The Politics of Conflict: Transubstantiatory Violence in Iraq 9780773592049

Table of contents :
Cover
Title
Copyright
Contents
Acknowledgments
1 Problematizing Chthonic Security: Iraq as a Site of Investigation
2 Transubstantiatory Violence
3 Hegemony and the State: Towards an Understanding of Social Complicity and Political Violence in Iraq
4 Chthonic Constitutions: Violence and Iraqi State-Formation
5 States of Tolerance: [Ideal]ology, Violence, and the Iraqi Communist Movement
6 Transubstantiatory Violence and the Militant/Multitude Problematic
7 Saddam in Furs: Social Complicity and Regime Violence
Afterword
Notes
Bibliography
Index

Citation preview

t h e p o l it ic s of confli ct

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The Politics of Conflict Transubstantiatory Violence in Iraq

Monica Ingber

McGill-Queen’s University Press Montreal & Kingston • London • Ithaca

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©  McGill-Queen’s University Press 2015 isbn 978-0-7735-4359-1 (cloth) isbn 978-0-7735-4360-7 (paper) isbn 978-0-7735-9204-9 (epdf) isbn 978-0-7735-9205-6 (epub) Legal deposit second quarter 2015 Bibliothèque nationale du Québec Printed in Canada on acid-free paper that is 100% ancient forest free (100% post-­consumer recycled), processed chlorine free McGill-Queen’s University Press acknowledges the support of the Canada Council for the Arts for our publishing program. We also acknowledge the financial support of the Government of Canada through the Canada Book Fund for our publishing activities.

Library and Archives Canada Cataloguing in Publication Ingber, Monica, 1979–, author The politics of conflict: transubstantiatory violence in Iraq / Monica Ingber. Includes bibliographical references and index. Issued in print and electronic formats. isbn 978-0-7735-4359-1 (bound). – isbn 978-0-7735-4360-7 (pbk.). – isbn 978-0-7735-9204-9 (eP DF ). – isbn 978-0-7735-9205-6 (eP U B ) 1. Political violence – Iraq.  2. Social conflict – Iraq.  3. Iraq – Politics and government.  I. Title. H N 670.Z9V 5 2014   303.609567    C 2014-904967-6 C 2014-904968-4

This book was typeset by Interscript in 10.5/13 Sabon.

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For my loved ones

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Contents

Acknowledgments ix   1 Problematizing Chthonic Security: Iraq as a Site of Investigation  3   2 Transubstantiatory Violence  27   3 Hegemony and the State: Towards an Understanding of Social Complicity and Political Violence in Iraq  45   4 Chthonic Constitutions: Violence and Iraqi State-Formation  65   5 States of Tolerance: [Ideal]ology, Violence, and the Iraqi Communist Movement  103   6 Transubstantiatory Violence and the Militant / Multitude Problematic 127   7 Saddam in Furs: Social Complicity and Regime Violence  153 Afterword 176 Notes 183 Bibliography 209 Index 227

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Acknowledgments

Venus in Furs was first introduced to me as an academic text by Shannon Bell. I would like to thank Shannon for inspiring me to use Masoch’s work and for the time spent discussing the project, as well as reading and editing countless drafts of each chapter. I would like to thank Costas Constantinou, Bulent Gokay, Gad Horowitz, Cy Gonick, Barry Ryan, R.B.J. Walker, Michael Dillon, and Luis Lobo Guerroro for their feedback and tireless engagements with the text. I would like to extend my appreciation to my friends and colleagues Daniel Lowe, Rohee Dasgupta, Darrell Whitman, Christine Michael, Monique Chiotti, and L.J. Thompson for reading various chapters and contributing to their development through valued discussions. Grateful acknowledgement is made for the permission to use the following previously published material as part of the text: portions of chapter 3, “Hegemony and the State: Towards an Understanding of Social Complicity and Political Violence in Iraq,” first appeared in  Cultural Practices, Political Possibilities, courtesy of Cambridge Scholars Publishing. I would like to thank the Dandelion Foundation for providing me with the necessary funding to complete the project, as well as Keele University for their generous bursary. I would also like to thank Michael Molavi for his assistance in helping me locate McGill-Queen’s University Press, Raan Matalon for his work on the index, the manuscript’s reviewers for their helpful comments, and my editor Jacqueline Mason for believing in the project and for her hard work in helping me to bring the project to completion.

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x Acknowledgments

Finally, I want to thank my family for their love and support throughout the writing of this manuscript.

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t h e p o l it ic s of confli ct

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1 Problematizing Chthonic Security: Iraq as a Site of Investigation

introduction Violence is a complex social phenomenon; it is both embodied and structural, and it can shape as well as be shaped.1 When state violence is considered, it is traditionally thought of in terms of its legitimate use. As such, Max Weber defined the state as an entity that “claims a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence.”2 This definition of the state, when coupled with Hobbes’ concept of the Leviathan – a sovereign authority to whom the populace cedes their natural rights in order to gain protection3 – provides a foundation for the relationship between violence and security. In effect, security has to do with “threats to survival.”4 And, as Mohammed Ayoob argued, “[s]ecurity-insecurity is defined in relation to vulnerabilities – both internal and external – that threaten or have the potential to bring down or weaken state structures, both territorial and institutional, and governing regimes.”5 Ayoob’s definition is demonstrative of the tradition to approach security from a state-centric position that focuses on the state as the referent object of security – the thing to be  secured, particularly from violent conflict. With the rise of the Copenhagen School,6 security was re-articulated in terms of survival, which broadened its scope to include categories of security, such as military, environmental, economic, societal, and political security. One of the key contributions of the Copenhagen School was to deepen security studies to include non-state actors. This deepening has opened an avenue for concepts like human security to be developed. Human security shifts the referent object of security from the  state to the individual. As such, human security challenges

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state-centric approaches by arguing that the political violence committed by state authorities against individuals can create as much insecurity as that created through inter-state conflict.7 When thinking about human security, the nature of the threat to individuals becomes a focal point for policy initiatives centered on the means to achieve security. Despite the separation of the state and individuals as the referent objects of security, in states such as Iraq, these categories are blurred by the focus on a different referent object: that of the regime. Regime security is oriented towards the protection of the ruling elite from violent challenge. It has been argued that in weak states (who do not hold a monopoly on the means of violence) this means that state and regime security are tied together since the state apparatus itself collapses when a particular regime is overthrown.8 In addition to this, regime security is also tied to societal security through the maintenance of ethno-national identities. In Iraq, this was accomplished through the creation of an Iraqi identity which obfuscated sectarian divisions and denied the privileging of the Sunni minority over that of the Shiite and Kurdish populations. Drawing on the relationship between violence and security, The Politics of Conflict: Transubstantiatory Violence in Iraq offers an alternative perspective on violence by examining the mechanisms that are at work in the production of social complicity. In order to do so, The Politics of Conflict sets out to problematize regime violence by assessing the transubstantiation of violence into a sign and symbol of power through its aestheticization. Regime violence is the focus of the analysis throughout and serves as an underlying theme of the text. In this respect, Iraq presents a unique site of investigation since the referent object of security is the regime, but presents as the state itself. Here, the claim that the state holds a monopoly on the legitimate means of violence, coupled with the desire to maintain a stable environment, lends credibility to the assertion that the government is there to provide protection to the citizenry of the state. This claim, however, cannot be made without some form of authorization; this authorization derives itself from the interdependent habits of the population that create a web of normative behaviours that ground the jus cogens norms of the domestic state apparatus.9 Customs that function to legitimize the governing regime are established over time; however, in a state like Iraq, these customs  have given rise to the ability for a governing regime to subvert official

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Iraq as a Site of Investigation 5

state institutions. In the case of the Ba’th regime, it has been argued that the creation of a parallel network of Ba’th party institutions, as well as a complement of nominally state-based institutions served to legitimize the regime. For instance, the criminal court system was frustrated by a system of special courts where the death penalty was used both routinely and extensively. In addition to this, the security apparatus permeated Iraqi life, thus normalizing insecurity.10 In relation to international law, Larry May points out that “[interdependent] habits are not the same as consent.”11 Applied to the domestic realm of a state, regimes could find themselves acting in accordance to custom versus consent. Custom then serves as an implicit acceptance of the regime’s will, which is then demonstrated in the state’s behaviour. As long as the citizenry behaves in interdependent and habitual ways, the habits themselves form normalizing customs. When normalized customs fuse with regime violence, this violence comes to underlie the functioning of the social body and brings what I call “chthonic security” into our purview. In Iraq, and particularly under Saddam Hussein’s Ba’th Party rule, state security was based on the chthonic. “Chthonic” refers to the bowels of the Earth, the Darwinian bloodshed and squalor that is relegated from sight through adherence to an Apollonian mindset.12 Of significance is the link to the Earth. Not only does “chthonic” mean “of or in the Earth,” but the Earth itself signifies something organic; this ties the chthonian to the image of the mother. The image of the mother, however, is not that of Gaia (who represents creation, the living surface, and nurturing), but that of both abundance and the grave. Chthonic security is then defined as the dark inside of security, the side through which the sacrifice and violence associated with insecurity renders security possible. As a concept, chthonic security presents us with an alternative problematic to that of the security dilemma; this calls for a different analytical framework of violence to be considered if one is to deepen the understanding between violence, security, and the social contract. For its part, the security dilemma presents us with an existential uncertainty in human affairs and is usually expressed along the following lines: the means to secure one actor presents the source of insecurity for the Other. This is generally articulated in terms of inter-state relations, whereby weapons that provide self-protection for one state actually or potentially threatens harm to other states.13 Even if a state intends to use weapons only for self-protection, it is

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difficult for the Other to know this with any certainty. Uncertainty and fear breed insecurity and this in turn presents a predicament ­surrounding the interpretation and response between actors in the global arena. As Ken Booth and Nicholas J. Wheeler point out, at the  heart of the security dilemma is the complex interrelationship between both psychological and material dimensions.14 Given that one can never know with certainty that the Other will not pose a threat, the security dilemma presents us with the paradox that my security necessitates your insecurity. Chthonic security does not replace the security paradox; instead, it presents a different understanding of the security/insecurity relationship. In Iraq, chthonic security stems from the transformation of the various ideological state apparatuses that informed the structural, spatial, and psychological basis of the state into biopolitical tools. This was enabled in part due to the manipulation of the traditional space of politics, which relies on a system of privilege and patronage. Charles Tripp has noted that Iraqi history has been marked by a “tendency for politics to be seen mainly as a way of disciplining the population to ensure conformity with the rulers’ visions of social order.”15 For Talcott Parsons, this is a matter of power, whereby power is defined in terms of the “capacity to secure the performance of the binding obligations by units in a system of collective action when the obligations are legitimized with reference to their bearing on collective goals and where in the case of recalcitrance there is a presumption of enforcement by negative situational sanctions.”16 In this sense, power is derived from an assumption of consent and the authorization to act and to make use of actions.17 With this definition of power in mind, it can be argued that repressive measures were presented as collective security endeavours that were supported by the general Iraqi population. For instance, official state security policy appeared as it would in almost any other state: the military conducted campaigns that were designed to achieve both domestic and foreign policy goals; this was centered, for example, on the suppression of Kurdish and Shiite insurgen­ cies,  the Iran–Iraq War, and the invasion of Kuwait. In the background to official policy, however, was the normalization of violence that allowed chthonic security to emerge and become the face of security in Iraq. In this sense, chthonic security aimed to maintain the regime instead of the individual. It could then be said that the Ba’th Party maintained control over the population by producing a

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Iraq as a Site of Investigation 7

continuous condition of insecurity, which paradoxically led to a conditioning of state and human security. As a term chthonic security signifies the underside of security; in practice, it is normalized insecurity that is sanctioned by a society whose governing regime is legitimized by custom instead of consent. This not only renders regime violence banal, but places the right of the state/regime above that of the individual. In this respect, Iraq presents us with a site that is open to a reading of chthonic security given that the state became a space where regime security superseded human security. Chthonic security forms the underlying discourse that drives transubstantiatory violence and social complicity, two concepts to which we now turn. It is used in this work as a means of understanding the space within which transubstantiatory violence manifests and social complicity is enabled. Transubstantiatory Violence: A Framework of Analysis It is assumed throughout this work that violence not only informs the underlying social contract of the state, but also determines the nature of the social contract itself. To this effect, I would like to ­suggest that the analytic of violence that becomes useful to the development of an understanding of chthonic security is what I call “transubstantiatory violence.” Transubstantiatory violence is a violence of psychosocial change; it takes regime violence as a sign and symbol of the movement towards change and of change. In this sense, it is the violence that signals the transformation of one thing into another form. In theology, transubstantiation has to do with the changing of the elements of bread and wine when they are consecrated in the Eucharist, into the body and blood of Christ. The pairing of “violence” and “transubstantiation” serves the purpose of pinpointing the violent side of transformation; the transformation of the self is both sacred and sacrificial. By conceptualizing violence as transubstantiatory, one can then see violence as paradoxical: violence both destroys and renews by inaugurating the new. When considered in relation to the chthonian, the inauguration of the new is linked to the mother image and to violence; this will be seen in the next chapter. The analytic of transubstantiatory violence is based on the Deleuzian interpretation of the work of Leopold Sacher-Masoch, which is set out in Gilles Deleuze’s essay “Coldness and Cruelty.”

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The analysis of transubstantiatory violence demonstrates that it is an ontological and originary violence that is chthonian. It is based on the following three propositions: (1) the creation of social meaning is itself violent and this is demonstrated by the chthonic side of the contract, which lays down a new law, but in doing so guarantees violence; (2) violence is tolerated and sustained in order to pursue an Ideal, which is either constantly deferrable or impossible to reach; and (3) the violence of creation leads to the violence of recreation in a paradoxical attempt to secure or preserve the self, whether the self is a corporate self or a human self. Together, these three propositions point to what I call “social complicity.” Social complicity is differentiated from the legal understanding of complicity (which is defined in terms of aiding and abetting a principal perpetrator in the commission of a crime against the state) in that it refers to the problem of legitimizing violence through aesthetic and semiotic indicators. Social complicity legitimizes state violence, but is not blameworthy itself. It is in this respect that social complicity is related to violence in a different way than criminal complicity. Social complicity raises the question of legitimate and illegitimate violence. According to Walter Benjamin, legitimate violence is founded on assumptions of natural law. Natural law sees violence as a product of nature: violence is used as a means to a just end. As a product of nature violence is grafted onto positive law whereby legal means justify legal ends. In this regard, it is the legality of the means that is important even if the means are violent; the legality of the means justifies the pursuit of the ends by the state, since “legal ends … can only be realized by a legal power.”18 The creation of parallel state institutions to those of official state institutions maintains that state violence is able to transcend moral and ethical judgment provided that it is legal. “In Benjamin’s argument, the existence of this legal authority necessitates that it take on a certain personality of self-preservation through the suppression and manipulation of those it governs.”19 As a result, Benjamin maintains that violence holds two functions: (1) a law-making function that is able to found and modify legal conditions; and (2) a law-preserving function, which serves the end of maintaining the legal apparatus itself. Given the existential threat of non-sanctioned violence to the established legal system, every legal system is founded on the use of violence. Law has to maintain a monopoly on violence if it is to preserve its status as law, which is its source of legitimation.20 It can then be said that

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legal ends are not manifestations of justness, but are instead a creation of power and the desire to maintain that power. As such, translations of natural law to the state apparatus serve as a legitimizing force behind morally objectionable political moves; the sovereign decision transcends morality to preserve the state/regime, thus making violence a product of sovereignty due to sovereignty’s link to power.21 If legitimation is contingent on the foundation of historically determined and potentially contestable power structures, then the possibility of an uprising of law-making violence against the legal order exists. Acts of law-preserving violence contain within them a “defensive moment of lawmaking violence,” whereby the legitimized regime re-legitimizes itself.22 Regime security manifests through the attempt to remove the possibility of contestable power structures, while at the same time maintaining the legitimacy (and sovereignty) of the governing regime. This is accomplished through law given that it is through this avenue that the governing regime is able to define the parameters of life and manipulate existence. Citizens negotiate these parameters, which ensures that law’s violence permeates all levels of society.23 It is in this way that social complicity and chthonic security are linked. In order to interrogate the correlation between security, law, and the social contract, this work utilizes the three propositions on transubstantiatory violence as an analytical framework for assessing social complicity. Through this, chthonic security emerges as a security problematic. This will be further developed in chapters 2 and 3.

Aesthetic Politics In order for chthonic security to be understood, it is necessary to assess violence through an aesthetic approach that sees violence in terms of its psychological impact on the social body. Aesthetics offers alternative insights into politics and international relations by allowing us to step back and reflect on political conflict and dilemmas in  new ways.24 Following F.R. Ankersmit, an aesthetic approach assumes that there is a gap between a form of representation and what is represented; politics is located in this space.25 And, according to Jacques Rancière, politics is an intervention in the visible and the sayable. Politics is thus located in the frozen or blank space between the form of representation and the represented, where the symbolic order is abolished. This abolishment is felt in a rupture of

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sense. Where Rancière is concerned, this provides us with dissensus, defined as a gap in the sensible itself, which amounts to “a conflict between a sensory presentation and a way of making sense of it, or between several sensory regimes and/or ‘bodies.’”26 If dissensus is a division that is inserted in common sense, then politics is tasked with creating a new form, a dissensual common sense in contrast to the sensory worlds framed by state, military, economic, religious, and scholarly power.27 What is the relation between art, politics, and dissensus? Art forms a new sensorium, which in turn signifies a new ethos, a way of being.28 Art presents us with a sensorium that initiates the turn to the political. It does this by creating a rupture in the sensible that results from a suspension of common sense and with it consensus. In this respect, Rancière writes that fiction does not designate the imaginary in contrast to the real, but involves a reframing of the real. This reframing of the real is the framing of dissensus. Accordingly, “fiction is a way of changing existing modes of sensory presentations and form of enunciation; of varying frames, scales and rhythms; and of building new relationships between reality and appearance, the individual and the collective.”29 In this way, fiction creates new possibilities of subjective enunciation. Politics is absent when consensus occurs, because consensus is a mode of government that serves to transform politics into the police, (the police is a distri­ bution of the sensible that effectuates the common community and structures)30 thus “positing an immediate identity between the political constitution of the community and the physical and moral constitution of a population.”31 Art and politics both serve the function of creating a partition of the sensible; art invokes a sphere of experience, a dissensus, whereas politics frames the space of dissensus in the common world. Rancière frames his discussion of aesthetics and politics in terms of the distribution of the sensible. In contrast, Gilles Deleuze sees aesthetics and politics more in terms of sensation and orients his thought towards becoming-in-sensation. This is perhaps what attracts Deleuze to authors such as Masoch and Kafka, as well as painters such as Francis Bacon. In What Is Philosophy?, Deleuze and Guattari unequivocally say that “[art] is the language of sensations.”32 By sensation, Deleuze means “the opposite of the facile and the ready-made, the cliché, but also of the ‘sensational,’ the spontaneous, etc.”33 According to Daniel Smith, the general aim of art for

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Deleuze is to produce a sensation, a sign. Here, signs designate forces of encounter, which have no fixed or objective forms of recognition. Sensation is allotropic; it is a vibration. For instance, in Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation, Deleuze talks about the Figure in Bacon’s paintings and argues that the Figure is the sensible form that is related to a sensation. The Figure in Bacon’s paintings is the body without organs, exemplified through the scrubbed and brushed parts of the canvas. Deleuze writes that one can discern a wave flowing through the body that effectively traces levels upon it. Sensation is then produced when the wave encounters the forces acting on the body, as in “affective athleticism” or the “screaming breath.” As such, Deleuze argues that when sensation is linked to the body in this way it is no longer representative but becomes real. Here, Deleuze lends an important insight to the understanding of violence. He notes that in the process of moving from representation to the real, cruelty in art ceases to be linked to the representation of the horrible; instead, it “becomes nothing other than the action of forces upon the body.”34 The body is neutralized and rendered indeterminate in the moment of sensation. Deleuze’s notion of sensation brings to the fore two concepts that are essential to his political and aesthetic philosophy: namely, desire and becoming. In Anti-Oedipus, Deleuze and Guattari outline desire as being an active force that is productive. As Paul Patton argues, Deleuze and Guattari’s theory of desire differs from that of other theorists (for instance, from Plato to Hegel and Freud who conceptualize desire in terms of the attempt to regain an unattainable lost object of satisfaction) because they approach desire from a constructivist sense: desire requires a machine or assemblage and it is not directed towards the production of stable subjects, but is instead asocial or revolutionary in the sense of wanting what it wants.35 Desire is characterized as libidinal energy centered on subjectivity. In effect, Deleuze and Guattari write that “desire does not take as its object persons or things, but entire surroundings which it traverses, the vibrations and flows of every sort to which it is joined and in which it introduces breaks and captures.”36 Desire is an all-pervasive energy that flows. And, desire and sensation fold into one another: sensation is the apex of desire that initiates a moment of indeterminacy that forges a space where subjectivity becomes. How does the couple sensation/desire produce a movement of becoming? For Deleuze, sensation is a sign that is defined as an encounter. Sets of

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encounters are then connected by flows of libidinal energy. This produces a desire-machine that culminates in intensities from which subjectivity emerges. Important to this is the idea that intensities are the products of the synthesis of different forces and are thus the effects of encounters between different energies.37 Movement of the desire-machine is experienced as affects. Affects are transformative in the sense that they are both active and reactive; becomings are characterized as affects brought on by the engagement with other bodies. Art provides a materiality where affects/ becomings are subsumed. In his analysis of the work of Francis Bacon, Deleuze writes that movement is connected to colour, which opens up an avenue of meaning and allows one to grasp or perceive the world. The visual becomes felt. As such, art harnesses the forces necessary for becoming-other. This is made clearer if we consider Deleuze’s analysis of the movement-image in Cinema 1. Here, Deleuze argues that the shot is the movement-image and movement itself is derived from machinic connections or assemblages of film.38 The camera moves and the production of mobile sections of movement makes it so that the shot does not “express the duration of the whole which changes, but constantly puts bodies, parts, aspects, dimensions, distance and the respective positions of the bodies which make up a set in the image into variation.”39 Movement varies the elements of the set by dividing them up into parts that are dissembled and reassembled, thus creating an open whole. As such, the open whole is constantly becoming. Our becoming-other occurs in the unconscious where affects of the desire-machine act on the body. For example, if one looks at the concept of becoming-animal, one sees that becoming-animal has to do with the production of affects “or forming an inter-individual body with real or imagined powers of the animal in question.”40 As Patton notes, the engagement with the powers attributed to the animal in the social imaginary can enhance the feeling of power and with it the real capacities of those engaged in the becoming.41 As mentioned above, artists present affects, as well as invent and create affects. For Deleuze and Guattari, Kafka is an important writer because his mode of writing enables him “to account for different machines that condition our actual relation to the world, to the body, to desire, and to the economy of life and death.”42 Kafka’s writing – characterized as a minor literature because he is writing in a language and culture that is not his own – affects language through

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a deterritorialization that displaces major language by utilizing a new language that destratifies the cognito. Kafka’s writing reconfigures language because it is a deterritorialized communication. Kafka accomplishes this by creating a machine of expression. Deleuze and Guattari maintain that in order to be a machine of expression, ­writing “must break forms, encourage ruptures and new sproutings. When a form is broken, one must reconstruct the content that will necessarily be part of a rupture in the order of things.”43 As such, writing translates everything into assemblages and dismantles assemblages. This process results in words transubstantiating into sensation, thus allowing common language to break out of consensus. The political is then initiated in the instant of intensity – of becoming – when we are forced to engage with the experience of meaning. F.R. Ankersmit argues that meaning is representational and arises from the recognition of how others, such as historians, painters, and novelists, represent the world.44 Fiction can thus be seen as a mode through which an understanding of politics can be derived; it is a medium of representation where aesthetic politics can be located. One might look towards historiography in order to see the relevance of the aesthetic turn to the study of history. Hayden White has argued that historiography allows us to consider the nature of narration and narrativity given that it is within historiography that the desire for the imaginary contests with the imperatives of the real. Drawing on this, one could then say that although the novella is primarily a work of the imaginary, it nevertheless conveys a particular consciousness; the writer infuses the text with meaning, while the reader approaches the narrative from a particular standpoint and grafts further meaning onto the text. The real is thus conveyed through two modes of imaginative grafting. In addition to this, ­fiction promotes the grasping together of sensation, memory, and imagination, thus pointing us towards the recognition of a certain political real that is psychosocial in nature. The value of fiction to the writing of history is not through the representation of the past as such, but through the communication of psychosocial disposition. Given Deleuze’s political aesthetics, it is unsurprising that he would be drawn to the respective works of Sade and Masoch since he characterizes both writers as great artists: “they discovered new forms of expression, new ways of thinking and feeling and an entirely original language.”45 For instance, in Sade’s work, the torturer speaks the language of the established order and power; the victim

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alone speaks about torture. Conversely, Masoch’s heroes speak the language of the torturer they are to themselves. Therefore when Deleuze writes that “language reaches its full significance when it acts on the senses,”46 he ushers in his discourse of sensation – words compel the body to become. Similar to his analysis of Bacon’s paintings, violence in Sade and Masoch’s work is linked to eroticism by way of forces. In Deleuze’s analysis, we see force coming to the fore through the function language. For instance the demonstrative function of language reaches a higher function when it is founded between violence and eroticism. In Sade’s work it appears between sequences of description, such as when the libertines are resting or between two commands. This may also be seen when the libertine agrees to converse with his victim, using her as either a confidante or listener. All of this holds the purpose of showing that reasoning itself is a form of violence. As such, Deleuze writes that reasoning does not have to be shared by the person it is addressed to, nor does pleasure have to be shared by the object from which it is extracted. Sade’s language is a dual language. On the one hand, the imperative and descriptive factors point to a personal element, which “directs and describes the personal violence of the sadist as well as his individual tastes.”47 On the other hand, there is the impersonal element that “identifies the impersonal violence with an Idea of pure reason, with a terrifying demonstration capable of subordinating the first element.”48 In Masoch’s work, we see the demonstrative function of language reaching a higher function through persuasion and education. This is seen through the victim’s search for a torturer, their persuasion and need to educate the torturer, as well as in the alliances needed for the purpose of realizing strange schemes. As such, advertisements and contracts form a large role in Masoch’s language. Furthermore, education, submission, and torment in Masoch’s writing all point to the attempt to reach an Ideal. “The ascent from the human body to the work of art and from the work of art to the Idea must take place under the shadow of the whip.”49 For example, in Venus in Furs, Severin’s motto is “supersensualism,” which does not mean “supersensitive,” but is defined as “supersensual,” “supercarnal.”50 The doctrine of supersensualism thus points to a higher flesh, a high sense. It represents the moment of intensity and becoming. Masoch’s work proceeds through the dialectical spirit of reversal, disguise, and reduplication, therefore implying transpositions and displacements that enable the scene to be enacted simultaneously on

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different levels.51 Like Sade, Masoch’s work demonstrates that “particularity is seen reflectively in the impersonal Ideal of the dialectical spirit.”52 Given this, Deleuze characterizes the language of Sade and Masoch as “pornological” instead of pornographic because it “cannot be reduced to the elementary functions of ordering and describing.”53 Pornological language confronts language at its own limits, producing a non-language whereby violence does not speak and eroticism remains unspoken.54 It is with this in mind that The Politics of Conflict: Transubstantiatory Violence in Iraq takes the various novellas written by Leopold Sacher-Masoch, particularly his work Venus in Furs, and reads the text from the standpoint of its literary, historical, and political value, as opposed to the psychoanalytic approach that sees Masoch’s writing in terms of sexual perversion. As such, it is an interdisciplinary text that combines the disciplines of international relations, political theory, philosophy, psychoanalysis, history, and law in order to explore the presence and function of transubstantiatory violence.

L e o p o l d S a c h e r- M a s o c h : A Political and International Relations Theorist The three propositions on transubstantiatory violence abstracted from Masoch’s work suggest that he can be considered as a political theorist given that his work contributes to the study of both politics  and international relations. Masoch, however, is not a traditional political or international relations theorist; instead, Masoch’s name has been attributed to what we know today as “masochism.” Masochism was first considered as pathology when the term appeared in the work of Richard Krafft-Ebing in his study of sexual perversity Psychopathia Sexualis.55 It was later expanded upon by Sigmund Freud, notably in his work called “The Economic Problem of Masochism,” where he discusses three different types of masochism: erotogenic masochism, feminine masochism, and moral masochism.56 Freud paired the term “masochism” with that of “sadism” and generally considered them to be counterparts of one another, forming the entity we know today as “sado-masochism.” The clinical interpretation of the works of both Masoch and the Marquis de Sade that have arisen from the work of Krafft-Ebing and Freud has been widely used by thinkers in both the fields of psychoanalysis

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and politics in order to point out neurosis or to form a discourse about suffering. Until Deleuze’s influential essay Coldness and Cruelty, which argued that both the works of Masoch and de Sade belong to “different worlds” in terms of their political, literary, and psychoanalytic contributions, other research on Masoch’s work generally focused on the “masochism complex” or on his themes about Jewish life.57 Literary scholars such as John Noyes, Michael O’Pecko, and Kai Kauffmann58 have more recently shown that Masoch’s imagination allows for an enactment of gender reversals and sexual negotiations that allow Masoch and his readers to explore the boundaries of permissiveness within societal borders. Their work counters the more negative critiques of Masoch’s political agenda, such as that of Albrecht Koschorke who writes that Masoch’s determinism lies in the nihilism, asceticism, and renunciation of his protagonists, and who argues that this is ultimately an example of his depravity.59 Masoch was a historian who taught courses at the University of Graz for almost ten years before leaving to work on his literary career. In 1866, after the exclusion of Austria in the German Fed­ eration, Masoch became the editor of a literary periodical called ­Gartenlaube für Österreich (Austrian Arbor). The goal of the periodical was to promote Habsburg national self-sufficiency with simultaneous regional and journalistic reportage.60 The editorial program was described by Masoch as a mission to “rise above partisanship, to be just to all ethnicities … ”61 In effect, what is seen is that Masoch’s goal was to fight against the Prussian state, which he saw as militaristic, materialistic, and anti-Semitic in orientation. Literary Analysis; Political Implications Masoch belonged to an aristocratic family; however, his writing nevertheless addresses the human consequences of developing a human and regional area (in his case Galicia) that is structurally similar to the colonizing West.62 Masoch’s most famous work Venus in Furs is part of the unfinished series entitled The Heritage of Cain, which is comprised of six cycles of novellas dealing with the respective themes of love, property, money, the state, war, and death. Each cycle contains six novellas. The first five depict the issue itself and its many nuances; the sixth contains the response, solution, and reconciliation.63 Masoch has expressed that one of the main ideas of the novella

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cycle is to point out that the possibility of human happiness will only be attained when the moral social laws are given validity at the state level, which can only happen if there is equality between the “socalled ‘great princes,’ great generals, and great diplomats”64 and the “murderers, robbers, forgers, and swindlers,”65as exemplified by everyone being subject to the law. As Deleuze notes, Masoch is connected to political and national movements in central Europe, especially pan-Slavism. This link makes Masoch inseparable from the 1848 Austrian Revolutions.66 Central European ethnic ecumenism was central to Masoch’s political convictions. The result was that he believed that the various Eastern European peoples could preserve an equal political status under Habsburg rule.67 Masoch’s political position is not, however, without contradiction: after Austria was excluded from the German Federation in 1866, Masoch advocated Austrian nationalism and invoked metaphors about the fatherland and the need to move towards an all-inclusive Austrian patriotism, whilst at the same time criticizing the Germans for exhibiting German nationalism which he saw as chauvinistic. Masoch depicted Austria as a nation that was more than simply the sum of its ethnic groups within the monarchy. He describes Austria as follows: “[as] a political nationality, in which the natural nationalities could be united, each with the full recognition of its rights and freedoms.”68 Here Masoch amalgamates two entities: the consensus driven, civilized Austrian nation and the atavistic Slavic community.69 As such, Masoch envisioned the unification of multiple Eastern European ethnicities into one Habsburg nation while at the same time retaining the rights and freedoms of these ethnicities. This is where Masoch’s cosmopolitan outlook is derived. Masoch’s existential liminality is also seen in this outlook since he sees himself as an Austrian and at the same time as a citizen of the world. For Masoch, all aspects of public life need a general reconstitution of the exploitative social-Darwinist structure if the population is to pursue happiness. As such, his vision called for a pan-European democracy with unlimited equality for all citizens. Commenting on the meaning of the term “Heritage of Cain,” Deleuze points to the complex meaning of Masoch’s literary project: What is the meaning of the term “Heritage of Cain”? It is intended first to express the burden of crime and suffering inherited by humanity; however, this apparent cruelty conceals the

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more secret theme of the coldness of Nature, of the steppe, of the icy image of the stern Mother wherein Cain discovers his own destiny; the coldness of the stern mother is in reality a ­transmutation of cruelty from which the new man emerges.70 The concept of transmutation is central to Deleuze’s understanding of Masoch’s work and helps to point out the political implications of Masoch’s thinking. In terms of transmutation, Jones Irwin has characterized Masoch’s work as involving an assimilation of Christian conceptions of cruelty into a humanistic framework which affirms the ambiguities of the traditional reading of cruelty, but employs them to reach a more radical conclusion.71 In addition to this, Deleuze has noted that the sexual minorities Masoch imagines can be seen as referents to the national minorities of the Austrian Empire.72 By making these connections, Deleuze not only places Masoch’s work within the historiographic tradition, but he also draws our attention to the political aesthetic of the work. According to Deleuze, if phantasm is the object of Masoch’s narrative, then violence is its symptom.73 Deleuze’s analysis of Masoch’s writings opens an avenue for the three propositions on transubstantiatory violence to be made. This is because Masoch’s writings point to the problem of the aestheticization of violence. In short, Masoch is used as a political theorist because his thinking presents an alternative view of the nature of violence; he sees violence in terms of desire as opposed to protection or threat. As such, this provides a lens through which social complicity can be seen.

T owa r d s A N e w A e s t h e t i c V i o l e n c e : Iraq as a Site of Investigation The purpose of The Politics of Conflict: Transubstantiatory Violence in Iraq is to provide an analysis of the legitimization of violence through the problematization of the modern correlation of security, law, and the social contract. This is accomplished by using Masoch’s thinking to interrogate the violence that is integral to the working of the libidinal and gender economy of the social contract. Transubstantiatory violence is used as an analytic to show the way that violence leads to social complicity, which in turn works to legitimize otherwise illegitimate violence. This is done through an exploration of three key areas of sociopolitics – state-making and nation-­building,

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political movements, and the popular militia – which are read through different aspects of transubstantiatory violence. The second chapter, “Transubstantiatory Violence,” focuses on transubstantiatory violence as an ontological and originary violence and it provides the lens through which the analysis of Iraqi politics will be made in the remaining chapters. The chapter begins by noting that instrumental violence has been formulated as a violence of change and that this ignores the metaphysical aspect of formative/transformative violence, which is articulated by thinkers within the continental political thought tradition. Once this has been established, the chapter then looks at Masoch’s thinking in relation to Hegel’s “lordship and bondsman” that is seen in the Phenomenology of Spirit. This section aims to show that transubstantiatory violence is an ontological violence. The chapter then proceeds by noting that transubstantiatory violence is also an originary violence that is chthonic as opposed to Heraclitean. Starting with Heraclitus’ dictum that “war is the father of all” things, this section looks specifically at Derrida’s and Benjamin’s respective notions of originary violence for the purpose of showing that Masoch’s thinking on transubstantiatory violence demonstrates that violence produces an organic “presencing” that is linked to female procreation. This presencing is, however, in line with Derrida’s concept of the messianic, which makes the Ideal deferrable. The chapter then turns towards Masoch’s concept of the contract, which is initially juxtaposed to the social contract theory of Thomas Hobbes. As it will be seen, Masoch shows how it is that the authority of the social contract is usurped by law and thus leads to law’s mystification. Furthermore, Masoch offers us a way to demystify the contract through the use of provocation, which ultimately points to the chthonic side of the contract that guarantees violence. Overall, it will be seen that Masoch’s thinking is situated within the field of formation and intervention concerning the transformative character of violence. Here it is seen that violence is not only performative and/or instrumental; instead, it transforms the very conditions in which it first arises and to which it is instrumentally directed. This is expressed in the three propositions on transubstantiatory violence that arise through the analysis of Masoch’s thinking. The third chapter, “Hegemony and the State: Towards an Understanding of Social Complicity and Political Violence in Iraq,” aims to provide a genealogy of the notion of complicity, since complicity

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serves as the underlying problematic of the text. The chapter starts by noting the problem of complicity in regime violence through a brief discussion of the 1982 executions of the men and boys from Dujail, which were committed as a response to the failed assassination attempt of Saddam Hussein on his visit to Dujail. This discussion raises the issue of legitimate violence and this is then used as an  opening to discuss complicity. The chapter then looks at how complicity has been addressed within the political-legal framework at both the domestic and international levels. Through this, it is argued that two conceptual shifts within the political-legal framework have occurred with regards to the formulation of our understanding of complicity: 1  When complicity entered the discourse of international law in response to the Nuremberg Tribunals, complicity was ­re-conceptualized along the lines of responsibility for the atrocities committed. By moving away from the causal interpretation of complicity, states and individuals could now be held accountable for their role in violence committed against particular populations; 2  While remaining centered on causality, the interpretation of complicity at the domestic level was broadened to the point where any harm or potential harm committed, whether directly against the state or against an individual citizen, was reconfigured so that it could be seen as a threat to the governing authority. This enabled Saddam Hussein to rationalize the violence committed by the Ba’th party during the period that the party was in power. This broadening is seen specifically in the Dujail case where Saddam Hussein argued that those executed were killed for their complicity in the assassination attempt carried out against him. The chapter then turns towards highlighting a contradiction between domestic and international law that arises when complicitous behaviours legitimize regime violence. It will be suggested that in order to understand complicity within the juridical framework, one also needs to look at complicity as a way of setting the hegemonic framework in place and guaranteeing the violence that results. As such, complicity should be addressed as a mode of authorizing and legitimizing state violence.

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The third chapter concludes by linking the three analytical terms – chthonic security, transubstantiatory violence, and social complicity – together for the purpose of clarifying the relationship between them. In order to further develop an understanding of this relationship, subsequent chapters explore each proposition in the context of Iraqi psychosocial politics. It is here that the work begins to diverge given that the subject matter of each chapter is discontinuous – it provides mere snapshots of Iraqi historiography by focusing first on state formation, then on the Iraqi communist movement, and finally on Iraqi militia groups. Beginning with a look at Iraqi state formation, chapter 4, “Chthonic Constitutions: Violence and Iraqi State Formation” juxtaposes ­current US attempts at state building with British attempts in the 1920s. After noting the role of violence in state building and state formation, Iraq is read in the context of three models of state building – developmental, functional, and historical – which are discussed by Charles Tilly in his work, “Western State-Making and Theories of Political Transformation.”74 It will be seen that these models of state-formation generally approach violence in terms of means-ends or as part of the process of development related to modernity. Each model will be discussed in terms of the role of violence within state-making that each highlights it will also serve to provide some historical background to the development of the Iraqi state prior to the 1958 coup/revolution. In this respect, the historical analysis of Iraq will not provide a complete picture, nor will it attempt to provide a unilinear picture of Iraqi history; instead, the aim will be to provide episodes within Iraq’s complex history that can highlight aspects of the theoretical approaches to state-making that are being used. What will become apparent is that Iraq presents us with a case that does not fit neatly into the dominant understanding of colonial and postcolonial states. This is for a number of reasons, partly owing to developments in the international arena and the advent of the mandate system, and partly because of the rapid centralization of the state apparatus and the growing economic wealth resulting from the exploitation of oil resources. As such, it will be seen that stateformation in Iraq has followed what has been termed as a “primitive accumulation of power” which, although this power accumulation began for different reasons than that of European states, it nevertheless resembles this stage of state-formation. With this in mind, the

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role that violence has taken in Iraq can be seen as part of this power accumulation. Violence, however, also plays a role due to the insecurities that can be identified from the colonial and postcolonial experience. Mohammad Ayoob has written about Third World insecurity and the violence associated with state-formation.75 He offers us a dominant view of the role of violence in state-development in the context of the Third World, which provides a platform for at least noting the closer proximity that Iraq shares to European models of state-making despite the uniqueness of the Iraqi case. Given the context of regime change, the fourth chapter takes the 1958 coup/revolution as its focal point for discussing Iraqi stateformation along the lines of transubstantiatory violence, given that this point in Iraqi history signaled a fundamental change in the composition of the official state apparatus – Iraq moved from being a monarchical state to a republic. Here, the masochian proposition that “the creation of social meaning is itself violent and this violence is demonstrated by the chthonic side of the contract, which lays down a new law, but in doing so guarantees violence” will be used to assess the violence of the social contract. In order to do so, however, aspects of the developmental model will be borrowed; Iraqi history will be split into two periods: the period between 1925 and the coup/revolution of 1958 and the period between the coup/­ revolution and 1963. This will enable a reading to be made of a complex history, as well as enabling a reading to be made of the presence and role of violence in the state-making context through the use of one of the masochian propositions. If state-formation is one area where we see transubstantiatory violence emerge, then political movements present us with another area that can be read along transubstantiatory lines. The fifth chapter, “States of Tolerance: [Ideal]ology, Violence, and the Iraqi Communist Movement,” begins by noting the presence of opposition movements in Iraqi history, as well as the presence of the communist movement within that history. The discussion will then turn to the presence of  the Ideal in political philosophy, and the formalistic symbolic ­language tied to the attempt to achieve it. It will be seen that the attempt to achieve a political Ideal can be linked to the proposition that “violence is tolerated and sustained in order to pursue an Ideal that is constantly deferrable or impossible to reach.” The Iraqi communist movement will then be read through this proposition, beginning with an identification of the general Ideal state envisioned by

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this group. Here, it will be seen that the Ideal state was not fixed, but changed due to the internal and external pressures and changing situations that the Iraqi Communist Party (I CP ) had to face. In this respect, four tenets underpinning the movement will be assessed and it will be argued that despite the non-fixity of the Ideal, the Ideal state that the communist movement vied for was, a democraticsocialist one. Once this has been identified, the discussion will turn towards the ideological reshaping that the movement has undergone throughout its history, particularly with regards to the notions of revolutionary struggle and passive defense. From this point, the deferability of the Ideal will be looked at in order to identify transubstantiatory violence within the attempt to achieve a democratic-socialist state. Lacan’s notion of desire will be employed for the purpose of demonstrating that a sociopolitical Ideal is constantly deferrable and cannot be achieved.76 Desire, it will be argued, is necessary for agency; however, in trying to make the governing regime not only “see” the object of desire (the Ideal) of the party, but to desire it too, the communist party made concessions and reimagined the reality of Iraqi society. This was undertaken so that actions taken by the communist party would fit the image of a state which corresponded to the tenets underpinning the movement itself. Through the use of two examples, the “national question” and the agrarian problem, it will be seen that the decisions taken by the communist movement on these two questions/problems served to turn the movement around the Ideal instead of allowing them to actually reach it. It is with this in mind that the role of violence in the Iraqi communist movement’s attempt to reach the Ideal state will be discussed. Through the lens of transubstantiatory violence, it will be argued that violence, when it enters discourse as a psychological language, is symbolic of sociopolitical success. It will be seen that the remodeling of the experience of violence based on notions of omnipotence and immunity work so that violence becomes desirable since it ­suggests that the sociopolitical movement is moving closer to the desired Ideal. Furthermore, it will be seen that violence is anticipatory of change and as such it presents itself as a symptom of change. Drawing from both the notions of regime change and violence as indicative of socio-political success, chapter 6, “Transubstantiatory Violence and the Militia/Empire Problematic,” looks at the Iraqi militia problematic in terms of Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s

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concept of Empire.77 Beginning with a look at the Ba’thist regime in the context of chthonic security, it will be argued that the current violence being experienced within Iraq in the wake of regime change is a product of severing the ties that enabled the state to become subordinate to the Ba’thist regime. It will be seen that the proliferation of militia groups is the result of removing the security apparatus that had previously been in place prior to the US-led invasion. In this chapter, one finds the problem of violence situated within a global framework due to the initiation of regime change by an outside actor. It will be noted that the globalized world itself has induced a change in the nature of insurgency and warfare, in addition to a redefinition of the “militant.” It will be seen in this chapter that Hardt and Negri’s concept of Empire and its relationship to the multitude opens an avenue for understanding the relationship between the globalized world and the Iraqi insurgency; however, it will also be argued that their theory is unable to account for how it is that the power void that was c­ reated by forced regime change can be filled; this is due to the non-dialectical approach inherent in their work. Instead, it will be suggested that a reading of the figure of the Iraqi militant and their various groupings can be made through the masochian proposition that “the violence of creation leads to the violence of re-creation in a paradoxical attempt to secure or preserve the subject, whether the self is a corporate self or a human self.” In effect, this proposition will be used in order to think through the way that initiatory violence associated with militia groups in the context of insurgency attempts to either secure and/or preserve the subject, and/or a hegemonic positionality within Iraq. It will therefore be argued that Masoch’s dialectical spirit enables us to see how the attempt to negotiate the subject of the state leads to a preservation of chthonic security; this aspect of transubstantiatory violence demonstrates the social complicity inherent in maintaining the violence of the social contract. The work concludes by looking at the recent trials against Saddam Hussein, particularly the Dujail and Anfal trials. The trials themselves help elucidate the pathological broadening of state power over the population and highlight the necessity of inquiring into the ways that chthonic security informs the legitimacy of regime violence. Chapter 7, “Saddam in Furs: Social Complicity and Regime Violence,” begins by recounting the violence undertaken by the Ba’th regime against the citizens of Dujail and the Kurds in Northern

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Iraq. By assessing these trials through the three masochian propositions, it will be seen that regime violence is both aestheticized and rendered banal. In order to begin assessing the aestheticization and banalization of regime violence, the issue of complicity as it was presented in the Dujail trial will be discussed. Here, we will see that the charge of joint criminal enterprise liability fits within the rubric of accepted international law. The testimony of Awad al-Bandar, the former head of the Revolutionary Court, will serve to highlight the disjunction between the norms of international law and the broadening of the concept of complicity in Iraqi domestic law. The issue of social complicity in legitimizing regime violence will then be assessed by rereading the Dujail trial along transubstantiatory lines. By deviating away from the events of Dujail and looking at the Kurdish question, it is possible to see how it is that the events of Dujail are a product of the pathological broadening of state power, as well as part of a wider system of Ba’thist repression that is linked to chthonic security. The resulting belief in the omnipotence of the Ba’thists, and that of Saddam Hussein in particular, served to sanction regime violence. As such, the issue of sovereign immunity that was highlighted prior to and during the Dujail trail will be discussed in terms of its place in international law and Iraqi sovereignty given that it is here that one can begin to really see the presence of a tension between human rights, chthonic security, and legitimate violence. The execution of Saddam Hussein for the crimes committed in Dujail serves as a symbolic initiation of a new Iraqi state. It will however be suggested that the proliferation of violence undertaken by militia groups in the wake of regime change is indicative that chthonic security will nevertheless form part of the workings of the new Iraq despite efforts to remake the state in a liberal-democratic image.

Conclusion Each chapter is a whole in itself and part of a larger project, thus making the text both continuous and discontinuous. The chapters themselves read aspects of Iraqi politics through the analytic of transubstantiatory violence, which will be expanded upon in the next chapter. Taken together, the three propositions that structure the analytic of transubstantiatory violence form a larger picture of social complicity. Social complicity is initially problematized in chapter 3

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through an exploration of a disjunction between international and domestic laws on complicity. Following the second and third chapters, each subsequent chapter focuses on one of the propositions in order to think through the networks of social complicity that have manifested in Iraq. It is through this that this work problematizes the modern correlation of security, law, and the social contract.

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2 Transubstantiatory Violence War is the father of all things and king of all. Some he shows to be [g-ds] and others men; some he makes slaves and others free. Heraclitus, Fragment 53

Introduction Just as states and societies make war, violence and war are also important to state and societal development.1 Heraclitus saw violence in terms of the underlying belligerent nature of the universe, whereby symptoms of violence, like war, produce change. Change, however, is referred to as an end; violence, the means or instrument used to bring it about. Traditionally, violence has been expressed in  terms of an Aristotelian/Kantian means-ends model, whereby ‑violence is the instrument used to bring about a desired end. For instance, Carl von Clausewitz defined violence as the use of physical force and categorized it as a means to an end. In effect, he defined war as an instrumental concept given that it refers to “an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfill our will.”2 The means-ends categorization of violence that is seen in Clausewitz’s thinking on war was later reformulated by Hannah Arendt who saw violence as an instrument with power as its end. For Arendt, Clausewitz’s dictum “war is merely the continuation of policy [politics] by other means”3 had become inverted so that peace also became a continuation of war by other means. Through her critique of Clausewitz, Arendt highlights that war is a reflection of political activity, which results from equating power with coercion. Power was then defined by Arendt as a condition that enabled a group of individuals to think and act in terms of means and ends in which power itself is an end.4 In effect, Arendt argued that power and

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violence were non-dialectical and asymmetrical; instead, by categorizing violence and power in terms of a means-ends model, Arendt could define violence instrumentally. As an instrument, violence is then defined as a tool to multiply natural strength, which Arendt argued made it rational in nature.5 This assumes that the individual is a rational animal who has a choice either to use violence or to not use violence based on rational gain. This sets the stage for a consideration of the legitimate use of violence, which traditionally belongs to the state who decides when, where, and how violence is to be deployed. This is seen in the work of Max Weber who argued that the modern state is defined in terms of the means that are particular to it, especially the legitimate use of physical force.6 Here, the means of the state (violence) are ingrained in law whereby, according to Rudolf von Ihering, the source of law is a compromise based on purposes that are historically grounded. For Ihering, laws were written as ends to the interests they sought to accommodate. With the notion that coercion was indispensible to the achievement of the purposes of the association, the state could claim the right to use violence through necessity.7 This provided for the legitimization of the use of violence by the state and led Weber to later argue that the state is an entity that claims a “monopoly on the legitimate use of violence.”8 In effect, Weber argued that “the state’s absolute end is to safeguard (or to change) the external and internal distribution of power […] It is absolutely essential for every political association to appeal to the naked violence of coercive means in the face of outsiders as well as in the face of internal enemies.”9 This leads one to look at self-preservation as the rational for the use of violence by the state and links us to notions such as just war theory, which legitimizes war and the rules governing the use of force.10 The concept of the state as an entity that holds the monopoly on violence, which is directed by rational individuals who base their decisions on law, forms the assumption that enables violence to be deployed instrumentally; it also conceives of change in terms of power distribution. By articulating change as power distribution, traditional concepts of violence, such as those presented by Clausewitz, Arendt, and Weber, suggest that violence shapes the ends to which it is employed. This conception of violence, however, is unable to address the capacity of the subject to be constituted by violence and/or transformed by it, given that it assumes that violence is not integral to the subject itself.

