The Politics of Antagonism: Understanding Northern Ireland 9781474287777, 9781474287791, 9781474287784

Table of contents :
Cover
Half-title
Title
Copyright
Dedication
Contents
Series Editors' Preface
List of figures
List of tables
Acknowledgements
Introduction
Plan of the book
Terminology and how to read this book
1 Auditing the antagonism
The comparative scale of the conflict
The militant agents and their civilian victims
Forms of killing
Trends in deaths, 1969-90
The status of victims and responsibility for deaths, 1969-89
Injuries, explosions, shootings, robberies, intimidation, and incarcerations, 1969-90
The other costs of the war
2 The colonial roots of antagonism: fateful triangles in Ulster, Ireland, and Britain, 1609-1920
The plantation of Ulster
The political development of the British archipelago
The incomplete penetration of Ireland by the English Crow n and the British state
The failure of Anglican and British standardization
The crises of 'participation': nationalism and unionism
The Great War and partition
Conclusion
3 Exercising control: the second Protestant ascendancy, 1920-62
Hegemonic control and particularist regimes
Hegemonic control in Northern Ireland
Territorial control
Constitutional control
Electoral control
Coercive control
Legal control
Economic control
Administrative control
Why 'hegemonic control' describes the Stormont system
What motivated hegemonic control?
The external environment of hegemonic control
Appendix 3.1 The relative reduction in the effective numbe r of parties caused by PR(STV) in 1925 compared wit h plurality-rule in 1929
4 Losing control: the collapse of the Unionist regime, 1963-72
The exogenous background to 'O'Neillism'
The endogenous background to 'O'Neillism'
'O'Neillism' and its consequences
British intervention: the politics of embarrassment
Conclusion
5 Deadlock, 1972-85: the limits to British arbitration
British arbitration
The evolution of party-competition and the party-system, 1969-85
Arbitration and reform in an ethnically divided society
Consociational initiatives, 1972-6
A second start: criminalisation, Ulsterisation, an d normalisation, 1976-81
The second wave of consociational initiatives, 1979-82
Searching for a way out of international and domesti c embarrassment
6 The meaning(s) and making of the Anglo-Irish Agreement: an experiment in coercive consociationalism
The content of the AIA and its rival interpretations
Why was the AIA signed?
Rational actor explanations
Organizational process explanations
Governmental politics explanations
Conclusion: the nature of the experiment
7 The impact of the Anglo-Irish Agreement, 1985-9: the limits to coercive consociationalism
Co-operation and conflict in British-Irish relations
Party-political developments and the failure of coerciv e consociationalism
Social justice and legal justice
Violence and security
Conclusion
8 Transcending Antagonism? Resolving Northern Ireland in the 1990s
Macro-constitutional solutions: which state and wha t form of government?
Comparing macro-options
Unitary, federal, and confederal formulae
What type of decision-making?
Grand public-policy objectives
9 Epilogue: the Brooke initiative and after, 1990-
Driving into the strands
Resuscitating the Brooke initiative
The Westminster election of April 1992 and its aftermath
What if?
Conclusion
10 Postscript: a tract of time between war and peace
11 Addendum: war about talks, and talk about war, February-March 1996
Glossary
Bibliography
Subject Index
Names Index

Citation preview

The Politics of Antagonism

History and Politics in the 20th Century: Bloomsbury Academic Collections

Focusing on international relations, this set covers international relations throughout the 20th century and pays special attention to how international relations were strained, or strengthened, during times of upheaval and conflict, such as the Cold War, the Troubles or the post-Soviet struggles in Eastern Europe. All eight titles are facsimiles from our imprints The Athlone Press, Pinter and Continuum. The collection is available both in e-book and print versions. Titles in History and Politics in the 20th Century are available in the following subsets: International Relations in the 20th Century Europe in the 20th Century Conflict in the 20th Century Postcolonialism in the 20th Century Multidisciplinary Approaches Other titles available in International Relations include: Creating the Second Cold War: The Discourse of Politics by Simon Dalby European Values in International Relations edited by Vilho Harle History, the White House and the Kremlin: Statesmen as Historians edited by Michael Fry International Relations: A Handbook of Current Theory edited by Margot Light and A.J.R. Groom Revolution and Change in Central and Eastern Europe by Roger East and Jolyon Pontin Revolution and International Politics by Peter Calvert The Last Great Game: USA versus USSR – Events, Conjunctures, Structures by Paul Dukes

The Politics of Antagonism Understanding Northern Ireland

Brendan O'Leary and John McGarry

History and Politics in the 20th Century: International Relations BLOOMSBURY ACADEMIC COLLECTIONS

Bloomsbury Academic An imprint of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc

Bloomsbury Academic An imprint of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc 50 Bedford Square London WC1B 3DP UK

1385 Broadway New York NY 10018 USA

www.bloomsbury.com BLOOMSBURY and the Diana logo are trademarks of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc First published in 1996 by The Athlone Press This edition published by Bloomsbury Academic 2016 © Brendan O'Leary and John McGarry 2016 Brendan O'Leary and John McGarryhave asserted their right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identified as Editors of this work. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the publishers. No responsibility for loss caused to any individual or organization acting on or refraining from action as a result of the material in this publication can be accepted by Bloomsbury or the author. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. ISBN: HB: 978-1-4742-8777-7 ePDF: 978-1-4742-8778-4 Set: 978-1-4742-9295-5 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress Series: Bloomsbury Academic Collections, ISSN 2051-0012

Printed and bound in Great Britain

The Politics of Antagonism

To the memory of John Whyte, who would have found every remaining error.

Contents Series Editors' Preface List of List of tables Acknowledgements Introduction

figures

1 Auditing the antagonism The comparative scale of the conflict The militant agents and their civilian victims Forms of killing Trends in deaths, 1969-90 The status of victims and responsibility for deaths, 1969-89 Injuries, explosions, shootings, robberies, intimidation, and incarcerations, 1969-90 The other costs of the war

x xii xiv xvi 1 8 9 22 28 28 34 40 44

2 The colonial roots of antagonism: fateful triangles in Ulster, Ireland, and Britain, 1609-1920 54 The plantation of Ulster 55 The political development of the British archipelago 62 The incomplete penetration of Ireland by the English Crown and the British state 64 The failure of Anglican and British standardization 74 The crises of 'participation': nationalism and unionism 83 The Great War and partition 96 Conclusion 101 3 Exercising control: the second Protestant ascendancy, 1920-62 Hegemonic control and particularist regimes

107 108

viii The Politics of Antagonism Hegemonic control in Northern Ireland Territorial control Constitutional control Electoral control Coercive control Legal control Economic control Administrative control Why 'hegemonic control' describes the Stormont system What motivated hegemonic control? The external environment of hegemonic control Appendix 3.1 The relative reduction in the effective number of parties caused by PR(STV) in 1925 compared with plurality-rule in 1929 4 Losing control: the collapse of the Unionist regime, 1963-72 The exogenous background to 'O'Neillism' The endogenous background to 'O'Neillism' 'O'Neillism' and its consequences British intervention: the politics of embarrassment Conclusion 5 Deadlock , 1972-85: the limits to British arbitration British arbitration The evolution of party-competition and the party-system, 1969-85 Arbitration and reform in an ethnically divided society Consociational initiatives, 1972-6 A second start: criminalisation, Ulsterisation, and normalisation, 1976-81 The second wave of consociational initiatives, 1979-82 Searching for a way out of international and domestic embarrassment

110 111 112 119 125 127 129 131 133 135 142 148 153 155 159 162 171 177 181 183 185 193 197 202 209 214

6 The meaning(s) and making of the Anglo-Irish Agreement: an experiment in coercive consociationalism 220 The content of the AIA and its rival interpretations 221 Why was the AIA signed? 229 Rational actor explanations 229

Contents ix Organizational process explanations Governmental politics explanations Conclusion: the nature of the experiment 7 The impact of the Anglo-Irish Agreement, 1985-9: the limits to coercive consociationalism Co-operation and conflict in British-Irish relations Party-political developments and the failure of coercive consociationalism Social justice and legal justice Violence and security Conclusion

235 237 238 242 243 250 260 270 273

8 Transcending Antagonism? Resolving Northern Ireland in the 1990s Macro-constitutional solutions: which state and what form of government? Comparing macro-options Unitary, federal, and confederal formulae What type of decision-making? Grand public-policy objectives

279 290 295 300 306

9 Epilogue: the Brooke initiative and after, 1990Driving into the strands Resuscitating the Brooke initiative The Westminster election of April 1992 and its aftermath What if? Conclusion

312 313 317 320 322 324

10 Postscript: a tract of time between war and peace

327

11 Addendum: war about talks, and talk about war, February-March 1996

356

Glossary Bibliography Subject Index Names Index

370 373 389 396

277

Series Editors' Preface The works in this series are intended to offer a grand tour of the social and political landscape of Britain, looking most closely at areas conventionally thought to be troubled by conflict. No area has had a more obvious, dramatic, bloody and sustained history of conflict than Northern Ireland, and the history has been distinguished by a mischievous power to feed, transform and confuse itself. Myths and half-truths have folded into one another, creating a kind of political miasma. About no area has it seemed more difficult to obtain a clear, informed and disinterested analysis. One of us can recall a seminar at the London School of Economics at which a student from one side of the communal divide presented a strongly partisan account of the province's politics and structure. When asked how someone from the other side would have talked about the same matters, he replied that he did not know and did not care to know. He refused to take the role of this adversary. It is that deep, excluding hostility that marks so much of the argument about the province. Northern Ireland's conflicts are in urgent need of an examination that would be at once part-sociology, part-history and partpolitical science. In The Politics of Antagonism, O'Leary and McGarry have transcended faction and muddle by providing just such a detached and penetrating audit of the province's adversities. They have grounded their interpretation in political and social history, tracing the roots of the present discontents; given the first authoritative inventory of the deaths and injuries inflicted by the Troubles; told us what politicians have done to manage (or augment) Northern Ireland's difficulties; and have surveyed competing proposals for constitutional reform. Perhaps for the very first time, readers will be able to unravel some of the special, bitter

Series Editors' Preface xi and complicated problems that beset what remains of John Bull's other island. David Dowries Paul Rock London School of Economics

List of figures Figure 1.1

Figure 1.2

Figure 1.3

Figure 1.4 Figure 1.5 Figure 1.6 Figure 1.7 Figure 1.8 Figure 1.9

Figure 1.10 Figure 1.11 Figure 1.12

(a) Northern Ireland and Belfast 10 (b) The spatial distribution of killings in Northern Ireland, 1969-89 11 (a) The death-toll in liberal democracies from internal political violence, 1948-77 14 (b) The per capita death-toll from internal political violence in liberal democracies, 1948-77 15 The (logs of the) absolute and per capita death-tolls in the thirty most violent governmental units in the world, 1948-77, compared with Cyprus and Northern Ireland 17 The triangle of ethnic war: the war between the paramilitaries and the security forces, 1969-89 23 The second war: the war on civilians, 1969-89 24 The two wars, 1969-89 25 The annual and cumulative death-toll from political violence, 1969-90 31 (a) Militant agents responsible for all deaths, 1969-89 37 (b) Status of victims, 1969-89 37 Estimates of the successs of militant agents in killing their intended targets, and their responsibilities for civilian deaths 38 Smoothed data on injuries, explosions (and defusions), armed robberies, shooting incidents, and the firing of plastic and rubber bullets 41 The nominal and actual value of armed robberies, 1969-88 42 Persons charged with terrorist offences and total prison population, 1970-88 45

List of figures xiii Figure 2.1 Figure 2.2 Figure 2.3

Figure 2.4 Figure 2.5 Figure 3.1 Figure 3.2 Figure 3.3 Figure 3.4 Figure 5.1 Figure 5.2 Figure 5.3

The Stuart plantation of Ulster 58 The distribution and concentration of Catholics in Ireland, 1981 59 The impact of the Ulster plantation, the Cromwellian confiscation (as modified at the restoration), and the Williamite confiscation, and the Penal Laws on Catholic land-ownership in Ireland 68 The under-representation of Catholics in the secular professions in Ireland, 1861-1911 82 Catholics in Ulster, 1911 93 The impact of plurality-rule on political competition in Northern Ireland 124 How plurality-rule cemented the electoral hegemony of the UUP 125 Religion, sex, and unemployment in Northern Ireland, 1971 130 The percentage rise and fall of Catholics in Ireland between 1911 and 1926 (by counties) 137 The unionist bloc, 1969-85 188 The nationalist bloc, 1969-85 190 The Ulsterisation of the security forces 203

List of tables Table 1.1 Numbers killed in political violence in Ireland (1886-1990) 21 Table 1.2 The types of incidents in which victims died, July 1969-June 1989 29 Table 1.3 Political deaths in Northern Ireland, 1969-90 (RUC) 30 Table 1.4 Political deaths in Northern Ireland, 1969-89 (IIP) 36 Table 2.1 Seats won by parties in parliamentary constituencies in Ulster, 1885-1910 89 Table 2.2 The Westminster election in Ireland, 1918 99 Table 3.1 Wards and local-government election results, Londonderry, 1967 121 Table 3.2 Senior judicial posts in Northern Ireland in 1969 128 Table 3.3 Religion and occupational class in Northern Ireland, 1971: economically active men 130 Table 3.4 Estimated impact of emigration on Northern Ireland's religious balance, 1926-81 131 Table 3.5 Catholic representation in the Northern Ireland civil service, 1969 133 Table 4.1 (a) Employment in Northern Ireland's traditional sectors, 1950-73 162 (b) The shifting pattern of sectoral employment, 1926-71 162 Table 4.2 The Stormont election of February 1969 170 Table 5.1 Party support in elections in Northern Ireland, 1969-85 186 Table 5.2 UUP and DUP competition before 1985 189 Table 5.3 SDLP and (P)SF competition before 1985 191 Table 5.4 Ethnic attitudes on law and order 3 June 1985 205 Table 5.5 Percentage unemployment by religion and sex in Northern Ireland, compared with the Northern

List of tables Ireland and Great British averages Table 7.1 The outcome of the January 1986 by-elections in which the SDLP and Sinn Fein competed Table 7.2 Party performances in the unionist and nationalist blocs before and after the Anglo-Irish Agreement Table 7.3 (a) Comparing the conviction rates for scheduled (i.e. conflict-related) offences of members of the security forces with the adult population (aged 16-65) in Northern Ireland (b) Absolute numbers convicted of scheduled offences by population group Table 7.4 Indicators of violence before and after the AIA, 1983-8 Table 8.1 Northern Ireland's macro-constitutional options Table 8.2 The acceptability and likely impact of macro-solutions for Northern Ireland Table 9.1 Party performances in Westminster elections, 1983-92

xv 207 251 257

269 269 271 280 292 321

Acknowledgements We have incurred multiple debts in the construction of this book. Our intellectual and marriage partners, Lorelei Watson and Margaret Moore, have been constructive critics. Paul Rock and David Downes, the editors of this series, and Brian Southam of The Athlone Press deserve a vote of thanks for their advice and patience, as do the research staff of the Irish Information Partnership, particularly Helen Dady, Marian Larragy, Tom Lyne, and Michael McKeown. Jane Pugh of the LSE drew the maps and Figures 1.4, 1.5, and 1.6. We extend our thanks to Paul Arthur, Arthur Aughey, Paul Bew, Steve Greer, Adrian Guelke, John Hutchinson, Ian Lustick, Chris McCrudden, David McKittrick, David Smith, Paul Teague, Brian Thompson, and Robin Wilson for commentary and insight. Brendan O'Leary thanks the LSE staff research fund (for funding research-assistance carried out by John Peterson and Brendan O'Duffy), and the Nuffield Foundation (for grants to conduct interviews in 1988-9 and 1990-1). The hospitality of Hans Blomkvist and Li Bennich-Bjorkman meant that the Department of Government at Uppsala provided a congenial environment in which to complete some writing in the spring of 1991. The Nuffield grants enabled O'Leary to interview Irish politicians, and civil servants in the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Department of the Taoiseach who were constructive, helpful and discreet. Most British ministers and spokespersons with past and present responsibilities for Northern Ireland agreed to be interviewed in London in 1990-1. Past and present civil servants in the Northern Ireland Office and the Foreign Office were informative, generous and cautious, as were the staff in the Irish Embassy in London. Political advisers to Harold Wilson, James Callaghan, and Charles Haughey agreed to be interviewed, while other political advisers were interviewed on a non-attributable basis, including advisers to Northern Irish political parties. The

Acknowledgements

xvii

Joseph Rowntree Reform Trust kindly made available the full data-sets of polls throughout the British Isles which are referred to in Chapter 8 and the Epilogue. O'Leary expresses warm appreciation to Brian Barry, Alan Beattie, Percy Cohen, Patrick Dunleavy, Amanda Francis, George Jones, Christopher Hood, Howard Machin, James Mayall, Desmond King, Michael McGrath, Tom Nossiter, Brendan O'Duffy, George Schopflin, Anthony Smith, Gordon Smith, and the students who took MSc courses in Nationalism and the Government and Politics of Ireland at LSE between 1985 and 1990. John McGarry thanks the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada for a grant which enabled him to travel to Great Britain, Northern Ireland, and the Republic of Ireland. He expresses special gratitude to Sid Noel for many stimulating discussions of ethnic conflict, some of the fruits of which can be found in this book; and to Jim Crimmins and Michael Keating for their helpful reactions to the drafts of material published here. Our secretaries, Sharon Batkins and Jane Borecky, deserve our mutual admiration for their assistance with copying, faxing, mailing, phoning, printing, scanning, word-processing, and for dealing cheerfully and efficiently with all the fire-fighting tasks that preceded the publication of this book. We are accountable for its content. Brendan O'Leary Reader in Political Science and Public Administration at the London School of Economics, England John McGarry Assistant Professor in the Department of History and Political Science, King's College, London, Ontario

Introduction The nationalist not only does not disapprove of atrocities committed by his own side, but he has a remarkable capacity for not even hearing about them. (George Orwell, Notes on Nationalism, 1945) In 1968, the Dutch political scientist Arend Lijphart wrote a book entitled The Politics of Accommodation. It was not about housing in The Netherlands. Rather it attempted to explain why the Dutch had evolved a stable democratic political order despite their deep ethno-religious divisions. This book echoes Lijphart's endeavour, but with a different title and purpose. We attempt to understand why Northern Ireland has failed to develop a stable democratic political order, or a politics of accommodation, and why it is instead characterized by a politics of antagonism. Every viewer of contemporary television is aware of the fact that the politics of Northern Ireland are profoundly antagonistic. No state structures have emerged in the region which have possessed sustained and widespread support amongst both the unionist, and mainly Protestant, and the nationalist, and mainly Catholic, ethnic communities who live on its narrow ground with apparently even narrower minds. After street disturbances which accompanied civil rights demonstrations in 1968 there have been over twenty years of political violence in Northern Ireland. At the time of writing, there are few reasons to believe that hostilities are likely to be terminated, let alone resolved, in the immediate future. Expectations of progress rose when inter-party talks began on 30 April 1991. The talks stuttered to a halt on 3 July 1991, only to resume once more on 30 April 1992. Hopes were tempered by pessimism: false dawns are as common as political murders in Northern Ireland. The construction of stable and legitimate institutions in the region is a daunting task of

2

The Politics of Antagonism

political architecture, the unenviable lot of British and Irish ministers assigned the relevant portfolios and of those local politicians who genuinely seek peace. The fundamental antagonism in Northern Ireland is easily stated: Ulster unionists insist that Northern Ireland must remain part of the United Kingdom; Irish nationalists that it must immediately or eventually become part of an all-Ireland Irish nation-state. The political aspirations of nationalists and unionists are therefore not only conflicting but apparently mutually exclusive. Political scientists view the conflict as a 'zero-sum' game in which the antagonists cannot co-operate to their mutual advantage and what one antagonist gains the other must lose. This structure of exclusive, dualistic, and intensely felt aspirations that generate internal war marks Northern Ireland off as an 'exception', 'a place apart' within the internally peaceable polities of western Europe. However, events east and south of the River Elbe since 1987 have made more British and Irish people aware that Northern Ireland is not exceptional in the wider world. The overriding purpose of this book is to outline the historical evolution and entrenchment of the politics of ethnic antagonism in Northern Ireland by using simple explanatory concepts developed in political science. The Politics of Antagonism presents an audit of the scale and nature of the present conflict, an analytical history of ethnic conflict in Northern Ireland, and prognoses about the likely development of the conflict and conflict-management. We provide analytical rather than chronological history. Our evidence is drawn from the existing historical literature, our own research materials (interviews, data-sources and data-evaluation) and multiple primary sources (the press, broadcasting transcripts, and parliamentary and official governmental publications). Sound political science is often parasitic upon sound history; and we acknowledge our debts to historians throughout. Nevertheless we believe it is imperative, and distinctive, to provide an analytical rather than a chronological history of Northern Ireland: first, to counterbalance the partisan doctrinal histories in the public domain which are usually nationalist, unionist, or Marxist; and second, to demonstrate how simple concepts developed in political science elucidate key elements in the origins and evolution of the conflict - especially the concepts of settler colonialism, hegemonic control, arbitration, and consociationalism. The Politics of Antagonism is designed to serve

Introduction 3 as an introduction to understanding Northern Ireland for students of government, political science, history, and political sociology. Nationalist mobilization occurs when a political movement seeks autonomy or independence for a nation; and nationalists with sufficient opportunities almost invariably seek to build their preferred 'nation-state'. National conflict occurs when different nations (and/or nation-states) compete over the composition of their nation(s), and their national territories. That the conflict over Northern Ireland is fundamentally national does not mean that there are no other antagonisms in the region, including deep divisions within each national community. But our premise is that the internal conflict is between two (internally divided) national communities rather than between two religious communities. More distinctively, however, we maintain that conflict has been sustained by conflictual external relations between the British and Irish nations and the specific patterns of political development of the British and Irish states in the twentieth century. Ethnic communities are culturally bounded and self-consciously differentiated from other such communities. They are mostly endogamous descent-groups. They are not to be confused with races or religious communities, even though they may be based upon the latter categories. Ethnic communities share with races and religious communities the fact that they are obvious materials for nationalist mobilization and national conflict. But the conflict in Northern Ireland should not be seen just as an endogenous ethnic conflict; it has equally important exogenous dimensions. Northern Ireland is where Irish and British nationalism remain locked in a stand-off, often to the embarrassment of British nationals in Great Britain and Irish nationals in the Republic of Ireland. The endogenous and exogenous dimensions are linked because the two ethnic communities in Northern Ireland have been partially mobilized into the Irish and British 'nations'. One community, the Irish nationalists of Northern Ireland, is a sub-set of a wider ethnic community, the 'native' Irish of Ireland, whose ancestors once spoke Gaelic. Irish nationalists are usually but not invariably Roman Catholic in religion; but not all Roman Catholics in Northern Ireland are Irish nationalists in their politics and those who are vary considerably in the intensity of their nationalist convictions. The other community, that of Ulster Protestants, is usually religiously labelled even though by no means

4

The Politics of Antagonism

all of its members are religious. This community mostly consists of the descendants of Scottish and English settlers in Ireland. Ulster Protestants see themselves as a sub-set of the multi-ethnic UK polity, even if their membership of that polity is not invariably recognized by the other members. Extremely few Ulster Protestants are Irish nationalists. They now regard themselves as British but they remain divided over the precise nature of their ethnic identity. Religious institutions, especially endogamous marriage and denominational education, provide the most obvious mechanisms through which ethnic differentiation is sustained in Northern Ireland. However, that is not to say that the secularization of the region or ecumenism would guarantee the withering-away of ethnic conflict. Religious beliefs and religiosity are not irrelevant or epiphenomenal in accounting for the politics of antagonism: in any thorough analysis their role must be carefully specified rather than dismissed, and we have attempted this task elsewhere (McGarry and O'Leary, forthcoming: ch. 5). However, the assumption of this book is that the national conflict, which derived from ethnic and religious differentiation, is primary and has an autonomous dynamic of its own.

Plan of the book Our analytical history starts with the present. Any objective understanding requires an appreciation of the scale and nature of violent conflict in Northern Ireland. Chapter 1 'Auditing the antagonism' fulfils this goal. It demonstrates that Northern Ireland is the site of an ethnic war. The subsequent Chapters (2-7) are devoted to explaining the roots and dynamics of the present conflict. Chapter 2 situates the historical antecedents of the politics of antagonism in the patterns of English and Scots settler colonialism in Ulster in the three centuries following 1609 and in the imperfect partition of the island of Ireland in 1920-5. Chapter 3 explains how the British constitutional system permitted ethnic majoritarianism in Northern Ireland between 1920 and 1972. This system, which we describe as one of hegemonic control, regulated ethnic conflict through the subordination of the Irish nationalist minority. The Northern Ireland conflict thus has roots which are generally neglected by British observers: it is partly an outcome of English political institutions. However, it is also partly an outcome of the development of the Irish state. Chapter 4 provides

Introduction 5 an account of why the system of hegemonic control eventually collapsed in the late 1960s. Chapters 3 and 4 demonstrate the interplay between endogenous and exogenous factors in sustaining the politics of antagonism. In Chapters 5-7 we examine and explain the failure of successive British efforts to engage in conflict-resolution. Chapter 5 shows why solitary British arbitration between 1972 and 1985 ended in failure, and why attempts to promote voluntary power-sharing, or consociation, proved unsuccessful. Chapters 6 and 7 bring the reader up to the present, and evaluate the British and Irish governments' reasons for signing the Anglo-Irish Agreement and its impact on conflict-management. We explain why this experiment in 'coercive consociationalism' has so far proved unsuccessful. Finally, Chapter 8 evaluates the prospects for conflict-resolution in the 1990s. Terminology and how to read this book The glossary lists all the abbreviations used in this book and a glossary entry is indicated by the superscript G. We make our own analytical and normative preferences as clear as possible throughout the book, leaving readers to judge their merits. However, terminology raises more complex question about objectivity. Since charges of sectarianism accompany any writing on Northern Ireland we have been explicit, if not neutral, in our conventions. The following norms should enable acute decoders to decide in advance where we stand on all the important issues. First, we refer to 'Northern Ireland' as the formal political unit, not the 'Six Counties' or 'Ulster' as nationalists and unionists respectively prefer. When we use the latter expressions it is because we are citing or discussing nationalist or unionist views, although we do use Ulster to refer to 'historic Ulster', i.e. the province which encompassed nine counties of pre-1920 Ireland. We also avoid the use of the expression the 'North of Ireland' which is employed by nationalists. Second, we normally refer to Northern Ireland as a 'region', not as a 'province' or 'Province'. When we use the latter expressions it is because we are citing or discussing nationalist or unionist views, or the historic province of Ulster. Third, we use the expression 'Great Britain', not 'the British mainland' to refer to England, Scotland, and Wales. 'The British mainland', preferred by unionists, is ideologically charged, and both geographically and politically inaccurate, and when we use the term

6

The Politics of Antagonism

it is because we are citing or discussing unionist views. Fourth, we refer to 'the Republic of Ireland', rather than 'Eire', 'Ireland' or 'the twenty-six counties'. When we use the latter expressions it is because we are citing or discussing unionist, nationalist, or republican views. We employ 'Ireland' to refer to the geographical entity, or the unit of administration before 1920. Fifth, we use capital-letter designations to refer to formal political membership of an organization, and lower-case designations to refer to political disposition or doctrine. Thus 'Nationalist' refers to the Nationalist party, whereas 'nationalist' refers to somebody of that persuasion who may or may not have been a member of the Nationalist party. Similarly, 'Unionist' refers to one of the parties which bears this name, whereas 'unionist' refers to anybody who believes in preserving the Union between Great Britain and Northern Ireland, whether or not they are supporters of political parties like the Ulster Unionist Party or the Democratic Unionist Party. Sixth, we do not use Catholic and Protestant as synonyms for nationalist and unionist. Seventh, we use Derry/Londonderry for the disputed second city of the region. The ordering of the term was dictated by the alphabet rather than political bias. We wanted to designate it Stroke city to reflect its contested name, our hyphenated compromise, its high rate of heart disease, and the fact that the local cooking is nearly as lethal as its politics (as consumers of 'Ulster fries' will testify). However, this re-baptism would have detracted from serious analysis. Finally, throughout we deliberately use the term 'paramilitaries' rather than 'terrorists', because the former expression is more precise and less emotive. Terrorism can be practised by both the state and insurgents, but presently the term is used almost exclusively to refer to insurgent paramilitaries. When we use the terms 'terrorist' or 'terrorism' we are generally reporting the views of the authorities or members of constitutional political parties. Our preference for the term 'paramilitaries' does not indicate, and should not be construed to mean, that either of us supports, critically or otherwise, any of the relevant paramilitary organizations. Readers should also note that since this book went to press the largest loyalist paramilitary organization, the UDA, has been proscribed. This book is a stand-alone introduction to understanding Northern Ireland and should be read and reviewed as such. It also serves as an introduction to a simultaneously written book, Explaining Northern Ireland: Broken Images (McGarry and O'Leary, forthcoming), which evaluates in more technical detail the multiple and rival

Introduction 7 explanations of the conflict, of violence, and of the apparent intractability of the stalemate put forward by political actors within Northern Ireland, Ireland, and Great Britain, as well as historians and social scientists. These explanations are treated more summarily here but have framed the way in which we have composed The Politics of Antagonism.

