The Politicization of Social Divisions in Post-War Poland 3031265297, 9783031265297

Table of contents :
Acknowledgements
Contents
Abbreviations
1 Introduction
References
2 The First Structural Experiment: Communist-Era Homogenisation
Ideological and Political Reasons for Interfering with the Structure, and the Patterns of That Interference
National Unity as an Instrument for Integration and Exclusion
A Revolutionary Attack on Existing Social Divisions
The Promise of Non-antagonistic Relationships Between Structural Segments
References
3 Consequences of the Experiment: The Division Between Society and the nomenklatura
Mechanisms of the Formation and Removal of Social Distances
Experience of Discrimination in Workplaces
Inequalities in Advanced Socialist Society
The Main Division of the Communist Era: “Us”–“Them”
References
4 The Second Experiment: The Differentiation of the Social Structure
Ideological and Economic Reasons for Interfering with the Structure, and the Patterns of That Interference
Problems with Structure, Waiting for the Formation of the Middle Class
Continuation of Communist-Era Social Division
Transformation and Further Politicization of the “Us”—“Them” Division
References
5 Consequences of the Second Experiment: The “Winners”–“Losers” Division
A New Register of Wrongs and Transformation of the Social Structure
Division of the Time of Economic Differentiation: “Winners”–“Losers”
The “Solidary”–“Liberal” Practice as a Confirmation of the Continuity of Divisions
The Practices of Repartition—Consequences of a Homogeneous Society
References
6 The Formation of Social Divisions and the Theory of Practices of Repartition
Ideological and Structural Context and Social Divisions
Mechanism of Dichotomous Practices of Repartition
Conditions for Applying and Redefining Repartition
Practices of Repartition—Homogeneity Destruction Instruments
References
7 Conclusion
Index

Citation preview

The Politicization of Social Divisions in Post-War Poland Piotr Borowiec

The Politicization of Social Divisions in Post-War Poland

Piotr Borowiec

The Politicization of Social Divisions in Post-War Poland

Piotr Borowiec Institute of Political Science and International Relations Jagiellonian University Kraków, Poland

ISBN 978-3-031-26529-7 ISBN 978-3-031-26530-3 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-26530-3 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover illustration: Marina Lohrbach_shutterstock.com This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

To my daughter Alicja

Acknowledgements

Many people contributed to my writing of this book, including my colleagues from the Institute of Political Science and International Relations at the Jagiellonian University in Kraków. I would like to thank all of them. In particular, I would like to extend my gratitude to Piotr Obacz, Ph.D., for the inspiration provided by his monograph entitled Podział “Polska solidarna—Polska liberalna” w ´swietle wybranych koncepcji pluralizmu politycznego. (2018). It helped me consider many issues related to divisions. Even if I provide different answers to some of the questions he asked, they would not have been formulated had it not been for his paper. I would also like to thank the students of the Political Studies Faculty of the Jagiellonian University, to whom I presented an approach to social divisions and the theory of practices of repartition during political sociology lectures. I am profoundly thankful to them for their critique, patience and inquisitiveness. Kraków, Poland December 2022

Piotr Borowiec

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Contents

1

1

Introduction

2

The First Structural Experiment: Communist-Era Homogenisation

11

Consequences of the Experiment: The Division Between Society and the nomenklatura

57

3 4 5 6 7

The Second Experiment: The Differentiation of the Social Structure

105

Consequences of the Second Experiment: The “Winners”–“Losers” Division

151

The Formation of Social Divisions and the Theory of Practices of Repartition

197

Conclusion

245

Index

253

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Abbreviations

CBOS GUS KPN PGR PKWN PPR PPS PRL PZPR RP SLD UB UE ZMP

Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej —Centre for Public Opinion Research Główny Urzad ˛ Statystyczny—Central Statistical Office Konfederacja Polski Niepodległej —The Confederation of Independent Poland Panstwowe ´ Gospodarstwo Rolne—State Agricultural Farm Polski Komitet Wyzwolenia Narodowego—Polish Committee of National Liberation Polska Partia Robotnicza—Polish Workers’ Party Polska Partia Socjalistyczna—Polish Socialist Party Polska Rzeczpospolita Ludowa—Polish People’s Republic Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza—Polish United Workers’ Party Rzeczpospolita Polska—The Republic of Poland Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej —The Democratic Left Alliance Urzad ˛ Bezpieczenstwa—Security ´ Office Unia Europejska—European Union Zwiazek ˛ Młodziezy ˙ Polskiej —Union of Polish Youth

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Two observations formed the basis of my interest in the formation and politicization of social divisions in Poland. Both are seemingly different and perhaps exceptionally trivial but, in practice, they are related to each other, inspire me and bring about scientific research. The first consisted in me realising my growing irritation caused by another passionate statement of a certain public opinion leader in the media, claiming that Polish society was deeply “divided in half” and that this caused negative consequences suffered, in particular, by the author of these words and which were unbearable for him. He considered those divisions and splits to be a burden weighing him down and leading to his permanent discomfort of living. His additional words did not lead to anything sensible. Often, he was not even able to define the sides of this division, its genesis or the causes behind the formation of related distances, and yet he noticed it and made it socially significant, seemingly considering himself a messenger of some sort. In the later part of his argumentation, he warned against further divisions and condemned those causing divisions and fuelling the “Polish-Polish war”. As expected, he only counted politicians who did not share his worldview among the dividers. It was them who he considered the source of those divisions. He had no second thoughts about expressing his negative opinion of them. Elated, he was convinced that he was the truth-bearer, failing to notice that suddenly he joined the dividers (in reference to the notion above). © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 P. Borowiec, The Politicization of Social Divisions in Post-War Poland, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-26530-3_1

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He divided politicians into those who reportedly cause divisions due to employing dividing as a strategy and those who reportedly abstain from doing it (at least in his opinion). In other words, into those worthy and unworthy of trust, not equal to himself. Some he considered superior, others inferior. The whole of his statement showed disdain for politics, a wish for the need for unity and universal harmony, but built solely based on his own vision of order and proper living—which is an expectation that shocks with its totality and is partially a legacy of communism and its ´ 1998, p. 291). doctrine of “moral and political unity” (Swida-Ziemba, The second observation is related to a statement by Adam Michnik— a person symbolic of the Polish fight for freedom—from early 2015. It was a statement anchored in politics and practically opened that [politically important] year when presidential and parliamentary elections were held. Michnik made a division “into an authoritarian Poland wanting to build a police state, and a democratic Poland” (Adam, 2015). The above statement is clearly significant because both Michnik and the circles centred around him were reluctant to employ such polarisations. It cannot be interpreted only as a mechanical attempt at supporting one of the parties to a political dispute with his own authority and, therefore, as an instrumental and demagogic strategy. It would constitute a simplification unfair to the source of this concept, very likely untrue. Therefore, there must be something more in those dichotomous, discursive juxtapositions—hereinafter referred to as practices of repartition. These observations and attempts at answering the question of what the actual reasons for the appearance of social divisions and application of repartitions—those that lie deeper than the ones suggested by common sense, political discourse conditions and available scientific knowledge on divisions, often referred to as the “classic knowledge on the matter”— are constituted as the basis for the decision to begin research on the phenomena mentioned above. The main substantive assumption of this paper is a reflection on the role of the ideas of justice and equality in Polish social order. The introduction of the first version of these ideals in 1945, following the communist distribution ideology, resulted in a permanent revolution of the social structure and the destruction of existing divisions, differences and inequalities. The consequences of those processes are still being felt today. It is necessary to remember that the egalitarian perspective situates inequalities mainly in the structure, within perspectives of

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superiority−inferiority (Domanski, ´ 2002, p. 9). The introduction of their second version, based on meritocracy and efficiency, led to the formation of new inequalities, once again transforming the social structure and making it more difficult to read. Therefore, in my paper, I focus on the economic, ethnic and religious categories of social structuralisation, various approaches to the structure and also subjective awareness aspects of the lives of individuals (i.e., the meanings assigned to inequalities). It is in these phenomena that is see the individual, psychological sources of division. I believe that their premises lie mainly in endogenous factors, inequalities and the attitudes of individuals towards them. I make central the categories that constitute inequalities and eventually lead to divisions. It is them that create the distances between individuals; therefore, they are “signposts”, determinants for describing the structure of and changes in inequalities, as well as for the formation of divisions. The analysis assumes recognising social order as a “system” of active individuals socially, economically and politically anchored and being in a state of constant integration and transformation. Additionally, it may be recognised as an order that is a collection of rules and institutions that determine the framework of social existence (Marody, 1991, p. 7) and that are all structured and co-dependent—and, therefore, also the relations between them. Acting in this manner allows showing the ties between transforming structures that result from their effect and, therefore, the formation of divisions and politicization thereof. In the analysis presented, social divisions and practices of repartition constitute the main object of interest and bind all of the considerations undertaken. Repartitions are important political matters—not only in democracy—that form a basis for rooting and transforming politics. That is why I attempt to present their model and capture their dynamics. Repartitions are commonly considered mobilisation strategies that help provide political support, while in reality, they are forms of questioning the stability of the order by calling for a rejection of its dominant hierarchies. They are also instrumental tools that groups use to anchor themselves in politics and participate in them, or methods intended to ensure political survival. They constitute a reflection of many conditions present within a given society. This is why I consider them forms of diagnosis of social statuses, the depth of inequalities and the changes expected. The foundation of my consideration is the functionalist assumption that divisions and practices of repartition are intrasystemic consequences that usually reflect the condition of structures, the influence of dominating

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ideologies and the accepted vision of social justice. To put it as simply as possible, practices of repartition are attempts at revealing unjust relations and privileges and political calls for abolishing them. In this manner, my paper reaches to the very basis of structures (i.e., to the formation of social relations and appearance of distances and connects them to political activities and practices of repartition employed). I claim that the experiences of unjust differences created the divisions in Poland and, therefore, repartitioning practices (which includes politics). In the repartitioning theory proposed, the objective is to explain one of the forms of politicization of social divisions. The majority of inequalities and divisions arising are subject to politicization that varies in form and intensity. However, not all of them are politicized by means of repartitions. In this paper, I demonstrate that the divisions are conditioned upon the structure condition, inequalities, registers of wrongs and factors present at an individual level, as well as subtle meanings that individuals assign to them. At the same time, the analysis showed that repartitions are employed in two cases: when there are significant and noticeable inequalities between groups and when differences disappear, and homogenisation progresses. A “homogeneous” society increases the likelihood of the application of repartitions, usually through the “underlining” of hidden partitions aimed at destroying that homogeneity. This applies to the democratic order in particular. Political actors reach for such measures when the social structure is characterised by profound differences, when it is nearly homogeneous and, also, when a specific lifestyle model is imposed on minorities. The existence of a homogeneous society does not exclude taking advantage of these practices. On the contrary, it basically “invites” them to be included in the discourse. That is why repartitions are also “instruments” used for controlling social space and “healing” relations. They lead to a controlled change while, at the same time, not being one, and that is one of the major findings of this paper. In the analysis, I introduce notions that constitute theoretical assumptions for the subject matter discussed, make it more understandable and enable preparing the whole concept of divisions and practices. In this paper, society is a social space that keeps becoming, that is, a network of social relations. I consider the notions of society—relations identical, 2004, p. 11; and they appear interchangeably in this paper (Domanski, ´ Sztompka, 1989; Wasilewski, 2006, p. 47). I differentiate between the occurrence of objective inequalities and the subjective reception of objective condition of structures, as well as between the historically formed

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social divisions and the practices of repartition recreating them. These practices are discursive creations that depend on the condition of the surroundings. They hold control and sustain or undermine existing privileges, which makes them types of well-developed change implementation projects. In this paper, I omit the issue of the “translation” of divisions into the party system and their impact on competition between parties—this is due to the fact that, at present, there is still no evidence that the divisions (also as presented in this paper) determine the form of the party system. It turns out that “the political entrepreneurs organise only some of the social divisions into political ‘sides’ and parties, expressed in programs in activities, while others remain dormant” (Grabowska, 2004, p. 257). Another reason is that it is a separate research question that goes beyond the issues presented in this paper. I also do not involve myself in seeking the lines of political division and do not answer the question of how individual divisions impacted the role, successes or failures of individual parties. I am searching for facts in the discourse that explain the mechanisms of the formation of divisions and creation of practices. I am also looking for confirmation of theoretical conclusions and, therefore, anchoring my deliberations in post-1945 Polish politics. This work provides an empirical basis for the repartition theory. However, as it lacks complete verification, I am presenting it in the form of a dynamic interpretation scheme (Karwat, 2011, pp. 78–79). The research question of this paper required returning to the processes of Communist-era homogenisation, when totalitarian communist authorities generated the “us”–“them” division, striving to build an “equal” society. I take these processes into account and return to them because this paper describes the continuity of change in Poland, taking place despite attempts at applying discontinuous development that were made during different periods. I remind them as the struggle against social divisions and the formation of new ones had even started in Poland before the end of World War II. They have been continued for decades up to the present day. One of the features of changes experienced by society was the conviction that striving to abolish inequalities would lead to the formation of relations based on justice. This conviction seems persistent, but its strength was changing over time. Thanks to returning to the post-war period, the compilation of sources employed was extensive. All of them, including compilations of political and historical facts and the inductive method of theory building, formed

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the source and methodological base for the research. It consists of scientific literature regarding the social structure and transformation of Polish society during the years 1945–2022. This literature is very abundant, although some of it has ideological influences that refer to multiple theoretical and empirical approaches, including Marxism. The literature on the subject, irrespective of its ideological influences, allows the formation of the fundamental inequalities and division to be recreated—both after World War II and in later decades. It allows noticing “revolutionary interventions” in the structure, aiming at liquidating one division and creating others. This does not mean, however, that only the political interventions generated social distances. I took advantage of the knowledge of structuralisation and social classes—as well as of both Marx’s and Weber’s approach—according to the historical period in which they were employed to analyse the social structure. When discussing social structure, I employ notions from a given historical period as they constitute a part of scientific temporal awareness. I recognise their impact on politics and the repartitions employed. This paper is based on the empirical and theoretical achievements of scholars dealing with the structure and condition of Polish society. It is also based on works of authors from outside of Poland that touch upon socio-political divisions, including the reflections of Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan (1967), reflections of Stein Rokkan (1970), concepts of Scott C. Flanagan (1980), Ronald Inglehart (1984), Stefano Bartolini and Peter Mair (1990), Amory Gethin et al. (2021) and those of Oddbjørn Knutsen and Elinor Scarbrough (1995). Some special inspiration was provided by the works of Herbert Kitschelt (1989, 1992) and the theoretical solutions of Ryszard Herbut (1997, 1999), Radosław Markowski (2000), Radosław Markowski and Ben Stanley (2016), Mirosława Grabowska (2004, 2021), Agnieszka Figiel (2009), Piotr Obacz (2018, 2021), Tomasz Zarycki (2000, 2007) and other scholars (Bejma, 2013; Borowiec, 2021; Cze´snik & Kotnarowski, 2011; Górka, 2009; Klepka, 2013; Kwiatkowska, 2010; Letki, 2013; Łukowski & Sadowski, 2013). All the works listed constituted the basis for research, but I do not refer to them further on. The analysis was built around the chronological line of events and a comparison of temporally distant events. It focuses on a process approach to recognising events taking place and striving for generalisation. What the whole of this paper and its considerations have in common is the two great social experiments—the first one starting in the 1940s, the second

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one in the 1990s. In both cases, the intention was to “change the social life in line with a more or less specified vision of a society” (Blok, 1994, p. 17), with greater or lesser social acceptance—both instrumentally and politically—to destroy the social division or recreate them in line with ideological templates and selected concepts of justice.

References Adam Michnik: Komorowski przegra wybory tylko, je´sli pijany przejedzie na pasach zakonnice w ci˛azy. ˙ (2015, January 5). http://wiadomosci.wp.pl/ kat,1342,title,Adam-Michnik-Komorowski-przegra-wybory-tylko-jesli-pijanyprzejedzie-na-pasach-zakonnice-w-ciazy,wid,17154951,wiadomosc.html?tic aid=1141d0. Accessed 6 January 2015. Bartolini, S., & Mair, P. (1990). Identity, Competition and Electoral Availability: The Stabilisation of European Electorates 1885–1985. Cambridge University Press. Bejma, A. (2013). Od afery Rywina do katastrofy smolenskiej ´ – nowe (utrwalone) podziały społeczno-polityczne w Polsce. Studia Politologiczne, 29, 112–132. Blok, Z. (1994). Transformacja systemowa jako proces i jako przedmiot badan. ´ In K. Zamiara (Ed.), Społeczna transformacja w refleksji humanistycznej. Wydawnictwo Fundacji Humaniora. Borowiec, P. (2021). Podziały społeczne i ich upolitycznienie jako przykłady toksycznych struktur władzy? Wrocławskie Studia Politologiczne, 30, 75–94. Cze´snik, M., & Kotnarowski, M. (2011). Nowy wymiar politycznego współzawodnictwa: Polska solidarna versus Polska liberalna. Studia Polityczne, 27 , 129–158. Domanski, ´ H. (2002). O ograniczeniach badan´ nad struktura˛ społeczna. ˛ Wydawnictwo IFiS PAN. Domanski, ´ H. (2004). Struktura społeczna. Wydawnictwo Naukowe “Scholar”. Figiel, A. (2009). J˛ezyki IV RP. Podziały społeczno-polityczne w dyskursie polityki. Wydawnictwo Wydziału Nauk Społecznych UAM. Flanagan, C. S. (1980). Value Cleavages, Economic Cleavages and the Japanese Voter. American Journal of Political Science, 24(2), 177–206. Gethin, A., Martínez-Toledano, C., & Piketty, T. (Eds.). (2021). Political Cleavages and Social Inequalities. A Study of Fifty Democracies, 1948–2020. Harvard University Press. Górka, M. (2009). Kształtowanie si˛e politycznych biegunów w polskim systemie partyjnym w latach 2005–2007. Politeja, 12, 57–74. Grabowska, M. (2004). Podział postkomunistyczny. Społeczne podstawy polityki po 1989 roku. Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar.

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Grabowska, M. (2021). The Post-communist Cleavage. Social Bases of Politics in Poland After 1989. Peter Lang. Herbut, R. (1997). Podziały socjopolityczne w Europie Zachodniej. Charakter i struktura. In A. Antoszewski & R. Herbut (Eds.), Demokracje zachodnioeuropejskie. Analiza porównawcza. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego. Herbut, R. (1999). Podziały socjopolityczne. Studia z Teorii Polityki, I , 105– 116. Inglehart, R. (1984). The Changing Structure of Political Cleavages in Western Society. In J. R. Dalton, C. S. Flanagan, & A. P. Beck (Eds.), Electroral Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies: Realignment or Dealignment. Princeton University Press. Karwat, M. (2011). Rodzaje teorii w nauce o polityce. In Z. Blok (Ed.), Czym jest teoria w politologii? Dom Wydawniczy Elipsa. Kitschelt, H. (1989). The Logics of Party Formation. Ecological Politics in Belgium and West Germany. Cornell Univeristy Press. Kitschelt, H. (1992, March). The Formation of Party Systems in East Central Europe. Politics and Society, 20/1, 7–50. Klepka, R. (2013). Podziały elit politycznych jako kryterium periodyzacji okresu III RP. In J. Sielski, J. Mizgalski, & J. Hajduk (Eds.), Polska mi˛edzy przeszło´scia˛ a przyszło´scia. ˛ Wydawnictwo Akademii im. Jana Długosza. Knutsen, O., & Scarbrough, E. (1995). Cleavage Politics. In J. W. van Deth & E. Scarbrough (Eds.), The Impact of Values. Oxfod University Press. Kwiatkowska, K. (2010). Polska solidarna – Polska liberalna. Przykład sztucznego podziału rzeczywisto´sci w działaniach propagandowych. Acta Humana, 1, 113–124. Letki, N. (2013). Social Divisions Explain Political Choices? The Case of Poland. In G. Evans & D. N. de Graaf (Eds.), Political Choice Matters: Explaining the Strength of Class and Religious Cleavages in Cross-National Perspective. Oxford University Press. Lipset, M. S., & Rokkan, S. (1967). Cleavage Structures. Party Systems, and Volter Alignments: An Introducion. In S. M. Lipset & S. Rokkan (Eds.), Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives. The Free Press. Łukowski, W., & Sadowski, I. (2013). Podział społeczno-polityczny w Polsce. Kilka Uwag Teoretycznych. Studia Politologiczne, 29, 11–36. Markowski, R. (2000). Rozłamy socjopolityczne w zamy´sle klasyków, o tym, jak ich rozumiano, poprawiano i testowano. Studia Polityczne, 10, 7–44. Markowski, R., & Stanley, B. (2016). Rozłamy socjopolityczne w Polsce: Iluzja czy rzeczywisto´sc´ ? Studia Socjologiczne, 4, 17–40. Marody, M. (1991). Działania jednostek a system społeczny. In M. Marody (Ed.), Co nam zostało z tych lat… Społeczenstwo ´ polskie u progu zmiany systemowej. Aneks.

