The Politics of Laughter in the Social Media Age: Perspectives from the Global South 303081968X, 9783030819682

Table of contents :
Foreword
References
Acknowledgements
Contents
Notes on Contributors
List of Figures
Chapter 1: Ridicule and Humour in the Global South: Theorizing Politics of Laughter in the Social Media Age
Introduction
The Global South and Contemporary Context of Humour, Ridicule and Laughter
Theorizing Humour
Social Media
Aspects of Humour, Ridicule and Laughter
Digital Humour in ‘Asian and Latin American’ Contexts
The Structure of the Book
Outline of the Book and Chapters
References
Part I: Social Media Humour, Commentary and Confronting Power
Chapter 2: The Aesthetics of ‘Laughing at Power’ in an African Cybersphere
Introduction
Context
Laughter in African Folklore
The African Carnival as a Space for Resistance
The Power of Humour in Contemporary African Cybersphere
Theoretical Framework
Methodology
Findings and Discussion
Laughing at Corruption Government
Economic Decline
Shrinking Democratic Space
Conclusion
References
Chapter 3: Political Satire and the Mediation of the Zimbabwean Crisis in the Era of the “New Dispensation”: The Case of MAGAMBA TV
Introduction
Context
The Case: MAGAMBA TV
Reflections on the Role of Political Satire
Theoretical Framework
Methodology
Findings and Discussion
Satirising “Abductions” and Police Brutality in Zimbabwe
The Question of Legitimacy
Corruption and the Abuse of Law in the “New Dispensation Era”
Conclusion
References
Chapter 4: Zapiro’s Satirical Reconstruction of Marikana Victims and Representation of Mourning
Introduction
Cartooning Politics and Politicising Cartoons
Macro Versus Micro Discourses
Multimodal Discourse
Methodology
Grieving, Vulnerability, and Discourse
Personal Responsibility vs Political Responsibility
Findings and Discussion
Blame and Political Responsibility
Police Victims and the Blaming of Miners
Motivating Political Action
Conclusion
References
Chapter 5: Humour, Politics and Mnangagwa’s Presidency: An Analysis of Readers’ Comments in Online News Websites
Introduction
Humour Within a Crisis in the Global South
Theoretical Framework
Methodology
Findings and Discussion
Of the Gukurahundi Ghost and Cockroaches: Humour and Mnangagwa’s Dark Past
Varakashi, Insults and Power: Contestation over Mnangagwa’s Humour
Insults as Weapons of the Oppressed
References
Chapter 6: This Is a Laughing Matter: Social Media as a Sphere of Trolling Power in Malawi and Zimbabwe
Introduction
Tracing Jonathan Moyo and Stanley Onjezani Kenani
Humour in Dissidence
Theoretical Framework
Methodology
Framing Dissidence
Findings and Discussion
Humour and Ridicule in Social Media Content
Humour and Ridicule in Leaks and Exposé Posts
Humour and Ridicule in Call to Action Posts
Humour and Ridicule in Trolling Posts
Understanding Humour and Ridicule in Social Media Dissidence
Conclusion
References
Part II: Humour and the Everyday
Chapter 7: Laughing at Trouble: A Multimodal Analysis of Online Economic Satire in Zimbabwe
Introduction
Theoretical Framework
Methodology
Findings and Discussion
Tackling Contentious Matters: Subversion of Relationships
Mocking the Governing Power
Yearning for Economic Rebirth
Oppression Between Ordinary People
Conclusion
Appendix: Corpus Analysed
References
Chapter 8: ‘Humour and the Politics of Resistance’: Audience Readings of Popular Amateur Videos in Zimbabwe
Introduction
Literature Review
Social Media and the Politics of Resistance
Social Media, Resistance and the Politics of the Everyday
Conceptualising Audience Resistances: Revisiting Audience Reception Research
Theoretical Framework
Methodology
Findings and Discussion
Untangling the Media Discourses in the Amateur Video
Audience Readings of Lameck Makwiramiti’s Video
Humour and Laughter as Resistance
Challenging Hegemonic Cultural Norms and Social Injustices in Zimbabwe
Confronting Women Abuse and Hegemonic Masculinities
Challenging Governance and the Political System in Zimbabwe
Disrupting Patriotic History
Conclusion
References
Chapter 9: The Prank of Celebrity Activism through Postcolonial Nigeria
Introduction
‘Activism’, Celebrity Advocacy in Africa, and YABIS Culture
Incumbency-Possessed Celebrity Activism in Nigeria
Conclusion
References
Chapter 10: Comedy, Horror, and Graphic Violence: Brazilian Allegories of the Culture Wars
Introduction
A Return to National Allegories
Culture Wars, Allegorical Battles
Comedy, Horror, and Graphic Violence
Conclusion
References
Part III: Race, Ethnicity and Gender Politics
Chapter 11: ‘If Ever I Offended You I Am Sorry’: Disparagement Humour, Black Twitectives and the Dream Deferred
Introduction
Disparagement Humour and Social Media
Methodological and Theoretical Framing
Analysis and Discussion of the Black, Ugly and Disabled
Conclusion
References
Chapter 12: The Curious Case of “Coconut Kelz”: Satire as a Critique of Race-Thinking in South Africa
Introduction
Satire and Race-Thinking
Coconut Kelz
Theoretical Framework
Methodology
Findings and Discussion
Rhetorical Devices: Mimicry
Rhetorical Devices: Juxtaposition
Conclusion
References
Chapter 13: Gender Performance and Irony in Online Presentification: A Study of the Case “Katylene” in Brazil
Introduction
Context
Online Identity
Case Study
Blog Aesthetics Analysis
Blog Content Analysis
Twitter
Twitter Aesthetics Analysis
Twitter Content Analysis
Conclusions
References
Chapter 14: ‘Those Boys Are Representing Mashonaland’: Digital Football Fandom, Ethnicity and National Identity Politics in Zimbabwe
Introduction
Context
Literature Review
Theoretical Framework: Everyday Nationalism’
Methodology
Findings and Discussion
‘That was Mashonaland FC, not a national team’
‘Zimbabwe belong to the Shona’
‘We are one people, tribalism sucks’
Conclusion
References
Chapter 15: Humour, Identity and Ethnicity in the Zimbabwean Political Landscape
Introduction
Humour and Its Functions
Reflections on Ethnicity and Identity Politics in Zimbabwe
Humour, Identity and Construction of Meaning in Cyberspace
Struggle for Power and the Realm of Aesthetics of Humour
Findings and Discussion
Humour as Means of Creating Social Cohesion and as Political Instrumentality
Findings and Discussion
Omkhula’s Humour and Subverting the Powerful
Relationship Between Humour, Identity and Ethnicity
Conclusion
References
Index

Citation preview

The Politics of Laughter in the Social Media Age Perspectives from the Global South Edited by Shepherd Mpofu

The Politics of Laughter in the Social Media Age “An original and sophisticated collection on laughter and ridicule in the global south in the age of digital media. This is a hard headed take which is as much about the robust ridiculing of the pretensions of postcolonial regimes, as about the dangers of the accelerated dispersion of prejudice and stereotype. A timely and exigent intervention.” —Professor Dilip M. Menon, Mellon Chair in Indian Studies, Director Centre for Indian Studies in Africa “This timely volume has brought the whole notion of laughter and its attendant politics in the age of social media to critical and I must add academic and entertaining attention. Indeed, as the volume reveals chapter after chapter, the politics of laughter in the Global South has grown to prodigious proportion in the age of social and digital media—from what one contributor describes as ‘Coconut Kelz’ in South Africa through the art of ‘laughing through trouble’ in Zimbabwe to what another describes as “the prank of celebrity activism’ in postcolonial Nigeria.” —Olufemi Abodunrin, Professor of English Studies and Performing Arts, University of Limpopo “This is a superb volume of essays on the subject of laughter and ridicule as it is deployed to mock and put pressure on rogue postcolonial regimes by concerned citizens, with social media tapped into as a rich reservoir of political struggles and contestations between the powerful and the powerless! In this volume, laughter and ridicule emerges as a method and indeed a discourse of speaking truth to power.” —Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, Professor and Chair of Epistemologies of the Global South & member of the Africa Multiple Cluster of Excellence, University of Bayreuth, Germany

Shepherd Mpofu Editor

The Politics of Laughter in the Social Media Age Perspectives from the Global South

Editor Shepherd Mpofu University of Limpopo Polokwane, South Africa

ISBN 978-3-030-81968-2    ISBN 978-3-030-81969-9 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-81969-9 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG. The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Foreword

laughing truth … degraded power. —M.M. Bakhtin

In his famous Rabelais and His World: Carnival and Grotesque (1984), MM Bakhtin gave us one of the most profound contrasts between what he called official festivities and folk festivities: “While official festivities aim to supply a legacy for authority, folk festivities have a critical centrifugal social ̇ function” (Ilim, 2017, p.  155). This timely volume appropriately titled The Politics of Laughter in the Social Media Age: Perspectives from the Global South has brought the whole notion of laughter and its attendant politics in the age of social media to critical and I must add academic and entertaining attention. Indeed, as the volume reveals chapter after chapter, the politics of laughter in the Global South has grown to prodigious proportion in the age of social and digital media—from what one contributor describes as “Coconut Kelz” in South Africa through the art of “laughing through trouble” in Zimbabwe to what another describes as “the prank of celebrity activism” in postcolonial Nigeria. But like “Rabelais and His world”, official and folk festivities have also got a long history in the Global South. But the history of their marginalisation in the face of the onslaught of colonial modernity and the present postcolonial dispensation is hardly well known. To cite just one example, there is the popular Oke-Ibadan festival in South West Nigeria. Oke-­ Ibadan is a festival of designated abuse, curses, oaths, slangs, erotic laughter and popular tricks, celebrated around the figure of Esu-Elegbara, the v

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Yoruba trickster/god of fate. Every aspect of the festival brings to light what Bakhtin describes as a grammatical jocose: “whereby grammatical order is transgressed to reveal erotic and obscene or merely materially satisfying counter-meaning. Punning is one of the forms taken up by grammatical jocose” (Bakhtin, 1965, p.  10). Oke-Ibadan festival transgresses all spatial boundaries to encompass the old and the young, the sacred and the profane. Also the prodigious feasting that characterises the festival is absolute and to give every member of the society sufficient and ample time to enjoy the spinning of jokes; all cooking must be done before the night of the festival, thus forbidding anyone to cook on Oke-Ibadan day. Groups of young men and women, going from compound to compound, are licensed to appropriate and consume food being prepared on the day of the festival, simply by sighting smoke from firewood coming from any kitchen. Unfortunately, most of the punning effects in these erotic jokes are unavoidably lost in translation. I have recorded and transcribed some of them as follows: Lojo Oke-Ibadan mo le foko roka.     Oke-Ibadan lanti lanti! (On Oke-Ibadan day, I can mix a pot of. Yam flour with a penis! Baba da agabada bole, Oko nle.     Odagbada bole, Oko nle! (Ola man’s voluminous robe is spread on the ground, But I can see a hardening penis!) Ore meji, jowojowo epon, Mon bumi, jowojow epon! Oni o rojo, ola o re kotu, Mon bumi, jowojowo epon! (Two friends, flabby flabby testicles, Try to curse me, flabby flabby testicles, Today isn’t for empty talks, tomorrow we aren’t. Going to the courts, flabby flabby testicles!) Oko Olopa kiki beliti, Mon bumi, kiki beliti! (Policeman’s penis is imprisoned under a wad of heavy-heavy. Belt! Try to curse me, just a wad of belt!

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Oni kekee, rora goke, oko nle! (Bicycle rider take it easy as you climb that hill, I can see your hardening penis!

These erotic jokes do not merely work along Bakhtin’s notion of “grammatical jocosa” by punning in ways that violate and unveil the structure of prevailing convention and provoke laughter; they also echo Samuel Beckett’s punning pronouncement: “In the beginning was the pun”. This sets pun against official word and at the same time, as puns often do, sets free a chain of puns. Finally, carnivals, as Bakhtin concludes, “set themselves in punning relationship with official culture and enable a plural, unfixed, comic view of the world” (Bakhtin, 1984, p. 10 emphasis added). Finally, returning to the premise of the primordial philosophical debate between Plato and Aristotle, not just on tragedy but also on comedy and the whole history of laughter—the former, Plato arguing that poetry and poets should be banished from the ideal republic while the latter, Aristotle affirms the essence of poetry, especially tragic poetry by displaying and affirming its cathartic effects. Shepherd Mpofu’s introduction to this volume has demonstrated how these official festivities have contrasted sharply in historical times and still contrast with folk festivities and the Bible, according to Mpofu, offers one of such “negative views on laughter” and the ways this has “played a pivotal role in shaping the attitudes of early Christian thinkers towards laughter as an objectionable human attribute”. Polokwane, South Africa Olufemi Abodunrin

References Abodunrin, F. (2008). Blackness: Culture, ideology and discourse. Dokun Publishing House. Bakhtin, M. M. (1984). Rabelais and his world: Carnival and grotesque. Indiana University Press. Ilim, F. (2017). Bakhtin: Diyaloji, Karnaval ve Politika. Ayrıntı Yayınları.

Acknowledgements

This anthology explores the role of humour in the Global South in the digital age. It is a product of collaborate work proffering questions, interrogating issues and casting light on the roles and uses of humour in different contexts especially from the perspective of ordinary everyday citizens. As the editor, I would like to thank those who allowed me to tap from their wisdom, especially Professors Shireen Hassim and Wendy Willems. Wendy saw potential in this project and encouraged me to tackle it and here we are. I remain thankful for their encouragement and seeing a possibly scholarly contribution in this endeavour. This book project would not have been successful had it not been for various contributors whose chapters make up this anthology. They worked through tough times under restrictive circumstances as different governments and institutions tried to contain and arrest the spread of the COVID-19. Some authors were directly affected, as they suffered from the virus or lost loved ones. Our sympathies go to them. This work is in the memory of my young brother who passed on at the height of the pandemic in 2020. I would like to dedicate this work to all those who succumbed, survived and were in the frontline against the virus. I would also like to thank the staff at Palgrave Macmillan, especially Mala Sanghera-Warren, Emily Wood and Md Saif for working with me till the end of the project. Mala was the first person I contacted with the proposal and has been enormously supportive and helpful since then until the completion of the project. I also thank Prof Olufemi Abodunrin from whose interactions some of my ideas were sharpened. Drs Tawanda Nyawasha, Trust Matsilele, Metji Makgoba and Profs Martin Ndlela and Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni have challenged and pushed ix

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me to do better. Our families, as editor and contributors to this volume, deserve some special mention. I thank my wife Vera and our children Maka and Lelo for their support and encouragement. Lastly but not least I thank the South African National Research Foundation, University of Limpopo Research Director and Vice Chancellor for research, my departmental colleagues and Ms. Semang Mathobela for their assistance and support in this and other projects.

Contents

1 Ridicule and Humour in the Global South: Theorizing Politics of Laughter in the Social Media Age  1 Shepherd Mpofu Part I Social Media Humour, Commentary and Confronting Power  21 2 The Aesthetics of ‘Laughing at Power’ in an African Cybersphere 23 Trust Matsilele and Wishes Tendayi Mututwa 3 Political Satire and the Mediation of the Zimbabwean Crisis in the Era of the “New Dispensation”: The Case of MAGAMBA TV 43 Mbongeni Jonny Msimanga, Gibson Ncube, and Promise Mkwananzi 4 Zapiro’s Satirical Reconstruction of Marikana Victims and Representation of Mourning 67 Metji Makgoba and Abram Mashatole

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5 Humour, Politics and Mnangagwa’s Presidency: An Analysis of Readers’ Comments in Online News Websites 93 Bhekizulu Bethaphi Tshuma, Lungile A. Tshuma, and Nonhlanhla Ndlovu 6 This Is a Laughing Matter: Social Media as a Sphere of Trolling Power in Malawi and Zimbabwe113 Albert Sharra and Trust Matsilele Part II Humour and the Everyday 135 7 Laughing at Trouble: A Multimodal Analysis of Online Economic Satire in Zimbabwe137 Mathew Nyaungwa 8 ‘Humour and the Politics of Resistance’: Audience Readings of Popular Amateur Videos in Zimbabwe155 Blessing Makwambeni and Joseph Olusegun Adebayo 9 The Prank of Celebrity Activism through Postcolonial Nigeria175 Garhe Osiebe 10 Comedy, Horror, and Graphic Violence: Brazilian Allegories of the Culture Wars197 Diego Hoefel Part III Race, Ethnicity and Gender Politics 213 11 ‘If Ever I Offended You I Am Sorry’: Disparagement Humour, Black Twitectives and the Dream Deferred215 Shepherd Mpofu

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12 The Curious Case of “Coconut Kelz”: Satire as a Critique of Race-Thinking in South Africa233 Sisanda Nkoala 13 Gender Performance and Irony in Online Presentification: A Study of the Case “Katylene” in Brazil249 Rafael Soares Krambeck and Adriana da Rosa Amaral 14 ‘Those Boys Are Representing Mashonaland’: Digital Football Fandom, Ethnicity and National Identity Politics in Zimbabwe267 Lyton Ncube and Jasper Maposa 15 Humour, Identity and Ethnicity in the Zimbabwean Political Landscape291 Bhekinkosi Jakobe Ncube Index311

Notes on Contributors

Joseph Olusegun Adebayo  is a postdoctoral research fellow in the Media Department of the Cape Peninsula University of Technology. He obtained his PhD from the Durban University of Technology, South Africa, where he researched peace journalism. His research interests include good governance, elections and democracy in Africa. He also analyses media framing and representation of Africa and media reportage of conflict-­sensitive issues in Africa. Diego  Hoefel  is a research fellow at the Laboratory of Cinema and Philosophy (CineLab) of the NOVA School of Social Sciences and Humanities (FCSH), Portugal. He mainly investigates the intersection between politics and contemporary media. In particular, he is now looking at how Brazilian comedies are responding to the intense social polarisation currently taking place in the country. This research project is funded by the Portuguese Foundation of Science and Technology (FCT) and by the European Social Fund (ESF). Rafael  Soares  Krambeck is a doctoral student in Communication Sciences from the Postgraduate Program in Communication Sciences at the Universidade do Vale do Rio dos Sinos—UNISINOS, Master in Communication Sciences through the Post-Graduation Program in Communication Sciences at the Universidade do Vale do Rio dos Sinos— UNISINOS (2013), and Bachelor in Social Communication with a degree in Journalism from Centro Universitário Franciscano—UNIFRA (2010). He has an MBA in Marketing and Communication from the Escola Superior de Propaganda e Marketing—ESPM (2014). He has experience xv

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in the area of communication, with emphasis on cultural studies and digital culture, acting mainly on the following subjects: cultural studies, digital culture, queer theory, identity and performance. Metji  Makgoba holds a PhD from Cardiff University and teaches Communication Studies and Culture at the University of Limpopo. He takes a deep interest in the intersection of language, ideology and power in the areas of social policy, gender and race. Blessing Makwambeni  is a senior lecturer and postgraduate coordinator in the Media Department of the Cape Peninsula University of Technology. He holds a PhD in Communication from the University of Fort Hare, South Africa. He has previously taught Journalism and Media Studies at the National University of Science and Technology in Zimbabwe. Blessing’s research interests lie in the broad areas of political communication, audience studies, development communication, journalism education and strategic communication. Jasper  Maposa  is a lecturer in the Department of English and Media Studies, Great Zimbabwe University. Maposa is also Deputy Chairperson of the Zimbabwe Media Commission (ZMC). His research interests are in political economy of the media, digital media and activism; media, human rights and democracy. Abram  Mashatole is a PhD candidate at the University of the Witwatersrand and teaches Multilingual Studies at the University of Limpopo. His research interests are oriented towards applied linguistics with deep interests in transemiotic studies, translanguaging and the multimodal nature of language. Trust  Matsilele  holds a DPhil et Litt in Communication Studies from the University of Johannesburg, South Africa. Matsilele has an interdisciplinary research interest cutting across education, digital anthropology, social media and journalism. Matsilele lectures in the Media and Public Relations Department, Cape Peninsula University of Technology. His latest paper published by Media Culture and Society journal looks at how social media is being appropriated by Zimbabwe’s subalterns for dissidentiality purposes. Promise  Mkwananzi  is a PhD candidate at the University of Western Cape in the Department of Governance and Politics and is studying on social movements in Zimbabwe. He is also the executive director of the

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Zimbabwe Informal Sector’s organisation and leader of one of the leading social movements in Zimbabwe Tajamuka/Sesjikile Campaign. He is also a fellow at the Africa No Filter Emerging Scholars Program. Shepherd Mpofu  is Associate Professor in Media and Communications at the University of Limpopo. He holds a PhD in Media Studies from the University of the Witwatersrand. He is also an African Humanities Programme Fellow. His research interests include digital media; media, elections, protests and democracy; new media, diaspora, race and identity; media, violence and genocide. In 2020, he co-edited his latest book Mediating Xenophobia in Africa (with Dumisani Moyo). He has authored several book chapters and journal articles on the above-­mentioned areas; these have appeared in reputable local and international publications. He has also offered media commentary to local and international media around issues that fall within his expertise. Mbongeni Jonny Msimanga  is a PhD candidate in the Department of Communication Studies at the University of Johannesburg. His research at PhD level examines how political satire constructs national identity in Zimbabwe. His research interests are in journalism studies, digital cultures, political theatre and political communication. Mbongeni has been engaged as a seasonal lecturer at Lupane State University and the University of Johannesburg. Wishes  Tendayi  Mututwa  holds a PhD in Communication from the University of Fort Hare, South Africa. He mainly researches on the role of social media in promoting human rights, political communication and social media-driven journalism, popular culture and media policy. He has also published on health communication, focusing on the role of celebrities in mediating health crisis on social media. Bhekinkosi Jakobe Ncube  is a Global Excellence Stature Postdoctoral Fellow in the Department of Communication and Media Studies at the University of Johannesburg, South Africa. His research interests include identity politics, community media and ethnic minority media, social media and the implications of computational journalism. He recently published a chapter in the book, Music and Political Messaging in Africa. His PhD was on the online constructions and contestations of ethnic identities. Gibson Ncube  is an associate professor in the Department of Languages, Literature and Culture at the University of Zimbabwe. He is also an Iso

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Lomso Research Fellow at the Stellenbosch Institute for Advanced Study (South Africa). His research interests are in comparative literature, gender and queer studies and cultural studies. His publications have appeared in journals such as the Social Dynamics, Current Writing, Journal of Commonwealth Literatures and the Journal Southern African Studies. He is the Assistant Editor of the South African Journal of African Languages. Lyton Ncube  is a Postdoctoral Research Fellow at Centre for Diversity Studies, University of the Witwatersrand, South Africa. Ncube is also a senior lecturer in the Media and Society Studies Department, Midlands State University, Zimbabwe. He holds a PhD in Cultural and Media Studies from the Centre for Communication Media and Society, the University of KwaZulu-Natal (2015). His research interests revolve around sociology of sport, critical media theory, cultural studies, sports media, identities and nationalism. His recent publications focus on digital social media, fake news and multiple “truth” regimes in Zimbabwe. Nonhlanhla Ndlovu  is Postdoctoral Research Fellow in Journalism and Media Studies at Rhodes University. She has researched in the areas of gender and the media, reception analysis and tabloidisation. Her research interests are in critical textual analysis and online media. Sisanda Nkoala  is an academic whose research interests are in the rhetoric and language of South African journalism and journalism education. She is a former award-winning journalist. She lectures at the Cape Peninsula University of Technology’s Media Department and is a PhD candidate at the Centre for Rhetoric Studies at the University of Cape Town. Mathew  Nyaungwa  is a doctoral student in the School of Journalism and Media Studies at Rhodes University, South Africa. Garhe Osiebe  is a Research Fellow at the African Studies Centre and the International Library of African Music, Rhodes University, Makhanda, South Africa. Adriana da Rosa Amaral  holds a PhD in Social Communication from PUCRS (2005) with a PhD Internship in Communication Sociology at Boston College (USA) through CNPq. She completed a Senior Internship Abroad at the University of Surrey-United Kingdom (2015–2016), through CAPES (post-doctoral). She is a professor and researcher in the

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Communication Sciences Program at Universidade do Vale do Rio do Sinos (UNISINOS). Albert Sharra  is a PhD candidate in the Department of Political Studies at the University of the Witwatersrand in Johannesburg, South Africa. He also holds an MA in Journalism and Media Studies from the same university. Albert has spent over 10 years in the newsroom and his last post was Investigative Journalist for Solutions Journalism. His research interests intersect between politics and journalism with a bias in communication science, media and society, press regulation, communication for social change, African politics and elections, policy studies, social media and society, digital activism and networked social movements. His latest paper published by African Journalism Studies journal looks at how Malawian journalists conduct themselves during political press briefings. Bhekizulu  Bethaphi  Tshuma is Lecturer in Journalism and Media Studies, National University of Science and Technology (NUST), Bulawayo, Zimbabwe. He is also a doctoral candidate at University of Free State, Bloemfontein, South Africa. His research interests are in media, democracy and politics as well as online media. Lungile A. Tshuma  is a PhD candidate in the Department of Journalism, Film and Television at the University of Johannesburg. His research interests are in political communication, visual culture and collective memory.

List of Figures

Fig. 6.1 Fig. 7.1 Fig. 11.1 Fig. 13.1 Fig. 13.2 Fig. 13.3 Fig. 13.4 Fig. 13.5 Fig. 13.6

Moyo riding on a crocodile. (Source: @ProfJNMoyo Twitter, October 20, 2020) Analytical framework for satirical videos A collage of humorous tweets from 2013 to 2014 denigrating black people Sequence of pictures with the idea of zooming in Profile images and anonymous photos Profile pictures and photographs of pop singers Profile images and photographs of Valesca Popozuda Profile pictures and fashion photographs Profile image based on the soap opera “Avenida Brasil”

129 144 224 258 259 259 260 260 261

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CHAPTER 1

Ridicule and Humour in the Global South: Theorizing Politics of Laughter in the Social Media Age Shepherd Mpofu

Introduction The Politics of Laughter in the Social Media Age: Perspectives from the Global South focuses on the politics of ridicule, humour and laughter in the Global South. Humour and laughter, in the ancient times, have been negatively perceived, especially by philosophers and religious zealots. As Morreall historicizes, ‘from ancient Greece until the 20th century, the vast majority of philosophical comments on laughter and humor focused on scornful or mocking laughter, or on laughter that overpowers people, rather than on comedy, wit, or joking’ (Morreall, 2013). For Plato, laughter was evil, he characterized it as an irrational emotion suggesting lack of self-control, and went on, in the Republic (388e) to suggest that Guardians of the state should eschew laughter for ‘when one abandons himself to violent laughter, his condition provokes a violent reaction’. Plato, according to Morreall, 2013, further advised that ‘if anyone represents men of

S. Mpofu (*) University of Limpopo, Polokwane, South Africa © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 S. Mpofu (ed.), The Politics of Laughter in the Social Media Age, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-81969-9_1

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worth as overpowered by laughter, we must not accept it, much less if gods.’ Given his misgivings, Plato said that ‘We shall enjoin that such representations be left to slaves or hired aliens, and that they receive no serious consideration whatsoever. No free person, whether woman or man, shall be found taking lessons in them. No composer of comedy, iambic or lyric verse shall be permitted to hold any citizen up to laughter, by word or gesture, with passion or otherwise’ (Laws 7, 816e in Morreall, 2013). These negative views on laughter played a pivotal role in shaping the attitudes of early Christian thinkers towards laughter as an objectionable human attribute. This attitude towards laughter has a basis on the biblical verses where laughter is equated to hostility. For example, Psalm 2 verses 2–5 reads: The kings of the earth rise up and the rulers band together against the LORD and against his anointed, saying, 3 “Let us break their chains and throw off their shackles.” 4 The One enthroned in heaven laughs; the Lord scoffs at them. 5 He rebukes them in his anger and terrifies them in his wrath…

Again, an encounter between Elijah and the over 400 prophets of Baal points to a notion of laughter as an expression of hostility (see 1 Kings 18 verses 20–27). Laughter has deadly consequences. A group of children is swallowed by the bears for laughing at Prophet Elisha’s bald head. Marrying the philosophers’ take on laughter with the biblical evidence, early Christian thinkers and leaders warned against laughter and joking labelling these as evil and deadly. Schaff cites John Chrysostom, one early Christian thought leader as saying Laughter often gives birth to foul discourse, and foul discourse to actions still more foul. Often from words and laughter proceed railing and insult; and from railing and insult, blows and wounds; and from blows and wounds, slaughter and murder. If, then, you would take good counsel for yourself, avoid not merely foul words and foul deeds, or blows and wounds and murders, but unseasonable laughter itself (Schaff, 1889, p. 442).

The Christian institution went as far as punishing those who laughed for whatever reason. Resnick (1987, p.  95) picks this up as he quotes St Columbanus Hibernus saying ‘He who smiles in the service … six strokes; if he breaks out in the noise of laughter, a special fast unless it has

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happened pardonably.’ Prynne captures the European Christian Purists’ views on humour and laughter when he says these ‘are sinfull, heathenish, lewde, ungodly spectacles, and most pernicious corruptions; condemned in all ages, as intolerable mischiefes to churches, to republickes, to the manners, mindes, and soules of men’ (Prynne, 1633). Humour, however, is more than that as it serves complex purposes in the current society and this collection unravels some of the critical themes in this day and age with a focus to the Global South. There are many different contexts in the Global South where humour has been used by ordinary citizens targeted at exposing the follies of those in power and the consequences have been devastating. This is true especially in countries with high levels of shallow democracy where backward thinking leaders think they are kings, infallible and God-ordained to rule. This explains why, when a dictator falls at an airport, as Mugabe did, his aides were quick to demand that photographers delete images of the fall, as gods in this part of the world do not fall, and the fall was couched by the propagandists around him as a near-fall which he ‘broke’. Later, memes mocking the frailty of this leader abound online not to mock his fall per se but this was a larger commentary. The frowning upon citizen activism social media by political leaders in the Global South has made for a deviant citizenry which has challenged the status quo for political and democratic ends. Power views social media humour and ridicule as deviant, unpatriotic and disrespectful but these have to be seen as more than that: revolutionary, daring and the departure of fear and readiness to confront oppressive system.

The Global South and Contemporary Context of Humour, Ridicule and Laughter Ridicule and humour, while making people laugh and at times grasp their conditions of existence or even pushing them to make alterations, has been one of the accessible ways for coping or bringing about change in society. This collection explores the political functions of humour and ridicule in the digital age in the Global South. What is peculiar about the Global South, critics might ask? Global South, according to Dados and Connell (2012, p.  12), ‘refers broadly to the regions of Latin America, Asia, Africa and Oceania’. Besides, the Global South is a geo-political, ideological and geographic location. The Global South is unique in that it

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composes of multi-dimensional and yet complex societies deemed peripheral to the Global North, that is, Europe and North America. In the Global South you have, just like in the Global North, problems with migration, xenophobia, democracy and politics. At the time of writing this, America is undergoing some political schisms we have been wired to think can only happen in the Global South: Donald Trump is refusing to concede electoral defeat claiming the election was rigged. Besides, racism exists within the countries of the Global South whereby, for example, Indians and Chinese are racist towards blacks (Tharoor, 2016). Of course, I am aware that Global South can be a totalizing term used to homogenize non-Western countries. This is not the intention in its usage in this book. If anything, as pointed out, countries, even western ones, are not socio-­ politically and economically homogeneous as they are complex. Most countries in the Global South region share, and are connected by histories of oppression and colonialism (Dados & Connell, 2012), mostly (though not all) ‘low income and often politically or culturally marginalized’ (Dados & Connell, 2012, p. 12). More often than not, especially in academic circles, the region has been subservient to the Global North. The Global South has largely been seen as a site for the production of commercial and intellectual raw materials and the Global North as a site of knowledge production. A cursory look at the subject matter covered in this book reveals that most writings are from the Global North context (Girard, 2020; Trindade, 2020). As already clarified, this book is distinctive in that it brings together and privileges material from the Global South, an under-researched geographic location. In addition, technological advancements are changing the way we have known life, politics and identities in this global location which continues to lag behind in many respects and this book acts as a critical intervention exposing us to the usages of technologies in spaces considered alternative deliberative platforms-social media. It is no secret that in the Global North technology has been appropriated to an extent that it is used in spaces that the Global South, in many contexts, only dreams of currently. For example, electronic voting or vote counting is used in a handful of Global South countries compared to the Global North. Technology has been used by the elite and ordinary citizens alike and most effectively in contexts where ordinary citizens have previously been excluded from the mainstream public sphere such as newspapers, radio and television programming mostly controlled by the political and economic elite. Social media offer everyday citizens with an alternative public

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sphere to engage on issues pertinent to their survival, perceptions of politics and identities as they deem necessary. In the Global South, social media have afforded these citizens an opportunity to speak up to power from below, organize offline protests and share ordinary things about life including humour. The proliferation of technology in the Global South has been met with mixed attitudes and resistance especially where people think that technology is upsetting their livelihoods and stands to benefit a minority techno-­ enabled few. This disruption has affected political, cultural, economic and social spheres of our lives. Economically, we now have shops that do not exist physically as they are online; we now use e-hailing services such as Uber and Taxify for transportation departing from the traditional system of phoning a call centre to request a car to pick one up to their destination. Traditional transport operators have resisted this technological disruption and subsequently deadly fights have broken up between the two generations of transport operators. This partly speaks of resistance and disruptive effects of technology on traditions. Politically, citizens can ridicule, engage and insult their leaders and formulate independent political opinions. Also, leaders can do the same. The ethics of communication that guide traditional media and even cultural ways of communication between the ruled and the rulers or elders and youngsters are disrupted and left to renegotiation.

Theorizing Humour Scholars are agreed that there are three critical theories of humour, and these are Superiority, Incongruity and Relief. Some scholars have dismissed some of these theories as descriptive of conditions and not explainers of humour (Bardon, 2005). Be that as it may, these theories are helpful, as starting points, in helping us understand various ways of approaching humour. The Superiority Theory draws from articulations by Hobbes, Descartes, Plato, the Bible and so on, which shaped Western thinking on humour for a long time (Morreall, 2013; Lintott, 2016). The central tenet of these philosophers’ misgivings about humour was that laughter was an expression of superiority (Morreall, 1982) where, as Bardon opines, ‘the humour we find in comedy and life is based on ridicule, wherein we regard the object of amusement as inferior and/or ourselves as superior’ (Bardon, 2005, p. 43). Plato extended this to suggest that ‘we laugh at what is ridiculous about our friends, by mixing pleasure with malice, we

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thereby mix pleasure with pain… malice is a pain in the soul, that laughing is a pleasure, and that both occur together on those occasions’ (1993, 50e13–16). Morreall (2013) further argues that the superiority that anchors the Superiority Theory is not necessarily superiority over others but could also refer to our former selves, leading to self-deprecating humour or laughter. Again, one might also laugh at their current selves and not only at their former selves. If I use the light of my mobile cellular phone to search for the same gadget under the car seats only to awake and realize that I am actually looking for my phone using its light, I would laugh at myself. But this is not covered by the Superiority Theory. However, the theory is inadequate in that it does not cater for innocent jokes and laughter where superiority in sharing a joke and laughing at it is not the central concern. In a way, the theory does not ‘account for the distinction we make every day between laughing at and laughing with others’ (Lintott, 2016, p. 349 italics provided). The second theory of humour offered as a challenge and cover up to the weaknesses of the Superiority Theory discussed above that I would like to turn to is the Incongruity Theory. Incongruity Theory, whose main advocates are Aristotle, Immanuel Kant, James Beattie, Arthur Schopenhauer and others, posits that incongruity (the strange, abnormal, odd) or what Koestler termed ‘bisociation’ (Koestler, 1964) and violation of a ‘person’s normal mental patterns and normal expectations’ (Morreall, 2012, p. 124) is a source of amusement and laughter. Beattie captured the object of humour thus ‘two or more inconsistent, unsuitable, or incongruous parts or circumstances, considered as united in one complex object or assemblage’ (Beattie, 1779, p.  320). Thus ‘laughter results from the sudden, insightful integration of contradictory or incongruous ideas, attitudes, or sentiments which are experienced objectively’ (Eysenck, 1883, p. 307). For Schoepenhauer The cause of laughter in every case is simply the sudden perception of the incongruity between a concept and the real objects which have been thought through it in some relation, and laughter itself is just the expression of this incongruity. It often occurs in this way: two or more real objects are thought through one concept, and the identity of the concept is transferred to the objects; it then becomes strikingly apparent from the entire difference of the objects in other respects, that the concept was only applicable to them from a one-sided point of view. It occurs just as often, however, that the

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i­ncongruity between a single real object and the concept under which, from one point of view, it has been rightly been subsumed, is suddenly felt. Now the more correct the subsumption of such objects under a concept may be from one point of view and the greater and more glaring their incongruity with it, from another point of view, the greater is the ludicrous effect which is produced by this contrast. All laughter, then, is occasioned by a paradox, and therefore by unexpected subsumption, whether this is expressed in words or in actions. This, briefly stated, is the true explanation of the ludicrous (Eysenck, 1883, p. 76–77)

Kant (1952, p. 199) captures this theory at work with two examples. The first is the joke of an Indian man drinking beer with an Englishman. An Indian at the table of an Englishman in Surat, when he saw a bottle of ale opened and all the beer turned into froth and overflowing, testified his great astonishment with many exclamations. When the Englishman asked him, “What is there in this to astonish you so much?” he answered, “I am not at all astonished that it should flow out, but I do wonder how you ever got it in.”

What we deem funny here is not necessarily our sense of superiority over the Indian but rather that the bubble of our expectation was extended to the full and suddenly went off into nothing (Kant, 1952, p.  200). In another example, Kant speaks of a rich man who attempts to organize a massive funeral and fails at it because ‘the more money I give my mourners to look sad, the more pleased they look’ (Kant, 1952, p. 200). As Morreall declares, ‘the core of humour is that we adopt a playful attitude toward something incongruous and we enjoy it’ (Morreall, 2012, p. 126). The third and final popular theory on humour and laughter is the Relief Theory which is seen as a valve which allows people to release pressures that civilizing processes of Western culture repress (Elias, 1978). According to Morreall (2013), this theory is ‘an hydraulic explanation in which laughter does in the nervous system what a pressure-relief valve does in a steam boiler’. Lord Shaftesbury’s article The Freedom of Wit and Humour gave a cursory definition of Relief Theory as The natural free spirits of ingenious men, if imprisoned or controlled, will find out other ways of motion to relieve themselves in their constraint, and whether it be in burlesque, mimicry, or buffoonery, they will be glad at any

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rate to vent themselves, and be revenged on their constrainers (cited in Morreall, 2008, p. 221)

In Taking Laughter Seriously, Morreall (1983, p. 21) says a ‘person may have come into the situation with the nervous energy that is to be released, or the laughter situation itself may cause the build-up of the nervous energy, as well as its release’. The explanations for this draw from physiological works such as Spencer’s On the Physiology of Laughter (1911) whereby emotions are ‘take the physical form of nervous energy’ (Morreall, 2013). According to Spencer, nervous energy ‘tends to beget muscular motion, and when it rises to a certain intensity, always does beget it’ (1911, p. 299). The following examples capture the theory at work When we are angry, for example, nervous energy produces small aggressive movements such as clenching our fists; and if the energy reaches a certain level, we attack the offending person. In fear, the energy produces small-­ scale movements in preparation for fleeing; and if the fear gets strong enough, we flee. The movements associated with emotions, then, discharge or release the built-up nervous energy. (Morreall, 2013)

This understanding that sponsored the links with the eighteenth-­century appreciation of physiology that says ‘our nerves were thought to be tiny tubes carrying not electro-chemical impulses but spirits, that is fluids’. The spirits flowing through the nerves to the muscles were though to cause our bodies to move. When we are not allowed to do what we want to do, according to this view, spirits are summoned in our nerves, but then they are constrained from moving our muscles to carry out the desired action. As a result, the pressure of the spirits against the walls of the nerves increases and so the spirits have a tendency to vent themselves by moving our muscles in other ways, such as “burlesque, mimicry, or buffoonery. (Morreall, 2008, p. 221–222)

There have been many more modern theories dealing with humour and the ones accounted for above are probably the seminal ones that helped scholars understand humour by ‘illuminating their cognitive, affective, social, ethical, and psychological aspects’ (Lintott, 2016, p. 357). These theories have weaknesses but are important in the understanding of humour.

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Social Media It is critical here to also discuss the social media phenomenon. According to Mpofu (2019, 110), ‘Social media include groupware, online communities, peer-to-peer and media sharing technologies, and networked gaming. Instant messaging, blogging, microblogging, forums, email, virtual worlds and social network sites are all genres of social media’ (see also Boyd, 2008). To Howard and Parks (2012, p. 4), social media are a form of shorthand, we often describe social media by identifying particular applications, like Facebook, Twitter, or YouTube. But social media are inherently social; meaning that beyond a particular proprietary tool, there is very social content … social media is different from the content of other news media, even when it is dealing with the news. Design choices and infrastructure both shape and are shaped by users’ social activities in ways that far transcend the traditional categories of uses and gratifications theories … social media may be defined in three parts … (a) the information infrastructure and tools used to produce and distribute content; (b) the content that takes the digital form of personal messages, news, ideas, and cultural products; and (c) the people, organizations, and industries that produce and consume digital content.

While to Lang and Benbunan-Fich (2010), social media are ‘web applications that process, store, and retrieve user-generated content’ (cited in Postill & Pink, 2012, p.  123). Barring digital divide, ‘social media are characterized by their broad reach, flexibility in terms of access, composition, editing, uploading and consumption of content, easy accessibility’ especially in contexts where the internet is readily available, ‘allowing many people to interact at the same time especially on public-facing platforms such as Facebook, blogs, listservs, WhatsApp, Twitter, Instagram and the like’ (Mpofu 2019, p.  110). These definitions of social media summarize the understanding of this phenomenon in this volume.

Aspects of Humour, Ridicule and Laughter This book engages largely with non-Global South literature because a large body of work has not been done here and then zeroes in on the Global South in its approach to humour and politics in the social media age. It seeks to build on existing literature while providing new ways of

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thinking and opening new avenues for exploration. Putting together this Global South edition suggests that we are alive to the Global North, its knowledge constructions and productions. The Global North has a long tradition of scholarship on humour when compared to the Global South (Billig, 2001; Glenn, 2003; Mulkay, 1988, Palmer, 1994, Roodenburg, 1997, Lockyer 2010; Weaver, 2011a, 2011b, 2013; Wolfers et al., 2017). Some scholars in the Global South have written monographs and articles on humour (Chukwumah, 2018; Downe, 1999; Anesi, 2018; Mpofu 2019; Obadare, 2012, 2016, Guimarães, Trindade, 2018). This book seeks to make a modest contribution to this body of scholarship while also adding a new dimension, that of digital media and how it enables people to engage on issues humorously for different socio-economic and political ends. Focus on the Global South is brought about by an appetite to explore humour and its uses in some unique and yet complex systems of governance, social configurations and political communication. Thus, Global South scholars should be given a chance to tap from the intellectual traditions and cultures of their region and bring forth understandings and analyses of people’s lived experiences. For instance, most countries in the Global South are variously characterized by different challenges such as economic, social or political where political leaders either enjoy or face crises of legitimacy and rule by coercion and consent in some instances. This book draws from theoretical and empirical approaches; some of which have been popularized by the western academy, to show how humour, in the social media age, is creatively used to humorously navigate, or ridicule life, society and politics of the day. This book therefore fills up existing knowledge gaps, and the humour aspect is important as it helps highlight part of the myriad ways ordinary people view themselves, society, politics and engage with different identities. Politics, in this instance, refers to anything from party politics, governance, identities, life choices and the like. To reiterate, this book differs and complements competition while maintaining its unique focus on the Global South. It explores different facets of life from the perspective of humour and ridicule while largely privileging voices of the ordinary citizens and ruling elite from various locales in the Global South. These conversations are seen as commentary for different purposes such as coping with their predicament, resistance, suppression, asserting power, critiquing ruling regimes or society, interacting with political leaders or followers, advocating for change and identity formation.

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At the same time, ridicule and humour are sophisticated avenues into accessing people’s intellectual assessments about crises, their experiences, things they fear, their interpretation of everyday politics and views on society in general. In some cases, humour has been the political elite’s way of resisting change and suppressing their subjects. Daily we encounter humorous engagements mediated by the digitized alternative public spheres which have made these accessible on the click of a button. While humour and ridicule have a potential of engendering hatred, divisions or violence based on social, political, ethnic or racial identities (Billig, 2001; Weaver, 2011a, 2011b, 2013; Arango, 2013; Roshani, 2016; Trindade, 2020; Goldstein, 2003; Kozintsev, 2010), it remains a potent site and tool for socio-political and economic commentary (Boland, 2012), social change agitation or as defence against anxiety or to release tension (Hamamoto, 1989; Shifman et al., 2007; Coetzee & Cilliers, 2012). Billig’s (2001) exploration of the online racist jokes of the Ku Klux Klan demonstrates that while some humour can be taken as enjoyment, there is potential for engendering racist and violent acts towards minorities. Weaver (2011a, 2011b) has also done a great deal of work on the characteristics of the body of the ‘other’ but does not explicitly or implicitly include ‘the systemic totality of older, often academic, forms of biological racism [and it is] not always present or significant in some instances of racism’ (Weaver, 2011a, p. 7). In his book, The Rhetoric of Racist Humour, Weaver critiques racist humour and exposes how its rhetoric has ‘communicative impact, is persuasive, and can affect impressions of truth and ambivalence’ (Weaver, 2011b, p.  1). Using Zygmunt Bauman’s theory of postmodernity (Bauman, 1991) and ‘order-building’ (Bauman, 2000), Weaver discusses three main types of racist discourse, ‘embodied’, ‘cultural’ and ‘postmodern’ racism. Modernity, argues Bauman, has created order and order-­ building thereby creating classes that fit into the stereotypes of order, normative, legal or lawful and acceptable or satisfying behaviour. Those who have normative and acceptable behaviours are loved and accepted and those who are deviant ‘strangers’, ‘outsiders’ or ‘others’ often become the referents of humour—this is clearly the case in ‘racist and ethnic joking’ (Weaver, 2011b, p. 46). In addition, humour has been central in the perpetuation of toxic cultures and violence in Brazil for instance. For example, there has been a rise of race-based and gendered violence humour (Trindade, 2020; Goldstein, 2003) in society in general and on social media in particular, undermining

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the integrity and rights of women and blacks. Besides, many different contexts find themselves having to contend with various types of commentary couched in humour so as to be palatable. In other cases, humour has been critical at providing people with an avenue to negotiate social, economic and political crises such as coups, stolen elections, ethnic tensions, racism, change, pandemics, corruption and violence among others. This edited book collection not only breaks new ground through reading the power of ridicule and humour, but also brings these debates in a more contemporary fashion and context: that of the digital era. It links crucial nodal points in politics, identity and humour in the digital age in the Global South. This work is different from other seminal works on humour and politics which have largely not focused on the digital age where ordinary citizens’ agency has been amplified and they have participated in some debates in ways unimagined before given the affordances of security and wider instantaneous reach of digital platforms. For instance, most researches on humour look at newspaper cartoons, offline humour and folklore, and these are disseminated through traditional media platforms. This book project therefore explores how digital media have made debates on political issues that matter to societies in the Global South ubiquitous through broadcasting them on digital media and using humour as a strategy of engagement. This book offers a nexus between identity, ridicule, humour and digital media where ordinary people’s engagements with those issues considered taboo such as politics of identity are brought to the fore and engaged with.

Digital Humour in ‘Asian and Latin American’ Contexts There are not many contributions on the Asian and Latin American context in this volume except Brazil. These are critical sub-regions of the Global South and it is therefore important to reflect on digital humour in these sub-regions. China is considered one of the significant Asian and global superpowers. While scholarship suggests that the Chinese are less likely to use humour in everyday life as they consider themselves ‘lacking a humorous trait’, being funny is ‘not associated with being an orthodox Chinese and humour as not important for everyone but exclusively for those with expertise’ (Jiang et al. 2019, p. 3). Public political humour as a socio-political act is frowned upon in China and ‘may bring about severe

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repercussions in the context of the contemporary Chinese regime’ (Dynel and Poppi 2020, p. 2). China is well known for its surveillance and stringent internet laws that make it difficult for citizens and political satirists to use humour to critique the state without consequence. While the government is not in a position to censor each and every dissident citizen who criticizes the political elite, internet companies are made responsible for any negative material their subscribers post on their sites and ‘To avoid being shut down by the government, these companies have hired censors to manually filter negative posts’ (Luqiu 2017, p. 128). Latin American countries such as Chile, Ecuador, Colombia, Venezuela, Nicaragua and Bolivia have seen citizen unrest and protests where technology has been used to undermine and challenge governments through mobilization, ‘sharing security and legal advice for protesters’ and creatively challenging the government through satire and humour. The governments have used ‘tech-related measures …to censor, dissuade demonstrations and increase surveillance’ (Alimonti 2019). It would seem that there is not much research on humour and social media in Latin America; hence, in 2020 Héctor Fernández L’Hoeste and Juan Poblete issued a call for an edited collection entitled Internet, Humour and Internet in Latin/x America.

The Structure of the Book This work is seminal as it focuses in the digital age where ordinary citizens’ agency has been amplified. Previous works, and most of them, focused on humour and health/pandemic communication or identity and there is little work that has been done on humour and pandemics, illnesses or environmental crises. This book project is one of the few towards that direction and the Global South mix presented here speaks of the sameness and difference of humanity. Contributions in this book are diverse and cover different contexts in the Global South such as Malawi, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Nigeria, Brazil and India. Outline of the Book and Chapters This book has a wide array of chapters that problematize and theorize humour and ridicule in the digital age. There are chapters in this book that interrogate how political elites humorously engage with ordinary people and how ordinary people engage issues to do with identity politics amongst

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themselves. The digital space seems to be a meeting point of and for citizens and politicians. Underlying this humour and ridicule are of course issues that address the political, be it at national, global or even village level. As already intimated, identity, too, has been a critical aspect on the menu of the ridiculous and comical especially in the Global South where racial and ethnic tensions remain rife and pronounced. The role of the digital media in this regard remains under-theorized in academic works and this book partly covers that lacuna. Contributions in this book are diverse and cover different context in the Global South. Part 1 focuses on social media humour and party politics. In this section, authors focus on the engagements of ordinary citizens with politicians via the use of humour. Matsilele and Mututwa open the section with a broad discussion on the aesthetics of laughing at power in African digital spheres. Msimanga and others explore the mediation of crisis through political satire in the post-coup Zimbabwe where long time strongman Robert Mugabe was overthrown to be replaced by an incompetent Emerson Mnangagwa. Makgoba and Mashatole’s chapter engages the mediation of death of those considered the homo sacer, the bare life by Agamben (1998), politics and humour used by citizens in engaging with political cartoons. This chapter demonstrates that ‘commentaries of political cartoons can potentially raise serious political questions about who counts as human and what makes for a grievable life in South Africa in which violence is a way of life and the means to secure self-defense are limited’. The next chapter interrogates the online responses to Mnangagwa’s oratory and presidential skills. These jokes extend from appreciating one’s conditions of existence and also speaking up to power where social, ethnic and political tribulations characterizing Mnangagwa’s administration are exposed. Mnangagwa’s ‘second republic’, the authors argue, is at variance with the expectations of the people and what he, together with the military that assisted him, promised the Zimbabweans. Matsilele and Sharra offer a comparative study of how power is trolled in Malawian and Zimbabwean context where they investigate how dissidents use humour to undermine their respective states. The authors observe that in spaces where leaders have an appetite for autocracy, new media platforms become alternative avenues for engagement and adding humour to political engagements has become a creative way of doing dissent. They conclude that dissidents are tactical in baiting those in power and attracting bystanders into a conversation online.

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Part 2 of this volume casts light on humour and the day-to-day life as authors pay attention to the use of social media and humour in the everyday lives. Matthew Nyaungwa exposes how satire uses the language of the ordinary to understand complex economics in a time of economic meltdown in Zimbabwe. Through an exploration of humour in Bustop TV between 2016 and 2020, the author demonstrates how humour is used to learn, educate, let off steam and comment about the shortcomings of those superintending the nation. Osiebe’s chapter engages us on how pranks and jokes are used by Nigerian celebrities as activism in peace-­ building and conflict resolution exercises. For Nigerians, the author argues, ‘“celebrity activism” is a non-existent construct. This runs contrary to the beliefs of Nigerian celebrities who are quick to beat their chests over their impactful efforts in activism.’ The next chapter by Berg suggests that humour and public speaking have to go hand in hand. The third chapter problematizes the issue of violence and comedy in the Brazilian context. Diego Hoefel demonstrates how some bloody and comic films have tended to mirror political polarization in Brazil leading to memification and other online engagements where opponents are ridiculed and demonized. Both comedy and horror have been central in the representation of the ‘country’s recent sociopolitical situation’. Part 3 focuses on humour and identity. Shepherd Mpofu’s and Sisanda Nkoala’s chapters interrogate the theme of race in South Africa. Mpofu looks at how a potential Miss South Africa contestant Bianca Schoombee had her dreams shattered after the excavation of her old tweets where she was disparaging people because of their race and body shape. Nkoala’s chapter analyses how Coconut Kelz, a vlogist and satirist, uses social media to critique ‘the kind of race-thinking prevalent in South Africa’ which largely ‘views white people as superior’. Rafael Soares Krambeck and Adriana da Rosa Amaral’s research explores digital humour at the intersection of sexuality, technology and sexuality in the Brazilian context. Here, they explore how issues of transsexuality, transphobia using a case of the blog Papel Pobe run by a character identifying as transvestite. The blogger makes ‘rough’ ‘montages with her “kitsch” face on the bodies of celebrities like Madonna or Gisele Bündchen’, and profanes them and ‘the glamor of the photograph in question, deconstructing canonical personalities from pop culture and appropriating traits to build her narrative’. Lyton Ncube and Jasper Maposa’s chapter visits the problematic nature of ethnicity where he focuses on soccer fandom and the tensions that abound in a context where sport is a nationalist undertaking. The ethnic tensions

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are between the majority Shona-speaking and minority isiNdebele speaking people of Zimbabwe. These support two leading soccer teams in the country, Dynamos and Highlanders respectively. The researchers conclude that when the national team is playing, those matches ‘are ritualised ethnic identity wars, always throwing up ontological, philosophical and metaphysical questions “Who is a Zimbabwean?” and What is Zimbabwe anyway?’ Wittingly or not, the Warriors are viewed through the polarising ‘Shona’/‘Ndebele’, ethnic lens. Bhekinkosi Jakobe Ncube follows up on the theme of ethnicity and humour in the digital age. He follows a street comic group called Omkhula who do street theatre in South Africa and reflect on Zimbabwe’s ethnic problems. These videos are widely shared on social media creating a large off-the-ground-viewership and online conversations. The group, Ncube demonstrates, can ‘reproduce the status quo, it can also challenge and trouble it. The chapter concludes that through humour, ridicule and laughter, language can be used towards self-liberation and self-rehabilitation.’

References Agamben, G. (1998). Homo sacer: Sovereign power and bare life (D.  Heller-­ Roazen, Trans.). Stanford: Stanford University Press. Alimonti, V. (2019). Protests and Technology in Latin America: 2019 in Review. https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2019/12/protests-­and-­technology-­latin-­america-­ 2019-­review-­0 Anesi, J. (2018). Laughing matters: Humour as advocacy in education for the disabled. Disability & Society, 33(5), 723–742. Arango, E. A. (2013). Racismo y discurso en la era digital: el caso de la revista Hola y los discursos en las redes sociales. Discurso & Sociedad, 7(4), 617–642. Bardon, A. (2005). The philosophy of humor. In M. Charney (Ed.), Comedy: A geographic and historical guide, 2 vols (pp. 462–476). Westport CT: Praeger. Bauman, Z. (1991). A sociological theory of postmodernity. Thesis Eleven, 29(1), 33–46. Bauman, Z. (2000). Liquid modernity. London: Polity Press. Beattie, J. (1779). Essay on Laughter and Ludicrous Composition. In Essays (3rd ed.). London. Billig, M. (2001). Humour and hatred: The racist jokes of the Ku Klux Klan. Discourse & Society, 12(3), 267–289. Boland, T. (2012). Critical comedy: Satire, absurdity and Ireland’s economic crash. Irish Political Studies, 27(3), 440–456.

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Boyd, D. (2008). Why youth (heart) social network sites: The role of networked publics in teenage social life. In D.  Buckingham (Ed.), Youth, identity, and digital media (pp. 119–142).Cambridge: MIT Press. Chukwumah, I. (Ed.). (2018). Joke-performance in Africa: Mode, media and meaning. London: Routledge. Coetzee, O., & Cilliers, F. (2012). Humour as defence against the anxiety manifesting in diversity experiences. SA Journal of Industrial Psychology/SA Tydskrif vir Bedryfsielkunde, 38(2), 9. https://doi.org/10.4102/sajip.v38i2.990 Dados, N., & Connell, R. W. (2012). The global South. Contexts, 11(1), 12–13. Downe, P. (1999). Laughing when it hurts: Humor and violence in the lives of costa Rican prostitutes. Women’s Studies International Forum, 22(1), 63–78. Dynel, M., & Poppi, F.  I. M. (2020): Caveat emptor: boycott through digital humour on the wave of the 2019 Hong Kong protests, Information, Communication & Society. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2020. 1757134 Elias, N. (1978). The civilizing process. Oxford: Blackwell. Eysenck, H. J. (1883). The appreciation of humour: An experimental and theoretical study. British Journal of Psychology, 32(4), 295–309. Girard, B. (2020). Racism Is Alive and Well in China https://thediplomat. com/2020/04/racism-­is-­alive-­and-­well-­in-­china/ Glenn, P. (2003). Laughter interaction. Cambridge: University Press Cambridge. Goldstein, M. D. (2003). Laughter out of place: Race, class, violence, and sexuality in a Rio shantytown. University of California Press. Hamamoto, D. (1989). Nervous laughter: Television situation comedy and liberal democratic ideology: New York: Praeger. Jiang, T., Li, H., & Hou, Y. (2019). Cultural Differences in Humor Perception, Usage, and Implications. Front. Psychol. 10(123), 1–8. https://doi. org/10.3389/fpsyg.2019.00123 Kant, I. (1952). Critique of Judgement, Trans. Janies Meredith Creed. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Koestler, A. (1964). The Act of Creation. London: Arkana/Penguin. Kozintsev, A. (2010). The mirror of laughter. Transaction Publishers. Lang, G., & Benbunan-Fich, R. (2010). The use of social media in disaster situations: Framework and cases. International Journal of Information Systems for Crisis Response and Management, 2(1), 11–23. Lintott, S. (2016). Superiority in humor theory. The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 74(4), 347–358. Lockyer, N. (2010). Dynamics of social class contempt in contemporary British television comedy. Social Semiotics, 20(2), 121–138. Luqiu, L.  R. (2017). The cost of humour: Political satire on social media and censorship in China. Global Media and Communication, 13(2), 123–138.

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Morreall, J. (1982). A new theory of laughter. Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition, 42(2), 243–254. Morreall, J. (1983). Taking laughter seriously. New  York: State University of New York Press. Morreall, J. (2008). Philosophy and religion. In V.  Raskin (Ed.), The primer of humour research. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Morreall, J. (2012). Humor, philosophy and education. Educational Philosophy and Theory, 46(2), 120–131. Morreall, J. (2013). Philosophy of Humor. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward N. Zalta. http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/ spr2013/entries/humor/. Mulkay, M. (1988). On humour: Its nature and its place in modern society. Cambridge: Polity Press. Obadare, E. (2012). State of travesty: Jokes and the logic of socio-cultural improvisation in Africa. Critical African Studies, 2(4), 92–112. Obadare, E. (2016). Humour, silence and civil society in Nigeria. University of Rochester Press: Boydell & Brewer. Palmer, J. (1994). Taking humour seriously. London: Routledge. Plato. (1993). Philebus. Translated by Dorothea Frede. Indianapolis: Hackett. Postill, J., & Pink, S. (2012). Social media ethnography: The digital researcher in a messy web. Media International Australia, 145, 123–134. Prynne, W. 1633. Histrio-Mastix: The players scourge or actors Traegedie. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.  Resnick, I. (1987). Risus Monasticus: Laughter and medieval monastic culture. Revue Benedictine, 97(1–2), 90–100. Roodenburg, J. N. B. (1997). A cultural history of humour. London: Polity Press. Roshani, N. (2016). Grassroots Perspectives on Hate Speech, Race, & Inequality in Brazil & Colombia. Berkman Klein Center for Internet & Society at Harvard University. Schaff, P. (Ed.). (1889). John Chrysostom, on the priesthood: Ascetic treatises; select homilies and letters; homilies on the statues, vol. 9 of a select library of the Nicene and post-Nicene fathers of the Christian Church. Massachusetts: Hendrickson Publishers. Shifman, L., Coleman, S., & Ward, S. (2007). Only joking? Online humour in the 2005 UK general election. Information, Communication & Society, 10(4), 465–487. Tharoor, I. (2016). China and India have a huge problem with racism toward black people. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/ wp/2016/05/27/china-­and-­india-­have-­a-­huge-­problem-­with-­racism-­toward­black-­people/

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Trindade, L. V. P. (2018). It is not that Funny. Critical Analysis of Racial Ideologies Embedded in Racialized Humour Discourses on Social Media in Brazil. PhD Thesis, University of Southampton. Trindade, L. V. P. (2020). Disparagement humour and gendered racism on social media in Brazil. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 43(15), 2766–2784. Weaver, S. (2011a). Jokes, rhetoric and embodied racism: A rhetorical discourse analysis of the logics of racist jokes on the internet. Ethnicities, 11(4), 413–435. Weaver, S. (2011b). The rhetoric of racist humour: US, UK and global race joking. Surrey: Ashgate Publishing. Weaver, S. (2013). A rhetorical discourse analysis of online anti-Muslim and antiSemitic jokes. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 36(3), 483–499. Wolfers, S., File, K., & Schnurr, S. (2017). ‘Just because He’s black’: Identity construction and racial humour in a German U-19 football team. Journal of Pragmatics, 112, 83–96.

PART I

Social Media Humour, Commentary and Confronting Power

CHAPTER 2

The Aesthetics of ‘Laughing at Power’ in an African Cybersphere Trust Matsilele and Wishes Tendayi Mututwa

Introduction Critical geopoliticians have increasingly explored how humour can destabilise and subvert dominant geopolitical narratives and established hierarchies (Dodds & Philip, 2013; Flint, 2001; Kuus, 2008). This existing body of scholarship fails to adequately address other serious disciplines such as sovereignty, bio-politics, violence, war and interstate crisis management, a gap this study seeks to fill. This chapter explores how humour has been employed as a tool for digital dissidentiality against African political regimes. This form of resistance has been employed in competitive authoritarian regimes by ‘subalterns’ as part of their language of resistance (Makwambeni, 2017; Matsilele, 2019; Matsilele & Ruhanya, 2020). To laugh, as Bhungalia (2020) asserts, in the face of power is not to say: ‘I oppose you’—rather it is to assert: ‘your power has no authority over me’.

T. Matsilele (*) Cape Peninsula University of Technology, Cape Town, South Africa W. T. Mututwa University of Fort Hare, Alice, South Africa © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 S. Mpofu (ed.), The Politics of Laughter in the Social Media Age, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-81969-9_2

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It is to discredit the authorising force. As such, and borrowing from Bhungalia’s (2020) conceptualisation, this chapter maintains that closer inspection of the relationship between humour, laughter and power carves out new spaces wherein power is not only opposed but also caricatured, lampooned and disavowed. Qualitative content analysis and qualitative methodology are preferred tools of analysis and research approach in this chapter. This chapter seeks to investigate how humour has been used historically and in contemporary African cyberspace to challenge master narratives and undermine power. This chapter focuses on how the ‘repressed’ use social media to mock, to laugh at, to generate humour from and to troll power drawing inspiration from folkloric and other historical figures.

Context This chapter borrows Holmes and Marra’s (2002) definition of humour characterised as paralinguistic, prosodic and discoursal utterances intended by the speaker(s) to be amusing and perceived to be amusing by at least some participants. As Marra (1998) observes, a wide range of contextual and linguistic clues are relevant to identifying instances of humour, including the speaker’s tone of voice and the audience’s responses. Humour permeates every aspect of society and has done so for thousands of years (Berger, 2017). Agreeing with Berger, Obrdlik (1942, p.  709) says, ‘humour is both a social product and an agency with social functions’. It assumes different forms in various groups and within the same group according to the changing insinuations. One such insinuation is observed by Wooten (1996) who argues that humour and laughter can be effective self-care tools to cope with stress. This is confirmed by Mobbs et al. (2003, p. 1041) arguing that, ‘humour plays an essential role in many facets of human life including psychological, social, and somatic functioning’. The compelling power of humour makes it a recurrent topic for research in many fields, including communication (Meyer, 2000). As Meyer (2000, p. 310) intimates, ‘three theories of humour creation emerge in humour research: the relief theory, which focuses on physiological release of tension; the incongruity theory, singling out violations of a rationally learned pattern; and the superiority theory, involving a sense of victory or triumph.’ Morreall (1983) gives an etymological review of these theories of laughter and humour which originated from ancient times with the view that laughter is an expression of feelings of superiority over another person. This superiority theory was held by Plato, Aristotle and Hobbes.

