The Populist Challenge: Political Protest and Ethno-Nationalist Mobilization in France 9781782381808

Table of contents :
CONTENTS
ILLUSTRATIONS
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
ABBREVIATIONS
INTRODUCTION The Rise of Extreme Right-Wing Populism
Chapter 1 POLITICS AND POLITICAL BEHAVIOR A Theoretical Framework
Chapter 2 FRONT NATIONAL VOTERS Social Base and Attitudes
Chapter 3 THE FRONT NATIONAL Authoritarian and Socio-cultural Right?
Chapter 4 NATIONALISM AND NATIONAL IDENTITY
Chapter 5 XENOPHOBIA AND ANTI-IMMIGRATION RHETORIC
Chapter 6 POPULISM AND THE POWER OF THE ANTI-ESTABLISHMENT STRATEGY
CONCLUSION
REFERENCES
INDEX

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THE POPULIST CHALLENGE

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BERGHAHN MONOGRAPHS IN FRENCH STUDIES The Populist Challenge: Political Protest and Ethno-Nationalist Mobilization in France Jens Rydgren French Intellectuals Against The Left: The Antitotalitarian Moment of the 1970s Michael Scott Christofferson Sartre against Stalinism Ian H. Birchall Sartre, Self-Formation and Masculinities Jean-Pierre Boulé

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THE POPULIST CHALLENGE Political Protest and Ethno-nationalist Mobilization in France

 Jens Rydgren

h B Books Berghahn NEW YORK • OXFORD

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First published in hardback in 2004 by Berghahn Books www.berghahnbooks.com First paperback edition published in 2004 © 2004 Jens Rydgren All rights reserved. Except for the quotation of short passages for the purposes of criticism and review, no part of this book may be reproduced in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system now known or to be invented, without written permission of the publisher. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Rydgren, Jens. The populist challenge : political protest and ethno-nationalist mobilization in France / Jens Rydgren. p. cm. (Berghahn monographs in French studies) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 1-57181-643-7 (alk. paper) 1. Front national (France : 1972–). 2. Right-wing extremists—France. 3. Populism—France. 4. France—Politics and government—1995–. 5. France—Politics and government—1981–1995. I. Title. JN3007.F68R93 2003 324.244'03—dc21 2003051965

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Printed in the United States on acid-free paper

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CONTENTS

 List of Illustrations

vi

Acknowledgments

viii

List of Abbreviations

x

Introduction: The Rise of Extreme Right-Wing Populism

1

Chapter 1 Politics and Political Behavior: A Theoretical Framework

27

Chapter 2 Front National Voters: Social Base and Attitudes

85

Chapter 3 The Front National: Authoritarian and Socio-cultural Right?

119

Chapter 4 Nationalism and National Identity

131

Chapter 5 Xenophobia and Anti-immigration Rhetoric

157

Chapter 6 Populism and the Power of the Anti-establishment Strategy

192

Conclusion

226

References

233

Index

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ILLUSTRATIONS

 FIGURES 1.1. 1.2. 1.3. 2.1. 2.2. 2.3. 6.1. 6.2. 6.3. 6.4. 6.5.

The Analytical Framework A Model of Voting Behavior The Social Space Votes for the Front National and Links to the Working Class Voting in the 1997 Election According to Age and Number of Links to the Working Class Votes for the Front National after Self-estimated Status Pessimism of the French Voters, 1981–1986 Attitudes toward Politicians, 1977–1985 Modes of Opposition The Populist Triangle The Front National—a Danger for Democracy?

28 54 57 95 96 98 195 199 212 213 219

TABLES I.1. Results for the Front National in National Elections, 1973–2002 18 1.1. Civilian Employment by Sector, 1973–1995 32 1.2. Changes in Employment Structure across Industries in Seven EEC Countries 32 1.3. Some Indications of Economic Crisis 33 1.4. Unemployment Rates in Europe, 1981–2000 34 1.5. Unemployment Ratios by Educational Attainment for Persons Aged 25–64 34 1.6. Levels of Class Voting 38 2.1. The Sociology of Authoritarian, Nationalist, and Xenophobic Attitudes, 1995 89 2.2. The Sociology of Le Pen’s Voters in the 1988 and 1995 Presidential Elections 93 2.3. Some Characteristics of the Front National’s Voters, 1984–1997 94 2.4. The FN Voters According to Educational Level and Age 99 2.5. Effect of Attitudes on the Decision to Vote for Le Pen in the 1988 Presidential Election 101

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Illustrations

2.6. Effect of Attitudes on the Decision to Vote for Le Pen in the 1995 Presidential Election 2.7. Effect of Attitudes on the Decision to Vote for the Front National in the 1997 Legislative Election 2.8. The Sociology and the Attitudinal Motivations of Le Pen’s Voters in 1988 and 1995 5.1. Immigration Rates, Xenophobia, and Support for the ERP parties 5.2. Areas of Origin for French Immigrants 5.3. Negative Attitudes toward Ethnic and Other Minorities 5.4. What the French Voters Fear 5.5. Approval of the Positions of the Front National 6.1. The Impact of Political Satisfaction on the Vote for Le Pen in 1995 6.2. Confidence in Societal Institutions

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103 106 109 159 161 186 187 188 194 198

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

 I have had the privilege of working in a highly competent and dynamic academic environment at the Department of Sociology at Stockholm University. Peter Hedström was my tutor during my years as a doctoral student, when most of this book was written. His analytical approach to sociology has had a strong influence on my thinking, and I am grateful for his generous support and valuable comments on various drafts. Aside from Peter, Göran Ahrne, Richard Swedberg, and Lars Udehn (now at Mälardalen University College) deserve thanks in particular. Like Peter, they have all made me a better sociologist. Also Patrik Aspers, Christofer Edling, Barbara Hobson, Carl le Grand, and Ryszard Szulkin are gratefully acknowledged for having read, commented on, or discussed earlier drafts of this study. Among the numerous people outside of Stockholm who have contributed to this book in various ways, I am greatly indebted to Sidney Tarrow and Martin Schain, who have read the book in its entirely. Their comments provoked many thoughts and insights. Tom Burns, Masoud Kamali, and Nora Machado, among others, have read and offered valuable comments on parts of my work. I am also indebted to Tomas Peterson, who read and commented on four of the chapters of this book. In addition, over the past few years I have had the pleasure of collaborating with Joop van Holsteyn and Anders Widfeldt, which has both deepened and broadened my understanding of right-wing extremism. I am also indebted to CEVIPOF in Paris and Nonna Mayer in particular for letting me use their data on the French elections of 1988, 1995, and 1997. Monique de Saint-Martin showed generosity in introducing me to the French academic life during my stay at the École des Hautes Études en Science Sociales (EHESS) in Paris from 1998 to 1999. Needless to say, my being in Paris was of invaluable importance for this work. I would also like to express my gratitude to Peter Marsden, who was my host during my stay at the Department of Sociology at Harvard University in the fall of 2001. At Berghahn Books I would like to thank Marion Berghahn, Vivian Berghahn, Erica Da Costa, Shawn Kendrick, and Lori Rider for their support and great scrutiny in copyediting and publishing this book.

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Acknowledgments

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I have received financial support from the Swedish Foundation for International Cooperation in Research and Higher Education (STINT), the Swedish Institute, Elisabeth and Herman Rhodin’s foundation, and John Söderberg’s foundation. They are all gratefully acknowledged. Finally, I want to thank my wife Malin Wahlberg. Without your love, concern, and intellectual response, this book would perhaps not have been written at all.

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ABBREVIATIONS

 ANPE CDS CEVIPOF CODAR CREDOC EMU ENA ERP EU FF FN FNJ FPÖ GATT GRECE HLM MNR OLS PCF PS RPR SMIC SOFRES UDF

Agence nationale pour l’emploi Centre des Démocrats Sociaux Centre d’étude de la vie politique française Confédération des associations républicains Centre de recherche pour l’étude et l’observation des conditions European Monetary Union L’École nationale d’administration extreme right-wing populist European Union French francs Front National Front National de la Jeunesse (youth party) Austrian Freedom Party General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Groupement de recherche et l’études pour la civilisation européenne public housing (habitation à loyer modéré) Mouvement National Républicain ordinary least squares French Communist Party Socialist Party Rally for the Republic minimum wage (salarire minimum interprofessionnel de croissance) Société française d’enquête par sondages Union for French Democracy

INTRODUCTION The Rise of Extreme Right-Wing Populism


During the last decade and a half, Europe has witnessed the emergence of a new family of political parties: the extreme right populism of the Front National and the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ), among many others. In 1999, the extreme right-wing populist (ERP) parties were represented in the Austrian, Belgian, Danish, Italian, Norwegian, and Swiss parliaments, and were also substantially represented at the regional and local levels in France and Germany (Betz 2001: 407). Since then, Austria and Italy have formed governments involving the Freedom Party and the Northern League (Lega Nord), respectively.1 Thus, it is not an exaggeration to claim that for the first time since World War II, the extreme right constitutes a significant force in Western European democracies (Betz 2001: 407).2 The aim of this study is to present a theoretically based explanation of the emergence and sustained electoral support for the French Front National. However, although this claim will not be systematically examined in this book, it is my hope and conviction that the theoretical account to be presented here also has some explanatory value for the emergence of ERP parties in other countries (as well as for the lack of emerging ERP parties in others). Still, there are several reasons to focus exclusively on France and the Front National. First, my choice of method, consisting as it does of a detailed examination of both the political demand side (i.e., the sociology and attitudes of the voters), and the supply side (i.e., the ideology and strategy of the parties), as well as how the contextual environment and/or the interaction between the ERP parties and the contextual environment create opportunity structures, makes the work extremely time-consuming and best suited for a case study. Second, the Front National may be considered the prototypic ERP party. It was the first ERP party to meet with electoral success, and it was ideologically sophisticated. In addition, during the 1980s and 1990s the

Notes for this section begin on page 25.

2

The Populist Challenge

Front National became a model for other parties “combining fervent nationalism, opposition to immigration, and a populist hostility to the political establishment” (Eatwell 2000b: 408). Hence, other ERP parties used the Front National as a source of inspiration and knowledge for developing their ideology, rhetoric, strategy, and organizational strength (see Hainsworth 1992b: 29). In fact, the Front National has also tried actively to build a European network of ERP parties, especially in its contacts with the ERP parties represented in the European Parliament. Smaller ERP parties have also received resources, as when the Sweden Democrats were helped with electoral campaign materials in 1998 (Camus 1998: 78). Therefore, the Front National is not just an ERP party among others, but the prototypic one. As such, it is key to understanding the more general phenomenon of the newly emerged family of extreme right-wing populist parties in Western Europe. The remainder of this introduction will be organized in the following way. First, I will briefly outline the contours of the theoretical framework of this study. I will also address the merits and potential drawbacks of the theoretical approach and the empirical methods employed. Second, I will provide a working definition of the new family of extreme right-wing populist parties. As will be evident from this discussion, no consensus on this matter has been reached in earlier research, which makes it necessary for me to state my own position in explicit terms. Third, by way of introducing this book to readers who are unfamiliar with the development of the extreme right-wing parties, I will provide a short history of some of the ERP parties in Western Europe, and a slightly longer one of the Front National.

Theory and Method This study takes its point of departure in a theoretical framework for understanding politics and political behavior. In order to explain the emergence and sustained electoral support of the Front National, I will take both the political demand side and the political supply side into consideration. I will also distinguish between the macro and the micro levels, resulting in four different areas. On the demand side, we have societal structures (macro) and the voters (micro); on the supply side we have the party systems (macro) and the political parties (micro). It appears reasonable to assume that the macro levels of both the demand and the supply sides are characterized by a higher degree of inertia than the micro levels. However, it will also be assumed that the voters are more volatile than political parties, which are constrained by organizational factors. Using this framework, I will set out to demonstrate under what conditions ERP parties might emerge and sustain a significant electoral support. More specifically, in order to explain the emergence and sustained electoral support of ERP parties, we have to consider both opportunity structures,

Introduction

3

created by demand- and supply-side factors, as well as the ability of the various ERP parties to take advantage of the available opportunities (cf. Diani 1996 and Kitschelt 1995 for a similar explanatory structure).3 Two changes in particular have created opportunity structures for the ERP parties: (1) the partial realignment of cleavages, which has increased the importance of the socio-cultural cleavage dimension at the expense of the economic dimension; and (2) the growing discontent with political institutions, particularly with the established political parties. However, it can be argued that both these processes have similar causes, consisting of structural changes that have affected all Western European democracies in similar ways. Of particular importance is the transformation from an industrial to a postindustrial economy, which has tended to affect negatively the salience of the economic cleavage dimension, and the political internationalization and globalization that have diminished the political autonomy of the nation-state, and thus contributing to the decline in confidence in (national) political institutions. The transition from an industrial to a postindustrial economy has affected groups of individuals differently, depending on their position within the social space. While some have won, others have lost, which has resulted in feelings of absolute and relative deprivation. Not least important in this context is the fact that this transformation process has changed the structure of social comparison. Individuals with little cultural capital have increasingly found themselves in a situation of social decline and status deprivation, which has made them susceptible to political entrepreneurs promoting a return to the status quo ante, stressing themes of ethno-national identity (see Lipset and Raab 1970: 23–24). Similarly, because of feelings of anxiety, frustration, and resentment that result from poverty and unemployment, people who find themselves in situations of absolute deprivation have become increasingly susceptible to attraction by political actors using xenophobic themes of welfare chauvinism, that is, placing the blame for unemployment and the financial problems of the welfare state on immigrants (cf. Betz 1994; Kitschelt 1995; Kriesi 1999). Although left-wing extremists have traditionally capitalized on the ‘never-hads’ and right-wing extremists have attracted the support of the ‘once-hads’ (Lipset and Raab 1970: 23–24), the ERP parties have been able to draw support from both categories. Initially, most ERP parties were supported mainly by the ‘once-hads,’ that is, by middle-class groups affected by the structural change. This is also today reflected by the fact that voters with an intermediate level of education are the ones most likely to vote for the ERP parties (Betz 2001: 416). Whereas the poorly educated know that they cannot aspire to ‘good’ jobs, those with an intermediate level of education have recently been affected by the ‘grade inflation’ that has become endemic to the ‘knowledge society’ (i.e., their diplomas are not worth as much as they were ten or fifteen years ago). However, during the 1990s the ERP parties have been increasingly successful in

4

The Populist Challenge

attracting blue-collar workers and the unemployed, and have in many countries—not least in France—become the largest or second largest ‘working-class party’ (e.g., Mayer 1999; Minkenberg 2001). Together with the fact that the salience of the socio-cultural cleavage dimension has increased at the expense of the economic cleavage dimension (e.g., Betz 1994; Inglehart 1997; Kitschelt 1995; Perrineau 1997), this transformation process has created a situation favorable for ethno-national, welfare chauvinistic, and authoritarian mobilization. Hence, on the demand side, macro changes resulted in an altered distribution of the voters’ political attitudes and preferences. However, the parties are not as flexible as the voters; shifting positions is a process that takes some time for a political party, because of constraints such as ideological commitment and identification, democratic but ‘inefficient’ party organization, and so on. Normally, there exists a considerable time lag between the movement of the voters and the parties within the political space. As a consequence, a rapid change in the voter distribution creates a gap between the political demand side and its supply side. If a political party can position itself in this gap, or niche, it may have a good chance to capture votes, at least if the number of party-identified voters has decreased below a certain level. In fact, niches in the electoral arena will be considered as one of the most important ‘opportunity structures’ (see McAdam 1996) fostering the emergence of ERP parties, and I will argue that ethno-nationalism and xenophobia, which both belong to the socio-cultural cleavage dimension, have been the two niches of greatest importance in the emergence of the ERP parties. However, of equal importance has been a ‘negative’ factor. The process of political transformation has resulted in growing discontent with political institutions and politicians, as well as in a decrease in party-identified voters (Putnam et al. 2000). This situation has facilitated the emergence of the ERP parties by freeing resources and opening up niches in the electoral arena, which has made it possible for some ERP parties to take advantage of the opportunities for ethno-national mobilization. In addition, this situation has made it possible for the ERP parties to foment popular discontent and mobilize political protest. To make my hypotheses more incisive, I will argue that the electoral breakthrough of an ERP party can be explained in one of three ways: first, as a result of the existence of niches within the socio-cultural cleavage dimension, demanding ethno-nationalist and xenophobic (i.e., anti-immigration and welfare chauvinist) policies, in combination with a situation in which a sufficient number of voters lack bonds of loyalty to the other parties (i.e., a situation of dealignment); second, as a result of political protest, which can be based either on dissatisfaction with particular aspects of one or several of the established parties, or on a more general discontent with the political institutions per se, in particular with the political parties and politicians; or third, by a combination of these two alternatives. Which explanation is valid is bound to vary between different ERP

Introduction

5

parties. However, in order to explain the sustained electoral support for the ERP parties, political protest is not a sufficient explanatory factor. Only if there exist niches of ethno-nationalism and xenophobia will the newly emerged ERP party persist as a significant force, not least because protest voters are likely to return to their ‘old’ parties when they have made their voice heard unless they have a ‘positive’ interest in continuing to support the new party. Still, neither extensive xenophobia nor political discontent alone explains the electoral successes of the ERP parties. In fact, these factors are equally present in countries in which no successful ERP party has emerged (Rydgren 2002; Rydgren and van Holsteyn 2002; cf. EUMC 2001; Holmberg 1997: 338). Hence, we also have to look at supply factors, that is, the ERP parties’ ability to use mobilizing strategies successfully. Among their most important mobilizing strategies is their ability to put forward a populist program (Diani 1996) or populist ‘appeal’ (Fryklund and Peterson 1981), which may attract discontented voters, or even foment the sentiments of conflicting interests between the ‘establishment’ and the ‘ordinary people’ (for the concept and ideology of populism, cf. Canovan 1981; Hermet 2001; Ionescu and Gellner 1969; Taggart 2000). Put differently, the ERP parties have to use an ‘anti-political establishment strategy’ (Schedler 1996) sufficiently well. Another crucial mobilizing strategy is to politicize and/or frame the immigration issue in a way favorable to themselves, and to ensure that it stays on the political agenda. Both these latter strategies will be extensively discussed in chapter 5, while the anti-establishment strategy will be discussed in chapter 6. However, not all ERP parties have managed to use these and other mobilizing strategies successfully. I will argue that the following factors facilitate a successful mobilization: (1) an ERP party needs some essential resources, although initially these can be relatively meager, as well as sufficient internal order and party discipline; (2) it needs sufficient strategic skill; (3) it needs to be sufficiently free from the burden of ideological baggage deriving from its party history (i.e., from ideological commitments that are at odds with its strategic interests); and (4) perhaps most importantly in this context, it needs to be sufficiently detached (in the eyes of the voters) from anti-democratic political currents. Since an overwhelming majority of Western European voters are in favor of democracy4 and view anti-democratic parties and movements as illegitimate, the ability of parties that are perceived as anti-democratic to win votes is severely limited. Hence, it is crucially important to present the party as democratic, or— which is indeed the most common way for ERP parties—as representatives of ‘true democracy,’ rather than as opponents of democracy per se. As long as voters associate an ERP party with anti-democratic currents such as fascism and Nazism, it has, under contemporary Western conditions, no chance to break out of its marginalized existence. However, if an ERP party succeeds in detaching itself, in the eyes of the voters, from such

6

The Populist Challenge

anti-democratic currents, it may potentially attract voters outside the small, marginalized groups of voters that are prepared to support straightforward anti-democratic parties. This choice of an ‘integrated’ theoretical framework implies that theories emanating from different research traditions—ranging from cognitive social psychology to theories of party organizations—will be synthesized in this book. But might not such an approach lead to ad hoc theorizing and a mishmash of theories that are mutually exclusive? Yes, that is a possibility. However, I will do my best not to let that happen. To start with the latter point, in my opinion every researcher has the right to pick individual aspects of theories—and theorists—and to disregard the wider theoretical framework of which they originally were a part. Hence, although two theories may appear mutually exclusive, there might be aspects within them that could actually be combined (with beneficial results). Concerning the first point, the purpose of this theoretical focus is in fact to avoid ad hoc theorizing. Only explanatory factors that are implied by the theoretical framework, which is supposed to be internally coherent, will be used in the analysis. In this way it will be possible to avoid a situation in which explanations of different aspects of the phenomenon turn out to contradict one another. However, the aim of this study is evidently not theoretical parsimony. Rather, I want a theoretical framework that provides a way to capture the complexity of the phenomenon under investigation as thoroughly as possible, and to stake out the factors relevant for explaining the emergence and sustained electoral support of the Front National. In my opinion this is the major merit of the theoretical framework of this study. Nevertheless, at a concrete level, this theoretical choice implies that I will look in detail at three particular aspects: 1. How the particular niches have evolved. Here, it will be necessary to take the contextual environment into consideration; the actions of other political parties will also be of particular importance in this regard. 2. The attitudes and preferences of the voters. It is ultimately the demand side that determines whether a niche exists or not, so it will be of utmost importance to investigate how voter attitudes changed. Furthermore, in order to anchor the macro analysis at a micro plane, it will be necessary to analyze the social status of the voters. Are voters who have been negatively affected by recent macro changes (i.e., by the postindustrialization of society) more likely to vote for the Front National? I will argue that this is to a large extent indeed the case. 3. The ideology, rhetoric, and strategic actions of the Front National. Any explanation of the emergence and sustained electoral support for the ERP parties would be incomplete unless the actions of the emerging party itself were accounted for. Hence, it is important to study what role the Front National had in the creation of the niches and/or

Introduction

7

changing voter opinion, and, perhaps even more importantly, how they actively tried to take advantage of the available niches and other opportunity structures. In order to accomplish this analysis, I will use three broad types of methods. First, I will draw on secondary literature for the analysis of the role played by the environmental context and the other political actors. Although it would ideally have been better to do my own primary research in this area, it would have been too time-consuming for the scope of this study. Besides, some good fieldwork exists already. Second, while discussing voters, I will basically rely on statistical material and quantitative analysis. Here, too, I will in part use secondary literature. However, the bulk will be based on my own quantitative analysis. Third, when discussing the ideology, rhetoric, and strategic actions of the Front National I will augment secondary material with party programs as well as speeches and articles by highly placed party representatives (mostly Jean-Marie Le Pen and Bruno Mégret). For several reasons I will discuss potential drawbacks of the methods chosen for the study. For one thing, there are always perils associated with the use of empirical findings provided by secondary works. They might, for instance, be colored by the theoretical foundations of the particular work in question. They may also be laden with ideological assumptions, and so on. The most effective way to protect oneself from biases of this kind, besides being critical and skeptical to the best of one’s ability, is to use a variety of works that investigate the same phenomenon from different perspectives. Although one can never guarantee absolute objectivity or neutrality, the worst biases might be avoided. Second, as we all know, several biases and possible errors are associated with quantitative analysis. Are the results and/or the data reliable, valid, unbiased, and so forth? I would argue that whether or not data measure what they are supposed to and whether they are representative for the whole population and not only for the sample are issues plaguing both quantitative and qualitative methods. The strategy employed in this study is to be explicit about how the questions are stated. Moreover, when referring to statistical results found in others’ work, I have for the most part chosen to use work that relies on data from well-known and respected institutes (e.g., CEVIPOF and SOFRES). My own analysis is based on three election surveys conducted by CEVIPOF in 1988, 1995, and 1997. Results from these surveys have been published earlier, without any serious criticism being raised about errors or biases in the data sets. Operationalization and coding of the data will be discussed in chapter 2. Third, I have chosen to use quotations from party documents, the party press, and public speeches—occasionally quoted from the secondary literature—as an illuminating and elucidatory way to assess the ideology, rhetoric, and strategic actions of the Front National.5 This might give an impression of

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The Populist Challenge

tending toward the anecdotal. More specifically, by using such a method one runs the risk of finding—or at least presenting—only what one is looking for. For instance, if I argue, as I am, that the Front National was trying to attract voters by using anti-immigrant rhetoric, it would represent a methodological fallacy to present only quotations from such remarks, but not from pro-immigration rhetoric, if such exists (which is not the case when it comes to the Front National). However, the reader will have to trust the honesty of the author, who assures that his selection of quotations and examples has been systematic and rigorous, even though it is presented in a more unsystematic (but reader-friendly) way.

Defining Extreme Right-Wing Populism Writing about the emergence of contemporary extreme right-wing populist parties, it is of utmost importance to provide a definition that distinguishes this party family from others (see Mair and Mudde 1998). This is of even greater importance, considering the lack of consensus on core definitions and on which parties should be included in the family (cf. Fennema 1997; Mudde 1996b). Writing in 1996, Mudde identified 26 definitions used in the literature, in which 58 different definitional features are mentioned at least once (Mudde 1996b). Furthermore, a great variety of names have been given to this particular party family, including ‘right-wing extremism’ (e.g., von Beyme 1988), ‘new right-wing extremism’ (Hainsworth 1992a), ‘postindustrial extreme right parties’ (Ignazi 1996a), ‘radical rightwing populist parties’ (Betz 1993, 1994), ‘new radical right’ (Kitschelt 1995), ‘new populism’ (Taggart 1996, 2000), ‘neo-fascism,’ and ‘fascism’ (e.g., Ford 1992). In this section I will suggest a way to correct this situation. However, I will first complicate matters further by proposing a new name for this party family, namely, ‘extreme right-wing populism.’ This name implies three main concepts that demand clarification: ‘right-wing,’ ‘extremism,’ and ‘populism.’ However, we must first decide on which aspects the definition should be based. There are, broadly speaking, three different ways of determining the family affiliation of political parties: (1) the institutional approach, which is ‘genealogical’ and focuses upon similarities in socio-historic situations prevailing during the emergence of the parties; (2) the ‘partybased’ approach, which looks for generic characteristics in ideology, style, or policy that unite certain parties and exclude others; and (3) the spatial approach, which uses the parties’ location in the political space as the criteria for classification. I will choose the second approach. The first runs the risk of becoming too deterministic (i.e., it implicitly regards parties as ‘fixed and ready’ once they have emerged), whereas the third approach is too dependent on the particular party systems (i.e., in a party system with

Introduction

9

only moderate parties, the ‘least moderate’ would nonetheless occupy the extreme position in the political space). In my opinion, a good definition of a party family should be simultaneously inclusive and exclusive, and it should be based on common and essential features that are part of the political parties per se, that is, their ideology, policy, rhetoric, and/or style. However, because most ERP parties lack the wherewithal to demonstrate whether or not they actually intend to implement their political programs (even though parties such as the FPÖ and the Lega Nord are part of ruling coalitions), I will in practice only look at ideology and rhetorical style. Still, we should be aware of the fact that these features are not ontologically immanent: instead of trying to classify a party once and for all, we have to recognize the possibility (1) that it may be an amalgam of different ideological currents, and thus difficult to place within one particular family of parties; and (2) that parties may change character over time. Hence, the classification of parties (which are still active) is by nature tentative, and could in a way be compared to a Weberian ideal type. For now, let us turn to the concept of ‘right.’ Whether or not a party is ‘right,’ ‘left,’ or ‘center’ can be assessed in three different ways. It can be based on the party’s position on socio-economic politics, which concerns the degree of state involvement in the economy (i.e., economic socialism versus economic liberalism); on its positions on socio-cultural politics, which concerns issues such as national identity, ‘law and order,’ immigration policy, abortion, and so on (i.e., socio-cultural liberalism versus authoritarianism); or on a combination of these two. Hence, a party may be classified as politically ‘right’ because it promotes economic liberalism and/or socio-cultural authoritarianism, which implies that the category of right-wing parties is a very broad one, including, to mention only the extremes, both neo-liberal parties (which are economically right-wing, but not necessarily socio-cultural authoritarians) and fascist parties (which are socio-culturally right-wing, but to the center or even left in terms of economics). As will be demonstrated in this study, the ERP parties, the Front National included, are right-wing primarily in the socio-cultural sense of the term. In fact, as will be further discussed below, authoritarian positions on issue areas such as law and order, citizenship, and immigration policy are among the most characteristic features of the ERP parties. As far as economic policies are concerned, we have a more ambiguous picture. Most of the ERP parties backed neo-liberal economics of one sort or another during the 1980s, based on a quest for radical tax cuts. However, during the 1990s, most ERP parties changed positions and have become more economically protectionist, which implies a center or even slightly left position on economic policies, although some parties such as the FPÖ still embrace liberal economic positions. Generally speaking, however, the 1990s witnessed a process in which the economic programs of most ERP parties became subordinated to their socio-cultural programs, so that

10

The Populist Challenge

nowadays national protectionism and economic protectionism go neatly together. In fact, the principal socio-economic issue for the ERP parties is a combination of nationalism and xenophobia. It can be described as a politics of national preference or welfare chauvinism, and implies that “the state should ensure that employment and welfare policies work to the (exclusive) benefit of ‘the own people’” (Mudde 2000: 177; cf. Eatwell 2000b: 413). Let us continue with the concept of extremism. I will here rely on Lipset and Raab’s well-known definition of political extremism as anti-pluralism or monism. The “operational heart of extremism,” to follow the argument of Lipset and Raab (1970: 6), “is the repression of difference and dissent, the closing down of the market place of ideas. More precisely, the operational essence of extremism, or monism, is the tendency to treat cleavage and ambivalence as illegitimate.” Political monism of the extreme right is expressed in two ways: as a rejection of the democratic political system and/or a rejection of universalistic and egalitarian, sometimes called democratic, values (e.g., the idea of equality before the law). We should here distinguish between two different subtypes of right-wing extremism, namely, the parliamentary and the nonparliamentary. Whereas the former is verfassungswidrig, that is, opposed to the constitution, the latter is only verfassungsfeindlich, that is, hostile toward the constitution (see Mudde 2000: 12). More specifically, while the extreme nonparliamentary right has chosen to take action outside the parliamentary arena, the extreme parliamentary right has chosen to follow the parliamentary rules of the game in that they participate in public elections and aspire to win representation within democratic political institutions. Furthermore, as in the case of the ERP parties, the extreme parliamentary right does not usually oppose democracy per se (as idea), although they typically are hostile to representative democracy and the way existing democratic institutions actually work. In fact, ERP parties argue that they represent true democracy (in contrast to the sham democracy characterizing contemporary Western Europe). Hence, although the ERP parties reject cleavages and division lines within ‘the people’—they are typically ‘anti-party parties’ (Ignazi 1996b; Mudde 1996a)—they are extremists primarily because of their rejection of pluralist values. I will argue that the ideology of the ERP parties is essentially moralistic and based on a metaphysical conception of ‘the natural order.’ While everything that is in accordance with this natural, harmoniously organic order (manifested in the nation and in the family, for instance) is ethically good, everything that breaks this ‘natural order’ is ethically bad (e.g., globalization, homosexuality, ethnic mixing, etc.). To put it bluntly, monism is good, whereas pluralism is bad. More generally, as Sternhell has argued, every “ideology that propounds an organic society is bound to be unsympathetic to political pluralism” (Sternhell 1986: 2). As will be demonstrated in chapter 4, ethno-nationalism, which is one of the key characteristics of the ERP parties, the Front

Introduction

11

National in particular, is a highly symptomatic manifestation of an ideology of the organic society (see Sternhell 1986: 28). It is also unsympathetic to political pluralism. As Mudde shows in a study of the Belgian Vlaams Blok, the German Republikanen and Deutsche Volksunion, and the Dutch Centrumdemocraten and Centrumpartij ’86, the ERP parties argue that the “state should implement a policy of internal homogenisation to create a monocultural society” (Mudde 2000: 177). This also implies halting further immigration and the repatriation of immigrants already living in the country. More generally, the xenophobia, which is another key characteristic of ERP parties, implies that “everything ‘abnormal’ (or better: that which is perceived as deviating from their own nation and convention) is seen as negative and threatening. This includes both ‘internal enemies’ (e.g., immigrants, homosexuals) and external enemies (e.g., supranational organizations)” (Mudde 2000: 177). Furthermore, many ERP parties, not least the Front National, have opposed democratic values in more explicit terms. For the Front National, for instance, human rights are a symptom of decadence. So far, we have been able to establish that ERP parties are right-wing because of authoritarian policy positions on socio-cultural politics, and extremists because of monism and a corresponding rejection of pluralism, but that they belong to the extreme parliamentary right because of their readiness to compete in democratic elections and their subjection to political democracy as an idea. However, the ‘democracy’ propounded by ERP parties is of a specific kind, and I would suggest that they are less democrats than populists (see Weinberg 1993: 8). In fact, the extreme right (characterized by a radical, ethnic nationalism) is similar to populism in that both have an organic conception of society. Nevertheless, the key characteristic of populism is that populists always seek legitimacy by claiming that they speak in the name of ‘the people,’ that is, that they are the medium for ‘the common will’ or ‘the people’s will’ (Berlin et al. 1968: 173–178; cf. Shils 1956; Taggart 2000: 16–17). ‘The people’ is hailed as the bearer of superior wisdom in the form of simple and uncompromising ‘common sense.’ However, ‘the political class’—which is a unifying concept for all political actors deemed to belong to the ‘political establishment’—has robbed ‘the people’ of their voice, and is intent on ruining it with its corrupt, ‘inorganic’ elite values (see Canovan 1999: 3). As a consequence, populist parties, ERP parties included, loathe representative democracy, and are in favor of transparent decision-making procedures, such as referenda (see Taggart 2000: 2). Another distinctive feature of populism is its nostalgia and its reliance on the concept of a ‘sacred homeland,’ which also makes the populist conception of ‘the people’ essentially exclusionary. According to Paul Taggart, populist ideology tends to build on an idealized image of a chosen people, which is located in a similarly idealized landscape, that is, a ‘heartland.’ For some populist movements the heartland coincides with a nation, for

12

The Populist Challenge

others with a region. However, both these variants are constructed by looking inward and backward; what is imagined is the homogeneous and genuine way of life of an idealized past (Taggart 2000: 3, 95). It is the people inhabiting this imagined heartland who constitute ‘the people,’ and those who did not belong to ‘the people’ of the heartland of the past do not belong to ‘the people’ of today. Yet within the boundary of the heartland, ‘the people’ is undivided and unitary. Populism is a characteristic but not a distinctive feature of the contemporary extreme parliamentary right. In addition, many old extreme rightwing parties and movements have involved populist aspects, that is, have claimed to be speaking in the name of ‘the people’ and have justified their policies as ‘the will of the people’ (Lipset and Raab 1970: 13). Nonetheless, inserting the term ‘populism’ into the definition of the ERP parties clarifies the fact that they belong to the extreme parliamentary right (i.e., they participate in democratic elections and do not openly contest democracy as an idea), but that they are monist ‘populists’ rather than ‘liberal democrats.’ Before concluding this section, I will spell out what distinguishes ERP parties from fascism, on the one hand, and from the mainstream right, on the other. Let us start with fascism. First, we have already established some basic similarities and differences between the ERP parties and the European fascism that grew up between the world wars by claiming that they both are extreme right (i.e., they are both anti-pluralist and socio-culturally authoritarian), but that the former belong to the extreme parliamentary right, whereas the latter belongs to the extreme nonparliamentary right (i.e., the fascists wanted a total rupture with democracy, which is not the case with the ERP parties). Still, we will try to plunge deeper into this question by examining some ideological features in greater detail. In an influential book, Roger Griffin argues that the ideological core of fascism “is a palingenetic form of populist ultra-nationalism” (Griffin 1991: 26). The concept of ‘palingenetic’ refers to the myth of rebirth or renewal, that is, “to the sense of a new start or of regeneration after a phase of crisis or decline.… At the heart of palingenetic political myth lies the belief that contemporaries are living through or about to live through a ‘sea-change,’ or ‘water-shed’ or ‘turning-point’ in the historical process” (Griffin 1991: 33, 35). If we take a look at the three mythic components that, according to Griffin, constitute the ‘fascist minimum’—the rebirth myth, populist ultranationalism, and the myth of decadence (Griffin 1991: 201)—we find similarities as well as differences between fascism and the ERP parties. First, although the populist ultranationalism (ethnic nationalism, that is) of the ERP parties is less aggressive and expansive, and rather turned inward, it still constitutes the ideological core of these parties. Second, as we will see in chapter 3, decadence has been a recurrent ideological and rhetorical theme of the Front National, and I would argue that this is true of most other ERP parties, as well. Hence, the ideological differences between fascism and the ERP parties mainly concern the rebirth myth. Although such

Introduction

13

a myth also exists among the ERP parties, it is much weaker. Even more important, whereas fascism was oriented toward the future (Sternhell 1986: 108), in particular concerning this aspect, the ERP parties are rather oriented toward the past (or better: toward an idealized idea of the past). Rather than create a ‘new society,’ rising “phoenix-like after a period of encroaching decadence” (Griffin 1991: 38), the ERP parties wish to restore the status quo ante (see von Beyme 1988). The commitment to the status quo ante also distinguishes the ERP parties from the conservative right-wing parties, whose principal objective is to maintain the status quo (see von Beyme 1988: 1). However, even more important, the big difference between the ERP parties and the mainstream right-wing parties is the latter’s commitment to, or at least acceptance of, political pluralism. Hence, although mainstream right-wing parties occasionally propound proposals aimed at increasing ethnic and cultural homogenization, for instance, or even use xenophobic rhetoric, they do not seriously oppose universalistic, democratic values. Furthermore, they do not reject democracy, or even parliamentarianism, as a political system. To sum up, I have argued that the ERP parties are socio-culturally authoritarian, anti-pluralist, and populist parties oriented toward the idea of the past. Their ideology is based on a belief in the ‘natural order,’ which is being threatened by a variety of forces (most notably immigration). The ideological core consists of ethnic nationalism,6 xenophobia, law and order, and a populist critique of ‘the political class.’

The Recent Wave of Extreme Right-Wing Populism: An Introductory Overview As mentioned above, the ERP parties have been able to establish themselves as electorally significant parties in a variety of Western European countries. I will below provide a brief outline of the history of some of these parties. However, this will only be by way of introduction, and I will have to refer the interested reader to any of the books or articles referred to below for further reading. The Austrian FPÖ, loosely translated as the Freedom Party of Austria, has been one of the most successful ERP parties during the 1990s. The party obtained 27 percent of the vote in the 1999 legislative election, and is currently a member of the ruling coalition in Austria. Yet the FPÖ is not a new party. In fact, it was founded in 1956, as a direct continuation of the League of Independents, which was founded in 1949. However, the party was not especially successful during the first 30 years of its existence, when its electoral support scarcely exceeded 5 percent of the vote (Luther 2000). In 1986 Jörg Haider became party leader, and he transformed the party into a populist one, sharply right-wing in orientation (Luther 2000; Morrow 2000: 34). Hence, it is only after 1986 that the FPÖ can be defined

14

The Populist Challenge

as an ERP party. Its political appearance has been marked by anti-immigration campaigns, attacking cosmopolitan and multicultural developments (the European Union included), and a populist critique of the ‘political class.’ The party’s economic neo-liberalism, which has been another distinctive characteristic, should partly be seen in the light of its populism. The party is “proposing to dismantle the welfare state to the benefit of the small, hard-working man against the designs of parasitical ‘sponglers’ and big capital” (Morrow 2000: 60). The FPÖ has also made widespread use of welfare chauvinism and proposed a politics of ‘national preference’ (Riedlsperger 1998: 36). Furthermore, Haider has a history of flirting with the Austrian World War II veterans, and in fact praised the activities of the Waffen SS (Morrow 2000: 59). In Italy, the extreme parliamentary right has been successful during the 1990s, as well. Twice, in 1994 and again in 2001, the former fascist party MSI/Alleanza Nazionale and the Lega Nord have formed coalition governments together with Berlusconi’s Forza Italia. I will not say much about the MSI/Alleanza Nazionale, which, because it is an offspring of interwar fascism, partly falls outside my definition of ERP parties (see Gallagher 2000; Ignazi 1993; Newell 2000 for the history and recent transformation of this party), but rather concentrate on the Lega Nord. Lega Nord is a direct continuation of the Lega Lombarda, which was founded by Umberto Bossi in the early 1980s. However, it did not begin to attract voters at a national level until the 1990s: in 1987 it garnered only 0.5 percent of the vote, compared to 8.6 percent in 1992 (as Lega Lombarda), and 8.4 percent in 1994 and 10.1 percent in 1996 (as Lega Nord). However, the party has always been much stronger in the north of Italy. In 1992, for instance, the party received 17.5 percent of the vote in the north of Italy, and 24 percent of the vote in Lombardy (Betz 1998b: 46; Sidotti 1992). The ideological core of the Lega Nord has always been resentment and hostility directed against “‘Rome,’ the ‘centralist state, and the political class, without which the north ‘would be the richest country in Europe, or perhaps in the world’” (Bossi, quoted in Betz 1998b: 48). Furthermore, the Lega Nord has also propounded a form of economic neo-liberalism that I would argue has populist and even ethnic undertones. As Hans-Georg Betz has shown, the party’s neo-liberal program “grows out of a particular interpretation of northern identity,” that is, of an emphasis on the entrepreneurial culture and protectionist ethic, which, according to the party, are distinctive features of the petty bourgeoisie of northern Italy (Betz 1998b: 48). When it comes to xenophobia and welfare chauvinism, these have traditionally been directed as much against southern Italians as against immigrants. These themes have occasionally been toned down somewhat, especially in the late 1980s and early 1990s. However, after 1995 the party’s xenophobic profile has become radicalized, especially against immigrants (Betz 1998b: 49; Ruzza 2001). Generally speaking, the Lega Nord has combined neo-liberal economics with anti-immigration

Introduction

15

politics (although partly directed toward ‘nationals’ from the south) in “an attempt to forge a sense of ethnically pure community, legitimized by history” (Eatwell 2000b: 409). In Belgium the mobilization of extreme right-wing populism has been more or less exclusively confined to the Flemish part of the population. Although there exists a Belgian Front National, it has been a rather insignificant factor in elections, although it succeeded in winning parliamentary seats in 1991 (Kitschelt 1995: 50). However, the Vlaams Blok has been able to attract substantial support, in particular in areas dominated by Flemish speakers. In the 1994 Antwerp municipal election, for instance, the Vlaams Blok became the largest party with 28 percent of the vote, and in the 1995 national election the party received 12.5 percent of the vote in Flanders (Swyngedouw 1998: 69; 2000: 121). Vlaams Blok was founded in the late 1970s as a merger of small extreme rightist groups, and they built on an ideological core of cultural and ethnic distinctness (Husbands 1992; Swyngedouw 1998: 62; 2000: 134). One implication of this idea is, of course, antiimmigrant xenophobia, and another that Belgium should separate into Flemish and Walloon sections (see Eatwell 2000b: 409). In Switzerland the ERP parties have been able to attract substantial support. In the 1999 parliamentary election, the Swiss People’s Party, headed by Christoph Blocher, made great strides, receiving 23 percent of the vote (Skenderovic 2001). Earlier, the Swiss extreme parliamentary right had been divided among a variety of smaller parties, of which the Automobilist Party and the National Action/Swiss Democrats were the most significant. Although scattered, the Swiss ERP parties received 10.9 percent of the vote as early as the 1991 federal election, and 9.3 percent in the 1994 election (Gentile and Kriesi 1998). In the Scandinavian countries, ERP parties have a long record in Denmark and Norway. In Denmark the Danish Progress Party was founded in 1972 by Mogens Glistrup, and received 15.9 percent of the vote in the 1973 parliamentary election (and more than 10 percent in all other elections during the 1970s). Although the party had a downturn during the early and mid 1980s, it garnered 9 percent of the vote in 1988 and 6.4 percent in 1990 and 1994. However, in 1995 the party split when Pia Kjaersgaard left the party and founded a new ERP party, the Danish People’s Party. This party received 7.4 percent of the vote in 1998 and 12.0 percent in 2001, while the Progress Party sank to 2.4 percent of the vote in 1998 and 0.6 percent in 2001. The emergence of the Danish Progress Party in 1972 inspired Anders Lange to launch an analogous party in Norway, which succeeded in gaining 5 percent of the vote in the 1973 election. However, Lange died in 1974, which caused some difficult years for the party until Carl I. Hagen became party leader in 1978. The Norwegian Progress Party has been successful in elections since the late 1980s: 13 percent of the vote in 1989, 15.3 percent in 1997, and 14.7 percent in 2001. The question of whether the Scandinavian Progress Parties qualify as ERP parties, or if they constitute

16

The Populist Challenge

a separate brand of anti-tax protest parties, has been discussed. However, although anti-tax rhetoric dominated during the 1970s, these parties have since been transformed in an extreme right authoritarian direction. Since the second half of the 1980s, the themes of anti-immigration and welfare chauvinism have dominated the parties’ programs and appearance. The Danish People’s Party has always been an ERP party, given its xenophobic national-populist agenda (Andersen 1992; Andersen and Bjørklund 1990, 2000; Svåsand 1998; www.electionworld.org). Sweden did not have a successful party similar to the Progress Party during the 1970s. It was not until the early 1990s that a Swedish ERP party emerged, when New Democracy, headed by Ian Wachtmeister and Bert Karlsson, received 6.7 percent of the vote in the 1991 parliamentary election. The party’s program and rhetoric criticized the established parties for not representing ‘the people,’ called for radical tax cuts and a privatization of the public sector, and expounded a xenophobic anti-immigration message. However, New Democracy turned out to be short-lived. Because of internal dissension, Ian Wachtmeister resigned from his position as party leader in early 1994, which made support for the party fall dramatically. The party received only 1.4 percent of the vote in the 1994 election, and it has practically disappeared since. The leading party today is the Sweden Democrats, which so far has been unsuccessful at a national level, although it has succeeded in sending a handful of deputies to local councils (Rydgren 2002; Rydgren and van Holsteyn 2002; Taggart 1996; Westlind 1996; Widfeldt 2000). In Germany, there have been some minor electoral successes for ERP parties in local and European elections, but no real electoral breakthrough at a national level (Backes and Mudde 2000). The Republikaner received 7.5 percent of the vote in the 1989 West Berlin elections and 7.1 percent of the vote in the elections to the European Parliament the same year. Furthermore, although they only captured 2.1 percent of the vote in the Bundestag election of 1990, they won 10.9 percent of the vote in the Landtag of Baden-Württemberg two years later. In the late 1990s, the German People’s Party (DVU) received 13 percent in the 1998 election to the parliament in Saxony-Anhalt (Backer 2000; Kolinsky 1992; Minkenberg 1997; Winkler and Schumann 1998). In the Netherlands, the ERP parties were electoral failures until very recently, except perhaps in 1994, when the Centrum Democrats received 2.5 percent of the vote (Mudde and van Holsteyn 2000; Rydgren and van Holsteyn 2002; cf. Lucardie 1998). However, during the spring of 2002, Pim Fortuyn and the party founded by him, List Pim Fortuyn, unexpectedly emerged and succeeded to attract media attention as well as voters with ardent anti-immigration and populist messages. Fortuyn announced that he intended to enter politics as late as 20 August 2001, and he was elected party leader of the Livable Netherlands in November of the same year. However, he was kicked out of the party in February 2002 because of

Introduction

17

his strong anti-Islam statements, and he founded the party List Pim Fortuyn (Mudde 2002). Pim Fortuyn was killed by a Green activist in early May 2002, and the List Pim Fortuyn got 17 percent of the vote in the legislative election held 15 May of the same year (www.electionworld.org). However, there are reasons to question the inclusion of Pim Fortuyn and his party within the family of extreme right-wing populism. He was a populist (according to the definition given above), used a fierce anti-immigration rhetoric, and was emphasizing law and order. On the other hand, neither Pim Fortuyn nor his party was radically nationalist, against the EU, or in support of traditional authoritarian values (he was an open homosexual, for instance). Furthermore, he was in favor of integration of immigrants, provided that they followed the norms of the Netherlands society (Mudde 2002). There are hence similarities as well as differences between Pim Fortuyn and List Pim Fortuyn and the parties deemed to belong to the party family of extreme right-wing populism. In Britain, finally, neither the British National Front, founded in 1967, nor the British National Party, founded in 1983, received significant electoral support at the national level during the 1980s and 1990s (Eatwell 1992, 2000a).

The Front National In France the recent wave of extreme right-wing populism began in 1983– 1984, when in 1983 the Front National received 16.7 percent of the vote in the local election in Dreux and 11.3 percent in the twentieth arrondissement in Paris; and in 1984, 11.2 percent of the vote in the European election (Perrineau 1997; see table I.1). Although this book will deal exclusively with this recent wave (i.e., 1983–2002), I will by way of introduction say something about the history of electoral right-wing extremism and/or populism in postwar France. In 1956, the Poujadist movement, a populist anti-tax and anti-modernization movement, captured 11.6 percent of the vote and sent more than 50 deputies to the National Assembly. However, this movement fell apart in 1958 and disappeared as quickly as it had emerged. During the 1960s, there were occasional outbursts of right-wing extremism in connection with the war in Algeria. At an electoral level, these sentiments were manifested in the 1962 referendum on the independence of Algeria, in which 9.2 percent voted no, and in the 1965 presidential election when Tixier-Vignancour, a former star lawyer from French Algeria, got 5.2 percent of the vote (Mayer 1998: 16; Perrineau 1996: 37–38). It might be of some interest to note that Jean-Marie Le Pen was a deputy in the National Assembly for the Poujadist movement in 1956, and that he was campaign president for Tixier-Vignancour in 1965 (Marcus 1995: 27–52). Furthermore, there are also some ideological similarities between the Poujadist movement, Tixier-Vignancour,

18

The Populist Challenge

TABLE I.1 Results for the Front National in National Elections, 1973–2002 Election

Vote

1973 legislative 1974 presidential 1978 legislative 1981 legislative 1984 European 1986 legislative 1988 presidential 1988 legislative 1989 European 1993 legislative 1994 European 1995 presidential 1997 legislative 1999 European 2002 presidential 2002 legislative

0.6 0.8 0.8 0.3 11.2 9.8 14.6 9.8 11.7 12.5 10.5 15.1 14.9 5.7 (9.2) 16.9* (19.2) 11.3 (12.4)

* The result is from the first round of the presidential election. In the second round, Le Pen received 17.8 percent of the vote. Source: Simmons (1996: 267); Perrineau (1997: 9); Eatwell (2000: 410); Hainsworth (2000: 20); www.electionworld.org. For the elections from 1999, the results presented within parentheses indicate the sum of the FN’s and the MNR’s voter support.

and the Front National. Anti-intellectualism, xenophobia, defense of ‘the little man,’ authoritarianism, opposition to ‘the political class’ and the bureaucracy, defense of the family, strong law and order position, a cult of Joan of Arc, and rejection of perceived decadence are all ideological aspects that the Front National shares with the Poujadist movement and/or Tixier-Vignancour (see Hainsworth 1992b: 33). This is not surprising, however, since these three political movements have a common tradition of prewar French right-wing extremism and radical nationalism to draw from, including General Boulanger, Maurice Barrès, and Charles Maurras (cf. Chebel d’Appollonia 1996; Girardet 1966).7 Nevertheless, after 1965 the French far right was highly fragmented and marginalized. One of the most significant groups, Occident, was founded in 1964 but was banned in 1968 because of its violent activities. In 1969, some of the leading figures of Occident founded Ordre Nouveau, which gathered former supporters of the Vichy regime, former Poujadists, neo-fascists, and advocates of French Algeria, and which quickly became the leading far right group in France (Camus 1996, 1997; Marcus 1995). Influenced by the Italian neo-fascist MSI’s electoral success earlier the same year (i.e., 8.7 percent of the vote), Ordre Nouveau launched a front organization, the Front National, in October 1972. The purpose was to engage in electoral politics with a party that was less stigmatized by direct

Introduction

19

associations with the Nazi and fascist parties and movements between the wars (cf. Camus 1996: 35–36; 1997; Chebel d’Appollonia 1996; Hainsworth 2000b; Marcus 1995: 18; Simmons 1996: 61). The Front National, from the beginning under the leadership of JeanMarie Le Pen, was unsuccessful in the elections during the 1970s and early 1980s. Before 1984, the party did not succeed in attracting more than about one percent of the vote in the national elections (i.e., presidential and French and European parliamentary), and seldom more in the local and regional elections before 1982. Furthermore, between 1974 and 1981 the Front National was competing with another far right party, the Parti des Forces Nouvelles, which was also relatively unsuccessful (Marcus 1995: 20; Perrineau 1997: 22). However, as mentioned above, the Front National made an electoral breakthrough in 1983–1984. In fact, the party had achieved significant results in local elections in 1982, for example, 13.3 percent in Grande-Synthe, 12.6 percent in Dreux-Ouest, and 9.6 percent in Dreux-Est (Perrineau 1996: 41). However, the significance of the local election in Dreux in 1983, in which the Front National list headed by J-P. Stirbois received 16.7 percent of the vote, was that the mainstream right decided to ally itself with the Front National in order to beat the left candidates (Marcus 1995; Perrineau 1996, 1997). This event attracted the attention of the national media and gave political visibility to the Front National. The fact that Jean-Marie Le Pen was invited to participate in the popular television program l’heure de verité in February 1984 was of particular importance (Marcus 1995: 55–56). In addition, the alliance with the mainstream right gave the party increased legitimacy, which, as we will see in chapter 6, was of fundamental importance for the emergence of the Front National as a political force in French politics. The Front National’s national electoral breakthrough occurred in 1984, when the party received 11 percent of the vote and sent ten deputies to the European Parliament (Marcus 1995: 57). This result was important for the development of the Front National in a number of ways. It not only increased its political visibility and legitimacy, it also enticed mid-rank officials within the mainstream right, as well as intellectuals of the Nouvelle Droite (in particular from the Club de l’Horloge), to join the Front National. This wave of recruitment not only provided the Front National with an organizational backbone of politically experienced activists and ‘respectable’ candidates, but also brought well-educated intellectuals to the party (e.g., Yvan Blot and Jean-Yves Le Gallou). It was during this wave of recruitment that Bruno Mégret joined the party, when his organization, the Confédération des associations républicains (CODAR), merged with the Front National in 1985 (Birenbaum and François 1996; Marcus 1995: 38–39). In the wake of the legislative elections of 1986, Mitterrand decided to introduce a proportional voting system (instead of the majority voting

20

The Populist Challenge

system that had been used since the birth of the Fifth Republic). The purpose of this measure was supposedly to split the mainstream right and to ensure the victory of the left. However, the reform also opened a window of opportunity for the Front National (see chapter 1). The reform liberated the Front National from the risk of the vote utile, and, even more importantly, it meant that the Front National, with 9.8 percent of the vote, could send 35 deputies to the National Assembly. The presence of the Front National in Parliament ensured the party sustained political visibility. It also made clear that the Front National was now a significant political actor, able to attract voters in important national elections (Marcus 1995: 58–61; Simmons 1996: 80–83). In the presidential election of 1988, Jean-Marie Le Pen received 14.6 percent of the vote in the first round, which was only 2 percentage points less than Raymond Barre (UDF)8 and 5 percentage points less than Jacques Chirac (the RPR) (Marcus 1995: 62; Perrineau 1997). In the legislative election later that year, the Front National garnered 9.8 percent of the vote, but lost all but one of its seats in the National Assembly because of the reinstated majority voting system. However, by polling 33 percent of the vote in one of Marseille’s constituencies, the Front National showed that it might conceivably be a future contender for political power, even in elections under the majority voting system, at least at a local level. Furthermore, as a consequence of the large number of votes for the Front National in some districts where the party held the balance of power, the mainstream right (i.e., the local UDF of the Bouches-du-Rhône) chose to make electoral agreements with the Front National (Marcus 1995: 63–64; Perrineau 1997). Although the Front National had some problems during the latter part of 1988—it lost its only deputy to the National Assembly after Yann Piat was expelled from the party, and its support declined in surveys after certain racist and anti-Semitic remarks made by Le Pen (see chapters 5 and 6)—the party nonetheless received 11.7 percent of the vote in the European election of 1989. Furthermore, in a legislative by-election in Dreux later the same year, Marie-France Stirbois won 42.5 percent of the vote in the first round and 61 percent in the second, and secured the party a new representative in the National Assembly (Marcus 1995: 66; Perrineau 1997). However, this sole seat was lost in the 1993 legislative campaign, in which the Front National received 12.4 percent of the vote. Still, the party was close in several districts: in Dreux Marie-France Stirbois garnered 49.8 percent of the vote in the second round; Bruno Mégret got 49.5 percent of the votes in Marignane; Marie-Claude Roussel got 45.2 percent in Marseille, and Le Pen received 42 percent in Nice (Marcus 1995: 69). In the European election of 1994, the party received 10.5 percent of the vote, after the traditionally authoritarian, nationalist, and anti-Maastricht list headed by Philippe de Villiers entered into competition with the party (Marcus 1995: 71; Perrineau 1997: 78–80).

Introduction

21

The year 1995 marked the second breakthrough for the Front National. That year Le Pen received 15 percent of the vote in the first round of the presidential election. Some weeks later, in the local elections, the party got the majority of the votes in three cities, and was thus able to take political power in Marignane, Orange, and Toulon (Perrineau 1997: 82). In addition, in a partial local election in February 1997, the Front National won the majority in a fourth city, when the list headed by Catherine Mégret got 52.5 percent of the vote in the second round in Vitrolle (Perrineau 1997: 91–92). In the legislative election later that year, it had its best showing ever in a parliamentary election, receiving 14.9 percent of the vote in the first round (Perrineau 1997: 94). However, just when the Front National’s fortunes appeared at their highest, with solid electoral support of some 15 percent, four mayors in cities of significant size, and approximately 2,000 local and 250 regional councilors (Hainsworth and Mitchell 2000: 443; cf. Ivaldi 1998), the party split because of internal rivalries (see Hainsworth 2000b). In 1998–1999 the rivalry between Le Pen and the de facto number two man in the party, Bruno Mégret, escalated into open conflict for power and control of the party. The schism was probably hidden beneath the surface for some time before 1998 (Mégret wanted to approach the mainstream right for strategic purposes in order to make alliances, whereas Le Pen wanted to use a confrontational strategy), but the trigger was the quarrel over the nominations in the 1999 European election. Because Le Pen was threatened by suspension, Bruno Mégret expected to top the Front National list. However, Le Pen, wanting to reduce the influence of Mégret and his followers, which had increased after the victory in Vitrolle, thought differently. Instead, he wanted his wife to top the list. After an open war of words, in which Le Pen and Mégret called each other racists and neo-fascists, the party split in early 1999. Mégret founded a rival party, the Front National-Mouvement National, which later changed its name to Mouvement National Républicain. Together with Mégret, a large part of the party activists and elected candidates at different levels left the Front National, not least the intellectuals of the Nouvelle Droite (Darmon and Rosso 1999; Hainsworth 2000a: 18–19; Hainsworth and Mitchell 2000: 452). However, I agree with Hainsworth and Mitchell (2000: 452) that the split “cannot be seen in terms of a split between extremes and moderates,” not least considering the fact that the pagans and neo-fascists sided with Mégret. Beyond a doubt, the split hurt the Front National. In the 1999 European election the Front National received only some 6 percent of the vote, whereas Mégret’s party garnered 3 percent. Furthermore, in this election the Fronts were increasingly subject to the competition from the Rassemblement pour la France, headed by Charles Pasqua and Philippe de Villiers, which “offered a more sanitized version of the Front’s program” (Eatwell 2000b: 409–410). However, the split was not the beginning of permanent decline of the Front National, as many commentators had

22

The Populist Challenge

thought. In the aftermath of the 11 September attack in New York and after an election campaign that had focused much on (in)security and law and order, Le Pen started to increase his support in the opinion polls. He received 16.9 percent of the vote in the first round of the presidential election in April 2002 and qualified to the second round (and thus eliminated the PS candidate Jospin). After a massive mobilization, not least from the left, to support Chirac in the second round of the election, Le Pen only increased his support marginally and obtained 17.8 percent of the vote. In the legislative election in June 2002, the Front National did not succeed in repeating the results from the presidential election, and garnered only 11.3 percent of the vote. The ideology and rhetoric of the Front National will be dealt with extensively in the coming chapters (especially in chapters 3–6), so I will leave that aspect out for now. It is sufficient to say at this point that the party’s program concentrated on two core themes: (1) that the national identity was threatened (by immigrants as well as by globalization, etc.), and (2) that the political establishment usurped the power of ‘the people’—and that only the Front National could return it (see Mayer 1998: 16).

The Structure of the Book The disposition of this book is, I think, rather straightforward. In chapter 1, I will present a theoretical framework of politics and political behavior. I will discuss and relate key concepts that will be used in the empirical analysis in chapters 2–6. More specifically, I will base this chapter on a discussion of societal structures and voters, both belonging to the political demand side; political parties and party systems and party laws, which belong to the political supply side; and the relationship between the supply and demand sides on the micro as well as the macro level. In the first section, macro-changes, that is, economic, political, and cultural changes associated with the transformation from an industrial to a postindustrial society, will be discussed. As indicated above, I will in this study argue that these changes affected people in different ways, partly dependent upon what position they occupy in the social space. As a result, macro changes influenced the disposition and behavior of the voters. The voters will be discussed in the second section of chapter 1. Here I will discuss cognitive and emotive aspects of individual behavior, as well as the role of interests, and how these aspects are intertwined in ideologies. This section will conclude with a model of voting behavior, in which voters are supposed to base their voting decisions on party identification, party image, and/or political issues. I will assume that the two latter are subject to spatial rationality, that is, that a voter will vote for the party that he or she believes is closest to his or her position within an attitudinal space.

Introduction

23

In the third section, the macro and micro levels of political demand will be linked in a more direct manner. I will here discuss the concept of social space, and argue that people located near each other in the social space— which consists of the amount as well as the composition of economic and cultural capital—are more likely to share attitudes and patterns of behavior with each other than with people located farther from their own position. I will also argue that the social space is a system or structure of social comparison, where one’s own position is dependent on the capital of the others. When the evaluation of different types of cultural capital changes as a result of macro-changes, the result will be social decline for groups of individuals whose cultural capital has become devalued. These individuals (who may also be affected by economic decline) are likely to become increasingly frustrated and resentful, but also more prone to support political actors who stress the value of the status quo ante, and who support a reevaluation of the dominant system of group classification (e.g., from socio-economic categories to categories based on ethno-national belonging). As we will see in chapters 3–6, this is the kind of political program offered by the Front National (as well as by the other ERP parties). In the fourth section of chapter 1, political parties will be discussed. I will argue that political parties are organizations, based on party ideologies, which use strategies in order to obtain certain goals. The main goal of political parties is to influence policy outcome in a political system in line with their political platform. In order to achieve this goal, parties in Western democracies that consist of party systems involving three or more parties must do well in four different arenas: the electoral arena (vote maximization), the internal arena (internal cohesion), the parliamentary arena (compromises and coalition building), and the implementation arena (‘realistic’ and feasible proposals). I will argue that political parties are normally constrained in the electoral arena because of the partly conflicting goals of the different arenas, and that a new political party with a weak party organization and without an ideological tradition might have greater strategic room to maneuver for vote maximization in the electoral arena, which might be considered an initial advantage. However, there are also macro factors shaping the behavior of political parties. Electoral systems and laws in particular will be discussed in the fifth section in chapter 1. In the sixth section, finally, I will discuss strategies of political propaganda to illustrate how the political demand and supply sides are linked. Political actors not only act or react to the distribution of voter preferences, but they also try to influence (or even to create) these preferences by means of framing processes and political propaganda. In chapter 2, I will move from a more general discussion of the emergence and sustained electoral support for the ERP parties to an analysis of the French Front National in particular. This chapter will focus on the voters of the Front National. By means of a series of logistic regression analyses, I will study the social characteristics as well as attitudinal motivation

24

The Populist Challenge

of Front National voters. By using data from three different elections—the presidential elections of 1988 and 1995 and the legislative election of 1997—changes over time will be identified and discussed. In chapter 3, which partly serves as an introduction to the analysis of the three basic niches that made the emergence and sustained electoral support of the Front National possible, I will discuss the emergence of the socio-cultural right-wing authoritarian niche in France during the 1980s. I will also examine how the Front National has been able to capitalize on it. In the first section, I will argue that this niche evolved through a general rightward shift by the voters in the political space, and a situation in which the voters perceived a convergence of the established political parties’ position within the same space. In the second section, I will examine the ways in which the political program and appearance of the Front National was based on a socio-culturally right-wing and authoritarian ideology and political rhetoric. In chapter 4, I will discuss the importance of the niche of ethno-nationalism. In the first part of this chapter, I will discuss different types of nationalism, of which territorial, or civic, nationalism, on the one hand, and ethnic nationalism, on the other, will be considered the most important ones. In the second part, I will discuss the tradition of ethnic nationalism in France, which I will argue has existed as an important undercurrent since the nineteenth century. In the third part, finally, I will demonstrate that ethno-nationalism is at the heart of the ideology of the Front National, and discuss the ways in which the party has used rhetorical strategies to take advantage of the existing niche. Chapter 5 will consider the exclusionary aspect of ethnic nationalism, namely, xenophobia. More specifically, I will in this chapter discuss the importance of politicized xenophobia and the anti-immigration issue. I will discuss the politicization of the immigration issue, which in France in fact was initiated by parties others than the Front National—the French Communist Party in particular; the framing processes, in which the immigration and immigrants were to be seen as problems; and, finally, the rhetorical strategies and ideological devices by which the Front National was able to influence the outcome of the framing processes, and capitalize on the existing niche of xenophobia and anti-immigrant attitudes. In chapter 6, the final chapter of this book, I will discuss the niche of political discontent. This niche, together with a more general phenomenon of political alienation, is important for two reasons. Aside from discouraging voters from the traditional parties, and thus freeing resources for new parties, it provides fertile ground for parties ready and able to mobilize political protest. I will in this chapter demonstrate that the Front National’s ideology is partly populist, and that this, together with their successful use of populist anti-political establishment strategies, made it possible for the Front National to mobilize protest votes.

Introduction

25

Notes 1. If we take a look at the electoral support for the ERP parties in recent elections, we see that the Austrian FPÖ received 27 percent of the vote in the 1999 parliamentary election; Vlaams Blok received 16 percent in the 1999 election to the Flanders Parliament in Belgium; the Danish People’s Party received 12 percent of the vote in the 2001 parliamentary election in Denmark; Le Pen received 17 percent of the vote in the first round of the 2002 presidential election in France; the German People’s Party (DVU) received 13 percent in the 1998 election to the parliament in Saxony-Anhalt in Germany; the Northern League received 10 percent in the 1996 parliamentary election in Italy (but considerably less in the 2001 election); the Progress Party received 15 percent in the 2001 Norwegian parliamentary election; and the Swiss People’s Party received 23 percent in the 1999 parliamentary election in that country (Eatwell 2000b: 408, Ivaldi 2001: 54; www.electionworld.org). 2. An emerging new party may wield political power in two different ways: it may take over the power of the state and implement its program (or at least take part in governments), or it may influence the other political actors on central issues, and wield an indirect influence over policy (see Lipset and Raab 1970: 498). As we have seen, the ERP parties have been a political force in both respects. 3. Although this study is similar to Kitschelt’s (1995) in some ways, it differs in several others. One of the most important is that this book, contrary to Kitschelt’s, combines a discussion of macro-sociological change, (supply) opportunity structures, and a sociopsychological theory of how preferences and voting dispositions are created—and not least by means of which mechanisms they are connected to the macro-sociological processes. 4. In 1994, between 74 and 93 percent of voters in the Western European democracies included in the World Values Survey (with the exception of Ireland and Northern Ireland) believed democracy to be the best form of government. Popular support for democracy ‘as an idea’ or ‘ideal’ was even greater, and varied between 93 and 99 percent (Dalton 1999: 70; Klingemann 1999: 44). 5. I have used quotations from the secondary literature for several reasons. Souchard et al. (1997) present a rich collection of excerpts from Le Pen’s speeches. Davies (1999), Marcus (1995), and Simmons (1996) provide a fair number of quotations from interviews with the Front National’s leadership in the French media. By relying on these works, I was able to spare myself a lot of work that was not motivated by the purpose of this study. Furthermore, the works in English mentioned above also contain quotations from the official party literature (party programs, etc.). I have used these already translated quotations when I have found them representative of the Front National’s political platform. 6. There are ERP parties, such as the Lega Nord and Vlaams Blok, that actually work against the nation-state they belong to. However, their aim is to break free from Italy and Belgium, respectively, in order to form new nation-states that they believe correspond to ethnicity in a purer way. Hence, these parties are still ethno-nationalist parties, although we might call them micro-nationalists (see Eatwell 2000b: 409). 7. In fact, the tradition from Maurras’s nationalism may be particularly significant. As Ernst Nolte has argued, Maurras was the “first to conceive of nationhood as a privilege, and to deny other people the right to nationality. He is the first to transform, while fully conscious of what he was doing, the Kantian imperative into the pseudo-absolute imperative of France d’abord” (Nolte 1966: 104; cf. Rémond 1996: 13). 8. I will use abbreviations for the French mainstream parties: PS (the Socialist Party), PCF (the French Communist Party), UDF (Union for French Democracy), and RPR (Rally for the Republic).

Chapter 1

POLITICS AND POLITICAL BEHAVIOR A Theoretical Framework


Before turning to the more specific discussion of how to explain the emergence and electoral success of the Front National and other ERP parties, a more general theory of politics and political behavior must be provided. The reason for this is to avoid ad hoc explanations. The disposition of this chapter will follow two fundamental dichotomous distinctions: one between the macro and the micro level, and one between the political demand and the political supply side. If we set these two distinctions against each other, we get four different areas (see figure 1.1). In order to understand politics and political behavior, all four areas will have to be accounted for. Hence, four of the six main sections of this chapter will deal with these four different areas. In addition, one section will deal with the issue of how to link the macro and the micro levels on the demand side; and one section will deal with the issue of how to link the demand and the supply sides.1 Although this chapter sets out to present a theoretical framework for politics and political behavior in general, I will additionally focus on how new political parties, in particular ERP parties, emerge. Let us start with the distinction between the macro and micro levels. At the macro level, I will argue, the transformation processes connected with the change from an industrial to a postindustrial economy have been a fundamental condition for the emergence of ERP parties. However, we cannot stop at the macro level. In order to find a rock-bottom explanation for the phenomenon under investigation, we have to show how the changes at the macro level influence individuals (in this case, mainly voters), whose actions and behaviors ‘produce’ the emergence of the ERP parties. Without popular support, ultimately as a cast of ballots, no ERP party would emerge at the electoral level. Hence, we should try to provide a macro-based explanation with a micro foundation (cf. Coleman 1986, 1990; Hedström and Swedberg 1998). Notes for this chapter begin on page 79.