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Obacz, P. (2018). Podział „Polska solidarna - Polska liberalna” w s´wietle wybranych koncepcji pluralizmu politycznego. Wydawnictwo Libron. Obacz, P. (2021). Podział społeczno-polityczny w Polsce i jego przejawy w parlamentarnej kampanii wyborczej 2019 roku. In P. Borowiec & A. Tyszkiewicz (Eds.), Kampania parlamentarna 2019 roku. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellonskiego. ´ Rokkan, S. (1970). Citizens, Elections, Parties. Approaches to the Comparative Study of the Processes of Development. Universitetsforlaget. ´ Swida-Ziemba, H. (1998). Człowiek wewn˛etrznie zniewolony. Problemy psychosocjologiczne minionej formacji. Uniwersytet Warszawski. Sztompka, P. (1989). Poj˛ecie struktury społecznej, próba uogólnienia. Studia Socjologiczne, 3, 51–65. Wasilewski, J. (2006). Formowanie si˛e nowej struktury społecznej. In J. Wasilewski (Ed.), Współczesne społeczenstwo ´ polskie. Dynamika zmian. Wydawnictwo Naukowe “Scholar”. Zarycki, T. (2000). Politics in the Periphery: Political Cleavages in Poland Interpreted in Their Historical and International Context. Europe-Asia Studies, 52(5), 851–873. Zarycki, T. (2007). W poszukiwaniu peryferii. Teoria podziałów politycznych Lipseta - Rokkana w kontek´scie polskim. In M. Dajnowicz (Ed.), Oblicze polityczne regionów Polski. Wydawnictwo WSFiZ.

CHAPTER 2

The First Structural Experiment: Communist-Era Homogenisation

Ideological and Political Reasons for Interfering with the Structure, and the Patterns of That Interference Had there been a necessity to describe the structure of the Polish society directly after the end of World War II using a single word, the most fitting one would have been “broken”. Its precise image was unobtainable at that time given the lack of complete knowledge of the extent of wartime losses and destruction. Besides, it was simply not necessary then as other objectives—the recreation of social life, rebuilding of the country and overcoming poverty and supply shortages—were far more important (Jarosz, 2002). However, if anyone had accepted such a task, they would have failed due to a lack of certain data. The five years of war brought the society [at that time] a previously unknown degree of suffering and population losses, as well as a biological (Roszkowski, 2010) and financial disaster. War was a traumatic experience, and the social fabric was in a critical biological condition (Kersten, 2018). For every thousand Polish citizens as of 1939, 220 people died—murdered by Soviet and German occupiers or due to other causes. What was the society that had been destroyed in a structure like, then? Clearly, it was rife with social divisions and enclosed within numerous hierarchies and inequalities (Zagórski, 1978, pp. 37–54). It experienced noticeable distances, generated conflicts and organised strikes and social © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 P. Borowiec, The Politicization of Social Divisions in Post-War Poland, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-26530-3_2

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events. The war destroyed an order that was characterised by wrongs and social injustice, one in which unjust relations were accepted, justified and effectively sustained. It was a world where ethnic and religious inequalities were present next to economic distances. However, demands for creating just relations also appeared together with calls for rejecting social pathologies. The country, reborn in 1918, was taking intensive actions to introduce social and economic changes. It initiated and conducted changes towards industrialisation and urbanisation, performing limited but indispensable social destructuralisation. The number of industrial workers employed was growing systematically in the newly developed industrial centres. However, the social structure was dominated by farmers and farmworkers employed in large manors. Agriculture was the core of the contemporary economic system (Wesołowski et al., 2017, p. 41). In 1939, 75% of the Polish population lived in the countryside, with farmers and farmworkers constituting 55% of the 35 million citizens of Poland. Industrial workers—who later became the shapers of history—constituted 27.5% of the population, bourgeoisie—11%, intelligentsia—over 5%, larger entrepreneurs—1%, and landed classes—about 0.4% (Dziurok et al., 2014, pp. 43–52). The above-mentioned groups were internally diverse, mainly in economic terms. Social disproportions were running deep—an example of which may be the distance between the majority of groups and the entrepreneurs and landed classes or the economic and cultural rift between the farmers and farmworkers and the intelligentsia. There were also certain similarities between them—an example of which can be the similar living standard of farmers, farmworkers and industrial workers (Turski et al., 1978, p. 81). The society of that time had extreme faces—on the one hand, small privileged groups; on the other, numerous and large handicapped groups. When it comes to nationality, the situation resembled a multicultural mosaic that is hard to create because of the ambiguous ethnic affiliation of some of the inhabitants. In some of the people living in the territory of a country that was being patched together after World War I, national awareness was barely forming. Over 68% of the population declared Polish identity. The subsequent most numerous groups were: Ukrainians—over 15%, Jews—8.5%, Belarusians—over 3% and Germans—over 2%. The remaining ones were: Russians, Lithuanians, Czechs, Romani, a few Slovaks and Karaites and certain ethnic groups linguistically similar to Ukrainians (Boykos, Lemkos, Hutsuls), as well as Polonised Armenians

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and Tatars. Social differentiation was the highest among Poles. It is estimated that they constituted: 60% of all farmers and farmworkers, 75– 80% of industrial workers, about 80% of the intelligentsia, about 40% of the bourgeoisie and 50% of entrepreneurs. Polish nationality was also dominant among landed classes. The majority of Poles were Catholic, and only a small part was Protestant. Ukrainians, who usually worked in agriculture, were mostly Greek Catholic. A similar religious structure was dominant among Belarusians, who were either Eastern Orthodox or Catholic. The Belarusian population was characterised by the highest percentage of the illiterate. The majority of Jews, who constituted 21% of the urban population, were followers of Judaism. They spoke Yiddish and Polish, engaged in various professions and had a significant share of entrepreneurs, lawyers and doctors. As much as 55% of doctors in Poland were Jewish (Dziurok et al., 2014, pp. 43–52). What remained of that society after the war and the forced resettlements or migrations resulting from the international political arrangements? (Kersten, 2018, p. 201). The consequences of these processes can be noticed when discussing the social structure, but at the same time can only be presented in approximation. Since some Polish citizens remained outside the new borders at the Eastern Borderlands, all the data is approximate. In 1946, the population of the country was 23.9 million people, which means that it decreased by over 30%. Nowadays, the population losses of the Second Polish Republic are estimated to be about 2.8 million casualties of Polish nationality and 2.7–2.9 million of Jewish nationality, bringing the total losses of the Polish state to about 5.5–5.7 million people (Roszkowski, 2010, pp. 84– 85). Other nationalities living in the pre-war territory of Poland also suffered losses. In total, national minorities constituted about 2% of the population after the war. Thus, the war and the post-war resettlements formed a nearly uniform society in terms of ethnicity (Eberhardt, 2000, p. 79). Among all the groups that composed the pre-war structure, the intelligentsia suffered the greatest losses, which stemmed from the landed classes and bourgeoisie. Similarly to the case of the Jewish population, it is also possible to talk of planned extermination with regard to the intelligentsia. The losses among this last group exceeded the average, reaching up to 58% among lawyers, 38% among doctors and 28% of professors and higher education facility employees (Palska, 1994, p. 39). Population

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losses also translated into a transformation of the religious structure, with the Roman Catholic denomination becoming dominant in the territory of Poland after 1945. While the war damaged the hierarchical organisation of Polish society, the post-war political and economic changes constituted a ruthless transformation of it. They often took the form of actual physical elimination of whole social groups, and the decision regarding ideology and poli2008, tics became the main structure-building factor (Wnuk-Lipinski, ´ p. 57). Their objective was changing the unjust, pre-war structure and removing all its distances, differing interests, conflicts and antagonisms. The tasks to be carried out included a revolution of relations leading to the creation of new socialist relations and building a social space based on equality—all in the name of justice and dignity of the previously wronged. A social experiment started to be implemented in which the structure became an indicator of the effectiveness of changes. Thus, the concept of a flattened structure of a classless society was promoted, aimed at finally ending exploitation among people. When it comes to the everyday life of individuals, the new authorities undertook meeting the material needs of everyone (Kolarska-Bobinska ´ & Rychard, 1990, p. 5) according to the social justice principle of: “to everyone according to their needs” ´ 2010, p. 38). (Swida-Ziemba, The aims mentioned were ideologised and both ambitious and wishful, which determined the practical measures employed for furthering them. The new order was supposed to be built using the available models— Marxist social theory, scientific socialism and Soviet experiences. It would be impossible to achieve that without taking advantage of Leninist concepts, including the practical actions described using the statement/method of: “taking shortcuts without paying attention to costs”. In practice, all the means to an end became acceptable, including physical violence against opponents and a radical political and economic change to the social structure (Mokrzycki, 1997, p. 34) achieved through industrialisation. A radical reconstruction of awareness was also performed—a supervised and purposeful indoctrination aimed at building an obedient society that would take actions beneficial to those in power. The power takeover was commenced on the go, without waiting for the war to end, using nearly 300,000 Soviet soldiers (Jezierski & 1995, p. 166) present on the Polish territory. Their presLeszczynska, ´ ence was decisive for the effectiveness of the introduction of the new authorities. These actions were anchored in the image of the “eternal”

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friendship with the Soviet Union, which was hailed as the model of relations in every sphere of social life (Fik, 1989, p. 158). However, designing the new order based on the Soviet model—and according to the templates (Hirszowicz, 2001, p. 106) from beyond the eastern border—did not arouse too much enthusiasm in Polish society. To most Poles, “the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) was a country of poverty and enslavement of the society” (Jarosz & Pasztor, 1995, p. 111). Internal circumstances facilitated a power takeover. The communists were supported by a part of society that previously experienced discrimination and exclusion. However, those people expected social advancement in exchange for providing political support. The majority of society remained “beyond these changes” and had no impact on their shape (Gawin, 2005, p. 108). It was also not inclined to support them. Society was also “disciplined” by the local supporters, whose numbers were growing systematically. In practice, they carried out military, political and repressive actions per the guidelines received. In 1947, the security agencies alone employed about 100,000 people. The number of supporters of the new order was over 1.4 million people at the end of the following year—this was the number of members of the Polish United Workers’ Party (PZPR) (Grabowska, 2004, p. 101). The road to the new order was built on repressions and elimination of the anti-communist underground (Szpakowski, 1996, pp. 14–79) in prisons of the Security Office (UB), which continued until mid-1950s (Paczkowski, 1996, p. 270). In 1950, there were about 35,000 people imprisoned due to political reasons (Kostewicz, 1996, pp. 121–178). Additionally, those years also saw the arrest of a few hundred thousand farmers and farmworkers for delays in providing obligatory supplies, or for resistance against the collectivisation enforced (Dudek & Zblewski, 2012, p. 82). All of these repressions contributed to the experience of injustice being a part of the abundant record of wrongs caused by communism. The scale of persecution rose until the end of the Stalin era. Both declared, and potential opponents were being eliminated ruthlessly (Jarosz & Pasztor, 1995, p. 14). Those who refused to support the new regime and did not accept it were intimidated. The authorities employed arrests and mock trials, while those of “improper origin” and opponents of the new order were denied and deprived of work. Anyone who could stand in the way of the regime was supervised. Fear, also that for the safety of one’s family, was employed to enforce conformity, fingerpointing and making false accusations against fellow workers. Any positive

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“memories” of the previous social system were considered a threat and, therefore, the authorities attempted to oust them from the collective consciousness. Pre-war pluralism and democracy were ridiculed, existing social ties were destroyed (together with public confidence) and the intelligentsia and artistic communities were put under supervision. In the countryside, the farmer’s self-government institutions were being abolished (Styk, 1990, p. 151), medical chambers were dissolved and the so-called “landed class” (i.e., owners of large manors) were wiped from 1955, p. 8). Any individualism was being extinguished history (Kuzinski, ´ ´ 2010), replaced by organisational unity among youths (Swida-Ziemba, (Dudek & Zblewski, 2012, p. 90) and unity of thought and action. The main part of the legitimisation of communists relied on the ideological vision of a perfect future, which was presented as feasible and devoid of alternatives (Duda, 2010, p. 28). It was referred to as the ´ 2010, p. 51). Without ideology of historical necessity (Swida-Ziemba, it, it would have been impossible to carry out any activities on such a major scale. The order being formed, which was supposed to reflect this vision, was confined within a dichotomously simplified contraposition— a confrontation between “good” and “evil”. With time, this dichotomy ´ 1998, became dominant among the definitions of reality (Swida-Ziemba, p. 289) and evaluation/interpretations of the issues faced by the order. This unidimensional form of evaluation was applied to individuals as well. The vision of the change being implemented was legitimised through examples of pathological relation from the times before the war: “One of the strengths of the communist vision of the world was its radical opposition against social inequalities and the irrationality of the capitalist economy” (Hirszowicz, 2001, p. 9). Such a vision was an attractive choice for many people and was considered a valuable alternative. Additionally, the propaganda made false simplifications and reinterpretations by “imposing” new, ideological evaluations on pre-war relations. All communication was supplemented with images of the future filled with hope. They were used to create ideological “frameworks” that were difficult to undermine and convince a part of society. Using the images of injustice, pre-war relations were “expropriated” from individuals and future, equality-based relations were elevated instrumentally. The capitalist past was given worthless, negative meanings and the status of evil—outside of a few examples of positive activity such as the proletariat’s struggle against capitalism.

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Egalitarian order was supported by selected resources of social memory (i.e., examples from the past). However, the examples of wrongdoings and poverty referred to were not a propagandist product or mystification—they were scenes from the everyday life of many individuals during the interwar period (Kochanowicz, 2010, pp. 153–180), experiences that were survived and remembered, thus sustaining the need to abolish social injustice. The wartime experiences only strengthened those demands. Therefore, the relations from the period of the Second Polish Republic had few defenders, although it was not a unidirectional process to which everyone submitted. Many individuals were convinced that history favoured communism and that the future would belong to it. Audacious declarations confirmed this regarding the ability to shape the new order and its scope (Hirszowicz, 2001, p. 83), described in the form of a collective objective. However, there was also a part of society that was anchored around positive memories and evaluations of the past. That is why it is so difficult to determine the degree of contemporary social approval for building non-antagonistic relations. The pre-war wrongs were the fundamental source of legitimisation of the actions that the communists carried out and kept exploiting it for decades. The injustice was supposed to originate from capitalism and its ownership structure, presented concerning the means of production. Its segments (i.e., the capital owners and the supporters of exploitation) survived the war and threatened the formation of the new order, allegedly. Thus, eliminating those people who sustained ownership relations, inequalities and divisions was a political task. That partially retained hierarchy of actual divisions, identical to the pre-war structure, also became a target of the change postulated by the communists. The decision to transform the structure and abolish the hierarchies inherited was made “in the name” of the majority of society by a minority controlled by representatives of the Soviet Union. Thus, it was an imposed change (Leder, 2014, p. 7) that ignored all social costs as those were necessary to incur in the struggle for a better future. The reconstruction, in line with the ideological assumptions, brought about tremendous social and economic costs. For many people, it meant losing their livelihood, abandoning their values, standards and customs, and also abandoning their religious beliefs under political pressure. It caused many personal tragedies and led to people moving to the underground, joining the armed struggle, emigrating or attempting to fit in. The changes commenced also led to capitulation (i.e., acceptance of the

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enforced rules of living by individuals). The negative consequences were particularly noticeable in local communities. They were plagued by chaos, lawlessness, dominance of the strong and previously unknown distrust. The changes meant leaving the old relations behind and learning new ones. For a large part of society, the communist revolution was a tragedy touching upon the foundations of existential functioning. It was even so where the attitude towards the change was positive—as in the case of those farmers and farmworkers who acquiesced to the change. To many of them, the actions carried out meant success, advancement in the professional structure, privileges and, often, easier access to goods plagued by shortages. Forming the state in line with the new model was taking place as a result of radically quick actions. Accelerating the rate of change was a strategy that fitted the Marxist concept of history, leading to complete political control and enabling structural transformations (Wesołowski, 1989, p. 6). Changes were introduced unexpectedly under the principle of unconditional acceptance. This acceleration was also a part of the propaganda messages offered to society. It had an intensive presence in the language that described the actions performed. The slogans of “race with time” and calls for taking advantage of a historical moment characterised the strategy applied. The acceleration of political and social transformations was confirmed through the language used in the discourse, which was supposed to assure the recipients that the course of history was accelerated and keep faith in the imminence of changes and effectiveness of the authorities. The method of quickly imposed solutions limited opposition in society. Time became considered as an invaluable revolutionary resource that was useful for transforming and supervising society. The management of social time was visible in the propaganda slogans, such as that about the ceaseless “increase of the tempo of socialist construction” or the constant struggle with time to benefit society. Presenting changes as inevitable and impossible to avoid was combined with references to the Enlightenment. A part of this was the integration of the communist changes with the course of progress, improvement and continuation of the march of reason through history. The ideologically interpreted sense of history, the “historical necessity”, was where the sense of changes and the hope for them coming true were perceived to be confirmed. The holistic project introduced constituted a challenge but also testified to the bravery of the authorities. It demonstrated their self-confidence and that they had the indispensable knowledge required

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for starting the mechanism of change at their disposal. The authorities claimed that the “might of the human mind” was employed to abolish social inequalities. The society development mechanisms additionally guaranteed the certainty described by Marx, including the conviction of having discovered the economic rights governing various orders. The project being implemented was supposed to become a triumph of reason ´ 2010, p. 44) science over and the Marxist-Leninist (Swida-Ziemba, tradition, dogmas and all kinds of superstitions and religions. The activities previously carried out in Soviet Russia were the principal model for the Polish revolution. They were employed in both internal and external politics (Opulski, 2016, p. 11). Using them was considered an obligation, which was aimed at ensuring that the right path that guarantees success is followed, the same one that was trodden on by the builders of the first worker state. This strategy led to Stalinism being implemented at first and then being condemned and abandoned—similar to what happened in the USSR. Copying was made a long-term method of rebuilding reality, and the proper “reading of the template”—was considered a method for enduring and participating in politics. The remaining pre-war social structure was subjected to radical and immediate change. It became the object of propaganda and an instrument of control over society. The inherited structure was defined as a system of constituents: capitalists, landed classes, workers, the internationally stratified class of small-scale farmers and farmworkers, the internally non-uniform and numerous bourgeoisie and the internally varied intel1965, p. 10). The task was to eliminate the ligentsia (Szczepanski, ´ elements of the structure that were not in line with Marxist ideology and remove the antagonistic relations between classes, economic inequalities and the dominance of all kinds of owners. It was visible most clearly in the economic sphere—in the prepared plan of “takeover” of industry and agriculture in order for them to become “owned by the nation” (Zaremba, 2001, p. 148). This was to be achieved by changing ownership relations and socialising the means of production. The party-based system of management introduced was supposed to ensure control over ownership on the part of society. Controlling the development—that is, utilising the existing resources rationally and the supervision of these resources carried out by the central government—was described by the assumptions of the new economic order. In practice, this meant not only the nationalisation of privately owned establishments but also their destruction and

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wastage (Leszczynski, ´ 2013), as well as pushing the private property to the margin of the state’s economic structure. The radical liquidation of capitalist hierarchies was to be the beginning of the social justice system. Socialist relations were supposed to be formed due to “transformation” of individuals and their acceptance of new standards and values. At first, the revolution took advantage of the “communist human being” concept, the foundations of which had already been presented in 1924 by Leon Trotsky (Baczko, 1994, p. 144). In general, it focused on the elevation of egalitarianism and humanism and promised the continuation of the Promethean myth (Mazur, 2009). At the same time, it referred to the template prepared by the Marxist ideology. According to it, the whole life of individuals and society was to be subordinated to introducing new ideological solutions (Chojnacki, 2018, p. 149) and implementing a previously designed plan. An individual was supposed to be determined and ready to sacrifice their life for the cause, convinced of the justness of the choices made and working intensely for the common good. Additionally, they were supposed to be capable of finding “the (one and only) right way” (Zwierzchowski, 2000, p. 13). An individual’s devotion to the cause of socialism was supposed to manifest itself in motivations and the actions taken, which was possible as a result of the increase in revolutionary awareness and was useful in both political and ideological struggle. This awareness was supposed to enable that individual to dispose of the desirable convictions and attitudes (Mazur, 2009, p. 10). “The new consciousness planned to be formed in the minds of Polish people was actually supposed to take over the propaganda slogans. The propaganda was to raise a new human being exhibiting characteristics of the ‘communist morality’, such as internationalism and patriotism (as understood by the communists, obviously), the primacy of public interest over private one, being active and working 2006, p. 8). To form this consciousness, all the efficiently” (Czyzniewski, ˙ instruments and methods available were employed. For instance, the ideas of a nation, patriotism, sacrifice or responsibility for the fate of the socialist community were used instrumentally for elevating collective objectives over individual objectives and interests. They all formed a catalogue of model activity and politically desirable and useful behaviour.