1 Auditing the antagonism The struggle to govern Ireland may fairly be regarded as Britain's longest counter insurgency campaign. (Charles Townshend, 1986: 45) The politics and societies of Northern Ireland are antagonistic. Over twenty years of continuous political violence since 1969 have made the region a byword for intractable ethnic conflict, and the idea is regularly aired that British and Irish ministers must manage a problem which has no solution. The manifest cause of the antagonisms is simple to state: whereas Ulster unionists insist that Northern Ireland must remain part of the United Kingdom, Irish nationalists maintain that it must immediately or eventually become part of a sovereign Irish nation-state. This conflict of aspirations has produced 'republican' paramilitaries dedicated to the triumph of Irish nationalism, and 'loyalist' paramilitaries committed to maintaining Northern Ireland within the UK. It has also generated ethnic political parties representing different strands of the rival aspirations. Mutually exclusive aspirations have ruled out the 'normal' politics of accommodation characteristic of other western liberal democracies. The small population of Northern Ireland consists of approximately 900,000 people who are Protestants, or are descended from Protestants, and almost invariably unionists in their political persuasion; the remaining 600,000 people are mostly Roman Catholics, or descended from Roman Catholics, and are usually, but not invariably, nationalist in their politics. This small but deeply divided population has generated the most intense political violence of any part of the contemporary UK, the highest levels of internal political violence of any member-state of the European Community, and the highest levels of internal political violence in the continuously liberal democratic states of the post1948 world. Since 1969 nearly 3,000 people have died because of political

Auditing the antagonism 9 violence in Northern Ireland (IIP, 1990; RUC, 1990). Political murders, sectarian assassinations, tit-for-tat shootings, car-bombings, petrol-bombings, and 'human bombs' have made Northern Ireland infamous, as have armed robberies, 'tarring-and-feathering', kneecappings, and other forms of communal intimidation associated with the actions of local paramilitaries. The security forces have often added to the region's notoriety, cataloguing developments which have done little for the UK's reputation amongst civil libertarians: internment and detention without trial between 1971 and 1975; the torture of civilians suspected of being nationalist paramilitaries in the 1970s; the killing in January 1972 of thirteen unarmed civilians on 'Bloody Sunday' by troops from the Parachute regiment; 'dirtytricks' by army and intelligence personnel conducting 'low-intensity war' operations in the 1970s and 1980s; the use of 'supergrasses' (paid informants) to generate 'assembly-line' justice; and allegations about 'shoot-to-kill' policies throughout the 1980s and early 1990s. The conflict has often spilled outside the borders of the region, leading to the deaths of approximately 200 people in Great Britain, the Republic of Ireland, and sites elsewhere in Europe, ranging from Gibraltar to western Germany. Arms have been supplied to Northern Ireland's paramilitaries from political actors and arms-merchants operating in North Africa, North America, and eastern Europe. However, the bulk of the violence has occurred within the region, and even then much of it has been spatially concentrated within sub-districts of Northern Ireland, notably in greater Belfast. Thus over 50 per cent of killings by the security forces, over 68 per cent of killings by loyalist paramilitaries, and over 36 per cent of killings by nationalist paramilitaries have occurred within Belfast.1 The maps in Figure 1.1 confirm what everybody in Northern Ireland knows: violence does not occur with equal intensity in every area, and there are areas where years go by without the occurrence of a single death. The comparative scale of the conflict: 'troubles' or 'war'? Nearly three thousand dead may seem a relatively small toll in a conflict which in its present phase has lasted for over two decades and has attracted immense international publicity. However, scale matters. The population of Northern Ireland in the 1981 census, itself

DERRY/ LONDONDERRY, CITY

Figure 1.1 (a) Northern Ireland and Belfast

Number of killings

455 300 200 100 50 25

Figure 1.1 (b) The spatial distribution of killings in Northern Ireland, 1969-89 Source: McKeown (1985) and IIP (1989)2

12 The Politics of Antagonism disrupted by violence and abstention, was estimated as 1,488,077. If the equivalent ratio of victims to population had been produced in Great Britain in the same period some 100,000 people would have died, and if a similar level of political violence had taken place the number of fatalities in the USA would have been over 500,000, or about ten times the number of Americans killed in the Vietnam war. When gauging the scale of the conflict observers must beware of distortions created by the media, the British government, the security forces, paramilitaries, and tourist agencies. The external media report in depth only on selective atrocities, and can mislead people into thinking that in the intervals all is calm. The government and the security forces have obvious incentives to downplay the scale of the conflict and to stress 'normality'; and tourist and economic development agencies are keenly aware that the external perception of violence affects the success of their endeavours. The police force, the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), emphasizes that the number of civilians killed annually as a result of road-accidents in the period 1969-89 usually exceeded the total number of those who died annually because of political violence, or, 'as a result of the security situation' as they prefer to put it (e.g. CCAR, 1989, 1990: 24). Others note that the numbers killed in political violence in Northern Ireland are much less than the homicide-tolls in large US cities (e.g. Zimring, 1987: 3 ff.),3 or emphasize that the risk of death in being a resident of Northern Ireland is considerably less than that of being a denizen of many urban centres in advanced industrial states. Such 'realistic' comparisons persuade the uncritical consumer of official press briefings that the conflict merits classification as a small-scale and parochial quarrel, or, more technically, as a 'low-intensity' conflict (Kitson, 1971). Yet such comparisons are misleading. The contrast between deaths from political violence and deaths from road-accidents is grotesquely inappropriate. Deaths because of political violence are an addition to other socially caused deaths, and in functioning and stable liberal democracies deaths caused by road-accidents should be, and usually are, higher than deaths caused by political violence.4 There is nothing exceptional about Northern Ireland's road-accident/political violence ratio, except that it is used as a distracting indicator by a police force anxious for a good press. Citizens of liberal democracies and their governments support

Auditing the antagonism 13 private and public transport policies which have known and built-in risks of death. There is no comparable way in which they explicitly accept built-in risks of deaths from political violence when they make and enforce public policy.5 Rather, any self-respecting modern state and its citizenry seek to establish a monopoly of legitimate force to prevent political violence: but nearly 2 per cent of the population of Northern Ireland have been killed or injured through political violence in the last two decades. The comparison of the death-rate in the Northern Ireland conflict with the homicide-rate in US or other major cities is equally misleading. The people who died in the USA between 1948 and 1977 as a result of political violence (434) were fewer than those killed in Northern Ireland in 1972 alone, and much less than those killed in the entire period (1,835),6 and the per capita death-toll from political violence was radically less in the USA. 'Ordinary' violent criminality is dramatically less in Northern Ireland: it is politically - not criminally - violent, whereas the converse applies to the USA.7 Moreover, US homicide-rates owe something to constitutional provisions, which protect the citizen's right to bear arms, and widespread drug-related criminality, factors irrelevant in accounting for deaths in Northern Ireland. To evaluate the nature and intensity of the Northern Ireland conflict it is better to compare the total deaths and the per capita death-tolls from internal political violence in liberal democracies (see Figures 1.2 (a) and (b) ). The World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators provides us with the latest available data on these matters for the three decades 1948-77 (Taylor and Jodice, 1983). Figures 1.2 (a) and (b) are drawn from a slightly modified version of this data-set, and bring home the astonishing scale of the conflict in Northern Ireland when seen in a comparative perspective.8 Northern Ireland was by far the most internally politically violent of the recognizably continuous liberal democracies during the period 1948-77, both in absolute numbers killed and relatively, as indicated by the per capita death-toll.9 Sceptics might suggest that Figure 1.2 misconstrues the comparative evidence because Northern Ireland is a sub-unit of one liberal democracy, namely the UK, and therefore we are not comparing 'like with like', and because states are excluded which have some claim to being regarded as liberal democracies during the years 1948-77, notably India, Sri Lanka, and Israel. Yet, as Figure 1.2 (a) shows,

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If each community is given an equal weight in determining the future of Northern Ireland then a united Ireland, (a), would win easily as it is the first preference of three of the four communities. But a fair objection to this result would be that it does not reflect differential preference-intensities across the four communities. We may consider it fair to rule out a united Ireland because each community should be able to veto its most unacceptable option, and it is the most unacceptable solution for unionists. However, on the same decision-rule option (b), undiluted British rule in Northern Ireland, must be ruled out because this solution is the (or one of the) most unacceptable solution(s) to three of the four communities. Exactly the same reasoning excludes (d), a new partition, because it is considered an equally bad solution by three of the four communities.

Table 8.2 The acceptability and likely impact of macro-solutions for Northern Ireland 8.2 (a) Acceptability of the five macro-solutions Is the macro-solution acceptable? Macro-solution

to nationalists in Northern Ireland (preferences are very intense)

to unionists in Northern Ireland (preferences are very intense)

NI becomes part of an all-Ireland state

yes

no

NI stays part of the UK

no

yes

NI as an independent state

no

NI partitioned between Britain and Ireland NI governed by British and Irish authority

yes

to the British electorate (preferences are mostly weakly held) very acceptable 33% very acceptable 5-10% very acceptable 25-33% very acceptable 5% very acceptable 25%

to to to to to

to the Irish electorate (preferences are mostly moderately held) very acceptable 55% very acceptable 5% very acceptable 35% very acceptable 5% very acceptable 45%

to to to to to

Note: The estimates of the levels of acceptability of the five options in Great Britain and the Republic of Ireland are based on polldata tapping first and second preferences (O'Leary, 1991b) which is why the estimates across the five options do not add to 100.

8.2 (b) The likely impact of macro-solutions What is the likely impact of the macro-solution in the medium term? Macro-solution

on promoting political and legal reform and ethnic equality

on controlling political violence

NI becomes part of an all-Ireland state

unpredictable

poor prospects threatens more severe civil war

poor prospects

no

NI stays part of the UK

poor record to date

status quo, i.e. existing civil war

status quo

yes

NI as an independent state

poor prospects

poor prospects threatens more severe civil war

poor prospects

NI partitioned between Britain and Ireland

irrelevant

potentially disastrous war(s) in the shortterm, but then matters stabilize

irrelevant

NI governed by British and Irish authority

positive prospects

on promoting political is the solution accommodation economically between the two sustainable in worstcommunities case scenarios:

not much worse than no worse than the status quo in the status quo short-term but good in the medium-term

yes

yes

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On the premises of this argument, in which each community counts equally, and each can veto their worst alternative(s), the ultimate decision-choice must be between the difference-splitting solutions of independence or joint authority. How might this choice be resolved? On the premises of the above argument and evidence it cannot be resolved since both Irish nationalists in Northern Ireland and the Republic prefer joint authority to independence, while both Ulster unionists and the British electorate prefer independence to joint authority. But one further difference-splitting answer is to recommend a form of democratized condominium that maximizes the independence of the peoples of Northern Ireland within the framework of joint authority. Northern Ireland might be given a separate international legal personality, as an autonomous condominium. It might be enabled or encouraged to negotiate a special status within the European Community. Its internal government might consist of a power-sharing executive including representatives of the British and Irish governments (similar to that outlined in Kilbrandon's co-operative devolution proposals), checked and balanced by a locally elected assembly. If weighting each community's preferences equally (albeit with veto-rights to rule out their worst option(s) ) seems an unacceptable way of discussing the best options for Northern Ireland consider Table 8.2 (b), which presents our worst-case judgements of the impact of each of the five macro-constitutional solutions on medium-term prospects for reform, controlling violence, and long-run political accommodation between the rival communities. It also includes our worst-case assessment of the economic viability of each option. 14 The table suggests that each of the five logical ways in which Northern Ireland's statehood can be resolved entails obvious and profound costs, beyond those of violating some community's preferences, and much less obvious and more intangible benefits. However, it is vital to remember that the status quo has considerable, persistent, and predictable costs. Durable joint authority that takes the form of a democratized condominium15 (permitting the maximum feasible degree of selfgovernment for the peoples of Northern Ireland) is the best of the five options in our judgement. It is more acceptable to more of the four communities than any other option (other than independence). Moreover, it survives the worst-case evaluations better than the

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295

other four options, including independence. It is a better option than repartition because it is more acceptable to more actors admittedly more so to Irish nationalists and the Irish government than to unionists - and it is a better option than all the others in its potential for promoting the reform of Northern Ireland and controlling political violence. 16 The presence of the Irish government in a system of joint authority would give a permanent impetus for fair employment and fair administration of justice. One reason why the UK state has not effectively reformed Northern Ireland is just because it is a British state. A fully equal Irish dimension (to match a British dimension) is indispensable to promote and implement substantive reforms which would benefit the Irish nationalist minority in Northern Ireland and ensure it genuine equal citizenship. The presence of the Irish government and its security forces, and a jointly supervised security apparatus will make the legitimate policing of nationalist paramilitary violence much easier to accomplish. One firm lesson of Irish history is that Irish nationalists are most successfully coerced by officials from a legitimate Irish state. Indeed hard-line law and order zealots should note that under any system of joint authority the opportunities for effectively administered and co-operative repression of paramilitaries are very good. Joint authority, in the form of a democratized condominium, provided it was not presented and defended as a short-stay transit-lounge to Irish unification, could perform no worse than the other options in promoting the prospects for a long-term political accommodation. The outraged reaction of Ulster unionists to the AIA suggests that the prospects of promoting peaceful accommodation would at best be medium-term under joint authority, but it is nevertheless an option which we believe survives normative and predictive evaluation better than the others. Architects of a democratized condominium would have to ensure that there were very powerful incentives for unionists to participate within its institutions.17

Unitary, federal, and confederal formulae Critics might argue that the above argument is superficial because 'the devil is in the detail', i.e. each of the options cannot be judged unless their substantive content is examined. Consider

296

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then the horizontal dimension of Table 8.1 which is based on the supposition that there are three modes of organizing liberal democratic states: in unitary, federal, or confederal forms. In their turn unitary states, federations, and confederations can be more or less centralized or decentralized, depending upon the structures of government, intergovernmental relations, and the allocation of powers and functions. Irish unitary, federal, and confederal formulae An Irish unitary state, advocated by Fianna Fail in the Irish Republic, does not appeal to unionists (it was acceptable to a mere 3 per cent of Protestant respondents in a Belfast Telegraph poll of January 1990) even if it was accompanied by extensive devolution of authority to Northern Ireland. They find it unacceptable because it would vest sovereignty in the hands of the nationalist/Catholic majority in the island of Ireland. The fact that since 1982 it has also been the goal of Sinn Fein and the IRA to obtain a unitary Irish state does nothing to enhance its attractiveness to unionists. An Irish federation or confederation, by contrast, would have to be either a two-unit federation or confederation, or built upon three or more freshly created political provinces throughout the island of Ireland. The problem with a two-unit entity is that the historical track-record of such political institutions in bi-ethnic societies is disastrous (Vile, 1982). They have proven consistently unstable elsewhere in the world. The problem with any more than two-unit entity is that it would entail a dramatic disruption of the institutional fabric of the Republic of Ireland, a price which neither its political elite nor its people seem prepared to pay. An Irish confederation would be more acceptable than a federation to unionists both because a confederation is easier to secede from and because the constituent components enjoy greater self-government than in a federation. However, for the same reason it would be opposed by Irish nationalists as unstable and likely to give Ulster Protestants too much power within the confederal unit of Northern Ireland. British unitary, federal, and confederal formulae The UK is presently a unitary state. Since 1972 Northern Ireland has been centrally governed, under direct rule from Westminster

Transcending Antagonism ? 297 and the Northern Ireland Office (tempered after November 1985 by the AIA). The centralization of government within the British unitary state has not proved much more legitimate than the Stormont arrangements it superseded, nor has it produced successful conflictregulation or generated fundamental reform of Northern Ireland's political economy. Northern Ireland used to have a devolved government within the UK: the Stormont parliament which presided over institutionalized discrimination against Catholics and nationalists. The DUP still contains activists who would like to see majority rule in a devolved government restored: a prospect rejected by nationalists within Northern Ireland, and by the British and Irish governments who insist that a devolved government must enjoy widespread consent across both communities. All unilateral British attempts to establish an agreed form of devolved government within Northern Ireland have failed. So far bilateral British-Irish fostering of an agreed devolved government has also failed. Historically informed pessimists had good reasons to suppose that the Brooke initiative would go the way of its precursors. Administrative and electoral integrationists within the unionist bloc maintain that if the UK government resolved that Northern Ireland was part of the Union for ever then the political uncertainty that bedevils the region would end, and the IRA would be demoralized and eventually defeated. This thinking is wishful. A sizeable body of opinion within the UUP favours administrative integration, treating Northern Ireland 'exactly like the rest of the UK'. It is rarely specified which sub-region of the UK they have in mind - Scotland, Wales, Yorkshire, London? The shortest and most elegant response to their contentions is that of Nicholas Scott, former Under-Secretary of State for Northern Ireland: 'Northern Ireland is different, so it must be governed differently.'18 Moreover, despite the Westminster election results of 1992, there remains strong pressure for political and administrative devolution and differentiation within the UK which cuts across the aspirations of administrative integrationists. Electoral integrationists contend that if 'real' British political parties, namely the Conservatives, Labour, and the Liberal Democrats, were to organize and compete in elections in Northern Ireland then its ethnic politics would be transformed, and 'normal' liberal demo-

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cratic politics could develop (e.g. Aughey, 1989; Roberts, 1987; and Wilson, 1989). This argument rests on insecure foundations. It presupposes that parties matter more than cross-national evidence suggests in determining the nature of political conflicts: yet 'Spanish parties organize in the Basque country without preventing ethnic conflict there . . . Swiss parties organized in the Bernese Jura without preventing conflict and in Belgium the three main parties organized across the linguistic divide, but that did not stop tension between Fleming and Walloon from rising in the 1960s' (Whyte, 1990: 220). 19 Moreover, the electoral integrationists suppose that Northern Irish residents will vote for British political parties in large numbers if given the opportunity. The evidence is not persuasive. The Conservatives, the solitary British political party to have organized in the region, lost their deposits in the European parliamentary election of May 1989 and the by-election in Upper Bann in May 1990, and have performed well in only one very unrepresentative local-government district, North Down. In the 1992 Westminster elections the Conservatives achieved a 5.7 per cent share of all votes cast in the region. Organizations seeking to persuade Labour to organize in the region have received derisory votes. The electoral integrationist case also rests on the assumption that Northern Irish voters who will vote for British political parties will do so for non-ethnic reasons. Yet polling evidence confirms that the Conservatives appeal most to those in favour of the Union, i.e. Protestants; whereas the Labour party appeals most to those in favour of Irish unity, i.e. Catholics, because Labour favours achieving Irish unity by consent {Irish Political Studies, 1989, 4: 151). Far from transcending sectarian politics the organization of the major British political parties in the region, if it had any impact at all, would directly embroil them in its national/ethnic conflicts, and prevent them from playing the role of more disinterested arbiters. Electoral integrationists erroneously assume that the major cause of conflict in Northern Ireland since 1920 was the absence of British party competition in the region:20 an argument that presupposes that such parties would have been electorally successful and transcended historically-established antagonisms, and manages to forget that the Conservatives and the UUP were intimately and mutually

Transcending Antagonism ? 299 beneficially linked. The UK has never formally been a federation or a confederation. Even if it was to become more like a federation or a confederation, after the establishment of Scottish and Welsh devolution as well as powerful English regions by a reforming Labour government in the late 1990s, it is not clear what significance this transformation would have for the problems of Northern Ireland. Ulster unionists would seek a UK federation which gave them provincial control within Northern Ireland. Their preferred models of a UK federation or confederation completely deny Irish nationalists their aspiration for an Irish dimension (Smyth, 1987), and provoke fears that a UK federation would re-establish a new Stormont regime. What about a federation or confederation of the British isles, or the archipelago of the Celtic Sea, or indeed 'the federation of Man' 21 as some Utopians are wont to suggest? Such an institutional transformation might satisfy the dual national aspirations of the peoples in Northern Ireland, but the British and Irish states are unlikely to surrender sovereignty over all their territories to solve the Northern Irish question if they have found it so difficult to manage their conflicting sovereignty claims over the region. Moreover, Irish nationalists see any proposal for a federated or confederated British Isles as a Trojan horse for the reincorporation of Ireland into the UK. European federal or confederal formulae Federalists maintain that if the boundaries between the components of the federation match the boundaries between the relevant ethnic, religious, or linguistic communities, then federalism is an effective conflict-regulating device because it has the effect of making an ethnically heterogeneous society less heterogeneous through the creation of more homogeneous sub-units. However, of the seven genuine federations in long-term liberal democracies, only three achieve this effect, those of Belgium, Canada, and Switzerland (Lijphart, 1984: Table 10.3). In these three cases the success of federalism in conflict-regulation, such as it is, is based upon the lucky accident that the relevant ethnic communities are sharply geographically segregated, something that does not apply in Northern Ireland.

300 The Politics of Antagonism Perhaps Northern Ireland's problems could be transcended within the framework of an emergent European federation or confederation. Joint membership of the EC has aided the development of neighbourly relations between the London and Dublin governments but it is not obvious what impact spillovers from increasing European union will have on intra-communal relations within Northern Ireland. Issues such as dual-national identity, the administration of justice, militarized policing, paramilitary violence, discrimination, and the distribution of local political power are not likely to be resolved as by-products of 'post-1992 Europe'. The removal of tariff barriers and increased cross-border co-operation between the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland, if they materialize, will not resolve a conflict centred on national identity and ethnicity. Moreover, the border across Ireland is likely to remain one of the most heavily policed in the EC whatever the fate of '1992'. European co-operation is something desirable in its own right, not something to be favoured as a panacea for Northern Ireland (Lyne, 1990). However, that said, no future framework for resolving Northern Ireland can occur outside the EC. Unitary, federal, or confederal formulae do not appear to advance the search for a solution any further than the arguments we surveyed in considering the macro-constitutional options. However, it might be maintained that one reason why these formulae are unhelpful is their imprecision about their implications for political decision-making. What type of decision-making? Whichever state Northern Ireland is to belong to, and whatever its constitutional nomenclature, the political question is straightforward: how should political power be organized over, across, and within the respective communities? There are four ideal typical ways in which this question can be answered: through arbitration, majority rule, cantonization/communization, and powersharing, although each of these types can be permed in multiple ways.

Transcending Antagonism ?