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That violence is constitutive suggests that it exists on multiple levels and that its phenomenology shares an important relationship to metaphysics. Metaphysics, according to Deleuze, is a space open to the “new.” For Deleuze, the openness of structures suggests that creation and transformation are not only possible within metaphysics, but it is also possible to retrieve or reactivate avenues of thought that can be inserted into new contexts.11 With this said, the concept of transubstantiatory violence which is derived from Masoch’s thinking refers to the violence of change/in change and is expressed in terms of the initiatory and constructive moment of violence itself; this is ultimately expressed ontologically and is related to the chthonian through the adherence to Dionysian nature. Transubstantiatory violence provides an analytic of violence that adds to the thinking on violence as change that is seen in continental political philosophy. For instance, in his work Totality and Infinity, Emmanuel Levinas argued that war, which is a part of the human condition, is a form of annihilation which destroys not just the Other, but also Sameness, including the subjectivity of the Self who wages it. For Levinas, complete power over the other negates the other; this is like murder. The Self, however, is also negated in the sense that the Self is dependent on the Other. To this effect, the Self can only be grasped in transcendence to what is other than the Self. Without the relation outside of the Self, there is no Self. Violence is therefore seen by Levinas as the violent and permanent disruption of man’s relation to being.12 By viewing violence in this way, Levinas highlights ontological transformation that is both initiated by v­ iolence and constructed by violence. Like Levinas’ approach to violence, transubstantiatory violence is also ontological. Its transformatory character is derived, however, from Masoch’s reinterpretation of G.W.F. Hegel’s “lordship and bondsman” narrative. For Hegel, the dialectic of the master and slave made interpersonal violence explicit by demonstrating that individuals struggle for both recognition and the domination of others. By defining desire as self-consciousness, Hegel was able to situate his understanding of violence in terms of not only human conflict, but also within the notion of Being. The first part of this chapter will look at transubstantiatory violence in relation to Hegel’s “lordship and bondsman” in order to show that Masoch both draws upon and builds on Hegel’s thinking. Here, it will be seen that the transformatory character of violence is

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linked to the chthonian. As such, what will be seen is that transubstantiatory violence re-scripts Being and in doing so also provides a different approach to the concept of originary violence that is seen in the works of Heidegger, Derrida, and Benjamin. Here, it will be argued that by seeing transubstantiatory violence as chthonic as opposed to Heraclitean, Masoch is able to articulate violence as organic and messianic. As such, what will be suggested at the end of this chapter is that the analytic of transubstantiatory violence works through the propositions that: (1) Violence is tolerated and sustained in order to pursue an Ideal, which is either constantly deferrable or impossible to reach; and (2) the violence of creation leads to the violence of recreation in a paradoxical attempt to secure or preserve the self, whether the self is a corporate self or a human self. The second part of this chapter will argue that Masoch approaches originary violence from the standpoint of the contract. As such, it will be seen that Masoch’s approach to the social contract demonstrates a mystification of the foundation of law, which is also articulated by Derrida in “Force of Law.” It will also be seen that Masoch demystifies the law through the use of provocation; this, together with his articulation of the mystification of the law, then points to the chthonic side of the contract which ultimately guarantees violence. It will be seen in the conclusion that this will provide a third proposition on transubstantiatory violence. This third proposition suggests that the creation of social meaning is itself violent and that this is demonstrated by the chthonic side of the contract, which lays down a new law, but in doing so guarantees violence.

T r a n s u b s t a n t i a t o ry V i o l e n c e a s O n t o l o g i c a l a n d O r i g i n a ry Masoch’s thinking can be read as part of the thought tradition that sees violence as formative and transformative. The concept of transubstantiatory violence is particularly related to Hegel’s discourse on “Lordship and Bondsman” due to the focus on desire and selfconsciousness that informs Hegel’s ontology. In the Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel writes that self-knowledge occurs when the Self identifies an object as “other” in the course of desiring it. “Self-consciousness is Desire.”13 It is the act of distinguishing the Self from an object of desire that leads to self-­knowledge. In effect, Hegel looks at the object as something that one can consume;

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self-knowledge resides in the fact that the Self is permanent and objective. And, it is achieved by reflecting back on the Self in the process of consuming a desired other. The Self, however, is transient in that it is also consumed in the consummation of its desires through its identification of itself.14 In order to achieve a more stable identification of the Self, the self must confront another self-conscious. As such, individuals “recognize themselves as mutually recognizing one another.”15 When the Self presents itself to another Self it does so first in terms of a negation of its objective mode. This detaches the Self from the natural processes that sustain it, thus demonstrating that the Self can detach itself from natural desires and place its own life at risk. This, Hegel writes, is a display of freedom because it provides the truth of recognition as an independent self-consciousness given that the life-and-death struggle is a display of independence from both nature and the other Self. Here, each Self seeks the destruction of the other Self because the presence of the other is needed in order to display the lack of concern in the face of death, which marks the beginning of freedom. The dual imperatives of freedom and life are distributed between the two Selves. One Self retains independence and freedom, whilst the other Self is a dependent consciousness whose nature is to live or be for another.16 This is what sets up Hegel’s master/slave discourse. In “Lordship and Bondsman,” Hegel argues that the bondsman is both a self-conscious subject, but also a laboring object of the lord. This is the result of the different positions occupied by both the lord and bondsman with respect to bodily life. The lord, whose recognition as a free agent is dependent on being recognized by another, is left unsatisfied as a result of the bondsman’s slip from personhood through subjection. As such, the quality of recognition afforded to the lord by the bondsman is diminished. The bondsman thus becomes an instrumental body; this body provides the labour necessary for production of the material conditions required for the lord’s existence. In other words, the lord no longer needs to actively pursue objects that he desires given that the bondsman provides these objects for him. As Judith Butler writes, the lord postures as a disembodied desire for self-reflection who requires the subordination of the bondsman in the status of instrumental body.17 The lord is thus able to exist as a consumer of pure enjoyment whose object of dependence is now the bondsman instead of the external world. In effect, the lord is neither recognized in a way that allows him to

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achieve true self-consciousness or independence. Through this, Hegel argues that the Self is aware of its Selfhood as a distinct entity only through the eyes of another equal Self. The transformatory character seen in Hegel’s lord and bondsman is derived first through their positioning as lord and bondsman and then in the formative capacity of the labour engaged in by the bondsman. Desire is the transformation of the natural world, which is at the same time a transformation of the natural self into an embodied freedom.18 By becoming an instrument for the lord, the bondman ceases to consume the natural world; instead, he works on it, shapes it. Judith Butler writes that for Hegel, “Desire requires the transformation of the particularity of the natural world (the lived body as well as natural objects) into reflections of human activity; desire must become expressed through labour, for desire must give shape or form to the natural world in order to find itself reflected there.”19 The bondsman gains self-consciousness by recognizing his own formative capacity through the identification of his own mark in the artifacts that he makes. As such, Hegel writes that “[w]ork … is desire held in check, fleetingness staved off; in other words, work forms and shapes the thing.”20 The bondsman experiences freedom as he identifies the products of his labour as his own fashioning. The move towards self-consciousness by the bondsman is driven by the desire to overcome external differences; through this, the bondsman becomes “a self-sufficient subject for whom all things apparently different finally emerge as immanent features of the subject itself.”21 This represents the external determination of desire because desire gives way to creative work through the attempt to find satisfaction. As such, the Self is recognized not only in the form that the Self inhabits, but also for the forms that the Self creates. For Hegel, “self-­consciousness in general is Desire”22 and this is driven in the first instance by force, which prefigures consciousness. Hegel argued that force assumes the externality of the world of sensuous and perceptible reality that is related to consciousness. As such, it is essential to  the transformation of consciousness to self-consciousness. This becomes the basis of consciousness’ bond to the sensuous and perceptual world that the Self experiences externally and distinctly from itself.23 Self-consciousness emerges as a knowing that is in the mode of becoming through the attempt to explain what is known. By ­recognizing the authorship of explanation, the conscience becomes

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aware of itself for the first time; consciousness discovers reflexivity and becomes other to itself and knows itself as other. 24 Hegel’s influence on Masoch’s work is exemplified in the opening pages of Venus in Furs, where the masochist falls asleep reading Hegel.25 Masoch takes the Hegelian notion of Being and expands upon the relationship between desire and Being by addressing desire as violence and placing it within the realm of the chthonian. Where in Hegel force posits that the world of sensuousness and perceptible reality is external, in Masoch it assumes that this is derived internally. Masoch approaches the relationship between the Self and the external world through a disavowal of reality. Like Georges Bataille, Masoch views the real in terms of the objective world order, which is based on the world of things; however, this reality is a constructed one and is expressed in Masoch’s novellas as instances of folklore or national custom. The fantasy that is provided by disavowing the real forms the space where self-consciousness formulates the real and projects it as objective reality. For Masoch the purpose of taking reality and disavowing it is not to negate reality, destroy the world, nor to idealize it; instead, the disavowal works to suspend reality so that the Ideal can first be secured and then suspended in fantasy.26 Masoch accomplishes this by separating the Ideal from material reality in order to isolate it. The purpose of this is not only to highlight what the Ideal is, but to also suspend it so that the Ideal can be seen in terms of a totality. Once the Ideal has been relegated to the realm of fantasy, it is reunited with the real – a reality that is now founded upon the desire to reach the Ideal. It is in this space that Masoch then takes up Hegel’s discourse on the move from consciousness to self-consciousness. Like the lord and bondsman in Hegel, the masochian hero and his mistress are found to be similarly positioned. The positionality, however, is not derived from the life-and-death struggle Hegel articulates. Instead, Masoch begins from a gendered standpoint that already assumes that each Self has undergone the Hegelian move towards Selfconsciousness. In effect, he reverses the established relationship so that each consciousness is subject to a dialectical reversal and a painful decentering which is external. For Hegel, the bondsman takes the place of the lord by recognizing his own formative capacity, but once the lord is displaced, he becomes lord over himself, over his own body. In Masoch, dialectical reversal is initiated by the lord, not the

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bondsman. The lord, or masochian hero, points to the fashioning of self-consciousness that is first decided upon by the lord through desire for particular objects. The bondsman, as the lord’s instrument, then fashions through a different avenue to that of the lord. In shaping the natural world and recognizing his signature in the objects he fashions, the bondsman projects his self-consciousness onto the objective world. Transformation in Masoch’s thought is initiated by the Self in the bondsman’s position: the masochian hero takes the place of the bondsman for the purpose of employing both the lord’s ability to fashion as well as that of the bondsman; where the lord lacks signature, the bondsman provides it. Through gender reversal, the masochian hero and the heroine both end-up as bondsman in a relationship that is re-inserted into the real. The importance of Masoch’s gender reversal, however, is seen in the ontological change that comes from breaking the paternal law and culturally bound Apollonian mindset that is connected to the image of the father that governs the self/other relationship. Patriarchy transcends natural realities with man-made ones through the repression of sexual and emotional desires. As such, individuals dominate their own nature in order to conquer nature; this is accomplished by projecting a set of social meanings onto the body. Masoch disrupts this through gender reversal in order to invest the mother with paternal law, making her both stern and cruel. This revises the gendered version of nature so that the threat of cruelty, when placed on the mother, produces a different effect then when it is placed on the body of the father and is linked to his image. Linked to the father, paternal law prevents incest; when linked to the mother, incest is ensured. Freud wrote that the fear of castration acts as a threat that prevents incest; however, in Masoch’s thinking what we are presented with is an altogether different situation: the son’s castration represents the success of incest and incest in turn is assimilated into a second birth which releases us from the father’s role. The importance of this lies in the becoming that is made possible by rendering the body indeterminate. The chthonian plays an important role in this respect because it links us to the violence of becoming that is exemplified in Dionysian rites. For Deleuze, the Dionysian must exploit his will to nothingness. By exercising his power to destroy the Dionysian actively destroys himself and in the process of destroying whatever bound his power, he rediscovers an array of unfamiliar impulses.27 The

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“will to nothingness, when seized actively and applied creatively, might be transformed into its opposite – an energetic (re)affirmation of the will to power in its (uncivilized) vital essence.”28 This is expressed in Masoch’s thinking through the torture received by the masochian hero. The blows received by the masochist serve to expel the father from the symbolic order. The new man that is born does not appear like the father, nor does he take his place; instead it obliterates him and generates a new man. At the end of Venus in Furs, Masoch’s hero nevertheless takes the place of the heroine. This demonstrates that transformative violence is paradoxical because it can recreate the terms it was meant to change even with the generation of the new man. Through this, Masoch’s thinking takes a turn towards the concept of originary violence. Transubstantiatory violence, as a violence in and of change, is initiated as an originary violence that is defined as chthonian. Originary Violence as Chthonic Recall that Heraclitus’ dictum on war, which begins with “War is the father of all things,” suggested that the instrumental use of violence was directed towards change. In his essay “Heidegger’s Ear,” Derrida notes the significance of Heidegger’s analysis and brings the importance of Heidegger’s notion of “initiatory violence” to our attention. According to Derrida, Heidegger interprets Heraclites’ war as a struggle for things to present themselves – a power that brings to light and makes appear.29 For Heidegger, Being opens itself to the world, to the “there is” of presence. The relationship of Being to violence is that violence is foundational in the sense that it grounds or opens a space for ontic or physical violence itself.30 Derrida, however, sees initiatory violence as originary given that he conceptualizes it in terms of différance – as a relation that transcends ontology. In other words, it is in and through difference that “there is.” Originary violence can be defined as the originary violence of the system of differences and it can be considered in terms of what Derrida calls arché-writing. As Richard Beardsworth has explained, arché-writing is an originary structure of repetition, which constitutes the structure of the instituted trace and which realizes the foundation, exclusion, and contradiction of linguistics.31 Arché itself translates into “beginning” and “sovereignty.” This implies that arché-violence is

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the first form of violence and functions as a template for other forms of violence, and, it is also the violence of a sovereign who has the power to institute and define. Derrida’s notion of originary violence shares an affinity to that of Walter Benjamin. In “Critique of Violence,” Benjamin posits a typology of violence that sees violence as secular and theological, sanctioned and unsanctioned, as well as law-preserving and law-positing. In his re-thinking of instrumental violence as a means or implement to be used for political ends, Benjamin formulated a pure form of violence that was both expiatory and bloodless, and which ultimately fell outside of the realm of legal norms. This violence he called “divine violence,” which he juxtaposed to what he termed “mythical violence.” Mythical violence is law-establishing and is a violence that lingers within law itself “under the title of power.”32 This is produced through the violent circular movement of law itself: as a means, all violence is either law-establishing or law-enforcing. As such, conflict within the law cannot be resolved without violence given that they are both categories of means-ends. Even non-violent political consensus amounts to juridical decrees that Benjamin notes are violent in their establishment and enforcement. This led Benjamin to argue that legal positivism can no longer guarantee the legitimacy of the legal order. Instead, it attests to the discrepancy between legality and legitimacy that is typical of modernity.33 As such, Benjamin describes his non-instrumental mode of violence in terms of George Sorel’s proletarian strike, which exposes the violence embedded in political-legal institutions of the victors.34 The cycle of violence invoked and perpetuated by mythical violence can only be broken by a messianic force that is able to penetrate from the outside, thus bringing justice. This violence is what Benjamin has termed “divine violence.” Divine violence is divine end-making, which Benjamin argues is a force outside of law; its outside origin places it not only in a position to destroy law, but to also provide justice as its promise. It is divine violence alone that is sovereign in that it founds from the outside as a force exempted from law; it is an inaugural violence that finds its purpose by way of providing justice along with the end of the instrumentalism of the law. “Divine violence … is distinguished from state sovereignty as the exception which founds law, as well as from pure violence as anarchic explosion.”35

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Both Derrida and Benjamin see originary violence as messianic, which arises out of the nature of law and time. For instance, Derrida argues that every “present,” or “now” point, is always already compromised by a trace or a residue of a previous experience that prevents us from ever being in a self-contained “now” moment.36 Instead of emphasizing the presence of a subject to itself, Derrida employs a conception of time that emphasizes deferral. Derrida explains this as follows: “What is really going on in things, what is really happening, is always ‘to come.’ Every time you try to stabilize the meaning of a thing, try to fix it in its missionary position, the thing itself, if there is anything at all to it, slips away.”37 This suggests that the meaning of a particular object or word is never stable; it is always in the process of change. And, following this line of thought, presence-to-self or self-contained identity cannot exist for Derrida given that our temporal existence is a type of experience that eludes us. In effect, Derrida sees Being in terms of the messianic since experience is about waiting – experience is only when it is deferred.38 As such, Derrida sees originary violence as messianic, which he articulates as a structure of existence that is open to the coming of an ungraspable and unknown other. Derrida’s concept of originary violence is related to the Heraclitean fragment in the sense that différance opens the space for the trace to emerge and infuses it with determination through iterability. It is in iterability that the struggle to present is located. With Masoch, originary violence is chthonic rather than Heraclitean. Heraclitus masculinized originary violence by referring to it as the “father.” This immediately sets the emergence of presence in the direction of the Apollonian mind, which is artificial. In contrast to this the chthonian, which is seen as natural, belongs to the mother and woman; it is expressed as procreative femaleness. Here, originary violence takes on a more organic mode; the subject emerges, presents itself, but does so out of sync with the structures that bind it to already-present Being. Transubstantiatory violence draws on Derrida’s notion that originary violence is messianic by showing that violence is endured in order to reach an Ideal that is either deferrable or impossible to reach. As Deleuze has written, Masoch’s Ideal is Nature herself who oscillates between the extreme positions of the Grecian woman and the sadistic one.39 This oscillation ensures that the Ideal will not be reached and thus opens the masochian hero to a waiting that is

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akin to Derrida’s ungraspable other. This leads to the proposition that violence is tolerated and sustained in order to pursue an Ideal, which is either constantly deferrable or impossible to reach. Transubstantiatory violence, however, finds its formative capacity through a revision of nature and agency that is expressed in Masoch’s interpretation of the social contract and its subsequent mystification and demystification, as seen in his writing.

The Violence of the Social Contract The political economy of violence is initially seen through the notion of the social contract as a struggle to define. This places particular emphasis on the nature of nature and the nature of agency that social contract theory relies on. For instance, the social contract theories of Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau all take the state of nature as the starting point for understanding the social compact. Hobbes’ theory in particular expresses the nature of nature and the nature of agency that is seen within social contract theory. For Hobbes, prior to the creation of the commonwealth, individuals are in the state of nature whereby life is “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.”40 Hobbes argues that in the state of nature individuals, guided by appetite, try not only to control as many objects as possible, but they must also try to control as many persons as possible. “There is no way for any man to secure himself so reasonable as anticipation, that is, by force or wiles to master the persons of all men he can, so long till he see no other power great enough to endanger him. And this is no more than his own conservation requireth, and is generally allowed.”41 While this can be interpreted to mean control through brute force, Hobbes is also referring to the discursive struggle that decides the meaning and value of concepts. Hobbes believed that “to know truth, is the same thing as to remember that it was made by ourselves by the very usurpation of the words.”42 As such, Hobbes wrote that “connections between names and objects are not natural.”43 Instead, they are constructed based on individual desires, whereby ­individuals place labels pertaining to concepts in acts of creation.44 Accordingly, by their natures as creators of meaning whose “desire of power after power … ceaseth only in death,”45 individuals try to include others beneath their personhood in order to control these others and glorify themselves. The discursive struggle becomes a physical one in the attempt to eliminate the other as a meaning creator. This leads to

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a state of war due to the inability of individuals to know the meanings and intentions of others. In order to exit the state of nature, individuals entered into a social compact whereby they cede all authority and sovereignty to the Leviathan in exchange for security from each other and protection from foreign invaders. For Hobbes, the Leviathan is the sovereign who is defined as an absolute authority. As such, there are no reciprocal rights and duties with regards to the relationship between the Leviathan and the populace; instead, the populace has to obey the Leviathan until the sovereign is no longer performing their prescribed role. In effect, Hobbes ends up advocating a social compact that is based on a master/slave relationship that is founded on a wish for the sovereign to satisfy the needs of the populace. The main categories of the sovereign’s tasks are “to make and abrogate laws, to determine war and peace, [and] to know and judge of all controversies,”46 which makes the Leviathan the ultimate definer, thus enabling the commonwealth to avoid the definitional problems experienced in the state of nature. These meanings are usually created and promulgated by the Leviathan in the form of laws. In a similar manner to Hobbes, Masoch sees the contract as something that sets the terms for the existence of the social world – a social world derived through formalism. The role of formalism in Masoch’s thinking shows that the creation of social meaning is itself violent: the heroine must get her “sign” and protect the masochian world. Taken together with transubstantiatory violence as an ontological violence – which saw the generation of a new man – it can be proposed that the violence of creation leads to the violence of recreation in a paradoxical attempt to secure or preserve the self, whether the self is a corporate self or a human self. Unlike Hobbes, however, Masoch’s social contract is based on an actual contract in order to demonstrate the compact’s impulse to generate law. This changes the agency seen in the Hobbesian account where individuals give up their rights in order to enter the social contract and form the commonwealth. Instead, the masochian contract is based on ritual, which epitomizes the world of fantasy. This is seen in the agrarian rites that are rampant in Masoch’s stories. That the contract becomes ritual attests to the movement of binding words to meanings and then to actions since it is in this movement that we find the confirmation of the law being played out. Masoch aptly shows this to be the location where we find the mystification

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of the law – a mystification that depends on the complicity of masters and slaves by first being a delegated power and then moving into a usurped one. In effect, Masoch shows that the law comes to act on the contract itself and displays a force that is actually devoid of law, which is rationalized under the notion of protecting the masochian world. As such, Masoch demonstrates the process of how it is that the law comes to act on the contract in the name of protecting the “world.” The mystification of the law is seen in Derrida’s thinking. Derrida argued that the violence of the founding is located in law’s legitimization of itself and that this is only meaningful in the context of and presupposition of a system of laws. As suggested above in Hobbes, Derrida argues likewise that “a performative speech act can only be just when it is based on conventions and other performative acts, which means that it is inherently violent.”47 For Derrida, founding violence is made possible only by the autographic fiction of its origins. As such, Derrida saw the foundation of law in terms of a “mystical foundation,” which he characterizes as the silence in the violent structure of the founding act.48 Commenting on Benjamin’s law of  oscillation between law-positing and law-conserving violence, Derrida writes that law discovers the necessity for an originary repetition of power: “For here Benjamin to some extent recognizes this law of iterability that insures that the founding violence is constantly represented in a conservative violence that always repeats the tradition of its origin and that ultimately keeps nothing but the foundation destined from the start to be repeated, conserved, reinstituted.”49 As such, Derrida shows the founding act as problematic in the sense that through the genesis of positive law, the contractlaw relationship involves a mystification in which the origins of the law are forgotten. In his critique of the law, Masoch first points to this mystification by showing the process of invalidating the contract through the use of successive love contracts whose terms become increasingly strict in order for law to eventually supersede them. This demonstrates the disappearance of reciprocal rights and duties which characterize the initial contract. As such, there is a movement within the contract whereby the contract stipulates reciprocal rights and duties and then devolves into a law where the sovereign has rights but no duties and the subject has duties but no rights. This leads Deleuze to place enslavement as the object of the contract since the law results in our

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enslavement and points to a type of culturally bound relationship that is Apollonian and which ignores the chthonian side of the contract through its mystification. In effect, Deleuze has argued that imagining that the contract is at the origin of society means that the conditions of the contract are invalidated as soon as the law comes into being. This is because once it is established the law violates the contract since it can apply to third parties, it is valid for an indeterminate period, and it fails to recognize inalienable rights.50 Masoch demystifies the contract by acting out a provocation initiated through the scrupulous application of the law. The observance of the law serves as a refrain from questioning it – “we then behave as if the supreme sovereignty of the law conferred upon it the enjoyment of all those pleasures that it denied us; hence, by the closest adherence to it, and by zealously embracing it, we may hope to partake of its pleasures.”51 In effect, Masoch saw law as a punitive process, which he turns upside down by having the punishment inflicted upon himself; once the punishment has been given, he is allowed or  even commanded to partake in the pleasures that the law is ­supposed to forbid. Here, Masoch shows the law’s absurdity and provokes the very disorder that the law is intended to prevent. The  demystification of the contract-law relationship points to the chthonic side of the contract that guarantees violence in the process of laying down the law. As such, it can be proposed that the creation of social meaning is itself violent and this is demonstrated by the chthonic side of the contract, which lays down a new law, but in doing so guarantees violence.

Conclusion Defined instrumentally, violence finds its transformatory power by shaping the ends to which it is employed. And its legitimate use resides in the state, which is defined by its right to violence, a right that is premised on law. Violence, however, is formative and transformative in an ontological and originary sense as well. This is seen in continental political philosophy through the work of Hegel, Levinas, Heidegger, Deleuze, Derrida, and Benjamin, amongst others. This chapter sought to look at ontological and originary violence through the work of Leopold Sacher-Masoch, whose thinking pointed towards a formative and transformative violence that I have called “transubstantiatory violence.”

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Transubstantiatory violence differs from the traditional definition of instrumental violence in that it is chthonic rather than a tool that is employed to shape. This places transubstantiatory violence within the tradition of continental political thought as it both draws on aspects of that thought, as well as adds to it. As such, Masoch offers an interpretation of the nature of nature and the violence integral to  it by drawing first on the Hegel’s notion of consciousness and the  move from consciousness to self-consciousness that is seen in the  Phenomenology of Spirit. For Hegel, self-consciousness arose through the need to be recognized by another Self and the life-anddeath struggle that initiated independence. Following this, the two Selves occupied the respective positions of lord and bondsman, whereby the bondsman’s self-consciousness was derived from the recognition of his signature in the object he labored on. Masoch expands upon this through his use of gender reversal. By gendering the master/slave discourse seen in Hegel, Masoch is able to render both positionalities as bondsman first through a dialectical reversal and then by decentering them. This invokes ontological change, which is accomplished through the use of force. Recall that transformation for Hegel was driven by self-consciousness, which he saw as desire. This required the transformation of the natural world into reflections of human activity. Masoch draws on this, but approached it from the chthonian by addressing ontological change in terms of the Dionysian. Here, Masoch breaks with the already-present image of the Apollonian that Hegel assumes and sets his hero and heroine on the path of dominating their own nature in order to transform both themselves and external reality. By following the chthonian path, Masoch highlights that patriarchy transcends natural realities; he instigates the formation of a new man who is not only born of the mother alone, but who also breaks with paternal law and the image of the father attached to the Apollonian. Transubstantiatory violence follows the path set out by Masoch’s use of the chthonian and this places it as both ontological and ­originary. Following Heraclitus’ dictum on war, it was seen that Heidegger interpreted the dictum to mean a struggle for things to present, whereby Being opens itself to the “there is” of presence. Derrida, however, defined originary violence in terms of différance and in relation to what he called arché-writing, an originary structure of repetition. Derrida’s conceptualization of originary violence shared an affinity with that of Benjamin who saw originary violence

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as messianic and articulated it in terms of what he called divine violence. Derrida too saw originary violence as messianic, but for him it was articulated in terms of the coming of an ungraspable other. Transubstantiatory violence draws on Derrida’s understanding of the messianic; however, its originacy is chthonic, not Heraclitean. This sets it as something organic where the subject emerges out of sync with the structures binding it to already-present being. Masoch’s thinking was centered heavily on the notion of contract and as such, transubstantiatory violence must also be looked at from the standpoint of the contract. Starting with a look at Hobbes’ characterization of nature and agency with regards to the social compact, it was seen that Hobbes viewed human nature as being guided by the instinct of humans to satisfy their appetites. The individual in the state of nature engaged in a war of all against all with the underlying impetus being the satisfaction of needs. The individual in the state of nature also engaged in a discursive struggle that translated into a physical one, thus engendering the need for self-protection. Accordingly, in order to move out of the state of nature, individuals entered into a social compact and gave their right to violence to a sovereign, which Hobbes called the Leviathan. With the authority to create and enforce law, the Leviathan became the ultimate definer. Masoch saw the social compact as also setting the terms for the existence of the social world; however, unlike Hobbes he actually identified it as a contract. Through this, Masoch revises the nature of nature and the nature of agency seen in social contract theory like that of Hobbes by basing the social contract on ritual. This allows Masoch to demonstrate how it is that the social contract itself binds words to meanings and then to actions, which then confirm the law. It also shows that through the mystification of law, law comes to act on the contract itself, thus displaying a force that is devoid of law but is rationalized as a discourse of protection. The founding of the law is violent and this Derrida saw in terms of law’s legitimization of itself. This was tied to the fiction of its origins, which he characterized as a “mystical foundation.” As such, both Masoch and Derrida pointed out the mystification of the law whereby the origins of the law are forgotten. Masoch demonstrated law’s mystification by revealing that the terms of the contract become increasingly strict, which then enables the law to supersede it. Masoch is able to demystify the contract through the use of provocation. Here, the masochian hero applies the law rigorously, so that

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he can partake in the pleasures conferred upon it. By having punishment inflicted upon himself, the masochian hero is able to provoke the disorder that the law is meant to prevent. This de-mystificatory technique employed by Masoch enables one to see the chthonian side of the social contract and with it the guarantee of violence. From the standpoint of the social contract, transubstantiatory violence shows the dark side of the social contract which is bound to be abused and which renders social contract theory problematic. This chapter has looked at the concept of transubstantiatory ­violence in terms of its relationship to other theories of formative and transformative violence, particularly within continental political thought. Here it was seen that as a violence of formation and transformation, transubstantiatory violence transforms the Self as well as the conditions in which the Self arises. What can be abstracted from Masoch’s thinking are three general propositions on transubstantiatory violence that can be used analytically to assess what I have termed “social complicity” a concept that will be looked at in the next chapter. The three propositions are as follows and they will be used in chapters 4 to 6 in order to demonstrate the political aestheticization of violence in Iraq that incites social complicity: (1) the creation of social meaning is itself violent and this is demonstrated by the chthonic side of the contract, which lays down a new law, but in doing so guarantees violence; (2) violence is tolerated and sustained in order to pursue an Ideal, which is either constantly deferrable or impossible to reach; and (3) the violence of creation leads to the violence of recreation in a paradoxical attempt to secure or preserve the self, whether the self is a corporate self or a human self. The next chapter will look at complicity in its relationship to transubstantiatory violence and chthonic security in order to show that this relationship invokes social complicity. Here, it will be seen that social complicity drives the political economy of violence that has been played out in Iraq.

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3 Hegemony and the State: Towards an Understanding of Social Complicity and Political Violence in Iraq Introduction Discussions about the trial of Saddam Hussein for the execution of 148 Shia men and boys from the northern Iraqi town of Dujail in 1982 have prompted many questions about the role of violence in the Iraqi state. This was to be one of a series of trials against the former president for crimes against humanity and genocide,1 which would have raised questions not only about the culpability of those in governmental positions, but also about the legitimate use of violence by the state. The relationship between legitimate violence and crime has been raised primarily in the fields of genocide studies and human rights discourses.2 One of the important insights these literatures have raised surrounds the role of complicity in both the implicit and explicit authorization and/or sanctioning of violence in both the domestic and global contexts. While Christopher Kutz has defined the domain of complicity as comprising “those cultural and legal practices surrounding the relations of an agent to a harm that is mediated by other agents,”3 the concept itself has been discussed only tentatively by political and international relations scholars. When it has been discussed, complicity tends to be thought of in terms of Western complicities in that have taken place “elsewhere.”4 Given this, discussions about complicity committed either in or by Iraq has been geared towards particular considerations of spatial distance between an actor and a harm and/or knowledge and intent pertaining to the violence committed.5 What we find along these lines of thinking are considerations of aiding and abetting Iraq’s war with Iran, implicitly sanctioning the invasion of Kuwait, weapons

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sales and aid in the development of the chemical weapons used during both the Iran war and the Anfal campaign against the Kurds in the North, betrayals of the Shia and Kurdish uprisings by Western countries who had implied their support following the 1991 Gulf War, and economic sanctions which have drained the country of the basic resources needed to live. It is not difficult to make a case for why each of these examples would be constitutive of complicity and some authors have endeavored to argue for the importance of acknowledging them as such.6 While it is important to address instances of Western complicity, political violence in Iraq has been rendered banal through its constant use as a response to both internal and external threats to the state. Reasons like national security and self-preservation have been used as a rationale for state violence, however, the rationalization of  violence along these lines has done little to realize these goals. Instead, national security has become more and more of a myth in the contemporary world, particularly in light of threats (whether real or imagined) relating to things like terrorism, environmental assaults, such as the Southeast Asian Tsunami or Hurricane Katrina experienced by the inhabitants of New Orleans, or threats to health like the growing number of HI V patients in Africa. Given this, I want to suggest that in addition to looking at complicity within the juridical world, what also needs to be addressed is the role of complicit behaviours in constructing the rationale for the use of violence by the governing elite as a response to securitization. Complicit behaviours are defined as behaviours that aestheticize violence in such a way that, while they sanction the use of violence by the governing elite in particular ways, are not blameworthy in terms of the judicial understanding of complicity.7 These complicit behaviours are part of the social realm and, as such, I have termed this type of complicity “social complicity.” Social complicity is a product of transubstantiatory violence, which results from an aestheticization of violence that is driven by its chthonic foundations. In the previous chapter, transubstantiatory violence was presented as an ontological and originary violence, which was linked to the Dionysian. Here, we saw that Masoch’s thinking both builds upon and added to the literature on formative and transformative violence that is seen in continental political thought, particularly the thought of authors such as Hegel, Derrida, and Benjamin. Masoch’s thinking differed from these authors in that

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he approached transubstantiatory violence from the standpoint of the contract. This allowed Masoch to also provide the tools necessary to demonstrate both the mystification and demystification of the social contract. I now want to suggest that the three propositions on transubstantiatory violence point towards the aestheticization of  violence that then drives the impetus towards social complicity. Recall that the propositions on transubstantiatory violence were as follows: (1) the creation of social meaning is itself violent and this is demonstrated by the chthonic side of the contract, which lays down a new law, but in doing so guarantees violence; (2) violence is tolerated and sustained in order to pursue an Ideal, which is either constantly deferrable or impossible to reach, and; (3) the violence of creation leads to the violence of recreation in a paradoxical attempt to secure or preserve the self, whether the self is a corporate self or a human self. The aestheticization of violence is seen in how change itself enables violence to be endured. If one locates politics in the space between the representation and the represented, then there is always a possibility that the represented will evoke a different image to its representation.8 This opens the possibility for the new to emerge, in much the same way that Masoch’s indeterminate body does. This body was rendered indeterminate through the use of v­ iolence, which makes transubstantiatory violence into a political aestheticization of violence. Social complicity is a product of transubstantiatory violence that arises out of the political aestheticization of violence. As transubstantiatory violence functions, so does social complicity. In its sanctioning of violence to create the indeterminate body, social complicity raises the issue of legitimate and illegitimate violence. As it was seen in chapter 1, legitimate violence is based on assumptions of natural law and is considered to be a means to a just end. However, what is considered to be illegitimate violence is accepted through transubstantiatory violence since it promises that experienced violence will produce the “new.” Social complicity is thus separated from brute acquiescence on these same grounds. By sanctioning violence (whether considered legitimate or illegitimate), social complicity guarantees it. In chapter 1 it was argued that when normalized customs and regime violence fuse together, the violence that comes to underlie the functioning of the social body presences chthonic security. I now want to add that social complicity enables this fusion to take place through its mode of sanctioning violence.

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This has particular implications when one considers what this means in relation to Iraq. Before turning towards the discussion of social complicity that is seen in Iraq, the first part of the chapter will demonstrate two conceptual shifts that have occurred within the legal framework: namely, that as complicity entered the discourse of international law in res­ ponse to the Nuremberg Tribunals, complicity was re-conceptualized along the lines of responsibility for the atrocities committed. By moving away from the causal interpretation of complicity, states and individuals could now be held accountable for their role in violence committed against particular populations. Secondly, while remaining centred on causality, the interpretation of complicity at the domestic level was broadened to the point where any harm or potential harm committed, whether directly against the state or against an individual citizen, was reconfigured so that it could be seen as a threat to the governing authority.9 This enabled Saddam Hussein to rationalize the violence committed by the Ba’th party during the period that the party was in power. This broadening is seen specifically in the Dujail case where Saddam Hussein argued that those executed were killed for their complicity in the assassination attempt carried out against him.10 By looking at how it is that complicity is addressed in both these arenas, it will become evident that there is a contradiction between the way international law addresses complicity and the way in which it has been broadened and interpreted in Iraq under the rule of Saddam Hussein. This contradiction is located specifically in the way that complicity is interpreted in both of these realms and it highlights the difficulty of addressing violence that is undertaken by the governing elite as a result of legitimate violence being interpreted one way within international relations and in another way within the rubric of domestic politics. In order to develop an understanding of how it is that violence is legitimized in the domestic realm, one needs to look as how it is that social complicity works as a legitimizing force. As such, in the second part of this chapter I will argue that one needs to look beyond the political-legal framework in order to address complicity in terms of non-blameworthy complicit behaviours. Here, I will argue that at the outset, certain practices like the internalization of the norms and values of society for the purpose of navigating the pathways of everyday life, as well as the conditioning of the population in order

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to help perpetuate a moral story behind national security measures, confirm the hegemonic framework of the state. This enabled Saddam Hussein to use the state’s monopoly on violence to further the idea that the violence committed by the governing body was existentially motivated and was therefore committed with the intent to protect the state even if it was turned inwardly towards the state’s own population. While subsequent chapters will show how it is that transubstantiatory violence produced the social complicity necessary for sanctioning this violence, this section will demonstrate that it is the hegemonic framework that enables the necessary social climate to develop for the normalization of violence. It will therefore be seen that the hegemonic framework plays an important role in creating  the terms necessary for transubstantiatory violence and social complicity to function within Iraq.

L a w, C o m p l i c i t y, a n d V i o l e n c e : T wo C o n c e p t ua l S h i f t s 11 When we speak about complicity in the contemporary world, we usually address the concept in terms of the juridical understanding that developed out of Anglo-American law and European Continental law. Under these systems of law, complicity is generally conceptualized in terms of the role of an accomplice in aiding, abetting, or advising the principal perpetrator in an offence. These systems of law have retained the general definition of complicity and have both interpreted it in terms of deciding who can be an accomplice. The determination of who is an accomplice is not necessarily uniform across every country, but does retain the generic understanding that an accomplice can be “[persons], institutions, companies, or governments who knowingly or negligently assist individuals, organizations, or governments” in the commission of an offence.12 This way of addressing complicity has been articulated through the discourse of causality and intent, for which moral and ethical considerations relating to principles of individual difference, control, and autonomy play a role in judging whether or not an individual is culpable alongside the primary actor.13 The way in which complicity is defined in Iraqi law follows this model.14 The 1969 Iraqi Penal Code states, under the section on parties to a crime, that an accessory to an offence is: (1) “any person who incites another to commit an offence and that offence is committed on the basis of such incitement”; (2) “any

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person who conspires with others to commit an offence and  that offence is committed on the basis of such conspiracy”; and (3) “any person who knowingly supplies the principal to an offence with a weapon, instrument, or anything else to commit an offence or deliberately assists him in any other way to carry out those acts for which he has received assistance.”15 In order to determine culpability a differentiation between the accomplice and the principal perpetrator is made. The idea here is that the only difference between the perpetrator and the accomplice is the degree of causal contributions.16 This differentiation between primary perpetrators and accomplices is based on the assumption that while both of these actors make a difference to the outcome of the offence, the essential difference between them is located in the avenue through which that contribution occurs. For example, accomplices make their contribution through the principal actor by making a difference to the offence carried out by the principal.17 While this is how complicity is formally addressed in Anglo-American, European Continental law, and Iraqi domestic law, there have nevertheless been two fundamental conceptual shifts that have impacted the way in which complicity is currently addressed in international law and interpreted in domestic law. International Law: From Causality to Responsibility The first shift occurred at the time of the Nuremberg Tribunals in response to the atrocities committed by the Nazi regime. At this time, complicity began to be articulated in terms of responsibility instead of causality. The Charter of the International Military Tribunal indicates the crimes that are within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, which an individual can be deemed responsible. These include: (1) crimes against peace, such as “the planning, ­preparations, initiation or waging of a war of aggression, or a war in ­violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing”; (2) war crimes, such as “violations of the laws or customs of war”; and (3) crimes against humanity, such as “murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, before or during the war, or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the

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country where perpetrated.”18 What the Charter focuses on is responsibility for the three categories of crimes and the type of enterprises that one engages in or with that makes them a party to the offence. This focus has asserted individual responsibility; however, it also demonstrates a need to address “accountable actions.” There are two debates that when thought together are demonstrative of the shift from causality to responsibility. The first surrounds the nature of collectives. According to Lindsay Farmer, causation is  unable to deal with things like spontaneous participation in an offence or with the problem of treating the collective as one identity or legal personality. As such, broader concepts like responsibility and participation can allow for courts to deal more effectively with these difficulties. In conflict situations, prosecutions tend to help develop responsibility because they individualize the actors, thus making individuals responsible instead of groups. The Charter thus looks at an individual’s political responsibility, despite the presence of collective responsibility. This is important because of the mens rea requirement that is attached to the knowledge-based approach applied to such large-scale crimes as genocide and crimes against humanity.19 The second debate looks at the responsibility to intervene and stop genocide by the international community.20 It surrounds the notion of dolus eventualis21 and whether or not this is sufficient enough for one to be determined as an accomplice to genocide or whether positive knowledge of genocidal intent is absolutely necessary. For example, Harmen Van der Wiit asks “would the fact that an arms trader, selling weapons to a disreputable regime, is aware that his clients may develop a plan to annihilate a despised minority and may employ his merchandise to such a dreadful purpose, warrant branding him as an accomplice in genocide?”22 According to Van der Witt, this question is currently unsettled since some decisions have ruled out dolus eventualis whilst others have left room for the interpretation that “knowing” does not necessarily mean positive certainty but includes a degree of speculation. With these two debates in mind, we can see that the difficulty that international law is faced with surrounds the problem of dealing with collective offences and determining the culpability of actors who are involved in the offence due to a common purpose or joint enterprise that are relational with regards to the relationship between the accomplice and the primary perpetrator.23 This problem was highlighted due to a rethinking of the relationship between justice

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and war. Prior to the Nuremberg Tribunals, justice and war were thought of in terms of jus ad bellum – justice in war. This line of thinking looks at the laws of war and concerns whether or not war is conducted justly. In order to deal with the Holocaust carried out by the Nazi Regime, the Allies refocused their attention away from the principle jus ad bellum and looked towards the principle jus contra bellum – justice against war – for the purpose of bringing those responsible to justice.24 Despite critiques that the Nuremberg Tribunals were the diktat of the victors, they nevertheless opened a space for criminalizing harms carried out by the state25 through the condemnation of war crimes “wherever committed.”26 The result of this shift in international law was a broadening of the scope of accountability for violence committed by the state, particularly with regard to human rights violations which became a new category of international law with the inception of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948.27 This broadening called for the state/non-state divide to be bridged so that international law could be applied to legal persons, like non-profit organizations, corporations, and other groups. By bridging the state/non-state divide the scope of who can be tried under international law not only expanded, but there was also an attempt to address some of the difficulties that were encountered in the effort to deal with violence that takes place in the global arena. For example, the expectation that those with power, whether public or private, have the duty to react to human rights violations that fall within their sphere of influence could now be considered and addressed in terms of complicity.28 If we take a look at how this shift in international law affects Iraq, one can see certain trends develop. The first trend is to see complicity in terms of spatial distance. For instance, these would include historical abuses relating to colonization that have contemporary implications, such as the acts of violence that occurred when the British merged the three provinces of Mosul, Basra, and Baghdad in order to form the modern state of Iraq. When this occurred there were a number of uprisings and revolts against the British forces. These revolts were a product of religious dissent, socio-economic insecurity, and armed might, as well as the opportunity for some to   make a claim of their own in the emerging political order.29 While   the British were able to gain control and end the revolts, this  nevertheless cost a large number of lives and had the further

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repercussion of breeding resentment by the Shia and Kurdish minorities towards those who, despite their defeat, had benefited from the sacrifices they had made.30 This resentment based on problems of greed and the attempt to gain control of the state apparatus is demonstrated in part by the sectarian violence occurring today in the effort to reconstitute the Iraqi state. In this example, what we see is that at least one element of the violence taking place today is related to the creation of the state under the British Mandate, thus demonstrating a particular degree of distance versus a cause and effect. The second trend that emerges through the shift from causality to responsibility surrounds knowledge and intentionality. This trend developed in response to notions of command responsibility, the determination that participation in the global marketplace may result in harms being committed, and additionally, that attempts to secure the international system may result in certain violence taking place. For example, indifference and selective intervention (such as the international community turning a blind eye to the genocide of the Kurds) material contributions like financing and/or providing weapons materials, as well as economic sanctions can be included under determinations of knowledge and intent that fall under the rubric of this second trend. Discussions surrounding how the international community should act in light of violence carried out against the Kurds and Shiites following the uprisings in the weeks following the 1991 Gulf War are also demonstrative of this trend. In a speech delivered on 15 February 1991, President Bush said “there’s another way for the bloodshed to stop, and that is for the Iraqi people to take matters into their own hands to force Saddam Hussein the dictator to step aside and to comply with the United Nations resolutions and then rejoin the family of peace-loving nations.”31 This speech implied support for resistance movements within Iraq. Subsequently, the Kurds mounted a rebellion in the attempt to force a regime change. Western powers did not aid in this rebellion and the Kurdish rebellion was violently repressed by the Iraqi army. The international community only stepped in to help the Kurds on humanitarian grounds, and only then at the request of neighbouring countries like Turkey and Iran who were dealing with refugee flows into their respective states. The United States has refuted the charge of complicity by denying that they had any knowledge that their acts would lead the Kurds to rebel against the Hussein government.

