offered by the electoral dynamics of post-communist elections. Three election generations are identified in Central and Eastern Europe: first-generation or founding elections, which are defined as the first competitive elections since the Second World War; second-generation elections, held during ‘normal years’, in which voters disaffected with the status quo could opt for untried mainstream alternatives; and third-generation elections, which occur after two different ideological camps have had a significant shot at governing (Pop-Eleches 2010: 233). Ataka, Jobbik, and the SNS emerged (or re-emerged) during third-generation elections, enjoying interesting electoral results (Table 1.1). Table 1.1 Electoral results of populist radical right parties in national elections, 2005–14 Country

Party

Highest result

Latest result

Bulgaria Hungary

Political Party Attack (Ataka) Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik) Slovak National Party (SNS)

9.4% 20.3%

4.5% 20.3%

11.7%

4.6%

Slovakia

Note: Ataka contested national elections in 2005, 2009, 2013, and 2014; Jobbik in 2006, 2010, and 2014; after re-emerging as a unitary force, the SNS ran for public office in 2006, 2010, and 2012. Source: Parties and Elections in Europe, www.parties-and-elections.eu [Accessed 28 October 2014].

Introduction 13 When the analysis turns to the populist radical right’s success or failure at the polls, there is enough variation in the dependent variable (i.e. electoral performance) to be content with the adoption of the three cases at hand (e.g. Geddes 1990; Collier 1993; King et al. 1994). Although these parties have all proven to be somewhat successful in third-generation elections, they currently display rather different electoral trends. Of the three parties, only Jobbik shows an upward trend. In October 2014, Ataka secured access to the national parliament for the fourth consecutive time, yet its vote share has been steadily declining since 2009. The SNS did not meet the 5 per cent threshold at the 2012 parliamentary elections and then failed to gain representation in the National Council. From a comparative perspective, the area approach was preferred to research efforts with a broader continental range because of “the cluster of characteristics that areas tend to have in common” (Lijphart 1971: 688; also Diesing 1971: 187–8). Especially as far as contextual factors are concerned, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Slovakia seem to convey similar political cultures; hence, their analysis will comprise a crucial part of this study. On the contrary, other portions of political opportunity structures such as electoral systems and laws will not be included in the discussion. Research on the relationship between institutional effects and the electoral performance of these parties has often delivered contradictory findings, with a majority of studies indicating that the level of proportionality of electoral systems is not a necessary condition for the populist radical right’s success (e.g. Carter 2005; Norris 2005; van Kessel 2015; Jackman and Volpert 1996; Golder 2003). On the whole, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Slovakia all have single-chamber parliaments with representatives elected on the basis of various proportional electoral systems (Rose and Munro 2009)10; this should isolate the particular effect of the institutional environment, treating it as a constant. Put differently, “it may be the case that the psychological effects of electoral systems are being overshadowed by other concerns” (Carter 2005: 196). In this regard, it should be noted that the populist radical right in Hungary scored its best result to date (20.3 per cent in April 2014) amidst a changed and extremely unfavourable institutional environment (on the role of electoral systems’ disproportionality, see Arzheimer and Carter 2006). Ideology as an analytical tool The main focus of this book rests on the ideology of populist radical right parties in Central and Eastern Europe. This study argues that the ideology of this party family in post-communist countries resolves into a specific set of issues. Starting from this intuition, the ideological features of these parties are used as a lens through which their impact on respective party systems and electoral performance is understood. In a broad sense, this work follows an ideological approach in the sense that “the substance and the prevalence of a party’s ideology are of primary interest to the investigator” (Lawson 1976: 15). However, unlike previous contributions on the ideology of this party family (cf. Mudde 2000b), this study also employs ideology as an analytical tool, extending the scope of research beyond the supply-side of populist radical right politics.

14

Introduction

The first part of this work will give reasons and cite evidence in support of the existence of a different context and characteristic issues of populist radical right parties in Central and Eastern Europe. Especially as far as the ideology of these parties is concerned, the populist radical right in the region is expected to hark back to a pre-communist and communist past and not only deal with postcommunist issues (cf. Mudde 2005a). Previous research has already distinguished between pre-communist, communist, and post-communist far right parties on the basis of their origin or tradition (Mudde 2000a), yet clear-cut distinctions have become blurred over the course of the past two decades, and these categories would now tend to overlap. Instead, it seems more useful to reason in terms of a single (populist radical right) party family fostering a range of pre-communist, communist, and post-communist issues, depending on the specificities of single national contexts. Having defined what issues constitute the ideology of this party family in Central and Eastern Europe, the second part of this project will address questions concerning the impact and electoral performance of populist radical right parties, with particular attention devoted to the role of the populist radical right in the political process. As a result, the ‘demand for’ and ‘supply of’ populist radical right politics, jointly or individually considered, will be a recurring theme throughout this book. The underlying idea is that a specific set of issues shapes public attitudes towards politics and defines the electoral opportunity structure (i.e. demand for populist radical right politics); in turn, these issues and their electoral profitability influence the dimensionality of the political space and the political opportunity structure (i.e. supply of populist radical right politics) (e.g. de Lange and Guerra 2009: 528). Hypotheses Context and issues This study initially posits that historical legacies and contextual idiosyncrasies affect the raison d’être of populist radical right parties in Central and Eastern Europe. According to the silent counter-revolution hypothesis (Ignazi 1992, 2000), the mobilisation of this party family in Western Europe took place in the wake of a silent revolution (Inglehart 1971, 1977) – a far-reaching change in sociocultural terms that unfolded with 1968. This hypothesis never quite served as an explanation for the emergence of this party family in post-communist countries; the absence of a full-fledged silent revolution would then prompt a search for alternative explanations for the emergence of populist radical right parties in the region. This study appraises the populist radical right in Central and Eastern Europe as a phenomenon sui generis defined by historical legacies and contextual idiosyncrasies. It can be argued that half a century of communist rule, along with the transition away from it, has shaped post-communist parties and voters. Besides questions related to the transformation process, fractures left unsolved and

Introduction 15 belonging to a communist or pre-communist past may have also motivated the rise of populist radical right politics in the region. Following this reasoning, populist radical right parties in Central and Eastern Europe would exploit a certain set of post-communist issues and hark back to a communist or pre-communist past. Given the centrality of these issues in the interaction between the demand-side and the supply-side, this book aims to: a) define the set of issues at the heart of populist radical right politics in the region; and b) ascertain whether these issues could be coherently classified as pre-communist, communist, or post-communist depending on the type of legacy or contextual factors at play. The idea that populist radical right parties in Central and Eastern Europe are different primarily rests on the types of issues they foster. However, a rigorous definition of the issues of this party family in post-communist countries is still needed. Through a valuable classification, von Beyme (1988) deemed the Western European populist radical right part of a ‘third wave’ of right-wing mobilisation which appealed to ‘unemployment and xenophobia’. On the whole, this seemed to apply to parties such as the French FN or the Austrian FPÖ, which profited electorally from a limited-issue agenda emphasising immigration and ‘law and order’ (Betz 1994; Mudde 1999). In essence, populist radical right parties in Western Europe prioritise policies related to immigration. These are “omnibus issues through which other concerns, such as crime and security, care for the elderly and health care, and European integration, can be funnelled” (Akkerman and de Lange 2012: 579; also Williams 2006). Conversely, the Central and Eastern European populist radical right emphasises and exploits a distinct set of issues. Hence, attention is paid to themes such as creed, irredentist claims, and ethnicity – features that are either qualitatively different from, or seldom part of, the silent counter-revolution of the West. As a case in point, the contrast between the immigration issue in Western Europe and minority issues in Central and Eastern Europe could represent the first key to understanding populist radical right politics in the region. A fine-grained analysis will also have to consider that the immigration issue may result in an inadequate means to assess the electoral performance of this party family in the region. In postcommunist countries, the ‘enemy’ could be ‘within the state but outside the nation’ – taking the form of indigenous ethnic minorities (Mudde 2007: 69–73). Although the different declension of the ideology of these parties should render them, as a group, fairly discernible from their Western counterparts, the background of these parties is also likely to play a role. Considering that Ataka and Jobbik are fairly new parties and that the SNS has contested elections since 1990, it would be reasonable to expect some differences across this party family in Central and Eastern Europe. Policy competition Having extensively elaborated on a fine-grained framework for the analysis of these parties’ ideology, this study broadens its focus to include other national parties and turns attention to the dimensionality of populist radical right politics. The

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Introduction

issues at the core of the populist radical right ideology are translated into spatial terms and interpreted as possible areas of competition with other parliamentary parties. Straying from the electoral aspects of party competition, this study explores the dimensionality of these issues and posits that populist radical right parties may be able to exert influence on respective national party systems. In the past few years, populist radical right parties in Central and Eastern Europe have expanded their electoral support, gained parliamentary representation, and entered government coalitions. Most importantly, however, populist radical right parties seem to have increased their specific weight and influenced the agenda of other political parties. Although part of the populist radical right’s impact could be linked to its positive electoral performance, it is also useful to appraise political influence as a dimension detached from fortunes at polls (e.g. Minkenberg 2001, 2002a). Therefore, the assumption is that parties may release effects in the political process irrespective of the number of seats in parliament. A number of contributions have focused on the relationship between populist radical right parties and their mainstream competitors (e.g. Downs 2001; Meguid 2005, 2008; Akkerman and de Lange 2012). When attention is devoted to party competition, the impact of populist radical right parties has been described in terms of a ‘right turn’ in national politics (e.g. Kitschelt and McGann 1995; Carter 2005; van Spanje and van der Brug 2007). However, this study argues that, in order to examine the impact of the populist radical right, extending the analysis to interaction effects over specific policy dimensions (i.e. policy competition) can prove to be a more satisfactory strategy. In contrast to policy competition, party competition is traditionally depicted as being one-dimensional and organised along a leftright continuum (Carter 2005: 104). Amongst other things, the research strategy of this book should contribute to assessing the interaction between populist radical right parties and their mainstream competitors beyond traditional left-right divides. Whilst the populist radical right is expected to affect the dimensionality of certain nativist issues, this study anticipates only limited policy-making effects from parties in opposition. In other words, if not through actual pieces of legislation, populist radical right parties should be able to exert at least some influence on the policy positions of other parliamentary parties. Moreover, once the agenda of the populist radical right is set, its effects are likely to withstand the specific electoral performance of these parties. Electoral performance The second part of the book also pays attention to the interaction between the demand-side and the supply-side of populist radical right politics. The study posits that the electoral performance (and, for that matter, emergence) of populist radical right parties depends on the interaction between the demand-side and the supplyside over a certain set of (populist radical right) issues. The demand-side is first set against the supply-side by looking at how public attitudes shape the emergence and electoral performance of these parties in

Introduction 17 post-communist countries. At this stage, the supply of populist radical right politics (as delivered by populist radical right parties) not only accounts for parties’ ideological responsiveness to public demands but also considers the credibility of this offer as well as the ownership exerted over these issues. In other words, this study considers populist radical right parties capable of shaping their own fortunes as far as their proclaimed and actual stands over certain issues are concerned. These aspects would normally fall within the domain of party agency, which is, so to say, internally determined. At the same time, however, populist radical right parties will be able to mobilise on these issues only when they (rather than other parties) are identified as the most competent actors to deal with these issues. Issue ownership falls within the domain of policy competition, which is externally determined. In terms of the domain of party agency, populist radical right parties’ supply is not only assessed on the basis of their ideological stance on certain issues; it is also assessed on the coherence of these positions. Both aspects of party agency are deemed internally determined, in that populist radical right parties are the ones called to articulate their own ideology and make good on their pledges. Therefore, parties advocating nativist positions and hypothetically found to be compromising on minority rights would fail in delivering a credible supply of the issue (for other interpretations of credibility of party supply, see Hauss and Rayside 1978; Betz 2002; van Kessel 2015).11 As for the domain of policy competition, one of the crucial goals for populist radical right parties’ supply (and, ultimately, electoral performance) is to be recognised as the most competent actors in dealing with the issues identified. Issue ownership is externally determined, meaning that once the agenda is set and certain issues gain in salience, other parties may attempt to incorporate these issues in their platforms. In this regard, populist radical right parties are not simple masters of their own fate, and their supply is also constrained by other parties’ positions on a given issue. As a result, assessing the continuing ownership by populist radical right parties of these issues is of the utmost importance.

Research design and methodology The previous section posed a series of questions about populist radical right parties in Central and Eastern Europe. In order to understand this phenomenon, the first part of this book emphasises the specific declension of these parties’ ideology. In the second part, the features at the core of this ideology are employed to investigate hypotheses on the demand-side and the supply-side (individually and jointly considered) of populist radical right politics. Different types of data and various techniques for extracting data are employed to develop converging lines of enquiry (Yin 1994: 92). In other words, this work adopts a strategy of triangulation – that is, a “research procedure that employs empirical evidence derived from more than one method or from more than one type of data. Triangulation can strengthen the validity of both descriptive and causal inference” (Seawright and Collier 2004: 310).

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Introduction Three research questions are inherent to this study:

Q1: What features lie at the core of the populist radical right ideology in Central and Eastern Europe? Q2: How do populist radical right parties exert influence on post-communist party systems? Q3: What factors account for the electoral performance of populist radical right parties in Central and Eastern Europe? The book initially focuses on the post-communist context and singles out the issues that lie at the core of populist radical right parties’ text. This study hypothesises that historical legacies and contextual idiosyncrasies contributed to shaping populist radical right parties’ ideology in Central and Eastern Europe in a fairly distinctive way. This should become apparent both through the analysis of the regional context and through a fine-grained analysis of these parties’ ideology. The scholarship on this party family has recognised that Western European populist radical right parties emerge in reaction to changing values in post-industrial societies. Conversely, this study argues that parties such as Ataka, Jobbik, and the SNS emerge from a different context. In a search for alternative explanations for the rise of populist radical right parties in Central and Eastern Europe, arguments related to regime change, transformation costs, and deprivation could be fruitful starting points for our discussion. Therefore, the study holds that historical legacies and contextual idiosyncrasies affect the raison d’être of these parties. In turn, these parties articulate their ideology over a specific set of issues. H1: Populist radical right parties in Central and Eastern Europe articulate their ideology over a set of pre-communist and post-communist issues. Populist radical right parties in Western Europe present a limited-issue agenda that emphasises immigration and ‘law and order’. Conceiving the populist radical right as a party family appealing to ‘unemployment and xenophobia’ (von Beyme 1988) could come across as inadequate or simply too narrow in its applicability in the case of post-communist Europe. In order to verify the aforementioned hypothesis, different means are employed. This study initially elaborates on the context of these parties and advances a framework for the analysis of the ideology of these parties. The social scientific literature on Central and Eastern Europe seems to suggest that ‘new’ sources of division have come to the fore after the collapse of state socialism – sources that the populist radical right is expected to construe and transform into text. Whether appealing to citizenship, ethnicity, religion, or resource distribution (e.g. Kitschelt 1992; Whitefield 2002), the declension of the populist radical right ideology in Central and Eastern Europe would bear substantial differences as compared to other Western European parties. The populist radical right in Central and Eastern Europe should come across as a phenomenon sui generis, and the ‘traditional values’ advocated by these parties be indebted to historical legacies and

Introduction 19 contextual idiosyncrasies. As a result, this study argues that the issues of these parties could be meaningfully classified as pre-communist, communist, and postcommunist, depending on the type of legacy at play. When the focus shifts from context to text, this study seeks to ascertain the validity of this classification by analysing the ideology of populist radical right parties in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Slovakia. The analysis of the populist radical right ideology in these countries resorts to qualitative content analysis of party literatures as well as semi-structured interviews with party leaders. Although more time consuming and labour intensive than quantitative content analysis (e.g. Budge et al. 1987), a qualitative approach proves to be highly effective for the explorative purposes of this work and allows for the preservation of the detailed information on the issues analysed. In fact, the diachronic and fine-grained analysis carried out in this book represents the first attempt to systematise the issues at the core of these parties’ ideology in Central and Eastern Europe. Whether qualitative content analysis offers the necessary degree of flexibility in operationalising the complex ideological features of this party family (Mudde 2007: 39), the flexibility gained from this approach does not undermine the comparative foundations of this study. The purpose of exploring and understanding is always projected onto a comparative perspective in order to reveal similarities and differences across the three cases at hand. In this part of the study, data primarily consist of the national election party programmes of Ataka (2005a, 2005b, 2013), Jobbik (2006, 2010a, 2010b), and the SNS (2006, 2010, 2012), since party programmes are “considered to represent and express the policy collectively adopted by the party” (Borg 1966: 97). In order to overcome the potential pitfalls related to the ‘unspoken’ portion of party ideology (Mudde 1995: 208), official media with internal orientation (mostly party websites) are also analysed; when party programmes contain only indications of the issue under examination, the analysis is integrated with party leaders’ statements. Finally, the different timing of elections prompted the author to conduct semi-structured interviews to ‘update’ the ideological positions of the parties in early 2013. This part of the study moves from the assumption that populist radical right parties in Central and Eastern Europe articulate their ideology over a set of precommunist and post-communist issues. However, the analysis of the ideological features of these parties is also expected to reveal certain differences across the region. H2: As far as the framing of their ideology is concerned, populist radical right parties in Central and Eastern Europe do not constitute an entirely homogeneous group. Despite their ideological similarities, this study hypothesises that Ataka, Jobbik, and the SNS are likely to differ with regard to certain issues. Even though the three populist radical right parties emerged or re-emerged in the mid-2000s, their different histories and institutionalisation tracks may have affected their ideological

20

Introduction

profiles. In other words, the old (SNS) and new parties (Ataka and Jobbik) are likely to present some ideological differences, possibly resulting from the different time spans available to undergo processes of moderation or institutionalisation. In order to put this hypothesis to the test, the analysis resorts to the same sources employed to investigate H1 (i.e. qualitative content analysis of party discourses) and aims to ascertain the presence and salience of each ideological feature for Ataka, Jobbik, and the SNS. Whilst the analysis should reveal similarities and differences across these parties, it will also define what minimum and maximum combination of issues makes up the populist radical right ideology in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Slovakia. The second part of the book keeps ideology at the core of investigation, using it as an analytical tool to assess the role of populist radical right parties in the political process. After addressing questions relative to the issues of these parties, attention is paid to the political supply-side and, in particular, the impact of populist radical right parties on national party systems. Here, the impact of the populist radical right transcends definitions of success and failure based on the electoral performance and number of seats in parliament and is appraised as the ability of these parties to exert institution-shaping and policy-making effects in the national political arena (Williams 2006). Drawing on the Bulgarian, Hungarian, and Slovak cases, the study hypothesises that populist radical right parties may condition shifts in their mainstream competitors’ positions in selected policy areas. Very little comparative work has elaborated on the impact of populist radical right parties. Overall, the existing literature has mostly drawn attention to party competition in Western Europe (e.g. Carter 2005). This work proposes a different approach and argues that the effects of populist radical right parties in the political process are best estimated through the analysis of policy competition. In particular, this part of the study suggests that the impact of this party family is likely to be displayed in policy dimensions that are relevant for the populist radical right. This study precisely explores competition across policy dimensions in different national party systems. In particular, the position of national parties is analysed by means of expert surveys (e.g. Castles and Mair 1984; Laver 2001). At times, the opportunity to employ expert surveys in the study of political parties has been questioned and equated to ‘peer surveys’ reproducing received wisdom (e.g. Mudde 2009). In spite of these criticisms, the populist radical right in Central and Eastern Europe remains an under-researched phenomenon. This should in part minimise the risk of coming across as ‘received wisdom’; contribute to the understanding of a growing real-world phenomenon; and ultimately validate the results of the qualitative content analysis conducted in the first part of the work. Especially within the framework of this comparative research project, expert surveys prove to be valuable, at least for their legitimacy and comprehensiveness, as well as their ability to provide detailed and up-to-date information (Mair 2001). Party positions on policy dimensions are measured using two different sources. For the years 2006 and 2010, the analysis resorts to Chapel Hill expert surveys (Hooghe et al. 2010; Bakker et al. 2012). In order to capture the most recent evolutions within respective party systems and add a further time point to the

Introduction 21 analysis, expert surveys were conducted ad hoc by the author in early 2013, enquiring about party positions in the year 2012 (for a complete list of experts and questions, see Appendices A and B). The questionnaires designed and carried out for the purpose of this study were specifically tailored to allow comparisons with Chapel Hill data on a number of policy dimensions. However, questions exploring other relevant policy dimensions did not lend themselves to longitudinal comparison with other cross-national surveys. Though they serve more descriptive purposes, these questions should offer preliminary insights into the dimensionality of populist radical right issues and lay the ground for future research on these policy dimensions. The book draws on expert survey data to investigate the role of populist radical right parties in the political process. In addition to a set of secondary propositions concerning the dimensionality of populist radical right politics, attention is devoted to the impact of these parties on minority issues. H3: Amongst all relevant policy dimensions, the populist radical right exerts greater influence on the dimension of ethnic minorities. This work appraises minority issues as ‘omnibus issues’ for this party family and the prime expression of nativist politics in post-communist Europe. Accordingly, H3 recognises the ability of populist radical right parties to exert greater influence on this vis-à-vis other relevant policy dimensions. Since the arena of interaction between populist radical right parties and mainstream competitors splits into institution-shaping and policy-making levels, potential shifts may affect the first more than the latter. Whilst impact at the institution-shaping level may result in other parties’ (ideological, discursive, spatial) reaction to the populist radical right, impact at the policy-making level would result in legislative output. This study argues that interaction between the populist radical right and mainstream competitors would primarily release symbolic effects and condition the political discourse of other parties. The in-depth analysis of these dimensions should then offer realistic insights into the evolution of policy competition in each country. Subsequently, attention turns to the electoral performance of the populist radical right. Even though populist radical right parties articulate their ideology over different types of issues, electoral competition for this party family is ultimately expected to round on post-communist issues. In order to examine the electoral performance of this party family, a specific set of issues is placed at the core of an interactive framework between the demand-side and the supply-side. The underlying assumption is that populist radical right parties thrive electorally when the demand-side of populist radical right politics is matched by a corresponding supply-side. Appraising the electoral performance of these parties as the outcome of the interaction between the demand-side and the supply-side initially prompts the adoption of public opinion surveys (demand-side) as well as content analyses of party literatures (supply-side). In line with the strategy of triangulation chosen to explore the electoral performance of these parties, this study also makes use of

22

Introduction

other sources. First, the lack of comparable survey data on these ideological dimensions pushes the analysis of the demand-side beyond single cross-national surveys and respective indicators. Hence, different data sources are triangulated in this part of the study. Second, at this stage of analysis, research into the supply-side of populist radical right politics extends beyond the specific ideological stance of these parties; it also takes into account issue ownership and the credibility of the party supply. As a result, expert surveys, mass surveys, and data on national media will be analysed to address these additional aspects. Ultimately, this study should identify which issue or combination of issues proves to be electorally rewarding for the populist radical right. It has been anticipated that not all the issues advocated by populist radical right parties in these countries will be profitable at the polls. Therefore, also within the range of postcommunist issues, it is possible to hypothesise that certain issues turn out to be more rewarding for the electoral performance of these parties. H4: The correspondence between a high demand-side and a high supply-side on minority issues is a necessary condition for the high electoral performance of populist radical right parties. Outline of the book Having outlined the conceptual, theoretical, and methodological starting points of this research, the next chapter elaborates on the context of populist radical right parties in Central and Eastern Europe. Chapter 2 discusses the differences of this phenomenon across Europe and advances a framework for the analysis of populist radical right parties’ ideology in post-communist countries. Chapter 3 presents three parties of the populist radical right famille spirituelle in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Slovakia and analyses the issues at the core of their ideology. Making use of expert surveys, Chapter 4 explores the dimensionality of policy competition in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Slovakia and assesses the impact of populist radical right parties on respective party systems. The electoral performance of these parties is discussed in Chapter 5; the chapter identifies relevant dimensions for the success and/or failure of these parties at the polls and appraises party performance as the outcome of an interactive process between the demand-side and the supply-side of populist radical right politics. Chapter 6 reflects on the findings of the study and its implications and advances avenues for further research.

Notes 1 The distinction between ‘extreme’ and ‘radical’ right is largely based on the relationship of these organisations with the democratic system. The term ‘far right’ is employed throughout this work as an umbrella concept referring to both extreme and (populist) radical right variants. 2 For the purposes of this work, Central and Eastern Europe refers to former communist countries that are also member states of the European Union (EU).

Introduction 23 3 In the grammar of Latin, Greek, and other languages, declension refers to “the variation of the form of a noun, pronoun, or adjective, by which its grammatical case, number, and gender are identified” (Oxford Dictionary). The term is employed in this study in reference to the variation of the populist radical right ideology in the Central and Eastern European context. Such declension results in a specific set of issues. 4 “The extension of a category is the set of entities in the world to which it refers. The intension is the set of meanings or attributes that define the category and determine membership” (Collier and Mahon 1993: 846). 5 Whereas Canovan (1984) observes that the definition of ‘the people’ varies according to different populists, Taggart (2000: 2–3) recognises that this commitment to ‘the people’ actually derives from a sense of identification with an idealised heartland. 6 For the purposes of this work, the ‘right’ embodies a drive for inequality – an inclination to accrue, or at least not diminish, the degree of inequalities (Bobbio 1994). 7 Although some populist radical right parties have enjoyed government responsibilities in the quality of junior coalition partners, their relative electoral marginality prevents them from putting their pro- or anti-system attitudes to the test. The possible tension between the internal- and external-oriented dimensions of populism remains one of the unfathomable feats of the populist radical right. 8 Taggart (2000: 74) refers to ‘New Politics’, including under the umbrella both green and left-libertarian parties. These parties epitomise the shift from materialist to post-materialist values and advocate a commitment to self-affirmation and environmentalism. 9 Although the distinction between generation and period effects has been applied to the study of party organisations, these concepts are herein transposed to the context and text of this party family (cf. van Biezen 2005; also Webb and White 2007). 10 In Bulgaria and Slovakia, members of national parliaments are elected on the basis of party-list proportional representation, with 4 and 5 per cent thresholds, respectively. Until 2010, members of the Hungarian Parliament were elected on the basis of tworound mixed-member proportional representation (176 elected in single-seat constituencies, 152 in multi-seat constituencies, and 58 compensation seats), with a 5 per cent threshold. Following changes in the electoral system, in 2014 Hungary switched to one-round mixed-member proportional representation and decreased the number of seats from 386 to 199. 11 The term credibility was hereby preferred over ideological consistency. Credibility refers to how ideological consistency would be ultimately perceived by the national publics.

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Introduction 25 Evans, G., and S. Whitefield (1998) ‘The Evolution of Left and Right in Post-Soviet Russia’. Europe-Asia Studies, 50 (6): 1023–42. Freeden, M. (1998) ‘Is Nationalism a Distinct Ideology?’ Political Studies, 46 (4): 748–65. Geddes, B. (1990) ‘How the Cases You Choose Affect the Answers You Get: Selection Bias in Comparative Politics’. Political Analysis, 2 (1): 131–50. Golder, M. (2003) ‘Explaining Variation in the Success of Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe’. Comparative Political Studies, 36 (4): 432–66. Gunther, R., and L. Diamond (2003) ‘Species of Political Parties: A New Typology’. Party Politics, 9 (2): 167–99. Hauss, C., and D. Rayside (1978) ‘The Development of New Parties in Western Democracies Since 1945’, in L. Maisel and J. Cooper (eds.) Political Parties: Development and Decay. London: Sage, pp. 32–58. Hockenos, P. (1993) Free to Hate: The Rise of the Right in Post-Communist Eastern Europe. London: Routledge. Hooghe, L., R. Bakker, A. Brigevich, C. E. de Vries, E. Edwards, G. Marks, J. Rovny, and M. Steenbergen (2010) ‘Reliability and Validity of Measuring Party Positions: The Chapel Hill Expert Surveys of 2002 and 2006’. European Journal of Political Research, 49 (5): 684–703. Ignazi, P. (1992) ‘The Silent Counter-Revolution: Hypotheses on the Emergence of Extreme Right-Wing Parties in Europe’. European Journal of Political Research, 22 (1): 3–34. Ignazi, P. (1996) ‘The Crisis of Parties and the Rise of New Political Parties’. Party Politics, 2 (2): 549–66. Ignazi, P. (2000) L’Estrema Destra in Europa. Bologna: Il Mulino. Inglehart, R. (1971) ‘The Silent Revolution in Europe: Intergenerational Change in PostIndustrial Societies’. American Political Science Review, 65 (4): 991–1017. Inglehart, R. (1977) The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles among Western Publics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Ishiyama, J. (1995) ‘Communist Parties in Transition: Structures, Leaders and Processes of Democratization in Eastern Europe’. Comparative Politics, 27 (1): 146–77. Jackman, R. W., and K. Volpert (1996) ‘Conditions Favouring Parties of the Extreme Right in Western Europe’. British Journal of Political Science, 26 (4): 501–22. Janos, A. C. (1993) ‘Continuity and Change in Eastern Europe: Strategies of Post-Communist Politics’. East European Politics and Societies, 8 (1): 1–31. Judt, T. (1994) ‘Nineteen Eighty-Nine: The End of Which European Era?’ Daedalus, 123 (3): 1–19. King, G., R. O. Keohane, and S. Verba (1994) Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Kitschelt, H. (1992) ‘The Formation of Party Systems in East Central Europe’. Politics & Society, 20 (1): 7–50. Kitschelt, H., and A. J. McGann (1995) The Radical Right in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. Kitschelt, H., Z. Mansfeldova, R. Markowski, and G. Toka (1999) Post-Communist Party Systems: Competition, Representation, and Inter-Party Cooperation. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Kopecký, P., and C. Mudde (2002) ‘The Two Sides of Euroscepticism: Party Positions on European Integration in East Central Europe’. European Union Politics, 3 (3): 297–326.

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Introduction 27 Minkenberg, M. (2011) ‘The Radical Right in Europe Today: Trends and Patterns in East and West’, in N. Langenbacher and B. Schellenberg (eds.) Is Europe on the ‘Right’ Path? Right-Wing Extremism and Right-Wing Populism in Europe. Berlin: Friedrich-EbertStiftung, pp. 37–55. Mudde, C. (1995) ‘Right-Wing Extremism Analyzed: A Comparative Analysis of the Ideologies of Three Alleged Right-Wing Extremist Parties (NPD, NDP, CP’86)’. European Journal of Political Research, 27 (2): 203–24. Mudde, C. (1996) ‘The Paradox of the Anti-Party Party: Insights from the Extreme Right’. Party Politics, 2 (2): 265–76. Mudde, C. (1999) ‘The Single-Issue Party Thesis: Extreme Right Parties and the Immigration Issue’. West European Politics, 22 (3): 182–97. Mudde, C. (2000a) ‘Extreme Right Parties in Eastern Europe’. Patterns of Prejudice, 34 (1): 5–27. Mudde, C. (2000b) The Ideology of the Extreme Right. Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press. Mudde, C. (2004) ‘The Populist Zeitgeist’. Government and Opposition, 39 (3): 541–63. Mudde, C. (2005a) ‘Racist Extremism in Central and Eastern Europe’. East European Politics and Societies, 19 (2): 161–84. Mudde, C. (ed.) (2005b) Racist Extremism in Central and Eastern Europe. London: Routledge. Mudde, C. (2007) Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Mudde, C. (2009) ‘Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe Redux’. Political Studies Review, 7 (3): 330–37. Mudde, C. (2011) ‘Radical Right Parties in Europe: What, Who, Why?’ Participation, 34 (3): 12–15. Mudde, C., and C. Rovira Kaltwasser (2012) ‘Populism and (Liberal) Democracy: A Framework for Analysis’, in C. Mudde and C. Rovira Kaltwasser (eds.) Populism in Europe and the Americas: Threat or Corrective for Democracy? Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, pp. 1–26. Norris, P. (2005) Radical Right: Voters and Parties in the Electoral Market. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Pop-Eleches, G. (2007) ‘Historical Legacies and Post-Communist Regime Change’. Journal of Politics, 69 (4): 908–26. Pop-Eleches, G. (2010) ‘Throwing Out the Bums: Protest Voting and Unorthodox Parties After Communism’. World Politics, 62 (2): 221–60. Pop-Eleches, G., and J. A. Tucker (2010) ‘After the Party: Legacies and Left-Right Distinctions in Post-Communist Countries’. Paper prepared for presentation at the 2010 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, 2–5 September, Washington, DC. Ramet, S. P. (1999a) ‘Defining the Radical Right: Values and Behaviors of Organized Intolerance in Post-Communist Central and Eastern Europe’, in S. P. Ramet (ed.) The Radical Right in Central and Eastern Europe Since 1989. University Park, PA: Penn State Press, pp. 3–27. Ramet, S. P. (ed.) (1999b) The Radical Right in Central and Eastern Europe Since 1989. University Park, PA: Penn State Press. Rose, R., and N. Munro (2009) Parties and Elections in New European Democracies. Colchester, UK: ECPR Press. Sartori, G. (1970) ‘Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics’. American Political Science Review, 64 (4): 1033–53.

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Sartori, G. (1976) Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Sartori, G. (1984) ‘Guidelines for Concept Analysis’, in G. Sartori (ed.) Social Science Concepts. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, pp. 15–85. Sartori, G. (2004) ‘Where Is Political Science Going?’ Political Science and Politics, 37 (4): 785–7. Seawright, J., and D. Collier (2004) ‘Glossary’, in H. E. Brady and D. Collier (eds.) Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, pp. 273–313. Shafir, M. (1999) ‘Reds, Pinks, Blacks, and Blues’. RFE/RL Newsline, 3 November. Stanley, B. (2008) ‘The Thin Ideology of Populism’. Journal of Political Ideologies, 13 (1): 95–110. Szczerbiak, A., and P. Taggart (eds.) (2008a) Opposing Europe – The Comparative Party Politics of Euroscepticism. Volume I: Case Studies and Country Surveys. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Szczerbiak, A., and P. Taggart (eds.) (2008b) Opposing Europe – The Comparative Party Politics of Euroscepticism. Volume II: Comparative and Theoretical Perspectives. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Taggart, P. (1996) The New Populism and the New Politics: New Protest Parties in Sweden in a Comparative Perspective. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Taggart, P. (2000) Populism. Buckingham, UK: Open University Press. Taggart, P., and A. Szczerbiak (2001) ‘Parties, Positions and Europe: Euroscepticism in the EU Candidate States of Central and Eastern Europe’. SEI Working Paper 46. Brighton, UK: Sussex European Institute. Taggart, P., and A. Szczerbiak (2004) ‘Contemporary Euroscepticism in the Party Systems of the European Union Candidate States of Central and Eastern Europe’. European Journal of Political Research, 43 (1): 1–27. Tismaneanu, V. (1998) Fantasies of Salvation: Democracy, Nationalism, and Myth in PostCommunist Europe. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Tismaneanu, V. (2007) ‘Leninist Legacies, Pluralist Dilemmas’. Journal of Democracy, 18 (4): 34–9. van Biezen, I. (2005) ‘On the Theory and Practice of Party Formation and Adaptation in New Democracies’. European Journal of Political Research, 44 (1): 147–74. van Kessel, S. (2015) Populist Parties in Europe: Agents of Discontent? Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan. van Spanje, J., and W. van der Brug (2007) ‘The Party as Pariah: The Exclusion of AntiImmigration Parties and Its Effect on Their Ideological Positions’. West European Politics, 30 (5): 1022–40. von Beyme, K. (1985) Political Parties in Western Democracies. Aldershot, UK: Gower. von Beyme, K. (1988) ‘Right-Wing Extremism in Post-War Europe’. West European Politics, 11 (2): 1–18. Ware, A. (1996) Political Parties and Party Systems. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Webb, P., and S. White (2007) ‘Conceptualizing the Institutionalization and Performance of Political Parties in New Democracies’, in P. Webb and S. White (eds.) Party Politics in New Democracies. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 1–19. Whitefield, S. (2002) ‘Political Cleavages and Post-Communist Politics’. Annual Review of Political Science, 5 (1): 181–200.

Introduction 29 Wiles, P. (1969) ‘A Syndrome, Not a Doctrine’, in G. Ionescu and E. Gellner (eds.) Populism: Its Meanings and National Characteristics. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, pp. 166–79. Williams, C. (1999) ‘Problems of Transition and the Rise of the Radical Right’, in S. P. Ramet (ed.) The Radical Right in Central and Eastern Europe Since 1989. University Park, PA: Penn State Press, pp. 29–47. Williams, M. H. (2006) The Impact of Radical Right-Wing Parties in West European Democracies. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Yin, R. K. (1994) Case Study Research: Design and Methods. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Zaslove, A. (2009) ‘The Populist Radical Right: Ideology, Party Families and Core Principles’. Political Studies Review, 7 (3): 309–18.

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Part I

Context and text

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2

The context and issues of the prophets of the patria

Introduction The literature on the populist radical right grew alongside the success of the party family in Western Europe. A significant portion of this literature associated the emergence of this party family to a process of sociocultural and economic change that unfolded in the second half of the 20th century. It has been argued that the populist radical right made important electoral inroads by dramatising the vulnerability of the nation in times of real or presumed crisis (Minkenberg 2001: 5). Populist radical right parties eventually thrived also in post-communist countries; however, significantly less attention has been paid to Central and Eastern European parties. Especially those aspects concerning the context and text of the populist radical right in these countries appear to still be open to question. This chapter focuses on the distinctive context of this party family and proposes a congruous categorisation of its ideological features. The first part of this chapter precisely argues that the accounts of the Western European populist radical right are context-specific and difficult to translate to the post-communist European environment. The emergence of this party family, often interpreted as a reaction to a far-reaching value change that occurred after the Second World War (Inglehart 1971), may have different roots in Central and Eastern Europe. In Western Europe, populist radical right and green/left-libertarian parties have come across as expressions of a certain kind of radical politics (e.g. Taggart 1996). Ultimately, these two party families have been able to restructure national party competitions and cut across existing societal cleavages (e.g. Minkenberg 1992). On the contrary, commentators argued that Central and Eastern Europe had been exposed to a multifaceted modernisation process involving transformations from authoritarianism to liberal democracy; from state socialism to market economy; and from industrialism to post-industrialism (Linz and Stepan 1996; Miller et al. 1998; von Beyme 1996). In a political setting dominated by underlying fluidity and volatility, comparable cleavage structures are clearly not self-evident. In general terms, addressing questions relative to the context of populist radical right parties entails outlining the primary sources of mobilisation for this party family. The populist radical right draws on the cultural and structural opportunities

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of its context, construes them, and transforms them into text. Therefore, understanding the conditions and processes at play in the post-communist context appears to be of utmost importance. The first aim of this chapter is to identify potential mobilisation sources for this party family. Appraising modernisation in terms of a specific cultural change would present us with a phenomenon in reaction to the liberal mindset of postcommunist publics. In this case, the populist radical right would foster traditional (or ‘anti-modern’) values in response to a process of individualisation and social differentiation. Conversely, placing emphasis on transformation would define the populist radical right as the opponent of a far-reaching process that started in 1989 – a process allegedly incomplete or, overall, negatively assessed. Whatever the source of change (i.e. modernisation or transformation), the populist radical right constructs opposition to it in social and political terms. The second aim of this chapter is to advance a framework for the analysis of the populist radical right ideology in Central and Eastern Europe. In particular, this study argues that the ideological features of these parties draw inspiration from the different legacies and contextual idiosyncrasies at play in Central and Eastern Europe. This would have two implications for the study of this party family. First, populist radical right parties in the region would come across as a phenomenon sui generis in light of the distinctive declension of their ideology. Second, the features at the core of the populist radical right ideology in Central and Eastern Europe could be meaningfully categorised as pre-communist, communist, and post-communist issues. Such a categorisation is not a mere conceptual exercise. The systematisation of these issues lays the foundations of this book. In particular, it allows one to clarify the raison d’être of this party family in Central and Eastern Europe; identify (individually and comparatively) the issues emphasised by these parties (Chapter 3); assess the impact of populist radical right parties on these dimensions (Chapter 4); and single out those issues which are ‘electorally rewarding’ for this party family (Chapter 5). Moreover, ascertaining differences in the context and text of this party family should help distinguish whether the populist radical right in Central and Eastern Europe is part of a generation effect rather than a period effect. Should a generation effect ultimately be revealed, the populist radical right in post-communist countries would not simply resemble its Western counterparts ‘at a different time’ but would come across as a distinctive entity within the broader European scenario. The chapter is structured as follows: the following section proposes alternative explanations for the mobilisation of the populist radical right in post-communist Europe. Next, the chapter advances a framework for the analysis of these parties’ ideology in context. The chapter concludes by summarising the findings and outlining the advantages of the conceptual framework presented.

A matter of context As previously argued, this study recognises the existence of a populist radical right party family sharing ideological and structural features across Europe. However, the

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different regional contexts of these parties may have prompted a different declension of the populist radical right ideology in Western and post-communist Europe. The rise of populist radical right politics in Western Europe has been linked to a series of sociocultural changes that first unfolded in the late 1960s (e.g. Ignazi 1992; Betz 1994; Kitschelt and McGann 1995; Minkenberg 2000). These changes have been convincingly described in the work of Inglehart (1971, 1977), which elaborated on the appearance of a ‘silent revolution’ – that is, a progressive shift from materialist to post-materialist values amongst Western publics. Subsequently, Inglehart (1981, 1984) went on to describe the political implications of these changes, suggesting that the silent revolution had favoured the emergence of green and leftlibertarian politics (i.e. ‘New Politics’; see also Dalton 1988). Although other authors criticised these accounts on post-materialism for their exclusive focus on the left side of the political spectrum (Inglehart and Flanagan 1987: 1303 ff.), Ignazi is listed amongst the first to have articulated developments in the far right camp in terms of a ‘silent counter-revolution’. According to Ignazi (1992: 6): Together with the spread of post-materialism, in Western countries in the 1980s, a different cultural and political mood, partially stimulated by the same ‘new politics’ has also been taking root. This change in beliefs and attitudes has been partially expressed in the so-called neo-conservatism (and has been partially interpreted by conservative parties). But, to a large extent, it remained underground until the recent rise of [extreme right parties]. . . . In a sense, it could be said that the Greens and the [extreme right parties] are, respectively, the legitimate and the unwanted children of the New Politics; as the Greens come out of the silent revolution, the [extreme right parties] derive from a reaction to it, a sort of ‘silent counter-revolution’. In other words, the silent revolution had not only favoured the emergence of left-libertarian parties but also a counter-revolution of non-materialist populist radical right parties. The largest portion of scholarship on this party family has focused on Western European parties. At the same time, one of the most important contributions with a truly pan-European scope has placed emphasis on the similarities shared by these parties across the continent (Mudde 2007). In this regard, this book takes yet another route by focusing on Central and Eastern European parties and drawing attention to their differences. In particular, the specific sociocultural context of these parties is expected to influence the raison d’être of the populist radical right in Central and Eastern Europe. Hence, this study starts off by arguing that the emergence of populist radical right parties in Central and Eastern Europe is unrelated to the unfolding of a post-materialist revolution. At least some elements prompt one to consider these background conditions. First, a growing body of literature on party politics has put the accent on the increasing resemblance between Eastern and Western Europe (e.g. Webb and White 2007; on populist radical right parties, see Bustikova and Kitschelt 2009; de Lange and Guerra 2009). In this case, acknowledging that post-communist

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populist radical right parties are ‘catching up’ with their Western counterparts would entail that this party family is also drawing on similar sources of mobilisation; (a reaction to) comparable sociocultural changes should then be revealed. Second, although often marginal, green and left-libertarian parties appeared early in the transition process and have been a constant presence in the democratic politics of post-communist Europe (Bugajski 2002; Rink and Gerber 2001). Equally, 25 years after the end of single-party rule, sociocultural conditions may be expected to compare across Europe. The concomitant representation in the Hungarian Assembly of populist radical right and green/left-libertarian parties would suggest that the unfolding of a post-materialist revolution has created opportunities for the emergence of radical politics. Still, in Central and Eastern Europe, perceptions of prosperity and security have not yet consolidated (see, for example, European Values Study 1999, 2008; Eurobarometer 73.1), demonstrating that the legacy of authoritarianism may have put under strain the publics in the region, whose prime concern, in return, is to ameliorate their material conditions. Notably, and perhaps related to these factors, green representation in the 2009 European elections was confined to the EU-15, with no green member of the European Parliament elected in any of the 12 new member states (Carter 2010: 295). In Western Europe, the silent counter-revolution of the populist radical right ran parallel to the silent revolution of the green and left-libertarian parties. On theoretical grounds, the silent counter-revolution hypothesis fails to explain the emergence of populist radical right parties in Central and Eastern Europe, as it is hard to conceive a populist radical right of the post-industrial type to have emerged in an environment where materialist stances still seem to hold strong. At least aspects concerning value change move along different lines, and the populist radical right appears to be unrelated to a post-materialist revolution. As a result, sources of populist radical right mobilisation in the region shall be sought elsewhere. Historical legacies and contextual idiosyncrasies In search of explanations that could apply to post-communist Europe, it is important to note that the populist radical right mobilises in concomitance of specific social and cultural changes – a time when real or perceived destabilisation occurs. Broadening the scope of investigation beyond the unfolding of a post-materialist revolution extricates this phenomenon from a series of explanations that do not hold for Central and Eastern Europe, still relating it to the aspect of change with its own specifics. In other words, if 1968 and the process of modernisation attached to it were a catalyst for the populist radical right’s backlash in Western Europe, the transformations of 1989 could serve a similar explaining function in Central and Eastern Europe. Communism has provided the nations of Central and Eastern Europe with resources and resentment (Bunce 2005: 430) and, with the collapse of state socialism, the region underwent a crisis of values and authority (e.g. Tismaneanu 1998).

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After 1989, post-communist countries were charged with the multiple task of sociocultural, political, and economic transformation (e.g. von Beyme 1996; Linz and Stepan 1996; Miller et al. 1998) – processes which have not fully consolidated and are not necessarily immune from the risk of backsliding (Bunce et al. 2010). For the third time in less than a century, the ‘Leninist extinction’ was directly contributing to challenging and redefining the political, ideological, economic, and military boundaries of the region (Jowitt 1992: 284). In fact, at the outset of the transition process, divisions centring on citizenship, ethnicity, creed, and resource distribution gained new impetus in the region (e.g. Kitschelt 1992; Williams 1999; Whitefield 2002). To be sure, nationalism is not a new phenomenon in Central and Eastern Europe (e.g. Bunce 2005). Especially during Soviet domination, the ethno-cultural conception of the nation-state was overcome by the imposition of an institutional entity that was, by all means and purposes, supranational and defined by territorialpolitical principles (Brubaker 1996). All those nationalistic aspirations repressed under the umbrella of Soviet dominance were, however, easily reignited after 1989 (von Beyme 1996), confirming that nationalism is a phenomenon that had never left Central and Eastern Europe, but rather remained quiescent or adapted to context during the period of communist rule (Brown 1991; Shafir 1999). Already between the two world wars, a number of movements in the region had flirted with authoritarianism and ethno-clerical fundamentalism (e.g. Sugar 1988). As one observer noted, “nationalist passions were not exactly ‘frozen’; they had been asserting themselves for a long time, parallel to the gradual enfeeblement of the totalitarian machinery” (Kolakowski 1992: 51). It took the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the breakup of Czechoslovakia to realise that the liberal promises of 1989 could also remain unfulfilled. Indeed, amongst those who welcomed the demise of Leninism were also revolutionaries who embraced populist fundamentalism, religious fanaticism, and nostalgia for the pre-communist non-democratic regimes (Tismaneanu 2012: 22). In transposing Hirschman’s lesson on the perversity, futility, and jeopardy arguments of reactionary narratives (Hirschman 1991), Tismaneanu sketched three scenarios for post-revolution Central and Eastern Europe: a first scenario, in which the dormant national political cultures (including their chauvinist, residual fascist, ethno-clerical fundamentalist, and militaristic degenerations) would take centre stage and transform the post-communist environment into a more dangerous setting; a second scenario, in which nothing had really changed, with the former power-holders still in charge, although with different clothes and masks; and a third scenario, in which the post-communist publics, disappointed with the outcome of the 1989 revolutions, allowed unscrupulous politicians to make it to the scene and use the new opportunities to establish their domination (Tismaneanu 1999: 2). To varying degrees, post-communist countries have been (or are still) exposed to a synthesis of these three courses. This creates opportunities for the emergence of illiberal parties and movements in the region. At least in part, populist

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radical right parties embody the resurgence of national political cultures; capitalise on public disenchantment over cases of rampant political and economic corruption; and aim at ousting the former ruling elites that hampered change after 1989. In itself, the populist radical right in Central and Eastern Europe produces historical narratives and draws on contextual idiosyncrasies to legitimise a radical change – a change that, in the view of these actors, did not materialise with the transitions of 1989. It has been noted that “East European countries are in the first stages of creating new myths of origin” (Stokes 2012: 50). Be that as it may, nativists had progressively come to reject 1918, since it bears the memory of national and territorial disintegrations; 1945, as it evocates the starting point of communist domination; and 1989, which has lost its resonance mostly because of the growing disillusionment with the processes attached to it. In Chapter 1, emphasis was placed on the role of historical legacies. This study subscribes to the interpretation advanced by Minkenberg (2009: 454), who appraises them as both contextual and textual factors. Legacies come across as contextual factors, as they offer the structural and cultural opportunities for the emergence of populist radical right parties. In turn, legacies are textual factors because they provide the ideological baggage that is revived and reinterpreted by the populist radical right. Pairing post-communist contextual idiosyncrasies with historical legacies then enhances this interpretation. Historical legacies are, by definition, ‘backwardlooking’ factors; placing emphasis on them alone would yield a phenomenon that exclusively harks back to a pre-communist and communist past, for these are the legacies available to contemporary populist radical right parties in Central and Eastern Europe. Drawing attention to post-communist contextual idiosyncrasies has the advantage of extending the range of opportunities and themes of this party family to the current sociocultural and political setting. As a case in point, populist radical right parties in the region are found to romanticise the past as much as to address the dilemmas of the post-communist transformation. This apparently contradictory goal of conservative revolution is something not uncommon to the Central and Eastern European experience. Also in the interwar period, the planned nationalistic revolutions were considered “more of a return to the old national values than a new departure” (Sugar 1972: 16). As far as its core ideological features and organisational aspects are concerned, the populist radical right bears similarities across Europe, thus making this party family in Central and Eastern Europe part of a process of a ‘return to Europe’. Unlike their Western counterparts, however, these parties ‘return to history’ in that they also draw inspiration from a pre-communist and ultranationalist past. Following this reasoning, populist radical right parties in Central and Eastern Europe could be rightfully deemed a phenomenon sui generis. They would qualify so because they embody a combination or synthesis of these two courses rather than neither of the two (cf. Minkenberg 2002). The following section particularly relates these questions to the way the ideology of this party family is framed according to the historical legacies or contextual idiosyncrasies at play.

