The Politics of Accomodation: An Analysis of the 1978 Malaysian General Election 9789814377591

Table of contents :
CONTENTS
PREFACE
ABBREVIATIONS
LIST OF TABLES
I. THE POLITICAL FRAMEWORK
II. THE ELECTORAL SETTING
III. THE PRENOMINATION MANOEUVRINGS
IV. THE CAMPAIGN
V. THE RESULTS
VI. CONCLUSION

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-The Institute of Southeast Asian Studies

The Institute of Southeast Asian Studies was established as an autonomous organization in May 1968. It is a regional research centre for scholars and other specialists concerned with modern Southeast Asia. The Institute's research interest is· focused on the many-faceted problems of development and moderniza• tion. and political and social change in Southeast. Asia. The Institute is governed by a twenty-four-member Board of Trustees on which are represented the University of Singapore and Nanyang University. appointees from tbe government. as well as representatives from a broad range of professional and civic organizations and groups. A ten-man Executive Committee oversees day-to-day operations; it is chaired by the Director. the Institute's chief · academic and administrative officer. The respoliSibility for fact~ and opinions expressed in this publication rests exclusively with the author and his interpretations do not necessarily reflect the yiews or the policy of the Institute or its supporters.

"Copyright subsists in this publication under the United Kingdom Copyright Act. 1911. and the Singapore Copyright Act (Cap. 187), No person shall reproduce a copy of this publication. or extracts therefrom, without the written permission of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Singapore."

THE POLITICS 0 F ACCOMMODATION An Analysis of the 1978 Malaysian General Election

by

Ismail Kassim

Research Notes and Discussions Papt"rs No. 10 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies 1978

CONTENTS

Page

PREFACE

ii

ABBREVIATIONS

Ill

LIST OF TABLES

\!

1: THE POLITICAL FRAMEWORK

1

II: THE ELECTORAL SETTING

12

III: THE PRENOMINATION MANOEUVRINGS

27

IV: THE

CA~IPAIGN

41

V: TilE RESULTS

64

VI: CONCLUSION

93

APPENDIX

Breakdown of Parliamentary and Sta: ~~ Constitucncit·s by State and Racial l\Iajority in Peninsular !\lalaysia

110

II

PREFACE

As a journalist with the New Nation (Singapore), this writer has been covering political developments in Malaysia since 1975. During the 1978 general election, he was there for two· weeks covering the campaign. For this purpose, he visited l1 enang, Kedah, Perak and the Federal Territory, interviev. ing do/.ens of politicians, ranging from state level leaders down to the grassroots party worker, and had numerous discussions with Malaysian journalists and obscrwrs as well as with the ordinary voters. Some of the information released to the author was giwn in confidence, and therefore could not be attributed to the sources. He is greatly indebted to all of them for the insights they had given to him on the nature of Malaysi;m politics. In the writing of this report, the author has drawn, wherever relevant, on his earlier political features for the New Nation. He wishes to place on record his appreciation to his Editor, the Group Editor of New Nation and Times Periodicals and Deputy to the Times Organization Editor-in-Chief, Cheong Yip Scng, whose decision to send him on periodic trips to Malaysia,including the election coverage,enabled this paper to he Written. His thanks also go to the Editor of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Christine Tan, for diligently going through the final manuscript, and to the ISEAS pool of typists for typing the final draft. Whatever defects remain, the author accepts full responsibility. 20 August 1978 Singapore

Ismail Kassim

Ill

ABBREVIATIONS

Baris an Berjaya Berjasa DAP KITA MCA MIG PAJAR PAS Peke mas PNRS PPB ppp PSRM Pus aka SAPO SCA SCUP SDP Sedar SNAP SUPP UMAT UMNO UPP USNO

w

Note:

Barisan Nasional (National Front) Sabah United People's Party Barisan J umaah Islamiah Malaysia Bersatu Democratic Action Party Kaum Insaf Tanah Ayer Malaysian Chinese Association Malaysian Indian Congress Parti R.akyat J ati Sarawak Partai Islam Social Justice Party Parti Ncgara Rakyat Sarawak Parti Pesaka Bumiputra Bersatu People's Progressive Party Partai Socialis Rakyat Malaya Parti Perhimpunan Social Bersatu Sarawak People's Organization Sabah Chinese Association Sabah Chinese United Party Social Democratic Party Sabah Democratic Rakyat Parti Sarawak National Party Sarawak United People's Party Parti Umat Sarawak United Malays National Organization United People's Party United Sabah National Organization Workers' Party

Party is spelt as partai in West Malaysia and parti in East ~lalaysia. The English equivalent of the Malay names of some of the parties have not been given as they are not in general usa~e.

v

LIST OF TABLES Table No. I .1

Total Estimated Population of Malaysia as at 31 December 1974 according to the Main Ethnic Groups

Page

4

III.1

The Lineup for the 8 July Election in Peninsular Malaysia

38

III.2

The Lineup for the 8 July Election in Sabah and Sarawak

40

V.1

State of the Parties in Parliament after the 1978 General Election in Peninsular Malaysia

66

State of the Parties in the Ten State Assemblies in Peninsular Malaysia after the 19 7 8 General Election

69

Comparison of Votes Received by Barisan and PAS in Two Kelantan Parliamentary Constituencies in March 1978 and July 1978

71

Comparison of Votes Received by Barisan and PAS in Kelantan in March 1978 and July 1978

73

Votes secured by Barisan in Four Parliamentary and Eight State Constituencies in Kedah in the 1978 General Election

73

Comparison of the Relative Performances of the Main Parties in Four Penang Parliamentary Constituencies and the Twelve States Seats within them in the 1974 and 1978 General Electillns

75

The Relative Performances of the Main Parties for Parliament in the 1974 and 1978 General Elections in Penang

77

Comparison of the Relative Performances of the Barisan and DAP in the 1974 and 1978 General Elections in Perak

80

Comparison of the Relative Performances of the Barisan and DAP in the Kinta Valley in the 1974 and 1978 General Elections

80

V.2

V.3

V.4

V.5

V.6

V. 7

V.8

V.9

V. 10 Comparison of the Relative Performances of the Barisan and DAP in Three Federal Territory Constituencies 111 the 19 74 and 19 7 8 General Elections V.11

Performances of the Barisan Component Parties for Parliament by States in Peninsular Malaysia in the 1978 General Election

83

86

VI

Table No. V.12

Page

Performances of the Barisan Component Parties for the Ten State Assemblies by State in Peninsular Malaysi;l in the 1978 General Election

87

V.13

Results of the Sabah 1978 Parliamentary Election

89

V.14

Results of the Sarawak 1978 Parliamentary Election

90

V.15

The State of the Parties in Parliament after the Nationwide Results of the 1978 General Election

92

Comparison of the Relative Performances of the Main Political Parties for Parliament in the 1974 and 1978 General Elections

92

V.l6

I. THE POLITICAL FRAMEWORK

The framework of politics in Malaysia has been based on race ever since the first nationwide election was conducted under British rule in 1955. Independence two years later and five subsequent general elections spanning a period of more than two decades, have not changed the basic structure. Race remains the constant and dominating factor. Most of the political parties are or~anized along ethnic lines. They mobilize communal support for essentially communal oriented programmes. The rest, though multiracial in structure, arc in practice communal oriented and dependent largely on the support of a single community. The lineup for the fifth general election since independence on 8 July 1978 was in broad outlines identical to those of previous polls except for leadership changes, the appearance of a host of new political parties registered over the last few years and the dissolution of a few of the older ones. Like in past elections, the choice before the electorate was between the ruling group consisting of a number of communal parties allied together in a multiracial framework known as the Barisan Nasional (Barisan) and an array of smaller opposition parties, some even more communally extreme, and some multiracial in name only. And, of course, as in the past, there were numerous Independent candidates too.