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Whether or not this is the case, the debate about the complicity of the United States in the violence carried out against the Kurds c­ entres on their knowledge and intent regarding the rebellion. As Hiltermann has observed, while intent retains a central role in determining complicity, there should be a move away from this so that states cannot hide behind the need for “positive knowledge” or marketplace excuses. Instead, a turn towards seeing responsibility outside of its political consequences would place the onus on governments not to engage in those very actions that could possibly lead to genocides or other crimes against humanity. As such, what we see is that knowledge and intent retain a central role in determining whether or not an actor is responsible under the criteria used for determining ­complicity in the violence.32 Domestic Law: From Causality to Hegemony While the shift in international law enabled the state and its clients to come under the rule of law, the thinking in Anglo-American domestic law about complicity has broadened in an altogether different way. In Anglo-American domestic law, complicity is almost always articulated in causal terms and is addressed under the rubric of accomplice liability.33 Whether one looks at individual or collective acts, any harm committed is linked back to the statute that makes it an offence in the first place. For instance, crimes like sex with a minor, robbery, and murder, while they are crimes carried out by individuals against one another or against the other’s property, they are nevertheless violations of the state since they breach the laws that were set in place to protect the social body. As such, any breach of law becomes a crime against the state since it calls into question the authority of the governing body.34 Important to the discussion on complicity is Gabriel Hallevy’s definition of the different types of victims.35 Hallevy notes that there are three types of victims in modern criminal law: (1) the public; (2)  the injured person; and (3) the victim-in-law. When the victim is the public, the accuser in the criminal proceedings represents the public interests and the injured interests. The first to be injured by the perpetration of the offence is the public. In modern legal systems, the public can also be addressed as being synonymous with the state. Given this, it can be held that while the individual can waive his own interests, he or she cannot waive those of the state.36 In this case, public order and interest are the major considerations in criminal

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proceedings against the defendant instead of the specific situation of the person who is injured as a result of the offence. The second type of victim, the injured person, is defined as someone who is injured physically, mentally, financially, or in any other way as a direct or indirect result of the commission of an offence. While this victim is usually the direct victim of an offence, Hallevy points out that the public interest is also damaged. For example, a deceived person might be damaged financially and as such is the direct victim, but the family is also damaged financially if the person participates in the family’s daily livelihood. The public interest is thus damaged due to a loss of financial confidence. In the proceedings for this type of offence, the offence to public interest is further highlighted by the role of the victim in the proceedings. Here, the victim becomes a witness and shares no other role in the proceedings. According to Hallevy, modern law sees the victim as an inci­ dental person against which the specific offence was committed. Given this, the basic reason for the criminal proceedings against the ­defendant is “the public interest through future and past.”37 The third type of victim is the victim-in-law. This has been seen as paternalistic from the viewpoint of modern legislators. While the victim-in-law has the status of “victim,” they are not necessarily physically, mentally, or financially injured by the offence. The law protects this type of victim even though he or she did not ask for this protection. As such, the offence is also an offence to the law that is in place to protect the social body and thus becomes an offence against the public interest. What Hallevy’s discussion shows is that no matter how the victim is characterized, offences are always offences to the public interest. Since this interest is tied to the state in modern criminal law, offences to the public interest are therefore also offences against the state. While much has been done to think through the role and nature of accomplice liability, complicity in harms committed by the governing body have not yet been fully addressed by political or legal scholars. One might think back to Hobbes’ account of the Leviathan38 in order to see the link between complicit acts and accountability for these acts and why complicity tends not to be addressed when it comes to violence committed by the governing body in the name of security. The Hobbesian narrative tells the story of how accountability for harms undertaken by the state lies not with the state itself, but with its citizens. Hobbes argued that life in the state of nature would

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compel individuals, through an act of compact, to establish a civil state that is headed by a sovereign, which he called the Leviathan. The Leviathan was given the absolute monopoly over the means of coercion – or power – in order to ensure that individuals would be protected against other members of society and against the threat of outside invasion. Hobbes saw consent to the sovereign as recognition of the need for social order and peace, which corresponded to the obligation of the social body to obey the Leviathan. On the premise of Hobbes’ argument, the sovereign could not commit a harm against the population because each member of a commonwealth must authorize “all the actions and judgments” of the representative and sovereign agent “in the same manner, as if they were his own” and authorize them in advance.39 Following from this is the assertion that every particular man is the author of all the things the sovereign does and that as a consequence every complaint made against the sovereign is actually a complaint against the self since it is the self who authors all of the sovereign’s acts. As such, nothing that the sovereign does to a subject can be called an injustice or an injury.40 This is precisely the type of narrative that Saddam Hussein employed when he discussed the violence carried out against the Kurds and stated that the violence was necessary for the purpose of national security. Throughout Iraqi history, the Kurds generally saw themselves as a separate people with their own culture and language and the rights to their own state. As such, they vied for autonomy from Iraq.41 Between 1986 and 1989, there were a series of attacks carried out against them, often with the use of chemical weapons. The campaign, which was called Al-Anfal, was undertaken by the Iraqi regime for the reason of putting an end to the rebellion and attempted secession, as well as the creation of an independent Kurdistan. In addition to this, the attacks carried out during the Iran–Iraq War were said to be a response to the aid that the Kurdish rebels were giving to Iran and thus the actions carried out against them were also considered to be legitimate responses to securing the state. The Hobbesian account demonstrates how it is that accountability for harm is removed from the state itself and the governing body; however, it also points to the problem of harm against the state since violations of the law are configured as threats against the state itself. By addressing complicity through a Hobbesian narrative, complicity in harm against the state could be extended to the participation in

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acts that would harm the regime or create an existential threat to the authority of the government. By extending complicity in this way, collective acts such as rebellion, conspiracy to overthrow the government, or even discussions that run counter to the ideology of the regime would become criminal acts.42 This move is made explicit in the second part of the 1969 Iraqi Penal Code where it states that offences such as acts that may violate the independence of the country, offences against the internal security of the state – for instance the incitement of armed rebellion, civil war, or sectarian violence – and offences to the constitution of the state like murdering or attempting to murder the president, are all crimes against the public welfare.43 By including these acts and others as crimes against the public welfare, one can immediately see that dissent against the regime in power is interpreted as a threat to the state and subsequently a threat to the population. Furthermore, the narrative of “threat” and “danger” has been something that governments have come to exploit in order to create the type of social climate necessary to justify and legitimize government action.44

Social Complicity: Iraqi Beginnings While the political-legal understanding of complicity is thought of in terms of causality or responsibility, in order to understand how it is that violence is guaranteed, one must begin to think of complicity in a very different manner altogether. As suggested at the beginning of this chapter, complicity is not necessarily criminal or blameworthy; instead, there are complicit behaviours that construct the hegemonic framework through which the right to violence is legitimized. The hegemonic framework is built upon concepts such as ideologically wrought consent, co-optation, as well as the normalization of practices that construct and then stabilize the status quo. These behaviours work to create and stabilize the power structure necessary to sanction the use of violence. This presents the way in which violence comes to underlie the state and sets the social climate in which transubstantiatory violence and social complicity function. While hegemony is generally understood as an attempt by political elites to generalize their interests in the population at large, the creation of hegemony involves not only the effort to elicit the consent of subaltern groups through the encouragement to internalize the ruling elite’s norms and values, but also the generation of a set

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of  foundational myths that define and institutionalize a particular nationalist imagery.45 The Ba’th Party, which gained control in Iraq for a second time in 1967,46 was particularly adept at utilizing the hegemonic framework to their advantage. Through the promotion of a particular image of Iraq, Saddam Hussein was able to forge a link between hegemony and the very existence of the state in order to justify the security apparatus that he put in place. The complicit behaviours working to frame this particular vision of Iraq became the basis of consent for the violence that was carried out. Iraq’s particular brand of hegemony has been seen historically in the development of the state machinery and the almost exclusive privileging of the Sunni majority in that machinery. According to the official historiography, the foundation for the current framework of the state was set in place at the time when the British established Iraq under a League of Nations mandate in the 1920s. In an effort to shape the new state, British officials needed subjects to constitute an order that they felt would be appropriate for the mandate and the protection of British interests. According to Charles Tripp, these subjects were sometimes invented by encouraging particular individuals and groups to emerge as their chief interlocutors in shaping Iraqi politics.47 By choosing those who the British believed to be suitable enough to carry out their particular vision of the Iraqi state, they were able to assimilate particular subjects into the power structure that they had set in place. As such, the British privileged two types of Iraqis: the ex-Ottoman officials who were mostly, but not exclusively Sunni, and the tribal sheiks who resembled the local nobles that the British had seen elsewhere.48 In order to ensure the compliance of these individuals, the British, in the case of the tribal sheiks, promised to give the sheiks territory over which they could govern. This was particularly desirable given that society was being increasingly defined in terms of property ownership. Likewise, the promise of a central place in the power structure of the new state was used to ensure the support of the ex-Ottoman administrative elites. This initial formation of the state set the framework in place for the Sunni minority to position itself as the ruling elite within the official state apparatus.49 Integral to setting the hegemonic framework in place is the internalization of the elite’s norms and values. In order to help internalize the elite’s norms and values, a set of foundational myths are generated for the purpose of defining and institutionalizing a particular

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nationalist imagery. The move made by the Ba’th party towards building the state in a particular way was instrumental in forging the image of Iraq as being modern and secular in nature. This is seen in the way that the Ba’th regime used cultural policy in order to create a national-territorial consciousness that rested on the particular history of Iraq that lent credence to Ba’thist ideology. For example, the Ba’th party focused historical memory on the ’Abbasid Empire (750–1258 C E ) in order to suggest parallels between past greatness and the greatness of Iraq under Ba’th rule. This was seen in the official drive to foster archaeological research and to make the Iraqi people aware of the importance and relevance of the country’s ancient history, including the pre-Islamic era. Coupled with this was the reintroduction of ceremonies, names, and symbols that dated back to the Islamic and the Pre-Islamic Mesopotamia into the administrative, political, and cultural life of modern Iraq. The Ba’th regime encouraged the cultivation of local folklore for the dual purpose of inspiring various communities with a sense of internal Iraqi unity, as well as, for the purpose of emphasizing Iraq’s uniqueness among the nations of the world.50 By participating in these activities, Saddam Hussein was able to instill a sense of general will into the Iraqi population that allowed him to carry out functions in the name of Iraq.51 This “general will” is seen in the confirmation practices undertaken by others who were not part of the governing elite. For instance, the elite’s inner circle and the party’s mass base depend on the way intellectuals conceive of the past as a way of providing indirect cues about how the contemporary world should be viewed. As such, the acceptance of the narratives and values promoted by Ba’thist ideology by intellectuals constituted symbolic support for the Ba’thist world view. Conversely, subaltern groups were also implicated in Ba’thist ideology, although in a different way to that of intellectuals. State-sponsored understandings of the past informed Iraqis outside of central power how it was they needed to conceptualize Iraqi history and cultural heritage in order to navigate the pathways of everyday life. For example, when non-elite members of society sought privileges such as positions in the state bureaucracy, public entitlements, or state contracts, they often attempted to accept certain memories of the state at least partially as a means to gain favour with the bureaucrats and powerful political actors. As such, they might study political messages in order to learn what not to say

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in order to avoid antagonizing those who controlled the state. What these examples show is that the governing elite is able to elicit consent from the populace through the use of historical memory that at its very least demonstrates symbolic support for Ba’thist ideology.52 One might also look at the creation of the army as a way of producing a particular type of citizen. This was expressed by General Ranton in a memorandum to the Iraqi Minister of Defense entitled “Memorandum on the Future Organization and Training of the Army when the British Advisory Military Mission is Withdrawn.” In the conclusion to this memorandum, General Ranton stated: “I would urge most strongly that the Educational and Vocational Training Schemes, which I have so often recommended, be put into force. The Army should be the University of the Nation and any man who has served in it should come out [as] a better citizen and fit to take his place in whatever trade he chooses in Civilian life.”53 As Khaled Salih notes, the reference to the army as a “University of the Nation” suggests that the military should function as an institution that prepares individuals for future roles within the state. It does this by offering courses, training, and fitness, thus producing better citizens by giving soldiers the training required for their chosen profession once they’ve left the army. Salih furthermore notes that this reorganization was a major part of the process of nation-building.54 Nation-building in this sense entails a certain molding that relates to the creation of disciplined and obedient soldiers in order to have an efficient force. This is carried out through exercise, training, and drill. In addition to this, the army must also be “uniform.” The use of military uniforms acted as a way of homogenizing the soldiers. This, in combination with the requirement for discipline and drill lent to a certain standardization that was to help soldiers play a constitutive role in civilian life once they left the army. This would also help develop a sense of political community out of an otherwise heterogeneous group that could be used to form desired character, a spirit of citizenship, a sense of duty, self-sacrifice, patriotism, and a spirit of nationalism. As such, the military was like a social school. This could then be used in order to justify the use of force in internal matters since the military would have also developed a sense of country and nation. While the above examples only give a brief and tentative demonstration of complicit behaviours that serve to construct the hegemonic framework of the state, the importance of them is the resulting

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entrenchment and normalization of the status quo. The confirmation of the status quo that results is then used by the governing elites as further confirmation of their place within the state. Given the idea that the state holds the monopoly on the legitimate use of violence, this confirmation is then used as an authorization for the governing elite to use the means of violence in order to protect the state. While complicit behaviours became a mode of survival for the majority of the population, they are not particularly criminal or blameworthy. Instead, these behaviours fit into a discourse of compliance, which is  the very discourse that signals consent to the official state. This makes it so that self-protection paradoxically leads to oppression. Given this observation one can also see that the danger of expanding complicity is found in the lack of limits to government power that it invokes. This is especially the case when one considers Walter Benjamin’s observation that law sees violence in the hands of individuals as a danger that can undermine the legal system.55 The defense’s opening statement in the Dujail trial regarding the charges against Awwad al-Bandar, the Chief Judge of Saddam’s Revolutionary Court exemplifies this: “If the defendant is to be found guilty, certain implications must arise. A judge does not make the law. He carries out the laws of his country, be it a democracy or a dictatorship. The statement “my country, right or wrong” was expressed by a great American patriot. It is no less true for a German patriot. Should the defendant have carried out the laws of his country? Or should he have refused to carry them out and become a traitor?”56 The defense argued that according to the case file that al-Bandar had seen when the trial took place, the defendants from Dujail had confessed to their part in the failed assassination.57 In addition to this, the case file had contained documents that established the defendants’ affiliation with the Iran-allied Al-Da’wah Party. Given this, the defense in the Dujail case argued that Saddam Hussein’s and al-Bandar’s justifications (whether right or wrong) for their response and handling of the assassination attempt that took place in Dujail in 1982 fell within the rubric of Iraqi domestic law. By executing the men and boys of Dujail, the Iraqi government demonstrated a right over life and death, which it was able to use as a legal act that served as a reaffirmation of the law and subsequently of the governing body that decrees the law. The arguments surrounding the legitimacy of the response to the attempted assassination of Saddam Hussein in Dujail have been carried out along these lines and serve as a practical

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demonstration of the pathological broadening of the power of the state over the population within.

Conclusion The turn in international law towards bringing the state under the law by including the governing body as an actor that can be held responsible or accountable for crimes is at odds with the broadening of complicity in domestic law to include any participation in a perceived threat against the state. The Nuremberg Tribunals prompted thinkers and jurists in international law to start addressing those acts that contribute to violence being carried out against particular populations. The result was that a new category of crimes was created: crimes against humanity and genocide. The broadened scope of accountability effected a change in the way complicity was addressed. Instead of seeing complicity in causal terms, complicity was now thought of in terms of responsibility vis-à-vis the harm committed. This way of thinking about complicity has called into question the way in which knowledge and intent is viewed with regards to not only the outcome of violence, but also the prevention of violence. The turn towards responsibilization in international law has caused many to rethink the terms governing the legitimacy of violence. The use of the means of violence in international law is very specific – if the state is threatened, it is allowed to respond using only the force necessary to secure itself. Richard J. Goldstone has noted that prior to the Nuremberg Tribunals, [the] manner in which governments treated their own people was their “internal affair” and was not the business or legitimate ­concern of other governments or of international organizations. Individuals had no standing in international law – such rights inhered solely in governments. And, apart from piracy, criminal justice was strictly a territorial matter: domestic authorities could prosecute only crimes that were committed within the ­geographical jurisdiction of their courts.58 While the Nuremberg Tribunals may have changed this, the way that complicity has been interpreted in Iraqi domestic law demonstrates that the use of violence to protect the state is still seen in

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many cases as a legitimate response to dealing with perceived threats and challenges to the governing authorities. In the Dujail case, complicity in harm against the state was used as a justification for the need to use violence in order to protect the state. Using the same logic as that governing the use of force in international relations, what we find is that by addressing complicity in domestic law in terms of an existential threat the Iraqi government has been able to manipulate the rhetoric of threat to national security as a way of justifying the violence carried out against its own population. By justifying violence in this way, violence comes to be viewed as legitimate by the governing party, especially if the acts they are responding to are breaches of domestic law. This poses a difficulty for addressing acts of violence carried out in times of internal conflicts, particularly when those acts become breaches of international law. This is because on the one hand the governing body, through the creation of a particular image and constitution of the state, is able to claim that state sovereignty allows them the right to deal with internal affairs in their own way. In this case, Iraqi leaders have accepted the composition of the state (although some would also include Kuwait within Iraqi borders) and have worked to maintain this. The Kurdish question, for example, has threatened the vision of Iraqi society through the attempt to create an independent Kurdistan. The use of violence against the Kurds has always been justified as a necessary means to secure Iraqi borders even though it has led to genocide and crimes against humanity. In addition to this, Iraq has used institutions like the army to form citizens who are more likely to believe in the moral story relating to the violence employed due to the installation of a sense of nationalism and uniformity that serves as a melting pot to create a particular type of citizen. As such, the Iraqi government has claimed legitimacy for its actions against its own population in the name of protecting a particular vision of the Iraqi state, which is at odds with an international law that sees this type of violence as a crime against humanity. The observation of the disjunction between international law and domestic law serves to highlight the necessity of addressing the role of social complicity in the legitimization of state violence. The hegemonic framework plays a role in setting the stage for transubstantiatory violence and social complicity to function. In effect, power relations are legitimized through co-optation, the recognition and tacit acceptance of hegemonic positionalities, desiring practices, and

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habituation. This all leads to the social climate necessary for the normalization of violence. At the outset of this chapter, it was noted that the three propositions of transubstantiatory violence point towards an aestheticization of violence that in turn drives social complicity. The next three chapters, beginning with “Chthonic Constitutions: Violence and Iraqi State Formation,” will assess transubstantiatory violence in terms of each respective proposition. This will demonstrate that social complicity, as a product of transubstantiatory violence, arises out of the political aestheticization of violence.

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4 Chthonic Constitutions: Violence and Iraqi State-Formation

Introduction Since the invasion of Iraq and the ousting of Saddam Hussein as President of the Republic, many have turned their attention to the question of regime change and what the new state will look like once the current violence is under control. That Iraq owes its existence to both a legacy of imperialism and to the recognition of self-­ determination is something that scholars have been trying to come to terms with since its very creation as a modern nation-state. The state was initially constructed by the British, who had decided to fuse together the three Ottoman provinces of Mosul, Baghdad, and Basra according to their interests in the region.1 The interests expressed by the British included the need to control the Mosul oil fields for the purpose of providing oil to the Royal Navy, the SykesPicot agreement regarding the control of territories, particularly Baghdad, economic wealth mainly relating to oil monies, and geopolitical positioning.2 In the course of pursuing its objectives, Britain attempted to rule the people of Iraq through the means of a centralized administration. Thus, the main concern when it came to statebuilding was the creation and maintenance of public institutions. As such, the British envisioned a state that looked and operated much like Britain herself. This image was one of a constitutional monarchy with a system of government that included a written constitution, bicameral legislature, and complete democratic rights. In addition to this, the administration was not only created by the British, but was also staffed by non-Iraqis. The result was that as the state emerged, it began to look like a modern bureaucratic state with a civil society

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that consisted of “cleavages of pre-modern socio-economic and political formation: tribal chieftains of various power bases, notables, wealthy merchants, a hierarchy of semi-feudal lords, peasants, tradesmen, and most importantly, a powerful religious hierarchy.”3 It also reinforced an ethnic divide whereby the Sunni Arab minority dominated Iraq’s Shiite and Kurdish majority populations. Although Iraq was recognized in 1932 as a sovereign independent state by the League of Nations, the establishment of national independence is not the only criteria of state-formation: “it is also an internal process which created a high degree of internal cohesions within a particular political fabric.”4 Given that Iraq has a heterogeneous population, the question of legitimacy for the nation-state was also closely connected to the state’s ability to manufacture a national identity that could be accepted by the various groups within the overall population.5 This lent to an attempt at nation-building, which had been disassociated from British attempts at state-­building. By the 1930s, the legitimacy of the nation-state became dependent on mobilizing and organizing various social forces either in the form of a loyalty to the monarchy or to a territorially based national identity.6 By the time of the 1958 revolution, the state was seen as constituting a single entity and polity that was expressed in terms of “the Iraqi people,” “the national armed forces,” and “the beloved homeland.” 7 Despite this attempt, throughout Iraq’s short history the identity of the Iraqi nation has been split between an Iraqi nationalist identity and a pan-Arab one. This is partly due to the disjunction that was created between British attempts at state-building and those of nation-building mainly carried out later on by Iraqi groups and politicians. In a critique of US state-building strategy in Iraq, Toby Dodge has argued that the US is likely to repeat the mistakes made by the British.8 One of the prominent arguments behind US involvement in Iraq does in fact echo the argument about “enlightened self-interest” derived following the First World War. This argument highlights that the state who is engaging in nation-building (especially if one can build a state and clothe it as a liberal democracy) will be more secure. This is because a stable state can contribute to a reduction of security threats towards the state that is engaging in nation-building. It has been further argued that this then contributes to the development and enhancement of international stability.9 The expected result of regime change has been the recreation of Iraq in the image

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of a liberal democracy. The spiral of violence seen to date has, however, run counter to what one would have thought would result from holding elections and transferring sovereignty to the Iraqi people. Instead, following along the lines of Charles Tripp’s argument, what we have seen is a struggle for power that is taking place behind the  official state, in the realm of what he has aptly termed the “shadow state.” This struggle surrounds a bid for control of the central state apparatus and involves the types of networks of privilege and patronage that were encouraged by the British at the inception of the state.10 That events in Iraq are moving against the tide of what is expected signals a need to reconsider the place of violence in state-formation. In their attempt to develop an understanding of state-formation, state-making, and nation-building, scholars have tried to place violence within the framework of the approach they are using despite violence not knowing its proper time or place.11 The first part of this chapter will look specifically at how it is that violence is placed within theories of state-formation. Charles Tilly has looked at stateformation in early modern Europe in order to abstract the main theories pertaining to the development of the modern nation-state. As such, he has suggested three interlinked approaches that he calls developmental, functional, and historical approaches. These theories about state-formation, while acknowledging the role of violence in state-making and nation-building, have not sufficiently addressed violence as a part of the social contract itself. Instead, when analyzing state formation, thinkers tend to address the emergence and transformation of national states – while acknowledging this as being a violent process itself – as something that will ultimately lead to a check on violence once a more stable political order has emerged.12 Although Iraq would not generally be considered within the group of states to which these approaches would normally apply, it is also a state that does not fit easily into the dominant understanding of colonial and postcolonial state-formation. This is due in part to developments that were taking place in the international arena, particularly regarding the advent of the mandate system, as well as the rapid centralization of the state apparatus and the growing economic wealth resulting from the exploitation of oil resources. Instead, one might think of Iraq as following along the lines of what has been called a primitive accumulation of power that, although this power accumulation began in Iraq for different

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reasons than it did in European states, nevertheless resembles the European experience. As such, the role of violence in Iraq can be seen as part of this stage of state-formation, which places it in some ways closer to trends in European state-formation than to colonial and post­colonial experiences. Although any discourse on state-formation is bound to be complex, the first part of this chapter not only provides an example of where violence shows its face within each of the three approaches to state-formation articulated by Tilly, but also provides part of the picture of the history of Iraq prior to the 1958 coup/revolution. The period of Iraqi history beginning with the 1958 coup/revolution and ending with the fall of General Qasim is viewed from a masochian perspective in order to see the way that violence underpins the social contract. As such, the second section of the chapter is a masochian reading of Iraqi state-formation. Whether one argues that the state is a necessary requirement for the protection and/or expression of the nation, or whether one argues that nation-building is necessary to maintain and expand the power of the regime,13 a masochian reading will attempt to understand violence as part of constitutional praxis. As such, the proposition, which states that “the creation of social meaning is itself violent and this is demonstrated by the chthonic side of the contract, which lays down a new law, but in doing so guarantees violence,” will be drawn upon in order to do this. By doing a masochian reading we can see a new face of violence that appears even though the terms of the new social contract tell us that violence will cease as a result of the rights and freedoms ensured in the contract itself. An analysis of the Qasim regime will thus provide us with a period of Iraqi history which will allow us to see the violence that results from an increase in the strictness of the contract and which is then guaranteed by the newly formed constitution.

Theories of State-Formation: The Iraqi State Prior to the 1958 Coup/Revolution The European experience of state-making suggests that transformations of the state were by-products of the consolidation of central control. As Charles Tilly argues, this experience does not provide a picture of modernizing elites articulating the demands and needs of

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the masses; instead, he describes it as a world where power-hungry men fought off their rivals as well as any popular resistance in the pursuit of their own ends. This, Tilly says, inadvertently promoted the formation of national states and popular involvement in the state.14 In the case of states like Iraq that owe their existence to the imperialist legacy, priority was given by state elites to the primitive accumulation of power in the hands of the state over the creation of a popular consensus about the content and parameters of nationalism within heterogeneous and fragmented societies.15 State-building strategies were couched in the language of nation-building so that state-making became justified along the lines of a “national consciousness.” Of important note is the observation that European state-makers constructed and then imposed strong national governments prior to the beginning of mass politics; in new states, these two processes have tended to occur together.16 Keeping this in mind, while the European experience has led scholars to identifying different phases of state-making, colonialism has introduced hegemonic ethnic policies into new states instead of accommodative ones.17 The role of violence in these states has been characterized as one ­resulting from an instability that engenders insecurity.18 Ayoob has identified the roots of insecurity in new states as the following: unconditional legitimacy of borders, institutions, regimes; inadequate social cohesion, and; the absence of societal consensus on fundamental issues of social, economic, and political organization. As such, violence occurs as the state-making strategies that are adopted by elites “broaden and deepen the reach of the state clash with the interests of counter elites and segments of the population that perceive the extension of state authority as posing a direct danger to their social, economic, or political interests.”19 While Ayoob sees these as roots of insecurity arising during the early stages of state-building at the time when state makers try and impose order, monopolize the instruments of v­ iolence, and demand exclusive loyalties of their populations, he also believes that given adequate time the conflicts arising from these insecurities can be overcome peacefully through prolonged negotiations.20 The observations offered by Ayoob follow the predominant idea that once new states develop a capacity to check the violence and instability inherent in socioeconomic modernization, then the centralized state would have enough control over power resources, which would enable the state to enforce order. As noted previously, the struggles in Iraq follow along the lines of European state-formation in the

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period of what has been called the “primitive central state power accumulation.”21 As Cohen and Brown argue, the political violence in new states is a function of the conflicts that are inherent in the process of primitive central power accumulation. They define state-making as a historical process that is characterized by the creation of political order at a new spatial and institutional level, which involves the redistribution of the political control of power resources away from subnational collectivities and polities and towards the central state apparatus. As such, political violence indicates a movement towards the creation of order versus indicating a type of political decay that is associated with “failed states.”22 Theories about the formation of the nation state, while acknowledging the role of violence in state-making and nation-building, have not sufficiently addressed violence as a side of the social contract. Instead, when analyzing state formation thinkers tend to do so through developmental, functional, or historical theories in which state-making is associated with the emergence and transformation of nation states. Although being a violent process itself, it is argued that the emergence and transformation of nation states leads to a check on ­violence once a stabler political order has emerged.23 A Developmental Approach to State-Making in Iraq In their endeavour to think through state-making in Iraq, developmental theorists have focused their attention on socio-economic modernization and its effects on the way in which Iraqi society has developed both internally and in relation to the global political marketplace. Charles Tilly has pointed out that developmental approaches tend to use a standard process of political transformation “to which all social units of some type-societies, regions, nations, or something else – are subject as a consequence of forces which are internal to those units.”24 This is usually employed for the purpose of examining the economic development of a state with regards to the relationship of this development to the process of political organization. Consequently, this approach assumes a standard path to social development, which is exemplified in the recourse to stages or sequences of development.25 While Tilly acknowledges that most ­accounts of national formation exhibit a “streak of developmentalism,” the terms “political modernization” and “political development” have come to designate those accounts that exhibit a standard path and internal logic to state-formation than do others.26

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Those who follow a developmental approach to the understanding of state-formation have often placed violence as part of the transitions, crises, and/or challenges that are faced by political units undergoing development. The result is that violence shows its face in these narratives as a part of economic modernization, whether it be through the exploitation of workers, the uneven evolution of the economic system and its effect on the populace, or through class antagonisms. Charles Tilly has often argued that war-making and state-making parallel each other – as techniques and instruments of warfare advance, so does the development of the social body. This makes it so that when we read about the state from this perspective on state-formation, we are often reading about the social and political progresses that have come about through things like war, revolutions, and workers strikes. From the developmental approach, Iraqi state-formation does indeed follow stages or sequences of development that have transformed the social body in many ways. An example would be the various revolts/popular uprisings and revolutions that have been instrumental in shaping the state. Following this line, one would first look at the British occupation as the first stage in the sequence. Charles Tripp has noted that demonstrations in Baghdad that were carried out in opposition to the British occupation were met by force by the British. By August 1920, these demonstrations were impossible to carry out due to the imposing presence of the British security forces and intelligence services; however, those outside of Baghdad were able to organize themselves for a rebellion. By May 1921, the sheiks of some of the major tribes of the mid-Euphrates had discussed such a rebellion and their reasons for carrying it out (which were varied). At the end of June 1921, an armed revolt broke out following the arrest of Ayatollah al-Shirazi’s son and the subsequent arrests of tribal sheiks due to the fatwa that had been issued by alShizari, which had encouraged armed revolt. Instead of numbing the revolt, the arrests actually created a spark whose ensuing fire spread to other districts. For example, since the rebels were able to gain control of the mid-Euphrates, tribes in the lower Euphrates and Kurdish leaders in southern Kurdistan made a move to gain control of those areas from the British. This revolt was suppressed through the use of superior military power, although it cost the lives of many Iraqi, British, and Indian soldiers. Tripp notes that although the Iraqis were not successful in ousting the British, one of the most

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important results of this conflict was that it became part of the founding myth of Iraqi nationalism.27 The next rallying point for the nation came after they gained independence from the British in 1932 when the government turned to attacking minority groups as scapegoats for the difficulties experienced by the Iraqi people. In 1933, the Assyrians carried out an uprising against the government. Under British control, the Assyrians were employed as British-protected levies who were used to suppress nationalist uprisings. According to Simons, this group had incurred the hatred of nationalist forces due to their involvement with the British. In retaliation to the uprising, the government slaughtered 400 Assyrians in their villages. The assault had been orchestrated by General Bakr Sidqi, who was able to use the massacre to gain political standing. It has been argued “[the] army’s massacre of the helpless villagers enhanced its public image and brought fame and promotion to the commanders of the expedition.”28 The political significance was seen in, for example, the move to introduce military conscription, which was something previously opposed. The result was that by the eve of Iraq’s first military coup, the strength of the army had risen from 12,000 in 1933 to approximately 20,000 troops by 1936. The Assyrian massacre had the second effect of placing the military in a position to intervene directly in politics. On 29 October 1956, General Sidqi led a coup against the Iraqi government. He installed a civilian administration headed by Hikmat Suleiman, which was forced to resign due to conflicts between them that had led to a series of strikes around the state. As such, Sidqi became the only commander in the state until he was assassinated by some of his fellow officers.29 The sequence continues with the 1948 revolt. This revolt has been described by Samira Haj as “the culmination of almost a decade of turbulent urban social protest that was nationalistic in sentiment and reformist in disposition.”30 In 1944, the government of Hamadi al-Pachachi attempted to appease workers by implementing “liberal reforms”; however, Haj has noted that some of these reforms were simply put in place for the purpose of undermining Nuri al-Said’s position within the power structure.31 Instead of ending the demonstrations, the reforms encouraged them. The protesters included workers in the railways, the port of Basra, the utilities, and the oil  industry. For example, in the case of the oil workers demands included higher wages and the right to a union, which had been

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denied to them by the British who controlled the company. Events that took place in 1946, surrounding the oil workers’ strike in Kirkuk, were said to be leading factors in the 1948 revolt. Here, the Iraqi Petroleum Company refused to negotiate with the strikers and called in the government to intervene and help break up the strike. One of the major events that led to the 1948 revolt has been described as follows: “On the tenth day [of the strike], while the strikers were holding a public meeting, the riot police charged into their meeting, killing six workers and wounding fourteen. The first of its kind, this incident provoked public outrage, as it was seen as representing the government’s deep commitment to the British and their willingness to sacrifice Iraqi people for the protection of British interests.”32 In 1948, the government signed the Portsmouth treaty that, in many ways, renewed the 1930 treaty between the two. This instigated a three-day strike and massive demonstrations in Baghdad. Popular reaction caused the Regent to disown the treaty and forced Prime Minister Salih Jabr to resign and flee the state. The regent called on Muhhammad al-Sadr to form a new government; however, although his government took measures to appease the populace, social unrest continued. The communist party was a major driving force behind the demonstrations and given previous experiences the government, which was facing an election at the time, opted to withdraw earlier liberal policies and apply martial law. It has been argued that at the time of the elections, the government interfered in the electoral process, thus preventing the opposition party from participating freely. Sadr’s government resigned shortly after the election and was replaced by al-Pachachi. Soon after, alPachachi’s government relinquished power and was replaced by Nuri al-Said. This new government went a step further and took much harsher repressive measures against the opposition parties, particularly the communists.33 The 1948 revolt was followed by what has been called the 1952 intifada. This has been characterized as a new wave of social unrest that culminated in a general strike across industries that was called by the central union in 1952. Here, the opposition parties forwarded a petition to the Regent demanding political freedoms such as free elections and democratic and civil rights. Upon receiving no reply from the Regent regarding their petition, they organized a protest that was joined by workers, street vendors, and students. The government employed force to put down this demonstration and

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declared martial law. A new military government was instated under the army Chief of Staff, Nur al-Din Mahmud. Soon after, Mahmud al-Din dissolved the political parties and imprisoned their leaders. Again, instead of stifling social unrest, these policies provoked the masses. On 24 November, demonstrations and riots were carried out in – although not limited to – major urban centres, particularly in Baghdad and the holy city of Najaf. The government responded to this by calling in the army and opening fire on the demonstrators. Armed rebellion and more strikes followed in 1953. These disturbances forced more changes in the government and by 1954, alJamali’s government was replaced for that of Irshad al-Umari’s, who was seen as being sympathetic to the British. The British suggested that al-’Umari introduce new political and economic reforms in order to ease pressure on the regime. New elections were called and held in June 1954. Like the ones before, these elections were interfered with through falsification of votes and intimidation by government officials. With Nuri al-Said back in as Prime Minister, from 1954 to 1958 Iraq saw a period of extreme repression whereby the freedoms gained in 1953 were cancelled.34 Following this was the signing of the Baghdad Pact and the 1956 uprising. The Baghdad Pact was a response of Western governments and their allies in the region to the threat of nationalist movements and the increase in Soviet influence in the region. The Baghdad Pact was generally seen by Iraqis as a way for the government to pander to British interests and thus it was largely opposed. For this reason, in addition to the tripartite attack on Egypt and other grievances against the government, the Iraqis decided to mount a mass uprising. Like with the previous demonstrations, the government used force to put down the rebels. The significance of this at the time was that it signalled to the opposition parties that they would need to combine forces if they truly wanted to force a change in the way that politics was conducted.35 The National Front, comprising mainly the communists, National Democratic Party (N D P ), and the Ba’th was created in order to present a stronger front against the government. This helped pave the way to the 1958 coup/revolution. In order to demonstrate a way in which the developmental approach follows sequences and/or stages of development, what I have attempted to do is present a narrative that tells the story of Iraqi political development that has run alongside both the social conflicts surrounding modernization in the state and the attempt to

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rid the state of British influence. The main focus, however, has been the placement of violence. As such, each stage represented a point where there was a social and political crisis that forced some changes to be made. What can be inferred from looking at Iraqi state-­ building in this way is that it followed a cyclical pattern, whereby demonstrations and uprisings forced periods of repression to be followed by periods of liberation, and then back again. Violence was identified as a way of uniting the state at first (through the revolt against the British and then the Assyrian massacre) and prompting the population to build a national identity. Once this had largely been achieved (perhaps with the exception of the Kurdish population), violence was used to suppress any popular unrest that had been expressed through demonstrations and uprisings pertaining to social and e­ conomic developments. A Functional Approach to State-Making in Iraq Functional approaches to state-making are similar to developmental approaches, however, instead of focusing on sequences or stages as the developmental approach does, these theories look towards other elements that must be present if the state is to exist at all. As Tilly makes clear, many developmental theories themselves should actually be considered as functional since they focus on those elements needed for the state to exist instead of the processes that are seen to produce it.36 According to Morton Fried, the state “is a collection of specialized institutions and agencies, some formal and others informal, that maintains an order of stratification.”37 For Fried, the point of concentration is the basic principle of organization relating to hierarchy, the degree of access to basic resources, obedience to officials, and defense. As such, the state can defend itself both internally and externally by defending itself both ideologically and physically, as well as by creating an identity for itself. Tilly notes that Fried’s work highlights two things that developmentalist approaches normally glaze over: the close tie between stratification and the means of various forms of coercion – all part of the internal form of domination. Within the functional approach, what we see is violence being used as a means to organize the social body and as an institutionalized resource to secure the state both internally and externally. The functional approach to state-making leaves open a number of avenues one could follow to tell the story of Iraqi state-formation.

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Khalid Salih has noted the way in which the formation of the Iraqi army interacts with the attempt to create the nation. Law and the military construct national identity because they “come to constitute and produce the subjects and the categories they seek to discipline and/or repress. Moreover, the strategies through which these subjects are produced generate a range of processes outside the realm of the military and the law, which they carry their production to the realm of national culture.”38 As noted in chapter 3, Salih has used the metaphor that the army represented, at least on a symbolic level, “the University of the Nation.” The main idea was that “the army should function as an institution that prepares its members for future roles in a wider society.”39 They attempted to achieve this by providing courses, training, fitness, and goals for them to work towards. By offering the soldiers these opportunities, it was though that once the soldier left the army, they would not only be in a better position to take up a civilian profession, but they would also demonstrate a higher standard of efficiency and performance in their particular role.40 This was therefore geared towards the idea of the soldier playing a constructive role in society later. In addition to this, an army that was efficient and politically reliable could develop a sense of duty and self-sacrifice that served to make individuals feel the presence of the country and ultimately the nation. This served the nation-building project by infusing a nationalist feeling that discounted the heterogeneity of the nation, and at the same time instilled a sense of loyalty to the state and particularly to the monarchy. The importance of this is found in the ability of the regime to use the army to maintain Iraq’s territorial integrity. While Iraq was attempting to define the state itself, whether along pan-Arab or nationalist lines, one thing remained certain: the state that had been created, despite the artificiality of its borders, would not be broken by secessionist forces. At this time, the main threat to Iraq’s territorial integrity came from the Kurds. When the Ottoman Empire collapsed, the Kurds had initially been promised by Britain that they would be granted territory to build their own Kurdish state. Due to British interests in the area and Turkish concerns over the threat of a neighbouring Kurdistan, the promised territory never materialized. In addition to the desire for autonomy, the lack of economic modernization was a major concern of the rebels. The government at this time had no real economic policy in place to deal with the grievances

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expressed.41 Over the course of the monarchical era, there were ­several revolts and uprisings, some of which were led by Mustafa Barzani: (Batatu lists twenty-two, of which twelve were in localized Kurdish areas) that the government put down. As a method of providing legitimacy for government action against the Kurds, Barzani was characterized by the Iraqi government as a terrorist who acted like an independent ruler by intervening in inter-tribal disputes and government administrations, maintaining his own militia, disturbing government attempts to construct the needed infrastructure that the area needed, etc. The image of Barzani that was propagated to the rest of the social body made him out as a threat to Iraqi sovereignty, particularly the sovereignty of the government which was central to the creation of the nation state. The Barzani rebellion was thus a challenge to the authority of the government and subsequently to a new state that “was determined to establish within its territory, be it in the capital, major cities or remote areas traditionally not controlled by the central government.”42 Any challenge to the authority of the government was thus seen as “an attempt to resist the general process of penetrating, policing, supervising and instructing the population in a given manner.”43 This became a way of imposing modern order on society, which assumed the “submission to and control from the capital, with the ultimate goal of creating a new kind of society made of the ‘Iraqi people,’ based upon a new category of identity called ‘Iraqi identity/nationality.’”44 Although not all government officials preferred to use a military solution to the Barzani revolt, the military was nevertheless called upon to bring the revolt under control. The reasons given primarily surrounded the security, stability, and unity of the state in the face of the threat being mounted by Barzani and his rebel militia. Like the Assyrian revolt, which served as a rallying point for the nation, the suppression of the Kurds also served as a way for the state to create a nation. It should be noted that until the war against Israel in 1948, the Iraqi army was solely used as a way to ensure internal security. What Salih presents us with is a picture of the way in which violence intersected with the attempt to create a nation through the preservation of the state by using a particular state institution, the army. The violence seen in the functional approach to state-­formation can thus be seen in terms of the attempt to consolidate power in the central state apparatus through the fashioning of “desirable” c­ itizens and the instilment of a particular type of nationalism.

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A Historical Approach to State-Making in Iraq As opposed to developmental and functional theories of state-­ making, historical theories account for particular characteristics of any government as a result of its individual relationship to historical transformation that affects the world in its entirety.45 Within the historical approach to state-formation, scholars have tended to connect structures of power and control amongst states to their counterparts within states. Violence finds its place within the historical approach as a function of the struggle ensuing from various trends in the international arena. Rosneau and Krippendorff, for instance, argue that governments respond to outside pressures and opportunities that are created by the international structure of power.46 By responding to these pressures and opportunities, governments shape the relationship between themselves and those under its jurisdiction.47 One might take the example of the struggle to define Iraq as a case in point. Taken within the wider debate surrounding pan-Arabism that was taking place in neighbouring states at the time, Malik Mufti has characterized the debate over pan-Arab unionism in Iraq as relating more to internal struggles and transnational penetration versus the argument that it is more closely related to imbalances of power.48 Mufti argues that unity projects represented by such alliances as the United Arab Republic and the Arab Union are best understood not as alliances between states, but more so as elite alignments that cut across state boundaries. In a passage discussing the violence experienced in both Iraq and Syria, Mufti highlights that as their monarchies collapsed, both states “fell prey to praetorianism” which he defines as an “extended period of violent and nonstop jockeying for power by coalitions of civilians and soldiers.” He contends that this resulted from the absence of effective political institutions, which were able to mediate, refine, and moderate the political actions of the various groups within.49 Accordingly, Mufti explains that state-building was placed on hold whilst each faction in power tried to remain in power and thus avoid another coup. This suggests that violence finds its place in the attempt to centralize power in the state apparatus and  then consolidate it around a particular political party, leader, or faction. A historical approach to state-formation could also include a consideration of the relationship of Iraq to issues of economic ­

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dependency and the exploitation between developing states and developed ones. As such, state-formation would look at how the experience of specific areas sits within the larger international processes that help to create that experience.50 As Tilly notes, within the literatures of dependency and underdevelopment, the state can be seen as an instrument of the national oligarchy whose position depends on controlling local land and capital. This ability to control land and capital is reinforced by the state’s repressive apparatus, but within the limits set by outside powers.51 Important to this is the recognition of the international structure of power and how it is that this structure affects the form, change, and variation in the national economic lives of developing countries and the importance of this to state-making. It also recognizes that the class structure of particular states depends upon the relationship between each major class and the international organization of production and distribution, which in turn also affects the state’s form of government. Charles Tripp has note that Iraq owes its existence to the legacy of imperialism, as well as, to the recognition of the principle of selfdetermination.52 In this vein, Toby Dodge has argued that Iraqi state-formation was subjected to the mandate system that developed as a result to the changing nature of international politics at the end of World War I. Dodge’s account traces the constraints to British policy resulting from the mandate system itself and the idea that imperialism’s empire-building and policies of annexation were no longer acceptable.53 As such, the various stages of state-building in Iraq were a product of changes in British policy resulting in Britain’s attempt to meet international commitments under the Mandate ­system, to pacify the Iraqi public who were becoming increasingly hostile, and diffusing the resentment at home regarding the costs of state-building. He notes that the institutional and legal basis for Iraq was centered on the cabinet and the king, which resulted in conflicting pressures surrounding Iraqi autonomy. On the one hand, the British hoped that King Faisal would not only be able to rally the population behind the new state, but would also be able to appeal to moderate nationalist opinion and build a coalition against those who wanted a complete British withdrawal. On the other hand, we see a move to create a sovereign state that could enter the League of Nations as a completely independent entity. It can be argued that the conflicts experienced in Iraq were brought on by Britain’s endeavour to build the state. For instance, the British

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did not commit the time, money, and expertise that were required to fulfill the obligation to the League of Nations and the Iraqi populace. According to Dodge, in the period between 1914 and 1932 when Iraq gained formal independence the institutional basis of the Iraqi state should have been built. The failure to fulfill the League of Nations mandate and to construct a stable and sustainable state has in turn created the basis for political instability and violence that has come to dominate Iraq.54 Instead, the military victory over the Assyrian uprising bestowed legitimacy on the army and helped forge a sense of nationalism. For Dodge, the reason for Britain’s failure lay in the transformation of the international system between the First and Second World Wars. He notes that the idea that the developing world should be organized as self-determining states started out as a novelty, but became a dominant idea by the 1930s. This signalled the end of the pre-war imperialism of the European powers that was based on empire-building and territorial annexation.55As such, Iraq found itself at the crossroads of an imperialist legacy that was being played out through the advent of the mandate system and the principle of state self-determination. It can then be said that the violent conflict that occurred in Iraq surrounds the struggle for independence from the British mandate and the attempt to forge a sovereign nation-state. In this way, those scholars that approach Iraqi state-formation using a historical approach have largely placed violence as a product of the attempt to centralize power within the state apparatus. They have addressed violence this way by working within the parameters and trends set by international influences and by placing violence as resulting from the struggle to gain sovereignty and independence from imperialist powers.