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The declension of the populist radical right ideology in Central and Eastern Europe This section advances a framework for the analysis of the issues of the populist radical right in Central and Eastern Europe. Such a framework, drawn up on the basis of theoretical and substantive knowledge, helps put these parties’ ideology into place. Populist radical right parties in the region are expected to hark back to a pre-communist past and deal with post-communist issues. In this regard, it seems useful to reason in terms of a recognisable party family fostering a range of pre-communist, communist, and post-communist issues, depending on specific legacies and contexts. The issues fostered by populist radical right parties in Central and Eastern Europe, as formulated in this section, come across as a distinctive declension (or variant) of the populist radical right ideology. These parties are expected to deal with issues such as clericalism and irredentism (pre-communist issues); ‘social-national’ economics; and ethnic minorities, corruption, and the EU (postcommunist issues). The framework advanced herein and the related set of ideological features were brought together on the basis of the historical (pre-communist and communist) legacies and the current sociocultural, political, and economic challenges faced by these countries. The pre-communist past of these countries often coincides with ultranationalist or fascist experiences that emphasised national unity – both spiritual and territorial. The interpenetration of church and state is readily visible in the Slovak case with the clerical dictatorship of Monsignor Jozef Tiso during the Second World War.1 However, other authoritarian movements such as the Nyilaskeresztes Párt (Arrow Cross Party) in Hungary or Bulgarian fascist groups also appealed to Christian and traditional values. In addition, interwar nationalism very much centred on nation-building, with a focus on maintaining or questioning (depending on the gains or losses at stake) the post-conflict status quo. Indeed, nationalist movements in this period maintained a revisionist and aggressive foreign policy aimed at regaining the territories lost in the Balkan War or First World War (e.g. Frusetta and Glont 2009; Ramet 1999b). If post-communist nationalism is actually an expression of an historical cleavage (Tismaneanu 1998), then both clericalism and irredentism should help reinvigorate backward-looking ideologies and long-repressed national values. The collapse of the Communist Bloc also had several implications. First and foremost, the legacy of state socialism set the initial conditions of party competition, especially as far as economic and redistributive issues were concerned. Indeed, three types of communist rule (i.e. bureaucratic-authoritarian, nationalaccommodative, and patrimonial; see Ishiyama 1995; Kitschelt et al. 1999) were identified as influential factors in shaping the fortunes of the populist radical right (Bustikova and Kitschelt 2009). Hence, anti-modern forces such as populist radical right parties in Central and Eastern Europe are reasonably expected to foster antimarket and social-protectionist views. In the post-communist context, potential for the mobilisation of the populist radical right is further defined by current political questions. Minority issues,

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corruption, and the EU appear to be important questions to Central and Eastern European publics, and the populist radical right is expected to supply this demand in light of its nativist, authoritarian, and populist profile. Populist radical right parties focus on sources of identity such as the ethnic community; are antiestablishment and thus anti-corruption by definition2; and champion anti-Western orientations.3 In this regard, the EU could be interpreted as both the most proximate Western enemy and a threat to (recently regained) national independence. Pre-communist issues are then defined as those that draw on the political culture and ideas of the pre-communist period; the ideas at the core of these issues often compare with those of the authoritarian movements of interwar Central and Eastern Europe. Communist issues draw ideological inspiration from the communist period; these issues often combine the nativist aspects of the populist radical right ideology with nostalgia for the communist past. Post-communist issues are rooted in the post-communist period and mainly focus on current political issues.4 Pre-communist issues As far as pre-communist issues are concerned, clericalism and irredentism will come across as the most distinctive features of the populist radical right in Central and Eastern Europe. These issues had received scant or no attention in the agenda of similar parties in Western Europe but were already present in the discourse of populist radical right parties in the region.5 Clericalism and irredentism qualify as pre-communist issues essentially for two reasons: the Christian traditions of these countries pre-date communist rule, and irredentism (actual or potential) in the Central and Eastern European context surfaces with the pan-nationalist movements and territorial claims after the First World War. Ultimately, each pre-communist issue creates a sense of rupture with the communist past. Clericalism, as advocated by these parties, goes beyond a mere emphasis on Christian values and calls for a greater interpenetration of church and state. Some authors have already identified religion as a mobilising factor for the populist radical right (Hockenos 1993; Ramet 1999a: 14). Above all, Ramet (1999a: 14) described radical rightists as those who “often defend their intolerance by appealing to traditions or to sacred texts, painting themselves as the defenders of ‘traditional values’ . . . against the alleged hordes of liberal progressives and other ‘sinners’ ”. Then, referring to radical rightists as the ‘prophets of the patria’ would emphasise in equal measure the importance given to nativism and clericalism to break with the communist past of these countries (and revive their pre-communist past). Whilst the combination of nativism and (Catholic, Protestant, and Orthodox) Christianity generally tends to reinforce the ‘us versus them’ contraposition fostered by the populist radical right, the articulation of principled policies and the interchange between church and state demonstrates a feature peculiar to the Central and Eastern European context. Irredentism is generally seen as part of the ethno-nationalist discourse of interwar authoritarian movements. Following the treaties signed at the end of the First World War, a number of state borders were redrawn and national territories

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disrupted. Thus, the nationalist organisations of these countries advanced claims on neighbouring countries on the grounds of ethnic and historical affiliation. The irredentist discourse has been revamped in a modern fashion and today is largely associated with the rights of national minorities abroad. Nonetheless, irredentism should qualify as an issue in its own right in light of its specific treatment in the parties’ literature. A caveat should be added here. After 1989, and before our period of analysis, only the Magyar Igazság és Élet Pártja (Hungarian Justice and Life Party, MIÉP) retained an outright irredentist discourse (Karsai 1999); this issue was mostly articulated in relation to Hungarian minorities living abroad. This prompts a distinction between forms of actual irredentism and irredentism ‘ex negativo’, which is defined here as the threat of territorial claims by neighbouring countries. Whilst the MIÉP in Hungary drew on actual irredentism, the Slovenská Národná Strana (Slovak National Party, SNS) turned its attention to irredentism ex negativo in its rhetoric (Cibulka 1999: 125–9). Parties can also be expected to sit somewhere in between the two extremes and draw on both facets of the issue according to the pan-nationalist legacies of individual countries. Communist issues Approaching communist issues is not an easy task. Considering that the political debate in Central and Eastern Europe is often framed in terms of keeping the communist past at a distance, almost every populist radical right party in the region may be expected to comply with this tenet. As a result, communist issues sensu stricto, or issues displaying nostalgia for the communist past, should be absent from the agenda of populist radical right parties in Central and Eastern Europe.6 Even so, populist radical right parties in the region can be expected to support state protectionism and leftist economic ideas, mostly in reaction to an unprecedented process of privatisation (Mudde 2007: 129). Such a view would be in line with the work of Kitschelt (1992), who hypothesised the evolution of a link between authoritarian and anti-market politics in Central and Eastern Europe. This opens up a number of scenarios. First, populist radical right parties in the region would tend to play down the neoliberal content of the economic programmes of their Western counterparts (e.g. Betz 1994; Kitschelt and McGann 1995). Second, fostering ‘social-national’ economics would serve to oppose the process of massive privatisation carried out by the ‘anti-national’ (e.g. former communist) elites. Ultimately, this rhetoric should present populist radical right parties as defenders of the ‘transition losers’ (as opposed to the ‘modernisation losers’ of the West), for anti-modern forces are assumed to capitalise on the discontent caused by the retrenchment of the welfare state (Bustikova and Kitschelt 2009: 460). Although social-national economics may appear to be indebted to the legacy of state socialism, the opportunity to define this issue as communist sensu lato is, to say the least, contentious. The leftist imprint of the socioeconomic agenda of these parties should not leave out of consideration the sense of political rupture from the communist past and former communist elites that they convey. These parties do

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not advocate a ‘conservative revolution’ in the vein of National Bolshevik movements (e.g. Bobbio 1994: 50); amidst an apparently irreconcilable ideological confusion, the populist radical right shies away from political extremism and maintains a negative assessment of communist rule. As a case in point, anti-communism is shared almost without exception across parties of the right in Central and Eastern Europe (e.g. Bustikova 2009) and, at the present time, is best delivered through their anti-corruption agenda. Bearing this in mind, social-national economics does not qualify as a post-communist issue either, for modernising political forces in post-communist countries inevitably point towards market liberalisation. Post-communist issues Post-communist issues such as ethnic minorities, corruption, and the EU look at the current social, political, and economic scenario and refer to topics that were absent from the political debate before 1989. As much as these issues could resemble (part of) the agenda of the populist radical right parties of the West and thus entail a ‘return to Europe’, they are nevertheless shaped by the idiosyncrasies of the post-communist context. In order to appraise the substantive difference between pre-1989 and post-1989 exclusionary ideals, it is important to understand that, for example, anti-Semitism was not a mass-mobilising factor in interwar Central and Eastern Europe and that instances of forced assimilation of minorities during communist rule (such as in the case of the ‘Revival Process’ against Bulgaria’s Turkish minorities) mostly came across as legitimising factors in response to phases of economic stagnation (e.g. Bugajski 1994; Bell 1999). Fascist movements in Central and Eastern Europe were politically insignificant, and anti-Semitism became a salient issue only when several fascist leaders were placed at the head of satellite governments in the late 1930s (Sugar 1972: 17). Therefore, the question of ethnic minorities, as it is configured today in Central and Eastern Europe, has been refashioned and politicised only after 1989. Notably, anti-Semitism either disappeared or became secondary in the agenda of populist radical right parties, which in turn use the Roma communities and other indigenous minorities as the principal target of discrimination. Unlike Western Europe and despite their EU membership, countries such as Bulgaria, Hungary, and Slovakia are not (yet) destinations for immigrants. Hence, the enemy for the populist radical right in post-communist countries remains generally ‘within the state and outside the nation’ (Mudde 2007), taking the form of indigenous ethnic minorities. The emergence (or comeback) of populist radical right parties in Central and Eastern Europe is often related to minority issues – that is, the most evident expression of nativism in post-communist countries. Especially throughout the 2000s, demand for nativism has been on the rise (Political Capital 2010); the populist radical right, as a defender of the (ethnic) nation, is expected to respond with an array of solutions to these issues. The indigenous Roma communities have progressively come under attack in post-communist countries; they are often blamed for living at the margins of

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legality and are associated with rising crime figures. Nonetheless, each country generally preserves its own ‘historical’ enemies, as in the case of the Turkish minority in Bulgaria or the Hungarian minority in Slovakia. With regard to anti-Semitism, populist radical right parties are expected to have dropped this rhetoric – if not altogether, at least the most controversial aspects of it. This would be largely in line with considerations of the electoral viability of an overtly extreme rhetoric (Carter 2005) and the fact that “disliking Jews serves little political purpose today” (Ost 1999: 89). This notwithstanding, a conspiratorial outlook on the Jewish community may still be present in the rhetoric of these parties, but it would be mostly of secondary importance and framed in terms of ‘anti-Zionism’ or the blaming of ‘cosmopolitan liberal elites’. The transition process that started in 1989 is also linked to a new form of corruption stemming from the liberalisation and privatisation of national assets (Anastasakis 2002: 4). Corruption certainly represents a crucial question in post-communist countries (e.g. Vachudova 2009), and the success of the populist radical right has also been understood as a reaction to corruption and political unaccountability (Bustikova 2009). The issue, as addressed by populist radical right parties in the region, lends itself to the populist and anti-communist aspects of their ideology. On the one hand, it would be the principal vehicle for populism by framing the political world in dualist terms (Taggart 2000: 113) – that is, ‘the pure people’ against ‘the corrupt elite’ (Mudde 2004: 543). On the other hand, this study argues that corruption qualifies as a post-communist issue for its ability to create a break with the communist past. In general terms, the parties of the (centre and radical) right have advocated lustration procedures intended to screen those holding high public office for past collaboration with communist security apparatus. . . . Centre-left opponents are thus viewed as continuing communist ideology in an attenuated form, ensuring the dominance of elites drawn from nomenklatura structures, or themselves personifying links with the communist past. (Hanley 2004: 17–18) In practice, the anti-communist profile of these parties should find consistent ideological sustenance in the supply of an anti-corruption agenda. Though these parties could be found as denouncing the evil perpetrated by the communist regime, anti-communism can also be interpreted as a battle fought at the policy level (i.e. through anti-corruption policies) and targeting the old communist elites. After the collapse of the Communist Bloc, former political elites retained or regained much of their influence through communist successor parties (PopEleches 1998; Tismaneanu 1996), and the populist radical right is expected to find them responsible for acts of cronyism and corruption in the privatisation of national assets. This should explain why the populist radical right regards lustration as a necessary step to eradicate corruption and complete the transformation process that began in 1989.

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Lastly, accession to the EU demonstrated a critical juncture for post-communist countries. ‘Europe’ functioned as a powerful myth in Eastern Europe: Dissidents, young people, and even reform-minded communist managers longed to share in the personal, political, and moral benefits of ‘Europeanness’, to ‘return’ to a Europe from which they had been cut off by their enforced attachment to a different and distinctly dysfunctional myth, ‘socialism.’ (Judt 1994: 5) To be sure, once committed to accession, the mechanisms of EU conditionality substantially prevented national policy-making (and populist radical right parties) from hampering reform (Vachudova 2008, 2010; Mungiu-Pippidi 2010). Yet it was believed that the populist radical right could benefit from the “inflated expectations concerning EU membership and fatigue from long-lasting austerity measures” (Smilov and Krastev 2008: 9), mostly in light of their Eurosceptic attitudes. Core elements and issues The final part of this section addresses the relationship between the core elements of the populist radical right ideology (i.e. nativism, authoritarianism, and populism) and its proposed declension in Central and Eastern Europe. Table 2.1 shows that all six features advanced here stick to the core concept of nativism (Mudde 2007: 15–20); they help define natives and exclude non-natives on the basis of different criteria – i.e. ethnic, religious, moral, territorial, economic, and political factors. The element of nativism is easily identifiable in issues such as clericalism, ethnic minorities, and corruption. Natives are, in turn, Christians, the dominant national or cultural group, and the ‘pure people’; non-natives or the out-group (i.e. aliens and enemies) are then defined by exclusion or “by a system of difference . . . instituting a political frontier between two opposed camps” (Howarth and Stavrakakis 2000: 11). The remaining three issues deserve further qualification. First, irredentism, as an (actual or potential) attempt to restore state borders on the basis of any territory

Table 2.1 Declension of the populist radical right ideology in Central and Eastern Europe Issue

Nativism

Authoritarianism

Populism

Clericalism Irredentism Social-national economics Ethnic minorities Corruption European Union

• • •

• •

•

• • •

Note: Only the least contentious matches are reported.

• •

• • •

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formerly belonging to the country, relates to nativism because any territorial disruption represents an evident threat to the homogeneity of the nation. In this case, natives will include members of the national community (within and outside national state borders), and the enemy will be represented by the non-native members currently occupying the irredenta; those limiting the rights of national minorities living abroad; and, in its ex negativo variant, those posing threats to the territorial integrity of the nation-state. Second, social-national economics would also reproduce the ‘us versus them’ dichotomy typical of nativism. The issue serves to blame internal and external enemies of the nation for the plundering of national economies. Moreover, socialnational economics comes across as a functional nativist issue in that it elaborates, in chauvinistic terms, an economic agenda for the native people; hence, minorities and other enemies would fail to qualify as recipients of the benefits deriving from these economic platforms. Third, various degrees and forms of distrust of external enemies are visible in the rhetoric of the party family. In light of the anti-Western views conveyed by the populist radical right in the region, international organisations such as the EU or NATO are likely to be portrayed as new colonisers threatening the recently regained economic and political sovereignty of the nation-state. According to the definition advanced in Chapter 1, authoritarianism refers to “the belief in a strictly ordered society, in which infringements of authority are to be punished severely” (Mudde 2007: 23). The concept evidently applies to infringements on the part of ethnic minorities and those (generally, former members of the nomenklatura) found to be involved in political and economic crimes. In terms of irredentism, appeals for punitive measures are expected in the case of violation of national minorities’ rights or, when reference is made to the ex negativo variant, to criminalise any threat to the territorial integrity of the nation-state. In the case of the EU issue, these parties are likely to condemn the ‘anti-national’ and ‘undemocratic’ conduct of the supranational institution and its officials. This notwithstanding, the reaction of the populist radical right will entail moral criminalisation and, in its most radical form, pleas for withdrawal from the Union. Similarly, with their calls for clericalism, populist radical right parties in Central and Eastern Europe are not expected to embark on any religious crusade; therefore, they would resort to clericalism mostly to reinforce the distinction between the in-group and the out-group. The matching of these two issues with authoritarianism was deemed contentious and was not reported in Table 2.1. The relationship between the individual issues and populism largely depends on the breadth attributed to this core feature. If the accent is on the people and the politics of the heartland, populism places the heartland at the core of the community, excluding everything and everyone lying outside of it. “Populism will identify with nationalism when nationalism is an expression of the values of the heartland, but it is clear that the commitment to nation derives from the heartland, and not vice versa” (Taggart 2000: 97). In light of this symbolic resonance, virtually every issue identified in this chapter would bear a relationship with populism. The

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boundaries of this organic community are labile. Accordingly, the heartland may be inclusive (the native people within and outside state borders, the Christian people, the pure people) without, however, including all those in the nation (the bad or corrupt elites). Since the exact correspondence between core features and issues remains open to debate, a more restrictive interpretation was given in this study. In particular, the study only associates the issues of ethnic minorities, corruption, the EU, and social-national economics with the populist element. Whilst the association of the first two issues is rather straightforward, that of the EU and social-national economics shall be further clarified. Populists are indeed diffident of internationalism and cosmopolitanism (Taggart 2000: 96) and associate the EU with elitist and shady decision-making procedures. Following a similar rationale, the elites and dangerous ‘others’ are also depicted as depriving the sovereign people of their prosperity (Albertazzi and McDonnell 2008: 3), offering populists a chance to frame their economic policies in terms of economics for the heartland. The disenchantment with the elite would then result in calls for redistribution to people with ‘real’ national identity (Greskovits 2007: 44).

Towards an analytical framework This chapter has raised a number of questions regarding the emergence of populist radical right parties in Central and Eastern Europe. One of the most prominent hypotheses on the rise of this party family in Western Europe presents this phenomenon as a reaction to a process of sociocultural modernisation – a value change that unfolded with the revolutions of 1968. Populist radical right parties thrived in post-communist countries despite the absence of a full-fledged silent revolution; hence, this chapter started out in search of alternative sources of mobilisation. Considering that populist radical right mobilisation usually takes place in times of accelerated social and cultural change, this study identified 1989 as the most plausible juncture for the rise of this party family in Central and Eastern Europe. Not only had the revolutions of 1989 given way to a multifaceted transition process, but they also brought to the fore issues that had been dormant or had remained unaddressed until that point. The populist radical right reacts to these transformations and produces historical narratives to legitimise a radical change. Questions related to the process of transition are still very salient in the political debate, and the populist radical right is expected to present itself as the most competent actor to deal with these issues. In this regard, the literature on legacies offered a fruitful starting point and drew attention to contextual and textual factors for the emergence of the populist radical right. In other words, context matters, as it offers the raw material that is construed and transformed into text by populist radical right parties. Although historical legacies represent vital elements for the assessment of this phenomenon in the region, they were deemed inherently ‘backward-looking’ factors. Hence, it was

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suggested to refine the analysis of the populist radical right’s context and text by looking also at post-communist idiosyncrasies. Populist radical right parties in the region embody a form of nationalist salvationism emerging from the ideological chaos created by the collapse of state socialism, yet they are also an expression of disaffection of a status quo perceived as politically decadent and morally corrupt (Tismaneanu 2007: 36). In essence, the populist radical right in Central and Eastern Europe is a phenomenon sui generis that reacts to the transformations of 1989 and resorts to historical legacies and contextual idiosyncrasies to frame its ideology. In line with this definition, this chapter outlined a framework for the analysis of the issues of the populist radical right in Central and Eastern Europe. These issues come across as a specific declension of the populist radical right ideology: they are indebted to pre-communist and (to a certain extent) communist legacies as much as to the idiosyncrasies of the post-communist context. With the help of theoretical and substantive knowledge, six issues were identified as likely features of these parties’ ideology in the region. These issues are: • • •

Clericalism and irredentism – issues that romanticise the pre-communist past and help revive old myths; Social-national economics – an issue somewhat indebted to the legacy of state socialism that, in the post-communist context, comes across as an expression of conservatism (or ‘anti-modernity’); Ethnic minorities, corruption, and the EU – issues that represent the perverse effects of the (allegedly) incomplete transition process that started in 1989.

This systematisation is certainly not self-conclusive. The scholarship on the populist radical right emphasised the relevance of certain issues in the analysis of the ideology of these parties (e.g. Mudde 2000b), their impact on national politics (e.g. Minkenberg 2001; Williams 2006), and their electoral performance (e.g. Carter 2005; Norris 2005). This book recognises the lack of similar attempts beyond the realm of Western European politics and precisely aims to advance a workable framework for the study of the populist radical right in Central and Eastern Europe. The following chapter takes the first step in this direction by analysing the ideology of populist radical right parties in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Slovakia.

Notes 1 The nominally independent First Slovak Republic (1939–45) was de facto a Naziprotected state. 2 Anti-corruption and anti-establishment views are intertwined in the populist radical right discourse. As far as ‘populist anti-party sentiments’ are concerned, “all established parties are accused of being thoroughly corrupt” (Mudde 1996: 270). 3 Motives and instances of anti-Western views in the discourse of nationalist organisations in Central and Eastern Europe are documented in Tismaneanu (1998), Anastasakis (2002), and Mudde (2005).

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4 The distinction between pre-communist, communist, and post-communist issues is indebted to the party categorisation by Mudde (2000a), which is amended accordingly for the purposes of this work. 5 Earlier examples include the Magyar Igazság és Élet Pártja (Hungarian Justice and Life Party, MIÉP) in Hungary and the SNS in Slovakia. Conversely, populist radical right parties of the West hardly ever address clerical issues. 6 One notable exception would be the now-marginal Partidul România Mare (Greater Romania Party, PRM) in Romania. See, for example, Shafir (1991) and Mudde (2000a: 14).

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Dalton, R. J. (1988) Citizen Politics in Western Democracies: Public Opinion and Political Parties in the United States, Great Britain, Germany, and France. London: Chatham House. de Lange, S. L., and S. Guerra (2009) ‘The League of Polish Families between East and West, Past and Present’. Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 42 (4): 527–49. Frusetta, J., and A. Glont (2009) ‘Interwar Fascism and the Post-1989 Radical Right: Ideology, Opportunism and Historical Legacy in Bulgaria and Romania’. Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 42 (4): 551–71. Greskovits, B. (2007) ‘Economic Woes and Political Disaffection’. Journal of Democracy, 18 (4): 40–6. Hanley, S. (2004) ‘Getting the Right Right: Redefining the Centre-Right in Post-Communist Europe’. Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, 20 (3): 9–27. Hirschman, A. O. (1991) Rhetoric of Reaction: Perversity, Futility, Jeopardy. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Hockenos, P. (1993) Free to Hate: The Rise of the Right in Post-Communist Eastern Europe. London: Routledge. Howarth, D., and Y. Stavrakakis (2000) ‘Introducing Discourse Theory and Political Analysis’, in D. Howarth, A. J. Norval, and Y. Stavrakakis (eds.) Discourse Theory and Political Analysis: Identities, Hegemonies and Social Change. Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, pp. 1–37. Ignazi, P. (1992) ‘The Silent Counter-Revolution: Hypotheses on the Emergence of Extreme Right-Wing Parties in Europe’. European Journal of Political Research, 22 (1): 3–34. Inglehart, R. (1971) ‘The Silent Revolution in Europe: Intergenerational Change in PostIndustrial Societies’. American Political Science Review, 65 (4): 991–1017. Inglehart, R. (1977) The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles among Western Publics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Inglehart, R. (1981) ‘Post-Materialism in an Environment of Insecurity’. American Political Science Review, 75 (4): 880–900. Inglehart, R. (1984) ‘The Changing Structure of Political Cleavages in Western Society’, in R. J. Dalton, S. C. Flanagan, P. A. Beck, and J. E. Alt (eds.) Electoral Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies: Realignment or Dealignment? Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, pp. 25–69. Inglehart, R., and S. C. Flanagan (1987) ‘Value Change in Industrial Societies’. American Political Science Review, 81 (4): 1289–319. Ishiyama, J. (1995) ‘Communist Parties in Transition: Structures, Leaders and Processes of Democratization in Eastern Europe’. Comparative Politics, 27 (1): 146–77. Jowitt, K. (1992) New World Disorder: The Leninist Extinction. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Judt, T. (1994) ‘Nineteen Eighty-Nine: The End of Which European Era?’ Daedalus, 123 (3): 1–19. Karsai, L. (1999) ‘The Radical Right in Hungary’, in S. P. Ramet (ed.) The Radical Right in Central and Eastern Europe Since 1989. University Park, PA: Penn State Press, pp. 133–46. Kitschelt, H. (1992) ‘The Formation of Party Systems in East Central Europe’. Politics & Society, 20 (1): 7–50. Kitschelt, H., and A. J. McGann (1995) The Radical Right in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.

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Kitschelt, H., Z. Mansfeldova, R. Markowski, and G. Toka (1999) Post-Communist Party Systems: Competition, Representation, and Inter-Party Cooperation. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Kolakowski, L. (1992) ‘Amidst Moving Ruins’. Daedalus 121 (2): 43–56. Linz, J. J., and A. Stepan (1996) Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: South America, Southern Europe, and Post-Communist Europe. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. Miller, W., S. White, and P. Heywood (1998) Values and Political Change in Postcommunist Europe. Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan. Minkenberg, M. (1992) ‘The New Right in Germany’. European Journal of Political Research, 22 (1): 55–81. Minkenberg, M. (2000) ‘The Renewal of the Radical Right: Between Modernity and AntiModernity’. Government and Opposition, 35 (2): 170–88. Minkenberg, M. (2001) ‘The Radical Right in Public Office: Agenda-Setting and Policy Effects’. West European Politics, 24 (4): 1–21. Minkenberg, M. (2002) ‘The Radical Right in Post-Socialist Central and Eastern Europe: Comparative Observations and Interpretations’. East European Politics and Societies, 16 (2): 335–62. Minkenberg, M. (2009) ‘Leninist Beneficiaries? Pre-1989 Legacies and the Radical Right in Post-1989 Central and Eastern Europe: Some Introductory Observations’. Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 42 (4): 445–58. Mudde, C. (1996) ‘The Paradox of the Anti-Party Party: Insights from the Extreme Right’. Party Politics, 2 (2): 265–76. Mudde, C. (2000a) ‘Extreme Right Parties in Eastern Europe’. Patterns of Prejudice, 34 (1): 5–27. Mudde, C. (2000b) The Ideology of the Extreme Right. Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press. Mudde, C. (2004) ‘The Populist Zeitgeist’. Government and Opposition, 39 (3): 541–63. Mudde, C. (ed.) (2005) Racist Extremism in Central and Eastern Europe. London: Routledge. Mudde, C. (2007) Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Mungiu-Pippidi, A. (2010) ‘When Europeanization Meets Transformation: Lessons from the Unfinished Eastern European Revolutions’, in V. Bunce, M. McFaul, and K. StonerWeiss (eds.) Democracy and Authoritarianism in the Postcommunist World. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, pp. 59–81. Norris, P. (2005) Radical Right: Voters and Parties in the Electoral Market. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Ost, D. (1999) ‘The Radical Right in Poland: Rationality of the Irrational’, in S. P. Ramet (ed.) The Radical Right in Central and Eastern Europe Since 1989. University Park, PA: Penn State Press, pp. 85–107. Political Capital (2010) Back by Popular Demand: Demand for Right-Wing Extremism (DEREX) Index . Budapest: Political Capital Policy Research and Consulting Institute. Pop-Eleches, G. (1998) ‘Separated at Birth or Separated by Birth? The Communist Successor Parties in Romania and Hungary’. East European Politics and Societies, 13 (1): 117–47. Ramet, S. P. (1999a) ‘Defining the Radical Right: Values and Behaviors of Organized Intolerance in Post-Communist Central and Eastern Europe’, in S. P. Ramet (ed.) The Radical

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Right in Central and Eastern Europe Since 1989. University Park, PA: Penn State Press, pp. 3–27. Ramet, S. P. (ed.) (1999b) The Radical Right in Central and Eastern Europe Since 1989. University Park, PA: Penn State Press. Rink, D., and S. Gerber (2001) ‘Institutionalization Instead of Mobilization: The Environmental Movement in Eastern Germany’, in H. Flam (ed.) Pink, Purple, Green: Women’s, Religious, Environmental and Gay/Lesbian Movements in Central Europe Today. New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 120–31. Shafir, M. (1991) ‘The Greater Romania Party’. Report on Eastern Europe, 2 (4): 25–30. Shafir, M. (1999) ‘Reds, Pinks, Blacks, and Blues’. RFE/RL Newsline, 3 November. Smilov, D., and I. Krastev (2008) ‘The Rise of Populism in Eastern Europe: Policy Paper’, in G. Mesežnikov, O. Gyárfášová, and D. Smilov (eds.) Populist Politics and Liberal Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe. Bratislava, Slovakia: Institute for Public Affairs, pp. 7–13. Stokes, G. (2012) ‘Purposes of the Past’, in V. Tismaneanu and B. C. Iacob (eds.) The End and the Beginning: The Revolutions of 1989 and the Resurgence of History. Budapest: Central European University Press, pp. 44–63. Sugar, P. F. (1972) ‘Fascism in Interwar Eastern Europe: The Dichotomy of Power and Influence’, in S. Sinanian, I. Deak, and P. C. Ludz (eds.) Eastern Europe in the 1970s. New York: Praeger, pp. 13–32. Sugar, P. F. (1988) ‘The Problems of Nationalism in Eastern Europe: Past and Present’. East European Program Occasional Paper 13. Washington, DC: The Wilson Center. Taggart, P. (1996) The New Populism and the New Politics: New Protest Parties in Sweden in a Comparative Perspective. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Taggart, P. (2000) Populism. Buckingham, UK: Open University Press. Tismaneanu, V. (1996) ‘The Leninist Debris or Waiting for Perón’. East European Politics and Societies, 10 (3): 504–35. Tismaneanu, V. (1998) Fantasies of Salvation: Democracy, Nationalism, and Myth in PostCommunist Europe. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Tismaneanu, V. (1999) ‘Introduction’, in V. Tismaneanu (ed.) The Revolutions of 1989. London: Routledge, pp. 1–18. Tismaneanu, V. (2007) ‘Leninist Legacies, Pluralist Dilemmas’. Journal of Democracy, 18 (4): 34–9. Tismaneanu, V. (2012) ‘Rethinking 1989’, in V. Tismaneanu and B. C. Iacob (eds.) The End and the Beginning: The Revolutions of 1989 and the Resurgence of History. Budapest: Central European University Press, pp. 24–41. Vachudova, M. A. (2008) ‘Tempered by the EU? Political Parties and Party Systems Before and After Accession’. Journal of European Public Policy, 15 (6): 861–79. Vachudova, M. A. (2009) ‘Corruption and Compliance in the EU’s Post-Communist Members and Candidates’. Journal of Common Market Studies, 47 (s1): 43–62. Vachudova, M. A. (2010) ‘Democratization in Postcommunist Europe: Illiberal Regimes and the Leverage of the European Union’, in V. Bunce, M. McFaul, and K. Stoner-Weiss (eds.) Democracy and Authoritarianism in the Postcommunist World. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, pp. 82–104. von Beyme, K. (1996) Transition to Democracy in Eastern Europe. Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan. Webb, P., and S. White (2007) Party Politics in New Democracies. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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Whitefield, S. (2002) ‘Political Cleavages and Post-Communist Politics’. Annual Review of Political Science, 5 (1): 181–200. Williams, C. (1999) ‘Problems of Transition and the Rise of the Radical Right’, in S. P. Ramet (ed.) The Radical Right in Central and Eastern Europe Since 1989. University Park, PA: Penn State Press, pp. 29–47. Williams, M. H. (2006) The Impact of Radical Right-Wing Parties in West European Democracies. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

3

The ideology of the populist radical right in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Slovakia

Introduction The populist radical right in Central and Eastern Europe is interpreted as a phenomenon sui generis that reacts to the transformations of 1989 and resorts to historical legacies and contextual idiosyncrasies to frame its ideology. The previous chapter advanced a series of arguments concerning the issues at the core of these parties’ ideology. In particular, it has been argued that the underlying differences from Western European populist radical right parties should manifest themselves over a set of issues, drawing from pre-communist legacies and post-communist idiosyncrasies. This should lend support to the fact that the populist radical right ideology is context-sensitive and thus framed differently in different places. This chapter delves further into these aspects and specifically addresses questions relative to the ideology of this party family in post-communist Europe. First, this study aims to ascertain whether it is possible to identify distinctive ideological features in the discourse of populist radical right parties. Second, the scope and intensity of these ideological features are analysed and interpreted as they evolve over time. On the one hand, this should determine whether we are indeed confronted with a phenomenon sui generis bearing substantial ideological differences from Western Europe. On the other hand, the features of these parties’ agenda should highlight potential differences within the same party family in the region. The hunch is that no party will entirely resemble each other and that each of them will place selective emphasis on specific issues depending on the idiosyncrasies of their contexts. Moreover, most of these differences are expected to reflect a ‘generational’ divide: parties established in the 2000s (Politicheska Partiya Ataka [Political Party Attack, Ataka] and Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom [Movement for a Better Hungary, Jobbik]) would then deliver a more radical version of the populist radical right ideology, especially compared to parties with a longer record of parliamentary representation (Slovenská Národná Strana [Slovak National Party, SNS]). Data, methodology, and aim Data for analysis primarily consist of the electoral programmes and manifestos of populist radical right parties (Ataka 2005a, 2005b, 2013; Jobbik 2006, 2010c; SNS 2006, 2010, 2012). As party programmes are submitted to party members for

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official endorsement, they are believed to represent the collective stand of the party on the issues and thus outline their expressive function (Borg 1966). Party manifestos have been recognised as the “only direct and clear statement of party policy available to the electorate and directly attributable to the party as such” (Robertson 1976: 72). Electoral programmes for national elections are the principal data source of this chapter, as the focus of investigation remains on domestic party competition. However, when programmatic documents contain only indications of the issues analysed, the analysis resorts to appropriate additional sources. Ataka in particular has contested the first two elections on the basis of two short and unchanging programmatic documents (both released upon foundation in 2005), making it necessary to integrate this information with party leader statements and official media with internal orientation. In this regard, official party websites have progressively come to fulfil the dual function of addressing both the broader public (external orientation) and the grassroots of the party (internal orientation). As a case in point, most of the news, which was once delivered through party newspapers, is now also reported on party websites. Both the particular timing and the sensitive nature of this research project posed a number of challenges to the process of data gathering. By the time the project was initiated in 2011, the three populist radical right parties covered in this book had contested national elections every four years (Ataka in 2005 and 2009; Jobbik and the SNS in 2006 and 2010), allowing for a consistent comparison of their ideology through electoral programmes. When fieldwork started in 2013, however, Slovakia had already held early elections (March 2012), prompting the author to conduct interviews to ‘update’ the ideological positions of the parties on the issues identified. Whilst interviews were arranged and eventually carried out with the leaders of Jobbik and the SNS, Ataka did not seem willing to cooperate. This reluctance may have both practical and ideological reasons. On the one hand, Bulgaria faced a long series of mass protests before and after the national elections of May 2013. Ataka’s party leader, Volen Siderov, has personally backed street protests in the run-up to the elections and has been available only to (certain) Bulgarian media outlets. On the other hand, Ataka is ideologically the most anti-academic and anti-Western party amongst the three, further curbing chances of successful communication with the cadre. Incidentally, these are problems that also affected the conduction of elite surveys in studies on post-communist party systems (Kitschelt et al. 1999). Moreover, during the first years of its political activity, Ataka’s official website presented pages in Bulgarian and English. Roughly between 2009 and early 2013, the English pages of the website were taken down, somewhat suggesting that the party may have had no interest in appealing to an international ‘Western’ audience.1 The same party eventually overcame the problem of missing data for the year 2013; in occasion of the 2013 parliamentary elections, Ataka has indeed assembled its first fullfledged programme, which updates and completes our understanding of the party stance on the set of issues identified. As far as the interviewing of party officials is concerned, Mudde (2007: 36–8) raises some important questions concerning what or who represents the political

Ideology of the populist radical right 55 party. Besides the official party literature (which remains the primary data source of this study), the representativeness of the party ideology (as delivered by party leaders and representatives) very much depends on the organisation and structure of the party. At the structural level, populist radical right parties are fluid and ‘open-ended’ (Gunther and Diamond 2003: 188); whilst some put the accent on the ‘leadership principle’ (Ataka and the SNS), others resemble a looser organisation with a dynamic leadership (Jobbik). Therefore, resorting to interviews with high-ranking party officials in the case of Jobbik (Márton Gyöngyösi, the deputy leader of Jobbik’s parliamentary group, vice-chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Hungarian Parliament, and member of the Hungarian national group of the Inter-Parliamentary Union during the 2010–14 legislature) and the party president in the case of the SNS (Andrej Danko) should, in principle, guarantee a high degree of accuracy in the representation of respective party stances for the year 2013. The method employed for the study of the issues of the populist radical right in Central and Eastern Europe is qualitative content analysis. Simply put, “the selected material is ‘read carefully’ [or interpreted, in the case of interviews] and the most important ideological features, according to the researcher, are presented”, often with illustrative quotations (Mudde 2000: 22). Although certainly more labour intensive and time consuming, this method is best suited for the explorative and interpretive purposes of this work and allows for retaining detailed information on the components of the ideology of this party family. An alternative line of enquiry, not adopted in this study, is quantitative content analysis. This technique has become widely acknowledged in the discipline through the Comparative Manifesto Project (e.g. Budge et al. 1987; Budge et al. 2001; Klingemann et al. 2006). As the Manifesto Project’s assessment of positioning and salience over policy dimensions is bound to pre-determined categories and is generally dependent on the number of references made in the text, its data is believed to poorly serve the explorative and interpretive goals of this book. The previous chapters have placed emphasis on the role of context in shaping the populist radical right’s text. Especially for this reason, this chapter expects to unveil qualitative, rather than quantitative, differences in the ideological features of these parties, depending on their historical legacies and contextual idiosyncrasies. Moreover, whilst the individual issues of the populist radical right in Central and Eastern Europe could be interpreted as self-standing ‘outlets’ for the nativist, authoritarian, and populist ideology of these parties, they should also maintain a degree of interdependence and mutual communication. Therefore, human coding is believed to offer the flexibility necessary to tackle these aspects but also ensure that measure validation is linked to the analyst’s theoretical concerns (Shultz et al. 1998: 270). The aim of the analysis is twofold. First, the chapter seeks to discover what minimum and maximum combination of issues makes up the populist radical right ideology in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Slovakia. Second, the chapter aspires to find out whether the populist radical right in Central and Eastern Europe constitutes an internally homogeneous party family. These goals are achieved through the same

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means – that is, by ascertaining the presence and salience of each issue for Ataka, Jobbik, and the SNS. When a certain issue is present and salient, it is deemed a core feature of party ideology; conversely, the sole presence of the issue in the party literature indicates that the feature is not a core feature; the presence of the issue outside the party programme would also disqualify the feature from being a core feature.2 Finally, a feature is considered absent if it is absent from the party literature or if there is substantial divergence in the formulation of the issue, as framed in Chapter 2. A qualification should be made with regard to the European Union (EU) issue. Contributions on national parties’ positions on the EU and European integration abound (e.g. Hooghe et al. 2002; Marks and Steenbergen 2004; Marks et al. 2006; Szczerbiak and Taggart 2008a, b; Taggart and Szczerbiak 2013; de Vries and Edwards 2009; Arnold et al. 2012), with a body of literature focusing on Euroscepticism both in old (Taggart 1998) and new member states (Kopecký and Mudde 2002; Taggart and Szczerbiak 2004). As the ultimate bearers of national interests against supranational elites, populist radical right parties across Europe are likely to present positions ranging from ‘Eurosceptic’ to ‘Euroreject’ (Kopecký and Mudde 2002). In line with the framework elaborated by Kopecký and Mudde (2002), the analysis of the EU issue carried out in this chapter subscribes to a differentiation of party positions on the basis of diffuse and specific support for European integration. Populist radical right parties are naturally expected to deliver Eurosceptic and Euroreject positions (Table 3.1). Populist radical right parties are regarded as ‘EUpessimists’, for they “do not support the EU as it is at the moment, or are pessimistic about the direction of its development” (Kopecký and Mudde 2002: 302). This notwithstanding, EU-pessimists do not necessarily oppose EU membership. EU-pessimists can still be ‘Europhiles’ in that they “believe in the key ideas of European integration underlying the EU: institutionalized cooperation on the basis of pooled sovereignty (the political element) and an integrated liberal market economy (the economic element)” (Kopecký and Mudde 2002: 301). Those parties combining EU-pessimism and Europhilia can be labelled as ‘Eurosceptics’. ‘Eurorejects’, on the other hand, combine EU-pessimism with Europhobia, as they “fail to support one or more of the ideas underlying European integration” (Kopecký and Mudde 2002: 301). The evolution of party-based EU-pessimism and the possible ideological differences experienced by this party family will be elaborated accordingly in the appropriate sections of this chapter. Table 3.1 Typology of party positions on Europe Support for European integration

Support for the EU

EU-optimists EU-pessimists

Source: Kopecký and Mudde (2002: 303).

Europhile

Europhobe

Euroenthusiasts Eurosceptics

Europragmatists Eurorejects

Ideology of the populist radical right 57 The chapter is structured as follows: each section presents, in turn, populist radical right parties in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Slovakia, outlining their histories, courses of action, and sources of analysis. Each following sub-section explores the ideological evolution of each relevant issue, proceeding from ‘pre-communist’ to ‘post-communist’ issues (i.e. clericalism, irredentism, social-national economics, ethnic minorities, corruption, and the EU). In order to capture the evolution of party stances on these issues and allow meaningful comparisons across cases, the analysis focuses on the periods from 2005 to 2006, 2009 to 2010, and 2012 to 2013. After examining commonalities and differences in the issues advocated by the parties, the chapter advances comparative perspectives on their ideology as well as minimum and maximum combinations of ideological features for the populist radical right.

Political Party Attack (Ataka) Despite a long history of anti-minority policies, Bulgaria has never been a hotbed for populist and radical right politics. During the first 15 years of democratic elections, far right parties systematically fell short of parliamentary representation; the electoral support for all far right parties combined never exceeded 2 per cent. Accordingly, extreme and radical right organisations played only a marginal role in shaping Bulgarian politics, and the sub-cultural milieu (e.g. the skinhead movement) has been constantly fragmentary, incoherent, and dispersed (Ivanov and Ilieva 2005: 13). By and large, nativist politics have been monopolised by the communist regime and, after its demise, by the communist successor party (Genov 2010: 35). Before 1989, the Bulgarska Komunisticheska Partiya (Bulgarian Communist Party, BKP) was responsible for several name- and religion-change campaigns targeting Muslims, Turks, and Roma minorities. Under the leadership of Todor Zhivkov, the BKP started cultivating nationalist themes and assimilationist policies in response to the economic stagnation and declining birth rate of the 1970s and 1980s. The peak was reached in the second half of the 1980s with the launch of the so-called Revival Process – a campaign of ethnic homogenisation that ultimately resulted in the flight or expulsion of more than 300,000 ethnic Turks and Muslims (Bell 1999: 243). The successor of the BKP, the Bulgarska Sotsialisticheska Partiya (Bulgarian Socialist Party, BSP) was deemed the representative of national interests, and the presence of nationalists in the left-wing camp continued until the political and economic turbulences of 1996–7 (Genov 2010). In the face of the turmoil in the Balkan region during the 1990s, observers point out that Bulgaria has been able to develop a successful model of ethnic integration, preventing any real tensions between Bulgarians and ethnic Turks (e.g. Vigenin 2011: 197). By the late 1990s, all major political formations supported the consolidation of democratic institutions and successfully prevented ethnic tensions from breaking out; indeed, right-wing radicalism did not rank high amongst the problems of post-communist Bulgaria (Bell 1999: 254). Despite the constitutional provision limiting party representation on ethnic, racial, or religious grounds,3 the

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Dvizhenie za Prava i Svobodi (Movement for Rights and Freedoms, DPS) has functioned as the political vehicle for the Turkish minority since 1990. By the early 2000s, both socialist and conservative governments had proven to be unable to tackle the increasing impoverishment of the population and were soon linked to mismanagements and scandals in the process of the privatisation of national assets. Furthermore, the Bulgarian public met the rising crime figures with growing disappointment, as well as the attainment of member status of NATO and the EU without serious public debate (Genov 2010). The populist radical right Ataka was founded on 17 April 2005 by popular TV host Volen Siderov and since then has been tightly controlled by its founder.4 Siderov was a local secretary for the dissident trade union Podkrepa prior to 1989 and started his career in journalism in 1990 as editor-in-chief of Demokratsiya (Democracy), the media outlet of the Sayuz na Demokratichnite Sili (Union of Democratic Forces, SDS). Later, he went on to serve as the editor-in-chief of the Monitor national daily – a newspaper that has regularly featured explicit hate speech targeting Roma, Jews, Turks, and religious minorities, both non-traditional and Muslims. . . . Anti-European, anti-US and anti-NATO rhetoric are also a constant in Monitor, as well as very aggressive hate speech against domestic human rights NGOs and activists, and international public interest figures. (Ivanov and Ilieva 2005: 10) Between 2001 and 2004, Siderov wrote and published three books: Bumerangat na Zloto (The Boomerang of Evil), Bulgarophobia, and Vlastta na Mamona (The Power of Mammon). Excerpts from the first book had already been published in Monitor, and it comes across as an anti-Semitic and conspiratorial account of the ills of the world – including the 70 years of communism in Russia and the ravages of global capitalism (Siderov 2002). Bulgarophobia looks at post-communist Bulgarian affairs and identifies those ‘national traitors’ (i.e. the Bulgarian political elite) and foreign ‘bulgarophobes’ (e.g. international organisations and ‘cosmopolitan’ elites) responsible for the sale of national assets, the deteriorating state of the Bulgarian economy, and rising crime and unemployment (Siderov 2003). Most notably, part of these accounts would end up constituting the core of the programmatic ‘20 Principles’ of the party (cf. Ataka 2005a). Vlastta na Mamona (Siderov 2004) returns to the anti-Semitic style of Bumerangat na Zloto, “further developing the idea of an international Jewish plot to eradicate Eastern Orthodox Christianity” (Ghodsee 2008: 33). After an unsuccessful race to become the Sofia mayor in 2003, Siderov rapidly came to prominence as the host of the night TV show ‘Ataka’ on the private cable station SKAT. Since 2004, Siderov has used the platform as a vehicle to take sides with the angry and disenfranchised common man and bring attention to three topics in particular: the increasing rate of Roma criminality, the ever-growing threat of ‘Turkification’ of Bulgaria promoted by the DPS and its partners, and the moral corruption of the entire political establishment (Popova 2013: 6). Mostly due to

Ideology of the populist radical right 59 his increasing popularity, Siderov decided to enter Bulgarian politics and contest the upcoming elections on the basis of these themes. As Ataka could not register as an independent party in time for the June 2005 elections, it organised as a coalition – Natsionalen Sayuz Ataka (National Union Attack) – led by Siderov and including the Natsionalno Dvizhenie za Spasenie na Otechestvoto (National Movement for the Salvation of the Fatherland), Bulgarska Natsionalno-Patriotichna Partiya (Bulgarian National-Patriotic Party), Sayuz na Patriotichnite Sili i Voinite ot Zapasa ‘Zashtita’ (Union of Patriotic Forces and Militaries of the Reserve ‘Defence’), and Partiya Nova Zora (New Dawn Party). These organisations built on a common ideological ground of nativism and populism, with some of them starting from radical left, aggressive ultranationalist positions. The first two organisations were substantially marginal platforms with valid court registration, whilst the latter were expected to contribute to the electoral cause of the coalition through their network of local activists (Popova 2013: 6). At the 2005 elections, Ataka gained 8.1 per cent of the popular vote and sent 21 members to the national assembly. Shortly afterwards, the coalition reorganised as a party – Politicheska Partiya Ataka (Political Party Attack) – still under the leadership of Siderov. Amidst a series of personal scandals and internal struggles within the party, Siderov made it to the second round of the presidential election in 2006 against the incumbent Georgi Parvanov, gaining 24.1 per cent of votes. At the European Parliament elections of 2007 and 2009, the party secured 14.2 (three seats) and 12 per cent of votes (two seats), respectively. At the general elections held in 2009, Ataka further improved the 2005 results, winning 9.4 per cent of votes and 21 seats in parliament. During the 2009–13 term, the party offered unconditional external support to the Grazhdani za Evropeisko Razvitie na Bulgaria (Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria, GERB) government led by Boyko Borisov. In spite of the ethnic tensions that preceded the 2011 presidential elections, Siderov lost ground with just 3.7 per cent of votes. In late January 2013, anti-government protests spread over major Bulgarian cities. These protests were triggered by discontent with high electricity bills and, on the whole, foreign monopolies operating in the country. Despite signs of declining consensus, Ataka grew increasingly critical of GERB’s policies and, by the time the Borisov cabinet resigned in February 2013, Siderov’s party position had become all-out confrontational. The party undertook an unequivocal antigovernment stance and, in May 2013, Ataka entered the Bulgarian Parliament for the third consecutive time, with 7.3 per cent of the popular vote and 23 seats. The 2013 elections resulted in a hung parliament, with GERB securing a majority of votes, yet without the numbers to form a cabinet. The largely technocratic BSPDPS coalition government led by Plamen Oresharski was instated on 29 May 2013. The new cabinet was approved thanks to the support of the BSP and the DPS, as well as Ataka’s boycott of the session. In this instance, Siderov’s party practically acted as a kingmaker for the new government. The support offered to the BSP-DPS government had disastrous consequences for the party. Public support for Ataka plummeted over the course of the

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legislature, leading to a meagre 3.0 per cent of votes and no seats in the European Parliament elections of May 2014. With another political turnaround, Siderov decided to stand against the Oresharski government, which eventually resigned in July 2014 under increasing pressure from opposition forces and coalition partners alike. Ataka’s electoral decline continued through the early elections of October 2014 (Table 3.2), though it managed to cross the electoral threshold and enter parliament again (4.5 per cent of votes and 11 seats). In the meantime, Siderov’s monopoly on populist and nativist issues had been challenged by a plethora of political organisations. Amongst them, the newly formed coalition Patriotichen Front (Patriotic Front, PF), comprising the Natsionalen Front za Spasenie na Bulgaria (National Front for the Salvation of Bulgaria, NFSB) and the long-standing Bulgarsko Natsionalno Dvizhenie (Bulgarian National Movement, VMRO). The PF gained 7.3 per cent of votes in the 2014 early elections, collectively sending 19 representatives to the 43rd National Assembly. Following lengthy consultations, the PF offered support to the GERBled minority government in November 2014. In practice, the PF may have come to supersede Ataka by sustaining a nativist model that has consolidated during the previous decade (e.g. Dawson 2014). The material used for the analysis of Ataka’s ideological features primarily consists of two short programmatic documents released for the 2005 Bulgarian elections (the ‘20 Principles of the Ataka Party’ and the ‘Programmatic Scheme’) and a full-fledged 144-page electoral programme (‘The Siderov Plan against Colonial Slavery’), released ahead of the May 2013 early elections. The schematic nature of the first two documents prompted the use of the party leader’s statements and official media to integrate the assessment of the party’s stance on each issue. Overall, the 2013 electoral programme presents us with a collection of what Ataka had stood for during the first eight years of its political activity. The issues touched upon in the early documents are upheld and often expanded in the latter programme. Although all documents maintain an unequivocal populist and radical character, the impression is that certain dividing lines have been marked with the 2013 programme. For the first time, the party no longer seems to blame the establishment as a whole; instead, it appears to be inclined to identify certain political parties and figures as being more responsible than others for Bulgaria’s recent loss of status. This is especially the case for all those involved in Bulgaria’s ‘neoliberal Table 3.2 Electoral performance of Ataka by type of election

Parliamentary Presidential European Seats *

June 2005

October May 2006 2007

June 2009

July October May May October 2009 2011 2013 2014 2014

8.1% – – 21

– 24.1%* – N/A

– – 12.0% 2

9.4% – – 21

– – 14.2% 3

– 3.7% – N/A

7.3% – – 23

Refers to the second round of voting. N/A = not applicable.

Source: Parties and Elections in Europe Database, www.parties-and-elections.eu.