The Barisan Setup In Peninsular Malaysia,the Barisan is made up of six components: the United Malays National Organization (UMNO), the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA), the Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC), the Gerakan Rakyat l\lalaysia (Gerakan) and the People's Progressive Party (PPP). The last two are multiracial on paper but their leadership and support come from the non-Malay segment of the population. In the opposition are the Chinese-led Democratic Action Party (DAP), the theocratic Partai Islam (PAS), Social Justice Party (Pekemas), Partai Socialis Rakyat l\Ialaya (PSRM), left-leaning and led by Malay intellectuals, Kaum Insaf Tanah Ayer (KITA), Social Democratic Party (SDP), Worker's Party (W) and the United People's Party (UPP). Except for the DAP, PAS and the ideological PS&\1, the rest are insignificant fly-bynight parties or, in the case of Pekemas, a one-man party led by Dr. Tan Chee Khoon who retired from active politics because of ill health just before the election. In Sabah, the Sabah United People's Party (Berjaya), indigen< ms-led but whose membership embraces all ethnic groups, and the United Sabah National Organization (USNO), a bumiputra dominated party, are members of the Barisan. On the opposite

2

side are the Sabah Chinese Association {SCA), Sabah Democratic Rakyat Parti (Sedar), the Sabah Chinese United Party {SCUP), Parti Perhimpunan Social Bersatu (Pusaka), and the DAP and Pekemas, both of which have set up branches in the East Malaysian state. In Sarawak, the Barisan consists of three local parties: the Partai Pesaka Bumiputra Bersatu (PPB), the result of a merger in early 1973 between the largely Than Pesaka party and the indigenous-Muslim Bumiputra party, the Iban Sarawak National Party (SNAP) and the Chinese Sarawak United People's Party (SUPP). Outside the coalition in the Opposition arc four newly registered parties -- Parti Negara Rakyat Sarawak {PNRS), Parti Rakyat Jati Sarawak (PAJAR), Parti Umat Sarawak {UMAT) and the Sarawak People's Organization (SAPO). The concept of the Barisan, like that of its pr•·decessor, the Alliance of UMNO, MCA and MIC, is based on unity at the top and separation at the gtassroots level. Implicit in this political arrangement is that each party looks after its own community, restrains the more volatile and extremist elements and formulates communal demands within the context of a multiracial society in order to preserve racial balance and communal harmony. By implication, parties outside the Barisan, whether communally oriented or otherwise, are a danger to racial peace as their lack of a communal partner make them in practice less encumbered to compromises in the pursuit of communal demands. To the top Barisan leaders especially those from UMNO, there is no wa\ out except coalition politics based on race at this stage of the country's development. They concede quite readily that it is far from ideal, but for the moment, it is the next best alternative. For a single multiracial party as such cannot function effectively, given the complexity of the multiethnic makeup of the population, and the different development priorities of the main communities. Like the Alliance, the Barisan too is a loose communal coalition. The component parties are linked together at the top by a Supreme Council which is made up of three representatives from each member. The activities of the Council are co-ordinated by the secretary general. The first to hold the post was an MCA leader, Datuk Michael Chen, but he was replaced by an UMNO strongman, Ghafar Baba, after the 1974 general election. The Council meets on an ad hoc basis whenever necessary under the chairmanship of the UMNO president. Such meetings arc usually called to discuss mundane matters like sorting out differences among members, formulating a code of conduct to lessen bickerings between component parties and deciding on electoral matters. It does not deliberate on national policies, much less fom1Ulate them, as such functions are deemed to be the prerogatives of the Cabinet.