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Another aspect of laughter, noted by Aristotle and Cicero and neglected until Kant and Schopenhauer developed it into the incongruity theory, is that laughter is often a reaction to the perception of some incongruity (Morreall, 1983). According to the third and latest traditional theory, the relief theory of Herbert Spencer and Freud, laughter is the venting of superfluous nervous energy. Humour serves multiple purposes, and although there is a sizable and expanding research literature on the subject, the research is spread in a variety of disciplines (Martin & Thomas, 2018). Much has been said and written about humour that disparages, belittles, debases, demeans, humiliates or otherwise victimises (Zillmann, 1983). In the African context, laughter has folkloric roots, presented through poetry, songs, proverbs and prose. According to Finnegan (2012), the animal characters feature predominantly in African folklore to celebrate or ridicule human behaviour. The messages in the folklore put great emphasis on ‘animal tricksters—small, wily, and tricky animals who cheat and outdo the larger and more powerful beasts’ (Finnegan, 2012, p. 335). Presented mainly through humour, these animal tricksters outwit the powerful beasts in tugs of war, cheat them in races, deceive them into killing themselves or their own relations, gobble up their opponents’ food in pretended innocence, divert the punishment for their own misdeeds on to innocent parties and perform a host of other ingenious tricks (Finnegan, 2012). While laughter was an inherent nature of folklore for different audiences, from children to adults, it was also a convenient way of lampooning those in positions of power such as kings, fathers and heroes for particular vices and follies. Today, many African independent states are experiencing a raft of challenges ranging from corruption, authoritarianism, civil wars and human rights violations mainly perpetrated by the political elites. Borrowing from folklore, the modern African citizenry employ humour to expose these failings by those who govern them, thus playing a pivotal role in keeping public officials and politicians in check. As the world continuously become digital, modern life is increasingly becoming mediated (Weimann, 1999). The cybersphere, which is the realm of information technology and electronic communication on the internet, is emerging a vital platform for ordinary citizens to laugh at power. Drawing from influences of African folklore, this chapter addresses the question: How are Africans employing humour within the cybersphere to challenge power? Many African countries are increasingly showing resentment towards freedom of expression by enacting laws that discourage citizens from challenging the political

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elite (Ntibinyane, 2018). Therefore, in order to evade censorship, citizens resort to satire in jokes, comic skits and animation to challenge power across the cybersphere. It should be noted that unlike several countries with cyber security laws which the governments are using to curb various cyber-crimes and take advantage of that power to employ digital authoritarianism on digital dissidents, Zimbabwe does not have such law yet. However, in 2020, the government of Zimbabwe promulgated the Cyber Security and Data Protection Bill, which the government wanted to fast track to ratify. While cyber security is necessary for the country, the law is prone to abuse by the state to thwart digital dissidence (MISA, 2020). The law sanctions the state’s clampdown on dissent voices.

Laughter in African Folklore There are four main genres of presentation in African folklore, namely poetry, song, idioms and prose. As Finnegan (2012) observed, resistance was mainly conveyed through song and prose presentations. Songs were politically effective weapons to insult, challenge, or satirically comment on political leaders’ behaviours (Mpofu & Matsilele, 2020; Matsilele, 2019). For example, in songs by the Hausa and Hottentots, unpopular chiefs were lectured by women in sarcastic ‘reed-songs’ and on one occasion the young girls sang into the chief’s face telling him that ‘he was a hungry hyena and a roguish jackal that he was the brown vulture who is not only satisfied with tearing the flesh from the bones, but also feasted on the intestines’ (Hahn cited in Finnegan, 2012). In African orature, songs were also directed against opposing groups or individuals in the community. For instance, the songs ranged from the half-joking, exchanged between individuals of the same age, between villages, or between different quarters of the same village (Finnegan, 2012). The vices, follies and customs of others are ironically commented on or their accents parodied and ridiculed. As observed across cultures in Southern and West Africa, there were instances where quarrelling villagers composed songs of a poetic nature against each other, usually directed towards the offending elder of the rival village (Gbeho, 1954). As Finnegan (2012) noted, lampoons were not only used between groups but were a means of communicating and expressing personal enmity between hostile individuals. The prose genre (Folktale) in African folklore mainly lampooned human weakness through animal characters. Extant literature finds

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similarities in plots, motifs and in some cases, characters in African stories from all parts of the continent (Finnegan, 2012; Makaudze, 2013). Many of these folktales are light-hearted, even satirical and centre around the tricks and competitions of the hare, spider, or their friends, set in a wide range of adaptable and adapting situations (Finnegan, 2012; Matsilele, 2019). These tricksters, however, can manipulate any situation to their advantage. Their success in outmanoeuvring the fierce and huge animal characters, often associated with rulership of the jungle, is what generates humour, exposing fallibility of the rulership. Scatological humour is also found in African folktales where the often-­ powerful animal and human characters are often embarrassed. Modern-­ day resistance in post-colonial Africa locates scatological humour within political strategy. Mbembe (2001, p. 107) asserts that ‘the significance of orifices’ and of a body that drinks, eats, shits ‘and is open’ is fundamental to ‘people’s political humour’ (Mbembe, 2001, p. 107), a humour which in particular targets ‘the president’s anus’ (Mbembe, 2001, p. 108). By retracing the idea of laughing at power in the cybersphere, this chapter raises Finnegan’s (2012) assertion that it would be a mistake to assume too easily that there is necessarily a complete break in continuity between African folklore and that of ‘modern politics’. For Finnegan, it would be more accurate to say that the long-standing interests in oral literature and in politics have, surprisingly, proved adaptable to the political circumstances of the digital age. Satire across the cybersphere is, therefore, an extension of folkloric narratives that have been modernised to meet the circumstances of the digital age.

The African Carnival as a Space for Resistance Humour, as a broader concept, has been theorised and used for cathartic purposes for thousands of years. Politics has afforded abundant targets for wits, satirists and comedians at which to aim their scorn. As Dudden (1985) observes, the use of humour accelerated with almanacs, newspapers and comic showmen popping up everywhere in the nineteenth century, a widening variety of humourists focused their talents on the indigenous resources at hand to poke fun at foolish or knavish political figures. There was a realisation of humour’s tactical objectives by attacking extraordinary behaviour and individual shortcomings in democracy’s political arena (Dudden, 1985, p. 51). The definition of ‘carnivalesque’ is marked by an often mocking or satirical challenge to authority and the

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traditional social hierarchy. The term carnival was first used to refer to theatrical challenges to the status quo. For this chapter, the definition extends beyond theatre to comics, satire and humour. This study employs Price’s (2010, p. 3) conceptualisation of the African carnival that sees the ‘southern African culture as carnivalesque because it is often depicted as colourful, unique and if not always actively revolutionary, then at least indifferent to authority and rules to varying degrees’. The study looks at how comics in Zimbabwe employ humour as a form of digital dissidence.

The Power of Humour in Contemporary African Cybersphere Humour is a powerful resource for social commentary and transformation, in part because it is often considered to be innocuous ‘mere’ entertainment. Anthropologists have long recognised the utility of humour and joking in regulating social relationships (Raddiffe-Brown, 1940; Fortes, 1953). Humour is the extent of the intentional use of verbal and nonverbal behaviours that elicit laughter, pleasure and delight (Booth-Butterfield & Booth-Butterfield, 1991), and it is identified as an important immediacy behaviour (Gorham & Christophel, 1990). Humour can be defined as a state of mind, as the quality of causing amusement and as the ability to understand and enjoy what is funny and makes people laugh (Longman Dictionary of English Language and Culture, 1998). As Zhang (2005, p. 113) postulates, ‘the Chinese people have been endowed with a deep-­ seated humour’ (Wells, 1971), but they seem to deliberately de-emphasise humour in life because humour is typically expressed in a very latent, constrained and suppressed manner, with the only exception being in art and literature, in which humour abounds and is given free reign. But humour can also be used to reduce the face threat of a directive, a challenge or a criticism (Holmes, 1998). Holmes and Meredith (2002, p. 66) writing on the interface between humour and power say, ‘in the workplace, where differences in power and authority are part of the fabric of interaction, humour is one useful strategy for getting a negative or critical message across in an ostensibly acceptable form. In other words, humour may finesse objections to an insult, or a criticism by presenting them in a form which frames the objector negatively: for example, as lacking a sense of humour.’ Humour can be a powerful tool in negotiating as it can function as ‘a bouquet, shield, cloak, incisive weapon’ (Holmes, 1998, p.  6).

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Superiors can maintain their power with humour through ‘repressive humour’; subordinates can challenge that power through ‘contestive humour’ (Holmes, 1998, p. 6). Discourse is a part of social practice and reproduces social structures (Fairclough, 1989). Consequently, on the one hand, negotiation discourse reflects power relations, and, on the other hand, power struggles also occur in negotiating. Power dynamics in negotiating reflect the fact that powerful participants control and constrain what non-powerful participants can say, as well as when and where they can say it (Vuorela, 2005, p. 107). In authoritarian environments such as Zimbabwe where the state security apparatus often clamps down on government critics, Willems (2010) opines that humour and laughter can serve as a powerful tool for social protest. The disillusionment reflects the frustrations at the government for a range of failures brought about by corruption, electoral rigging and poor service delivery (Willems, 2010). There is abundant literature that explores how Africans have appropriated the cybersphere, mainly Facebook, YouTube, Instagram, WhatsApp, Twitter and blogs to challenge power through humour. Zimbabwe, South Africa, Nigeria and Cote d’ivoire are a few cases in Africa in which humour is used as an instrument of resistance. With Zimbabwe having been hamstrung by economic and political crisis arguably since 1995 and the state becoming more ruthless to dissenting voices, laughter becomes one of the ways for citizens to share their experiences and challenge domination (Jongwe, 2015). Jongwe identifies the role played by artists and ordinary citizens in speaking about their daily struggles. In difficult times where unemployment is rampant, and poverty widespread, a new generation of comedians has emerged to entertain the masses and make light of the worsening situation and laugh at the political elites too (Jongwe, 2015). One Zimbabwean poet, Chirikure Chirikure cited in Jongwe (2015), described the efficacy of humour in the midst of the crisis noting, ‘we laugh at ourselves; we laugh at funerals; we laugh even when things are not going well for us and we should be moaning and groaning’. In South Africa, the former president Jacob Zuma who was impeached on allegations of state capture has been one of the most satirised South African politicians. In 2016 while standing trial for allegedly raping an HIV-Positive woman, Jacob Zuma who admitted not using a condom claimed the sex was consensual and he then took a shower to reduce chances of contracting the virus. In response to Zuma’s case, cartoonist Jonathan Shapiro repeatedly depicted a shower head attached to

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Zuma’s head, constantly reminding readers of the HIV gaffe (Smith, 2009). The cartoons which were scattered across the cybersphere became a popular and much imitated running joke on the president. This chapter explores satire as a form of expression by artists and ordinary Zimbabweans under an authoritarian media environment. This indirect means of communicating with someone in power through the artistic medium of vlogging is a way by which the Zimbabwean comedians hope to influence while at the same time avoiding the open danger of speaking directly. Nigerians have used humour to ridicule their political leadership (Obadare, 2010). For example, the (1983–1985) regime of Buhari/ Idiagbon in Nigeria was a source of laughter for being unsmiling, equated with lacking a sense of humour. When the then Chief of Staff Supreme Headquarters, General Tunde Idiagbon, was caught laughing in a rare show of emotion, newspapers were flooded with the unlikely image. On the contrary, the 1985 coup leader, Ibrahim Babangida, made himself favourable by his smiling demeanour, earning him the nickname, ‘the gap-­ toothed general’ (Obadare, 2010). Humour was used to install political legitimacy on the coup regime of Babangida through comparative imagery of the two contrasting regime faces. What this means is humour is as much a form of collective self-critique as it is of political resistance (Obadare, 2010). In Cote d’ivoire, both the mainstream media and citizen journalists have employed humour to laugh at power. In 2014, Bôl Kotch, a satirical weekly publication, published a caricature of the country’s president, Alassane Quattara (Eko, 2010). In response to the growing criticism from the media, the government suspended five publications. In order to fill this void, digital dissidents took to Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, websites and blogs outside the country to caricature the president. Therefore, in authoritarian media environments, the cyberspace empowers ordinary citizens to speak truth to power in the comfort of their perceived safe havens.

Theoretical Framework Cultural studies is a very broad theory that begins with the Frankfurt School and travels to British Cultural Studies. Kellener (1995) argues that the Frankfurt School combined political economy of the media, cultural analysis of texts and audience reception studies of the social and ideological effects of mass culture and communications. British Cultural Studies emerged in the 1960s. Kellener (1995) argues that it situates culture

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within a theory of social production and reproduction, either to further social domination or to enable the people to resist and struggle against domination. It builds on Gramsci’s model which establishes the existence of a struggle between hegemony and counter-hegemony. The use of humour in different forms of expression across the cyberspace reflects how ordinary citizens struggle against the ruling elite who are at leisure when the nation is at its knees economically and socially. In the digital age, media culture is used as a site where battles for control of society are fought. Kellener (1995)) argues that the struggle for cultural power is fought in the medium not only of news and information but also of entertainment and the cybersphere. Language is cultural, not natural, and so the meanings it generates. The way in which language generates meaning, according to Saussure, is important. Semiotics allows us to examine the cultural specificity of representations and their meanings by using one set of methods and terms across the full range of signifying practices: gesture, dress, writing, speech, photography, film, television and so on (Mututwa et al., 2019). Central here is the idea of the sign. A sign can be thought of as the smallest unit of communication within a language system. Semiotics has become part of the vocabulary of cultural studies especially in the analysis film. Therefore, in this chapter, emphasis shall be put on how the language and the images offer a narrative of the social, economic and political status quo in Zimbabwe.

Methodology For this qualitative research, data was purposively gathered from the YouTube channels of Zimbabwean comedians: Bustop TV, Sabhuku Vharazipi and Goldgator TV. There are two main reasons for using a qualitative method for this chapter. The qualitative method allows researchers to rise from observations or ‘findings’ and then draw ‘generalisable inferences’ (Bryman, 2001, p. 10). The inferences by the researcher come at the backdrop of interpretations obtained during the process of watching the selected YouTube performances. Until November 2020, Zimbabwe has had one television network controlled by the state and Zimbabweans were fed up with substandard content and programming on Zimbabwe Television (ZTV). Despite the Broadcasting Authority of Zimbabwe (BAZ) issuing licences to six commercial television stations, there is little hope of diversity as the new television licence holders either already hold

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print or broadcasting licences or are linked to the government or governing party (MISA, 2020). Therefore, comedians, whose subversive content has no place in the partisan state broadcaster, and the ordinary citizens who are disgruntled with ZTV’s partisan coverage find a home on social media. In an analysis of the trends overview of the global web index, Young (2017) argued that watching videos on social media is now a mainstream activity. Warmbrodt (2007) notes that unlike television, YouTube allows for conversation between the comedians and the viewers. As Blaikie (1993, p. 36) puts it, ‘the social world is already interpreted before the social scientist arrives.’ This basically means that the researcher will be able to infer certain meanings during the process of watching the plays and these inferences should be able to be traced back to theory. Data were then analysed using Online Content Analysis. Online Content Analysis refers to a collection of research techniques employed to explore online material through systematic coding and interpretation (Kim & Kuljis, 2010). In this case we analyse ‘themes and main ideas of the (online) text as primary content’ (Mayring, 2000, p.  2). Therefore, in analysing the selected vlogs, focus was on language, body movement, tone and props so as to explore the underlying meanings.

Findings and Discussion The section explores the performances by selected Zimbabwean comedians: Bustop TV, Goldgator TV and Sabhuku Vharazipi posted on their YouTube channels. Laughing at Corruption Government The political elite in Zimbabwe are the main drivers of corruption. They sustain this culture through a system of patronage. Goldgator TV (2020) released a video skit ‘Catch and Release’ which exposed the president and his wife in the stage-managed Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission (ZACC) arrests and unjustifiable release of the corrupt political elite so as to disguise the ordinary citizens that they are serious in ending corruption. In the skit the president, clearly identifiable by the scuff with ZANU-PF colours which he popularised in 2017, addresses colleagues within his party about a ‘new program called catch and release’. He sarcastically alludes to the growing public anger, ‘kurikupisa (It is hot)’ with some humorous desperation and stresses the need to sacrifice some of his

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colleagues, who will be ‘arrested’ and later ‘released’. The group of ZANU-PF politicians are reduced to elementary kids as the president instructs them to repeat the ‘catch and release’ slogan after him. Those members who will be ‘caught and released’ would be decided by an ‘oracle’, satirically depicted by the blindfold selection of the members from a hat. When the president and his wife’s names are picked first, he barks in anger claiming they are exempted from arrests. The skit exposes ZACC for being a partisan and toothless arm of government. Another vlogger, Bustop TV satirises corruption that arose from the donations to victims of Cyclone Idai in March 2019 and COVID-19 pandemic which originated in China’s Wuhan province in December 2019 and soon became a global pandemic. The comic skit, ‘Drax International’, reflects how the global health pandemic opened a window of opportunity for the emergence of ‘Covidpreneurs’—the politically privileged, to bypass COVID-19 equipment tender processes, overcharge government and supply substandard goods among many other vices (Bustop TV, 2020a). This was an apparent reference to a COVID-19 equipment tender corruption scandal that linked President Emmerson Mnangagwa and his son, Collins, in COVID-19 equipment tender corruption. A ‘two-week-old company’ called Drax International, using a United Arab Emirates address but claiming to be headquartered in Switzerland, was awarded the tender to supply Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) and masks. The media revealed that there was a connection between Drax International and the Mnangagwa family traceable from the ‘business partnership’ and friendship between Drax owner, Delish Nguwaya and Mnangagwa’s son. Although the skit does not laugh at COVID-gate, the title is a comic reminder of the corruption scandal. Drax International is humorously synonymised with any form of high-level corruption by political elites. Related to the COVID-gate scandal, the skit ‘Ghost worker Drax International’ lampoons ZANU-PF politicians for stealing donations meant to benefit victims of Cyclone Idai which occurred in Chimanimani, a peri-urban location in Zimbabwe’s eastern highlands killing approximately 1200 in March 2019. In the comic skit, a top government official known as DRC and Gonyeti convince Maggie to sign for money which is meant to be donated to people in remote communities in Chimanimani and Chipinge. DRC and Gonyeti boast that they ‘are the government’, implying that their ‘ghost work’ will not be uncovered. In the skit, DRC convinces Maggie to join the corruption through a rhetoric question, ‘you took clothes meant for Cyclone Idai donations, were you arrested?’ The

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skit reflects that corruption in Zimbabwe involves and is sustained by the political elite who use their influence to benefit from government donations meant for the vulnerable communities. Therefore, ‘ghost worker’ becomes a satirical symbol of corruption, where politically connected people get paid for work they did not do. The study finds that through laughter, vloggers can indirectly speak truth to power. Comedian Sabhuku Vharazipi’s comic skits often represent the plight of the rural folk as opposed to other comic vloggers. Vharazipi, the headman, is the voice of the rural folk but also represents power. In the skit ‘Sabhuku Vharazipi speaks against corruption by elected officials’, headman Vharazipi leads a group of angry villagers who want to beat up an elected corrupt official who has not done any development since being elected into office. The headman’s use of broken English ‘konzichuenz’ for constituency adds to the humour as he blames the member of parliament for embezzling constituency development fund, a government payout given to the members of parliament to develop their constituencies. Villagers take turns to hurl humorous verbal exchanges with the visibly shaken politician. Some of the comic statements which undermine the politician’s integrity are ‘munhu ngaabatwe-batwe’ (Let us beat him) and ‘benzi rinodzoka kumba rakanaka’ (A fool who remembers to return home is better). Echoing Makombe and Agbede’s (2016) analysis of the efficacy of laughter, the skit is a comic reminder of Zimbabwean politicians who are in politics because of greed and not driven by a genuine conviction to serve the people. Economic Decline Vloggers, Bustop TV, Sabhuku Vharazipi satirised the economic difficulties facing the ordinary citizens. Bustop TV’s comic skit, ‘Murivo nemapotato, mocks Mnangagwa who had addressed a rally and encouraged citizens to eat vegetables and potatoes because these were healthy and also considered as a way of dealing with the economic challenges (Bustop TV, 2020b). In the play, Gonyeti is complaining of a running stomach and ‘green’ faecal discharge thus evoking scatological humour. While the president is calling on everyone to eat vegetables and potato as ‘staple food’, ironically, he was seen on a private jet eating ‘sadza nezondo’ (pap and lower leg of bovine that is the fetlock, pastern and hoof). The president is thus depicted as hypocritical, unrealistic and out of touch with the everyday experiences of the ordinary citizen. He is quick to suggest a coping mechanism to

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poverty, yet he lives a luxurious life, symbolised by ‘sadza and zondo’ which he took while on a flight to France. Apart from being a psychological escape from the unalterable, humour serves to bolster fellowship among oppressed or marginalised groupings (Hart, 2007). Through scatological humour, which Mbembe (2001, p. 107) describes as a ‘culture of vulgarity’, Bustop TV vloggers are implying that if by continuously eating green vegetables they have a running stomach, the president must be experiencing the same unless he is lying to the nation. Therefore, by laughing at their own problems, citizens will be indirectly laughing at the national leadership for mis-governance. Goldgator TV captured the economic stagnation through a comic skit entitled, ‘Zimbabwe is burning us-it’s on fire, we are on fire’. Three men gather around a huge fire which is a representation of the Zimbabwean predicament under Mnangagwa’s leadership  (Ngubozabo, 2020). The men humorously comment ‘tirikutsva’ (we are burning) and compare Zimbabwe to ‘gehena’ (hell). Apparently, they are lampooning authoritarian rule in the post-Mugabe dispensation which has seen a continuity of economic and political crisis. The economic and political stasis that would continue in the post-Mugabe era has been succinctly captured by Southall (2017) who observed that Mnangagwa was likely to adhere to an extremely limited notion of democracy. This study finds that the dearth of public debate on the government-owned radio and television channels, prompting the rise of citizen media. Shrinking Democratic Space Vloggers appropriated the YouTube platform to expose the dearth of democratic space in Zimbabwe through humorous skits. In response to increasing police brutality on civilians, Bustop TV (2019) posted a skit entitled ‘Instrument of evil servants’. The skit lampoons the police who are exploited by the state to brutalise dissenting voices. The presentation makes subtle reference to a brutal crackdown on peaceful protestors by police on 16 August 2019  in Harare. A police officer, DRC, brags for mercilessly beating a fat woman who couldn’t run as police violently disrupted their peaceful demonstration. DRC, a tenant, boasts to the fact that when the woman fell, ‘he crashed her head with feet’ and beat her with a button stick. After narrating his exploits, the property owner satirically asks DRC if government is doing anything to offer them houses after being used to beat up protesters. The humour in the skit exposes the

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ruling party and the president of the country for misdirecting energy in crushing dissenting voices by deploying security forces yet the same police are underpaid and neglect. In one of the pitfalls of social media, the subaltern employs hate speech to challenge power. The use of ‘evil servants’ to refer to police propagates online hate against the police, eventually spreading to offline spaces. Marima (2019) notes that online hate speech targets political affiliation and with Zimbabwe’s police being partisan, digital dissidents will be indirectly attacking the ruling party, ZANU-PF. By laughing at the police, Gonyeti is arousing their conscience to realise they are being abused by the state to violate rights of peaceful assembly, yet the government is ignoring their welfare. As Orwell (1945) once famously expressed, every joke is a small revolution because it undermines the established order. This study finds that political satire spread on the cybersphere has a potential to impact on the targeted subjects to listen to the marginalised voices. Goldgator TV scorned authoritarian consolidation posting a song composed by Taffy entitled, ‘Hello army’. The song is derived from Zim Dance Hall singer Jah Master’s hit song ‘Hello Mwari’ (Hello God) in which the persona is pleading for God’s covering from people who are stealing money meant for him. The derived song laughs at President Emmerson Mnangagwa who resorts to calling the military when he faces popular resistance. The song aptly laughs at the president’s cowardice as reflected by deploying coercive tools to stifle dissenting voices. On the power of satire Boler (2006) argues that satire ‘speaks truth to power’ and challenges the powerful. Therefore, ordinary citizens have resorted to laughter to indirectly influence the changes they wish to see in their society. The shrinking democratic space in Zimbabwe is coupled with human rights abuses even in prisons. Prisoners are deprived of a voice and endure traumatic experiences. These experiences are captured by Sabhuku Vharazipi’s skit, ‘Banditi’ (prisoner)  (Sabhuku Vharazipi, 2018). The prison officer is humorously clad in tight fitting shirt and short reminiscent of colonial prison officers, tosses around prison inmates. With a comic air of superiority, the abusive prison officer plays fool to the prisoner, giving him a silly task to distinguish the people within the prison walls. When he says ‘Mune vanhu’ (There are people), the officer slaps him on his bald head until the officer correctly separates ‘shefu’ (boss) and ‘mabhanditi’ (prisoners). Through humour, the skit conjures up that the shrinking democratic space and human rights abuses in Zimbabwe extends to prisons, places hidden from the full glare of the

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public eye. The study finds that the security sector which comprises of the army, the police and the Zimbabwe prisons and correctional services are the major tools used by the ruling political elite to stifle freedoms.

Conclusion Speaking truth to power is not a new form of resistance in Africa as it finds its roots in folklore where citizens appropriated cultural performances as forms of resistance. This chapter confirms that southern African culture could also be considered carnivalesque because it is often depicted as colourful, unique and if not always actively revolutionary, then at least indifferent to authority and rules to varying degrees (Price, 2010). The digital turn has inspired Zimbabweans to move to the cybersphere which offers vast freedoms and audience as they challenge power (Mare & Matsilele, 2020; Mpofu, 2015; Matsilele & Ruhanya, 2020). However, with the coming of the cyber security and data protection law, there is very little hope Zimbabweans will continue to enjoy cyber freedom (MISA, 2020). YouTube is emerging as a vibrant site of struggle where comic artists make vlogs which lampoon the political elite for failing to govern democratically. For all its easy accessibility, its power to gather communities of interest and independence of the presenter and participants, YouTube has become an alternative platform for expression for ordinary citizens in Zimbabwe. Ultimately, this study affirms previous studies that see social media affordances as opening spaces for resistance (Mpofu & Matsilele, 2020; Matsilele, 2019; Mpofu, 2019), democracy (Mutsvairo & Sirks, 2015) and even education (Mututwa & Matsilele, 2020).

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CHAPTER 3

Political Satire and the Mediation of the Zimbabwean Crisis in the Era of the “New Dispensation”: The Case of MAGAMBA TV Mbongeni Jonny Msimanga, Gibson Ncube, and Promise Mkwananzi

Introduction The fall of Robert Mugabe in November 2017 was expected to usher in a “New Dispensation” and a new way of governing in Zimbabwe. However, in addition to the perennial economic and political challenges, the

M. J. Msimanga (*) Department of Communication Studies, University of Johannesburg, Johannesburg, South Africa G. Ncube Department of Languages, Literature and Culture, University of Zimbabwe, Harare, Zimbabwe Stellenbosch Institute for Advanced Study, Stellenbosch, South Africa © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 S. Mpofu (ed.), The Politics of Laughter in the Social Media Age, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-81969-9_3

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government of President Emmerson Mnangagwa, dubbed the “Second Republic” or the “New Dispensation”, has been dealing with issues of legitimacy against the background of the soft coup that brought it into power as well as the contested elections of July 2018. In its efforts to legitimise itself nationally, regionally and internationally, the “New Dispensation” has grappled with the continuities and discontinuities of Mugabe’s legacy. Discussing how Mnangagwa’s government is caught in the bind of breaking with “Mugabeism” (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2015, p. 1) and charting a new future for the country, Rwodzi (2019, p. 196) explains: The Second Republic under Emmerson Mnangagwa appears to be increasingly focusing its energies towards consolidating power through any means necessary as opposed to constructing effective representative institutions that make economic development and improved standards of living in the country possible. Zimbabweans continue to suffer the effects of an economy that was subjected to 37 years of plunder by the governing elite under the former President Robert Mugabe’s tutelage. The coup leaders who arrogated to themselves the mandate to rule after the elections of July 2018 are earnestly perpetuating the Mugabe legacy and perfecting it to suit the corporate interests of the military-backed government with a substantial proportion of careerists who retired to assume the work of government.

In this chapter, we are interested in how political satire provides commentary on the Zimbabwean crisis especially as it plays out in the “New Dispensation”. Given the continued shrinking of democratic spaces, alternative spaces have been forged in which people can exercise their rights to freedom of expression and freedom of association. We argue in this chapter that social media platforms provide such alternative spaces in which the “New Dispensation” can be critiqued and held to account. We take Magamba TV, a YouTube platform, as a metonymy of virtual spaces through which it is possible to speak truth to those in power. Through an examination of selected video clips, our overarching argument is that satire is an aesthetic tool that makes it possible to think through the crises which continue to play out in the country. As a critical praxis, satirical videos are “embedded in history and in culture” and “subvert the

P. Mkwananzi Department of Governance and Politics, University of Western Cape, Cape Town, South Africa

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dominant social order” (Griffin, 1994, p. 2). In the next section of this chapter, we contextualise the Zimbabwean crisis in the “New Dispensation” era and frame it within a continuum of crises that have plagued Zimbabwe since the attainment of independence.

Context Zimbabwe has, since the turn of the millennium, continued to face a multi-faceted crisis (Mhiripiri & Ureke, 2019). The Zimbabwean crisis resulted in part due to the fast-track land reform programme and as stated by Zamponi (2005, p.  28) caused by “economic difficulties … famine, violence, political authoritarianism and international isolation”. The crisis was further exacerbated by food riots and a sharp rise in inflation at the turn of millennium all pointing to failed leadership. In sum, the crisis is attributed to erstwhile leader, Robert Mugabe who is accused of contributing to the economic, political and social meltdown (Holland, 2008). The above and other factors have continued well into the “New Dispensation” era under Emmerson Mnangagwa. However, digital media platforms have been key in reflecting on the Zimbabwean crisis, thus playing a significant role in challenging ZANU-PF-centric discourses. In part, this is because of the polarisation of the media that has led to the growth of alternative media platforms and citizen journalism. However, some studies have highlighted how digital media platforms have been used by civil society organisations, pressure groups, cultural activists and student bodies who dabble as social activists or mere “keyboard warriors” seeking funding opportunities for bread and butter purposes from non-­ governmental organisations (Chitanana & Mutsvairo, 2019)—bringing out the weakness of these alternative platforms. Magamba TV has reflected satirically on corruption, social injustices and human rights abuses in Zimbabwe’s “New Dispensation”. Key within the “New Dispensation” have been clampdowns on Zimbabwean journalists particularly Hopewell Chin’ono and Mduduzi Mathuthu for exposing corruption scandals and supporting 31 July protests meant to demonstrate citizen dissatisfaction with Mnangagwa’s regime. Human rights activists and civil society leaders have been targeted by state security agents. The “New Dispensation” has also been accused of electoral fraud, intimidating and “abducting” satirists, civil society, opposition and student leaders—and this has been the order of the day in Zimbabwean politics.

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Poor health facilities and infrastructure, ministerial corruption, an escalating job crisis and a soaring inflation rate continue to contribute to a multi-faceted crisis. Political violence continues to be endemic as evidenced by Operation Restore Legacy,1 the August 2018 shootings2 and the January 2019 fuel protests.3 The political administration of the “New Dispensation”, like that of the Mugabe era, continues to disregard human rights as alleged abductions and torture are lessons for those who oppose the ZANU-PF rule. These issues largely mirror an irresolvable political crisis in Zimbabwe. A popular website, www.zimcitizenswatch.com, has also attested that the Mnangagwa government has failed to deliver on promises made to the country when it assumed power. The failure to break completely from the Mugabe regime and how it operated and governed has inadvertently perpetuated the Zimbabwean political crisis, further eroding political and civil liberties.

The Case: MAGAMBA TV Magamba TV is a digital media television platform that produces satirical content and shows. Its content is largely distributed on social media platforms Twitter, Facebook, Instagram and YouTube. The word “Magamba” is a chiShona term that means (liberation war) heroes and the television station uses youth activism to open up democratic space in Zimbabwe (Matsilele, 2017). The name Magamba is an attempt to reconceptualise the definition of heroes in Zimbabwe that have been defined, since post-­ independence using ZANU-PF lens. We utilise Mpofu’s (2016, p.  68) definition of heroes in Zimbabwe as “politically motivated than rational in 1  This was a military operation that triggered the fall of Zimbabwe’s sole ruler from Independence, Robert Mugabe. It has been widely referred to as a coup de tat. The operation, also targeted G-40 faction members such Jonathan Moyo, Kudzayi Chipanga, Ignatious Chombo, Saviour Kasukuwere who were either tortured, arrested or whose families where harassed. 2  The August 1 shootings were a result of MDC-Alliance supporters demanding Zimbabwe Electoral Commission to release results of the 2018 elections. Disgruntled supporters took to the streets and six were shot dead by Zimbabwe National Army personnel, while dozens were injured. 3  The January fuel protests were triggered by fuel hikes by the Emmerson Mnangagwa-led government. Fuel hikes were coupled with already deteriorating socio-economic and sociopolitical conditions. The results were protests and looting that lasted for three days. Government responded by blocking the internet and unleashing the army and police in the streets to silence the dissent.

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nature”. Mpofu (2016, p. 68) further conceptualises heroes in Zimbabwe stating that they are selected on “political, sexual orientation or ethnic grounds”. It is these discourses that Magamba TV challenges on their shows such as Zambezi News, Tsaona, The Week and Minister of Impending Projects. Magamba TV is co-owned by Samm Farai Monro and Tongai Makawa and was established in 2011 (Matsilele, 2017). In the next section, we review and reflect on political satire in Zimbabwe and the Global South.

Reflections on the Role of Political Satire Satire has, since time immemorial, been a tool deployed to challenge the ruling elite (Hammett, 2011). The genre provides a space for communicating and venting out displeasure towards government officials and policies. Over the years, satire has gained prominence as an alternative political communication tool, especially in countries with highly restrictive media landscapes such as Zimbabwe’s. Nyamnjoh (2009, p. 97) acknowledges this by stating that: “…political control, draconian press laws, selective communication and downright misinformation and disinformation by governments … have pushed ordinary people to seek alternative ways of satisfying information and communication tools”. Zimbabwe’s state media are firmly controlled by the ruling ZANU-PF party and suppresses any information that critiques government officials, shields corruption scandals or promotes factional journalism (Chuma et  al., 2020). In such a context, the satirist is subjected to an uneven playground, in which their freedom of expression and critical commentary of government leaders are curtailed. Notwithstanding, online television parody has enjoyed some success in this endeavour. Satire encourages criticism of and reflection about prevailing systems of power and becomes a discursive and dissident tool in the struggle between the dominant and resistive forces (Gray et al., 2009, p. 10; Mpofu & Mastilele, 2020). Nyamnjoh (2009, p. 99) further states that through satire, “…politicians are stereotyped as completely … self-centred, self-indulgent, lacking in any altruistic thought action or motive and being in complete variances with those they purport to serve”. Political satire in Africa is an avenue of challenging power and in the process exposing politicians and government officials to ridicule and laughter by the ordinary individuals in society. Satire is also a form of silent resistance in the face of military dictatorships that enjoy one partyism (Siziba & Ncube, 2015, p. 517). Political

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satire, then, becomes a counter-hegemonic public sphere in which the satirist derives pleasure from ridiculing those in power. Focusing on Kenya, Senegal and Cameroon, Eko (2010) highlights how satire serves as a counter-discourse by mocking the excesses of political leaders. Mpofu (2019), too, contends that satire challenges the powerful, although his focus is on the deployment of “near-pornographic satirical humour” in South African politics in artworks by South African-based artistes Brett Murray, Ayanda Mabulu and Iven Amali. Satire, therefore, speaks back to power that is political authorities or policies within a given context (Neale & Krutnick, 2006; Crithley, 2002). The attack on power using this genre also enables deliberative discussions to take place amongst audiences. These discussions focus mainly on socio-political issues that take place in the country. In this way, satire has the power to energise civic culture, engaging citizen-audience, inspiring public political discussions and drawing citizens enthusiastically into the realm of the political with deft and dazzling ease (Gray et al., 2009, p. 4). The genre’s trump card lies in its ability to produce social scorn or damning indictments through playful means, transforming the aggressive act of ridicule into a more socially acceptable act of rendering something ridiculous. In as much as satire is a means of silent resistance, Willems (2011) invites us to question the extent to which the hidden satirical scripts are important in challenging those in power. Other scholars, however, find that satire has been a means of coping with the tragic events unfolding therein or a means of resisting and speaking back to power (Makombe & Agbede, 2016; Kuhlman, 2012). In the aftermath of the land reform programme, for instance, Zimbabweans were able to communicate their dissent about political issues using diverse art forms that circulated on and through new media and internet technologies, while cartoonists evaded stringent media laws to lampoon officials in power (Arnsten, 2009; Musangi, 2012). Cartoons and online platforms using satire have served as alternative mediums of communication that enable the discussion of political issues, amongst them rigging by ZANU-PF, political violence, oppression and threats against ordinary citizens, which have also contributed considerably to the Zimbabwean crisis. Army service chiefs, delayed election results, violence and voter intimidation during and after the runoff in 2008 and the uneven electoral-playing field in Zimbabwe have also been key themes highlighted by online cartoons (Arnsten, 2009). Musangi (2012) also highlights how digital humour can be understood as a “form of subversion”, particularly in

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authoritarian contexts, through a digital distortion of the “symbolic embodiment of power”. Satire is often viewed as a moralistic mode of address that critiques the misdeeds and hypocrisy of those who wield cultural and political authority (Tinnic, 2009, p. 168). It is devoted to exposing human folly and its goal is to inspire critical thinking and reasoned social engagement. It is often accompanied by irony, parody and word play (see McClennen & Maisel, 2014, p.  108). Digital media technologies together with satire have enabled citizens to critique “untouchable” leaders as well as taboo topics in society. For example, studies have focused on Mugabe’s fall at the airport in Harare upon his return from the African Union meeting held in Ethiopia in February 2015, and the memes that circulated on social media platforms Twitter and Facebook enabling Zimbabweans the opportunity to critique Mugabe (Makombe & Agbede, 2016; Siziba & Ncube, 2015). Such satire demonstrated a form of resistance amongst Zimbabweans, showing that Mugabe and his character as created in state-controlled media could also be critiqued on social media platforms (Siziba & Ncube, 2015). In line with this, Musila (2009, p. 150) submits that satire “facilitates the breaking of various silences around ‘taboo’ questions […] while allowing for the articulation of alternative readings that challenge hegemonic ‘common senses’ […] often wrapped up in the thick silence of political correctness and implicit forms of correctness which police the boundaries of the ‘speakable’”. Thus, the broader discussion within these debates not only shows how satire has been used as a means of resistance, but also highlights how social media are a means through which opinions are expressed. The intersection of social media and satire provides a space for dissent and critical engagement within a limited public sphere in a quest to tackle complex relations of power and resistance (Eko, 2010). That said, this present chapter seeks to complement existing scholarship by showing that alternative media are pivotal in challenging ideas and discourses which the state sanctions through its control of mainstream media. The originality of this chapter, though, lies in our consideration of political satire as a means of challenging the rhetoric of the “New Dispensation” that it represents newness compared to the Robert Mugabe regime. The proliferation of political satire in the “New Dispensation”, we argue, is not a sign of the opening up of democratic space in Zimbabwe but rather a growing propensity to keep the government in check. We show that because there are more and more videos that offer political satire, this does not imply that the “New Dispensation” is any different to the

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former regime. By examining the visual satirical skits produced and circulated by Magamba TV, we are interested in the way in which the artistic is transformed into socio-political interventions that demand a rethinking of the status quo. Although this rethinking does not necessarily imply any real or palpable changes of the status quo, the artistic interventions are important in initiating conversations on Zimbabwe’s past, present and future.

Theoretical Framework How do citizens speak to power when there is a dearth of spaces in which to do any such speaking? In places where speaking against those in power is criminalised, how do the disenfranchised express their displeasure with the prevailing realities? What tools or weapons are at the disposal of such defenceless citizens? What role can alternative media play in materialising and offering different views on prevailing realities? Can media offer views that contrast those that are propagated by the state through its control of mainstream media? To answer these questions, we draw on Scott’s ideas that he expresses in his seminal book Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Resistance (Scott, 1985). These ideas are brought into conversation with Downing’s postulations on “radical media”. In an examination of slave and peasant communities, Scott affirms that it is important to turn from concentrating on the palpable historical events that lead to, and take the form of, collective uprisings and rebellions. Rather, he calls for a focus on the subtle intricacies of forceful forms of everyday resistances. Scott further emphasises that “most of the political life of subordinate groups is to be found neither in the overt collective defiance of power holders nor in complete hegemonic compliance, but in the vast territory between these two polar opposites” (Scott, 1985, p. 136). The subtle and nuanced forms of resistance, according to Scott, can produce similarly significant results. If such a logic is applied to an understanding of Zimbabwe’s social and political situation, especially under the current “New Dispensation”, political satire is one such subtle tool which can be used to challenge the status quo. In addition to being a subtle tool of challenging the status quo, political satire, especially as represented through Magamba TV, needs to be considered as alternative or radical media which sets out to offer a divergent view compared to that projected by the state. Downing (2001, p. v) explains that “radical media” refer “to media, generally small-scale and in

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many different forms, that express an alternative vision to hegemonic policies, priorities, and perspectives”. Downing (2001, p. vi) goes on to ask how such small-scale media can have any palpable impact. He responds by affirming that radical media “represent radically negative as well as constructive forces” (Downing, 2001, p. ix), depending on the vantage point of the observer. For the purposes of this study, we consider radical media such as Magamba TV to represent a constructive force in that they allow to think through the idea that the “New Dispensation” offers and represents newness in Zimbabwe. The satirical video clips that are created and circulated by Magamba TV should be regarded as both weapons and radical media and alternative that can be used by weak and incapacitated to challenge those in power. More than being simply weapons, these videos should be viewed as representing an important space of mediation of the prevailing socio-political situation in contemporary Zimbabwe. Given the fact that the mainstream media are controlled and regulated by the state, often with a heavy hand, the virtual spaces of the internet and social media in which Magamba TV videos circulate and are shared become central to circumventing the state’s control. Operating away from the state’s direct control, in many instances, online spaces become an avenue of creating and disseminating counter-­hegemonic narratives or what Scott (1985, p. 2) terms “hidden transcripts”. These “hidden transcripts” are essential to confronting and denouncing the power relations that perpetuate power structures in which citizens occupy subaltern positions and their voices are often muzzled. The satirical videos by Magamba TV are therefore transformed into a form of imperceptible power, which is pivotal in interrogating the way in which the country is governed. Siziba and Ncube (2015, p. 519) explain, in this regard, that: In the same manner in which concealed forms of power can be used by the dominant discourses and those articulating them to regulate what issues can be seen or discussed, [satire] can be read as a form of invisible power deployed by the “weak”.

The power veiled in these satirical memes and fictional narratives “moulds the national consciousness, giving it forms and contours and flinging open before it new and boundless horizons” (Fanon, 1980, p. 193). In our reading of political satire through the lens of Scott’s concept of the “weapons of the weak” and Downing’s concept of “radical media”, we

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are fully cognisant of the positive potentialities of satire. Satire operates in tandem with humour. In this way, criticising the diverse ills in the status quo functions at the same time as entertaining those who view the satiric videos. It is thus important not to limit the power and potential of the satiric videos that we will analyse herein to simply their function in challenging Zimbabwean politics and politicians in the “New Dispensation”. We will show that, at a very elementary level, the humour that is embedded in satire allows the challenging of the status quo to be salubrious compared to a form of critique which is not veiled behind a comical and light-hearted tone.

Methodology This chapter draws on digital ethnography approach which is a methodological intervention that “seeks to develop an understanding of active audiences by exploring genre readings, issues of race and gender, family living, and identity, in order to understand media as a cultural form” (Ardevol & Gomez-Cruz 2014, p. 2). Ardevol and Gomez-Cruz (2014, p. 2) further develop that ethnography “implies the understanding of cultural formations from an experiential point of view. Ethnographers must attend to people’s sayings and doings, including their material condition of existence and their worldviews: how people build meaning in relation to their experiences and actions”. What is worth highlighting in these words is the question of creating meaning through observation of people’s experiences and actions. We monitored videos posted on Magamba TV YouTube channel as well as their Facebook page. The videos were purposively selected from Magamba TV shows such as The Week, Tsaona, Minister of Impending Projects and Zambezi News. A total of 30 videos were posted from the inception of the “New Dispensation”. Out of the sample of 30 videos, 14 posted were interviews with political actors about their careers and social lifestyles. These videos were not relevant to this study. This left us with a sample of 16 videos. We further subjected the remaining videos to additional purposive sampling on issues in line with the Zimbabwean crisis in the “New Dispensation” era. This involved examining apparent continuities and discontinuities between the “New Dispensation” and the regime of Mugabe. As pointed out by Ndlovu-­ Gatsheni and Ruhanya (2020, p. 4), “The Mnangagwa regime is a direct child of Mugabeism; indeed, Mugabeism is its recurrent theme”. Drawing from this sample of videos, we were able to code and find overarching

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themes such as elections, the question of legitimacy and police brutality which are central in imagining the “New Dispensation”. The selected eight videos were grappled with the Zimbabwean crisis in the “New Dispensation”. For analysis, the videos were subjected to a Multi-Modal Critical Discourse Analysis Approach. This approach involved examining and trying to understand the manner in which words, images, gestures and colours were used and related to each in creating narratives and meaning (see Iqani, 2020, p. 200; Atalay, 2015).

Findings and Discussion In the following section, we present and discuss the findings that arise from satirical videos from Magamba TV that we analysed. The findings demonstrate that satire is indeed a genre that challenges the ruling elite, calling them to account. The findings and analysis are anchored around the following themes: • Satirising “abductions” and police brutality in Zimbabwe, • The legitimacy question in Zimbabwe, • Corruption and the New Dispensation. Satirising “Abductions” and Police Brutality in Zimbabwe In this section, we analyse a video entitled Abductions which appears on the show Tsaona. Our objective is to show how this video offers a satirical view on political abductions and the violence that characterises the modus operandi of the “New Dispensation”. We examine how the video challenges the culture of impunity and violence by giving a comical perspective on abductions. The actors in the skit mimic abductions allegedly carried out by state agents in Zimbabwe. In the video, a young man, supposedly representing an opposition party or civic society, is abducted by state agents and taken to an unknown destination where he is to be tortured. The video follows the abduction and torture of Tawanda Muchechiwa, the nephew of Zimbabwean investigative journalist and government critic, Mduduzi Mathuthu.4 Muchehiwa’s sole crimes are his relationship to 4  Mduduzi Mathuthu, together with Hopewell Chin’ono, played a major role in exposing corruption of Minister of Health and Child Welfare, Obadiah Moyo, in what became known as the Covigate scandal. Because he went against the grain and exposed other corruption

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Mathuthu, his association with members of the opposition political party and distributing pamphlets inscribed #ZanuPFMustGo. The video constructs a narrative that highlights the heightened oppression and abuse associated with Mnangagwa’s “New Dispensation” ZANU-PF government. The satirists expose the inhumane nature of abductions and the “crocodile”5character that is associated with Emmerson Mnangagwa in the post-Mugabe era. The video exposes how, in authoritarian states such as Zimbabwe, political leaders neglect the socio-economic agenda and prioritise the consolidation of power through more unconventional ways such as abductions (Muchacha, 2016). In this video, satire gets the audience to deliberate and think about follies committed by government. As McClennen and Maisel (2014, p.  108) note, “[s]atire is dedicated to exposing human folly and its goal is to inspire critical thinking and reasoned social engagement”. The video reflects not only on Tawanda Muchehiwa’s abduction and several other opposition and civil society leaders who have been similarly (mis)treated. In the same video, the satirists ridicule Nick Mangwana, the Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Information. Mangwana is questioned about the government’s position on abductions at what seems to be a press conference. Mangwana, representing the Zimbabwean government’s standpoint on abductions (and well-known for denying human rights violations), refutes that the abductions were perpetrated by ZANU-PF and instead insists that “Zimbabwe is free, misrepresented and misunderstood”.6 The satirist, playing the role of Mangwana in the video, instructs journalists to ask questions about abductions that he had previously discussed with them before the press conference. In a conversation with the journalists, then, he states: Ehh … Vakomana, mubvunze zvatataurirana, atidizve kuzonetsana handitika … You know what is good for you. (Listen, chaps, remember to ask the questions we rehearsed on the abductions issue scandals, Hopewell was incarcerated while Mathuthu went into hiding, fearing for his life. The state, using what has become known as the “ferrets”—a team allegedly responsible for abductions in Zimbabwe, reacted by abducting Tawanda Muchehiwa and Mathuthu’s two nephews. 5  Mnangagwa earned this nickname during Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle when he was a member of the so-called crocodile gang, which was famous for bombing petrol tanks in the industrial area of Southerton in Salisbury (now Harare). Some also say he earned the title from his shrewd tactics, which were similar to those of a crocodile, in outmanoeuvring opponents (see Ncube, 2020, p. 342). 6  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YFuvdGGzaDw

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[before this press conference]. We don’t want to brew controversy do we, if you know what’s good for you). The video ridicules the use of the state media (ZBC) by government to spread propaganda about abductions and human rights violations. It exposes directives from the Ministry of Information to spin stories and information to suit a ZANU-PF narrative. Abductions and human rights violations in Zimbabwe have been shrouded in controversy and are persistently denied by ZANU-PF.  Satire, in this context, tackles a topical issue and makes it realistic. Although satire need not be funny per se, it maintains its characteristic of scorning those who wield power and exposing their follies. In the process, satire speaks back to power, that is to political authorities or policies in any given context (Crithley, 2002; Neale & Krutnick, 2006; Gray et al., 2009). Topical amongst the alleged abductions during the Mnangagwa era are those of a Movement for Democratic Change Alliance (MDC-Alliance) trio consisting of Netsai Marova, Cecilia Chimbiri and Harare West Member of Parliament Joana Mamombe. Their alleged abduction by the state took place at a police roadblock after they staged a demonstration against the deteriorating state of affairs in Zimbabwe further aggravated by the COVID-19 pandemic and the subsequent lockdown. However, government denied involvement in the abduction, resolving that the trio should be prosecuted for violating lockdown regulations that prohibited gatherings for protests. In one of the episodes that features the trio’s abduction titled Energy Mutodi Fired, Mamombe Abduction & Tagwirei’s New Buses on the show The Week, presenter Cde Fatso narrates how the trio was “sexually assaulted, dumped in a pit, tortured and forced to eat human faeces”. In the same video, Cde Fatso pokes fun at how the government, through its police officers, placed charges on the trio for allegedly “faking” the abduction. He states: How does one place charges on someone for an illegal demonstration when they just told you they were abducted and forced to eat human faeces. Are you not at least curious to know who did that to them? The only way you wouldn’t be interested in knowing about such information is because you already know who did it. Police officers flipflop more than Jonathan Moyo’s political career.

His sentiments are overtly directed at government and state agents allegedly involved in these abductions. This video captures how satire is a critical mode of addressing those in power and how the press in Zimbabwe

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is too timid and unable to convey political and social events the way satirical videos reflect on issues. Day (2009, p. 95), in concurrence, states that “while traditional news is monolithic, presenting a closed, authoritative version of what the issues of the day are and why they are important, parodic news … are dialogic, playing multiple voices against each other”. Satire, in this case, opens the public space for deliberation on and the discussion of contested topics in Zimbabwe such as “abductions”, which have been shrouded in controversy. Social media platforms where these videos are shared become an arena for the subaltern where narratives and counter-narratives on abductions are exposed. The growing hunger and record unemployment have led to disgruntlement amongst the people of Zimbabwe, especially the youth. These are some of the reasons that prompted political activist Jacob Ngarivume to call for Zimbabweans to take to the streets and voice out their discontent over the deteriorating socio-economic and socio-political situation in the country. However, the July 31 protests were unsuccessful because of intimidation of opposition leaders and fear of police brutality. This came as no surprise, since the ZANU-PF regime has in the past used police and the army to quell protests or any form of resistance against it. This is reflected in a video titled How ZANU-PF is Trying to Stop July 31 demo on the show The Week. The video begins with a conversation between two colleagues. One of them is supposedly a state security agent, in the know-­ how of tactics to be used to stop the July 31 protests, and is telling his friend how the government plans to do so. He states: There will be a canister that will be thrown to the crowd. The light that comes after this is Corona. Then a water canon will knock you out. Once that happens, there will be no social distancing there. Then the police will come and beat you up with a baton stick. Ya, you will go into quarantine all beaten and bruised up.

By mimicking the intelligence officer, the video stands as a form of resistance against structural violence in Zimbabwe. It reveals how repression against citizens practising their civil liberties is entrenched in ZANU-PF system of rule. The sadistically playful tone of the video reveals the extent to which state violence is naturalised amongst state security agents. Thus, as acknowledged by Gray et al. (2009, p. 9) satire brings about the aspect of defamiliarisation, allowing an audience to view and think about perspectives presented to them. Humour both exposes the

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situation and indicates how it might be changed (see Crithley, 2002, p. 16). Police brutality in the “New Dispensation” era is now a common trend, and one could cite other incidents such as the August 1 shootings, the January fuel protests and the Operation Restore Legacy. The ideas discussed in the analysis of the Abductions video are of central concern in post-Mugabe Zimbabwe in that there has been a continuation, if not perfection, of the grammars of violence and brutality against dissenting voices. The diverse forms of brutality and violence have been a way of ruling and dealing with dissenting voices since Zimbabwe attained independence in 1980. Ncube (2018, p. 42) explains that the kind of violence and brutality that is experienced in Zimbabwe is a relic of the colonial regime: “The post-independent government thus simply replicates, if not perfects, the ‘physics’ and ‘anatomy’ of violence that had been used by the colonial Rhodesian government. Such violence is thus not new in anyway. What is new or different is the perpetrator and, in some instances, the victim of acts of state sponsored violence.” This culture has been characteristic of ZANU-PF modus operandi since independence and is a way of intimidating opposition and civic society members to consolidate hegemonic control (Ndlovu-Gatsheni & Benyera, 2015). Werbner (1991) also reveals how the political elite adopt the use of violence in what he terms “quasi-nationalism”, which he defines as a “movement of ideas and practices which wins its often cruelly violent moments within twentieth-­ century nation-state building […] Yet it is energised by a myth of being prior to the postcolonial nation-state, of carrying forward primordial identities…” (Werbner, 1991, pp. 159–160). The state has continued to use brutality in its treatment of opposition political leaders and civic society leaders especially when negotiations or agreements fail. The next section analyses the question of legitimacy of the New Dispensation. The Question of Legitimacy The study also examines how satire has been used to discuss the question of legitimacy of the “New Dispensation”. For the purpose of this section, we analyse two such skits. The first is entitled Coupbinet from the show The Week. This title itself is satirical and is a portmanteau that combines the words “coup” and “cabinet”. The skit examines the cabinet that was formed following Mugabe’s fall from power. It begins with a man in a suit

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entering what could be the Munhumutapa offices7 and boasting that he is back to his ministry. It becomes clear as he moves through the building that this is a minister who had previously been deposed because of factional fighting between G-40 and Lacoste factions in ZANU-PF during the heightened tussle to succeed the late and former President, Robert Mugabe. The minister has been reinstated in the new post-coup cabinet. Satirising the fact that Mnangagwa’s government was made up of the same old faces that Zimbabweans had seen in previous governments under Mugabe, this skit highlights the manner in which the Mnangagwa government was attempting to create legitimacy by shuffling ministers who had performed dismally in Mugabe’s regime. This is highlighted by the satirist, Cde Fatso, who states: Zimbabwe had a record where we had a coup that was not a coup, and a cabinet that was not a cabinet. The whole country has been waiting impatiently for the new cabinet. Yes, it’s a new lean cabinet—Air Marshal Perence Shiri got the lands Ministry. Does it make sense for a guy with air and bird in his name to get land? Meanwhile General Sibusiso Moyo aka General Bae of the ZBC takeover fame got the Foreign affairs Ministry. We thought he would get the Broadcasting Services. If this cabinet would sing, who would sing for it Jah Prayzah! Because the cabinet has a military touch. There is a lot of new blood in the cabinet, well, military blood of course. Meanwhile, the biggest winner was Patrick Chinamasa who went from being the Minister of WhatsApp and data bundles to being the Minister of Bondnotes and Ecocash.

What this skit highlights are continuities rather than discontinuities between the “New Dispensation” and the ancien regime. This disregards military rule in Zimbabwe as it satirises Perence Shiri who previously was an Air Marshal. The use of the metaphor “Does it make sense for a guy with air in his name to get the Lands Ministry” questions his suitability for the ministerial position in cabinet. By using a sarcastic tone throughout the skit, Cde Fatso questions the capability and legitimacy of the appointed cabinet ministers and their ability to perform given their track record. A second skit takes us into what appears to be a cabinet or ministerial meeting. What is being discussed in the meeting is the purchase of snow graders which will be used in road construction. Cde Fatso comments on

7

 The Munhumutapa offices are in Harare and mostly house Ministerial offices.

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this meeting by citing the statement of then Minister of Transport and Infrastructural Development, Joram Gumbo, that: It is true that some of the graders are not for road making at all, they are for snow grading. But we have them, we have to use them. They were bought by us, that is, (sic) corruption between us. But let us forget about it, let us move forward.

What is interesting about this quotation is the fact that Gumbo talks of “corruption between us”. What this means is that the snow graders were purchased under the Mugabe regime. The “corruption between us” thus refers to committed within and by the ZANU-PF party. The viewer is left pondering why snow graders were purchased to begin with, in a country that does not experience snow. This skit further shows how the New Dispensation dismally fails to move beyond the kind of corruption that was characteristic of Mugabe’s rule. The legitimacy of the “New Dispensation” is thus tainted by its failure to transform itself away and outside of the vices that had come to be associated with previous ZANU-PF governments. This is particularly evident in the last sentence of the above quotation which shows a dismissive tone and a lack of conscience. The analysis of the two skits above highlights that, in effect, the “New Dispensation” is seized with a crisis of legitimacy. In its attempts to forge a new vision for itself, it finds itself, wittingly or unwittingly, simply reproducing the kind of governance that Zimbabwe knew under the leadership of Mugabe. Legitimacy, as previously pointed out, is particularly relevant against the background of the November 2017 coup and the contested July 2018 elections. Analysing the political arena in Zimbabwe following the demise of Mugabe, Rwodzi (2019, p.  210) concludes that “governance, legitimacy and democracy issues remain central to Zimbabwe politics”. Chimininge (2019, p. 38), moreover, opines that the rallying call by Mnangagwa that “the voice of the people is the voice of God” was an attempt to use religion to foster legitimacy in Zimbabwe whilst the mantra “Zimbabwe is open for business” sought to gain the acceptance of the international community in a bid to gain legitimacy. Chimininge (2019, p. 40) highlights, in this regard, that these diverse mantras that heralded the coming into power of the “New Dispensation” sought to frame the “the Government of Zimbabwe [as] opening to the international community for business; [as] having a president who listens to the voice of the

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people as well as making sure that government departments are easily accessible to the public.” In as much as the “New Dispensation” has worked tirelessly to distance itself from the ancien regime of Mugabe, it has become evidently clear that it is not, in fact, necessarily “new” but merely a reincarnation of the system of governance that Mugabe had perfected over his long political career. Numerous skits on Magamba TV have highlighted the question of legitimacy by satirising efforts to sanitise the “New Dispensation” and nurture the regime’s legitimacy nationally and internationally. Corruption and the Abuse of Law in the “New Dispensation Era” Corruption has been the cancer of the Zimbabwean body politics since the country gained independence in 1980 (Makumbe, 1994, p. 53). As early as seven years into black majority rule, several major scandals have been recorded: the ZISCO Blast Furnace Scandal of 1987, Air Zimbabwe Fokker Scandal of 1987, the National Railways Housing Scandal of 1986 and the Willogate scandal of 1988. Scandals as recent as the Command Agriculture Scandal of 2016, the ZESA Scandal of 2018 and the COVID-19 Procurement Scandal involving multimillion dollar contracts awarded to buy supplies at inflated prices8 are just some recent cases that show that the “old” and New Dispensation are, in effect, one and the same. Significantly, political scandals and their exposure by the state-­ controlled media in Zimbabwe are at times choreographed sting operations used to fight political faction members. Such is the case of the ZIMDEF corruption scandal involving the former Minister of Higher and Tertiary Education, Jonathan Moyo and his then Deputy, who were aligned to the Mugabe faction. In some cases, the diligent work by private journalists lands them in prison or results in them being subjected to censorship. However, with the advent of social media, more exposure of reporting on corruption has been registered lately. Comedians, for their part, are making use of satire and parody to dramatize and highlight scandals in the context of weapons of the weak theory. They use softer and subtler methods to highlight the problem and mobilise against the offenders. One skit titled General Sibanda Attacks ZANU-PF, Obadiah Moyo Caught & Released, Khupe Fires More MPs on The Week shows how 8

 https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-54480264

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endemic corruption and abuse of law are in the New Dispensation era. The use of the heading Obadiah Moyo Caught and released is itself ironic and shows the abuse of law in Zimbabwe by government officials that is rampant. In the video, a police officer is shown pretending to arrest and detain the former Minister of Health Obadiah Moyo, who was at the centre of the COVID-19 Procurement Scandal in which there was a misuse of funds meant for Covid-19. The police officer publicly rebukes the Minister, only to release him thereafter from police custody, allowing him to go and sleep at his house and return very early in the morning to give the impression that he has slept in police cells, since he was “denied” bail by the magistrate’s court. Away from the eyes of journalists and the public, the police officer is seen apologising to the minister for harassing him and being too rough with him and advising him to return as early as 0430 hrs the following morning. The main theme highlighted in this episode is the long suspected tendency of ZANU-PF of pretending to fight corruption using what has now come to be known as the “catch and release” strategy, where it is believed that the regime occasionally captures some of its own, detains them over one or two nights and then releases them. This abuse of the law is further demonstrated in one of the video’s titled Catch & Release-Used by ZANU-PF in Zimbabwe-Fake Jailing of Corrupt Politicians on the show Tsaona. In what seems to be a politburo meeting, the satirist, donning a scarf with Zimbabwean colours similar to that worn by the President, urges his ministers to understand and sacrifice one night in prison cells for the sake of proving that the government is fighting corruption. In the video, the President decides to play a game of raffle, where ministers present in the politburo meeting write their names on pieces of paper and place them in a hat. Parodying the President, the satirist states: Comrades, our new programme is very simple. It is called catch and release. What it means is that some of you are going to be caught and released. I am sure you know why we are doing this because mastreets arikupisa (the streets are burning). People want us to do something about corruption. Munhu anongosungwa, oenda pajere zvetwo minutes. Paweekend unge wapaden. (You will be arrested, and not got to jail for long. You’ll be home by the weekend).

The statement by the satirist brings to the fore what has become known, in political circles, as the “catch and release” phenomenon. Politicians with high profile corruption cases evade arrest and are instead granted bail

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and endless court cases. These arrests of high-profile politicians and ministers merely reflect political and factional bickering amongst politicians within ZANU-PF. In the same video, the ministers in the politburo meeting only write down the names of the President and the First Lady and put them into the hat instead. The video shows the President shuffling the names in the hat. He is the only one who picks names and decides who will go to prison. He first picks his own name and then goes on to pick that of the First Lady. The satirist, imitating the President, states: Ndiyani aisa zita rangu apa? Makuda kufarisaka. Ini zita rangu neraFirst Lady arifanira kuva palist pano. Mazita enyu chete. Ini I can’t be on this list ka. Munopenga here? (Who put my name on this list? You are really pushing your luck, aren’t you? My name and the First Lady’s name cannot be on this list. Only yours. I can’t be on this list! Are you all mad?

The video shows in part how the President views himself as immune from arrest and any form of legal prosecution. By writing the President and the First Lady’s names on the list of those people meant to be arrested for corruption, the satirist attempted to present the President as a corrupt individual who should also face a jail term, given that he is presiding over a corrupt government and because of his previous involvement in corruption and abuse of law. This video was actually played for the President by ZimboLiveTV during an interview with the President. The President could not help but laugh, quite ironically. The fact that the presenter was able to play this video directly in front of the President also points to the creative licence that comedy sometimes has in presenting serious issues and accusations in a seamless yet effective way. While the President laughed, he must have also grasped the hard reality of the message and the general sentiments of the public about his government’s attitude towards fighting and eradicating corruption. This very same video has also been extensively used by prominent anti-corruption bodies including Transparency International Zimbabwe and the Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission itself. From the point of view of the weapons of weak theory, the parody and caricature deployed by comedians are very important outlets of political social expressions in societies such as Zimbabwe, where peaceful protests and freedom of expression are vehemently stifled and severely punished. Scott contends that people adapt to repression by adopting subtle and less

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than obvious ways and methods of protest and expression as exemplified by the Magamba TV crew. In this way, Magamba TV adopts the weapons of the weak to continue to expose corruption and other state vices. In this way, such strategies serve as a precursor to eventual open and defiant protests in that they conscientise, educate and mobilise the masses, albeit in subtle ways, until there is sufficient awareness and anger to directly confront the powers that be. In explaining this, Scott (1985, p. 64) states that the “weapons of the weak” are not only meaningful in the sense that they effect change in people’s lives. These “weapons” are also crucial to the construction of a resistance culture that may eventually become capable, at certain historic moments, acting as a catalyst of broader, more openly oppositional liberation movements. In this way, Magamba TV and many other comedians deploying “satire” have become deeply embedded into public discourse and have helped to define a new paradigm for the mediation of the public sphere.

Conclusion In this chapter, we have shown how Magamba TV creates a space in which the “New Dispensation” can be held to account through the power of satire. In a socio-political context in which the free exercise of freedom of speech, freedom of association and freedom of conscience is for the most part impeded, satire provides an avenue through which to critique the prevailing socio-political situation in Zimbabwe. Indeed, satire positions itself as a weapon of the weak in that it makes it possible for the emergence of discourses whose themes are intended to mock and ridicule the Zimbabwean government and public officials during the post-Mugabe era. Satire, we argue, embodies a form of veiled dialogue that takes place between the discourses of the weak, oppressed and marginalised and the dominant autocratic discourse of the ruling regime. The repressive context gives rise to alternative world narratives outside those of the oppressive regime, mediating the Zimbabwean crisis and offering another framework to the regimes policies. This chapter has also shown how political satire as embodied in Magamba TV is instrumental in challenging the rhetoric of newness that the “New Dispensation” has used to describe itself. Our analysis has shown “New Dispensation” does not exude any newness given by the way in which it has worked on perfecting all the evils that characterised the Mugabe regime. Magamba TV frames itself as an

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alternative voice that ridicules the very premise of novelty and freshness which the “New Dispensation” purports to represent.