– – 3.0% –

4.5% – – 11

Ideology of the populist radical right 61 turn’ initiated by Ivan Kostov’s government (1997–2001). Moreover, Ataka’s rabid anti-Turkish and anti-DPS rhetoric has been recently stripped of its most controversial aspects. Considering that the BSP-DPS government was instated in May 2013 thanks to Ataka’s tacit support, the populist radical right party’s (selectively moderate) façade may not be completely accidental. Clericalism Clericalism is the first pre-communist issue analysed. As noted previously, Ataka adheres to the leadership principle, and the political outlook of party leader Volen Siderov directly informs its ideological positions. Therefore, it should not be surprising to find consistent replication of Siderov’s personal views in the programmatic documents of the party. This certainly applies to Ataka’s position on clericalism. As a theology graduate (Novinite 2009), Siderov places Orthodox Christianity and its principles at the core of the party platform, which also inspired an official agreement with the Bulgarian Orthodox Church in 2006 (Feffer 2012). Ataka, as a Bulgarian patriotic party, aspires to unite the nation under the common creed of (Orthodox) Christianity. In this regard, the first principle of the party, which paraphrases the first two articles of the Bulgarian constitution, is perhaps paradigmatic: the unitary and monolithic nature of the Bulgarian state shall not be undermined by questions related to (nonChristian) religion or faith (Ataka 2005a). In its ‘Programmatic Scheme’, Ataka devotes a specific section to the issue (‘Creed’). Here, the party advocates the return of confiscated properties to the Church; the endorsement of Orthodox Christianity as the state religion; and the delineation of a statute of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church as a financially and organisationally stable institution which plays a significant role in Bulgarian society and outlines the values for the future of Bulgaria (Ataka 2005b). In addition to appeals for the strengthening of the Orthodox Church, Ataka turns to the question of religion in the seventh chapter (‘Education’) of its 2013 programme, aiming at the introduction of religion as a compulsory subject in school curricula as it was prior to 1944 (Ataka 2013: 70). Irredentism As the second pre-communist issue analysed, the question of irredentism is imbued with historical references to the Bulgarian pre-communist past. Although Ataka places greater emphasis on the ex negativo facet of the issue (see Chapter 2), mostly in relation to an alleged Turkish threat to the country, ex positivo aspects of irredentism are also addressed. In its two early programmatic documents, Ataka does not explicitly refer to external homelands. However, statements delivered through official media channels and by Siderov himself confirm that irredentism is certainly part of Ataka’s platform. Partly in connection to minority issues, Ataka has repeatedly denounced a Turkish irredentist threat in Bulgaria (irredentism ex negativo). Part of this view is, once again, encapsulated in the first of the ‘20 Principles’, which rejects forms

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of secession on ethnic grounds. Similarly, the party proposes to ban any secessionist organisation in the second point of the programmatic document (Ataka 2005a). In February 2009, the party released a statement addressed to the President and the Prime Minister of Turkey denouncing the atrocities inflicted by the Turks on the Bulgarian people. This statement also included explicit references to territorial issues: In 1913, breaking the London peace treaty, regular Turkish troops passed the Enos-Midia boundary and invaded Bulgaria’s territory. Tens of villages with Bulgarian population were burnt and devastated while their inhabitants – Bulgarian Christians: men, women and children – were killed by the Turkish army. Over 300,000 Bulgarians from Eastern Tracey were expelled from their native lands and their estates were plundered. According to [the] Carnegie Commission report from that epoch and according to the data stored in Bulgarian and Turkish foreign ministries the price of these estates equals to over USD 10 billion today. (Ataka 2009) The question of monetary compensation for the territories lost to Turkey is brought forward once more in the 2013 programme (Ataka 2013: 130). Nonetheless, irredentist threats remain an actual problem for the party. Especially in areas with a strong Turkish minority or under the control of the DPS, such as the Kardzhali province, Siderov claims that separatist forces might seek to break off from the rest of the country (e.g. Novinite 2010). Ataka seems to draw also on the other facet of the issue. Historically, most of the territorial disputes that are the subject of Bulgarian (actual) irredentism concern the Macedonian question (Bell 1999: 243–9). Siderov personally maintained that the Macedonian population and territory historically belong to the Bulgarian nation (Novinite 2009). More recently, some Romanian claims on Bulgarian territory (Ataka 2012a) have stimulated the irredentist rhetoric of the party; in response to these claims, the party envisaged a potential backlash in Northern Dobrudja, a Romanian region historically inhabited by ethnic Bulgarians (Ataka 2012b). The two facets of Ataka’s irredentism are effectively summarised in its unwillingness to compromise with Skopje and its hard line on Turkey (Ataka 2013: 31). Social-national economics Ever since its foundation, Ataka has appealed to an economic platform defined as ‘social capitalism’. Even though the party advocates the delineation of a clear ratio of private and public ownership (Ataka 2005b), in essence Ataka has taken a consistent dirigiste, protectionist, and autarchic position as far as socioeconomic policies are concerned. In order to satisfy the needs of the Bulgarian population, the party aims at reverting privatisation and concession deals and renationalising all those assets (e.g. high technology, chemistry, electronics, the arms industry,

Ideology of the populist radical right 63 agriculture) deemed crucial for the recovery and growth of the Bulgarian economy (Ataka 2005a, b, 2013). Indeed, whilst the sixth point of the ‘20 Principles’ holds that “Bulgarian businesses, both public and private, shall be supported by the state within its boundaries and abroad”, the ninth point states that “Bulgaria’s production, commerce, banks and all other means of production should be in Bulgarian hands” (Ataka 2005a). The economic agenda of the party aptly serves the populist profile of the party. On the one hand, Ataka uses the questions of taxation and salaries to pit the good of the Bulgarian people against (the requirements of) the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (i.e. the supranational elite). On the other hand, the revision of the state budget shall be undertaken to ultimately favour the good of Bulgarian citizens rather than the ‘ruling elite’ (Ataka 2005a). The ‘Programmatic Scheme’ succinctly exposes the aforementioned principles without, however, adding much on the means to implement these policy goals. In particular, Ataka advocates the reallocation of budget funds to social security and health, as well as the introduction of a progressive taxation system and a guaranteed minimum wage (Ataka 2005b). These positions were again submitted in the 2013 electoral programme, in which the party states: “we, the nationalists, want our fathers, mothers, grandfathers and grandmothers to have respectful pensions and lives, and not to get ridicule and misery from their own country” (Ataka 2013: 26). Especially with reference to salaries, the programme critically posits: “Bulgarians, are we nine times more inferior to the rest of Europe that we get nine times less than the EU’s average?” (Ataka 2013: 10). On the whole, the elements at the core of the party’s economic agenda maintain a discernible ‘leftist’ breed and appear to be ostensibly indebted to the legacy of state socialism.5 Yet this economic platform is not merely ‘social’ and protectionist; in essence, Ataka’s ‘social capitalism’ is primarily an outlet for its blend of nativism and populism. The principal targets of Ataka’s discourse remain those national and foreign elites (i.e. economists and former governments, especially from Ivan Kostov’s government onwards; the IMF; and the World Bank) who have pushed the country towards the brink of poverty (e.g. Ataka 2013: 16ff. and 52). In the introduction of the 2013 programme, the party claims that “Bulgaria has been colonised since 1997” (Ataka 2013: 3) and that “there is no sector at home that brings good revenue and is not in foreign hands” (Ataka 2013: 9). Finally, and directly drawing on one of the ‘hot topics’ of the 2013 electoral campaign, the party stated that ownership of energy companies should be in Bulgarian hands (rather than in those of foreigners “who despise us and discriminate against us”) and that the profits should be used for national education, pensions, and health care (Ataka 2013: 26). Ethnic minorities The introductory part of this section outlined how the Bulgarian ethnic model has been preserved throughout the post-communist period. Starting from the early 2000s, Volen Siderov actively contributed to questioning this model, mainstreaming a virulent anti-minorities discourse in the Bulgarian public debate. Initially

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through the columns of Monitor and his own books and successively through his TV show, Siderov systematically blamed Roma, Turkish, and Jewish communities for the problems affecting today’s Bulgaria. As noted previously, much of Siderov’s personal outlook on Bulgarian affairs has been translated into the political platform of his party. However, pragmatic political considerations based on the viability of an extremist rhetoric seem to have prompted Ataka’s leader to formulate these positions in fairly subtle terms within party manifestos. As a result, questions concerning ‘Roma criminality’ have been almost completely omitted from the early programmatic documents of the party; the anti-Turkish rhetoric has been often channelled through proposing bans on the political representative of the Turkish minority, the DPS (e.g. Ataka 2013: 95); and the anti-Semitic discourse has been dropped from official party platforms or has taken a more veiled form. The main target of nativism in the programmatic documents of Ataka is the Turkish minority of Bulgaria. The first two points of the ‘20 Principles’ precisely address questions affecting the Turkish minority and the ethno-liberal DPS. However, whilst the defining issue of Bulgarian nationality outlined in the first point maintains a sufficiently large breadth to apply to any ethnic group, the second implicitly aims at curbing the rights of the Turkish minority: The official language in Bulgaria is the Bulgarian language; the national media supported by the state budget shall not feature broadcasts and editions in other languages. Bans and clear sanctions shall be imposed on ethnic parties and secessionist organisations. (Ataka 2005a) As far as language rights are concerned, Ataka proposes an act on the protection of the Bulgarian language in its ‘Programmatic Scheme’ (Ataka 2005b). However, it is mostly through official media and Siderov’s statements that the party articulates its stance on ethnic minorities. For instance, on its website, the party refers to the DPS as a Turkish Muslim party formed in 1983 as an illegal terrorist group that committed over 50 fire-raisings, bomb attempts and murders of Bulgarian citizens in the period between 1983 and 1989. . . . After 1990 the Turkish terrorist movement led by Ahmed Dogan was known as Movement for Rights and Freedoms and took part in almost every Bulgarian Government since then. Nowadays [DPS] is a complete criminal-political mob and its leader Ahmed Dogan is a criminal affairs billionaire taking decisions about the government of the country. In 2005 President Parvanov gave the mandate for governing Bulgaria to the Turkish terrorist movement and now the country is ruled by those who detonated trains 22 years ago. (Ataka 2008) The party left the most virulent aspects of its anti-Roma rhetoric outside the short and unchanging early manifestos. In the ‘Programmatic Scheme’, the party

Ideology of the populist radical right 65 succinctly advocates a government plan for the “control and eradication of Gypsy crime” (Ataka 2005b). As a result, the contentious portions of the party ideology often have to be retrieved from interviews or public statements. This is especially the case for Siderov’s outlook on Roma communities: [T]hey live in ghettos, in absolute ignorance. This prevents the children from getting education, learning a trade, becoming integrated citizens of the society. These people are used for criminal activities in order to make rich their leaders who keep their own people in poverty. We believe that every Bulgarian citizen should be integrated instead of living in tribal societies so that they can work and support their family with that. We are probably the only parliamentary party with a clear vision of how to integrate the Roma because this is a huge problem, and unless we act now, in ten years it would be much worse. . . . This is an anonymous mass whose leaders urge it to commit crimes. These people do not pay their taxes, or water or electricity bills, which is extremely annoying for the rest of the society which sees a double standard. (Novinite 2009) Ataka returns to the Roma issue in the 2013 electoral programme. In this document, the party envisages the end of scenarios in which Roma people would get away with beating up policemen (Ataka 2013: 34).6 Moreover, in the chapter devoted to the judiciary, the Roma community is generally associated with specific forms of crime (e.g. assault, theft, and rape) – practices allegedly leading to the depopulation of entire villages: “people leave their occupation because the fruits of their labour are anyway stolen” (Ataka 2013: 98). In the face of the widespread sense of injustice and inequality before the law, the party calls for “real protection of life and property with a gun” (Ataka 2013: 98) and to privilege “the rights of the victims above the rights of the criminal!” (Ataka 2013: 99). As an additional means to deal with minority issues, the party aims at the establishment of a voluntary militia in every village: “we think that there is no better and applicable way to guarantee the protection of the rights of citizens in times when the state is showing utter helplessness to deal with the problem” (Ataka 2013: 99). Corruption Corruption and, broadly defined, political crime represent one of the crucial areas of contestation for Ataka. Through its stance on corruption, the party reinforces its populist and anti-establishment profile and aims to come across as the only viable parliamentary alternative to deal with this post-communist issue. Ataka has placed great emphasis on the issue from the outset. The party’s view on the revision of privatisation deals is not only inspired by its socioeconomic platform and autarchic goals. According to the party, these deals have been predominantly tainted by instances of corruption and reached at the expenses of the good of the Bulgarian people. Hence, the party calls for a ‘Clean Hands’ operation “to identify and prosecute those who grew rich overnight through crime” as well

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as the “investigation of all deals conducted with the participation of politicians” (Ataka 2005a). ‘National betrayal’ serves as the rationale behind the confiscation of illegally acquired assets, and the party envisages the enforcement of a legal formula to allow the prosecution of those national enemies (Ataka 2005a). In line with these purposes, the party aspires to disclose police and security services files to prosecute those criminal acts that had taken place during the previous decade (Ataka 2005b). The party calls for a halt to corruption at different levels: from the Ministry of Regional Development (Ataka 2013: 108) to spheres outside strict political and economic circles. Indeed, national betrayers are also those who favour, through judicial means, the perpetuation of these crimes. Therefore, Ataka also calls for the investigation and prosecution of corrupt magistrates (Ataka 2005b, 2013: 95–7). In the 2013 electoral programme, the party identifies questions pertaining to the judiciary and corruption as the most important factors after the foreign colonisation that has taken place in Bulgaria since the 1990s. “The feeling of ruling injustice and inequality before the law, the inability to defend and maintain basic civil and human rights is part of the everyday life of Bulgarians” (Ataka 2013: 95). The impunity of national betrayers looms large in the introduction of the programme (Ataka 2013: 15–23). Starting with former Prime Minister Ivan Kostov, the programme lists a number of figures who had dominated the Bulgarian political life up until that point: “don’t vote for these people and their parties! Gather data about their crimes towards Bulgaria, so that they may face justice one day!” (Ataka 2013: 16). The European Union Ataka has maintained a critical stance on the EU throughout its political lifespan. The EU is easily perceived as an unaccountable supranational elite promoting neoliberal ideals. At the same time, the EU embodies the most proximate foreign entity undermining Bulgaria’s sovereignty and interests. Ataka’s outlook on the EU has been less erratic compared to other (Central and Eastern) European populist radical right parties. The reason for this relative consistency depends on the circumstantial nature of the party’s EU-pessimism. In particular, the biggest deal of contention is represented by the shutdown of the Kozloduy nuclear power plant – a strategic asset for the energetic self-sustenance of Bulgaria. Ataka claims that EU accession was negotiated on unfavourable terms and had, on the whole, detrimental effects for Bulgaria. In light of these considerations, the party aims to revise the closed chapters of EU negotiations, renegotiate all unfavourable clauses, and rescind any stipulation affecting the dismantling of the Kozloduy nuclear power plant (Ataka 2005a, 2013: 53). In the ‘Programmatic Scheme’, the party outlines Bulgaria’s need to adhere to a principle of ‘undisputed sovereignty’ (Ataka 2005b). Party leader Siderov articulates this principle: We have a vision for a Europe of nations and nation-states that have all sorts of connections but preserve their national delineation. . . . What we need here

Ideology of the populist radical right 67 is a union of nations where everyone is equally respected and there are opportunities for the development of the real sector. . . . It is something like the COMECON earlier. We believe that there must be a greater freedom in the EU, a more flexible structure, a harmony of states, and that it should not turn into a pyramid-like structure. (Novinite 2009) In another interview, Siderov further elaborates on the party’s vision of the EU and the question of Bulgarian interests in relation to EU membership (see also Ataka 2005b, 2013: 32 and 54): We should have a better policy, without leaving the European community. The EU, however, is built on the wrong foundation. It should be a set of countries that trade between each other on equal footing. That was de Gaulle’s idea of Europe. And now the trend is to make it a new Roman Empire, something that we don’t accept. And there is strong opposition coming from parties identical to ours. Toward the EU, we should be cooperative, of course, but we should never forget that the world is larger than the EU. . . . We should have a global policy, but we should also take care of our own sovereignty, so that we can have a better standard of living for the small number of people that live in this country. (Feffer 2012) Although Brussels would be used as a platform to lobby Bulgarian interests against Ankara (Ataka 2013: 130), Ataka has recently displayed a clear stance towards further financial integration, claiming that Bulgaria does not need the Eurozone and that, in the long term, Bulgaria should also consider exiting the currency board (Ataka 2013: 129). The party has shown certain signs of pragmatism vis-à-vis the EU issue; however, Ataka has maintained at least a Eurosceptic stance since 2005. The salience of the issue has remained high, if only for the party struggle for the reopening of the Kozloduy nuclear plant.

Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik) The far right in Hungary has evolved along somewhat different lines. The legacy of interwar authoritarianism had been directly relevant for the reactivation of extreme right milieus even before 1989. In fact, mobilisation of the movement sector was already high during the 1980s, perhaps favoured by the relatively liberal environment of ‘goulash communism’ under János Kádár (Bernáth et al. 2005: 87). The regime change offered far rightists the opportunity to organise and propagate their ideas; some of them had maintained contact with Nyilaskeresztes Párt (Arrow Cross Party) émigrés and, by the mid-1990s, the skinhead movement was already estimated at several thousand members (Karsai 1999). István Csurka and his Magyar Igazság és Élet Pártja (Hungarian Justice and Life Party, MIÉP) by and large dominated the radical right camp during the

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1990s. The party split off from the Magyar Demokrata Fórum (Hungarian Democratic Forum, MDF) in 1993 after the publication of a ‘quasi-Nazi document’ on the Magyar Fórum weekly (Szőcs 1998: 1100). Incidentally, the MDF has been one of the key players in the ‘Velvet Revolution’ of 1989–90: Although the Democratic Forum was not extreme right-wing, it was open in that direction. . . . The Democratic Forum and its historic leaders, in particular premier József Antall and foreign minister Géza Jeszenszky, were at least partly responsible for the anti-Semitic, chauvinistic, xenophobic radical right coming out into the open. (Karsai 1999: 134–5) The MIÉP advocated anti-Semitic and biological-nativist views whilst calling for the revision of the Treaty of Trianon (1920). The party leader Csurka openly engaged in statements against the ‘worldwide Judeo-liberal-cosmopolitan conspiracy’, including the IMF, the World Bank, and Hungarian-American philanthropist George Soros (Karsai 1999: 143). However, after crossing the 5 per cent threshold in 1998 (5.5 per cent of votes and 14 seats), the MIÉP underwent an irreversible decline and failed to enter the Hungarian Parliament again. Since the late 2000s, the Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom (Movement for a Better Hungary, Jobbik) has come across as one of the most successful populist radical right parties in Europe. Jobbik originally organised as a movement of Christian conservative university students under the name Jobboldali Ifjúsági Közösség (Right-Wing Youth Association, JOBBIK). Founded in 1999, the organisation could count on a membership of 1,500 by the year 2002. From the outset, the goal of the association has been to prevent the Socialists from returning to power and to ensure the continuation of the Fidesz – Magyar Polgári Szövetség (Fidesz – Hungarian Civic Union) government. Prior to the 2002 elections, its members had been actively involved in arranging events for right-wing politicians at Eötvös Loránd University (ELTE) in Budapest (Jobbik 2010a). When the Magyar Szocialista Párt (Hungarian Socialist Party, MSZP) won the 2002 elections, the relationship between the youth organisation and Fidesz progressively started to deteriorate. This could be attributed to two principal reasons. On the one hand, Fidesz fell short of supporting a public demonstration involving members of JOBBIK, which was set up in July 2002 to request that the ballots from the recent elections be recounted. On the other hand, Fidesz promoted the establishment of a network of ‘civil circles’ – an initiative that was initially welcomed with enthusiasm from Jobbik’s future leaders. However, these civic circles soon proved to be politically irrelevant and led to growing disenchantment for the members of the association (Bíró Nagy and Róna 2013). Jobbik eventually reorganised as a party in October 2003, placing a blend of ultraconservatism, anti-communism, and anti-globalism at the core of its early agenda. Because of its own organisational limitations, however, the party could not contest the European elections of the following year. Jobbik contested its first parliamentary elections in April 2006 in alliance with the MIÉP on the

Ideology of the populist radical right 69 MIÉP-Jobbik – A Harmadik Út (The Third Way) split ticket, gaining 2.2 per cent of votes nationwide. Whilst the alliance with Csurka’s party was, de facto, dissolved by the year 2008, Jobbik’s fortunes started to change significantly in autumn 2006. In fact, Jobbik and its members were at the forefront of the anti-government protests that took to the streets of Budapest and other major Hungarian cities after the divulgation of the ‘Balatonőszöd speech’ on 17 September 2006. In this private speech given in May 2006, Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány (MSZP) admitted to have lied to win the recently held elections. Around the same time, a change of leadership occurred within the party, and Jobbik started emphasising a new range of issues. Gábor Vona then replaced Dávid Kovács as the party chairman, and Jobbik acquired a prominent anti-establishment and anti-minorities profile. Party chairman Gábor Vona was also the crucial figure behind the foundation of the Magyar Gárda (Hungarian Guard) in June 2007. The Gárda was a non-armed paramilitary-like organisation practically established to preserve law and order in rural areas of the country where the coexistence between ethnic Hungarians and the Roma community proved to be more problematic. The organisation, which was stigmatised in the international press as a ‘neo-fascist group’ (e.g. Dowling 2007), was eventually disbanded by court ruling in July 2009 on the grounds that its activities represented a breach of the human rights of Hungarian minorities. Although the organisation reformed and is still active under different names (e.g. Új Magyar Gárda, Magyar Nemzeti Gárda, Szebb Jövőért – some of which retain a direct affiliation with Jobbik), the establishment and the demonstrations of the Magyar Gárda provided Jobbik with unprecedented media exposure in a critical moment of interethnic tensions. Indeed, starting from late 2006, a number of incidents between ethnic Hungarians and Roma people made the headlines of national media, and the Gárda presented itself as the only actor willing to intervene in areas where state institutions have been largely absent. Whether positive or not, such sort of publicity (Tamás 2011), as well as the 249 local branches that the organisation had set up by January 2009 (Bíró Nagy and Róna 2013), has been deemed instrumental to Jobbik’s rise to prominence. In 2008, the party decided to run independently at the following European elections (June 2009), where Jobbik won 14.8 per cent of votes, sending three representatives to the European Parliament. At the 2010 parliamentary election, the party consolidated its position as the third national political force behind FideszKDNP and the MSZP. In less than a year, Jobbik had doubled its performance compared to the 427,773 votes of the European elections, resulting in 16.7 per cent of votes and 47 seats in the Magyar Országgyűlés (Hungarian National Assembly). In concomitance with the rise to national politics, the party has also confirmed its appeal at the local level, winning a number of mayoral races across the country. Jobbik’s electoral appeal continued through the year 2014. The party scored its highest result to date at the national elections of 6 April 2014 (20.7 per cent of votes and 23 seats) – the first elections contested under the new electoral law. Even though the party ranked third behind Fidesz-KDNP and the short-lived coalition of the left, Összefogás (Unity), it ultimately rose as the single largest opposition party with over 1 million votes. The role of second political force of Hungary

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Table 3.3 Electoral performance of Jobbik by type of election

Parliamentary European Seats *

April 2006

June 2009

October 2010

April 2014

May 2014

2.2%* – –

– 14.8% 3

16.7% – 47

20.7% – 23

– 14.7% 3

Refers to the MIÉP-Jobbik – The Third Way split ticket.

Source: Parties and Elections in Europe Database, www.parties-and-elections.eu.

was practically consolidated with the European elections of May 2014. Amidst signs of electoral fatigue (Pirro 2014: 330), the party gained 14.7 per cent of votes and confirmed its three seats in the European Parliament (Table 3.3). Despite instances of cooperation with Fidesz-KDNP at the local level, Jobbik maintained a fairly radical and uncompromising anti-establishment stance in the National Assembly. As a case in point, Jobbik often portrays the nationalconservative Fidesz-KDNP and the social-democratic MSZP as two sides of the same coin (i.e. corrupt politics). Overall, the party can be deemed responsible for a considerable renewal of the Hungarian populist radical right; though certainly drawing on some of the issues advocated by the MIÉP, Jobbik has been able to frame old-fashioned themes in a modern way and deliver them through new communication channels. Jobbik has been able to turn the ostracism from mainstream politics and media to its own advantage and mobilise support through new media and campaigning strategies. On 1 November 2013, the party had over 140,000 followers on its Hungarian Facebook page (as compared to the almost 74,000 of the ruling party Fidesz), reasonably earning the reputation of ‘far right party for the Facebook generation’ (EUobserver 2010). The party’s presence on the Internet is skilful and capable of pleasing different audiences. For instance, whilst the party paper Barikád! (Barricade!) and the affiliated website Alfahir.hu serve as the official news outlets of the party, kuruc.info – a website indirectly linked to Jobbik, though the leadership has denied running it – presents extreme anti-Roma and anti-Semitic views appealing to the Hungarian sub-cultural milieus. Moreover, the party can rely on committed grassroots activists across the whole country. This substantially allowed Jobbik to introduce a form of ‘constant campaigning’ that takes place irrespective of specific electoral contests and brought party representatives to hold meetings virtually in every Hungarian town and village. The statements of party representatives have often led to controversy and allegations of racism. For instance, at the height of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in Gaza in November 2012, Member of Parliament (MP) Márton Gyöngyösi stated: “I think now is the time to assess how many people of Jewish origin there are here, and especially in the Hungarian parliament and the Hungarian government, who represent a certain national security risk for Hungary” (Gyöngyösi 2012). The statement stirred a wave of condemnations, nationally and internationally. The party then held a

Ideology of the populist radical right 71 number of ‘anti-Zionist and anti-Bolshevik’ rallies throughout the year 2013 – themes that Jobbik uses to draw attention to the threat of political and economic ‘invaders’ of the past and present. The party has released electoral programmes for each election contested. Considering the period covered by this book, those released in 2006 and 2010 represent the primary data sources for the analysis of Jobbik’s ideology. Whilst the two documents display a certain degree of continuity, two of the party’s leitmotivs (i.e. Roma criminality and anti-corruption) were not (fully) developed yet in 2006. Indeed, the 2006 programme bore a fervent clerical and antiglobalist profile. Alternatively, the 88-page 2010 programme (‘Radical Change’)7 addressed a broader palette of issues – now elaborating on the antiestablishment and anti-minorities aspects of the party ideology – and sought to present the party as a competent actor in all policy areas or, in the words of the programme, as the party able to deliver a ‘brighter future’ (‘szebb jövőt’) for Hungary. The comparative scope of this study prompted the updating of party ideology for the years 2012–13. The interview held with MP Márton Gyöngyösi, in a period of changing economic scenarios across the EU, was certainly instrumental in ascertaining Jobbik’s radicalisation vis-à-vis European integration and the party’s selective emphasis on certain aspects of its ideology. Amidst growing popularity, Jobbik strived to preserve its uncompromising radical outlook and yet come across as a respectable and responsible parliamentary force. Clericalism Jobbik translates the (Catholic and Protestant) Christian conservative background of its founding members into the party platform. Jobbik (2010d) defines itself as ‘a principled, conservative and radically patriotic Christian party’ that recognises Hungary as a country based on Christian moral values (Jobbik 2006, 2010c). In comparative terms, Christian appeals almost displayed a fundamentalist slant in 2006. In the electoral programme, national identity and Christianity are defined as ‘inseparable concepts’. The party believes that “national morality can only be based on the strengthening of the teachings of Christ”, which are identified both as the founding principles of Jobbik and a political goal in its own right (Jobbik 2006). In order to achieve these goals, a key role is attributed to the revival of Christian communities and churches, which have laid the spiritual, intellectual, and cultural foundations of the Hungarian nation throughout the centuries. Amidst the uncertainties of the modern world, Jobbik promotes the spiritual recovery of Hungarians, which has to be achieved by returning to (or rediscovering) the traditional communities – the family (‘the immediate patria’), churches, and the nation (Jobbik 2006). The party’s stance on religion is also reflected in additional policy goals. For instance, Jobbik adopts a notion of life that starts from the foetus. Hence, the party seeks to tighten the law on abortion and, at the same time, contribute to redefining the concept of new life. As far as educational policies are concerned, Jobbik claims

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that institutions must contain the spread of liberal values and instead emphasise traditional and conservative values as the backbone of Hungarian society. As schools occupy a primary role in the building of national consciousness, they have to ensure that young people develop “good moral judgement, sensitivity to others, and openness to human and transcendental values”, also through the introduction of religion as a mandatory subject in school curricula (Jobbik 2006). Whilst the supply of Christian-oriented policies did not vary much in 2010, many of its formulations were somewhat toned down. In outlining its religious affairs policy, the 2010 electoral manifesto states that Jobbik’s principles and objectives are a comprehensive religious affairs policy rooted in an awareness of the entire nation, a recognition of the Christian moral value system, ensuring that the country’s historic religious communities and denominations can continue their charitable functions, renegotiating religious funding, making good on the state’s contractual obligations to religious communities, a re-examination of the regulations governing registration of new religious bodies and the operation of sects, improving the Gypsy people’s integration through the assistance of religious institutions, and the making of religious (or ethical) education compulsory in school. (Jobbik 2010b: 16) In particular, the party aspires to put forward a new constitution with an ‘emphatic’ reference to the Christian roots of the Hungarian country and culture, a necessary strengthening of the practices of abortion, and a firm opposition to euthanasia. Important for the sake of this analysis is the fact that Jobbik seeks the establishment of a more effective cooperation between church and state; this would then enable a rapid response to common societal problems, as well as the representation and management of confessional issues at the governmental level (Jobbik 2010c: 59). Three years after the presentation of its previous electoral programme, Christianity and confessional issues still play a central role for Jobbik. In updating the understanding of the party’s ideology, the deputy leader of Jobbik’s Parliamentary Group, Márton Gyöngyösi, initially stresses the Christian roots of Hungarian culture: We have a long history – 1100 years of presence – in Europe as a Christian state; when we look at our past, we see ourselves in many instances as a country that has been defending not only Christianity within Hungary, but also Christianity in Europe. (personal interview, 23 January 2013)8 However, if other documents also emphasised the crucial political function of a greater interpenetration of church and state, here the accent seems to be on the social and cultural value of Christian morals.

Ideology of the populist radical right 73 When we talk about social structure, we think that the family – the conventional family that we accept and envisage with a man, a woman, and children – is the pillar of society. . . . The most important role for politicians is to make possible that faith, and Christianity in particular, is defended from this very liberal stream that is sweeping through the western hemisphere. The importance of Jobbik in this respect is to fight against all this nonsense that comes from the West – this extreme liberalism that washes away and relativises everything that we consider being normal – family, marriage. All this [liberalism and relativism] is extremely dangerous and it destroyed the European nations, economies, and societies. (Márton Gyöngyösi, personal interview, 23 January 2013) In spite of its fervent religious profile, sociodemographic data show that the voters of Jobbik are the least religious across the Hungarian political spectrum (e.g. Krekó 2011). The party leadership is aware of this, yet the Christian-oriented portion of Jobbik’s ideology is still deemed an integral part of the party’s formula. Hence, the party does not seem willing to adapt to public demands and abandon this aspect of its ideology. We were also somewhat puzzled by the fact that our voters represent the most non-religious portion of our society, although being non-religious stems from very subjective criteria. . . . In Hungary, people always had different attitudes towards religion. The Church has never been as powerful as in Poland or Ireland, and our religion also preserved different elements coming from our past – our Asian roots, even mythology – which were different from Western Christianity.9 . . . When we say that Christian values are important, we can only accept the Christian type of principles in society and in our everyday life. I do not think that we would need to drop this because our voters do not mention this as their first preference. We have to be very responsible in this – this is one of the pillars our programme is built upon. (Márton Gyöngyösi, personal interview, 23 January 2013) Irredentism Drawing on one of the trademark issues of the MIÉP and the Hungarian far right, Jobbik holds outright irredentist claims and calls for a revision of the ‘Trianon diktat’. At the end of the First World War, the victor powers signed the Treaty of Trianon (1920), which redefined the borders of independent Hungary and left the country with roughly one third of the pre-war Kingdom of Hungary’s area and population. Therefore, the party’s political horizons are not defined by the borders of the Hungarian state but by those of the Hungarian nation (that is, Greater Hungary), which today includes 15 million people (Jobbik 2006, 2010b: 15–16).10 In the 2006 programme, Jobbik sought to solve the ‘vital problems’ connected to the separated parts of the nation by promoting the autonomy aspirations of the

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Hungarian minorities abroad and the advancement of a ‘dual citizenship’ law. Therefore, Jobbik believes that it is the duty of the national government to grant all means to support the self-determination of the Hungarian diaspora in neighbouring countries (Jobbik 2006). The 2010 manifesto further elaborates on these questions, holding that the Hungarian nation had its territorial and spiritual contiguity dismembered with the imposition of the Trianon diktat. In this regard, Jobbik seeks to elevate the Hungarian motherland to the role of ‘protector power’ for the Hungarian communities living abroad, both by promoting efforts for self-determination and by making it possible for Hungarians beyond the border to have the requisite legal foundation to take instances of violations of human rights before international bodies. We shall, in the most resolute manner, stand up against any and all activities by neighbouring countries whose purpose is either restricting the use by Hungarian people of their own language, or disadvantaging them in the exercising of their rights. (Jobbik 2010b: 16) The party primarily aims at the cultural and economic reunification of the ‘territorially maimed’ nation; this mission shall no longer be interpreted as a burden but as a positive moral obligation. As far as the economic aspects of this reunification are concerned, Jobbik considers the Hungarian-populated areas of the Carpathian basin as part of a “unified protected Hungarian economic zone” (Jobbik 2010b: 2). When reference is made to the cultural aspects of this question, Jobbik claims that “the Hungarian state must be restored to the prominence its history demands” and defines it as an “inescapable duty to guarantee Hungarian citizenship, unconditional on residence within the Hungarian Republic, to all those Hungarians residing in both the Carpathian basin and the wider world” (Jobbik 2010b: 16). These objectives are once again brought forward in the ‘Foreign Affairs’ section of the 2010 programme, in which the party advocates “the reincorporation into the national body of both Western and Carpathian-basin Hungarians” and the revision of the treaties stipulated with neighbouring countries (Jobbik 2010b: 20–1). The persistent salience of the irredentist issue is confirmed by MP Márton Gyöngyösi, who reclaims Jobbik’s crucial role in sustaining political awareness on a ‘sensitive subject’ for the entire Hungarian population: Hungarians living abroad is a very important issue for Jobbik. Jobbik is the only party that has advocated in its programme, continuously for the past ten years, double citizenship for the Hungarians living abroad. This is based on the observation – not new in Hungary – that the geographical boundaries of the country and the boundaries of the nation are two different things. It is very important after the trauma of Trianon to reunify the nation, at least at a symbolic level, by providing double citizenship to Hungarians in the Carpathian basin and to those who emigrated. . . . It is a shame that it took us twenty years

Ideology of the populist radical right 75 since the fall of the Iron Curtain to get to this point, but we are very happy that [the passing of a new Hungarian Citizenship Law] happened.11 . . . Trianon is still an open wound and it still has a huge impact – it is still the number one issue with every one of our neighbours. It is a very sensitive issue in Hungary and we think it was the greatest injustice that happened in Europe throughout its history. (Márton Gyöngyösi, personal interview, 23 January 2013) The deputy leader of Jobbik’s Parliamentary Group outlines which moral responsibilities should inform governmental action in this regard and seems to suggest that an incremental strategy – starting from the symbolic level and ending with the adoption of policy measures – should be adopted to bring the Hungarian nation back to its original form. At the same time, MP Gyöngyösi recognises the existence of uneasy diplomatic relationships with some neighbouring countries and takes the opportunity to attribute the uncooperative attitude of some to idiosyncratic historical legacies. We want the Hungarian government to attach a lot of importance to fighting for the rights of Hungarians living outside of our country and make it very clear on the international stage that it is unacceptable to have policies by Slovakia, Romania, Ukraine, or Serbia that cause tensions in our bilateral relations. Of course, there are exceptions: Croatia, Slovenia, and Austria have a much better attitude towards our minority. We want a government that stands one hundred per cent for these minorities and fights for some type of autonomy for them. . . . I don’t make a secret out of it that territorial autonomy would be the perfect idea, but cultural autonomy would probably be the easiest to achieve. . . . There is a big diplomatic struggle with neighbouring countries: in Slovakia, where history building is based on counterpointing Hungary, it must be very difficult [to accept these ideas]. There are Hungarian-speaking minorities and we should find a way of dealing with this, otherwise our bilateral relationships are not going to get anywhere. . . . I have a vision that Hungary will be united again and that the Szeklers12 will be not only spiritually linked to Hungary but territorially as well, and this is valid for the other parts as well – Transcarpathia or Vojvodina, for that matter. (Márton Gyöngyösi, personal interview, 23 January 2013) Despite the high salience of this issue, however, the party presently lacks a concrete geopolitical strategy; therefore, Jobbik seems content with elevating the conditions of Hungarian minorities abroad (especially in Slovakia; e.g. Vona 2010a). Social-national economics In light of its early anti-globalist profile, the party has placed great emphasis on socioeconomic issues from the outset. Jobbik’s nativist economic agenda – “the

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fundamental need to protect our interests” (Jobbik 2006) – has maintained an unequivocal ‘leftist’ feel throughout, seeking national economic autonomy from foreign countries and corporate powers, and identifying a number of strategies to achieve this goal. In the 2006 programme, the party deemed the present form of globalisation inherently vulnerable and bound to collapse. As a first step to escape the perverse consequences of a worldwide economic crisis, Jobbik called for a ‘state of alert’ centring on the preservation of natural resources as well as the re-establishment and relaunch of Hungarian enterprises. Crucial in this endeavour is an ethical promotion of national strategic areas such as education, farming, industry, and transport. The party then called for a strong role of the government in steering the activity of national social actors (individuals and businesses) towards the achievement of Hungary’s socioeconomic goals. The party has further drawn attention to the importance of reassessing the privatisation process, deeming it necessary to renationalise certain strategic sectors that have ended up in foreign hands. In line with this outlook, Jobbik sought to halt the exploitation of national resources by setting up and enforcing a moratorium on the acquisition of Hungarian land by foreigners (Jobbik 2006). The party also held a coherent stance on socioeconomic policies in the 2010 electoral programme. With the breakout of the Great Recession, Jobbik presented the failure of the global capitalist system based on the free movement of multinational capital as a fait accompli and formulated its economic philosophy in terms of an ‘eco-social-national economy’. This credo entails tailoring the economy, through controls which lead it to serve the interests of Hungarians, so as to provide both the environment and the living standards that people deserve; this requires a state that is capable of promoting national economic actors in order to place them on a level competitive playing field, so as to create more just relationships within society through the redistribution of wealth. (Jobbik 2010b: 2) In essence, the state is asked to intervene in defence of Hungarian industry, farmers, businesses, and products and to protect (and renationalise) Hungarian land, water, natural gas, and forests. In both electoral programmes, the party called for a substantial revision of the taxation system, aiming at the introduction of a more efficient progressive taxation system as well as the re-examination of the Hungarian foreign debt (Jobbik 2006, 2010c). Moreover, the party has persistently maintained a favourable outlook on eastern countries, and this is especially evident regarding commerce and trade: Jobbik has long strived to ‘look eastwards’ and intensify trade relations with countries such as China, India, Russia, Turkey, Kazakhstan, and Indonesia (Jobbik 2010c: 10).13 Jobbik’s socioeconomic stance stems from an all-encompassing critique of the transition process. This criticism sets the party against the communist regime, the communist successor party (MSZP), and the rest of the political establishment

Ideology of the populist radical right 77 (including Fidesz), thus reinforcing its anti-communist and populist profile. In particular, all those parties that have taken part in the transition process are claimed to have piloted Hungary to the market economy in compliance with the dictates of Washington and Brussels. Therefore, besides persistent criticism, the party’s rhetoric is often imbued with conspiratorial tones. We are very different not only from Fidesz but also from all the other parties. We are strongly critical of the transition years. The way the transition was conducted in this country has been very secretive. It was never known how this political elite was established and what was the political agreement between these parties. But what we can see is that Hungary, already ten years before the fall of the Iron Curtain, had somehow drifted into this Euro-Atlantic stream. The events of the past thirty years have proven that the whole transition has been somehow guided – in no way as spontaneous as we thought. . . . In 1982, at the height of communism and seven years before the fall of the Iron Curtain, Hungary became a member of the IMF and the World Bank – the leading financial institutions of today’s globalised world that hand out loans in return for implementing an extremely neoliberal economic agenda. . . . Shortly after, the so-called spontaneous privatisation started off – a process that is a synonym for institutionalised stealing. Who knew the information got state industries for one or two forints – we know of such examples as well. Who was close to the party and knew what was going to happen could put his or her hands on enormous state wealth for peanuts. . . . By the time 1989 came, behind the curtain, every single piece had been on the stage for the neoliberal economic setup. So, when the Iron Curtain came down, it was only a ceremonial celebration. It was all wonderfully prepared and, of course, our political elite was already there negotiating with the communists how transition should be conducted. So we have the Socialist Party – the successor of the Communist Party, completely associated with the bloodiness of the dictatorship – still with us today, sitting in parliament. Basically, we have a political elite, which Fidesz also belongs to, that took part to this secretive roundtable where they laid down the conditions of the transition. It is fairly clear that one of the agreements was that the Socialist Party could convert its previous political monopoly to economic wealth, remain in the political system, and that every single party could only adhere to the Euro-Atlantic framework. . . . When we look back at the past two decades, we can see that Hungary has been basically conquered from the West with the assistance of our political elite – Fidesz, the first MDF government, Socialists, Free Democrats, everybody. So it is Jobbik, coming from the outside, versus the political establishment of Hungary that has secretively negotiated the transition process and completely sold out Hungary to the interests of Brussels and Washington in a process of Euro-Atlantic foreign policy. (Márton Gyöngyösi, personal interview, 23 January 2013) Even though the party’s critique is moved to the political elite that ruled the country during the past decades, the privatisation of national assets has produced

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detrimental effects for the Hungarian economy as a whole. The anti-Western and anti-globalist discourses remain an integral part of Jobbik’s diagnosis of Hungarian recent history, hence suggesting that the party’s stance on the issue has not varied substantially since the original elaboration of the 2006 programme. The unconditional longing for a ‘nativist economy’ is documented by the party’s praise for state ownership in strategic sectors; indeed, state ownership is preferred, regardless of previous experiences of negative economic performance. They have sold out everything in this country to the West. Over the span of ten years, between the ‘spontaneous privatisation’ and the mid-1990s, this country ceased to be a 100 per cent state-owned socialist structure – badly managed and in need of a lot of adjustments, but at least it was Hungarian. . . . As far as the economy is concerned, Hungary was in much better shape. . . . What we have now is an extremely liberalised economy in strategic sectors such as gas, water, agriculture, and food processing – all in German, French, Italian, Dutch hands. These are strategic sectors that every normal country is protecting with every instrument. . . . We’ve been told that state ownership is the worst thing in the world, that everything would be better off in private hands, and that market conditions would bring everything into equilibrium – and they didn’t! (Márton Gyöngyösi, personal interview, 23 January 2013) When reference is made to the current financial situation in Hungary, MP Gyöngyösi urges the government to renegotiate the state debt inherited from the communist regime (“This is a huge amount of money that steals resources for growth”) and puts the accent on Jobbik’s ‘social-national’ philosophy, which should privilege state ownership and Hungarian enterprises: We are not against multinationals – we want free competition in certain sectors. But I think that strategic sectors should be in the hands of the Hungarian state. Now this government is trying to repurchase at least the strategic segments in agriculture, water and gas supply, food processing and retailing. These strategic sectors have to be regained and small- and medium-size companies, which are generally Hungarian-owned, should be preferred by the Hungarian state to multinational companies. (Márton Gyöngyösi, personal interview, 23 January 2013) Ethnic minorities Jobbik claims to be the only party to have denounced “the unsolved situation of the ever growing Gypsy population” in Hungary (Jobbik 2010d). In actual fact, as early as 2005, István Csurka referred to an ongoing ‘Gypsy problem’ in the MIÉP manifesto (MIÉP 2005). The ‘Gypsy issue’ would appear as a clear-cut issue on the Jobbik agenda only in late 2006 (e.g. Krekó and Szabados 2010; cf. Jobbik 2006) and was mostly propelled by the public resonance of the Olaszliszka

Ideology of the populist radical right 79 assassination. This element tends to substantiate the idea that part of the issues fostered by the MIÉP had been absorbed and rejuvenated by Jobbik towards the end of their alliance.14 One could also interpret these developments as an attempt, on the part of Jobbik, to preserve a respectable profile in the run-up to the 2006 elections, leaving the MIÉP to deal with the most contentious ideological aspects of their shared platform. As a case in point, Jobbik seems initially more concerned with a possible immigration problem resulting from its bordering position within the then–EU-25. Therefore, in the ‘National Policy’ section of its 2006 programme, Jobbik calls for the protection of the cultural identity and traditions of the country, and the concomitant resistance to large-scale immigration in order to prevent the “social, cultural and economic tensions associated with it” (Jobbik 2006). In this regard, the party aspires to reconsider the role of national defence, as the army must be prepared to combat terrorism and deal with immigration flows. Another pertinent question concerns the establishment of a national guard. Jobbik deems it essential to establish a guard of volunteers performing duties of territorial defence, training of young people, and strengthening of patriotic values (Jobbik 2006). The inclusion of these provisions suggests that the launch of the Magyar Gárda had been already envisioned ahead of its eventual establishment in 2007 yet, most importantly, that its constitution had been considered irrespective of the ethnic tensions with Roma communities that made headlines later in 2006. Jobbik later went on to politicise the Roma issue in the mainstream, framing it in terms of ‘cigánybűnözés’ (‘Gypsy crime’). The party currently regards the problem of Roma criminality as “a unique form of delinquency, different from the crimes of the majority in nature and force” (Jobbik 2010d). Moreover, Jobbik claims that, regardless of political affiliations, everyone agrees that the coexistence of ethnic Hungarians and the Roma minority is “one of the severest problems facing Hungarian society” (Jobbik 2010c: 40). The party itself recognises the source of this problem in the regime change of 1989, as the members of the Roma community lost their low-skilled jobs and found themselves incapable of adjusting to the conditions set by the emerging market economy. Generations have now grown up, having never once seen their parents in work. The continuation of the Gypsy people’s circumstances along their current course is nothing short of a potential time-bomb, and if it is not subject to concerted intervention, our mutual home could sink into a state of virtual civil war. At the present time a segment of the Gypsy community strive for neither integration, nor employment, nor education; and wish only that society maintain them through the unconditional provision of state benefits. (Jobbik 2010b: 11) In response to this problem, the party has repeatedly called for law enforcement initiatives (especially through a dedicated rural csendőrség, or gendarmerie)

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aiming at the ultimate eradication of this form of criminality; the revision of the conditions regulating state benefits’ allocation; and the implementation of social, educational, and employment schemes tailored to integrate the Roma community (Jobbik 2010c) – policies which could be otherwise defined as forced assimilation. Especially through its recent political activity, Jobbik has managed to present itself as a nativist organisation that transcends the concept of a single-issue party (e.g. Fennema 1997). This notwithstanding, the Roma issue has firmly maintained a crucial role in the party’s agenda since 2006, and MP Márton Gyöngyösi seems to confirm this: The Gypsy minority represents a national threat to public security. This issue has escalated into a problem that affects the majority of the Gypsy community – masses that have fallen out of education, the labour force, and that, in a time of crisis with cuts on social expenses, has resulted into crime. (Márton Gyöngyösi, personal interview, 23 January 2013) Jobbik’s programmatic documents delineate different solutions to tackle the problems linked to this minority. However, the interview with the vicechairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Hungarian Parliament reveals priorities in the strategy to follow – hence placing selective emphasis on security and relegating other policies, such as education, to less stringent objectives. It is very important to rejig the social contribution system, make sure that Gypsy children attend school the same way as Hungarian children – this would be a mid-term to long-term project and I hope that in about ten years’ time these things could change. But what is extremely urgent is improving public security, because people feel in danger. This problem has escalated. . . . Now Europe has also realised that there is a problem, but they do not particularly care about the status of the Gypsy community in Hungary; they are worried about this Gypsy community heading towards Europe – as an immigration problem. We live with this community – they are born in Hungary, they are Hungarian citizens, they are part of the Hungarian nation, but they belong to a completely different sociocultural background – and we have to integrate them into our society. They are different and we have to make sure that they are compatible with our national standards. The only way to integrate them is with schooling and education, and by participating in the social system – not only by taking, but also contributing through labour and tax payments. . . . When it comes down to the Gypsy community, it has to be made very clear that they only have rights if they also accept obligations. (Márton Gyöngyösi, personal interview, 23 January 2013)

Ideology of the populist radical right 81 Corruption From the beginning of its political activity, Jobbik has been able to preserve a radical anti-establishment profile. The scope of this stance has been far-reaching and has found practical articulation in a number of policy proposals. The party has identified the entire political class as inherently corrupt, yet through this ideological feature, Jobbik has also been able to channel aspects of its anti-communism. In essence, anti-corruption is a ‘multivalent’ issue, which aptly serves the populist and anti-communist profile of the party. In general, Jobbik claims that political and economic crime has compromised the good of the nation to the benefit of the corrupt (national and foreign) elite. At first, Jobbik advocated a relentless fight to corruption in all its forms. Corruption was then deemed a phenomenon entrenched in the world of business and finance, and the party sought to increase transparency and accountability, also through a new law on public financing. This notwithstanding, provisions on the toughening of anti-corruption measures also look at domestic affairs. In particular, Jobbik aims to revert those privatisation deals concluded through illegal practices and uncover forms of political crime that have remained secret due to the current legislation (Jobbik 2006). Subsequently, the party articulated its anti-corruption agenda, devoting different sections to this problem. First, the party holds that a significant portion of national assets has been sold off to private or multinational corporations; hence, those responsible for the plundering of the nation should face punishments up to life imprisonment (Jobbik 2010b: 2). Second, Jobbik seeks to eliminate corruption through a comprehensive reform of regulations governing public procurement and extensive investigation of public sector projects, investments, and offshore companies (Jobbik 2010b: 4). Third, the anti-corruption discourse of the party is very much tied to the blaming of a specific elite (“that has effectively remained in power since the days of the one-party state”), which had either favoured or taken advantage of the sale of agricultural, financial, and public services to foreign companies. In all these cases, the party envisages a review of privatisation contracts and the punishment of ‘political criminals’ (Jobbik 2010b: 4). The populist rhetoric, anti-corruption policies, and lustration objectives combine in the programme of Jobbik. The party does not merely seek to tackle and abolish corruption but to finally hold politicians (of whatever colour) accountable: We shall dissolve the secrecy legislation these parties have deliberately passed in order to conceal their wrongdoing; and will at long last bring into the public eye the names on the single-party state’s lists of former agents and informants (many of whom entered or remained in politics following 1989’s regime change). It is high time that political crimes finally become classified under the Hungarian penal code! (Jobbik 2010b: 18)

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The perception that collusion between reforming forces and criminality has taken place in the process of transition persists to this day. Jobbik, as a selfproclaimed outsider force, deems political and economic crime an inherent and inextricable feature of Hungarian politics. Jobbik insists that there are shady procedures that have characterised the transition from state socialism to the market economy and liberal democracy. As regards the transition process, there is a very clear division of who got what through institutionalised corruption. The political and economic transformation of this country went hand in hand. Hungary has been receiving orders from Washington ten years before the fall of communism. We’ve been told how to build down and rebuild the whole structure and, of course, the political and economic elites have been more or less the same since then. . . . Certain dynamics have been preserved to prevent these elites from hurting each other: under the Fidesz government, they don’t tackle the corruption of the previous Socialist government, because they know that when the tide turns they could be after them. . . . This is the reason why, twenty years after the transition, we still don’t know who is what and why in the system; we cannot face our communist past. (Márton Gyöngyösi, personal interview, 23 January 2013) It is worth noting that, when reference is made to economic issues as well as political and economic crime, the party systematically refers to the communist past of the country. This further corroborates the multivalence of the socioeconomic and anti-corruption platforms of Jobbik, which practically serve as outlets for its anti-communist profile. Therefore, anti-communism and lustration procedures are best conveyed when linked to anti-corruption. Tellingly, MP Márton Gyöngyösi returns to the evil perpetrated by the communist regime whilst discussing the issue: “just imagine this country – this was the darkest system in the history of mankind. We know of reports about people who were taken away by the secret police, tortured, killed, and buried under this building”15 (Márton Gyöngyösi, personal interview, 23 January 2013). Finally, as the domain of mainstream politics and (moral, political, and economic) corruption confound, the deputy leader is enquired about the possible consequences of Jobbik’s loss of anti-establishment appeal after entry to parliament. His answer resolutely reasserts the party’s role within national politics: We are a completely marginalised party – here, and outside even more.16 We consider ourselves against and outside the establishment. You can see it in our everyday struggle with the political elite. . . . There is Hungarian politics and there is Jobbik – we’re completely separated. There is, thank God, no attempt to mix up with the political establishment and this is what our programme is based upon. (Márton Gyöngyösi, personal interview, 23 January 2013)

Ideology of the populist radical right 83 The European Union As far as party-based EU-pessimism is concerned, the MIÉP of István Csurka maintained during the 1990s the same Euroreject stance that distinguished many far right parties in Central and Eastern Europe before accession (Kopecký and Mudde 2002; Batory 2008). Although erratic, Jobbik’s attitude to Europe has been driven by EU-pessimism overall. In addition, the intensity and scope of this pessimism have varied over time. In 2006, the party associated EU membership with a treacherous loss of national sovereignty – a process of ‘south Americanisation’ that only a governmental intervention based on the principles of Christian solidarity could avoid. Jobbik’s position was grounded in the perception that the Hungarian accession was agreed upon on unfair and unfavourable terms, and had the only consequence of endangering vital national assets. In turn, the EU has been described as an “anti-democratic, bureaucratic, centralising power” (Jobbik 2006). Despite the party’s appeal to withdraw from the EU by means of referendum, the EU was first and foremost depicted as one of the multiple facets of globalisation. Hence, in terms of salience, the EU issue appeared to be only secondary in the party agenda and, in light of its general objection to the EU and European integration, the party qualified as Euroreject in 2006. In the year 2009, the party had gained representation in the European Parliament (three seats) and, despite ongoing criticism, Jobbik seemed to abide by Hungarian membership in the EU in its 2010 electoral programme. The electoral breakthrough at the European elections prompted the party to define itself as the only exponent of a ‘radical change’, not only within national politics, but now also in the EU arena. The EU issue accordingly gained in salience, with an articulated section of the party manifesto devoted to it (Jobbik 2010c: 75–7). In particular, Jobbik claimed that Hungary is part of Europe not because of its entry into the EU but by its own historical right. Therefore, the party aspired to promote, in collaboration with its allies, “the concept of a Europe of the Nations” (Jobbik 2010b: 21). Even though the party sought to re-examine the disadvantageous clauses of the Accession Treaty – “even if doing so could end up raising questions over our continued membership of the EU” (Jobbik 2010b: 5) – Jobbik did not push for a withdrawal from the Union. Jobbik’s EU-pessimism has somewhat curbed to contingent opposition to the process of integration. The Euroreject rhetoric was toned down, and the EU was appraised as a platform for the discussion and resolution of questions of national interest such as “the plight of our disjointed nation – the Hungarian question” (Jobbik 2010b: 15). Thus, the party position for the year 2010 should qualify as Eurosceptic, and the EU issue should qualify as one of primary importance. Hungary has been on the verge of bankruptcy ever since 2010, and the country has largely depended on loan guarantees by the IMF, the EU, and the World Bank to roll over its foreign debt (e.g. Jenne and Mudde 2012: 149). More recently, the EU has come to play an ever-growing role in Hungarian affairs, especially following the controversial constitutional reforms enacted by the Fidesz-KDNP

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government.17 Starting from the year 2012, Jobbik engaged in a fierce anti-EU rhetoric, and greater emphasis has been placed on the issue ever since. Using an interrelated series of political and economic circumstances (i.e. EU criticism of the new constitution and Hungary’s bailout) as a catalyst for dissent, the party held a number of demonstrations centring on (opposition to) the EU. These demonstrations initially concerned the EU’s interference in Hungarian internal affairs and called for Hungarian exit from the Union (Jobbik 2012). Whilst confirming Jobbik’s continued EU-pessimism, MP Márton Gyöngyösi associates the evolution of the party’s stance on the issue with the changing nature of the ‘European project’. As of 2013, Jobbik seems determined to reconsider Hungarian membership in the EU. We should rethink our EU membership. . . . We were always against it, but how much against it depended on the EU project itself. What we voted for in 2003 is not the EU that we face today! This project is heading towards complete centralisation – I mean, Mr Barroso is going to approve the next Hungarian budget! Our problem is that we are faced with a political elite that does not want to hear about any criticism or scepticism towards the EU. The EU is unsustainable and is, sooner or later, going to collapse, and I would love to hear Hungarian people’s opinion about it – we want a referendum on leaving the EU.18 . . . Our opinion is that the EU is working against our benefits: when you look at what we gained from European membership and what we lost, our analysis is completely negative, and not only in monetary terms. We lose out and the prospects are even darker. (Márton Gyöngyösi, personal interview, 23 January 2013) More recently, Jobbik has dissociated itself from the ideas underlying the process of European integration and the EU as a whole. This radicalisation virtually brought the party back to the positions adopted at its first stages of political activity, yet with new impetus and on the basis of a broader range of arguments elaborated during the past years of Hungarian membership in the EU. Although the Eurozone crisis had severe effects on the Hungarian economy, the motives of Jobbik’s radicalisation could be only indirectly linked to the European sovereign debt crisis. Therefore, whilst the financial crisis has been used as a pretext, Jobbik primarily placed emphasis on the broader interference of the EU in Hungarian political affairs. Jobbik’s opposition to the EU is all-encompassing and is not limited to monetary issues; this should explain why the party generally preferred to lament a loss of national sovereignty and point out its negative assessment of Hungarian membership. In light of this, the party position on Europe would qualify as Euroreject since 2012, with the EU coming across as a primary issue in the party agenda. As the European crisis has taken centre stage in the debate on (and rhetoric of) populist radical right parties (e.g. Pirro and van Kessel 2013; van Kessel and Pirro 2014), the understanding of Jobbik’s ideology is also relevant for questions pertaining to alliance seeking at the EU level and the strategies adopted ahead of the

Ideology of the populist radical right 85 2014 European elections. Jobbik MEP Béla Kovács has been the main promoter behind the establishment of the Alliance of European National Movements (AENM) on 24 October 2009 in occasion of the Sixth Party Congress. The AENM included, amongst others, members of the British National Party (BNP), the French Front National (National Front, FN), the Italian Fiamma Tricolore (Tricolour Flame, FT), and the Swedish Nationaldemokraterna (National Democrats, ND). By late 2013, however, members of the FN had officially left the AENM to join the more moderate (or simply less stigmatised) European Alliance for Freedom (EAF). As of December 2014, the only party member of the AENM still represented in the European Parliament is Jobbik. Cooperation amongst populist radical right parties has evidently proved to be difficult to achieve, not to mention sustain (Mudde 2007: 172–81). Besides questions concerning respective national interests, which have traditionally hampered cooperation amongst this party family at the EU level, the doubts faced by Jobbik seem to extend to issues such as immigration and Islamisation – and how they are problematised by Western European parties. It is very difficult to build an alliance between radical movements across Europe, because all of them are very concerned with their own national issues – and national issues differ across Europe. When we look for alliances, the common denominator is Euroscepticism – which is what we agree on and want to press on. Our common ground is harsh criticism of the EU and the way the EU is now. We would love to see a ‘union of nation-states’ across Europe, not this type of project that is ongoing. . . . With radical nationalist movements we have a point on which we clearly differ: across Western Europe, the main problem for radical movements is immigration and all the social problems caused by it. The problem with immigration is very much associated with the spread of Islam across Europe. Almost all radical movements that you would associate with Jobbik are anti-immigration and antiIslam. In this regard, Jobbik is a bit more cautious. . . . It is very important to discuss the Islam issue, because, west of Hungary, every single party associates immigration with Islam – these are the issues. Since they have this type of attitude towards Islam, they have, in a very simplistic view, a very strong attachment to Israel and Zionism. When these parties take a position on the Middle East conflict, as they are anti-Islam, they take pro-Israeli positions and strongly support Zionism. We have a different position with regard to Israel and Islam as well. (Márton Gyöngyösi, personal interview, 23 January 2013) According to Jobbik, room for pan-European cooperation is limited to a common EU-pessimist stance and a shared vision of a ‘Europe of nations and nationstates’. Questions such as immigration and ‘the spread of Islam’ are deemed idiosyncrasies of the West and are at odds with the ideology of the party. First, Jobbik does not regard immigration as a problem, since the most stringent issue

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for Hungarian public security would be represented by Roma criminality. Second, immigration in Western Europe is not interpreted as a source of social tensions, but rather as a consequence of Western liberalism and the decline of Christian morals and values. Third, the party regards Hungary as a natural doorway to the East and holds that the Hungarian culture represents a synthesis of Western and Eastern traditions; hence, Jobbik does not find Eastern influences, broadly defined, as threatening the Hungarian identity. Fourth, and most importantly, Jobbik maintains a very clear position on Israel. Whereas this may represent a form of covert anti-Semitism, the party has fiercely committed itself to anti-Zionism; therefore, coupling this with anti-Islam forces on the international stage would certainly represent a contradiction in ideological terms for Jobbik. If only for its outlook on Islam, Jobbik would represent a rare exception within this party family across Europe.