28

The Populist Challenge

FIGURE 1.1 The Analytical Framework Demand

Supply

Macro Level

Societal Structures

Party Systems

Micro Level

The Voters

Political Parties

The two factors presented above both relate to the demand side of the political space. However, not only what the voters and other political actors demand but also the alternatives offered by the supply side are important for the structuring of political behavior. I will also distinguish here between a macro and a micro level. At the macro level, we find formal laws and institutions, such as voting laws (e.g., proportional or majority voting systems), as well as the political system as a whole. The macro-level factors of the political supply side are important for three reasons: First, it can be of varying degree of closure. A proportional voting system, for instance, is more favorable to the emergence of new parties than is a majority voting system. Second, political parties and other political actors partly determine their positions in relation to those of other political actors. Thus, the political supply side (or political field) has in part an internal dynamics (see Bourdieu 2000). Third, the degree of convergence within the political space has two important effects. A high degree of convergence may create new niches, that is, lead to a gap between the distribution of voter preferences and the positions of the political parties. It may also cause increases in the level of popular distrust in and discontent with the political parties and other political institutions, as well as a decrease in the level of party identification. Both these effects may provide new parties, especially protest parties, with a favorable opportunity structure. At the micro level of the supply side, finally, we find the political parties. However, this classification is based on a deliberate simplification. Since I conceive of political parties as organizations, which implies that the functioning of political parties cannot be reduced to its individual parts (i.e., party leaders and other party members), they should actually be placed at a meso level. However, the inclusion of a meso level would make the theoretical model too complex and voluminous, at least for the scope of this study. Hence, by placing the political parties at the micro level, I only want to indicate that they exist at a ‘lower’ level than electoral laws and the party system. I will also occasionally state that a party ‘says’ or ‘writes’ this or that. Although this is a mild form of false personification, it

Politics and Political Behavior

29

is a convenient way to describe statements from official party sources, such as party programs, posters, and leaflets. As mentioned in the introduction, it will be assumed that the macro levels of both the demand and the supply sides are characterized by a higher degree of inertia than are the micro levels, which will be assumed to be relatively more volatile. However, it will also be assumed that the voters are more volatile than political parties, which are constrained by organizational factors (see March and Olsen 1989: 55). As we will see below, these differences in the level of inertia might lead to the emergence of niches, that is, situations in which existing supply does not satisfy the demand of a substantial part of the electorate. As mentioned in the introduction, I believe that the emergence and electoral successes of the ERP parties can best be understood in terms of ethno-nationalism, xenophobia, and populism. Using this framework, I will argue that in order to explain the emergence of ERP parties, we have to consider both opportunity structures, created by demand- and supplyside factors, and the ability of the various ERP parties to take advantage of the available opportunities. However, this chapter will deal exclusively with the emergence of opportunity structures (i.e., niches). The transition from an industrial to a postindustrial economy has affected groups of individuals differently, depending on their position within the social space. While some have gained, others have lost out, which has resulted in feelings of absolute and relative deprivation. Not least important in this context is the fact that this transformation process has changed the structure of social comparison. Individuals with little cultural capital have increasingly found themselves in a situation of social decline and status deprivation, which has made them susceptible to political entrepreneurs promoting a return to the status quo ante, and who stress themes of ethno-national identity. Similarly, because of feelings of anxiety, frustration, and resentment resulting from poverty and unemployment, people finding themselves in situations of absolute deprivation have become increasingly susceptible to political actors using xenophobic themes of welfare chauvinism, that is, who place the blame for unemployment and the financial problems of the welfare state on immigrants (cf. Betz 1994; Kitschelt 1995; Kriesi 1999). This transformation process has created a situation favorable to ethno-national, welfare chauvinistic, and authoritarian mobilization. Hence, at the demand side, macro changes have in many Western European countries resulted in a changed distribution of voter attitudes and preferences in the political space (see Kitschelt 1995; see also chapter 3). Yet as we will see below, the parties are not as flexible as the voters; to shift position is a process that takes some time for a political party because of constraints such as ideological commitment and identification, democratic but ‘inefficient’ party organization, and so on. Normally, there is a considerable time lag between voter and party movement within the political

30

The Populist Challenge

space.2 Consequently, a rapid change in the voter distribution creates a gap between the political demand side and its supply side. If a political party can position itself in this niche, it may have a good chance to capture votes, at least if the number of party-identified voters has decreased below a certain level.3 In fact, niches in the electoral arena will be considered as one of the most important ‘opportunity structures’ facilitating the emergence of ERP parties, and I will argue that ethno-nationalism and xenophobia, which both belong to the socio-cultural cleavage dimension, have been the two most important such niches. However, a ‘negative’ factor has been of equal importance. The political transformation process has resulted in a growing discontent with political institutions and politicians, as well as in a decrease in party identification among voters (Putnam et al. 2000). This situation has facilitated the emergence of the ERP parties by freeing resources and opening up niches in the electoral arena, which has made it possible for some ERP parties to mobilize on ethno-nationalism and xenophobia. In addition, it has made it possible for the ERP parties to foment popular discontent and mobilize political protest. To pinpoint my hypothesis more clearly, I will argue that the emergence (i.e., electoral breakthrough) of an ERP party can be explained in either of three ways: first, as a combination of the emergence of niches within the socio-cultural cleavage dimension, demanding ethno-nationalist and xenophobic (i.e., anti-immigration and welfare chauvinist) policies, and a situation in which a sufficient number of the voters lack loyalty to other parties (i.e., a situation of dealignment); second, as a result of political protest, which can be based either on dissatisfaction with particular aspects of one or several of the established parties, or on a more general discontent with political institutions per se, in particular with the political parties and politicians; or third, by a combination of these two alternatives. Which explanation is valid is bound to vary among different ERP parties. However, in order to explain the sustained electoral support of the ERP parties, political protest alone is not a sufficient explanatory factor. Only if ethnonationalist and xenophobic niches exist will the newly emerged ERP party persist as a significant force—not least because protest voters are likely to return to their ‘old’ parties when they have made their voices heard, unless they have a ‘positive’ interest in continuing to support the new party.

From an Industrial to a Postindustrial Economy: Macro Transformations Affecting the Demand Side When it comes to macro phenomena, I will follow Daniel Bell’s (1996) proposal to make an analytical separation between the economic, cultural, and political realms of society. Although the three spheres are highly interconnected, they are also partly autonomous, which means that to some

Politics and Political Behavior

31

extent they “respond to different norms, [and] have different rhythms of change” (Bell 1996: 10). As a result, changes in the economic realm are likely to influence the form and content of the interactions that individuals have at their workplaces, but not necessarily the interactions they have as neighbors, consumers of cultural goods, or members of a political party. Yet in the long run more radical changes in one of the three spheres will have an influence on the other two, as well. The task of this study is to explain changes in the political realm (i.e., the emergence of a new party—or indeed a new party family). In order to accomplish this task, I must discuss all three societal realms (the economic and cultural ones here, the political one in a coming section). More specifically, I must show how changes in these macro realms have resulted in changes at the micro level (e.g., in individuals’ real and perceived life situations; in negative emotions; and in beliefs, attitudes, and preferences). Nevertheless, I will in concert with Betz (1994) and Kitschelt (1995) argue that the emergence of the ERP parties is largely “a consequence of a profound transformation of the socioeconomic and sociocultural structure of advanced Western European democracies” (Betz 1994: 26–27), and more specifically the transition from an industrial to a postindustrial society, as well as the ongoing modernization processes.4 According to Kitschelt (1995), these structural changes in the economy brought about changes in the citizens’ preferences. Contrary to the situation during the first decades of the postwar era, “contemporary postindustrial democracies generate a limited but distinctive demand for a political combination of ethnocentric, authoritarian, and free market liberal appeals” (Kitschelt 1995: 5).5 In this study ‘postindustrial society’ denotes a society in which the importance of the production of services has outgrown the importance of industrial production—which implies a reevaluation of skills and virtues (e.g., from ‘reliable’ to ‘flexible’)—and in which social stratification is increasingly based on knowledge and formal education (see Bell 1976). As shown in table 1.1, the production of services has increased substantially at the expense of industrial production in Western Europe—France included—since the early 1970s. In order to get a more fine-grained understanding of this development at the time for the emergence of the Front National, it may be instructive to take a look at table 1.2. While the sectors of manufacturing and mining declined all over Western Europe, we saw a strong increase in knowledgeintensive sectors, such as real estate and business service. Furthermore, the transition toward a postindustrial society is largely characterized by dissolution, fragmentation, and differentiation, which are the results of increased individualization (see Beck 1992). These processes have implications for the cultures of contemporary Western societies, in which, according to Betz (1994: 29), “established subcultures, milieus, and institutions, which traditionally provided and sustained collective identities, are getting eroded and/or are being destroyed …, and

32

The Populist Challenge

TABLE 1.1 Civilian Employment by Sector, 1973–1995 Agriculture

Austria Belgium Denmark Finland France Germany Italy Netherlands Sweden UK

Industry

Services

’73 ’83 ’95 ’73–95

’73

’83

’95 ’73–95

’73 ’83

’95 ’73–95

16 4 10 17 11 7 18 6 7 3

41 41 34 36 40 47 39 37 37 42

39 31 28 33 34 41 36 28 30 33

33* 28** 27* 27 27 38 33* 23* 26 26

43 55 57 47 49 45 42 58 56 55

60* 69** 68* 64 69 69 60* 73* 71 72

10 3 7 13 8 5 12 5 5 3

7* 3** 5* 8 5 3 7* 4* 3 2

-9 -1 -5 -9 -6 -4 -11 -2 -4 1

-8 -13 -7 -9 -13 -9 -6 -14 -9 -16

51 65 64 54 58 54 51 67 65 64

+17 +14 +9 +17 +20 +24 +18 +15 +15 +17

* Data from 1994. ** Data from 1990. Source: OECD (1996: 191).

TABLE 1.2 Changes in Employment Structure across Industries in Seven EEC Countries (employees only) Countries for which share has between 1977 and 1986: Declined Grown Production of metals Textile manufacturing Building and civil engineering Timber and wooden furniture manufacturing Metal manufacturing Electrical engineering Mining of coal, coke ovens Real estate and business service Health and veterinary Recreation and cultural Hotels and catering Travel agents Insurance Office and data processing machinery Education Banking and finance

7 7 7 7 7 6 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1

0 0 0 0 0 1 1 7 7 7 7 7 7 6 6 6

Average annual growth rate of share (in percent) -4.9 -4.1 -3.4 -2.7 -2.3 -1.1 -3.1 +4.6 +3.1 +2.6 +2.3 +1.2 +1.0 +3.0 +2.0 +1.3

Source: OECD (1989: 165–166). Countries included are Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, and the United Kingdom.

Politics and Political Behavior

33

are giving way to a ‘flux of contextualized identities.’” Some indicators of this process are the declining importance of marriage—as shown by rising divorce rates and the number of babies born of unmarried mothers (Castells 1997: 146)—the decline in class voting (as will be discussed below), and the declining membership rates of unions (Ebbinghaus and Visser 2000) and political parties (Mair and van Biezen 2001). Taken together, these developments increase the importance of cultural capital, flexibility, and individual entrepreneurship to people’s efforts to adapt to rapidly changing circumstances in contemporary Western societies (see Bunar and Trondman 2001). Hence, those who possess these characteristics can be expected to be among the ‘winners’ in postindustrial societies (Betz 1994: 29–30). However, the ‘losers,’ those who are unable to cope with the “acceleration of economic, social, and cultural modernization” and/or are stuck in full or partial unemployment, run the risk of falling into a new underclass, and becoming “superfluous and useless for society” (Betz 1994: 32). The last decades have been characterized not only by the postindustrialization process, but also by periodic deep economic downturns in most Western European countries, a situation that was particularly severe during the 1990s. The golden years of fast and steady economic growth during the 1950s and 1960s came abruptly to an end in the mid 1970s, which is indicated in table 1.3. Since 1974 the growth of the GDP has slowed down and the unemployment rates have been established at a high level. As indicated above, and as shown in greater detail in table 1.4, this situation was worse in France than in most other Western European countries. As a result of this situation, substantial groups have been affected or threatened by unemployment and other kinds of social marginalization over the last decades. In a postindustrial society, people with little cultural capital are increasingly overrepresented among these groups. As demonstrated in table 1.5, the unemployment rates are considerable higher (often two or three times as high) for the poorly educated than for people with a higher level of education. TABLE 1.3 Some Indications of Economic Crisis 1961–1973 Average (in %)

Growth of GDP Unemployment rate Inflation rate

1974–1993 Average (in %)

EU15 Average

France

EU15 Average

4.9 2.4 4.5

5.3 2.0 4.7

2.3 7.1 8.6

Source: Alesina and Wacziarg (2000: 158).

France

2.4 7.9 7.2

Difference EU15 France Average

- 2.6 + 4.7 + 4.1

- 2.9 + 5.9 +3.5

34

The Populist Challenge

TABLE 1.4 Unemployment Rates in Europe, 1981–2000

Austria Belgium Britain Denmark Finland France Germany Ireland Italy Netherlands Portugal Spain Sweden

1981

1984

1986

1988

1990

1992

1994

1998

2000

— 11.1 9.1 8.7 — 7.7 4.8 10.2 8.0 8.8 — 14.4 —

— 14.4 11.8 9.9 — 10.0 8.4 16.6 11.9 14.5 8.5 20.6 —

— 12.6 12.0 7.6 — 10.8 8.1 18.4 13.8 12.4 8.5 21.5 —

— 10.2 8.5 6.4 — 9.9 6.3 17.3 10.9 9.3 5.7 19.4 —

— 7.6 7.0 8.1 — 9.0 4.8 14.5 10.0 7.5 4.6 16.2 —

— 7.3 10.1 9.2 13.0 10.4 6.6 15.4 9.0 5.6 4.2 18.5 5.8

— 10.0 9.6 8.2 17.9 12.3 8.4 14.3 11.4 7.1 7.0 24.1 9.8

4.5 9.5 6.3 5.2 11.4 11.8 9.4 7.6 11.9 4.0 5.2 18.8 8.3

3.6 8.7 5.9 5.0 10.2 10.5 8.5 5.0 11.2 2.7 4.3 15.1 6.6

Source: Eurostat (1987: 7; 1994: 6; 1996: 57; 2000: 57).

TABLE 1.5 Unemployment Ratios by Educational Attainment for Persons Aged 25–64 Less Than Upper Second Education (A)

Austria Belgium Denmark Finland France Germany Sweden UK EU

Upper Second Education (B)

Tertiary Level Education (C)

A minus C

1995

1999

1995

1999

1995

1999

1995

1999

8.5 13.4 14.6 21.6 14.0 13.3 10.1 12.2 13.7

6.9 12.0 7.0 13.1 15.3 15.8 9.0 10.0 11.5

6.2 7.5 8.3 16.1 8.9 7.9 8.7 7.4 8.2

3.6 6.6 4.1 9.5 9.2 8.8 6.5 4.7 7.2

4.0 3.6 4.6 7.6 6.5 4.9 4.5 3.7 5.8

2.0 3.1 3.0 4.7 6.2 4.9 3.9 2.7 5.1

+4.5 +9.8 +10.0 +14.0 +7.5 +8.4 +5.6 +8.5 +7.9

+4.9 +8.9 +5.3 +8.4 +9.1 +10.9 +5.1 +7.3 +6.4

Source: OECD (1998: 203–205; 2001: 221–223).

I will in this study argue that this situation may favor the emergence of ERP parties in three ways. First, as indicated above, the ‘losers’ in the postindustrialization process have increasingly found themselves in a situation of social decline and deprivation, which has made them more susceptible to political actors promoting a politics of the status quo ante, and who stress themes of ethno-national identity. Second, partly as a response to the established political parties’ inability to cope with the perceived perversions of rapid economic and cultural transformation processes, as well

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as with unemployment, many have become increasingly discontent and disenchanted, which has opened a niche for parties ready to exploit popular political discontent in order to win protest votes. Third, the fragmentation and individualization of postindustrial societies lead to a decreased salience of the economic cleavage dimension, as well as to weakened class loyalties, which may open up a space for parties addressing new issues, such as the ‘immigration question’ (see Betz 1994: 34–35). Issues that resonate with other kinds of identity (e.g., ethnicity and nationality) are especially apt to find a receptive audience. However, as indicated above, the emergence of the ERP parties is not only a result of changes in the economy, but also of cultural change. As Inglehart (1997: 251) has argued, the emergence of xenophobic parties and movements can partly be seen as a reaction against cultural changes that are eroding traditional values and customs. Like changes in the economy, this is likely to affect people differently, depending on their position within the social space. As a result, postindustrial society promotes both a more skilled and sophisticated population, which increasingly accepts cultural changes (e.g., multiculturalism), and a polarization between winners and losers, which creates growing frustration and feelings of envy and resentment among the losers of the postindustrialization processes. These negative emotions may be turned into support for the authoritarian and neo-racist ideology of the ERP parties (see Kitschelt 1995: 273). However, how the structural transformations of the economic and cultural realms have led to these changes in individual preferences and/or emotions and affects, and in what way these have been favorable to the emergence of the ERP parties, will be discussed in coming sections of this chapter. In the remainder of this section, I will deal more in detail with the macro phenomena of economic and cultural change, as well as the decreasing importance of the economic cleavage and weakened class loyalties.

Dealignment or Realignment? I will argue below (in chapter 6, in particular) that the emergence of the Front National—and the ERP parties generally—has been facilitated by a dealignment process, one in which “voters abandon their lifelong loyalty and avoid commitment to another party” (Rose and McAllister 1990: 15) and consequently become ‘floating voters.’ However, a partial realignment process, in which the relative salience of the socio-cultural cleavage dimension has increased at the expense of the economic cleavage dimension, has also been of great importance for the emergence of the ERP parties. I believe that several cleavage dimensions always exist simultaneously (cf. Hout et al. 1996; Przeworski and Sprague 1986), most of them ultimately based on social identity or interests. Although these cleavage dimensions exist side by side, either manifest or latent, their salience increases or declines during certain periods (Hout et al. 1996: 55–56). Contemporary

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Western European democracies are characterized by two major cleavage dimensions: the economic cleavage dimension, which puts workers against the capital, and which concerns the degree of state involvement in the economy, and the socio-cultural cleavage dimension, which is about issues such as immigration, law and order, abortion, and so on (see Bell 1996: 332–333). Together, these two cleavage dimensions constitute the basic contours of the political space. At a voter level, it is not uncommon for people to endorse at the same time the attitudes that “I am a worker, and I do not like capitalists” and “I am French (or Austrian, etc.), and I do not like immigrants.” However, the salience of these cleavage dimensions are historically contingent. In addition, the cleavage structures may be of different degrees of complexity, and may vary both over time and between different countries. While countries such as Sweden, for instance, have a relatively simple cleavage structure, France has a much more complicated one. In France, other cleavage divisions (e.g., religious, ethnic, regional) have for a long time cut across economic class loyalties, which has lessened the impact of social class on political behavior (Lipset in Mair et al. 1999: 313). But although issues belonging to the socio-cultural cleavage dimension have existed at an attitudinal level throughout the twentieth century, the economic cleavage dimension has structured most political behavior in the postwar era (see Budge and Robertson 1987). However, there are certain indications that the salience of the socio-cultural cleavage dimension has increased at the expense of the economic cleavage dimension during the past few decades, not least because of the politicization of issues such as immigration, multiculturalism, feminism, and the environment (for discussion and empirical indications, see e.g., Betz 1994; Clark and Lipset 2001; Ignazi 1997a; Inglehart 1997; Kitschelt 1995; Perrineau 1997). This trend is one of the most important factors encouraging the emergence of the ERP parties. As we have seen, the ERP parties are not mainly right-wing extremists on economic matters, but rather on issues belonging to the socio-cultural cleavage dimension. More specifically, the socio-cultural cleavage dimension ranges between the poles of authoritarianism (or particularism) and cultural liberalism. In fact, the ERP parties occupy the opposite pole to the New Left, which began to mobilize in the 1960s, and in a way constitute a mirror image of those parties and movements (Kitschelt 1995: 2).6

Political Changes: Increased Political Alienation and Weakened Class Loyalties? So far, we have mainly discussed economic and cultural changes. However, changes in the political realm have also been of great importance for the emergence of ERP parties. More specifically, I will argue that (1) increasing political alienation among certain groups of individuals, (2) a

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decreasing trust in political institutions and a corresponding increase in discontent with political parties and politicians, (3) a decreasing level of party identification among voters, and (4) a decline in class voting were all of great importance for the emergence and electoral successes of the ERP parties. Political discontent and alienation will be further discussed in chapter 6, where empirical indications of these processes will be presented. These situations arose for a variety of reasons, and I will briefly mention the four most important ones. First, the political parties and other political institutions have found it difficult to adapt to the profound economic and social changes that have left many voters feeling that both the politics and the politicians are decoupled from the ‘reality’ that ‘ordinary people’ live (Mény and Surel 2000: 24). Second, the increasing complexity of the political process combined with the declining political autonomy of the nationstate have made the political decision-making processes more opaque (see Poggi 1990). Third, the real or perceived convergence between the mainstream parties in the political space has caused a widespread feeling that no real differences exist between the political right and left. And fourth, various political scandals and ‘affairs,’ and cases of corruption in particular, have had a disenchanting effect on many voters. There are two reasons why this political climate facilitated the rise of the ERP parties: first, because of the weakened ties between the voters and the political parties, resources were freed and niches were opened up within the political space in which political entrepreneurs could operate; second, the growing political alienation and discontent had created an audience receptive to ‘anti-system’ and ‘anti-establishment’ messages (see Ignazi 1996b: 77), and thus provided an opportunity for the ERP parties to mobilize protest voters. Before summing up this section, I will briefly discuss some aspects of weakening class loyalties and the corresponding decline in class voting. Like party identification, class voting represents a relatively stable and enduring component in voter behavior. We usually talk about class voting when, statistically, people belonging to the same social class vote in the same way. This is assumed to be the result of their common interests, which are based on their shared socio-economic position (e.g., Nieuwbeerta and De Graaf 1999). The micro aspects of class voting, i.e., when both interests and a feeling of belonging and/or loyalty to a social class govern voter decisions, will be discussed in greater detail in a coming section. Here, I will mainly discuss the macro factors that have caused the decline in class voting. As we can see, some of these factors are also relevant to the supply side of the political space, in particular the political parties. As shown in table 1.6, class voting, measured by the Alford Index, has declined in most European countries.7 In France, too, class voting has declined during the postwar period, not least during the period preceding the emergence of the Front National. There seem to be at least seven possible reasons why the influence of class has diminished:

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The Populist Challenge

TABLE 1.6 Levels of Class Voting (measured by Alford Index)

Austria Belgium Britain Denmark Finland France Germany Italy Netherlands Norway Sweden

1945–1960

1961–1970

1971–1980

1981–1990

— — 37.3 39.8 48.4 24.4 36.0 26.6 14.0 52.5 51.0

29.3 25.4 38.3 52.0 50.2 18.3 24.8 14.5 14.7 32.0 40.7

28.3 17.9 24.3 28.1 36.9 17.0 14.9 17.8 21.8 33.8 37.3

18.3 16.4 23.4 20.9 35.7 11.7 13.4 13.1 15.5 20.5 32.7

Source: Nieuwbeerta (2001: 126). The index score is obtained by taking the difference between the percentage of manual voters that voted for Left-wing political parties and the percentage of nonmanual workers that voted for these parties.

1. Class voting declines in a situation where new structural cleavages supersede class cleavages. Sector cleavages that put people who work in the private sector against those who work in the public sector, as was discussed above, are one example of such a new cleavage structure (Evans 1999b; Mair et al. 1999). 2. Class voting declines in a situation of increased material well-being, which reduces the salience of class-related issues in favor of issues related to other identities and values, such as the nation, gender, and ethnicity (Evans 1999b; Mair et al. 1999). In other words, class voting is likely to decline in situations where the dominance of the economic cleavage dimension has increasingly been challenged by the socio-cultural cleavage dimension. 3. Another consequence of increasing material well-being is that real or perceived class inequalities diminish, which also diminishes the impact of social class on identity and actions (Mair et al. 1999). Class voting is likely to decline in such situations. 4. Class voting might also decline as a result of a general trend toward individualization. As a result of increasing social and geographic mobility, and as family, workplace, and neighborhood lose importance, the traditional milieus for socialization are dissolving. This results in a more individualistic way of making political decisions, and increases the importance of issue voting (Evans 1999b; Mair et al. 1999). 5. Class voting may also decline as a consequence of the ‘decomposition of labor’ (Dahrendorf 1959), that is, as a result of an increasing differentiation of the working class by skill levels (i.e., skilled, semiskilled, and unskilled). This has resulted in a fragmentation of the class

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structure, and has had a negative effect on class consciousness (Clark and Lipset 1996). 6. Class voting may also decline as a consequence of strategic actions of the Social Democratic parties. As the working class has declined as a proportion of the electorate, the Social Democratic parties have increasingly directed their policies toward attracting the growing middle classes. This has resulted in a weakening of the class character of the Social Democratic parties (Evans 1999b; Przeworski and Sprague 1986). 7. Finally, I would argue that class voting may decline in a situation of growing political dissatisfaction and alienation. When voter groups such as workers no longer believe that any of the political parties serve the interests of the voters, but rather the interests of the ‘political class,’ a process of dealignment or realignment might be initiated.

In Conclusion One of the main explanations for the emergence of and sustained electoral support for the ERP parties is that transformations of the economy, together with cultural and political changes, disadvantaged certain groups of individuals. More specifically, these changes resulted in a situation in which: 1. some groups of individuals became increasingly marginalized and excluded, or at least felt that way; 2. there was an increasing gap created between some groups’ expectations and the reality of their lives; 3. some groups lost their cognitive and emotional map because of the erosion of traditions, habits, religion, class loyalties, and/or political ideologies; 4. some groups of individuals became increasingly detached and alienated from the established political institutions. In other words, because of absolute or relative deprivation, and/or cognitive and emotional disorientation, some groups of individuals (particularly unskilled and semiskilled workers and poorly educated members of the lower middle class, such as craftsmen) became susceptible to the authoritarian, populist xenophobic ideology of the ERP parties, stressing themes of resentment and national identity. In addition, because of the decline in class voting and party identification, resources were freed for the emergence of new parties. In many ways the structure of this explanation follows one of the dominant explanations for the rise of Nazism and fascism during the interwar era. According to Lipset (1981: 489), for instance, fascist parties were disproportionately supported by sections of the middle class that

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were “displaced or threatened by the emergence of centralized, largescale industry and the growing power and status of organized labor” (cf. Linz 1976). The reasons for this, according to Lipset (1981), were (1) the increasing economic insecurity for these groups, (2) their lack of education and political sophistication, (3) their decline in status, (4) the growing threats to the values they believed in, and (5) their poor integration into democratic institutions. As indicated above, I believe that similar mechanisms were involved in the emergence of the ERP parties. However, contrary to the situation preceding the emergence of interwar fascism and Nazism, in contemporary Europe the characteristics listed above also included segments of the working class. More specifically, while the petty bourgeoisie that supported the interwar fascists and Nazis were affected by the industrialization of the economy and the cultural modernization, the unskilled and semiskilled workers—and petty bourgeoisie, such as small traders and craftsmen—who support the ERP parties are subjected to the stress arising from the postindustrialization of the economy (and to the still ongoing cultural modernization processes).8 Hence, if interwar fascism can be described as “a revolt of those who lost—directly or indirectly, temporarily or permanently—by industrialization” (Sauer 1967: 417), the emergence of the ERP parties can partly be understood as a revolt of those who lost as a result of postindustrialization. Accordingly, like interwar fascism and Nazism, the ERP parties are to a great extent “a revolt of the déclassés” (Sauer 1967: 417).

Cognition, Emotions, and Interests: Micro-Level Aspects of Political Demand In this section I will discuss a micro approach to political behavior in general, and the emergence of the ERP parties in particular. I will discuss in greater detail how cognition (e.g., beliefs), emotions (e.g., frustration, fear, resentment, and identification), and interests, by themselves as well as intertwined in attitudes and ideologies, influence individual political behavior. More specifically, they create emotional dispositions and form the bases of political preferences, which in turn directly affect voting behavior. Given a voter’s emotional dispositions (e.g., degree of party identification) and political preferences, he or she will either vote for a particular party because of party identification (a nonchoice situation), or because of a belief that its profile (party image) or position on a particular political issue approximates his or her preferences. These are the basic features of the voting model that will be presented toward the end of this section. However, by discussing background factors such as cognition, emotions, and interests—rather than starting directly with the voter model—we are in a position to detect the social aspects of political preferences and dispositions. Beliefs, attitudes, and ideologies are essentially

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social phenomena, to a large extent created through socialization and social interaction. Furthermore, throughout this study people’s perceptions and understanding of reality are what count in the final analysis. This does not mean that reality itself is without importance: quite the contrary. Most of our perceptions and understanding of reality, we may assume, are based on reality. However, how one perceives and comprehends reality is also dependent on, among other things, (1) what one knows beforehand, (2) what information one gets, and (3) what one’s interests are. A phenomenon will be perceived differently whether or not it is perceived as belonging to the category of ‘problem,’ or ‘political,’ or so on. The salience of different systems of classifications in a society is also likely to change over time. Phenomena that at time t1 were generally classified as belonging to social class might, for instance, be classified in terms of ethnicity or nationality at t2 (e.g., criminal youngsters from marginalized suburbs). Similarly, a phenomenon that is perceived as nonpolitical at t1 might be perceived as political at t2. In order to grasp this dimension, it will be necessary to discuss cognition, emotion, and interests, as well as how these are shaped by social interaction in the social space. Furthermore, in a coming section we will discuss how political actors such as political parties and the media try to influence how voters perceive and understand reality, by framing and political propaganda, and by trying to politicize certain issues and depoliticize others (see also chapter 5). This section will proceed in the following way. First, cognitive aspects will be discussed, in particular categorization, stereotypes, and beliefs. Second, I will explore the importance of emotions and affects, especially identification, prejudice, resentment, and frustration. Third, I will discuss the importance of interests. Fourth, I will show how these aspects commingle in attitudes, belief systems, and ideologies. Finally, I will present a voting model.

Cognition In order to understand social behavior, of which political behavior constitutes a part, we have to address the question of how people construct their image of the world. In this section I will discuss how a priori cognitive forms (e.g., linguistic concepts, categorizations, rules for inferences, etc.) shape our reality. In addition, as will be demonstrated below, these a priori cognitive forms usually serve us well, but may at times be too rigid and limited, which may lead to biased judgments. However, a position holding that cognition plays an important role in the understanding of social actors should not be seen as a plea for an atomistic approach. Individuals are socially situated, thinking and feeling beings with personal biographies who live under certain material and historical conditions. The conceptual schemes, knowledge, and information shaping

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The Populist Challenge

our view of the world are socially mediated and always shared to some extent. Moreover, how we perceive the social world depends on the angle from which we see it. This means that each individual, at least to a certain extent, is ”in a two-fold sense predetermined by the fact of growing up in a society: on the one hand he finds a ready-made situation and on the other he finds in that situation preformed patterns of thought and of conduct” (Mannheim 1936: 3). With language, for instance, various interpretive schemes are internalized and institutionally defined (Berger and Luckmann 1966). The ways in which categorization is constructed linguistically partly determine how we see and comprehend our social surroundings.9 Hence, it should be noted that the beliefs, theories, and schemas discussed within this cognitive perspective are essentially social. They are acquired through a range of different channels such as socialization in childhood, through education and the media, and all kinds of social interactions in everyday life. Consequently, formal theories distilled from academic research mingle in people’s stock of knowledge with theories and schemas emanating from popular sayings, parables, myths, fables, epigrams, allegories, well-known songs, films and novels, as well as anecdotes about famous people or personal acquaintances (see Nisbett and Ross 1980: 119). Nevertheless, the notion of an a priori cognitive form stems from the fact that all knowledge inevitably assumes the mobilization of a priori forms. In itself, reality is too complex to be perceived and understood without the help of such forms. Among contemporary sociologists, Raymond Boudon (1989b, 1994, 1996) in particular has emphasized cognitive mechanisms. In his theory of (false) beliefs Boudon (1994) takes Georg Simmel’s (1977, 1978) notion of a priori forms as his point of departure. According to Boudon (1989b: 195), social actors are often confronted with ambiguous and complex situations in the natural course of daily life, which they master by using theories, principles, and conjectures. These a priori forms are more extensive than the counterparts presented by Immanuel Kant (1778 [1996]). Contrary to the Kantian usage of the term, the neo-Kantian position taken by Simmel, and adopted by Boudon, sees a priori forms as variable in time and space. Hence, we end up with a situation in which individuals’ perceptions and understanding of a phenomenon are dependent on what they already know. This is also the core of so-called social cognitive theory (see Fiske and Taylor 1991). This theory states that adults almost never approach objects and events as if they were sui generis configurations, but rather perceive and conceive of them through the lens of preexisting systems of schematized knowledge (i.e., beliefs, theories, propositions, and schemas). Without these a priori knowledge systems, life would be a “buzzing confusion” (Nisbett and Ross 1980: 7, 36), something that we do not tolerate because our innate striving for a coherent and meaningful interpretation of the events that surround us (Tversky and Kahneman 1982b: 117). Hence, we

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meet our surroundings with the help of a priori forms, which are normally taken for granted. However, at the same time as these a priori forms enable us to orient ourselves in the world, they occasionally lead to errors and/or oversimplifications. Because people have good reason to regard them as self-evident, the implicit frameworks impose themselves on the subjects and may often lead to dubious or even erroneous beliefs (see Boudon 1994: xii).10 More specifically, people are assumed to be ‘cognitive misers,’ that is, to use low-cost cognitive strategies in their everyday thinking. One such strategy is inductive reasoning, another the inclination to simplify reality “by interpreting specific instances in light of the general case” (Fiske and Taylor 1991: 141). The notion of black boxes (see Boudon 1994) is also of great importance in this context. This notion stems from the obvious observation that levels of sophistication differ between individuals and between different areas. We all have things about which we know a great deal, and some things about which we are ignorant or have only a vague conception. Nevertheless, when individuals face unfamiliar situations, they have, at least initially, only two alternatives: either to use a priori forms valid in other situations, or to trust information and/or theoretical propositions received from other people. The first strategy runs the risk that a priori forms valid in one context become mobilized in contexts where they are inappropriate, while the other strategy may lead people to succumb to false information and/or theoretical propositions (due to deliberate propaganda or just half-baked rumors). Moreover, in black box situations, especially in our first meetings with individuals, our perceptions may be governed by salient categorizing aspects in the form of stereotypes. When we lack information about an individual, we interpret him or her in light of our ‘knowledge’ of the social group or category to which he or she belongs. When this category is an ‘out-group,’ from our perspective, our stereotypes may commingle with negatively evaluated beliefs and/or affects. When this happens, we have a prejudiced stereotype (Rydgren 2000a, 2000b).

Categorization, Stereotyping, and Heuristic Biases To recapitulate, reality is usually too complex to be perceived and understood without the help of social categories. These are necessary for us, but can at the same time easily lead to stereotypes. Stereotypes, which Bar-Tal (1989: 227) characterizes as “frozen contents of knowledge,” are often employed when people feel the need to form a quick social category in order to process incoming information.11 Moreover, once a particular stereotype has been mobilized in one’s encounter with a person, our further perception of the individual will partly be dictated by the characteristics of the stereotype.12 Hence, we can make use of Rupert Brown’s (1995: 82) definition of stereotyping as a process in which someone attributes to another

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The Populist Challenge

person characteristics “which are seen to be shared by all or most of his or her fellow group members.” In other words, while a stereotype can be defined as a highly simplified and stylized image of a (social) category, stereotyping is “an inference drawn from the assignment of a person to a particular category.” At this point it is important to differentiate between individual and social stereotypes (e.g., Augoustinos and Walker 1995: 210). Besides being a highly simplified and stylized image of a social category, a social stereotype is also socially shared in a more or less consensual way (cf. Gardner 1994; Lippman 1922). In this study, the concept of stereotype should be understood in the latter sense. In the physical world, according to Nisbett and Ross (1980: 38), it is an approximate truth to say that “if you’ve seen one oak tree, you’ve seen them all.” Here we only need a limited number of properties to define objects as belonging to one category rather than another, and once we have correctly placed an object in the category of oak trees, we can predict with extremely high probability that “the tree will provide shade and acorns, that its wood will be hard and burn slowly, that all its leaves will drop in the fall, and so on” (Nisbett and Ross 1980: 38). In the social world, however, this is rarely the case. Here the observed properties of an object are less diagnostic and not so sharply delineated; there are usually many possible categories in which the object may be placed, and once the categorization has taken place, further predictions of properties of the categorized object are likely to fail. Hence, in the social world, categorizations and schemas are “rarely … more than rough outlines and tentative guides for perception and behavior. When they are relied on heavily, there are bound to be inferential errors and misguided actions” (Nisbett and Ross 1980: 38–39; cf. McGarty 1999; for ‘the problem of categorization,’ see Goodman 1978, 1983). Moreover, there are normally several ways in which an individual can be categorized in a given situation, for instance, by age, gender, social class, and ethnicity (Brown 1995: 39). Which categories people choose is partly determined by the context and partly by the disposition of the categorizer. However, there are also studies that indicate that ‘priming’ plays an important role: if an event “has occurred very recently which is evocative of a particular categorization then it is likely that subsequent events or situations will also be interpreted in terms of that same category system” (Brown 1995: 66–67). As mentioned above, inference rules often exist as a priori forms. Without a rudimentary knowledge of how to deduce and induce, for instance, we would hardly be able to get along as well as most of us do. However, as Tversky and Kahneman (1982a, 1982b, 1982c, 1982d; Kahneman and Tversky 1982a, 1982b) have pointed out, people often use very simplified heuristic principles in order to economize their thinking. For example, people often use the ‘Representative’ heuristic (to make inferences about probability on the basis of how similar phenomena are) and the ‘Availability’ heuristic (to make inferences about probability on the basis of how available an

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instance is in memory). However, although these heuristics often serve us well, they occasionally lead to biases (see Rydgren 2000b). In particular, it has been shown that people often lack the knowledge to distinguish between reliable and unreliable information. People tend to be insensitive to the fact that “their particular niches in the universe may funnel unrepresentative evidence or information to them in a thousand different domains” (Nisbett and Ross 1980: 262–263). As a result of our location in a social system, our lifestyles, and our personal preferences, we meet specific but limited slices of the social world. To this, add certain communication effects, that is, that individuals with a similar location in a social space also tend to use similar information sources—not least each other (Bar-Tal 1989; Boudon 1994; cf. Moscovici 1976).13 Moreover, many people are not aware of the fact that not all kinds of information are equally well remembered. Generally, vivid information is more easily remembered and accessible than pallid information. Information that is likely to attract and hold our attention because it is (1) emotionally interesting; (2) concrete and image provoking; and/or (3) proximate in a sensory, temporal, or spatial way may be deemed vivid (Nisbett and Ross 1980: 44–45). The fact that information is often weighted in proportion to its vividness implies that certain types of credible and very useful information will have a low effect on people’s inferences just because it is pallid. There is a risk that credible but boring information (e.g., academic reports) will be overlooked, while more vivid, anecdotal information will have a strong effect on our inferences, even though it is less credible and useful (Nisbett and Ross 1980: 55–56).14 These findings have far-reaching implications for everyday beliefs, judgments, and inferences.15 For one thing, they show how the feeling of insecurity, so typical of ethno-nationalism and xenophobia, may be stirred up. That people recall vivid information more easily may give them the impression that the world (or country, or city, or block) is more insecure than it really is. When people lack firsthand information, which they often do, they rely on secondhand information in order to form an opinion of the surrounding world. In doing so, they tend to remember reports about robberies, rapes, and murders more easily than other reports. Yet at the same time, they do not recall the days, weekends, or weeks when no robberies, rapes, or murders were reported. On the other hand, the fact that people tend to recall ‘stereotype-relevant’ information better (Hewstone 1989: 211) implies that memory biases in favor of reports that apparently ‘verify’ prejudiced stereotypes (e.g., North African immigrants are aggressive and inclined to criminal activity) are remembered better.

Beliefs, Attitudes, and Cognitive Schemas For reasons accounted for above, categories, and among them stereotypes, are essential for people’s perception and apprehension of reality. I will now turn to a discussion of the notions of beliefs, attitudes, and cognitive

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The Populist Challenge

schemas. We here enter a vicious circle: at the same time as the outcome of every categorization process is of direct importance for the formation of beliefs, attitudes, and cognitive schemas, preexisting beliefs, attitudes, and cognitive schemas partly determine the outcome of categorization processes. What comes first must be settled analytically. In the theoretical model used in this study, I will allow a two-way flow. Broadly speaking, there are two kinds of beliefs, factual beliefs and normative or evaluative beliefs: what we believe to be true or false, and what we believe to be right or wrong, influences our perception and comprehension of social phenomena. Although analytically separate, these two types of beliefs are often intertwined in various belief systems (see van Dijk 1998). When such a belief system is directed toward a specific phenomenon, and involves emotions and affects, I will call it an attitude (cf. Campbell et al. 1960: 189–190; Eagly and Chaiken 1993; Operario and Fiske 1998; van Dijk 1998: 61). In addition, since stereotypes and other categorizations are parts of belief formation, stereotypes usually commingle in various belief systems or attitudes, as well. They typically have an evaluative and affective ‘baggage’ called prejudice, which may be seen as an emotional disposition (see Elster 1999: 244). Contrary to most definitions of prejudice (e.g., Jackson et al. 1998: 110), I will stress that prejudices may encompass either negative or positive feelings and evaluations. A prejudiced stereotype can thus be defined as an attitude or set of attitudes held toward a group or members of a group, encompassing simplified beliefs and a set of negative or positive feelings and evaluations. Hence, social categories usually influence not only people’s cognitive processes, but also their affective feelings and evaluations of others (Operario and Fiske 1998: 45).16

Emotions As already indicated above, people are not merely cognitive beings, but emotional ones, as well. Because of their often intensive character, emotions and affects play a great role in human behavior. When possible, most people tend to act in a way that reduces negative feelings, or that leads to positive feelings. In addition, emotions and affects may influence the beliefs we hold, as when we justify actions based on emotions by making our beliefs more consistent with our actions (Elster 1999; Festinger 1957). In this study, negative feelings such as frustration, fear, anxiety, resentment, envy, and so on, as well as positive feelings such as social identity (i.e., a feeling of belonging to a social group), are assumed to play a role in the support of ERP parties. As discussed above, there are indications that macro changes have increased the level of negative emotions for certain groups of individuals (if we assume that people do not like being unemployed and/or in social decline), and these negative emotions and affects have to be dealt with, that is, channeled in one way or another. As Max Scheler (1998) has argued, and which I will discuss in greater detail below,

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feelings of resentment (ressentiment) may be reduced by aiming at reevaluation of a society’s established value system. Similarly, feelings of envy may be reduced by adopting a belief that those whom you envy have achieved the desired object in an unjustified way (Elster 1999). In addition, feelings of anxiety and frustration may be reduced by adopting an ideological schema that explains the chaotic world in a comprehensible way, and/or by adopting a strong identification with a social group or collectivity, and hence, a strong feeling of belonging.

Identity In the literature on identity, we often find a distinction between personal and social identity on the one hand, and between individual and collective identity on the other. While personal identity and social identity refer to the object of identification, individual identity and collective identity refer to the subject of identity. I will argue that only individuals can have an identity in the strict sense of the word, since it presupposes a consciousness (although identities may be of a high degree of intersubjectivity, as well as build on ‘collective memory banks’). This makes the distinction between individual identity and collective identity somewhat artificial. Yet ideas about, or belief in, collective identities are often important for people’s understanding of the world, and have a powerful political potentiality. In this study, I will show how the idea of an ethno-national character has been mobilized in terms of a collective identity. The distinction between personal identity and social identity is common within both sociology and social psychology. While personal identity refers to individual qualities and characteristics (e.g., I am aggressive; I am strong), social identity usually places an individual in relation to a social category, social group, social position, and/or social status. More specifically, social identities are attached to, and derived from, the social groups to which we belong, or to which we wish to belong (Augoustinos and Walker 1995: 98; Tajfel 1981: 255). Hence, like cognition, social identification starts from categorization. As Bourdieu (1984) has argued, social identity is “defined and asserted through difference” (see also Sherif 1966; Tajfel and Turner 1986). Still, it is important to stress that ‘objective’ categorization is not a sufficient condition for identification: people also have to ‘understand’ themselves in terms of the ascribed category. As in most sociological work, the focus will be on social identity in this study. Although personal identity plays an important role in the life of every single individual, it is not a major cause of social patterns. The social world consists of a multitude of social categories, some of them large, such as class, religion, ethnicity, and gender, some of them smaller, such as hobby groups. Every individual belongs to, and identifies with, several groups and categories simultaneously, which makes it possible to speak about an overlapping system of identifications. However,

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these identifications do not all have the same degree of salience; nor are their saliences stable over time, but are rather dependent on the concrete socio-historical situation (see Eriksen 1996: 54). Yet there is one stable basic social categorization, which seems to be a semantic necessity as well as an integral component of the socialization process, namely, the distinction between ‘self’’ and ‘other,’ and its corollary ‘us’ and ‘them,’ which suggests that individuals often will consider some social categories as in-groups and some as out-groups (see Augoustinos and Walker 1995: 106–108). Furthermore, we may assume that individuals are motivated to think well of themselves. Moreover, because the self is partly a social self, we may assume that people generally evaluate their in-group membership positively (Augoustinos and Walker 1995: 109; Brown 1995: 170). Put differently, by evaluating the social group or category they belong to positively, people may positively evaluate their social identity and hence also themselves. One way of achieving positive self-esteem is to think that one is better than average, or at least not worse than most others. Such an evaluation of self-esteem primarily involves an act of social comparison (Augoustinos and Walker 1995: 109; Fiske and Taylor 1991: 165). Yet in order to make a comparison between an in-group and an out-group, two problems must be resolved. First, one must decide with which of the many available outgroups the in-group will compare itself (i.e., selection of a referent). Second, one must decide along which dimension the comparison should be made (Augoustinos and Walker 1995: 111; cf. Pettigrew 1967). Of particular interest for this study is the question of what happens when individuals find themselves in in-groups that are negatively evaluated in relation to other groups. There are three strategies that can be used in such situations: (1) individuals belonging to negatively evaluated groups may leave the group; (2) individuals belonging to such a group may try to change the society’s status hierarchy; and (3) individuals may try to change the established system of group classification. One way of using the third strategy is to argue that the established order of group classification is irrelevant and/or artificial (e.g., social class) and that there is an alternative order that is essential and of real relevance (e.g., ethnicity). I will come back to this discussion in a coming section. However, let me now make the point that the feeling of being trapped in a negatively evaluated in-group may result in negative emotions and affects. The feeling of ressentiment, which Max Scheler (1998) describes, for instance, is probably as much a result of relative as of absolute deprivation. More specifically, according to Scheler, individuals who feel impotent (i.e., unable to satisfy their wants), who are excluded from society, and/or for whom the disparity between ambition and reality has become acute are more likely to feel ressentiment. It is also a well-established fact that the process of social comparison is intimately bound up with the phenomena of stereotyping and prejudice (see Brown 1995: 174). Instead of trying to achieve a positive in-group evaluation solely by designing the in-group as positive and the out-group

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as neutral, in-group members usually represent the out-group in a negative, stereotypical, and even derogating way (see Augoustinos and Walker 1995: 120). Moreover, it has been shown that the attempts to differentiate the in-group positively from the out-group are intensified in situations in which people’s identity is threatened (Brown 1995: 173–174). Hence, I will argue that a discussion of social categorization and identity formation is necessary if we want to understand the emergence of and sustained support for the Front National. A strongly positive evaluation of one’s own ethnic group is the basic element of ethnic nationalism. Xenophobia, which is generally the flip side of ethnic nationalism, is based on an equally strong negative evaluation of individuals deemed to belong to other ethnic groups. The niches of ethnic nationalism and xenophobia would not have emerged unless the salience of ethnically based categorizations had increased among substantially large groups of voters (see chapters 5 and 6). Finally, the decreased importance of another kind of identification, party identity, also played an important role in the evolvement of these niches.

Interests Needless to say, interests are also an important factor in political behavior, for both the demand and the supply sides. In this context we are only concerned with individual interests, which can nevertheless be shared to a greater or lesser extent. I will use the concept of interests in a commonsense way as something that is ‘good’ or ‘useful’ for the acting subject.17 Interests can be connected to individuals’ socio-economic position, and it can be assumed that people who are economically deprived have a greater interest in a redistributive economic policy than individuals who are well off. However, we may also assume that people who are deprived or in social decline have a higher interest in limiting the competition for jobs, social allowances, public housing, and so on. In a situation in which immigrants are seen as competitors for these and similar resources, this kind of interest may under certain conditions find its outlet in welfare chauvinism and antiimmigration attitudes—especially if immigrants are seen as illegitimate competitors. Hence, xenophobia (i.e., fear of ‘the other’) and anti-immigration sentiments may arise not only because of an emotionally motivated striving for identity (i.e., immigrants are seen as a threat to the ‘ethnonational identity’) but also because of real or perceived clashes of interests. Still, in both cases there first has to exist a cognitively based belief that immigrants and natives (nonimmigrants) belong to different categories.

Linking Cognition, Emotions, Interests, and Attitudes: Ideologies So far in this section, we have discussed cognition, emotions, interests, and attitudes. I will now try to link these aspects by introducing the concept of ideologies. Like attitudes, ideologies not only involve factual and

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evaluative beliefs, but also affects and emotions.18 In addition, ideologies are socially shared to a greater or lesser extent. The main difference between ideologies and attitudes, as they will be understood in this study, is the fact that ideologies cover a wider range of social phenomena. In this way, attitudes (e.g., ‘taxes should be lowered’) are often a part of an ideology (e.g., a liberal or bourgeois ideology). The concept of ideology, to continue, is a complex one, and has generated much controversy. One can distinguish between a ‘negative’ and a ‘positive’ view of ideology. The former views ideology as intrinsically false knowledge, which deludes and obstructs access to true knowledge. Marx, with his famous metaphor of the Camera Obscura (Marx and Engels 1846 [1978]) is the classic forerunner to this tradition.19 For Marx, ideology stands for false, ‘upside-down’ beliefs about the social world that reflect the economic, material, and hence also social constitution of a society.20 Put differently, for Marx ideologies are based on class interests.21 Several scholars have picked up this thread in many different ways. However, most of them have one thing in common: they see ideology as a form of interest-ridden knowledge, which more or less unconsciously obstructs access to the ‘truth.’22 However, there are also those who have pursued a more ‘positive’ view of ideology. Daniel Bell (1976: 60), for instance, saw it as a form of secularized religion that functions as a “conceptual map of the world,” both in a cognitive and a normative sense.23 Similarly, Clifford Geertz (1973) regarded ideology as cognitive, normative, and emotional ‘maps’ of problematic social reality. These maps are particularly likely to become mobilized in situations marked by socio-psychological strain and a sense of loss of meaning or direction (Geertz 1973: 219–220).24 Moreover, we should not disregard the imaginative or ‘utopian’ aspects often embedded in ideologies. A powerful ideology is visionary and imaginative, and stakes out possibilities open to humankind (Bell 1996; cf. Dewey 1934; Ricouer 1986, 1991). Hence, I will not follow Mannheim’s (1936) or Ricoeur’s (1986) strategy of separating ideology and utopia. Although we might distinguish between them for analytical reasons, they are in my opinion two sides of the same coin. Nevertheless, the utopian aspects of ideologies represent an element of mythical thinking. By providing ideals to strive for, utopian elements are beyond the question of true or false. These ideals are always imagined, in one form or another, and can be based on future states, as well as on states of the past. To sum up and to give my own definition of ideology, I will argue that ideologies can be seen as cognitive and affective maps of reality (see Campbell et al. 1960: 42), which are often bound up with people’s interests. One might argue that ideologies are an extensive and relatively coherent system of attitudes (as defined above). Like Geertz and Boudon, I also argue that the salience of ideologies is likely to increase in situations of strain and/or uncertainty. Nevertheless, we have by now reached a

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point where we can present a conceptual hierarchy. This hierarchy follows not only a bottom-up direction. At the same time as ideologies are based on attitudes, which in turn are based on beliefs (as well as on emotions and interests), an ideology is an organizing schema for attitudes, beliefs, emotions, and subjective interests. There are two reasons for this. First, ideologies and attitudes are socially shared a priori schemas that influence further perception and comprehension. As is usually assumed in the literature on social cognition, in order to compare the relationship between the cognitive schema and incoming information, any new stimulus is matched against the preexisting cognitive schema. If the incoming information fits the schema, at least in an approximate way, its constituent elements are imposed upon the new information, and often ‘fill in’ missing data in the incoming information (see Augoustinos and Walker 1995: 43). Second, as Festinger (1957) pointed out, individuals are motivated to reduce their cognitive dissonance. In this context, this means that beliefs and attitudes are brought into line with the more inclusive ideological framework.25 However, there is seldom complete consistency between beliefs, attitudes, and ideologies. I will follow Nisbett and Ross (1980: 189), who persuasively argue that people generally change beliefs as a result of disconfirming information less than would be demanded “by logical or normative standards,” because such changes would put pressure on the subject to “reject entire belief networks and to renounce the social, political, or philosophical systems that produced them.” Still, sometimes beliefs, attitudes, and ideologies do change, although with a certain degree of inertia. An important point, which is supported by sociopsychological research, is that the degree of adaptability is highest at the level of beliefs, and lowest at the level of ideology.26 When confronted with a phenomenon, a whole cluster of beliefs and emotions is mobilized, and it is this cluster that should be the focus of an analysis of the dispositions underlying individual action. The perception of a socio-political phenomenon becomes different, for instance, whether you conceive of it as a problem or not. The first meeting with a phenomenon is at least as dependent on values and emotions as on cold cognition. In other words, whether you like or dislike a phenomenon may govern your further perception of it (cf. Asch 1946, 1956; Nisbett and Ross 1980: 173).27

Toward a Theory of Voting Behavior So far, we have been concerned with the question of how voters’ emotional dispositions and political preferences are created. We are now in a position to formulate the second part of a theoretical model of voting behavior. In this step we are interested in how a voter decides how (or if) to vote given his or her emotional dispositions and political preferences. The following discussion will be structured around the notions of ‘party image,’ ‘party identification,’ and ‘issue voting.’ Party identification is a

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relatively stable and enduring factor; party image has a stable and enduring ‘core,’ but is nonetheless more variable than party ideology and party identification. The least stable component in the model is political issues. Hence, contrary to, for instance, Boudon (1994) and Downs (1957) I will not use the concept of party ideology (i.e., an internally consistent set of propositions belonging to a specific party) in this context. According to these authors, party ideologies provide voters with ‘good reasons’ for their choices, that is, with a means of simplifying the decision-making process (e.g., Boudon 1994: 242; Downs 1957; North 1981: 49). Voters often find it difficult to determine exactly what the parties stand for. In such a situation of uncertainty, many voters may find party ideologies useful, because they save them the trouble of relating each political issue promoted by the political parties to their own preferences. In this way, party ideologies help voters to focus on the differences between parties, which is a more economic way to proceed (Downs 1957: 98). However, it can be argued that the concept of party ideology does not fit very well in this context, although it will be useful in discussing the political supply side. Only few voters read party programs in their entirety, or have more than a rudimentary knowledge of the parties’ ideologies; and I would argue that few voters base their voting decisions on party ideology. Instead, I argue that the concept of ‘party image’ better captures what Downs, Boudon, and North are saying with reference to party ideology. A party image is a simplified image or representation of what a particular party represents. However, although always simplified, it may be of a different degree of complexity. For Sartori (1976: 329), a party image could even be condensed into a single word or slogan. In his opinion, which I will adopt, phrases such as ‘good for the workers’ or ‘workers’ party,’ for instance, express party images (and not party ideologies or issues). The same is true of labels such as ‘liberal’ and ‘conservative,’ ‘progressive’ and ‘reactionary,’ and ‘left’ and ‘right.’ Although these kinds of party images correspond to some extent to the parties’ ideologies and their policy records, they also stem from ‘knowledge’ transmitted through socialization and all kinds of everyday interaction, from mass media reports as well as from the strategic action and propaganda of the political parties themselves. In fact, anticipating the sections dealing with the supply side, a large part of the parties’ electoral strategies is concerned with constructing an appropriate party image for the voters from whom they expect support (Sartori 1976: 329), as well as creating negative party images for opponent parties. Let us continue with the notion of ‘party identification.’ As indicated above, party identification represents the most stable component in the pattern of voting behavior. The concept of party identification was developed by the so-called Michigan school of political behavior (Campbell et al. 1960; cf. Budge et al. 1976), which looked at the problem of the link between group belonging and voting behavior.28 For this school of thought, only factors

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that pass through the heads of the voters are assumed to influence voting behavior. Put differently, only factors that contribute to ‘a picture of the political world,’ which is a cognitive as well as an affective ‘map’ that voters have in their brains, were assumed to be relevant for the study of voting behavior. In this context the notion of party identification played a leading role. Campbell and his colleagues understood the relation between the voters and parties in terms of psychological identification, which is characterized as an affective orientation that can be both positive and negative, and experienced in varying intensity. According to them, party identification is acquired through socialization in the family, as well as through interaction with friends, neighbors, colleagues, and so on, and plays an important role in itself as a factor shaping voting decisions. It is also an indirect factor that influences voters’ interpretation of information. However, during the last few decades, the number of party-identified voters has declined in most Western European democracies, which has contributed to less stable political systems. I will come back to these aspects in chapter 6. Finally, political issues are often of great importance for determining how voters decide to vote. If a voter feels strongly on a specific political issue, it is likely that he or she will vote for the party that is believed to view this issue in a similar way, especially if the choice of party is not in conflict with an already established party identification.29 The impact of political issues may also be purely negative, as when a voter abandons the party he or she usually votes for because of disappointment with the party’s position on a specific issue. If they think that they agree more with the position taken by another party, they may vote for that party instead. Otherwise, they may choose the ‘exit’ alternative, that is, to abstain from voting, or the ‘voice’ alternative, that is, try to get the political parties’ attention by various forms of protest (cf. Hirschman 1970). Hence, a strong commitment to a specific political issue may either weaken or strengthen voter party identification, depending on whether they believe that the party they identify with holds the right position on the issue in question.30 In every election campaign, a few political issues are brought to the forefront by the media and/or by the political parties themselves. Consequently, the salience of the issues is likely to vary between elections. In addition, while new issues appear on the agenda, other issues disappear. Nevertheless, I will follow Campbell et al. (1960: 169–170), and specify three conditions that have to be fulfilled for a political issue to have an impact on a voter’s vote: 1. The issue must be cognized in some form. 2. It must arouse some minimal intensity of feeling. 3. It must be accompanied by some perception that one party represents the person’s position better than the other parties do. If an issue is to motivate a voter, he or she must be aware of its existence and must have an opinion on it.

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Hence, although a political issue may be of vital importance for the national welfare, for instance, it is not considered an important political issue in this context if it engenders only mild support and opposition (Campbell et al. 1960: 176). To sum up the discussion, let us take a look at figure 1.2. As we have seen, in this model of voting behavior, there are three principal factors that determine the voters’ decisions how to vote (given their emotional dispositions and political preferences): party identification, political issues, and party images.31 Voters who base their decisions on party images and political issues are assumed to be spatially rational, that is, to vote for the party they believe to be closest to their own position within the political space.32 Voters with a high degree of party identification, on the other hand, always vote for the party they identify with. This is practically a nonchoice situation, and falls outside the realm of spatial rationality. In this model, given their emotional dispositions and political preferences, the voters decide how to vote on the basis of party identification, party images, or political issues. Voters with a high degree of party identification always vote for the same party, if nothing extraordinary happens. They do not examine their own preferences and the parties’ positions. Voters who base their votes on political issues or party images, on the other hand, are usually spatially rational, and choose the party whose position FIGURE 1.2 A Model of Voting Behavior

Protest

Political Party

Political Issues

Party Image

The Voter

Abstain

Party Identification

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in the political space is believed to be closest to their own preferences. Voters who have a low degree of party identification and/or who cannot find any party that comes sufficiently close to their preferences may choose to abstain from voting. However—something that is of great importance for this study—these voters may also choose protest voting. Protest voting is based neither on spatial rationality nor party identification, but rather represents an expression of a protest against one specific party or against ‘the political class,’ that is, all political parties deemed to belong to the political establishment.33 If we assume that the above model represents a closed system, a decrease in the number of voters who base their vote on party identification will lead to an increase in the number of voters who vote on either political issues or party images, or in the number of abstainers and/or protest voters. The importance of party identification has declined over the last few decades, which has led to increased importance of political issues and party images (see Rose and McAllister 1986; see also chapter 6 of this study). Consequently, this process has led to a more turbulent political arena (Panebianco 1988: 209), where voting behavior is ‘individualized’ (Dogan 2001: 114), and where many voters are ready to jump ship. Hence, a significant percentage of the electorates in Western European democracies base their voting decisions on spatial rationality. This is especially true among the group of highest strategic interest for the parties—the ‘floating’ voters (see Dalton 2000). These ‘marginal voters’ often determine the outcome of an election, even when they do not constitute a majority of the electorate. Moreover, it should be noted that voters base their decisions on the basis of their perceptions of the parties’ positions, rather than on their real positions. We must be aware of this distinction, and continually ask ourselves whether there are reasons to assume that there exists a discrepancy between the parties’ positions and the voters’ perceptions of those positions within the political space. In addition, voters may also perceive the contours of the political space differently. As already mentioned, I will in this study argue that the political space consists of two fundamental cleavage dimensions, namely, the economic and the socio-cultural cleavage dimensions. However, the salience of these two cleavage dimensions varies, both at a macro level over time, and at a micro level between different individuals as well as over time. As Converse (1966: 197–202) observed, two dimensions represented in a Cartesian space can always be perceived in three different shapes: (1) one where the x- and y-axes are equal, (2) one where the x-axis is seen as more important (which extends the x-axis and shortens the y-axis), and (3) one where the y axis is seen as more important (which extends the y-axis and shortens the x-axis). I will return to this typology in a coming section.

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In Conclusion I have in this section elaborated micro-level aspects of political demand. Individuals are depicted as cognitive and emotional social beings with certain interests, who live under specific historic and material circumstances. To bring order and meaning to the chaotic world of information that surrounds them, people are obliged to use a priori cognitive forms in their everyday thinking. It is, for instance, necessary to categorize in order to distinguish an object or person from its environment, and from other objects or persons. When people meet a person for the first time, they are likely to categorize him or her on the basis of available characteristics of social groups or collectivities to which he or she belongs. This process often involves stereotypes, that is, a highly simplified image of the essential features of people belonging to a particular social group. Similarly, when individuals approach a social phenomenon, their perception and understanding of it depend on what they know beforehand, how they usually classify phenomena, and their emotions and interests. A phenomenon will, for instance, be perceived differently whether or not it is conceived a priori as belonging to the category of problems. As will be discussed in a later section, the salience of different systems of classification in a society is likely to change over time. Phenomena that at t1 were generally classified according to one system of distinctions (e.g., socio-economic class) may at t2 be classified according to another (e.g., ethnicity or nationality). People also tend to act (consciously or not) in a way that reduces negative emotions, or that leads to positive emotions. Such ‘actions’ include changes in beliefs, so that they become more consistent with people’s feelings and behavior. Macro changes have caused increased negative emotions among certain groups of individuals, who have been affected by absolute or relative deprivation, as well as cognitive, normative, and emotional disorientation (see chapter 2). These individuals have had an incitement to act in a way that reduces the level of these negative emotions. This may make them susceptible to ideas advanced by the ERP parties (see Rydgren 2003). If ethno-nationality, for instance, were valued more highly than social class and/or education (i.e., if it had more status associated with it), this would have potential positive effects on people of the lower classes with low education (i.e., it might increase their self-esteem). Similarly, those who lack flexibility, knowledge of languages, computer skills, and so on, which are seen as important values and qualities in postindustrial society, may be attracted by an ideological program that stresses the supreme values of tradition, authority, and, not least, ethno-national belonging. People who feel increasing personal insecurity (whether caused by criminality or diseases) may find comfort in the xenophobic messages of the ERP parties, which may reduce the diffuse fear and anxiety arising from not knowing what or who to fear. Since a belief that immigrants are criminal, for instance, may result in a reduced level of self-perceived uncertainty (“You

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know who you have to look out for”) it may have positive effects on individuals living under this kind of stress. In the case of negative emotions and affects resulting from unemployment, it may reduce the frustrating feeling that you yourself (or your relatives, friends, etc.) lack the qualifications needed to find a job (“It is the immigrants’ fault, not ours”). In sum, I have discussed how cognition, emotions, and interests—often intertwined in ideologies—influence voters’ emotional dispositions and political preferences. This is the first step in a theoretical model of voter behavior. In the second step of this model, a voter is (given his or her emotional disposition and political preferences) assumed to base the decision of how to vote on party identification, party images, or political issues. As the stability of party identification has decreased (as has class voting, as we saw above), more voters decide how to vote on the basis of spatial rationality. As a result, they have been more flexible and volatile, which has freed potential resources for the emergence of new parties. The reasons why party identification has declined will be discussed in chapter 6.

The Social Space: Linking Macro and Micro (Demand) In this section, I will try to link the macro and the micro levels. This must be done if we are to reach a deeper understanding of the aggregated patterns of voting behavior. More specifically, I will argue that we have to conceptualize voters’ social situations, and that Bourdieu’s (1984) notion of the social space may function as a useful point of departure. Social space is composed of three dimensions: (1) the total volume of capital, (2) the composition of capital, and (3) the past and potentially future trajectories within the social space. The concept of ‘trajectory’ refers to changes in the other two dimensions over time. Two different forms of capital are constitutive for the social space, namely, economic capital and cultural capital (see Bourdieu 1984: 337; 1986: 243).34 More specifically, as shown in figure 1.3, the vertical axis of the social space shows the total volume of capital, FIGURE 1.3 The Social Space Capital Volume (+)

Economic Capital (-) Cultural Capital (+)

Cultural Capital (-) Economic Capital (+) Capital Volume (-)

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while the horizontal axis shows the composition of capital (relatively more economic than cultural capital on the right side of the axis, relatively more cultural than economic capital on the left side of the axis). Individuals located near each other in social space are assumed to have more properties in common than with individuals located distant from one another. According to Bourdieu, the causes of these patterns are to be found in notions of taste, distinction, and (class) habitus. However, as mentioned above, I will in this context only use Bourdieu’s conception of social space as a point of departure. I will not follow Bourdieu on every point—in fact, occasionally not at all—and I will present additional reasons, as well. Nevertheless, I will argue that individuals located near each other in social space resemble each other (i.e., they share similar emotional dispositions and preferences, as discussed above) for four different reasons. First, they are assumed to have more or less similar taste for (cultural) consumption, because of a desire to distinguish their own group or class from other groups and classes, and because of similar experience and backgrounds of socialization, which taken together create a tendency to use similar formal information sources. Second, the position in social space structures encounters in time-space (see Giddens 1984). Individuals with similar positions within the social space meet at work, tend to live in the same areas, spend their spare time in the same associations, and so on. This results in a tendency to use similar informal information sources (that is, each other). Third, they are likely to share similar social identities, which involve emotional attachment to certain viewpoints that favor the ingroup. Fourth, people with similar positions within social space also often share similar interests, which make them act or support actions that are attuned to these interests. We have earlier stressed the essentially social character of people’s attitudes and ideologies. The four factors accounted for above may help us take one step further and understand similarities within groups as well as differences between groups in emotional dispositions and political preferences, which in turn creates patterns of voting behavior. However, individuals’ worldviews and ideological outlooks not only depend on their present position within the social space, but also on their past and expected future position (Bourdieu 1984: 453–454). This gives trajectory a major role in the formation of people’s political opinions. The slope of the individual and the collectivity of which he or she is a part influences whether people are turned toward the future and are inclined to social optimism, or turned toward the past and inclined to social pessimism (Bourdieu 1984: 454–455). Individuals who find themselves in social decline tend to celebrate traditions of the past, history, and its rituals, because, as Bourdieu (1984: 111) put it, “the best they can expect from the future is the return of the old order, from which they expect the restoration of their social being.” In other words, groups of individuals in social decline have a perceived

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interest in the status quo ante, as well as in a reevaluation of established orders of values. In the first section of this chapter, I argued that recent transformations in the economy, together with cultural and political changes, have increasingly marginalized and excluded some groups. More specifically, people who possess little cultural capital and/or have cultural capital invested in ‘old’ modes of production (i.e., unskilled and semiskilled workers, segments of the lower middle class, such as some small tradesand craftsmen, and other small employers, etc.) have found themselves in social decline, which may foster feelings of relative deprivation (not least of social status). To echo Bourdieu (1984: 364, 458), it can be argued that there is a tendency for individuals in or threatened by social decline, whose objective properties, practices, and opinions can be seen as linked to a past age, to become conservative, pessimistic, and resentful, and to reject ‘politics’ and ‘politicians’ of all kinds. This tendency is stronger for individuals who are not politically organized and/or lack political education. Hence, the structures of social space, which is also a structure of social comparison, change as a result of the transition from an industrial toward a postindustrial society. In this process knowledge (not least formal education) increasingly becomes the dominant instrument of stratification. As groups of individuals perceive themselves to be in social decline, they tend to experience relative deprivation, which in turn leads to frustration and other negative feelings, such as resentment, envy, and so on. Generally, the experience of relative deprivation is caused by a gap between expectations and achievements, which are derived either from comparisons with other groups of individuals, or from comparisons with one’s own past (see Brown 1995: 192). People mostly expect their future to be similar to their present, or at least to follow the current trajectory of life. If standards of living rise over time, many people will expect future increases. As a consequence, it may be predicted that the level of dissatisfaction will be at its highest when a period of increased standards of living is suddenly followed by an economic downturn (Davies 1969). Similarly, people tend to regard the status associated with particular social positions and characteristics, professions in particular, as taken for granted. When their status becomes devaluated, some will experience a status deprivation. When people believe that they run the risk of sinking to a lower class, feelings of deprivation and decline may under certain conditions foster right-wing authoritarian attitudes. More specifically, I will in this study argue that they may be channeled into support for extreme right populism in a variety of ways, of which three will be mentioned here. First, it may be expressed in a ‘nihilist’ populism (i.e., ”All politicians and capitalists are out to cheat us ordinary people”). Second, people may adopt and support strategies of reevaluation (i.e., to shift the dominant value system toward values based on the status quo ante). Third, and partly overlapping, people may become susceptible to ethno-nationalist protectionism and/or xenophobic welfare chauvinism (i.e., “Those who don’t belong here shouldn’t

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share the benefits of our society”). As will be further discussed below, this is more likely to happen in a situation in which the voter groups in question have a low level of trust in the established political parties, in particular when they have lost confidence in the parties that traditionally have represented their interests. In the second section of this chapter, I raised the question of what happens when individuals find themselves in in-groups that are negatively evaluated in relation to other groups. We may assume that most people, under normal conditions, will accept this situation as a fait accompli—especially if they are born into this position. However, in a situation of social decline and (further) deprivation, that is, when new groups enter into such a position or when socio-economic cleavages are increasing, more people may strive to change this situation. There are three strategies that can be used in such situations: (1) individuals belonging to such groups may leave the group, (2) they may try to change the society’s status hierarchy, and (3) they may try to change the established group classification. However, it is not always easy to leave the group one belongs to, especially not social classes or professional groups. It may be particularly difficult to acquire the cultural and social capital needed to move to another more positively evaluated group. Much of our cultural and social capital is acquired in the family and in formal education during adolescence. Nor is it always easy for individuals with little cultural capital to leverage social change. It is practically impossible for singular individuals to do it on their own, and many people, especially people with little cultural capital, have lost faith in established political parties and movements. We know that many of the old outlets for channeling socio-political discontent do not function as well as they once did (e.g., Lawson 1988), and many who possess little cultural capital have become increasingly pessimistic about the possibility of achieving social change within the established political institutions. With the two first options partly blocked, many turn to the third one, that is, they try to change the established group classification scheme, or at least support political actors who claim that they will change it. As we recall from the second section of this chapter, one way of using the third strategy is by arguing that the established order of group classification is irrelevant and/or artificial (e.g., social class) and that there is an alternative order that is essential and of true relevance (e.g., ethnicity). By identifying this mechanism, I will argue, we are approaching a way of giving the phenomenon of realignment of cleavage dimensions a micro foundation. It shows why the established way of categorizing groups in a society and, thus, the salient conflict dimension—which also influences in what way social and political problems should be framed—become challenged under certain conditions. I will argue that many who find themselves in social decline tend to support political programs that promise to redraw the boundaries of group classification. In the specific socio-historical context I am interested in (i.e., Western Europe during the 1980s and 1990s), we are mainly concerned with

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the increased salience of the socio-cultural cleavage dimension, and the corresponding decreased salience of the economic cleavage dimension. As a consequence of this partial realignment, many who previously defined themselves, their adversaries, and socio-political issues in terms of economic position now define these in terms of ethnicity and nationality. By downplaying the existence of class stratification and by stressing the harmony and homogeneity of ‘the people,’ individuals in negatively evaluated groups may redraw, or at least support political actors who claim to redraw, the boundaries of classification, and thereby achieve higher selfesteem. Yet at the same time a new out-group has to be constructed, in this case people of other ethnic origins, mainly ‘immigrants.’ In addition, since ethno-nationality is ascribed rather than achieved, which makes the impact of social competition less significant, a sense of positive distinction may be easier to sustain. To sum up, I have in this section tried to find a way to link the macro and the micro levels of the political demand side. For this purpose, I have borrowed Bourdieu’s conception of the social space, which is a way of conceptualizing how individuals’ social positions create patterns of similarities. At least as important, the social space may also be seen as a structure of social comparison. Changes at the macro level also change structures of social comparison, which may create feelings of relative deprivation in individuals belonging to groups that are negatively evaluated, especially for groups in social decline. Because of their interest in hanging on to the status quo ante and their strategy of changing the dominant scheme of group classification, these groups may become attracted by the right-wing authoritarian, ethno-nationalist politics advocated by the ERP parties.35 Finally, I will argue that we now are in a position to formulate some hypotheses about voting patterns, of which the ones that are of direct relevance for the emergence of the ERP parties will be tested in chapter 2, where I will analyze the French elections of 1988, 1995, and 1997. First, we assume that because of economic interests, groups with little economic capital are more likely to support a redistributive economic policy. Second, for the reasons given above, we assume that groups with little cultural capital, and especially those in a social decline, are more likely to support an authoritarian and particularistic socio-cultural policy. Third, we assume that groups that are economically secure and that have much cultural capital are more likely than other groups to conceive of the socio-cultural cleavage dimension as more important than the economic cleavage dimension. Similarly, we assume that groups that have little trust in political institutions, or are openly discontented, and that have little economic and cultural capital are more likely than other groups to conceive of the sociocultural cleavage dimension as more important than the economic cleavage dimension. However, we assume that while the former are likely to support liberal and universalistic socio-cultural policies, the latter are more likely to support authoritarian and particularistic socio-cultural positions.

