The Politics of Colonial Exploitation: Java, The Dutch, and the Cultivation System 9781501719127

Table of contents :
Contents
Preface
1. Java: The Jewel In The Dutch Crown
2. The Cultivation System
3. "The Cork On Which The Netherlands Floats"
4. Criticism In Private
5. Sugar And Sugar Contracts
6. Criticism In Public
7. Years Of Continuity And Change
8. Colonial Profits And The Liberal Dilemma
9. The Cultivation System And "Free Labor"
10. Sugar And Scandal
11. Rochussen And The Sugar Contractors At Bay
12. The End Of The Conservative Era
Conclusion
Appendix 1: The Major Government Cultivations In Figures
Appendix 2: Market Prices Of Coffee, Sugar, And Indigo Auctioned By The Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappij In The Netherlands On Government Account In The Period 1840–60
Appendix 3: Ministers Of Colonies And Governors-General Of The Netherlands Indies, 1840–60
Appendix 4: The British Envoy, Lord Napier, To The Minister Of Foreign Affairs Lord Russell, The Hague, 12 December 1860
Abbreviations And Glossary
Bibliography

Citation preview

Cornells Fasseur

THE POLITICS OF COLONIAL EXPLOITATION JAVA, THE DUTCH, AND THE CULTIVATIONSYSTEM

Translated from the Dutch by R. E. Elson and Ary Kraal Edited by R. E. Elson

STUDIES ON SOUTHEAST ASIA Southeast Asia Program Cornell University, Ithaca, New York 1992

Editor in Chief Benedict Anderson Advisory Board Randolph Barker George Kahin Stanley O'Connor Takashi Shiraishi Keith Taylor Oliver Wolters Editing and Production Donna Amoroso Audrey Kahin Roberta Ludgate Dolina Millar

Studies on Southeast Asia No. 8

Second Printing, 1994 © 1992 Cornell Southeast Asia Program ISBN 0-87727-707-9

CONTENTS

Preface

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1. Java: The Jewel in the Dutch Crown Java an "area of gain"; growing opposition in the Dutch parliament to the system of "exclusive" supreme rule by the Crown; communication between the Ministry of Colonies and the Indies government; opening of the "overland route" in 1845; size and composition of the European population in Java; entrance of "private persons" impeded; no freedom of the press in the Indies; organization of the Netherlands Indies administration.

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2. The Cultivation System The Cultivation System not a "system"; the Cultivation System and Javanese land rights; explanation of data in the Cultivation Reports; scope of the Cultivation System during the period 1840–50, calculated on the basis of the Cultivation Reports; enlistment of private entrepreneurs; geographical extent of forced cultivations in Java; significant regional variation; financial results; crop payments dependent on harvest results; crop payments and land rent; the pressure of sugar and indigo cultivation; supervision of government cultivations; cultivation percentages; the Cultivation System and conservative principles of administration; influence of the Cultivation System on relationships within the village; the Cultivation System incompatible with the conservative ideal of a "closed" Javanese society.

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3. "The Cork on which the Netherlands Floats" The Indies budget surplus the "property" of the mother country; the supplementary instruction of 1842; severe economizing measures in the Indies administration; increases in land rent and other taxes; the consignment system; the "budget surplus policy" accepted without criticism.

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4. Criticism in Private Increase in the pressure of the Cultivation System after 1840; the reasons for this increase; production, crop payments, and land rent in indigo cultivation; "declining prosperity" is not reported; the "passivity" of the Javanese; high rice prices; Baud; his warnings against "contract mania"; the Cirebon rice milling contract; Rochussen; his unfavorable impression of the Cultivation System; partial withdrawal of indigo cultivation; government indigo cultivation in 1845 and 1850; still no "awakening of the national conscience" in the Netherlands; Rochussen's measures with respect to the other cultivations; "neglect" of coffee cultivation; Baud opposes alterations in the levying of land rent.

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The Politics of Colonial Exploitation

5. Sugar and Sugar Contracts Government sugar cultivation in 1845 and 1850; losses from this cultivation before 1845; little uniformity in sugar contracts; attempts to improve the quality of sugar; Rochussen's measures; provision of capital to sugar contractors; only a few Chinese among the sugar contractors; the "model-contract" of 1847; Rochussen in conflict with the sugar contractors; sugar cultivation approached differently by Baud and Rochussen; private enterprise agriculture; impediments put in the way of this form of agriculture after 1840; no further expansion of the Cultivation System after 1850.

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6. Criticism in Public 102 The Dutch constitutional revision of 1848; a shower of colonial pamphlets; Van Hoevell head of the "colonial opposition"; the Tijdschrift voor Nederlandsch Indie; Baud elected to the Second Chamber in 1850; Minister of Colonies Pahud; De Indier; famine in Demak; causes of the famine; death and flight elsewhere in Central Java; reactions in the Netherlands; critical remarks by Rochussen; Baud attacked in parliament; Duymaer van Twist appointed governor-general in 1851; opposition of Baud and van Hoevell to the Cultivation System; the rift between van Hoevell and Baud final. 7. Years of Continuity and Change Negative result of the inquiry entrusted to Duymaer van Twist into the operation of the Cultivation System; Baud assesses a quarter-century of government sugar cultivation; Inspector of Cultivations Umbgrove charged with an inquiry; assessment of Duymaer van Twist's administration; preparations for the new constitutional regulation; Baud's influence on it; the constitutional regulation and the Cultivation System; the "conciliatory" ARTICLE 56; the constitutional regulation and free agricultural enterprise; the constitutional regulation and the native chiefs; the constitutional regulation and the budget surplus; assessment of the constitutional regulation.

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8. Colonial Profits and the Liberal Dilemma Thorbecke and van Hoevell; the "colonial question"; alterations in the consignment system; large increase in colonial profits after 1850; proposals for the abolition of excise duties; should not the Javanese share in the profits?; increase of crop payments in coffee cultivation; increase of other expenditures in the Indies budget; drawing up the Indies budget remains provisionally reserved to the Crown; warnings against the "precariousness" of colonial profits; none of the parties reject the Indies profits in principle.

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9. The Cultivation System and "Free Labor" 162 The Cultivation System loses ground in Java after 1850; scope of the Cultivation System in the years 1840 and 1860; private agricultural enterprise on "waste" land; private agricultural enterprise on cultivated land; De Perez and Schiff; private tobacco cultivation in Rembang; Rochussen's "liberal" period; "scandal" in Rembang; the "free labor" Residents called to account; Rochussen opposes "free labor"; inquiry in Java produces little result; the private plantation industry around 1860 still no real alternative to the Cultivation System; the private sugar industry impeded; dismissal of Bekking; a "crusade" against

Contents

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"free labor?"; uncertain attitude of the Indies authorities; freedom in the "free" cultivations an elastic concept; rehabilitation of Bekking. 10. Sugar and Scandal The public auctioning of sugar contracts as a political controversy; experiences with auctioning in the years 1837-40; patronage in the granting of sugar contracts; sugar contracts attract interest in the Netherlands; discussion of them in the debates on the government budget for 1853; prohibition on issuing new sugar contracts; sugar cultivation experiences a boom period; introduction of a "fixed" delivery figure in 1854; profits of the sugar contractors; their absenteeism; the Pangka contract; King William III arranges that this contract be promised to a member of the royal household; the motion of van Bosse to regulate the granting of sugar contracts by law rejected by a small majority; opposition between the liberal party and the sugar contractors; Rochussen's point of view; Rochussen in conflict with the "colonial opposition."

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11. Rochussen and the Sugar Contractors at Bay Rochussen joins the ministry of van Hall established in 1860; interpellation by van Hoevell on sugar contracts; Rochussen's reply; the motion of Wintgens; this motion a "turning point"; Rochussen draws up a new regulation for sugar cultivation without parliament; crop payments in government and free sugar cultivation; the "general principles" received in Java with little enthusiasm; disappointment within the "colonial opposition."

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12. The End of the Conservative Era New claims for the Pangka contract; judicial sale of the Pangka factory; the arrangement between Rochussen and van Vloten; Max Havelaar; Rochussen suffers a defeat in the Second Chamber; his resignation; Loudon, minister of Colonies; Loudon wants to maintain the Cultivation System but with "free labor"; his plans deemed unworkable; conflict between Loudon and van Zuylen van Nyevelt; Loudon obtains the support of the liberals; Thorbecke passes over van Hoevell; Thorbecke and Loudon; the changing of the guard.

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Conclusion

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Appendix 1: The major government cultivations in figures

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Appendix 2: Market prices of coffee, sugar, and indigo auctioned by the Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappij in the Netherlands on government account in the period 1840–60

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Appendix 3: Ministers of Colonies and governors-general of the Netherlands Indies, 1840–60

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Appendix 4: The British envoy, Lord Napier, to the Minister of Foreign Affairs Lord Russell, The Hague, 12 December 1860

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Abbreviations and Glossary

255

Bibliography

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PREFACE

he subject of this book is the development of the Cultivation System during the midnineteenth century (c. 1840-c. 1860), insofar as this development was intertwined with ideas held in Dutch government circles in Java and with political decision making in the Netherlands. The Cultivation System, intro duced in Java around 1830, was a form of government agriculture in which the colonial government forced the peasant population to grow tropical export products that subsequently were sold at the auctions of the Netherlands Trading Company (Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappij [NHM]) for the benefit of the Dutch Treasury. What interested me in particular was the question of how the colonial ruler reacted to the forces that he—purposely or not—set in motion with the Cultivation System. It is this way of asking questions that has influenced the perspective from which this book was written. Probably no other topic in Dutch colonial historiography has been discussed as much as has the Cultivation System in Java. This literature, however, was strongly influenced by the political struggle in the Netherlands that preceded the liquidation of the Cultivation System around 1870; its quality is.not proportionate to its extent. If the system was praised by the conservatives, it was condemned by the liberals. The mainstay of the system was government pressure—the obligation laid on the Javanese peasantry to grow commercial crops such as coffee, sugar cane, indigo, tobacco, and tea, which had to be handed over to the colonial administration. For every nineteenth-century liberal a compulsory system of this kind was necessarily a thorn in the flesh. The Cultivation System was, moreover, an essential instrument in the pursuit of a policy of economic exploitation which made the years from 1830 to 1850, in the words of the Dutch author Gonggrijp, "the most shameful pages in our colonial history/'1 No wonder the system finds no favor with the majority of the older writers on the topic. To mention only the best known of them, van Soest, Pierson, Clive Day, Colenbrander, Stapel, Gonggrijp, they have given a verdict against the Cultivation System and often judged and condemned it out of hand in harsh terms.2 A belated conservative reaction against this liberal criticism can be found in some Dutch dissertations written in the last decade before World War II under the guidance of Gerretson who then held the chair of colonial history in Utrecht. But the one-sidedness of this reaction makes it equally untrustworthy. Gerretson, also a well-known Dutch poet in his time, boldly characterized the Cultivation System in 1938 as "the greatest

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1 2

G. Gonggrijp, Schets ener Economische Geschiedenis van Indonesie (Haarlem: Bohn, 1957), p. 82. See the bibliography at the end of this monograph.

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The Politics of Colonial Exploitation

benefit ever conferred by the Dutch on their East Indian possessions."^ Thereafter interest flagged when, after 1945, the Dutch were pushed rather forcefully into the era of decolonization and had other problems to worry about. The only study in Dutch of the Cultivation System that appeared after World War II—the scholarly thesis of Reinsma on the decline of the system—discussed the existing literature and was not based on new archival sources.4 So I come to a second reason for the out-of-date impression made by the older literature on the Cultivation System. Research into archives and other source materials was for a long time no more than minimal. Until the 1960s virtually all the relevant literature was based on a selection made from the colonial office archives by S. van Deventer in his famous Bijdragen tot de Kennis van het Landelijk Stelsel op Java (Contributions to the understanding of the land rent system in Java).^ The Bijdragen appeared under the auspices of liberal Colonial Minister Isaac Dignus Fransen van de Putte (1863-66). They provided ammunition used by the minister in his campaign against the conservative protectors of the Cultivation System. Van Deventer, an East Indies official on home leave, regarded himself as the "instrument" chosen by the minister to deal the system its "death-blow."^ When Fransen van de Putte resigned in 1866, van Deventer was also obliged to cease his activity. Although it is thus difficult to see van Deventer's work as unprejudiced, it nevertheless provided the basis for all later publications on the Cultivation System up to and including Reinsma's thesis of 1955. It was relatively late before the archives of the colonial office, which van Deventer had used as his source, were transferred to the General State Archives in The Hague and thus became accessible to systematic academic research. The archives for the years 1830-50 were transferred in 1929; those covering the years 1850-1900 did not become available until about 1950. The importance of this material for a fresh investigation of the Cultivation System can be demonstrated by the socalled Kultuurverslagen (Cultivation Reports). In those reports, the Directorate of Cultivations in Batavia provided during its existence from 1832 to 1866 an annual detailed survey of the results of the system for the information of the Netherlands East Indies administration and for the Colonial Office. Although van Soest, in his Geschiedenis van het Kultuurstelsel published in 1869-71, had already focused attention on the importance of these reports, it was not until 1959 that they were rediscovered in the colonial archives/ With the exception of some valuable short studies published by the American historian Robert van Niel in various periodicals,^ this book was, when it was pub^ C. Gerretson, J.B.D. Derksen, G. H. Crone, H. Kraemer, D. Crena de longh, F. M. van Asbeck, De Sociaal-Economische Invloed van Nederlandsch-Indie op Nederland (Wageningen: Veenman, 1938), p. 18. 4 R. Reinsma, Het Verval van het Cultuurstelsel (The Hague: Van Keulen, 1955). See also W. Ph. Coolhaas in Algemene Geschiedenis der Nederlanden (Utrecht, 1955), 10: 240: "It is not yet possible to provide conclusive arguments demonstrating the importance of the system." 5 S. Van Deventer, Bijdragen tot de Kennis van het Landelijk Stelsel op Java, 3 vols. (Zaltbommel: Noman, 1865-66). 6 S. van Deventer to I. D. Fransen van de Putte, 8-22 December 1867, private papers Fransen van de Putte held at Huis ter Heide (Utrecht). ^ See R. Reinsma, "De Cultuurprocenten in de Praktijk en in de Ogen der Tijdgenoten," Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis 72 (1959): 57-83. ^ See, in particular, his "Measurement of Change under the Cultivation System in Java, 18371851," Indonesia 14 (1972): 89-109.

Preface

9

lished for the first time in 1975 as a Dutch doctoral dissertation, the first attempt to make a systematic analysis of this ''new" source material. Without being fully aware of it myself, it was then, in 1975, an opportune moment to draw attention to the history of the Cultivation System. Twelve years before in 1963, Clifford Geertz had published his stimulating essay Agricultural Involution: The Processes of Ecological Change in Indonesia. Although his study is certainly not without its shortcomings, it has greatly obliged all historians by reviving interest in the role played by the Cultivation System in the development of Java during the last century and a half. The period of the Cultivation System, in the words of Geertz, was "the classic stage of colonial history," ^ and he went on to explain that the system was decisive in at least three ways. By its intense concentration on Java it gave a final form to the extreme contrast between Inner and Outer Indonesia. It stabilized the dual economy pattern of a capitalintensive Western sector and a labor-intensive Eastern one and, most importantly, it kept the natives native; it brought Indonesia's crops into the modern world but not her people. The system prevented autochthonous agricultural modernization at the point it could most easily have occurred. In a later essay, in 1984, rethinking his concept of agricultural involution, Geertz confessed himself "still partial" to his original position in this respect.^ I do not need to mention here the enormous impact Geertz's work had in the whole field of Indonesian development studies during the last quarter-century.11 But one should not lose sight of the fact that the historical component of Agricultural Involution is extremely weak. The only "historical" data the book provided were borrowed from an agricultural atlas of Java published in 1926. It is not a bold statement to say that, because the literature on the Cultivation System to which Geertz could refer in 1963 was hopelessly outdated, his analysis of the system is open to severe criticism and in serious need of revision. This book focuses on the period that could be described as the "high noon" of the Cultivation System. The years of the system's decline between 1860 and 1870 and the drawn-out political debate in the Netherlands connected with it have been left out as these topics deserve a study of their own. Since the Dutch edition of this book was published, a few more studies of the Cultivation System in Java have appeared. I have already mentioned Robert Van Niel's contributions to furthering our knowledge of this subject. Very useful, for instance, is the reflective article he published in 1981.12 An outstanding monograph by R. E. Elson, published in 1984, deals partly with the impact of the Cultivation System on the East Java Residency of 9

C. Geertz, Agricultural Involution: The Processes of Ecological Change in Indonesia (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963), p. 53. 10 Geertz, "Culture and Social Change: The Indonesian Case," Man 19 (1984): 511-32, especially 525, n. 5. 11 See Benjamin White, "'Agricultural Involution' and Its Critics: Twenty Years After," Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars 15 (1983): 18-31. Geertz's work has been severely criticized from an ecological angle by Arthur van Schaik, Colonial Control and Peasant Resources in Java. Agricultural Involution Reconsidered (Amsterdam: n.p., 1986). 12 R. Van Niel, 'The Effect of Export Cultivations in Nineteenth-century Java," Modern Asian Studies 15 (1981): 25-58. Van Niel's many articles on the Cultivation System have been brought together in R. Van Niel, Java under the Cultivation System (Leiden: Koninklijk Institut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde, 1992).

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Pasuruan.13 He has also written several other short studies on the functioning of the Cultivation System.14 The work of G. R. Knight should also be mentioned. In 1980 he published a study on the early years of the Java sugar industry;15 more recent studies have dealt with the situation in the North Central Java Residency of Pekalongan during the period of the Cultivation System.1** Two unpublished theses worth mentioning, are M. R. Fernando's doctoral dissertation on the West Java Residency of Cirebon,*' and Djoko Suryo's work on the Residency of Semarang.18 Peter Boomgaard's book presents a very critical picture of the impact of the Cultivation System on indigenous prosperity in contrast with the more favorable opinion of most other writers mentioned here.1^ My own further research on the Cultivation System has developed a number of themes identified in my earlier work.20 Most of the more recent publications on the Cultivation System, as these comments indicate, are local studies; they deal with different regions of Java. Many of them are, at least partially, based on the holdings of the Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia in Jakarta. An "Indonesia-centric" approach to nineteenth-century Java in the period of the Cultivation System has undeniably made good progress since the last decade when the original version of my book, based almost exclusively for its unprinted sources on the holdings of the General State Archives in The Hague, was published. Only through such regional studies will it be possible to analyze accurately local differences in administrative organization, economy, social contrasts, customs, and so on. This proliferation of specific studies, however, does not make superfluous a general overview of Dutch policy and decision making in so far as it influenced the development of the Cultivation System and vice versa. With this book I hope to contribute toward a broadening of the knowledge of that subject. 13

R. E. Elson, Javanese Peasants and the Colonial Sugar Industry: Impact and Change in an East Java Residency, 1830-1940 (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1984). 14 R. E. Elson, The Cultivation System and "Agricultural Involution" (Clayton: Monash, 1978); idem, "Sugar Factory Workers and the Emergence of Tree Labour' in Nineteenth Century Java/' Modern Asian Studies 20 (1986): 139-74; 'The Famine in Demak and Grobogan in 184950: Its Causes and Circumstances," Review of Indonesian and Malaysian Affairs 19 (1985): 39-85. 15 G. R. Knight, "From Plantation to Padi-field: The Origins of the Nineteenth Century Transformation of Java's Sugar Industry," Modern Asian Studies 14 (1980): 177-204. 16 See, for example, "Capitalism and Commodity Production in Java," in Capitalism and Colonial Production, ed. Hamza Alavi et al. (London: Croom Helm, 1982). ^ M. R. Fernando, "Peasants and Plantation Economy in Cirebon Residency from the Cultivation System to the End of the First Decade of the Twentieth Century," Ph.D. diss., Monash University, 1982. ^ "Social and Economic Life in Rural Semarang under Colonial Rule in the Later Nineteenth Century," Ph.D. diss., Monash University, 1982. 19 P. Boomgaard, Children of the Colonial State: Population Growth and Economic Development in Java, 1795-1880 (Amsterdam: Free University Press, 1989). I have discussed Boomgaard's views in my "Clio and Clifford Geertz," Itinerario 14, 2 (1990): 71-79, especially pp. 76-77. ^® See, for example, C. Fasseur, "Some Remarks on the Cultivation System in Java," Ada Historiae Neerlandicae 10 (1976): 143-62; "Organisatie en Sociaal-Economische Betekenis van de Gouvernementssuikerkultuur in Enkele Residenties op Java omstreeks 1850," Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde 133 (1977): 261-93; idem, 'The Cultivation System and Its Impact on the Dutch Colonial Economy in Java and the Indigenous Society in Nineteenth-Century Java," in Two Colonial Empires: Comparative Essays on the History of India and Indonesia in the Nineteenth Century, ed. C. A. Bayly and D.H.A. Kolff (Dordrecht: Nijhoff, 1986).

Preface

11

I am, of course, aware that a study of the intricacies of Dutch parliamentary politics around the middle of the nineteenth century might be rather perplexing for nonDutch readers who do not have a specific knowledge of the subject. For that reason I have included among the appendices a report of the British envoy in The Hague, Sir Francis Napier, written in 1860 for the information of his government. This memorandum provides an excellent survey of the workings and peculiarities of the Dutch parliament in the period covered by this book as seen through the eyes of a well-informed and intelligent foreign observer. The best modern comprehensive account in English of the history of the Netherlands during the last century is E. H. Kossman, The Low Countries 1780-1940 (London: Clarendon, 1978). A NOTE ON SPELLING AND USAGE

The place names employed in this book are those in use in the colonial period, thus "Batavia" for Jakarta and "Buitenzorg" for Bogor; the spelling of Indonesian place names has been modernized, thus "Surabaya" rather than "Soerabaja"; the names of institutions, however, have been rendered in their original spelling, thus the "Gajam" sugar factory rather than "Gayam." Several descriptions and concepts that appear in this book will be reminders of Indonesia's colonial past. Expressions like "The Indies," "native chiefs," and so on, are examples of this. This was, in a monograph like this, difficult to avoid. There was, however, no question of any subjective preference for the use of these terms.

"I shall shout it on the corners of the streets, I shall tell it to the King as I point at the jewels in his crown and I shall tell it to Holland as I point at its wealth: those jewels have been robbed, those fortunes have been stolen, your prosperity is robbery and your colonial profit is a tree which has its root in a swamp of injustice!'' —Multatuli, Memorandum to Governor-General Duymaer van Twist, 9 April 1856, in Volledige Werken (Brieven en Dokumenten), 9: 613.

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JAVA: THE JEWEL IN THE DUTCH CROWN

he Dutch Constitution of 1815 stated nothing about the "colonial settlements and possessions of the Kingdom in other parts of the world" other than that supreme rule rested "exclusively" with the king.1 J. C. Baud, minister of colonies from 1840 to 1848, had taken that clause literally, as had his predecessor, J. van den Bosch. The Constitution, according to Baud, had correctly excluded the Dutch parliament from making laws on colonial matters. The principles of constitutional law in force in the Netherlands could never be applied to colonial administration. The situation was different from that in the Netherlands: over there, the wishes of a small minority were what mattered. The East Indies possessions, "invaluable Java" in particular, were "areas of gain" (wingewesten)?- To a small group of Europeans was entrusted dominion over a population one hundred times more numerous; there could be no illusions about the true dispositions of that mass of millions of people. "Language, color, religion, morals, origin, historical memories, everything is different between the Dutch and the Javanese. We are the rulers, they are the ruled!"3 In Baud's opinion, if the Dutch colonial administration wanted to maintain itself through its own power, it had to be monolithic and "autocratic." Absolute obedience to the governor-general, who in turn had to be the obedient executor of the instructions and orders of the king sent to him through the intermediary of the minister of colonies, was imperative. Any interference by the Dutch parliament in the administration of the Indies was not only an inadmissible infringement of the rights of the Crown, but also a disturbance of "the harmony of colonial institutions," which would prejudice the "firmness" of Dutch authority in those far-off lands.4 The Dutch government, consequently, monopolized the information at its disposal relating to the affairs of the Indies. For example, when important changes were made to Indies government administration in 1836, it was not even thought necessary

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ART. 60 of the 1815 Constitution; ART. 59 of the 1840 Constitution. See also ART. 36 of the 1814 Constitution and ART. 36 of the Holland Constitution of 1806. 2 E. de Waal, Nederlandsch Indie in de Staten-Generaal sedert de Grondwet van 1814 (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1860-61), 3: 392 (Second Chamber sitting of 5 October 1843); p. 474 (sitting of 22 June 1844). 3 A. Alberts, Baud en Thorbecke 1847-1851 (Utrecht: Oosthoek, 1939), p. 172 (note of Baud in 1849). 4 De Waal, Nederlandsch Indie, 3: 483 (sitting of 22 June 1844); cf. P. Mijer, Jean Chretien Baud Geschetst (Utrecht: Kemink, 1878), p. 499.

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to advise the Dutch parliament of the relevant royal decree.5 Indeed, the Indies Government Gazette (Staatsblad) was not forwarded regularly to the Dutch parliament until after 1840.6 Before 1840, information on how colonial finances were managed had also been completely withheld from the Dutch parliament. However, when the Constitution was revised in that year because of the secession of Belgium, the government had to yield to the almost universal wish of the parliament for greater openness in and a certain degree of control over the use of Indies budget surpluses. The colonial article of the Constitution was then complemented by a provision (drafted by Baud) that henceforth budget statements received from the Indies would be supplied annually to parliament. Furthermore, the manner in which colonial budget surpluses available for the benefit of the mother country were to be spent would be regulated by law 7 Thus formal contact between the parliament and the administration of colonial affairs dated from 1840, but for the time being it remained very superficial. The government interpreted the new constitutional provisions very narrowly. Only a brief explanation was given of the Indies budget figures—in fact they were not much more than a "summary" of the budget statements. What thereafter was actually received or spent remained unclear. The way Indies finances were organized, according to Baud, did not permit such accountability.8 The bills to regulate the disposal of the colonial budget surplus over past years also amounted to very little. From 1841 onwards, a committee, in which two members of each chamber of the bicameral Dutch parliament served, checked the colonial remittance accounts drawn up by the department (i.e., the account of what was received and spent in the Netherlands on behalf of the Indies government), but approval of the accounts remained reserved to the Crown.^ For parliament, then, remained the rather futile task of legislating that the Indies budget surplus ascertained from the remittance accounts be added to Dutch government revenue. Under those circumstances, parliamentary control of colonial finances remained nominal. A minority of liberal and middle-of-the-road members of parliament found it difficult to resign themselves to this situation. They wanted more influence in drawing up the Indies budget and also a law approved by parliament embodying the principles on which government in the Indies should be based.10 Initially, Baud had little trouble defending the "vital principle" of "exclusive supreme rule" by the Crown.^ Gradually, however, the opposition became stronger. In 1841, during the debate on the domestic budget for the years 1842 and 1843, only 5 This regulation of the policy of the government (Regeringsreglement), established by royal decree of 20 February 1836, Ind. Sib. no. 48, replaced an earlier regulation that had been proclaimed in 1830. 6 De Waal, Nederlandsch Indie, 3: 693. ^ A. Jansen, Vaststelling en Verantwoording van de Indische Begrooting, 1814-1932 (Leiden: Dubbeldeman, 1932), pp. 19 ff. 8 See de Waal, Nederlandsch Indie, 3: 742, 754. 9 For the royal decree of 29 September 1841, through which this committee was established, see de Waal, Nederlandsch Indie, 3: 151. The committee consisted further of two members of the Council of State and two members of the General Audit Department. The minister of colonies was chairman. 10 See J. Zwart, Duymaer van Twist. Een Historisch-Liberaal Staatsman 1809-1887 (Utrecht: Oosthoek, 1919), p. 44. 11 De Waal, Nederlandsch Indie, 3:147.

The Jewel in the Dutch Crown

15

three members voted against the estimates for the Department of Colonies; in 1843 there were eight; in 1845, eighteen.12 in 1847, during debate on the budget for 1848 and 1849, the opposition formed a solid bloc of twenty-three members of parliament as opposed to thirty-four members who were loyal to the government, so that Baud anxiously began to wonder, "What will the figures be in two years time?"^ One may conclude that decision making on colonial matters, insofar as it took place in the Netherlands, was until 1848 still completely reserved to the Department of Colonies. The parliament was scarcely ever consulted, even after the event. Even if Baud maintained that colonial administration was, so to speak, "in a glass house, visible on all sides," ^ a member of parliament, Sloet tot Oldhuis, was undoubtedly closer to the truth when he commented in 1849 that the conduct of colonial policy had been one of "keeping things secret," and that previous governments had acted as if "the colonies did not really concern the Nation and consequently should lie outside its circle of cognizance, like a sort of crown domain."^ Although the parliament received little information from the minister of colonies, the department itself did not seem to be well informed either about affairs and conditions in the Indies. Even in 1850, one still comes across the complaint in semi-official correspondence between the minister and the governor-general that "with respect to some subjects it is impossible to deny that the Department of Colonies is not abreast of what happens in the Indies."^ There were three types of correspondence between the governor-general and the minister: official (ordinary as well as secret), semiofficial, which was kept in the cabinet of the governor-general and was passed on to his successor, and private, which was of a strictly personal character/7 As a rule, the governor-general wrote one semiofficial letter per month (after 1856, this became two), in which all kinds of matters were treated more or less confidentially. The governor-general wrote semiofficial letters himself (at least that was the case before 1850). The minister left this task in the end to his secretary-general (a position that before 1860 was always filled by a high Indies official on temporary furlough in the Netherlands).1^ There was, for that matter, not that much for a minister to delegate. In 1860, the Department of Colonies, including the clerks of the office and the archives, numbered only sixty-seven officials. Of those, apart from the secretary-general and a senior official from the Indies who was temporarily working for the department, only twenty-three officials were specifically responsible for handling Indies business (apart from military matters). Bureau A (ten officials) dealt with general matters, Bureau E (eight officials) checked 12

Ibid., pp. 169,403,525. Baud to Rochussen, 22 August 1847, Collectie Baud, 572. 14 De Waal, Nederlandsch Indie, 3:484 (sitting of 22 June 1844), 610 (28 November 1845). 15 Bijl. Hand. 1849-50, p. 91. 16 Pahud to Rochussen, 21 February 1850, no. 56, Kol. 6526. 17 See Baud to Rochussen, 13 November 1845, Collectie Baud, 572; V 24 October 1844, no. 1, Kol. 1597. When official correspondence is quoted, usually a Verbaal (minute) or Exhibitum (agenda item) is given, as well as the inventory number under which the documents (or minute) are deposited in the archives of the Ministry of Colonies. When semiofficial correspondence is quoted, a number is given after the date of the letter without indication of Verbaal or Exhibitum but with an inventory number of the archives of the Ministry of Colonies. When a letter is quoted to or from Baud from the Baud collection, it always refers to private correspondence. 18 Rochussen to Baud, 29 February 1848, no. 70, Kol. 4567. 13

16

The Politics of Colonial Exploitation

the colonial accounts and remittances, Bureau H (five officials) dealt with cabinet and confidential matters.^ In addition, the minister was able to acquaint himself with things by referring to the so-called register of Indies decisions and decrees taken and promulgated by the governor-general, of which a copy was sent to the department every three months.2^ Finally, the Indies government secretariat (Algemene Secretarie) dispatched a short monthly report of "particulars worth mentioning."2* According to the instruction drawn up in 1836 for the governor-general, every year he had to forward a general survey of the Apolitical situation" of the Netherlands Indies, as well as a "statistical summary."2^ These reports, which could have supplied a total picture, did not amount to much, and they did not appear after 1838.23 The excuse of the Indies government was that it did not have sufficient competent officials at its disposal to perform this burdensome task in addition to their day-to-day responsibilities at the office. D. C. Steyn Parve, the referendary who was especially responsible for this job, had to be placed on half-pay in 1845 because of his lack of zeal for his work. (It would later be found that he had spent his time collecting material for a book critical of the system of government in Java.)2^ In 1850, submission of the reports was resumed, together with a detailed report covering the years 1839-48.25 Thus the information that reached the Netherlands along official channels left much to be desired and as a rule did not go further than the department. There were almost no other means of communication, nor an Indies daily press, which could have made up for this shortcoming. Until the mid-1840s, mail and travel connections between the Netherlands and Java were little better than they had been in the seventeenth century. The journey around the Cape of Good Hope, in most cases still made by sailing ship, required an average of four months.2** That great distance made the regular exchange of views very difficult. Replies to letters sent from and to the Indies could easily take up to nine months to be received. Whoever went to the Indies did so hoping to make a fortune but in the knowledge that return to the Netherlands would take place, at best, only after many years. Officials in the Indies could lay claim to furlough in Europe only after fifteen years of service. Inside that period, furlough to Europe 19

Almanak en Naamregister van Nederlandsch-Indie over het jaar 1860 (Batavia: Landsdrukkerij, 1860), pp. 5-7. 20 See ART. 21 of the instructions for the governor-general of 26 March 1836; W. A. Knibbe, De Vestiging der Monarchie. Het Conflict Elout-Van den Bosch in Verband met de Wordingsgeschiedenis der Regeerings-Reglementen van 1830 en 1836 (Utrecht: Oosthoek, 1935), p. 192. 21 The order to this effect had been issued by Van den Bosch in 1835. See J. J. Westendorp Boerma, Briejwisseling tussen J. van den Bosch en J. C. Baud 1829-1832 en 1834-1836 (Utrecht: Kemink, 1956), 1:202. 22 ART. 57,58. See Knibbe, Vestiging der Monarchie, pp. 201, 202. 2 ^ For further details see Governor-General to Minister, 15 September 1839, Cabinet, no. 162; Exh. 3 February 1840, R1, Kol. 4431; Governor-General to Minister, 24 June 1850, no. 411; Exh 31 January 1851, no. 27 bis, Kol. 5823. 24 Rochussen to Pahud, 27 April 1850, no. 92, Kol. 6529. 25 "Algemeen Overzicht van de staatkundige gesteldheid van Nederlandsch Indie over 18391848"; Exh. 31 January 1851, no. 27 bis, Kol. 5823. 2 ° In 1844 and 1845, the semiofficial letters of the governor-general took on average 125 to 130 days to reach their destinations. Rochussen was the first governor-general who sent his semiofficial letters and the most important documents from the official correspondence by overland mail.

The Jewel in the Dutch Crown

17

could be granted only "for the recovery of health" and—after at least twelve years— because of "urgent family affairs."^ Consequently, Europeans in the Indies soon became estranged from family and friends at home.^8 Only after 1844 was improvement significant, when a route via the Isthmus of Suez was opened, which connected with a steamship mail service run by an English company. This overland route reduced the journey from the Netherlands to Java and vice versa to fifty-five or sixty days. From then on it was possible to send postage articles "by landmail" every month, which went via Marseilles, Southampton or Trieste, and Alexandria and was collected from Singapore by a Dutch government steamship. The public was informed in detail about this new connection in the Dutch Official Gazette of 1846.29 'It is the start of a new era, a turning point in the history of the Indies," predicted W. R. Baron van Hoevell, a Batavia clergyman3^ and, indeed, the influence of this new line of communication, tugging the Netherlands and Java together, was soon evident. Mail traffic immediately became much heavier. The number of private letters exchanged between Java and the Netherlands rose from approximately 64,000 in 1846 to 104,000 in 1850.31 The Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant (NRC) and the Algemeen Handelsblad, the two leading newspapers in Holland, began publication of landmail editions that informed their subscribers in Java about political developments in the Netherlands.32 The book trade also became interested in the opportunities available in the Indies as a market for Dutch books. In 1848, E.J.L. Fuhri, brother of a wellknown publisher from The Hague, opened a bookshop in Batavia; this example was followed in the same year by W. J. van Haren Noman of the firm of Joh. Noman and Son at Zaltbommel.33 In 1850, the importation of books from the Netherlands to Java, dispatched by seamail, already amounted to three times as much as in 1846, not including the daily papers and pamphlets that had been dispatched by the much more expensive landmail.34 The Dutch community in Java was numerically very small, which contributed to its strong isolation. Most of its members were born outside the Netherlands. In 1860, the number of Europeans living in Java (excluding the military and children of soldiers) was still only 22,663 persons in all, consisting of 7,602 men, 5,265 women and 9,796 children.35 Of these Europeans, 18,338 had been born in the Indies. Further27

See Bijl. Hand. 1851-52, p. 199. See R. Nieuwenhuys, Oost-Indische Spiegel (Amsterdam: Querido, 1972), p. 121. 29 See R.E.J. Weber, "Zee- en Landtransport in het Postverkeer met het voormalige Nederlands Indie/' Spiegel Historiael 2 (1967): 226. 30 He would recall this utterance in the Tijdschrift voor Nederlandsch Indie of 1851, pt. 1, p. 71. 31 See Reinsma, Cultuurstelsel, p. 29. 32 At the end of 1845, the first copy of the mail edition of the NRC was received in Batavia. See T. H. der Kinderen, "Levensbericht van S. van Deventer," in Levensberichten van de Maatschappij der Nederlandsche Letterkunde (Leiden: Brill, 1891), p. 304. According to thejavasche Courant of 2 January 1850 it was also possible to subscribe to a mail edition of the Algemeen Handelsblad. This latter edition, however, did not last long. The mail edition of the NRC still existed in 1860. 33 See A. C. Kruseman, Bouwstoffen voor een Geschiedenis van den Nederlandschen Boekhandel, gedurende de Halve Eeuw 1830-1880 (Amsterdam: Van Kampen, 1886-87), 2: 764. 34 See De Indier, 18 September 1851, no. 64; TNI 2 (1851): 211; Kruseman, Bouwstoffen, 2: 742. 35 Koloniaal Verslag I860, Bijl. Hand. 1862-63, LVII, Bijlage A, no. 3. Bijl. Hand, cited with a Roman numeral, as here, refers to a so-called "white paper" (see bibliography). 28

18

The Politics of Colonial Exploitation

more, there were 1,077 "foreign Europeans" and only 3,248 Dutch people born in the Netherlands or outside the Indies. Of this latter category, 2,096 were adult males and 623 were women. Finally, 13,466 Europeans were serving in the Indies army in 1860, of whom a great number were foreigners, and another 6,507 Europeans were living outside Java.36 This small Dutch community had the character of a society of officials that was not very open to the outside world. See table 1.1 for the occupational composition of the male European population (again not including the military) in 1860. Table 1.1. Composition of the male European professional population in Java in 1860 Employment Govern- Agricultural ComOther ment Engerprises3 merce Occupations

Unemployed^

Total Employed

Europeans born in the Indies

1750

60

196

1541

1332

4879

Europeans born in the Netherlands and Dutch born outside the Indies

779

78

250

668

321

2096

58

15

171

244

139

627

2587

153

617

2453

1792

7602

Foreign Europeans TOTAL

Source: Bijl Hand. 1862-63, LVII, bijlage A, no. 5. Agricultural enterprises contracted to the government. Most were employed at sugar factories. " Includes 1,002 pensioned officials and military men. a

Thus, almost one-half the Europeans employed in Java in 1860 were government officials. Taking into account the Europeans serving in the army, in that year not more than one in six people was "privately employed," that is, in industry or commerce and not as a public servant or in the military. Travel from the Netherlands to Java was not made easy for those who were not assured in advance of government employment. The government had no love for Europeans who, because they could not find employment, could become public charges. Before leaving, a European had to produce a certificate, which stated that two guarantors, whose financial solvency had to be confirmed by four witnesses, would commit themselves to the immediate repayment of all expenses that the government would have to make if the person unexpectedly threatened to become a charge on colonial finances. Included in this repayment were the expenses of a possible return journey to the Netherlands.37 Furthermore, one had to be able to produce proof of good moral conduct (together with a certificate that military service 36

Ibid., Bijlage A, no. 11, no. 14. The difficulty that the Dutch who wanted to go to the Indies experienced in finding guarantors was attributed to the fact that almost all private trades and professions in Batavia around 1850 were in the hands of foreigners. These foreigners were not obliged to secure guarantors in their own countries before they left for Java. See Sloet tot Oldhuis, Bijl. Hand. 1849-50, p. 91. 37

The Jewel in the Dutch Crown

19

obligations had been fulfilled). When, after several visits to the city hall, the stamp office, and the police station, all these requirements had been met, the Department of Colonies issued a passport. Without such a passport, no ship captain was allowed to . ^K provide passage.00 This procedure worked as a social filter. Those who did not have relations with at least some financial means, who were willing to act as guarantors, had no chance of going to Java, unless they volunteered for the colonial army for at least six years. It would not be an exaggeration to suggest that most people who went to Java as civil servants or as private persons belonged to the "respectable middle class/' and as a rule would have received some secondary education. Most probably, someone like Eduard Douwes Dekker (better known under his pseudonym Multatuli) was, with regard to parentage (his father was captain of a merchant ship) and education (some years at grammar school), fairly representative for the group of people going to the Indies. Having arrived in Java, one had immediately to look for two more guarantors who would agree to ensure payment for the return voyage, the good conduct of the newcomer, and so on, otherwise the certificate for permanent or temporary residence would be refused.3^ Some kind-hearted inhabitants of Batavia acted as guarantors for twenty or more persons at the same time.4^ Even former public servants or former military men who wanted to stay in the Indies were obliged to apply for such a residency permit. On the basis of the number of certificates issued for permanent or temporary stay, one can establish reasonably accurately how many Europeans came to Java as private persons—that is, those not assured in advance of government employment. In the eleven years from 1839 to 1849, a total of only 1,270 certificates were issued for permanent residence (of which about 1,000 were to Dutch people) and 395 certificates for temporary stay.41 In 1860,334 such certificates were issued (of which 273 were for permanent residence).4^ It was not until after 1860 that the procedure for admittance to the Indies was simplified.43 In addition to all this, there was no freedom of the press in the Indies, or, to put it more correctly, until the start of the 1850s no press or daily newspaper existed at all. Apart from the government printing office, which, at high prices, also took care of some printing for private purposes, 4 there were only a few small printing shops, which van Hoevell would somewhat sarcastically call in 1847 "a peculiarity, something remarkable, a curiosity."45 Apart from two or three small advertising sheets 38

See the nota of the Indies official J. Esser of 25 May 1858 in V. 12 June 1858, no. 6, Kol. 715; Hand. RR, 3: 731. 39 Certificates for permanent residence were issued only to Dutch people and to European foreigners who had served at least ten years in the Indies as officials or in the military. See Ind. Sib. 1834, no. 3. 40 See the nota by Esser, n. 38. See also Ind. Stb. 1842, no. 4. The need for surety ended only when a person for whom a statement of surety had been executed entered government service. 41 Bijl.Hand. 1851-52, p. 131. 42 Bijl. Hand. 1862-63, LVII, Bijlage A, no. 16. 43 See royal decree of 27 October I860, Ind. Stb. 1861, no. 40, 41. 44 See ART. 33 of the regulation on the administration of the Government Printing Office of 1828, Ind. Stb. no. 47. 45 W. R. van Hoevell, Reis over Java, Madura en Bali, in het midden van 1847 (Amsterdam: Van Kampen, 1849-51), 1:103.

20

The Politics of Colonial Exploitation

that appeared under local government supervision in 1850, the only newspaper printed in the whole of the Indies was the official Javasche Courant.^ Consequently, apart from newspapers that arrived by mail from the Netherlands, the government held a monopoly over the provision of news. Until 1856, the government, in fact, exercised a preventive supervision on everything that was printed in the Indies, a power that had no basis in any provision in the constitutional regulation or any other ordinance. In 1846, the Indies government still refused to give permission for the publication of a daily paper on the single ground "that the periodic publication of political writings in the Netherlands Indies is not compatible with the system of administration in these overseas possessions."4'7 The government did not want to accept the consequences of the fact that freedom of the press had already been enshrined in the Dutch Constitution in 1815.^8 After all, that Constitution was applicable only to the kingdom in Europe. Van Hoevell and some other residents of Batavia had been treated more obligingly in 1838 when they requested the cooperation of the government in establishing the Tijdschrift voor Nederlandsch Indie. The government had willingly rendered that assistance—including printing the journal at the government printing office at a reduced rate—on condition, however, that nothing would be written relating to "government or personal affairs." If there was the slightest doubt whether a proposed article satisfied this requirement, the editorial staff had to submit it for approval to the authorities.49 The quantity of books and periodicals printed in the Netherlands or elsewhere and imported into Java had always been so small that any preventive supervision or, much less, any regulation of them had never even been considered. To demonstrate further the almost total isolation of the European community in Java before 1845, it was not until the opening of the overland route that the authorities became aware of the absence of any regulation that gave them the power to prevent "excesses" of the press. In 1847, when he had already been minister of colonies for seven years, Baud would ascertain, somewhat to his surprise, that the government could not derive from any regulation the authority to curb the press or prohibit the distribution of books or newspapers sent by landmail from the Netherlands that were critical of the government. However "odd" this might have been, Baud did not consider it advisable to fill this gap by special regulation. "That would have been too conspicuous."^ When, however, a Penal Code for the Indies was drafted, this fact would have to be kept in mind. For the time being the governor-general would have to call on "the established customary law of the Indies, according to which the distribution of newspapers as well as magazines is not permitted without prior permission from the government/'51 Thus a paradoxical situation existed: there was no freedom of the press in the Indies because it had never existed there, but the admittance and dis46 The Javasche Courant contained an unofficial section in which family notices, announcements, and so on, could be placed. 47 Government decree of 15 October 1846, no. 7; see Rochussen to Baud, 31 January 1847, no. 57, Kol. 4566. 48 See ART. 227 of the Constitution of 1815. 49 V. 16 February 1847, no. 82, Kol. 4332. See also TNI 1(1849): 9. 50 Baud to Rochussen, 22 January 1847, Collectie Baud, 572. 51 V. 16 February 1847, no. 82, Kol. 4332. A new Penal Code was finally introduced in 1866 (only for Europeans), but then times and the political climate had changed.

The Jewel in the Dutch Crown

21

tribution of material printed in the Netherlands or elsewhere was unrestricted, because in the past (when there had been—practically speaking—nothing to distribute) nothing had been put in its way. It was only with the constitutional regulation of 1854 that provisions relating to the press came into being, which were developed in 1856 into a regulation concerning printed materials.^ The latter regulation, in other respects a most reactionary document that met strong resistance from the liberals, ended the actual preventive supervision of Indies newspapers. From then on, the press would fast develop from a medium of local news into the mouthpiece of the European sector of the population. If the minister in The Hague was sometimes poorly informed about what was going on in the Indies, the attitude of the Indies government was also partly to blame. It had always adopted a very independent stance. The words of a governorgeneral at the beginning of the eighteenth century—"The gentlemen in the mother country decide matters as they think proper, but we do it here as we understand and judge best"—were still being heard one hundred years later in government offices in Batavia and Buitenzorg.53 The less the department was aware of the details of Indies administration, the less was the chance that it would interfere in the affairs of that administration. How was this Indies administration organized? At the top stood the governorgeneral, usually somebody who before his appointment to this high office had never been in the Indies. He had to work with the Council of the Indies (Raad van Indie), a college of five members, who were as a rule Indies civil servants who could boast long experience in the administration. The Council of the Indies, however, was only a faint shadow of the powerful government body it had been earlier. The constitutional regulation of 1836 had concentrated all power in the governor-general and reduced the council to a purely advisory body that did not even have to be consulted in all affairs. Contact between the governor-general and the council took place mainly by letter, primarily because the governor-general resided at Buitenzorg whereas the council was situated in Batavia. Not until the constitutional regulation of 1854 did the council acquire more influence on the government, for example through the stipulation that, barring exceptions, internal regulations or ordinances had to be drawn up with the council's concurrence. The governor-general was further assisted by the general government secretary and one or more assistant secretaries, who were in charge of the general secretariat (Algemene Secretarie), "the focal point where everything related to the day-to-day government of the Indies, as well as the comprehensive correspondence with the supreme government in the Netherlands, is concentrated."^ in 1841, however, this office still comprised only fourteen officials (in 1860 there were thirty-six).^ Besides the secretariat there were several central directorates, namely the Directorate of Finance and Domains, which, among other things, was in charge of drawing up the Indies budget, the Directorate of Treasury and Domains, the Directorate of State Products and Civil Warehouses, and the Directorate of Cultivations. The names of 52

ART. 110 of the constitutional regulation of 1854; Regulation on printed material in the Netherlands Indies, Ind. Stb. 1856, no. 74. 53 A statement of Governor-General A. Van Riebeeck, quoted by F. W. Stapel, GouverneursGeneraal van Nederlandsch-Indie (The Hague: Van Stockum, 1941), p. 41. 54 Bijl Hand. 1851-52, p. 114. 55 Almanak van Nederlandsch-Indie 1841, p. 8.

22

The Politics of Colonial Exploitation

these directorates indicate how "revenue oriented" the Indies administration was. Not until 1854 was a separate Directorate of Civil Public Works established; inde pendent departments of Internal Administration and Education and Justice came into being in 1866 and 1870. The first three directorates were then amalgamated.^ In the middle of the nineteenth century, only a small part of the Indies archipelago was under direct Dutch rule. Java, however, was an important exception. Apart from the principalities in Central Java (the native states of Yogyakarta and Surakarta), the whol.e island was government territory where Dutch officials exercised direct rule under the supreme supervision of the governor-general. The highest government official was the Resident; below him were one or more assistantresidents and kontroleur. In 1840, the part of Java under direct Dutch rule was made up of eighteen residencies and two separate assistant-residencies (in 1860, there were nineteen and four respectively).^ As late as 1865, there were in the Indies civil ser vice (binnenlands bestuur) in Java no more than 175 European officials for a population that totaled at least 12 to 13 million.^ Actual control over the population rested with a much larger administrative apparatus of "native" officials, who were at the same time the traditional leaders of the people. They derived their authority not only, and not even primarily, from their appointments as officials by the Dutch government but also from their membership—certainly the case with the regents—of the old Javanese aristocracy. The regents were the "trusted advisers" of the Residents and at the same time their "younger brothers" (one of those paternalistic touches that proliferate in every colonial society).59 The government did not see the regents solely as ordinary officials, who could be transferred or dismissed at the pleasure of the government, but as native chiefs (volkshoofderi), who were entitled to special signs of respect. Below the regent stood a district chief and possibly one or more subdistrict chiefs. Finally, at the bottom of the native government pyramid, but not himself an official in the strict sense of the word because he was not appointed or paid by the government, stood the village chief. In I860, there were 69 regents, 300 to 400 districts, and about 34,000 villages.™ Direct contact between European and native officials was generally at the level of the district chief and higher. Immediate contact by European officials with the great mass of the population was avoided as much as possible. The regents in the Priangan region in West Java were treated with special consideration. The United East India Company (VOC) had made coffee cultivation compulsory in this residency in the eighteenth century. Because of the great financial interest at stake with that cultivation, the native administration had since remained virtually unchanged under the "Priangan-system," as a result of which outdated conditions persisted in that part of Java. This situation would not be brought to an end until 1870. Another survival from the days of the VOC were the "private estates" (partikuliere landerijen), which principally were situated in West Java. Because of ^6 See J. de Louter, Handleiding tot de Kennis van het Stoats- en Administrate/ Recht van Nederlandsch-Indie. (2d ed., The Hague: Nijhoff, 1877), p. 74. 57 Almanak van Nederlandsch-Indie 1840, pp. 35-52 58 In 1865, according to the Indies budget, the personnel of the European "binnenlands bestuur" consisted of 19 Residents (with 2 more in the principalities), 45 assistant-residents, and 111 kontroleur; see Bijl. Hand. 1865-66, p. 1341. 59 Ind. Stb. 1820, no. 22 (ART. 2). 60 Almanak van Nederlandsch-Indie 1860, pp. 68-110; Bijl. Hand. 1862-63, LVII, Bijlage M.

The Jewel in the Dutch Crown

23

financial problems the VOC had sold large parcels of land to private persons; in the act of conveyance had been included the exercise of certain rights over the people who lived on or later moved to those estates, such as the right to collect taxes in kind or to demand labor services.^1 The owners of those estates were thus like petty potentates. In I860, the population living on the 350 or so private estates was estimated to number one million people, or about ten per cent of the population of Java.62 The Dutch did not lack good intentions when they recovered the Indonesian archipelago from the British after the Napoleonic wars. As the Dutch Council of State (Raad van State) proclaimed in 1814, Java was no longer to be the domain of merchants and traders longing only for gain, as had been the case in the days of the VOC. On the contrary, Java would benefit from the "benign government" of the Dutch king. "It is his purpose, his wish, his interest that this important possession may become a flourishing, prosperous and happy land!"63 But Stamford Raffles was less optimistic when he visited King William in Brussels two years later. He regretted to say, he wrote to his friend Marsden in 1817, that "notwithstanding the King himself and his leading minister seem to mean well, they have too great a hankering after profit, and immediate profit, for any liberal system to thrive under them."6^ He had guessed correctly. The problem was that liberal principles failed to make Java profitable to the Dutch treasury or to the mother country in the short term because the Javanese peasant did not have any inclination to cultivate export crops like coffee and sugar voluntarily. The economic stimulus was just not there in early nineteenth century Javanese society with its rudimentary money circulation and lack of any "free" labor force that could be mobilized outside the village. Dutch private capital and entrepreneurial skill were also absent in Java. The only export crop worth mentioning was coffee, but that commodity was cultivated either openly in compulsory labor as was the case in the Priangan region or secretly with European and Chinese traders making arrangements with native chiefs to plant coffee (so-called "desarenting"). Moreover, coffee prices dropped considerably after 1824 as a result of a substantial increase in Brazilian coffee crops. The Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappij (Netherlands Trading Company), founded in the same year to protect the Java market better against British competitors, remained thus for want of export crops and preferential treatment a constant source of anxiety for the Dutch government and King William personally, who had made himself guarantor for the shareholders. By 1829, he had already paid 3.5 million guilders to them to cover promised dividends.65 On top of this, the Java War broke out in 1825. It was the last large-scale uprising of the old Javanese aristocracy against the Dutch, a sign for the Indies gov61

The rights of government and landowners were set down in a separate regulation (Ind. Sib. 1836, no. 19). 62 Bijl. Hand. 1862-63, p. 679. 63 Advice of 6 December 1814. See P. J. Platteel, De Grondslagen der Constitutie van NederlandschIndie. De Wording van het Regeerings Reglement van 1815 (Utrecht: Oosthoek, 1936), p. 160. 64 Raffles to Marsden, 27 July 1817, in Sophia Raffles, Memoir of the Life and Public Services of Sir Thomas Stamford Raffles (London: Murray, 1830), p. 289. 6 ^ D. W. van Welderen Rengers, The Failure of a Liberal Colonial Policy. Netherlands East Indies, 1816-1830 (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1947), p. 123. This book provides a useful although somewhat outdated survey of the problems that confronted Dutch colonial policy from 1816-30, the guiding principles of the period, and the attempts to solve these problems.

24

The Politics of Colonial Exploitation

ernment also that it had cared too little for the loyalty and support of the Javanese chiefs under the impact of liberal ideas about "good government." The Java War brought Dutch power in the heartland of the island, the densely populated regions of Central Java, to the brink of disaster; it ended only in 1830 after a huge military effort by the Dutch that cost the lives of hundreds of thousands of Javanese and tens of thousands of Dutch soldiers and native auxiliaries. The lessons of the Java War would not quickly be forgotten in Dutch policy making with regard to the Javanese regents and lesser aristocracy. In spite of the strict economizing policy introduced by Commissioner-General Viscount Du Bus de Gisignies (1826-30), Indies finances were in a mess at the end of the Java War. The Dutch government had lent more than 40 million guilders to the Indies government—an enormous sum of money for those days—despite the fact that "the colonies exist for the mother country, not the mother country for the colonies."66 Java seemed to have become a bottomless pit because the Indies budget for 1825 (the last "normal" year) had assessed the total revenue at no more than 24 million guilders.6^ After the secession of Belgium, which became a fact in September 1830, the Dutch government was even confronted with the prospect of a state bankruptcy in the near future as its headstrong king refused to accept the reality of an amputated kingdom and kept his armies in the field for nine consecutive years until 1839. This was the setting in which Governor-General Johannes van den Bosch (183034) received the opportunity to introduce the Cultivation System in Java. Other solutions to increase the productive resources of Java did not seem workable, at least not in the short term. The "colonization" of Java, as was suggested in a report drawn up under the responsibility of Du Bus in 1827, had intended to create a class of Dutch private entrepreneurs that could take over and organize Javanese export production on "waste" or uncultivated land, ceded to them by the government. But how to find not only these energetic entrepreneurs but also the necessary private capital and Javanese laborers who were willing to leave their villages freely? It would certainly take decades before this grandiose scheme with its possibly detrimental effects for Javanese society might bear any fruit. The only solution seemed to return to some guiding principles of the old VOC. Van den Bosch himself had experienced the final years of the "Company" as an officer in its army. He did not think that the Company's policy of monopoly and "forced" cultivation was all that bad. Later on, as an owner of a private estate (partikuliere landerij) in Java and, after his return to Holland in 1812, deeply involved in agrarian settlement projects in the eastern provinces on behalf of the urban poor, he grew into an ardent agriculturist and physiocrat. Appointed as commissioner-general for the Dutch slave colonies in the West Indies in 1827, he was again in a position to appreciate the contribution of forced labor to agrarian productivity; in his eyes, products cultivated in Java under "free" labor could never compete with those of a slave colony like Suriname. In 1829, before his departure for Java, he had proposed to King William a means to make this jewel in the Dutch crown a paying concern again. The government was to take up the grow66

An axiom formulated by a state commission in The Hague in 1802 and adopted firmly thereafter "in a sense which excludes all injustice." See C. Fasseur, De Geest van het Gouvernement (Leiden: Leiden University Press, 1977), p. 7. 6 ^ See H. van der Wijck, De Nederlandsche Oost-Indische Bezittingen onder het Bestuur van den Kommissaris Generaal Du Bus de Gisignies (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1866), p. 113.