3

The linchpin of this political arrangement is ll\1NO whose dominance is accepted unquestionably by the other ten component parties. [n practice, this means that the UMNO president automatically becomes the head of the Barisan. As leader of a communal party (UMNO) and that of the multiparty coalition, his role is that of a balancer of community interests or, in short, the final arbiter on the shape and direction of national policies. To lead the coalition, he has to satisfy Malay aspirations without alienating the non-Malay component parties. In this perpetually balancing job, there are no hard and fast rules. He is only guided by what he deems to be fair to all communities. But, at the crunch, there is no doubt as to which side he will lean if he is to retain his position as undisputed leader of UMNO and htnce of the multiracial Barisan.

The Roots of Malay Political Power The acceptance of the other communal groups to the leadership of UMNO is rooted in the fact that political power rests in the h;mus of the Malays, the largest ethnic group. In terms of numbers, the Malay community forms 4 8.5% of the population as at 31 December 1974 1 (see Table 1.1). If the other indigenous groups in Sabah and Sarawak are added, the total bumiputra segment comes to 55. 7%. In Peninsular Malaysia, the Malays are even more dominant with 53.5%; the rest are Chinese (35.3%), Indians (10.5%) and others (0. 7%). For Malaysia as a whole, the Chinese are the second largest ethnic group accounting for 33.8% of the population. 2 Malay political power is not based strictly on numerical superiority but also on thc distribution of the community -- a fair majority of whom reside in the rural areas. The weightage of the nonurban districts gives the Malays added political weight out of proportion to their numbers, a sore point with opposite parties like the DAP which has repeatedly attacked the huge differences in size between rural and urban constituencies as being unparalleled in other democracies. In Peninsular Malaysia, 79 out of the 114 constituencies have at least an absolute Malay majority. In only 22 constituencies the Chinese form more than 50% of the votes. Neither community has the absolute majority in the remaining

---~-~---

1 In computing the size of the Malay community, the Melanaus i~ Sarawak, and the Bajau:' and Muruts in Sabah are classified as Malays because the three ethmc groups are largely Mushm · 2 Population figures are obtained ~rom Malaysia 1975 Official Yearbook (Department of Information, Ministry of Information, Malaysia).

4

Table 1.1

Total Estimated Population of Malaysia as at 31 December 1974, According to the Main Ethnic Groups

Peninsular Malaysia

Ethnicity

Total

Sarawak

Sabah

%

No.

%

No.

%

No.

%

Malays

3,274,077

53.5

165,333 1

20.6

268,052 2

24.6

5,707,462

48.5

Chinese

3,481,447

35.3

161,861

20.1

335,767

30.8

3,979,075

33.8

Indians

1,034,577

10.5

1,034,577

8.8

418,759

3.6

211,210

1.8

Land and Sea Dayaks

418,759

38.4

No.

Kadazans

211,210

26.3

Other Indigenous Groups3

150,523

18.7

56,223

5.2

206,746

1.8

115,222

14.3

11,364

1.0

202,120

1.7

Others

Total

75,534

9,865,635

0.7

100

804,149

100

1,090,165

Notes:

1 It includes 91,270 Bajaus and 35,096 Muruts 2 It includes 58,734 Melanaus 3 Some of them are Muslims and they adopt a Malay way of life

Source:

Figures are compiled from Malaysia 1975 Official Year Book.