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This hypothesis is based on the assumption that voters will be more likely to conceive of the economic cleavage dimension as more important than the cultural cleavage dimension if they believe that their personal financial situation can be substantially improved by political means. People who feel economically secure, and who have a good deal of cultural capital, have a tendency to give higher priority to ‘postmaterialist’ socio-cultural issues than to further improvements of their personal finances (see Inglehart 1977, 1997). People with little trust in political institutions, and little cultural (and economic) capital, on the other hand, might lose confidence in improvement to their own financial picture by political means. For them, the basic cleavage is between the ‘ordinary people’ and the ‘establishment,’ and established politicians, independent of party affiliation, are believed to favor themselves and their fellows within the ‘establishment.’ In addition, for people with little economic capital, the perceived or real clashes of economic interests are presumably greater, which makes these groups more susceptible to the welfare chauvinistic messages of the ERP parties.

Political Parties as Strategic and Ideological Organizations: Micro- and Meso-Level Aspects of Political Supply We now turn to the supply side of the political space, and more specifically to the political parties. As mentioned above, I conceive of political parties as organizations,36 a choice that has certain implications for the discussion in this section. Nevertheless, I will depart from an old debate within the studies of political parties, namely, whether political parties are mainly governed by ideological principles or by rational strategies. At the core of this debate is the question of adaptability. The rational strategies view sees parties as actors that adapt their party ideology and political proposals to the opinions of their expected supporters among the voters. The ideological principles view, on the other hand, argues that ideology, and not least old ideas and beliefs that have guided the parties since their founding, play a major role and make it difficult, and occasionally impossible, for them to adapt to changing public opinion (see Ware 1996: 18–21). Without attempting to address this dispute directly, I will use a synthetic approach. I will use spatial theory’s assumption of perfect adaptability as an ideal type, while at the same time looking at factors that constrain the realization of this ideal type (e.g., party ideology, prior policy record, organizational structures, conflicting interests, etc.). By using this synthetic approach, I will be able to consider, at least ideal-typically, the relative size of different political parties’ strategic room to maneuver. In addition, I will assume that political parties have two basic goals: first, to survive as an organization,37 and, second, to maximize their influence on policy outcomes in accordance with the core ideas and values embedded in

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their party ideologies. Normally, when the existence of a party is not threatened, the second goal can be assumed to be the more important one. Hence, I will not follow Downs’s (1957) suggestion that the overall goal of the political parties (i.e., of the party members constituting the parties) is to get elected and reelected, and hence that they are bound to act to maximize votes.38 However, the goal of maximization of policy implementation is closely related to electoral success; if a party does not receive a sufficient number of votes, it will not have an opportunity to implement its political ideas. However, a party is normally only prepared to negotiate its ideology up to a certain point. If a vote maximization strategy is at odds with core ideas that are deeply embedded in the party, we cannot a priori assume that the party will choose the vote maximization strategy. Still, if a large part of a party’s ideology is at odds with the preferences endorsed by a vast majority of voters, the party can be assumed to act strategically. In order to attract enough voters to survive as an organization and/or to be in a position to influence the implementation of favored ideas and policy proposals, parties can be assumed to be prepared to give up issue positions that they see as less important and central. One such strategy is to seek a balance between their ideology and vote-catching proposals, that is, to ‘soften’ and ‘hide’ its ideological positions by using a catch-all strategy, or simply try to add a ‘populist appeal’ to its core ideological messages. Hence, contrary to Downs (1957: 27–28), who assumed that politicians are not only rational but also selfish, and that politicians are motivated to get elected “solely in order to attain the income, prestige, and power which come from being in office,” I will assume that they act in order to implement their party’s ‘idea of a good society.’ Politicians, at least in most European democracies, are chosen and elected by their party organizations, and as representatives of organizations they have role expectancies and obligations governing their behavior.39 Even if the party leaders or other politicians were motivated only by narrow self-interest, they cannot by themselves determine the action of their parties, especially not in the longer run. If party leaders or other leading party members act in a way that is seen as a threat to the party by the party organization, either if they give up too many core ideological ideas, or ones that are too important, in order to attract new voters, or if they too stubbornly stand by less important ideological principles at the expense of securing votes, the party organization will sooner or later replace these politicians. As in other organizations, members of a political party are (mostly) replaceable (see Ahrne 1994). Hence, unlike the typical voter, the typical politician is an organized political being, which implies that his or her freedom of choice is limited. In holding a position as a representative of a party organization, the typical politician has certain obligations and role expectations that shape and constrain his or her behavior (see Sjöblom 1968: 14–15, 51). The most important of these expectations and obligations is to maximize ‘the good’ for the party, which implies a sound balance between ‘strategy’ and ‘ideology.’

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Conflicting Goals and Multiple Arenas In this study, I will assume that the political system involves more than two parties (which is the case in most Western European democracies— France included). In this section, I will take my point of departure from the second of the goals identified above, that is, that parties try to maximize their influence on the policy outcome in accordance with the core ideas and values embedded in their party ideologies. I will also distinguish between three subordinate goals connected to this general goal: (1) vote maximization, (2) maximization of parliamentary influence, and (3) party cohesion (see Sjöblom 1968). These are strategic goals connected to action in three different political arenas. More specifically, in order to fulfill the overall goal, the parties must act in three different arenas, the internal arena, the electoral arena, and the parliamentary arena (Sjöblom 1968).40 Although these arenas will be kept separate for analytical purposes, they are in fact highly dependent on each other; a party’s results in any of these arenas partly determine the conditions for action in the others. In order to be successful in the parliamentary arena, for instance, a party must first be sufficiently successful in the electoral arena. Nevertheless, as we have seen, a specific goal is connected to each political arena: vote maximization in the electoral arena, maximization of parliamentary influence in the parliamentary arena, and maximization of party cohesion in the internal arena. However, these goals sometimes conflict with each other, and it is normally not possible to maximize all three arenas simultaneously. Instead, the parties have to weigh these three different subordinate goals and try to strike a balance that serves the party’s overall goal. In the rest of this section, I will particularly focus on how the goals in the internal and parliamentary arenas constrain the parties’ ability to use vote maximization strategies in the electoral arena. The most important arguments that will come out of this discussion are (1) that niches are likely to emerge in the electoral arena in situations in which voter opinion is volatile because of the established parties’ inertia to adapt to changed voter opinion; (2) that new and small parties, which are excluded from one or both of the other political arenas, may have certain advantages in the electoral arena, at least in the short run, and hence be able to take advantage of emerging niches; and (3) that these initial advantages may turn out to be disadvantages in the long run, and occasionally lead to party splits and dissolution.

The Electoral Arena The electoral arena consists of the potential voters, and the goal is to maximize one’s number of votes in elections. Strategic action to this end goes on constantly, but is of course most intense during the election campaign itself.

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In this study, the electoral arena will be identical with the political space, composed of the voters’ distributions within two attitudinal dimensions, as well as the political parties, positions within the space. More specifically, this two-dimensional political space, as mentioned previously, consists of the economic cleavage dimension on the one hand (x-axis), and the sociocultural cleavage dimension on the other (y-axis). The economic cleavage dimension is about which role the state should play in the economy. Its left pole represents a socialist position (i.e., the state should own all means of production), whereas the right pole represents a capitalist (free market) position. The socio-cultural cleavage dimension is about moral values and culture, and involves issues such as abortion, immigration, law and order, (noneconomic aspects of) family policy, and so on. It ranges from cultural liberalism, which represents a position in favor of libertarian and universal values and cultural expressions, to cultural authoritarianism, which represents an authoritarian and particularistic view on values and culture. Moreover, for some voters these two dimensions are seen as equally important, for some the economic cleavage dimension is more important than the socio-cultural cleavage dimension, and for some voters the sociocultural cleavage dimension is more important than the economic cleavage dimension. The distribution of voters within these two dimensions is always historically contingent; it varies both between countries and within a specific country over time. Yet we have no theoretical reasons to assume that a position within the economic cleavage dimension is correlated with a position in the socio-cultural cleavage-dimension. Theoretically, the combination of economic left and socio-cultural right (i.e., authoritarian and particularistic) can be assumed to be as likely as the combination of economic right and socio-cultural right. Aside from ideological considerations, which positions a political party takes within the two cleavage dimensions are partly dependent on which voter groups it wants to attract. This choice, in turn, is based on which voter groups it believes are available, as well as on traditional bonds between the party and particular voter groups. If an extreme right-wing populist party, for instance, wants to attract groups of individuals with little interest in redistributive economic policy, it is likely to combine its authoritarian and particularistic program with a right-leaning position within the economic cleavage dimension. On the other hand, if it wants to attract groups of individuals with greater interest in a redistributive economic policy, it is likely to take a centrist or left-leaning position within the economic cleavage dimension. More specifically, my analysis will be based on the fundamental assumptions that no new parties will emerge and sustain their electoral support over time if: • there are no sufficiently large niches, defined as gaps between the voters’ location in the political space and the perceived position of

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the parties (i.e., the party images and/or position on crucial issues) in the same space,41 and • the proportion of voters with high degree of party identification is close to 100 percent. Only niches will be discussed in this chapter. The issue of declining party identification will be saved for chapter 6. Niches are unlikely to evolve under stable conditions, with relatively stable voter preferences. In these cases, the established parties have had time to find their strategically optimal positions. However, if the voter distribution is shifting in some direction, the parties will have to adapt their positions in the same direction. Yet the parties are not as flexible as the voters; to shift position is a process that takes time for a political party. Normally, there exists a considerable time lag between voter and party movement within the political space. Consequently, a rapid change in the voter distribution creates a gap between the political demand side and its supply side. If a political party can position itself in this gap, or niche, it may have a good chance of attracting votes, at least if the number of party-identified voters has decreased below a certain level. The probability of the emergence of niches is particularly great if the salience of a new or earlier weak cleavage dimension, or a specific issue connected to such a cleavage dimension, suddenly increases at the expense of the old, established cleavage dimension. In such situations, the established parties often had no incentive to position themselves strategically within the ‘new’ cleavage dimension, but are likely to be positioned near one of the end-poles (if the ‘new’ cleavage dimension has increased in salience as a reaction against a consensual way of thinking) or near the center (if the parties used to be indifferent to issues belonging to the cleavage dimension). As a result, a rather large niche may emerge, which a new political party may be able to mine. More specifically, I will argue that the greatest chance of electoral success for a new political party, at least initially, is the emergence of new ‘hot’ political issues, connected to an ‘alternative’ cleavage dimension, which the established parties have been unable or unwilling to deal with. As indicated in the second section of this chapter, only a few political issues are likely to ‘pass the news hole’ in an election campaign. Stated differently, in most election campaigns only a few issues are considered ‘hot’ and gain media attention. I will argue that these political issues are likely to be a major cause of many voter decisions, both because their scarcity and salience make it relatively easy for voters to get information on exactly these issues, and because ‘hot’ issues are presented in a way that arouses emotional responses. Consequently, I will argue that a ‘single-issue’ or ‘few-issues’ strategy might be an advantage for a new nonestablished party, at least initially.

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The Internal Arena The internal arena consists of the party organization. However, the party organization can, from the standpoint of the party executive, be regarded from two different perspectives: as an arena or as an instrument. When regarded as an arena, the main goal is to maximize member support and to ensure party cohesion. When seen as an instrument, the main goal is to maximize the effectiveness of the instrument (Sjöblom 1968: 52). As will be shown below, these two goals are sometimes in conflict with each other. The former goal is also potentially in conflict with the goal of vote maximization in the electoral arena. Strong and unified member support is an important asset for a party, while weak party cohesion creates problems in several ways (see Sjöblom 1968: 87). Besides reducing the party’s credibility in the eyes of the voters, it makes it more difficult for the party leaders to maintain party discipline in parliamentary voting. Weak member support also makes it more difficult to mobilize ‘rank and file’ members needed to do necessary but unpaid party work such as putting up posters, distributing leaflets, and so on. However, the goals connected to the internal arena are potentially in conflict with the vote maximizing strategy in the electoral arena, which constrains their strategic room to maneuver. As mentioned above, in this section I will use the assumption of ‘total adaptability’ or ‘total strategic room to maneuver’ as an ideal type, while at the same time focusing on aspects that constrain such freedom of choice. There are institutional constraints that are created ‘outside’ of the parties as well as within the party organizations themselves. As will be shown below, a party’s own history and traditions also constrain its strategic room to maneuver by creating a path dependency, where choices of action at t1 constrain the ability to deviate from the path at t2 (cf. Powell 1991: 194; Thelen and Steinmo 1992). First, party members are not neutral, but are more or less identified with different aspects of a party: with the party per se; with its political ideology, political program, and/or issue positions; with a certain group associated with the party; and/or with certain individuals within the party (Sjöblom 1968: 187–188). In this context, I will argue that identification with political ideology, political program, and/or issue positions is particularly important. However, this kind of identification creates a certain degree of path dependency, since changes in the political program, or changing positions on specific issues, which is needed in order to adapt to changing voter opinion, cannot deviate too much from established ideological principles and earlier policy positions. If party leaders want to initiate such changes, they must first create an anchor within the member organization. If the party fails to create an anchor, this will undermine the strength and cohesion of the party organization, risk internal fragmentation and factionalism, and ultimately split the party.

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However, to create an anchor for changes in the political platform is time-consuming, especially if the party claims to be internally democratic. Occasionally, it may even be impossible to create such an internal anchor, as when the party leaders want to change principles that many of the party members conceive of as the party’s raison d’être. Hence, there is a potential tension between the internal arena and the electoral arena. The demands of voters are not always attuned to the demands of the party’s own members. In this situation, the parties have to strike a balance. Insufficient sensitivity to the voters leads to defeat; at the same time, neglecting internal opinion undermines the power of the party organization (see Bäck and Möller 1990: 44). Consequently, as Rose and Mackie (1988: 540) have argued, a political party is always involved in a trade-off between an introvert activity, engaged in to maintain the internal cohesion, and an extrovert activity, engaged in to attract voters (cf. Lawson 1994: xiii; Rose and McAllister 1990: 179). One possible way of managing this trade-off, or at least of reducing its effects, is to try to ‘speak with double tongues,’ that is, to separate its ‘front-stage’ and ‘back-stage’ activities (see Goffman 1959). While the former is used while addressing voters, the latter is used in internal discourse. Most political parties may become constrained as discussed above. However, there is an additional kind of constraint that is more likely to vary among parties, depending on how they are organized. In addressing this aspect, we are also approaching constraints that are partly created outside of the party organizations themselves. As indicated above, the political parties have a strategic interest in having an efficient party organization. In order to maximize voter support, a party needs to be adaptive and flexible. To this end, party leaders need considerable freedom of action, which is better provided for in a vertical, hierarchical organization than in a more flat, participatory, democratic one. In fact, extensive participation by the members is likely mainly a problem when seen from the viewpoint of vote maximization and party efficiency (see Assarsson 1993: 52). Yet the claim of internal party democracy is normally one of the most important institutional myths and demands within a liberal democracy. As Meyer and Rowan (1981) have argued, there are certain expectations, both within and outside of a specific organizational field, of how an organization should work; and by adapting to these expectations, the organizations gain in legitimacy. However, since institutional contexts are often both pluralistic and inconsistent, demands for efficiency can easily come into conflict with the expectation of how things should be done (Meyer and Rowan 1981: 546– 547). Within most liberal democracies there exists a strong expectation of internal democracy as the legitimate way of organizing a political party. This expectation forces the parties to choose between efficiency and legitimacy, or at least to find a balance between them. As indicated above, this dilemma affects both the electoral and the internal arenas. The party needs a hierarchical and elitist party structure to be maximally adaptive in the

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electoral arena. In the internal arena, on the other hand, a centrist structure is a problem in terms of legitimacy, but it seems to be a functional necessity. For a party to aggregate special interests in an efficient way, there needs to be effective coordination within the party organization, and such a coordination presupposes a certain degree of centralization (Bäck and Möller 1990: 239). Running roughshod over internal party democracy, on the other hand, would result in a loss of legitimacy and undermine the strength and cohesion of the party organization. At the same time, it might also affect the party negatively in the electoral arena if voters come to believe that an undemocratic organization cannot govern democratically.

The Parliamentary Arena The parliamentary arena consists of the legislative and the governing agencies, and the goal here is to maximize the party’s influence on political decisions taken in these agencies. The best means of achieving this goal is, of course, to win a majority in the legislature, and to form a oneparty government. However, this usually happens only in majority voting systems where the winner takes all. Mostly, political parties lack a majority of their own, which forces them to act strategically. Compromising and coalition formation are two of the most common strategies used by parties to maximize their influence. Hence, to be represented in the government is seen as promoting the goal of maximizing program realization. Naturally, a party’s results in the electoral arena largely condition its ability to realize its programs in the parliamentary arena. However, it can also work the other way around (see Sjöblom 1968: 254). In addition, the goal of maximizing program realization in the parliamentary arena may be in potential conflict with the goal of vote maximization in the electoral arena. In a situation where a party cannot expect to receive a majority on its own, it is forced to cooperate with other parties. This is a fact of which the parties are aware before the elections: in order to form coalitions successfully, they must adjust to their potential coalition partners, and this process of adjustment often starts before the elections. The same is true if a party wants to work out compromises, since a party’s bargaining power is not only dependent on its electoral strength, but also on how compatible its programs and positions are with those of other parties. For electoral success, it is generally considered fundamental to have a distinctive appearance. However, such an appearance risks undermining a party’s ability to achieve its parliamentary goals (Bäck and Möller 1990: 44). The parties must strike a balance. Still, as soon as a party takes the possibility of cooperation into consideration before an election, it runs the risk of weakening its vote-getting potential. However, there is one additional strategy for maximizing program realization. In a situation where two big parties or well-established political

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blocs strongly oppose each other, a party may strive to hold the balance of power. In such a situation compromises ‘over the blocs’ are not likely, and if neither of the blocs holds a majority, a third party can use the strategy of logrolling. This strategy makes the conflict between the electoral and the parliamentary arenas less acute and increases the party’s room to maneuver. However, most parties cannot easily choose this strategy, partly because it presupposes a particular cleavage structure of the party system, and partly because, for historical reasons, most parties already belong to one side or the other of a cleavage. If a party deviated from its traditional position just to achieve a position holding the balance of power, protest among the members who strongly oppose the other bloc or political current would be likely. This, in turn, would trigger the conflict between the electoral and the internal arenas. In addition, the party might risk losing voters who base their voting decisions on similar adversary party images.

The Relative Size of the Room to Maneuver To sum up the discussion above, I have argued that there are several factors that constrain a political party’s room to maneuver in terms of adapting to changing voter opinion. In part, these constraints consist of organizational inertia caused by traditions and routines. However, even if a political party acts rationally to achieve its overall goal, its room to maneuver in terms of voter maximization will be constrained because of conflicting subordinate goals. Still, it should also be clear that the size of the room to maneuver is variable, and it can be expected to vary among different parties, as well as for the same party at different times. The goals of the internal and the electoral arenas potentially conflict, which reduces the parties’ strategic room to maneuver. However, a new party may escape this conflict to a greater or lesser extent, which grants it some short-term advantages in the electoral arena. Since a new party has not yet acquired a political tradition, its path dependency can be expected to be less significant. In addition, a new political party generally has a weaker party organization, with fewer members and activists, compared to the established parties. As a result, in the short run a new party can be assumed to have greater room to maneuver to adapt to changing voter opinion than do established parties. Similarly, the lack of a discernible history makes it easier for a new party to escape the conflict between the parliamentary and the electoral arenas by seeking to hold a position of balance of power. If successful, this also opens up strategic room to maneuver, and gives the new party some shortterm advantages in the electoral arena.42 I will argue that many of the ERP parties—the Front National included—approximate this description of a new, relative flexible party (see Betz 1998a: 9 on ERP parties generally, and Birenbaum 1992 on the Front National). Still, we should keep this as an empirical question, since some of the ERP parties—the FN included—have

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a more or less spectacular history that some of the members are aware of and identify with. This forces these parties to use similar trade-off strategies as discussed above, most importantly, perhaps, the strategy of distinguishing between ‘front-stage’ and ‘back-stage’ discourse. Yet although the size of the strategic room to maneuver also varies between different ERP parties, it is generally bigger than that of the established parties. I have consistently talked about ‘initial’ or short-term advantages in claiming that having a single-issue or few-issue character and a weak party organization might be an advantage for a new party that is trying to establish itself. However, in order to sustain its electoral support, and ultimately to survive, a party cannot count solely on single-issue voters. The salience of issues is likely to vary over time, and what is considered a ‘hot’ issue in one election can turn out to be a ‘dead’ issue in the next one. In addition, although political parties are inert, as organizations, one or several of the established parties will sooner or later try to break the new party’s monopoly on the ‘hot’ issue. Consequently, after a single-issue or few-issue party has overcome the entry barriers in the electoral arena, it has to connect the issue/issues to a party ideology, which creates a broader and more nuanced party image, and try to develop a traditional voter base with a high level of party identification. In fact, if a new party succeeds in winning representation in the legislature, a broader, relatively coherent political platform is likely to evolve even if the party tries to preserve its single-issue or few-issue character. First, in legislature, a party is ultimately forced by the act of voting to take definite positions on a wide range of issues. Second, parties in legislative bodies are monitored so that incoherent or contradictory positions are revealed. Third, and finally, positions that are too incoherent and contradictory are likely to attract the attention of both political contenders and the media, and to be used as arguments against the party. I will argue that an electoral breakthrough by a political party is likely to force it into a transformation process, in which the new party develops a broad and relatively coherent political platform and a more extensive party organization. Concerning the latter, I argue that the organizational resources needed initially to achieve an electoral breakthrough are currently rather small compared to the considerable resources needed to sustain its electoral support, which presupposes a functioning party organization.43 However, not all new parties manage to undergo such a transformation successfully, and it can be assumed that the risk that a party will disband is greatest during the years immediately after its electoral breakthrough, and in particular, after it has won representation in local, regional, or national legislative bodies (see Stinchcombe 1965).44 In fact, a weak party organization and a single-issue or few-issue character might be advantageous for the emergence and electoral breakthrough of a party, but in the long run turn out to be disadvantageous for the party’s survival. An internally democratic party organization—with party-identified members and

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activists—and a deep party history and tradition yield some stability to a political party. Precisely because of the fact that traditional parties’ room to maneuver is constrained compared to the authoritarian and hierarchical ERP parties, they are less dependent upon specific single individuals. Hence, this section has provided a theoretical understanding of the evolvement of niches. Because of a time lag between voter and party movement within the political space, niches emerge, in which new political parties can position themselves. Niches are most likely to evolve when a new or already established but subordinate cleavage dimension, or one or several issues belonging to such a cleavage dimension, suddenly becomes salient. Since a new political party lacks a discernible history, and usually has weak party organization, it often has greater room to maneuver for votemaximizing activities in the electoral arena, which makes it possible to take advantage of the available niches. Hence, niches in the electoral arena are to be considered one of the most important ‘opportunity structures’ (see McAdam 1996) that facilitates the emergence of ERP parties, and I will in coming chapters argue that ethnonationalism and xenophobia, which both belong to the socio-cultural cleavage dimension, have been the two most important such niches. However, of equal importance has been a ‘negative’ factor, namely, political discontent and alienation, which has turned voters away from the established parties, and consequently freed resources for emerging new parties. In addition, ERP parties have also been able to exploit the political discontent in a more direct way and thus mobilize protest voters.

Laws, Regulations, and Party Systems: Macro-Level Aspects of Political Supply I argued above that niches in the political space are among the most important ‘opportunity structures’ for emerging new parties seeking to gain entry to legislative assemblies. In this section, additional opportunity structures will be discussed, namely, voting laws and regulations, as well as the degree of convergence in the political space. Whether a political system has a proportional or a majority voting system, and how high the thresholds are, all make a difference (cf. Katz 1980; Weaver and Rockman 1993). The idea that the majority voting system places constraints on the emergence of new parties is an idea that goes back to Duverger (1954). According to what has become known as Duverger’s Law, the simple majority ballot system favors a relative stable two-party system, while proportional voting systems favor a multiparty system (Duverger 1954: 217). According to Duverger, there are two reasons for this. First, there is a mechanical effect in that the third and fourth parties in an election held within a majority voting system will receive a much smaller share of legislative seats compared to the votes they received. Second, there is a psychological

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effect in that many voters will feel that a vote for a small party is a wasted vote, which makes them vote for one of the two major parties instead. In such a situation, the emergence of new political parties is less likely. I would not put it as starkly as Duverger—there are, after all, several cases that have contradicted these predictions—but rather see the mechanisms identified by Duverger as heuristic principles. In general, a proportional voting system makes the emergence of a new, nonestablished party easier, while a majority voting system makes it considerably harder. Similarly, whether a political system has an entrance threshold of two or four percent, for instance, makes a difference for the emergence of new parties. The same psychological effect identified by Duverger is likely to be operative here, as well. Although this point will not be discussed in depth in this study, I will argue that the decision of Mitterrand to introduce the proportional voting system in France in the wake of the 1986 legislative election played an important role in the sustained support for the Front National. First, following Duverger, the FN would arguably not have received as many votes during the regular French majority voting system. Although the Front National had had its electoral breakthrough in the 1984 European election, it was still without success in a French national election at that time. Second, this change made it possible for the FN to send a group of MPs to parliament, which increased its political visibility and legitimacy. There are, of course, other important laws and regulations influencing the political supply side, of which laws directing state-sponsored economic subsidiaries of political parties are of particular importance. However, in order to limit the scope of this study, I will not discuss these aspects here. Finally, as Kitschelt (1995) has argued, the degree of convergence in the political space also makes a difference in terms of the probability of the emergence of new political parties. The degree of convergence in the political space is historically contingent, and is bound to change both between different party systems and within a party system over time. Nevertheless, convergence between the established parties provides a favorable opportunity structure for emerging new parties for two reasons. First, a convergence may result in a feeling that the established parties ‘are all the same.’ This, in turn, may fuel popular distrust and discontent in politicians and political parties, and create an audience receptive to parties ready to mobilize protest votes. Second, of course, a convergence may also have direct effects, in that it facilitates the emergence of niches within the political space.

Framing and Politicization: Linking Political Demand and Supply In this final section, I will elaborate the linkage between the political demand and supply sides. Such a linkage has been implied above, but I have so far focused mainly on how the behavior of political actors is influenced by political demand. However, political parties not only try to

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adapt to voters’ preferences, but also play an important role in the creation of political demand.45 More specifically, I will discuss how political actors may influence voters by means of framing processes. In order to bridge this section with the coming chapters of this book, I will mainly discuss how ERP parties may influence voters by means of an ethno-nationalist and xenophobic strategy and party ideology. However, I believe that the discussion is equally valid for other kinds of parties, as well. The key concepts of this section are politicization and framing. An emerging ERP party may politicize the immigration issue, that is, ‘translate’ the social phenomenon of immigration into political terms.46 In order to consider an issue politicized in the full sense, voters and political actors must talk about it in political terms (Campbell et al. 1960: 29–32). A politicization of the immigration issue permits people to think and talk of immigration as being caused by political processes, and as being the cause of other political and social phenomena. If the immigration issue is already politicized, the presence of an ERP party of significant size may increase its salience and keep it on the agenda. This is partly due to the ERP party’s own propaganda, but, more important, to the fact that it catches the media’s attention and is likely to provoke countermovements (see Rydgren 2003). Moreover, an emerging ERP party may increase the salience of the sociocultural cleavage dimension. As the socio-cultural dimension gains in importance, other political actors will have to talk about politics in terms of categories and division lines belonging to it, which is likely to influence the voters in the long run. As indicated above, when the salience of the sociocultural cleavage dimension increases, the salience of the economic cleavage dimension decreases, which means that many who previously defined themselves and their adversaries in terms of economic position now define their political world in terms of ethnicity and nationality. Thus, the political parties and the party system have a great influence on the relative salience of different cleavage dimensions, which affect the weight the voters give to different political issues (see Przeworski and Sprague 1986). An emerging ERP party of significant size may also influence people’s thinking, by ‘framing’ issues or engaging in a ‘frame struggle’ (cf. Benford and Snow 2000; Goffman 1986; Snow and Benford 1988; Snow et al. 1986; Tarrow 1998: chapter 7; Zald 1996). For Goffman (1986: 10–21), frames are those basic elements that organize people’s experience and govern their ‘definition of a situation.’ Hence, frames or frameworks are for Goffman equivalent to schemata and other schemes of interpretation. In this way, what Goffman calls frames and what I, in accordance with cognitive social psychology (e.g., Augoustinos and Walker 1995; Fiske and Taylor 1991; Nisbett and Ross 1980), in the second section of this chapter have called cognitive schemas are essentially the same thing, denoting the importance of socially mediated a priori forms for our perception and understanding of the surrounding world (see Boudon 1994: 27, 60).

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Nevertheless, it could be argued that the ideology and propaganda of the ERP parties offer a frame in which people’s more or less unarticulated stock of xenophobic beliefs can be articulated in a more comprehensive way. Thus, as Bourdieu also argued, people’s beliefs and attitudes are not always fully articulated until they are confronted with the ‘already made explicit’ line of thought presented by the political supply side. In other words, the ‘ethos’ of popular xenophobia, ethno-nationalism, and so on, may not find its form until an articulated and (sufficiently) comprehensive program of ideas (but also slogans, etc.) is offered by the supply side of the social/political production of opinion (Bourdieu 1984: 459–460). In this perspective, the articulation of the demand side never occurs prior to the offered alternatives of opinion. Yet at the same time, the ideology and propaganda offered by the supply side have to be sufficiently attuned to people’s preconceptions if they are not to fall flat (see Merton 1968: 572–573).47 But, with the emergence of an ERP party, and the attention it attracts, a new alternative frame of thought is offered, which may help people to articulate their previously more or less unarticulated stock of beliefs and attitudes, especially if the frame offered is in line with their emotional dispositions and/or interests (see Merton 1968: 572–573). More specifically, there are some partly overlapping reasons why people, consciously or not, may find the authoritarian, ethno-nationalist, and xenophobic program of an ERP party attractive as a frame of thought. First, to start with the most general reason, the ideology of ERP parties may offer a theory of guidance in black-box situations, that is, a way to make the complex social and political reality meaningful (cf. Boudon 1994; Rydgren 2000b, 2003). In this way, it may provide a means of reducing fear and anxiety. This aspect will most likely attract people who have little knowledge of society and politics, and/or who have little trust and confidence in political institutions, especially political parties and established information sources (Rydgren 2000a, 2000b). For these people, the level of uncertainty is higher than average, at least in this context. There are also reasons to assume that the need for such a theory of guidance is most acute in periods of rapid social change (e.g., postindustrialization), when established traditions, ideologies, and identities are dissolving (see Betz 1994). Moreover, there are also reasons to assume that more people will adopt a xenophobic ethno-nationalist ideology as a theory of guidance, if it is sufficiently legitimized. Similarly, the ethno-nationalist and xenophobic political ideology of the ERP parties may appear attractive because of it being a powerful tool for reframing political problems that are perceived as ‘unsolved’ for many voters (e.g., unemployment, criminality, etc.). In fact, it offers a ‘cardinal solution’ to any conceivable social ill. As Winock (1998) argued in the case of the Front National, for the ERP parties “everything comes from immigration, everything goes back to immigration,” including unemployment, personal insecurity, the financial problems of the welfare state, AIDS, and so on.

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These kinds of problems, representing issues that affect people in a very direct and fundamental way, lead to negative emotions in two ways. They not only cause frustration in people who are subjected to them, and worry and anxiety for those who are not, but they may also lead to distrust in and dissatisfaction with political institutions because of their perceived inability to cope with these essential problems. The ethno-nationalist and xenophobic ideology of the ERP parties may offer a way of reducing—or at least channeling—these kinds of negative emotions and affects. In the case of feelings of growing personal insecurity, the ideology may provide a means of reducing the diffuse fear and anxiety arising from not knowing what or whom to fear. Since a belief that immigrants are criminal, for instance, may reduce the level of experienced uncertainty (i.e., “you know whom you should look out for”), it may have seemingly positive effects on individuals living under this kind of stress. In the case of negative emotions and affections resulting from unemployment, it may reduce the frustrating feeling that one (or one’s relatives, friends, etc.) lacks the qualifications needed to find a job (i.e., “it is the immigrants’ fault, not ours”). Another mechanism may be found in these latter psychological factors. As indicated above, the ethno-nationalist and xenophobic ideology of the ERP parties may also offer a way to reduce personal frustration by identifying objects of ressentiment, a theme particularly likely to attract people who feel impotent, who are excluded from society, and/or in whom the discrepancy between ambition and reality is acute. As we have seen, themes of ressentiment have in common that they aim at a revaluation, that is, at a negation of the established value order (Scheler 1998: 49). If ethno-nationality, for instance, were valued more highly than social class and/or education, this would have positive effects on people of the lower classes with little education. Similarly, those who lack flexibility, knowledge of languages, computer skills, and so on, which are deemed important values and qualities in postindustrial society, may be attracted by an ideological program that stresses the supreme values of tradition, authority, and, not least, ethno-national belonging.

Conclusion In this chapter, I have set out to present a theory of political behavior, involving both macro- and micro-level aspects, at the demand and the supply sides of the political space. I have discussed how changes in the economic, political, and cultural realms of society have resulted in (1) changed life situations in general for several groups of individuals, and (2) changed structures of social comparison in a society. More specifically, these changes resulted in a situation in which:

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1. some groups of individuals became increasingly marginalized and excluded, or at least felt that way; 2. there was an increasingly large gap created between some groups’ expectations and the outcome of their lives; 3. some groups lost their cognitive and emotional maps because of the erosion of traditions, habits, religion, class loyalties, and/or political ideologies; and 4. some groups of individuals became increasingly detached and alienated from the established political institutions. This situation has favored the emergence of ERP parties in three ways. First, since people are affected by economic, political, and cultural change in different ways, depending on their social position, ‘the losers’ in the postindustrialization processes can be supposed to become anxious, bewildered, insecure, resentful, and lost, sentiments that may be channeled into support for policy proposals that stress the need to return to the ‘traditional values’ of the status quo ante, not least to the values of ‘heartland’ and ethno-national identity. Furthermore, because of their denial of plurality, which may make them appear less ambiguous and tentative than other ideologies, monist ideologies are particularly efficient as cognitive and emotive ‘maps.’ Second, as a response to the established political parties’ inability to cope with the perceived perversions of the recent rapid economic and cultural transformation, many become increasingly discontent and disenchanted, which opens up a niche for parties ready to exploit that discontent. Decreased political trust also has an indirect effect by turning voters away from the established parties, thereby freeing resources for new parties. Hence, the fact that the electorate has become more volatile is a major prerequisite for the emergence of ERP parties. Third, the fragmentation and individualization of postindustrial societies lead to a decreased salience of the economic cleavage dimension, as well as to weakened class loyalties, which may open up a space for parties addressing new issues, such as immigration. People who possess little cultural capital, or who have cultural capital invested in ‘old’ modes of production (i.e., unskilled and semiskilled workers as well as segments of the petty bourgeoisie, such as some small traders, craftsmen, and other small employers), have found themselves in social decline. Earlier research (e.g., Lipset and Raab 1970; Kitschelt 1995) has indicated that many who find themselves in this position have a tendency to support political programs that promise to redraw the boundaries of group classification. In the specific socio-historical context I am interested in (i.e., Western Europe during the 1980s and 1990s), we are mainly concerned with the increased salience of the socio-cultural cleavage dimension and the correspondingly decreased salience of the economic cleavage dimension. As a consequence of this partial realignment, many who previously defined themselves, their adversaries, and socio-political issues in terms of economic position now do so in terms of ethnicity and

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nationality. By downplaying the existence of class stratification and stressing the harmony of ‘the people,’ individuals placed in negatively evaluated groups may redraw, or at least support political actors that claim to redraw, the boundaries of classification and thereby achieve higher self-esteem. Yet at the same time, a new out-group has to be constructed, in this case people of other ethnic origins, mainly ‘immigrants.’ Furthermore, individuals who find themselves in such a position of deprivation or social decline may be assumed to be more susceptible to welfare chauvinism, because of their real or perceived interest in limiting the competition for scarce resources such as jobs, public housings, social allowances, and so on. In a situation when immigrants are seen as illegitimate competitors, this may result in support for anti-immigration policies. In other words, because of absolute or relative deprivation, and/or cognitive as well as emotional disorientation, some groups of individuals (i.e., unskilled and semiskilled workers and an undereducated petty bourgeoisie, such as craftsmen) became susceptible to the authoritarian, populist, neo-racist ideology of ERP parties, stressing themes of resentment, national identity, and xenophobic welfare chauvinism. In addition, because of the decline in class voting and party identification, resources were freed for the emergence of new parties. Hence, on the demand side, macro changes resulted in a changed distribution of voters in the political space. But parties are not as flexible as voters. Normally, there is a time lag between the voter and party movement within the political space. Consequently, rapid change in voter distribution creates a gap between the political demand side and its supply side. If a political party can position itself in this gap, or niche, it may have good chances to capture votes, at least if the number of voters with a high degree of party identification has decreased below a certain level. More specifically, niches are most likely to evolve when a new or an already established but subordinate cleavage dimension, or one or several issues belonging to such a cleavage dimension, suddenly becomes salient. Furthermore, if the socio-cultural cleavage dimension is gaining in importance, it will be more important for the other political actors to talk about politics in terms of categories and division lines belonging to the sociocultural dimension, which are likely to influence the voters in the long run. Since a new political party lacks a visible history, and mostly has a weak party organization, it has often a greater room to maneuver for votemaximizing activities in the electoral arena, which makes it possible for them to take advantage of the available niches. Hence, niches in the electoral arena will be considered as one of the most important ‘opportunity structures’ (see McAdam 1996), which facilitate the emergence of ERP parties, and I will in coming chapters try to demonstrate that ethno-nationalism and xenophobia, which both belong to the socio-cultural cleavage dimension, have been the two most important niches for the emergence of the ERP parties. However, of equal importance

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has also been a ‘negative’ factor, namely, political discontent and alienation, which has repelled voters from the established parties and consequently freed resources for emerging new parties. In addition, ERP parties have also been able to exploit political discontent in a more direct way and thus mobilize protest voters. As stated above, I will more specifically argue that the emergence (i.e., the electoral breakthrough) of an ERP party can be explained in one of three ways: first, as a combination of the emergence of niches within the socio-cultural cleavage dimension, demanding ethnonationalist and xenophobic (i.e., anti-immigration and welfare chauvinist) policies, and a situation in which a sufficient number of voters lack bonds of loyalty toward the other parties (i.e., a situation of dealignment); second, as a result of political protest, which can be based either on dissatisfaction with particular aspects of one or several of the established parties or on a more general discontent with the political institutions per se, in particular with the political parties and politicians; or third, by a combination of these two alternatives. However, in order to explain the sustained electoral support of the ERP parties, political protest will not be a sufficient explanatory factor. Only if there exist niches of ethno-nationalism and xenophobia will the newly emerged ERP party persist as a significant force.

Notes 1. For this reason I will not explicitly try to link the macro and the micro levels on the supply side. Some aspects of this issue are touched on elsewhere in this chapter, but I do not find it important enough to deal with in an entire section. 2. As Clark (2001: 27) concludes, “citizens in many European countries shifted toward post-industrial politics long before their party leaders.” 3. However, to go back to figure 1.1 above, it is not the case that political parties are merely reactive in adjusting to political demand. As we will see below, political actors also try to create and mold political demand using various strategies (i.e., by politicizing some issues and depoliticizing others; by framing activities, political propaganda, etc.). Hence, there is no simple causality here, flowing from the demand side to the supply side, but a complex one, in which demand and supply always interact. 4. Ignazi (1992, 1996a) and Inglehart (1997) present similar explanations. Of course, the increasing process of globalization is one important aspect of these processes. 5. In addition, Kitschelt (1995: 273) argues that the transition from an industrial to a postindustrial economy, because of the polarization between winners and losers in the new economic order, as well as the decline in established modes of mass organization, has brought about a potential for social unrest that can be exploited by racist political entrepreneurs. Hence, according to Kitschelt, racism and xenophobia are partial causes for the emergence of the ERP parties. 6. Although the supporters of the ERP parties to some extent share their anti-modernism with the New Left, they are distinguished by their value system, which is authoritarian (Ignazi 1996a). Ignazi (1996a) indicates that authoritarian anti-modernism has existed as long as postmaterialist anti-modernism, but that those who endorsed these kinds of values were silent until a political entrepreneur emerged who could mobilize their support.

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7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15. 16.

At the same time, we should not disregard the fact that the New Left (e.g., women’s lib, May ’68, the Peace Movement, and the Greens) has had a mobilizing effect on intellectuals and ideologues of the extreme right. Hence, Ignazi’s article is a critique of Inglehart’s (1977, 1997) theory of value change, which predicts a more unambiguous change toward postmaterialist values and manifestations. Yet several scholars have criticized the Alford Index for being too coarse. As an alternative, the Eriksson-Goldthorpe schema has been proposed (Eriksson and Goldthorpe 1992; cf. Evans 1999b). Empirical data measured with this schema do not provide the same unambiguous support for the thesis of the decline in class voting (Evans 1999a). As a result, while still acknowledging the existence of alternative cleavage dimensions, Goldthorpe (1996) wants to tone down the paradigmatic changes indicated by Inglehart (1977, 1997), among others. For a general view of the debate on class voting, cf. Clark and Lipset (2001); Evans (1999b); and Lee and Turner (1996). Although the declining factions of the petty bourgeoisie played a role also in the emergence of the ERP parties (i.e., individuals from these groups are overrepresented among the voters supporting ERP parties), individuals belonging to such groups were not at all as numerous in the 1980s as they were in the 1930s. Nevertheless, one has to be cautious not to cross the line into social determinism. Individuals are born into specific ‘start positions,’ and the linguistic context puts constraints on our perception and cognition. Still, people do change, sometimes in unexpected ways, due to experiences in their everyday lives as well as through more ‘extraordinary’ experiences (Joas 2000). The presence of these a priori elements in all human thought and reasoning may also imply a potential discrepancy between the subject’s reasoning as it is, and the same reasoning as the subject perceives it (Boudon 1994: 60). As mentioned above, much of our stock of social categories, among them also stereotypes, is the result of socialization and education. However, sometimes stereotypes are created and used in a way that can be described as a two-way process. A stereotype may be constructed at the aggregated level by individual induction from singular cases, which people, in turn, use to make generalizations about every individual sharing the group-specific traits. The same, of course, is true for social categories in general, that is, not only for oversimplified social categories. Studies have also shown that expectations generally influence the perceptual categories that are employed to organize and encode experience (e.g., Kahneman and Tversky 1982c). This is because individuals with a similar location in social space are likely to meet at work, to live in the same areas, and/or to spend their spare time in the same civic organizations. In short, an individual’s relevant others are more likely to be found among individuals with similar location in social space. All of this may lead to selection biases (Nisbett and Ross 1980; cf. Boudon 1994: 94). Nisbett et al. (1993: 20) indicate, however, that people may sometimes overcome sample bias by applying ‘rules of thumb,’ such as the sayings “Don’t judge a book by its cover” or “All that glitters is not gold.” This is not to imply that this kind of vivid information is always a bad thing. As Nisbett and Ross (1980: 59–60) note, “vivid experiences and observations can be a source of new insights, can provide ‘phenomenological reality’ … to otherwise poorly understood propositions, and can inspire action in circumstances in which previous knowledge or opinions had not overcome inertia.” Social actors may also deliberately try to influence—and even mislead—people by means of carefully selected concrete and vivid information. We should also take note of the collective character of prejudices. Any member of a given out-group can potentially become the victim of prejudice, and it is not directed at individuals as individuals. Before such prejudice is acted upon, however, someone has to categorize a person according to one social characteristic rather than another. Hence, the foundation of prejudice is the cognitive activity of categorization (Brown 1995: 40;

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20.

21.

22.

23.

24.

25.

26.

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cf. Allport 1954; Tajfel 1969). Language, cultural traditions, norms, power relations, and societal institutions all play a significant role in how we construe our world. These sociohistorical factors determine a great deal of our stock of social categories (Brown 1995: 11; Operario and Fiske 1998: 40). The importance of language is stressed by Boudon (1994), who argues for the centrality of linguistic a priori forms. The philosopher Ernst Cassirer (1946: 28) argued that symbolic forms are ”organs of reality,” and that all ”theoretical cognition takes its departure from a world already pre-formed by language.” According to Cassirer, we all live with our objects only as language presents them to us. It may be useful to distinguish between short-term and long-term interests, and acknowledge the fact that the former are sometimes in conflict with the latter. Of course, since beliefs are influenced by categorizations, attitudes often include stereotypes and prejudices. However, Marx was not the first to write about ideologies. Francis Bacon had already written about ideology, although avant la lettre, in a similar sense. In his Novum Organum (1620 [1960]), he described idols as preconceptions that are deeply rooted in the mind and which disrupt access to truth. The term ‘ideology’ was coined by Destrutt de Tracy in the early nineteenth century (see Rush 1992: 181). This means that ideology serves the function of preservation of and for the ruling classes. In Marx’s words “the ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas” (Marx and Engels 1846 [1978]: 60). However, at the same time they are represented in a universal form: “in order to carry through its [the ruling class’s] aims, [it is compelled] to represent its interests as the common interests of all the members of society, that is, expressed in ideal form: it has to give its ideas the form of universality, and represent them as the only rational, universally valid ones” (Marx and Engels 1846 [1978]: 65–66). Karl Mannheim (1936: 40), for instance, argued that ideologies reflect the fact that ruling groups “can in their thinking become so intensively interest-bound to a situation that they are simply no longer able to see certain facts that would undermine their sense of domination.” For Habermas (1971) the concept of ideology signifies knowledge that claims to be beyond interests, but which nonetheless serves the function of hiding specific interests through rationalizations (see also Pareto [1935], who viewed ideology as ‘derivations’ that function as rationalizations or justifications for feeling). Berger and Luckmann (1966: 141) also connected knowledge and interests, although they did not indicate that the latter govern the former: ”When a particular definition of reality comes to be attached to a concrete power interest, it may be called an ideology.” See Campbell et al. (1960: 193), who argued that an ideology, ”once its affective components are set aside, shares some of the characteristics of any taxonomic system. Perceived events and states are given meaning because they may be coded into classes.” This latter aspect is in tune with the position taken by Raymond Boudon. For Boudon (1982, 1989, 1994) situations of uncertainty (i.e., about the things we cannot know for sure) are the place par excellence for ideology. Ideologies are false or dubious ideas, in which we believe in the absence of certain knowledge. However, since Boudon’s project was to demonstrate the ‘subjective rationality’ of human beliefs, he saw ideology as beliefs that individuals have ‘good reasons’ to endorse. However, as Fiske and Taylor (1991: 11) note, ”people do in fact tolerate a fair amount of inconsistency.” We should, therefore, not exaggerate the motivational force provided by the search for consistency. It is always an empirical question how many beliefs can be changed before an attitude changes, and how many attitudes can be changed before an ideology changes. More specifically, within the theory on social cognition, there are three alternative views on such schema change: first, the ‘bookkeeping model,’ according to which “people fine-tune the schema with each piece of information”; second, the ‘conversation model,’ which suggests that while “minor inconsistencies are tolerated, schemas can undergo dramatic and sudden change in response to salient instances which clearly disconfirm

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28.

29.

30.

31. 32.

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the schema”; and finally, the ‘sub-typing model,’ which argues that “disconfirming instances of the schema are relegated to subcategories” (Augoustinos and Walker 1995: 53; cf. Weber and Crocker 1983). All three share the indication that the degree of adaptability is highest at the level of beliefs, and lowest at the level of ideology. Moreover, the evaluative beliefs, which are immensely bound up with emotions, are based on value systems. These are rather stable and enduring, and give a certain degree of cohesion to various evaluative beliefs embraced by an individual. This would mean that evaluative beliefs cannot be ‘learned away’ as easily as factual beliefs. Instead of, like Lazarsfeld et al. (1968), stressing a more or less automatic connection between social surroundings and the individual act of voting, they used a social-psychological model of explanation. The explicit purpose was to anchor the analysis of voting behavior at the individual level (Campbell et al., 1960: 64). More specifically, Lazarsfeld et al. (1968) assumed a strong link between group belonging and voting behavior. They set out to prove the connection between socio-economic group belonging, religious practice, and place of residence on the one hand, and voting on the other. Their approach was summed up in the statement that as ”a person thinks, politically, as he is, socially. Social characteristics determine political preference” (Lazarsfeld et al. 1968: 27). Occasionally, however, as Downs (1957: 47) observed, “a rational voter may at times vote for a party other than the one he most prefers.” This eventuality is based on the assumption that some voters vote for the preferred party only if this party has a perceived chance of winning. Since we are dealing with a multiparty system, Downs’s definition of ‘winning’ should be modified. It should not signify ‘taking possession of the government,’ but rather ‘winning representation in the legislature.’ Nevertheless, some voters may feel that voting for a party they believe has no chance of winning is a wasted vote—and that these voters may instead vote for a ‘second-best’ alternative. The political issues also have considerable influence on the relative salience of the two cleavage dimensions constituting the political space. If ‘socio-cultural’ political issues are ‘hot’ in an election campaign, for example, they will draw attention to the cultural dimension—and increase its salience. See Sartori (1976: 330): “Issue, identification, and image are thus the major concepts employed for understanding why voters vote as they do.” Rationality has been one of the major controversial issues within the social sciences for a long time. However, I will use the concept of rationality in a rather specific way. Spatial rationality, as I will use it, says nothing about the ‘rationality’ of voters’ preferences, only about the link between preferences and the act of voting. However, the spatial approach to voting behavior (e.g., Downs 1957) has had a major influence in this context. This theory, which builds on Hotelling (1929), is very simple. Spatial theory is based on the following assumptions: First, a one-dimensional scale is constructed, and individuals are placed on that scale according to their preferences. Second, the theory assumes that the voters will vote for the party that has the position closest to their own within the constructed space. Third, the political parties are assumed to choose the position that grants them the maximum electoral reward. Hence, Downs makes the assumption that the voters act rationally, that is, in a way that will best satisfy their preferences. However, although I find this spatial approach useful in many ways, it has several drawbacks. The main problem, as I see it, is his assumption of fixed political tastes. Although it would reduce the theory’s predictive power as well as its ‘theoretic parsimony,’ we should allow floating and changeable political preferences in our model. As is evident from earlier sections of this chapter, I find the processes of preference construction fundamental for an understanding of social (and political) action. There is an additional type of voting behavior that is based neither on spatial rationality nor on identification, namely, strategic or tactical voting. Strategic voting occurs when the voter wants to help a ‘second-best’ party to win representation, because he or she believes it would be useful for his or her favorite party in the longer run; or when voters vote for their second or third preference party, because they think that this party has

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40.

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a better chance than their first preference to beat a party they disagree with completely (see Catt 1996: 46–48). In addition, the three significant factors may be interconnected to some extent. Political issues and party images may or may not be connected to the process of identification, and a commitment to political issues may or may not be in conflict with the voters’ political or party ideological framework. Economic capital consists of material means, money, and so on. Cultural capital exists in different forms, such as education, exams and grades, books, and so on (Bourdieu 1986). However, in chapter 2 I will operationalize it as formal education. Bourdieu also discussed a third form of capital, namely, social capital. However, the social space as Bourdieu constructed it, and as I will use it, only explicitly involves economic and cultural capital (see Bourdieu 1984: 337; 1986: 243). This view is in line with several authors who have studied ERP parties. Betz (1998: 7–8), for instance, has argued that it is among “blue-collar workers, employees doing routine jobs, or young persons lacking formal educational credentials [that] … we would expect the radical populist right to be most successful.” The reason for this, according to Betz, is that these groups are the most affected by “the psychological strain associated with uncertainties produced by large-scale socio-economic and sociostructural change.” In Betz’s words, these groups are the “losers of modernization.” Kitschelt (1995: 9) has promoted a similar view. According to Inglehart (1997: 238), finally, the salience of this new dimension alters the meaning of, and transforms, the social bases of political left and right: “Historically, the Left was based on the working class and the Right on the middle and upper classes. Today, increasingly, support for the Left comes from middle-class Postmaterialists, while a new Right draws support from less secure segments of the working class. A new Postmodern political cleavage pits culturally conservative, often xenophobic, parties, disproportionately supported by Materialists, against change-oriented parties, often emphasizing environment protection, and disproportionately supported by Postmaterialists.” Hence, I start from a totally different position than most spatial theory, which otherwise has influenced this section. Downs (1957: 25–26), for instance, defined political parties as teams of men (sic), where every member of the team, who is supposed to be rational, has exactly the same goals as everybody else. Hence, as Downs also acknowledged, this definition treats a political party as if it were a single person. In this way, Downs defined away the organizational aspects of political parties, which I will argue, in concert with a long tradition (e.g., Ostrogorski 1902; Weber 1978), are essential for reaching an understanding of how political parties work (see Lawson 1994; Panebianco 1988). It would not necessarily make Party A happy if Party B implemented all of Party A’s policy proposals, if that meant that the survival for Party A as an organization was threatened. No party organization voluntarily disbands. This was the first of the three basic assumptions that Downs (1957) formulated in his Economic Theory of Democracy. The other two were (1) that the parties are free to take any position they like on a one-dimensional scale, as long as they do not bypass each other, and (2) that the parties have full information about voters’ preferences and the action of the other parties. These three assumptions have all been criticized (cf. Grafstein 1992: 135; Hermansson 1990: 196; Sartori 1976: 324–351; Udehn 1996). Much of this critique is justified, and I will in this study argue for fundamental modifications of all three assumptions. Accordingly, the modification of the political parties’ overall goal does not imply that the politicians or the parties try to maximize the ‘common good.’ First, it is difficult— or perhaps even impossible—to agree on a uniquely common good; the ‘common good’ is likely to mean different things to different people (Schumpeter 1996: 251; cf. Blondel 1978: 107). Secondly, political leaders are ultimately expected to act in a way that maximizes the interests—the ‘good’—of the party, not the ‘common good.’ To these arenas, we may add the arena of implementation (see Hadenius 1981). The arena of implementation is the domain of achieving political decisions taken in the parliamentary

84

41.

42.

43.

44.

45.

46. 47.

The Populist Challenge

arena. The goal in this arena is to maximize the party’s influence on practical, streetlevel policy. This aim is best fulfilled through representation in the government agencies and good contacts with the public administration at the national, regional, and local levels, and with unions and other interest groups and organizations that can influence the implementation of the policy. Still, most important is the formulation of legislative bills in a way that makes them possible to implement. This, however, brings the goal in the arena of implementation into potential conflict with the goal of voter maximization in the electoral arena. It forces the parties to operationalize their ideological programs and to issue positions in precise and technical language, which makes their efforts to broaden their appeal more difficult. For a discussion of niches, see population ecological organizational theory (e.g., Hannan and Carrol 1992; McPearson 1983; McPearson and Ranger-Moore 1991). However, this theory is mainly concerned with member niches, while I am primarily interested in voter niches. The established parties, too, try in various ways to increase their strategic room to maneuver, mainly by different forms of decoupling. According to Meyer and Rowan (1981), there are possible ways to overcome the dilemma of how to choose between efficiency (hierarchical organization) and legitimacy (internal democracy); for instance, by decoupling the formal structure of the organization from the informal organization of day-to-day activities. As Brunsson and Olsen (1993: 9) have written, “it is possible to affect people’s picture or perception of an organization by talk, changing a name or projecting an image through symbols without (necessarily) changing any structures or processes or altering productivity or efficiency.” In addition, one way of overcoming the dilemma between the electoral and the implementation arenas may be to ‘let the future legitimize the present.’ In order to satisfy public opinion, and to present themselves as efficient, parties occasionally launch reforms that are very unlikely to be implemented in the day-to-day street-level bureaucracy. The size of the established political parties’ room to maneuver is partly contingent on how well they succeed in their decoupling activities. For a discussion on how the established parties in France have handled this conflict, see Appleton (1994). A political party always needs to possess sufficient resources, although the actual amount may be relatively small initially. Access to the media may nowadays be more important initially than means for coordination (see Epstein 1980: 233). When a party was founded and led by a charismatic leader, the resignation of that leader may increase the risk of dissolution or break up. The routinization of charisma is a crucial process that is likely to lead to tension between those who want to ‘normalize’ (i.e., develop a bureaucratic organization) and those who want to be faithful to the original charismatic character of the movement (see Weber 1978). In acknowledging this ability of political parties to influence and change voters’ preferences, we are moving toward the position held by Schumpeter (1996: 263), who argued that “the will of the people is the product and not the motive power of the political process.” In my analysis, the political demand side and supply side has a reciprocal relation: the “will of the people,” or the voters’ preferences, is both the motive power and the product of the political process. Where one begins the analysis depends on the nature of the problem under investigation. For ‘agenda setting,’ see Bachrach and Baratz (1962, 1963). See Zaller (1992: 6), who argues that every “opinion is a marriage of information and predisposition.”

Chapter 2

FRONT NATIONAL VOTERS Social Base and Attitudes


We are now taking the step from general theory to discussing a particular empirical case, the French Front National, and the voters who supported the party in elections from 1984 to 1997. The preceding chapter ended by stating that the emergence (i.e., the electoral breakthrough) of the ERP parties could be explained in one of three ways: (1) the emergence of niches within the socio-cultural cleavage dimension, demanding ethno-nationalist and xenophobic policies; (2) political protest, which can be based either on (2a) dissatisfaction with particular aspects of one or several of the old parties, or (2b) on a more general discontent with political institutions per se, in particular with political parties and politicians; or (3) a combination of 1 and 2. Yet in order to explain the sustained electoral support for a particular ERP party, political protest, in particular of the 2a type, is not a sufficient explanation. Only if there exist niches of ethnonationalism and xenophobia will the newly emerged ERP party persist as a significant electoral force. For this reason, this theoretical framework calls for a two-step explanation. It is possible that an ERP party emerges because of political protest (even of the 2a type), which may not be ethno-nationalist and xenophobic in character, but that it survives because of its ability to attract voters demanding ethno-nationalist and xenophobic policies. I will argue that this was partly the case in France. Electoral support for the Front National in its national breakthrough election, the election to the European Parliament in 1984, came largely from voters who previously voted for the mainstream right, but who were disappointed after the victory of the left in 1981, and discontented with the (at least perceived) ‘soft’ line of the mainstream right parties in the early 1980s. Many of these voters returned to their usual voting behavior after 1984, although some of them remained with the Front National throughout the 1980s (see Perrineau 1997). However, because of the political visibility that Notes for this chapter begin on page 113.

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resulted in the wake of their electoral success in 1984, the FN was able to attract voters who demanded ethno-nationalist, xenophobic, and populist policies. This was partly because these niches had evolved before 1984, and partly because the emergence of the Front National created niches and amplified already existing ones. As will be demonstrated below, issues like immigration and personal security were of relatively low salience for French voters at the time of the emergence of the Front National, but of high salience four years later. Nevertheless, when we turn to a discussion of the voters who supported the Front National and Le Pen in national elections, the theoretical conclusion reached in chapter 1 yields two alternative sets of hypotheses. For reasons discussed in chapter 1 we would expect (H1) more support than average for the Front National from a base of voters experiencing relative deprivation, or who are threatened by social decline. More specifically, we would expect the party to get more support than average from voters with little education; those who are manual workers or members of the petty bourgeoisie (in particular those working within traditional trades such as craftsmen and small traders); and those who are pessimistic about their present and future situation. However, this expectation is based on the assumption that the presence of niches of ethno-nationalist and xenophobic demand explains the voting behavior of that particular election. If, on the other hand, the election was the result of political protest, in particular if the political protest was of the 2a type, we would expect (H2) a social base much more like the traditional one of the mainstream right, that is, relatively well off and well educated. Similarly, concerning the attitudinal motivation of Front National voters, we would expect (H3) more support than average from voters who consider the socio-cultural cleavage dimension to be more important than the socio-economic cleavage dimension; are more directed toward the past; have authoritarian attitudes, in particular concerning law and order and personal security; have ethno-nationalist and xenophobic attitudes, in particular against immigrants and other ethnic minorities; and express a relative high level of general political discontent. This hypothesis is based on the assumption that the existence of niches in the socio-cultural cleavage dimension explains most of the electoral behavior in the particular election. An alternative hypothesis is that political protest explains most of the behavior. If that were the case, we would expect less conspicuous attitudinal patterns. More specifically, if the social protest was of the 2a type we might expect that (H4) the voters tended to have a radical type of mainstream rightist attitudes: they were likely to be authoritarian and xenophobic, but they were not necessarily focused upon the past; were more likely to be civic than ethnic nationalists; were more likely to share socio-economic rightist (pro-market) attitudes; and were less likely to have a high degree of general discontent with political parties per se (because they still identified with one of them). On the other hand, if the

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87

social protest was of the 2b type we might expect (H5) attitudinal patterns much more in line with H3, although we may assume that the level of political discontent was even higher. As seen, these hypotheses are not mutually exclusive. However, the purpose of coming sections is not to verify or falsify particular hypotheses, but to proceed in a more interpretative way. The hypotheses presented above are to a certain extent ideal types, which will help us find a plausible explanation for the rise and sustained electoral support of the Front National.

The Vote for the Front National: Sociological Characteristics I will below discuss the result of some quantitative analyses (logistic regressions) that I conducted, based on the CEVIPOF surveys from 1988, 1995, and 1997.1 I will also refer extensively to studies of other scholars, most of whom have based their research on surveys from either CEVIPOF or SOFRES.

An Authoritarianism Based on Absolute and/or Relative Deprivation? According to hypothesis H1, voters experiencing absolute or relative deprivation are more prone to become attracted by authoritarian, nationalist, and xenophobic attitudes and ideas, which in turn implies that they are more likely to be mobilized to support ERP parties that advance such issues. I will below estimate a series of logistic regressions with the purpose of testing whether this hypothesis seems to hold true in the case of France in the 1990s. The variables I have chosen as independent variables are generally rather straightforward indicators of real and/or perceived absolute and relative deprivation. As we recall from chapter 1, the position within the social space—which structures social comparisons—is determined by the amount of economic and cultural capital. This makes it appropriate to include variables measuring income and education in the model. Unemployment is an indicator of absolute or relative deprivation, whereas fear of becoming unemployed may be an indicator of the feeling that one is exposed and at risk of sudden deprivation. A feeling that one’s personal economic situation has been impaired over the past twelve months and the belief that it will deteriorate over the coming twelve months are used as indications of social decline or fear of social decline in a near future. The petty bourgeoisie (i.e., small traders and craftsmen) has for a long time been threatened and/or directly affected by ongoing rationalization processes, and workers find themselves in an increasingly vulnerable position. In 1997, 14 percent of French workers were unemployed; they represented 47 percent of long-term unemployment; and 25 percent of the unskilled workers had limited employment. They also had the lowest income of all

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groups, and a worker’s life span was, on average, five years shorter than that of individuals belonging to the upper classes (Mayer 1999: 93). I have estimated a series of logistic regression equations dealing with authoritarian, nationalist, and xenophobic attitudes. The data are taken from CEVIPOF’s 1995 survey, which was carried out after the presidential election of 1995. I have used logistic regression rather than ordinary least squares (OLS) regression for two reasons. First, it is theoretically more interesting to look at voters who have strong preferences for or against this or that, rather than to elaborate how these attitudes are distributed over a continuous scale—because strong preferences are, unlike weak ones, likely to make a difference in voting decisions. Second, in CEVIPOF’s surveys, attitudes are mostly coded as a four-valued variable, such as “Strongly agree”; “Somewhat agree”; “Somewhat disagree”; “Strongly disagree.” This codification is not very well suited to OLS regressions because of the few values and the arbitrary relative distance between them. Hence, the Y-variables below are all coded as dummy variables based on one of the extremes. For readers who are unfamiliar with logistic regressions, table 2.1 should be read in the following way: Instead of displaying coefficients (b), as is common in OLS regressions, odds ratios (eb) are used. The odds ratio shows how the odds of the ‘event’ are influenced by changes in the independent variables.2 It is defined as: odds (if the independent variable is increased by 1) odds (if the variable is not incremented) For example, an odds ratio of 2 means that the odds of the event is doubled by a one-unit increase in the independent variable. A value of 1 means that the change in the independent variable has no effect on the odds, and an odds ratio of 0.5 means that the odds of the event halve as the independent variable increases by 1. Odds ratios greater than 1 thus signify positive relationships, odds ratios less than 1 negative relationships, and odds ratios equal to 1 no relationship at all. Log likelihood is a value for the overall fit of the model, whereas pseudo-R2 provides a way to describe or compare the fit of different models for the same dependent variable (cf. Hamilton 1998: 225–249; Pampel 2000). The two first regressions are designed to tap xenophobic attitudes. In the first, respondents were asked if they strongly agreed, somewhat agreed, somewhat disagreed, or strongly disagreed with the statement “There are too many immigrants in France.” In the model above, “strongly agree” was coded as 1, and the other three alternatives as 0. If we take a look at the results, which also control for the effect of a variety of interaction variables,3 we see that they are in line with hypothesis H1. People with little economic and cultural capital (i.e., with a low income and a low level of education) were significantly more likely to agree strongly with

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TABLE 2.1 The Sociology of Authoritarian, Nationalist, and Xenophobic Attitudes, 1995 (logistic regression analyses) Immigration Income Low education Petty bourgeoisie Skilled worker Unskilled worker (Manager, civ. serv., engineer) Unemployed (Employed full-time) Risk of unemployment Impaired personal economy Bad future personal economy Age Male Age* Income Age* Low education Age* Male Unskil. worker* Impaired econ. Unemployed* Impaired econ. Unemployed* Bad future econ. Pseudo-R2 Prob > Chi2 Log likelihood N

Income Low education Petty bourgeoisie Skilled worker Unskilled worker (Manager, civ. serv., engin.) Unemployed (Employed full-time) Risk of unemployment Impaired personal economy Bad future personal economy Age Male Age* Income Age* Education Pseudo-R2 Prob > Chi2 Log likelihood N

0.675*** 6.170*** 3.589*** 3.404*** 2.888*** (1.000) 1.120 (1.000) 1.011 1.136 0.867 0.988 1.040 1.007*** 0.972***

Intolerance 0.948 1.729*** 3.697*** 4.268*** 2.974*** (1.000) 1.124 (1.000) 1.237* 1.146 1.043 0.983*** 0.958

Death Penalty 0.931* 4.182*** 3.543*** 4.297*** 2.919*** (1.000) 0.894 (1.000) 1.201 1.039 0.972 0.999 0.607 0.979*** 1.013** 2.172*

0.519* 2.082* 0.096 0.000 -1794.40 2912

0.077 0.000 -1554.77 2872

0.072 0.000 -1694.65 2900

Nationalism

Nostalgia

Political Discontent

0.870*** 2.108*** 3.390*** 6.403*** 4.512*** (1.000) 1.157 (1.000) 0.900 1.055 1.163 0.997 0.672***

0.716*** 7.690*** 1.735* 2.410*** 2.057** (1.000) 0.908 (1.000) 1.057 1.235* 0.773* 1.002 0.804* 1.004* 0.968*** 0.096 0.000 -1689.57 2901

0.117 0.000 -1543.60 2943

0.827*** 1.072 1.048 1.357 1.270 (1.000) 1.236 (1.000) 1.565*** 1.583*** 1.945*** 0.991 0.991

0.074 0.000 -1407.46 2932

* Significant on the 0.05 level. ** Significant on the 0.01 level. *** Significant on the 0.001 level.