301

Arbitration. Arbitration was tried by the British government in Northern Ireland between 1972 and 1985. After the AIA arbitration has been exercised by the British government in consultation with the Irish government, providing 'direct rule with a green tinge'. In principle, as we have advocated, at some future conjuncture arbitration might be exercised by both Britain and Ireland in a system of joint authority. More fancifully arbitration might be exercised by personnel from the EC (or the UN), appointed by the British and Irish governments. While there is little support for UN involvement in Northern Ireland, in the British Isles the JRRT/Gallup polls data did suggest widespread agreement across nationalists and unionists that the EC should play 'a minor role' in the future government of Northern Ireland (O'Leary, 1991c). The most fundamental problem with arbitration is that the arbitrated do not regard the most likely arbiters, namely Britain or the Republic, as sufficiently disinterested to be neutral. Irish nationalists regard direct British rule in Ireland as responsible for continuing economic discrimination, regular abuses of human rights by the security forces, and denial of their identity. Unionists, by contrast, find repulsive the mere idea of institutionalized consultation with the Irish Republic. Joint authority has the decided advantage that the two partisan-states would be forced to resolve their differences while adjudicating disputes between their respective nationals in the region.22 Majority-rule Political power in Northern Ireland in principle might be exercised according to majority rule G . This norm of the Westminster model is, however, problematic in ethnically divided societies. Under the Stormont government there was one-party rule by the UUP for over fifty years, and no prospect of the nationalist opposition sharing power or achieving governmental authority through the alternation in power that characterizes functioning democracies. Majority-rule devolution provided a milieu for the systematic abuse of political power; and the application of majority-rule decision-making procedures in unitary, federal, or confederal formulae would create the same threat, whether Northern Ireland was Irish, British, or an independent state. The question in any case is 'which majority?' Nationalists claim

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The Politics of Antagonism

that Northern Ireland is illegitimate because its borders were drawn to create an artificial majority, and that they are the genuine majority in the island of Ireland; whereas most unionists claim that since they are a majority within Northern Ireland they should be allowed power commensurate with that status. Electoral integrationists, by contrast, argue that the true majority is in the entire UK. They favour majority rule through the operations of the UK two-party system throughout the state. They are as wildly idealist about the benefits of the Westminster model as Gaelic romantics are about Irish unification, and have no answer to the question of what could or should stop a UK majority from relinquishing British sovereignty over Northern Ireland. Political romanticism is not an exclusively Irish nationalist commodity. Cantonization/communization Northern Ireland could be cantonized, in a manner similar to the Swiss mode of government, or communized: the region could be subjected to a micro-partition in which political power would be devolved to new and very small political units - averaging about 20,000 people (Swiss cantons are much larger; it is Swiss communes which are small). Such political units could be designed either to create ethno-religiously homogeneous units where majority rule would be practically coterminous with the self-government of all the relevant community or to achieve a very local form of power-sharing government of Catholics and Protestants. Where intra-ethnic conflict is high then the partitioning of units to create homogeneity would be the operating administrative principle; and where such conflict was low local power-sharing might be encouraged through the design of balanced 'mixed' cantons/communes. Cantonization/communization would decompose Northern Ireland into islands of nationalist, unionist, and power-sharing units, simultaneously combining majority rule, partitionist and power-sharing principles - and it could be carried out by a British arbiter or under joint authority. Some areas with high political violence would have to remain under direct rule, and a regional anti-terrorist force would obviously still be required. However, under 'rolling cantonization' policing and judicial powers could be gradually devolved to those areas where the population expressed a wish to exercise such powers, and where the British and Irish governments judged that

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the experiment had some prospects of success. Cantonization/communization is fraught with potential difficulties, notably the drawing and policing of appropriate units of government, winning consent for them, and the ever-present threat that the cantonization of policing and judicial powers might be used by paramilitary organizations to seize control of parts of Northern Ireland, and treat them as 'liberated zones'. 23 However, cantonization is at least as realistic as pushing traditional unionist or nationalist positions; it is more gradualist in its implications than drastic repartition because it permits both governments the freedom to reverse any experimental initiatives; and for these reasons it deserves to be debated more widely. But cantonization/communization could not be easily applied to the Greater Belfast area, where 49 per cent of Northern Ireland's population resides. As Figure 1.1 demonstrated Belfast experiences the highest levels of violence in Northern Ireland (p. 11). But there is no reason why all sub-regions of Northern Ireland should be governed and administered in a uniform way, so the exclusion of Greater Belfast from cantonization/communization does not necessitate the rest of the region being excluded from experimental cantonization. Power-sharing Finally, political relationships in Northern Ireland might be organized according to the power-sharing principles characteristic of some democratic and stable societies which survive despite being divided by ethnic cleavages. Consociational democracies usually have four features (see pp. 197-202): a grand coalition government incorporates the political parties representing the main segments of the divided society; full proportionality rules throughout the public sector; 'community autonomy' norms permitting each group selfgovernment over those matters of most profound concern to them; and constitutional vetoes for minorities. However, the promotion of consociational arrangements for Northern Ireland, whether through voluntary or coercive means, has failed: even though public-opinion polls consistently find it an 'acceptable' solution to large numbers of both Catholics and Protestants. Voluntary consociation cannot work effectively where the rival communities are fundamentally divided over their national as opposed to their linguistic or religious identities, and where they are divided

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The Politics of Antagonism

over the legitimacy of the state. 'Northern Ireland is not Belgium' as one sage has put it. Nationality conflicts appear to have an irreducibly zero-sum character, a view daily reinforced by paramilitaries who kill for the proposition that 'one nation = one state'. The majority of constitutional unionists reject institutionalized power-sharing as 'un-British', i.e. foreign to the Westminster parliamentary tradition, and contend they cannot share power with people who want Northern Ireland to belong to a foreign country. The majority of constitutional nationalists reject any consociational proposals if they are not accompanied by an institutionalized linkage between Northern Ireland and the Republic. Political leaders of nationalist and unionist parties personally prepared to compromise fundamentally on a consociational settlement rapidly find themselves overthrown by revolts within their parties and their ethnic communities. Finally, since both the nationalist and unionist communities are internally divided into 'ultras' and 'moderates' the latter are insufficiently free to negotiate. The AIA was intended to break this stalemate, but it has not done so, so far. Voluntary consociational solutions, while eminently desirable, seem destined to fall on stony ground. There are several ways in which the British and Irish governments might react if they recognize this increasingly palpable fact. They may simply opt, as they usually do, to engage in crisis-management. Alternatively they may agree to play a long-term strategy, reforming Northern Ireland's discriminatory economy and its administration of justice to win the political confidence of nationalists, isolating the IRA and Sinn Fein, whilst simultaneously gently coaxing unionists out of the cold. The logic of this strategy would be to accomplish all of the institutional features of consociationalism except grand coalition government, which would have to await a better tomorrow. The two governments could aim to ensure proportional representation in non-elected political institutions (including, eventually, the police), community autonomy, and a Bill of Rights guaranteeing equality of citizenship and entrenching some minority rights. Simultaneously they would have to ensure the fight against paramilitaries stayed within the rule of law. The British and Irish governments might also take the more risky and drastic step of threatening a major new initiative, such as moving towards joint authority or repartition, to increase the pressure on

Transcending Antagonism ? 305 unionists and nationalists to arrive at a power-sharing settlement. Arend Lijphart, the pioneering political scientist who developed the theory of consociational democracy, argues that partition is the most stable and least undesirable solution when consociationalism fails, and that threatening partition might sometimes bring the relevant actors to the negotiating table (Lijphart, 1977, and 1991). In The Future of Northern Ireland we sketched a similar argument (McGarry and O'Leary, 1991b: 294-300). However, we observed that threatening joint authority might be as beneficial as threatening partition (ibid.: 303, fn. 24) in encouraging a consociational settlement. We now firmly believe, for the reasons advanced at various points throughout this chapter, that threatening joint authority is a decidedly better option than threatening repartition, because if the internal parties 'call the bluff of the British and Irish governments it is much easier and more desirable to implement the relevant threat: joint authority poses fewer threats of disaster than repartition. To sum up on possible types of decision-making for Northern Ireland: British and Irish arbitration through joint authority would be more disinterested and productive in outcome than simply British or Irish arbitration; majority rule must provoke conflict unless it is kept to non-contentious issue-areas, or unless it takes place within a framework of joint authority; cantonization/communization outside the Greater Belfast area could be experimented with under joint authority or under the existing status quo of British direct rule tempered by the Anglo-Irish Agreement; and under joint authority both the British and Irish governments could continue to promote consociational solutions, with no worse prospects of success than under present circumstances, and with some medium-term prospects of creating more widely legitimate structures of government. Joint authority 'responds to the analysis of the Northern Ireland problem as one of a clash of identities . . . is the logical goal towards which the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985 seems to be pointing, whether or not the signatories intended that fact . . . it is the point towards which various forces in the conflict appear to be converging - unionists' adamant refusal to be ruled by Dublin; nationalists' insistence on symbolic as well as practical equality in Northern Ireland; the declining interest of opinion in the south in outright unification; and possibly a British readiness for detachment from the problem without taking the risk of abandoning all say in how it should be handled' (Whyte, 1990: 241).

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Grand public-policy objectives Appraising the merit of macro-solutions, unitary, federal, and confederal formulae, and decision-making systems presupposes grand public-policy goals. In liberal democratic ethnic-conflict resolution inhumane, obnoxious, and indefensible objectives must be ruled out axiomatically: such as genocide, forced mass-migration, or allowing one ethnic group to establish hegemonic control over another. Liberal democratic policy-makers are faced with three fundamental choices in attempting to resolve policy-goals for resolving ethnic conflict: • •

•

reinforcing ethnic separatism as a prelude to partition, repartition, federalization, confederalization, or cantonization; or pursuing the civic integration (and eventually the assimilation) of all members of the relevant communities into one (or a new transcendent) identity; or pursuing communal and individual equality, which we call ethnic and civic pluralism.

The first option has already been substantively discussed above so we can confine analysis to the second and third options. From Integration to Assimilation. Many people believe that the goal of public policy in Northern Ireland should be to reduce the differences between Catholics and Protestants (or nationalists and unionists) through civic integration, to enable ethnic assimilation to take place later. The advocates of integrated education (e.g. Fraser, 1973; and Heskin, 1980), and integrated housing policies share the supposition that the promotion of integration will accomplish eventual assimilation and is intrinsically desirable. The members of the Alliance party, predominantly composed of 'liberal' middle-class Protestants and Catholics, share these beliefs. It is not clear, however, whether they think public policy should be directed towards the dissolution of both ethnic identities, whether they be defined as Protestant and Catholic, or unionist and nationalist; or whether they favour the creation of a British middle-class semi-secularized identity, as their critics suggest.

Transcending Antagonism ? 307 There are two obvious questions about such civic 'integrationism'. Is it feasible and is it just? Compulsory educational and housing integration produce considerable ethnic violence, as the US experience of 'bussing' confirms. Using state-incentives to encourage educational integration would have to work at the expense of the voluntary, i.e. the predominantly Catholic sector, which would signal a clear message that integration is taking place at the differential expense of one identity. As one British minister taxed with the task of investigating integrated education in Northern Ireland in 1974-5 put it: T became persuaded that integrated education meant Protestant education.' 24 The key problem is that too many parties to the conflict are integrationists, but on their terms. Unionists wish to integrate Northern Ireland into the UK, administratively, electorally, or culturally, by ignoring or diminishing the importance of their minority's Irish national identity, while nationalists, north and south, have sought an all-Ireland state while ignoring or diminishing the importance of their minority's British and religious identity. Each national integrationist project is majoritarian. Christians in both communities are either opposed to co-operative interaction or they are concerned that any ecumenical developments do not take place at the expense of their theological commitments. There are also secular integrationists who are equally exclusivist: some (usually originally Protestant) socialists and liberals maintain that integration into the UK party-system will advance a secular socialist and liberal agenda in Northern Ireland, whereas some (usually originally Catholic) socialists and liberals maintain that the integration of Northern Ireland into the Republic will advance the causes of social democracy, pluralism, and secularism in all of Ireland. All such integrationists, national, Christian, socialist, and liberal engage in varying degrees of wishful thinking. Creating civic homogeneity out of intense ethnic divisions may seem desirable, although that is debatable, but it is hardly practical. Ethnic and civic pluralism. The alternative public-policy objective is to secure the rights, identities, freedoms, and opportunities of both national-ethnic communities, and to create political and other social institutions that enable both to enjoy the benefits of equality without forced assimi-

308 The Politics of Antagonism lation. This policy goal would not entail any efforts by governments to force people to be schooled or housed together. However, it does require full equality of public provision for each community, and an end to the unjustified underfunding of Catholic schools and Catholic housing estates identified by recent and careful research (Cormack, Gallagher, and Osborne, 1991: 144-6; Smith and Chambers, 1991: 330-67). Ethnic pluralism does imply a commitment to proportionality and equality in political, legal, and economic work-organizations since here ethnic differences are likely to produce violence, instability, and perpetuation of conflict. One might see the British government's decision, announced in 1991, to merge the (overwhelmingly Protestant) UDR with the Royal Irish Rangers (which recruits some Catholics from all of Ireland as well as Protestants) as consistent with this objective.25 Ethnic pluralism requires Bills of Rights, fair employment, institutional respect for the two traditions, proportionality in policing, judging, and military pacification, and mutual vetoes on matters of communal and national autonomy. Ethnic pluralism, which we favour, would be best advanced through a form of joint authority that maximized the self-government and autonomy of the communities of Northern Ireland. It is also compatible with ensuring that secular, bi-confessional or non-christian individuals and families, and people who are neither British nor Irish in their national or ethnic origins, enjoy the full benefits of a liberal democratic civil society. Notes 1. The full data-set was made available to O'Leary (1991b, 1991c, and 1992) by the Joseph Rowntree Reform Trust. 2. Thus if a referendum was held in all three jurisdictions a united Ireland would be the plurality-rule winner. Alternatively if each jurisdiction was given one vote and the future of Northern Ireland was decided by a majority vote then a united Ireland would defeat Northern Ireland being integrated into Great Britain by two votes to one. 3. Catholics understate their Irish nationalist militancy, inter alia, because of fear of being identified as subversive, suspicion of pollsters, and on the sour grapes' principle that 'if a united Ireland cannot be had it's not worth supporting'. 4. If Northern Ireland's economy were reformed through affirmative action

Transcending Antagonism ? 309 then presumably the differential between Catholic and Protestant emigrationrates would be reduced and the Catholic/nationalist electorate of Northern Ireland would expand. However, such a transformation would take time and might reconcile Catholics to Northern Ireland's status as a part of the UK. 5. We share the mainstream belief that a British governmental and military withdrawal from the island of Ireland would be more likely to provoke unionists to create an independent, albeit smaller, Northern Ireland, rather than encourage them to negotiate their place in a new Ireland. 6. The lower level of first-preference support for independence amongst Protestants in the JRRT/Gallup polls compared with Catholics may reflect the fact that the question made it emphatically clear that this option would make Northern Ireland completely independent of the UK as well as of the Republic. 7. The New Ireland Forum sub-committee noted that under joint authority there would be a case for the British staying in Northern Ireland even if a simple majority emerged for a united Ireland: 'it could be argued that if Joint Authority is justified where there is a nationalist minority of 35-40 %, it would be equally justified when there was a substantial Unionist minority in the North' (Kilbrandon, 1984: 70). We agree. 8. The deliberations of the Forum sub-committee were leaked and published in the Kilbrandon Report (1984: 61 ff.). 9. The idea of joint authority was first put on the agenda in 1971 by a nationalist intellectual (Fennell, 1985: 156 ff.). It was briefly taken up by the SDLP in a policy document published in 1972: its condominium proposal entailed a self-governing Northern Ireland under the joint control and supervision of the London and Dublin governments (SDLP, 1972), but as the precursor to a united Ireland established by an all-Ireland referendum. Joint authority was also aired in a pamphlet by the British-based intellectual T. J. Pickvance (1975), and by political scientist Bernard Crick (1982). See also Dent (1988), Kenny (1991), and Wright (1989). The subtle and intelligent arguments of Ruane and Todd (1991) provide the best normative underpinning for a democratized condominium, whether or not that is the explicit intention of the authors. 10. The Forum sub-committee envisaged a vaguely specified Joint Authority Commission, one British and one Irish person (in effect dual prefects), who might appoint 'Deputy Commissioners'; and, an alternative model under which the Joint Authority Commission supervised a local executive 'supported by' a locally elected assembly (Kilbrandon, 1984: 62). 11. The term 'joint sovereignty' was avoided by the proponents of joint authority because of Thatcher's acetose distaste for losing one iota of sovereignty, and because of the ideological debates about sovereignty. 12. The Irish dimension is so strongly entrenched in the minds of the Great British public that more of them (49 per cent) think the Irish government should

310 The Politics of Antagonism have a major role in the affairs of Northern Ireland than think the same should apply to their own government (32 per cent). 13. We explore these issues in McGarry and O'Leary (forthcoming). 14. Here we have not elaborated the empirical bases for our judgements. We leave it to readers to assess how far our recommendation of joint authority is vulnerable to the challenge that our judgements are not robust. We defend our judgements in depth in McGarry and O'Leary (forthcoming). 15. Transitional joint authority as a prelude to a British withdrawal would be destabilizing while permanent joint authority would entail constitutional inhibitions upon future widely agreed changes to a more acceptable form of self-government. Therefore we prefer the expression durable joint authority, which should be operationalized as meaning not less than twenty years. To ensure that durable joint authority is not seen as 'creeping Irish unification' it would have to be accompanied by changes in Articles 2 and 3 of the Irish Constitution, as well as a new constitution of Northern Ireland which specified that (after the twenty-year period) a very high level of consent (over 75 per cent) would be required for Northern Ireland to become (exclusively) part of the Republic or (again) exclusively part of the UK. Incentives for a powerful local input into the system of joint authority could include an executive structured like the Kilbrandon model, with special provisions for the appointment of functional ministers from a locally elected assembly, and for agreed appointments to senior bureaucratic, judicial, and security posts. 16. In the JRRT/Gallup polls joint authority (26 per cent) came third behind full integration with the Republic (38 per cent) and an independent Northern Ireland (33 per cent) as the cumulated first and second preferences of the public in Great Britain. In the Republic, joint authority (44 per cent) came second to full integration with the Republic (55 per cent) and ahead of an independent Northern Ireland (35 per cent). 17. See Note 15 above. 18. Interview with B. O'Leary, 3 Jan. 1991. 19. State-wide party-organization and competition have not stopped ethnic conflict or prevented the development of powerful local ethnic parties in democratic states as large and as diverse as India and Canada; and the nation-building ambitions of successive Nigerian constitutional designers who have emphasized electoral integration have not been realized. 20. Roberts (1987: 335) claims that the British party 'boycott' of the region is 'the fundamental reason for the continuing conflict' (our emphasis). We wonder whether Indian party-organization in Sri Lanka, Indian partyorganization in Kashmir, Serbian party-organization in the disintegrating Yugoslav republics, Israeli party-organization in the west Bank and Gaza strip, or Greek (or Turkish) party-organization in Cyprus would remove the fundamental reasons for conflict in these territories.

Transcending Antagonism ? 311 21. One intellectual has proposed a Federation of Man; and later followed it up with a proposed Confederation of Man, comprising only Scotland, Wales, and Ireland, with its confederal institutions in an independent island of Man (Fennell, 1985: 179). He did not discuss whether the federation or confederation should be tax-havens. 22. Joint authority like the Kilbrandon model of co-operative devolution would combine the benefits of arbitration and majority rule. 23. All of these problems were manifest in the EC's ill-fated and ill-conceived cantonization plans for Bosnia Herzegovina during 1991-2. 24. Roland Moyle (interview with B. O'Leary, 3 Jan. 1991). 25. It transpired in late 1991, however, that the British Army had greatly overestimated the Catholic and southern proportion of the Irish Rangers which is to be merged with the UDR to create the RIR. The Catholic/Irish membership of the Rangers is a mere 6 per cent, not 30 per cent as first suggested. This predictable failure at integration confirms that only joint authority can produce ethnically balanced security forces in Northern Ireland.

9 Epilogue: the Brooke initiative and after, 1990The trouble with Ireland may well be that you get this slow burning fire all the time which never solves anything either by constitutional negotiation or by the sort of traumatic experience that everybody wants to shy away from. (Roland Moyle, interview with B. O'Leary, 3 January 1991) The future is not what it used to be. (Anonymous) When Peter Brooke was appointed Secretary of State for Northern Ireland in July 1989 he 'dusted off papers submitted by unionists in 1987-8 and began a series of interventions to create an atmosphere conducive to talks between the constitutional political parties in Northern Ireland and the Irish government. Sinn Fein was to be excluded until it renounced support for political violence. Initially it was unclear whether Brooke's style was 'oracular or simply inept' (Pyle, 1989). l However, before long, he had managed to impress nationalists, unionists, and the Irish government that it would not be in their interests to oppose his initiative which he announced formally in January 1990. Throughout 1990 and early 1991 doubts persisted over whether the internal political parties would agree on an agenda for talks, let alone conduct the discussions. The NIO team nevertheless persisted in its ambitions, even though Brooke's diplomatic manoeuvring sowed, possibly deliberately, considerable confusion. In August 1990 one leading nationalist MP's political adviser posed a riddle:2 'Question: What do you get when you cross Peter Brooke with the

Epilogue: the Brooke initiative and after 313 Mafia? Answer: An offer you cannot understand, but cannot refuse.

At least two inferences could be drawn from this joke. The leaders of Northern Ireland's constitutional political parties felt obliged to demonstrate their willingness to talk, and endeavoured to avoid responsibility for the breakdown of any prospective talks, but none of them believed that a new British-Irish agreement could be constructed to command widespread assent. Yet Brooke's 'talks about talks' eventually delivered an agreement to hold discussions starting on 30 April 1991, with a 'gap' of ten weeks assured before the meeting of the next intergovernmental conference due on 16 July, and on the understanding that the Maryfield secretariat that services the conference would be run down during the talks.3 Brooke's officials sold unionists the merits of working with John Hume's agenda, which declared that three relationships - between unionists and nationalists in Northern Ireland, between unionists and the Republic of Ireland, and between Ireland and Great Britain - needed to be negotiated and resolved. All parties to the prospective round of talks - the two governments and the four constitutional parties in Northern Ireland (the UUP, the DUP, the APNI, and the SDLP) - agreed to the formula announced by Brooke in the House of Commons in March 1991. Driving into the strands The agreed formula consisted of three strands of talks. The first was to involve cross-party talks in Northern Ireland about internal structures of government for the region. The second was to consist of all-Ireland discussions, and the third was to settle British-Irish relations. The second and third strands were to be launched 'within weeks' of the first. However, after 30 April the talks were delayed by wrangling for seven weeks over the proposed agenda and standing orders, the venue for the proposed second strand of the negotiations, and finally over the choice of a chair for the second strand. The debate over the agenda and procedures focused on the subjects of the various proposed strands of discussion, and the order and location in which they would be processed. The debate over the venue(s) at one stage produced the remarkable outcome that the British and Irish governments, the SDLP, and the APNI were agreed

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that the second phase of the talks should take place in Northern Ireland while the UUP and DUP were holding out for a venue on the European continent. It was eventually accepted that the talks would centre in Belfast, but would also take place in London and Dublin. Since the UUP and the DUP were not prepared to hold talks with the Republic's government in Dublin under the chairmanship of the Irish Foreign Minister, Brooke and Collins proposed that an independent chairman be appointed to preside over such talks.4 However, their first proposal for the post, Lord Peter Carrington, produced an outraged response from the DUP and the UUP who felt that Carrington was anti-unionist, and complained bitterly that as British Foreign Secretary he had sold out Rhodesia in 1980.5 An alternative chair for the second phase of the talks, in the person of the former Governor-General of Australia, Sir Ninian Stephen, was finally agreed by all parties, and proper discussions began on 17 June 1991 about the possible replacement of the Anglo-Irish Agreement. Had the talks produced a British-Irish Agreement then 'History' would have been made. However, prognoses that the latest consociational initiative would not succeed proved correct. The cherished assumptions of inexperienced journalists that Charles Haughey, James Molyneaux, and Ian Paisley wanted to establish more benign reputations with twenty-first century historians, that 'public opinion' was pushing the rival leaders to a political accommodation, and that 'young unionist turks' of moderated dispositions were thrusting into view, all proved false, at least for the time being. The procedure for managing the discussions, had they taken place for any length of time, was open to criticism. It was impossible to disentangle the separate strands so perhaps one set of talks should have been organized. Some maintained that there are four not three relationships at stake: • • • •

within Northern Ireland, across all of Ireland, between Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and between the Republic of Ireland and Great Britain.

Others maintained that the European dimension should not be overlooked in any full-scale talks. In the prematurely terminated first strand of talks all the internal

Epilogue: the Brooke initiative and after

315

parties set out their wares as predicted. The UUP held out for greater integration with the UK and weak 'administrative devolution'; the DUP wanted strong devolved government but did not declare themselves committed to executive power-sharing; the APNI wanted an internal settlement and some Irish dimension; and the SDLP declared that the 'abiding reality' recognized by the Anglo-Irish Agreement 'is the right of the Irish Government to involvement in the affairs of Northern Ireland'. 6 The participating parties did not agree to sign provisional 'heads of agreement' before strands two and three could begin. Everything was to be left 'undecided' until all strands of discussion were completed, to prevent any side from breaking the negotiations at a favourable juncture for them.7 Substantive issues did arise. One was whether an 'internal settlement' - involving an agreed devolved government for Northern Ireland - could be part of the overall settlement. But it was clear that any 'internal settlement' was impossible to detach from any prospective 'external settlement'. The thorny external issues were: •

• •

the relationships between any Northern Ireland government and the institutions of the Anglo-Irish Agreement (or its successor) and Westminster and Whitehall; the constitutional status of Northern Ireland; and the stability of any devolved government without 'external guarantees' from the British and Irish governments.