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National Unity as an Instrument for Integration and Exclusion It turned out very quickly that eliminating political opponents does not guarantee political security and the full extent of power. The authorities realised that administering legitimisation is indispensable even in an order without any opposition. For these reasons, they very often took advantage of various legitimisation strategies, including the propaganda that underlined patriotic and national values and references. They strived to obtain the full support of society and to be able to administer support for change projects and methods of implementing them. However, despite numerous actions, they still lacked social credibility and political support. To gain control over society, a complete separation from the Western world and limitation of contact with bourgeoisie culture was enforced. The authorities limited discussion and exchange of ideas within the country and even within their own political camp (Mazur, 2009, p. 195), which eventually prevented the verification of information communicated to society. In such an isolated order, manipulation, lies and all other useful propaganda tools were employed in the fight for the “soul of Poles”. A part of this process was increasing the control over the media and eliminating competing sources of information, but that did not guarantee success either. Manipulating information and creating messages favouring the authorities during the Stalin era was made “one of the most important weapons in the battle for gaining and maintaining power” (Czyzniewski, ˙ 2006, p. 258). Using propaganda, the authorities tried to form a society that would be more friendly towards them. Attempts were also made to “Polonise” propaganda—a foreign word with many negative connotations—as akcja zjednawcza (support-winning campaign), which perfectly demonstrated what kind of hopes were placed in it. The propaganda aimed simply to win over society—it was a fundamental weapon in the battle for support. One of the primary tasks of monopolist communication was forming the “conviction of persistence and stability of the authorities” 2006, p. 9). In this message, it was underlined that the (Czyzniewski, ˙ order being built is based on values that are fundamental to the lives of individuals, assigning only positive evaluations to the reality created and, at the same time, elevating the activities contributing to building a just order. It presented sets of ready-made answers to long-standing questions about the causes of poverty, the fall of man and the sources of conflicts

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and inequalities, including the question of where the causes of society’s misery lie. These explanations met the need of the individuals to have a simple and systematised vision of order, of what happens and of what the contemporary struggle was about. In the public discourse, the message disseminated was that the order being created is “on the common man’s side”. The individual experience of wrongs was skilfully transformed into dreams of a better world. Sometimes the tasks undertaken were extremely difficult and required a great deal of belief in the new order. An example of that can be the attempts to explain to society in 1952 that the fact that all of the election candidates originate from a single political force is not only compatible with democracy, but even an expression of its highest 2006, p. 11). form (Czyzniewski, ˙ The control over information was a part of a mechanism of total control over social life. The authorities considered some of the information a threat to the order being formed, which is the reason for their selective treatment of historical events and any accounts of the past— especially those regarding the history of the Polish state. Manipulation also encompassed relatively recent events that were a part of the history of the new order being created. An example is hiding information about the 2006, p. 9) Soviet army helping with the power takeover (Czyzniewski, ˙ or falsely ascribing certain actions to political opponents. The authorities conveyed false information not only to society, but even to their own party apparatus. In the political structure, there was a rule that the higher a given individual was in the party structure, the more information they were receiving: “The people standing lower in the party and state hierarchy received information ‘more sparingly’. In most cases, they had to settle for half-truths, guesswork and assumptions” (Jarosz & Pasztor, 1995, p. 14). In their propaganda, the authorities used newspeak intensively 2009), and its meaning and characteristics evolved over time. (Głowinski, ´ Trivialities, obvious facts and simple catchphrases describing the new ideals and values received the status of revealed truths for which society supposedly had waited for decades. They became signposts, motivators and powerful justifications for the objectives pursued and the activity forms employed. The messages of revolution reached everyone and, thanks to the information monopoly, tore into the previously unavailable social spaces by anchoring themselves effectively in science, politics and everyday interactions. Their effectiveness stemmed partially from the fact that they were presented as scientific knowledge resources, thus

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increasing their strength. Another reason was the impossibility of verifying the information that the messages included. Meanwhile, scientific knowledge, especially historical, was being manipulated. Numerous examples of class struggle were found in the past that were supposed to confirm that it is a force that drives social changes. The Marxist concept, enriched with Lenin’s thought, was made the model in research and for making comparisons. The Marxist concept of social structure and the theory of social class became a sort of theoretical “frameworks” and templates for analysing society. The authorities obtained legitimisation through manipulation by generating strong emotions, inciting fear, anxiety or pathos and controlling everything impossible to previously control. They were apt at creating a reality based on imaginations with new hierarchies of values, and strived to form an atmosphere conducive to exercising their power, which was useful from the point of view of their interests. At first, the authorities tried to keep the appearance of post-war Poland as a democratic country, which is why there was no radical opposition against the foundations of the society’s identity. During the years 1944–1947, even contact with Christian symbolism was maintained, Catholic church bishops were ´ 2010, p. 68) invited to participate in state ceremonies (Swida-Ziemba, and there was no interference in the religious sphere of party activists. Memorial services for the souls of communist militiamen fallen in battle were still allowed (Os˛eka, 2007, p. 45). The authorities maintained an ideological relationship between the Christian ideology and the fight of the exploited classes for their rights, which was supposed to confirm the grass-roots origin of the latter. Being close to the people, the local authorities and the central ones were supposed to legitimise the communists. Its purpose was also to undermine the spreading rumours of their external, anti-national origin. To reinforce their legitimisation, the authorities referred to both Christian and patriotic-national values. At first, the representatives of the new government did not shy away from participating en masse (Osóbka-Morawski, 1981). They referred to deeply rooted community symbols in the form of the national colours, the national anthem or distinguished historical figures: Mikołaj Kopernik, Adam Mickiewicz or Tadeusz Ko´sciuszko (Zaremba, 2001, p. 121). They also referred to selected events such as the Battle of Grunwald or national insurrections and persons easy to affiliate with communism, such as Jakub Szela, Rev. ´ Piotr Sciegienny or Edward Dembowski. However, they did not limit

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themselves to reminding them, but carried out intensive manipulation. They described the course of many events in a way contrary to the facts or claimed that Adam Mickiewicz himself was fighting for socialism. What they were doing was a certain “perfecting” of symbols by adjusting them to new times and challenges. They transformed the national emblem, depriving the eagle of its crown, or skilfully combined the communist movement with the symbolism of Worker’s Day (1st May). They also reached out to values and resources that were less rooted in the social consciousness and totally new ones. An example of that is the celebration of the National Day of the Rebirth of Poland (22nd July), Polish Armed Forces Day (12th October) and anniversaries of events related to revolutionary Soviet leaders—Vladimir Lenin or Joseph Stalin. Some historical facts and characters that were inconvenient to the new ideology were “killed with silence” or aptly depreciated by the authorities in line with the message: “What we do not celebrate did not happen” (Os˛eka, 2007, p. 56). The new heroes of the collective memory originated from the “working masses of cities and countryside” and were often activists of the party apparatus, usually “people and events of little significance, but 2006, p. 176). ideologically catchy” (Czyzniewski, ˙ The character of certain relations between the authorities and society is perfectly shown by the course of the contemporary ceremonies and rituals related to the new order (Miernik, 2007, p. 123). It was the leaders of the Polish Committee of National Liberation (PKWN) (in 1944) who had already attached particular weight to symbols and rituals, noticing their major significance for achieving the goals assumed, gaining the support of masses and control over them and for enforcing subordination. Significant events were not only celebrated, but also had specific scenarios of ceremonies and rituals elaborated for them. Ceremonies were purposefully prepared with properly assigned roles for the communist leader and the population. The observers’ behaviour was divided into roles, and they were assigned certain expected reactions to play. The scenarios envisaged symptoms of “spontaneity” of participants and the occurrence of bottomup initiatives confirming the approval for the whole order (Os˛eka, 2007, pp. 12–37). All the ceremonies were under the constant supervision of the security measures. The population’s participation in official celebrations was supposed to indicate the rightfulness of the authorities, while in practice, it was confirming the distance between the ruling apparatus and the society [at that time]. During the ceremonies, some negative social 2000, p. 39) attitudes towards the authorities were expressed (Kaminski, ´

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and were not always accompanied by the enthusiasm expected. Therefore, not all the forms of the authorities trying to bond with the nation ended in success. National traditions and patriotism were being used instrumentally for legitimising the order (Zaremba, 2001, p. 7), even though the attitude of communists towards these ideas was negative. To them, the only fatherland was the “motherland of international proletariat” and, therefore, they found any references to national independence hard to accept. Some of the symbols of the national community were subjected to a particular “reconstruction”—significant instrumental processing—by the authorities. They were building new relations by combining even distant historical periods, employing time compression and presenting the relations of “people’s” authorities with selected elements of social remembrance, which turned out to be exceptionally useful. In order to build the necessary legitimisation, the authorities sought the roots of the communist order in the times of the Piast dynasty’s rule in Poland in the tenth century (Gomułka, 1962, p. 131). This kind of binding of communism with the beginnings of the Polish statehood was a way of forming a founding myth and providing the idea of Polish communism with a feeling of stability. Additionally, it formed a symbolic “liturgical year” that was indispensable to the authorities (Miernik, 2007, p. 123). In view of the aspiration to subordinate society to the Soviet state, sustaining the concept of national unity was a form of political cynicism. The actions taken and the propaganda instruments applied confirmed that without referring to national identity and convincing those sharing that identity that at least an apparent unity is being formed, it would be impossible for the new authority structures to take root. The authorities’ decisions regarding using the idea of a nation also testified to the strength of this idea and the significance of the symbols, myths, historical characters and emotions forming it. The usefulness of the unity postulate that it was also influenced by the pre-war experiences (i.e., the ethnic diversity of the society). That is why the idea of a nation strengthened the current policy by referring to the pre-war quarrelling and ethnic divisions presented as “pathologies of democracy and capitalism”. The instrumental use of the national unity category in a society “formed” by the war was a safe strategy applied by the authorities (Lewandowski, 1972, pp. 62–100). When it comes to ethnic composition, Poland was nearly uniform and, therefore, “talking” about a nation seemed credible. The ethnicity of other groups was not noticed—they

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were deprived of it from the top-down. To this end, the concept of internationalism was employed, which stated that the proletariat “has no nationality”. “Coexistence with Polishness” itself was supposed to be temporary as the anticipated successes of communism were expected to lead to it eventually being abolished. After 1945, communist groups fought a military struggle with the proindependence underground while simultaneously calling them to reach an agreement and achieve national concord. They suggested the possibility of leading to “creation of national solidarity” (Zaremba, 2001, p. 123). Such an approach to national matters constituted a deliberate strategy by communists, employed during the period of power struggle. The nationalist character of this policy went beyond pompous reference to elements of national tradition—it reached beyond the integrative dimension. The offer of unity was, next to the mass terror employed, an offer that could not be refused—it did not accept a lack of consent. It meant a situation without alternatives, where its hidden strength lay. Any refusal to undertake cooperation and a collective quest for unity meant being pushed outside of the community and was unambiguously exclusive. The concept of unity was employed during the creation of the foundations of communist structures in the propaganda messages of the Polish Workers’ Party (PPR) (Jó´zwiak, 1952) or the self-proclaimed Polish Committee of National Liberation (PKWN)—the task of which was to take over the administrative authority in Poland under the umbrella of the Soviet secret services and be an alternative to the Government of the Republic of Poland in exile. The use of PKWN in propaganda manifested itself later in the form of the decree on agricultural reform and the celebration of 22nd July—“National Day of the Rebirth of Poland”— as the day of “Freedom of the Polish Nation”. The continuation of the desire for unity was the creation of the puppet Provisional Government of 1995, pp. 173– National Unity in June 1945 (Jezierski & Leszczynska, ´ 174), uniting the communist activists, some of the people’s and socialist politicians and people from intelligentsia communities. The role of noncommunist activists was being limited, and they were effectively deprived of their influence and ultimately forced to flee the country. Including “unity” in the name provided the impact desired and enabled controlling the political situation by underlining the openness towards agreement and concord. The noticeable movement away from nationalistic legitimisation was gradual and became clear from the moment of the referendum (1946) that was manipulated by the communists (Zaremba, 2001, p. 175).

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Organisational unity was an important value in Poland after 1945. It turned out that it was also necessary for parties competing for the power takeover. Without eliminating the organisational “double voice” of the groups trying to build a “people’s state”, taking over the power would be more difficult. This was confirmed by the rivalry between the Polish Workers’ Party (PPR) and the Polish Socialist Party (PPS), which was noticeable to everyone. An example of it was the search for an answer to the question: “Who is going to carry the banner of the national unity?” (Osóbka-Morawski, 1946, p. 1). Thus, revolutionary efficiency requires the unity of activists, although even the calls for unity themselves granted certain credibility and was a part of this rivalry. The basic grounds for agreement between these two left-wing parties—as argued by the contemporary propaganda—was their previous actions that led to regaining independence, the unification around the same ideas and the willingness to lead to establishing dominance over the people (Syzdek, 1975, p. 27). The actual form of organisational unity was achieved in December 1948 when the Polish United Workers’ Party (PZPR) was formed. Its formation meant a completely new stage of changes intro1995, p. 210). The period duced in Poland (Jezierski & Leszczynska, ´ from the formation of PKWN to the unification assembly of PZPR was later named “the birth of the authority system” (Kersten, 2018). The authorities presented organisational unity as an example of responsibility for Poland and as a confirmation of the democratic character of the newly established party. In practice, the “fleshing out” of unity took place over many years and was intensively controlled and stimulated behind the scenes. The supervisory activities in this direction originating from the Soviet representatives are described in detail by works of historians. Organisational and programme unity within the scope of revolutionary action and thinking were again instruments used for internal struggle with political opponents and controlling different political communities of activists competing for power within the party. It was exceptionally useful and helped eliminate from the party structures those activists who had divergent ideas that were not compliant with the binding line imposed and threatening the majority. Whenever there were calls for “purifying the structures”, the need for “ideological unity” within their own ranks was suggested. The new order based its legitimisation also on other actions. The postwar reality required being active and resourceful. It was necessary to mobilise the masses towards rebuilding the country. These very necessary

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actions became a part of the process of the communists taking root in society. The authorities made their struggle with physical destruction and supervision of the post-war reconstruction one of the arguments for their power. That is why they conducted actions aimed at ensuring stabilisation and order—one of the fundamental objectives of their administration. The need for safety and peace was a fundamental part of social expectations, which is why the propaganda messages and information on successes (either actual or fictional) became so frequent in any communication directed to society. A good example of the above-discussed legitimisation was the rebuilding of Warsaw. The enthusiasm and spontaneity of the society that strived to return to normality were used for political purposes. The rebuilding of the capital city was made into a national political and economic programme. Propaganda was convincing people that “the unity of everyone’s actions is the slogan for the next year”, that “the whole nation is building its capital city” or that “a united nation encounters no difficulties”. The rebuilding was linked to patriotism, unity and the persistence of community. Such an approach turned out to be effective in mobilising the masses and encouraging participation in bringing the destroyed city back to life. The buildings and streets were rebuilt and the commissioned tram lines were declared symbols of efficiency—and, therefore, usefulness—of the new order. Propaganda called for competing at work and suggested a need for increased productivity and dedication to work. All efforts were geared towards rebuilding the capital city. These efforts led to the activation of society, created trust and generated loyalty towards the order of the political groups in power. The rebuilding initiatives sustained the dichotomous division into the rebuilding party and the opposing party serving only the foreign centres, which was imposed by the authorities. The authorities employed this scheme of description of the contemporary reality for their own political and sociotechnical purposes. Once it gained the nature of an ultimatum, it was used for the intensive exclusion of opponents and building artificial differences that were not based on actual inequalities. In most cases, the authorities created them instrumentally, only for temporary political needs. For the purposes of these activities, the authorities also took advantage of the still-existing social differentiation, which was made a point of reference for the policy conducted, anchored around the “government and nation” vs “opponents and threatening enemies” relation.

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The authorities assigned negative characteristics and condemnable moral meanings to the nation’s opponents. In the information communicated, the authorities dehumanised all opponents—not only those understanding national unity differently, but also those reacting negatively to the socio-political order being formed. Propaganda was leaving people no choice—being an opponent of the nation meant being deprived of the right to participate in social life. Such an opponent was marginalised by the nation because the lack of involvement in building the new order was unacceptable since it delayed the course of history and the moment of appearance of a perfect world. In practice, the authorities labelled all the defiant or inconvenient opponents as enemies. And as historians demonstrate, there was no shortage of such opponents during the period of the Polish People’s Republic (PRL). They were all quickly deprived of their place in the community, physically eliminated by the security measures in place or forced to emigrate. Pushing “problematic” opponents beyond borders was used (by the authorities) for the whole duration of the Polish People’s Republic period. It was a specific “form of coordination of values” that employed force, violence and silencing of opponents, representing a totalitarian approach to the idea of unity. All the detected deviations from the template adopted became an object of attack. And when some of them turned out impossible to overcome, the authorities turned a blind eye to them, claiming that they simply did not exist. Achieving national unity was not an easy task, especially in the light of the thesis of “aggravation of class contradictions together with the progress in building socialism” (Paczkowski, 2000, p. 283), which the propaganda kept using. It presented a significant aspect of the order based on creating a conflict convenient to the authorities and managing it, as well as forming dichotomous oppositions useful to the authorities for political purposes. It was generated not in order to solve or eliminate specific social issues, but only to remain in power. This means that the divisions employed for political purposes were often fictional and found no confirmation in actual inequalities. All of them were anchored in dichotomy by the authorities. It was the simplest one possible and, therefore, easy to understand: it meant the presence of and struggle between good and evil. Constant tension was created and maintained in the oppositions built. The category of the nation turned out to be particularly useful and, therefore, was manipulated intensively. An example of that

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can be identifying workers with the nation and putting them in opposition to students. Such an opposition, asymmetric in terms of numbers, led to the creation of a “force of attraction” on the majority side, including being in the ultimate right. It was supposed to attract and integrate the other with the majority group. It also enabled the elimination of differences in the majority group itself. The aim of such actions was to “force” people to accept the problems of everyday life and support the authorities by accepting the interpretations that were of use to them. This is evidenced by propaganda slogans such as: “Be wary towards the enemy of the nation”, “The party and the nation fight together for a better tomorrow” or “3 times YES – this is an expression of the unity of the Polish nation” (Zaremba, 2001, p. 153). History was made the main platform for seeking enemies of the order. It was in relation to it that the communist authorities positioned themselves and where they sought bases for useful dichotomies. That is why the pre-war state and its elites were degraded symbolically. There was a clear declaration of cutting off from the past and abandoning continuous development. The dichotomy that constructed the fundamental interpretations was the system of the “old” order and the “new” order, which formed a line that was difficult to cross over. It was an opposition that ensured the main drive of the revolution, the desire to differ from the past and constantly seek evidence—whether true or fictional—that the decision made by history was not a mistake. Similarly, society was being reassured that the revolution was necessary and that the reality created was better and, therefore, valued positively. The new order was exceptionally flexible. To survive, it often accepted various deviations from the model set and the ideology defining it but always took advantage of discrediting its opponents. It made fighting enemies a fundamental part of actions contributing to the achievement of political objectives. The existence of enemies allowed the authorities to differentiate society according to their political needs. It was not only the past that constituted a source for political strategies. Creating an available, understandable and relatively effective communication required reference to contemporary problems. The contemporary problems that were difficult to solve determined the categories of new enemies. Among them were representatives of all the social groups: penmen and writers who tried to negate the sense of the notion of “nation and purposefulness of any sacrifices for it” itself (Fik, 1989), and then “landed lords”, “underground thugs”, “kulaks” or “saboteurs”.