Slovak National Party (SNS) The history of the contemporary populist radical right in Slovakia is directly linked to the Slovenská Národná Strana (Slovak National Party, SNS). Not only does the party represent one of the longest-living populist radical right parties in Central and Eastern Europe, but it is also the only populist radical right party in Slovakia to have accessed the Národná Rada (National Council) – gaining representation in all legislatures but two (2002 and 2012). Far right organisations have become increasingly influential in Slovakia, and their members are estimated to be several thousand strong. Amongst the most relevant extra-parliamentary organisations, the Slovenská Pospolitost’ (Slovak Community, SP) and Nové Slobodne Slovensko (New Free Slovakia, NSS) have organised rallies against the ‘Gypsy terror’ and ‘Roma criminality’ over the years. Moreover, the Slovenská Národná Mládež (Slovak National Youth, the youth organisation of the SNS) at times has served as an outlet for politically oriented skinheads, favouring their access to formal party structures (Milo 2005: 215). Finally, the extreme right formation Ľudová Strana Naše Slovensko (People’s Party – Our Slovakia, ĽSNS), which is directly linked to the SP, has mobilised a portion of young voters disenchanted with mainstream (and) radical right politics in the past few years (Gyárfášová and Mesežnikov 2015). Its controversial leader, Marian Kotleba, was elected as the Governor of the Banská Bystrica region in November 2013 on the basis of a virulent anti-Roma agenda (Slovak Spectator 2013). The SNS was established in December 1989 and claims direct links with the historical party of the same name – the first Slovak political party to be founded in 1871 and active until 1938 (Rose and Munro 2009: 115). The emphasis on nationalism and clericalism remained a constant throughout the history of the SNS. As an aggressive anti-Czech party, the SNS was the only major political force advocating full independence for Slovakia after 1989. However, after the ‘Velvet Divorce’ between the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic (1993), its antiCzech and anti-federal platform was dropped in favour of an anti-Hungarian and

Ideology of the populist radical right 87 anti-Roma discourse. Moreover, the SNS has long struggled for the rehabilitation of the wartime Slovak state and its most prominent (or instrumental) figures, such as Andrej Hlinka and Jozef Tiso (e.g. Cibulka 1999: 116–18).19 Up until the 2000s, the party also advocated a strong anti-NATO position and held a very critical stance towards the EU. The SNS gained almost 14 per cent of the popular vote and 22 seats in the first democratic elections of Czechoslovakia in 1990. After securing 7.9 and 5.4 per cent of votes in 1992 and 1994, respectively, the SNS participated as a junior coalition partner in the governments led by Vladimír Mečiar of the ruling Ľudová Strana – Hnutie za Demokratické Slovensko (People’s Party – Movement for a Democratic Slovakia, ĽS-HZDS). During the 1994–8 term, the SNS was in charge of the defence and education ministries. In 1998, the SNS was the only former governmental party to gain seats (14) in the elections with 9.1 per cent of votes. Ján Slota, the co-founder and most prominent figure within the party, has been chairman of the SNS since 1994. Between 1990 and 2006, Slota served as the mayor of Žilina, a town in the northwest of the country. The city swiftly turned into the party’s stronghold, and observers claim that the power system within it has been long based on cronyism and corruption (Mesežnikov 2009: 28). In general, Slota has been the emblem of the party’s radicalism, persistently flirting with forms of historic revisionism and engaging in virulent public attacks on the Hungarian and Roma minorities of Slovakia. Internal disputes within the party led to a split in 2001. A non-aligned wing emerged under the new leadership of Anna Malíková; in August 2001, five MPs in opposition to the chairwoman were first ousted from the caucus and, later, from the party itself. This rift caused the expelled members to form the Pravá Slovenská Národná Strana (Real Slovak National Party, PSNS) under the leadership of Slota. Whilst the SNS of Malíková then attempted to deliver a more respectable image of the party (also building links with the European Parliament group the Union for Europe of the Nations), the PSNS seemed to undergo further radicalisation. The two parties ran independently at the 2002 elections, both failing to win parliamentary representation. After an unsuccessful alliance between the two parties for the 2004 European Parliament elections, Malíková and Slota eventually agreed to merge the two parties back into the SNS with Slota as chairman. The party gained 11.7 per cent of votes in 2006 – the best result to date in the politics of independent Slovakia. As a result, the party was asked to join an unusual coalition with the social-democratic Smer – Sociálna Demokracia (Direction – Social Democracy, Smer-SD) led by Robert Fico and had three ministers appointed (Education, Environment, and Construction and Development). The SNS was the initiator of the Slovak Language Law in the 1990s and, during the 2006–10 term, was the main driver behind the toughening of its provisions. In addition, the party advanced a number of controversial bills in the fields of education and culture, including a proposal on the rehabilitation of Andrej Hlinka as a central figure in Slovak history. However, during the time served as a junior coalition partner, the leadership of the SNS was involved in a number of corruption scandals. In 2006,

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the Ministry of Environment sold CO2 emission quotas to a US company for a considerably lower price compared to the market average. The following year, the Ministry of Development was involved in the so-called noticeboard scandal. On this occasion, the Ministry announced a call for the allocation of EU structural funds worth €120 million, which was posted on a noticeboard in the Ministry hallway and not accessible to the public. A consortium, including two companies (Zamedia and Avocat) with close ties to SNS chairman Slota, eventually won the competition. The party halved its share of votes by 2010, barely making it into parliament with 5.1 per cent of votes. Amidst widespread political scandals and decisions on the bailout of Eurozone countries, early elections were called for 2012. The party then fell short of the 5 per cent threshold and consequently lost parliamentary representation. Shortly thereafter, the SNS initiated a major process of organisational restructuring. Andrej Danko was elected as the new party chairman in October 2012 – provisionally leaving Ján Slota as the honorary president of the SNS – and a number of party personnel were dismissed in due course. Slota himself was eventually expelled by the party presidium in April 2013 on allegations of misuse of party property during his chairmanship (1994–2001, 2003–12) and went on to form the marginal Kresťanská Slovenská Národná Strana (Christian Slovak National Party, KSNS). The SNS gained 3.6 per cent of votes and no seats in the European Parliament elections of May 2014 (Table 3.4). The SNS has punctually released programmatic documents for each national election contested. In occasion of the 2006 elections, the party articulated its first unitary platform after the split of 2001 in a 75-page document entitled ‘We Are Slovaks: A Slovak Government for the Slovak People’. Following participation in government, the 37-page 2010 electoral programme (‘A Policy of Continuity: What We Have Tried, What We Have Achieved, What We Want’) mostly served as an account of the results achieved as a junior coalition partner. The two documents do not bear substantial differences and, overall, deliver the image of a comparatively moderate party, especially vis-à-vis the rhetorical excesses of the 1990s. The party approached the 2012 early elections with an 11-page memorandum (‘Allegiance to Slovakia’), which concentrated on the most stringent problems faced by the Slovak population. The document, whose paternity can be primarily Table 3.4 Electoral performance of the SNS by type of election

Parliamentary Presidential European Seats

1990

1992 1994 1998 1999 2002 2004 2006 2009 2010 2012 2014

13.9% – – 22

7.9% – – 15

5.4% – – 9

9.1% – – 14

– 2.5% – N/A

3.3% – – –

– – 2.0% –

11.7% – – 20

– – 5.6% 1

5.1% – – 9

4.6% – – –

– – 3.6% –

Note: 1) Results for the 1990 and 1992 parliamentary elections refer to the federal Slovak Parliament (Czechoslovakia); all other results refer to the elections to the Parliament of the Slovak Republic; 2) in 2002, the SNS and the splinter PSNS ran independently; only the vote share of the SNS is reported; 3) at the 2004 European Parliament elections, the SNS and the PSNS ran for office on a common ticket. N/A = not applicable. Source: Parties and Elections in Europe Database, www.parties-and-elections.eu.

Ideology of the populist radical right 89 attributed to its signatory, Ján Slota, has somewhat set new standards for the radicalism of the party. Especially as far as minority issues and the EU are concerned, the memorandum could be deemed Slota’s swan song, since it bears all the themes held dear by the party chairman – delivered in his trademark uncompromising fashion. After failing to enter parliament in 2012, the SNS has been on the brink of bankruptcy. Hence, the party started a process of concomitant reorganisation and rejuvenation in late 2012.20 Besides increasing the number of observations for this analysis, the interview held with new party chairman Andrej Danko helped assess the scope of the party’s attempts at moderation and modernisation, especially in relation to the previous chairmanship. Even though the party rhetoric was toned down in certain respects, the SNS still qualifies as a full-fledged member of the famille spirituelle object of this study. The ties with the Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (Freedom Party of Austria, FPÖ) of Heinz-Christian Strache, repeatedly accentuated during the interview, further corroborate this view. Clericalism Three basic principles recur in the SNS programmes: the national, the Christian, and the social. The party equates the question of nationhood to that of Christianity, partly due to Slovakia’s own Catholic history. Religious affiliation has traditionally demonstrated one of the defining traits of Slovak identity (especially compared to the predominantly non-religious Czech Republic). In addition, the first Slovak Republic (1939–45) was a clerical fascist experience that took shape under the leadership of Monsignor Jozef Tiso and the aegis of Nazi Germany. Throughout its history, the SNS has claimed continuity with the first Slovak Republic21 and has sought to rehabilitate prominent figures of that experience. More recently, the new leadership has maintained a more cautious stance on the question of the first Slovak Republic. In particular, the interview with the new party chairman, held on the 74th anniversary of the first Slovak Republic, offered the opportunity to evaluate the current party stance on the issue. It’s a part of history that cannot be undone and is a significant part of Slovak history. The misfortune of history is that the birth of the Slovak nation was imposed by the foreign leaders of that time and what the Slovaks had dreamt about was dictated by unfortunate historical circumstances. So we definitely commemorate the state, it was the first time when there was a state with every trait of it – with a president, a parliament, its symbols – and we will remember it. At that moment, the SNS was not functional, because it was incorporated by the Popular Front led by Andrej Hlinka. All that can be said is that it is a very delicate issue and it’s part of history and, from my personal point of view and from that of the party, there is no real space to get back to it or need to reflect on it because the party was not functional at that moment. (Andrej Danko, personal interview, 14 March 2013)

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In its 2006 electoral programme, the party formally considers believers and non-believers to be the same (SNS 2006: 41); even so, Christian morals inspire the social policies of the SNS and shall inform national policies accordingly. The party especially claims that the Christian principles of social solidarity and its moral values have forged Slovak history, ensuring the spiritual survival of the nation (SNS 2006: 2). In the field of education, the party aspires to shape school curricula in such a way that the upbringing of the pupil conforms to national pride, Christian roots, and Slovak identity (SNS 2006: 35). The party devotes a section ad hoc to church-state relations: here, the party “appreciates the contribution of the Christian churches to the development and rescue of the Slovak nation”; seeks to coordinate the cooperation between church and state and contribute to their activities; and ultimately regards “the requirement for the separation of Church and state as historical and legal nonsense in the Central European space” (SNS 2006: 41–2). The Christian principles outlined in 2006 are substantially unchanged in the 2010 electoral programme, yet the shorter length of the document seems to have relegated religious issues to the spheres of culture and education. Therefore, the party reasserts that the knowledge of and respect for national and Christian traditions are instrumental in the upbringing of Slovak patriots (SNS 2010: 22), the preservation of Slovak identity, and national civic development (SNS 2010: 27). As the party prepared to face early elections in 2012, the SNS only released a memorandum referring to the most stringent issues faced by Slovakia. The 11-page document, comparatively more radical in character, made only occasional reference to clerical issues. At the same time, however, Christianity is distinctly employed ‘outwardly’ – that is, as a tool to hold back the spread of Islam and multiculturalism in Slovakia and Europe. Islamisation and multiculturalism are equated to forms of violent suppression of Christianity, and the SNS sets itself in opposition to these processes (SNS 2012: 2 and 11). Perhaps in response to this, the party aspired to dignify nationwide the 1,150th anniversary of the arrival of Saints Cyril and Methodius to Great Moravia by declaring 2013 as the year of the two missionaries (SNS 2012: 9). Even when Christianity is read through the lens of history, the party seems inclined to interpret creed as a defensive instrument to preserve Slovak identity: The SNS was founded in 1871, at a moment when Budapest gained power and there were Magyarisation programmes taking place; it was the time of the greatest oppression from Hungarians. The party was then founded on three pillars: the national, the Christian, and the social. Christianity is tied within the party programme. (Andrej Danko, personal interview, 14 March 2013) Accordingly, the new party chairman Andrej Danko places emphasis on the role of Christian morals to help defend the Slovak nation and Europe from external sociocultural threats. As the Church is undergoing a phase of decline, the SNS also wishes it could regain a prominent role in society by contributing to charitable activities.

Ideology of the populist radical right 91 Today both society and the Church are facing great problems. As I see my role of young chairman of the party to rejuvenate and reinvigorate the party, the Church needs to reconsider the way it communicates with young people, in order to preserve certain values around Europe. First, even when you travel abroad, . . . you see lots of immigrants and, when immigrants come, they bring lots of different cultures. In this regard, Islam is on the rise and the Church needs to regain its role within society to prevent Christian and social values from losing out in this religious cohabitation. When it comes to Christianity and social issues, the Church has generally cooperated with parties that have a strong value statement within their programmes.22 Second, the Church and the parties need to cooperate on social issues. For example, here in Slovakia there is a large Roma community and there is nothing similar to the missions that have been carried out in Africa or Latin America. This would be an opportunity for the Church to regain trust and respect, and return to their values. (Andrej Danko, personal interview, 14 March 2013) Irredentism The SNS has played the ‘Hungarian card’ extensively, often jeopardising SlovakHungarian diplomatic affairs (e.g. Petőcz 2009). Since the 1990s, this form of irredentism ex negativo was pursued by raising awareness on the geopolitical and sociocultural threats faced by independent Slovakia. The issue remained a constant in the party’s programmatic documents. In its 2006 electoral programme, the SNS questioned the loyalty of the Hungarian minority to independent Slovakia and denounced the irredentist claims of the Hungarian government. In particular, the party asserts that the Hungarian government has used the rights of Hungarian minorities abroad as a pretext to redefine the borders with neighbouring countries, question the after-war territorial arrangements of Europe, and pursue the administrative and state-political unification of Hungarians in the Carpathian basin (SNS 2006: 58). The SNS also claims that the Strana Maďarskej Koalície – Magyar Koalíció Pártja (Party of the Hungarian Coalition, SMK-MKP), as a coalition partner in the 1998–2002 and 2002–6 governments, has systematically cooperated with the Hungarian government in breach of the legal framework of the Slovak Republic. According to the SNS, the SMKMKP has supported calls for the cancellation of the Beneš decrees on the part of the Hungarian government (SNS 2006: 58). The salience of the irredentist issue remained high in the following documents, in which the party displays its unwillingness to compromise on Slovak–Hungarian relations. In the 2010 electoral programme, the SNS sought to counter domestic and foreign Hungarian policies by criminalising any threats to the Slovak Republic (SNS 2010: 6–7). Related to this, the SNS submitted to the parliament a declaration according to which the Slovak Republic does not recognise “the arbitrary declaration of independence of Kosovo, which is contrary to international law and practice. . . . By doing this, we have tried to prevent that something similar could be repeated in southern Slovakia in the future” (SNS 2010: 6).

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The inclusion of the issue in the 2012 memorandum confirms the continuing importance attached to irredentism by the SNS. Indeed, at the end of the document’s preface, the party states: “we cannot underestimate the permanent threat to the sovereignty and integrity of Slovakia from our southern neighbour” and intends to adopt incisive, effective, and legitimate countermeasures to preserve the territorial and political cohesion of Slovakia (SNS 2012: 2). The issue of irredentism is evidently a question articulated on Slovak-Hungarian relations. The SNS clearly values national minorities abroad, but with the lack of a real irredenta, the party aspires to see Slovaks living in neighbouring countries benefiting from equitable treatment. When it comes to Slovak minorities living abroad, it is very important to maintain our cultural ties, as it is the case with Slovak expatriates in America, but also those living in neighbouring countries. A very important issue for us is that Slovak minorities abroad are granted the same rights of the minorities living in Slovakia. A great grievance that the party feels is that the Slovak minority living in Hungary has lesser rights than Hungarians living in Slovakia. . . . It is historically renowned today that there are around 400,000 Hungarians in Slovakia and the same number of Slovaks used to be in Hungary, but in Hungary they have been assimilated. The problem of Slovak-Hungarian relationships is a historical one; it was our party that during the Great Hungarian empire was operating across the empire so that the Hungarian oppression could be stopped. I was just recently at a conference on the Slovak-Hungarian border and became aware of the fact that Slovaks in Hungary, shortly before elections, needed to undertake a special kind of registration – or at least that was the idea. What we are talking about here is reciprocity. National minorities in Slovakia receive substantially greater support and more rights than minorities in Hungary. Slovaks in Hungary are not even dreaming about the rights that Hungarians have in Slovakia. (Andrej Danko, personal interview, 14 March 2013) As of the year 2013, the territorial aspect attached to irredentism is still revealed in its variant ex negativo in Slovakia. Despite a process of internal reorganisation initiated in late 2012, Andrej Danko appears to be as resolute as the previous chairmanship in his assessment of the threats posed by the policies of the Hungarian government. What is going on under the government of Viktor Orbán is the greatest madness. It is sick that he would change the constitution without respecting Trianon and talk about Greater Hungary. And what’s incomprehensible for us is that Orbán claimed that he has 300,000 new Hungarian citizens living in neighbouring countries. He’s doing the same thing that Hitler was doing with the Sudeten! He’s actually handing out passports on ethnic principles in neighbouring countries – that means, he’s giving them citizenship. The Council of Europe is silent, mute. The EU is mute. Imagine that he is also handing out

Ideology of the populist radical right 93 passports in Ukraine, so he’s artificially increasing the number of EU citizens in Ukraine only based on ancestral connections with Hungary. I cannot understand this. Not mentioning that you cannot increase the number of EU citizens and do political campaigns abroad. This stirs up tensions and supports politicians that have problems respecting what is stated by the law of their own countries.23 For example, there is a Slovak legislation that strips you of your citizenship if you accept the Hungarian one, but the government does not even know how many of these citizens have Hungarian citizenship and still live here and take the social benefits despite having accepted Hungarian citizenship. This is a very important issue for the party and we abide by the tenets of the Trianon Treaty. We stand for the principle of reciprocity, a civil and constructive dialogue, but what is going on under the current governments of Orbán and Fico is a false dialogue and this is creating tensions – not only between Slovaks and Hungarians, but also between Hungarians and Romanians, and Hungarians and Croats. (Andrej Danko, personal interview, 14 March 2013) Social-national economics The type of economic nativism advocated by the SNS has moved towards more liberal positions over time. The position of the party leans towards the centre of the left-right continuum when it comes to economic policies (Hooghe et al. 2010; Bakker et al. 2012), somewhat resembling the Christian democratic and liberal economic views of some populist radical right parties of the West. Most importantly, the SNS does not reject the market economy and foreign investment and also appreciates certain advantages of the process of globalisation (e.g. SNS 2006: 7). In light of these premises, the economic agenda of the party has diverged from the conceptualisation of ‘social-national economics’ discussed in the previous chapter. In order to achieve the proclaimed goal of the ‘revival of Slovakia’, the party sets as a central point of its 2006 programme the deregulation of the state apparatus (SNS 2006: 2). The party further aims at “building an efficient, competitive and effective economy”; however, in line with its nativist profile, the economic policies shall “serve first of all the development of Slovakia and the improvement of the living standard of its population” (SNS 2006: 3). As the party does not completely neglect forms of economic paternalism, the party reclaims the role of the state in steering the allocation of capital and resources to the regional cohesiveness of Slovakia and supporting the agricultural sector in order to satisfy the sustenance needs of the Slovak population (SNS 2006: 3). The party declares that it will primarily focus on the promotion of small and medium Slovak enterprises, as well as the removal of all bureaucratic, legislative, and financial barriers hampering their development (SNS 2006: 6). Even though the SNS would attempt to regain a 51 per cent share of state participation in strategic assets, it has declared that it will abide by the developmental strategies of advanced industrial economies (SNS 2006: 8).

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The economic stance outlined in the 2010 programme is virtually unchanged, if not for the different economic scenario in which it is released. Indeed, the party acknowledges the worsened conditions of the Slovak economy, attributing responsibility to the global economic crisis as well as some inherent problems of neoliberalism, which could not be solved through governmental action alone. As an incumbent governing party, however, the SNS claims responsibility for the effective provision of social safety nets (SNS 2010: 4). Without questioning the advantages of foreign investment, the party recognises that the current status quo has increasingly exposed the economy of Slovakia to global market fluctuations. Therefore, the policy efforts of the party would be directed at swift recovery through the support of domestic enterprises and the preservation of the economic results achieved during the 2006–10 term (SNS 2010: 8). The chauvinistic slant of the 2012 memorandum is also evident from its outlook on the economy. The party seeks to break current monopolies and reclaim state participation in the energy, telecommunication, and banking sectors as a means to benefit Slovak consumers; support ‘buy Slovak’ programmes; and introduce a taxation on foreign companies and multinationals (SNS 2012: 3). This notwithstanding, the party still favours a slim state apparatus and cuts in the (unproductive and expensive) public sector (SNS 2012: 6). Under the new chairmanship, the economic agenda of the party has dropped its most radical aspects and currently seems to have returned to the principles outlined in the documents preceding the 2012 memorandum. The SNS generally maintains a paternalistic profile when it comes to economic policies, expecting the government to adequately support domestic enterprises and discipline services of public utility. Unlike other populist radical right parties, however, the SNS preserves a fairly realistic stance on economic issues, as demonstrated by the party’s recognition of the conditionality imposed by supranational institutions. There are four main pillars when it comes to the economy. The first concerns taxation, especially undoing the flat tax and increasing the VAT – the alpha and omega of taxation policy. The second one is having the state take serious and restrictive measures to deal with the crisis. The third one is to offer equal opportunities to domestic and foreign investors. And, fourth, an effort to get utility companies – water, gas, and electricity – under effective control of the state. If you get these four together, this would help the economy. At the same time, this all depends on what the EU is doing, especially when it comes to the European Financial Stability Fund and fiscal union, which are terribly complicated issues. The bottom line is that the minimum monthly salary here in Slovakia is €700, a pension is €400, but when it comes to gas, water, and electricity costs, their prices are the same as in Western Europe. The role of the SNS is to get Slovakia on the same side of the income scale – on the same level as Spain or Italy – or at least pave the ground to bring Slovakia on the same level of these countries. (Andrej Danko, personal interview, 14 March 2013)

Ideology of the populist radical right 95 Ethnic minorities As noted in the introductory part of this section, the SNS has been riding high on minority issues ever since its foundation. The party employed a strong ‘anti-Czech’ rhetoric until the ‘Velvet Divorce’; then, after 1993, Hungarian and Roma minorities turned into the primary targets of discrimination. The party leader Slota and other members of the party have reiterated to the public their hostility towards ethnic minorities (Petrova 2006). Moreover, the SNS has often questioned the legitimacy of the SMK-MKP and the very existence of the Hungarian ethnic minority in Slovakia. Infamous is the ‘long whip and small yard’ policy advocated to tackle the problem of Roma criminality (Slovak Spectator 1998). Similarly, the historic party chairman stated that: “Hungarians are the cancer of the Slovak nation, without delay we need to remove them from the body of the nation” (Új Szó 2005). This notwithstanding, with the only exception of the radical 2012 memorandum, the SNS has ostensibly toned down its official anti-Roma stance in recent years, leaving the Hungarian minority as the principal target of its nativist rhetoric. Overall, Hungarian and Roma minorities are portrayed as enjoying aboveaverage rights, especially compared to those of the Slovak minorities abroad (SNS 2006: 39). In the 2006 electoral programme, the party set itself in firm opposition to the “chauvinistic and revanchist interpretations of the rights of national minorities” on the part of the SMK-MKP and the Hungarian community (SNS 2006: 58). The party precisely aims at reversing the deplorable policies of the SMK-MKP in the spheres of culture and education, which have disproportionately favoured the rights of ethnic Hungarians at the expense of the rest of the Slovak population. In essence, the party holds that Slovak natives are the victims of a process of negative discrimination (SNS 2006: 58–9). As far as the problem of Roma backwardness and criminality is concerned, the SNS calls for the improvement of their conditions (read: ‘correction’) (SNS 2006: 60). At the same time, the party rejects the current framework for the assimilation of these minorities (SNS 2006: 26), thus implicitly aspiring to marginalise them. In 2010, the SNS again denounced the Hungarian attempts “at home and abroad” to spread their influence and undermine the rights of Slovak nationals. In this regard, the party, as the main promoter of the Language Law, suggests that its provisions merely ensure that Slovak remains “the basic language of communication for all Slovak citizens without distinction of nationality” and that “Slovaks in Southern Slovakia can obtain information in the national language” (SNS 2010: 5–6). The policies targeting the Roma community seemed to acquire a broader assimilationist breadth through the support of integration policies elaborated at the EU level. However, the SNS calls for a general reassessment of subsidies to the Roma minority, the ‘diversification’ of their education programmes, and the dislocation of police forces to supervise Roma settlements (SNS 2010: 16). The 2012 memorandum is the only programmatic document found to devote a specific section to the Roma issue (‘Solution of Gypsy Issues and Problems with Settlements’).24 The SNS asserts that the social system in Slovakia is currently

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configured in such a way that it encourages unemployment and abuses of the welfare state. Therefore, the party deems it necessary to change the regulation of subsidies’ allocation and tie it to the fulfilment of parental obligations, legal conduct, and a minimum of three years of a continuous 30 hours of social work per month. Moreover, the party returns to one of its early leitmotivs by advocating birth control policies for the Roma community (SNS 2012: 8). As Roma and Hungarian minorities pose different problems in Slovakia, the problems that they may pose require different policy solutions. Andrej Danko also corroborates this view: “the Hungarians are the biggest ethnic minority in Slovakia. It is a completely different kind of problem” (personal interview, 14 March 2013). The interview held with the party chairman helped ascertain two crucial elements: first, and in spite of the change of leadership, the Roma issue still figures prominently in the nativist agenda of the party; second, the SNS appears committed to moderation (at least compared to the Slota chairmanship) and seeks to establish a constructive dialogue to solve problems of marginalisation and abuses of state benefits attributed to the Roma community. With regards to our position on minorities, we have made a shift from nationalism to patriotism and we stopped offending minorities – we’re now engaged in dialogue. This is a very important point in the rebuilding of the National Party and it is truly a personal trait of the chairman – which does not mean that there are no different opinions within the party – but as long as I will be the chairman . . . I will try to engage in a polite constructive dialogue. When it comes to Gypsies or the Roma population, we still hold that there are parts of them that take advantage of the state without paying back, so we think there should be at least a motivational element – they need to show their willingness to work or contribute through social work. A further point refers to the spiritual dimension – the cooperation with the Church – because I think that it must be the combination of spiritual and material support that could help these populations integrate into society, whilst providing them with the ability to preserve their identity. Without any doubt, there are plenty of very talented people who could become successful sportsmen or artists, a lot of hardworking people, but there are also a lot of people who are very selfish and abuse the system. It is important to have common rights and obligations for every citizen in this country. (Andrej Danko, personal interview, 14 March 2013) Corruption The party’s anti-corruption agenda does not appear to be particularly salient. Anti-corruption appeals are present yet ill-defined; moreover, corruption is often treated together with other issues (e.g. heavy bureaucracy and powerful group interests). In the 2006 programme, the party blames regional fragmentation and backwardness for the weakening of the state, the emergence of envy and corruption, and the

Ideology of the populist radical right 97 brain drain from the country and the regions (SNS 2006: 3). The only explicit appeal to anti-corruption policies comes in this form: “we will direct the legislation first and foremost to the struggle against useless bureaucracy, corruption and the abuse of the political and economic power from narrow group interests” (SNS 2006: 9). Despite the party’s involvement in corruption scandals during the 2006– 10 term (with the subsequent dismissal of delegated ministers), the party’s stance on the issue does not vary in the 2010 electoral programme. Overall, the party aspires to achieve clear and stable forms of legislation that would put an end to corruption and cronyism (SNS 2010: 9), especially in the area of public procurement (SNS 2010: 35). From the way the issue is addressed in these two documents, corruption resembles a side effect stemming from complex state legislation rather than a problem per se. Between December 2011 and early 2012, the leak of wiretap files from the years 2005–6 ended up monopolising the Slovak public debate. The so-called ‘Gorilla scandal’ concerned cases of high-level corruption in procurement and privatisation contracts that involved representatives of the liberal-conservative Slovenská Demokratická a Kresťanská Únia – Demokratická Strana (Slovak Democratic and Christian Union – Democratic Party, SDKÚ-DS) and Smer-SD (e.g. Cienski 2012). The public protests that followed largely dominated the 2012 electoral campaign, and the SNS also picked up on the issue. “Today we recognise their true faces”, states the 2012 memorandum, making reference to those politicians who have deceitfully presented themselves as a ‘decent alternative’ to the Slovak voters. The SNS, as the party that ‘will always tell the truth’, calls for a comprehensive audit to ascertain these events (SNS 2012: 1). Moreover, the party asserts that it will support any legislation aimed at eliminating corruption and redressing the grievances of Slovak citizens (SNS 2012: 6). Corruption has somewhat represented the SNS’s Achilles heel during Slota’s leadership. The party’s stance on the issue has been, perhaps deliberately, vague, and anti-corruption appeals have never figured prominently in the agenda of the SNS. The restructuring of the party is at least partly linked to the corruption scandals that plagued the SNS during its participation in government in 2006–10. In this regard, the new party chairman Andrej Danko appears to be committed to eradicating internal mismanagements and regaining the confidence of Slovak voters: As the leadership has changed in 2012, we are working on a new programmatic vision that could be in synch with our times. We will start with the cleaning of our own house, especially as regards party financing. . . . We don’t close our eyes to history. When members of our party have been subject to allegations of corruption, we have faced that. . . . We are very responsible when it comes to the financing of the party – we’re cleaning the house, we’re carrying out internal audits. . . . When it comes to campaigning, we will create a new legal and transparent entity that would solely serve the purpose – separated from the rest of the activities of the party. . . . If I may draw a parallel, the government of the SNS and Smer-SD is similar to the FPÖ and Social

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This notwithstanding, the anti-corruption agenda of the new chairmanship appears to still be in fieri. As Andrej Danko was instated in October 2012, there has been little time to elaborate on concrete policy strategies with outside orientation. Therefore, whilst the party could be set on the right track internally, the external anti-corruption profile of the SNS still needs to be enhanced. As of early 2013, the new chairman has delineated principles of transparency and aspires to a truly independent judiciary with investigative powers. As an attorney, I pay several thousand euros in taxes and I think it is very important, for me and the party, to advance a law that would disclose how people obtain their property. . . . Topics such as corruption are of utmost importance for East European countries, but to me the cornerstone of the rule of law is the functioning of legislative, executive, and judiciary. We are missing a judiciary with the power to investigate. So, regrettably, the separation of powers and the mechanisms of checks and balances are not working in Slovakia. Whoever is in power in Slovakia wants to control legislation, the executive, and the judiciary – solving these problems is the sort of contribution I was expecting from the EU. (Andrej Danko, personal interview, 14 March 2013) As these excerpts highlight, it is admittedly difficult to ascertain a clear shift in the anti-corruption stance of the party. The anti-corruption agenda of the party bears an aura of fuzziness and, once again, corruption seems to be attributed to the malfunctioning of the Slovak state apparatus. As a result, the issue would still qualify as a secondary ideological feature in the agenda of the SNS. The European Union After the uncertain prospects of accession of the 1990s, Slovakia was eventually able to join the EU in the first wave of Eastern enlargement in 2004 and join the Eurozone in 2009. The Slovak public has come across as one of the most proEuropean in Central and Eastern Europe, and this is believed to influence parties’ positions on the issue; this would further corroborate the fact that no Euroreject party in Slovakia has ever managed to garner more than 10 per cent of votes (Henderson 2008: 281).

Ideology of the populist radical right 99 The SNS started out as a Euroreject party, “deeply distrustful of both the ideas underlying European integration and the EU itself” (Kopecký and Mudde 2002: 314). The party sought to freeze negotiation talks and postpone the question of EU membership indefinitely – at least until Slovakia was in a position to discuss accession on an equal footing with other EU members. By the mid-2000s, the SNS reemerged as a unitary political force and toned down much of its anti-EU rhetoric. Slovakia’s accession to the EU in 2004 has certainly contributed to this transformation since the party showed evident signs of pragmatism within its Eurosceptic framework of action. The SNS has systematically opposed the project of a ‘United States of Europe’ and has emphasised the EU’s responsibility of respecting and protecting the sovereignty of its member states. The party asserted that by the “entry of the Slovak Republic into the European Union, the history of the Slovak nation neither begins nor ends” (SNS 2006: 57) and claimed that the EU, as the Europe of nations and national cultures, “must respect, protect and support the cultural individuality and variety of its member states” (SNS 2006: 39–40). At the same time, the party aspired to take advantage of the EU’s structural funds for the strengthening of the regional cohesiveness of Slovakia and the development of the national economy (SNS 2006: 3). In the year 2006, the SNS qualified as a Eurosceptic party, though it placed only moderate emphasis on the issue. The party maintained an analogous Eurosceptic stance in the run-up to the following elections. In the 2010 programme, the SNS denounced a progressive loss of national sovereignty in a number of policy fields. Nonetheless, the document generally served as an account of the SNS’s achievements as a junior coalition partner. The party then included pragmatic considerations, taking credit for the allocation of over 99 per cent of the EU’s structural funds (SNS 2010: 3)25 and the adoption of the euro (SNS 2010: 6). During the 2006–10 term, however, the party was involved in major corruption scandals regarding the allocation of EU funds. The political and financial scenario had changed by the time that early elections were called for 2012. The political debate focused on the ‘Gorilla scandal’ and the bailout of Eurozone countries. The fall of the government coalition led by Iveta Radičová of the SDKÚ-DS was indeed triggered by a vote of no confidence over support for the European Financial Stability Fund. Accordingly, the Eurozone crisis had taken centre stage also in the 2012 memorandum of the SNS. For the first time since EU accession, the party explicitly appealed for withdrawal from the EU and the end of the common currency (SNS 2012: 1). The party document is permeated with calls for Slovak sovereignty, self-sufficiency, and patriotism, but this time placed in the context of the EU’s financial and structural failure. The SNS has rejected the principles of EU solidarity, as it is seen as sustaining a monetary system that is based on debt and loss (SNS 2012: 2). Moreover, the EU leadership has been interpreted as an unaccountable elite that serves the interests of multinational financial groups, monopolies, and globalists (SNS 2012: 10). Despite recent claims of ideological moderation, the SNS’s criticism towards the EU persists under the new chairmanship. However, the SNS justifies its

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EU-pessimism on different grounds and delineates three areas (i.e. foreign affairs, the economy, and rule of law) that should be improved to see the EU ultimately fulfil its role. In principle, the EU is a very good idea, but we see today that it needs reconstruction. There are no clear rules on how the EU functions. The Maastricht criteria are not just a piece of paper. . . . It is very important that all member states have the same rights and obligations. First, it is important that the EU creates a collective mechanism system [in the field of foreign policy] so that when situations such as those in Northern Africa happen, Italy is not afraid of the wave of immigrants. Second, the common currency is very important. But there has to be a common goal for the EU – the elimination of differences [across member states]. Europe has to elaborate a strategy to reduce income differences amongst citizens of different member states. . . . The balance has to be equal across the Union; access to subsidies has to be the same for all member states; there should be an equal standing or, at least, the perspective to reach the same position of other EU countries. Third, we need to focus on legal aspects. Although it is very difficult to get back to socialism and dictatorship, we would expect mechanisms that guarantee a balanced division of powers between the legislative, executive, and judiciary. I am especially referring to changes in electoral laws and the constitution, as in the case of populist leaders such as Orbán or Fico, that once elected can change either of them. I would expect Western countries to provide us with measures that could prevent this disintegration of democratic values from taking place. If Fico changes the electoral threshold to 10 per cent or Orbán changes the constitution, this would become a great governance problem for the EU. (Andrej Danko, personal interview, 14 March 2013) Having prescribed an ideal course of action at the EU level, the SNS does not exclude ‘exit’ as a measure of last resort. Especially compared to the irreconcilable positions of the 2012 memorandum, calls for withdrawal from the EU are certainly more cautious, yet still present. As any patriotic party, we also have to consider a scenario in which the EU could fail. If it does, from our position it would be a step back, but we need to be prepared. . . . So the options would be either creating internal blocks or going back to national states, because even today the most important politicians within the EU don’t know how the EU crisis is going to end. This is tremendously complicated, but we need to be prepared for any alternative because we can’t expect that, if anything bad happens, others will come to rescue us. But we also see that nationalist parties are gaining in importance in the EU and I expect that those countries will hold referendums on withdrawal from the EU. . . . If the EU fails, it will be a common

Ideology of the populist radical right 101 process across all countries; there is no need to stir up emotions, but time is running out. (Andrej Danko, personal interview, 14 March 2013) To sum up, after EU accession, the SNS adapted to the relatively pro-European attitudes of the Slovak public and abandoned the Euroreject positions of the 1990s. On the brink of electoral failure, the party decided to adopt an uncompromising stance (also) on the EU. The motives of this radicalisation have been circumstantial and very much tied to the Eurozone crisis. In October 2011, Radičová’s government fell over the decision to bail out (comparatively) wealthier countries such as Greece, and the SNS decided to turn to the issue. From this perspective, in 2012 the SNS placed EU-related issues at the core of its agenda, adopting an unequivocal Euroreject stance. Be that as it may, the new leadership seems to have instilled a dose of pragmatism in the party’s EU-pessimist stance; the party currently articulates a preferred course of action and substantiates its criticism beyond monetary issues alone. After 2012, exit from the EU is no longer taboo, and the new leadership still considers this prospect to be a viable option.

Comparative perspectives This chapter carried out a fine-grained analysis of the ideological features of populist radical right parties in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Slovakia. On the basis of theoretical and substantive knowledge, six issues were expected to play a central role in the ideology of this party family in Central and Eastern Europe – issues which are indebted to certain historical legacies and the idiosyncrasies of the postcommunist context. The previous sections of this chapter presented three parties of the populist radical right family and analysed how these parties have individually dealt with each issue over time. This final section puts forward comparative perspectives on the ideology of this party family. By advancing a minimum and maximum combination of ideological features of the populist radical right, it is then possible to ascertain if, and to what extent, we can speak of a homogeneous party family in Central and Eastern Europe. Summary of findings Clericalism and the intertwining of church and state feature prominently in the discourse of the populist radical right in these countries. Considering the populist radical right’s appeal to traditional values, this may not be surprising. The regional scope of this phenomenon generally demonstrates that half a century of communist rule had failed to neutralise the appeal of party-based Christian-oriented policies. In return, these policies create a cohesive factor for the native (Christian) people, exacerbating their differences from the ‘alien’ (non-Christian) part of the population. In light of the presence and salience of this issue in party discourses, clericalism qualifies as a core feature for all three parties.

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A number of peculiarities came to the fore in the analysis of this issue. In its ‘us versus them’ juxtaposition, clericalism in Central and Eastern Europe by no means follows an univocal rationale. In Bulgaria and Slovakia, creed and clericalism are defensive tools against the spread of Islam. In the case of Ataka, its antiIslam profile is closely related to its opposition to Ankara and the Turkish minority living in Bulgaria; in the case of the SNS, clericalism serves as an instrument to counter the undermining of Christian values across Europe. Conversely, Jobbik preserves an overwhelmingly positive outlook on Islam. The party appraises Hungarian culture as an amalgam of Western and Eastern traditions and has repeatedly praised the ability of the Muslim world to preserve its traditions (e.g. Vona 2010b). In addition, the party maintains a clear anti-Israel stance and, more specifically, an anti-Zionist stance on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which naturally causes Jobbik to side with Islam. Generally speaking, however, all three parties seem to convene on the necessity to tighten links with the (Orthodox, Catholic, or Protestant) Church and return to Christian morals to halt the spread of liberal values. The issue of irredentism, with its two facets, may appear to be fluid at first. Often connected to minority issues (especially in the case of irredentism ex negativo), the two issues may seem to overlap. Nonetheless, two elements justify separate treatment in this study: first, the fact that irredentism, unlike the ethnic minorities issue, harks back to a pre-communist past, thus qualifying it as a stand-alone issue; second, irredentism retains a territorial aspect that is virtually absent from the antiminorities rhetoric – especially when reference is made to the Roma minorities. In light of the presence and salience of the issue in party programmes, irredentism demonstrates a core feature of the populist radical right ideology in Hungary and Slovakia; in this regard, it is important to note that actual irredentism (Jobbik) and irredentism ex negativo (the SNS) represent two sides of the same coin – i.e. Slovak-Hungarian relations. Ataka’s irredentist appeals are more occasional, and irredentism would not qualify as a core feature of the party’s ideology. Social-national economics fails to qualify as a communist issue, mostly because of the traditional anti-communist profile of this party family. However, the economic policies advocated by these parties are often leftist, partly indebted to the legacy of state socialism. After 1989, modernising forces and mainstream political parties supported market liberalisation and capitalist institution building. The process of political and economic transformation essentially proved to be a one-way route, involving major costs. In practice, the shift from state socialist to capitalist market economies brought about the sale of vital national assets and a progressive retrenchment of social protections, which affected almost every stratum in society. The populist radical right had then translated dissatisfaction with the economy into a leftist and conservative economic agenda appealing to ‘transition losers’ (e.g. Bustikova and Kitschelt 2009). Undoubtedly, these economic appeals are often vague, which is not to say unrealistic. Perhaps with the only exception of the SNS, the formulations of these parties completely disregard the obligations coming from the EU – elements that

Ideology of the populist radical right 103 prove to be a constant in the ‘overpromising’ of this party family. Still, populist radical right parties place great emphasis on their economic platforms and constantly strive to present themselves as competent actors in different policy areas. Moreover, in spite of the specific formulations of their agendas, economic issues remain instrumental to the nativist ideology of populist radical right parties. In other words, the economy shall first and foremost serve the needs and guarantee the well-being of the native population. In light of the different formulations and positioning on the issue, social-national economics is a core feature of party ideology only for Ataka and Jobbik. Despite some recent flirting with radical leftist elements (SNS 2012), the SNS has been long set on a more centrist economic track, and ‘social-national’ aspects are generally absent from its agenda. At the present time, the issue of ethnic minorities may be legitimately considered a leitmotiv in the populist radical right discourse, and its salience is high for all three parties analysed. Populist radical right parties in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Slovakia present themselves as the most competent actors to handle the problem of ethnic minorities. In return, their rise to prominence is often linked to this antiminorities stance, for they are believed to have ownership of the issue. Nonetheless, the analysis brought attention to different aspects of the issue. On the one hand, these parties identify distinct enemies of the nation, as the cases of the Turkish minority in Bulgaria or the Hungarian minority in Slovakia demonstrate. As these minorities are claimed to be unwilling to integrate with the dominant national culture, they primarily represent a threat to the cultural homogeneity of the nation-state. Therefore, it should not be surprising if the populist radical right’s struggle against these minorities resolves into (pleas for) restrictive cultural and educational policies (e.g. language laws, revision of school curricula, etc.). On the other hand, all three parties identify the Roma minority as the principal threat to national public security. The Roma communities of these countries are de jure part of the state but practically live at the margins of society, with evidence of unsatisfactory socioeconomic conditions as well as educational and employment status. The disadvantaged position of this minority makes it an easy target for the rhetoric of populist radical right parties, which in turn associate the Roma minority with specific forms of criminality and abuses of social benefits. Populist radical right parties prompt the adoption of different policy solutions to tackle the issue; however, they tend to privilege immediate law-and-order measures over inclusive cultural and educational policies. In this regard, all three parties have come to promote the establishment or dislocation of local militias, perhaps encouraged by the example of the Magyar Gárda in Hungary. As far as corruption is concerned, populist radical right parties in Central and Eastern Europe have been able to address the issue in such a way that it appears to be connected to the transformation process of 1989. Formulated in these terms, corruption comes across as an endemic problem related to the communist past and former communist elites that only a radical change could solve. Populist radical right parties generally present themselves as the answer, for they are anti-establishment and anti-corruption organisations by definition. The

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corruption issue comes across as a core feature in the ideology of Ataka and Jobbik; conversely, the SNS’s emphasis on the issue appears to be only secondary. In this regard, it should be noted that the party’s anti-corruption agenda (and anti-establishment profile in general) has been severely weakened by its own conduct in power. During Slota’s leadership, and especially during the SNS’s participation in government (2006–10), the party has been tainted by major corruption scandals (Slovak Spectator 2009). Whilst the new chairmanship seems determined to set the party on the right track, the provision of self-standing anticorruption policies is still under way. The EU issue, as delivered by the populist radical right, should distinguish between a pre-accession phase and a post-accession phase. In the pre-accession period, populist radical right parties in these countries (for example, the SNS and the MIÉP) tended to hold ‘Euroreject’ positions. Concentrating on parties that (re-)emerged during third-generation elections had the advantage of highlighting how this pattern has changed after accession to the EU. By the end of the 2000s, and to varying degrees, populist radical right parties seemingly adapted to the status quo and moved towards Eurosceptic positions. Whereas Ataka and Jobbik maintained a fierce Eurosceptic stance, the SNS’s position appeared to be quite erratic.26 Overall, all three populist radical right parties reject the integration model outlined in the Lisbon Treaty, which is interpreted as a document designed to establish a ‘United States of Europe’. At least for this reason, these parties qualify as EU-pessimist organisations. Following the recent debate on austerity measures and in the face of questions concerning national sovereignty, populist radical right parties have become more critical of European integration, have started prioritising this issue, and have at times also adopted Euroreject positions. Multivalence Attention was also drawn to the ‘multivalence’ of some of these issues. This study anticipated the ability of certain ideological features to ‘communicate’ with each other. The analysis carried out in this chapter has provided at least preliminary substantiation of this claim. For instance, the question of multivalence seems to apply to the facet ex negativo of irredentism and minority issues. The examples of Bulgaria and Slovakia demonstrate that a single ethnic minority (i.e. Turkish or Hungarian) could be portrayed as both a territorial and a sociocultural threat. In such cases, ethnic minorities turn out to be a target of distinct, yet related, discourses. In addition, the qualitative content analysis of the discourses of Ataka and Jobbik highlighted a significant interdependence between their socioeconomic platform and their anti-corruption agenda. Indeed, by seeking reversal of the privatisation process, the Bulgarian and Hungarian parties do not simply attest their support for state ownership. Ataka and Jobbik aim at invalidating the privatisation of national assets also because they regard this process as inherently

Ideology of the populist radical right 105 tainted by corruption. Hence, rationales for adopting a particular stance on these issues are often interrelated and comparable. Furthermore, Jobbik adds a third element to this chain – that is, anti-communism. The analysis of the party discourse on economic issues and corruption has systematically brought to the fore the blaming of former communist elites – now active within the political framework of the MSZP. Interestingly, Jobbik is the only party out of the three presenting an outright anti-communist profile. Given the traditional importance attached to the issue by the far right in the region (e.g. Bustikova 2009), it was certainly surprising to find anti-communism playing a marginal role in the discourse of the other two parties. To be sure, this does not mean that populist radical right parties in Central and Eastern Europe should now be considered ‘pro-regime’ organisations. Nevertheless, the symbolic value of the pro-regime/ anti-regime divide may have progressively come to lose its salience in a number of post-communist countries. Conversely, anti-communism still resonates in the patriotic and nationalistic cultures of Hungary.27 In light of all this, it seems fair to find anti-communism attached to other issues rather than figuring as a standalone issue in the agenda of this party family. In other words, anti-communism may be better translated (or fought) at the policy level through the prosecution of political and economic crimes. A minimum and maximum combination of ideological features In terms of their ideologies, Ataka, Jobbik, and the SNS are fairly ‘like-minded’, yet they do not constitute an entirely homogeneous group. A strict analysis based on the presence and salience of ideological features reveals that, at the time of writing, only three of the six issues analysed qualify as core features in the ideologies of all three parties: these are clericalism, opposition to ethnic minorities, and EU-pessimism – the minimum combination (Table 3.5). However, a looser analysis based only on the presence of these features in the party discourses would extend this range also to irredentism and anti-corruption – the maximum combination. Irredentism (actual or ex negativo) is a core feature of the ideologies of Jobbik and the SNS only; the issue is not articulated in a systematic fashion in the case of Table 3.5 Summary table of ideological features per party as of the year 2013 Issue

Ataka

Jobbik

SNS

Clericalism Irredentism Social-national economics Anti-minorities Anti-corruption EU-pessimism

++ + ++ ++ ++ ++

++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++

++ ++ – ++ + ++

Note: ++ = core (present and salient); + = not core (present); – = absent.