Unsurprisingly there was little evidence by the end of June that an internal agreement was likely to be negotiated by the parties, and even if it were, that it would prove stable. A joint UUP-DUP document on 'Administrative and legislative devolution' (first composed in 1987) formed the basis of their negotiating posture during the Brooke talks.8 It envisaged an executiveless assembly based upon strong committees, in which the elected parties would be proportionally represented according to the d'Hondt rule, and it also foresaw an assembly large enough to ensure that there would be no danger that Unionists lacked a permanent majority on every committee! 'Proportionality, yes; power-sharing no' was this document's code. Unionists wanted any internal settlement tied to a fundamental modification or scrapping of the Anglo-Irish Agreement. Molyneaux and others in the UUP also wanted to marry a very weak form of

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devolution (little more than local government) to 'integrationist' measures at Westminster, like the ending of Orders in Council and a beefed-up parliamentary committee for Northern Ireland. The SDLP was not enthusiastic about these proposals. The SDLP refused to respond with detailed proposals for devolved government because it believed - correctly - that the UUP and the DUP were about to pull out of the talks. The SDLP saw the Anglo-Irish Agreement as a minimum and irreversible base-line from which to negotiate. Unionists insisted on the clarification of the status of Northern Ireland's position within the UK, whereas the SDLP wanted it to be compatible with future membership of an all-Ireland entity. The SDLP (and to an extent the APNI) wanted to tie down any new internal arrangement with 'external guarantees'. The furthest the SDLP was prepared to go in negotiations was to accept the Anglo-Irish Agreement as a default-option, which would come back into full force in the event of a collapse of a negotiated devolved government. There is no evidence that unionists were prepared to consider the SDLP's minimal requirement to stabilize an internal settlement, i.e. accept something like the Anglo-Irish Agreement. The Unionists participated in the talks knowing that if they produced nothing then the default-option would be a return to the Anglo-Irish Agreement. However, accepting under protest the Anglo-Irish Agreement as a default for talks was very different, for them, from building in the entire Agreement as an agreed default-option for a settlement which Unionists would sign. Since such a deal would lock them into power-sharing with the SDLP - without being able to threaten their resignation from a devolved government at an acceptable price - they considered such a default-option unacceptable. This division could not be glossed over by diplomacy, but was not highlighted as the talks broke over another issue: the refusal of Unionists to continue discussions given the fact that the British and Irish governments had committed themselves to going ahead with their scheduled Intergovernmental Conference on 16 July 1991. Paisley called for 'injury time' on the grounds that the seven weeks of delay after 30 April had prevented substantive talks. His critics pointed out that most of that delay was because of Paisley and Molyneaux's behaviour, and suspected that the DUP and the UUP wanted to 'wear down' the institutions of the Anglo-Irish Agreement rather than engage in constructive negotiations.9 The

Epilogue: the Brooke initiative and after 317 SDLP offered the possibility of another 'gap' between meetings of the Intergovernmental Conference as the basis for further discussions, but Unionists considered it unacceptable to negotiate with the threat of continuous Inter-Governmental Conferences. Brooke therefore brought the talks to an end on 3 July, which led to widespread criticisms of the unionists. By 12 July Paisley was renewing rhetorical war, describing Charles Haughey as the Saddam Hussein of Ireland.10 Resuscitating the Brooke initiative After the summer parliamentary recess the unionist leadership sought to repair some of the damage done to the unionist position in Great Britain.11 In September 1991 Molyneaux and Paisley met Brooke at Westminster. Paisley demanded that Collins, the Irish Foreign Minister retract a remark he had made earlier in the month to the effect that the Republic would be as flexible as possible in future talks, 'consistent of course with our commitment to the Anglo-Irish Agreement'. The unionist leaders demanded also that any future talks to replace the AIA with a new British-Irish Agreement should (initially) be conducted only at Westminster and only amongst MPs from Northern Ireland (a device to exclude the APNI from participation in any talks). These demands were non-starters for the SDLP and the Irish government, but later in a conciliatory response on RTE radio Haughey stated that Collins had been misinterpreted, and had not meant that new talks could only take place under the auspices of AIA (interview 22 September 1991). On 1 October Brooke and Collins met, and the latter confirmed that the Irish government wanted the previously agreed procedures for talks to be maintained. During the next three months both loyalist and republican paramilitary violence reached levels unseen for over a decade and increased the pressure on the parties to renew dialogue. The press in Great Britain and the Republic, and in Northern Ireland, called for a revival of talks and were particularly vigorous in their condemnation of unionist intransigence.12 Polls continued to show that Great British public opinion favoured the withdrawal of British troops from Northern Ireland.13 On 21 November 1991 Brooke met Paisley and Molyneaux for further 'talks about talks', but at the DUP's party conference, just over a week later, Paisley called for the talks to

318 The Politics of Antagonism be at Westminster, while demanding that the Republic immediately rescind the territorial claim in Articles 2 and 3 of its constitution, suggesting there was little room for progress. In early December the British Prime Minister John Major, who had succeeded Margaret Thatcher the previous year, met Charles Haughey in Dublin, in the first formal visit by a British Prime Minister to the Irish capital since 1980. The two Prime Ministers agreed that there would in future be a summit between them twice a year, and Major pointedly declared that he saw no reason for 'time-wasting', and believed that talks could restart before the next British general election, due in 1992. On 19 December 1991 Brooke met the Northern Irish party leaders to present a new formula for renewed talks. It was to consist of the previous formula (three strands, a gap between IGCs, and the running-down of the Maryfield secretariat) with a series of amendments, all of which appeared to have been put forward by Molyneaux and Paisley. Strand one talks would take place in London, although later stages of the talks could take place elsewhere. Second, the number of people on each party's negotiating team would be reduced from ten to three. Third, the talks would take place during a gap between meetings of the Intergovernmental Conference, commencing on 20 January 1991 and continuing until the British general election campaign, whenever that took place. However, Molyneaux and Paisley would guarantee to continue the talks if and only if a Conservative government was returned to power in the forthcoming Westminster election. There were also rumours that Paisley was insisting that Sir Ninian Stephen be dropped as the prospective chair of the second strand of talks. The first amendment in principle was acceptable to the Irish government and the SDLP, provided it did not mean the exclusion of the APNI, and provided the north-south talks would not take place in London.14 The second amendment was capable of resolution, neither the number ten nor three had any sacred status with the respective parties. The third amendment, that talks should continue until the next British general election, was apparently acceptable to a sceptical Irish government and the SDLP, even though it might conceivably mean that the 'gap' between IGCs could be even shorter than the ten weeks agreed the last time. However, the idea that the continuation of the talks should be made conditional upon the re-election of a Conservative government was completely unacceptable to the SDLP and the Irish government

Epilogue: the Brooke initiative and after 319 (which would then have been interfering in the British electoral process). Kevin McNamara, Labour's shadow Secretary of State publicly indicated to Brooke that a new Labour government would be happy to pick up any talks where they were left by an outgoing Conservative government, and the SDLP insisted that any new agreement to hold talks would have to be on the basis that they would continue irrespective of who formed the next government at Westminster. The SDLP, Labour's sister-party in the Socialist International, did not look kindly on a proposal to exclude a prospective Labour government, which favoured Irish unity by consent, from the terms of a new set of talks. Brooke therefore had some diplomatic finessing to do if there was to be a further round of talks before the general election. He also had to allay the suspicion that he was keeping the unionists sweet in order for the Conservative party to have at least one party it could do business with in the event of a hung parliament in Westminster, which was then being predicted by nearly all public opinion polls. However, Brooke had lost his diplomatic touch. On 17 January the IRA killed 8 Protestant workers at Teebane Cross, on the grounds that they were collaborators with the security forces. On the following night Brooke was seen singing a song live on Irish television in Dublin, which prompted calls for his resignation. Brooke did offer to resign, and although Major promptly rejected the offer, his political position had been decisively weakened. Just when the prospects for a renewal of talks looked extremely bleak the Irish Prime Minister, Charles Haughey, whose government had been dogged by scandal, resigned. He was replaced by Albert Reynolds on 6 February. Reynolds had the decisive advantage of not being Haughey, i.e. of not having a reputation as a hard-line republican, and promptly declared his willingness to meet unionist politicians, anywhere, at any time. He also replaced Collins as Irish foreign minister with David Andrews, who also declared that everything would be on the table in any new cross-party and intergovernmental talks. Under prompting from various Irish nationalists, north and south, both Reynolds and Andrews subsequently amplified their position to argue that the Government of Ireland Act of 1920, along with Articles 2 and 3 of the Irish constitution, must be on the agenda for discussion,15 which was not well received by unionists. However, the impetus for talks had been restored by a fresh-faced

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Irish government. By 28 February agreement had been reached by the two governments that talks to create a new British-Irish Agreement should resume after the IGC planned for 6 March. At that meeting it was decided not to reconvene the IGC until after the British general election, but to allow for the relaunch of the talks, under the terms originally agreed by Brooke with the relevant parties in March 1991, saving only that this time there would be a three-month 'gap' between meetings of the IGC. One entire year had passed to achieve an agreement to start talks again on almost exactly the same basis as had been agreed before. By coincidence the talks would eventually restart on 30 April 1992, again exactly one year after their last ill-fated start.

The Westminster election of April 1992 and its aftermath During the Westminster general election campaign there was much speculation about what role Northern Ireland's MPs might play in the event of a hung parliament. It was clear, especially from Brooke's conduct, that the Conservatives were prepared to enter into arrangements with the UUP's MPs, and that the SDLP would take the Labour whip. Nevertheless all three British party leaders declared during the campaign that the Anglo-Irish Agreement, an international and bilateral treaty, could not be negotiated away in the event of a hung parliament. In any case the speculation proved idle as, against expectations, the Conservatives were returned to office, albeit with a much reduced majority, on 9 April 1992. However, the outcome of the election in Northern Ireland was beneficial for the voices of moderation in both communities (see Table 9.1). Within the nationalist bloc the SDLP recorded its highest ever share of the vote in a Westminster election, 23.5 per cent, while Sinn Fein fell back to 10 per cent, and Gerry Adams lost his West Belfast seat to the SDLP's Dr Joe Hendron.16 Within the unionist bloc the UUP's share of the vote fell to 34.5 per cent, and the DUP's rose only very slightly to 13.1 per cent, despite the fact that the party was running more candidates than in 1987. 17 The election delivered a stable British government, and had shown the long-term party-political benefits of the AIA. The SDLP had continued to gain at the expense of Sinn Fein, and unionist 'ultras' lacked electoral momentum. The election had also come after a

321

Epilogue: the Brooke initiative and after Table 9.1 Party performances in Westminster elections, 1983-92 (votes in per cent, seats in absolute numbers) Party/bloc performance unionist bloc UUP DUP nationalist bloc SDLP SF non-ethnic APNI WP Conservatives

1983 votes seats 54 14 34 11 20 3 2 31.3 17.9 1 13.4 1

1987 votes seats 12 49.5 37.8 9 11.7 3 4 32.5 21.1 3 11.4 1

8 1.9

0 0

10 2.6

0 0

-

-

-

-

1992 votes seats 12 47.6 9 34.5 3 13.1 4 33.5 4 23.5 0 10 8.7 0.6 5.7

0 0 0

net \Sain, 83--92 votes seats -6.4 -2 -2 0.5 0 -6.9 2 2.3 3 5.6 -3.4 - 1 0.7 -1.3 5.7

0 0 0

Notes: (i)

To include the Conservatives within the unionist bloc or to define them as non-ethnic is a matter of taste. Their support is overwhelmingly Protestant, (ii) We do not treat the non-ethnic parties as a bloc, (iii) Support for the unionist bloc is underestimated as one seat has been held by James Kilfededder of the Ulster Popular Unionist Party, (iv) Since 1983 the Westminster constituencies boundaries have remained the same.

major transition in Irish politics, which in fifteen months had seen the election of a new Irish prime minister and of a new Irish president, Mary Robinson, not associated with traditional irredentism. If British-Irish-Northern Irish talks were ever to succeed in delivering widespread agreement then the Spring of 1992 seemed an auspicious time An IRA bomb which exploded in the City of London the day after the British election, leaving three people dead, reminded all optimists of the scale of the task facing peacemakers. Major had appointed Sir Patrick Mayhew to replace Brooke as the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland,18 and by 30 April 1992 talks were scheduled to restart at Stormont Castle, on the understanding that the IGC would be suspended for three months (long enough for unionists to have time to negotiate, and short enough to prevent the Anglo-Irish Agreement being damaged by filibustering). As the parties prepared for serious discussions in the first week of May it

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remained to be seen whether the talks would prove more productive than their predecessors'.

What if? Let us imagine, for the sake of argument, and superseding all precedents, that there could be a provisional agreement about a devolved power-sharing internal settlement during strand one of the new round of talks (or subsequent talks), and that the parties could shuffle towards Dublin or between Dublin and Belfast to develop strands two and three. What might happen then? The fault-lines are predictable. Unionists (in return for whatever concessions they are prepared to consider on the constitution of a devolved government, the administration of justice, and fair employment) will want the teeth of Articles 2 and 3 of the Irish constitution to be drawn. Indeed at several stages during 1990-2 they declared they would enter talks only if the Irish government made a public commitment to alter Articles 2 and 3. However, it is not apparent whether Unionists are content to have Articles 2 and 3 minimally altered (so that they are compatible both in letter and spirit with the Anglo-Irish Agreement), or whether they hold the maximalist position of agreeing to settle only if Articles 2 and 3 are deleted from the Irish Constitution, and the aspiration to Irish unity left without any constitutional expression in Bunreacht na hEireann. Since the Irish government (unlike the British government) cannot alter its Constitution simply with a bare parliamentary majority, changing Articles 2 and 3 requires the DUP and the UUP to give Irish nationalists something which could be sold by both the Irish government and the SDLP in the referendum which would have to be held to endorse the settlement. The minimum price the UUP and the DUP would have to pay the Irish government and the SDLP would be two Irish dimensions. Unionists might be prepared to concede the first: a constitutional provision for Northern Ireland, like that in the AngloIrish Agreement, which permits Irish unity at some future juncture if a majority in the region were to vote for it in a referendum, or if a devolved government were to agree to negotiate Irish unity. But the second and more important Irish dimension would stick in their throats: a constitutionally entrenched Intergovernmental Conference

Epilogue: the Brooke initiative and after

323

with a policy-advisory and possibly policy-making role in Northern Ireland. The IGC could consist of the Great British, Irish, and the (devolved) Northern Irish governments; of the Northern Irish and Irish governments; or, of the Irish and Great British governments, as at present. The agenda of the IGC could be security, economic development and EC co-operation, and other matters of high politics, but whatever its intergovernmental character and agenda one of the governments involved would have to be that of the Republic of Ireland. The SDLP and the Fianna Fail/Progressive Democrats government have to be offered something as good as, if not better, than the Anglo-Irish Agreement in return for modifying/terminating Articles 2 and 3. In the Spring of 1992 no leading Unionists appear to want to make such an offer, but even if some of them do it is doubtful whether their inter-party and intra-party strains could survive such a bargaining posture. Unionist supporters will say they have not come all this way to sign up to something they disagree with. Let us star-gaze one light-year further. Imagine that strands one and two have brought into public view the outlines of a feasible agreed settlement - a power-sharing devolved government, transformation of Articles 2 and 3 into aspirational articles, and two Irish dimensions, one being an Intergovernmental Conference which includes the Irish government, and the other being a mechanism to permit Irish unity by consent. What would then remain to be done, apart from putting the package to the peoples of Ireland in two referenda, and hoping thereby to delegitimize paramilitary violence through an all-Ireland vote which would show that Sinn Fein and the IRA and loyalist paramilitaries are completely isolated? The answer is that the relations between Great Britain and Ireland would remain to be 'sorted out' in strand three. What would be at stake? Apart from the possible issue of Irish re-entry into the British Commonwealth we cannot think of anything likely to cause a major hiatus in this strand. Standing back from this optimistic scenario questions must arise. If the two governments could outline the parameters of what they would regard as a reasonable settlement - like that outlined above - would it not be much easier to see whether or not Northern Ireland's parties could agree to them? Why are they going through the process of taking people over hurdles they show no particular enthusiasm to jump in order to bring them to consider the elements of a settlement broadly agreeable to the British and Irish governments?

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Are not the external governments (the exogenous actors) once more leaving the (endogenous) parties in Northern Ireland to show the world that they cannot agree, by leaving them the widest possible agendas to consider ? One response to this line of criticism might be that if the British and Irish governments frame the basis for an agreed settlement then Unionists will not be prepared to sign it. We would reply that, as with the Anglo-Irish Agreement, it would be a matter of time before Unionists came to negotiate its terms. This assessment is consistent with our case for the construction of a system of joint authority which maximizes the self-government of the peoples of Northern Ireland, a solution which grapples with both the exogenous and endogenous sources of conflict and instability.

Conclusion The experience of voluntary consociational initiatives in Northern Ireland is so far consistent in its message. From Whitelaw in 1972 to Brooke during 1991-2 they have not worked. The collapse of talks in July 1991 portended a renewal of deadlock, and though the talks have subsequently been resuscitated there is no cause for undue optimism. Failures in constitutional politics have encouraged the two sets of paramilitaries to renew their campaigns. Loyalist paramilitaries, reinvigorated by a purge of their more corrupt leaders, and of police-informants within their ranks, have been killing Catholics on a scale not seen since 1976, and successfully targeting republican activists in a way which suggests informed access to supposedly confidential security sources. They are motivated by frustration that Unionist politicians have failed to negotiate the Anglo-Irish Agreement away, and by the fear that the British government's decision to merge the UDR with the Royal Irish Rangers to create the Royal Irish Regiment might be the first step in 'disarming Protestants'. 19 Republican paramilitaries are also displaying a new recklessness: seasoned observers speak of a 'third generation' taking the place of their predecessors. The 'ballot box' component of the 'armalite and ballot box' strategy is blocked. Sinn Fein almost certainly cannot grow much in the foreseeable future, and may be beginning a permanent decline,

Epilogue: the Brooke initiative and after 325 but if so the IRA may increasingly act in a purely militaristic fashion. There are always stirrings in the undergrowth to which one can point if one wishes to be optimistic about Northern Ireland: such as renewed peace marches, vigorous north-south exchanges, a developing civil society of non-aligned people, the prompting of voluntary, academic, and media organizations, and, not least, sheer exhaustion with the present conflict. However, we believe that there are also reasons for supposing that ethnic antagonisms are presently being reforged rather than resolved. The widespread despair that the cruel conflict will continue, apparently with no end in sight, has solid empirical foundations. Two centuries after the United Irishmen promised to 'abolish the memory of all past dissension', the statecraft required to break the manacles of the past has not yet materialised.20 Notes 1. In August 1989 when Brooke invoked a non-existent phrase in Article 29 of the Review of the Intergovernmental Conference to suggest the possibility that the two governments had agreed that the AIA could be transcended he was interpreted as either shrewd or stupid; and in November 1989 when he declared that he could 'never' say that he or his successors would 'never' talk with Sinn Fein his comments gave rise to similarly polarised interpretations. 2. Non-attributable interview with B. O'Leary in Derry/Londonderry, August 1990. 3. Unionists wanted the secretariat suspended. Instead, it was agreed that it would not service the Intergovernmental Conference when the Conference was suspended (a negotiating victory for the Irish government). 4. The Irish government understandably was not prepared to discuss altering Articles 2 and 3 of its constitution under the chairmanship of a British minister. 5. They had ample evidence of unsympathetic statements by Carrington about Unionist leaders, especially Paisley. The NIO were apparently not aware of the reaction that proposing Carrington would have on unionist politicians. The Unionists' complaint that Carrington had 'sold out' Rhodesia was not publicly analysed even though it suggested that Unionists empathized with a 'settler minority' 'betrayed' by the British metropolis. 6. From The SDLP Analysis of the Nature of the Problem', written in May 1991, and submitted to the plenary session of the talks. 7. Otherwise the DUP and the UUP could choose to break over the Irish dimension or the SDLP could choose to break over power-sharing (i.e. over

326 The Politics of Antagonism issues where they could expect to receive a sympathetic hearing in Great Britain or the Republic). 8. It was leaked to former UUP politician Frank Millar, now the London editor of the Irish Times (Irish Times, 3 July 1991). 9. Interview with Irish public official, London, July 1991. 10. Guardian, 13 July 1991. 11. The JRRT/Gallup polls showed that unionist politicians were held most responsible for the breakdown of talks in Great Britain, the Republic, and in Northern Ireland (O'Leary, 1992). 12. The most memorable criticism maintained that the UUP leadership was 'as set in its views as a mammoth preserved in Siberian ice' (Irish Independent, 29 Oct. 1991). 13. A MORI poll for the Channel 4 documentary Pack up Your Troubles found that 61 per cent of respondents in Great Britain favoured the withdrawal of British troops (24 October 1991) and in November 1991 the British Social Attitudes survey found that 60 per cent of respondents favoured their withdrawal, and 56 per cent favoured Irish unification, very marginally higher support (+1 per cent) for these policies than had been recorded the previous year (Gallagher, 1991: 61). 14. The UUP and DUP were determined to sideline the APNI as an unwelcome distraction, who made them appear unreasonable to the world's media, which is why Molyneaux proposed in the Autumn of 1991 that Northern Ireland's MPs (who included no APNI representatives) should have discussions at Westminster on relatively low-level issues, an idea rejected by the SDLP. 15. Their argument was echoed by the SDLP's Dennis Haughey (no relation of Charles) who argued that the British as well as the Irish constitution had to be on the table in any discussion of the future of Ireland. 16. Sinn Fein's total vote held steady in West Belfast. Hendron's victory owed something to higher turn-out and the collapse of the Workers' Party, but it also owed something to unprecedented tactical voting by a couple of thousand working-class Protestants in West Belfast, who voted for a moderate nationalist to defeat the ultra-nationalist. 17. The squeeze on the unionist bloc was partly caused by Conservative candidates taking 5.7 per cent of the regional vote (although they also undoubtedly won Protestant voters from the APNI). 18. The same man had, as Attorney General, caused grave offence to the Irish government and Irish nationalists. See Ch. 7: 247. 19. See however Ch. 8: 311, n. 25. 20. In Explaining Northern Ireland: Broken Images we examine in greater depth what we believe such statecraft requires, building upon the arguments advanced here (McGarry and O'Leary, forthcoming).

10 Postscript: A tract of time between war and peace WARRE, consisteth not in Battell onely, or the act of fighting; but in a tract of time, wherein the Will to contend by Battel is sufficiently known: and therefore the notion of time is to be considered in the nature of Warre; as it is in the nature of Weather. For as the nature of Foule weather, lieth not in a showre or two of rain; but in an inclination thereto of many dayes together: so the nature of war, consisteth not in the actual fighting; but in the known disposition thereto, during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary. All other time is PEACE. (Thomas Hobbes.1) We seek to avoid as far as possible symbolic overtones of surrender, or of a one-sided admission of guilt. In this context, no less than others in Northern Ireland, the concepts of victory and defeat will never offer a solution. To make the decomissioning of weapons a precondition for entry into negotiations - as opposed to an important goal to be realised in that process - ignores the psychology and motivation of those on both sides in Ireland who have resorted to violence, and the lessons of conflict resolution elsewhere. . . . If we multiply preconditions we are in danger of saying in effect that negotiations can take place only when the problems they are supposed to address have already largely been solved. (Dick Spring, Deputy Irish Prime Minister, 1995.2) Cease-fires, frameworks and reactions The three-stranded talks reviewed in the last chapter continued until November 1992, before collapsing over the Strand Two,

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North-South negotiations. The Unionist parties had insisted that the Republic's government propose to its public the amendment of articles 2 and 3 of the Irish constitution as evidence of its good faith, and before any progress could be made on defining a new North-South relationship. This position was unacceptable to Irish nationalists who were prepared to propose an amendment to the constitution only as part of an overall settlement which addressed all three relationships: North-North, North-South and East-West. The negotiations also stalled over the unionist refusal to accept the view of the SDLP, and the Republic's government, that a settlement required a North-South institution (or institutions) with extensive executive responsibilities. The two governments therefore put the talks into cold storage, though they promised to put their heads together, and to return to the parties at some unspecified time with 'framework' documents over which negotiations might resume. These talks had not resumed when this revised chapter went to press (early 1996), but the political scene looks dramatically different than it did over three years ago, when we concluded on a sombre note. The reason is simple. On 31 August 1994, the Provisional IRA unilaterally implemented a complete cessation of its military operations. Six weeks later, on 13 October 1994, a reciprocal cessation of violence was announced by the Combined Loyalist Military Command acting on behalf of the UVF and the UDA. Its cessation was dependent upon the continuation of the IRA's. The respective cease-fires were fronted by each side's political parties: Sinn Fein on behalf of the IRA, and the much smaller and obscure Ulster Democratic Party (the UDP) on behalf of the UDA, and the Progressive Unionist Party (the PUP) on behalf of the UVF. Despite initial doubts about the commitment of the paramilitaries to peace, particularly about the IRA's, especially on the part of British and unionist politicians, the cease-fires have held, and Northern Ireland has experienced its first year of relative tranquillity for a quarter of a century. In February of 1995, the British and Irish governments finally released a 'Joint Framework Document', addressing cross-border and East-West relationships, while the British government simultaneously issued a document containing proposals for the internal government of Northern Ireland. These texts set out the two governments' agenda for a comprehensive political settlement. Though procedurally flowing from the suspended inter-party and

Postscript 329 inter-governmental talks, the documents were designed to consolidate the peace process, and to use the opportunity presented to forge a new political accord, to provide 'substance' to the 'process'. This postscript was written during a hiatus, when watching the peace process resembled watching a glacier move. It focuses first on the reasons for the cease-fires and the events surrounding them, then analyses the Framework documents, and the reactions to them, before concluding on a necessarily speculative note.3 How the guns were silenced The roots of the paramilitary cease-fires lay in four immediate sources. The first emerged from political and military evolutions within the two sets of paramilitaries. The republican evolution was most significant. After the Anglo-Irish Agreement Sinn Fein and the IRA were forced to take stock. Sinn Fein's growth as an electoral force, North and South, had been thwarted. Militant republicanism was not winning, politically or militarily, but it was not beaten. Adams had lost his Westminster seat in West Belfast to the SDLP's Joe Hendron in the general election of 1992,4 and Sinn Fein's prospects of surpassing the SDLP as the dominant northern nationalist party looked remote as long as it remained the party of war. The Republic, its establishment and citizenry, was hostile to the long war, and Sinn Fein was performing abysmally in elections there.5 Its participation in electoral politics had, however, obliged it to develop greater political sophistication. From the mid-1980s republicans started to reconsider their explanations of the conflict, and the place of Protestants in a new Ireland. More sensitive political language crept into their public documents - as evidenced in Towards a Lasting Peace in Ireland (1992) and its predecessor Scenario for Peace (1987). Loyalist political reconstruction was much less publicly evident, though spokespersons from the UDA and the UVF consistently insisted that their violence was merely reactive to republican violence, and would terminate if, and only if, the IRA and other republicans halted their campaigns without having achieved their war-aims.6 The second facilitating set of developments lay in unofficial diplomacy. The 'second track' diplomatic activities of John Hume,

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and third parties, including an Irish-American peace delegation, eventually bore fruit. Since 1988 Hume had taken the politically risky decision to hold a series of meetings with Gerry Adams. These meetings were promoted by intermediaries within the nationalist community. In their exchanges, Hume sought to persuade Adams of the merits of constitutional nationalism and of the flaws in republican analysis, particularly the view that the British government was the crucial obstacle to Irish unification. Hume had consistently argued that Republican violence had killed more Irish people than had the security forces, and that the IRA was responsible for the British military presence.7 His views on these matters may not have shifted the thinking of the grass-roots in Sinn Fein, but its leaders came to believe in a new departure: an opening to constitutional politics to create a broad alliance of Irish nationalists, in Ireland and the USA, that would produce better prospects than continuing the long war. By September of 1993, Adams and Hume announced that they had reached an agreement, which they refused to publish. The contents were, however, relayed to the Irish and British governments. In the same month, a US delegation, with close links to President Bill Clinton, and led by the former congressman Bruce Morrison, visited Northern Ireland, and subsequently briefed the White House. 8 In the face of loud opposition from the British government, Clinton subsequently extended a visa to Adams to allow him to visit the United States in February 1994. The British complained of a propaganda concession to terrorists, but the potential emergence of a broad constitutional nationalist front, running from Sinn Fein to Irish America, helped persuade the republican leadership, and helped them persuade their followers, that a switch to a purely political strategy, 'unarmed struggle', could pay dividends - albeit uncertain ones. The key role of America, governmental and organised Irish America, was to tell the republicans that a democratic, negotiated end to the long war would break the stalemate, and that while it would not guarantee a united Ireland it would bring Sinn Fein in from the cold, and help reconstruct Northern Ireland.9 The third significant development, about which much less is publicly known, was clandestine negotiations between the British government and the IRA. Despite denials by the British government that it would ever talk to terrorists, and John Major's comment that it would turn his stomach to talk to Adams, negotiations or 'communications', as the British government preferred to call them,

Postscript

331

occurred between British representatives and Martin McGuinness of Sinn Fein between October 1990 and the winter of 1993. These private dialogues fed into policy. Publicly, the British government sought to encourage the republicans' re-evaluation of their position. In a major speech in 1990 Secretary of State Peter Brooke directly addressed republican explanations of the conflict. He argued that the British identity of Ulster unionists, rather than the British state, was the major obstacle to a united Ireland. Brooke reasoned that there were four distinct aspects to the 'British presence': the British army; the Northern Ireland Office; the British subvention; and its 'heart and core', 'nearly a million people . . . who are, and who certainly regard themselves as British'. The Army was present to stop violence; the Northern Ireland Office was willing to have its authority replaced by an agreed developed assembly; the UK subvention was not dictated by some selfish strategic or economic interest; and it was the 'Britishness' of unionists which was ignored by Sinn Fein. Brooke insisted that the British state was not opposed to Irish unity in principle: 'it is not the aspiration to a sovereign, united Ireland, against which we set our face, but its violent expression'. These sentiments were repeated by Brooke's successor Sir Patrick Mayhew, and were subsequently incorporated in the Joint Declaration for Peace made at Downing Street in December 1993, intended to encourage a republican termination of violence. While republicans could still reasonably doubt the neutrality of the British state (or the Conservative party), it had became increasingly difficult for them to hold that the British state was the central obstacle to Irish unification. This changing British public language strengthened the hands of Hume and of revisionists within Sinn Fein. The fourth root of the peace process was more long-term, and its establishment has been covered in chapters 6 and 7. The co-operative diplomacy of the British and Irish governments in and outside the Inter-governmental Conference established by the Anglo-Irish Agreement, combined with regular inter-primeministerial meetings, created a milieu in which the two governments were able, eventually, to co-ordinate their responses to events, and to nudge their respective co-nationals in co-operative directions. The survival of the Agreement mattered, not least because it closed off extremist options: on the one hand, the prospect of a united Ireland achieved without majority consent in Northern Ireland, and on the other hand