Iraq’s Chthonic Constitution: Violence and the Social Contract To look at state-making in Iraq through the proposition pertaining to the chthonic side of the social contract offers a rather different way of looking at the social contract and its relationship to violence. In the previous section we saw that different approaches to statemaking discussed violence in certain ways: as a production of economic modernization and the transformation of society resulting from the attempt to modernize; as a function of the power struggles

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inherent in the attempt to accumulate power, centralize it in the state apparatus, and then consolidate it around a political party and its leader; and as a struggle for independence that is linked to the relationship between the governing party, the Iraqi population, and trends in the international arena, particularly surrounding sovereignty and imperialism. No matter which approach one takes to the state-making and nation-building process in Iraq, the presence of violent conflict through its short history as a nation-state cannot simply be explained by analyzing conflict through any one of these avenues. This is why a consideration of the violence inherent in the social contract needs to be addressed and Masoch provides a platform from where we can at least start considering the prospect that the social contract itself generates violence. In addition to locating the ways in which violence has been addressed within the parameters of various approaches to statemaking, the previous section also provides a general overview of the social and political climate in Iraq and the difficulties experienced with state-formation and transformation in the period leading up to the 1958 coup/revolution. Despite many changes in the cabinets and the various demonstrations and uprisings, the basic form of the state seemed to be accepted. It was not until much later when the United Front was created – providing the opposition groups with a common front – and the creation of the Supreme Council of Free Officers and their various cells, that we see a fundamental desire to change the composition of the state itself. The 1958 coup/revolution presents an act of violence that effectively destroyed the state as it was, and reformed the state along new lines. In other words, Iraq went from being a constitutional monarchy to a republic, which signalled – at least on the surface – a new social contract. The proposition on transubstantiatory violence suggested something that other social contract theories side step: the idea that violence allows for an ontological change to take place. Social contract theorists like Hobbes and Rousseau have argued that the social contract entered upon by the sovereign and the populace involves a contract-law relationship, whereby the contract generates positive law. The violence produced was seen as a sanctioned force; however, it was argued that Masoch shows this to be problematic since the contract-law relationship founding the state involves a mystification. This mystification entailed a “forgetting” of the origins of  law, which it was argued renders the violence of the founding

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act silent. This enabled the law to usurp authority which results in law tending towards violence in an attempt to preserve the state. Like Masoch’s successive love contracts, whose terms become increasingly strict so that the law eventually supersedes the contract, the terms underlying the social contract in Iraq are mystified by the increasing demand to conserve a state whose governance depends on producing a focal point for unifying the nation, but also where the accumulation and then maintenance of power around a “Sole Leader” becomes the modus operandi of the state. In order to do a reading of Iraqi state-formation and expose both the way that the contract-law relationship is mystified and demystified, it is necessary to look at a point in time when we see a repainting of the Iraqi state using different colours. The 1958 coup/ revolution represents such a point, which is why the remainder of this chapter will focus on the period of Iraqi history between the 1958 coup/revolution and the 1963 coup, when General Qasim fell from power and the Ba’th party was able to take the reins of the state, albeit for a short time. The next section will take a somewhat inverted path to making the argument: instead of showing how the contract-law relationship was mystified during the time of the monarchy and then demystified by the 1958 coup/revolution, the demystification of the contract-law relationship of this period of Iraqi history will serve as the starting point of the exploration of the chthonic side of the contract. The section will then proceed to show how, under the terms of the new social contract, the very same contract-law relationship was mystified under the Qasim regime. In masochian terms, the section starts with the birth of the new man/state and finishes by showing that as the terms of the contract become stricter, are set for an indeterminate time, and allow for the construction of the despot, the chthonic side of the contract will ensure that the law comes to violate the contract that gave it birth by failing to recognize inalienable rights. Demystifying the Social Contract/Castrating the Monarchical State The social contract underpinning the monarchical state was based on a model of government imposed by the British. Lucas Russell has argued that the Hashemite monarchy installed by the British appeared before the apparatus of the modern state. Given this, it has been argued that there was a lack of the means to legitimize the monarchy

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through parliamentary institutions. For example, the 1924 Organic Law Constitution granted the king extensive powers. He had the power to convene and adjourn the legislature, appoint parliamentary members, act as commander-in-chief, approve the appointment of the prime minister, other members of cabinet, as well as all other government appointments. Furthermore, if the parliament was not sitting, the king could enact laws through royal decree, although these laws would require parliamentary approval at a later date.56 As such, it presents us with a regime-led state-building process that has had to draw on “local nationalist ‘traditions’ to imagine both the regime and the [state] into the past [in order] to solidify their rule.”57 This presents a reversal of the Hobbesian social contract since instead of individuals coming together and making a contract with the sovereign, the reverse happens: the sovereign is imposed upon the people from an outside power, so that the law precedes the contract. Legitimacy for the social contract had to come from the assumption of a tacit acceptance of the underlying social order that had the ­backing of Benjamin’s law-making and law-preserving violence. That political parties worked within the imposed parameters of the political process represents such an acceptance. Samira Haj has argued that in periods when there was liberalization, the government attempted to co-opt the opposition; however, the mobilization of grassroots organization and the organization of political groups was met with repression as soon as the government faced opposition. Mass unrest followed periods of repression, which were then followed by concessions, more unrest, and then another government attack. This cycle repeated itself several times in the period between 1940 and 1958; however, the regime was able to survive because of disunity between opposition groups.58 The king was able to consolidate power around himself through the use of law-preserving force, exemplified in the use of the army to quell uprisings and demonstrations against the regime, and by ensuring that the government in power remained sympathetic to the British who were the main force backing the monarchy. Despite all of the uncertainty regarding the social contract, the king was instilled in power as a figure who would act as a rallying point for the nation. As such, the king served as a symbol unifying an otherwise heterogeneous society. The result is a derivation of legitimacy through a process of weaving historical memory together to form an image of unity embodied in the monarch. It could thus be argued that the social contract underpinning

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the monarchy is a product of simulacra more so than the type of contract that would be expected following the assumption that the impetus of the contract is the generation of law. At the time of the 1958 coup/revolution, the Iraqi people had been living under martial law for six years. As noted previously, this period of repression was carried out by the government of Nuri alSaid in response to the growing social unrest that Iraq was experiencing at the time. As such, the imposition of martial law was used as a way for the government to protect itself in the name of protecting the state, thus ushering in chthonic security. This also represents a point at which the contract-law relationship is mystified since it calls forth the state of exception, therefore saving the legal order from the threat of being called to account by the social body. In masochian terms, this would be seen as an attempt to save the “fantasy” of Iraq from collapsing by protecting against any opposition to that fantasy. One of the ways Masoch was able to demystify the contract-law relationship that had given birth to the state was through his use of gender reversal. Here, Masoch attempted to not only break with the terms of patriarchal law, but he actually placed these terms onto the body of the mother in order to show a second birth that is enabled by expelling the father from the symbolic realm. This released the social body from the patriarchal law of the father and made castration the symbolic condition of success. One of the prominent points made by feminist theorists is that male characteristics are mapped onto the dominant state in international relations and feminine characteristics are grafted onto the state that is seen as inferior. This has been seen particularly in the colonial experience. It has been argued that the opposition of superior/inferior, strong/ weak, masculine/feminine has served as a tool to legitimize foreign policy initiatives, and in the case of Iraq, the British Mandate. One might read the creation of Iraq in terms of the British father guiding the female-child state by teaching the inhabitants the “right” way to be. If we read the violence of the coup/revolution as generating a new state, then what we can infer is that the initiatory violence committed by General Qasim and his supporters effectively castrated the state. Thus, the castration of the monarchical state can be read as the  symbolic success of the coup/revolution that brought the new ­republic into being. The coup was initially planned by the Supreme Committee of the Free Officers. Despite the planning and preparation undertaken by

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the Free Officers, two of their members took things into their own hands and as such they were the ones who executed the coup without the knowledge of the rest of the committee. On 14 July 1958, General Qasim and Colonel Arif saw a window of opportunity to launch a coup attempt. This window opened due to the crisis unfolding in Lebanon59 and the difficulties that Iraq was experiencing vis-à-vis the United Arab Republic.60 At this time, Prime Minister Nuri al-Said decided to send units to the Jordanian border in order to aid the Jordanians. This provided Qasim with the opportunity to stage the coup since the troops stationed in the east would have to cross close to Baghdad and could be diverted into the capital. As such, on the eve of 14 July Colonel Arif diverted his troops and those commanded by allied officers into the capital. They occupied all strategic buildings including the radio station where Arif made the announcement that Iraq was now a republic. This was made clear with the execution (intentional or not) of the royal family who were not only the symbols of the monarchy, but who had also come to bear the markings of imperialism. It can be argued that the execution of the royal family and Prime Minister Nuri al-Said the next day symbolically castrated the state because they were symbols of the grievances that prompted the coup/revolution. Their deaths made it possible to open a space for the republic to be born. Not only does the re-creation of the state as a republic signal a new face to the Ideal of Iraq in the ontological sense, but it cleans the slate for a new social contract. In this way, it can be said that in addition to executing the royal family, the new constitution representing the inhabitants also effaces the state by replacing the rule of the old order with the new. There are two interconnected ways in which the new social contract can be identified: the first is through the creation of the provisional constitution; the second is through a general acceptance by the masses of the aims of the revolution and their subsequent show of support for the new regime. Derrida has argued that the new state is not identifiable until there is some sort of contract that institutes a new law. Thus, in order to provide a sense of legitimacy for and to inaugurate the new state, a legal basis for the repudiation of the old constitution was needed. This was important because, “[the] last Cabinet of the monarchy was never formally dismissed; it was deemed to have dissolved together with the monarchy. The houses of parliament disappeared with the old Organic Law.”61 It was decided

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that the legitimacy of the republic was achieved through the show of open support of the military action by the nation. It has been argued that, “[on] the eve of the 1958 Revolution, large land ownership, together with the power of Nuri and the Monarchy, were correctly identified by many Iraqis as the creation of the British. Abolition of the landlords and the political apparatus which sustained them were desired not simply on the grounds of economic efficiency or social justice, but to achieve the goal of full independence from British control.”62 What this suggests is that discontent with the prevailing order of the state, and particularly with Western involvement in Iraq, was a driving force behind the general acceptance of the coup. This is important because the reasons given by the Free Officers for planning the coup were mixed: in addition to the belief that Britain had dislocated the social and political structure of Iraq, many of the officers had come from peasant families and were disconcerted by the fact that although agrarian reform had been promised most of the land had not been redistributed. In addition to this, with the attempt at economic modernization, Iraq was experiencing an isolation of the rural population from that of the urbanites. Peasant families had moved to Baghdad in the hopes of finding employment and the result was the growth of shanty towns around the perimeter of the city. Oil wealth further contributed to the dislocation of society from the government because the government was able to function independently since they did not rely on tax monies to operate. On the international front, Nuri al-Said’s support of the Chamoun government in Lebanon, which was seen as being sympathetic to imperialist interests, caused many to question the loyalties of the government towards the people of Iraq. This, in addition to the grievances due to attempts at creating a pan-Arab state, entry into the Baghdad Pact, the merging of Egypt and Syria to create the U AR, and the union with Jordan, laid the foundations of discontent, particularly within the officer corps. While the National Front did not participate in planning or executing the coup, by encouraging people to take to the streets to ­demonstrate their support it was instrumental in producing the mass support that was expressed upon the seizure of the government by the military. Iraqi lawyers were then able to justify the legitimacy of the republic and its provisional constitution by using the a­ rgument that this support amounted to what has been called revolutionary

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jurisprudence, which signals a fall of the constitutional system due to revolutionary action.63 Thus, it can be argued that the creation of the provisional constitution and the general acceptance of the aims of the coup are what allow us to identify the presence of a new social contract. Mystifying/Demystifying Qasim’s Regime By reading the initial violence of the coup/revolution as first castrating the state and then laying the foundations for a new state to emerge, what we also find is that patriarchal law is placed on the new social body. It can be argued that while there is a rebirth of the state, the chthonic side of the social contract nevertheless enables violence to not only continue, but also ensures that it will.64 A second way in which Masoch demystifies the contract is to accelerate it. By accelerating the contract, Masoch is able to show how its terms become more strict, which enables the chthonic side of the contract to present itself. By demystifying the contract in this way, Masoch also shows how the contract-law relationship is mystified in the first place. If we look at the Qasim regime through an accelerated lens, what we find is that Qasim’s manipulation of Iraqi politics allowed him to consolidate power around himself. This was aided by those social and political powers around him. For instance, the attempt by  Colonel Aref to gain power through his insistence on bringing Iraq into the pan-Arab fold and the co-optation of political parties who then became instrumental in building the Sole Leader serve as exemples. On the outside, the social contract that resulted from the coup/ revolution promised to ensure the rights and freedoms that Iraqis had so far been denied. The social and political policies that prerevolutionary Iraq had demanded were largely implemented, giving the new regime a face of progress. For example, Qasim implemented several reforms such as the withdrawal from the Sterling Area65 and Baghdad Pact,66 as well as negotiating with the Iraq Petroleum Company for a greater share of oil royalties,67 all of which signalled a further severing of ties to the British. Qasim also provided a muchneeded housing program for those living in the shanty towns surrounding Baghdad, a reduction of rent, and a cut in the price of food and other necessities. This was coupled with a new limitation

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of fifteen per cent profit on consumer goods. In addition to this, the draft constitution and legal recognition for the various trade unions, peasant associations, and other democratic organizations proved instrumental in furthering support for the new regime and laying down the terms of the new social contract. One of the new policies set in place by Qasim at the outset of his administration was an amnesty for political prisoners. This policy and those interlinked with it provide for a good demonstration of the way in which the new social contract was mystified. The amnesty was first put in place because [a] major grievance harboured against the old regime was that all persons whom it considered disloyal – i.e., all those representing the progressive, wholesome and independent elements in Iraqi society – were hampered and harassed. This the new regime hastened to repair […] the rehabilitation was consummated by the “Law for the Pardon of Political Offenders,” published on Sept 4, which proclaimed a general amnesty for all political offenses committed between September 1, 1939, and July 13, 1958.68 While Qasim occupied himself with pardoning those he saw as the victims of the old regime, he also attempted to finish castrating the old regime by eliminating those who were sympathetic to it. For example, Uriel Dann has argued that “The first two laws enacted under the republic were promulgated on August 4 ‘For the Purge of the Judiciary’ and ‘For the Purge of the Government Services.’”69 The declared purpose of these laws was to rid the state of “weak elements that had invaded [the judiciary and administration] because of the corruption of the extinct regime.”70 One of the things that signals the mystification of the contract-law relationship is seen in the way that Qasim was able to extend these two laws. The laws were meant to lapse after the first six months they were in place, however, the legislation was perpetuated through successive extensions. The result was that section 23 of the provisional constitution, which guaranteed the independence of the judiciary, was deprived of any effectiveness.71 In this way, the provisional constitution was disregarded, which serves to undress the regime so that its military character is exposed. In order to consolidate power and purge the old regime from the new state, Qasim set up a Special Supreme Military Court that was

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presided over by Colonel Fadil ‘Abbas al-Mahdawi, a prosecutorgeneral, Colonel Majid Muhammad Amin, and two civilian lawyers. If we take a look at the progression of the Madhawi court we see that this progression eventually allowed Qasim to embody the law by becoming the sole judge and jury over the cases before the court. In essence, it can be said that what we see is the way in which the sovereign claims rights whilst eclipsing any duties he might have to the populace in terms of upholding the law. The intended function of the court was to try the leading personalities of the old regime for acts that were defined as “conspiracies against the safety of the country” and acts that contributed to the corruption of the regime.72 Khadduri notes that the first set of crimes were those acts that were either political or military that were seen to interfere in the domestic affairs of neighbouring Arab countries; in the second, he places those acts that a person or high-ranking official committed and that were seen as adversely affecting public interest or which violated the laws of the land. Khadurri furthermore notes that the powers given to the court were such that they could also apply to anyone who was seen as an opponent to the coup/revolution,73 which in masochian terms highlights that it can be applied to third parties. The progression of the impetus of the court can be read like Masoch’s successive love contracts. Over time, the type of cases that were put before the court signal a tightening of the hold Qasim had on the regime so that eventually the associated strictness culminated in a usurpation of authority. For instance, there were three sets of cases that were put before the Madhawi court. The first were the trials of the leading figures of the old regime, which lasted from August 1958 to March 1959. One of the main purposes of these trials was to delegitimize the old regime by exposing the corruption of the constitutional monarchy, and in particular the leading figures of the regime. The second set of cases that were heard were the trials of the enemies of the revolution. These included civilians as well as military personnel who had at first collaborated with Qasim, but who had then rebelled against him. These trials dealt in particular with those leaders who were part of the counter-revolution and thus represented the figures that were struggling for power. The third sets of trials were for those who had tried to assassinate Qasim. Khadduri has characterized Madhawi’s court as a “circus” and has noted that at least at the outset, it was seen as “a public forum for the people to express their suppressed emotions.”74 As the punishments became

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stricter and stricter, from the pardoning of the death sentence and short prison sentences to the execution of military officers, the Madhawi court became less and less a forum for public expression and more of a place where Qasim could demonstrate his power and show the people that he was not to be opposed in any manner. Madhawi’s own reputation declined with the increasing severity of the punishments and the subsequent alienation of those who should have been his supporters (e.g., other military officers). This led Qasim to place himself as the one who would make the final decision regarding, for example, the punishment of those who tried to assassinate him. When looked at through an accelerated lens, we see that Qasim was able to take authority upon himself as judge and jury. This is demonstrative of the despot usurping authority and claiming rights over what was supposed to be a public institution. Further­ more, the absolute power that this gave Qasim shows the disappearance of reciprocal rights and duties since the object of the court resulted in the punishment of anyone at who opposed Qasim himself. This confirms Deleuze’s observation that the object of the contract is enslavement since the law resulted in a type of enslavement to the republic and then to the person of Qasim. Qasim was enabled to take control of institutions like the court because of his construction as the Sole Leader. One could argue that Qasim would not have been able to step out of a contract that demanded the reciprocity of rights and duties if he had not been able to consolidate power around his own person. This consolidation of power would not have been made possible if there had not been an attempt to construct a Sole Leader by encouraging that person to get “their sign.” In the process of obtaining his sign, Qasim developed a “growing conviction that he alone should define what constituted the common good. He tended to present himself as all things to all men, especially at the outset when he was still uncertain of the kind of support he could command.”75 This was essential to Qasim’s political survival because, as Batatu recounts, initially the regime seemed to lack focus, especially when one considers that there was “no one person, force, or institution … [that] dominated the scene.”76 Within a year, Qasim came to believe that he really did represent all Iraqis in his person, thus believing that he alone embodied the state. This will be made clear if we take a look at the system of privilege and patronage that helped centralize power around Qasim and thus transform him from a modest army commander to a dictator.

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There are two ways in which the system of privilege and patronage worked to reclothe Qasim. The first was in the way that he initially privileged certain individuals and then edged them out of power, such as he did with Colonel Aref, his main partner in the coup. The second way was through the patronage of certain political parties or groups, which he used to suppress opposition. At the inception of the state, Qasim altogether ignored the wishes of the Free Officers who had envisioned a completely different institutional set-up. For the most part, the Free Officers believed that army officers should occupy all of the administration’s senior posts, thus keeping civilians within the administration in subordinate positions to them. This would be institutionalized in a Revolutionary Command Council formed by those officers who were part of the Supreme Committee of Free Officers, who would then have supreme legislative authority in the new state; however, instead of setting up a Revolutionary Command Council, the provisional constitution declared that a three-man Sovereignty Council would fulfill the ceremonial function of head of state.77 The Sovereignty Council was intended to provide a check on those in power; however, according to Tripp, no representative institutions were established and Qasim himself occupied the posts of prime minister, minister of defense, and commander in chief. In his cabinet, Aref occupied the posts of deputy prime minister and minister of the interior. Other than this, few of the Free Officers were given government posts and, as such, the rest of the posts were given to civilians who were either members of the N D P and the Arab nationalist trend.78 The distribution of seats in the Qasim government was initially characterized as “admirable.” “The president was a Sunni Arab who had as associates a Kurd and a Shi’i Arab.”79 This was therefore seen as a progressive administration since it represented the three main ethnic divisions in the state.80 The importance of this type of representation was that the religious division had also represented a social one. Sunni Arabs had previously dominated the government and this sociopolitical division had created a hierarchy of power that was represented in major socio-­ economic disparities between majority and minority groups – the Sunni minority was placed above the Shiite majority in terms of privilege and prestige in both sociopolitical and economic senses. The incorporation of representatives from the three main ethnic groups in Iraq represented a chance to bridge the sociopolitical and economic gap between these ethnic groups.

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By placing himself initially in a centrist position, Qasim was able to use and manipulate political forces in such a way that he emerged as the Sole Leader. One of the ways he was able to consolidate power around himself was through the defeat of the pan-Arab trend. Aref was of the opinion that Iraq should become a member of the U AR and thus sided with the Ba’th in their aspirations toward Arab unity. As one of the centers of influence in the state, Aref often acted on his own accord. For instance, it is well known that he approached Gamal Abdel Nasser as early as 18 July 1958 about the possible union of Iraq with the UA R when he met with him in Damascus. It was not until August, however, that he called for a direct union with Egypt and Syria that would take the form of a republic within the U A R . As such, Aref believed that the Iraqi republic was an indivisible part of the Arab nation and that this nation “is of one people.”81 Although pan-Arabism was present in Iraq, it did not have nearly the same support that it had in Syria and Egypt at the time. Batatu has observed that its mass support could be drawn only from Sunni Arabs, which counted for only one fifth of the population.82 While the officer corps was predominantly Sunni and pan-Arab in sympathy, in order to stimulate support for the merger with the U AR, Aref  toured Iraq in order to promote pan-Arabism. This incited those, such as the peasants, to begin taking matters into their own hands and thus the peasants began to take possession of the land or to sack the estates belonging to the sheiks. One of the problems that stifled the ability of the pan-Arabists to maintain the support they had gained, was that the nationalists were an incoherent political force. As a result, their own factionalism served to stifle their ability to make any gains. In addition to this, one of the political consequences was the alienation of the nationalists and consequently the officers who should have supported it. It has been argued that “[while] Aref was overtalking himself, he [Qasim], on his side, was gradually and quietly easing him out of his power.”83 In the first place, Qasim tried to alienate Aref from the more prominent Free Officers by placing sole responsibility on him for the rejection of the idea of the Revolutionary Command Council, despite Qasim having had a hand in this himself. In addition to this, Qasim transferred many of the officers in Aref’s own Twentieth Infantry from the capital and moved this brigade to Jalawla, some 140 miles from Baghdad. On 12 September 1958, he removed Aref

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from his position as the assistant commander-in-chief to the armed forces, as well as from his posts as deputy prime minister and minister of the interior, and Aref was instead given a post in the embassy in Bonn. In order suppress the pan-Arab sentiment within the officer corps, Qasim passed the command of the brigade’s Third Battalion, which had been led at one point by Aref, to Colonel Hasan ‘Abbud Ibrahim, who was communist. The brigade was passed to Staff Colonel Hashim ‘Abd-uj-Jabbar, who was also a communist. In this way, Qasim was able to remove Aref from any position of real power and as such he was able to emerge as the clear leader of the state. The removal of Aref’s influence in Iraq was done in conjunction with the use of the communist party to counteract pan-Arab forces. This was important because the communist party enjoyed a wide base of popular support exemplified by the various organizations that began to flourish after the coup/revolution and by their ability to encourage the masses to show their support for the various goals and interests that they held at the time. Qasim’s manipulation of the political parties at the time has been described in the following way: “in reality Qasim, of course, did not stand above the struggles of parties, and especially of the two main forces – the nationalists and the communists – nor did he attempt to mediate between them. On the contrary, he only prevailed by keeping them divided, by playing them off one against the other, and hedging them with their mutual aversions and antipathies.”84 As such, Qasim manoeuvred between both of these factions and counterpoised one against the other; he harassed and patronized them in turn, depending on what would produce the best political outcome for him. It has been argued that his survival depended on this because it ensured that neither force would become strong enough to oppose him nor would they be able to form an alliance or agreement between them. Integral to the emergence of Qasim as the Sole Leader was the event of the Mosul revolt. In March 1959, the communist-led Peace Partisans orchestrated a massive rally in Mosul that had the effect of triggering a coup attempt by the pan-Arab leaning Free Officer who commanded the Mosul garrison. Sections of the army and civilian population resisted and the ensuing violence represented “conditions of civil war in miniature going far beyond simple opposition to or support for the government”85 since the conflict exhibited sectarian, inter-tribal, and economic antagonisms. It took the

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government forces five days to restore order and gave Qasim the pretext to purge the armed forces and administration of anyone with pan-Arab sympathies. In addition to this, Qasim co-opted those who were not necessarily his supporters through the use of reforms that allowed him to find a balance between the various interests. For example, the manufacturers enjoyed special rights, such as protection against foreign goods and liberal credits from the State Industrial Bank. This increased the contribution of the manufacturing sector to the net domestic product in the decade between 1953 and 1963. As such, Qasim was able to secure the goodwill of “men of capital,” whilst at the same time showing concern for the masses of the labouring poor. Qasim strived to increase his support base and one of the other ways he attempted to do so was through land reform. The agrarian reform86 strove to cut the power of the landlords who had been beneficiaries of the monarchy and thus expanded the class of landowning peasants. In these ways, he was able to increase his base of support within the body politic. Thus, Qasim’s ability to manipulate the system of privilege and patronage worked to help him consolidate power. The result, however, was that the system itself led to the creation of a despot. Critique/Provocation By the time of the Mosul coup, Qasim was the undisputed authority in the state. Hashim Jawad, Qasim’s minister of the interior, described Qasim as “accessible, open-minded, and very anxious to learn” when he first took power.87 After the Mosul coup, however, at the time when there was confusion within the administrative apparatus, ­ministers would not take initiative or make any decisions without consulting Qasim. Furthermore, Jawad writes “the unopinionated, unassuming Qasim whom [he] knew in 1958 gradually got the taste of being the only man in the country.” Jawad makes a masochian move when he then opined that this process resulted in creating a dictator. “In other words, we built a dictator … Our people are in truth builders of dictators.”88 It could be argued that the Mosul coup was the point at which the social body entered into a new phase of the social contract; a phase where the violence of the chthonic side of the contract culminates and is only broken by an element of ­provocation that leads to the law becoming unconcealed.

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One of the ways this can be seen is through the support given to Qasim by the communist party in the face of an onslaught of repressions following the Mosul coup. In the first year of the republic, communist organizations began to flourish. For example, the communist party was extremely successful in creating many popular organizations, such as the Peace Partisans, the teachers’, engineers’, and lawyers’ associations, the Iraqi Democratic Youth Federation, and the League for the Defense of Women’s Rights. With the ­creation of these bodies, the party began to overshadow its rivals and this served to make Qasim wary of them. Once the pan-Arab threat had been suppressed, Qasim began to turn his attention to the communists and any communist led-organizations. In order to maintain power, Qasim used the system of privilege and patronage more extensively as a method of dealing with any perceived threats or potential threats to his power. As such, Qasim setup rivals for trade union leadership instead of following the tactic of suppressing the trade unions as Nuri had done. This ensured that he  would maintain authority over the trade unions and other ­associations, whilst preserving the projected image of the republic. Trades unions and peasants’ associations were not legalized until early in 1959 and then enjoyed only a brief period of independence before being subsumed into Qasim’s system of corporate, patrimonial control. The same thing applied to various other forms of associational life which appeared soon after the fall of the monarchy: professional syndicates and youth and women’s organizations emerged, often with official encouragement and subject to increasingly intrusive state patronage, bringing them all eventually into line with a system unambiguously dominated by Qasim himself.89 This is seen in particular in Qasim’s dismissal of more than 6,000 trade unionists from their posts. Once these trade unions had been dismissed, the government then took charge of the trade unions and professional organizations after the systematic attack on the homes and offices of democratic leaders.90 In the autumn of 1959, the Iraqi Communist Party (I C P ) complained that these unions were experiencing difficulties due to the arbitrary dismissals of communist functionaries. By 1960, a systematic campaign was being carried out to displace the communist leadership by non-partisans who enjoyed

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the trust of the employers. This was accomplished by infusing anticommunist guidance within the basic units of these societies, which was done for the purpose of eventually removing the communist leadership from the higher levels of the associations. This served to undermine the communist leadership from below. For instance, the railway workers and the dockworkers unions were two of the strongest constituent trade unions; however, they were both owned by the government and were headed by retired army officers. These officers were commonly employed in the civil service and were generally anti-communist in political orientation. While there were some genuine grievances against the communists, for the most part the government was acting to tighten its control over these unions and societies. Qasim received a number of petitions citing the grievances of the communists, although strikes were dealt with largely by bringing in the army. The result of the government onslaught was that eventually the campaign spread to other public firms and then to private ones. In the end, the various unions opted for electing independent committees. Instead of boycotting these committees as would have been expected, the communists lent them support in an effort to expose them. “The communists lent the committees their seeming support, and in the process showed them to be incapable of advancing the workers’ interests, or unwilling to do so.”91 The support given by the communist party in this instance can therefore be read as a provocation – by lending support, they called on the government to show that it was capable and willing to advance the workers’ interests. The government’s inability or unwillingness to do so then broke the façade that Qasim had created since it served as a demonstration of Qasim overstepping the social contract. Vaclav Havel has argued that in order to beat an authoritarian regime, one should demand that the regime abide by its own laws. This shows contempt for the regime whilst at the same time undermining it since the act makes the regime work within its own parameters.92 Similarly to Havel, Masoch suggests that by scrupulously applying the law, one also makes a critique of it. The attempt made by the various political parties to apply for a license under the Associations Law exemplifies the type of scrupulous application and critique of the law that Masoch pinpoints. The Iraq Communist Party, the National Democratic Party, United Democratic Party of Iraqi Kurdistan, and the religious parties all had different experiences with the Associations Law and in their relationships with the

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government.93 In terms of the application process, the Minister of the Interior had control over whether or not the society would be successful in its quest for legal and official recognition and the right to form in the first place; any society that was seen as a potential threat to the Qasim regime by virtue of simply existing was turned down. By abiding to the terms of the Associations Law, it can be argued that the parties vying for legal recognition were being coopted into the regime through their tacit acceptance of the law. It can, however, also be said that by applying the law and failing to reap its benefits, these societies actually served to show contempt for the law by showing the absurdity of its application. Again, the I C P presents one of the better examples of the provocation and critique that Masoch highlights. While keeping within the parameters set by the government, the I CP sent a notification with the signatures of fifteen founding members and eighty-two supporting members to the Minister of the Interior. Their party programme was composed of two parts: the introduction and a statement of their platform. Uriel Dann notes that “[there was] no hint that the party was looking beyond the ‘principles of the 14th July revolution,’ and [that] the terminology of the Marxist repertoire was avoided.”94 Despite this, the statement of the internal constitution was seen as outspoken for a communist publication. After waiting for nearly the entire duration of the thirty-day review period, the founding committee finally received word from the Minister of the Interior. The minister requested that a number of changes be made to the internal constitution, one such amendment being the deletion of the word “revolution” through the entire document. The I CP leadership acceded to the demands of the Minister of the Interior. In addition to this, “[an] involved dissertation on the meaning ‘Marxist-­Leninist’ contorted itself to combine doctrinal correctness with regard for Qasim’s idiosyncrasies.”95 Despite this, the Sa’igh Communist Party – led by Dawud al-Sa’igh, a Baghdadi lawyer who enjoyed Qasim’s patronage – was granted a license before the I CP . As such, in anticipation of the rejection of their application, the I CP renamed their party Ittihad al-Sha’b Party and explained to their members that the party platform remained the same despite the name change. Regardless of the measures taken by the I CP , the Minister of the Interior rejected their application. The reasons for the rejection included the following: (1) an Iraqi Communist Party was already established; (2) the name change was unacceptable because it signalled the need to change the internal constitution as well; (3) the

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objectives of the party were in agreement or almost in agreement with those of the existing communist party; and (4) the ministry had learned from “responsible quarters” that the party did not conform to the requirements of section 4 of the Associations Law. The I CP did not employ its right to appeal under the law, but decided instead to send a memorandum to Qasim himself, taking issue with Minister of Interior’s latest communication. So, instead of bringing their case to the Court of Cassation, they petitioned to the revolutionary government. The reasons behind this move are clear: the I CP could not expect to gain anything in their appeal to the Court of Cassation. In a press conference, Zaki Khayri explained as follows: “The implementation of law in any one society is always inspired by the interests of the ruling class and the nature of the prevailing political system. This is exactly why public opinion is, ultimately, the highest court competent for deciding important issues such as legalizing a Communist Party.”96 As Dann notes, the I CP stated its view in a press conference in all likelihood because of the belief that putting Qasim under public pressure would perhaps give the party a chance of success; however, instead of receiving an official reply to their memorandum the party only received the private advice that it should merge with Sa’igh’s party. Efforts to join with Sa’igh’s party were to no avail. One would have expected that the I C P would act as an opposition force against the government, given that it had been slighted in its effort to gain a license; instead, the party showed open support of Qasim by appealing to him personally. As such, in writing proclamations of support for the government, the I CP acted in defense of Qasim and thus tried to reinforce that they were not an opposition party. At the same time, however, they attempted to draw attention to those aspects that were negative about its policies. Dann has argued that this really meant that they would support Qasim so long as he did not rejoin the Central Treaty Organization or accede to the U A R , or voice his enmity of the communists.97 By January 1961, parties and associations were yet again invited to submit license applications. This time, a new notification was submitted to the Minister of the Interior by some who were known to have communist connections. They named their party the “Republican Party” and identified themselves as a communist satellite. The application was, however, rejected and although the founding ­members made the necessary amendments, they were unsuccessful in

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obtaining a license. The Republican Party used the same avenue as that of the I C P in order to appeal the decision of the Minister of the Interior; they addressed themselves to Qasim instead of appealing to the Court of Cassation. By working within the parameters of the political system, the attempt to gain official recognition for the Communist Party and that of the Republican Party can be read as ritualistic since it bound the party to the legal process and confirmed the parameters and underlying order set by the regime. By first adhering to the legal process stipulated in the Associations Law, the communists played their role in the fantasy of the state; however, by appealing to Qasim instead of appealing to the Court of Cassation, the Communist Party critiqued the regime by showing their contempt for it through a submission to Qasim’s personal rule. This ultimately served to show the underlying absurdity of Iraq’s political process and paved the way for the Qasim’s downfall, which the law was intended to prevent.

Conclusion Uriel Dann clearly and plainly states “[a] climate of violence is part of the political scene in Iraq.”98 He likens this violence to communal problems, conditions of poverty, and under-development, but argues that although these problems go a long way to explaining the presence of violence, they do not provide us with a full answer to why it is there. It was noted at the outset of this chapter that these problems themselves could be attributed in part to the project of state-­ formation started by the British and that current US attempts at state-building through regime change were unlikely to transform the way politics is conducted in Iraq despite the effort to provide Iraqis with a liberal democratic system. Despite this, the violence being experienced since the fall of Saddam Hussein has been named “­sectarian.” Even though some of the violence is sectarian-based, this naming hides the underlying problem relating to the history of ­violence in Iraq’s political arena. By likening the violence to the system of privilege and patronage and placing it as part of the “shadow state,” Charles Tripp has evoked the image of Iraq as a state that is still experiencing a stage of primitive accumulation of power despite the face of democracy that the “official state” now wears. Given this, it was argued that a starting point for looking at the violence of state-formation would

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be through the three main approaches to state-formation that were derived by looking at the European experience. Charles Tilly argued that there are three main approaches to state-formation, which he called “developmental,” “functional,” and “historical” approaches. Scholars writing about Iraqi state-formation seemed to approach the topic through one or more of these avenues. As such, it was noted that these approaches tend to present the place of violence in stateformation as a by-product of the effort to transform Iraq into the type of state that was desired at the time. One of the problems with approaching violence this way is that violence does not always find its right place.99 This is one of the reasons why the spiral of violence today is unexplainable – it simply does not fit into any of the categories of explanation presently available to us. Reimaging the violence in terms that we already understand ignores the presence of violence within the social contract itself. By ignoring the chthonic side of the social contract, the three approaches to state-formation that were looked at cannot provide a path towards furthering an understanding of the presence of violence in the political arena. While this may be the case with the approaches to state-formation suggested by Tilly, Masoch has provided an avenue through which we can at least start to consider the chthonic side of the social contract. Masoch proposed that the creation of social meaning itself was violent. In the context of state-formation, this would suggest that the ontological construction of Iraq is violent; nation-building, with its scripting of what constitutes an “Iraqi,” exhibits violence on both the individual body and the social body by transforming both into what constitutes “Iraqiness.” Masoch, however, went a step further by saying that we cannot simply look at this scripting as the only force in ontological change; instead, he proposed that the social contract underlying the state (which had much to do with this scripting,) had a chthonic side to it. It was furthermore proposed that violence was guaranteed by virtue of the social contract laying down a new law. In order to see how Masoch’s proposition could be employed in the Iraqi context, a particular period in Iraqi history was examined. That period started with the 1958 coup/revolution and ended with the fall of General Qasim. The reason for choosing this period is because the state transitioned from a constitutional monarchy to a republic. By choosing a point on the cusp of transition, it could be argued that a new social contract came into being at this time. This

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enabled us to see both the demystification of the previous social contract, the mystification of the new social contract, the subsequent guaranteeing of violence, as well as the elements of provocation that were exhibited once the law usurped authority. This explains an aspect of transubstantiatory violence which, if we recall, was the violence associated with a change in form or nature. This change, however, was seen as paradoxical – it destroys what is there, but then employs violence in order to maintain the new. This places transubstantiatory violence within the realm of Benjamin’s law-making and law-preserving violence; however, unlike Benjamin, Masoch’s focus is first on the point of transition and then on the way that the forces underpinning the new social contract come to act in ways that ensure that violence will continue. In a sense, this deals with the collapse of Benjamin’s scheme that Derrida points to because it finds a different avenue to explain the violence in the creation of social meaning – the very thing Derrida concerns himself with when he argues that language can only tend towards violence by practicing the violence inside it. Masoch’s thinking can be employed to tell the story of how the violence of 1958 coup/revolution allowed for the Iraqi canvas to be repainted. By virtue of painting a republic, social meaning itself was changed – the symbolic castration of the previous regime called for the rebirth of Iraq. If we recall that the contract attaches words to meanings, then it can be said that this rebirth signalled a reinterpretation of Iraq itself; however, as it was seen, the creation of the Sole Leader through the initiatory violence of the coup/revolution enabled Qasim to eventually eliminate any rival powers and emerge as the sole authority in Iraq. The tightening of the social contract and the overstepping of the reciprocity of rights and duties that characterized the contract-law relationship was then seen by showing how the terms of the social contract became stricter as Qasim consolidated power around himself. This mystification was demystified by virtue of the critique and provocation of the regime that was undertaken by the scrupulous application of the law – in this case, this was shown through the example of the way in which the communist party attempted to unmask the inability of the government to deal effectively or at all with workers’ issues, as well as in their attempt to gain legal recognition for the party. With this, we could see the way that the words and meanings being invoked within the contract-law relationship conflicted to allow for the creation of the

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very climate of violence that permeated Iraqi politics. Given the role played by the Iraqi communists in provoking a demystification of the social contract, the next chapter focuses on the Iraqi communist movement and looks more specifically at transubstantiatory v­ iolence through the proposition that violence is tolerated and sustained in the pursuit of a constantly deferrable Ideal.

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5 States of Tolerance: [Ideal]ology, Violence, and the Iraqi Communist Movement Introduction Iraq has a rich history of opposition movements and social and political resistance groups. This history is often driven by the need to assert sovereignty or to forge a particular Iraqi identity. Located at the center of the Iraqi opposition movement is the political left, namely the Iraqi Communist Party (I CP ). The history of the I CP itself has been equated with Iraq’s own revolutionary history,1 which places it very closely in relation to the problem of violence and social change. Where revolutionary change is demanded, one can almost always find an ideologically driven Ideal that either calls into question the status quo or demands that the Ideal underpinning the state be employed “as it should be.” For its part, the Ideal occupies a special place in political philosophy; it provides the standard of perfection. This was seen in the first instance in the work of Plato, whose dialogues explained that the highest form of knowledge is “the Idea of the Good,” the perfect nature of goodness. Historically, the state itself is founded upon some understanding of the way in which society can be constructed in the likeness of some form of the Good. In this, ideology takes up the function of infusing phantasmagoric forms of consciousness with cultural and political development. The fantasy is often represented through symbolic language and it is this symbolic language that informs us of particular determinate objectives: it is an ideological medium that is itself a political, ethical, as well as an aesthetic choice. The fantasy espoused through symbolic language is an instrument for social action since it provides the necessary signs needed to promote formalistic behaviours.

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Formalistic symbolic language is articulated in the literatures disseminated by the particular sociopolitical movement. For instance, in his influential work The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq, Hanna Batatu recounts the happenings of a seemingly small event that took place on the evening of 13 December 1932 in Nasiriyah, Iraq. The event consisted of the placement of a proclamation in eighteen different locations around the town, which read “Workers of the World Unite!” This proclamation called on the Union of Workers’ and Peasants’ Republics to join in the struggle to emancipate the workers and peasants from oppression and thus allow themselves to reap the benefits of their own work.2 This proclamation is significant on two initial counts: it was the first proclamation of its kind in Iraq that bore the sign of the hammer and sickle representing communism and it was signed “A Communist Worker.” While the placement of these proclamations was only one instance of the dissemination of communist ideals, it forms part of the symbolic language that is essential to the fantasy. Although the communist party in Iraq was just at its beginnings and did not yet have a strong affiliation with the Comintern or any of the other communist parties abroad, the adoption of the symbol of the hammer and sickle served to produce a particular imagery that informed the symbolic language needed to instill the ideological wish picture into the collective psyche. For instance, the symbol of the hammer and sickle itself represents unity between the industrial and agricultural workers and, the use of the colour red indicates the blood spilt by workers in the struggle for emancipation. In keeping closer to the Russian communist tradition at the time that the proclamations were posted, this would also indicate (at least symbolically) that a move towards the Good can be accomplished through anti-imperialist struggle (given that in the Russian language, red is etymologically linked to “very good” and “beautiful”). The symbolic language used then enables social action by calling into question the status quo.3 In the case of the place of violence, the proclamation suggests that when considered in relation to the phantasmagoric of the state, ­violence plays a role in psychologically legitimizing the ideological wish picture. Where ideology provides an Ideal image of the state, it will be argued that violence represents a step towards the realization of that image. Attempting to reach an ideological wish picture or phantasmagoric of the state exhibits a conflict with the ideology defined in terms of the status quo. Where the ruling ideology meets

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the ideological wish picture espoused by social or political groups, violence becomes the norm. This is how one can equate revolutionary history with the history of social movement: it is often the case that violent conflict is present when opposition movements gather the masses and forcefully challenge the status quo. At this juncture, it should be noted that the standard Marxist belief is that the use of violence to achieve change can be justified so long as peaceful means are not available.4 As such, the violence dealt with in this chapter is the violence of the state, not the violence of opposition groups. In general, political violence amounts to a polar opposition between legitimate and illegitimate force. This either/or equation fails to recognize that violence itself is part of a symbolic language that transcends this type of construction. As such, violence cannot be ­located within the polar opposition of good and bad; instead, it is formalistic. This is to suggest that violence can represent social success for those against whom violence is being employed. As a signifier, violence can be equated with both notions of suffering and omnipotence that enable the experience of violence against elements of the social body to be articulated as necessary to social agency and the realization of change. In this sense, violence becomes something that is not only tolerated, but at times even desired. The proposition that “violence is tolerated and sustained in order to pursue an Ideal which is either constantly deferrable or impossible to reach” alerts us to the problem of tolerable violence that seems to arise within the relationship between social action and social change; it also enables a reading to be done of social and political movements, like the Iraqi communist movement, that have demanded sociopolitical l­ iberation, but whose revolutionary and emancipatory politics have succeeded in deferring this very state. The first part of this chapter defines the ideological wish picture or phantasmagoric of the state that the communist movement in Iraq attempted to achieve. The communist movement saw the ideal state as democratic-socialist in form; this was underlined by the main tenets underpinning the Marxist-Leninist ideology that the movement adopted and by the methods through which the movement attempted to achieve the desired type of state. While it will be seen that there were periods of ideological reshaping, the end result remained relatively fixed on the question of which type of state would benefit Iraq. And, in the case of the communist movement, this always came back to a democratic-socialist state.

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The discussion of the Ideal will be followed by a look at how the Ideal is deferrable. The proposition is premised on the assumption that the Ideal itself is deferrable or impossible to reach. It will be seen that this is supported by Lacan’s concept of desire, which sees desire as a metonymy since the object constituting it also displaces desire, leading to the continual state of unsatisfaction. In relation to the communist movement, the particularities of Iraqi society were reimagined so that they corresponded with the image of the h ­ istorical stage that the I C P leadership envisioned Iraq was in. This prompted the IC P to follow policy initiatives that served as stepping stones in the attempt to reach their sociopolitical goal; however, the ­movement from one signifier to another deferred the possibility of ever reaching the Ideal because it was done in the vein of gaining recognition by the state of the desired condition of Iraqi society. This premise has implications when it comes to the toleration of violence. In the third section it will be argued that the communist movement tolerated violence in order to reach the Ideal. Instead of looking at violence in terms of legitimacy, it will be argued that violence can be construed as a psychosocial language. In this capacity, violence is transformed into a symbol of social success. This section will discuss how the experience of violence is transformed through what is called “aesthetic rendering” – the process of changing formats. It will be seen that this is precisely what makes it tolerable; aesthetic rendering transforms painful experience into a format of power, which enables agency. Finally, the chapter concludes by placing the discussion within the context of transubstantiatory violence. It will be seen that violence changes codes of behaviour; not so much because of its instrumentality in the conflict between social movements and governing regimes, but more so because of the symptomatology it produces. The implication is that the experience of violence is also an anticipation of change at the psychosocial level, as well as the political one.

[Ideal]ology In Marxist thought, society’s dominant ideology pertains to the set of beliefs held by the ruling class. In this capacity, it leads to the reproduction of the status quo versus any emancipatory politics; false consciousness ensures that the interests of the ruling class are maintained since cultural hegemony enables the working class to

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develop a false concept of its own interests.5 Where ideology meets the Ideal in order to form the wish picture, however, is where ideological belief is seen to produce a movement towards social change, particularly by producing a change in the thought process of the masses so that the ideological platform becomes normative itself. Despite the inherent circularity, the attempt to reach the Ideal is important to the production of social change since it is what allows social movements to challenge the status quo. The Ideal purported by the I C P throughout the Iraqi communist movement’s history has not remained fixed; it has changed in light of the members’ responses to both internal party politics and external pressures at both the national and international levels. From the onset, the origins of the communist movement’s ideological basis began with Husain ar-Rahhal’s feminist critique of the status quo. Ar-Rahhal and his informal literary group began a newspaper in the 1920s called as-Sharifah. This paper is credited with being one of the first papers to inject Marxist thought into the Iraqi consciousness; it discussed sensitive social issues that were related to things like social justice and human rights against state and class-based oppression, especially women’s rights. In essence, the paper called for the creation of a regime that championed social justice and defended the underprivileged classes. In addition to this, as-Sharifah called for the public to participate in politics and took an overtly anti-British stance. It was in this vein that the theoretical principles of socialism and Marxism first appeared in Iraq and where these principles started to be infused within the mindsets of Iraqis as representing intellectual and social progress.6 From this point onward, the ideology of the communist movement began to take on a more distinctive Marxist flavouring that is  identified by three main tenets: the two-stage revolution; anti-­ imperialism; and democratic centralism. The two-stage revolution signalled one of the foundational theories for the I CP since it indicated the revolutionary path that the party would follow. The twostage revolution refers to the idea that underdeveloped countries have to first go through the stage of bourgeois democracy before reaching the second stage, which is the socialist stage. The first party conference attests to the belief that Iraq was in the first stage since the national charter “combined a mixture of patriotic and democratic policies perceived from a more or less lower-middle-class perspective, while the role of the workers was confined to the submission

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of legal or trade-union demands.”7 What the national charter tells us is that at this point in time the communist movement was trying to take a middle-ground instead of promoting a more radical platform, given that radicalism would be met by political repression. It also tells us that the movement was forming a picture of the bourgeoisie that would enable its followers to believe that there was in fact a national bourgeoisie who could lead them in the first stage of the revolution.8 By appealing to the lower-middle-class perspective, the communist movement was able to appeal to the masses, as well as to those who the I C P believed composed the national bourgeoisie. One of the most notable aspects of the various conferences and charters is not only the adherence to the notion of the two-stage revolution, but also the continual anti-imperialist stance, even in postcolonial times. The anti-imperialist sentiment espoused by the communist movement was theoretically underpinned by Lenin’s argument that advanced capitalist nations exploit the resources of the colonial states, which in turn enables a portion of their own population to obtain a higher standard of living.9 The party’s antiimperialist stance can also be seen in the various demonstrations that were organized by the I C P , particularly against the Anglo-Iraqi treaty of 1930 and the 1948 Portsmouth Treaty. In effect, anti-­ imperialism became tied to class antagonisms since the bourgeoisie became tied to the British through economic and then political necessity. As Batatu notes, prior to the Second World War, anti-­ imperialism was orientated towards the elimination of British influence; however, after this point, anti-imperialism had to do with liberation from repressive states.10 In essence, it was the change in the way that the British army was seen that effected the change in the way that anti-imperialism was articulated and employed by the communist movement. According to Ilario Salucci, it was not until May 1942 that the I C P declared that the British army, which was fighting against Nazism, would be seen as an army of liberation.11 This later served to refocus anti-imperialism so that it could not only be used to equate the governing regime with the imperialist forces, but anti-imperialist rhetoric could be employed to critique the repressive state apparatus in Iraq. While the adherence to both the two-stage revolution and the anti-imperialist stance formed two major components of their political platform, the internal party organization played an equally important role in determining how the party would achieve its

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objectives. In keeping within the Marxist-Leninist line, the idea of democratic centralism formed one of the structural bases of the I CP . According to Lenin, the vanguard party could only be successful if it formed a disciplined organization based on democratic centralism. Democratic centralism called for tactical and ideological decisions within the party to be made through democratic methods. The main idea was that once these decisions had been made, all party members must accept the decision by externally supporting it and actively promoting it.12 As Tariq Ismael argues, although this concept caused major differences within the I C P as well as between them and other Arab and communist movements, it was nevertheless an important aspect of the Iraqi communist Ideal. This is because democratic centralism played a major part in the I CP leadership process, particularly given that it took a central place in the attempt to consolidate the party. One of the main problems experienced with democratic centralism in the I C P surrounded the limiting of democratic debate, which led to a decision-making process that was monopolized by the central committee to the exclusion of the rest of the party members. This ensured the grip that the party leaders had on the rest of the party and led to centralization instead of democratic centralism.13 A fourth tenet, which signalled a break from the communist ideology articulated in the Soviet Union at the time, was the move towards the formation of national fronts. This trend really took hold after the 1943 dissolution of the Comintern because the dissolution enabled the I C P to articulate a new theoretical and organizational direction facilitated by its release from nominal control of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. This allowed the I CP to work with democratic and popular forces, which turned the party towards the notion of national fronts. At this point, national fronts were seen in terms of helping Iraqi society with its historical progression. The purpose of forming a national front was expressed in the promotion of Iraqi independence, the strengthening of national sovereignty, and the removal of the imperial influence from the state. In addition to this, the national front was supposed to introduce a democratic system that would be able to promote and secure public freedom by allowing political parties to form, by ending the censorship of the press, and by lifting extraordinary and martial laws.14 These four tenets predominated the I CP platform at different points in time; however, each was integral to the realization of the ideal state that the Iraqi communist movement came to hold as the

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movement developed throughout time. In general, it was believed that these tenets would serve as the building blocks that would enable the realization of a democratic-socialist state, whose government would be constructed by a national front.15 In effect, despite the changing nature of Iraqi society and the shift in not only the construction of the state, but also in the global arena, the tenets themselves remained relatively fixed. For the most part, the tenets underpinning the I C P ’s platform were developed in the time of Yusuf Salman Yusuf (known as Faud), who was the central figure in the movement until his death in 1949. The relative consistency of the tenets underpinning the actions of the movement does not mean that the communist movement did not undergo any ideological reshaping. When there was an ideological re-evaluation it usually surrounded the modus operandi of the party. For instance, prior to the 1958 coup/revolution, the communist movement underwent an ideological reshaping under the leadership of Baha’u-d-Din Nuri. This ideological reshaping called for the establishment of a popular republican regime through revolution. It was envisioned that this regime would eradicate British influence, nationalize the oil industry, and broaden freedom through the unification of opposition groups into a popular front. Then, in the mid1950s, when Salam Adil took the leadership, there was a shift away from the Marxist-Leninist principle of a revolutionary transformation to socialism and towards the creation of a national government. Here, the I C P followed the principle of “passive defense,”16 whereby it was thought that change would occur through the cooperation with other national forces by peaceful means and through the ­construction of a national front coalition government. The struggle between these two viewpoints on action can be seen in the contemporary example of the Iraq Communist Party Central Command (I C P - C C ) and the Iraqi Communist Party Central Leadership (ICP - C L ). A major development in the thinking of the ­I CP -CC was the turn away from their previous isolationist leanings regarding the pan-Arab trend. In response to the August Line,17 it was seen that the party should move away from the condition of political democracy with relation to Arab unity and move more towards the viewpoint that the problem of democracy “can be solved within the course of the operation of unity itself with mass struggle, persuasion, and the persistent influence of the socialist camp upon the Arab leaders themselves.”18 This change of heart towards Arab unity was directed by another trend: non-capitalist development.19 In light of

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this trend, Arab unity was seen as a way of establishing national and social liberation. In 1967, disagreement over the August Line prompted a split in the party. The I C P -CC fought for a popular democratic revolutionary regime that would be led by the working classes and a revolutionary Arab Unity that would be socialist in nature. For its part, the I C P - C C continued with its attempts to join forces with the government and obtain its sociopolitical vision through passive defense. This was opposed by the breakaway faction who called themselves the I C P - CL , and who subscribed to the idea that armed opposition would effect the necessary changes that were needed in order to achieve the desired political results. A ­current communist faction, the Worker Communist Party of Iraq (WC PI), is following along the lines dictated by the I CP -CL when they called for political and mass struggle in the form of protests against the United States and allied forces currently in Iraq. While the IC P-C C has thus far supported the role of the US, the W CP I has called on the masses to build their own regime and to take it upon themselves to debathify Iraq and to oust any Islamic groups still operating in the state.20 This demonstrates a continued disagreement within the movement itself over the methods that should be employed in order to reach the Ideal. What this implies is that the four basic tenets underpinning the communist movement’s ideology and structuring the movement itself remained relatively constant throughout. At certain points, one or more of the tenets predominated; however, where the most change has occurred in terms of the basic ideology has been more in view of whether the ICP would follow a revolutionary or passive approach to achieving their goals. While it is difficult to pinpoint an exact ideal followed by the communist movement, especially given the history of factionalism within the party and the number of leadership changes due to the execution of leaders, it is evident that the movement followed a path that eventually led them to the idea of a democraticsocialist state; a state that they envisioned would facilitate the realization of those parts of Marxist-Leninist ideology that would bring social and political emancipation.