The Jewel in the Dutch Crown

25

ing of tropical export crops and subsequently to dispose of those products to the benefit of the treasury. Provided with comprehensive powers and assured of the approval of a desperate king who now hankered urgently for immediate profit, van den Bosch would put his ideas into effect during the four years of his administration. A system of arrangements came into operation that has become known as the "Cultivation System." With this, van den Bosch struck gold in Java like Moses struck water from the rock in the arid desert.^ 68

See J. J. Westendorp Boerma, Een Geestdriftig Nederlander. Johannes van den Bosch (Amsterdam: Querido, 1950).

2 THE CULTIVATION SYSTEM

he Cultivation System as such was not mentioned in any constitutional regulation1 or any comparable regulation applying to the Dutch East Indies. The constitutional regulation of 1830, which van den Bosch brought with him from the Netherlands, as well as that of 1836 were completely silent about it.2 By 1854, it appears to have been no longer possible to ignore a system of arrangements where such important interests were at stake, but even then the constitutional regulation laid down in that year did not mention the Cultivation System by name; it spoke only of the "cultivations introduced on high authority/'3 That was a small but important difference. With a "system'' one thinks of an organized whole that possesses a certain internal unity and cohesion and is governed by more or less general rules. Within the Cultivation System rules existed that applied only to local situations. Nobody was as well aware of this as van den Bosch himself. In 1833 he rightly pointed it out to Director of Cultivations B. J. Elias, who had wanted to introduce equal payments for sugar cane growers in all Residencies of Java. "General systems," according to van den Bosch, had to be disregarded, "What is good for the smith, is not always right for the carver, and this is nowhere else so true as in agriculture."4 His words were echoed in 1853 in the explanatory memorandum of the draft of the constitutional regulation that was then pending in the Second Chamber of the States-General: locally differing circumstances make it almost impossible to give directions for the Cultivation System "appropriate for general application and which do not contradict each other."5 This significant local variation must always be kept in mind. The government issued orders and instructions that determined which products would be grown and where. In all cases, they were products for which a market existed in Europe. The most important were coffee, cane sugar, and indigo (a blue dyestuff), while tobacco, tea, pepper, cinnamon and other products were cultivated

T

1

I have adopted the term "constitutional regulation" to translate "Regeringsreglement." Although the Regeringsreglement was not a constitutional document in the strict sense, it did provide the basic rules for the administration of the Indies[ed.]. 2 The constitutional regulation of 1836 limited itself to exhorting the governor-general to promote as much as possible the cultivation of products which could be sold in Europe (ART. 94). The (secret) instruction for the governor-general of that year was almost as vague: the Indies government would have to be mindful of "the greatest possible increase of products for the European market, insofar as this is not detrimental to the cultivation of rice and other daily necessities" (ART. 41); see Knibbe, Vestiging der Monarchie, p. 198. 3 Law of 2 September 1854, Sib. no. 129 (ART. 56). 4 23 November 1833, no. 407, Kol. 3203. 5 Hand.RR, 2:179,180.

The Cultivation System

27

on a smaller scale. The government tried to obtain these products at the lowest possible cost and subsequently to sell them at high prices. Therefore, if one wants to define the Cultivation System, it could be described as that form of agricultural-industrial exploitation of Java in which the government used its authority and influence to force the peasantry to grow tropical export products in return for payments that were unilaterally fixed and low; these products subsequently were sold for the benefit of the treasury.6 The Cultivation System remained limited to Java and to those parts of Java that were under direct Dutch rule. The principalities, as well as the private estates, were not involved.7 Outside Java, there was no Cultivation System, but sometimes there were arrangements that resembled it. Thus in 1847 the people on the west coast of Sumatra were forced to deliver their coffee to the government.8 A similar "coffee monopoly" had already been introduced in 1832 in the Minahasa region of north Sulawesi (Multatuli's Droogstoppel states that "Menado" was a good brand).9 The clove monopoly in the Moluccas had long been in force. With the exception of tin from Bangka and, later on, Padang coffee, the exploitation of the "outer possessions," where Dutch authority existed mostly in name only, did not produce much. For a long time it had to be subsidized, and Sumatra, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, the Moluccas, and so on were, in fact, financial burdens.10 It is no wonder that the Dutch government concentrated its efforts entirely on Java—the constitutional regulation of 1854 still showed this clearly11—and the expansion of dominion in the islands outside Java was disapproved of as "a useless waste of 6

Compare the description that Van den Bosch himself gave of his "system"; Van Deventer, Bijdragen 2: 544. The drawback of the definition that Reinsma gives in Cultuurstelsel, p. 22 ("a system of agricultural and industrial enterprises which rested on the intervention of the government") is that it does not take account of those cultivations in which no processing of the product by private enterprises took place and where the government obtained the products directly from the people; this was, for example, the case in indigo and coffee cultivation. ^ The coffee harvested by peasants in the principalities had to be delivered to the government. Ten guilders was paid to the susuhunan and the sultan for every picul of coffee above the crop payments that the population received. For instance, according to the Cultivation Report on the principalities for 1850, around 8,000 piculs of coffee were received, which cost the government fl8 per picul, or twice the price that was paid elsewhere. 8 In the years 1850 to I860, between 100,000 and 200,000 piculs of "Padang coffee" were supplied annually, which were sold in the Indies on account of the Indies government. See N. P. van den Berg, "Historisch-statistische Aanteekeningen over de Voortbrenging en het Verbruik van Koffie," Tijdschrift voor Nijverheid en Landbouw in Nederlandsch-Indie 24 (1879): 441. ^ See L.J.A.Tollens, Verzameling van Wetten, Besluiten, Bepalingen, Kennisgaven, enz. welke niet i het Staatsblad van Nederlandsch Indie zijn opgenomen, over de Jaren 1808-1856 (Batavia: Lange, 1856), 1: 387. In the years 1850 to 1860, an annual average of 15,000 to 25,000 piculs of "Menad coffee" was received annually in government storehouses. See Van den Berg, "Historischestatistische Aanteekeningen," p. 441. For a recent translation of Multatuli's famous novel, se Roy Edwards, trans., Max Havelaar or the Coffee Auctions of the Dutch Trading Company (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1987). ^ See E. de Waal, Aanteekeningen over Koloniale Onderwerpen. Onze Financieele Politiek jegens Nederlandsch Indie (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1866) 7:150. Over the period 1841-50 a deficit of almost 1.5 million guilders was reported. The actual deficit, however, was probably higher. 11 See H. J. Bool, Wet houdende Vaststelling van het Reglement op het Beleid der Regering van Nederlandsch Indie (Zaltbommel: Noman, 1876), p. 13. The interest in the Outer Islands became greater after 1850 as a result of mining operations in South Kalimantan (coal and diamonds) and Billiton (tin).

28

The Politics of Colonial Exploitation

money/' Not until the third quarter of the nineteenth century would this attitude change. The Cultivation System made great demands not only on the labor of the population but also on their land on which they cultivated rice. This was particularly the case with sugar and indigo, which were grown in rotation with rice. For one crop of cane, the best wet-rice lands (sawah) of a village could be withdrawn from their normal use for a period ranging from fourteen to eighteen months. For the cultivation of coffee, unused or "waste" land (woeste gronden) was generally employed.12 Whereas sugar and indigo cultivation took place in the densely populated lowlands, coffee plantations were usually situated in the hilly lower ranges of mountain slopes. However, in the regions where coffee plantations were sited, sawah could not be cultivated. The government stipulated in 1836 that in areas where in the long run a shortage might develop of land suitable for coffee plantations, abandoned plantations of good quality had to lie fallow for ten years so that in due course they could be used again for coffee growing. Only in case of "absolutely necessity" could those plantations be returned to the people for growing food crops.13 The Cultivation System seriously encroached upon Javanese land rights and this happened in a period when, in the words of van Vollenhoven, customary laws had not yet been "discovered." "Before 1860 nothing was really known about the rights of the people to its land."14 Baud was well aware of this when he called the introduction of the Cultivation System "an act of resoluteness" in which those concerned had not troubled themselves with the rights of the people. "They had just taken a risk about this and it has turned out rather well."15 Just how confused were van den Bosch's ideas about customary land rights is obvious from an 1834 nota, in which he reported on his "achievements" in the Indies. In one place he describes all land as being communally owned, in another place he rails against the "entirely incorrect" assertion that the Javanese has no notion of individual ownership rights to land.16 Van Vollenhoven, the first to describe adat (customary) law systematically, has pointed out that one should see the Javanese village not only as a center of authority and administration but also as a center of an agrarian area of control (agrarische beschikkingskring). This so-called village right of control (dorpsbeschikkingsrecht) is reflected, in one way at least, in the village community having a say in the disposal of the cultivated land of the village. In pressing cases, authority can be derived from this right to redistribute the sawah belonging to the village among those villagers who have a share in the fields (so-called nuclear villagers) and sometimes as well among those who until then were excluded from a share in the sawah. Finally, this right of control extends to a broad stretch of unused land surrounding the village. This land, which has not yet been cultivated, is at the disposal of the members of the 12

In contrast with the data provided for sugar and indigo cultivations, the Cultivation Reports never stated how many bouw of land were assigned for the cultivation of coffee. 13 Government decree of 25 September 1836, no. 128. See Bijl Hand. 1862-63, p. 1467; Van Deventer, Bijdragen 3: 96. 14 C. van Vollenhoven, De Indonesier en zijn Grond (Leiden: Brill, 1919), p. 48. 15 Baud to Rochussen, 22 June 1847, Collectie Baud, 572. 16 J. van den Bosch, Mijn Verrigtingen in Indie. Verslag van Z. Excellence den Commissaris Generod J. van den Bosch, over de Jaren 1830,1831,1832 en 1833 (Amsterdam: Muller, 1864), pp. 53, 77. Extracts from this nota were inserted in the Indies Government Gazette of 1834, no. 22 (the Zakelijke Extracten).

The Cultivation System

29

village community. They can appropriate pieces of that land by constantly cultivating it or take temporary advantage of it by collecting forest products, by cultivating fields (ladang), which after one harvest are abandoned, by hunting, fishing, and so on. Strangers are permitted to use the land on which the village has the right of control only with the permission of the village administration and after payment of a levy.17 Included in the village right of control is a more or less individually specified native right to possess the land. This right is based upon first reclamation of the land and is subject to heredity and transfer rights. In cases where the village right of control has "worn out," as happened very early in West Java, then this right of ownership comes close to an ownership right (even though "ownership" remains a typically Western notion of law). If, however, the village right of control is more powerful, as in Central Java, then the native right of possession is pushed aside, as a result of which the impression could easily arise (and in fact was so conceived by the government) that the land was communally owned.18 The important political debate during the second half of the nineteenth century, whether agrarian land rights in Java were "communal" or "individual," was in retrospect misconceived. What was thought to be communal property was in reality a "caricature" of a powerful village right of control.19 And "heritable individual property"—that other term from the (to use van Vollenhoven's words) "paltry conceptual apparatus of bureaucrats"—was still not absolute individual property, much less a right of ownership in the sense of the Dutch Civil Code.20 For this was to overlook the right of control of the village community—even if that right was weak—and more generally the strong communal orientation of Javanese society. "The interest of society weighs heavily on the way one uses one's own property."21 In general, it can be taken for granted that the introduction of the Cultivation System led to a strengthening of the village right of control over the cultivated fields of the village, at the expense of individual rights of usufruct and usage of the land.22 The Dutch administration did not interfere in the distribution among village inhabitants of the burdens that the Cultivation System imposed. This distribution of tasks remained a matter for the village administration. The village head was responsible for the execution of orders given from above, and it was he who organized dayto-day activities. In this respect, the way in which government cultivations were organized did not differ from that of corvee services (herendiensten), that is, the many unpaid services for all kinds of projects and works for which the government could call up people. Whenever the government needed people the regent, in accordance with his official instructions, had to make sure that every village contributed equally. 17

Van Vollenhoven, De Indonesier, p. 9; Van Vollenhoven, Het Adatrecht van Nederlandsch-Indie (Leiden: Brill, 1925), 1: 514, 604, 611, 734. Van Vollenhoven defined adat as that which is or should be in force. "Adat law" is then that adat which has legal consequences; see idem, Adat recht, 1: 7-8. In Java van Vollenhoven distinguished between three adat law areas, namely, West Java (the Sunda region), Central and East Java, and the principalities. 18 Van Vollenhoven, Adatrecht, 1:611ff., 734. 19 Ibid., p. 734. 2 ^ Van Vollenhoven, De Indonesier, p. 42. 21 Van Vollenhoven, Adatrecht, 1:541. 22 Ibid., p. 619. R. Van Niel, 'The Introduction of Government Sugar Cultivation in Pasuruan, Java, 1830," Journal of Oriental Studies 7 (2) (1969): 269, disputes the view that the Cultivation System led to a strengthening of communal land tenure. Later, he seems to have revised his opinion. See Van Niel, "Measurement of Change," pp. 99,105.

30

The Politics of Colonial Exploitation

"The selection of those persons to make up the required numbers shall, however, be left to the village chiefs/'23 In instructions to and from the Indies government the great importance that the authorities in Batavia attached to the strict maintenance of village autonomy was repeatedly underscored. According to custom, the only villagers liable for corvee and cultivation services were those who had a share in the cultivated land of the village.24 For that reason, under the pressure of the Cultivation System, agricultural land was often redivided into smaller plots to increase the number of landowners and thus the number of those liable for services. Redistribution of land was necessary anyhow whenever the villages had to give up sawah for government cultivations as well as forced laborers. Sometimes the entire customary order was erased.25 Such was particularly the case in areas where government sugar cultivation was introduced. This development was especially damaging to the class of more well-to-do farmers within the village.26 They were forced to take part personally in compulsory services because substitution was no longer possible with the great expansion of cultivation services. Baud was to acknowledge in an 1854 instruction to the Residents (inspired by himself) that the introduction of sugar cultivation, as well as several other problems, had led to "the disturbance of the ancient property rights and other rights among the Javanese/' to "the destruction of the difference between classes" and "the lowering of all the people without distinction, to the class of laborers."27 In the Indies Government Gazette one repeatedly finds the opinion that the government as the lawful successor of the native rulers is, according to custom, the (supreme) proprietor of all lands, cultivated or not.28 This view had already served as the basis for the land rent system introduced by Raffles during the British interregnum (1811-16), a harvest tax that was construed as a payment to the government by the people for the hire or lease of land. Van Vollenhoven rejected this pretence of ownership of the land by the ruler as being "in conflict with all established conditions."29 In his opinion, the village had "the supreme right" to the land.30 Even so, this pretence, which was also enshrined in the constitutional regulations of 1830 and 23

See Ind. Stb. 1820, no. 22, ART. 16. Apart from government corvee services on roads, bridges, and so on, there were village services for the village community and services for higher- and lower-ranking native chiefs (so-called pancen services). 24 Van Vollenhoven, Adatrecht, 1:524,555. 25 Ibid., p. 526. 2 *> L.Vitalis, Nog Een VJoord over het Voorstel van Vrijen Arbeid, en van Uitbesteding der Kontrakten op Java (The Hague: n.p., 1859), p. 24. 27 Bijl Hand., 1862-63, p. 348 23. 2 ^ See the explanatory memorandum of the draft of the Agrarian Law of 1870, Bijl. Hand. 186869, p. 1041. 2 ^ Van Vollenhoven, Adatrecht, 1: 620. Herein lies an important, if not the most important, difference between the adat law schools of Leiden and Utrecht. The University of Leiden view (Van Vollenhoven-Logemann) started from the principle of the existence of a village right of disposal of real significance, which extended over a wide terrain of unused land outside the cultivated fields of the village. The University of Utrecht (Nolst Trenite) opinion attached very little importance to village power of disposal over unused lands because otherwise the exploitation of Java by Western agricultural enterprises would have been seriously threatened. It, therefore, emphasized a "domain right" of the government that placed the power of disposal over land that had not been cultivated primarily in the government. 30 Van Vollenhoven, De Indonesier, p. 9.

The Cultivation System

31

1836 and other places, was extraordinarily tenacious.31 Undoubtedly the legal conviction, however challengable in itself, that the government could validly hold certain rights of control over lands under cultivation facilitated the introduction of the Cultivation System. In this context, it should be remembered that van den Bosch had been a "landowner" in Buitenzorg. The particular position that he had enjoyed as a landowner in relation to the people may have been a determining factor in the way he perceived the relationship between the government and the population in general. It is no exaggeration to say that the Cultivation System made Java into a huge "private estate."32 And so, in just about every government residency in Java, the introduction of specific government cultivations began, conducted in more or less arbitrary ways. Planting was sometimes done without proper care.33 The Cultivation Report for 1839, for instance, reported a "total failure" of the cane planting in the Residency of Banyumas in 1838 as a result of "the choice of land which has been found to be completely unsuitable for this cultivation."34 According to the 1851 Cultivation Report, coffee plantations had been established in Jepara and Rembang on soils "which now appear to be unsuitable."35 If a crop appeared to yield little or no result because of soil unsuitability, then the government (sometimes years later) gained some useful knowledge. It was the people who suffered. Usually one village was selected to cultivate a specific crop. Thus, one village planted coffee, another sugar, a third indigo, and so on. But there were exceptions to this rule.36 From the reports in the village registers, the government was more or less aware of the number of "households" and the area of land in every village.37 The number of households mentioned in the Cultivation Reports, which were grouped according to whether they worked in sugar, indigo, coffee, or other cultivations, was obtained by adding up all the households devoted to a specific cultivation. If one compares these totals with the population figures of each residency, a figure (again obtained from village registers) expressed each year in the report on rice cultivation that was part of the Cultivation Report, and if the same is done for land under forced cultivation in relation to the total area of cultivated land, then one can obtain an impression of the degree in which the various government residencies of Java were involved in the Cultivation System. 31

See ART. 74 of the 1830 constitutional regulation: 'The lands of the island of Java, which are still owned by the government, shall, insofar as they are cultivated by the Javanese, be permanently leased to the native people." (Emphasis mine) There is a similar statement in the 1836 constitutional regulation (ART. 62). 3 ^ This had already been pointed out by Rochussen in a letter to Baud of 25 August 1847, Collectie Baud, 588. 33

34

Woordenboek 2: 215.

For the location of the Cultivation Reports ("Kultuurverslagen") from 1834 to 1851, see the bibliography. 35 For other examples, see Van Deventer, Bijdragen 2: 680, 695. 3 ^ Households assigned to pepper cultivation were usually also assigned to coffee cultivation. For a further discussion, see Van Deventer, Bijdragen 3:123, regarding the situation in the residency of Jepara in 1841. 3 ^ Village chiefs had been instructed to draw up and maintain population registers by virtue of the regulation on the administration of the police and so on, ART. 14-18, Ind. Stb. 1819, no. 20. Cf. Ind. Stb. 1820, no. 22, ART. 19, in which a similar instruction was directed at the regents.

32

The Politics of Colonial Exploitation

In the following summary for the period 1840-50, the percentage of the population assigned to the Cultivation System (calculated by comparing the numbers of households involved in the cultivation of coffee, sugar, indigo, tobacco, tea, and cinnamon) is compared with the total population figures of each residency. Pepper cultivation is not included because the growers mostly were also assigned to coffee cultivation. Some smaller cultivations like nopal, silk, and cloves are also not considered because they were of little importance. The percentage of the cultivated land that was reserved for the system has been calculated on the basis of the totals mentioned in the report on rice cultivation as the percentage planted for the government.38 Table 2.1. The extent of the Cultivation System during the period 1840-1850 Percentage of Population3 Assigned to Government Cultivations Government Except Coffee Cultivations

Percentage of Cultivated Landb Allocated to Government Cultivations (Not Including Coffee)

Residency

1840

1845

1850

1840

1845

1850

1840

1845

1850

Bagelen Banten Banyumas Besukic Cirebon Jepara Karawang Kediri Kedu Madiun Pacitan Pasuruan Pekalongan Priangan Rembang Semarang Surabaya legal

81 92 68 47 69 35 42 61 79 56 72 59 59 65 31 30 32 44

62 48 74 54 54 35 37 61 97 51 63 64 55 67 25 25 33 36

56 16 80 52 51 31 17 57 79 52 76 61 45 71 22 22 26 47

54 20 33 19 49 24 42 23 1 23 0 31 46 9 14 5 31 28

43 25 36 24 36 25 37 19 6 23 0 33 40 9 21 10 31 23

38 2 40 22 28 26 17 15 5 25 0 27 33 6 19 5 25 32

15 4 12 6 1 5 0 6 2 5 0 11 15 2 1 1 3 6

11 7 9 7 8 6 0 4 1 4 0 12 12 2 2 2 4 10

8 0 7 6 6 5 0 3 2 3 0 10 8 2 1 1 4 5

Javad

57

52

46

25

25

19

6

6

4

Source: "Kultuurverslagen." In the Cultivation Reports a distinction is made between "agricultural" households and others. In this table, "population" means the total native population, including nonagricultural households. b "Cultivated land" means sawah and other land that was allocated to and cultivated for the government every year, thus not ladang or similar tracts. c Includes Probolinggo and Banyuwangi, which at that time were not administratively separate from Besuki. d Java except for Datavia, Buitenzorg, the principalities, and the private estates. a

38

As a rule, only cultivated land was set aside for sugar and indigo cultivation. According to the Cultivation Report for 1850, 68,754 bouw were set aside for government cultivations, of which 41,151 was for sugar and 26,037 for indigo. For 1840, those figures were, respectively, 78,182,31,989, and 42,833 bouw.

The Cultivation System

33

These figures give only a broad indication of the pressure of the Cultivation System on the population. The available demographic data on Java in the first half of the nineteenth century are very unreliable. In 1862, Minister of Colonies G. H. Uhlenbeck could still complain that the statistics of the Netherlands Indies were "undeniably based on a very imperfect foundation. Indeed, the figures must for the greater part be considered as being based on estimations, if they have not been mere fabrications." This was especially the case, he thought, with population statistics.39 When a more accurate investigation was conducted after 1850, it was evident that the population figures in general were considerably higher and the area of cultivated land much more extensive than was supposed in official accounts and Cultivation Reports. Sometimes the difference was as much as 30 percent.40 Van Niel estimated that the totals given in the Cultivation Reports amounted to 72 to 75 percent of the actual figures.41 The data provided by the native chiefs to European officials were not very trustworthy. Population growth and reclamation of new land were incompletely reported or not reported at all to avoid the pressure of land rent, corvee, and cultivation services becoming even heavier than they already were. Rochussen was well aware of this when he wrote in 1853, "The village and district chiefs are very skilful in removing from their registers people who have left.. . but tardy in entering newcomers."42 Equally, it appears that government plantings of sugar and indigo were sometimes reported as lower than they really were by European officials as a means of inflating production figures, which could result in a favorable notation on the conduct report of the official.43 In 1840, the Indies government still deemed it necessary to notify the Residents to refrain from planting areas of cane which were larger than those specified in their instructions.44 Finally, it should not be forgotten that these figures do not properly capture the unequal demands made by the various cultivations. Thus, it can be supposed that in a residency like Bagelen, where in 1840 more than half of the population was involved in forced cultivation of indigo, the situation was much less favorable than in Kedu, where the population was devoted almost entirely to the cultivation of coffee. Cultivation services involved not just field work but processing of the product before it could be delivered to government storehouses and transport services. With some cultivations, especially coffee, processing could be left entirely to the people. With sugar cultivation, however, this was not possible; from the beginning the government had to engage private entrepreneurs with whom it entered into so-called sugar contracts. Such entrepreneurs were initially also enlisted for the processing of indigo. By 1837, however, the government had abandoned this practice.45 By contrast, in 1836 the government for the first time entered into a contract with a Euro39

Uhlenbeck to Governor-General L.A.J.W. Sloet van de Beele, V 25 February 1862, no. 19, Kol. 1154. 40 See BijL Hand. 1862-63 ("Nota over de statistische opnamen in de residentie Cheribon"). 41 Van Niel, "Measurement of Change/' pp. 98,107-9. 42 J. J. Rochussen, Toelichting en Verdediging van Eenige Daden van Mijn Bestuur in Indie (The Hageu: Van Cleef, 1853), p. 157. 43 G. H. van Soest, Geschiedenis van het Kultuurstelsel (Rotterdam: Nijgh, 1869-71), 3:115. 44 Government decree of 29 January 1840, no. 5, quoted in "Kultuurverslag" 1840. 4 ^ The last indigo contract was withdrawn by the government decree of 29 May 1837, no. 18. See "Kultuurverslag" 1837. Reinsma, Cultuurstelsel, p. 137, incorrectly makes it appear as though indigo contracts also existed in a later period.

34

The Politics of Colonial Exploitation

pean contractor for the preparation of tobacco for the European market, which had been planted on the orders of the government.46 After 1840 "tea contracts" were also issued. With a sugar contract (see chap. 5 for more detail) the government undertook to have a certain area (stipulated in the contract) of cane planted by the people of the villages within a certain radius (kring) of the sugar factory that was to be established. The "contractor"—almost always a European or Chinese—undertook to build a factory (which, until 1847, was generally done with capital advanced by the government), to process the cane in that factory, and to deliver the end product wholly or in part to the government at a price fixed in the contract. Thus the government made available to the sugar manufacturer the raw material and initially also the capital required for the enterprise. The manufacturer could also count on help from the government for the cutting and transport of cane, the felling and transport of timber from the forests (to stoke the fires under the boilers), and factory labor as well. By 1840, not a single residency in the government area of Java (with the exception of Batavia) had been spared from the Cultivation System. The cultivation of coffee had been introduced in all residencies, from Banten in the west to Besuki in the far east. Around that time the big plantings of coffee trees ordered by van den Bosch had become productive. Coffee cultivation was most productive in three separate areas, namely, Priangan in West Java, Kedu in Central Java, and Pasuruan and Besuki in East Java. In 1840, 56 percent of the total government coffee harvest came from those three areas.47 Sugar cultivation had been introduced in thirteen of the eighteen residencies by 1840. Like coffee, this cultivation had already played an important role during VOC days. In the eighteenth century, an extensive sugar industry had existed in the areas around Batavia (mainly in the hands of Chinese). After that, however, this cultivation had lost much of its significance until van den Bosch in 1830 gave it a new lease on life. The center of the government sugar cultivation was situated in the East Java residencies of Pasuruan, Surabaya, and Besuki. In 1840, almost 65 percent of the harvest came from these three residencies.48 Extensive plantings were also maintained in the north coast residencies of Central Java, like Jepara, Semarang, Pekalongan, Tegal, and, further west, Cirebon. The cultivation of indigo was also strongly encouraged by van den Bosch. By 1840, it had been introduced into eleven residencies. This cultivation had its center in Bagelen and Banyumas, two residencies in south Central Java, which in 1840 produced 51 percent of all indigo.49 There were also extensive plantings in Cirebon and Pekalongan. Of the smaller government cultivations, tobacco was mainly planted in Rembang in north Central Java, pepper in the area of Pacitan in south Central Java, whereas Karawang in West Java was an important center for cinnamon cultivation. It is difficult to compare the various cultivations in relation to the demands they exerted on the people because circumstances varied greatly, not only between the cultivations but also in the same cultivation within a specified area. Local conditions 46

During that year three more contracts were approved. See "Kultuurverslag" 1836. "Kultuurverslag" 1840. In 1850, it was 51 percent, in I860, 59 percent. Coffee cultivation in Pasuruan was mainly restricted to the regency of Malang. 48 "Kultuurverslag" 1840. In 1850 it was 62 percent, in I860, 63 percent. 49 "Kultuurverslag" 1840. In 1850 it was 53 percent, in 1860, 77 percent. 47

The Cultivation System

35

of soil and climate, the number of people available for cultivation services among whom crop payments had to be divided, the diligence with which the local administration implemented the instructions of the Directorate of Cultivations and supervised the crops, and other factors were responsible for the significant variations within the system. The Cultivation Reports show, among other things, the inequality in payments that the people received, even if they were assigned to the same cultivation and did the same work. Thus, in 1840, the average crop payments in sugar cultivation, divided according to residency (these reports do not reveal differences between districts within a residency) are given in table 2.2. In indigo cultivation, the differences were no less great. Table 2.2. Crop payments in sugar cultivation in 1840 (guilders)3

Residency

Average per Bouw

Average per Household

Banten Banyumas Besuki Cirebon Jepara Kediri Madiun Pasuruan Pekalongan Rembang Semarang Surabaya Tegal

34.113 44.20 83.50 64.09 51.34 71.30 23.100 66.80 64.20 25.72 49.30 72.44 49.104

5.49 8.110 27.33 14.15 11.62 16.92 6.38 18.64 14.90 5.41 12.10 10.00 10.50

Java

62.26

13.51

Source: "Kultuurverslag" 1840. In this and table 2.3, amounts are given in recepis guilders. See note 53 this chapter. a

Even though one must be very careful about making general assertions because the Cultivation System was not organized uniformly and did not yield uniform results, and even within the confines of the same cultivation variations were great, in general, sugar cultivation made heavier demands on the people than coffee cultivation, but sugar was less burdensome than indigo cultivation. Coffee cultivation left rice growing relatively undisturbed. The maintenance of coffee plantations was time consuming—certainly when the plantations were situated far from villages—but it was not physically demanding. Perhaps the greatest burden of coffee cultivation was the unpaid transport services that the population was forced to render.50 After harvest, the coffee was taken from the plantations to the 50

Only in four residencies did peasants receive some payment for this transport, namely 3.5 cents per picul for every paal over five. See C. J. Bosch, "Rapport Koffiecultuur," Bijl. Hand. 1869-70 (Begroting van Ned. Indie voor 1871, no. 35), p. 112. Transport from purchase storehouses to the coast storehouses where coffee was shipped off was done by contractors, except in Priangan where it took place by means of paid corvee service.

36

The Politics of Colonial Exploitation

homes of growers where it was dried and shelled, and then to storehouses established to take delivery of it. Mountain paths were often impassable for vehicles or animals, so growers often had to carry the heavy loads themselves. The government could have alleviated the burdens of transport services by increasing the number of storehouses, but it did so only reluctantly because of the costs involved. According to the Cultivation Reports, the number of storehouses increased from 174 to 192 in the period 1841-49, an increase of only 10 percent. In 1863, there were still complaints about the "insufficient" number of storehouses and to this deficiency was also attributed the decline of coffee cultivation.51 Table 2.3. Crop payments in indigo cultivation in 1840 (guilders)

Residency

Average per Bouw

Average per Household

Bagelen Banten Banyumas Besuki Cirebon Jepara Kediri Madiun Pekalongan Priangan Tegal

65.13 11.20 75 59.08 65.48 28.40 33.40 43.40 62.60 16.80 37.50

12.73 0.117 17 16.20 15.63 4.75 6.75 8.93 15.100 5.45 7.76

Java

60.97

12.69

Source: "Kultuurverslag" 1840.

For the Dutch exchequer, coffee had always been the product on which the greatest profits were made, between 1840 and 1849 alone about 65 million guilders compared with 15 million for indigo. Sugar did not become profitable until after 1845, sustaining big losses in earlier years. The other cultivations, at best, supplied only negligible profits. (See table 2.4.) Coffee cultivation was the "principal source" of Indies profits not only because the coffee was sold at high prices but also because it was purchased so cheaply. When fixing the price at which the peasantry had to supply the coffee, the government calculated liberally in its own favor. In 1833, van den Bosch had determined that the crop payments made to peasants would be equal to the "market price" (at Batavia), which at the time was fixed at f25 per picul of 125 pounds.52 The government, however, deducted flO for land rent (a tax that originally had been levied only on the rice harvest) and, furthermore, took 51

Bijl Hand. 1862-63, p. 1317. The obligation to deliver coffee to the government was imposed on the people by resolution of the governor-general of 3 February 1833, Ind. Stb. 1833, no. 7. Before this time, peasants had to maintain coffee plantations but, except in the Priangan region, they had been free to dispose as they wished of the product. As a consequence, most of the coffee had gone into the hands of private buyers. The pound was the Amsterdam pound of 0.494 kg. 52

The Cultivation System

37

Table 2.4. Financial results of government cultivations 1840-1849 (guilders) Years

Coffee

Sugar

Indigo

Cochineal

Cinnamon

1840-44 1845-49

40,277,6371* 24,549,042P

8,217,907La 4,136,060P

7,835,772P 7,726,362P

20,421L 519,661P

151,310L 171,798L

Years

Pepper

Tea

Tobacco

Credit Balance

1840-44 1845^9

132,744P 58,548P

514,394L 1,666,495L

94,560L

39,341,651 35,056,820

Source: N. G. Pierson, Het Kultuurstelsel (Amsterdam: Van Kampen, 1868), p. 169. The figures are quoted from Bijlage VIII of the "Cultuurwet," Bijl. Hand. 1865-66, LV. a "P" is profit; "L" is loss. For the figures after 1850, see chapter 8.

another f3 per picul for "transport expenses" of coffee from the storehouses in the interior to the storehouses on the coast. In reality those costs were much lawer. According to the Cultivation Report for 1845, they amounted to fl,022,304 or approximately fl.50 per picul; according to the report for 1850, they were f 1,098,817 or just over fl per picul. Consequently, the grower actually received less than half the officially fixed price, namely, f!2 per picul.53 In addition, the government, from fear of being shortchanged, had also determined that on every picul of coffee two kati "overweight" would be levied for which the grower received no compensation at all.54 Although in 1833 the government had determined that crop payments would be adjusted to the market price each year, this adjustment did not happen in practice. Constant fluctuation in the level of crop payments was thought to be "politically unwise/'55 For that matter—as will become evident later—even more provisions in the Indies Government Gazette were never applied. In 1844, indeed, because of the depressed coffee market in Amsterdam (the price of good Java coffee had fallen to 20 cents per pound),56 it was decided to lower the crop payments to flO net per picul.57 So profitable for the government was this measure that it was not cancelled when coffee at Amsterdam sold at much higher prices after 1848; in 1850-51 the price even 53

The amounts mentioned here, as far as they refer to the period before 1846, are expressed in so-called copper money. "Silver money" was also in circulation. In 1846, the recepis guilder was introduced, divided into 120 doits, the value of which was 5:6 in relation to the copper guilder divided into 100 doits. Therefore the amounts which appear in the Cultivation Reports before 1846 have to be multiplied by 5/6 to make them comparable with those after 1846. In 1854 a new silver guilder was introduced, divided in 100 cents, which could be exchanged guilder for guilder against recepis guilders. This exchange was finalized in 1860. See Ind. Stb. 1826, no. 7; 1846, no. 8; 1854, no. 62; 1858, no. 64, 136; 1860, no. 86. The Indies guilder was nominally equal to the Dutch guilder after the latter was designated as the standard coin in the Indies in 1826. See Ind. Stb. 1826, no. 7; 1839, no. 37; 1854, no. 62. 5 * In 1850, the amount of "overweight" coffee in storehouses was about 9,000 piculs; "Kultuurverslag" 1850. 55 See Bijl. Hand. 1856-57, p. 632; Ind. Stb. 1834, no. 20. 56 C. H. Schoffer, Der Caffeehandel (Amsterdam: Seyffartsche Buchhandlung, 1868), 2: 46. 57 Van Deventer, Bijdragen 3:189 (Government decree of 12 April 1844, no. 2).

38

The Politics of Colonial Exploitation

reached 30 to 34 cents per pound.58 In residencies where no land rent was levied or where the peasantry, because of cultivation duties, was exempted from payment of it, crop payments were considerably lower: in Priangan they came to no more than f3.75 per picul (before 1837, f2.92 1/2). In Pacitan, Madiun and Kediri, they were f8 (lowered to f6.25 in 1844).59 A similar situation also applied to the other government cultivations. The peasantry received a fixed crop payment, depending on the quantity that was delivered; these payments were not proportionate to the labor done and were generally far below the market value of the product. Moreover, all risk fell to the growers. They were paid according to result, which depended heavily on weather conditions. If the harvest failed, they received little or nothing. Finally, irregularities often occurred when crop payments were made, so the difference between what was paid according to the Cultivation Reports and what the growers actually received was considerable. In coffee cultivation, opportunities for storehouse personnel to enrich themselves were very great.60 In sugar cultivation, where the crop payments were made a year or more after the start of planting, village chiefs could cheat by putting persons on the pay lists who had taken little or no part in cultivation labor.61 It also appeared that native chiefs of higher and lower rank possessed extensive rice fields that they had obtained either as "official fields'7 associated with their positions or in some other way, for instance, by inheritance or reclamation. If cane was planted on those fields, they received half the crop payment and growers had to be content with the other half. Some chiefs, in this way, collected hundreds of guilders from peasants after the peasants had received their crop payments.62 To counteract interference by the chiefs in the making and distribution of crop payments, the government decided in 1851 that future payments in the sugar, indigo, and tobacco cultivations would take place in the presence of Dutch officials, and they would be made individually and without any deductions.63 This happened after Director of Cultivations S. D. Schiff established during an inspection tour of Java that the making of crop payments was arranged "entirely at the discretion of officials"; as a result, those payments, sometimes even within the sectors of a single residency, did not take place in the same manner.64 The fields planted with sugar cane and indigo as well as those still used by the peasants themselves were assessed for land rent. No fixed standards existed for levying this land rent. Raffles had used the measure of two-fifths of the value of the rice harvest, calculated at market prices. Even for a revenue farm this was a 58

Schoffer, Caffeehandel, pp. 13, 46. Van Deventer, Bijdragen 2: 722, 729; 3:189. The different arrangements in Madiun, and so on, remained in force until 1859, the ones in Priangan until 1870. 60 The storehouse personnel, for instance, could reject coffee because it had not been sorted or dried properly. The Javanese coffee grower was then forced to accept a lower price. The storehouse keeper pocketed the difference. 61 See TNI 2 (I860): 192. 62 Report by the so-called Umbgrove Commission into sugar cultivation, Bijlage IJ (the situation in the Residency of Probolinggo). Bijl. Hand. 1862-63, p. 1077. 63 Ind. Stb. 1851, no. 53; TNI I (1854): 183. Cf. R. Van Niel, 'The Regulation of Sugar Production in Java, 1830-1840," in Economic Factors in Southeast Asian Social Change, ed. R. Van Niel (Honolulu: Asian Studies at Hawaii, no. 2,1968), p. 104. 6 ^ Preamble to Government decree of 15 October 1851, no. 4, Kol. 7126. See Fransen van de Putte, Hand. 28 May 1863, 854 1. 59

The Cultivation System

39

remarkably high percentage. In practice, it appears that never more than one-fifth to one-quarter was levied, and the second crop was not taxed.65 The administration was completely ignorant about everything that could have served as a basis for a responsible levy of land rent. Modest efforts were undertaken shortly after the restoration of Dutch rule over Java in 1816 to start the gigantic task of surveying and classifying the rice fields, but they soon had to be abandoned for lack of personnel and money. Estimates from the native administration could not be relied upon. As an 1844 instruction to the Residents put it, officials were "groping about in the dark."66 The assessment of land rent, which was on a villagewide basis, was often set by bargaining and negotiation between the village and district chiefs on one side and the kontroleur on the other.67 Once the amount of the assessment had been decided upon, Dutch officials did not interfere with the way the amount due was apportioned by the village administration among the inhabitants of the village. In this situation, too, the intervention of the Dutch administration stopped at the Javanese village, and much latitude was left to the village heads, just as with the apportionment of corvee and cultivation services. Because village chiefs received a collection wage of 8 percent of the amount paid by the village, they shared the government's interest in ensuring that the sum assessed was collected.68 If one peruses in the Indies Government Gazette the famous zakelijke extracten of 1834, left as a sort of political testament by van den Bosch to his successors, it appears as though van den Bosch had wanted to exempt villages that were involved in indigo and sugar cultivation from paying land rent. A village would be released from the obligation of paying land rent when it set aside one-fifth of its rice fields for the cultivation of products for the European market. Moreover, the amount of the assessed value of sugar and indigo that was over and above the amount of land rent due would be returned to the village. Finally, the losses caused by crop failure, for which the peasantry was not responsible, would be borne by the government.69 That the way the Cultivation System actually operated—heavy labor for disproportionate pay and levying of land rent along the old lines—was so little in tune with the fine promises made was later adversely attributed to van den Bosch. Van den Bosch himself and the whole system were thereby seriously discredited. An example of the 65

It was calculated in 1844 that from a rice harvest with an estimated value of 45 million guilders around 10 to 11 million guilders of land rent was raised; see Van Deventer, Bijdragen 3: 203. In 1836, checks in the adjoining Residencies of Cirebon, Tegal, and Pekalongan revealed that the population paid respectively 12, 33, and 28 percent of the value of the rice harvest, calculated at market price, in land rent; Van Deventer, Bijdragen 3:59. 66 Van Deventer, Bijdragen 3: 213 (circular letter from Governor-General Merkus of 20 June 1844). See also "Kultuurverslag" 1850 (section on rice cultivation) in which it was noted that the levying of land rent was based on the "arbitrary opinion" of European officials and the inaccurate statements of native chiefs who were far from disinterested. 6 ^ Cf. Van Deventer, Bijdragen 3: 264 (nota from the official H. A. van der Poel, December 1850). According to Van der Poel the usual practice was that first it was decided how much a village had to pay in land rent, after which the kontroleur calculated how many piculs of rice that village should harvest to justify the size of the assessment. Assume, for instance, that a village had to pay f400 and the market price of rice was f2 per picul. The kontroleur then wrote in his register—assuming that the land rent amounted to 40 percent of the rice harvest—that a total of 500 piculs of rice had been harvested. In other words, it was not the rice harvest that decided the size of the land rent but the land rent that decided the size of the rice harvest! 68 Ind. Stb. 1819, no. 5 (ART. 19); Ind Stb. 1827, no. 37. 69 /ml Stf. 1834, no. 22.

40

The Politics of Colonial Exploitation

liberal philippics that hold sway in the older literature on the Cultivation System is Colenbrander's remark, "Worst of all, the land rent continued to be levied on the people subject to cultivation service/'70 The purely propagandistic purpose of the zakelijke extracten cannot be disputed. For instance, the government never kept its promise that sugar and indigo growers would be compensated for crop failures. Indeed, even if the crop failed, land rent was still levied.71 However, Colenbrander and other writers on the Cultivation System have paid insufficient attention to the crop payments.72 As already mentioned, van den Bosch had originally intended that no crop payments would be paid, but that settlement would take place via the land rent. This type of settlement without money actually having to be paid out by the government did not work well in practice. In some instances, a village that possessed a lot of land and was, therefore, assessed to pay a large amount of land rent was exempted from it but contributed less to cultivation services than a village that had been taxed much less heavily in the land rent. In general, in areas with individually held sawah, growers who owned much land and were assessed proportionately for land rent were advantaged more than others who held little or no land but who had performed the same or more labor on the cultivations. Finally, it became clear that the exemption from paying land rent did not provide sufficient incentive for peasants to give the crops the attention they needed. That incentive was certainly present when the reward depended on the quality and the quantity of the crop.73 After 1836, crop payments in coffee, sugar, and indigo cultivations were usually paid without exemption from or being discounted by the land rent owed.74 Only in the residencies of Madiun and Kediri and some smaller regions did the exemption from land rent remain in force until 1859, and the peasantry received in addition a small payment for the products it delivered.75 Between 1839 and 1848, the share of the land rent that was discounted against services rendered or products grown was never more than 5 to 7 percent of the total assessment in all residencies.76 70

H. T. Colenbrander, Koloniale Geschiedenis (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1926), 3:39. L. Vitalis, Antwoord op het Voorstel... om, na Expiratie van de thans in werking zijnde Kontrakten voor de Suikerondernemingen op Java, dezelve bij wijze van Uitbesteding af te staan en ook om dien Afstand bij Eene Wet te Regelen (The Hague: Stahl, 1857), p. 14. 72 See, for instance, the unclear passage in J. S. Furnivall, Netherlands India. A Study of Plural Economy (Cambridge: U.P., 1944), p. 133, on crop payments. Cf. Gonggrijp, Schets, p. 92; W. F. Wertheim, Indonesian Society in Transition. A Study of Social Change, 2d ed. (The Hague: Van Hoeve,1959),p.61. 73 See Van Deventer, Bijdragen 3: 72; Bijl. Hand. 1862-63, 348 34 (report of the Umbgrove Commission). 7 ^ Government decree of 14 July 1837, no. 4, quoted in Van Deventer, Bijdragen 3: 73. According to the Cultivation Report for 1836, the exemption of land rent in sugar cultivation then existed only in Semarang and Tegal (and in Madiun and Kediri). 7 ^ According to the Cultivation Report for 1848, for example, the amount of land rent payable that year by villages in Kediri and Madiun that cultivated sugar cane and from which villagers had been exempted was, respectively, f 16,686 and f 18,783. Crop payments amounted to f 19,500 and f 12,033 or, respectively, f7.24 and f3.21 per household. The government in Holland had already authorized in 1842 that growers in these two residencies be paid on the same basis as in other residencies, but this was first put into effect by Ind. Stb. 1858, no. 46. See Van Deventer, Bijdragen 3:85. 76 Bijl. Hand. 1851-52, p. 176. 71

The Cultivation System

41

The importance of the crop payments made in government cultivations as a new source of income for the population should not be underestimated. Because land rent had to be paid in cash (the rule that payment could also be made in kind had already fallen into abeyance before 1830), peasants who did not have any ready money apart from what was realized from the sale of the rice harvest often fell victim to Chinese money lenders and usurious practices. According to the Cultivation Report for 1850, abuses were widespread in the levying of land rent and the imposition of corvee services, such as the arbitrary apportionment of land rent among villagers by village chiefs; the levying in advance of the land rent for future years, which advances were used by village chiefs for their own benefit but later had to be made good again by the people; the imposition of heavy burdens on certain sawah owners with the aim of taking over their fields; the exemption of certain villagers from corvee and cultivation services in return for payment, so that these services had to be performed by other people, while the village chiefs kept the moneys they received; the payment of advances for crops that were still standing on the fields; the hiring-out of plough animals by peasants to enable them to pay land rent from the fees they received. The amounts that, according to the Cultivation Reports, were made in crop payments were generally more than sufficient to pay the land rent owing. Until 1838, crop payments made for sugar cultivation lagged behind the land rent that had to be paid by sugar-growing villages for their land (i.e., both the land under cane and that which remained for the peasants' own use), but thereafter, crop payments were always considerably higher. This was already the case in 1836 in indigo cultivation, although around 1845 the ratio between crop payments and land rent would change to the detriment of indigo growers.77 Taking into account the crop payments made in coffee cultivation, land rent assessments between 1840 and 1860 always remained considerably below crop payments in these three cultivations.78 Crop payments in coffee, sugar, and indigo cultivations combined amounted during that period to an average of 11 million guilders per year, and land rent assessments were on average almost 9 million guilders (recepis)/9 There is little doubt that a considerable portion of the crop payments never reached those entitled to them but remained stuck to the fingers of middle-men. As already seen, there was hardly any supervision over the making of crop payments before 1851. This lack does not alter the fact that crop payments, insofar as the peasantry actually benefited from them, must have been an important source of extra income, even though they fluctuated greatly from year to year. One should not underestimate the monetization of the Javanese peasant economy that took place in this way, particularly after 1840. 77

Data about the ratio between crop payments and land rent in indigo and sugar cultivation are not available for the period after 1851 (Ed.:While conducting research in the Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia in 1984,1 discovered substantial fragments of the 1852 Cultivation Report that contain this information). 78 The Cultivation Reports contain data about the total assessment of land rent for the whole of Java (including the areas where there were no forced cultivations). These figures are compiled in Koloniaal Verslag 1866, bijlage no. 12, Bijl Hand. 1868-69, XXXVIII. 79 The proportion of crop payments in coffee, sugar, and indigo cultivations of this total was, for the period 1840-50, respectively 59, 25, and 16 percent; for the period 1851-60 it was 58,34, and 8 percent. See appendix 1.

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The Politics of Colonial Exploitation

In some publications by Van Niel on the significance of the Cultivation System for the peasantry in Java, the connection between crop payments and land rent is strongly emphasized. Van Niel thought that land rent was used as the basis for the determination of crop payments. The aim of the Cultivation System, as far as the indigenous side of things was concerned, would have been to provide the people with such financial benefits that they would be able to pay land rent from their crop payments.80 The question is, however, whether this assumption is correct. Van den Bosch himself in 1833 used a different criterion to measure crop payments in sugar cultivation. The growers would have to be paid so much that they would enjoy more profit from their land than when they planted rice.81 Not taken into account in this, however, was the extra time and extra effort involved in the cultivation of sugar cane over that of rice. This principle was still enshrined in the regulations of 1860 that provided a new basis for government sugar cultivation: the minimum crop payment was then fixed at f75, deemed to be "at least equal to the average yield of one bouw of padi//82 Finally, one should remember that, even if in the beginning there was a connection between crop payments and land rent, that connection was severed with the stipulation in the first model sugar contract of 1836 that crop payments in future would be calculated on the basis of the actual quantity of sugar obtained from the cane, whereby in principle a fixed amount was paid for each picul.83 The suitability of soil and climate for sugar cultivation, the technical equipment of the factory, and the skill of the factory owner in producing as much sugar as possible from the available cane were, thus, the factors that determined the level of crop payments. Because the best sawah was reserved for the cultivation of sugar, those fields were more heavily assessed for land rent than those planted with rice. In 1844 and 1845, for instance, the assessment on cane fields came to an average of fll.85 per bouw as against f5.25 for the other fields.84 During the years 1857-60, those figures were respectively f!2.06 and f6.28.85 In 1846, crop payments for sugar cultivation averaged f76 per bouw, from which still had to be deducted the land rent on those areas planted with cane.86 If one fur-

80

See R. Van Niel, 'The Function of Landrent under the Cultivation System in Java/' Journal of Asian Studies 23 (3) (1964): 366; idem, "Measurement of Change," p. 105 ("the purpose of the system . . . was to provide enough to pay the total land-rent assessment"). It is not clear how Van Niel can state that this aim was not achieved because the total amount in crop payments in the government cultivations (excluding coffee cultivation) was lower than the amount that was paid in land rent. To make a true comparison only those villages must be taken into account that were assessed for land rent as well as being incorporated in the government cultivations, and then it becomes clear that those villages received substantially more in crop payments than was paid in land rent (on all the land belonging to those villages). 81 "Nota over de beginselen te volgen bij de suikerkultuur," 23 November 1833, no. 407, Kol. 3203. 8 ^ Start. 1860, no. 138. See chapter 11. Similarly the starting point of the later land hire ordinances (Grondhuurordonnanties) was always that the owner of the land had to receive as minimum rent from the entrepreneur what he could have earned with his own labor on the land he had hired out. 83 For a further discussion, see chapter 5. 8 ^ See "Kultuurverslagen" 1844 and 1845 (rice cultivation). The amounts have been converted to recepis guilders. 85 Woordenboek 3:110, 486. 86 "Kultuurverslag" 1846.

The Cultivation System

43

ther assumes, as van den Bosch had done,87 that four able-bodied men (households) were required for every bouw of cane, on the understanding that one of those four turned out daily, if necessary with a team of buffaloes, to work, plant, care for, and guard the field, then this totals about 360 days of service per year, for which was paid in crop payments, less land rent, f64.00 or 21 doits per day. This type of payment does not seem to have differed much from the daily wages paid during that period for "free labor."88 However, the cane grower was clearly underpaid in comparison, because no compensation was provided for the use of buffaloes for ploughing and for tools, and payments began only when the crop ripened, that is, about one year after planting. Finally, cane occupied the fields much longer than rice, so that it was impossible for peasants to plant second crops like tobacco and corn on that land (for which no land rent had to be paid). Sometimes fields were returned to peasants so late that they missed out on two rice harvests instead of only one, or they were forced to plant fast-ripening varieties of rice with lower yields.89 Once the fields were again available to peasants, they could not immediately be used for the cultivation of rice. Small irrigation dikes had first to be rebuilt, irrigation channels constructed, and so on. According to an official report from 1846, the advantages of sugar cultivation for the peasantry were to be found not so much in crop payments but in ancillary labor and activities that this cultivation entailed, which were paid separately, such as the cutting and transport of cane, the supply of baskets and pots for storing sugar, coolie labor in the factories, and so on.90 Apart from using land intended for rice growing and late and insufficient payments, government sugar cultivation also caused hardship because peasants were sometimes forced to plant at great distances from their own villages.^1 The government preferred to concentrate crops in large, contiguous plantations near the factory. Supervision was easier, and transportation of cane to the factory was cheaper. Some villages within the operating radius of a sugar factory were forced to give up a large part of their sawah for the cultivation of sugar, much more than the originally stipulated maximum of one-fifth. Those villages had to come to an arrangement with other villages less severely affected to make good the fields they had given up. All types of arrangements and adaptations in land tenure became necessary. All this was more complicated because cane was never planted two years in succession on the same land. Mostly, Dutch officials remained as much as possible detached from those arrangements and generally seem to have been only dimly aware of them. It sufficed for the kontroleur, at the beginning of each year and in consultation with the district chief, to make up a list of those fields that had to be planted with cane that year. 87

Ind. Stb. 1834, no. 22. In 1846, according to the Cultivation Report, about 155,000 households were assigned for the cultivation of about 37,000 bouw of sugar cane. 88 See the report of Director of Cultivations L.W.H. de Munnick dated 23 May 1846, no. 1600, Exh. 4 January 1847, no. 10, Kol. 1755. 89 See Bijl. Hand. 1863-64, p. 118. The cultivation of rice usually occurred during the period November to May; second crops were grown from May to November. For the cultivation of sugar, the land was used from May or June of one year until September/November of the next. 90 See the report by de Munnick cited in n. 88. 91 This problem was much emphasized in the report of the Umbgrove Commission on sugar cultivation, Bijl. Hand. 1862-63,348 21.

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Roads and drains were marked out in the fields to be planted with cane, and then village chiefs apportioned each grower his share.92 Only in 1853—when government sugar cultivation had already existed for almost a quarter-century—did the Dutch government decide to appoint a commission whose task it was, on the basis of a detailed questionnaire, to survey for every sugar factory land tenure, the effects of the introduction of sugar cultivation on customary law, the division of labor among the people, and a great number of other subjects.93 In this way, over a period of four years, almost one hundred sugar factories were described. The descriptions contained a wealth of data, but little use was made of them.94 The inquiry was all too late. Another problem caused by sugar cultivation was that the factories that used water power for their machinery made great demands during the milling season on the part of the water supply that could not be spared from the cultivation of rice and second crops. When the number of water-driven mills increased—in 1835, 42 compared to 27 buffalo-powered mills, in 1838,56 and 10, respectively—this use of irrigation water for the sugar industry began to cause more and more problems.95 Only with the increased use of steam engines and boilers after 1850 did this situation gradually improve. But even in 1868, 57 out of approximately 100 sugar factories still worked exclusively with water power, 29 with a combination of steam and water, and only 11 exclusively with steam engines.96 Of all the cultivations, however, indigo was the most difficult for the peasantry to bear. Crop payments were still considerably lower than in sugar cultivation compared with the services demanded from growers. What is more, deductions were made from crop payments to pay for the maintenance of the many small "factories" (which were really primitive installations).97 The work in those small factories was extremely unpleasant. Finally, indigo exhausted the soil so that fields used for indigo were useless for growing rice. Already around 1845, the Indies government came to the conclusion that indigo cultivation could not be maintained on its prevailing scale. Supervision of government cultivations was entrusted to a small number of Dutch officials. In 1840, only 86 kontroleur and 9 additional officials comprised the government branch of land rent revenue and cultivations, and in the opinion of the Ministry of Colonies that was too many anyway.98 In the mid-1850s, supervision was exercised by around 170 officials, including Residents and assistant-residents, who usually had many other official duties, while a further 100 lower officials (opzieners) 92

See H.Ch.GJ. van der Mandere, "De Cultuurmaatschappij Wonolangan (1895-1925)," Indie. Geiilustreerd Tijdschrift voor Nederland en Kolonien 9 (19) (1925): 310, 311. 9 ^ I refer here to the Umbgrove Commission. The establishment and work of this commission is discussed more fully in chapters 7,10, and 11. 94 Van der Mandere used these monographs "De Cultuurmaatschappij Wonolagan." They certainly belong to that category of documents that could be extremely valuable for a "Javacentric" approach to the Cultivation System. 95 See K. W. van Gorkom, "Historische Schets van de Suikerindustrie op Java," Tijdschrift voor Nijverheid en Landbouw in Nederlandsch Indie 23 (1879): 309; Bijl. Hand. 1862-63,348 35. 96 Van Gorkom, "Historische Schets," p. 289. 97 See chapter 4, n. 8. 9 ^ Cabinet letter of the governor-general, 17 April 1840, no. 51, Kol. 4550.