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the statement that there are too many immigrants in France.4 Also members of the petty bourgeoisie (i.e., small traders and craftsmen), skilled workers, and unskilled workers were significantly more likely to share this attitude.5 However, when controlling for other relevant variables, neither unemployed voters, voters who declared that they or someone in their household was at high risk of unemployment, voters who declared that their personal economic situation has been impaired during the past twelve months, nor those who believed that it would grow worse over the coming twelve months, were significantly more likely to believe that there are too many immigrants in France.6 In the second logistic regression model, which analyzes intolerance toward ethnic minorities, we find similar results. Here, too, the dependent variable is a dummy, in which those who strongly disagreed with the statement “It is only fair for Muslims living in France to have mosques to practice there religion” are coded as 1, and those who agreed strongly or somewhat, as well as those who disagreed somewhat, are coded as 0. As in the first model, poorly educated voters, skilled workers, unskilled workers, and voters of the petty bourgeoisie were significantly more likely to have this attitude. So were voters who believed that there was a high risk of getting unemployed in the future. Hence, also in this model the results are in line with hypothesis H1. The third model was designed to tap more general authoritarian attitudes. It measures attitudes toward the death penalty, which is often used as a key indicator of authoritarianism versus cultural liberalism. I have coded those who strongly agreed with the statement “The death penalty should be reinstated” as 1, and those who disagreed strongly or somewhat, as well as those who agreed somewhat, as 0. Also here the results are well in line with hypothesis H1. In this model, voters with a low income and voters with a low level of education were significantly more likely to share this kind of authoritarian attitude. So were also skilled and unskilled workers, and members of the petty bourgeoisie. The fourth model, which is an indicator of national identity, yields results that support hypothesis H1, as well. I have coded all voters who stated that they feel “French only” as 1, and those who declared that they are “more French than European,” “French and European equally,” “more European than French,” “European only,” or “neither French nor European” as 0. In addition to low-income voters and voters with a low level of education, also skilled and unskilled workers, and voters belonging to the petty bourgeoisie were significantly more likely to define themselves as French only. The fifth model is designed to tap nostalgia and a feeling that ‘things were better in the past.’ As I will show in chapter 4, the idea of a ‘golden past’ has been an important underlying theme in the rhetoric of the Front National. I have (in chapter 1) also argued that voters who share this kind of nostalgia are more likely to become attracted to political entrepreneurs

Front National Voters

91

who try to mobilize around the values of the status quo ante. In fact, if we correlate the variable ‘nostalgia’ with the variable ‘too many immigrants,’ we obtain a correlation coefficient of 0.61. Furthermore, in the elections of 1988, 1995, and 1997, 30–32 percent of the voters who strongly agreed with the statement “One doesn’t feel as much at home like one once did” voted for Le Pen or the Front National, compared with only 2–4 percent of those who disagreed strongly with the statement (own calculations based on CEVIPOF 1988, 1995, 1997). As in the earlier models, the dependent variable is a dummy. I coded the voters who strongly agreed with the statement “One no longer feels at home like one once did” as 1, and those who disagreed strongly or somewhat, as well as those who agreed somewhat, as 0. This model also yields results in line with hypothesis H1. Lowincome voters, voters with a low level of education, skilled and unskilled workers, voters from the petty bourgeoisie, and voters whose personal economic situation has been impaired were all significantly more likely to have this attitude. However, we should also note that voters who believed that their personal economy would grow worse during the coming twelve months were significantly less likely to have this attitude. The sixth model, finally, was designed to tap political discontent. I coded the voters who answered “not at all” to the question “In your opinion, are politicians concerned with what people like yourself think?” as 1, and those who answered “a lot,” “somewhat,” and “very little” as 0. In this model, too, the results are in line with hypothesis H1. Low-income voters, voters who assess a high risk of unemployment in the future, voters whose personal economy has grown worse, and those who think that it will do so in the future were all significantly more likely to have this attitude. However, the results from this model suggest that economic capital is a more important predicator than cultural capital for assessing the level of political discontent. In summary, these six models provide considerable support for hypothesis H1. Voters who were experiencing deprivation—because of a lack of economic and/or cultural capital, because they are employed in sectors in an exposed position—were more likely to share authoritarian, nationalistic, and xenophobic attitudes. The models indicate that this was the case in France in 1995.

The Front National Voters: Who Are They? The fact that people in a vulnerable social position are more likely to share attitudes consistent with the Front National does not automatically imply that they are also more likely to vote for the party or for Le Pen. As I stressed in chapter 1, a variety of factors affect the link between attitudes and voting behavior. Voters having such attitudes may identify strongly with another party; they might not value such attitudes highly in relation to preferences based on other kinds of attitudes (e.g., economic); and so on. Therefore, I

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will in this section discuss the results from two additional logistic regressions, one from the presidential election of 1988 (CEVIPOF 1988), and one from the presidential election of 1995 (CEVIPOF 1995). Their design permits us to detect changes over time in the Front National’s electorate. In both models, the dependent variable is coded 1 if the voters have stated that they voted for Jean-Marie Le Pen in the first round of the presidential elections of 1988 and 1995. Otherwise, the variable has been coded as 0. I will use the same independent variables as in table 2.1 when possible.7 I will also control for the effects of a variety of interaction variables. However, when we take a closer look at table 2.2, we should keep in mind that I am interested in the effects of the specific variables rather than of the overall fit of the whole model. Because each survey involved relevant questions that were not included in the other, it will not be possible to compare the two sets of models in a strict sense. However, it will still be possible to discuss some more general divergences and convergences. Although none of the models provides unequivocal support for hypothesis H1, the results from both 1988 and 1995 seem to be much closer to hypothesis H1 than to Hypothesis H2. In 1988, poorly educated voters, skilled and unskilled workers, and voters from the petty bourgeoisie were significantly more likely to vote for Le Pen. However, when controlling for other relevant variables, neither low-income voters, voters who were unemployed or who believed that they soon would be, voters who defined themselves as ‘poor,’ nor voters who claimed to have little status in society were significantly more likely to vote for Le Pen. In fact, voters belonging to the latter three categories were even significantly less likely to vote for Le Pen. In 1995, the situation had changed. Voters with little economic capital were significantly more likely to vote for Le Pen. Also, unemployed voters and voters from the petty bourgeoisie were significantly more likely to support Le Pen. But poorly educated voters and skilled and unskilled workers were not significantly more likely to vote for Le Pen (in fact, in the first case were significantly less likely to do so), provided that we control for the effects of all other independent variables. However, male unskilled workers and unskilled workers with a low level of education were significantly much more likely to vote for Le Pen. Thus, although these results are not unequivocal, they generally provide support for hypothesis H1 (they are clearly closer to the results predicted by that hypothesis than to the predictions of hypothesis H2). Still, as will be discussed below, the character of Front National voters had evidently changed between 1988 and 1995. As was indicated in the introduction, the Front National (in common with many other ERP parties) underwent a ‘proletarianization process’ during the late 1980s and 1990s (cf. Betz 1994: 161; Mayer 1999; Perrineau 1997: 120). In the early and mid 1980s, many who voted for the Front National were relatively well off—but still authoritarian and xenophobic—voters, who

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TABLE 2.2 The Sociology of Le Pen’s Voters in the 1988 and 1995 Presidential Elections (logistic regression analyses) 1988 Wage income Low education Petty bourgeoisie Skilled worker Unskilled worker (Civil servants) (Managers, civil servants, engineers) Unemployed (Employed full-time) High risk of unemployment Subjectively poor Subjectively working class Subjectively worker Subjectively ‘small people’ (Subjectively ruling class) Subjective status Impaired personal economy Bad economy in the future Age Male Age* Low education Income* Low education Income* Unemployed Income* Risk of unemployment Skilled worker* Subjective status Unskilled worker* Male Unskilled worker* Low education Subject. working class* Age Pseudo-R2 Prob > Chi2 Log likelihood N

0.983 3.339** 2.208* 8.030*** 12.141** (1.000) 1.030 (1.000) 0.354* 0.066* 0.733 1.219 0.696 (1.000) 1.207**

1.019** 1.760*** 0.979*

1995 0.878* 0.377* 2.761* 1.988 0.331 (1.000) 6.079*** (1.000) 1.262

1.246 1.049 0.983** 1.561** 1.242* 0.689**

1.274* 0.730** 3.607* 4.036** 0.977* 0.052 0.000 -889.60 3060

0.074 0.000 -969.20 2872

* Significant on the 0.05 level. ** Significant on the 0.01 level. *** Significant on the 0.001 level.

were dissatisfied with the mainstream right, and who turned to the Front National after the victory of the left in 1981 and the perceived ‘softness’ of the mainstream right. Many of them returned to the mainstream right during the late 1980s, and many of the remaining ones became during the 1990s increasingly attracted by De Villiers (and later Charles Pasqua), whereas the Front National succeeded to attract a growing number of voters from the so-called lower strata. The proletarianization process of Front National voters had already begun at the time for the presidential election of 1988, as indicated in table 2.2 above, and in table 2.3 we get a more comprehensive picture of the large fluctuations between 1984 and 1997.

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TABLE 2.3 Some Characteristics of the Front National’s Voters, 1984–1997 Eur. 1984

Leg. 1986

Total

11

10

Male Female

14 8

11 9

Age: 18–24 25–34 35–49 50–64 65–

10 11 12 12 10

Pres. 1988

Leg. 1988

Leg. 1993

Pres. 1995

Leg. 1997

1984– 1997

14.5

10

13

15.5

15

+4

18 11

12 7

14 13

19 12

18 12

+4 +4

14 10 11 9 6

16 17 17 11 12

15 9 8 10 10

18 10 13 13 13

18 18 15 17 9

16 19 15 15 12

+6 +8 +3 +3 +2

Profession: Farmer Small trade worker or craftsman Liberal profession Middle-class employee Worker Retired, inactive

10

17

13

3

13

16

4

-6

17 14 15 8 9

16 6 11 11 8

27 19 13 19 12

6 10 8 19 9

15 6 13 18 12

14 7 16 30 11

26 4 14 24 15

+9 -10 -1 +16 +6

Education: Primary Secondary Technical trade Higher education

8 12 17 11

8 15 12 7

15 13 18 12

7 12 12 10

13 16 14 8

14 17 21 9

17 14 19 10

+9 +2 +2 -1

Religion: Catholic, practicing Catholic, non-practicing No religion

14 13 5

7 12 7

7 17 9

5 11 9

12 13 15

10 18 14

7 18 17

-7 +5 +12

Source: Perrineau (1997: 102). This table is a compilation of SOFRES’s postelectoral surveys. The figures signify the amount (in percent) of every category that voted for the Front National or Jean-Marie Le Pen.

In fact, by examining table 2.3 we see that for the elections up to the 1988 presidential election, hypothesis H2 seems to fit better than hypothesis H1. In the elections of the mid 1980s, the Front National received strong support from voters in the liberal professions, and rather weak support from the workers. However, this began to change after the presidential election of 1988, and the percentage of FN voters among the workers increased by 16 percentage points between 1984 and 1997. During the same period, the percentage of FN voters among the liberal professions decreased from 14 to 4 percent. In fact, the proletarianization process accelerated during the late 1990s to such an extent that some scholars (e.g., Mayer 1999: 23) began to talk about an evolving ouvriéro-lepénisme (worker’s Le Penism). As indicated above, during the late 1990s readiness

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95

to vote for the Front National was high among working-class voters, in particular among unskilled workers, of whom 48 percent voted for Le Pen in the 1995 presidential election (own calculations based on CEVIPOF 1995). Furthermore, as Mayer (1999) has shown, during this period the Front National was particularly successful in attracting young workingclass voters who were deeply socialized into a working-class milieu. In the 1997 parliamentary election, 47 percent of workers younger than 40, whose fathers or partners were also workers, voted for the Front National (Mayer 1999: 23–34). Figure 2.1 shows the effect of working-class ‘embeddedness’ on the propensity to vote for the Front National. More specifically, it shows the number of links to the working class. Voters are assumed to have between zero and three links to the working class (i.e., they may be workers themselves; they may be married—or live together—with a worker; and their father may be a worker). This figure clearly shows that the propensity to vote for the Front National increased in direct proportion to the number of links to the working class. This was also the case in the elections of 1988 (presidential), 1995 (presidential), and 1997 (parliamentary). However, we also see that the slope of the lines changed substantially between every election. In

FIGURE 2.1 Votes for the Front National and Links to the Working Class (in percent)

Source: This figure is based on data presented in Mayer (1999: 88).

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the 1988 presidential election, the percentage of those who had three links to the working class and voted for the Front National was 8 percentage points higher than among those who had no links (21 percent and 13 percent, respectively). In the 1995 presidential election, the divergence was 17 percentage points (28 percent versus 11 percent), and in the 1997 election to Parliament it was 20 percentage points (33 percent versus 13 percent). In fact, in the 1997 election to the French Parliament, 58 percent of the Front National’s voters had at least one link to the working class. This was the highest percentage of all French parties, with the exception of the PCF (Mayer 1999: 97). These findings indicate that during the 1990s the Front National attracted voter groups that had traditionally constituted the left parties’ electoral base. As late as 1978, the left parties captured 80 percent of the working-class voters who were born and had married within this milieu. However, we cannot conclude from these figures that the Front National succeeded in getting the support of former left voters. Rather, it mainly was young voters from this milieu who turned toward the Front National—voters who earlier had been likely to support the PCF or the PS (Mayer 1999: 89). The interacting effect of age and links to the working class is shown in figure 2.2. Clearly, it is mainly younger voters among FIGURE 2.2 Voting in the 1997 Election According to Age and Number of Links to the Working Class (in percent)

Source: This figure is based on data presented in Mayer (1999: 92).

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97

those who are deeply embedded within the working class that voted for the FN (for these voters the Front National was a more common choice than the left parties), whereas the older voters among this group voted for the left to a much higher extent. Furthermore, in contrast to voters from other occupations, female workers were at least in 1997 as likely to vote for the Front National as their male counterparts (although the regression analyses of the elections of 1988 and 1995 do not show this). In the 1997 election 37 percent of the female workers younger than 40 years voted for the Front National, compared to 27 percent of the young male workers.8 Of the workers below 40 years of age, who were born and who married within the working class, 47 percent of both male and female voters voted for the Front National in the 1997 election (Mayer 1999: 119).9 Finally, there are also indicators that ‘class-conscious’ working-class voters were more prone than other working-class voters to vote for the Front National during the 1990s. In the 1995 presidential election, 18 percent of workers who said that they had ‘nothing at all’ to defend together with other workers voted for the Front National, compared to 26 percent among the workers who said that they had ‘a lot’ to defend together with other workers (Mayer 1999: 112–113). Furthermore, French workers did not identify with the political left to the same extent as previously. In 1997, only one-third of workers considered themselves to be ‘left’ when asked to define themselves politically. At the same time, a quarter considered themselves to be ‘right,’ while as many as 40 percent answered that they were ‘neither left nor right.’ It is among this latter category that the Front National polled the most votes during the 1990s. In the 1997 election to the French parliament, 47 percent of workers who defined themselves as ‘neither left nor right’ voted for the FN, compared to 22 percent of workers who defined themselves as ‘left’ and 31 percent of those who defined themselves as ‘right’ (Mayer 1999: 91). Looking at the voters’ self-assessment of social status also illuminates the changed composition of the Front National voters between the 1980s and 1990s. As figure 2.3 shows, the FN’s support in the 1988 election was more or less unrelated to the voters’ self-estimated social status (although the regression analyses above showed that the odds for voting for Le Pen increased slightly with a higher status position). In 1995, on the other hand, voter support was symmetrically distributed between strong support among low-status voters and weak support from high-status voters. Furthermore, in 1995, 66 percent of Le Pen’s voters believed that their personal economic picture had declined over the past twelve months. De Villiers’s voters notwithstanding, this was considerably more than the other candidates’ voters.10 In addition, 43 percent of Le Pen’s voters stated in 1995 that there was a high risk of unemployment in the near future, for themselves personally or for someone in their household. This is the highest figure for all candidates’ voters (own calculations based on CEVIPOF

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FIGURE 2.3 Votes for the Front National after Self-estimated Status (in percent)

Source: This figure is based on data presented in Mayer (1999: 83, 86). The respondents were asked to place themselves on a scale where number 1 stands for the least elevated and number 10 for the most elevated position in society. It should be noted that 8 to 10 are represented as 8 in this figure.

1995).11 In fact, 26 percent of voters who believed that there was a high risk of becoming unemployed in the near future voted for Le Pen in 1995 (own calculations based on CEVIPOF 1995).12 As we recall from table 2.3, we can observe the same kind of changes between Front National voters of the 1980s and the 1990s concerning the level of education. In the elections of the mid 1980s—most notably in the 1984 election to the European Parliament—the FN’s voters were more or less evenly distributed among the different levels of education (although voters with exams from technical and trade schools were overrepresented). In 1997, on the other hand, only 10 percent of voters with higher school certificates (BAC) voted for the Front National, which can be compared to 20 percent of voters who lacked a higher school certificate (Mayer 1999: 68). As with working-class voters, the effect of educational level interacts with age. As table 2.4 shows, the Front National received strong support from young, poorly educated voters.13

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TABLE 2.4 The FN Voters According to Educational Level and Age Less than 40 years old

More than 40 years old

1988 Presidential Election: Without BAC

18% (914)

15% (1357)

BAC or more

8% (501)

16% (287)

Without BAC

26% (673)

15% (1350)

BAC or more

10% (647)

8% (470)

Without BAC

27% (358)

15% (913)

BAC or more

9% (366)

10% (326)

1995 Presidential Election:

1997 Legislative Election:

Source: Mayer (1999: 69).

To conclude, this section strengthens the perception that the 1988 presidential election was something of a turning point. The early and mid 1980s had been characterized by political protest; the voters who supported the party were relatively well off and well educated. If anything, their voting behavior was more a result of a feeling of impending relative deprivation than of actual relative or absolute deprivation. Hence, hypothesis H2 but not H1 receives some support from the period before the presidential election of 1988. In the presidential election of 1988, on the other hand, a change was underway. In this election and in the elections of 1995 and 1997, we see results that yield stronger support for hypothesis H1.

The Attitudes of Front National Voters: Authoritarian, Xenophobic, and Politically Dissatisfied? I will now turn to a discussion of the attitudes of the Front National’s voters. Here, as well, my analysis will to a great extent rest upon a series of logistic regressions based on CEVIPOF surveys from the elections of 1988, 1995, and 1997. When discussing authoritarian attitudes, it is important to note that French voters in general have become less authoritarian and more socio-culturally liberal over the past decades. For instance, the percentage of voters

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who think that “homosexuality is an accepted form of sexuality” increased from 24 percent in 1973 to 55 percent in 1997. Furthermore, between 1988 and 1999 the percentage of voters who supported the death penalty decreased from 62 to 51 percent (Mayer 1999: 137; cf. Balme 2002). However, the fact that the voters in general have become less authoritarian does not preclude the possibility that the salience of authoritarian attitudes has increased among some voters. As indicated above, I believe this has been the case in France, in particular during the 1990s. This view is shared by Mayer (1999: 145), who on the basis of CEVIPOF’s surveys from the 1995 and 1997 elections has concluded that the support or rejection of cultural liberalism is the major ideological cleavage for the French voters—although the importance of the economic cleavage dimension has not vanished completely. Furthermore, Mayer (1999: 58) has argued that the vote for the Front National was mainly an expression of authoritarianism and ethnocentrism. In order to justify this claim Mayer used an ‘authoritarian index’ involving a wide range of survey questions, which indeed has been the most common approach in studying the impact of authoritarianism on political behavior since the seminal work of Adorno and his colleagues (Adorno et al. 1954; see also Altemeyer 1996 for a discussion of such studies since Adorno). I do not contest Mayer’s conclusions, although I have chosen another approach. In my opinion, it is theoretically more useful to look only at strong preferences for or against this or that position or party, because strong preferences rather than weak ones are most likely to influence voting decisions. Furthermore, there are pitfalls associated with adding together a wide variety of attitudes and calling them ‘authoritarianism.’ As we will see below, attitudes measuring authoritarianism go in different directions, which means that important information may be lost if we pack them together in an index. Finally, for reasons accounted for above, the original coding of the variables is somewhat ill suited to OLS regressions. For this reason, I will refrain from using index variables, and will in the logistic regressions below instead use dummy variables based on extreme values. Using stepwise models, I test for the effects of attitudes (authoritarian, nationalist/xenophobic, political discontent, anti-European, and socio-economic) on the vote for Le Pen in the 1988 and 1995 presidential elections, and for the Front National in the 1997 election to the French Parliament (see tables 3.5 to 3.7). In the first model in table 2.5 we see that only attitudes strongly in favor of the death penalty and a clear affirmation of the need for discipline in school are significantly associated with voting for Le Pen in the 1988 presidential election.14 The ‘effect’ of the death penalty variable persists even when we control for a wide range of other relevant variables in models 2 to 4.15 Of equal interest is the finding that strong feelings against abortion or homosexuality, strong agreement with the statement that ‘the woman’s role is in the home,’ and a strong belief in the need for hierarchies and leaders in society, were not significantly associated with the odds of voting for

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TABLE 2.5 Effect of Attitudes on the Decision to Vote for Le Pen in the 1988 Presidential Election (logistic regression analysis) Model 1 Authoritarianism: Death penalty Discipline in school Abortion Homosexuality Women’s role Need of hierarchies

3.450*** 1.349* 0.805 1.165 1.121 1.215

Nationalism/xenophobia: Proud to be French Nostalgia Too many immigrants Not acceptable with mosques Jews have too much power

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

1.973*** 1.158 0.853 1.032 0.866 1.164

1.960*** 1.177 0.830 1.016 0.918 1.199

1.991*** 1.091 0.835 0.931 0.924 1.106

0.774 1.599** 4.518*** 2.349*** 0.898

0.790 1.563* 4.642*** 2.215*** 1.015

0.715 1.697** 4.624*** 2.386*** 1.288

1.262 1.778*** 0.642* 0.775 0.873

1.331 1.440* 0.753 0.904 0.890

Political discontent: Democracy does not work Negative reactions on politics Politics are too complicated Left and right are obsolete Accept society without parties Economic left-right: Bad with equal salary Less state control Profit positive Privatization positive Pseudo-R2 Prob > Chi2 Log likelihood N

1.410 1.396 1.397 0.891 0.068 0.000 -972.91 3367

0.194 0.000 -603.83 2313

0.207 0.000 -539.26 2141

0.232 0.000 -434.95 1723

* Significant on the 0.05 level. ** Significant on the 0.01 level. *** Significant on the 0.001 level.

Le Pen. Thus, it is not clear that authoritarian attitudes alone explain the vote for Le Pen in the 1988 presidential election. Rather, these findings indicate that Le Pen’s voters responded to one particular authoritarian issue, namely, law and order and the need to reinstate the death penalty. In the second model, I have added variables measuring nationalism and xenophobia. As we can see, voters who agreed strongly that there are too many immigrants in France were much more likely to vote for Le Pen. This association persists when we control for economic attitudes and attitudes that measure political discontent. Among Le Pen’s voters, 75 percent strongly agreed that there are too many immigrants in France, which is roughly speaking twice as many as for other voters, and 95 percent of Le Pen’s voters either strongly or somewhat agreed with this statement. It should also be noted that 31 percent of the voters who strongly agreed

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with the statement that there are too many immigrants in France voted for Le Pen in the 1988 presidential election. Of those who strongly disagreed with this statement, only 1 percent chose to vote for Le Pen (own calculations based on CEVIPOF 1988). Furthermore, voters who opposed French Muslims’ right to mosques were significantly more likely to vote for Le Pen.16 This association persists in models 3 and 4. Finally, voters who agreed strongly with the statement “One doesn’t feel as much at home as one once did” were significantly more likely to vote for Le Pen, even when we control for other relevant variables. Yet neither anti-Semitism nor ‘national pride’ are significantly positively associated with the odds of voting for Le Pen.17 In sum, we can conclude that xenophobia was an important factor in the vote for Le Pen in the 1988 presidential election. In model 3, I have added variables measuring political discontent. The only variable among these that is significantly associated with the odds of voting for Le Pen is the one measuring negative emotions toward politics.18 However, we should keep in mind that authoritarian and nationalist/xenophobic attitudes are being controlled for. It should also be noted that voters who strongly believed that politics is too complicated were significantly less likely to vote for Le Pen, but that this association did not persist when we controlled for other relevant variables. In model 4, finally, I have added variables measuring socio-economic attitudes. Not a single one of these additional variables was significantly associated with a vote for Le Pen.19 These results indicate that neo-liberal economic attitudes were not a major factor behind the vote for Le Pen in 1988. To conclude, these analyses indicate that strong attitudes against immigrants and ethnic minorities living in France, as well as a strong preference for the reinstatement of the death penalty, were the most important direct attitudinal factors behind the vote for Le Pen in the 1988 presidential election. More specifically, if we compare the changes in pseudo-R2 and log likelihood between the different models—and only involve respondents who have answered all questions (N = 1723)—it is indisputable that xenophobia and nationalism contributed most to the explanatory power of the overall model.20 However, in 1988, general authoritarian attitudes (other than death penalty) were not a distinguishing trait of Le Pen’s voters. In addition, we found attitudes expressing discontent with political institutions to be of low direct importance for explaining the vote for Le Pen in 1988. Finally, although there are some indicators that Le Pen’s voters had some socio-economic rightist attitudes, we find no real support for the hypothesis that neo-liberal economic attitudes were an important factor in why some voters rather than others voted for Le Pen. Hence, these results are somewhere in between hypotheses H3 and H4—although closer to H3 than to H4, they neither confirm nor refute either of them completely—but point against hypothesis H5. However, there are certain indicators that political discontent of the 2a type played an important role

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in the 1988 presidential election, although we have not been able to read it out from the results above. When the voters were asked, one week before the election, which candidate they wanted to see elected (‘in the bottoms of their heart’) for president, only 28 percent of those who stated that they would vote for Le Pen answered ‘Le Pen,’ while 26 percent preferred Chirac and 17 percent Mitterrand (Mayer and Perrineau 1992b: 133). Still, the findings above are in line with the argument that the 1988 presidential election was a watershed in the electoral development of the Front National. Let us continue with an analysis of the 1995 presidential election as shown in table 2.6. When we take a look at model 1, we find similar results as in table 2.5.21 Also this year, voters who shared attitudes strongly in favor of the death penalty were significantly more likely to vote for Le Pen,

TABLE 2.6 Effect of Attitudes on the Decision to Vote for Le Pen in the 1995 Presidential Election (logistic regression analysis) Model 1 Authoritarianism: Death penalty Security Discipline in school Abortion Homosexuality Women’s role

3.448*** 1.611*** 1.510*** 0.713 0.876 0.987

Nationalism/xenophobia: Feel as French only Nostalgia Too many immigrants Salience of immigration Unacceptable with mosques Negative to Islam

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

1.687*** 1.098 1.033 0.648 0.716* 0.909

1.630*** 1.132 1.054 0.562 0.713* 0.962

1.587** 1.104 1.000 0.596 0.737* 0.929

1.643*** 1.092 0.944 0.635 0.740 0.902

1.342* 1.368* 2.851*** 2.615*** 1.543** 0.854

1.204 1.348 2.841*** 2.653*** 1.441* 0.844

1.119 1.301 2.838*** 2.564*** 1.367* 0.834

1.052 1.290 2.828*** 2.593*** 1.357* 0.866

1.770*** 1.332 1.040 0.824

1.659*** 1.352 1.059 0.808

1.617** 1.275 1.035 0.795

1.971***

1.859***

Political discontent: Politicians do not care Democracy does not work Left and right are obsolete Salience of corruption Anti-European Union: Voted no to Maastricht Economic left-right: Too much state intervention Profit positive Privatization positive Negative to equality Pseudo-R2 Prob > Chi2 Log likelihood N

0.080 0.000 -1104.82 3416

Model 5

0.981 1.401* 0.753 2.271** 0.170 0.000 -881.06 2864

0.180 0.000 -844.69 2776

0.195 0.000 -809.12 2700

0.198 0.000 -767.66 2551

* Significant on the 0.05 level. ** Significant on the 0.01 level. *** Significant on the 0.001 level.

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even when we control for other relevant variables.22 Furthermore, voters who thought that the principal aim of the school is to create a sense of discipline and voters who assigned great importance to personal security were also more likely to vote for Le Pen.23 However, these associations are not robust and disappear when we control for nationalistic and xenophobic attitudes. Yet contrary to the hypothesis of the importance of authoritarian attitudes, neither voters with negative attitudes toward abortion, voters with strong negative attitudes toward homosexuality, nor those who think that women’s role is to raise children were significantly more likely to vote for Le Pen. Indeed, voters with strong negative attitudes toward homosexuality were significantly less likely to do so in models 2–4. Hence, we have a highly ambiguous picture here. These findings strengthen the impression we found in the data from 1988 that single issues rather than a whole range of more general authoritarian attitudes are important in explaining the vote for Le Pen and the Front National—in particular law and order and a positive attitude toward the death penalty. As in the 1988 analysis, model 2 reveals a strong association between xenophobia and a vote for Le Pen.24 Voters who strongly agreed with the statement that there are too many immigrants were significantly more likely to vote for Le Pen. Among Le Pen’s voters 91 percent strongly agreed with the statement that there are too many immigrants, and almost all voters who chose to vote for Le Pen (99 percent) strongly or somewhat agreed with this statement. Of those who strongly agreed with the statement above, 30 percent voted for Le Pen. This made Le Pen by far the most popular candidate among the voters who shared this opinion (own calculations based on CEVIPOF 1995). Furthermore, as in 1988, voters who shared intolerant attitudes toward the right of ethnic minorities to retain cultural and religious traits were more likely to vote for Le Pen.25 In addition, I have added a variable that unfortunately was absent in the 1988 survey, namely, the salience of the immigration issue. Here we find that voters who gave a high importance to the immigration issue were significantly much more likely to vote for Le Pen. It is noteworthy that 80 percent of Le Pen’s voters gave the immigration issue 10 of 10, which is more than twice as many as for any other candidate’s voters. In fact, as many as 42 percent of the voters who stated that the immigration issue was of the greatest importance in their choice of candidate voted for Le Pen (own calculations based on CEVIPOF 1995). All three of these associations were shown to be robust: they persisted even when we controlled for other relevant variables. Moreover, unlike in 1988, voters with a French ‘national identity’ were significantly more likely to vote for Le Pen, although no such association can be established when we control for other relevant attitudes. The same is true for voters who do not feel as much at home in France as they used to do. In sum, we have seen that nationalistic and, in particular, xenophobic attitudes in 1995 had at least as high an explanatory value as in 1988.

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In model 3, we were also able to include an important variable that was missing in the 1988 survey, namely, whether politicians care about the opinions of ‘ordinary people.’ This, in my opinion, is a strong indicator of the degree of political discontent. In 1995, voters who believed that politicians did not care about the voters’ opinions were significantly more likely to vote for Le Pen—even when we control for other sets of variables.26 However, neither voters who believed that French democracy does not work, those who believed that the notions of right and left are obsolete, nor those for whom the issue of corruption was very important were significantly more likely to vote for Le Pen. A possible interpretation is that Le Pen’s voters (in 1995) were contemptuous of politicians (and probably political parties) rather than of French democracy per se.27 Contrary to the analysis of the 1988 election, I have in the analysis of the elections of 1995 and 1997 been able to include variables concerning attitudes toward the European Union. As will be discussed in chapter 4, anti-European rhetoric has played an increasingly important role for the Front National—and for many other ERP parties—during the 1990s. The Front National has been able to connect themes of xenophobia and ethnonationalism to the issue of the European Union. However, in the analysis of the 1995 presidential election, the variable does not mainly measure attitudes but rather electoral behavior. More specifically, we can see in model 4 that those who voted no to the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 were significantly more likely to vote for Le Pen in the 1995 presidential election.28 In model 5, finally, we find some indicators that voters with socio-economic rightist attitudes were more likely to vote for Le Pen in 1995. Although neither voters who favored privatization nor those who believed that there is too much state intervention in the economy were significantly more likely to vote for Le Pen, the voters who found ‘profit’ to be a very positive word and those who opposed equality were.29 However, it is not evident that the variable measuring attitudes to equality adequately taps economic attitudes toward ‘equality’—it may also tap socio-cultural attitudes. Hence, we should be cautious before concluding that these results support the hypothesis that neo-liberal economic attitudes were associated with a vote for Le Pen. In fact, if we take a closer look we see that the Front National voters were mostly situated between the voters of the left and the voters of the mainstream right on attitudes toward socio-economic issues. For instance, when voters were asked to place themselves on a scale ranging from 1 (the State intervenes too much in social and economic life) to 7 (the State does not intervene enough in social and economic life)—which is a straightforward indicator of socio-economic left versus right attitudes— only 14 percent of Le Pen’s voters chose ‘1,’ whereas 31 percent of them chose ‘7’ (own calculations based on CEVIPOF 1995). In addition, they did not find economic issues particularly important, which lends support to my hypothesis that Front National voters have perceived socio-cultural politics to be more salient than socio-economic politics. One indicator of

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this is that in 1995 only 5 percent of Le Pen’s voters believed that Le Pen provided the best solution to the problem of purchasing power and salaries; 5 percent of them believed that he provided the best solution to the problem of social welfare; and 8 percent of them believed that Le Pen provided the best solution to the problem of unemployment (own calculations based on CEVIPOF 1995). Hence, we may more safely conclude that such economic issues were not especially important to his voters. Most of them voted for him despite his perceived ability (or lack thereof) to cope with socio-economic political issues. To sum up this model, we find at least as strong support for hypothesis H3 as in the analysis of the presidential election of 1988. Still, the support is not unequivocal. Furthermore, nationalism and xenophobia contributed most to the explanatory power of the overall model here, as well.30 When analyzing the models from the 1997 election (see table 2.7), we should keep in mind that the same variables are not included here as in the

TABLE 2.7 Effect of Attitudes on the Decision to Vote for the Front National in the 1997 Legislative Election (logistic regression analyses) Model 1 Authoritarianism: Death penalty Discipline in school

3.378*** 2.307**

Nationalism/xenophobia: Feel as French only Economic protectionism Nostalgia Too many immigrants Veils in school Inferior races

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

1.869*** 1.789**

1.849** 1.838**

1.670* 1.703**

1.664* 1.649*

1.239 0.953 1.513* 3.043*** 2.290** 0.810

1.081 0.934 1.218 2.954*** 2.023* 0.834

1.017 0.912 1.230 2.684*** 1.877* 0.836

1.047 0.942 1.323 2.646*** 1.729 0.753

1.571* 1.468* 1.053 3.195***

1.348 1.215 0.981 3.083***

1.270 1.227 0.972 3.262***

2.043*** 1.366

2.095*** 1.479*

Political discontent: Politicians do not care Democracy does not work Left and right are the same Trust neither right nor left Anti-European Union: Negative toward EMU Benefit. from membership Economic left-right: Profit positive Public utilities Increased minimum wage Creation of public jobs Pseudo-R2 Prob > Chi2 Log likelihood N

Model 5

1.021 1.058 0.559 3.006*** 0.078 0.000 -630.22 2683

0.138 0.000 -560.03 2536

0.195 0.000 -512.55 2461

0.199 0.000 -480.40 2310

0.213 0.000 -463.20 2264

* Significant on the 0.05 level. ** Significant on the 0.01 level. *** Significant on the 0.001 level.

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analysis of the elections of 1988 and 1995, so we have to be cautious in our comparisons. Nevertheless, we can see in model 1 that voters with a strong preference for the death penalty and voters who believed that the school’s principal aim is to instill discipline were significantly more likely to vote for the Front National.31 Although these associations become weaker when we control for additional variables, they are still significant. Hence, in the 1997 election we find support for the hypothesis that authoritarian attitudes are an important factor in explaining the vote for the Front National.32 In model 2, we find that voters with xenophobic attitudes about there being too many immigrants, and with intolerance toward ethnic minorities’ right to religious and cultural expression, were significantly more likely to vote for the Front National.33 However, neither nationalistic nor overtly racist voters were significantly more likely to vote for them, which indicates that the voters of the FN shared a particular form of xenophobia.34 I will return to this below (in particular, in chapter 5). Finally, although nostalgic voters were significantly more likely to vote for the Front National, this association did not persist when we controlled for other relevant variables. In model 3, which also includes variables measuring political discontent, we find only one persistent significant association. Voters who trusted neither the left nor the right were significantly more likely to vote for the Front National. It is also important to note that those who believed that there are no differences between left and right were not more likely to vote for the FN, at least when we have controlled for the other variables involved in model 3.35 Anti–European Union attitudes were also important in the 1997 election. Those who were strongly against the European Monetary Union (EMU) were significantly more likely to vote for the Front National, as were those who believed that France had not benefited from membership in the EU—provided that we control also for socio-economic attitudes.36 Considering socio-economic left-right attitudes,37 we see that only one variable was significantly associated with a vote for the Front National, namely, a negative attitude toward the creation of public jobs. Thus, the results from 1997 seem to provide support for hypothesis H3. More specifically, by comparing changes in pseudo-R2 and log likelihood, we can conclude that nationalism/xenophobia and political discontent contributed most to the explanatory power of the overall model.38 To conclude this section, we have seen that xenophobia and intolerance toward immigrants and other ethnic minorities were the most important ‘dimension’ for explaining the emergence of and sustained electoral support for the Front National. A final illustration that this issue area was an asset for the FN is that 36 percent of French voters in 1995 believed that Le Pen provided the best solution to ‘the problem of immigration.’ This figure was particularly high among De Villiers’s and Balladur’s voters, of whom 55 percent and 50 percent respectively answered that Le Pen provided the best solution

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(own calculations based on CEVIPOF 1995; see chapter 5). However, I do not want to make any far-reaching conclusions about ethnic nationalism on the basis of the results of this study. The questions involved in the CEVIPOF surveys are rather poor indicators of the particular type of nationalism, that is, ethno-nationalism, which I argue was of great importance for the emergence of and electoral support for the Front National. Although these variables measure feelings of national identity and national pride, they do not discriminate between national identity and pride based on civic traditions and territory on the one hand, and on ethnicity on the other. In addition, an authoritarian attitude toward other socio-cultural issues (in particular the death penalty) was of considerable importance, as were a certain kind of political discontent and alienation, and, during the 1990s, anti–European Union sentiments.39 Socio-economic attitudes, on the other hand, had less mobilizing power. As we can see, these results largely correspond with my hypothesis H3, as formulated above. Before concluding this chapter, however, I will analyze the joint effect of sociological variables and variables measuring attitudes (see table 2.8). These logistic regression analyses generally confirm the earlier conclusions. Concerning attitudes, voters in favor of the death penalty (1988 and 1995), who believed that women’s place is at home (1988), who believed that there are too many immigrants (1988 and 1995), who assigned the issue of immigration high importance (1995), who were nostalgic (1988 and 1995), who were against Muslims’ right to practice their religion in France (1988), who voted no to Maastricht (1995), who were negative to equality (1995), who reacted with negative feelings toward politics (1988), and who believed that politicians do not care about the opinion of ordinary people (1995), were all significantly more likely to vote for Le Pen— even when we control for various sociological and demographic variables. However, concerning sociological variables, only low-income voters (1995) were significantly more likely to vote for Le Pen when we control also for variables measuring attitudes. Yet we also have some interaction effects: in 1988 male voters who would accept a society without political parties were considerably more likely to vote for Le Pen, and in 1995 voters whose personal economy had been impaired and who defined themselves as French only, and unemployed voters who found mosques in France unacceptable were significantly much more likely to vote for Le Pen.

Right or Left—or Neither? Before concluding this chapter, I will turn to one important aspect of the Front National voters that has not been included in the quantitative analysis above, namely, how they defined themselves politically. Since this might have implications for the party image (see chapter 1), it has a potential influence on voting behavior.

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TABLE 2.8 The Sociology and the Attitudinal Motivations of Le Pen’s Voters in 1988 and 1995 (logistic regression analyses) Authoritarianism: Death penalty Security Discipline in school Abortion Homosexuality Women’s role Need of hierarchies Nationalism/xenophobia: Feel as French only Nostalgia Too many immigrants Salience of immigration Unacceptable with mosques Negative to Islam Jews have too much power Political discontent: Politicians do not care Democracy does not work Left and right are obsolete Salience of corruption Negative reactions on politics Politics are too complicated Accept society without parties

1988

1995

1.994*

1.964*** 1.090 1.224 0.419 0.960 0.811

1.120 0.739 0.697 2.121* 1.229 0.543* 2.018** 7.026*** 3.653***

0.869 1.537

1.184 0.930

Sociological variables: Income Low education Petty bourgeoisie Skilled worker Unskilled worker (Civil servants) (Managers, civil servants, engineers) Unemployment (Employed full-time) High risk of unemployment Subjectively working class Subjectively worker Subjectively ‘small people’ Subjectively ruling class Subjective status

1.524* 1.506 1.096 0.820

2.023** 1.724 0.133**

Anti-European Union: Voted no to Maastricht Economic left-right: Too much state intervention Profit positive Privatization positive Negative to equality Bad with equal salary

0.703 1.469* 4.205*** 2.889***

1.524** 0.995 1.032 0.724

0.913 1.169 0.835 2.176*

1.704* 1.093 0.733 1.059 1.524 0.001** (1.000) 0.263** (1.000) 1.149 0.051 0.944 0.328 (1.000) 1.160

0.886* 0.864 1.246 1.471 0.622 (1.000) 0.500* (1.000) 1.526

(See next page)

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TABLE 2.8 The Sociology and the Attitudinal Motivations of Le Pen’s Voters in 1988 and 1995 (cont.) 1988 Sociological variables (cont.): Impaired personal economy Bad future personal economy Age Male Male* Politics too complicated Male* Unskilled worker Male* Accept society without parties Age* Unskilled worker Skilled worker* Women’s role Skilled worker* Too many immigrants Impaired economy* French only Risk of unemployment* Salience of immigrants Unemployed* Unacceptable with mosques PseudoR2 Prob > Chi2 Log likelihood N

1.004 0.962 0.195** 0.034* 17.568*** 1.165** 0.059**

1995 0.785 0.980 0.962*** 1.572*

0.428* 2.336* 0.480* 4.375** 0.361 0.000 -286.57 1377

0.257 0.000 -548.70 1856

* Significant on the 0.05 level. ** Significant on the 0.01level. *** Significant on the 0.001 level.

As we have seen above, Front National voters were significantly more authoritarian and socio-culturally right-wing than other voters, at least on important issues such as immigration and law and order. However, while this authoritarianism showed no indication of diminishing between 1984 and 1997, the Front National voters’ readiness to define themselves as ‘right’ did indeed decrease during that period. In the 1984 European election, 77 percent of the FN’s voters classified themselves as ‘right’ (Perrineau 1997: 113). In 1997, by contrast, only 50 percent of them said that they were ‘right,’ while 16 percent defined themselves as ‘left’ and 34 percent as ‘neither left nor right’ (own calculations based on CEVIPOF 1997). Although we cannot know how voters defined the notions of ‘right’ and ‘left,’ these changes reflect the diminished impact of the party image of ‘right,’ although it still seems to have been of some importance to Front National voters. In fact, there seems to be no absolute consensus about how to determine what party image the FN actually had. Although 53 percent of FN voters gave the FN the value of 7, when they were asked in 1995 to determine the party’s position on a 7-grade scale from left (1) to right (7), 15 percent of FN voters gave the party a value of 4 (i.e., neither left nor right) and as many as 25 percent gave it either 1 or 2 (own calculations based on CEVIPOF 1995). Furthermore, we see a general decline in the impact of the party images of ‘right’ and ‘left’ during the 1980s and 1990s. In 1981, 43 percent of French

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voters believed that the distinction between left and right was an appropriate framework for understanding French politics, whereas 37 percent believed that they were outdated. In 1984, the percentage of voters who believed them to constitute a valid framework had decreased to 37 percent, while 49 percent now believed that they were obsolete. In 1991, only 33 percent found them valid, while 55 percent found them outdated. In 1996, finally, as many as 60 percent of French voters believed that the notions of left and right were obsolete (Hargreaves 1995: 186; Mayer 1999: 29). As Mayer (1999: 29) has argued, this implies that Le Pen and Mégret nowadays in fact express the opinion of the French majority when they contest the validity of the traditional left-right dimension. As we saw above, a main characteristic of Front National voters was, at least during the 1990s, the large number of voters who defined themselves as neither right nor left. Still, as has been demonstrated elsewhere in this chapter, Front National voters were doubtlessly socio-culturally right-wing on a number of important issues, regardless of the terms they used to define themselves.

Conclusion We have in this chapter examined the social basis and attitudes of the Front National voters. Generally, the results support the hypotheses (H1 and H3) that the voters (1) who occupy an unfavorable position within social space, or who have reasons to expect social decline in the near future, and/or (2) who share authoritarian (i.e., law and order and security), ethno-nationalist, and xenophobic attitudes were more likely to support the Front National. In the first case, we saw in a series of logistic regressions that marginalized French voters—because they had little economic and/or cultural capital, because they were employed in exposed sectors, in an exposed position—were more likely to have authoritarian, nationalistic, and xenophobic attitudes. However, when we looked at the sociology of Front National voters, we saw that although neither the logistic model from 1988 nor the one from 1995 provided unequivocal support for hypothesis H1, they were both closer to hypothesis H1 than to hypothesis H2. When we look in even closer detail at the sociology of Front National voters, we see many indications of changes between the mid 1980s and the 1990s. In fact, the analysis indicated that the 1988 presidential election was something of a turning point. The early and mid 1980s had been characterized by political protest; voters who supported the party were relatively well off and well educated. If anything, their voting behavior was more a result of a feeling of threatened relative deprivation than of actual relative or absolute deprivation. Hence, hypothesis H2, but not H1, receives some support before the presidential election of 1988. In the presidential election of

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1988, on the other hand, a change was underway. The support for Le Pen was higher than average among voters who were socialized into the working class. Furthermore, in this election support for Le Pen was stronger than average among workers (see table 2.2)—as predicted by hypothesis H1. During the 1990s, too, we saw results that yield support for hypothesis H1. Concerning the attitudes of the Front National voters, we saw in a series of logistic regressions that voters who shared authoritarian, ethno-nationalist, and xenophobic attitudes were more likely to support the Front National. More specifically, we saw that xenophobia, law and order, personal security (i.e., the death penalty), anti–European Union sentiments, and a belief that politicians do not care about the opinion of ordinary persons were of particular importance. As both the logistic regression analyses and the cross tabulating analyses showed, xenophobia contributed most to overall explanatory power. Furthermore, in line with hypothesis H3, neo-liberal economic attitudes were of only minor importance to the Front National voters. Although they were occasionally more to the right than to the left, they were typically in between the voters of the left and the mainstream right on economic issues. In addition, few who voted for the Front National (or Le Pen) believed that the party provided the best answers to economic problems, which indicates a low salience of the economic cleavage dimension for these voters. Finally, we have seen that although many Front National voters still defined themselves in terms of the political “right,” just as many during the late 1990s defined themselves as either “left” or “neither left nor right.” As we will see in the coming chapters, this change corresponds to a similar change at the elite level during the 1990s, when the Front National increasingly tried to foster a party image of being “neither left nor right.” Still, this chapter clearly shows that whatever the Front National voters call themselves, they are clearly socio-culturally right-wing. In the coming four chapters I will show that this was equally true of the ideology and rhetoric of the Front National.

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Notes 1. The survey from 1988 had 4,032 respondents; that from 1995, 4,078 respondents, and the one from 1997, 3,010 respondents. Ideally, I would have used a data set from 1984, in order to make the results from the comparisons more persuasive. However, I did not succeed in finding any data set from this period that was good enough, so I have to draw on secondary work for the period before 1988. 2. The odds are defined as P/(1-P) where P is the probability of the event. 3. I have only included interaction variables that were shown to be significant in the model. Despite that, the inclusion of these variables has led to multicolinearity, which has sometimes caused increased standard errors. Yet specification errors also cause problems, and I have chosen to prioritize a (more) correctly specified model before one without multicolinearity (see Hedström 2001). 4. The variable income involves total household income, social subsidies included, and was coded in ten different stages: (1) less than 2,000 FF; (2) 2,001 to 3,000 FF; (3) 3,001 to 5,000 FF; (4) 5,001 to 7,500 FF; (5) 7,501 to 10,000 FF; (6) 10,001 to 15,000; (7) 15,001 to 20,000; (8) 20,001 to 30,000 FF; (9) 30,001 to 40,000 FF; and (10) over 40,000 FF. We should bear in mind that the different intervals are not symmetrical. Nevertheless, as we can see from the logistic regression, the odds of voting for Le Pen decrease with each step up on the income ladder. The variable education is based on the question “What was the highest academic degree you received?” I have transformed it into a dummy, where “no diplomas” and “primary education” were coded as 1 and all other categories were coded as 0. The reason for this is simply that it is difficult to order the variable in a linear but still meaningful way. 5. The variables measuring professions are dummies that correspond to categories in the questionnaire. The only exception is “Petty bourgeoisie,” where I have added small traders and craftsmen. I have used the category “Managers, civil servants, engineers” as a reference category. 6. Unemployment is a dummy that contains all those who have answered “No, unemployed, but formerly employed” and “No, unemployed, looking for first job,” when asked “Are you currently employed?” I have here used ‘employed full-time’ as a reference category. High risk for unemployment was originally coded in three stages: (1) high risk, (2) slight risk, and (3) no risk. However, I have recoded it into a dummy, where “high risk” was coded as 1, and the other two alternatives as 0. Concerning the variable measuring people’s impaired personal economy, people were asked: “Do you feel that your personal financial situation has become better, worse or stayed the same over the past twelve months?” I have recoded this variable to a dummy, where the answer “worse” was coded as 1, and the answers “better” and “stayed the same” were coded as 0. Concerning the variable measuring people’s estimation of whether their personal economy will improve or decline in the future, people were asked: “In the next twelve months, do you think that your personal financial situation will improve, worsen or stay the same?” I have also here recoded it into a dummy, where “will get worse” was coded as 1, and “will improve” and “will stay the same” were coded as 0. In the table, we can also see that older voters and women are more likely to strongly agree with the statement that there are too many immigrants in France. 7. The model from 1988 involves some variables that have not been defined earlier. “Subjectively poor,” “subjectively working class,” “subjectively worker,” and “subjectively ‘small people’” consist of the voters that have chosen those alternatives, respectively, in answering the question “To which group or social class do you feel you belong?” Hence, they are all dummies. “Subjectively ruling class” has been chosen as a reference category. “Subjectively status,” on the other hand, is a continuous variable. The respondents were asked to locate themselves on a ‘staircase’ where number 1 corresponds to the lowest rank in society and number 10 to the highest. Furthermore, although the variables measuring professions are coded in the same way as in 1995, the reference category

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8. 9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

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is slightly different: “Civil servants.” This category comes closest to the one used in 1995 (none of them existed in both the 1988 and the 1995 surveys). This may be compared to the fact that of female voters belonging to the middle and upper classes, only 3 or 4 percent voted for the Front National (Mayer 1999: 119). The fact that female workers and, as we will see, poorly educated women (in particular the younger ones) were as likely as men to vote for the Front National during the 1990s is at odds with the well-established fact that male voters were strongly overrepresented among the FN voters—and in fact of all ERP parties (e.g., Betz 1994: 146). As we recall from table 2.2 above, this was the case in both the 1988 and the 1995 presidential elections, also when we controlled for sociological variables. Similarly, only 14 percent of Le Pen’s voters thought that their personal economic picture would improve over the coming twelve months, which is considerably less than other voters. Furthermore, although the Front National voters have become even more pessimistic and economically dissatisfied during the 1990s, their pessimism had already grown in 1988. That year, 45 percent of Le Pen’s voters stated that they became worried when they thought about the future. The voters of the PCF notwithstanding, the other voters are considerably less pessimistic (own calculations based on CEVIPOF 1988). However, in 1997 as many as 81 percent of the Front National voters answered that they were worried about their personal and professional future. This was the highest figure of all parties’ voters (own calculations based on CEVIPOF 1997). This may be compared to 9 percent of De Villiers’s voters, 14 percent of Balladur’s voters, 33 percent of Chirac’s voters, 23 percent of Jospin’s voters, and 26 percent of Hue’s voters (own calculations based on CEVIPOF 1995). It should be noted that voter support of Le Pen is underrepresented in the survey from 1988 (10.01 percent instead of 14.6 percent). In order to facilitate comparisons between different elections, I will in this study multiply the results from that survey by 1.458 in order to obtain a figure that corresponds to the actual voter support. In 1995 the electoral support of Le Pen was slightly overestimated (16.95 percent instead of 15.3 percent), and I will here multiply the results from the survey by 0.903 in order to obtain results that are easier to compare. Finally, the electoral support of the Front National is underestimated in the survey from 1997 (6.45 percent instead of 15.2). I will here multiply the results from the survey by 2.357. Furthermore, young women with a low level of education were at least as likely as their male counterparts to vote for the Front National in the 1997 election. Twenty-nine percent of female (and 26 percent of male) voters younger than 40 who lacked the BAC voted for the Front National. For the variable ‘death penalty’ all voters who answered that they strongly agree with the statement “The death penalty should be reinstated” have been coded as 1, while those who answered that they somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree have been coded as 0. For the variable ‘discipline in school’ I have coded those who agreed most with the statement “School should primarily develop a sense of discipline and effort” as 1, while those who agreed most with the statement “School should primarily form sharp-minded people who think critically” have been coded as 0. For the variable ‘abortion’ the voters who answered that abortion is morally very wrong have been coded as 1, while those who answered that it is fairly wrong, hardly wrong, or not wrong at all were coded as 0. Similarly, for the variable ‘homosexuality,’ the voters who stated that homosexuality is morally very wrong were coded as 1, while those who answered that it is fairly wrong, hardly wrong, or not wrong at all were coded as 0. For the variable ‘women’s role’ the voters who strongly agreed with the statement “Women’s main role is to have children and bring them up” were coded as 1, while those who somewhat agreed, somewhat disagreed, and strongly disagreed were coded as 0. For the variable ‘need for hierarchies,’ finally, the voters who strongly agreed with the statement “In society we need a hierarchy and leaders” were coded as 1, while those who somewhat agreed, somewhat disagreed, and strongly disagreed were coded as 0.

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15. More specifically, 70 percent of Le Pen’s voters strongly agreed with the statement that the death penalty should be reinstated, which was considerably more than for the other candidates (own calculations based on CEVIPOF 1988). 16. Thirty-three percent of the voters who felt strongly that Muslims should not have the right to establish mosques voted for Le Pen in 1988. Of those who strongly agreed that they should have such a right, only 5 percent voted for Le Pen (own calculations based on CEVIPOF 1988). 17. For the variable ‘Proud to be French,’ the voters who strongly agreed with the statement “I am proud to be French” have been coded as 1, while those who somewhat agreed, somewhat disagreed, and strongly disagreed have been coded as 0. Similarly, the variable ‘Too many immigrants’ is rather straightforward. The voters who have strongly agreed with the statement “There are too many immigrants in France” have been coded as 1, while those who have somewhat agreed, somewhat disagreed, and strongly disagreed have been coded as 0. For the variable ‘Not acceptable with mosques,’ the voters who strongly disagreed with the statement “It is only fair for Muslims in France to have mosques to practice their religion” have been coded as 1, while those who somewhat disagreed, somewhat agreed, and strongly agreed were coded as 0. For the variable ‘Jews have too much power,’ finally, the voters who strongly agreed with the statement “Jews have too much power in France” were coded as 1, while those who somewhat agreed, somewhat disagreed, and strongly disagreed were coded as 0. 18. For the variable ‘democracy does not work’ the voters who stated that democracy in France “does not function well at all” were coded as 1, while those who stated that it functions very well, fairly well, and not very well were coded as 0. For the variable ‘negative emotional reactions on politics,’ I coded the voters who answered that their first reaction when they hear the word ‘politics’ is distrust, boredom, and disgust as 1, while those who answered interest, enthusiasm, respect, and hope were coded as 0. For the variable ‘Politics is too complicated,’ the voters who strongly agreed with the statement “Politics is too complicated and one has to be an expert to understand it” were coded as 1, while those who somewhat agreed, somewhat disagreed, and strongly disagreed were coded as 0. For the variable ‘Left and right are obsolete,’ the voters who agreed strongly with the statement “Today the notions of left and right don’t make much sense anymore” were coded as 1, while those who somewhat agreed, somewhat disagreed, and strongly disagreed were coded as 0. For the variable ‘Accept society without parties,’ finally, the voters who stated that it would not matter at all to them if political parties were abolished were coded as 1, while those who stated that it would matter very much, that it would somewhat matter, and that it would hardly matter were coded as 0. 19. For the variable ‘Bad with equal salary,’ the voters who strongly agreed with the statement “If everybody earned the same salary people would have no incentive to work” were coded as 1, while those who somewhat agreed, somewhat disagreed, and strongly disagreed were coded as 0. For the variable ‘Less state control,’ the voters who believed that the State in order to face economic difficulties “should place more trust in business and give it more leeway” have been coded as 1, while those who on the contrary thought that the State should control and regulate business more closely were coded as 0. For the variable ‘Profit positive,’ the voters who have stated that the word ‘profit’ evokes something very positive were coded as 1, while those who thought that it evokes something fairly positive, fairly negative, and very negative were coded as 0. Similarly, in the variable ‘Privatization positive,’ the voters who have stated that the word ‘privatization’ evokes something very positive were coded as 1, while those who think that it is something fairly positive, fairly negative, and fairly negative were coded as 0. 20. Model 1: R2 = 0.095, log odds = -512.24; model 2: R2 = 0.218, log odds = -442.69; model 3: R2 = 0.224, log odds = -439.41; model 4: R2 = 0.232, log odds = -434.95. Hence, the Pseudo R2 increased forcefully when we introduced variables measuring xenophobia in model 2.

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21. The variables ‘death penalty’ and ‘discipline in school’ were coded in the same way as in 1988 (see above). For the variable ‘abortion,’ voters who strongly disagreed with the statement “It is normal for women to choose to have an abortion” were coded as 1, while those who strongly agreed, somewhat agreed, and somewhat disagreed were coded as 0. Similarly, for the variable ‘homosexuality,’ the voters who strongly disagreed with the statement “Homosexuality is an acceptable way of expressing one’s sexuality” were coded as 1, while those who strongly agreed, somewhat agreed, and somewhat disagreed were coded as 0. For the variable ‘security,’ I coded as 1 voters who answered 9 or 10 on the following question: “On a scale of 0 to 10, could you assess the importance of ‘people’s security’ in your choice on the first ballot in the presidential election?” Those who answered 0 to 8 were coded as 0. For the variable ‘women’s role,’ finally, voters who marked themselves 6 and 7 on a scale from 1 (= Women should have the same role as men at work and in politics) to 7 (= A woman’s place is in the home) were coded as 1. Those who answered 1 to 5 were coded as 0. 22. Yet in 1995, only 48 percent (compared to 70 percent in 1988) of Le Pen’s voters strongly agreed with the statement that the death penalty should be reinstated, which is not significantly more than for the other candidates’ voters (own calculations based on CEVIPOF 1995). One possible reason for this change is that De Villiers was able to attract some of the more traditional, authoritarian voters. 23. When asked about how important the issue of security was for their decision how to vote, 53 percent of Le Pen’s voters gave it 10 of 10 and 88 percent gave it 8 or more (own calculations based on CEVIPOF 1995), which is considerably more than for other voters. 24. The variables ‘Too many immigrants’ and ‘Unacceptable with mosques’ were coded in the same way as in 1988 (above). For the variable ‘Feel French only,’ the voters who stated that they ‘feel French only,’ rather than ‘more French than European,’ ‘French and European equally,’ ‘more European than French,’ or ‘neither French nor European’ were coded as 1, while the others were coded as 0. For the variable ‘Salience of immigration’ I coded as 1 those voters who answered 9 or 10 to the following question: “On a scale of 0 to 10, could you assess the importance the problem of immigration had in your choice on the first ballot in the presidential election?” Those who answered 0 to 8 were coded as 0. For the variable ‘Negative toward Islam,’ finally, voters who stated that the word ‘Islam’ evokes something very negative were coded as 1, while those who stated that it evokes something very positive, quite positive, or quite negative were coded as 0. 25. In 1995, 29 percent of the voters who had such opinions voted for Le Pen (own calculations based on CEVIPOF 1995). 26. Of Le Pen’s voters 38 percent believed that politicians are not at all concerned with ordinary people’s opinions, which is considerably more than for other candidate voters, and as many as 92 percent of Le Pen’s voters believed that politicians are very little or not at all concerned with the opinions of ordinary people. In addition, 33 percent of voters who believed that politicians do not care at all about people’s opinions voted for Le Pen, which made him the most popular candidate for these voters. On the other hand, only 3 percent of voters who thought that politicians care a lot about the opinions of ordinary people voted for Le Pen (own calculations based on CEVIPOF 1995). 27. The variables ‘Democracy does not work’ and ‘Left and right are obsolete’ were coded in the same way as in 1988. For the variable ‘Politicians do not care,’ the voters who stated “Politicians are not at all concerned with what people like myself think” were coded as 1, while those who stated that they are ‘a lot,’ ‘somewhat,’ or ‘very little’ concerned were coded as 0. For the variable ‘Salience of corruption,’ finally, I coded as 1 the voters who answered 9 or 10 to the following question: “On a scale of 0 to 10, could you assess the importance the problem of corruption had in your choice on the first ballot in the presidential election?” Those who answered 0 to 8 were coded as 0. 28. Of those who voted against Maastricht in 1992, 26 percent voted for Le Pen in the 1995 presidential election, which made him the most popular candidate for these voters. Only 6 percent of the voters who had voted yes to Maastricht voted for Le Pen in that

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29.

30.

31. 32.

33.

34.

35.

36.

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election. Furthermore, 47 percent of the voters who voted for Le Pen in the 1995 presidential election voted against Maastricht three years earlier, while 21 percent voted yes. That means that Le Pen’s voters had the highest percentage of no-voters (and the lowest percentage of yes-voters) of all parties’ voter groups (own calculations based on CEVIPOF 1995). The variables ‘Profit positive’ and ‘Privatization positive’ were coded in the same way as in 1988. For the variable ‘Too much State intervention’ I coded as 1 voters who marked 1 or 2 on a scale from 1 (= State intervenes too much in social and economic life) to 7 (= State does not intervene enough). All other voters were coded as 0. For the variable ‘Negative to equality,’ finally, voters who stated that they are very negative to the word ‘equality’ were coded as 1, while those who stated that they are very positive, quite positive, or quite negative were coded as 0. When only including respondents who have answered all questions involved in model 5 (N = 2,551), we get this result: model 1: Pseudo-R2 = 0.083, log odds = -880.78; model 2: Pseudo-R2 = 0.171, log odds = -795.01; model 3: Pseudo-R2 = 0.181, log odds = -784.41; model 4: Pseudo-R2 = 0.191, log odds = -774.53; model 5: Pseudo-R2 = 0.198, log odds = -767.66. Hence, we see greatest changes in Pseudo-R2 and log odds when we include variables measuring xenophobia in model 2. The variables ‘Death penalty’ and ‘Discipline in school’ were coded in the same way as in 1988 and 1995. Of Front National voters, 58 percent strongly agreed that the death penalty should be reinstated, which was approximately twice as high as for the other candidates’ voters (own calculations based on CEVIPOF 1997). In this election, 70 percent of Front National voters strongly believed that there are too many immigrants living in France, which is twice as many as for any other parties’ voters (own calculations based on CEVIPOF 1997). The variable ‘Too many immigrants’ was coded in the same way as in 1988 and 1995. For the variable ‘Feel French only,’ the voters who stated that they felt “French only” were coded as 1, while those who stated that they felt “more French than European” or “French and European equally” were coded as 0. For the variable ‘Economic protectionism,’ voters who strongly agreed with the statement “France must limit the import of foreigners products, even though the consumers have to pay more for the products” were coded as 1, while those who somewhat agreed, somewhat disagreed, and strongly disagreed were coded as 0. For the variable ‘Veils in school,’ voters who strongly disagreed with the statement “The wearing of the Muslim scarf should be permitted in school” were coded as 1, while those who strongly agreed, somewhat agreed, and somewhat disagreed were coded as 0. For the variable ‘Inferior races,’ finally, the voters who strongly agreed with the statement “Some races are less gifted than others” were coded as 1, while those who somewhat agreed, somewhat disagreed, and strongly disagreed were coded as 0. The variables ‘Politicians do not care’ and ‘Democracy does not work’ were coded in the same way as in 1995. For the variable ‘Left and right are the same,’ I coded as 1 the voters who answered “not different at all” to the question “Do the proposals of the left and the RPR-UDF majority seem different to you?” Those who answered “very different,” “somewhat different,” or “not very different” were coded as 0. For the variable ‘Trust neither right nor left,’ the voters who stated that they “trust neither in the left nor in the right to govern the country” were coded as 1. Those who stated that they “trust in the left to govern the country” or “trust in the right to govern the country” were coded as 0. For the variable ‘Negative toward EMU,’ the voters who strongly disagree with the statement “The European Union should have a single currency” were coded as 1, while those who strongly agreed, somewhat agreed, and somewhat disagreed were coded as 0. For the variable ‘Not benefited from membership,’ the voters who stated that France has not benefited from being a member of the European Union were coded as 1, while those who stated that France has benefited were coded as 0.

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37. The variable ‘Profit positive’ was coded in the same way as in 1995. For the variable ‘Public utilities,’ the voters who stated that the phrase ‘public utilities’ evokes something very negative were coded as 1, while those who stated that it evokes something very positive, quite positive, or quite negative were coded as 0. For the variable ‘Increased minimum wage,’ the voters were coded as 1 who were very much against the idea that the minimum wage (SMIC) should be increased by 1,000 francs per month. Those who were very much for, somewhat for, and somewhat against have been coded as 0. For the variable ‘Creation of public jobs,’ finally, the voters who were very much against the proposal that 350,000 public jobs should be created have been coded as 1, while those who were very much for, somewhat for, and somewhat against were coded as 0. 38. When only including respondents who have answered all questions involved in model 5 (N = 2264), we get the following results: model 1: Pseudo-R2 = 0.079, log odds = 541.75; model 2: Pseudo-R2 = 0.133, log odds = -510.26; model 3: Pseudo-R2 = 0.185, Log odds = -479.38; model 4: Pseudo-R2 = 0.199, log odds = -471.12; model 4: Pseudo-R2 = 0.213, Log odds = -463.20. 39. Even though general French opinion favored European integration during the 1990s (in 1997, 60 percent of the registered voters declared themselves for the European Monetary Union), there was a large minority that opposed European supranational institutions (see Mayer 1999: 140–141). As will be demonstrated in chapter 4, the theme of the European Union became more prominent in the rhetoric of the Front National during the 1990s, and the party tried hard to promote anti–European Union sentiments.

Chapter 3

THE FRONT NATIONAL Authoritarian and Socio-cultural Right?


By looking at the voters in the preceding chapter we were able to find some support for the main hypothesis of this study, that is, that the Front National largely draws support from voters who share authoritarian and right-wing socio-cultural attitudes. Although xenophobic attitudes toward immigrants and other ethnic minorities stand out as the principal explanatory factor, more general authoritarian attitudes (in particular death penalty and personal security) have been of importance as well. Ethno-nationalism and xenophobia, which are both instances of socio-cultural authoritarianism, will be discussed in chapters 4 and 5. This chapter, which partly serves as an introduction to those chapters, will address authoritarianism in more general terms. In the first section, I will discuss the emergence of electoral niches in France during the early 1980s. I will argue that two niches were evolving, one neo-liberal in the economic dimension, and one authoritarian and particularistic in the socio-cultural dimension. As argued above, the latter was of primary importance for the emergence of and sustained electoral support for the Front National. In the second section, I will look at different strategies and/or ideological devices with which the Front National tried to exploit the available niche on the authoritarian and particularistic spectrum of the socio-cultural cleavage dimension. More specifically, I will argue that the Front National built on a relatively coherent party ideology, which was based on an essentially moralistic metaphysical conception of ‘natural order.’ While everything that is in accordance with this natural, harmoniously organic order (manifested in the nation and in the family, for instance) was ethically good, everything that broke this ‘natural order’ was bad (e.g., globalization, homosexuality, ethnic mixture, etc.).

Notes for this chapter begin on page 129.

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The Emergence of Socio-cultural Niches in France in the 1980s This section will take its point of departure from two conflicting descriptions of French politics in the early 1980s: one that claims that the political space was broadened rightward (Ignazi 1996b), and one that on the contrary claims that the established parties were converging during that period (Kitschelt 1995). More specifically, Ignazi (1996b: 76–77) argued that as a result of the victory of the left in 1981 the traditional right went through a process of radicalization during the early 1980s, when the RPR and the UDF abandoned their old, more centrist positions for a new ideological stance that implied an acceptance of an aggressive, politically conservative rhetoric. According to Ignazi, this radicalization opened up a new and legitimized ideological space in which the Front National could outbid the mainstream right parties. Kitschelt (1995: 95–98), on the other hand, argued that the established political parties gradually converged between 1978 and 1984. When discussing this process of convergence, Kitschelt pointed at the collapse of the united left as well as at the centrist policy of the socialist government, and he argued that the convergence was at its peak in the 1984 European election when the mainstream right rallied under a joint list headed by the centrist politician Simone Veil who had championed liberalization of the abortion laws in the 1970s. At that point, according to Kitschelt, because “right-wing voters could no longer see a clear difference between the record of the moderate-conservative government until 1981, the centrist Veil list in 1984, and the socialist government since its turnabout in 1983, their quest for a policy alternative began to turn to new competitors” (Kitschelt 1995: 97–98). Who was right, Ignazi or Kitschelt? One problem with the statements above is that it is unclear in which political cleavage dimension the divergence or convergence occurred; another problem is that they did not distinguish between the factual positions of the parties and the positions as perceived by the voters. I will argue that we cannot talk about a convergence in a strict sense of the term, but rather of a more complex pattern of changes: (1) the PS during the early 1980s was moving toward the center on economic issues, but was on the contrary becoming more socio-culturally liberal during the same period; and (2) the mainstream right parties, in particular the RPR, were moving in an economic right, more neo-liberal direction. However, for reasons discussed below, we may assume that the voters did not quite grasp this change. Furthermore, the mainstream right parties were at least holding their old positions in the socio-cultural cleavage dimension. However, they were divided on these issues, and in 1984 they rallied under a joint list headed by the relatively socio-culturally liberal Simone Veil. This fact may have been perceived by the voters as a move toward socio-cultural liberalization.

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More specifically, the PS moved toward the center of the economic dimension in 1983. After gaining power in 1981, the PS had set out to build the foundations of democratic socialism, not least by means of a redistributive Keynesianism. However, after being faced with economic difficulties, the party backed a monetarist austerity program and decided to remain within the European Monetary System. In this way, the PS accepted limitations on its room to maneuver for radical economic reforms. The joint effect of these changes was that the policy of the socialist government differed very little from nonsocialist, liberal policies elsewhere in Europe. This trend of policy shift peaked in 1984, when Mitterrand appointed Laurent Fabius as Prime Minister. Fabius has frequently been referred to as a ‘technocrat,’ and this appointment established the move away from an ideologically laden redistributive policy. Furthermore, the appointment of Fabius ended the alliance between the PS and the PCF, which reinforced the impression that the Socialist Party was moving away from its earlier pronounced left-wing economic position (Betz 1994: 52–53; Kitschelt 1995: 96–97). However, at the same time the PS moved toward a socio-culturally liberal position, as manifested by the abolition of the death penalty and the proposal to let immigrants vote in local elections. In 1978, the PS promised that the party would allow foreigners living in France to vote in local elections if it won the parliamentary election. Mitterrand also made this promise during the election campaign in 1981; after he was elected, he said that he was ready to implement the proposal. However, due to strong protests, in particular from the mainstream right, this never happened. Nevertheless, between 1981 and 1984 the left government introduced a variety of socio-culturally liberal measures with the aim of improving the rights and living-conditions of minority groups living in France (Hargreaves 1995: 165, 189). When it comes to the mainstream right parties, the RPR, and Jacques Chirac in particular, influenced by Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan, moved right in the economic dimension during the early 1980s by embracing more pronounced market liberalism (Kitschelt 1995: 96). However, the RPR and Chirac were strongly associated with the state-centered policies conducted by mainstream right governments between 1958 and 1981, which made it difficult for many voters to grasp the new policy position. It also made it hard for them to gain public credibility for their new neoliberal positions (Karapin 1998: 228). Moreover, as mentioned above, the mainstream right was not drifting toward the socio-cultural left, exemplified by the vigorous protests after the left parties proposed to let immigrants vote in local elections. Furthermore, between 1977 and 1981 the mainstream right government was launching measures that aimed at inducing immigrants to return to their homelands (Hargreaves 1995: 19–20). Still, after the victory of the left in 1981, the rhetoric of the mainstream right was primarily framed in economic terms;

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the perils of economic socialism were the main focus. In fact, I believe it is the case that the mainstream parties’ further move toward the socio-cultural right received impetus primarily after the first signs of electoral successes of the Front National (see chapter 5). Furthermore, in the 1984 election campaign, the mainstream right parties rallied under the joint list headed by Simone Veil, which might have created an impression of a socio-cultural liberalization. Hence, if my reading of the case is correct, there were two niches at the time of the Front National’s electoral breakthrough. One was located to the right of the economic dimension, where a new actor promoting economic neo-liberalism could gain some votes, and the other, which was more important, was located at the authoritarian right end of the socio-cultural dimension, where a new actor might attract voters with authoritarian and particularistic positions on issues such as law and order and immigration. These niches were not only the result of supply side changes, but also a result of changes on the demand side. As a result of the victory of the left in 1981, the debate on economic issues became more polarized. Furthermore, as a result of the failure of the left government to implement some form of economic socialism, Keynesianism lost some of its appeal for many voters. Moreover, the socio-cultural liberalization of the left, the PS in particular, might have had a mobilizing effect on voters inclined to authoritarianism. But of even greater importance were the changes in attitudes and voting behavior initiated by macro transformations (cf. chapter 1). We can also see a tendency toward an increase in general right-wing sentiments and preferences during the early 1980s. Between 1981 and 1986, the proportion of the French voters who defined themselves as ‘left’ decreased from 42 percent to 36 percent. Correspondingly, the proportion of the voters who defined themselves to be ‘right’ increased from 31 to 37 percent during the same period (Ignazi 1996b: 67). In sum, there existed niches on the electoral arena in which a political party propelling authoritarian positions on issues such as immigration and law and order could capture votes. We have earlier seen that voters who share authoritarian attitudes on these and related issues have supported the Front National to a great extent. In the next section, we will discuss how the ideology of the Front National corresponded to the available niches, and what strategies it used to attract voters.