332 The Politics of Antagonism the denial of either integrationism or majority-rule devolution for unionists. The peace process may also have been helped by the replacements of the 'Iron Lady' Margaret Thatcher and the 'Boss' Charles Haughey by their more flexible and more pliable finance ministers, John Major and Albert Reynolds during 1990-1. Major and Reynolds had dealt with each other frequently before their respective promotions, trusted one another, and were interested in striking effective deals. The unfolding peace processes in South Africa and the Middle East, despite their numerous differences with the Irish case, may also have had a demonstrative effect: they enabled republicans to see their prospective cessation of violence as part of a global trend one which had seen the ANC and subsequently the PLO engage in peaceful negotiations with their antagonists. The Northern Irish peace process was 'a nice surprise', like those in South Africa and Palestine.10 Initially, the potential thaw in the republican position had not been visible. The same was true of the loyalist camp. The early 1990s had, as we have seen in Chapter 9, produced a revival of loyalist paramilitarism, prompted by the unionist reaction to the Anglo-Irish Agreement, and by the clearing out of informers from their ranks. The collapse of inter-party talks sponsored by the two governments in 1991-2 had obscured the sounds of cracking ice. Indeed the IRA renewed extensive urban bombing in Northern Ireland and in Great Britain - wreaking significant destruction in the City of London - while loyalists increased their attacks on real and alleged republicans. In October 1993, the IRA attempted to kill the leadership of loyalist paramilitaries by planting a bomb at a fish shop in the Shankill road near where they were supposed to meet. Ten Protestant civilians, and the IRA bomber, but no loyalist paramilitaries, were killed. Loyalists responded by killing thirteen Catholics within a short period, including six in the 'trick or treat' massacre in a bar at Greysteel, County Londonderry. Hume now looked ill and exhausted, and appeared to have got nowhere by making overtures to Adams to bring republicans in from the cold. In this discouraging atmosphere the Irish Taoiseach, with an able team of civil servants, supported by a wave of nationalist public opinion, North and South, won over John Major to making a joint declaration for peace that would incorporate a commitment to Irish national self-determination, and guarantee Sinn Fein a place at the negotiating table after its abandonment of violence. The upshot was the Joint

Postscript 333 Declaration for Peace, which became known as the Downing Street Declaration of December 15 1993. The Declaration was a carefully worded document that offered something to both nationalists and unionists.11 To Irish nationalists Major reiterated Brooke's statement that the British government had no 'selfish strategic or economic interest in Northern Ireland'. He affirmed the right of the 'people of Ireland alone' to exercise their right of self-determination to bring about a united Ireland, if that was their wish, but 'on the basis of consent, freely and concurrently given, North and South'. Major described the 'primary interest' of the British government as 'peace, stability and reconciliation' achieved by agreement among all 'the people of Ireland', and added that the role of his government would be to 'encourage, facilitate and enable' the achievement of such an agreement. In a passage particularly addressed to Sinn Fein, both governments stated that in the event of a 'permanent end to the use of or support for, paramilitary violence' that 'democratically mandated parties which establish a commitment to exclusively peaceful methods and which have shown that they abide by the democratic process' would be able to participate fully in political negotiations. The Taoiseach, for his part, had been in touch, through intermediaries, with the concerns of loyalist paramilitary organisations as he drafted the Declaration, and in his sections of the jointly agreed text sought to allay some of their concerns. He departed from traditional republican language by stating that a united Ireland achieved without consent would be no better than Northern Ireland is now, that is a political system rejected by a significant minority. He promised to seek to remove any part of the Republic's public life that could be represented as a threat to the unionist way of life. The Taoiseach reiterated the Irish government's political commitment that a united Ireland could be achieved only with the agreement of a 'majority of the people of Northern Ireland', and promised that, as part of an overall settlement, his government would put forward and support proposals to entrench this commitment in the Irish constitution. The British prime minister subsequently assured unionists that any negotiated settlement would be put to the population of Northern Ireland in a referendum. The Irish government followed the publication of the Declaration by lifting its 'Section 31' broadcasting ban on Sinn Fein. The latter initiated 'peace commissions' to consider the Declaration at the end

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of January 1994; and the US administration, after extensive lobbying by influential Irish-Americans, and with the goodwill of the Irish government, extended a visa to Adams to address a conference in New York. In April, Secretary of State Mayhew said that a republican termination of violence would not be judged a surrender, and in May the British government responded to a Sinn Fein request for 'clarification' of the Declaration with what Ian Paisley described as a 'twenty-one page love letter to Gerry Adams'. In June the Irish prime minister reciprocated by clarifying the Declaration for the UDP, but in July, when Sinn Fein rejected the Declaration at a special conference in Letterkenny, renewed gloom was widespread. The republicans intended to indicate that they did not accept the Declaration, but that it was something that could be worked on and lived with; but this subtlety was not immediately apparent. At the end of August, after another visit from the Irish-American peace delegation, and another meeting between Hume and Adams, the IRA made its announcement, opening an historic opportunity for peace.

From the cease-fires to the frameworks While the republican cease-fire was unconditional and open-ended, i.e. with no time limit, much of the British commentary which followed it focused on the absence of the word 'permanent'. This was much more of a concern for the British than the Irish government. Although Gerry Adams and Martin McGuinness, widely rumoured to be the man upon whom the IRA Army Council most relied, described the Taoiseach's interpretation of the cease-fire as permanent as 'correct', the DUP warned that it was a ruse. Nonetheless, small but significant transformations in the British military presence and the operations of the RUC followed. British troops stopped patrolling by day, then by night, and significant numbers of troops were withdrawn to Britain. The RUC began to take on the appearance of a civilian rather than a paramilitary police force, patrolling in ordinary police vehicles rather than in armoured cars, and its members shed their bullet-proof flak jackets. In September, the British government lifted its ineffective broadcasting ban on Sinn Fein and announced the opening of border roads which had been sealed for years by the military. Meanwhile the Irish Justice minister, Maire Geoghegan-Quinn, announced she

Postscript 335 was considering the early release of some republican prisoners held in Irish jails. Having received reassurances that neither the British or Irish governments had agreed a secret deal to terminate the Union, the loyalist paramilitaries eventually announced their own cease-fire, six weeks after the republicans. The peace process experienced a couple of hiccups in its early months. On 10 November a postal worker was shot dead by IRA personnel during an armed robbery in Newry, an action which persuaded the Republic's Justice minister to suspend her plans. The IRA admitted responsibility, but claimed the action had not been sanctioned by its Army Council, and leading Sinn Fein figures condemned the killing. Reassurances that republicans were committed to the cease-fire eventually satisfied both governments. Then, in mid November 1994, the Irish prime minister who had played a large role in initiating the peace process, Albert Reynolds, was forced to resign for misleading Dail Eireann in a complex affair involving his choice of a candidate for Attorney General, and the latter's role in an extradition case involving a paedophile Catholic priest. The coalition government of Fianna Fail and Labour broke up in acrimony and a month ensued before the formation of a new three-party government composed of Fine Gael, Labour and Democratic Left. This crisis endangered the peace process because the Fine Gael leader, John Bruton, had previously displayed little sympathy for republicans or northern nationalists, while both Sinn Fein and the SDLP had been happy with the role played by Reynolds, a tough negotiator with the British government. Nonetheless, since elected Taoiseach on 15 December, Bruton has made clear his determination to continue the work of his predecessor, and spokespersons from Sinn Fein, after wavering, indicated their willingness to work with the new government. The crisis in Dublin delayed the planned release of the Framework package for discussion and negotiation by political parties in Northern Ireland, but it compelled the British government to sustain the momentum. The package was released on 22 February 1995. What is framed in the framework documents? The Frameworks for the Future comprised two distinct but related documents, A Framework for Accountable Government in Northern Ireland, the responsibility of the British government, and A New

336 The Politics of Antagonism Framework for Agreement (or 'Joint Framework Document'), the joint responsibility of the British and Irish governments.12 The former document describes London's assessment of the internal settlement most likely to command support across the parties in Northern Ireland. It had its origins in the previously suspended constitutional inter-party and inter-governmental negotiations. The latter document presents the views of both governments on the relationships which should be established between Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic on the one hand, and between the Irish and British governments on the other. It also fleshes out the thinking of the two governments as expressed in the Joint Declaration for Peace of December 1993. Together, the documents show the extent to which both governments have learned to manage and analyse the conflict as nationally driven. They also offer the most imaginative texts yet produced by liberal democratic governments negotiating the future of a bi-ethnically disputed region, which is not to say that they are perfect pieces of engineering. The 'framework' documents have two immediate goals: to reinvigorate the stalled three strand talks; and second, to build peace by bringing republicans (and loyalists) into constitutional politics. 1) The internal frame: The 'North-North' dimension After the breakdown of the previous inter-party discussions in 1992, which had excluded Sinn Fein and the loyalist parties, the British Government had promised to put forward proposals which would address the 'internal' or 'North-North' aspects of the deadlock. During the negotiations the SDLP had sought a collective presidency which would have included three representatives from the British and Irish governments and the European Union respectively, as well as three elected representatives from Northern Ireland. The two major unionist parties, the UUP and the DUP, had, by contrast, opposed any external interference in the government of Northern Ireland (other than from Britain), but they were prepared to consider 'proportionality' in the working of any new devolved assembly though not full-blooded executive power-sharing. The British government's proposals split these differences. They call for a Northern Ireland Assembly, unicameral in nature, elected for a fixed four or five year term, presided over by a speaker, and consisting of about 90 members.13 The Assembly would make laws

Postscript 337 for Northern Ireland in respect of transferred matters. The exact scope of devolution is to be determined during negotiations, but the British government intends it to be of at least the same order as in 1973-4. A number of Assembly committees would be established, one for each Northern Ireland Department (which presently would mean at least six major committees). Their principal task would be to oversee the work of the Northern Ireland Departments. The proposals for the executive are complex and reflect difference-splitting. Two bodies are to be given recognisable executive authority and in each of them the authority is fragmented. First, legislative committees would be established to supervise the Northern Ireland Departments, with their chairs and deputy-chairs elected in proportion to party strengths in the Assembly. In a fusing of executive and legislative responsibilities, each committee chair would double as department head. This form of executive is close to the position of the UUP and DUP, and has also been accepted by the Alliance Party. In addition, however, there would be ('probably') a three person collective presidency, termed a 'Panel', which would be elected separately by proportional representation (presumably STV).14 This Panel is to have significant powers, including the right to nominate chairs to the Assembly for ratification, to veto legislation from the Assembly, and to refer legislation to the courts. The arrangements also, therefore, provide for a separation of powers - and attempt to create 'checks and balances' as in the American political system. The proposal for a Panel is, evidently, a watering down of the SDLP's original proposal for a joint-sovereignty presidency by the simple device of excluding any role for external representatives. These proposed executive arrangements differ significantly from those which existed under the Sunningdale Agreement of 1973-4. Then the executive was modelled to a significant extent on the Westminster parliament, i.e. it held power because it could command a vote of confidence in the legislature, and it was governed by the principle of collective responsibility. It differed from the Westminster model only in that its terms of reference required it to command support from both communities. In the new arrangements, the Assembly will not be able to bring down the separately elected Panel, a feature which should please the minority. Moreover, neither executive body will depend on the formal coalition arrangements that were a central feature of the Sunningdale model - which should satisfy the UUP and DUP.

338 The Politics of Antagonism The new proposals, like those in 1974, are, however, squarely consociational in nature.15 They exclude a return to the Stormont parliament in which exclusively majority rule prevailed. Their consociational nature is clear from three features: (a) provisions to encourage the functional equivalent of a grand coalition, (b) proportionality rules, and (c) multiple opportunities for minority vetoes. (a) The methods for electing the panel or collective presidency, and the executive Chairs and Deputy Chairs, are designed to secure a 'grand coalition', roughly proportionally representing the two main communities, but not requiring them to enter either an electoral or parliamentary pact. It is, so to speak, the formation of a grand coalition structure which does not require a coalition. The election of the Panel, in an at-large election using proportional representation (probably STV with candidates nominating their successors should they die or become incapacitated), will almost certainly result in the election of two unionists and one nationalist - as it does for the European Parliament. The Panel then is to draw up a list of nominations for the Committee Chairs/Department Heads and their deputies 'broadly reflecting proportional party strengths in the Assembly', and submit this list to the Assembly for ratification.16 How might this work? Assume ten committees/departments, and that party strengths after an election mean the following distribution of seats: Sinn Fein - 11, SDLP - 23, Alliance - 7, UUP- 31, DUP 15, Others - 3. Below we illustrate the impact of two mechanical rules applied to this outcome. They produce two very similar results. Thefirst,the d'Hondt rule, is used in the European Parliament, while the second, the Sainte-Lague rule, is usually fairer to small parties. The major difference under the second rule is that Sinn Fein and the Alliance party get better chairs, the 4th and 7th as opposed to the 6th and 10th choices respectively. In general, the second rule is best for the small parties, so the Alliance, Sinn Fein (and even the DUP) should prefer it to d'Hondt (which should be favoured by the larger parties). Either of these mechanical rules, however, provide a reasonable and workable carve-up. (b) The consociational principle of proportionality is recommended throughout the internal Framework proposals. Elections to the Assembly are to take place by a form of proportional representation, presumably STV, but perhaps a list system. Proportionality is also reflected in the provisions for electing the Panel, the Chairs

Postscript 339 Rule 1, D'Hondt: Committee chairs are allocated to the parties in the order of the number in brackets. The total number of chairs going to each party is in italics. nationalists divisors 1 2 3 Total

Sinn SDLP Fein 11 (6) 23 (2) 5.5 11.5 (5) 7.7 (8) 1 3

cross-national + ultras/fringe APNI Others 7

(10)

1

3

0

unionists UUP

DUP

31 (1) 15.5 (3) 10.3 (7) 3

15 (4) 7.5 (9) 2

Rule 2, Sainte-Lague: Committee chairs are allocated to the parties in the order of the number in brackets. The total number of chairs going to each party is in italics. nationalists divisors 1 3 5 Total

Sinn SDLP Fein 11 (4) 23 (2) 3.75 7.7 (6) 4.2 (10) 1 3

cross-national + ultras/fringe APNI Others 7 (7) 1.4 1

3

0

unionists UUP 31 (1) 10.3 (5) 6.2 (8) 3

DUP 15 5 3

(3) (9) 2

and Deputy Chairs, as well as the membership of the Committees. While these provisions ensure that both traditions will be represented in practice, they do nothing to entrench them by guaranteeing seats to any particular community or party - they operate according to self-determination, rather than pre-determination. They thus confront the (misguided) criticism of those liberals and unionists who see consociationalism as entrenching ethno-national divisions, and meet the goal of the British government 'to avoid any entrenchment of the main community division'. (c) Minority and mutual vetoes for the majority and minority communities are included through two devices: (i) decisions of the Panel are to be unanimous; and (ii) the Assembly is to operate in contentious areas by weighted majority. The blanket prescription of unanimity for the Panel seems unlikely to be something that will

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survive negotiations - a right of veto on specific grounds seems a more robust proposal. The document also calls, albeit rather weakly and unsatisfactorily, for the establishment of protection for 'specified civil, political, social and cultural rights' on a basis to be arrived at in consultation with the parties. To the extent that this proposal will result in justiciable collective and individual rights, it would provide for judicially-enforced vetoes on measures which infringed the rights of either community. The proposals do not deal with the fourth pillar of consociation community self-government or 'segmental autonomy'. This element of power-sharing already exists, at least in the primary, secondary and teacher-training educational systems - both the separate (Catholic) schools and public (effectively Protestant) schools have been fully funded by the British government since 1992. Future provisions to protect Irish language users, and their right to public education in the language of their choice would complete the consociationalisation of the political system. Impartiality and parity of esteem The British government is committed by virtue of the Joint Framework Document to 'rigorous impartiality' in its conduct and oversight of government in Northern Ireland, and to ensuring that there will be 'parity of esteem' between the two national traditions. To give weight to the former commitment the British government would have to adopt administrative and policy-formulation procedures which would require it to consider whether its decision-making is rigorously impartial. The explication and evolution of the latter notion, parity of esteem, is likely, however, to be where the most symbolic capital is invested. Parity of esteem, on a radical interpretation, which we would embrace, would mean full equality for the two national traditions and their full reflection in public institutions and display. This would mean, for instance, room for two national anthems or none on public occasions, and a role for two heads of state, the Queen and the Irish President, on ceremonial occasions, and for dualistic constitutional practices, or their replacement by a 'de-royalised' legal order. In a less radical version parity of esteem would mean nothing more than full freedom of expression for each national tradition. The litmus test on whether a radical or modest version of parity of esteem will prevail will be the police service. In this respect it is important that the RUC is not explicitly

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named in either Framework document, and that discussions about winning widespread identification with a police service are left for the Inter-Governmental Conference to determine. We may hope in the interests of making parity of esteem meaningful that the kibosh (Gaelic for 'the cap of death') has been put on the name of the RUC, the Royal Ulster Constabulary, a title which hardly reflects parity of esteem for two traditions. The biggest institutional hole in the proposed internal arrangements is that no measures are suggested for the judiciary, or the Northern Ireland Supreme Court. Negotiations and proposals are invited on a Bill of Rights, including individual and collective rights, but the British government declares that the protection of rights will be 'in accord with the constitutional arrangements of the United Kingdom'. That is hardly likely to satisfy northern nationalists, and perhaps suggests a fear within the British government that a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland might have a precedent-setting effect for Britain, as well as a fear that a Bill of Rights might outlaw or restrain the government's present emergency laws. The absence of clear provision for a legally enforceable Bill of Rights is all the more regrettable given the acceptance of this idea by all of Northern Ireland's political parties, and its endorsement by the government's own advisory agency, the Standing Advisory Commission on Human Rights. Northern nationalists and the Alliance Party are certain to propose something better here, including proposals for the democratic appointments to judicial positions in Northern Ireland, and the explicit entrenchment of rights. 17 2)

The externa/frames: North-South and East-West

dimensions

The consociational framework expressed in the British Government's internal proposals for Northern Ireland is similar to the arrangements which historically have been practised in countries such as the Netherlands, once divided between Catholics and Protestants, and, more recently, the provisional arrangements in South Africa, which has been and is severely divided along ethnic and racial lines. So, why are additional frameworks needed ? Answer: The two governments are aware that Northern Ireland, unlike the Netherlands or South Africa, is a nationally-divided society, i.e., divided between two national communities who want to be ruled by their respective nation-states. In Northern Ireland, a

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purely internal consociational arrangement would be inadequate. It would address the minority's desire to resist majority rule, but would do nothing to satisfy its nationalist aspirations for a united Ireland, or for institutional links between Northern Ireland and the Republic, or to remedy its complaint that the very existence of Northern Ireland as part of the UK is an injustice. As a partition of Northern Ireland between the two communities would be very difficult, and as the national aspirations of the majority community are already met by the existing link between Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the two governments have, sensibly, agreed that justice and stability require institutional arrangements which go beyond the boundaries of the United Kingdom to include the Republic of Ireland. It is the two governments' proposals for these 'external' arrangements which are the subject matter of 'A New Framework for Agreement', the 'Joint Framework Document'. This document also had its origins in the suspended 1991-2 talks, but by contrast was drawn up by both governments. The drafters of the text address North-South (all Ireland) and East-West (British-Irish or UK-Republic) relations. Their joint efforts produced a carefully drafted essay in statecraft. More eloquent and expansive in its arguments than the British document on internal arrangements, the second text delicately integrated two processes: the suspended three-strand talks and the peacemaking foreshadowed in the Joint Declaration for Peace. The nameless trinity of North-South A new North-South Institution (or institutions) is proposed, in which representatives of both the Dublin and Belfast governments would be required to sit as 'a duty of service'. The two governments deliberately avoided naming it 'A Council of Ireland', or anything else which might antagonise unionists. It is the nameless 'North-South Body'. It would operate by agreement between representatives from Northern Ireland and the Republic, and would have a range of functions bilaterally overseen by committee chairs in the North and Ministers from Dail Eireann. This body could discharge or oversee executive, harmonising or consultative functions that the two governments would initially delegate, but which could be supplemented by agreement between the North and the South. The two governments fall short of specifying exactly what functions they have in mind, but clearly they anticipate the delegation of European

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Union matters, especially those of a 'cross-border or island-wide' nature, and in the text they 'illustrate' virtually every conceivable aspect of public policy apart from foreign affairs and security. Within the functions devolved to Northern Ireland the British government declares that it has 'no limits' of its own to impose on the nature of the functions which could be delegated to a North-South body - which clearly leaves it open to unionists to propose in negotiations whatever limits they deem fit. The North-South body is, however, to be established and maintained by the two parliaments (Westminster and the Oireachtas), not by the Northern Ireland Assembly. So, what is the nature of the North-South body? It might be simultaneously three things, rather like the mystery of the Trinity: I. an embryonic Irish federal level of government with the capacity to grow in power and capability through agreement (as constitutional nationalists hope); II. a set of inter-governmental arrangements between sovereign states dedicated to rational cross-border co-operation (which many unionists can accept); and III. an embryonic Euro-federal level of government within and across the island (which Euro-federalists can embrace). As with the Trinity, the North-South body has the advantage that believers can choose which of the three aspects they most wish to worship, and the disadvantage that predictable disputes are likely to arise about which of the three aspects is, or should be, dominant. East-West The 'New Framework for Agreement' also envisages East-West political institutions. Under anew agreement, the standing Inter-Governmental Conference established by the Anglo-Irish Agreement will be maintained, though it will not discuss matters devolved to Northern Ireland - except where the continuing responsibilities of the Secretary of State are involved. The relevant passage (paras. 44-45) may be significant because judicial matters, which are not technically within the Secretary of State's brief, may not be open to the Inter-Governmental conference, though clearly all aspects of security will - at least until this function is devolved. The two governments, as with the existing Conference, will seek to arrive at a common position, but where that is not possible they will now establish an agreed procedure to resolve any differences between

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them. This passage (para.46) appears to indicate a British willingness to accept mediation and even arbitration when it is in dispute with the Irish government - and signals an important change from the status quo, though our sources suggest that the procedure is likely to be simply a standing committee of civil servants. The proposals also envisage greater input from Northern Irish politicians into the Inter-Governmental Conference. They would be given 'suitable' rights of attendance and consultation. These arrangements, along with local input into a Northern Ireland Assembly and Panel, and into North-South institutions, would undermine the argument that Northern Ireland is being governed as an internal colony, without local involvement in crucial political decisions. If the internal arrangements in Northern Ireland cease to operate, however, the two governments seek to provide a default mechanism, and it is this idea which has caused most unionist anxiety. The British government says it would implement the commitment 'to promote co-operation at all levels' across the island which it made in the Joint Declaration for Peace, and would ensure that any co-operation developed in the North-South body would be maintained. This section of the proposals has at least two meanings. The Governments may simply be proposing an agreed default mechanism which unionists are invited to accept or to negotiate away. It may, however, additionally spell a latent threat to unionists. The Joint Declaration for Peace, which preceded and facilitated the IRA's cessation of violence, committed the British government to develop North-South institutions come what may, and since that is so, unionists may be being told that they might as well start negotiating about these institutions in their own interests, or else face the prospect that some all-Ireland political architecture will be built which they cannot destroy. The Dublin and London governments also promise to take steps to ensure explicitly that the union between Britain and Northern Ireland, and any future union between the latter and the Irish Republic, is based on the principle of majority consent within Northern Ireland. The British promise to bring forward domestic constitutional legislation which would allow a Northern Ireland majority to decide if there should be a continuing United Kingdom or a united Ireland, and to amend or delete the Government of Ireland Act, especially Section 75. For its part, the Irish government reaffirms its commitment in the Joint Declaration to support an amendment to the Irish Constitution

Postscript 345 to make a united Ireland conditional on majority consent in Northern Ireland. Ambiguities, problematic silences and the hereafter The two documents are the most far-reaching and intelligent texts yet produced by the two governments, and one must be hopeful that they will lead to fruitful negotiations. However they fail to address adequately three important matters. First, the two texts are vague, and arguably inconsistent, in their commitments on rights, law and the judiciary. Given the failure of political checks and balances in past attempts at devolution in Northern Ireland, there seems to be no good reason why the institutions proposed in the Framework documents are not supplemented by a strong Bill of Rights which shifts some powers to the courts. In this way, effective third party intervention would be institutionalised. Given that effective protection of rights also requires confidence in the judiciary, it is also worrying that neither the internal northern institutions, nor the Inter-Governmental Conference, appear to have been given any formal capacity to consider judicial appointments, or even the workings of the judicial system. This will not do. Any significant reinvention of Northern Ireland requires explicit proposals on how rights are to be protected. It would also be an advantage if the same human and collective rights, and arguably the same final court or courts of appeal applied throughout Ireland (two potential European avenues already exist). In this way a fully operative model of double protection of both communities could be developed - in which nationalists would be protected within the United Kingdom and unionists would be protected within any future united Ireland. Second, apart from the ultimate prospect of referenda and constitutional legislation in the two sovereign parliaments, the two texts are silent about methods for agreeing the proposed agreement. What does the requirement for consensus mean? Does it require the agreement of every political party, including Sinn Fein and the DUP? If so, it would seem to impose an impossibly high threshold, akin to requiring that an Israeli-Palestinian settlement be accepted by Likud and Hamas, or that a South African constitution require the support of the Afrikaner far right and the Pan-Africanist Congress. The alternative to unanimity is to proceed on the basis of 'sufficient

346 The Politics of Antagonism agreement', as the South African constitutional negotiators did. In the Northern Ireland context, this would imply working for an agreement among the Alliance, the SDLP, and the UUP - or, better, between a majority of the minority, and a majority of the majority. Given that the absence of war may encourage a temporary re-solidification of the electoral blocs, as we suggest below, difficult times are ahead in deciding when sufficient agreement exists to risk a referendum on a partly but not unanimously agreed settlement. Lastly, and understandably, the texts are silent about what happens if no agreement is forthcoming. We can, however, make reasonable inferences. If there is no resumption of war there will also be no return to the status quo ante. What would emerge instead would be 'direct rule with green guidance': a British commitment to 'rigorous impartiality' and 'parity of esteem' in the conduct of public policy; renewed inter-governmental co-operation (including mediation and arbitration procedures to resolve differences between London and Dublin); and the incorporation of elected northern nationalists into all quangos, including North-South quangos. The two governments could proceed with some reforms suggested in the Framework documents, such as changes to the police force that would make it acceptable to the nationalist community, and reforms in the Republic that might make unionists less fearful of its nature. The British government should also move to terminate its emergency legislation, which is not necessary as long as the cease-fires continue - and which it can always resurrect if they break down. Direct rule with green guidance would continue until a new set of cross-community negotiations delivered a balanced constitutional settlement, or alternatively, until demographic and electoral changes delivered a united Ireland. Reactions and reactionaries When we went to press only the SDLP and the Alliance Party had committed themselves to negotiating within the terms of the Framework agreements. While the loyalist parties greeted the documents by urging dialogue, they were rejected outright by the two main unionist parties, the UUP and DUP, who, to register their disgust, voted against the government in a crucial Commons vote in early March 1995 - indeed on 10 March, the UUP announced that