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45

were engaged. Office personnel in the main towns of the residencies were not included in these figures." Residents and lower officials, who because of their areas of responsibility were involved in the cultivations, were bound to follow the instructions of the director of cultivations. The Directorate of Cultivations had been established in 1831. It was responsible not only for government cultivations but also for such matters as the cultivation of rice, land rent, corvee services, and forestry.100 From 1834, all those subjects were reported annually in the Cultivation Report.101 Directly subordinate to the director of cultivations were three inspectors of cultivations. Their function had been established in 1833, when van den Bosch became worried about "the deviations which have already emerged from the principles which form the basis of the system of industry which has been introduced/'102 The first inspector of cultivations was L. Vitalis. Of Italian origin, he did not have a good command of the Dutch language, so the government had to give him a private secretary to translate his reports!10-* An inspector of cultivations was equal in rank to a Resident, but his salary was lower.10"* More often than not he tried, therefore, to become a Resident as soon as possible or a sugar contractor, just as Vitalis did, leaving government service to take up one of these lucrative sugar contracts in 1838.105 It goes without saying that such rapid career changes were not in the best interests of cultivation inspection.106 According to his instructions, the director of cultivations would from time to time be informed by the Indies government "what expansion it wanted given to the cultivation of the various products suitable for the European market, and consequently be advised of the quantities of each of these articles to be cultivated annually."10' He had to decide, "with such changes, nevertheless, as local conditions may perhaps require," and after deliberation with the Residents, the area to be planted in each residency and then, after approval had been received from the Indies government, issue the necessary orders.108 This instruction, issued by van den Bosch himself, shows clearly how little value could be attached to his repeated statements that the Cultivation System would in no way be forced upon the peasantry against its will.109 The Residents enjoyed a great degree of independence in executing the instructions sent to them by the director of cultivations. Much was left to their own initia99

See Hand RR, 2: 511; 3: 479. For the "opzieners," see Ind. Stb. 1837, no. 28. Instruction for the director of cultivations, Ind. Stb. 1832, no. 15, ART. 2. 101 The obligation to draw up an annual report had been imposed on the director of cultivations in ART. 15 of his instructions. 102 See Ind. Stb. 1833, no. 73. 103 Vitalis, Nog een Woord, p. 61. Later he gained a better command of Dutch, as is apparent from some of his publications on the Cultivation System. 104 See Ind. Stb. 1836, no. 54, sub. 3o. 105 By decree of 17 August 1838, no. 5, Kol. 2585, the government declared that it was willing to conclude a new contract for the Tjiledoek sugar factory in Cirebon with the retired Inspector of Cultivations Vitalis. Vitalis would receive an advance of f300,000, which had to be repaid in ten years. 106 See Bijl. Hand. 1862-63,348 41. 107 Ind. Stb. 1832, no. 15 (ART. 6). 108 Ibid. (ART. 7). 109 Ind. Stb. 1834, no. 22. 100

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tive.110 Conditions from residency to residency were so different, so little was known in detail about the area of land available for cultivation and the number of growers that might in time be engaged, that it was impossible for the Indies administration to be too precise in its orders. It always had to invoke expressions that gave its instructions an "elastic" character: expressions such as "in accordance with existing practices," "as much as the capacities of the people will allow," "this can nevertheless be altered by the local administration, according to circumstances," and so on.111 One effective means to make local officials cooperate industriously in the introduction and expansion of government cultivations was "cultivation percentages": payments made in proportion to the number of piculs of coffee, sugar, and so on produced in the residency or area in which the official resided—the higher the production, the higher the cultivation percentages.112 Sometimes these payments were greater than officials' salaries. Van den Bosch had thought the introduction of cultivation percentages fair because government cultivations, certainly in the beginning, caused the officials concerned a lot of extra work. The payment of percentages was, for that matter, already customary in the forced coffee cultivation that was already operating in Java before 1830. Thus, the payment of coffee percentages to regents and lesser chiefs in Priangan and Buitenzorg was regulated in a decree of 1808.113 Those percentages were also paid to European officials. Commissioner-General Du Bus de Gisignies, who usually comes out much more favorably in the older liberal literature on the Cultivation System than does his successor van den Bosch and his abominable cultivation percentages, had granted the assistant-resident of Buitenzorg, who had requested a raise in salary, five stuiver for every picul of coffee annually delivered to the government in his region.114 There also was a precedent in the judicial sphere. Until 1842, the "fiscals" (public prosecutors) of the courts of justice were entitled to one-sixth of the proceeds from the fines imposed and confiscations pronounced.115 Cultivation percentages were thus not, as has often been suggested,116 an invention of van den Bosch but the continuation of a government tradition, rooted in the conceptions of a past era, concerning the propriety of certain advantages to which 110

See the circular letter of Director of Cultivations J. I. van Sevenhoven, dated 9 February 1832: 'The Residents are given absolute freedom to arrange all this in such a way as will be most advantageous and best in their Residencies to further the beneficial goal of obtaining many products of the best quality at the lowest prices without oppressing the Javanese." Bijl. Hand. 1862-63, 859. Van Niel also places much stress on the independence of local officials within the Cultivation System. 111 See B.R.P. Hasselman, Mijne Ervaring als Fabriekant in de Binnenlanden van Java (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1862), p. 3. See also the instruction for the director of cultivations, cited n. 110, ART. 7. •^ See Reinsma, "Cultuurprocenten." No cultivation percentages were paid to the director and inspectors of cultivations. 113 V 17 May 1848, no. 2, Kol. 1855. For village chiefs in Priangan, who did not receive "collection payments" (in this Residency no land rent was levied), these percentages were the only source of income from the government treasury. See "Historische nota over de dessabesturen op Java," Koloniaal Verslag 1877, Bijlage N, Bijl. Hand. 1877-78, p. 18. After 1825, coffee percentages were also paid in the Banyuwangi region of East Java. 114 Government decree of 15 March 1828, no. 11, Kol. 2514. Until 1855 there was an obligation on owners of private estates in Buitenzorg to deliver coffee to the government. 115 Ind. Stb. 1831, no. 28; 1842, no. 10. 116 See Reinsma, Cultuurstelsel, 27; C. Day, The Policy and Administration of the Dutch in Java, reprint (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1966), p. 293.

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47

civil servants could lay claim. There can be no argument that this way of rewarding official diligence by making others work harder involved a number of questionable aspects. Cultivation percentages converted officials into people with a direct interest in the unlimited expansion of the cultivations, with all the disadvantages that might result from them for the peasantry. The danger of driving things too hard became even greater when the Indies government decreed in 1835 with regard to coffee cultivation and in 1841 for the other cultivations that cultivation percentages would only be paid in full for amounts of produce that exceeded the previous year's production. Only half the normal rate would be paid for the production figure already achieved before an official arrived in a posting.117 Cultivation percentages were disastrous from the point of view of good administration because they caused great differences in salaries between officials of the same rank. Detailed figures are available for the cultivation percentages paid during the years 1858--60.118 They show how much the heads of the local administrations benefited from those percentages. Table 2.5. Annual average cultivation percentages for Residents, 1858-60 (guilders)

Resident Bagelen Banten Banyumas Besuki Cirebon Jepara Kediri Kedu Madiun Pasuruan Pekalongan Priangan Probolinggo Rembang Semarang Surabaya Tegal

Ciiltivation percentages received for the years 1858-60

10,401 1,301 6,297 7,152 7,543 5,714 4,905 4,293 4,165 25,064 3,123 5,994 10,599 2,737 5,977 14,213 5,274

Source: Bijl Hand. 1865-66, p. 1341; Supplement archive Kol. no. 24.

Thus the Resident of Banten received in those years an average of fl,300 from secondary income in cultivation percentages in addition to the salary of f!5,000 per year 117

See Ind. Sib. 1835, no. 11; 1841, no. 41. These lists were the basis of proposals submitted in 1866 to the Second Chamber of Parliament, as a result of which the cultivation percentages for European civil servants were abolished while their salaries were simultaneously increased. 118

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attached to his position. His colleague in Rembang received no more than about £2,700. The Resident of Surabaya, however, received £14,000, the Resident of Probolinggo well over £10,000, the Resident of Cirebon f7,500 per year. Usually the Resident of Rembang did not stay long at his post: between 1838 and 1844 six Residents took turns in that region. No residency was in greater demand than Pasuruan. During the years 1858-60, the Resident there received on average f25,000 over and above his salary, so that his pay was more than three times greater than the yearly salary of the minister of colonies, who received f 12,000! Dissatisfaction (because in a society of officials all happiness stems from comparabilities), which found expression in continuous requests for transfers to residencies where extra earnings were higher, rode like an inseparable footman on the golden coach of the cultivation percentages. By the same token, there was no lack of complaints, requests for allowances, bonuses and so forth when a Resident from a region with high cultivation percentages was promoted to a higher official position that carried with it little or no extra earnings.119 In 1842, upper limits were set for the cultivation percentages that Dutch civil servants in the internal administration below the position of Resident could claim. For assistant-residents the maximum was f500 per month (or 100 percent of their salaries), for kontroleur f!50, f!25, or flOO, depending on their classifications.120 For kontroleur, this measure was not very fair because they carried the lion's share of the extra work that the Cultivation System entailed. They had to listen to the native chiefs and urge them on, they supervised the cultivations and paid regular visits to the factories of entrepreneurs operating in their regions. A significant part of their time was spent compiling and checking lists and tables to show how many coffee trees had been planted or piculs of sugar delivered. It is possible that the limitations placed on cultivation percentages for lower European officials was partly to blame for the decline that occurred after 1842 in some of the cultivations (including coffee cultivation). The unequal manner in which cultivation percentages were divided among European officials of different ranks is shown by the fact that between 1858 and 1860 about 20 Residents received a total of f!29,533 in cultivation percentages per year, or around 56 percent of the total amount distributed in those years to Dutch officials; approximately 40 assistant-residents received a total of f33,034, or 14 percent; whereas the remaining 30 percent, or f69,083 per year, was paid to 111 kontroleur.121 Undoubtedly, the government would have handled things more fairly had it cut down the enormous amounts paid to some Residents. This cut would have been all the more justified because cultivation percentages as a rule were earned most easily where the cultivations had existed for a long time, and supervision required relatively little time. The Resident of Pasuruan most probably spent less time worrying about sugar cultivation than the Resident of Rembang spent on the administration of the extensive teakwood forests, so lucrative for the government treasury, without the latter being able to claim any extra compensation. 119

See V 17 May 1848, no. 2, Kol. 1855. Ind. Stb. 1842, no. 55; 1850, no. 24. See BijL Hand. 1865-66, pp. 1338,1339. The annual salary of an assistant-resident was £6,000 (if he received maximum cultivation percentages his salary was the same as that of a cabinet minister in the Netherlands). The annual salary of a kontroleur varied between £2,700 and £3,900. After 1866 these amounts were increased. 121 BijL Hand. 1865-66, pp. 1341,1342. 120

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Indeed, in 1844 Baud put the question to the Indies government whether it was advisable to abolish cultivation percentages for Residents. If in the future they took a "neutral position/' then that would also be in the interest of the people entrusted to their administration.122 However, the suggestion of the Indies government, made in a letter of 20 August 1845, to abolish cultivation percentages for Residents and to replace them by a fixed allowance of f350 per month on top of salary made no further progress once Baud had considered the various objections raised, and the matter was laid to rest.123 This was also the case with a remarkable letter from Minister J. C. Rijk, Baud's successor in 1848, in which he asked the governor-general whether it was perhaps preferable to abolish cultivation percentages for European officials altogether, not so much out of fear of driving the cultivations too hard but because of their demoralizing influence and the mutual jealousy that they caused, "Ambition gives way to lust for money; morality is debased."124 There the matter remained for fear, among other things, that the cancellation of these rewards, however questionable they might be, would harm government coffee cultivation. The fact that the percentages could lead to excesses and, what is more, could cast a spanner in the efficient functioning of the civil service—for many Dutch officials the service was not important but the cultivation percentages were—was considered a matter of minor importance.125 Only after 1860 did the question of abolishing cultivation percentages for European officials appear again in the correspondence between minister and governor-general. Finally, they were abolished on 1 January 1867.126 There were also great differences in the cultivation percentages paid to regents and lesser chiefs—in 1858-60 an average of f800,000 annually, as against approximately f250,000 for European officials. Thus during that period the four regents in Banten received annually on average less than f2,500, but the five regents of the neighboring Priangan regencies (to illustrate the contrast that played a role in Max Havelaar) received no less than f90,000 or thirty-six times as much! During the same period, the five regents in Surabaya received together an average of f26,000 per year in cultivation percentages, the three regents of Pasuruan were able to share among themselves f38,000; the four regents in Rembang, however, received no more than f3,600 annually.127 Differences were also very great among the lower chiefs (for whom there was no upper limit), depending on their rank and the cultivation and residency to which they had been appointed. Between 1816 and 1830, a tendency had arisen in administrative circles to bring abouta certain degree ofdefeudalization" of Javanese society.128 To be sure, a regula122

V 15 October 1844, no. 2, Kol. 1596. See Van Deventer, Bijdragen 3:142. Van Deventer, Bijdragen 3:143. V 17 May 1848, no. 2, Kol. 1855. Baud preferred a system of allowances on a fixed scale, by which a small difference would remain between those Residents in areas with many cultivations and those Residents with few. This distinction was not made in the proposal of the Indies government. 124 V 17 May 1848, no. 2, Kol. 1855. 125 V 21 December 1848, no. 11, Kol. 1901. 126 Ind. Stb. 1866, no. 6. They were maintained for native chiefs until 1907. See also chapter 12. 12 ^ For a survey of cultivation percentages paid to native chiefs during the years 1858-60, see Supplement Kol. no. 24. 128 See D. H. Burger, "Structuurveranderingen in de Javaanse Samenleving," Indonesia 2 (194849): 382 ff. 123

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tion on the titles and ranks of the regents, dating from 1820—and probably drafted by Baud129—had indicated the high value that the government placed on the friendship of those prominent chiefs of the people, but, nevertheless, several measures were unmistakably intended to curtail the power of those chiefs in order to protect the people against their arbitrariness.130 This process of defeudalization, however, had not produced the desired results. Together with the offensive conduct of some Dutchofficialstowards prominent Javanese chiefs and princes, it was even blamed for the bloody Java War that laid waste to a great part of Central Java between 1825 and 1830. Under the leadership of van den Bosch, who, in this respect as in others, reverted to the policy of the VOC, the government had taken another course after 1830. Thenceforth, the aim was to allow the native chiefs to keep their influence as much as possible and to shield Javanese society from disturbing influences from outside. The Cultivation System, as it had been envisaged by van den Bosch, was designed around this latter notion. The management of production would be in the hands of native chiefs, who would link the Dutch government with the mass of the people. Dutch officials were to remain as much as possible in the background and to refrain from direct interference in the organization of the workforce. In all this, van den Bosch was making a virtue of necessity, because with the small number of officials that the government had at its disposal another framework would hardly have been feasible. The question whether the Cultivation System infringed custom, the "domestic institutions" of the Javanese, by such things as arbitrarily encroaching upon rights to land for the sake of sugar cultivation, could thus be passed over in silence. The time had not yet come when much attention was paid to the rights of the peasantry, even though Baud was personally sympathetic towards them.131 It was the same Baud who, in 1851, would cynically discuss the system of administration that had been put into operation while he and van den Bosch had been in power: the people had been ruled through the medium of their chiefs, especially the regents, with care taken not to clip the wings of the regents' power or privileges. Undeniably, this system had its drawbacks, but what else could have been done? "The Javanese people know very well that we do not really belong there." It was possible by various means to stay on good terms with the chiefs, who were relatively small in numbers, "but it is impossible to do the same with the millions of people who comprise the population/'132 The government secured the cooperation of the chiefs by the payment of the cultivation percentages already discussed. These emoluments were of great importance for the lower Javanese chiefs in particular, because, in contrast to the regents, they were very poorly paid. As early as 1834, Baud, as interim governor-general, had recognized during a tour of inspection of Java the gravely inadequate payment of district chiefs and acknowledged "that it is well known, but under the given circumstances tacitly allowed, that all of them indulge in illegal practices to supplement their 129

Ind. Stb. 1820, no. 22. At that time Baud was general secretary of the Indies government. Among other things, the (temporary) abolition of the ex officio land ownership of regents, decreed in 1819, could be attributed to these measures. 131 See the favorable judgement of Baud by C. van Vollenhoven, van Vollenhoven, De Ontdekking van het Adatrecht (Leiden: Brill, 1928), p. 45. 132 At least that is what Duymaer van Twist recorded Baud as saying in 1851; see Zwart, Duymaer van Twist, p. 247. 130

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51

insufficient incomes."133 But nothing was done to raise salaries, however much this was urgently required, not even when Baud was appointed head of the Ministry of Colonies in 1840, because the expense involved would have decreased the colonial surplus. As late as 1865 no more than fl,250,000 was appropriated in the Indies budget for the salaries of 69 Regents, 70 patih, 106 mantri, 342 district chiefs, and so on, while all of them received, moreover, an estimated 40 percent of their income from the treasury as cultivation percentages.134 The Dutch government further consolidated a practice that had already existed before the introduction of the Cultivation System, namely to replace regents on retirement or death as much as possible by their sons or close male relatives.135 In 1839, van den Bosch attributed the success of the Cultivation System to this measure in particular. He rejected the idea that the Indies government might independently— that is, without authorization from the government in Holland—dismiss regents or abolish regencies. The argument that this provided a way of cutting administrative expenses was not deemed a decisive factor (one of the few occasions when it was not!).136 The governor-general was instructed accordingly. It is true that Baud in 1841 reversed this limiting instruction, but only after enjoining upon the Indies government that, in the interests of Dutch authority in Java, the chiefs had to be treated with the utmost discretion.137 The dismissal of a regent was very rare, although perhaps less rare than might be believed from the then current axiom that the government would rather dismiss ten Residents than one regent. In the period from 1840 to 1848, ten regents were suspended from their positions or dismissed because of extortion, abuse of power, opium smuggling, and so on. In one of these cases (the regent of Pamalang in Tegal), the grounds for dismissal also included insufficient zeal in expanding government cultivations.138 Dutch officials charged with supervising the cultivations were required, in their relations with chiefs and people, to act with "gentleness without weakness," "courteousness without exaggeration," and "earnestness and dignity without stiffness."139 If the chiefs abused their powers, Dutch officials could take action against them but only with great prudence and caution. They were warned in particular that actions that, according to custom and the prevalent notions of the people, were deemed permissible were not to be considered as abuses.140 Even though the constitutional regulation—a distant echo from the era of Enlightenment and the French/Batavian revolution!—laid down that the native people should enjoy 133 yan Deventer, Bijdragen 2 : 632. 134 See Bijl. Hand. 1865-66, p. 1334. Supplement Kol. no. 24. 135 Hand. RR, 3: 640; Mijer, Baud, p. 424. See "Algemeen Overzicht 1839-48," passim. This principle was departed from only when closest relations were utterly unsuitable. During the period 1840-48 this happened eight times. The prestige of the regents was further strengthened by the reintroduction in 1832 of official land ownership, which had been abolished in 1819: the regents could, if so inclined, receive half of their income from the proceeds of the land rent of the landholdings provided them. See Van Deventer, Bijdragen 2: 448. This measure was a particular source of abuses. 136 v 4 October 1839, F15, Kol. 4426. 137 See "Algemeen Overzicht 1839-48," p. 161. 138 See ibid., p. 41. ™9Ind.Stb. 1837, no. 20. 140 See Van Deventer, Bijdragen 2:199.

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"the special protection" of the government, and that abuse of power, the extortion of money, and so on would be severely punished, it was made quite clear to Dutch officials that too much zeal in their supervision of the observance of this provision would not be appreciated.141 No doubt the understaffing of the Dutch administrative apparatus in the "inner residencies" of Java, something still clearly evident even in 1865, was also connected with the policy of the government to respect the chiefs as much as possible. They were not to get the impression that the government could easily manage without their services! The less visible the Dutch administration remained, the stronger (and cheaper) it was. It was no accident that the constitutional regulation of 1836 was premised upon "the principle . . . as far as circumstances allow this, to leave the native people under the leadership and direct administration of their own chiefs."142 This declaration of policy, absent in previous constitutional regulations, had its sequel in the governor-general's instructions for that same year. Among other things, it was impressed upon him that the interests of the chiefs, as much as possible, should be linked to the maintenance of existing institutions and those still to be introduced, by which obviously was meant the Cultivation System. He had also to instruct the Residents that they should treat the regents "with gentleness and special care." Any departure from this latter order "would not be overlooked" and would be punished "by dismissal of the derelict official from government service."143 An 1842 supplement to this instruction still carried resonances of this important principle of government, "The Governor-General will continually be on guard against any attempt to deprive the native chiefs of higher and lower rank of the position allocated to them in the Internal Administration."144 Village chiefs occupied a special place in the administration. Strictly speaking, the village chiefs were not officials like the regents or district chiefs. They were not paid, although they did receive cultivation percentages and a percentage of the land rent collected.145 In theory they were also not appointed by the government (although they could so be dismissed) but elected by the people of the village. The government regarded the free election of village chiefs by the people as an "old custom" (which it was not) that should be maintained (which did not happen).146 I have already indicated the important role that village chiefs played in the apportionment of land rent obligations and corvee and cultivation services: "The execution of all orders is the responsibility of the village chiefs and everything depends on the way in which they carry out those orders, in matters of policing as well as in those that concern the cultivations." Thus, in 1842, did a former director of cultiva141

Article 98 of the constitutional regulation of 1836. This stipulation originated from the constitutional regulations laid down in the days of the Batavian Republic. 142

143

ART. 50, paragraph 2.

ARTS. 44, 45. See Knibbe, Vestiging der Monarchie, p. 199. 144 Supplementary instruction (ART. 5); see J. P. Cornets de Groot van Kraaijenburg, Over het Beheer onzer Kolonien (The Hague: Belinfante, 1862), p. 164. 14 ^ As a consequence of Ind. Sib. 1833, no. 7, village chiefs received 2 percent of the amount paid for the coffee supplied by their villages. By virtue of Ind. Stb. 1850, no. 24, this was replaced by a payment of 24 doits per picul. In sugar cultivation, village chiefs received a maximum payment of fl .80 per bouw. 146 C. J. Hasselman, "Het Palladium. Een Koloniaal-historische Dwaling," De Gids 4 (1901): 210; van Vollenhoven, Adatrechi, I: 537.

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53

tions describe his position in a nutshell.147 If the execution of orders from above was neglected as, for instance, when cane fields were not well maintained or if peasants were slow in carrying out cultivation services imposed on them, then the village chiefs were held responsible and punished. Sometimes punishment even took the form of flogging with a rattan whip, until Baud in 1841 banned this type of corporal punishment because he regarded it as damaging to the prestige of Java's chiefs.148 After that the rattan whip was reserved for the ordinary "native/' although in 1844 the government's humane feelings led it to stipulate that such punishment was never to exceed forty lashes.149 Thus civil administration and the administration of justice were united in one hand. The Resident, as head of police, could punish a villager who was unwilling to perform cultivation services required of him by means of rattan flogging, or could sentence him to prison for a maximum of eight days or to be placed in stocks or to compulsory labor on public works with meals provided but without pay. The Resident, in these matters, was the only judge. The procedure of the police-roll was not limited by fixed rules; there was no appeal against any sentence; and sentences were carried out immediately.150 To curb the sometimes incredible arbitrariness that was the order of the day in this administration of justice according to the police-roll, a committee of lawyers, which had been commissioned in 1839 to prepare a new civil and criminal law code for the Dutch East Indies, had proposed that these matters in future be brought before the local court (Landraad).151 True enough, the Resident was always the chairman of this court, but at least in this function he would not be dispensing judgements as a sole judge. The Indies government, however, objected to this proposal. It considered that curtailing the almost unlimited power of the Residents would endanger the continued operation of the Cultivation System. Baud, who originally concurred with the proposal, was sympathetic to this argument. In a nota written in 1844, he admitted frankly that when the interests of coffee, sugar, and indigo cultivation were mixed with judicial problems, "then the government in power may not expose itself to the always unpredictable directions which the decisions of judges can take."152 He had initially agreed with the proposal because he had not been sufficiently aware of its dangerous implications for the Cultivation System. In the regulation on judicial organization proclaimed in 1848, the police roll 147

C.F.E. Praetorius, "Bijdrage tot de Kennis van het Binnenlandsch Bestuur op Java/' De Indische Bij (1843): 10. Praetorius, who resigned in 1841 as director of cultivations (he was later rewarded with a sugar contract), provided in this article a very readable sketch of the organization of the civil administration in Java around 1840. The article is also interesting because it is one of the few pieces written by someone knowledgable about what was going on in Java to appear before 1848 in the Dutch press. 148 See Van Deventer, Bijdragen 1:420. From an inquiry set up by the Indies government it was revealed that punishment was sometimes carried out in the coffee and sugar plantations as an example to others. Reinsma, Cultuurstelsel, p. 41, incorrectly gives the impression that rattan flogging for village chiefs continued up to 1866. 149 Ind. Sib. 1844, no. 6. In 1848, this maximum was reduced to 20. 15 ^ ART. 28 of the provisions to regulate some subjects of criminal law. See also ART. 110 of the regulation on judicial organization in the Netherlands Indies; ARTICLES 368-72 of the regulation on the police, and so on. 151 For further information on this commission, see A. J. Immink, De Regterlijke Organisatie van Nederlandsch-Indie (The Hague: Stemberg, 1882), pp. iv ff. The new legislation for the Indies was introduced in 1848. 152 Nota of 1 July 1844, quoted by Immink, Regterlijke Organisatie, p. xxii.

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The Politics of Colonial Exploitation

remained an important part of the administration of justice (or what served in its place) in Java.153 A village chief was judged with much greater severity than other chiefs for the assiduity with which he cooperated in carrying out the forced cultivations. It was, after all, easier to dismiss him than a regent. If he did a satisfactory job in this, however, the government was willing to overlook his conduct in other areas and gave him a large measure of latitude.154 In the supplementary instruction laid down for the governor-general in 1842, he was directed to maintain and consolidate the "independence" of Javanese village administration. He had also to pay special attention to village chiefs to ensure that they were not deprived of their "indispensable" authority over the people.155 The Cultivation System reinforced the power of the village chiefs over the people. The more services that had to be performed, the greater became the influence of the village chief who organized the daily activities. Because of the small reward they received from the government there was a great temptation to enrich themselves at the people's expense. The picture of village chiefs drawn by Inspector of Cultivations H. A. van der Poel in 1850 was most unfavorable. According to him, an investigation in the villages would prove that the best fields, as far as they had not been reserved permanently for government cultivations, had come into the hands of village chiefs and their families or favorites. All kinds of people of low quality had been appointed as village chiefs, because the only criterion had been whether they took good care of government cultivations.156 Perhaps this was too gloomy a picture. Van der Poel does not, in all respects, seem to have been a reliable witness. Yet there can be little doubt that the introduction of government cultivations, combined with the land rent and corvee services that after 1830 were increased more and more, dislocated the social relations within the village. Even though Baud in 1840 sharply condemned "all unnecessary intervention in the domestic institutions and customs of the native people,"157 this does not alter the fact that the Cultivation System as such exerted an influence from above that was powerfully felt within village communities. The Cultivation System and a "closed," static Javanese society, such as van den Bosch and Baud had envisaged as ideal, turned out in practice to be incompatible with each other. The provision of crop payments led to a great expansion of the circulation of money in the interior. The roads built for the transportation of products stimulated new activities. As time went by, the influence of the Cultivation System was noticeable even in the most remote areas of Java. If around 1830 an "autonomous" society had still existed—one not disturbed by Western economic expansion— 153

Although later there were also frequent complaints about the arbitrariness of judgments made under the police-roll procedure, it was not until 1914 that these powers were completely withdrawn from officials. Punishment by rattan flogging was abolished in 1866; it was maintained afterwards as a form of disciplinary punishment in such "total" institutions as prisons and the army. 15 ^ See Van Deventer, Bijdragen 3: 283; D.H. Burger, De Ontsluiting van Java's Binnenland voor het Wereldverkeer (Wageningen: Veenman, 1939), p. 129. 155 ART £. see Cornets de Groot, Over het Beheer, p. 164. 156 Van Deventer, Bijdragen 3: 258, 283. 157 feud to Governor-General DeEerens, 7 March 1840, quoted by Van Deventer, Bijdragen 3: 93.

The Cultivation System

55

this society had now been attacked and destroyed by the Cultivation System. Conservative in design, the Cultivation System in the long run had to collide with the conservative principles of administration. It also became a source of corruption.

3 THE CORK ON WHICH THE NETHERLANDS FLOATS"

F

rom the very start, the Cultivation System was an indispensable instrument for the implementation of a colonial surplus policy that van den Bosch in 1831 had described as follows:

The Indies is a Dutch territory of exploitation. The people there must be ruled with fairness and justice, that is, we must not interfere with their domestic and religious institutions, we must protect them against all ill-treatment and rule them as much as possible in accordance with their own conceptions. But for the rest the interests of these lands must be entirely subordinate to those of the Motherland.1 By decree of 30 January 1834, just before his departure for the Netherlands, van den Bosch had laid down in the name of the king "some regulations with regard to the financial management of these regions" for his successor, Governor-General ad interim Baud.2 That instruction stated that the budget of expenditures for 1834 would also be binding for 1835 and the following years. In other words, no expenditures would be allowed that had not been provided for in the final budget that had been drawn up by van den Bosch himself. Insofar as certain unavoidable expenditures came up, they would have to be met 'from an amount of f500,000, which had been reserved for that purpose (and which under no condition could be exceeded).3 For such expenditures, approval had to be sought from the government in Holland every three months. Unforeseen expenditures of a permanent character could be put on the (ordinary) budget for the following year only "after the need for them has been acknowledged" and with the express authorization of the king.4 The aim had to be (and this was indeed achieved around 1840) that through "appropriate thrift" on the one hand and by increasing taxes where this was possible on the other, the normal administrative expenses of the Indies—the so-called territorial expenditures—could 1

Van den Bosch to Baud, 4 June 1831, in Westendorp Boerma, Briefwisseling, 1: 93. Van Deventer, Bijdragen, 2: 607. See also Ind. Stb. 1834, no. 48, in which further instructions were given to put into effect the decree of 30 January 1834. At his own request, Baud acted only temporarily as governor-general because he had had to leave his eleven children, most of them still young, in the Netherlands after the death of his wife. See Mijer, Baud, p. 371. 3 See Van Deventer, Bijdragen, 3: 22. 4 Ibid., 2:609; Ind. Stb. 1834, no. 48. 2

"The Cork on which the Netherlands Floats"

57

be met entirely from the ordinary territorial revenues.5 The only expenditures not curtailed were those for the Cultivation System and for trade—the so-called commercial expenditures—as long as they kept pace with the increase of commercial products delivered to the government. The surplus of revenue over expenditures on the Indies budget, since it was "the property of the Motherland/' had to be transferred annually to the Netherlands in the form of valuable products.6 Van den Bosch had tentatively estimated this surplus for 1834 at 10 million guilders, to be increased by the amount that would be available after deduction of an "administrative capital" of 10 million guilders at the end of that year.7 In the following years, the amount which, by way of salable products, had to be sent to the Netherlands, was set higher and higher. For 1838, it already amounted to 25 million guilders or as much more as possible.** In 1834, Baud had doubted whether he would succeed in remitting the required 10 million guilders in products to the Netherlands, but this brought him trouble from van den Bosch, who had been made minister of colonies after his return from Java. At the same time Baud was informed that the king was deeply dissatisfied with him.^ After that he had lifted his game. Promoted to commander in the Order of the Dutch Lion in 1835, commissioned after his return to the Netherlands in the following year to give colonial advice as an extraordinary councillor of state, and finally, in 1840, after van den Bosch had retired, having become minister of colonies himself, he proved to be as unrelenting toward his successors as van den Bosch had been towards him. The Indies surplus was now absolutely indispensable: before 1840 to persist with the prodigal "perseverance policy" towards Belgium and after that to prevent the battered finances of the state from becoming completely hopeless. "The amount which I nominate as the colonial surplus must be supplied by the Indies." That was the theme repeated again and again in Baud's letters to the Indies government.^ When the governor-general plucked up the courage to propose certain provisions that might cost money, then in most cases he could look forward to a letter from The Hague by return mail in which the minister acrimoniously expressed his dissatisfaction about this new attack on "the only system by which Java can remain 'the cork on which the Netherlands floats.'"11 In 1842, these exhortations were even included in the official instructions for the governor-general. After the death of de Eerens in 1840, P. Merkus, a member of the Council of the Indies, had temporarily filled this post. Previously, Merkus had been reputed to be an opponent of the Cultivation System. Consequently, Baud was in no great hurry to appoint him permanently to this high position, although Merkus, in view of his long experience and great ability, which had also been acknowledged by 5

De Eerens to van den Bosch, 27 September 1839, no. 26, Kol. 4433. ^ See Ind. Stb. 1834, no. 48. The budget of expenditures for the cultivations rose by 200 percent between 1835 and 1845; see Van Deventer, Bijdragen, 2: 745; 3:188. 7 Van Deventer, Bijdragen, 2: 609. The administrative capital was required as a reserve because in some months of the year more was paid (in salaries for civil servants, crop payments, etc.) than was received in taxes. In 1835, it was increased to 12.5 million guilders. 8 Van Deventer, Bijdragen, 2: 776; 3: 22-26. 9 Van Deventer, Bijdragen, 2: 774; 3: 21 ff. See Westendorp Boerma, Briefwisseling, 1:193; 2:18085. 10 Baud to the senior Indies official J. van der Vinne, 21 March 1842, Collectie Baud, 571. 11 Baud to Merkus, 10 January 1842, no. 11, Kol. 4576; see also Van Deventer, Bijdragen, 3:122.

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The Politics of Colonial Exploitation

van den Bosch, was the obvious choice. Finally Merkus was given to understand that his appointment would depend on the Indies budget for 1842, which he was to draft.*2 When those budget papers were received in the Netherlands and were found by Baud, "although not without critical remarks," to be in order, Merkus was finally informed of his permanent appointment.^3 Yet it seems that Baud was not altogether reassured by Merkus's repeated assurance "that the finances of the Indies are being managed with the most scrupulous thrift in the interests of the beloved Fatherland,"^ because together with his letter of appointment the new governor-general received supplementary official instructions, of which the first two articles read:15 (Article 1) The Governor-General will, in accordance with the views of the supreme government in the Motherland, support with all his influence the financial measures and arrangements of this government and will, through appropriate measures, assist in steadily increasing the available colonial surplus for the benefit of the Motherland. He will strictly carry out the planned arrangements, without prejudice to his authority to raise objections to them. (Article 2) He will consider as incapable of compliance or support the proposals of the administrative Departments and officials which tend to increase expenditures as long as those proposals are not based on unavoidable necessity. Thus everything had to be subordinated to the striving for higher and higher remittances. Every expenditure that was not completely unavoidable had to remain in abeyance. In all branches of the Indies administration, ruled a thrift that bordered on the incredible. Areas of importance to the government (even according to the restricted conceptions then current) were grossly neglected. Thus in 1840, through Baud's interference, a seriously needed reorganization of the Department of Water Control and Public Works was stopped because an annually recurring expense of f70,000 was involved. The rigid economizing that had been prescribed applied, according to Baud, not only to superfluous, but also to "useful" expenditures.1^ As late as 1847, only around f350,000 was spent on irrigation works and water control in general (for personnel as well as materials); for education and health care (facilities that, with the exception of smallpox vaccination, were almost exclusively enjoyed by Europeans anyhow) less than f250,000.17 Expenditures on administration and police came to f4,038,546 in 1845 compared with f3,886,643 in 1835 (thus an increase in expenditures of 4 percent in ten years), for civil public works f964,392 compared with f745,910 in 1835.1** To economize as much as possible, the government ordered many public works that in the past had been a charge on the budget to be carried out by corvee services. Peasants were often called 12

Baud to Merkus, 6 July 1842, no. 17; 14 October 1842, no. 19, Kol. 4576. Royal decree of 11 October 1842, Ind. Stb. 1843, no. 3. Merkus had then been acting governor-general for more than two years! 14 Merkus to Baud, 4 July 1842, no. 7, Kol. 4561. ^ This related to the supplementary instruction already mentioned in chapter 2; Cornets de Groot, Over het Beheer, p. 163. 16 See V 9 March 1840, Q3, no. 6, Kol. 4431. 17 Bijl. Hand. 1861-62, LI, Bijlage E. 18 Ibid., Bijlage D. 13

"The Cork on which the Netherlands Floats "

59

up en masse to maintain the many roads and bridges required to facilitate the transport of the products of the Cultivation System.^ Only the Department of War continued to soak up large amounts after 1830: in 1835 f8,875,724, in 1845 flO,349,765 (even though not nearly as much fighting was going on).2^ ^ significant portion of this money was spent to build gigantic fortifications. On the basis of a plan drawn up by General van den Bosch (himself a former officer of the Royal Engineers), Java was provided with a series of forts and citadels to be able to repel a possible attack from a foreign enemy.2* Moreover, for work on those fortifications, most of which had already been written off around 1850 as useless and impracticable, peasants were called up en masse, which sometimes meant they had to travel long distances. How burdensome those services were is apparent from the fact that between 1840 and 1843 a significant part of the population of Rembang tried to escape being forced to labor at the citadel of Semarang, then under construction, by moving to other areas;22 this was the same fort which Governor-General Rochussen scornfully remarked in 1850 was about to sink in the swamp where it was built.23 While expenditures were reined in as much as possible unless they were directly connected with the Cultivation System, taxes were increased as much as possible. Already in 1836, van den Bosch had recommended gradually increasing the land rent because of "the considerable livelihood now afforded the Javanese through the expansion of the cultivations."24 In a secret decree of 27 September 1839, the Indies government, with reference to the instructions received from the Netherlands, raised once more for the special attention of the director of cultivations the desirability of further increasing the land rent "up to the figure . . . which it can yield without unfairness."25 The Cultivation System thus served as an alibi to raise the land rent because crop payments would bring more money among the people. To be sure, it is often claimed in the literature on the Cultivation System that the system adversely influenced the levying of land rent—Reinsma, for instance, asserts that the huge proceeds from the system for the benefit of the Motherland occurred at the expense of the land rent26— but this assertion does not stand up. From an average of six million guilders during the years 1836-38, the total land rent assessment rose to around eight million guilders per year in the period 1840-45.27 This rapid rise was influenced by higher prices for 1^ Rochussen, Toelichting en Verdediging, p. 141; de Waal, Aanteekeningen, 8: 218 ff. Bijl. Hand. 1861-62, LI, Bijlage D. 21 For details of this defence plan, which was started in the mid-1830s when the relationship with France and England left much to be desired as a result of "the Belgian question," see TNI 1(1854): 128 ff. 22 "Algemeen Overzicht 1839-1848," p. 58. 23 Rochussen to Baud, 27 November 1850, Collectie Baud, 840. 24 Van Deventer, Bijdmgen, 3:25. 25 De Eerens to van den Bosch, 27 September 1839, no. 26, Exh 24 April 1840, D6, Kol. 4433; cf. Van Deventer, Bijdragen, 3: 68. 26 Reinsma, Cultuurstelsel, p. 82. 27 See Koloniaal Verslag 1866, Bijlage no. 12, Bijl. Hand. 1868-69, XXXVIII. Cf. Koloniaal Verslag 1849, Bijl. Hand. 1851-52, p. 176, which gives figures for the proceeds from land rent for the years 1839-48. See also Bijl. Hand. 1861-62, LI (Bijlage C) for data on taxes levied in the Indies in the years 1830-^5. 20

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The Politics of Colonial Exploitation

rice, themselves affected by the inflationary pressure of crop payments; it was, after all, the market price of rice that served, although often more on paper than in reality, as the basis for the levying of land rent.2** There was also a large increase in "farmed out income"—so called because it referred to levies on the population, the collection of which had been farmed out by the government (to Chinese)—in particular in the period after 1834.29 From 5.5 million guilders in 1830, government income from revenue farms rose to almost 11.5 million guilders in 1840 and to more than 14.5 million in 1845, thus almost trebling in fifteen years.3** Most profitable were the "opium farms"—the consumption of opium distributed under government supervision was thus harnessed for the benefit of the treasury—which in 1845 yielded more than 9 million guilders. Significant revenue also came from the "market farms" (a levy on merchandise offered for sale at markets): in 1845,3.5 million guilders. In that same year the "buffalo farms" brought in another f400,000.^ Actual levies on the population were probably much heavier than these figures suggest. Complaints about the extortionate practices of tax farmers, who were able to carry on their activities almost unchecked, were legion.32 Rochussen estimated in 1847 that about two-thirds of the crop payments distributed flowed back into the treasury as a result of increased taxes and revenues from tax farms.33 By contrast, the only typically European tax, the so-called "oorgeld" or "ear-money" (a tax on the keeping of riding horses), annually yielded less than f80,00034—symbolic of the unequal burden of taxation. Thus, the Cultivation System was not the only means of exploiting Java, but it was certainly the most important. It also attracted the most attention. First, the results soon surpassed all expectations. Second, it was a result of the consignment system, which was inconceivable without the Cultivation System (although the reverse was not the case). The coffee, sugar, indigo and so forth delivered to the government were consigned to the Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappij—an arrangement which from 1836, when the last government auctions of products in Java were discontinued, involved almost the entire harvest that subsequently was sold at auction by this company in the Netherlands on government account. Because the Cultivation System caused a rapid and spectacular increase in the production of exports from Java, the consignment system became highly important for the Netherlands. Thus, the export of coffee from Java to the Netherlands rose from less than 300,000 piculs in 1830 to more than one million piculs in 1840. The export of sugar rose from less than 100,000 piculs to almost 900,000 piculs, whereas indigo exports increased from 18,000 pounds to over 2,100,000 pounds during the same period.3^ The auctioning of coffee, sugar, and indigo by the NHM made 28 Rice prices are discussed further in chapter 4. 29 The right of collection was granted to the highest bidder. Thus the government was saved the expense of tax officials and assessment. 30 Bijl. Hand. 1861-62, LI, Bijlage C. 31 Ibid., Bijlage C. The "buffalo-farm" was a tax on the slaughtering of buffaloes. 32 TNI 1 (1850): 85,239,305,440; 2 (1850): 111, 216. 33 Rochussen to Baud, 25 April 1847, no. 60, Kol. 4566. 34 Koloniaal Verslag 1849, Bijl Hand. 1851-52, p. 181. 3 ^ See G. F. de Bruyn Kops, Statistiek van den Handel en de Scheepvaart op Java en Madura sedert 1825 (Batavia: Landsdrukkerij, 1857-58) 2 (exports): 120,132,186.

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Amsterdam, and to a lesser degree Rotterdam, staple markets of colonial produce.3** Amsterdam regained the important position that it had occupied during the VOC years as the arrival port and sales center of colonial staple products. Because the NHM chartered only Dutch vessels to transport consigned products to the Netherlands, Dutch shipping in Javanese waters, in a pitiful state before 1830, achieved new prosperity?' The net return of the NHM auctions (that is, after deduction of the artificially high freight rates, insurance premiums, storage, supervision, and sales costs, and also the considerable commissions that the NHM, as a reliable but expensive agent, charged to the government) was partly used to supplement the financial deficits in the Indies that resulted from expenditures incurred in the purchase of government products. Furthermore, amounts were deducted from the receipts from the sale of products to cover expenditures incurred in the Netherlands on behalf of the Indies government. Thus, for instance, large amounts were involved in the dispatch of duitenplaatjes (copper small change) to Java—more than 10 million guilders altogether during the period 1836-43.38 From the remaining moneys was subsequently deducted the interest on the socalled East Indies debt. This debt had been created by a number of laws in the years 1836-38 to compensate for the real and supposed expenditures incurred by the motherland on behalf of the overseas territories during earlier periods3^ (a great deal of effort had gone into ascertaining how much the liquidation of the VOC in 1795 and subsequent years had cost the government). In 1844, that debt had been consolidated at a total of 236 million guilders, incurring an interest of f9,800,000 annually.40 In fact, this debt was, for the most part, fictitious, but useful as an expedient for putting Dutch bad consciences to sleep. As a member of parliament and Leiden professor, L. C. Luzac, once asserted, it was based on "Blankenberg accounting," a reference to a bookseller in Leiden who had acquired a certain renown by the confused and disordered manner in which he presented his accounts.41 The Indies funds were further reduced by subsidies for the Dutch West Indies and a few small possessions on the coast of Africa that always needed money. Those funds were even used for expenditures that had no connection at all to the colonies. From them came expenditures that were not mentioned in the budget because it was deemed preferable to keep the States-General in the dark about them. Thus, between 1836 and 1840, van den Bosch siphoned 2 million guilders from colonial profits for the Benevolent Society (Maatschappij van Weldadigheid), of which he was the founder and patron. The 1840 revision of the Constitution, which provided the States-General 36

Chartering was divided according to a fixed ratio among the most important Dutch trading cities; in 1847 Amsterdam had a share of 21/42, Rotterdam 15/42, Dordrecht, Schiedam, and Middelburg each had a 2/42 share. See W.M.F. Mansvelt, Geschiedenis van de Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappij(Haarlem: Enscheder, 1924), 2:224. 37 In 1841,321 ships were registered for charter by the NHM. See V 19 August 1841, La Z, Kol. 4439. 38 For a specification of these expenditures see Bijl Hand. 1865-66, CXXXVI, Bijlage B. 39 Laws of 24 April 1836, Stb. no. 11 and 12; 11 March 1837, Stb. no. 10; 27 March 1838, Stb. no. 9; 22 December 1838, Stb. no. 50. See De Waal, Aanteekeningen, 7:123 ff. 40 Law of 25 June 1844, Stb. no. 28. 41 De Waal, Nederlandsch Indie, 2: 154 (13 April 1836). See N.P. van den Berg, Debet of Credit? 3rd ed. (Batavia: Kolff, 1885), p. 22, n. 2.

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with at least some control over the management of colonial finances, ended such practices. After all this financial sleight-of-hand, what was finally accounted for in the Finance Act (Middelenwet) as "probable budget surplus from the colonial administration" was often only a fraction of the real Indies surplus.4^ During the years 1830-50, when things were most disordered, the total of the Indies surplus, as far as could be ascertained in 1866, was around 235 million guilders, of which only just over onesixth was accounted for as colonial surplus (batig slot) in the finance acts of those years.4** Altogether the Indies surpluses in the period 1832-50 amounted to around 19 percent of total Dutch public revenues or almost one-quarter of the amount that in those years flowed into the treasury through the levying of direct and indirect taxes, import and export duties, excise duties, pilotage dues, and so on.44 It was an impressive amount, the more so if it is compared with the minimal amounts spent on education, health care, and such in the Indies. The question of the legitimacy of the Indies surpluses, however, was still hardly raised in those days. That incarnation of political liberalism Thorbecke—he headed three liberal cabinets after the constitutional reforms of 1848—in his 1841 Aanteekening op de Grondwet (Comment on the Constitution) would think it so self-evident that "the treasury of this country is entitled to the colonial surpluses" that he considered it superfluous to devote a single word in defense of that right.4^ The liberal opposition, as it was expressed, for instance, in the columns of the Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant (founded in 1844), did indeed press for greater legislative powers for the States-General and better supervision on the use of colonial funds, but there was no suggestion of asking whether perhaps too much was being demanded from the Indies. When in 1845 the former Minister of Finance J. J. Rochussen was appointed governor-general (Merkus had died in 1844), the list of claims that the NRC presented to him was limited to combatting the "clique mentality" that prevailed in the colony, the reform of the Indies coinage system, the curtailing of British intrusion in Borneo and Sumatra, and a revision of the tariff system. These were the very matters that were closest to the hearts of business houses in Rotterdam.4^ Baud had no problems in the Second Chamber on the very few occasions when the Cultivation System was brought up for discussion: the Javanese is "amply" paid, he made parliament believe. "Java is experiencing increasing prosperity and is developing with youthful vigor. The native people enjoy peace and prosperity."47 4

^ The colonial surplus, which was entered in the Finance Act for a certain financial year, was not taken from moneys already available in the Netherlands on the remittance account but from future assets. 43 See Bijl. Hand. 1865-66, CXXXVI, Bijlagen A and B. This summary is more complete than the summary that De Waal provided in his Aanteekeningen, 7:143 ff. Not included in the amount of 235 million are the moneys that were remitted to the Indies. 44 The Dutch public revenues in the period 1831-63 are specified in Bijl. Hand. 1864-65, II, no. 147. From this specification it appears that direct and indirect taxes and other levies in the Netherlands during 1832-50 raised a total of almost 1 billion guilders (f987,871,141). 45 J. R. Thorbecke, Aanteekening op de Grondwet, 2nd ed. (Amsterdam: Mueller, 1841), 1: 348. 46 NRC 27 January 1845. 47 De Waal, Nederlandsch Indie, 3: 355 (24 May 1843). Baud asserted on that occasion (without being contradicted) that a crop payment of fl5 per picul of coffee was paid, and, consequently, for a harvest of 1 million piculs of coffee 15 million guilders was paid. In fact, when this level of production was achieved in 1843, no more than 10 million guilders (copper) was paid.

"The Cork on which the Netherlands Floats'"

63

Who could contradict him? In 1847, a Second Chamber committee discussing the Cultivation System could do no better than refer to the zakelijke extracten in the Indies Government Gazette of 1834. "Whether this system has remained unchanged and whether it has been expanded is not known to us."48 The years, however, during which (to quote Multatuli, that sharp critic of the Dutch colonial exploitation policy) "the peace had remained peaceful," were already nearing their end. 48

Ibid., p. 715.

4 CRITICISM IN PRIVATE

ccording to the summary in chapter 2 of the extent of the Cultivation System in the period 1840-50, approximately 57 percent of the population of Java (excluding Batavia, Buitenzorg, and the principalities) was incorporated in the Cultivation System in 1840, compared to about 52 percent in 1845. This decrease must be attributed mainly to the smaller number of households involved in coffee cultivation in the latter year (around 435,000 households in 1845 compared with 465,000 in 1840). This decline meant little, because originally many coffee growers who seldom took part regularly in the work in the plantations appear to have been included in the official listings (though they did plant some coffee near their houses).1 A better indication of the extent of coffee cultivation was the number of mature trees that had to be looked after, although that figure was no more than a very rough estimate.^ According to the Cultivation Reports, the number of productive coffee trees in plantations increased by 46 percent between 1840 and 1845. The burden of coffee cultivation in 1845 was certainly no less heavy in 1845 than in 1840. Moreover, the crop payment, as mentioned earlier, had been reduced from f!2 to flO (copper) per picul in 1844. Merkus took this decision without even waiting for the formally required approval from the government in Holland for this measure, as the Council of the Indies had advised him to do. If he had done that, the old price would still have been paid for the 1844 harvest. Merkus thus prided himself on the fact that for that one year alone he had saved about 1.5 million guilders.3 If coffee cultivation is not considered, then in 1845, just as in 1840, approximately 25 percent of the people were involved in the Cultivation System (mainly in the cultivation of sugar cane and indigo) and about 6 percent of the cultivated land. This latter figure did not take into account that in sugar cultivation the land had to be made available halfway through one year for the cane harvest of the following year. Yet the situation for the peasantry, insofar as it was involved in the Cultivation System, seems to have been considerably worse in 1845 than it had been in 1840. There were three main reasons: declining results in indigo cultivation, the extension of tobacco cultivation, and increases in land rent and other taxes.

A

1

In the Cultivation Reports after 1840, only the households that were assigned for labor in the plantations or "gardens" and for the planting of so-called forest coffee were included. This probably also explains why in the Cultivation Report for 1840 almost the entire population of Banten was involved in coffee cultivation and in the 1845 report no more than half of it. 2 Thus the Cultivation Report for 1842 complained that many more trees were mentioned in the lists than really existed. According to "Kultuurverslag" 1846 and 1847, 11 million coffee trees less had been found in one regency in West Java than the number stated in the registers. 3 Merkus to Baud, 18 June 1844, no. 38, Kol. 4563.