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All of these people were an obstacle to the economy of socialism and took subversive actions, both in the countryside and in cities. Spies were appearing everywhere and were being spotted by the authorities, even in their own party. At first, it was claimed that they would sneak into “the state apparatus for subversive and sabotage purposes”, and later this was used, for example, to fight the supporters of the “right-wing nationalist deviation” intensively (Zaremba, 2001, p. 190). Spies were said to be present in all social groups, particularly among the clergy. Most of the dichotomies used were rooted in the contemporary, taking advantage of the economic system pathologies and everyday problems and ills of society, an example of which can be the phenomenon of speculation. The demand for punishing the speculators also meant, in practice, a demand for punishing the workers selling their benefits in kind that they were receiving in addition to their monthly salary. At the same time, the calls for fighting speculators issued by the authorities found significant support among workers (Kenney, 1997, p. 220). The “majority” vs “speculators” opposition that was created played a significant role in propaganda for a certain time. According to Gomułka, a speculator was allegedly “the most predatory, anti-national and anti-social as he only appears where he sees the largest sources of income for himself. The interest and good of the national are completely alien to him” (Gomułka, 1962, p. 389). The problems with providing society with the most fundamental goods made this dichotomy significant. However, an insight into the actual contemporary economic situation confirms that speculators were a consequence of the shortcomings of the centrally planned economy. Taking advantage of dichotomies required attributing values and assigning moral supremacy to the nation and groups included in it. Thus, propaganda was assigning elevated and noble characteristics to groups working towards the national interest (i.e., workers, farmers, working intelligentsia and party apparatus). The opponents were refused any positive characteristics—they were allegedly cruel and ruthless. The opposition created employed vilifying, dehumanising and stigmatising. The authorities were intensively using the existing social stereotypes, myths and prejudices. For a long time, any defence against false information, lies or false accusations was impossible. “Sometimes they were simply slighted, with insults in almost gutter language thrown at them” (Czyzniewski, ˙ 2006, p. 190). Propaganda used all the statements of the government,

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also those that were direct calls for the physical elimination of enemies standing in the way of socialism. The propaganda communication employed the category of “war” intensively. The tragic consequences of war and the crimes committed by the German occupants were presented extensively, fanning the flame of anti-German sentiment (Lesiakowski, 2008, p. 30) and sustaining the validity of threats. The war atmosphere was strengthened using notions and expressions typical of military language. The fact that the Polish state was anchored in the community of socialism-building states competing with capitalism sustained the contemporary dichotomy of two opposing camps and, additionally, made reality more understandable to society. The core of the international dichotomy was the two sides implementing opposing objectives: one seeking confrontation and war, and the other seeking the end of confrontations and fighting for peace. There was an immutable contrast present between the capitalist countries and the peace-loving camp: the former were immersed in chaos, crisis and weakness, while the others were characterised by social development, 2006, p. 190). The backwardness strength and courage (Czyzniewski, ˙ and warmongering of the imperialist camp was fiercely condemned and stigmatised (Fik, 1989, p. 143). The communist side, referring to itself as socialist, was the embodiment of progress and peace, exhibited revolutionary consciousness and had the knowledge of the rules of history at its disposal—so, it was being ceaselessly elevated. Among the enemies were not only the “Anglo-Saxon imperialists”, but also the “eternal enemy” in the form of the Federal Republic of Germany (Zaremba, 2001, p. 157). In this never-ending rivalry, it was a civic duty to join the forces of progress and development and support their actions and objectives. The use of the idea of a nation and making it the ideological core of the new order, especially during the times of post-war crisis and ruthless struggle for power and elimination of the opposition, is significant for the repartition practices discussed in this work. The majority of these practices employed the ideas of national and patriotism either directly or through implication (Zaremba, 2001, p. 152). At the same time, these practices were anchored in the inequalities and injustice experienced. However, they were formulated intensively and sustained in the forms most beneficial to contemporary authorities. All of them determined how individuals thought about being together and participating in the national community for many decades to come. It is also possible that such an intensive manifestation of the need to be together was one of the reasons for

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sustaining national identity in a part of society. It also constituted an important factor that led to the fall of the order because society noticed the fiction in references to the national interest made by the authorities. Their declarations of serving the country and society were empty. On the other hand, it was noticed that their actions hurt the interest of the community. Such actions strengthened the conviction that the authorities had little to do with the national community and that the nation consisted of people who the authorities kept forgetting. The observations of this kind may have led to the appearance of the imagination of the need for the existence of a true community, which formed the basis for the “us” vs “them” social division.

A Revolutionary Attack on Existing Social Divisions The main task of the authorities was to transform the remains of the capitalist structure permeated by unacceptable inequalities in line with the plan accepted and the ideology adopted. Ultimately, the aim was to finish with threatening distances and structural elements from the Second Polish Republic, causing feelings of a lack of security and, therefore, retaining social divisions. The structure inherited was to be changed radically and adjusted to Soviet models functioning in line with the concept of full employment, production supervision, state interference in society and a project consistent with humanist and progressive values. The authorities were quick to commence it without even waiting for a full takeover of power. In the first post-war years, the scale and dynamics of social and economic transformations were astonishing. A part of them was the state taking over the accumulated possessions of “exploiters and petty capitalists”, which was considered abandoned. After the Red Army entered Poland, the accelerated plundering of private property was started through the nationalisation of medium and large industries. The property and real estate in territories regained from Germany were treated similarly. The process of property takeover proceeded as follows: a “liberated” plant was entered by a representative of the “people’s” state, a plenipotentiary of the Provisional Government of the Republic of Poland and an officer of the Red Army, and they declared “requisitioning” of that plant for the purposes of the people’s authority being formed. The pre-war owners had nothing to return to. During the years 1944–1946, 10,662 industrial

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enterprises and 2,252 commercial enterprises were nationalised (Anasz & Wesołowski, 1976, p. 33). This is how bourgeois Poland was eliminated— and in the propaganda messages, this was described as an act of historical justice. In view of the Soviet army controlling every aspect of life, it was impossible to oppose these actions. The nationalisation of industry and implementation of the Soviet 1995, s. 190) were model of management (Jezierski & Leszczynska, ´ not supported universally by society, but only by the groups encompassed by the so-called “social advancement” (Marody, 1991a, p. 53), which were the most susceptible to the impact of the ideology of equality in the form imposed. The contemporary descriptions also feature statements that the nationalisation of industry was expected and desired by society and that the pre-war experience of private factories made the workers support the new forms of managing them (Kenney, 1997, p. 33). The processes of taking over the industry and organising new forms of management in it determined the main points on the line of deep social structuring processes. Every workplace was defined as the main centre of the “formation of new, socialist relations and the main centre of the implementation of ideas of socialist humanism”, and the strength of the system was supposed to depend on how the social relations within workplaces looked (Wacławek, 1965, pp. 4–5). Any obstacles on the way to implementing new economic solutions were removed instrumentally together with gaining the material base for political actions of the party apparatus. The actions mentioned above were just the beginning, complemented by the “conscious, revolutionary transformation of the structure during the years 1944–1945” (Wesołowski, 1978a, p. 26). However, the most important role in the initial phase of the structural change was given to the most numerous group—the rural population, which the authorities saw as the future loyal supporters of the order, a “pillar of the new system” (Zagórski, 1978, p. 21). The agricultural reconstruction was to be radical, thus confirming the ideal of the revolution and its concept of justice. At the same time, it was supposed to confirm the possibilities of communists concerning rebuilding the world, as well as their capability of implementing largescale projects (Wesołowski, 1978a, p. 26). A radical change in the structure of land acreage in the countryside was intended to be the answer to the manifestations of inequality, feeling of injustice and actual poverty among farmers and farmworkers, which were unacceptable there. According to the population census of 1931, “60.6% of the population

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of pre-war Poland worked in agriculture, and the remaining 39.4% in non-agricultural jobs” (Wesołowski, 1969, p. 12). In 1944, farmers and farmworkers constituted nearly 70% of the society. After 1945, the situation of farmers and farmworkers was described using the Marxist concept of social class (Widerszpil, 1965, p. 30)—instrumental and politically useful analyses of social structure. It was claimed that a class differentiation of the farmer population took place in the countryside before the war, based on their attitude towards the means of production. The numbers of the rural semi-proletariat class increased. The economically weak farmer class took shape, while the inexpensive employed labour was exploited by the class of small agricultural capitalists (Turski et al., 1978, p. 48). The presence of large farms in the agricultural structure was criticised. Such farms were later subdivided (Wesołowski, 1969, p. 10). The agricultural reform was carried out according to the decree of the Polish Committee of National Liberation (PKWN), which signalled social 1965, p. 19)—a document devoid of and economic reforms (Szczepanski, ´ references to the communist ideology and therefore acceptable to a large part of political groups (Zaremba, 2001, p. 139). It included universal and politically useful slogans underling, for example, the necessity to 1977), which later changed ensure universal employment (Mrówczynska, ´ into guaranteed employment. The agricultural reform included stateowned, post-German, abandoned properties, as well as large acreages owned by individuals and legal entities. The land was distributed equally among farmers who held little or no land and was seized by the state. During the years 1944–1948, 9,707 land estates encompassing about 3.49 million hectares were taken over for the agricultural reform. In the end, 1.2 million hectares were distributed among 387,000 farmer families (Chwalba, 1999, pp. 718–719). Of the land distributed, the overwhelming majority was assigned to new farms and about 500,000 ha was dedicated to the enlargement of the already existing ones. From among the farms existing in 1949 on the so-called “old land”, every fourth one benefited from the agricultural reform. The changes introduced by the agricultural reform into the agrarian structure of the farmer class were of great significance. The number of farms with less than 2 ha of land or more than 20 ha of land (i.e., the extreme groups) decreased, while the number of farms with small (2–5 ha) and medium areas increased. The farms with 5–20 ha of land constituted 41.5% of the whole farms in 1950 and accounted for 68.2% of the land of farmers (Turski et al., 1978, pp. 48–49). On the land recovered from Germany, a single distribution of

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land amounted to 7–15 ha (Kołomejczyk & Syzdek, 1971; Słabek, 1972). In total, 6,070.1 ha of land was transferred to farmers there during the years 1944–1949, and 814,000 farms were created (Góra, 1969, p. 7). The subdivided land was distributed among farmers who had either no land or had small and medium farms, which is why the structure of farms became fragmented. In 1950, there were over 1.5 million farms smaller than 5 ha (Turski et al., 1978, p. 49). The agricultural reform was a flagship project of communism, simple in terms of its nature. It consisted in depriving landowners of their land and distributing it among landless farmers. Despite that, it still caused social feuds and disputes. For landowners, it was the time to emigrate as they had no instruments at their disposal that would let them oppose the subdivision of their land. The reform caused conflicts both on the part of its beneficiaries and on the part of families deprived of land. The method of distributing the land caused conflicts due to the limited supply and major demand. Misunderstandings were less frequent when settling farms on land recovered from Germany. The assignment of small acreages stemmed not only from the equality idea promoted, but also from reasons of political and planning nature. It turned out quickly that, in the near future, collectivisation of the countryside was planned (i.e., complete control over food production being taken over by the party 2013, p. 334]). The rumours that the distribuapparatus [Leszczynski, ´ tion was temporary and that the land would be handed over to state farms formed on the basis of the Soviet model were confirmed. The declarations trying to reassure people were to no avail: “Remember, however, that it is only our rule that can guarantee your perpetual control over the land owned and protection against the nightmare of ‘kolkhozes’” (Witek, 1946, p. 3). The collectivisation was confirmed by the limitations within the scope of individual building construction—introduced for some of the agricultural land—necessary to transform these areas into large farms in the future. The information and rumours regarding collectivisation in 2011). Soviet Russia horrified the farmers (Kaminski, ´ The reforms’ purpose was to destroy the landowner class and large multi-generational specialised farms (Lewandowski, 2008, p. 208), which were the foundation of the pre-war agricultural economy. To the farmworkers (previously living from occasional work and not having any land of their own) who received the land, the reform meant social and financial advancement, an actual benefit (Kersten, 2018, p. 209) and allowed them to feel like an owner. In terms of the economy, the small size of the

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land assigned did not guarantee adequate income or standard of living. In spite of that, conducting that reform was the part of a revolution that spoke to the imagination of the disadvantaged. However, the change in agriculture temporarily satisfied the aspirations and expectations of farmers. They became an instrument of influence on the countryside and of pursuing political and ideological objectives—a significant political resource in the hands of those in power. The distribution of land was presented as an act of social justice, carried out according to the rule of “an equal share to each”. The authorities were using the message regarding solving social problems and the willingness to end farmers’ poverty. In the reforms made, the economic calculations were not taken into account—only the social and political ones. The authorities did not consider the efficiency of farming, nor did they take into account that the property allocated could not be taken away in practice. The sole purpose of the reform was to obtain short-term political support, and its purpose was to provide the farmers with a sense of rapid improvement in their financial situation. It led to the elimination of not only large manors, but also many medium-scale farms that could have formed the foundation for efficient agriculture. Based on the decree of PKWN, those gifted were obligated to pay for the land with the equivalent of the average annual harvest within twenty years, mainly in the form of crops. The burden of this payment was extended for many years, partially ensuring, at the same time, the supply of products. The reform ensured sufficient basic agricultural production, which meant achieving self-sufficiency in terms of food during the postwar years. Conducting it also brought measurable positive consequences for the whole management system. It helped eliminate the traditional debt incurred by farmers (that was known for years), as well as the actual famine and poverty in some of the farmer families (Turski et al., 1978, p. 73). However, not all of its consequences turned out to be functional for the order. In many regions of the country, conducting it led to conflicts and divisions among local communities. One of the consequences was the aggravation of conflicts between poor farmers and the rich ones, also referred to as kulaks. The reform also determined [for the economic system] the model of relations in the countryside and the scheme of relations with the other classes as it determined the maximum level of management capability for farmers through instruments such as the upper limit of the surface area of an individual farm. It introduced the “dwarf” farms and low

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production efficiency into the agricultural structure, but retained private ownership. The owners soon realised that when they were forced to look for income in other sectors of the economy. A situation of hidden migration appeared, where small-scale farmers systematically travelled to work in nearby industrial centres that were intensely looking for labour. In practice, a significant group of farmers was forced to earn their income outside of farming. The rumours of collectivisation turned out to be the greatest threat to obtaining the support of farmers for the new order. They nullified some of the positive political consequences of the reform and introduced a lack of trust in the relations between farmers and authorities. However, all the rumours had their confirmation in reality. Most attempts at introducing collectivisation over the years failed. The greatest intensity of subordinating the countryside to the authorities by means of repressions and administrative actions took place in the years 1952–1953. The collectivisation policy implemented thus far turned out to be an economic and social failure, leading “the countryside to economic ruin. Its bankruptcy became obvious in 1956” (Jarosz & Pasztor, 1995, pp. 29–44). Imposing of collectivisation, failure of new forms of farm management and reluctance and enmity of farmers towards collectivisation forced the authorities to accept the existence of residual capitalist relations (Turski et al., 1978, pp. 50–51) in the countryside. The distribution of land alone “kept a large number of farmers in the system of thinking about profit”, revolving around resourcefulness and responsibility for one’s own fate, which made it more difficult to make a change in countryside relations that the authorities planned. The structure of farms made many farmers stay with the traditional farmer economy. They made products for their own needs and sold surpluses privately or delivered them to socialised buying points. The appearance of farmers–workers was not the only noticeable feature of the structure of the farmer class. When analysing this class, some scholars actually talked about two different classes of farmers—individual farmers and collective farmers. In this manner, the farmers were differentiated in terms of control over means of production—in the case of individual farmers, this control was complete (Turski et al., 1978, pp. 39– 47). Although the cooperatives referred to pre-war traditions, they had little to do with them. In reality, they were state-owned enterprises completely subordinated to central planning, used for spreading control over agricultural workers and preparing and “training” the planned collectivisation of the countryside. The proclaimed voluntary character of

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associating within these cooperatives was mostly fiction. In practice, the poorest among farmers were forced to work there. The inefficient forms of management, the lack of responsibility of the managers and workers for the common property and the shortcomings in farming culture made it impossible to achieve sufficient management efficiency within cooperatives, which had an impact on their further existence. In September 1956, there were over 10,000 cooperatives operating that farmed 13% of the total land acreage, while on the 31st of December of that year, less than 2,000 such cooperatives remained (Cena, 2002). However, the ideas for state administration were not abandoned and, later on, a process of the older farmers handing over their farms to the state in exchange for retirement pensions was implemented. As a result of the reforms carried out, farmers gained more prestige, and educational opportunities and many barriers to mobility were abolished. This is confirmed by sociological analyses devoted to his class that were carried out during the first twenty years of the “people’s” state. They show how the share of farmers in the employment structure changed. According to population censuses, in 1931, farming was the source of income for 60.6% of the population, while in 1960, only for 38.4% (Wesołowski, 1969, p. 12). It also stemmed from the fact that the young inhabitants of the countryside moved to industry, receiving professional training. However, the image of the situation of farmers was not only positive. They experienced mass terror, were forced to form cooperatives and kolkhozes and provided food quotas for the state. The obligatory quotas were abolished only in 1972. Some of the farmers were presented in propaganda as kulaks, enemies, hiding and selling privately the goods they should have handed over to the socialised buying points (Cena, 2002). Years later, it is easier to notice that although the countryside’s situation definitely improved, it was still underinvested and backwards in terms of economic, cultural and educational aspects. The next part of structural changes turned out to be industrialisation processes aimed at transforming the country’s character from agricultural to industrial. From the very beginning of the revolution, it was underlined that its objective was “creating a socialist, industrial society in Poland” (Wesołowski, 1969, p. 11). This meant that it was necessary to form a 1998, large working class consisting of blue-collar workers (Domanski, ´ p. 373). The authorities considered the rate of growth of numbers of this class another indicator of the revolution’s success.