Front National: Ideological Themes and Rhetorical Strategies In the 1980s, in particular the years immediately after the Front National’s electoral breakthrough, there was a discussion about whether or not the party had a party ideology (e.g., Mitra 1988).1 As noted in chapter 1, Hinich and Munger (1994: 11) defined ideology as “an internally consistent set of

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propositions that makes both proscriptive and prescriptive demands on human behavior. All ideologies have implications for (a) what is ethically good, and (therefore) what is bad; (b) how society’s resources should be distributed; and (c) where power appropriately resides.” If we follow this definition, I think that it is clear that the Front National had and has an ideology: 1. The party’s ethic is based on a metaphysical conception of ‘natural order.’ Everything that is in accordance with this ‘natural order’ (of the nation, the family, etc.) is ethically good. Everything that breaks this ‘natural order’ is considered to be ethically bad (globalization, homosexuality, ethnic mixing, etc.). 2. The party’s idea of resource distribution is very simple: those who belong to the national ethnic community (i.e., ‘the people’) should have; those who do not belong to this community should not have. Hence, the division is ethnic. However, like other ERP parties, the Front National has lacked a more fine-grained theory of how the distribution of resources should be administered. In fact, the party’s position has oscillated between full-fledged neo-liberal positions to centrist or even slightly leftist positions. 3. The party’s ideology rests on an ethno-nationalist, populist, and charismatic foundation. The basic unit of society is the people (not the individuals) of the nation, and power belongs to the people and to the movement and leaders who ‘give the people a voice.’

Authoritarian Themes Like other ERP parties, the Front National has been mainly concerned with the socio-cultural cleavage dimension, a fact that has been stated explicitly by FN representatives. During the 1990s, the party stressed the need to exchange the old economic left-right dimension with a ‘real’ political cleavage dimension structured around the issue of national identity, which put the supporters of a cosmopolitan society against the supporters of ‘France for the French’ (Perrineau 1997: 46). According to Bruno Mégret, for instance, “the old distinctions between left and right are no longer relevant. Previously … the political process was a debate between Marxists and liberals over the social and economic organization of a country. But today … there is a new debate between nationalism and cosmopolitism, between identity and internationalism” (quoted in Marcus 1995: 130). As will be discussed at length in coming chapters, ethno-national identity is an ideological core of the Front National (see Davies 1999). As a corollary, the dangers of cosmopolitanism play a prominent role in the FN’s ideological corpus. To quote Bruno Mégret, cosmopolitanism is “the desire to get rid of differences and identities and to glorify mixing, cross-breeding [métissage], the melting pot, and cultural and ethnic deracination … [this] increasingly vigorous cosmopolitanism is trying to deprive our fellow

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citizens of their ethnic and cultural references” (Mégret 1990: 20, 36; quoted in Simmons 1996: 221). Taken together, these themes express the rejection of the different, of ‘the other,’ as will be discussed in chapter 5. However, the extreme right-wing authoritarianism of the Front National was not restricted to the theme of ethno-national identity. On the contrary, the FN’s rejection of libertarian values constituted an ideological base that covers a whole range of issues (see Vaughan 1995: 225). Souchard et al. (1997: 44) conducted a quantitative discourse analysis on Jean-Marie Le Pen’s articles and speeches during the period 1983–1996 and found that ‘morality’ was the dominant general theme. Forty percent of the material fell within this category, which can be compared to only 6.75 percent for ‘economics.’ The ‘moral theme’ is composed of two main subcategories: the themes of decadence and the nature-culture dichotomy and hierarchy, on the one hand, and the positive valuation of the nation and the family, on the other (Souchard et al. 1997: 83–85). In the nature-culture dichotomy, ‘nature’ stands for force and superior authority, and ‘culture’ for weakness and the artificial. The theme of decadence, which generally originates from degeneration from ‘nature’ to ‘culture,’ has an old tradition within French politics. It has consistently been promoted by reactionaries of different shades, and is generally characterized by (1) hatred of the present, (2) nostalgia for a Golden Age, (3) praise of immobility, (4) anti-individualism, (5) nostalgia for the ‘sacred,’ (6) a fear of genetic corruption and demographic collapse, and (7) anti-intellectualism (Winock 1998: 76–78). As will be demonstrated below and in coming chapters, the Front National shares most of these characteristics. We can easily find examples of these two themes within the ideology and discourse of the Front National. One illustrating example of the theme of the ‘nature-culture dichotomy’ can be taken from one of Le Pen’s speeches: “We demand a natural order that respects Man in his natural and living settings, which are the family, the community, the work, the province, the nation” (“Le discours de Jean-Marie Le Pen à La Trinité,” Présent, 2 September 1992, quoted in Souchard et al. 1997: 85).2 Similarly, one of many examples of the theme of decadence, in fact one of the more provocative ones, is given below from another quotation from Jean-Marie Le Pen: “By granting privileges to the weak, by favouring them excessively in all respects, one weakens the social body as a whole. One does the very opposite of what dog and horse breeders do. I am not against relief for misfortune, e.g. for the handicapped, but nowadays we almost got to the stage where handicap is promoted” (quoted in Vaughan 1995: 223). Another time, he stated that “[w]e are for justice and not for equality. The theme of equality seems decadent to us” (quoted in Simmons 1996: 244). A considerable part of the Front National’s ideological corpus is based on the themes of immigration and law and order. The FN wants to stop all immigration to France and make punishment more severe (including the restoration of the death penalty). This will be discussed at length in chapter 5.

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The Family and the Natural Order of Gender Roles The central idea of the Front National is that the right of the nation and the right of the family have priority over individual rights (see Davies 1999: 130). Nationalism will be discussed in chapter 4, but since the concepts of nation and family are intertwined in the ideological discourse of the Front National, some overlapping will be necessary. For the Front National, the family is viewed as the fundamental institution in society, as the backbone of the nation. Family rights are determined by the way they contribute to the interests of the nation (Davies 1999: 25; Simmons 1996: 241). As Simmons (1996: 241) put it: “Individual obligations follow from the absolute necessity of maintaining societal order and stability; and societal order in turn depends on maintaining the integrity of the different groups that compose the whole, especially the family.” Within the families, to follow the logic of the Front National, ‘biological and cultural reality’ dictates that men and women have different roles to play. Women’s role is to give birth and to educate the children. Hence, the Front National sees the family as the primary unit of society. This makes it natural for them to oppose ideas that make the individual the foundation of society—such as the Declaration of the Rights of Man, which they scorn as ‘Socialist propaganda’ (Simmons 1996: 243). Similarly, the Front National blames ‘individualism’ for the declining importance of marriage, motherhood, and other traditions and institutions connected to the family (Davies 1999: 128).3 A related essential concern for the Front National is the falling birthrates. According to the FN, France and the rest of the Western world are slowly committing suicide as peoples as a result of the low birthrates. A low population density creates a vacuum, which, the FN argues, will be filled by immigrants.4 This makes it imperative for French women to give birth to (many) French children (e.g., Marcus 1995: 102). As Jean-Marie Le Pen wrote in an article, the “future depends a lot more on young girls than boys.… One of the most grave menaces facing France and the world is dénatalité.… I want to say to the young girls and young women of France that they hold the destiny of the country in their hands” (Le Pen in National Hebdo, 11 May 1984, quoted in Davies 1999: 120). The Front National wants to reduce the perceived problem of declining birthrates, as well as the decreasing importance of family institutions, by political means. As will be discussed in chapter 4, the idea of ‘national preference’ (i.e., to give all ‘real’ French citizens, i.e., ethnically French, priority in employment, housing, health-care, etc.) is essential for the Front National. A related concept is ‘family preference,’ which implies that families should be granted social and financial support not given to single people or unmarried couples (see Davies 1999: 125). Part of this strategy is also to create inducements for families to have more children. Examples of such inducements are maternal wages and extra votes for families with

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many children. The idea of a maternal income is a long-standing proposal that has been a part of the Front National’s program since 1974 (see Davies 1999: 126). Like ‘national preference,’ ‘family preference’ is built on an ethno-national condition: only (ethnically) French people may benefit from this program (see Davies 1999: 25). In addition, the Front National wants to strengthen the family and the institution of marriage by means of legislation. One proposal is to make divorce more difficult (Davies 1999: 129). Hence, the Front National has a very simple view of the ‘women issue’: their role is to give birth to and educate children. Le Pen explicitly emphasizes this view: it “is not a question of imposing on women something they might think of as a new kind of servitude. It’s just a question of admitting the facts; namely that women are invested with a fundamental mission both at the individual as well as the collective level—to transmit life and educate children” (Le Pen 1989: 18; quoted in Simmons 1996: 248). According to the Front National, a French woman should not work; she should stay at home and take care of her children (and her husband). In fact, one of the main objects of the Front National’s social policies is to encourage women to leave the workforce, and reliance on the public sector for childcare and education should be reduced (see Simmons 1996: 245–246). One illustration of this view is the following: Nowadays, a lot of mothers are forced to work in factories or in offices, not because the work is a pleasure for them but because the households need a second salary. The introduction of a maternal wage would permit mothers to make their choices without financial constraints. It would disburse a benefit larger than the SMIC to mothers who chose to devote their time to the education of their children. It would also involve all the social benefits normally associated with employment. (Le Pen, Le Lettre de Jean-Marie Le Pen, 15 March 1992; quoted in Souchard et al. 1997: 151–152)5

Similarly, the Front National has indicated that the phenomenon of working women has negative social effects: “What is the use of seeking a second salary outside of the home, if one pays for it with a child who becomes a drug addict, for example? Is it worth the price? Is it not necessary to make a calculation?” (Le Pen, speech of 10 May 1987, quoted in Souchard et al. 1997: 151).6 Generally, in the ideology of the Front National, women are given no other social role than wife and mother. Women’s role is to give birth to children, and the more the better. In fact, by providing a ‘mother’s income,’ the Front National has aimed to grant official ‘professional’ status to mothers. Other women (single women, etc.) are hardly mentioned in the Front National’s political discourse (see Simmons 1996: 245–246). With this concept of the family and this view of women’s roles, feminism and socialism became the natural enemies for the Front National. According to Le Pen (1985), the feminist lobby has “inspired a whole series of laws which have encouraged the development of feminine wage-earners and

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imposed a devalued image of mothers of families.” At the same time, “socialists and social-democrats,” who are obsessed by egalitarian “visions” and a “contempt for the family,” have tried hard to dissolve the family and other “organic and natural communities” in order to isolate individuals within a “false and inorganic unity in a collectivist state” (Le Pen 1985: 128; quoted in Simmons 1996: 240–241).

Economic Policy I have repeatedly argued that economic issues play only a minor role in the Front National’s ideological discourse. As we saw in the preceding chapter, the same seems to have been true of the decision to vote for the Front National. That notwithstanding, all Front National programs between 1984 and 1998 have included a chapter with the word ‘economic’ or ‘economical’ as a part of the title (Roy 1998: 85). Their program from 1993 (Front National 1993) includes chapters such as ‘Prosperity,’ ‘Economy: For Economic Power,’ ‘Taxation: For a Stop to the Fiscalisme,’ and ‘Enterprise: Produce French’ (see Roy 1998: 86). In 1983, the Front National’s economic program was marked by anti-Marxism, anti-tax populism, and economic liberalism.7 Ten years later, the focus of the Front National’s economic program had changed. In 1993, the party warned against the consequences of a market economy.8 It is important to note how the economic policy at this time has become subordinated to the interests of the nation: The unlimited growth, development, and accumulation of material wealth have become the main goals of the social life. The free trade, the intensification of global exchange, and the international division of labor constitute the essential instruments to achieve these aims.… Why can we not see that this conception of economic life is a menace that dissolves worlds where people have joined in historical communities?… This process of homogenization imperils the very idea of the Nation. (Front National 1993: 128)9

Hence, during those ten years, ‘globalization’ replaced ‘Marxism’ as the principal enemy. Thus, ‘economic nationalism,’ to use Marcus’s (1995: 110) term, became a more dominant theme in Front National discourse during the 1990s.10 In 1993, the party launched a campaign for a ‘new protectionism,’ declared war on the whole concept of international free trade, and called for the abandonment of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) (Marcus 1995: 110).11 I would argue that this new program was far more coherent and consistent than that of 1983 (see Roy 1998: 94). The Front National’s shift from market liberalism to national protectionism brought the party’s economic program more into line with its positions in the socio-cultural dimension (see Betz 1994: 129–130). Thus, the economic program became integrated into the general strategy to create a party image of ‘a third way,’ which

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was expressed in the party slogan ‘Neither Right nor Left—French’ and in the title of Bruno Mégret’s book (1997) La Troisième Voie. In this book Mégret promoted an economic policy beyond the twin poles of socialism and liberalism. However, I would also argue that this shifting focus has decreased the importance of economic issues within the ideological discourse of the Front National. Economic politics per se have seldom been of interest to the Front National; the economy is merely a springboard for its pet issues (i.e., national identity; anti-immigration and the ‘national preference’). As I will show in chapter 4, ‘national preference’ is the Front National’s universal solution. Unemployment and other economic problems, insecurity and criminality, health problems, and so on, can all be solved by means of ‘national preference.’ As Le Pen wrote in one of his weekly letters: “[O]ur politics of social justice for all French workers will make this poverty and this endemic unemployment disappear.… An effective politics of social justice implies the general application of the national preference, which states that social justice is applicable mainly for members of the same community of destiny” (Le Pen, “La Lettre de Jean-Marie Le Pen,” 15 March 1992, quoted in Souchard et al. 1997: 160).12 As we can see, the Front National’s conception of ‘the people’ is based on ethnicity and on the populist conception of the indivisible people. As a corollary, the existence of social classes is denied. Indeed, the Front National has traditionally attacked all doctrines and institutions based on conceptions of class struggle. This is also logical with regard to the party’s antiMarxism, which was essential to the Front National, especially during the early 1980s (Hainsworth 1992b: 51).13 That notwithstanding, the Front National has increasingly tried to direct its message to working-class voters, in hopes of consolidating their electoral support.14 In 1995, Le Pen introduced his annual 1 May speech by saying: “You have come today 1 May 1995, as you have every year, from all the districts of France to celebrate Joan of Arc, our national heroine, the Saint of the Country, the purest symbol of patriotism and sacrifice for the survival of the Nation and the People, but also to celebrate the national festival of work and workers” (Le Pen, speech published in Présent, 3 May 1995, quoted in Souchard et al. 1997: 162).15 One year later the workers had become even more central: It is here appropriate to honor the long struggle of the workers and the unions for greater justice, greater security, and greater liberty in their work. Honor the memory of the miners, the sailors, the railway workers, and the metal workers, proud of their jobs, attached to their tools. Through this, we should no longer see their effort to transform society as the tool of their slavery, but as the means of their liberation. Today, work no longer oppresses, but unemployment does. (Le Pen, speech published in Présent, 3 May 1996, quoted in Souchard et al. 1997: 162)16

We can here see that Le Pen and the Front National actively tried to address the workers, in particular those working in declining sectors.

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To conclude this chapter, we have seen that the Front National’s ideology fit well the authoritarian niche in the socio-cultural cleavage dimension. By their championing of natural order and their opposition to everything (changes in particular) that disturbs the natural order, the Front National positioned itself to stress the supreme values of the status quo ante, that is, of the ‘primordial’ institutions of family and nation that were threatened by ongoing individualization and modernization processes.17 In the next chapter, I will discuss one of these institutions, the nation, in greater detail.

Notes 1. More contemporary writings on the Front National seem to agree that the party had developed a party ideology. As Davies (1999: 2) has written, for instance, “we should not labour under the illusion that the FN is devoid of a coherent thought system.” According to Davies (1999: 2–3), the Front National’s particular notion of the nation is the key to their ideology and discourse. 2. My translation. Original quotation: “Nous nous réclamons, nous, d’un ordre naturel qui respecte l’homme dans ces cadres naturels et vivants que sont la famille, la commune, le métier, la province, la nation.” As demonstrated by the following quotation from Joseph de Maistre, this locates the Front National in an old reactionary tradition: “There is no man in the world. In my lifetime, I have seen Frenchmen, Italians, Russians; but as for man, I declare I have never met him in my life; if he exists it is certainly unbeknownst to me” (quoted in Winock 1998: 156). 3. This theme is partly directed against socialism, as well: according to the Front National “the ‘Socialist or social-democratic alchemy’ … leaves individuals isolated and indifferent, bound only by the artificial harmony of public assistance” (Davies 1999: 128). 4. This idea was, of course, fueled by the fact that the birthrate in France fell from over 2.7 in 1965 to below 2 in 1975. However, after 1975 the birthrate has been rather stable. Moreover, most other Western European countries actually have similar or lower birth rates (Castells 1997: 153). 5. My translation. Original quotation: “Actuellement beaucoup de mères de famille sont obligées d’aller travailler à l’usine ou au bureau, non pas parce que ce travail est pour elles un épanouissement mais parce qu’il faut faire rentrer un deuxième salarie au foyer. La création d’un revenue maternel permettra aux mères de famille d’effectuer leur choix sans contraine financière. Il sera versé en effet aux mères de famille qui choississent de se consacrer à plein temps à l’education de leur enfants une rémunération supérieur au SMIC bénéficant des avantages sociaux liés à tout salarie.” 6. My translation. Original quotation: “À quoi sert d’aller chercher quelquefois un deuxième salaire à l’extérieur si jamais on doit payer cela du fait que votre enfant devienne drogué, par example? Est-ce que ça vaut la peine? N’est-il pas nécessarie de faire un calcul?” 7. This was probably the result of the strategic effort of the Front National to attract a combination of (1) traditional extreme right-wing supporters (former supporters of the movement for a French Algeria, Tixier-Vignancour, Occident, etc.), (2) former Poujadist supporters (mainly small traders and other members of the lower middle class who run their own business), and (3) disappointed and disillusioned voters from the mainstream right. The first group could be mobilized by strong anti-Marxist rhetoric, the second by

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anti-tax populism, and the third group by ‘Reaganite’ or ‘Thatcherist’ economic liberalism (see Roy 1998: 88–91). I will discuss the anti-tax populism more closely in chapter 6. This change in policy corresponds to a changing public opinion. Between 1992 and 1994, the proportion of voters that believed that to “increase State regulation” is a better way to face economic challenges than to “give more freedom to firms” increased from less than 30 percent to 45 percent. It is also of some interest to see that the proportion of the voters that believed it is better to give more freedom to the firms doubled between 1980 and 1986 (Balme 2002). My translation. Original quotation: “La croissance, le développement, l’accumulation sans limite des richesses matérielles sont devenus des objectifs majeurs de la vie sociale; le libre-échangisme, l’intensification des échanges mondiaux, la division international du travail constituant les instruments privilégiés qui doivent permettre d’atteindre ces objectifs.… Comment ne pas voir que cette conception de la vie économique menace de disparition un univers où les hommes se réunissaint au sein de communautés historiques?… C’est l’idée même de Nation que cette enterprise d’uniformisation met en péril.” As Bruno Mégret has put it (in an interview with Marcus 1995: 109–110): “For us, territory exists, the nation exists, and we consider that the principles of the free economy must be applied within territorial limits, we believe, within the nation.” When combined with cultural protectionism and xenophobia, this new focus on economic protectionism opens up for a kind of welfare chauvinism (see Perrineau 1997: 246). My translation. Original quotation: “Ainsi, notre politique de justice sociale pour tous les travalieurs français vise à faire disparaître cette pauvreté et ce chômage endémiques.… Une effective politique de justice sociale implique l’application généralisée du principe de préférence national qui veut que la justice sociale s’applique d’abord aux membres de la même communauté de destin.” The anti-Marxist rhetoric was, of course, directed against the PCF, but the purpose was also to sow confusion about the differences between the socialism of the PS and ‘revolutionary Marxism’ (see Roy 1998: 89). Still, the Front National more frequently used more general references to the ‘common man.’ Similarly, by being partly a populist party, the Front National tried to direct its message toward the petty bourgeoisie. In one speech, for instance, Le Pen stated that “the poor, those who are cold and hungry the lonely and those without hope always have a privileged place in my heart; so have the farmers, the craftsmen, and the traders who increasingly have been chased by the politics of GATT, the PAC and of Maastricht” (Le Pen, speech published in National Hebdo, 15 September 1994, quoted in Souchard et al. 1997: 147). My translation. Original quotation: “les pauvres, ceux qui ont eu froid et faim, les solitaires, les déspérés auront toujours une place privilégiée dans mon cœur, ceux aussi qui ont été progressivement chasses de nos campagnes, agriculteurs, artisans, commerçants, pour les politiques du GATT, de la PAC et de Maastricht.” My translation. Original quotation: “Vous êtes venus aujourd’hui 1er Mai 1995 de tous les pays de France comme chaque année pour honorer Jean d’Arc, notre héroîne nationale, la Sainte de la Patrie, le symbole le plus pur du patriotisme et du sacrifice pour la survie de la Nation et du Peuple, mais aussi pour célébrer la fête nationale du travail et des travailleurs.” My translation. Original quotation: “Il convient de saluer ici la longue lutte des travailleurs et des syndicats pour plus de justice, plus de sécurité, plus de liberté dans le travail. Salutons la mémoire des mineurs, des marins, des cheminots, des métallos fiers de leur métier, attachés à leur outil de travail et y voyant par leur effort de transformation de la société non plus l’instrument de leur servitude, mais le moyen de leur libération. Aujourd’hui ce n’est plus le travail qui opprime mais le chômage.” As will be noted in chapter 4, the nation is in fact not a primordial institution. However, in the rhetoric of the Front National, it is.

Chapter 4

NATIONALISM AND NATIONAL IDENTITY


In this chapter, I will discuss ethno-nationalism and ethno-national identity. Ethno-nationalism is one of the two most important niches within the sociocultural cleavage dimension, which made the emergence of and sustained electoral support for the Front National and other ERP parties possible. I will start with a historical account of the phenomenon of nationalism, and try to approach a general definition. After that, I will more specifically turn to the French case, where a long tradition of ‘closed’ ethno-nationalism will be identified. Third, I will show how the Front National has used ethnonationalist themes in its political discourse.

Nationalism: History and Definition The phenomena of nationalism and national identity have recently generated a great many books and articles, yet it has been difficult to agree on definitions. I will in the following discussion mainly stick to the ‘classics’ in the literature on nationalism, which, in my opinion, are representative of the various currents in this research area. Following Kedourie, I will regard nationalism as an ideology “concerned to establish a state of affairs in society and state such that everyone, as they say in the old-fashioned novels, will live happily ever after” (Kedourie 1993: xiii–xiv). Within the framework of this study I will conceive of nationalism as a utopian ideology rather than a form of realist politics. As Max Weber put it, the nation is concerned with the realm of Kultur, while the state is concerned with the realm of power (Beetham 1985: 128). Furthermore, nationalism should be seen as a distinct ideology. Nationalism does not per se belong to the political right or left, but has been associated with both at different times and in different places (Kedourie 1993: 84). It is a popular belief, fueled by nationalists, that nations and nationalism are ‘natural things’ that have existed since time immemorial (see Smith 1991: 19). This is not the case. Nations and nationalism are actually Notes for this chapter begin on page 152.

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rather recent historical phenomena.1 Exactly when they originated is contested. According to Kedourie (1993: 1), nationalism was invented in Europe at the beginning of the nineteenth century. The main message of the original doctrine was that (1) humanity is naturally divided into nations, (2) nations are known by certain characteristics that can be ascertained, (3) the only legitimate form of government is national selfgovernment, and (4) the members of the nation can reach freedom and fulfillment only “by cultivating the peculiar identity of their own nation and by sinking their own persons in the greater whole of the nation” (Kedourie 1993: 67). For Herder, one of the founding fathers of the doctrine of nationalism, nations were seen as “separate natural entities ordained by God.” The best political arrangement, according to Herder, was achieved when each nation formed a state of its own. The only true and lasting state was one in which a nation is formed through natural kinship. States that contain more than one nation, on the other hand, were seen as unnatural, oppressive, and doomed to decay. Hence, Herder argued that states in which there are more than one nation run the risk of losing their identity, because they sin “against the principle of diversity,” which makes them unable to fully cultivate their originality (Kedourie 1993: 52). As we will see in a coming section of this chapter, the nationalism of the Front National as well as other ERP parties, and especially their claim to ‘the right to be different,’ is attuned to these aspects of Herder’s nationalism. Still, the question remains as to what exactly a nation is. For Herder, as well as for Fichte, another of the founding fathers of the doctrine of nationalism, the linguistic criterion was of paramount importance for the nationalist ideology. In his Addresses to the German Nation, Fichte stated that “we give the name of people to men whose organs of speech are influenced by the same external conditions, who live together, and who develop their language in continuous communication with each other” (quoted in Kedourie 1993: 58). Hence, for Fichte a nation is a group of people speaking the same language—and such a language group ought to constitute a state of its own (Kedourie 1993: 62). Nowadays, language is one among many characteristics included in the concept of ethnicity, which many scholars see as essential for delineating the boundaries of a nation.2 An ethnic community is a group that shares the same culture, defined as a “distinctive style of conduct” (Gellner 1983: 92; cf. Smith 1999a: 16).3 However, traditionally the distinction between linguistic and racial nationalism has been blurred. Although the doctrine saw language as the most important sign of “a group’s peculiar identity,” this was because a nation’s language was “peculiar to that nation only because such a nation constituted a racial stock distinct from that of other nations” (Kedourie 1993: 66). According to the French nationalist writer Charles Maurras, for instance, no Jew could ever “understand or handle the French language as well as a Frenchman proper” (Kedourie 1993: 66; cf. Hobsbawm 1992: 108).

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Nevertheless, as Kedourie has argued, there are really no reasons why “the fact that people speak the same language … should, by itself, entitle them to enjoy a government exclusively their own.” In order to present a convincing reason for that, nationalists have to make people believe that ethnic and language differences are the most salient differences there are (Kedourie 1993: 74). In this study, as we have seen in chapter 1, I believe it to be the case that nationalists found popular resonance for this idea in many places in Western Europe—France included—during the 1980s and 1990s.

Territorial (Civic) Nationalism and Ethnic Nationalism So far, I have treated nationalism as a political ideology based on culture. In order to capture both of the two main aspects of nationalism (its political and its cultural aspects), it may be enlightening to discuss Anthony Smith’s dualistic conception of nationalism. For Smith (1991: 74), nationalism is “a political ideology with a cultural doctrine at its center,” and he defined nationalism as “an ideological movement for attaining and maintaining identity, unity, and autonomy on behalf of a population deemed by some of its members to constitute an actual or potential ‘nation’” (Smith 1999c: 103; cf. Smith 1991: 73).4 In addition, according to Smith we need to distinguish between territorial (or civic) nationalism on the one hand, and ethnic nationalism on the other (Smith 1991). Whereas territorial nationalism is characterized by a view of the nation as a rational association, ethnic nationalism is rather characterized by a view of the nation as an organic, historic community of culture, held together by family-like bonds of solidarity.5 More specifically, territorial nationalism is more voluntary and open, while ethnic nationalism is deterministic and closed. According to territorial nationalism, every individual must belong to a nation, but can choose which one to join.6 The ethnically defined nation, on the other hand, is one that you are born into, which makes the myth of common ancestry more important than territorial residence (Smith 1995: 14; cf. Smith 1991: 81). Hence, while territorial nationalism is based on a common history and mass culture, and allows people of different ethnic origins to take part in these, ethnic nationalism, with its myth of common ancestry, allows only people of a specific ethnic descent to be members of the narrow family circle depicted as the nation.7 Consequently, ethnic nationalism implies by definition a collective exclusivity (Smith 1999e: 192). While ‘we,’ the members of the ethnic nation, have a “definite origin in time and space,” all the others who happen to reside in the same territory “are guests and strangers” (Smith 1999e: 194). The drive for cultural homogeneity and purity is also more common in ethnic nationalism (Smith 1999a: 15), and it is logical that the family is one of the most fundamental metaphors of ethnic nationalism (Smith 1991: 78–79). This metaphor denotes something ‘natural’ (which

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implies something that is not chosen). In fact, the ‘beauty of gemeinschaft,’ which nationalists promote, lies largely in its ‘natural ties’ (see Anderson 1991: 143; for a discussion of the ‘natural,’ see chapter 3). Vernacular cultures, such as language and customs, are highly prized in the ideology of ethnic nationalism (rather than legal equality, which is essential for territorial nationalism). As a consequence, a populist political ethos is a predominant feature of ethnic nationalism (Smith 1995: 14; 1999e: 190; cf. Hobsbawm 1992: 103–104; Taggart 2000: 96).8 This aspect will be discussed further in chapter 6, where I will argue that the conception of ‘the heartland,’ constituting ‘the people,’ is inherent in populist ideology. In addition, in ethnic nationalism, as in populism, ‘the people’ is the final court of appeal.9 Myths of ethnic descent, focusing on genealogical ancestry, are of essential importance to ethnic nationalism.10 The myths trace, and try to prove, a link between the contemporary ethnic group, which claims the ‘right’ of the nation, and the ‘founder’ (or founders) of the nation, which is typically depicted as a hero, or even a deity (Smith 1999b: 58).11 In this respect, the myth of ethnic descent is a myth of a Golden Age (see Levinger and Lytle 2001).12 With this ideal of a Golden Age, which typically is more fictitious than real,13 ethnic nationalists try to define what is, normatively, distinctive about the national community in question. As Smith put it, ethnic nationalists generally “define an ideal, which is not so much to be resurrected (few nationalists want actually to return to the past, even a golden past) as to be recreated in modern terms” (Smith 1999f: 263). By contrasting the great culture and civilization of the ancestors with contemporary decline or decadence, the myth of a golden past helps articulate a quest for renaissance (Smith 1999f: 264). Besides the forgotten virtues, the roots of the contemporary evil are sought in moral decay; that pleasure and vice have overcome discipline and sacrifice; and that the old hierarchies have crumbled away. Generally, the myth of decline tells a story of how the community lost its anchor, by giving way to individualism and particularistic interests at the expense of collective ideals (Smith 1999b: 67).

National Identity To recapitulate my discussion of identity and identification in chapter 1, individual social identity plays an important role in people’s self-understanding and self-evaluation. Nationality is one of many social categories that may, permanently or occasionally, constitute salient identifications. In fact, at least at a latent level, nationalism as an ideology provides one of the most compelling identity-creating myths we have (Smith 1991: viii; cf. Billig 1995). As mentioned in chapter 1, individuals belong to various groups and social categories and have many social identities, and which identity becomes salient at a given moment is contextually dependent (Eriksen 1993: 31; 1996: 54). When people travel abroad, for instance, the salience of

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national identity normally increases. Within a country, however, nationality (in its legal, civic sense) may be an insufficient means of distinguishing oneself from others. In this context, ethnic categorization provides a more useful basis for social identity, because of its greater ability, in such a situation, to distinguish between in-groups and out-groups. The reasons why ethno-nationalism may appeal to some voters has to do with its ability to provide a feeling of ‘sameness,’ that is, that people, as members of a particular group, perceive themselves to share some salient characteristics that outsiders lack. For example, since people belonging to the same ethno-national category eat and dress in similar ways and speak the same language, they are distinct from nonmembers who dress, eat, and speak differently (see Smith 1991: 75). This perceived ‘sameness’ of ingroup and out-group members may, of course, be more or less based on stereotypical social representations. This actualizes the notion of ‘collective identity.’ As I argued in chapter 1, there is no such thing as a collective identity, because an identity presupposes a consciousness. However, the idea of collective identity plays an important role in social and political mobilization. The notion of ‘national identity,’ especially when based on the idea of ‘national character,’ is sometimes used as if it were a collective identity.14 National character is a stereotyped image of a few traits that are seen as typical of a specific ethno-nationality. They mostly involve one positively evaluated part (mainly used by members of the ethno-nationality), and one negatively evaluated part (mainly used by nonmembers). The idea of national character was already of central importance for Herder, who argued that every nation has its own national character, or ‘genius,’ that is, its own ways of thinking and acting—in short, a unique and peculiar identity (see Smith 1991: 75). The greatest threat to each people, according to Herder, is a situation in which this unique identity is threatened with extinction. As we will see below, this idea is very well attuned to the ethno-nationalist message of the extreme right-wing populist parties.

The Appeal of Nationalism As indicated above, the main reason why nationalism may appear appealing is contained in its ability to provide feelings of belonging. In this sense, nationalism fulfills a commonly felt need for a fixed point amid constant change. Like other ‘fixed points,’ such as traditions, religions, family bonds, social class, and so on, ethno-national identity may assure the individual a sense of belonging. Hence, when these other fixed points are ‘melting into air,’ nationalism has sometimes taken their place. In addition, as was indicated in chapter 1, the breakdown of earlier ideological schemas, seen as cognitive and affective ‘maps,’ may result in insecurity and feelings of meaninglessness, which the nationalist myth of ethnic descent may potentially counter (see also Smith 1999b: 84).

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I will argue that recent macro changes have facilitated the increased salience of ethno-nationalist identity for three reasons. First, because of absolute and relative deprivation and changed structures of social comparison, some voter groups may be induced to support parties that promise to redraw the dominant system of group categorization. Nationalist ideology does not in itself distinguish between poor and rich, between capitalist and worker. For nationalists, “the sole principle of political exclusion and inclusion follows the boundaries of the nation—that category of people defined as members of the same culture” (Eriksen 1993: 102). Second, changes in the cultural realm (e.g., individualization, secularization, declining importance of traditions, etc.) have resulted in a situation that has facilitated the mobilization of voters with a conservative ethos, for whom the nation becomes a symbol of traditional life. In addition, people who feel lost in ‘the new world’ may resort to ethno-nationalism. Third, internationalization has diminished the autonomy of the nation-state, which feels threatening to certain groups of voters. More specifically, this reaction has its origin in the clash between the real and perceived power of the nation-state. As Anthony Smith noted, the nation-state, not the global economy, remains the chief source of benefits and sanctions for the individual citizen (Smith 1999f: 259), a fact that sustains the belief in national autonomy.15 Nevertheless, when the appeal of ethno-nationalism to voters has increased in periods, the supply side has always had a nationalist tradition to draw on. As we will see in the French case, the occasionally resurgent ethno-nationalisms of the last one hundred years have been amazingly similar in structure and content.

Ethnic Nationalism in France As indicated elsewhere, I believe that the Front National can in part be seen as a resurgence of ethno-nationalism. Besides the general roots of ethno-nationalism presented above, there were some additional factors more or less peculiar to France that favored the mobilization of ethnonationalism. First, the declining size and impact of the PCF and Gaullist movements, which both had strong ideologies, left an ideological gap that could be filled with a substituting ideology. Second, although France saw a similar decline in traditional institutions as other Western European democracies,16 the decreased importance of the Catholic Church has affected France more than most other countries. Third, the fact that civic, assimilationist nationalism has been more dominant in France than in most other Western European countries, has also been important. As Jenkins and Copsey (1996) showed, a state-based open form of nationalism was almost able to provide for consensus during the first thirty years after World War II. During this period, ‘state’ and ‘nation’ were increasingly

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seen as equivalent. However, this perspective was vulnerable in the sense that a decline in the socio-economic power of the state had a very direct effect on the valuation of national identity. Thus, I will argue, the severe economic crisis of the early 1980s (which ran parallel with the political crisis of the socialist government) resulted in a crisis of national identity, based on a state-based, open type of nationalism. Fourth, there was in France a sophisticated far-right intelligentsia (e.g., GRECE and Club l’Horloge), which facilitated the Front National’s success in transforming and reframing the social and political crises of the early 1980s into a crisis of national identity. Fifth, the established French citizenship policy was challenged in the late 1970s and early 1980s when it became known that 400,000 young second-generation Algerian immigrants were obliged to obtain French citizenship (sometimes against their will), because their parents were born French citizens in Algeria, before its independence in 1962 (Brubaker 1992: 139–142). This event initiated an intense debate over citizenship laws, and provided favorable opportunities for nationalist actors—not least the Front National—to criticize the existing legislation for “turning foreigners into Frenchmen on paper without making sure that they were ‘French at heart’ (Français de cœur)” (Brubaker 1992: 143). Not least, this event—in particular the increase in dual citizenships—raised the issue of the ongoing desacralization of citizenship. As Brubaker has noted, traditionally “the sacralization of citizenship has found its central and most poignant expression in the obligation to perform military service for the state, to fight for the state and die for it if need be. Dual citizenship relativizes this obligation” (Brubaker 1992: 145). In France, an increasing proportion of the second-generation Algerian immigrants were free to choose between military service in France or in Algeria. Although they had to serve two years in Algeria, but only one year in France, many chose to do their military service in Algeria (Brubaker 1992: 145). This fact had a provocative and even mobilizing effect on people who believed that “citizenship should possess dignity and command respect. It should not be sought for convenience or personal advantage. It should possess intrinsic, not merely instrumental, value. It should be sacred, not profane” (Brubaker 1992: 147).

Nationalism in France—Open and Closed In France, the two nationalisms (i.e., civic and open versus ethnic and closed) have existed side by side since the aftermath of the French revolution, although the civic nationalism has mostly been the official position during the twentieth century (cf. Hazareesingh 1994; Winock 1998). In line with the discussion above, French civic nationalism has been more moderate, cautiously expansive, optimistic, and open to people of other ethnic origins, but still a nationalism “admiring itself for its virtues and its heroes, easily forgetting its faults” (Winock 1998: 24; cf. Hazareesingh 1994: 128). Within the tradition of French ethnic and closed nationalism,

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on the other hand, the nation has consistently been defined by excluding ethnic ‘intruders’; this tradition has always focused on the French ethnic essence, and is authoritarian, suspicious, pessimistic, and adversarial in character (Hazareesingh 1994: 128; Winock 1998: 24–25). Still, one should be cautious not to draw a watertight demarcation between French civic and ethnic nationalisms. It is, in fact, possible to find passageways, convergences, and even compromises between them (Winock 1998: 6).17 As Winock (1998: 24–25) demonstrated, ethno-nationalism has reemerged periodically in France (cf. Jenkins and Copsey 1996: 106; Koopmanns and Statham 2000: 38). The ideology of French ethno-nationalism has also often been commingled with an anti-republican and anti-democratic tradition, not least because of its distinction between the ‘essence’ of France, the ‘real France,’ on the one hand, and the legal France with its political institutions on the other hand. Within this tradition, the political institutions have typically been seen as a negation of the essence of the ‘real France,’ and as a cause of degeneration. Still, the different waves of French ethno-nationalists have not always had the same opinion of what should be included in the definition of the ‘real France.’ Charles Maurras’s Action Française, for instance, saw the monarchy as the essence of ‘real’ French social and political values. The Ligues of the interwar period, on the other hand, argued that the army represented the prototypic French virtues. Marshal Pétain turned to the peasant community as an example of uncorrupted ‘Frenchness.’ In the 1950s, Poujade promoted a vision of the petty bourgeoisie, the traders and the craftsmen, as the essence of ‘French France’ (Hazareesingh 1994: 129– 130). The Front National, finally, draws on several of the themes of its ancestors, and in particular the traditional ‘close-knit’ communities of peasants and small traders. At the same time, the Front National, like many earlier manifestations of French ethno-nationalism, aims at defining French citizenship in racial and cultural terms. We could also distinguish between conservative and reactionary nationalism on the one hand, and revolutionary nationalism on the other. This distinction partly crosses the distinction between civic and open nationalism and ethnic and closed nationalism. The Front National mainly expresses a conservative or reactionary nationalism; the ethno-national essence is something that should be preserved or re-created. Revolutionary nationalism, on the other hand, is teleological in character and aims at a future order that can only be reached through the more or less complete destruction of present society (Hazareesingh 1994: 130–131). Nevertheless, the ethno-nationalism of the Front National resembles the one that predominated during the Third Republic. At that time, nationalism was authoritarian, pessimistic, conservative, and adversarial. More specifically, the Front National shares with these movements the obsession with decadence (see chapter 3) and the idea of French decline, while it has been more moderate in its outspoken critique of democratic and republican institutions per se (although they have sharply attacked

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contemporary French ones).18 Nevertheless, in short, for French ethnonationalists the French nation has always been a “fragile entity whose identity had to be nurtured and protected from the threat of invasion and debasement” (Hazareesingh 1994: 140–141).

Front National: Nationalist Themes and Strategies From the discussion thus far, we have been able to identify several core themes of nationalism. We will now turn to the nationalist ideology and rhetoric of the Front National. I will discuss the following issues in this section: 1. Whether the FN stands for a civic and open or ethnic and closed nationalism 2. How the FN uses the conception of national identity 3. How the FN uses the notion of decline and decadence 4. The FN’s reaction against various forms of internationalization (e.g., globalization processes, the European Union, etc.) Apart from these four themes, the relation between ethno-nationalism and populism is of great importance for this study. However, this discussion will be saved for chapter 6. That nationalism is at the core of Front National’s ideology is beyond doubt (cf. Davies 1999: 2–3), and is in fact even indicated by its name. As Jean-Marie Le Pen stated in 1988: “The Front National indicates by its name that it considers the nation a beneficial and irreplaceable reality” (quoted in Davies 1999: 18). Actually, for the Front National the rights of the nation transcend the rights of the individual (Davies 1999: 130): the equilibrium of the nation is considered to be more vital than individuals’ possibilities to liberation, emancipation, and self-realization. However, a clear definition of the concept of a nation cannot be found in the writings of the Front National. Although territory and geographic space are mentioned in the writings and speeches of the Front National, the party mainly emphasizes shared historic descent, shared memories, suffering, and sacrifices as constituting parts of a nation (see Davies 1999: 19). In the 1985 party program, for instance, the party defines the nation as “the community of language, interest, race, memories and culture where man blossoms. [A man] is attached to it by roots and deaths, its past, heredity and heritage. Everything that the nation transmits to him at birth already has an inestimable value” (Front National 1985: 29–30, quoted in Davies 1999: 82). It is also evident from the following quotation that the territorial criterion is insufficient; people sharing geographic space must also have the same historical origins: “the nation … designates a living people, existing together in the same geographical space, having the same

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historical origins and sharing the same sense of destiny” (Front National 1988: 81, quoted in Davies 1999: 82). Moreover, as exemplified by the following quote, the Front National expresses a conception of the nation as a natural entity, which has existed since time immemorial: “It is certainly the Creator who has given us our soil and our landscapes, but they have been defended, conserved, and embellished by us, the sons who have peopled this territory for thousands of years” (Le Pen, speech published in Présent, 3 June 1991; quoted in Souchard et al. 1997: 88).19 Hence, apart from being seen as eternal, the nation is also seen as ‘natural,’ and not seldom compared to the family: “The French nation is a people whose community of men and women is held together by bonds of solidarity and brotherhood, which, although to a lesser degree, are comparable to bonds of solidarity existing in a family” (Le Pen, La lettre de Jean-Marie le Pen, 15 March 1992; quoted in Souchard et al. 1997: 95–96).20 In these and similar ways, the Front National indicates that nationalism, defined as an attachment to a nation, is a natural human instinct (cf. Davies 1999: 85).

An Ethnic and Closed Nationalism At the core of the distinction between civic and open nationalism on the one hand, and ethnic and closed nationalism on the other, we find the discussion of whether the ‘right of blood’ (jus sanguinis) or the ‘right of soil’ (jus soli) should be the cardinal principle of nationality. Traditionally, French citizenship has been based on the ‘right of soil,’ while German citizenship has been based on the ‘right of blood’ (see Brubaker 1992). More specifically, during most of the twentieth century there have been two principal legal paragraphs that regulate the ways in which non-French people acquire French citizenship: Article 23 and Article 44. Article 23 ascribes citizenship at birth to third-generation immigrants, while Article 44 ascribes citizenship “at age 18 to second-generation immigrants who were born in France and have resided there since age 13—provided that they have not opted out of French citizenship during the preceding year and that they have not been convicted of certain crimes” (Brubaker 1992: 140). As we will see, the Front National contests both these articles and takes a clear position in favor of the ‘right of blood.’ In fact, the notion of ‘blood rights,’ that is, that only those born of French parents can obtain French citizenship, provides one of the main pillars of the Front National’s nationalist discourse. Another main pillar is the principle of ‘nonautomatic’ naturalization procedures (see Davies 1999: 77–78). However, the most important ethno-national theme, which will be discussed below, is the overall theme of the threat to French national identity. As will be shown in chapter 5, the Front National wants to stop all new immigration to France. However, French-born children of immigrants should not stay in France, either, unless they integrate completely into

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French society. As Jean-Marie Le Pen, addressing the ‘beurs’ (i.e., secondgeneration North African immigrants), puts it: If you are loyal to France, if you love it, if you adopt its laws, morals, language, way of thinking and, in a word, if you integrate yourself completely, we will not refuse your being one of us, so long as there is a spark of love and not a material interest in your stay. But if you are loyal to your roots—which is something I would respect—and if you just pretend to live under our laws, with your own morals and culture kept to yourself, it is better that you return home because otherwise it could all end very badly. (Le Monde, 4 April 1987; quoted in Davies 1999: 78)

Thus, not only should children of immigrants born in France integrate completely, they must also prove that this integration is the result of love for France and nothing else. In practice, the only way for a French-born immigrant to show this ‘love’ is to serve the country at war. Nevertheless, as was indicated in chapter 3, the Front National often boasts of the fact that their ideology is almost the exact opposite of ‘cosmopolitan’ ideas (i.e., socialism, liberalism, human rights, etc.). The same is true of the Front National’s nationalist position. In fact, much of the opposition between cosmopolitan and particularistic positions is captured by the conflict between open civic and closed ethnic nationalism. While the ‘rights of man’ belong to the universal spectrum, the rights of the nation belong to the particular spectrum (see Davies 1999: 73). According to the Front National, this cleavage is also between ‘the abstract’ and artificial (e.g., ‘the rights of man’) on the one hand, and the ‘real’ and ‘natural’ (e.g., the nation) on the other. Although the Front National occasionally uses economic arguments to justify its preference for a closed nation,21 they mostly argue in terms of culture and national identity. In fact, it should by now be clear that the Front National mostly promotes an ethnic nationalism, that is, as an organic historic community of culture, held together by family-like bonds of solidarity. In the party’s 1985 program, for instance, Le Pen expressed his view of France as the land of our fathers, the soil cultivated and defended throughout the centuries; the country fashioned in the landscape, the cities, the language, the history and enriched by people’s efforts and fertilised by their sweat and blood.… The people of France are the heirs to nearly two thousand million human beings, who suffered and loved for France, making sacrifices, including their lives … we must honour and maintain this … we must not undo it.… France is not only the people of the moment, but also those of yesterday who are now dead, and those of tomorrow who are still to be born. (Front National 1985: 29–30; quoted in Davies 1999: 81)

Similarly, Bruno Mégret has argued that to be French is to share a heritage of myths, values, language, ethnicity, and Christian religion (Simmons

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1996: 162). More specifically, he has defined the nation as “the dream of a people which wants to endure in history. It is composed of the dead, the living and of those who are going to be born in the heart of the community.” In addition, he has stated that “the nation is constituted of a soil, a people and a culture, and it can’t exist without the work of time” (quoted in Simmons 1996: 162). Hence, Mégret emphasized shared history as the main force shaping a nation and a ‘people,’ a position that implies that only those who have French roots can claim to be truly French. This position is also put forward by Le Pen, who argued that “it has taken more than a thousand years of effort to establish the French nation, its historical homogeneity, its culture, and its language” (Le Pen, speech published in Présent, 30 August 1991; quoted in Souchard et al. 1997: 96).22 In a speech five years later, Le Pen went one step further in linking the concepts of ‘nation’ and ‘blood’: “We are actually the heir of an old family, and we are defending a particular idea of France that is as old as our blood” (Le Pen, speech published in Présent, 5 September 1996; quoted in Souchard et al. 1997: 89).23 Moreover, as mentioned above, the Front National has put forward a proposal for ‘nonautomatic’ naturalization procedures, a proposal to which they attach great importance. As exemplified by the quotation from Bruno Mégret below, for the Front National there are only two ways of obtaining French citizenship: either by bloodlines or by ‘merit.’ The FN’s use of the word ‘merit’ is always vague, but it mostly implies extraordinary endeavors (and it is not seldom synonymous with ‘sacrifice’). Bruno Mégret wrote in 1991: [I]nstead of facilitating access to French nationality, we want for our part to retain its unique character. Those who become French, if [they] have not received it through the family line, must merit what they ask for. To enter into the national community … to integrate into an exceptional community of destiny, is not something to be given to every man on earth. French nationality is not a possibility or a right; it is an honour. This is why we want to reform the nationality code. We do not want the identity card to be given to the first stateless person.… France is not a club of bridge players. (Le Monde, 19 November 1991; quoted in Davies 1999: 76)

As we can see here, as with all forms of ethno-nationalism, the nationalism of the Front National implies ‘a will to exclusion’ (see Souchard et al. 1997: 109), and also xenophobia and sometimes overt racism. As we saw above, ethno-nationalists often use the family metaphor in order to justify their position. Le Gallou, one of the party ideologues, provides an additional example of this by stating: “France is one large family, and simple good sense leads to the rejection of bad subjects. If you are going to get married, you don’t want your wife or spouse to be a criminal. In the same way, in a large family like France, you also do not want criminals” (Davies 1999: 80). In a speech from 1991, Le Pen provided an excellent example of an exclusionary statement involving xenophobic overtones:

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The press writes: ‘There are 56 million French …’ No, Mister Journalists, there are perhaps 56 million inhabitants, but there are probably only 50 million French.… It is an evident fact that France since 1974, even officially, has received several million foreigners. However, it is also true that the naturalization system has automatically emptied this classification of ’foreigners,’ so people say: ‘Well, yes, but they are not immigrants anymore, they are French.’ They are French of the Yaka Miam Miam type, who has become Secretary of State of Integration. (Le Pen, speech published in Présent, 3 June 1991; quoted in Souchard et al. 1997: 110–111)24

As should be clear, the nationalism of the Front National is mainly closed and ethnic in character. However, although this is the overall picture, there have been examples of statements that might indicate a more open nationalism (as when the party occasionally stresses the ‘European heresy and civilization,’ rather than the French ones). As will be shown below in the discussion on the Front National’s view of the European Union, neither the ideology nor the strategic rhetoric of the FN has been static. In fact, during the 1990s the Front National seems to have moved toward increasing closeness and ethnocentrism.

National Identity As discussed above, national identity is a form of self-understood social categorization. The notion of national character is moreover of particular importance to the idea of a collective national identity. The greatest threat that an ethno-nationalist can imagine is a situation in which the own national character, that is, the ‘genius’ of the ‘own’ people, is undermined. This idea is at the core of the Front National’s ideology, rhetoric, and electoral appeal. As mentioned above, the Front National’s main argument for a closed nationalism is the threat to French national identity posed by economic, political, and cultural openness. Moreover, the notion of ethnonational identity became even more important to the Front National during the 1990s (see Betz 1994).25 During this period, the Front National became more consistent by bringing their socio-economic goals in line with the aim of preserving French national identity (i.e., they moved from economic neo-liberalism to a more centrist or even leftist position). According to the Front National, only those rooted in a particular culture have the ability to show responsibility and due respect for the patrimony. Others are expected to act in an irresponsible way without regard for the law and customs of France. Both multinational corporations operating in France and immigration were thus at odds with the Front National’s conception of how to defend the French national identity (see Betz 1994: 128). However, it is difficult to find a specific definition of what exactly constitutes ‘French national identity.’ For instance, Le Pen stated in a speech that he believed that France held a unique position in Europe, and in the world, because “our people is the result of a unique fusion of Roman, Germanic, and

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Celtic virtues” (Le Pen, speech of 4 May 1988; quoted in Souchard et al. 1997: 108).26 Actually, the existence and shape of the specific French national character is taken for granted by the Front National, and the party presupposes that its existence belongs to the realm of the ‘natural’ and the ‘real.’ However, I would argue that national character is mythical rather than empirical; its content is taken from a mythical past (i.e., from the Golden Age). This is also how the idea of national character gets its legitimacy (see Souchard et al. 1997: 102). Yet we can with certainty classify the Front National’s conception of a French national identity as an ethnic national identity (defined in terms of shared ancestors, rather than in terms of shared territory). Generally, ancestors play a great role in the Front National’s discourse on national identity. As Le Pen wrote in 1997, “by studying the past, we get educated about the present, and gain perspective on the future.… The history of our people is an encouragement to continue our total struggle” (Présent, 5 September 1996; quoted in Souchard et al. 1997: 102).27 According to the Front National, profound values, more or less lost in contemporary society, are to be found among the ancestors and, more specifically, among the founding fathers of the nation. These values are often presented as the essence of French identity, and the fact that they have been lost is seen as a sign of decadence. Thus, the Front National uses Joan of Arc and Clovis as national heroes in their discourse (see Hainsworth 1999). In fact, the Front National celebrates Joan of Arc at a festival every spring, and I will quote a representative speech from such an occasion: We are celebrating today, in a loving way, I dare say, an especially dear daughter of France. She is dear to us because she was consecrated to a loving aim during her life, not at all the love of men, but the love for a people and a dawning nation, as well as its liberty.… Frenchmen, let us always remember, as Michelet concluded, that our country is born from the heart of a woman, from her tenderness, from her tears, and from the blood she gave for us. (Le Pen, 10 May 1987; quoted in Souchard et al. 1997: 99–100)28

The notion of national identity is also often defined against things that the Front National opposes (e.g., globalization, multiculturalism, etc.). Human rights is one of the targets, as exemplified with this quote from an article in the Front National publication Identité: “The rights of man wants to construct a new human genre, indifferent, where all the particularisms and specificities in the nature of man disappear.… [It is] an egalitarian and totalitarian vision [that implies] the death of peoples and nations” (Bardet, in Identité, May–June 1989; quoted in Davies 1999: 74). ‘Negative’ definitions, like this one, make it possible for the Front National to dress their defense of ethno-national identity in positive terms. However, the quotation above also implies the Front National’s catch phrase ‘the right to be different.’ For the Front National, the only way to preserve national ‘differences,’ which is seen as a prerequisite for national

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identity or character, is to keep different ‘people’ separated. In this way, the Front National’s defense of ethno-national identity inevitably implies an exclusion of ‘foreign’ elements (see Orfali 1996: 130). As Fabrice Le Roy, former head of the Paris FNJ (youth association), put it: “We are fighting for the French identity. We are serving France—we want a French France” (quoted in Davies 1999: 67). Another high-ranking Front National member echoed this theme when he stated: “I … support the National Front’s positions on immigration, the nationality code, and national identity because these are essentially questions of culture rather than legal or political issues. I’m not one of those who is going to accept a multiracial or a multicultural France” (quoted in DeClair 1999: 133; emphasis added). The Front National’s discourse on national identity thus tends toward xenophobia, as expressed in the following quotation from a member of the FN’s Political Bureau: ‘We are going to have a profound transformation of our national identity. You see it every day. I can tell you that in the district where I have campaigned … certain parts of the city are populated by no one but foreigners. When I say a foreign city, I mean a city where you see Islamic butcher shops, where you see mosques, or where you see people dressed as they would be in the Maghrib, etcetera” (quoted in DeClair 1999: 132). Le Pen, finally, summed up the position of the Front National when he stated that “[l]ike other countries, we hope France has the courage to defend its identity and priority rights of its children instead of welcoming foreigners” (Front National 1988: 81; quoted in Davies 1999: 78–79). As a natural corollary, the solution to the threat to the French national identity is national and ethnic isolationism. As shown by the statement below, the Front National wants to expel most of the immigrants living in France, and to ensure special treatment for ethnic French citizens, that is, a politics of ‘national preference,’ by means of legislation. The defense of the national identity, and therefore control over immigration, is an absolute priority for the Front National. This will be accomplished by a reformation of the National Code, the expulsion of illegal and criminal immigrants, the gradual sending back of immigrant workers, together with a development of the Third World, and the implementation of the politics of ‘national preference’ in the areas of employment and social security. (Le Pen, in National Hebdo, 26 September 1985; quoted in Souchard et al. 1997: 112)29

More specifically, the politics of ‘national preference’ implies a policy that would give favorable special treatment to ethnic French citizens, and as a corollary discriminate against immigrants and French citizens of nonFrench ethnic origin. In addition, the Front National wants a politics of ‘national preference’ in the labor market, the housing market, in the area of health care, and so on. In fact, the politics of ‘national preference’ can be summed up in the Front National slogan “The French first!” The politics of ‘national preference’ implies a principle of ‘French fraternity’ (see Roy 1998: 93), that is,

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that one should help people in need of help, but only French people (see Davies 1999: 69). During the late 1990s, the Front National increasingly tried to present itself as a ‘party of welfare.’ However, welfare should not be distributed to everybody equally, only to the ethnic French (Davies 1999: 5).30 Thus, the Front National propounds a politics of welfare chauvinism. In addition, the Front National wants to defend French national identity by means of cultural and educational policy. As Kedourie argued, education holds a central position within nationalist ideology. From this perspective, the aim of education is not only, nor in fact even primarily, to transmit knowledge, but to “bend the will of the young to the will of the nation” (Kedourie 1993: 78). Accordingly, the Front National proposes a reformation of the French educational system. More specifically, it argues that French culture and history should be seen as the cornerstone of the new educational system. According to the 1993 party program, for instance, the “teaching of history will favor knowledge of our national continuity, placing an emphasis on the glorious pages of our past” (quoted in Marcus 1995: 116). In the cultural domain, the Front National wants to preserve French culture. It is opposed to both U.S. domination of mass culture and what it sees as centralist, elitist, abstract, and cosmopolitan culture, typically funded by the state, which separates ‘the cultural few’ from the ‘mass of the public,’ and which pays no attention to national and regional cultural variations (Marcus 1995: 117). According to the Front National’s culturally protectionist proposal, the state should only award resources to works of art that respect national identity (Marcus 1995: 118).31

Decline and Decadence If the Front National conceives of immigration as one of the great threats to French national identity, declining birthrates is the other. As indicated in chapter 3, the Front National believes that France is slowly committing suicide because of its low birthrates. According to the Front National, France is short about 120,000 French births each year in order to maintain the current level of the ’French’ population. Of course, the Front National does not include births of French immigrants in its estimates of the ‘French’ birthrate (Simmons 1996: 239). As one high-ranking Front National member put it: “France is no longer having babies. In Paris, one baby out of three is born to a foreign mother. If we continue down this path, in a few years France will no longer be France” (quoted in DeClair 1999: 128). As indicated by the quotation above, the main reason why the Front National fears the declining birthrate is the belief that French territory will be absorbed by other ethno-nationalities; a scenario that would destroy French national character and identity.32 As Le Pen stated, the “nation is becoming empty [because of the declining birthrate]. Nature fears a vacuum and this vacuum will be filled. It is already in the process of being filled by immigration. So what is at stake is the independence of

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France, even its existence. As far as I am concerned, I propose a family policy that will allow France to survive” (quoted in Simmons 1996: 80). In order to increase the French birthrate, the Front National wants to encourage French women (and men) by means of an array of policy proposals to have more babies. According to Bruno Mégret, for instance, whether or not to have children “is not only a personal question, it is also the business of the entire community, and it is criminal to ignore the evil that threatens us. A major natalist policy is vital and urgent” (quoted in Simmons 1996: 239). As a consequence of the preoccupation with the low birthrate, the Front National has strongly opposed the legalization of abortion (which was legalized in 1975). According to Jean-Marie Le Pen, this law is nothing more than “official anti-French genocide,” because “killing the child is killing France” (Marcus 1995: 112; Davies 1999: 130). On an official postcard, the Front National depicts Simone Veil, who initiated the law, together with Hitler, Stalin, and Mao. Hitler welcomes Veil with the words “Welcome to the club,” and at the top of the postcard we read “The Veil Law: 4 million victims already.” In the context of declining birthrates, the Front National also turns to history (i.e., to France’s more or less mythical ‘ancestors’) for ideals for people to strive toward. The Front National uses Joan of Arc as a symbol of a woman’s struggle to drive invaders from French territory. Unlike Joan, who actually was a virgin, French women are expected to do their duty and drive out the non-European immigrant intruders by giving birth to as many French children as possible (see Simmons 1996: 239). In fact, the Front National has celebrated Joan of Arc every 1 May since 1987. Simmons gives an eyewitness account of the women’s parade, which is part of the celebration: The “Front parades are led by a phalanx of pregnant women symbolizing the Front’s view that Frenchwomen must have more babies as a defense against growing numbers of immigrants from the Middle East and Africa. Behind the pregnant women follows a second group of women pushing empty baby carriages representing the decline in the French birthrate” (Simmons 1996: 238). The obsession with declining birthrates can also be seen as a part of a more general theme of decadence (a theme which, as we saw above, has been a characteristic trait of the extreme French right for a very long time). Besides the low birthrate, this theme includes everything that the Front National considers ‘abnormal,’ ‘artificial,’ ‘cosmopolitan,’ and so on. According to Le Pen, for instance, “France … has fallen into an economic, social, cultural, and moral crisis that is so severe that the French people today is threatened with death” (Le Pen, speech published in National Hebdo, 15 September 1994; quoted in Souchard et al. 1997: 108).33 Although the theme of decadence involves many aspects, I will restrict my discussion to aspects of relevance to the nationalism of the Front National. One such aspect is AIDS. Since the Front National connects AIDS mainly with immigrants and homosexuals, they use it as a symbol of decadence (much as Maurras used syphilis).

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Since the Front National’s ideology and electoral appeal rest on populism, they cannot blame the French people—where supreme virtue is believed to reside—for decadence and decline. Instead, they blame these things on ‘non-French’ elements (i.e., immigrants, globalization, ‘the feminist lobby,’ etc.) and on ‘degenerate’ elite groups and, more generally, on ‘degenerate’ political institutions within France. These attacks are often dressed up in terms of a conspiracy directed against France. Although different actors may be depicted as staging the plot, the ‘foreigner’ is depicted, in one form or another, as the principal scapegoat (see Souchard et al. 1997: 221). In this respect, the Front National follows a long tradition of French extreme right nationalism (see Davies 1999: 135).

Anti-internationalism As already discussed, the shape and power of the Front National’s ideology and rhetoric rest largely on the party’s opposition to ‘universalism,’ ‘cosmopolitism,’ and ‘internationalism.’ Earlier, the Jew and the Freemason, as well as socialism and communism, were the principal targets of French ethno-nationalism. As we will see in chapter 5, the Jew still plays a role in the rhetoric of the Front National (although Muslim immigrants are more important). In addition, in the 1970s and 1980s, the Front National mainly struck at Soviet communism, which, next to immigration, was the party’s main enemy. However, since the fall of communism in Eastern Europe, the Front National has increasingly turned against other international phenomena and tendencies, such as globalization and the European Union. As Simmons (1996: 139) noted, the Front National has recently added the new words mondial and mondialiste (i.e., global and globalist) to its vocabulary. According to the FN, the mondial doctrine, which is seen as equivalent to Marxism, is usually dressed up as the rights of man, [it] preaches the destruction of nations, the abolition of frontiers, mixing of races, cultures and peoples. Formerly the Marxists looked to eliminate inequality in their search for a classless society. Today, the mondialistes attack what they call ‘exclusion’ and instead stand for the establishment of a society without differences. The myth of Paradise has given way to a utopia of a café au lait Paradise. Now the dictatorship of the proletariat is no longer popular, the idea of the melting-pot has become the norm. (Front National 1993: 16; quoted in Simmons 1996: 129)

In fact, the Front National regards internationalism as the “gravest menace to weigh today on the future of France” (Front National 1993). What is at stake is, of course, French national identity, which can be preserved only by the protectionism of closed nationalism. In 1997, the Front National argued on their Web site that today: France’s identity is threatened by the global vision of the political establishment. Faced with the cosmopolitan projects that mix together people and cultures, the

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National Front wants to be the rampart of our national identity. Far from being racist or xenophobic, Jean-Marie Le Pen is fighting to defend the French so that they are given priority before foreigners and so that their fundamental rights will be respected. (Quoted in DeClair 1999: 131–132)

Recently, the European Union has held a particularly important place in the discourse of the Front National. It is always of strategic interest to political parties and social movements to link their pet issues to other issues of great and enduring political salience. By doing so, they may extend the mobilization cycle. During the 1990s, the issue of the European Union was very salient and played a major mobilizing role within most Western European democracies. The Front National, like most ERP parties, switched positions on the issue of the European Union: from a neutral or even pro-EU position during the 1980s to an ardent anti-EU position during the 1990s. More specifically, the Front National made a great effort to frame the issue of the European Union in xenophobic and ethno-nationalist terms (see Rydgren 2003). Thus, the Front National’s discourse on the European Union hardened during the 1990s. In the 1980s some leading FN members almost sang the praises of the European Community. For instance, in 1988 Jean-Pierre Stirbois discussed the need for France to play a central part in the EU: Imagining France with a solitary future is impossible. To avoid dependence and survive, to find again the common values that have made the civilization and the power of our continent, we cannot shirk the pressing need of the time: to link our future to that of Europe’s and be the motor of her future. How can we not see that the future of Europe’s peoples lies in their union so that we can face together the problems of the modern world. (Stirbois 1988: 156; quoted in DeClair 1999: 130–131)

Similarly, in 1986 Bruno Mégret argued that Europe is a “community of myths, of norms, of values, of history, of religion, of ethnicities, in brief a community of culture and civilization. And if the construction of Europe must be accomplished, it should first be done by being conscious of this, by the exaltation of a European sentiment, by the birth—above and beyond national patriotism—of a prideful Europe” (Front National 1988: 59; quoted in DeClair 1999: 130–131). In the early 1990s, the Front National’s tone became harsher, a change that in fact coincided with the party’s stepwise retreat from its neo-liberal pro-market position (see DeClair 1999: 131). In 1994, for instance, Le Pen stated that “[we] refuse to sacrifice the French on the altar of the European-‘Globalist’ utopia; we refuse to let them invade our territory and violate our borders, to let them squander our patrimony and jeopardize our public and social security, to let the French people get trapped in the great ‘globalist’ magma.… Europe is not the future of France” (quoted in Perrineau 1997: 79).34 Le Pen’s statement that “Europe is not the future of France” is at odds with the position expressed by Stirbois and Mégret in

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the 1980s. There are two main reasons for this hardened attitude against the EU: first, the fact that federalist tendencies grew stronger within the European Union; and second, the fall of communism in Eastern Europe. During the Cold War, the Front National talked far more positively of Europe as an autonomous bloc in between the two superpowers (see Davies 1999: 23), which were both loathed by the FN. Nevertheless, since the early 1990s, the Front National has opposed the EU with violent language. In 1991, for instance, Le Pen stated that this stage in European construction was about to “destroy the nations in favor of a global order, in favor of international and cosmopolitan oligarchies. This new order already has its own religion, that is to say, human rights, its great priests, its devils, and its media stakes. Hence, Maastricht is one of the keys to the actual ‘globalist’ and international conspiracy” (Le Pen, speech published in Présent, 30 August 1991; quoted in Souchard et al. 1997: 75–76).35 As demonstrated by this quotation, the Front National often dresses its anti-globalization rhetoric in terms of conspiracies. In a later speech, Le Pen clarified the matter further: In fact, this Europe that neither recognizes areas nor borders, is it not, in the minds of the ‘Euro-federasts,’ only a stage in the establishment of a global government, which the Trilateral is trying to accomplish before the year 2000? This is an actual conspiracy against the European peoples and nations, and in particular against France and the French people. (Le Pen, speech of 1 May 1996; quoted in Mayer 1999: 63)36

This conspiracy theory is typical of the Front National’s populist strategy, and I will come back to this in chapter 6. Still, of course, the main reason for the Front National to oppose the EU is its concern for French national identity. Hence, the Front National has always opposed any kind of federalism, and instead proposed a loosely confederated ‘Europe of nations,’ in which each nation retains the ability to maintain its own national identity. In short, the Front National’s device has always been ‘a French France in a European Europe’ (Davies 1999: 23, 96). As Jean-Marie Le Pen put it in 1989: “Europe, yes, but with a French France, a Spanish Spain, and a German Germany. Everybody respects the identity of the others, and refuses the cosmopolitan magma, which serves no other end than to destroy our past as well as our future” (Le Pen, La Lettre de JeanMarie Le Pen, 15 October 1989; quoted in Souchard et al. 1997: 73).37 However, the Front National is not the only French political actor that has opposed the European Union. During the Fifth Republic, both the right (i.e., de Gaulle) and the left (i.e., the Communist Party) were opposed to the idea of an integrated European Union (cf. Jenkins 1990; Jenkins and Copsey 1996). Charles de Gaulle was in favor of a ‘Europe of nations,’ stretching from the Atlantic to the Urals, but loosely integrated. He was strongly opposed to supranational institutions, which he saw as a threat to France (Jenkins 1990: 177). More recently, in the 1994 election to

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the European Parliament, Philippe de Villiers managed to capture 12.4 percent of French votes by taking a clear anti–European Union stance (Perrineau 1997: 79). Similarly, Charles Pasqua campaigned with a position strongly opposed to the EU. However, the Front National can be distinguished from De Villiers and Pasqua by its violent rhetoric and, foremost, by its strategy of linking fear of immigrants with fear of the EU. The Front National has argued on its Web site that the “Europe that is being fashioned in Brussels, according to the utopian schemes of the Eurocrats who are dreaming of a super-European state involved in everything, is destroying the nations and opening Europe to the immigrants of the Third World as well as to American and Japanese products” (quoted in DeClair 1999: 131–132). In a similar vein, Le Pen asked his audience: “This federation, how large will it become?… If Turkey is going to be part of Europe, there are clearly other nations outside of the European territory, but that are historically closer to France, which will have to be a part also. Will the French, the Europeans, agree to integrate North Africa?” (Le Pen, speech published in Présent, 7 May 1992; quoted in Souchard et al. 1997: 65–66).38 If the critique of the EU provides one of the pillars of the Front National’s anti-internationalist discourse, anti-Americanism provides another. Here, the FN continues a long-standing French tradition (indulged in by both de Gaulle and the Communist Party) of criticizing U.S. cultural imperialism, which is accused of destroying genuine French (and more generally, European) cultural values (see Jenkins and Copsey 1996: 108). In fact, Front National leaders use American culture as a negation of French culture (and of French national identity). Recently, the FN has increased its antiAmerican rhetoric in connection to the introduction of American-style theme parks, Disneyland Paris being the most notorious (see Davies 1999: 85–86), and during the NATO campaign against Serbia during the Kosovo crisis in 1999. However, even though the Front National follows a French tradition of skepticism toward the United States, shared by earlier extreme right and mainstream parties alike, their arguments tend to be more violent than those of the mainstream parties. During the 1997 election campaign, for instance, Le Pen declared that France is “at war with the United States, which wants to dominate the world” (in Le Monde, 31 May 1997; quoted in DeClair 1999: 137).