100

11,759,949

100

5

13, out, in these constituencies, the non-Malays outnumber the Malays 3 (see Appendix). In all the parliamentary constituencies in the four northern Malay states of Kedah (13), Perlis (2}, and Trengganu (7), Malay voters are in the majority. Even in the West Coast states where the Chinese community is concentrated, the Malays still dominate in the majority of the constituencies. I ;1 Selangor, the ratio is six to one, with Indians holding the balance at four. ln Pcrak it is 10:7:4, and in Negri Sembilan it is 3:1:2. Only in Penang State have the l\Ialays a minority with 3 as compared to 5 Chinese and l mixed. At state level, the ratio at 238:51:23 is even more lopsided. Except for Penang, more than half of the seats for the other 10 state assemblies are Malay-majority areas. For Kedah, Perak and J ohore, each parliamentary constituency comprises two state seats. In another three -- Penang, Selangor and Kelan tan -- it is three state to one parliamentary. In Negri Sembilan, Trengganu and Pah the leadership of the Tunku led to his removal from the party's Supreme Council ;mel his subsequent dismissal from UMNO. Except for Musa Hitam -- then an Assistant Minister, who attempted to manoeuvre things against the Prime Ministership, but instead found himself forced out of the government -- none of the other UMNO leaders dared lo openly disagree with the Tunku's leadership. The May 13 Incident led to the suspension of parliamentary democracy. A National Operations Council (NOC) was set up under the then Depuly Prime Minister, Tun Abdul Razak, to rule the country. For the first time since independence, the Malay leadership in UMNO woke up and reexamined their policies. The result was inevitable; government policies took another significant pro-Malay tilt. A New Economic Policy (NEP) was formulated with the expressed objective of restructuring society to make the indigenous groups on par in socioeconomic terms with the Chinese and other races. The main target as set in the NEP was to achieve a 30"la bumiputra ownership of the economy by 1990. To balance the new emphasis on the Malays, the NEP also stressed that it would attempt to eliminate poverty among all races in the rural as well as the urban areas.

9 For a more detailed discussion of the events preceding and following the May 13 Incident, see Goh Cheng Teik, op.cit.

11

The top UMNO leaders like Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman, his deputy, Tun Abdul Razak, and Tun (Dr.) Ismail Abdul Rahman were still committed to democracy. After twenty-one months, the NOC relinquished its rule in February 1971 but not after formulating the Rukun Negara, a set of five principles to ensure national unity, and amending the Sedition Act to make it illegal to criticise the relevant constitutional clauses pertaining to Malay special rights, the position of the national language, the Sultanate and the citizenship rights of the immigrant races. About six months before the restoration of parliamentary rule, the Tunku officially stepped down in favour of Tun Razak.

The Barisan Formula But Tun Razak could no longer depend on the old Alliance to guarantee firm rule and stability. Instead, he proposed a larger alliance to include the main opposition parties on the grounds of ensuring a greater base of support for the government. Even during NOC rule, the process of coalition-making had begun. The SUPP was brought in at State and Federal levels after elections resumed in the State in 1970. Later, the Gerakan and the Alliance agreed to form a coalition government in Penang. The same process was repeated with the PPP in Perak. With the hindsight of the May 13 Incident, the three opposition leaders felt that it would be more beneficial to national unity and stability if they try to influence the policy-making process from within. PAS was the last to be incorporated into the coalition though tentative approaches and negotiations had been going on since early 1971. The DAP was unconvinced and instead called for an urgent review of national policies to remove political, social and economic ills from the body politic. To the party, the formation of the Barisan was an UMNO attempt to get new partners to ensure its political dominance. 1 0 In the view of the party secretary general, Lim Kit Siang, UMNO's interest for new coalition members was motivated by three reasons:

10

1.

UMNO has absolutely no faith and confidence in the ability of the MCA and MIC to regain non-Malay support which they lost in the 1969 general elections;

2.

UMNO is itself unsure about its traditional power base in the rural areas, particularly among the Malay peasants; and

3.

The tendency towards the establishment of a one-party state through the elimination of all opposition parties, either by absorption or suppression.

Lim Kit Siang, "Coalition Politics in Malaysia" speech delivered at the Fourth Great Economic Debates at the University of Malaya on 25 August 1972, mimeographed.