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The industrialisation process was referred to as socialist, which meant that it “was organised and shaped according to a plan by the state and 1977, p. 30). Marxist-Leninist party of the working class” (Mrówczynska, ´ In 1945, the group of workers, which was exceptionally uniform, was estimated to be over one million people. A major step in the direction of industrial society was the implementation of the six-year plan (1949–1955), also referred to as the plan of “building the foundations of socialism” (Jezierski, 1987, pp. 152–197). In terms of economy and ideology, this plan imitated Soviet solutions and envisaged achieving accelerated growth in the form of intensive industrialisation. It assumed increasing production, new investments and growth of the heavy industry. Basing the plan on the existing free labour force and focusing the whole of changes on simple development of the heavy industry was supposed to lead to faster achievement of political goals. The detailed assumptions of the six-year plan were often revised and modified under the influence of current events or problems that were difficult to solve. The plan, which was implemented to a large extent, had certain negative consequences next to positive ones. It led to stagnation in other fields of the economy and a crisis in agriculture, a certain reflection of which was the social breakdown of 1956, as well as irreversible, destructive changes in the natural environment. According to what the scholars claim, after all those years, the partial success of the plan was a consequence of the overexploiting forms of economic activity, “drainage of private property, low wages, shortages on the market and ubiquitous impoverishment” 2013, p. 335). (Leszczynski, ´ The working class was defined as a large collection of people encompassing workers who do not own the means of production, but are their co-owners as members of society employed in the sphere of production and exchange. They perform subordinated works within the system of an enterprise and their main source of income is the remuneration for work. The additional features indispensable for characterising the working class and its constituents are the lifestyle and the culture specific to it (Widerszpil, 1965, p. 182). The working class was formed around major investment ideas. The best example is the construction of the Nowa Huta combine, which was an ideologically and politically motivated action aimed at “breaking” the intellectual and pro-independence community in Kraków. The elaborations regarding this class mentioned the significance of the quantitative dimensions and the increase in numbers of the working

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class (Wesołowski, 1969, p. 12). In 1931, there were 2,786,349 bluecollar workers in Poland (81.2% of employees), and in 1973—6,904,855 (65.4%). The number of people employed directly in the industry was, accordingly: 1,545,719 (45%) and 3,652,359 (34.6%) (Jarosinska ´ & 1978, p. 109). Kulpinska, ´ The creation of a working class was perceived as a condition for the success of the new order, a stage on the path towards a classless society. The workers were assigned the status of a hegemon, beneficiary and the main party interested in the formation of relations based on justice (Wesołowski, 1969, pp. 4–5). However, in view of the constantly noticeable imperfections and presence of destabilising elements among the workers, this class was subjected to ceaseless ideological shaping. The ideologists were relentless in efforts to have a working class characterised by similar aims, common values and views, identical functioning patterns and bonds testifying to internal coherence. It was claimed that the process of such integration takes place based on the common economic situation and common social position, under the influence of a specific set of institutions and forms of formal organisation, through acceptance of common ideological vision of social order and one’s own role in the implementation of that vision, whereas its course is determined by a complex system 1961, p. 12). Whenever obstacles appeared on of factors (Szczepanski, ´ the path to the appearance of such consciousness, the ideological and propaganda pressure was increased. There were appeals for further integrations, “elimination of divergent and conflicting aims and elimination 1961, p. 10), as well as for eliminating of antagonisms” (Szczepanski, ´ the causes leading to disagreements among workers. Class consciousness was to mobilise for a political struggle ensuring the domination of the working party. The evaluation of the working class in the middle of the 1970s was not clear. In the sociological and demographic approach, the working class was young in three ways—demographically, sociologically and technically. It was young demographically as people aged up to 39 constituted about 61% of all workers; sociologically because a lot of workers came from farmer families and technically because the majority of them had professional preparation, not just vocational training. The description showed the undisputed potential of that class as well as the hazards and threats to the authorities coming from the workers, stemming mainly from their constantly growing aspirations. Meeting them constituted a major bargaining chip in relations between the authorities and the

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workers. The workers were noticing more often that the actions taken did not yield the expected results. While it did not mean that there was no success at all, the new order was incapable of handling many problems, including work efficiency and effective administration (Wesołowski, 1978b, pp. 229–230). The educational backwardness of society, the need to educate ideological and party personnel and the growing needs of the developing industry necessitated the development of education on all levels. After 1945, there was only a small number of surviving engineers, teachers, doctors, economists and lawyers left in the country after the war. There were also problems with primary education, which is why it was the first one that was made universal (Makarczyk & Błuszkowski, 1978, p. 178), which led to the elimination of illiteracy within five years. An educational programme aimed at the countryside population was introduced, and vocational and secondary education were developed as well. The actions mentioned above made education universal and accessible and provided possible educational advancement. Next to these actions, the authorities were also making intensive attempts at “persuading” the pre-war intelligence to join their side. At the same time, they exhibited a disdainful attitude to it and ran a simultaneous expansion of white-collar personnel (Palska, 1994, p. 20). The new intelligentsia originated from the popular masses and was supposed to have class consciousness and be an effective conveyor belt for the ideology imposed. At the same time, the new intelligentsia was relieved by the authorities from fulfilling the mission of creating higher culture while, at the same time, being assigned new tasks that were subordinated to the objectives of the communist revolution. The composition of the intelligentsia was changing quickly and was increasingly diverse in terms of social background. The authorities achieved that also by manipulating the criteria characterising this stratum. Within the scope of administration, they included the new professions among the intelligentsia, which is why the cross-section of the contemporary society reflected the contemporary values (Widerszpil, 1965, p. 46). In 1966, the intelligentsia was formed by people originating from the former bourgeoisie and landed classes (0.4%), the petite bourgeoisie (12.9%), farmers (20.3%), workers (25.8%) and other social groups (Nowak, 1966, p. 23). However, it is necessary to remember the specific character of those times, which also included concealing one’s actual background to avoid various forms of harassment. Once this is done, it turns out that the data quoted understated affiliation with groups of former

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“exploiters” and overstated the number of intelligentsia with the farmer and worker backgrounds. The universalisation of the education system and increasing access to education for groups previously excluded from it was an achievement of the revolution, but there was also a different side to these processes. Certain pathological phenomena appeared, such as awarding diplomas to people who were not educated—to the party and military apparatus (Bar, 2009, p. 44). The awoken and understandable educational ambitions were achieved using half-measures and feigned actions, subordinated to political criteria. It quickly turned out that the authorities’ main objective was to create a personnel supply for the state bodies and the party. The higher education programme assumed creating their own intelligentsia, one that accepted the order, was available for duty and recognised and disseminated the ideological values. One example of this is the formation of “believers in the communist ideology coming from the Union of ´ 2010, p. 90). For example, the Polish Youth (ZMP)” (Swida-Ziemba, instruments used to form a new consciousness included political trainings for higher education system employees in 1950s. Education became a form of gratification, awarded to those most obedient and complying with the political instructions—which does not mean, however, that all the people who became educated then did that by submitting to the authorities. However, this often imposed certain gratitude-based dependencies on them, which persisted for many years. After 1945, the higher education system was transforming rapidly, as confirmed by changes in the educational structure of the population. Within thirty years, higher education was completed by 753,200 graduates. Thus, the number of intelligentsia representatives nearly doubled. In the mid-1970s, the number of white-collar workers in the wide sense of the notion was nearly two million people (Makarczyk & Błuszkowski, 1978, pp. 179–180). However, the structure of intelligentsia was inter1959). nally diverse, which was often mentioned by scholars (Szczepanski, ´ White-collar workers were divided into two “socio-professional categories”—the intelligentsia in the narrower sense (encompassing creators of culture and specialists educated in higher education facilities) and the medium- and lower-level office workers (Wesołowski, 1974, p. 15). Such a wide approach to the intelligentsia was a significant modification of defining it and an opening towards the expectations of this stratum’s members. Additionally, it was a purposeful, ideological and political “manipulation” of its structure. It was argued that being included

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among the intelligentsia should stem from the work performed, which was supposed to determine all the other features (Wesołowski, 1966, p. 175). Such an approach was supposed to reduce the grudges of the authorities towards the intelligentsia, being a consequence of the reluctant approach of the pre-war intelligentsia towards communism. The pre-war intelligentsia, affiliated with the landed classes and the gentry culture, 1958, p. 113), turned out to be a major disappointment (Chałasinski, ´ which is why it was systematically criticised and persecuted (Wiatr, 1965, p. 446). Order was maintained using the systematically expanded party bureaucracy, the party apparatus at workplaces, the militia and a network of security service collaborators. From the very beginning, there was assumed “a division into avant-garde and the unenlightened masses, into teachers and students – often headstrong or lazy, those in privy and those outside of the circle of special knowledge; the division that, with time, simply adopted the character of division into the authorities and society” (Marody, 1991b, p. 132). A part of the party apparatus was also included among the intelligentsia. The guiding political force of the revolution was first the Polish Workers’ Party (PPR), and later, after 1948, the Polish United Workers’ Party (PZPR). In 1946, the Polish Workers’ Party had 400,000 members, the Polish Socialist Party—650,000 members (Paczkowski, 1993, p. 79) and the Polish United Workers’ Party—after it was established—had nearly 1.5 million members (Kersten, 2018, p. 405). In the following years, the number of its members increased. At the apex of its functioning, in 1980, PZPR had over 3.5 million members (that is, about 10% of the society) (Magierska, 2005, p. 29). The party became the guide and the tutor, maintaining a tight-knit bond with the working class and considering its aspirations. All the actions taken by the party were aimed at ensuring its undisputed hegemony. The course of the revolution confirmed that it is possible to have partial control over the development and performance of transformations using the state’s existing resources and top-down actions.

The Promise of Non-antagonistic Relationships Between Structural Segments In the planned processes, the individual had a specific role to play in reconstructing the social structure, but their agency or innovativeness was limited to the minimum. The dominance of authorities encompassed the

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individual as a whole. There was no place for them to exhibit any creativity deviating from the models imposed. They were fully subordinated to the ideological vision and were supposed only to accept the motivations and patterns of behaviour that were provided top-down. Their thinking and acting were fully subordinated to the objective of the change. The authorities strived to eliminate any unpredictability, spontaneity and independence in individuals using the state apparatus. Ubiquitous supervision and control over all actions of the individual was employed. The majority of society was quickly convinced that any resistance against the order is punished and that it is not worth taking any actions that are not consistent with the expected ones. The domination and supervision of communists over the everyday life of individuals were bringing the results expected. Some people did change their approach towards the communist authorities. Friendly attitudes appeared more frequently, the authorities were trusted, and more people signed up for the communist party. With every subsequent year, society’s faith in the return of the democratic order was weakening, and people were getting used to the idea that the scenarios of the political situation turning around would not come true. The behaviour that was becoming increasingly frequent was conformism and trying to come to terms with the existing order. Finding a place for oneself and arranging an existence in harmony with the totality became a challenge to many individuals. Such decisions also stemmed from observing the state of reality created by the regime. The order was legitimised through the partial elimination of uncertainty and chaos from it, as well as the limitation of the feeling of lack of security resulting from the past wars—World War II and the so-called “domestic war”. The pacification of the situation within the country (i.e., elimination of the armed underground) was also considered an achievement by a part of society. Some people also considered the implemented redistribution of property in the form of agricultural reform or nationalisation of the industry a manifestation of security. Both processes were marked with the symbolism of equality and justice and could be used to persuade many people to support the new order effectively. All the symptoms of stabilisation raised hope and encouraged positive opinions, which translated to the attitude towards the government. The authorities limited numerous spheres of uncertainty but also created new ones that became grounds for the appearance of new anxieties.

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The social structure reconstruction processes commenced—intended to introduce a feeling of social justice—required time, even when performed with the use of a “quick path” of implementation. The passing of time started to play a central role in the processes inspired. As in every other revolution, it became an object of the action of the government and legitimised or delegitimised its actions. It was also skilfully saved as all the actions and reforms were based on indisputable acceptance and total subordination without considering any opposing voices and standings. In this manner, the communist revolution supervised the administration of time. When evaluating the condition of structural transformation after a few years, the government noticed that the actions that were supposed to lead to social homogeneity were only partially successful at achieving the objectives set. As a result of the mistakes made, limitations, political obstacles and internal obstacles, the scenarios for execution were extended in time. Long-term objectives were replaced by short-term objectives, which were assigned the most important role in the legitimisation of the order. At the same time, it was argued that the revolution, including industrialisation, contributed to the disappearance of many differences and distances. Firstly, this was in the economic aspect, when the unnecessary segment of semi-feudal order was eliminated (such as the connection with private ownership and capital). The social space was cleansed of objectively pathological elements such as unemployment and poverty, which contributed to a persistence of differences. It was also argued that the obstructions to consciousness and culture were eliminated, including the stereotypes that divided communities. In their place, relation networks devoid of hierarchy and domination were supposed to appear. This last conviction was being disseminated by the authorities at the end of the 1960s, when they were defining the structure and argued that, by that time, it consisted of non-antagonistic elements only. The core of the new structure made the working class a hegemon, in line with the ideological assumptions. The strata of small-scale farmers and intelligentsia were mentioned next to it. At the same time, the stratum of private craftsmen, low in numbers and manufacturing small items and providing services to the population, was noticed (Wesołowski, 1969, p. 3). Such descriptions and methods of presenting the structure were dominant in its definitions appearing in sociological studies. The above representation of the structure was the adjustment to the expectations of the authorities. It was done knowing that the authorities

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expect success in reconstructing the social structure, with certain ideological categories imposed. Descriptions of the structure that presented it in a different way, less satisfactory to the authorities, also appeared (Wiatr, 1962). In most cases, the existing classes were described as internally coherent, devoid of any discrepancies and conflicts. Their internal diversity was often ignored, for example, in terms of income. Thanks to eliminating “non-confirmatory elements” from the structure, the belief in the effectiveness of the change implemented was maintained. That is why in the postulate and research aspect, the structure presented gained the character of a political and ideological “framework”. Almost all the social analyses were compared to it. Additionally, a great deal of effort and time was spent demonstrating that the differences present, always free of conflict and antagonism, considered only a sort of folklore, elements of little significance (Szawiel, 2003, p. 267) for the functioning of the order. The propaganda underlined that workers and formers are the fundamental forces of the change being carried out (Wesołowski, 1969, p. 10), a political slogan legitimising the order and supporting the structural transformations. It was being underlined that the industrialisation process led to these classes coming closer to each other through common work in the industry and that this closeness was “exceptionally strong and profound” (Nowakowski, 1976, p. 340). Reminding of the elimination of the former hierarchies served to underline equality. Such claims sounded good in propaganda, but in reality, they were an exaggeration as some of the old hierarchies were not eliminated despite great effort. The authorities also failed to build fully non-antagonistic relations within specific social classes. Messages like that only presented the hierarchy desired that was supposed to be strived for. Another challenge was achieving proper relations between the ideologically “elevated” parts of the structure and its other elements. The issues of introducing equality in society turned out to be extremely complicated, more than had been expected at the beginning of the revolution. The inequalities that the communist ideologists were unable to handle “were found” in the division of labour. The fact of the continued existence of the division of labour in a centralised economic system was driving the engineers of communism to despair. It was blamed for the homogenisation of society not proceeding at the rate expected and for the classes remaining internally diverse. However, in spite of these problems, it was underlined that the structure is characterised by a lack of significant conflicts within the classes (Wesołowski, 1978b, p. 34).

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The authorities strived for organisational and institutional reinforcement of their power and expansion of social support. By distributing land to farmers, they partially gained support for the revolution implemented, even though numerous steps were taken later on to deprive them of that property. The farmers were not completely “torn out from the clutches” of capitalist relations, defined by means of private property. They still had property at their disposal, and the dominant conviction among them was that individual effort and diligence decide the standard of living. The small profits they managed to make took a very special meaning, impacted their consciousness and sustained the market rules. This meant that the cult of individual industriousness and responsibility remained strong among people who had only skills in physical agricultural labour. It manifested when they provided products for private sale for rates higher than at the state-owned buying point. It was the form in which capitalist relations remained present in the countryside. They also had an impact on relations between farmers and other social groups. However, the significance of land ownership to farms had been reduced. The authorities made sure that it was very hard for farmers to achieve any sort of affluence as their small farms did not allow them to accumulate capital. What was then left was an existence at an elementary level, which allowed the authorities to claim that the exploitation of farmers in the countryside had ended. Farmers had the most valuable goods at their disposal—food products. This fact created dependencies and antagonisms between them and the rest of society. Both sides became dependent on each other and a new type of relations appeared, which was significant in view of the lack of existential security in most of the population. The above conditions generated tensions as farmers were blamed for food supply shortages (Nowakowski, 1957). The journey to the just structure that would do away with social insecurity was continued, but its final destination was nowhere in sight. Further obstacles appeared on the way, stemming not only from the need to maintain the division of labour. According to the ideological assumptions, the classes created were a temporary solution—as confirmed by the changing attitude towards the existing classes and strata (Kenney, 1997). At the same time, the members of these classes had different experiences in terms of work. The pre-war experience of capitalism among workers significantly impacted the relations they formed and their functioning in the industry. This historical anchor also provided an important differentiation. Large new groups of workers had different experiences as they

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were anchored mainly in the farmer culture. It comes as no surprise then that the internal homogenisation of workers encountered numerous 1961, p. 10). At the same time, the obstacles on its path (Szczepanski, ´ majority of the working class functioned in the socialised economy sector (Wesołowski, 1969, p. 13) and was subordinated to central planning and state administration and subjected to supervision and state discipline. It is no surprise then that the experiences of workers with communism differed from those of farmers. Workers noticed the actual mechanisms of organising and maintaining order more readily. They also experienced massive disillusionment with the new order. Very often, it turned out that the declarations on taking their needs into account in social and economic decisions made by the state did not translate into specific actions. According to the propaganda communications retained, the processes of building the structure desired ended in success. However, analyses by sociologists often did not confirm those successes. Propaganda presented the structure as a system of friendly classes (Widerszpil, 1974, p. 77), while, in reality, it was far from the plans set for it. At the same time, it was argued that the formation of a fully homogeneous society takes a longer time, even though there were also opinions that it is “almost within arm’s reach” (Wesołowski, 1965, p. 117). According to the propaganda, the sole and basic task of the authorities was to eliminate those differences. These issues were systematically repeated in the discourse as if explaining the authorities for the existing, imperfect situation. New tasks were designated for the party and state apparatus in order to make equality a reality. However, the postulates listed and the demands for introducing equality were not converging with social expectations. Society wanted goods, not equality in poverty. In scientific analyses, the systematically decreasing income differences between classes and strata were underlined (Wesołowski, 1965, pp. 118– 127). Simultaneously, it was omitted that the general living standard of a large part of society was no longer improving and that it was, in fact, even deteriorating. The everyday experience of individuals confirmed that inequalities were still present. This was confirmed mainly by comparing one’s own economic situation with the living standard of others. Observations confirmed that others had more and more goods at their disposal— and that was not only the comparison with party apparatus. People’s own findings confirmed that those with private initiatives had a better living standard, which effectively undermined the messages about striving to reach equality and implement collectivist values. A conviction that the

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majority of society participates in poverty distribution was becoming more widespread. In order to weaken these social doubts, examples of egalitarianism were included in propaganda communications. Equal rights in terms of culture and just access to education and cultural assets were mentioned, next to the existence of moral and political unity in society (Widerszpil, 1974, p. 77). The improvement in accommodation conditions in the countryside and the financial situation of its inhabitants were underlined, as well as the fact that they were encompassed by free health care and agricultural insurance. It was said that the financial situation of farmers and workers had become equalised to a significant extent. The statistical data showed that, in comparison to 1945, the income per capita in an average farmer family had been averaged. However, it still was lower than in an average worker’s family in the socialised sector (Turski et al., 1978, pp. 82–83). The fact that a major part of smallscale farmers started working in the industry significantly impacted these classes becoming closer. In 1960 there were 824,00 farmers-workers, who 1965, p. 62). A legally held nearly 17% of individual farms (Szczepanski, ´ significant distance in the sphere of income remained between the group of farmers and workers and that of white-collar workers. An example of the elimination of social barriers was supposed to be the phenomenon of marriage homogenisation, which meant breaking the social and community block regarding the selection of spouses, which was typical of the interwar period. The more frequent acceptance of a person from another class as a spouse after 1945 was said to confirm the decreasing role of class affiliation. With every decade, it was increasingly difficult for the authorities to justify the existence of differences in income with the capitalist past. The power of propaganda messages regarding the continuation of the revolutionary trend was also waning—and, therefore, this kind of justification of the government’s leadership was losing significance. Further assurances about eliminating divisions or reducing the existing differences were not receiving too much interest from society. The authorities were also losing interest in further equalisation of the structure. That is why some of the differences present were “covered up with silence” or their significance was underrated. The authorities effectively used the categories of objectivity and subjectivity of perceiving differences for these actions. There was no shortage of problems to overcome on the way to homogeneity. They became more visible once the class representatives turned out not to meet the authorities’ expectations towards them. They did

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not appreciate the advancement achieved or demanded a greater share in the distribution of goods. They also did not share the admiration for the socialism-building carried out thus far and refused to confirm the opinion that an egalitarian society had already been formed. It was irritating to the authorities that the farmers were unwilling to subordinate themselves to collectivisation ideas and refused to submit to it in spite of encouragement and pressure. The lack of understanding of the idea of revolution by the farmers results in the actions of authorities directed against them. They were less dedicated to supporting the Polish countryside, and the support promised to farmers usually did not come to fruition. In practice, the authorities guaranteed the farmers protection against the former owners of their land—and that promise had been kept. Only those farmers who were obedient and loyal to the order were appreciated. Meanwhile, others continued to be an object of distrust. Attempts were made to subordinate them completely by means of collectivisation, which was slowed down and extended in time, but never abandoned. The strategies of the takeover of land by the state were being changed systematically. Private property kept irritating doctrinarians and ideologists, which is why alternative forms of farming such as production cooperatives were suggested. The change projects did not take any economic arguments into account and only the ideological and political criteria mattered, which fully confirms the mode of conducting the agricultural reform. Nevertheless, it often turned out that political needs dominated even over ideological ones. Remaining in power was clearly the authorities’ sole objective, and everything else was subordinated to it. That is why the ideas of complete social reconstruction of the countryside and “rooting out” traditional religiousness and rituals from it were abandoned. In spite of devoted efforts, by the 1970s, the authorities still had not managed to form a social structure compliant with ideological assumptions. The structure formed was still considered temporary and a testimony to failures experienced and compromises, concessions and silencing made. It was an image of both strengths and weaknesses of the authorities and reminded of the class structure with the officially decreed leading role of workers. The structure created was disappointing to communist ideologists, sociologists and representatives of existing strata and classes alike. Even the privileged nomenklatura expressed their dissatisfaction with the range of their privileges. The new hierarchies in individual classes were built by “elevating” certain professional and industry branches both politically and instrumentally. For strategic reasons, the industries that received

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privileges were mining, arms and metalworking (Zaremba, 2001, p. 91), thus differentiating the workers in terms of salary and improving their access to rarer goods. The workers who were less useful to the order were subjected to full economic exploitation. Such compromises and actions deprived the order of its ideological character, providing it with a conciliatory, political and instrumental one instead. An example of that can be the services sector, which was continuously maintained and tolerated despite being in conflict with the principles of orthodox Marxism. The attempts at a scientific explanation of the contemporary social structure led to the conclusion that the social structure of the 1970s did not correspond to the expectations of communist ideologists.