Conclusion In this chapter, I have argued that the emergence of and sustained electoral support for the Front National partly can be explained as a resurgence of a long tradition of French ethno-nationalism, which has increased in salience because of the types of macro-level changes discussed in chapter 1. In the ethno-nationalism of the Front National the preservation and defense of national identity is regarded as the principal aim. According to the doctrine

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of ethno-nationalism, different ‘peoples’ should be kept separated in order to prevent the national identity or character from eroding. This implies that national borders should be closed, in particular to immigrants, but also to certain (mainly cultural) commodities that are believed to threaten French national identity. Consequently, the nationalism of the Front National can be characterized as ethnic, closed, exclusionary, and conservative/reactionary. As we recall from chapter 1, the ERP parties can be explained by the emergence of various niches in the political space. Generally, together with increased political discontent and decreased party identification among voters, the increased salience of the socio-cultural cleavage dimension and the authoritarian niche within this dimension have been the most important of the ‘opportunity structures’ facilitating the emergence of ERP parties. More specifically, within the socio-cultural authoritarian niche, ethno-nationalism and xenophobia have been of particular importance. Although several of the established parties in France are and have been nationalist, and occasionally strongly so, they have mainly represented a more open, civic kind of nationalism. As a result, there emerged a niche for an ethno-nationalist party when these kinds of attitudes increased in salience among the voters. The ‘losers’ of the postindustrialization processes have become increasingly anxious, insecure, resenting, and lost, both because of absolute and relative deprivation as well as changing structures of social comparisons. These kinds of negative emotions may be channeled into policy proposals that stress the need to return to the ‘traditional values’ of the status quo ante, not least the values of the ‘heartland’ and the ethno-national identity. In addition to such general causes of ethno-nationalism, which were discussed in chapter 1, there were some factors more or less specific for France: first, the ideological lacuna left by the declining PCF and the Gaullist movements; second, the decreased importance of the Catholic Church; third, the existence of a sophisticated far-right intelligentsia (e.g., GRECE and Club l’Horloge), which facilitated Front National’s success in transforming the social and political crises of the early 1990s into a crisis of national identity; and fourth, the French citizenship legislation became challenged during the late 1970s and early 1980s, which opened up favorable opportunities for a nationalistic critique.

Notes 1. As Jenkins and Copsey (1996: 101) wrote: “France was a ‘State’ long before it became a ‘nation.’ The image of an historic community of native Gauls and Franks, contained within ‘natural’ frontiers and conscious of their collective identity since the time of Clovis, is a retrospective myth.” In fact, in France in 1789, for instance, only 50 percent of ‘Frenchmen’ spoke French at all, and only 12–13 percent spoke it ‘correctly’ (Hobsbawm 1992: 60).

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2. Max Weber conceived of the nation as a ‘community of sentiment,’ which was rooted in objective factors such as a common race, language, religion, customs, or political experience. Weber argued that no single such factor was common to all examples of a nation. Nevertheless, race was seen as the least important factor, while a common language was seen as one among the most important ones (Beetham 1985: 21–23). 3. More specifically, Smith (1999a: 13) defined an ethnic community, or ethnie, as “a named human population with myths of common ancestry, shared historical memories and one or more common elements of culture, including an association with a homeland, and some degree of solidarity, at least among the elites.” Ethno-history, on the other hand, Smith defined as “the ethnic members’ memories and understanding of their communal past or pasts, rather than any more objective and dispassionate analysis by professional historians” (Smith 1999a: 16). 4. Ernst Gellner, for instance, tried to sustain this kind of synthetic conception of nationalism while defining nationalism as “the principle of homogenous cultural units as the foundations of political life, and of the obligatory cultural unity of rules and ruled” (Gellner 1983: 125). Yet for Gellner, nationalism was mainly a political principle, stating that the national and the political unit should be congruent. However, contemporary nationalism, at least in the Western world, is commonly seen as more reactive than proactive, which makes it more cultural than political, and in this way “more oriented toward the defense of an already institutionalized culture than toward the construction or defense of a state” (Castells 1997: 31). 5. Originally, natio meant “a group of men belonging together by similarity of birth, larger than a family, but smaller than a clan or a people” (Kedourie 1993: 5). 6. Four features define the territorial nation: a definite, compact territorial homeland; common legal codes and the equality of all members before the law; the social and political rights of citizenship; and a shared ‘civic religion’ and mass public culture. Moreover, nationalism generally presupposes an intersubjective recognition of a specific homeland—the nation. In this way, the nation as an imagined political community (Anderson 1991) is a prerequisite of nationalism. 7. Fichte clearly favored the second view when he stated that “it is not because men dwell between certain mountains and rivers that they are a people, but, on the contrary, men dwell together because they were a people already by a law of nature which is much higher” (quoted in Kedourie 1993: 64). 8. The historic myth has been “adapted by populist intellectuals to the alleged needs of peasants and workers; the peasants, especially, become quasi-sacred objects of nationalist concern, since they carry many memories and myths (ballads, dances, crafts, customs, social organisations, tales, and dramas) which the nationalist intellectuals draw upon for the construction of their ethnic myth of descent” (Smith 1999b: 85). 9. ‘The people’ is the object of the ethno-nationalist’s aspirations, which implies that ethno-nationalist leaders ultimately justify their actions only by appealing to the ‘will of the people.’ As Smith noted, this makes ethnic nationalism “obviously ‘inter-class’ and ‘populist’ in tone” (Smith 1991: 12; cf. Taggart 2000: 96). 10. In this context, the importance of the ‘myth of origin’ (see Eriksen 1996) is actualized. Here, it might be useful to examine Ernst Cassirer’s (1946, 1955) writings on mythical thinking. Cassirer (1955: 105–106) distinguished between historical and mythical time. Mythical time is characterized by its reliance on an ’absolute past.’ More specifically, for Cassirer mythical time is distinguished from historical time in that “for mythical time there is an absolute past, which neither requires nor is susceptible of any further explanation.” History, on the other hand, “dissolves being into the never-ending sequence of becoming, in which no point is singled out but every point indicates the way to one further back, so that regression into the past becomes a regressus in infinitum” (Cassirer 1955: 106). Thus, mythical thinking erects a barrier that “divides the empirical present from the mythical origin” (Cassirer 1955: 106). The idea of the mythical ’origin’ makes possible a nonempirical justification of specific aspects of human existence, such as

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usages, customs, and social norms. By being “situated in the depths of the past, a particular content is not only established as sacred, as mythically and religiously significant, but also justified as such” (Cassirer 1955: 105). In this respect, the mythical past itself “has no ‘why’: it is the why of things” (Cassirer 1955: 106). As Smith wrote, “nationalists rediscovered and often exaggerated the heroism of past ages, the glories of ancestral civilizations … and the exploits of their great national heroes, even when those heroes belonged more to the realm of legend than history and, if they lived, knew nothing of the nation which was so busy reclaiming them from obscurity” (Smith 1991: 128). It is important to remember that there is “nothing fixed or immutable about a golden age or the principle of its selection. Successive generations of the community may differ as to which epoch is to be regarded as a golden age, depending on the criteria in fashion at the time” (Smith 1999f: 263). Yet for nationalists themselves, the role of the past may be clear and unproblematic and anything but fictitious. For them, the task of the nationalist “is simply to remind his or her compatriots of their glorious past, so that they can recreate and relive those glories” (Smith 1999d: 180). Nevertheless, when the Golden Age in fact corresponds to a real historical time, nationalism mostly “omits most negative aspects … and is highly selective about what it singles out.” In many cases, however, the Golden Age “is mythical indeed, a utopia that never existed, a time of harmony and organic unity between rulers and the ruled and between God and the simple people” (Merkl 1993: 218). Class, gender, race, and religion are sometimes treated as collective identities, as well. These three themes resonate to a greater or lesser extent with the arguments of several authors. Benedict Anderson, for instance, made a point of the fact that the dawn of the age of nationalism in Western Europe in the late eighteenth century coincided with the twilight of traditional religious modes of thought. With the crumbling of traditional religion, there emerged a void for fatalist, irrational thought suited to providing a fixed point. According to Anderson, nationalism came to fill this void (Anderson 1991: 11). Anthony Smith came to a similar conclusion when he wrote that nationalism “has emerged as an ideological movement in an era of widespread religious doubt and secularism, in which many traditional myths and beliefs are under challenge” (Smith 1999b: 61). More specifically, ethnic myths of descent become autonomous and gain salience when tradition is under attack “and men seek alternative antidotes to their sense of estrangement and insecurity” (Smith 1999b: 84). Taguieff takes a similar position by stating that nationalism may be seen as a symptom of a longing for a ‘close-knit’ community (i.e., gemeinschaft), which was destroyed by modernization and industrialization. In a way, Taguieff argues, nationalism may be seen as a substitute for the meaning once provided by such traditional societies (Taguieff 1990: 113). Kedourie also argues that individuals have a need to “belong together in a coherent and stable community.” Normally, this need is satisfied by the family or the neighborhood, and earlier by the religious community. However, as these institutions weakened, nationalism sometimes took their place (Kedourie 1993: 96–97). Eriksen echoed this theme by stating that “nationalism offers security and perceived stability at a time when life-worlds are fragmented and people are being uprooted.” By aiming at transcending alienation and the feeling of rupture between individual and society resulting from modernity, nationalist ideology tries to re-create a sentiment of wholeness and continuity with the past (Eriksen 1993: 105). As discussed above, nationalist ideology often presents itself as a form of metaphorical kinship, and nationalism seems in fact to grow stronger in periods when the institution of kinship is weakened. There are two probable reasons for this: (1) nationalist ideology promises to satisfy roughly the same needs that were the province of kinship (Eriksen 1993: 108), and (2) nationalists often mix their nationalism with a plea for traditional family values. The divorce rate per 100 marriages in France, for instance, was 12 percent in 1970, 22 percent in 1980, and had increased to 31.5 percent in 1989 (Castells 1997: 140). Moreover,

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28.

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in 1973 only 50 percent of women worked; in 1992 that figure had grown to 61.3 percent (Castells 1997: 157). The difficulty in differentiating between the nationalisms is evident when considering the nationalism of Charles de Gaulle. De Gaulle aspired to represent the superior values of the Latin peoples of Europe against the Anglo-Saxon and Russian superpowers. Yet although de Gaulle’s nationalism sometimes focused on culture, it was mostly civic and open (see Hazareesingh 1994: 133–134; cf. Jenkins and Copsey 1996: 109). However, in line with its movement forebears, the Front National’s politics implies a repudiation of core democratic values, such as civil and political equality, by denying ethnic minority groups full membership in French society (i.e., a monist ideology). My translation. Original quotation: “Qu’il s’agit là de notre terre, de nos paysages, certes, tels qu’ils ont été donnés par le Créateur mais tels qu’ils ont été défendus, conservés et embellis par ceux qui ont peuplé ce territoire depuis des millénaires et dont nous sommes les fils.” My translation. Original quotation: “La nation française, c’est un peuple donc une communauté de femmes et d’hommes unis par des liens de solidarité et de fraternité un peu comparables à un moindre degré, à ceux qui existent dans une famille.” One example is found in their 1993 program: “The Japanese economy is prosperous because it is based on a homogenous population, which respects its national traditions.” My translation. Original quotation: “L’économie japonaise est prospère car elle est le fruit d’une population homogène qui respecte ses traditions nationales” (quoted in Roy 1998: 96). My translation. Original quotation: “[i]l a fallu plus de mille ans d’efforts pour établir la nation française, dans son homogénéité historique, dans sa culture, dans sa langue.” My translation. Original quotation: “En verité, nous sommes les héritiers d’une longue lignée, nous défendons une certain idée de la France qui est aussi vielle que notre sang.” My translation. Original quotation: “la presse d’écrire: ‘il y a en France 56 millions de Français …’ Non, Messieurs les journalistes, il y a peut-être 56 millions d’habitants mais il n’y a probablement que 50 millions de Français.… Or, il est est bien évident que, depuis 1974, il est entré dans notre pays, même officiellement, plusieurs millions d’étrangers, mais il est vrai aussi que les systèmes de naturalisation automatique vident cette entité étrangère tous les ans de gens dont on nous a dit: ‘Ben, oui mais il ne s’agit plus d’immigrés maintenant, ce sont des Français.’ Ce sont des Français du type Yaka Miam Miam qui est devenue secrétaire d’État à l’integration.” However, although national identity is the most important identity for the Front National, the party also repeatedly argues for the need to defend regional identity (within France), and European identity against Americanism, Islam, and so on (see Davies 1999: 10). That the idea of identity is at the core of the Front National’s ideology and political rhetoric is also demonstrated by the title of the party’s doctrinal review publication, Identité. As Le Pen explained in a promotional flyer for the journal: “In choosing the title Identité, the founders of the review wanted to get to the heart of the problem of our future. What will be tomorrow if by reason of the demographic, social and political changes of our century, we are incapable of defining ourselves or situating ourselves?” (quoted in Davies 1999: 66–67). My translation. Original quotation: “notre peuple résulte de la fusion unique en soi des vertues romaines, germaniques et celtes.” My translation. Original quotation: “l’étude de ce passé, nous torons des enseignements pour le présent et des perspectives pour l’avenir.… L’histoire de notre peuple est un encouragement à poursuivre notre combat, envers et contre tout.” My translation. Original quotation: “Nous fêtons aujourd’hui, suis-je tenté de dire amoureusement, une fille de France particulièrement aimable, parce que tout sa vie fut consacrée et sacrifiée à un objectif amoureux, non pas de ces amours des hommes, mais de cet amour du peuple et d’une nation naissante ainsi que de sa liberté.… Souvenons-nous toujours,

156

29.

30.

31.

32. 33.

34.

35.

36.

37.

38.

The Populist Challenge

Français, conclut Michelet, que la patrie chez nous est née du cœr d’une femme, de sa tendresse et de ses larmes, du sang qu’elle a donné pour nous.” My translation. Original quotation: “La défense de l’identité national et donc la maîtrise de l’immigration, sont pour le Front National une priorité absolue; ceci passe par une réforme du code de la nationalité, l’expulsion des clandestins et des délinquants étrangers, le retour progressif des travailleurs immigrés associé au developpement des pays du tiers monde, la mise en place d’une politique de préférence nationale en matière d’emploi et de prestation socials.” Moreover, the Front National wants to restrict the feeling of empathy to be directed at French people alone. Bruno Mégret, for instance, has argued that no, or blurred, boundaries between French citizens and foreigners will result in a lack of interest in those one should care for most. He argues that “everybody commiserates with the death of Malik Qussekine or the imprisonment of Mandela, but no-one intervenes to help a neighbour getting beaten up on the Metro” (quoted in Davies 1999: 73). Whatever issue is discussed, the Front National tries to connect it to the preservation of the national identity. One example of this is its effort to present itself as ecological, stating that the solution to environmental problems is to be found in the preservation of national identity: “For the Front, defending the environment means defending national identity. The Front proposes to establish within cities ‘a relatively homogeneous community of inhabitants’ by giving preference in jobs, housing, social welfare, and education to French citizens. The Front argues that a necessary prerequisite to ensuring comity within society itself; this means protecting national identity against disruptive forces such as immigration” (Simmons 1996: 216). Another reason is more symbolic, that is, that “babies of French mothers are viewed as the ultimate personification of ‘France’ and ‘Frenchness’” (Davies 1999: 131). My translation. Original quotation: “La France … est entrée dans une crise d’une gravité telle qu’au plan économique, social, politique mais aussi culturel et moral, son existence même, et avec elle celle du peuple français, est aujourd’hui menacée de mort.” My translation. Original quotation: “refusons de sacrifier les Français sur l’autel de l’utopie europé-mondialiste, de laisser envahir notre territoire et violer nos frontières, de laisser dilapider notre patrimoine et mettre en péril notre sécurité publique ou sociale, de laisser piéger le peuple français dans le grand magma mondialiste.… L’Europe n’est pas l’avenir de la France.” My translation. Original quotation: “détruire les nations au bénéfice du nouvel ordre mondial, aux ordres d’une oligarchie internationale et cosmopolite. Ce nouvel ordre a d’ailleurs déjà sa religion, celle dites des Droits de l’homme par antiphrase, ses grands prêtres, ses diables, et ses bûchers médiatiques. Maastricht est donc une des clés de ce véritable complot mondialiste et internationaliste.” My translation. Original quotation: “En réalité, cette Europe dont on ne connaît ni l’étendue ni les frontiers n’est elle-même, dans l’esprit des Eurofédérastes, qu’une étape de la route d’un gouvernement mondial dont la Trilatéral ne cache pas qu’elle soit en place avant l’an 2000. Il s’agit là d’une véritable conspiration contre les peuples et les nations d’Europe et d’abord contre le peuple français et la France.” My translation. Original quotation: “l’Europe oui, mais avec une France française, une Espagne espagnole, une Allemande allemande. Chacun respectant l’identité de l’autre, refusant le magma cosmopolite qui ne serait pas seulement la destruction de notre passé mais aussi de notre avenir.” My translation. Original quotation: “Cette fédération, jusqu’où va-t-elle s’élargir?… Mais alors, si le Turquie fait parties de l’Europe, il est bien évident que toute une série de nations extérieures à l’Europe géographique et qui sont plus près de la France historique seront bien évidemment dans la nécessité d’y adhérer aussi. Est-ce que la France, est-ce que les Européens seraient d’accord pour y intégrer le Maghreb?”

Chapter 5

XENOPHOBIA AND ANTI-IMMIGRATION RHETORIC


In the previous chapter, I argued that ethno-nationalism played an essential role in the emergence of and sustained electoral support for the Front National. In this chapter the exclusionary aspects of ethno-nationalism (i.e., xenophobia and racism) will be discussed. Since national identity is partly defined by negation, and since ethno-nationalist negation is based on ethnic criteria, ethno-national identity and xenophobia are inherently related (cf. Evans 1996: 33; Gellner 1995; Miles 1989: 39). Xenophobia (and sometimes racism) is integral to the Front National’s ideological program and rhetoric. This applies to ERP parties in general, and has led some scholars (e.g., Mitra 1988) to view xenophobia as the sole cause of their emergence. This is not the case; although xenophobia is a sine qua non of the ERP parties and constitutes a necessary factor for explaining its emergence and sustained electoral support, it is not a sufficient explanatory factor. In addition, the anti-immigration issue is only a part of a wider web of issues (cf. Mudde 1999, 2000; Rydgren 2003). First, we cannot understand the xenophobia of the ERP parties (nor the appeal of this xenophobia) independently of the idea of ethno-national identity and welfare chauvinism. Whereas the appeal of the former is based on an emotionally motivated strive for identity, the appeal of the latter is based on a real or perceived clashes of interests—that is, that immigrants are seen as illegitimate competitors for scarce resources (see chapter 1). Second, the potential for mobilizing a substantial proportion of voters for ethno-nationalist, xenophobic political programs increases where the legitimacy of established political parties and institutions is on the wane. Consequently, the anti-establishment strategy is of great importance for the ERP parties, as well. Thus, the success of the ERP parties cannot be fully understood without taking xenophobia and ethno-nationalism and populism into account. In fact, one of the reasons for the electoral successes of the ERP parties has been their strategy of linking a broad array of policy areas to the same

Notes for this chapter begin on page 189.

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two issues: ethno-national or regional identity and immigration (see Bréchon and Mitra 1992). In my opinion, their most essential ideological component is ethno-nationalism (or occasionally, ethno-regionalism). In the ideology and rhetoric of the Front National, most other policy areas are governed by the notion that the true French national identity is threatened and that it has to be saved by all means. This implies hostility toward all elements that are believed to pose a threat to ethno-national identity, especially non-European immigrants. Xenophobic and anti-immigration statements have been crucial mobilizing tools for the Front National and for other ERP parties (cf. Marcus 1995: 105; Kitschelt 1995: 103, 276), not least because of the increased salience of the immigration issue in several Western European countries (Solomos and Wrench 1993: 4). In fact, xenophobia has provided the ERP parties in a number of countries with one of their most effective rhetorical means, that is, to blame all social problems and ills on designated scapegoats. This chapter will proceed in the following way. I will start with a discussion of the relationship between the electoral support for ERP parties and the presence of non-European immigrants. Second, I will discuss the politicization and framing of the immigration issue, which will lead to an account of xenophobia and racism expressed in the Front National’s political program and rhetoric. Finally, I will briefly discuss the xenophobia of FN voters. First, however, it might be appropriate to briefly define the concepts of ‘racism’ and ‘xenophobia.’ ‘Racism’ is traditionally understood as an ideology that claims the fundamental inequality and hierarchical order of different biologically defined races. However, after World War II and German Nazism, this traditional racism lost much of its power in Western Europe. Yet in the postwar era, a new type of racism has emerged (Barker 1981; Miles 1989, 1993; Wieviorka 1998), one that Taguieff (1988) calls racisme différencialiste and Wieviorka (1998) calls racisme culturel. This racism is not based on biology and hierarchy but on culture and difference. In other words, this new racism does not argue that some races are superior or inferior, but rather stresses the insurmountable difference between culturally defined ethnies (Wieviorka 1998: 32). According to the new cultural racism, a merging of different ethnic groups would lead to an abolition of the unique qualities that constitute the ethnies. The implication is that different ethnic groups should be kept separated. This type of ‘new’ or ‘cultural’ racism comes close to the conception of ‘xenophobia,’ that is, fear of individuals who are different or ‘strange.’ Like the new cultural racism, xenophobia is also characterized by a belief that it is ‘natural’ for people to live among ‘their own kind,’ and a corresponding hostility toward the presence of people of a ‘different’ kind (Miles 1993: 36). We should also distinguish between ‘latent’ and ‘manifest’ xenophobia. Latent xenophobia mainly consists of more or less unarticulated negatively prejudiced stereotypes and beliefs, which are normally ‘taken for granted,’

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159

while manifest xenophobia consists of more elaborated beliefs and attitudes, which implies a higher level of consciousness. The new cultural racism that the ERP parties embrace could be considered an ‘ideologized’ form of xenophobia.

A Reaction against Extensive Immigration? One common way of explaining the emergence and electoral success of the ERP parties has been to regard the phenomenon as a reflection of popular reaction against the increased presence of non-European immigrants. However, in spite of the immense importance of xenophobia, neither popular xenophobia nor the proportion of immigrants within a population has, as a comparative outlook reveals, much explanatory power per se. The amount of xenophobia in a society is not a simple reflection of the number of immigrants. In fact, ERP parties have done better in countries such as Italy, Austria, Denmark, and Norway with low foreign-born populations, than in Germany and Britain, which higher rates of immigration (Karapin 1998: 224). This is exemplified by the figures in table 5.1. Yet even though the presence of popular xenophobia cannot be seen as a sufficient condition, it might still be a necessary condition. The fact that immigration was politicized, which increased popular xenophobia to the

TABLE 5.1 Immigration Rates, Xenophobia, and Support for the ERP Parties France

UK

Germany Denmark

Italy

Netherlands

There are too many people of other races in the home country

44.1

37.9

35.5

Feels disturbed by the presence of other races in the home country

34.9

32.4

28.9

18.5

11.4

Foreign-born population as percentage of the population

19.2

13.7

12.5

8.8

11.1

8.7

7.4

3.1

2.0

4.2

Growth of the foreign-born population (percent per year, 1983–88)

9.0

7.5

39.2

42.5

38.0

30.0

Refugees as % of the overall population in 1989

0.33

0.18

Average level of electoral support for extreme right in the 1980s (percent)

6.6

Source: Kitschelt (1995: 62).

< 1.0

0.25

< 2.0

0.53

0.19

6.6

6.4

0.19

< 1.0

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point where it came out into the open, together with the fact that a majority in most Western European countries supported xenophobic views in the early 1990s (Betz 1994: 103), surely constituted a favorable situation for the ERP parties. In France, this situation was already manifest in 1985. In a survey, nearly 75 percent agreed with the statement that “one does not feel secure in areas with many immigrants”; 50 percent agreed that “the immigrants are an important cause of criminality in France”; and nearly 50 percent agreed that “every time a foreigner takes a job in France, it is at a Frenchman’s expense” (Ignazi 1996b: 70).1 Furthermore, in two polls taken by SOFRES in November 1984, 68 percent wanted to stop further immigration; 25 percent wanted the immigrants to “go back where they came from”; and 66 percent thought that there were “far too many North Africans in France” (Bréchon and Mitra 1992: 68). These xenophobic attitudes remained at roughly the same level throughout the 1980s and 1990s: in 1988, 67 percent and in 1997, 61 percent believed that “there are too many immigrants in France” (Mayer 1999: 137).2 The same holds true for most other Western European countries, as well (EUMC 2001). This widespread popular xenophobia can therefore be seen as one of the most important underlying causes for the electoral success of the ERP parties. For Front National voters, as we will see below, the immigration issue has always been at the top of the list when French voters are asked what motivated them to their party choice. However, in France the widespread popular xenophobia of the 1980s and 1990s cannot be explained by any ‘objective’ crisis in immigration. The proportion of immigrants in the workforce was unchanged in the 1970s and 1980s and cannot have triggered a popular reaction against immigration (Kitschelt 1995: 103). There are also indications that xenophobia and the inclination to vote for the Front National are not a simple reflection of the number of immigrants living in the area (see Martin 1998: 143). According to Mayer (1999: 260–261), the number of immigrants has no substantial impact on Front National voting rates. Only at the department level is there an enduring positive correlation between the proportion of immigrants in the population and a vote for the Front National; this correlation disappears at the town, constituency, or block level (Mayer 1995: 102). In fact, the growth in the number of immigrants living in France was decreasing in the years preceding the Front National’s electoral breakthrough. Between 1975 and 1982, the number of immigrants grew by 7 percent, compared to 31 percent between 1968 and 1975 (Ubbiali 1995: 119). Officially, France closed the door to new immigrants in 1974, soon after Giscard d’Estaing took office. Although new immigrants have arrived since then, the French government has been restrictive (Ubbiali 1995: 121; Marcus 1995: 74).3 However, although the French immigration rate has been fairly stable since the 1960s (see table 5.2), and indeed since the interwar years (Ubbiali 1995: 119), the share of non-European immigrants has increased. According

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TABLE 5.2 Areas of Origin for French Immigrants (in millions and in percent of the immigrant population) 1962

1982

1990

N

%

N

%

N

%

Northern Europeans Eastern Europeans Southern Europeans Total Europeans

0.2 0.2 1.2

10 11 53 74

0.2 0.1 1.5

5 2 41 48

0.2 0.08 1.2

6 2 32 40

North Africans Other Africans Asians Americans Total non-Europeans

0.4 0.02 0.04 0.1

19 1 2 4 26

1.5 0.1 0.3 0.05

38 5 8 1 52

1.4 0.25 0.4 0.08

39 7 12 2 60

Source: Perrineau (1997: 143).

to Perrineau (1997), this has increased the ‘visibility’ of immigrants, and has resulted in a situation where many perceive an increase in the immigrants’ share of the population. In addition, while young male guest workers were once the most common immigrants, during the past decades entire families have immigrated. This may have increased the ‘visibility’ of immigrants in social spheres other than the workplace, such as schools and neighborhoods, which may have had similar consequences (Perrineau 1997: 143). As we will see below, when people were asked about their sympathy/ antipathy to different immigrant groups, North Africans were the most disliked (which they were already in the 1930s). The salience of highly negative prejudices about North Africans has likely been influenced by the historically tense relations between France and the North African countries, involving the loss of the colonies and the war in Algeria (1954– 1962) as well as by recent terrorist acts conducted by Muslims in France (Perrineau 1997: 144, 152; House 1995: 87). Although the total number of immigrants in France was rather stable between 1962 and 1982, the number of North African immigrants doubled during this period. Still, studies have shown that the vote for the Front National is much higher among voters living close to areas with a high concentration of nonEuropean immigrants than for those living within these areas (Perrineau 1997: 146–148). In fact, the correlation between the presence of non-European immigrants and the vote for the Front National is considerably stronger in urban France (0.40) than in the suburbs with the highest proportion of immigrants (0.07) (Perrineau 1997: 146–148). This apparent paradox may be resolved if we use Miles’s (1989: 15) distinction between the experienced ‘other’ and the imagined ‘other.’ Relative proximity makes it easier to endorse prejudiced images (i.e., makes it easier to see their

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‘otherness,’ or to meet the imagined ‘other’), but relative remoteness does not permit a confrontation with reality (i.e., with immigrants as individuals), which might reveal the hollowness of the stereotyped images (cf. Hamilton 1981: 341; Rydgren 2000a, 2000b).4 Nevertheless, this fact shows that there is no clear correlation between the presence of non-European immigrants and the vote for the Front National. In summary, simply to view xenophobia and its political implications as reflections of the ‘objective’ reality of immigration is to drive the analysis into a dead end. In order to reach a deeper understanding of this phenomenon, we have to proceed further and discuss the politicization and framing of the immigration issue, as well as to reveal the mechanisms of prejudiced beliefs (which we did in chapter 1). We must address the question of why xenophobic sentiments arose, and why the immigration issue suddenly became a part of the political agenda.

Immigrants as a Problem: Politicization and Framing of the ‘Immigration Issue’ The emergence of the Front National and of other ERP parties was facilitated by an already existing widespread latent xenophobia, which became manifest in the 1980s and 1990s. This is widely recognized in the research literature. What is more seldom recognized, however, is the causal complexity of the explanatory chain. More specifically, there are three major questions begging for answers: 1. How did the latent xenophobia become manifest? 2. How did the xenophobia become politicized, that is, get transferred from the private or social sphere to the political sphere? 3. Why did this politicization of xenophobia benefit the ERP parties, which are usually political outsiders, instead of any of the established political parties? As we have seen above, the presence of manifest xenophobia in a society does not automatically result in successes for ERP parties. In this section, I will argue that it is of great importance to take ‘politicization’ and ‘framing’ into consideration to better understand the complexity of the relationship between xenophobia and the emergence of an ERP party. First, it is fully possible that manifest xenophobia remains within the private sphere (i.e., that it remains a politically insignificant issue, although of great social and personal importance). In fact, we cannot disregard the probability that some actor must politicize the immigration issue, or any other issue associated with xenophobia, if it is to become politicized at all. Second, if xenophobia is to remain important for people’s political choices, immigration (or a similar issue) must stay on the political agenda. At this stage, I will argue, frame struggles and political propaganda play great roles.

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As indicated in chapter 1, I distinguish between two different kinds of politicization: one involving the voters and one involving the parties and other political institutions. Thus, an issue might be politicized on the supply side but not on the demand side, or vice versa. Nevertheless, we could with Campbell et al. (1960: 29–32) regard politicization as a ‘political translation,’ in which social phenomena and situations are linked to political objects and understood in political terms. An issue outside the political realm may become a politicized part of it in several ways: an established political party, a new political party, a social movement or lobby organization, the media, and so on, might introduce it (i.e., talk about it in political terms). Yet in order to deem an issue politicized on the supply side, one or several of the political actors already considered as relevant must get involved in the discussion. In other words, it is not enough for a new or marginalized actor without political relevance to raise a new issue for political discussion—if none of the ‘relevant’ political actors respond to this initiative in some way or another. On the demand side, I would argue that an issue is partly politicized when voter groups of significant size talk and think about an issue in political terms, but it is fully politicized only when it makes a difference in their political behavior. However, if a new issue of some magnitude is politicized, this may change the criteria for how to determine the relevance of political actors. In fact, the politicization of a new issue may constitute an opening for new or marginalized political actors. In addition, as we will see below, the actor who initiates the politicization of an issue is not necessarily the one who subsequently benefits from it. Although parties mainly try to politicize their supposed “profit-issues” and to depoliticize their supposed “lossissues” (Sjöblom 1968: 123), they do not always fully recognize the potential conflict between short-term and long-term effects. One unanticipated long-term effect might be that a new party that specializes in the newly politicized issue may emerge and profit from the politicized issue. As we saw in chapter 1, a new, not yet established party may have some initial strategic advantages in the electoral arena, because established parties are constrained by their political history and by their large member organizations. As will be discussed below, this happened in France, where the immigration issue was mainly politicized by the PCF, but ended up promoting the emergence of the Front National. Yet as we saw in chapter 2, the issue of immigration was not fully politicized at a voter level until after the Front National’s electoral breakthrough. Still, it was partly politicized in the early 1980s—before the electoral breakthrough of the FN— and the supply-side politicization initiated by the PCF and others created favorable conditions for this development. When an issue has been politicized, all political actors have an interest in influencing (1) how the issue is presented, and (2) how the voters receive the issue (i.e., how the issue is ‘understood’ and evaluated). In this context the notions of ‘framing’ and ‘propaganda’ become crucial.

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‘Frame’ and ‘framing’ were discussed in chapter 1, so I will not define them here. However, people’s perception of the surrounding world, that is, their definition of the situation, is influenced by preexisting forms of knowledge (e.g., schemas, scripts, beliefs, attitudes, etc.). These are mediated through all forms of social interaction. However, although the mediation is sometimes unintended and more or less unconscious, and often rather neutral, social actors occasionally try to impose certain frames or a priori forms on others in order to influence their definition of a specific issue, event, or phenomenon. By doing this, social and political actors hope to influence people’s beliefs and attitudes in a way that suits their own ends. When two or more social actors try to impose mutually conflicting frames or a priori forms on the same individuals, we have a ‘frame struggle.’ Yet framing (and, similarly, propaganda) has its limits. Political actors cannot choose just any strategies. To succeed, they must be sufficiently attuned to people’s psychological wants and preconceptions of reality. If not, the political actors run “the risk of [their] propaganda being completely rejected and [themselves] appearing unreliable” (Sjöblom 1968: 115; cf. Merton 1968: 572–573). Differently stated, in order to be successful, offered frames have to be sufficiently culturally resonant (cf. Benford and Snow 2000). These notions are brought up for discussion because they provide useful ways to understand the link between xenophobia in a society and a vote for an ERP party. The Front National’s (relative) success in imposing their ‘definition’ of France as an extremely dangerous and insecure place, and its almost total success in framing the immigration issue as a problem is a case in point.

Politicizing Immigration: The Vitry Bulldozer In this section, I will argue that the politicization of the immigration issue in France represented the confluence of five events: first, the initiative taken by the mainstream right parties in the late 1970s to reduce the number of immigrants, partly by state-sponsored repatriation; second, and related, by the debate on citizenship legislation (which was discussed in chapter 4), in which the mainstream right parties sought to modify Articles 23 and 44; third, and seemingly paradoxically, the pro-immigration attitude of the Socialist Party in the late 1970s and early 1980s, because it contested status quo and provoked counter frames; fourth, the anti-immigration campaigns of the PCF in the late 1970s and early 1980s, in which immigrants were framed as ‘problems’ and immigration as a question of competition for scarce resources; and fifth, the emergence of the Front National, which completed the politicization of the immigration issue. The Front National did not politicize the immigration issue by itself. Although the FN promoted the issue in the 1970s and had incorporated anti-immigration themes at its ideological core, the party was far too small

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and marginalized to be able to politicize the issue. In addition, although intellectuals of the Nouvelle Droite (in particular Alain de Benoist) formulated a xenophobic ideology of ‘the right to be different’ during the 1970s, they were not in a position to politicize the immigration issue by themselves. Nevertheless, although the Front National did not bring the immigration theme into the political sphere, as Ignazi (1996b: 73) among others has argued, it introduced the immigration issue as a cultural and racial defense of France by being successful in the subsequent frame struggle. Nevertheless, after liberation in 1945, the question of immigration hardly entered the public realm for three decades. Instead, immigration policy was worked out on collaboration between experts and politicians. Immigration policy was a technical issue rather than a politicized one. In fact, the French Parliament passed no legislation relating to immigration between 1945 and the early 1980s, except for a law against racial discrimination in 1972. Instead, the general lines of the immigration policy were handled by an ordinance (Hargreaves 1995: 177–178). However, the consensus to keep immigration a ‘technical issue’ started to change in the 1970s. In 1974, soon after Giscard d’Estaing had been elected president, the government announced that further immigration would temporarily cease. In 1977, the government announced that the temporary suspension would be permanent. In addition, they sought to reduce the existing immigrant population in France. In order to encourage non-European immigrants to return ‘home,’ a system called l’aide au retour (repatriation assistance), which provided financial incentives for voluntary repatriation, was launched in 1977. However, the program was rather unsuccessful (Hargreaves 1995: 19). In its place, the government designed a proposal in which immigrant workers and their families could be forced to return ‘home’ if they were deemed to be superfluous on the labor market. Such a measure demanded radical changes in the legislation, but the proposal failed to yield a majority when it was put before the parliament in 1979–1980. Although the Ministry of the Interior “used discretionary powers to expel as many individual foreigners as possible,… the numbers involved—on average, about 5,000 a year between 1978 and 1981, most of them young Maghrebis—were far smaller than the hundreds of thousands explicitly targeted in Stoléru’s mass repatriation plans” (Hargreaves 1995: 20; cf. Weil 1991: 107–138). This behavior by the mainstream right government had two, possibly unintended, effects: first, it contested the tradition of consensus and rule of experts (i.e., it initiated a politicization of the immigration issue at the supply side); second, it initiated a framing of the immigration issue, in which immigrants and immigration were intimated to be ‘problems.’ As we will see below, this diagnostic frame was further developed by the PCF in 1980. However, the behavior of pro-immigration movements and, in particular, the Socialist Party also played a role in the politicization of the immigration issue. In 1978, the PS promised to let foreign residents (i.e., immigrants

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that had not yet acquired French citizenship) vote in local elections if the party won the election. In his presidential campaign in 1981, Mitterrand included this proposal in the election manifesto. After the victory of the left in the presidential and the parliamentary elections, the PS announced that it was prepared to implement the proposal. However, since this announcement was met by virulent hostility from the mainstream right and only received a lukewarm response from the left, the PS retreated (Hargreaves 1995: 165). Yet the PS-dominated government did declare an amnesty for illegal immigrants in 1981, if they had entered France before 1 January and could prove that they were employed. As a result, 132,000 illegal immigrants obtained French citizenship during the winter of 1981– 1982 (Hargreaves 1995: 21). Furthermore, the Socialist Party explicitly adopted and endorsed the rhetoric and ideological principle of le droit à la difference (the right to be different), that is, that immigrant groups should have the right to ethnically based distinguishing characteristics. This theme played an important role in Mitterrand’s presidential campaign in 1981 (Brubaker 1992: 148; Hargreaves 1995: 194). These pro-immigration measures and proposals contributed to the politicization of the immigration issue in two ways. First, they ran counter to the consensus of the status quo and helped immigration stay on the political agenda. Second, they provoked counter movements and counter frames (cf. Benford and Snow 2000). The proposal to let non-French citizens vote in local elections was at odds with a long-established conception of French citizenship, that is, that formal citizenship and substantive citizenship rights should be congruent. The proposal to let immigrants without French citizenship vote in local elections would “objectively devalue formal citizenship by making less depend on it” (Brubaker 1992: 148). As a result, many might have perceived this proposal as a desacralization and devaluation of citizenship, which may have provoked nationalist responses. The idea of ‘the right to be different’ provided support for xenophobic nationalists’ claim that non-European immigrants do not want to integrate and therefore threaten French national identity (Brubaker 1992: 148). As we will see below, the Front National adopted the line ‘the right to be different’ and gave it a new meaning. The French Communist Party had had an ambivalent attitude toward immigrants since the early 1970s, and had occasionally protested against what they saw as the “inequitable distribution of immigrant workers and their families,” that is, that a disproportionate number of non-European immigrants lived in areas governed by the party. In 1979, the party position, at least at the local level, was that immigrants “‘above all’ were citizens of their home countries … and they should seek to work there.” Moreover, they should not be given the right to vote in local elections, because that “would imply those obligations which would push for forced integration of the immigrants, and which, consequently, would infringe

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on their national personality” (Schain 1988: 604). Thus, in contrast to ‘the tradition of solidarity’ that had marked the PCF’s relationship with European immigrants, the PCF stressed that non-European immigrants are only temporal residents, and insisted that they be encouraged to return home (Schain 1988: 604). Local communist politicians also took action in order to reduce the number of immigrant families. For example, in the late 1970s in Vénissieux, a suburb of Lyons, the local PCF government put pressure on the authorities that controlled an apartment project, housing about 35,000 people, to refuse apartments to immigrant families (Schain 1988: 604). In addition, in 1978 in Ivry, a suburb of Paris, the local PCF government put an end to the traditional distribution of used clothing to poor families when it was found that 80 percent of those receiving the clothes were children of immigrants (Schain 1988: 605). Yet all these examples are of local PCF deputies and are not necessarily representative of the PCF’s general attitude. However, during the presidential election campaign in 1980–1981, this kind of local activity was coordinated and led by the national leaders of the PCF in an attempt to use the immigration issue to mobilize support for its presidential candidate (Schain 1988: 605). In my opinion, the ‘bulldozer affair’ should be seen in the light of this general background. On Christmas Eve 1980, a group of PCF sympathizers, led by the elected communist mayor of Vitry, used a bulldozer to destroy the power supplies and staircases of a hostel used by immigrant workers. This brutal action was later backed by the PCF’s national leadership: the General Secretary of the PCF and candidate for the presidency, George Marchais, sent an open letter to the rector of the Paris mosque justifying the event (Marcus 1995). In the letter, Marchais wrote that he approved of the Vitry mayor’s “refusal to allow the already high number of immigrant workers in his commune to increase.” The PCF was not a racist party, Marchais continued, but immigration was nevertheless one of the evils created by capitalism. In addition, he claimed that current French immigration policy was “as much against the interests of the immigrant workers and of most of their home countries as against the interests of French workers and of France” (quoted in Marcus 1995: 77). Finally, Marchais argued that there were too many immigrants in the areas governed by the communists. He insisted that the threshold of toleration had been overstepped, and that the pressure on social resources was unbearable: When the concentration [of immigrants] becomes very great … [t]he housing crisis gets worse; council housing is cruelly deficient and numerous French families cannot have access to it. The costs of the social services necessary for immigrant families plunged into misery, become impossible for the budgets of communes peopled by workers to bear. Schooling is not able to support the situation and school backwardness increases amongst children, as much immigrants as French. The health expenses [also] increase. (Quoted in Marcus 1995: 77–78)

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Consequently, Marchais demanded a more equal distribution of immigrants among different areas and a halt of all further immigration (Marcus 1995: 78). This calculated attack on African immigrants, conducted by the PCF, was the first time in the postwar era that an established French party had explicitly defined the immigrant issue in terms of a source of social and economic problems (Schain 1988: 606). Indeed, aside from the fact that an established political party raised the immigration issue, the main importance of this event, and the discourse it initiated, was the emphasis placed on the link between immigration and different kinds of urban social problems. The immigration issue was presented both as a problem in itself and as a cause of other problems. It was this double-edged character of the issue’s image that lent it its explosive force. More specifically, it offered an apparently cardinal solution to all major problems perceived by the discontented, lost, and frustrated urban inhabitants. Because of its simplicity, this image of immigration framed future discourse on the issue and, as a consequence, opened up a political space for the rhetoric of the Front National. Marchais’s statements indicate that immigration should be conceived of as a competition for scarce resources (e.g., housing and welfare services). As will be demonstrated below, the Front National has framed the immigration issue in these terms, as well, not least as competition for jobs. Thus, the discourse initiated by the PCF in the late 1970s and early 1980s paved the way for the Front National. The PCF was neither the only established party to use the immigration issue as a way to attract xenophobic voters during the 1980s, nor was it the most hostile in its rhetoric. However, it was the first. The ‘Vitry Bulldozer’ set in motion a bandwagon of politicized xenophobia: with the events of December 1980, immigrants reentered the political debate and became the scapegoats for social insecurity (see Perrineau 1997: 28).5 According to Schain (1988), the politicization of the immigrant issue was due to a strategic move by the PCF party elite. It “initiated, defined, developed and magnified the issue” (Schain 1988: 619). It was not the case that the PCF before 1981 had been forced to take this step by mass reaction to non-European immigrants or by “the heat of electoral competition from other parties carrying the immigration issue” (Schain 1988: 606). In fact, the PCF consistently stressed that they were trying to anticipate racism and racial conflicts, which were bound to emerge if nobody put an end to the unequal distribution of immigrants. Thus, the PCF claimed that it was acting to prevent xenophobic outbursts; in fact, it politicized the immigration issue and mobilized and legitimized popular xenophobia. If Schain is right, which seems probable, why did the PCF elite initiate the politicization of the immigration issue? Why did the PCF decide to put an issue, which had been a political nonissue for several decades, on the political agenda? Was it, as the PCF argued, in order to anticipate and prevent outbursts of racism and xenophobia, or were there other reasons?

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I would argue that there are at least two other possible reasons. First, the electoral support of the PCF was declining at the time, and since people belonging to the party’s traditional electoral base were more likely to have anti-immigration attitudes (see chapter 2), the PCF might have chosen to politicize the immigration issue in order to win back old voters. Second, they might also have chosen to do this as a possible way to expand their electoral support. The PCF actually believed (for good reasons) that the mainstream right, or a splinter group within the right, was about to politicize the immigration issue, and so they decided to act out of strategic (vote-maximizing) considerations. First, as indicated above, the Nouvelle Droite (i.e., GRECE), which was founded in the late 1960s, had made a breakthrough in the mass media in the late 1970s. Alain de Benoist was writing for Le Figaro Magazine, which spread the ideas of the French New Right (e.g., the cultural racist idea of “the right to be different”) to new audiences. In fact, Benoist became something of a media star in 1979, and his books found a new audience, as well (Simmons 1996: 209–215; Camus 1996). Nevertheless, many leading members of the mainstream right became influenced by the ideas of the Nouvelle Droite, and many abandoned the mainstream right parties for the Front National after 1984. Second, as we saw above, between 1977 and 1981 the government of the mainstream right had launched proposals aiming at reducing the total number of immigrants in France. Because of this, the PCF had good reason to assume that the RPR or the UDF might politicize the immigration issue by promoting explicitly xenophobic views in the near future. In addition, there already existed widespread latent xenophobia among the French voters. The proportion of the citizens who thought that the number of “foreigners in general” was too high increased from 51 percent in 1968 to 61 percent in 1977 (Schain 1987: 237). In addition, the economic crisis worsened in the late 1970s and, as we will see in chapter 6, trust in political institutions and politicians was declining. The situation was thus approaching the image of a fertile ground for manifest xenophobia. In this situation there emerged impetus for the parties to anticipate each other’s strategies to exploit voter opinion so as to win important marginal voters. Of course, this strengthened the PCF’s suspicion that the mainstream right might politicize the issue. However, there was also impetus for the PCF to act in order to profit from the now available niche. Although the PCF did not have any ideological or programmatic interest in pursuing a hard line on immigration, there might have been some electoral interest in doing so. As we recall from chapter 1, political parties can be said to have two main goals. Aside from realizing their image of the good society, they also want to survive. However, the concept of ‘survival’ may be somewhat ambiguous in this context; it might, for instance, denote ‘survival as a party of a certain size.’ If electoral support for a political party decreases below a certain level (which is likely to differ between different

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parties), the goal of party survival might become paramount. In addition, to meet the goal of ‘program realization,’ the parties need votes. A party might therefore be prepared to give up aspects of its program, if that permits it to realize other aspects that are seen as more important. Electoral support for the PCF was declining at the time of the ‘Vitry Bulldozer.’ From a stable 20 to 22.5 percent of the vote between 1962 and 1978, the PCF sank from 20.7 percent in the 1978 parliamentary election to 16.1 percent in the 1981 parliamentary election. This represented a loss of almost a quarter of its voters, and marked the beginning of a permanent downward trend (Bell and Criddle 1994: 202). If we look only at the share of registered voters, the PCF suffered severe losses already in the 1979 European election, in which the party attracted 11.9 percent of registered voters, compared to 16.9 percent in the 1978 parliamentary election (Courtois and Lazar 1995: 426). When the PCF felt that its electoral support was declining, vote-maximization efforts became more important.6 At the same time, the Socialist Party had increased its electoral support from 16.6 percent in 1968 to 20.8 percent in 1973, 24.9 percent in 1978, and 37.8 percent in 1981 (Bell and Criddle 1994: 130). This resulted in increased electoral competition, especially around the PCF’s core voters, the blue-collar workers. In fact, the PCF had problems maintaining its position as the working-class party. The reason for this is not only to be found in the growing strength of the PS, but also partly in the structural transformation of the economy. Traditional heavy industry (metals, mining, and shipbuilding) was in decline. At the same time specialization and stratification within the working class increased (into skilled, semiskilled, and unskilled workers). As a result, the traditional milieu for identity formation partly disappeared at the same time as the homogeneity among the workers diminished; upwardly mobile workers no longer identified with the working class and downwardly mobile workers no longer voted (Courtois and Lazar 1995: 390). At the beginning of the 1980s, the PCF was perceived as being a party in difficulty. To escape marginalization and to revive the party as a revolutionary force, the party had to win back support, especially among workers. In its efforts to realize this goal, the PCF employed a strategy of radicalization—it tried to create a wider distance between itself and the PS, mostly by means of an aggressive rhetoric (Bell and Criddle 1994: 107). In addition, it moved closer to the Soviet line, by openly defending its intrusion into Afghanistan and Poland. Another strategy was to reinforce the image of the party as the true defender of the interests of French workers. In the 1979 European election, for instance, they ran an impassioned anti-European campaign based on the dangers to French agriculture and heavy industry posed by ‘southern enlargement,’ that is, the incorporation of the Mediterranean countries in the EC (Bell and Criddle 1994: 107). Moreover, the PCF launched the campaign “Produce French,” which, according to Courtois and Lazar (1995: 389), became chauvinistic.7 The

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PCF thus felt there were compelling reasons to play the anti-immigration card at that moment. As a result, the immigration issue was partly politicized before the emergence of the Front National, in particular on the supply side, but partly also on the demand side: When asked in 1984 about possible solutions to ‘the immigration problem,’ repatriation was ranked as the best solution (Hargreaves 1995: 156). The fact that the immigration issue was partly politicized in the early 1980s in part explains the electoral breakthrough of the Front National in 1984. The politicization of immigration changed the criteria for judging political relevancy. It opened up a space of relevancy for parties specialized in the immigration issue, such as the Front National. In addition, the issue drew and sustained media attraction, which increased the visibility of the Front National, whose position on immigration represented one of the two extremes. The RPR’s and the UDF’s positions on the issue of immigration have been ambiguous since the emergence of the Front National. The established parties had to opt for (1) remaining silent on the issue and letting the FN control that niche, or (2) speaking for (2a), or against (2b) immigration. The first strategy may in the longer run have resulted in decreased salience of the immigration issue (i.e., when no fuel is added to the debate, it eventually dies down) at the possible expense of short-term electoral losses for some of the parties; the second strategy would keep the immigration issue on the political agenda, regardless of whether one was pro or con. However, strategy 2b also risked legitimizing the Front National. Whether strategy 2a or 2b was chosen depended on which marginal voters the party in question hoped to reach, but also on the party’s ideological history and core member/voter identification. Ever since the emergence of the Front National, the mainstream right parties have mostly tended toward strategy 2b. In fact, already in the 1983 election, several RPR and UDF candidates discussed the immigration issue in immoderate terms. The UDF mayor of Toulon, for instance, stated with reference to the immigration issue that “France refuses to become the dustbin of Europe” (Marcus 1995: 53). Jacques Chirac, at the time mayor of Paris, addressed an audience in 1983, saying that France no longer had the means to “support a crowd of foreigners who abused her hospitality” (quoted in Marcus 1995: 79). As will be demonstrated below, the rhetoric of the mainstream right parties was even more immoderate after the electoral breakthrough of the Front National in 1984 (as might have been predicted by the logic of spatial competition for voters). To sum up, the politicization of the immigration issue in the late 1970s and early 1980s helped open up a new political niche, in which the Front National held a pole position (see Perrineau 1997: 28). Moreover, as will be discussed below, it is striking to what extent these initiatives, in particular the PCF’s initiative in 1980, defined the terms of the national debate: almost everybody at the time accepted the frame that immigrants posed a problem to the French community (see Schain 1988: 612).

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Framing Immigration: Propaganda Themes and Historical Events When discussing framing processes, we should distinguish between two essential components of political frames: the diagnostic element, that is, the definition of the problem and its source, and the prognostic frame, that is, the identification of a ‘solution’ to the problem (McCarthy et al. 1996: 291; cf. Snow and Benford 1988). As we have seen, the general diagnostic frame of the immigration issue was already settled in 1980: immigration posed problems that had to be solved. Hence, the Front National could draw on this general frame and try to reinforce it. Yet there were important substantial differences between the xenophobia of the PCF in the early 1980s and the xenophobia endorsed by the Front National. While the PCF mainly based its anti-immigration themes on ‘welfare chauvinism’ (i.e., ‘if we have to share our welfare with them, we cannot get it all for ourselves’), the FN mainly linked xenophobia to ‘threatened’ ethno-nationalism. Still, we should note that this difference belongs to the supply side, which does not exclude the possibility that they both exploit the same or a similar kind of popular xenophobia. We find greater differences between the PCF and the Front National when we examine the prognostic frame of the immigration issue. While the PCF mainly wanted to redress the problem by redistributing immigrants more equally among different cities and provinces (and only occasionally stressed the need to lower the total number of immigrants in France), the Front National consistently sought a solution to ‘the immigration problem’ in a complete termination of immigration and a deportation of immigrants already living in France. In fact, the Front National has argued that they would like to see a retroactive law that cancels the French citizenships given to all immigrants after 1974 (Davies 1999: 79). It is well documented that the Front National has put great effort into the frame struggle and into propaganda. Since the days of GRECE and the Club l’Horloge, the Front National and its supporters have, with explicit references to Antonio Gramsci, tried to influence people’s way of perceiving the world by means of political propaganda (e.g., Simmons 1996: 247). This strategy is implied in the following quotation from Bruno Mégret’s La Flamme: “For decades the semantic superiority of the left has been put at the service of its cultural, and then its political influence.… The National Front has decided to counterattack and to disseminate through public debate its own expressions, which carry its own vision of the world” (quoted in Simmons 1996: 207). As shown below, the Front National has framed immigrants as a ‘problem’ in four different ways: (1) they pose a threat to the French ethnonational identity, that is, their ‘otherness’ combined with their sheer number threaten to undermine the ‘truly French’; (2) they cause unemployment (by ‘taking our jobs’); (3) they are a major cause of criminality and insecurity; and (4) they abuse the generosity of the welfare states of

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Western democracies, which results in lower state subsidies, etc., for ‘us.’8 As revealed by this list, some of these xenophobic frames are mutually inconsistent (i.e., 2 and 4). Furthermore, all these variations of anti-immigration frames fall within the categories of injustice frames (Gamson 1992) and/or adversarial frames (Gamson 1995). Nevertheless, the most important frame for the Front National is the threat that immigrants are believed to pose to French ethno-national identity. This frame is at the core of the party ideology. However, for the voters, and hence for mobilizing electoral support, the three other frames might be equally or even more important. In addition, all four frames have one thing in common: they are all based on fear and/or resentment (see Betz 1994: 85). Another issue related to anti-immigration is the issue of personal security—or lack thereof. Part of the framing strategy of the Front National has been to create an image of France as an insecure place. This strategy is useful to the party in two ways: first, it may influence the voters’ decision how to vote; second, the mobilizing power of some of the anti-immigration frames employed by the Front National increases in situations of perceived insecurity (e.g., ‘immigrants are criminal’). It is interesting to note that French voters, like voters in other Western European democracies, have become increasingly concerned with personal security during the past two decades (Betz 1994: 88). Surveys conducted by CREDOC show that perceived insecurity increased dramatically during the 1980s. In 1977, 18 percent declared that their personal security ‘was seriously threatened in their neighborhood.’ In 1985–1986, the rate was 38 percent. Similarly, in 1981– 1982, 39 percent ‘feared attack or harassment on the street.’ In 1989–1990, the rate had increased to 52 percent (Perrineau 1997: 171). Most of the perceived insecurity was not based on personal experience, but rather on other types of information (e.g., information received from acquaintances, from media reports, etc.). In fact, earlier studies indicate that most of this perceived insecurity came from things about which most people have only little (and often biased) information, such as marginalized suburbs (Perrineau 1997: 172–173). Nevertheless, this situation, together with the fact that 53 percent of the French population in 1993 believed that immigration was ‘a factor for insecurity’ (Betz 1994: 88), facilitated the breakthrough of and sustained electoral support for the Front National. So far, I have mainly considered deliberate propaganda. However, ‘historic events’ (i.e., events that are not consciously planned by any actor, but that just ‘happen’) occasionally influence the framing of specific issues, as well. Kingdon (1984: 173, 177) has talked about ‘policy windows’ that may be opened by historic events and offer opportunities for political actors to promote their pet issues. For instance, an airplane crash opens a window of opportunity for political actors advocating increased aviation safety (see Gamson and Meyer 1996: 282). I will argue that some such ‘historic events,’ and most notably the ‘headscarves affair,’ opened opportunity windows for the Front National’s anti-immigration rhetoric.

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The ‘headscarves affair’ was a controversy between three girls of North African origin and the headmaster at a secondary school in Creil, a town outside of Paris. In October 1989, the three girls claimed their right, as Muslims, to wear their headscarves in the classroom. The headmaster, referring to French law that prohibits all forms of religious propaganda in school, presented the girls with an ultimatum: either cease wearing headscarves in school, or stop attending school altogether. Since the girls insisted on wearing their scarves, they were first barred from school, and later forced to stay in the school library during class hours (Bréchon and Mitra 1992: 66–67). This deadlock attracted the media, which made an issue of it. When the issue reached public and political awareness it revealed a deep cleavage in opinion. Moreover, this cleavage reached deep within the political parties themselves. The fact that this little incident achieved such salience and significance in the political debate demonstrates that it was only an instance of a much larger conflict of basic and deeply embedded values. In fact, as Bréchon and Mitra (1992: 67) noted, at the heart of this issue “was the position that French society was prepared to accord to immigrants, particularly to those of North African origin. Were they to be accepted on the condition that they assimilated French norms and culture? Or was France ready to recognize the specific religious and cultural identity of the immigrants?” By questioning the consensus around French immigration policy, the ‘headscarves affair’ challenged a French tradition and a common system of beliefs (Marcus 1995: 87). As indicated in chapter 4, until the 1980s French immigration policy had been characterized by integration and ‘naturalization.’ The ‘American melting pot’ or ‘Anglo-Saxon multiculturalism’ were not to be the French way. Rather, immigrants should be turned into French people. Since the state educational system, which should be nonconfessional, was the main instrument in this effort, the ‘headscarves affair’ hit at the very heart of French immigration policy (see Marcus 1995: 87). The ‘headscarves affair’ shows how the immigration issue evoked feelings that cut across traditional party lines. It also shows how a change (in this case multiculturalism) put pressure on an inert institution, the school. The main effect of this affair was that it kept the immigration issue on the political agenda and intensified its salience. The Front National tried to exploit this issue by focusing “attention on what [the party] saw as the threat posed by an alien, Muslim minority, unwilling to subscribe to French norms” (Marcus 1995: 87). While the old integration policy was put into question, the old consensus on the issue was increasingly replaced by a politicized, polarized debate between ‘multiculturalism’ on the one hand, and ethnic protectionism on the other. Because the Front National dominated one of these poles, this new situation was favorable to the party. The importance of the ‘headscarves affair’ was that it expanded and prolonged the salience of the immigration issue. Although the French electorate had been aware of, and actually highly divided on, the issue of

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immigration since the early 1980s, they had generally not based their voting decisions on it before the emergence of the FN. In 1984, only 6 percent answered that the immigration issue was important in their decision how to vote. In 1988, as a result of the emergence of the Front National and the reaction that it provoked among the established political actors, that figure increased to 22 percent (Schain 2001: 292), and after the ‘headscarves affair’ in 1989, the immigration issue moved from eighth to second place on the voters’ list of most important issues (Mayer 1999: 152). This is also indicated by the fact that 31 percent stated in 1993 that the immigration issue was of importance for their choice of candidate (Schain 2001: 292). To sum up, one of the most important explanations for the emergence and sustained electoral support of the Front National was the politicization of the immigration issue. The FN held a quasi-monopoly on one of the two extreme positions on this issue, which were shared by a substantial proportion of the voters (Ignazi 1996b: 69). Immigration was increasingly perceived to be a problem; indeed, for many voters it was the problem. While the established parties were more or less taken by surprise by the politicization of the immigration issue, the Front National was prepared and to a great extent succeeded in setting the terms for the discussion (see Marcus 1995: 99). As Hargreaves (1995: 151) noted, largely because of the emergence of the Front National, it became “commonplace in France to claim that immigration is a threat to national identity.” In the next section, we will look more closely at the rhetorical strategies used by the Front National.

The Front National: Anti-immigration Themes and Strategies As discussed in chapter 2, the Front National mobilized electoral support by means of the anti-immigration issue. An examination of the ideology and rhetorical strategies of the Front National reveals the priority given to the issue of immigration. Even early on, the Front National was highly concerned with the immigration issue. In 1978, Le Monde published an article by Le Pen entitled “Against Immigration.” In this article, Le Pen declared that the Front National had for some months “mounted a very active campaign against immigration and it has based its electoral activities on this problem” (quoted in Simmons 1996: 79). Moreover, the FN forcefully denounced immigration as a problem, for instance as a major cause of unemployment. The solution to unemployment was, according to the article, to repatriate two million foreign workers and to stop all further immigration. In addition, Le Pen declared that the core of the Front National’s political program is to put “France and French first” (Simmons 1996: 79–80). During the 1990s, the party had elaborated its immigration policy

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and enlarged the objects of their rhetoric. In 1991, for instance, Bruno Mégret published his “fifty measures on immigration,” the core of which was to substitute jus sanguinis for jus soli as the basis for acquiring citizenship (Simmons 1996: 98). As mentioned above, four different frames were particularly important for the Front National in mobilizing support for its anti-immigration position. In looking in greater detail at how the FN framed the immigration issue, we will see that frames were constructed in three different but overlapping ways (Rydgren 2003). The first process is usually described as frame amplification, the second as counter framing, and the third as frame transformation (Benford and Snow 2000). Most anti-immigration frames employed by the Front National draw upon and try to amplify already existing ‘knowledge’ and beliefs. Le Pen draws on familiar myths and representations when talking about immigration. For instance, as we will see below, he often uses the metaphors of the family or the strongly emotional image of wartime invasion, of which many voters still have personal memories. In fact, the Front National boasts that its anti-immigration frames often are based on popular beliefs. This can be seen as a way of reducing the stigma associated with their political program. According to Le Pen, for instance, he only says “out loud what people are thinking inside—that uncontrolled immigration leads to disorder and insecurity” (Le Monde, 9 March 1983, quoted in Marcus 1995: 54). However, many anti-immigration frames are also constructed by means of counter framing and even frame transformation. By using concepts originally employed by proponents of a multicultural society, such as ‘the right to be different,’ in another context, the Front National may change the original understanding of these concepts, and in fact generate new ones. As we have seen, the right to be different was originally stressed by political actors fighting against assimilation policies, who wanted to ensure for immigrant groups and other ethnic minorities a right to maintain cultural traditions and ethnic characteristics in their new country of settlement. In the usage of the Front National, the ethnic identity of the ‘original’ population is threatened by immigration, and the only way to maintain ethnic and cultural differences is to keep ethnic groups separated (which implies a total stop to further immigration and a repatriation of immigrants already living in the country). Another example can be found in the use of the concept of anti-French racism, which is commonly used by the Front National.

Ethno-nationalism As we recall from chapter 4, ethno-nationalism is at the core of the ideology of the Front National. French national identity, which the party seeks to preserve at all costs, is defined in terms of ethnic kinship. As has been discussed above, this type of nationalism always implies a notion of ethnic

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exclusion. This implication is made explicit in the link between immigration and ethno-national identity, which is the Front National’s main antiimmigration strategy. More specifically, the FN denounces two main threats to the French ethno-national identity: declining birthrates (which were discussed in chapter 4) and immigration. According to the Front National, French ethno-national identity is threatened by “a veritable invasion” (Le Pen 1985: 289) of immigrants who pose a “deadly menace to the French nation” (Le Pen 1985: 51). In a speech given in 1991, Le Pen argued that France is “actually a victim of a global mutation; of an invasion that seems peaceful, but which in fact poses a deadly threat to our identity, our security, and our culture” (Le Pen, speech published in Présent, 30 August 1991, quoted in Souchard et al. 1997: 75).9 This is an ideological conviction that is well anchored within the Front National. At the 1990 party conference, for instance, 95 percent of FN deputies expressed the belief that “immigrant women’s high fertility endangers French national identity” (Ignazi and Ysmal 1992). Hence, “more integration is impossible. The only possible course of action is resistance, otherwise, sooner or later, submission to the invasion” (Le Pen in Présent, 13–14 November 1989; quoted in Duraffour and Guittonneau 1991: 132).10 In fact, the Front National even compares the threat posed by immigrants with the threat posed by the German army during World War II: “It is the existence of the French people that is at stake. It was not necessary to mobilise France against Germany in 1914 and 1940 if today we are going to tolerate an invasion—this time peaceful—of our national territory” (Le Pen 1984: 205; quoted in Davies 1999: 156). According to the Front National, immigration from the Muslim countries is particularly dangerous, because Muslims are so culturally different that it is impossible to assimilate and integrate them into French culture (see Davies 1999: 148). In the words of Le Pen (1985: 218), Islam, “which is already the second religion in France,… threatens our identity.”11 Le Gallou also argued, in 1985, that Islam “is incompatible … with a Christian conception of the world, because the two religions are mutually exclusive” (quoted in Duraffour and Guittonneau 1991: 206).12 In addition, the Front National argues that Muslim immigrants are particularly dangerous because they tend to claim their right to maintain their own religious, and therefore also cultural, characteristics. The Front National often builds up its political rhetoric by starting with actual observations of existing distinguishing cultural traits, such as the wearing of ‘headscarves,’ and builds up a phantasmagoria of future possibilities. This rhetorical strategy is exemplified by the following quotation from Le Pen: “The Muslim immigrants want to impose their customs on us: the mosques and the ‘headscarves’ and veils today, polygamy and the law of the Koran governing marriage and civil life tomorrow” (Le Pen in Présent, 28 October 1989; quoted in Duraffour and Guittonneau 1991: 201).13

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A question that has to be raised is whether the Front National’s antiimmigration policy and rhetoric are expressions of racism or ‘merely’ of xenophobia. As we have seen, the FN argues passionately that, because of the cultural difference between immigrants and ethnic French, immigration poses a threat to the unique French national character and identity, and that it accordingly has to be stopped and immigrants repatriated. This is a neo-racist, or cultural racist, position. As we saw above, the new racism is also characterized by a belief that it is ‘natural’ for people to live among ‘their own kind,’ and a corresponding hostility toward the presence of people of a ‘different’ kind (Miles 1993: 36; cf. Barker 1981). The Front National often tries to appeal to what it perceives as ‘natural.’ In the following frequently quoted statement, analogy is used to evoke the feeling that it is natural to like people of the ‘same kind’: “I have said it many times, I like my daughters better than my nieces, my nieces better than my cousins, my cousins better than my neighbors. It is the same thing in politics; I like the French better” (Le Pen, speech of 13 May 1984, quoted in Souchard et al. 1997: 23).14 It is mainly immigrants who are perceived as significantly culturally distinctive that are regarded as immigrants (Eriksen 1993: 137–138). It is mainly toward these immigrants that xenophobic or neo-racist messages are directed. However, the meaning of ‘significantly culturally distinctive’ is contextually contingent and bound to change over time. Today, French xenophobia and neo-racism are directed mainly against non-European immigrants, and especially toward North Africans. Earlier, this kind of xenophobic hostility was directed against guest workers from Italy, Spain, and Portugal, nationalities that the Front National nowadays more or less speaks of as ‘neighbors’ (Hazareesingh 1994: 127). However, in the anti-immigration rhetoric of the Front National we also find elements of old ‘biological’ racism, as well as anti-Semitism. This might seem strange, since this kind of racism does not attract voters. Biological racism, and especially anti-Semitism, enjoy very low legitimacy and actually repel voters. As we will see below, voter polls have shown decreasing support for the Front National after the most blatant antiSemitic remarks made by Le Pen and other FN representatives. Why, then, do they retain elements of biological racism and anti-Semitism in their rhetoric? One possible answer is, of course, that the party leaders act entirely on the basis of ideological faith, rather than on strategic considerations. In my opinion, this is only partly true. Another answer, which I find more persuasive, is that it is also the result of the conflict between the electoral arena and the internal arena. As we recall from chapter 1, we can distinguish between extrovert and introvert party activity (Rose and Mackie 1988), and between ‘front-stage’ discourse, belonging to the extrovert activity, and ‘back-stage’ discourse, belonging to the introvert party activity. In order to maintain internal cohesion, the party leaders sometimes have to please influential currents within the party by means of policy

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proposals and/or political rhetoric, which is known to adversely affect voter maximization. The Front National had a long history within the extreme right before its electoral breakthrough, and some of the old hardcore right-wing extremists still have influential positions within the party organization. In fact, at the 1990 party conference, 50 percent of Front National deputies expressed the belief that “there are inferior and superior people,” and 80 percent believed that “financial power is in the hands of Jews” (Ignazi and Ysmal 1992: 111; for the voters, see chapter 2). In order to demonstrate to these groups that the party has not ‘become soft,’ the leadership occasionally has to stray from cultural racism and xenophobia, which are more attuned to the attitudes of the voters. However, by using ambiguous messages that can be interpreted both in terms of biological and cultural racism, the leadership of the Front National occasionally attracts voters, while pleasing right-wingers within the party at the same time. An official New Year greeting card in 1991, for instance, showed nine blond babies sitting in front of the Tricolor, and a phrase saying ‘defend our colors’ (Davies 1999: 164). Le Pen has also made disparaging remarks about immigrants, about which it is hard to tell whether they are expressions of cultural or biological racism. In 1987, for instance, he referred to North African women as “women in rut [en rut].… Excuse me, I meant in struggle [en lutte]” (Simmons 1996: 162), and another time he remarked that North African immigrants have no other wish than “to sleep with your daughter or your son” (quoted in Safran 1993: 30). However, the ‘new’ cultural racism implies biological racism in a deeper way. As Wieviorka (1993: 56–57) argued, because the differences between immigrants and the French are seen as ‘irreducible,’ the “difference is then not only cultural, it is natural, inherent in racial attributes.” For instance, the Front National (e.g., Le Pen 1985: 52) often recommends that people “take a look in the street, in the schools, etc.” to ‘verify’ that there are too many immigrants. This means that people with darker skin will serve as proof of the FN’s statements, even if they are third- or fourth-generation French citizens and know no other culture than the French one. Hence, this has more to do with biological ‘race’ than with ‘culture.’ Nevertheless, occasionally the Front National expresses overt biological racism. One of the most blatant examples was when Le Pen, at the FN’s ‘Summer University’ in 1996, said that he believed in “the inequality of the races” because “all of history shows [that they] have not the same capacity to evolve” (quoted in Ivaldi 1998: 13).15 This statement was not an isolated lapse into biological racism. In 1991, for instance, Bruno Mégret defined the French people as a species of distinction, and claimed to be worried about the “disappearance of the human races as a result of the general interbreeding” (Le Monde, 5 November 1991; quoted in Ivaldi 1998: 13).16 Although ambiguous, this statement can hardly be seen only as cultural racism. Moreover, during the Front National’s colloquium “The Origins of France” in 1996, Le Pen stated that France is “inseparably

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connected to blood, soil, and memory,” and he stressed the need to be watchful for all the “perils that jeopardize the very existence of France, its biological substance” (quoted in Ivaldi 1998: 13).17 Occasionally, there have also been visible elements of anti-Semitism in the rhetoric of the Front National. The most notorious was Le Pen’s remark when he was asked in 1987 about his opinion of historical revisionism: “I ask myself a number of questions: I do not say that the gas chambers did not exist. I have not been able to see them myself, and I have not studied the subject. But I think that they are a detail in the history of the Second World War” (quoted in Perrineau 1997: 48).18 This statement was followed up in 1988 by an anti-Semitic pun, when Le Pen in public called the French civil minister Durafour, who is of Jewish origin, “Durafour crématoire” (Dura gas oven) (Vaughan 1995: 228). In 1989, Le Pen attacked the Jews by stating that “the big Internationals, like the Jewish International, play a significant role in the creation of these anti-national sentiments” (Le Pen in Présent, 11 August 1989, quoted in Souchard et al. 1997: 71).19

Insecurity and Criminality The second most important frame employed by the Front National in its anti-immigration discourse is the strategy of linking the immigration issue to the issue of insecurity and criminality. This is an important mobilization frame because of the emotional and affective elements inherent in the issue of insecurity. As we will see below, this frame is also useful because it gains credibility from common cognitive biases (see chapter 1). For the Front National, the link between immigration and insecurity “is incontestable” (quoted in Davies 1999: 158). As shown above, the FN and Le Pen argued that “uncontrolled immigration leads to disorder and insecurity” (Le Monde, 9 March 1983, quoted in Marcus 1995: 54). The Front National’s weekly newspaper regularly published a column on criminal acts committed by immigrants during the previous week (Winock 1998: 30). Since neither criminal acts committed by nonimmigrants nor, of course, a list of immigrants that have not committed criminal acts are presented, people may easily get the impression that immigrants in general are criminal, and that immigration actually is a major cause of criminality. In addition, the Front National often uses covariation of statistical curves to ‘prove’ that immigration causes criminality and other types of social unrest. This is exemplified by the following quotation from one of Le Pen’s speeches: “The growth in phenomena being caused by immigration show the same tendency every year: unemployment, criminality, youth crime, drug use; all are increasing by 8 to 10 percent” (Le Pen, speech published in Présent, 3 June 1991; quoted in Souchard et al. 1997: 63).20 In this way, the Front National collapses the difference between statistic macro-level covariation on the one hand, and causality, on the other, which is unacceptable. Still, not all voters have the knowledge

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needed to understand this deception, and for them this kind of argumentation may seem probable and almost ‘scientific.’ Nevertheless, these beliefs seem to be well anchored within the Front National, since 88 percent of FN deputies at the 1990 party conference expressed the belief that “immigration causes criminality” (Ignazi and Ysmal 1992: 111). In addition, as discussed in chapter 4, the Front National has tried to mobilize support by linking immigration to people’s fear of disease, in particular AIDS. According to the FN, immigration literally has a severe and deleterious impact on a nation’s health. Moreover, the FN has deliberately tried to stir up the fear of AIDS by launching a populist and misleading campaign based on the danger of an epidemic disease sweeping France. In sum, the Front National has tried hard to elaborate a frame in which immigrants and insecurity are inherently interconnected. This frame might have appeared attractive to anxious and worried voters, because it seemed to offer them guidance in a perceived ‘black-box situation.’ For people affected by feelings of growing personal insecurity (whether caused by criminality or diseases), it may provide a means of reducing the diffuse fear and anxiety arising from not knowing what or whom to fear. Since a belief that immigrants are criminal may result in a reduced level of self-perceived uncertainty (i.e., ‘you know who you should look out for’), it may have positive effects for individuals living under this kind of stress (Rydgren 2003).