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Production in indigo cultivation, in total as well as per bouw, declined sharply. Although the average production per bouw in the years 1839-41 was still 46 pounds of indigo, it dropped to just over 35 pounds in 1843^5 and to less than 31 pounds during 1848-50.^ Besides the decline, extensive plantings failed time and again, for which peasants received no compensation at all. In 1842 3,000 bouw or onefourteenth of the total area failed; in 1843 almost 1,700 bouw, and in 1844 about 1,350 bouw failed .5 It is not entirely clear what caused this drop in productivity. Most probably the principal cause was exhaustion of the soil. However, Rochussen suspected in 1847 that the cause could well lie in a degeneration of the indigo bush as a result of the constant reproduction of that plant by cuttings, "Even the leaves are smaller and less succulent."^ Finally, the disappointing harvests were also blamed on the weather that was said to have been either too dry or too wet (but bad weather conditions were always a ready excuse for officials who had to justify themselves whenever the cultivations did not come up to expectations). Coupled with the decline in indigo production was a decrease in crop payments. Although in 1840 crop payments still averaged f!2.50 per household and f61 per bouw, in 1845 they came to f9 and f40.50, respectively, and in 1850 less than f7 and f28.7 As those payments went down (from which were also deducted expenses for maintenance of the indigo factories), labor demands became heavier.8 In order not to have crop payments fall any further, the government after 1840 gradually reduced the number of households involved in this cultivation, although the total area planted remained almost the same until 1847.9 Moreover the indigo fields, as the original fields became exhausted, were situated further and further away from the villages where growers lived.^ The area planted with tobacco tripled between 1840 and 1845, from 1,200 to almost 3,700 bouw. The cultivation was expanded particularly in the residencies of Rembang, Semarang, and Cirebon. The number of tobacco enterprises on contracts with the government increased from eight to thirty-seven (in Rembang alone there were already eighteen contracts in 1845). * Only in sugar cultivation did somewhat better times seem to have arrived after 1840. True enough, the planting area of this cultivation was expanded as well after that year, but coupled with that went a rise in average sugar production per bouw through the use of more modern machinery and improved methods of production in sugar factories. The primitive "buffalo-mills" disappeared quickly.^ Although 4

See appendix 1. "Kultuurverslagen." 6 Rochussen to Baud, 25 April 1847, no. 60, Kol. 4566. 7 See appendix 1 (recepis guilders). ** In 1846, fl 10,000 or around 6 percent of the crop payments was deducted for maintenance costs of the indigo factories, which the administration charged to the people; see Exh. 5 August 1848, no. 6, Kol. 1873. ^ Between 1840 and 1845, the number of households engaged in indigo cultivation fell by about 10 percent, whereas the planting area was reduced by less than 2.5 percent. 10 See Van Niel, "Measurement of Change," p. 100. ^ "Kultuurverslagen." 12 As a result of this, the number of sugar enterprises decreased by 10 percent between 1841 and 1845, although the area under cultivation expanded. 5

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peasants did not always benefit fully from this production increase, it did influence crop payments favorably. These amounted to f!3.50 per household and f62 per bouw in 1840, in 1845, f!7 and f72, and in 1850, f22 and f81.13 Despite that increase, crop payments remained disproportionately low compared to the effort demanded of peasants, so that the significance of the relatively improved situation in which cane growers found themselves should not be overestimated. Besides, in 1848 a smaller part of the population was involved in sugar cultivation than in the cultivation of indigo. Thus, in 1846 almost 15,000 more households were involved in indigo cultivation than in sugar cultivation.^ All things considered, one may justifiably conclude that the development of the Cultivation System from 1840 until around 1847 led to a further increase in the burdens of the growers employed in the various cultivations; this obtained in particular for growers involved in coffee, indigo, and tobacco cultivation. In the same period (1840-47), land rent and other taxes like the market and buffalo revenue farms were increased to help the government obtain more revenue.^ If one draws up an index of taxes with the 1840 figure as 100, then land rent had risen to 125 in 1845, market tax to 143, buffalo tax to 125, while the population had increased (1840 = 100) to 111.16 For the first time since 1835, crop payments paid in indigo cultivation in 1845 fell below the level of the land rent that had to be paid by the villages assigned to this cultivation. This situation was repeated in the years 1847-48 and 1850-51 .*7 A significant decline in prosperity must have occurred, especially in those residencies where in 1840 a relatively large part of the population was involved in indigo cultivation, such as Bagelen (54 percent), Cirebon (38 percent), Pekalongan (34 percent) and Banyumas (31 percent), as well as in residencies like Semarang and Rembang where the cultivation of tobacco had been greatly expanded. The following data from the Cultivation Reports concerning average production, crop payments, and land rent levies in indigo cultivation in the residencies of Bagelen and Cirebon during 1840-50 show this trend clearly. How accurately was the administration informed about the material conditions of the Javanese people? According to their instructions, the regents were bound to inform the Resident about everything that happened in their regencies; moreover, there were weekly "report days."1** The Residents personally had to travel through their residencies from time to time to acquaint themselves with people and affairs and to give the people an opportunity to present their interests.^ Such provisions were mainly intended to make the government immediately aware of threatening disturbances of the peace that could jeopardize Dutch authority, which was still somewhat tenuously imposed. If everything remained outwardly peaceful, however, 13

See appendix 1 (recepis guilders). Ibid. 15 Bijl Hand. 1851-52, p. 173; 1861-62, LI, Bijlage C, no. 5. 16 According to "Kultuurverslag" 1840, the population of lava (with the exception of Batavia, Buitenzorg, and the principalities) was 6,704,707 people. According to the report for 1845, the number was 7,460,129. 17 See appendix 1. 18 Ind. Stb. 1820, no. 22 (ART. 20 and 22). These weekly report days seem to have been discontinued around 1840. See Praetorius, "Bijdrage tot de Kennis," p. 22. 19 Ind. Stb. 1819, no. 16 (ART. 40). 14

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Table 4.1. Developments in indigo cultivation in Bagelen (Central Java) Production per bouw1a 1840° 1841 1842 1843 1844 1845 1846 1847 1848 1849 1850

52 43 38 38 34 31 46 36 36 28 22

Crop payments per household (guilders) 12.73 9.02 8.56 9.37 8.55 8.06 12.72 9.109 10.29 7.27 5.118

Land rent per household (guilders)b 5.110 6.38 9.04 9.114 1.57d 12.42 7.45 9.77 12.5 6.32 10.46

Source: "Kultuurverslagen." In Amsterdam pounds. b The land rent that had to be paid by the villages growing indigo, both for the fields set aside for indigo as well as the fields used for rice growing, has been divided by the number of households involved in indigo cultivation each year. c The data expressed in copper guilders before 1846 have been converted into recepis guilders of 120 doits, which were used from 1846 on. ^ This figure is presumably a mistake in the Cultivation Report. The total assessment of land rent in Bagelen in 1844 did not differ much from the one in 1845. a

Table 4.2. Developments in indigo cultivation in Cirebon (West Java) Production per bouw a 1840° 1841 1842 1843 1844 1845 1846 1847 1848 1849 1850

52 46 34 36 36 35 34 31 33 32 25

Crop payments per household (guilders) 15.63 14.5 11.53 12.51 12.86 12.94 14.07 11.01 12.115 11.08 8.90

Land rent per household (guilders)^ 8.29 8.34 9.65 10.86 12.100 14.00 12.24 12.77 16.71 12.73 5.92

Source: "Kultuurverslagen." In Amsterdam pounds. k The land rent that had to be paid by the villages growing indigo, both for the fields set aside for indigo as well as the fields used for rice growing, has been divided by the number of households involved in indigo cultivation each year. c The data expressed in copper guilders before 1846 have been converted into recepis guilders of 120 doits, which were used from 1846 on. a

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if there was no internal emigration of people that drew attention, then the "declining prosperity" of a certain area or district could remain hidden for a long time from the government. Residents and other local European officials, if they were better informed, were very careful not to highlight in their reports the shady sides of the Cultivation System, unless specifically requested, nor to paint the situation in their areas in too dark colors. The government might get the impression that the messenger of those bad tidings was not equal to his task! If an official report, by contrast, painted a rosy picture of the prosperity and general attitude of the people, then it became a letter of recommendation for the author, and the earlier he could hope to be promoted, perhaps to a residency with higher cultivation percentages. Thus everybody read what he wanted to read: "The government of the Netherlands Indies is eager to write to its master in the mother country that everything is running smoothly. The Residents like to report this to the government. The assistant-residents who receive themselves almost nothing but favorable reports from their kontroleurs send in their turn no unwelcome news to the Residents. Out of all this an artificial optimism is born in the official and written treatment of matters."20 There was no other truth but official truth: Europeans not in government service and who could have provided some counterweight in the reporting of news were thin on the ground in the interior of Java. The few "private persons" were mostly directly interested in the Cultivation System as employees in sugar factories, as tea contractors, and so on. The interior of Java was closed to religious missions because the government wanted to respect the religious feelings of the Muslim population. People were not allowed to travel freely in Java. A person in possession of a certificate of temporary residence was not allowed to travel outside the Residency of Batavia without the express permission of the governor-general. "Permanent residents" had to have a special passport and were only allowed to travel along the main roads.21 The government argued that it could not otherwise guarantee their safety. Finally, many official reports were submitted very late. The Cultivation Report for 1844 did not arrive in the Netherlands until 1847; that for 1845 arrived at the beginning of 1848; the report for 1846 and 1847 reached Holland in mid-1850. In 1848, the department had no later population census figures than those for 1838.22 Few disturbances of the peace during those years shook the government, except for traditionally turbulent Banten. In 1847, Baud was surprised about the "passivity" of the people, who were weighed down by a system in which their rights and institutions were trampled under foot "thousands of times."2^ Active resistance against the Cultivation System is mentioned in official reports on only very few occasions after 1840 (no doubt, cases of passive opposition would have been more frequent, but as such these were less easy to distinguish unless opposition took the form of massive flights of people away from their villages).24 In 1842, peasants from four villages in the Residency of Pekalongan objected to the redistribution of their fields for the sake 20

Multatuli, Max Havelaar of de Koffij-Veilingen der Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappij (Amsterdam: Van Oorschot, 1963), p. 154. 21 Ind. Stb. 1834, no. 3. 22 See V 7 July 1848, no. 8, Kol. 1866. The gap had to be filled in with the detailed population statistics for 1845 that were published in the Tijdschrift voor Nederlandsch Indiel 23 Baud to Rochussen, 22 June 1847, Collectie Baud, 572. 24 For disturbances of the peace before 1840, see Van Deventer, Bijdragen, 2: 310, 468,582 ff.

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of sugar cultivation and refused to be satisfied with the crop payments offered them. Dissatisfaction was vented in a riot of some hundreds of people in front of the Resident's house. Four persons who had acted as spokesmen to express the growers' grievances (among them a village chief) were arrested as "agitators" and exiled from the residency for one year.2^ In that same year there was a demonstration in Kedu against indigo cultivation. In this case, the government refrained from repressive measures after the growers went back to work.2** There was, finally, a spectacular demonstration of dissatisfied indigo growers in 1847, again in Pekalongan. It was spectacular because Governor-General Rochussen—at that time on an inspection trip—became personally involved. Between seven hundred and eight hundred men armed with grass knives, which gave the demonstration a threatening appearance, had encamped in front of the Resident's house for two successive days and—an unheard of occurrence!—had demanded to talk to the governor-general over the heads of the regent and Resident. Rochussen did not appear.27 After the event, he expressed the opinion that the people had been stirred up by a sacked regent, thus dismissing the incident rather too easily.2** It was not the disturbance of the Pax Neerlandica but the high price of rice, the principal article of consumption, which finally indicated to the government that the burdens under which the population labored had reached a dangerous level. Initially, the rise in rice prices, which began after 1838, had not been regarded as an unfavorable sign. Merkus, at least, had been of the opinion in 1839, according to a report he wrote as a member of the Council of the Indies, that land rent was capable of a further increase, because the higher prices for rice and the expansion of cultivations had "spread greater wealth among the Javanese."29 The director of cultivations had been instructed accordingly.30 One of the residencies where land rent was significantly increased as a result of such instructions was Cirebon. Under the administration of the energetic and ambitious Resident, J.W.H. Smissaert, the levy was almost doubled between 1836 and 1843 from f488,286 to f859,654.31 The high price of rice, it was alleged, was evidence of increased consumption by the people. Whereas in the past people had eaten cheaper substitutes, they could now, as a result of crop payments in the government cultivations, keep their rice harvest for themselves instead of selling it to pay land rent.32 The Dutch administration, however, became less certain of its ground after 1840 when, according to quotations in the Javasche Courant, rice prices remained exorbitantly high. 25

See Government decree of 2 February 1843, no. 11, Kol. 2642. An investigation into this incident showed the likelihood that part of the crop payments had been embezzled by native chiefs. 26 See "Algemeen Overzicht 1839-1848," p. 73. 27 Rochussen to Baud, 25 August 1847, no. 64, Kol. 4566. 2 ^ According to Rochussen, the Regent had been dismissed because through his marriage to a Chinese woman he had lost prestige with the people and was no longer useful to the government. It is not clear, however, why this dismissal had led to a popular movement. 29 Quoted by Van Deventer, Bijdragen, 3:67. 30 Ibid., p. 68. 3 * J.W.H. Smissaert, Een Woord over de Nota van den Heer Sloet tot Oldkuis (Leiden: La Lau, 1850), p. 6. The amounts given are in recepis guilders. 32 See Baud to the king, V 18 February 1847, no. 9, Kol. 1765.

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Table 4.3: Average prices of rice of medium quality (per koyang) at Batavia, Semarang, and Surabaya (guilders)

Year

Batavia

1831 1832 1833 1834 1835 1836 1837 1838 1839 1840 1841 1842 1843 1844 1845 1846

114 141 125 145 140 123 100 110 144 131 129 143 132 142 162 155

Semarang 69 73 114 125 119 111 105 94 121 122 120 130 101 141 208 148

Surabaya 85 107 134 149 127 139 122 105 132 122 107 119 105 129 186 134

Source: Baud to the King, V18 February 1847, no. 9, Kol. 1765.

There is no doubt that high rice prices were partly connected with depreciation of the copper coins in circulation in Java. The abundance of money circulating and the declining value of copper coins had an inflationary effect. Moreover, this inflationary tendency appears to have already existed before the introduction of the Cultivation System.33 However, this tendency could not sufficiently explain the exceptionally high rice prices after 1838. Under these circumstances, it goes without saying that in some official reports a relationship was mooted between the scarcity of rice and a certain overextension of the Cultivation System.34 The use of so much fertile sawah for the cultivation of sugar and indigo would have adversely affected rice cultivation. Already in 1835, the Resident of Surabaya had warned that sugar cultivation in that region could not be further expanded without damaging rice cultivation.35 If one is to believe a report of Baud in 1847, the high rice prices had forced the government to abandon a further expansion of indigo cultivation. In 1841, the planting of indigo had even been curtailed by 18 percent in Bagelen, which was affected by a rice shortage.3^ Already high rice prices went higher still between 1844 and 1847, a period of repeated crop failures. The situation was particularly critical in Cirebon, the rice barn of West Java. Average yield per bouw in that residency fell from 22-23 piculs of padi in the years 1841-43 to 16-17 piculs during the period 1844-47.37 The amount of the 33

Data about the movement of rice prices before 1830 are in a nota from the director of cultivations of 6 January 1846; see Rochussen to Baud, 31 January 1846, no. 46, Kol. 4565. Cf. Collectie Baud, 251. 34 V 18 February 1847, no. 9, Kol. 1765. Baud to Merkus, 21 January 1842, no. 12, Kol. 4576. 35 "Kultuurverslag" 1835. In Surabaya there were then 4,444 bouw of sawah set aside for the cultivation of sugar compared to 6,751 bouw in 1845. 36 See "Kultuurverslag" 1841; V 18 February 1847, no. 9, Kol. 1765; Bijl. Hand. 1865-66, p. 512. 37 See Koloniaal Verslag 1866, Bijlage no. 12, Bijl. Hand. 1868-69, XXXVIII. This contains a summary, taken from the Cultivation Reports, of average rice production and land rent assess-

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total land rent assessment—a good measure to judge whether the rice harvest in a certain year had been successful or not—went down in Cirebon from f859,654 in 1843 to f776,325 in 1844; the lowest point was reached in 1847 with an assessment of only f397,407. The rice harvest also failed in 1844 in some districts of the Residency of Surabaya: in that year the assessment in that residency came to f984,505 as against fl,213,373 in 1843. In Rembang, the assessment in 1844 was almost one-third lower, in Tegal, one-seventh.3** It is true that in the following years land rent assessments were restored to the 1843 level (with the exception of Cirebon), but during the years 184951, serious crop failures occurred again, which this time hit Central Java in particular. Furthermore, a mysterious disease broke out in 1846 in Central Java, probably a form of typhoid that, appearing now in one place and now in another up to the end of 1849, claimed tens of thousands of victims.^ The disease was particularly severe in the mountain districts; according to the Cultivation Reports for 1846 and 1847, "epidemic fevers" had hampered the coffee harvest. What impression did these tidings make on Baud, who, like nobody else after 1840, had given direction to the colonial administration? Around 1830, Baud had looked upon the introduction of the Cultivation System with a certain reserve, even if—the examplar of the loyal official—he had served van den Bosch as faithfully as he had served other governments. After some adventurous escapades as an officer with the Dutch and French marines, he had landed in Java in 1811 and had preferred at that time to serve the British rather than be interned in England. He was still young, just 27 years old, when, on the restoration of Dutch authority in Java, he was appointed secretary of the government, in which function he quickly won the confidence of the liberal Governor-General G. A. G. Ph. baron van der Capellen. Returning to the Netherlands, Baud had been from 1824 director for the affairs of the East Indies possessions in the Department of Colonies under the liberal minister C. T. Elout.40 In those years, Baud, as he would later say, had belonged "with conviction" to those who applauded an administration based on liberal principles. But after the appointment of van den Bosch as governor-general and the resignation of Elout, he had allowed himself to be "convinced" that a system of free labor and free cultivation, as advocated by Elout, could not develop Java in the short term and, therefore, had to be abandoned.41 The secession of Belgium, which had caused the Dutch national debt to rise to unprecedented heights—not until 1846 was a budget brought in without a deficit, something that had not happened for half a century4^—and the impressive results of ments during 1836-66, subdivided into the various residencies of Java where land rent was levied. The amounts have been converted to recepis guilders. 38 Ibid. On the harvest failure in Cirebon in 1844, see Van Deventer, Bijdragen, 3:172. Not until 1860 did the assessment in Cirebon reach the 1843 level! 39 See Koloniaal Verslag 1849, Bijl Hand. 1851-52, pp. 147-49; TNI 2 (1850): 18, 90. See also Rochussen to Baud, 25 August 1847, no. 64, Kol. 4566. See Peter Boomgaard, "Morbidity and Mortality in Java, 1820-1880: Changing Patterns of Disease and Death," in Death and Disease in Southeast Asia: Explorations in Social, Medical and Demographic History, ed. Norman G. Owen (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 48-69. 40 Particulars about the official career of Baud are from Mijer, Baud, passim. As secretary of the government, Baud had played an important part in the way the Indies administration had been organized around 1820. 41 Baud, Hand. 6 December 1851, pp. 447, 449. 42 Mijer, Baud, p. 541.

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the Cultivation System had finally caused the last remnants of Baud's opposition to van den Bosch's plans to vanish. In 1833—in the Indies for the second time and now as interim governor-general—he informed his former chief van der Capellen that he had come to recognize that his principles, which in the past had also been his own, were "erroneous."43 For that matter, this would not be the last time that Baud, as far as the Cultivation System was concerned, changed his tack. This change would again become apparent once he had resigned as minister of colonies in 1848. In the meantime, in some respects Baud was certainly firm. The harsh judgment that Furnivall passed on his character and opportunism seems undeserved, even if it was understandable.44 The "noble" Baud was extolled so unanimously during his life and after his death by his contemporaries that such exuberant praise inevitably stimulated a contrary opinion, especially when one surveys his previous career in which (perhaps this betrayed the former sailor in him) he so consistently sailed with the prevailing wind. To the end of his days, Baud was firm of principle about his conviction that Dutch authority in Java was secure only when it succeeded in keeping the native chiefs permanently on its side. In 1840, Baud had still been of the opinion that the increase of production in sugar and coffee cultivations proved "that the native population is becoming more and more familiar with those cultivations and that its enthusiasm for them is increas ing."4^ Merkus was quite willing to agree "that the Javanese are enjoying a previously unknown prosperity."4" When contrary views were asserted, they were, according to Baud, rumors inspired by people who in the past had enriched themselves at the expense of the Javanese as coffee merchants working in complicity with the native chiefs, but who, with the introduction of the Cultivation System under which all coffee had to be delivered to the government, were put out of business. "The interests of the fatherland" could not possibly be sacrificed because of their complaints and those of some foreign merchants established in Java!47 And yet Baud had his doubts when high rice prices, among other things, came up for discussion. In 1842, he deemed it "indisputable" that the cultivation percentages "have given rise to a very powerful influence which does not always operate in the interests of the lower class of the population."48 When Residents and other officials had personal interests in sugar, tea, or tobacco enterprises in their areas—and Baud was convinced that that was indeed sometimes the case—there were still fewer guarantees that the government would be warned in time "if the cultivations were overstrained at any point."49 These considerations found expression in 1844 in the proposal to abolish cultivation percentages for Residents.^ In 1843, Baud warned against a further expansion of government cultivations "if there is not absolute confidence that the native population will not be restricted too much in the free disposal of its land, time, and labor." In particular, it appeared that 43

Ibid., p. 3%. J. S. Furnivall, Netherlands India. A Study of Plural Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1944), pp. 152-54. 45 V 2 April 1840, M5, no. 13, Kol. 4432. 46 Baud to Merkus, 10 January 1842, no. 11, Kol. 4576 47 Ibid. 48 Ibid. 49 Ibid. 50 See chapter 2. 44

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sugar cultivation had reached "its utmost limit."^1 Because such great personal interests were involved in this cultivation, both of officials and manufacturers, there was a real danger that this cultivation would be expanded further than the capacity and interests of the population would permit.^ Baud's warning against a rash expansion of sugar cultivation was doubtless also inspired by his dislike of "contract mania/' that is, the chase after those coveted sugar contracts in which the end seemed to justify any means. In his semiofficial and private letters to Governor-General Rochussen after 1845, this excrescence on the Cultivation System, with which Baud was personally confronted in a very disagreeable way, was raised over and over again. In 1842, two of Baud's sons, Willem and Henri, had gone to Java to pursue a career in the civil administration, as their father had done. Both, however, quickly concluded that owning a cultivation contract would make them rich much more quickly than would the life of an official. Willem was soon able to obtain a tea contract—for the Djatinangor plantation in Priangan53—and Henri also maintained, so Rochussen reported, that "he was entitled to a profitable contract because he was the son of a highly respected official."^4 Baud was very annoyed with all this. It caused him to write to Rochussen that "the system of contracts and percentages . . . has extinguished the sense of honor of officials and has enthroned Mammon. What better proof of this can there be than the behavior of my own sons."^ The door to new contracts, according to Baud, had to be closed "irrevocably," as much because of the "messy practices" to which they gave occasion as to end the constant imposition of new burdens on the people. 'The contractors, protected by the influential arm of the government, are the real vampires. The Chinese, protected by nobody, but hated by the Europeans, have the reputation—but we are the culprits."^ Meanwhile, Baud himself was not entirely free of blame in the "contract swindling" that he condemned. In 1842, deciding on a request from his brother-in-law and son-in-law J. J. van Braam, he had "most emphatically" recommended to the Indies government van Braam's request for cooperation in the establishment of a rice mill in the Residency of Cirebon.^7 Consequently, the government had given permission to van Braam and his partner, H. Burger, to establish rice mills, to the exclusion of all others, and to buy as much rice from the population as would be necessary for the enterprise.^ The Resident of Cirebon, Tj. Ament, had taken this patronage even further. On his own initiative he had personally and in the presence of the regent and lesser chiefs extracted a promise from the population of three districts close to the enter51

V 6 October 1843, no. 405, Kol. 4294. Cf. V 15 October 1844, no. 2, Kol. 1596; Van Deventer, Bijdragen, 3:139. 52 V 13 December 1845, no. 438, Kol. 4321. 53 This tea contract was approved by Government decree of 26 August 1844, no. 2. It included an interest-free advance from the treasury of f42,409. See V 10 July 1848, no. 17, Kol. 1867. 54 Rochussen to Baud, 1 December 1845, Collectie Baud, 588. 55 Baud to Rochussen, 22 January 1846, Collectie Baud, 572. 56 Baud to Rochussen, 22 June 1846, Collectie Baud, 572. 57 V 11 October 1842, no. 4, Kol. 1467. Van Braam was a brother-in-law from Baud's second marriage, and was married to a daughter of Baud from his first marriage. 58 Government decree of 17 October 1843, no. 6. See "Algemeen Overzicht 1839-1848," pp. 3438; Van Deventer, Bijdragen, 3:173.

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prise that they would hand over one-fifth of the harvest in 1843 to the mill owners, who in return had undertaken to pay the land rent owed by the people. For the sake of convenience the land rent assessment in those three districts in 1843 was set at the amount of the 1842 assessment. This system of "voluntary agreements" was strongly reminiscent of the cloak under which the Cultivation System had been introduced in 1830 for products such as indigo and sugar.^ After the event, the government advised Ament of its "displeasure" at this transaction. It was, after all, forbidden for anyone to pay the land rent for the population in return for a portion of the rice harvest.^ Moreover the Resident had no authority to fix the land rent assessment at the figure for the previous year.^ Things, however, were left as they stood. At the start of 1844, Burger had around 100,000 piculs of padi (equivalent to about 50,000 piculs of rice) at his disposal, for which he had paid f83,261 in land rent. This meant a purchase price of fl.50 per picul, while the market price at Batavia was more than three times higher. And the mill had still to be built.62 In 1844, a large part of Cirebon, but particularly the area of the projected enterprise, was struck by a severe famine. Around 1870, van Soest, who was no sympathizer of Baud, deemed it a foregone conclusion that the "rice contract" had been responsible for this to significant degree.^ This connection, although plausible at first sight, is disputable. Probably it made little difference to the people whether they sold their padi to a European entrepreneur on condition that he would pay the land rent or whether Chinese merchants got hold of it by means of a system of money advances on the harvest at perhaps even lower prices. The famine in Cirebon—and the one in Central Java around 1850—would probably not have assumed such serious proportions if the population had not been already totally impoverished by the excessive increase in land rent, the market tax, and other taxes. On top of all that, they had been exposed to outrageous maladministration and extortion from their own chiefs, against which the European administration had not taken sufficient action. Moreover, several government cultivations had been a heavy burden. Van Hoe veil, who visited Cirebon in 1847 and had found, according to his travel journal published a year later in Amsterdam, "poverty, misery and famine," was of the opinion that excessive expansion of indigo cultivation was responsible for the situation.64 The cultivation of tobacco, too, although introduced in Cirebon only in 1845, had disastrous consequences. It involved only two contracts, but they had been granted in the poorest districts.65 To escape the "monstrous" cutting of timber for tobacco sheds, the population had moved away en masse, while rice fields were left unculti59

V 13 January 1844, no. 28, Kol. 1548; Exh. 9 October 1844, no. 34, Kol. 1594. ^ See publication of 6 November 1834, Ind. Stb. no. 52. This publication had been issued by Baud. 61 Government decree of 28 January 1844, no. 1. See Exh. 9 October 1844, no. 34, Kol. 1594. 62 Merkus to Baud, 19 May 1844, no. 102, Exh. 9 October 1844, no. 34, Kol. 1594. 63 Van Soest, Kultuurstelsel, 3: 211-17; Van Deventer, Bijdragen, 3:172 ff.; Furnivall, Netherlands India, p. 137. 64 Van Hoevell, Reis, 1: 62-71. 6 ^ A tobacco contract with B.J.A.W. Brilman, approved by decree of 19 June 1845, no. 3, for the cultivation of 200 bouw in East Indramayu; also with L.I. Barkeij, approved by decree of 15 October 1845, no. 8, for the cultivation of 200 bouw in the district of Sleeman or Jatibarang. See V 10 July 1848, no. 17, Kol. 1867. 6

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vated.66 In one district, only 15,000 out of 26,000 inhabitants remained.67 At the start of 1846, the situation had become so completely untenable that the government had unilaterally voided the contracts and denied both manufacturers the right to remain on their enterprises.^ Criminal proceedings would later be instituted against them because of improper practices towards the population. The Council of Justice at Batavia, however, acquitted them.69 But even taking all this into account, it was clear that the government—or rather Baud—had taken a thorny course by granting van Braam's request for cooperation. Soon there were more amateurs coming forward who wanted to establish rice mills with government assistance and to the exclusion of other people. Among those interested was even so highly placed a person as P. Mijer, a member of the High Court of the Netherlands Indies, who later became a minister and governor-general.7^ in Java alone eight such requests were submitted in 1844, and there were also some petitioners in the Netherlands. Among the latter was the firm of A. van Hoboken and Sons of Rotterdam and a former member of the Council of the Indies, H. G. Nahuys van Burgst.71 If all those requests had been agreed to—this was eventually the case with only one7^—then rice cultivation would also have been incorporated into the Cultivation System, with all the undesirable implications thereof. A new group of "contractors" would have arisen, able to enrich itself at the expense of the population with the support of the government. In that respect, Cirebon was an instructive example. In 1845, Burger (to whom van Braam had ceded his rights) complained that the administration was providing him little assistance in acquiring padi for his enterprise. When the Resident was notified of this by the Indies government, he reported that the people were disinclined to sell their padi to Burger and that perhaps the best thing to do was to force them to do so "at a fair price." The Indies government did not want to go that far but thought that the population should be advised "in a friendly way" about "its true interests," which could be done by having the entrepreneur accompanied by an official when he went out to conclude new contracts with the people for the supply of padi. In a later decree—of 22 March 1846—the government, reconsidering the matter, authorized the Resident to use the powerful influence of the administration to that end, without applying force.73 This authorization was not what an increasingly alarmed Baud, who realized the real purport of such instructions, had intended. "What would happen if we proceed to force the Javanese, who is already severely handicapped in how he employs his 66

Rochussen to Baud, 31 January 1846, no. 43, Kol. 4565. Ibid., 1 January 1846, no. 42, Kol. 4565. 68 Ibid., 28 February 1846, no. 44, Kol. 4565. 69 Ibid., 25 May 1847, no. 61, Kol. 4566. 7 ^ Mijer indeed received permission to establish a rice mill in the Residency of Surabaya but had to withdraw because of lack of capital. See Rochussen to Baud, 30 April 1846, no. 123, V 10 August 1846, no. 19, Kol. 1725. 71 V 25 April 1846, no. 27; V 29 April 1846, no. 17, Kol. 1702. 7 ^ By decree of 18 February 1845, no. 3, Jhr. K.C.A. van Hogendorp was given permission to establish rice mills in the district of Kabooh in the Residency of Surabaya. This enterprise was still operating in 1851. See "Staat kultuurinrichtingen" for that year; Exh. 16 February 1853, no. 9, Kol. 238. 73 Rochussen to Baud, 30 April 1846, no. 123; V 10 August 1846, no. 19, Kol. 1725. 67

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time, in what he may do, and how he uses his land, to sell his rice to private speculators?"74 Baud wanted to regard as "sacred" the right of the people to dispose as they wished of their rice.7^ His unequivocal condemnation brought to an end all covert use of force by the government for the sake of the rice-milling enterprise in Cirebon, which was abandoned a short time later.7** It was a lesson for Baud. He wrote to Rochussen "that the poor Javanese has to be protected with an iron fist by the central government because he has no hope of that protection from officials whenever the interests of Europeans are at stake."77 When Baud in later years wanted the government sugar cultivation (in which semi-independent entrepreneurs contracted to the government also played an important role) subjected to critical investigation, it is highly likely that his sceptical attitude was also influenced by memories of the Cirebon rice mill affair, in which he personally had so unfortunately been involved. Before Rochussen left for Java as governor-general, Baud had encouraged him, apparently with a certain degree of warmth, to involve himself in interests apart from those of the treasury. "I have recommended the Javanese to you, yes, affectionately recommended, at your farewell dinner. It would be a bitter disappointment if my welcome greeting, on your return, could not echo that toast."78 How did Rochussen fare in that respect? Rochussen began his career as a tax official in Amsterdam. As an expert in financial affairs with great diplomatic talents, around 1830 he had come to the attention of King William I and the Prince of Orange. Especially with the latter he soon came to be on rather familiar terms. Appointed as minister of finances by King William I in the last year of his reign, Rochussen did his utmost to bring order to the confused and disordered Dutch public finances, but he was not successful in his efforts to bring about a conversion law. After the defeat of that bill in 1843 by the Second Chamber, he resigned.7^ However, the positions of minister of state and envoy at the Belgian Court, followed in 1845 by his appointment as governor-general, were all signs that royal confidence in the abilities of this faithful servant of the Crown were undiminished. How much one good turn deserves another becomes clear from a report by Rochussen about the ways in which he, when in Brussels, had settled a number of lingering property and inheritance matters in which members of the Dutch royal household were involved, to their complete satisfaction.8^ As governor-general, Rochussen was certainly not a bad choice. Even if in the opinion of Baud he sometimes made a fool of himself, for instance by wanting to imitate King William II in everything he did, by going about in a general's uniform to 74

Baud to Rochussen, 23 April 1846, Collectie Baud, 572. See V 10 August 1846, no. 19, Kol. 1725. 7 ^ From a letter of Rochussen to Baud of 1 October 1846 it in fact appears that, as the latter had suspected, "some force" had been used in getting rice supplied to the enterprise, notwithstanding the fact that this was forbidden (Collectie Baud, 588). The rice mill was shortly afterwards liquidated by Burger, after the government had declared that it was prepared to take over the water works constructed by him for the capital sum of f 120,000; Rochussen to Baud, 30 November 1846, no. 55, Kol. 4566. 77 Baud to Rochussen, 23 April 1846, Collectie Baud, 572. 78 Baud to Rochussen, 21 November 1846, Collectie Baud, 572. 79 See van Soest, Kultuurstelsel, 3:39-67. ^ J. J. Rochussen, "Autobiografie," ed. R. Reinsma, Bijdragen en Mededelingen Historisch Genootschap 73 (1959): 94. 75

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which he was not entitled, by wanting to impress people on his tours of inspection, "whereby unfortunately he twice fell from his horse and arrived covered with mud,"**! he nevertheless possessed the qualities and prestige—King William II had farewelled him personally on the roadstead at Flushing82—that enabled him to reactivate an Indies administration that had sunk into a certain degree of apathy. As a minister, Rochussen had been regarded as fairly liberal, partly because he was known to put store by such novel concepts as ministerial responsibility and public accountability of finances. It could not be denied that he had original ideas. His proposal to build railways in Java and install a telegraph system caused the King to comment "so Rochussen seems to have caught planning-fever as a result of the heat—but he has always been something of a developer of projects."83 When Baud told Rochussen of this remark in a letter, it drew the response that Rochussen had expected such a reaction from "our good Gothic king/'84 In the meantime, little remained of this liberalism—at least while he was in the tropics. This shift was demonstrated by the warmth with which Rochussen, in his letters to Baud, sounded the praises of an "enlightened, strong and honorable autocracy" as the single saving principle of government for administering the huge archipelago entrusted to him.8^ Even Baud felt decidedly "uncomfortable" when Rochussen went so far with his autocratic principles that he expelled the apostolic vicar and head of the Roman Catholic church in the Indies, Bishop J. Grooff, in 1846 without further ado because in matters of religious organization the bishop refused to be the obedient servant of the governor-general.8^ Rochussen's attitude towards the press was also anything but liberal. Van Hoevell later reported extensively on the opposition he experienced from Rochussen in publishing the Tijdschrift voor Nederlandsch Indie.^ Not devoid of a certain shallowness and extremely vain (even if this vanity was compensated by a "kindliness" that Douwes Dekker also fell for), Rochussen believed in the wisdom and solidity of a form of government of which the power rested in the hands of a few trusted advisers of the Crown, one of whom was naturally, Minister of State Rochussen. Although the first task to require Rochussen's attention as governor-general was a reorganization of the Indies monetary system—the introduction of the so-called recepis guilder was an important improvement, although it remained a palliative88— in the second half of 1846, he could report to Baud that he was busy studying "the operation of the cultivations in all their many parts."89 He did not hesitate to confide to Baud the unfavorable impression that the Cultivation System had made on him. "I have been assured that there are areas where more than one-third of the sawahs have 81

See Baud's opinion of Rochussen, Zwart, Duymaer van Twist, pp. 241, 242. Rochussen, "Autobiografie," p. 97. 83 Baud to Rochussen, 23 June 1846, Collectie Baud, 572. Rochussen had done his utmost to get a railway line constructed from Batavia to nearby Buitenzorg, but Baud would have nothing to do with it because the cost of the project would seriously affect the colonial surplus. 84 Rochussen to Baud, 28 August 1846, Collectie Baud, 588. 85 Rochussen to Baud, 28 February 1846, no. 44, Kol. 4565. 86 Baud to Rochussen, 22 May 1846, Collectie Baud, 572. 87 See W. R. van Hoevell, "Het Tijdschrift voor Nederlandsch Indie, in zijn Oorsprong, Lotgevallen en Tegenwoordige Strekking Geschetst," TNI I (1849): 1-65. 88 See Mijer, Baud, p. 574. 89 Rochussen to Baud, 31 October 1846, Collectie Baud, 588. 82

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been taken for the cultivations; I shall have this matter investigated seriously/7 At least, if this were really possible: "The statistical data are not always reliable; they have become very clever here in the art of compiling figures so that the results will prove what one wants to prove."^ In a later letter of 25 April 1847, he repeated his opinion "that in many places not only too much land but also too much time is taken from the Javanese."^ In particular, he regarded the forced cultivation of tobacco as "very burdensome" and that of indigo as "no less so."^2 During an inspection tour through Central Java in mid-1847 he found "here and there quite a number of reprehensible things—either abuses or improper application of the people's corvee services or driving the cultivations too hard or the arrogant use of authority, or insipid devotion to duty ."93 In particular, he had few good words to say on the citadels and fortifications being built all over Java, "those excesses of the Royal Engineers" as he would put it in 1850 (but then, in contrast to van den Bosch, he had never served in that arm of the services).94 Regarding the fort named "Generaal Cochius" situated in remote Gombong, he commented, "It is beyond my comprehension that a fort is being built there."95 It was not correct, however, so Rochussen remarked, that the "mysterious illness" in the mountain districts of Central Java was the result of malnutrition and impoverishment of the population, as was asserted by the chief of the Medical Service, Dr. W. Bosch, "A proposition which, if it were true, would be very opportune for the so-called liberals and philanthropists, of which so many are found in this administration . . . on the contrary, there is prosperity in those areas, even more than elsewhere."96 At that time, Rochussen put out a circular letter in which the Residents were directed, with reference to rice prices, which were still alarmingly high, to pay more attention to the cultivation of that basic nutrition. It was admitted that land which was intended for rice growing had on occasions been requisitioned for government cultivations "to a greater extent" than was reasonable or desirable.97 This instruction was repeated in 1848.98 The high price of rice was also regularly discussed in Rochussen's letters to Baud. As far as Rochussen was concerned, there was no doubt that rice cultivation had been neglected. The Cultivation System, applied injudiciously and carried much too far in many places in Java, as well as the abuse of corvee services, were responsible for this 90

31 March 1847, no. 59, Kol. 4566. 25 April 1847, no. 60, Kol. 4566. 92 31 January 1847, no. 57, Kol. 4566. 93 25 August 1847, no. 64, Kol. 4566. 94 27 November 1850, Collectie Baud, 840. 95 25 August 1847, no. 64, Kol. 4566. 96 Rochussen to Baud, 25 August 1847, no. 64, Kol. 4566. Initially Rochussen had thought that the mortality figures had turned out better than expected but had to change his mind after his tour of inspection: 'There are villages which have completely died out apart from two or three people." 97 Circular of 18 June 1847; Rochussen to Baud, 28 June 1847, no. 62, Kol. 4566. For the text of this circular, see Van Hoevell, Reis, vol. 1, pp. 223-27. 98 Circular of 15 September 1848; Rochussen to Rijk, 20 October 1848, no. 77, Kol. 4567; Bijl Hand. 1849-50, p. 405. Baud, so he wrote to Rochussen, had always protected rice cultivation and given it the attention it deserved while he still was governor-general ad interim, "but what happened since then I scarcely know"; Baud to Rochussen, 21 April 1846, Collectie Baud, 891. 91

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neglect." The population was often forced to perform all kinds of labor, much of it useless, as a result of which too little time remained for work on the rice fields even if they had been returned in good time. "Nowhere is more human effort wasted than here."100 Rochussen had heard some striking examples of that. In the Residency of Surabaya alone, 36,000 men had to turn up daily for work on fortifications, government cultivations, maintenance of roads and bridges, and so on.101 When a high official or officer travelled from Batavia to Surabaya, 30,000 people would turn out to water the road and lay the dust.102 What had also surprised Rochussen was the great number of carts drawn by Javanese on which goods were carried. On a trip from Batavia to Buitenzorg he counted eighty-seven of them in three hours, "each one with two men pulling and four men pushing."103 To make matters worse, land rent had been systematically increased by "active" officials who hoped thereby to be promoted more quickly.104 According to Rochussen, the market tax also put "a heavy and, I believe, in the long run unbearable burden" on the people.105 Abolition of that tax would be "the greatest benefit" that the government could confer upon the people. The government had been forced to abandon efforts to limit the abuses that occurred in collecting that tax. When it was announced that in the future the written conditions and tariffs would be strictly enforced, the amounts offered for those "farms" had fallen steeply.10^ Baud was quite open to such critical remarks, even if he sometimes reacted in a less detached fashion than Rochussen, who, as a newcomer to the Indies, could not be blamed for what had gone wrong. In 1851, Rochussen would recall his irritation when Baud had thought it necessary to caution him, the minister of state and former colleague, against adopting the role of "the administrative Don Quixote, travelling around to track down wrongs and always prepared to break his lance in the struggle against imaginary injustices."107 In the meantime, Rochussen's "serious study" of the Cultivation System had not been without fruit. In 1846, he proposed to Baud to abandon indigo cultivation gradually and to replace it by sugar cultivation, because this change was surely in the interests of the people and the treasury, and Dutch trade and shipping would also benefit from it.108 According to Rochussen, it was beyond dispute that the Javanese had an "avowed dislike" of indigo cultivation, because it was very labor intensive, paid poorly, and was more damaging to rice cultivation than any of the other cultivations. He calculated that replacing 10,000 bouw of indigo with sugar cane would yield the treasury an annual profit of around f 180,000, not to mention big profits for the NHM, shipping companies, sea insurance companies, brokers, and so on. 99

Rochussen to Baud, 1 December 1845, no. 41, Kol. 4564; 30 September 1846, no. 53, Kol. 4565; 30 November 1846, no. 55, Kol. 4565; 31 January 1847, no. 57, Kol. 456 100 1 December 1845, no. 41, Kol. 4565 101 31 January 1848, Collectie Baud, 588. 102 1 December 1845, no. 41, Kol. 4565. 103 31 January 1848, Collectie Baud, 588. Cf. Bijl. Hand., 1862-63, p. 1522. 104 30 November 1846, no. 55, Kol. 4565 105 30 November 1846, no. 55, Kol. 4565; 25 April 1847, no. 60, Kol. 4566 106 30 October 1846, no. 54; 30 November 1846, no. 55, Kol. 4565 107 Rochussen to Baud, 23 May 1851, Collectie Baud, 840. 108 Rochussen to Baud, 30 November 1846, no. 258; V 20 February 1847, no. 20, Kol. 1765

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Sugar required much more freight space than indigo, so that by comparison there was more to be earned from its transport and sale. The changeover from indigo to sugar cultivation, to be limited initially to, say, 10,000 bouw, would begin in a few residencies where circumstances appeared most favorable for the change; among them Rochussen mentioned Cirebon, Pekalongan, and Besuki.109 Baud was able to agree with this proposal to abandon one-quarter of the indigo cultivation and later on still more when that proved opportune, although he believed that Rochussen's calculations regarding greater profits for the treasury from the cultivation of sugar compared to indigo were somewhat inflated.1 ™ It was clear, however, according to Baud, that indigo cultivation had presented great difficulties for the people and also influenced the "appalling expensiveness" of rice. Were it not for the fact that in every instance the direct and indirect advantages for the motherland were all-important, then the complete withdrawal of that cultivation would be highly desirable. Under existing circumstances, however, that could not be contemplated.111 Baud thought it necessary to warn Rochussen against too rapid an execution of the plan to replace indigo cultivation with sugar. The passionate desire to obtain a sugar contract could easily close the eyes of the people advising the governor-general in the face of local considerations that were unfavorable to establishing new sugar factories.11^ In Baud's opinion, the "contract and percentage system" had "indisputably" deprived the people of a great part of the protection that they had previously enjoyed from the government and local officials. It might not be appropriate in every case if, for instance, 10,000 bouw less of indigo were cultivated, to have an equally large area planted with sugar cane. It would be sufficient for the treasury to break even on the proposed change; there was no need to profit from it.11^ The decision taken in the beginning of 1847 to abandon part of the indigo cultivation had far-reaching consequences. In that same year, the area of indigo planted was considerably reduced.11^* In the following years, the planting area would gradually be further contracted, so that in 1850 the area planted with indigo would be only 62 percent of that of 1845. The number of households set aside for this cultivation in 1850 had been reduced by 42 percent compared with that in 1845.115 Especially in a residency like Cirebon, where the reduction of indigo cultivation, according to a report from the director of cultivations of 28 April 1847, was "not only 109 110

Ibid.

V 20 February 1847, no. 20, Kol. 1765. See also V 18 February 1847, no. 9, Kol. 1765, in which Baud, in an important report that also discussed the high rice prices and so forth, requested authorization from the king for the proposed measures. 111 Baud to the King, V 18 February 1847, no. 9, Kol. 1765. See Van Deventer, Bijdragen, 2: 616. 112 y 20 February 1847, no. 20, Kol. 1765. It is possible that Baud was thinking here, among others, of the member of the Council of the Indies Du Puy, who had sought a sugar contract in 1846 but had been refused. See chapter 10. 113 Ibid. Baud also pointed to the fact that with the introduction of sugar cultivation instead of indigo, the people would not receive crop payments during the first year because sugar cane stood a year longer in the fields than indigo. This could spread dissatisfaction among the growers. 114 By Government decrees of 4 June 1847, 24 December 1847, and 2 January 1848 the planting area was decreased by more than 10,000 bouw; this measure began to have some effect in 1848. See Exh. 25 October 1847, no. 40, Kol. 1814; 5 August 1848, no. 6, Kol. 1873. ^5 See appendix 1.

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desirable but, because of the small and constantly declining production of the fields and the flight of people, absolutely unavoidable,"116 the effect of this measure made itself felt. The area under cultivation there in 1850 was less than half that in 1845. Table 4.4: Government indigo cultivation in 1845 and 185C Area (bouw)

Hou seholds

Residency

1845

1850

1845

1850

Bagelen Banten Banyumas Besuki Cirebon Kediri Kedu Madiun Pekalongan Priangan

57,933 17,132 28,416 7,877 29,524 5,888 5,015 6,700 18,065 10,779

40,136 withdrawn 20,684 1,608 15,128 2,381 4,270 8,621 9,452 6,297

12,014 2,691 6,749 1,783 8,737 1,262 334 1,108 4,202 2,698

8,975 withdrawn3 5,049 402 4,263 653 700 1,692 2,137 2,165

187,329

108,577

41,578

26,037

Java

Source: "Kultuurverslagen," 1845,1850. Indigo cultivation had already been abandoned in Banten in 1846 (the peasantry was then partly recruited for pepper cultivation).

a

Rochussen's original idea to abandon indigo cultivation entirely and replace it with sugar (in which case, 40,000 bouw of indigo would be replaced by 15,000 bouw of sugar cane) on closer examination appeared impracticable. Especially in the residencies of Banyumas and Bagelen where indigo cultivation was important, the expansion of sugar cultivation faced problems from the great difficulties in transporting sugar to export centers. Yet the decline of indigo cultivation by almost 50 percent in a few years (in 1851, the planting area was again reduced by more than 3,000 bouw from the previous year) was a significant step, for which Rochussen most of all deserved credit. De Waal, reminiscing about that period, could quite correctly date the moment at which improved principles of government were introduced from the time Rochussen took office as governor-general.117 The decision partially to withdraw indigo cultivation was later sometimes linked with "an awakening of the national conscience in the Netherlands."11** That connection, however, is not correct. At best, the consciences of Rochussen and Baud were awakened. But even that does not seem entirely relevant. Their decisions could be defended very well on commercial grounds. The interests of government and treasury were better served by an expansion of sugar cultivation than by maintaining indigo cultivation on a scale that in the long run could not be sustained. In 1848, Rochussen rejected a proposal from the Resident of Bagelen to improve the earnings of the remaining indigo growers by a modest increase in crop payments because that 116

Exh. 25 October 1847, no. 40, Kol. 1814. De Waal, Aanteekeningen, 1:469. 118 Reinsma, Cultuurstelsel, p. 30. 117

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would have had to be done at the expense of colonial profits.1 ^ There was no question of public opinion in the Netherlands having any influence on affairs in the Indies up to 1848: Baud now and then referred in his correspondence with Rochussen to "utterly outrageous" articles in Dutch papers, but almost always this "newspaper clamor" came down to personal matters. ^ In periodicals, things were not much better with regard to interest in Indies affairs. The only periodical appearing in the Netherlands before 1848 that aimed at promoting "the knowledge" about the Dutch colonies was Indische Bij (Indies Bee), established in 1842. This government-sponsored magazine, which sang the praises of the Cultivation System, was already dead and gone a year later.!2* A magazine of standing like De Gids—"organ of a school of thought or party which fights with sharp weapons the dozing, sleepy, spineless-Johnny spirit of the Fatherland in the political as well as in the scientific field"—gave virtually no attention to intellectual life in the Netherlands East Indies.122 In 1846, van Hoevell would complain bitterly in a letter to one of the editors that his Tijdschrift voor Nederlandsch Indie, then in its eighth year of publication, in all that time had only once been deemed worthy of a mention in De Gids.123 The reduction of indigo cultivation thus went hand in hand with an expansion of sugar cultivation. By government decree of 4 June 1847, the director of cultivations was authorized by Rochussen to conclude four new sugar contracts, three of them in Cirebon, which were later followed by other contracts, for example in Besuki.*24 This development will be discussed further in chapter 5. Apart from indigo cultivation, Rochussen also took his knife to the tobacco and tea cultivations. In 1847, the cultivation of tobacco had taken such an unfavorable turn that almost all contractors were threatened with "complete bankruptcy."125 The tobacco that was brought to market—from 1839, the whole crop was left for the contractors to dispose of—was little in demand and sometimes had to be sold below cost price, as a result of which manufacturers could no longer meet their obligations to the government and to private moneylenders. This "lack of profit" in the Java tobacco industry was attributed to the ignorance and incompetence of some manufacturers and to planting areas being too extensive, so that it was impossible to keep a proper check on the quality and processing of the product. The government did help the contractors by agreeing, for instance, to capitalize from the treasury the advances that 119

It had been proposed to increase the wage of each indigo grower by 80 doits per year, which would have resulted to a total annual increase in expenditure of f 100,000; Exh. 5 August 1848, no. 6, Kol. 1873. 120 Baud to Rochussen, 22 May 1846, Collectie Baud, 572. 121 Former Director of Cultivations Praetorius was among those who contributed articles to this periodical. 122 Van Hoevell to P. J. Veth, 26 May 1846, Collectie Veth. 2 * ^ Ibid. The contents of the fourth volume of the Tijdschrift voor Nederlandsch Indie were mentioned in De Gids of 1843, pp. 719 ff., by the linguist T. Roorda, who had the chair of Javanese in Delft. He regretted that the magazine was known only "to very few people" in The Netherlands and would probably attract few readers in the future because of the high subscription price. 124 Exh. 25 October 1847, no. 40, Kol. 1814. 125 "Kultuurverslag" 1848.

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had been granted,126 but this assistance could not save most contractors. In 1851, only fourteen government-sponsored enterprises were planting tobacco. Three enterprises were in liquidation and the remaining contracts were discontinued.12'7 The planting area of government tobacco in 1851 was only 1,830 bouw or half that of 1845; the number of households involved in the cultivation was just over 11,000 or one-third of the number of tobacco growers in 1845.12** The cultivation of tea had expanded significantly between 1840 and 1846 partly because the government had begun to issue tea contracts. Although the planting area in the first year was only 2,632 bouw with 44 tea enterprises, in 1846 this had risen to 4,594 bouw with 100 enterprises (including plantations that were run directly by the government as well as those managed by "tea contractors'7). Production increased fivefold in those six years, from 178,995 pounds in 1840 to 927,957 pounds in 1846.129 These results, however, were little cause for satisfaction, because the government was continually losing money on tea and losing more the more tea was produced. The cost price in Java in 1850 was fO.78 and the net market price in the Netherlands fO.44.*30 So, in 1851 all plantations where tea was prepared directly by the peasantry under supervision of government officials were abandoned, except for the district of Ledok in Bagelen.131 The government could not so easily rid itself of tea contracts that had been concluded for periods from 15 to 20 years. In 1851, there were still 13 T1O contracts in operation, of which 6 were in Priangan.1JZ Of all the cultivations introduced or maintained by the government, Rochussen reported that none was as "neglected" as coffee, which was so important for the treasury.133 Until 1843, the quantity of coffee delivered to the government had steadily increased. In that year, the government crop had even surpassed one million piculs for the first time. Thereafter, however, production began to decline. In 1845, less than 700,000 piculs were delivered to the storehouses, and in 1849, less than 500,000 piculs.13* Rochussen blamed the disappointing results on the fact that old plantations had not been replaced in time by new ones. Moreover, in many districts the obligation on growers to process and dry the coffee themselves was too burden126

At the end of 1847 the total debts to the government of the thirty-one tobacco enterprises still in existence was £1,720,315 ("Kultuurverslag " 1848). 127 "Kultuurverslag" 1851. For a summary of the enterprises still in existence, see "Staat kultuurinrichtingen" 1851, Exh. 16 February 1853, no. 9, Kol. 238. 12 ** Reinsma, Cultuurstelsel, pp. 129,141, saw in this development a "transfer" by the government of "semi-government enterprises" to private persons. This characterization, however, is not correct because most tobacco enterprises failed and were not thus continued in another form. 129 "Kultuurverslagen." The number of households engaged in tea cultivation increased from 1,904 in 1840 to 3,647 in 1846. Later, much use was made of voluntary labor in this cultivation. In 1851, according to the Cultivation Report, the number of households engaged in tea cultivation was just under three hundred, and the required numbers were made up by "free" laborers. See also chapter 9, n. 10, which shows an increase in the number of households engaged in tea cultivation in 1860. It is possible that the "free" laborers of 1850 were classified as "forced" laborers in 1860. 130 Van Soest, Kultuurstelsel, 3:160. 131 "Kultuurverslag" 1851. 132 "Staat kultuurinrichtingen" 1851; Exh. 16 February 1853, no. 9, Kol. 238. 133 Rochussen to Baud, 29 September 1847, no. 65, Kol. 4566. 13 ^ See appendix 1.

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some for them. Finally, the native chiefs would often keep part of the crop payments for themselves.135 According to the director of cultivations, the decline could also be blamed on lack of interest from European officials. They seldom visited the coffee plantations, so the peasantry took little care of them. Repeated instructions to display more zeal in supervising the coffee plantations had brought no results, to which was attributed the many other duties these officials had to perform. The director of cultivations regarded as futile a new circular to officials, proposed by Rochussen, in which they would be instructed to explain the drop in production. They would undoubtedly plead that the weather had been either too wet or too dry.13** The only method that could produce results was to refuse to pay cultivation percentages to European officials and regents if production remained more than 5 percent under a quantity stipulated by the government—say, 900,000 piculs—and on the other side, to award extra payments if production was increased 10 percent or more above that figure.137 This proposal to use the cultivation percentages as a drastic means to raise coffee production was adopted by Rochussen and placed before the minister in 1848, with the commonsensical lament that people had to be taken for what they were: most officials were better motivated by self-interest than by a sense of duty.13** The ministry, however, where Baud had meanwhile given way to Rijk, would have nothing to do with this notion.13^ Rochussen was no more fortunate in his attempts to have the processing of coffee done in factories, to be established at government expense and supervised by European entrepreneurs in contract with the government.^ Yet Rochussen's efforts did have some results: in 1850 production was almost one million piculs, whereas the following year it even surpassed the 1843 figure.141 In the meantime, the Cultivation Report for 1851 mentioned a shortage of suitable land for coffee cultivation. Expansion was possible only "in a few places/7 Thus, this cultivation, too, seemed to have reached its maximum extent. Finally, Rochussen as governor-general attempted to improve the method of land rent assessment. Already, in 1844 Merkus had insisted on this change.142 By researching and surveying the sawah, the administration would acquire more insight into the taxable capacity of the population. It would then be in a position to arrange land rent more equitably and, eventually, perhaps even increase it. It would then also be possible to guard against excessive expansion of government cultivations.143 But on this point, Rochussen was unable to get Baud to go along with him. On Baud's orders, the surveys, which were actually under way, had to be stopped in 1846. Baud feared that such research, if it could be carried out at all, would precipi135

Rochussen to Baud, 1 March 1847, no. 58, Kol. 4566. Director of Cultivations de Munnick to Rochussen, 31 December 1847, no. 4175; see V 17 May 1848, no. 2, Kol. 1855. 137 Ibid. 138 Rochussen to Baud, 24 February 1848, no. 109; V 17 May 1848, no. 2, Kol. 1855. 139 V 17 May 1848, no. 2, Kol. 1855. 140 Information from "Kultuurverslag" 1851. 141 See appendix 1. 142 See Van Deventer, Bijdragen, 3: 212 ff. 143 Ibid., p. 218. 136

Criticism in Private

85

tate opposition from the people. They might easily gain the impression that the government intended to impose new taxes alongside those already existing.144 As long as Baud remained minister of colonies this matter was never raised again. However, his stewardship did not last much longer; when the "ancien regime'' was toppled in the March upheaval of 1848, Baud fell with it. After that moment, however, Rochussen had lost interest in the subject. Deeply impressed by the surprise events that took place in the Netherlands and elsewhere in 1848—"It appears to me that the very foundations of society are being overthrown and I do not understand much of what I see happening"—he adopted a wait-and-see attitude after that year.14^ He developed almost no new initiatives during the second part of his term of office.14** The administration that Duymaer van Twist inherited from his predecessor in 1851 had, in many respects, reverted to the old routines. 144

Ibid., pp. 219 ff.; V 21 October 1846, no. 348, Kol. 4328. Rochussen to Baud, 26 July 1848, Collectie Baud, 795. 14 *> An exception to this was the limitation of corvee services for fortifications among other things, which was decided upon in 1850 and 1851. The government in the Netherlands had insisted on this. See chapter 6.

145

5

SUGAR AND SUGAR CONTRACTS

nder the administration of Governor-General Rochussen, the Cultivation System lost a great deal of ground. Whereas in 1845, according to the Cultivation Report, about 52 percent of the population in Java (with the exception of that in Batavia, Buitenzorg, the principalities, and the private estates) was involved in the Cultivation System; in 1850, only 46 percent was involved (those figures were 25 and 19 percent, respectively, if one does not include coffee cultivation). The cultivated area that government cultivations occupied declined in that period from 6 to 4 percent of the sawah and tegalan (unirrigated) fields known to the government.1 This development was based on a series of decisions that as yet were not influenced by critical public opinion in the Netherlands or by a Second Chamber able to thwart the minister and the Indies government. In previous years, the bow had been too drawn too tight; thereafter, a reaction was inevitable. Purely economic motives, such as the small productivity of some cultivations, had also made their influence felt. The only government cultivation that was expanded significantly after 1845 was sugar cultivation. Until 1847, this cultivation had been smaller in area than that of indigo, but after that it had become the most important cultivation apart from coffee. In 1851, the area of indigo cultivation had been reduced to little more than half the area planted with sugar cane.2 Yet sugar had not been good business for the government before 1845. The profits had flowed to the sugar contractors, who often received, for a bad product, prices that were far too high, and to the Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappij, which, when market prices were low, had charged disproportionately high freights and commissions. During the years 1840-44, the loss to the treasury amounted to more than 8 million guilders, about as much as the net profit on indigo during the same period.3 Not included in this deficit was the loss of interest from advances provided by the treasury (to be paid back in sugar) for the building and purchase of sugar factories, running costs, and so on. If sugar had not occupied as important a place within the consignment system—the quantity delivered to the government from the 1840 harvest and shipped to the Netherlands exceeded the total volume of indigo by a

U

1

See chapter 2. According to the Cultivation Reports, the area of land under government cultivations decreased from almost 85,000 bouw in 1845 to less than 69,000 bouw in 1850. 2 See appendix 1. The area planted with indigo in 1851 was approximately 23,000 bouw compared with almost 42,000 bouw of sugar cane. ^ See chapter 2. During 1831-39 the loss would have been still greater, namely, almost 12.5 million guilders. See appendix to V 19 August 1841, La Z, Kol. 4439.