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Iqani, M. (2020). Media texts: Modality, meaning and analysis. In M.  Iqani & S.  Chiumbu (Eds.), Media studies: Critical African and decolonial approaches. Goodwood. Kuhlman, J. (2012). Zimbabwean diaspora politics and the power of laughter: Humour as a Tool for Political Communication, Criticism and Protest. Journal of African Media Studies, 4(3), 295–313. Makombe, R., & Agbede, G. T. (2016). Challenging power through social media: A review of selected memes of Robert Mugabe’s fall. Communicare: Journal of Communication Sciences in Southern Africa, 35(2), 39–54. Makumbe, J. (1994). Bureaucratic corruption in Zimbabwe: Causes and the magnitude of the problem. Africa Development/Afrique et Développement, 11(3), 45–60. Matsilele, A. (2017). Incorporating comedy: Unconventional journalism in Zimbabwe comics step into the breach to fill a journalism vacuum in the face of government censorship. Jamlab Africa. 02 June. https://medium.com/jamlab/incorporating-comedy-unconventional-journalism-in-zimbabwe51a8512a4df0 McClennen, S. A., & Maisel, R. M. (2014). Is satire saving our nation? Mockery and American politics. Palgrave Macmillan. Mhiripiri, N. A., & Ureke, O. (2019). Theoretical paradoxes of representation and the problems of media representations of Zimbabwe in crisis. Critical Arts, 32(2), 1–17. Mpofu, S. (2016). Making heroes, (un)making the nation?: ZANU-PF’s imaginations of the Heroes’ Acre, heroes and construction of identity in Zimbabwe from 2000 to 2015. African Identities, 15(1), 1–17. Mpofu, S. (2019). Pornographic intersections: Race and genitalia in South African political art in the age of digital media: Intersections pornographiques. Critical African Studies, 11(2), 230–261. Mpofu, S., & Mastilele, T. (2020). Social media and the concept of dissidence in Zimbabwean politics. In S. J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni & P. Ruhanya (Eds.), The history and political transition of Zimbabwe: From Mugabe to Mnangagwa (pp. 221–245). Palgrave Macmillan. Muchacha, M. (2016). Politically motivated violence in Zimbabwe and the role of social work. Journal of Human Rights and Social Work, 1, 156–164. Musangi, J. (2012). ‘A Zimbabwean Joke Is No Laughing Matter’: E-Humour and Versions of Subversion (pp. 161–175). Cape Town: HSRC Press. Musila, G. A. (2009). Laughing at the Rainbow’s Cracks? Blackness, whiteness & the ambivalences of South African stand-up comedy. In E.  Obadare & W. Willems (Eds.), Civic agency in Africa arts of resistance in the 21st century (pp. 147–166). Boydell & Brewer Ltd.

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Ncube, G. (2018). Of dirt, disinfection and purgation: Discursive construction of state violence in selected contemporary Zimbabwean literature. Tydskrif vir Letterkunde, 55(1), 41–53. Ncube, L. (2020). Misogyny, sexism and hegemonic masculinity in Zimbabwe’s operation restore legacy. In S. J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni & P. Ruhanya (Eds.), The history and political transition of Zimbabwe: From Mugabe to Mnangagwa (pp. 331–359). Palgrave Macmillan. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S. J. (2015). Introduction: Mugabeism and entanglements of history, politics, and power in the making of Zimbabwe. In S.  J. Ndlovu-­ Gatsheni (Ed.), Mugabeism? History, politics, and power in Zimbabwe (pp. 1–25). Palgrave Macmillan. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S. J., & Benyera, E. (2015). Strategy recommendation framework for resolve in the justice and reconciliation question in Zimbabwe. African Journal of Conflict Revolution, 15(2), 9–31. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S.  J., & Ruhanya, P. (2020). Introduction: Transition in Zimbabwe: From Robert Gabriel Mugabe to Emmerson Dambudzo Mnangagwa: A repetition without change. In S.  J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni & P.  Ruhanya (Eds.), The history and political transition of Zimbabwe: From Mugabe to Mnangagwa (pp. 1–23). Palgrave Macmillan. Neale, S., & Krutnick, F. (2006). Popular film and television comedy. Routledge. Nyamnjoh, F. B. (2009). Press cartoons and politics: The Case of Cameroon. In J. A. Lent (Ed.), Cartooning in Africa. Hampton Press. Rwodzi, A. (2019). Democracy, governance and legitimacy in Zimbabwe since the November 2017 military coup. Cadernos de Estudos Africanos, 38, 193–213. Scott, J. (1985). Weapons of the weak: Everyday forms of resistance. Yale University Press. Siziba, G., & Ncube, G. (2015). Mugabe’s fall from grace: Satire and fictional narratives as silent forms of resistance in/on Zimbabwe. Social Dynamics: A Journal of African Studies, 41(3), 516–539. Tinnic, S. (2009). Speaking ‘truth’ to power? Television Satire, Rick Mercer Report, and the politics of place and space. In J.  Gray, J.  P. Jones, & E.  Thompson (Eds.), Satire TV: Politics and comedy in the post network era (pp. 167–186). NYU Press. Werbner, R. P. (1991). Tears of the dead: The social biography of an African family. Edinburgh University Press. Willems, W. (2011). Comic strips and ‘the crisis’: Postcolonial laughter and coping with everyday life in Zimbabwe. Popular Communication, 9(2), 126–145. Zamponi, M. (2005). From social justice, to neo-liberalism, to authoritarianian nationalism: Where is the Zimbabwe state going? In D. Suzanne, M. Zamponi, & M. Henning (Eds.), Zimbabwe: The political economy of decline (Discussion Paper 27) (pp. 27–43). Nordiska Afrikainstitutet.

CHAPTER 4

Zapiro’s Satirical Reconstruction of Marikana Victims and Representation of Mourning Metji Makgoba and Abram Mashatole

Introduction This chapter employs Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) to examine how ordinary people engage Zapiro’s political cartoons. Focus is on his reconstruction of the Marikana massacre. Here, we engage both the creative representation of the massacre and embodied discourses of mourning, death, and blackness in those contexts. To do so, our analysis explores and engages how Facebook commentaries on Zapiro’s construction of the Marikana massacre illuminate diverse ideological inclinations, subjectivities, and how they fit into discourse frames about what counts as human, life, and mourning. Studies that have analysed Zapiro’s cartoons have either focused on the macro aspects of the text, dealing with the issues of social relations and power (Dodds, 2010; Hammett, 2010; Labuschagne, 2011) or on the microelement that focuses on how the text is constructed and how the text is an instrument of the social construction of reality (Conradie et al.,

M. Makgoba (*) • A. Mashatole University of Limpopo, Polokwane, South Africa e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 S. Mpofu (ed.), The Politics of Laughter in the Social Media Age, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-81969-9_4

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2012). This approach ignores the intersection of the two analytical strands, the macro-level and the micro-level of discourse, contributing to the reproduction and maintenance of social relations and power. Our approach to CDA here considers language and other sociolinguistic features as ‘site of power and social struggle’ that are ‘involved where there is contention over, and a challenge to, power’ (Wodak & Busch, 2004, p.  110). Consequently, this chapter points to ‘the necessary interdependence of “micro” analyses of specific discourse samples and more “macro” analysis of longer-term tendencies affecting orders of discourse, the construction and restructuring of hegemonies in the sphere of discursive practices. These “macro” dimensions constitute part of the context of any discursive event and are necessary for its interpretation’ (Fairclough, 1995, p. 101). In doing so, this chapter follows the logic that ‘subscription to a particular discourse at the individual level is likely to be [the] effect of the processes of discursive formation that occur at the societal level’ (Locke, 2004, p. 32). For this purpose, this chapter draws upon Marion Young’s concept of ‘responsibility’ and Judith Butler’s concepts of ‘mourning’, ‘grieving’, and ‘discourse’ to understand the discourses of mourning and responsibility, as well as how they contribute to the oppression of miners through discourses in Facebook comments to Zapiro’s political cartoons. Despite the significance of the Marikana massacre, as well as the role of political cartoons in political discourse, no study has explored the construction of the miners, and how South Africans have dealt with their death and the effect of this on the wider structures and patterns of socio-­ political relations as well as on digital spaces.

Cartooning Politics and Politicising Cartoons Political cartoons form part of discursive tools of challenging and maintaining power in Africa. Critics demonstrate how South Africa’s political-­ cultural diversity and multiculturalism, as well as the psychological legacies of imperial history and colonialism, may lead to the multiple and unintended readings of Zapiro’s cartoons (Mason, 2010; Hammett, 2010; Labuschagne, 2011). According to Labuschagne (2011), the country’s sharp cultural divisions, stemming from their different orientations of ideologies and myths and customs, shape the interpretation of political communication and meaning. As Hammett notes, these dissensions are ‘complicated by the competing and complex ideological tensions arising from competing ideals of non-racialism, multi-racialism, African

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nationalism, and the African renaissance’ (Hammett, 2010, p.  92). But political cartoons are significant beyond the African context. The famous Charlie Hebdo shooting saw 11 journalists murdered and 11 staff members injured after brothers, Saïd and Chérif Kouachi, attacked the offices of the satirical weekly magazine Charlie Hebdo in Paris. This event sparked controversy and demonstrated the significance of political cartoons in shaping political and cultural discourses. Hammett (2010, p. 3) notes that political cartoons can be used to ‘embody, represent and criticise power relations and resistances to the excesses and inequalities of power’, depending on their political positioning and their medium of distribution. By exposing the dynamics of power relations, political cartoons provide a critical platform where power is negotiated, resisted, and expressed (Dodds, 2007). Political cartoons have attracted research attention. Some studies have explored various themes reflected in political cartoons whilst attempting to understand their social functions (Mazid, 2008; Steuter & Wills, 2008). Cutting across disciplines such as education, communications, media, sociology, and psychology, these studies have employed different approaches to explore the impact of political cartoons. For example, Templin (1999) sought to explain how political cartoons relate to the real world, and Morris (1992) analysed the levels and dynamics of satire present in cartoons. Kuipers (2005) focused on how cartoonists employ devices and techniques, such as metaphors, tropes, and irony, to produce humour to construct their meanings. Meyer (2000) researched the effects of political cartoon-messaging and how these could be interpreted, while Eko (2007) studied the impact of animalisation of people in political cartoons to provide commentary on issues of public interest. These studies conform to two hermeneutical frameworks by Eco (1994) which focus on the concept of a reader-orientated strategy and a text-orientated strategy, dealing with the consumption and production of political context, respectively. They tend to reflect these two hermeneutical frameworks according to the satirical nature and the social functions and meanings of political cartoons. However, they neglect the analysis of the intersection of visual discourses, ideologies, and representational power.

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Macro Versus Micro Discourses Studies, such as Hammett’s (2010), Dodds’s (2010), and Labuschagne’s (2011), move away from the dichotomy of reader-orientated strategy and a text-orientated strategy by analysing how political cartoons serve as a critical and cultural platform from which power is negotiated, resisted, and expressed. However, their analyses mainly focus on the macro-level of discourse without engaging the nexus of discourses, ideology, and power. They mainly explore the ideology of constitutionalism, polity, multiculturalism, legal pluralism, geopolitical representation, and significance while ignoring the micro-level of discourses, as well as visual texts and analyses. In doing so, their analyses mainly pay attention to discourse with a big D (macro-sociological discourse) without engaging the discourse with the smaller d (linguistic and micro-sociological discourse). This is despite that the notions of ideology, power, and hierarchy which largely remain the hegemonic outcomes and the ideological work of Discourse and visual rhetoric, text linguistics, and sociolinguistics (the social activities of making meanings), ‘together with sociological variables, are all seen as relevant for an interpretation or explanation of text’ (Wodak & Busch, 2004, p. 108). Despite this, Labuschagne (2011) and Hammett (2010) have critically explored the notions of political and social power in political cartoons, showing the need to contextualise these cultural texts within their macro-­ structures of power. As Hammett (2010, p. 1) puts it, ‘political cartoons function as a key indicator of the democratic health of a polity. These images provide individual, momentary insights into the expressions and experiences of power and the creative ways in which these are responded to’ and ‘embody, represent and criticise power relations and resistances to the excesses and inequalities of power’. Meanwhile, Labuschagne draws on Max Weber’s conceptual model, which explains three models in the form of authorities for the compartmentalisation of political culture—(1) traditional (2) charismatic (3) legal-rational to explain how political cartoons ‘can result in opposing reactions and evoke different outcomes’ (2011, p.  367). This is something he believes has been overlooked in favour of safeguarding the freedom of the cartoonist. Although his study does not specifically cover visual theories, his insights and contributions are crucial for understanding how socio-cultural and political diversity and orientations complicate the interpretation of political cartoons. In his analysis of Zapiro’s Rape of Justicia cartoon, Labuschagne (2011)

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demonstrated that because of different dynamics and makings of political culture, the reception and interpretation of political communication ought to be oppositional.

Multimodal Discourse Furthermore, scholars, such as Dodds (2010), have engaged the visual and symbolic power of political cartoons, deconstructing and explaining ‘how visual images and technologies are put to work for the purpose of making sense of the geopolitical world around us’. However, his work, as well as that of Labuschagne (2011) and Hammett (2010), ignores the intersection of micro and macro issues of power relations in political cartoons and the multimodal nature of the political texts. Equally, using the model of contrapuntal reading1 within a cultural studies framework, Mason (2010, p. 35) examines ‘the socio-political and economic conditions underlying the production of the cartoon; second, textual analysis; and third, analysis of the cartoon’s reception by the public’. Although his rigorous approach to the text is multi-layered and offers a critical analysis, it mainly concentrates on the aspects of public reception and political signification falling to the dichotomy of consumption and production. In addition, Conradie et al. (2012) adopted Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) and pragmatics to analyse satire, irony, and humour in Zapiro’s political cartoons. However, their approach ignores the political implications of discourses at the macro-level (power relations and ideology), which are primarily crucial to understanding and analyse cultural texts. Dodds (2010), Hammett (2010), Labuschagne (2011), and Conradie et al. (2012) paid less attention to the intersection of the micro-­ level and macro-level of discourse. Mazid (2008) adopted CDA to analyse satire and humour in political cartoons in George Bush and Osama bin Laden cartoons. Here Mazid (2008) employed what he calls a discursive semiotic approach, a combination of semiotics and CDA, to examine the representation of ideological standpoints in political cartoons. Although his study offers a critical analysis, it explains discursive practices of ideologically constructing these two political figures without dealing with how this maintains power relations. Despite this, Mazid (2008) 1  Said (1993) defines contrapuntal reading as ‘an attempt to read not only what is there, but also what is not there by virtue of having been forcibly excluded’ (cited in Mason, 2010, p. 45).

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provides a useful starting point since he adopted a multimodal framework (Kress & van Leeuwen, 2002) within a critical framework to analyse visual metaphors in satirical representations. Our approach responds to Mason’s (2010) calls for a critical integrated approach towards the study of political cartoons. Mason (2010) states that critical studies should explore not only the text but also diverse cultural, historical, and political contexts linked to it and the audiences to unpack meanings, as well as factors that the reader may bring when interpreting the text. Using the model of contrapuntal reading within a cultural studies framework, Mason (2010, p. 35) examines ‘the socio-political and economic conditions underlying the production of the cartoon; second, textual analysis; and third, analysis of the cartoon’s reception by the public’.

Methodology This chapter adopts Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) to examine how the consumers of Zapiro’s political cartoons draw upon different contexts and mental models to interpret his discourses. CDA ‘is a type of discourse analytical research that primarily studies the way social power abuse, dominance, and inequality are enacted, reproduced, and resisted by text and talk in the social and political context. With such dissident research, critical discourse analysts take explicit position and thus want to understand, expose, and ultimately resist social inequality’ (Van Dijk 2001, p.  355). According to Fairclough (1995, p. 132), CDA: aims to systematically explore often opaque relationships of causality and determination between (a) discursive practices, events and texts, and (b) wider social and cultural structures, relations and processes; to investigate how such practices, events, and texts arise out of and are ideologically shaped by relations of power and struggles over power; and to explore how the opacity of these relationships between discourse and society is itself a factor securing power and hegemony.

We adopt Fairclough’s three-layered model (1992) to analyse the interpretations of three political cartoons through their textual form, and the broader social practice that they are part of, to follow the logic that ‘subscription to a particular discourse at the individual level is likely to be [the] effect of the processes of discursive formation that occur at the societal level’ (Locke, 2004, p. 32). As Fairclough (1995, p. 97) notes:

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how a text is produced or interpreted, in the sense of what discursive practices and conventions are drawn from what order(s) of discourse and how they are articulated together, depends upon the nature of the sociocultural practice which the discourse is a part of (including the relationship to existing hegemonies); the nature of the discourse practice of text production shapes the text, and leaves ‘traces’ in surface features of the text; and the nature of the discourse practice of text interpretation determines how the surface features of a text will be interpreted.

First, this involves explaining and asking who and what the text denotes. Second, this explains what the text connotes, asking: ‘what ideas and values are communicated through what is represented, or through the way in which it is represented?’ (Machin & Mayr, 2012, p. 50). The second layer is concerned with how recipients of texts draw ‘on already existing discourses and genres to interpret a text and how they apply available discourses and genres in the consumption and interpretation of the texts’ (Jorgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 69). The third level moves from the micro (text) to the macro (ideology, power, dominance, and inequality) levels of the analysis (Van Dijk, 2001). It focuses on the sociocultural practice of a text or ‘the social and cultural goings-on which the communicative event is part of’ (Fairclough, 1995, p. 57). At this level, this chapter analyses the questions relating to how the text constructs and ‘represents’ society and its functions in preserving or resisting domination as well as its effect on the wider structures and patterns of socio-political relations. This chapter offers a ‘linguistic description of the language text, interpretation of the relationship between the (productive and interpretative) discursive processes and the text, and explanation of the relationship between the discursive processes and the social processes’ (Fairclough, 1995, p. 97).

Grieving, Vulnerability, and Discourse The questions such as who counts as human, whose lives count as lives, and, finally, what makes for a grievable life are central to the principles of Ubuntu under certain social and political conditions in which violence is a way of life and the means to secure self-defence are limited. In South Africa ‘[c]ertain lives are not considered lives at all, they cannot be humanized … they [cannot] fit any dominant frame for human’ (Butler, 2004, p. 34). These questions underlie issues of vulnerability, ‘a vulnerability to the other that is part of bodily life’, and define the hierarchies of grief and

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mourning. The combination of these conditions and the subsequent hierarchies suggests that lives may be supported, protected, and maintained differently, and, in turn, human physical vulnerability may be radically distributed in different forms across the globe. In these conditions, ‘certain lives will be highly protected, and the abrogation of their claims to sanctity will be sufficient to mobilize the forces of war. Other lives will not find such fast and furious support and will not even qualify as grievable’ (Butler, 2004, p. 32). She continues: Some lives are grievable, and others are not; the differential allocation of grievability that decides what kind of subject is and must be grieved, and which kind of subject must not, operates to produce and maintain certain exclusionary conceptions of who is normatively human: what counts as a livable life and a grievable death? (Butler, 2004, p. xiv)

Butler’s concern is that when lives are rendered precarious in this way when they are exposed to such extreme conditions of suffering and vulnerability, our very understanding of social and human reality is altered, rendering some lives ‘unreal’. As she asks: ‘What is real? Whose lives are real? How might reality be remade? Those who are unreal have, in a sense, already suffered the violence of derealization. What, then, is the relation between violence and those lives considered as “unreal”?’ The concept of ‘derealisation’ is the name Butler gives to the process by which certain lives are made ‘unreal’, ‘meaning that they are neither alive nor dead, but interminably spectral’. As Butler (2004, p. 33) notes: If violence is done against those who are unreal, then, from the perspective of violence, it fails to injure or negate2 those lives since those lives are already negated. But they have a strange way of remaining animated and so must be negated again (and again). They cannot be mourned because they are always already lost or, rather, never “were,” and they must be killed, since they seem to live on, stubbornly, in this state of deadness. Violence renews itself in the face of the apparent inexhaustibility of its object.

2  ‘If 200,000 Iraqi children were killed during the Gulf War and its aftermath,’ do we have an image, a frame for any of those lives, singly or collectively? Is there a story we might find about those deaths in the media? Are there names attached to those children’ (Butler, 2004, p. 34).

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Personal Responsibility vs Political Responsibility Butler’s concepts of what counts as life, a grievable life, work well with Young’s concepts of personal responsibility and political responsibility which deal with the understanding of responsibility in social, structural, and personal terms. Young develops her argument on the idea that: many of the problems we collectively face are large scale structural problems. Yet the concepts of responsibility we operate with derive from and are most suited to issues of smaller scale interaction. We continue to rely on a phenomenology of agency that gives primacy to near effects over remote effects, to individual effects over group effects, and to people’s positive actions more than what they have failed to do (2003, p. 8)

Young regards this form of agency and the concept of responsibility derived from it as inadequate for understanding and taking responsibility for the large-scale social structural processes that produce social problems. Thus, we tend to depend on the notions of personal responsibility which seeks to ‘assign responsibility to particular agents when we show that their actions are as causally connected to the outcome for which we seek to assign responsibility’ (Young, 2011, p. 98). Young (2011) calls this conceptualisation of responsibility as the liability model. In this model, Young (2003, p. 12) indicates that: the actions found causally connected to the circumstances are shown to be voluntary and performed with adequate knowledge of the situation. if candidates for responsibility can successfully show that their action was not voluntary or that they were excusably ignorant, then their responsibility is usually mitigated, if not dissolved. When these conditions do exist, however, it is appropriate to blame the agents for the harmful outcomes.

This model ‘holds a person liable for an action that caused a harm even if they did not intend or were unable to control the outcome, or holds a person or institution liable for a harm caused by someone under their command’ (Young, 2003, p.  12). It is also fundamentally backward-­ looking in its purpose; it reviews the history of events in order to assign responsibility, often for the sake of exacting punishment or compensation. Assigning responsibility to some agents, in this model, finally usually also has the function of absolving other agents, who might have been

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candidates for fault. To render this person or group of persons guilty of a crime usually implies that others who were suspect are not guilty (ibid.). According to Young (2003), there must be clear evidence, not only for demonstrating the causal connection between this agent and harm, but also for evaluating the intents, motives, and consequences of the actions when applying this concept of responsibility. This model of personal responsibility, Young (2003, 2011) suggests, is either insufficient or inappropriate for assigning responsibility to social issues that contain structural properties. As Young (2003, p. 20) elaborates: The assignment of responsibility as liability is an indispensable aspect of moral judgement. People do all sorts of irresponsible and harmful things, out of indifference, sloppiness, malice, selfishness, or self-righteousness. The liability model of responsibility, however, is inadequate for understanding and evaluating much about the relationship of individual actors to large-­ scale social processes and structural injustices. It needs to be supplemented with a notion of responsibility that implicates persons in the effects of structural processes because they participate in the production and reproduction of those structures.

For these reasons, Young (2003, 2011) proposes the model of ‘political responsibility’ to complement the notions of personal responsibility. In the model of political responsibility, the term political entails ‘something wider than what state institutions do’ (Young, 2003, p.  20). Drawing upon Hannah Arendt’s conception of the political, Young (ibid), the political refers to ‘phenomena and movements of collective action, where people work together to form public works and institutions’ (2003, p. 23). Proposing a model of political responsibility expands, rather than replace or reject the liability model of responsibility. As a result of the inadequacy of the liability model, Young develops five features that distinguish the concept of political responsibility from a liability model: (1) political responsibility does not isolate some responsible parties in order to absolve others; (2) whereas blame or liability seeks remedy for deviation from an acceptable norm, political responsibility concerns structural causes of injustice that are normal and ongoing; (3) political responsibility is more forward-looking than backward-looking; (4) what it means to take up or assign political responsibility’ is more open and discretionary than what it means to judge an agent blameworthy or liable; (5) an agent shares political responsibility with others whose actions contribute to the structural processes that produce injustice. (Ibid.)

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Findings and Discussion

3*

This section draws on Butler’s (2004) conception of mourning and Young’s conceptions of personal and political responsibility within a CDA framework to examine the interpretation and the comments towards Zapiro’s cartoon that is titled: Seven YEARS ON A MOMENT FOR SILENCE FOR MARIKANA! as shared on his Facebook page. The cartoon depicts three men identified as LONMIN, GOVT (represented by then deputy president Cyril Ramaphosa), and POLICE MURDERERS (carrying raffles, and reimagining white apartheid policemen who killed black people during apartheid). The men have closed their ears and eyes, turned their backs on the widows, who are seen paying tribute to the victims of the Marikana massacre, and have stains of blood on their clothes signifying the death of mineworkers in Marikana. In August 2012, workers at the Marikana mine in Rustenburg staged a protest for a pay rise. After a week of demonstrations, the situation spiralled out of control, as police opened fire on the protesting miners, killing 3  Permission to reproduce this cartoon has been granted. First published in Daily Maverick 16/08/2019.

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34 of them. Ramaphosa, currently the president of South Africa, was a non-executive director of Lonmin at that time while at the same time serving as the deputy president of the RSA and the ANC, and his company, Shanduka, held minority shareholder in Lonmin. Ramaphosa asked thenminister of police Nathi Mthethwa to take ‘concomitant action’ against the miners and referred to them as ‘plainly dastardly criminals’. He sent his emails to the minister and Lonmin Board just a day before the police gunned down 34 black miners. As it shall be shown in ensuing commentaries from Facebook comments about the cartoon and the massacre, the cartoon triggered varying responses in ways that illuminated discourses of blame. The cartoon also triggered competing discourses of political responsibility, personal responsibility drawing upon a range of ideological standpoints including white and black conservatism which dehumanised black miners and condoned violence against them. As these users noted: The now deceased will never again attack an armed police force with traditional weapons. To be fair. If scores of people run towards me, armed with pangas, and are looking to brutally attack me, I’ll shoot them. Zapiro, you are getting this one wrong too. Your political views and knowledge are really starting to fail you, old timer. Never accuse someone as a murderer if you do not have all the facts. What exactly did they want the police to do when the hordes rushed them with weapons? Ask them nice to not also kill them? This was not the police’s fault. They were defending their own lives. You got to look at who put them there in the first place. Look at the president and his cronies. The miners’ lives do not matter to government. This is your ANC. Zapiro go to hell. Moment of silence my foot. They fired shot at police, but no one is talking about that. They killed people as well, but no one is talking about. All lives matters. Was the police supposed to fold arms while they shot at them.

At a micro-level of discourse, these descriptions uphold the discourse of personal responsibility which involves assigning responsibility to particular agents when we believe that their actions are causally connected to the outcome for which we seek to assign responsibility. This dominant

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concept of responsibility, we suggest, operates on a liability model that seeks causally to connect an agent to a harm in order to assign the agent responsibility for it. In this context, the purpose of implicitly distributing blame and responsibility as fault is to punish. At the socio-historical level, how the deceased miners have been blamed enact and recontextualised the hegemonic discourses that ontologically deny the humanity of blacks. In Butler’s terms, this suggests that if ‘certain lives are not considered lives at all, they cannot be humanized, and cannot fit any dominant frame for the human’ at the level of discourse (Butler, 2004, p. 34). This means they have suffered the violence of derealisation. For her, derealisation raises two questions. The first one is of ethics, and ‘how there can be an ethical relation to those who cannot appear within the horizon of ethics, who are not persons or are not considered to be the kind of beings with whom one can enter into an ethical relation’ (Butler, 2004, p. 78). The second is a question of mourning and memory, of ‘what counts as a livable life and a grievable death?’ (ibid., p. 79). According to these Facebook comments, which draw on the mental models of black and white conservatism, there can be no ethical relation with the miners because they have been accused of killing other security people, as well as arming themselves with weapons. However, taking this politically, broadly, this complies with the discourse of colonialism that does not take the experiences of black men as a human experience, because black men are not structurally regarded as human beings from a racial and colonial point of view. Their dehumanisation firstly occurs at discursive level which provides cultural frameworks that give ‘rise to a physical violence that in some sense delivers the message of dehumanization that is already at work in the culture’ (Butler, 2004). As the phrase from one of the quotes above and another comment to the cartoon emphasise: The miners’ lives do not matter to government. This is your ANC.

Black lives Matter… Unless you’re a Black South African miner that is. Defending is one thing, running into the rocks and executing the wounded is entirely another. But big boetie ANC is and has always had little regard for human life or accountability.

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When we understand the lives of these miners under their exploitative social and political conditions in which violence is a way of life, their lives have been rendered unreal and have been erased from the category of the human. These constructions then become the basis for the social, economic, legal, and political organisation of racialised societies in which blacks generally come to occupy the underclass, the abject poor, the ­subordinated, ‘the wretched of the earth’. The historical legacy of this European fantasy we call ‘white supremacy’ is then one of structural ­racism, white cultural and social dominance, and tremendous economic inequality between blacks and whites. The insults, degrading racial slurs, the wounding words as well as the beatings that whites mete out against Blacks are then simply a reflection of this structural problem (Modiri, 2016). One comment further elaborates this: I cannot believe that 8 years on they still have not paid the money owed to these people. I saw how the Police just mowed down the Protesters who had no weapon or guns. There was a Young Man with great Leadership qualities just mowed down and the Police and President Ramaphosa just stood and watched these lives being taken. Their protest was real. Besides the low wages they also had terrible conditions to live in. Very sad. SHAME, SHAME, SHAME and their families whom these people supported financially were left without their Breadwinner.

Through this dehumanisation, their lives are displaced by the violence of derealisation, disappearing from the horizon of ethics. In consequence, their lives may not be regarded as beings with whom other people can enter into an ethical relation with. As these Facebook comments to the cartoon further elaborate: This was an illegal protest by already overpaid mine workers which was a danger to peaceful citizens in the area. The police just did their job. How the hell do you go on strike carrying assortment of traditional weapons? For what purpose exactly? As a policeman, what do you do when someone who has killed before is running towards you? If I was a policeman, I would have made the same decision over and over again. Hostility and barbarism unfortunately yields sad results. The Govt needs to educate and civilize the masses on their demonic behaviour of killing, loot-

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ing, burning, stealing. Not to mention higher education institutions that produce future leaders that are destroyed by barbaric individuals. Govt keeps replacing with hardworking taxpayers money.

These descriptions do not only erase these black miners from the category of the ‘Human’, but also advance the racist and right-wing discourses in South Africa, supported by black conservatives, that the killing of these black miners somehow was necessary.4 In Butler’s terms, ‘Violence against those who are already not quite living, that is, living in a state of suspension between life and death, leaves a mark that is no mark. There will be no public act of grieving.’ (2004, p. 36). At the socio-historical level, this legitimises police brutality, as well as the dehumanisation of blacks through the discourses of colonialism, combined with the hegemonic discourse of white conservatism, and white supremacy that generally dehumanise, disrespect, and misrecognise blacks in anti-black societies, such as South Africa, the USA, and England, as emphasised by the statement that: The Govt needs to educate and civilize the masses on their demonic behaviour of killing, looting, burning, stealing. Not to mention higher education institutions that produce future leaders are destroyed by barbaric individuals.

These descriptions displace and conceal the discourse of police brutality as well as how the police in South Africa continue to apply force on black men. These comments also. are manifestations of broader social dynamics, activated by unequal power relations where the perpetrators seek to reaffirm their sense of social position and privilege. The acts of verbal and psychical punishment that characterise racial assaults and slurs are a way in which the perpetrator reinforces their sense of identity over their victims, whom they cast as inferior or deviant. (Modiri, 2016)

4  Butler (2004, p. 34) continues: Although we might argue that it would be impractical to write obituaries for all those people, or for all people, I think we have to ask, again and again, how the obituary functions as the instrument by which grievability is publicly distributed. It is the means by which a life becomes, or fails to become, a publicly grievable life, an icon for national self-recognition, the means by which a life becomes noteworthy. As a result, we have to consider the obituary as an act of nation-building. The matter is not a simple one, for, if life is not grievable, it is not quite a life; it does not qualify as a life and is not worth a note. It is already the unburied, if not the unburiable.

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In general terms, these discourses have not only made possible the dehumanisation and the social death of blacks that automatically produce and permit physical violence and death but also erased blacks from the national discourses of mourning and that power that it confers while, in turn, excluding them from the normative conception of the human. This discourse and its social practices suggest that their vulnerability becomes misrecognised to the point of being constituted as the ‘unrecognizable’. For recognition of a life to take place, the naming of the life and its ontological status should happen. This limitation, in turn, produces systems that have intelligibility of their own which render certain lives un-­grievable. However, the discourse of dehumanisation does not necessarily produce physical violence, ‘but rather that there is a limit to discourse that establishes the limits of human intelligibility’ (Butler, 2004, p. 35). To appropriate this power requires renaming that which is named or appropriating the very named and possessing it. To use the word to name is to ‘bring something into existence and reclaiming of a word also constitutes a decisive aspect of the struggle’ (More, 2017, p. 46). This is key because the process of naming depends on ‘the existence of a life, a life worth noting, a life worth valuing and preserving, a life that qualifies for recognition’ (More, 2017, p. 46). Butler’s concern is that when lives are rendered precarious in this way when they are exposed to extreme conditions of suffering and vulnerability, our very understanding of social and human reality is altered, rendering some lives ‘unreal’. As she asks: ‘What is real? Whose lives are real? How might reality be remade? Those who are unreal have, in a sense, already suffered the violence of derealization’ (2004, p. 33). Blame and Political Responsibility The limit to this discourse of mourning—showing how the lives of miners have not been grieved in this context—continues on how other commentators focus on assigning responsibility to the political system and to some section of the political class. While this discourse of political responsibility highlights the problematic and symbiotic relations between capital and the ruling ANC, as well as issues of the revolving door, it further limits how the lives of these black miners cannot be marked and mourned. As the comments show:

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I think AMCU leadership needs to at least share the blame and take some responsibility. They started the mess and invited this violence which led to irreparable damage to our economy. Thousands of people lost their jobs. The economy had never recovered. Nobody except possibly AMCU leadership benefited from AMCU-inspired strikes.

This operates with the hegemonic notion of the liability model of responsibility which assigns personal responsibility to particular agents, such as Association of Mineworkers and Construction Union (AMCU), by demonstrating that their actions are as causally and directly connected to the outcomes of the protests and the events that accompanied them. However, by generally concealing these social events under the notion of violence, this description ideologically functions to depoliticise structural problems in the mining sector and reduces something large-scale, structural, and socio-historical, such as violence to microcosmic actions of AMCU. Thus, many of the problems in the mining sector, such as exploitative working conditions, low-wages, and violence collectively faced by the government, miners, unions, and capital, are large-scale structural problems. Yet, the concepts of responsibility that emerge from these discourses are most suited to issues of microcosmic interaction, privileging individual effects over group effects. This ignores the discourse of ‘political responsibility’ which requires the broader understanding of the political which refers to ‘something wider than what state institutions do’. This ‘refers to phenomena and movements of collective action, where people work together to form public works and institutions. The making of state institutions, and using them to enact collective goals, is often an important means of enacting political responsibility, but do not exhaust the concept or its organizational possibilities’ (Young, 2011, p. 245). Nonetheless, the discourse of personal responsibility continues in dominant forms in comments to the cartoon: I would really like to see Zapiro do one of the Sangoma giving the miners Muti to make them invincible to bullets when they attack the police with pangas. That would not suit the political narrative where the media and journalists do not apportion blame on the irresponsible miners and the fact that the very same miners murdered people the previous day.

Only AMCU should stand there. Go read and figure the truth of AMCU PLANS back then.

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Zapiro has forgotten one other force that created Marikana and that is the A.M.C.U. leader Joseph Mathunjwa who got the miners all riled up over a R12 500 basic wage.

Brought closer to the issues of mourning and grieving, the concern on these descriptions is not the lost lives themselves. Rather, it is on how the actions of these black miners, who have been characterised as unreasonable, and political actors such as the AMCU, obscuring the death of the miners. While these commentators legitimately expect AMCU to shoulder some responsibility, whether positive, or negative, ethical, or unethical, they continue with the blaming of the miners for their death, dehumanising them in the process. This is emphasised by the following comment: The police management of the day, all the way up to National Commissioner, are fully accountable and responsible and should be facing the music. That being said: We also still waiting for the Unions to come forward and claim responsibility for the 10 workers, security guards and policemen that were brutally assaulted and murdered in the days before the massacre. They are as much responsible for creating the climate of violence that led to the climax.

Considered in the context of the confrontation between the police and these miners, this may be regarded as an apolitical and ahistorical issue of violence, both at a discursive and physical level, explicitly constructing the miners as active agents who brought the violence to themselves. However, taken within the macro context of our colonial and apartheid past that produced racial inequality, and impaired citizenship of black miners and the nation’s systemic failure to address the exploitative working conditions of the mining industry that set the standards for the exploitation of African labour since the 1890s, these constructions limit how the lives of the miners can be marked and mourned, thereby rendering their lives ungrievable. These discourses not only limit how certain lives are made ‘unreal’ and erased from the category of the human through genocidal and oppressive practices (such as racist exploitative working conditions) but also operate to produce and maintain certain exclusionary conceptions of who counts as human and what can be considered as a grievable death. While less dominant, other commentators do recognise how the working conditions and political system have produced structures that presented significant constraints for the mine workers:

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The culprit here is Lonmin for exploiting their workforce...a little bit of better workplace culture and communication with their employees would have not given Unions such AMCU a window of opportunism. At the end of the day this kind of behaviour will continue and probably at some point become the norm. You cannot vote a corrupt government into power and the complain about them on a daily basis. The families of the murdered miners from Marikana were looking for someone responsible. Ramaphosa gave the initial order to quell the uprising to the police at whatever cost. He seems to have forgotten that he gave that order. He was the manager or top nut at the mine at the time.

Police Victims and the Blaming of Miners The discourses that call for political responsibility for the killing of the black miners in Marikana from the political class and mining company operate alongside other discourses that define the hierarchies of grieving and mourning. Instead of opening spaces for the mourning of these miners, as suggested by the cartoon, these highlight ideological contestations with regard to how these commentators refuse to enter into an ethical relation with these miners, rendering their lives ungrievable by seeking to mark the lives of the policemen who lost their lives. Because of how the lives of the miners have been denuded of any human teleology or presence, their grievability is concealed by the marking of the lives of the policemen and security agents as if these lives cannot be mourned, and marked together. As the comments emphasise: I am still waiting for the world, government, and media to acknowledge the security guards and policemen killed by this so called innocent miners in the days leading up to the Marikana “mass shooting“. For the world, government, and media to acknowledge the families of the security guards and policemen killed in the days leading up to the shooting. Surely those families were also left without breadwinners. How easy it is for people to forget how the police were attacked and had to defend themselves. I do not know what the purpose is to make a bunch of aggressive, armed miners look like angels. The blame is on all sides for this tragedy, but mostly with government. It is so easy to criticize from an arm-

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chair and a position of total inexperience on never having had to look death right in the eye.

How the actions of the miners have been hegemonically problematised and demonised recontextualise right-wing traditions of targeting the working class for demanding their rights. In this context, when your life has suffered the violence of derealisation, your claim for recognition as a human is treated as a problem and an inconvenience. This form of discourse treats the status quo and capitalist relations as normative and treats as deviant those, such as the miners, who intend to resist exploitation and marginalisation. This continues with the practice of justifying the killing of the miners by suggesting that their actions warrant the behaviour of the police and the company. As the comments emphasise, Sorry Zip [ Zapiro], you really missed this one badly. The police were absolutely justified in protecting themselves from a drug crazed mob who had already brutally murdered two (2) policemen and security guards. They mob was lucky more were not sent to hell. RIP for the police and security guards. Anyone enter into my property to do me or my family harm will enter the realm of his forefathers. How can anyone claim that their rights are different or better from the other person's rights? The lives of the 10 people killed by the miners a week before does not matter? Families of those 10 killed do not deserve justice? The pain of death is the same, it matters not how many deaths! Why do people keep forgetting these striking miners savagely killed mine security guards, killed other miners who refused to strike and killed 2 policemen? There was nothing peaceful about their strike. The police had no choice but to use maximum force.

Considering the context of mourning that defines the cartoon, these descriptions tend to see the mourning of the miners as some of inconvenience, and socially unacceptable, as seen through statements such as ‘I don’t know what the purpose is to make a bunch of aggressive, armed miners look like angels and ‘They mob was lucky more [because they] were not sent to hell.’ However, these discursive practices are resisted by the less dominant position that recognises and affirms the actions of the miners, such as staging a protest, as shown by the following user:

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“Are you people listening to yourselves,” “illegal strikes” when citizens gather in a unified voice the government has no right to declare it illegal. Have you all forgotten government is a civil service therefore making them civil servants, the way you people are going on anyone would swear that you are the servants to government, that’s not democracy but indeed a dictatorship?

In Butler’s words, ‘it is the means by which a life becomes, or fails to become, a publicly grievable life, an icon for national self-recognition, the means by which a life becomes noteworthy. As a result, we have to consider the obituary as an act of nation-building’ (2004, p. 33). From the point of racist discourses, this recontextualises the ideology of white supremacy, both currently and historically, that made the lives of black people publicly ungrievable, becoming an icon for national self-­recognition, as this scene as painted by the cartoon. This discourse also operates alongside the discourse of black conservatism which also functions to dehumanise black people and the underclass while, in turn, consolidating white supremacy. Thus, this produces and maintains class struggle that creates divisions among blacks by promoting the creation of black middle class and black working class while at the same time irreducibly expanding and intensifying the overall strength of white supremacy. Motivating Political Action The cartoon highlights discursive themes that implicate major economic, political, and cultural institutions, such as capital, the police, and the government in South Africa, that continue to reproduce the structural injustices against black miners through mining capitalism and neoliberal policies. This attempt to mark the lives of the black miners is worth remembering. However, in this context, the social structures have been systemically deprived of discourses of ethics that recognise their lives as markable and grievable. For this reason, ‘it is not just that a death is poorly marked, but that it is unmarkable. Such a death vanishes, not into explicit discourse, but in the ellipses by which public discourse proceeds. They cannot be mourned because they are always already lost or, rather, never “were,” and they must be killed, since they seem to live on, stubbornly, in this state of deadness’ (Butler, 2004, p. 35). Through combining Young and Butler within a CDA framework, the analysis of the comments to this cartoon shows that the Marikana

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massacre politically represents the outcomes of broader system of oppression under a neoliberal capitalist economic regime that continues to reproduce and maintain racial inequality and suffering by subjecting certain lives to the violence of derealisation, or social death. Under these social and political conditions in which violence is a way of life in the mining sector, black miners experience constraints as the result of the structure of domination which systemically determines power and the positions of different agents. This power depends on the position that miners occupy in these socioeconomic structures which then give agents, such as capital, the government, and the police, certain powers of a certain kind. To quote Butler (2004) more, ‘their means to secure self-defense are limited and in which [their] lives are not considered lives at all, and cannot be humanized or fit any dominant frame for human.’ Furthermore, the analysis demonstrates the comments hegemonically recontextualise the discourse of personal responsibility that employs the liability model which ‘holds a person liable for an action that caused a harm even if they did not intend or were unable to control the outcome, or holds a person or institution liable for a harm caused by someone under their command’ (Young, 2003, p. 12). This model is backward-looking in its purpose; it reviews the history of events in order to assign responsibility, often for the sake of exacting punishment or compensation. Assigning responsibility to some agents, in this model, finally usually also has the function of absolving other agents, who might have been candidates for fault. To render this person or group of persons guilty of a crime usually implies that others who were suspect are not guilty (ibid.). From the surface as well as the micro-level, the comments assign responsibility to the miners for the sake of punishing them from the colonial and conservative point of view that is allied to hegemonic powers such as the government, capital, and the police, as well as security forces. In this liability model of responsibility, ‘punishment, redress, or compensation aims to restore normality or to ‘make whole’ in relation to the baseline circumstance’ (Young, 2003, p. 18). Depoliticising to the structural injustice against the miners, the comments largely suggest that the miners are guilty of perpetrating ‘wrongful actions’, such as arming themselves, and protesting against their low-wages and brutal working conditions, as well as their death, to absolve the police, the government, and capital whose actions contributed to the Marikana massacre from bearing responsibility for the death of the miners, security, and the police. These comments legitimise the status quo while affirming, trivialising, and depoliticising the

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rights of miners, thereby recontextualising the conservative and racist discourses. More shockingly, they suggest that the miners cannot be mourned because their ‘wrongful actions’ have erased them from the horizon of ethics. Through this logic, miners are ‘not persons, or are not considered to be the kind of beings with whom one can enter into an ethical relation’, and have been excluded from conceptions of who is normatively human (Butler, 2004, p. 78). However, at a macro-level, considering that political context of our colonial and apartheid past that subjected miners to the violence of derealisation, these discourses continue with their dehumanisation, as well as affirming and reproducing their social death, because of their position in the status quo as the underclass, as the nation has systemically failed to transform the sector in the face of an unaccountable economic system that continues to produce racial inequality while leaving those of that past untouched. Under these social and political conditions, ‘violence against miners who are already not quite living, that is, living in a state of suspension between life and death, leaves a mark that is no mark. There will be no public act of grieving’ (Butler 2004, p. 36). Hence, the hegemonic, and right-wing discourses continue to question their lives and humanity on Facebook. Further, hegemonic as are they, these discourses of personal responsibility which also prevent the Facebook actors from mourning the miners block the former from politically envisioning more emancipatory institutions and practices of conceiving what counts as human and what is a grievable life. In their conservative nature, these discourses call for personal responsibility over macro-scale structural problems, giving ‘primacy to near effects over remote effects, to individual effects over group effects, and to people’s positive actions more than what they have failed to do’ (Young, 2003, p. 8). However, this liability model of responsibility is not sufficient for examining and conceiving ‘the relationship of individual actors to large scale social processes and structural injustices’ (Young, 2003, p. 24). At a discursive level, this maintains and reproduces social relations of power by blocking the link between the personal and the political as well as failing to implicate agents, such as the government and capital in the effects of structural injustices because they participate in the production and reproduction of structures of domination and oppression. This oppresses the miners, as well as other agents, that are expected to bear personal responsibility for large-scale structural injustices while absolving

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the government, capital, and police. The combination of the concepts of mourning and political responsibility within CDA fundamentally helps explain the structural relationships of dominance, discrimination, power, and control as manifested in discourse of mourning and personal responsibility.

Conclusion This chapter has illustrated how public commentaries on cartoons can illuminate diverse ways ordinary people engage with political texts, especially those with public interests. As shown in this chapter, commentaries on cartoons can potentially raise serious political questions about who counts as human and what makes for a grievable life in South Africa in which violence is a way of life, and the means to secure self-defence are limited and in which ‘[c]ertain lives are not considered lives at all, they cannot be humanized … they cannot fit any dominant frame for human’ (Butler, 2004, p.  34). In these conditions, ‘certain lives will be highly protected, and the abrogation of their claims to sanctity will be sufficient to mobilize the forces of war. Other lives will not find such fast and furious support and will not even qualify as grievable’ (Butler, 2004). This analysis is thus important as it contributes to scholarly debates on the importance of combining the macro with the micro in the analysis of texts. This expands the work of Dodds (2010), Hammett (2010), and Labuschagne (2011) who conduct macro-level analyses that illustrate how Zapiro engaged with issues of constitutionalism, geopolitics, and media freedom. This intellectualisation is central because racism fundamentally concerns the doubting of those on the margins of the economic divide. European colonial racism constructs the false superiority of white identity precisely through the Othering of Africans as irrational, savage, animal-like, wild (‘cheeky’), uncivilised, and incapable of self-government.

References Butler, J. (2004). Precarious life: the powers go mourning and violence. Verso, New York. Conradie, M., Brokensha, S., & Pretorius, M. (2012). No small irony: A discourse analysis of Zapiro’s 2010 World Cup cartoons. Language Matters: Studies in the Languages of Africa, 43(1), 39–59.

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CHAPTER 5

Humour, Politics and Mnangagwa’s Presidency: An Analysis of Readers’ Comments in Online News Websites Bhekizulu Bethaphi Tshuma, Lungile A. Tshuma, and Nonhlanhla Ndlovu

Introduction In 2016, the then vice president of Zimbabwe who later became president after a coup in 2017, Emmerson Mnangagwa, addressing a ZANU PF rally in Chiredzi, gave a humour-laden speech stating his party will rule forever. Part of his speech said: Kana ukarota nyika yino ichatongwi neZANU PF, muka ubike doro uti midzimu yandirasa isandipe hope dzakadai (If you dream of this country being ruled by another party other than ZANU PF, wake up and brew beer and appease your ancestors for giving you

B. B. Tshuma (*) University of Free State, Bloemfontein, South Africa L. A. Tshuma University of Johannesburg, Johannesburg, South Africa N. Ndlovu Rhodes University, Makhanda, South Africa © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 S. Mpofu (ed.), The Politics of Laughter in the Social Media Age, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-81969-9_5

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such nightmares). His speech became popular and to some extent arguably launched him as a humorous political figure. Parenthetically, it is argued that unlike his predecessor the late Robert Mugabe, Mnangagwa has never been a prolific orator. He is largely regarded as a behind the scenes schemer and strategist brutal at vanquishing his political adversaries. But in the aftermath of the November 2017 military coup, he was moved from behind the scenes to the front seat in the public platform. Still, Mnangagwa has continued to dole out humour-laden speeches that have sparked debate and split public opinion, especially on social networking sites such as WhatsApp and Twitter. His humorous statements come against a background of hate and trauma that reign supreme in Zimbabwe. Incidents such as the Gukurahundi genocide which left more than 20,000 isiNdebele speaking people killed, the chaotic land reform programme of 2000, Operation Murambatsvina, and the violent elections of 2008 show that the country is dominated by hate as the aforementioned issues remain unresolved (Tshuma & Ndlovu, 2020; Mpofu, 2015; Sachikonye, 2011). In this chapter, we examine the interpretation and meanings audiences derive from Mnangagwa’s humour-laden speeches as reported on news sites such as NewZimbabwe.com and Nehanda Radio. We juxtapose this within the context of historical, social, political and economic decay prevailing in Zimbabwe. Broadly, the study is aimed at appreciating issues of relevance and presidential etiquette of Mnangagwa’s humorous speeches as the first citizen of Zimbabwe. Through a reception analysis of Mnangagwa’s speeches, we argue that people appropriate them to speak to their conditions and also to ‘speak back truth to power’. We are concerned with how these comical speeches are ‘read’ at the moment of consumption and how they acquire a new lease of life when they are then circulated through various social media platforms. We therefore offer a nuanced reading of Mnangagwa’s jokes in this space that we consider as an agonistic public sphere, a space of conflict and contestation, in which Mnangagwa’s humour is used as a weapon at their disposal. We argue that when people speak of their daily experiences in relation to Mnangagwa’s constructions of his image and the ‘second republic’, they begin to formulate strategies for social change in Zimbabwe’s postcolonial imaginary. This study is carried out within an expansive context of media narratives that have been created from some of Mnangagwa’s popular humorous speeches. The following are some of the speeches that have sparked controversy in the mainstream media and they will be used as cases in point.

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First, his speech, ‘Health inspectors for cockroaches’ in March 2020, uttered at a national clean-up event in Masvingo, makes an important case: Wash the dishes after supper to prevent an infestation of cockroaches in your homes. There will come a time when we will send village inspectors to check for cockroaches in your homes. If we find a home with cockroaches, we will start by issuing a warning. But eventually we will arrest you if cockroaches are found in your home. (Ndoro, 2020a)

The media was quick to relate it with the past noting that this was not the first time Mnangagwa had used cockroaches as a figure of speech. Media narratives referred to the cockroach metaphor Mnangagwa made after independence describing suspected dissidents in the Matabeleland region and what the government would do to them with the outcome being a genocide commonly referred to as Gukurahundi (Ndlovu, 2018). In another speech, ‘State of the art mortuary in Kwekwe’, March 2020, when Mnangagwa was opening a mortuary at a hospital in Masvingo, he said: When I was a Member of Parliament for Kwekwe, I constructed a state-of-­ the-art mortuary with 12 bays, very cool inside. So I offered a prize to the first family to bring their deceased relative to that mortuary. As it happened, someone had already died at the hospital, so that family won the prize. In this mortuary, there are six bays and they are very cool! (Ndoro, 2020a)

Again, the media raised concern over Mnangagwa’s apparent pleasure with death, which they opined, perhaps reflected his character (Ndoro, 2020a). The third clip, ‘Avoid meat, eat vegetables: Mnangagwa tells hungry crowd’ (January 2020) relates to an incident where Mnangagwa urged Zimbabweans to shun meat and eat vegetables because they are healthy. He made this speech in Harare against soaring prices of beef thus telling citizens to go for ‘cheap’ vegetables. Lastly, this paper makes reference to ‘Mnangagwa likens difficult Chamisa to Satan’ speech, uttered at a press briefing during the Zimbabwe, South Africa Bi-National Commission (BNC) in Harare in 2019. This related to MDC-Alliance President Nelson Chamisa’s refusal to join talks with ZANU PF leaders. Mnangagwa said: We will not be swayed by negative forces because even the Lord upstairs was not able to keep His house in order. He had Satan. So these things happen but he still remains there as the creator. (Machaya, 2019)

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Concerning the above, mainstream media discourses have depicted Mnangagwa as being fond of dominance by equating himself to God. Given these media sentiments about Mnangagwa’s humour-loaded speeches, this paper takes an audience approach through an analysis of online viewers’ comments on Mnangagwa’s selected humorous speeches that are available on selected online news sites. Our position is informed by the dearth of literature on the reception of satire and humour, especially in the Global South where this study is located, as most studies have been analysing memes and humour as produced by people, not as a direct reception of sentiments by those in power. This study thus critiques Mnangagwa’s humorous speeches as ‘the privileged language through which power speaks, acts, coerces’ (Mbembe, 2001, p.  123). We argue that Mnangagwa performs power through his speeches and thus by analysing the responses to his speeches we establish a concern with how the public responds to his apparent political manoeuvres, calculated or otherwise, to legitimise or delegitimise his rule. We argue that this space where these responses manifest can be considered an agonistic public sphere, that space in which the internet functions as a site of discursive struggle and conflict (Dahlberg, 2007; Mouffe, 1999).

Humour Within a Crisis in the Global South Studies on humour have been steadily making their mark in academic inquiry over the years. These typically focus on the discursive use of humour and satire in African societies to critique political affairs. This study builds on several studies that have been conducted in relation to humour and politics in Zimbabwe. Willems (2011) argues that popular humour and rumour function as strategies of resistance to state power. In another study, she theorises postcolonial laughter as demonstrated through comic strips as part of coping mechanisms, not only by challenging those in power but also through which ‘those subject to power mock their own powerlessness and lack of agency in the face of a system that they perceive as immutable’ (Willems, 2010, p.  126). Similarly, Manganga’s (2012) study into the use of jokes and mobile telephony concludes that political jokes are used to negotiate or subvert state power in view of the restrictive ‘mediascape’ in Zimbabwe. Manganga particularly notes how the jokes were used as a way of coping with the ‘crisis’ such that by telling jokes, people would be trying to ‘kill time’ in the fuel, bank or bread queues. It should be noted that these studies were conducted during the time that

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Zimbabwe was emerging from a deepening crisis period between 1997 and 2008 (Makina, 2010, p. 102), that is also described as the country’s ‘lost decade’ (Sachikonye, 2011). Zimbabwe is a country primarily defined by its crisis but there are multifarious accounts as to its genesis (see Raftopoulos, 2013; Sachikonye, 2011; Muzondidya, 2013; Gaidzanwa, 2015). Broadly speaking, from a human rights perspective Zimbabwe is characterised as having no respect for the rule of law, human rights and democracy whilst the ruling party advances a narrative that depicts Zimbabwe as caught up in a perpetual struggle against colonialism (Christiansen, 2005). To this end, Zimbabwe has been constituted as ‘a site for contestations between decolonisation values of social and economic justice vis-à-vis the post-Cold War universal claims of good governance, human rights and liberal democracy’ (Ndlovu-­ Gatsheni, 2013, pp. 150–151). While there was arguably a period of some stability between 2009 and 2013 owing to the Global Political Agreement (GPA), which saw a Government of National Unity being inaugurated for the first time, the economy began to slowly backslide when ZANU-PF won a landslide victory in a highly contested 2013 election which firmly re-established it as the only party in power once again. The introduction of the bond notes into the multi-currency system as a way of averting the cash shortages in 2016, a pseudo-currency, marked the beginning of yet another economic crisis. The scarce US Dollar and the devaluation of the bond note triggered inflation. It is in this milieu that current president Emmerson Mnangagwa came into power in November 2017, through a military coup, and found himself in a crisis of legitimacy. He thus embarked on a populist narrative to relexicalise Zimbabwe as a ‘Second Republic’ which, by implication, stands binarily opposed to Mugabe’s ‘First Republic’. Paradoxically, he was all along part of this government that he now was trying to expurgate. Offering an African perspective on the study of humour, Obadare’s (2009) study demonstrates how jokes served a double function; as a tool for the ordinary people to subvert state power and also to laugh at themselves. Similarly, studies in South Africa have also noted the role of stand-up comedy in critiquing social and political institutions (Kallstig & Death, 2020; Musila, 2014). In the Zimbabwean context, whilst there are satirical studies which focused on the political figure of the late Mugabe (Siziba & Ncube, 2015; Nyambi, 2018), there is a gap in the literature pertaining to the political signification of Mnangagwa, perhaps owing to his recent rise to power. Siziba and Ncube’s study focused on the infamous fall of

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Mugabe and traced how it went viral on social media giving people a chance to tear down, in jest, the hitherto indefatigable figure of Mugabe and his hold on power for over three decades. In the same vein, Nyambi’s study critiques the use of nicknames as signalling the state of political contestations in Zimbabwe. This study contributes meaningfully to this growing area of research by critically exploring the reception of Mnangagwa’s speeches. As such we interrogate the responses to Mnangagwa’s humour as having the potential to illuminate alternative identities and discourses in a largely dissatisfied society.

Theoretical Framework This paper is informed by Bakhtin’s carnivalist and reception theories. The carnivalist theory is crucial in that it helps us understand the role of satire and humour in politics. An entry point to this discussion is an assertion by Orwell (1968, p. 284) that ‘every joke is a tiny revolution’ which broadly means that humour is inherently political as it ‘disrupts’ and ‘threatens’ the status quo. The carnivalist theory as propounded by Bakhtin (1984) is characterised by four key elements: eccentricity, profanities, suspension of hierarchies and an emotional bond. On eccentricity, the carnival allows for an unusual or odd behaviour to be exhibited, as there will be no shame in the manner in which the persons have conducted themselves (Torn, 2012; Thompson, 1993). Profanities are also legalised in the carnival’s obscene imagery and language, blasphemies and parodies—‘the carnival is not afraid of the arsehole, the prick or cunt’ (Presdee & Carver, 2000, p. 39), as the ‘carnival profanities hold a mirror to society, reflecting its inequalities and injustices: putting forth an argument by inverting and critiquing structured life’ (O’Sullivan, 2016, p. 1038). The suspension of hierarchies disrupts the social order and allows for ordinary people to have a ‘conversation’ with the power as all ‘participants become equal’. The latter leads to an ‘emotional bond’ inspired by free thoughts as the carnival brings everyone together, ‘high and low, sacred and profane, the wise and the stupid, through ridicule, mockery, and satire’ (O’Sullivan, 2016, p. 1038). With our focus being the reception of humour in the social media, this study argues that the social platforms enable the breaking down of barriers, overcoming power inequalities and hierarchies through free interactions. Taking a leaf from the carnivalist theory, the dethroning of the king through suspension of power hierarchies enables ordinary people to respond back to the elite in a way that

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they could not do in formal platforms. Hence, their response (humorous as well) ‘subverts, deconstructs, and engages with the state’ (Obadare, 2009, p.  241). Accordingly, we postulate that people’s responses to Mnangagwa’s humorous comments can be diverse, that is, both formal and informal language which include insults, profanities and the grotesque. All such comments are made possible by the new media technologies that provide a platform for ‘parody and pastiche [which] are vital forms of speaking out and resistance’ (Aaron & Hess, 2009, p. 429). In short, the study regards humour as the ‘weapon of the weak’ (Scott, 1985) and an important weapon in the armoury of civil society against perceived state high handedness (Obadare, 2009, p. 244). The current chapter further taps from reception studies to understand the encoding and decoding of Mnangagwa’s humour, as we argue that his utterances are not ‘closed’, instead, they are open to many interpretations. Williams (2003, p. 190) contends that ‘audiences understand media texts differently and this is determined by individual, social and cultural factors’. This observation shows that people are bound to interpret Mnangagwa’s humorous messages differently influenced by different factors. Hence, reception studies put emphasis on the ‘power of audiences, emanating from their critical and creative abilities, to resist the media’ (Williams, 2003, p. 201). In capturing different perspectives that people might have on a text, Hall (1980) developed a model where he demonstrates that there are three types of readings that emanate from any media text: the dominant, negotiated and oppositional. Dominant reading is when a reader of the media message takes its meaning as it is, right from its producer, and interprets it the same way as the producer intended while in oppositional reading, the reader completely throws away the encoded meaning intended by the texts because of the influence from a number of factors and decodes the message differently (Hall, 1980). In other words, as the audiences interpret the message they would be in complete disagreement with the dominant reading (Livingstone, 1998). The negotiated reading is when the reader neither takes the meaning of the message as encoded nor discards it, but he or she accepts some of the things in the message at the same time rejecting what is not necessary (Hall, 1980). The underlying message from Hall’s model is that while the elite encode certain ideologies as they produce a text or in this case, utter sentiments that they deem as humorous, audiences who then decode that text ‘make their own text’ (Fiske, 1987, p. 32), as the text assumes a new life soon after leaving the production economy, that is, after being encoded by

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Mnangagwa. Taking into consideration the ongoing crises that are in Zimbabwe, the study argues, people are bound to read the humorous texts differently as influenced by their socio-political and economic contexts. The jobless, victims of state torture and civil servants who are earning paltry salaries are likely to be associated with oppositional reading, while those who are sympathetic to the regime are bound to engage in dominant reading. Such a difference in reading the text shows that indeed, at the point of sale the commodity (humourous text) exhausts its role in the distribution economy, but begins its work in the cultural economy hence making the object of analysis not the products or the system that distributes but specific users who consume the product. (Fiske, 1987, 35)

The following section addresses the methodology used in this chapter.

Methodology This chapter is a qualitative reception of four of Mnangagwa’s widely circulated speeches available on popular online news websites, that is, NewZimbabwe.com and Nehanda Radio. The period of this study is between March 2019 and August 2020, when these speeches and the resultant comments were made. NewZimbabwe.com and Nehanda Radio websites were selected because they carried most of Mnangagwa’s humorous speeches and further publicised them on their social media pages. These clips were retrieved through archival research, that is, through a keyword search ‘Mnangagwa + Popular speeches’. As a result, we managed to identify the following video clips that exhibited popularity based on the number of views and comments. Concerning comments, we observed that viewers appeared to be relating broader historical, social, economic and political issues obtaining in the country such Gukurahundi, human rights violations and poor governance among others. Thus, these issues constitute some of the criterion which were used to select readers’ comments for analysis. On this point, we selected clips with more than 100 comments so as to harvest a variety of views. We, therefore, purposively sampled clips of Mnangagwa titled ‘Avoid meat, eat vegetables: Mnangagwa tells hungry crowd’ (Ndoro, 2020a), ‘State of the art mortuary in Kwekwe’ (ibid.), ‘Mnangagwa likens Chamisa to Satan’ (Machaya, 2019) and ‘Health inspectors for cockroaches’ (Ndoro, 2020b).

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The next step, therefore, involved delving into viewers’ comments to unpack the meanings they connoted from these four popular videos. Further, through a preliminary reading of the viewers’ comments, we discovered trends which enabled us to create thematic categories for content analysis and subsequent data presentation. The preliminary reading enabled us to decode the sort of issues that the majority of viewers tended to associate Mnangagwa’s speeches with. Broadly, emerging issues about Mnangagwa’s humour-laden speeches include his role in Gukurahundi and the governance crisis in Zimbabwe due to toxic politics. As such, the following thematic categories emerged from our reading of the viewers’ comments: Of the Gukurahundi ghost and cockroaches: Humour and Mnangagwa’s dark past, Varakashi, insults and power: contestation over Mnangagwa’s humour and insults as weapons of the oppressed. Qualitative content analysis was deployed as an analytic tool on purposively selected comments that speak to the objectives of the study. There are ethical considerations that have to be made in internet research in order to protect the identity of participants in discussions. While there is no obligation to obtain consent to use content that is in the public domain for research such as these sites in our study (Sveningsson, 2009; Ess & AoIR, 2002), we opted for pseudonyms to conceal people’s identities in order to make sure that we ‘do no harm’ (Markham & Buchanan, 2012).