12

But, the other non-Malay parties appeared convinced that there was no other alternative in the immediate future to national unity and stability except through communal co-operation in the Barisan. The multiparty alliance was cemented before the August 19 74 general election. Contesting under a common symbol -- the scales of Justice -- the Baris an passed through its first test with flying colours. The Opposition was decimated except for the DAP in Peninsular Malaysia and SNAP in East Malaysia. At parliamentary level, the Barisan won all the 114 seats except for 9 going to the DAP, and 283 out of the 312 seats in the 11 state assemblies in Peninsular Malaysia. In Sabah, only 1 of the 16 parliamentary scats was contested and that too fell to the ruling coalition. The other 15 fell into the Barisan's lap on Nomination Day unopposed largely owing to the political machinations of USNO strongman, Tun Datu Mustapha Harun. The only dark note was in Sarawak when the opposition SNAP captured 9 of the 24 parliamentary and 18 of the 48 state seats. But, overall, it was a magnificent victory -- the best electoral performance by the ruling groups since independence. The euphoria generated by its first success did much to cement the component groups together, but only for a time. Divisive signs were quick to resurface again in the next few years. They were quite inevitable as, unlike the Alliance which comprised only one party for each ethnic group, the Barisan embraces several partners that sought support from the same communal group. The rivalry between them even outshadowcd the competition between the multiparty coalition and the Opposition in the intervening period between the 1974 and 19 7 8 general elections.

II. TilE ELECTORAL SETTING The first hint of an early election came in January 1977 from Deputy Prime Minister Datuk Seri (Dr.) Mahathir Mohammed. In Kuching on a state visit to Sarawak, he said that if the Barisan found it worthwhile, elections might be held the following year. 11 That statement from a senior Cabinet Minister set waves of speculation even though the parliamentary term was not due to expire until September 1979.

11

Sunday Times, 9January 1977.

13

But, despite the occasional references to an early election in the next few months by Barisan leaders including Prime Minister Datuk Hussein Onn -- he told a political gathering in mid-May in Malacca that he had not had any inspiration yet to determine the date -- nothing concrete materialized. It was not until the end of the year that the first signs of an imminent election came with the announcement by the Election Commission that it was ready to conduct the general elections any time it was called.12 If the year had opened under a cloud of political uncertainty, it did not end any better. The twelve months were most eventful for Datuk Hussein Onn, the Barisan, UMNO and the other component parties. Much of the instability within UMNO, the premier party, resulted from the death of Tun Abdul Razak in January 1976 of leukaemia. As the chief architect of the Barisan, UMNO president and Prime Minister, Tun Razak wielded firm control over the party. His leadership was unquestioned within UMNO, but his untimely demise set off a train of reactions within the party.

The Succession Crisis in UMNO After the May 13 Incident, the leadership of the Tunku was no longer tenable in UMNO owing to the opposition of the ultras or radicals in the party. The succession of Tun Razak to the Prime Ministership in September 1970, was regarded as a logical development as he had always been considered as the Tunku's heir apparent. He was also acceptable to all sections of the party as well as to the other communal leaders in the Alliance. To the credit of Tun Razak, he managed during his term of office to weed out those whose abilities or dedication were Sltspect to him. The first to go was Datuk Senu Abdul Rahman, the former Minister of Information and Broadcasting, who lost to a PAS candidate in the 1969 general election. Following his defeat, he relinquished his leadership of UMNO Youth, and was subsequently appointed by Tun Razak as the party's secretary general -- a post which he held continuously till after the 1978 election. He made a comeback to Parliament in March 1973 when he successfully contested the Kuala Kedah constituency vacated by the Tunku, but he was not taken back into the Cabinet. Khir J ohari, the Minister of Commerce and Industry and onetime rival of Tun Razak, lost the vice-presidency in the party's election in January 1971, partly because of his close association with the Tunku. That was the excuse that Tun Razal-. needed. 12

Straits Times. 30 December 1977.