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Ataka, as it is often relegated to indications in official media and statements. Social-national economics, in light of its leftist imprint, represents a core feature only for Ataka and Jobbik. Despite an extemporaneous courtship of radical economic policies (2012), the SNS should be considered a ‘pro-market’ force with a centrist economic platform; this formulation substantially diverges from the socialnational economic model outlined in this study, and the issue could be considered absent from the ideology of the Slovak party. Ultimately, the analysis tells us that Jobbik could serve as an archetype of the populist radical right party in Central and Eastern Europe. The Hungarian party is currently found to deliver all six ideological features in a consistent manner. Ataka resembles Jobbik’s agenda in all aspects but one – irredentism. The SNS seems to have ‘moderated’ its agenda over time and does not match the radical profile of the other two parties. To be sure, the 2012 memorandum of the party has paved the way for a new (or renewed) radicalisation of the SNS. Elements of ideological continuity between the Slota and Danko leaderships are at least discernible through the increased salience of the EU issue. Nevertheless, Danko’s proclaimed aim to rejuvenate the party’s brand and present the SNS as a respectable nationalist organisation within established Slovak politics seems to suggest an ongoing process of moderation. Conclusion This book started off suggesting that the (re-)emergence of populist radical right parties in Central and Eastern Europe prompts a better understanding of the (distinct) issues at the core of their ideology. Populist radical right parties in Central and Eastern Europe tap into a ‘post-communist syndrome’ stemming from the disappointments of the transformation process. This is aptly reflected in the framing of the ideology of these parties: populist radical right parties in Central and Eastern Europe were expected to address pre-communist issues such as clericalism and irredentism; social-national economics; and post-communist issues such as ethnic minorities, corruption, and the EU. With the exception of their different economic platforms, the three parties under scrutiny are collectively found to address five of the six issues identified. The empirical analysis of these ideological features has two direct implications for the study of this party family. First, populist radical right parties in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Slovakia articulate their ideology over a set of pre-communist and post-communist issues. Communist issues are not part of any (minimum or maximum) combination of ideological features. Social-national economics – an issue somewhat indebted to the legacy of state socialism – does not currently figure in the agenda of the SNS and thus fails to provide common ideological ground for this party family. Second, and related to the previous point, populist radical right parties do not constitute an entirely homogeneous group. As far as their ideology is concerned, these parties are fairly like-minded, but the selective emphasis they place on certain issues would only present us with a common denominator of clericalism, opposition to minorities, and EU-pessimism. These differences should

Ideology of the populist radical right 107 be ascribed to the historical legacies of these countries and the idiosyncrasies of respective national contexts. The comparatively more moderate ideological profile that the SNS adopted in 2006 and 2010 may be attributed to its level of institutionalisation. As a case in point, whilst the SNS belongs to the populist kind (‘either/or’), the degree (‘more or less’) of its populism is certainly lower compared to the other two parties (see Sartori 1970: 1036). This becomes apparent by looking at the secondary role played by its anti-corruption and anti-establishment appeals, and by the fact that the new chairmanship appears to be committed to disassociating itself from the rhetorical style of Ján Slota. In terms of the extension of the maximum combination of issues to the whole of Central and Eastern Europe, some considerations are in order. Irredentism is likely to be found only in the discourse of populist radical right parties with a country-specific legacy of pan-nationalism. Countries lacking external homelands or not subject to territorial claims by neighbouring countries will yield populist radical right parties with no irredentist agenda. Therefore, a refined maximum combination willing to take this observation into account will only include clericalism, ethnic minorities, corruption, and the EU as the defining issues of the populist radical right in the region. In addition, the defining question of ethnicity may be only secondary in ethnically homogeneous countries. Then, the specific configuration of this palette of issues – and their primary or secondary roles – will have to be assessed on a country-by-country basis. By providing a framework for the analysis of their ideological features, the chapter highlighted the raison d’être of populist radical right parties in Central and Eastern Europe, individually and comparatively. The emergence, electoral performance, and impact of this party family very much depend on competition over these issues. Putting the issues identified at the core of investigation will shed light on the impact that this party family exerts on respective national party systems. Moreover, interpreting the electoral performance of these parties as an interaction between the demand-side and the supply-side of populist radical right politics should offer better insight into their success and/or failure at the polls. It is to these questions that the following chapters turn their attention.

Notes 1 Despite their pan-Slavic and ‘eastward’ orientations, the other two parties analysed present multi-language websites (Jobbik) or at least a number of documents in English (SNS). 2 The distinction between presence and indication relates to the inclusion/non-inclusion of the issue in electoral party programmes. However, both scenarios would yield secondary issues that are present, but not core. 3 Article 11(4) of the Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria states: “there shall be no political parties on ethnic, racial or religious lines”. 4 The origins of the name Ataka are explained by Siderov: “[it] is the name of a TV commentary show that is still on the cable TV SKAT, where I have been expressing my position on current political topics. I made it up as a name of the TV show, and of a civic

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5 6 7

8

9 10 11 12 13

14 15 16 17

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organization. It comes from the Bulgarian attack on Edirne (Adrianople) on March 13, 1913, when the Bulgarian troops captured the most impregnable fortress of that time, the pride of the German military machine. . . . This is when the Bulgarian soldier, fighting for the unification of his country, showed incredible heroism. The Bulgarian attack is something superhuman. This is the idea of the name because I believe that today we need such uplifting of spirit in defence of the Bulgarian nation. I want to point out that Ataka’s nationalism is defensive, it is an immune system saving the nation from extinction” (Novinite 2009). In Chapter 2, doubts were raised on the opportunity to refer to this form of nativist economics as a ‘communist issue’. This is partly confirmed by Siderov himself: “this is not a communist view, this is a humanist view” (Novinite 2009). Reference is made here to incidents that occurred between members of local Roma communities and police patrols in the exercise of their duties. The programme was also made available, in an abridged version, in the English language. The number of pages of the Hungarian programme has caused controversy. The number 88 is used within neo-Nazi milieus as an abbreviation for the ‘Heil Hitler’ salute, as the ‘H’ is the eighth letter of the English alphabet. Even during the personal interview with MP Márton Gyöngyösi, these allegations were dismissed as an “unfortunate coincidence”. In the interview held with Márton Gyöngyösi, the Jobbik MP also drew attention to the symbols of the party and, in particular, to the use of the St. Stephen’s cross in their logo. According to the party, the Patriarchal cross epitomises both Christianity and statehood. On the distinctive component of paganism in the narrative of the Hungarian populist radical right, see Akçali and Korkut (2012). Note that the Hungarian population living within Hungarian borders amounts to 10 million people (Hungarian Central Statistical Office 2013: 2). Reference is made to the 2011 Hungarian Citizenship Law, which grants the possibility to apply to become a Hungarian citizen to every person able to prove Hungarian ancestry and knowledge of the Hungarian language. The Szeklers are a Hungarian minority sub-group living in the Székely Land, Romania. Russia, Turkey, and Kazakhstan are frequent destinations of Jobbik representatives’ diplomatic visits. The party advocates ever-tighter political relationships with these countries, both on the basis of an “ancient kinship with the peoples of that region” and their “geopolitical status and influence” (Jobbik 2010b: 21). This claim is substantiated by the fact that many issues addressed in the 2005 MIÉP electoral programme appear in the 2010 Jobbik manifesto. Above all, both parties often call for a ‘radical change’. The interview was held in the Országgyűlés Irodaháza (Office Building of the Hungarian Parliament). The building used to host the headquarters of the Central Committee of the Magyar Szocialista Munkáspárt (Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party, MSZMP). Gyöngyösi evidently refers to the stigmatisation of Jobbik in the international press. Whilst in government, Fidesz drafted and adopted a new constitution that entered into force on 1 January 2012. The new constitution received widespread criticism from the international community and resulted in the launch of legal proceedings by the European Commission following concerns over reforms to the Central Bank, the judiciary, and data protection. It is important to note that Hungarian law does not allow holding referendums over issues concerning international obligations, hereby including the EU. Article 28C(5) of the Hungarian Constitution states: “national referendum may not be held on the following subjects. . . . b) obligations set forth in valid international treaties and on the contents of laws prescribing such obligations”. Therefore, it is not clear how the party intends to play the ‘exit card’ through popular consultation. This practice of ‘outbidding’ or

Ideology of the populist radical right 109

19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26

27

‘over-promising’ (Sartori 1976: 139–40) is often common to opposition parties, “in the knowledge that they will never be called upon to make good on their pledges” (Capoccia 2002: 16). The nominally independent First Slovak Republic (1939–45) was, de facto, a Naziprotected state. “As a new leadership we have inherited a big zero” (Andrej Danko, personal interview, 14 March 2013). As a case in point, the party often spoke of a renewed independence starting from 1993. Mr Danko evidently refers to the privileged relationship that the SNS may have in collaborating with the Church. Mr Danko here refers to the SMK-MKP and Most-Híd, the two parties representing the interests of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia. Note that this document also marks a change in the terminology employed. The 2006 and 2010 electoral programmes refer to the Roma people as ‘Roma’, whereas the 2012 memorandum uses the derogative term ‘Gypsies’. In this respect, the Court of Auditors, the EU’s financial watchdog, found numerous errors and fraud in 36 per cent of regional aid projects sampled in 2009, concluding that about €700 million should not have been paid out (Castle 2010). If possible, the SNS’s position qualified as ‘soft Eurosceptic’, whereas the positions of Ataka and Jobbik qualified as ‘hard Eurosceptic’. This differentiation in degree adheres to the conceptualisation of the ‘Eurosceptic’ party position by Kopecký and Mudde (2002: 302). For a different usage of ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ Euroscepticism, see Taggart and Szczerbiak (2001, 2004). Celebrations for the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 against the communist regime (23 October) bear a greater symbolic and mobilising value compared to the other two national holidays – 15 March (outbreak of the 1848 Revolution) and 20 August (St. Stephen’s Day).

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Ideology of the populist radical right 113 Pirro, A.L.P. (2014) ‘Bulgaria, Slovacchia, Ungheria: Populismo ‘Soft’ e Astensionismo’, in M. Valbruzzi and R. Vignati (eds.) L’Italia e l’Europa al Bivio delle Riforme: Le Elezioni Europee e Amministrative del 25 Maggio 2014. Bologna, Italy: Istituto Cattaneo, pp. 325–33. Pirro, A.L.P., and S. van Kessel (2013) ‘Pushing Towards Exit: Euro-Rejection as a “Populist Common Denominator”?’ Paper presented at the 2013 EUDO Dissemination Conference, 28–29 November. Florence, Italy: European University Institute. Popova, M. D. (2013) ‘Attack and Counter-Attack: Mainstream Party-Radical Challenger Interaction in Bulgaria’. Paper presented at the Association for the Study of Nationalities World Convention, 18–20 April. New York. Robertson, D. (1976) A Theory of Party Competition. Chichester, UK: Wiley. Rose, R., and N. Munro (2009) Parties and Elections in New European Democracies. Colchester, UK: ECPR Press. Sartori, G. (1970) ‘Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics’. American Political Science Review, 64 (4): 1033–53. Sartori, G. (1976) Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Shultz, K. S., M. L. Riggs, and J. L. Kottke (1998) ‘The Need for an Evolving Concept of Validity in Industrial and Personnel Psychology: Psychometric, Legal, and Emerging Issues’. Current Psychology, 17 (Winter): 265–86. Siderov, V. (2002) Bumerangat na Zloto. Sofia, Bulgaria: Obektiv. Siderov, V. (2003) Bulgarophobia. Sofia, Bulgaria: Bumerang. Siderov, V. (2004) Vlastta na Mamona. Sofia, Bulgaria: Bumerang. Slovak Spectator (1998) ‘High Hopes and Hard Truths for Slovak Romanies’. 9 April. Available from: http://spectator.sme.sk/articles/view/6795/3 [Accessed 27 November 2014]. Slovak Spectator (2009) ‘People Often Get What They Want, Not What They Need’. 31 August. Available from: http://spectator.sme.sk/articles/view/36352/11/people_often_ get_what_they_want_not_what_they_need.html [Accessed 1 December 2014]. Slovak Spectator (2013) ‘Far-Right Leader Kotleba Wins in Banská Bystrica’. 24 November. Available from: http://spectator.sme.sk/articles/view/52139/2/far_right_leader_kotleba_wins_in_banska_bystrica.html [Accessed 25 November 2014]. Slovenská Národná Strana (Slovak National Party, SNS) (2006) ‘Election Programme of the Slovak National Party’. Available from: www.sns.sk/wp-content/uploads/2010/03/ sns_program_english.pdf [Accessed 18 January 2013]. Slovenská Národná Strana (Slovak National Party, SNS) (2010) ‘Volebný Program 2010’. Available from: www.sns.sk/wp-content/uploads/2010/03/Volebny_program_20101.pdf [Accessed 17 October 2013]. Slovenská Národná Strana (Slovak National Party, SNS) (2012) ‘Vernosť Slovensku. Programové Memorandum SNS’. Available from: www.sns.sk/engine/assets/ uploads/2012/01/Text-programového-memoranda-SNS.doc [Accessed 17 October 2013]. Szczerbiak, A., and P. Taggart (eds.) (2008a) Opposing Europe – The Comparative Party Politics of Euroscepticism. Volume I: Case Studies and Country Surveys. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Szczerbiak, A., and P. Taggart (eds.) (2008b) Opposing Europe – The Comparative Party Politics of Euroscepticism. Volume II: Comparative and Theoretical Perspectives. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Szőcs, L. (1998) ‘A Tale of the Unexpected: The Extreme Right vis-à-vis Democracy in Post-Communist Hungary’. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 21 (6): 1096–115.

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Taggart, P. (1998) ‘A Touchstone of Dissent: Euroscepticism in Contemporary Western European Party Systems’. European Journal of Political Research, 33 (3): 363–88. Taggart, P., and A. Szczerbiak (2001) ‘Parties, Positions and Europe: Euroscepticism in the EU Candidate States of Central and Eastern Europe’. SEI Working Paper 46. Brighton, UK: Sussex European Institute. Taggart, P., and A. Szczerbiak (2004) ‘Contemporary Euroscepticism in the Party Systems of the European Union Candidate States of Central and Eastern Europe’. European Journal of Political Research, 43 (1): 1–27. Taggart, P., and A. Szczerbiak (2013) ‘Coming in from the Cold? Euroscepticism, Government Participation and Party Positions on Europe’. Journal of Common Market Studies, 51 (1): 17–37. Tamás, P. (2011) ‘The Radical Right in Hungary: A Threat to Democracy?’ in N. Langenbacher and B. Schellenberg (eds.) Is Europe on the ‘Right’ Path? Right-Wing Extremism and Right-Wing Populism in Europe. Berlin: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, pp. 221–41. van Kessel, S., and A.L.P. Pirro (2014) ‘Discontent on the Move: Prospects for Populist Radical Right Parties in the 2014 European Elections’. Intereconomics, 49 (1): 14–18. Vigenin, K. (2011) ‘The Radical Right in Bulgaria: ATAKA – Rise, Fall and Aftermath’, in N. Langenbacher and B. Schellenberg (eds.) Is Europe on the ‘Right’ Path? Right-Wing Extremism and Right-Wing Populism in Europe. Berlin: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, pp. 197–204. Vona, G. (2010a) ‘Gabor Vona: Europe Kept Silent – Interview’. Available from: www. jobbik.com/gabor_vona_europe_kept_silent_-_interview [Accessed 11 March 2015]. Vona, G. (2010b) ‘Islam’. 9 December. Available from: www.jobbik.com/vona_gábor_ about_islam [Accessed 19 November 2013].

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Exploring the dimensionality and assessing the impact of populist radical right parties

Introduction The first part of this book focused on the context and text of the populist radical right in Central and Eastern Europe. Turning attention to the issues of this party family has provided the basis for a number of fruitful distinctions. First and foremost, the previous chapters highlighted important differences compared to the same phenomenon in Western Europe. Indeed, the populist radical right in Central and Eastern Europe draws ideological inspiration from historical legacies and contextual idiosyncrasies, which evidently deviate from the Western European experience. In turn, this brings attention to a second point: populist radical right parties in Central and Eastern Europe are not a ‘single-issue’ phenomenon (e.g. Fennema 1997; Mudde 1999). It is precisely on the basis of their range of issues that it was possible to ascertain ideological differences across this party family in Central and Eastern Europe. Populist radical right parties in Central and Eastern Europe strenuously endeavour to present themselves as competent actors in different policy areas. In other words, the selective emphasis they may place on clericalism, corruption, or the European Union (EU) denotes that the populist radical right seeks to influence the political debate beyond the more predictable area of ethnic minorities. Whether the populist radical right is indeed capable of exerting influence over different policy areas has yet to be ascertained. This chapter specifically aims to answer questions relative to the dimensionality, strategies, and impact of populist radical right parties in postcommunist countries. This research agenda acquires particular value not only for the study of the populist radical right but also for post-communist party politics as a whole. At present, very little attention has been paid to the impact and dimensionality of this party family, and the scholarly literature has regrettably overlooked the importance of these aspects in Central and Eastern Europe. Already in 2007, many alarmist accounts made headlines in the international press in relation to the activity of the Magyar Gárda – the organisation affiliated with the populist radical right Jobbik and established to restore law and order in rural areas with a high concentration of Roma minorities. At first, this seemed to confirm the more anti-democratic and more militant character of populist radical right organisations in the region (Minkenberg 2002b: 362). According to

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some observers, however, ‘Hungary’s illiberal turn’ (Bánkuti et al. 2012; Jenne and Mudde 2012; Rupnik 2012) has mostly materialised through the governmental action of the national-conservative Fidesz. The Hungarian example is even more telling if we consider that, in the eyes of the Hungarian voters, the ideological differences between Jobbik and Fidesz are far from striking (Enyedi and Benoit 2011). It is exactly to this alleged blurring of roles, or ‘contagion’ (van Spanje 2010), that this chapter turns its attention. Central and Eastern Europe now seems to be confronted with a populist challenge, and assessing the role of populist radical right parties in recent political developments is of critical importance. Populist radical right parties in Central and Eastern Europe have increased their specific weight, influencing the agenda of other political parties. Especially for this reason, this chapter argues that, regardless of their electoral performance, the populist radical right in Central and Eastern Europe may have wielded direct or indirect influence over certain policy dimensions and prompted changes within respective national party systems. Although part of populist radical right parties’ impact could be linked to their positive electoral performance, it is useful to appraise political influence as a dimension detached from fortunes at the polls (Minkenberg 2001, 2002a; Williams 2006). The basic tenet behind this view is that parties may release effects in the political process irrespective of the number of seats in parliament. Therefore, the chapter transcends definitions of success and failure based on the electoral performance of populist radical right parties and addresses their impact on national political spaces. Drawing on the Bulgarian, Hungarian, and Slovak cases, this part of the study hypothesises that populist radical right parties may condition shifts within respective party systems. The strategies of populist radical right parties would then display effects on other parties – in particular, those parties that could be regarded as ‘nearby competitors’ and with more pronounced effects on the dimension of ethnic minorities. First, the chapter addresses why it is important to examine the dimensionality of political spaces and focus on the impact of populist radical right parties by drawing on different streams of literature. Second, the analysis focuses on the competition over different policy dimensions in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Slovakia. The chapter concludes by identifying the areas and types of influence exerted by this party family in the three countries.

The impact of populist radical right parties Despite the considerable interest stimulated by the populist radical right over the past decades, scholarly attention has primarily concentrated on the reasons behind the success of these parties or the determinants of their support in Western Europe (e.g. Abedi 2004; Givens 2005; Norris 2005; Golder 2003; Jackman and Volpert 1996). Conversely, the impact of these parties has remained by and large an under-researched area of enquiry. Since populist radical right parties do not simply play a dysfunctional role (cf. Fisher 1980), they are believed to

Impact of populist radical right parties 119 influence the workings of respective political systems and thus deserve due consideration. It has been argued that once minor parties pass the threshold of representation, they can exert influence in a number of ways. They may alter the normative boundaries of the system; challenge the ideological and symbolic aspects of the system or the rules of the game; or even introduce new patterns of political competition. As a result, they are deemed “relevant to the political system and to its understanding” (Herzog 1987: 326). Besides the only occasional attention paid to the alleged relevance of these parties, little clarity surrounds the effects on the system in which they operate and the overall resonance of their activities. The previous chapters have drawn attention to the particular framing of nativism, authoritarianism, and populism put forward by populist radical right parties in post-communist countries. Especially compared to the early stages of activity of this party family, the populist radical right now turns to a fairly diversified palette of issues. From the way they are delivered, then, issues such as clericalism or ethnic minorities appear to be equally important in the agenda of these parties in Central and Eastern Europe. Having ascertained the emphasis placed on different ideological features and considering that this party family does not operate in a political vacuum, it is relevant to ask whether the populist radical right is actually able to exert influence on certain policy dimensions. Before putting forward a number of propositions in this regard, it is necessary to define what impact is and at what levels it is expected to be revealed and, most importantly, why it is important to study the impact of these parties. The populist radical right’s impact is appraised as the ability of these parties to wield direct or indirect influence on respective political systems in general and policy competition in particular. The stimulus introduced by populist radical right parties consists of the capacity to change a course of events, which might develop differently otherwise (Williams 2006: 42). As the impact on a political system virtually ranges from the party’s ability to successfully get a certain message across to undermining the foundations of the liberal-democratic regime, it is important to identify pertinent areas of influence for the populist radical right. Expanding on a distinction between agenda-setting and policy-making effects (Minkenberg 2001, 2002a), Williams detected three levels of influence for the populist radical right – that is, agenda-setting, institution-shaping, and policy-making.1 With the first, reference is made to the influence exerted on political discourse and public opinion; with the second, attention is devoted to the populist radical right’s structural impact on the political party system; with the third, the focus is on the influence exerted through legislation and policy initiatives (Williams 2006: 6). In addressing the last preliminary question – why is it important to study the impact of the populist radical right? – the chapter suggests that these parties may increase the salience of nativist issues and prompt people to frame society and societal problems in terms of ethnicity and nationality; contribute to polarising social and political issues and stigmatising persons or ideas opposing their nativist struggle; and, ultimately, prompt mainstream parties to adjust their positions on certain issues in a more nativist, authoritarian, and populist direction. This would

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in turn legitimise and mainstream discourses and ideas that were previously condemned (see Rydgren 2003). Assessing influence beyond electoral success A number of recent contributions have started focusing on the institutional effects coming from the presence of the populist radical right in public office (e.g. Bale 2003; Heinisch 2003; Art 2007; Akkerman and de Lange 2012; de Lange 2012; Akkerman 2012). However, the role of this party family remains either linked to the number of seats gained in parliament or its participation in government. This certainly applies to the work of Meguid (2005, 2008) and van Spanje (2010), in which the impact on policies and party competition is directly related to the electoral fortunes of these parties. To be sure, the present work does not neglect the relevance of electoral results in the political process, for the size and experience of a parliamentary caucus is somewhat expected to produce a high parliamentary input (Minkenberg 2001: 13). By disentangling the impact of these parties from their electoral performance, however, it is ultimately possible to stray from the axiom ‘electoral success equals political influence’. Since the effects released by the populist radical right are mostly visible through public responses and other parties’ reactions to the populist radical right (Minkenberg 2001: 5), this would suggest no direct or straightforward relationship between these spheres of influence and the share of votes of this party family. In this respect, the chapter follows the tradition of authors such as Minkenberg (1998, 2001, 2002a, 2015), Schain (2002, 2006; see also Schain et al. 2002), and Williams (2006), in that the impact of populist radical right parties is believed to be revealed irrespective of the specific fortunes at the polls. For instance, when successful and unsuccessful populist radical right parties are considered, it has been argued that mainstream right parties adopted at least part of the populist radical right’s agenda (Minkenberg 1998: 14–17). However, consensus is not widespread. Other authors concluded that the influence of populist radical right parties on immigration issues has been small and that, in countries like Germany or Italy, the restrictive policies of the 1990s would have been implemented even without the emergence of Die Republikaner (The Republicans, REP) and the Lega Nord (Northern League, LN) (Perlmutter 2002). In principle, this would lend support to the facts that populist radical right parties matter in unorthodox ways and that the dynamics of their impact are complex (Williams 2006). In order to exert influence in the political process, the populist radical right needs to politicise the issues at the core of its agenda and/or establish ownership over them. Post-communist countries’ political cultures and the diffuse sense of disappointment stemming from the transition process already presented a favourable breeding ground for nativist appeals; a number of populist radical right parties have taken advantage of a latent potential generally left unexploited until the mid2000s. Once nativist issues are politicised, populist radical right parties do stand a chance to increase their electoral support (see Chapter 5). Although their electoral breakthrough may affect the agenda-setting, institution-shaping, and

Impact of populist radical right parties 121 policy-making spheres, the consistency of their electoral results should not prove to be a necessary condition for the continuity of this influence. In other words, once the agenda has been set, the prominence of these issues no longer depends on the sole electoral performance of populist radical right parties. Since the focus of this chapter rests on policy competition, the underlying assumption is that the influence exerted by the populist radical right at the institution-shaping level prompts shifts in political spaces. For the sake of this discussion, it is worth noting that concepts such as ‘political space’, ‘party competition’, or ‘policy competition’ are not new in political science. Anthony Downs (1957) has by and large contributed to mainstreaming the idea that parties could strategically move along the left-right continuum in order to attract more votes and ultimately win office. Other scholars have pointed out how talking about politics often entails the use of spatial metaphors. Politics and political competition could be fruitfully interpreted in terms of position, distance, movement, and direction – that is, spatial language and reasoning (Laver and Hunt 1992; Benoit and Laver 2006). Referring to the impact of populist radical right parties in spatial terms denotes that political spaces can be ultimately measured. In turn, the mapping of national party systems should expose: a) on which policy dimensions this influence is exerted; and b) the strategies adopted by other parties in reaction to the populist radical right. The extant literature emphasises the interaction between mainstream and populist radical right parties (e.g. Kitschelt and McGann 1995; Carter 2005) and associates different responses with the politicisation of nativist issues by the populist radical right. Meguid (2005: 349–50) refers to three in particular: dismissive, accommodative, and adversarial. Parties adopt a dismissive strategy and ignore a certain issue when the issue is deemed unimportant or too difficult to address. However, when mainstream parties decide to compete with the populist radical right on a given policy dimension, they either adopt accommodative or adversarial strategies, respectively resulting in convergence or divergence between populist radical right and mainstream parties. Other authors observe that mainstream parties’ reaction to the populist radical right produces responses ranging from cooperation to exclusion (van Spanje and van der Brug 2007; also Downs 2001). Since parties are assumed to have abandoned ideological immobility and developed their ideologies as a means to gaining office (Downs 1957: 110–11), this study deems two types of mainstream parties’ responses relevant for the mapping of the populist radical right’s impact: cooptation and opposition. With the first strategy, mainstream parties adapt to the standards set by the populist radical right and progressively try to incorporate nativist issues in their agenda. With the second strategy, established parties either distance themselves from the positions of the populist radical right or openly confront them. In this regard, it is important to note that the populist radical right in Central and Eastern Europe did not undergo a similar process of stigmatisation experienced by Western European populist radical right parties.2 This means that no cordons sanitaires have been implemented to limit the influence of populist radical right parties, potentially favouring the resilience and resonance of nativist issues in national political discourses.

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The chapter began by specifying that populist radical right parties are not singleissue parties. In advancing expectations on the impact of these parties, however, it seems at least reasonable to consider them as the most competent actors in the field of ethnic minorities and capable of mobilising on these issues. In virtue of this (real or perceived) issue ownership, populist radical right parties are able to present minority issues as ‘omnibus issues’ through which other concerns, such as ‘law and order’ or welfare policies, can be funnelled (e.g. Williams 2006; Akkerman and de Lange 2012). In light of this premise, the chapter advances two arguments: a) one concerning the populist radical right’s policy sphere of influence; and b) one concerning the parties that are most affected by the impact of the populist radical right. This study then posits that the impact of populist radical right parties on respective party systems: a) releases the most significant effects on the dimension of ethnic minorities vis-à-vis other areas of competition; b) principally affects mainstream ‘nearby competitors’; and c) withstands the specific electoral performance of these parties. This study appreciates the existence of a fertile breeding ground for populist radical right mobilisation – a political culture opening up opportunities not only for the electoral breakthrough and/or persistence of populist radical right parties but also for the very same resonance of the issues fostered by this party family. Whilst the aspects lying outside strict policy competition will be considered in the following chapter, populist radical right parties are expected to take centre stage in the political process, if not on multiple policy dimensions, at least as the main advocates of opposition to minorities. Therefore, a process model willing to account for the impact of the populist radical right beyond its electoral performance should also consider the interaction between populist radical right and mainstream parties on relevant policy dimensions. In this sense, this analysis deems a dimension relevant when it bears at least some importance for the populist radical right (e.g. Benoit and Laver 2006: 50). Evidently, these policy dimensions would consist of those presented in the first part of this study. The revolutions of 1989–91 have propelled new sources of division centring, inter alia, on citizenship, ethnicity, divisions between church and state, and resource distribution (Kitschelt 1992; Williams 1999; Whitefield 2002). The populist radical right in post-communist countries seems to have capitalised on these opportunities and projected a nativist agenda into the mainstream political arena. On the whole, the (pre-)existence of favourable conditions (i.e. public attitudes as well as other opportunity structures) for the rise of populist radical right parties in Central and Eastern Europe should not underestimate their role of ‘catalysts’ in the politicisation of minority issues (cf. Mudde 2013). In post-communist countries, nativist issues remained largely outside the mainstream political discourse before the breakthrough of populist radical right parties. Also in consideration of their attempts to articulate policy changes on pre-existing (yet previously nonpoliticised) dimensions, populist radical right parties in Central and Eastern Europe may aptly come across as ‘prophets’ rather than mere ‘purifiers’ (see Lucardie 2000). Unlike mainstream parties, then, the populist radical right’s raison d’être

Impact of populist radical right parties 123 may reside in prompting established players to change their ideological positions (e.g. Downs 1957: 127–8; Harmel and Robertson 1985; Williams 2006).

Measuring interactions in Central and Eastern Europe Having outlined the merits and scope of this enquiry, this section specifies how the impact of the populist radical right and the reaction of other parties are empirically measured across countries. In order to examine the dimensionality of populist radical right politics and assess whether and how established parties react to the populist radical right, this chapter analyses policy spaces in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Slovakia. The reasons for focusing on policy competition and interactions between populist radical right and mainstream political parties in these three countries are different. First, political parties provide a common organisational ground for analysis and are certainly easier to monitor; this is especially the case if compared to subcultural milieus, which often tend to act in limited numbers and operate outside the democratic framework. Second, social problems are usually translated into political issues with solutions articulated at the party level (Lucardie 2000: 176). In this regard, it seems at least plausible that a portion of the populist radical right agenda could influence the position of other parties across policy dimensions, not to mention affecting other arenas such as public opinion and counter-mobilisation (Minkenberg 2015). Third, the electoral fortunes of these parties offer valuable background conditions for the present analysis. On the one hand, these parties emerged or re-emerged in the mid-2000s, presenting a unique opportunity to examine the timing of these strategic interactions in a comparative fashion. On the other hand, electoral results set the conditions to test one of the working propositions of this chapter – that is, the impact of the populist radical right does endure, irrespective of the specific electoral performance of this party family. Indeed, out of the three parties analysed, only Ataka showed a certain degree of consistency in its electoral performance (at least until the 2014 early elections); Jobbik has been on the rise, whilst the Slovenská Národná Strana (Slovak National Party, SNS) has undergone a steady decline and is not currently represented in the National Council. In exploring the dimensionality and assessing the impact of peripheral parties,3 the following analysis purposely focuses on competition across a set of policy dimensions. In line with the ideological approach of this study, it is important to emphasise that the kind of impact analysed here influences “the very identity of other parties by causing them to change key issue/ideological positions” (Harmel and Svåsand 1997: 316) – a type of influence that is primarily observable at the level of policy competition. Earlier contributions often appraised the impact of populist radical right parties in terms of a ‘right turn’ in national politics (e.g. Kitschelt and McGann 1995; Carter 2005; Norris 2005); such a strategy could be somewhat inadequate. Twenty-five years of research on this party family in Western Europe have almost unanimously taught us that the impact of populist radical right parties mostly affects ‘law and order’ and anti-immigration policies (Mudde

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2007), yet studies with an emphasis on spatial shifts have frequently aggregated these dimensions as taking place on the left-right ideological continuum (e.g. van Spanje and van der Brug 2007). In order to evaluate the immediate consequences of populist radical right parties’ impact on certain issues, analysing interaction effects over specific policy dimensions seems to be a more satisfactory strategy (e.g. Harmel and Svåsand 1997). Therefore, this study argues that competition between parties is best assessed on an issue-by-issue basis. In addition, this approach allows for a refined understanding of ‘nearby competitor’, which should be appraised as the mainstream party occupying the most proximate position to the populist radical right on relevant policy dimensions. As noted previously, the relevant dimensionality of policy spaces is determined on the basis of the populist radical right’s own ideology. The assumption is that, in order to observe interaction effects between the populist radical right and mainstream competitors on a given policy dimension, populist radical right parties should hold a position on the issue and deem it a significant feature of their ideology. In this regard, the analysis conducted in the previous chapter provides sufficient background material to be content with the policy dimensions selected. Those idiosyncrasies underlined up to this point especially seem to corroborate the value of this approach. The populist radical right in Central and Eastern Europe does not embody a radical version of neo-conservatism (cf. Ignazi 1992; Minkenberg 1992, 2000; Kitschelt and McGann 1995), and analysing interaction effects in terms of shifts along the left-right continuum would surely limit the scope of investigation. Some observers aptly noted that political and party affiliation in post-communist countries might lack the same coherence of Western Europe (PopEleches and Tucker 2010). In other words, Central and Eastern European politics are likely to be structured in terms of their distance from communism rather than left-right dimensions, substantiating the role of historical legacies in shaping distinctive pathways to politics. Another contribution, focusing on racist extremism in the region (Mudde 2005), suggests that nativist politics are not a sole prerogative of far right organisations. In this sense, the Slovak example is quite telling, as a government coalition including the ‘leftist’ Smer-SD and the populist radical right SNS ruled the country between 2006 and 2010. Therefore, a fine-grained analysis of policy dimensions should reveal if, and to what extent, the populist radical right is able to exert influence on national party systems. Methodology and data The position of national parties over these policy dimensions is analysed by means of expert surveys at three different time points (2006, 2010, and 2012). For the purposes of this comparative study, expert surveys prove to be valuable for at least three reasons: First, precisely because they reflect the judgements of experts, [expert surveys] acquire a certain weight and legitimacy. Second, they are seen to have

Impact of populist radical right parties 125 the advantage of making a judgement of party position based on what the party is currently doing or saying, rather than being based on assumptions derived from past party behaviour. . . . Third, expert judgements are quick, easy and comprehensive. They permit the collection of highly comparable and standardised data. (Mair 2001: 24, italics in original text) As the previous discussion on the dimensionality of political spaces highlighted, “the need for systematic and reliable empirical measures of the policy positions of political actors is overwhelmingly self-evident” (Benoit and Laver 2006: 52). Expert surveys respond to these needs and help locate political parties on different scales. Overall, this research technique came to prominence following the work of Castles and Mair (1984), who investigated the location of political parties on the left-right dimension in Western Europe, the US, and the Old Commonwealth. Unlike mass surveys, expert surveys bear a major operational advantage in that they are virtually inexpensive to conduct (Castles and Mair 1984: 74). This aspect – along with their asserted authoritativeness, accessibility, and interpretability (Carter 2005: 112) – has certainly contributed to the popularity of this research tool. Party positions across policy dimensions are measured using two different sources. For the first two time points, the analysis draws on the 2006 and 2010 waves of the Chapel Hill expert survey, which offer comparable data for Bulgaria, Hungary, and Slovakia (Hooghe et al. 2010; Bakker et al. 2012). Since the positions of some parties relevant for this study were only included in the 2010 wave of the Chapel Hill expert survey, it was deemed necessary to add a further time point to the analysis. In order to do so, original expert surveys were conducted ad hoc in early 2013 and enquired about party positions in the year 2012. These expert surveys were specifically tailored to allow comparisons with Chapel Hill data on a number of dimensions – i.e. religion, economy, ethnic minorities, and the EU. Furthermore, the original surveys included questions on national minorities abroad (in the case of Hungary) and corruption. Unfortunately, these additional dimensions are not covered by other surveys. Hence, the lack of comparable sources provisionally restricts the scope of data gathering to descriptive purposes, yet concomitantly lays the foundations for further research on these dimensions. The questionnaires were crafted following the general guiding principles and specific advice on survey questionnaire design (Converse and Presser 1986). Three variants of the survey were developed for each country examined. The surveying technique employed was computer-assisted Web interviewing (CAWI). Simply put, the country experts were contacted via e-mail and were asked to answer a series of questions (see Appendix B) available online through a Web platform provided by the Laboratorio Analisi Politiche e Sociali (Political and Social Analyses Laboratory, LAPS) of the University of Siena. The questionnaire was sent to 56 political scientists and practitioners with a particular expertise on far right politics and policy competition in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Slovakia (for the list of experts consulted, see Appendix A). The overall response rate after two reminders

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was 51.8 per cent – a positive result also compared to the popular Chapel Hill expert surveys, which report response rates of 45 per cent for the 2006 wave and 34.9 per cent for the 2010 wave. Although it is likely that the expert surveys for 2012 do not draw on the same pool of experts as the Chapel Hill survey, these original sources shall provide a realistic impression of shifts in party positions on different policy dimensions. In the following sections, the focus moves to the empirical analysis of party positions in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Slovakia. In practice, the analysis subscribes to the multivalence of issues ascertained in the previous chapter. Party positions on indigenous ethnic minorities and national minorities abroad (i.e. ‘minority issues’) and economic issues and corruption are then treated together, whereas competition on the dimensions of the EU and clerical issues are analysed separately.

Minority issues To a large extent, the value of party competition on minority issues in post-communist Europe has already been outlined. The quality of the populist radical right’s omnibus issue appended to ethnic minorities indeed serves a number of purposes. Narrowly defined, the stance on ethnic minorities comes across as an indicator of party-based hostility towards real or perceived enemies of the nation-state; these enemies may be identified with Roma communities (in all three countries analysed) but also Turkish (in Bulgaria), Hungarian (in Slovakia), or Jewish communities. Broadly defined, however, minority issues are also a proxy for nativism and a specific (restrictive) interpretation of the nation-state. Hence, the impact of this party family should become evident in the area of ethnic minorities, since minority issues represent the principal area of contestation for this party family in the three countries analysed. Looking at other political actors, this influence should primarily materialise through the radicalisation of mainstream nearby competitors’ positions on this policy dimension. With regard to the question of irredentism (operationalised in this part of the study as ‘cultural and territorial rights for national minorities living abroad’), the analysis of the policy dimension should reveal a substantial proximity between the populist radical right and the mainstream competitor in Hungary. In fact, the question of ‘Greater Hungary’ was by and large mainstreamed by the Magyar Igazság és Élet Pártja (Hungarian Justice and Life Party, MIÉP) during the 1990s and then co-opted by Fidesz. For this reason, it seems plausible to posit that Jobbik and Fidesz would be ‘closer’ on the dimension of national minorities abroad than ethnic minorities. Bulgaria Ever since 2001, the Bulgarian party system has faced a dramatic process of restructuring. In particular, Ataka rode high on the cyclical political instability that first brought the Natsionalno Dvizhenie Simeon Vtori (National Movement Simeon

Impact of populist radical right parties 127 II, NDSV) and later Grazhdani za Evropeisko Razvitie na Bulgaria (Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria, GERB) to power (Smilov 2008). Although the Bulgarian political culture offered a fertile breeding ground for populist radical right mobilisation, such potential remained unexploited until the mid-2000s. Ataka capitalised on this portion of the political opportunity structure and presented itself as the principal advocate of a single national monolithic Bulgarian state. Ataka appealed to patriotic and ethnic Bulgarians and made aggressive anti-Roma and anti-Turkish statements. A substantive share of its anti-minorities and anti-establishment agenda precisely targeted the ethno-liberal Dvizhenie za Prava i Svobodi (Movement for Rights and Freedoms, DPS). Throughout the whole period analysed, Ataka occupies the most extreme positions on the opposition side of the policy dimension (Figure 4.1). In the case of Ataka, expert judgements’ score for the first time point is 1.83 on the 0–10 scale, a comparatively less extreme score justified by Chairman Volen Siderov’s shot at the Bulgarian presidency in 2006 and subsequent attempt to appeal to moderate voters. During the presidential election campaign, Ataka’s party leader had toned down much of its hard-line nativist agenda and mostly played on the populist and anti-establishment profile of the organisation. On this occasion, questions concerning Bulgarian membership in the EU and NATO, as well as the shutdown of two

Figure 4.1 Position of Bulgarian parliamentary parties on ethnic minorities, 2006–12 Note: Party positions range from ‘strongly oppose’ (0) to ‘strongly support’ (10) more rights for ethnic minorities. Sources: 2006 and 2010: Chapel Hill expert survey (N = 12; N = 11); 2012: own data (N = 9).

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units of the Kozloduy nuclear power plant, took centre stage in the party discourse. After gaining almost 600,000 votes and 21.5 per cent of the share in the first round, Siderov was defeated by Georgi Parvanov in the second round of the presidential election, and the party swiftly turned to more radical positions. The positioning of parties over this policy dimension indicate that Ataka had no rivals on the question of ethnic minorities, and its further radicalisation in 2010 and 2012 remained largely unparalleled. The rise of GERB at the 2007 and 2009 European elections and its consolidation at the 2009 National Assembly elections filled a void in mainstream right-wing politics. Moreover, Boiko Borisov’s party emerged as a new actor on the opposition side of the dimension analysed. Though not as extreme as Ataka, GERB managed to distance itself from both the positions of the centre-left Koalitsiya za Bulgaria (Coalition for Bulgaria [KB], formed around the socialist Bulgarska Sotsialisticheska Partiya [Bulgarian Socialist Party, BSP]) and those of the marginal centre-right Sayuz na Demokratichnite Sili (Union of Democratic Forces, SDS) and its splinter faction Demokrati za Silna Bulgaria (Democrats for a Strong Bulgaria, DSB). GERB is a mainstream populist force (e.g. Smilov 2008), which is regarded here as the nearby competitor of the populist radical right Ataka. In light of their proximity on this dimension and their common populist framework of action, Siderov’s party simultaneously represents a viable partner and a potential electoral threat to the mainstream GERB. After the 2009 general elections, GERB had sought to establish a governing coalition with other right-wing parties. Out of these, only Ataka had formally agreed on external support for the minority government on the basis of their mutual opposition to the policies of the ‘anti-national’ BSP and DPS (Novinite 2009a). Amongst those parties that eventually refused to take part in the coalition, there is the marginal Red Zakonnost Spravedlivost (Order Law Justice, RZS), whose view on Muslim fundamentalism and Islamisation is aptly captured by the expert judgements (3.2 in 2010 and 2.57 in 2012). As far as party impact is concerned, Ataka played a crucial role in mainstreaming a xenophobic agenda in Bulgarian politics. However, the picture presented by the expert surveys suggests that GERB’s co-optation of the issue was only modest between 2010 and 2012. This would also be corroborated by Ataka’s lack of impact at the policy-making level. Indeed, Ataka’s legislative proposals amending the Citizenship Law and aimed at abolishing double citizenship (submitted to the 40th National Assembly) or amending the Law on Radio and Television to eliminate programmes in Turkish (submitted to the 41st National Assembly) were systematically rejected. Be that as it may, GERB’s relatively mild opposition to minorities does not account for the symbolic portion of this positioning, nor most of the courtship with Ataka that preceded its rise to power in 2009. For instance, in 2007 GERB and Ataka together backed the Kardzhali mayoral bid of Father Boyan Saraev, a priest who aspired to break the monopoly of the DPS in the region. The region presents a high concentration of ethnic Turks, and the DPS is believed to have consolidated its stronghold through acts of cronyism. As a result, GERB’s leader Borisov

Impact of populist radical right parties 129 defined the battle for Kardzhali as “a battle for elementary justice” (Novinite 2007). Yet Borisov would also resemble Siderov in claiming that the communist assimilation campaign against the Muslim population in the 1980s had, in principle, right objectives (Novinite 2008). Ever since Ataka’s emergence, questioning the legitimacy of the DPS, or framing politics in nativist and populist terms, has become an integral part of the discourse of right-wing parties, including the DSB of former Prime Minister Ivan Kostov. In other words, “Siderov has put many politicians in the uncomfortable position of having to agree with him or seem anti-Bulgarian” (Ghodsee 2008: 35). As the same Siderov observed: “nationalism is no longer a taboo in Bulgaria. . . . A number of the other right-wing Bulgarian parties copied a lot of our party’s nationalist slogans” (Novinite 2009b). This notwithstanding, the available data suggest that much of the (radical) competition over ethnic minorities stabilised after 2010, substantially leaving Ataka and the DPS (though from antithetical positions) as the two most recognisable and vocal owners of the issue. Precisely this oppositional aspect of dimensionality has recently received some attention (Bustikova 2014; Koev 2013). These contributions have pointed out how the electoral success of populist radical right parties in Central and Eastern Europe could depend on the presence and participation in government of ethno-liberal parties such as the DPS. Considering that: a) this interaction partly rests on the assumption that minority interests benefit from the participation of ethno-liberal parties in government; and b) the mutual interdependence between these parties and the populist radical right cannot be ruled out (Koev 2013), it seems plausible to interpret their concomitant radicalisation between 2006 and 2010 (as well as their relative stabilisation on these positions in 2012) in light of these considerations. In other words, populist radical right and ethno-liberal parties in Central and Eastern Europe may represent two sides of the same coin (i.e. minority issues), and their interaction would also be reflected in party positions on this policy dimension. Hungary The realignment of the Hungarian party system is a relatively new affair. Competition in post-communist elections resulted in the alternation between parties of the mainstream left and right, relegating other contestants to political marginality. With the 2010 elections, however, this pattern has changed significantly (Enyedi and Benoit 2011). Amongst the new actors that made it to the Hungarian Parliament in 2010 is the populist radical right Jobbik. The recent history of the populist radical right in Hungary is one of rejuvenation. It has been noted that Jobbik was not the first party to raise the issue of Roma minorities in Hungary, yet it was the first to politicise it in terms of ‘Gypsy crime’ and prioritise it over anti-Semitism, arguing that “certain specific criminological phenomena are predominantly and overwhelmingly associated with this minority” (Jobbik 2010: 11). Both the anti-establishment profile of the party and the absence

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Figure 4.2 Position of Hungarian parliamentary parties on ethnic minorities, 2006–12 Note: Party positions range from ‘strongly oppose’ (0) to ‘strongly support’ (10) more rights for ethnic minorities. Sources: 2006 and 2010: Chapel Hill expert survey (N = 5; N = 16); 2012: own data (N = 10).

of political competitors on the question of ethnic minorities played a crucial role in the electoral performance of Jobbik, first at the 2009 European elections, and then at the 2010 Hungarian elections. Perhaps not surprisingly, Figure 4.2 presents Jobbik as the party yielding the strongest opposition to ethnic minorities. Ever since its entry to parliament, the party went on to occupy the most extreme position on this dimension (1 in 2010 and 1.11 in 2012). As the positions of other parliamentary parties demonstrate, minority issues did not represent a crucial issue for policy competition in the first time point (2006); thus, parties remained largely neutral over this dimension. It is certainly worth noting that some changes took place in the nationalist camp in the early 2000s. In an attempt to regain office in 2002 and win the voters of the MIÉP, Fidesz adopted part of Csurka’s rhetoric during the electoral campaign; Viktor Orbán had then ‘out-Csurkaed’ Csurka (Shafir 2002). However, such a strategy brought Fidesz to gain on the right what it eventually lost in the centre (Bozóki 2008: 210). The MIÉP’s failure to re-enter parliament in 2002 had two immediate consequences: first, it presented Fidesz as the only relevant nationalist party across the political spectrum; second, it normalised the competition on minority issues – at least until Jobbik’s new framing and politicisation of the issue. Through his courtship of nativist politics, Orbán has practically shown his

Impact of populist radical right parties 131 readiness to outflank parties of the populist radical right. Therefore, Fidesz would rightfully qualify as the nearby competitor of Jobbik. With the 2010 elections, the Hungarian party system and the actual balance of power in parliament experienced a significant shift towards the right. With 52.7 per cent of votes, Fidesz and its satellite Kereszténydemokrata Néppárt (Christian Democratic People’s Party, KDNP)4 secured a two-thirds super-majority that allowed, amongst other things, a controversial process of constitutional reform. As far as indigenous ethnic minorities are concerned, the stance of the new governing coalition has steadily leant towards opposition to minority rights. Figure 4.2 shows that shifts in this direction have been incremental and quite significant (from 4.9 in 2006 to 3.93 in 2012). This notwithstanding, Fidesz and the KDNP have generally refrained from engaging in an overtly radical rhetoric. Representatives of the two parties have often preferred to remain silent on minority issues or only belatedly condemn the anti-Roma rallies held by groups close to Jobbik.5 Despite the proclaimed attempts to improve the conditions of the Roma through ministerial activity, it is not unusual to come across anti-Roma statements on the part of Fidesz affiliates6 – behaviours which have been in part condoned by the politicisation of minority issues by the populist radical right. Moreover, it is possible to detect the influence of Jobbik on Fidesz-KDNP’s policy-making on welfare issues. In the rhetoric of Jobbik, the Roma community is portrayed to benefit unfairly from state contributions and, in its 2010 manifesto, the populist radical right party sought to reconsider the ‘inadequacies’ in the allocation of subsidies by tying state support to some form of (social) work (Jobbik 2010: 10). After its rise to power, the Fidesz-KDNP coalition made it necessary for citizens to perform volunteer work and allow their living spaces to be inspected for orderliness to receive benefits from the state (e.g. Verseck 2013). The impact of Jobbik is well captured at the broad systemic level. Expert judgements indicate that overall party positions shifted from 5.22 in 2006 to 4.74 in 2012. This systemic shift towards opposition to minorities has taken place in concomitance with Jobbik’s entry to parliament (and politicisation of the issue in between the first two time points), despite the distancing of the Magyar Szocialista Párt (Hungarian Socialist Party, MSZP) from Jobbik (6.44 in 2010) and the breakthrough of a libertarian party such as Lehet Más a Politika (Politics Can Be Different, LMP). In this regard, the role of LMP seems to equal that of ethno-liberal parties in other post-communist countries. Considering its ‘pro-minority’ position on the policy dimension, the libertarian party may act as a substitute of parties such as the pro-Turkish DPS in Bulgaria or the pro-Hungarian parties Strana Maďarskej Komunity – Magyar Közösség Pártja (Party of the Hungarian Community, SMKMKP) and Most-Híd in Slovakia. In fact, despite a sizeable minority of 6 per cent (Mizsei 2006), the Roma community has hardly been successful in mobilising at the party level, hence relegating ethnic-based representation outside the parliamentary arena (Millard 2004: 248). Still, Hungarian nativism is also articulated over the question of Greater Hungary. The relevance of the ‘disjointed nation’ in the Hungarian political debate extends beyond far right milieus, essentially motivating the mapping of this

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dimension by means of original expert surveys. In order to allow for a meaningful representation of party positions, the issue was framed in somewhat loose terms; it was indeed observed that even the irredentist claims of Jobbik were curbed because of geopolitical contingencies (see Chapter 3). Therefore, rather than referring to lost territories alone, experts were asked to locate parties on the policy dimension on the basis of cultural and territorial rights for national minorities living abroad – a formulation which should, in principle, better capture the breadth of policy competition on this issue. The following provision introduced the question in the original survey: In states which have been subject to territorial redefinition and/or territorial disputes, parties may have different positions on cultural and territorial rights for ethnic nationals living abroad, defined as the right to reconstruct the cultural community of the nation outside the borders and/or formally revise territorial borders. Figure 4.3 seems to confirm that minority issues in Hungary are indeed a battle fought on two fronts. Although it is not possible to ascertain how party positions have evolved over time, it is at least possible to note that Jobbik and Fidesz-KDNP

Figure 4.3 Position of Hungarian parliamentary parties on national minorities abroad and relative salience of the issue, 2012 Note: Party positions range from ‘strongly against’ (0) to ‘strongly in favour of’ (10) granting national minorities living abroad cultural and territorial rights. Issue salience ranges from ‘not important at all’ (0) to ‘extremely important’ (10). Source: Own data (N = 10).