Unemployment As we saw above, the Front National uses two important anti-immigration frames that are built on the same logic, namely, the competition for scarce resources. These frames have a strong mobilizing power because of the perceived clashes of interests, and, not least, because of the emotional stress of unemployment (whether one is affected directly or indirectly). In addition, by using this frame, the Front National seeks to profit from common cognitive biases. This frame is very simple: unemployment is caused by immigration. A representative example of this strategy can be found in the following quotation from one of Le Pen’s speeches: “Unemployment with three million workers out of work is a national disgrace. This national disgrace, which has been a fact for ten years, is caused by a mad immigration policy, an excess of public taxes, and a degrading level of education” (Le Pen’s first speech of May 1990, quoted in Souchard et al. 1997: 49).21 From this perspective, the problem of unemployment has a simple political solution: expel the immigrants and/or “reserve job priority in this country for the sons and daughters of France” (Le Pen, speech of 16 September 1984, quoted in Souchard et al. 1997: 156).22 Similarly, the Front National often explicitly equates the number of unemployed with the number of immigrants. In 1978, Stirbois remarked: “one million unemployed, that’s one million immigrants too many” (quoted in Camus 1996: 34); in the same vein, Le

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Pen wrote in 1985: “two and a half millions unemployed, that is two and a half million immigrants too many” (Le Pen 1985: 219);23 and in the 1990s, Front National election posters announced that “4 million immigrants = 4 million unemployed” (Simmons 1996: 160). Contrary to the impression given by these slogans, the immigration rates did not increase by 400 percent between the late 1970s and the 1990s; they were actually fairly stable. A similar rhetorical strategy has been to provide carefully selected (and biased) international examples in order to justify its arguments. For example, since France has the highest percentage of immigrants in the working population and the highest unemployment rate of all industrialized countries, and Japan, which virtually lacks immigrants, has the lowest unemployment rate, immigration causes unemployment (see Simmons 1996: 160). Needless to say, it is impossible to draw this kind of conclusion from these propositions, but because the argument is presented in a quasi-logical form, the argument may seem more persuasive than it really is, at least to voters who lack relevant knowledge. Furthermore, this frame may be attractive to voters affected, directly or indirectly, by unemployment, because it reduces the frustrating feeling that one oneself (or one’s relatives, friends, etc.) lacks the qualifications needed to find a job (Rydgren 2003).

Welfare Chauvinism The fourth anti-immigration frame used by the Front National is also built on the idea of competition for scarce resources. The mobilizing power of this frame is its appeal to envy and resentment. Thus, if the link between immigration and unemployment mostly attracts voters who are directly or indirectly affected by unemployment, the xenophobic type of welfare chauvinism attracts voters whose well-being does not correspond to their expectancies, as well. The Front National seeks to stir up the feeling of xenophobic welfare chauvinism by depicting immigrants as lazy parasites living on state subsidies. In a speech in 1992, for instance, Le Pen stated that the “millions of immigrants who have come to France have mostly not come to work, because there are no jobs. We already have millions of unemployed. They have not come because of love of France, at least not the great majority of them. They have come because ‘There are unemployment and welfare benefits’” (Le Pen, speech published in Présent, 2 September 1992, quoted in Souchard et al. 1997: 63).24 The problem of public housing (HLM) is of particular importance in the French case. The waiting list for these apartments creates a fertile breeding ground for envy and resentment, which the Front National tries to exploit by framing the problem in xenophobic terms. For example, in one of his weekly letters, Le Pen wrote: “Many of our compatriots have difficulties getting an HLM apartment, whereas immigrant families, which are generally

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much bigger, get them easily. On the whole, the massive presence of immigrants in the numerous HLM areas causes living conditions for the French to deteriorate” (Le Pen, La Lettre de Jean-Marie Le Pen, 15 March 1992, quoted in Souchard et al. 1997: 63).25 In addition, the notion of ‘anti-French racism’ is commonly used in this context. This notion refers to an overt ‘anti-French bias’ embraced by the political establishment (cf. Davies 1999: 74; Wieviorka 1993: 57), which manifests itself in discrimination against ethnic French citizens.26 One example of the use of this notion can be found in a speech given by Le Pen in 1984: “The French are last in line for the ANPE, the HLM, and other such bodies of social aid. Yes, racism exists: anti-French racism in our country” (Le Pen, speech at Saint-Étienne, 23 March 1984; quoted in Duraffour and Guittonneau 1991: 218).27 To sum up, we have identified four different anti-immigration frames employed by the Front National to mobilize voter support. However, these frames are not only presented separately, but often together in the form of an ‘omnibus issue’ (see Marcus 1995: 101), as in the following quotation from Le Pen: “The overpopulation of immigrants is today the principal factor behind disequilibria and disorder in our society: unemployment, insecurity, overtaxation, abuse of the social security systems, the failure of the national education system, scarcity of housing, etc.” (Le Pen in Présent, 9 November 1990; quoted in Duraffour and Guittonneau 1991: 215).28 Hence, for the Front National, all kinds of social problems and ills can be traced back to one and the same cause: immigration. As a corollary, from this perspective the same solution can be proposed for all conceivable political problems and ills: stop immigration and repatriate immigrants already living in France. As Vaughan (1995: 225) noted, this method is not new or original, but resembles the inner logic of anti-Semitism. The main difference is that Muslim North Africans have taken from the Jews the main role of scapegoat.

Following in the Front National’s Footsteps: The Ambiguity of the Mainstream Right After the electoral breakthrough of the Front National, the RPR and the UDF had to figure out how to win back dissident voters. While there were reasons to believe that a tougher line on immigration policy and a xenophobic touch to the political rhetoric could yield substantial electoral gains in the shorter run—though at the risk of legitimizing the Front National—a strategy of putting the lid on might cause the FN to disappear, and therefore yield electoral gains in the longer run. Immediately following the electoral breakthrough of the Front National, in 1983–1984, the established right parties seem to have been taken by

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surprise, and they instinctively tried to win back voters by using antiimmigration frames similar to the Front National. In October 1984, for instance, Chirac remarked that “if there were fewer immigrants, there would be less unemployment, less tension in certain towns, and lower social costs,” and in November of the same year, he linked France’s decreasing birthrate to the threat of large-scale immigration (Marcus 1995: 136). Moreover, in 1985 Charles Pasqua stated that immigrants were not in their own home and should behave accordingly (Marcus 1995: 93). In 1991, after polls had shown increasing support for the Front National, Chirac tried hard to express a tougher line on the immigration issue. Occasionally, this effort resulted in xenophobic statements, as in the story told by Chirac in Orléans, about the worker who lives in Goutte d’Or together with his wife, who also works. Together they earn about 15,000 francs per month. On the same floor in the HLM there is a family consisting of a father, three or four wives, and some twenty kids, who draw 50,000 francs per month in social allowances, of course without working. To this you could add the noise and the smell, and the French worker on the same floor goes crazy. (Quoted in Perrineau 1997: 71)29

Similarly, in September 1991, Giscard d’Estaing talked about “the invasion of immigrants” (Mayer 1999: 245).30 However, the strategy to win back voters by talking the same language as the Front National seems to have failed. Rather, these kinds of remarks legitimized the ideas of the FN, and, not least, the party itself. In fact, support for the FN’s political ideas reached its all-time high (32 percent who totally or partly agreed) in the period immediately following these statements in 1991 (Mayer 1999: 245). However, the RPR and the UDF tried to present a tougher position on the immigration issue not only by rhetorical means, but also through legislation. In 1985, they included the issue of nationality laws in their joint manifesto for the 1986 parliamentary elections (Hargreaves 1995: 169). As a result, the issues of immigration and nationality became regular features of the party agenda from 1985 onward. In 1986, after his election victory, Chirac announced that the government would put an end to the ‘automatic’ acquisition of French citizenship: “Second generation immigrants would no longer become French jure soli; they would have to demand French nationality expressly, and that demand would have to be accepted by the state” (Brubaker 1992: 138; cf. Hargreaves 1995: 169–170). As we have seen, this position was in line with one of the Front National’s pet issues. However, the reform provoked strong protest from a variety of organizations and movements, in particular on the left, which made the mainstream right retreat.31 Instead, a commission was appointed. The commission, which presented its report in 1988, agreed that Article 44 should be modified, and that automatic acquisition of citizenship should come to an end, although “its recommendations were in most other respects far more liberal

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than the abortive proposals which had been put forward by the government” (Hargreaves 1995: 172). Chirac promised that if elected president in 1988, he would hold a referendum to decide whether the nationality laws should be changed in accordance with the commission’s recommendations. However, the mainstream right did not return to office until 1993, then under the premiership of Edouard Baladur. One of the first pieces of legislation submitted to Parliament was the proposal to reform the nationality laws, involving “a number of amendments which went well beyond the Nationality Commission’s recommendations,” most importantly, an amendment to Article 23 (Hargreaves 1995: 173). For instance, children born in France to Algerian immigrants would be French only on the condition that the parents had lived in France for five years or more prior to the birth. This measure was justified on the grounds of the need to combat the fraudulent use of Article 23 by Algerian mothers allegedly traveling to France with no other purpose than to gain residence rights for themselves and their children by giving birth there. No figures were given to indicate the extent of this ‘fraud,’ but it seems unlikely to amount to more than a few hundred cases a year at most. (Hargreaves 1995: 174)

The proposal was adopted by Parliament in 1993. The effect of this protracted debate on nationality laws was twofold. First, it contributed to the sustained salience of the issues of immigration and nationality. It also provided favorable opportunities for the rhetoric of the Front National, which was given a chance to express its policy platform publicly, and which was also given the opportunity to claim that the mainstream parties only tried to copy—although in watered-down form—the proposals of the FN. Second, this debate helped to maintain the frame that immigrants and immigration (in particular from North Africa) were a problem. Otherwise, why legislate against it?

The FN Voters: A Scared and Xenophobic Electorate As we recall from chapter 2, Front National voters were shown to be significantly more xenophobic and opposed to immigration than other voters. Practically all FN voters answered that they strongly or somewhat agreed with the proposition that “there are too many immigrants living in France.” In fact, of all variables discussed in chapter 2, the variables measuring xenophobia contributed most to explaining why certain voters voted for the Front National (or Le Pen). Hence, at the voter level the FN has primarily been distinguished by its xenophobia and ethnocentrism, which, as Mayer (1999: 59) argues, can be seen as a sine qua non for electoral support for the FN. However, we also saw in chapter 2 that FN voters are distinguished by xenophobia and cultural racism, rather than by

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biological racism or anti-Semitism. As indicated above, the FN’s, in particular Le Pen’s, occasional lapses into biological racism and anti-Semitism only find very weak electoral support. In fact, only 2 percent of the French electorate agreed with Le Pen and regarded the Holocaust as ‘a detail’ in the history of World War II (Mayer 1999: 51). In this chapter, we have seen that the political rhetoric of the Front National is directed most against immigrants of North African origin. This tendency is mirrored in the attitudes of FN voters. As shown in table 5.3, FN voters dislike ethnic minorities more than does the average voter. Although this is true for all ethnic minorities included in the survey, FN voters are most clearly distinguished by their negative attitudes toward North African immigrants, whether first- or second-generation. Furthermore, we have also seen in this chapter that the Front National tries to appeal to a feeling of personal insecurity, by depicting France as an increasingly dangerous place to live. We can find indications that FN voters feel more insecure than other voters (Mayer 1995: 103). For instance, surveys conducted in Grenoble in 1987 showed that 42 percent of the FN voters (compared to 29 percent of all voters) felt insecure at home, and that 72 percent of the FN voters (compared to 52 percent of all voters) were afraid to go out at night (Mayer 1995: 102). As we recall from chapter 2, at least in the 1995 presidential election the issue of personal security was important for Le Pen’s voters. When asked about how important the issue of security was for their decision how to vote, 53 percent of Le Pen’s voters gave it 10 out of 10, and 88 percent gave it an 8 or more (own calculations based on CEVIPOF 1995). We also saw that this issue was of relatively low salience before the electoral breakthrough of the Front National,

TABLE 5.3 Negative Attitudes toward Ethnic and Other Minorities (in percent) 1 FN

2 All Voters

Discrepancy 1–2

85 78 49 33 49 58 36 32 28 21 13

40 35 17 12 29 39 18 17 15 9 5

+45 +43 +32 +21 +20 +19 +18 +15 +13 +12 +8

Percentage of voters who feel an antipathy toward: North Africans (first generation) North Africans (second generation) Black Africans Central Europeans Homosexuals Gypsies Pied Noires Jews Asians West Indians South Europeans

Source: Perrineau (1997: 150-151), based on a survey conducted by CSA in 1996. Cf. Mayer (1995: 99).

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but of relatively high salience after this election, and that the FN voters were consistently overrepresented among those who mentioned security as one of the principal issues that influenced their decision how to vote (Schain 2001: 292). As this chapter has revealed, the Front National tries to establish a link between immigration and insecurity in its rhetoric. As shown in table 5.4, many FN voters seem to believe that such a link actually exists. Although FN voters are more afraid than the average voter of everything (except natural disaster and nuclear plants), it is the fear of immigrants that distinguishes FN voters from other voters. As many as 54 percent of FN voters declare that they are afraid of immigrants, compared to only 12 percent of all voters. TABLE 5.4 What the French Voters Fear 1 FN

2 All Voters

Discrepancy 1–2

54 45 44 39 57 30 58 39 37 68 33 22 24 36 29

12 29 29 25 46 22 51 32 31 63 28 18 22 37 31

+42 +16 +15 +14 +11 +8 +7 +7 +6 +5 +5 +4 +2 -1 -2

‘Very afraid of’: Immigrants Street muggings Burglaries Street thefts Terrorism Gangs, punks AIDS Air pollution Water pollution Drugs Fires Food preservatives Street traffic Nuclear plants Natural disasters

Source: Mayer (1995: 104), based on the 1989 OIP/IHESI survey.

Hence, we can safely conclude that the issues of immigration and security have been great assets to the Front National. As shown in table 5.5, not only do the party’s own voters support its positions on the issues of immigration and security, but a substantial percentage of voters who do not vote for the FN do, as well. Every year since the FN’s electoral breakthrough, these issues have received much greater support (several years twice as large) than the proportion that voted for the FN in the various elections.

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TABLE 5.5 Approval of the Positions of the Front National (in percent) 1984 Immigrants 28 Security and justice 26 Defense of traditional values – Critique of the political class – The struggle against communism 25 AIDS – France’s foreign affairs – Critique of RPR and UDF 9 Critique of the extensive influence of the U.S. – Statement of the Jews’ influence on French politics –

1985

1987

1989

1991

1993

1994

1996

1997

31 29

31 32

25 27

38 31

35 30

35 29

33 35

25 26

24

28

26

30

25

28

31

30

12

12

13

24

14

14

19

19

20 – –

15 – –

11 13 –

19 18 18

12 16 11

– – –

– – –

– – –

8

10

8

12

8

8

13

14

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

20

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

4

Source: Perrineau (1997: 198).

Conclusion In this chapter, I have discussed the importance of xenophobic attitudes, in particular in relation to the immigration issue, for the emergence of and sustained electoral support for the Front National. First, we found indications that by itself the number of immigrants in an area explains neither the level of popular xenophobia nor the inclination to vote for an ERP party. Second, I have argued that although xenophobic attitudes in relation to immigration are a sine qua non for the ERP parties, by itself widespread popular xenophobia has weak explanatory power. In order to benefit the ERP parties, the immigration issue has to be politicized, which implies the active involvement of established political actors. In addition, if the immigration issue is to retain its importance and salience, the debate has to be kept alive in a way that attracts media attention. This is easier if other political actors get involved, or if unanticipated events occur. In France, the immigration issue was politicized in the late 1970s and early 1980s by a variety of different factors—not least by the anti-immigration campaign by the PCF in 1980. Although both the French ‘New Right’ and the Front National had pursued xenophobic and neo-racist positions on the immigration issue by the end of the 1970s, neither of them had been in a position to politicize the immigration issue. However, once the immigration issue was politicized—on the supply side—the criteria for how to judge political relevance were changed, and the Front National became increasingly entitled to take part in the frame struggle over how

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to define the immigration issue. In addition, the PCF had already set a general frame—that immigration and immigrants are a problem—which the Front National could draw on and reinforce. In addition, the FN has tried hard to pursue four other frames: (1) immigration as a threat to French ethno-national identity, (2) immigration as a major cause of insecurity and criminality, (3) immigration as a major cause of unemployment, and (4) immigration as a major cause of problems in the welfare state. As demonstrated in this chapter, the established right parties occasionally used several of these frames in their own political rhetoric, probably to win back dissident voters. However, this strategy failed, and is more likely to have legitimized the ideas promoted by the Front National. We have also seen—in this chapter and in chapter 2—that the four antiimmigration frames employed by the Front National correspond to attitudes held by FN voters. FN voters are distinguished from other French voters by their xenophobic attitudes.

Notes 1. My translations. Original quotations: “On ne se sent pas en sécurité dans les quartiers où les immigrés sont nombreux”; “Les immigrés sont un facteur important de délinquance en France”; “Chaque fois qu’un étranger occupe un emploi en France, c’est un Français qui en est privé.” 2. However, it should be noted that the proportion of the voters that favored departure of immigrants before integration decreased by almost 10 percentage points to 38 percent between 1998 and 2002 (Balme 2002). Still, 38 percent is at least twice as high as the voter support for the Front National or Le Pen personally. 3. If we define immigrants “as people born abroad without the nationality of the country in which they do now live” (Hargreaves 1995: 5), there were in the early 1990s more than four million immigrants living in France, of whom about one-third had acquired French nationality. It is also estimated that about five million people were the children of immigrants (Hargreaves 1995: 5). 4. It may also partly be the result of selection effects: if they have the opportunity to choose, people who have strong xenophobic attitudes do not choose to live in areas with a high concentration of immigrants. 5. The ‘bulldozer affair’ was not an isolated event. For instance, in January 1981, a few weeks after the events in Vitry, the communist mayor of Montigny-les-Cormeilles helped organize a demonstration outside the home of an immigrant family that was accused of drug dealing (Marcus 1995: 78). Another example occurred when the communist municipal executive of Ivry announced, also in January 1981, that “a quota of 15 percent would apply to children of immigrant families for the city’s summer camps, normally open to all children living in the city. Immigrant children were 28 percent of the population under the age of sixteen, and a much higher percentage of the children of the poorest families” (Schain 1988: 605). The Communist Party subsequently shifted its position on immigrant matters, as when the party declared in June 1985 that it favored the participation of immigrants in local elections. But at that time the immigration issue was already politicized.

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6. To this we may add that membership support fell sharply, as well. The number of members fell from 1,930,000 in 1975 to 1,360,000 in 1980 (Bell and Criddle 1994: 130). 7. This chauvinism was not only visible in several local campaigns against immigrant workers, but also in a general appeal to authoritarian moral attitudes. For example, during this period, the PCF neglected themes that they had earlier tried to integrate into their political platform (such as feminism and ecology). They also openly condemned homosexuality (Courtois and Lazar 1995: 389). 8. These and many other examples of xenophobic views are presented in Wieviorka (1992: 9–16). 9. My translation. Original quotation: “véritablement victimes d’une mutation mondiale, d’une invasion apparement pacifique mais qui, évidemment, nous menace mortellement dans notre identité, dans notre sécurité, dans notre culture.” 10. My translation. Original quotation: “il n’y a plus d’intégration possible. Il n’y a plus de possible que la résistance, ou tôt ou tard la submersion par l’invasion.” 11. My translation. Original quotation: “qui représente déjà la deuxième religion en France … menace notre propre identité.” 12. My translation. Original quotation: “est incompatible … avec une conception chrétienne du monde car les deux religions s’exclusent mutuellement.” 13. My translation. Original quotation: “Ce sont les étrangers musulmans qui veulent aujourd’hui imposer leurs coutumes: aujourd’hui, les mosquées et le port du voile à l’école, demain la polygamie et la loi coranique pour le mariage, l’héritage et la vie civile.” 14. My translation. Original quotation: “Je l’ai dit à plusieurs reprises, j’aime mieux mes filles que mes nièces, mes nièces que mes cousines, mes cousines que mes voisines. Il en est de même en politique, j’aime mieux les Français.” 15. My translation. Original quotations: “l’inégalité des races”; “tout l’histoire démontre [qu’elles] n’ont pas la même capacité d’évolution.” 16. My translation. Original quotation: “disparation des races humaines par métissage généralisé.” 17. My translation. Original quotations: “indissolublement lié au sang, au sol et à la mémoire”; “périls qui mettent en jeu l’existence même de la France, sa substance biologique.” 18. My translation. Original quotation: “Je me pose un certain nombre de questions; je ne dit pas que les chambres à gaz n’ont pas existé. Je n’ai pas pu moi-même en voir. Je n’ai pas étudié spécialement la question. Mais je crois que c’est un point de détail de l’histoire de la Seconde Guerre mondiale.” This ambiguous position toward the Nazi period was not new for Le Pen. In the 1960s, he ran a record publishing company specializing in historical recordings. In 1965, Le Pen was sued for ‘apologizing for war crimes,’ by publishing songs of the Hitler era. The basis of the accusation was a statement on the record jacket: “Here are the songs of the German revolution. The arrival in power of Adolph Hitler and the National Socialist Party was characterized by a powerful, popular and democratic mass movement which triumphed after regular elections—circumstances which are generally forgotten. In this, the oratorical propaganda of Hitler’s chiefs, and the political songs expressing collective passions played an essential role. This record recreates this spirit with the help of original documents of an inestimable historic value” (Simmons 1996: 46). This resulted in an eighteen-month suspended sentence for Le Pen, and he was fined ten thousand francs for ‘justifying war crimes’ (Simmons 1996: 46). 19. My translation. Original quotation: “les grandes internationales comme l’Internationale juive jouent un rôle non négligeable dans la création de cet esprit antinational.” 20. My translation. Original quotation: “La montée en puisance de ces phénomènes conséquents de l’immigration suit la même courbe, tous les ans: le chômage, la criminalité, la délinquance, la drogue augmentent entre 8% et 10%.” 21. My translation. Original quotation: “Le chômage de trois millions de travailleurs est une honte nationale. Une honte nationale qui due depuis dix ans, caussée par la folle politique de l’immigration, l’excès des prélèvements publics et la dégradation du niveau de l’enseignement.”

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22. My translation. Original quotation: “réserver sur notre territoire nationale le travail en priorité aux fils et aux filles de France.” 23. My translations. Original quotations: “[u]n million de chômeurs, c’est un million d’immigrés en trop”; “[d]eux millions et demi de chômeurs, ce sont deux millions et demi d’immigrés de trop.” 24. My translation. Original quotation: “millions d’immigrés qui sont entrés en France ne sont pas, pour le plupart, entrés pour travailler puisque théoriquement il n’y pas de travail, puisque nous avons déjà des millions de chômeurs. Ils n’y sont pas entrés non plus par simple amour pour la France. C’est peut-être le cas de certains d’entre eux, mais ce n’est pas le cas de l’immense majorité. Ils y sont entrés parce que ‘Y a bon RMI,’ ‘Y a bon la Sécu.’” 25. My translation. Original quotation: “Beaucoup de nos compatriotes ont des difficultés à obtenir un logement HLM alors que les familles immigrés, généralement plus nombreuses, les obtiennent plus facilement. De surcroît, la présence massive d’immigrés dans de nombreuses cités HLM conduit à une grande détérioration des conditions de vie des Français.” 26. However, the notion of ‘anti-French racism’ has many meanings. The Front National claims, for instance, that “the true racists today are those who wish to get rid of national differences and to subsume national identity under some mondialiste philosophy.” According to Jean-Yves Le Gallou, it is insulting to accuse of racism those who merely wish to defend the unique qualities of French national identity from the threat posed by those holding different values and beliefs (Simmons 1996: 161). 27. My translation. Original quotation: “A la queue de l’ANPE, à la queue des HLM, à la queue de tel organisme d’aide sociale, le dernier qui passe est le Français. Oui, il y a du racisme, du racisme antifrançais dans notre pays.” 28. My translation. Original quotation: “La surpopulation étrangère est aujourd’hui le facteur principal des déséquilibres et partant des désordres de notre société: chômage, insécurité, fiscalisme, surcharge des systèmes sociaux, faillite de l’Éducation nationale, pénurie de logements, etc.” 29. My translation. Original quotation: “le travailleur qui habite à la Goutte d’Or, qui travaille avec sa femme pour gagner environ 15 000 francs et qui voit, sur son palier d’HLM, une famille entassée avec le père, trois ou quatre épouses et une vingtaine de gosses, qui touche 50 000 francs de prestations sociales sans naturellement travailler. Si vous ajoutez à cela le bruit et l’odeur, le travailleur français, sur le parlier, il devient fou.” 30. After the summer of 1991, when the mainstream right tried hard to exploit xenophobic sentiments, Bruno Mégret stated that the Front National was dominating the ideological space, and he talked about an “ideological victory” (Perrineau 1997: 71–72). 31. Yet during the government led by Chirac between 1986 and 1988, Minister of the Interior Charles Pasqua implemented policies that made it easier to deport illegal immigrants, as well as giving the police greater authority to question suspected illegal immigrants.

Chapter 6

POPULISM AND THE POWER OF THE ANTI-ESTABLISHMENT STRATEGY


As we recall from chapters 1 and 2, I believe that the electoral breakthrough of an ERP party can be explained in one of three ways. First, it may result from a combination of the emergence of niches within the socio-cultural cleavage dimension, demanding ethno-nationalist and xenophobic policies, and a situation in which a sufficient number of voters lack loyalty to the established parties. Second, it may result from political protest, which can be based either on dissatisfaction with particular aspects of one or several of the established parties or on more general discontent with the political institutions per se, in particular with the political parties and politicians. Third, it might also be explained by a combination of these two alternatives. However, political protest alone is not a sufficient explanatory factor in accounting for the sustained electoral support of an ERP party. Only if niches of ethno-nationalism and xenophobia exist will the newly emerged ERP party persist as a significant force—not least because protest voters are likely to return to their ‘old’ parties when they have made their voices heard, unless they have an interest other than protest in continuing to support the new party. Since I discussed the niches of ethno-nationalism and xenophobia in chapters 4 and 5, respectively, I will now turn to the niche of political discontent and alienation. Aside from their direct importance for the emergence of ERP parties, discontent and alienation may also be of indirect importance because of their potential for separating voters from the established parties, and as a consequence freeing resources for the ERP parties. The emergence of the ERP parties coincided with intensified public dissatisfaction with, and distrust in, the political institutions in general and the political parties in particular (Betz 1994: 169). More specifically, the electoral breakthrough of the Front National between 1983 and 1985 occurred at a time when loyalties to the established parties had decreased, and political alienation and discontent had increased, to a critical point

Notes for this chapter begin on page 221.

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(see Ignazi 1996b: 77). This situation facilitated the emergence of the Front National for two reasons. First, as a result of decreased party identification and loyalty, more people became issue voters, which opened up possibilities for the FN. Loyal voters with a high degree of party identification are unlikely to vote for a new party even if they agree with its ideas. Second, the growing political alienation and discontent had created an audience receptive to ‘anti-system’ and ‘anti-establishment’ messages (see Ignazi 1996b: 77) and thus provided an opportunity for the Front National to mobilize protest voters. This situation is demonstrated by the fact that “the normal level of abstention increased dramatically” in France during the 1980s (Schain 1999: 155). By employing populist strategies, the Front National tried to stir up feelings of alienation from the political process and resentment toward the established political parties and politicians (see Betz 1993: 419). One such strategy was to depict all political parties as one homogeneous political class. This ‘anti-establishment’ strategy was facilitated by the decreasing importance of the economic cleavage dimension and by the fact that an increasing number of voters perceived no essential difference between the political right and the political left (see Mény and Surel 2000: 115). In chapter 2, we found that voters who believed that politicians do not care about ordinary people’s opinions were more likely to vote for the Front National. The FN voters were also the most resigned, that is, most prone to believe that it is useless to vote in democratic elections. Still, we also saw that the effects of political discontent often disappeared—except the belief that politicians do not care about ordinary people—when we controlled for other relevant variables in the logistic regressions, which indicates that we should not overestimate the direct importance of political discontent in explaining the vote for the Front National or Le Pen in the elections that were held between 1988 and 1997. Nevertheless, at least in 1995, Le Pen’s voters stood out as the most politically discontented in at least one particular attitude. That year, 38 percent of Le Pen’s voters believed that politicians do not care at all about ordinary people’s opinions, while as many as 92 percent of his voters believed that politicians care very little or not at all about their opinions (own calculations based on CEVIPOF 1995). This pattern was even more obvious in 1997, when 58 percent of Front National voters believed that politicians do not care at all (own calculations based on CEVIPOF 1997). Furthermore, in 1995, 33 percent of the voters who agreed with that statement voted for Le Pen, which made him the most popular candidate for those voters. In addition, there are indications that the level of ‘political satisfaction’ has a great effect on whether voters who have the same xenophobic attitudes as the Front National will vote for the party. As shown in table 6.1, of the voters who agreed with the proposition that there are too many immigrants living in France, but who also expressed a high degree of

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TABLE 6.1 The Impact of Political Satisfaction on the Vote for Le Pen in 1995 Too many immigrants (-) Political satisfaction (+) Political satisfaction (-)

Too many immigrants (+)

1 percent 3 percent

13 percent 27 percent

Source: Martin (1998: 160), based on SOFRES/CEVIPOF 1995.

‘political satisfaction,’ only 13 percent voted for Le Pen in the 1995 presidential election. On the other hand, of the voters who expressed the view that there are too many immigrants and who expressed a low degree of ‘political satisfaction,’ 27 percent voted for Le Pen. The rest of this chapter will proceed in the following way. In the first section I will discuss the growing public pessimism and political discontent and the declining level of party identification. Second, I will outline the features of populism, both in terms of ideology and strategy or style. Finally, I will discuss the importance of political legitimacy, and the ways in which the behavior of the French mainstream right helped to legitimize the Front National.

Pessimism, Party Identification, and Political Discontent Before turning to the discussion of decreasing party identification and increasing political discontent, I will briefly address the importance of pessimism.

Pessimism Since this is a discussion of political processes, we are mainly concerned with political pessimism. However, we should be sensitive to the fact that political phenomena may be deeply affected by other kinds of pessimism, as well. Thus, personal pessimism and dissatisfaction (whether caused by economic or social worries) may be of great importance in this regard. As Inglehart (1997: 176–178) reminds us, “politics is a peripheral aspect of most people’s life.” When people are merely dissatisfied with politics, the reactions are ephemeral and shallow, but when people are dissatisfied with their lives, the political reactions may be powerful. With this in mind, I will suggest that peoples’ ‘subjective well-being’ may be as important as their specific political dissatisfaction for our understanding of the dynamics underlying outbursts of political protest. Although we should be cautious not to draw too much on these kinds of comparisons, figure 6.1 shows that the level of pessimism—as measured by agreement with the statement “Things have a tendency to become worse”—peaked in 1983–1984, just as the Front National was having its electoral breakthrough.1

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FIGURE 6.1 Pessimism of the French Voters, 1981–1986

Source: Ignazi (1996b). Percentage of the French who agreed with the statement “Things have a tendency to become worse.”

We know that Front National voters are distinguished by pessimism (Perrineau 1997: 117). In 1997, 81 percent of FN voters declared that they were worried about their personal and professional future (compared to 71 percent of the PCF voters, 64 percent of the PS voters, and 54 percent of the RPR/UDF voters). The FN voters were also most pessimistic about the future of France: only 11 percent of FN voters believed that the economic situation would improve (compared to 19 percent of the Greens, 29 percent of the PS voters, 31 percent of the PCF voters, and 36 percent of the RPR/UDF voters).

Party Identification In chapter 1, I distinguished between three different ideal types of voters: those whose votes are governed by political issues, those who make up their minds on the basis of party image, and, finally, those whose decisions are governed by party identification. Traditionally, party identification has played a great role in explaining the behavior of the voters. In fact, it is possible that the electoral behavior of most voters is still mainly

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governed by party identification. Yet importantly, the number of voters with a high level of party identification has declined in Western Europe, France included, over the past several decades (Dalton 2000; Mayer 1999: 186; Putnam et al. 2000: 17). In fact, during the years preceding the electoral breakthrough of the Front National, the general Western European trend toward decreased party identification was strongest in France (Schain 1988: 610). The proportion of French voters who claimed that they had “no ties to any party” rose from 29 percent in 1978 to 42 percent in 1984. During the same period, the proportion of voters who claimed that they were “very close” or “fairly close” to a political party declined from 29 percent in 1978 to 17 percent in 1984.2 Since this decline in party identification did not coincide with a corresponding decline in interest in politics,3 an increasingly large number of French voters were made available for political mobilization (Schain 1988: 610). We also know that in the mid 1980s, the Front National voters were the ones with the lowest level of party identification of all voters. This is not surprising, since we may assume that it takes some time to develop a sense of identification with a new party. They, together with the Greens, also placed the greatest emphasis on candidates’ proposals and ideas in the 1988 presidential election (Mayer and Perrineau 1992b: 126–127), that is, they were issue voters. Furthermore, Front National voters were, together with the Green voters, least inclined to answer that the personality of the party leader or presidential candidate was of decisive importance for their decision how to vote: only 13 percent of FN voters (own calculations based on CEVIPOF 1988). We see the same pattern in 1995 (own calculations based on CEVIPOF 1995). However, it is notable that many Front National voters became relatively loyal to the FN during the 1990s.4 Of 100 voters who voted for the party in 1984, 66 voted for the FN in 1988, as well, while 83 percent of voters who had voted for the FN in 1993 were repeat voters in 1997 (Perrineau 1997: 208–209; see also Veugelers 1997). However, this kind of loyalty should not be confused with party identification. In 1997, FN voters showed a lower level of party identification than other voters: 72 percent of FN voters declared that they did not feel close to any particular party, compared to 56 percent of the RPR/UDF voters, 51 percent of the PS voters, and 47 percent of the PCF voters (Perrineau 1997: 114–115).5 Hence, the majority of the FN voters did not vote repeatedly for the party out of party identification.6 However, the large number of faithful FN voters indicates that we should be very cautious not to exaggerate the role of protest voting in the party‘s successes in the late 1980s and the 1990s (cf. Mayer 1999: 191; Betz 1994: 63). Still, the widespread political discontent played a significant role, both directly and indirectly, in the emergence and initial electoral successes of the Front National. During the period from 1983 up to 1988 the FN benefited most from protest voting, while it was less important in 1988 and

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afterwards. In the 1984 European election, for instance, many former Giscard d’Estaing voters voted for the Front National in protest. This kind of protest voting was triggered by the victory of the left in the 1981 election, and by the fact that no national political offices were at stake in the election. Moreover, one week before the presidential election of 1988, when the voters were asked “from the bottom of their heart” which candidate they wished to see elected president, only 28 percent of the voters who declared that they would vote for Le Pen answered ‘Jean-Marie Le Pen,’7 while 26 percent of them preferred Chirac and 17 percent Mitterrand (Mayer and Perrineau 1992b: 133). There are thus reasons to believe that the protest dimension has played a great role in the initial success of the Front National. However, once the FN had passed the initial stage, it seems to have relied more on voters who supported the party’s political program. Many of the protest voters left the FN for the mainstream right in the late 1980s. However, the successes in the elections during the 1980s had given the Front National greater political visibility, which made it possible to compensate for the losses with new voters who voted for specific issues.

Political Alienation and Discontent In all known democracies, there have been people who are dissatisfied with the political system and its institutions (see Mény and Surel 2000: 23). However, the extent, depth, and intensity of such political dissatisfaction are not constant. There are “periodic cycles of hope and fear” (Norris 1999b). Recently, confidence in political institutions and in politicians has been declining in most Western democracies. In a recent survey of Western European democracies, the United States, and Japan, Putnam et al. (2000: 14) concluded that confidence in politicians is declining in 12 of the 13 countries for which systematic data are available (see Dalton 1999: 63). At the same time, public confidence in Parliament has declined in 11 of the 14 countries that were represented in the survey (Putnam et al. 2000: 19). Among the various societal institutions, as we can see in table 6.2, political ones received the lowest confidence ratings. Especially notable is that the political parties, with the partial exception of the United Kingdom, enjoyed the lowest confidence ratings of all institutions. In France, these trends have been visible since the aftermath of May 1968. According to surveys conducted by CEVIPOF, the proportion of voters who believed that “politicians do not care about people like us” increased from 62 percent in 1978 to 73 percent in 1995, and to 80 percent in 1997 (Mayer 1999: 138). In figure 6.2, we see that this development was rapid during the period of the Front National’s electoral breakthrough. Moreover, when asked in 1999 to describe their feelings about politics, 57 percent of the French public answered ‘distrust,’ 27 percent answered ‘boredom,’ and 20 percent answered ‘disgust,’ while only 7 percent chose ‘respect’ (Mény and Surel 2000: 25–26). As we saw in chapter 2, the Front

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TABLE 6.2 Confidence in Societal Institutions (in percent)

Government Parliament Political parties Church Legal system Unions Press Radio Television

European Union

France

Germany

Italy

UK

37 40 16 50 43 38 40 63 56

37 38 12 36 36 36 51 62 46

29 35 13 47 50 39 42 62 59

27 29 13 55 31 29 34 49 42

46 46 18 54 48 36 15 67 65

Source: Mény and Surel (2000: 159), based on the European Union’s 1998 Eurobarometer.

National voters were early on significantly overrepresented among the voters who held such negative attitudes toward politics. Yet despite these negative attitudes, a majority of interviewed voters (57 percent) declared that they believed that “French democracy is working fine” (Mény and Surel 2000: 25–26). More generally, it is important to note that although French voters deeply distrust political institutions and politicians, they still support the democratic system (Mény and Surel 2000: 25; cf. Dalton 1999: 70; Klingemann 1999: 44). We should keep this duality in mind, since it plays a major role in the populist strategies employed by the Front National: as we will see below, the FN has sought to exploit the widespread distrust of political institutions, without seeming overtly anti-democratic. Nevertheless, the supporters of the Front National were those who had the least confidence in societal institutions in general (with the exceptions of the army and the police), and in political institutions in particular (see Ranger 1996: 140). How, then, did this situation arise? Why is the popular distrust in, and discontent with, political institutions increasing? I have suggested in chapter 1 that the following four factors may provide at least a partial answer to this question: (1) growing political alienation caused by the difficulty that political institutions have in adapting to profound social changes; (2) the increased complexity of the political process, combined with a decreased autonomy of national politics; (3) the convergence of mainstream parties (see chapter 3), which has left many voters with a feeling that there are no real differences between the political right and left; and (4) political scandals and ‘affairs,’ of which cases of corruption have been of particular importance. I will briefly discuss these factors below. First, the real and perceived inability of political institutions to adapt to profound changes has for many voters resulted in a feeling that politics and policies are decoupled from the ‘reality’ of ordinary people’s lives

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FIGURE 6.2 Attitudes toward Politicians, 1977–1985

Source: Ignazi (1996b: 75), based on SOFRES’s polls. The respondents were asked to answer the question “In your opinion, do the politicians generally care a lot, a little, very little, or practically not at all about the opinions of people like you?”

(Mény and Surel 2000: 24). Moreover, the political parties promised radical reforms, mostly in their electoral campaigns which, when unrealized, created a growing discrepancy between voters’ expectations and the results coming out of the political process (see Mény and Surel 2000: 24). In addition, prolonged economic crises, in particular high unemployment rates (Mayer 1999: 213), probably played a large role in this process. Perrineau (1997: 28) argued that although the economic difficulties in France go back to the mid 1970s, it was not until the early 1980s that people began to apprehend the depth and extent—as well as persistence—of the problem. Before the early 1980s, many had regarded the situation as a ‘normal’ temporary recession in the economy, but in 1982 many sensed that they might be witnessing the beginning of the end of the ‘Golden Years’ of unbroken economic growth during the postwar period. This changed perception was, in part, caused, or at least reinforced, by the victory of the left in the 1981 elections. Until then the left had been an untried alternative (at the time, both the PS and the PCF advocated a ‘break with capitalism’). When it became apparent that the left could not cope with the

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economic difficulties either, that is, that it had no ‘miracle solutions,’ many people awoke to the sad reality of the economic crisis (Perrineau 1997: 28). As we saw above (figure 6.1), this situation was marked by increased pessimism: the proportion who said that “things have a tendency to get worse” increased from 40 percent in 1981 to 51 percent in 1982, and 62 percent in 1983. Distrust in political institutions also increased during this period. Second, many voters may have become increasingly alienated from the political process as a result of the increasing opaqueness of the decisionmaking process. If people cannot easily see where political power resides, they have difficulty understanding how to influence political outcomes, which may raise the question of why they should participate at all. Third, as was discussed in chapter 3, the established parties have converged, that is, become more alike each other, which has left voters with a feeling that there are no substantial differences between the political right and the political left. In France, there has been a dramatic increase in the number of voters who believe that “left and right have little meaning in terms of political parties today”: from about one-third in 1981 to approximately 50 percent in 1984, and more than 60 percent in 1996 (Mayer 1999: 29).8 This increase was most dramatic during the period preceding the electoral breakthrough of the Front National. Thus, a convergence between the established parties may contribute to increased political alienation and discontent with political parties and other political institutions. However, it is hard to tell whether this kind of convergence is a cause of the decline in party identification, or vice versa. Perhaps it should be seen as a vicious circle. When the number of voters with high party identification decreases—which also causes an increase in the number of mobile voters—the parties have to ‘win’ all of their votes at every election (earlier they could rely on a substantial core of loyal voters). As indicated in chapter 1, this situation increases the importance of using successful voter maximization strategies. When established generalist (see chapter 1) parties try to attract new voters without scaring away the old ones, the result will normally be a convergence toward the median position (e.g., Downs 1957). This convergence may, in turn, add to public discontent with the political parties, because it partly justifies the belief that there are no substantial differences between them. In France, this feeling of blurred distinctions might, in addition, have been reinforced by the twice-tried experience of ‘cohabitation,’ that is, the coexistence of a president of the left and a government of the right (Marcus 1995: 169; cf. Ivaldi 1998: 19). Fourth, the political scandals, and in particular the cases of political corruption, have had a negative effect on public confidence in politicians and political institutions (see Mény and Surel 2000: 24; for the dynamics of corruption and political scandals in France, see Pujas and Rhodes 1999). In France, more people (61 percent in 1999) believe that the politicians are “corrupt rather than honest” than believe that they are “honest rather than

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corrupt” (Mayer 1999: 138; Mény and Surel 2000: 25–26). Among young people between 18 and 24 years of age, the figure was as high as 75 percent in 1999 (Mény and Surel 2000: 25–26). Here, too, Front National voters were overrepresented (see chapter 2; cf. Perrineau 1997: 67). To conclude this section, we have seen that a number of related processes, all concerning the relation between voters and the political institutions, were creating a situation favorable to the Front National during the 1980s and 1990s: the number of voters with a high level of party identification was declining, the general level of pessimism was increasing, and the voters’ confidence in political parties and other political institutions was in decline. As we will see below, the Front National did what it could to reinforce and exploit this situation. However, before dealing with the party’s rhetorical strategies, I will describe the type of populism that is a part of the FN‘s program and rhetoric. It will be suggested that these populist features helped the FN to successfully exploit political discontent.

Populism: Ideology and Strategy In the introduction, I argued that core components of the new extreme right populist parties were ethno-nationalism, xenophobia, authoritarianism on socio-cultural matters (in particular law and order), and populism (in both style and ideological content). The other core components have been discussed in chapters 3 to 5, and we will now turn to the last one: populism.9 Populism may refer to a more or less coherent political ideology; to a political style, which “simply seeks to be popular” (Taggart 2000: 5); or to cultural populism, which may be unpoliticized. In this study, I will leave cultural populism aside and discuss only the two first aspects of populism. However, ideology and strategy cannot be fully separated in practice, since they often commingle. More specifically, I will in this section present and discuss the basic features of populism, and try to relate this discussion to the ERP parties in general and the Front National in particular. I will suggest that populism is characterized by a hostility toward the idea of representative democracy (a hostility that within a democratic context may manifest itself in a quest for direct democracy); an image of ‘the people’ as harmonious and homogeneous, which is pitted against ‘the political class’ or ‘the establishment’; and an idea that the populist party or leader represents ‘the voice of the people.’ In Weberian terms, populist movements are charismatic and try to base their appeal as well as legitimacy on emotions rather than on (rational) reason (see Weber 1978: chapter 3). As with other ideologies, we seldom find populist ideology in its pure form when we look at concrete parties and movements. Historical examples of populist parties and movements may be the People’s Party in the United States during the late

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nineteenth century, the Narodnichestvo movement in Russia during the same period, Juan Peròn and Peronism in Argentina, the Poujadist movement in France during the 1950s, anti-tax movements such as the Scandinavian Progress parties during the early 1970s, and—to a certain extent—the ERP parties of the 1980s and 1990s (Ionescu and Gellner 1969; Taggart 2000). These parties and movements differ in many respects, but share the basic features mentioned above.10 The concepts of ‘populism’ and ‘populists,’ as I will use them below, will denote this ideal typical core that unites various populist currents. Concerning the ERP parties, they are a mixture of right-wing extremism, ethno-nationalism, and populism. As said, the mixture is likely to differ between the parties—some, like the FPÖ, involve more populism than others, such as Vlaams Blok (see Mény and Surel 2000: 257). Yet although the ERP parties are not pure populist parties, we cannot understand the dynamics of the emergence of these parties without taking their populist features into consideration. Before moving on, I will briefly introduce the characteristic traits of populism mentioned above. First, populism, unlike neo-fascism and other nonparliamentary right-wing extremism, does not present itself as anti-democratic (see Mény and Surel 2000: 32). In fact, populist movements seek to obtain legitimacy by claiming that they speak in the name of the majority, that is, as a medium for ‘the common will’ or ‘the people’s will’ (Berlin et al. 1968: 173–178; cf. Taggart 2000: 16–17). However, they loathe representative democracy (Taggart 2000: 2), which, they argue, ‘takes the power away from the people.’ Instead, within a democratic context, populist movements often promote direct democracy. Yet as we will see below, the conception of ‘the people’ used by populists is often particularistic and exclusionary. Second, populist ideology stresses the idea of a harmonious and homogenous people, which also implies its nostalgia and its reliance on the conception of a ‘sacred heartland.’ Populist ideology is fundamentally nostalgic and directed toward the past (Berlin et al. 1968: 173–178; Taggart 2000: 16–17; Wiles 1969: 170). Populist movements generally dislike the present world in which, they argue, people are uprooted and alienated, and they long for a return to the ‘rootedness’ of an integrated and coherent Gemeinschaft (Berlin et al. 1968: 173–178; MacRae 1969: 156; Taggart 2000: 16–17; Wiles 1969: 170). Hence, as we recall from chapter 1, every ideology has utopian aspects, that is, an image of the ideal society, and for the populists this utopia is an idealized past (MacRae 1969: 162). This trait is inherently bound up with populists’ urge to speak in the name of ‘the people.’ Simultaneously, at a strategic level populist movements typically try to foment voter discontent with political institutions by using a dualistic rhetoric, that is, by pitting ‘we’ against ‘them,’ ‘the people’ against ‘the politicians,’ and so on. They argue that the established parties and politicians are antiquated and that a new party or movement, which springs directly from the people, and which “will set aside both

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doctrine and selfish interest and put the people first” (Canovan 1981: 262), is needed (see Fryklund and Peterson 1981). This is a part of the ‘populist program’ (Diani 1996) or ‘populist appeal’ (Fryklund and Peterson 1981) or ‘the anti-political-establishment strategy’ (Schedler 1996). A related trait of populism is its anti-intellectualism and its proneness to conspiracy theories (Wiles 1969: 167). Finally, as implied above, populist movements and parties are often chameleon-like, and frequently change position on concrete policy areas. One reason for this is that populist ideology lacks core values. Unlike other ideologies, which focus on values such as equality, liberty, or social justice, populism lacks such a value core (see Taggart 2000: 3–4). Populist movements have taken both left-wing and right-wing forms, and have often stressed that they are neither on the right nor on the left (Canovan 1981: 294; Worsley 169: 241). Not least, the fact that populists generally lack interest in the administration of the state (Berlin et al. 1968: 173–178) has made it difficult to determine their positions within the economic cleavage dimension. I will below discuss populism in greater detail, and not least how it relates to the Front National, as well as to ERP parties generally.

A Populist Conception of Democracy While the Front National, as we have seen, has in common with earlier French right-wing extremist parties and movements its rejection of cosmopolitanism and pluralism, as well as its obsession with falling birthrates, it differs from those by its self-proclaimed acceptance of democracy (cf. Marcus 1995: 102). In fact, even the Front National—like other ERP parties—hails the sovereignty of the people (Mény and Surel 2000: 190). As Bruno Mégret has stated: Of the people, by the people, for the people: in France, the people are sovereign. Power emanates from the people, they decide their destiny, and the government should be for them. This is the principle of sovereignty in our nation; this is the deep spirit of the republican institution; this is the foundation of French democracy. The foundation of democracy is by no means only a constitutional mechanism, or a formal judicial procedure, that is defined by elections. It is a quasi-sacred expression of legitimacy springing from the people. (Quoted in Mény and Surel 2000: 73)11

Populists distrust most formal social institutions: political parties, bureaucratic institutions of the state, the universities, the media, and the financial institutions. This attitude is partly a result of the populists’ opposition to elites and elite values (Canovan 1999: 3). In populist ideology and rhetoric, the elites, especially those peopling political institutions, are seen as not only corrupt but also lacking in wisdom, which resides only in ‘the people’ (Shils 1956: 101–103; Taggart 2000: 11). The democratic institutions of representative democracies are typically seen as cut off from ‘real people’

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(Taggart 2000: 100). The Front National, like other ERP parties, argues that there is a deep gulf between the people and the political elite, and it is ultimately because of the existence of this gulf, according to the FN, that it rejects the idea of representative democracy (Souchard et al. 1997: 135–136). Although the Front National is in favor of democracy, they are also in favor of a new political order. An election leaflet from 1995, for example, stated: “Unemployment—immigration—corruption—insecurity—taxes. ‘Let us turn the page.’ Toward the sixth Republic” (Davies 1999: 64).12 In populist ideology and strategy, there are two things that break the link between the people and their representatives. The first is corruption, and the second is ‘special interests,’ which are said to have captured the democratic process. The idea of corrupt elites is consistent with the ERP parties’ right-wing extremist ideology, as exemplified by the description of the contemporary world as morally decadent and disordered as a result of the deviation from the wisdom and values of the past. The second aspect takes different forms depending on whether one is a right-wing or leftwing populist. While the populists of the right identify immigrants and other ethnic minorities, environmentalists, feminists, and so on, as ‘special interests’ that pervert the democratic process, the left is more likely to place the blame on ‘the big capital,’ that is, large corporations and bankers (Taggart 2000: 93). Although the right populist ideas dominate the ideology and political rhetoric of the ERP parties, it is interesting to note the presence of left populist tendencies, albeit with nationalist and/or anti-Semitic overtones (i.e., Jewish bankers, multinational corporations, etc.). Since representative democracy, its institutions, and its politicians are seen as lacking in value per se within populist ideology and rhetoric (see Shils 1956: 102–103), populists, logically, favor direct democracy (see Mény and Surel 2000: 61).13 As Jean-Marie Le Pen stated at a press conference in 1987, “in order to give a voice to the people, we have to move in the direction of direct democracy. That is the only way to promote the development of the people’s participation in their own destiny” (quoted in Souchard et al. 1997: 137).14 Being trapped within the existing system of representative democracy, the Front National nonetheless seeks to reinforce direct democracy by frequent recourse to referendum (see Mény and Surel 2000: 193). In their 1997 program, for instance, the Front National wrote that “in order to liberate the French people from the influence of the political class, the Front National will expand the use of the referendum. In that way, people will be able to express their opinions on all major social issues, such as immigration, ‘national preference,’ the death penalty …” (Front National 1997).15 This point is made even clearer in a speech given by Le Pen in 1991: I will here demonstrate that French democracy is much more a democracy of appearance than a real democracy. The citizens think that they can express their opinion. They cannot; not on a certain number of essential issues, such as immigration, the death penalty, and so on,… well, yes, on those issues where the

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preferences of our people represent a ‘crushing’ majority. And when they say “Le Pen is speaking up on things that people think silently to themselves,” they are right. So, why do we not recognize the massive support for changed policies? (Le Pen, speech published in Présent, 30 August 1991, quoted in Souchard et al. 1997: 136)16

The Front National thus consistently chose the same core issues, such as immigration and the death penalty, to exemplify issues that should be decided directly by the people in referendum. The FN also understood that considerably more voters supported its positions on these issues than it could hope to mobilize in support for the party. Moreover, since the party knew that the established parties would never agree to referenda, not least because of the wave of official protests that would come in from abroad, the Front National simply made the point that the political establishment puts certain elite values over the will of the people.17 As Mény and Sorel (2000) have argued, the ambiguity of the concept of ‘democracy,’ which permits a wide range of interpretations, provides populists with an opportunity to argue, with a certain credibility, that representative democracy in contemporary Western countries actually runs counter to ‘true,’ direct democracy. While populists, as Shils (1956: 98) noted, proclaim “that the will of the people as such is supreme over every other standard,” most established parties argue that certain democratic values such as pluralism have to be protected in order to keep democracy alive. Democracy cannot be reduced to mere voting procedure.18 Nevertheless, this results in a situation in which the established parties and the populists accuse each other of being undemocratic. In a way, this may be seen as a frame struggle over the concept of ‘democracy,’ and in this context it is important to note that for quite a number of people, populism does not present a threat to democracy, but rather is the “true, radical ideal of democracy itself” (Canovan 1981: 172). One example of how the Front National uses this ambiguity can be found in the following statement by Yvan Blot, one of the leading FN ideologues: “Two conceptions of democracy confront each other: direct democracy, which permits people to participate in decision making, and the indirect or representative democracy, which forces people to delegate their power to representatives and to dissociate themselves from the decision making. The Western democracies are indirect democracies. Are they still ‘democracies’?” (Quoted in Mayer 1999: 220).19 At the same time, however, one of the characteristics of the Front National, as well as of several other ERP parties, has been a certain ambiguity concerning its commitment to democracy. Although the ERP parties are careful to present a democratic image to the public, based on their conception of democracy, their ideology is based on monism and antipluralism (see the introduction). Moreover, as will be discussed below, the democracy of the Front National and the other ERP parties can best

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be understood in terms of ‘Herrenvolk democracy,’ that is, a conception of democracy that denies rights to those not deemed to belong to ‘the people’ (see Canovan 1981: 203).20 However, this is at least as much a result of the FN’s ethno-nationalist ideology as of its populism—although ethno-nationalism and populism tend to overlap in this respect, as we will see below.

Populists’ Invocation of ‘the People’: Democratic or Ethno-nationalist? As we have seen, ‘the people’ plays an absolutely essential role in populist ideology and rhetoric. However, the term is ambiguous. The lines of inclusion are often very fuzzy, and populists are typically more clear about which groups that are to be excluded. As Taggart (2000: 96) has suggested, the lines of exclusion often correspond to ethno-nationalist or ethno-regional identities. This implies that populists often are ethnonationalist (which does not necessarily mean that all or even most ethnonationalists are populists). In populist ideology and rhetoric ‘the people’ are presented as monolithic, as a unitary entity without internal divisions (Taggart 2000: 92). Still, in order to treat ‘the people’ as monolithic, populists exclude whole groups of individuals from ‘the people.’ Exactly what groups are excluded varies from one movement to another. However, they often involve the ‘elites,’ immigrants and other ethnic minorities, and sometimes internationalists and supranationalists (Canovan 1999: 5). Populism is thus often allied with ethno-nationalism (see chapter 4). As several scholars have noted (e.g., Mény and Surel 2000: 217–218; Stewart 1969: 183), populists have a tendency to equate ‘the people’ with ‘the nation’ and, in a manner similar to ethno-nationalists, stress the eternal value of ‘organic community.’ The Front National is both ethno-nationalist and populist, as exemplified by the statement of Stirbois that “[w]e are the people because for us national and popular are and must be synonymous.… We stand above all for the reconciliation and unity of the French people, of the popular community” (Stirbois 1988: 222; quoted in Davies 1999: 106). Moreover, just like ethno-nationalism, populism is inward looking and loathes internationalism and cosmopolitanism (Taggart 2000: 96). Taggart (2000) has used the term ‘heartland’ as a way of conceptualizing the populists’ lines of inclusion. According to Taggart (2000: 3, 95), populist ideology tends to build on an idealized image of a chosen people that is located in a similarly idealized landscape, that is, a ‘heartland.’ For some populist movements, the heartland coincides with a nation, for others with a region. However, both these variants are constructed by looking inward and backward; what is imagined is the homogeneous and genuine way of life of an idealized past, the good, sacred time of the simple, spontaneous order of the Gemeinschaft (MacRae 1969: 155–156).21 It is the people inhabiting this imagined heartland that constitute ‘the

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people’ of populist ideology and rhetoric: those who did not belong to the people of the heartland of the past do not belong to ‘the people’ of today, either. Another aspect of the monolithic conception of ‘the people,’ propelled by populists, is its effort to present itself as above class, as classless. Since ‘the people’ is unitary and undifferentiated by class cleavage, populists, claiming to be ‘the voice of the people,’ must be, as well (Taggart 2000: 96). Hence, we seldom hear populists appeal to the ‘working man’ or the ‘middle classes,’ but rather to the ‘small man,’ the ‘ordinary man,’ or, mostly, simply to ‘the people’ (see Worsley 1969: 241). Do populists stress the superiority of ‘the people’ because they express deeply rooted democratic convictions, or, as Taggart (2000: 95) argues, because “‘the people’ occupy the heartland, and this is what, in essence, populists are trying to evoke”? Is the populist invocation of ‘the people’ mainly democratic or ethno-nationalist? The answer to this question is, I believe, contingent upon how we define ‘democracy’ as well as which populist movement we are looking at. However, I believe that the Front National and the other ERP parties invoke ‘the people’ in a way that is closer to ethno-nationalism than to democratic values, however we choose to define ‘democracy.’ Bruno Mégret’s words below offer a good illustration of the FN’s position: Democracy cannot … be realized through a collection of individuals without bonds to each other, and even less through a juxtaposition of different ethnic groups with incompatible cultural references. In order to nourish democracy and to make it flourish, it has to permeate an authentic people, that is, a community of men and women who mutually recognize their closeness to each other as a result of language, culture, faith, blood, and history. (Quoted in Mény and Surel 2000: 207–208)22

Nevertheless, ‘the people’ serve several different purposes in populist ideology and rhetoric. The way populists use the term implies that ‘the people’ are numerous and in the majority, which lends legitimacy to those claiming to speak in the name of ‘the people’ (see Taggart 2000: 92). In addition, as we saw above, populists argue that superior virtue and wisdom reside in the common people. Populists often counter the stupidity, corruptness, and superficiality of elite values and bookish knowledge with the sound common sense of the common man (Canovan 1981: 233; Taggart 2000: 94–95). Given the essential role played by ‘the ordinary people’ or ‘the simple man’ in populist ideology, we can easily understand how important it is for populist leaders to present themselves as ‘one of them.’ In fact, one of Le Pen’s stock-in-trade phrases has long been “We are the people,” and Mégret has at least since 1993 used a similar expression, claiming that the Front National is “by the people, for the people” (Davies 1999: 106). However, here we can see an important split between Jean-Marie Le Pen and Bruno

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Mégret. While Mégret has a hard time downplaying his elite education at the ENA, Le Pen has a certain gift for presenting himself as one of ‘the little people’ in the way he speaks as well as in what he says: I am the grandson of farmers and sailors, who, like my grandfather Le Pen, started to work at the age of five and who worked fifteen hours a day, seven days a week, who raised their children without child allowances, who had no hope of retiring, who often died in the war. As a child, I knew the hardship of their situation. I am the son of a father who died for France … and of a mother who was forced to leave school at the age of twelve in order to raise her brothers and sisters. I have also had a couple of extremely tough jobs, as when I was a soldier. I have seen human misery, and I have a deep comprehension of working people and their humble but painful problems. (Quoted in Mény and Surel 2000: 79)23

On other occasions, Jean-Marie Le Pen has presented himself as “a man of the people, born in a flat with two rooms, without running water, with grandparents who did not know how to read or write” (Le Monde, 13–14 December 1998; quoted in Mayer 1999: 235–236).24 Moreover, in contrast to other politicians and political parties, the Front National does not oppose being called ‘populist.’ This, I will argue, is another example of the strategic aim of FN representatives: to present themselves as belonging to ‘the ordinary people.’ As Le Pen stated in 1994, “populism is the application of a politics of the people and for the people” (Libération, 3 September 1994; quoted in Wieviorka 1997: 77–78).25

A Populist Political Economy? The populist conception of political economy is more or less a corollary of its conception of ‘democracy,’ ‘the people’ and the ‘person.’26 Populism opposes centralization, division of labor, classes, large-scale production, and politics that stress the supremacy of economic growth (see Fryklund and Peterson 1981). It furthermore opposes the internationalization of the economy, which they set against the ‘real economy’ (Mény and Surel 2000: 217–218). There are several reasons for this rejection: because they ruin the Gemeinschaft and thus alienate people from their integrated lives and personalities; because they are associated with the ‘elites,’ which by definition are against the ‘small people’ of the ‘heartland’; and, finally, because they are based on ideologies, either liberalism or socialism, which are anathema to populist ideology. Instead, populism seeks economic policy based on a traditional economy that emphasizes small-scale production, an economy based on family capitalism and craft and trade guilds (Fryklund and Peterson 1981; Mény and Surel 2000: 199). Populist ideology is not against economic inequality per se; only against inequality caused by institutions it does not like (see above). On the other hand, inequality produced by the ‘traditional’ institutions of the Gemeinschaft is accepted and seen as ‘natural’ (Wiles 1969: 170).

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Are the Front National and the other ERP parties populist in this sense? It has been argued (i.e., Kitschelt 1995) that the ERP parties are inherently neo-liberal, which, as we have seen, is anathema to populists. In my opinion, this argument is somewhat flawed. First, as I have argued repeatedly, the Front National and the other ERP parties have been far from static. Even if some of them were in favor of economic policies emanating from neo-liberalism during the 1980s, most of them, the FN included, took a national-protectionist position during the 1990s. The FN, for instance, has favored ‘national capitalism.’ Second, the anti-tax rhetoric of the ERP parties should not be seen mainly as a sign of neo-liberalism but as populist opposition to the centralization and elite values of the state. In a speech given in 1997, Le Pen echoed traditional populist rhetoric: The same egoistic interests, those of anonymous and vagabond capital, which often turned the mines and the factories of the nineteenth century into veritable hells, are today turning dozens of millions of children into slaves and are keeping hundreds of millions in poverty throughout the Third World. These are the financial, speculative interests of the big multinational corporations, which with the goal of accumulating an unlimited, and therefore illegal, profit have established and imposed these interests on us as inevitable. This is a part of a conspiracy called ‘globalism.’ (Quoted in Mény and Surel 2000: 201)27

Still, we should keep in mind that—because economic policy has mostly been of secondary ideological importance to the ERP parties—they have often staked out positions that they believed were most suitable for the available niches in the electoral arena. Hence, in the 1980s many ERP parties tried to position themselves by using Reaganite and Thatcherite economic policies. During the 1990s, on the other hand, it became more profitable to exploit anti-globalization sentiments by using the corresponding rhetoric, which moved their economic positions leftward. However, my point is that this shift made the economic position of the ERP parties more consistent with their extreme right populist ideology.

Anti-intellectualism and Conspiracy Theories within Populist Ideology and Rhetoric In extolling the straightforwardness, simplicity, clarity, and common sense of ‘the common man,’ populism aims at a politics of simplicity. Politics should be as simple and direct as the spirit of ‘the people,’ and solutions to political problems should be formulated in a way that is commonly understood (Taggart 2000: 97, 112).28 In fact, populists have always maintained that most political issues actually are much more simple than the politicians of the established parties pretend. If ‘the political class,’ to use another populist term, argues that politics is a complex and difficult task, it is because they want, as Canovan (1981: 208) so eloquently puts it, to “protect the mysteries of their trade from the public gaze.” By wrapping

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up their language in “a fog of complexities and technicalities” (Canovan 1981: 208), they hope to keep the people at a distance, so that they can keep the power by themselves. Another aspect of populist ideology and rhetoric, related to the quest for simplicity, is its anti-intellectualism and distrust of educated people (Canovan 1981: 183; MacRae 1969: 161). This aspect is of course also related to populists’ dislike of elites and elite values. Nevertheless, as we have seen, populists are in favor of transparent decision making procedures, such as referenda, as well as of simplistically formulated policy proposals. All nontransparent aspects of the political process, such as compromises, coalition building, secret treaties, the technical language of specialists, and so on, are denounced by populist ideology and rhetoric (see Canovan 1999: 6). In addition, populists use these kinds of nontransparent political procedures as a means to verify the plausibility of their conspiracy theories. Conspiracy theories in their modern forms are described by Popper (1971: 95) as “a typical result of the secularization of a religious superstition.” Such a theory declares, according to Popper (1971: 95), that “whatever happens in society—especially happenings such as war, unemployment, poverty, shortages, which people as a rule dislike—is the result of direct design by some powerful individuals and groups.” Furthermore, as Lipset and Raab (1970: 15) have argued, it “is an essential element of the conspiracy theory that such conspiracy is the decisive factor in turning history.” Finally, conspiracy consists of “the manipulation of the many by the few” (Lipset and Raab 1970: 15). Because ‘the people’ is seen as inherently good— a thought that constitutes the backbone of populist ideology—‘ordinary people’ cannot be blamed for the evil and decadence of contemporary society. Instead, this blame is put on ‘the elites,’ and in particular on the secret elites that are working behind the scenes. Conspiracy theories, in the meaning given to them by Popper and Lipset and Raab, are more often than not an essential part of populist ideology as well as rhetoric. The same is true, however, for other movements that build on a monist ideology (Lipset and Raab 1970: 13). Consequently, conspiracy theories are occurring frequently in right-wing extremist ideologies and rhetoric, but also in left-wing extremist ideologies and rhetoric.29 As we will see below, the Front National frequently uses conspiracy theories in its ideology and political rhetoric. The core aspects of the conspiracy theories advanced by the Front National are that (1) the political reality shown to the public by the establishment is merely an illusion that conceals mysterious forces beneath the surface; (2) these forces deliberately try to obscure political reality; (3) these forces conspire together as an ‘oligarchy’ in order to achieve secret aims; (4) these aims run counter to the national interest and in fact represent a severe danger to the nation; and (5) it is only the ‘national party,’ ‘the voice of the people’ (i.e., the FN), that has the power to reveal the nature of the conspiracy and thereby save the nation (see Simmons 1996: 225–226). The

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writings of the Front National are vague about who is included in this ‘oligarchy.’ However, the (national as well as international) political establishment, the bureaucracy, the media, and the lobbies, of which the ‘anti-racist’ lobby and the ‘human rights’ lobby are the most important, are often included (cf. Simmons 1996: 225–226; Souchard et al. 1997: 73– 75). Of particular importance are also the various ‘cosmopolitan actors,’ such as the European Union, the United Nations, and NATO, among others (Perrineau 1997: 68). One telling example of the first three aspects of the Front National’s conspiracy theory was given by Le Pen, when he stated that “it is not much to do with the politics of Chirac and Balladur. It is hardly more to do with the socialists, nor with the secret forces that more or less govern our country” (quoted in Perrineau 1997: 78; my emphasis).30 The following illustrates the last two aspects of the conspiracy theory put forward by the Front National: “This conspiracy aims at destroying the nations and the structures of natural order by the promotion of supranational structures, by the suppression of national borders and national preferences, by a politics aiming at low birthrates, by immigration, and by a massive naturalization of foreigners” (Le Pen, speech published in Présent, 3 May 1996; quoted in Souchard et al. 1997: 74).31 However, as we will see below, occasionally the Jews are among the conspirators, which places the Front National in a long tradition of French anti-Semitism. As many scholars have stressed, for the French extreme right, the Jews have always been a symbol of everything that is antiFrench (e.g., Simmons 1996; Winock 1998). The fact that the proportion of Jews is low in France, only 1.3 percent of the population, is irrelevant for the Front National. In concert with an old tradition of anti-Semitism, the FN points instead to the key roles that Jews allegedly play in all the major institutions that produce and promote ideas: in education, the media, and, not least, government (see Simmons 1996: 124). With certain exceptions, as in Le Pen’s statements on the role of the ‘Jewish International’ in anti-nationalist sentiments, the Jews’ role in ‘the conspiracy’ is mostly intimated rather than stated straightforwardly. One example of this rhetorical strategy is provided by the following quotation from a speech given by Yvan Blot at the Front National’s summer school in 1991. Blot argued that President Bush’s “New World Order [defends] the interests of Madame Veil, Monsieur Jean-Jacques Servan-Shreiber and Madame Barzach [all of whom are of Jewish origin] … in short, you can see what I mean to say” (quoted in Marcus 1995: 126). To sum up, we have seen that the Front National pits the ‘ordinary people’ against the ‘elites’ or the ‘establishment,’ and intimates that vicious forces threaten the close-knit community. As we will see below, the party also promises to restore the power of ‘the real elites.’ I will conclude this section with a final statement from Le Pen, which is an instructive example of the conspiracy theory used by the Front National:

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The establishment, which for the public salvation has to be overthrown by a revolution, represents the governing class, which today imposes its power on us. Human rights are its codes of law. It has its gospel according to St. Freud and St. Marx. It has its clergy, its architects, its masons, its cult sites, its republican Pantheon, its rites, its moral sermon. It is the duty of the Front National to ensure that the real elites will return to power after we have first rid French society of the parasitic bodies that are squeezing and suffocating it. (Le Pen, in Identité, January 1990; quoted in Souchard et al. 1997: 124)32

The Only True Opposition: The Anti-political-establishment Strategy In this section we will discuss the ‘anti-political-establishment strategy.’ This strategy, which corresponds to the populists’ ideological conception of democracy, is populist in character, although it is occasionally used by political ‘outsiders’ and newcomers who are not populists in other respects. A party using this strategy tries to construct an image of itself as in opposition to the ‘political class,’ while trying not to appear anti-democratic. A party that is viewed as anti-democratic runs the risk of being stigmatized and marginalized as long as the overwhelming majority of the electorate is in favor of democracy per se (Schedler 1996; cf. Mudde 1996a: 272).33 This double strategy is illustrated in figure 6.3. In order to create distance between themselves and the established political parties (i.e., both the government and the anti-incumbent opposition), populist parties aim at recoding the political space, with its diversity of parties, into one single, homogeneous political class. One way of achieving this goal is to argue that the differences between government and established opposition parties are irrelevant surface phenomena. According to populists, in reality the established parties do not compete but instead collude. The strategy of creating a political outsider image is often based as much on rhetoric as on actual policy proposals. Populist parties using the anti-political-establishment strategy often use a rhetorical style that is

FIGURE 6.3 Modes of Opposition

Government

Anti-incumbent opposition

Source: Schedler (1996: 303).