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Sugar and Sugar Contracts

Table 5.1: Government sugar cultivation in 1845 and 1850

Residencies Banten3 Banyumas Besuki Cirebon Jepara Kediri Madiun Pasuruan Pekalongan Rembang Semarang Surabaya legal Java

Households

1850

1850

1845 Area (bouw)

Households

Area (bouw)

Population (%)

Area (%)

4,535 1,600 17,672 10,150 23,428 3,320 7,862 23,112 5,444 2,600 6,100 46,469 12,800

759 400 5,031 2,909 5,068 800 2,150 7,262 1,550 554 2,100 6,751 3,200

0 2,692 19,412 13,004 17,291 5,480 5,186 19,030 6,249 1,960 6,553 42,469 15,510

0 400 6,600 4,275 5,317 1,274 800 7,242 1,500 477 2,140 7,484 3,640

0 4 21 13 25 11 9 26 13 2 5 24 32

0 0.5 6.0 3.0 5.0 2.0 1.0 11.0 3.0 0.5 1.0 4.0 5.0

165,092

38,534

151,836

41,151

10

2.5

Source: "Kultuurverslagen" 1845,1850. Sugar cultivation was withdrawn in Banten in 1846.

a

ratio of 40:1, whereas the figure for 1845 was 75:1 ^—then it is very debatable whether sugar cultivation, with these unfavorable financial results, would have been maintained. Under prevailing circumstances, the consignment system, on which the commercial interests of Amsterdam and Rotterdam and the whole Dutch shipping industry were so heavily dependent, was the saviour of government sugar cultivation. Baud in 1853 in the Second Chamber had called the consignment system "the only justification" for the Cultivation System. This curious assertion, notwithstanding its one-sidedness (Baud was speaking as the representative of Rotterdam), certainly applied to sugar cultivation in the years before 1845.^ Besides, the government was bound by contracts for the manufacture and delivery of sugar, which in most cases had been concluded for periods of twenty years. These sugar contracts, as already explained briefly in chapter 2, were agreements between the government and private entrepreneurs, in which the government undertook to have sugar cane planted and to force the population to render certain services, while the entrepreneurs contracted to process the sugar cane in factories that were built and operated by them (mostly with interest-free government advances) and to deliver all or most of the sugar to the government at prices fixed in the contract. The contracts laid down how many bouw of sugar cane should be planted, but the manufacturer was not involved in cultivation as such.^ 4

Excluding the quantity of sugar that remained at the disposal of the manufacturers, which was also mostly shipped to the Netherlands. 5 Hand. 17 November 1853, p. 102. 6 Some Residents took this principle so far that advice from the manufacturers about crops was regarded as unlawful interference; see Stcrt. 1860, no. 138 (par. 6).

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The Politks of Colonial Exploitation

Crop payments to the people as well as premiums for the chiefs of villages where sugar cane was planted were charged to the manufacturer.7 After the harvest and settlement, the advances made and expenditures borne by the government were repaid in sugar. The manufacturers also paid to the government a fixed amount per picul for the sugar, which they might keep for their own disposal. This money was used by the government to pay cultivation percentages, for those percentages were also calculated on sugar not delivered to the government.** Although the government tried to introduce a degree of uniformity as quickly as it could by means of "model contracts/7 in practice uniformity was not often achieved. First, in every agreement local circumstances had to be taken into account, which could necessitate variant regulations. Second, the government sometimes changed its mind, so that contracts varied according to the time when they were issued.^ Third, once contracts had been concluded, they could naturally be altered only with the agreement of both parties. Fourth, one contractor might stipulate more favorable conditions than another, for instance, by offering to implement a new production process in a factory. Moreover, favoritism was not unusual in the small European community in Java. In principle, it was the task of the governor-general to decide to whom among the frequently numerous applicants a contract would be awarded. The Ministry of Colonies took the view that "here in the Netherlands we do not enter into such agreements, neither do we make recommendations with regard to them."^ The complaint that the Indies government favored its "friends" when granting and extending sugar contracts was thus almost as old as government sugar cultivation itself.1* Yet in the beginning, van den Bosch found great difficulty in finding takers for his sugar contracts. Earlier experiences with sugar cultivation on private account (in which the government was not involved in the planting of the sugar), were no encouragement; the sugar industry had "fallen into a bad state of decline."^ in 1830, only about 100,000 piculs of sugar were exported from Java, mainly processed in primitive little factories run by Chinese entrepreneurs. Consequently, the first contractors were mostly Chinese, some of whom, it seems, had only been willing to accept sugar contracts under strong pressure from the Residents.^ Europeans, who stood to lose a permanent official position, were not game to take the risk. Of the 175 to 180 sugar contracts that had been granted by the end of 1833, among which were dozens of more or less fictitious contracts concluded by Residents with sugar cane7

These premiums increased, according to the model contract of 1847 (ART. 7), to fl.80 per bouw for a yield of 20 piculs and more per bouw. 8 According to the model contract of 1847 (ART. 28), the contractor had to pay 50 doits into the government treasury for every picul of sugar that was not delivered, for whatever reason, to the government. In the years 1858-60, approximately f330,000 was thus handed over annually by sugar contractors to be given out as cultivation percentages; see Suppl. Kol. no. 24. 9 Before 1840, the government had striven to have all the sugar delivered to itself and to alter the existing contracts accordingly; see "Kultuurverslag" 1839. After 1841 the government left an increasing portion of the sugar produced at the disposal of manufacturers. 10 V 11 July 1848, no. 6, Kol. 1867. 11 For further details on this, see chapter 10. 12 Woordenboek, 3: 464. 13 Van Deventer, Bijdragen, 2: 368; I. D. Fransen van de Putte, De Regeling en Uitbesteding van de Suiker-Contracten op Java (Goes: Schetsberg, 1860), p. 2.

Sugar and Sugar Contracts

89

producing villages, about three-quarters were in the names of Chinese, and no more than thirty or so were made with Europeans.1"* In 1834, van den Bosch had not dared to put the average production of a bouw planted with sugar cane any higher than 15 piculs.15 It was soon evident that he had been too pessimistic. Already in 1836, average production was almost 20 piculs per bouw; in 1837-40, it was annually more than 23 piculs per bouw.16 Partly because the Indies government had had no great expectations about the productivity of the sugar enterprises and partly because it had not been able to find partners otherwise, the provisions of those first sugar contracts favored manufacturers in a very one-sided way. This was particularly evident in the seventeen contracts made in the Residency of Pasuruan in East Java in 1831-33. In those contracts, crop payments had been calculated on the estimated value of the cane and not the real yield. This strategy was especially advantageous for manufacturers because every year this estimate was far below actual production. According to the old Pasuruan contracts that remained in force until the beginning of the 1850s, the local administration was obliged to provide, on request, carts and workers for the cutting and transport of cane and for work in the factories. All this was done for a payment of 15 doits per day per man, which could justly be deemed ''meagre" if one realizes that the working day often lasted twelve hours with a break of only one hour during the hottest part of the day. Moreover, this work was physically quite demanding; for example, it involved turning the white sugar in the drying bins in the fierce heat.17 Finally, the government had to accept the sugar at flO (copper) per picul; half of it had to be "first quality" and the rest "second quality." Sugar that the government took as repayment of the capital advanced, the timber it had supplied, and the crop payments it had advanced was valued at f!2 per picul.18 The product, which was subject to the most superficial quality inspection, often consisted of very inferior sugar.wonder, then, that such contracts soon enriched the manufacturers. The government, learning from bitter experience, became much more mindful in later contracts of its own interests and those of the Javanese growers. In a model contract drawn in 1836, crop payments were fixed at f3.50 (copper) for every picul of sugar actually produced. Furthermore, the task of the sugar growers was deemed completed when the cane was ripe and ready to be cut. The manufacturer would have to provide "by his own means," that is, without government assistance, for cutting, transport, and processing of the cane.1^ This arrangement did not take place, because the government continued to provide help. Although the government, at least on paper, was no longer willing to oblige the manufacturers in everything, it could probably have imposed rather more stringent requirements. The position, after ^ A summary of the sugar contracts issued by the end of 1833, with the names of the contractors and the planting areas of the various enterprises, is in Kol. 3203; see Bijl. Hand. 1865-66, p. 516. Among the first contractors was a son of van den Bosch and also A. Loudon (father of the later minister of colonies) and J. E. Banck, merchant and commissioner of the Javasche Bank at Surabaya. The latter was granted an interest-free advance of f210/000, C.S.R. Wijnmalen, a contractor in Pasuruan, received fl00,000, A. Loudon f53,754, and so on. l5 Ind.Stb. 1834, no. 22. 16 "Kultuurverslagen." 17 Duymaer van Twist to Pahud, 20 October 1852, no. 122, Kol. 6529. 18 "Staat kultuurinrichtingen" 1845, V 10 July 1848, no. 17, Kol. 1867. 19 Laid down by government decree of 11 November 1836, no. 2. See "Kultuurverslag" 1836; Van Deventer, Bijdragen, 2: 701; Bijl. Hand. 1865-66, p. 516.

90

The Politics of Colonial Exploitation

all, had changed after the first few uncertain years. Existing contracts sometimes changed hands at high prices; new contracts were much sought after.20 Around 1840, partly as a result of pressure on the government to issue new contracts, sugar cultivation had expanded considerably. Even in residencies like Banten and Rembang where recent experience with sugar cultivation had been very unfavorable, new contracts were issued.21 At that moment, however, the government in Holland intervened. Already in 1836, the market price of Java sugar in the Netherlands, after deducting the costs of shipping and sale, was nowhere near sufficient to cover the expenses incurred by the government in Java for the sake of sugar cultivation. In the following years, the market price fell even farther until in 1841, at the July auctions of the NHM, it reached its nadir with a net price of f6.23 per picul, a little over half of what the sugar had cost the government in Java!22 King William II had then taken the matter in hand personally and had demanded effective measures from Baud to end the continuing losses in this cultivation. Would it not be best if the government left all the sugar at the disposal of the manufacturers and withdrew altogether from the sale of that article?23 Baud had to point out that this approach was impossible. According to most sugar contracts, the government was bound to accept all the sugar produced at fixed prices, irrespective of actual market value. This was the case, among others, with the sugar contracts in Pasuruan. Moreover, the government was committed to the consignment contracts concluded with the NHM. For the time, being it was possible only to instruct the Indies government not to make any new sugar contracts. Furthermore, when existing contracts were altered, the government's acceptance of the sugar could be made optional. In the meantime, while sugar prices remained low, more attention would have to be paid to the quality of sugar rather than its quantity. Already in 1840, the Indies government had been instructed to be more strict with its inspections. Standard samples made up by some brokers from sugar from the government cargoes and numbered in order of quality from no. 1 to no. 18 had been sent to Java.24 Baud proposed pushing the matter further. The manufacturers would be allowed to dispose of one-quarter of the sugar themselves on condition that the rest, to be delivered to the government, would be of good quality.2^ 20

Thus it was that a half-share in the Gending factory in Besuki was sold in 1837 for f!90,000, the other half in 1843 for f!21,000; see Met Regt in Nederlandsch Indie 7: 358, 360. See also chapter 10. 21 Sugar cultivation was withdrawn in both residencies in 1834 because of unfavorable results; in 1837, however, it was introduced again. During the years 1839^5, the yield was no more than 5.3 piculs per bouw in Banten, so that sugar cultivation there was again withdrawn in 1846; an amount of almost f600,000 in advances had to be written off as unrecoverable; van Soest, Kultuurstelsel, 3:126. In Rembang it was retained in the interests of the two contractors working in that residency. In 1848, however, the yield there was no more than 12.5 piculs per bouw as compared with almost 33 for Java as a whole. "Kultuurverslagen." 22 V 23 October 1841, La I, no. 2, Kol. 4439. For further information see appendix 2. Sugar was usually auctioned five times per year. 23 V 13 July 1841, La U, Kol. 4439. 24 V 16 September 1840, no. 7, Kol. 1323. 25 V 19 August 1841, La Z, Kol. 4439.

Sugar and Sugar Contracts

91

After those proposals had been discussed in the Council of Ministers, the Indies government was instructed accordingly in October 1841.26 As a result of this instruction, a serious brake was placed on the expansion of sugar cultivation. Between 1843 and 1848 the planting area remained more or less constant. The quality improved because in the meantime the government, when contracts came up for revision, began to stipulate that deliveries be in line with the standard samples. By 1842, thirty-nine contracts had already been altered to that effect^ Sugar of standard sample no. 18 usually had to be delivered for f!2 per picul (copper, or flO recepis), no. 16 for flO (f8.40).^ Thereby, it was in the manufacturers' interests to deliver as much sugar as possible of the best quality. By the same token, they obtained much greater rights to dispose freely of part of the product, as a rule one-third of the total; in 1845, around forty contracts permitted free disposal of a part—and in some cases all—of the product.® Whereas in 1842 approximately 84,000 piculs of sugar, or about 10 percent of the total sugar harvest, was left at the disposal of the manufacturers, by 1845 that figure had risen to 200,000 piculs or almost 20 percent.30 Finally, the government tightened the inspection of sugar delivered to government storehouses. In 1846, inspections were done everywhere by agents or employees of the NHM Factory at Batavia.31 Improving the quality of sugar had an effect on sale prices.32 In the years 184044, the net market price of Java sugar auctioned in the Netherlands averaged f8 per picul; in 1845-47, it was fll.85.33 For the first time in ages, the government began to make a profit from sugar cultivation: in 1845, fl,838,085; in 1846, f2,257,074; and in 1847, f678,142.34 It is true that in 1848 sugar was again sold at a loss, but that was attributable to a temporary drop in prices as a result of the general unrest in Europe. In 1849, the market had recovered. Rochussen's proposal to expand sugar cultivation in the interests of the Javanese, the treasury, and commerce, simultaneously reducing part of the indigo cultivation, had been made just at the right moment. By 1846, the period of teething troubles that had confronted government sugar cultivation was over. Under Rochussen's administration, between 1847 and 1851, fifteen new sugar contracts for factories equipped with modern machinery were issued.3^ Rochussen forced sugar contractors to stand on their own feet more than in the past. To that end, he expanded the right of manufacturers to dispose freely of part of the 26

V 23 October 1841, La I, no. 2, Kol. 4439. See also Baud to Merkus, 27 September 1841, no. 7, Kol. 4575. 27 "Kultuurverslag" 1842. There were then 112 sugar contracts in operation. See appendix 1. 28 "Staat kultuurinrichtingen" 1845; V 10 July 1848, no. 17, Kol. 1867. 29 Ibid. Four manufacturers, two in Pekalongan and two in Rembang, enjoyed free disposal of all their product. 3 ^ See appendix 1. 31 Report director of Cultivations 29 January 1846; Exh. 4 January 1847, no. 10, Kol. 1755. 32 In 1844 three times as much "white" sugar was received in the Netherlands as in 1840. The whiter the sugar the better the quality; Exh. 4 January 1847, no. 10, Kol. 1755 33 Koloniaal Verslag 1849, Bijl. Hand. 1851-52, p. 190. See appendix 2. 34 See Bijlage VIII of the Cultivation Law (Cultuurwet), Bijl. Hand. 1865-66, LV, where the net results of the various cultivations from year to year are listed. 35 In 1848 the net market price was f7.49 per picul, in 1849 £10.81. See appendix 2. 36 "Staat kultuurinrichtingen" 1851; Exh 16 February 1853, no. 9, Kol. 238.

92

The Politics of Colonial Exploitation

sugar.37 From the 1851 harvest of approximately 1,375,000 piculs, almost 370,000 piculs, more than 25 percent, remained at the disposal of the contractors. In almost all contracts, ten excepted, free disposal of one-third (and, in some cases, the total production) was expressly stipulated in 1852.38 Rochussen also stopped the provision of advances for building new factories or improving existing ones. In a new model sugar contract drawn up in 1847, the government stipulated that entrepreneurs would have to build and maintain their factories without any financial assistance from the government.3^ This meant an important curtailment of the role that the colonial treasury had played up to that time as banker and financier of the contractors. In 1844, contractors still owed the government almost 7 million guilders in long-term credits; the terms of some contracts had even included advances of f500,000 or more.40 In the future, they would have to call on the private capital market for new investments. Rochussen was not impressed by the argument that nobody would be interested in new contracts under such onerous conditions. The outcome proved him right.41 The manufacturers had come by a valuable security in "free sugar/7 which made the extension of credit by private commercial firms attractive.4^ Consequently, as prominent a business firm as Reynst and Vinju of Batavia reduced its interests in the import trade and invested its freed capital in the cultivations.43 In addition, it managed some sugar factories for the trading firm of A. van Hoboken and Sons. In 1848, this Rotterdam firm took up the contract for the new sugar factory De Maas in Besuki; some years later it also took over the sugar factories Bekassie-Oost and De Onderneming in Pasuruan.44 At that time, too, the East Indies Administration and Annuity Company (OostIndische Maatschappij van Administratie en Lijfrente), established in 1842, acquired some sugar factories, namely Kadipatten in Cirebon in 1849 (situated on rented land—the government was not involved in the cultivation process) and the next year the Tjomal and Bandjardawa factories in Tegal.45 Both these cases involved foreclosures on 37

In government decree of 26 October 1846, no. 11, the principle was adopted that manufacturers would be able to obtain free disposal of one-third of the sugar if the remaining twothirds consisted of sugar of standard sample no. 16 or better; Exh. 4 January 1847, no. 10, Kol. 1755. Bijl. Hand. 1865-66, p. 518. This principle was also adopted in a new model sugar contract established by government decree of 4 June 1847, no. 1; Exh. 25 October 1847, no. 40, Kol. 1814. 38 "Staat kultuurinrichtingen" 1851. 39 ART. 10. For the text of the model-contract see Bijl. Hand. 1849-50, p. 406 34 ff. 40 A summary of the outstanding credits in 1844 is contained in an appendix to the report of the director of cultivations of 23 May 1846, no. 1600; Exh. 4 January 1847, no. 10, Kol. 1755. Rochussen estimated in 1845 that 10 million guilders had been advanced to sugar, tea, and tobacco contractors of which three-quarters would probably have to be written off. Rochussen to Baud, 1 November 1845, no. 40, Kol. 4564. 41 Cf. Fransen van de Putte, Suiker-Contracten, p. 10. 42 The Cultivation Report for 1843 had already mentioned this possibility. 43 E. C. Godee Molsbergen, Gedenkboek Reynst en Vinju. 1836-1936 (Batavia: n.p., 1935), p. 20; W.M.F. Mansvelt, De Eerste Indische Handelshuizen (Batavia: n.p., 1938), p. 11. 44 Reinsma, Cultuurstelsel, p. 169, incorrectly states that around 1848 six or seven sugar contracts were accepted by business houses without government advances. In fact, that was the case only with De Maas, in which Reynst and Vinju acted not on their own account but for Van Hoboken. See "Staat kultuurinrichtingen" 1851, Exh. 16 February 1853, no. 9, Kol. 238. 45 According to a petition of 8 March 1850, V 16 March 1850, no. 1, Kol. 6, the Oost-Indische Maatschappij had put out capital of 3 million guilders in the Indies, of which £2,500,000 had

Sugar and Sugar Contracts

93

investments that had not turned out successfully. In 1842, the company had invested £200,000 (silver) in Kadipatten and in 1844, £500,000 in the factories in Tegal in return for consignment contracts on the sugar. The owners had not been able to make a success of the factories, however, and had, consequently, sold them as a result of legal proceedings. The company had been obliged to act as buyer in an effort to recoup some of its money. Under similar circumstances, the NHM in 1841 had bought the Wonopringo factory in Pekalongan.46 The NHM had taken over Wonopringo from the estate of a bankrupt debtor and subsequently, when no buyer came forward, had been forced to operate the factory itself. It appears that the NHM invested f600,000 in this enterprise to return it to profitability.47 Later, there would be no cause for regret: after 1852, the factory yielded huge profits—in the period 1858-65 alone, a sum of fl,300,000.48 As one of the few financial institutions in Java that offered long-term credit, the factory also played an important role in providing capital for various sugar factories. After 1850, part of the large amounts of capital freed by the termination of the bankers' relationship between the NHM and the state was put out to sugar contractors in the form of loans on the security of the factory buildings and machinery owned by the manufacturer. One of the conditions of these mortgages was that the sugar of which manufacturers had free disposal would be consigned to the NHM. In 1861, the factory had arrangements of this sort with seventeen contractors, to whom a total of almost 5 million guilders had been lent.49 Other providers of capital were the Orphans Courts (Weeskamers), in particular the one at Batavia, but the investment of their funds was subject to strict conditions. Finally, well-to-do persons, for instance Chinese who had amassed wealth through opium farms, also acted as moneylenders. Nevertheless, one should not overestimate the need of sugar manufacturers at that time for private capital. Although no new government advances were provided for the establishment or improvement of sugar factories after 1847, the outstanding advances were only gradually paid off.^ Moreover, the government still supplied a significant portion of the working capital of most sugar manufacturers. According to the contracts—and this regulation was maintained in the model contract of 1847—the government provided interest-free advances ''for the daily expenses of the enterprise," which together with crop payments were cleared by the delivery of sugar.51 Not until the model contract of 1860 was the making of advances brought to an end. been financed by others in 1845. According to Het Regt in Nederlandsch Indie 7: 304, Kadipatten was bought for f270,000. For further information on the Oost-Indische Maatschappij, see Mansvelt, Nederlandsche Handel-Moat schappij, 2: 358; N. P. van den Berg, Munt-, Crediet- en Bankwezen, Handel en Scheepvaart in Nederlandsch Indie (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1907), p. 115. Reinsma, Cultuurstelsel, p. 162, incorrectly states that this company did not acquire its own rural enterprises until after 1860. 4 *> Mansvelt, Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappij, 2: 40. 47 Exh. 3 July 1849, no. 20, Kol. 1944. 48 Mansvelt, Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappij, 2 :364. 49 Ibid., p. 361. ^ Of the capital advances provided before 1847, four million guilders had still not been paid off in 1850, of which f800,000 was "hopeless debt." See Rochussen to Pahud, 26 August 1850, no. 96, Kol. 6529; Bijl. Hand. 1852-53, p. 529. 51 See ART. 15, Bijl. Hand. 1849-50, p. 406 35. Fransen van de Putte, Suiker-Contracten, p. 47, estimated the working capital for a factory at f40,000 to £70,000. See also Het Regt in Nederlandsch Indie 12: 434.

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The Politics of Colonial Exploitation

Apart from the enterprises mentioned, in the mid-1850s, all contracts for the processing of sugar were in the names of private persons. One striking aspect was that only a few Chinese were left among the contractors. In 1851, no more than thirteen to fifteen of the almost one hundred enterprises had a Chinese owner. Only in Pasuruan were they well represented, with seven contracts out of a total of eighteen.^2 Once interest in taking up sugar contracts had become so great that even former Residents did not deem it beneath their dignity to become sugar manufacturers, the "foreign Orientals" were no longer in the running for new contracts.53 Moreover, the government was opposed to the transfer of existing contracts from Europeans to Chinese.54 The names of the sugar contractors and their guarantors (every producer had to have two guarantors to ensure that the terms of the contract were properly observed) are given for every factory separately together with details of the planting area and production and the main conditions of contract, in the "lists of cultivation enterprises" in Java. These summaries, containing particulars that are found nowhere else, have so far remained unnoticed in the literature about the Cultivation System. The amount of information they contain makes them indispensable for any analysis of Western plantation agriculture in Java during the period under discussion. They were compiled every year after 1844 on the instructions of the Indies government for the information of authorities in the Netherlands.55 The model contract, which had been drawn up under Rochussen in 1847 and was used as the basis for new agreements for the planting and delivery of cane in following years, differed in several important points from earlier model contracts. Already mentioned was the provision (ART. 10) that stated that the government would no longer make funds available for the establishment and maintenance of sugar factories. ARTICLE 20 (already discussed) allowed the producer free disposal of a maximum of one-third of the harvest on condition that the remaining two-thirds to be delivered to the government was equal to standard sample no. 16 or better, that is, sugar of good or very good quality. The price to be paid by the government was fixed in ARTICLE 21 at flO for no. 18 and f8.40 for no. 16. These prices were lower than those stipulated in most of the current contracts.5^ Another new condition in the model contract of 1847 was the sliding scale of crop payments (ARTICLE 6). For the first 30 piculs of sugar per bouw, the manufacturer had to pay a higher crop payment per picul than for the remaining piculs (i.e., two guilders and 110 doits for every picul below 30 piculs per bouw, two guilders and ten doits for every picul between 30 and 40, and one guilder and thirty doits for every picul of sugar above 40). The expectation was that manufacturers would thereby be encouraged to produce as much sugar as possible; the higher the production, the less the sugar would cost to produce. It was even seriously considered whether to set a maximum crop 52

"Staat kultuurinrichtingen" 1851; Exh. 16 February 1853, no. 9, Kol. 238. In 1837, a system of preferences was introduced for the granting of new contracts, in which Chinese came last. See government decree of 21 February 1837, no. 10. See also chapter 10, n. 1. 54 See Fransen van de Putte, Suiker-Contracten, p. 13. 55 In 1844, the department had requested the forwarding of "lists" of cultivation enterprises existing in Java. See V 5 July 1844, no. 9, Kol. 1576. 56 The amounts mentioned in the model contract were expressed in recepis guilders; £3.50 (copper) was thus equal to 2 guilders and 110 doits (recepis). 53

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payment in the model contract.^7 Such a maximum had already appeared in some contracts drawn around 1840.58 However, Director of Cultivations de Munnick considered this to be an unfair advantage for manufacturers at the expense of the peasantry.59 According to his calculations, crop payments to cane growers were certainly not "excessively7' high.^0 He convinced Rochussen of this, so the latter substituted the sliding scale of crop payments for the idea of maximum payments, which was regarded by de Munnick as the lesser of two evils. Through such ingenious measures as the sliding scale of crop payments, the peasantry benefitted only partly from the further development of the sugar industry, which, thanks to the use of better techniques in cane processing, occurred during those years. Although average production in 1840 was still only 23 piculs per bouw, it had risen in 1850 to 34 piculs, an increase of 48 percent. The average crop payment per bouw in those ten years rose by 30 percent, from f62 in 1840 to f81 in 1850. The greatest rise, proportionately, during this period was in the average crop payment per household which rose from f 13.50 to f22, thus by around 60 percent.^1 It should be remembered, however, that after 1846 the cane planting area had been expanded by about 11 percent, but that the number of households involved in that cultivation had decreased by about 2 percent, so that the remaining growers had to carry out proportionately more work (in 1846 an average of 4.2 households were set aside for one bouw of sugar cane, whereas in 1850 there were no more than 3.7 households). Table 5.2. Crop payments per residency in sugar cultivation in 1850 (guilders) Residency Banyumas Besuki Cirebon Jepara Kediri Madiun Pasuruan Pekalongan Rembang Semarang Surabaya Tegal

Average per Bouw 92.42 105.11 72.94 84.78 23.117 19.109 72.05 57.18 51.40 84.105 92.93 77.102

Average per Household 13.87 36.90 23.112 26.63 5.69 7.27 26.75 13.86 12.100 27.86 16.42 18.32

Source: "Kultuurverslag" 1850. 57

Baud had insisted on this in the interest of sugar production; V 31 October 1845, no. 378, Kol. 4320. 58 This maximum was fixed at f!05 (copper), which would be attained with a production of 30 piculs per bouw. This was included in eleven contracts in 1845. 59 Report of 23 May 1846, no. 1600; Exh. 4 January 1847, no. 10, Kol. 1755. De Munnick fixed the cost of production of one picul of sugar at f7 (copper), of which f3.50 went in crop payments. The sugar could be sold in Java, however, for at least £10 per picul, even when it was of lesser quality. 60 Report of 15 August 1846, no. 1943; Exh. 4 January 1847, no. 10, Kol. 1755. 61 See Appendix I (recepis guilders). The figures provided were thus averages.

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The remaining features of the model contract of 1847 were that every enterprise was limited to 400 to 500 bouw.62 In earlier contracts there had been little regularity on this point, as on many other points. There were factories with planting areas of less than 250 bouw, but there were also factories with planting areas of 800 bouw. Not only were such large areas burdensome for the people, but they sometimes exceeded the capacities of the factories (sugar cane keeps only a short time after harvest). Limiting the planting areas of newly established factories was thus a sensible measure, given the existing state of technology, which forced manufacturers to give more attention and care to the cane to be processed than was sometimes possible on enterprises of larger dimensions. Extending the life of old sugar contracts that had expired was arranged on the basis of the model contract of 1847, albeit mostly with incidental changes. Among these were the sugar contracts issued by van den Bosch in Pasuruan. Rochussen forced the sugar contractors in that region to accept conditions that made the sugar industry more profitable for the government and people. Thus, future crop payments would be calculated, as in the remainder of Java, on actual production and not depend on estimates that often grossly wronged the Javanese cane growers. Even in 1848 the harvest at Pasuruan was estimated at 126,000 piculs of sugar, although it really was 356,000 piculs. With an average yield in Pasuruan which was more than 13 piculs per bouw higher than in Besuki, crop payments per bouw were still almost f30 lower. In 1848, the government had received 15,000 piculs of sugar from Pasuruan of such inferior quality that it had been found unsuitable for dispatch to the Netherlands and had to be sold in Java.6** Furthermore, the sugar—one-third of which was available for free disposal—had to be supplied to the government at prices below those of the model contract (in 1848, Pasuruan sugar had still cost the government more than sugar from any other residency except Tegal).6^ Manufacturers were also obliged, within two years, to improve their factories and to buy new machinery. Finally, contracts were extended for only ten years instead of twenty, while the planting areas of several factories were considerably decreased.65 Some manufacturers had initially refused contract extensions on those conditions. On behalf of one of them, J. E. Banck, a contractor for two big factories in Pasuruan, the firm of A. van Hoboken requested the minister of colonies to give the new agreement "a more lenient direction/' The minister, however, not only deemed that it was not his place to do this—because matters concerning cultivation contracts belonged to "the domestic authority of the Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies in which the Department of Colonies as a rule does not interfere"66—but he appears to have been completely unaware of the conditions on which contract exten62

ART. 1, Bijl. Hand. 1849-50, p. 406 34. "Kultuurverslag" 1848. 64 Sugar of standard sample no. 18 had to be delivered at f9.20, no. 16 at f7.60 per picul (recepis guilders). 65 This data is from "Kultuurverslag" 1851. Negotiations over the conditions of agreements to be extended were started in 1850; the old contracts expired between 1851 and 1853. When the new contracts came into operation in 1853, the planting area declined from 7,200 to 6,400 bouw, and the following year to just over 6,000 bouw. 66 V 20 November 1850, no. 19, Kol. 53. Banck was the owner of the Bekassie-Oost and De Onderneming factories. On the basis of the new contract the planting area of the first factory was reduced from 490 to 300 bouw and that of the second from more than 600 to less than 500 bouw. Both factories were sold to Van Hoboken around 1853. 63

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sions had been offered to the manufacturers.**7 Such protests made little impression on Rochussen. His threat, that if the conditions offered were refused other interested parties would no doubt be found, proved effective. Eventually, only one manufacturer refused to accept the new conditions. Rochussen also got into trouble with the sugar contractors in Tegal. In this Central Javanese residency were some big sugar factories with planting areas of 800 bouw. The economic situation of the cane-planting villages in this area was not very rosy. In particular, the local administration had much abused the provision of labor for the manufacturers. Thus, according to the Cultivation Report for 1848, in contravention of existing regulations, the workers who had been made available had been used to pull carts and wagons loaded with firewood from the forests to the factories.68 A new Resident, J. A. Vriesman, who had been put in charge of the administration of Tegal in 1847, had, more diligently than his predecessors and with the support of the Indies government, wanted to enforce the conditions of the current contracts. However, this had caused him all kinds of conflicts with the local manufacturers. Well could the Cultivation Report for 1848 "regret that the manufacturers, who enjoy such great benefits and owe so much to the government, the native chiefs and the population, do not understand their position, but on the contrary, try to do everything to offend officials and make the native chiefs and the people dislike them intensely." With one of them, E. A. van Vloten of the sugar factory Pangka, the quarrel became so serious that this manufacturer closed his factory in 1850 and started legal proceedings against the Indies government. These proceedings dragged on for ten years to end in 1860 in a sensational political scandal.69 One may conclude that government sugar cultivation under the administration of Rochussen expanded considerably. The treasury benefited from this expansion—in 1850, Rochussen could report that all new contracts were profitable for the government^—as well as the majority of manufacturers. But little changed in the conditions of the people involved in this cultivation. The contents of ARTICLE 11 of the model contract of 1847 illustrate the way in which the people's interests were weighed against those of the sugar industry. According to this article, when a sugar factory was equipped with a waterwheel, the use of irrigation water for the factory was not allowed to disadvantage peasant domestic agriculture. However, once the local (European) administration had agreed to the installation of the waterwheel, then the quantity of water used by the factory could not be decreased as a result of the expansion of rice cultivation.7* In such cases, peasant agriculture had to yield to sugar cultivation. Regulating the relationship between government, people and entrepreneurs, as laid down in the model contract of 1847, was the work of Rochussen. No prior approval had been asked from the government in Holland because the subject was 67

The firm of van Hoboken had referred in its petition to the conditions offered but not appended a copy of the draft contract. However, the department appears to have been ignorant of the matter! 6 ^ This forced labor had to be supplied at a daily wage of 12 to 15 doits (voluntary labor was paid at the rate of about 20 doits per day). 69 More details about this process are provided in chapters 10 and 12. 70 Rochussen to Pahud, 26 August 1850, no. 90, Kol. 6529. 71 Bijl. Hand. 1849-50, p. 40635.

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thought to be within the competence of the Indies government. The new arrangements and the expansion of the sugar cultivation that went with them strengthened the role of the private element within the Cultivation System. Although Baud was not opposed to this development—he had in 1847 agreed to the expansion of sugar cultivation in tandem with the simultaneous withdrawal of part of the indigo cultivation—he was still only moderately pleased with it. Baud saw the sugar contracts as a source of "demoralization."72 The sugar contractors—and not only them—had little sympathy for the people. "There exists with the people in Java, I mean with the Europeans, a lack of conscience in the way they control the soil, labor, products, person and anything else of the Javanese which knows no limits."7** A further opening up of Java for European industrialists and entrepreneurs would, according to Baud, also threaten the traditional attachment of the people to their chiefs. A process could easily be set in train by which the authority of the chiefs was eroded and, consequently, also the authority of the Dutch administration that availed itself of those chiefs to keep its grip on the mass of the population.74 This train of thought had led Baud to ask Rochussen in 1846 whether it would be preferable to invoke a royal decree that would forbid new cultivation contracts between the government and European entrepreneurs. Rochussen, who was in this respect more "liberal" than Baud, had not deemed the proposal to be very "appropriate."75 With the decision taken shortly afterwards, at Rochussen's initiative, to issue a number of new sugar contracts, a new direction was set that had previously filled Baud with great scepticism. It is very possible that it was easier for Baud after 1848 to distance himself from the Cultivation System precisely because within that system the center of gravity had been moved to a cultivation that could be maintained only with the involvement of private entrepreneurs, whom Baud had once unflatteringly labeled as the "real vampires."7** The role of private entrepreneurs in Java operating independently of the government, that is, outside the Cultivation System before 1850, was very modest. Indeed the small scale of production on private account, compared with that which occurred through the intervention and on government account, is apparent from table 5.3. Table 5.3. Production of export crops on private and government account, 1849 Total Production of Java Coffee (piculs) Sugar (piculs) Indigo (Amsterdam pounds)

On Private Account 66,590 177,060 165,940

On Government Account 413,469 1,203,523 a 895,919

Source: Koloniaal Verslag 1849, Bijl. Hand. 1851-52, p. 196; Cornets de Groot, Over het Beheer, p. 152. a Includes 254,195 piculs of sugar that were left at the disposal of the manufacturers by the government, in accordance with the existing contracts. 72

Baud to Rochussen, 22 January 1846, Collectie Baud, 572. Ibid., 21 November 1846, Collectie Baud, 572. 74 See Baud to acting Governor-General J. C. Reynst, V 18 April 1845, no. 1, Kol. 1628. 75 Rochussen to Baud, 22 June 1846, no. 50, Kol. 4565. 76 Baud to Rochussen, 22 June 1846, Collectie Baud, 572. 73

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Private agriculture was still not "free" enterprise. If the entrepreneurs were also "landlords/' who owned private estates, or "land hirers" who had hired land in one of the principalities from Javanese autocrats, then they could exercise certain public law entitlements over the population and force it to cultivate on their behalf. The share of so-called free plantation agriculture in the whole realm of private production of Java during this period was still very modest.77 Insofar as free plantation agriculture existed in Java, outside the interference by the government and without the entrepreneur being also "landlord" or "land hirer," it was practiced (1) on "waste" land, that is, unoccupied land, over which entrepreneurs gained control after the government had made it over to them for hire or lease, or (2) on land already cultivated by the Javanese, in which case, entrepreneurs could not control the land but had to try to make agreements with the population to grow products in which they were interested. The type of agricultural enterprise mentioned under (1) dated from a royal decree of 1831, which authorized the Indies government to hire out "waste" land in appropriate cases to private entrepreneurs who wanted to use it to expand "useful cultivations."78 Those hire agreements had terms of twenty or twenty-five years. Around 1850, there were a total of about fifty registered hire agreements on "waste" land with a total area of more than 32,000 bouw (23,140 hectares) of which, however, no more than about 26,000 bouw (18,329 hectares) were under cultivation. About half of those agreements (twenty-four) were for the cultivation of coffee on plots of land in the Residency of Semarang and about ten for the growing of sugar cane in the division (afdeling) of Karawang and the residencies of Cirebon and Surabaya.79 The basis of plantation agriculture on "the land of the people"—mentioned under (2)—was an article in the constitutional regulation that stated that inhabitants, "in order to carry on useful enterprises," must have the opportunity to enter into collective agreements with village administrations for the delivery of certain articles and the performance of services. The problem these enterprises faced was obtaining the necessary supply of labor at moderate wages.80 This provision was further developed in a government publication of 25 December 1838, Ind. Stb. no. 50. Thus, initially, the government had not been averse to private entrepreneurs who wanted to establish plantations on "waste" land with labor recruited elsewhere or who wanted to enter into contracts with villages for the cultivation of coffee, sugar 77

The production of the private estates and of the hired lands in the principalities was not given separately in the reports compiled around 1850. 78 Royal Decree of 20 March 1831, no. 50, quoted by Cornets de Groot, Over het Beheer, p. 119. See ART. 110 of the constitutional regulation of 1830; ART. 95 constitutional regulation of 1836. See also Bijl. Hand. 1865-66, p. 498. This decree also covered the possibility of granting property or lease rights, but in practice no use was made of this. 79 See "Kultuurverslag" 1850, Bijlage no. 16; "Staat kultuurinrichtingen" 1851; Exh. 16 February 1853, no. 9, Kol. 238. These lists give detailed summaries from year to year of the existing enterprises on "waste" land, the names of the owners, the production, and further details. Reinsma, Cultuurstelsel, p. 131, relied upon an incorrect estimate from the (Indies) Central Bureau of Statistics that before 1850 no more than 5,000 hectares of "waste" land had been hired out. According to data from the Central Bureau, in 1853 approximately 22,000 hectares of "waste" land had been hired out. Basing his figures on this, Reinsma concluded that during 1851 and 1852,15,000 hectares had been added to the area hired out. That, however, was not the case. After 1850, the area hired out remained almost constant. For further details, see chapters 7 and 9. 80 ART. 116 of constitutional regulation of 1830; ART. 102 constitutional regulation of 1836.

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cane, and so on. Had not van den Bosch himself said "that there was ample space" to let government agriculture and "free" entrepreneurs work side by side in Java?*** But it was almost unavoidable that, in the long run, he would come to see those entrepreneurs who were not connected with the Cultivation System as troublesome competitors because "what is planted for private entrepreneurs is not planted for the government, because the Javanese cannot work in two places at the same time."**2 Van den Bosch was referring in particular to coffee cultivation, which was attractive to private entrepreneurs because no expensive investments in factory buildings and machinery were required. Another consideration, naturally, was that private plantations occupied land that might have been used to expand government coffee plantations. If government and private coffee plantations existed side by side, as was the case in the Residency of Semarang, there was the danger that government coffee bought clandestinely from the population would be brought to market as the product of private coffee plantations. For these reasons, the hiring out of "waste" land for coffee, sugar and indigo cultivation on private account was stopped after 1840 by order of the government. For other cultivations, the principle was adopted that hiring out of land could take place only with the express consent of the government in Holland. The making of agreements on the basis of the publication of 25 December 1838 was also prohibited, if they "obviously tended to disadvantage government cultivations."83 In doubtful cases, the local authorities, in accordance with a supplementary decree of 17 April 1841, had to submit the matter to the director of cultivations who, in turn, was required to ask for a decision from the Indies government, unless it was clear that the agreements in question were directly connected with the Cultivation System.84 The establishment of new cultivation enterprises on "waste" land was, thereby, made impossible after 1840. Almost all the enterprises in existence in 1851 had been established on the basis of hire agreements entered before 1841.8^ No further agreements based on the publication of 1838 were registered after 1841. Private entrepreneurs, however, could still find employment within the Cultivation System after 1840 in the cultivation of tobacco and tea (there is, no doubt, a connection between the ending of the hiring out of "waste" land and the rapid expansion of the number of tobacco and tea contracts) as well as in the cultivation of sugar. In any case, a sugar contract, and to a lesser degree a tea or tobacco contract, gave more guarantee of a good return than a precarious existence as a "free grower."8" The experiences of the cultivation enterprises on "waste" land were not very encouraging, among other reasons because the Javanese were not yet used to free wage labor. The Cultivation Report for 1850 described the situation of all enterprises, with few exceptions, as "languishing." Thus, the production of the free sugar enter8

* Quoted in the explanatory memorandum on the Cultivation Law, Bijl. Hand. 1865-66, p. 498. V 1 November 1838, La B8, Kol. 4420; 31 March 1840, La G5, Kol. 4432. See also Bijl. Hand. 1865-66, p. 498. 83 Government decree of 25 February 1840; see V 6 January 1842, no. 5, Kol. 4277; Hand. 16 December 1860, p. 525; Bijl. Hand. 1865-66, p. 498; Duymaer van Twist, "Artikel 56 van het Reglement op het Beleid der Regering van Nederlansch Indie," Bijdragen tot de Kennis van het Stoats- Provinciaal- en Gemeentebestuur in Nederland 9 (1864): 16 ff. 84 Bijl. Hand. 1865-66,498. 85 "Staat kultuurinrichtingen" 1851; Exh. 16 February 1853, no. 9, Kol. 238. 86 See Fransen van de Putte, Hand. 4 December 1862, p. 363. 82

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prises in Karawang in 1850 was no higher than an average of 13 piculs per bouw, although the entrepreneurs in Karawang, according to the Cultivation Report, did not lack know-how and finance. In Cirebon the harvest had been better, with an average of 18 piculs per bouw, but even this yield was poor compared with an average of 25 piculs in government sugar cultivation in Cirebon in 1850.*^ The results of coffee cultivation on "waste" land in the Residency of Cirebon were more favorable than in 1849, when the annual lease had been reduced to one-tenth because the growers, with the depressed state of the coffee market, would otherwise have gone bankrupt. Nevertheless, the Cultivation Report for 1850 deemed it out of the question that these coffee lands would ever make good the capital invested. As long as the Cultivation System expanded, it offered private entrepreneurs opportunities to work under the protective umbrella of the government. Around 1850, however, the government began to withdraw from tobacco and tea cultivations, and the expansion of sugar cultivation came to a standstill. After 1852, no more sugar contracts were issued. Areas of activity now had to be found outside the Cultivation System for new enterprises and newly formed capital. The incentive was there because the prices of several commercial crops rose considerably after 1850.**** The emergence of a liberal-colonial party in the Netherlands ran parallel with this development. This party was averse to state exploitation and state monopoly in the cultivation and consignment systems. After 1848, it was able to make itself heard in the Second Chamber. Great events marked that year of revolution in Europe in peaceful Holland as well. The conservative government in which Baud took part resigned in March 1848. A new constitution, drafted by the Leiden professor Thorbecke, was promulgated that same year. It heralded a new era of reform for Holland and the Indies as well. After a weak interim government, a liberal cabinet under the guidance of Thorbecke seized the reins of power on 1 November 1849. What would this mean for colonial policy? 8

^ Ibid. In 1851 the average production of sugar factories on "waste" land in Cirebon was 26.5 piculs as against 28.5 in government sugar cultivation in that region; in Karawang it was 16 piculs. See "Staat kultuurinrichtingen" 1851. 88 See appendix 2.

6 CRITICISM IN PUBLIC

he Constitution of 1848, which gave the Netherlands a new form of government, also altered the constitutional relationship with the kingdom outside Europe. The most important change was that the formal legislator for the Netherlands—the Crown together with the States-General—was granted a real share in the administration of the overseas possessions. The Constitution of 1848 still entrusted the king with "supreme government/7 but no longer "exclusively/7 According to the new Constitution the governmental principles to be applied in the colonies, as laid down in the constitutional regulations, had to be fixed by law, just as did the monetary system and the manner in which colonial finances had to be managed and accounted for. Furthermore, ARTICLE 59, paragraph 4, of the Constitution left open the possibility of regulating by law "other matters" that concerned the colonies, "as soon as the need for this appears to exist." Finally, the government was obliged—and this was the official death warrant of the former policy of secrecy—in accordance with ARTICLE 60 to dispatch annually to the States-General "a detailed report" on the management of the overseas possessions and on the situation of those places.1 The Second Chamber thus obtained what it had requested, a check on and a say in the colonial finances based on a so-called Indies Accountability Law, yet to be drafted, and even more. However, Thorbecke, the most prominent liberal politician of his day, architect of the state's new institutions in 1848, and no less than three times head of a cabinet thereafter, was deeply disappointed. In his opinion, no provision fell more short of his expectations than the colonial article. ^ His disappointment went so far that he went out of his way in the constitutional committee that he chaired to leave the editing of that article to others, so little could he agree with the principles expressed in it.3 Already in his 1839 "Comments on the Constitution," Thorbecke had defended the idea that the legislator in the mother country did not encroach on the royal prerogative when it laid down laws for the overseas possessions. The word "exclusively" should only be written in the Constitution to prevent the transfer of the

T

1

According to the draft bill of the Constitutional Commission, judicial organization and criminal and civil legislation would also have to be determined by law, but the government dropped this proposal. For the passage of ARTICLES 59 and 60 of the Constitution of 1848, see E. de Waal, De Koloniale Politick der Grondwet en hare Toepassing tot 1 Februarij 1862 (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1863), pp. 32-52; J. T. Buys, De Grondwet. Toelichting en Kritiek, vol. 1 (Arnhem: Gouda Quint, 1883), pp. 227-56. 2 J. R. Thorbecke, Bijdrage tot de Herziening der Grondwet, new ed. (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1948), p. 24. 3 See Thorbecke, Hand. 24 November 1859, p. 300.

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administration to private persons and trading companies as had happened before 1798.4 In the proposal presented to the Second Chamber in 1844 by the then oppositional "Nine Men/' with Thorbecke as leader, for a complete revision of the Constitution, this view was elaborated in the provision that the overseas possessions be ruled "by special laws." Thus, there was no indication either of specific subjects or of laws that had to be made, as in the Constitution of 1848.5 For a great majority of the Second Chamber, among them influential members like Duymaer van Twist who were certainly not averse to a revision of the Constitution, this general provision went much too far. They were of the opinion that the role of the States-General as (co-) legislator for the colonies could not be the same as for the mother country .^ Their arguments against this equalization were once again summarized in 1854 by J. M. de Kempenaer/'Some people desire that much should be left to be controlled by legislation in the mother country, but we warn: don't risk it, because you do not know that land, nor its people, nor its needs, nor the various circumstances which have to be taken into account when making such laws."^ Thorbecke must have seen the result as a personal defeat. What in his system was the rule, namely involvement of the States-General in legislation on colonial matters, became in the new Constitution the exception: the Crown would be qualified to regulate affairs by royal decree unless the Crown and the States-General should jointly decide that a law was "needed." This defeat also explains the unfair judgment on the work of his "allies who had deserted him." He was of the opinion that ARTICLE 59, paragraph 4, "provided for less than nothing."8 He had to be reminded by his former ally, D. Donker Curtius, that the Second Chamber was not as powerless as he thought: "Would representatives who overthrow ministers, who hold the strings of the purse in their hands, not know how to find a means to get their view accepted that there is need for a regulation to be introduced by law and to get that law passed? Certainly, yes."9 But for the time being it did not come to that. The States-General in 1848 were by no means prepared for making laws for the Indies. The Second Chamber, to quote Buys, not only lacked "the most elementary knowledge of the situation and needs of the overseas possessions" but also had quite enough other legislative tasks to perform.10 Of the colonial laws required by the Constitution, those on the monetary system and the constitutional regulation for the Netherlands Indies were not published in the Government Gazette until 1854, and an Indies Accountability Law did not appear until 1864. Moreover, colonial reports were forwarded erratically to the States-General. Only in mid-1850 was the first bundle of "Communications regarding the Overseas Possessions of the Kingdom" presented to the Second Chamber.11 The first Colonial Report submitted in accordance with the Constitution (covering the ^ Thorbecke, Bijdrage, pp. 71, 75. 5 Handelingen omtrent het Voorstel van Negen Leden der Tweede Kamer van de Staten-Generaal tot Herziening der Grondwet in 1845 (The Hague: Belinfante, 1846) p. 18. Cf. Zwart, Duymaer van Twist, p. 204. 6 Ibid. 7 Hand. 25 July 1854, p. 1207. 8 De Waal, Koloniale Politiek, p. 170 (Hand. 5 July 1850). 9 Ibid., p. 172. 10 J. T. Buys, Studien over Staatkunde en Staatsrecht, vol. 1 (Arnhem: Gouda Quint, 1894), p. 386. 11 Bijl. Hand. 1849-50, pp. 403 ff.

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year 1849 and supplemented with information on the previous ten years) was not sent to parliament until 30 August 1851.^ But the resignation of Baud, the revision of the Constitution and the foreshadowing of a new constitutional regulation for the Indies unleashed immediate turmoil in the separate little world of retired Indies hands in The Hague and other "colonial experts." Quite a few among them had old scores to settle with a minister of colonies who was now toppled from his pedestal or hoped to exert influence on the direction to be taken by the government in the Indies. "At present it is raining colonial pamphlets/7 Baud would write to Rochussen in 1848.^ That flood of pamphlets and newspaper articles—from van Nes,14 Kruseman,15 van Vliet,16 van Herwerden17 and also from Baud himself, who was not backward in defending the colonial administration of which he was the personal embodiment1**—was a notable contrast with the dead period before 1848.19 Yet the influence of those publications should not be overestimated. Certainly before 1848 it was generally not advisable for an Indies official to put forward opinions publicly that did not accord with "the spirit" of the government. An "unbecoming attack" on the measures or decrees of the government or the government in Holland could even result in dismissal.^ This did not mean, however, that there were no 12 De Waal, Koloniale Politiek, p. 378. The submission of iheKoloniale Verslagen to the Second Chamber continued to take place two or more years after the years that they covered. Thus the report for 1850 was not submitted to the Second Chamber until October 1852, the report for 1857 only in January 1860. See de Waal, Koloniale Politiek, p. 379. 13 Baud to Rochussen, 21 June 1848, Collectie Baud, 572. ^ In a letter to van den Bosch in 1834, Baud had expressed an unfavorable opinion of the character of J.F.W. van Nes, at the time Resident of Pasuruan, and thought him unfit for the post of governor-general; see Westendorp Boerma, Briefwisseling, 2:134. Thereafter there seems to have been a personal difference between them both. In 1847, van Nes had resigned as member of the Council of the Indies. In 1850, he again entered the Indies civil service, this time as vice-president of the council. He had to resign again a year later because of illness. 15 J. D. Kruseman had been dismissed as director-general of finances in 1844, after having intrigued with King William II against Baud. 16 L. van Vliet, who also called himself Van Woudrichem van Vliet, had become involved in 1845 in a libel suit against the Indies government and had then been expelled from the colony. Later on he acquired some notoriety as an author of many pamphlets on Indies affairs. However, he exercised no political influence. 17 J. D. van Herwerden, most recently Resident of Madiun and, according to Rochussen, not a good one, became in 1849 the first Indies official on leave in Europe to write publicly about Indies affairs. He revealed himself as an ardent defender of the Cultivation System, to which Rochussen attributed the fact that later he was invested with the Order of the Dutch Lion without the Indies government having made a nomination to that effect. Rochussen to Pahud, 26 August 1850, no. 96, Kol. 6529. ^ In 1848 and 1850, Baud wrote pamphlets against Kruseman and Steyn Parve. He also published several articles in the conservative paper De Nederlander. ^ Reinsma found mentioned in the catalog of the Royal Library no more than eight pamphlets relating to the Netherlands Indies for the period 1843-47. For the years 1848-50 there were fifty-two. Reinsma, Cultuurstelsel, p. 30 n. 2® See the supplementary instruction for the governor-general of 1842 (ART. 4), Cornets de Groot, Over het Beheer, p. 164. Even in 1855, in a new official instruction that replaced the previous one, the governor-general was emphatically instructed to maintain obedience to authority and if necessary to remove any official who did not observe the obedience required. See J. Kiers, De Bevelen des Konings (Utrecht: Oosthoek, 1938), p. 207 (ART. 27).

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dissenting opinions. In 1847, Rochussen already had impressed on Baud that the Indies were no longer the Indies that Baud had known twelve years earlier. "The influence of a new generation, educated under liberal conceptions, is also making itself felt here/'21 Probably the many "Indies" pamphlets that appeared around 1848 were more an expression of the feelings and opinions existing in government circles in Java that had already been nursed for a long time, rather than actual new ideas and opinions in the Indies administration, as Reinsma, for instance, supposes.22 Moreover, most of the pamphlets were very hastily written, so they were destined to remain "one day wonders"; after 1850, they were very seldom quoted. Even D. C. Steyn Parve's Het Koloniaal Monopoliestelsel, Getoetst aan Geschiedenis en Staathuishoudkunde (The colonial monopoly system, tested against history and political economy), which Rochussen believed would cause "a real sensation," had in a few months, so he was informed from the Netherlands, "almost passed into oblivion, just like so many pamphlets in recent times."2** The tenor of Steyn Parve's book, of which a supplementary edition was published in 1851, was that the cultivation and consignment system ("the monopoly system") influenced the colonial budget adversely rather than beneficially. No profit was made on that system, but a loss.24 According to the author, the government would do well to relinquish as quickly as possible the improper role of "planter and merchant" and to limit itself to the role of "sovereign." Freed from the burden of the government cultivations, the Javanese people would seek their own advantage in "free labor," as a result of which production and various taxation yields would increase considerably. This would also put revenues at the disposal of the government that were no longer dependent on the fluctuating market prices of a few colonial products such as coffee and sugar. Steyn Parve argued his surprising conclusions using an impressive number of statistics and other material from the Indies archives to which he, as a official, had had access. "He is playing with figures," was Rochussen's opinion. As a former minister of finances, he was in a position to make such a judgment and, to a certain degree, to sympathize with such methods.25 While Steyn Parve's book had the merit that it pointed out a number of debit items that had too easily been overlooked in the past when calculating the profits of the Cultivation System, by trying to prove too much, namely that the transition to a system of free cultivation without state interference would increase Indies profits, he ultimately proved nothing. His "hollow theories" were not convincing.2^ Dr. W. Bosch, chief of the public health service in the Netherlands Indies, also poured a flood of statistics over his readers in an 1851 brochure, De Vermeerdering van 21

Rochussen to Baud, 29 October 1847, Collectie Baud, 588. Reinsma, Cultuurstelsel, p. 31; Zwart, Duymaer van Twist, p. 73. 23 Rochussen to Pahud, 26 August 1850, no. 96, Kol. 6529; Pahud to Rochussen, 22 October 1850, no. 65, Kol. 6526. 2 ^ D. C. Steyn Parve, Het Koloniaal Monopoliestelsel, Getoetst aan Geschiedenis en Staathuishoudkunde (Zaltbommel: Noman, 1850), pp. 67,68. 25 Rochussen to Baud, 25 August 1850, Collectie Baud, 840. Rochussen was of the opinion that Steyn Parve's book had been written "with talent," but that he should be dismissed from government service—Steyn Parve was on leave in Holland when he wrote his books—because no official was entitled to dispute openly the principles adhered to by the government. 26 I. D. Fransen van de Putte to J. P. Cornets de Groot, 15 November 1854. See Reinsma, "Brieven van I.D. Fransen van de Putte uit diens Planterstijd," Bijdragen en Mededelingen Historisch Genootschap 71 (1957): 177. 22

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Java's Bevolking, Beschouwd al$ de Grootste Bron van Rijkdom voor Nederland (The increase of Java's population, considered the greatest source of wealth for the Netherlands). This somewhat long-winded title masked an argument that concluded that the Cultivation System, instead of bringing prosperity, had impoverished the Javanese year by year. Mortality had increased alarmingly, and it would not be long before a great many of them would be dead from starvation. According to the author, the population statistics proved that a considerable decline had occurred in the normal growth of the population with the result that in 1850 there were two million less Javanese than there would have been if the Cultivation System had not been introduced. Bosch's pamphlet, with all the statistics it brought together and its apodictic train of argument, initially made an impression.^ Those who went further into his calculations, however, soon concluded that they often did not tally, as H. J. Lion would demonstrate in a merciless analysis.28 Lion was an independent character. In a series of letters published in the NRC in 1850 and 1851, he criticized just about anybody and anything. A letter in which he accused Rochussen of maladministration ultimately saw him facing a lawsuit for "insult and calumny"; it was one of the first legal actions involving the press in the Indies and, for Lion, who combined a sharp intellect with a sharp pen, not the last.^ Finally, there was the pamphlet, also published in 1851, of the retired Inspector of Cultivations Vitalis, De Invoering, Werking en Gebreken van het Stelsel van Kultures op Java (The introduction, operation and faults of the system of cultivations in Java). It was interesting because of the light it threw on the first years of the Cultivation System, but it was not very systematic. Although Vitalis was certainly no principled opponent of the Cultivation System—indeed, as owner of a sugar contract he had a direct interest in it—his memoirs of his days as an official, somewhat soured by grudges, would provide welcome material in the struggle against the system.30 Bosch, Lion, and Vitalis all had to get published in the Netherlands what they had written in the Indies because there was no press freedom in the colony. Rochussen did not want to hear of freedom of the press. For the time being, in anticipation of the new constitutional regulation, the custom (it was no more than that) was maintained that nothing was to be printed in Java unless it had been approved by the government. The absence of press freedom in the Netherlands Indies was one of the reasons that made van Hoevell decide in 1848, after "many unpleasantnesses" with the government over his Tijdschrift voor Nederlandsch Indie, to resign his post as minister of religion in Batavia. He thought himself "under the present circumstances, 27 The "really very interesting work" of Dr. Bosch was quoted with approval by several speakers during the budget debates in the Second Chamber on 6-9 December 1851. See Hand. Tweede Kamer 1851-52, pp. 438, 442, 453. 2** H. J. Lion, Analyse der Cijfers en Beschouwingen, voorkomende in het Werk "De Vermeerdering van Java's Bevolking, Beschouwd als de Grootste Bron van Rijkdom voor Nederland" (Rotterdam: Nijgh, 1852). 29 After Minister Pahud had brought this article to the attention of Rochussen, legal action against Lion was taken in the Council of Justice at Semarang. This court acquitted him because there had been no intention to offend. This judgement was confirmed by the Supreme Court of the Netherlands Indies. See Het Regt in Nederlandsch Indie 6: 379, 469 ff. 3® Vitalis also published an article on "Misbruiken in de Administratie op Java" ("Abuses in the administration in Java"), TNI 2 (1851): 246 ff. After that he wrote a number of other pamphlets which were, however, very reactionary and consequently ignored by van Hoevell. In themselves, these later writings are quite interesting.