Deferability The realization of the Ideal provides the focus for political groups; it forms the referent object that is sought through political platforms and the formation of affiliated societies. This is to say that in its

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capacity as the referent object, the Ideal is also the object of desire. In the case of the communist movement the desired object became equated with a democratic-socialist state. One of the most striking observations that can be made from looking at the experience of the Iraqi communist movement is that the Ideal is continually elusive and that despite attempts to realize the Ideal it is only particular aspects that can be secured at any given point. Masoch’s assumption regarding the deferability of the Ideal21 is usually absent in political theory; instead, deferability is articulated more clearly in psychoanalysis through Lacan’s notion of desire. Commenting on Lacan’s notion of desire, Lorenzo Chiesa writes that, “[by Lacan’s] definition, desire remains beyond the ‘necessity of need,’ the ‘appetite for satisfaction’ – after all, desire essentially looks for unsatisfaction.”22 When this is applied in the context of attaining an ideal state, it suggests that the realization of the democratic-socialist state is something that is unattainable since the process of desiring is always already a deferral. In essence, social movement relies on the referent object because the object of desire is what is designated by the social body to fill a lack.23 The lack experienced by the Iraqi populace can be exemplified in the idea that attached to a democratic-socialist state are those rights and freedoms, such as the freedom of association, that the populace does not currently enjoy. Given this, it becomes necessary to maintain the phantasmagoric of the state in order to provide a focal point for sociopolitical movement itself. Sociopolitical formalization depends on the desiring subject because the desiring subject is also the subject of agency. In Lacanian psychoanalysis, the focal point provided by the referent object/­object of desire, however, necessitates recognition by the Other. Desire “is bound to its being recognized,” particularly in the sense that desire takes on its significance in the desire of the other.24 In this sense, the  IC P had to follow initiatives that would enable the governing ­regime to see the need for social change. According to Foucault, forms of knowledge involve a relationship between “saying” and “seeing,” which involves making something appear that conforms to  what is being said. The adherence to the two-stage revolution exemplifies this very state. For instance, prior to 1963 the I CP firmly followed the belief that Iraq was experiencing the first of the two stages: the vying for independence from imperialist powers, the abolition of feudal and neo-feudal relations in the countryside, i­ ndustrial development led by the industrial bourgeoisie, and the gaining of

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democratic rights and a constitutional state all pointed to this.25 It was believed that the bourgeois revolution would realize these gains for Iraqis and enable them to reach the second stage of the revolution. Haj argues that in upholding the principles of the bourgeois democratic stage of development, the I CP was forced to subordinate class conflict to national struggle. There are two implications that Haj points out: the first concerns the national question and the second concerns agrarian reforms.26 The I CP attempted to play the political field on these issues for the purpose of not only gaining sociopolitical emancipation, but in order to orient the regime so that it would recognize the ideal state; however, instances of co-optation, the ­acceptance of particular concessions, and the uncritical acceptance of certain policies demonstrates the movement from object to object, which forced the Iraqi communists to circle around the Ideal without every being able to actually step closer to it in any meaningful way. This, it will be seen, was because to a certain extent the communists reimagined the particularities of Iraqi society so that it would conform to the image that was produced about that society. The assumption that a national bourgeoisie was the class who would lead Iraq in economic development and modernization served to forge an alliance between the I C P and the National Democrats on the issue of Iraqi nationalism. The national question centers on the nature of the identity of the Iraqi state. Here, parties are split along the lines of pan-Arabism and Iraqi nationalism. Pan-Arabism sees Iraq as belonging to a wider Arab nation, whilst Iraqi nationalism focuses on Iraq as its own sovereign entity. For its part, the I CP sided with Iraqi nationalism. In doing so, the I CP legitimized the right of the national bourgeoisie to its own nation state. The result of opposing those adhering to the pan-Arab trend was that the I CP ’s position aligned with that of the National Democratic Party (N D P ), who were positioned against Arab unity in the struggle against Western domination and economic underdevelopment.27 For instance, in the 1950s, the I C P ’s stance on the issue of a merger with the U AR focused on the national peculiarities of Arab states, which the I CP saw as being part of the history of colonial domination and capitalist penetration.28 The I C P pointed out that colonialism had produced an uneven development in the socioeconomic structures of these societies. This had inevitability affected class formations, which was exemplified in the comparison of the Egyptian national bourgeoisie, who were older and thus more entrenched nationally and

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internationally as compared to the Syrian and Iraqi bourgeoisie.29 The 1958 coup/revolution saw the I C P maintain their support of the Iraqi bourgeoisie by stating that they supported the economic interests of the bourgeoisie given that these interests provided a condition for the development of a democratic bourgeois state. Haj has argued that by sticking to the viewpoint that national democracy was a separate stage of development, the communist movement could see no alternative but to lend its support to capitalism and the legitimate right of the Iraqi bourgeoisie to a separate nation state.30 This example demonstrates the propensity of the I CP to adhere to a signifier that corresponded to the stage of development that they envisioned Iraq was experiencing based on an underlying ideological tenet of the movement itself. In this case it led to an alignment with the N D P , which placed the I C P on the side of capitalism. The realization of agrarian reform also served as a signifier that placed the I C P closer to reaching the democratic-socialist state. With regards to the agrarian question, the I CP was interested in a land reform that would rid Iraq of the pre-capitalist iqta31 and landlordism. Both the iqta and landlord systems were viewed as impediments to the development of the national economy in general and industrial development in particular. To this effect Faud, then secretary of the IC P, argued that it was both “the economic penetration of world monopoly capitalism” and “the economic and political domination of British imperialism” that served as a major factor in stifling economic and industrial growth in Iraq.32 In addition to this, Faud argued that the semi-­feudal relationships in the countryside impoverished the peasantry, which in turn served to “undermine the possibility of creating a national market for industrial goods by reducing the purchasing power of the largest portion of the population.”33 As such, the agrarian revolution became one of the central tasks of the bourgeois revolution. The 1958 Agrarian Land Reform Law, which was meant to ­abolish feudal relations and emancipate the peasantry, saw numerous concessions being made to appease the old landed classes. For instance, landowners were to be paid compensation for their confiscated land and any immovable property and trees. They also had the right to choose which lands they would give up and which they would keep. This worked to neutralize the landowners and to enable them to become auxiliary allies rather than to abolish them as a class. The  land reform also appeased the Shia clergy by excluding religiously-endowed lands from confiscation. This served to contain

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and manipulate class conflict, in addition to dispersing power relations in the countryside. The NDP , who had gained control of the state after the 1958 coup/revolution, saw this as a fair and equitable redistribution of land, which would quell possible social antagonisms that would arise from a more punitive land reform. Despite the promise of land redistribution, most peasants were unable to benefit from the land reform since the reform enabled only those middle peasant holders who ­already had capital to benefit, thus excluding most of the rural population from benefiting from the reforms. Although acknowledging the problems with the land reform law, the IC P invoked its commitment to the bourgeois stage of development in order to j­ustify their acceptance of the new law. The commitment to the two-stage revolution blinded the communist movement to the fact that the national bourgeoisie was not in a position to lead the state in the first stage of development.34 The reality was that no such national bourgeoisie existed. The three factions making up the bourgeoisie – the agricultural, the commercial, and the industrial factions – were structurally weak and vulnerable. For example, the industrial faction was vulnerable due to its infancy and its dependence on agricultural raw products and close social ties  to agricultural-rentier wealth. In addition to this, the conflict between the commercial faction and the industrial one over the issue of protectionism served to maintain a schism between these factions of the national bourgeoisie.35 As such, the image that there was a national bourgeoisie who could lead Iraqis in the revolution demonstrates Lacan’s idea that desire is linked to the Ideal through the support of fantasy, or as Lacan calls it, the mise-en-scène. The fantasy of the state is in effect what structures the relationship between the subject and the desired object. “The question of desire is that the fading subject yearns to find itself again by means of some sort of encounter with this miraculous thing defined by the phantasm.”36 The presencing of the national bourgeoisie provides an object that the communist movement could desire because it supported the mise-en-scène. This mise-en-scène was structured not only by the belief that Iraq was in a particular stage of development, but also by the idea that the establishment of the nation state was simply a precondition for the realization of the socialist revolution.37 With the national question, the I C P rewrote the situation of the national bourgeoisie so that it would fit in line with the necessary conditions for the first stage of the two-stage revolution. By rewriting the situation of the national bourgeoisie, the I CP deferred the

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possibility of reaching out to those sectors of society whose support might have enabled a real political change to occur. This is seen again through the agrarian question, where the I CP supported the government’s decision to make concessions to the landowners. When the conflict between the I C P and the nationalists intensified, the I CP found that it required the support of the landless peasants, whose interests had not been accommodated by the Agrarian Land Reform Law. As such, the I C P switched tactics and instead of supporting the land reform law, they publicly criticized it by pushing for a more radical set of reforms and by mobilizing the peasantry. In effect, what is demonstrated by the actions of the I CP on these two fronts is a type of repressive toleration that lead them to move between signifiers without ever being able to create the social and political space where movement towards the Ideal could actually take place. In this sense, the actions undertaken in terms of the national ­question and agrarian reform by I C P demonstrate that repressive tolerance amounts to a deferral of the sociopolitical Ideal.

Violence and Sociopolitical Success The central place occupied by the communist movement in Iraq’s sociopolitical development speaks to the way in which acts carried out by the I C P formed an important formalistic role in this development. Sociopolitical development in itself is based in social action and social change; this relies on the development of agency at both the individual and group levels. The distribution of communist literatures, the organization of rallies, parades, and petitions demonstrates that the communist movement chose avenues that would enable them to change codes of behaviour that were engrained in the collective awareness of different communities. The consistent growth in the number of organizations associated with the party attests to not only their organization skills, but also to the popular support given to the movement. Despite this, the communists were either coopted by the governing regime or were tolerated by them so long as they did not disrupt the status quo. When there was a threat to the status quo, the governing regime used force in order to subdue the movement and neutralize it. Political repression, torture, the execution of communist leaders and supporters, as well as violent conflict with government forces, were experienced by those who were part of and/or affiliated with the communist movement.

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Agency and the realization of change, however, require a different relationship to violence than that expressed in conflict between those in power and those excluded from it. Symptomatically, violence is symbolic of sociopolitical success when it enters into discourse as a psychological language. It works as a psychological indication of power that is extracted through the process of aesthetic rendering. Aesthetic rendering has to do with generating an image from a model using a defined language through which knowledge is created, interpreted and then displayed. In this respect, aesthetic rendering transforms suffering into a symbol of sociopolitical success by converting the meaning of suffering into a vision of power. In this way, violence turns into its opposite: it serves as an indication of power that is then interpreted as a success for the movement itself; this is ultimately what makes violence tolerable. Remodeling the experience of violence into a form that renders it appealing is accomplished by allowing suffering to be reclaimed as a sign of agency. The emulation of omnipotent power enables the movement to identify with the governing regime thus conferring a certain amount of control over the social space. For example, in the monarchical years, British forces were called upon to quell any popular uprisings against the regime. These were put down with the use of force and were kept at bay through the implementation of repressive measures. The 1920 uprising against British forces was put down with the sheer use of force on the part of the British. Their greater military strength allowed the British to demonstrate not only their primacy in the state, but also the need for a greater power to protect the territory, even from its own inhabitants. As such, the British came to represent a force of safety and protection because of their seemingly limitless ability to punish. The governing regime then came to emulate the British by employing similar tactics against those who threatened them, which can be seen in the modes through which the various regimes used force in order to quell dissident movements and popular uprisings. The communist movement modeled their own power on that of the governing regime and some of the tactics employed by the communist movement mirrored the environment that had been created by the British. For example, in order to demonstrate that the 1958 coup/revolution was supported by civilians and was not ­simply a military endeavour, General Qasim, along with the I CP , thought it necessary to create a permanent organization that would express

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this support. It was deemed that a civil militia would be the best avenue through which to do this. As such, the Popular Resistance Force, which consisted of volunteers, was created. The main task was “to train citizens in civil defense as a means of helping the regular military forces to maintain order, and to provide civil defense and defense against foreign attack.”38 As Khadurri notes, the civil militia was later used to reduce the power of political opposition to the regime through intimidation techniques and then through the arrest of opposition leaders. “It [the militia] paraded the streets of cities and towns at night and often invaded the privacy of homes and committed violence to persons and property.”39 The militia was modelled on the militias of communist states and given that the Iraqi communists enjoyed popular support, the structure and function of the ­militia came to symbolically represent a way through which the communist movement could make political gains. This has been seen in particular during times of struggle amongst ideological groups, whereby the militia, which was composed of “radically-minded young men,” gave their support to the communists. This served to provide the picture that the communist movement had the potential for omnipotent power; they could symbolize, and in some ways embody, the power that provided safety and protection similar to that granted by British forces. It can also be inferred that the emulation of British omnipotence bestows a sort of narcissistic specialness onto the group. In effect, by acting out the repressive measures previously endured by the movement, the I CP was able to reclaim agency by reimagining that repressive measures were designed for their own benefit, thus allowing the movement a degree of control over the violence they had to contend with. The violence endured by the communist movement can also be transformed into a symbol of sociopolitical success by transforming violence into its reverse: the capacity to punish is reimagined as a capacity for understanding; this is something that can only arise from genuine omnipotence. This is because when omnipotence is psychologically attached to an omnipotent figure, it implies that this figure has a thorough knowledge of their subjects, as well as the power to act in their subjects’ interests. In psychoanalytic terms, and according to masochian thinking, this provides the potential to turn abuse into love by suggesting that those carrying out repressive ­measures are also the ones rescuing the victim.

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The capture and then release of political prisoners serves as an example of the torturer-cum-rescuer. The imprisonment of Abdallah Mas’  ¯ud on 29 October 1941 and his subsequent release in April 1942 provides an example of this. Prior to his arrest, Mas’  ¯ud was a chief organizer of the Baghdad group40 and had started the communist journal “al-Shararah.” At the time of his arrest, the I C P had yet to consolidate itself. It was not until Faud returned from his studies at The Communist University of the Toilers of the East (K U T V )41 that the party transformed from one based on individualism to one based on a collectivity. Mas’  ¯ud was nevertheless a prime mover in the I C P and had held the position of Secretary of the party until his arrest. In April 1942, he was suddenly released from his detention in Fao. The explanation given to his colleagues for his release sym­ bolically suggests the transformation of violence into understanding. Mas’  ¯ud recounted to the Central Committee (a faction within the I C P Central Command) that “he had addressed a petition to the British Embassy in which he protested his loyalty to the ‘democratic cause,’ expressed bewilderment at being confined together with ‘fascists,’ and solicited an early intervention on his behalf.”42 Mas’  ¯ud’s release itself is attributed to the belief that the British had the power to act on the behalf of Iraqi citizens, and in this case, gain the release of political prisoners. The language used in Batatu’s account of what Mas’  ¯ud told the Central Committee is telling.43 For instance, although it was not the British themselves who had imprisoned and tortured him, Mas’  ¯ud’s request for them to intervene means that there existed the belief that on some level the British were the true rulers instead of the monarchy, who ruled in name only. Furthermore, through the mimetic relationship between the British and the monarchical regime at the time, the actions of the monarchial regime become associated very closely with the British themselves; repressive measures carried out by the governing regime are thus treated as if it were the British themselves who had carried them out. This allows the British to be seen as an omnipotent power who could be both cruel and just. In the case of turning punishment into love, that the British intervened on behalf of Mas’  ¯ud suggests that there was a degree of understanding pertaining to the interest of the working class who are represented through Mas’  ¯ud’s own ­struggle for worker’s rights. The transformation of punishment into an expression of love can  also be witnessed within the political dynamics of the group

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themselves. Through his attempt to consolidate the party, Faud himself took on the role of the omnipotent power within the organization of the I C P . Batatu’s account of Faud indicates not only that Faud held the belief that he was the only one who could lead the I CP , but also that “[the] party became the point of his existence.”44 His strong belief in the Ideal enabled him to represent the movement so thoroughly that it became his entire existence instead of something that he could turn to in order to relieve the frustrations of everyday life. As such, “His followers [invested] him with imaginary virtues.”45 According to Batatu, Faud himself was not a “mechanical addition” to the movement; instead, his own subjectivity was its product. In other words, unlike the British whose power had been imposed upon Iraqi subjects, Faud’s own positioning and embodiment as an omnipotent figure was a creation of the communist movement itself; this resulted from his selection, preparation, and testing that had been carried out for the first two decades of the movement, particularly through his involvement with the Basra group. Although the history of the I C P itself is fraught with many breakaway factions and instances of near extinction, the actual consoli­ dation of the various communist groups under Faud’s leadership is demonstrative of the way the experience of violence can turn into a  mode of agency (or punishment into love). One of the tactics employed by Faud was the use of fear in order to bring party members in line with the party ideology and particularly with the party leadership. For example, in August 1942, Faud had published a letter in the party’s paper Ash-Shar  arah ¯ that was intended to frighten his opponents. The letter read as follows: “Our beloved leader Faud, […] We have been much upset by what happened lately. We await patiently the orders of our party. We are ready – at a word from you – to cut the necks of traitors with the teeth of our saws. A Group of Carpenters.”46 In his reply to the letter, Faud called for a deeper understanding of Marxist-Leninism; however, as Batatu notes, the publication of the letter in the first place is demonstrative of the use of fear to quell opposition. The expulsion of party members for non-conforming attitudes exemplifies the method through which Faud was able to consolidate the party and turn it into a force that could mobilize the masses. The dismissal of Zh  u¯ N  un ¯ Ayy  ub ¯ from the party serves as an example of  the use of repressive measures within the movement that were

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undertaken in order for the I C P to progress. Zh  u¯ N  un ¯ Ayy  ub’s ¯ dismissal from the I C P was the result of his involvement with a faction that had begun to form around the leadership of Ya’q   ub ¯ Cohen in  June 1942. Cohen believed that socialism could be achieved through the work of students, the intelligentsia, and the petty bourgeoisie, instead of relying on the workers who he saw as lacking class consciousness as well as numbers. Faud did not want this “ideological heresy” to spread, so he had Cohen tried in July 1942 before the party court, who reminded Cohen that the task of the party at that time was not to bring about socialism, but to encourage the development of a bourgeois-democratic regime. Faud, with the agreement of some members of the Central Committee, had Cohen expelled from the party. Despite this, Cohen was not deterred from promoting his viewpoint and began approaching some party organizers, including Zh  u¯ N  un ¯ Ayy  ub ¯ to join him in issuing an unauthorized statement that would bring confusion and undermine the authority of the I C P leaders. In order to assert authority and quell the factionalism that Cohen was creating, Faud decided to expel those who had been dealing with Cohen. As such, on 16 August 1942, Faud called a meeting of the Central Committee and decided to expel Zh   u¯ N  un ¯ Ayy  ub ¯ and other asso­ciates who had schemed against him. Although this is only one ­incident, the expulsion of party members for expressing different or  even opposing views to those of the I C P leadership became a common occurrence in the history of the I C P . The expulsion of party members is also a demonstration of the transformation of punishment into a capacity for understanding. With the expulsion of party members, there were a number of factions that formed, such as a faction known as the Congressionalists, as well as, a faction lead by Mas’  ud. ¯ The 1943 government crackdown on communists, however, served as a catalyst towards the unification of the different factions. The second arrest of Mas’  ud ¯ and all of his committee at this time prompted his followers to contact Faud in order regain admittance into the I CP for the purpose of working towards common goals. Faud accepted them back in, but would not agree to conditions that could not be reconciled with what he saw as the good of the party.47 Those seeking to be readmitted into the party had to put aside their disagreements with Faud on the grounds that unity was a necessity of common action. As such, Faud

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succeeded in extremely difficult conditions in “commanding implicit obedience from the entire membership.”48 In this way, the repression of political opposition served to consolidate the party, which was necessary if the I C P was to be an effectual force. In psychoanalysis, this means transforming punishment into fulfillment. Faud’s use of repression was turned into a symbol of love for the party, since the measures employed actually allowed the party to exert power within the sociopolitical realm. This indicates that on some level repressive measures can be seen by the political party or social movement as being designed for their own benefit. The transformation of punishment into sociopolitical success is seen through its representation as immunity. It can be argued that punishment teaches one to transcend one’s own emotions; delusions of self-sufficiency come through the belief that the individual can stop having feelings, transcend pain, and maintain a narcissistic isolation.49 Success is then considered through the superhuman ability to rise above emotion because the act of control is itself a test of immunity. The torture endured by Zaki Basim (a leading figure in the Central Committee) when he was arrested in 1947 demonstrates the ability to transcend pain in order to demonstrate the immunity of the movement itself to the violence of the governing regime. Upon his arrest, Basim recounts that “six policemen seized me, laid me on the floor, and inserted my feet in a sling rifle; an assistant, ‘Abd-urRazz  a¯ ‘Abd-ul-Ghaff  ur, ¯ reached for a cane and driving it violently, beat me on the soles. I was at the time out of health and in great pain but he took no pity on me.”50 As Batatu notes, the police used ­violent force prior to interrogating prisoners in order to bring them to the “right” frame of mind. In the case of Zaki Basim, they were unsuccessful in obtaining information about the I CP or its leadership. The omnipotence and immunity of the movement was also exemplified in the move by Faud to acknowledge his own position within the party,51 but to remain unbreakable with regards to divulging information on his associates when he was arrested by the Iraqi security forces.52 The politics surrounding the imprisonment of the I CP leadership also points to the transformation of punishment into a vision of immunity. With the arrest of Faud, many of the communist cells disintegrated and many of the movement’s followers either drew away or went into hiding; however, when it became known that those captured had not weakened under torture, many of the cells

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became active again. At their trial Faud, Basim, and their associate Muhammad Husain al-Shabibi, were convicted and given the death penalty. A further indication of the immunity of the party is suggested by the worldwide protest and national outcry at the death sentences that had been passed. As a response to this protest, alShabibi and Basim’s sentences were reduced to fifteen years imprisonment and Faud’s sentence was reduced to life imprisonment. This sentence reduction bestows a delusion of omnipotence on the international community, due to the belief that they have the ability to intervene on behalf of opposition movements in general and Iraqi citizens in particular. With the sentence reduction, both Faud and Basim were taken to Kut prison, which placed Faud in a position to communicate with the leadership outside. This then allowed him to provide some direction for the party. With the Portsmouth treaty in 1948 and the mass insurrection that followed, it became known to the governing regime that Faud was directing the party from prison. He was later retried and sentenced to death for inciting revolution from prison. Like in the case of Mas’  ud, ¯ the British tried to intervene and save the I CP leadership from being executed. The British opposed the death sentence by citing the fragility of Iraq “and by expressing the opinion that ‘the opportunity to organize revolution must be very limited from a prison in Iraq, and the political motive in such a re-trial must be obvious even to a simple mind.’”53 Despite a lack of British support for the death sentence, Faud, Basim, and al-Shabibi were executed in Baghdad in February 1949.54 Symbolically, the execution of these communist leaders could suggest the extinction of the communist movement, as well as the extinction of British omnipotence in Iraq; however, Faud, Basim, and al-Shabibi were relegated to the status of martyrdom and this reversed the process of disintegration by invoking the revolutionary impulse associated with the existing social situation. By 1951, the party had rebuilt itself, thus demonstrating the immunity of communism to political repression. In essence, the martyrdom and later the relegation of Faud to the status of a national hero actually enabled the communist movement to propel itself forward in many respects. The transformation of violence into sociopolitical success is accomplished by rendering punishment into either omnipotent delusions or visions of understanding and love. The effect of these renderings is to turn violence into something that is not only tolerable,

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but also desirable on the level that it produces the ability for sociopolitical movements like the Iraqi communist movement to develop agency in a particularly dangerous and volatile setting.

Conclusion Sociopolitical emancipation and the construction of a regime that enables this has been the focus of many political movements within Iraq. While there have been points in time when these movements have come together in opposition to the governing regime, they all exhibit a different viewpoint on what sort of regime and what type of society Iraq should be. Even within these movements themselves it is difficult to pinpoint a specific Ideal. The main tenets underpinning the Iraqi communist movement help identify what type of state and society they believed would benefit Iraqis; however, while evidence points to a democratic-socialist state as the Ideal, there was never complete unity on this vision or how to go about achieving their social and political goals within the movement itself. This makes the democratic-socialist state the closest approximation that one can find to a unified Ideal. In itself the Ideal points to the referent object of desire, which provides the object that the communist movement could focus upon and gear their activities towards. Where there was disagreement within the party, it was either shaped around variations in the ideological viewpoint, usually pertaining to who to include in the party’s sphere of influence (like peasants, students, workers, professionals, etc.) or which path the party should pursue in the attempt to achieve their goals (revolutionary activities or ­passive defense). Regardless of the type of Ideal pursued, Masoch suggested that the Ideal was something that was constantly deferrable or impossible to reach. By looking at Lacan’s definition of desire and applying it to the IC P ’s decisions surrounding both the national and agrarian questions, the I C P could reimagine aspects of Iraqi life so that it corresponded with tenets underpinning the movement. This was seen in particular in the image that was constructed of the national bourgeoisie and their role in the two-stage revolution, of which it was believed that Iraq was in the first stage. This then enabled the I CP to make policy decisions that fit the constructed image, even though they were not in line with the reality of Iraqi society. The result was that instead of realizing their goal of a democratic-socialist state,

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the  communist movement constantly moved from one signifier to another based on their responses to the happenings at the time. This then served to steer the movement around the Ideal instead of actually enabling them to reach it. One of the results was that the I CP partook in repressive toleration because they believed to a certain extent that tolerating some policies in order to achieve the Ideal later on would actually lead Iraq to becoming a democratic-socialist state; instead, what happened was that repressive toleration amounted to a deferral of the sociopolitical Ideal. Repressive toleration and the deferral of the sociopolitical Ideal that results is part of the political maneuvering that has taken place in Iraq’s political arena. The political arena within which the Iraqi communist movement must navigate has been fraught with violence committed by the governing regime that should have been able to not only neutralize the movement, but to bring about its extinction. The proposition that violence is tolerated in order to reach an Ideal that was unreachable called for a rethinking of the violence/agency relationship and subsequently the realization of change. Instead, it was seen that through a process of aesthetic rendering, violence was made desirable – it signalled a way to reclaim agency by modeling the omnipotence of either colonial Britain or the governing regime that had modeled itself in the image of the British. This modeling enabled violence to be transformed into possibilities of agency by rendering suffering into a symptom of love, understanding, and/or immunity. The violence/agency relationship calls for a further consideration of what aesthetic rendering actually means when considered in light of the deferability of the Ideal. With the attempt to reach a socio­ political Ideal, the Iraqi communist movement had to not only use communist aesthetics to bring to the forefront the need for sociopolitical emancipation, but they also had to transform the signs and symbols of violence so that the movement could continue functioning in a volatile setting. This propensity for transformation at multiple levels places the movement in a transubstantiatory position. Guattari and Negri point to this with their definition of communism: “We will define communism as the assortment of social practices leading to the transformation of consciousness and reality on every level: political and social, historical and everyday, conscious and unconscious.”55 In other words, what they are suggesting is a change in codes of behaviour that are not based in the redistribution of wealth, but more so in the interaction between individuals

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and groups leading towards the creation of the “conditions for human renewal.”56 If violence is psychosocially transformed into a sign of sociopolitical success, then it is also a symptom of change. In this sense, the experience of violence anticipates change and propels the self towards the reformalization of codes of behaviour. In short, the aesthetic rendering of violence makes it tolerable because of its transubstantiatory potential. Transubstantiatory potential is suggestive of the violence of subject creation and recreation. As such, the next chapter will look at the militant/multitude problematic through the proposition that the violence of creation leads to the violence of recreation in a paradoxical attempt to secure or preserve the subject.

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6 Transubstantiatory Violence and the Militant/Multitude Problematic

Introduction What is the relationship between violence and Empire as it pertains to the achievement of security in the Iraqi state? Under Saddam Hussein’s Ba’th Party rule, Iraqi state sovereignty was based on chthonic security, which refers to the dark inside of security; the inside through which the sacrifice and violence associated with insecurity renders security possible. When Saddam Hussein took control of the Ba’th in 1979, he had already consolidated both his own power and that of the party through the use of the patronage system, which he alone controlled. In this sense, the purpose of the party was to provide a supportive role to his regime instead of acting as a forum for debate. Charles Tripp argues that Saddam Hussein’s political manoeuvrings enabled Iraq to become a dual state. On the one hand, there is the official state apparatus and on the other hand the aptly termed “shadow state.” The shadow state refers to the state forms that produced Saddam Hussein’s power: the “networks of associates, chains of patrons and clients, circles of exclusion and privilege emanating from the office and person of the president.”1 This forms one aspect of chthonic security since the network of privilege and patronage served as a biopolitical tool in which Iraqis learned that social/human security was dependent on conforming to the system. During the Saddam Hussein regime, chthonic security was also based within the state and ideological apparatuses that informed the structural, spatial, and psychosocial basis of the state. The secret police and intelligence agency, the army, and the party militia are

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representative of the institutions that were used to survey the population and ensure compliance. In effect, the patronage networks worked in tandem with the state ideological apparatuses so that it appeared as though repressive measures were collective endeavours supported by the Iraqi population. The ideological apparatuses normalized violence in such a way that the chthonic security attached to the shadow state came to replace both human and state security. As such, while each institution operated on the basic premise of protecting the state, its real function was the protection of Saddam Hussein’s regime. From the point of view of the official state, Iraq’s state structures were commensurate to those of other states: the military, for instance, conducted campaigns that were designed to achieve both domestic and foreign policy goals. For example, the official role of the army under the Ba’th regime was the maintenance of state security. In Iraq, this was centered on the repression of insurgencies, mainly aimed at the Kurds in northern Iraq and later on at the Shiites in the south. Within the shadow state, however, the army was transformed into a mechanism for regime security. This was seen, for instance, when Saddam Hussein purged all of the influential highranking officers and established a system of accountability whereby party members could veto the orders of non-Ba’thist superior officers if they suspected them of working against the party. The changes undertaken by the Saddam Hussein regime effectively separated ideology from the military, which meant that the party organization removed the opportunity for military officers to envision themselves as protectors of national identity. This was reinforced by the threat of the death penalty for the participation or membership in any other political organization or any breach involving the army or the police. Given this, the role of the army was broadened so that state security t­ ranslated into regime security. For its part, the secret police and intelligence agency exemplifies the interlinking of structural, spatial, and psychosocial functions that enabled Saddam Hussein’s regime to become pervasive. This institution worked to control citizens through surveillance methods and information gathering and was comprised of only those who were extremely committed to the Ba’th Party. As such, it became a party-based alternative power to that of the officer cadres of the Ba’th.2 In order to carry out its main functions, the secret police and intelligence services were divided into three separate agencies which

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were individually responsible to the Revolutionary Command Council: (1) The State Internal Security, or Amn, was set up so that major cities such as Baghdad were divided into security zones whereby the headquarters of each zone acted as a surveillance center that checked both the internal movements within the zone and the external movements between the zones; (2) the Military Intelligence Agency, called the Estikhbarat, controlled most of the operations against Iraqis or nationals abroad and employed embassy personnel, particularly the military attaché’s office; (3) the Party Intelligence, or Mukhabarat, was a meta-intelligence organization that was designed to watch over the other policing networks by controlling the activities of state institutions such as the army and government departments, as well as mass organizations like youth, women’s, and labour organizations. In effect, the Mukhabarat was a distinctly political body with a section controlled by the party militia. The party militia itself was grouped into tightly organized cells that were isolated from one another, thus ensuring that Saddam Hussein could retain complete control over them. This was of particular importance because the militia acted first as a counterbalance to the army, and then as an auxiliary to it. In addition to this, the militia or ‘­people’s army’ also became a vehicle for party recruitment and the p ­ romotion of Ba’thist values amongst the youth. The structuring of the secret police and intelligence agency into three separate agencies led to its bureaucratization, thus rendering it faceless. In effect, the regime was able to gain absolute control since those within the hierarchy watched both those below and above them, thus forming a system of spying on spies.3 This rendered all the policing agencies under the Ba’th political. In this way, the Ba’th could maintain control over the population by producing a continuous condition of insecurity, which paradoxically led to the security of both the shadow state and the official state apparatus. The violence that is now governing Iraqi society is a product of cutting the threads that had merged the Ba’th Party, the state, and civil society into a structure in which the state had become subordinated to the Party.4 Under Ba’thist rule, the modus operandi of politics developed into one in which security and insecurity became two sides of the same coin, thus producing a type of stability that was centered on violence and was controlled by Saddam Hussein. From this point of view it could be said that the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 resulted in the removal of Saddam Hussein from power, the

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dismantling of Iraq’s formal institutions, the regime, and the political elite, in an effort to replace chthonic security with a combination of human and state-centered security which would be initiated through a democratic Iraq. The result, however, has been the emergence of an ongoing power struggle between various groups for ­control of the state apparatus. As Oren Barak has explained, the dismantling of the state not only left Iraqis without their chief arbitrator, but it also redirected Iraqis towards clans, tribes, and communal militias in order to achieve security.5 Many have noted that although under Ba’thist rule interethnic relations had been negotiated through both control and coercion, this had led to a relatively stable situation despite domestic and external factors such as the Iran-Iraq War, the Gulf War, and the Kurdish and Shiite uprisings.6 In addition to this, the dismantling of the army and the debathification process alienated many of those who had participated in the Ba’thist regime mainly for the purpose of achieving social mobility.7 Under these circumstances, armed groups have proliferated in Iraq; the Sunnis have formed armed resistance groups, whilst the Shiites have either formed militias or have joined the Iraqi Security Forces, which they have now come to dominate. It can be argued that the communal violence being experienced in Iraq can be attributed to the weakness of the postcolonial state, which is unable to impose its authority over the territory, as well as to the existence of insurgent groups who have the military capacity to avert suppression from the central government, whilst at the same time imposing their will upon the local population.8 In short, the Iraqi insurgency that is taking place in Iraq at present is the product of the removal of the security apparatus that had been in place. This has left not only a leadership void within the state, but it has also served to orient Iraqis towards other sources of security and protection. In addition to this, the globalized world itself has not only produced a change in the nature of insurgency and warfare, but it has also initiated a redefinition of the figure of the militant. The attempt to understand the role of violence and non-state actors within the globalized international arena has led many to argue that terrorism, guerrilla warfare, and insurgency have co-opted globalization. The critics point out that globalization amounts to terrorism because of the creation of networks that have enabled Western imperialism to impose its will on non-Western

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populations, while at the same time opening up avenues for nonstate actors to procure sovereignty.9 Hardt and Negri argue that the development of a new form of Empire in the postmodern era has created the arena in which the figure of the militant plays a prominent role. They have termed this the “insurgent multitude,” which is fighting against imperial power. The first part of this chapter will look at the Iraqi militant in the context of Empire and the relationship it has with the multitude. It will be seen that Hardt and Negri’s concept of Empire and the multitude enables a greater understanding of the relationship between the globalized world and the Iraqi insurgency; however, it will be seen that, due to the non-dialectical approach underpinning their theory, they are unable to account for how the power void can be filled in Iraq. According to Hardt and Negri, Empire provides a greater potential for revolution than modern regimes of power because it presents an alternative: it presents the multitude (the set of all the exploited and subjugated) alongside the machine of command, which directly opposes Empire.10 Regime change in Iraq, however, has awakened a power struggle within the shadow state, this requires the negotiation of a particular dialectical relationship in order to recreate security. In other words, the leviathan needs new clothes. The third proposition on transubstantiatory violence enables us to see the way in which the initiatory violence of militia and insurgent groups attempt to reclothe the leviathan by attempting to secure and/or preserve the subject (in this case the shadow state and with it chthonic security) and/or hegemony within the social fabric of Iraq. Recall that initiatory violence was linked to the Heraclitean fragment “war is the father of all things.” Here, Heidegger interpreted the fragment to mean that war was a struggle for things to present themselves.11 The struggle for power undertaken by the various militia groups suggests that at least part of the violence is a struggle to remake Iraq into a particular image/identity by forcing that image/ identity to appear. As the second part of this chapter shows, this is something that cannot be seen in the discussions of these groups in relation to insurgent typologies, globalization, or Empire and its multitude, and thus offers a new perspective on the militant/insurgent problematic in Iraq. In short, the attempt to negotiate the subject of the state paradoxically leads to preserving chthonic security. It will be seen that when thought of in this way, transubstantiatory

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violence – the violence of sociopolitical construction – is enabled through social complicity.

Empire, the Multitude, and the Iraqi Militant Many have noted the presence of foreign fighters and ethnic entrepreneurs who have contributed to the interethnic and sectarian violence in Iraq, as well as the overarching discourse of anti-Western imperialism permeating Iraqi insurgent and militia groups. Although most of the violence is taking place within Iraq’s demarcated borders, the development of Empire has provided a conceptually different fighting terrain. According to Hardt and Negri, this new form of Empire is defined in terms of the globalized world and the shift from a traditional form of state sovereignty to one based in national and supranational organisms that are united “under a single logic of rule.”12 In this way, Empire is defined as a decentered and deterritorialized apparatus of rule that is based in processes of globalization and is characterized by a lack of boundaries, in the spatial, temporal, and biopolitical senses. The imperialist discourse being challenged by Iraqi militants surrounds Empire’s regulation of human interactions and the attempt to rule over human nature.13 As non-state actors, where terrorists, militias, and insurgent groups come together in Iraq is in their endeavour to fill the power void that has been created with the removal of Saddam Hussein from power, as well as in the attempt to reclaim Iraqi sovereignty by riding the state of Western hegemony within and over state institutions. This places them inside the wider category of the multitude14 within the discourse of Empire. According to Hardt and Negri, “In the postmodern era, as the figure of the people dissolves, the militant is the one who best expresses the life of the multitude: the agent of biopolitical production and resistance against Empire.”15 The contemporary militant is not so much representational as it is constitutive given that it resists imperial command. “Resistance is linked with a constitutive investment in the biopolitical realm and to the formation of cooperative apparatuses of production and community.”16 In the Iraqi context, one might see the movement of the multitude in terrorist/militia/insurgent guise as one geared towards the reappropriation of space; this reappropriation of space fulfills the desire for liberation and works at creating new

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freedoms. Thus, as Hardt and Negri might argue, the Iraqi militant as multitude produces a new ontological reality by reproducing the sociopolitical networks that are derived from a theurgical teleology.17 For Hardt and Negri, the multitude acknowledges difference and the theurgical teleology assumes democracy as its ultimate goal; this, however, remains tied to the inside of the official state. This is because Hardt and Negri’s concept of Empire only produces an inside due to its postmodern and biopolitical orientation.18 The terrain of conflict in Iraq, however, is located in the shadow state, thus suggesting that Hardt and Negri’s unitary multitude forms a metanarrative of resistance that assumes that the act of resisting and the terms of resistance are also uniform. Iraq’s “Militant” Subject in Socio-Historic Context For its part, the Iraqi militant is a multi-faceted figure. From intellectual dissidents to freedom fighters, resistance to repressive rule has always been present in the state. Two types of militant have taken a prominent place within the state throughout most of Iraqi history: those attached to the militia and those forming insurgent groups. In Iraq, the militia first took the form of ultranationalist youth battalions during the time that Rashid Ali al-Gailani served as  prime minister.19 After the 1958 coup/revolution, the Popular Resistance Front was initiated by the government for the purpose of acting as an auxiliary force to the armed forces in the event of an attack. At this time, the militia was seen as the natural progression of the revolution; it was ingrained in the Popular Resistance Law, which had the task of training citizens so that they might aid the regular army “in civil defence, the maintenance of internal security and the defence of the country, subject to the directions issued by the Armed Forces Command.”20 When linked to the government, however, the militia was transformed from an agent of resistance to one of maintaining the regime in power by undertaking various tasks such as arresting suspected plotters against the regime to forcing political compliance. While the popular militia grew out of the perceived need to add an auxiliary force to the army to aid with internal security (writ regime security), insurgent groups have also been used to provide security to parts of the Iraqi population who have been the target of government oppression. The Kurdish Peshmerga force, for example, came

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into existence at the inception of the Kurdish independence movement that followed the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Like the Popular Resistance Force, which at one point had been tied to the Iraqi Communist Party, the Peshmerga were tied to political parties, namely Mustafa Barzani’s Kurdistan Democratic Party and also to Jalal Talabani’s Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. For the most part, the Peshmerga were used to protect the Kurdish people from the Iraqi army and to keep the area under the control of one or the other political party. With the growth of Empire, however, there has been a shift in the nature of militant groupings. The nature of militia groups, for example, is no longer synonymous with “citizen army.” Instead, the current situation in Iraq has seen the militia transform into something closer to a private army attached to either tribal, religious, or communal leaders. Empire has also shaped the nature of insurgency so that the distinction between inside and outside is not so clearly demarcated. This suggests that the insurgent no longer has to be of a particular nationality, but only needs to identify with the terms of resistance. The presence of foreign militants who have joined the various groups already operating in Iraq attests to the international networked nature of insurgency. The tendency to categorize Iraqi militia/insurgent groups along sectarian lines has enabled these groups to be thought of as three distinct entities given that after the 2003 US invasion militant groups turned inward towards their own tribal, ethnic, and religious groupings in order to find protection. The violence being experienced between these groups has led many to characterize it as a sectarian conflict; however, this is complicated by the fact that within each militia/insurgent grouping there are a number of different groups whose modus operandi and ideological orientation is ­different from the next.21 John Mackinlay has argued that there are at least four models of insurgent groups: Lumpen (urban proletariat-driven), Clan, Popular, and Global. These models are based in different organizational structures, contain different bases of support, and utilize different operational methods.22 Iraq has evidenced the proliferation of a number of different insurgent groups, many of which can fit into one or more of Mackinlay’s models. For instance, groups such as The General Command of the Armed Forces, Resistance and Liberation in Iraq, Popular Resistance for the Liberation of Iraq, and Patriotic

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Front can be considered as former regime loyalists, who have an underlying clan-based orientation. They are primarily composed of individuals who were part of former regime organizations, especially mid-ranking and junior members of the former security and intelligence services, the Republican Guard, as well as the Fida’iyin Saddam. For the most part, their former privileged position has enabled these groups to obtain funding from outside sources, such as charitable organizations, wealthy individuals, and businesses. This has provided them with the means to recruit disgruntled and unemployed youth (those normally considered as lumpen insurgents) to undertake attacks against coalition forces. Then there are nationalists, many of whom are not former regime loyalists but who had previously held relatively senior positions with the Ba’th Party, particularly in the armed forces. The dissolution of the military left a large number of men from cities such as Tikrit, Ramadi, Fallujah, and Mosul without work. The result is that many of these individuals were forced to seek financial support from their relatives, which has incited feelings of shame and humiliation; this has propelled many towards joining the insurgency. Third, groups like the Al-Faruq Brigades, who include secular Sunni Arabs and individuals who had been part of the former regime, fall within both models of lumpen and clan-based insurgencies, but whose ideological orientation is different to that of regime loyalists.23 Iraqi history has seen many popular insurgencies, mostly stemming from the efforts of those such as the communists and al-Dawa, a Shiite religious party. While typically it is a minority population who has initiated the insurgency against the majority due to exclusions based on divisions such as culture, ethnicity, opportunity, as well as poverty and wealth, in Iraq this has been reversed where it is the majority population who holds these types of grievances. The Mehdi Army, led by Moqtada al-Sadr, has oriented itself towards Shia nationalism by opposing the US presence and by demonstrating hostility towards the established Shia political parties, particularly the Dawa Party. Despite the uprisings fought against US forces, alSadr has recently become involved with the newly instilled political process and holds thirty seats in parliament.24 Many of the insurgent attacks targeting Shia areas have been defended by the Mehdi Army, who now control and protect Sadr City and other areas around Baghdad. While the Mehdi Army looks like a popular insurgent force, it also has lumpen elements as the group appeals to poor,

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disenfranchised Shia. To this effect, the rise of Shia militias has seen an increase in restrictions towards the population that were not seen during Saddam Hussein’s regime. For instance, Saddam Hussein’s regime was predominately secular and as such, women’s rights were protected and fundamentalist interpretations of Islamic law were not used to decide disputes. In addition to this, alcohol, movies, music, and Western clothes were widely consumed. With the rise of Shia militias, displays of Western dress, music, romantic affection, and alcohol consumption became capital offenses. In terms of ­sectarian violence, many Sunnis have accused the Mehdi Army of engaging in sectarian killings, which have thus far been denied; however, the Badr Brigade, the party militia of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SC I R I), which was created in Iran, has been linked to death squads, kidnappings, and sectarian killings of Sunnis (although this has also been denied).25 The religious element that has demarcated the sects has regional implications since a majority Shia state changes the established power dynamic not only within the state, but also within the region. As Mackinlay notes, the influences of globalization have increased the span of a popular insurgency’s objectives to include identity politics despite not being sufficient enough to alter the national impetus that tends to limit their ambitions.26 As such, identity politics relating to ideas such as the likelihood of Iran to mobilize the majority Shia population, thus reconstituting the greater Middle East as not only a Shia dominated area versus a Sunni dominated one, as well as promoting a greater impetus towards religious fundamentalism, is able to come to the fore through the influence of globalization.27 The potential regional implications of popular insurgencies and their development abroad can also include these groups within the category of global insurgency given that their development is linked to an international network of groups. Mackinlay defines the global nature of “global insurgency” in the following way: “global refers to the movement’s source of energy and support, the environment in which it chooses to fight and the nature of its organization.”28 In the case of al-Qaeda, the support network is derived from a range of communities that spans over sixty states, thus incorporating various races, cultures, and professional backgrounds into the movement. In effect, the global insurgent utilizes the same tools that states do; they can use the same technology and communication proliferations to allow each individual to evade detection. Al-Qaeda has surfaced in Iraq since the US invasion. Previously led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi,

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it has become a prominent insurgent group within Iraq that uses tactics that include synchronized bomb attacks, suicide bombers, and the abduction and murder of foreign hostages. The range of targets has included US military personnel, the Iraqi Security Forces, as well as Shiite communities. Foreign jihadi fighters are also thought to play a key role in the group, although some analysts have noted that there is considerable Iraqi membership. In 2006, al-Qaeda in Iraq posted an Internet statement saying that it had joined five other insurgent groups to form an umbrella orga­nization called the Mujahideen Shura Council. This was for the p ­ urpose of building cooperation between the various groups and promoting a unified strategy.29 In addition to this, a potentially affiliated group to al-Qaeda is Ansar al-Islam. This group is a radical Sunni group that operates in Northern Iraq and recruits from the Kurdish population who oppose the US-backed Patriotic Union of Kurdistan Party.30 While there are numerous other groups operating in Iraq, what can be inferred is that Iraqi militant groupings form a web that cuts across insurgent categorizations, as well as sectarian divisions; the global dimension places militant groups within Hardt and Negri’s Empire. The Militant and Multitude: Oppositions, Mediations, Dialectics Hardt and Negri’s concept of the multitude links the network of militants in Iraq under one umbrella: the militant as multitude functions to oppose Western imperialism writ Empire. To this effect, in an era where imperial sovereignty surpasses the nation state, Hardt and Negri write that postmodernity is American as opposed to the Europeanism inherent in modernity.31 In this manner, the American underpinnings of Empire as Hardt and Negri conceive of it enable one to make the case that Iraqi militants do form a multitude that opposes Empire. Hardt and Negri argue that the relationship between the multitude and Empire is one based in the premise that the multitude forms a productive and creative counter-power to Empire that draws on Empire itself to reproduce a democratic ontology within Empire. This, however, does not take into account the power void that occurs when regime change is forced from an outside or third-party source. Recall that Empire does not have an outside, only an inside. This makes it difficult to understand historical progress and ontological change. Hardt and Negri repudiate dialectical movement in their conceptualization of the relationship between

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Empire and the multitude. In this respect, G.K. Browning argues “a dialectical perspective that connects phenomena by way of immanent argumentative development is stigmatized by Hardt and Negri as disguising historical development as a form of teleology that presumes the external end of freedom from the outset of its analysis.”32 Instead, Hardt and Negri choose to utilize a critical and decon­ structive methodology, as well as a constructive and ethico-political approach, which they see as non-dialectical and immanent.33 The purpose of choosing this type of approach to history is to create a break with other philosophies of history, particularly with regards to deterministic conceptions of historical development.34 Hardt and Negri repudiate dialectal thinking by maintaining that the postmodern neatly supersedes the modern, as well as the immateriality of biopower through the new conditions of informational and communicative technologies. Their designation of Empire “includes an overlapping conceptual recognition of the development of the prospective liberation of the multitude.”35 One prominent critique is that this designation commits Hardt and Negri to a teleological and dialectical style of reading history that is influenced by both Marxist and Hegelian dialectics.36 In effect, Hardt and Negri’s approach to history is dialectical given that new events and concepts emerge and are revealed to us by their interrelations and their relations with preceding developments. As Browning contends, without dialectics progress becomes unilinear and politics is relegated to strategic acts that respond to a course of events that have already been identified.37 One of the problematic attributes of Hardt and Negri’s discourse is the dialectical concept of mediation. The multitude simply exists. As such, Empire has dissolved mediations, such as the state, thus allowing the multitude to confront Empire directly and overcome it through practical experimentation.38 As Kevin Michaels argues, Hardt and Negri appreciate the potential of subjectivity and the power of labour as a human category; however, they reject the negative power of these concepts. “Labour for the authors is ‘the living power of being’39 rather than the negative process by  which the subject changes the objective world and, in turn, is changed by the same world he or she helped to create.”40 Notions of labour and religion, which serve as mediations, are ignored as mediations; thus, where Marx’s theory of value is seen in part as a theory of measure, for Hardt and Negri labour is beyond measure. Likewise, the role of religion is communicative and constitutive, as well as oriented towards strength. “Through evangelism and the

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­ issemination of texts, communication furnished the means for the d ­religious multitude to constitute itself as a multitudinous subject. In fact, it would be proper to say that the multitude constituted itself in and as communication rather than through it.”41 As such, the multitude uses religion to valorize itself both politically and ontologically, thus becoming a communicative matrix. Given this, religion loses its transcendental power and with it its mediatory function. As Michaels argues, Hardt and Negri’s non-dialectical conception ignores the concept itself as mediation; a conception that is created by humans in a historical process and which will be in turn overcome by h ­ umans in the continuation of that process.42 Despite the dialectical outgrowth inherent in their thesis, from the perspective of historical progress, the anti-dialectical stance adhered to by Hardt and Negri in their conceptualization of Empire and the multitude makes it difficult to really come to terms with the place of the militant in the political arena of contemporary Iraq. A dialectical approach becomes important because dialectical movement functions as mediation. For its part, Marxist and Hegelian dialectics recognize the emergence of new social forms. In a state such as Iraq, this becomes important to the initiatory violence taking place in the effort to reconstruct the state. The figure of the Iraqi militant can thus be placed at the crossroads between occupying a place within Hardt and Negri’s multitude, and utilizing dialectics in the effort to remake (in the case of Shiite and Kurdish militias) or to preserve the state (in the case of Sunni insurgents). In short, Hardt and Negri are unable to account for the power void that is driving the struggle between insurgent and militia groups because their non-dialectical approach and their concept of Empire and its relationship to the multitude do not enable the presence of such a space.