Impact of populist radical right parties 133 present strikingly similar stances on this policy dimension (9.8 the first; 9.3 the latter). Moreover, whilst both parties attached great salience to the issue in 2012, the MSZP and LMP maintained a fairly neutral stance on national minorities abroad. Besides their spatial representation, party positions are also borne out in practice at the policy-making level. Amongst its first initiatives in power, FideszKDNP submitted an amendment to the Hungarian Citizenship Law that appeared to be very much in line with the nativist and irredentist agenda of Jobbik. Moreover, the consequentiality between a number of Jobbik proposals and Fidesz policies would substantiate the influence exerted by the populist radical right party on the Orbán government. For instance, Jobbik sought elementary schools to organise trips to neighbouring areas inhabited by Hungarian minorities; in October 2010, the parliament passed a draft resolution proposed by Fidesz specifying that every pupil in public education can indeed participate in cross-border class trips to Hungarian-inhabited areas in neighbouring countries. In a similar fashion, upon the National Assembly’s inaugural meeting, Jobbik advanced a suggestion to declare the anniversary of the Treaty of Trianon a national day of commemoration; in May 2010, the Fidesz government declared June 4 the ‘Day of National Unity’ in remembrance of the Treaty of Trianon (Bíró Nagy et al. 2013: 245ff.). Slovakia The Slovak party system has recently experienced elements of discontinuity. In 2006, the social-democratic Smer – Sociálna Demokracia (Direction – Social Democracy, Smer-SD) defeated the ruling parties of the centre-right and formed an unusual coalition with the populist radical right SNS (which had just re-emerged as a unitary force after internal rifts) and the right-wing Ľudová Strana – Hnutie za Demokratické Slovensko (People’s Party – Movement for a Democratic Slovakia, ĽS-HZDS) of Vladimír Mečiar. Alternation of power and discontinuity took place also in 2010 and 2012; new parties entered the National Council (Sloboda a Solidarita [Freedom and Solidarity, SaS]; Most-Híd; and Obyčajní Ľudia a Nezávislé Osobnosti [Ordinary People and Independent Personalities, OĽaNO]), whilst others faced electoral losses and were relegated to extra-parliamentary status (first the ĽS-HZDS and SMK-MKP, then the SNS). Ever since the dissolution of Czechoslovakia, the SNS has put the question of ethnic minorities (i.e. opposition to ethnic Hungarians and Roma living in Slovakia) at the top of its agenda and has unequivocally maintained issue ownership over the years (Mesežnikov and Gyárfášová 2008; Gyárfášová and Mesežnikov 2015). Therefore, unlike Bulgaria and Hungary, by the year 2006 the issue of ethnic minorities had already been politicised; this becomes apparent by looking at the average score of parliamentary parties’ positions in the first time point analysed (4.48). Nonetheless, the 2006 general elections represent an important turning point for at least two reasons. First, the SNS re-emerged as a successful and unitary force after the internal splits of the early 2000s; second, the party was asked to join (along with the ĽS-HZDS) a governing coalition led by Robert Fico’s Smer-SD.

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Figure 4.4 Position of Slovak parliamentary parties on ethnic minorities, 2006–12 Note: As of 2012, the SNS is no longer represented in parliament; its position in 2012 is reported for illustrative purposes. Party positions range from ‘strongly oppose’ (0) to ‘strongly support’ (10) more rights for ethnic minorities. Sources: 2006 and 2010: Chapel Hill expert survey (N = 12; N = 14); 2012: own data (N = 10).

The alliance was formally agreed to on the basis of a shared vision of the economic policies to implement but was also due to a common denominator of ethnic nationalism (Mesežnikov et al. 2008: 111). In line with these elements and despite its ‘leftist’ profile, Smer-SD is appraised here as the nearby competitor of the SNS. Figure 4.4 further demonstrates that ground for cooperation between Smer-SD, the SNS, and ĽS-HZDS was also offered by their position on the ethnic minorities dimension. In 2006, the SNS took the lead on this dimension with a score of 0.17; the ĽS-HZDS and Smer-SD followed with 3.58 and 4.33, respectively. During the 2006–10 legislature, the SNS was effective in orienting the political discourse towards nativism and opposition to minorities. Since the year 2006, the party has put forward a series of initiatives aimed at undermining the rights of ethnic Hungarians living in Slovakia – measures which have ultimately jeopardised the quality of bilateral relationships of the country with Hungary. Most notably, the SNS was the initiator of the Slovak Language Law and the main driver behind the toughening of its provisions in 2009. The Act of Parliament on the State Language of the Slovak Republic was first enacted in 1995 when the SNS was part of the government led by Mečiar (ĽS-HZDS); its content was amended and softened in 1999 by the SDKÚ-DS government. The new

Impact of populist radical right parties 135 formulations passed by the National Council essentially came across as a hard thrust at minority languages. Other measures proposed by the SNS and introduced by the ruling coalition include replacing textbooks for Hungarian-language schools with new ones containing the names of geographical places in Slovak (e.g. Malová and Učeň 2010: 1161) and the Patriotism Act which, in a softer version redrafted by Smer-SD, required the national anthem to be played in schools, in the National Council, in regional parliaments, and at major sport events (e.g. Malová and Učeň 2011: 1127). The SNS has repeatedly questioned the loyalty of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia, and its interpretation of the Slovak Republic in ethnic terms swiftly extended beyond populist radical right boundaries after 2006. Prime Minister Fico then revealed his ambition to make the Slovak Republic home for the Slovak nation “as well as for loyal minorities” (Slovak Spectator 2007; emphasis added). Similarly, the vice-chairman of Smer-SD, Dušan Čaplovič, would refer to SMKMKP’s policies as “increasingly extremist, anti-Slovak and anti-European” (Čaplovič 2008). Just before the 2010 elections, Smer-SD quickly responded to the amendment to the Hungarian Citizenship Law approved by the new Hungarian government. This was achieved first by passing a parliamentary resolution against the Hungarian law and later on by amending the Citizenship Act that allows the state to strip Slovak citizenship from citizens who voluntarily (apart from by birth or marriage) acquire the citizenship of another state. (Malová and Učeň 2011: 1124) The nativist appeal of Fico’s party is also captured by expert judgements: in 2010, Smer-SD’s score on the ethnic minorities dimension is 3.08, hence taking the proximate position to the SNS (0.07). Despite changes that occurred in the Slovak party system after 2010,7 the balance of political competition over this dimension has further moved towards opposition to ethnic minorities (average of 4.40 in 2010), showing the pervasive effects of the polarisation of the ethnic discourse. In addition, the poor electoral showing of the SNS8 did not seem to induce Smer-SD’s moderation on the issue. Fico’s party maintained a rather radical position on ethnic minorities (3.5 in 2012), presenting itself as the mainstream alternative to the nativism of the SNS.

Economy and corruption Since their first appearances in national political arenas, populist radical right parties have gradually come to elaborate on socioeconomic issues. However, it would be misleading to confound the increasing emphasis placed on these issues with growing competence – a competence that is commonly attributed to mainstream parties. For the most part, the economic policies advanced by the populist radical right are indeed unrealistic and at odds with the criteria set by the EU (see Chapter 3; also Mudde 1999; Minkenberg 2000; Eatwell 2003). Nonetheless, the populist

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radical right seemed capable of reviving forms of economic paternalism and relaunching the prospect of renationalisation of certain strategic sectors – especially in the face of the recent European economic crisis. Hence, this study does not rule out the impact of populist radical right parties on the economic positions of mainstream competitors, if only at the spatial level. The broader purpose of this section is to measure party positions on the left-right economic continuum. Given the following provision, experts were then asked to locate parties on the basis of their stance on economic issues: Parties on the economic left want government to play an active role in the economy. Parties on the economic right emphasise a reduced economic role for government: privatisation, lower taxes, less regulation, less government spending, and a leaner welfare state. For the study of the populist radical right in these countries, the analysis of party positions primarily serves as a means to cross-validate the findings of the qualitative content analysis carried out in the previous chapter. We have indeed found Ataka and Jobbik parties to deliver ‘leftist’ platforms; instead, the SNS displayed rather centrist and pro-market traits. Moreover, since the analysis of policy dimensions includes all parties represented in national parliaments at a given time point, this section aims to ascertain whether instances of cooperation with the populist radical right are effectively grounded in a common socioeconomic outlook. Generally speaking, the populist radical right cannot be regarded as the most competent actor in the field of economy; in addition, their (formal or informal) subordinate position in government coalitions would lead to the expectation of an influence mechanism going from senior coalition partners to the populist radical right. In other words, it should be the mainstream nearby competitor influencing the socioeconomic stance of the populist radical right rather than the other way around. For example, Smer-SD and the SNS in Slovakia have claimed that cooperation was also possible because of a shared vision of the way the economy should have been run (e.g. Mesežnikov et al. 2008). Considering Ataka’s unconditional support to the Borisov government (2009–13), it would be reasonable to expect the populist radical right party to resemble the position of the ruling party, or at least adjust to it over time. In Chapter 3, it was also noted how the populist radical right’s take on the economy may be driven by its anti-corruption and populist outlook. The issue of corruption is inherently considered a valence issue, as it represents a condition that is negatively valued by the electorate. Therefore, for the study of political parties, the issue is better assessed in terms of degree rather than position (e.g. Stokes 1963; see Chapter 5). With its focus on policy competition, the present study aspires to map the aspect of dimensionality also in the case of corruption. This result was attained by classifying parties on the basis of their stance on additional anti-corruption measures. Indeed, parties may be expected to oppose further measures, remain neutral on the issue, or support additional anti-corruption legislation yet, quite certainly, not to stand for policies favouring corruption. In line with the

Impact of populist radical right parties 137 previous analysis, Ataka and Jobbik should be found to deliver the most radical positions in their respective political spaces. Bulgaria Some observers have pointed out how economic transition in Bulgaria did not really take place until 1997 (Giatzidis 2002; Stanchev 2001). With the end of power alternation between the SDS and the BPS, the Bulgarian party system underwent a substantial realignment and opened up to ‘anti-establishment reform’ parties (Hanley and Sikk 2014) – that is, centrist parties with a pronounced populist profile. For instance, the success of the Natsionalno Dvizhenie Simeon Vtori (National Movement Simeon II, NDSV) at the 2001 elections prompted a series of changes: first, the BSP abandoned its role of reformed communist party and transformed into a social-democratic force; second, the SDS underwent new internal rifts after the relative internal stability of the late 1990s (Spirova 2010: 406). Three issues in particular took centre stage in the political debate during the 2000s: fighting corruption, accession to the EU, and (especially towards the end of the decade) handling the effects of the economic crisis. A coalition between the Socialists, the NDSV (now renamed Natsionalno Dvizhenie za Stabilnost i Vazhod [National Movement for Stability and Progress]), and the ethno-liberal DPS was established in 2005, suggesting that cooperation had also been achieved on the basis of common policy goals in some of these areas. Subsequently, the populist GERB emerged as the winning party in the 2009 national elections. Borisov’s party campaigned on the basis of three principles: economic freedom, competition in an environment of clear responsibilities and rules, and minimum state participation (GERB 2007: 3). As previously noted, Ataka stipulated a post-election agreement with GERB in July 2009. In particular, Siderov declared his intention to back GERB’s cabinet and those policies aimed at implementing anti-crisis measures and stabilising the economic situation of the country (Novinite 2009a). As far as economic stances are concerned, it is then reasonable to expect Ataka’s convergence towards more ‘centrist’ positions after 2009, with GERB setting the agenda on this dimension. Figure 4.5 presents, however, a different picture. On the pro-market side of the spectrum, the conservative SDS and its splinter faction DSB occupy, perhaps not surprisingly, fairly similar positions throughout the whole period analysed. On the redistributive side of the continuum, Ataka’s position on the economic left closely resembles that of the BSP; in the first and last time points recorded, both parties bear identical positions – that is, 3.25 in 2006 and 2.56 in 2012. On the one hand, these results cross-validate the qualitative analysis of Chapter 3 and ascertain the ‘leftist’ imprint of this portion of Ataka’s ideology. On the other hand, according to the expert judgements, the BSP maintains a distinctly more leftist trait than expected by the social-democratic turn of the late 1990s (cf. Karasimeonov 2004). Furthermore, the expert surveys’ scores do not seem to account for the fiscally conservative measures implemented by the Socialist-led government after 2005, which included

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Figure 4.5 Position of Bulgarian parliamentary parties on economic issues, 2006–12 Note: Party positions range from ‘extreme left’ (0) to ‘extreme right’ (10). Sources: 2006 and 2010: Chapel Hill expert survey (N = 12; N = 11); 2012: own data (N = 9).

cuts in pensions and social benefits and the introduction of the flat tax (Tavits and Letki 2009: 566). The redistributionist position adopted by the ethno-liberal DPS reasonably stems from the government coalition with the BSP (with a shift from 4 to 3.18 between 2006 and 2010), only to return to more centrist positions after this period (4.33 in 2012). Besides considerations on the political opportunism that may inform the strategy of populist radical right parties, Figure 4.5 indicates that, should these positions have lasted after 2012, a similar outlook on socioeconomic issues could also justify Ataka’s support for the BSP-DPS coalition in the aftermath of the 2013 elections. On the contrary, the positions of Ataka and GERB significantly differ for the year 2010. Overall, the expert surveys are quite telling regarding the volatile nature of new populist parties in parliament. It has been noted that Bulgarian parties often lack consistent principles, ideas, and policies (Spirova 2010: 407); this is aptly exemplified by the variable positions of GERB (6.27 in 2010 and 5.22 in 2012) and RZS (4.17 in 2010 and 6.5 in 2012) on the spectrum. Indeed, whilst the original aim of the Borisov government was to maintain a balanced budget, spending decisions contributed to a growing budget deficit. In practice, no coherent policy emerged from the plan of reforms outlined in the fields of health care, education, and social security (Kolarova and Spirova 2010: 916). The positions reported in 2010 and

Impact of populist radical right parties 139 2012 finally confirm that no influence has been exerted by GERB on the economic stance of Ataka. As the Bulgarian economic sector remains plagued by forms of economic and political crime, the issue of corruption represents another crucial (and related) topic in the Bulgarian public and political debate (e.g. Ganev 2006). More so, curbing corrupt practices maintained a central role in both pre-accession and post-accession talks with the European Commission, practically conditioning governmental roadmaps well beyond Bulgaria’s EU entry on 1 January 2007 (e.g. Spirova 2008). The original data gathered for the year 2012 confirm the salience of the issue amongst political parties represented in the National Assembly (Figure 4.6): on average, Bulgarian parties deem the issue very important (i.e. 3.15 on a 4-point scale). Parties that have campaigned against widespread corruption, such as the populist GERB or RZS (e.g. van Kessel 2015: 38–40), indeed attribute great importance to the issue, yet none of them parallels the position of Ataka on this dimension (6.22 on a 7-point scale). This indicates that the Bulgarian populist radical right party has effectively managed to deliver an uncompromising anticorruption image; according to the experts, the anti-corruption stance of Siderov’s party has not been tainted by the two consecutive terms in parliament or by the support offered to the ruling GERB. On the other side of this dimension, the

Figure 4.6 Position of Bulgarian parliamentary parties on additional anti-corruption measures and relative salience of the issue, 2012 Note: Party positions range from ‘strongly oppose’ (1) to ‘strongly favour’ (7) additional anti-corruption measures in the country. Issue salience ranges from ‘no importance’ (1) to ‘great importance’ (4). Source: Own data (N = 9).

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location of the ethno-liberal DPS translates into data the profile of a party that has been often associated with controversial political and business practices (e.g. Genov 2010; Sgourev 2010). In fact, whilst no Bulgarian party resolutely aspires to preserve the status quo, the party of then-leader Ahmed Dogan was, in 2012, the one placing less emphasis on the issue and the least in favour of furthering anticorruption measures. Hungary The Hungarian party system provides a vivid example of the lack of correspondence between what constitutes left and right in political and economic terms. Already during the 1990s, the MSZP had embraced the principles of democracy and the market economy in order to overcome the legacy of the communist successor party (Grzymala-Busse 2002). After 1994, the party implemented a series of liberal economic reforms such as the privatisation of national utility services and cuts in public spending that the previous Magyar Demokrata Fórum (Hungarian Democratic Forum, MDF)–led government had failed to achieve (Morlang 2003). The Hungarian conservative galaxy, on the contrary, has been markedly non-rightist in its economic policies (Tavits and Letki 2009: 559); anti-communist parties have often privileged expansionary fiscal policies and criticised the restrictive measures implemented by the MSZP (Morlang 2003). Moreover, with its ideological turnaround in the mid-1990s, Fidesz has come to play an ever-growing role in the organisational cohesion of the Hungarian right (e.g. Kiss 2002; Fowler 2004; Bakke and Sitter 2005), also functioning as the main driver behind socially oriented economic policies. In 2006, the MSZP–Szabad Demokraták Szövetsége – a Magyar Liberális Párt (Alliance of Free Democrats – Hungarian Liberal Party, SZDSZ) coalition initiated a widely anticipated process of privatisation of the health-care system. The reforms that followed resulted in growing health-care costs for citizens and the plan for a health insurance scheme that combined private and public health insurance elements. Fidesz then led a successful referendum campaign requiring the abrogation of some of these reforms. Following the outcome of the referendum, the MSZP dissociated from these privatisation plans and distanced itself from the junior coalition partner SZDSZ, which had been the main advocate of these economic reforms (Bozóki and Simon 2010: 218). After the resignation of Prime Minister Gyurcsány in March 2009, a caretaker government led by the Minister for National Development and Economy, Gordon Bajnai, was instated in April, carrying out a series of urgent measures dictated by the economic crisis, as well as by the contracts with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the EU (see Várnagy 2010). Expert survey scores show that, by the year 2010, discernible market-liberal positions were no longer represented in the National Assembly (Figure 4.7). Party positions averaged 3.56 in 2010 and 3.83 in 2012, indicating that the competition on economic issues in Hungary progressively converged on leftist territories. Remarkably, the positions of the populist radical right Jobbik (3.12) and the

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Figure 4.7 Position of Hungarian parliamentary parties on economic issues, 2006–12 Note: Party positions range from ‘extreme left’ (0) to ‘extreme right’ (10). Sources: 2006 and 2010: Chapel Hill expert survey (N = 5; N = 16); 2012: own data (N = 10).

governing coalition Fidesz-KDNP (3.23) closely resembled each other in 2010. This proximity is reflected in the policies implemented by the government of Prime Minister Orbán. Fidesz-KDNP has practically co-opted a number of economic issues on which Jobbik has campaigned. For instance, the populist radical right party has repeatedly denounced the limited revenues deriving from multinational companies operating in Hungary. Fidesz has drafted a bill introducing a ‘bank tax’, which requires corporations (primarily multinationals) in the financial, energy, and telecommunication sectors to contribute to the budget deficit by paying special taxes. Similarly, Jobbik sought to abolish the mandatory private pension system and reintroduce statutory pension insurance, yet still allow free choice amongst pension funds. Not only has the Orbán government abolished the mandatory private pension funds, but it has also moved these savings into the government-run programme to reduce the Hungarian public debt – virtually offering no alternative to members of private funds (Bíró Nagy et al. 2013: 245; Várnagy 2011: 995). Overall, Fidesz-KDNP has systematically sought forms of Hungarian economic self-sufficiency in a way that is reminiscent of Jobbik. Since its rise to power in 2010, Fidesz has had a strained relationship with the IMF, resembling, on more than one occasion, the hostile attitude of Jobbik towards global financial institutions. Moreover, the Orbán government has recently reoriented international trade

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eastwards (cf. Jobbik 2010), also winning acclaim from Jobbik. Therefore, the relative distancing between Jobbik (3) and Fidesz-KDNP (3.83) ascertained in 2012 may be realistically attributed to the introduction of the flat personal income tax by the Orbán government (2012). Differences are certainly more evident in the analysis of the anti-corruption stance of Hungarian parties. Throughout its political existence, Jobbik has placed major emphasis on its anti-establishment and anti-corruption profile. Such a stance played a prominent role in the run-up to the 2010 election, when the party “launched an aggressive campaign calling for revenge on corrupt politicians and setting itself the goal of overtaking MSZP” (Várnagy 2010: 1006). However, Jobbik was not the only party mobilising on anti-corruption messages and diffuse public resentment against the political class. By competing on a similar platform and drawing on a similar constituency, the left-libertarian LMP has by and large interrupted Jobbik’s monopoly on the issue (e.g. Bíró Nagy and Róna 2013). The picture presented by Figure 4.8 substantiates the enduring proximity of Jobbik and LMP on this dimension, whose positions (5.4 and 5.22, respectively) and issue salience (3.9 and 3.89, respectively) are plainly at odds with those of the governing Fidesz-KDNP coalition and the Socialists. Corruption scandals in Hungary have

Figure 4.8 Position of Hungarian parliamentary parties on additional anti-corruption measures and relative salience of the issue, 2012 Note: Party positions range from ‘strongly oppose’ (1) to ‘strongly favour’ (7) additional anti-corruption measures in the country. Issue salience ranges from ‘no importance’ (1) to ‘great importance’ (4). Source: Own data (N = 10).

Impact of populist radical right parties 143 repeatedly tainted the reputation of political elites and established parties; in return, no mainstream political party has shown intent to implement more transparent regulations over the years (Bozóki and Simon 2010: 219–20). Hence, it should not be surprising that the distribution on this dimension resolves into a dichotomy between established and anti-establishment parties – old and new parties. Slovakia For over a decade after the collapse of the Communist Bloc, the political debate in Slovakia was dominated by questions concerning the character of the political regime, democracy, and nationalism. Between the 2002 and 2006 elections, the major patterns of political competition changed. To be sure, nativist concerns and the liberal-conservative cultural divide still remained salient, yet socioeconomic issues turned into the principal area of policy competition. As a result, the political spectrum began to resemble the conventional left-right divide of other established democracies, and the 2006 electoral campaign was primarily contested over the expected role of the state in the economy and the state of society in general (see Malová and Učeň 2007, 2011; Rybář 2007). In this respect, the package of reforms launched by the cabinet of Mikuláš Dzurinda (2002–6) had particular resonance. The coalition led by the pro-market SDKÚ-DS introduced a series of reforms in the fields of taxation, labour relations, social policy, pensions, health care, and state administration. Smer-SD, on the contrary, expressed its preference for state regulation over market-based competition (Rybář and Deegan-Krause 2008) and, since 2004, has publicly supported the Konfederácia Odborových Zväzov Slovenskej Republiky (Confederation of Trade Unions of the Slovak Republic). Fico’s party promoted solidarity, justice, and equality of opportunity; strongly criticised the social costs of the measures implemented by the Dzurinda government; and was committed to lower taxes on basic goods and the introduction of progressive taxation (Malová and Učeň 2007). Smer-SD emerged as the largest party in the 2006 elections and formed a government coalition with the SNS and Mečiar’s ĽS-HZDS. It has been observed that the three parties were the only parliamentary parties in Slovakia emphasising a strong role of the state in the economy and the advantages of a ‘Scandinavian model’ of welfare (Wientzek and Meyer 2009: 471). Hence, despite the distance between Smer-SD and the other two parties on the economic left-right continuum (Figure 4.9), their alliance could be partly explained by their broad ideological proximity on the one hand and the fact that the SNS and ĽS-HZDS had been the only other parties opposing the previous governing coalition on the other. The new governing coalition had then promised to build a strong socially oriented state, although the state budget could only allow a 2 per cent growth in social spending (Malová and Učeň 2008: 1129). Overall, the budget restrictions imposed by both the previous reforms and EU membership constrained governmental action, leaving Fico’s party to target private foreign companies owning public utilities and pension and health insurance (Malová and Učeň 2009: 1102).

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Figure 4.9 Position of Slovak parliamentary parties on economic issues, 2006–12 Note: As of 2012, the SNS is no longer represented in parliament; its position in 2012 is reported for illustrative purposes. Party positions range from ‘extreme left’ (0) to ‘extreme right’ (10). Sources: 2006 and 2010: Chapel Hill expert survey (N = 12; N = 14); 2012: own data (N = 10).

Whilst the inability of the governing coalition to make good on its pledges did not resonate with the electorate (e.g. Malová and Učeň 2008), interactions at the party level exhibit no less than moderate effects. Following the coalition with Fico’s party, the populist radical right SNS shifted its position from 5 in 2006 to 4.27 in 2010, providing at least qualified evidence of a senior coalition partner’s ability to exert influence in areas of competence such as the economy. This form of adaptation has already been noted in the analysis of the 2010 programme of the SNS, in which the party emphasised the results – mainly steered by Smer-SD – achieved during the term in office (SNS 2010; see also Chapter 3). In line with this reasoning, the expert judgements for the year 2012 indicate that, with the lack of specific political incentives (i.e. partnerships and alliances), the SNS abandoned its previous ‘social’ overtones and returned to its trademark centrist positions under the new leadership (5.22). Although corruption represents one of the most pressing problems in Slovakia, governmental efforts to strengthen anti-corruption mechanisms have by and large waned after 2007. Already during the 2006–10 term, the state interventionist agenda of Fico’s government is believed to have increased the space for practices of cronyism, plundering of state resources, and misuse of EU structural funds. Fico’s attempts to promote his image of crusader against corruption were far from

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Figure 4.10 Position of Slovak parties on additional anti-corruption measures and relative salience of the issue, 2012 Note: Party positions range from ‘strongly oppose’ (1) to ‘strongly favour’ (7) additional anti-corruption measures in the country. Issue salience ranges from ‘no importance’ (1) to ‘great importance’ (4). Source: Own data (N = 10).

persuasive (Malová and Učeň 2010), and corruption scandals erupted amidst the general compliance of his cabinet (Mesežnikov et al. 2008; Malová and Učeň 2009: 1103–4). The substantial ‘neutrality’ of Slovak parties vis-à-vis the strengthening of anticorruption measures is reflected in their location on the corruption dimension in 2012 (Figure 4.10). In this regard, only two (new) parties offer exceptions to this: the liberal SaS and, most notably, its conservative offshoot OĽaNO (position 6.56; issue salience 3.8), which indeed ran the 2012 elections on an anti-corruption platform. On the contrary, the SNS’s inability to formulate a credible anti-corruption agenda is also confirmed at the spatial level through expert judgements. The SNS’s difficulty to compare with other populist radical right parties on this dimension substantially confirms that its position is still affected by the party’s involvement in previous corruption scandals.

The European Union The accession to the EU represented a milestone in the transformation process of post-communist countries (e.g. Ramet 2010). Whilst the EU is generally assumed to have tempered parties and party systems (Vachudova 2008), the rise or

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reawakening of populist radical right politics in Central and Eastern Europe is also linked to a growing dissatisfaction with the supranational institution (Bustikova 2009). This part of the study especially posits that populist radical right parties have grown more wary of the EU and the process of European integration over time. This radicalisation should largely configure as a post-accession phenomenon, since no structural or political constraints would now make anti-EU positions impracticable. In other words, because these countries have already attained EU membership, the ‘irresponsible opposition’ (e.g. Sartori 1966) of populist radical right parties on the issue should not, in itself and by itself, put this membership into question. Apart from intrinsic ideological motives (see Chapter 3), populist radical right parties’ radicalisation on ‘Europe’ may be prompted by a series of contextual factors. First of all, radicalising positions vis-à-vis the EU can be interpreted as a means to differentiate from mainstream parties (e.g. Taggart 1998). Especially in contexts where mainstream parties have co-opted at least some nativist issues, the populist radical right may have an incentive to expand its palette of issues and focus more strongly on Europe. Second, public consensus on the EU has steadily declined, offering an incentive for populist radical right parties to tap into this dissatisfaction (e.g. de Vries 2007; Werts et al. 2012). The effects of the ‘Great Recession’ have further amplified this downward trend, and the populist radical right has had an unprecedented opportunity to see its anti-EU message favourably met by the general public (van Kessel and Pirro 2014). The populist radical right is commonly appraised as a natural carrier of Eurosceptic views (e.g. Mudde 2007; Hooghe et al. 2002), and the EU issue has been recognised as an identifying trait of these parties’ ideology (Chapter 3). Therefore, this section posits that the radicalisation of populist radical right parties on this issue may affect the position of their mainstream competitors. In particular, mainstream parties, which have proven to be willing to co-opt the nativist agenda of the populist radical right, may try to outflank their radical competitors also on this dimension. If shifting from ‘Eurosceptic’ to ‘Euroreject’ positions is indeed a vote-seeking strategy on the part of the populist radical right in times of crisis, their mainstream competitors may seek to counter this strategy and also open up competition on this dimension. Two caveats are in order. First, just as the recent EU economic and financial crisis may have prompted a radicalisation of the populist radical right’s EUrelated discourse, this may have also motivated growing scepticism on the side of mainstream parties. At the same time, however, it would be reasonable to expect mainstream parties and, even more so, governing parties to display a rather favourable outlook on Europe (e.g. Taggart and Szczerbiak 2013). Second, since ‘EU-pessimism’ should also be appraised as a vote-seeking strategy, mainstream parties would have, in principle, no incentive to adopt a tougher stance on ‘Europe’ without a direct competitor occupying more radical positions on the issue. These dynamics are explored in detail in the following sub-sections.

Impact of populist radical right parties 147 Bulgaria In 2006, the attention in Bulgaria was monopolised by the country’s accession to the EU. EU conditionality has been claimed to be responsible for the BSP’s orientation towards the pro-European positions of other socialist parties across Europe (Vachudova 2008); it was exactly under the supervision of the Stanishev government that the country approached EU entry in 2007. Virtually every parliamentary party shared the overarching goal of EU entry, although accession provisions remained uncertain until the year 2007. The Bulgarian government was asked to implement a series of measures to reform the judiciary, counter corruption, and fight organised crime; however, only two constitutional amendments had been approved in this direction by the year 2006 (Spirova 2007). When the European Commission finally opted for Bulgaria’s entry, the country was subject to a ‘Mechanism for Verification and Cooperation’ in order to monitor and ensure the continuation of reforms in the aforementioned areas. In the face of inadequate governmental responses and systematic irregularities, the European Commission then decided to freeze EU aids to Bulgaria in 2008 (Spirova 2009). Despite the Bulgarian Parliament’s struggle to comply with the requests coming from Brussels and the absence of any real campaigning on EU-related issues, Bulgarian parties of all colours have unequivocally shown a pro-European outlook before and after accession (Figure 4.11). Of all parliamentary parties, only the

Figure 4.11 Position of Bulgarian parliamentary parties on European integration, 2006–12 Note: Party positions on European integration range from ‘strongly opposed’ (1) to ‘strongly in favour’ (7). Sources: 2006 and 2010: Chapel Hill expert survey (N = 12; N = 11); 2012: own data (N = 9).

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populist radical right Ataka has questioned this consensus. The party delivered strong anti-EU positions in 2006 (2.46) and 2010 (2.5), mostly informed by its negative assessment of Bulgarian membership and view of the unfavourable access conditions. Partly in line with the aforementioned expectations, Ataka indeed radicalised its position in 2012 (1.67). The EU has figured more prominently in the discourse of the party, which has, in turn, ascribed to a disadvantageous membership the adverse financial situation that has afflicted Bulgaria since the beginning of the Great Recession. However, a similar dissatisfaction with the European integration process did not seem to affect GERB’s position on the issue (6.73 in 2010; 6.11 in 2012). Borisov’s party quickly gained membership in the European People’s Party (EPP) in 2008, and its rise to power in 2009 has been claimed to be responsible for the general improvement of relations with the EU (Kolarova and Spirova 2010). Notwithstanding the cooperation between Ataka and GERB, the centreright party has maintained a strong Europhile outlook throughout its term in government. Hungary The Hungarian accession to the EU is part of a series of systematic transformations undertaken after the collapse of the Communist Bloc. Hungary is today the most important recipient of foreign direct investment in Central-Eastern Europe (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development [UNCTAD] 2012), and this exposes the country’s economy to international market fluctuations, including crises taking place in the Eurozone. Hungary has been on the verge of bankruptcy ever since 2010, and the country has relied on a rescue package of the IMF, EU, and the World Bank to bolster its finances. In itself, this would give the governing coalition Fidesz-KDNP sufficient room to play up its nationalist profile against the supranational EU elites. At the same time, Fidesz has mainstreamed a large portion of Jobbik’s rhetoric since the party entered the Hungarian Parliament in 2010. As far as the EU issue is concerned, then, it is plausible to expect a shift of Fidesz-KDNP’s position towards Jobbik. Generally speaking, Fidesz’s ideological shift to conservative positions during the 1990s also influenced its attitude towards Europe. From its original ‘EUoptimist’ stance, Fidesz swiftly evolved into a mainstream Eurosceptic party; by the year 1998, the party set itself in defence of national interests in the process of accession negotiations (Batory 2008: 270). At the same time, Fidesz showed a rather favourable outlook on Europe in the run-up to the 2010 elections. At least two elements may have contributed to this. First, Fidesz has been in opposition since 2002, and the party used European integration for partisan advantage to deliver a more moderate self-image. Already in the 2002–6 term, Fidesz had offered support for EU-related constitutional amendments and had toned down its EU-critical stance (Batory 2008: 271). Second, with no populist radical right party in parliament,9 Fidesz lacked any short-term incentive to stir up competition over

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Figure 4.12 Position of Hungarian parliamentary parties on European integration, 2006–12 Note: Party positions on European integration range from ‘strongly opposed’ (1) to ‘strongly in favour’ (7). Sources: 2006 and 2010: Chapel Hill expert survey (N = 12; N = 11); 2012: own data (N = 10).

the EU issue. In comparative terms, the party was still more critical than the EUoptimist governing parties and any other party represented in parliament. Figure 4.12 shows a significant evolution in the positions of Jobbik and its nearby competitor, Fidesz-KDNP. On the one hand, Jobbik’s radicalisation is in line with our expectations, and the analysis of the political space over the EU issue provides a visual complement to this discussion. On the other hand, FideszKDNP’s change of position substantiates an ongoing process of structural and ideological adaptation following Jobbik’s entry to parliament. Fidesz-KDNP’s rise to power in 2010 helped Orbán revive his dormant Euroscepticism. Fidesz-KDNP’s changing attitude towards Europe between 2010 and 2012 could be explained in two (non-mutually exclusive) ways. First, the state of the Hungarian economy deteriorated during later years, and the EU financial crisis further stimulated Fidesz’s nationalism in opposition to the allegedly ‘undemocratic’ European architecture (e.g. Orbán 2012). The political impasse with the EU resulting from constitutional reforms is perhaps paradigmatic and could provide the first reason for the radicalisation of Orbán’s party position on the EU issue. Second, the concomitant radicalisation of Jobbik and Fidesz-KDNP vis-à-vis the EU is grounded in the reality of Hungarian political competition. Fidesz-KDNP

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has gradually taken over part of Jobbik’s rhetoric on nativist issues. Under pressure from the mainstream right, Jobbik may have opted to differentiate itself from Fidesz-KDNP by increasing the salience of its anti-EU agenda and playing the ‘exit card’. As far as these shifts are concerned, it is admittedly hard to tell the cause from the consequence. This notwithstanding, if Fidesz-KDNP feared that moderating its position would increase the electoral appeal of its populist radical right competitor (e.g. Carter 2005), its return to Eurosceptic positions could be interpreted as an attempt to win Jobbik voters. Other commentators have also noted striking parallels in the rhetoric of the parties. Both Jobbik and FideszKDNP have placed national interests above those of the EU; moreover, Orbán’s rhetoric has grown more critical of EU institutions and more radical in tone since Jobbik’s entry to parliament (e.g. Bíró Nagy et al. 2013). In Hungarian party politics, the nativist discourse has far-reaching implications. The current financial crisis surely contributed to elevating this discourse from the national to the supranational level, turning the EU into a central theme of political competition. Moreover, Fidesz, as a mainstream organisation of the centre-right, has a direct competitor in the populist radical right Jobbik. This relationship shapes party positions on different policy dimensions, and the pressure exerted by Jobbik’s radicalisation on the EU issue seems to have also conditioned Fidesz-KDNP’s shift to more Eurosceptic positions. Slovakia The route to Slovak accession to the EU has been tortuous. During the 1990s, Prime Minister Vladimír Mečiar had a strained relationship with the EU. Despite his formal commitment to liberal-democratic values and EU integration, the European Commission vowed to interrupt talks with Slovakia if the ĽS-HZDS returned to power in 1998. Negotiation talks resumed with the Dzurinda governments; Slovakia has undertaken an unequivocal pro-European trajectory ever since, securing EU membership in 2004 (Vachudova 2008). In 2006, the governing coalition led by Smer-SD included the SNS of Ján Slota and the ĽS-HZDS of Vladimír Mečiar. Even though the alliance did not question Slovakia’s continued membership in the EU (e.g. Harris 2010), it caused the suspension of Smer-SD from the Party of European Socialists (PES) between 2006 and 2008; indeed, cooperation with the populist radical right SNS was considered a clear breach of the PES’s founding principles. Nevertheless, Fico’s government worked towards further European integration: the party committed to joining the Schengen Area by the end of 2007 and entering the Eurozone in January 2009 (e.g. Malová and Učeň 2008). In this regard, the expert judgements are quite informative. On the one hand, the mapping of party positions on this dimension confirms that in 2006 both the ĽS-HZDS (5.23) and Smer-SD (4.79) were located on the pro-European side of the spectrum (Figure 4.13). Smer-SD’s shift towards more pronounced Europhile positions (by the end of its term in government, the party had scored 5.87 on the policy dimension) confirms the party’s commitment to the pro-European agenda.

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Figure 4.13 Position of Slovak parliamentary parties on European integration, 2006–12 Note: As of 2012, the SNS is no longer represented in parliament; its position in 2012 is reported for illustrative purposes. Party positions on European integration range from ‘strongly opposed’ (1) to ‘strongly in favour’ (7). Sources: 2006 and 2010: Chapel Hill expert survey (N = 12; N = 11); 2012: own data (N = 10).

On the other hand, the soft Euroscepticism of the SNS (or its comparatively less EU-pessimistic position) is accurately translated into spatial terms. The positions of the party on European integration (3.23 in 2006 and 3.08 in 2010) validate the findings of the qualitative content analysis (see Chapter 3) and preliminarily indicate that a soft Eurosceptic agenda could also prove to be a viable strategy in a pro-European context (see Chapter 5). On the whole, party-based attitudes towards Europe demonstrate a paradox: until recently, parties had generally supported the process of European integration, though they had little or no interest in campaigning on EU-related issues (e.g. Malová and Učeň 2010). The breakout of the crisis has, however, also attested to the importance of ‘Europe’ for national elections and had seemingly influenced party positions on this issue. In response to the Eurozone crisis and talks about the bailout of other EU member states, the SNS has further shifted its position towards the oppositional end of the spectrum (2.8). However, it is quite likely that the timing of the original expert surveys also detected the ‘moderation effects’ deriving from the new leadership, making the change between 2010 and 2012 only apparently more gradual. As EU-related issues gained in salience in the political debate, it is important to note that early elections were called for 2012 as a result of an unsuccessful vote

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of confidence over the approval of the European Financial Stability Fund. On this occasion, SaS and Smer-SD abstained, practically provoking the fall of the Radičová government. Even though the Europhile trajectory of Smer-SD may have come to a provisional halt (5.5 in 2012), Fico’s party has shown a certain degree of financial responsibility during its new mandate. Conversely, the position of SaS in 2012 (3.4) may indeed indicate the party’s growing scepticism towards the criteria imposed by the EU (e.g. Slovak Spectator 2012). Be that as it may, it is admittedly difficult to attribute these shifts to the Euroreject rhetoric of the SNS. The party influence reduced quite significantly after 2010 and its (electorally unsuccessful) attempt to play the ‘exit card’ should be appraised as a strategy solely aimed at diversifying its ideological supply.

Clerical issues Religious issues may come across as a paradox in the strategy of populist radical right parties. Clericalism certainly plays a prominent role in the framing of the populist radical right ideology in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Slovakia – to the point that these parties are brought together by a common denominator of clericalism, opposition to ethnic minorities, and EU-pessimism (i.e. the ‘minimum combination’ of ideological features presented in Chapter 3). Nonetheless, the impact of religion is negligible in the political competition of these countries, and the value of religion-oriented policies is, to say the least, questionable. Unlike other Central and Eastern European countries (above all, Poland), the three countries analysed are highly secularised. Despite the historical relevance of religion in Hungary and Slovakia, it cannot be argued that religion has a strong influence in the politics of these countries (e.g. Bozóki and Simon 2010; Harris 2010). Moreover, Bulgaria has traditionally lacked a religious-secular cleavage besides forms of party mobilisation on religious grounds. Here, religious affiliation is closely correlated with the minority status of Islamic Turks (e.g. Evans 2006), which finds political representation with the DPS. This element would then substantiate the principal function of clericalism in the ideology of Ataka – that is, reinforcing the dichotomy between the in-group and the out-group, which is primarily constructed in ethnical terms.10 The paradox also rests in the voters of populist radical right parties, who generally comprise the least religious portion of national constituencies. In Bulgaria, 48 per cent of Ataka voters considered themselves non-religious or only somewhat religious compared with 32 per cent of Socialist voters.11 In Hungary, only LMP voters (55 per cent) declared themselves to be less religious than Jobbik and MSZP voters (both 49 per cent). Only Slovakia showed a different trend: here, half of the SNS voters identified themselves as strongly religious, though against almost 90 per cent of the Kresťanskodemokratické Hnutie (Christian Democratic Movement, KDH) voters (European Social Survey, Round 5).12 To be sure, this phenomenon is not new; in the 1990s, the Hungarian MIÉP was a party committed to radical clerical policies against a backdrop of predominantly secular voters,

Impact of populist radical right parties 153 underlining the highly symbolic role of religion and the complex relationship between religiosity and religious politics (Enyedi 2000: 173). Elite political discourse does not always of course determine partisan affiliations at the mass level. There are in fact many indications that citizens do not regard elections as [an] appropriate means of expressing their religiosity and they do not rank clerical/anti-clerical conflicts as the most relevant political issues. (Enyedi 2000: 157) Despite the relative marginality of Christian democratic parties in the region and the fact that they were stronger in the early 1990s than today (Bakke 2010: 80), this study posits their continued ownership over clerical issues. Just as populist radical right parties should be interpreted as rightful owners of minority issues, it seems reasonable to regard Christian democratic parties as the principal political vehicle for religious principles in politics. The analysis of political spaces in Hungary and Slovakia provides at least partial confirmation of this. Prima facie, the distribution of Hungarian parties across this policy dimension suggests that religion sharply differentiates between opposing political camps (Figure 4.14). This would be in line with previous conclusions on party identities. The differentiation between parties on the basis of anti-clerical and Christian-national

Figure 4.14 Position of Hungarian parliamentary parties on clerical issues, 2006–12 Note: Party positions range from ‘strongly oppose’ (0) to ‘strongly favour’ (10) religious principles in politics. Sources: 2006 and 2010: Chapel Hill expert survey (N = 12; N = 11); 2012: own data (N = 10).

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attitudes holds to this day (e.g. Enyedi 2000), and the right-wing camp has also shown its continuing allegiance to religion and the churches (e.g. Enyedi and O’Mahony 2004). By assimilating the KDNP in the 2000s, Fidesz has also turned into a radical – the most radical – political party on this policy dimension. If support for religious principles in politics could be considered a proxy for ideological conservatism, Fidesz has indeed gradually moved towards the conservative side of the political spectrum; this is certainly an interesting fact considering the liberal and anti-clerical origins of the party. Since 2006, the Fidesz-KDNP coalition has radicalised its clerical profile, moving from a score of 7.9 to 8.9 in 2012. In 2010, the position of Fidesz-KDNP is virtually confounded with that of Jobbik (8.69 the first, 8.44 the latter), confirming that, in yet another respect, the two parties tend to resemble each other. Still, according to the expert judgements for the year 2012, Jobbik has moderated its position on clerical issues (7.9), whilst Fidesz-KDNP has further radicalised. This proximity reveals a substantial overlap between the platform of Jobbik and the posture and decisions of the Fidesz-KDNP coalition. For instance, the populist radical right party has repeatedly emphasised the need to anchor the Fundamental Law to the Christian roots of Hungary; the commitment to the nation-sustaining power of Christianity has been established in deed and word through the contentious constitutional changes approved by Fidesz-KDNP (e.g. Bíró Nagy et al. 2013). In outlining its family policy, the 2010 electoral manifesto of Jobbik stated that the promotion and protection of the institution of the family shall be preserved from attacks by “a liberalism whose objective is to put the family unit on an equal footing with every conceivable alternative living arrangement or deviant lifestyle” (Jobbik 2010: 9). The amendments to the Fundamental Law introduced by the Fidesz-KDNP governing coalition include a definition of a family as a man, a woman, and their children and the designation of marriage as the basis for the definition of family – hence excluding single parents, unmarried partners, and gay marriage. Furthermore, the recognition of same-sex unions, available in Hungary since 2009, has been edited from the constitution (Saltman 2013). Jobbik also intended to tighten up the process of registration for new religious sects, recognise the prerogatives of historic religions, and strengthen their relationship with the state (Jobbik 2010: 16). With a law on the status of religion, the FideszKDNP government redefined the criteria for the recognition of churches from the state, practically reducing the number of official churches from a few hundred to 14. The situation is apparently different in Slovakia. Despite its fervent Christian profile and roots, the SNS is neither the sole nor the most radical herald of religious principles in Slovak politics (Figure 4.15). According to expectations, it is a Christian democratic organisation (KDH) that exerts continuing ownership on this policy dimension. A cultural conflict along conservative-liberal lines emerged in 2006, shaping Slovak party politics accordingly. Although the KDH avoided making explicit reference to religious principles, its 2006 electoral campaign centred on traditional morality and family. The party favoured pro-life issues and opposed divorce and same-sex civil partnerships. The strictness of this narrative is reflected in the position of the party on this dimension (9.25). The SNS shared a similar,

Impact of populist radical right parties 155

Figure 4.15 Position of Slovak parliamentary parties on clerical issues, 2006–12 Note: As of 2012, the SNS is no longer represented in parliament; its position in 2012 is reported for illustrative purposes. Party positions range from ‘strongly oppose’ (0) to ‘strongly favour’ (10) religious principles in politics. Sources: 2006 and 2010: Chapel Hill expert survey (N = 12; N = 11); 2012: own data (N = 10).

though not as radical, view of the family (the party position on the issue is 6.92) and primarily distinguished itself by strongly supporting young families (Malová and Učeň 2007: 1102). Notably, this position is not subject to significant changes over time, indicating that no real competition is at stake on this dimension: amidst slight changes, the SNS scored 7.22 on this dimension in 2012. As other concerns took centre stage in the political debate, the religious divide swiftly exhausted its resonance. This is well exemplified by the composition of the coalition that ruled the country between 2010 and 2012. Indeed, the government included the centre-right/libertarian SaS (2.07 in 2010 and 2.8 in 2012), which openly supported same-sex marriage (e.g. Henderson 2010), and the KDH (9 in 2010 and 8.6 in 2012).

Concluding remarks Populist radical right parties are listed amongst the most vocal opponents of the status quo. These parties have made important inroads by systematically questioning the model of ethnic and cultural integration, as well as the political dynamics developed after 1989. Their electoral performances, however, account for only one aspect of the politicisation of the issues at the core of their ideology. For this reason, this chapter

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strayed from stories of success and failure framed in electoral terms and paid attention to the dimensionality and impact of the populist radical right on national policy competition. The value of this approach is twofold. On the one hand, the scope of investigation focused on (and was by no means limited to) different aspects of nativism in these countries, advancing a fine-grained analysis of the dimensionality of populist radical right politics. On the other hand, the chapter adopted a dynamic approach and examined policy competition over time, hypothesising that once certain patterns are consolidated, their effects are likely to endure in the political process. A complex set of dynamics On the basis of the three cases analysed, it is possible to draw some important conclusions. Populist radical right parties do not own all the issues that they preach, and they are not able to exert influence on all the issues that they own. In fact, the dimensionality of policy competition suggests that the impact of this party family is limited to certain areas of competence. In the remaining areas, the existing dynamics are conditioned by political opportunity structures comprising specific configurations of resources, institutional arrangements, and historical precedents for mobilisation (e.g. Kitschelt 1986). Moreover, the effects released by these parties vary across countries, making it difficult to ascertain a distinct pattern valid for all cases. Populist radical right parties unambiguously occupy the most extreme positions on minority issues. They acquired issue ownership by filling a space that was previously left vacant and maintained this ownership throughout; in other words, their command of minority issues over the last decade has been unparalleled. Nevertheless, the impact of populist radical right parties on this dimension is complex, and institution-shaping and policy-making effects vary across contexts. At the broader institutional level, the sole presence of these parties gradually shifts the balance of competition towards opposition to minorities, regardless of the presence of strong multicultural positions in the political space. This would suggest that the presence of the populist radical right in parliament contributes to a progressive normalisation of the anti-minorities discourse. However, when the specific interaction between populist radical right parties and nearby competitors is taken into account, patterns are not homogeneous across countries and range from modest (Bulgaria) to significant (Slovakia). According to the expert judgements, GERB showed only modest signs of adaptation to the nativist agenda of the Bulgarian populist radical right. In this case, however, the fact that this courtship was partly displayed before 2010 cannot be ignored. The impact of Jobbik is more evident in the policy position of FideszKDNP. In addition, the interaction between Jobbik and its nearby competitor also takes place over the question of Hungarian minorities abroad; this is convincingly demonstrated by the position of Fidesz-KDNP on this dimension and the legislative output of the Orbán government since 2010. Two interpretations could be advanced in this regard. First, mainstream parties willing to co-opt the anti-minorities agenda of populist radical right parties (without

Impact of populist radical right parties 157 estranging their traditional or moderate electorate) cannot engage in overtly radical statements. Hence, their interaction with (or reaction to) the populist radical right will be gradual and mostly passive. In this sense, focusing on national minorities abroad allows mainstream competitors such as Fidesz-KDNP to enter nativist territories without getting involved in contentious discriminatory practices. Second, nearby competitors’ interaction with the populist radical right on the question of indigenous ethnic minorities preserves at least a symbolic component. Regardless of relative shifts across policy dimensions, mainstream parties give evidence of an allusive courtship of nativist themes in all three cases analysed. The Slovak case presents yet another picture. Smer-SD significantly radicalised its position on ethnic minorities between 2006 and 2010, adopting a discursive style reminiscent of the SNS. By the time of its re-emergence, the SNS had already politicised and partially mainstreamed the issue; however, its participation in government as a junior coalition partner seemed to expand the resonance of its antiminorities agenda. Indeed, whilst issue ownership makes it possible to recognise that the SNS ‘led’ and Smer-SD ‘followed’ on this dimension, it is difficult to tell whether co-optation stemmed from the ideological influence of the populist radical right, its participation in government, or both. The SNS barely crossed the electoral threshold in 2010 and ultimately fell short of entering the National Council in 2012. Whereas the multicultural discourse may benefit from the absence of the populist radical right in parliament, it is important to note that the impact of the SNS endured its poor electoral performance. As a case in point, the SNS and Smer-SD had both radicalised their positions by 2010, and the extra-parliamentary status of the SNS did not seem to prompt the return of Smer-SD to its starting positions. The populist radical right unequivocally contributed to mainstreaming the antiminorities discourse within respective national settings. Cross-national differences very much depend on the context of these parties, different facets of nativism, and the timing of politicisation of minority issues. In Hungary, where the nativist discourse is articulated over the question of ethnic Hungarians abroad and indigenous ethnic minorities (above all, Roma), the interaction between Jobbik and FideszKDNP is contested on at least two fronts. Although the interaction over indigenous minorities is not negligible, a substantial overlap is discernible on the question of Hungarian minorities abroad. In Slovakia, where the question of minorities has been part of the political debate since the 1990s, the agenda of the populist radical right was swiftly reignited, and its impact was easily discernible. A refined understanding of interaction effects Of all three parties, Ataka shows modest institution-shaping and no significant policy-making effects. The party could be legitimately considered the owner of the anti-minorities and the Eurosceptic agenda, as well as the staunchest supporter of anti-corruption measures. Unfortunately, the lack of longitudinal data on anticorruption does not allow for testing whether Bulgarian parties (especially, ‘antiestablishment reform’ ones) have adapted to the standards set by Ataka in the past few years. The modest influence exerted on the dimension of ethnic minorities is

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not paralleled by an increase in EU-pessimism by the other (otherwise proEuropean) parties. Finally, the interaction effects expected in the area of the economy did not occur. Ataka did not adapt its social-national economics to the platform of GERB following the post-election agreement between the two parties. On the contrary, Ataka preserved remarkable similarities with the position of the BSP, perhaps indicating that Siderov’s party may have acted as a kingmaker of the BSP-DPS government in 2013 also on the basis of similar positions on economic policies. The analysis of the Hungarian case revealed substantial ‘confounding effects’ in a number of policy areas. In fact, the impact of Jobbik on the issue of ethnic minorities seems to represent just the tip of the iceberg. The analysis of institutionshaping and policy-making effects ascertained a considerable overlap between Jobbik and Fidesz-KDNP. The populist radical right party and the governing coalition bear strikingly similar positions on the question of national minorities abroad, the economy, and clerical issues. In addition, both Jobbik and Fidesz-KDNP have recently radicalised their positions on the process of European integration. A distinct demarcation is only noted on fighting corruption practices; this dividing line splits the Hungarian political camp into two – the new and anti-establishment (Jobbik) and the old and established (Fidesz-KDNP). The analogies established in this chapter lend support to the view that Fidesz is a ‘party that speaks with two tongues’ (Verseck 2013). Whilst the party publicly distances itself from Jobbik, in practice it flirts with populist radical right politics to attract its constituency. The SNS in Slovakia similarly comes across as the owner of minority issues and the Eurosceptic agenda. Whilst significant institution-shaping and policy-making effects were ascertained in the first area, it seems difficult to attribute SaS’s or Smer-SD’s growing reservations about European integration to the sole presence (or radicalisation) of the SNS. Moreover, unlike other populist radical right parties in the region, the SNS is not perceived as a credible supplier of anti-corruption policies. During its time as a junior coalition partner, the party showed moderate signs of adaptation to the ‘leftist’ economic agenda of the senior Smer-SD – only to return to its trademark centrist positions at the end of this alliance. As far as clerical issues are concerned, the SNS is neither the only nor the most radical actor on this dimension. Despite the marginal incidence of religious voting, the presence of an established Christian democratic party in the political arena clearly affects issue ownership and the possibility of mobilising the religious voter. Despite a long-standing interest in the populist radical right, the scholarship on this party family in Central and Eastern Europe, as well as its role in the political process, is still in its early stages. With the help of expert judgements, this chapter examined the dimensionality of populist radical right politics and assessed how the populist radical right exerts influence on national parties and political spaces. The added value of this contribution rests in the extension of the analysis not only beyond traditional left-right divides but also more predictable areas of influence such as ethnic minorities. This strategy then allowed for a refined understanding of interaction effects on different policy dimensions. Had the analysis been limited to ethnic minorities, the broader picture would have been inevitably missed. As a

Impact of populist radical right parties 159 result, these parties would have been compared on the basis of the smaller or greater influence exerted on minority issues. Alternatively, by adopting a finegrained analysis, it was possible to ascertain the overall negligible impact of Ataka at the institution-shaping and policy-making levels and the remarkable overlap between Jobbik and its mainstream competitor Fidesz-KDNP. Having partly concluded that some of these interaction effects withstand the electoral success or failure of populist radical right parties, it could be argued that the quality of liberal democracy is today more in danger in Hungary than in Bulgaria.