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it had rejected the framework documents 'in their entirety'. James Molyneaux, who had long trumpeted his 'special relationship' with the British prime ministers, found that his leadership was fatally wounded by the British government's preparedness to go some way towards accommodating Irish nationalists. He resigned in September 1995 to be replaced by a hard-liner, David Trimble, who had figured prominently in Orange Order marches through nationalist residential areas during the summer of 1995. The election of Trimble in competition with the more moderate Ken Maginnis and the apparently more flexible John Taylor, was interpreted as a setback to the prospects for a new accommodation, but it is worth remembering that, as with Rabin and de Klerk, there is a famous tradition of erstwhile hard-liners delivering compromises, and Trimble has some of the skills and virtues of a lawyer. Trimble will not, however, lack hard-line critics. The DUP leader, Ian Paisley, felt vindicated by the Framework documents: the British government, in his view, is organising a surrender to the IRA. Both Unionist parties, predictably, have so far refused to participate in the Forum for Peace and Reconciliation established by the Republic's government after the republican cease-fire. On the nationalist side, Sinn Fein wants to negotiate, but with its own radical agenda, and not on the basis of the framework documents. One can hope, however, that both the DUP and Sinn Fein, may be willing to play the role of constitutional opponents of the new constitutional dispensation. The Northern Irish public has been muted and nuanced in its response. Optimists pointed to the fact that unprecedented numbers of the public have asked for and read the texts in detail, and to polls which showed overwhelming support for the Framework proposals 50,000 free copies of the Framework document were made available in Post Offices and by freephone, and were picked up within days. One poll, conducted for Channel Four in late February, found a 51-24 majority within Northern Ireland agreeing that the framework proposals were the basis for a lasting peace: 98 per cent of Catholics and 79 per cent of Protestants said their party should take part in talks based on the document.18 This enthusiasm, to the extent that it exists, has not yet put irresistible pressure on the politicians to compromise, and in a Westminster by-election held in North Down in June 1995, 75 per cent of votes cast were for unionist candidates opposed to the Framework documents. The constituency, however, had a strikingly low turn-out by local standards, 39 per cent, in a thoroughly unionist

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zone. Therefore the victory of the hard-line integrationist Robert McCartney as an independent should not be over-read as an index of unionist extremism. Nevertheless, there is both fluidity and uncertainty, and we do not assume that the respective national communities are more moderate than their politicians - though the latter appear to have an unprecedented opportunity to take risks without losing their positions. One consequence of recent political developments has been an apparent increase in cohesion within the two ethno-national blocs. Some shared thinking has been apparent for some time on the nationalist side. The Hume-Adams talks of 1988-1993, the IRA cease-fire of August 1994, and joint pressure on the British government to respond to these changes, have helped to reduce the distance between the SDLP and Sinn Fein, and between Sinn Fein and the Irish government. Indeed in January of 1995, Adams expressed his willingness to consider an electoral pact with the SDLP. According to one reviewer, the only significant difference between Adams's latest book, Free Ireland: Towards a Lasting Peace (1995) and his earlier The Politics of Irish Freedom, is the deletion of all sections critical of the SDLP from the latest version. 19 While nationalists were divided, unionists could afford their own divisions, and vice-versa. The development of a constitutional 'pan-nationalist constitutionalist front' may thus force a similar coalescence on the unionist side - and indeed both unionist parties have already formed a common front in their rejection of the Framework documents. Some believe that this incipient alliance has been strengthened by the election of Trimble who, during the summer of 1995, co-operated with Paisley in provoking Orange marchers (and mobs) to march through nationalist areas. The malign way of reading these developments is to assume that any electoral restructuring and reunification of the blocs will prevent successful conflict-regulation - as hard-liners will be able to prevent moderates from making compromises, and thereby repeat the recent past. There are, however, more benign readings, made possible by the absence of violence and the apparent willingness of republicans to settle for something less than their first preference, and the willingness of loyalists to see the nature of the Union as negotiable, though not the Union itself. On the one hand the re-unification of the blocs may be no more than temporary coalitions of convenience that will not outlast the construction of a

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constitutional grand bargain - after which conflicting (non-national) interests within each bloc will break them up, but within a working democratic order in which cross-national deals and bargains can be struck by the SDLP, Alliance, the UUP, or their successors. And on the other hand, it is conceivable that the stable re-unification of the blocs might just make possible an agreed and disciplined carve-up, in which the moderates within each camp bring their extremists into political office and respectability.

A process without an outcome The republican and loyalist cease-fires held when we went to press. They have survived despite several incidents which might have derailed them. On 3 July 1995, the Secretary of State, Sir Patrick Mayhew, released Private Lee Clegg, a paratrooper who had served just four years of a life sentence for the 1990 murder of a Catholic 'joyrider', Karen Reilly. The release was widely believed to be an orchestrated attempt to boost John Major's hopes of retaining the leadership of the Conservative party in an electoral contest to be held the following day. Clegg's release, and the failure of the British government to emulate the Republic's practice of early release of paramilitary prisoners created an impression of a double standard, and led to serious rioting in nationalist areas. Despite hijackings and burning of vehicles, however, there was no use of guns or explosives, and the cease-fire emerged intact. Moreover, several months later the British Government changed its legislation and started to release paramilitaries early and in greater numbers - and to contemplate the complete transfer of all paramilitary prisoners held in Britain to jails in Ireland. The marching season of July and August 1995 also produced several dangerous flashpoints. Nationalists rioted and protested as Orange bands were given permission to march through or near nationalist areas in Belfast and Deny/Londonderry. Loyalists rioted and protested because the RUC blocked some of their marches from going through nationalist areas, and because republicans marched in Belfast to mark the anniversary of the introduction of internment. Despite these occurrences, which look like being cultural fixtures in Northern Ireland's future, the paramilitary groups remained committed to the cease-fire. Indeed, paramilitaries and their political

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supporters urged restraint on rioting youths, and ensured that the rioting did not become worse. The durability of the cease-fires, in the face of these incidents, has led to growing optimism that the future will not resemble the immediate past. The withdrawal of British troops and the 'de-fortification' and 'demilitarisation' of Northern Ireland are slowly under way, though there is no agreement on how to reconstruct the policing of the region. The major wrinkle in the peace process as we went to press remains the fact that Sinn Fein has still not been accepted by the British government, or the main unionist parties, as a constitutional political party, and that they have refused to engage it in full negotiations. This has enabled hard-line republican critics to argue that the cease-fire has delivered nothing, not even a seat at the negotiating tables, and has led to some speculations (or threats) that an Irish National Republican Army (INRA) may be formed to resume the long war. The chief obstacle to including Sinn Fein, as far as the British government is concerned, is the IRA's unwillingness to decommission arms before Sinn Fein enters constitutional talks. In the Conservative view, such a decommissioning - or at least a partial decommissioning - is necessary to demonstrate that Sinn Fein is committed to constitutional politics. It is also needed, the Government believes, if unionists are to be persuaded to enter negotiations on the basis of the Framework documents. Sinn Fein's perspective, broadly shared by the SDLP, the Republic's government, the Clinton administration, and, ironically, the loyalist paramilitaries, is that the de-commissioning of arms should be discussed after constitutional negotiations not before, or at least 'in parallel' with them. They also find it bizarre that the British Government has publicly made the 'working assumption' that the IRA's termination of violence is permanent, but is not prepared to enter negotiations on that assumption. Security personnel in Belfast have apparently argued that it is far more important to include Sinn Fein in talks than to make gestures on weapons - they realise that even a complete surrender of arms would not prevent the IRA from quickly restocking its arsenals if it was so inclined. Sinn Fein's leaders claim that there would not have been a cease-fire if the British had made it clear earlier that weapons would have to be surrendered before talks began, that decommissioning arms before talks would be tantamount to surrender, that no previous republican movement has handed in its arms upon declaring a cease-fire, that it (Sinn Fein) does not have

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any weapons, and that it could not persuade the IRA to surrender arms even if it wanted to do so. The Irish prime minister who signed the Joint Declaration for Peace claimed (correctly) that it did not state that arms would have to be decommissioned before Sinn Fein could be included in talks, and added that he wouldn't have signed it if it had. 20 This impasse is not simply motivated by principle. The Major administration's wafer-thin parliamentary majority makes it dependent in close votes upon right-wing backbenchers and Ulster unionist MPs, and consequently it feels constrained from making more decisive moves, especially since it fears that the Labour opposition might take advantage of them. This suggests that the peace process will move at the pace dictated by right-wing backbenchers until the next UK general election - which scarcely suggests that fast moves are likely. Nevertheless, a breakthrough seemed to be emerging in Autumn 1995, when the British Government reluctantly agreed to hand the issue of decommissioning arms over to an international commission, which would be presided over by George Mitchell, an American Democrat. The idea was that Sinn Fein (and the loyalist parties) could enter into negotiations with the commission simultaneously with the beginning of all-party constitutional talks on the Framework documents - the parallel twin-track approach. This proposal seemed to unravel when the British government made it clear that it would continue to insist on the IRA handing over some weapons before Sinn Fein could enter talks. The failure to resolve this issue led the Taoiseach, John Bruton, to cancel an Anglo-Irish summit scheduled for 6 September, on one day's notice. The incident was the most public setback to inter-governmental relations since London and Dublin jointly embarked on the peace process in December 1993, but we believe it is unlikely that the 'decommissioning' of paramilitary arms will indefinitely postpone serious constitutional and all-inclusive negotiations, and that the international commission and the twin-track approach will be followed.

Conclusion: the politics of a better tomorrow? Despite occasional setbacks, the prospects for a durable peace in Northern Ireland have improved significantly. The Framework

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documents have accurately analysed the conflict as nationallydriven, and the British and Irish governments have attempted, in an ingenious example of statecraft, to accommodate fairly the national aspirations of both communities. They have sketched the elements of a dual protection model - protecting both communities whether they are a majority now or later, or a minority now or later - and workable elements of co-sovereignty. They have left the parties free to negotiate the details. They have ruled out the solutions favoured by 'ultras' - Irish unification without consent, local majority-rule and unionist integrationism. They have avoided the imposition of joint sovereignty - though this option will revive in significance should there be a return to massive instability. They have facilitated, with varying degrees of skill and sensitivity, the incipient normalisation of Sinn Fein and the loyalist parties. The paramilitary cease-fires, by making radical positions less fashionable, have also helped the chances for constitutional compromise - since it was always difficult to conceive of a settlement being reached, or lasting, while violence continued with significant support. Neither a durable peace, nor a significant constitutional settlement are guaranteed. After cross-table jousting, protracted oral stalemate, and multiple walkouts, we may simply get a cold peace. In Hobbes's view such a peace is latent war: 'the nature of Warre, consisteth not in the actual fighting; but in the known disposition thereto, during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary'. Of course, there remain those who believe that power and security come from the Armalite. Intransigents exist aplenty who will accuse their leaders of treason when they embrace fundamental compromises. They have followers who will cast their votes, secretly or with loud mouths, against such leaders. The two governments, and their possible successors, do not have a splendid record in conflict-management, and they have shown every capacity through parliamentary miscalculation and sheer myopia to endanger the peace process, and the construction of a workable outcome. There are therefore sound reasons for being wary of optimism, but notwithstanding these reasons it is now more realistic to conceive of a reasonably benign future than at any other time in the past quarter of a century. This does not mean that politics in Northern Ireland are destined to be co-operative rather than antagonistic. The region will continue

Postscript 353 to be an ethnic frontier, where one nation overlaps with another. It will remain dominated by ethno-national political parties whether Northern Ireland stays in the United Kingdom, or subsequently becomes part of a united Ireland. Its patron-states will continue to misread one another, and to touch the other's conationals where they are ultra-sensitive to symbolic pain. But it is increasingly plausible to see Northern Ireland's future as one in which its sovereignty is fragmented and uncertain, yet in which each national community can see its survival secured, its identity protected, its interests heard, its equality assured, and its national self-determination realised in its most workable form. Most of the Northern Irish, most of the time, could live with that future. Their future is now in their hands, and their parties, and their respective patron-states. Notes 1. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968), ed. C.B. MacPherson, chapter xiii. 2. Address to the United Nations General Assembly - see 'Britain Critical of Spring Over Speech', Irish Times, 29.9.95 (World Wide Web). 3. Our companion volume engages in more long-run speculation, John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary, Explaining Northern Ireland: Broken Images (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1995). See also the essays collected in Brendan O'Leary and John McGarry (eds.) A State of Truce: Northern Ireland After Twenty Five Years of War, Special Issue of Ethnic and Racial Studies, 18 (4) 1995 4. See Table 9.1, p. 321. 5. After deciding to participate in elections to Dail Eireann in 1986 Sinn Fein barely registered with the Republic's voters - averaging less than 2 per cent of the first-preference vote in elections to the Dail, and marginally better in European parliamentary elections. See inter alia Brendan O'Leary, 'Affairs, Changing Partners and Spring Tides: The Irish General Election of 1992', West European Politics, 16, 3 (1993), 401-16. Sinn Fein's weak electoral performance in the Republic flowed from multiple factors, the most important being its image (i) as a 'northern' party that would embroil the Republic in war; (ii) as a semi-clandestine organisation whose members were subject to state surveillance and censorship; and (iii) its lack of an electoral strategy targeted at southern voters' needs. 6. Liberals who believe in the potentially educationally therapeutic effects of jail were able to join with hardened cynics in admiring the sophistication of

354 The Politics of Antagonism loyalist and republican 'graduates' of the Northern Ireland Prison Service. 7. Hume observed at the SDLP's 1989 party conference that 'If [the IRA] were to have the courage to shout "stop", there would also be an end to the military presence on our streets. . . . Many of the things [republicans] complain about are a direct consequence of the campaign mounted by the IRA', Irish Times, 6 November 1989. 8. The Morrison delegation was the de facto 'peace envoy' that Clinton had promised in his 1992 election manifesto. Sources: confidential and off-the-record conversations and interviews conducted by B.O'Leary with Irish Americans in London, Washington, New York and Belfast in 1994 and 1995. 9. Sources: Confidential and off-the-record conversations and interviews conducted by B.O'Leary with Irish Americans in London, Washington, New York and Belfast in 1994 and 1995. 10. The phrase is Professor Edward Tiryakian's who invited us to a conference on the subject at Duke University in November 1995. The three peace processes were very different, although they had one common stimulus: the end of the Cold War. In Northern Ireland the end of the Cold War freed British and American foreign policy from previous rigidities; in Palestine it weakened the bargaining power of the PLO and made it interested in a second-best option; and in South Africa it encouraged de Klerk to seize a window of opportunity. The differences in the respective cases, at least with regard to outcomes, are more instructive. In South Africa there was a tacit agreement, despite some Zulu and Afrikaner dissidents, on the territorial definition of the nation. The peace process focused on the redistribution of power within South Africa - which is why a temporary consociational deal could be struck. In the Middle East the peace process could focus on the separation of Palestinians and Israelis, with a two nation-states resolution as a possible outcome. In Northern Ireland, by contrast, the peace process is focused on persuading two rival national communities to accommodate one another within the same territory - and they are being encouraged to establish a consociational settlement with elements of co-sovereignty by their national patron-states. Despite superficial appearances to the contrary, the institutional task facing constitutional peace-makers in Northern Ireland may therefore be more difficult than that of their counterparts in the Middle East and South Africa. 11. A full discussion of its multiple subtleties can be found in two appendices to John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary, Explaining Northern Ireland: Broken Images (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1995). 12. A New Framework for Agreement: A Shared Understanding Between the British and Irish Governments to assist Discussion and Negotiation Involving the Northern Ireland Parties (Belfast: Her Majesty's Stationery Office; Dublin: Government Stationery Office, 1995) and A Framework for Accountable Government in Northern Ireland, (Belfast: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1995).

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13. Why 90? Answer: Northern Ireland is now to have 18 seats in the Westminster parliament, and the districts for the Assembly will be based on these seats, and each will return five members to ensure reasonable proportionality under the single transferable vote ( 1 8 x 5 = 90). 14. The smaller parties, such as Sinn Fein, Alliance, Democratic Left and others, are unlikely to be happy with the idea of a three-person collective Presidency - from which they would be excluded on their present electoral performances. If so, they have three options: (i) to reject any idea of a collective executive, (ii) to accept it but make sure that a winning candidate seeks to attract their votes, or (iii) to accept it but recommend expanding the size of the Presidency - in which case a non-unanimity rule would have to be adopted for some measures to ensure some prospect of workability. 15. They have received the blessing of the doyen of consociationalism - Arend Lijphart 'Consociational Theory and the Case of Northern Ireland', paper presented at 'The Round table on Theoretical Perspectives on Northern Ireland', Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, 31 August-3 September 1995. 16. In the case of the Speaker, where the nature of the office precludes an easy consociational arrangement, the Government has insisted upon election by weighted majority. The proposals therefore include 'vote-pooling' - the stratagem to encourage successful candidates for office to pool votes across ethnic boundaries, see Donald Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1985), pp. 386, 396-7 and 425-6. We believe that 'vote pooling' within an Assembly is a much easier task to accomplish than vote pooling within the Northern Irish electorate. 17. The Joint Framework Document calls for representatives from both jurisdictions in Ireland to adopt a 'Charter or Covenant' to protect the 'fundamental rights of everyone living in Ireland', but it is not clear how such a document is to be made legally enforceable. 18. Fortnight, March 1995, 5. 19. This led her to comment, tongue-in-cheek, that perhaps the next book would be co-authored by Hume and Adams, Fortnight, July/August, 9. The Westminster plurality rule system creates incentives for the ethno-national blocs to coalesce, so if British policy-makers wish to reduce them they should develop a proportional system for Northern Ireland's representation at Westminster. This is not merely an academic judgement about the future, it is informed by the past - the collapse of the Sunningdale agreement owed something to the clash between PR and plurality-rule mandates. 20. Fortnight, September 1995, 6.

11 Addendum: war about talks, and talk about war, February-March 1996 On February 9 1996 the IRA Army Council announced that from 6.00 p.m. 'with great reluctance' its total cessation of violence was at an end. An hour later one of its active service units detonated a major explosion in London's Docklands, close to media and financial centres, killing two men in nearby newsagents, injuring 60 others, five seriously. IRA active service units followed up this action with bomb-threats and scares throughout central London. These activities culminated in the death of an IRA man in a bizarre explosion on a bus in the Aldwych. In its aftermath, Sinn Fein and Irish Americans appeared to win a guarantee of 'a breathing space' from the IRA,1 and as we went to press on March 11 the IRA appeared either to be operating an undeclared renewal of its cease-fire, keeping its options open, or managing its renewal of violence in a low-key manner, confined to Great Britain. Throughout the month that followed the Docklands' bomb, loyalist paramilitaries had held to their cease-fire, while issuing some counter-threats. Thus far, no political shootings, bombings or bombscares had occurred in Northern Ireland. Sinn Fein leaders were surprised at the breakdown of the cease-fire. The Irish Government responded by suspending ministerial contacts with Sinn Fein until the IRA's cease-fire was renewed, a measure immediately imitated by the British Government. The two largest unionist parties, the UUP and the DUP, claimed that what had occurred fully justified their stance on decommissioning, while David Trimble claimed it showed that the IRA was afraid of elections. Direct responsibility for what most hoped would be a temporary breakdown of the peace process obviously rested with the IRA, but many commentators in London, Dublin and Belfast,

Addendum 357 rapidly addressed the issue of whether others had been indirectly responsible. Naturally, die-hard unionists and their supporters, felt vindicated, maintaining that the IRA had realised that it was not going to get its demands met at the negotiating tables, and consequently had resumed its familiar ways. Its mask had slipped. They pointed to evidence that throughout the cease-fire the IRA had maintained itself on a war-footing, engaging in practice-runs. By contrast, the Irish Government, privately and publicly, held the British Government indirectly responsible for the breakdown in the peace process, a view widely shared by northern nationalists. British Prime Minister John Major's errors of judgement certainly explain, though they do not excuse, the scenes of devastation in London. His errors of judgement were not his alone, but were shared and supported by the Opposition Leader, Tony Blair, and many other British politicians. They were also shared by some Irish politicians. The Downing Street Declaration had stated that all parties with democratic mandates, and committed to 'exclusively peaceful methods', would be entitled to enter into political dialogue and all-party negotiations. The Declaration sent a clear message to Sinn Fein: persuade the IRA to abandon violence, for good, and a place awaits you at the negotiating tables. Sir Patrick Mayhew privately assured a member of the Morrison delegation that he 'could not imagine' more than six months elapsing between an IRA cessation of violence and the convening of all-party talks.2 The Downing Street Declaration had called for a 'permanent' cessation of violence, an assurance, as we have seen, the IRA refused to give. Major did, however, eventually make the 'working assumption' that the IRA's cessation of violence was permanent, but did not act speedily upon the assumption to which he had committed himself. That is, he did not convene an all-party peace convention. He thereby impaired the possibility that rapid momentum on negotiations might have built confidence among northern nationalists. Instead, as we have discussed, the British Government equivocated over the necessary agenda of reform in Northern Ireland over the structure and name of the police,3 emergency legislation, the early release of prisoners, and the public policy measures that might have indicated willingness to deliver on promises of 'rigorous impartiality' and 'parity of esteem' between the two national traditions, made recently in the Framework Documents. More importantly, and against the explicit advice of some of

358 The Politics of Antagonism his own security experts, Major insisted that the IRA and, in a quieter voice, the loyalists, decommission some of their weapons before all-party talks could begin. Decommissioning of weapons had become a precondition of substantive all-party talks, despite the fact that it is not explicitly mentioned in the Downing Street Declaration. Indeed it only became a publicly important issue after the two Governments had issued their constructive Framework documents in February 1995. In May 1995, through adroit diplomatic skill the British Government succeeded in getting US Vice-President Al Gore publicly to defend the thesis that paramilitaries should decommission their weapons before substantive all-party talks.4 The precondition promptly was renamed 'Washington Three'. It became Stalemate Number One. The central explanation for this insistence on decommissioning is simple: Major wished to calm unionist fears about a possible betrayal of their interests, reflected in the wounded reaction of the UUP's leader James Molyneaux to the Framework Documents, and Molyneaux's subsequent replacement by Trimble. Major persisted with the error of judgement that the IRA Army Council was always going to be more flexible, reasonable and accommodating than the Ulster Unionist Party; in short, that the IRA would be willing to engage in symbolic surrender, unlike the party of 'No Surrender'. The unrealism of this thinking was palpable, at least to others. The IRA had not been defeated. Its willingness to negotiate indicated that it believed it could not win its aims through war. A minute's inspection should have made it plain that the IRA could not expect Sinn Fein to win the IRA's war objectives at the negotiating table. In other words, both the IRA and Sinn Fein were ready to settle for less than their historic demands. The cease-fire indicated the willingness of the republican movement to achieve a political settlement, short of its historic objectives. Unfortunately that premise, that is factually correct and will be confirmed by historians, was not tested quickly, or decisively. Normal, albeit difficult politics, that is negotiating, bargaining and compromise, were not allowed to occur at the necessary pace, and with the necessary back-seat driving by the two Governments. Instead an impasse resulted. The impasse looked as if it could be resolved when President Clinton visited Britain and Ireland in November 1995. The issue of decommissioning was handed, with the consent and support of all three governments, over to former US Senator Mitchell, Canada's

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John de Chastelain, and Finland's Harri Holkeri - track one. On the parallel second track the two Governments, the British and the Irish, committed themselves to convening all-party talks by the end of February 1996. The International Body, the Mitchell Commission, deliberated, took counsel, and reported in January 1996. It made a judgement of Solomon. Its judgements were like that of Solomon, wise. Decommissioning of materiel, it unanimously suggested, should take place not before, and not after all-party talks. Instead it should take place during them, as confidence-building measures. It recommended amnesties and legal protection for those engaged in decommissioning. The Mitchell Commission additionally emphasised that parties to such talks should abide by six firmly delineated democratic principles. The Commission also indicated that other ideas, such as elections in Northern Ireland, might usefully supplement such a package, provided the mandate of an elected body was widely acceptable, and provided that it would address the agenda of the Framework documents. Major did not unequivocally accept the Mitchell Commission's report - instead he 'cherry-picked' its recommendations. ( He was not alone in this respect, every party highlighted those aspects of Mitchell with which they agreed, sidelining those aspects of which they disapproved). More importantly, Major appeared to come up with a forked formula. To Sinn Fein and the IRA he said: decommission something now and we will let Sinn Fein into all-party talks or let's have elections in Northern Ireland, after which parties with mandates can negotiate. We use the word 'appeared' deliberately because it is not exactly clear that that is what he intended to do, but that is how he was understood. We are not sure he did know what he was doing - something that did not stop the Opposition from following Major into the hole that he had dug for himself. Major had moved the goal-posts. All-party talks plainly could not now begin by the end of February. Major had appeared to back away from a principled stance on decommissioning, only to make elections an alternative hurdle to all-party talks. He had not made clear elections to what, or for what? He had treated threats of an IRA resumption of violence as Sinn Fein calling 'wolf; and he had not listened to those who had advised him that northern nationalists, especially republicans, look upon any prospective restoration of a unionist-dominated assembly, especially one based on majoritarian

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principles, as a return to their worst nightmare, not as a negotiating opportunity. Major's response to Mitchell encouraged the IRA to use it as an excuse to return to war - it remains to be seen, however, whether it has done so merely as a negotiating tactic. After the Docklands' bombing Major patiently explained that his response to Mitchell had been misunderstood. A characteristic understatement. Proposing elections as a route to all-party elections was not senseless. Major had intended that it would bring the UUP into all-party negotiations, but the idea needed to be handled with maximum feasible sensitivity, and with detailed attention to nature and timing - as the Mitchell Commission was aware. Major's last and worst error of judgement, shaped by tacit pressure from rightwingers within his party, cumulated a succession of, at worst, broken promises and, at best, gauche political ploys. The precondition of elections was not mentioned in the Downing Street Declaration, just as decommissioning had not been, and nothing in the Declaration suggested that these were alternative routes forward. Democratic mandates exist for all the major political parties in Northern Ireland - except for the small loyalist parties that would probably not fare well in an immediately conducted contest - and elections risk the possibility that the parties will lay out their 'non-negotiable demands', thus making peace-making even more difficult. Major's errors of judgement can be interpreted in three ways. First, his party enjoyed a diminishing majority in the Commons. He did not think, in consequence, that he'could place significant pressure on the UUP to come to negotiations. The second reason, widely touted, was that Major's conduct was explained by his own unionist convictions. We do not share this verdict. The third reason, and in our view the paramount reason, was that Major judged that unionist politicians would not enter into worthwhile negotiations unless he extracted more concessions from the IRA. The Labour leader, Tony Blair repeated Mr Major's errors of judgement, but added one of his own. By reassuring Ulster unionists that Labour's Irish policy was now different - although it had not been formally changed - Blair, influenced by party-political advantage, made them less fearful of a Labour government.5 The price, of course, was to make the UUP and the DUP less willing to negotiate under a Conservative government. The result was that the IRA cease-fire become the occasion for a seventeen month non-violent stalemate, rather than a moment for rapid change and taboo-breaking negotiations. The stalemate was

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punctured by the IRA's termination of its cease-fire. Whether the two Governments could put things back together, and improved, was the next challenge for politicians and their officials.