“War is the Father of All Things”: Rethinking the Role of Iraqi Militia G ro u p s a l o n g T r a n s u b s t a n t i a t o ry L i n e s “Militancy makes resistance into counterpower” and “rebellion into a project of love.”43 Where Hardt and Negri are the most helpful is in their assertion that the figure of the militant in the postmodern era becomes the most powerful when the group comes together to open up the realm of possibility. It could be argued that in Iraq, politics (or the realm of  possibility) is located in the space between the official state

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apparatus and the shadow state. The violence within this space can be said to be “initiatory”; it is initiatory in the sense that dialectical identity formation is tied to initiatory violence since it informs self, group, and state identities. Following Heidegger’s analysis of the Heraclitean fragment “war is the father of all things,” it was suggested that violence is initiatory in its capacity to create the self and then to act on that same self in the attempt to secure it so that the self is recreated or reformed as a result of the dialectical movement initiated by violence in the first place. Masoch opened the possibility of assessing this through the proposition that “the violence of creation leads to the violence of recreation in a paradoxical attempt to secure or preserve the subject, whether the self is a corporate self or a human self,” which utilizes a particular mode of dialectical thinking that was developed through his novellas, particularly Venus in Furs. The work undertaken by militia and insurgent groups was said to be the result of an attempt to obtain power within Iraq and to create or recreate the state in a particular image. This, however, is a violent process; it is violent in the sense of the atrocities being committed on all sides (whether seen as legitimate or illegitimate violence), but it is also violent in the sense that identity formation is itself violent as it is based in an initiatory process. Masoch’s dialectical approach is based in the premise of initiatory violence. In this sense, the dialect follows a different path to both Marxian and Hegelian dialectics – it does not attempt to synthesize a thesis and an antithesis, nor is it an attempt to reconcile contradictions. Instead, Masoch’s dialectical approach follows what Deleuze has termed his “dialectical spirit,” which utilizes dialectical reversal, disguise, and reduplication in order to assess identity formation and with it the emergence of the new, whilst at the same time preserving a particular type of subject (in this case the state and group identities/positions within the state). In this way, Masoch’s approach demonstrates that dialectical movement can take place within a voided space; this is something that Hardt and Negri cannot account for in their non-dialectical approach to Empire and its relationship to the militant as multitude. By employing the masochian lens, it will be seen that the violence of militia/insurgent groups is not only initiatory, but also transubstantiatory. Dialectical Reversal The place of particular identities within Iraq has always been hierarchical; the Sunni minority has held the place of privilege and prestige

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over the Shiite majority in terms of governance. This ruler/ruled opposition was overturned with the removal of Saddam Hussein from power and the debathification process that ensued. From a psychosocial perspective this meant the destabilization of both groups within the social fabric; this called on members from both the Sunni and Shiite communities to reorientate consciousness towards the direction of a representative democracy, at least on the level of the official state. In other words, Iraqis were to be resubjectified along with the state. Resubjectification can be articulated in terms of a decentering of the subject since decentering removes the subject from the social space in order to reimagine and recreate that space, but also the subjectivity of the individual and group. This forms the dialectical reversal. In Iraq, the decentering was initially external; the US forced a regime change, which consequently called for Iraqi citizens to reimagine the state and their place within it. Subjectivity in Iraq has been scripted primarily along the lines of national identity, with parallel discourses of ethnic, tribal, cultural, religious, and class identities informing the sociopolitical make-up of the state. As it was previously noted, the 2003 invasion and the subsequent attempt to rebuild Iraq resulted in transforming subjectivity into sectarian groupings. In this way, the first instance of decentering can be seen by consciousness being redirected towards these groupings. Once set in this manner, it is possible to see a decentering of both the Sunni and Shiite populations along lines pertaining to status and economic positioning. For instance, Arab Sunnis were privileged under Ba’th rule and many were connected to Saddam Hussein’s regime through relatives or close friends. The privileging of the Sunni population, however, is something that has its roots in the formation of Iraq in the 1920s. As Amatzia Baram asserts, “generally speaking, the chances of a young Sunni Arab man finding a well-paying job in government service, especially in the security apparatus, were better than those of his Shi’i equivalent.”44 The pan-Arab ideology attached to the Ba’th Party did not allow for discussions pertaining to a Sunni-Shia divide, thus silencing questions about which group received more government jobs or privileges. If an individual was of Kurdish origin or from any other minority group they were further distanced from positions of power or influence by virtue of being non-Arabs.45 With the removal of Saddam Hussein from power and the attempt to recreate Iraq, Iraqi Sunnis lost this privileged position. For example, when the army was dismantled and the coalition forces began the debathification

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process, ex-army officers, security personnel, and Ba’th Party members lost their privileged status in the new Iraq. The loss of jobs that had provided not only prestige, but also economic security, in addition to the humiliation felt by individuals and the community as a result of this loss, serve as indicators of the experienced decentering. This is exacerbated further by the fact that their expertise is necessary for the state to rebuild its institutions; many senior and midlevel Sunni Ba’thists believe that they are the only ones with the knowledge to conduct state affairs. The removal of these individuals was part of the process of debathification; however, many Ba’thists were Ba’thist in order to advance their careers and to maintain their livelihood in a state that demanded obedience to the party.46 In this sense, individuals were removed from their posts based solely on sectarian groupings and Ba’th Party membership. Decentering is also seen in the positional shift of the Sunni tribes within the new Iraq. From an economic perspective, Sunni tribes had worked many of the border jobs. For instance, many tribesmen under Saddam Hussein worked as border guards. Tribes also earned money through transborder smuggling and had been given payment for “good behaviour” by the regime itself. Being a tribesman was also seen as being prestigious because of their motivation in battle and their loyalty to Iraq, which was due to the tribal code of honour.47 During the Iran–Iraq war, tribesmen were promoted in the armed forces at great speed, thus filling positions on the Mukhabarat. The loss of this employment after the fall of the Ba’thist regime and the increased difficulty for tribes carrying out cross-border smuggling signalled not only financial hardships but also a loss in status and prestige. This was further induced by the behaviour of US soldiers who conducted things like body searches on Iraqi women, which are seen by Iraqi families as attacks on their honour, and the US soldiers’ practice of pinning men down with their feet. In Bedouin tradition, exposing the soles of the feet is considered to be an offensive act given that it symbolically suggests that the one who does so is stepping on the one to whom it is exposed.48 From this standpoint, the loss of positioning by the Sunni minority has had the effect of taking Sunnis subjectively out of the state. Disguising/“Uniforming” Decentering forces individuals and groups to reorient consciousness and adopt a new identity. This is what Masoch refers to as the

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disguise function, whereby conditions of visibility are fabricated and are then imposed upon the subject. The hierarchy reversals that initiated the decentering of sectarian groups then prompted many to not only adopt sectarian identity more forcefully, but to also find a new place for themselves within the social fabric. Sectarian identity serves to create a space whereby the militant can act in order to negotiate the place of their group within the new state. For instance, militant groups utilize particular ideologies in order to regain what was lost or to create a space within the social fabric that the group can occupy. The mixing of both Saddamism and Islam within the Sunni Arab areas points to such an ideological reshaping, even if it is one that contains contradictions. This particular mix has been seen in Sunni neighbourhoods where one might read both the slogans “Long live Saddam” and “Jihad is Our Way!” This can be attributed to the Islamization of the regime in the last decade of Saddam Hussein’s rule, which served to bridge the gap between party members and non-party Muslims and some Islamists.49 In effect, Saddam Hussein created a Ba’thist brand of Islam, whereby a show of piety became a means to advance an individual’s career; following the demise of the regime, party members turned even more towards their religious traditions, some of them adopting more radical religious stances, such as the Salafis and Wahhabis.50 For the most part, however, Sunni insurgents move between nationalist, religious, and tribal identities. Within this cloaking there are two important factors that come to make up the Sunni insurgent: the first is pan-Arab nationalism and the other is a religious ideology based on the thought of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. The intermixing of these two factors provides the uniform that enables the creation of the Sunni insurgent. At the inception of the Iraqi state, the mixing of militarism, statism, and pan-Arabism fuelled Iraqi nationalism. Pan-Arabism was based in a vision of an Arab nation, which assumed a culturally concrete and politically unified form.51 In this respect, nationalism was underpinned by the idea that unity could be achieved by reinforcing cultural links between Arab people. The idea that one should subordinate personal and regional interests to national goals was also reinforced in order to orient the Iraqi consciousness towards pan-Arabism. For instance, the language policy saw standardized Arabic instituted, which replaced the whole-word method that was open to local variations and dialectical expressions, thus making the Baghdadi dialectic the official one of the state. Given that Baghdad

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has a majority Sunni population, this served to reinforce the primacy of that population since it meant that Shiites would have to recognize Baghdad as the state’s cultural center.52 In the 1950s, the Syria– Iraq scheme53 would be seen in the same light: it would reinforce Iraq’s position in the Arab world as a first step towards the creation of a pan-Arab state and when considered in terms of Iraq’s internal political arena, it would mean the definitive categorization of Iraq as a Sunni Arab state.54 In effect, the adherence to a pan-Arab ideology allowed for only one Arab identity, thus occluding the Sunni-Shia divide.55 After the US occupation, pan-Arab nationalism served a different function: it provided a respectable ideological legitimacy in the effort to return the Ba’th regime to power and/or to return the Sunni Arab community to its previous status through other means to reverse the ascendency of both the Shiites and Kurds. This is because the adherence to pan-Arabism enables the prospect of financial, political, and military support from the Sunni Arab world, especially the Gulf States, who object to the growing Shiite influence within the region.56 This shift in the orientation of pan-Arabism has enabled the formation of the Sunni militant under the guise of the need to preserve the Iraqi state as it was, thus providing security for both the Sunni populations and the Sunni Arab world. The turn towards religiosity provides a second part of the uniform adopted by the Sunni militant. The decline in Ba’thist ideological coherence and the refuge from the regime that mosques provided served as turning points towards Sunni religiosity within a secular regime. As Amatzia Baram points out, the Iraqi Muslim Brother Muhammad Ahmad al-Rashid is an influential figure in terms of orienting Iraqi consciousness towards Islam and towards instigating a revolution that would recreate Iraq as a religious state. Al-Rashid argued that in order to introduce Islamic change in society, there has to be a “deep conviction in the hearts of the people.”57 This was to be done peacefully, as Muslims organize educational activities to expand their ranks and deepen their Islamic education and conviction; however, al-Rashid branded most Islamic states as “pre-Islamic pagan Arab,” which delegitimizes these governments, but also accuses them of being guilty of apostasy. According to Islamic tradition, apostates should be killed. This means that although al-Rashid never stated it explicitly, he nevertheless implied that these regimes should be removed. In addition to this, al-Rashid advocated a “jihad of the sword.” This was not possible prior to the removal of Saddam

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Hussein as head of state because the network of fear and control made revolt unthinkable and because it would have opened an avenue for immediate Shiite ascendancy. In his view of jihad of the sword, al-Rashid looked towards the ideal jihad warrior, who can be described as a “man … attracted to battle, whether [in the way of] rejecting the oppressive [ruler] or fighting in the battlefield against the infidels.”58 In effect, al-Rashid provided Iraqis with a sense of value and mission in a place where their lives were threatened if they crossed a certain line. The removal of Saddam Hussein and the Ba’th party from power enabled a space to open for radical Islamic thought to be expressed openly. In this sense, Sunni Arab Islamists could now interpret what they read in the works of al-Rashid and others who encouraged them to follow the path of jihad for the purpose of returning the Sunni Arab community to its hegemonic status “under the banner of Islam.”59 From the perspective of Shiite militants, while decentering enabled them to occupy a place of dominance within Iraq, the uniforming took place in a different way to that of Sunni Iraqis. In effect, three different and competing groups exist within the Shia community: these groups include the religious hierarchy, the urban middle-class intellectuals, and the declining entrepreneurial and mercantile class. These groups have coalesced around the commitment to Iraqi nationalism, as well as, a unified Iraqi state. When Iraq was first constructed, the Shia religious hierarchy mobilized the rural population against the British in the name of Iraqi nationalism, whilst the Shia middle-class intellectuals helped shape the Ba’th Party’s nationalist ideology at its inception. It was believed that an Iraqi-centric approach would lead to a democratic Iraq composed of predominantly Shia politicians in the ruling regime; however, despite comprising the majority of the population, there nevertheless existed a division between Shia in terms of geographic and ideological arguments concerning the relationship between religion and the state.60 This divide has carried over into the present, whereby some favour a secular political platform that is focused on the principles of equality and democracy, whilst others prefer to orient the state towards Islamism. In addition to this, there is a divide within the religious hierarchy between those that remained in Iraq during Saddam Hussein’s regime and those who were exiled in Iran and other places. For its part, the Shia clerical establishment’s power and influence in Iraq have been tied directly to the power of the state and the regime’s

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policies concerning the ulama.61 Following the Gulf War, the regime allowed the Shia religious establishment to expand its charitable organizations. Ayatollah Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr used this to create networks through which he could disseminate his political messages. His sermons were critical of Saddam Hussein and called for an Iranian-style rule by Islamic jurists. After his assassination, his son Muqtada al-Sadr carried on his political endeavours. With the fall of regime, al-Sadr used the networks set up by his father as a system of local government; this served to fill the power vacuum, especially in Sadr City, where his militia, the Mehdi Army, worked to impose order on the population. In terms of the uniforming process, Sadr used rhetoric to merge militant Iraqi nationalism with a commitment to Islamic radicalism. This set him against the religious establishment, particularly Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani who believed that the Shia clergy should remain outside of politics.62 The uniforming of the Shia has also taken place in the more literal sense through the donning of the police uniform and with it the repressive and despotic persona of the political elite, particularly of those higher up in the chain of Ba’thist command. With the creation of the Iraqi Governing Council, groups such as the Dawa Party and the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (S CI RI ) have been able to gain political influence despite not having an organic base of support. For its part, Dawa has promoted national Islamism, whilst SCI R I has traditionally reflected Iran’s desire to unite the Iraqi Shiites against Saddam Hussein’s regime. By 2005, S CI RI controlled the Interior Ministry, and its militia, the Badr Brigade had infiltrated the Iraqi police; the Iraqi police became linked to death squads, kidnappings, and sectarian killings of Sunnis. By putting on the police uniform, Shiites could adopt the privileged role held previously by the Sunni elite, which was legitimized by its relationship to the coalition forces. The assumption of power by the Shia is reflected in the occupation of these posts and by the methods of control that are being employed in order to maintain power. For example, Hadi al-Amiri, the head of the Badr Organization, used coercion and control techniques to assert his power. As such, those who were part of the Badr Organization were afraid of him because he employed the type of iron fist reminiscent of Saddam Hussein’s regime. The donning of the persona of the political elite in the fashion adopted by Saddam Hussein himself attests to an assertion of political power and prestige. Furthermore, the adoption of ­politically correct rhetoric

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enabled the Badr Organization to gain political legitimacy in the eyes of coalition forces. For example, in an i­nterview with Charles Ferguson, al-Amiri stated, We are proud that when it was necessary to carry weapons, we carried weapons. And we are proud that when Saddam’s regime collapsed in April 9, 2003, we let down weapons with our full will without any exterior power asking us to do so…we believe in democracy, multiplicity, and the peaceful transfer of power through ballot boxes.63 While this suggests an interest in the creation of a democratic Iraq, the turn towards religious fundamentalism and traditional tribal behaviours actually reduced the rights and freedoms of many Iraqis, particularly women. In short, one can envelop himself in the correct rhetoric, but in the shadow state, politics is conducted through methods of control and coercion. In this sense, in order to maintain a hegemonic status, one must don the clothing of security, but it must be a chthonic security if control of the official state apparatus is to be maintained. Reduplication Uniforming is transformative; it takes the subject, who has been ejected from the social fabric, and reclothes them so as to create a new subjectivity. The call for democracy by both the Sunni and Shiite populations is a call for a new law – a law that is supposed to reinsert both the Sunnis and the Shiites into a new social totality whose foundations are democratic. The militant has become important in this respect because the violence carried out decides what new state will emerge, and consequently what the social contract and law will look like. This, however, is subject to reduplication, which is based on the re-interpellation of newly formed subjects into the social body. In this sense, the Sunnis, Shiites, and Kurds are reinserted into the social fabric through an initiatory violence that opens an avenue for newly formed subjectivities to occupy a newly created role within the social body. The ongoing violence in Iraq suggests that the reinterpellation of Iraqis has not yet taken place. One might, however, see the beginnings of this in the co-optation of Muqtada al-Sadr’s Mehdi Army into the Iraqi government. The Mehdi Army initially

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took an anti-coalition stance; they became a shadow government in many areas, particularly in Sadr City, Najaf, Karbala, Kut, Nasirriyah, Hillah, Diwaniah, and Kufa where, in April 2004, the closing of ­al-Sadr’s newspaper al-Hawza and the arrest of one of his senior aides invoked a violent uprising by Mehdi Army militiamen that led to clashes with coalition forces. Although there was a call for a ceasefire, mutual distrust between the government and militia members made it difficult to maintain the ceasefire. Intense fighting with coalition forces in Sadr City, with indirect fire aimed at the Green Zone, however, rendered it imperative to come to some agreement with al-Sadr. Under the terms of the agreement, militia members would receive compensation for turning in heavy weaponry and in turn they would let coalition and Iraqi Security Forces patrol Sadr City. Although many did not believe that the buy-back was successful in disarming the Mehdi Army, it allowed for al-Sadr to save face and to turn towards following the political process. The success of al-Sadr and those of his followers who ran in the 2005 parliamentary election64 enabled a smoother transition to take place from the elections to the national assembly.65 In this manner, al-Sadr was coopted into the political process and thus represents the beginnings of the process of reduplication. Reduplication requires the opening of a space so that the new subject can be reinserted into the social fabric. It has already been seen that initiatory violence is involved in the process of subject formation. Thus far, the violence has been seen strictly in terms of insurgency and not in terms of the process of initiatory violence and transubstantiation. This has led to a difficulty in creating the space for reduplication to occur. For instance, this is seen in the difficulty of dismantling the militias, which were no longer needed to provide security to population under the protection of S CI RI , al-Sadr, and Kurdish parties, given that they had won control of the official state apparatus through the electoral process. This is due to a variety of reasons. In the first place, in their attempt to deal with the violence of the insurgency, the Coalition Provisional Authority (C P A ) created C P A Order 91, which called for the disbanding of militias. Under this order, only Iraqi and coalition forces, licensed private security companies and contractors, and residual elements of militias who had signed up for transition and reconciliation were legitimate armed forces. In order to become a residual force, militias had to provide a list of its members to the Iraqi government; however,

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armed groups did not want to provide lists of names or register their weapons. In addition to this, C P A Order 91 promised that “those who fought against Saddam were, in fact, soldiers of Iraq in the ­truest sense”66 and would thus be eligible for pensions and other benefits. Again, however, many of the militants did not qualify for retirement pensions, etc. and Iraqi government officials were reluctant to believe claims to the contrary. Part of the problem was that the interim minister of defence did not want Islamists in the security forces, which excluded most militiamen from signing up; many of them also wanted to be brought into the security forces at a higher rank than that offered to them. Other programs for the militiamen, such as vocational and educational programs did not exist. One of the difficulties in negotiating reduplication is that while the insurgent multitude is supposed to use networks to create a movement towards democracy, protection calls first for the protection of the self and is then assumed to turn towards the protection of the other. In this sense, one can see that by giving control of the Ministry of the Interior to Byan Baqir Jabr, a member of S CI RI , protecting the sectarian self and protecting Iraqis in the name of securing the state becomes a contradiction. For instance, despite announcing his intentions to incorporate militia members into the security forces and thus providing them with legitimate employment, many Iraqis, particularly the Sunnis, felt that the Iraqi Security Forces would not provide the necessary protection and may even contribute to the violence being carried out against them. This was because within a fragmented state like Iraq, giving the leadership to a party who controlled one of these militias suggested that the security forces would be founded in sectarianism. This has proven to be the case. For instance, elements of the Mehdi Army have transformed themselves into the police in southern Iraq. Becoming the police has given them the power to decide on matters of justice and the method of dispensing it. Likewise, in Kirkuk, security forces have been accused of conducting illegal activities, such as arresting Arabs and Turkomen as part of a drive to increase the Kurdish population prior to the referendum on transferring Kirkuk to Kurdish control. In addition to this, remnants of the Badr Brigades, along with remnants of the Mehdi Army who operate in mixed Shia and Sunni areas, have conducted assassination campaigns, round-ups in Sunni neighbourhoods that have resulted in killings, as well as using torture techniques (some of which have been conducted within the building of the

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Ministry of the Interior).67 This has made it so that those wearing masks have become the protectors, whilst those in police uniform are the threat.68 Part of the problem has been attributed to leniency on the part of the Ministry of the Interior who believes that this is only part of the process of routing out terrorism.69 Given that counterinsurgency is a political operation, the military turn towards dealing with it has prevented a reintegration of Iraqi society.70 As such, as of the writing of this work, Iraq is only starting with the reduplication process. Through the dialectical process of dialectical reversal, disguise, and reduplication, what becomes evident is that the militant as multitude is producing historical movement with its negotiation of Empire. The creation of new subjectivities begins through initiatory violence – the dialectical sprit is itself violence. The proposition that “the violence or creation leads to the violence of recreation in a paradoxical attempt to secure or preserve the self” is seen in Iraq through this dialectical spirit. For instance, the Sunni militias are attempting to preserve Iraq in the image of Sunni dominance, which has underpinned the state since its inception; however, in order to do so, they need to recreate themselves and Iraq upon pillars that relegitimize their hegemonic status. Likewise, the Shiite militias are working to recreate Iraq in a particular image that will enable them to maintain their newly found status within Iraq; however, in order to do so, they are preserving the shadow state by employing the same political means that are found in that realm.

Conclusion Under the Ba’thist regime, security for Iraqis related to the chthonic security of the shadow state; however, officially, discourses of security imitated those ideas about what is considered a threat that are founded in the concept of state sovereignty, and which have also been seen as legitimate sources of threat within the international arena. Saddam Hussein’s security apparatus functioned in such a way that security came to be equated with regime security only, therefore working to remove human security from the enjoyment of Iraqis. Despite this, the hold that Saddam Hussein maintained ensured that insecurity led to a form of stability within the state; however, the removal of Saddam Hussein as head of state left a power void, which has seen the proliferation of insurgent/militia

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groups who are oriented towards protecting their sectarian groups, whilst at the same time struggling over hegemony of the shadow state – hegemony that will dictate the face of the new Iraq and with it control of the official state apparatus. The violence in Iraq cannot be assessed without taking into account that the nature and role of the militant in domestic and global arenas has been influenced by the various networks developed through globalization. Recall that Hardt and Negri defined Empire in terms of the globalized world, which is decentered and deterritorialized; the insurgent multitude acted not only as a counterforce to Empire, but also as an opposing force to it. Iraqi militant groups fit into the subject of the multitude in the sense that together they form a multiplicity instead of a uniform group. This was seen through an investigation of the various insurgent and militia groups operating in Iraq. In addition to this, it was seen that the propensity of the militant as multitude to resist Empire is complemented by the move towards producing and investing in biopolitics; the hegemonic struggle within the shadow state is evidence of such an investment. In this way, one can see the relationship between Empire and the multitude being played out in the Iraqi domestic arena. Hardt and Negri’s concept of the multitude and its relationship with Empire is only able to paint part of the picture of the dynamics of violence being carried out within Iraq. This is because the attempt to recreate the state requires some form of mediation that is able to negotiate the past and the present in order to produce a new ontology. In aesthetic theory, the space between the representation and the represented is where politics takes place; placing this in the context of Empire, mediation becomes important because it is politics. In Hardt and Negri’s discourse, mediations such as labour and religion lose their mediatory role due to a repudiation of dialectical thinking. Although there is a dialectical undertone that can be abstracted from their thinking, the repudiation of dialectics makes it difficult to think through subject formation (and particularly violent subject formation) in any meaningful way. Given this, it was suggested that in the context of Hardt and Negri’s thinking on Empire and the multitude, an alternative dialectical subject formation may be more useful in coming to terms with the struggle taking place in Iraq. The proposition concerning initiatory violence, which stated that “the violence of creation leads to the violence of recreation in a paradoxical attempt to secure or preserve the self” led to the abstraction of a new

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dialectic based on the mechanics of dialectical reversal, disguising/­ “uniforming,” and reduplication. The dialectical process abstracted from Masoch’s thinking is a violent process, which is itself initiatory. The subject is first ripped out of the social fabric, then reclothed, and then reinserted into a social fabric that is now different from the one they were initially removed from. In this sense, the initiatory violence of the dialect is transubstantiatory. Where we see social complicity come to the fore, however, is in the way that this transubstantiatory violence serves to preserve or secure the self. This is accomplished through the preservation of the chthonic security of the shadow state. Violence is legitimized through the discourse of self-preservation; however, it is also a preservation linked to hegemonic status and thus the shadow state. For instance, the violence being carried out through the infiltration of the Iraqi Security Forces by Shia militiamen and the meting out of violence in the name of protecting the newfound hegemonic position of the Shiites works to preserve chthonic security by re-instilling the methodology employed by the former regime as legitimate violence. This places Iraqi politics further away from the democratic politics that the militant as multitude is assumed to strive towards. While dialectical identity formation produces new subjectivities and inserts them into a new social fabric, transubstantiatory violence is paradoxical given that it also produces the necessary social complicity that ensures that self-preservation will maintain the traditional space of politics and with it the terms of violence. Through an assessment of all three propositions on transubstantiatory violence, the next and final chapter shows that the trial and execution of Saddam Hussein is able to highlight the disjunctions that arise from the attempt to negotiate between legitimate and illegitimate state violence.

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7 Saddam in Furs: Social Complicity and Regime Violence ... Revolutionaries wait For my head on a silver plate Just a puppet on a lonely string Oh who would ever want to be King? Coldplay, “Viva la Vida”1 You are not a dictator ... You were not a dictator ... The people or those who are around the official make him a dictator. Judge Abdullah al-Amiri, Iraqi High Tribunal2

Introduction The trials of Saddam Hussein for crimes against humanity, crimes against the peace, and genocide signalled a new chapter in Iraqi history. Regime change and the chance to use the law in order to come to terms with Iraq’s violent past were envisioned as a means to usher in a new Iraqi legal and political order. Unlike the trial of Slobodan Milosevic, who was tried for all indictments in one trial, it was decided by the Iraqi High Tribunal (I H T ) that the various indictments against Saddam Hussein would be split into a series of trials covering the offences allegedly committed during the reign of the Ba’thist regime.3 The first of these trials was that of Dujail, which began in ­October 2005. The Dujail trial against Saddam Hussein and seven co-defendants4 was the first trial to which Saddam Hussein would defend himself and it was only trial for which the prosecution was able to obtain a conviction. Accounts of the happenings in Dujail on

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8 July 1982 recount that Saddam Hussein had visited the predominately Shiite village of Dujail, which is located northwest of ­Baghdad. As the presidential convoy left the village, they were ambushed by a group of men who were hiding in the orchards. While the assassination attempt was unsuccessful and Saddam Hussein himself was uninjured, he nevertheless turned the convoy around and went back into Dujail in order to announce that he would find and punish those who were responsible.5 Ba’thist officials subsequently rounded up, detained, interrogated, and tortured many of the Dujailis in an attempt to determine their involvement in the assassination attempt. Given that Iraq was at war with Iran at the time, and that Dujail was considered to be a Dawa Party stronghold, the Revolutionary Command Council issued an order that authorized the expropriation of land in Dujail in order to search for weapons being hidden in the orchards.6 In the end, 148 men and boys from Dujail were charged and, on 14 June 1984, were found guilty by the Revolutionary Court for the assassination attempt, an offence punishable by death pursuant to the 1969 Iraqi Criminal Code. On 16 June 1984, Saddam Hussein issued a decree ratifying the death sentence that had been passed by the Revolutionary Court, which was a constitutional requirement for the death sentence to become finalized; the sentences were carried out in May 1985. The second trial that took place was the Anfal trial, which includes the events of the Anfal campaigns that were carried out against the Iraqi Kurds between 1987 and 1989. The Anfal campaigns refer specifically to the eight military campaigns conducted against the Iraqi Kurdish population near the end of the Iran–Iraq War, which saw the use of chemical weapons being employed against the Kurds. The 1980 Iran–Iraq War began when Saddam Hussein saw an opportunity to regain the lands lost by Iraq to Iran in the 1975 Algiers Accords.7 This prompted an Iraqi invasion of Iran, which resulted in an eight-year war that saw the balance of power in the region shift multiple times. Iranian gains in 1984 prompted Saddam Hussein to employ the use of chemical weapons in order to deal with Iran’s much larger and better equipped army; however, despite the successful employment of these weapons, by 1987 Iran was able to make significant advances into northern Iraq. Saddam Hussein attributed this to the collaboration of the Kurds and characterized the violence conducted against them as counter-insurgency measures that were to protect the Iraqi state during wartime.

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In order to deal with the Kurdish problem, Saddam Hussein gave his cousin Ali Hassan al-Majid, the task of dealing with Kurdish resistance forces.8 Al-Majid specifically targeted the Iraqi Kurds living in the more rural areas of northern Iraq and began his campaign against them by ordering the confiscation of property, suspending the legal rights of residents living in prohibited villages, and ordering the execution of first-degree relatives of saboteurs and those who had been determined to be hostile to the Ba’thist regime. By June 1987, al-Majid issued two successive standing orders that were ­designated to govern the conduct of the security forces through the Anfal campaign and beyond; this was premised on the notion that residents of prohibited rural areas were coterminous with Peshmerga insurgents. The first directive was a ban on all human existence in the areas that had been prohibited. This was to be implemented with a shoot-to-kill policy; the second directive expanded on the first by ordering random bombardments, which had the purpose of killing the largest number of people possible in the prohibited zones, capturing, detaining, and interrogating the villagers, as well as executing those aged between fifteen and seventy years old after any useful information had been extracted. Like the chemical weapons used against the Iranians, al-Majid also used chemical weapons against the Kurds. For instance, on 15 April 1987, Iraqi aircraft dropped poisonous gas (including mustard gas and Sarin) on the Kurdish Democratic Party (K DP ) headquarters in Dohuk, as well as on the  headquarters of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (P U K) in Suleimaniyeh. In addition to this, they dropped chemicals on the undefended civilian villages of Sheik Wasan and Balisan, killing over one hundred people, most of which were women and children. These attacks were the first of at least forty documented attacks that would continue for the next eighteen months.9 Using these methods, the Iraqi forces were successful in breaking Kurdish resistance, which alleviated the security issue that the Kurds represented. With the success of the Anfal campaign and the end of the Iran– Iraq War, Saddam Hussein issued a general amnesty for all Kurds on 6 September 1988.10 Despite this, the repressive measures continued due to the terms of repatriation which saw that the Kurds did not return to prohibited villages but were instead given new homes in camps near the larger cities; this served as part of the Arabization policy for northern Iraq. As a result of the actions undertaken by the Ba’th regime during the Anfal campaigns, Saddam Hussein and Ali

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al-Majid were tried for crimes against humanity and genocide. The prosecution was able to obtain a conviction against al-Majid, however, they had to acquit Saddam Hussein because they could not try  him in absentia (Saddam Hussein was executed prior to the ­conclusion of the Anfal trial). Taken together, the events of both Dujail and the Anfal campaigns tell a particular story about the way in which chthonic security operated during the time of the Ba’th regime. These two cases present us with an example of the pathological broadening of state power over the population, which is important because when one considers that violence has a transubstantiatory element, these cases elucidate how it is that chthonic security comes to inform the legitimacy of regime violence. As such, these cases enable us to unpack how it is that social complicity constructs the terms in which a regime can usurp the authority of law and bring violence to bear on the population. Although these two cases are of a very different nature, they are linked in the sense that varying aspects of both demonstrate the banality of violence and its legitimizing function. Three Propositions on Transubstantiatory Violence Recall that transubstantiatory violence was defined as a violence of creation; it means to change, alter in form or nature. It inaugurates the new, but is paradoxical in the sense that its elements also ensure the continuation of violence. The three propositions serve to pinpoint elements of transubstantiatory violence while at the same time demonstrating that this type of violence produces a social complicity that can lead to the sanctioning of otherwise illegitimate violence. This legitimizes regime violence in ways that renders it banal and thus leads to the production of chthonic security, such as that displayed by the Ba’thist regime. The three propositions on transubstantiatory violence are as follows: (1) the creation of social meaning is itself violent and this is demonstrated by the chthonic side of the contract which lays down a new law, but in doing so guarantees violence; (2) violence is tolerated and sustained in order to pursue an Ideal which is either constantly deferrable or impossible to reach; and (3) the violence of creation leads to the violence of recreation in a paradoxical attempt to secure or preserve the subject, whether the self is a corporate self or a human self. Each proposition was investigated in turn to see the way in which transubstantiatory violence

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worked in the Iraqi context. The first proposition assessed the demystification of the initial social contract produced through the creation of Iraq by the British and the mystification of the new social contract and the guaranteeing of violence that resulted from the 1958 coup/ revolution. This was followed by an assessment of the Iraqi communist movement through the second proposition. Here it was seen that violence was tolerated by the movement in an attempt to reach a deferrable Ideal due to the propensity of violence to signify sociopolitical movement. Finally, by looking at Masoch’s dialectical thinking in relation to the proliferation of militia groups after Saddam Hussein was removed as head of state, it was seen that violence undertaken by these groups in their attempt to consolidate power also served to recreate the terms needed to produce chthonic security. The removal of Saddam Hussein from power and his subsequent execution for the crimes committed in Dujail represent a critical point in not only the formation of Iraq, but also in the attempt to bridge domestic and international law within a newly founded judicial apparatus, the Iraqi High Tribunal. The first part of this chapter will look at the issue of complicity as it pertained to the Dujail trial. In this trial, Saddam Hussein and his co-defendants were charged and found guilty of joint criminal enterprise liability. This section will focus primarily on the testimony of Awad Hamad al-Bandar, former head of the Revolutionary Court, in order to show the difficulty of linking Iraqi domestic law with international law. By drawing on the notion of social complicity that was developed in chapter 2, it will be seen that the violence undertaken by the Iraqi regime was clothed in a law that corresponded with the terms of chthonic security. This is what makes it difficult to reconcile the principles of human rights with the principles of Iraqi domestic law. The second part of this chapter rereads Dujail along transubstantiatory lines, tracing the pathological broadening of state power that is evidenced through the Kurdish question in order to demonstrate how it is that the omnipotence of the regime was reinforced, thus leading to the sanctioning of displays of power such as that seen in Dujail. This deviation allows us to see an avenue through which the events of Dujail were linked into a wider system of repression carried out by the Ba’thist regime. To this effect, the Kurdish question will be looked at through the proposition that the toleration of violence in the pursuit of a deferrable Ideal works to reinforce and legitimize the regime in power that was developed in chapter 5. The sanctioning

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of violence in this way normalizes the violence that was experienced in Dujail given that it can be justified through a security discourse that is driven by the belief in the omnipotence of the Ba’thist regime. The issue of sovereign immunity that arose during the Dujail trial serves to highlight this problem. The third part of this chapter will then assess the execution of Saddam Hussein in terms of the chthonic side of the social contract and the power void that had been created as a result of the US and British occupation of Iraq. By drawing on the thinking developed in chapters 4 and 6, this section argues that the transitional space that was opened up with the removal of Saddam Hussein provided an opportunity for Iraqis to provoke a fundamental change in the constitution of the state; while the execution of Saddam Hussein is cathartic, it represents a turn towards mimetic desire that points towards the possibility of mystifying the new social contract that has  been imposed due to the regime change that has taken place. This chapter concludes by arguing that a deeper understanding of transubstantiatory violence and the social complicity it invokes is required in order to ensure that state and/or regime security does not supersede human security.

Regime Change: Chthonic Constitutions Approaches to state-making, such as the developmental, functional, and historical approaches discussed in chapter 4, saw violence as a product of modernization, power struggles, and independence movements. It was suggested, however, that the social contract itself generates violence. During Saddam Hussein’s regime, the state was considered on the surface to be a republic like it had been after the 1958 coup/revolution. With the removal of the Ba’th from power, Iraq entered into a grey area whereby the basic form of the state, and consequently a new social contract, was being renegotiated. As such, like the 1958 coup/revolution, the 2003 US invasion of Iraq represents an act of violence that destroyed the state as it was and sought to reconstruct the state in a new image. With respect to this, Masoch’s writings suggested that violence allows for an ontological change to take place; where the violence of law is seen in more traditional social contract theories as a sanctioned force, Masoch suggested that the contract-law relationship involved a mystification, thus rendering the contract-law relationship

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founding the state problematic. It was seen that the mystification entailed a forgetting of the origins of the law, thus silencing the ­violence of the founding act. This eventually enabled law to usurp authority and for chthonic security to take root: the violence of the law was directed at the preservation of the state; this was demonstrated in both the Anfal campaign and the events of Dujail. Legitimizing Institutions: Founding the State With the 2003 invasion, Saddam Hussein’s removal from power called for the reestablishment of Iraq’s governing authority. The Coalition Provisional Authority (C P A ) was created by the United States and others for the purpose of governing Iraq during the occupation. The C P A served as the governing authority until June 2004 when it was replaced by the Iraqi Interim Government. The interim government was subsequently replaced by the Iraqi Transitional Government, which had been elected 31 January 2005. This body was charged with drafting the permanent Iraqi Constitution. The permanent Iraqi government under the new constitution was able to officially take office in May 2006. The Iraqi High Tribunal On 10 December 2003, Paul Bremer signed Order No. 48 creating the Iraqi Special Tribunal (I S T ). The order promulgated the Statute of the Tribunal, which stipulated the court’s jurisdiction over war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide for the period between 17 July 1968 and 1 May 2003 when the Ba’th Arab Socialist Party was in power in Iraq. As Micheal J. Kelly highlights, the statute establishing the I S T that was drafted by the CPA contained all the necessary accoutrements that placed it as domestic law with “international” guidance given that it was a domestic Iraqi court that existed within the Iraqi judicial system under the authority of the Iraqi government.11 The defence in the Dujail trial argued that the Geneva Conventions prohibited an occupying power from dissolving domestic courts and  creating its own. For instance, Article 43 of the 1907 Hague Convention stipulates that an occupying power must respect the laws in force in the occupied country unless otherwise prevented. Article 64 also stipulates that the penal laws of the occupied country

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should remain in force unless they represent a threat to the security of the occupier and that the tribunals of the occupied territory should continue to function. The authoritative commentary to the Fourth Geneva Convention emphasized that the occupied authorities cannot abolish or suspend the penal laws, particularly in order to make them correspond with their own legal conceptions. The purge of the judicial system and the abrogation of the 1971 Constitution of Iraq violated these provisions. In effect, it has been argued that Order No. 48 created the IST by decree instead of by law. This violated the C P A ’s own constitution that said that special tribunals could not be established in Iraq. The restriction to a specific time also meant that the tribunal targeted specific individuals, which was confirmed in official statements by American officials. Despite being close to the occupying power, the C P A was far enough away to make the defense’s claims of illegitimacy of the court unsupportable. The IST became the I H T when it was formally embraced by the elected Iraqi government in 2006; this was seen as an essential element of the legitimacy of the tribunal, which had been originally designed by the occupying power. In light of arguments against the legitimacy of the I S T and I H T , the court argued that according to the two Security Council resolutions pertaining to the re-establishment of state bodies and the entity of rule of Iraq after the collapse of the authority’s establishments, the C P A temporarily exercised governmental powers. This was in order to manage the affairs of Iraq during the transitional period for the purpose of regaining stability and security, as well as forming the conditions that may allow the Iraqi people to determine their political future freely. Complicity: The Dujail Case Like modern international criminal tribunals, the I H T examined three modes of liability for each of the defendants: (1) “direct liability for giving orders, aiding and abetting, or personally committing criminal acts”; (2) “indirect liability for the acts of others stemming from participation in a joint criminal enterprise”; and (3) “indirect liability for the acts of subordinates under the doctrine of command responsibility.”12 According to Newton and Scharf, joint criminal enterprise liability is contingent on finding that the defendant had participated in a common criminal plan or purpose with one or more other individuals, and in addition to this, that the defendant knew about the common

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plan or purpose. For the purpose of determining joint criminal enterprise liability, the common plan need not be expressed. In the Dujail case, the defendants were found liable under the theory of joint criminal enterprise given that the acts carried out against the inhabitants of Dujail were not isolated; instead, they formed part of a larger picture of Bathist repression. Given this, it was determined that the lesser defendants knew what would happen to those they had informed on and helped to arrest; the higher level officials would have also had an awareness of the role they were playing in that repression.13 When one considers the legal definition of complicity, it is necessary to also look at the way that chthonic security operated in order to see that state repression is not so much a matter of the traditional understanding of complicity – in this case articulated as joint criminal liability – but more a problem of social complicity whereby official state institutions become overruled and subverted. In the case of the Ba’th regime, it has been argued that the creation of a parallel network of Ba’th party institutions, as well as a complement of nominally state-based institutions served to legitimize the regime. For instance, the criminal court system was frustrated by a system of special courts where the death penalty was used both routinely and extensively. In addition to this, the security apparatus permeated Iraqi life, thus normalizing insecurity.14 As noted in chapter 6, chthonic security is part of the shadow state, not the official state apparatus. In the shadow state, networks of privilege and prestige worked to determine one’s place within Iraqi society, and although politics worked differently in the official state, it was in the realm of the shadow state that control of the official state was determined. Chthonic security itself is the underside of security; in the process of creating regime security and with it state security, various Iraqi regimes used modes of repression, control, and coercion in order to create stability amongst a diverse population who had been brought together as a unit by external powers. On 15 March 2006, after hearing the prosecution’s case, the defendants in the Dujail trial were given the opportunity to comment on the testimony they had given to the investigative judge, Ra’id Juhi, prior to the start of the trial. The arguments made by Awad Hamad al-Bandar, the head of the Revolutionary Court who had presided over the 1984 Dujail trial, resonate with the problem of linking domestic law with international law. For his part, al-Bandar argued that according to Iraqi law it was a criminal offense to belong

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to the Dawa Party and that in this case the death sentence was applicable. In addition to this, the death sentence was also applicable to assassination attempts on the head of state. As such, given Iraqi law at that time, as well as the confessions and other evidence obtained, it was determined by the court that the defendants would be sentenced to death.15 In effect, Awad al-Bandar attempted to make the case that according to the law, a judge cannot be arrested or tried unless he carries out a proven crime; the execution sentence for the 148 men and boys from Dujail was in line with Iraqi law, thus the execution sentence given by the Revolutionary Court could not be considered a crime. The arguments made by Awad al-Bandar in the Dujail trial exemplify the tension between the turn towards responsibility in international law and the domestic laws that the Iraqi courts upheld. With the shift away from causality and towards responsibility, international law asserts individual responsibility and accountability for crimes against the peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. The individual is not only responsible for their own actions, but is also accountable given the types of enterprise to which he or she is a party. Finding Saddam Hussein and his co-defendants guilty of joint criminal enterprise is congruent with this understanding of complicity in international law. One of the main components in determining complicity is through the determination of the perpetrator’s knowledge and intent. Many critiques of the Dujail trial surround the complicity of Western powers in supporting the Ba’thist regime despite the assumption of reasonable knowledge pertaining to the human rights abuses being inflicted on the Iraqi population. The provision  of dual-use materials to the Iraqi government, which ultimately  served to help produce the chemical weapons used against the Iranians in the Iran–Iraq War and the Iraqi Kurds in the Anfal campaigns, serve as examples of Western complicity. It has been argued that the decision to construct the I H T instead of creating an international tribunal serves the underlying purpose of shielding international actors from criminal liability in some of the atrocities perpetrated by the Ba’thist regime. As a domestic court that found its basis in both domestic and international law, the I H T has the task of bridging the gap between these two realms of law. That makes the IHT unique in the sense that other courts trying heads of states and other officials are either ad hoc tribunals or international courts, like the International Criminal Court (I C C ).

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In the case of domestic law, complicity in a crime is articulated as an infraction against the state. This is seen particularly in those cases of victim complicity, where one participates in an unlawful act from which the law was intended to protect them. An example of this is statutory rape, where the minor consented to the act. Following the Hobbesian viewpoint that accountability for harms undertaken by the state lies not with the state itself but with its citizens, crimes listed in the 1969 penal code of which the inhabitants of Dujail were convicted follow the expanded notion of harm against the state to include harm against the regime. If this is placed within the space of chthonic security, one can see that the notions of threat and danger can be used to justify and legitimize the actions taken by the Ba’thist regime in the Dujail case from a legal standpoint. The creation of parallel institutions by the Ba’thist regime allowed the regime to expand the notion of complicity so that those associated with or suspected of associating with those who did (or were assumed to) pose a threat to the state could be found liable for acts committed by others. In the case of Dujail, the citizens of the town were found to be collectively liable by the Revolutionary Court. Actions undertaken against the citizens of Dujail were legitimized by constructing the inhabitants as a threat against the state under the assumption that Dujail formed a Dawa stronghold. At the trial, Saddam Hussein and the defence lawyers argued that the Dawa party was linked to Iran, and given that Iraq was at war with Iran, actions such as razing the orchards and investigations into the Dujaili citizens and their subsequent detentions were in accordance with the necessary steps undertaken to protect the Iraqi state. In this sense, chthonic security presents itself by removing accountability for harm from the governing regime given that the regime itself becomes the state. Thus, instead of the law working to protect the citizens and subsequently the state, it shifts to protect the governing regime from perceived existential threats. Chthonic security guarantees violence. Chapter 2 argued that in order to understand how this violence is guaranteed it is necessary to look at complicitous behaviours that construct the hegemonic framework through which the right to violence is legitimized. The sanctioning of a state elite, in this case the Sunni minority, worked to construct state security in terms of protecting the balance between Iraq’s varied population and ensuring that the Sunni minority retained their prominent position within the state. Foundational

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myths produced the gateway for normalizing and institutionalizing particular positionalities within Iraq; in order to negotiate everyday life, one had to internalize the elite’s norms and values. The underside to this is that governmentality then produces the necessary customs that are taken as consent, which in turn serves as a basis for legitimizing the security regime. This enables the governing regime to extract legitimacy for the violence committed in the name of security. In the case of Dujail, it was noted that the execution sentence enabled the Ba’thist regime to provide a visible demonstration of its right over life and death, which reaffirmed the law and with it the governing regime decreeing the law.