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in the interests of education, science and religion in the Indies, able to work much more effectively in the fatherland than here."^1 The "other weighty reasons" that he mentioned when tendering his resignation on 19 July 1848 related to the Indies government's expression of dissatisfaction in him concerning his role in the famous meeting in the "De Harmonic" club on 22 May 1848 in Batavia. This meeting was organized to protest against the neglect of education and the Delft monopoly on the training of government officials,^ but it filled Rochussen with such fright that he had "everyone ready with loaded guns and cannons" in the barracks.33 Farewelled by half the population of Batavia after a final service in the packed Willemskerk, van Hoevell left in August 1848 for the Netherlands, "not only," as he wrote to his parents, "because I no longer feel safe under a system of administration under which such things can happen as have befallen me, but in particular also because I feel a calling to do everything in my power in the motherland for the welfare of the unfortunate natives of this land. They place all their hope in me and I cannot put that hope to shame."34 Rochussen was only too glad to see "our tribune of the people" depart.3^ In the Netherlands, van Hoevell would be "vindicated by the King and the Nation itself." The acceptance of his forced resignation was canceled and some days later, on 10 September 1849, he was elected to the Second Chamber by the electorate of the small Guelders town of Zaltbommel with 271 of the 407 votes.^6 He delivered his maiden speech on 15 December 1849. As "chief of the colonial opposition" he would, during the next twelve years, untiringly lead the battle against the colonial system existing in Java. Van Hoevell was not the first person to impress upon the Netherlands by medium of the Second Chamber that possession of the Indies carried with it not only rights but also obligations. Some months earlier, BWAE baron Sloet tot Oldhuis had already borne the brunt. However, this president of the Court of Justice in Zwolle and chief editor of the Tijdschrift voor Staathuishoudkunde en Statistiek, for all his good intentions, lacked the force of conviction. His speeches were too pompous and reeked too much of the study hall. His ideas—for instance the proposal to sell "waste" land in Java to private European entrepreneurs to cover budget deficits (a subject about 31

Clergymen of the Protestant church in the Netherlands Indies were appointed and dismissed by the government, van Hoevell's letter of resignation is published in his De Beschuldiging en Veroordeeling in Indie, en de Regtvaardiging in Nederland (Zaltbommel: No man, 1850), Bijlage no. XXX. On the question of this resignation and what preceded it, see P. van 't Veer, Geen Blad voor de Mond. Vijf Radicalen uit de Negentiende Eeuw (Amsterdam: Arbeiderspers, 1958), pp. 101 ff. 32 In 1842, Baud had concentrated the training of Indies officials in Delft. The inner circle of the Indies bureaucracy and thus access to higher office was in principle reserved for those who had completed their training in Delft. See Ind. Stb. 1843, no. 12. The small number of students at Delft, however, meant that this principle was repeatedly deviated from. The Delft monopoly put Dutch parents in the Indies to great expense, often without any avail for the careers of their sons. 33 Rochussen to Baud, 27 May 1848, Collectie Baud, 795. 34 26 July 1848 (copy), Collectie Veth. 35 Rochussen to Baud, 26 August 1848, Collectie Baud, 795. 3 ^ Hand. 1849-50, p. 28. In the following year, van Hoevell was elected to the Second Chamber for the district of Almelo, also situated in the eastern rural part of the country. He represented this district without interruption until 1862.

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which much was spoken and written in 1848 and 1849)—were seldom as good as his delivery.3? Van Hoevell, then, was a much better advocate of the interests of the Indies. In 1849, before he became a member of parliament, he had satirized his countrymen in a pamphlet under the pen name of "Jeronymus," because they had failed so badly in fulfilling their moral obligations towards the Javanese people. He had contrasted the cholera then raging in the Netherlands with the ten times greater misery of an epidemic among the Javanese population in the Indies who were deprived of all medical care, something he had himself witnessed in 1847. "People of the Netherlands, does not guilt burn your consciences?"38 As a member of the Second Chamber he would not abandon this theme. With van Hoevell, the "ethical" movement in colonial politics obtained a voice and expression for the first time. Stirring and beseeching—he could sometimes say things with "a disturbing eloquence"^—he put into words the idea that the Netherlands had "higher responsibilities" to its overseas possessions and the people living there; a calling that it had neglected for much too long because it had eyes only for the budget surplus. It had taken millions from the Indies but never given anything back. Education, Christianity, and the blessings of progress had unjustly been denied the people who "planted and harvested" for the Netherlands.4^ The Dutch government gradually would have to bring Java to a situation that "develops and satisfies" those attributes and needs of the Javanese "which they have in common with us and makes them happier materially and spiritually."41 Education would make the Javanese selfassertive and free people. Their conversion to Christianity—the clergyman in him would not be denied—would crown that civilizing mission. Van Hoevell brought an expertise to the Chamber that had all too often been absent in the treatment of colonial subjects. In the past, parliament had listened to the minister without being able to counter with anything more than an odd piece of information borrowed from a private letter, which the honorable representative— who did not himself know Java—had received from friends or relations. Van Hoevell, however, spoke with all the authority of someone who had lived in Java for twelve years and who had himself been a careful observer of things there, as was evident from his account, published in book form in 1849, of a journey he made through that island in 1847.42 This record of his trip—even today highly readable and one of the very few that appeared in the first half of the nineteenth century about Java—aimed to arouse the interest of readers in that unknown island and to give 37 See Hand. 1848-49, pp. 235 ff. Van Hoevell also saw in this sale of land a means to develop Java, but in contrast to Sloet tot Oldhuis he wanted the money obtained from it to benefit Java itself. The government deemed the proposal unworkable and undesirable as well. See also chapter 7. 3 ® Jeronymus [W. R. van Hoevell], Eene Epidemie op Java en de Cholera in Nederland (Amsterdam: Van Kampen, 1849), p. 11. 39 G. H. van Soest, Dr. W.R. Baron van Hoevell (Zaltbommel: Noman, 1879), p. 18. 40 Hand. 18 July 1854, p. 1108. 41 TNI 1 (1849): 59. 42 Van Hoevell, Reis over Java. The second part of this travel journal appeared in 1851. Van Hoevell had already planned in 1847 to write this book. He had contacted Professor Veth in Amsterdam because its publication in the Indies would be out of the question as a result of the existing "censorship scissors" wielded there. See van Hoevell to P. J. Veth, 28 August 1847, Collectie Veth.

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them an impression of how the people there lived and how they were governed. It was an impression that was not too favorable to that government. As an orthodox liberal, van Hoevell saw in the press a powerful weapon to fight abuses and wrongdoings.43 Knowing that he could now finally write freely, he lost no time in preparing to republish in the Netherlands the Tijdschrift voor Nederlandsch Indie, the publication of which had been stopped after his departure from Java. In the first issue of that magazine published in the Netherlands, which appeared as early as January 1849, he promised to publish everything he knew or would come to know about the Indies, but which could not be made public over there because of the censorship applied by the government. Furthermore, he promised his readers a "free and independent opinion" of all the news, "not because I regard my own opinion as infallible, but because I do not credit anyone with that ability, certainly not the government in the Indies."44 Rochussen had been warned! Frequently, van Hoevell aired official papers not intended for publication that he had been able to locate in the Indies or that later on were sent to him. Indeed, in his first speech in the Second Chamber, he quoted from an 1847 letter written by Minister Baud to the Indies authorities to demonstrate the inaccuracy of the information supplied by official sources.45 He replied to the reproach that this made him an accomplice to the breach of secrecy by officials by stating that he would continue to publish such material as often as it was sent to him, "if that material can serve to inform the Nation and the Parliament about the real situation in Java and in the Indies."4** The publication of several confidential documents in the Tijdschrift voor Nederlandsch Indie finally led to a royal decree that tightened the prohibition on supplying copies of and allowing access to documents belonging to the government archives in the colonies to unauthorized persons.4'7 This restriction did not achieve much. Complaints about "disgraceful disloyalty in the Indies offices" regularly appeared even after that year in correspondence between the minister and the governor-general.4^ Van Hoevell also did not rise in the general estimation because he provided space in his magazine for anonymous letters and accusations that sometimes bordered on libel and even went farther than that. On one occasion, the result was an invitation to a duel!49 He was also the target, inside as well as outside the Chamber, of very personal attacks. Baud, with whom his personal relationship was always poor, once publicly intimated that van Hoevell had neglected his duties as pastor in Batavia to a person who was dying.5^ His past work as a clergyman, which he had to 4

^ See W. R. van Hoevell, Parlementaire Redevoeringen over Koloniale Belangen (Zaltbommel: Noman, 1862-65), 1:179 (8 December 1851). 44 TN71(1849): 57. 4 ^ Van Hoevell, Parlementaire Redevoeringen, 1:3. 46 Ibid., p. 195 (8 December 1851). 47 Royal decree of 13 January 1854; Ind. Stb. 1854, no. 18. To those secret documents belonged the "supplementary points of instruction" to the governor-general, laid down in 1842, which were published by van Hoevell in 1851. See TNI 1 (1851): 267 ff. 48 See, for example, Pahud to Rochussen, 25 December 1858, no. 215, Kol. 6530; Rochussen to Pahud, 24 November 1859, no. 213, Kol. 6528. 4 ^ With H. Loudon, on the occasion that the Tijdschrift voor Nederlandsch Indie accused his brother James (the later minister of colonies) of owing his appointment as an official in the General Government Secretariat to patronage. See TNI I (1855): 336, 401. 50 Cf. van Hoevell, Parlementaire Redevoeringen, 1: 193; Collectie Baud, 913; van Soest, Van

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give up to be able to take his seat in the Chamber, weighed for many years like a millstone around his neck. "People are against him because he is a former minister of religion/'51 Things that would not have been held against other people were seen as doubly grievous in him, the former pastor. Impulsive and short-tempered by nature—"My character is too fiery; great prudence, calmness, astuteness and even craftiness is necessary to accomplish anything in that gathering," he wrote to his friend Veth of his first impression of parliamentary work5^—those attacks caused him in turn to utter bitter remarks. The "slander and lies" to which he was exposed were a recurring theme in his speeches.53 By acting in this way—however excusable it might have been in some instances—undoubtedly he seriously prejudiced in the long run the cause that he championed with so much conviction. Courage and compassion went hand in hand with an undeniable inclination to think that he was always in the right and an all too uncritical acceptance of certain liberal dogmas. As a result, his role in politics remained perhaps somewhat more limited than it could have been. The principal political opponents of van Hoevell were Baud, Rochussen, and— although he was a member of the liberal Thorbecke government brought to power in November 1849—Minister of Colonies Pahud. In 1850, Baud made a surprising comeback to politics when he was elected to the Second Chamber as representative for Rotterdam, much against the wishes of the liberal NRC.54 In the Chamber, Baud, who enjoyed great prestige, defended the conservative point of view vigorously and enthusiastically. "Baud was a fine man, a classic fellow," Thorbecke would remember in 1870. "A statesman, a breed apart from the men of today who are whippersnappers compared with him. Easily angered, warm, always dignified in his speeches. Master of his thoughts and words as few men are."5^ If van Hoevell was leader of the "colonial opposition," Baud was, until his resignation from the Chamber in 1858, "the leader of the old colonial politics."56 Rochussen, who had retired after stepping down as governor-general in 1851, was elected to the Chamber the following year (as representative for Alkmaar). Still the courtier of old, before taking this step he had asked the advice of the king, "who desired it very much."57 C. F. Pahud already had behind him a long career as an official in the Indies when, in the autumn of 1849 while on leave in Europe, he was put in charge of the Department of Colonies. Van Hoevell, who knew him from the Indies, did not think unfavorably of him, judging from his opinion about the new minister in a letter to Veth of 4 November 1849, "Mr Pahud is a very meritorious official, a scrupulously honest man, who is convinced of the need for great changes and reforms to be made Hoevell, p. 32. The informant (a retired Indies civil servant) to whom Baud referred in the Second Chamber had to admit later that a slur had been unjustly cast on van Hoevell. 51 F. s'Jacob to I.D. Fransen van de Putte, 2 August 1854, Collectie Fransen van de Putte (in private hands). 52 17 December 1849, Collectie Veth. 53 See van Hoevell, Parlementaire Redevoeringen, 2:15. 54 Alberts, Baud en Thorbecke, p. 211. See Baud to Rochussen, 21 August 1850, Collectie Baud, 572. 55 Diary of Willem Thorbecke, Collectie Thorbecke, 977; Thorbecke, Hand. 9 May 1864,6101. $6 See van Hoevell, Parlementaire Redevoeringen, 3: vi. 57 Rochussen, "Autobiografie," Bijdragen en Mededelingen Historisch Genootschap 73 (1959): 125.

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in the Indies/'58 But van Hoevell would soon change his mind. Pahud appears to have been rather conservative and not very independent. Baud, once he was a member of the Chamber, exercised great influence over him. Thorbecke would later describe him as "more administrator than legislator, certainly more administrator than reformer; a diligent, hardworking administrator, but like all administrators, stuck fast to tradition/'59 Pahud, then, had been less Thorbecke's choice than the king's.60 This became evident in April 1853, when Thorbecke resigned after a conflict with King William III and Pahud stayed on in a conservative cabinet. Among the circle of colonial liberals like van Hoevell, Steyn Parve, and so on, it soon became clear that even though Pahud was a member of a liberal ministry, no radical changes could be expected from him. "It was soon all too obvious that the old ways would not be abandoned, that delays, secrecy, aversion to all so-called unnecessary intercourse with parliament would continue to characterize the course of colonial affairs." This quotation is taken from De Indier and, indeed, from the first issue of that paper that appeared on 4 July 1850. Just like the Tijdschrift voor Nederlandsch Indie, De Indier aimed to make better known and to raise interest in colonial matters and topics. "The purpose behind the publication of De Indier is to spread knowledge of colonial affairs, to provoke daily discussion, to work with others in the realm of journalism, in a word, to quash the monopoly of knowledge of colonial affairs, together with the many other colonial monopolies which have already caused the Netherlands such incalculable damage."6* The weekly Indier—or "Monster" (ondier), as it was also less kindly labeled— published leading articles in which the government in Holland and the Indies government were fiercely criticized, and also summaries of parliamentary documents, miscellaneous news, including much from the British and French colonies, and book reviews. Finally, it reserved space for private correspondence from the Indies. For overseas subscribers, a separate monthly supplement dispatched by overland mail was available, which contained, among other things, information about commerce, the stock market, political events, summaries of parliamentary reports, in short, everything people wanted to know when the mail arrived to be "upto-date" about what had happened since the previous mail from the Netherlands had been sent. De Indier was printed by the firm of Noman and Son at Zaltbommel, which from 1850 also printed the Tijdschrift voor Nederlandsch Indie. This fact, and the similarity in tone of both journals, led people to suspect that van Hoevell was the author of the leading articles. Van Hoevell denied this. The editors, who scrupulously maintained their anonymity, were, until the end of 1852, Steyn Parve and the Amsterdam professor and orientalist Veth.6^ Thereafter, the editorship was passed to the journalist Iz. J. 58

4 November 1849, Collectie Veth. Hand. 25 November 1864, p. 182. ^ See C. B. Wels, "De Formatie van het Eerste Ministerie-Thorbecke," Bijdragen en Mededelingen Historisch Genootschap 76 (1962): 296,317; Alberts, Baud en Thorbecke, p. 68. 59

61 See the edition of 4 July 1850. The name of the paper may have been inspired by De Nederlander; from the start a conservative paper (under the leadership of former minister F. A. van Hall), from 1850 it became the party organ of the antirevolutionaries, who took a very conservative stand in colonial matters. ^ See P. A. van der Lith, "Levensbericht van P. J. Veth," in Jaarboek van de Koninklijk Academie van Wetenschappen 1896 (Amsterdam: Mueller, 1897), p. 39. However, it is incorrectly asserted that De Indier no longer appeared after 1852. See also De Indier of 18 July 1850 and 9 October

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Lion, who later became editor of the ultra-conservative Dagblad van Zuid Holland en 's Gravenhage but who was at that time still writing in support of the liberal and Thorbeckian line. He was, so he said, put in charge of editing De Indier on the recommendation and under the guidance of van Hoevell from 1 January 1853. It was a teaming that did not turn out very well because it ended just one year later.^ That the influence of De Indier was certainly not underestimated is evident from Pahud's semiofficial correspondence with Rochussen. Already, in a letter of 22 November 1850, he had asked whether De Indier was really read as widely in the Indies as some people maintained. And did the journal have a large number of officials among its subscribers?64 The establishment of the Tjaraka Welanda (Dutch Envoy) in 1855—the following year renamed Nederlandsch Indie—was meant to counter De Indier.^ Both Baud and Pahud had financial interests in this magazine, which originally was under the editorship of the Delft professor of Islamic and administrative law in the Indies, S. Keyzer; in 1860, the renegade Iz. Lion became chief editor. It also enjoyed the support of some sugar contractors, who had little in common with van Hoevell and De Indier.^ Pahud would continue to do his utmost for Nederlandsch Indie when he replaced Duymaer van Twist in 1856 as governor-general. "People know that I regard reading Nederlandsch Indie as desirable, so as not to see things solely through the spectacles of De Indier/'67 Notwithstanding that support, the journal was not a great success.6** In 1861, its publication was discontinued. One year later De Indier would also disappear. As an opposition paper it was finished when the liberal party came to power again in 1862.^9 A journal like De Indier, whose supply of news benefited from improved communications after 1845, saw to it that the catastrophic famine that ravaged Central 1851, where it is denied that the paper had the same editor as the Tijdschrift voor Nederlandsch Indie. 63 I. J. Lion, Mijn Staatkundig Leven. Bijdrage tot de Kennis der Dagbladpers in Nederland (The Hague: Susan, 1865), p. 33. For details about this Lion, who frequently changed his colors during his career as a journalist and hack writer, see J. M. H. J. Hemels, De Nederlandse Pers voor en na de Afschaffing van het Dagbladzegel in 1869 (Assen: Van Goreum, 1969), pp. 81-84,107. He was replaced by his namesake H. J. Lion, who in the meantime had thrown in his lot with van Hoevell. See J. C. van Lier, H.J. Lion, Een Strijder voor de Belangen van Indie (Batavia: Bruining, 1870), p. 39. 64 Pahud to Rochussen, 22 November 1850, no. 66, Kol. 6526. Rochussen was unable to answer these questions. His information went no further than that the magazine had 147 subscribers outside Batavia, most of them in Semarang; Rochussen to Pahud, 27 January 1851, no. 101, Kol. 6529. ^ Nederlandsch Indie appeared from the beginning of 1857 as a weekly (before that it was a fortnightly), while a special mail-edition was also published at that time, intended for subscribers in the Indies. 66 See Pahud to Baud, 9 January 1857, Collectie Baud, 844; Baud to Keyzer, 22 December 1856, M. G. van Heel to Baud, 6 July 1857, Collectie Baud, 852. See TNI 2 (1857): 85. 67 Pahud to Baud, 9 July 1856, Collectie Baud, 844. 68 According to information available to Pahud, 233 copies of De Indier were distributed in the Indies at the end of 1856, whereas Nederlandsch Indie had no more than 40 subscribers; Pahud to Baud, 10 December 1856, Collectie Baud, 844. 69 Nederlandsch Indie was then taken over by the Nieuw Dagblad van 's Gravenhage; the chief editor was Iz. Lion. See Lion, Staatkundig Leven, pp. 74, 79. The Koloniale Courant took the place of De Indier on 1 January 1863.

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Java in 1849 and 1850 did not go unnoticed in the Netherlands. Even the first issue of De Indier paid a great deal of attention to this appalling occurrence, something exceptional in nineteenth-century Java, which, in contrast to India, did not experience a long series of severe famines with mass mortality.^ The Residency of Semarang was seriously affected by the famine. According to official figures, which are certainly too low rather than too high, the division (afdeling) of Semarang lost 9 percent of its population in 1850 as a result of death or flight to other areas. Demak lost as much as 31 percent of its population, and the district of Grobogan 5.4 percent. According to the Colonial Report for 1850, in those three areas together the population figure fell by more than 80,000, or 20 percent of the total/1 Moreover, Duymaer van Twist^ and van Soest^ later came up with much higher figures. An example of the dramatic form that the famine took can be found in Het Regt in Nederlandsch Indie. In 1850, a Javanese from the Residency of Semarang was brought before the court for burying alive his three-month-old son, because his wife could no longer look after it "through hunger."74 Food shortage was not an unusual occurrence in Java, but previous information about it had filtered through to the Netherlands only sparsely or not at all. By com parison, the detailed information about the famine in Demak and Grobogan confronted the public in the Netherlands for the first time with the dark side of the colonial system (the cultivation and consignment system) that up to then had usually been so enthusiastically praised. All the greater, then, was the impression made by the information appearing in private correspondence and journals like De Indier, where officials reluctantly conceded that natural causes like crop failure and diseases were not exclusively to blame for the misery. As early as 1847, during a tour of inspection through Central Java, Rochussen had formed an unfavorable impression of the situation in the Residency of Semarang. The corvee services for the fortification works in the city of Semarang and the cultivation of tobacco introduced some years earlier placed a heavy burden on the people. "The simultaneous cutting of very considerable quantities of timber, required for the forts and the gigantic tobacco sheds, has been very oppressive. No wonder that rice and coffee cultivation have suffered."^ Rice cultivation in Demak had also suffered from the poor condition of the soil, which was often either too wet or too 70

See W. R. Hugenholtz, "Famine and Food Supply in Java 1830-1914," in Two Colonial Empires, ed. Bayly and Kolff, pp. 155-88 and especially p. 182. 7 ^ Bijl. Hand. 1852-53, p. 113. In these figures the decrease in population in 1849 was not in cluded. According to the Cultivation Report for that year, the population of the whole Residency of Semarang fell by almost 35,000 people. 72 Duymaer van Twist estimated the population of Grobogan before the famine at 120,000 people, of whom 42,000 would ultimately be left (Duymaer van Twist to Pahud, 12 September 1852, no. 121, Kol. 6531). 73 According to van Soest, Kultuurstelsel, 3: 222, the population of Demak decreased from 336,000 people in 1848 to 120,000 in 1850, that of Grobogan from 98,500 to 9,000. Van Soest relied on information, for which no sources were cited, in TNI 2 (1851): 66. His figures are probably much too high to be accepted uncritically, as Colenbrander, Koloniale Geschiedenis, 3: 42 and Gonggrijp, Schets, p. 104, did. See Bleeker, TNI 1 (1850): 2, who put the population of Demak in 1847 at no more than 235,000 people. 74 Het Regt in Nederlandsch Indie 5 (1851): 51 ff. The accused was found guilty in the first instance but acquitted on higher appeal because he had acted in a fit of temporary insanity. 75 Rochussen to Baud, 22 July 1847, no. 63, Kol. 4566. For an elaborate study of the Demak famine, see Elson, 'The Famine in Demak and Grobogan."

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dry. A plan proposed by Rochussen in 1847 to have a system of drainage and irrigation canals built had not been carried out, as was the case with several more of his projects. Not until it was too late would the construction of those works be started.76 Also unexecuted was an instruction from Rochussen—he called it an "explicit order"—to exempt the people from corvee services for the fortifications; the military authorities would not hear of it.77 As if all this was not enough, the regent of Demak had been an arrant extortioner, alive only to his own advantage and to that of the many members of his family. The poorly paid lower chiefs had cooperated in these extortions, while the European administration in Demak, consisting of an assistant-resident and two subordinate officials for an area comprising more than 200,000 people, had only been concerned with increasing land rent and collecting it ruthlessly.78 Finally, government tobacco cultivation had been "very disadvantageous" for the households involved in it, so people continually moved away.79 Up to 1843, the Regency of Demak and the sub-Regency of Grobogan had been spared almost entirely from the Cultivation System because coffee did not grow well there and water was insufficient for the cultivation of sugar cane and indigo. The whole area was poor—"the villages all look equally wretched, there are no bamboo, coconut or other fruit trees of any importance to be found in them"—and the people were labeled as "utterly lazy and indifferent."80 The introduction of tobacco cultivation, which the government decided upon in 1843, could, therefore, be propounded as beneficial for the people; after all, in that way some money would come to the villages. With the support of the Resident of Semarang, Smissaert—the same one who had driven up land rent in Cirebon—that cultivation was strongly encouraged after 1843. When he retired in 1846, contracts for seven enterprises had been issued that provided for 1,100 bouw of tobacco through forced cultivation.81 Thus the people were forced to contribute to building enormous wooden tobacco sheds in several places at the same time. More often than not the necessary timber and bamboo had to be cut far away from the villages. The "fair" price set by the government for that material was sometimes lower than the price that the people themselves had had to pay for it.8^ On an 1852 tour of inspection through the area, Governor-General Duymaer van Twist was still struck by the fact that returning peasants always settled at considerable distances from the ruins of the tobacco sheds, as if they were terrified of those buildings.83 Despite all efforts, tobacco cultivation was not very successful. The government had not been very fortunate with the entrepreneurs it had contracted, for which it 76

Rochussen, Toelichting en Verdediging, p. 147. Ibid., p. 149. 78 Van Soest, Kultuurstelsel, 3:218-19; TNI 2 (1855): 79-89. 79 "Kultuurverslag" 1849. 80 Information on the introduction of tobacco cultivation in Demak and Grobogan is contained in a nota of former Resident Smissaert of 14 November 1850, Collectie Baud, 900. 81 In the Regency of Semarang two more tobacco contracts were granted for a total planting area of 300 bouw. 8 ^ For the inquiry conducted by local European officials among village chiefs on the consequences of the introduction of tobacco cultivation, see Pierson, Kultuurstelsel, pp. 153-55. 83 Duymaer van Twist to Pahud, 12 September 1852, no. 121, Kol. 6529; see Pierson, Kultuurstelsel, p. 156. 77

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was itself partly to blame. One contractor was a former artillery officer who wanted to try out tobacco growing; a second was a sugar manufacturer from Jepara for whom the government had wanted to do a favor; a third was a former tax official who had rashly taken out his pension in order, as manager of a sugar factory, to lose someone else's money; the intercession of a member of the Council of the Indies shortly after had secured him one of those lucrative-looking tobacco contracts.^ Finally, a drop in prices on the European market had sent most entrepreneurs into bankruptcy. After 1848, only two contracts had not "failed."*^ For the totally impoverished population—it had already been reported at the beginning of 1849 that part of the sawah had remained uncultivated through lack of cattle for ploughing^—the failure of the rice harvest later in that year had been the deathblow. Some rice still was available for sale at Semarang, but the people had no more money to purchase it. Massive mortality had occurred because the European administration had underestimated the seriousness of the situation. The Resident, A. A. Buyskes (a former director of cultivations who had expected to see out his working life sedately in Semarang), as late as 8 January 1850 had still advised the Indies government that the news about famine in his region was "very exaggerated and inaccurate." Rochussen would later plead in his own defence that he had been deliberately kept in the dark.87 Buyskes paid for this with his job. According to the government decree of 6 May 1850 by which he was dismissed, he had been insufficiently diligent in preventing and relieving the disasters that had struck his residency. Those disasters, which, as the decree put it, "were acts of God, were aggravated by many long-standing abuses which were never brought under control, and by constantly sustained corvee services."88 The assistant-resident of Demak, S.G.F. Fraenkel, had already been relieved of his post on 9 April 1850.8^ Finally, the regent of Demak and the subregent of Grobogan were also dismissed by the government decree of 23 August 1850. Elsewhere, too, in Central Java in 1849 and 1850 the death rate was alarming amid great flights of people after the failure of the rice harvest.90 During these two years, a decline in the population figures for Java as a whole was recorded, something that had not occurred since 1830. 84

See the nota of Smissaert of 14 November 1850, Collectie Baud, 900. Ibid. See also Rochussen, Toelichting en Verdediging, p. l49;Koloniaal Verslag 1849, Bijl Hand., 1851-52, p. 193. 8 ^ Rochussen, Toelichting en Verdediging, p. 149. 87 Ibid., p. 145. 88 This decree would be published by van Hoevell; see TNI 1 (1850): 392-95; TNI 2 (1852): 134 85

ff. 89

See Javasche Courant of 13 April 1850. His successor, C. Rodenburg, also did not long remain in office as assistant-resident of Demak and Grobogan. The Javasche Courant of 27 July 1850 mentions that he had been discharged and granted half-pay (wachtgeld). In contrast to his predecessor, Rodenburg had stood up too much for the interests of the people. "In the past he was known to be a good cultivation official, well acquainted with native customs. During this year, however, he has returned from a two-year European leave with such eccentric ideas that he did not scruple to tell the Javanese that they were wholly free and no longer obliged to perform corvee and cultivation services unless they themselves chose to do so! Although the stricken areas mentioned here have to be treated as leniently as possible, the spreading of such doctrines cannot be tolerated." (Rochussen to Pahud, 26 August 1850, no. 96, Kol. 6529). 90 "Kultuurverslag" 1849; "Kultuurverslag" 1850.

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Table 6.1. Population figures for Java, 1840-50 Year

Number of peoplea

Households

1840 1845 1848 1849 1850

6,704,707 7,460,129 7,508,012 7,459,515 7,292,349

1,466,842 1,605,230 1,564,766 1,562,305 1,503,453

Source: "Kultuurverslagen" (a) This data includes returns for the whole of Java, with the exception of Batavia, Buitenzorg, Surakarta, and Yogyakarta. In 1849, the population of those four regions, including the island of Madura, amounted to around 1,800,000 people. See Koloniaal Verslag 1849, Bijl Hand. 1851-52, p. 112. Cf. the data of P. Bleeker in TNI 2 (1850): 205.

In some Central Java residencies, the decline was particularly great. Semarang was worst with a decrease in population from 670,005 in 1845 to 545,933 in 1850. For neighboring Jepara, these figures were 421,251 and 336,940, respectively, and for Tegal 293,668 and 240,651. A significant amount of cultivable land remained untilled in 1850, attributed in the Cultivation Report to "exhaustion, flight and mortality among the population ... lack of cattle for ploughing and agricultural tools/'^l In the Residency of Semarang, approximately 25 percent of all sawah and tegalan fields remained fallow in 1850; in Tegal, also 25 percent; in Bagelen, 21 percent; and in Jepara, 16 percent.^ For all government residencies combined, an area of almost 200,000 bouw was reported in 1850 as having been left uncultivated; that is, about one-eighth of the known area of cultivable land (for 1849, this figure was 180,000 bouw). Land rent assessments had to be lowered considerably. For the various residencies where land rent was levied, the increase/decrease in total land rent assessments during the period 1849-51 as compared with 1848 are shown in Table 6.2. In Pasuruan and Besuki, which were the most prosperous residencies in Java and which proportionately benefited most from the Cultivation System, the land rent assessment remained on or above the 1848 levels; the other East Java area (Surabaya) compares favorably in this respect. There are no indications either in West Java (Banten and Karawang) or in Kedu in south Central Java that the economy was seriously disrupted during the period 1849-51. In the rest of Central Java, especially in the north coast residencies, declines in the level of assessment ranged from large to very large. By contrast, neighboring Cirebon seems to have weathered the period 1849-51 relatively well. This region proportionately had benefited most from the measures Rochussen had taken during the first half of his term of office to reorganize the Cultivation System. Undoubtedly, some government cultivations contributed greatly to the flight of people and to the prevailing misery. Among others, this was the case with indigo cultivation in Banyumas and Bagelen and tobacco cultivation in Semarang. The 91 In the Colonial Report for 1850 submitted to the States-General, this passage from the Cultivation Report was much less strongly worded. See Bijl. Hand. 1852-53, p. 128. 92 In 1851, too, a considerable area was left uncultivated, for instance in the Residency of Semarang about 18 percent, in Bagelen about 20 percent. "Kultuurverslag."

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Table 6.2. Land rent assessments 1849-51 (1848 = 100)

West Java

Banten Karawang Cirebon

Central Java

legal Pekalongan Semarang Jepara Rembang Banyumas Bagelen Kedu

East Java

Surabaya Pasuruan Besuki (including Probolinggo)

1849

1850

1851

103 92 97

95 100 94

103 97 88

70 90 76 82 85 100 64 100

65 79 37 72 74 83 75 99

61 80 60 76 74 78 72 99

97 103 118

99 102 103

112 100 109

Source: Compiled from land rent assessment figures for 1836-66, as given in bijlage no. 12 of Koloniaal Verslag 1866, Bijl Hand. 1868-69, XXXVIII. In general, the amount collected varied little from the assessment. See Koloniaal Verslag 1849, Bijl. Hand. 1851-52, p. 176. Madiun and Kediri are not included in this summary because land rent assessments in those residencies were fictive. Cultivation Report for 1851 also attributed the depopulation of Jepara to "the after effects of the excesses" of sugar cultivation in that residency in earlier years, as was also the case in Tegal. However, the arbitrary and excessively high levies of land rent, combined with what were euphemistically called "shortcomings in the local administration which have existed for many years" appear to have influenced the situation adversely to a considerable extent.^ The Cultivation Report for 1850 laid great stress on these things.94 Besides all this, corvee services in Central Java, in particular those for the fortifications, had been much more burdensome than elsewhere. Finally, the epidemic fevers prevalent since 1846 in this part of the island had taken their toll. The "disasters from on high," like crop failures and floods, would in all probability not have assumed such great proportions if a sufficient number of people had been available to cultivate all the rice fields. The government was well aware that the situation was precarious, as evidenced by Rochussen's unfavorable impressions on his trip through Central Java in 1847, but despite this knowledge it had neglected to intervene in good time. News of the famine in Central Java traveled only slowly through official channels to the Netherlands. As late as December 1849, Rochussen had written in his semi93 "Kultuurverslag" 1849. It is typical that the cited passage was not included in the government report submitted to the States-General. See Bijl. Hand. 1851-52, p. 194. No open criticism was allowed regarding the internal administration (read native chiefs)! 94 A comparison of the average assessment per bouw in land rent in the years 1840 and 1860 is also revealing (see Koloniaal Verslag 1866, Bijlage no. 12, Bijl. Hand. 1868-69). It relates to two "normal" and, therefore, comparable years. The assessment in 1860 was lower than in 1840 in nine residencies and higher in five. The residencies where the drop was biggest were Tegal, 47 percent, and Pekalongan, 51 percent.

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official correspondence (obviously relying on the initially far too optimistic reports of Resident Buyskes) that he had reason to believe that the matter had been presented "in a very exaggerated way." He did acknowledge that there was "great want of food" in Demak and Grobogan as a consequence of crop failures—the crops had been destroyed by insects—and extortion, which the local European administration had treated too "casually."95 The Dutch Official Gazettes of 22 January and 22 February 1850, which were able to draw information from mail news that had been dispatched overland at the end of November and December 1849, contained only superficial information. Thus, when Sloet tot Oldhuis on 4 March 1850 questioned the minister of colonies—the first time that this right was exercised to obtain information from the government about the actual situation in a part of the Netherlands East Indies and possible shortcomings of the administration there—he based his questions mainly on information from private sources, and Pahud would do the same in his reply. On the basis of letters he had received from Java and from which he quoted extensively, Sloet tot Oldhuis concluded that the situation was much more serious than had been admitted officially. Sloet tot Oldhuis directly related the food shortage to the operation of the Cultivation System. The shortages of rice were greatest in those regions where the Cultivation System had been most developed (which was only partly true).96 In Demak, the misery was mainly attributable to excessive levies of land rent and forced corvee services for the fortification works. The harbingers of a similar disaster were already present in other residencies in Java. The prosperity of Java had been detrimentally affected by the Cultivation System. The many other burdens that the government had imposed on the people—Sloet tot Oldhuis mentioned in this context the market tax and the salt monopoly—had aggravated the prevailing poverty.9'7 Pahud limited himself to an answer that was as reassuring as it was evasive. He labeled the information quoted by Sloet tot Oldhuis as exaggerated. The famine at Demak had resulted from floods and other events that the government could have done nothing about. The people themselves were also to blame because they had been too careless. Perhaps some wrongdoings of lesser chiefs had aggravated the situation; an investigation was being made to punish those who were eventually found guilty. There was no fear that the famine would spread to other areas. It was incorrect to blame the government cultivations; on the contrary, it was "common knowledge" that the expansion of those cultivations had increased prosperity in most residencies. Moreover, discussions like the one at hand—and this just in connection with a localized disaster—were in Pahud's opinion less desirable because they could damage the authority of the Indies government, which had to bear such great responsibilities.98 "One should not forget that in Java a few thousand Europeans are facing millions of natives. It is true enough that they are a good and submissive people, but no less susceptible because of that to promptings and influences which could work to prejudice most seriously the general interests of the State."99 95

Rochussen to Pahud, 30 December 1849, no. 88, Kol. 4568. Hand. 4 March 1850, p. 305. 9 ^ Ibid., p. 307. The sale of salt was a government monopoly in Java. 9 ** For this reason sixteen members of the Second Chamber had voted on 25 February 1850 against the request of Sloet tot Oldhuis to be allowed to question the minister. In 1850, the Second Chamber numbered sixty-eight members. 99 Hand. 4 March 1850, p. 310. 96

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Although the interpellation of Sloet tot Oldhuis was not too troublesome for the government, it was an indication, as Pahud wrote to Rochussen, "that more and more attention is being given to the so-called problems which continually take place in the Indies/'100 They were also making an impression on Pahud. Without wanting to admit that everything that was called extortion really deserved that description, he thought it "not totally superfluous to draw the attention of Your Excellency to the desirability that the local authorities in the Indies refrain strictly from anything that could give rise to well-founded accusations in this matter/'101 Pahud also regretted that he had been so poorly informed by the Indies authorities about what had happened in Central Java and the means that had been taken to redress the situation. He had now, for lack of official information, been forced to use private letters and news, which was an "inappropriate" state of affairs. With the ever-increasing interest in colonial affairs, said Pahud, it was now more than ever before necessary that he be kept posted, quickly and confidentially, about all important events.102 Rochussen was probably far from happy with this reprimand from his former subordinate; Pahud had served under him as director of State Products and Civil Warehouses. However, in essence he seems to have agreed with him. Rochussen at least admitted that "the European makes the law, but is unfair when dividing the burdens. Too many burdens fall on the native, too few on himself and on the Chinese and the Arab."10^ In a private letter to Baud of 27 November 1850 Rochussen attempted to analyze the causes of poverty among the people and took a veiled swipe at Baud. The Cultivation System had not always been an unqualified good for the people. Tobacco and indigo cultivations had had very adverse effects. As a consequence of increased production, corvee services had been increased also because more and more bridges, roads, and so on were necessary for product transport. At the same time, the population had been recruited in large numbers for the construction of a series of senseless and indefensible fortification works. "How many thousands have been sent to the grave by this." To cap it, all kinds of onerous taxes and monopolies had been increased. "Yes, many officials have been imprudent in this respect, some have acted unscrupulously. But it may be said in their defence that they were subject to the continual and persistent demands for money, money, money !"10^ During the transfer of the administration to Duymaer van Twist on 12 May 1851, Rochussen returned to this subject. He acknowledged openly then that excessive corvee services and forced deliveries without payment or at inadequate payment had been "huge and frequent," that "great uncertainty and abuses" existed in the levying of land rent, and that indigo cultivation remained "very harmful" to the people, so that it was questionable whether this cultivation could be sustained in the long run.105 100

Pahud to Rochussen, 22 March 1850, no. 58, Kol. 6526. Ibid. 102 V 16 March 1850, no. 2, Kol. 6. In his semiofficial correspondence, Pahud maintained that he had not been informed in good time about the famine in Central Java; see Pahud to Rochussen, 22 July 1850, no. 62, Kol. 6526. 103 Rochussen to Pahud, 28 March 1850, no. 91, Kol. 6529. In this context, Rochussen pointed out, Europeans paid hardly any tax. 104 Rochussen to Baud, 27 November 1850, Collectie Baud, 840. 105 See TNI I (1856): 53; Cornets de Groot, Over het Beheer, p. 185. 101

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One serious abuse that Rochussen again criticized on that occasion had, in the meantime, been stopped. By government decree of 26 March 1851, the continued conscription of people for the fortification works was prohibited unless authorized by the governor-general, which authorization would be given only when absolutely necessary.106 Less effective was an instruction to the Residents dated 23 May 1850 that insisted on limiting corvee services that had been utilized for all kinds of purposes. At any rate, Schiff, the new director of cultivations, obtained the impression from a tour of inspection in Java that "little lasting improvement" was to be expected from this detailed instruction.1^ The Political Report for the years 1839-48, which was presented in mid-1850 by the Indies government to the minister of colonies, also attempted to analyze the defects of the Cultivation System. This report was written by the referendary at the General Government Secretariat (and later minister of colonies), E. de Waal, who acquitted himself so much to Rochussen's satisfaction that he received a gratuity of f2,000 for it1^* The principal causes of decreased prosperity were seen as insufficient knowledge of the land and people by officials, as a result of which the government was ill-informed about the "capacities" of the population, abuse of power by the chiefs, and the greed of European entrepreneurs who were involved in the Cultivation System.109 The native chiefs, in particular, were responsible; mostly they had embezzled the crop payments that were paid by the government through their agencies.110 Baud found it particularly difficult to acknowledge that the colonial system over which he had presided for so many years could have worked to the detriment of Java's prosperity. His wavering with regard to the "contract and percentage system," apparent before 1848 in more than one of his letters, seems to have been repressed once he left the ministry. In a letter to Rochussen of 21 September 1850, written some weeks after his election as a member of the Chamber, he sought to attribute the impoverishment of the people of Java, if such were indeed the case, not to the Cultivation System, but to the forced services for the building of fortifications.111 Those services would have impoverished the owners of sawah on whom they fell, because they had to pay for substitutes to take their place when they themselves could not be spared from the land. Baud thought the question sufficiently important to bring it privately (public discussion would only be "damaging"!) to the attention of Pahud.112 Pahud, who found "this way of making representations to the government" much more useful than the "public altercations which often produced no result," sought Rochussen's feelings on the matter. It is not unlikely that Baud's 106

See de Waal, Aanteekeningen, 8: 289. "Kultuurverslag" 1850. See de Waal, Aanteekeningen, 8: 224; Rochussen, Toelichting en Verdediging, p. 142. 108 Rochussen to Pahud, 28 March 1850, no. 91; 26 August 1850, no. 96, Kol. 6529. 109 "Algemeen Overzicht, 1839-1848," p. 193. 110 Ibid., p. 163. 111 Baud to Rochussen, 21 September 1850, Collectie Baud, 572. Baud was thinking of a government decree of 14 November 1834, drawn up by himself, in which recruitment of those liable for service in Cirebon for work in the Residency of Batavia had been forbidden. It was evident that well-to-do farmers on whom this burden rested usually escaped it by sending other people whom they paid; see van Deventer, Bijdragen, 2:316 ff. 112 Baud to Pahud, 18 October 1850, Collectie Baud, 891. 107

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initiative hastened the abolition of forced services for the fortification works in Java.113 Shortly, Baud was again under greater pressure. Sloet tot Oldhuis and van Hoevell seized on the discussion of the budget of the Department of Colonies that took place on 23 December 1850 to draw attention again to the famine in Java, which, according to their information, was continuing unabated. Van Hoevell quoted from correspondence between Inspector of Cultivations van der Poel, and the sugar manufacturer, G. J. Netscher, from the Residency of Tegal. From this it appeared that "very frequent" cases of death had occurred among the people of the villages in the vicinity of the factory as a result of the famine that had raged in that residency earlier that year.114 Netscher claimed that he had wanted to have rice distributed, paid for by himself, but the Resident of Tegal had been against this and had tried to keep the matter secret. According to Netscher, the lack of food was probably attributable to the extremely high level of land rent and the abuse of corvee services. "The price of rice is not exceptionally high: there were also stocks of it, but the little man who sold his buffaloes at ridiculously low prices so that he could pay his land rent had no money to buy rice."11^ Rochussen would later correctly question whether Netscher was indeed reliable as a witness.1 ^ Just like other sugar manufacturers in Tegal, he had an interest in putting the "difficult" Resident Vriesman in an unfavorable light. But the public reading of the letters that van Hoevell had so unexpectedly produced did not fail to have an effect on Baud. He would reply to van Hoevell that he too suspected that "a wrong direction has been taken in some matters, a direction it is our duty to help oppose."117 For the rest, Baud denied that he had ever given orders to the Indies government aimed at increasing revenues more and more to raise the amount of the colonial surplus (this denial was rendered unconvincing when shortly afterwards van Hoevell published the text of the supplementary instruction given in 1842). ^ Finally, Minister Pahud promised an investigation (the results of which appar ently never were disclosed to parliament).11^ This time, too, he was of the opinion that the unfortunate events under discussion could be attributed in great measure to "an act of God." Just as the periodically occurring famines and massive death rates in British India could not be blamed on the Cultivation System, no less could could this be done with the misery prevailing in Java. The outcome of this budget debate was undeniably a serious defeat for the colonial-conservative party. Baud himself gained the impression from the meeting that there was "some truth" in the words that Sloet tot Oldhuis had addressed to him during the debate "that the evil had come about as a result of the principles of government which I introduced in the colony, principles which have developed in completely different ways from those I had imagined and whose wrong direction I could 113

Pahud to Rochussen, 22 October 1850, no. 65, Kol. 6526. It is probable that van Hoevell had received these letters for perusal from Netscher's father, a member of the Council of State. 115 Hand. 23 December 1850, p. 492. 116 Hand. 7 December 1852, p. 338. 117 Hand. 23 December 1850, p. 494. 118 Seen. 47. 119 Hand. 23 December 1850, p. 500. See Hand. 7 December 1852, pp. 336, 339 6. In a letter to Baud, Vriesman labeled Netscher's assertions as myths. Collectie Baud, 850. 114

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no longer check when I lost power."120 From a letter he wrote to Rochussen, it seems that this observation had given Baud food for thought, "My farewell toast, in which I charged you from the bottom of my heart with protecting the Javanese against arbitrariness of whatever sort, everything that I wrote to you and your predecessors before and after on that subject concerning obsolete ordinances, corvee services, etc., etc., everything came to mind."121 From this examination of conscience resulted the well-known offer from Baud to accompany the new Governor-General Duymaer van Twist to Java as commissioner-general. As a cautious liberal—one of those "men in the center7' in the Second Chamber who had indeed wanted a revision of the Constitution before 1848 but not in the radical form propounded by Thorbecke—and not being a "colonial expert," A. J. Duymaer van Twist had not been the most obvious choice as successor for Rochussen.122 The fact that this former lawyer from Deventer, known in the Second Chamber as an expert in financial matters, was nonetheless, in accordance with Baud's advice to Pahud, appointed as governor-general, demonstrated that no fundamental changes in the existing colonial system could be expected from the liberal Thorbecke ministry.12^ For that matter, Thorbecke may have considered that the appointment of Duymaer van Twist was a positive confirmation of the changed relationship that the Constitution of 1848 had wrought. Rochussen had been one of the "men around the throne," who under the "ancien regime" had parceled out power and high government offices. Duymaer van Twist symbolized the new era in which the elected representatives of the prosperous middle class in the Second Chamber occupied the real positions of authority. When Duymaer van Twist, unsure whether to accept the appointment, had asked Baud's advice, Baud had offered to accompany him to Java. As commissioner-general he would then, relying on his long experience and knowledge of the Cultivation System, be able to conduct a local inquiry and devise means for improvement. Duymaer van Twist rather liked this offer, and Pahud, who in a conversation with Baud on 14 January 1851 had characterized the situation in Java as "distressing, even critical," also found it appealing. Thorbecke, however, would not hear of it.124 The new governor-general was indeed charged with setting up a thorough and comprehensive investigation into what had to be done to remove existing grievances and wrongdoings and abuses that had developed, but Baud's good services were not to be put to use in this.125 Baud was greatly angered by the fact that the government in the end had not been willing to accept his offer to go to the Indies as commissioner-general. He referred to this matter in the next budget debate on 6 December 1851 in the Second Chamber. In a remarkable speech, he expounded on how he had initially been a great 120

Baud to Rochussen, 22 January 1851, Collectie Baud, 572. Ibid. 122 Originally consideration was given to G. L. Baud, a nephew of J. C. Baud and former high Indies official, who had for a short while been minister of colonies in 1848 and 1849. But he was deemed to be too conservative. After that, G. I. Bruce, who, like Duymaer van Twist, belonged politically to the center, had been appointed. However, he died before leaving for Java. 12 ^ Baud had already recommended Duymaer van Twist in the summer of 1850 as a suitable candidate to succeed Rochussen. See Alberts, Baud en Thorbecke, p. 224. 124 Alberts, Baud en Thorbecke, pp. 97, 224; Zwart, Duymaer van Twist, pp. 70,214-16. 125 Pahud, Hand. 8 December 1851, p. 467. 121

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advocate of a system of free cultivations and free disposal of products, in which the task of the government would be limited to making and maintaining laws and protecting the inhabitants. But the motherland's need for money had made the Cultivation System unavoidable, because otherwise a rapid increase of Java's export production was impossible. Impressed by the favorable financial results of the system, no one thereafter had paid attention to the potential for abuse. However, Baud, so he said, was now convinced that a revision of the principles of the Cultivation System was necessary. For that reason he had thought himself obliged to offer to investigate in Java how such a revision could best be achieved. A governor-general like Duymaer van Twist, who was unacquainted with the country, language, affairs, and people would find it very difficult to perform such an investigation himself, the more so because he had so many other official duties.126 In an anonymously published pamphlet leveled at Steyn Parve's book The Colonial Monopoly System, Baud had defended the Cultivation System as a positive good. In that publication, he had argued among other things that the only alternative to the Cultivation System was private entrepreneurs who, having bribed the chiefs, would force the people to produce for the world market. Such a situation had existed before 1832 in coffee cultivation, to the great detriment of the native growers. With the Cultivation System, the people at least received a "reasonable" wage, and European officials would have their best interests at heart. European entrepreneurs, by contrast, were mindful only of their own profits: "The European . . . is often surly, imperious; he gives orders, demands hard work and takes no nonsense."127 More than one year later, deeply affected by the news from Central Java, Baud's defense of the Cultivation System was much more reserved. Now it had become just a necessary evil. For the time being it was essential to the Netherlands because otherwise the prosperous trade in colonial products and the merchant marine of Java had threatened to dwindle, and without the Indies profits a "national bankruptcy" seemed inevitable.12** However, Baud no longer defended the system as such. He was not "an obdurate old colonial," but "an adherent of milder principles, whose ideas have had to give way to the unavoidable pressure of circumstances."12^ If one compares Baud's point of view of the Cultivation System with that of van Hoevell, the difference is not great. Van Hoevell recognized that for the time being the Cultivation System was still indispensable, not only for the Netherlands but also to bring Java to a state of development and prosperity by ushering in a social environment in which private entrepreneurs and investors would be able to assume the role of the government and its officials. "We have to aim at a system of freedom of labor and freedom of cultivation. But we must achieve that not by repudiating the system of cultivation which now exists, but by means of that system."1 ^ Van Hoevell held no great expectations of the large-scale investigation in Java that Baud had recommended. The time for action was already long overdue. The Cultivation System would have to be cleansed immediately of its worst abuses and wrongdoings. First, the payment of cultivation percentages, that powerful and immoral method of ex126 127

16. 128

Hand. 6 December 1851, pp. 448,449. Baud, Het Koloniaal Monopoliestelsel. .. Daadzakelijk Wederlegd (Gouda: Van Goor, 1850), p.

Hand. 6 December 1851, p. 449. Hand. 9 December 1851, p. 475. 130 Hand. 8 December 1851, p. 463. Emphases in the original. 129

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panding government cultivations, had to be stopped. Second, more Dutch officials had to be appointed to the internal administration to be able to control the chiefs better. Third, those chiefs should be paid higher salaries because they were unable to live on f40 to f60 per month and thus had to resort to abusing their authority and enriching themselves at the expense of the people. Finally, a free press in Java had to be allowed the chance to point out mistakes and abuses within the system.131 Once the Cultivation System had been cleansed of its worst abuses, it could, according to van Hoevell, remain in force during a transition phase until private agricultural industry was able to manage without the active support of the government. During that transition period—van Hoevell harped on that same theme in many speeches both in the Second Chamber and outside it—the government would have to encourage Dutch entrepreneurs and industrialists to establish themselves in Java instead of shackling them to "the most eccentric and irrational conditions."13^ The government had only to heed the example of the numerous European entrepreneurs in the principalities who had converted extensive wildernesses into fertile regions filled with villages, rice fields, coffee plantations, cane fields, and indigo fields. The strength of van Hoevell's criticism faltered somewhat with this last example, because "free" labor in the principalities was anything but free. The people on the lands hired by European entrepreneurs from Javanese aristocrats and princes were forced to plant two-fifths of their land with crops selected by the entrepreneurs.133 Fransen van de Putte had taken a much more realistic view of land hire in the principalities when he condemned it in 1863 as "a Cultivation System in private hands" and had no wish to label what happened there as free labor. ^ According to van Hoevell, it was also essential that the people became more conscious of the advantages of free labor. The government would also have to ensure that the Javanese growers really received the wages due them, which meant a responsibility to protect them against extortion and oppression by their chiefs. Wages, moreover, should not be kept artificially low but had to be subject to the laws of supply and demand.135 Besides, the government would have to address the role of the private entrepreneur within the Cultivation System. Van Hoevell had most in mind the sugar contractors. The task was to make them independent industrialists. Van Hoevell believed that manufacturers were well able to run their factories with free laborers. Because of this the government, when renewing existing sugar contracts, would have to refuse any longer to play a role in forcing peasants to work in the sugar factories. By way of compensation, the government would have to allow 131 132

Ibid.