Findings and Discussion Of the Gukurahundi Ghost and Cockroaches: Humour and Mnangagwa’s Dark Past While addressing people after a clean-up campaign at Matizha Business Centre in Gutu−Masvingo, Mnangagwa threatened to arrest people who would be found with cockroaches in their homes. However, his ‘dark humour’ invoked memories of the Gukurahundi genocide where he once called the isiNdebele speaking people cockroaches that would be dealt with by the use of a pesticide called DDT. Gukurahundi is a Shona term translated: ‘the rain that washes away the chaff from the last harvest, before the spring rains’ (CCJP & LRF, 1997, p. xiii). Within the Zimbabwean context, Gukurahundi denotes state-orchestrated massacres committed against predominantly isiNdebele-speaking people in Matabeleland and Midlands provinces between 1983 and 1987 (Tshuma & Ndlovu, 2020). Mnangagwa has been implicated in the genocide as he was the Minister of

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State Security at the time and he also led a barrage of vitriol in calling isiNdebele speaking people and ZAPU cockroaches. Reporting at a rally in Victoria Falls in 1983, the state-controlled Chronicle newspaper indicated that Emmerson Mnangagwa delivered a threat, using language that would be echoed 11 years later by the perpetrators of the Rwandan genocide: Likening the dissidents to cockroaches and bugs, the minister said the bandit menace had reached such epidemic proportion that the government had to bring ‘DDT’ [pesticide] to get rid of the bandits (The Chronicle, March 5, 1983, 1)

The above epigraph was conjured by audiences who dismissed Mnangagwa’s utterances as a joke. Instead they were quick to invoke memories of the genocide and used such recollections to support their claim. Commenters argued that the cockroaches referred to; represent the opposition or any voices of dissent. One discussant, Cde KakaNdande,said ‘I am not surprised esp(ecially) with his Gukurahundi background’ and as such invoking Gukurahundi memories. This is further raised by another interlocutor, Calton Diliza Hlongwane who indicated that ‘Some will be butchered soon. In 1982 he saw the same cockroaches in Matabeleland, when his demon arises it mixes up humans to cockroaches’ while, WaMavhunga Kodzwa argued that ‘these are not cockroaches in literal meaning … he is talking of eliminating opposition supporters’. Taking into account that Mnangagwa made the remarks while leading a clean-up campaign and with his speech designed to promote good hygiene, audiences appropriated it in a way which suits their needs and desires as informed by their socio-cultural and political backgrounds. Such a move by respondents to assign the text their own meaning shows that audiences are active consumers who ‘make their own text’ (Fiske, 1987, p. 32). This is consistent with Hall’s (1980) theory which states that audiences are bound to make an oppositional reading, by completely ignoring the encoded message as sent by the producer, due to a number of factors. While others were invoking memories of the Gukurahundi genocide, some respondents likened his utterances to the Rwandan genocide where Tutsis were called cockroaches (Cieplak, 2017). Therefore, Mnangagwa is seen as a murderer willing to employ the same tactics used in butchering the Tutsis. Thus, people were being warned to be careful lest they be killed or some form of harm being inflicted on them. Some respondents likened Mnangagwa to Hitler with Godie Mavhunga urged to ‘be very afraid’ with

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those thinking that he was speaking of real cockroaches called to ‘read about Hitler, Mobutu or more recently, the Rwandan Genocide. Be afraid’. Moreso, making reference to the movie Hotel Rwanda, respondents argued that ‘another Gukurahundi is coming’ with a comment from, JF Mhute saying: Genocide might be on the way. This man is using metaphorical language. “Mapete” (cockroaches) is referring to people who are not Pfeerorists (word for people who don’t support Mnangagwa’s ZANU-PF party). Watch out. Yava ngozi yevanhu vaakaponda kubva kare kare (this is now evil supernatural power being invoked by people whom Mnangagwa killed in the past).

Bearing in mind that the nation-state has been muzzling voices of dissent and also that discussing Gukurahundi genocide is considered criminal (Mpofu, 2015, 2019), people are using social media to air their views. Thus, Mnangagwa’s jokes become a ‘moment of revolution’ where people use them to disrupt the status quo and expose its disrespect for human rights with the fear that his utterances show that ‘something brewing’. The underlying message or reading of the text by audiences is their view of Mnangagwa as evil and having necrophilic tendencies—a fascination with dead bodies (Muchemwa, 2010). One commenter, Ted Gariraneko from New Zimbabwe.com argued: ‘Here we have a whole President likening himself to God and the opposition to Satan!! What are the implications to the nation. Last time the whole tribe was labeled cockroaches and we know what followed  - Gukurahundi!!!! This Guy is evil’. Such utterances are in line with the carnivalist theory where there is a suspension of hierarchies with people or citizens being able to speak back to power in an informal way, they deconstruct and subvert the state in a way they could not do in a formal way (Obadare, 2009). Varakashi, Insults and Power: Contestation over Mnangagwa’s Humour True to Mnangagwa’s prodding to ‘pindai mu social media imomo, muvarakashe’—hence the nickname varakashi—(go on social media as well and attack them), Mnangagwa’s supporters clearly live up to this instruction as attested by their presence on social media platforms attacking and opposing anti-Mnangagwa sentiments. For example, in response to the cockroaches story carried by Nehanda Radio, Nicky Bennettone of

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Mnangagwa’s supporters said ‘citizens can’t keep their places clean then claim that the government is failing? 2030 ED achenge aripo’ (will still be in power). This sarcastic response attracts criticism but varakashi, unmoved, insist sickness is caused by filthy surroundings. Nicky Bennett added: ‘thumbs up for the president’ while emphasising that ‘it’s a mere joke to promote hygiene’. The responses are strategic in order to dispel the real connotations of the President’s metaphorical reference of cockroaches as argued in the previous section and hence promote a dominant reading of a humorous President. This serves the purpose of constructing a humane figure endeared to the nation. However, taking an oppositional reading, those who do not support Mnangagwa construct him as un-presidential and idiotic. In fact, in their responses, they also employ humour to counter his, which serves to delegitimise the presidency. They suggest that he has failed his duties to the extent that he has decided to tackle cockroaches instead. Due to this, he is nicknamed Scarfmore Mapete, a derisive play on his signature scarf and his seeming obsession with mere cockroaches in this instance. This is consistent with Nyambi’s (2018) argument that nicknaming is a complex socio-­ cultural act that reveals the state of political contestations in Zimbabwe. Therefore, the name calling should be understood within the context of general displeasure towards the figure of Mnangagwa as a person which stems from his failure to resuscitate the economy and deliver on his promise for a better life for Zimbabweans. Consequently, those opposed to his rule on NewZimbabwe.com like Owen Chimweta Nyabepu find it justified to call him ‘mad’, a ‘cartoon character’, noting that there is a void in leadership which Henry Chafa indicates is evidenced by his ‘shallow’ speeches that possibly stem from ‘the effect of drugs to neutralize ice cream poisoning’. This is yet another political play on his survival from a poisoning attempt by political rivals before his presidency. As Fiske (1987) argues, audiences always make meaning depending on their socio-cultural context hence the full effect of this last comment can be appreciated within the context of factional fights of ZANU-PF that started before the coup and have marred the leadership of the party ever since. In another clip on NewZimbabwe.com where opposition leader Nelson Chamisa is labelled a ‘Satanist’ for refusing to have talks with Mnangagwa, more of the same scenario obtains with name calling from both sides when arguments get heated. In actual fact, this tug of war between the non-­ supporters of Mnangagwa and vakarashi obtains across all social media

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platforms in which there are reports on the President’s speeches. It is evidence of the deeply wounded state of Zimbabwe and constitutes a space where citizens can safely register their displeasure. This has been made possible by the affordances of the internet where users can use pseudonyms in order to remain anonymous and therefore not hold back in criticising political rivals even though discussions often turn vulgar. We argue that like his predecessor Mugabe, Mnangagwa continues to mysteriously hold on to power in the face of overwhelming opposition from ordinary citizens, and this owes, albeit in part, to the varakashi who constantly assert and re-assert a narrative that legitimates his rule. However, this is always contested at the moment of reception as audiences, in decoding Mnangagwa’s humour, also dissect Mnangagwa’s personhood and Presidency and refuse to be interpellated as patriotic subjects in hopes for achieving social and political change. Insults as Weapons of the Oppressed Political messages and engagements routinely produce rude talk and insults. However, insults and invective are common rhetorical practices in political discourses, as such, they are always situational and contestable (Sobieraj & Berry, 2011). Content analysis deployed in this study revealed that perhaps owing to frustration and disappointment with Mnangagwa’s dry jokes, some of the viewers resorted to insults as a form of expression. Our results illustrate very clearly that insults (incivility) are a common feature of public discussions. Of the varieties of incivility and insults we examined, name-calling was the most common and this was not limited to a few individuals but rather was widely distributed across many different commenters. While some scholars find invective language and insults in online discussions disappointing (Sinopoli, 1995; Massaro & Stryker, 2012), this paper takes a sympathetic stance towards the trend in that they are seen as a form of expression for the fed up and marginalised groups. As such, a reading of the insults-laden comments revealed anger, fears, passions, and doubts towards Mnangagwa as a President. Commenting on Mnangagwa’s joke that he will soon order the arrest of people found with cockroaches in the homes, one commenter on Nehanda Radio, Stephen Zvinairo wrote: This idiot anotaura nemadimikira! Zvese zvaanotaura is about, kusunga and killing! (This idiot talks using idioms. Everything he says is about arresting and killing.) Another commenter, Mphilisi Ndlovu

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responding to Mnangagwa’s speech on NewZimbabwe.com that people should shun meat and eat vegetables added: Sithenga ngemali yakho leyo nyama yini uhluleka ukufaka imali emabhanga abantu bakho ba scattered all over the world kodwa ubusy ngama fruit and veg Mr. trump pliz help us kill this shit man (Do we buy meat with your money? You are failing ensure there is money at the banks, your people are scattered all over world yet you are busy talking about vegetables. Mr. (Donald) Trump please help us kill this shit man).

In view of the above, it can be argued that insults are a powerful tool for the oppressed to express and vent out their frustration. According to Schudson (1997), insults as a form of incivility exhibit passionate and emotional responses for those seeking dramatic social or political change. Further, insults are also hailed as an act of democracy by allowing people to withdraw from civility and show their ambitions within a given content (ibid). In this instance, Mnangagwa’s speeches are received within a context of a troubled economic environment where ordinary citizens are failing to make ends meet due to an increasingly biting economy. Furthermore, insults in political discourses are seen as having some modest positive consequences. Coe et  al. (2014) note that uncivil and insult-laden comments are more likely to include statistics as evidence. Rather, the considerable incivility present in online discussions has clear factors associated with it and, in many cases, well-defined targets (Santana, 2014). Our findings also confirm that although a number of discussants resorted to insulting Mnangagwa, they also provided evidence in form of context that in a way justified their actions. For instance, a commenter, Bro Midjeck responding to the ‘shun meat and eat vegetables video’ which appeared on Nehanda Radio said: Iye achidya mazondo ari mu private jet (but he is eating hooves in a private jet). This guy is just a wizard. Another respondent on Nehanda Radio, Ronnie Ngwenya responding to Mnangagwa’s cockroaches speech said: ‘Failing his duties he decided to tackle Cockroaches. Mbwa (dog)’. The two responses above show that the insults are made within a particular context. In the first instance, the commenter refers to an incident where Mnangagwa was pictured in a private jet eating cow hooves. We also argue that insult-laden comments tend to submit evidence by providing context to support their actions. Even though insults may be with emotion, it is not the case that they are necessarily irrational. Consequently, it would be unwise to dismiss insulting

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comments as mere mindless reactions driven solely by emotion. The mere fact that people are responding at all could be considered beneficial to public discourse as a sign of increased participation (Coe et al., 2014). Finally, insults are a mechanism of breaking away from social control. For this reason, Brooks and Geer (2007) argue that insults should be treated as a rejection of the leader-class claims to respect, a demand that leader-class types start looking hard at themselves. Similarly, insults as a form of expression can serve as an assertion of identity and power by those who are being marginalised by those in power (Murray, 1993). As a result, invective has been a primary weapon of the oppressed to speak to power. It can also act as an expression of outrage against evils such as corruption, incompetence, and suppression, which exist on a scale and of a kind that rupture the assumptions of the social order. For instance, Shumbex Gowore, another commenter, posted on Nehanda Radio saying: This is what happens if people just pick a moron and mental patient from the jungle who only knows how to hold a gun. To be honest The Almighty God has a long time ago turned his back to my poor Country. God can’t shower his blessing to a land whose leadership is so evil and heinous. Just look in S.A (South Africa) it’s raining cats and dogs but if you just cross Limpopo it’s dry and dams are drying up. When men sin against God nature goes to the side of God.

We close by arguing that as the oppressed resort to insults, they tend to show passion and reasoning behind their comments. We also submit that while these insults in online paces have promoted incivility and bred hatred toward the figure of the presidency, they have also permitted discussions that use evidence with well-defined targets within a relevant context. In view of the above, we argue that humour, lays bare the social, political and ethnic contestations and challenges that riddle Mnangagwa’s presidency. We argue that when people speak of their daily experiences in relation to Mnangawa’s constructions of his image and the ‘second republic’, we can begin to formulate strategies for social change in Zimbabwe’s postcolonial imaginary. While Mnangagwa made numerous humour-laden speeches, at the point of reception, commenters found them in bad taste owing to their historical experiences. Readers were quick to refer to the Gukurahundi genocide in which Mnangagwa is said to have played a major role. We however argue that while most readers viewed the jokes in bad taste, some of the readers treated them as pure satire to be read within that

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context. They have used online spaces as an agonistic sphere to challenge Mnangagwa through his jokes. A potential limitation to our study is that it purely analysed readers’ comments, from the context of reception, and hence there was less engagement with critical discourse analysis of the actual video clips. We recommend that further studies could also carry out visual analysis in order to deconstruct the various discourses in the visuals, as they are coded with various signs that aid in meaning-making. Nevertheless, our study makes important inroads in understanding the power relations at play as Mnangagwa keeps enforcing his hegemony through veiled attempts, by employing humour, over a largely displeased populace, whose almost palpable hatred and disrespect for Mnangagwa seeps through the comments they make in response to his speeches.

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CHAPTER 6

This Is a Laughing Matter: Social Media as a Sphere of Trolling Power in Malawi and Zimbabwe Albert Sharra and Trust Matsilele

Introduction This chapter investigates how ‘dissidents’ or ‘enemies of the state’ in Malawi and Zimbabwe use humour on social media to create hate and discredit those in power. The term dissident is key to this study and we are focusing on dissidents who use social media to fight those in authority. We call them social media dissidents (See Matsilele, 2019; Matsilele & Ruhanya, 2020; Mpofu & Matsilele, 2020). General scholarship about dissidence tends to categorise many interminably varied actions under the wide spectrum of dissidence, rendering opaque strict identification of what counts and does not count as dissidence (Matsilele, 2019, 2018; Mutsvairo, 2016; Matsilele & Ruhanya, 2020). Conceptually, the strict

A. Sharra (*) University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa T. Matsilele Cape Peninsula University of Technology, Cape Town, South Africa © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 S. Mpofu (ed.), The Politics of Laughter in the Social Media Age, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-81969-9_6

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identification of a dissident is complicated by the fact that one man’s dissident might be another man’s criminal, saboteur, or terrorist (Matsilele, 2019). Similarly, one man’s dissident can be another man’s freedom fighter. In this study, we use the term social media dissident to mean individuals who are labelled enemies of the state by government officials for using social media to fight its policies. Furthermore, evidence suggests that dissidence is amorphous and can target whoever it will: individuals, states, or corporations. Should the category of dissident be confined only to individuals and groups fighting the state or should it also include non-­ state targets, such as those targeting corporate capital? It is this very considerable width of the spectrum of dissidence that makes taxonomisation and categorisation so difficult. Adding to the complexity is the further fact that nothing stops human beings from transitioning from one identity to another, or even carrying multiple identities at the same time. For instance, dissident 'liberators' may easily morph into conservative establishment figures who themselves turn to oppressing the new crop of dissidents that might emerge from amongst those that they formerly 'liberated'. Indeed, this is a charge that has often been laid at the door of many former freedom fighters and liberation heroes in Africa, Asia, and South America. Fanon has written arguably the most celebrated critique of this tendency in the famous essay, ‘The Pitfalls of National Consciousness’ (see also, Southall, 2013). At the same time, some normative ‘oppressors’ or ‘dissidents’ may simultaneously display an ambiguous side that contradicts the normative labels, such that ‘oppressors’ may occasionally show a dissident side—or at least what amounts to flashes of dissidence—and ‘dissidents’ may simultaneously display an oppressive streak. In grappling with the question of dissidence in Malawi and Zimbabwe, we have had to concede that the figure of a dissident is necessarily a complex, fluid and moving target. In trying to identify, define and evaluate the phenomenon of dissidence, we have been compelled to avoid singular explanations and, instead, to identify a complex plurality of dissident figures. Dissidence itself is a process, always in the process of becoming, marked by constant flux, metamorphosis, and peaks and troughs. The enablers also vary from person to person, and even so, their relevance and impact in their respective countries. With social media, many new dissidents have emerged, but there is still limited literature that explores how social media dissidents use humour to create hate and discredit those in power, a gap this chapter is trying to close.

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We are concentrating on a group of dissidents who claim to stand by or represent the interests of the public against corrupt and underperforming governments. We are singling out two social media dissident characters, Jonathan Moyo from Zimbabwe and Stanley Onjezani Kenani from Malawi, whose dissidence rest in discrediting the government by exposing secrets and trolling politicians. We are more interested in how they add humour to these secrets. Interestingly, Zimbabwe and Malawi share many similarities from social to economic, including a long political history having operated under the same banner, the Rhodesia, during the colonial period.

Tracing Jonathan Moyo and Stanley Onjezani Kenani The characters sampled for this study present a similar kind of dissidence against the ruling political parties in the two countries. Interestingly, both Kenani and Moyo have stories that explain what turned them into dissidents and this leaves us with questions of what creates dissidents. As argued above, dissidence is malleable, and it is always important to contextualise cases to avoid generalisation. So far, the question about why some people become dissidents is not well contextualised, but what is clear is that ‘reasons vary’. What is, however, common is that many dissidents in spite of having personal issues against a particular regime, they fight established institutions while claiming to be representatives of the voiceless, and social media networks and their affordances, have become a viable tool for exercising their dissidence, particularly against established institutions such as autocratic regimes. In Malawi and Zimbabwe, the last decade has seen an influx of social media dissidents. The dissidence by both Moyo and Kenani is directed towards the ruling parties in the respective countries. It is imperative, therefore, to understand how this works not only to their advantage but also against the targeted regimes. Moyo is a Zimbabwean politician and former Minister of Information as well as Higher Education. He uses the Twitter handle @ProfJNMoyo. The Twitter account was opened after being removed from the Information portfolio in 2015. Commenting on the 10th of February 2015 on the rationale for opening Twitter and Facebook accounts, Moyo wrote, The bottom line that you can ignore at your own peril is that social media have become so ubiquitous and so pervasive that it is no longer possible to be relevant in any human endeavours without using them. Those who do

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not use social media in one way or another and those who want to ban their use are doomed.

He added, as a result, ‘I have decided to open Twitter and Facebook accounts from today and I intend to use these accounts like nobody’s business’. Two years after opening his Twitter account he had over 24,000 tweets with an average of more than 50 tweets a week. Moyo, a political science professor, seems to be acknowledging the impact of communication. Twitter gave Moyo a direct line to the national narrative at a time when he had just lost the Information portfolio, a ministry in Zimbabwe that typically shapes the direction of the national narrative through the state-­ controlled media. Gainous & Wagner, 2013, p. 95) point to an existing relationship between social capital and interconnectedness, something Moyo seemed alert to. Hence, ‘As a result, these new online communities have the potential to counter or perhaps even reverse the effect of traditional social capital decline on political participation by replacing the missing interactions’ (Gainous & Wagner, 2013, p. 95). Unlike Moyo who has a long-known background in politics, Kenani is well known as a fiction writer and accountant. However, over the last decade, he has grown wings and now occupies a central space in Malawi’s political debate. His literary work has won several awards locally and internationally. He has had two Facebook accounts, Stanley Kenani and Onjezani Kenani. Once in a while, he would remind his followers that the latter is for personal issues while the former is for political commentary. Onjezani Kenani account which was first created as Stanley Onjezani Kenani had over 12,839 friends by December 2020. Stanley Kenani account which had over 4, 000 friends was deactivated in July 2019. Of course, Kenani’s political ambitions remain unclear. He has publicly distanced himself from politics, but not the framing of dissent in his Facebook posts and what turned him into a ferocious political commentator or dissident. The frustration began in 2002 as revealed in his July 25, 2020, Facebook post: One harrowing experience I had in this regard was for a lucrative post of IFMIS finance manager in 2002. I was invited to interviews at the Lilongwe Hotel in January of that year … The panel asked me endless questions, ranging from the practical to pure textbook nonsense … I never heard back from that panel. However, I picked it through the grapevine that they gave the

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job to a member of the interview panel. Such incidents of what I considered to be a grave injustice drove me further to leave the country…

Since 2007, Kenani has been working abroad. His anger rears its head in the post quoted above and encapsulates his dissident character. The other part reads: Those who have seen me fight the Peter Mutharika regime for six years will agree: When I declare war on someone or something, I fight with every ounce of energy I have got, and nothing and no one can stop me. I can fight with the same level of energy for years and years.

Although Kenani has been relevant in Malawi’s discourses, his popularity shifted from being a writer to a political commentator, but wearing dissidence robes, in which, his dissidence rests in accessing secret information in government and using it to discredit the leadership. Another concept of dissidence which is still in its infancy is about the relevance of dissidents in different political dissidence. In June 2020, Mutharika lost a rerun election to Lazarus Chakwera and the question that bothers many is, what does this mean to Kenani and his dissidence in Malawi’s politics? Few weeks after Mutharika’s downfall, Kenani announced scaling down his dissidence and presence on social media. So, this page is scaling down its presence for a limited period of time in the foreseeable future. To the many layers of activities, I do 24 hours work, writing, reading extensively, being a father and a husband. I have added school. The school is quite demanding and will vacuum up whatever time I had to effectively participate in the Malawian daily life to the smallest detail… (Onjezani Kenani Facebook, September 20, 2020)

We also expect to see what happens to Moyo’s dissidence after the downfall of Mnangagwa or the ZANU-PF. The main difference between the two dissidents is that while many see Moyo as a problem that haunted many Zimbabweans during Mugabe’s final years in power, many Malawians see Kenani as a messiah who championed a perpetual war against Mutharika’s corrupt government. As argued above, an enemy of the state can be another man’s freedom fighter, and this is an image that Kenani has created for himself. In this chapter, we are focused on the frames of dissidence that Moyo and Kenani use against Mnangagwa and his ZANU-PF

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and Mutharika and his DPP, respectively. The frames we sampled have elements of humour and hate, what we consider to be ‘laughing at power’, a form of dissidentiality.

Humour in Dissidence Since the precolonial era, political humour from both those in authority and in opposition has found its way into the political debate. Although the two seem to represent different narratives; with politics being treated as something serious and humour as funny, the opposite is also true. Generally, humour is one of the many ways of communication. However, this kind of communication is based on ‘ambiguity and incongruity’ (Sorensen, 1963, p. 7) which forces us to think in different ways at the same time. It is also argued that humour is not good or bad, but research shows it can be used to hurt others in the same way it can make others happy (Sorensen, 1963). Nonetheless, it remains a subjective process and this gives us clues to understand how people consume and process information as funny or odium. In the Global South, political humour is commonly used to convey criticism against those in authority or those in authority against their adversaries, but in a humorous way. This usually happens by picking and reinforcing common views in political debate while giving them a new face that laughs at the political status quo. This kind of laughing can either be constructive or destructive. Studies also show that humour has the potential to give ‘under-dogs’ a ‘strong voice’ in political struggle and this is what we see in countries such as Malawi and Zimbabwe. Over the last decade, we have seen social media dissidents and other ordinary citizens in Global South expressing themselves online in a humorous way against powerful politicians by posting what Sorensen, 1963) calls ‘political stunts’: a performance/action carried out in public which attempts to undermine a dominant discourse. It either is so confrontational that it cannot be ignored or involves a deception that blurs the line between performers and audiences. It includes or comments on a political incongruity in a way that is perceived as amusing by at least some people who did not initiate it.

The focal point of this concept is that political humour in these stunts is recognised by others. For instance, as (Sharra, 2021) notes in his seminal work on self-made activists in Sub-Saharan Africa, Zambian musician

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Pilato used a humorous narrative ‘Rat in the Pot’ to describe corruption in government. Few days later, an image of a rat became a popular meme against corruption. The term meme was first put into the limelight by Richard Dawkins through his work in a book titled The Selfish Gene (1976; Dawkins, 2006). In the book, he looks at a meme as ‘small cultural units of transmission, analogous to genes, which are spread by copying or imitation’ (Shifman, 2013, p. 188, Makombe & Agbede, 2016, p. 41). Buchel (2012) notes that originally Dawkins theorised a meme as an ‘idea, a thought, or a concept which can be passed between minds’ (p.  16). Borrowing from the Zambian example, the idea that the level of corruption in the country was destructive to the level of the damage a rat causes when in a food pot was adopted by many citizens. We argue that the humour masked in the narrative enabled the virality of the meme. To date, a rat symbolises a humorous way of describing corrupt politicians in Zambia (Sharra, 2021). Another example can be that of Robert Mugabe in which some people used a picture of him falling at a public rally to symbolise he is too old to rule while others used the picture to denote how one can run away from poverty and human rights violations in Zimbabwe (Makombe & Agbede, 2016). There is humour in all these narratives as they provoke one to think in different ways at the same time with the potential of creating laughter. This may sound funny to some and not others. In this chapter, we follow this pattern to pull out what sounds to be humorous in dissidence posts by social media dissidents Moyo and Kenani in Zimbabwe and Malawi, respectively.

Theoretical Framework The study draws its theoretical framework from a combination of three theories, the Habermasian public sphere, carnivalesque and subaltern theory. The first section of the chapter considers that social media dissidents reconstruct social media into a public sphere of sorts (Matsilele & Ruhanya, 2020). However, the public sphere they construct out of social media is not a one to one fit with Habermas’ model. Instead, some modification must happen before Habermas can fit the Zimbabwean and Malawian situations. This leaves us with what can be characterised as the digital public sphere. As Mpofu (2014, p. 117) argues, the digital public sphere theory stems from the Habermasian conception of the public sphere as a 'forum where people meet and discuss issues of the day'. However, such a sphere is no longer a coffee shop, but rather, is refracted by the virtual

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sociality of social media, by application software, server farms, the 'cloud', the battery life of smartphones, emojis, and the proprietary terms of use of Twitter, Facebook and WhatsApp. The second theoretical framework we employ is the carnivalesque lens. In deploying this theorisation, we lean heavily on works of Badarneh (2011) who argued that ‘political jokes represent a variety of texts whose topics revert around “glorifying”, mocking, parodying, scatologizing, and ultimately betraying the ruler’. Badarneh further states that, ‘these types of political jokes reflect a textual representation of the life cycle of the oppressive ruler, which begins with comic “crowning” and glorification and ends in “decrowning” and comic death’. (p. 305). In such a context, political jokes represent a kind of hidden dialogue between the oppressed and their marginalised discourse, and the regime, and its dominant autocratic discourse. Like carnival, the telling of these jokes in a repressive context merely builds a second world outside the oppressive world of the regime and offers an alternative framework to the regime’s policies (Makwambeni, 2017;  Badarneh, 2011). This concept explains the space of humour in political discourse and how it constructs or destructs the lifecycle of rulers. In the chapter, we are showing, how Kenani and Moyo use humour to fight and discredit ruling elites in their respective countries. The third and final theoretical framework we use considers dissidence to be a subaltern practice, a claim that simultaneously opens opportunities and limitations for the current study. Mpofu (2015, p. 83) and Sharra (2020, p. 2) have argued that ‘the Web 2.0 has revolutionised participation in salient public discourses of those ostracised Zimbabwean and Malawian members of society whom Fanon and Farrington (1969) and Gramsci (1971) have categorised as “the wretched of the earth” or “subaltern” respectively’. This participation by the subalterns of Zimbabwe and Malawi informs the spirit behind this study. However, like in the case of the public sphere, we are not limited to seeing the subaltern in relation to postcolonial India or Mussolini’s Fascist Italy. The subaltern of Zimbabwe and Malawi is a product of these two countries’ history, whose identity and agency are now refracted through the keypad, touch screen, and camera of a smartphone and orchestrated in online public spaces.

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Methodology This study draws its empirical data from an analysis of 50 social media posts on Kenani’s Facebook page with the username Onjezani Kenani and Moyo’s Twitter page which uses @ProJNMoyo handle. The justification is that despite Malawi and Zimbabwe having many social media dissidents, the two have been consistent with their dissidence and have formal accounts. They own every post on their pages. Since the pages are public, we used Facepager to capture all the posts and comments. The target period was January 2017 to June 2020, a period in which the two posted many dissidence posts against ruling parties in their respective countries. Being a qualitative study, the focus was on posts that directly attack and expose the regime and contains a sense of humour or laughs at power. We only used threads that started with a post by the page owner. Another factor that determined which posts to use was accessibility. Social media has privacy settings and not all that is posted is accessible. Other users delete posts they do not want on their walls. Thus, only posts that are accessible to the public were captured. For this reason, this chapter does not rule out the chances of biases, but it argues that the sample is representative and large enough for fair results which can be used for further research. We used social media analysis to analyse the posts and the subsequent comments. Online ethnographic data are usually a product of texts only or a combination of text and visuals. Therefore, we adopted two methods: discourse analysis and visual analysis methods to analyse online texts and visuals, respectively.

Framing Dissidence Political commentary in Africa and elsewhere has been a game of the few and the logic behind the political economy of the media explains this phenomenon. Those with power in the society have space to air out their views and shape the public discourse. While social media has liberated public spaces and allow for anyone to air out their views, the political economy of social media shows that, of course, anyone can post a comment, but the attention it accords varies. Thus, in cases where one has an issue to post on social media, the first question is how to attract attention. This is one of the reasons that many people, as this chapter shows, prefer leaking information to selected social media populists and dissidents such as Moyo and Kenani. Similarly, social media dissidents realise that they

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command social media political debate in their respective countries and the need to sustain the commentary. However, the most interesting element in Southern Africa’s social media dissidence is how the posts are framed. In this chapter, we are interested in understanding how social media dissidents, Moyo and Kenani, frame humour in political issues to build ridicule against political figures in their respective countries and how these have helped to sustain their dissidence and challenge established institutions such as autocratic regimes. Although Twitter and Facebook offer almost equal opportunities for political commentary, the two platforms accord unequal freedom in terms of how much text is accommodated. Twitter allows for fewer words than Facebook, and as it will be shown in this chapter later, Moyo’s political posts are short and catchy which means, he spends time framing the messages to publish the gist. In Malawi, Kenani, although at times posts short messages, the freedom on Facebook allows him to publish leaks as they are without cutting except for identities. It is, therefore, imperative to appreciate how this affects the creation of humour or ridicule in dissidence political posts. It is also important to highlight that the process of creating ridicule and humour frames against someone begins with the creation of a ‘popular rhetoric’ which shapes the public’s perception towards a particular individual or system. For instance, in Malawi, Kenani’s ridicule and humour are built around an established perception that Mutharika and his DPP are a failed team that is corrupt, and no one should ever trust them. The framing has gone as far as making people believe that Mutharika and DPP are always busy plotting evil deeds. Thus, the majority of the posts with and without Mutharika and his DPP in government are framed to prove these lines of reasoning. Similarly, Moyo’s dissidence against Mnangagwa and his ZANU-PF centres on framing Mnangagwa as an evil man who has done so much dirt and misled Mugabe when he was vice president. His dissidence posts reinforce an image of an evil man who tricked the system to illegally assume the presidency but is clueless. The discussion below shows how these two dissidents have framed their dissidence along these lines to ridicule and add humour to the shortcomings of both Mnangagwa and his ZANU-PF and Mutharika and his DPP.

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Findings and Discussion Humour and Ridicule in Social Media Content Humour permeates every aspect of society and has done so for thousands of years (Berger, 2017). Obrdlik (1942, p. 709) says, ‘humour is both a social product and an agency with social functions’. The power of humour makes it a persistent topic for research in many fields, including communication. As Meyer (2000, p. 310) submits, ‘three theories of humour creation emerge in humour research: the relief theory, which focuses on physiological release of tension; the incongruity theory, singling out violations of a rationally learned pattern; and the superiority theory, involving a sense of victory or triumph’. This chapter explores how humour is built in protesting political elites in Zimbabwe and Malawi. Researchers argue that these three theories find expression on the nature of humour circulated in the social media space. This form of resistance has been employed in competitive authoritarian regimes by ‘subalterns’ as part of their language of resistance (Matsilele, 2019; Matsilele & Ruhanya, 2020). As Bhungalia (2020) asserts, to laugh in the face of power is not to say: ‘I oppose you’—rather it is to assert: ‘your power has no authority over me’. It is to refuse that power authorising force. This article maintains that closer inspection of the relationship between humour, laughter and power carves out new space wherein power is not only opposed but is also caricatured, lampooned and disavowed. It shows how Moyo and Kenani streamline humour in political issues in a way that does not only discredit, but also satirises the political regime. The posts on Twitter and Facebook accounts of Moyo and Kenani carry at least three types of content: leaks and expose, calls to action and trolling. This content is framed to hold the regimes to account. The discussion below shows how Moyo and Kenani use this content to create humour for political campaigns against regimes. This humour is understood by exploring how dissidence creates or alters meanings to discredit regimes. We are interested in how these dissidents build spaces for laughter in political issues. Humour and Ridicule in Leaks and Exposé Posts This kind of dissidence is focused on exposing corruption practices, political ideologies, partisan policies and decisions, including secrets involving top government officials. These dissidents operate like whistleblowers and

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their posts, apart from touching on sensitive issues, create public discussions online. Unlike other online debates, these discussions are controversial and framed to call either authorities or citizens to action. For example, in one case against Chiwenga, Moyo mixed a leak that has humour in it. On one hand, Moyo is exposing Chiwenga for the reasons behind firing his staff and on the other hand, he is laughing at Chiwenga exposing him as a ‘clown’ for firing his staff after being terrified by his own shoes which he mistakenly assumed were a bomb. The tasks of leaking and exposing dirt in government demand individuals with good connections. In Malawi and Zimbabwe, evidence show that many people, particularly those in government, are not happy with the conduct and some of the decisions made in government. However, since exposing such information carelessly can cost one a job, Kenani and Moyo have been a relief to this group of people, who include civil servants. Borrowing from the logic of the political economy of social media, it is evident that many social media users are aware that one’s prominence both in the society and on social media helps in reaching out to many people with online posts (McChesney, 2008). In other words, many people feel that if the information is published on particular pages, then it will get more prominence unlike if published on their personal pages. For instance, apart from leaking government information to these dissidents, some individuals share their personal concerns with the dissidents to have them published on the dissidents’ social media pages. By drawing a line between what the dissidence independently source and what the like-minded individuals within and without government share confirms that there are many dissidents in the society or as Matsilele (2018) puts it ‘everyone is a dissident’. However, many individuals are limited by their circumstances such as security issues or protecting their sources of bread. Nonetheless, the fact that they can leak information through other channels reinforces their dissidence. We should also highlight that there is trust between social media dissidents and individuals who leak the information. Kenani prefers accompanying posts emerging from leaks with a short phrase: ‘From my inbox’. Unlike Kenani, Moyo demonstrates having access to some government secrets and he owns every post. By posting these leaks, both Kenani and Moyo ridicule the leadership by exposing what the authorities think is private. They are also telling the world that the leadership is failing and can do better. They also add humour by teasing out the figureheads. For instance, in the post below

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posted on March 20, Moyo pokes fun on Mnangagwa’s scarf by calling it paraffin-scarf drawing on muse from a comic actor who always had a scarf when acting: Worry more & do something urgent about the over 5,000 soldiers that have been embedded in every street & village in Zimbabwe to rig the #2018Election; than this picture of bemused & clueless observers of the just ended Russian election; out in the cold with their paraffin-scarf!

In Malawi, Kenani’s leaks have touched on Mutharika’s every nerve and even questioned his academic credentials. For instance, he pulled out one of Mutharika’s law books which was making rounds on social media with an error on the title. The book was published with the title The Regulation of Statelessness Under ‘International’ and ‘International’ Law. The repetition of the word ‘international’ instead of replacing one with national is what Kenani humourised. He wrote: ‘If the error is on the first page…’ meaning there could be more errors in the book. What Kenani was trying to achieve was adding humour to confirming his earlier claims against Mutharika that he is a failure and has a long history of failure not only in politics but also in academia where Mutharika worked for over 40 years. By focusing on the error in the title, Kenani signals a possibility of many errors in the book, a creative way of adding humour and discrediting the professor of law by telling Malawians not to be obsessed with academic titles. Such kind of ridicule masked in humour has been popular during the entire seven-year period of Mutharika’s reign. It even created a debate on whether academic credentials mean good political leadership. Like many African countries, political leadership in Malawi is left to the highly educated as they are revered as the most brilliant individuals to run the affairs of the state. Thus, by questioning Mutharika’s academic work, including his professorship, Kenani was not only pulling down the ridicule plug but also building humour to decampaign the law professor. Prior to the 2014 elections, Idriss Ali Nassah and I repeatedly warned everyone about how incompetent Peter Mutharika was, but there was no shortage of educated people who thought, despite evidence to the contrary, that he was the best thing that could ever happen to our country. I am glad time has taught everyone a lesson, but at what cost? We should never repeat such stupidity as a nation. (Onjezani Kenani Facebook, June 27, 2020)

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The relevance of this humour on academic credentials and competencies can also be seen from elsewhere. UTM Vice President Michael Usi once told a political rally during the 2019 Malawi elections campaign period that they should not be obsessed with qualifications. He said he has the PhD that Mutharika has and there is no need to vote for Mutharika because of academic credentials. Humour and Ridicule in Call to Action Posts Dissidence does not happen in a vacuum. As conceptualised under the publics and counterpublics concepts which challenge the contemporary logic of the public sphere, social media dissidents have their own online publics where they champion deliberations through online posts (See Fraser, 1990; Warner, 2002). Thus, when dissidents post leaked information, it is for their publics. Two issues seem to be certain here: they release the information to inform their publics about what is happening behind the curtains, and secondly, to call them to action. The kind of action needed varies. For instance, in Zimbabwe, Moyo who went into exile after the fall of Mugabe and claims to be exposing abuses in Zimbabwe, has used his posts to invite the media and other authorities such as regional bodies and their leaders to act on the leaked information. For example, he has been tweeting to former and current African presidents. HE P.  Kagame; HE C.  Ramaphosa; HE T.  Mbeki; HE B.  Mkapa; HE O. Obasanjo; HE Y. Museveni & HE K. Annan. Coup rulers in Zimbabwe are persecuting your brother, Cde Mugabe. Plz check on him. (@ ProfJNMoyo, March 25, 2018)

Moyo is adding humour and ridicule to the safety of Mugabe in the hands of the new government led by what he calls ‘coup rulers’ who include Mnangagwa. The composition of the post tilts towards helplessness and portrays Africa’s powerful leaders as sleeping on the job and not interested in checking on their colleagues since the coup. By calling on the international community, Moyo adds humour to the state of affairs in Zimbabwe and the safety of Mugabe, an indirect way of attacking Mnangagwa’s government. Being a one-time insider, Moyo’s leaks and expose stretch into the days of Robert Mugabe’s reign when Mnangagwa was the vice president. He divulges ZANU-PF’s campaign strategy and information from previous

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ZANU-PF and government minutes. In most related posts, Moyo reinforces ridicule and a frame that Mnangagwa is evil and unforgiving. He further builds humour by challenging that he has the minutes of the secrets which he can reveal. It seems it is his signature. In most posts, he signs off with a warning that he has more details which he can reveal if someone argues otherwise against his leaks. This explains one of the many characters of political dissidents: they are always well informed. Not only that, but the post also signals that there are too many secrets which the public does not know, a potential highlighter of humour for calls to action. By also claiming to have inside information, Moyo is echoing one of Zimbabwe’s earliest social media dissidents Baba Jukwa who also de-­ campaigned the Mugabe regime claiming to have insider secrets (see Matsilele, 2019). In Malawi, Kenani’s dissidence builds a call to action frame by promoting the rhetoric that Mutharika and his DPP are a cult you should never trust. They are crooks and use any formula at their disposal. He, however, reinforces humour and ridicule in his call to action frame by using parables and popular quotes such as: ‘One day the poor will have nothing to eat but the rich’ and ‘Revolution is not an apple that falls when it is ripe. You have to make it fall’. In all these, Kenani is trying to mobilise people to stand up and act while warning the leadership that if nothing is done, people will one day get tired and stand up. The humour here is framed to heighten the rhetoric that things are getting worse and the remaining option is standing up. Humour and Ridicule in Trolling Posts Moyo and Kenani are very good at ridiculing and trolling politicians, technocrats, institutions, government, and even ordinary citizens. Kenani’s strength is in building ridicule masked in humour while trolling on political leaders. One of his major strengths is on how he plays down any efforts in Mutharika’s leadership. If it is not portraying him as a crook or thief who is always busy plotting evil, then he frames his leadership as something no one should take seriously. He also labelled him an absent president who was not in control. The creativity you see in his short stories rears its head in his dissidence, particularly against Mutharika. For instance, proving his long-time stance that there is no serious governance in DPP-­ led government, on June 26, just three days after Mutharika had lost a rerun election, Kenani humorously likened Mutharika’s circle to actors of

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a popular and longest-running radio soapie called Zimachitika, which literary means ‘it happens’ by allocating DPP’s politburos and noisemakers different roles in the play. The characters in the play have their roles framed along the lines of humour surrounding issues of gossips, troublemakers, peacemakers, tricksters, and respected elders, but with a sad ending. However, Kenani’s post was largely framed to signal an ‘end of an error’ for DPP and that they never listened when Malawians were crying. In the play, Mutharika had lost the election, and borrowing from how the radio play signs-off with a promise to return the following week, Kenani adds humour by using a five-year timeline, meaning the people will only see Mutharika and his DPP in 2025, the year for the next election. The humour and ridicule masked in this frame centres on that the ousted Mutharika and his DPP had popularised a rhetoric that they were a ‘system’, and no political party could unseat them. Kenani’s post allocates roles in the play to individuals who were noisy during the Mutharika era: Sewero La Zimachitika (Zimachitika play). Museweroli chaka chino (In this year’s play): President: anali (was) Arthur Peter Mutharika. Vice: anali Atupele Muluzi. Mfiti (Witch): anali Grezeda Jeffrey. Lawyer: anali Kalekeni Kaphale. Muulutsi (Radio announcer): anali Steven Maseya. Mwana (Child): anali Fyness MP. Mlangizi (Advisor): anali Bakili Muluzi. Malawi Electoral Commission Chairperson: Jane Ansah. Muzakhalenso pomwepo 2025 pamene tizakupatsireni sewero lina kuchokera ku DPP drama group (Be there in 2025 to follow the next episode of the DPP drama group).

Similarly, Moyo frequently mocks Zimbabwe’s post-coup dispensation and has gone after any senior government officials. For example, he once trolled Vice President General Chiwenga for his skin condition. Moyo tweets ‘If ‘NHUTA’ caused Chiwenga’s bleached skin with reports of blood cancer, then it’s noted. Sorry. But it’s just incredulous that Chiwenga & Mary contracted NHUTA at the same time!’ By so doing, Moyo is pocking fun at Chiwenga’s skin disease which is a way of undressing the powerful through not so violent means. Moyo has also likened Mnangagwa to rebels such as Osama Bin Laden.

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Fig. 6.1  Moyo riding on a crocodile. (Source: @ProfJNMoyo Twitter, October 20, 2020)

Moyo has also used various tools, including pictures to troll and demonstrate how much he underrates Mnangagwa. To add humour to these pictures, Moyo has gone on to use Photoshop to make the message clear. One of the most circulated tweets on Moyo’s page is a photoshopped picture of Moyo riding on a crocodile. This photo is meant to undermine, in the public’s mind, Mnangagwa’s reputed ‘predatory powers’ as well as, possibly, provoke him into retaliatory actions. Mnangagwa is reputed as a crocodile (Ndlovu, 2018) which symbolises a fearful character and for Moyo to Photoshop the crocodile picture with him riding on the reptile demonstrates that he is not afraid of the crocodile, a humorous way of trolling and undermining someone (Fig. 6.1.). Understanding Humour and Ridicule in Social Media Dissidence The discussion shows the type of dissidence content on Moyo and Kenani’s pages reflect an ever-changing and an enigmatic dissidence built around ridicule and humour. It is a form of activism in which dissidents build an empire of followers who are always ready to react to posts on the

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dissidents’ pages. Some followers are inspired by the figures behind the dissidence while others are driven by political interests. For instance, in Zimbabwe, all those against the downfall of Mugabe are likely to enjoy Moyo’s tweets, and similarly, those who do not like Mutharika and his DPP, including all corrupt politicians in Malawi enjoy posts on Kenani’s page. Thus, the way dissidents frame their dissidence and position themselves within the political discourse determine their audience. However, humour and ridicule play a crucial role in generating interesting debates on issues of public interests such as the abuse of public resources. Social media dissidence thrives with huge followership and reaction to posts. A number of factors, which include humour, ridicule, loss, secrecy around serious issues and scandals determine the popularity of dissidence posts when online. While there are many issues to leak or expose or troll about someone, Moyo and Kenani have placed their dissidence ahead of many by carefully choosing what to publish and ‘how’, including the use of similes to prove their points. The most significant character is how they add humour and ridicule to their posts to discredit authorities. For instance, Kenani adds humour to one of Mutharika’s political campaign promises in which the law professor promised Malawians that given a chance to rule the country, he would transform Malawi to the levels of Singapore. Kenani trolls Mutharika on this dream by adding humour in a ridicule way that questions the practicability of the vision. He wonders how could Mutharika move Malawi to the levels of Singapore when he could not construct his retirement home in the five years he had been in power. The post was made days after it had transpired that Mutharika’s private home was not ready for occupation, a day after losing the run-off election in June 2020. The other way social media dissidents add humour and ridicule to their political posts is by demonstrating that they are well resourced. By successfully creating an image that there is too much dirty linen to be washed in public, the dissidents create humour about wrongdoing in government and this creates an anticipation for the public to read more. On the other hand, such revelations ridicule the regime by tainting its public image. Moyo has gone on to threaten Mnangagwa. Yes, it is true. Before the 15 November military coup, Mnangagwa used to be brutal & unforgiving in his politburo attacks & rejection of the likes of Mutsvangwa, Matemadanda, Mahiya, Tsenengamu & that whole once

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loquacious Lacoste lot. We have the minutes to prove this akati nyo! (@ ProfJNMoyo, May 1, 2018)

Apart from provoking posts like the above, social media dissidents also use inflaming quotes to persuade people into thinking about solutions and acting against their governments. For instance, during the last three years of Mutharika’s rule, Kenani promoted the rhetoric that the ‘poor will not suffer forever’ but there will be a time when they will have no option but to act’. Badarneh (2011, p. 305) writing on the concept of the carnival argued that such strategies are meant to unsettle power and, in some instances, forcing power to react. Kenani enjoys posting the following popular quotes: The revolution is not an apple that falls when it is ripe. You have to make it fall. One day the poor will have nothing left to eat but the rich. Freedom is possible. The power of the people is strong than the people in power.

The driver is the humour attached to the messages. Building up on this, social media dissidents also build humour in their posts by exposing facts and challenge the people to think and imagine the gravity of the damage.

Conclusion The discussion has shown that humour and ridicule in social media dissidence in Southern Africa are built differently. We have shown that while social media dissidents have a lot of information for trolling on politicians, they engage in careful selection and use of words to attract not only public attention but also those in authority confirming Mutsvairo and Ragnedda’s (2017) conclusions in their earlier study. While anyone can be a dissident as Matsilele (2019, 2018) notes, the levels of doing dissidence vary and the few that have taken the route seriously declare war with those in authority. What, however, distinguishes one dissident from another is how they play around with the information at their disposal? This chapter has shown that adding humour to dissidence posts is changing the political discourse in the region. With political space closing, subalterns are increasingly employing new methods such as protest humour to troll power, expose leaks and call citizens to action against the powerful, confirming earlier studies on the deployment of humour as an act of political protest

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(Simmons, 1963; Kutz-Flamenbaum, 2014; Cipriani, 2019; Pearce & Hajizada, 2014). Other than mocking the powerful, political humour also plays the second and most critical part which has been apparent in Zimbabwe and Malawi which Willems (2011) characterises as ‘a self-­ reflexive mode through which those subject to power mock their own powerlessness and lack of agency in the face of a system that they perceive as immutable’. We conclude that the political humour employed by the cases we studied is informed by hate and disdain of those who occupy spaces of power. The hatred can range from the mundane to the most serious: from being pushed out of power, to ethnic differences, assumed intellectual deficiencies to hatred of state-backed corruption and violence, among others. This hatred is what Tshuma and Ndlovu (2020) observed when studying photographs of the Gukurahundi genocide in the virtual sphere.

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PART II

Humour and the Everyday

CHAPTER 7

Laughing at Trouble: A Multimodal Analysis of Online Economic Satire in Zimbabwe Mathew Nyaungwa

Introduction In line with a Shona adage that goes, “kuseka nhamo kunge rugare”, meaning to laugh at troubles like they bring pleasure, this article analyses online economic satire by a Zimbabwean satirical group, Bustop TV between 2016 and 2020. The period 2016 to 2020 is characterised by resurging inflation, cash and fuel shortages despite expectations of political and economic renewal when President Emmerson Mnangagwa took over from the now late President Robert Mugabe following a military coup in late 2017. The introduction of bond notes pegged to the US dollar in 2016 by the post-government of the National Unity administration saw the emergence of a parallel market for foreign exchange (Odero, 2018, p. 2). The number of Zimbabweans in extreme poverty was 3 million in 2017 (Odero, 2018, p.  8). The disputed victory of President Mnangagwa in the July 30, 2018 election coupled with persistent droughts, have also left the Zimbabwean economy in the doldrums.

M. Nyaungwa (*) School of Journalism and Media Studies, Rhodes University, Makhanda, South Africa © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 S. Mpofu (ed.), The Politics of Laughter in the Social Media Age, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-81969-9_7

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Zimbabwe’s annual inflation reached a recorded high of 837% in July 2020 (ZimStats, 2020). Zimbabwe is experiencing food and fuel shortages, while the local currency, which was re-introduced in 2019, albeit in piecemeal, has dramatically lost value against the US Dollar, which is eroding personal income, leaving millions in abject poverty. The Zimbabwean Dollar slumped to 81.35 against the greenback end of October 2020 after a 25:1 peg imposed in March 2020 was abandoned. Nyamnjoh (2005), who draws on the notion of “radio trottoir” (pavement radio) which Stephen Ellis defines as “the popular and unofficial discussion of current affairs in Africa” (Ellis, 1989, p.  321), posits that alternative spaces have emerged as the State have the propensity to control the media. In Zimbabwe, the ruling elite seeks to guide discourse and limit opposing voices in a bid to hold onto power (Siziba & Ncube, 2015, p. 518; Willems, 2011, p. 52). This explains why Zimbabwe has a single national television station, which is dominated by the State (Mano, 2016, p. 4). Although the Broadcasting Authority of Zimbabwe (BAZ) issued out six new free to air national commercial television licences with a limited spectrum, in November 2020, the companies awarded the television licences either already hold print or broadcasting licences or are linked to the government or the ruling ZANU-PF party (MISA Zimbabwe, 2020). While the Zanu-PF led government has a history of meting out violence to the opposition (Siziba & Ncube, 2015, p. 523) and those that threaten its power-base, considerable growth in mobile phone penetration supported the rise of digital activism and comedians such as Bustop TV, Magamba Network, Simuka Comedy and Taffy The Man who are not afraid to speak against government’s economic policies, political and social ills. Zimbabwe had about 8.3 million active internet subscriptions in the second quarter of 2020 (Potraz, 2020, p. 4) vis-a-vis an estimated population of 14.5 million in 2016. Mobile internet and data usage rose by 56.2% to record 10,407 TB in the second quarter of 2020 from the previous quarter’s 6661 TB (Potraz, 2020, p. 4). Of the four satirical forums listed above, Magamba Network and Bustop TV are more prominent and consistent in terms of output. Magamba Network was launched in 2007 by Samm Manro (Cde Fatso) and Tongai Makawa. Their first-ever satire show, Zambezi News, inspired a whole new generation of young satirists and online content creators in Zimbabwe. Apart from Zambezi News, Magamba’s productions include the Tsaona Show and “The Week with Cde Fatso”. Magamba, which has more than 15,000 subscribers on YouTube, about 12,000 followers on Twitter and more than 51,000 on

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Facebook, focuses more on political satire through the faux newscast. Bustop TV was established in 2014 by Lucky Aaroni after he left PO Box TV, which he co-founded with his film school classmates. Bustop TV is widely known for its satirical skits, which comment on economy, political and social issues that affect the Zimbabwean society. Bustop TV has more than 100,000 subscribers on YouTube, 176,000 followers on Facebook and about 72,000 followers on Twitter. Simuka Comedy mainly satirises Zimbabwean president Emmerson Mnangagwa, while Taffy The Man is also predominantly engaged in political satire with his solo acts. All these satirical groups are not given time on the national broadcaster, ZBC, but are freely distributing their content on YouTube, Facebook and Twitter. Willems (2010, p.  55) points out, new technologies had been useful in making dissenting voices heard: In a context in which Zimbabweans had restricted access to alternative views of the crisis due to the high costs and lack of availability of print media and alternative broadcasters, they began to express themselves through a range of popular and informal media. New technologies such as the Internet and mobile phones played an important role in enabling the spread of dissenting voices… jokes and rumours then emerged as important popular forms of commentary on the economic and political crisis as well as on the attempts of the state to restrict the public arena.

Satire is hard to define as it is usually considered a subgenre of humour with an additional element of social critique (Gray et al., 2009, p. 8). As posited by Test (1986:28), Western satire consists of four elements, viz.: aggression, play, laughter and judgment. These are evident in varied ways such as “that attempting to define satire has been like trying to put a shadow in a sack” (Test, 1986, p. 13). Satire has previously been employed “as a means of discrediting those in authority” (Cameron, 1993, p.  6). Just like irony, satire is subtly used to express critical sentiments as well as to openly tackle contentious matters (Owais et  al., 2015, p.  2084). Younger individuals consider satire as more authentic as it eschews the “manufactured” realities often created and promoted by politicians and advertisers (Jones, 2010). Online satire is considered a “participatory activity involving multitudes of people interacting through digital networks” (Yang & Jiang, 2015, p. 2). It is also a playful way of addressing critical social and political (and one could add economic) concerns on the Internet (Yang & Jiang,

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2015, p. 3). In China, studies of Internet-based political satire vary from “parodies, jokes, slippery jingles, verse, songs [to] flash videos” (Yang & Jiang, 2015, p. 2). Satire, in general plays an important “role in inspiring and provoking powerful political emotions” as well as “informing the political agenda” (Bessant, 2017, p.  1057). User-generated satire has expanded as a result of new media, which saw users taking advantage of digital technology to create their content, which is shared with the rest of the world (Bessant, 2017, p. 1070). As noted by Ferrari (2018, p. 2210), this particular type of satire marks a shift in understanding satire “from a vertical view—where the powerful satirist directs the public to a critique of politicians—to a more horizontal situation in which many users–satirists generate satirical content for different micro publics that intersect with each other and sometimes interact with the broader media system”. Focusing on Zimbabwe, Siziba and Ncube (2015, p. 516)’s analyses of political satire as a critical part of “silent resistance” in the country, established that the satirical memes “constitute vital avenues of resisting, contesting, rewriting and availing a different “truth” about Zimbabwe and powerful myths around the fetishisation of Mugabe’s person and power”. They further asserted that satirical memes are “weapons of the weak” and conduit through which people can “reconfigure the hegemonic narrative of Mugabe as invincible, youthful and resistant to the effects of time” (Siziba & Ncube, 2015, p. 536). In another study, Rwafa (2010, p. 108) uses a Zimbabwean play, Honourable MP (1987), which employs the “language of political satire and irony embedded in song and dramatic performance to move its story ahead”. He postulates that satirical songs in Zimbabwe integrate elements of poetry and humour to challenge both the weak and the powerful. Musila and Moyo (2012) studied South African satirical cartoonist Zapiro’s use of satirical cartoons to ridicule the figure of the late President Mugabe. Nyamnjoh (2004, p. 75) posits that satirical cartoons are a “perfect medium of communicating dissent and discussing the powerful in unflattering, even if muted terms”. Mbembe (2001) provides an alternative view of satire as a ritualistic sharing of space (in this case online) between the powerful and the dominated, in a convivial relationship which deprives both of agency. He posits that “the acts of the dominated do not necessarily lead to resistance, accommodation, ‘disengagement,’ the refusal to be captured, or to an antagonism between public facts and those sous maquis [of the underground]” (Mbembe, 1992, p.  5). While academic research on satire in Zimbabwe coupled with online dissent and digital media previously

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focused on political issues (see Siziba & Ncube, 2015; Gukurume, 2017; Mpofu, 2016; Mutsvairo & Sirks, 2015; Mare, 2013; Moyo, 2010), economic woes such as hyperinflation, fuel and cash shortages deserve attention as they equally affect people’s daily lives.

Theoretical Framework The study draws on Bakhtin’s (1984) notion of carnival as a subversion of hierarchies, which foregrounds humour as a meaningful form of engagement in public deliberation by conceptualising public spaces as an arena where people can resist dominant power with the free expression of non-­ legitimate voices, even mocking the governing power. Previous studies on Zimbabwe have revealed that Zimbabweans use jokes to criticise the discourse of state media and ridicule the resident (Willems, 2010, p.  56); political satire in the form of memes also highlighted a people “resisting, contesting, rewriting and availing a different ‘truth’ about Zimbabwe (Siziba & Ncube, 2015, p. 516). For Bakhtin (1984, p. 218), the carnivalesque is understood “not only as carnival per se in its limited form but also as the varied popular-festive life of the Middle Ages and the Renaissance”. The three main facets of carnivalesque are participants/collective, individual freedom and breakdown of hegemony (Díaz-Cintas, 2018, p. 135). From these three, the notion of carnival arises a universal spirit in which “all were considered equal during carnival” (Bakhtin, 1984, p. 10) and are free to express themselves. Bakhtin’s interpretation of carnival anchors on the battle between two notions: “the official culture, which is represented by the authorities and the existing hierarchy, and is controlled by repression and prohibitions; and the folklore culture, which is characterised by the common people, utopian equality, jocular enjoyment and freedom” (Díaz-Cintas, 2018, p. 138). Carnivals here are considered an essential element of folklore culture given that they allow the common people, who are often restricted by hierarchy, “to break the usual taboos and conventions through sartorial metamorphoses as well as the use of abusive language and reckless laughter, and the subversion of traditional norms” (Díaz-Cintas, 2018, p. 138). Gardiner (1992, p. 30) posits that rebirth’ is also a significant signifier in Bakhtin’s theory as “the deconstructive thrust of folk culture was not simply negative or dismissive, rather it held out the promise of a renewal of humankind on a more egalitarian and radically democratic basis”. The uncrowning of the king and the

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crowning of the clown during a carnival denote renewal and rebirth. As Díaz-Cintas (2018, p. 142) notes: crowning contains the potential for uncrowning, while uncrowning is the completion of crowning. Carnival, therefore, is a reminder that there is no definite and unchangeable truth in the world and everything is going through the process of death and rebirth…

Park (2013, p. 314) posits that “carnivalistic actions triggered by social media can create a new public space, which is formed by numerous voluntary people who wish to see ‘real changes’ in the democratic process”. Habermas’ original concept of the public sphere—a space where ostensibly ordinary people meet and deliberate free from interference from the state and church (Bosch, 2010, p. 268)—is often criticised for its excessive focus on the elites. Fraser (1992), for example, accuses Habermas of idealising his liberal public sphere and of failing to examine non-liberal, non-­ bourgeois and competing for public spheres. She advocates for plural spheres, which she calls “alternative public spheres,” “competing public spheres,” “subaltern public spheres” and “counter-public spheres”. Rasmussen (2013, 2014) contrasts a presentational public sphere (referring to more traditional media platforms where deliberations are dominated by a few, mostly male and middle-class individuals) with a representational public sphere (referring to the use of social media platforms, internet and other alternative platforms of communication, which promote “inclusive” and “democratic” forms of deliberation. Marginalised groups use the Internet as a means for the formation of counter-publics allowing for the articulation of rational as well as truly alternative and sometimes radical critical discourses (Dahlberg, 2007, p.  60). Willems (2010, p.  49) advances that “an advantage of conceptualizing African publics as sites of popular culture is that it avoids the elitist connotations attached to Habermas’ concept of the public sphere”. Popular culture is often associated with opposition to power (see Hall, 1981, p. 238) and Barber (1987, p. 2) posits that in Africa, popular culture, is mainly recognised for its strength to communicate, because “for the majority of Africans, the arts are the only channel of public communication at their disposal”. Although economic journalism is often accused of appealing to and serving the interests of a narrow elite (Brand, 2010, pp. 25, 38), such as the investment and business community (Davis, 2005; Rumney, 2008)

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and political and social elites (Arrese, 2017, p. 380) while failing to reflect or interpret mass opinion (Brand, 2010, p. 38) or the views of the general public and ordinary citizens (Arrese & Vara, 2019, p. 78; Knowles et al., 2017, p. 325). This excessive focus on the elites is often cited as one of the limitations of Habermas’ original concept of the public sphere—a space where ostensibly ordinary people meet and deliberate free from interference from the state and church (Bosch, 2010:268), the growing use of Internet has had a crucial role in the steady popularisation of economic journalism, understood as the branch of journalism that tracks, analyses and interprets changes in the economic state of a society (Pani & Fischer-­ Butmaloiu, 2018, p.  9). Economic media are “now meat and drink to media enterprises” given their impact on ordinary lives (Hayes, 2014, p. 58). Economic news is somewhat becoming very much part of everyday discussions and is not only a case of elites speaking to themselves due to the penetration of markets into areas of public and private lives (Happer, 2017, p. 441).

Methodology This qualitative study analyses Bustop TV’s skits about the economy in Zimbabwe during the period 2016–2020. After initial consideration, content from Magamba TV and Taffy The Man was discarded as mainly faux newscasts with political inclination. Simuka Comedy also produced political satire, which is not the focus of this article. From 2016 to 2020, Bustop TV produced about 200 skits and from this, 10 that addressed economic issues were purposively sampled. Given the amount of work involved in translating Bustop TV’s skits from Shona to English, I purposively sampled two skits per year for the period analysed to lessen the workload (see Appendix). Often economic issues were imbedded within other issues, which required careful consideration of all Bustop TV’s skits and this proved to be a laborious exercise. Nine of the ten Bustop TV’s skits analysed were in a dialogue form (diegetic), while one took the format of a news media interview with two panellists being interviewed. Besides language-­based interactions, I relied on the setting, the characters’ outward appearance, the objects placed in the videos, the action of the characters and their facial expressions to evince meaning. There is a growing call among discourse analysts to consider multimodal facets of discourse (LeVine & Scollon, 2004; Milner, 2013, p. 2363). Kress and van Leeuwen’s (2001, pp. 4–8) recommend that any

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Fig. 7.1  Analytical framework for satirical videos

Visual Representation (Mise-en-scène)

Sound (diegetic & nondiegetic)

analysis of multimodality—the use of several semiotic modes in the design of a semiotic product or event—in contemporary communication should include an examination of discourse, design, production and consumption as fundamental issues. El-Farahaty (2018, p. 37) postulates that “semiotic resources used to create multimodal texts are different from those drawn on to create printed texts, and they bring with them different potentials for meaning-making”. YouTube videos consist of several multimodal resources than printed texts. Drawing on aspects of Caldas-Coulthard and van Leeuwen (2003)’s critical social semiotic framework, Cara (2017)’s semiotic analysis of visual text, film theory (Bordwell & Thompson, 2004) and reception theory, I developed a two-component analytical framework (see Fig. 7.1) to study Bustop TV’s economic satire in Zimbabwe. The first component focuses on the semiotic analysis of the visuals and the second on the sound. Using this analytical framework for satirical videos (see Fig. 7.1), the data gathered examines which social actors are represented in Bustop TV’s skits and how they are represented in both the language and visuals.

Findings and Discussion Tackling Contentious Matters: Subversion of Relationships This article shows that satire is not all about “discrediting those in authority” as pointed by Cameron (1993, p. 6). From the data sampled, two of the videos specifically focused on the subversion of the relationships between educated and uneducated people at a time of economic downturn in Zimbabwe. In the skit “Monoshandepi?” (Where do you work?),

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a couple employed as teachers approach a potential landlady looking for a house to rent. The setup itself implies that, unlike in the past, educated civil servants can no longer afford to buy their own house. The landlady, depicted as sitting on a dirty veranda and sowing with an old machine (evident signs of poverty) initially offers a three-room house. However, after realising that the couple is employed as teachers and cognisant of the cash-flow problems affecting public servants, suggests trying elsewhere. She captures the subverted hierarchy of desirable tenants, where bus conductors and street vendors are preferable to teachers, in her own words: Alright, teacher, teacher (as she resumes her sewing). You see my children, the three rooms are indeed vacant, but with your job will you be able to pay rent on the 28th of each month? What I can do is to send you to that house without a curtain. There is a soldier that owns that house and I think if you talk to him you will be able to understand each other because your paydays are always the same […] I would have availed the rooms to you if you were bus conductors or vendors as they get money daily, unlike you.