Dujail and the Kurdish Question The display of the regime’s claim to the right over life and death is rendered banal through the formation and workings of a hegemonic framework. Within this framework, the governing regime becomes not only omnipotent, but its leader comes to embody the state itself. Chapter 5 argued that the communist movement saw sociopolitical success in terms of violence being psychologically transformed into its opposite. When violence was experienced, it was aesthetically rendered so that it would be seen in terms of power instead of weakness. This, it was argued, enabled violence to become tolerable; however, this process also feeds back into the delusions of omnipotence of the governing regime, thus leading to the pathological broadening of state power. Although it does not directly bear on the events of Dujail, if one looks at the Kurdish question, it becomes evident that the Kurdish leaders followed a similar path to that of the communist movement in their attempt to make political gains and create an independent Kurdish state. A brief look at the Kurdish question from the standpoint of transubstantiatory violence informs us of the construction of the terms that enabled the broadening of power by the Iraqi regime, which was then experienced by the people of Dujail. The Kurdish Ideal: A Historical Background It was seen in chapter 5 that the Ideal forms the focus for political groups by providing a referent object of desire, which serves to fill a void in the social body. In the case of the communist movement, this was a democratic-socialist state. Unlike the communist movement,

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the Ideal state purported by the Iraqi Kurdish leadership was that of an independent Kurdistan. When the British obtained mandated control over Ottoman Kurdistan, the international community was oriented towards principles of sovereignty and self-determination within the nation state. At this point, the Kurdish question was rooted in the desire to form an independent state. Given the orientation of the international community at the time, the 1920 Treaty of Sèvres stipulated the creation of the state of Kurdistan and represented the first international document recognizing the rights of the Kurds.16 However, by 1923, the Treaty of Lausanne, which partitioned Kurdistani territory between Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria, ignored the territorial and autonomy claims made by the Kurds. This was due to the belief that Iraq’s economic viability was dependent on this territory despite the recognition that Kurdish ethnicity, along with the pan-Kurdish movement and the Kurdish nationalism tied to it, required a separate state.17 The desire for the creation of Kurdistan and the attempt to obtain self-determination and autonomy served to produce a number of uprisings within Iraq. For instance, after World War II, Mustafa Barzani led the Kurds in a revolt against the Iraqi government, which the Iraqi army was able to suppress. In this case, the creation of the Kurdish Republic of Mahabad18 in Iran served to orient Barzani’s focus away from territorial claims that would violate Iraq’s borders and towards what was then seen as an independent Kurdish state. With the collapse of Mahabad in 1946, the Kurdish leadership sought refuge in the Soviet Union. By the 1958 coup/revolution, the leadership was invited back to Iraq with the aim of reconciling with the Iraqi government. However, by 1961, the relationship between the Kurds and the Iraqi government had disintegrated and a new series of insurrections took place. This lasted until the second Ba’th regime, in which Saddam Hussein recognized territorial autonomy for the Kurds. By this time, the vision of Kurdistan had shifted to one of Iraqi Kurdish autonomy within a democratic Iraq. This vision is exemplified in the slogan “autonomy for Kurdistan, democracy for Iraq,” which was adopted by both the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KD P ) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (P UK ). The violence and repression experienced by the Kurds under the Ba’th regime served to shift the focus even further so that by October 1992, the Kurdish government “declared its ultimate intention of becoming a federal state within a future democratic, post-Saddam Iraq.”19

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The vision of the Ideal state serves as a referent object of desire, which became an autonomous Kurdish region within a federal democratic Iraq. It was argued in chapter 5 that desire is bound to its recognition by the Other, and according to Lacan’s definition of desire, it was seen that desire looks for unsatisfaction, thus rendering the Ideal deferrable despite its dual purpose of acting as the focal point for social movement. In the effort to make the Iraqi leadership see the need for social change, the communist movement used the phatasmagoric of the state as a mode through which social gains could be made. To this effect, they reimagined Iraq in terms of the two-stage revolution that possessed a national bourgeoisie who would be able to lead Iraq in socioeconomic development. The Iraqi communists thus engaged in “presencing” signifiers like the national bourgeoisie who corresponded to the stage of development envisioned; this served to defer the Ideal since it alienated those sectors of Iraqi society whose support could have enabled real political change. In the attempt to build a quasi-Kurdish state within Iraq, the split between the two rival Kurdish factions served to defer the realization of an autonomous Iraqi Kurdistan. The split within the KD P originated in the division between its conservative and traditional, tribal wing that was associated with Mustafa Barzani and its leftist, intellectual Marxist wing, led by Ibrahim Ahmad and then his sonin-law Jalal Talabani. The split was rooted in an attempt to conso­ lidate political power within the region. This served to defer the achievement of the Ideal due to a lack of consensus on the best way to exercise Kurdish autonomy. Omnipotent Delusions The relationship of violence shared between the KD P and P U K in their attempt to consolidate political power over the Iraqi Kurdistan served to indirectly reinforce Saddam Hussein’s belief in his own omnipotence and that of his regime. It was seen in chapter 5 that violence is symbolic of sociopolitical success when it enters into discourse as a psychological language and is aesthetically rendered to act as an indication of power, thus making violence tolerable. This was accomplished by enabling suffering to be reclaimed as agency. In effect, it was argued that the emulation of omnipotent power enabled sociopolitical movements to identify with the governing regime, thus providing a sense of control over the social space; however, it also

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reinforced the omnipotence of the regime by legitimizing its violence through a representation of that violence as the norm. The Kurdish leadership modeled itself on the Iraqi regime by emulating its control over Iraqi Kurdistan. In the case of the I C P , it was seen that power within the party was modeled on that of the governing regime. For the K D P , this is exemplified in the consolidation of power over the party that Barzani was able to gain. In 1964, for example, Barzani signed a ceasefire agreement with Baghdad without informing the K D P central committee. The central committee resisted Barzani’s rule in turn, which resulted in their exile to Iran. This incident led Iran to transfer its support from the central committee to Barzani, which then enabled Barzani to increase his control over the movement. This placed Barzani in a position to adopt the guise of the omnipotent power within Iraqi Kurdistan, which was consolidated even further throughout the 1960s when Barzani’s Peshmergas grew to more than 20,000 well-equipped fighters who were armed with anti-aircraft guns, field guns, antitank weapons, and had gained increasing Iranian support. This is significant because the Peshmerga forces used by both the K D P and P U K to exert control over various parts of Iraqi Kurdistan came to represent a power that could provide safety and protection to the Iraqi Kurds. The control that Barzani had over the Peshmerga, however, forced Ahmad and Talabani to return to the K D P and defer to Barzani who then had virtual control over Iraqi Kurdistan. The Peshmerga would later be used during intra-Kurdish fighting in ways that emulated the Iraqi regime such as the execution and torture of prisoners and civilians and in the violence against those living in opposition strongholds. Chapter 5 argued that the torturer, through the attachment of genuine omnipotence, can be transformed into the rescuer and that this served as a mode of demonstrating an understanding for the victim. This is seen in the Kurdish example through the reliance on Iraqi intervention in intra-Kurdish conflicts. For instance, despite being subjected to the Anfal campaigns, in October 1996 the KD P asked Baghdad to intervene in the conflict between themselves and the PU K . Barzani rationalized this decision as necessary to preserve Iraqi territorial integrity from being threatened by Iran, who was supporting the P UK at the time: “After the United States and the west refused to listen to us and help us, we agreed with the central government to end this foreign threat.”20 On 31  August 1996, a joint Iraqi-K D P strike force quickly forced the P U K out of Ibril. In

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this respect, the K D P reinforced the vision of Ba’thist omnipotence given that Saddam Hussein’s regime was given the role of “rescuer,” by acting when called upon to support the KD P . The creation of tolerable violence through the emulation of the omnipotence of the Iraqi regime served to reinforce Saddam Hussein’s own omnipotent delusions. This fed back into the wider spectrum of Ba’thist repression given that it sanctioned the type of violence that Iraq was itself utilizing to subdue the population. The events of Dujail then present us with an instance of violence that was not only normalized, but sanctioned through the emulation of the Iraqi regime by other political groups like the KD P and P U K. The Dawa party can also be read in terms of the phantasmagoric of the state: at outset the Dawa party envisioned Iraq as an Islamic state, thus offering a different vision to that of the governing regime. This was designated to fill a void in Iraqi society given that although religion still held a prominent place within Iraq, it was giving way to more secular ideals. The Dawa Party was able to use religion to gather the masses – religious and political programs, debates and open discussions, publications and mass demonstrations were all used to put pressure on the governing regime to pursue sociopolitical objectives that were based on the party’s ideological outlook. The Dawa party claimed responsibility for the assassination attempt on Saddam Hussein and, given that Dujail was considered a Dawa stronghold, the Dujailis were considered treasonous. Given the Dawa Party’s Iranian roots and the war with Iran taking place at this  time, Saddam Hussein was able to further the claim that the Dujailis were treasonous since the Iranians were considered to be enemies of Iraq. If one looks at the invasion of Kuwait that prompted the 1990 Gulf War, it is evident that Saddam Hussein’s megalomania and belief in his own omnipotence, as well as that of the regime, served to justify the violence carried out against others. Jerrold Post has argued that for Saddam Hussein, the realization of Ba’thist dreams is contingent on the unification of the Arab nation under one ruler – himself.21 This is exemplified, for instance, in his Victory Day ­message on 2 August 1990: The second of August … is the legitimate newborn child of the struggle, patience and perseverance of the Kuwaiti people, which was crowned by revolutionary action on that immortal day. The

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newborn child was born of a legitimate father and an immaculate mother. Greetings to the makers of the second of August, whose efforts God has blessed. They have achieved one of the brightest, most promising and most principled national and ­Pan-Arab acts.   Two August has come as a very violent response to the harm that the foreigner had wanted to perpetrate against Iraq and the nation. The Croesus of Kuwait and his aides became the obedient, humiliated and treacherous dependents of that foreigner. … What took place on 2 August was inevitable so that death might not prevail over life, so that those who were capable of ascending to the peak would not be brought down to the abysmal precipice, so that corruption and remoteness from God would not spread to the majority . . . Honour will be kept in Mesopotamia so that Iraq will be the pride of the Arabs, their protector, and their model of noble values.22 The reference to the “legitimate father” and “immaculate mother” in Saddam Hussein’s speech are suggestive of Saddam Hussein himself and Iraq respectively. This not only places Saddam Hussein in the paternal role, but it also serves to center him symbolically within the pan-Arab movement. Iraq as the “immaculate mother” also suggests the purity of the state which, with Saddam Hussein as the figurehead, can unite and lead all Arabs. In addition to this, the reference to Mesopotamia combines Iraqi heritage to the Mesopotamian past, thus relegating differences between Arabs to the sidelines, and opening a path for Iraq to take a central place within the Middle East. Any political or ethnic group that threatens to disrupt this image is then seen as an existential threat to the state and the Ba’th regime. Given that the sovereign state is traditionally seen to hold legitimate monopoly on the use of violence, Saddam Hussein and his regime could justify the use of violence against its own population since those like the Dujailis could be constructed as a threat to Iraqi security. The propositions on transubstantiatory violence suggest that there exists a third image that haunts the text and which can apply to the Iraqi state in general and Saddam Hussein in particular: this third image is of Saddam Hussein “in furs.” With this image, the furs serve to represent protection from the cold outside world – whether the outside world is seen as other states or whether it is seen as anything else that can be considered as outside of the Ba’th regime itself. The

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image of the furs, however, also represents a particular cruelty – the Other has to be skinned to produce the furs. This can be represented by the production of chthonic security, the respective wars against Iran and Kuwait, as well as the violence committed against both the inhabitants of Dujail and the Iraqi Kurds. Where the inside layer of the furs reflects cruelty (the bare inside skin of the Other), the outside reflects utilitarian warmth (the beautiful that protects from the cold); this image highlights that the governing regime is both protector, protected, and the source of violence. This parallels the images of the Grecian woman and her opposite, the Sadistic woman, which are both present in Masoch’s novellas, particularly Venus in Furs. When these images are attached to Saddam Hussein, one can see the bifurcation between sovereign protector (who demonstrates an Apollonian rationality) and sadistic despot (who is impersonal and without sentiment) that is created within his person. In relation to the position of the sovereign, one can see that a tension exists between the sovereign in furs and the Ideal sovereign. The issue of sovereign immunity that was brought up during creation of the I H T , as well as during the Dujail and Anfal trials, serves to highlight this tension.

S ov e r e i g n I m m u n i t y / I m p u n i t y The issue of sovereign immunity for Ba’thist officials arose through debates regarding the content of the statute of the I H T , and in particular with regards to the legitimacy of the court itself. Saddam Hussein himself highlighted the issue of sovereign immunity during the court proceeding against him by questioning the legitimacy of the IHT. For instance, prior to pleading not guilty to the charges against him, Saddam Hussein challenged the authority of the court by saying: “I preserve my constitutional rights as president of Iraq. I do not recognize the body that has authorized you and I don’t recognize this aggression.”23 When the formal charges were laid in May, Saddam Hussein noted, when asked to give a plea: “I can’t just say yes or no to this. I am the president of Iraq according to the will of the Iraqis and I am still the president up to this moment.”24 In the effort to defend Saddam Hussein against the charges of genocide and crimes against humanity, his defense team argued that the former Iraqi President was immune from prosecution given that “[he] had full immunity under the prevailing Iraqi constitution and you cannot have a retroactive legislation that removes that immunity.”25 Stemming from the quasi-theological notion of the divine right of

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kings, the concept of sovereign immunity developed in part from the Roman maxims that recognized sovereignty in terms of supreme legislative authority.26 This notion carried over into the modern world, where it became articulated through English common law as absolute immunity – not only did the notion that “the King can do no wrong” serve to exempt the sovereign from civil and criminal liability, but at the same time it placed the sovereign above the law by acknowledging that no legal right can exist against the authority that makes the law. The notion of sovereign immunity that later developed through customary international law became universally accepted as the standard protecting leaders and other state officials from prosecution for acts carried out in their official capacities as state representatives. In other words, sovereign immunity came to shield sovereigns from criminal liability for their actions.27 The attempt to use the sovereign immunity defense in Saddam Hussein’s case is fitting; in an effort to shield Saddam Hussein and the Ba’th regime this defense is able to draw on the debates con­ cerning intervention and the inviolability of international borders, particularly with regards to the general prohibition on foreign interference with a state’s internal affairs. This enables the defense team to make the case that in his capacity as president, Saddam Hussein was immune from prosecution whilst performing state actions.28 In effect, Tariq Aziz, Iraq’s former Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister under the Ba’th Party, cited the ex-president’s right to take retributive action in response to the 1982 assassination attempt. There are, however, two areas in which head of state immunity has been eroded: the first is in civil cases where the actions of the official in question were private, and the second is in cases where actions of the official are found to be in gross violation of international law, particularly with regard to the principles of jus cogens and violations to which universal jurisdiction applies. For instance, international agreements, such as The Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide and the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations – both of which Iraq is a signatory state – waive the right to head of state immunity. In addition to this, the Rwandan and Yugoslavian tribunals have specifically removed the right to immunity for heads of state and other state actors given that these courts are trying cases where the defendants are being accused of committing gross human rights violations concerning both genocide and crimes against humanity. The I H T has followed suit in removing head of state immunity as a viable defence. By rejecting the

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defence of sovereign immunity and superior orders, the I H T drafters built the concept of command responsibility for criminal liability into the statute of the court. In order to move around this, the defense team argued that the crimes Saddam Hussein and the Ba’th were accused of committing occurred during a time of conflict. This only served, however, to invoke the Geneva protections for civilians, which requires the prosecution of those accused of committing human rights violations.29 In this respect, obligation under the Geneva Convention surpasses domestic legislation, thus opening up an avenue for the prosecution of Saddam Hussein and other Ba’thist officials for the violation of human rights during the time that the regime was in power. It has been argued that in order to make this claim, the I H T needed to extend the international treaty dealing with the treatment of people in an occupied land at the time to the dealings of a state apparatus with its own population. In effect, criminalizing actions cannot be accomplished by extending the law beyond its remit at least in the legal sense. Up until 2003, Iraqi law had no legislation that domestically criminalizes actions that could be classified as war crimes, crimes against humanity, or genocide.30 As such, it has been noted that the retroactive application of criminal legislation is prohibited under both international and Iraqi law. Despite ratifying the Geneva Convention, Iraq did not pass domestic legislation which would have made indictment for crimes under the convention accessible through domestic law.31 Overall, the shift from sovereign immunity towards its opposite articulates that not only are heads of state and other state officials subject to the law, but that certain acts carried out in the name of the state are illegitimate. The difficulty with head of state immunity is that in the effort to enable heads of state to carry out their functions, it opens the way for an abuse of power. The defeat of sovereign immunity is intended to protect humanity from the atrocities that result from the unrestrained exercise of state power. This was first seen in the Nuremberg tribunal whereby the Nuremberg Principles specifically stated that heads of state or other public officials were not immune from prosecution.32 Under the 1970 Iraqi Constitution, heads of state enjoy immunity. For instance, section 40 of the constitution reads: “the Chairman of the [Revolutionary Command Council] RCC,33 his deputy and members enjoy full immunity and no action could be taken against any of them without a prior permission from the Council.”34 Given this, Abdul al-Ani argues that it would be difficult

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to deny Saddam Hussein and other members of the RCC the immunity granted by the Iraqi Constitution, particularly if Iraqi law is seen to be still in force. As such, al-Ani notes that even if the I H T was set up legally, it still would not have jurisdiction to try Saddam Hussein and other members of the R CC given the immunity granted under the Iraqi Constitution; instead, head of state immunity could be called into question if principles upheld in international law were breached and the trial was held in an international court.35 To have been able to mount the sovereign immunity defense, Saddam Hussein’s lawyers would have had to demonstrate that the US-led invasion of Iraq was illegal under international law, thus arguing that Saddam Hussein was still legally head of state.

E x e c u t i n g S a d da m H u s s e i n On 5 November 2006, Saddam Hussein was convicted of crimes against humanity and was sentenced to hang for the murder of 148 Shiites from Dujail. Death sentences were also given to Barzan al-Tikriti and Awad al-Bandar.36 In the trial court’s opinion, Chief Judge Rahman noted that the attacks on the Dujail civilians were not random, but appeared ordered, systematic, and deliberate. They were carried out to intimidate and terrorize the villagers of Dujail, which the court saw as being simultaneously in violation of customary international37 and Iraqi domestic law.38 In effect, under applicable Iraqi law the court stated that the party who orders the commission of a crime is deemed to be the principal perpetrator, who is thus more dangerous than the one who actually carried out the physical acts themselves. Given the evidence produced there was sufficient evidence to infer Saddam Hussein’s complicity in the acts; all accomplices to crimes such as Dujail are liable regardless of their particular role. In addition to this, given Saddam Hussein’s role as head of state, it was his job to prevent the crime or to punish those who committed the crime in light of his particular knowledge. Failure to do this rendered him liable for the crimes carried out under his command. By executing Saddam Hussein, the court was effectively castrating the state. It was seen in chapter 4 that the execution of the royal family served to castrate the state, which opened the space for a new state to emerge. Saddam Hussein’s execution can be read along similar lines given the equation between Saddam Hussein the individual and the Iraqi state that had been developed. For instance, Newton

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and Scharf have argued that under Saddam Hussein, the will of the regime became the sole criterion for the affairs of Iraqi society; Saddam Hussein’s word was law in both the figurative and literal senses.39 Given this, the drafting of the new Iraqi constitution and its implementation in conjunction with the execution would then serve as a marker for the start of a new social contract. The issue of the death penalty, however, suggests that Iraq may enter into a state where the origins of the law are forgotten. The death penalty has been seen as a legitimate penalty for criminal offences throughout Iraqi history. For instance, the 1969 Penal Code lists the death sentence as a viable penalty for criminal offences. International human rights law allows capital sentences in nations that have not banned its practice provided that the trial and appeals process meet the highest standards of due process.40 The Iraqi Interim Governing Council adopted the original tribunal statute in 2003 which permitted a range of punishments that had been proscribed in the 1969 Penal Code; legislation following the restoration of full sovereignty retained the language ensuring that it was made clear that the legislation was congruent with previous Iraqi norms. Despite this, the Tribunal and Appeals Chamber consistently argued that the norms of customary international law have direct application in Iraq. This highlights the question of legitimacy in upholding capital punishment as a part of Iraqi domestic law. There is a principle in international law called lex mitior which stipulates that if new laws or rules come into force between the alleged offences and the hearing of the allegations on them, then the sanctions that are seen as “more favourable” to the accused must be applied. This principle is one that has been incorporated in Iraqi Penal Code Law No. 111 of 1969, Article 2 and in Article 24(2) of the I CC Statute; this suggests its universal acceptance by most of the international community. The I H T was established in part to demonstrate the truth that the Ba’th regime abandoned its fundamental role as the protector of the people.41 In effect, the ethos of the Iraqi tribunal was to establish a lasting example of the power of the law as a way of recognizing and protecting the individual human rights of the citizenry.42 The slightly amended version of the statute of the I H T that was included by the Iraqi government one day before the Dujail trial started, however, included offences from the 1958 law on the “Punishment of Conspirators against Public Safety and Corruptors of the System of Governance.” These were the same laws administered by the Mahdawi court in its show trials after the monarchy was overthrown by General Qasim. This represents an instance of mimetic

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desire that forgets the origins of the foundations of the democratic republic first initiated by General Qasim, as well as the foundations of the shadow state.

Conclusion Iraq presents a unique site of investigation for beginning to think through how transubstantiatory violence and social complicity work to legitimize illegitimate violence. To this effect, the propositions on transubstantiatory violence that were abstracted from Masoch’s writings enable us to identify a different dimension to violence, which suggests that social complicity is present in the construction of the terms that legitimize illegitimate regime violence. For its part, illegitimate regime violence is normalized as state security that is privileged over human security. Threats to the regime are reconfigured as threats to the state, thus imbuing violence with legitimacy. The analysis of regime violence along transubstantiatory lines highlights an impasse between international human rights law and sovereignty. Where human rights law is centered on human security, the referent object of security is still the state. The Dujail and Anfal trials bring this to the forefront given that the atrocities were conducted under the rubric of state security, but also clearly demonstrated the usurpation of the social contract by the law itself, thus leading to human rights abuses. At present, violence continues to proliferate despite working towards building the foundations of a liberal democracy in Iraq. In chapter 6 it was seen that Masoch’s dialectic begins to enable us to see a different side of this violence; instead of for its destructive power, violence was carried out in order for various groups to stake a claim in the governing regime of the shadow state. In this respect, violence carries on the mantle of chthonic security replete with its mystifications and omnipotent delusions, albeit in new clothes. Overall, this work has attempted to demonstrate that as a theory of violence, transubstantiatory violence offers an avenue for developing an understanding of social complicity. As such, it also opens the door for future research to be carried out in the area of chthonic security and its impact on both the domestic and international laws governing the use of regime violence.

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Afterword

Much is owed to Deleuze’s essay Coldness and Cruelty. His literary analysis of Masoch and Sade served to demonstrate not only the ­difference between both authors, but it also helped to identify and extract the pornological language that characterizes their respective works. Pornological language confronts language at its own limits, enabling a new becoming to emerge. This becoming is a violent one,  but its violence is the product of education and persuasion. Given this, The Politics of Conflict: Transubstantiatory Violence in Iraq set out to develop an analytic of violence out of the Deleuzian interpretation of Masoch’s work. The three propositions on transubstantiatory violence served as such an analytic. It became apparent throughout the development of transubstantiatory violence that Masoch’s thought pointed towards what I call “social complicity.” In turn, social complicity was defined as a non-blameworthy type of complicity as compared to that which is articulated in both the domestic and international legal realms. In effect, social complicity centres on desire and in doing so it points to the problem of legitimizing violence through aestheticization. Masoch’s work is fundamentally political. Writing in the late 1800s, he had witnessed the Polish peasant uprisings, the ghettoization of the Jews, and the impoverishment and oppression of various peoples within the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Masoch drew upon his personal and political experiences in order to write his novellas. As such, one can discern the presence of the chthonic security state underlying his writing. The chthonian presents us with the underside to security and in doing so points towards instances where regime security supersedes human security. Given that Iraq represents the

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chthonic security state, The Politics of Conflict used Iraq as a site of investigation in order to think through the triad of transubstantiatory violence, chthonic security, and social complicity in the context of a contemporary political example. The reading of Iraqi politics along transubstantiatory lines served to demonstrate how it is that social complicity arises through the aestheticization of violence that is tied to the dual process of instigating the “new” and becoming. The analytic of transubstantiatory violence is useful in cases where we see an attempt to become. For instance, in 2010 the world witnessed the Arab Spring. First citizens in Tunisia, then Egypt, Yemen, Bahrain, Libya, and Syria called for regime change from oppressive governments. In so doing, they were calling for a new social contract that would recreate the state in a new image. Read along masochian lines, what we can potentially find in these types of examples is a founding violence that represents the phantasmagoric of the originary condition from which the state is produced. The Originary Condition What is this originary condition? Masoch combines the JudeoChristian world with that of the Greeks: from the Judeo-Christian, he brings forth the heritage of Cain; from the Greeks he draws upon Aphrodite. The cold, hard statue of the goddess of love that is seen in Venus in Furs combines the two worlds in an image of violence and love. Masoch approaches initiatory violence through the chthonian. When approached in this way, the emerging subject is out of sync with the structures that bind it to the already-present Being. God represents the already-present Being in Judeo-Christian and Islamic theology. Consider, for example, that the founding of a democraticreligious state is premised on the basis that as the creator God has right over humanity. In Judeo-Christian thinking, God created Eve out of Adam’s rib, whereas in Islamic theology, Adam and Eve are created from a single soul.1 Unlike in Judeo-Christian theology, the common soul shared by Adam and Eve in Islamic theology renders the sexes equal. This is corroborated by the reference to the word “minha” in the Qu’ranic phrase “wa khalaqa minha zawjaha” which means “and created from it its pair.” “Minha” is a female singular, which means that “it” does not refer to Adam, but to the single soul.2

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As such, in Islamic theology, the originary condition is one of ­equality presented as the single soul from which humanity is born. When looked at through the chthonian, the originary condition takes on a different form. The chthonic is earthbound and chaotic. The binding to the earth suggests a grounding that ties us to the order of Nature. The originary in the order of Nature is what becomes; it becomes in violence. And, by being tied to the ground, the originary condition is one of enslavement. When linked to the chthonian, becoming is a metaphorical enslavement to the universal. In Judeo-Christian theology this is symbolized by Abel’s blood, which cries out to God from the ground and whose reception in the earth serves to curse Cain.3 With this in mind, Masoch’s work draws on the chthonian in two ways: (1) Violence serves to render the body neutral so that the “new” man can emerge; and (2) Masoch’s “new” man is one who is not reborn in the father’s image. Instead, the new man is solely born from the mother’s image. His utilization of the originary condition is ultimately chthonic. The mother image is a direct link to the earth, the father image is negated, and the “new” is conceived in the violent process of rebirth. The entire process is undertaken for the purpose of securing humanity. Masoch’s world opens an avenue for more research to be done on the chthonic side of the social contract. The creation of the 2005 Iraqi Constitution as well as, for instance, the recreation of the Egyptian Constitution following the Arab Spring could serve as starting points for such an exploration. In the Iraqi case, the preamble to the Constitution speaks of a founding violence by referring to “Iraq’s martyr’s,” “the darkness of the ravage of the holy cities,” being “burnt by the flames of the grief of the mass graves,” the oppression Iraqis had faced, “accusations of being infidels,” and having to fight through sectarian strife and terrorism to remake Iraq.4 The founding violence presents itself as the phantasmagoric of the originary condition: in and through violence, the Iraqi state is reborn – and it is reborn equal given that it is not only based on Islam, but it includes all Iraqis in the founding violence. This was made possible because the images of violence, suffering, and oppression that are expressed in the constitutional preamble can be equated with the Ba’th regime’s secular orientation; this serves to associate secularism with repression. With the removal of Saddam Hussein from power, Iraqis were now able to express their religion more openly and the political-religious dialogue that ensued was one that

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saw religion as a way to counter a resurgence of Ba’thist Iraq, as well as the occupation by coalition forces.5 What this highlights is that initiatory violence presences a democratic-religious state that is identified through the 2005 Iraqi Constitution. The Law-Contract Relationship Recall that the chthonic side of the social contract ensured that the law would come to violate the social contract that gave birth to the new state. In doing so, the contract-law relationship becomes mystified so that it becomes difficult to see the law usurp authority from the social contract. Legislative language provides a mode through which this occurs. One can begin to see the mystification of the social contract through the example of the tension in Iraqi family law between terminologies that are designated as being specifically Shiite or Sunni in nature. Both Shiite and Sunni juridical rules stipulate that only the husband has the right to a unilateral divorce; however, the wife can obtain this right when negotiating the marriage contract.6 According to Haider Ala Hamoudi, Sunni Arabs refer to the woman’s right as a “divorce by delegation” whereas Shia Arabs refer to this as a right that is given through “agency.”7 The 1959 Personal Status Code, Article 34(1) recognizes both terminologies; however, the 1980 amendment, which was created to prevent the husband from giving a third party the right to issue a divorce, served to ban all divorces by agency. The privileging of Sunni terminology in the amendment ensured that Shia women would no longer be able to obtain a divorce by agency, thus removing their power to unilateral divorce.8 If we now turn to the 2005 Constitution, what we find is the inclusion of Article 41, which provides Iraqis with the freedom of religion.9 By providing the right to live by one’s own rules of religion, the constitution appears to open an avenue through which Shia women can reclaim the power to “divorce by agency.”10 This avenue opens up even more so given the inclusion of Article 14, which bans discrimination based on gender.11 Where we see a mystification occur in constitutional language is with the requirement of Article 2 for enacted laws to remain within the established rules of Islam. Article 2 states that “Islam is the official religion of the State and it is a fundamental source of legislation” and guarantees the “Islamic identity of the majority of the

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Iraqi people … the full religious rights of all individuals to freedom of religious belief and practice such as Christians, Yazedis, and Mandi Sabeans.”12 To this effect, no law contradicting “the established provisions of Islam,” “the principles of democracy,” or “the rights and basic freedoms stipulated in [the] constitution” may be established.13 Iraqi Shiites follow the Usuli school of Islamic jurisprudence, which sees Islamic law as being derived from reasoning and the interpretation of the Prophet Muhammed, as well as the imams. As such, the interpretation of Islamic law is seen as being within the domain of the Ulama.14 As Hamoudi writes, the Iraqi Federal Court is reluctant to rule on issues dealing with Article 2 because it requires judges to interpret what Islamic legislation means.15 Under the new regime, the inclusion of Article 2 and the reluctance of the Federal Court to overstep the Ulama in their interpretation negates that religious courts differ in their interpretations of Islam and vary in the strictness of the application of Islamic Law.16 Given this, one can begin to see how it is that law begins to usurp the authority of the social contract given that the difficulty of making Article 2 judgments has the added effect of frustrating the ability for women to invoke the rights given to them by Article 14 and Article 41. If we recall the Islamic principle of equality, which is essential to the originary condition of the social contract underpinning the constitution, then it becomes apparent that Article 2 acts on the social contract in such a way that it negates the very foundation it is meant to preserve. This example shows that by providing an alternative avenue for understanding the contract-law relationship, Masoch’s work is able to highlight the difficulty of maintaining the universals enshrined in written contracts, like the constitution, and calls for more research to be done on the contract-law relationship. Human Rights One of the issues that the mystification of the social contract brings to the forefront is that of human rights. It was seen throughout this work that social complicity raises the question of legitimate and ­illegitimate violence. As such, an area for further research might include the turn towards internationalized civil war and the War on Terror in the post-9/11 era. While many authors have argued that the definition of a terrorist depends on one’s standpoint or perspective (i.e.  one person’s terrorist is another’s freedom fighter), law

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defines terrorism in terms of an act of illegal violence that should be prosecuted and punished as a criminal act.17 In the post-9/11 era, international civil war has created a grey area for the law since what has now been termed as “new war” is fought by states against nonstate actors. Furthermore, if one considers that law is what distinguishes terrorism from legitimate (and legally tolerated) forms of political violence, such as interstate warfare, civil wars, war of national liberation,18 then one’s particular designation as an actor (whether it is a soldier, civilian, insurgent, or terrorist) plays an important role in determining one’s status under the law. One of the underlying problems that a masochian approach can help think through is the mystification of the legality of war. For instance, Costas Douzinas writes that in the contemporary world, “[the] main character of the new moral order is precisely that it does not make clear distinctions between moral and legal arguments or between enemies and criminals.”19 What can be found is that in fighting the War on Terror, law and violence become intertwined so that “acts of legal enforcement repeat the original law-making violence that established the law.”20 In this sense, when addressing the figure of the soldier/terrorist/insurgent law becomes a vehicle of power instead of acting as the legal regulation of war. The mystification of the law can also be seen in foreign policy initiatives. For instance, in the wake of the attack on the U S S Cole, President Clinton authorized a cruise missile strike on a suspected hideout of Osama Bin Laden. This strike was presented as a traditional (legal) military act, which in turn demonstrated a desire for foreign policy to stay within “legally” accepted methods of warfare. This changed under President Bush after 9/11, with the construction of the detention facility for suspected terrorists at Guantanamo Bay. This facility indicates a desire to operate outside of international law, albeit somewhat covertly, in combatting the purported terrorist threat given that various forms of torture and detention are seen as necessary to combatting terrorism. Finally, under President Obama, there is evidence of a willingness to openly operate outside of the traditional methods of international law. This is demonstrated by the authorized killing of senior al-Qaeda leader Anwar al-Awlaki, who was killed  in Yemen alongside Samir Khan, by a CI A-led US drone strike – both were American citizens. This operation not only violated the sovereignty of another state, but it presented the uncontestable imposition of the death penalty on US nationals as legally

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legitimate under the pretext of war (and in response to purportedly organizing crimes against humanity). This discussion is particularly important since there is a lack of consensus on the legal rules pertaining to how the War on Terror is waged, and because the application of rights under the law is determined by the status of the individual who is party to a conflict (for instance, an individual who is designated as a terrorist is not considered party to the Geneva Conventions). As such, this has posed a legal problem with respect to securing human rights, as well as determining the proper legal procedures for addressing each particular case. Like with the dis­ cussion of the Iraqi constitution and the mystification of the social contract, the masochian approach has the potential of providing an avenue for looking at the way in which the subject comes to occupy their place within the international legal realm and the impact this has on rights.

Conclusion What I have tried to briefly demonstrate is that Masoch’s thought has the potential for a wider application in philosophy, political theory, gender studies, law, and international relations. An exploration of the chthonic side of the social contract and the potential application of Masoch’s thought with regards to human rights and foreign policy provide avenues through which future research can be made. In effect, this is enabled through Masoch’s creation of an entirely original language. For instance, the concept of chthonic security which was derived from Masoch’s thinking presents a different avenue for understanding the security/insecurity dichotomy and for providing a means to transcend their opposition. As seen in chapter 1, chthonic security differs from other approaches to security in its insistence on approaching security from the inside of security itself. As an alternative approach to security, it also builds on the literature by providing a new concept and lens through which issues of security can be assessed. As such, the concept of the chthonian offers a starting point for more research to be made at both the theoretical and practical levels by enabling us to approach other concepts and/ or issues from a different angle. Given this, Masoch’s world serves as a new theoretical domain that thinkers can tap into in order to further develop an understanding of politics and violence.

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Notes

chapter one   1 Grenfell and James, “Debating Insecurity in a Globalized World,” 3, 7.   2 Weber, “Politics as a Vocation,” 78.  3 Hobbes, The Leviathan.  4 Collins, Contemporary Security Studies, 2.   5 Ayoob presents but one definition of security that has emerged since ­security studies developed as a discipline following the Cold War. Collins “Introduction: What is Security Studies,” 3. Ayoob, The Third World Security Predicament. Smith, “The Contested Concept of Security.”   6 The Copenhagen School is a school of academic thought that emphasizes the social aspect of security. Key thinkers within this school include Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde.   7 Pauline Kerr has noted that the terms “threat” and “means” both serve as points of contention. Kerr argues that security can be seen on the one hand in terms of freedom from fear and on the other hand in terms of freedom from want. Kerr, “Human Security,” 123, 126.   8 Jackson, “Regime Security,” 191.   9 Larry May discusses this in terms of the creation of customs and consent in international law with regards to the relationship between states within the global arena. May’s discussion, however, can be used to see the internal dynamic of authorizing a governing regime outside the democratic framework. May, Crimes Against Humanity, 57. 10 Sisson and Wierda, “Political Pedagogy, Baghdad Style,” 237. 11 May, Crimes Against Humanity: A Normative Account, 57. 12 Paglia, Sexual Personae, 5.

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13 Booth and Wheeler, The Security Dilemma, 1. 14 Ibid, 4–5. 15 Tripp, A History of Iraq, 2. 16 Talcott Parsons, Politics and Social Structure, 34. 17 Hindess, Discourses of Power, 10–11. 18 Walter Benjamin, “Critique of Violence,” 280. 19 Martin, “The Violence within the Sovereign Decision,” 85. 20 Abbott, “The Creature before the Law,” 82. 21 Martin, “The Violence within the Sovereign Decision,” 85, 87. 22 Abbott, “The Creature before the Law,” 83. 23 Scott discusses this in terms of the relationship between domination, ­subordination, false consciousness, and hegemony. Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts, 70. 24 Bleiker, Aesthetics and World Politics, 2. 25 Ibid., 19. 26 Rancière, Dissensus, 139. 27 Ibid., 69, 139. 28 Ibid., 119. 29 Ibid., 141. 30 Ibid., 92. 31 Ibid., 100–1. 32 Deleuze and Guattari, What Is Philosophy?, 175. 33 Deleuze, Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation, 31. 34 Ibid., 40. 35 Patton, Deleuze and the Political, 70–1. 36 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, 292. Patton, Deleuze and the Political, 71. 37 Patton, Deleuze and the Political, 72. 38 Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement Image, 18–22. 39 Ibid., 23. 40 Patton, Deleuze and the Political, 80. 41 Ibid., 80. 42 Bensmaïa, “Foreword: The Kafka Effect,” xvi. 43 Deleuze and Guattari, Kafka: Towards a Minor Literature, 28. 44 Ankersmit, Historical Representation, 205. 45 Deleuze, “Coldness and Cruelty,” 16. 46 Ibid., 17. 47 Ibid., 19. 48 Ibid., 20. 49 Ibid., 22.

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50 Ibid., 21. 51 Ibid., 22. 52 Ibid., 23. 53 Ibid., 18. 54 Ibid., 22. 55 Krafft-Ebing, Psychopathia Sexualis. 56 Freud, “The Economic Problem of Masochism.” 57 Werner, Darwinismus und Literatur, 109. 58 Kaufmann,“Slawische Exotik und Habsburger Mythos: Leopold SacherMasoch’s Galizische Erzählungen,” 175–190. Noyes, Mastery of Submission: Inventions of Masochism. Leopold Sacher-Masoch, A Light for Others and Other Jewish Tales from Galicia. 59 Koschorke, Leopold von Sacher-Masoch: Die Inszenierung einer Perversion. Ulrich Bach, “Sacher-Masoch’s Utopian Peripheries,” 1–2, 5. 60 Bruck, “Die Gartenlaube für Österreich.” Bach, “Sacher-Masoch’s Utopian Peripheries,” 7. 61 Leopold Sacher-Masoch, Gartenlaube für Österreich. Bach, “SacherMasoch’s Utopian Peripheries,” 17. 62 Leopold von Sacher-Masoch was born in 1836 in Lemberg, Galicia. His father was Don Matthias Sacher, a Spanish nobleman who became the director of police in Lemberg; his mother was Charlotte von Masoch, a Russian noblewoman. 63 Deleuze, “Coldness and Cruelty,” 12. 64 Bach, “Sacher-Masoch’s Utopian Peripheries,” 17. 65 Ibid., 17. 66 Deleuze, “Coldness and Cruelty,” 9. 67 Bach, “Sacher-Masoch’s Utopian Peripheries,” 205. 68 Bruck, “Die Gartenlaube für Österreich” 389. Bach, “Sacher-Masoch’s Utopian Peripheries,” 9. 69 Bach, “Sacher-Masoch’s Utopian Peripheries,” 1–2, 15. 70 Deleuze, “Coldness and Cruelty,” 12. 71 Irwin, “The Cruelty Beyond Cruelty: Deleuze and the Concept of Masochism.” 72 Gilles Deleuze, “Mysticism and Masochism,” 131. 73 Ibid., 132. 74 Tilly, “Western State-Making and Theories of Political Transformation.” 75 Ayoob, “State Making and Third World Security.” 76 Jacques Lacan, “Of Structure as an Inmixing of an Otherness Prerequisite to Any Subject Whatever.” 77 Hardt and Negri, Empire.

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chapter two  1 Kaspersen, Anthony Giddens: An Introduction to a Social Theorist, 186.  2 Clausewitz, On War, 13.   3 Ibid., 28.  4 Arendt, On Violence, 51.  5 Hassen, Critique of Violence, 24–6.  6 Brennan, Max Weber on Power and Social Stratification, 219.   7 Turner and Factor, “Decisionism and Politics: Weber as Constitutional Theorist,” 340.   8 Weber, “Politics as a Vocation,” 77.   9 Ibid., 334. 10 Kaldor, Human Security. Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars. 11 Daniel W. Smith, “Deleuze and Derrida, Immanence and Transcendence,” 50. 12 Levinas, Collected Philosophical Papers. 13 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, 174. 14 Knowles, Hegel and the Philosophy of Right, 94. 15 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, 95. 16 Ibid., 189. 17 Butler, The Psychic Life of Power: Theories in Subjection, 35–43. 18 Butler, Subjects of Desire: Hegelian Reflections in Twentieth-Century France, 56. 19 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, 195. Butler, Subjects of Desire: Hegelian Reflections in Twentieth-Century France, 57. 20 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, 195. 21 Butler, Subjects of Desire: Hegelian Reflections in Twentieth-Century France, 6. 22 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, 167. 23 Butler, Subjects of Desire: Hegelian Reflections in Twentieth-Century France, 27. 24 Ibid., 28. 25 Sacher-Masoch, “Venus in Furs,” 147. 26 Deleuze, “Coldness and Cruelty,” 32–3. 27 Miller, The Passion of Michel Foucault, 197. 28 Ibid., 197. 29 Derrida, “Heidegger’s Ear: Philopolemology.” 30 Žižek, Violence, 176. 31 Beardsworth, Derrida and the Political, 23. 32 Benjamin, “Critique of Violence,” 56.

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33 Hassen, Critique of Violence: Between Poststructuralism and Critical Theory, 19–23. 34 Fritsch, The Promise of Memory: History and Politics in Marx, Benjamin, and Derrida, 7. 35 Žižek, Violence, 201. 36 Derrida, Speech and Phenomena and Other Essays on Husserl’s Theory of Signs, 68. 37 Ibid., 104. 38 Beardsworth, Derrida and the Political, 145. 39 Deleuze, “Coldness and Cruelty,” 50. 40 Hobbes, Leviathan, 86. 41 Parrish, “Derrida’s Economy of Violence in Hobbes’ Social Contract,” 9. Quoted from Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Edwin Curley (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Inc.), XIII.4. 42 Hobbes, Leviathan, 86. 43 Parrish, “Derrida’s Economy of Violence in Hobbes’ Social Contract,” 7. Quoted from Thomas Hobbes, Philosophical Rudiments Concerning Governments and Society [De Cive] (1651), XVIII.4. 44 Parrish, “Derrida’s Economy of Violence in Hobbes’ Social Contract.” For example, Hobbes writes that “the nature, disposition, and interest of the speaker, such as are the names of virtues and vices; for one man calleth wisdom, what another calleth fear; and one cruelty what another justice.” Hobbes, Leviathan, 23. 45 Hobbes, Leviathan, 66. 46 Ibid. 47 Schinkel, Aspects of Violence: A Critical Theory, 97. 48 Buonamano, “The Economy of Violence: Derrida on Law and Justice,” 176. Derrida, “Force of Law: The Mystical Foundation of Authority.” 49 Derrida, “Force of Law: The Mythical Foundation of Authority,” 103. 50 Deleuze, “Coldness and Cruelty,” 92. 51 Ibid., 88.

chapter three   1 On 5 November 2006, the Iraqi High Tribunal found Saddam Hussein guilty of murdering 148 Shia men and boys from Dujail. The former Iraqi president was given the death sentence, which was upheld by the appeals court. Saddam Hussein was executed on 29 December 2006. His abrupt execution has left the other trials, particularly the trial for the crime of genocide against both the Kurds in the North of Iraq and the Shias in the

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South, unresolved. Kelly, Nowhere to Hide. Scharf and McNeal, Saddam on Trial.  2 George, Western State Terrorism. Adam Jones, “Introduction: History and Complicity.”  3 Kutz, Complicity: Ethics and Law for a Collective Age, 2.  4 Lando, Web of Deceit.   5 Adam Jones, “Introduction: History and Complicity.” Peter Stoett, “Shades of Complicity: Towards a Typology of Transnational Crimes against Humanity,” 31–49.  6 Lando, Web of Deceit.   7 While it is obvious that individuals are the ones engaging in practice, the point that should be reinforced is that people engage in certain everyday practices that do not challenge the status quo because of the belief that dissidence can lead to the situation whereby their entire livelihood is threatened. Vaclav Havel’s greengrocer example is a case in point. In Havel’s example, the greengrocer places a sign in his shop window that reads “Workers of the World, Unite!” The greengrocer unquestioningly puts up the sign, not so much because of the desire for the workers to unite, but more so because the party distributed the sign to him. If the greengrocer did not put up the sign, he would run the risk of being seen as a dissident, which would effectively upset his livelihood and social positioning. By putting up the sign, the greengrocer is sending the message about his willingness to comply with the government and the government’s authority in particular. Havel, “The Power of the Powerless,” 13–14.   8 Bleiker, “The Aesthetic Turn in International Political Theory,” 509–33.   9 Hallevy, “Victim’s Complicity in Criminal Law,” 72–94. 10 On 1 March, 2006, while nevertheless maintaining that his actions were legal, Saddam Hussein accepted accountability for his actions regarding the Dujail case and stated that his co-defendants were not criminally responsible. Scharf, “Does Saddam Have a Viable Defense Based on the Necessity to Combat Insurgents and Terrorists?” 172–3. William and McGonigle, “Saddam’s Admission: I Am Responsible,” 177–9. 11 This section was previously published in Monica Ingber “Hegemony and the State: The Role of Complicity in Political Violence in Iraq,” 150–77. 12 Charny, “Toward a Generic Definition of Genocide,” 84. 13 Kutz, Complicity, 2. 14 Like many of the British colonies, Iraq’s legal system models that of British Common Law. 15 Iraqi Ministry of Justice. Iraqi Penal Code No. 111 of 1969, STS 251/88 Section 5 Parties to a Crime 2(1)(2)(3).

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16 Gardener, “Complicity and Causality,” 127–41. 17 Ibid. One major discussion relating to the differentiation between ­principles and accomplices surrounds mens rea. The IC C , as well as legal literature, has acknowledged that there is a marked difference between the mens rea of principles and that of accomplices. For example, in the case of genocide, “accomplices only need to have knowledge of the plan or purpose to commit genocide, without having to share the main perpetrator’s special intent.” In terms of political crimes or politically motivated trials, the main argument surrounds the complementarity between domestic and international law, especially if the trial occurs under the auspices of domestic legislation. Some crimes, like genocide and crimes against humanity have universal jurisdiction attached to them and those involved in offences can thus be tried by countries to which they do not hold ­citizenship. Van Der Witt, “International versus Domestic Jurisdiction: Reflections on the Van Anraat Case,” 244. 18 Wassestrom also notes that article six states that there “shall be individual responsibility” for any individual who commits any of these crimes and that the conditions of individual responsibility are clarified in the remainder of article 6, articles 7, 8, and 10. For instance, he notes that article six establishes liability in respect to those participating in a common plan or conspiracy. This includes leaders, organizers, instigators, and accomplices who participated in the formulation or execution of a common plan or conspiracy to commit any of the crimes listed in the Charter. Likewise, article 10 of the Charter looks at the responsibility of those who are members of a group. Membership in a group that has been determined as “criminal” by the criteria in article 9 of the Charter constitutes responsibility for the acts committed by the group. Wassestrom, “The Relevance of Nuremberg,” 136–7. Yearger, “Helping, Doing, and the Grammar of Complicity,” 25–35. 19 Farmer, “Complicity beyond Causality,” 151–6. 20 Open Society Institute. “Justice: Different Notions of Responsibility,” 1–40. 21 Dolus eventualis means “indirect intention” as opposed to dolus directus, which means “direct intention.” Dolus eventualis exists when there is a possibility of a particular consequence or circumstance that can be foreseen, but there is a reckless disregard for whether or not it develops. 22 Van der Wiit, “International versus Domestic Jurisdiction: Reflections on the Van Anraat Case,” 247. 23 Yearger, “Helping, Doing, and the Grammar of Complicity.” 24 It should be noted that prior to Nuremberg, the standard sanctions for the violation of the laws of warfare included military reprisals or reparations

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that were imposed by the victors. With the creation of “crimes against humanity” the treatment of the Germany towards the Jews and others could be dealt with. This was an important development because the laws of war only protect belligerents. As such, it was not a “war crime” if a government treated its citizens or its allies’ citizens iniquitously. This changed through the adoption of the category of “crimes against humanity.” Sanford Levinson, “Responsibility for Crimes of War,” 104–33. For more on Just War theory and the shift from “jus ad bellum” to “jus contra bellum” see Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars. Elshtain, Just War Theory. Elshtain, Just War Against Terror: The Burden of American Power in a Violent World. 25 State crime can be generally defined as “harmful behaviours committed by states upon its citizens (for example, the Holocaust), citizens of another state (for example, US air pollution’s effect on Canada), or upon another state (for example, Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait).” Kauzlarich, Mullins, and Matthews, “A Complicity Continuum of State Crime,” 241–2. 26 For a critique of the Nuremberg Tribunals as the diktat of the victors see Sartre, “Inaugural Statement to the Russell Vietnam War Crimes Tribunal,” 182. Ahtisaari, “Preface – Justice and Accountability: Local or International.”. Richard J. Goldstone, “Foreword: The Role of Law and Justice in Governance: Regional and Global.” 27 Mullins, Kauzlarich, and  Rothe, “The International Criminal Court and the Control of State Crime: Prospects and Problems,” 285–6. Mullins, Kauzlarch, and Rothe open their article by noting the normalization of state/government crime in the field of criminology. They discuss the International Criminal Court (I CC), which was created through the Rome Statute in 1998. The I CC has international jurisdiction over the crimes of genocide, war, “aggression”, and crimes against humanity. 28 Clapham, “Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors in Conflict Situations,” 491–523. 29 Tripp, A History of Iraq, 44. 30 Ibid., 44. 31 Freedman and Boren, “‘Safe Havens’ for Kurds in post-War Iraq,”. 32 As noted above, important to the idea of complicity is the relationship between complicity and “unintended consequences.” Where this relationship has come up in the literature is in the debate surrounding dolus eventualis. Here, it is debated whether or not positive knowledge is needed or whether reasonable speculation suffices. In terms of marketplace transactions as a type of complicity, there seems to be a serious discrepancy surrounding the idea of intention in the global marketplace and that of

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political intention. In the global marketplace, intent is focused primarily on economic intents versus the outcome of the use of the products sold. In contrast, political intent has more to do with the intention towards political outcomes. As Joost Hiltermann has noted, taking responsibility does not necessarily translate into politics. This observation is based on the idea that there is a duty to act in cases of violence that come under universal jurisdiction. Open Society Institute, “Politics and Responsibility: Public Pressure to do Something,” 14. 33 Charny, “Toward a Generic Definition of Genocide.” While Charny’s ­definition of “accomplice” falls in line with the turn in international relations to include a wider range of actors into the rubric of complicity, the actors he mentions have been recognized as legitimate across the various domestic legal systems. This is also in part due to the universal jurisdiction that has called for domestic legislation to complement its counterpart in international law, which takes precedence over domestic legislations. In terms of political crimes or politically motivated trials, the main argument surrounds the complementarity between domestic and international law, especially if the trial occurs under the auspices of domestic legislation. Some crimes, like genocide and crimes against humanity, have universal jurisdiction attached to them, and those involved in offences can thus be tried by countries to which they do not hold citizenship. 34 Hallevy, “Victim’s Complicity in Criminal Law.” 35 In “Victim’s Complicity in Criminal Law,” Gabriel Hallevy has tried to think through the role of consent between a perpetrator and the victim in the commission of the offence committed against the victim. The legal question raised surrounds whether or not victim consent could constitute complicity. In order to think this through, Hallevy calls into question the argument that any victim is an exempt party in criminal law and therefore cannot be considered as an accomplice despite the presence of consent between the victim and perpetrator. The Tyrell principle is the guiding principle for this in Anglo-American legal systems. The Tyrell case surrounded a sixteen-year-old girl who abetted the perpetrator to have unlawful sexual intercourse with her, an offence under the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1885, s. 5. In this case, Lord Colderidge C J held that the girl could not be convicted of abetting since the act had been passed “for the purpose of protecting women and girls against themselves.” This decision has subsequently been interpreted as the authority for the general principle that victims cannot be convicted of complicity if the offence was created for their protection. Essentially, this became applicable so long as someone could be recognized as a victim, thus bestowing a legal immunity

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from criminal liability. While there are various degrees in which the victim is involved, generally victim involvement is not seen as a defense for the perpetrator. Ibid., 4–5. 36 Ibid., 11. 37 The future interests of the public in this case are the general deterrence of criminals and the reduction of crime rates. Ibid., 14 38 Hobbes, Leviathan. 39 Martin, “Hobbes and the Doctrine of Natural Rights: The Place of Consent in His Political Philosophy,” 380–92. 40 Ibid. 41 Cordesman and Hashim, Iraq: Sanctions and Beyond, 60. 42 The development in domestic law towards extending the terms of ­participation in an offence is similar to the turn in international law towards thinking about complicity in terms of responsibility. This is because one could say that this very broadening is a perversion of responsibilization in international law, but applied within domestic law. Generally ­however, complicity in a domestic offence tends to be still addressed in the language of causality even though this language is stretched to allow for a greater variety of acts to be taken into account in the conviction. 43 Iraqi Ministry of Justice. Iraqi Penal Code No. 111 of 1969, STS 251/88, 2: 1–5. 44 Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity, 1–15. 45 Davis, Memories of State: Politics, History, and Collective Identity in Modern Iraq, 2. 46 The Ba’th Party was briefly in power in 1963 and then again in 1967 until 2003. 47 Tripp, “The Creation of the Iraqi State 1914–74.” 48 Ibid. 49 Tripp, A History of Iraq. 50 Baram, Culture, History, and Ideology in the Formation of Ba’thist Iraq, 1968–89. 51 Davis, Memories of State: Politics, History, and Collective Identity in Modern Iraq, 1–28 52 Ibid., 1–28. 53 Salih, State-Making, Nation-Building, and the Military: Iraq, 1941–1958, 59. The quotation is from General Ranton’s concluding remarks in “Memorandum on the future organization and training of the army when the British Advisory Military Mission is withdrawn.” 54 Ibid.