See W. R. van Hoevell and W. Bosch, De Vrije Arbeid op Java, behandeld in "Felix Mentis" (The Hague: Nijhoff, I860), p. 31. He alluded in this to the royal decree of 1856, Ind. Stb. 1856, no. 64, concerning the hiring out of "waste" land, discussed further in chapter 9. 133 See Koloniaal Verslag I860, Bijl Hand. 1862-63, pp. 735, 737. For a recent overall picture of the practices of European entrepreneurs in the principalities, see V. J. H. Houben, "Kraton en Kumpeni: Surakarta en Yogyakarta 1830-1870" (PhD diss., Leiden University, 1987). 134 Hand. 28 May 1863.1. D. Fransen van de Putte, Parkmentaire Redevoeringen (Schiedam: Roelants, 1872-73), 1:124. 135 Hand. 15 December 1858, p. 445. Van Hoevell and Bosch, De Vrije Arbeid op Java, pp. 27-33.

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the contractors free disposal of all the sugar they produced. Voluntary planting of sugar cane by the people would then be the next step.1^ Finally, van Hoevell was not in principle opposed to the Indies budget surpluses; but they should, however, not be allowed to become a guiding principle of action. The budget surplus had to be the end result, not the starting point, of calculations. Promote the prosperity of Java by encouraging private enterprise, so he argued, and material advantages would inevitably follow; the motherland could then legally and validly lay claim to them. But "first prosperity, then profit."*^ In this respect, he was completely consistent when, even during the first budget debate in which he took part, he proposed to list as normal revenue for covering the public expenditures not the "probable" surplus of colonial income and expenditures for the next budget year but the "actual" budget surplus of the previous year.^8 What van Hoevell submitted to the Second Chamber on 8 December 1851 was the program of the "colonial opposition." It was indeed "opposition," because from this moment he would no longer support Pahud's budget. Greatly disappointed in Pahud, van Hoevell in the autumn of 1851 definitively parted company with this minister.1^ 136

Hand. 8 December 1851, p. 464. ^ Van Hoevell, Parlementaire Redevoeringen, 2:10. ^ Van Hoevell, Parlementaire Redevoeringen, 1:14. 13 ^ The budget of the Department of Colonies for 1851 had still been adopted unanimously. The one for 1852 was endorsed on 9 December 1851 with van Hoevell and seven other members (including Sloet tot Oldhuis) voting against it. 13

7 YEARS OF CONTINUITY AND CHANGE

nder the influence of the news from Java, which painted a dark picture of the condition of the population, there emerged after 1850 a critical interest in the way in which the system of cultivations, corvee services, and land rent were applied in practice—a subject about which hardly anything had been spoken or written in the Netherlands before that time. As even so hard-line a conservative in colonial affairs as the sternly Calvinistic M. P. Groen van Prinsterer would put it on 8 December 1851 in the Second Chamber, "We are beginning to harbor doubts about many aspects of the statecraft of the government in the East Indies; and because we have doubts, we are asking questions/'1 Even Pahud, always so prudent, admitted in the Second Chamber that the Cultivation System was exhibiting "defects'7 that could no longer be tolerated.2 However, Pahud would not have been Pahud if he had not immediately added the assurance that, before taking any action, he would first have to wait on advice from the Indies and the results of the inquiry to be set up by Duymaer van Twist. Baud had never held high expectations of that inquiry by Duymaer van Twist and, as it would appear, he was right. It would be unfair, however, to criticize the new governor-general for this. The inquiry that he had been commissioned to conduct was as unspecific as it was far-reaching. The Cultivation System, land rent, and corvee services were closely intertwined. In an inquiry into the pressure of cultivation services in certain areas of Java, land rent assessment and demands for all kinds of corvee services had to be included to be able to get a better insight into the situation of the people and the means which might serve to improve it. Because there were insufficient trained personnel, such an inquiry in a local area could not avoid being very time-consuming, as events in Cirebon proved. Already in 1849, the director of cultivations had insisted on resuming the data collection required to improve the levying of land rent, which had been discontinued on Baud's orders in 1846.3 But it would be another two and a half years before Duy-

U

1

Hand. 8 December 1851, p. 456. A further example of this changed mood was the speech by Groen's supporter, Mackay, Hand. 6 December 1851, pp. 437-40. To what extent did the Protestant Reveil play a role here? The literature on the Reveil gives no final answer. The Reveil as such was indeed interested in the abolition of slavery in the West Indies and on this point supported van Hoevell. With a few exceptions (Mackay, Elout van Soeterwoude, and later Keuchenius), however, the antirevolutionaries or Calvinistic M.P/s in the Second Chamber usually voted with the conservatives in colonial affairs before 1870. 2 Hand. 8 December 1851, p. 467. 3 Van Deventer, Bijdragen, 3: 330.

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maer van Twist gave orders in November 1851 to do so, and then only on a trial basis for one residency.^ The inquiry was to obtain data about the area of sawah; the rights and obligations of land holders, chiefs, and the government; the corvee and cultivation services demanded in Cirebon; the number of households and head of cattle; and so on. The inquiry was so far-reaching that it took years to carry out; not until 1858 was it concluded.5 After all this time data had been obtained—and not very reliable data at that—about just one residency of the twenty that the government controlled in Java.** Thus Duymaer van Twist, who was certainly not lacking in good intentions, had to report soon after his arrival in Java that, apart from partial reforms, the time did not yet seem right for "radical and systematic changes and improvements/7 for they required data that the government did not yet have at its disposal. "Knowledge of land and people is lacking to a degree at which one could justly be surprised, considering the time we have already been here/'7 Thus had come home to roost a policy, which had as its basis that Java had to be ruled through the intermediary of the chiefs, avoiding as much as possible any direct interference by Dutch authority in the social institutions of the people.8 Under those circumstances, it took a very long time before the existing uncertainty in the levying of corvee services and land rent, in which almost everything was left to the discretion of European officials and the chiefs, was replaced by a minimum of rule and regularity. The first attempts at this were made in the constitutional regulation of 1854. According to ARTICLE 57, personal services had to be organized in accordance with "existing customs, institutions and needs," in which the aim was a gradual reduction of these services.^ Thus, this article amounted to a late recognition that in the past these services had been employed excessively; "an excess which certainly has not been the intention of the government and which perhaps not until very recently has come to the attention of the higher authorities in the Indies."10 With regard to land rent, ARTICLE 59 prescribed that the principles of assessment would be laid down by "general ordinance." The idea of including in the constitutional regulation itself specific guarantees for a correct levying of that tax were dismissed by the government with the typical reasoning "that every guarantee assumes knowledge of specific sorts of information, knowledge which . . . is available only to a very limited degree."11 ^ See Zwart, Duymaer van Twist, p. 101. 5 Details of this inquiry are contained in a nota by Minister Fransen van de Putte of 12 May 1863, Bijl. Hand. 1862-63, pp. 1378-79. See also Bleeker, TNI 2 (1863): 1 ff. *> After this, the collection of data was begun in the Residency of Banyumas. See TNI 1 (1868): 27,110; 2 (1868): 53. 7 Duymaer van Twist to Pahud, (11) November 1851, no. Ill, Kol. 6529. 8 See Koloniaal Verslag 1849, Bijl. Hand. 1851-52, p. 172: "What corvee services consist of is difficult to indicate with complete accuracy. The system of non-interference by our officials in the overall domestic arrangements between the native people and their .. . chiefs has not helped us become acquainted with these unpaid services which the ordinary man does for them." 9 Included under this article were services for the government and those for the chiefs but not cultivation services. Those were controlled by ARTICLE 56, which is discussed in this chapter. 10 Pahud, Hand. jRK, 3: 617. 11 Hand. RR, 2: 251.

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For the time being, neither article was acted upon. The first codification of personal services, applicable only to Java, did not appear until 1864.12 The government had to abandon the idea of drawing up an inventory of these services for every residency.^ Just as unsuccessful was the ordinance in which principles were laid down for levying land rent, which did not appear until 1872.14 Another inquiry, begun during the administration of Duymaer van Twist and which also demanded years of work, was the inquiry into government sugar cultivation ordered in 1853. After 1850, a temporary drop in the market price of Java sugar occurred in the Netherlands, which—incorrectly as it would turn out—was attributed to the increasing competition of beet sugar, the cultivation of which was making great strides in several European countries in those years.^^ This caused Pahud in a letter to Duymaer van Twist of 20 December 1851 to insist on economizing on the costs of production, among other things by improving the processing of cane. The savings, however, were not to be at the expense of the peasantry's crop payments.16 After the matter had been studied in the Indies, the resultant findings transmitted to the Netherlands, and subsequently the proposals of the Indies government discussed between Pahud and such colonial experts as Baud and Rochussen, a further year and a half had passed, while in the meantime the price of sugar had recovered. That the matter was not forgotten was Baud's doing. He took the opportunity in a nota of 21 June 1853 to Pahud to take up again the idea he had put forward two years earlier of a thorough inquiry into the operations of the system of cultivations to begin with the sugar industry.^ In that nota, Baud, as it were, drew up a balance sheet for the period of almost twenty-five years of government sugar cultivation. His conclusion was that the government, on introducing this cultivation, had wished to respect adat, but that because of the need to expand production as fast as possible and through the ignorance of officials, van den Bosch not excepted, about the domestic institutions of the people, in practice often very little had come of it.*** Baud mentioned the following as the principal problems created for the people by government sugar cultivation:^ 12

See de Waal, Aanteekeningen, 8: 266; C. W. Margadant, Het Regeeringsreglement van Nederlandsch-Indie (Batavia: Kolff, 1895), 2: 236. Among other things, the maximum number of days of labor under this regulation was set at one day per week or fifty-two days per year. Landless peasants were exempted. Village services were not affected by the regulation. 13 The constitutional regulation had prescribed "local" regulations that had to be revised every five years. 14 Margadant, Regeeringsreglement, 2: 295. 15 Some articles on this subject, taken from The Economist, were published in the NRC of 29 and 31 December 1851. 16 V 20 December 1851, no. 6, Kol. 145. See Zwart, Duymaer van Twist, p. 104. 1^ The nota is appended to the article of J. M. Zwart, "De Voorstellen van G. G. Duymaer van Twist aangaande de Suikerkultuur," Indische Gids 2 (1938): 1124-53. Duymaer van Twist's proposals, which were not accepted by the government in Holland, provided among other things for the Indies government to allow sugar contractors free disposal of the sugar they produced on condition that they themselves would see to the labor requirements for their factories. On this point Duymaer van Twist's views agreed with those of Van Hoevell. Baud, however, considered that they had been insufficiently thought out and also were unacceptable because they implied a partial abandonment of the consignment system that was so advantageous to Dutch shipping and commerce. 18 Ibid., pp. 1136,1138. 19 See circular of the governor-general of 14 July 1854, Cabinet, no. 113 b, in which the prob-

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1. the requisition for that cultivation of sawah which from time immemorial had been used for growing rice 2. the annual rotation of those fields, at the cost of much labor, which resulted in insufficient time being left over for the cultivation of rice on fields that remained at the peasantry's disposal20 3. the requisitioning of irrigation water by sugar factories that could not be spared from the cultivation of rice and so-called second crops 4. the lack of respect for existing property relationships (the fields set aside for sugar cultivation had been taken away from the rightful users) 5. the tendency of officials to force peasants, insofar as they were assigned to a specific cultivation, to take part equally in cultivation services, as a result of which the existing stratification within the villages and the distinction between sawahholders and landless farmers was destroyed Baud acknowledged that in this way a "revolution" had taken place within Javanese society that could not be reconciled with the demands of justice nor with those of the state's interests; much had been done "which is now recognized to be vexatious."21 The government in Holland, however, had been insufficiently aware of this; it had thought that sugar cultivation was popular with the people, an impression that had been strengthened by the Indies government's insistence in 1847 on expanding that cultivation significantly. In Baud's opinion, a thorough investigation into the burdens that the government sugar cultivation imposed on the people was now urgent. It would have to cover every one of the almost one hundred sugar factories operating on government contracts in Java; it was necessary to ascertain for every factory what changes could be made in the contracts and in cultivating and processing cane to make the cultivation less oppressive for the peasantry. In this, the guiding principles would be that on the one hand, government sugar cultivation was to be maintained, while on the other hand, infringements of landholding rights and rights of usufruct and of adat as well as the imposition of heavy burdens had to be avoided.22 In this way, it would gradually be possible to reach a state of affairs in which, through a better regulation of cultivation, doing away with hardships where this was possible, the Javanese people would continue to do voluntarily what they now were still forced to do.2^ Baud's nota, with which Pahud agreed, was naturally easier to write than it was to bring the inquiry it proposed to a satisfactory conclusion.24 By a decree of 8 December 1853, Inspector of Cultivations G. Umbgrove was put in charge of the inquiry.2^ He busied himself over the next six months drawing up very detailed lems mentioned by Baud in his nota are repeated almost word for word. Bijl. Hand. 1862-63, p. 34823. 20 Rochussen had also pointed out this problem repeatedly in his semiofficial correspondence; see Rochussen to G. L. Baud, 28 March 1849, no. 80, 25 June 1849, no. 83, Kol. 4568. 21 Zwart, "Voorstellen van Duymaer van Twist/' p. 1138. 22 Ibid., p. 1145. 23 Ibid., p. 1131. 24 Baud's considerations and proposals were taken over verbatim in Pahud's instruction to the Indies government of 16 August 1853, no. 304, Kol. 5840, which ordered the inquiry. 25 Bijl. Hand. 1862-63, p. 34822.

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questionnaires, which were sent to the Residents with a circular on 14 July 1854. In accordance with Baud's instructions, that circular requested a detailed investigation and full description (with map) of every sugar factory, "thus avoiding the harmful inclination to generalize."2** After that, nothing was heard about the inquiry for quite some time, apart from the statement of Umbgrove transmitted to the Second Chamber in the autumn of 1856 that the huge volume of paper received from the Residents "had caused great difficulties."2'7 Duymaer van Twist had perceived in the instruction sent him to establish an inquiry into the sugar cultivation a "tactic" of Pahud to put off indefinitely obvious reforms that need not have been delayed further, ostensibly because still greater reforms were desired. Even if Pahud had not written that the idea of such an inquiry had come from Baud, he would have recognized in that technique of delay the "arch conservative" principles of Baud. "He is a man who knows what he wants and who acts accordingly."2** In his annoyance, Duymaer van Twist forgot that he himself had repeatedly warned against precipitate decisions when the government did not have sufficient knowledge of land and people. "Until that knowledge has been acquired, I believe that no decision should be taken either to retain the existing system or to change or completely alter it."29 What was accomplished during the administration of Duymaer van Twist, however, was not without importance. He abolished the market tax without waiting for authorization from the Netherlands, a step that afterwards brought him the resentment of the Council of State.30 The measure, however, was not reversed. Indeed, in the constitutional regulation of 1854, the reintroduction of this tax, the occasion of so many abuses, was expressly prohibited.31 Furthermore, Duymaer van Twist laid down new provisions to limit corvee services.32 The planting area of indigo was once more reduced; in 1856 the area set aside for this cultivation was 77 percent of what it had been in 1851.33 Action was taken against native chiefs practicing extortion. Thus, the regent of Kendal in Semarang was dismissed in 1851 ("one is filled with indignation when one reads of the horrors of oppression and extortion which the investigation brought to light"), although not the one from Lebak who would play such a prominent role afterwards in Max Havelaar.^ Sugar contractors also found the going 26

Bijl. Hand. 1862-63, p. 348 24. Bijl. Hand. 1856-57, p. 345. 2 ^ Duymaer van Twist to t'ahud, 16 October 1853; see Zwart, Duymaer van Twist, p. 275. 29 Duymaer van Twist to Pahud, (11) November 1851, no. Ill, Kol. 6529. Zwart, Duymaer van Twist, p. 100. 30 Ind. Stb. 1851, no. 73; 1853, no. 44; 1855, no. 72. The royal assent to the decree to abolish this tax, which had still yielded two million guilders in 1851, was not given until 1853. The Council of State had been of the opinion that Duymaer van Twist was not empowered to abolish this tax on his own authority and had, therefore, asked for further information. See P. A. Van der Lith, "Levensbericht van A. J. Duymaer van Twist/' Levensberichten van de Maatschappij der Nederlandsche Letterkunde (Leiden: Brill, 1891), pp. 58 ff. To compensate the government for the income it had lost as a result of the abolition of the market tax, land rent and the price of salt were increased. The increase in the land rent was annulled again a year later, and the salt price increase was reversed in 1856. See Koloniaal Verslag 1855, Bijl. Hand. 1857-58, p. 461.

27

31 32

ART. 60.

Cf. Ind. Stb. 1851, no. 59; 1853, no. 9. De Waal, Aanteekeningen, 8: 225. 33 See appendix 1. 34 Duymaer van Twist to Pahud, 23 July 1851, no. 107, Kol. 6529. Duymaer van Twist had

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more difficult. They complained to Pahud about unkind treatment from the governor-general and government officials. When Duymaer van Twist was notified, he protested vehemently against this accusation. He certainly did not want to deny contractors the advantages to which they were entitled, but "the government cannot force the people to carry out heavy labor for the sugar manufacturers for wages they cannot live on."3^ By the government decree of 28 July 1853, further regulations were promulgated on the proper treatment and payment of workers provided by the government, especially for work in sugar factories.3** Finally, Duymaer van Twist seems to have thought—something that would have been inconceivable under his predecessor—that the (European) inhabitants should be allowed to express their feelings freely and have freedom of association and assembly, because no single law or other provision expressly denied them those rights.37 Because of these measures, the administration of Duymaer van Twist had a liberal cast which also applied to the lower ranks of officialdom. The tenor that came from above was liberalism, and these officials needed no prompting to carry through to the very end the implications of those principles once the governor-general had started the ball rolling. Fundamentally, though, not much changed during these five years from 1851 to 1856. The obstruction of the Pahud-Baud team ensured that Duymaer van Twist was relatively impotent, so that from time to time he even contemplated resignation.3** In the Indies itself, he also provoked a certain degree of opposition and animosity because he isolated himself from his surroundings and, with his "distant and less tractable character," he did not go out of his way to flatter his senior officials, in this regard, too, a shrill contrast to Rochussen.39 One somewhat frustrated observer, later wanted to prosecute the regent of Kendal, together with a European kontroleur who had been an accomplice and for that reason placed under arrest, to set a "powerful example" and by doing so to counter "the idea that the government was not able or willing to protect the natives, if necessary by force, even against their own Regents." The public prosecutor, however, had advised against this, because he feared that it would be difficult to procure evidence; witnesses would not dare to speak out for fear of the regent and his relatives. Thereupon the regent was exiled by government decree to Menado in Sulawesi, there to remain for the rest of his life as a prisoner of the state with a grant of f25 per month. Instructive comparative material for the Havelaar affair of five years later was provided by the lament of the Council of the Indies that the documents "show in a distressing way how a system of forced labor and forced deliveries gives rise to a complex of crimes if the Resident loses sight of the obligation, resting on the government, to protect the native people, by not keeping continual supervision to control those occasions for wrongdoing and not maintaining a stern vigilance to keep the native people free of the characteristic crime of their chiefs, extortion." 35 Duymaer van Twist to Pahud, 20 January 1853, no. 125, Kol. 6529. *6Ind.Stb. 1853, no. 63. 37 V 17 April 1852, no. 134, Kol. 5831; Zwart, Duymaer van Twist, p. 85. The Council of the Indies was still then of a different opinion. This matter arose in 1851 when, at the initiative of Dr. Bosch, a society to promote medical science was founded that also published its own journal, all this without asking for prior consent from the government. After much to-ing and froing in correspondence, the government decided to leave things as they were. However, it refused to subscribe to the journal or to have free advertisements placed in the ]avasche Courant to draw attention to it. Incidentally, this case was an exception and seeking prior permission remained customary until the press regulation, mentioned in chapter 1, came into force in 1856. 38 Zwart, Duymaer van Twist, p. 123. 39 O. van Rees to J. P. Cornets de Groot, 24 March 1853, Collectie Cornets de Groot.

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himself to become governor-general, attributed this attitude of Duymaer van Twist to his "excessive fear of allowing himself to be influenced, something unlikely to happen to one with his energetic character which sometimes verges on stubbornness; everything is settled in writing and rarely if ever does the Governor-General listen to verbal explanations of how things are going, even though this is one of the most important means of getting at the truth."40 Although many things remained undecided during Duymaer van Twist's administration, that was partly the result of the long delay in drawing up the new constitutional regulation envisaged by the Constitution of 1848. Until 1855, the Indies administration had to make do with the obsolete regulation of 1836. It is true that already by the autumn of 1848 a draft for a new constitutional regulation, written by Rochussen, had been submitted to the department, but this was of no use because it did not take into account the new state of affairs created by the Constitution of that year.4* Rochussen's draft, which had not in the meantime been discussed with the Council of the Indies, would have been useful had the Second Chamber agreed, as Baud had still hoped in the beginning of 1848, to a revision of the Constitution that provided that the existing constitutional regulation, still fixed by royal decree, would be maintained on the understanding that it could be changed only by law. At the last moment, the constitutional regulation would then be completely revised for the last time by royal decree to postpone for as long as possible the moment when it might well be changed by law, for which the cooperation of the States-General would be required.^ Minister Rijk, then, thought it best to return the draft to Rochussen on 17 November 1848 with a request to review it and also to seek the opinion of the Council of the Indies.43 The council appeared to prefer its own more liberal draft, which was sent to the Netherlands in September 1850, with Rochussen's comments.44 But there was not much time left, because according to the Constitution the draft constitutional regulation had to be submitted to the States-General at the latest on 1 November 1851.4^ At this stage, Pahud decided to call on Baud's help, with the result that all existing drafts were put aside and finally, on 29 October 1851 a draft bill, which in essence differed little from the constitutional regulation of 1836, was submitted to the Second Chamber. The mountain of advice had thus brought forth a little 40

Ibid. Van Rees was inspector of finances at the time. Later he became successively member and vice-president of the Council of the Indies, minister (1879), and governor-general (188488). 41 The draft had been sent to the Netherlands on 25 February 1848 and was received there on 4 May 1848; see V 17 November 1848, no. 462, Kol. 4349. 42 According to the original proposal by the government that had come from the cabinet of which Baud was a member, changes in the existing constitutional regulations, thus not the regulations themselves, should be effected by law, whereas a proposal for such a change could emanate only from the Crown. It could not have been more half-hearted. The proposal was rejected in mid-March 1848 by a large majority of the Second Chamber; that majority demanded that the constitutional regulation be fixed by law, as Rochussen had already predicted to Baud. See Handelingen van de Regering en de Staten-Generaal over de Herziening der Grondwet (The Hague: Belinfante, 1848-49) 1: 44, 57, 97; Rochussen to Baud, 29 December 1847, Collectie Baud, 588. 43 V 17 November 1848, no. 462, Kol. 4349. 44 See Cornets de Groot, Over het Beheer, p. 175. This liberal member of the council exercised great influence on its proposals. 45 Additional articles (ART. 5).

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mouse. Baud left his mark upon the new constitutional regulation like no one else. On 27 February 1851, Pahud had sent a "schema" of the proposed constitutional regulation to his "eminence grise," with the request for comment on it. Baud reacted to this with a "counterproject," which served as the basis for further discussions between himself and Pahud.46 During the parliamentary discussions of the draft bill, Baud also exercised a preponderant influence. He was a member of the review committee of the Second Chamber, which on 12 March 1853—one and one-half years down the track— presented an extraordinary bulky report, and he also wrote the memorandum in reply (formally the explanatory memorandum on the completely reworked and resubmitted draft bill), which was sent to the Second Chamber on 15 December 1853.47 Finally, he dominated the debate during the public deliberations in the summer of 1854. "Baud is the same as ever; he is more tenacious than ever ... Pahud's attitude is like that of a schoolboy," wrote an observer in the public gallery of the impression the debate made on him.48 Baud's influence is obvious in each of the following subjects that came up for discussion in or on the occasion of the constitutional regulation of 1854. THE CONSTITUTIONAL REGULATION AND THE CULTIVATION SYSTEM

Of the 132 articles of the constitutional regulation, as laid down by the law of 2 September 1854, Ind. Stb. 1855, no. 2, only ARTICLE 56 related to the cultivations "introduced on high authority." Because this article dominated the judicial finesse of parliamentary debate afterwards, it seems useful to quote it verbatim. ARTICLE 56. The Governor-General maintains in operation, as much as possible, the cultivations introduced on high authority and in accordance with the orders of the King takes care: 1. that those cultivations do not stand in the way of the cultivation of sufficient foodstuffs; 2. that, insofar as those cultivations take place on lands reclaimed by the native people for their own use, those lands are requisitioned with fairness and with respect for existing rights and customs; 3. that in the division of labor the same rules are applied; 4. that the payment of natives involved, while avoiding harmful excesses, be such that the government cultivations provide them, for equal labor, at least 46

For the preliminary draft by Baud, see Collectie Baud, 838a and 855; Ph. Kleintjes, "Gegevens betreffende de Medewerking van Jean Chretien Baud aan de Samenstelling van de Ontwerpen van Wet tot Vaststelling van het Reglement op het Beleid der Regeering van Ned.Indie en hun Toelichtingen," Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde van Nederlandsch-Indie 89 (1932): 129-40. 47 ARTICLE 98 of the Constitution of 1848 (The assembly of the States-General is closed by the king or by a committee on his behalf) was interpreted, on the authority of Thorbecke, to mean that the closure of the States-General caused unfinished bills to lapse. Those bills then had to be reintroduced the next year of session, after which the treatment of them started afresh. Only in 1874—two years after the death of Thorbecke—was this impractical interpretation of this article of the Constitution abandoned by the Chamber. See Buys, Grondwet, 1:568. 48 F. s'Jacob to I. D. Fransen van de Putte, 2 August 1854, Collectie Fransen van de Putte (in private hands).

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equal advantages as those for free cultivation; 5. that such burdens which, after a deliberate investigation, may be found to exist with respect to those cultivations, be lifted as much as possible; and 6. that thus a regulation be prepared, based on voluntary agreements with the villages and people involved, as a transition to a situation in which the intervention of the government can be done without. In the report required by the Constitution regarding the governance of the overseas possessions and their condition, each year a list is to be made of the measures taken by the Governor-General in pursuance of this article.^ ARTICLE 56, like many other articles of the constitutional regulation, was drafted by Baud. There was already in his "counter-project" of early 1851 an article on which the later ARTICLE 56 was clearly modeled. In it, the governor-general was ordered "after a comprehensive local inquiry" within three years after the new constitutional regulation had come into force, to frame "general provisions" concerning the government cultivations and to submit them for approval and authorization to the government in Holland. Those provisions had to ensure that the cultivations introduced on high authority caused as little damage as possible to the cultivation of rice and that the returns to the people from government cultivations, when the people's rice fields were used for them, would be at least equal to what rice cultivation would have yielded them.^ At the request of Thorbecke, however, this article had been deleted from the original draft. * It is not clear why Thorbecke had wanted this deletion. Perhaps he thought that by doing so he could avoid a discussion on the Cultivation System in the Chamber. It is also possible that he thought that the real intention of the article was to retain the Cultivation System for an indefinite period (the instruction to prepare a regulation based on voluntary agreements was not included in the original article). Finally, it is possible that he saw in the instruction to the governor-general to institute a local inquiry a maneuver of Baud to land himself the job of carrying it out. Whatever the reason, Thorbecke's resignation in April 1853—one month after the report of the Second Chamber on the draft constitutional regulation had been presented—gave Baud the opportunity to reinsert this article. It was precisely the 49 Was it especially significant that the constitutional regulation did not mention the "Cultivation System" as such, but only spoke of "cultivations?" Duymaer van Twist thought so in a subtle but not very convincing argument. See Duymaer van Twist, "Artikel 56 van het Reglement," p. 55. ^ Collectie Baud, 855. In the original article it was laid down, among other things, that control over village lands could not exceed a certain maximum and that wages had to be increased if the distance from the fields to the factories exceeded a "fair" maximum. It is clear from this how much this article, just like the final ARTICLE 56, was written with a mind to the sugar and indigo cultivations. 51 The article had been crossed out with red ink, so that it was one of those alterations "which were made in the bill at the request of Thorbecke, or after a conference between Pahud and Thorbecke" (note in Baud's handwriting on the bill).

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absence of provisions relating to the Cultivation System that had given rise to much criticism.52 ARTICLE 56 gave the "colonial opposition" more than it had dared to hope for under the prevailing circumstances; in the "April Chamber" duly formed after new elections, the liberals were, after all, in the minority. An attempt by van Hoevell to postpone the parliamentary discussions on the bill until the autumn of 1854, by which time the terms of several conservative members of the Chamber would have expired, failed.53 Nevertheless, ARTICLE 56 met the wishes of the liberals to an important degree. Although government cultivations were maintained, for the first time it had also been clearly stated that in the long run they had to make way for "voluntary agreements" (implying, perhaps, that such things as involuntary agreements were possible!). Henceforth, the Cultivation System had a right to exist only as a transitional phase in the movement towards a liberalized system. Not only the colonial liberals but also most colonial conservatives saw in 1854 the replacement of the Cultivation System by a system of private agricultural enterprise, based on "free labor," as inevitable, even if they had different opinions about the pace of this transition process. The role of the government in forced labor under the Cultivation System was too much at odds with the economic and political principles that were acknowledged and accepted around 1850. Referring to what he had argued on 8 December 1851 in the Second Chamber, van Hoevell could rightly note with triumph that he saw his "principles" embodied in ARTICLE 56.54 Baud did not contradict him. On the contrary, he admitted frankly that it was only the motherland's financial need at the time that had forced it to deviate from "those salutory principles" that were the best "in all parts of the world and in all circumstances," namely those where the government refrained from all unnecessary interference in industry and commerce.5^ If it was Baud's intention, by means of the conciliatory ARTICLE 56, to avoid a long debate on the Cultivation System during the passage of the constitutional regulation, then he certainly succeeded. Remarkably little was said in 1854 about this article, which was included in the bill only at the last moment. The short deliberation concentrated on a liberal amendment of van Bosse that aimed to increase the role of European officials in the management and supervision of government cultivations.56 In that way, according to van Bosse, production could be increased by the introduction of more efficient ways of working and at the same time the extortions and abuse of power of the native chiefs against the people could be checked. Pahud, however, thought that there was no need for the amendment. Baud also would not hear of it, because it would infringe upon the principle of ruling Java through the intermediary of the chiefs. It was eventually defeated by thirty-two votes to twenty.5^ 52

Hand. RR, 2: 31. ^Hand. RR, 2:559. See van Hoevell, Parlementaire Redevoeringen, 2: vi. 54 Hand. RR, 3: 492-93 (28 July 1854). 55 Ibid., 482-^83. 56 Van Bosse wanted to insert at the beginning of ARTICLE 56, "under the guidance and supervision of government officials," Hand. RR, 3:474. $7 Hand. RR, 3: 502. An amendment from the conservative member for Amsterdam, H. Stolte, which also called for additional personnel, was rejected as well. Baud also voted against this.

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Yet it would have been difficult to point to any other article in the constitutional regulation that evoked and left unanswered more questions than just this important article. In the parliamentary arena of those days, in which so many lawyers were involved, the battle over the winding up of the Cultivation System—until 1870 the core of the "colonial issue"—would after 1854 all too often assume the form of a juridical joust about ARTICLE 56. Many columns of the parliamentary record in those years were filled with legal logic chopping on the question of how it should be interpreted. Did not, for example, the stipulation that requisitioning of land that the people had reclaimed for their own use could be done only while "respecting existing rights and customs" preclude that requisitioning right from the outset? What, further, was meant by the provision that payments to the growers, "avoiding harmful increases" (another one of those vague concepts), had to be at least equal to the profits that voluntary cultivation of the commodities demanded by the government might produce? How could the profits of the government from forced coffee cultivation be reconciled with a strict application of this provision? Those profits were based precisely on the difference between the market price of that product and crop payments that were kept artificially low. How did the government propose to bring about the development that would result in a situation in which its intervention would no longer be needed, as the final part of ARTICLE 56 required? What measures did it contemplate taking to carry out that provision and how quickly? And how could the government reconcile those measures with the obligation placed on the governorgeneral at the beginning of ARTICLE 56 to maintain the cultivations "as much as possible?" Thorbecke could already remark with good reason in 1854 that he did not know what to make of the words "as much as possible" in a law in a context like this.58 His proposal (a subamendment of van Bosse's amendment) to replace this phrase with the notion that government cultivations should be maintained insofar as this was consistent with the other provisions of ARTICLE 56 was defeated with the amendment after Baud had declared that acceptance of this proposal would unhinge everything because it was, in fact, not intended to make the maintenance of government cultivations dependent upon those provisions.5^ When Buys later said of the constitutional regulation that it was "the faithful expression of that half liberalism, faithful to the Treasury, which animated the legislative arm at that time," he must have been thinking in the first place of ARTICLE 56.60 THE CONSTITUTIONAL REGULATION AND FREE AGRICULTURAL ENTERPRISE UNDER WESTERN MANAGEMENT

The disruptive influence that the Cultivation System had exercised on adat— acknowledged by Baud on more than one occasion—had not been raised in the discussions over ARTICLE 56. Adat land rights were much more fully discussed in connection with ARTICLE 62. This article prohibited alienation of land by the governorgeneral (except for small blocks for urban or village expansion or for setting up industrial enterprises). This article shut the door on the sale of ("waste") land on a 58

Hand. RR, 3: 497. Ibid., p. 498. 60 Buys, Studien, 1:390. 59

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large scale, which Sloet tot Oldhuis and van Hoevell had recommended as a means to make Java profitable with the aid of European capital and "free labor."61 The government—here read Baud—in defense of this prohibition, which had been lacking from the constitutional regulation of 1836, referred to the "doubt" that had arisen about whether the ownership right to land, as far as Java was concerned, was indeed vested in the government as had earlier been accepted. Closer acquaintance with adat had shown that in the past an incorrect notion had been formed about the nature of native landrights. In this uncertain situation, the government deemed the sale of uncultivated land undesirable because of the possibility of infringing upon the rights of the people. It was also afraid that large-scale alienation of "waste" land could once more lead to a lack of cultivable land among the people as they grew in numbers.62 Baud explained this point of view further when ARTICLE 62 was debated on 31 July 1854 in the Second Chamber. As governor-general, he had been required on several occasions to give a ruling in disputes between entrepreneurs to whom the government had hired out "waste" land and the inhabitants of neighboring villages. The entrepreneurs had demanded payment for the gathering of forest products on their lands, and this demand was regarded by villagers as an infringement of their rights. Eventually, the government had decided in favor of the people.6^ Baud saw, in this example, a warning of how careful the government had to be in asserting control over land, even when this was deemed to be "waste" land. Although the new constitutional regulation was silent about it, the government made it clear in the explanatory papers that it likewise did not think acceptable the granting of ("waste") land on long lease; the objections against the sale of land were, after all, equally applicable to the granting of land on long lease.64 An attempt by van Hoevell to leave this matter undecided for the time being failed when an amendment proposed by him was rejected by thirty votes to twenty-two.6^ The only avenue left open by the constitutional regulation of 1854 for obtaining "waste" land was by means of hire. As explained in chapter 5, since 1840 this had hardly been used at all, although strictly speaking the royal decree of 1831 that contained regulations about this matter was still in force. Even in 1849, Rochussen, feeling "constrained" by the instructions sent to the Indies government, had asked formal agreement from the department to a decree that had allowed the expansion of two sugar enterprises onto "waste" land in the region of Karawang.66 Duymaer van Twist had wanted to reactivate the hiring out of "waste" land and had proposed the withdrawal of the obstructing provisions.67 Indeed, in 1853 he seems to have been authorized to resume the issue of new hire contracts for "waste" land. However, this authority, because the passage of the new constitutional regula61

See Sloet tot Oldhuis, nota on the state budget for 1850, Bijl Hand., 1849-50, pp. 91 ff.; Van Hoevell, Parlementaire Redevoeringen, 1:103 (11 December 1850). 62 Hand. RR,. 2: 260, 255. Cf. J. H. A. Logemann, "Mr. Nolst Trenite's Parlementaire Geschiedschrijving," Indisch Tijdschrift van het Recht 125 (1927): 383 ff. 63 Hand. RR, 3:552; Logemann, "Mr. Nolst Trenite's Parlementaire Geschiedschrijving," p. 392. M Hand.RR,2:5lS. 65 Hand. RR, 3:548. 66 y 19 January 1849, no. 4, Kol. 1907. Contracts for these two enterprises had been made in 1836. 67 See Zwart, Duymaer van Twist, pp. 113-14.

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tion had been foreshadowed, was never acted upon.68 According to the list of cultivation enterprises for 1855, all enterprises operating that year on "waste" land were based on agreements made before 1851.^ After Pahud had made it known during the debate in the Chamber over ARTICLE 62 that the government intended to revise the royal decree of 1831 (because, among other reasons, this decree applied only to Java), an amendment introduced by Baud was accepted unanimously, except for Sloet tot Oldhuis, in which a new (third) paragraph was added to the article, which prescribed the making of further rules "by general ordinance" in relation to the hiring out of ("waste") land, but which also indicated which land could not under any circumstances be permitted to be hired out. These exceptions were land "reclaimed by natives, or belonging to villages as common pasture land or used by villages in any other way."7^ Baud had thus opposed the efforts of the liberal opposition to open up Java for the benefit of private agricultural enterprise under Western management with an appeal to the rights and interests of the native people. In contrast to previous regulations, the constitutional regulation of 1854 did not enshrine the pretension that the government was the "owner" of the land, whether cultivated or not. Unsure about the exact character of land ownership among the people, the government had in 1854 prudently abstained, through Baud's doing, from any "domain-declaration."7* Moreover, with the addition proposed by Baud to ARTICLE 62, for the first time the existence of the village right of control extending to a broad stretch of "waste" or unused land around the villages was acknowledged; that right involved a prohibition on the cession or transfer in any form of that land by the government to private entrepreneurs. Because, apart from some thinly populated areas, the areas under the control of villages were virtually contiguous with one another, that is, almost all "waste" land could be considered to belong to one or another village, the granting of land by way of hire had, in fact, been made next to impossible (something that van Hoe veil, when he voted in favor of Baud's amendment, seems not to have grasped sufficiently).72 6

^ Cornets de Groot, Over het Beheer, p. 140; Zwart, Duymaer van Twist, p. 114. Reinsma, Cultuurstelsel, p. 131, puts it differently, but he relied on incorrect estimates of the Central Office of Statistics in the Indies. 69 V 5 May 1857, no. 17, Kol. 601. 7 ^ This concluding sentence was borrowed by Baud from a royal decree he had prepared in 1828 concerning the granting of "waste" lands in Java, which was not acted upon after the introduction of the Cultivation System. See G. J. Nolst Trenite, Inleiding tot de Agrarische Wetgeving van het Rechtstreeks Bestuurd Gebied van Nederlandsch Indie, 2d ed., (Utrecht: Kemink, 1942), p. 109. 71 See Ph. Kleintjes, Het Staatsrecht van Nederlandsch-Indie (Amsterdam, 1903), 3:260-61. 72 Nolst Trenite, Inleiding, pp. 106 ff., assumes that Baud wanted to give only a limited interpretation to the notion "lands, in any way belonging to the villages," which would then have left much land open for further development of agricultural industry by private entrepreneurs. However, Logemann, "Mr. Nolst Trenite's Parlementaire Geschiedschrijving," p. 403, disputes Nolst Trenite's view, referring among other things to previous utterances of Baud from which it appears that Baud had much respect for a more extended view of village rights of control over land. Logemann's opinion seems the right one. Baud was consistent when in 1854 he rejected large-scale private agricultural enterprises because they threatened to deliver the Javanese into the hands of private entrepreneurs, of whom Baud, evidenced from his correspondence with Rochussen, did not have a high opinion. Indeed, Nolst Trenite (p. 113) contradicts himself when he counts Rochussen, whose ideas did not vary much from Baud's, among the "conservative supporters" of the government Cultivation System and as one who was,

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Yet Baud's triumph in this case was very much a pyrrhic victory. First, the right that the government had arrogated to itself under the Cultivation System to control the cultivated fields of villages was put in a strange light, now that such a right of control with regard to uncultivated lands within the village area of control had been rejected. Second, there was a question whether Baud had overshot the mark by excluding all right of control by the government of "waste" land within the village area of control. His dislike of private agricultural enterprise, with its disruptive influence on Javanese adat and social structure, did not serve him well in this case. It would have been sufficient had the constitutional regulation provided that uncultivated land might be granted to entrepreneurs only on condition that the existing rights of the people on that land were respected or properly compensated.7^ Third, it was questionable whether it was in the interests of the people themselves that there be such a broad definition of the village area of control within which the hiring out of "waste" land to entrepreneurs was not permitted. When Baud used the argument that with a further growth of population a shortage of cultivable land could occur in the long run if the government allowed private entrepreneurs to have things their way, he should perhaps have considered some form of "reclamation ordinance" to put a stop to the predatory cultivation (the establishment of ladang) carried out by the peasantry on still unreclaimed cultivable land.74 By not doing so, Baud supplied his liberal opponents with the future option of insisting on a narrow interpretation of the concept "lands belonging to the villages for any reason" and to draw the boundaries of village areas of control as compactly as possible. THE CONSTITUTIONAL REGULATION AND THE NATIVE CHIEFS

The material development of Java, according to spokesmen for the colonial liberal party, demanded that the Dutch government intensify the supervision of native chiefs and better protect the people against arbitrariness and extortion. Someone like van Bosse could attribute the "less favorable" situation in which the people of Java found themselves mainly to their powerless position against the chiefs, as a result of which there was no security of goods and chattels.75 The prohibition on Dutch officials involving themselves directly with the people consequently meant "that the chiefs defraud and disadvantage the people in everything; that they are cheated when they deliver their coffee, when they are sold salt, when they receive crop payments for growing sugar cane, when they are assessed for land rent, when they are allocated labor tasks, when their labor, horses and materials are supplied for corvee services, and so on."76 This subject was discussed in detail in the context of ARTICLE 55 of the constitutional regulation, in which appeared that noble provision (as it had in previous constitutional regulations), "The protection of the native population "therefore," not keen on private agriculture and exaggerated the adat rights of the people. It is, furthermore, not clear from Nolst Trenite's discussion why Baud, if he really wanted to promote private agricultural industry, would allow entrepreneurs only a precarious right of hire instead of some real right to the land (ownership or long lease) that could be mortgaged. 7 ^ Van Vollenhoven, De Indonesier, p. 76. 74 The first reclamation ordinance for Java was fixed in 1874; it laid down, among other things, that the people required a permit from the local administration to reclaim "waste" land. See Ind. Stb. 1874, no. 79. 75 Hand. RR, 3:177. 76 Ibid., 2: 406.

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against arbitrariness, on the part of anyone at all, is one of the most important duties of the Governor-General/777 Van Hoevell thought this article the pinnacle of duplicity. He compared it with "a flag, which is hoisted high and flutters proudly, in order to avoid arousing suspicion from the way the ship is arranged and its hull constructed that it carries contraband on board."7** Was not a provision such as this just pure rhetoric, so long as no measures were taken to ensure the protection of the people against the arbitrary power of their chiefs? Then van Hoevell once more summarized his program. In the first place, the number of European officials in the internal administration must be increased to ensure better supervision over the chiefs. Furthermore, cultivation percentages and official land ownership (by the regents) had to be abolished, a measure to be paralleled by an increase in the seriously deficient salaries of the chiefs. Finally, the personal services (pancendiensten) that the people were obliged to render their chiefs must be abolished completely. As long as those services were still tolerated it was impossible to protect the people because it was nowhere stated how far the native chiefs were permitted to go in demanding such services, and even if rules were provided, it seemed highly improbable that their observance could be monitored79 In this way, the liberal opposition launched a frontal attack on the "chiefs system" of which Baud had always been a devoted champion. But on this point he would not give ground. In his view, anything that might possibly be detrimental to the attachment of the Javanese chiefs to Dutch authority had to be avoided. The government simply could not count on the support of the mass of the population. If Dutch power in Java was to be maintained by peaceful means, then it had to form a lasting alliance with the "upper classes" and "convince them that should that power collapse, their social position would also be at stake."80 Consequently, the principle was maintained in the new constitutional regulation (ARTICLE 67) that, as far as circumstances would allow, the people must remain under "the direct rule" of their own chiefs. The constitutional regulation of 1854 went even one step further than previous regulations by explicitly providing (ARTICLE 69) that when a regent's position became vacant, as far as possible one of the sons or relatives of the last regent should be appointed as successor. Although this solemn assurance enshrined what was already an established government practice, it was in itself rather special: the government had always exercised restraint with such promises, on the one hand not to tie its hands unnecessarily and on the other hand to provide incentive for ambition and diligence on the part of regents and claimants. The promise made to a regent that 77

The article also laid down that the people would everywhere be given the opportunity to complain "freely." 78 Hand. RR, 3: 453 (28 July 1854). The government defended the article with the argument that a similar provision had also appeared in earlier constitutional regulations. If it were not included, people might easily draw incorrect conclusions from that. 7 ^ Hand. RR, 3: 460. In the discussion of ARTICLE 57, van Hoevell also made a strong plea for the abolition of those services for the chiefs (pancendiensten), just as Sloet tot Oldhuis did (Hand. RR, 3: 460, 606, 610). Baud, however, had no objections to the article: those services were certainly not the first candidates for abolition. According to Baud, the government could set a good example by limiting services on public works; Hand. RR, 3: 609. With regard to the abolition of cultivation percentages, the government took the position that this could not be considered as long as it valued the maintenance of the Cultivation System; see Hand. RR, 2: 512. 80 Hand. RR, 3: 637.

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on his death or resignation he would be succeeded by one of his sons was seen as a special distinction in reward for services rendered.8* It is clear why Baud nevertheless favored including this promise in the constitutional regulation. It prevented the possibility that in the future, under the influence of new liberal ideas, this golden rule might be deviated from.82 The liberals probably waged a stronger campaign against this particular provision than against any other provision of the draft constitutional regulation. In their view, no greater heresy was conceivable than the explicit provision for "inheritance" of a public office, even more so by way of formal law! Van Bosse, the first speaker in a long debate, called the article "incompatible" with the rights of the Crown, "impolitic" and "dangerous."83 It was incompatible with the royal prerogative because the regents, whatever one might think of their relationship with the people, were officials, appointed by the government; it was impolitic because something that in the past had been at most a verbal promise, which was naturally much less binding, had been made into a legal provision from which "rights" could be derived; it was dangerous because it would thereby be more difficult ever to reverse the principle that formed the basis of this provision.8^ It was, however, all to no avail. Baud remained, albeit not without effort, master of the debate. An amendment by van Bosse and van Hoevell to delete the provision was rejected by thirty votes to twentythree.85 THE CONSTITUTIONAL REGULATION AND THE COLONIAL SURPLUS

The "colonial surplus policy" did not come up for discussion in the context of the constitutional regulation as such, but it certainly featured prominently in the exchanges of views surrounding it. The explanatory memorandum on the original draft bill had frankly stated that the Netherlands Indies was an "area of gain." The basic principle should be maintained that "while preserving the prosperity of the native people, this area of gain will continue to provide The Netherlands with the material advantages which were the aim of the conquest."8^ What was acceptable to the Council of Ministers in 1851, of which Thorbecke and van Bosse were then members, was, however, not acceptable to a majority in the Second Chamber in March 1853. The "very general" opinion was that it would have been better had the government not used the term "area of gain" and in this context had not appealed explicitly to the right of conquest. In the opinion of many, the designation "area of gain" also was historically incorrect, because a significant part of the East Indies possessions had come the way of the Dutch by treaty and not by conquest. According to some members, that expression was furthermore unconstitutional and in any case "unworthy of a civilized and religious nation."8'7 Finally, other members pointed out the unfavorable impression that such expressions would make in the Indies. 81

See "Algemeen Overzicht 1839Z1848," p. 42. See Hand. RR, 3:664. 83 Hand. RR, 3: 625. 84 Ibid., pp. 626,627. 85 Ibid., p. 668. 86 Hand. RR, 2: 2. 87 Ibid., pp. 36,37. 82

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The Politics of Colonial Exploitation

If all this was the outpouring of a guilty conscience, only a minority in the Second Chamber, among whom, of course, van Hoevell was numbered, wanted to follow up the consequences it implied. They advocated that the acquisition of material advantages for the motherland should no longer be the main aim, "but rather the furtherance of the welfare of the people of the Indies, so that the gaining of contributions to the Dutch treasury should be sought only if it could be reconciled with that chief aim/'88 The government dismissed this last remark with the statement that the members who supported this notion should first prove that the treasury could manage without the direct and indirect profits from the Cultivation System. Only then could the government begin to consider the introduction of the milder principles for administering the Indies that those members proposed.**9 This dismissal provoked a bitter lament from van Hoevell during the verbal deliberation on the bill that the colonial surplus was used again and again to render impotent the arguments of the colonial opposition. "Every proposition of the opposition is countered with just one terse word: the millions!"90 Yet van Hoevell was not a sole voice crying in the wilderness/The constitutional regulation of 1854 was followed in 1855 by a new instruction for the governorgeneral.91 In the old instruction of 1836, as supplemented in 1842, it had been impressed upon the governor-general that he must contribute to the continued growth of the colonial surplus available for the needs of the motherland. In the new instruction, by contrast, it was the "prosperity" of the people and no longer the colonial surplus that was first and foremost, "As far as this can be done without prejudicing or losing sight of the prosperity of the native people, the Governor-General must be mindful of maintaining the benefits for the motherland."92 This definition was undoubtedly closer to van Hoevell's basic principle ("first prosperity and then profits") than to the concept embodied in the explanatory memorandum in which the Netherlands Indies was still seen primarily as "an area of gain." Apart from that, it was once more characteristic that such a provision was scrupulously kept secret. Although the Second Chamber had repeatedly insisted on it, the government had never complied with the request to make public this instruction.93 The significance of such a provision was thus limited because it was impossible for the States-General to put the policy of the Indies government and the minister to the test. This was equally the case with the other good intentions expressed in the instruction. Among these was that the governor-general had to do his utmost to "bring relief," where possible, to those involved in the forced cultivations.94 Changes to current sugar contracts that might benefit government or manufacturers were not permitted if they disadvantaged the peasantry.95 Furthermore, the governor-general 88

Hand. RR, 2: 38. Ibid., p. 187. 90 Hand. RR, 3: 32. 91 Royal decree of 5 June 1855. The text of this instruction is published in Kiers, De Bevelen, pp. 200-22. 89

92 9

ARTICLE 52; Kiers, De Bevelen, p. 214.

^ The instruction was not published until 1938, by which time it had only historical value. 94 ARTICLE 57; Kiers, De Bevelen, p. 215. 95 ARTICLE 54; Kiers, De Bevelen, p. 215.

Years of Continuity and Change

143

had to make sure that the payments to which the people were entitled for their services were not defrauded by native chiefs and other persons.^6 The Indies government should propose to the government in Holland to raise the salaries of the chiefs if such appeared necessary to prevent extortion.^ The political relationship between the Dutch government and the native princes and people should be characterized by "the most unambiguous good faith," and so on.98 The law declaring the new constitutional regulation dated from 2 September 1854 and came into operation on 1 May 1855." It was the legislative product of the reactionary April Ministry and the most conservative Second Chamber that the Netherlands would see in the second half of the nineteenth century. The liberals were clearly in the minority in this Chamber, even though they received support now and then in colonial affairs from relatively progressive antirevolutionaries like Mackay and Elout van Soeterwoude and from an otherwise conservative Catholic like van Nispen van Sevenaer. How the cards were stacked is obvious from the fact that van Hoevell, notwithstanding the active support of Thorbecke, saw all but one of his eleven amendments to the draft constitutional regulation rejected.^ In spite of the sharp political differences, the first constitutional regulation laid down by law and promulgated with the cooperation of the States-General was a surprisingly neutral document. That happened because the conservative majority, led by Baud, as van Hoevell himself later admitted in the preface of his collected parliamentary speeches, displayed great "leniency" on many points.101 One example of this leniency was the decision to allow the further regulation of a number of subjects to be left to "general ordinances." Thereby for the time being the important question remained unanswered as to the role the formal Dutch legislator—the Crown and the States-General together—would have in the regulations necessary for carrying out the constitutional regulation. Initially, the draft had retained in most of those cases an instruction that they be regulated by the Crown (for instance, in the article that stipulated that the administration of justice for Europeans would rest on codes laid down by the king).1^ When a minority in the Second Chamber objected to this, because the States-General was thereby threatened with being excluded—even though a "greater number of members" was inclined to acquiesce in the proposal—the government met this objection by settling upon the vague expression "general ordinance," which could include a regulation in the form of a law, a royal decree or an ordinance of the governor-general .™3 96

ARTICLE 61; Kiers, De Bevelen, p. 216. ^ ARTICLE 51; Kiers, De Bevelen, p. 214. The Indies government was in no hurry to introduce such proposals, as is evident from V 12 April 1861, no. 19, Kol. 1053. 98 ARTICLE 46; Kiers, De Bevelen, p. 212. 99 The bill was passed by the Second Chamber on 8 August 1854 by 38 votes to 19 (against the bill were van Hoevell, Thorbecke, and almost all the other liberals), and on 31 August 1854 it passed the First Chamber by 31 votes to 1. 100 Baud confined himself to three amendments, all of which were accepted by a large majority. 1 1 ^ Van Hoevell, Parlementaire Redevoeringen, 2: vii. 102 ARTICLE 71 of the original bill. ^3 Hand. RR, 2: 344. The majority had taken the view that the application of a principle expressed in the Constitution (the regulation of colonial matters by law as soon as that appears necessary) could not be prejudiced because an ordinary law like the constitutional regulation charged the Crown with its execution. In itself this argument was, of course, correct. The order 9

144

The Politics of Colonial Exploitation

Thorbecke condemned the constitutional regulation as a "failed experiment" in law making, because it did not define the direction and shape of colonial administration sufficiently explicitly.104 Indeed, the new constitutional regulation merely flagged the existing dilemmas rather than solving them. All too often decisions were put off by leaving them to a later regulation by "general ordinance." It was symptomatic that one of the few articles in which a real decision was taken—namely ARTICLE 115, which stipulated that slavery in the Netherlands Indies must be abolished at the latest on 1 January 1860—had been inserted by amendment.105 By the same token, it was precisely this vagueness of some vital articles of the constitutional regulation that rendered it a useful instrument for ministers of colonies who held completely different views from those of Baud and Pahud. In fact, it endured for three-quarters of a century before being replaced by a new Indies constitution. for further regulation by the Crown in the constitutional regulation would, however, have signified that the legislator was stating, in so many words, that that need did not exist, at least not in 1854, and the minority was objecting to this acknowledgement. 104 Hand. RR, 3:749. 105 T^ happened after some other amendments had been rejected; among them was (by 28 votes to 27!) an amendment by van Hoevell, which wanted to declare slaves free immediately under a suspended condition of proper compensation of the owners within five years from the time the law became operative. The government had not been prepared to include anything concerning the abolition of slavery in the constitutional regulation.

8

COLONIAL PROFITS AND THE LIBERAL DILEMMA

he extensive discussion of the constitutional regulation—the Second Chamber had debated it for three weeks in the summer of 1854—was a remarkable contrast to the shallow deliberations previously conducted in that Chamber on colonial affairs. Despite the oratorical fireworks of van Hoevell and Sloet tot Oldhuis during the first Thorbecke ministry, colonial policy had only incidentally come up for discussion. For most members the "East" was a long way away.1 Other problems closer to home, like the preparation of electoral laws and provincial and municipal laws, had demanded their attention. "Did not the Ministry of 1849-1853 have a great task to accomplish above everything else? Did it not have to concentrate on that first of all?" Thus would Thorbecke later defend himself, after a former ally who was accused by him of deserting liberal principles had objected that he, the steadfast liberal, had tolerated in his cabinet a minister of colonies as conservative as Pahud.2 The fact remains that Pahud, with van Bosse who managed the portfolio of finances, were the only colleagues of Thorbecke to serve the full period of his ministry. The appointment of Pahud, the little-known Indies official home on leave, had come as a complete surprise, perhaps most of all to himself. One day after his appointment he confided to a visitor, "Just sympathize with me, because I won't last six months, my whole career is finished."3 In fact, he did not remain as minister for six months but for six years, almost four of them in a liberal cabinet, supported by a liberal majority in the Second Chamber and more than two years in a cabinet and with a Second Chamber majority of a different political stripe. Not a small achievement—a record, even, in the second half of the nineteenth century, of ministerial longevity—but also proof that colonial policy in these years still lay outside the real arena of political battle. During his first ministry, Thorbecke concerned himself little with colonial policy, although his role in preparing the draft constitutional regulation introduced in 1851 was probably somewhat greater than he later made it appear. His influence was

T

1

Of the sixty-eight members of the Second Chamber in 1854, six had been in the Indies: van Hoevell, Baud, Rochussen, Stolte (former Indies official and later agent in Batavia of the firm of van Hoboken and Son), one member who had served in the navy, and one who had served in the army. See van Hoevell, Parlementaire Redevoeringen, 2:1. 2 Hand. 11 and 13 May 1861, pp. 685, 700. That former ally was in this case J. P. P. van Zuylen van Nijevelt, minister of foreign affairs in the first ministry of Thorbecke. 3 S. P. V Honore Naber, "Het Leven van een Vloothouder. Gedenkschriften van M. H. Jansen," Werken Historisch Genootschap, 3d sen, no. 49 (Utrecht: Kemink, 1925), p. 257.