14

In the Cabinet reshuffle announced on 31 December 1972, he was packed off to Washington, D.C. as the country's ambassador to the U.S. though he retained his ministerial rank. In the party's election in June 1975, he lost his seat in the Supreme Council, and, on the expiry of his ambassadorial term, Tun Razak did not appoint him to any public office. Unlike Khir, another oldtime Cabinet member, Tan Sri Saadon bin Haji Jubir, managed to retain the party vice-presidency in 1971 and also in the following year. At the 1972 UMNO general assembly, the party's constitution was amended to allow elections to party posts on a triennial basis. He held his Cabinet post -- Health and then Commerce-- until after the 1974 general election when he was appointed Malaysia's ambassador to the United Nations, and subsequently Governor of Penang State. Consequently, he did not contest the election to the party's top posts in the 1975 UMNO general assembly. Their places were taken over by other appointees of the Prime Minister. The most prominent among them was Hussein Onn (he had yet to be conferred the Datukship). He had left the party together with his father, Dato Onn, in the early 1950s, and was only persuaded to come back to the party's fold in 1968. In 1969, he was elected as a Member of Parliament, but refused to serve in the government on principle until after the retirement of the Tunku whom he regarded as his father's implacable foe. He was appointed by Tun Razak, his brother-in-law, as Education Minister in January 1971, following his success in winning a seat in UMNO's Supreme Council though he lost in the contest for the vice-presidency. He succeeded in capturing it the following year and, at UMNO's general assembly in 1973, was elevated to deputy president following the vacancy caused by the death of the incumbent, Tun (Dr.) Ismail. Tun Razak was instrumental in paving the way for his comeback. Later, he was appointed as Deputy Prime Minister. Tun Razak also played a big role in the comeback of Datuk Musa Hitam and Datuk Mahathir, who had been respectively sacked from the government and the party by the Tunku, and the rapid rise of Tunku Razaleigh Hamzah in the party's hierarchy. Datuk Musa was taken back as Deputy Trade and Industry Minister in January 19 73 and promoted to Minister in the same ministry after the 1974 general election. Tunku Razaleigh who won a seat in the Supreme Council in 1971 was subsequently appointed as party treasurer and then chairman of Perbadanan Nasional Berhad (Pernas), a state-owned corporation for bumiputras. He was promoted to the vice-presidency following Datuk Hussein's elevation to UMNO deputy leader, and in 197 5 retained the post in the party election.

15

As for Datuk Mahathir he was accepted back into the fold in 1972 just before the party's general assembly. He lost in the contest for the vice-presidency but won a seat in the Supreme Council by a big majority. After the 1974 general election, he was appointed Education Minister. Like Tunku Razaleigh, he was successful in his bid for the vice-presidency in 1975 following the backing given by Tun Razak. Not only did Tun Razak infuse new blood into the top ranks of UMNO, but he also went out of his way to protect his proteges by defusing the challenges of those he deemed as mavericks. One was Tun Mustapha from Sabah who had his powers clipped following a split within USNO, inspired from Kuala Lumpur. The other was Datuk Harun Idris, Selangor Menteri Besar and UMNO Youth leader. A member of the Supreme Council since 1964 and a party vice-president by virtue of his post as UMNO Youth president since 1971, he was perceived to be a threat to the party establishment because of the tough stands he took on popular issues. The crunch came when he decided to make a bid for power by contesting for the UMNO's vice-presidency in June 1975. He came in a poor fourth losing to Tun Razak's three nominees. As an honourable way out, he was asked to step down and accept the offer of the ambassadorship to the United Nations. Datuk Hanm, who was under investigation for corruption, was not unmindful that it was the route out for Khir and Tan Sri Saadon. He dilly-dallied and finally announced that he was only prepared to go if the corruption charges against him were dropped first. That was unacceptable to Tun Razak. The offer was withdrawn and he was arraigned in November 1975 on several counts of corruption involving misuse of party funds. Two months later, Tun Razak died in London. Datuk Hussein, whose health was suspect following a heart at tack a few years earlier and who had actually indicated his desire to step down, was reluctantly thrust into the top office. His succession, together with his controversial selection of Datuk Mahathir as his deputy two months later, caused ripples of dissension. Members of the Old Guard, in particular, who were eased out of top positions by Tun Razak felt chagrin at the rapid rise to powerful positions of relative newcomers to the party. They were joined by the Tunku who felt that he was not given his due recognition by his successor as an elder statesm