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˙ Kostewicz, T. (1996). Terror i represje. In B. Otwinowska & J. Zaryn (Eds.), Polacy wobec przemocy 1944–1956. “Editions Spotkania”. Kuzinski, ´ S. (1955). O proporcjach mi˛edzy przemysłem a rolnictwem w Polsce Ludowej. “Ksi˛azka ˙ i Wiedza”. ´ Leder, A. (2014). Prze´sniona rewolucja. Cwiczenia z logiki historycznej. Wydawnictwo Krytyki Politycznej. Lesiakowski, K. (2008). Strajki robotnicze w Łodzi 1945–1976. IPN, Komisja ´ Scigania Zbrodni przeciwko Narodowi Polskiemu. Leszczynski, ´ A. (2013). Skok w nowoczesno´sc´ . Polityka wzrostu w krajach peryferyjnych 1943–1980. Wydawnictwo Krytyki Politycznej. Lewandowski, C. (1972). Koncepcja jedno´sci narodowej i frontu narodowego w my´sli politycznej Polskiej Partii Robotniczej (1942–1944). In M. Orzechowski (Ed.), Polska. Naród. Panstwo. ´ Z badan´ nad my´sla˛ polityczna˛ Polskiej Partii Robotniczej 1942–1948. Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolinskich. ´ Lewandowski, S. (2008). Dyskryminacja chłopów przez komunistów w Polsce ˙ Ludowej. Wydawnictwo Akademickie ZAK. Magierska, A. (2005). Rok 1989 – z do´swiadczen´ przeszło´sci. Społeczenstwo ´ i Polityka, 2(3), 25–34. Makarczyk, W., & Błuszkowski, J. (1978). Przemiany warstwy pracowników umysłowych. In W. Wesołowski (Ed.), Kształt struktury społecznej. Studia do syntezy. Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolinskich. ´ Marody, M. (1991a). System realnego socjalizmu w jednostkach. In M. Marody (Ed.), Co nam zostało z tych lat… Społeczenstwo ´ polskie u progu zmiany systemowej. Aneks. Marody, M. (1991b). Polityka. In M. Marody (Ed.), Co nam zostało z tych lat… Społeczenstwo ´ polskie u progu zmiany systemowej. Aneks. Mazur, M. (2009). O człowieku tendencyjnym… Obraz nowego człowieka w propagandzie komunistycznej w okresie Polski Ludowej i PRL 1944–1956. Wydawnictwo UMCS. Miernik, G. (2007). „My” i „Oni”. Społeczenstwo ´ Kielecczyzny i stalinowski system ´ etokrzyskie. władzy. Wydawnictwo Akademii Swi˛ Mokrzycki, E. (1997). Od protokapitalizmu do posocjalizmu: makrostrukturalny wymiar dwukrotnej zmiany ustroju. In H. Domanski ´ & A. Rychard (Eds.), Elementy nowego ładu. Wydawnictwo IFiS PAN. Mrówczynska, ´ J. (1977). Społeczno-ekonomiczne warunki realizacji prawa do pracy w Polsce Ludowej. UAM. Nowakowski, S. (1957). Warszawski hotel robotniczy i jego mieszkancy. ´ Kultura i Społeczenstwo, ´ 2, 33–62. Nowakowski, S. (1976). Zblizenie ˙ grup społecznych w procesie socjalistycznej industrializacji w Polsce. In Przemiany struktury społecznej w ZSRR i Polsce. Spółdzielnia Wydawniczo-Handlowa “Ksi˛azka ˙ i Wiedza”.

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Szpakowski, Z. (1996). Zbrojne podziemie antykomunistyczne. In B. ˙ Otwinowska & J. Zaryn (Eds.), Polacy wobec przemocy 1944–1956. “Editions Spotkania”. Turski, R., Łapinska-Tyszka, ´ K., & Nowak, W. (1978). Przemiany klasy chłopskiej. In W. Wesołowski (Ed.), Kształt struktury społecznej. Studia do syntezy. Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolinskich. ´ Wacławek, J. (1965). Kształtowanie socjalistycznych stosunków mi˛edzyludzkich w zakładzie przemysłowym. Próby i do´swiadczenia. Przyczynek do opracowania zakładowego programu humanizacji pracy. “Ksi˛azka ˙ i Wiedza”. Wesołowski, W. (1965). Przemiany społeczne w Polsce Ludowej. “Ksi˛azka ˙ i Wiedza”. Wesołowski, W. (1966). Klasy, warstwy i władza. PWN. Wesołowski, W. (1969). Klasa robotnicza i przeobrazenia ˙ struktury społecznej w PRL. “Ksi˛azka ˙ i Wiedza”. Wesołowski, W. (1974). Teoretyczne i metodologiczne problemy badan´ empirycznych nad struktur˛a klasowo-warstwow˛a. In W. Wesołowski (Ed.), Zró˙znicowanie społeczne. Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolinskich. ´ Wesołowski, W. (1978a). Wprowadzenie. In W. Wesołowski (Ed.), Kształt struktury społecznej. Studia do syntezy. Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolinskich. ´ Wesołowski, W. (1978b). Teoria. Badania. Praktyka. Z problematyki struktury społecznej. “Ksi˛azka ˙ i Wiedza”. Wesołowski, W. (1989). Typologia podziałów społecznych i identyfikacje jednostek. IFiS PAN. Wesołowski, W., Janicka, K., & Słomczynski, ´ M. K. (Eds.). (2017). Strukturalizacja społeczenstwa ´ polskiego. Ewolucja paradygmatu. Wydawnictwo IFiS PAN. Wiatr, J. (1962). Uwarstwienie społeczne a tendencje egalitarne. Kultura i Społeczenstwo, ´ 2, 33–45. Wiatr, J. J. (1965). Inteligencja w Polsce Ludowej. In A. Sarapata (Ed.), Przemiany społeczne w Polsce Ludowej. PWN. Widerszpil, S. (1965). Skład polskiej klasy robotniczej. Tendencje zmian w okresie industrializacji socjalistycznej. PWN. Widerszpil, S. (1974). Czy zmierzch klasy robotniczej? In J. Szczepanski ´ (Ed.), Narodziny socjalistycznej klasy robotniczej. Instytut Wydawniczy CRZZ. Witek, T. (1946, August 28). Czas juz˙ najwyzszy ˙ rozwia´c legend˛e o „kołchozach”. Dziennik Polski, 3. Wnuk-Lipinski, ´ E. (2008). Socjologia zycia ˙ publicznego. Wydawnictwo Naukowe “Scholar”. Zagórski, K. (1978). Rozwój, struktura i ruchliwo´sc´ społeczna. PWN. Zaremba, M. (2001). Komunizm, legitymizacja, nacjonalizm. Nacjonalistyczna legitymizacja władzy komunistycznej w Polsce. Trio & ISP PAN. Zwierzchowski, P. (2000). Zapomniani bohaterowie. O bohaterach filmowych polskiego socjalizmu. “Trio”.

CHAPTER 3

Consequences of the Experiment: The Division Between Society and the nomenklatura

Mechanisms of the Formation and Removal of Social Distances The previous analysis of how the totalitarian order employed the values of equality and justice has demonstrated that they conditioned the revolution and its sets of political objectives. It was according to these ideas and imaginations that the transformation of the social structure was carried out. Because of that, it has been retold how it was instrumentally and unscrupulously modified until the 1970s and then “played out” for the following two decades. There have been some of the consequences of this supervised and controlled change presented, supported by intensive propaganda and an information monopoly that took advantage of the authority of science and the idea of progress and rationalism, and carried out with the use of three-way actions—starting with the elimination of political opponents and then proceeding to destroy capitalism (its structure) and perform actions aimed at changing society through education and indoctrination. The promoted concept of justice provided a political advantage during the initial phase of changes as that concept was attractive and credible to many people. The ideological and political “elevation” of workers and farmers, often facing discrimination before, made them feel that historical justice had been served and more important. Seeking to solidify their rule, the authorities sought the support of these groups by making © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 P. Borowiec, The Politicization of Social Divisions in Post-War Poland, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-26530-3_3

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more promises and filling the discourse with images of a better future. It is hardly surprising that the designated beneficiaries of the revolution waited so intensely and impatiently for the order to fulfil these promises. When managing the revolution, the authorities pointed to further factors testifying to the effectiveness of the change. The achievements of the order were confirmed by leading to the formation of socialist relations and bringing back to individuals the dignity taken away by capitalism. They meant a change in the whole of living, in aspects crucial to human existence, and were supposed not to be another mirage (i.e., “masks” applied onto relations to obscure and falsify their actual form). Implementing such changes required time, social approval, indispensable economic resources and political determination. C,ommunist ideologists were thoroughly analysing all the fears, humiliations and injustices that had been suffered by the Polish society (Hirszowicz, 2001, p. 17). They made the pre-war social divisions, having the mostly economic background, an object of their interest. Additionally, they skillfully linked these divisions to the condition of the pre-war social structure. They recognised the wrongs and the exploitation of one people by another as dependent on economic formation (i.e., also on structural inequalities), and defined the future as the elimination of these pathologies (i.e., of the divisions). They confirmed that in Polish conditions, the distances also stemmed from inequalities present in capitalist relations. They presented interpretations of these inequalities (i.e., places of their formation and occurrence), as well as mechanisms used to sustain them. Turning attention to the significance of relations to the order stemmed from analyses made by Karl Marx. According to him, relations were identical to structured inequalities that eventually generated social conflict. The capitalist social relations were characterised by economic determinations, were overflowing with conflicting interests and antagonisms. The communists based the formation of non-antagonistic relations on manipulating “the mechanism of suppressing and generating aspirations” (Touraine, 2010, p. 18). They set “manually” the principles decisive for the functioning of that mechanism. The first was the principle that the authorities controlled the distribution of goods in society. Thus, they abandoned the individual aspirations of individuals, imposing [on society] certain different, official and ideological models of aspirations. They were characterised by universal supervision and top-down satisfaction of needs by the state, which led to the individuals becoming subordinated to those

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who disposed of goods. The authorities created catalogues of valued goods and aspirations, which sometimes took the form of general ideological promises that were certain utopian imaginations difficult to meet. They created sets of rules and standards admitting and limiting aspirations and made the solutions adopted the final instance in settling what a good life was, which interests had a chance of being expressed in the order and which were blocked. They decided on forming and sustaining new hierarchies; every single of them was a functional structure that determined the chances of development of social groups. The arrangement of such a mechanism always determines and stimulates the stability of orders and their capability for transformation, specifies the range of possible changes and indicates the initiators and inhibitors of change. It also decides on delaying or accelerating the rate of changes, thus forming orders and relations typical of them. It imposes contradictions and leads to social problems, conflicts and political disputes within society. They especially occur when this mechanism is set from the very basics, according to completely new rules incompatible with the previous ones. It is worth adding that it is impossible to “deactivate” the old rules of that mechanism for the duration of reconstruction and use only the new ones—they may exist next to each other for a long time. It is similarly unrealistic to immediately and ultimately eliminate the old forms of aspirations in individuals. These conclusions show that the mechanism always plays a significant role in society, which is confirmed by the fact that communists often referred to material ambitions and aspirations. An example of that can be the use of the idea of competition at work—it was allowed, but only concerning the execution of planned tasks (Narojek, 1996, p. 12). The lack of clear and intelligible rules of functioning of this mechanism creates chaos in individuals, undermining the functioning of the order and forming a basis for its change. Eventually, this leads to the later changes in the order being radical. “Manipulating” the mechanism discussed means instrumental control over change. From a long-term perspective, however, the adopted models of communist aspirations generated negative consequences for the authorities. Thoughtless “driving” of mass aspirations, imposing ideological visions of such aspirations and linking them to the then-current policy turned out to be dysfunctional to the authorities. There were multiple instances of them experiencing negative consequences of increasing the aspirations of many groups and failing to satisfy most of them.

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The “aspiration arrangement” mechanism discussed is of importance to any order. A radical change to its rules always demands quick changes, rejecting the whole previous order and negating sets of existing hierarchies and privileges. The mechanism confirms the significance of ideology for increasing the precision of its functioning, consisting of preparing useful justifications for increasing or limiting aspirations. It shows the role of ideology in supervision and control over society. Usually, it is the economic aspect of aspirations—bearing all its limitations in mind—that seems the most important for forming orders, and the optimal adjustment of economic aspiration rules leads to ordering political objectives. Thus, any suggestions of changes in the redistribution of riches gain not only ideological but also political dimensions. A general adjustment of this mechanism that was introduced by communists and had an impact on everyone was the abolishment of the free market and the introduction of central planning, state property and full political supervision and control (Mokrzycki, 1997). A part of it was the creation of standards and the administrative apparatus handling the distribution of goods. The extensive system of distribution was tasked with performing “just” allocation of goods on a group and individual level (i.e., implementing the fundamental communist dream of equality). And it was doing that as long as it had enough goods—mainly plundered ones (agricultural reform). Once there was a shortage of goods, it took even more pathological forms, for example, by creating the corrupt and primitive clientelist system (Tarkowski, 1994). In terms of the adjustment of aspirations, the communist authorities were both radical and conservative. They destroyed what was before and imposed changes without leaving much choice to anyone. Or at least it seemed so, especially when they referred to experiences of the Soviet order. They focused on subordinating the whole society and taking complete control over the realisation of aspirations, set admissible forms of aspiration realisation (in line with assumptions of the communist economy) and took full responsibility for improving the lives of all individuals. They set aspirations for all groups, extending them radically for some and declining others not only the right to aspirations, but even to existence. They set the maximum achievement ceilings and ensured they were not exceeded by punishing them for realising aspirations in any way other than the imposed ones. They occupied themselves with setting places for all groups within hierarchies, controlling the objectives and the methods of achieving them.

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Such actions [of the government] in a situation of universal deficiency of goods led to people considering “ripping out” any goods plagued by shortages from its hands a success. Despite their devoted efforts, the authorities were unable to extinguish all aspirations. They remained smouldering in people, appearing in scattered or hidden forms, breaking into consciousness and waiting for a chance to be realised. Certain actions [of the government] were in line with society’s aspirations, for example, the industrialisation programme: “It did enable social advancement and fostered realisation of personal aspirations of various groups and strata, thanks to which it could count on their approval” (Rychard, 1995, p. 18). The authorities did not encompass everyone with the equal distribution of goods and created an exception for themselves by way of alternative access to goods that constituted a certain bypass of the official distribution system (Koralewicz, 2008) and was intended for the avant-garde of the proletariat. Its existence led to the appearance of the nomenklatura. The authorities controlled society by playing a “game of aspirations and ambitions” of individuals. This did not apply solely to the administrative structures of running the state. The authorities reached for all aspirations, “took them over” and used them to control individuals in a manner beneficial to their own political interests. They built a universal system of satisfying aspirations and then failed to comply with it, and also employed partiality, bias and interest of the party apparatus. Although the original aspirations of certain groups were realised, like in the case of farmers, they were not fully satisfied. The distribution of land made farmers its owners, but their financial standing was not improved significantly, and the value of agricultural land in the Polish People’s Republic was low. All groups, not only those towards which the government had a positive attitude, experienced having their aspirations managed. Many groups were persuaded that they were experiencing some advancement, with some individuals becoming its shareholders: “The degree of deprivation of basic needs resulted in the feeling of advancement already being experienced as a result of moving to a city from the countryside, even if such a transition was not readily accompanied by any noticeable improvement of the material standard of living” (Marody, 1991, p. 232). Initially, advancement was experienced by workers who systematically improved their qualifications, similarly to their children who had access to educational advancement. However, these actions were, to a great degree, a part of the authorities’ instrumental manipulation of the aspirations of various groups. Whole groups were shifted in the queue for goods. This was

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achieved not only by manipulating aspirations of measures of success, but also through specific actions such as the so-called “extra points” for the background of children of farmers and workers for admission to higher education. Any advancement without the participation of the authorities was excluded, and all others were presented by the propaganda “as a gift – a present from the people’s authority” (Palska, 1994, p. 9). Blocking the activity of individuals in many spheres of life was a significant limitation of the existing paths of aspiration realisation. The substitute spheres of activity imposed, beneficial to the state apparatus and the nomenklatura, were losing their mobilising potential. In fact, some of them had never played such a role at all. The fact that individuals accepted them often stemmed from other motivations and instrumental calculations rather than from being convinced of the validity of the existing solutions and objectives. Another weakness of the paths suggested was the undermining of the faith in the possibility of realisation of those aspirations. This resulted in a collapse of mutual dependency between labour and effort and the reward for them. The social experience gained indicated that working more efficiently did not result in a higher salary. The ideological propaganda forms of mobilisation, such as slogans like “good and honest work contributes to building the socialist Fatherland”, were not fulfilling their role. The mechanism of incitement of collective aspirations was also blocked by the “serious” interpretation of the equality idea promoted. This was evident in view of the messages on the necessity of equal remuneration paid to all people working in the same position, irrespective of their involvement at work. The labour system formed turned out to be dysfunctional—the individuals with “blocked material aspirations” were not driving efficiency and effectiveness. What became entrenched in the consciousness of many workers was the conviction that salary was not an economic category, but “only plays a social role and is remuneration for the lone fact of remaining in an employment relation” (Marody, 1986, p. 15). On the other hand, the hopes vested in the concept of common good and sacrifice for the nation or the realisation of collective interest” turned out empty and impossible to make real. Officially, the state and party apparatus was responsible for satisfying the aspirations. Making good on all the promises made and management over advancements and distribution of goods—all of that was in its hands (Zagórski, 1978, p. 21). The majority of individuals were deprived of responsibility for the conditions of their existence and the possibility to

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control their own lives. In practice, such a limitation turned out to be more dysfunctional than useful to the authorities. It was beneficial to them only to a very limited extent, and its political usefulness varied as well. An example of that can be the situation and behaviour of smallscale farmers and former manor workers who were incapable of making a living off the land they were assigned. Thus, what had been perceived as advancement and a path towards equality was eventually considered an “illusory moment of peace”. Because of that, political support for the authorities expressed by such farmers changed over time and waned when the government failed to meet their subsequent aspirations. Such a situation was experienced by social groups, especially in the early 1970s (Koralewicz, 2008, pp. 21–22), when the disappointment of society with how its needs were satisfied was revealed. Further promises of the authorities were taken less and less seriously and only angered the people. In view of the “constantly growing needs of the working class, working farmers and the intelligentsia”, these promises “created one of the most signifi2010a, cant ‘legitimisation pitfalls’ for the existing social order” (Panków, ´ p. 208). It turned out that providing further advancement to workers and farmers was difficult. In view of the lack of goods for distribution, such a strategy was no longer possible to repeat. This led to ceaseless competition for resources between the authorities and the social groups. A side effect of this competition was further awakening of aspirations with simultaneous failure to satisfy them, resulting in recurring social conflicts. After ´ 2010, p. 313), further the period of “little stabilisation” (Swida-Ziemba, consumer aspirations were awakened. In the decades to follow, the range of unsatisfied needs experienced particularly strong expansion, and the scale of unrealised consumer aspirations increased. One of the symptoms of the deepening crisis—market breakdown and growing inflation, as well as a direct consequence of a rapid decrease of actual income in 1982 that impacted all the social groups—was the increase in discrepancies between the achieved income and that declared as desired (Sikorska, 1999, p. 115). The fields of materialism, consciousness, privilege distribution and access to and shortage of goods were where the fate of the social justice concept and its version implemented in practice was decided. The order could not provide the welfare promised, even to the ideologically selected groups. The “mechanism of suppression and generation of aspirations” that had been introduced turned out to be a pitfall that led to tragic economic consequences for society. The above statements are confirmed by the fluctuating level of society’s support for the order (Zaremba,

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2001), as well as the level of its acceptance and legitimisation. An increase in support for the Polish People’s Republic’s authorities was always related to an improvement in the economic situation, which is confirmed by the periods of Gomułka’s “little stabilisation” and Gierek’s industrialisation.