Positively the last communique: adding more processes to the process When things go wrong governments often return to where they went wrong, to see if they can repair the damage. In this case they went back to the Mitchell Commission's recommednations. The IRA's resumption of bombing London acted, as intended, as a wake-up call to the British and Irish Governments. The consequence was to add further processes to the peace process, without yet guaranteeing a substantive outcome. The two Governments reacted to the renewal of violence by suspending Sinn Fein from ministerial contacts, though the party was to be allowed to have contacts at official level, a response followed by the American administration. They avoided the temptations of renewed repression, while putting their security systems back into full alert. After hasty negotiations they then produced a joint communique on February 28 1996. In it, both Governments made compromises, and tried to deliver reassurances all around. They jointly demanded a full and unequivocal restoration of the IRA's August 31 1994 cease-fire. They did not ask for the word 'permanent' to be used, but made plain that Sinn Fein's presence at all-party talks would depend upon a restoration of the IRA's cease-fire: an informal IRA cease-fire would not get Sinn Fein invitations to all-party talks. The Prime Minister and Taoiseach denied that the IRA bomb in Docklands had influenced them, when it had, and emphasised that any further use of violence would not be allowed to disturb their management of the peace process. The penalty for parties that supported or condoned such violence would be exclusion from constitutional negotiations. The premiers reaffirmed their commitment to the Downing Street Declaration and the Joint Framework Document. This was significant insofar as the former shaped the IRA cease-fire, and the latter has an k all-Ireland' character in the words of Sinn Fein's Gerry Adams. It was important that the British Prime Minister restated his commitment to the Joint Framework Document, which contains extensive North-South and

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East-West proposals, including default-mechanisms, and proposals for Bills of Rights, precisely because this commitment had not been heard for a long time, and because it was tied to achieving 'a lasting peace and comprehensive settlement'. The Prime Minister and Taoiseach affirmed their wish to see 'the earliest possible inclusive negotiations' and confirmed that such negotiations will take place within the three-stranded process, established earlier in the Brooke-Mayhew talks of 1991-2. After 'intensive negotiations', that is 'proximity talks' scheduled for March 4-13, and after an elective process, scheduled to occur by early June at the latest, all-party negotiations are promised by June 10 1996.6 The Irish Government, and northern nationalists, had succeeded in getting two things from the communique: a named date for all-party talks, and for the preceding proximity talks, which they had originally suggested as an alternative to an elective process. In return they had to concede to the British Government, and the unionists, that an elective process would take place. The Prime Minister and the Taoiseach agreed that an elective process would have to be 'broadly acceptable', 'and lead immediately and without further preconditions to the convening of all-party negotiations with a comprehensive agenda' (our emphasis). The phrase 'without further preconditions' acknowledged that the elective process had become a precondition - one not present in the Downing Street Declaration. It strongly implied that the decommissioning of weapons before inclusive all-party talks cannot be another precondition. That was John Major's important concession, and implies his Government's full acceptance of the Mitchell Commission proposals. The elective process, at least as presently defended, is consistent with Mitchell's recommendations because the International Body had wanted any such idea tied to inter-party talks, an acceptable mandate, and the three-stranded talks-process. The communique did not make clear to what the elective process leads, although from what Major has said in the House of Commons and elsewhere, no assembly, or parliament, will result, nor any body that confines itself to matters purely internal to Northern Ireland. Whether a body is to be produced, how many members it will have, whether it will have a life or authority independent of the negotiating teams it mandates, these questions are left to be decided in the proximity talks, or after. The British Government is going to have

Addendum 363 to choose between the nationalists' preference for an elective process that produces no body, but merely mandates parties to engage in negotiations, and the unionists' preference for an elected forum that will have independent legitimacy and committee structures. According to the communique the details of an elective process are to be decided by the parties in Northern Ireland and the UK Government. In this respect the Irish Government temporarily abandoned its right under the terms of the Anglo-Irish Agreement to discuss any matter of law or public policy affecting Northern Ireland. It did so, presumably, because it had won reassurances from the UK Government about the nature of the elective process. The communique emphasises that the British Government will determine the nature of the election system "for the process if there is no cross-party consensus on the matter - which seems likely. The UUP and the Alliance Party are known to favour using STV, with Northern Ireland's eighteen Westminster districts being used to return five members each, i.e. a 90 person elected body. The SDLP and the DUP, by contrast, support a party-list system of proportional representation in which Northern Ireland is treated as a single district, but are divided over the number of persons to be elected (the former preferring a smaller body, the latter a larger one). Sinn Fein has not expressed its preference on electoral formulae; neither, so far as we are aware, have the UDP or PUP. When we went to press the most probable outcome appeared to be that Major would favour a party-list system of proportional representation.7 Yet one more process may be added to the peace process, an idea originating with the SDLP. In response to calls for an election John Hume proposed the alternative of parallel referendums in Northern Ireland and the Republic to support non-violent politics, and to mandate immediate all-party talks. This proposal is also to be considered in proximity talks, but, as yet, is not firmly on the agenda. It may be that any such referendums will coincide with the holding of elections. When the substantive inter-party talks begin, with or without Sinn Fein, the two Governments are agreed that confidence-building measures will be necessary at the start of those negotiations, though these are not explicitly laid down as time-tabled hurdles. One of these is a condition, if not a precondition: all parties must sign up to Mitchell's six democratic principles. They include opposing the use of violence to influence negotiations, and agreeing to

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accept the outcome of a negotiated settlement in a constitutional manner. Another possible measure is much less strongly expressed. The parties will need to 'address' Mitchell's recommendations on decommissioning. This wording is a major climb-down on the part of the British Government, and has exposed it to strong criticism from right-wing Conservative MPs. Mitchell's agenda on decommissioning merely needs to be addressed, though in practice it would undoubtedly push some parties towards insisting upon some parallel decommissioning while substantive negotiations took place. Moreover, before it can be addressed the two Governments will need to have legislation in place to facilitate amnesties for those who choose to take advantage of a verifiable decommissioning process. The last measure suggested requires unionists and nationalists to recognise one another's legitimate concerns, and the need for new political arrangements with which all can identify. This confidencebuilding measure is proposed to prevent unionists from insisting on purely internal or purely British constitutional proposals.

Conclusion: what is struggling to be born? No one can foresee the future, not least the parties to the Northern Irish peace process, and for that matter our selves. Three immediate obstacles to successful conflict-resolution are, however, obvious. How they are treated will determine whether Northern Ireland returns to war, experiences a cold peace, or, lastly, the blessings and difficulties of a political settlement. The first is the uncertainty which surrounds the prospect of the IRA resuming its cease-fire, and the political place of Sinn Fein, with or without such a cease-fire. Many arguments can be advanced to show that a resumption of the IRA's cease-fire is within the interests of the republican movement. The joint communique, has produced a date for all-party talks, with a compromise formula on decommissioning. The two Governments, and the American Government, appear to be lined up behind the agenda of the Framework documents. Constitutional pan-nationalism cannot deliver a united Ireland, but it can deliver a better deal for northern nationalists than they have so far been offered. The contrary thesis will, however, carry weight amongst republicans. In this thesis the British Government only responds to violence not politics, and

Addendum 365 surrendering the IRA's negotiating power in advance of a comprehensive settlement will leave republicans in a weakened position. In the eyes of hard-liners the recent communique has delivered an elective process which they see as endowing Northern Ireland, a gerrymandered entity, with false legitimacy. They also believe that the first item on the agenda of any inter-party talks, whatever reassurances they receive in advance, will be the surrender of the IRA. Nevertheless, even the most recalcitrant of hard-liners must realise that re-mobilising a movement which has been prepared for compromise and peace will be highly risky. Are their 'soldiers' to be told that they renewing war for a thirty two county socialist Republic, or are they doing so for the right to sit at the negotiating table and the right to hold onto their guns before, during and after such negotiations ? Sinn Fein is faced with a strategic dilemma. How can its leadership return to a strategy which they had already concluded locked them in stalemate ? They must choose, at some juncture, whether to become a constitutional anti-system party. The sooner they do so, the sooner they oppose the IRA's use of violence, now and in the future, the better their electoral prospects, the better the prospect of a joint alliance with the SDLP, the Irish Government and Irish America, and the greater the likelihood of a political dispensation in which they have a worthwhile place. The price, however, is a division of the republican movement, especially if the IRA and hard-liners decide to return fully to the long war. For the republican movement the decision is painful, though for most of its members we believe it points in an inexorably constitutional direction. The unionist and loyalists parties, naturally and understandably, have no sympathy for republican pain, but they too have to reflect on the uncertainty surrounding the IRA's future strategy. On the one hand they will be tempted by the belief that a full renewal of republican violence leaves them free to avoid painful historic compromises. It would leave the unionist parties in a position to hope that the two Governments will embark, at some point, upon a fulsome and joint repressive strategy: internment, North and South; and it would leave the loyalist paramilitaries to reconsider resuming thier war of deterrence, killing northern nationalists. On the other hand, unionists and loyalists may think that a renewed republican cease-fire offers the best or last chance to win permanent security

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for their community, from the British state, the Irish state, and from their northern nationalist neighbours. The second obstacle to successful conflict-resolution is easy to identify. Any resolution must avoid pure 'internalisation' if it is to satisfy nationalists, let alone republicans. For them, there must be Irish dimensions, within Northern Ireland, across the border, and between the two Governments. Equally, however, any stable resolution must avoid pure 'externalisation' if it is to satisfy unionists. They want the security of their Union vouchsafed, even if it has to have Irish dimensions, and they must be able to live with the internal reconstruction of Northern Ireland. In short, the region must remain recognisably British while simultaneously becoming more formally Irish. Managing this dilemma, and making it into a liveable outcome, will be at the heart of a successful political settlement. It will not be easy, not least because the negotiating formulae the Governments have tacitly accepted appear to empower almost every party which comes along with a veto as and when substantive inter-party talks begin. 'Nothing is agreed until everything is agreed', 'the three-stranded process' and 'consent', appear to be recipes for interminable constitutional dialogue. Unless the two Governments make plain, and maintain, their determination to support their jointly agreed agenda in the framework documents the prospects for substantive agreement must be remote. The third obstacle is the one that our wording in this addendum has highlighted. The number of processes which are now in place to encourage or facilitate the peace process, both feasible and infeasible, may seriously disturb the likelihood of any coherent and workable outcome emerging. High thresholds of agreement and numerous procedures can easily block progress. We shall confine ourselves to five illustrations. (i) All parties have rival preferences for different processes precisely because they know that process affects outcome. That is why decommissioning, before, during or after a settlement, elective processes, the relationships between strands in talks, and the principles of national self-determination and consent, matter. Irish nationalists hope that all-party talks will achieve agreement, to their satisfaction. Unionists hope that an elective process that delivers a forum will achieve agreement, to their satisfaction. Their preferred processes express fear and tactical assumptions. At some stage, however, the two Governments must treat process as secondary to

Addendum 367 outcome, and must choose processes which damage at least one party's expectations. (ii) It remains probable, if not determined, that decommissioning will block substantive negotiations, as and when they begin. If Sinn Fein is present on June 10 can it deliver the IRA on decommissioning, as well as a renewal of its cease-fire; and if it cannot, must it be expelled from negotiations, even if it is the IRA rather than Sinn Fein which refuses to address decommissioning? Alternatively, if Sinn Fein is not there, must the loyalist parties deliver on decommissioning by the UDA and UVF, on pain of expulsion from the talks, regardless of the conduct of the IRA ? (iii) Even before the decommissioning conundrum is addressed it is possible that the elective process and referendums may inhibit the ability of political elites to deliver workable compromises; and even if they come to the tables genuinely minded to do so, it is a fallacy, as Donald Horowitz insists, to believe that whatever the negotiators agree will necessarily be acceptable to their publics, and a further fallacy to believe that they will be necessarily workable, (iv) The temptation will be considerable for the two Governments not to drive the negotiating process for fear that one party will exit from the talks (assuming that all have come within in thefirstplace). In short their focus may remain on inclusive process rather than workable outcome. The most evident form this temptation has taken sofar has been the British Government's refusal to execute those reforms within its power that would please northern nationalists, precisely because they would worry Ulster unionists. The price of that temptation was paid when the IRA abandoned its cease-fire, (v) Last, and not least, the processes of governmental formation in Britain and Ireland may once again occasion difficulties for conflict-resolution in Northern Ireland. The Sunningdale settlement was partly destroyed by the replacement of a Conservative by a Labour government in 1974. More recently, the peace process was disturbed by the break-up of the Fianna Fail-Labour coalition in Dublin and its replacement by a three-party coalition; and by the insecurities occasioned from London by the Conservatives' diminishing parliamentary majority. Contrary to the school of thought which sees conflict in Northern Ireland as internal we regard its dynamics as centrally connected to the rhythms and strains of wider British and Irish politics, and no one should underestimate the capacity of the two states to mismanage their relations with one

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another, and with their co-nationals, and with those who refuse to be their co-nationals in Northern Ireland. For these reasons we must end this revised edition of our book with a strong caveat. One lesson of the last twenty seven years is that inter-party negotiations have not worked, at least in the sense of delivering agreed and workable outcomes (see chapters 5-9). One conclusion is that they have not worked because they have not been inclusive enough. We hope that that conclusion is right, but we are not confident that it is. Another lesson is that when the two Governments, British and Irish, are united, focused and resolute then progress can be accomplished. The Sunningdale settlement, the Anglo-Irish Agreement, and the Downing Street Declaration emphasise this possibility, if not fully. One conclusion is that they have worked not simply because the Governments have been united, though that is important, but because it is easier for the Governments to make compromises than the local parties. If that conclusion is right there are only three broad roads out of crisis or log-jammed talks: (i) joint governmental repression of a truly draconian kind, (ii) joint or shared authority, or (iii) an imposed settlement built from the elements of the framework documents that cannot be effectively blocked by local resistance, naturally as a prelude to a more agreed outcome later. The first of these roads is blocked. It has insufficient support in Ireland, especially in the Republic, and a low likelihood of success. The same can presently be said of the second, though its lack of support is concentrated in Northern Ireland. Joint or shared authority has the merit of justice, if not consensus, but lacks agents to execute it. The third road is more feasible, if less just and no more consensual. Whether there is a sufficient quota of British and Irish politicians willing to follow this road is another matter. We will know soon enough.

Notes 1. Confidential sources. 2. Confidential source. 3. The continuing reluctance of the Government to move on this issue emerged on March 8 1996 when Sir Patrick Mayhew sacked David Cook and Chris Ryder from the Northern Ireland Police Authority. The two men were isolated

Addendum 369 in their efforts to reform the RUC, including proposals to abandon provocative features of the RUC's routines, such as flying the Union Jack on all stations on July 12. Critics remarked that this action reflected poorly on the Government's commitment to 'rigorous impartiality' and 'parity of esteem' (Nationalists boycott the authority). 4. Confidential sources in discussions with B.O'Leary at the White House Trade and Investment Conference in Ireland, May 1995. 5. In October 1994 Tony Blair replaced Kevin McNamara with Dr Marjorie Mowlam as Labour's Shadow Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. The move reflected a softening of Labour's policy position and presaged a return to uncritical bi-partisanship on the part of the Opposition. What was trumpeted as a policy of supporting the Government when it was right on the peace process in practice became a policy of supporting the Government whatever it did on the peace process. This shift in disposition was not made through a formal change of policy, through a party conference, but rather at leadership level. It did not overtly reflect any substantive warming of Labour's views of Ulster unionists, though it did reflect a weakening of support for northern nationalists. What it mostly reflected was a narrow electoral calculus, one applied in all policy-domains by the new Labour leadership. The ruling axiom in that calculus is to avoid any policy posture which might conceivably lose votes. Additionally, however, the Labour leadership was motivated to encourage the UUP, if possible, to vote with it in stratgic votes against the Conservatives. Whether the Labour party, as in the 1970s, will become pro-unionist if it achieves office, remains to be seen. 6. Any threat of a filibuster to delay the legislation for an elective process by right wing Conservative Party MPs is hollow. The Government can and will guillotine such a measure, with the support of the Opposition Labour Party. The June 10 date is real, and feasible. It also has, we understand, diplomatic American underwriting (Confidential US sources). 7. Widespread speculation at Westminster suggests that Paisley's DUP were informed of the Prime Minister's likely preference for this outcome at the same time as they made up their minds to abstain on the parliamentary vote on the Scott Report. The same speculation suggests that the UUP voted against the Government on the Scott debate because they believed that this deal was being done with their unionist rivals. Whether an alternative deal was offered by Trimble, or spurned by Major, is not something on which we can confidently comment.

Glossary AIA AOH APNI CEC Confederation

Consociation

CSJ Devolution DL DUP EOC EPA FEA FEC FET Federation

GAA

Anglo-Irish Agreement. Ancient Order of Hibernians. Alliance Party of Northern Ireland. Campaign for Equal Citizenship. States unified by treaty for certain functions, but which retain their sovereignty and international identity. Political system used in some ethnically divided societies to share governmental power proportionally between the relevant communities - in the executive, the legislature, and public employment. Each community enjoys cultural autonomy and public expenditure may be allocated on a proportional basis. Campaign for Social Justice (part of NICRA). Sub-central government with executive and legislative powers inside a unitary state. Democratic Left (party formed in 1992 from split in Workers' Party). Democratic Unionist Party. Equal Opportunities Commission. Emergency Provisions Act. Fair Employment Agency. Fair Employment Commission. Fair Employment Tribunal. State in which executive and legislative powers are shared and divided between central and sub-central governments, and intergovernmental relations are constitutionally regulated. Gaelic Athletic Association.

Glossary 371 Hegemonic control

A system of ethnic domination, in which the power-holders make revolt by the controlled ethnic group(s) unworkable. IGC Intergovernmental conference of the AIA. IIP Irish Information Partnership. IIP Irish Independence Party. INLA Irish National Liberation Army. Integration Unifying a territory or culture under one set of norms. In Northern Ireland two main types of integration are advocated: into the UK and into Ireland. British integrationists argue that Northern Ireland should be fully integrated into the UK's administrative system (England's, Scotland's, or Wales's?), into its party political system, and some maintain that educational integration (socializing Protestants and Catholics within the same institutions) should be an imperative of social policy. Irish integrationists suggest, by contrast, that Northern Ireland should be administratively and electorally integrated into the Irish Republic. Irish Republican Army - see (P)IRA and (O)IRA. IRA Irish Republican Brotherhood. IRB Joint authority The sharing of ultimate governmental authority over a territory by two or more states (a condominium). Joseph Rowntree Reform Trust. JRRT Majority rule Simple majority or plurality-rule is a decisionmaking norm used in many democracies - especially in electoral, constitutional, government-formation and policy-making systems. It usually means rule by those with the most votes rather than absolute majority rule, and is less pleasantly described as the 'minimum winning coalition' norm, or the 'tyranny of the majority'. NICRA Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association. NILP Northern Ireland Labour Party. NIO Northern Ireland Office. NUPRG New Ulster Political Research Group. (O)IRA Official IRA. OUP Official Unionist Party (see UUP).

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The division of a territory with a view to creating ethnically or culturally homogeneous political units. Provisional IRA. (P)IRA Power-sharing See consociation. Proportional Representation. PR Provisional Sinn Fein. PSF Prevention of Terrorism Act. PTA Progressive Unionist Party. PUP Royal Irish Regiment (regiment of British Army RIR presently being created from the merger of the UDR with the Royal Irish Rangers). Royal Ulster Constabulary. RUC Standing Advisory Commission on Human Rights. SACHR Social Democratic and Labour Party. SDLP Sinn Fein. SF Single Transferable Vote. STV Ulster Defence Association. UDA Ulster Democratic Party. UDP Ulster Defence Regiment (soon to be merged into UDR the RIR). Ulster Freedom Fighters. UFF Ulster Unionist Council. UUC United Ulster Loyalist Central Coordinating ComUULCC mittee. Unitary state State in which sub-central governments enjoy no autonomous sovereign power. Ulster Unionist Party (also known as the Official UUP Unionist Party (OUP)). United Ulster Unionist Council. UUUC Ulster Volunteer Force. UVF Ulster Workers' Council. UWC Vanguard Unionist Party. VUP A 'majoritarian' political system, characterized by Westminster the concentration of executive power in onemodel party and bare-majority governments, the fusion of executive and legislative powers under Cabinet dominance, and the plurality-rule (first-past-thepost) election system. Workers' Party. WP Partition

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Subject Index Act of Union, 72-4 Alliance Party of Northern Ireland (APNI), 174-5, 187, 222, 254, 259,313,317,318,321,341,346 America (USA), 19, 77-8, 85, 171, 214-5, 266 American war of independence, 71, Amnesty International, 48, 203 Anglo-Irish, 60; joint studies, 212, 216; new English, 65, 70; relations, 156, 172 Anglo-Irish Agreement (AIA), 32, 40,42, 183,213,216,220-41, 242-76, 283, 313-25, 331; Article 1,221,225, 245, 285; Article 2, 221,226; Article 4, 221; British-Irish co-operation and conflict, 243-49, 266-7; content and interpretations 221-9; justice 260-70; Inter-Governmental Conference, 345; Mary field secretariat, 226; party politics, 250-60; violence and security 270-6; why signed, 229-41 Anglo-Irish Treaty, 101, 112, 136, 139, 146, 147 Anglo-Irish War, 21, 98ff Anti-Partition League, 160 arbitration, 2, 181-219, 181-2; British arbitration, 183-219, 184-5; internal and external, 182; reform, 193-97; failure, 208-9, 214-6 (see direct rule)

Armagh Four (see UDR Four) Battle of the Boyne, 69 Bennett Committee, 203 bi-confessional bloc, 193, 321 Bill of Rights, 172,308,345 Birmingham Six, 19, 48, 247, 249 Bloody Sunday, 9, 176, 196 Boundary Commission (see Partition) British Army, 27, 172-3, 175, 183, 196, 204, 267-8 (see security forces, policy) British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), 134 British government, state; arbitration, 183-219; consociational initiatives, 197-202, 209-13; direct rule, 181-219, 208-9; imperialism, 154; intervention, 171-77; neutrality, 183, 209; Secretaries of State, 184, 193-4 British-Irish relations, 142-7, 243-50 British isles, political development, 62-4 Brooke initiative, 243, 312-25, 327-8 Bunreacht na hEireann (see Ireland, Constitution) Burntollet bridge, 169 Campaign for Democracy in Ulster,

390 The Politics of Antagonism 159, 160 Campaign for Social Justice (CSJ), 117, 132, 160, 166 cantonization, 302-3 Catholics, 1, 3, 6, 57-62, 78-80, 153, 171; attitudes to security forces, 205; blocked social mobility 81-2; civilians and conflict, 8-53 passim; compared with Protestants, 35-40, 129-33, 206-8, 262-7; concentration/population 56, 59, 93, 158; more nationalist, 191-2 civil rights, 157, 158, 167-8, 168-9, 171 Clan na Gael, 85 Common Sense, 256 Compton inquiry, 176 confederal options, 295-300 Conservative party/government, 142, 144, 175-6, 184-5, 210-6, 221, 230, 244-5, 248, 252, 255, 275, 283; (also see home rule) consociation, consociationalism, 2, 184, 303-5, 327-8, 338-40; Brooke initiative 243, 312-25; coercive, 220-41, 234-5; initiatives, 197-202, 209-213; rolling devolution 212; (see AIA) Council of Ireland, 138, 198-99, 200 courts, 47, 116, 117, 128, 246-9, 267-8 criminalisation, 202-209, 203-6 Cromwellian conquest, 67-8 deaths, 8-9, 8-53 passim; agents responsible, 34-40; forms, 28-9; spatial distribution, 11; status of victims, 34-40 Decommissioning of weapons, 350 Defenders, 70 de Klerk, 347 Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) 176, 186-9, 198,211,220,222,

250, 252-6, 254-5, 257-8, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 321, 322, 334, 336, 337, 346 devolution, and AIA 221-41 passim; rolling, 212; UDA, 256 (see consociation and hegemonic control) d'Hondt rule, 338-9 Diplock Report, 196, 267 (see courts) direct rule, 181-219,208-9 discrimination, 76, 81-2, 116-7, 119, 120-1, 125-7, 128, 129-32, 134, 165, 195, 206-8, 262-5, 266-7 Easter Rising, 96; fiftieth anniversary, 165, 167 education, 157-8, 263-4, 300-7 election systems, 115-6, 118, 119-25, 148, 185-93, 192; STV and plurality-rule, 121-25, 194, relative reduction index, 125, 148 elections, after the AIA, 250-60; Assembly, (1973), 198, (1982), 212-3; Convention, 201; in Ulster, (1885-1910), 86-7, 88-9; Ireland (1987), (1989), 243-4; local government (1924), 112; Londonderry Corporation (1967), 120-1; region-wide, (1969-85), 186-93 Emergency Provisions Act, 197, 261 Enniskillen 'Poppy Day' killings 272 ethnic, communities, 3-4, 57-62; frontier, 56, 62; languages, 57, 60, 77, 83; pluralism, 307-8; war, 4, 18, agents of war, 22-5, costs of war, 45-51 European Commission on Human Rights, 47 European Convention on Human Rights, 47 European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, 230, 232

Subject Index 391 European Court of Human Rights, 47 European Economic Community (EEC), European Community (EC), 156, 294, 299-300 European Parliament, 214 explosions, 40-4, Stormont, (1920-69), 123-5, 148, (1969), 169-70, (1925 and 1929), 135, 148; Westminster, (1918), 97-99, (1955), 160, 178, (1959), 160, 178, (1974), 199, (1983), 212-3, (1986 by-elections), 250-2, (1987) 244-5, (1992) 320-2 Fair Employment Act, (1976), 206-8, (1989), 261,265-7 Fair Employment Agency (FEA), 206 Fair Employment Commission (FEC), 265-66 Fair Employment Tribunal (FET), 265-66 fair employment (see discrimination) federalism, 295-300 Fenians, 85-6 Fianna Fail, 136, 146, 155, 222, 228, 236, 243-4, 246, 280, 335 Fine Gael, 146, 222, 225, 228, 231, 238, 240, 243-4, 246, 268, 275, 280, 335 Flag and Emblems Act, 116-7, 128, 134, 261 Forum Report, 213, 215, 238 Framework Document(s), 328, 335-46, 352, 355n; internal frame, 336-40; impartiality and parity of esteem, 340-1; external frames, 341-5; North-South body, 342-3; Bill of Rights, 345 French Revolution, 71-2 Friends of the Union, 253 Gaelic Athletic Association (GAA), 82-3, 92 Gaelic revival, 82-3