146

The Politics of Colonial Exploitation

clearly evident only in the decision that Baud should not accompany Duymaer van Twist to Java. In essential matters, for instance, the discussion of the draft constitutional regulation in the Council of Ministers, there is no evidence of serious differences of opinion between himself and Pahud. Even in 1852, Pahud asserted to the Second Chamber that "unanimity" existed between himself and his colleagues on the principles of colonial administration.4 When van Hoevell withdrew his confidence in Pahud in the most emphatic way ("I can no longer support a Minister whose principles are opposed to my own"), neither Pahud nor Thorbecke reacted in any way.5 The assumption is clear that the "eminent chief" of the liberal party was quite content with the way in which Pahud, under Baud's guardianship, was managing the affairs of the Indies. Van Bosse, indeed, wrote to Duymaer van Twist in 1851 that "Thorbecke is by no means a liberal in colonial affairs: on the contrary!"6 Things changed when Thorbecke resigned in April 1853 and Pahud, instead of following the example of the majority of his colleagues, stayed on. In the debates on the constitutional regulation during 1854, Thorbecke fell in line with van Hoevell, even though he did not support his fierce condemnation of the colonial surplus policy, "Up to now I have been and remain of the opinion that this so-called system of exploitation accords with the interests of the people of the Indies, provided that system and our administration is properly regulated."'7 Van Hoevell seems at that time to have been more respected by Thorbecke than before when Baud's views still carried most weight. When there was momentarily talk of appointing van Hoevell to the Council of the Indies—the new ministry would love to have seen the departure of this difficult opponent—Thorbecke moved to persuade him not to accept this offer: "Mr. van Hoevell can render better service here."** In 1854, the Indies question was still a relatively minor problem. Although some "colonial experts" may have busied themselves with it, a "colonial problem" as such did not exist for the Second Chamber and in the realm of public opinion (one seeks in vain for that expression in the Second Chamber proceedings). It was first the education issue—provisionally settled by the law of 13 August 1857—that made feelings run high and decided whether ministries and ministers stayed on or resigned; subsequently the railroad issue (the question whether, where, and how—by the government or by private companies—railroads should be constructed in a country endowed with countless rivers and canals) and the reform of the taxation system engaged attention in the political arena. Pahud's resignation at the end of 1855 was, consequently, of no political significance but was the result of his appointment as governor-general of the Netherlands Indies, not an unattractive post from a financial point of view. He took over the administration from Duymaer van Twist on 22 May 1856. As if to prove that in all these years nothing had changed in the realm of colonial policy, the king, with the concurrence of the Council of Ministers (of the ministry of van Hall and Donker Curtius, which was in power from April 1853 until 1 July 1856), offered Baud the Department 4

Hand. 7 December 1852, p. 339 5. 5 Hand. 6 December 1852; van Hoevell, Parlementaire Redevoeringen, 1: 256. 6 Van Bosse to Duymaer van Twist, 19 October 1851; J. Zwart, "Brieven aan de GouverneurGeneraal Duymaer van Twist," Bijdragen en Mededelingen Historisch Genootschap 60 (1939): 17. 7 Hand. RR, 3: 776; cf. Hand. RR, 3:924. 8 Van Soest, van Hoevell p. 69.

Colonial Profits and the Liberal Dilemma

147

of Colonies. Baud, however, took the wisest course and declined by pleading his age: at sixty-six years, he considered himself too old "for the constant strain."^ The choice then fell on another Indies official on leave: P. Mijer, a member of the Council of the Indies. He was well known to Thorbecke and van Hoevell. In Leiden, Thorbecke had counted him among his most promising students (he had already graduated at the age of twenty with the highest honors) and in Batavia he had, with van Hoevell, edited the Tijdschrift voor Nederlandsch Indie. In 1848, Mijer had been the principal spokesman at the celebrated May gathering in Batavia that had frightened Rochussen so much. But thereafter, the political paths of the two editors had separated. Mijer had received his first experience of official life (as referendary in the cabinet of the governor-general) from Baud, whom he admired greatly. In 1878, in his declining years, he would devote a seven hundred-page biography of praise to his former superior. In 1855, having returned to the Netherlands after a career of twentytwo (uninterrupted!) years of service in the Indies, he was recommended for the portfolio, very likely by Baud.10 Although he was regarded as a renegade by the liberal party, the colonial-conservative party in the Second Chamber obtained in him a powerful and eloquent advocate who, according to Baud, did well "at the green table."11 Just as Pahud had done before him, Mijer continued to hold office in a subsequent government (the ministry of van der Brugghen from 1 July 1856 to 18 March 1858) and just like his predecessor he allowed himself to be nominated, again while a member of a conservative cabinet, as governor-general in 1866. After Pahud's departure, Baud did not exercise any significant influence. Only very seldom did Mijer seek his counsel.12 Plagued by gout and rheumatism, he led a retiring life in his last years. There was no lack of royal honors for him. In 1854, the title of minister of state was conferred upon him.13 In 1856, the king for a short time considered appointing him as minister of foreign affairs and prime minister of a "royal" cabinet, which was to prepare a revision of the Constitution to stamp out the "excessive" influence of the people (a plan that Baud strenuously advised the king not to adopt).1^ In 1858, as a reward for his services to the state, in particular establishing and refining the Cultivation System, he was raised to the peerage with the title of baron (van den Bosch had been made a count, but there had to be a difference!). In that same year he also resigned from the Second Chamber in which he had represented Amsterdam since 1854; Duymaer van Twist was elected in his place. While Baud finally disappeared from the political stage in 1858 (he died one year later), an old friend from the days of the "ancien regime" who had been sworn in with him by King William I in 1840 returned at almost the same moment to play a 9 Baud to jhr. F. de Kock, director of the cabinet of the king, 12 November 1855, Collectie Baud, 821. ^ Details of the career of Mijer are from S. van Deventer, "Levensbericht van P. Mijer," in Levensberichten van de Maatschappij der Nederlandsche Letterkunde (Leiden: Brill, 1884). 11 Baud to Pahud, 8 January 1857, Collectie Baud, 839. The "green table" symbolized government power as the members of the cabinet were (and still are) seated at a table of that color during parliamentary sessions. 12 Baud to Pahud, 7 April 1859, Collectie Baud, 839. 13 Mijer, Baud, p. 677. ^ Details about the plan hatched at the Royal Palace of Het Loo for a revision of the Constitution that would limit direct franchise and the freedom of the press are in Collectie Baud, 821.

148

The Politics of Colonial Exploitation

major role. In 1858, Rochussen was charged with the formation of a new cabinet, which, according to the king's wishes, had to be "moderate and non-party."15 Rochussen, unlike Baud, was not a man to decline such a flattering offer because of his age (he was then sixty-one). He became the formateur of—and minister of colonies in—a cabinet named after him and van Bosse, which presented itself to the Second Chamber on 13 April 1858 with a declaration of government policy presented by Rochussen. It was during Rochussen's rule, so hopefully begun but unfortunately ended, that the colonial issue became acute. In defending the colonial policy of the government in 1854 in the Second Chamber, Baud did not have to look far to find the argument that would make the greatest impression on his audience. He had calculated the amount that the colony had contributed to the treasury of the motherland since 1830; the calculation had yielded the impressive surplus of more than 222 million guilders, not including the indirect advantages of the cultivation and consignment systems.^ Those indirect advantages, insofar as they benefited the Nederlandsche HandelMaatschappij, its shareholders and all those who were involved as shipowners, shipbrokers, commodity brokers, insurers, or manufacturers involved in the transportation and sale of colonial products in the Netherlands, became proportionately less after 1853. A new so-called consignment contract between the government and the NHM—authorized by the law of 22 December 1853^—reduced the commission which the NHM could charge from 2.75 percent to 2 percent.^ Still more savings were made in these years, such as a reduction of freight prices, brokerage fees, and insurance premiums, which resulted in less money accruing to the people involved in the transport and sale of products within the consignment system, while concealed subsidies to important branches of Dutch industry were gradually terminated.19 In comparison with 1846, about 6 million guilders per year were saved in 1856 on the transport and sale of those products.20 However, that proved no impediment to the NHM paying its shareholders (the most prominent of whom was the Dutch king) a dividend in 1856 that was higher than in any previous year.21 High prices for the principal colonial staple commodities were the reason for this increase. The new consignment contract shot a big hole in the trading monopoly of the NHM. Henceforth, the government itself was to be allowed to auction in Java part of the coffee and sugar it received. After 1860, it was in theory even possible to withdraw the entire harvest from the consignment system.22 This measure was intended not only to accommodate the liberals but had also been taken in view of the serious deficits the Indies government continually confronted because the Cultivation System necessitated all kinds of expenses without immediately compensating 15 Rochussen, "Autobiografie," p. 128. Hand. RR, 3: 8 (17 July 1854). Baud's estimate was on the low side. See n. 27 this chapter. 17 Sib. no. 129. The contract itself dated from 21 /22 July 1853. 1® ART. 6. During 1854, the commission was still 2.25 percent. An earlier contract between the state and the NHM of 2/3 July 1849 laid down that commission would "never" be less than 2.5 percent. This contract was thus overrruled in 1853. 19 Mansvelt, Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappij, 2: 263 ff. 20 Bijl. Hand. 1856-57, p. 593. 21 During 1850-55 the average dividend was almost f65 per year; in 1856 fl24 was paid. See J. J. Reesse, De Suikerhandel van Amsterdam van 1813 tot 1894 (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1911), p. 103. 16

22

ARTICLES 1,2.

Colonial Profits and the Liberal Dilemma

149

revenues. Thus in 1850, the deficit in the Indies to be covered from the sale of products in the Netherlands amounted to almost 15 million guilders.23 Sending bills of exchange or specie from the Netherlands to cover the shortfall was very cumbersome. In practice, however, consignment remained the general rule after 1853. The maximum amount of produce allowed to be sold annually in the Indies before 1860 was never attained, and after that year as well, the majority of the harvest continued to be consigned to the NHM.2^ After all, the interests of Dutch ship owners and Amsterdam community brokers outweighed the profits from a less artificially constricted market in colonial products or were a more important consideration than the Indies deficits.25 Another important change in the relations between the state and the NHM had already occurred in 1850 when Pahud had terminated the provision of interestbearing advances by that company on the anticipated proceeds from government products entrusted to it. It was precisely this role as banker, in which the NHM acted as a large-scale moneylender to the treasury, which in previous years had made the government all too dependent on its wealthy agent.26 The high prices of the principal colonial products that, despite less favorable conditions, enabled the NHM to pay still higher dividends, also caused Indies profits, from which the Dutch treasury benefited, to grow after 1850. De Waal calculated those profits at 234 million guilders for the period 1831-50 and at more than twice that amount, namely 491 million guilders, for the period 1851-70! Of this latter amount, 93.5 million guilders were realized during the years 1851-55 and 177.5 million during the next five years. Between 1860 and 1866, the flow of money from the Indies slackened only a little: 138 million guilders in 1861-65. Thereafter, Indies profits began to fall; in 1866, they were still 32.5 million guilders, in the following year, 15 million.27 But it was not until 1877 that this golden stream dried up completely. The Indies profits, "which through God's blessing flow annually into our treasury in such extraordinary amounts as a result of the sale at high prices of East Indies products,"2** as it was then expressed in the Second Chamber in a manner that Droogstoppel (one of the main characters of Multatuli's Max Havelaar and an incarnation of the hypocritical Dutch petit bourgeoisie) could not have improved upon, had accounted for on average almost one-fifth (19 percent) of the total Dutch public revenues before 1850. During the period 1851-60 they made up almost one third (31.5 23

Bijl. Hand. 1852-53, pp. 141 ff. ^ According to the consignment contract of 1853, a maximum of 200,000 piculs of coffee and 150,000 piculs of sugar could be auctioned in the Indies until 1 January 1860. But by 1861, however, no more than 170,000 piculs of coffee and 100,000 piculs of sugar per annum had been sold. See Hand. 13 May 1861, p. 698. 25 In 1861, the financial deficit in the Indies, to be covered from the sale of products in the Netherlands, amounted to 16.5 million guilders. See Bijl Hand. 1864-65, XCVIII, Bijlage K. This deficit had been caused by a large increase in expenditures in the Indies since 1850. 26 Mansvelt, Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappij, 2: 258. 2 ^ E. de Waal, Onze Indische Financien. Nieuive Reeks Aanteekeningen (The Hague: Nijhoff, 187677), 2: 44; De Waal, Aanteekeningen, 7:145 ff. De Waal put Java's share in those profits for the period 1831-63 at more than 550 million guilders. Other calculations arrive at an amount of 823 million guilders for the whole period between 1831 and 1877. 28 J. F. van Reede van Oudtshoorn, Hand. 12 December 1857, p. 270. 2

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The Politics of Colonial Exploitation

percent).2^ In some financial years, the so-called contribution from the Netherlands Indies amounted to one-half the total of the national revenues, including direct taxes, excise duties, import and export duties, and so on.3^ Table 8.1. Holland's income and expenditure, 1851-1861

Year

Normal Revenue

Contributions from the Netherlands Indies3

General Government Expenses

Interest on National Debt

Amortisation of National Debt

1851 1855 1860 1861

59,013,063 63,319,285 62,402,493 63,260,715

16,382,698 24,347,850 32,359,171 32,994,720

31,940,356 38,809,399 41,278,746 43,026,242

35,838,874 33,696,250 29,644,581 29,381,586

7,667,385 12,391,522 13,205,896 14,305,852

a

Including interest on the East Indies debt but excluding the sums paid for the West Indies and Guinea from Indies finances.

Because in those years enormous amounts still had to be paid in interest on the Dutch national debt (until 1854 the interest burden even exceeded general administrative expenditure), the Indies profits were indispensable for maintaining balance in the state budget. Every year at least 8 or 9 million guilders of Indies profits had to be used to close the gap between the normal sources of revenue on the one hand and expenditures on general administration and the payment of interest on the national debt on the other.3* Thus Duymaer van Twist was absolutely right when in 1858 he asserted that without those colonial contributions it would be impossible to meet the most indispensable and urgent needs.32 The passage of the Railroad Act of van Hall in the summer of 1860 created important new financial obligations for the government, as a result of which dependence on the Indies profits increased still further.33 Until 1870, the execution of this law required an expenditure of at least 10 million guilders annually, the financing of which was completely or largely done by the colonial contributions. The same thing happened with the considerable amounts that were spent in those years on the emancipation of slaves in Suriname (to compensate the slaveowners) and for the construction of new waterways from Amsterdam and Rotterdam to the sea.34 New government loans to pay for public works would have further aggravated the already harsh burden of national debt; no minister of finances would have dared or been willing to recommend this strategy. In 1857, the government impressed on the Second Chamber that interest payments on the national debt in the Netherlands accounted for more than 47 percent of total government expenditure compared with 29

See Bijl. Hand. 1864-65, 2, no. 147. See also chap. 3. The total of Dutch public revenue comprised normal tax revenues and the colonial contributions together. 30 See G. M. Boissevain, Dejongste Belastinghervorming in Nederland (Amsterdam: Van Kampen, 1894), Bijlage B, Staten 1 and 2, which give total figures for the period 1849-90. The figures in table 8.1 are taken from it (Dutch guilders). 31 Ibid. 32 Hand. 25 November 1858, p. 148. 33 Law of 18 August 1860, Stb. no. 45. 34 Law of 8 August 1862, Stb. no. 164 (Suriname); Law of 24 January 1863, Stb. no. 4 (waterways).

Colonial Profits and the Liberal Dilemma

151

29 percent in France and less than 27 percent in Belgium.3^ Proposals for the introduction of new taxes, for instance an "income tax" (was there ever a tax more at variance with the Dutch national character than this most "inquisitorial" of all taxes?) could count on little support in parliament,for such proposals would have aggravated the burden of the well-to-do middle class that had gained the right to vote. In those circumstances, the easy way out was to use the Indies profits to plug the holes in Dutch government budgets. The observation in some of the literature that after 1850 the importance of colonial profits diminished is, therefore, incorrect.3** The size of the Indies profits after 1850 both in absolute as well as in percentage terms, that is, compared with the total Dutch public revenue, was considerably greater than before. This situation changed only around 1870; in 1872, normal revenues for the first time exceeded expenditures for general administration and interest payments on the national debt.37 During the period 1850-59, about 90 percent of Indies profits came from the profits on the sale of commodities produced by the Cultivation System (the remaining 10 percent was profit on the sale of tin).38 Although the Cultivation System was in decline after 1850, if one considers the number of growers and the area set aside for the system, this was certainly not the case if financial results are the yardstick. Table 8.2 shows results for the various different cultivations (for comparative purposes I have added figures for the period 1840-49). Table 8.2: Financial results of government cultivations 1840-59 (guilders) 1840-49 Cinnamon Cochineal Coffee Indigo Pepper Sugar

Tea

Tobacco Credit balance

a

323,108 L 499,240 P 64,826,679 P 15,562,134 P 191,292 P 4,081,847 L 2,180,889 L 94,560 L 74,398,471

1850-54

1855-59

46,509 P 444,626 P 77,539,790 P 6,758,999 P 205,138 P 3,384,980 P 1,840,758 L 4,461 L 86,534,823

206,006 L 43,695 L 105,599,071 P 5,854,527 P 203,398 P 33,704,786 P 2,448,870 L 60,518 L 142,602,693

Source: See Pierson, Kultuurstelsel, p. 169. L = Loss, P = Profit.

a

Although the Netherlands depended on the Indies profits, those profits in turn came entirely from profits from the sale of two or three government products. During the period 1850-59, coffee and sugar combined accounted for 96 percent of the profits from the Cultivation System (coffee alone accounted for 80 percent). Those profits were the result of a sharp increase in the market price of coffee and to a lesser degree that of sugar after 1850; in 1851-52, the price of Java coffee at NHM auctions was just under f24 per picul, but in 1859-60, Droogstoppel had to pay f38 per picul. Sugar 35

Minister of Finances A. Vrolik, Hand. 11 May 1857, p. 764. ° See Gonggrijp, Schets, p. 113; Wertheim, Indonesian Society in Transition, p. 62. 37 Boissevain, Belastinghervorming, Staat 1. 38 The Indies budget surplus in the period 1850-59 amounted to about 254 million guilders. See de Waal, Aanteekeningen, 7:148. 3

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realized in those years respectively about flO and f!5 at auction; in 1857—a miraculous year for sugar—it yielded almost £23 per picul.3^ Thus the edifice of Dutch public revenues was propped up by the high market prices of coffee and sugar and that, naturally, was a rather precarious foundation. A crop failure in Java, increased coffee production in South America, or a further expansion of the beet sugar industry in Europe could change the situation radically. Especially around 1860, when the prices of colonial products had risen to heights that a few years earlier had not been thought possible, this must have been a great worry. Steyn Parve may have exaggerated in his usual way when he wrote in 1850 that the prosperity of two nations (the Netherlands and the Indies) had seldom been exposed to a more dangerous risk; it cannot be denied that there was a grain of truth in those words.4^ As early as 1843, the government had admitted through the then Minister of Finances Rochussen that a balance was needed between revenues and expenditures and "that we must not remain dependent in the same degree as we now are on the always uncertain and precarious contributions from the overseas territories."41 But this "finishing-post on the race-track of finances, to be kept in sight, approached and eventually reached by each Minister of Finances," to use Baud's words, seemed to move further and further away through the 1850s.42 The huge size of the colonial profits had a paralyzing effect that hampered the recovery of Dutch government finances. On the one hand the government never dared rely too much on those revenues, uncertain and so difficult to estimate in advance. As late as 1848, the sale of government products had been so disappointing that it could not entirely cover even the obligatory "interest" of f9,800,000 on the socalled Indies debt. Because of this failure, the Indies surpluses, insofar as they were not required to pay for current expenditures, were often earmarked for more useful purposes, namely to redeem an oppressive national debt. "Amortize, amortize again and do nothing but amortize," thus Sloet tot Oldhuis condemned the financial policies of the government in 1857, and he added the question of whether the money could be spent in better ways, for instance on public works like railroads and canals, instead of repaying a public debt that a later generation would perhaps find easier to carry as a result of inflation.43 Only after 1860 did he get his way. Between 1850 and 1860, a total of 135 million guilders of the national debt was either paid off or amortized. The total interest burden declined by 6.5 million guilders in that period. In 1860, the amount of interest to be paid annually on the national debt was still only 82 percent of that in 1850.44 However, colonial contributions came in so regularly and, especially after 1850, were almost always much higher than originally estimated that neither the government nor the opposition could resist the temptation to introduce proposals abolishing 39

See appendix 2. I. J. Seijlmans and A. Seijlmans, Suikerveilingen der Nederlandsche HandelMaatschappij 1840-1859 (Amsterdam: n.p., 1860), calculates gross prices of f29.72 for 1850-54 and f41.31 for 1855-59 per 100 kg of sugar. 4

^ Steyn Parve, Koloniaal Monopoliestelsel, p. 117.

41

V 21 May 1843, no. 194, Kol. 4291. Cf. Baud, Hand. 11 June 1855, p. 870. Hand. 11 June 1855, p. 870. 43 Hand. 20 November 1857, p. 192. 44 Boissevain, Belastinghervorming, Staat 2. See van Hall, Hand. 21 September 1860, p. 12. Between 1860 and 1870 the interest burden decreased by another 9 percent. Although the tempo of amortisation slowed down after 1860, it was not stopped. 42

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burdensome excise duties without replacing them with new taxes.45 In November 1853, the opposition took the initiative with a bill introduced by nine members, including Thorbecke, van Bosse, and van Hoevell, to abolish the excise duty on beef.4** The explanatory memorandum on this bill described as "exaggerated" the fear that the Indies profits might rapidly decline. According to the nine, the strong increase in demand, which outstripped supply, did not presage a drop in the prices of colonial products for the time being. Moreover, they claimed that the profits gained on those products accounted for only "a minor part" of the colonial surplus.47 Alarming reports in private letters about a threatening decline in coffee cultivation— which previously had been pointed out on more than one occasion by Sloet tot Oldhuis and van Hoevell as proof that the Cultivation System was failing—were brushed aside as "unproven."4** After a fierce battle by the government, the bill was finally rejected by a large majority on 21 December 1853, after van Bosse had once again made it clear that he considered a reform of the Dutch taxation system and the introduction of an income tax necessary, but that he was at the same time convinced that "belief in the need for that has not sufficiently sunk into the nation; this explains the general opposition that arises as soon as that subject is discussed."49 Here he spoke from experience, because several of his proposals for the introduction of such an income tax, which he had defended as minister of finances in the years 1848-53, had come to grief in the Second Chamber; this failure was partly the result of their somewhat unfortunate content and partly because the claim that there would be budget deficits without those taxes was invalidated because of the unexpectedly high Indies profits.5^ In 1855, the government made a counter move with the proposal to abolish the government excise on flour. A significant portion of the 4.5 million guilders that this oppressive excise duty realized for the treasury would be abolished without compensation by other taxes. Van Bosse, the careful financier, thought this a very serious step indeed. He held the view that a bridge was being crossed that had never been crossed before; "We are considering today a proposal which tends to decrease our revenue and to cover the resulting deficit from income from colonial sources."51 He voted against it, but with the support of almost all the liberals, the abolition of the excise on flour was accepted by a majority in both chambers .52 Although Baud had voted for the proposal, he seized upon the discussion of this bill to warn the Second Chamber emphatically on 11 June 1855 against the "highly dangerous" notion that there need be no fear of a decline in the Indies profits and that the practice of increasing expenditures and abolishing taxes could comfortably 4

^ Between 1850 and 1867 an annual total of 7 million guilders in taxes was abolished, whereas less than 1.5 million in new taxes were introduced. During that same period, interest on the national debt decreased by 3 million guilders. The balance of 2.5 million guilders had to be found in the increased profits from the Indies and existing taxes. See Minister of Finances A. Vrolik, Hand. 20 November 1857, p. 94. 46 Bijl Hand. 1853-54, pp. 143 ff. 47 Ibid., p. 145. 48 Ibid., p. 208. 49 Hand. 20 December 1853, p. 527. ^ See Boissevain, Belastingheruorming, pp. 6 ff. 51 Hand. 7 June 1855, p. 825. 52 Law of 13 July 1855, Stb. 103.

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be continued.53 He remembered very well how the market price of such an important article as Java coffee had stood at 26 cents per pound in 1829 and subsequently had fallen to 22, 21 and 20 cents; afterwards (in 1832), the price had risen again to 32 and even 38 cents. But then a prolonged slump had occurred, which had continued until 1848, when the price reached its lowest level of 18.5 cents, and in 1849, 22 cents.54 The price had now risen again to 30 cents, but for how long would this favorable market continue? Moreover, how long would Java be able to continue producing such great quantities of coffee? Had not several Residents already complained of an increasing shortage of suitable land and a threatened exhaustion of coffee plantations?55 For those reasons, according to Baud, the aim had to be one of becoming less dependent on those uncertain and, indeed, "precarious" profits from a few products. Only then would there be an end to an unnatural situation that could only be compared with the relationship that had existed between Spain and its former colonies, and that was not a very encouraging example.56 If the government wanted to ease burdens, then justice demanded that it should not be the Dutch, who paid for only four-fifths of what they spent, who benefited in the first instance from this, but rather the Javanese people. The nation was indeed being "misled" if it were being told that it was responsible for the surpluses of previous financial years. "The nation cannot be told often enough that this proposition is untrue and the nation cannot be reminded often enough that the surpluses are derived from another part of the world; the nation cannot be told often enough that those surpluses are a burden which it does not carry itself."5'7 Therefore, Baud wanted a pertinent answer from the government on the question of whether, with all those millions available, it would be able to do something to ease the burdens of those who with their labor had earned all that wealth. It was only to be expected that van Hoevell would not leave this argument unanswered. Two days later, he recalled how he and his friends had fought for years to alleviate the burdens of the Javanese people and how, again and again, they had come up against Baud, "our skillful, our experienced, our tireless opponent."58 If the colonial profits were uncertain and precarious, which van Hoevell did not want to dispute, then that was the fault of Baud himself and his supporters, who had relied too much upon the Cultivation System and the coercion upon which it was founded. If Baud had suddenly changed his mind and wanted to oppose the colonial surpluses that he had so vigorously defended before, then van Hoevell, pleasantly surprised by this about-turn, was willing to take note of it. In the meantime, half measures would not suffice if the interests of the Javanese were to be pursued sincerely. To do that, the oppressive corvee services laid on the Javanese by their chiefs would have to be done away with; private industry would have to be encouraged. Then the outcome would be based on a much firmer foundation than the prices of coffee and sugar!59 53

Hand. 11 June 1855, p. 871. Ibid., p. 870. 55 Ibid., p. 871. 56 Ibid., p. 869. 57 Ibid., p. 871. 58 Hand. 13 June 1855, p. 906. 59 Hand. 13 June 1855, pp. 906,907. 54

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Encouraged by the views expressed on opposite sides of the Chamber, Pahud hastened to declare that he agreed with the idea that the favorable situation of the colonial finances should also be used to further the interests of the native people of the Netherlands Indies; "Now that principles have been included in the new Constitutional regulation which gradually have to be put into practice, the moment has now come for me also to prove that it is a serious concern to me that the Javanese ought not be forgotten when the prosperity of the peoples of The Netherlands and of its overseas possessions is being discussed."6^ Before too long the government would be invited to bear the consequences of that promise. In 1854, less coffee was sold on government account than had originally been estimated because of a partial crop failure in Java in the previous year. But because the price had been higher than had been budgeted (f27.45 per picul instead of f21.32) the proceeds had still exceeded the estimated amount by more than 2.5 million guilders.6* When this statement of account was presented in the autumn of 1855 to the state committee charged with checking the colonial accounts,62 the committee asked "whether fairness demands that payments to the Javanese be increased in proportion to the improved market prices?""3 Pahud, then in the last days of his ministership, was only too glad to leave the answer to this awkward question to his successor, Mijer. One year later, during the investigation of the colonial account for 1856—the most favorable account ever presented—the matter was raised again. Mijer, however, was not keen on an increase in crop payments; the majority of the Residents in Java, whose advice had been sought, had not thought that increase necessary. The director of cultivations shared this opinion. True enough, the Council of the Indies had been of a different view, but the thrifty Duymaer van Twist had not been able to agree with the feelings of the council and had also advised against increasing crop payments.64 But when, in the subsequent exchange of views between the government and the Second Chamber, many members appealed to "the principles of justice and fairness," which had to provide the line of action in this,6^ and when Pahud in the Indies had also sent word that in his opinion a loyal implementation of ARTICLE 56 of the constitutional regulation made an increase of the wages for coffee growers unavoidable, 6® Hand. 13 June 1855, p. 917. This assertion was probably connected with the decision taken shortly after by the government in Holland, against the advice of all the Residents, to rescind the increase in the price of salt in Java from 1 January 1856. The price of salt had been increased after the abolition of the market tax in 1852. See Bijl. Hand. 1857-58, p. 461. 61 Bijl. Hand. 1855-56, p. 685. 6 ^ This was the state committee established in 1841, under the chairmanship of the minister of colonies, which was charged with checking the colonial remittance account prepared by the department; see chap. 1. This very limited parliamentary supervision on the management of colonial finances and revenues was retained after 1848 pending the Indies Accountability Law (Indische Comptabiliteitswet) foreshadowed by the Constitution. 63 Bijl. Hand. 1855-56, p. 687. 64 Bijl. Hand. 1856-57, p. 631. See also Mijer, Hand. 2 March 1857, p. 569. 65 Bijl. Hand. 1856-57, p. 912 (interim report on the bill for regulating the use of the colonial budget surplus for 1855). See also Margadant, Regeeringsreglement, vol. 2, p. 193.

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Mijer changed his tack.66 Early in 1858, he authorized Pahud to increase the delivery price paid to the people for their coffee.67 Further guidelines were given in an instruction from Rochussen dated 23 September 1858: crop payments should follow the average price of coffee at the market in Batavia, on the understanding that peasants would never be paid less than f8.50 per picul (with a market price of f20 or less) and never more than f 13 (with a market price of f40 or higher).68 Thus the increases did not really mean all that much, the more so because in Priangan, crop payments, for the time being at least, remained considerably lower than the delivery price of coffee elsewhere in Java.6^ Consequently, the Council of State had contended that this increase did not do sufficient justice to the constitutional regulation because its intention was that the growers should share in the profits from coffee.70 But Rochussen had known better than to accept this advice: in his instruction to the authorities in the Indies he described the provision of the constitutional regulation as "very vague/' while he also pointed to the danger of "harmful increases" in crop payments, against which the provision itself had already warned.7* The great volume of the Indies profits and the growing realization "that rather too much is being demanded from the colonies" (the words of Minister van Bosse in 1849) led to a situation in which, after 1850, other colonial interests, already too long neglected, began to receive attention.72 Thus in 1849, the Indies government was authorized to budget f25,000 annually for the establishment of schools in which sons of Javanese chiefs could be trained as native officials.73 In 1860, expenditure on native education was f76,436 (still less than one-quarter of the amount spent on the education of European children).74 Expenditure for health care rose from f!27,517 in 1850 to f255,506 in 1860, an increase of 100 per cent in ten years.7^ Expenditure on public works during that same period grew from f972,489 to f3,188,979. But all in all 66

Pahud was alluding to the provision (ART. 56, sub. 4) that the government cultivations had to provide the people with the same benefits for the same labor as free cultivations. However this regulation, like the whole of ARTICLE 56, was originally not meant to cover coffee cultivation but only sugar and indigo cultivation. See chap. 7, n. 50. 67 Ind. Sib. 1858, no. 19 and 20. 68 Van Deventer, Bijdragen, 2: 550; Margadant, Regeeringsreglement, 2:194, 209. The Council of State had been consulted on this instruction. 69 In I860, crop payments in Priangan were 5.25 per picul, compared with flO.50 in the rest of Java; van Deventer, Bijdragen, 2:551, 730. It should be borne in mind, though, that no land rent was levied on the rice harvest in Priangan. 7 ^ Margadant, Regeeringsreglement, 2:195. 7 ^ Van Deventer, Bijdragen, 2: 551. The maximum of £13 per picul was reached in 1867, after crop payments over the previous ten years had risen from f8.40 in 1857 to f!2 in 1865 (f3.15 and f6 in Priangan). After 1867, crop payments remained at f!3, independent of further fluctuations in the market price (after 1871 this amount was also paid in Priangan), until in 1874 they were raised to f!4. The net price paid for Java coffee in the Netherlands was then almost f64! In 1889, crop payments were increased to f!5. See Margadant, Regeeringsreglement, 2: 209, 211. 72 See van Hoevell, Parlementaire Redevoeringen, 1: 27. Pahud too thought that it was "generally recognized" in 1853 that because of the demands of the Dutch treasury many improvements in the Indies had to remain in abeyance; see Hand. 10 December 1853, p. 3% 2. 73 Royal decree of 30 September 1849. See TNI 1 (1868): 371,372. 74 De Waal, Aanteekeningen, 7: 176. Not until 1863 was more than one hundred thousand guilders spent annually on native education. See TNI 1 (1868): 375. 75 De Waal, Aanteekeningen, 7:174,176.

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those items did not carry very much weight. What Mijer had emphasized in the Second Chamber in 1857 still applied, "If the Dutch state were not to such a high degree financially dependent on the East Indies colonies as is now the case, (then) we could put up with many sacrifices in the interests of the native people, sacrifices which under the present circumstances are out of the question."7** Increases in expenditure for the army and the navy were much larger, especially after 1855 when the government began to pursue a more active policy with regard to the islands outside Java. It is true that the instruction laid down in that year for the governor-general had still rejected the aim of territorial expansion ("The political relationships of the Dutch government to the native rulers and peoples will be characterized by the most unambiguous good faith. Any attempt to exploit the weakness of those rulers and peoples to expand Dutch power must be carefully averted and avoided by the Governor-General as long as existing agreements are conscientiously observed by them"),77 but this line of action gradually began to lose its significance.78 In 1850, according to the finalized Indies accounts, Department of War expenditure amounted to f9,456,719 and in 1855 f 11,340,526. In 1860, that figure had risen to f!6,196,182.79 Especially because of the large rise in military expenditures, the balance between territorial revenue and expenditure in the Netherlands Indies itself was upset after 1850. Van Bosse calculated that government revenue in 1849 from land rent, tax farms, import and export duties, the salt monopoly, and various smaller revenues amounted to more than 34 million guilders and expenditure for the Indies administration (excluding those for the Cultivation System) were approximately 27.5 million guilders. By 1858, this surplus of 6.5 million guilders had been replaced by a deficit of more than 3.5 million guilders because territorial revenues had risen to almost 43 million guilders but actual government expenditures to about 46.5 million guilders.80 In 1860, this deficit amounted to almost 8 million guilders.81 This shortfall had to be recouped from the sale of coffee and other government products. In other words, without the Cultivation System it would have been impossible from the mid-1850s to balance accounts in the Indies as well, unless "ordinary" expenditure was cut or new burdens were imposed on the people. After 1848, the framing of the Indies budget remained the prerogative of the Crown, until such time as the Indies Accountability Law came into being; the StatesGeneral exercised no direct influence on it. Successive ministers of colonies explained away the nonappearance of this law by appealing to the complexity of the matter. Whenever the Second Chamber repeatedly pressed for action, again and again it met 76

Hand. 24 February 1858, p. 411. ART. 46. See Kiers, De Bevelen, p. 212. 78 See S. L. van der Wai, "De Nederlandse Expansie in Indonesia in de Tijd van het Modern Imperialisme: de Houding van de Nederlandsch Regering en de Politieke Partijen," Bijdragen en Mededelingen betreffende de Geschiedenis der Nederlanders 86 (1971): 48. Van der Wai was of the opinion that the policy of restraint ended around 1870. But the already large increase in military expenditures raises the question of whether this date should be put back another fifteen years. See C. Fasseur, "Een Koloniale Paradox/' Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis 92 (1979): 162-86. 79 De Waal, Aanteekeningen, 7:171,172. 8 ^ P. P. van Bosse, "Bijdrage tot het Onderzoek der Vraag of de Koloniale Begrooting door de Wet behoort Vastgesteld te worden," Bijdragen tot de Kennis van het Stoats-, Provindaal- en Gemeentebestuur in Nederland 6 (1862): 130 ff. 81 See de Waal, Aanteekeningen, 7:160 ff. 77

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with evasive answers, subterfuges, and promises. Thus, for the time being, a situation endured that Duymaer van Twist had already condemned in 1845, namely one in which the parliament argued for days on end over the question of whether perhaps a few hundred thousand guilders could be cut from the Dutch budget, while it was denied the right to assess the Indies budget, which was at least as important.82 Not until early in 1855 did a bill reach the Second Chamber, but the first reaction was so unfavorable that it was never discussed publicly.83 According to the bill, the colonial budget (one budget for all the colonies together) would be drafted by the minister, later to be approved by royal decree. This approach was certainly not what the Second Chamber wanted: the great majority was of the view that the legislature should exercise more influence on drawing up the colonial budget and because of this most members wanted that budget to be laid down by law.84 The coming to power of the ministry of Rochussen and van Bosse in April 1858 prompted the expectation that an Indies Accountability Law would be pursued at last. In his first statement to parliament, Rochussen considered the enactment of that law to be one of the matters requiring "urgent attention" and one to which the new ministry would "first of all" pay attention.8^ Indeed, just six months later, in November 1858, a bill was presented.86 This bill differed from Pahud's draft in that it laid down that the budgets—separate ones for the Netherlands East Indies, Suriname, Curacao, and Guinea on the coast of Africa (a Dutch colony until 1871)— would be enacted by law; every five years, supplementary budget bills would be presented for expenditures that became necessary after the budget had been passed and that could not be financed from the "unforeseen expenses" item. For the great majority of the Second Chamber, this concession did not go far enough; according to their report, presented on July 1859, they thought that the enactment by law of colonial budgets should take place every three years; a minority insisted on annual budgets.87 The last word in this matter that had already dragged on so long had not, however, yet been delivered, because in the autumn of 1859 Rochussen appears to have changed his mind. What did not go far enough according to the Second Chamber, he thought on closer consideration already went too far.88 An Indies Accountability Law, as conceived by the Second Chamber, was "impracticable."8^ In 1860, the States-General was still as powerless as in 1840 as far as answering the questions of whether certain expenditures should be included in the Indies budget or not. In the meantime, there was no lack of warnings against relying too much on those "fortuitous" and "precarious" Indies profits. Baud and van Bosse, who in this regard had so exerted themselves in the debate on the abolition of the excise on flour in 1855, found supporters in Rochussen, Duymaer van Twist, Thorbecke, and other prominent members of the Second Chamber of diverse colors. Such warnings always came in handy, either to combat liberal proposals to abolish excise duties or to fight 8

2 Zwart, Duymaer van Twist, p. 44. De Waal, Koloniale Politiek, p. 79; Bijl Hand. 1854-55, pp. 414, 843. 84 De Waal, Koloniale Politiek, p. 121. 85 Hand. 13 April 1858, p. 422. 86 De Waal, Koloniale Politiek, pp. 85,125. 87 Ibid., pp. 129,135. 88 Bijl Hand. 1859-60, p. 208; 1860-41, p. 474. 89 Hand. 14 December 1860, p. 533. 83

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against increases of expenditure, in particular for the departments of war and the navy, as proposed by conservative governments. But things remained at the level of words. Even the ministry that came into office in 1858 under the leadership of two such experienced and thrifty financiers as van Bosse and Rochussen—Rochussen himself, according to Baud, had stated that his predecessors had spent rather too much on the Indies account and that he intended to change this 9 ^—remained impotent to the end. The proceeds from normal public revenue sources in the Netherlands increased between 1858 to 1861 by a total of 1.5 million guilders, whereas general expenditure by contrast rose by more than 4 million guilders (not taking into account the outlays on the construction of the state railroads that had been started in I860).91 The expenditure figure on the Indies budget—mainly as a result of a further increase in military expenses—increased from more than 82 million guilders in 1858 to almost 92 million in 1861.92 The only thing done to lessen dependence on the Indies profits was more shadow than substance. Starting with the so-called Revenue Law for the financial year 1859, the amount of colonial surplus set aside in that law (usually a fixed amount of 4.5 to 5.5 million guilders) was no longer taken from future profits but from present colonial profits, that is those obtained in the financial year prior to the budget.93 Van Hoevell, who had already insisted on this measure in 1849, finally got his wish ten years later. That technical budgeting operation, however, made little difference with the enormous growth of the colonial surpluses, which made sufficient money available in cash. Moreover, van Bosse, who in 1858 as minister of finances had proposed this change of the Revenue Law, was not consistent because he did not take the fixed interest item of f9,800,000 into account. This fixed interest item was a peculiar affair. If one assumed that there really was an East Indies debt (which was subject to serious doubt), it could be regarded as having been gradually redeemed during the course of the years in which the debtor had done so much in return for the motherland.94 Van Hall, who in 1844 as minister of finances had seen to the consolidation of that debt, could justly label it in 1859 as "one of the greatest fictions in the world."95 Van Bosse could only remonstrate that it was a matter of "an established practice . . . for the observance of which there is much 90

Baud to Pahud, 23 May 1858. Collectie Baud, 821. See Boissevain, Belastinghervorming, ser. B, Staten 1 and 2. 92 See TNI 2 (1867): 424. The increase in military expenditures was, among other things, connected with military expeditions in South Sulawesi and Kalimantan. The total figures of 82 and 92 million guilders, respectively, related both to territorial and commercial expenditures and, thus, also to those directly related to the Cultivation System. 9 ^ In deliberations on the revenue laws in previous years this idea had already been discussed regularly, especially when in 1855 the government had proposed—in connection with extra expenditure for the reconstruction of the navy—to increase the estimate of the contribution from colonial revenues. An amendment of Rochussen to take this increase from existing colonial profits was rejected by 35 votes to 20. See Hand. 18 December 1855, p. 511. This discussion was repeated the following year on the occasion of the revenue law for 1857 when an amendment presented by van Bosse, Thorbecke, and Sloet tot Oldhuis met the same fate (Hand. 18 December 1856, pp. 520 ff.). 94 This was, for instance, Baud's opinion, Hand. 14 June 1855, p. 927. Van Hoevell was of the same mind, Hand. 13 December 1859, p. 582. 95 Hand. 13 December 1859, p. 581; van den Berg, Debet ofCrediet?, p. 36. 91

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to be said/'96 Not until the 1865 budget was the fictitious East Indies debt cancelled.9^ In summary, one can say that the importance of the Indies profits in the period 1850-70 was at least as great, if not greater, than in the period 1830-50. The Indies budget surpluses remained the "cork" on which the Netherlands floated, a cork that floated on a sea of falling and rising coffee and sugar prices. During the 1850s, 86 percent of the Indies budget surplus came from profits from the sale of those two government products. The dependence of the Dutch national budget—and after 1850 also that of the Indies—on the Cultivation System was the reason that the liquidation of the system would develop into a problem of national political importance. The central issue was how the system of agricultural enterprise on government account could gradually be transformed into a system of free agricultural enterprise for private account, while retaining, as much as possible, the Indies millions that were for the time being indispensable to the Dutch treasury. Although the parliamentary documents of that period contain many a pious plea directed towards the overseas territories, there was little willingness to pay the price of putting into practice those proposals that involved losing all or part of the Indies surpluses. Baud had been correct when he wrote in a letter to Pahud of 7 April 1859, only a few months before his death, that there was no danger that the Cultivation and consignment systems would be abandoned in the short term; "the people are too keen on the remittances."9** The liberal dilemma was well expressed by Duymaer van Twist, who was of the opinion that the Indies profits, and as well the Cultivation System that produced them, had to be retained for the time being, "because we can't do without them and because for the moment I know of no means of replacing them with a tax which would be less onerous for the native population."99 The NRC of 24 December 1859 had no solution either. Discussing how such taxes had to be organized, the liberal newspaper wrote that "the government will need to reflect upon this; it will need to make plans for this. In a land as rich in production as Java, surely a means can be found to replace those revenues which we draw from it at present with a regular tax." Even van Hoevell could not entirely escape this half-hearted approach. In the years after 1854, he repeatedly stated in the Second Chamber that any change in the Cultivation System had to be weighed against the interests of the treasury.100 Although challenged to do so, he refused in 1861 to draw up a "budget for the future" from which the Cultivation System was excluded.101 It is, of course, possible that tactical considerations played a role in this stance. A clear rejection of the budget surpluses would, as van Hall assumed in 1859, have compromised him too much as far as the calculating minds of his fellow members were concerned.10^ This liberal 96

Hand. 13 December 1859, p. 586. ^ The fixed interest item of f9,800,000 was thereafter included in the colonial budget surplus and no longer separately accounted for. Thus was ended the fiction, used to "salve the conscience," that the Indies had certain "obligations" toward the motherland. 98 Baud to Pahud, 7 April 1859, Collectie Baud, 839. 99 Hand. 15 December 1858, p. 447. 100 See van Hoevell, Hand. 16 December 1858, p. 455; 24 February 1859, p. 538. 101 Hand. 29 November 1861, p. 272. 102 Hand. 24 February 1859, p. 539. 9

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dilemma was not resolved until the 1870s when the colonial profits began to diminish. It was not the question of whether the Netherlands was "entitled" to those profits that divided the political parties in the Second Chamber after 1854 but the issue of which system of exploitation would bring, directly or indirectly, the most benefits: the system in which the government acted as producer and entrepreneur or a state of affairs in which it was not agriculture "on high authority" but "free labor" that made Java productive for the benefit of the mother country.

9 THE CULTIVATION SYSTEM AND 'TREE LABOR',//

lthough the parliament had hedged somewhat in 1854, it had made it clear in the new constitutional regulation that the system of government exploitation would in the long run have to make way for a more liberal system in which there would be no coercion by the government. Baud— and who would know better!—underscored this once more in 1856 when he remarked that ARTICLE 56 "requires the retention, as much as possible, of existing cultivations, but just as explicitly wants progress towards the system of entirely free labor/'1 Moreover, the Cultivation System was no longer able significantly to increase Java's export production. Government tea and tobacco cultivations, which continued to suffer considerable losses (between 1850 and 1860 tea lost more than 4 million guilders), were in decline.2 In 1860, it was decided not to extend the existing contracts when they expired (the last contracts were due to expire in 1866).^ In this way, the government withdrew completely from these cultivations. Government indigo cultivation also went downhill further after 1850. In 1860, the area planted with indigo was only 72 percent of that in 1851 and 93 percent of that in 1856.4 Outside the three Central Java residencies of Bagelen, Banyumas, and Madiun, where in 1860 almost 90 percent of the cultivation was concentrated, indigo did not amount to much. In the meantime, it was withdrawn from four residencies where in 1850 it had still been firmly established, such as Pekalongan.^ Indigo remained very much in demand on the Dutch market. Between 1850 and 1860, much higher prices were paid than in the preceding period.6 For that reason, the government continued to make great efforts to stimulate production in all sorts of ways, including increasing crop payments from fl.30 to f2.00 per pound, but without satisfactory results. In the years 1858-60, the average annual production per bouw of indigo was still only 35 pounds as compared to 43 pounds in 1840-42. Yet, around

A

1

Hand. 12 December 1856, p. 438. For losses on tea cultivation see Pierson, Kultuurstelsel, p. 169. Tobacco contractors (there were still eleven of them in 1861) could dispose of their tobacco as they wished, so that the government's losses averaged no more than f!7,000 annually. At the end of I860, f389,933 was still outstanding in advances. See "Staat kultuurinrichtingen" I860, Exh. 28 April 1862, no. 16, Kol. 1188. 3 Bijl. Hand. 1860-61, pp. 476,612, n. 1; 1865-66, pp. 508,511. 4 Seeapp. 1. 5 Koloniaal Verslag 1860, Bijlage R (no. 17), Bijl. Hand. 1862-63, LVII. 6 See app. 2. 2

The Cultivation System and "Free Labor"

163

1860 proportionately much more attention could be given to indigo cultivation (in 1840, on average 4.8 households were set aside for each bouw of indigo, in 1858-60, 6.1 households)/ These data indicate that the decline of indigo cultivation was to a significant degree attributable to soil exhaustion, the use of increasingly less suitable fields for this cultivation, and—something about which Rochussen had already complained in 1847—degeneration of the stock. An indication that this conclusion was correct came with the development of indigo cultivation for private account in the Princely Territories. Initially the "land hirers" who, according to adat, could require the people on the hired lands to plant crops for them, had had much success with the cultivation of indigo. Sometimes, at least in the Yogyakarta area, an average production of 60 pounds per bouw was achieved. According to statements by the Yogyakarta manufacturers (the reliability of which the government could not guarantee), 434,150, 319,385, and 253,870 pounds of indigo were produced in the years 1858-60, equivalent to almost 60 percent of the total production in government residencies in those years.** After that, however, complaints had been received of declining yields as a result of the "degeneration" of the indigo plant. After 1860, this cultivation was rapidly supplanted by sugar cane.^ In the final analysis, unwillingness on the part of the Javanese population may also have played a role; its aversion to indigo cultivation does not seem to have abated with the passage of the years. At the end of 1860, Rochussen posed the question in his correspondence with the Indies government whether or not the time had come to consider total withdrawal of government indigo cultivation; he asked the same question for some smaller cultivations like pepper and cinnamon.^ Eventually, the government cultivation of these commodities was stopped in the mid-1860s. Table 9.1. Number of households involved in smaller cultivations, 1850 and 1860 Cultivation

1850

1860

Cinnamon Pepper3 Tea Tobacco

8,102 8,890 241 16,362

14,324 1,524 2,121 14,825

a

also cultivating coffee.

In coffee cultivation, good and bad harvests alternated, but average production over five-year periods showed a slight decline, so the condition of this cultivation ^Seeapp. 1. See Koloniaal Verslag 1860, Bijl. Hand. 1862-63, p. 735. In Surakarta the annual production of indigo was no more than 20,000-50,000 pounds. 9 Bijl. Hand. 1862-63, p. 735. The first sugar factory, powered by water, was commissioned in Yogyakarta in 1860. 10 V 24 December I860, no. 2, Kol. 1016; cf. Fransen van de Putte, Hand. 11 December 1863, p. 370 5. How unimportant these small cultivations were is apparent from the summary of the number of households involved in 1850 and 1860. 8

164

The Politics of Colonial Exploitation

was likened to that of a "person suffering from consumption."11 In this cultivation, the government could not be accused of lack of zeal in its efforts to improve results. In 1854, the Residents were still being reminded of the provision that abandoned coffee plantations had to remain fallow for ten years before using them, if it were at all possible, to cultivate coffee again, so that the people were denied the use of these fields for the cultivation of rice.1^ But especially in this cultivation, the lack of proper supervision by officials—an old complaint—took its toll, as a result of which plantations were often neglected and no appropriate extra planting done. Even as late as I860, of the approximately one hundred European supervisors in government cultivations no more than fifteen were involved in coffee cultivation.1** It is also probable that, as a result of the poor supervision and the great difference between the price paid by the government and the real market price, large quantities were not presented as forced deliveries and were sold clandestinely. This smuggling trade was facilitated once it was gradually made easier for private entrepreneurs to establish themselves in the interior.1'* One possible solution would, perhaps, have been to relinquish coffee plantations to private entrepreneurs, thus bringing in "coffee contractors" as in sugar cultivation. Van den Bosch had already proposed this idea in 1840,15 and liberals like van Hoevell reverted to this idea somewhat later on.16 The self-interest of the entrepreneurs would then guarantee regular upkeep of plantations! The government, however, did not want to hear of it. It was experiencing enough problems with the sugar contractors without inflicting upon itself a new class of stubborn entrepreneurs who cared little for the interests of the people. Sugar was the only government cultivation that still showed a clear increase in production after 1850. This increase was not the result of an expansion of planting area, which had been reduced by about 7 percent between 1850 and 1860 but an increase of the average yield per bouw of about 35 percent.17 On the one hand, this result was due to the introduction of improved agricultural methods, the initiative for which often came from the manufacturers, even though officially they were not allowed to interfere in the cultivation process.18 On the other hand, the equipment of many sugar factories was further improved by new investment in factory buildings and machinery that was sometimes stimulated by the government in a "Napoleonic" manner; one calls to mind the conditions imposed when the Pasuruan contracts were extended around 1850. In the meantime, this increase in production mainly benefited 11 See Hand. 1 June 1863, p. 880 3. Average crop yields dropped from 912,000 piculs in 1852-56 to 891,000 piculs in 1857-61 and to 848,000 piculs in the next five years (including coffee from the Principalities). See Koloniale Verslagen. 12 Koloniaal Verslag 1854, Bijl Hand. 1856-57, p. 163. Cf. chap. 2. 13 Almanak van Nederlandsch-Indie 1860. These figures included vacant posts. For information on these supervisors, see chap. 2, n. 99. ^ See D. F. van Alphen, "De Koffiekultuur in Oost-Indie," Handelingen en Geschriften van het Indisch Genootschap, 31 January 1888, p. 47. ^ J. van den Bosch, lets over de Finantiele Aangelegenheden van het Rijk (The Hague: Van Cleef, 1840). See the discussion of this pamphlet in Indische Bij, pp. 516 ff. 16 See, for example, Hand. 8 December 1851, p. 464; 15 December 1858, p. 445. The hiring out of coffee plantations was still defended in 1868 by Pierson; see Pierson, Kultuurstelsel, p. 220. 17 Seeapp. 1. 18 After 1850, black Cirebon cane was introduced, which had a higher sugar content and was more resistant to moisture and drought, thanks to the experiments of the sugar contractor J. M. Gonsalves from Cirebon.

The Cultivation System and "Free Labor"

165

the contractors themselves. The quantity of sugar delivered to the government remained fairly constant; it fluctuated in the period 1854-60 between 800,000 and 900,000 piculs per year.19 Although the population of Java increased rapidly after 1850 and the total area of cultivated land increased regularly, the Cultivation System as a whole stagnated. At best, as in coffee and sugar cultivations, planting areas and the number of cultivation workers remained more or less constant. Proportionately, that is, using as a measure the amount of agricultural land and the number of people used by the Cultivation System, after 1850 it was clearly losing ground. This is again demonstrated in table 9.2, in which the years 1840 and 1860 are compared. It thus appeared that the development of Java in the longer term would have to come from private agricultural enterprise without the intervention of the government. Van Hoevell's arguments could not be rebutted when he showed, using figures from the Colonial Reports, that only from "free, paid labor" could a significant increase of production in Java be expected in the long run.2^ A stagnating Cultivation System, even if that stagnation was partly the result of efforts to spare the population more than had been the case in the past, could not be considered to have much future! Although the power of any government was limited, "Private forces know no boundaries: those private forces must be given a significant arena of operation."2* But this free agricultural enterprise, the godchild of the colonial opposition, had obtained little elbowroom under the operation of the new constitutional regulation. According to ARTICLE 62, only the hiring of uncultivated ("waste") land was permitted. Sale or long lease were prohibited. The absence of long-term control over land hindered the ability to attract capital because establishing a right of security for mortgage purposes was impossible. Moreover, it was not entirely clear which land could be hired out. Baud had wanted a very narrow interpretation of the concept of "waste land."22 By contrast, Governor-General Duymaer van Twist favored a more liberal understanding. According to an explanation in the 1855 Supplement to the Official Indies Government Gazette, the single fact that the land had "once or twice" been used by the population did not preclude its hiring.23 Nevertheless, a great number of requests for the hiring of "waste" land were refused after 1854 because they were contrary to the constitutional regulation; in a few cases, hire contracts made before that year were not extended for that reason.24 The royal decree of 3 July 1856 that provided more detailed rules for the hire of land (this was the "general ordinance" promised in ARTICLE 62) did not encourage the exploitation of "waste" land by Western entrepreneurs, although Javanese and Foreign Orientals were not permitted to be hirers.*5 Hire agreements were only for 19

Seeapp.l.Cf.chap. 11. Van Hoevell and Bosch, De Vrije Arbeid op Java, pp. 3, 4; Hand. 15 December 1858, p. 445. 21 TNI 1(1862): 157. 22 See Logemann, "Mr. Nolst Trenite's Parlementaire Geschiedschrijving," p. 406. See also chap. 7. 23 Bijblad no. 377. 24 See Bijl. Hand. 1861-62, p. 561. A summary of the number of rejected requests is in Bijl. Hand. 1860-61, II, 128L. 2 ^ Ind Stb. 1856, no. 64. Chinese were allowed to hire in land on the islands outside Java. 20

166

The Politics of Colonial Exploitation

Table 9.2. The dimensions of the Cultivation System, 1840 and 1860 Percentaige of Peasarits Engaged iin Forced CulthCation3 Coffee

Residency Bagelen Banten Banyumas Banyuwangi Besuki Cirebonc Jepara Karawang Kediri Kedu Madiun Pacitand Pasuruan Pekalongan Priangan Probolinggo6 Rembang Semarang Surabaya Tegal Javaf

Other Ctiltivations

Percentage