While it can be deduced that Bustop TV seeks to expose the economic rot by highlighting how once esteemed professionals have been reduced to nothing, the focus is not mainly on confronting the elite, but to revoke the emotions of the ordinary people in line with Mbembe (2001)’s assertion that the “acts of the dominated do not necessarily lead to resistance, accommodation, ‘disengagement,’ the refusal to be captured, or to an antagonism…”. In “Kurorwa na Money Changer” (Getting married to a forex dealer), a university graduate losing his fiancée to an illegal forex trader (euphemistically called money changer in Zimbabwe). The girl and her mother pointed out that, after seven years of engagement, the former boyfriend was unable to raise money for food and the customary marriage. Adding scorn to injury, the girl adds that the former boyfriend was even offered a job picking grapes in South Africa, which he refused. The experience of educated Zimbabweans having to accept menial jobs in neighbouring countries is well documented (Crush & Tawodzera, 2017, p. 77). As Yang and Jiang (2015, p. 3) pointed, online satire is a playful way of addressing critical social and political concerns on the Internet. In the video “Ka Life” (This Life), we see another example of a subverted hierarchy, this time between city and village dwellers. There is no confrontation in the video as Hall (1981)’s definition of popular culture suggests. One

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of the characters complains with a friend about problems with the electricity supply in the capital, only to be reminded of her refusal to switch to solar panels. This is not based on environmental considerations, but rather as a direct reference to economic failure and decaying infrastructure. The first character considers moving to the village to benefit from food handouts. A third character arrives carrying shopping bags, allegedly received from relatives in the village who benefitted from food relief programmes. The idea of relatives in rural areas supporting their counterparts in the city goes against an established tradition of remittances flowing in the opposite direction when a third character arrives. The economic challenges meant that “urban households were […] getting more resources from the village than they were sending” (Tawodzera, 2013, p. 311). In a survey done in Epworth, a high-density suburb of Harare, it was found that 62% of the respondents were receiving food and 34% received money from their villages (Tawodzera, 2013, p. 311). Mocking the Governing Power Bakhtin’s (1984) notion of carnival foregrounds humour as a meaningful form of engagement in public deliberation by conceptualising public spaces as an arena where people can resist dominant power with the free expression of non-legitimate voices, even mocking the governing power. Also in line with what Foot (2002) identifies as carnival providing “ordinary people with the means to joke and to insult political actors”, we see in the skit, “Percentage Amai Mwana” (Percentage Mother) two women wondering how the finance minister, who owned a bank which failed, was going to manage the economy. The country is facing cash shortages and 80% of the population is said to rely on mobile money to pay for goods and services, especially Eco-Cash, which is the country’s largest mobile money provider (Mkhithika, 2018, p. 4) and it was launched by Econet in 2011. Again in the “Bond Notes Explained” skit, we see the mocking of power as three women “explained” the introduction of bond notes, a currency of notes introduced in May 2016. A series of bond coins had entered circulation in 2014. The $2 bond notes were only introduced in November 2016 and the $5 notes were released in January 2017, the same time this skit was shared. The bond notes were said to be at par with the US dollar when they were introduced, but Zimbabweans treated them with derision. The women in the skit highlight this derision by ironically speaking

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gibberish in their bid to explain the introduction of the bond notes. Dahlgren (2009, p.  139) posits that humorous commentary works to “strip away artifice, highlight inconsistencies and generally challenge the authority of official political discourses [and] this offers pleasurable ports of entry to current political (in this case economic) topics”. In Best Bhero, a pregnant woman is selling imported second-hand clothes in open defiance of the COVID-19 lockdown rules the Government imposed without consulting those affected. Yearning for Economic Rebirth Bakhtin’s concept of “rebirth” is a significant signifier considering “the deconstructive thrust of folk culture was not simply negative or dismissive, rather it held out the promise of a renewal of humankind on a more egalitarian and radically democratic basis” (Gardiner, 1992, p. 30). Furthermore, Park (2013, p. 314)’s claim that “carnivalistic actions triggered by social media can create a new public space, which is formed by numerous voluntary people who wish to see ‘real changes’ in the democratic process”. In the skit, “Gonyeti & Magi on State of Economy” a woman in the high residential suburbs have no money to buy firewood and ended up asking neighbours for the logs so she could cook as there was no electricity due to load shedding. Even sending a simple short message service (SMS) becomes a luxury, as shown by the quote below: You are talking about an SMS. It’s a luxury, I don’t have bread at home. I have even asked someone to give me firewood, but I have no idea what I am even going to cook […] You know that we are constantly experiencing power cuts.

By exposing the economic challenges being faced by ordinary Zimbabweans, Bustop TV can be said to be subtly sending a message to those in power to put on their thinking caps for the economic re-birth of the country. The optics from this video capture a dire economic situation as represented by a house in the background with a gate badly scratched and the security walls not plastered. The carrying of firewood for cooking in an urban setup further portrays a depressing situation that most Zimbabweans want to see gone.

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Oppression Between Ordinary People In as much as proponents of popular culture like Hall (1981) and those of satire such as Cameron (1993) and Siziba and Ncube (2015) highlight a binary opposite of the weak and the powerful, Bustop’s skits also exposes oppression that takes place between ordinary people. In the “Kupima” (Weighing) video, tomatoes and chunks from a vending store are strangely charged in grams using a scale, on which the seller weighs the bond coins against to establish the right grams, to the protest of a customer. Again in “Percentage Amai Mwana” (Percentage Mother), a landlady asks her tenant to pay an extra 2% plus the 21% charged by EcoCash agents when paying rent using mobile money, or pay in US Dollars. Due to cash shortages, EcoCash agents were at the time of producing the skit charging a premium of 21% whenever customers convert their mobile wallet balances into cash. What this means is that one would only get 79% of their balance. The Zimbabwean government takes two cents per every dollar transacted following the introduction of a mobile money transfer due to the increase in informalisation of the economy and high electronic and mobile transactions (Karombo, 2018).

Conclusion This article explored how satire is used by Bustop TV, a satirical group, to highlight economic challenges in Zimbabwe. I argue that although satire is often employed to ridicule the powerful, it is also used to highlight the power relations between ordinary people as those who think they have the wherewithal treat their compatriots with derision. This study further exposes that satire is not all about entertainment or escapism from the economic challenges bedevilling Zimbabwe, rather it has underlying messages to highlight the economic hardships faced by ordinary Zimbabweans and this strategy can be to elicit Government’s action to revive the economy or cause the ordinary people, put pressure on their leaders to stop the economic rot. The findings of this study further demonstrate that while the legacy media use technical language that can only be understood by the elite when covering the economy, satire uses the language of the ordinary people coupled with visuals they relate to in a bid to highlight the economic problems facing Zimbabwe. By doing so, ordinary people are allowed to add their voices to the economic situation in the country, which strengthens the digital public sphere.

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Appendix: Corpus Analysed 2016 Munoshandepi? KaLife 2017 Kupima Bond Notes Explained 2018 Percentage Amai Mwana! Kuronga 2019 Kurarama netsaona Gonyeti & Magi on State of Ecomony 2020 Kurorwa na Money Changer Best Bhero

https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=i9wNpS9YU8E https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=Xb-­TQ9q0-­SM https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=Lq1djYm-­oPk https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=Q0qhNH6bpwY&t=75s https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=wJSh9DgmkbA https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=GQn756KwsY8 https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=z2Qwq6xNKo0 https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=-­rZc1hg4Y_A https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=qsQ-­fG82AUY https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=KoiPYrA0KEo

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CHAPTER 8

‘Humour and the Politics of Resistance’: Audience Readings of Popular Amateur Videos in Zimbabwe Blessing Makwambeni and Joseph Olusegun Adebayo

Introduction A protracted multi-dimensional crisis has marred Zimbabwe’s sociopolitical milieu for over two decades, with scholars at variance on the exact cause(s). Extant scholarship attributes both internal and external issues for the country’s deteriorating situation (Ndlela, 2010;Mhiripiri&Ureke, 2018). Some of the problems adduced for the protracted conflict are: the land reform programme in 2000, disputed presidential elections of 2000, contested presidential election of 2008, misgovernance and western-­ imposed sanctions. The resultant effects have been monumental, as the country has grappled with poor economic performance, decay in infrastructure, poor health and service delivery, and human rights issues among

B. Makwambeni (*) • J. O. Adebayo Department of Media, Cape Peninsula University of Technology, Cape Town, South Africa e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 S. Mpofu (ed.), The Politics of Laughter in the Social Media Age, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-81969-9_8

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other ills that continue to blight her (Chiumbu&Musemwa, 2012; Hodzi, 2014). Despite the removal of Robert Mugabe from power through a military coup in November 2017 and Emmerson Mnangagwa’s ascendancy to the Presidency, the Zimbabwean crisis has not abetted. Instead, the nation has witnessed increased repressive tactics, poor service delivery, corruption, misgovernance, economic decay, increasing militarism and political disenfranchisement. Sadly, the malaises that characterised Robert Mugabe’s tenure have deepened (Hodgkinson, 2019), due mostly to increased authoritarianism from the Ruling Zanu-PF. To manage and control citizens’ interpretations of the unfolding crisis in the country, the ruling Zanu-PF government introduced a gamut of measures and policies whose sum effect has been to stifle counter-­ hegemonic discourses and shrink communicative and democratic space in the country (Moyo, 2007; Ndlela, 2010; Mpofu, 2013). Worse still, the measures and policies have stifled the media’s growth, grossly restricted media access and curtailed freedom of expression (Ndlela, 2010;Willems, 2010). Besides introducing restrictive measures and policies that stifle media freedom in the country, the ruling Zanu (PF) government has also been using extra-judicial activities to silence and thwart dissenting voices. It is now common to witness arbitrary arrests and harassment of journalists, outspoken civilians and political activists who initiate or engage in discourses that challenge the government’s official and singular interpretation of the Zimbabwean crisis Tendi (2008) aptly describes as patriotic history (Willems, 2010). In response to the government’s control of the mainstream media, particularly radio and television, different individuals and groups have moved to social media and online platforms to challenge and contest the ruling Zanu-PF government hegemonic discourses. Various studies have examined and discussed how social media and digital platforms like Facebook provide Zimbabwean citizens with alternative spaces to disrupt and disarticulate state propaganda (Moyo, 2007; Mpofu, 2013; Mare, 2014; Mhiripiri & Ureke, 2018). Popular citizens’ movements like #This flag, #Thisgown and #Tajamuka have used social media and online platforms as alternative spaces to mobilise citizens and protest against increasing repression and deepening poverty (Gukurume, 2017; Chibuwe&Ureke, 2016). Thus, studies on social media activism in Zimbabwe have provided ample evidence to dispute claims that have gained currency in public debates that

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Zimbabwean citizens lack the necessary agency and ingenuity to subvert an increasingly repressive regime (see Willems, 2010). However, although a wide range of studies have interrogated and discussed the role that social media and digital platforms play as an alternative public sphere in Zimbabwe, extant scholarship has mainly focused on overt and organised forms of resistance that have attracted the rancour of officialdom. Significantly less attention has been paid towards understanding other subtle and banal everyday forms of resistance used by ordinary Zimbabweans to critique, guffaw and resist hegemonic power on social media and digital platforms. It is against this background that this chapter sought to examine how audience reception of viral ‘amateur videos’, produced and shared by ordinary citizens with no cinematic experience on social media and other digital platforms, contributes to developing a subaltern counter-public. This chapter examines how citizens can lampoon, resist and laugh at hegemonic power in Zimbabwe. Focusing on audience readings of Lameck Makwiramiti’s amateur video on social media and digital platforms, the chapter asks broader questions on how audience negotiations of seemingly banal and everyday communication forms like amateur videos intersect with every day and broader national politics.

Literature Review Social Media and the Politics of Resistance Social media and digital platforms have inspired new practices that promote citizen-led newsgathering and content sharing globally (Mutsvairo & Columbus, 2012). They allow ordinary citizens who are not necessarily media professionals, to share their experiences and contribute to contemporary media discourses (Mhiripiri & Ureke, 2018). New digital platforms have opened up new alternative space for civic engagement that is de-­ institutionalised, decapitalised and de-professionalised (Mhiripiri & Mutsvairo, 2014). The alternative milieu provided by social media and digital platforms is arguably liberating. It gives voice to previously disenfranchised and marginalised sections of society that had no access to mainstream media and elite public spheres. Therefore, social media and digital platforms have enhanced democracy by allowing and giving voices to subaltern populations previously out of the dominant public sphere’s purview. As argued by Mare (2014), social media and other digital media have also

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morphed into new protest drums used by subaltern populations to subvert hegemonic power, especially in repressive regimes. Researchers have studied the nexus between social media and politics in Africa. In the aftermath of the Arab spring, several studies have examined how individuals and groups are using social media and other digital platforms for political mobilisation, as well as an alternative space, to make demands on human rights, accountability and good governance on the continent (Mpofu&Matsilele, 2020). Studies by Douai and Olorunnisola (2013) and Mutsvairo (2016) have investigated the complex entanglement of social media and political participation in Africa. These studies glean that political movements and individuals in Africa are actively harnessing new social media technologies to orchestrate and mobilise political activities in a wide variety of ways under challenging contexts. Researchers like Bosch (2013) and Mare (2014) have also studied how youths, in particular, appropriate social media platforms like Facebook as alternative forms of political activism. On the whole, the corpus of research on social media and activism in Africa provides compelling evidence that attests to the efficacy of social media technologies in enhancing transparency, freedom of expression and public participation in politics and governance. Most studies on social media and politics in Africa, specifically Zimbabwe, point to the efficacy of new digital media and social networking in galvanising citizens to engage in everyday political discourse that critiques and at times subverts hegemonic power. However, scholars such as Mutsvairo and Sirks (2015) are cautious about the ability of such engagements to translate into active political participation. Chiweshe (2017) shares this pessimism. His position stems from the observation that Zimbabwean citizens, particularly the youths, spend most of their time on social media focusing on nonpolitical engagements like fashion, football and other entertainment forms (2013). Thus, scholars who critique social media’s role in politics and resistance have focused exclusively on overt forms of political resistance and activism used by citizens to engage with the dominant power bloc (Gukurume, 2017;Mpofu&Matsilele, 2020). There is a lack of studies that engage with subtle, disingenuous, everyday forms of resistance embedded in mundane forms of meaning-­making that ordinary citizens use to contest and subvert hegemonic power using social media (see Chiumbu&Musemwa, 2012;Willems, 2010).

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Social Media, Resistance and the Politics of the Everyday Chiumbu and Musemwa (2012) and Willems’ (2010) seminal work on Zimbabwe is instructive in so far as it serves as a stark reminder that resistance should not always be overt and physical. The studies contend that Zimbabwean citizens are not passive; they can harness mundane forms of resistance, such as humour to subvert and challenge hegemonic power in their repressive context. As such, resistance should not be narrowly and singularly understood as referring to physical and material protests in the streets. It should be viewed as inclusive of the broader set of practices used by the dominated to challenge those who oppress them (Haynes & Prakash, 1992). This re-mooring of resistance suggests that all cultural practices that present themselves in the subaltern’s consciousness, which can undermine hegemonic power and attendant ideologies, need to be viewed as everyday forms of resistance. Building on the preceding conceptualisation of resistance, Willems’ (2010) study engages with the contested view that Zimbabwean citizens are passive to the Zanu-PF government’s authoritarian rule. Willems’ study debunks this assumption by providing evidence that clearly shows that ordinary citizens use everyday forms of resistance, such as cartoons and jokes, to protest against the crippling political, social and economic crises. This covert and creative use of social media that subverts the restrictions placed on conventional media and freedom of speech by the government reflects citizen agency (see Chiumbu&Musemwa, 2012). De Certeau (1988) also provides an exciting perspective of approaching everyday forms of resistance that issue from below. He avers that ordinary citizens, often viewed as nobodies or the other, have got the agency to develop clever tricks such as humour and jokes to adapt texts (media texts such as amateur videos) to their own rules and interests. He posits that the subaltern should be viewed as heroes and shrewd philosophers full of inventions to make do with their misfortune, and record victories over the strong using simple meaning-making forms (De Certeau, 1988). Furthermore, De Certeau (1988) contends that ordinary citizens have innovative tactics to interpret and customise technology to fit their context, needs, and environment and use mundane forms of meaning-making to invert dominance in society (De Certeau, 1988). De Certeau’s position that ordinary citizens are active and have the creativity to articulate simple forms of meaning-making to protest their marginal reality and quotidian

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experiences resonate with the key claims assumptions and interests of audience reception studies. There is acknowledgement in the literature that subaltern populations in repressive regimes can use innovative tactics to fight oppression. However, a survey of literature on social media, politics and resistance in Zimbabwe returns very few studies dedicated to understanding the creative ways in which citizens harness mundane forms of communication. There is a lack of literature on how citizens utilise platforms such as amateur videos to engage with everyday politics and general national politics. Studies on social media activism in Zimbabwe are yet to engage with new cultural practices where ordinary citizens, with no previous cinematic experience, are creating, sharing and consuming ‘amateur videos’ on social media that focus on every day and seemingly non-political issues. Pink (2006) argued that it would be near-impossible to ignore ordinary videos recorded by citizens who are neither researchers nor anthropologists, which capture unscripted visual realities. These amateur videos as forms of popular culture demand serious academic scrutiny because they have become an alternative way of telling citizens mundane experiences far removed from the mass media’s purview (Pink, 2006). Guided by audience reception research, we argue that the reception of these popular amateur videos that focus on the ‘ordinary’ Zimbabwean is potentially imbricated in resistance politics. Conceptualising Audience Resistances: Revisiting Audience Reception Research As argued in this chapter, audience reception research provides an interesting premise for interrogating meanings associated with resistance that situated audiences negotiate from amateur videos. It advances an alternative approach to studying audiences that views them as capable of actively and making their meanings from media texts (Ang, 1995;Livingstone, 2015). Unlike, early audience research that viewed media texts as powerful and audiences as passive, audience reception research rejects the notion that the media texts can affect audiences in some direct or measurable ways (Silverstone, 1990). It posits that audiences are active. Thus, meaning-making should be a site of a struggle pitting the structuring text and socially situated audiences (Livingstone, 2015). Milestone studies in audience reception research (Morley, 2003;Ang, 1988) have shown that audiences are not passive recipients of meaning but active decoders who do

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not necessarily accept the text’s positions. Instead, audiences have interpretative freedom, creativity and agency to construct meanings that at times differ from those preferred by the media text (Strelitz, 2000). Notably, audience reception research has a keen interest in understanding the meanings, resistances and pleasures audiences negotiate from media texts. This interest essentially means that audience readings of texts cannot be deduced from media texts alone. Instead, the meaning has to be gleaned carefully in the interaction between the media text and situated viewers who critically interpret, select and evaluate the media text in the context of audiences and their everyday lives. Thus, the context of consumption becomes critical in understanding the meanings and transformations that the media text encounters in the reading process because it is in these contexts that meanings are made (Morley, 2003;Ang, 1996). Ang’s (1988) study of women’s consumption of media texts supports the preceding position. The study’s findings show that media texts are a site of resistance where women can contest forms of domination, such as patriarchal demands. The study confirms the dominant position in audience reception studies that context, as much as the form itself, determines the meanings and pleasures audiences negotiate from media texts (Johnson, 1986). For this reason, audience reception research adopts an approach that compels researchers to relate meaning-making (as well as resistances and pleasures) to the broader economic and ideological formations in which reception takes place (Strelitz, 2000).

Theoretical Framework The study used Nancy Fraser’s conceptualisation of an alternative public sphere to make sense of how audience reception of ‘amateur videos’ circulated and consumed on social media and digital platforms in Zimbabwe constitutes a subaltern counter-public. Fraser’s alternative public sphere provides a useful framework for examining how the reception of ‘amateur videos’ gives citizens space, separate from the state and official economy, to generate and circulate meanings that resist and contest hegemonic discourses in Zimbabwe (see Fraser, 1990). According to Fraser (1990), an alternative public sphere or ‘counter-public’ is a parallel discursive arena that springs up in unequal societies characterised by relations of dominance and subordination, where ordinary citizens cannot participate fully in public debate and deliberation (Fraser, 1990). As a result of marginalisation, subordinated groups in such Manichean societies invent and

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circulate counter-discourses through alternative public spheres. The counter publics become a breeding ground for subversion, contestation and oppositional interpretations of subaltern people’s identities, interests, aspirations and needs (Fraser, 1990). Fraser contends that alternative public spheres allow issues that are exempt from contestation to be argued out publicly. They also have a dual character, while on the one hand, they function as spaces of withdrawal and regrouping. On the other hand, they serve as training grounds for agitational activities directed towards the broader public (1990).

Methodology The study employed a three-stage audience reception analysis of Lameck Makwiramiti’s amateur video that went viral on social media in May 2017, to understand audience reception. The first stage of the analysis consisted of a qualitative content analysis of the video. This stage helped the researchers get a broad idea of the narrative and key themes encoded, as Babbie and Mouton (2001) recommended. The key themes identified through qualitative content analysis formed the basis for making a critical comparative analysis of media discourses with audience discourses in the third stage of the audience reception analysis. The second stage of the analysis consisted of a pared-down virtual ethnography. The study employed lurking or unobtrusive observation to glean audiences’ engagement, interactions and comments about the video on YouTube and Lameck Makwiramiti’s official Facebook page, drawing from the principles of traditional ethnography. Hine’s (2015) notion informed this process that audience participation on social networking sites leaves online traces that reveal their attitudes, social relationships and affiliations. Thus, audience interactions and comments provided the researchers with access to the discursive space where audiences negotiated meaning from the media text. The audience reception analysis’s final stage involved comparing the encoded themes identified through the first stage with audience readings emerging from the pared-down virtual ethnography, as suggested by Makwambeni and Salawu (2018). Following the audience reception analysis precepts, the researchers did not treat audience readings as finished accounts (see Jensen, 1988); the researchers proceeded to interpret audience readings of the video by relating the readings to the broader sociohistorical context of consumption. This process allowed the researchers to

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account for the meanings associated with resistance negotiated from the video (Ang, 1996). The audience reception analysis focused on a purposively selected amateur video that attracted thousands of views on digital platforms between May and December 2017. The video depicts Lameck ‘Makwiramiti’ Chimuka, a Zimbabwean man, storming the funeral gravesite of Mrs. Tumba, his neighbour. Lameck accuses the deceased woman and the Tumba family of ill-treating his daughter impregnated by Mrs. Tumba’s son, who subsequently eloped. Lameck accuses the dead woman of ill-­ treating his daughter and pouring urine on her while she was sleeping. He further accuses the speakers at Mrs. Tumba’s funeral gravesite of hypocrisy for falsely describing the deceased woman as a good person when she was very cruel. Holding his grandchild wearing a tan boot, Lameck, wearing a blue work suit gives the Tumba family forty-eight hours to approach his family or face war and certain death. He further threatens to throw sand and faeces on the food prepared for the funeral attendees. Lameck ends by daring those who may not take kindly to his act of abomination to confront him.

Findings and Discussion Untangling the Media Discourses in the Amateur Video The qualitative content analysis of Lameck Makwiramiti’s video shows that it engages with a seemingly mundane domestic abuse issue meted out against women by their mothers-in-law in a poor community in Zimbabwe. The video’s central theme is a domestic issue that afflicts ordinary women in Zimbabwe. It would not ordinarily receive much coverage and debate in elite public spheres that mainly give vent to grand political matters. Read as an anthropological text; the video engages with ordinary citizens’ quotidian experiences that De Certeau (1988) refers to as the everyday politics. The video engages with deep societal issues that reveal social relations of power, domination and subordination in subaltern spaces, such as issues include condoned social injustices, hegemonic masculinities, physical and material abuse, oppressive societal norms and values, the culture of silence and hypocrisy associated with not speaking ill of the dead, caring for one’s children and grandchildren, honesty and freedom of expression, articulating one’s pain as well as disruptive behaviours and retribution.

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Audience Readings of Lameck Makwiramiti’s Video The study’s findings show that Zimbabwean citizens negotiate meanings associated with resistance from amateur videos circulated on social media and digital platforms. Audience readings of the videos reflect that Zimbabweans are not passive and docile; they actively use humour and laughter to subvert hegemonic power and other forms of domination in their micro and macro contexts of consumption. Besides being used to critique and protest oppression and their marginal existence, the reception of amateur videos on social media has also provided a subaltern counter-­ public. The counter-public offers ordinary citizens space to voice their needs and aspirations, hardly mirrored in the dominant elite public sphere. These findings cohere with Fraser’s conceptualisation of an alternative public sphere as space, separate from the state and official economy, where ordinary citizens generate and circulate counter-hegemonic discourses (1990). They also correspond with Mpofu (2013), and Moyo’s (2007) observation social media and digital media have created alternative arenas where marginalised groups negotiate and debate issues outside government control. Humour and Laughter as Resistance Notably, the resistance to hegemonic power and patriotic discourse that emerge from the findings are clothed in humour and jokes about Lameck, the protagonist in the video. It is important to note that humour in this context serves as an essential resource used by citizens to resist oppression, fight social injustice and call for social and political change (Takovski, 2019). Audience reception of Lameck’s video consists of a litany of jokes and humour centred on Lameck. Some of the humour and jokes shared on social media and digital platforms include, …when your daughter is being mistreated in her marriage, you have to dial Lameck’, ‘Lameck come here, those people (politicians) have started (lying), and ‘Lameck should be our President, we also want tan boots’.

The above quotations attest to the fact that Zimbabwean citizens use humour not just to contest everyday domestic politics but also to challenge oppressive power structures in the country. The above readings read as contestive humour meant to get a critical message across in an

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ostensibly acceptable form (Holmes &Marra, 2002). Thus, humour and laughter serve as a powerful outlet for citizens to share their experiences and challenge domination (Willems, 2010). The subaltern counter-public provided by social media and digital platforms allows Zimbabwean citizens to speak truth to power and escape the censor of state apparatuses in a country where government’s critics are often assaulted (Tendi, 2008). Challenging Hegemonic Cultural Norms and Social Injustices in Zimbabwe The data analysed in the study show that situated audiences use social media’s alternative space to challenge hegemonic norms and social injustices in their micro and macro-social contexts of consumption. It is evident in their dominant reading of Lameck, who violates the ‘Wafa Wanaka’ culture that compels society to only speak good things about the dead. Instead of chastising Lameck for the terrible act, most readers of the video congratulate him for speaking ‘truth to power’. This reading is captured by the sentiments of one social media native who applauds Lameck: ‘Well done Lameck, it is high time we should call a spade by its name’. Other readers go even further and invoke humour to jokingly invite Lameck to contest the Presidency because he is an advocate of change: Makagona vaMakwiramiti. It is time for change. Endai for Presidency because muri munhu anochinja zvinhu straight away. Within 48 hours nyikainenge yanaka. Go for Presidency please, mavote munawo tinokuvhoterai. (You did well Makwiramiti, it’s time for a change. Go for the Presidency because you will bring change. Within 48 hours, the country will be fine. We will vote for you).

These readings clearly show that readers of amateur videos are active and creative; they use the alternative space provided by social media to challenge hegemonic norms that they consider to be oppressive. The video’s reception could be read as a subaltern counter-public provided by social media, where ordinary Zimbabweans critique and challenge the culture of silence and hypocrisy surrounding the culture of not speaking ill of the dead even if they terrorised people in their lifetime. As shown in the quotations, ordinary citizens have got the agency to inflect media texts and infuse them with meanings of resistance that, at times, differ those suggested by the text (Ang, 1988). By articulating their reading of Lameck to

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discourses about the Presidency and change using humour, subaltern readers are participating in counter-hegemony. They use humour to challenge prevailing political leadership in Zimbabwe that unlike Lameck is characterised by dishonesty and has presided over a protracted social, political and economic stasis. Strelitz (2000) argued that audience readings, particularly contestive humour, should be understood in the social-­ historical context of consumption. Read within the broader Zimbabwean context, the change that audiences are calling for transcends the domestic and the cultural, it includes a major revamp of the political and economic system in the country. Confronting Women Abuse and Hegemonic Masculinities Besides contesting the ‘Wafa Wanaka’ culture of silence, Zimbabwean citizens have also harnessed social media and online platforms to confront women’s physical and material abuse. Zimbabweans have also harnessed social media to engage hegemonic masculinities perpetuating the marginalisation of women. The abuse, marginalisation and disempowerment of women in Zimbabwe are well documented (Moyo&Kawewe, 2002). Audiences’ identification with Lameck for exposing domestic abuse meted out against his daughter mirrors their opposition to widespread forms of condoned domestic abuse directed at women: Makagona imi baba. Maratidza vosevana vamwene vasingadi varoora, especially vabereki vanosarudzira mwanakomana wavo mukadzi wekuti varoore. (You did very well. You have taught a lesson to all mother in law who do not like their daughter-in-law, especially parents who want to choose wives for their sons).

Audience negotiation of the theme of abuse also mirrors their opposition to hegemonic masculinities in their social contexts of consumption. By identifying with Lameck, a man who confronts hegemonic masculinity by articulating his pain and standing up for her daughter in ways that defy the most respected, desired and dominant form of masculine identity in his culture given (see Makwambeni, 2013; Gee, 2009), audiences are negotiating meanings associated with resistance to the dominant culture and hegemonic masculinity which expects men to be strong and chase

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away their daughters when they are impregnated out of wedlock. Identifying is an act of resistance to hegemonic masculinities in the social context of consumption that associates pain and emotion with weakness in men. Instead, audience readings subvert dominant conceptions of fatherhood in Zimbabwe by associating manhood with showing emotion, being ‘protective, loving and caring’: This is what you call a man and father’. What a loving father, daivarivamwevaitodzingamwanawavo. Thanks Lameck we need men and fathers like you

As evidenced in the above quotation, audience readings of Lameck are at variance with the most honoured way of being a man in patriarchal societies. The negotiated readings that come to the fore resonate with Connell’s observation that hegemonic masculinities can be contested by other alternative masculinities. In this instance, Lameck reads as the metonym of a new man who is empathetic to women’s suffering. Audience resistance to hegemonic masculinity is also evident when another reader jokingly describes Lameck as ‘woke’ for standing up for his daughter. This reading of the media text shows that audiences do not come into the reading process culturally naked; they can articulate their domestic experiences of marginality to broader global social justice and equality struggles. In this case, identification with Lameck and the antipathy directed towards hegemonic masculinities perpetuate women are shaped by the #metoo movement which views ‘wokeness’ as referring to acts of resistance and solidarity structural oppression women (Cauley, 2019). The subaltern counter-public opened up through the amateur video’s reception on social media, and digital platforms allow Zimbabwean citizens to micro and macro struggles that challenge power relations and oppression. Challenging Governance and the Political System in Zimbabwe The study’s findings show that audience resistances identified in Lameck Makwiramiti’s video’s reception are not confined to hegemonic power at the domestic level. They extend to governance and the political system that the ruling Zanu-PF government has entrenched. It clearly shows that ordinary citizens are shrewd philosophers who are full of the invention to use simple forms of meaning-making to challenge hegemonic power (De Certeau, 1988). A case in point is when one reader laughs at Zimbabwean political leaders:

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I am just in love with Lameck’s level of honesty, kkkkkkkkkk…dai vatungamiriri vedu vakaita saLameck. (This is what it means to stand for the truth, I wish our leaders were like Lameck).

This allusion to Zimbabwe’s political leadership’s dishonesty resonates with another humorous joke that reads, ‘someone, please arrange Lameck for us here’ about the eulogies Zanu-PF leaders directed towards former Chief Justice Chidyausiku’s. The tongue-in-cheek comments from the amateur video show that readers view Lameck as a metonym for good governance and leadership. Audience readings show that he is appropriated as a foil to condemn lack of leadership integrity among Zimbabwean leaders. This lack of integrity extends to failure to honour their pledges to citizens and honesty on issues such as corruption. The amateur video’s reception constitutes a counter-public where the pervasive culture of fear and silence in Zimbabwe is challenged. The quest for a country with freedom of expression is captured in the following reading: ‘if any leader is wrong, people should be allowed to talk. Those days are gone when people are used to saying nice things about their leaders’. This reading of the amateur video can be read as a form of resistance in a social context of consumption where freedom of expression is significantly curtailed, and communicative space has shrunk. It constitutes subversion in a country where some people have been hauled to court for uttering negative comments about the President. Ndlela (2010) posits that ordinary citizens, journalists and opposition members have been victimised because they pointed out wrongs or criticised the ruling Zanu-PF party’s policies. By encouraging others to speak out their mind, the reader directly challenges political violence, institutionalised intimidation and lawlessness that have been the defining feature of Zimbabwe’s political environment (see Chikerema&Chakunda, 2014). The negotiation of meaning is an insult to the politics of intolerance in the country. Therefore, the reader is implicitly challenging the repulsive approach to divergent political views that led to political opponents’ assassination both during and after the liberation (Chikerema&Chakunda, 2014). Simba makes an exciting and humorous reading of ‘Lameck’ that speaks to audiences’ opposition to democratic decay and lack of good governance in Zimbabwe on Facebook: Guys where is Lameck, he must give ZEC 48  hours to recount the votes. Simba’s negotiated reading of the amateur video challenges the culture of impunity manifest as electoral fraud that has engulfed Zimbabwe’s political landscape and defines its political

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culture and governance system (Chikerema&Chakunda, 2014). The resistance to the erosion of independent democratic that Simba alludes to shows that the reception of seemingly banal ‘amateur videos’ on social media and digital platforms in Zimbabwe has helped open up democratic space. It has created a subaltern counter-public where ordinary citizens question the status quo where institutionalised intimidation, fear, violence, lawlessness and selective application of law among other ills have become deeply entrenched (Chikerema&Chakunda, 2014). Laughter in this instance becomes an important tool used by the subaltern to lampoon governance decay. There is ample evidence in the data that Zimbabwean citizens who engage with Lameck Makwiramiti’s video attribute the Zimbabwean crisis to lack of empathetic leadership. This reading is articulated by Nokuthula who compares Lameck with President Emmerson Mnangagwa: ‘Lameck represents the leaders we should consider voting. They have real human feelings. They are real men, not the likes of Ngwena’. Nokuthula’s sentiments are echoed by another reader Chimowa who jokingly quips Julius Malema naLameck same WhatsApp group’. The audience readings quoted above articulate Zimbabwean citizens yearning for empathetic leaders who are sensitive to their suffering. This reading signifies a direct challenge to the national leaders. It also shows that ordinary citizens derive pleasure from actively reworking media discourses in ways that imbue them with new meanings within the parameters set by both the text and the social context of consumption. In opposing the dominant political culture in Zimbabwe, situated audiences draw raw materials from South Africa where Julius Malema, the opposition Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) leader, is viewed by the poor as an empathetic politician who represents them and empathises with their suffering. Disrupting Patriotic History A key pattern of audience’s reading of Lameck Makwiramiti is their appropriation of humour and Lameck the protagonist, as a tool to challenge the official explanation of the Zimbabwean crisis. It serves as a subtle form of resistance to the biased official position, premised on patriotic history, which attributes the causes of the Zimbabwean crisis to external forces at the expense of internal dynamics such as leadership failure (Ndlovu-­ Gatsheni, 2003). It is clear that instead of blaming the minority group of white settlers, the British, and the opposition Movement for Democratic

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Change (MDC) for plunging Zimbabwe into a social, political and economic morass, audience readers’ counter-hegemony suggests that the Zimbabwean crisis results from a crisis of governance. This reception of the amateur video demonstrates that social media and digital platforms have become an alternative platform, envisaged by Fraser (1990), where disenfranchised citizens can articulate their need for a new form of politics and governance consensus that is predicated on pluralism, democracy, human security, tolerance, consent of the governed and respect for human rights (see Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003). It further accentuates Willems’ (2010) observation that citizens will always have the agency to forge disingenuous ways of critiquing and resisting oppression in repressive regimes like Zimbabwe.

Conclusion This chapter sought to understand how audience reception of popular ‘amateur videos’ circulated on social media and online platforms in Zimbabwe has contributed to the development of a subaltern counter-­ public where citizens can safely resist, challenge and laugh at hegemonic power. Focusing on Lameck Makwiratiti’s amateur video, the chapter examined how audience engagement with a seemingly banal form of communication ‘amateur videos’ intersects with both the politics of the everyday and broad national politics in Zimbabwe. The study’s findings clearly show that although ‘amateur videos’ seemingly engage with the politics of the everyday, they provide raw materials for situated readers to generate meanings associated with resistance to hegemonic and institutionalised power at the reception level. The findings attest to the fact that the interaction between the media text and subaltern audiences located in a social context of consumption characterised by marginality has the potential to produce readings that subvert, challenge and guffaw at hegemonic power. These findings of this study contradict claims made in some studies that Zimbabwean citizens are passive victims of the ruling government’s patriotic history and propaganda. They reflect subaltern citizens agency in resisting quotidian experiences of marginality and governance failure. As evidenced in the audience readings, resistance is not always overt and physical but can be manifest in the everyday and ordinary cultural practices of the subaltern. Furthermore, the data analysed in this study shows the efficacy of humour and jokes in camouflaging resistance in despotic regimes. The findings of the study are in synch with previous research that

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has shown that ordinary citizens are harnessing social media and other digital platforms to resist and challenge different forms of domination in their socio-historical contexts. This study recommends that future studies should direct more attention towards understanding how the meaning-­ making process of seemingly mundane forms of communication intersects with broader politics in society.

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CHAPTER 9

The Prank of Celebrity Activism through Postcolonial Nigeria Garhe Osiebe

Introduction It has since been established that “causes are to celebrities what corporate social responsibility is to business” (Cole et al., 2015: np). Consequently, the notions of advocacy, humanitarianism, and diplomacy continue to test media and celebrity studies. This test is typically to do with which makes for which, and what constitutes what. In the events that definitions are proffered, they tend to overlap or display fluidity depending on the sociocultural milieu being engaged. Offering that “celebrity humanitarianism is different from celebrity advocacy”, Richey and Brockington (2019, p. 45) are convinced that “celebrity humanitarianism requires a needy ‘Other’— it is something that one actor does for another person. Advocacy is taking up a cause and amplifying it in public discourse”. Still, the scope of activity involved has been deployed in distinguishing celebrity diplomacy from the other forms such that celebrity diplomats are not restricted to single geographically focused issues, but are rather preoccupied with mainstream

G. Osiebe (*) Rhodes University, Makhanda, South Africa © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 S. Mpofu (ed.), The Politics of Laughter in the Social Media Age, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-81969-9_9

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diplomatic activities, notably communication and negotiations of global breadth (Cooper, 2012). However, the concern here is with celebrity activism—a phrase of two fluid words. Activism has been defined as the practice of deploying direct vigorous action or campaigns in order to bring about change in a given sociopolitical space (Osiebe, 2020a). Celebrity activism has been conceived within celebrity advocacy such that “there is a significant element of activism in celebrity advocacy [since] the act of fighting on behalf of the weak translates to some forms of social activism” (Popoola et al., 2020, p. 1009). I propose that celebrity activism be understood as the celebrity’s application of direct vigorous action or campaigns towards certain causes without the co-optation of a cause-driven organization. The best illustration of this is the tireless crusade for social justice through the life of Fela Anikulapo-Kuti which did not require the trigger or association of any humanitarian or developmental-oriented (non-)governmental organizations. Fela’s activism inherently had the “advocacy” of the pursuit of self-sponsored causes. ‘Celebrity’ is typically understood to mean a well-known personality in entertainment, sports, science, arts, journalism, and politics. For purposes here, celebrity will refer to a personality in popular music and film with at least a national spread of recognition in Nigeria. The term ‘Nollywood’ will refer to the Nigerian film industry whose nomenclature is a popular wordplay on the American film industry’s label: Hollywood. Whereas “fighting on behalf of the weak” remains the staple go-to usually claimed as motivation by celebrities in show business, my analysis of selected case studies would demonstrate that for many celebrity activists in Nigeria, “raising the visibility of suffering” (Chouliaraki, 2012, p. 2) does not constitute the primary goal of their quest for spectacle, let alone ameliorating suffering. Their intent, all factors considered, is to amass visibility for the self, thus resuscitating or sustaining their relevance and often dwindling show business. For the most part, they constitute the commodified residue of political struggle, decked with Fela-like rhetoric, shorn of its revolutionary substance (Richey & Christiansen, 2018). Popoola et al. (2020) has argued that celebrity advocacy in Nigeria is reliant on being politically expedient, serving more to expand celebrities’ stardom than to initiate or sustain change. The ensuing analysis of moments of celebrity activism in Nigeria buttresses this position and highlights ‘explicit co-optation’ as the sole difference between celebrity advocacy and celebrity activism in the country. Also evident is how celebrity activism in Nigeria coexists with political patronage or power and adopts operative modes that keenly

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mimic Western celebrities. The chapter is made up of three subsequent sections. The next section offers an overview of the literature on activism in Africa accompanied by that of celebrity advocacy on the continent in which Western actors preponderate. This is followed by a section conveying an indication of the method, theoretical basis, and discussion of the subject matter—celebrity activism in Nigeria. The final section provides the conclusion.

‘Activism’, Celebrity Advocacy in Africa, and YABIS Culture The literature on activism in Africa is dominated by studies on HIV/AIDS (Bujra, 2000; Epstein et al., 2004; Robins, 2008) and on feminism (Tripp, 2001; Hodgson, 2007). Beyond these, Mmati (2008) explores activism as a social work strategy on the continent. Lindell (2010) is preoccupied with the diversity of organized actors in the politics of informal livelihoods. Ekine (2010) is timely in bringing together a team of mobile communications’ enthusiasts to critically evaluate the modes of connective activism that have transpired through SMS, after its proliferation in Africa. Mutsvairo (2016) proffers a critical reflection of emerging trends on digital activism. The volume covers issues of the LGBTI in Zimbabwe, Fees Must Fall in South Africa, the Bring-Back-Our-Girls movement in Nigeria, and the dwindling popularity of the leadership in Ethiopia and Uganda. Nyabola (2018) breaks with convention in Digital Democracy, Analogue Politics: How the Internet Is Transforming Kenya while Asiedu-Acquah (2019) focuses on students’ activism in Ghana as relating to the government and party of ex-president Kwame Nkrumah. Osiebe (2020b) is concerned with the appeal of activism as a tool in ousting the protracted presidency of a despot in Uganda. In Nigeria, Ejeke (1999) engages with the sociopolitical dimensions of Ken Saro-Wiwa’s environment-centred activism. Uwalaka (2017) is concerned with the rise of digital activism among university students with respect to the 2012 Occupy Nigeria protests. Olabode (2018) extends this by interrogating the role of digital media in Occupy Nigeria, Boko Haram, and the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta. With regard to celebrity, Osiebe (2019a) shows how the Occupy Nigeria protests provided a marketing avenue for artistes of various hues. In spite of the range of literature on activism in

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Africa, few studies have so far managed to focus on activism as practised by African celebrities. In their introduction to Transnational Celebrity Activism in Global Politics: Changing the World? Tsaliki et al. (2011) note that [t]he economy of celebrity culture … dictates that celebrities develop a strategy for building and maintaining consumer (i.e. audience) loyalty by forging and safeguarding a symbiotic relationship with the media. […] Celebrity activism and charity may be interpreted as part and parcel of this symbiosis, whereby the celebrity persona is this all-round individual who, apart from feeding publicity events to the media upon mundane matters such as their latest show, film, album, romance, vacation and the like, also takes active interest in ‘heavy artillery’ matters such as Third World debt, world famine, child soldiers or the vaccination of children in Africa. (9)

In isolating celebrity activism as practised by Africans in Africa, cue is drawn from Tsaliki et al. (2011). Indeed, while Western celebrities appropriate Africa and African conditions to project themselves, African celebrities who ought to see through this and know better have adopted the same strategies to such an extent as to constitute ‘effective’ competition to their Western peers. Put simply, it is increasingly becoming unfashionable for Western celebrities to champion African-centred causes considering the spate of foundations and NGOs founded by African celebrities towards this or that facet of advocacy or activism. Omenugha et al. (2016) argue that Nigerian celebrities simply want to play out what celebrities in the West do. In addition, the displacement of Western popular music and other forms of Western media production from the broadcast scene in Nigeria following media liberalization and their replacement with locally themed and locally produced films and popular music is transpiring in the sphere of celebrity activism or advocacy (Osiebe, 2016). But to what ends? Riina Yrjölä’s (2009) intervention in drawing attention to Africa’s continual subordination to the West, indeed to Africa as a specifically Western project, through the ‘make poverty history in Africa’ activism of two Irish musicians—Bob Geldof and Bono—is perhaps the most noteworthy in the literature on celebrity activism and celebrity advocacy. Appreciating Bono’s efforts as a celebrity leader, Hicks (2006) asks what happens when the celebrity fades. Hicks is of the opinion that citizens rather than rock stars are responsible for holding political leaders accountable. Somewhat more daring in its criticism of Bono’s self-employment as the aid exponent of

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Africa is Dieter and Kumar’s (2008) study titled Downside of Celebrity Diplomacy: the Neglected Complexity of Development. Therein, the authors problematize the notion of development buzz and question the competence of celebrities in handling development issues in a complex continent like Africa, particularly with regard to the one-size-fits-all recommendations they typically proffer. Within the context of democracies, the duo take issue with the legitimacy of celebrity activists having to berate duly elected administrations in Africa (Dieter & Kumar, 2008). Repo and Yrjölä (2011) bring to scrutiny the ‘Africa as hapless child’ narrative of celebrity activism, adding the ‘subversive’ impact of Madonna’s adoption of a Malawian child in 2006. Bell (2013) takes the conversation further through her conceptualization of Western celebrity activists as real-life ‘White Saviours’ in a passive and helpless Africa. Huliaras and Tzifakis (2010) examine Princess Diana’s campaign to ban anti-personnel landmines while they (2012) argue that the roles of Mia Farrow and George Clooney in Sudan’s ‘messy war’ are overstated. Daley (2013) is preoccupied with a holistic assessment of the role of Western celebrities in the snowballing commodification of humanitarianism in Africa. Kogen (2015) questions the veracity of the activist performances of Bono, Clooney, and Angelina Jolie in actually making a difference to suffering Africans. Barron (2009) critiques the additional angle accruing from the celebrity activism of Jolie who managed to turn travel writer by documenting her role with the United Nation’s High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Volcic and Erjavec (2015) highlight Jolie’s obsession with expanding her territory by directing a film about war rapes in Bosnia and Herzegovina. While Jolie stated that her goal was to raise awareness about war rape victims, the authors conclude that the film did not raise awareness as purported and only further polarized the region. For Bennett (2013), the use of social media platforms by celebrities to communicate with their audiences can be interpreted as instigating a re-emphasis of the dominance of ‘the celebrity confessional’ and a reconfiguration of celebrity activism (see also Chouliaraki, 2011; Chouliaraki, 2012). Redmond (2008) explores the carnal nature of the celebrity confession(al) in order to demonstrate that it is often stage-managed and manipulative towards the redemption/resurrection of a celebrity’s dwindling profile. It is in this sense that this study borrows from scholars in assessing certain Nigerian celebrity online activism moves. The foregoing review demonstrates that academic interest in celebrity activism has largely focused on its international forms emanating from the Global North towards the Global South.

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The scholarship on celebrity activism and advocacy undoubtedly veers towards the transnational, at the very best focused on racially or culturally mixed celebrities “between [the West] and Africa in an embodiment of Afropolitanism” (Richey & Christiansen, 2018, p. 241). There has been too little interest in the domestic dynamics of celebrity activism in Africa (Richey & Brockington, 2019; Popoola et al., 2020). Despite the volume of literature on the famed Nigerian social justice crusader and Afrobeat pioneer Fela Anikulapo-Kuti, the statement that he was celebrity activism personified has seldom been made. Nonetheless, his countrymen ceaselessly allude to what might have been were Fela on ground, whenever activism unravels in the contemporary space. Fela’s activism was in the pre-internet age, yet his example of yabis remains a benchmark through which to interrogate celebrity activism in Nigeria presently. There exists a nexus between Fela’s approach in yabis and jokes or stand-up comedy in contemporary Nigeria. More specifically, it is instructive that most of Fela’s application of direct vigorous action came in the midst of defiance. This is to claim that because he was arrested and jailed several times by operatives of the Nigerian state for myriad reasons including the tangible and the concocted, Fela was able to manifest the stature of an activist in his refusal to budge on his methods. The consistency of the arrests therefore meant that consistency in defiance became cultural. Other than these episodes, only a handful of Fela’s activities like the conveyance of his mother’s corpse to the seat of power at Dodan Barracks, Obalende, match the proffered definition of celebrity activism. Most of Fela’s ‘activism’ arguably took place in his application of the vocal stand-up technique known as yabis. It was mainly through yabis, before the well-known documentation records, that he addressed his country’s and Africa’s ills and misnomers so enduringly that he earned the tag of human rights activist (Alimi & Anthony, 2013). It explains why Fela could be said to have expressed an activism ethos in everything he did, yet a study of celebrity activism based solely on Fela is yet to materialize. The word Yabis became very popular among residents in Lagos State of Nigeria in the 1970s, when Fela started his musical shows at his “African Shrine”. [At that time] Fela had a total of three shows every weekend, with a show per day, starting from Friday to Sunday. On Friday, it was “Yabis Night”, while “Saturday Comprehensive Show” came up the day after. Then on Sunday, Fela staged his “Sunday Afternoon Jump”. Although each of these shows was well attended, many people believed that the Friday’s

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“Yabis Night” had the largest crowd. During this particular show, Fela would take time to “yab” himself, most often starting from his alleged “big head”, members of his band, the audience, as well as the government officials at all levels (Federal, state and local government). [With government officials, he revealed] their various corrupt practices and their money wasting programmes. Yabis music plays the role of a stimulant or a motivator to move the people into action against oppressive rule, looting of the nation’s treasury, bribery and corruption, promotion of large-scale violence as well as undermining conventional democratic processes. (Olatunji, 2007, pp. 27, 33)

Whereas much of Fela’s activism was performed within the humorous ambience of yabis, celebrities in contemporary Nigeria appear to have reversed this by putting on a face of seriousness and urgency while actually only humouring themselves and their audiences in the name of activism. Obadare (2009) draws our attention to how jokes have always been iconic tools in the hands of society’s subalterns, used to caricature those in power, subvert authority, and in turn deployed towards the empowerment of the joke-makers. Celebrities in Nigeria are by no means constitutive of the subaltern, yet they have employed the tag of ‘activism’ to caricature those in power and appropriate authority to themselves even while securing or extending bonds with power. Fela’s contributions were before the dawn of the internet and before social media liberalization. Post Fela, the bulk of what passes as activism in Nigeria has occurred in the social media space. Understanding the lacuna between celebrities’ connective rhetoric on social media and celebrities’ collective action or influence on collective action in Nigeria is the objective of this chapter. Between Mancur Olson Jr.’s The Logic of Collective Action (1965) and Lance Bennett and Alexandra Segerberg’s The Logic of Connective Action (2013), the world witnessed a remarkable transformation in the ways that aggrieved persons got themselves heard. Earl and Kimport (2011) emphasize the low cost of internet activism and makes the case for activists acting together, while apart. Yet, Bonikowski (2013) demonstrates that internet popularization has not resulted in mass activism. The penchant to dwell on the technological enabler in this study nonetheless goes beyond the technology and seeks to comprehend the sociocultural processes and implications. A discussion of the activism of some notable Nigerians across music and film, each of whom is well known and makes for a celebrity through the digital era, including Tuface Idibia, Olanrewaju ‘eLDee’ Dabiri, Desmond Elliot, and Omoni Oboli, follows a brief historicizing of celebrity activism in Nigeria

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before the internet. The analysis demonstrates that Nigerian celebrities have adopted operative repertoires mimicking Western celebrities, and that their activism coexists with political patronage and power.

Incumbency-Possessed Celebrity Activism in Nigeria The study’s methodology is mostly a critical discourse analysis of selected texts. Fairclough (2001) declares certain reservations about the concept of ‘method’. He holds the view that the temptation to consider a ‘method’ some sort of transferable skill becomes much higher once such a ‘method’ is understood to be a technique: a tool in a box of tools, which can be resorted to when needed, and then returned to the box (Fairclough, 2001, p. 121). Fairclough insists that critical discourse analysis is as much theory as method. This theory and method are in a dialogical relationship with other social theories and methods with which they ought to engage in a way that is not merely interdisciplinary but transdisciplinary. By this conception, Fairclough refers to the ways in which the particular co-­ engagements on specific aspects of the social process may yield developments of theories and methods which will shift the boundaries between these two (Fairclough, 2001, p. 121–122). In other words, each method and theory ought to be open to the theoretical logics of others, open to internalizing them in a way which can transform the relationships between them. As “[the transdisciplinarity] of discourse […] renders CDA [critical discourse analysis] a powerful critical theoretical and methodological tool in the social sciences” (Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 2010, p. 1218), celebrity activism in the age of social media proliferation ought to be engaged through a dialogical and transdisciplinary interrogation of every facet deemed necessary. Among a number of perspectives from audiences in Nigeria, the one of the head of the communication department at one of the country’s private universities captures the aggregate position of the people which shall be unpacked: I am not aware that Nigerian celebrities are into activism. I don’t see how their activities amount to activism. Against who? And to what end? In my view, it is one of the many false ideas sold to Africans. (An Associate Professor of Media and Politics, Nigeria; March 2020)

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Not just a few household names have made the headlines at one time or the other for the ‘people’s cause’ in Nigeria. The aims are, however, seldom attained. Celebrity activism has taken many forms through the chequered history of postcolonial Nigeria. A review of some of these would surprise the student of Nigerian political literature. Through Nigeria’s postcolonial history, celebrity endorsements of politicians have been framed as activism by the media and by the celebrities themselves in numerous instances. Non-democratic regimes understand the symbolic power of legitimating events, as demonstrated by pro-government rallies organized by the police and military (Norris, 2002). To cite a key moment when this happened in Nigeria, the two-million-man march of 1998 campaigning for the self-succession of General Sani Abacha was framed as some sort of activism by celebrities who had been induced to partake in the march and insist that Abacha was synonymous to Nigeria’s vast potential and promise. Of the event, Olukotun (2002) observes that in order to give the impression of a national platform, the government used traditional media forms cut across Nigeria’s geo-ethnic groups. Illustrating this, Olukotun lists the entertainers mobilized to sing the glories of Abacha on the historic occasion of 3 and 4 March 1998. It is perhaps in understanding the predicament of these celebrities, in terms of the economic dispossession of art or life under military dictatorship, that Charly Boy Oputa offered the following description of what ought to characterize activism: Not everybody can do activism. For you to be a sincere and a good activist, you need to have a revolving income, you need to have roof over your head, you need to be grounded economically, you also need to be disciplined enough to be content with your simple life. (Oputa, 2019)

However, the seamless relationship between activism and political patronage in Nigeria is best communicated by Festus Keyamo, a well-­known human rights activist who is now in the corridors of power: People don’t realize that governance is activism. … We have distinguished [political office holders] who are fighting for the rights of their people. They cannot fight for the rights of their people without being [in government]. … There is only so much you can do as a private person. … The greatest activists are those in government. (Keyamo, 2019)

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The foregoing distinct convictions of activism, nonetheless the activist music beyond Fela’s, through military-ruled Nigeria have previously been documented (Osiebe, 2018). It is plausible to argue that present-day artistes function in a space equidistant from connective rhetoric and collective action. Innocent Idibia (2baba) has had a flourishing career from the 2000s to date. In 2020, he was appointed goodwill ambassador by the UNHCR.  Idibia’s activities through the decades make his activism an interesting case study. Idibia is the subject of the neutral electoral consciousness (Osiebe, 2019b) wherein, in order to maintain the act of an activist, he urged a gathering at a particular elective office aspirant’s campaign event in 2011 to cast their votes for whomever their conscience preferred. Since starting his solo career in 2004, Idibia has released an album biennially without fail. His body of works reveals that his subsequent albums were released between 2006 and 2014.1 In 2016, the prolific singer−songwriter failed to put out an album two years after the last release as had become his tradition. What might have gone wrong? Rather than leave critics/fans speculating, Idibia provided answers in January 2017, when he suddenly became an online activist, calling for nationwide protests against the hardships faced by citizens in Nigeria. As if it was not strange enough that Idibia was only realizing the veracity of protests against the people’s hardships 57  years after independence, 48  hours before the scheduled march, Idibia reneged, insisting that he remained part of the protests but had only withdrawn from the ‘physical’ parade due to security concerns. This evoked nostalgia in many who were interested in reflecting what Fela might have done. The resulting backlash constituted, in the main, on social media, the single ‘Holy Holy’ (2017), wherein Idibia opened the video with an excerpt, in Fela’s own voice, humouring the proclivity of the African to suffer, yet smile while at it. In ‘Holy Holy’ (2017), Idibia accuses his critics of being hypocritical, stating that “he who has no sin should cast the first stone”. The relationship between a creative block, a fabrication of activism, and an eventual trigger for creativity is evidenced. In fact, for enhanced damage control, Idibia sought the services of a band of Nollywood actors to perform an exercise in revisionism: Power of 1 —a film that starred Idibia’s wife Annie (Ojukwu, 2018). These attempts to save face and to manufacture some nationalist ethos for himself as a conscience which would always speak out against masses’ 1  After 2014, Idibia only managed an album in 2020 (a hiatus of six years) through the somewhat underwhelming Warriors project.

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sufferings are symptomatic of a wide-ranging tradition of activism in Nigeria, before and after digitization. The turn of the digital age has had its impacts on celebrity activism in Nigeria. Additionally, there is the tendency through post-independence Nigeria to elevate each occupant of the nation’s number-one-office to messianic or saviour status. This tendency is endemic to the point that it also borders on claims of divinity. In the case of the self-succession bid of ex-president Goodluck Jonathan, there were two additional factors that played out: first, his name ‘good luck’ vis-à-vis a political trajectory exemplifying this, and, second, the circumstances surrounding his assumption of the office of acting president while his principal Umaru Musa Yar’Adua lay ill, and subsequently as president after Yar’Adua passed on. Intrigues bordering on majority/minority politics meant that Yar’Adua’s lieutenants were reluctant to have Vice President Goodluck Jonathan ascend as constitutionally required (Osiebe, 2020b). With Yar’Adua’s absence assuming protracted proportions, a national outcry for tangible governance from visible leaders meant that the 2011 presidential election bid of Goodluck Jonathan was conducted as some sort of pursuit of a just cause, since joining the Jonathan campaign meant playing a part in undoing the injustice meted out to Jonathan by his detractors. The band of Nollywood actors and actresses who performed at least three jingles for Jonathan’s campaign were spurred on by this sense of pursuing justice. Hence, the 2011 presidential election campaigns had a sizeable representation of electoral activism by many celebrities who received incentives in patronage and influence. Among the electoral activisms of the age, the Mo′ hits Records website announced on 6 February 2011 that Oladapo Oyebanjo (D’banj) “will be leading a group of artistes in Nigeria, with the support of icons and professionals to engage Nigerian Youths in the on-going voters’ registration” (Mo’ hits Records, 2011). The announcement was emphatic in communicating the novelty of the idea stating that “this is the first time in Nigerian Entertainment History, that artistes have formed a coalition, to encourage the Youth of Nigeria to register to vote, vote, and have a voice in the future of Nigeria” (Mo’ hits Records, 2011). It further added:

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It is the findings of OUR TIME that only 8% of eligible youths are registered to vote and it will do the on-going democratic transformation2 harm if there is a low turnout of the youths in the forthcoming elections. It is the belief of OUR TIME that a strategy is devised to ensure youth participation in the on-going voters’ registration and in the forthcoming elections. … The Intentions of OUR TIME is to utilize a unique platform to create a campaign that will mobilize the youths to participate in the on-­ going voters’ registration exercise via radio jingles, television ads, print media, online marketing and concerts in six geographical regions in the Federal Republic of Nigeria. (Mo’ hits Records, 2011)

The website gave the impression of altruistic intentions. However, observers were compelled to rethink when Olanrewaju ‘eLDee’ Dabiri, a member of the now defunct hip-hop trio Trybesmen, reported on 23 March 2011 that D’banj had in fact hijacked a non-partisan campaign by a number of artistes to discourage voter apathy among youths by performing at concerts which could only be accessed using the voter registration cards (Dabiri, 2011). Dabiri describes his shock when he saw a commercial that took footage from the voter registration initiative commercial, but now with a different tagline, supported by Our Time Group, Youths rising up for GEJ (Goodluck Ebele Jonathan) while watching television on 17 March 2011. Dabiri’s decision to go the lengths he did to clear the air speaks to public distrust of celebrities in Nigeria. His published rebuttal also betrays his and his colleagues’ opportunism. This raises some preliminary questions. First, why wait for the government to begin a voters’ registration exercise before deciding to use their music as a platform? Second, could it in fact be that getting more “attention from their intended demographic” (Dabiri, 2011) through “multiple concerts across the country” (Dabiri, 2011) was the primary incentive here? Third, otherwise, the calendar for electoral activities was already available and certainly accessible before the electoral season. Fourth, how come these celebrities interested in “increasing youth participation in the democratic process” had not written or recorded music either individually or collectively to sensitize youth to the electoral or democratic process? It comes across that the idea of registered voters provided more of an avenue for these artistes to promote their art and relevance, as against their interest in getting increased 2  ‘Transformation’ was a key slogan in the election bid of President Goodluck Jonathan in 2011.

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youth participation in the electoral process. As for the tag “Our time” for the concert series, one wonders how such a tag could be arrived at if truly these “household names who would easily fill up arenas in any city” (Dabiri, 2011) had no preferences among the electoral candidates. One must ask: Our time for what? Just vote? This is hardly compelling to the discerning observer. Unsurprisingly, Dabiri argues that “in order to avoid the initiative being politicized, we agreed to raise funds through non-­ partisan means alone” (Dabiri, 2011). Yet, questions remain as to what constitutes the politicization of the initiative, and what manner of funds makes for non-partisan means in a country where politicians and others affiliated with the state are more well off than the general population and are typically better placed to recruit entertainers even at private functions. Conveniently, Dabiri continues with a claim to “little resources” put together, with no mention of actual figures or sources towards TV commercials in a manner that is known in Nigeria as express (done at short notice, an emergency—this usually means the sought production is done more expensively). Yet, he continues in a seemingly satisfactory tone that “at the end of the voter registration period, there was overwhelming evidence of the success of the initiative and we all looked forward to entertaining our registered voter fans at the concert series” (Dabiri, 2011). The latter part of the foregoing sentence is hardly believable because to the average Nigerian, who bears default cynicism towards the Nigerian celebrity, a motivation for these celebrities to entertain their fans across a series of concerts just for being registered voters is unfathomable. The claim that Dabiri makes that he and his colleagues would travel across cities in the country at personal costs to perform for fans who pay nothing but their voter registration cards cannot stand with the average Nigerian observer. The claim suggests a half-truth wherein either corporate or political sponsors are omitted. Equally, the omission of a disagreement between the participating musicians unravels when Dabiri fast-forwards to a later paragraph. When he writes that “this version [had been] manipulated to suit a different purpose … and totally omits [their] voter registration campaign initiative” (Dabiri, 2011), one wonders why this should be an expectation since the voter registration period had ended with “overwhelming evidence of the success of the initiative” (Dabiri, 2011). Beyond the fact that Nigerian celebrities are not known to keep their word, what precisely would Dabiri have his readers believe? Surely, musicians showing up at series of concerts to perform after the fact of voter registration and voter registration card

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collection by youths or fans would not compel these fans to put the cards to actual use by voting. When Dabiri writes that the new tagline “‘supported by Our Time Group, Youths rising up for GEJ’ was the exact opposite of what we created the initiative for” (Dabiri, 2011), one gets the feeling that he is hoping to have his readers believe that the original purpose was to encourage citizens to get registered with a view to making independent or uninfluenced candidate choices at the ballot. The innocence claimed by Dabiri is under-compelling. After all, the initial announcement on the Mo′ hits website gave itself away with the use of ‘transformation’. The original trigger for the initiative which was elections underlies the central point that celebrities in contemporary Nigeria are obsessed with political or electoral events and are too state-minded to offer activism in an unburdened form. Whereas D’banj had feigned an activist outlook with regards to a concern for youths’ participation in the electoral process, it had only been a smokescreen for him to campaign for the incumbent president. D’banj went on to record a campaign jingle for the president and also served as the president’s interviewer at a time when the president was evading debates along with other presidential hopefuls. Through these electoral engagements, D’banj got handsomely rewarded, thus aptly demonstrating the manifestation of a brand of self-serving, purchasable activism in Nigeria. The story of Nigerian celebrities in activism and politics has been dismal. It is generally believed in Nigeria that Nigerian celebrities associate with politics and politicians for their self-interest. Some celebrities get appointed as commissioners by state governors who seek to appropriate the entertainment block for their demographic support. Highlife music maestro Sir Victor Uwaifo and veteran actor Richard Mofe Damijo were named commissioners of culture in their respective states of Edo and Delta. Both men served for as long as their chief executives let them, yet many are of the view that both left no tangible legacy beyond self-service and self-promotion. Their primary constituencies of music and film felt no indication of one of their own in government. A group of other celebrities actually sought elective office and failed in their bids. Musicians Tony Tetuila and 9ice attempted to be legislators to no avail. More recently, singer KCee sought to be governor of Anambra as did Nollywood star Yul Edochie. Both KCee and Edochie were eliminated from the process before any serious electioneering and campaigning began. Actress Kate Henshaw also sought elective office and failed. Of this lot, Popoola et al. argued that “the manner in which [celebrities in show business] abandoned their

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political agenda [reveals] that they showed interest in politics so they could be ‘bought out’” (Popoola et al., 2020, p. 11). One rare exception, however, is Nollywood star Desmond Elliot. Elliot is an ardent disciple of the former governor of Lagos state whose influence on southwest Nigerian politics is such that he is the national leader of the ruling party Bola Ahmed Tinubu. Elliot warmed his way to Tinubu and emerged an elected legislator of the Lagos State House of Assembly in 2015. Expectations were rife on a fresh approach to doing things and a semblance of the sort of energy Elliot displayed while courting attention from the comforts of the opposition. Regrettably, Elliot’s voice and impact since his election victory have been conveniently low-key. The sole changes observers can point to are Elliot’s self-development and evolution from actor to bona fide film director. In a recent controversial episode, Elliot’s decision to provide some relief materials for his constituency following the Covid-19 outbreak was marred by his brandishing of the materials with his name and photograph. Post Fela, Nigerian celebrities are generally incapable of activism since they have price tags. It is the case that celebrities in Nigeria are quick to lay claim to the charitable component of their artistry. However, more often than not, it is believed to be a hoax. An example should suffice: Omoni Oboli is a very successful Nollywood actress. She runs the Omoni Oboli Foundation, which, as expected, is geared towards ‘assisting the less privileged’ in some social entrepreneurship sense. She authored a book which was launched to coincide with her fortieth birthday celebrations.3 Careerists such as Oboli court politicians, as she did Goodluck Jonathan, and Udom Emmanuel among others, to make huge donations on behalf of ‘some less privileged group’, for example, only to be seen executing her next big career leap (The Nation, 2017). Oboli is a representative of the broader celebrity mindset in Nigeria’s film and music sectors where (re) igniting one’s relevance is standard practice. These sorts of feel-good activism convey Oboli and her ilk in Nigeria as model ironic spectators, particularly regarding NGO branding, marketization of purported humanitarianism, and the outright resort to technology for communication (Chouliaraki, 2013). The question of altruism recurs in Nigerian activism discourse because activism serves as an auditioning ground for celebrities. In the end, celebrity only embodies the false promise of individual power 3  Oboli released the book The Stars Are Ageless about her journeys through life as a wife and mother, indicative of her propensity for self-glorification. Nothing prevents her from doing a book on the ‘less privileged’ she is perpetually engaged catering for.