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Notes to pages 61–9

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55 Benjamin, “Critique of Violence,” 236–53. 56 Scharf, “The Significance of Defendant Al-Bandar’s Testimony – Judgment at Nuremberg Revisited,” 200. 57 It is now common knowledge that the use of torture to extract confessions was widespread in Iraq. It is likely that torture was used in the case of Dujail in order to obtain information and confessions about the assassination attempt. 58 The Nuremberg Tribunals gave birth to universal jurisdiction due to the advent of crimes against humanity in international law. Goldstone, “Foreword: The Role of Law and Justice in Governance: Regional and Global,” viii.

chapter four   1 Tripp, “Introduction.” Fattah, “The Question of the “Artificiality” of Iraq as a Nation-State,” 49–60.   2 Ismael, “Iraqi Society, 1914–1974.”  3 Ibid.   4 Mommsen, “The Varieties of the Nation State in Modern History: Liberal, Imperialist, Fascist, and Contemporary Notions of Nation and Nationality,” 211.  5 Davis, Memories of State: Politics, History, and Collective Identity in Modern Iraq. Tripp, A History of Iraq. Batatu, The Old Social Class and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq. Lukitz, Iraq: The Search for National Identity.  6 Haj, The Making of Iraq 1900–1963: Capital, Power, and Ideology.   7 Salih, “State-Making, Nation-Building, and the Military: Iraq 1941– 1958,” 130.  8 Dodge, Inventing Iraq: The Failure of Nation Building and a History Denied.  9 Feldman, What We Owe Iraq: War and the Ethics of Nation-Building, 30. 10 Tripp, “The Creation of the Iraqi State 1914–74.” 11 Walker, “Violence, Modernity, Silence: From Max Weber to International Relations,” 137–60. 12 Cohen, Brown, and Organski, “The Paradoxical Nature of State Making: The Violent Creation of Order,” 901–10. 13 Salih, “State-Making, Nation-Building, and the Military: Iraq 1941– 1958,” 8–9. 14 Ayoob, The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict, and the International System, 30. 15 Ibid., 26.

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Notes to pages 69–76

16 Ibid., 38. 17 Weiner, The State and Social Transformation in Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan, 38. 18 Ayoob, The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict, and the International System, 32. 19 Ibid., 32. 20 Ibid., 32. 21 Cohen, Brown, and Organski, “The Paradoxical Nature of State Making: The Violent Creation of Order,” 901. 22 Ibid., 903. 23 Ibid. 24 Tilly, “Western State-Making and Theories of Political Transformation,” 602. 25 The two main types of developmental theory that Tilly places the most emphasis on is the sequence and stage theories – that is “(1) schemes involving standard stages, sequences, or paths of development; and (2) statements of relationships without well-defined temporal orders.” Ibid., 604–5. 26 Ibid., 604. 27 Tripp, A History of Iraq, 43–4. 28 Simons, Iraq: From Sumer to Post-Saddam, 232. 29 Ibid., 232–3. 30 Haj, The Making of Iraq 1900–1963: Capital, Power, and Ideology, 99. 31 Nuri al-Said was the Iraqi Prime Minister prior to Hamadi al-Pachachi. He was replaced due to his pro-British stance, but was later reinstated as Prime Minster after the 1946 oil workers’ strike. 32 Haj, The Making of Iraq 1900–1963: Capital, Power, and Ideology, 99–100. 33 Ibid., 99–102. 34 Ibid., 102–5. 35 Ibid., 105–9. 36 Tilly, “Western State-Making and Theories of Political Transformation,” 621. 37 Fried, The Evolution of Political Society: An Essay in Political Anthropology, 235. Tilly, “Western State-Making and Theories of Political Transformation,” 621. 38 Salih, “State-Making, Nation-Building, and the Military; Iraq 1941– 1958,” 61. 39 Ibid., 61–2. 40 Ibid., 62.

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Notes to pages 77–87

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41 Ibid., 87. 42 Ibid., 96. 43 Ibid., 96. 44 Ibid., 99. 45 Tilly, “Western State-Making and Theories of Political Transformation,” 623. 46 Ibid., 623. 47 Ibid., 623. 48 Mufti, Sovereign Creations: Pan-Arabism and Political Order in Syria and Iraq, 4. 49 Ibid., 11. 50 Tilly, “Western State-Making and Theories of Political Transformation,” 627. 51 Ibid., 628. 52 Tripp, “Introduction.” 53 Dodge, Inventing Iraq: The Failure of Nation-Building and a History Denied, 7. 54 Dodge, “The British Mandate in Iraq, 1914–1932.” 55 Ibid. 56 Simons, Iraq: From Sumer to Saddam, 231. 57 Russell, “Monarchical Authoritarianism: Survival and Political Liberalization in a Middle Eastern Regime Type,” 107. 58 Haj, The Making of Iraq 1900–1963: Capital, Power, and Ideology. 59 At this time, Lebanon was threatened by civil war between the Maronite Christians and the Muslim population due to both political and religious tensions. The Maronite Christians wanted to keep Lebanon aligned with Western powers whilst the Muslims wanted Lebanon to join the United Arab Republic. 60 The United Arab Republic was a union between Syria and Egypt that lasted between 1958 and 1961. 61 Dann, Iraq Under Qassem: A Political History, 1958–1963, 45. 62 Hazelton, “Iraq to 1963,” 19. 63 Khadduri, Republican Iraq: A Study in Iraqi Politics since the Revolution of 1958, 64. 64 Many have written that Qasim did not disturb the status quo and that this can be seen in the retention of the Sunni minority in the key positions of power within the governing body. This presents the most common thread in the attempt to answer the question of why Qasim’s regime exhibited just as much violence and repression as the constitutional monarchy did.

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Notes to pages 87–93

65 The Streling Area was a WWII emergency measure in exchange control between groups of states who were part of the British Empire. States used either the British pound or brought their own currency in line with that of the pound in order to protect its the external value. 66 The Baghdad Pact was a defensive organization that promoted shared political, economic, and military goals between Iraq, Turkey, Britain, Pakistan, and Iran. 67 Law 80 of October 1961, ended the negotiations with the Iraq Petroleum Company and limited the company’s rights to 0.5% of the concessions actually being exploited. This secured prospecting and oil rights in the other 99.5% of the country for the government. Hazelton, “Iraq to 1963,” 27. 68 Dann, Iraq Under Qassem: A Political History, 1958–1963, 50. 69 Ibid., 46. 70 Ibid., 46. 71 Ibid., 46. 72 Khadduri, Republican Iraq: A Study in Iraqi Politics since the Revolution of 1958, 79. 73 Ibid, 79–80. 74 Ibid., 80. 75 Tripp, A History of Iraq, 151. 76 Batatu, The Old Social Class and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq, 808. 77 Tripp, A History of Iraq, 146, 152. 78 Ibid., 152. 79 Dann, Iraq Under Qassem: A Political History, 1958–1963, 43. 80 For a really good description of the various players in the first cabinet see Batatu, The Old Social Class and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq, 814–815. Here, Batatu highlights the “hybrid character” of that first ­cabinet. Batatu’s discussion sheds some light on the difficulty being faced by a state that lacks the foundations for order but is at the same time attempting to unite wide range of political interests, many of which were in contradiction to one another. 81 Batatu, The Old Social Class and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq, 817. 82 Ibid., 832. 83 Ibid., 835. 84 Ibid., 843. 85 Tripp, A History of Iraq, 156.

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Notes to pages 94–7

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86 “The reform limited holdings of any one person to a maximum of 2,000 dunums of rain-fed land, or 1,000 dunums of land irrigated by free flow or by artificial means, leaving unscathed 250, 451 petty and middling landowners, and striking – but against a specified compensation – at only 2,803 sheikhs and other large proprietors who, however, owned between then … more than 18 million dunums, that is, more than 56 percent of the total of privately held land.” Batatu, The Old Social Class and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq, 837. 87 Ibid., 836. 88 Ibid. 89 Tripp, A History of Iraq, 151. 90 Simons, Iraq: From Sumer to Post-Saddam, 256. 91 Dann, Iraq Under Qassem: A Political History, 1958–1963, 283. 92 Havel, “The Power of the Powerless,” 10–59. 93 In order to form a society, one needed to submit an application form to the Minister of the Interior and this needed to be signed by no less than ten founding members. The notice given by the founding members would have to be accompanied by the constitution of the society, which would have to include the aims of the society, its financial resources (actual and expected), and its headquarters (that had to be located in Iraq). In addition to this, the societies aims must not be contrary to the state’s independence and national unity, it must not be contrary to the republican regime and the requirements of democratic government, its aims must not be to create discord between the various communities in Iraq, the society must not conceal any unstated aims, and: the society must be in line with public law and decency. In addition this, the founding members could not have convictions for “dishonourable offence” and had to confirm in writing their allegiance to the constitution of the state. For his part, the Minister of the Interior had the right to reject the notice or request amendments, deletions or additions to the constitution, and the power to reject any founding member. The founding members were obligated to comply with the minister’s request, which also allowed for a new reviewing period of thirty days to begin. If the founding members did not agree with the review of the Minister of the Interior, they could appeal within fifty days to the Court of Cassation, which then had fifteen days to make a ruling on the appeal. The decision made by the Court of Cassation would be a final decision. Dann, Iraq Under Qassem: A Political History, 1958–1963, 265–8. 94 Ibid., 269.

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Notes to pages 97–110

95 Ibid., 273. 96 Dann, Iraq Under Qassem: A Political History, 1958–1963, 274. 97 Ibid., 274–5. 98 Ibid., 6. 99 R.B.J. Walker, “Violence, Modernity, Silence: From Max Weber to International Relations,” 137.

chapter five   1 Zacher, “The Opposition,” 140.  2 Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq, 428.   3 António Martins, Soviet Union (2001).   4 For example, the Cuban Communist Party actually opposed the uprising led by Fidel Castro until after it had proven successful. In 1972–1973, the I C P would refer to Saddam Hussein as the “Iraqi Fidel Castro.” In 1974, the party closed its independent workplace organizations and supported the Ba’thists, including their war against the Kurds. Salucci, A People’s History of Iraq, 162.   5 Marx and Engels, The Communist Manifesto. Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks.  6 Batatu, The Old Social Classes and The Revolutionary Movement in Iraq, 394–6. Ismael, The Rise and Fall of the Communist Party of Iraq, 17–20.  7 Salucci, A People’s History of Iraq, 25.  8 Haj, The Making of Iraq 1900–1963: Power, Capital, Ideology, 116.  9 Lenin, Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism. 10 Batatu, The Old Social Classes and The Revolutionary Movement in Iraq, 523. Salucci, A People’s History of Iraq, 23. 11 Salucci, A People’s History of Iraq, 23. 12 Ismael, The Rise and Fall of the Communist Party of Iraq, 285. 13 Ibid., 285–6. 14 Ibid., 34. 15 Ibid., 48. 16 Batatu, The Old Social Classes and The Revolutionary Movement in Iraq, 993. 17 The August Line refers to the alignment of the I C P with the Algerian and Egyptian governments, who they saw as moving towards a “non-­ capitalist” path, which was anti-imperialist orientation and which also demonstrated a commitment to social progress and Arab unity. Ibid., 121.

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Notes to pages 110–4

199

18 Batatu, The Old Social Classes and The Revolutionary Movement in Iraq, 1037. 19 The view that Iraq had entered a period of non-capitalist development persisted well into the 1970s, where the Central Committee at the Third Party Congress reaffirmed the classical position that “the national-­ democratic revolution [had] entered a new radical phase, the phase of non-capitalist development.” The demand for democratic freedoms, an anti-imperialist ethos followed by that of anti-dictatorship in the period of Ba’th rule, the formation of a national front, and the adoption of a socialdemocratic form of pragmatism in order to reach socialism, was renewed at subsequent Party Congresses and was maintained until the present. Ismael, The Rise and Fall of the Communist Party of Iraq, 177. 20 “Statement of the Worker Communist Party of Iraq – Political Bureau, September 26, 2003,” in A People’s History of Iraq, 172. 21 Dominant understandings of Marxist thought see this in terms of the ­revolution moving through various stages that are likely to last hundreds of years before the final stage of communism is reached. In sense, deferring would not be “deferring,” so much as it would be building towards the Ideal by stages. 22 Chiesa, Subjectivity and Otherness: A Philosophical Reading of Lacan, 153. 23 Lacan argued that “[the] question of desire is that the fading subject yearns to find itself again by means of some sort of encounter with this miraculous thing defined by the phantasm.” Lacan, “Of Structure as an Inmixing of an Otherness Prerequisite to Any Subject Whatever,” 194. 24 This, Lacan argues, is not so much because “the other holds the key to the object desired,” but more so because “the first object of desire is to be ­recognized by the other.” Lacan, “Seminar X: The Two Narcissisms.” 25 Salucci, A People’s History of Iraq, 69–70. 26 Haj, The Making of Iraq 1900–1963: Capital, Power, and Ideology, 112–25. 27 Ibid., 112. 28 The implication was that the Egyptian bourgeoisie was seen as less ­progressive given that it had already made compromises with Western capitalism as opposed to the Syrian and Iraqi bourgeoisie who were seen as more progressive given their rise in the interwar period and their more recent struggle against imperialism. Ibid., 115. 29 The I C P argued that unification at that particular point in time would result only in subsuming the “weaker” Syrian and Iraqi bourgeoisie under the “stronger” and more efficient Egyptian capital, leading to imperial domination by the Egyptians. Ibid., 115.

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200

Notes to pages 114–22

30 According to Elias Murqus, this prevented the IC P from placing unity within the wider context of the historical struggle against communism. Murqus has argued furthermore that although Arab unification was part of the national democratic-socialist revolution, “socialism is not the logical historical and strategic precondition for Arab unification … ” Instead, it is the other way around; unification is “the historical and strategic precondition for socialism and communism.” For Murquis, this is because the objective of unification moves beyond the limits of bourgeois national democracy in its attack of imperialist foundations. Ibid., 116. 31 The Islamic practice of tax farming. 32 Haj, The Making of Iraq 1900–1963: Capital, Power, and Ideology, 97. 33 Yusuf, “Semi-Feudal Relations in Agricultural Retard Industrial Development.” Haj, The Making of Iraq 1900–1963: Capital, Power, and Ideology, 97. 34 Haj, The Making of Iraq 1900–1963: Capital, Power, and Ideology, 97–8. 35 Ibid., 130–4. 36 Lacan, “Of Structure as an Inmixing of an Otherness Prerequisite to Any Subject Whatever,” 194. 37 This also shows a major break in their ideology as compared to that of the ND P . 38 Majid Khadduri, Republican Iraq: A Study in Iraqi Politics since the Revolution of 1958, 83. 39 Ibid., 83. 40 This was one of several communist circles that developed in Iraq during the 1930s. 41 Batatu, The Old Social Classes and The Revolutionary Movement in Iraq, 491. 42 Ibid., 492, 498–9. 43 This had been recalled from an interview that Batatu had conducted with D  a  ¯ ud ¯ S  ayegh. ¯ Ibid., 499. 44 Ibid., 487. 45 Ibid., 485. 46 Yusuf, “Letter.” Batatu, The Old Social Classes and The Revolutionary Movement in Iraq, 487. 47 Ibid., 493–505. 48 Ibid., 487. 49 Kucich, Imperial Masochism: British Fiction, Fantasy, and Social Class, 150. 50 Batatu, The Old Social Classes and The Revolutionary Movement in Iraq, 537. 51 The authorities already knew that Faud was the party secretary. Ibid., 538.

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Notes to pages 122–32

201

52 The charges that would be laid against them included the reliance on ­foreign sources of income, contacts with a foreign State, the Soviet Union, T  udeh ¯ of Iran, and the party of Kh  alid ¯ Bakd  ash, ¯ designs that were subversive to the constituted order, armed insurrection, and the propagation of communist ideals in the armed forces. Ibid., 539. 53 Mudarisov, “A History of the Iraqi Communist Party 1934–1963.” 54 This demonstrates that at this point in time, the vision of British ­omnipotence in Iraq may have been held by the British alone. 55 Guattari and Negri, Communists like Us, 10. 56 Ibid., 13.

chapter six  1 Tripp, A History of Iraq.  2 Makiya, Republic of Fear, 5.   3 Ibid., 12–15.   4 Ibid., 16.   5 Barak, “Dilemmas of Security in Iraq,” 460.   6 Ibid., 459.   7 Allawi, The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the War, Losing the Peace, 149.   8 Barak, “Dilemmas of Security in Iraq.”   9 Pollard, “Globalisation’s Bastards: Illegitimate Non-State Actors in International Law,” 41. 10 Hardt and Negri, Empire, 393. 11 See page 43. 12 Hardt and Negri, Empire,xii. 13 Ibid., xiv–xv. 14 The multitude is defined as the “many,” which refers to the multiplicity of differences that cannot be reduced to a single identity or unity – such as different forms of culture, race, ethnicity, gender, and sexuality, as well as, different forms of labour, living, worldviews, and desires. “The multitude is a multiplicity of all these singular differences.” This means that the multitude encompasses diverse figures of social production that enables it to work as an open network. This allows communication, collaboration, and cooperation, to function in an expanding, or sprawling web-like relationship. See Hardt and Negri, Multitude: War and Democracy in the Rise of Empire, xiv. 15 Hardt and Negri, Empire, 411. In this case, the militant is considered as the communist and liberationist combatants of the twentieth-century ­revolutions, the persecuted intellectuals and exiles in anti-fascist struggles, the republicans of the Spanish civil war and European resistance

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Notes to pages 132–41

movements, as well as the freedom fighters of the anti-colonial and anti-­ imperialist wars. 16 Ibid., 413. 17 Ibid., 397. 18 Ibid., 413. 19 Rashid Ali al-Gailani served as Prime Minister on three separate ­occasions: 20 March 1933 to 9 November 1933; 31 March 1940 to 31 January 1941, and; 3 April 1941 to 29 May 1941. 20 Dann, Iraq under Qassem: A Political History, 105. 21 Hashim, “The Sunni Insurgency in Iraq,” 6. 22 Greenhill and Staniland, “Ten Ways to Lose at Counterinsurgency,” 4. 23 Hashim, The Sunni Insurgency in Iraq, 7. 24 Cockburn, Muqtada: Muqtada Al-Sadr, the Shia Revival, and the Struggle for Iraq. Also Etherington, Revolt on the Tigris: The Al-Sadr Uprising and the Governing of Iraq. 25 Ferguson, No End in Sight: Iraq’s Descent into Chaos, 339. 26 Mackinlay, Adelphi Paper 352 – Globalization and Insurgency. 27 Nasr, “Regional Implications of Shi’a Revival in Iraq.” 28 Mackinlay, Globalization and Insurgency, 79. 29 BBC News, “Guide: Armed Groups in Iraq.” 30 Schanzer, “Ansar al-Islam: Back in Iraq.” 31 Hardt and Negri, Multitude, 225. 32 Browning “A Globalist Ideology of Post-Marxism? Hardt and Negri’s Empire,” 203. 33 Hardt and Negri, Multitude, 47. 34 Ibid., 49. 35 Browning, “A Globalist Ideology of Post-Marxism? Hardt and Negri’s Empire,” 204. 36 Ibid., 204. 37 Ibid., 204. 38 Some authors, such as Leo Panitch, Sam Gindin, and Gregory Albo argue that in fact the state is still alive and well, just different in a globalized world. See for example, Panitch and Gindin, Global Capitalism and American Empire. Also Albo, “Capital, Labour and the New Economy.” 39 Hardt and Negri, Empire, 468, note 4. 40 Michaels, “The Non-Dialectical Marxism of Hardt and Negri,” 2. 41 Hardt and Negri, Empire, 39. 42 Michaels, “The Non-Dialectical Marxism of Hardt and Negri,” 2. 43 Hardt and Negri, Empire, 413. 44 Baram, “Who are the Insurgents? Sunni Arab Rebels in Iraq,” 3.

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Notes to pages 141–53

203

45 Tripp, A History of Iraq. 46 Baram, “Who are the Insurgents? Sunni Arab Rebels in Iraq,” 3. Also Allawi, The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the War, Losing the Peace, 162. 47 The tribal code of honour stipulates that a fighter will not turn their backs to the opponent, meaning that they will face them and fight. 48 Baram, “Who Are the Insurgents? Sunni Arab Rebels in Iraq,” 5. 49 Ibid., 2. 50 Ibid., 10. 51 Lukitz, Iraq: The Search for National Identity, 32–3 52 Ibid., 33. 53 Ibid, 136. Pan-Arabists envisioned uniting Iraq with either Syria or Jordan. The Syria–Iraq scheme refers to the union of Syria and Iraq under the Hashemites. 54 Ibid., 137. 55 Baram, “Who are the Insurgents? Sunni Arab Rebels in Iraq,” 4. 56 Ibid., 3. 57 Ibid., 9. 58 Ibid., 9. 59 Ibid., 10. 60 Dodge, Inventing Iraq: The Failure of Nation-Building and a History Denied, 49. 61 Ibid., 50. 62 Cockburn, Muqtada: Muqtada Al-Sadr, the Shia Revival, and the Struggle for Iraq. Also Etherington, Revolt on the Tigris: The Al-Sadr Uprising and the Governing of Iraq. 63 Ferguson, No End in Sight: Iraq’s Descent into Chaos, 335. 64 Cockburn, “Iraq’s Election Result: A Divided Nation.” 65 Ibid. 66 Coalition Provisional Authority, “Armed Forces and Militia Transition and Reintegration.” 67 Ferguson, No End in Sight: Iraq’s Descent into Chaos, 338. 68 Barak, “Dilemmas of Security in Iraq,” 463. 69 Ferguson, No End in Sight: Iraq’s Descent into Chaos, 339. 70 Juergensmeyer, Global Rebellion: Religious Challenges to the Secular State, from Christian Militias to al Qaeda, 75.

chapter seven   1 Coldplay, “Viva la Vida.”   2 Von Zielbauer, “Judge Tells Hussein, ‘You Are Not a Dictator.’”

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Notes to pages 153–61

  3 This is in accordance with the Iraqi law tradition, which the IHT is primarily based upon.   4 Saddam Hussein’s co-defendants were as follows: Barzan Ibrahim ­al-Tikriti, Awad Hamad al-Bandar, Taha Yassin Ramadan, Abdullah Khadem Ruweid, Mezhar Abdullah Ruweid, Ali Daeh Ali, and Mohammed Azzam al-Ali.  5 Kelly, Ghosts of Halabja: Saddam Hussein and the Kurdish Genocide, 66.   6 This was carried out under the pretext of agricultural redevelopment whereby those whose land was confiscated were to receive compensation in accordance with the relevant law at the time. Al-Ani, The Trial of Saddam Hussein, 207.   7 The 1975 Algiers Accords ceded 518 square kilometres of oil-rich territory near the Shatt al-Arab to Iran in exchange for Iran’s agreement to stop their support of Kurdish rebels in northern Iraq.   8 Ali Hassan al-Majid was the leader of the Ba’th Party’s Northern Bureau at the time.   9 The gassing of Halabja, which is considered to be one of the worst cases of the use of chemical weapons against the Iraqi Kurds, is not considered as part of the Anfal campaign even though it occurred at the beginning of the campaign. This is because Halabja is designated as a city and not as a village. The Anfals were undertaken for the particular purpose of dealing with the Kurdish rural population, which “included wiping out the villages, eradicating the PU K and the Kurdish Democratic Party (K DP), and displacing the Kurds entirely from strategic locations.” Kelly, Ghosts of Halabja: Saddam Hussein and the Kurdish Genocide, 33. 10 Ibid., 20–32. 11 Kelly, Ghosts of Halabja: Saddam Hussein and the Kurdish Genocide. The I S T statute also specifically incorporates crimes committed during the wars with Iran and Kuwait and crimes against Iraqi ethnic or religious groups, whether during conflict or not. In addition to this, the I S T was given adjudicatory power over people, as opposed to parties or corporate entities. The I S T also did away with the sovereign immunity and superior orders defenses, whilst at the same time building in command responsibility as a basis for criminal liability. Newton and Scharf, Enemy of the State: The Trial and Execution of Saddam Hussein. 12 Ibid., 178. 13 Human Rights Watch has argued that the convictions on the basis of joint criminal enterprise liability are unsupportable given that there is no evidence of the habitual practice of the security agencies, the Revolutionary Court, or Ba’th Party institutions. This would have merit, however, the

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Notes to pages 161–72

205

perpetrators made no attempt to hide the executions; instead, the case was publicly documented as a warning to others who might oppose the Ba’th regime. Newton and Scharf, Enemy of the State: The Trial and Execution of Saddam Hussein, 178–9. Human Rights Watch, “The Poisoned Chalice.” 14 Sisson and Wierda, “Political Pedagogy, Baghdad Style,” 237. 15 Newton and Scharf, Enemy of the State: The Trial and Execution of Saddam Hussein, 142–3. 16 Babakhan, “Federalism as a Model for Democracy,” 163. 17 One should note here that the territory in Mosul, particularly in Kirkuk holds large oil reserves. It was decided that Mosul would belong to Iraq at the time when territorial borders were being decided. This was to ensure that Iraq would become an economically viable state. 18 Mahabad was created with the support of the Soviet Union. Bengio, Saddam’s Word: Political Discourse in Iraq, 174. 19 Gunter, The Kurds of Iraq: Tragedy and Hope, 67. 20 Stansfield, Iraqi Kurdistan, 98. 21 Post, The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders, 284. 22 Ibid., 280. 23 Kelly, Ghosts of Halabja: Saddam Hussein and the Kurdish Genocide, 67. 24 Ibid., 72. 25 Reuters. “Saddam to Claim Sovereign Immunity – Lawyer.” 26 The Digest, for instance, articulates that the Prince was an “unfettered ­legislator,” and while the original purpose of this was to exempt the emperor from certain rules, it came to imply the existence of a supreme legislative authority. Glenn, Legal Traditions of the World, 300. 27 When King John signed the Magna Carta in order to redress grievance against him and his officials for abuses of sovereign power, he effectively signalled that the sovereign is under the law. Sovereign immunity did not, however, vanish entirely because it was recognized that in order to be functionally efficient and effective in their duties, state officials needed to enjoy some immunity from the normal legal process. While the degree of immunity from civil legal processes varies between states, it is the general rule that immunity from the criminal legal process is complete while the individual is in office. After the individual leaves office, they continue to enjoy immunity, but only from criminal liability for the acts undertaken while in office and within their official capacity. Kelly, Nowhere to Hide. 28 International Law recognizes two main types of immunities: functional and personal. 29 Iraqi was a signatory state to the Geneva Convention at the time that both the Dujail and Anfal attacks were committed.

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Notes to pages 172–74

30 The first time these offences were criminalized was in December 2003 in C P A Order 48. 31 Al-Ani, The Trial of Saddam Hussein, 186–7. 32 The Nuremberg Principles were adopted by the UN General Assembly. Kelly, Nowhere to Hide, 80. 33 The Revolutionary Command Council was established in 1968 and was the highest decision-making body in Iraq until 2003. 34 Iraqi Interim Constitution of 1970. 35 Al-Ani, 186–7. 36 The defense team was given the opportunity to file an appeal, which they did on 3 December 2006. 37 It reasoned that even if no Iraqi national laws proscribed such actions at the time, international law undeniably categorized these actions as crimes against humanity. 38 The court stated that the defendants’ acts violated both the 1969 Baghdad Penal Code and the Iraqi Military Penal Code of 1940. 39 Newton and Scharf, Enemy of the State: The Trial and Execution of Saddam Hussein, 36. 40 The threat of legal objections once the occupation had begun saw Ambassador Paul Bremer promulgate Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 7 in June 2003, which sought to align Iraqi practice with human rights norms. Section 3, paragraph 1 of this order suspended capital punishment and reduced the punishment to life imprisonment or other lesser penalties in the Penal Code when capital punishment was the only viable punishment listed. According to Newton and Scharf, Iraqis did not support the suspension of capital punishment despite suffering gross abuses under the Ba’thist regime and its Revolutionary Court. The inclusion of the death sentence in the I HT statute polarized the international community and prevented many European states from assisting with the work of the tribunal. States that have retained the death penalty have done so on the grounds that the victims and community have the right to live in peace and security, which is something that the death sentence can provide by removing the individual from the social fabric entirely. Newton and Scharf, Enemy of the State: The Trial and Execution of Saddam Hussein, 37. 41 Ibid., 37. 42 Ibid., 38.

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Notes to pages 177–81

207

afterword   1 The Qu’ran, 4:1, 39:6. Mohammad Hashim Kamali, “Human Dignity in Islam.”   2 Kamali, “Human Dignity in Islam,” 6.   3 Davenport, “A Phenomenology of the Profane: Heidegger, Blumenberg and the Structure of the Chthonic,” 201.   4 Iraq Constitution of 2005.   5 Schneller, “Who Speaks for the Shi’a of Iraq?,” 309.  6 Wiley, The Islamic Movement of Iraqi Shi’as. Haider, “Judicial Review of Islamic Law under Iraq’s Constitution.”   7 Hamoudi, “Judicial Review of Islamic Law under Iraq’s Constitution.”  8 Ibid.   9 Article 41 states that: “First: The followers of all religions and sects are free in the: A. Practice of religious rites, including the Husseini ceremonies (Shiite ­religious ceremonies) B. Management of the endowments, its affairs and its religious ­institutions. The law shall regulate this. Second: The state guarantees freedom of worship and the protection of the places of worship.” Iraq Constitution of 2005. 10 Hamoudi, “Judicial Review of Islamic Law Under Iraq’s Constitution.” 11 “Iraqis are equal before the law without discrimination based on gender, race, ethnicity, origin, color, religion, creed, belief or opinion, or economic and social status.” Iraq Constitution of 2005, Article 14. 12 Iraq Constitution of 2005. Article 2. 13 Ibid. 14 Global Security. “Twelvers/Ithna Ashari Islamic Schools of Thought.” 15 Hamoudi, “Judicial Review of Islamic Law under Iraq’s Constitution.” 16 Ibid. 17 Stefan Oeter, “Terrorism as a Challenge for International Law,” 116. 18 Blank and Guiora, “Teaching an Old Dog New Tricks: Operationalizing the Law of Armed Conflict in New Warfare,” 87. 19 Douzinas, Human Rights and Empire: the Political Philosophy of Cosmopolitanism, 258. 20 Ibid., 252.

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Index

accomplice liability, 54–5 aesthetic politics, 8–15, 103; aesthetic theory, 151; aesthetic turn, 13; aestheticization, 4, 18, 25, 44, 46–7, 64, 176–7 aesthetic rendering, 106, 117, 125– 6, 164–5, 166 agency, 23, 38–9, 43, 105–6, 112, 116–18, 120, 124, 125, 166 agrarian reform, 86, 94, 113–14, 116; agrarian problem, 23; agrarian question, 114, 116, 124; 1958 Agrarian Land Reform Law, 114–16 Al-Bandar, Awad, 25, 60–1, 157, 162, 173 Al-Qaeda, 136–7, 181 Al-Sadr, Ayatollah Muhammad Sidiq, 73, 146 Al-Sadr, Moqtada, 135, 146–8 Al-Said, Nuri, 72–4, 84–6 Anfal campaign, 24, 56, 154–6, 159, 162, 167 Anfal trial, 24, 46, 154, 156, 170, 175 anti-imperialism, 104, 107–8

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Apollonian mindset, 5, 34, 37; image, 41–2; rationality, 170 Arab unity, 92, 110–11, 113 Arendt, Hannah, 27–8. See also violence, as means-ends Arif, Abdul Salam, 85 Associations Law, 96–9 Assyrians, 72; massacre, 75; revolt, 77; uprising, 80 August line, 110–11 autonomy, 49, 56, 76, 79, 165–6 Badr Brigade, 136, 146, 149 Baghdad Pact, 74, 86–7 Barzani, Mustafa, 77, 134, 165–7 Basim, Zaki, 122–3 Ba’th Party, 5–6, 20, 24–5, 48, 58–60, 74, 82, 92, 127–30, 135, 141–6, 150, 153–8, 159–62, 164–7, 169–73, 176, 178 becoming, 10–14, 32–4, 176–8 Benjamin, Walter, 8, 19, 30, 36–7, 40–2, 46, 61, 83, 101. See also violence, as divine, means-ends, mythical

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228 Index

chthonian, 5–6, 8, 19, 33, 35, 37, 41–2, 44, 176–8, 184; chthonic security, 5–9, 21, 24–5, 44, 47, 84, 127–8, 130–1, 147, 150, 152, 156– 7, 159, 161, 163, 170, 175, 176– 7, 182 Clausewitz, Carl von, 27–8 Coalition Provisional Authority (C P A ), 148–9, 159–60 coercion, 25–8, 56, 75, 130, 146–7, 161 co-optation, 57, 63, 87, 113, 147 complicity, 7, 8, 19–20, 25–6, 40, 44–6, 48–50, 52–7, 61–3, 157, 162–5, 175; as compliance, 58, 61, 120, 128, 133; international law on, 5, 48, 50–4, 62–3, 157, 160, 163; social complicity, 4–9, 18–9, 21, 24–6, 44–9, 46–9, 51, 53, 55, 57, 59, 61, 63–4, 132, 152–3, 155–9, 161–3, 175–7, 180 Deleuze, Gilles, 7, 10–8, 29, 34, 37, 40–1, 90, 140, 176 Derrida, Jacques, 19, 30, 35–8, 40–3, 46, 85, 101; arché-­writing, 35, 42; différance, 35; iterability, 37, 40 dialectical movement, 137, 139–40; spirit 14–5, 24, 140, 150 Dionysus, 29, 34, 42, 46 Dujail, 20, 45, 48, 61, 63, 153–4, 156–9, 168–70, 173; Dujail trial, 24–5, 61, 153, 157–8, 160–4, 170, 174–5 empire, 24, 127, 131–4, 137–40, 150–1; empire-building, 79–80 European Continental law 49–50

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Freud, Sigmund, 11, 15, 34 Geneva Conventions, 159–60, 172, 182 genocide, 45, 51, 53–4, 62–3, 153, 156, 159, 172–4 globalization, 130–2, 136, 151 Hague Convention 1907, 160 Hegel, G.W.F., 11, 19, 29–33, 41–2, 46, 138–40; lord and bondsman, 31–3, 42 hegemony, 20, 45, 49, 54, 57–8, 106, 131–2, 151 Heidegger, Martin, 30, 35, 41–2, 131, 140 Heraclitus, 19, 27, 35, 37, 42 historical memory, 59–60, 83 Hobbes, Thomas, 3, 19, 38–40, 43, 55–6, 81, 83, 163; leviathan, 3, 39, 43, 55–6, 131; state of nature, 38–9, 43, 55 human rights, 25, 45, 52, 107, 157, 162, 171–2, 174, 175, 180, 182 Hussein, Saddam, 5, 20, 24–5, 45, 48–9, 53, 56, 58–9, 61, 65, 99, 127–9, 132, 135–6, 141–6, 150, 152–7, 159, 162–3, 165, 166, 168–74, 178 Ideal, 14–15, 19, 22–3, 33, 37–8, 102–3, 105–7, 112, 115–16, 124–5, 157, 164–6, 168, 170; ideal state, 3, 4, 22–3, 104–5, 109, 112, 164–6; Iraqi ideal state, 85; Communist Party Ideal, 104, 107, 109, 111–13, 115, 120, 124–5 ideology, 57, 103, 107, 111, 141, 143; Bathist ideology, 59–60,

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Index 229

104–5; ­communist, 120; Marxist-Leninist, 105–7, 109, 111; pan-Arab, 145; ideological reshaping, 105, 110, 143; wish picture, 104–5, 107 imperialism, 65, 79–81, 85, 107–8, 114, 130, 132, 137 insurgent groups (types), 134–7 intelligence agency (Mukhabarat), 127–9 International Criminal Court (I C C ), 162, 174 Iran–Iraq War, 6, 45–6, 56, 61, 130, 142, 154–5, 164–5, 170–1 Iraqi army, 60, 63, 72, 74, 76–7, 80, 83, 93, 96, 127–30, 133–4, 141, 165 Iraqi domestic law, 25, 48, 50, 54, 61–3, 157, 159, 161–3, 172, 173–5 Iraqi national identity, 4, 66, 75–7, 103, 128, 141; pan-Arab identity, 66, 76, 78, 86–7, 92–5, 110, 113, 141, 143–4 insecurity, 3–7, 21–2, 69, 127, 129, 150, 163, 181. See also security Iraq Communist Party (I C P ), 23, 73, 93, 95, 97–9, 103, 107–25, 167; Iraq Communist Party Central Command (I C P - C C ), 110–11; Iraq Communist Party Central Leadership (I C P - C L ), 110–11; Worker Communist Party of Iraq (W C P I ), 111 Iraqi High Tribunal, 153, 157, 159–62, 170–4 Iraqi Interim Government, 159 Iraqi Special Tribunal (I S T ), 159–61 joint criminal enterprise, 25, 157, 160–2

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jus ad bellum, 52 jus contra bellum, 52 just war, 28, 52 Kurds, 4, 24, 63, 71, 96, 166–9; Kurdistan, 56, 63, 71, 76, 96, 165–7; Kurdish question, 25, 63, 157, 164–5 Kurdish Democratic Party (K D P ), 134, 155 Lacan, Jacques, 23, 106, 112, 115, 124, 166; on unsatisfaction, 106, 112, 166 language: policy, 143; pornological language, 14–15, 166; psychosocial language, 23, 106, 117; symbolic, 22, 39, 103–5; as violence, 101 League of Nations, 58, 66, 79–80 Levinas, Emmanuel, 29, 41 mandate system, 21, 67, 79, 80 martial law, 73–4, 84, 104, 109 Mehdi army, 135–6, 146–9 Military Intelligence Agency (Estikhbarat), 129 militia, 19, 21, 23–5, 77, 118, 127, 129–34, 136, 139–40, 146, 148– 52, 157 modes of liability, 162 monarchy, 17, 65–6, 76, 81–9, 94–5, 100, 119, 176 Mosul coup, 93–5 multitude, 24, 126–7, 129, 131–3, 137–40, 149–52 mystification, 19, 30, 38–41, 43, 47, 81–2, 88, 101–2, 157–8, 175, 179–82

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230 Index

national bourgeoisie, 107–8, 113, 115, 124, 166 National Democratic Party (N D P ), 74, 91, 96, 113–15 nationalism, 17, 59–60, 63, 69, 72, 76–7, 80, 113, 135, 143–6, 165; Iraqi, 113, 148; Kurdish, 165; pan-Arab, 143–4; Shia, 60, 63 National Front, 74, 86, 109–10 nation-building, 18, 60, 66–70, 76, 81, 100. See also state-building natural law, 8–9, 47 Nuremberg Tribunal, 20, 48, 50, 52, 62, 172 official state, 5–6, 8, 22, 58, 61, 67, 99, 127–9, 133, 139, 141, 147–8, 151, 161–3 omnipotence, 23, 25, 105, 118, 122–3, 125, 157–8, 164, 166–8, 175 ontology, 35, 137, 158; ontological change, 34, 42, 81, 100, 137, 158; ontological transformation, 29 originary condition, 177–9, 180 Other, 29–31, 34, 37–8, 43, 56, 112, 166, 170; becoming-other, 12 Ottoman Empire, 76, 134 Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (P U K ), 134, 137, 155, 165–8 Peace Partisans, 93–5 Peshmerga, 133–4, 155, 167 Plato’s Good, 103–4 Portsmouth Treaty 1948, 73, 108, 123 power, 6, 9–10, 12–3, 20, 27, 29, 34–6, 38, 40–1, 56, 71; absolute, 90, 117–20, 136, 144–6,

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149, 156–7, 164, 166, 172; balance of, 154; biopower, 138; broadening of state power, 24–5, 62, 157, 164; centralization of, 80, 90, 62–3, 66–9, 78, 81–3, 86, 89; consolidation of, 77–83, 87–8, 90, 92, 94, 101, 127, 157, 166; hierarchy of, 91; imbalance, 78; as means-ends, 27–8; international structure of, 78–9; primitive accumulation of, 21, 67, 69, 99; structure, 9, 57–8, 72, 79, 115; struggle, 13, 131, 158; as violence, 27, 35–6, 56, 175; void, 24, 131–2, 137, 139, 146, 150, 158; will to power, 35 privilege and patronage system, 6, 67, 90–1, 94–5, 97, 99, 127–8 Qasim, 68, 82, 84–5, 87–101, 117, 174; as sole leader, 82, 87, 89–90, 92–3, 101 Rancière, Jacques, 9–10; dissensus, 10; police, 10 real, 10–13, 33–4 regime change, 22–5, 53, 65–6, 99, 131, 137, 141, 153, 158–60, 177 religion, 138–9, 144–5, 151, 169, 178–9 repression, 25, 34, 74–5, 83–4, 95, 108, 110, 120, 122–3, 128, 157, 162–3, 167, 169, 178 repressive toleration, 116, 125 republic, 22, 65, 81, 84–6, 88, 90, 92, 95, 98–101, 104, 158, 175 Republican Party, 98–9 Revolutionary Command Council (R C C ), 91–2, 129, 154, 172–3

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Index 231

Revolutionary Court, 25, 61, 154, 157 revolutionary jurisprudence, 86–7 Sacher-Masoch, Leopold, 7, 10, 13–19, 24, 29–30, 33–5, 37–44, 46–7, 81–2, 84, 87, 89, 96–7, 100–1, 112, 124, 140, 142, 152, 157–8, 170, 175, 176–80, 182; on the disguise function, 14, 140, 142–4, 150, 152; on phantasm, 18, 103–5, 112, 115, 168, 177–8; on provocation, 19, 30, 41, 43, 94, 96–7, 101; reduplication, 14, 140, 147–50, 152; supersensualism, 14 Sa’igh Communist Party, 97–8. See also Communist Party Sade, Marquis de, 13–16, 176 sado-masochism, 15 secret police, 128–9, 146, 149–50 security dilemma, 5–6; apparatus, 5, 24, 58, 130, 141, 150, 163; human, 3, 4, 7, 128, 150, 158, 174–6; national security, 46, 49, 56, 63; referent object of, 3, 4, 111, 175; regime, 4, 7, 9, 128, 133, 150, 158; societal security, 4 self-conscious, 29–34, 42 self-determination, 65, 79, 85, 165 self-preservation, 8, 28, 46, 152 shadow state, 67, 99, 127–9, 131, 133, 140, 147, 150–2, 161, 174–5 Shia, 4, 45–6, 53, 114, 135–6, 141, 145–6, 149, 152, 179 Sidqi, Bakr, 72 social compact, 38–9, 43 social contract, 5–9, 18–19, 22, 24, 26, 30, 38–9, 43–4, 47, 67–8, 70,

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80–3, 85, 87–8, 94, 96, 100–2, 147, 157–8, 174, 177–9, 182 socialism, 107, 110, 121 sovereign immunity, 23, 25, 122, 158, 170–3 sovereignty, 9, 25, 35–6, 39, 41, 63, 67, 77, 80–1, 91, 103, 109, 127, 131–2, 137, 150, 165, 171, 174, 175, 181 state-building, 21, 65–6, 69, 75, 78–9, 83, 99 state of exception, 84 state-formation, 21–2, 64, 66–71, 73, 75, 77–80, 87–8, 99–100; developmental approach, 21–2, 67, 70–5, 100, 158; functional approach, 21, 67, 75–7, 100, 158; historical approach, 21, 67, 70, 78–80, 100, 158; models of state-formation, 21–2, 67, 134. See also nation-­ building; state-formation state ideological apparatus, 127–8 state internal security (Amn), 129 status quo, 57, 61, 103–7, 116 subjectivity, 11–12, 29, 120, 138, 141, 147 Sunni, 4, 8, 45, 66, 91–2, 130, 135–7, 139–47, 149–50, 163, 179 Sunni–Shia divide, 141, 144 Supreme Council of Free Officers 81, 84, 91 Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (S C I R I ), 136, 146, 148–9 Syria–Iraq scheme, 144 Talabani, Jalal, 134, 166–7 terrorism, 46, 130, 150, 178, 181

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232 Index

transubstantiation, 4, 9, 25, 125–6, 140, 148, 152, 175, 177 transubstantiatory violence, 4, 7–9, 15, 18–19, 21–5, 29–30, 35, 37–9, 41–4, 46–7, 49, 57, 63–4, 81, 101–2, 106, 156–8, 164, 169, 174–5, 176–7; 3 propositions, 8–9, 14–5, 18–9, 21, 25–6, 30, 38, 44, 47, 64, 156–8, 166, 176 two-stage revolution, 107–8, 112, 115, 124, 157, 166 Turkomen, 149 United Arab Republic, 78, 85–6, 98 United States Occupation, 53–4, 111, 158–9, 179 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (U D H R ), 52 victim types, 54–5 violence, 3, 8, 38; as aestheticized, 18, 44, 46–7, 64, 177; authorization of, 4, 6, 45, 61; as creation, 156; as divine, 36, 43; foundation, 40, 177–8; as illegitimate, 8, 18, 47, 140, 156, 172, 175, 180; as initiatory, 24, 35, 84, 101, 131, 139–40, 147–8, 150–2, 177, 179; as instrumental, 19, 28, 35–6, 42; law-making, 8–9, 83,

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181; law-preserving, 8–9, 83, 101, 179; as legitimate, 8, 20, 25, 45, 47–8, 152; Marxist concept of, 105; as means-ends, 21, 27–8, 36; as messianic, 19, 30, 36–7, 47; monopoly on, 3–4, 8, 28, 49; mythical, 36; normalization of, 6, 49, 64, 158; as originary, 8, 19, 30–1, 35–7, 41–3, 46; as political, 4, 46, 70, 105, 152, 181; psychological impact of, 9; regime violence, 4, 20, 24–5, 47, 49, 153, 156, 175–7; sectarian violence, 53, 57, 99, 132, 136; state, 20, 38, 46, 63, 104, 152; tolerable, 105, 168 War on Terror, 183–4 warfare, 6, 16, 19, 24, 27–9, 35, 39, 42–3, 45–6, 50, 52–3, 56–7, 66, 71, 77, 79–80, 93, 108, 130–1, 139–40, 142, 146, 154–5, 159– 67, 170–1, 174, 175–7, 180–2 Weber, Max, 3, 27–8. See also violence, monopoly on women’s rights 96, 107, 136 Yusuf, Salman Yusuf (F A U D ), 110, 114, 119–23

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