Notes 1 According to Minkenberg (2001, 2002a), agenda-setting effects refer to the impact on the agenda-setting and institution-shaping spheres. 2 An exception would be the Sdružení pro Republiku – Republikánska Strana Československa (Coalition for Republic – Republican Party of Czechoslovakia, SPRRSČ). For reference, see Čakl and Wollmann (2005). 3 With ‘peripheral’, reference is made to the position of these parties in the political space, not to their relevance or electoral performance. 4 In 2005, the two parties signed an agreement which has de facto turned the KDNP into an electoral appendix of Fidesz. The two parties are thus treated as a single entity, and their expert surveys’ scores are averaged. 5 See, for example, politics.hu (2011). For a glimpse of the half-apologetic style of Fidesz’s condemnations, see politics.hu (2009) or, more recently, politics.hu (2013). 6 Zsolt Bayer, a close friend of Prime Minster Orbán and Fidesz co-founder, recently stated: “most Gypsies are not suitable for cohabitation. They are not suitable for being amongst people. Most are animals, and behave like animals. They shouldn’t be tolerated or understood, but stamped out. Animals should not exist. In no way” (Bayer 2013). 7 Most-Híd took over the pro-Hungarian agenda and gained representation at the expenses of the SMK-MKP; the ĽS-HZDS fell short of the 5 per cent threshold. 8 The SNS attained 5.1 per cent of votes and nine seats in 2010 and 4.6 per cent and no seats in 2012. Despite its extra-parliamentary status, the position of the SNS in 2012 (1) is reported for illustrative purposes (Figure 4.4). 9 The MIÉP failed to re-enter the Hungarian Parliament after 2002. 10 Precisely for these reasons, the value of including a separate analysis for Bulgarian parties was questioned, thus limiting the scope of this section to policy competition in Hungary and Slovakia. 11 Voters are those respondents who declare to have cast a vote for a given party in the last national elections. Religiosity is measured with a self-assessed religiosity item (“How religious are you?”), which ranges from ‘not religious at all’ (0) to ‘very religious’ (10). The range considered here is 0–3 (European Social Survey, Round 5). 12 In this case, the range considered is 7–10.

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5

Demand and supply The electoral performance of the populist radical right

Introduction The project at the heart of this book took its first steps by observing that the electoral performance of populist radical right parties in Central and Eastern Europe has ultimately paralleled that of other Western European parties. This observation prompted a thorough and refined understanding of the populist radical right phenomenon in post-communist countries. This chapter further pursues this endeavour by focusing on the electoral performance of this party family in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Slovakia. Whilst the previous chapters of this work paid attention to different aspects of the supply-side, this chapter uses the information gathered during the process to analyse the interaction between the demand-side and the supply-side of populist radical right politics. In particular, the following analysis sets out to interpret the recent performance of these parties through those issues regarded as areas of competence for the populist radical right. Even though these parties foster (and may profit from) a specific set of issues, focusing on the supply of populist radical right politics alone does not help explain their electoral performance. In principle, these parties would be able to succeed only when the supply of populist radical right politics matches an adequate demand. By appraising the electoral performance of populist radical right parties as the outcome of demand-side and supply-side elements, this chapter shall contribute to the understanding of this phenomenon in Central and Eastern Europe. The interactive framework employed in this chapter is presented in the following section. Consecutively, the focus moves to the data and analysis of demandside and supply-side factors; the fortunes of populist radical right parties are then analysed in a comparative perspective. The chapter concludes by suggesting that the divergence in their electoral performances may indeed depend on interactions over post-communist issues.

Demand and supply of post-communist issues The populist radical right in Central and Eastern Europe has been defined as a party family that reacts to the transformations of 1989 and resorts to historical legacies and contextual idiosyncrasies to frame its ideology. From the perspective of these

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parties, those pre-communist elements lying at the core of their ideology do certainly matter (Chapter 3). However, by expanding the analysis of the supply-side beyond populist radical right parties alone, we have learned that these parties do not own all the issues that they advocate. At the same time, other issues might be simply not relevant to the competition between political parties (Chapter 4). Therefore, although populist radical right parties in the region turn to a broader palette of issues, they could be regarded as a ‘post-communist’ electoral phenomenon.1 Jointly considered, the populist radical right exerts partial or complete ownership of post-communist issues, suggesting that the electoral performance of these parties (i.e. degrees of success and/or failure at the polls) can be fruitfully interpreted through the lens of current political questions. In other words, the precommunist portion of these parties’ ideology primarily serves symbolic and accessory functions, leaving their electoral performances dependent upon postcommunist issues. For the sake of this discussion, it seems at least plausible to anchor public concerns to aspects related to the multiple transitions faced by these countries (von Beyme 1996; Linz and Stepan 1996). The post-communist publics may indeed resort to national salvationist appeals in reaction to the disappointing outcomes of the 1989 revolutions and their principal interpreters (see also Pop-Eleches 2010; Bartlett et al. 2012). Populist radical right parties, as defenders of the good (native) people, would then come across as the answer, since they advocate a radical change in the face of a status quo perceived as politically decadent and morally corrupt (e.g. Tismaneanu 2007). This chapter advances insights into the electoral performance of populist radical right parties by combining demand-side and supply-side factors. Minority issues, corruption, and the European Union (EU) offer the principal dimensions of competition for the populist radical right, suggesting that the success or failure of this party family could be interpreted through the public demands and parties’ supply of these issues. Although demand-side and supply-side arguments have been employed and combined in the analysis of the electoral fortunes of this party family in Western Europe (e.g. Carter 2005; Kitschelt and McGann 1995; Lubbers et al. 2002; Norris 2005), they have been only occasionally applied to the study of Central and Eastern Europe. The aim of this chapter is to focus in equal measure on demand-side and supply-side elements and reinstate party agency as a crucial aspect of the populist radical right’s own electoral fortunes. “Demand factors are undoubtedly the necessary prior condition for extreme right success. But they are clearly not sufficient. A complex mix of supply factors are necessary to help launch a party” (Eatwell 2003: 63). In line with this reasoning, the demand-side accounts for public attitudes and the salience of the issues outlined previously. The supply-side looks at the party level, as parties primarily engage in translating contrasts in the social and cultural structure into pressures for action or inaction (Lipset and Rokkan 1967: 5) – a form of responsiveness to societal demands articulated at the ideological level. This notwithstanding, the supply-side should also account for the credibility of this ideological offer and for the ownership exerted over these issues. In other words, this study considers

Demand and supply: electoral performance 169 populist radical right parties capable of shaping their own fortunes as long as their proclaimed and actual stances over certain issues coincide. At the same time, populist radical right parties will be able to benefit from their supply when they (rather than other parties) are identified as the most competent actors to deal with these issues. In fulfilling their expressive function, populist radical right parties are expected to prioritise minority issues over other questions. On the one hand, 25 years of research on populist radical right parties have mainly taught us that this party family garners support on the basis of its nativist agenda (Mudde 2007). Hence, populist radical right parties in Central and Eastern Europe would primarily mobilise support around identity-based appeals and place selective emphasis on minority issues because of their competence advantage (Budge and Farlie 1983). On the other hand, there are reasons to consider anti-corruption and EU-pessimism as ancillary issues for the populist radical right. First, corruption is a valence issue, for it represents a condition that is negatively valued by the electorate (Stokes 1963: 373). As far as issue ownership is concerned, it should then be easier for other parties to adopt an anti-corruption stance (especially compared to an anti-minorities one), possibly limiting the political impact of populist radical right parties on this issue. Second, whilst opposition to the EU could be generally deemed a peripheral party phenomenon, it should also be noted that parties tend to privilege national questions in the debates about the EU (Taggart 1998). As a result, it would be reasonable to expect opposition to the EU to turn into a profitable policy position when attached to other salient national issues. Overall, the interaction between the demand-side and the supply-side over the issues identified is believed to affect the electoral performances of populist radical right parties in Central and Eastern Europe. The basic tenet is that a high demand for populist radical right politics sets the breeding ground for populist radical right mobilisation. In turn, a matching supply of populist radical right politics (accounting for the ideological stance of the populist radical right, the credibility of this supply, and the ownership exerted over these issues) could help explain the electoral performances of this party family. Incidentally, the following analysis omits other portions of political opportunity structures, such as the broader institutional environment. One main drive behind this choice rests in the underlying approach of the book, which values the analytical power of the populist radical right ideology. The chapter coherently interprets electoral performances as the outcome of interactions taking place over specific ideological features. In addition, the role of electoral systems and other electoral laws has been the object of much speculation in the literature on the far right, at times delivering contradictory findings. Across the electoral sessions examined, however, all three countries bear similarities in their electoral systems (e.g. Rose and Munro 2009), offering at least qualified reasons to treat institutional factors as a constant. The processes outlined in the following sections are intended to identify possible elements (or a combination thereof) conducive to the populist radical right’s success or failure at the polls. Partly because of this, the processes analysed not only rest on

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discrete changes along these three dimensions but also rest on changes in nature that will thus require qualitative interpretations. These considerations will be included in the empirical analysis of the chapter. An interactive framework of analysis The demand and supply of ethnic minorities, corruption, and the EU are deemed important conditions to decipher the performance of populist radical right parties in these countries. The following sections specifically aim to assess the impact of these issues and provide insights into the electoral performances of Ataka, Jobbik, and the Slovenská Národná Strana (Slovak National Party, SNS). The combination of demand-side and supply-side factors is justified on the basis that “political elites must supply parties that reflect popular demands, or risk electoral failure” (Rose and Munro 2009: 1). Still, “politicians’ appeals and voters’ views often interact to create some sort of perpetual bond in which it is often impossible to tell the cause from the consequence” (Mesežnikov and Gyárfášová 2008: 35). The chapter expects to reveal a substantially favourable demand-side opening up opportunities for the supply of populist radical right politics; the correspondence between a high demand-side and a high supply-side over one or more issues should contribute to a positive performance of populist radical right parties at the polls (Figure 5.1). Populist radical right parties are expected to tap into a

Figure 5.1 Diagram of the electoral performances of populist radical right parties

Demand and supply: electoral performance 171 pre-existing demand for these issues or at least adjust to this demand over time. Radical changes at the macrolevel generally take time to materialise, especially over the span of two consecutive elections, yet variation in public attitudes is possible in the face of important turning points (e.g. EU accession) or the increasing salience of certain political issues. When referring to the demand-side, the chapter looks at the attitudes of the national publics of Bulgaria, Hungary, and Slovakia, as well as the salience of the issues amongst these publics. The demand-side is interpreted as an electoral reservoir (Minkenberg 2013), since public predispositions offer the breeding ground for populist radical right mobilisation (Political Capital 2010). Precisely for this reason, narrowing the analysis to the demand of populist radical right voters alone would not explain the importance of context, since populist radical right voters are expected to have already assimilated the populist radical right parties’ supply. By looking at the supply-side, the analysis explicitly focuses on populist radical right parties and their ideology. On the one hand, post-communist issues such as ethnic minorities, corruption, and the EU are appraised as central features of the populist radical right ideology in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Slovakia. On the other hand, these are issues over which the populist radical right fights electoral contests, for populist radical right parties are generally perceived (or aspire to be perceived) as the owners and most credible carriers of these messages. Therefore, the first part of the empirical analysis focuses on populist radical right party agency, examining how populist radical right parties respond to the demand-side and deal with each issue over time. This account also takes into consideration the credibility of this ideological supply. Should the credibility of the party message be undermined by compromise or misconduct over certain issues, populist radical right parties would be expected to lose consensus.2 The last part of the analysis completes the assessment of the supply-side and advances considerations based on policy competition. As populist radical right parties do not operate in a vacuum, they have to establish ownership over one or more issues in order to thrive electorally. Issue ownership is shaped by competition with nearby competitors (see Chapter 4; also Carter 2005; Meguid 2005; Williams 2006). Considering that populist radical right parties emerged or re-emerged around the first electoral contests analysed (2005–6), the demand-side should partially account for the electoral breakthrough of these parties.3 Incidentally, this framework should in part justify variations in the demand-side and the supplyside over time. Whilst parties are believed to adapt to voters’ demands in their race for votes, voters are likely to shift positions according to the salience of these issues in the political debate. The greater the ownership established over these issues by populist radical right parties, the more likely that they will be able to profit from them.

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Data and analysis In the following sub-sections, each issue is assessed in a comparative perspective in order to identify which issue, or combination of issues, has been electorally rewarding for Ataka, Jobbik, and the SNS. The interaction between the demandside (masses) and the supply-side (parties) is analysed in a sequential manner across two electoral sessions (Bulgaria: 2005 and 2009; Hungary and Slovakia: 2006 and 2010), and the evaluation relies on various sources. Demand-side The demand-side takes into consideration public attitudes and the salience of each issue. Inasmuch as possible, the analysis of the demand-side uses comparable sources in order to seek consistency across countries for each issue and any period analysed (for a complete list of questions, see Appendix D). Since the analysis focuses on public attitudes towards minorities, a series of indicators of multiculturalism; diversity (in terms of race, religion, and culture); assimilation; acceptance; security; and perceptions of ethnic minority groups is employed. Candidate Countries Eurobarometer (hereafter CCEB) data, a number of Eurobarometer waves, and a study by the Pew Research Center (hereafter PRC) are used. The analysis of public attitudes towards corruption adopts indicators of perceptions of corruption (CCEB and Eurobarometer data). Attitudes towards the EU are measured with different indicators: views of EU membership (CCEB and PRC data); trust in the European Parliament (European Social Survey; hereafter ESS); and views of the economic integration of Europe (PRC). The issues identified should read as ‘anti-minorities’, ‘anti-corruption’, and ‘Euroscepticism’; thus, the more unfavourable the attitudes on each issue, the higher the demand. When 0–25 per cent of negative views is observed on each issue in the sample, the demand for such issue is coded as low; accordingly, the demand is deemed moderate for between 26–50 per cent and high for 51 per cent or above. When the indicator of the demand-side consists of more than one item, average values are calculated. In the specific case of minority issues, the analysis attempts to systematise thresholds for the demand-side (i.e. negative attitudes towards minorities). Considering the sensitive nature of this issue and the substantive lack of a fixed benchmark for minority issues, the demand-side is coded as follows: low when scoring 0–15 per cent; moderate when scoring between 16–30 per cent; and high when scoring 31 per cent and above.4 The salience of these issues is an integral part of the assessment of the demandside. Following the work of Bustikova (2014), the analysis endogenises the salience of minority issues by looking at the strength and inclusion of ethno-liberal parties in governing coalitions. Whilst this proves to be a fruitful strategy in the case of Bulgaria and Slovakia, the absence of ethnic mobilisation at the party level in Hungary makes it necessary to draw on studies on the salience of the Roma issue in national media and for the general public. In the case of corruption, the analysis

Demand and supply: electoral performance 173 relies on PRC data. Finally, the salience of the EU issue is evaluated through CCEB data and the European Election Studies (hereafter EES). Supply-side The supply-side takes the ideological stance of populist radical right parties, the credibility of this offer, and issue ownership into consideration. The ideology of populist radical right parties is analysed by means of qualitative content analysis of party manifestos (Ataka 2005a, b; Jobbik 2006, 2010a; SNS 2006, 2010), official media, and party leaders’ statements (see also Chapter 3). This portion of the supply-side takes into account populist radical right parties’ stance on each issue and is coded accordingly. A high ideological supply of a certain issue indicates that the issue figures prominently in the party agenda and comes across as a core feature of the party ideology; a moderate supply refers to issues present in the party literature, yet only qualifying as secondary features of the party ideology in light of their salience; and, finally, a low supply of populist radical right issues denotes issues that are not present in the party agenda. In order to gauge another dimension of the supply-side, the analysis extends to the credibility of the populist radical right’s offer. The congruence between the proclaimed and actual stance on certain issues is a determinant of the parties’ own fortunes. Thus, populist radical right parties maintaining a coherent stance in office would be expected to sustain their party supply; conversely, populist radical right parties failing to make good on their pledges would be expected to lose credibility and electoral support.5 This dimension is also operationalised as part of the populist radical right party supply. The ideological supply and the credibility of populist radical right parties go hand in hand. By default, a high ideological supply corresponds to a high credibility, a moderate ideological supply to a moderate credibility, and so forth. Though addressed in the final part of the empirical analysis, the supply-side also takes into account the ownership exerted over single issues – an aspect falling into the realm of policy competition. Populist radical right issue ownership is assessed on the basis of party positions and salience on a given policy dimension. Indeed, ethnic minorities and the EU are policy dimensions over which competition between parties takes place or, put differently, spaces where party positions could be measured. Party positions are measured by means of Chapel Hill expert surveys (Hooghe et al. 2010; Bakker et al. 2012). Should the surveys reveal significant shifts towards opposition to ethnic minorities or the EU by mainstream competitors, issue ownership should no longer be interpreted as an exclusive domain of the populist radical right. In particular, this chapter suggests that the greater the political space available to populist radical right parties, the higher their levels of electoral success (Carter 2005). Unlike minority issues and the EU, corruption is a valence issue for which the evaluative dimension is better interpreted in terms of degree rather than position

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(Stokes 1963). In order to address the question of ownership of the corruption issue, the chapter uses a wave of the EES and looks at respondents who had identified corruption as the most important problem facing their country in an openended question.6 Should populist radical right parties be recognised as the most competent actors to deal with the issue by respective national publics, they would come across as owners of the issue. Electoral performance Finally, the electoral performance of populist radical right parties considers the percentage of votes gained in parliamentary elections and their relationship with governmental parties. In other words, success could be defined by a high electoral performance at the polls and the populist radical right’s participation in government. Therefore, their electoral performance is coded as follows: 0–5 per cent, low; 6–10 per cent, moderate; 11 per cent and above, high. However, participation in government will move the assessment of the populist radical right’s performance upwards – that is, from low to moderate and from moderate to high (Table 5.1).7 Besides being regarded as the most important suppliers of nativist politics in their respective countries, there is enough variation in the electoral performances of these parties (that is, the outcome variable) during the period analysed to be content with the case selection adopted. All three parties emerged or re-emerged during the third generation of post-communist elections (Pop-Eleches 2010), presenting the reader with a fairly recognisable electoral phase and a microcosm of assorted fortunes at the polls for the populist radical right. The varying electoral performances of these parties should indeed reveal specific interactions between the demand-side and the supply-side over the issues identified and unveil pathways to the fortunes of populist radical right parties in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Slovakia. Ethnic minorities The issue of ethnic minorities has become quite central for populist radical right mobilisation. Minorities in these countries vary between almost 10 per cent of the Table 5.1 Electoral performance of parliamentary populist radical right parties per country, operationalisation Country

Party

Bulgaria Hungary Slovakia

Ataka Jobbik SNS

2005–6 8.1% 2.2% 11.7%

Moderate Low High

2009–10 9.4% 16.7% 5.1%

High High Low

Note: Ataka contested national elections in 2005 and 2009; Jobbik and the SNS in 2006 and 2010. In 2006, Jobbik ran as part of the MIÉP-Jobbik – A Harmadik Út ticket. Source: Parties and Elections in Europe, www.parties-and-elections.eu.

Demand and supply: electoral performance 175 Hungarian population to 20 per cent of the population of Slovakia; moreover, the Roma population often features as the principal target for discrimination.8 In Bulgaria, the analysis of the period preceding the 2005 elections (before Ataka entered Bulgarian politics) shows that, whilst one person in four tended to disagree that multiculturalism is a good thing for society, a stark 47 per cent tended to disagree with the view that diversity in terms of race, religion, and culture represents a strength for their country. Sixty per cent of respondents espoused assimilationist views, stating that minorities must give up those parts of their culture that conflict with the national law. Forty-three per cent agreed that a further increase of minorities could cause problems, and 30 per cent agreed that minorities are objectively different and can never be fully accepted members of Bulgarian society (CCEB 2003.2). In the following period, 40 per cent of respondents did not view ethnic minorities as an enrichment for their society (Eurobarometer 65.4); in 2009, 38 per cent of Bulgarians agreed that minorities cause insecurity (Eurobarometer 71.3). Moreover, 38 per cent of respondents stated that they would feel uncomfortable having a Roma as a neighbour (Eurobarometer 69.1). The Roma minority remains the main target for discrimination in Bulgaria; there, almost 60 per cent of people hold unfavourable views of Roma (and almost 30 per cent view Turks unfavourably) (PRC 2009). The demand for nativism in Bulgaria is high across both periods analysed, and the salience of minority issues is confirmed by the high electoral performance of the ethno-liberal and pro-Turkish Dvizhenie za Prava i Svobodi (Movement for Rights and Freedoms, DPS) – 12.8 per cent in 2005 and 14.5 per cent in 2009 – as well as their participation in government as a junior coalition partner in 2005. Hungary also shows negative public attitudes towards ethnic minorities. In the first period analysed, 69 per cent of respondents held that there is a limit to how many people of other races, religions, or cultures a society can accept; this figure decreases to 56 per cent when reference is made to the objective limit that Hungary had reached in accepting these minorities. In turn, 39 per cent of Hungarians believe that people belonging to minority groups can never be fully accepted members of Hungarian society (CCEB 2003.2).9 In the following period, 29 per cent of respondents said that they would feel uncomfortable having a Roma as a neighbour (Eurobarometer 69.1), and 54 per cent claimed that minorities cause insecurity (Eurobarometer 71.3). Attitudes towards minorities remain overwhelmingly negative (PRC 2009): Hungarians express unfavourable views of Roma (69 per cent), Romanians (33 per cent), Jews (29 per cent), and Slovaks (27 per cent). The salience of minority issues has been high since late 2006 – both in the media and amongst the larger Hungarian public (Table 5.2), though this could be equally attributed to a concomitant effect of the attention drawn by murders committed by members of the Roma community and the politicisation of the Roma issue on the part of Jobbik. Public attitudes on minority issues are high in the period preceding the 2006 elections, though these questions are only moderately salient; in the run-up to the 2010 elections, the issues gain in salience and display high scores in both public attitudes and salience.

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Table 5.2 Salience of ‘Roma issues’ in Hungary, media and public (%), 2006–9 Date

October 2006 February 2009 February 2009 April 2009

Issue

Olaszliszka assassination Veszprém assassination Tatárszentgyörgy assassination Tiszalök assassination

Media

Public

Total Salient statements statements

Salience

6 23 12 5

70.3 73 57.9 23.1

57 65 70 50

Note: Total statements (media): portion of coverage amongst the total number of statements in the principal media outlets (i.e. M1, TV2, RTL Klub, Népszabadság, Magyar Nemzet). Salient statements (media): portion of salient statements. Salience (public): issue salience as perceived by respondents. Source: Medián databases in Karácsony and Róna (2011: 86).

Interethnic tensions spiralled towards the end of the decade; between 2008 and mid-2009, police forces were investigating 18 attacks (some of them lethal) targeting the Roma community (e.g. BBC News 2008, 2009). As Roma issues acquired ever-growing importance in the public debate, Table 5.2 is quite telling as far as the selective salience of these deadly attacks is concerned. In particular, the murder of Jenő Kóka (April 2009), a 54-year-old member of the Tiszalök Roma community, bears a significantly lower resonance compared to the three other lethal attacks – in which Romani people were the perpetrators rather than the victims. In Slovakia, the demand for minority issues is high in the period preceding the 2006 elections. Forty-six per cent of respondents stated that diversity in terms of race, religion, and culture does not add to Slovak strengths. Slovak respondents seem to adhere to a form of ‘Slovak exceptionalism’: there, only 22 per cent of people believe that there are limits to how many minorities a society can accept; however, 41 per cent agree that Slovakia had actually reached its limits and that the presence of more people belonging to these minorities would be problematic (CCEB 2003.2). In the period of the 2006 elections, 39 per cent of respondents did not view the presence of ethnic minorities as an enrichment for their culture (Eurobarometer 65.4). Data show that prejudices against minorities also remain high in the period between the two elections. The Roma minority remains the main target for discrimination, with 40 per cent of Slovaks stating that they would feel uncomfortable having a Roma as a neighbour (Eurobarometer 69.1). Another study finds that 78 per cent and 27 per cent of Slovaks are suspicious of Roma and Jews, respectively (PRC 2009). In turn, a majority of 49 per cent espouses the axiom according to which minorities equal insecurity (Eurobarometer 71.3). As far as the salience of the issue is concerned, it was high in 2006, when the party representing the Hungarian minority in Slovakia, the Strana Maďarskej Komunity – Magyar Közösség Pártja (Party of the Hungarian Community, SMKMKP), gained 11.7 per cent of the popular vote. However, the issue lost in salience in 2010, stabilising at moderate levels. Indeed, the SMK-MKP fell short of the

Demand and supply: electoral performance 177 5 per cent threshold (4.3 per cent), supplanted by the new, more moderate, interethnic party Most-Híd (8.2 per cent of votes). From the supply-side, Ataka seemed to satiate the Bulgarian voters’ demand for a strong nationalist party, as it was the first party to mainstream anti-Turkish and anti-Roma messages. By directly referring to articles of the Bulgarian Constitution, Ataka reinforces its view of a monolithic state inspired by Bulgarian nativism; hence, divisions based on faith, ethnicity, or culture shall not prevail over the defining question of Bulgarian nationality (Ataka 2005a). In light of these premises, Ataka denounced Turkish attempts to foment ethnic conflict in Bulgaria, especially through the activity of the ethnic-liberal DPS. In addition, party leader Siderov has repeatedly and publicly stigmatised the Roma community, defining Ataka as the only party conscious of effective integration policies for the Roma minority (Novinite 2009). Looking at the substantive content of Ataka’s programmatic documents, official media, and Siderov’s statements, it is possible to ascertain a high supply of minority issues (i.e. stance against minorities) in both 2005 and 2009. Jobbik started to address the question of cigánybűnözés as its trademark issue only in late 2006 – that is, after the party contested its first national elections. In the early stages of activity, the party had primarily emphasised its anti-establishment and anti-globalist profile, prophesying an immigration problem attached to EU accession (Jobbik 2006). As a result, the ideological supply-side, interpreted in broader exclusionary terms, qualifies as moderate in the 2005–6 period. As far as the (unsuccessful) Magyar Igazság és Élet Pártja (Hungarian Justice and Life Party, MIÉP)–Jobbik alliance is concerned, the MIÉP effectively retained ownership over minority issues, with a long record of anti-Semitic and anti-Israeli statements (e.g. Szőcs 1998; Karsai 1999). Towards the end of their electoral alliance, however, Jobbik rejuvenated and toned down part of the MIÉP’s party platform, progressively distancing itself from Csurka’s party. It has been noted that Jobbik’s major political innovation (and turning point in its electoral strategy) consisted of shifting the target of the Hungarian far right from the Jews to the Roma (Chapter 3). Especially in the rural areas of the country, the question of Roma minorities represents a much more pressing issue than anti-Semitism; thus, the inability on the part of the MIÉP-Jobbik alliance to politicise (or, at least, prioritise) the Roma issue before 2006 may in part explain their poor electoral performance. After the Olaszliszka assassination (October 2006), Jobbik started framing the Roma issue in terms of ‘Gypsy crime’. The party currently defines ‘Gypsy crime’ as “a unique form of delinquency . . . predominantly and overwhelmingly associated with this minority” (Jobbik 2010b). In order to counter this problem, Jobbik aimed to strengthen the established police force and launch a dedicated rural police service (Jobbik 2010a: 11). Successful electoral performances in northwest Hungary, where the concentration of the Roma population is high, are perhaps a result of this change of strategy. The supply-side for the 2009–10 period shall then be regarded as high. The SNS managed to present itself as an uncompromising nativist actor in Slovak politics. The Hungarian minority in Slovakia often comes across as the main

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target for discrimination: on the one hand, the SNS has questioned the political representation of the Hungarian minority through the ethno-liberal SMK-MKP and, more recently, Most-Híd (SNS 2006, 2010); on the other hand, the party has denounced systematic attempts by the Hungarian minority to disrupt the culture (SNS 2006: 39), as well as the political, administrative, and territorial sovereignty of the Slovak Republic (SNS 2010). Although most of the pronouncements against the Roma minority have been relegated to the public statements of the former chairman Ján Slota, the SNS also identifies a problem with the ‘backwardness and criminality’ of the Roma community and its substantial incompatibility with the Slovak population (SNS 2006: 60). Overall, the party supply remains high during the whole period analysed. By simply looking at public attitudes, the three cases under examination seem to offer a virtually unlimited potential for populist radical right mobilisation. Accounting for the salience of the issue amongst the demand-side, however, presents a more elaborate picture and expands our understanding of populist radical right fortunes at the polls (Table 5.3). All three parties have been (or have become, in the case of Jobbik) credible suppliers of an anti-minorities agenda. The electoral performance of Ataka is moderate in 2005 and, in light of the post-electoral agreement with Grazhdani za Evropeisko Razvitie na Bulgaria (Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria, GERB), high in 2009. The correspondence between high levels of demand and supply of minority issues should in part account for the party’s electoral breakthrough in 2005 and improvement in successive elections. The electoral performance of Jobbik (low in 2006, high in 2010) shows that, when minority issues did not figure prominently in the party agenda, the party swiftly adapted to the demandside and appeared to profit electorally from this. In Slovakia, the demand-side and the supply-side seemed to go hand in hand until very recently. Whilst this dynamic could explain the SNS’s high performance in 2006, the only moderate salience of the issue amongst the wider public, as well as other elements, shall be taken into account to understand the low electoral performance of the party in 2010. Corruption Perceptions of corruption are high across Central and Eastern Europe and have been increasing since the year 2006 (Transparency International 2006, 2011). Political parties are generally perceived to be the most affected by corruption; in the period between the two electoral contests, the lack of trust in politicians and political parties averages 89 per cent in Bulgaria, 86 per cent in Hungary, and 60 per cent in Slovakia (ESS Round 4). Before the 2005 elections in Bulgaria, corruption represented some or a lot of concern for 92 per cent of Bulgarians (CCEB 2003.3). In 2009, 99 per cent of Bulgarians listed corruption as a major concern for their country (Eurobarometer 72.2). The perception that the enrichment of the few has played against the good of the Bulgarian people is a recurring theme in public debate. In Hungary, data show that corruption represented cause for concern to 93 per cent of Hungarians

High High High

High Moderate High

High Moderate High

High Moderate High

d. Moderate Low High

b. High High Moderate

a. High High High

c.

a.

b.

Demand

Supply

Demand

Populist radical right electoral performance

2009–10

2005–6

High High High

c.

Supply

High High High

d.

High High Low

Populist radical right electoral performance

Note: Columns: a. public attitudes; b. public salience; c. populist radical right party ideological stance; d. populist radical right party credibility. Bold characters indicate correspondence between high demand-side, high supply-side, and high electoral performance.

Bulgaria Hungary Slovakia

Country

Table 5.3 Demand-side and supply-side of anti-minorities and populist radical right electoral performances by country

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Supply and demand

(CCEB 2003.3); in 2009, this figure had risen to 96 per cent (Eurobarometer 72.2). Similarly to Bulgaria and Hungary, Slovakia did not show much variation in perceptions of corruption in the two periods preceding the parliamentary elections; 86 per cent of Slovaks appeared to be concerned with corruption before 2006 (CCEB 2003.3) and 84 per cent in 2009 (Eurobarometer 72.2). In Central and Eastern Europe, the salience of corruption has been on the rise since the late 1990s (Grigorescu 2006) and is high during both periods analysed. Corrupt political leaders are seen as the biggest national problem beyond the economic situation in Bulgaria and Hungary and only beyond the economy and crime in Slovakia (PRC 2009). Ataka in Bulgaria and Jobbik in Hungary formulate their anti-corruption stance in fairly similar terms. Both parties call for a revision of the privatisation process undertaken after 1989, since ‘anti-national’ and corrupt political elites are deemed responsible for the indiscriminate sale of national assets (Ataka 2005a, b; Jobbik 2006). In particular, Jobbik aspires to counter the workings of ‘nefarious and corrupt’ Hungarian politics (Jobbik 2010a: 2) by initiating a “comprehensive reform of regulations governing public procurement” and toughening punishments for acts of corruption (Jobbik 2010a: 4). For both periods analysed, the agenda of Ataka and Jobbik shall be defined in terms of a high ideological supply of anticorruption policies. The SNS has generally presented corruption as a side effect of heavy state bureaucracy and power of special interests (SNS 2006: 9, 2010: 9). Overall, corruption received only modest attention as a stand-alone issue in the party programmes, and this ideological supply shall be only regarded as moderate. As far as the credibility of this offer is concerned, Ataka and Jobbik maintained a fairly uncompromising stance on the issue – a factor that certainly added to their anti-establishment profile. Conversely, the loose anti-corruption profile of the SNS has been further undermined by its participation in government between 2006 and 2010. During its time in office, the SNS has been involved in major corruption scandals, eventually leading to the dismissal of party ministers (e.g. Slovak Spectator 2009). Although the supply of anti-corruption policies never quite figured as a core feature of the party ideology during the period analysed, the credibility of the SNS was severely affected by instances of corruption during the 2006–10 legislature. Hence, this portion of the supply-side for the 2009–10 period shall be regarded as low. In terms of public attitudes and issue salience, the demand for anti-corruption measures is high across all countries and periods analysed (Table 5.4). In most cases, populist radical right parties in Central and Eastern Europe frame corruption in such a way as to fulfil their populist and anti-communist profile: on the one hand, they claim that certain elites are responsible for acts of corruption at the expense of the pure people of the nation; on the other hand, they also tend to identify these elites with members drawn from nomenklatura structures or associate these abuses with the (allegedly incomplete) transformation process of 1989. Ex positivo, the Bulgarian and Hungarian cases (2009–10) demonstrate that, in the presence of high levels on the demand-side, a high supply of anti-corruption

High High High

High High High

High High Moderate

High High Moderate

d. Moderate Low High

b. High High High

a. High High High

c.

a.

b.

Demand

Supply

Demand

Populist radical right electoral performance

2009–10

2005–6

High High Moderate

c.

Supply

High High Low

d.

High High Low

Populist radical right electoral performance

Note: Columns: a. public attitudes; b. public salience; c. populist radical right party ideological stance; d. populist radical right party credibility. Bold characters indicate correspondence between high demand-side, high supply-side, and high electoral performance.

Bulgaria Hungary Slovakia

Country

Table 5.4 Demand-side and supply-side of anti-corruption and populist radical right electoral performances by country

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measures can add to the high electoral performances of these parties; however, the sole interaction between the demand-side and the supply-side over this issue does not appear to be a sufficient condition for success at the polls (2005–6). Ex negativo, participation in government generally serves as a litmus test for the supply of populist radical right politics. Given the salience of this issue in post-communist countries, when parties are found to be involved in corruption scandals, their credibility (and electoral support) disintegrates accordingly. As the previous discussion highlighted, this factor could also contribute to deciphering the low electoral performance of the SNS at the 2010 elections. The European Union Attitudes towards European integration at the mass level have been very positive throughout the negotiation process. On the contrary, populist radical right parties in Central and Eastern Europe tended to oppose the EU project and the overall process of European integration, hence bearing ‘Euroreject’ positions (Kopecký and Mudde 2002). This pattern changed after EU accession, leading to a convergence between the demand-side and the supply-side on more moderate positions. In the analysis of public attitudes for the 2005–6 period, Hungarian and Slovak publics held moderate views of their prospective EU membership, with 49 per cent and 47 per cent of respondents in favour, respectively; in Bulgaria, 69 per cent of people had positive views of the EU (CCEB 2004.1). These attitudes are generally countered by measures of trust in the European Parliament; for instance, 33 per cent of Hungarians and 42 per cent of Slovaks held negative views on the European institution before the 2006 elections (ESS Round 2). Therefore, Eurosceptic attitudes amongst the general public would be low in Bulgaria and moderate in Hungary and Slovakia. However, measures of prospective salience with regard to the desired role of the EU in five years’ time find that Euroscepticism shows low salience overall (CCEB 2003.2).10 Before the 2009–10 elections (and in concomitance with the 2009 European Parliament elections), attitudes amongst Bulgarian, Hungarian, and Slovak publics changed. In Bulgaria, 46 per cent of respondents had unfavourable views of the European Parliament; figures peak at 52 per cent in Hungary, whilst they drop to 33 per cent in Slovakia (ESS Round 4). The effects of the EU economic integration influence public assessments in Bulgaria: there, 54 per cent of Bulgarians deem EU membership a good thing, yet 63 per cent of them believe that the economy has been weakened by the integration of Europe. As a result, Eurosceptic attitudes appear moderate at best. In Hungary, Euroscepticism looms large, and the demandside is unequivocally high: only 20 per cent of respondents consider their country’s membership in the EU a good thing, and 71 per cent view the economic integration of Europe as a detrimental factor for their economy. Slovakia is moderately proEuropean: here, 58 per cent of respondents see Slovak membership in the EU as a good thing, and only 33 per cent believe that the economy had been weakened by the European economic integration (PRC 2009). During the period under study, Eurosceptic attitudes had increased from low to moderate in Bulgaria and from

Demand and supply: electoral performance 183 moderate to high in Hungary, remaining stable on moderate levels in Slovakia. This notwithstanding, questions related to the EU (e.g. European integration, the euro, structural funds, etc.) hardly proved to be salient amongst the general public (EES 2009). Compared to their initial positions, and with reference to the period analysed in this chapter, populist radical right parties in Central and Eastern Europe gradually assumed less extreme positions vis-à-vis European integration. Starting out as ‘Euroreject’ parties, the populist radical right has progressively adjusted to different shades of Euroscepticism. Following the categorisation by Kopecký and Mudde, all three parties could be defined as Eurosceptic, as they had recently supported the general ideas of European integration, yet bearing a pessimistic outlook on the EU project (2002: 302). What ultimately brought them together is the view of the EU as a ‘Europe of nations’ able to preserve both their national identities and sovereignty in key policy areas (e.g. Novinite 2009; Jobbik 2010a: 21; SNS 2006: 40). Much of the criticism by populist radical right parties rests on the perception that respective national governments had negotiated EU membership on unfavourable terms; according to populist radical right parties, EU accession created a comparative disadvantage vis-à-vis former EU member states. Ataka encapsulates its position on the EU in the sixteenth point of its ‘20 Principles’; the emphasis is on reconsidering EU accession, renegotiating all the unfavourable clauses, and cancelling agreements on the dismantling of the Kozloduy nuclear power plant (Ataka 2005a). As a whole, the party supply shall be regarded as high throughout. In its 2006 programme, Jobbik associated Hungarian entry to the EU with a loss of national self-determination in favour of a non-democratic institution. In line with its early anti-globalist profile, the party identified an ongoing process of ‘South Americanisation’ stemming from EU membership and ultimately called for an exit from the EU (Jobbik 2006). Successively, and perhaps in relation to the almost 15 per cent of votes gained at the 2009 European Parliament elections, the party seemed to soften its EU-pessimist rhetoric and was willing to raise the question of ethnic minorities within the working framework of the EU (Jobbik 2010a: 21). Jobbik then toned down part of its agenda, yet always within the parameters of a high supply of EU-pessimism. The SNS presents the most erratic position out of the three populist radical right parties analysed. Although the party reads the process of European integration through the lens of Euroscepticism, it also shows evident signs of pragmatism, especially as far as the development of European economic strategies and access to EU structural funds are concerned (SNS 2006: 3, 2010: 3). In light of the inconsistency between its Eurosceptic profile and utilitarian considerations, the party’s ideological supply and credibility shall (at best) qualify as moderate throughout. The stance on the EU issue changed when the focus shifted from ‘accession’ to ‘integration’. Before accession, expectations at the mass level were relatively high, although they were weakened by ‘pre-accession blues’. With the exception of Hungary, the post-communist general public had shown only moderate scepticism towards the EU; since accession, however, the issue had progressively lost in salience. On the contrary, the populist radical right parties’ stance on the issue is

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much more fluid. Populist radical right parties in the region used to hold an uncompromising ‘Euroreject’ position. After accession, the demand-side and the supplyside were somewhat curbed and converged. To varying degrees, populist radical right parties moved towards more Eurosceptic positions. Especially in light of the low public salience of the issue, it seems difficult to consider the EU issue as a decisive element to understand populist radical right parties’ recent electoral performances. This notwithstanding, the dynamics outlined are quite telling as far as the mutual adaptation between the demand-side and the supply-side is concerned. Out of the three countries analysed, Slovakia is the most pro-European, and the SNS has turned into a ‘soft’ Eurosceptic party over time; in the Slovak context, the benefits deriving from a moderate EUpessimist rhetoric cannot be underestimated. Nevertheless, Table 5.5 shows that Ataka experienced a significant electoral breakthrough in the presence of a high supply-side and a low demand-side. Public demands are matched by a populist radical right party supply only in Hungary, indicating that, should the salience of the issue increase amongst the larger public, EU-pessimism may be a viable electoral card in Hungarian politics. Completing the picture: policy competition The last part of this analysis brings policy competition between populist radical right parties and mainstream competitors into the picture. Up until this point, the focus has been on populist radical right parties’ responsiveness to the demand-side; in turn, their electoral fortunes have been interpreted as ideological affairs centring on a populist radical right party’s ideological stance and credibility. However, it is important to recognise that once the issues identified previously are politicised, mainstreamed, or gain in salience amongst the national publics, other parties will adopt different strategies to cope with the populist radical right parties’ growth (e.g. Minkenberg 2002; Meguid 2005). Questions relative to the ownership of these issues are crucial in that they complement our understanding of the supply-side. Should populist radical right parties display ownership of these issues, they would be expected to fare well in contexts where the demand for such issues is high; should issue ownership be challenged by their mainstream competitors, populist radical right parties would lose part of their mobilising potential. In the case of ethnic minorities and the EU, issue ownership is assessed on the basis of party positions and salience over time and measured with Chapel Hill expert surveys for the years 2006 and 2010 (Hooghe et al. 2010; Bakker et al. 2012). Ownership of the corruption issue is evaluated on the basis of public perceptions of competence in dealing with the issue (EES 2009). The picture presented by the expert surveys suggests that in Bulgaria and Hungary, the ownership exerted by the populist radical right on minority issues is substantially unparalleled (Figure 5.2). In Bulgaria, a new populist force and winner party at the 2009 elections, GERB, adopted a relatively oppositional stance on minorities, placing more emphasis on the issue vis-à-vis the Natsionalno Dvizhenie za Stabilnost i Vazhod (National Movement for Stability and Progress, NDSV). In

Low Moderate Moderate

Low Low Low

High High Moderate

High High Moderate

d. Moderate Low High

Moderate High Moderate

a.

c.

a.

b.

Demand

Supply

Demand

Populist radical right electoral performance

2009–10

2005–6

Low Low Low

b.

High High Moderate

c.

Supply

High High Moderate

d.

Note: Columns: a. public attitudes; b. public salience; c. populist radical right party ideological stance; d. populist radical right party credibility.

Bulgaria Hungary Slovakia

Country

Table 5.5 Demand-side and supply-side of Euroscepticism and populist radical right electoral performances by country

High High Low

Populist radical right electoral performance

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Figure 5.2 Ethnic minorities: party positions and salience, 2006 and 2010 Note: Position towards ethnic minorities ranges from ‘strongly opposes’ (0) to ‘strongly supports’ (10) more rights for ethnic minorities. Importance/salience of ethnic minorities ranges from ‘not important at all’ (0) to ‘extremely important’ (10). Source: Chapel Hill expert surveys, 2006 and 2010.

the aftermath of the 2009 elections, the agreement between GERB and Ataka was indeed reached on the basis of opposition to the policies of the ‘anti-national’ Bulgarska Sotsialisticheska Partiya (Bulgarian Socialist Party, BSP) and DPS (Novinite 2009). Therefore, it is possible to argue that the continuing ownership of this dimension on the part of Ataka and the concomitant rise of a new populist actor willing to cooperate with the populist radical right may have contributed to the positive performance of Siderov’s party in 2009. In Hungary, the ability of Jobbik to adapt to public demands and increasing salience of the issue is well reflected in expert survey data. Through confirming the dynamics outlined in the previous sections, Jobbik’s rise to prominence seems to have also affected the salience devoted to the issue by Fidesz-KDNP. By taking into account policy competition, the Slovak case shows yet another scenario. Here, the SNS was asked to join the government coalition led by Smer – Sociálna Demokracia (Direction – Social Democracy, Smer-SD). The two parties seemed to agree on forms of economic paternalism, but in fact also ethnic nationalism (Mesežnikov et al. 2008). As a result, by 2010 Fico’s party had co-opted a good portion of the populist radical right’s nativist agenda, thus

Demand and supply: electoral performance 187 challenging the SNS’s issue ownership. In light of the decreased salience of minority issues, Slovak voters may have then opted for a more moderate nativist alternative to the SNS. In line with the expectations laid out previously, the valence nature of the corruption issue prevents populist radical right parties from establishing undisputed ownership vis-à-vis their nearby competitors. In Bulgaria and Hungary, the mainstream GERB and Fidesz-KDNP are identified as the best parties to deal with the issue amongst those who had identified political corruption as the most important problem faced by their countries (EES 2009). In Slovakia, the anti-corruption rhetoric that contributed to Smer-SD’s victory at the 2006 elections (Bútorová and Gyárfášová 2011: 143) would seem to be undermined by the corruption scandals affecting the government coalition during the 2006–10 term. However, whilst Smer-SD’s competence is still recognised by a share of Slovak respondents, the SNS never figures as an alternative (EES 2009), confirming the substantial loss of credibility outlined previously. As far as the EU issue is concerned, populist radical right parties have maintained EU-pessimist positions the whole time (Figure 5.3). Their ownership is substantially unrivalled, though with less emphasis as compared to their (generally pro-European)

Figure 5.3 European Union: party positions and salience, 2006 and 2010 Note: Overall orientation of the party leadership towards European integration ranges from ‘strongly opposed’ (1) to ‘strongly in favour’ (7). The relative salience of European integration in the party’s public stance ranges from ‘no importance’ (1) to ‘great importance’ (4). Source: Chapel Hill expert surveys, 2006 and 2010.

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nearby competitors. Unlike the dimension of ethnic minorities, it is possible to observe that the only relevant shift taking place is that of Smer-SD in Slovakia, which has moved further towards support for European integration over time.

Discussion Despite the increasing influence of populist radical right politics in Central and Eastern Europe, scholarly attention has been fragmentary and mostly conditioned by the populist radical right’s inability to affirm (or consolidate) itself within parliamentary arenas during the 1990s and early 2000s. This trend has changed in the past few years; this chapter advanced insights into the electoral performance of these parties through the breeding ground at their disposal and the supply of ‘post-communist’ issues. These parties tap into a ‘syndrome’ stemming from the disappointments of the transformation process and frame the populist radical right ideology according to the idiosyncrasies of their context. This is primarily reflected in the set of (electorally viable) issues fostered by these parties: ethnic minorities, corruption, and the EU. The chapter combined demand-side (public attitudes and the salience of these issues) and supply-side elements (ideological stance of the populist radical right, credibility, and ownership exerted over these issues) to interpret the populist radical right’s performance at the polls, presenting a composite framework to analyse this phenomenon in Central and Eastern Europe. Indeed, when accounts of the demand-side and the populist radical right parties’ own supply served only partly as an explanation, elements lying in the domain of broader policy competition seemed to enhance our understanding of this phenomenon in context. In terms of electoral performance, Ataka, Jobbik, and the SNS did not experience similar fortunes. The SNS was successful at the 2006 elections when a high demand for minority issues was matched by a corresponding supply-side. Questions concerning the credibility of the party’s offer, decreasing salience of issues, and external challenges to its issue ownership seem to complement the assessment of the SNS’s electoral debacle in 2010. On the one hand, corruption scandals seem to have undermined the electoral chances of the party; on the other hand, the party’s cooperation with Smer-SD seems to have played against the SNS. Smer-SD had progressively co-opted the nativist agenda of the SNS and profited from the moderate salience of the issue. Jobbik has been on the rise since the electoral failure of 2006; the supply of populist radical right politics seems to meet the demand of the larger Hungarian public, at least on minority issues and corruption. As any model offers only a simplified version of reality, the one presented in this chapter fails to explain the only moderate success of Ataka’s ‘winning formula’ in 2005. Besides the analytical implications of this, Ataka has at least been capable of mobilising part of the electoral reservoir available for its electoral breakthrough. This is in line with the view that the presence of a high demand for these issues may represent a favourable breeding ground for the populist radical right, yet populist radical right parties are able to mobilise just a portion of this demand to their own advantage (Mudde 2007: 230). This notwithstanding, elements lying outside the sole agency of populist radical right parties help clarify Ataka’s high performance in 2009. Once the nativist agenda of the party was

Demand and supply: electoral performance 189 politicised and mainstreamed, Siderov’s party displayed its coalition potential, and GERB sought cooperation with Ataka on the basis of a common ‘patriotic’ agenda. Overall, the electoral performances of populist radical right parties are best understood through the lens of minority issues. The scores of the SNS in 2006, Ataka in 2009, and Jobbik in 2010 suggest that the combination of high demandside and supply-side elements on minority issues account for the high electoral performances of these parties in three cases out of four. Moreover, questions concerning public salience and policy competition on this dimension provide at least partial insight into cases of electoral failure. Due to the valence nature of the issue and counter to explanations based on supply-side factors alone (see Chapter 4), populist radical right parties do not exert exclusive ownership over anti-corruption. In the eyes of national publics, issue ownership is, at best, shared with their mainstream nearby competitors. Drawing from the previous analysis, it is possible to interpret anti-corruption as a partly determinant factor and only ex negativo. A high supply of anti-corruption by populist radical right parties surely adds to their anti-establishment profile; however, corruption seems to affect the electoral performances of populist radical right parties only when the credibility of their supply is low. Generally speaking, this seems to show that parties profit electorally from a certain set of issues as long as they are perceived as credible (radical) actors within their respective political environments. In the time frame of this analysis, only Ataka and Jobbik maintained an untainted image and an uncompromising anti-establishment stance. At least amongst the general public, the EU issue still appeared to be prominent. Therefore, it was difficult to consider the EU as a significant dimension of political competition for the populist radical right. In light of the recent financial crisis, however, it has been observed that populist radical right parties have promptly radicalised their Eurosceptic positions and have placed more emphasis on EUrelated issues (see Chapters 3 and 4; also Pirro and van Kessel 2013). The (re-)emergence of populist radical right parties in Central and Eastern Europe has had deep, long-lasting effects. Some of these are already visible in the populist and nativist turn of mainstream politics in these countries. Parties such as GERB, Fidesz-KDNP and Smer-SD have, to varying degrees, swiftly adapted to some of the standards set by national populist radical right actors. Populism appears to be indeed entrenched in Slovak politics; the failure of the SNS to secure representation in 2012 could hardly make up for the systematic erosion of minority rights witnessed during the previous legislatures. The demand-side and the supplyside very much depend on each other and may, at times, be mutually reinforcing; the present chapter has indeed provided preliminary evidence of this.

Notes 1 Mudde (2005: 162–3) by and large considered far right organisations in Central and Eastern Europe as post-communist (ideological) phenomena, which do not hark back to a communist or pre-communist past. The analysis conducted up to this point has contributed to refining this view. 2 This aspect of party agency is considered internally determined, in that populist radical right parties are the ones called to make good on their pledges.

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3 It has been already observed that the SNS’s failure to gain representation in 2002 largely depended on organisational factors (Chapter 3). Had a split not occurred between the SNS and the Pravá Slovenská Národná Strana (Real Slovak National Party, PSNS), their combined vote (7 per cent) suggests that a unitary force would have made it into the National Council. 4 Values on the ‘minorities’ questions of the CCEB 2003.2 were used as a term of reference. For the three countries, means of two measures were calculated: the first measure (Q.64.2 ‘[COUNTRY] has always consisted of various cultural and religious groups’) represented the lowest average value of negative attitudes towards minorities across countries analysed (8 per cent); the second (Q.64.5a ‘In order to be fully accepted members of [NATIONALITY] society, people belonging to these minority groups must give up such parts of their religion or culture which may be in conflict with [NATIONALITY] law’) delivered the highest average value of negative attitudes towards minorities across countries analysed (52 per cent). The difference between these two values represented the range for anti-minority attitudes; this range was eventually divided by three to set low (0–15 per cent), moderate (16–30 per cent), and high (31 per cent and above) categories. 5 For instance, consider the case of the former Jobbik Member of European Parliament (MEP) Csanád Szegedi – a case that lies outside the period of analysis of this chapter. In the summer of 2012, Szegedi was asked to resign from all Jobbik posts, as he had offered a bribe to keep evidence of his Jewish roots quiet. Whether actions against Szegedi were taken because of his heritage or not, Jobbik was able to preserve its anticorruption profile by expelling an MEP who was involved in a case of bribery (e.g. The Guardian 2012). In the operationalisation of the credibility of party supply, a similar case would have reinforced Jobbik’s supply of anti-corruption policies. 6 The 2004 wave of the EES does not include Ataka and Jobbik. Therefore, the analysis only relies on 2009 data. 7 The chapter appreciates the poor political influence (or, for that matter, blackmail potential) of the populist radical right’s extra-parliamentary status or small parliamentary representation. The low category is then calibrated on national electoral thresholds (i.e. 4 per cent for Bulgaria; 5 per cent for Hungary and Slovakia), using the highest as a base. 8 Census of the Roma minority has been always problematic; variation between official data and estimates is in the order of several percentage points. Estimates of the actual percentage of the Roma population are 10 per cent in Bulgaria, 6 per cent in Hungary, and 9 per cent in Slovakia (Mizsei 2006: 1–5). 9 Amnesty International (2010: 9) cites a 2005 TÁRKI analysis, according to which “80 per cent of the Hungarian adult population thinks that the problems of the Roma would be solved if they would finally start working, and 62 per cent agrees with the statement that the criminal tendency is in the blood of Roma”. 10 An indicator of desired importance was preferred over one of expected importance, as it better served the purposes of the analysis. In principle, respondents wanting a bigger role of the EU in their lives would not oppose the process of European integration.