Gardiner Report, 202 gerrymandering, 120-1, 165 Glorious Revolution, 68-9 glossary, 5, 328-9 Government of Ireland Act, 98, 100, 101, 110, 112-9, 136, 139, 142, 177, 194,319 Great Famine, 76-8, Guildford Four, 19, 49, 249 hegemonic control, 2, 133-5, 108-52 passim , 153-80 passim, 159, 161, 165, 171, 172, 176, 177; coercive control, 125-7; constitutional control, 112-9; economic control 129-32; electoral control, 119-25; exercising control, 108-52; external environment 142-7; in Israel and South Africa, 158; legal control 127-8; losing control, 153-80; motives for, 135-41 Home Rule, 74, 138; first bill, 87-8; second bill, 88-90; third bill, 91-6 passim, hunger strikers, 205-6, 214, 216 Hunt Report, 173-4 incarcerations, 40-4, 44-5 independence, 284-6 Independent Commissioner for Police Complaints, 261 injuries, 40-4, 40-1 integration, integrationism, 142-5, 173, 189, 209, 210, 255-6, 283-4, 297-9, 306-7 Intergovernmental Conference (IGC), 221, 226, 231, 234-5, 243, 245-6, 249, 253, 254, 270 internment, 31-2, 175-6, 196-7, 197 intimidation, 40-4, 42-4 Ireland, Act, 145, 153, 155 Ireland, Constitution (Bunreacht na Eireann), 136, 153, 225, 318, 319,

392 The Politics of Antagonism 322-3; Articles 2 and 3, 136, 200, 225, 318, 319, 322-3 Ireland, history; Act of Union, 72-4; after 1958, 155, 236; American war of independence, 71; Anglo-Irish War 21, 98ff; Battle of the Boyne, 69; civil war, 21, 146; compared with Scotland and Wales, 83; Cromwellian conquest, 67-8; Easter Rising, 96; economic divergence from Great Britain 75-6; fateful triangle 65; French Revolution 71-2; Gaelic League, 82-3; Glorious Revolution, 68-9; Great Famine, 76-8; IRB, 82-3, 85, 90, 94, 96; land confiscations, 67-8; land reform 84-5, 86, 87, 90; languages 57, 60, 77, 83; partition, 94, 96-101, penal laws 69-70; state/government 243-50; under Tudors, 64-5; United Irishmen, 54, 71, 325; World War 1, 95, 96; Williamite settlement, 69 Irish civil war, 21, 146 Irish Congress of Trade Unions, 163 Irish Independence Party, 210 Irish Republican Army (IRA), 22-6, 166, 170, 202, 270-2, 325; pre-1969, 21, 126, 139-40, 153 155, 156, 160, 164, 328, 329, 330, 332; Operation Harvest, 161; Provisional, 20, 24-6, 30, 174, 175, 176; Official, 24-5, 190; (see nationalist paramilitaries) Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB), 82-3, 85, 90, 94, 96 Irish unity, 279-83 Irish Volunteers, 92, 95 irredentism, 136 Joint authority (sovereignty), 213, 223, 224, 287-90, 294-5, 309-11, 301, 305, 308

Joint Declaration for Peace (Downing Street Declaration), 332-3, 336, 351 Kilbrandon Report, 215 Labour Party (Irish), 335 Labour Party (British), 351 Labour party, government, 144, 155, 157, 159, 167, 173, 184-5, 187, 209,215,221,255,281,318-9 land confiscations, 67-8 land reform, 84-5, 86, 87, 90 legitimacy, 110, 154 local government, 165, 166, 196 Lockwood Committee, 164 lowland Scots, 57-60 loyalist paramilitaries, 9, 20, 22-8, 31, 32, 36-8, 39, 233, 270-2, 324 Loyalists, 332, 352 Lundy, Lundyism, 140-1, 166, 202 MacBride principles, 215, 266-7 Maguire Seven, 19, 48, 249 Matthew Report, 164-5 Marxism, 232-3 media, 49 nation, 1,75 nation-building, 62-3, 75, 81-2; British failure, 142-5; Irish failure, 145-7 nationalism, 1, 83-96, 232 nationalist bloc, 189-92, 220ff, 257-60, 320-1 nationalist paramilitaries, 9, 20, 22-8, 31, 32, 36-8, 39, 270-2, 324-5 National Democratic Party, 160, 170, Nationalist Party, 124, 158, 160, 170, 189, 198 National Unity, 158, 160 native Irish, 57, 70 Netherlands, 341 New Ireland Forum, 213, 215, 238 Northern Ireland, passim; Cabinets,

Subject Index 393 113-4; colonial roots, 54-106, 100, 140-1; comparative scale of conflict 9-22; deaths, 8-53 passim; agents responsible, 34-40, forms, 28-9, spatial distribution, 11, status of victims, 34-40, trends 28-34; fundamental antagonism/causes, 2-3, 8, 278; historical dimensions, 54-5, 54-105 passim; House of Commons, 113-5; majoritarianism 114-5, 301-2, 307; militant agents, 22-27; Office (NIO) 183, 184, 201; options compared, 277-95, 290-5; party competition, system, 185-93; prime ministers, 113-4; reforms, reforming, 184-5, 193-7, 245-6, 258, 260-1, 265-7, 267-70; scale of conflict, 8-53; Senate, 113-5; solutions proposed, 279-308; violence, 8-53 Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA), 160, 165, 167-8 Northern Ireland Constitution Act, (1973), 193-4, (1974), 200 Northern Ireland Labour Party (NILP), 124, 161, 162, 164, 167, 170 Northern Ireland Office (NIO), xvi, 183, 184, 201 O'Neillism, 155-71; consequences, 162-71; endogenous background, 159-62; exogenous background, 155-59 Orange Order, 70, 140, 165 Palestine, 332 participation crises, 83-96; democratization pressures, 84-5 particularist regimes, 108-10 Partition, 94, 96-101,98, 100, 111-2, 134; boundary

commission, 101, 111-2, 136, 139, 146; repartition, 286-7 party competition, system, 185-93; bi-confessional/non-ethnic bloc, 193, 320-1; nationalist bloc, 189-92, 220ff, 257-60, 320-1; unionist bloc, 185-89, 250-7, 258, 320-1 Peep O'Day boys, 70 People's Democracy, 158, 169, 170 Plantation of Ulster, 55-62 Police Authority for Northern Ireland, 227 Police Complaints Board, 227 Policy Studies Institute (PSI), 263-5 Progressive Unionist Party (PUP), 328 Protestant ascendancy, 70; second ascendancy, 107-52 passim Protestants, 1, 3, 6, 70, 79-80, 129-33, 136-8, 153, 154, 166; attitudes to security forces, 205; compared with Catholics, 35-40, 129-33, 206-8, 262-7; Irish Free State, 136-8; population, 136-8, 158; Presbyterians, 71, 79-80 Public Order (NI) Order, 261 Public Order Act, 128 reforms, reforming, 184-5, 193-7, 245-6, 258, 260-1, 265-7, 267-70 religion, 60-2, 76, 78-80, 85, 116-7; cleavages, 76, 78-80, 154; institutions, 4 Repeal of the Union, 74 Republican Clubs, 134, 161, 165, 190 republican paramilitaries (see nationalist paramilitaries) robberies, 40-4, 41-2 rolling devolution, 212 Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), 27, 126, 165, 171, 172, 202-3, 204-5, 252, 253, 261, 282, 334

394 The Politics of Antagonism Sainte-Lague rule, 338-9 security forces, 9, 32-3, 36-8, 264-5 security policy, 8-53 passim, 185, 202-6, 230-1, 246-9, 267-70, 272-3 settler colonialism, 2, 54-106, 55-62, 66-7, 101-2, 140-1 shootings, 40-4 Sinn Fein (SF), 90, 97, 160, 190-2, 212, 215, 220, 222, 232, 234-5, 250-1,328,329,330,331, 332, 333, 335, 336, 349, 352; Provisional Sinn Fein (PSF), 192, 228, 233, 242, 257-60, 270, 282, 312, Republican Sinn Fein, 274 Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP), 170, 190-2, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 204-5, 209, 210, 211,212,214,220,228,234-5, 238, 244, 250-1, 257-60, 313, 314,315,316,317,318,319,320, 322, 323, 335, 336, 346 South Africa, 332, 341 Special Powers Act, 127-8, 134, 196-7 Stalker and shoot-to-kill, 247 standardization failure, 74-83 Standing Advisory Commission on Human Rights (SACHR), 195-6, 227, 262, 263, 264, 265, 341 state penetration, 64-70, 80 state-building failures, 54-152 passim Sunningdale Agreement, 198-201, 234, 337 supergrasses, 203-4 Task Force Report, 256 terminology, 5 Tudors, 64-5 UDR Four (Armagh 4), 267, 269, 276 Ulster Defence Association (UDA),

26, 28-40 passim, 252, 271, 328, 329 (see loyalist paramilitaries) Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR), 27, 175, 203-4, 267-70, 276, 282, 308, 324 (see Ulsterisation) Ulster Democratic Party (UDP), 328 Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF), 26, 270 Ulster Special Constabulary (USC) (B Specials), 126, 171, 173, 174, 175, 270 Ulster Unionist Council (UUC), 91-2 Ulster Unionist Party (UUP), 111, 113, 114, 118, 120, 122, 123, 124, 130, 131, 144, 157, 159, 162, 165-6, 166, 167, 169-71, 173, 176, 185-9, 197-8, 209, 210, 211, 220, 222, 230, 231, 252-6, 254, 257-8, 259, 313, 314-5, 316, 320, 321, 336, 337, 346 Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), 91, 95, 96, 170, 328, 329 Ulster Workers' Council (UWC), 200 Ulster, economic differentiation, 78; plantation, 55-62; (see Partition) Ulsterisation, 34, 202-5, 202-9, 203-6 unionism, 83-96; loyalism vs. British 140-2; motives for hegemonic control, 135-41; reactions to AIA, 220ff unionist bloc, 185-9, 250-7, 258, 320-1 unitary options, 290-5 United Irishmen, 54, 71, 325 United Ulster Unionist Council (UUUC), 199, 201-2, 209 USSR (Soviet Union), 19 Vanguard Unionist Party (VUP), 176, 187, 201 Vatican Council, Second, 154, 166-7 violence, 8-53 passim, 270-6, 317; after the AIA, 270-6;,

Subject Index 395 agrarian 66, 70, 73-4; comparative scale, 9-22; distorting perceptions, 12; forms of killings, 28-9; trends in killings, 28-34 Westminster, 117, 118; model, 112-3; Speaker's convention, 119 Wild Birds Act, 115 Williamite settlement, 69 Winchester Three, 249 Wolfe Tone Societies, 161, 166 woodkern, 66

Names Index Adams, G., 220, 223, 232, 250, 320, 329, 330, 332, 334, 347 Agar-Robartes, T., 92 Allison, G., 229 Allister, J., 220, 223 Anderson, B., 108 Andrews, D., 319 Andrews, J.M., 113 Aristotle, 108 Ardill, A., 167, 179, 275 Armstrong, R., 237 Arthur, P., xvi, 115, 158, 165, 179, 217, 236 Asquith, H., 91, 94, 97 Atkins, H., 184,211 Aughey, A., xvi, 142, 255, 280, 298 Aunger, E., 21, 114, 129, 130, 132, 133 Balfour, A., 88, 91 Barnard, T., 67 Barritt,D., 130, 151 Barrington, T., 150 Barry, B., xvii Barry, P., 242, 246, 277 Barton, B., 152 Batterbee, H., 144 Beattie, A., xvii Beckett, J., 55, 57, 64, 87, 95, 96, 102, 104, 105 Bell, G., 141, 152 Bennett, Justice, 203 Beresford, D., 205

Beresford Ellis, P., 67 Bew, P., xvi, 85, 122, 129, 132, 159, 162, 198, 208, 209, 236, 273 Biggs-Davision, J., 210 Binder, L., 83 Birrell, D., 118, 119, 149 Bishop, P., 24, 32 Black, B., 253 Boal, D., 167, 179 Bogdanor, V., 119 Boland, K., 200, 223, 232 BonarLaw, A., 91,95 Boston, T., 275 Boulton, D., 39 Bowen, K., 138 Bowman, J., 146 Bowyer Bell, J., 21, 140, 156 Boyce, D.G., 144 Boyle, K., 240, 273, 289 Brady, C , 81 Brady, V., 66 Brooke, B., (Lord Brookeborough), 113, 114, 129, 151, 153, 157, 159, 216 Brooke, P., 33, 184, 216, 255, 256, 270, 273, 274, 312-2, 314, 317-9, 320, 321, 324, 325, 331, 333 Bruce, E., 102 Bruce, S., 152, 154, 163, 167, 178-9 Bruton, J., 335,351 Buchanan, R., 103 Buckland, P., 98, 120, 122, 129, 132, 138, 158, 159, 160, 161, 163, 165,

Names Index 397 166, 176, 178, 179 Budge, L, 21,76 Bulpitt, J., 80 Burke, W., 104 Butt, L, 74, 86 Callaghan, J., 153, 173, 180, 209, 284 Calvert, H., 149, 150 Cameron, Justice, 121, 131, 132, 158, 173,180 Campbell-Bannerman, H., 90 Carey, H., 214 Carrington, P., 177, 314, 325 Carron, O., 205 Carson, E., 91,92, 94,95, 98, 105, 106 Carter, C , 130, 151 Carter, J., 214-5 Casement, R., 179 Cathcart, R., 134 Chambers, G., 129, 206, 217, 262-5, 275, 276, 308 Charles I, 55, 57, 57, 103 Charles II, 68 Chichester-Clark, J., 171, 173-4, 180 Churchill, R., 87 Churchill, W., 105, 139, 155 Clegg, L., 348 Clinton, B., 330, 349 Cohen, P., xvii Collins, B., 76 Collins, G., 246, 270, 314, 317, 318 Collins, M., 73, 106 Compton, Justice, 176 Compton, P., 158, 263, 286 Conway, W., 164 Coogan, T.P., 24, 140 Cooke, H., 80 Cooper, L, 170 Corish, P., 67 Cormack, R., 206, 266, 275, 308 Coughlan, A., 223, 232 Cowling, M., 133

Cox, W., 243 Craig, J., (Lord Craigavon), 95, 98, 100, 106, 107, 113, 118, 121, 124, 138, 151, 152, 164 Craig, W., 169, 176, 179, 187, 201, 202, 254 Crick, B., 309 Crimmins, J., xvii, 284 Cromwell, O., 55, 65, 66 Cronin, S., 72, 104 Crossman, R., 181 Cullen, L., 72 Cullen, P., 79 Currie, A., 260, 275 Curtice, J., 278 Curtis, L., 104 Cushnahan, J., 260, 275 Dady, H., xvi Darby, J., 43, 46, 135, 165 Davitt, M., 86 Dawson Bates, R., 126 De Courcy, J., 102 Dent, M , 280, 289, 309 De Gaulle, C , 156 De Klerk, W., 109, 158 De Lacey, H., 102 Denning, Lord., 247, 274 De Paor, L., 168, 175, 178, 280, 284, 285 De Valera, E., 136, 138, 152, 155 Devlin, B., 180 Devlin, J., 114 Devlin, P., 161, 170,210 Devoy, J., 86 Dillon, M., 39 Doherty, P., 20, 21,276 Donnison, D., 152 Douglas-Home, A., 117 Downes, S., 41 Dudley Edwards, R., 68, 96 Dukes, A., 268 Dunleavy, P., xvi

398 The Politics of Antagonism Edward VI, 64, 65 Elizabeth I, 61,64 Elliott, E., 277 Elliott, M., 72 Elliott, S., 33, 123, 148, 170, 213,251 Emmett, R., 72 Esman, M., 218 Eversley, D., 262 Farrell, B., 178 Farrell, M., I l l , 122, 126, 129, 154, 158 Faulkner, B., 167, 169, 171, 174, 176-7, 179, 197, 198, 199, 200, 254 Fennell, D., 280, 309, 311 Ferdinand, F., 94 Fisk, R., 139, 200 Fitt, G., 160, 170, 180, 198, 209, 211 FitzGerald, G., 212-3, 215, 216, 218, 219, 221, 224, 225, 226, 231, 233, 234, 237, 240, 241, 243, 244, 249, 268, 276 Fitzpatrick, B., 21, 67, 76, 103 Flackes,W., 33, 170, 251 Foot, P., 49 Foster, I., 275 Foster, R., 55, 63, 84, 96, 158, 179 Frame, R., 63 Francis, A., xvii Fraser, M , 306 Gadaffi, M , 20, 275 Gallagher, A., 308 Gallagher, F., 120 Gallagher, T., 278, 326 Gandhi, M., 182 Gardiner, Justice, 202 Garvin, T., 96 Gibbon, P., 122, 129, 132 Gillespie, R., 66 Gellner, E., 57, 108 Geoghegan-Quinn, M., 334

George III, 72 George V, 94 Gladstone, W., 85, 86, 87, 88, 105 Glenholmes, E., 240 Goldstrom, J., 76 Goodhall, D., 237 Gow, L, 210 Gowrie, Lord, 247 Green, E., 76 Greer, S., xvi, 204 Griffith, A., 90, 106 Guelke, A., xvi, 19, 110,214 Gwynn, D., 105 Haagerup, N., 214 Hadden, T., 240, 273, 289 Hailsham, Lord, 247, 267, 274 Hammill, D., 183 Hamilton, J., 56, 58 Harbinson, J., 114 Harkness, D., 157, 165, 167, 179 Haslett, E., 223 Haughey, C., 212-3, 216, 231, 240, 244,246,283,314,317-9,332 Haughey, D., 326 Heath, E., 176, 177, 199, 239 Hechter, M., 62 Hendron, J., 320, 326, 329 Henry II, 64 Henry VIII, 64, 65 Hepburn, A., 76 Heskin, K., 50, 306 Hewitt, C., 133, 152, 168 Hickey, D., 20, 21 Hillyard, P., 33 Hobbes, T., 327, 353n Hogan, G., 128, 197, 204 Holland, J., 42 Hood, C , xvii Hopkinson, M., 146 Hoppen, T., 74, 80 Horowitz, D., 355 Howe, G., 49, 235 Hume, J., 170, 210, 211, 220, 228,

Names Index 399 238, 241, 250, 259, 260, 275, 313, 329, 330, 331, 332, 347 Hunt, Lord, 127, 173 Huntington, S., 83 Hurd, D., 184, 234, 235, 237, 247 Hutchinson, J., xvi, 81, 82 Hyde, D., 83 Inglis, B., 78 James I, 55, 58, 66 James II, 68, 69, 140 Jeffrey, K., 217 Jennings, A., 47 Jodice, D., 13, 14, 15, 17,51 John XXIII, 164 Jones, G., xvii Kearney, H., 63 Keating, M., xvii Kedourie, E., 108 Kelley, K., 24 Kelly, J., 178 Kennedy, D., 135, 146 Kennedy, E., 214 Kennedy, K., 162 Kennedy, L., 280, 286 Kenny, A., 223, 280, 288, 289, 309 Kilbrandon, Lord, 280, 288, 289, 310 Kilfedder, J., 321 Killias, M., 50 King, D., xvii King, T., 184, 220, 225, 244, 250, 252, 253, 255, 256, 274 Kitson, R, 12 Laffan, M., 96, 105, 106, 107, 111, 139 Larragy, M., xvi Lawrence, R.J., 110, 114, 153, 162 Lee, J., 75, 76, 79, 96, 104 Leech, J., I l l Lehane, D., 39 Lehmbruch, G., 181

Lemarchand, R., 182 Lemass, S., 155-6, 164, 178, 179 Lenihan, B., 219, 244, 246 Lijphart, A., 1, 197,299,305 Lloyd George, D., 91, 94, 97, 98, 100, 101, 139, 143, 171, 183, 287 Long, W., 98 Lowry, R., 247, 267 Lundy, R., 140-1 Lustick, I., xvi, 65, 84, 149 Lynch, J., 172, 180 Lyne, T., xvi, 155, 282, 300 Lyons, F.S.L., 21, 22, 51, 96, 143 McArdle, D., 100 McAllister, L, 160 McAnespie, A., 247 McAteer, E., 198 McCartney, P., 49 McCloskey, C , 117 McCormack, V., 207, 215 McCormick, D.N., 135 McCrudden, C , xvi, 196, 206, 214, 265, 266 McCusker, H., 220, 223 MacDonagh, O., 84 MacDonald, M., 141, 159, 179 McDowell, R.B., 80 McGimpsey, C , 225 McGrady, E., 245 McGrath, M., xvii McGuinness, M., 331, 334 Machin, H., xvii Maclntrye, T., 178 McKeown, C , 160 McKeown, M , xvi, 11, 50, 52, 160 McKittrick, D., xvi, 26, 32, 53, 249 McMichael, J., 271 McNamara, K., 119, 265, 273, 276, 281,319 McNarry, D., 275 MacNeill, E., 95 McQuade, J., 167, 179 Maguire, F., 180,205, 209

400 The Politics of Antagonism Mair, P., 242 Major, J., 52, 318, 319, 330, 332, 333, 349 Mallie, E., 24, 32 Mallon, S., 241, 250 Mandel, M„ 149 Mansergh, N., 121, 122 Marshall, G., 134 Marx, K., 54 Mary Stuart, 68 Mary Tudor, 64 Mason, R., 184, 202, 208-9 Maudling, R., 50, 175, 177, 180 May all, J., xvii Mayhew, P., 50, 247, 321, 331 Mill,J.S., I l l Millar, R, 256, 260, 275, 326 Miller, D., 100, 105 Miller, R., 262, 276 Mitchell, A., 273 Mitchell, G., 351 Mitchell, J., 50 Mokyr, J., 76 Moloney, E., 167,211,267 Molyneaux, J., 252, 255, 256, 314-8 Montgomery, J., 56, 58 Moody, T., 77 Moore, M., xvi, 284 Morgan, W., 167 Morris, G., 43 Morrison, B., 330, 354n Mountbatten, L., 25 Mountjoy, Lord, 64 Moyle,R., 151, 180,218,219, 311,312 Moynihan, P., 214 Mugabe, R., 182 Murie,A., 118, 119, 149 Murray, R., 50 Murphy, P., 104 Murphy, R., 100 Neave, A., 26, 210, 271 Nelson, S., 140, 152

Newark, F., 121, 150 Nimeiri, J., 182 Nkrumah, K., 182 Noel, S., xvii Nossiter, T., xvii O'Brien, C , 223, 280 O'Connell, D., 71, 74, 78, 84, 104 O'Dowd, L., 150, 154 O'Duffy, B., xvi, xvii, 42, 104, 271 O'Ferrall, F., 78, 84 O'Halloran, C , 146 O'Hanlon, P., 170 O'Hara, J., 207, 215 O'Leary, C , 21, 76, 213, 227, 252 O'Malley, P., 183, 205, 217 O'Neill, H., 57, 64 O'Neill, T., (Lord O'Neill of the Maine), 113, 123, 153, 154, 156, 158, 162-70, 174, 178-9 O'Neill, T.P., 210, 214 Orme, S., 218 Orwell, G., 1 Osborne, R., 122, 151, 206, 266, 275, 276, 308 O'Shea, K„ 104 Paisley, L, 80, 156, 166-7, 170, 174, 187-9, 197,211-12,217,220, 228, 252, 254, 255, 256, 258, 314, 316-8, 325, 347-8 Paisley, I., junr., 276 Pakenham, T., 72 Palley, C , 116, 122, 165,223, 224, 280 Parnell, C , 74, 86, 87, 104, 105 Patterson, H„ 122, 129, 132, 198, 208, 209, 236, 273 Pearce, E., 55 Peel, R., 77, 80 Peterson, J., xvi, 228, 244 Petty, W., 67 Pickrill, D., 104 Pickvance, T., 309

Names Index 401 Pitt, W., 72, 74 Pollack, A., 167,211 Poole, M., 50 Powell, E., 209, 210, 211, 233, 241, 245, 275 Pringle, D., 122 Prior, J., 181, 184,212,216,218, 233, 235, 238, 240, 241, 274 Purdie, B., 158, 168 Pyle,F., 312 Pym, F., 174, 217, 218 Reagan, R., 215, 275 Redmond, J., 91, 94, 95, 97, 105 Rees, M., 151, 180, 184, 200-2, 218, 240, 253, 287 Reynolds, A., 319, 332, 335 Richardson, G., 92 Roberts, H., 142, 149, 255, 280, 298,311 Robinson, M., 222, 321 Robinson, P., 201, 254 Roche, R., 72, 104 Rokkan, S., 62, 63 Rose, P., 119, 159 Rose, R., 21, 110, 154, 163, 164, 167, 177, 179, 180, 202, 262 Rowthorn, B., 47, 130, 131, 151, 282 Ruane, J., 309 Russell, J., 78 Ryan, P., 248 Salisbury, Lord, 87 Sands, B., 205, 284 Saunderson, E., 90 Schellenberg, J., 50 Schopflin, G., xvii Scott, N., 245, 297 Shugart, M., 125, 148 Simms, J.G., 64, 103 Smith, A., xvii, 108 Smith, D., xvi, 129, 131, 151, 206, 217, 262-5, 275, 276, 308 Smith, G., xvii

Smith, M., 24 Smith, P., 223 Smyth, C., 212 Smyth, M., 280, 299 Smooha, S., 158 Spence, G., 26 Spring, D., 327 Squires, M., 133 Stephen, N., 314 Stevens, J., 270 Stewart, A., 54, 61, 105, 134, 140, 141, 150, 152 Sutch (Screaming Lord), 253 Swift, J., 103 Taagepera, R., 125, 148 Taylor, C., 13, 14, 15,17,51 Taylor, J., 167, 179,231 Taylor, P., 203 Teague, P., xvi Tebbitt, N., 52 Thain, I., 247 Thatcher, M., 26, 52, 103, 205, 210, 212, 215, 216, 218, 219, 221, 224, 233, 234, 235, 236, 239, 248, 252, 253,255,271,284,310,318,333 Thompson, B., xvi Tiryakian, E., 354 Tocqueville, A., I l l , 165 Todd, J., 141,309 Tone, W., 71, 104 Townshend, C., 8, 21, 74, 272 Trimble, D., 347, 348 Tyrie, A., 252 Utley, P., 241 Van Dijk, J., 50 Vile, M , 296 Walker, B., 89, 99 Walker, C., 128, 197, 204 Wall, M., 62, 69, 103 Walsh, D., 47, 48

402 The Politics of Antagonism Wayne, N., 47, 130, 131, 151, 282 Weitzer, R., 141 West, H., 167, 179, 202, 272 Wentworth, T., 57 Wheare, K., 150 White, B., 46 Whitelaw, W., 177, 184,214, 217, 324 Whyte, J., 78, 128, 135, 177, 179-80, 279, 298, 305 Wilford, R., 213 William III, 56, 68, 69, 103, 141 Williams, T.D., 96 Williamson, A., 46 Wilson, Harold., 159, 167, 172, 173, 174, 253 Wilson, H., 105 Wilson, R., xvi, 257 Wilson, T., 142, 153, 163-4, 168, 253-4, 280, 298 Woodham-Smith, C , 76 Wright, F., 49, 56, 140, 152, 166, 172, 267, 309 Yeats, W.B., 145 Younger, C , 106 Zimmermann, E., 18 Zimring, F., 12