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as a force of social change precisely because “the [tangible] power of celebrity [lies] outside the spotlight” (Chouliaraki, 2011, p. 375; Chouliaraki, 2012). Social media has proven to be a safe space for the rhetoric of Nigerian celebrities which constitutes more of redecorating than activism (Slater, 2018). The #EndSARS protests of October 2020 revealed a lot in this respect. Of the protests, Seun Kuti, son of Fela, argued that [i]t is part of the failing of the black world that celebrities represent African people when it comes to politics and economics or any socio-political discussion. You cannot see Jewish people sitting down and having political problems and a Jewish celebrity is called to discuss it. Nor can you see Europeans having problems and their celebrities are called to discuss it. No! It is detrimental to the Pan-African consciousness of African people that we allow celebrities [to] represent us because they don’t know anything. I’m sorry, we are musicians, we know music, but we are not experts. Where are the professors? They are bought off. The ones that are not bought off have travelled. But none of them are speaking on the side of the people. But the real problem is that only celebrities are prominent in media for African people so they tend to have more political power than they should in our communities (Kuti, 2020).

Kuti strikes certain chords through his submission, yet it must be said that the involvement of artistes in popular protests as in the #EndSARS episode was reactionary. This is not good enough. Artistes pride themselves as original creatives and are respected and idolised on that basis. Consequently, it is not sufficient for them to march the streets with placards and offer rousing speeches. In the long run, therefore, for celebrity impact to be meaningful, they have to be proactive. Their activism must be more cerebral than mere reactionary street marches. They ought to be able to read society better and proffer solutions to brewing problems before these problems get out of control, as is typically the case. To pass the buck to professors as Kuti attempts to do is to invalidate their talents or art as original creatives. Celebrity activism in Nigeria as it is currently constitutes no more than pranks at the people’s expense. Celebrity activism in Nigeria has become “a place where elitist politics of the [cerebral and elite] are extended, perpetuated, and reproduced” (Richey & Brockington, 2019, p. 53). Not only have Nigerian celebrities made a choice of subordination to Western celebrities in projecting an image of the public good while good

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self-publicity is the intent, they have also appropriated a confessional mode in stage-managing certain causes towards the resurrection of dwindling profiles. Seun Kuti’s relaunch of Fela’s Movement of the People (MOP) in the midst of the #EndSARS protests leaves the inevitable wonder as to whether a rebirth could actually result from his relaunch, and to what degree it would put a brake on ceilings that Fela couldn’t effectuate in formal Nigerian political spaces. Perhaps the most blatant representation of activism as prank and prank as activism in Nigeria also materialized during the #EndSARS protests wherein celebrity online comedians, or Instagram skit makers as they are otherwise known, took the opportunity to convey their skills as online comic-tivists. Mark Angel, MC Lively, Billionaire Prince White, Broda Shaggi, Officer Woos, Nosa Rex, Mr. Macaroni, and Taaooma are a few of the online comics who bothered to communicate concern on the issues using their platforms. This was done not minding the substance and quality of thought that had gone into the various plots. Their contributions fell direly short of the fierceness in Fela’s yabis and portrayed each of them as posers mainly after the public’s approval and sustained relevance. As observed earlier, since the unceremonious end to the protests, each of these comics have returned to their routines of creating content for their livelihoods. There has not been a methodical and sustained attempt to chart a course either for the protesting youths or the government with respect to lasting solutions to the problems highlighted by the protests. The activism which they are happy to reference therefore constitutes no more than momentary yabis and a blatant prank on the public and the protesters. When one considers Bovi Ugboma’s ‘Banana Republic’, a comedic documentation series wherein he plays the title-head ‘President of Nigeria, Online’, or better yet, the ‘Social Media President’ and ‘The Committee’, a mimicry-based representation of Nigeria’s typical ruling or executive councils by a set-up of Basketmouth, Buchi, I Go Save, and Nedu Wazobia, it becomes apparent that by far the most critical and sustained form of activism that results from show business in Nigeria is to be found in comedy, particularly so for the series-­ oriented than for the activist moments in most others’ catalogues. Activism cannot exist in moments. Activism should be a lifestyle, but it mustn’t remain stuck on issues for the sake of sustaining and retaining survivalist rhetoric. The principal lesson every celebrity, every Nigerian, and indeed everyone must take from Fela’s yabis sessions is his example of opening with self-ridiculing/self-critiquing.

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Conclusion This chapter has drawn attention to the widespread cynicism of Nigerians towards their celebrities with regard to activism. For the overwhelming majority of Nigerians, ‘celebrity activism’ is a non-existent construct. This runs contrary to the beliefs of Nigerian celebrities who are quick to beat their chests over their impactful efforts in activism. Having established a celebrity gap in the activism literature in Nigeria and Africa, the chapter demonstrates that what passes for ‘celebrity activism’ in Nigeria is predominantly an activity from the playbook of Western celebrities. It further shows that ‘celebrity activism’ occurs more often in Nigeria when there is political patronage involved. The analysis demonstrates that Nigerian celebrity activism has been primarily attached to the government, associated with politicians, and executed in order to brand the celebrity more than branding a cause. The desire for wholly altruistic activism remains a utopian construct. The forms through which the construct of ‘celebrity activism’ exists in Nigeria include activism for attention and relevance, activism to sustain one’s celebrity, and activism to raise one’s celebrity status. Slavoj Zizek’s charge to think rather than act, to learn and learn some more (Triantis, 2013), is preferred to the obsessive propensity to be activists. Internet activists and scholars need to be aware that as partakers in connective action may be branded click-tivists, so might partakers of the age-long collective action be accused of showmanship. There is no evidence to propose that participants of the pre–internet age protests believed in the cause any more than the average click-tivist did in the present dispensation. It is hoped that this intervention will serve to curtail celebrity excesses in Nigeria and Africa towards motivating only individuals with altruistic objectives to deploy activism. Celebrity status may hold the capacity to pull crowds, make headlines, and promote trends and hashtags, but it is the evolution of the celebrity into a rallying centre bearing a collective ethos that gives credence to genuine forms of activism with the potential to impact peacebuilding and conflict resolution. Nigerian celebrities appear to be in-over-their-heads regarding the responsibility and accountability that ought to come with activism. In its place, social media has made Nigerian celebrities more visible in appropriating causes, yet with little effect, substance, or the people’s trust.

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Obadare, E. (2009). The uses of ridicule: Humour, ‘Infrapolitics’ and civil Society in Nigeria. African Affairs, 108(431), 241–261. Ojukwu, I. (2018). Power of 1. [DVD] Nigeria: Buckwyld Media. Olabode, S. (2018). Digital activism and Cyberconflicts in Nigeria: Occupy Nigeria, boko haram and MEND (digital activism and society: Politics, economy and culture in network communication). Emerald Publishing Limited. Olatunji, M. (2007). Yabis: A phenomenon in the contemporary Nigerian music. Journal of Pan African Studies, 1(9), 26–46. Olson, M., Jr. (1965). The logic of collective action: Public goods and the theory of groups. Harvard University Press. Olukotun, A. (2002). Traditional protest media and anti-military struggle in Nigeria 1988-1999. African Affairs, 101(403), 193–211. Omenugha, K., Uzuegbunam, C., & Ndolo, I. (2016). Celebrity culture, media and the Nigerian youth: Negotiating cultural identities in a globalized world. Critical Arts: South-North Cultural and Media Studies, 30(2), 200–216. Oputa, C. (2019). ‘Full Exclusive Interview with Charly Boy on Festus Keyamo Bribery Scandal’. Roots TV Nigeria. Online Video Clip. Retrieved January 1, 2020, from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=e1kEeT5zI5w Osiebe, G. (2016). The opportunism of political music culture in democratic Nigeria. Journal of African Cultural Studies, 28(1), 13–27. Osiebe, G. (2018). In the trenches with Fela: Reassessing protest political music culture before the fourth republic. In C. LeVan & P. Ukata (Eds.), Handbook of Nigerian politics (pp. 406–424). Oxford University Press. Osiebe, G. (2019a). Alternative popular music reporting at the occupy Nigeria 2012 protests. In C. Sterling (Ed.), Transnational trills in the Africana world (pp. 70–89). Cambridge Scholars Publishing. Osiebe, G. (2019b). Valences of electoral consciousness in the music of democratic Nigeria. Canadian Journal of African Studies, 53(2), 251–272. Osiebe, G. (2020a). ‘Oliver Twist, popular music and electoral nostalgia in Nigeria’. African Identities https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.108 0/14725843.2020.1796590 Osiebe, G. (2020b). The ghetto president and presidential challenger in Uganda. Africa Spectrum, 55(1), 86–99. Popoola, R., Egharevba, M., & Fayomi, O. (2020). Celebrity advocacy and Women’s rights in Nigeria. Journal of Asian and African Studies, 55(7), 1007–1022. Redmond, S. (2008). Pieces of me: Celebrity confessional carnality. Social Semiotics, 18(2), 149–161. Repo, J., & Yrjölä, R. (2011). The gender politics of celebrity humanitarianism in Africa. International Feminist Journal of Politics, 13(1), 44–62.

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Richey, L., & Brockington, D. (2019). Celebrity humanitarianism: Using tropes of engagement to understand north/south relations. Perspectives on Politics, 18(1), 43–59. Richey, L., & Christiansen, L. (2018). Afropolitanism, celebrity politics, and iconic imaginations of north–south relations. African Affairs, 117(467), 238–260. Robins, S. (2008). From “rights” to “ritual”: AIDS activism in South Africa. American Anthropologist, 108(2), 312–323. Slater, T. (2018). ‘That’s redecorating, not activism: A ‘protest’ in Manchester reminds us how trivial student politics has become’. Spiked [online] Retrieved January 1, 2020, from https://www.spiked-­online.com/2018/07/19/thats-­ redecorating-­not-­activism/#.W4vopJ3wbIX The Nation. (2017). Omoni Oboli: I’m tired of shooting in Lagos [online] Retrieved August 22, 2019, from https://thenationonlineng.net/omoni-­oboli-­im-­tired-­ shooting-­lagos/ Triantis, S. (2013). “Don’t Act. Just Think’: A short comment on Slavoj Zizek’s critique of Activism’. The Partially Examined Life: A Philosophy Podcast and Philosophy Blog [online] Retrieved March 1, 2018, from https://partiallyexaminedlife.com/2013/08/26/dont-­act-­just-­think-­a-­short-­comment-­on-­slavoj-­zizeks-­ critique-­of-­activism/ Tripp, A. (2001). The new political activism in Africa. Journal of Democracy, 12(3), 141–155. Tsaliki, L., Frangonikolopoulos, C., & Huliaras, A. (2011). Introduction: The challenge of transnational celebrity activism: Background, aim and scope of the book. In L. Tsaliki, C. Frangonikolopoulos, & A. Huliaras (Eds.), Transnational celebrity activism in global politics: Changing the world? (pp. 7–24). Intellect. Uwalaka, T. (2017). Mobile internet and the rise of digital activism among university students in Nigeria. PhD Thesis: The University of Canberra. Volcic, Z., & Erjavec, K. (2015). Transnational celebrity activism in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Local responses to Angelina Jolie’s film in the land of blood and honey. European Journal of Cultural Studies, 18(3), 356–375. Yrjölä, R. (2009). The invisible violence of celebrity humanitarianism: Soft images and hard words in the making and unmaking of Africa. World Political Science, 5, 1.

CHAPTER 10

Comedy, Horror, and Graphic Violence: Brazilian Allegories of the Culture Wars Diego Hoefel

Introduction Despite stimulating seemingly opposite sensations and affections, comedy and horror have been combined with astonishing frequency throughout the history of cinema. Gremlins (1984), Ghostbusters (1984), and Scream (1996) are highly visible examples (Carroll, 1999; Yogerst, 2016), but the fusion of comedy and horror is also present in more recent films such as Zombieland (2009) and Get Out (2017) (Carew, 2019; Bishop, 2011). This encounter may appear unusual and intriguing at first, as the viewer has an expectation of laughter on the one hand and of fright and increasing tension on the other. However, the two genres deal with the “problematization, violation, and transgression of standing categories, norms, and concepts” which, for some scholars, might explain their affinity (Carroll, 1999, p.  152). When discussing the horror-comedy subgenre, Nöel Carroll identifies a shift between moments of lightness, marked by the presence of jokes and the use of comic timing; and others of alertness,

D. Hoefel (*) The NOVA School of Social Sciences and Humanities (FCSH), Lisbon, Portugal © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 S. Mpofu (ed.), The Politics of Laughter in the Social Media Age, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-81969-9_10

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in which tension and fear are added to the narrative. This variation makes the spectator feel in some scenes as if watching a comedy, in others a horror movie. The mobilization (or not) of fear is a good way to explain the cadence of states discussed by Carroll. However, it does not completely apply to the sick and sadistic humor of some films recently released in Brazil. As I argue in this chapter, in these cultural texts the viewer sometimes experiences a simultaneous state of fear and amusement. Instead of fluctuating between comedy and horror, the films seem to combine them. A similar convergence of mockery and fear can also be identified in the reactions of different sectors of Brazilian society to an upheaval of social moralization that has occurred over the past five years, a process known in the country as the “conservative wave” (Almeida, 2020). During this period, an intense polarization of society caused the two ends of the political spectrum to attack each other, sometimes suggesting the enemy’s danger, sometimes discrediting it comically. The election of Jair Bolsonaro in 2018 reinforces this conjunction. When still a congressman, Bolsonaro had always reiterated a profound opposition to non-governmental organizations and social movements. He also openly and repeatedly discredited all sorts of activism related to the issue of human rights. His victory was taken with deep fear by progressive sectors of society as an imminent possibility of attack on any people who diverged (even if by their mere existence) from the moral agenda built on an alliance of far-right and evangelical churches (Almeida, 2019). At the same time, the apparent inability of the new head of State to the post and his frequent gaffes have motivated countless memes, imitations, and stand-up comedy routines. In many cases, the jokes were built precisely on the potential danger posed by the lack of prudence of the ultra-right president. A mixture of laughter and suspicion. Throughout these years of increased polarization and potential belligerence, a number of very unique films were produced in the country, in particular if compared to the recent history of Brazilian cinema. These films have many scenes of bloodshed, a profuse and intense use of graphic violence. In each of the narratives it is possible to identify the presence of two opposing sides, two extremes that combat each other until death. These scenes of strife, similarly to other representations of the political changes, are presented as something at the same time horrific and funny. In this chapter, I argue that these fictional battles relate intimately to the set of symbolic conflicts that have marked Brazilian society over the past few years, in both discursive and formal aspects.

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Several studies have sought to diagnose a historical tendency in Latin American culture in general (Shohat & Stam, 2014; Avelar, 2003), and in Brazilian cinema in particular (Xavier, 2013), to resort to allegories as instruments for representing local sociopolitical contexts, especially in crisis situations. As stated by Ismail Xavier, what unifies the very heterogeneous production that emerged in Brazil in the late 1960s is precisely the disseminated use of allegory. In that period, the military regime went through a process of recrudescence—with increased political persecutions and censorship—and allegory was used as a strategy to discuss national dilemmas. Ella Shohat and Robert Stam consider the possibility of this exaggerated use of allegory in repressive governments to be motivated by a feeling of obligation on the part of directors to “speak for and about the nation as a whole” (2014, p.  272). That is what took place during the Brazilian dictatorship, according to Xavier. That is also what I believe to be happening now, in response to the escalation of the conservative wave and to the recent rise of the far-right to power. While discussions needed to be encrypted at the time of the military regime—both to escape censorship and to protect the authors—today’s cultural texts are not produced under the same circumstances. Brazil is in the midst of profound culture wars in which the values of each of the opposing poles are constantly and openly confronted, sometimes by recourse to suspicion, sometimes by recourse to laughter. Given that these two tendencies, fear and mockery, have been amplified in recent symbolic conflicts, my main argument is that the combination of comedy and horror has gained momentum in recent Brazilian cinema as an allegorical translation of the culture wars. To address this discussion, in the first session of the chapter I examine allegories’ recent regaining of importance in Brazilian cinema and its connection to the society’s current belligerent context. In the second session, I discuss the new culture wars and the role of online cultures in the boost of actions of demonizing and ridiculing enemies. Finally, in the third session, I investigate how recent Brazilian films that intertwine comedy and horror represent the country’s recent sociopolitical situation.

A Return to National Allegories Allegory may be schematically defined as a “fiction told in such a way as to indicate, by aptly suggestive resemblance, a clear structure of non-fictional ideas” (Teskey, 2006, p. 300). It is a representation strategy in which a

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given situation is narratively constructed in order to address another. The term is derived from the Greek term allēgoria, which means “to speak in another way” (junction of allos, “other,” and agoreuein, “to speak in public”). There is a long tradition of discussions about allegory and its relation to the reader’s interpretive role (Bloomfield, 1972), the “game” (Teskey 2006, p. 307) that is established in the process of decoding, or “restructuring the text” (Honig, 2018, p. 29) occurred during reception. I will not focus on these debates, above all because the films I discuss here (and I will examine this in more detail in the third section) do not impose great hermeneutical challenges to the viewer. I address allegories in this chapter as an instrument that can be used to indirectly represent their sociopolitical context. In Allegories of Underdevelopment (2013), Ismail Xavier argues that the emergence of new forms in the Brazilian cinema of the 1960s and 1970s could be connected to the turbulent scenario of the military dictatorship. The films included in his analysis were produced mainly after 1968, when the Brazilian Congress was dissolved, the old Constitution abandoned, and civil liberties suppressed. Xavier’s hypothesis is that this set of profound political transformations was internalized in films in the form of allegories. He looked into a quite diverse constellation of cultural texts, all produced around the same period, and identified specific mechanisms of allegorical construction in the majority of these texts. His conclusions indicate a possible relationship between the preferential use of allegory as a representation tool and the collective feeling of crisis1 present in that particular context. Within recent films, although the sociopolitical context is evidently different, allegorical constructions are once again remarkable. Frequent controversies of the last few years (e.g. related to minority rights, colonial heritage, or racism in Brazilian society) have been transposed to the fictional microcosms of a number of different films, similarly to what happened in the late 1960s. However, there is a central difference between these new allegories and those of the dictatorial period: an unusual intersection of comedy and horror that substitutes the baroque drama (Xavier, 2013, p. 63) and the parody (Xavier, 2013, p. 130) identified in the wave of cultural texts created in response to the military regime. 1  The liaison of allegory and crisis in Latin American post-dictatorial fiction is also indicated by a few other scholars and has inspired concepts such as “allegories of defeat” (Avelar, 2003) or “allegories of impotence” (Shohat & Stam, 2014, p. 271).

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I base this discussion on the analysis of three films: Ghost Killers vs. Bloody Mary (2018), The Cannibal Club (2018), and Bacurau (2019). I have selected these films because they have very different production strategies and target audiences. Ghost Killers vs. Bloody Mary was produced by famous conservative humorists, released on Brazil’s commercial movie theaters and later featured on Netflix. The Cannibal Club is an independent film that was essentially seen on the arthouse festival circuit. Bacurau is an international co-production with a large budget that was premiered in the 2019 Cannes Film Festival and later released in Brazil both in multiplexes and arthouse cinemas. In spite of their quite distinct backgrounds, they were all produced after 2016, when Brazil’s social and political polarization became evident (Almeida, 2019). The three films are national allegories and also stories of very violent conflicts. In each of the narratives, the villains end up defeated in a spectacularly bloody fashion, which goes well beyond the exchange of gunshots. The graphic violence of these films includes beheadings, ax blows, and different sorts of body explosions. A set of images most commonly expected in a horror, in a thriller, or even in a western movie. Not in a comedy. These deaths put an end to an immediate threat to the heroes. They generate relief from the fear accumulated throughout each of the narratives. But, at the same time, there are also comic elements in these confrontations. The villain’s deaths are hence transformed into something both heroic and laughable. However, the characters dying are also allegorical representations of social sectors of the Brazilian society. In an extremely polarized country, their defeat and death is a symbolical victory—both horrific and comic—of one side over the other. Throughout this chapter, I present and discuss elements that contribute to the association between comedy and horror2 that I believe to be present in the three texts, although in different approaches. Before going further into this issue, it is important to have a glance at the recent Brazilian culture wars. The term, already widely discussed in the United States, has been lately borrowed by Brazil’s academia as a reference to a series of controversies that amplify the already intense social polarization, and that 2  This combination of comedy and horror is also identified by some theorists in the socalled terrir, a subgenre created in Brazil by the director Ivan Cardoso in the late 60s and 70s. According to Lyra, in terrir films there is an intertwining and overlapping of fragments of horror, humor, and sex (2006, p. 142). This overlap, however, is done through parody, in dialogue with the tradition of revisiting the clichés of classic cinema present in the “Marginal Cinema,” an important Brazilian cinematographic wave of that period.

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echo constant fissures in public opinion. The description of this warlike scenario is fundamental inasmuch as it brings to light how this bickering potential was allegorically translated into each of these films.

Culture Wars, Allegorical Battles According to James Hunter, culture wars can be identified in a given society not only when it is possible to recognize moral and social conflicts, but especially when these collisions stimulate “polarizing impulses” (1991, p. 43). These opposing impulses gravitate around orthodoxy, on the one hand, and progressivism, on the other. Hunter is regarded as a sort of pioneer of the discussions about the culture wars in the 1990s. Most scholars who identify the existence of this type of symbolic conflicts in contemporary Brazil follow a definition not very different from his (Goldstein, 2019), and often refer to his works as their main reference (Gallego et al., 2017; Souza & Azevedo, 2018). However, there are significant differences between today’s culture wars and those that the author described in the United States of the 1990s. For this reason, several recent studies prefer the term new culture wars (Daum, 2019; Campbell & Manning, 2018; Castle, 2018) as way of referring specifically to current conflicts, marked by a significant migration of the political discourse to social media platforms (Serpe, 2019, p. 101). In online environments, culture wars have not only become widespread, but have also been intensified by a type of customized engagement, made possible by personalized content recommendation. It is the so-called network bubbles (Recuero et al., 2017), which are formed not only by the restricted set of interactions between each network of contacts, but also by pervasive information tracking that allows platforms to suggest certain cultural products to users based on their previous interests. The criteria for selecting these contents are made by algorithms that try to predict their potential relevance for a given profile, which means that most people end up only exposed to content that reiterates (or even radicalizes) their beliefs. Thus, the “polarizing impulses” of the new culture wars tend to be even more extreme than in previous decades, leading countries like Brazil and the United States to deep social unrest. In addition, new phenomena are underway, such as the cancel culture (Ng, 2020) and the victimhood culture (Campbell & Manning, 2018). In both, collective actions of hostility are put into practice as groups’ resistance strategies to a common enemy, taken as representative of a set of systemic microaggressions (Fatima, 2017).

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The combination of this set of factors adds up to the establishment of a social war climate, which is not limited to online experiences. In Brazil, posters calling for a new military intervention and for the return of dictatorship have become frequent in recent far-right demonstrations (Novaes, 2015). Jair Bolsonaro, while still a congressman, presented his vote in favor of the impeachment of Dilma Rousseff after paying tribute to a colonel who had tortured Rousseff during the darkest hours of the dictatorial regime (Jiménez, 2016). There are also several incidents of people who were beaten just because they were on the streets wearing red clothes (Rossi, 2015), a color associated with the main left-wing party. In Brazilian society, therefore, there is an increasing contamination of political practices by hate speech and actions, both in and out of social media networks. This linkage is very remarkable in the macropolitical arena (Gallego, 2018; Gledhill, 2019), but it is also identified in the private domain, that is, in the home, in the family, in the church, in relationships between friends, neighbors, etc. (Pinheiro-Machado & Scalco, 2018; Gallego, 2019). The three cultural texts that I address in this chapter were produced in this deeply belligerent scenario. In the three, there are narrative constructions that lead to a great final conflict, a battle in which two opposing sides violently measure their forces. The clash varies in each text: a group of ghost hunters who fight a phantom cynically engaged in a progressive agenda (Ghost Killers vs. Bloody Mary); a black janitor who protects his own life from the cannibalism of his white and wealthy bosses (The Cannibal Club); or a community in northeastern Brazil that defends itself against a group of North American snipers, whose hobby is to murder people as if they were in a hunting video game (Bacurau). From this brief description, it is not hard to realize how these films play with specific elements of the culture wars (e.g. victimhood culture, racism, the colonial imaginary) to fictionally annihilate the characters who lie at the opposite side. And that is accomplished without sparing images of explosions, severed heads, and a lot of bloodshed. Yet, as stated earlier, it is possible to identify different types of comicality in the ways these confrontations are presented. In a rather conservative film like Ghost Killers vs. Bloody Mary the incursion into the horror genre is interspersed with politically incorrect jokes, in which the protagonists (all male) attack both feminist and queer activists, and reduce their struggle to victimhood strategies. In more progressive texts like The Cannibal Club and Bacurau, the target of comic operations is the hypocritical elite.

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In these films, the villains act in a deeply questionable way in ethical terms and simultaneously defend social moralizing speeches. The combination of humor and symbolic conflicts also brings these texts closer to the new culture wars taking place in the country. Over the past few years, the Internet has become an important space of confrontation of ideas and activism and also in an environment “saturated with irony” (Nagle, 2017, p. 17). Memes are a handy example. Typically constructed through the use of humor strategies, memes have a relevant discursive power in contemporary society (Wiggins, 2019; Shifman, 2014). In Brazil, recent studies indicate important repercussions of memes in the daily assimilation and discussion of political controversies (Freire, 2016) and even suggest their possible influence in electoral processes (Barros & Milanezi, 2020). Unlike the culture wars of the 1990s, in which a group composed mostly of older conservatives “fought against a tide of cultural secularization and liberalism among [the] young” (Nagle, 2017, p. 10), the clashes of recent years are no longer fundamentally restricted to generational conflicts. Angela Nagle identifies a tendency toward a young ultraconservatism on social networks, capable of mobilizing “a strange vanguard of teenage gamers, pseudonymous swastika-posting anime lovers, ironic South Park conservatives, anti-feminist pranksters, nerdish harassers and meme-making trolls” (Ibid., p. 10). What unites them is the use of humor as a strategy to devaluate their adversaries. Similarly, the three films I have mobilized here also seem saturated with a strange irony, a type of black or sick humor that invites the discussion of delicate themes, such as death, sexuality, and power relations. By this approach, the texts evoke—in most times quite directly—the set of prejudices that divides Brazilian society today. These text’s allegorical transpositions of national symbolic conflicts are hence not limited to the content of the quarrels, but also involve the tone in which they unfold.

Comedy, Horror, and Graphic Violence In the various reviews published in response to the release of Bacurau in Brazilian movie theaters, critics often mentioned, in a mixture of astonishment and outrage, the set of reactions of exaltation (including shouting, applause, laughter) that took place during the film’s most brutal sequence (Bernardes, 2019; Magnoli, 2019). While on the screen the villains were beheaded one by one, in the theaters the audience often cheered and celebrated. This short-circuit between violent representations of death, on

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one side, and a pleasant and festive response on the other, seems to mirror the reactions that motivated Paul Lewis to write about killing jokes (Lewis, 1997), a phenomenon he identified in the cultural production of the 1980s. At that time, characters like Freddy Krueger in cinema, and the Joker in comics, tightened the boundaries between horror and comedy as they fled the classic image of the monstrous villain and did not limit their actions to just torturing and murdering their victims, but also made jokes, mocked their preys, had fun with each killing—and with that also amused the public. Lewis collected reviews of the time of release of A Nightmare on Elm Street (1984), when there too critics seemed stunned by “shouts and loud laughs at the climaxes of violence,” which led to believe that “the audience seemed to take [the film’s many acts of cruelty] as a comedy” (Ebert 1981, p. 54 quoted in Lewis, 1997, p. 252). This state of amusement is only possible because there is no moral conflict in the representation of deaths. Carroll connects this placidity to comedy, a genre in which the concern for the well-being of the characters is dispelled (1999, p.  158). In the comic record, dying loses its gravity, which explains the easiness of programming cartoons like Wile E. Coyote and the Road Runner or Tom & Jerry as entertainment for kids, despite its storyline boiling down to unsuccessful attempts of the strongest character capturing the weakest, usually followed by chaos, destruction, and death. When Tom seriously injures himself, or when Wile E. Coyote falls over and over again off different cliffs, the viewer laughs instead of worrying about the physical integrity of the characters. And s/he laughs not only because it is the villain3 who dies; s/he laughs because there is a comic tone that does not invite the measurement of “the moral or human weight of the consequences” (Carroll, 1999, p. 158) of one’s suffering. Although deaths do occur, they are not felt exactly like deaths; it is as if they happened in a “dream space” (Lahikainen, 2015, p. 104). This unimportance and the absence of repercussions at the level of the narrative is what makes humor possible. When the boundaries between comedy and horror are blurred, one way of investigating the presence of comic operations is to analyze whether the representation of death is used as an element of reinvigorating fear, or as 3  A famous example of a non-villain whose death is made up as a recurring joke is Kenny McCormick of South Park. In the first five seasons of the series, Kenny dies in virtually every episode, often in an extremely violent and graphic way; and then reappears alive and well without much explanation in the next episode.

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some sort of cruel joke or mockery. If the latter is the case, the cultural text will invite the enjoyment of bloodshed scenes with less oppression and gravity than in classic horror, which can cause celebratory outbursts in movie theaters, such as those that outraged part of the critics in the Bacurau screenings. Not only in this film, but in all three discussed in this chapter, there is an absence of weight and seriousness in the representation of situations of mass extermination. But unlike cartoons, these deaths are not only suggested, they are explicitly and violently represented. This disrupts comedy’s “dream space” by affirming the materiality of each death. The only possible humor, in this case, is a sick or a black humor, as it conjugates both laughter and anxiety (Beermann, 2014; Mindess et al., 1985). Another element that indicates the films’ affinities to both comedy and horror are its allegorical constructions. In these texts, the characters who die violent and cruelly are not just villains. In a conservative film like Ghost Killers vs. Bloody Mary, the evil spirit fought by the ghostbusters reveals itself as the reincarnation of a girl who, when alive, pretended to be a victim to torment the lives of her colleagues. This discovery matches the villain with victimhood culture, a frequent right-wing interpretation of identity politics.4 It echoes actions of “networked misogyny” (Banet-­ Weiser & Miltner, 2016) used to combat the rise of popular feminism and reinforces the film’s conservative agenda. On the opposite side, The Cannibal Club and Bacurau portrait their villains as white, straight, and cisgender capitalists. The heroes of these two films are racialized people, poor, oppressed, and openly aligned to the struggle for a more inclusive country. They are hence clear personification of progressive thinking. In the three texts, the characters (both heroes and villains) allegorically embody themes that have been extensively discussed over the past few years. This causes monsters to be perceived simultaneously as villains of the narrative and as avatars of a set of political actors associated with one 4  Coincidence or not, two years before the production of Ghost Killers vs. Bloody Mary, another version of Ghostbusters (2016) had been released in theaters. The North-American remake had replaced the four men who occupied the position of ghost hunters with four women. Soon after the start of its promotion, it became the trailer with the most dislikes in the history of Youtube (Proctor, 2017), moving an immense resistance from fans. This set of reactions is connected to what some recent studies define as a “geek masculinity” (Salter & Blodgett, 2017; Blodgett & Salter, 2018), a niche that has been articulating and promoting a series of actions against what it defines as victimhood narratives, in which women (cis or transgender) are considered threats to their “way of life” (Levendusky, 2013), contributing to the deployment of an “us vs them” rhetoric (Massanari, 2017).

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or another position. Thus, their violent death is felt not only as the end of a threat at the level of the story, but also as a symbolic revenge, a sarcastic, cruel, and bloody extinction of enemies on each side. If we consider the cultural texts produced during the dictatorship period, allegory was in many cases used as an allusive resource, an indirect approach to debate national difficulties and dilemmas. At that moment, the artifice was adopted as a “form of protective camouflage against censorious regimes” (Shohat & Stam, 2014, p.  272). The audience was invited to unravel the message to understand its references, as if the text were a kind of game designed by the author (Teskey, 2006, p.  314). Decoding the real content would mean to win the game, reorganizing the text to figure out exactly what elements of the macropolitical scenario were mirrored in the fictional microcosm. But there are some allegories that do not fit in this type of cryptic structure. Especially in satirical allegories, Gordon Teskey identifies the presence of deliberately obvious constructions, in which barely coded messages are created to generate an unambiguous understanding of its meaning. In these texts, what gives pleasure is not the interpretative game, but “the opportunity of playing with the terms of comparison” (Teskey, 2006, p. 317, italics added). That is an elucidative definition to describe the allegorical operations present in the three cultural texts addressed in this chapter. They reflect discussions already consolidated in recent symbolic conflicts in a flagrantly direct way. But their terms of comparison are not mild. The opponents of each political field are represented as monsters or as psychopaths and the game is to exterminate them, to see their blood spilled over the screen. Something, as Amanda Lahikainen would say, “deeply horrible and potentially funny at the same time” (2015, p. 95).

Conclusion There are several studies that correlate the overlap between comedy and violence to the specificities of each production context. The cartoons produced in England in response to the bloody events of the French Revolution are an example. Lahikainen identifies in these cultural texts a notorious articulation of humor and horror. Fear and disgust were internalized in a historically comical format, giving rise to caricatured images of severed heads, cannibalism, gallows, and guillotines. These cultural texts “intensify hybrid genres and reveal an obsession with death and irony, all modern ways of dealing with the social turmoil unfolding in France”

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(Lahikainen, 2015, p. 96). Another example are Freddy Krueger’s killing jokes. According to Lewis, they could be associated to a “growing anxiety about the vulnerability of the human race in the context of global risks and dangers” (Lewis, 1997, p. 253), something that gathered attention in the 1980s with the dissemination of findings on the ozone layer hole, climate change, and the various impacts of human action on the environment. Given these circumstances, making fun of collective deaths presented in films or comics both dark and funny would be, in Lewis’ speculation, a way of better coping with our imminent end (and the very destruction of Earth). More recently, Nagle identified a joke cycle that started after a video of a gorilla’s death in a North American zoo went viral. In the video, the gorilla squeezes and drags a three-year-old boy who had climbed into his cage. Suddenly, he is shot by one of the zoo workers. As argued by Nagle, “responding to highly mediated tragedies with insensitive pranking and irony had been a staple of online trolling cultures” (2017, p. 17). This forges a specific type of humor response, which the author associates with the new culture wars. In all three cases, it becomes clear that certain historical conditions can favor the development, increase the tolerance, and/ or disseminate a taste for manifestations of a type of sadistic humor, in which comedy is combined with horror and violence. This type of sadistic humor can also be identified in recent Brazilian films. In this narrative, the culture wars are translated into what is constructed also as a war, but composed of de facto battles. The rival antagonists and their social actors are materialized into fictional characters by means of allegorical operations. These characters not only oppose each other in the field of ideas, as they predominantly do in reality; they effectively fight in violent, life-or-death combats. Thus, the country’s symbolic conflicts are represented by these cultural texts in a concrete way. They cease to be moral struggles and become corporeal, physical battles. The films translate the dilemmas of a polarized country in the midst of culture wars into allegorical combats, turning the death of those who represent each side’s political antagonists into a mixture of mockery, relief from terror, and graphic violence’s sadistic entertainment. If, as Christie Davies claims, jokes are “social thermometers that measure, record and indicate what is going on” (1997, p. 9), the emergence of forms of comedy marked by sadism traditionally indicates moments of social and political turmoil. Recent Brazilian allegories of the culture wars seem to validate that premise. These narratives, as I have argued, are nourished by a hybrid of humor and horror. But this assemblage is not restricted

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to fiction; it also reflects collective feelings about the set of hostilities that have marked Brazilian society over the past few years. With each new political rumor, each scandal, unexpected turn, or unreasonable declaration, a mixed feeling of revulsion and mockery spreads in the country. “We laugh not to cry,” says a popular Brazilian proverb. Perhaps this saying summarizes an acquired knowledge, a kind of resilience after centuries of oppression, decades of dictatorship, and recent new threats to a fragile young democracy. But in these films, crying is not just replaced by laughter. It is supplanted by a cruel laughter, a sick humor that targets the agony and suffering of its antagonists. Culture reflects the time in which it develops. “If anything is sick,” Alan Dundes argues, “it is the society that produces sick humor” (2017, p. 11).

References Almeida, R. (2019). Bolsonaro presidente: conservadorismo, evangelismo e a crise brasileira. Novos Estudos: Cebrap, 38(1), 185–213. Almeida, R. (2020). The broken wave: Evangelicals and conservatism in the Brazilian crisis. HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory, 10(1), 32–40. Avelar, I. (2003). Alegorias da Derrota: A ficção pós-ditatorial e o trabalho do luto na América Latina. Editora UFMG. Banet-Weiser, S., & Miltner, K. (2016). #MasculinitySoFragile: Culture, structure, and networked misogyny. Feminist Media Studies, 16(1), 171–174. Barros, L.  M., & Milanezi, M.  J. (2020). Disputas simbólicas em memes das eleições presidenciais brasileiras de 2018. Lumina, 14(1), 174–191. Beermann, U. (2014). Sick humor. In S.  Attardo (Ed.), Encyclopedia of humor studies (pp. 691–693). Sage. Bernardes, M. (2019, October 2). Brasil e a Catarse de um País Desesperado. Gazeta Arcadas. https://gazetaarcadas.com/2019/10/02/bacurau-e-acatarse-de-um-pais-­desesperado/ Bishop, K. (2011). Vacationing in ‘Zombieland’: The classical functions of the modern zombie comedy. Journal of the Fantastic in the Arts, 22(1), 24–38. Blodgett, B., & Salter, A. (2018). Ghostbusters is for boys: Understanding Geek masculinity’s role in the alt-right. Communication Culture & Critique, 11(1), 133–146. Bloomfield, M. (1972). Allegory as interpretation. New Literary History, 3(2), 301–317. Campbell, B., & Manning, J. (2018). The rise of victimhood culture: Microaggressions, safe spaces, and the new culture wars. Palgrave Macmillan. Carew, A. (2019). American horror: Genre and the post-racial myth in ‘Get Out’. Screen Education, 94(1), 14–21.

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Massanari, A. (2017). #Gamergate and the fappening: How Reddit’s algorithm, governance, and culture support toxic technocultures. New Media & Society, 19(3), 329–346. Mindess, H., Miller, C., Turek, J., Bender, A., & Corbin, S. (1985). The antioch sense of humor test: Making sense of humor. Avon Books. Nagle, A. (2017). Kill all normies: Online culture wars from 4Chan and Tumblr to Trump and the Alt-Right. Zero Books. Ng, E. (2020). No grand pronouncements here...: Reflections on cancel culture and digital media participation. Television & New Media, 21(6), 621–627. Novaes, M. (2015, August 19). Quando o ‘chorume’ da internet invade a vida real. El País. https://brasil.elpais.com/brasil/2015/08/18/opinion/1439908643_894361.html Pinheiro-Machado, R., & Scalco, L. M. (2018). Da esperança ao ódio: a juventude periférica bolsonarista. In E. S. Gallego (Ed.), O Ódio como Política: a reinvenção das direitas no Brasil (pp. 53–63). Boitempo Editorial. Proctor, W. (2017). Bitches ain’t gonna hunt no ghosts: Totemic nostalgia, toxic fandom and the ghostbusters platonic. Palabra Clave, 20(4), 1105–1141. Recuero, R., Zago, G., & Soares, F.  B. (2017). Mídia Social e Filtros-bolha nas Conversações Políticas no Twitter. Anais dos Encontros da Compós. Associação Nacional dos Programas de Pós-Graduação em Comunicação. Rossi, M. (2015, August 17). Protestos anti-PT registram agressões a quem veste camiseta vermelha. El País. https://brasil.elpais.com/brasil/2015/08/17/ politica/1439769515_800304.html Salter, A. & Blodgett, B. (2017). Toxic geek masculinity in media: Sexism, trolling, and identity policing.Palgrave MacMillan. Serpe, N. (2019). The new tech culture wars. Dissent, 66(4), 101–110. Shifman, L. (2014). Memes in digital culture. MIT Press. Shohat, E., & Stam, R. (2014). Unthinking Eurocentrism: Multiculturalism and the media. Routledge. Souza, M. F., & Azevedo, N. P. (2018). Guerras Culturais e Formações Imaginárias da Polarização Política Brasileira: um estudo discursivo. Humanidades & Inovação, 5(4), 209–226. Teskey, G. (2006). Allegory. In A. C. Hamilton (Ed.), The Spenser encyclopaedia (pp. 300–362). Routledge. Wiggins, B. (2019). The discursive power of memes in digital culture. Routledge. Xavier, I. (2013). Alegorias do Subdesenvolvimento: Cinema Novo, Tropicalismo, Cinema Marginal. CosacNaify. Yogerst, C. (2016). Rules for surviving a horror comedy: Satiric genre transformations from Scream to Zombieland. In C.  Miller & B.  Van Riper (Eds.), The laughing dead: The horror-comedy film from Bride of Frankenstein to Zombieland (pp. 169–186). Rowman & Littlefield.

PART III

Race, Ethnicity and Gender Politics

CHAPTER 11

‘If Ever I Offended You I Am Sorry’: Disparagement Humour, Black Twitectives and the Dream Deferred Shepherd Mpofu

Introduction The end of Apartheid (i.e. official racist and segregationist governing system with a capital A) ended in 1994 when democracy set in but since then South Africa has continued characterized by apartheid, an informal yet definitive socio-political and segregationist system which continues to defer many a black people’s dreams. Whites continue dominating the economy and mainstream media trumpet the mythic Rainbow Nation project as a reality and underplay everyday forms of apartheid and racism. Consequently, the advent of social media has enabled citizens to disrupt, in an unbounded way that cannot be disputed, about those issues that the mainstream public spheres and political leaders have treated as taboo topics, such as racism and white privilege. Equally, the advent of social media has magnified the socio-political and economic disparities between the haves and have nots. Thus, through digital access and lack thereof, some citizens are advantaged and their voices can be heard while those that are S. Mpofu (*) University of Limpopo, Polokwane, South Africa © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 S. Mpofu (ed.), The Politics of Laughter in the Social Media Age, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-81969-9_11

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disadvantaged are silenced. In this chapter, I venture into this space by exploring the salience of identity debates, via the avenue of humour, in the current South Africa. Digital ethnography is used to explore debates surrounding the excavated humorous tweets shared on social media by Miss South Africa hopeful, Bianca Schoombee. She posted the tweets when she was 14 years of age—some six years before the storm in May 2020. In the tweets, she shared disparagement humour where she body-shamed women, used the word bitches many times and ridiculed a black person for his skin colour and also used the N-word in her jokes. Disparagement humour is that humour that borders on body shaming, racism or sexism that seeks to denigrate, belittle, malign a person, members of a community or group (Ford & Ferguson, 2004, Janes & Olson, 2000; Zillmann, 1983). Schoombee’s humour was body shaming and racist. After the storm started on social media, she later apologized to people who felt ‘offended’ and she further wondered why someone, especially those whom she thought were persecuting her, would use her old tweets, from six years ago. This qualitative chapter deploys discourse analysis of body shaming and embodied racist humour in South African Twitter sphere to engage with two critical issues raised by the Schoombee saga: the role and effects of racist humour in a society haunted by past injustices that were not sufficiently resolved. Specifically, the study engages with the humour in Schoombee’s tweets and how black community’s reading of identity in relation to the mythic project of rainbow nationalism helped deconstruct her humour. Interest in this study further extends to the role of ‘detective Twitter’ or ‘investigators’ those who are quick to dig someone’s past in order to expose some forms of duplicity in their behaviours. In some cases, the net effect of this is that reputations are irreparably damaged as is the case with Schoombee’s saga. Twitter is a critical alternative public sphere in South Africa. It is used as a space for sharing jokes, socializing, discussing politics, policing each other-especially celebrities when they deviate from social norms and expectations, buttressing mainstream or challenging and curving alternative identities. At the same time, it could also be an exclusive space for a few insiders where the majority are excluded due to digital, economic and literacy divides. When official Apartheid ended in 1994, there was a celebration of what became known as the Rainbow Nation, a people united in diversity equal before the law, economy and in politics. Thus, while black people are now running the government, those who benefitted from the segregationist political environment of the past largely continued influencing and

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benefitting from the trajectory of the country’s economy with the state beholden to ‘big business’ (white owned) (Iheduru, 2008, p. 334). This led to the government implementing various economic opportunity strategies with an end goal of empowering blacks. There was then a rise, at first, of a black economically empowered elite through the Black Economic Empowerment programme (BEE), well connected to the ruling African National Congress (ANC). Questions abound ‘about how successfully BEE is actually transforming ownership of wealth in South Africa’ (Freund, 2007, p. 666). If one looks at the BEE there is little one may celebrate in terms of betterment of the majority poor’s lives as ‘there is very limited structural change in the lives of the poorer part of the population’ characterized by unemployment and limited ‘peasant self-sufficiency’ (Freund, 2007, p. 673). Levels of poverty are racialized, with the majority blacks dominating the poverty, unemployment and least educated categories of society while whites are largely well off with very low unemployment rates. This has partly led to racial tensions which, while there was an assumption that they were buried at the end of Apartheid in 1994, still characterize South Africans’ discourses especially on alternative public spheres and platforms such as Twitter, Facebook, WhatsApp and the like. In this chapter, my interest is on identity and disparagement humour, using tweets by Miss South Africa hopeful, Bianca Schoombee, coming across as embodied racism and body shaming as a form of exclusionary practice and magnifying the deeper problems of racial divisions in South Africa. There is a misconception, in some quarters, as expressed by former leader of the opposition Democratic Alliance, Hellen Zille, that had Africa been not colonized the continent and its people would have not known development. Also, the conceptions of beauty, especially by the beauty industry, seem to suggest that whiteness is the standard for beauty. Bianca Schoombee, when one goes by social media posts before the revelation of her disparaging tweets, seemed to be a lot of social media users’ favourite. On May 20, a Twitter user @lolitakotii (whom Fred Kumalo suggests is one of the former ‘black women who went to school with her…stepped out of the shadows and said: there is no way a virulent racist could be allowed to be the face of SA’ (2020) tweeted a string of tweets with the heading ‘lemme make a thread for everyone who’s gonna be lost when they wake up…here’s your queen; Bianca Schoombee in tweets’. The string of tweets elicited 6600 likes, 3500 retweets and 862 comments. This was enough to magnify the past transgressions of the Miss South Africa entrant, Bianca Schoombee. In May 2020 model Bianca

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Schoombee withdrew her entry into the Miss South Africa 2020 contest after tweets from her account were excavated and made public. The intention of excavating the six-year-old tweets remains unknown but the occurrence was more revealing, especially of race-relations and identity in South Africa. There has been a rise of Black Twitter in South Africa which has two dimensions to it. One is simply Black Twitter while the other is investigative: Twitter Detectives. According to Mpofu (2019a, p. 68), Black Twitter ‘is one of the most powerful and unified identities to emerge on Twitter. Black Twitter does not in any way suggest that it is only for blacks, nor is it representative of all blacks. However, the main hallmark of Black Twitter is its diversity as a community of users discussing issues concerning blacks, sometimes in a coded language to which only they can relate’. I propose a concept of Twitectives, that is, an amalgamation of Twitter and Detectives. Twitectives are not the official detectives who do the professional work of tracking deviants on social media and reconstructing crime scenes etc., but this is an extension of Black Twitter where self-appointed investigators expose fellow Twitter users or individuals making claims on certain things that are not truthful or honest. Usually the subjects would be trending through appearing on a television show that trends on Twitter or making claims on the Twitter platform. The self-appointed investigators dig into the person’s usually dirty past, revealing the truth that the subject would be hiding. For instance, one may lift a beautiful picture of a house from somewhere and post on Twitter and claim to have built it for his parents. In some cases, some people have gone on dating shows looking for love while they have partners that they would have recently posted on social media sites. In some instances, Black Twitectives dig past tweets and other social media posts of subjects to reveal the other side that the subject is not revealing to the public. The intention, it seems, in most cases, is to embarrass the subject or to warn the public of the harm the subject is capable of causing. After Schoombee’s exposure, social media and mainstream media congregated on the issue with differing opinions. The main question I seek to answer is: how could Schoombee’s racist and body-shaming humour be read on social media in relation to South Africa’s mythic rainbow nation project under the current woke and cancel cultures? Wokeness refers to alertness to any forms of discrimination, injustice, racism and prejudice. Woke people are easily offended and willing to stand up against perpetrators in an attempt to seek justice. They give online protests life. Cancel

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culture is an act where, after the woke express outrage or protest for social justice etc., offending figures and corporates who are the targets of this outrage lose out on the revenue/support from society or institutions as a form of punishment. Before proceeding I will draw the itinerary of this chapter. Below I review some literature on disparagement humour and the meanings of social media in the current world. Next, I address the methodological and theoretical framing of the chapter. After that I present the data that are the focus of this chapter and their analyses before concluding.

Disparagement Humour and Social Media Humour plays different roles in society; it could be destructive or constructive depending on the deconstruction tools available to that particular context. Some scholars argue that humour cannot be harmful (Davies 2004) while others contend that humour could have devastating social consequences (Mpofu, 2019b). While racist and disparagement humour is not new globally and in South Africa (Trindade, 2019), the advent of social media and democratization have made these much more prevalent and public. Also, increased frustration with the status quo has made some people let off steam in racially charged ways. However, there are few studies in Global South, that is, places with the burden of a history of colonialism, oppression and underdevelopment, marginalization and peripheral (Dados & Connell, 2012), about disparagement humour and social media. Studies on this topic abound in the Global North for instance (Billig, 2001;Weaver, 2011, 2013). Billig’s exploration of racist jokes of the Ku Klux Klan, an American extremist and racist group, is revealing. The study demonstrates the relationship between hatred and humour in the websites used to propagate the Ku Klux Klan jokes. Specifically, Billig demonstrates that ‘humour can provide a means of expressing hatred and thus bigotry can bring its own pleasures to the bigot’ (Billig, 2001, p. 285). In essence, the racist jokes are not just jokes to laugh at, they carry in them high levels of veracity and intend to dehumanize their targets: black people. Weaver’s intervention also demonstrates how anti-black jokes in five Internet websites containing embodied racism are used to express two ‘logics of racism…inclusion and exclusion’ and these jokes ‘should not be seen as “just a joke” or fundamentally harmless’ (Weaver, 2011, pp. 483 and 495). For Weaver humour is not ‘benign nor does it always work for the social, and, although claims of offensiveness differ, humour can, in particular readings, serve ideological functions for serious discourse’ (Weaver, 2011, p. 415).

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There are three social agents that are involved in the construction and distribution of disparagement humour and these are: 1. The joker who constructs and/or disseminates the deroga tory messages 2. The subject or recipient of the joke 3. The audience, who might either endorse or find amusement in the humour (Trindade, 2019, p. 3) The joker assumes that the audience is in tandem with the joke and that the joke s/he is sharing is harmless, ‘not purposely offensive and with the sole intention to entertain an audience’ (Trindade, 2019, p. 3) and the jokers in some instances behave as members of a joking society that pressurizes people to not find offence in jokes as doing so would lead to insults where those who protest are labelled and disparaged for their inability to take a joke (Sue and Golash-Boza 2013). Besides attacking those who protest, Billig also observes that when jokers are challenged on the ‘offensiveness of their jokes they go on a defensive intention-denial’ (van Dijk, 1992, p. 92) mode and argue ‘I was only joking’ (Billig, 2001, p. 269) when humour, according to Lockyer and Pickering (2008), is nowhere near being trivial as the object of ridicule might read it as harmful, dehumanizing and undermining. Whatever the taste of the joke, the joker attempts to portray a positive image of him/herself through the denials of harmfulness of the jokes and intention behind sharing the same. The subject of the joke is at liberty to decipher the joke whatever way s/he sees fit. In liberal societies where freedoms of expression are bound by the constitution, there arise situations where the offended are reminded of the constitutionally guaranteed rights to offend enjoyed by the offenders. Just like the objects of ridicule, the wider audiences are also at liberty to read jokes whichever way they prefer and they are also critical in meaning-making as their reaction to the joke may determine the direction and quality of relations between the joker and his/her object of ridicule. Studies on racist humour in the Global South have explored how whites, mainly, use racist jokes to denigrate blacks (Mpofu, 2019b;Hammett, 2010;Hudson, 2013;Trindade, 2019). Trindade’s study in the Brazilian context explores racist humour used to target the upwardly mobile black women. The racist ‘disparagement humour is used to challenge and undermine the achievements of these women and is used to ‘reinforce deep-seated ideologies regarding differentiated symbolic social spaces for blacks and

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whites in Brazil’ (Trindade, 2019, 1). Social media have given ordinary people an opportunity to transfer off line conversations and even private thoughts that they could only have shared with family or small circle of friends to the wider public sphere. Thus, new information technologies have provided a much more ‘appealing and interactive ways to stimulate participatory activity, especially among the younger citizens’ (Shifman et al., 2007, p. 467). Cyberspace is increasingly becoming part of our offline lives and the perception that the ‘virtuality of cyberspace …lacks real-world consequences does not hold (Shifman et al., 2007, p. 470). Granted, the internet’s lack of stringent editorial controls and regulation, and its anarchic ethos [makes it a space] of saturnalianlicence’ (Shifman et al., 2007, p. 470). This lack of policing has led to the Internet developing ‘an unfettered site for the expression of racism, and its global reach allows for the spread and connection of racist ideologies’ (Weaver, 2013, p. 484). The polysemy of jokes on the Internet, and indeed in offline life, makes for a dynamic and dynamite place where vibrant and irreverent debate obtains and in some cases leading to dire consequences to interlocutors. Thus, as is the focus of this chapter, one who shares jokes might end up being burnt and suffering real life consequences.

Methodological and Theoretical Framing The chapter was prompted by the debates raised by the revelation of Schoombee’s tweets. Data used in this chapter were gathered through archival digital ethnography. Archival digital ethnography was used to mine for old tweets, the archives, sent by Schoombee in 2014. Digital ethnography was then used to monitor people’s reactions and comments to the racist and body-shaming tweets shared by Schoombee. According to Statista, of South Africa’s 59 million people, 36.54 million are Internet users of which 34.93 million used the Internet using mobile devices (2020). Of these 22 million were on various social media platforms. A total of 21.56 million were said to be active social media users. Digital ethnography therefore is an appropriate methodology considering that there are a lot of South Africans with access to the Internet and in some cases, who use social media. Of course, the debates that obtain on social media might not be to all social media users’ interests. Just like in traditional ethnography where researchers go and observe, distantly or participatorily, the communities they are researching, digital ethnography is a distant unobtrusive method that allows researchers to access minutiae of

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daily life (Hine, 2011) online without being physically present in the same physical space as their subjects (see Harvey et al., 2007;Seale et al., 2010; Rogers, 2010). The data were purposively selected so that they addressed the main issues that this chapter is looking at, that is, the readings and subsequent meanings of the racist and body-shaming posts and how discussants and the main poster debated them on social media. Purposive sampling empowers a researcher to deliberately select particular people, settings or events in order to gain relevant information and data that could otherwise be difficult to obtain in other ways (see Maxwell, 1996;Taherdoost, 2016). Data are analysed using discourse analysis. Discourse is produced within a certain context and therefore has to be understood as obtaining within a certain framework of ideologies, powers, histories and relations. Discourses are therefore interconnected with many different others such as identity, language, belief systems, socio-political and economic influences and contexts (see Ocler, 2009;Haider&Bawden, 2007). Discourse analysis is not a textual, but a device that is made up of the way texts are organized and the context in which they are decoded and encoded. In the context of this research, it is important to interrogate the context body shaming and racist discourses are produced, debated and understood. Theoretically this study uses superiority theory, a theoretical framework propounded by Radcliffe-Brown (1940). Through this theory ‘we find in comedy and in life is based on ridicule, wherein we regard the object of amusement as inferior and/or ourselves as superior’ (Bardon, 2005, p. 463). Thus racist, ableist and body-shaming jokes are an expression of mainstreamist superiority.

Analysis and Discussion of the Black, Ugly and Disabled Social media conversations are complicated. There are certain issues people need to consider when posting potentially damaging issues, especially considering the polysemic nature of jokes and diversity of possible audiences sharing different ideologies and thinking on issues. Besides, major socio-political problems arise out of racist humour shared in multi-cultural and postmodern societies where many members are woke and in a position to analyse social media talk critically. For instance, copying racist, homophobic, body-shaming and sexist statements and posting on one’s page is

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equally damaging and offensive as originating them as this act is read as endorsement and co-signing. In fact, it tells the world more about you than the racist, sexist, shameful joke you are trying to invite the world into laughing with you. It could be possible that some of Schoombee’s posts were copied elsewhere and shared to her followers. This she did most likely because she sympathized with the views expressed and in this chapter, whether she initiated the posts or copied them from elsewhere, they remain attributed to her. Schoombee, the initiator of the posts, shared the tweets reproduced below in 2014 when she was 14 years old. The targets, that is the ‘focus or butt…the person at whose expense the humour is directed’ (Duncan, 1985, p. 557), are the blacks and disabled, obese, ugly. The rest of the society who are exposed to the joke are considered the ‘publics’ (Duncan, 1985, p. 557 emphasis provided). This chapter focuses on the racist and body-shaming aspects of the initiator’s jokes. After the storm she apologized and, as shown, it seems the apology was prompted by her mother’s call and concerns and need to save her modelling career. Also, she deflects the blame to the person who dug out her past and not herself or probably her surroundings that did not teach her about other people of different races, abilities and looks from hers. It is possible, again, to make a claim here that Schoombee’s racist tweets were not taken seriously and seen as punishable around 2014–15. Body shaming has not been seen as all that too offensive to cause for punishment. In addition, in cases where racist posts are made on social media, more often than not, these come from the de-individuated (Zambardo, 1969), that is, writing under anonymity ‘where people lose, or give up, their sense of self and their adherence to norms and expectations of others, whereby their behavior becomes intensely emotional, impulsive, irrational-­ that is unrestrained’ (Malmqvist, 2015, p. 735). Contrary to some scholars who argued that the Internet offers a colour-­ blind environment (Levy 2001, Hansen 2006), it is clear that the Internet ‘rather than being a colour-blind territory, the web is a space where both race and racism are markedly significant’ (Trindade, 2019, p. 3; Weaver, 2011, Mpofu, 2021) when people make fun of others, especially via sexist and racist jokes this is usually about the exercise of power (Medhurst 1990). Racist humour shown in Fig. 11.1 cannot be divorced from the recent spates of racism against blacks by whites on social media. Blacks suffered humiliation during Apartheid and the current dispensation of apartheid has not changed much, maybe only physical violence target at blacks has dramatically reduced. In the joke about the jacket, the black

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Fig. 11.1  A collage of humorous tweets from 2013 to 2014 denigrating black people

man is shown as impatient, unrefined, unreasonable and uncaring compared to the gentlemanly approach exhibited by the white man towards his girlfriend. Here, the logic of inclusion is at play where blacks and whites are juxtaposed together and the position of the black man is that of being inferiorized. Disparagement humour about ugliness, fatness and disability could be read as insensitive and an expression of various forms of privilege as shown in the following tweets: @BIANCA1015Z: Ever seen an ugly woman with 3 or more kids, and wonder to yourself, “Who KEEPS fcuking you?!”(2014/06/11). @BIANCA1015Z: I will love you till a mute man tells his deaf friend about a blind man that saw a guy with no legs walking on water. (2014/08/13). @BIANCA1015Z: I’m not saying you’re fat, but if I had to pick five of the fattest people I could think of, you would be three of them. (27/01/2014). @BIANCA1015Z: Fat people love diet coke. (23/04/2014). This privilege could stem from the instigator’s belief that as a model, she has an ideal body to be considered beautiful. In addition, the instigator’s treatment of the ugly and fat suggests that she speaks on behalf of a larger community which expects these shamed people to be like it and if not, they are ‘rendered less than full or “normal” member[s] of the

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community’ (Adkins, 2019, p. 77). Again, taking offence from these expressions by a model, someone with a potential of being Miss South Africa, does not suggest that body-shaming discourses do not abound, but they are more outrageous when done by those with authority towards those who are relatively marginalized. Shaming, in this instance, is an assertion of social privilege and claim to being a representative of the mainstream society. Humour, in such instances, is to be found by the mainstream community and the privileged. While one may not be at liberty to read Schoombee’s tweet about appearance and fat as referring to black women, the fact that she is white cannot be avoided for the following reasons. If whiteness is seen as ideal then the opposite has to be true especially to people expressing racist ideas. Body fat was seen as beautiful in most African contexts (Forth, 2012). However, the arrival of colonialists and indeed coloniality of cultures and bodies eroded this and sponsored body shaming (Gershon, 2019) and fat phobia (Strings, 2019) instead. Barrow, a colonial man who, seeing Hottentot women, described their buttocks and thighs as ‘most ridiculous… quivering and tremulous in motion as if two masses of jelly were attached behind’ (Barrow, 1806, p. 281). Froth further adds that most local peoples of Africa ‘served as foils for European aesthetics ideals, partly because they seemed to embody the physical extremes of fatness and thinness’ (Forth, 2012, 219). This is why Sarah Baartman was used for a freak show and in similar vein, Schoombee’s disparaging humour targeted at the ugly, fat and disabled draws from such colonial narratives. The second racist image that raised controversy is of a black young man standing between white people. There is a white background to the black man and the caption suggests they had to put a white background because he risked disappearing in the dark one which is maintained for the white subjects on the picture. The making of the image is undeniably racist. Propagating the same image, even though meant as humorous, inadvertently makes Schoombee’s act racist. As Vice suggests, Schoombee’s problem might be that of white privilege and seeing the world whitely (Fanon, 1967). She says of white citizens in South Africa … we may try to minimise our whiteliness … One of the tasks of white people is to engage with their selves… Habitual white privilege… Our thoughts are heavy with whitely assumptions, and so they would be morally risky, at best, to utter publicly in as racially charged a space as South Africa… Making pronouncements about a situation in which one is so deeply

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i­mplicated seems a moral mistake—it assumes one matters politically and morally beyond the ways in which everyone matters equally. (Vice, 2010, pp. 334–335)

After being caught out and exposed, Schoombee rued the prospect of losing the opportunity of becoming Miss South Africa. Indeed, she pulled out and issued the following statement on social media where she ‘profusely apologized’ for putting her posts out ‘into the universe’: @BIANCA1015Z:I am sorry guys. I am genuinely sorry. Sorry for a post, or a retweet that I thought at the time was funny or “okay” when it was not. I did not mean any emotional harm to anyone. @BIANCA1015Z: I woke up this morning with a call from my mother. VERY confused, not even knowing where to start. I am devastated that someone dug up tweets from when I was 14/15 (2014) and displayed my childhood life in a negative light. She later claimed that she has ‘grown as a person, this is no longer who I am or what I am…have dealt with my past by praying…I really hope South Africa can forgive me for these immature posts, as I have forgiven myself and moved on…we all deserve a second chance…’ (2020). Schoombee’s posture in the apologies aligns with Trindade’s observation that when caught out, jokers ‘oftentimes, they claim that their humour is harmless, not purposely offensive and with the sole intention to entertain an audience’ (2019, p. 3). Further, Billig adds that when challenged jokers, as Schoombee show, they ‘retreat into a defensive excuse “I was only joking”’ (Billig, 2001, p. 269) or in extreme cases claim to be exercising freedom of speech and the right to offend. Schoombee, to her defence, argues that at the time she posted the offensive joke she thought it was funny and ‘okaay’ and therefore meant no harm. Since she meant no harm, is praying and has forgiven herself, people should not hold it against her. However, the damage of her Tweets is succinctly captured by @lindelwamaggs who wrote an open letter to Schommbe and shared it on Twitter. It read in part You were only fourteen years old; an immature teenager who didn’t know any better. This is the common refrain in the statement that you had released in response to the firestorm ignited by your crass, racist and repugnant tweets…Your tweets may be old, but the words are still hurtful. This hurt and pain originates from our brutal past…you clearly do not understand that the injustices we suffered in the past still affect us today. Had it not been the investigative powers of Black Twitter, you would have moved onto

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­ igger better things…Your tweets go against the fundamental pillars of the b Miss SA pageant…You proceed to distance yourself from those tweets and claim that you have grown as a person. Yes people do evolve…this does not absolve you of culpability…. The icing on the cake is definitely the part where you pontificate about the importance of forgiveness and second chances. It takes a certain level of arrogance… to tell the victims to move on, all in the name of forgiveness. We fell for this trap before when our democracy was being negotiated… (May 21, p. 2020)

In addition, through intention denial approach (van Dijk, 1992, p. 92) racist jokers usually deny any intention of harm when their jokes are challenged and Schoombee clearly demonstrates this when she says ‘I did not mean any emotional harm to anyone’. Lastly there is always someone to blame for racist or body-shaming jokers’ actions. They are rarely responsible and in this case the bad person is ‘that someone [who] “dug” up tweets when I was 14/15”’ years old because their intention was to display my childhood in the negative. A Facebook discussion of Schoombee’s posts largely centred on the racist and not body-shaming tweets. Interlocutors found it to be a teaching and learning moment where they posted about how she had learnt her lesson and the need for parents to raise children who are aware of the ramifications of racist posts on the Internet. One discussant shared experiences about bullying at school also suggesting Schoombee deserved to withdraw from Miss South Africa thus: That’s Karma. Her hurtful comments to her school mates left emotional scars. She ruined their high school years and then still posting it on social media for all to see. Back on high school my best friend Babalwa was daily made fun of for being the only black student called horrible names … her parents pulled her from the school and we were not allowed to see her…she will now feel the hurt she inflicted on others with everyone talking. Hope this is a wakeup call for other school bullies who body shame and use racist remarks. (Comment by a discussant on Daily Voice Facebook page)

Some differed and suggested that she be forgiven as what she did has taught her a lesson and that she was young at the time and those who dug up her past ‘mayb they knew she had a good chance at winning so they dug up her past’ (Comment). Responding to this sentiment, some interlocutors strongly came out and lambasted the poster thus:

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The fact that she was a contestant doing a competition to be an ambassador for a country with a majority black population and thought it was okay -she didn’t even think to have it taken down. Just goes to show the depth of her racial hatred, now you’re out defending her ass. Maybe she will hire you to clean her ass—you seem very qualified.