Experience of Discrimination in Workplaces The communist authorities experienced a persistent lack of legitimisation, which is why they employed all sorts of means to increase their anchorage in society. To this end, they participated actively in all kinds of ceremonies, commemorations, anniversaries and official celebrations of state holidays. The participation of state leaders in those events was often transformed into a presentation of their skills or merits in liberating the country. The parties organising ceremonies built “an image of state leaders that assigned to them nearly divine characteristics” (Os˛eka, 2007, p. 150). The leaders were presented as rejuvenated, smiled and established direct contact with society. They received flowers from people dressed in folk attire symbolising the support of working people and the national tradition. Any visit from leaders was presented as a distinction and always constituted the central point of the event, around which the most important parts of the ceremony were structured. During the Stalin period, they were separated from society, standing on a tall, distant platform from which they saluted the marching crowds. In this manner, the hierarchy of the authorities and their distrust towards people invited to the ceremony was underlined. The whole event and the ceremonial space were planned in detail. The ceremonies organised were supposed to hide the distance present between the government and those governed (Os˛eka, 2007, p. 150). This distance was reduced later on, but the purpose of a ceremony was always to demonstrate the harmony that existed between the authorities and society. However, it was not ceremonies that reflected the form of relations between those groups. It started with the brutal elimination of the proindependence opposition and was complemented by the places where the socialist relations were born and where the true face of the order was “being displayed”—namely, the workplaces where workers met the plant management apparatus. The form of these relations was supposed to confirm the spread of the ideas as a new model of labour and plant management involving workers was to appear. In practice, it was the organisational apparatus—and later the party apparatus taking over the

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control over production—that was made responsible for realising this objective. In propaganda, the new authorities were inviting workers to joint management of factories and convincing them that the longawaited moment of making the labour movement’s dreams of creating the anticipated alternative work relations come true had finally arrived. A special role in those planned relations was to be played by the managing apparatus. Its recruitment was initially difficult due to a lack of staff experienced in recreating the production process. An obstacle to forming a complete apparatus was a peculiar “social vacuum” (Zaremba, 2001, p. 137) in which the new authorities were functioning. As time passed, the number of those interested in joining the managing apparatus grew (Grabowska 2004, p. 119). The arrangement of these relations and the creation of working conditions, including the practical transformation of the “mechanism of suppression and generation of aspirations”—during the first years of communism—was presented in the following work: Rebuilding Poland: Workers and Communists (Kenney 1997b), Strajki robotnicze w Łodzi ´ 2000, 1945–1976 (Lesiakowski, 2008) and in other studies (Kaminski, ´ 2015; Zawisza, pp. 64–149; Miernik & Pi˛atkowski, 2005; Chuminski, 2019). Padraic Kenney was right to claim that to examine the issue of opposition and resistance against the order imposed, it was necessary to go to the factories (Kenney, 1997a, p. 32). At the same time, it was possible to notice in the factories the framework for the formation of the “us” vs “them” social division, where the ideals of the ideology and revolution had a brutal clash with practical implementation thereof. Those taking over control of the work establishments strived to commence production, which was presented by propaganda as the successes of the new order. This required concluding the necessary compromises (i.e., making deals, especially with workers who had pre-war experience in production). The launching of factories was accompanied by enthusiasm and hope, also due to the lack of basic goods. The noticeable powerlessness in terms of provisioning was being handled using slogans about the improvement of the situation in the nearest future and requests for understanding. The post-war enthusiasm encompassed the workers, which is why the discontent stemming from product shortage was initially possible to explain. Thus, effective explanations for errors in production and shortages of goods were provided using sets of convincing arguments. Those in control of the order underlined that the shortage situation was a consequence of the war, which was true. Later on, the shortages were

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allegedly a side effect and consequence of the capitalist heritage and the initial shortcomings of the system, which, however, did not encumber the system itself but specific people only. It was claimed that the perspective of an “increasingly better, fuller, more prosperous and happy life seemed to be within arm’s reach” (Mazur, 2009, p. 356). The persistent promise to eliminate supply shortages started losing its impact because of the lack of confirmation of it. The workers’ desire to improve their biological existence led them to formulate demands for increased salaries, the introduction of fair standards and social and provisioning solutions. Despite growing penalties, strikes were still being organised. The authorities euphemistically referred to them as “work breaks” (Lesiakowski, 2008, p. 11). An excellent example was the situation in factories in Łód´z, where the expectations of higher gratifications, caused by the growing food prices and the availability of products in private trade (Lesiakowski, 2008), led to frequent conflicts. In order to increase the interest of workers in more efficient work, additional remunerations in kind were introduced, also referred to as allowances and material additions, which the workers often sold on the black market. Such attempts at linking productivity with aspirations and remunerations did not provide the expected effects and the workers’ despondency was becoming ubiquitous. Positive consequences of the worker’s labour existed in propaganda communications only. Meanwhile, factories were plagued by disorganisation and chaos. The dominating feeling was that their effort was being wasted and that the system of remunerations supplemented with allowances not only did not lead to the elimination of production problems, but also created more inequalities among the workers. Additionally, it kept workers convinced that the state is indeed responsible for the whole life of workers. Workers’ demands included egalitarianism, just distribution of goods, equal salaries and participating in decisions regarding their workplace— none of which were excessive. They noticed any inequalities present regarding remunerations and considered them unjust. What incited doubts in them was not only the salary differences present in factories between blue- and white-collar workers, but also those between workers in different factories. The workers were following the salary increases in other factories and demanded similar ones (Kenney, 1997b, p. 100). In this manner, the revolutionary ideas crashed against the reality of everyday life and the authorities’ problem was that the workers’ slogans they had been spreading were taken seriously.

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The official takeover of control over work establishments by workers and making the industry common property did not eliminate aspirations for fair remuneration. From whom could the workers expect decent work and pay if not from the “just” communist order? The authorities had to face this problem and convince the working class that although it had become the owner of the factories, it now had to work there more intensely. The inadequacy of the spread of ideas was apparent in such situations as there was a lack of effective tools for increasing production. The attempts at combining material aspirations with efficiency entailed questioning the equality and justice ideas promoted. It was of no significance what kinds of “justifications” were used to support the calls for more efficient work. The authorities created strategies to motivate the workers, but some quickly lost their attractiveness and were ineffective. At the same time, the initial dedication of the workers—stemming from the idea of rebuilding the country, which they accepted—was gone, replaced by weariness and bitterness (Lesiakowski, 2008, p. 38). The authorities were noticing the spread of behaviour typical of “layabout workers”, practically unknown during the interwar period (Malinowski, 1962, p. 94). The belief in the creation of the front of national unity was waning, especially when the reaction of authorities to poor production results was increasing the production efficiency standards, stricter supervision over production and growing the system of labour controllers and inspectors to an unimaginable size. The actions mentioned above confirmed that workers “were not allowed to decide on anything within their work´ 1998, p. 212)—they were not the actual owners places” (Swida-Ziemba, of these places, and they found it impossible to feel as if they were. Instead of developing employees’ aspirations and supporting creative solutions at work, the work establishments—especially the staff managing them— blocked the creation of new ideas as they saw them as a threat to their existence. They only promoted actions consistent with the propaganda communication and supported workers loyal to the order. From a long-term perspective, the work establishments took over the responsibilities outside of production and received tasks consisting in eliminating alienation and forming relations with workers to implement forms of paternalistic hierarchies. Their main task was to “socialise” the workers—according to Jan Poleszczuk, they were supposed to be “little societies” and worker collectives. Additionally, they were expected to take over all the welfare-providing functions of the state—helping supply people with both basic and luxury goods, supporting people in

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crisis situations, solving accommodation issues, organising health care and recreation and providing care for employees’ children. The whole life of workers was supposed to orbit their workplaces. However, fulfilling these functions turned out to be extremely difficult in practice. In reality, it was all about gaining more control over workers. Such numerous functions of work establishments turned out to be a part of concealed supervisory actions of the apparatus aimed against the workers (Poleszczuk, 1991). The work relations formed were not conducive to appropriate attitudes towards the workplace and the work itself or building the labour ethos. Unsatisfactory salaries, disappointment with the provision of goods (Miernik, 2005, p. 27), observation of factory management pathologies and realisation that the factories do not constitute common property all encouraged the workers to neglect and ignore their obligations at work. This led the workers to start illegal activities such as stealing from their workplaces (Madej, 2005, p. 135). They were irritated by unrealistic standards, low salaries and thorough searches at the workplace entrance. Their decision to commit theft often stemmed from the will to survive, insufficient salary or lack of basic goods (Lesiakowski, 2008, p. 14). Because of universal poverty, expecting the workers to work efficiently without that being reflected in the amount of their salary lacked grounds—especially in the worsening economic situation. In response to the transgressions of workers, the authorities introduced an extensive system of penalties: “The June 1950 law on socialist work discipline marks the official beginning of the open battle with worker crime and the dawn of Stalinism in the factories” (Kenney, 1997b, p. 206). It is worth adding that in 1950 it only took seven months to punish 42,443 workers under these regulations (Kenney, 1997b, p. 206). However, no penalties could stop alcohol consumption at work, which became a part of the worker culture, testifying to the feeling of pointlessness of work and the dissolution of work relations. The above actions confirmed that the working class experienced realising its place in the new order quite painfully. The workers quickly understood that the messages referring to a community of labour, equality and the party representing the workers were just another mystification employed in propaganda. In the order being formed, the workers ´ 1998, p. 209). were given the position of “slave labour” (Swida-Ziemba, On the other side of the growing conflict among factory management, the false imagination of workers as the leading force of history was falling as well. The progressing disappointment resulted from the workers not being involved enough in the production process, lacking

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ideological compatibility or ignoring the motivation tools proposed. The workers turned out to be the biggest disappointment on the ideological and political front as they not only failed to exhibit spontaneous desire to join the party, but were also devoid of a high level of political activity and did not participate in propaganda events (Miernik, 2005, p. 10). Complaining about their political slowness, passiveness and lack of political activity became a regular element of the discourse of the party apparatus. The said apparatus was more and more often disdainful towards its structural background. The workers were characterised as insufficiently seasoned, useless for the revolutionary tasks assigned to them and lacking the proper consciousness expected of them. The indifference of workers towards the order formed was becoming a problem, although one that remained hidden by the propaganda for many years. Disciplining the workers created enmity spaces in relations as it was not only the strike organisers who were deprived of employment—sometimes even whole work establishments were closed (Lesiakowski, 2008, p. 115). The workers were being made aware that because of the order built and them being owners of the workplaces, work was their fundamental obligation. The workers started to realise that the factory managers took over the role of pre-war factory owners. The management apparatus in factories did not shy away from actions aimed at disciplining the workers, but the primary role within that scope was played by Security Office (UB) officers employed full-time at the factories (Paczkowski, 1996, pp. 23–26). The presence of this apparatus, receiving generous salaries, deepened the workers’ disappointment with the new order and their reluctance towards it. A part of the relations built was introducing party organisations, often identical to the management apparatus, into work establishments. The party staff were taking over new tasks in work establishments, becoming responsible for educating the workers and increasing their ideological awareness. At the same time, they were not incurring liability for numerous instances of negligence (Lesiakowski, 2008, p. 56) or consequences of errors in factory management. Additionally, the party apparatus took control over labour unions, which made the workers aware of how they were completely alone before the authority structures. The unions, which were supposed to be a channel for communicating worker discontent, were subordinated to a party organisation (Miernik, 2007, p. 77), thus alienating the workers from the unions created. The worker’s dissatisfaction with the functioning of their work establishments, including numerous idle periods caused by shortages of

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resources or semi-finished products, was growing systematically. Production was universally handicapped due to a lack of timely deliveries and the collapse of the work ethos. In workers’ eyes, social property was becoming fiction, and the sense of common ownership was alien to them. The place previously occupied by the capitalist factory owner had been taken over by the factory director, and the management was chosen according to political needs. It turned out that the method of managing and using property did not differ much from the pre-war one. The salaries were not improving, while the production chaos was getting worse. The striking workers were characterised as enemies working to the detriment of society and destroying common property The image of a discontent and striking worker was becoming established among the authorities, requiring further education and awareness-raising. Despite that, in propaganda, the workers were always satisfied with their work conditions and salary. It was underlined that dissatisfaction is expressed only by a handful of bums and reactionaries (i.e., workers sympathising with the capitalist order) (Lesiakowski, 2008). New methods of activity stimulation and the application of extensive forms were supposed to increase work efficiency and productivity and improve responsibility (Miernik, 2007). One of the main ones was the competition at work (Wilk, 2005, pp. 43–68), the aim of which was to repair the disturbed relationship between work and remuneration. Attempts were made to increase work efficiency using ideological messages and new rhetoric about taking advantage of unreachable stocks of materials and symbolic goods. To the working class, the competition would provide an opportunity for higher salary, promotion, advancement and becoming a local workplace hero. In view of ubiquitous problems with production, the authorities reached individual resources of material aspirations. Campaigns like these were used to provide more goods for the economy and increase support and acceptance towards the authorities. At the same time, it was aimed at reducing the disappointment of workers caused by the condition of the economy, persuading them to accept the order and convincing them that the living standard may depend partially on their work efficiency (Miernik, 2005). The competition at work was implemented in line with the Soviet experiences (Wilk, 2011, p. 19)—it was a form of instrumental, continuous motivation, a form of rescuing the system and increasing production through encouraging to work by means of rewarding with goods that

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were difficult to access by most of society. It referred to individual aspirations, being appreciated and having one’s significance in the workplace recognised. The work for the socialist fatherland was combined with the aspirations of individuals. The offer of competition was directed to worker communities and intended to elicit new behaviour from them. However, this strategy created additional forms of inequality and further division at work establishments. It led to the destruction of group coherence. The model workers were not favoured by their co-workers and were becoming objects of ridicule, jealousy and antipathy, and sometimes even ´ 1998, p. 147). Competition of aggression or boycotting (Swida-Ziemba, was perceived as conflicting with equality as the rewards and gratifications were envisaged for the best only. Such opinions appeared mainly among older workers, who noticed in this programme a form of humiliation and deprivation of dignity. Younger workers were usually supportive of competing. Over time, the interest in competing was waning, and a significant hit suffered by this programme was the disappointment of model workers with the forms of rewards applied. Competing was systematically linked with increased requirements towards the workers and changes in the adjustment of salaries (Kenney, 1997b, pp. 237–286). The competition was a political and propaganda strategy used to influence society. The system of non-salary benefits was aimed at releasing the enthusiasm of the working classes, devoted to achieving new economic objectives and reducing the inertia of planning mechanisms (Poleszczuk, 1991, p. 127). The myth of the model workers was aimed at demonstrating that exhausting labour results from the collective enthusiasm of ´ 1998, p. 207). The exceptional and effective workers (Swida-Ziemba, role of the workers’ party, able to motivate workers to work hard, was presented (Wilk, 2011, p. 77). On the wave of this enthusiasm, declarations of additional employee obligations, working on more holidays or working longer hours were born. A work race was being created, which— from the authorities’ point of view—was particularly necessary as a form of education of workers, mainly on the basis of sustaining the sense of uniqueness of the moment and continuation of the revolution. Although no major economic successes were achieved, competing was a “hole torn” in the communist arrangement of the “mechanism of suppressing and generating aspirations”, a primitive response to the ideological blocks of the order imposed by the authorities. An undisputed achievement of this motivation strategy was temporarily drawing a part of society away from their everyday problems and shortages of goods, reducing social conflicts

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and tensions and undermining the question about chances for having one’s needs satisfied (Kenney, 1997b, pp. 232–286). When the decisive majority of ownership means ended up in the hands of the state, it required supervision and professional management. The management structure formed at work establishments “imposed” previously unknown forms of new hierarchies. The need to have this property managed forced the introduction of position variation solutions, which confirmed that the working people of the countryside and cities were the owner of the factories. However, these solutions’ practical forms of influence on the economy turned out to be a failure, and the control of workers over the property was particularly illusory. It also turned out that functioning of work establishments and all state institutions was impossible without hierarchical, bureaucratic structures ensuring minimum functionality. Without the hated idea of hierarchy, no management of state-owned means of production was possible (Morawski, 1982, pp. 14–15). In the management forms adopted, the possibility of promotion within formal structures was not eliminated, but it became dependent on subordination and obedience, or actually on the degree of presented activity and participation in solidification of the “people’s authority”. What became an evaluation criterion was the activity in socio-political structures maintaining the existing order. At the same time, the level of salary was disconnected from work efficiency and, therefore, the labour distribution retained stopped forming the basis for demanding respect (Giza-Poleszczuk, 1991, p. 80). Having a higher position in the work establishment structure did not entail respect, but actually became grounds for being denied it. Such an instrumentalisation of participation in the order deprived it of legitimacy. In this manner, the party ´ apparatus was placed at the top of the hierarchies formed. Hanna SwidaZiemba wrote that “members of the Polish United Workers’ Party were the aliens, those to whom false signals are sent, those with whom any non-formal contact is usually avoided. Thus, the members of the party were threatened with a certain banishment, and they were condemned to their own ghetto” (1998, p. 146). This is how the bureaucratic structure that also handled “ideological supervision” was being formed and solidified. Its task was to transmit the messages from the authorities to society and explain the government’s actions. It also confirmed politics as becoming the same as economics, as well as the dominance of politics over economics.