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6

Conclusions

Introduction Over the course of the last five chapters, this book has advanced, examined, and tested a series of propositions regarding the ideology, impact, and electoral performance of populist radical right parties in Central and Eastern Europe. This chapter ultimately brings together and reflects on the findings of this study and advances avenues for future research. Before turning to the empirical results of this analysis, it seems appropriate to summarise the principal contributions of this work. Conceptual contribution In outlining the core ideological features of this party family, this work relied on a conceptualisation recently proposed by Cas Mudde (2007). This conceptualisation proved to travel well across Europe, notwithstanding significant aspects differentiating between the same phenomenon in old and new European Union (EU) member states. Coming to the end of this book, it is possible to acknowledge that the ideological pillars of nativism, authoritarianism, and populism held up to the narrowing of the geographical scope and the time frame of analysis of this study. In their quest for homogeneity of the nation-state, these parties discriminate between an in-group (the native people) and an out-group (non-natives); call for severe punishments in the face of infringements of authority; and consider society (and politics) to be divided into two groups: the ‘good or pure people’ and the ‘bad or corrupt elite’. The populist radical right is the champion of exclusionary and authoritarian ideals and sets itself in defence of the allegedly superior common sense of the (good) native man. However, whilst Mudde’s work maintained a pan-European focus and placed emphasis on the commonalities between these parties (e.g. Mudde 2009), this study on Central and Eastern European parties has put the accent on their (inward and outward) differences. Such differences are precisely reflected in the identification of distinct out-groups, means to counter infringements of authority, and definitions of ‘bad or corrupt elites’. Populist radical right parties in Central and Eastern Europe are interpreted as political organisations that react to the transformations of 1989

Conclusions

195

and resort to historical legacies and contextual idiosyncrasies to frame their ideology. Although these parties appear more militant and anti-democratic compared to their Western European counterparts, they still remain committed to the rules of parliamentary democracy. They seek a radical change of the status quo and thus seek to redefine aspects of liberal democracy. However, they are not against the democratic system as a whole. In other words, the radical and illiberal nature of these organisations does not automatically turn them into ‘anti-system’ organisations (e.g. Sartori 1976; Capoccia 2002). In this regard, it is important to stress that the dividing line between the extreme and radical character of these organisations, as well as the sincerity of their populist message, cannot be ascertained unequivocally without putting these parties to the (governmental) test. In fact, whether these parties (internally and externally) declare a commitment to the democratic principles set by their national constitutions, it is almost impossible to determine this commitment conclusively without getting into the heads of their leaders.1 Controversy surrounding the populist radical right does not contribute to clarifying these aspects either. Similar to social movements, populist radical right parties are shunned by national media, and they often resort to unconventional tactics or sensational strategies to catalyse public attention (e.g. Pirro 2014b; della Porta 1995). Whether mere promotional strategies or not, the history of the populist radical right is constellated by systematic attempts to cross the line of political correctness; therefore, it may be difficult to disentangle the strategic and ideological portions of their acts. Be that as it may, the rhetorical excesses of the French National Front (FN) or the Austrian Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) have been no less odious and deplorable than the outbursts of the Slovak Slovenská Národná Strana (Slovak National Party, SNS) or Hungarian Jobbik, and there seems to be no substantial reason to consider the first two less radical than the latter at certain points in time. Hence, questions concerning the degree of radicalism of these parties may remain open to debate; this study has shown that a sensible way to tackle these issues rests in the analysis of the evolution of party ideology over time. Even though this enquiry has systematically refrained from the alarmist undertones of many journalistic accounts, these conceptual clarifications do (and should) not underplay the radical character of these parties. Since the specifications advanced in this work are grounded in the principles of social scientific research, it is on the same basis that the chameleonic character of these parties should be emphasised (Taggart 2000). In other words, populist radical right parties easily and swiftly adapt to context, which suggests that their ideology and strategies are liable to change. Therefore, satisfying criteria for belonging to this party family does not rule out the possibility that these parties could moderate or further radicalise over time. Moreover, part of their adaptive skills include a dynamic learning process. In other words, these parties learn from their own mistakes and those of the organisations that preceded them, and even demonstrate a certain familiarity with the scientific literature about them. Hence, their leaders and representatives have grown wary of the possible electoral and legal consequences that could negatively affect them and have calibrated their political strategies accordingly.

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Conclusions

Research advancements This book has also made a contribution as regards the research strategy employed. The enquiry has placed ideology at the core of investigation and, overall, reinstated the role of party agency in determining the parties’ own fortunes. Overall, neither the study of party families (e.g. von Beyme 1985; Ware 1996) nor the populist radical right (e.g. von Beyme 1988; Betz 1994; Kitschelt and McGann 1995; Ignazi 2000) is a new affair. Nonetheless, research into their ideology does not represent the prevailing trend in the discipline (cf. Mudde 2000, 2007); the majority of volumes and articles have focused on the conditions favouring their success (Jackman and Volpert 1996; Carter 2002; Golder 2003; Swank and Betz 2003; Arzheimer and Carter 2006) or the determinants of the vote for these parties (e.g. van der Brug et al. 2000; Givens 2005; Rydgren 2008). Through its ideological approach, the book advanced a framework for the analysis of these parties’ ideology in Central and Eastern Europe and engaged in a finegrained investigation of the issues at the core of this ideology. Party programmes, manifestos, and discourses were then systematically examined, making this study one of the first comparative efforts to tackle the ideology of populist radical right parties in contemporary Central and Eastern Europe. Moreover, this enquiry is listed amongst the very few studies successful in conducting and presenting original interviews with populist radical right party leaders. Against all odds and despite concerns regarding the ‘socially acceptable’ image delivered through interviews (Mudde 2007: 38), the party leaders were fairly outspoken in addressing contentious issues such as ethnic minorities or questions such as the involvement of party officials in corruption scandals. The data gathered often allowed the individual and comparative significance of the issues to be revealed independently, demonstrating the added value of using semi-structured interviews in the study of party ideology. The book also sought to assess the role of this party family in the political process by specifically looking at interactions with other parliamentary parties. The analysis of these issues’ dimensionality aspired to move beyond existing accounts of party impact. On the one hand, the analysis of party competition based on shifts along the left-right continuum (e.g. Carter 2005; van Spanje and van der Brug 2007) was deemed an unsatisfactory strategy for the study of party interactions in post-communist Europe. On the other hand, the analysis deliberately extended beyond the ethnic minorities policy dimension, including all relevant dimensions for the populist radical right in post-communist countries. Two criteria guided this choice: first, populist radical right parties may exert influence beyond the traditional areas of immigration (Western Europe) or ethnic minorities (Central and Eastern Europe); and, second, they may be expected to interact with their political environment in unconventional ways. The decision to carry out an exhaustive analysis of different policy dimensions demonstrated an important step towards a refined understanding of this phenomenon. Amongst other sources, the research strategy resorted to original expert surveys, which proved a crucial means to: a) validate the qualitative results of the analysis; and b) update and expand the knowledge of party interactions in these countries.

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Finally, the analysis of the electoral performance of these parties advanced an interactive analytical framework accounting for both the demand-side and the supply-side of populist radical right politics. A strategy of triangulation, relying on different methods and data, proved to be particularly helpful in this endeavour. By keeping ideological features at the heart of investigation, the assessment of the demand-side and the supply-side moved beyond simplistic juxtapositions of public attitudes and populist radical right party (ideological) supply. Above all, the analysis included often-neglected aspects, such as the public salience of issues, the credibility of party supply, and issue ownership – elements which ultimately increased confidence in the findings of this part of the study. Much work still lies ahead, though these challenges should be met positively. The analyses conducted in this book present a promising path for the study of this phenomenon. Given the substantial complexity of the populist radical right and the interaction with its context, it is important to preserve a degree of ‘pluralism’ in the research strategy, methods, and data employed. For instance, research on populist radical right party identification based on survey data analysis is often impervious. A series of problems – ranging from the novelty of some of these parties to the quasi-systematic under-representation of their voters (e.g. Hooghe and Reeskens 2007) – may frustrate the expectations of researchers in the field. Scientific inference is constantly under threat in the presence of small- to medium-sized parties, for the analyses are likely to face problems of external validity. Nonetheless, innovative and ‘methodologically unorthodox’ studies on populist radical right mobilisation (e.g. Bartlett et al. 2011, 2012) have shown that existing research paradigms can be constructively challenged and can deliver promising and insightful results. The need for original research is particularly necessary in the case of post-communist countries, since cross-national electoral studies calibrated on the Western European experience could prove to be of little use for the study of the same phenomenon in different contexts.

Ideology, impact, and electoral performance The study posed a series of questions to guide the investigation of the populist radical right phenomenon in post-communist Europe. These questions concerned the ideology, impact, and electoral performance of this party family. Similar to Western Europe, the rise of the populist radical right could be understood as a ‘nativist backlash’ in response to a sense of real or perceived uncertainty. The emergence of this party family cannot be straightforwardly linked to the adverse economic conditions faced by its countries (e.g. Tucker 2005; Polyakova 2013; Mudde 2013). Indeed, the type of reaction that they embody is primarily social and cultural. Unlike their Western counterparts, however, populist radical right parties in Central and Eastern Europe are not related to the unfolding of a post-materialist revolution. Even though these parties may use portions of their ideology (i.e. clericalism) to oppose forms of sociocultural liberalisation, their emergence cannot be attributed to the spread of libertarian values nor comes across

198

Conclusions

as a reaction to green/left-libertarian politics. The existence of a period effect in these countries is aptly exemplified by the concomitant rise of the populist radical right Jobbik and left-libertarian Lehet Más a Politika (Politics Can Be Different, LMP) in Hungary – two parties that can be effectively interpreted as responses sui generis to the problems of contemporary Hungarian politics (e.g. Bíró Nagy and Róna 2013). At the core of the populist radical right’s concerns in Central and Eastern Europe lie pre-communist issues such as irredentism and clericalism; post-communist issues such as ethnic minorities, corruption, and the EU; and, in certain instances, an economic agenda somewhat indebted to the legacy of state socialism. In their articulation, these issues rely on the historical legacies and contextual idiosyncrasies of the countries analysed. This is certainly evident for territorial claims and clerical issues (which are virtually absent from the agenda of Western European parties) and also for minority issues, corruption, and the EU. In fact, whilst anticorruption and EU-pessimism may be considered part of the populist radical right discourse across Europe, in post-communist countries these issues are specifically interpreted as problems stemming from the transformation process (e.g. Anastasakis 2002; Pirro 2014a). The analysis of the Bulgarian, Hungarian, and Slovak cases has shown that, as far as the parties’ ideology is concerned, this party family does not constitute an entirely homogeneous group. Only pre-communist and postcommunist issues could be (loosely) considered common features of the populist radical right ideology in these countries. Indeed, the SNS is primarily a ‘promarket’ political organisation, and its economic views diverge from the (at least partial return to) state ownership envisaged by Ataka and Jobbik. The way these parties exert influence is certainly complex. Unlike mainstream parties, the populist radical right’s principal purpose may be policy pursuit rather than office seeking (e.g. Williams 2006).2 By politicising or catalysing attention on certain issues, these parties aspire to exert influence at the agenda-setting, institutionshaping, and policy-making levels. Not only have these parties been able to influence public opinion, they have also extended this impact to policy competition and legislation. Out of all relevant policy dimensions, changes in the expected direction were ascertained across all countries only on minority issues; however, this relationship is neither straightforward nor monotonous. Whilst impact at the policy-making level seems to follow influence exerted on policy competition, such an impact is not proportional to the electoral performances or government participation of these parties. For instance, the fairly successful Ataka did not seem to be able to convert its endorsement of the Borisov government into support for its policy initiatives. The impact of the party has been modest at the institution-shaping level and nonexistent at the policy-making level. On the contrary, the impact of the SNS has been significant in both arenas, practically withstanding the recent (poor) electoral performance of the party at the polls. At first, the influence exerted by Jobbik on the dimension of ethnic minorities – moderate at the policy competition and policy-making levels – did not seem to complement its remarkable electoral performance. However, the fine-grained analysis of different policy dimensions revealed a significant overlapping, not only between the positions but also between the legislative activity of the mainstream Fidesz-KDNP and the policy proposals of Jobbik. Jobbik’s transformative role has

Conclusions

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challenged the Hungarian establishment in general and the homogeneity of the ‘national bloc’ in particular. In turn, this prompted a reaction from Fidesz-KDNP, which has substantially co-opted the agenda of Jobbik in the fields of indigenous ethnic minorities, national minorities abroad, clerical issues, and the economy, and has even adopted a Eurosceptic rhetoric reminiscent of the populist radical right. Jobbik and Fidesz-KDNP presently differ only on the basis of their different attitudes on corruption – a radical anti-establishment stance, that of Jobbik, still permitted by its low level of institutionalisation. On the one hand, these trends would confirm a general radicalisation of the mainstream in response to the populist radical right (Minkenberg 2013). On the other hand, they indicate that Jobbik has been the party exerting the broadest influence amongst the three cases analysed. The comprehensive analysis of the supply-side has laid the basis for the study of the electoral performances of populist radical right parties. The platforms of these parties place emphasis on different issues; however, only some of them can be deemed electorally viable. In this regard, these parties are comparatively interpreted as a postcommunist electoral phenomenon because of their continued (exclusive, or at least shared) ownership of minority issues, as well as anti-corruption and EU-pessimist positions. The analysis of the demand-side has shown the presence of a latent potential (i.e. a nativist ‘breeding ground’) that was left unexploited until the emergence (or re-emergence) of the populist radical right. The analysis of two consecutive electoral cycles indicated that populist radical right parties thrive electorally when a high demand for minority issues is matched by a corresponding supply. The high supply of an anti-corruption agenda certainly adds to the radical profile of these organisations, though it has not proven to be (by itself) a sufficient condition for the electoral success of these parties. Given the frequent cases of corruption in the area and the high salience of the issue, when populist radical right parties are found to be involved in corruption scandals, their credibility and electoral performances appear to disintegrate accordingly. At the same time, the EU has proven to be a ‘non-issue’ amongst post-communist publics; in turn, the EU-pessimism of these parties has not yet proven to be a profitable electoral strategy. In light of these insights, it is possible to read the SNS’s steady electoral decline through its (continued) inability to deliver a credible anti-corruption and thus antiestablishment supply. Moreover, with the new chairman in place, the SNS has purposely lost part of its radical aura. Whilst a portion of disenfranchised nationalist voters has turned to the moderate nativist alternative offered by Smer – Sociálna Demokracia (Direction – Social Democracy, Smer-SD), another portion is increasingly turning to the extreme right Ľudová Strana Naše Slovensko (People’s Party – Our Slovakia, ĽSNS) of Marian Kotleba to see anti-Roma and antiestablishment issues addressed. Overall, the question of credibility remains of utmost importance in the assessment of the electoral fortunes of these parties. By acting as the kingmaker of the Bulgarska Sotsialisticheska Partiya (Bulgarian Socialist Party)–Dvizhenie za Prava i Svobodi (Movement for Rights and Freedoms, BSP-DPS) government in 2013, the populist radical right Ataka has seriously undermined the credibility of its anti-Turkish profile. According to this reading, the fact that the party nearly halved its number of votes between 2013 and 2014 is hardly surprising.

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Conclusions

Equally relevant are aspects related to issue ownership and issue salience. Nativist issues may gain, maintain, or lose in importance amongst the larger public due to a variety of factors. It was observed that a high salience of these issues does not automatically convert into electoral success for the populist radical right. The radicalisation of the mainstream ascertained in the previous chapters indeed suggests that mainstream competitors are increasingly challenging the populist radical right. In this regard, Jobbik’s sustained ability to deliver a high supply of the entire range of populist radical right issues seems to offer the Hungarian party a comparative electoral advantage.

Last words Despite a long-standing interest in the populist radical right, the scholarship on this party family in Central and Eastern Europe has been, by and large, fragmentary. The number of scholarly contributions focusing on this phenomenon in postcommunist countries is significantly smaller compared to the several accounts of Western European parties. Twenty-five years after the first appearances of these parties, research on the populist radical right in Central and Eastern Europe appears to be, in different respects, still in its infancy. The organisational and electoral inconsistencies of these parties have evidently hampered the study of this phenomenon. In addition, the populist radical right in these countries did not seem to represent a reason for (international) concern until the recent eastern EU enlargements. Populist radical right parties seek to redefine the rules of the liberal-democratic game, envisioning the establishment of a populist and exclusionary variant of democracy. Moreover, the populist radical right in Central and Eastern Europe attempts to redress the alleged failures of the post-1989 transformations, substantiating its role of a ‘transformative force’ (Minkenberg 2015). Even though the parties’ transforming ability has only been partly put to the test, it has certainly had a number of detrimental effects on the liberal-democratic apparatus of their countries. First and foremost, they have contributed to politicising and mainstreaming nativist ideals, which now resonate across the political arena as much as across the larger public. However, since political dynamics are complex, populist radical right parties’ activity can result in ‘much bark and little bite’, often resting on the strategies adopted by their mainstream competitors. In this regard, the legislative course of the Orbán government has led to the questioning of its continued commitment to liberal-democratic values. Hence, it is surprising to note that the illiberal outputs of mainstream parties do not cause as much alarmism (or, for that matter, attention) as the activities of the populist radical right (Pirro 2014b). The populist radical right in Central and Eastern Europe has directly or indirectly contributed to the erosion of liberal-democratic values and recent ‘illiberal turns’. Even though populist radical right parties have not enjoyed sufficient electoral support to systematically subvert the rules of the game, they are nonetheless redefining the process of transformation through their unorthodox practices. Therefore, the study of these parties should pay equal attention to both the immediate and eventual consequences of their activities without underestimating the risks of democratic

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backsliding attached to them. The transformative power of these parties represents one of the most complex aspects surrounding this party family in post-communist countries. It is, however, only through the analysis of demand-side and supply-side factors, as well as their interaction, that this transformative force can be better understood, and this book has hopefully taken a step forward in this direction.

Notes 1 Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2012: 9) have put forward the same argument regarding the genuine or strategic nature of populist messages. 2 Even though the ultimate purpose of their political activity cannot be answered conclusively, this view was also confirmed by Márton Gyöngyösi (Jobbik) during the personal interview held on 23 January 2013.

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Transformation? The East European Radical Right in the Political Process. London: Routledge, pp. 27–56. Mudde, C. (2000) The Ideology of the Extreme Right. Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press. Mudde, C. (2007) Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Mudde, C. (2009) ‘Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe Redux’. Political Studies Review, 7 (3): 330–7. Mudde, C. (2013) ‘A European Shutdown? The 2014 European Elections and the Great Recession’. The Washington Post, 4 November. Available from: www.washingtonpost. com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2013/11/04/a-european-shutdown-the-2014-europeanelections-and-the-great-recession [Accessed 13 November 2013]. Mudde, C., and C. Rovira Kaltwasser (2012) ‘Populism and (Liberal) Democracy: A Framework for Analysis’, in C. Mudde and C. Rovira Kaltwasser (eds.) Populism in Europe and the Americas: Threat or Corrective for Democracy? Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, pp. 1–26. Pirro, A.L.P. (2014a) ‘Digging into the Breeding Ground: Insights into the Electoral Performance of Populist Radical Right Parties in Central and Eastern Europe’. East European Politics, 30 (2): 246–70. Pirro, A.L.P. (2014b) ‘There’s No Such Thing as Bad Publicity: Jobbik Leader’s Visit to London’. Political Insight. Available from: www.psa.ac.uk/insight-plus/blog/there’s-nosuch-thing-bad-publicity-jobbik-leader’s-visit-london [Accessed 14 December 2014]. Polyakova, A. (2013) ‘Let’s Stop Blaming the Economy: Radical Right Parties in Central Eastern Europe’. Eurozine. Available from: www.eurozine.com/articles/2013–01–30polyakova-en.html [Accessed 26 February 2014]. Rydgren, J. (2008) ‘Immigration Sceptics, Xenophobes or Racists? Radical Right-Wing Voting in Six West European Countries’. European Journal of Political Research, 47 (6): 737–65. Sartori, G. (1976) Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Swank, D., and H. G. Betz (2003) ‘Globalization, the Welfare State and Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe’. Socio-Economic Review, 1 (2): 215–45. Taggart, P. (2000) Populism. Buckingham, UK: Open University Press. Tucker, J. (2005) ‘Red, Brown, and Regional Economic Voting: Russia, Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic from 1990–99’. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, 7–10 April. Chicago. van der Brug, W., M. Fennema, and J. N. Tillie (2000) ‘Anti-Immigrant Parties in Europe: Ideological or Protest Vote?’ European Journal of Political Research, 37 (1): 77–102. van Spanje, J., and W. van der Brug (2007) ‘The Party as Pariah: The Exclusion of AntiImmigration Parties and Its Effect on Their Ideological Positions’. West European Politics, 30 (5): 1022–40. von Beyme, K. (1985) Political Parties in Western Democracies. Aldershot, UK: Gower. von Beyme, K. (ed.) (1988) Right-Wing Extremism in Western Europe. London: Frank Cass. Ware, A. (1996) Political Parties and Party Systems. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. Williams, M. H. (2006) The Impact of Radical Right-Wing Parties in West European Democracies. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Appendix A List of consulted country experts

Bulgaria Kiril Avramov Cristina Chiva Blagovesta Cholova Genoveva Petrova Lyubka Savkova Markéta Smrčková Aneta Spendzharova Boyka Stefanova Dragomir Stoyanov

Hungary Agnes Batory András Bozóki Zsolt Enyedi László Karsai Gregor Mayer Bartek Pytlas Dániel Róna Eszter Simon Nick Sitter Réka Várnagy

Slovakia Lenka Bustikova Kevin Deegan-Krause Oľga Gyárfášová Tim Haughton Karen Henderson Lubomír Kopeček Darina Malová Miroslav Mareš Josef Smolík Peter Spáč

Appendix B Country expert questionnaire

We would like you to reflect on the position of the leadership of national parties in [COUNTRY] in 2012. The leadership of a political party consists of the party’s chair, the party presidium, and the parliamentary party (as distinct from the party base or local and regional party officials).

Economic issues 1.

Parties can be classified in terms of their stance on economic issues. Parties on the economic left want government to play an active role in the economy. Parties on the economic right emphasise a reduced economic role for government: privatisation, lower taxes, less regulation, less government spending, and a leaner welfare state.

Table B.1 Position on economic issues Party

Extreme left 0

1

2

3

4

Centre 5

6

7

8

9

Extreme right 10

Don’t know

Party A Party B ...

European integration 2a. How would you describe the general position on European integration that the party leadership took in 2012? Table B.2 Position on European integration Party Party A Party B ...

Strongly Opposed Somewhat Neutral Somewhat In favour Strongly Don’t opposed opposed in favour in favour know

Country expert questionnaire 205 2b. Next, we would like you to think about the salience of European integration for a party. In 2012, how important was the European Union (EU) to the parties in their public stance? Table B.3 Salience of European integration Party

No importance

Little importance

Some importance

Great importance

Don’t know

Party A Party B ...

Policy dimensions Next, we would like you to consider where political parties stood on the following policy dimensions in [COUNTRY] in 2012. On each dimension, we ask you to assess the position of the party leadership and then assess the importance/salience of this dimension for a party’s public stance. 3a. Position on role of religious principles in politics. Table B.4 Position on religious principles Party

Strongly opposes religious principles in politics 0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

Strongly supports religious principles in politics 10

9

Don’t know

Party A Party B ...

3b. Importance/salience of religious principles in politics for each of the following parties. Table B.5 Salience of religious principles Party

Party A Party B ...

Not important at all 0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Extremely important 10

Don’t know

206 Appendix B 4a. Parties can be classified in terms of their stance on corruption. At one end of the spectrum (1), parties strongly oppose additional anticorruption measures. At the other end of the spectrum (7), parties strongly favour additional anti-corruption measures in the country.

Table B.6 Position on additional anti-corruption measures Party

Strongly Opposed Somewhat Neutral Somewhat In Strongly Don’t opposed opposed in favour favour in favour know

Party A Party B ...

4b. How important was anti-corruption to the parties in their public stance?

Table B.7 Salience of additional anti-corruption measures Party

No importance

Little importance

Some importance

Great importance

Don’t know

Party A Party B ...

5a. Position towards ethnic minorities.

Table B.8 Position on ethnic minorities Party

Strongly opposes more rights for ethnic minorities 0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Strongly supports more rights for ethnic minorities 10

Don’t know

Party A Party B ...

5b. Importance/salience of ethnic minorities for each of the following parties.

Country expert questionnaire 207 Table B.9 Salience of ethnic minorities Party

Not important at all 0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Extremely important 10

Don’t know

Party A Party B ...

6a. Cultural and territorial rights for national minorities living abroad. In states which have been subject to territorial redefinition and/or territorial disputes, parties may have different positions on cultural and territorial rights for ethnic nationals living abroad, defined as the right to reconstruct the cultural community of the nation outside the borders and/ or formally revise territorial borders. At one end of the spectrum (0), parties are strongly against granting cultural and territorial rights to national minorities living abroad. At the other end of the spectrum (10), parties are strongly in favour of granting cultural and territorial rights to national minorities living abroad. Table B.10 Position on national minorities abroad Party

Strongly against 0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Strongly in favour 10

No position

Don’t know

Party A Party B ...

6b. Importance/salience of issues concerning national minorities living abroad for each of the following parties. Table B.11 Salience of national minorities abroad Party

Party A Party B ...

Not important at all 0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Extremely important 10

Don’t know

Appendix C Expert surveys’ scores

Note: The scores of the SNS are not included in the average calculations for the year 2012. Sources: Chapel Hill expert survey 2006 (Hooghe et al. 2010); Chapel Hill expert survey 2010 (Bakker et al. 2012); own data for the year 2012.

Ethnic minorities Party positions range from ‘strongly opposes more rights for ethnic minorities’ (0) to ‘strongly supports more rights for ethnic minorities’ (10). Issue salience (in parentheses) ranges from ‘not important at all’ (0) to ‘extremely important’ (10). Bulgaria Table C.1 Ethnic minorities: position and salience Party

2006

NDSV ODS/SDS DSB KB/BSP DPS BNS Ataka GERB RZS

5.25 5.33 4.75 5.33 7.92 5 1.83 – –

N Average

5.06

2010 (5) (5.45) (5.91) (5.73) (8.36) (5.11) (6.9) – –

– 6.27 5.3 4.82 8.82 – 0.45 4.36 3.2

(6.07)

4.74

12

2012 – (5.6) (6) (5.8) (9.82) – (9.45) (5.3) (6.67)

– 5.5 4.87 5.5 8.75 – 0.37 4.12 2.57

(6.95)

4.52

11

– (4.75) (4.37) (4.37) (9.78) – (7.67) (5.14) (4.75) 9 (5.83)

Expert surveys’ scores

209

Hungary Table C.2 Ethnic minorities: position and salience Party

2006

Fidesz-KDNP MDF SZDSZ MSZP Jobbik LMP

4.9 5 5.2 5.8 – –

N Average

5.22

2010 (4) (4) (6) (4.33) – –

4.06 – – 6.44 1 7.94

(4.58)

4.86

5

2012 (4.91) – – (4.5) (7.75) (5.56)

3.93 – – 5.55 1.11 8.37

(5.68)

4.74

16

(4.35) – – (3.1) (8.5) (5.7) 10 (5.41)

Slovakia Table C.3 Ethnic minorities: position and salience Party

2006

ĽS-HZDS KDH SDKÚ-DS Smer-SD SNS SMK-MKP Most-Híd SaS OĽaNO

3.58 4 5.25 4.33 0.17 9.58 – – –

N Average

4.48

2010 (6.73) (5.91) (3.67) (4.36) (9.73) (9.73) – – –

– 3.71 5 3.08 0.07 – 8.86 5.69 –

(6.69)

4.40

12

2012 – (5.86) (4.5) (5.14) (9.71) – (9) (3.5) –

– 3.7 4.88 3.5 1* – 8.66 5.37 4.44

(6.28)

5.09

14

– (3.9) (4.2) (4) (9.56)* – (9.3) (4) (4.67) 10 (5.01)

*The scores of the SNS are not included in the average calculations for the year 2012.

National minorities abroad (Hungary only) Party positions range from ‘strongly against granting cultural and territorial rights to national minorities living abroad’ (0) to ‘strongly in favour of granting cultural and territorial rights to national minorities living abroad’ (10). Issue salience (in parentheses) ranges from ‘not important at all’ (0) to ‘extremely important’ (10). Table C.4 National minorities abroad: position and salience Party

2012

Fidesz-KDNP MSZP Jobbik LMP

9.3 4.4 9.8 5

N Average

7.12

(8.25) (3.7) (9.4) (3.9) 10 (6.31)

210 Appendix C

Economic issues Party positions on economic issues range from ‘extreme left’ (0) to ‘extreme right’ (10). Bulgaria Table C.5 Economic issues: position Party

2006

2010

2012

NDSV ODS/SDS DSB KB/BSP DPS BNS Ataka GERB RZS

6.5 7.5 7.83 3.25 4 6 3.25 – –

– 7.45 8.18 2.54 3.18 – 2.9 6.27 4.17

– 7.33 7.67 2.56 4.33 – 2.56 5.22 6.5

N Average

12 5.48

11 4.96

9 5.18

Hungary Table C.6 Economic issues: position Party

2006

2010

2012

Fidesz-KDNP MDF SZDSZ MSZP Jobbik LMP

2.58 5.4 8.83 6.5 – –

3.23 – – 4.18 3.12 3.69

3.83 – – 4.7 3 3.8

N Average

5 5.83

16 3.55

10 3.83

Slovakia Table C.7 Economic issues: position Party

2006

2010

2012

ĽS-HZDS KDH SDKÚ-DS Smer-SD SNS SMK-MKP Most-Híd SaS OĽaNO

5.46 6.79 8.29 2.36 5 6 – – –

– 6.29 7.57 2.23 4.27 – 6.29 8.36 –

– 6.2 7.4 2.8 5.22* – 5.6 7.7 5.75

N Average

12 5.65

14 5.83

10 5.91

*The scores of the SNS are not included in the average calculations for the year 2012.

Expert surveys’ scores

211

Corruption Party positions range from ‘strongly oppose additional anti-corruption measures’ (1) to ‘strongly favour additional anti-corruption measures’ (7). Issue salience (in parentheses) ranges from ‘no importance’ (1) to ‘great importance’ (4). Bulgaria Table C.8 Anti-corruption: position and salience Party

2012

ODS/SDS DSB KB/BSP DPS Ataka GERB RZS

5.44 5.22 4.78 4.56 6.22 5.33 5.37

N Average

5.27

(3.22) (3.44) (2.89) (2.33) (3.89) (3.67) (3.75) 9 (3.31)

Hungary Table C.9 Anti-corruption: position and salience Party

2012

Fidesz-KDNP MSZP Jobbik LMP

4.1 4.4 5.4 5.22

N Average

4.78

(2.75) (2.8) (3.89) (3.9) 10 (3.33)

Slovakia Table C.10 Anti-corruption: position and salience Party

2012

KDH SDKÚ-DS Smer-SD SNS Most-Híd SaS OĽaNO

5.56 5.22 4.56 3.67* 5.22 6.22 6.56

N Average

5.56

(2.9) (3.1) (2.9) (2)* (2.8) (3.4) (3.8) 10 (3.15)

*The scores of the SNS are not included in the average calculations for the year 2012.

212 Appendix C

The European Union Party positions on European integration range from ‘strongly opposed’ (0) to ‘strongly in favour’ (7). Issue salience (in parentheses) ranges from ‘no importance’ (1) to ‘great importance’ (4). Bulgaria Table C.11 European integration: position and salience Party

2006

NDSV ODS/SDS DSB KB/BSP DPS BNS Ataka GERB RZS

6.69 6.69 6.38 6.46 6.33 6 2.46 – –

N Average

5.86

2010 (3.92) (3.75) (3.58) (3.75) (3.58) (3.18) (2.64) – –

– 6.73 6.45 6 5.82 – 2.5 6.73 4.22

(3.49)

5.49

12

2012 – (3.6) (3.36) (2.82) (2.54) – (2.45) (3.73) (2.1)

– 6.11 6.11 6.44 6 – 1.67 6.11 4.5

(2.94)

5.27

11

– (3.44) (3.22) (3.78) (3.22) – (2.78) (3.78) (2) 9 (3.17)

Hungary Table C.12 European integration: position and salience Party

2006

Fidesz-KDNP MDF SZDSZ MSZP Jobbik LMP

5 6.6 7 6.83 – –

N Average

6.36

2010 (2.9) (2.8) (3.2) (2.8) – –

5.11 – – 6.65 2.35 6.47

(2.92)

5.15

5

2012 (2.75) – – (3.41) (2.71) (3.31)

3.45 – – 6.9 1.2 5.5

(3.04)

4.26

16

(2.81) – – (3) (3.2) (2.8) 10 (2.95)

Expert surveys’ scores

213

Slovakia Table C.13 European integration: position and salience Party

2006

ĽS-HZDS KDH SDKÚ-DS Smer-SD SNS SMK-MKP Most-Híd SaS OĽaNO

5.23 3.86 6.07 4.79 3.23 6.36 – – –

N Average

4.92

2010 (2.79) (2.86) (3.36) (2.57) (2.14) (3.21) – – –

– 4.53 5.2 5.87 3.08 – 5.87 4.53 –

(2.82)

4.85

12

2012 – (2.93) (3.4) (3) (2.2) – (3.07) (2.67) –

– 4.7 5.9 5.5 2.8* – 5.7 3.4 4.29

(2.88)

4.91

14

– (3.2) (3.3) (2.5) (3)* – (2.9) (3.6) (2.56) 10 (3.01)

*The scores of the SNS are not included in the average calculations for the year 2012.

Clerical issues Party positions range from ‘strongly opposes religious principles in politics’ (0) to ‘strongly supports religious principles in politics’ (10). Issue salience (in parentheses) ranges from ‘not important at all’ (0) to ‘extremely important’ (10). Hungary Table C.14 Religious principles: position and salience Party

2006

Fidesz-KDNP MDF SZDSZ MSZP Jobbik LMP

7.9 5.5 .8 2.6 – –

N Average

4.2

2010

(7.5) (5.25) (6.75) (5) – –

8.69 – – 1.75 8.44 1.4

(6.12)

5.07

5

2012 (8.3) – – (3.73) (7.5) (3.8)

8.9 – – 2.5 7.9 1.3

(5.83)

5.15

16

(8.1) – – (1.9) (6.4) (2.2) 10 (4.65)

214 Appendix C Slovakia Table C.15 Religious principles: position and salience Party

2006

ĽS-HZDS KDH SDKÚ-DS Smer-SD SNS SMK-MKP Most-Híd SaS OĽaNO

5.58 9.25 4.75 2.5 6.92 5.58 – – –

N Average

5.76

2010 (4.73) (9.45) (3.55) (3.64) (5.2) (4.73) – – –

– 9 6.07 3.5 6.43 – 5.57 2.07 –

(5.22)

5.44

12

2012 – (8.93) (5.36) (3.93) (5.57) – (5.31) (5.29) –

– 8.6 5.2 4.2 7.22* – 5.89 2.8 4.87

(5.73)

5.26

14

– (8.6) (4.7) (3) (5.8)* – (4.4) (3.5) (5) 10 (4.87)

*The scores of the SNS are not included in the average calculations for the year 2012.

References Bakker, R., C. de Vries, E. Edwards, L. Hooghe, S. Jolly, G. Marks, J. Polk, J. Rovny, M. Steenbergen, and M. Vachudova (2012) ‘Measuring Party Positions in Europe: The Chapel Hill Expert Survey Trend File, 1999–2010’. Party Politics. Advance online publication, 29 November. doi: 10.1177/1354068812462931 Hooghe, L., R. Bakker, A. Brigevich, C. E. de Vries, E. Edwards, G. Marks, J. Rovny, and M. Steenbergen (2010) ‘Reliability and Validity of Measuring Party Positions: The Chapel Hill Expert Surveys of 2002 and 2006’. European Journal of Political Research, 49 (5): 684–703.

Appendix D List of survey questions

Demand-side: public attitudes Ethnic minorities 2005–6 Candidate Countries Eurobarometer (CCEB) 2003.2 • • • • • •

Q.64.1 “It is a good thing for any society to be made up of people from different races, religions, and cultures.” Q.64.3 “[COUNTRY]’s diversity in terms of race, religion, and culture adds to its strengths.” Q.64.5a “In order to be fully accepted members of [NATIONALITY] society, people belonging to these minority groups must give up such parts of their religion or culture which may be in conflict with [NATIONALITY] law.” Q.64.7 “There is a limit to how many people of other races, religions, or cultures a society can accept.” Q.64.8 “[OUR COUNTRY] has reached its limits; if there were to be more people belonging to these minority groups we would have problems.” Q.64.11 “People belonging to these minority groups are so different, they can never be fully accepted members of [NATIONALITY] society.”

2009–10 Eurobarometer 65.4 •

Q.A4.1 “People of different ethnic origin than the rest of the population living in [OUR COUNTRY] enrich the [NATIONALITY] culture.”

Eurobarometer 69.1 •

Q.A6.1 “For each of the following situations, please tell me using this scale from 1 to 10 how you would personally feel about it. On this scale, ‘1’ means that you would be ‘very uncomfortable’ and ‘10’ means that you would be ‘totally comfortable’ with this situation: having a Roma as a neighbour.”

216 Appendix D Eurobarometer 71.3 •

Q.H1.1 “For each of the following statements, please tell me whether you tend to agree or tend to disagree: The presence of people from other ethnic groups is a cause of insecurity.”

Pew Research Center (PRC) (2009) •

Q.22 “I’d like you to rate some different groups of people in [SURVEY COUNTRY] according to how you feel about them. Please tell me whether your opinion is very favourable, mostly favourable, mostly unfavourable, or very unfavourable.”

Corruption 2005–6 CCEB 2003.3 •

Q.21.7 “How much concern do you feel about each of the following problems? Corruption”

2009–10 Eurobarometer 72.2 •

Q.B1.1 “For each of the following statements, could you please tell me whether you totally agree, tend to agree, tend to disagree, or totally disagree: corruption is a major problem in [OUR COUNTRY].”

The European Union 2005–6 CCEB 2004.1 •

Q.8 “Generally speaking, do you think that [COUNTRY]’s membership in the European Union will be . . . ?”

European Social Survey (ESS) (Round 2) •

Q.B9 “Using this card, please tell me on a score of 0–10 how much you personally trust each of the institutions I read out. 0 means you do not trust an institution at all, and 10 means you have complete trust. The European Parliament”

List of survey questions 217

2009–10 PRC (2009) • •

Q.8 “Generally speaking, do you think our country’s membership in the European Union is a good thing, a bad thing, or neither good nor bad?” Q.10 “In the long run, do you think that [SURVEY COUNTRY’S] overall economy has been strengthened or weakened by the economic integration of Europe?”

ESS (Round 4) •

Q.B9 “Using this card, please tell me on a score of 0–10 how much you personally trust each of the institutions I read out. 0 means you do not trust an institution at all, and 10 means you have complete trust. The European Parliament”

Demand-side: salience The European Union 2005–6 CCEB 2003.2 •

Q35.b “And in five years’ time, would you like the European Union to play a more important, a less important, or the same role in your daily life?”

2009–10 European Election Studies (EES) (2009 voter survey) • • •

Q1 “What do you think is the most important problem facing [COUNTRY] today?” Q2 “And what do you think is the second most important problem facing [COUNTRY] today?” Q3 “And what do you think is the third most important problem facing [COUNTRY] today?”

Supply-side: issue ownership Corruption EES (2009 voter survey) • •

Q1 “What do you think is the most important problem facing [COUNTRY] today?” Q4 “Which political party do you think would be best at dealing with [answer in Q1; only ‘corruption’ and ‘corruption’ answers were considered]?”

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Index

abortion 71–2 agenda-setting 119–20, 198; see also impact Akkerman, Tjitske 15–6, 120, 122 Alliance of European National Movements (AENM) 85 Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ) 77, 130, 140–1, 149, 153 anti-communism 42–3, 68, 77, 81–2, 105, 180 anti-establishment 6, 40, 65, 69–71, 81–2, 103–4, 107, 127, 142–3, 158, 180, 189, 199 ‘anti-establishment reform’ parties 137, 157 anti-globalism 68, 71, 75–8, 83, 99, 183 anti-minorities see ethnic minorities anti-Semitism 43, 86, 129, 177 anti-Zionism 43, 71, 85–6, 102 Arrow Cross Party 39, 67 authoritarianism 4–5, 44–5 Bajnai, Gordon 140 Balatonőszöd speech 69 Bale, Tim 3, 6, 120 Barroso, José Manuel 84 Betz, Hans-Georg 3, 6, 15, 17, 35, 41, 196 Bobbio, Norberto 9, 42 Borisov, Boyko 59, 128–9, 136–8, 148, 198 Brussels 67, 77 Bulgarian Communist Party (BKP) 57 Bulgarian National Movement (VMRO) 60 Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) 57, 59, 61, 127–8, 137–8, 147, 158, 186, 199 Bustikova, Lenka 12, 39, 41, 43, 102, 105, 129, 146, 172 Carter, Elisabeth 13, 16, 43, 121, 123, 125, 150, 168, 171, 173 Christian Democratic Movement (KDH) 134, 144–5, 151–2, 154–5

Christian Democratic People’s Party (KDNP) 131, 154; see also Fidesz Christianity 40, 58, 154; see also clericalism Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria (GERB) 59–60, 127–8, 137–9, 147–8, 156, 158, 178, 184, 186–7, 189 Citizenship Act (Slovakia) 135 clericalism 39–40, 44–5, 101–2, 105, 152–5; Ataka 61; Jobbik 71–3; SNS 89–91 Coalition for Bulgaria (KB) 128; see also Bulgarian Socialist Party Collier, David 6, 17 communist issues 41–2 content analysis 19–20, 55, 173 co-optation 121, 126, 128, 141, 146, 156–7, 186, 188, 199 corruption 43–5, 103–7, 135–7, 139–40, 142–3, 144–5, 169, 178–82; Ataka 65–6; Jobbik 81–2; SNS 96–8 credibility 17, 22, 168–9, 171, 173, 180–2, 188–9, 199 Csurka, István 67–8, 78, 130 Danko, Andrej 55, 88–94, 96–8, 100–1, 106 declension 2, 7, 9, 44, 47 de Lange, Sarah L. 14–6, 35, 120, 122 demand-side 11, 14–17, 21–2, 168–73, 179, 181, 185, 188–9 Democrats for a Strong Bulgaria (DSB) 127–9, 137–9, 147 dimensionality 15–16, 123–5, 158, 196 Downs, Anthony 121–3 Downs, William M. 16, 121 dual citizenship 74–5, 92–3, 128; see also Citizenship Act, Hungarian Citizenship Law Dzurinda, Mikuláš 143, 150

220

Index

economy see social-national economics ethnic minorities 15, 21–2, 42, 44–5, 104–7, 122, 126–35, 157–8, 174–8; Ataka 63–5; Jobbik 78–80; SNS 95–6 EU-pessimism 56, 105; Euroscepticism 56, 183; Eurorejection 56; see also European Union Euro-Atlantic influence 77 European Alliance for Freedom (EAF) 85 European Commission 139, 147, 150 European crisis 76, 84, 94, 99–101, 136–7, 140, 146, 149–51, 189 European elections see European Parliament European Parliament 1, 36, 59–60, 68–70, 83, 85, 87–8, 172, 182–3 European People’s Party (EPP) 148 European Union 44–6, 56, 104–6, 145–52, 182–5, 187–8; Ataka 66–7; Jobbik 83–6; SNS 98–101 Eurozone crisis see European crisis expert surveys 20–2, 124–7, 130, 132, 134, 138–9, 141–2, 144–5, 147, 149, 151, 153, 155, 186–7, 196; Chapel Hill 20–1, 125–6, 173, 184 extreme right 3, 8 family 71, 73, 154–5 Fico, Robert 87, 93, 100, 133, 135, 143–4, 150, 152 Fidesz 68–70, 77, 82–3, 118, 126, 130–3, 140–3, 148–50, 153–4, 156–9, 186–7, 189, 198–9 Freedom and Solidarity (SaS) 133–4, 144–5, 151–2, 155, 158 Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) 89, 97–8, 195 Front National (FN) 85, 195 Fundamental Law (Hungary) 154; amendment 83–4, 154 generation effect 10, 34 globalisation see anti-globalism ‘Gorilla Scandal’ 97, 99 Greater Hungary 73, 92, 126, 131; see also Treaty of Trianon Great Recession see European crisis Gyöngyösi, Márton 55, 70–5, 77–8, 80, 82, 84–5 Gyurcsány, Ferenc 69, 140 Hanley, Seán 43, 137 historical legacies 2, 9–12, 38–9, 46–7; see also pre-communist issues

Hungarian Citizenship Law 74–5, 133, 135 Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF) 68, 77, 130, 140–1, 149, 153 Hungarian Justice and Life Party (MIÉP) 41, 67–70, 73, 78–9, 83, 104, 126, 130, 152, 177; MIÉP-Jobbik – The Third Way 68–70, 174, 177 Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) 68–70, 76–7, 82, 105, 130–3, 140–3, 149, 152–3 ideology: analytical tool 13–14, 20; ideological approach 13, 123, 169, 196; minimum and maximum combination 20, 101, 105–7 Ignazi, Piero 1, 5, 8–9, 14, 35, 124 immigration 8, 15, 18, 42, 79–80, 85–6, 91, 100, 177, 196 impact 16, 20–1, 117–24, 156–9, 198–9 Inglehart, Ronald 14, 33, 35 institution-shaping 20–1, 119–21, 156–9, 198; see also impact, interaction interaction 15–16, 21, 121–4, 129, 156–9, 167, 169, 196–7 International Monetary Fund (IMF) 63, 68, 77, 83, 140–1, 148 interviews 19, 54–5, 71, 89, 96, 196 irredentism 39–41, 44–5, 102, 104–7, 126; irredentism ex negativo 41, 45; Ataka 61–2; Jobbik 73–5, 132–3; SNS 91–3 Islam 85–6, 90–1, 102, 128 issue ownership 17, 103, 120, 122, 153–4, 156–8, 168–9, 171, 173–4, 184, 186–9, 199–200 Kitschelt, Herbert 8–9, 12, 16, 18, 37, 39, 41, 54, 121–4, 156 Kopecký, Petr 56, 83, 99, 182–3 Kostov, Ivan 61, 63, 66, 129 Kotleba, Marian 86, 199 Kovács, Béla 85 Kovács, Dávid 69 Kozloduy nuclear power plant 66–7, 127–8, 183 Laver, Michael 20, 121–2, 125 Linz, Juan J. 4, 33 Lucardie, Paul 3–4, 122–3 lustration 43, 81–2 Magyar Gárda (Hungarian Guard) 69, 79, 117; see also militia Mair, Peter 7, 20, 124–5 Malíková, Anna 87

Index marriage see family Mečiar, Vladimír 87, 133–4, 143, 150 Meguid, Bonnie M. 16, 120–1, 171, 184 Mesežnikov, Grigorij 86–7, 133–4, 136, 145, 170, 186 militia 65, 103 Minkenberg, Michael 2–5, 8–10, 16, 33, 35, 38, 117–20, 123–4, 171, 184, 199–200 Most-Híd (Bridge) 131, 133–4, 144–5, 151, 155, 177–8 Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik): history 68–71; electoral performance 12, 70, 174, 179, 181, 185, 188–9; documents 71 Movements for Rights and Freedoms (DPS) 58–9, 61–2, 64, 127–9, 137–40, 147, 152, 158, 175, 177, 186, 199 Mudde, Cas 1–8, 13–15, 19–20, 41–5, 54–6, 85, 117, 122–4, 146, 169, 188, 194, 196–7 multiculturalism 90, 156–7, 172 multivalence 81–2, 104–5, 126 National Front for the Salvation of Bulgaria (NFSB) 60 National Movement Simeon II/ National Movement for Stability and Progress (NDSV) 126–7, 137–8, 147, 184, 186–7 nativism 4, 44–5 neoliberalism 41, 60–1, 66, 77, 94 Olaszliszka assassination 78–9, 176–7 opposition (strategy) 121 Orbán, Viktor 92–3, 100, 130, 133, 141–2, 149–50, 200 Order Law Justice (RZS) 127–8, 138–9, 147 Ordinary People and Independent Personalities (OĽaNO) 133–4, 144–5, 151 organisation 2–3, 55 party agency 17, 168, 171, 188, 196 party competition 15–16, 196 Party of European Socialists (PES) 150 Party of the Hungarian Coalition (SMKMKP) 91, 95, 131, 133–5, 144, 151, 155, 176–8 Patriotic Front (PF) 60 People’s Party – Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (ĽS-HZDS) 87, 133–4, 143–4, 150–1, 155 People’s Party – Our Slovakia (ĽSNS) 86, 199 period effect 10, 198

221

policy competition 15–16, 20–1, 121–3, 125, 156, 171, 173, 184–9, 198 policy-making 16, 21, 119, 128, 131, 133, 156–9, 198; see also impact Political Party Attack (Ataka): history 58–61; electoral performance 12, 60, 174, 179, 181, 185, 188–9; programmatic documents 60–1 Politics Can Be Different (LMP) 130–3, 141–2, 149, 152–3, 198 Pop-Eleches, Grigore 7, 9, 12, 43, 124, 174 populism 4–8, 44–6 populist radical right (definition) 2, 4; in Central and Eastern Europe 47 post-communist issues 39–40, 42–4 post-materialism 8–9, 35–6 pre-communist issues 39–41 radical right 3 Radičová, Iveta 99, 101, 152 Ramet, Sabrina P. 3–4, 39–40, 145 Real Slovak National Party (PSNS) 87 responsiveness 17, 168, 184 ‘return of history’ 10, 38 ‘return to Europe’ 10, 38, 42, 44 Revival Process 42, 57 right 7 Roma 42, 57–8, 64–5, 69–71, 78–80, 86–7, 91, 93, 95–6, 102–3, 126–7, 129, 131, 133, 157, 175–8 Rovira Kaltwasser, Cristóbal 6, 8 Russia 76 Rydgren, Jens 119–20, 196 Sartori, Giovanni 3–7, 107, 146, 195 Schain, Martin 120 self-definition (party) 7 Siderov, Volen 54, 58–67, 127–9, 137, 177 silent counter-revolution 8–9, 14, 35–6 silent revolution see post-materialism sincerity 7–8, 195 SKAT TV 58 Slota, Ján 87–9, 95–7, 104, 106–7, 178 Slovak Community (SP) 86 Slovak Democratic and Christian Union – Democratic Party (SDKÚ-DS) 97, 99, 134, 143–5, 151, 155 Slovak Language Law 87, 95, 134 Slovak National Party (SNS): history 86–9; electoral performance 12, 88, 174, 179, 181, 185, 188–9; programmatic documents 88–9 Smer-SD 87, 97, 124, 133–6, 143–5, 150–2, 155, 157–8, 186–9, 199

222

Index

Smilov, Daniel 44, 126–7 social-national economics 41–2, 44–6, 102–6, 135–9, 140–2, 143–4; Ataka 62–3; Jobbik 75–8; SNS 93–4 sovereignty 45, 56, 66–7, 83–4, 92, 99, 104, 178, 183 Stanishev, Sergei 147 state ownership 78, 104, 198 supply-side 11, 13, 15–17, 20–2, 167–74, 179, 181, 185, 188–9 Taggart, Paul 4, 6, 9, 33, 43, 45–6, 146, 169, 195 third-generation elections 12–3, 104, 174 trade 76, 141–2 transition 10, 36–8, 43, 46–7, 76–7, 82, 168 ‘transition losers’ 41, 102 triangulation 17, 21, 197 Trianon, Treaty of 68, 73–5, 92–3, 133

Union of Democratic Forces (SDS) 58, 127–8, 137–9, 147 United Democratic Forces (ODS) see Union of Democratic Forces (SDS) Vachudova, Milada A. 43, 44, 145, 147, 150 valence issue 136, 169, 173–4 van der Brug, Wouter 196 van Kessel, Stijn 6, 13, 17, 84, 139, 146, 189 van Spanje, Joost 16, 118, 120–1, 124 ‘Velvet Divorce’ 86, 95 Vona, Gábor 69, 75, 102 von Beyme, Klaus 1–2, 4, 6, 15, 18, 33, 37 Washington 77, 82 Williams, Christopher 9–10, 37 Williams, Michelle H. 15, 20, 118–20, 122–3, 171, 198 World Bank 63, 68, 77, 83