While in most cases racist social media posts elicit strong condemnation from blacks, it appears that in this instance white people were equally condemning. In fact, the last comment quoted above was written by a white discussant referring to a black interlocutor.

Conclusion Within jokes are embedded some truths, beliefs and prejudices. Also embedded in these are superiority complexes where jokers feel superior to those that they make fun of. Similarly, Schoombee’s jokes are anchored on privilege, either as a white woman or as someone society has categorized as beautiful, with advantages that accrue because of able-bodied-ness and blessed with a slim, healthy figure. In the current world where the world is moving towards a woke society, that is a society that critiques human behaviours and calls out inappropriate behaviours and cancels out those who transgress certain social norms and anti-racism and anti-body-­ shaming ethics, those who make insensitive jokes are likely to lose out on their livelihoods. As indicated above, the context of jokes is important in the creation of their meaning (Weaver, 2011). Besides, as suggested in audience debates, a critical analysis of the jokes suggests some in-group and culturally learnt traits on the part of those who share racist and body-­ shaming jokes. No one is born racist. They are taught white superiority and then, when they gain their own agency, choose to express or rebel against these racist teachings. It seems some whites have not largely acceded equal citizenship to blacks. Thus, racism in South Africa is assumed, largely, to have been abolished in 1994 with the advent of what Desmond Tutu and Nelson Mandela labelled the rainbow nation. Racist jokes and race talk on social media are therefore critical in that they help magnify the racial divisions that post-Apartheid has failed to solve. Body-­ shaming jokes, largely seen as unproblematic in society, are responsible for the creation of beauty/ugly, slim/slender and other binaries. However, the sophistication of online debates, call-out and cancel cultures and other ramifications have made people guard their social media engagements.

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Unlike political humour which leads people into talking about pertinent issues, disparaging humour leads us into a moment of reflection and ‘unlaughterness’ (Mpofu, 2019b, p. 259), that is, ‘not laughing when laughter might otherwise be expected, hoped for or demanded’ (Billig, 2005, p. 192) as we contemplate the trajectory of the current society built on myths and symbolisms and not living to the realities mainstream media and politicians wish to construct.

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CHAPTER 12

The Curious Case of “Coconut Kelz”: Satire as a Critique of Race-Thinking in South Africa Sisanda Nkoala

Introduction Satire is one of the oldest forms of discursive cultural criticism. While there are differing views on how to define it, there is consensus that unlike other forms of humour such comedy, offbeat or dark humour, satire is not primarily about entertainment, but about undertaking a creative critique of systems and institutions (Caufield, 2008; Peifer and Lee, 2019, p. 3). Where other humour forms focus on highlighting an individual’s shortcomings, satire uses humorous devices, such as mimicry and juxtaposition, to provide commentary on broader societal issues. This bend towards critique distinguishes it from other forms of political humour, which are often focused on politicians’ folly without really challenging the systems in which these individuals operate (Dinç, 2012). For this chapter, a satirical piece is defined as a text that uses humour to critique societal systems, institutions and issues to persuade audiences of the problematic nature of

S. Nkoala (*) Cape Peninsula University of Technology, Cape Town, South Africa © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 S. Mpofu (ed.), The Politics of Laughter in the Social Media Age, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-81969-9_12

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some behaviours, practices and views that are taken for granted within these (Fletcher, 1987; Condren, 2012). As an art form, satire’s power lies in the fact that the satirist uses literary devices that disguise the admonishments in delivering the critique. The satirist does not dictate to the audience how it ought to respond to the issues raised. Instead, in how it is constructed, “the critiqued behaviour deconstructs itself within the satirical work by being obviously absurd, most often because it is exaggerated or taken out of its normal context” (LeBoeuf, 2007). The literature argues that because it uses humour to deliver its critique, through literary devices such as mimicry, juxtaposition and intertextuality, satire can be disarming. This positions satirical works to serve an agenda-setting function by increasing attentiveness to societal issues that citizens might otherwise not have been aware of, or interested in (Boukes, 2019; Becker, 2020). The discursive satirical works that appear to have received the most attention in the literature are from the global north, with a limited yet growing scholarship from countries in the Middle East and China, and very little from an African perspective (Jones, 2017). Because of this concentration of scholarship from the global north, there has also been a tendency to focus on satire expressed in literary texts, theatre and mainstream media from these contexts (Fletcher, 1987; Becker, 2020). The result is that most of these studies examine satirical pieces that are performed by professionals on television or in the theatre because that is how satire has historically manifested in the global north. The growth of digital media, including social media sites, has necessitated a need to understand how these platforms’ features give rise to new satirical forms. These forms are uniquely purposed for these mediums. They have roused interest in how this change influences satirical works that are now more readily available due to these technological advances. This is because internet technology has liberated satire from the monopoly of professionals and has enabled citizens to create and disseminate satirical works online (Berthon et al. 2008). Satire on digital media exhibits traits that older forms did not. These works are often produced by ordinary people who speak in simple registers, not trained professionals. Further, on digital media platforms, such as social media, the work of the satirist is put back in the hands of the audience. This allows them to share the work widely and transform the work and engage in commentary about the critique.

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This development has led to researchers examining how digital media has shaped the satire that has emerged in their respective contexts in recent years. Christian Schwarzenegger and Anna Wagner (2018) look at the role played by satirical pages and groups on Facebook in mainstreaming extreme right political positions in Western democracies. They explore user commentary and content-sharing of the posts in a way that has not previously been possible when examining humour on mainstream media platforms. Jānis Juzefovičs and Triin Vihalemm’s (2020) work considers digital political humour as illustrations of new forms of civic participation characterised by informal and expressive engagements unique to digital platforms in the ex-Soviet, Baltic countries of Estonia and Latvia. In the African context, the research into satire and digital media is still minimal. Takuo Iwata’s (2020) work on political satire and laughter provides a recent and comprehensive exploration of the production of political satire works by ordinary Africans to engage in discourses that challenge the authoritarian regimes in this context. It is one of the few studies that consider how humour manifests in digital media in Africa. In this growing research on the production of satirical works in digital platforms by non-professionals, the conceptualisation is that three things are at play that make these works particularly relevant. Firstly, satire’s symbolic power exposes the folly and hypocrisy in the political systems in these contexts by appealing to emotions through humour. Secondly, there is the power of social media which presents alternative grassroots platforms for people to discuss politically sensitive issues in contexts that are known to clamp down on dissenting voices. Thirdly, what these studies have found is that political satire in digital spaces has the potential to undergo a snowball effect, inspiring related satirical works which go on to “create a satire movement and subject power to sustained shame and ridicule” of the systems that prop up these issues (Tang & Bhattacharya, 2011). By exploring a particular case, namely, that of a black South African satirist, Lesego Tlhabi, who has developed the character of Coconut Kelz, a self-described “white woman trapped in a black woman’s body” (Ntwasa, 2019), this chapter considers how she uses satire and social media to critique the particular kind of race-thinking that props up whiteness and confers undue social superiority to white people in South Africa. What makes this case noteworthy is that while there is a view that race-­ based humour perpetuates race-thinking because of how it portrays black life and issues affecting black people (Coleman, 2000; Atluri, 2009). Tlhabi’s critique is directed at “the sea of white South African dishonesties

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in which Kelz immerses herself” (Amato, 2018). Of course, as with all satire, some people misread Tlhabi’s work and think the views expressed by her alias, Coconut Kelz, are meant literally. For the most part, though, South African-based viewers seem to grasp that the pieces lampoon whiteness and black audiences, in particular, engage positively with it.

Satire and Race-Thinking Race-thinking is what occurs when people’s ideas of humanity are based primarily on perceived racial differences. It is a perspective that makes sense of experiences and identities through the lens of race (Maré, 2001). It is said to have emerged in the early eighteenth century due to scientific endeavours to classify nature according to a particular hierarchy, which for human beings included distinguishing people based on their skin colour and skull shape. Scholars like Ken Montgomery (2005) and Hannah Arendt (1944) argue that the political exercise of categorising people according to race stems from this scientific endeavour. Montgomery (2005, 318) states “Race thinking held that the world’s population could be divided into races”, that everyone belonged to one “race or another, and that one’s ‘race’ was indicative of specific temperaments or innate personalities”. This categorisation led to a view that some races are innately superior to others, which was used to justify the imperialist and colonial agendas, which are the root of modern-­day racism (Arendt, 1944). Racethinking is contrary to the prevailing modern-day view of race as a social construct that exists only because of human ideas, beliefs and practices, not because people of different races are innately different (Montgomery, 2005). It is essential to distinguish race-thinking from two closely linked concepts, namely racism and racialisation. Racism is a societal system in which “peoples of European origin dominate people’s of other origins” and manifests itself in terms of “economic, social, cultural and/or political hegemony” (Van Dijk, 2015, p. 24). At the heart of racism is the power that one group wields over another to discriminate against them. On the other hand, racialisation is “the extension of racial meaning to a previously racially unclassified social relationship, social practice or group” (Omi & Winant, 2014, p. 111). The idea of racialisation can describe the process that new immigrants undergo when they move to the United States (Chaudhary, 2015). Race-thinking is the worldview that undergirds both racism and racialisation. Through race-thinking, we see other people and

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ourselves through racialised social identities in the context of everyday life, drawing stark divisions between “us” and “them” (Maré, 2001). We also come to make sense of social relations, actions and events based on race. Race-thinking occurs through banal, everyday assumptions, and in turn, shapes systems and structures in society because it takes so much for granted. Because of this banality, the influence of race-thinking on society is often difficult to tease out, especially in a context like South Africa. This makes it an ideal issue to address using satire. This art form can critique perspectives and phenomena that are primarily taken for granted by removing from them from the context that we are so used to seeing them in and playing them out in a context that exposes their folly. As an art form, satire is well suited to critique race-thinking manifestations by amplifying this perspective’s absurd features. Taking this as the point of departure, this chapter hopes to apply the learnings in understanding how satire is used in digital spaces to critique the race-thinking that characterises post-apartheid South Africa by examining Tlhabi’s work through the character of Coconut Kelz.

Coconut Kelz Coconut Kelz is a character that plays on the idea of a black South African who wants to be white (Rudwick, 2010). Tlhabi’s conceptualisation of a “coconut” as the spokesperson on issues of race points to the unique dynamics needed in dealing with race. The term “coconut” is usually used in a derogatory sense to label black people who appear to distance themselves from their own identity to enjoy the privileges that come to having proximity to whiteness (Jawitz, 2012). Tlhabi says she took on Kelz as her alter ego after realising that the only way she could get online engagement when talking about race was when she used these selfie-styled satirical videos that she is now famous for (Amato, 2018). Her videos are primarily filmed in the form of a vlog where she speaks directly to her viewers. The selfie-styled vlog address is a unique feature of satirical works that are shared on social media. Vlogs, commonly known as video blogs, are a “user-generated form of online communication that serve as media for social commentary, alternative newscasts, creative outlets or personal online diaries” (Molyneaux et al., 2008). Because of how they directly address the audience, vlogs resemble face-to-face communication and allow greater intimacy between the audience and the person addressing them. The use of vlogs to share opinions makes it likely that the

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audience will be more open to hearing about issues that are deemed uncomfortable to discuss in public, such as race-thinking. However, this is an area of growing research. Presented in the form of a vlog, which is often used to share personal views, the satire is strengthened because these vlogs simulate something that might otherwise be deemed to be the subject of private conversations, and turns it into public pronouncement on the absurdity of widely held ideas that are informed by race-thinking. In her satire, Kelz broaches sensitive issues around race by using the personalised vlogging format to narrate how these issues play out in everyday scenarios in South Africa. Her vlogs often start with her greeting the audience saying “Hey guys”. Kelz’s starting point is that the people she is speaking to share her perspectives on race. The tone she uses to address issues positions her views as “common sense” for those who identify with her views. The personalised tone creates the impression that these are things she would be saying to her inner circle, namely those who relate to this view, and by self-­identifying as a Coconut, those would be people who esteem whiteness. Her posture is one where she is not setting out to be a jester but is drawing on the irony of some of the commonly held views expressed by those with proximity to whiteness on issues affecting black people. This is one of the things that strengthen what she is doing in her critique of race-thinking. Her work has not been without controversy. In one instance she had been invited to an interview with a television news broadcaster. While in character, she said things that caused the audience, who did not know her work or the persona of Kelz (Amato, 2018). At the crux of her appeal is the ability to say what many think white South Africans want to say in public, but do not, for fear of removing the mask of political correctness. The persona of Coconut Kelz allows her, as a black woman, to critique whiteness while pretending to identify with it. The outsider role is also used by Kelz who, as a Coconut claims not identify with Black people in South Africa, but is also not white. This outsider role allows her to provide the type of critique that would not be as palatable were she to have opted for a character that clearly identifies as an insider of any of the official South African racial categories. It would be too jarring if her persona was white to hear her say the things that she does about black people, and would be unbelievable were she black. So the identity of a Coconut positions her as an outsider and exposes the irony in what she has to say. Tlhabi’s has used Satire’s ability to turn the tables on an issue to expose how whiteness is propped up in South Africa. This has found such

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resonance with South Africans, that Tlhabi’s work has organically moved from her personal social media pages to leading news platforms where she is called upon to be a voice of commentary on current issues related to race. Further, she has written a satirical book, Coconut Kelz’s guide to surviving this shithole (2019), which provides a satirical account of the differences between races in South Africa, and what those who are not white can supposedly do to assimilate to whiteness. In terms of using satire to critique political issues, Tlhabi’s focus on race is unique because unlike the prevailing norm in society, where “to talk about race is to talk about all races except the white” (Dyer, 1997, p.  18), her commentary centres whiteness and the race-thinking that props it up in post-apartheid South Africa. Kelz’s vlogs do not take place in a vacuum and in constructing her, while Tlhabi does draw on the dumb blonde stereotype, she also makes sure that Kelz is informed and can coherently speak about current affairs. Thus, the timing of her videos is always relevant because she releases them while these issues of race are being debated. Kelz’s discurcive interventions on issues is always one that bodly expresses views of the Coconuts of the country who, while black, have chosen to take the side of whiteness on the issue. The work is made more humorous because the viewer would be well aware of the back story informing a particular incident. This intertextual element is further amplified by social media as a vehicle that is able to disseminate the satiracle work almost instantaneouly.

Theoretical Framework Tlhabi’s success as Coconut Kelz has been quite widespread. Her social media posts, which were the original home for sharing Kelz’s perspective, garner thousands of shares and retweets. Beyond social media, her work has found a home in mainstream and traditional media in South Africa, where she is invited to share her perspectives on pressing issues. Furthermore, she has attracted advertisers and other commercially lucrative opportunities to perform comedy. This shows the manner in which she critiques race-thinking is deemed to be persuasive, hence the chapter’s orientation to use rhetoric as the framework to analyse how she uses specific literary devices in her critiques. Rhetoric is a theoretical framework and approach that examines how texts persuade (Aristotle, 1994). By undertaking a rhetorical analysis of some of her work, the chapter looks at how some of Tlhabi’s videos have successfully used social media’s features

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and form to enhance humour’s persuasive effect by looking at a few of the literary devices that she draws on. The use of humour as a tool of persuasion on race and class is not new in the South African context; however, in the way Tlhabi employs the video-selfie form, together with the traction gained through the different social media platforms she uses, her work has transcended social media. She is shaping a new way in which satire, irony and deadpan humour, are used to persuade on current affairs issues in South Africa. It bears emphasising that a satirical work’s persuasive effect does not necessarily translate into a tangible impact in practical politics. However, ridiculing systems gives a sense of “moral victory” (Griffin, 1994). The critique becomes compelling because through the use of literary devices, the satirist, who usually speaks for those deemed powerless in a particular context, lampoons the powerful. In so doing, she draws attention by speaking truth to power. As Peifer and Lee (2019, p. 1) note: Satire represents a form of public discourse that invites the critical judgment of some sociopolitical folly, absurdity, or contradiction. Through devices like exaggeration, irony, and imitation, a satirical text aspires to cut through spin, deception, and misrepresentation in order to spotlight a given state of affairs as they are or could be. That is, satire is propelled by an impulse to elucidate; to highlight some truth.”

Methodology At the time of this research, Tlhabe was using four social media platforms to share her work and engage with audiences in the digital space. She uses Facebook, Twitter and Instagram under Coconut Kelz’s account name, and YouTube under her name Lesego Tlhabi. Based on the type of engagement facilitated by the respective platforms, her satirical work is received differently. In this chapter, only the videos posted on her YouTube were considered because that particular platform is streamlined and only features the selfie-style videos Coconut Kelz is known for. Coconut Kelz has married her online work with appearances in mainstream media. She also posts regularly on other online platforms, such as Twitter and Instagram. On these platforms, she posts her signature selfie-styled videos, but she also includes videos of products that she is advertising, posts from other people who have engaged with her work, retweets of what people have to say about her work and general posts that she finds interesting.

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On her YouTube account, Tlhabi had 24 videos posted between November 3, 2017, and June 30, 2020, which are between 2 and 4 minutes long. At the time, the accont had over 250-thousand views since it was started in May 2013. For the analysis, all 24 videos that were posted on YouTube at the time were considered. The audio was transcribed, and noteworthy aspects of the visuals were documented. These included instances where Coconut Kelz made a particular gesture to make a point, wore a costume or used an accessory to achieve a noticeable effect, and where filming was done to draw attention to any activity that may be unfolding in the background. Using persuasion as a framework, a rhetorical analysis of the content was then undertaken. The analysis examines how Tlhabi articulates race-­ thinking by looking at how she uses two rhetorical devices, namely mimicry and, juxtaposition, to persuasively speak truth to power, which in this instance means critiquing whiteness. The devices chosen are among several that satirists draw on. Others include irony, malapropism and exaggeration. This chapter has limited itself to considering these two in order to engage in an in-depth discussion on how they aid the satirical works. Further due to scope, the analysis references four out of the 24 videos to explain how this satirist employs these rhetorical devices.

Findings and Discussion Rhetorical Devices: Mimicry Mimicry is the “imitation of gestures, behaviours, facial expression, speech and movements” done intentionally and unintentionally (Van Baaren et al., 2009). When used intentionally, particularly in satire, the aim is to ridicule the target by “denaturalising the acts or actors being mimicked” (Filani, 2016, p. 91). By choosing Coconut Kelz as the character through which to deliver the satirical work, Tlhabi mimics a view that looks down on blackness and esteems whiteness. In one of her first videos on YouTube as Coconut Kelz, where she indirectly introduces herself, she states: Even though I’m black, I never really felt safe in like a black space. Like my friends Mish and Claire, were always saying like the black girls are really angry and that’s just something that I’m just not…My gogo always told me like the other black kids are not like you.

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(at this point there is a caption: written above her head that reads “Like they’re more ghetto so I must stay away”)

By mimicking the Afrikaans notion of swart gevaar, loosely translated into “black danger” in reference to a fear held by white South Africans that black South Africans pose a danger to their safety, she exposes the folly of the kind of race-thinking that deems “black spaces” as unsafe. The existence of this kind of race-thinking is evidenced in racially divided communities, where black spaces exist separate from white spaces, and the idea of white flight, where white people move out of locations that are increasingly being occupied by black people. The reference to the “anger” of black people, and the caption referencing “ghetto” are some of the characteristics that inform this type of race-thinking (Lubbe, 1994). In mimicking this perspective, she exposes its irrationality because the viewer is aware that the idea of black danger is being used in the context of a satirical piece, and so the satirist must be making a mockery out of it, as opposed to giving it credence. Further, in her wording, she mimics the infamous expression “some of my best friends are black…” This phrase is usually invoked by white people who want to claim enough personal proximity to black people to justify expressions of prejudice against black people as a group (Jackman & Crane, 1986). In her case, though, she is the “some” in the phrase, and she uses her proximity to whiteness to validate the view by arguing that there are some black people that do not fall into the angry black people category, and those are the ones like her, who are friends with white people. She also uses mimicry to expose how institutions, such as the mainstream media, use sympathetic connotations about white people’s moral failing and “criminal activities”. In a video posted providing commentary on $7.4 billion in accounting fraud committed over several years by retail holdings company, Steinhoff, she states: “First I want to talk to the people on like Twitter, especially like the Black people. It’s so rude you guys. Accounting irregularities happen like all the time. Have you never made a mistake?… I know it’s not corruption because corruption is like, I don’t want to say it, but it is a black thing” ~ December 7, 2017

Her use of the term “accounting irregularities” mimicked much of the discourse used by mainstream media about this scandal. It sounds farcical when used in the context of satire. However, since it references the actual

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phrasing used in news reports, her mimicry critiques the congenial language used that frames white criminals as troubled souls who have “made a mistake”. In contrast, black people bear the labels of the crimes they have committed. Jonathan Gray (2006, p. 4) notes that as a literary device used for critique, the persuasive appeal of mimicry lies in its “power to talk back to more authoritative texts and genres, to recontextualize and pollute their meaning-construction process, and to offer other ‘improper,’ and yet more media literature and savvy interpretations”. Kelz exposes the inconsistencies in how mainstream media frame offences by white people as misdemeanours, rather than labelling them as the crimes they are. As Homi Bhabha notes, “[t]he menace of mimicry is its double vision which in disclosing the ambivalence of colonial discourse also disrupts its authority” (Bhabha, 1994, p. 126). Thus, after watching a piece like this, one will be more aware of the folly behind how the term “accounting irregularities” is used. Moreover, its use in this context unmasks race-thinking that is hesitant to associate whiteness with criminality. Rhetorical Devices: Juxtaposition Juxtaposition is a literary device used in which the author places things side-by-side to compare and contrast (Abraham, 2017). When used in a satirical way, juxtaposition places contrasting ideas side by side to portray one in a positive light, and another in a disparaging light. The conceptualisation of the character of Coconut Kelz is in itself a juxtaposition because while she is black, her perspective is strongly informed by whiteness. Through Coconut Kelz’s monologues, Tlhabi suggests that developments in contemporary South Africa are interpreted based on what they are perceived to mean for black and white South Africans, respectively. In one instance, she discusses the differences between white people’s bone structures and those of black people, playing into the race-thinking that advances a biological justification for racial categorisation, where the notion of race is not just a social construct. This biological racism often leads to the dehumanising of black people and an association of their features with those of primates. “White heads are sort of more oblique rather than flat. We sort of learnt it in bio. We (black people) have a flat head a forward…ah, that’s where monkeys comes from. I get it now guys, don’t be mad. It’s just bio. Any way theirs (heads) is more oblique because the Europeans have lots of monarchies, so it’s for crown carrying” ~ January 24, 2018

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There is a view that these perceived biological differences between black and white, which inform the widespread practice of biological racism, were foundational to the kind of race-thinking that characterises South Africa today, where white people are deemed physiologically and morally (Arendt, 1944). Using juxtaposition in the context of this satirical work exposes how ridiculous that is. Even though Kelz references biology in her justification, an approach her audience would be well aware is unfounded the satire persuasively lampoons not only these so-called racial traits but also the biology that supposedly attests to them. In juxtaposing black people’s physiology with that of white people in this satirical work, Tlhabi critiques race-thinking based on so-called biological differences. Another way in which juxtaposition is used in Tlhabi’s work as Coconut Kelz is in how she contrasts white people’s perspectives and experiences of apartheid with black people’s perspectives. “Anyway my main point is that you have to stop looking back into the past because you’re holding us back. And by the past I don’t mean World War 1 or 2 or the Holocaust or the Great Depression or anything like that. I just mean apartheid because that one we’re over. Like, we’re all over it and if you keep looking back, then you’re holding us back. And not the other ones because the other ones are important. And they were like big but not apartheid” ~ June 21, 2018

There is a commonly held view, in South Africa, that people who still complain about the legacy of apartheid are stuck in the past. Those who argue that race-based redress needs to inform policy in the post-apartheid era are accused of holding the country back. By juxtaposing this attitude with attitudes towards similarly devastating global events, Tlhabi pokes holes in the argument. She persuasively shows the folly in viewpoints that say the passage of time has lessened the impact of race-thinking in South Africa. The people who would take offence to calls by Holocaust survivors to “get over” that atrocity are forced to consider similar calls to “get over” apartheid often directed at black South Africans, and Tlhabi highlights this through juxtaposition.

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Conclusion Mimicry and juxtaposition are but two of several literary devices that Tlhabi uses in her satirical pieces as Coconut Kelz. Through these, she persuasively exposes the folly of the race-thinking that is prevalent in South Africa. In doing this, she focuses the audience’s attention on whiteness, which is something that texts that deal with race overtly do not always achieve because so much about whiteness is taken as the standard, making this a challenging notion to study. Using satire for this kind of critique is useful because it exposes the lunacy of what is taken for granted. Because the idea of Coconuts does exist, there have been instances where Tlhabi’s work as Coconut Kelz has been misread. These misreadings seem to happen when she appears on mainstream media. When her work is featured online, her followers seem to appreciate that the work is satirical. This suggests that media platforms influence the way humour is received. In an online space, one can see the artist’s full body of work at a glance instead of instalments, as happens with traditional media. Further, as an alternative medium, social media has become an essential platform for people to engage in discussions on matters of public interest. It has also provided a mechanism that might not have otherwise been available to critics like Tlhabi, to comment on many of the things that are taken for granted around race-thinking in the South African context.

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CHAPTER 13

Gender Performance and Irony in Online Presentification: A Study of the Case “Katylene” in Brazil Rafael Soares Krambeck and Adriana da Rosa Amaral

Introduction In 2007, the blog “Papel Pobre1” impacted the Brazilian blogosphere, despite being produced by Daniel Carvalho, it was signed by a fictional character, Katylene Beezmarcky. Between the anonymous and the identified, the blog became popular and the character joined the “star system” of the Internet with the biography of a transvestite character “born” on the outskirts of Rio de Janeiro. There is an irony in the great popularity achieved by a character who calls herself a transvestite raised in the neighborhood of M’Boi Mirim, if we consider that, in Brazil, there is a transphobic society that kills about 119 transvestites a year.2 Would this be an  The name can be translated as “Poor Role.”  Since 2008, Brazil has recorded an average of 118.5 murders of trans people per year. (Benevides and Nogueira 2020, p. 8). 1 2

R. S. Krambeck (*) • A. da Rosa Amaral Universidade do Vale do Rio dos Sinos (UNISINOS), São Leopoldo, Brazil © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 S. Mpofu (ed.), The Politics of Laughter in the Social Media Age, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-81969-9_13

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indication that marginal individuals would have a space on the Internet? In addition to the content, the characteristic language of the blog, with vocal emulations and references to Pajubá—a popular dialect that has its origin in African ethnic-linguistic groups and considers appropriations by homosexuals and transvestites—plays a fundamental role in the whole process. This text is the result of an adaptation of the dissertation presented to obtain the title of Master, by the Postgraduate Program in Communication at the Universidade do Vale do Rio dos Sinos—UNISINOS.  The work proposes a reflection from a double perspective, since it allows thinking about sexuality issues from Katylene’s actions in the construction of a narrative as a transvestite, and also the way the character concretizes on social networks makes us reflect on the construction of identities in cyberspace. So, based on the theoretical contributions of cyberculture and queer theory and methodological grounded theory, the research maps the appropriations and uses of the blog and Twitter, as movements to mobilize multiple cultural elements that result in the narrative that originates and authenticates the character. Thus, the objective is to question how these movements that cross intersections between genres, digital cultures and humor occur.

Context Historically, identities are inserted in a social organization through unstable, reinterpreted and re-signified cultural values in complex circumstances. For Grosfoguel (2016), the structure of contemporary Western knowledge—and the consequent understanding of reality—is based on widely racist and sexist logics and epistemologies due to a colonialist and Eurocentric history. When turning to the social representations of genders, Butler (1993, 1999) points out that they are reinterpreted and, later, naturalized, conforming as idealizations and paradigms that delimit appropriate masculinities and femininities, reflections of dimorphism and heterosexual complementarity of bodies. So, these will be the principles that the author calls “gender norms”. Thus, naturalized knowledge operates as a preventive delimitation of reality, that is, it establishes what will or will not be intelligibly human or “real”, “Establish the ontological field in which bodies can have legitimate expression” (1999, p. XVII). There is a process in which various social bases operate—family, school, religion, etc.—that operationalize a pedagogy that incorporates the sexuality device to supervise a process that “culminates” in a cyclical investment by the

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subject themselves in the delimitation of their identity. Louro characterizes this process as “sexuality is ‘learned’, or rather, it is constructed, throughout life, in various ways, by all subjects” (2001, p.  11). In this context, the idea of performativity suggests a reflection on identities through their unstable character that occurs through acts that create/ recreate realities when referring to previous speeches, that is, “as a reiterative and citational practice by which discourse produces the effects it names” (Butler, 1993, p. 2). According to Derrida: Could a performative utterance succeed if its formulation did not repeat a ‘coded’ or iterable utterance, or in other words, if the formula I pronounce in order to open a meeting, launch a ship or a marriage were not identifiable as conforming with an iterable model, if it were not then identifiable in some way as a ‘citation’? […] in such a typology, the category of intention will not disappear; it will have its place, but from that place it will no longer be able to govern the entire scene of the system of utterance. (1988, p. 18)

As a daily updating strategy implemented in an attempt to recognize and legitimize, performance is operated through radical exclusions, since the hegemonic identity is constituted from the limits of the “human”. Such actions are constantly reviewed and monitored by the matrix of heteronormative norms, because the denied identities remain present in the relationship, delimiting the “human” and as an imminent disturbance and rearticulation of borders. So, essentialist naturalized notions are a legitimation strategy based on metalepsy, since this expectation produces the very phenomenon it anticipates (Butler, 1999, p. XV). Thus, performativity is a ritual that takes effect from its naturalization, since some representations assume such visibility that they are no longer perceived as representations, being taken as realities. Different masculinities/femininities and sexual practices are regulated cyclically in society. The normalization of heterosexuality operates by circumscribing the “natural” pattern of sexuality and the sexes will be shaped by a dynamic of power. This matrix confers its power insofar as it is cited as “the norm”; however, this power will also be the product of the very citations it imposes; therefore, “the citation of the law is the very mechanism of its production and articulation” (Butler, 1993, p.  15). Thinking about contemporary sexuality is reflecting on the identification processes linked to speeches based on the matrix that promotes certain identities and refuses others.

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Online Identity In technological spaces, performances are enhanced and the way people and their relationships are constituted are changed, enabling the emergence of social forms. In order to understand the consequences of the emergence of a media on personal connections and other media, let us look at the characteristics of each and their implications. However, traditional media adapts to new realities and is not replaced. for many, the increased amount of mediated interaction seems to threaten the sanctity of our personal relationships. For others, new media offer the promise of more opportunity for connection with more people, a route to new opportunities and to stronger relationships and more diverse connections. Both perspectives reflect a sense that digital media are changing the nature of our social connections. (Baym, 2010, p. 1)

As different technologies permeate everyday life, a cultural formation that starts from an informational understanding impregnated by an imaginary of technoculture starts to change the way of thinking and perceiving reality. Not as technological determinism, but as a system that depends on the relationships established by the subjects, with people or machines, relationships that become so intimate that they confuse the boundaries between the subject and the machine. Currently, the appropriation of those digital technologies has become evident, but culture has always been a technoculture. Society has become accustomed to the mediatized reality and development expands the process of derealizing the world. Thus, cyberculture establishes itself with the most diverse segments of society, tracing, sharing and complementing each other, constituting a complex reality. In 1998, Kenway observed that individuals are establishing different ways of relating to gender and sexuality on the Internet. According to the author, two elements of technological communication—anonymity and the ease of exchanging identities—will be essential for experimental identity games. Subjectivity is an endless construction, the subject plays roles in different contexts on a daily basis and this identity is constantly changing, experiencing and negotiating different aspects of themselves, dialogically. Technology recovers aspects of everyday life and values them, demonstrating the multiplicity of elements that constitute the subject. Thus, technologies are auxiliary devices in the disposition of the relational subject, “the individual conceived as a place of intersection in the

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connections that constitute social networks, for someone systematically outside themselves” (Sodré, 2002, p. 159). Thus, the idea of a postmodern self-arises, permanent in the human mind, but inconstant and discursive. Identity maintains a connection with language, being constituted by it and through it, an articulation of signifiers. The definition of identity is not the assumption of an essence, since the act of identification occurs from the expression. Thus, the digitized images with which the subjects interact become technological appendices of the subject, multiple and fluid identities expand in technologies and the evolution of communications engender relationships between the subject and the incorporeal identities imagetically constructed and semiotically negotiated, meaning to the subject. Donath (1999) points out that, in the interaction, the perceived impressions define the social process, therefore, in technological spaces, these originally “spontaneous” components are necessarily built to guarantee “humanity” to the representation that results in alterity. The body will be consumed in hybridization and dematerialization, and consciousness will transform into informational molds under infinitely expanding digitalism, but also reconstructed as alternative identities. Interactivity articulates the subject with the machines, appropriating the subject’s complexity, thus, technology acquires a personal power that reflects the projection of itself made by the user. The user is absorbed by the machine, becoming more than an information system. Technology mediates our social relationships and, therefore, “the cyborg is a kind of disassembled and reassembled, postmodern collective and personal self” (Haraway, 1991, p. 163). There is potential in contemporary times in which individuals are not afraid of multiple and unstable positions. Thus, this assembly takes place through communication. The technology inserts the cartography of the identity in the metaphors of the windows of the operational system, those multiple identities are exemplified on the computer through the windows. Resuming the discussions about the eternal historical–social (re)construction of gender, the cyborg image appears in Haraway’s work as a “post-gender” figure that breaks with heterosexist binary and standardization, “our most important political construction, a world-changing fiction” (Haraway, 1991, p. 149), that is, even if fictional, the cyborg’s imagery indicates alternatives to subversion.

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Case Study In this research, the Internet is thought of as an environment explored by platforms and these bring social manifestations as diverse as their specificities. It is observed how the creation of the character is due to the expansion of its manifestations in more than one platform. The study carried out is methodologically close to the grounded theory, because it is “experiencing the empirical field, observing the new elements and building their perceptions through the systematic analysis and reflection of the data found in the field” (Fragoso et al. 2011, p. 87). A flexible approach, which can bring the researcher and the object closer, is assumed so that it is possible to interpret the social processes in question. It was decided here to maintain an exploratory stance, in an almost involved way with the data to search for the character’s narrative traits. When agreeing with the authors that the researcher should choose to use “sensitivity to choose the data that seem most relevant to them” (p. 89), intentional sampling was built, because the great advantage of this perspective is the “selecting information-rich cases for study in depth” (Patton, 2002, p. 230). When analyzing Katylene’s performances, it was realized that, even if the comparison is inevitable, the character was not an “ordinary transvestite”. Therefore, the methodological observation of issues of aesthetics and language sought to emerge data for the development of a theory that explained this “new way of transvestizing”. When considering the blog based on its aesthetics, we investigate the elements that make up the structure and reflect its own culture and identity. Then, five posts were observed from October 16 to December 24, 2012, paying attention to expressions and traits that indicate references to other materials that help in the construction of a performance. On Twitter, on the other hand, we resorted to images used as a profile during the period from December 2011 to August 2012, trying to explain the values charged for the construction of the narrative. The tweets were collected during Daniel/Katylene’s birthday’s week, trying to understand the narrative between them.

Blog Aesthetics Analysis The blog layout is a simple template: a header, a space dedicated to posts, a column for gadgets and a footer at the end of the page. Vertically, the blog is very “tall”. Due to the number of gadgets, it is necessary to use the

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scroll bar to view it until the end. The blog background reminds us of Damier, a traditional print created in 1888 by Louis Vuitton. The print is one of the biggest icons of the brand that bears the name of its founder. Therefore, the background seeks to insert ideals of wealth and glamor. The blog header consists of the address in calligraphic letters that imitate a neon sign. Often, the letters flash as if there is a malfunction, inducing the idea of glamor and decadence, reflecting the aesthetic “luxury and trash” present in the character’s manifestations. However, when turned off, you can read “KY”, an intimate lubricating gel. The character’s image is inserted between diamonds, Katylene wears a miss hairstyle and a crown. In addition, a sash entitled “Musa do Twitter (Twitter Muse)” connects the character to the popularity it presents on the site. Then, another “luminous” appears, indicating a space dedicated to four situations classified as “Baphão”, a term used to designate scandals or confusions. However, of the four facts reported (celebrity wedding, gala dance, Rede Globo party, disagreement between two transvestites and client), only the last one could be considered a confusion. The rest of the events are reserved for the “bafão” category as “major events”. A new red sign indicates “Katchigurias” (Katchegories). The so-called categories refer to “tags”. Some of these categories are emblematic of the character’s language. Widely based on Pajubá, the way of writing/expressing herself is the main component of Katylene’s entire performance. Even a small search gadget inserted, instead of the traditional “search here,” is characterized by a “Caça Aqui” (Hunt Here), remembering that the term “hunting,” in gay culture, refers to the search for sexual partners. The blog archive is made available with the title “old bafos”. The interesting thing is that in some parts of the blog, the word “bafo” is spelled with “ph”; however, here it is presented with “f”, which demonstrates that the language has an “unstable” spelling, without any regulations. At the bottom of the page, a message that defines the blog as a “gossip” page and alerts about the blog’s content has no commitment to the truth, publishing “rumors, in addition to reported facts”. In addition, the non-authorship of the photos is assumed, allowing contact with the copyright holders of the materials that do not allow their display on the website. What draws attention in the blog’s observation is that one of the main constituents of identity is a “trash and luxury” aesthetic. Bringing together elements like “wallpaper”, neon signs, diamonds and a crown, Katylene takes up signs that refer to a luxurious aesthetic, but that in excess becomes caricatural kitsch. The “sign” in which some letters are cyclically turned

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off can be considered an exquisite synthesis of the aesthetics of the blog’s identity. In addition, it is visible that at various points gay culture is present in the form of slang and other elements. The hyperlinks with links to other platforms are insistent: they are presented at the beginning (header), middle (side column) and end (footer) of the blog. Thus, the reader cannot only read the blog but also be part of the official Orkut community, follow the character on Twitter and watch TV programs; in addition, the Facebook plug-in invites the reader to enter its Facebook fan page without leaving the blog. Anyway, it was possible to notice that the blog does not present itself as another gossip blog, because the aesthetic is an “one more attractiveness”. Thus, the character “per se” is already an attraction. In addition, it was possible to notice that the blog is linked to other platforms so that the connection between the character/author and the readers is stronger.

Blog Content Analysis To analyze questions about the content and language used on the blog, five texts were selected: “Umidificação de Dya”, about a photo in which the singer Mariano shows an autographed CD; “Foi Ótsheemo”, showing a police report involving a transvestite; “Olá Negõh Wait”, about the reproduction of the video “Scream & Shout” by a “subcelebrity”; “Feliz #Bereniceday”, in which a viral video from years ago is rescued and “Filiz Analtal”, with a comparison between the video “Hunky Santas: The Holiday Card” by the underwear brand Andrew Christian and a video posted by Luisa Marilac, a famous trans woman in Brazil after having a video of her going viral. In the texts, it can be noticed that some strategies are recurrent, among them, the feminization of some words like the name of the city of São Paulo, or, some syllable separations to insert puns like “pass-ada” or simulate intonations as in “ju-ro” (I swear). There is also the rescue of “memes” like “excuse me, Luciana” or “where have you been”, which generates an articulation with the culture of the Internet. The insertion of the text in a network of other components of the online culture also occurs with the videos used/cited, because when publishing the post “Foi Ótsheemo”, not only tags that refer to other older videos are used, but the video itself follows a pattern of other virals, such as police confusion involving transvestites. In addition, the video published in “Feliz #Bereniceday” is a Brazilian viral classic. In addition, the expectation x reality structure presented in the last post is also something

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very characteristic of the Internet language, in this case, exemplified as an expectation of “sexy men” contrasting with the reality of an amateur video of a trans linked to memes. In fact, the attention given to handsome men is repeated in the first and last post. The combination of a subcelebrity, which would not have the authority to do so, imitating a singer without much authenticity and carried out by a gossip program, the event narrated in the post “Olá Negõh Wait” becomes “disastrous”. Finally, we pay attention to the construction that exists in two posts in which a sequence of photos is published to build an idea of zooming in and draw attention to a specific point (See Fig. 13.1).

Twitter As previously said, Katylene calls herself “muse of Twitter”, because that site is the second most used online tool and where the character undeniably has great prestige. Cha et al., when trying to measure the influence of actors on Twitter, comments that “ordinary users can gain influence by focusing on a single topic and posting creative and insightful tweets that are perceived as valuable by others, instead of simply talking to others” (2010, p. 11). This case is an example of this, as Katylene became popular due to content tweets like the one on the site. Ironically, on Twitter, the character (@katylene) has more than two hundred thousand followers, while Daniel (@cadeodaniel) has only about twenty-two thousand. Daniel constituted a narrative of the character that practically stood out from his. We do not naively think that such a bond is breakable; however, when looking at Katylene’s performances, the reference to the author is in the background. Twitter Aesthetics Analysis On Twitter, the background used is the same as that of the blog, while the initial biography of the page “I was humiliated, I went through a series of problems and managed to turn it around and show my worth” reflects the narrative available on the blog about marginalized transvestites that overcame difficulties. The images used in the profile, however, vary over time. When designing online profiles as “representations of social actors”, it is considered that the images used in the profile constitute the representation process. Therefore, during the observation process, eleven profile images were analyzed in an attempt to understand the reason for the use

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Fig. 13.1  Sequence of pictures with the idea of zooming in

of those images and trace their origins. The figures are montages made with photos found on the Internet, in which the character’s face overlaps the face of the subject. The first two images analyzed are photos of anonymous people (as shown in Fig. 13.2), of which the character does not assume the meaning already assumed, but the construction of the image that tends to be tacky/ strange. Katylene searched for an image that would convey her way of dealing with sexuality/sensuality, extrapolating and making it vulgar. Another type of common reference of the images is pop singers, like Britney Spears and Madonna as shown in Fig. 13.3. Britney is one of the main celebrities “trolled” on the blog, because since the beginning of her

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Fig. 13.2  Profile images and anonymous photos

Fig. 13.3  Profile pictures and photographs of pop singers

career, the “princess of pop” has always had her authenticity questioned for using playback and having her voice manipulated during the recording of songs. The second photo was taken during a presentation at the North American MTV Video Music Awards (VMA) on September 9, 2007, which would be her official comeback. However, the presentation was severely criticized because Britney was out of shape and showed little enthusiasm, following neither the choreography nor the playback. So, the moment that was supposed to be a “big return” ended up being a little bit strange. Using this image, Katylene not only “trolls” Britney Spears, but also remembers the moment. Madonna was also the inspiration for a profile image, using the MDNA cover. Katylene relates the glamor image of the singer, in a kind of imitation of her performance, thus, when putting herself in the place of the singer, the character profanes the prestige of the American singer. The first image is promotional material from the group “Gaiola das Popozudas”, while the second was used during the carnival (See Fig. 13.4). The funk group from Rio de Janeiro, of which Valesca Popozuda is a vocalist, performed songs such as “Quero te dar” and “Tô Que Tô Pegando Fogo”. Despite being one of the promising feminist groups in funk, the group is criticized for using bad language. Thus, when relating her image to that of Valesca, Katylene manages to approach the ways in

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Fig. 13.4  Profile images and photographs of Valesca Popozuda

Fig. 13.5  Profile pictures and fashion photographs

which both of them deal with sex, vulgarizing it in a “trash” way, bringing a load of meaning from the singer’s reference. In Fig. 13.5, we have references to the fashion world. While the first photo is a cover stamped by Lea T, the first Brazilian transsexual model who has already debuted campaigns by the Givenchy brand, the second photo contains three elements that contribute to an aura of glamor: model Gisele Bündchen, fashion photographer Solve Sundsbo, and the fashion magazine “Numéro”. Thus, in this image, Katylene finds room to insert her face in a space marked by distinction. The third photograph is of actress Josie Maran taken by Terry Richardson, a photographer who has worked with big stars and big brands. Richardson is known for his controversial style, using a “sexualized atmosphere”. However, sex is exposed in a provocative and vulgar way, due to its gratuity, that is, only a commodity. It is a deconstruction of aesthetics, like an exaltation of the grotesque. The ways of dealing with sex are similar on Katylene.com and on Terry Richardson’s photos, both popularizing it. Therefore, the articulation with the photographer makes him reinforce “sex” in his narrative. “Avenida Brasil” was a soap opera that marked the history of Brazilian drama. Rede Globo’s soap opera had a wide audience and generated numerous memes on the Internet. Even though it was not possible to find the original image, those who followed the story recognize that Fig. 13.6

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Fig. 13.6  Profile image based on the soap opera “Avenida Brasil”

presented is Rita (Débora Falabella) spying on Carminha (Adriana Esteves), whose face was replaced by that of the character. Twitter Content Analysis The tweets reflect the style of the blog posts. However, not only for aesthetics, in a link, the address is provided. There are also some tweets, in which the character informs the production of a new post or inserts the link to the post. In many tweets, the narrative “unites” the identity of the creator and the character in one, as in the tweets in which she claims to be a DJ at a party or when someone refers to something Daniel did. However, the occasion made some followers wonder who was on their birthday, whether

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Daniel or Katylene. However, there is a dialogue between the character and Adriane Galisteu, in which the presenter asks about the blogger and Katylene answers in the third person, that is, she performs a movement of separation between the two narratives. Katylene is not just a pseudonym, but she has become an Internet celebrity, while she and Daniel cohabit on platforms, there is a narrative that attenuates without ever completely dissolving the link between creator and creature. It was possible to see that she has a very close relationship with other bloggers of equal popularity. However, the fact that Daniel/Katylene crosses the Internet barrier into the mainstream—the character was news, Daniel was a columnist for Adriane Galisteu’s program—means that their relationships are established with inside and outside Internet personalities. In both “celebrity” and “ordinary” followers’ tweets, one aspect that is constantly shown in appropriation and use is the character’s characteristic language. The puns and different spellings—that mimic the phonetics of words—function as a specific dynamic in this context that the character developed. Those who do not know the language have difficulty understanding what is being discussed in this specific scenario. Therefore, from observing Katylene’s profile on Twitter, several factors can be seen to be discussed in relation to the construction of an online identity and its relationship with followers. The origin of characters like Katylene demonstrates how the specificities of the Internet generate a space where, in addition to providing the creation and manipulation of an identity devoid of off-line referents, the formation of a culture conveyed by such an identity is allowed. Thus, when establishing social relations around the context of content production and, consequently, of a culture of its own, Katylene’s “celebrity sign” forms a social group with a characteristic dynamic. Such a social group does not seem to reflect a traditional heteronormative matrix, not least because there is no attempt to “domesticate” or even silence sex. Sex is a topic of discussion, jokes and any other conversation. In addition, Katylene’s performance is based on reference to performances from other genres. When commenting on the body of the singer Mariano or even on the “case” of the abused transvestite, Katylene builds her way of being a transvestite. Thus, the gender of the character is built on the blog and Twitter with the gender of the other.

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Conclusions From the different conceptions of queer theory and cyberculture, we present here the character Katylene Beezmarcky, her mobilization of identity traits and the consequent construction of a narrative in the spaces provided by the blog and Twitter. This text aims at highlighting expressive points of the research carried out over two years and which resulted in the master’s dissertation. Conceptual reflection through a queer perspective seems interesting from two main points: deconstruction is significant in the process of thinking about contemporary identities; and, understanding the place of gender identities among socio-cultural issues breaks with prejudices about trans culture. The research had an exploratory character, carefully observing what emerged from the meaning and carrying a certain cultural baggage or identity traits, to then draw a cartography of the movements and performances carried out by Katylene that materialize her on social networks. After reflecting on the uses and appropriations made by the character, it is noticed that Katylene “exists”, not from the same tactile existence of things, but in a symbolic plane of ideas, in the tangle of online practices, she originates and takes shape. The character is essentially language, be it verbal or imagetic, it is a kind of reference without a specific reference. In place of silicone prostheses, we have infamous puns, in place of makeup, we see references to celebrities and a montage that we have of pictures and crude drawings. In Katylene’s narrative there is an exoticism or eccentricity; it is a unique example of trans identity, and an extreme case of persona built in cyberspace. Although the explicit construction brings performances of sexuality and a gender identity, the character herself has no sexual practice, so her speech ends in itself, it is a real fantasy only in the world of ideas. However, this does not prevent from bringing to the blog and Twitter a real game of performances with the sexes and genders when adopting such a posture. In this way, the character plays (in the most ironic and sarcastic way possible) with sex, which society insists on polemicizing and trying to “train”. Katylene’s blog transmits, through textual/graphic elements, a “Katylenica” kind of culture/aesthetics. The language created by the convergence of Pajubá in the streets of prostitution and the emulation of the vocal forms of words is very important in this culture. Pajubá is no longer restricted to prostitution, as it has spread internally to the gay subculture and, today, it is already spreading beyond it, since gay characters appear in soap operas and films using slang which became popular.

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Another important element regarding references to famous people, that is, people who already carry meaning to the public, is the fact that when using a montage of her face in a photo of Madonna, Katylene borrows the title of “queen of pop”. She does it so, not in the sense of becoming such, but rather to mock the irony of not having the necessary authority to occupy that position. Furthermore, in Katylene’s behavior, we can see that in addition to any “typically transvestite” exaggeration, everything else must be exorbitant. In place of the desire to “look like a woman”, we have the desire to “look like a transvestite.” Thus, the sensual being goes beyond the ordinary and the glamor is in the excess that becomes kitsch. It is as if the character kept an eternal coming and going between luxury and trash, becoming a stereotype of a transvestite. And how does a blog signed by a transvestite character gain popularity in such a homophobic country? Humanizing celebrities. Blog and Twitter content is not centered on Katylene’s dilemmas, but on celebrity flaws. What makes this gay identity so palatable is the ironic humor that “masks” prejudices. As critical as humor is, it rarely serves as social criticism, in fact, what is most appropriate for the character is language and it hardly changes the homophobic conjuncture. However, there is an essential role for the Internet, since rarely does a television station insert a transvestite into its programming. On the network, the blog can be accessed and its content consumed by anyone who wants to, without going through “moralistic” filters. In addition, another issue in which the Internet plays a fundamental role is the possibility of producing this type of content. Blog posts and even tweets are practically all made from materials available on other sites, that is, a large part of the blog’s content depends on the web’s “public archive”. That way, Katylene can seek an interview, or even have access to an advertising campaign, to then make her comments. Thus, it is confirmed that Katylene’s performances do not subvert the norms—at least in the sense of questioning prejudice, as the character remains on the “strange” side. Almost like old freak shows, the crowd is attracted by exactly the exotic difference. And when consuming the blog content, it also consumes some of the identity traits used to compose it. However, undeniably, when playing with words, the character questions and reconstructs a specific field of meanings. Puns made with “sexual” words insert malicious meaning in different contexts. And, by making “rough” montages with her “kitsch” face on the bodies of celebrities like Madonna or Gisele Bündchen, she profaned the glamor of the photograph in question,

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deconstructing canonical personalities from pop culture and appropriating traits to build her narrative.

References Baym, N. (2010). Personal connections in the digital age. Polity Press. Benevides, B. G., & Nogueira, S. N. B. (2020). Dossiê dos assassinatos e da violência contra travestis e transexuais brasileiras em 2019. Expressão Popular. Butler, J. (1993). Bodies that matter: On the discursive limits of ‘sex’. Routledge. Butler, J. (1999). Gender trouble feminism and the subversion of identity. Routledge. Cha, M., Haddadi, H., Benevenuto, F., & Gummadi, K. (2010). Measuring user influence in Twitter: The million follower fallacy. ICWSM. Derrida, J. (1988). Limited Inc. Northwestern University Press. Donath, J.  S. (1999). Identity and deception in the virtual community. In P.  Kollock & M.  Smith (Eds.), Communities in cyberspace (pp.  29–59). Routledge. Fragoso, S., Recuero, R., & Amaral, A. (2011). Métodos de pesquisa para Internet. Sulina. Grosfoguel, R. (2016). A estrutura do conhecimento nas universidades ocidentalizadas: racismo/sexismo epistêmico e os quatro genocídios/epistemicídios do longo século XVI. Sociedade e Estado, 31(1), 25–49. Haraway, D. (1991). Simians, cyborgs and women: The reinvention of nature. Routledge. Kenway, J. (1998). Educando cybercidadãos que sejam ‘ligados’ e críticos. In L. H. Silva (Ed.), A escola cidadã no contexto da globalização (pp. 99–120). Vozes. Louro, G. L. (2001). O corpo educado: pedagogias da sexualidade (G. L. Louro, Ed.). Autêntica, 7–34. Patton, M. Q. (2002). Qualitative research and evaluation methods. Sage. Sodré, M. (2002). Antropológica do espelho: uma teoria da comunicação linear e em rede. Vozes.

CHAPTER 14

‘Those Boys Are Representing Mashonaland’: Digital Football Fandom, Ethnicity and National Identity Politics in Zimbabwe Lyton Ncube and Jasper Maposa

Introduction This chapter explores the intersections of ethnicity, national identity and everyday nationalism in Zimbabwe’s digital football fandom. Knott (2016) defines everyday nationalism as ‘a sub-field [that] refocuses attention on the ‘masses’ and human agency within nationalism studies’. Earlier theoretical departures to nationalism including (Anderson, 1983; Billig, 1995), are criticised for ‘top-down’ approaches which side-line the agency of ordinary people in articulating discourses about the nation and nationhood (Skey, 2006; Antonsich, 2016). Given football is part of the everyday fabric in Zimbabwe, as elsewhere, it is critical to examine its connections to nationalism. Football is a crucial site of representation where nations

L. Ncube (*) University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa Midlands State University, Gweru, Zimbabwe J. Maposa Great Zimbabwe University, Masvingo, Zimbabwe © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 S. Mpofu (ed.), The Politics of Laughter in the Social Media Age, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-81969-9_14

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and national identities are [re]imagined. If nations are considered as ‘imagined communities’ (Anderson, 2006), in sports they can seem ‘more real as a team of eleven named people’ (Hobsbawm, 1990, p. 143). Critically, football is one of the ‘most emotive cultural forms through which some sections of the Zimbabwean society experience and express nationalism’ (Ncube, 2017, p. 1). Historians Muzondidya and Ndovu-Gatsheni (2007) contend that despite its rare entry into both official and public discourse, ethnicity continues to shape and influence the economic, social and political life of Zimbabwe in post-colonial times. ‘Ethnicity refers to relationships between groups whose members considers themselves distinctive, and these groups may be ranked hierarchically within a society’ (Comaroff & Comaroff, 2009, p. 6). While in the past classical social anthropologists spoke of ‘tribes’, the term ethnicity has now become more common (Banks, 1996; Comaroff & Comaroff, 2009). Critically, Comaroff and Comaroff (2009, p. 32) submit that ‘ethnicity occurs in social contexts where cultural differences make a difference’. Football is a typical example of such social contexts where cultural differences make a difference. Therefore, using football to forge a common national identity in Zimbabwe is considerably a herculean task due to [re]curring ethnicity problems (see Muzondidya & Ndovu-Gatsheni, 2007; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009; Mhlanga, 2013; Ncube 2014; Mpofu, 2015, 2017). Mhlanga (2013, p. 1) argues that in Zimbabwe, ‘any attempt to discuss ethnicity risks being labelled as ‘tribalism’ and therefore, divisive to a supposedly united nation’. Despite discussing ethnicity in Zimbabwe’s public fora officially considered an abomination, online social media are key platforms where such discourses enjoy unfettered freedom. Social media spaces are hard for publishers to govern as comments can only be post-­ moderated, dashboards offer few governance options and user accounts cannot be easily verified (Martin, 2016). Hall (1991) argues the question of identity never went away (Hall 1991) and this explains why debates around ‘Zimbabweanness’ spill into superficially seemingly innocent spaces such as sports fandom. This chapter uses online football fandom lens to explore how ordinary Zimbabweans perceive and relate to their national football team, the nation and national identity at large. The focus is on the sentiments expressed on virtual fandom spaces during the 2017 Africa Cup of Nations (AFCON) tournament in Gabon. International competitions such as the Olympics or world championships allow for a spectating public to express

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and to reaffirm its national identity (Haut et  al., 2020). The Warriors-­ Zimbabwe senior men’s national football team had a forgettable nightmarish performance at the biannual African football extravaganza. It is important to note that the Warriors have consistently performed dismally in AFCON tournaments. For instance, at their maiden appearance at the biannual African football spectacle in Tunisia, the Warriors lost two group matches to Egypt and Cameroon and managed a single victory over Algeria. At the 2006 AFCON tournament in Egypt, the Warriors once again lost two group matches to Senegal and Nigeria but won against Ghana. Thus on both occasions, the Warriors failed to go beyond the group stage. However, at the 2017 AFCON tournament, the Warriors scaled their failure to dizzy heights. Playing in Group B composed of Senegal, Algeria, Zimbabwe and Tunisia, the Warriors drew 2 all in their first match against Algeria. However, they lost 0-2 to Senegal in the second match; and were hammered 2-4 by Tunisia. Consequently, the Warriors prematurely exited the tournament with only a single point, much to the disappointment of Zimbabwean fans who had anticipated something better. Since the Gabon AFCON tournament took place against a backdrop of increased social media use in fandom, fans’ frustrations, aspirations and perceptions about the Warriors, the nation and nationhood converged on combustible digital platforms. Some of the comments were intertwined with humour. The 2017 AFCON tournament becomes lens to explore how Zimbabweans relate with the national team and inherent contestations about national identity through selected online comments on fan pages. The national football team’s poor performance sparked a fierce debate on digital spaces. The debate revolved around questions such as ‘Who is Zimbabwean?’ and ‘What is Zimbabwe anyway? Existing literature on ethnicity and national identity in Zimbabwe, largely examines how ethnicity manifests in political and economic spaces (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003; Muzondidya & Ndovu-Gatsheni, 2007; Mhlanga, 2013; Mpofu, 2015, 2017). However, there is a dearth of studies focusing on the intersections of digital football fandom, ethnicity and national identity discourses in Zimbabwe. This makes the current investigation necessary.

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Context Literature on ethnicity and national identity politics concerning Zimbabwe and Africa is so abundant and impossible for this chapter to exhaust. However, despite the existence of a huge body of knowledge, the subject still requires systematic academic interrogation especially from sport sociological lens. This is because ethnicity like electricity, which is useful for many other facets of our lives, it can still electrocute (Mhlanga, 2013). From 1980, when the current Zimbabwean nation was born, the country has always been divided along ethnic lines, consequently constraining the attainment of a common national identity (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009). Historian Ranger (1989) contends that ethnicity problems in Zimbabwe date back to pre-colonial and colonial epochs, as shall be elaborated later. Zimbabwe is a multi-ethnic society, just like most African societies. More than 16 ethnic groups co-exist in the Southern African country. These include the Shona, Ndebele, Kalanga, Nambya, among others. The Shona are numerically superior1, a factor which gives them an advantage to dominate the political, economic and social spaces. Hierarchically, the Ndebele are the second dominant and vocal group after the Shona. Ethnic groups such as Kalanga, Nambya, Venda and Tonga are categorised as ‘minority’. Descendants of immigrants from Malawi2, Zambia and Mozambique who migrated into the country during the colonial era also make up the Zimbabwean population (Raftopolous & Mlambo, 2009). Whites, Indians and Coloureds3 are also part of Zimbabwe’s diverse social ethnic groups. In terms of geographical location, Shona speakers are largely concentrated in Northern provinces (especially Mashonaland), Manicaland, Masvingo and the Midlands provinces, though they can be found in any part of Zimbabwe (Giuliuanotti, 2004; Ncube 2014). Ndebele speakers mainly occupy the Southern parts of Zimbabwe (specifically Bulawayo and Matabeleland provinces). The Shona and the Ndebele are the key 1  There are no recent statistics about the exact percentages of these groups. Giuliuanotti’s (2004) study shows that Shona speakers comprise around 80 per cent of the population, which is currently approximated at 13. 5 million. The Ndebele around 16 per cent of the total population (Giuliuanotti, 2004: 81). 2  These groups came specifically during the Federation of Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) and Nyasaland (Malawi) from 1953–1963. Southern Rhodesia was the Federal capital. 3  The term ‘Coloured’ is often used to refer to offsprings born out of intermarriages between Whites and Blacks.

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protagonists in Zimbabwe’s ethnic rivalry matrix. However, thrown into the mix is the fact that Shona and Ndebele are not, and have never been, stable markers of identity at all throughout Zimbabwe’s history. Historians contend that ‘Shona’ is just a term signifying linguistic, cultural and political characteristics of people (Raftopolous & Mlambo, 2009). In essence, ‘Shona’ is an umbrella term for groups who have existed since pre-colonial times who include the Karanga, Manyika, Zezuru, Ndau (Muzondidya & Ndovu-Gatsheni, 2007, p. 277). Critically, ethnic conflicts go beyond the well-documented hostility between the Ndebele and the Shona. Internal conflicts are evident amongst the Shona sub- ethnicities including the Korekore, Zezuru, Karanga, Manyika, among others (Ranger, 1989; Sithole 1999). This ethnic hostility in the Shona groups was also evident in February 2016 at the height of factionalism within the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU PF) government, then under the leadership of Robert Mugabe. Addressing a rally in Chiweshe in February 2016, Grace Mugabe, Vice President Phelekezela Mphoko and some ZANU PF supporters controversially sang, ‘Zezuru unconquerable’. Earlier on, Mphoko had denounced those entertaining the idea that the next president after Mugabe would be of Karanga. Mphoko’s sentiments were plausibly directed at then-presidential aspirant, Emmerson Mnangagwa, of Karanga origin. Some historians trace ‘hostile relations’ between the Shona and the Ndebele to pre-colonial times (Beach, 1984; Ranger, 1989). During this period, the Shona people were regularly attacked by fierce Ndebele Warriors who had settled in Zimbabwe from the South, fleeing from Shaka Zulu in present-day South Africa4. The Ndebele allegedly often raided the Shona for cattle, land and women, until the Pioneer column arrived in the 1890s and put an end to this oppression (Beach, 1984). However, Ndlovu-­ Gatsheni (2009) traces the problem of ethnic polarisation between the Ndebele and the Shona from the split of the nationalist movement— Joshua Nkomo led Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) in 1963, which resulted in the formation of Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU). This Ndebele/Shona polarisation did not spare the course of the liberation struggle as nationalist movements—Zimbabwe People’s

4  The Ndebele speaking people came from Nguniland (present-day South Africa) under the leadership of Mzilikazi in 1868 during the period of Mfecane-fleeing from the wrath of Shaka leader of the great Zulu nation (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2010).

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Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) and Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) were divided across ethnic lines (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009). In the post-1980 period, Ndebele and Shona relations were further restrained by how President Robert Mugabe led government violently responded to alleged ‘dissident’ activities in Matabeleland and some parts of the Midlands province. Mugabe deployed a North Korean trained brigade to contain the so called ‘dissident’ military activities (Alexander et al., 2000: 186). However, in the process, ‘more than 20 000 civilians were killed while others were beaten, raped and lost their property’ (Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, 1997, p. 1). This incident, infamously known as ‘Gukurahundi’5, came to an end following the signing of the Unity Accord between Joshua Nkomo’s Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) led and Mugabe’s ZANU to form ZANU PF in 1987. However, until to date, for some Ndebele speaking people from Matabeleland provinces, Gukurahundi was ethnically motivated to wipe out the Ndebele. Moreover, currently the Ndebele people complain about perceived deliberate economic and political marginalisation by the Shona dominated ZANU PF government (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009). Such feelings of marginalisation have resulted in the rise of Ndebele ethnic nationalism. Fronted by radical groups such as Umthwakazi liberation movement, Ndebele nationalism is a radical counter-hegemonic discourse challenging the Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU PF) government’s nationalist discourse calling for a united Zimbabwe. It advocates for the secession of Matabeleland provinces from the current Zimbabwean nation to establish an ‘independent’ Ndebele nation (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009). This study investigates how online football fandom also contributes to discussions and contestations around Zimbabwe’s national identity and nationalism. Sports fandom by its nature is largely marked by banter, albeit there are moments it gets seized with political, ethnic, racial and gender insinuations. Papacharissi (2002) contends that online platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, blogs and online newspapers offer the public or citizens a public space to produce a public opinion. The study complements previous examinations on ethnicity, national identity and nationalism in 5  Gukurahundi, a Shona word for early rains that wash away dirt or chaff. After these early rains what follows is a blooming of flowers and new leaves, the sprouting of green grass among other things. In short, what follows Gukurahundi is supposed to be a new lease of life; regeneration

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Zimbabwe and Africa. It analyses digital fandom comments circulated following the Warriors’ poor performance at the Gabon 2017 AFCON tournament. In essence, we show how the Zimbabwean nation is imagined through popular culture.