Anti-politicalestablishment opposition

Anti-democratic opposition

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FIGURE 6.4 The Populist Triangle

Source: Schedler (1996: 294), in modified form.

hard and aggressive, uncompromising and confrontational. Their rhetoric is also often framed by metaphors of fighting and war, and they frequently use brash attacks and accusations (for instance, of corruption), insults, ridicule, and, excessively, popular language (Schedler 1996: 299; cf. Mudde 1996a: 272). This rhetorical strategy aims at creating a triangular symbolic space, involving three actors and their relationships. This space, which is shown in figure 6.4, is thus made up of the relationships between the political class, representing the ‘enemy within’; the people, which is portrayed as the innocent victim; and the populist party, which springs directly from the people, and which represents the redeeming hero. In other words, the main theme in this rhetorical strategy is that the political establishment disrupts and destroys the natural harmony between the people and their populist party (Schedler 1996: 293).34 By using the anti-political-establishment strategy, populist parties seek to present themselves as the only real opposition to the ‘political class.’ However, they have to be cautious not to overstep the line to opposition to democracy per se. This is the second part of the anti-political-establishment strategy: to position the party between the ‘normal opposition’ (i.e., the presently nonincumbent party or parties) and openly anti-democratic groups. Since an overwhelming majority of the Western European voters are in favor of democracy and view anti-democratic parties and movements as illegitimate, the ability of parties that are perceived as anti-democratic to win votes is slight. This is of great importance for our discussion of the emergence of and sustained electoral support for the Front National—and for the ERP parties generally. As long as voters associate an ERP party with anti-democratic

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currents such as fascism and Nazism, it has—under contemporary Western conditions—no chance of breaking free from its marginalized existence. However, if, in the eyes of the voters, an ERP party succeeds in detaching itself from such anti-democratic currents, it may potentially attract voters outside the small, marginalized groups of voters that are prepared to support straightforward anti-democratic parties. The Front National—like several other ERP parties—has made common use of the anti-political-establishment strategy. To start with the first part of the strategy, the FN seeks to deny existing differences between the socialists and established nonsocialist parties, in order to group them together into one ‘political class’: The rotation of power, which in the fifth Republic represents a rule impossible to evade, only involves, or is only expected to involve, the RPR, the UDF, and the PS. This rotation is fake, since there are no differences between the two components of French politics. The left has long since abandoned its generous ideas—to administer the purse and to enjoy caviar. The right, on the other hand, without doubt influenced by the freemasonry that today is a dominant feature in their ranks, has abandoned the defense of national values for ‘Europeanism,’ for ‘globalism,’ and for cosmopolitanism. (Le Pen, speech published in Présent, 4 October 1995; quoted in Souchard et al. 1997: 142)35

Moreover, in La Flamme, Bruno Mégret argued that the mainstream right has been ‘hypnotized’ by the left into embracing a ‘new socialist ideology.’ Hence, according to Mégret, all established parties in France are socialistic (Simmons 1996: 228), which has strengthened the ‘oligarchy’ of the ‘political class.’ The Front National has occasionally refused to recommend how its voters should vote in the second round of the presidential elections, which is the normal procedure in French political culture. During the 1995 presidential election, for instance, Le Pen and the FN refused to recommend that its voters cast their ballots for Chirac or Jospin, who were the two candidates remaining in the second round: “Chirac is exactly like Jospin, but worse! Under these conditions, you can understand that I cannot nor do not want to advise you to vote for either of the two remaining candidates” (quoted in Ivaldi 1998: 16).36 In fact, during the late 1990s the Front National increasingly attacked the mainstream right parties, which it called the ‘principal enemies’ in 1997 (Ivaldi 1998: 16–17). Since the FN has been perceived to be closest to the mainstream right parties and occasionally collaborated with them at a local level, the FN had to go to some lengths to create distance—at least rhetorically—between themselves and the mainstream right to be successful in their use of the anti-politicalestablishment strategy. These are some examples of how the Front National has tried to avoid being associated with one or several of the established parties. As we will see below, this strategy has generally been rhetorical, while the party has

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in fact occasionally allied itself with the mainstream right in local elections. Nevertheless, the Front National has frequently accused the established politicians of being corrupt and has presented itself as the only political party that offers ‘clean hands’ (see Marcus 1995: 167). In addition, as we have seen above, populist parties often refuse to define their position in the left-right dimension. This is increasingly true also of the Front National, as is shown by the party slogan “Neither Right nor Left—French (see Ivaldi 1998: 16).37 Hence, the Front National has frequently employed the first part of the anti-political-establishment strategy and has been eager to designate the established political parties as one homogeneous political class. This strategy has been successful, partly because of the cohabitation between a president of the left and a government of the right, and the fact that all four established parties held power (in various combinations) during the 1980s and 1990s.38 Given this situation, the Front National achieved some credibility for its claim of being the only political alternative not yet tried. In addition, the victory of the left in the 1981 election, and more specifically the fact that the PCF participated in the Mauroy government, resulted in a situation in which the Communist Party lost its traditional role of an ‘anti-political-establishment’ party (see Bell and Criddle 1994: 220). The Front National could thus fill a vacuum, a role that nobody else was occupying. However, the Front National was also successful in its use of the antipolitical-establishment strategy because it was a relatively new party. As indicated in chapter 1, and as Schedler (1996) has also noted, relatively new and small parties have advantages when they use the anti-politicalestablishment strategy. As we recall from chapter 1, such a party lacks a visible history and/or extensive party organization, which provides it with a greater strategic maneuverability and the ability to present itself as an untried alternative. The second part of the anti-political-establishment strategy is also widely used by the Front National. In fact, I would even argue that the ability to create sufficient distance between a party and anti-democratic right-wing extremism, especially fascism and Nazism, has been a necessary condition for the electoral successes of ERP parties in Western Europe. While ERP parties that have been successful in creating such distance have grown significantly, those that have not differentiated themselves from such rightwing extremism have failed to grow (Ignazi and Ysmal 1992: 1; cf. Mayer 1999: 291–292).39 Hence, electoral support for the ERP parties has been inversely related to their connections to fascism and Nazism. In France, almost all voters are in favor of democracy, and the Front National has successfully used the second part of the anti-political-establishment strategy (see Safran 1993: 35, 43). Thus, this strategy has been important to the Front National, as indicated by Le Pen’s campaign to get French newspapers such as Le Monde to stop using the term ‘right-wing

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extremist’ when writing about the Front National. In November 1995, Le Pen wrote in Le Monde: Being president of this movement, I once more protest against this term. It does not simply place the Front National among the other parties. In political science, this term has a precise definition, which evokes the fascist leagues and movements of the 1930s. These were leagues and movements that were characterized by a rejection of democracy and elections, an appeal to violence, racism, and the desire to establish a one-party state. On none of these points is the Front National distinguished as an extreme right party. In fact, the Front National even opposes these things. (Quoted in Mayer 1999: 14)40

According to Kitschelt (1995: 92), the Front National’s ability to convince people that it is not heir to a fascist tradition is partly due to the plurality and diversity of rightist movements in France, where no single fascist tendency has had a hegemonic domination. Hence, Kitschelt argues, although he does not use the term, the path dependency of the Front National was lower because they had a multitude of different traditions to draw from. It is also important to note that the FN underwent an ideological transformation during the late 1970s, when many of the old neo-fascist member groups within the Front National were expelled or isolated, and the FN got rid of much of the old political ‘baggage’ of the French extreme right (Marcus 1995: 12). I believe that for the FN this was a necessary step to achieve the political legitimacy needed to break the marginalization that had dogged it since its foundation in 1972. However, despite these steps, which made it possible for the Front National to use the anti-political-establishment strategy successfully, some hard-core right-wing extremists remained within the party. As we saw in chapter 5, this has resulted in a potential conflict between the internal arena and the electoral arena, so that the leadership of the Front National has occasionally believed it necessary to make remarks that bring it closer to fascism and Nazism.41 The voters have, as might be predicted, reacted negatively to these remarks. Polls have shown that after Le Pen’s remark in September 1989 that the Holocaust was merely a detail in the history of World War II, support for the Front National immediately decreased by 6 percentage points (7 percentage points for Le Pen personally). After the affair when Le Pen ‘jokingly’ called Minister Durafour— who is of Jewish origin—Durafour crématoire (gas oven), support for the FN decreased by 2 percentage points (6 for Le Pen personally), and after the remark that the Jewish International plays an important role in the anti-national sentiments throughout the world, voters’ support for Le Pen decreased by 6 percentage points, and the support for the FN decreased by 5 percentage points (Perrineau 1997: 190).42 In sum, the Front National has successfully used the anti-politicalestablishment strategy. We have discussed some factors that have facilitated the use of this strategy. However, we have left one of the most

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important ones until now: the effect that other political actors have on whether or not this strategy will be successful. First, successful application of this strategy is facilitated by a convergence between the established parties within the political space (see Austria, as an extreme example). In such a situation, the ERP parties can more easily find justification and credibility for the claim that the established political parties do not differ from each other in any significant way (see Kitschelt 1995). As suggested in chapter 3, French voters came to perceive a convergence between the established political parties in the 1980s. In addition, other political actors have a considerable impact on whether an ERP party is successful in its efforts to legitimize the party in the eyes of the voters. The ambivalence shown by the mainstream right parties in France, with local agreements and cooperation with the Front National, together with an appropriation of policy proposals and rhetoric style, contributed to the legitimization of the FN.

Legitimization: The Dilemma of the Mainstream Right As we remember from the introduction, the electoral successes of the Front National began in Dreux in 1982, where Jean-Pierre Stirbois received 12.6 percent of the vote in the local election. After this unexpected success, the mainstream right decided to cooperate with the Front National on a joint opposition list in order to be able to beat the incumbent socialist mayor. This decision, which was initiated by the local RPR leaders, was criticized by some groups within the mainstream right, especially by the small formation CDS (Centre des Démocrats Sociaux) within the UDF federation.43 In addition, the national leader of the RPR, Jacques Chirac, disapproved of the arrangement in Dreux and argued that alliances with the Front National on joint lists would be an “alliance against nature” (Marcus 1995: 133). Yet despite this, the local mainstream right parties collaborated with the Front National in Dreux in September 1983, in the election that followed on the annulment of the earlier voting results (Marcus 1995: 133). More than 55 percent of the voters supported the list, which enabled the Front National to send deputies to the local council (Perrineau 1997: 34). This alliance provoked highly ambivalent reactions from the national leaders of the mainstream right. Although most of them argued that there should be no national alliances with the Front National, only a few could rule out the possibility of further local alliances.44 Hence, the alliance in Dreux was not condemned or rejected by the mainstream right’s national leadership. In fact, they rather gave it their tacit approval. In this way, they helped to legitimize the Front National in the eyes of the voters and consequently facilitated the FN’s successful use of the second part of the antipolitical-establishment strategy.

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I will not argue that the mainstream right parties deliberately wanted to legitimize the Front National. However, the situation they faced in Dreux and feared elsewhere forced them to choose between giving political power to the left, although they did not have to, or allying themselves with the Front National. From the perspective of the mainstream right, this was a choice between two bad things. In the 1981 election, after an ideologically colored campaign by the left, the right lost the power for the first time in twenty-three years. This fact, and especially the fact that PCF ministers took part in the government, was hard for many groups within the mainstream right to accept (Hainsworth 1992b: 41). According to internal party rhetoric that dominated during the years immediately after the victory of the left, it would be dangerous to the nation if the right failed to take back power from the left as soon as possible. Hence, there was a strong incentive for the leadership of the mainstream right—at different levels—not to cede power to the left unless it was absolutely necessary. In addition, they most likely underestimated the potential strength of the Front National, which was seen as a temporary flash of discontent.45 In this situation, the mainstream right followed the logic of spatial theory and chose the alternative they thought would give them the best short-term benefit. However, by showing the voters that they were prepared to ally themselves with the Front National, which implied that the FN could not be that dangerous and anti-democratic, they lent legitimacy to the Front National. More specifically, the Dreux alliance marked the beginning of a period of ‘normalization’ of the Front National. The period from 1983 to 1987 (roughly speaking, the FN’s breakthrough years) saw a significant acceptance of the FN as a normal feature of the political scene. In polls taken between 1983 and 1987, 33 to 43 percent of French voters did not believe that the Front National posed a danger to democracy (see figure 6.5). Hence, the proportion of the voters who did not believe that the FN presented a danger was during this period considerably larger than the proportion of the voters who voted for the party. This indicates that the FN at that time was largely freed from its anti-democratic and extremist image, which had for many years stigmatized the party.46 As I have argued above, this made it possible for the FN to use the anti-political-establishment strategy, and present itself as a political alternative (cf. Mayer and Perrineau 1992b: 123–124; Simmons 1996: 78)—and consequently to exploit the niches in the electoral arena. This would not have been possible without this basic condition. After 1987, when the normalization years were over, the proportion of the voters who did not see the Front National as a danger to democracy had decreased to a level equivalent or even below the number of voters who had voted for the party at least once (i.e., 25 percent). Consequently, from 1987 onward, further growth was severely constrained (as long as almost every voter conceived of a ‘danger to democracy’ as something

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FIGURE 6.5 The Front National—a Danger for Democracy?

Source: Perrineau (1997: 206). The percentage units refer to the part of the voters who believe that Front National is—or is not—a danger to democracy.

highly negative). This is also confirmed in a slightly different type of survey, which shows that the proportion of French voters who would never consider voting for the Front National increased from 52 to 72 percent between 1984 and 1996 (Mayer 1999: 188). A related issue that also helped legitimize the Front National was the dilemma of how to condemn the FN but not its voters. In order to win back dissident voters (as we have seen, in the 1980s most of the FN voters came from the mainstream right), the mainstream right parties could not afford to stigmatize those who voted for the FN (Marcus 1995: 136). Another legitimizing factor, which was partly discussed in chapter 5, was that some of the leading representatives of the mainstream right tried to appropriate the Front National’s policy proposals on matters such as immigration and law and order, as well as, occasionally, imitate the FN’s anti-immigration rhetoric. In 1984, for instance, Chirac made an effort to express tougher attitudes toward issues such as immigration and crime.

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As we saw above, in October of that year, he stated that “if there were fewer immigrants, there would be less unemployment, less tension in certain towns, and lower social costs” (quoted in Marcus 1995: 136). In 1988 Pasqua publicly expressed his regret that the death penalty had been abolished, and in April of the same year he stated that there is no shame in saying that we want a strong France, with large families, respect for moral values, and the end of attacks on children which are the outcome of pornography. I must add that the Gaullist movement has supported direct democracy since its origin, even more than parliamentary democracy.… Yes, there are a few extremists in the Front National, but basically, the Front National has the same preoccupations, the same values as the majority. It merely expresses them in a more brutal and noisy way. (Quoted in Simmons 1996: 91)

Moreover, as discussed in chapter 5, the effort to bring forward a new Nationality Bill before the 1988 election, in order to prevent the Front National from exploiting this issue itself, proved counterproductive. Since the government failed to deliver on the proposal, these efforts legitimized the Front National. In addition, the FN exploited this failure as an illustration of the incompetence and the inability to act, which, according to the FN, characterizes the established political parties and politicians.47 To sum up, before Dreux, the perception of Front National as an antidemocratic extremist party made it impossible to reach its potential electorate (see Perrineau 1997: 33). The voting results in Dreux, and not least the subsequent behavior of the mainstream right parties, changed this situation. By legitimizing the Front National in the eyes of the voters, and by attracting attention from the national media, it provided the FN with an opportunity to present itself as a legitimate, if untried, alternative within the niches already created in the political space.

Conclusion In this chapter, I have discussed the importance of (1) declining party identification, which freed many voters from their bonds to established political parties; and (2) the declining political trust and increasing political dissatisfaction that gave the Front National the opportunity to mobilize protest voters. I have also demonstrated to what extent the Front National has been influenced by populist ideology. Like most populists, the FN has stressed the gulf between ‘the people’ and the ‘political establishment.’ The party has also used conspiracy theories, a quest for political simplicity, and a definition of ‘the people,’ which correspond to populist ideology. Finally, I have discussed the importance of populist strategies, and in particular the anti-political-establishment strategy. By means of this strategy,

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the Front National was able to present itself as a political outsider, but not as an anti-democratic party, which would have had repelled voters. The ambiguous behavior of the mainstream right, which has occasionally been prepared to ally itself with the Front National and that occasionally has appropriated policy proposals and rhetoric styles from the FN, contributed to a partial legitimization of the Front National, which made successful use of the anti-political-establishment strategy possible.

Notes 1. Pessimism reached its peak in 1984, even if we consider all years up to 1998 (Mayer (1999: 213). 2. This development continued even after the emergence of the Front National (see Mayer 1999: 189). 3. In fact, the French public’s interest in politics grew between the 1960s and the 1990s. In 1962, 37 percent of respondents declared that they were “rather or very interested in politics,” compared to 47 percent in 1997 (Mayer 1999: 138–139; cf. Ranger 1996: 111). However, the Front National voters had the lowest level of interest in politics: in 1997, 54 percent of the FN voters declared that they did not have any interest in politics, or only a little—compared to 49 percent of the RPR/UDF voters, 45 percent of the PS voters, and 38 percent of the PCF voters (Perrineau 1997: 114–115). 4. For ‘voter mobility’ in France, see Mény and Surel (2000: 229) and Boy and Mayer (1992: 292). 5. The FN voters have not only been among the most loyal, they have also been among the most determined. “Both in the regional elections of 1992 and the parliamentary election of 1993, more than 70 percent of Front National voters declared to have made their choice several months before the election, compared to 55 and 60 percent respectively for the average voting population” (Betz 1994: 63). 6. This loyalty is more likely a result of the fact that many of the Front National voters are issue voters, which means that many of them are genuinely interested in implementing the FN’s party program (Simmons 1996: 183). 7. This should be contrasted with 81 percent of Barre’s potential voters, 84 percent of Chirac’s supporters, and 91 percent of Mitterrand’s potential voters (Mayer and Perrineau 1992b: 133). 8. Moreover, on the eve of the 1997 election, 46 percent of the French public declared that the election would have “practically no consequences for us” (Ivaldi 1998: 19). 9. We should keep in mind that there are other ‘populisms’ than the one represented by the ERP parties (see Mény and Surel 2000: 296). In addition, in studying the phenomenon of extreme right populism, we should be aware that the proportion of populism and right-wing extremism differs between the ERP parties. The FPÖ, for instance, involves more populism than the Vlaams Blok (see Mény and Surel 2000: 257). 10. In addition, nonpopulist parties may also involve some populist aspects, although they are not based on them (or dominated by them). 11. My translation. Original quotation: “Du peuple, par le peuple, pour le peuple; en France, le peuple est souverain. C’est de lui que procède le pouvoir, c’est lui qui décide de son destin et c’est pour lui qu’agissent les gouvernants. Tel est, en tout cas, le principe de la souveraineté dans notre nation, tel est le sens profond de l’institution républicaine, tels sont les fondements de la démocratie en France. Cette dernière, loin de constituer un simple mécanisme constitutionnel qui se définirait par le recours à

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12. 13.

14.

15.

16.

17.

18.

19.

20.

21. 22.

The Populist Challenge

l’élection, est, bien au-delà de cette mise en forme juridique, l’expression quasi sacrée de la légitimité issue du people.” My translation. Original quotation: “Chômage—immigration—corruption—insecurité— impôts. ‘Tournons la page.’ ‘En avant pour la 6e République.” It should be noted that the ERP parties are not alone in their criticism of representative democracy and their favoring of direct democracy. The Greens in several countries, for example, have also taken similar positions (see Mény and Surel 2000: 115). My translation. Original quotation: “[p]our rendre la parole au peuple, il faut aller vers la démocratie directe car elle seule permettra de développer la participation du peuple à son destin.” My translation. Original quotation: “[p]our libérer le peuple français de l’emprise de la classe politique, le Front National étendra le champ d’application du référendum. Ainsi le peuple pourra-t-il s’exprimer lui-même sur toutes les grandes questions de société: immigration, préférence nationale, peine de mort.…” My translation. Original quotation: “Et c’est là que je démontre que la démocratie française est beaucoup plus une démocratie d’apparence qu’une démocratie de réalité. Les citoyens croient avoir leur mot à dire. Ils ne l’ont pas. Sur un certain nombre de sujet fundamentaux—l’immigration, la peine de mort, quelques autres,… eh, bien, ces aspirations qui sont celles de notre peuple sont majoritaires de façon ‘ecrasante.’ Et quand on a dit ‘Le Pen dit tout haut ce que tout le monde pense tout base,’ c’est bien vrai, alors pourquoi ne recevons-nous pas, lors des élections, l’appui massif et décisif qui permettrai un changement de politique?” The FN voters are also in favor of referendum and direct democracy. In 1988, 75 percent of the FN voters thought that it would be a good idea to use referenda as a means to decide on major problems, such as economic and social problems, since it gives people the chance to directly govern the results. However, this is not considerably higher than the voters of the established parties (67 percent) and is lower than the voters of the Green Party (Mayer 1999: 46). Moreover, most established parties cannot afford to disregard the need for an efficient way to handle the administration of the state, an issue that most populists never deal with. However, the Front National has occasionally argued that direct democracy is more efficient than representative democracy, although they never give arguments for why that is the case. Le Pen, for example, stated in 1987 that “I believe in the efficiency of direct democracy, whereas indirect and representative democracy—as ours—is not as efficient. This has to be acknowledged.” My translation. Original quotation: “[m]oi, je crois à l’efficacité de la démocratie directe quand la démocratie indirecte et représentative—celle qui est la nôtre—n’a plus d’efficité, il faut bien le reconnaître” (Le Pen in the National Assembly, 7 April 1987, quoted in Souchard et al. 1997: 137). My translation. Original quotation: “Deux conceptions de la démocratie s’affrontent. Le démocratie directe, qui permet au peuple de participer aux décisions, et la démocratie indirecte ou représentative, qui oblige le peuple à déléguer ses pouvoirs à des représentants et l’écarte des décisions. Les démocraties occidentales sont des démocraties indirectes. Sont-elles encore des ‘démocraties’?” Furthermore, many have based their organizations on paramilitary structures, and they occasionally have close contacts with openly anti-democratic groups, such as neo-fascists and skinheads (Mény and Surel 2000: 252). As many have observed, many populist movements have been against individualism and the vices of urban life (e.g., Stewart 1969: 192). My translation. Original quotation: “la démocratie ne peut … se réaliser avec une simple collection d’individus sans liens entre eux, et encore moins avec une juxtaposition de groupes ethniques diférents ou possédant des références culturelles incompatibles. Il lui faut, pour naître et s’épanouir, le creuset d’un peuple authentique, c’est-à-dire une communauté d’hommes et de femmes qui se reconnaissent mutuellement comme proches les uns des autres par la langue, la culture, la foi, le sang et l’histoire.”

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23. My translation. Original quotation: “Petit-fils de paysan et de marins qui dans la prémière moitié du siècle travaillèrent, pour certains, comme mon grand-père Le Pen, de l’âge de cinq ans, quinze heurs par jour, sept jours par semaine, élevèrent des enfants sans allocations familiales ni espoir de retraite et allant de temps à autre mourir à la guerre, j’ai connu dès l’enfance la dureté de leur condition. Fils d’un père mort pour la France,… et d’une mère qui ne put rester à l’école que jusqu’à douze ans, afin d’élever ses frères et sœurs. Ayant moi-même connu quelques-uns des métiers les plus durs, y compris celui des armes, j’ai côtoyé la misère humaine et, plus sans doute que beaucoup, je suis à même de comprendre ceux qui travaillent et leurs humbles mais lancinants problèmes.” 24. My translation. Original quotation: “un homme du peuple, né dans un deux-pièces sans eau courante et dont les grandsparents ne savaient ni lire ni écrire.” Populists are not the only ones that boast of the fact of having grown up under humble conditions; it is common among left politicians, as well. 25. My translation. Original quotation: “le populisme, c’est l’application d’une politique par le peuple et pour le peuple.“ 26. Populists are not individualists. On the contrary, they are more accurately described as anti-individualists, and they denounce individualistic tendencies in the contemporary world. I will argue that populists are ‘personalists’ (see MacRae 1969: 159). According to populists, in simple societies there are few institutions, but these are highly uniform. Individuals in such societies fill many roles, which makes them integrated personalities. In complex societies, on the other hand, the advanced division of labor forces people into specialization, which means that their personalities become dominated by one occupational role. As a result, people living in complex societies have one-sided and fragmentary personalities, which is a bad thing from a populist perspective. The remedy of this alienation, resulting from specialization and individualization processes, is to limit the division of labor within a society (MacRae 1969: 159–160). In the glorious past of the imagined ‘heartland,’ however, individuals were complete persons, who always understood each other and reached full agreement. Such a society would be essentially consensual and uniform, and the men and women in it would not be alienated—but fixed and static (MacRae 1969: 160). 27. My translation. Original quotation: “Les mêmes intérêts égoïstes, ceux du capital anonyme et vagabond qui firent souvent, au XIXe siècle, des mines et des usines de véritables enfers et qui, aujourd’hui encore, réduisent dans le tiers monde des dizaines de millions d’enfants en esclavage et des centaines de millions d’autres à la pauvreté, ceux des intérêts financiers massifs de la spéculation, des grandes multinationales, qui, dans le but d’accumuler un profit illimité et donc illicite, ont mis en place et imposé dans les esprits comme issue inéluctable les éléments d’un complot: le mondialisme.” 28. This aspect may motivate voters to vote for populist parties. One voter of the Front National, for instance, stated in an interview: “Le Pen, he talks about real things. It is not like the speeches full of inflation and trade outlook statistics.” My translation. Original quotation: “Le Pen, lui il parle simplement de choses vrais. C’est pas comme ces discours remplis de chiffres sur l’inflation et la conjoncture!” (Blondel and Lacroix 1996: 159). 29. As Popper (1971: 95) argued, “people who sincerely believe that they know how to make heaven on earth are most likely to adopt the conspiracy theory, and to get involved in a counter-conspiracy against non-existing conspirators.” This is, I believe, true of both extreme right and extreme left groups. 30. My translation. Original quotation: “La politique de Chirac et de Balladur est de ne pas en faire. C’est de ne pas faire de peine aux socialistes, ni aux forces secrètes qui gouvernement plus au moins notre pays.” 31. My translation. Original quotation: “Ce complot vise à détruire les nations et les structures de l’ordre naturel par la promotion des structures supranationales, suppression des frontières et des préférences nationales, politiques anti-natalistes, d’immigration et de naturalisation massive.”

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32. My translation. Original quotation: “L’établissement, qu’il s’agit de renverser par une révolution de salut public, désigne la classe dirigeante qui impose aujourd’hui son pouvoir. Les droits de l’homme sont ses tables de la Loi. Il a ses évangiles selon saint Freud et saint Marx. Il a son clergé, son architecte et ses maçons. Son lieu de culte, le Panthéon républicain, ses rites, il prêche la morale. Le Front national a pour devoir d’assurer le retour au pouvoir des vrais élites, après avoir dépouillé la société française des corps parasitaires qui l’enserrent et l’asphyxient.” 33. The French electorate was no exception. As Mayer (1999: 44) has shown, the French voters generally saw democracy per se as something positive. So did in fact, although a little bit less, the Front National voters. 34. Part of the anti-political-establishment strategy is also an unwillingness to define the party’s position in the left-right economic dimension, a political dimension that is dismissed as anachronistic. In addition, as Schedler (1996: 302) makes clear, parties using the anti-political-establishment strategy can be right-wing left-wing, or neither. 35. My translation. Original quotation: “L’alternance, qui est présenté comme la règle incontournable de la Ve république, ne se fait ou n’est prévue de se faire qu’entre le RPR et l’UDF et le Parti socialiste. Il s’agit là d’une alternance bidon, puisque aussi bien il n’y a plus de différence entre ces deux composantes de la politique française. La gauche a abandonné depuis longtemps ses idéaux généreux pour les remplacer par la gestion de la bourse des valeurs et la dégustation du caviar. Quant à la droite, sans doute sous l’influence de la maçonnerie aujourd’hui dominante dans ses rangs, elle a abandonné la défense des valeurs nationales pour se rallier à l’européanisme, au mondialisme, au cosmopolitisme.” 36. My translation. Original quotation: “Chirac, c’est Jospin en pire! Dans ces conditions, vous comprenez que je ne peux ni ne veux vous recommender de voter pour l’une ou l’autre des candidats résiduels.” 37. This slogan was coined by Maréchal in 1995 and was more or less immediately appropriated by Le Pen. As we saw in chapter 2, about 50 percent of FN voters placed the Front National as ‘extreme right’ during the late 1990s. 38. Between 1981 and 1984, the PS and PCF governed together; between 1984 and 1986, France was governed by the PS; between 1986 and 1988, a coalition of the RPR and the UDF was in power; between 1993 and 1995, the UDF held power alone; between 1995 and 1997, it was the RPR; and since 1997, a union of the PS, the PCF, and the Greens has been in power (Perrineau 1997: 104–105). 39. The case of the Republikaner in Germany also is an excellent example. Each time a far-right party such as the Republikaner has emerged in Germany, it has attracted neo-Nazi militants, which pushes the party’s position in that direction. The new party then gets a reputation of being just another anti-democratic extreme right party, which spoils its chance to break out of its electoral marginalization (Karapin 1998: 225; Kitschelt 1995: 210–218). 40. My translation. Original quotation: “Président de ce mouvement, je proteste une fois de plus contre cette qualification. Elle ne se borne pas innocemment à assigner au Front national une place sur l’éventail des partis. En science politique, elle a une définition bien précise qui, évoquant les ligues et les mouvements fascistes d’avant-guerre, se caractérise par le refus de la démocratie et des élections, l’appel à la violence, le racisme et la volonté d’installer le parti unique. Or, sur chacun de ces points, le Front national se distingue de l’extrême droite et même s’oppose à elle.” 41. One possible reason for this, which I have indicated before, is that the leadership of the FN had to please more radical cadres within the party organization. 42. Nevertheless, the importance of this second part of the ‘anti-political-establishment strategy’ is also indicated by the Front National’s ambiguous relationship with the skinheads. While the FN always had contacts with skinheads, and occasionally used them as security guards at meetings and demonstrations, the party has always been cautious to keep them at a distance, and has not allowed the establishment of more permanent links (Wieviorka 1997: 107–108).

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43. As Marcus (1995: 133) notes, “[t]he split in the mainstream right in Dreux … illustrates something that was to become clearer as the years went on, namely, that divisions over how to deal with Le Pen were not so much between UDF and RPR, as within each formation, with powerful local interests often taking precedence over the concerns of national politics.” 44. The ones who most clearly condemned the alliance were Simone Veil and the CDS leaders. 45. Even after the both real and potential strength of the Front National had become known, a considerable proportion of the supporters of the mainstream right was not prepared to categorically rule out alliances with it. Between 1983 and 1987, between 43 and 55 percent of the RPR/UDF voters did not rule out an alliance with the FN. After 1988, between 52 and 77 percent said the same thing. The RPR voters have consistently been more positive than the UDF voters about an alliance with the FN (Perrineau 1997: 207). 46. However, the answer to the question if the FN is a danger to democracy may also partly reflect whether people believe that the party has any chance to seize power. 47. Besides these legitimizing effects, the event in Dreux made the Front National politically visible. Although the election in Dreux was a local one, it attracted national media attention (Simmons 1996: 75). In 1983 there was a rupture in the media’s attention to the Front National. As data from the Service d’orientation des programmes audiovisuels shows, the FN had practically no television time at all in 1982, while it had 41 minutes at its disposal in 1983 (on the three national television channels). In 1984, the party’s television time had increased to 2 hours and 24 minutes, and in 1985 it was 4 hours and 24 minutes (Ignazi 1996b: 65).

CONCLUSION


The aim of this study was to present a theoretically based explanation of the emergence of and sustained electoral support for the French Front National. By taking both the political demand side and the political supply side into consideration, and by distinguishing between the macro and the micro levels, I have been able to discuss and relate societal structures (macro demand), the voters (micro demand), the party systems (macro supply), and the political parties (micro supply). One basic assumption was that the macro levels on both the demand and the supply sides are characterized by a higher degree of inertia than the micro levels, which were assumed to be relatively more volatile. More specifically, I have argued that in order to explain the success of the Front National—and ERP parties more generally—we have to consider both opportunity structures, created by demand- and supply-side factors alike, as well as the ability of the various ERP parties to take advantage of the available opportunities. Two phenomena were singled out as particularly important opportunity structures for the emergence of the Front National and the other ERP parties: (1) the partial realignment of cleavages, which has increased the importance of the socio-cultural cleavage dimension at the expense of the economic dimension; and (2) the growing discontent with political institutions, in particular the established political parties. More specifically, I have argued that structural changes associated with the transformation from an industrial toward a postindustrial society facilitated the emergence of two ‘positive’ niches, that is, ethno-nationalism and xenophobia, and one partly ‘positive’ and partly ‘negative’ niche (‘positive’ in the sense that it attracts voters to the Front National, ‘negative’ in the sense that it turns voters away from the established parties), that is, political discontent and alienation. I have also demonstrated that the number of voters sharing such attitudes increased in France during the years preceding the emergence of the Front National. The transformation from an industrial to a postindustrial economy has affected groups of individuals differently depending on their position within the social space: some groups have won, others have lost. This has

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resulted in feelings of absolute and relative deprivation. More specifically, in the wake of these changes, (1) some groups of voters became increasingly marginalized and excluded, or at least felt that way; (2) a widening gap was created between some voters’ expectations and their actual lives; (3) some voters lost their cognitive and emotional map of reality because of the erosion of traditions, habits, religion, class loyalties, and/or political ideologies; and (4) some voters became increasingly detached and alienated from the established political institutions. This transformation process has also changed the structure of social comparison. Individuals with little cultural capital and/or with cultural capital invested in ‘old’ modes of production (i.e., unskilled and semiskilled workers as well as segments of the lower middle class, such as some small traders, craftsmen, and other small employers), have increasingly found themselves in a situation of social decline and status deprivation, which has made them susceptible to the messages of political entrepreneurs who promote a return to the status quo ante and who stress themes of ethno-national identity and xenophobic welfare chauvinism. The logistic regression analyses in chapter 2 generally confirm that voters living under conditions of real or perceived absolute or relative deprivation were more likely to hold authoritarian, ethno-nationalist, and xenophobic attitudes. They were also more discontented than average with politicians and political institutions. Finally, they were also generally more prone to vote for the Front National or Le Pen. However, as will be discussed below, we should be aware that the sociological profile of the FN voters changed between the various elections, particularly between the mid 1980s and the 1990s. Moreover, I have found indications of a partial realignment in France during the past few decades, such that the salience of the socio-cultural cleavage dimension has increased at the expense of the economic cleavage dimension. As a consequence of this partial realignment, many who previously defined themselves, their adversaries, and socio-political issues in terms of economics now instead define these things in terms of ethnicity and nationality. Thus, because of absolute or relative deprivation and/or cognitive and emotional disorientation, increasingly large voter groups became susceptible to the authoritarian, populist, neo-racist ideology of the Front National, stressing themes of resentment and ethno-national identity. In addition, because of the decline in class voting and party identification, resources (in the form of volatile voters) were freed for the emergence of new parties. In fact, I would argue that on the demand side, macro changes resulted in a changed distribution of voters’ attitudes and preferences. However, the parties are not as flexible as the voters; shifting positions takes some time for a political party, because of constraints such as ideological commitment and identification, history, and democratic but ‘inefficient’ party organization. Normally, there is a considerable time lag between the voters’ and the

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parties’ movement within the political space. Consequently, a rapid change in voter attitudes and preferences creates a gap between the political demand and supply sides. If a political party can position itself in this gap, or niche, it may be able to capture votes, at least if the number of partyidentified voters has declined below a certain level. I have in this study shown that the Front National actively pursued an ideology and rhetorical strategy aimed at placing the party within the available niches of ethno-nationalism and xenophobia. I have also argued that the FN has presented a coherent party ideology, based on the monist idea of the natural order. By being concerned with the natural order and opposed to all changes that disturb the natural order, the Front National positioned itself as a defender of the values of the status quo ante, that is, of the ‘primordial’ institutions of family and nation that they saw as threatened by individualization and modernization. Furthermore, as we saw above, studies of FN voters’ attitudes suggest that the FN succeeded in this strategy. FN voters were consistently more prone to harbor xenophobic and anti-immigrant attitudes than other voters. The logistic regression analyses in chapter 2 generally confirm that voters who hold authoritarian (i.e., law and order and security), ethnonationalist, and xenophobic attitudes have been significantly more likely than other voters to support the Front National. We have been able to demonstrate that xenophobia, law and order, anti–European Union sentiments, and a belief that politicians do not care about the opinions of ordinary citizens have been of particular importance. Xenophobia had the most overall explanatory power. In addition, few of those who chose to vote for the Front National or Le Pen believed that the party provided the best answer to economic issues and problems, which indicates a low salience of the economic cleavage dimension for these voters. Furthermore, as indicated above, it was demonstrated that Western Europe—and not least France—has during the last decades witnessed a growing discontent with political institutions and politicians, and a decline in party-identified voters. This situation facilitated the emergence of the Front National by freeing resources and opening up niches in the electoral arena, which made it possible for the FN to mobilize around ethnicity. In addition, this situation made it possible for the Front National to foment popular discontent and mobilize political protest. Hence, this study has demonstrated that although the Front National pursued similar ideological and strategic political rhetoric during the 1980s and the 1990s—with the exception of economic policy and the EC/EU issue—its electorate has been far from static. During the mid 1980s the party was supported mainly by relatively well-off but authoritarian and xenophobic voters who voted for the Front National to protest the ‘soft line’ taken by the mainstream right. However, most of these voters returned to their original voting behavior, or voted for De Villiers or

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Pasqua, during the late 1980s and 1990s. During the 1990s, the Front National became increasingly successful in attracting voters with little cultural capital who were living in an exposed social situation. These findings support my hypothesis that although the emergence (i.e., the electoral breakthrough) of an ERP party can be explained as either (1) the existence of ethno-nationalist and xenophobic niches within the sociocultural cleavage dimension (when party identification is below a critical level), and/or (2) as a result of political protest (dissatisfaction with particular aspects of one or several of the established parties, or more generally discontent with the political institutions per se). Political protest does not explain the sustained success of the ERP parties, however. Only if there exist niches of ethno-nationalism and xenophobia will the newly emerged ERP party persist as a significant force, not least because protest voters are likely to return to their ‘old’ parties when they have made their voices heard, unless they have a ‘positive’ interest in continuing to support the new party. In the case of the Front National, the party emerged mainly out of political protest, but sustained its electoral support because a sufficiently large number of the French voters demanded authoritarian, ethno-nationalist, and xenophobic policies, which they believed no other party or presidential candidate would provide. We have also seen that FN voters were more inclined than most other voters to base their choice of party on political issues—in particular, the issues of immigration and law and order (e.g., the death penalty). Still, neither a widespread xenophobia nor political discontent by itself explains the electoral successes of the Front National (or any other ERP party). As I have shown elsewhere, these factors are equally present in countries in which no successful ERP party has emerged (Rydgren 2002; Rydgren and van Holsteyn 2002). Therefore, I have also looked at supply factors, that is, the FN’s ability to use mobilizing strategies successfully. Among the most important mobilizing strategies used by the Front National—as for other successful ERP parties—has been its ability to put forward a populist program or populist ‘appeal’ that attracts discontented voters, or even to foment conflicts between the ‘establishment’ and the ‘ordinary people.’ As I have demonstrated in chapter 6, the Front National has successfully used these and other populist strategies, not least the anti-political-establishment strategy. The FN has been fairly successful in presenting itself as the opponent of established political parties (the ‘political class’), while not appearing to be anti-democratic—although Le Pen and others have occasionally indulged in biological racism and anti-Semitism. Furthermore, as demonstrated in chapter 5, the FN has been successful in framing the immigration issue and ensuring that it stays on the political agenda. This is not least indicated by the fact that most other political actors in France—in particular on the mainstream right—have accepted the general frame that immigrants and immigration is a problem.

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Before closing, we will take a closer look at the three identified niches: ethno-nationalism, xenophobia, and political discontent. To start with ethno-nationalism, which was discussed in chapter 4, this study suggests that the success of the Front National is partly due to the long tradition of French ethno-nationalism on which it could draw. In fact, although a civic and open nationalism has mainly predominated in France since the late eighteenth century, there has always existed a more or less strong undercurrent of closed, ethnic nationalism. Nevertheless, the Front National regards the preservation and defense of national identity as its principal aim. According to the doctrine of ethno-nationalism, different ‘peoples’ should be kept separated in order to prevent the national identity or character from eroding. This implies that national borders should be closed, particularly to immigrants, but also to certain (mainly cultural) commodities that are believed to threaten French national identity. Hence, the FN’s anti-immigration and anti-globalization positions are a natural consequence of its conception of ethnic nationalism. Although most of the established parties in France are and have been nationalist, and occasionally strongly so, they have mainly represented a more open, civic kind of nationalism. As a result, I will argue, there emerged an available niche for an ethno-nationalist party when the salience of such attitudes grew stronger among voters. Because of absolute and relative deprivation, a feeling of alienation and detachment from the established parties (which otherwise might have channeled these feelings into other kinds of political mobilization), and the void left by the erosion of traditions, religion, and ideologies, new voter groups might have been increasingly attracted to such ideas—particularly during the economic crisis of the 1980s and 1990s. Besides these general causes of ethno-nationalism, there were some additional factors more or less specific to France: first, the ideological gap left by the declining PCF and Gaullist movements (which both were based on strong ideologies); second, the declining importance of the Catholic Church; third, the existence of a sophisticated far-right intelligentsia (e.g., GRECE and Club l’Horloge), which facilitated the Front National’s success in transforming and reframing the social and political crises of the early 1990s into a crisis of national identity; and fourth, the challenge to French citizenship legislation during the late 1970s and early 1980s, which created opportunity structures favorable to a nationalistic critique. Concerning the niche of xenophobia, in particular consisting of antiimmigration attitudes, I have shown that although xenophobic attitudes toward immigration are a sine qua non for all ERP parties, widespread popular xenophobia by itself has weak explanatory power. In order to benefit these parties, the immigration issue has to be politicized, which implies the active involvement of established political actors. In addition, if the immigration issue is to have sustained importance and salience, the debate has to be kept alive in a way that attracts media attention. This is

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facilitated if other political actors get involved, or if unanticipated events take place. As demonstrated in chapter 5, all of these conditions were fulfilled in France. In France, the immigration issue was politicized during the late 1970s and early 1980s by a variety of factors, not least by the anti-immigration campaign by the PCF in 1980. Although both the French ‘New Right’ and the Front National had pursued xenophobic and neo-racist positions on the immigration issue in the late 1970s, neither of them had been in a position to politicize the immigration issue. However, once the immigration issue was politicized—on the supplyside—the criteria for how to judge political relevance changed, and the Front National became increasingly entitled to take part in the frame struggle over how to define the immigration issue. In addition, as I have shown, the PCF had already set a general frame—that immigration and immigrants are a problem—that the Front National could draw on and reinforce. In addition, I have shown that the FN successfully pursued four other frames: (1) immigration as a threat to French ethno-national identity, (2) immigration as a major cause of insecurity and criminality, (3) immigration as a major cause of unemployment, and (4) immigration as a major cause of the problems of the welfare state. Finally, I have also demonstrated that the established right parties occasionally used several of these frames in their own political rhetoric, presumably in order to win back dissident voters. However, this strategy failed and is more likely to have legitimized the ideas promoted by the Front National. In any case, the behavior of the established right parties contributed to the continuing salience of the immigration issue in France for fifteen years. This also partly explains why it has consistently been one of the most important issues for the French voters since the late 1980s. As mentioned above, anti-immigration and other xenophobic attitudes were also the most important variables explaining why some voters rather than others voted for the Front National or Le Pen. Concerning the niche of political discontent and alienation, chapter 6 suggested that the level of party identification was declining rapidly at the time of the emergence of the Front National. Simultaneously, the level of political dissatisfaction—in particular with politicians and the established political parties—was increasing. These two processes were of great importance for the successful emergence of the Front National for two reasons: first, it freed many voters from their bonds to the established political parties; and second, it allowed the Front National to mobilize protest voters. The Front National took advantage of this situation by pursuing a populist program. As was demonstrated, like most populists, the FN stressed the gulf between ‘the people’ and ‘the political establishment.’ The party also used conspiracy theories and sought political simplicity and a unitary definition of ‘the people,’ which corresponds to populist programs.

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Finally, we saw that the Front National made good use of the anti-political-establishment strategy. Using this strategy, the FN presented itself as a political outsider, but not as an anti-democratic party, which would have repelled voters. The ambiguous behavior of the mainstream right, which has occasionally been prepared to ally with the Front National and which has occasionally appropriated policy proposals and rhetorical styles from the FN, contributed to a partial legitimization of the Front National, which facilitated the successful use of the anti-political-establishment strategy.

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INDEX


A Action Française, 138 Alleanza Nazionale, 14 anti-establishment strategy, 5, 37, 157, 192–93, 212–17 anti-pluralism, 10, 12–13 anti-Semitism, 20, 102, 178, 180, 183, 186, 204, 211, 229 a priori form, 42–44, 74, 81n. 16, 164 attitudes, 40, 45–46 Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ), 1, 9, 13, 14, 25n. 1, 202, 221n. 9 authoritarianism, 9, 11–13, 16–18, 20, 24, 31, 35, 36, 39, 61, 65, 72, 75, 78, 79n. 6, 119, 122–124, 129, 138, 152, 201, 227, 229 authoritarian mobilization, 4, 29 authoritarian attitudes, 59, 86–91, 99–104, 106–12, 116n. 22, 190n. 7, 227–28 B Balladur, Édouard, 107, 114n. 11, 211, 223n. 30 Barre, Raymond, 20, 221n. 7 Barrès, Maurice, 18 Belgian Front National, 15 belief concept of, 31, 40–43, 45–47, 49–51, 56, 62, 75–76, 81nn. 18, 24, 25, 82nn. 26, 27 belief formation, 46 belief system, 41, 46 Bell, Daniel, 30–31, 36, 50 Berlusconi, Silvio, 14

black-box situation, 75, 181 Blocher, Christoph, 15 Blot, Yves, 19, 205, 211 Bossi, Umberto, 14 Boudon, Raymond, 42–43, 45, 50, 52, 74–75, 80nn. 10, 13, 81nn. 16, 24 Boulanger, General, 18 Bourdieu, Pierre, 28, 47, 57–59, 61, 75, 83n. 34 British National Front, 17 British National Party, 17 C Campbell, Angus, 46, 50, 52–54, 74, 81n. 23, 82n. 28, 163 Cassirer, Ernst, 81n. 16, 153n. 10 categorization, 41–44, 46–49, 80n. 16, 81n. 18, 135–36, 143 Catholic Church, 136, 152, 230 Centrumdemocraten, 11, 16 Centrumpartij ’86, 11 charisma, 84n. 44, 123, 201 Chirac, Jacques, 20, 22, 103, 114n. 11, 121, 171, 184–85, 191n. 31, 197, 211, 214, 217, 219, 221n. 7, 222n. 30, 224n. 36 citizenship policy and laws, 9, 137, 140, 152, 153n. 6, 164, 166, 184, 230 civic nationalism, 24, 133, 137 Club de l’Horloge, 19 cohabitation, 200, 215 cognition, 22, 39–43, 47, 49–51, 53, 56– 57, 74, 77–78, 80nn. 9, 16, 135, 180–81, 227

252

Index

cognitive dissonance, 51 cognitive schema, 45–46, 51, 74 See also a priori form collective identity, 47, 135, 152n. 1 Confédération des associations républicains (CODAR), 19 conspiracy theory, 209–10 convergence in the political space, 24, 28, 37, 72–73, 120, 198, 200, 217 corruption, 37, 103, 105, 109, 116n. 27, 124, 198–99, 204, 213 cultural capital, 3, 13, 23, 29, 33, 57–62, 77, 83n. 34, 87–88, 91, 111, 227, 229 D Danish People’s Party, 15 Danish Progress Party, 15 dealignment, 4, 30, 35, 39, 79 de Benoist, Alain, 165, 169 de Gaulle, Charles, 150–51, 155n. 17 democracy attitude towards, 5, 10–13, 25n. 4, 101, 103, 106, 109, 115n. 18, 138, 198, 212–13, 215, 224n. 33 direct democracy, 201–202, 204–205, 222nn. 13, 17 institutions of, 10, 40, 203 representative democracy, 10–11, 201–205, 222n. 13 deprivation, 3, 29, 34, 39, 48, 56, 59–61, 78, 86–87, 91, 99, 111, 136, 152, 227, 230 De Villiers, Philippe, 20–21, 93, 97, 114n. 11, 116n. 22, 151, 228 Downs, Anthony, 52, 63, 82nn. 29, 32, 83nn. 36, 38, 200 Duverger, Maurice, 73–73 Dreux, 17, 19–20, 217–18, 220, 225nn. 43, 47 E economic cleavage dimension, 3–4, 35–36, 38, 60–62, 65, 74, 77, 86, 90, 112, 193, 203, 227–28 economic crisis, 33, 137, 169, 200, 230 economic protectionism, 10, 106, 117n. 34, 130n. 11

education, level of, 3, 19, 31, 33–34, 39–40, 56, 59–60, 76, 78, 83n. 35, 86–91, 93–94, 98–99, 109, 112, 113n. 4, 114nn. 9, 13 electoral arena, 4, 23, 30, 64–65, 67–72, 78, 84n. 40, 122, 163, 178, 209, 216, 218, 228 emotions, 31, 35, 39–41, 45–51, 54, 56– 58, 66, 75–78, 82n. 27, 102, 115n. 18, 152, 157, 176, 180–81, 200, 227 ‘establishment,’ the, 2, 5, 11, 22, 55, 62, 148, 183, 201, 205, 210–11, 212–13, 220, 224n. 42, 229 See also ‘political class’ ethnicity, 10, 13–15, 25n. 6, 35–36, 38, 41, 44, 47–49, 56, 60–61, 74, 77–78, 86, 90, 102, 104, 107–108, 119, 123, 125–26, 128, 132–35, 137–38, 143, 145–46, 149, 152, 153n. 3, 8, 154n. 15, 154n. 18, 157–58, 166, 174, 176, 178, 183, 186, 204, 206, 227–28 ethno-nationalism, 4–5, 10–13, 24, 25n. 6, 29–30, 45, 49, 59, 61, 74–77, 79, 85–86, 108, 111–12, 119, 123, 131, 133–44, 148–49, 151–52, 153n. 9, 157–58, 172, 176, 192, 201, 206–207, 226–30 European Monetary Union (EMU), 107, 116–17, 118nn. 36, 39 European Union (EU), 14, 103, 105–109, 112, 117n. 36, 118n. 39, 139, 143, 148–51, 198, 211, 228 extreme right-wing populism (ERP), 1–6, 8–17, 23, 25nn. 1, 2, 5, 27, 29–31, 35–37, 39–40, 42–44, 46, 53, 56, 61–62, 70–72, 74–79, 79n. 5, 80n. 8, 83n. 35, 85, 87, 92, 105, 114n. 9, 123, 131–32, 149, 152, 157–60, 162, 164, 188, 192, 201–205, 207, 209, 213–15, 217, 221n. 9, 222n. 13, 226, 229–30 definition of, 8–13 F Fabius, Laurent, 121 fascism, 5, 8–9, 12–14, 19, 39–40, 214–16 See also neo-fascism

Index

Festinger, Leon, 46, 51 Fichte, Johann Gottlieb, 132, 153n. 7 Fortuyn, Pim, 16–17 Forza Italia, 14 framing, 5, 23–24, 41, 60, 73–75, 79n. 3, 121, 137, 149, 158, 162–66, 168, 171–74, 176, 180–85, 188–89, 205, 213, 229–31 French Communist Party (PCF), 24, 25n. 8, 96, 114n. 10, 121, 130n. 13, 136, 152, 163–72, 188–89, 190n. 7, 195–96, 199, 215, 218, 221n. 3, 224n. 38, 230–31 Front National conspiracy theories of, 150, 210–11, 220 international contacts, 2 on abortion, 147 on ‘anti-French racism,’ 183, 191n. 26 on citizenship, 125, 140, 142, 172, 176 on cosmopolitism, 123, 141, 146–148, 150, 211, 214 on criminality, 128, 142, 145, 172, 180–81, 241 on decadence, 11, 124, 144, 146–48 on democracy, 203–205, 207, 216, 222n. 18 on gender roles, 125–26, 144, 147 on globalization, 127, 148, 150, 209 on human rights, 141, 144, 150, 211–12 on immigration, 124–25, 141, 143, 145–48, 151–52, 156n. 31, 172–83, 204, 211, 230 on integration, 141, 177 on Islam, 145, 177 on ‘national preference,’ 125–26, 128, 145, 204, 211 on socialism, 126, 128, 129n. 3, 130n. 13, 141, 148 on the European Union, 148–49, 211 on the family, 123–27, 129, 133, 140, 142, 147 Front National de la Jeunesse (FNJ), 145 Front National-Mouvement National, 21 Front National voters, 24, 85–118, 158, 160, 185–87, 189, 193, 195–96,

253

201, 219, 221nn. 3, 5, 6, 222n. 17, 224nn. 33, 37, 227–29 See also voters G GATT, 127, 130n. 14 German People’s Party (DVU), 16 Giscard d’Estaing, Valéry, 160, 165, 184, 187 Glistrup, Mogens, 15 globalization, 3, 10, 22, 79n. 4, 119, 123, 127, 139, 144, 148, 150, 209, 230 Goffman, Erving, 68, 74 ‘Golden Past,’ 90, 134 Gramsci, Antonio, 172 GRECE, 137, 152, 169, 172, 230 H habitus, 58 Haider, Jörg, 13–14 Hagen, Carl I., 15 ’headscarves affair,’ the, 172–75 ‘heartland,’ 11, 12, 77, 134, 152, 202, 206–207, 223n. 26 Herder, Johann Gottfried, 132, 135 homosexuality, 10, 100–101, 103–104, 109, 114n. 14, 116n. 21, 119, 123, 190n. 7 human rights, 11, 141, 144, 150, 211, 212 I ideology, 11, 50–52, 75–76, 81nn. 19–26, 131–34, 136 See also party ideology immigration issue, 5, 24–25, 36, 65, 74–75, 77, 86, 103–104, 106, 108–110, 116n. 24, 122, 124, 128, 157–60, 162–76, 180, 184–85, 187–89, 189n. 5, 205, 229–31 policy, 9, 11, 78, 165–68, 174–75, 184 rates, 159–60, 182 in-group, 48–49, 60, 135 insecurity, 40, 45–46, 56, 75–76, 128, 135, 154n. 15, 168, 172–73, 176, 180–81, 183, 186–87, 189, 204, 231

254

Index

interests, 5, 22, 30, 35, 37, 39–41, 45, 49–51, 55–63, 65, 68–69, 75, 78, 81nn. 17, 21, 22, 83n. 39, 125, 127, 134, 141, 149, 157, 163, 167, 169–70, 181, 192, 196, 203–204, 209–11, 221n. 3, 225n. 43, 229 internal arena, 23, 64, 67–70, 178, 216 J Joan of Arc, 18, 128, 144, 147 Jospin, Lionel, 22, 114n. 11, 214 jus sanguinis, 140, 176 jus soli, 140, 176 K Karlsson, Bert, 16 Keynesianism, 121 Kjaersgaard, Pia, 15 L Lange, Anders, 15 law and order, 9, 13, 17–18, 22, 36, 65, 86, 101, 104, 110–12, 122, 124, 201, 219, 228–29 Le Figaro Magazine, 169 Le Gallou, Jean-Yves, 19, 142, 177, 191n. 26 legitimization legitimacy, 5, 10–11, 49, 68–69, 75, 78, 84n. 42, 120, 132, 144, 157, 168, 178, 200, 202, 207, 213 of the Front National, 19, 73, 171, 183–84, 189, 194, 216–21, 225n. 47, 231–32 Le Pen, Jean-Marie, 7, 17–22, 25n. 1, 86, 91–95, 98, 100–106, 108–12, 113n. 4, 114nn. 10, 12, 115n. 15, 116n. 22, 189n. 2, 190n. 18, 193–94, 197, 223n. 28, 224n. 37, 225n. 43, 227–29, 231 discourse of, 124–28, 130n. 14, 139–44, 147, 149–51, 155n. 25, 175–86, 204–205, 207–209, 211–12, 214–16, 222n. 18 logistic regression analyses, 23, 87–90, 92–93, 99–101, 103, 106, 108–109, 111–12, 113n. 4, 193, 227–28

M macro level, 2, 22, 27–29, 55, 61, 72, 151, 180, 226 mainstream right, 12–13, 20–21, 85–86, 93, 105, 112, 120–22, 128n. 7, 164–66, 169, 184–85, 197, 214, 228–29 relations to the Front National, 19– 20, 171, 183, 191n. 30, 194, 214– 15, 217–21, 225nn. 43, 45, 232 Marchais, Georg, 167–68 Marx, Karl, 50, 81nn. 19–21, 212 mass media, 16, 19, 25n. 5, 41–42, 52–53, 66, 71, 74, 84n. 43, 150, 163, 169, 171, 173–74, 188, 203, 211, 220, 225n. 47, 230 Maurras, Charles, 18, 25n. 7, 132, 138, 147 Mégret, Catherine, 21 Mégret, Bruno, 7, 19–21, 111, 123–24, 128, 130n. 10, 141–42, 147, 149, 156n. 30, 172, 176, 179, 191n. 30, 203, 207–208, 214 meso level, 28, 62 micro level, 2, 23, 27–29, 31, 40, 55–57, 61, 76, 79n. 1, 235–36 middle class, 3, 83n. 35, 94 See also petty bourgeoisie Mitterand, François, 19 monism, 10–11, 205 Mouvement National Républicain, 21 MSI, 14, 18 See also Alleanza Nazionale N nationalism, 2, 10, 12, 17–18, 20, 24, 25n. 7, 87–89, 91, 100–109, 111, 123, 125, 131–41, 143, 146–48, 152, 153nn. 4, 6, 8, 154nn. 11, 13, 15, 155n. 17, 166, 204, 230 See also ethno-nationalism; civic nationalism national identity, 3, 9, 22, 29, 34, 39, 49, 77–78, 90, 104, 108, 123–24, 128, 131, 134–35, 137, 139–41, 143–46, 148–52, 155n. 25, 156n. 31, 157–58, 166, 172–73, 175–77, 189, 191n. 26, 227, 230–31

Index

nation state, 3, 25n. 6, 136 ‘natural order,’ 10, 13, 119, 123–25, 129, 211, 228 Nazism, 5, 19, 39–40, 158, 190n. 18, 214–16, 224n. 39 neo-fascism, 8, 18, 21, 202, 216, 222n. 20 neo-liberalism, 9, 14, 102, 105, 112, 119–20, 122–23, 143, 149, 209 New Democracy, 16 niche, 4–7, 24, 28–30, 35, 37, 49, 64, 66, 72–73, 77–79, 84n. 41, 85–86, 119– 20, 122, 129, 131, 152, 169, 171, 192, 209, 218, 220, 226, 228–31 Norwegian Progress Party, 15 nostalgia, 11, 89–91, 101, 103, 106–109, 124, 202 Northern League (Lega Nord), 1, 9, 14, 25nn. 1, 6 Nouvelle Droite, 19, 21, 165, 169, 188, 231 O Occident, 18, 129n. 7 opportunity structures, 1–4, 7, 25n. 3, 28–30, 72–73, 78, 152, 226, 230 Ordre Nouveau, 18 organic society, 10–11 out-group, 43, 48–49, 61, 78, 80n. 16, 135 P parliamentary arena, 10, 23, 64, 69–70 Parti des Forces Nouvelles, 19 party family, 7–9, 17, 31 party identification, 22, 28, 30, 37, 39–40, 51–55, 57, 66, 71, 78, 152, 193–96, 200, 220, 227, 229, 231 party ideology, 23, 52, 62–64, 71, 74, 83n. 33, 119, 122, 129n. 1, 173, 228 party image, 22, 40, 51–52, 54–55, 57, 66, 70–71, 83n. 33, 108, 110, 112, 127, 195 party organization, 4, 6, 23, 29, 63, 67– 72, 78, 83n. 37, 179, 215, 224n. 41, 226 party system, 2, 8, 22–23, 28, 70, 72–74, 82n. 29, 226

255

Pasqua, Charles, 21, 93, 151, 184, 191n. 31, 220, 229 path dependency, 67, 70, 216 perception, 41–46, 51, 53, 55–56, 74, 80n. 9, 84n. 42, 99, 164, 199, 220 pessimism, 58, 114n. 10, 194–95, 200– 201, 221n. 1 Pétain, Marshal, 138 petty bourgeoisie, 14, 40, 77–78, 80n. 8, 86–87, 89–93, 109, 113n. 5, 130n. 14, 138 See also middle class political alienation, 22, 36–37, 192–93, 197–98, 200 ‘political class,’ 11, 13–14, 18, 39, 55, 188, 193, 201, 204, 209, 212–15, 229 political demand side, 1–2, 4, 6, 22, 27– 30, 61, 66, 75, 78, 79n. 3, 84n. 45, 122, 163, 171, 226–27 political discontent, 5, 24, 35, 37, 60, 72, 79, 86–87, 91, 100–103, 105–109, 152, 192–94, 196, 201, 226, 229–31 political field, 28 political issues, 22, 40, 52–55, 57, 61, 66, 74, 77, 82n. 30, 83n. 33, 106, 145, 195, 209, 227, 229 political preferences, 4, 6, 10, 23, 25n. 3, 28–29, 31, 35, 40, 45, 51–52, 54–55, 57–58, 63, 66, 74, 82nn. 28, 32, 83nn. 33, 38, 84n. 45, 88, 91, 100, 102, 107, 122, 141, 227–28 political protest, 4–5, 24, 30, 79, 85–86, 99, 111, 192, 228–29 political space, 4, 8–9, 24, 28–29, 36–37, 54–55, 62, 65–66, 72–73, 76, 78, 82n. 30, 120, 152, 168, 212, 217, 220, 228 political supply side, 1–4, 22–23, 27–30, 37, 49, 52, 62, 66, 73, 75–76, 78, 79nn. 1, 3, 84n. 45, 122, 136, 163, 165, 171–72, 188, 226, 228 political visibility, 19–20, 73, 85, 197 politicization, 24, 36, 73–74, 158, 162–66, 168, 171, 175 Popper, Karl R., 210, 223n. 29 populism, 1, 5, 8, 11–15, 17, 29, 59, 127, 130n. 7, 134, 139, 148, 157, 192, 194, 201–206, 208–209, 221n. 9

256

Index

populism (cont.) populist strategy, 150, 193, 198, 220, 229 postindustrialism, 3, 6, 8, 22, 27, 29–31, 33–35, 40, 56, 59, 75–77, 79n. 5, 152, 226 Poujade, Pierre, 138 Poujadist movement, 17–18, 202 prejudice, 41, 43, 45–47, 80n. 16, 81n. 18, 158, 161–62 propaganda, 23, 41, 43, 52, 74–75, 79n. 3, 125, 162–64, 172–74, 190n. 18 PS, the (the Socialist Party), 22, 25n. 8, 96, 120–22, 130n. 13, 164–66, 170, 195–96, 199, 214, 221n. 3, 224n. 38 R racism, 20–21, 79n. 5, 107, 142, 149, 157–58, 167, 176, 178, 183, 191n. 26, 216 biological racism, 158, 178–79, 186, 229 new, cultural racism, 35, 78, 158–59, 169, 178–79, 185, 188, 227, 231 Rassemblement pour la France, 21 rationality, 62–63, 70, 81nn. 21, 24, 82nn. 29, 32, 83n. 36, 133, 154n. 15, 201 spatial rationality, 22, 54–55, 57, 82n. 33 Reagan, Ronald, 121, 130n. 7, 209 realignment, 3, 35, 39, 60–61, 77, 226–27 reevaluation, 23, 31, 47, 59 repatriation, 165 Republikaner, 16, 224n. 39 resentment, 3, 14, 29, 35, 39–41, 46–47, 59, 78, 173, 182, 193, 227 RPR, 20, 25n. 8, 117n. 35, 120–21, 169, 171, 183–84, 188, 195–96, 214, 217, 221n. 3, 224nn. 35, 38, 225nn. 43, 45 S social comparison, 3, 23, 29, 48, 59, 61, 66, 87, 136, 152, 227 social space, 3, 22–23, 29, 35, 41, 45, 57– 59, 61, 80n. 13, 83n. 34, 87, 111, 226

societal structures, 2, 22, 226 socio-cultural cleavage dimension, 3–4, 30, 35–36, 38, 55, 61–62, 65, 72, 74, 76, 78–79, 85–86, 119–20, 123, 129, 131, 152, 192, 226–27, 229 socio-cultural liberalism, 9, 120, 122 status quo ante, 3, 13, 23, 29, 34, 59, 61, 77, 91, 129, 152, 227–28 stereotype, 41, 43–46, 56, 80n. 11, 81n. 18, 135, 158, 162 Stirbois, Jean-Paul, 19, 149, 181, 206, 217 Stirbois, Marie-France, 20 structural change, 3, 31, 83n. 35, 170, 226 Sweden Democrats, 2, 16 Swiss People’s Party, 15, 25n. 1 T Thatcher, Margaret, 121, 130n. 7, 209 ‘the people,’ 10–12, 16, 22, 61, 78, 123, 128, 134, 153n. 9, 201–203, 206– 208, 210, 213, 220, 231 Tixier-Vignancour, 17, 129n. 7 U UDF, 20, 25n. 8, 117n. 35, 120, 169, 171, 183–84, 188, 195–96, 214, 217, 221n. 3, 224n. 35, 38, 225nn. 43, 45 unemployed, 4, 46, 87, 89–90, 92–93, 98, 110, 113n. 6, 181–82 unemployment rate, 33–34, 182, 199 V values, 10–11, 13, 17, 23, 25n. 4, 35, 38, 40, 47, 51, 56, 59, 62, 64–65, 76–77, 79n. 6, 82n. 27, 91, 100, 124, 129, 137–38, 141, 144, 149, 151–52, 154n. 5, 155nn. 17, 18, 174, 188, 191n. 26, 203–207, 209–10, 214, 220, 228 Veil, Simone, 120, 122, 147, 211, 225n. 44 Vitry, 164, 167–68, 170, 189n. 5 Vlaams Blok, 11, 15, 25nn. 1, 6, 202, 221n. 9

Index

vote maximization, 23, 63–64, 67–69, 169–70 voters ‘floating’ voters, 35, 55 party-identified voters, 4, 30, 53, 66, 228 See also attitudes; political preferences voting behavior, 22, 40, 51–55, 57–58, 82nn. 28, 32, 85–86, 91, 99, 108, 111, 122, 228 class voting, 33, 37–39, 57, 78, 80n. 7, 227 protest voting, 55, 196–97 voting system proportional, 19, 28, 72–73 majority, 19–20, 28, 69, 72–73 thresholds, 72–73 W Wachtmeister, Ian, 16 Weber, Max, 9, 83n. 36, 84n. 44, 131, 153n. 2, 201

257

welfare chauvinism, 3, 10, 14, 16, 29, 49, 59, 78, 130n. 11, 146, 157, 172, 182, 227 workers, 4, 36, 38–40, 52, 59, 77–78, 83n. 35, 86–87, 89–95, 97, 109–10, 112, 113n. 7, 114n. 9, 128, 136, 145, 153n. 8, 161, 165–67, 170, 175, 178, 181, 184, 190n. 7, 227 working-class, 4, 95–98, 128, 170 X xenophobia, 3–5, 10–11, 13–16, 18, 24, 29–30, 35, 39, 45, 49, 56, 59, 72, 74–76, 78–79, 79n. 5, 83n. 35, 85–89, 91, 99–107, 109, 111–112, 115n. 20, 117n. 30, 119, 130n. 11, 142, 145, 149, 152, 157–69, 171– 73, 175, 177–79, 181–85, 187–89, 189n. 4, 190n. 8, 191n. 30, 192–93, 201, 226–31