Literature Review The nexus between sport and nationalism in Africa in general and football in particular has been extensively explored (Kuper, 1994; Foer, 2004; Alegi, 2010; Pannenborg, 2010). Football has always been intertwined with nationalism since colonial times in Africa (Nauright, 1997; Pannenborg, 2010). In countries including Cameroon, former Zaire and South Africa, football has been closely encoded with discourses about the nation and national identity at various epochs (Foer, 2004; Kuper, 1994; Bloomfeld, 2010). In another related case, Kwame Nkrumah, former president of Ghana used the country’s national football team- The Black Stars, as a vehicle through which to spread nationalistic and Pan Africanist ideologies (Alegi, 2010; Pannenborg, 2010). There is an evidently growing scholarship on football in Zimbabwe in contemporary times, intersecting a number of thematic issues. For a start, there is a strand focusing on intersections of football and political discourse in Zimbabwe (Stuart, 1995; Muponde & Muchemwa, 2011; Zenenga, 2012; Willems, 2013; Ncube 2014). These studies illuminate on how football is appropriated and deployed by the ruling elites to negotiate for hegemony. In addition, these studies also indicate that the subaltern groups appropriate football symbols in an attempt to subvert power and escape from their domination. Scholars also show that the ruling ZANU PF government often use football to celebrate important national days on Zimbabwe’s calendar such as Heroes Day, Independence Day and Unity Day (Zenenga, 2012; Willems, 2013; Ncube 2014). Football is, therefore, an important site where the nation is imagined in Zimbabwe and beyond. However, due to their scope and focus, these works are silent on how the general populace utilise online football terraces to deconstruct discourses about the nation and national identity articulated in the elite voice. Other studies also focus on the nexus of football and gender (Daimon, 2010; Chikafa, 2014; Chiweshe, 2014; Ncube & Chawana, 2018). These studies generally show the gendered nature of Zimbabwe’s football fandom. There is also a body of literature focusing on fandom violence in

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derby rivalries (Stuart, 1995; Chiweshe, 2011; Ncube 2014; Choto et al., 2017; Ncube & Munoriyarwa, 2018). Other studies are grounded in media studies and therefore, concentrate on the media coverage of fan violence (Ncube & Moyo, 2017; Ncube & Munoriyarwa, 2018). Ethnicity, nationalism and national identity which is the heartbeat of this discussion has also been given a nuanced analysis in Zimbabwean football scholarship. Existing literature on the subject, however, has a huge bias towards the Dynamos and Highlanders FC rivalry and its connection to historical, political and ethno-regional discourses (Ncube 2014; Choto et al., 2017). This chapter is indebted to such works especially by Ncube (2017) which demonstrates intersections of Highlanders FC fandom, ethnicity and Ndebele nationalism in Zimbabwe. However, while this important literature lays an important foundation to the subject under investigation, it falls short when it comes to systematically exploring how discourses about the Zimbabwean nation and national identity playout in digital football fandom during matches involving the Warriors-the flagship of Zimbabwean football, especially at prestigious tournaments such as the AFCON. The unavailability of such critical examinations makes this chapter both long overdue and indispensable.

Theoretical Framework: Everyday Nationalism’ This article borrows strands from the concept of everyday nationalism to discuss how online football fans relate to the national football team in Zimbabwe during a selected epoch. Michael Billig is considered one of the pioneers of ‘everyday nationalism’ (Duchesne, 2018). Duchesne (2018) argues that Banal Nationalism (Billig, 1995) is one of the books that must be quoted when writing on contemporary nationalism in the early twenty-­ first century. In essence, Billig (1995) shows the everyday, largely unconscious aspects of nationalism, contending that while such representations may appear unremarkable, they are nonetheless influential in contributing to an imagined sense of national solidarity within daily life. Moreover, people in established nations retain their national consciousness because identity is rather ‘embedded in routines of life, which constantly remind, or ‘flag’, nationhood’ (Billig, 1995, 38). However some critics of the concept of banal nationalism highlight that it tends to operate with the notion of a uniform, homogenous national audience (Skey, 2006). Cultural studies scholars underscore the agency and heterogeneity of audiences (Hall, 1973).

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Chaney (2002, p. 4) contends ‘the everyday is generally the bedrock of social reality, what can be taken-for- and it is at this level that we must try and understand how and why identities are lived and made meaningful’. Therefore, focusing on the everyday experiences of Zimbabwean football fans helps to give clarity on previously neglected aspects especially their attitude and views towards the country’s senior men national football team. It is through everyday language and practices that identities gain credence (Skey, 2005). Moreover, Reicher and Hopkins (2001, p. 3) assert that to ‘analyse the cultural battles over national identity without understanding how people come to assume and inhabit such identities, and how the identity then shapes what they do . . . does not get us very far in understanding nationalism’. The nation is incarnated in the everyday, in what we do not notice and it draws much on popular culture as on high culture (Edensor, 2002). The important study National Identity and Popular Culture (Edensor, 2002) examine ways in which the nation was routinely represented, materialised and performed through a range of cultural forms, material environments and everyday practices. Such insights are key to analysing the manifestation of ethnicity, nationalism and national identity issues in football fandom since football can be unproblematically categorised as popular culture. Popular culture is one of the sites where the struggle for and against a culture of the powerful engaged. ‘It is also a stake to be won or lost in that struggle. It is the arena for consent and resistance. It is partly where hegemony arises, and where it is secured’ (Hall, 1981, p. 329). From this viewpoint, it is therefore crucial to examine how the Zimbabwean nation and national identity is appropriated and [re]constructed by citizens during football matches involving the national football team. While Crawford Young (2004) submits that there are various ways in which new nations of Africa subliminally communicate nationhood through flags, currency, postage stamps among others, this chapter contends that digital platforms have expanded and widened the scope and focus on nationalism and identity politics explored through lens of sport. Central to this study is the unravelling of the subtle often unnoticed manifestations of citizen agency in challenging and reinterpreting official signs of nationalism. Sport, and football in particular, is entangled with the socio-economic, political and cultural aspects of a nation becoming instrumental in the cooling and heating of nationalist temperatures (Skey, 2006). The study valorises the experiences and practices of the ‘ordinary’ people, especially their interaction and meanings derived from football

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matches involving the national football team. Focusing on the everyday experiences of ordinary fans helps to give clarity on previously neglected aspects of everyday fans’ experience (Benkwitz & Molna, 2012). Studying the attitude of fans during an important event such as the Africa Cup of Nations is important since international competitions allow for a spectating public to express and to reaffirm its national identity (Haut et  al., 2020). Moreover, they provide specific opportunities for interaction rituals, in which shared emotions can be generated (Cottingham, 2012; Haut et al., 2020).

Methodology The study is qualitative. The approach involves taking people’s subjective experiences seriously as the essence of what is real to them (Bryman, 2012). In addition, the study utilises the interpretive approach in gathering and analysing findings. Comments on the Warriors’ poor performance were ubiquitous on most social media platforms, but for feasibility purposes, the study focuses on a purposive sample of comments posted from 15 to 23 January 2017 when the Warriors played their group B matches6. The comments were obtained on Facebook football fan pages, specifically Dembare DotComs and Highlanders FC page. The former is the unofficial Facebook page for Dynamos FC, Zimbabwe’s most successful football club. The latter belongs to Highlanders FC fans. Highlanders FC is Zimbabwe’s second most popular football club. The two Facebook pages were selected for analysis largely due to the fact that they have considerably huge following compared to other social media spaces which focus on football matters in Zimbabwe. Apart from the ‘popularity’ of Dembare Dotcoms and Highlanders FC page, the two Facebook fan pages were selected for analysis due to the fact that previous studies on Zimbabwean football (Ncube 2014, Ncube, 2017) indicate that Highlanders FC and Dynamos FC are supported along ethnic lines. Ethnicity was one of the central aspects of this study hence the two platforms were unavoidable. It could have been interesting to also analyse comments on fan pages for clubs such as CAPS United, Chicken Inn, FC Platinum among others. Unfortunately, a preliminary analysis of such digital spaces yielded nothing fruitful or relevant to the discourse under study. Purposive sampling was 6  The Warriors played Algeria on 15 January, Tunisia on 19 January and Senegal 23 January 2017.

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the principal sampling technique for the study. This technique entails selecting groups or categories to study on the basis of their relevance to the research questions and the theoretical position and most importantly the explanation or account which is being developed (Yin, 2011). Relevant comments were archived in our personal computers and then subjected to thematic and discourse analysis. However, we are aware that comments selected for analysis do not entirely represent perceptions of all ordinary Zimbabweans towards the national football team, the nation and nationhood. The findings are specific to a section of the Zimbabwean population who participated in sharing their views on digital social spaces during the period under examination.

Findings and Discussion ‘That was Mashonaland FC, not a national team’ Comments posted on analysed Facebook fan supporter pages in the aftermath of the Warriors’ poor performance in Gabon clearly indicate contestations and ethnic divisions within the imagined Zimbabwean nation in the popular culture domain. The ethnic polarisation manifest in Ndebele and Shona binaries, albeit there are more than 16 ethnic groups in Zimbabwe. Some of the comments were uber-critical, questioning the selection and loyalty of the players who represented the country at the prestigious biannual continental football event. Some of the comments expressed that the Warriors were not representing Zimbabwe, but Mashonaland provinces. The online commentators, presumably from the Ndebele ethnic group, underscored that the Ndebele ethnic group were not under any obligation to shoulder this embarrassment, since the team in Gabon was representing Mashonaland. The Warriors’ humiliation was thus pinned to the Shona ethnic group, and not the whole nation. This manifestation of ethnic differences in social spaces such as football demonstrates the argument that ‘ethnicity occurs in social contexts where cultural differences make a difference’ (Comaroff & Comaroff, 2009, p. 32). Some of the comments below illustrate our observations: What is that Shona team all about! That was mashonaland FC not a national team… Uma ngangathi adliwe amShona am i wrong (That was Mashonaland FC, not a national team… that’s why I had said the Shonas must lose, was I wrong?)

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Another comment read: UkuSapota lababantu beHarare akushiyananga lokuthwala umganu uyecela impuphu emfeni. Kanti ezigwaze ngokwayo iyakhalelwa. Madoda othatha owakhe umphefumulo kangeniswa egumeni. UHadebe loMhlanga bahleliphandle kudlaliswa oMloywa labo Nhamoinesu. Ngokwabo lokho mina ngeke ngilale ngingadlili (Supporting these people from Harare is not different from carrying a plate to… Players such as Teenage Hadebe and Lawrence Mhlanga (from Bulawayo) were made to sit on the bench while players like Elisha Muroiwa and Costa Nhamoinesu (Harare and Masvingo respectively) were playing.

From the view of the fans, the idea of eleven named players representing the imagined community (see Hobsbawm, 1990; Anderson, 2006) was hardly applicable to the case of Zimbabwe during the 2017 AFCON tournament. To buttress the idea that the supposedly national team had been reduced to a Shona pilgrimage, one comment accused Pasuwa of ethnic bias in his team selection. Pasuwa’s dress code was also humorously ridiculed. He must select players based on performance and quality not because of tribe and province, I don’t like his dress code he dresses himself like someone who is selling airtime vouchers

Pasuwa is represented as not fit for the national duty at hand with his dress code also eliminating him from undertaking such a grand national duty. The image of the country is at stake in such tournaments and the coach’s decorum is constitutive of the national identity. However, the fan likened Pasuwa to an ‘airtime vendor’ thereby stripping him of the requisite appurtenances of the Coach of a national team. The nation is embedded in the everyday, in what we do not notice and it draws much on popular culture as on high culture (Edensor, 2002). Struggles for national identity are thus rooted in mundane practices such as football fandom. Interestingly, the failure of the Warriors team took a political tone with some comments expressing that Shona are good for nothing as evidenced by the persistent economic and political ruin at the hands of the long-time leader, Robert Gabriel Mugabe. The comment read: Katsande 31 years already retired, Mugabe 93 years is not even planning to retire… Shona people will support anything that has Shona in it,

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good or bad. That is why Mugabe is able to cling onto power for this long, they are still backing him whilst complaining that they are suffering… The alleged failure by the Shona to ‘rein in’ Mugabe at the height of the economic challenges in the country is used humorously by the fan to show how ‘idiotic and helpless’ the Shona people are hence entrusting them with such a national duty was bound to be an exercise in futility from the outset. The deployment of humour and laughter is worth unpacking. Laughter is a weapon for the weak (Bakhtin, 1984; Mbembe, 1992). Through laughter, ordinary people bridle, trick and toy with power (Mbembe, 2001). Moreover, Bakhtin (1984) argues that laughter is a tool that critics of hegemonic cultures use to overcome their fear and attack their object of scrutiny. In essence, laughter knows no fear; it knows no inhibitions, no limitations but it topples tyrants (Bakhtin, 1984). The study, therefore, shows that the above comments should be read in the context of humour resisting and challenging perceived dominant ethnic (Shona) cultures evident in social spaces such as the national football team. The Harare boys were outclassed and outplayed. This biased team selection will always cost them. Am sorry for the Shona boys for their poor performance at Gabon

We also observed that some of the comments accused coach Pasuwa of promoting Dynamos FC interests at the expense of national interests. Such comments submitted that only players with Dynamos FC background or ties were considered. The comment below confirms such observations. It’s amazing how some people want to act like they can’t notice that the selection was biased. Which kind of football is Rusike playing. Nkatha is much better than themRusikes, the couch acts like he doesn’t know Peter Muduhwa because he is a Bulawayo boy, even the able, tried and proved Teenage Hadebe is not even given a chance. The coach must differentiate between Dembare and the Warriors. Another comment below supports this observation. A coach must select players on merit and not because of tribe and province. Malajila is in the Warriors simply because he has a Dynamos background. He is playing shit. However, it is pertinent to note that Malajila started his football career at Chapungu FC.  He left Chapungu for Highlanders FC and later Dynamos FC.  It is plausible to argue that some of the online

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commentators suffered the problem of selective amnesia. Often supporters from the Northern part of Zimbabwe are sympathetic to Dynamos FC and those from the Southern part of the country usually sympathetic to Highlanders see ‘balance’ when the national team has more of their favourite clubs players than those of the rival club. Some of the comments with a Ndebele inclination blamed Highlanders FC management for failure to groom or acquire Ndebele speaking players. Such players would then represent the interests of Ndebele speaking fans in the national football team. Mina ngisola iBosso ngokuhluleka ukudinga abafana bakithi. KuBosso kugcwele amashona wodwa pho yiwaphi amaplayers asesindebeleni akade azosimela ku squad? (I blame Highlanders FC for failure to nurture Ndebele players. Currently the team is full of Shona speaking players. Where are the Ndebele players who will represent us in the national team?)

‘Nationalism and ethnicity are kindred concepts, and majority of nationalisms are ethnic in character’ (Gellner 1964, 119). This is evident in some of the comments as some of the fans could not support the team due to the absence of Ndebele speaking players especially from the Southern part of Zimbabwe whom they could relate to. Critically, Ncube (2017) argues that despite contestations surrounding Ndebele and Shona ethnic identities in Zimbabwe, ‘the Ndebele ethnic identity has become a critical tool for mobilization in football fandom in an attempt to create a stronger sense of collective identity and nationalism’. Due to a plethora of grievances such as Gukurahundi and alleged marginalisation of Bulawayo and Matabeleland provinces by a perceived Shona-dominated ZANU PF government, some sections of the Ndebele ethnic group utilise football fandom to call for the establishment of a separate Ndebele nation (Ncube, 2017). This is also evident in comments where some fans wish for a national team which can represent the interests of the Ndebele ethnic group. However, due to intermarriages that have been taking place between the Ndebele and Shona groups, it is no longer feasible to talk about ‘original’ Ndebele or Shona people. Zenenga (2012) submits that fans constitute important political actors, while the game becomes another way of conducting political activity. Vulgarity was also common in some of the comments which ridiculed not only the players in Gabon, but the Zimbabwe Football Association

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and President Robert Mugabe. Vulgarity is commonly used to mock power in post-colonial Africa (Mbembe, 2001). nxaa fuseki wena shona lothuvi vele ungathini madla mbeba ,,, vele if they is no ndebele player in our team ngeke siwine phansa ngabafana baka mgabe sesikhathele shem ngisho naye lo Pawuso wakhona bamkhethele I team bngokuyi zifa kwakhonaa phansi ngodoti wamashona zinja zabantuu ngisho kini lonke mashona (Fuck you Shona shit, who feast on rats, what can you say? There are no Ndebele players in this team and how do you expect us to win with these boys from Mugabe, we are tired. Pasuwa has no autonomy to select a team, and the ZIFA board is full of Shona dogs).

Pannenborg (2010) argues that football is a charged political and ideological structure where power and identity battles are fought both on the surface and through subtexts. The national team was perceived as an appendage of what Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2015) has referred to as ‘Mugabeism’. Studies on African football show an intimate relationship between football and political discourse (Alegi, 2010; Darby, 2002; Stuart, 1995; Muponde & Muchemwa, 2011; Ncube, 2017). The sporting space is a social space in which people’s movements, actions, speech and behaviours both reflect the space and create it (Lefebvre, 1992; Newhall, 2013). The comments on Highlanders FC page also targeted the Shona ethnic group in general. The Shonas were framed as ‘evil dogs’. For example: Lol ulibona kahle ishona lothuvi ngobubi nxaaaa zinja (Can you see Shonas full of shit and their evilness, these dogs.

From these fans lens, Shona people represent evil and oppression. This discourse is connected to Gukurahundi episode where thousands of Ndebele-speaking Zimbabweans were killed by state agents. The slogans ‘Shona lothuvi’ and ‘Shona zinja’ (Shona dogs) are regularly shouted at Highlanders FC matches especially while playing against bitter rivals Dynamos FC (Ncube 2014). For example, for the first time in 10 years, Highlanders FC sealed back-to-back league victories over Dynamos FC with a 2-1 win at Babourfields stadium on 11 September 2016. A delighted Highlanders FC fan at Babourfields stadium stands, raised a placard describing Shona ethnic people as dogs. The description of Shona people as dogs in football banter can be located in the ethnic class stratification

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which prevailed in the pre-colonial Ndebele state under Kings Mzilikhazi and even Lobengula (see Beach, 1984; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2010). These classes were the Zansi, Enhla and Hole (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2010). The Zansi were highly regarded on the hierarchy since they were the ‘original’ Khumalo/Ndebele people who had followed Mzilikhazi from Nguniland. The Enhla came second on the hierarchy. This group was constituted by people conquered and assimilated on the way from Nguniland to Zimbabwe. Conquered and assimilated Shona groups formed the lowest class (amahole) (Beach, 1984; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2010). This group was highly despised in the Ndebele state and was subject of ridicule, and were more often likened to ‘dogs’. The framing of Shona as dogs could be a reflection of pre-colonial relations between the Ndebele and the Shona in the Ndebele Kingdom, where the Ndebele were dominant. However, in post-independence Zimbabwe, the Shona (where the president and most cabinet ministers hail from) are now the most powerful ethnic group. Harare is now the political and economic ‘centre of power’ and not Bulawayo anymore which still holds a ceremonial name as the ‘city of Kings’. It is plausible to argue that the denigration of the Shona in fandom is an attempt to protest against the reality that the ‘former dogs’ are now ruling. ‘Zimbabwe belong to the Shona’ The study also established that some of the comments embraced the team which represented the nation in Gabon as the legitimate team of the nation. Those who defended the national football team underscored that the numerical dominance of Shona speaking players in the national team as a trend which is unavoidable. i was wondering kuti why mandebere took land isingarimike bcoz imbudzi chaidzo wher on earth kwamakamboona selection iri based on tribes ko zvamunongoziva mashona ndovakawanda varidzi venyika varikugona bhora just compare dembare ne bossolowa u wl find kuti imwe its nearly a decade wthout lifting the league (I have always wondered why the Ndebele people settled on non-arable land. These people are goats. Where on earth have you ever seen national teams being selected along tribal lines. It’s a fact that the Shonas are numerically dominant and they own this country. Moreover, the Shonas are playing

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better football, just compare performances of Dynamos and Highlanders FC in the Premier Soccer League).

As indicated earlier, the Shona ethnic group constitute close to 80% of Zimbabwe’s population (Giuliuanotti, 2004). However, the comment above shows that ‘Shona nationalism’ mutated into nativism, narrowing the definition of belonging in Zimbabwe. Nativism is an ‘extreme’ narrow version of African nationalism conceptualising African identities as frozen in time and space (Appiah, 1992). This form of nationalism is an aspiration towards ‘originary’ African ethnicities or identities. The insinuations in the above comment are that the Shona are the ‘legitimate’/original owners of Zimbabwe while the Ndebeles cannot have such claims since they came from Nguniland (present-day South Africa) during the period of Mfecane. However, ‘every human identity is constructed, historical; everyone has its share of false presuppositions, of the errors and inaccuracies that courtesy calls ‘myth,’ religion ‘heresy,’ and science ‘magic’ (Appiah, 1992, p. 174). The description of the Ndebele people as goats is equally derogatory and reflects on how nationalism reaches boiling points when the national football team loses. This is also evident in the comment below where the Ndebeles and King Lobengula are insulted as sellouts. Fuck u, mhata yamai vako, dats why Lobengula akatengesa nyika nesugar (Fuck you, your mother’s ass. That’s why Lobengula sold this country for sugar). Another comment read: When we lose its Pasuwa’s boys and when we won its zim boys.mandebele makapata ndosaka muchitengwa ne svikiri (When we lose its Pasuwa’s boys and when we won its Zimbabwe boys. Ndebeles you are fools, that’s why you are bought with sugar).

From historical sources, King Lobengula, the last Ndebele monarchy, was tricked into signing the Rudd concession in 1988 which paved way for the colonisation of Zimbabwe. However, in political banter, Lobengula is often humorously mocked especially by Shona speaking Zimbabweans that he was hoodwinked by sugar to sign the Rudd pact, granting settlers mining, hunting and farming rights. The Rudd concession paved way for the colonisation of Zimbabwe by the British South Africa Company in 1890.

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Data also shows that some defended Kalisto Pasuwa’s team selection. Those who expressed doubt in the national football team coach were vilified. Some supporters here are tribalists…!!! those who played there are e best talent that we have as a Nation…Whats with the Shona team??? When Peter,Adam,Madinda,Benjamin Nkonjera,Bruce Grobbler,Rambo Sibanda…did you hear us saying Ndebele.. team???? nxaaa tribalist mind sucks…

The comment above makes reference to the popular ‘dream team’ assembled by Reinhard Fabisch, a German expatriate coach. Fabisch coached the Warriors from 1991-1994, and is generally held in high esteem in Zimbabwean football circles for assembling one of the most formidable teams, albeit he failed to qualify for any major tournament. Fabisch’s team was largely constituted by Highlanders FC players and stands as one of the respected European coaches to have ever coached the country’s national team. This is because the most successful national soccer coaches in Zimbabwe’s history have been locals- Sunday Chidzambwa and Charles Mhlauri. ‘We are one people, tribalism sucks’ Despite the ethnic differences which played out during the Gabon football tournament, some of the fans who commented on the platforms under study reiterated that Zimbabweans need to remain united regardless of ethnic differences. These ‘neutral’ commentators denigrated those fuelling ‘tribalistic’ divisions. For example: Tribalism .Tribalism. that’s all. nothing else but tribalism and it has always been our problem on Zimbabwe. Only fools and tribalists talk about Ndebele and Shona, Senegal is a big team.

Someone also commented: This page is run by people possessed with demonic spirits. They will never celebrate any good. It’s purpose is satanic driven, nothing constructive comes from this thing. It’s a misrepresentation too of a multitude of Ndebeles who sees humanity as is seen by God, beautiful people always wishing the best on others, aware that nobody chose to be born Shona or

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Ndebele or English. Shonas are not better than Ndebes at all & Ndebeles are not better or greater than Shona’s an inch. I have worked in an environment of both & have had friends & enemies on both sides, there’s nothing special in belonging to any tribe. Only stupid people are tribalistic

The above comments show that some Zimbabweans can actually rise above the Shona and Ndebele dichotomy. As mentioned earlier the Shona and Ndebele are not, and have never been, stable markers of identity at all throughout Zimbabwe’s history. Many Highlanders supporters, anyhow, are ‘Shona’, and many Dynamos supporters are ‘Ndebele’ (Ncube 2014). Moreover, there are several other ethnic groups existent in Zimbabwe. The comments also suggested that the Warriors team assembled by Pasuwa was representing the whole nation and not Mashonaland provinces. Why ungakwaz ukuthi our warriors iteam yezwe lethu lase Zimbabwe, those boyz are representing us Zimbabwe as a whole not only Harare or Mashonaland (Why are you not aware that the Warriors are the team of the nation, those boys are presenting Zimbabwe as a whole not only Harare or Mashonaland).

There was an acknowledgement in such comments that the Warriors lost to better teams hence there was no need for disunity. No madodda let’s stop this Ndebele Shona attitude we lost to a better team vele iSenegal iyadlala let’s be honest, Zim squard outplayed but they gave their best after all. (Colleagues, it’s high time we stop this Ndebele/Shona attitude, we lost to a better team. The Zimbabwean team tried their best but lost to superior opponents. Senegal is a very good team, let us be honest).

In as much elite sport success increases national pride as well as the international prestige of a country (Haut et al., 2020), it can equally contribute to the fragility of national pride. During periods of demoralising defeats for the national football team, national identity can easily become a burden. This is because football often serves as a fetish for war, replaying past conflicts and sometimes setting off new ones.

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Conclusion This chapter is an important contribution to studies on football, ethnicity, nationalism and national identity politics in Africa and Zimbabwe. Football offers an important opportunity to engage with concepts of ‘nationhood’ and ‘imagined community’. Focusing on fandom comments on selected social media spaces during the Warriors’ disastrous performance at the 2017 AFCON tournament, the study has demonstrated how some Zimbabweans perceive and relate to their national football team, the nation and national identity. Questions emerged around who and what comprises the ‘nation’. The chapter shows that some of the fans who commented on digital spaces expressed that the Warriors were not a ‘real Zimbabwean team’. The team was viewed through the polarising ‘Shona’/’Ndebele’ ‘ethnic’ lens. Discourses of ‘patriots’ versus ‘sellouts’, warriors versus cowards, ‘real’ owners versus interlopers, belonging and not-belonging, and men versus boys, were evident on virtual platforms such as Facebook. In essence, discourses about the Zimbabwean nation, national identity fragmentations and ethnicity freely intersected in football fandom and ebbed. Such views are an important fabric of Zimbabwe’s memory politics from pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial times. Identity is rather ‘embedded in routines of life, which constantly remind, or ‘flag’, nationhood’ (Billig, 1995, p. 38). The article complements earlier analysis (Muzondidya & Ndovu-Gatsheni, 2007; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009; Mhlanga, 2013; Ncube, 2017) on Ndebele ethnicity and the politics around the Zimbabwean identity. The chapter corroborates the assertion by historians Muzondidya and Ndovu-Gatsheni (2007) that despite its rare entry into both official and public discourses about contemporary Zimbabwe, ethnicity continue to shape and influence the economic, social and political life of Zimbabwe in post-colonial times. Football fandom is one of the critical spaces where ethnic divisions are evident in Zimbabwe. The study has demonstrated how some people experience and express attachment and belonging or reject the imagined community-Zimbabwe through popular culture. The convergence of ethnicity, nationalism and national identity issues in online football fandom, therefore, shapes what some ordinary Zimbabweans talk about and do not talk about, what they aspire to and what they fear, love and hate.

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CHAPTER 15

Humour, Identity and Ethnicity in the Zimbabwean Political Landscape Bhekinkosi Jakobe Ncube

Introduction This chapter interrogates the intersection of the concepts of humour, identity and ethnicity in the Zimbabwean political landscape in the digital age. Zimbabwe is one of the countries hovering on the brink of being labelled authoritarian as far as freedom of expression is concerned. For example, police can arrest someone for spreading what is deemed falsehoods through social media platforms like WhatsApp. Despite this, many ordinary Zimbabweans who do not have access to mainstream media have taken to humour both as a way of mocking the elite and expressing their identity claims, thus taking advantage of social media platforms that have amplified their agency. This chapter is a discussion of the use of humour and laughter by a Ndebele street theatre comedy group called Omkhula based in Johannesburg, South Africa. The group’s shows, which are a sprinkling of humour, ridicule and laughter, circulate widely on social media platforms like Facebook and WhatsApp. Considering this as part of popular culture,

B. J. Ncube (*) Department of Communication and Media Studies, University of Johannesburg, Johannesburg, South Africa © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 S. Mpofu (ed.), The Politics of Laughter in the Social Media Age, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-81969-9_15

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the chapter shows that while humour can reproduce the status quo, it can also challenge and trouble it. Therefore, studying this group’s humour and laughter helps one to tap into Stuart Hall’s argument that the struggles of power and identity can be located in the realm of aesthetics. The chapter is against the background that when people who feel marginalised, such as the Ndebele ethnic group of Zimbabwe, are pushed to the fringes of society—both economically and politically—they come up with innovative ways to assert their identities and also voice their grievances against the economic and political elite. The chapter further reveals that through the concept of hybridisation (language mixing), comedians like Omkhula can manage to engage on issues and topics considered taboo in Zimbabwe such as the deployment of non-Ndebele speaking teachers in Matabeleland provinces’ schools and the corruption of the ZANU-PF government among many issues. In this process of engaging on topics or issues considered taboo, the marginalised create a hybrid space or third space that is a politicised and contested space. This shows that there is an intrinsic relationship between popular culture, in this case in the form of humour, and politics. According to Dodds (2010) and Macpherson (2008), humour functions as a mirror through which the world and its political landscape become visualised. It is against this background that one can see that humour, as a form of popular culture, is crucial in ‘practical geopolitical articulations’ (Dodds, 2010, p. 115) as both the elite and the lumpen use it for various reasons. The elite such as politicians use popular media to connect with their audiences and to communicate to publics within and beyond national boundaries. Equally, the subaltern, those who feel marginalised and excluded from participating in mainstream media, then resort to popular sources of expressions such as humour and in the case of this study, street theatre to not only challenge the elites but also assert their identity claims. The concepts of humour, identity and ethnicity in the Zimbabwean political landscape are an under-utilised focus for research in terms of exploring and interrogating their intersection in the social media landscape. Globally, scholars such as Macpherson, 2008; Ridanpää, 2009; Hammett, 2010; Hammett & Mather, 2010, have investigated the political significance of cartoons and caricature as part of humour and submit that all humour is a social and political construct arising from the society in which it is embedded. It is against this milieu that the concepts of

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humour, identity and ethnicity in the Zimbabwean political landscape are discussed. This chapter therefore focuses on Omkhula Arts theatre group with the aim of explicating how social media has enabled ordinary members of society a space to use humour not only for political contestations but for their ethnic identity claims as well. Ordinarily, Omkhula’s shows are open theatre  plays or dramasin Hillbrow and the surrounding areas in Johannesburg, South Africa, but they have a huge online presence and are accessible on social media sites like Facebook and YouTube. They started in Bulawayo, Zimbabwe before joining the great trek to South Africa. The group’s comedy shows are also found on www.filmafrica-­tv/omkhulatv and their motto is ‘we make people happy’. The group consists of two or three male members calling themselves Malume and Mzukulu (uncle and nephew). These characters entertain their audience with wit and gusto. Dressed in rags—oversized pair of trousers and jackets—and looking like vagrants, they become theatrical in their actions that are complete with plot, voice and movements. They involve the crowd and make it part of its humour whose topics seem spontaneous but well-rehearsed and thought out. Their acts, which are often repeated, are not ragged like their costume but are well executed and timed, and they break where they wait for the old crowd to go away, and they then start again later with a new one. This ensures they always have a new paying audience. Regarding their costume, Urish (2016, p. 317) posits the character of the joke performer is related to identity which is a key issue in the genre’s overriding cultural discourses. For Bakhtin (1968), joke performers are not just seen as actors but they stand on the borderline between art and life. Most of the jokes are a mixture of both political and social satire—both subtly and openly—up to a point of vulgarity. These jokes mostly target key political, social and economic issues affecting the Ndebele migrants in South Africa and back home in Zimbabwe. Issues pertaining to the feeling of being marginalised and excluded, of not belonging in both South Africa and Zimbabwe are highlighted and, in the process, acting as a means of exposing a certain kind of truth. Writing about the power of humour in the form of political cartoons, Plumb (2004, p. 432) is of the view that ‘it can accuse, encourage debate, convey opinion, and allow the reader to consider an issue from a different point of view’. Against this background, one can argue that humour plays an important role as far as its intersection with politics and ethnicity is concerned.

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Humour and Its Functions A full discussion of the intersection of humour, identity and ethnicity in the Zimbabwean political landscape using Omkhula theatre group as a case study necessitates an understanding of what is humour and what exactly it does. Chukwuma (2018, p. 5) describes humour as a joke performance and in the social media age, this can take place on social media sites like WhatsApp, YouTube and in compact disks or any other storage devices. Of importance is that even though this joke performance is now on social media sites, the wholeness of unorthodox theatre is still evident. To this end, Chukwuma (2018, p. 5) observes that it does not matter that the performance of the joke has migrated to social media. It also does not matter how many thousands of people are accessing it on YouTube. What matters, Chukwuma (2018, p. 5) argues, is that ‘the joke-performer is a member of the community for which he or she performs’. That is to say that in performing his or her jokes, ‘the performer gathers from the surroundings contemporaneous events and deftly employs them to the amusement of his or her listeners, all the while not missing out the form the joke-script should take’ (Chukwuma, 2018, p.  5). Technological advances in the form of social media and other storage devices like DVDs have therefore made jokes reach a far higher number of persons faster. Mbembe (2001) discusses humour in relation to power and resistance in post-colonial Africa. In a discussion of the role of humour and ridicule specifically in Cameroon, Mbembe (2001) is of the view humour can ridicule and mock those in power. That is, ridicule and mockery can be ‘active agents in the demystifying of power’ (Mbembe, 2001, p. 109). Although Mbembe (2001) thinks that humour and ridicule as artistic interventions create nothing more than some ‘potholes of indiscipline’ (Mbembe, 2001, p. 109), this chapter suggests otherwise—that the subaltern, those marginalised can use humour to challenge the status quo. It is this use of humour to speak back to those in power that humour is a form of resistance. That is to say, humour is another form of ‘weapons of the weak’ (Scott, 1985) that is used by the marginalised in the ‘construction of a resistance culture that may eventually become capable, at certain historic moments, of acting as a catalyst of broader, more openly oppositional liberation movements’, (Abrahamsen, 2003, p. 208). Remmy (2017, p. 19) acknowledges that humour is very powerful and repressive regimes are always sceptical of the performance of jokes. This is precisely because the author regards humour just like Scott (1985) as a

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weapon of the weak. The author cites a newspaper article published in the Daily News of Zimbabwe in 2012. The article headlined ‘Artists persecuted for raising voices’ mentions artists who have been persecuted in Zimbabwe. The artists who have been harassed during different times include Stephen Chifunyise for a play called Rituals, Cont Mhlanga for the play, The Good President and Bulawayo visualartist Owen Maseko for an exhibition depicting government soldiers’ brutality on armed civilians in Matabeleland and Midlands provinces . Against this background, one can posit that humour, just like other artistic performances, is interconnected with politics, identity and ethnicity in any given society. For Brigstocke (2011, p. 223), humour just like place primarily functions as a way of creating and consolidating an inside and outside, that is, it is crucial in as far as creating and maintaining a sense of belonging, of identity is concerned. That is to say, humour has the power to include and exclude, to create ‘us’ and ‘them’. This is precisely because humour or any joke performance ‘relies upon nuanced sensitivities to shared histories, traditions or codes’ (Brigstocke, 2011, p.  223). Humour can also be understood as a joke performance that synthesizes different conceptions. One can view humour as a joke performance that ruptures societal expectations such as ‘habits, logics, languages, patterns, schemes [and], rhythms’ (Basu, 1999, p. 386). That is to say, even ‘value-laden forms and propriety-­ intensive social situations, including taboos and tragedy, also lend themselves to comic juxtaposition’ (Basu, 1999, p. 386). The joke performer feels powerful and liberated when they ‘leap away from the tyranny of the culturally expected’ (Basu, 1999, p. 386). That is to say that during the performance and articulation of humour through street theatres, for example, the ordinary process of reasoning is suspended through the absurd. Precisely because humour is an essential part of human nature and that it belongs to the universal experiences of all societies, it may thus ‘focus on social issues such as bringing to people’s attention a problem like racial [ethnic] inequality’ (Hall et al., 1993, p. 1). It is through laughter, that the joke performer seeks to ridicule and criticise the status quo.

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Reflections on Ethnicity and Identity Politics in Zimbabwe The focus of this chapter is to interrogate the intersection of the concepts of humour, identity and ethnicity in the Zimbabwean political landscape in the digital age. The modest aim is to discuss how a Ndebele street theatre comedy group Omkhula use humour and laughter to not only express their grievances against the ZANU-PF government and challenge its hegemonic tendencies through ridicule but also assert their Ndebele ethnic identity. This is because ethnicity is very salient in Zimbabwe and its significance is even evident in humour and other artistic performances. In this way, the chapter discusses how humour works in building ethnic identities in a country where ethnic tensions between the two dominant ethnic groups, the Shona and the Ndebele are high. The Ndebele people who are victims of the Gukurahundi genocide where approximately 20 000 mostly Ndebele speaking unarmed civilians were murdered by the predominantly Shona ZANU-PF government (Mpofu, 2015; Ndlovu, 2018; Dube & Ncube, 2019) are always complaining of marginalisation. Social media has therefore given the weak, those who feel marginalised the chance to talk back at their oppressors, to laugh and ridicule them. Thus, humour in this sense is used in the process of reasoning the marginalised people’s personal experiences as well as in identity construction. In Zimbabwe, ethnicity and identity are among the most significant forms of identifying group members, of ‘othering’. Ethnicity has to do with a subjective belief in a common origin, descent and history. It is the idea of descent and common origin that makes a group an ethnic one, that is, the idea and belief in a common origin, descent and history distinguish ethnic identity from other social identities. This belief is never finished but always subject to reinterpretations and adjustments, depending on the present circumstances which make ethnicity dynamic, changeable and socially constructed (Verkuyten 2005, p. 75). Scholars like Wallerstein (1979, p. 194) had hoped that in Africa, tribal and ethnic particularism might in the end give way to cultural homogenisation and national integration but such optimism soon vanished when for example an independent Nigeria became torn apart in the Biafra War of 1966-1967. African scholars (Mbembe, 2001; Mazrui, 1995) therefore realised that ethnicity was not going to wither away with the coming of independence and the embracing of modernity for most African countries, (Comaroff & Comaroff, 2009, p. 1). Instead, they began to realise and

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recognise that ethnicity was not going to dissolve in the melting pot any time soon. This realisation was a result of examples that were pointing to the persistence, tenacity and re-emergence of ethnic differences in Africa. In Zimbabwe, just two years after attaining independence, the predominantly Shona government unleashed a North Korean trained army unit, the Five Brigade on innocently mostly Ndebele speaking population resulting in over 20000 deaths. Now infamously known as the Gukurahundi genocide, this has crystallised among some of the Ndebele people the spirit of resentment towards the ZANU-PF government, in power since independence in 1980. Zimbabwe is a society where ethnicity is politically mobilised and according to King (2002), in such societies, ethnicity becomes salient and this is usually evident because of the competition for scarce economic resources. Writing about the salience of ethnicity in Africa, Geertz (1963) had earlier argued that ethnicity had an economic and political dimension in that there was a close connection between post-colonial state formation and the politicisation of ethnicity. He saw ethnicity also serving as a means for aspirant elites to claim rights and privileges that they did not previously have access to. He further questioned why competition for scarce resources as education, income, status, infrastructure, jobs and political influence occurs on the battleground of ethnicity rather than class struggles or religion. He saw the answer lying in the tensions and contradictions arising from the politicisation of ethnicity. Comaroff (1997) on the other hand sees ethnicity as cultural practices that set a given community of people apart from others. Ethnic groups, according to Schermerhorn (1970, p. 12), tend to have a cultural focus on one or more symbolic elements that are seen as epitomising their peoplehood. Thus, according to Giddens (2006, p.  633), members of ethnic groups see themselves as culturally distinct from other groups, as a collective with real or imagined common ancestry, language, history, styles of dress or adornment (2006, 633). Giddens further states that there is nothing inborn about ethnicity, but rather it is a ‘purely social phenomenon that is reproduced and reproduced over time’, (Giddens, 2006, p. 633). According to Bhopal (2004, pp. 441–442), ethnicity is a: multi-faceted quality that refers to the group to which people belong, and/ or are perceived to belong, as a result of certain shared characteristics, including geographical and ancestral origins, but particularly cultural traditions and languages.

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However, Levo-Henriksson (2007, pp.  12–13) has a problem with both Giddens and Comaroff’s conceptions of ethnicity. Citing Fitzgerald (1992, p. 120), Levo-Henriksson, argues that there is always a problem with treating culture and ethnicity as essentially the same entity. According to Levo-Henriksson, ‘ethnicity or ethnic boundaries answer the question of who we are, while culture answers the question of what we are’. He (2007, pp. 12–13) asserts: In answering the question of what are we, culture provides the content and meaning of ethnicity; it animates and authenticates ethnic boundaries by providing a history, ideology, symbolic universe, and system of meaning.

Humour, Identity and Construction of Meaning in Cyberspace Hall (1984) remark that identity is formed at the unstable point where the unspeakable stories of subjectivity meet the narratives of history, of culture and for people in the diaspora or the dispersed, such unspeakable stories make up a critical aspect of the formation of the marginalised identities by virtual communities. Writing about the Greek-Turkish encounters in cyberspace, Haris Theodorelis-Rigas (2013, p. 2) argues that virtual communities are offering significant breathing spaces for individuals who are ready to revisit, discuss and negotiate the constitutive boundaries of modernity’s ‘imagined communities’. He sees cyberspace as ‘loci of political and semi-political discourse’ (2013, p. 2). Computer-mediated communication as social media can therefore accord comic groups like Omkhula ‘arenas of interaction, negotiation, and transformation of perceptions of ethnicity, history, and identity’ at a time when diasporic Ndebeles appear more willing to express and revisit their ethnically constructed images. There are two opposing views regarding the role of cyberspace in the construction of identities and meaning. The first view is that in the process of their transgression of national boundaries, computer-mediated communication (cyberspace) ‘deconstruct the exclusivist narrative of nationalism’ (Haris Theodorelis-Rigas, 2013, p.  4). Computer-mediated communication makes it possible for everyone to have his/her version of the narrative of the nation and in the imagination of homelands. Thus, the Internet through social media provides voice to the disposed, to the marginalised, acknowledging that indeed voice has been a contested commodity to the marginalised. The marginalised here are those people, in the

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context of this chapter the Ndebele people who feel alienated politically, socially and economically in Zimbabwe. Bernal Victoria (2014) cites the use of Internet by the Ethiopian diaspora communities. Through cyberspace, the marginalised can now use the newfound digital voice to utter the call for acknowledgement of their identities (Bernal, 2005). That is to say in cyberspace, the marginalised can challenge the dominant and put them in the difficult position of either having to acknowledge the marginalised, or further distance the marginalised by ignoring the call. Against this background, cyberspace can be viewed as a staging ground for identity claims and as providing for the platform where the marginalised can not only speak but also expect a response as well. One can therefore argue that marginalised members of a society have found in cyberspace not only a device that further advances the features of earlier media but also a space within which innovative forms of community life such as the use of humour can be created. Precisely because of the reconfiguration of the spaces of identity made possible by cyberspace, the nature of the nation-state as a space of identity is transformed. The focus therefore shifts from the nation-state as we know it to the social spaces and new forms of community that cyberspace makes possible. Cyberspace offers the marginalised a place to coalesce on issues of their nationhood and at the same time extending their capacity to articulate spaces of identity. There are various examples of instances where cyberspace has provided dispersed virtual communities with a concept of home. Appadurai (1996, pp. 206, 213) argues that for people in the diaspora, that is away from home, the question of home or lack of it constitutes a key determinant of identity, as place and as symbol. For him, home is not a simple construct but rather fragile ‘production of locality’ and ‘increasingly a struggle’.

Struggle for Power and the Realm of Aesthetics of Humour The discussion of the intersection of humour, identity and ethnicity in the Zimbabwean political landscape using Omkhula Arts group as a case study can best be underpinned by Bakhtin’s concepts of the carnivalesque and hybridisation. Writing about carnivals, festivals and folk humour, Bakhtin (1968, p. 11) observes that ‘the festival is the first form of human culture’. That is to say, since a festival is an outcome of a nation’s historical and

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cultural accumulation, it contains abundant national cultural connotations. This means that laughter plays a key role in the carnival or joke performance. One can therefore equate Bakhtin’s carnivals or festivals to Omkhula Arts’ comedy performances. As much as the traditional dances during the festivals serve to strengthen cultural identity, so are the joke performances during street theatre performances. Bakhtin’s classic work on laughter, in folk humour and carnival, can be perceived as a shared, confronting attitude towards prevailing power structures. Similarly one can perceive Omkhula’s joke performances as degrading the prevailing hierarchies and institutions’ dominant forms of expression. Bakhtin’s (1968) account of the carnivalesque makes a claim that humour has the subversive and liberating impulse. Bakhtin (1968) also discusses a concept of hybridisation. This is a strategy that marginalized people, those who feel pushed to the fringes of society by the ruling elite, use their language to create a hybrid space or third space to resist absorption and create and maintain their own identities. Using Omkhula Arts group, this chapter demonstrates that the hybrid space in Omkhula is a location for resisting Shona domination and also expressing their grievances against the ruling ZANU-PF government. Although Bakhtin was referring to hybridisation in terms of the colonized people versus their colonisers, the concept can still be applied to post-­ colonial discussions of language and identity in Africa. Hybridity in this case means ‘constant negotiation, challenge and struggle within relationships marked by asymmetrical power relations’ (Lunga, 1997, p. 97). That is to say, hybridity symbolises the struggle to subvert and to exclude others. According to Bakhtin (1968, p. 358), hybridisation involves the mixing of two languages (in this case IsiNdebele and English) ‘within the limits of a single utterance, an encounter, within the consciousness, separated from another by an epoch, by social differentiation or some other factor’ (Bakhtin, 1968, p. 358). Hybridisation therefore makes humour democratic as through language or code-switching, audiences can feel part of the joke. Closely linked to Bakhtin’s concepts of carnivalesque and hybridisation, are functionalist and conflict theories of humour (Hall et  al., 1993). The functionalist perspective of humour views humour as a means of promoting social cohesion and at the same time helping people meet their needs. That is to say, through humour, people share common values and consequently achieve unity and making themselves feel closer to each other. According to the functionalist’s view on humour, humour strengthens the informal bonds between people in a society. It is therefore ‘through

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humour and laughter that people ‘come to realise that they share many of the same needs, values, fears and problems’ (Hall et al., 1993, p. 2). It is these shared human conditions that bond them as a people and at the same time reinforcing their identity, in the process participating in the struggle for power. This therefore shows the relationship between the struggle for power by the marginalised and the aesthetics of humour and laughter. Juxtaposed to the functionalist perspective of humour is the conflict theory. This perspective views humour and laughter as critical views of society. The argument here is that the role of humour is to raise awareness of serious social societies and can go as far as calling for change. Such humour which is critical of society’s ills challenges the exploitation and oppression of the marginalised.

Findings and Discussion Humour as Means of Creating Social Cohesion and as Political Instrumentality This chapter is a discursive analysis of humour produced by Omkhula Arts group based in Hillbrow, South Africa. Using Bakhtin’s concept of hybridisation, functionalist and conflict theories of humour, this chapter analyses purposively selected Omkhula Arts jokes that circulate on social media platforms Facebook and WhatsApp. These jokes are purposively selected in order to meet the objectives of the study, which are to discuss the intersection of humour, identity and ethnicity in the Zimbabwean political landscape. Consequently, only jokes that relate to identity, ethnicity and politics are selected. That is to say, the selected jokes or joke performances are a kind of popular cultural satire targeting key segments and individuals of the entangled lives of comedians and their audiences. These jokes are discursively analysed to uncover the ways in which humour operates in the production, reproduction and contestation of hegemonic identities and representations. A discursive analysis of the jokes by Omkhula Arts reveals that humour, which is a key aspect of popular culture, is an essential part of society. From a functionalist perspective, humour is a necessary lubricant for the smooth functioning of society. Omkhula did not only make jokes about famous people who were not in the audience, but they also made jokes about some about people who were right there in front of them. In one of

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their joke performances, they approached an old man and said ‘hamba ekhaya wena mdala. Isayizi yakho ziyalima ekhaya wena udliwa zindunduma eGoli. Uyaba usuhlupha lapha abantwana sebekudinga kuKhumbula ekhaya’ (Old man go home and rest. You are age mates are farming at home). Although it was so embarrassing to the old man who surely seemed not to have any reason why he was still in Johannesburg, it was so funny that he laughed too. Against this milieu, one can argue that humour diffuses anger. It serves as an outlet so that the anger is less destructive. This act of involving the crowd in the joke performances is aligned to their motto ‘we make people happy’. It also makes them together with their audience and in the process creating a bond between the joke performer and the audience. In between joke performances, they also advise the standing crowd to be on the lookout for pickpockets. This shows that they view themselves as part of their audiences. This reveals that humour can also unite and integrate a group of people, that is to say, it can bring them together even in the face of danger and deaths (Zijderveld, 1993, 30). An example is when during xenophobia attacks in South Africa, Omkhula jokingly said South Africans were not worried about the influx of foreigners but they wanted to loot their mattresses in the name of xenophobia, thus reducing tension and using laughter as therapy. As they laugh together amidst the squalor that surrounds them in Hillbrow, South Africa, they bond as a people, as Ndebeles united by the situation of being migrants in South Africa, trying to create a home away from home. Hall et al. (1993, p. 2) call this community laughter a ‘smile of recognition’, a laughter that involves shared experiences—thus in the process helping the audience identify themselves as Ndebeles with the shared meaning of experiences. The comedians further say about xenophobic attacks: ‘If you are in Johannesburg angithi uzodinga imali? Sonke sivakatshile lapha. Liyasitshaya lithi kabahambe kahabambe. Sibizwe yini? We paid to come here. Lithi singabantu bangaphandle. Lina lingabaphakathi?’ (Everyone who is in Johannesburg is here for money. No one can call this place home). As the crowd laughs at the mention of mattresses, the call to let foreigners work and stay in South Africa is an attempt at nation-building and it appeals to the spirit of Pan-Africanism. This resonates with former South Africa president Thabo Mbeki’s famous speech in defence of The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) where he said ‘I am an African’. Therefore, according to the functionalist perspectives of humour, such humour can function to promote social cohesion.

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Humour cansolidify the exclusionary bonds and norms of a community (or the elite within the community) by stereotyping and ridiculing the liminal and abnormal. On seeing a man with a big tummy in the crowd, Omkhula say ‘umkhaba wakho ungani unothile, ingani usebenza eHarare kanti wena uzisuthele amagwinya’. (Looking at your tummy, one might think you are rich and you work in Harare yet it is just full of fat cakes). The mentioning of Harare, the capital city of Zimbabwe connotes government, and therefore ZANU-PF and corruption. In this way, oMkhula manages to subtle ridicule the status quo through employing day-to-day language deployed against hypocritical practices. As the crowd laughs at the man with a big tummy, the joke performer attempts to upset the established order, an attempt at relative boldness and at the same time gaining an additional weapon of ridiculing. According to Basu (1999, p. 39) in this way, a joke performer ‘can enlarge upon internal criticism through the sarcastic exposure of incongruities and malevolence within the dominant on-stage discourse’. Humour can make others tolerable and it can be fine-grained social sandpaper. That is to say, it can convey criticism less contentiously. It can make palatable what is otherwise hard to swallow. An example is when Omkhula talk about xenophobia. However, humour is never innocent. For example, a joke may result in disparagement for the audience and in bonding for the privileged joker and audience (Basu, 1999, p. 287). An example is when Omkhula say Xhosa women are not to be married because they cause problems ‘bango x abangasolveki’ (they are very difficult). As the crowd laughs at these rather crude jokes, one can argue that humour is a social glue. It fosters rapport and intimacy and promotes friendship by reducing tensions, re-describing differences, redrawing boundaries and appealing to common sentiments. Against this background, one can agree with Urish (2016, p. 317) who posit that one of humour’s greatest attribute is the ‘ability to function as a socializing and democratising force’, that is to say, humour generates social commentary and consequently calls into ‘discourse those cultural values that are often held as sacrosant’.

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Findings and Discussion Omkhula’s Humour and Subverting the Powerful Omkhula Arts use hybridity as a strategy. That is to say, linguistic hybridity has a notable effect and it is deliberate to include some and exclude some—and this shows the joke performer’s relation to the audience/listeners. Thus, hybridization—language mixing—in Omkhula Arts creates a hybrid space or third space, an alternative public sphere for ethnic identity construction. An example is the language used in joking about the then president of Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe. The comedians refer to Mugabe as ‘umdala lowana’ (that old man), ‘ukhulu’ (grandfather), ‘ikhehla’ (very old man). Without being specific, the comedians say ‘That old man uyabulala (kills). Buza abantu beTsholotsho (ask those from Tsholotsho)—a thinly veiled reference to the Gukurahundi genocide. Ridiculing Mugabe through these jibes presents the role of the theatre group as actors, as instruments in the process of shaping Ndebele ethnic identity as well as challenging the powerful. Thus, influencing the construction, crystallisation and strengthening of identities. Lunga (1997, p. 150) is of the view that in as much as language can be used to harm, it can also be used towards self-liberation and self-rehabilitation. One can therefore add that language is used to assert one’s identity, one’s place in relation to her/his nation. Thus, language used by Omkhula simultaneously to expose the ills committed by the ZANU-PF government was represented mostly by its former president Mugabe. Humour is an important means of understanding popular culture and, ‘it is involved in popular culture through helping us understand the social world around us’ Hall et al. (1993, p. 1). Comedians achieve this through the concept of poetic license enjoyed by joke performers or clowns. This concept of poetic licence dates back from time immemorial. Humour also has existed from time immemorial. Throughout history, there is evidence of clowns/comedians (iziphoxo in Ndebele). These together with poets had a license to criticise those in power. Even feared kings like Tshaka could be criticised. For example, when a poet says ‘Usalakutshelwa, usalakunyenyezelwa’ (he one who refuses to be told, who refuses listen to advice) and ‘UMahlom’ ehlathini onjengohlanya, Uhlany’ olusemahlwen’ amadoda’ (a man in the midst of the village). Just like in contemporary societies, joke performers like Omkhula can use poetic license to ridicule presidents like in the case of Mugabe and his

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regime without the fear of arrest. This is achieved through saying those things that ordinarily would not be said in any formal popular cultural forms like the media. In other words, the joke performer like Omkhula become the spokesperson of the entire community, they become the voice of the voiceless. What makes such humour popular according to Hall et al. (1993, p. 2) is that ‘it expresses an essential means of understanding and communicating of the shared human condition’. An example is the performance involving Mugabe and the late Movement for Democratic Change leader, Morgan Tsvangirai. Omkhula portray Mugabe and Tsvangirai in an athletics relay team. Mugabe is supposed to hand over the baton stick to Tsvangirai but instead runs with the stick to the finishing line leaving Tsvangirai bemused. In such a situation, humour becomes a weapon of the weak and a tiny revolution, which upsets the established order. To this end, Orwell (1968, 284-285) remarks that, ‘you cannot be memorably funny without at some point raising topics which the rich, the powerful and the complacent would prefer to see left alone’. Through such humour which calls into question Mugabe’s record of accomplishment in elections, Omkhula’s humour ‘creates license to transgress cultural norms and that license is in the cultural domain of the comedian’ Urish (2016, p. 308). As such, modern comedians like Omkhula can be compared to yesteryear clowns who were frightening because of their status and licence to transgress social and political boundaries (Bakhtin, 1968). Omkhula’s humour also calls for social change by bringing issues of conflict to public awareness. For example, during xenophobia jokes, Omkhula say ‘Lingasitshayi bantu, koMugabe phela siyatshaywa’ (Please do not beat us. Mugabe also beats us). They continue to say: ‘We are from Zimbabwe. You know Mugabe is shit thus why we are here. If Mugabe was okay we wouldn’t be here. In Zimbabwe there are no rights, there are lefts. If you want to drink a cool drink you apply, you want to drink today, Mugabe replies in November. In Zimbabwe you cannot stand like this. Ayaba esefikile amapholisa. Akadlali lowana ubaba ikakhulu uma ukhuluma isiNdebele’ (You cannot stand like this in Zimbabwe. Police would have arrived. Mugabe does not tolerate this especially if you are Ndebele).

The joke is a plea, a clarion call to South Africans to stop xenophobia because Zimbabweans are suffering a double tragedy. They are suffering in South Africa and equally they are suffering in Zimbabwe because of violence and police brutality. By mentioning that life in Zimbabwe is worse

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especially if you are  Ndebele, this highlights the socio-political conflict between Shona-Ndebeles in Zimbabwe. Thus, humour is at once ‘a test of and commentary on the social [and political) environment’ (Urish, 2016, p. 310). Such humour mutates from being a weapon of the weak to scatological attack. Omkhula refers to South African police officers who harass Zimbabwean in South Africa as too fat and unable to chase down thieves. In this way, Omkhula’s humour not only is available as a weapon of the weak but can also disarm, deflate and ‘levels social pretensions and snobbery, juxtaposing the sublime with the ridiculous, to the embarrassment of the former (in this case the South African police officers)’ (Basu, 1999, p. 393). The joke performers here render those participating in xenophobic acts, Mugabe and the South African police officers ‘funnily incongruous’ and ‘exposes hypocrisy in one form or another: greed, stupidity, cruelty, or plain humanity (Basu, 1999, p.  393). Such humour, that angers and humanizes the physically coercive excesses to which the powerful might otherwise be prone, has value as a strategic resort or weapon of the weak. Macpherson’s (2008) submission is that all humour is a social and political construct arising from the society in which it is embedded. That is to say, humour gives impetus for political debates. At the end of their jokes, Omkhula chant, ‘Shit Zabantu, Shit zabantwana’ (shit people, shit children) and this is greeted with laughter. For Basu (1999, p. 394) such humour ‘is at most a temporary rebellion against virtue, and its aim is not to degrade the human being but to remind him that he is already degraded’. To this end, one can infer that through their jokes, Omkhula in this way avoids being accused of being rude—that is, they therefore occupy the productive space between inquiry and invective, to be provocative in a way that calls forth. Relationship Between Humour, Identity and Ethnicity Omkhula’s humour touches on identity and ethnic issues. As already said, Omkhula are from Bulawayo, Zimbabwe and consequently they speak for and on behalf of the Ndebele people of Zimbabwe. In one of their joke performances about xenophobia they say: Ngijabulile uma ngibona abantu abakithi amaZulu. Thina lani maZulu siyafana. Esikukhulumayo liyakuwa. Umahluko nje yikuthi thina uMzilikazi wasithatha le Kwazulu wayasizalela eshitini (Zimbabwe). Ungakhulumisa

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umuntu ovela eZimbabwe ngesiZulu umuzwe ekuphendula ngesiLungu, tshaya liShona (I am happy that today I have one of ours, a Zulu person. We Ndebeles we are the same with you Zulus. What speak the same language. The only difference is that Mzilikazi took us from KZN to poor Zimbabwe. If you speak to anyone from Zimbabwe in Zulu and they respond in English, beat them up, they are Shona).

In this joke, Omkhula takes their audience down memory lane on how the Ndebele people ended up in Zimbabwe. In this way, Omkhula as artists participate through humour in shaping and reshaping Ndebele history and collective memory. Instead of portraying this history in a sombre and tragic way, Omkhula resorts to humour to reflect this part of traumatic memory. In this way, Omkhula’s humour functions as a means of pacifying tensions caused by history, collective memory, and their complications. Such humour is also a cry for belonging, to be part of South Africa where they are not wanted. On the same note—one notices the relationship between humour and nostalgic remembrance of the past in this act—thus ‘humour plays a role in relieving the anxieties caused by its injustices’ (Ezell, 2016, p.  49). One can therefore conclude that such humour by Omkhula becomes a favourite tool with which to confront problematic recollections of the Ndebele past. By calling on South Africans to differentiate between Shonas and Ndebeles, Omkhula are participating in the restructuring of the collective history and identity of the Ndebeles. They are creating ‘us’ and ‘them’. That is, they are saying Ndebeles are in South Africa because South Africa is their home—they are using humour and satire as a means of challenging the ways in which collective memory is shaped by dominant ideology. At the same time exposing the tensions that exists between the Ndebeles and the Shona, tensions that the ruling ZANU-PF government has failed to solve but has appropriated for its benefit. Against this background, Brigstocke (2011, p. 223), argues that such humour is disruptive and it might disrupt the Zimbabwe’s nation building project. This therefore is evident that the mediation of post-colonial identities in Africa is through coexistence and contradiction. This is precisely because post-colonial identity is not a location for synthesis and resolution but contradiction and opposition and hybrid spaces like joke performances provide that space.

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Conclusion Social media has indeed provided a platform for the marginalised to use humour and laughter to not only ridicule and speak back to the ruling elites but also to stake their identity claims. Humour is particularly useful as a tool for social integration—that it is shared through Facebook and WhatsApp. This shows that humour is popular—thus it appeals to a wide audience and is understood by people of all levels. By being on social media, Omkhula humour helps create an online community, a virtual Ndebele community aided by social media. Humour therefore not only breaks the ice, it allows one to advance the views one cherishes less obdurately, in a less threatening mode. As such, humour is civil and productive than the vicious triangle of dogmatism, disputatiousness and deadlock.

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Index1

NUMBERS, AND SYMBOLS #Tajamuka, 156 #Thisgown, 156 A Abductions, 46, 53–57, 54n4 Aesthetics, 23–37 AFCON, 269, 274 AFCON 2017, 268, 269, 273, 278, 286 Africa, 27, 29, 37 African National Congress (ANC), 217 Allegory, 199, 200, 200n1, 207 Apartheid, 215–217, 223 B Billig, Michael, 10, 11 Black social media, 228

Brazil, 198, 199, 201–204, 201n2, 249–265 Brazilian cinema, 198–200 Bustop TV, 137–139, 143–145, 147, 148 Butler, Judith, 68, 73–75, 74n2, 77, 79, 81, 81n4, 82, 87–90, 250, 251 C Carnivalesque, 27, 28, 37 Carroll, Nöel, 197, 198, 205 Cartoons, 67–72, 77–80, 83, 85–87, 90 CDA, see Critical Discourse Analysis Celebrity activism, 175–192 Chouliaraki, L., 176, 179, 182, 189, 190 Christian thinkers, 2 Coconut Kelz, 233–245

 Note: Page numbers followed by ‘n’ refer to notes.

1

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 S. Mpofu (ed.), The Politics of Laughter in the Social Media Age, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-81969-9

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INDEX

Comedians, 27, 29–32, 34 Comedy, 180, 191, 197–209, 291, 293, 296, 300 Corruption, 45–47, 53, 59–63 Counter-public, 142 Crisis, 43–64, 96–98, 101 Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), 67, 68, 71, 72, 77, 87, 90 Culture wars, 197–209 Cybersphere, 23–37 D Descartes, René, 5 Digital ethnography, 216, 221 Disparagement humour, 215–229 Dissident, 47 E Economic satire, 137–148 Economy, 121, 124 Ethnicity, 267–286 Everyday nationalism, 267, 274–276 F Facebook, 272, 276, 277, 286 Fairclough, N., 68, 72, 73 Fandom, 267–286 Folklore, 25–27 G Gender, 249–265 Gender performance, 249–265 Global South, 1–16, 96–98, 219, 220 Graphic violence, 197–209 Grievable lives, 73–75, 79, 84, 87 Gukurahundi, 94, 95, 100–103, 107

H Habermas, Jürgen, 119 Haraway, Donna, 253 Hegemonic masculinities, 163, 166–167 Hobbes, Thomas, 5 Horror, 197–209 Humour, 1–16, 23–31, 34–36, 93–108, 113–115, 118–132, 139–141, 146, 155–171, 291–308 I Identity, 291–308 Incongruity Theory, 6 J Jokes, 159, 164, 168, 170 Juxtaposition, 233, 234, 241, 243–245 K Kant, Immanuel, 6, 7 L Lameck ‘Makwiratiti’ Chimuka’s, 157, 162–170 Laughing at power, 23–37 Laughter, 1–16 Legitimacy, 44, 53, 57–60 Lewis, Paul, 205, 208 like #This flag, 156 M Magamba TV, 43–64 Marikana, 67–90 Mbembe, Achille, 140, 145 Mhlanga, B., 268–270, 278, 286

 INDEX 

Micro and macro text analysis, 68, 73, 90 Mimicry, 233, 234, 241–243 Miss South Africa, 216–218, 225–227 Mnangagwa, Emmerson, 93–108, 156, 169 Morreall, J., 1, 2, 5–8 Mpofu, Shepherd, 218–220, 223, 229 Mugabe, Robert, 94, 97, 98, 105 N Nationalism, 267–276, 280–286 Ncube, Lyton, 268, 270, 273, 274, 276, 280, 281, 285, 286 Ndebeles, 270–272, 274, 279–286, 291–293, 296–299, 302, 304–308 Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S.J., 268–272, 271n4 “New Dispensation,” 43–64 News websites, 93–108 Nigeria, 175–192 Nollywood, 176, 184, 185, 188, 189 O Omkhula, 291–294, 296, 299–308 Online activism, 179 Online Presentification, 249–265 Oppression, 48, 54 Osiebe, Garhe, 176–178, 184, 185 P Persuasion, 240, 241 Plato, 1, 2, 5 Polarization, 198, 201 Politics, 43–64, 176, 177, 185, 188–190 Popular music, 176, 178 Power, 23–37 Pranks, 175–192

313

Q Queer theory, 250, 263 R Race-thinking, 233–245 Racism, 215–219, 221, 223, 228 Reception, 94, 96, 98–100, 105, 107, 108 Relief Theory, 7 Resistance, 140, 145 Rhetoric, 239 Rhetorical analysis, 239, 241 Ridicule, 291, 294–296, 303, 304, 308 S Satire, 43–64, 233–245 Second Republic, 94, 97, 107 Shona, 270–272, 277–286 Skits, 139, 143, 144, 146–148 Social injustices, 45 Social media, 1–16, 24, 32, 36, 37, 113–132, 142, 147 South Africa, 233–245, 291, 293, 301, 302, 305–307 Stuart, Hall, 292 Subalterns, 23, 36 Superiority Theory, 5, 6 T Theories of humour, 5 Tlhabi, Lesego, 237, 239, 243 Transvestites, 249, 250, 254–257, 262, 264 Twitectives, 215–229 Twitter, 250, 254–264 U Ungodly spectacles, 3

314 

INDEX

V Van Dijk, T., 72, 73 Varakashi, 101, 103–105 W Warriors, 269, 273, 276–279, 284–286 White privilege, 215, 225 Wodak, R., 68, 70 Women abuse, 166–167 X Xavier, Ismail, 199, 200

Y Yabis culture, 177–182 YouTube, 138, 139, 144, 240, 241 Z ZANU-PF, 97, 103, 104 Zapiro, 67–90 Zimbabwe, 93–98, 100, 101, 104, 105, 107, 113–132, 137–148, 267–286, 291–293, 295–299, 303–307