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The political affiliation defined qualifications and skills. Incompetence, arrogance or wrong management of work establishments was not noticed, thus depriving the party and state elites of any right to introduce changes. The authorities shaped the system of selecting and recruiting members tasked with governing based on conformism. With time, that system expanded its range and was growing, especially during the periods of the improving economic situation in the country. Meanwhile, it was working well in times of crisis. It sanctioned the distribution of privileges, which was why it expanded its influence and recruited new members—always using the message that becoming privileged is available, and the first step towards it is choosing the side of the order. The distribution of privileges built did not introduce any rules of responsibility for wrong decisions. It did not allow for reckoning of those loyal and obedient (Poleszczuk, 1991, p. 119) unless the situation demanded designating a “scapegoat”. The authorities made decisions secretly, usually during meetings and councils, where they approved the decisions sent “from above”, which also made determining those responsible difficult. The costs of many errors were hidden by the factory managers. The vocational diversity of workers and the fact that they were assigned 1987, p. 71) led to the to different branches of the industry (Domanski, ´ appearance of industry privileges and work classifications. A mechanism of constant, elevated evaluation of work performed by workers employed in spheres of importance to the state was formed. Thus, the workers’ dreams of equality and the ideologists’ dreams of uniform social classes were being shattered. Under the influence of interest groups and ambitions to develop arms, new hierarchies of professional groups appeared. They were not aimed at restoring social justice, but only saving the remains of the production organisation. They were forms of managing the chaos that appeared in work establishments. The work classifications were aimed at introducing order to the economic system. Instead, they turned out to be a fundamental obstacle to building an order based on equality. Certain professional groups, considered more important to the state, received higher salaries and special bonuses. That is why the idea of equality “turned out to be an ideological banner masking the rise of a new class order” (Heymann, 1998, p. 140). In the end, actions that were supposed to rescue the economic system took the order away from the officially adopted ideology with every passing year. From the very beginning, the order strived to blur and eliminate differences. Meanwhile, the

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classification system confirmed that they existed and that it was impossible to function without them. Those studying the social structures noticed the significance of the distribution of labour for the formation of the new relations. They were confirming that the dreams of building a uniform structure and nonantagonistic relations were verified negatively by life itself. The analysis noticed the decreasing role of class factors—a consequence of the attitude towards the means of production, with a simultaneous increase in factors related to the place of an individual in the existing distribution of labour. It was claimed that it was the “distribution of labour that became a factor determining the distribution of all attributes of social standing 1978, p. 32). In in the socialist society” (Wesołowski & Słomczynski, ´ practice, this meant that striving to introduce a limited distribution of labour in factories failed and that instead of fostering the uniformity desired, work establishments were becoming forms of new diversification. The division forming led to the appearance of new hierarchies—formed around income, prestige, respect and participation in authority. The problems with the formation of claims for respect are presented perfectly in the analyses of Anna Giza-Poleszczuk. According to her, the sources of disturbance of respect were present in two spheres: political discourse regarding the distribution of labour and popular recognition of the legitimacy of social divisions. In the political discourse regarding social diversification—including the distribution of labour—respect had an ideological, not technological, character. Because of this situation, the discourse regarding claims took a specific character. It had been permeated by the ideological dimension, weakening or eliminating meritocratic matters typical of modern production organisations from the existing distribution of respect (1991, p. 83). The salary matters at work establishments were linked to being a party’s management apparatus member. What pictures this situation perfectly is the following statement from a worker (a letter regarding the socio-political situation from a worker from Łód´z to the Security Office [UB]), confirming the existence of distances: “Here, in Poland, it keeps getting worse instead of better. The government is supposed to support workers and equal opportunities. Still, those with access to money claiming that all is good in the country earn forty thousand or more per month, while an ordinary worker earns five thousand or less and, if he has a large family, they need to eat black bread and potatoes with borscht (beetroot soup)” (Kenney, 1997b, p. 233). Similar tendencies are

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pictured in the statement from a post office worker in 1945: “After a year of work at the post office, I’m a beggar, my clothes are torn, I sold everything else, I have no coal, no potatoes and my children want something to eat” (quoted after: Górecki, 1997, p. 102). It is not surprising that opinions such as “what a nice democracy with nothing to eat”, “the parasites keep eating while the worker is starving” or “easy for him to say 2000, p. 7). when he ate his fill” were present among workers (Kaminski, ´ That is why the workers considered the country’s government responsible for the economic situation. It was not guided by the “good of society”, but the binding will adopted by the political bodies of the ruling party ´ 1998, p. 27). (Swida-Ziemba, It was the work establishments where the paths of the authorities and society diverged most turbulently. It happened when the workers with the most friendly attitude towards the order experienced the discrepancy between official ideological messages and everyday work, as well as “the consequences of the policy of the authorities, glaringly inconsistent with the public declarations” (Jarosz & Pasztor, 1995, p. 22). It was the unfulfilled promises of ensuring a decent standard of living that were the most effective at delegitimising the order. When the promises to satisfy the needs were not made or fulfilled and supply problems were coming back, even those who were the most supportive and friendly to the order were becoming dispirited towards it. Only those who had access to goods maintained their support. The order being created assumed the existence of unity between the party apparatus and the workers, but this never happened (Kenney, 1997b, p. 336). According to the internal ideological communication, ´ the workers had not developed the so-called “class consciousness” (SwidaZiemba, 1998, p. 207). However, according to the propaganda, they supported the party and its actions. In reality, it was different. The systematic socio-political crises and suppression of worker demonstrations confirmed that the relation between the working class and the party is fiction. The workers very quickly became a symbol of uncouthness and primitivism to the party apparatus and were treated like obstacles on the path towards communism. The workers “looked good” in journalistic programmes in the media—when they were walking out together from a factory or a mine wearing identical clothes and with safety helmets on their heads, they constituted an example of a significant force. That is

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why they were kept at a distance, distrusted and subjected to more intensive surveillance. The cyclic outbursts of social discontent inspired by the workers were confirming that they were totally “lost” to the order.

Inequalities in Advanced Socialist Society Despite certain undisputed “successes”, the long-term, extensive actions aiming at changing the unaccepted elements of the pre-war structure did not lead to the appearance of a homogeneous society. They did not generate the anticipated equality and justice. The arrangement of the main classes and strata showed a certain coherence despite numerous examples confirming that this coherence was illusory. The authorities themselves evaluated the long-term revolutionary effort positively, often underlining that their “actions were unprecedented”. However, on the part of society, the evaluation of the order and relation showed the growth of initial doubts with every passing year. The partial “levelling” of the structure led to the elimination of glaring financial disproportions, but this was not the equality that some people were expecting when they expressed their trust towards the order, even if that trust was conditional. It was not about the lack of similarity of the existing relations to the models promoted as they had never been defined in detail. It was about the disappointment with daily life that a growing number of people felt. Not everyone, however. A part of society functioned within relations defined by belonging to the nomenklatura and sustained those relations, considering them important from the point of view of its own interest. Others accepted the pathological relations and suited some people perfectly—mainly those who made a living out of that pathology. They noticed the crisis of shortage economy and pathologies of the economic relations and effectively took advantage of them. An example of that can be the problems with the supply of rare products, which some of the more “resourceful” people could solve by creating methods for obtaining them that were alternative to those offered by the order. This is how a certain pathological “resourcefulness” was born in the form of corruption and bribery. “The informal arrangements, even if someone did not take advantage of them, created a sense of lawlessness, unequal opportunities and existence of secret and, in consequence, unjust criteria of distribution” (Kolarska-Bobinska ´ & Rychard, 1990, p. 28). The imitation of relations became visible in the residential system, manifesting in

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many years of waiting for one’s apartment and experiencing the existence of a system for the privileged, who obtained apartments outside of the queue. Everyday relations became filled with pathological forms. The necessity to enter such relations usually made people embarrassed. In fact, it was a form of daily humiliation. There was no escape from such humiliation, and it was present everywhere—even in waiting for the basic construction materials and household appliances according to the generally applicable rules. The situation looked similar within the scope of work and production relations, formed on capital absorption, labour absorption, delays, elimination of innovativeness and waste of resources and materials (Roszkowski, 2010, pp. 91–92), making appearances of working and noticeable helplessness in solving the problems of the workforce. The omnipresent inefficiency, initially irritating, was eventually accepted and recognised as a trademark of the order. In the formation of a new order, the temporary improvement of the situation of farmers and workers was ceaselessly presented as a success. The conviction that industrialisation is a “leap into modernity” and a consequence of ideological assumptions was reinforced (Sokół, 1997, p. 160). Conducting it was supposed to serve to demonstrate the superiority of the ideology imposed. In fact, every year of “coexistence” of the authorities and the working class confirmed that the workers would never become a force leading towards communism as it turned out to be impossible to harness them to serve the ruling order, which meant that the authorities had failed (Zaremba, 2001, p. 18). The discontent of the workers confirmed that the working class would never become the foundation for stabilising the order. At first, it was elevated and appreciated, but it was eventually removed to the margin of the order and considered a threat. The authorities felt that the actual bond between the workers and the “workers’ party” never existed. It comes as no surprise, then, that the low-level party apparatus observing this process increasingly experienced uncertainty and anxiety concerning the future. The lack of visible, expected consequences of the grandly announced reforms and having to observe erroneous and irrational decisions worsened these moods. With every passing year, the achievement of the authorities that formed the basis of their legitimisation were losing significance. The ideology itself lost its impact on society even earlier, and the majority of people perceived it as a hodgepodge of incompatible solutions which also provided grounds for delegitimising the authorities. Only a small part of society accepted the thesis of “aggravating class struggle”, which was

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another propagandist invention of ideologists intended to be an ideological drive for social processes. The arguments of this type were losing their propagandist impact. In practice, the authorities started lacking stimuli and goods necessary to motivate all the groups, and the existing once were directed to the violence apparatus that was “keeping society under control”. The motivation strategies that had been used for years had run dry and become ineffective. Society was no longer afraid and realised that protests were the only effective form of fighting, one that ensured a larger assignment of goods and temporary improvement of the financial situation. This experience transformed the attitude to the existing order into one based on demands and contestation, thus questioning it and providing grounds for changing it. The 1970s were supposed to be a confirmation of the solutions implemented and the superiority of relations, as well as a presentation of the advantages of the structure formed. It was intended to be a time of showing a better world, so highly praised during the destruction of the capitalist order and a demonstration of the successes of the civilising mission. In practice, that decade turned out to be the end of intensive changes in structure and only a time during which the authorities kept sustaining their position (Mokrzycki, 1997, p. 33). It started with turbulent protests, conflicts and clear manifestations of social discontent. That is why the first thing that was done was to take control over the revolt of workers. Afterwards, the authorities attempted modernising the order. It turned out fruitless and, at the end of that decade, an even greater structural crisis appeared instead of success examples—which meant a complete rejection of the existing economic solutions and relations by a large part of society. However, despite clear signs of failure and the social antipathy towards the project sustained, the construction of a centralised order was not abandoned. In fact, while the official objectives were officially followed, the authorities minded their privileges only. To continue the efforts and neutralise some of the problems, the authorities adopted the idea of Leonid Brezhnev regarding the existence of a transitional stage between the socialism already achieved and the communism to come. That stage was referred to as “the stage of developed socialist society” (Baczko, 1994, p. 147). Such a solution not only included Brezhnev on the list of thinkers and creators of communism, but also solved the issue of the timeliness of the creation of communism. From that moment on, there was no time limit for waiting for communism to come true.

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From the 1970s, changes in social structure were taking place, as if automatically, as the authorities had neither resources nor capabilities for the purposeful transformation of the structure (i.e., shifting the position of further groups in the hierarchy). They lost interest [in the structure] due to having no more tools that would allow strong interference with its shape. The reason behind this powerlessness was a major crisis of the order. The state and party apparatus solved the current conflicts and fought the opposition, focusing on remaining in power and minding its own economic interests. At the same time, the crisis increased the number of handicapped groups and led to the pauperisation of the majority of social groups. In December 1981, the majority of society considered themselves poor (Beskid, 1996, p. 35). Numerous studies confirmed the presence of poverty and material deprivation. In 1982, it was found that 38.2% of Poles lived in material deprivation, 47.2% had average living conditions, only 9.7% had good ones and very good were experienced by 4.9% (Beskid, 1985, pp. 68–69). This and other data confirm that society was not as egalitarian as it would seem from the ideological and propaganda communications. Poverty was experienced most by farmers and unqualified workers and least by the intelligentsia, management apparatus, 2014, p. 147). administration and private owners (Wnuk-Lipinski, ´ The institutional and ideological pressure of the authorities to subordinate all the structural analyses to the Marxist concept was weakening. Additionally, “starting from the times of the government of the team of Gierek and Jaroszewicz, the rough form of socialism became a thing of the past. In its place, an ideological consent to an increase in income differences appeared” (Heymann, 1998, p. 142). Alternative theoretical orientations and forms of organising social life started to break through. The analyses of social structures were torn out of the political clutches and stopped being an object of systematic manipulation. An example of that can be the application of the category of a stratum, bolder references to stratification among scholars and turning away from class concepts. It was becoming rarer that quasi-functional analyses of structures (KolarskaBobinska ´ & Rychard, 1990, p. 31) had Marxist tones and were becoming equivalent, alternative explanations of the social structure. The political changes observed invited the researchers to carry out bolder studies and used the previously dominant categories to a lesser degree. The existing structure did not confirm the working class’ dominance and its significant privileged status. There was not enough evidence that the workers transformed from an exploited, discriminated and

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stratified group into co-owners of means of production and content coadministrators of the country. Despite reminding them of successes and presenting the effectiveness of the qualification-raising process, or even public celebration of new relations, the workers did not see their excep´ tional position. As Hanna Swida-Ziemba rightly argued, it was already at the level of assumption of the communist ideology that the workers were objectified and incapacitated rather than elevated (1998, p. 207). The conditions of the working class observed in the 1980s confirmed those ideological consequences. However, the propaganda communications, as well as some scientific communication, kept sustaining the thesis of the unique significance of the workers to the order (Jarosinska ´ & Kulpinska, ´ 1978, p. 160). The workers were presented in a system of two social classes existing in a friendly relationship: the working class and cooperative farming class, as well as the stratum of working intelligentsia (Widerszpil, 1974, p. 77). In propaganda communication, it was still maintained that the societies should be characterised by unity of interests and that any conflicts and contradictions are symptoms of pathology (Rychard 1995, p. 69). A substantial matter for the structure created was its openness (i.e., the lack of permanent barriers making it difficult for the individuals to move between the structure’s constituents). The structure was, to a great extent, a result of the “mobility” forced by the authorities. An example of that can be the passage of men originating from the bluecollar workers’ group to the white-collar workers’ group during the years 1950–1954. During this period, in the beginnings of socialist industrialisation, this mobility was at its most intense. The processes were characterised well by the outflow of people from the countryside to other socio-professional groups (Zagórski, 1978, p. 121). During the years 1946–1960, it encompassed over 2.5 million people (Gał˛ecki, 1965, p. 268). The social revolution started with “unlocking” the mobility of the farmer population (Zagórski, 1978, p. 16). Andrzej Paczkowski states that only in the years 1950–1953, over 115,000 people experienced promotion to a management position (1996, p. 231). That is why “mass promotion” was mentioned in reference to workers, the said promotion consisting in changing their “position and role without changing their social affiliation” (Sarapata, 1965: 44). Later, from the 1970s, the promotion channels started to be blocked, and it was getting harder to notice examples of promotion itself. Władysław Adamski wrote that: “it was no longer ‘openness’, but ‘blockades’ and closures that characterised

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the social structure” (2014a, p. 300). In the 1980s, these blockades of advancement became one of the factors of erosion of the ideological order in real socialism (Wesołowski & Mach, 1986). The privileges stemming from one’s background came back in a new configuration. Arrested industrial development translated to the inhibition of horizontal and vertical mobility, which meant that society had nothing left to expect from the authorities. The structure formed consisted of the working class, farmer class, intelligentsia, bourgeoisie and little bourgeoisie (Marek, 1990, p. 273). The most numerous group in 1970 were workers. Blue-collar workers and their families constituted nearly half of the country’s population. In 1973, 6,905,000 blue-collar workers were employed in the socialised economy, of which the largest share was employed in industry—3,656,000, in construction—879,000 and in transport— 680,000 (Anasz & Wesołowski, 1976, p. 48). The workers seemed to be a uniform class. Still, internal differences were significant, especially to the advantage of those employed in heavy industry. It is difficult to determine clearly whether the situation of workers in the “people’s” state had been improved. In reference to the so-called “old working class” originating from before the war, everything seemed to indicate that it was not so, while workers from the countryside had a sense of advancement. The disappointment towards the forms and amounts of remuneration did not decrease in the last two decades of the Polish People’s Republic. During that period, the negative attitude of the party apparatus towards workers kept growing. They were completely objectified, and the apparatus acted towards them with disdain, forgetting that it stems from the working class. The relations between the workers and the party apparatus were characterised by mutual distrust. Solving social conflicts by force and throwing armed groups against workers created a gap that was difficult to bridge. The working class not only turned its back on its creators, but also threatened them—thus, undermining the whole long-term effort of the communist revolution. At first, it refused to respect the authorities. Therefore, the workers directed the denial of the right to exist, previously regarding the pre-war capitalists and owners and strongly promoted by the propaganda, against those who “created” them. The workers put an equation mark between the authorities and the exploiting class: “Since ‘they’ do not respect us, we also have no obligation to adhere to that principle” (Giza-Poleszczuk 1991, p. 85). The workers did not confirm the “revolutionary miracle” with their behaviour and actions and did not

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want to carry the communist values “on banners”. The split between these groups was evidenced by the disdain of the nomenklatura towards the workers, and the final confirmation of it was the formation of “Solidarity” Independent Self-Governing Trade Union (Polish: Niezalez˙ ny 2010b, p. 62). Samorzadny ˛ Zwiazek ˛ Zawodowy “Solidarno´sc´ ” ) (Panków, ´ Despite actions that continued for many years, the authorities failed to eliminate private property, which was still present next to the state in many spheres of the economy, saving the economic order against total discreditation. Because of that, the demands for immediate elimination of prywaciarze (private operators) coming from a part of the party and ideological apparatus sounded even more grotesque. It was them who the ideologists of the collapsing order fingered as responsible for all kinds of shortcomings, shortages and the dysfunctional condition of the economy. They kept upholding the “purity” of the order’s assumptions. The return to the original ideas was supposed to solve all the problems of the order 1978, p. 160). (Jarosinska ´ & Kulpinska, ´ It does not mean that there were no supporters of equality anymore— the majority of society was still interested in it. That is why the supplies of goods remaining in the hands of the nomenklatura and private initiatives generated a sense of injustice. The concept of distributional justice was accepted. Axiologically, “socialism had been validated” (Rychard, 1995, p. 177). The results of studies regarding the acceptance of the idea of justice show the changes that took place in a single year—between 1980 and 1981. It turns out that during that period, socio-political events did not remain without an impact on the acceptance of egalitarian and efficiency-based principles. The changes noticed included a decrease in the popularity of egalitarian principles, lower support for the concept of full employment and increased support for efficiency-based justice principles—by several percentage points on average. The downward tendency of the popularity of egalitarian justice principles was also noticed (Kolarska and Rychard, 1996, pp. 171–172). In the middle of the 1980s, there was still low acceptance of social differences, and fighting for the implementation of socially accepted principles of distributional justice and “market balance” was a fundamental objective of workers’ activities in 1980 (Kolarska-Bobinska ´ & Rychard, 1990, p. 21). It seems that the ideas of egalitarian equality of income distribution had become accepted elements of the rejected official ideology among society. Such anchorages helped the authorities continue manipulating the fields of conflicts and “moving the main line of conflict from the authorities-society axis to within society

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itself” (Kolarska-Bobinska ´ and Rychard 1990, p. 23). Results of further studies confirmed that in 1981 an “anti-farmer thinking syndrome” was present due to food shortages and contemporary propaganda. The natural access of farmers to the food produced incited anti-farmer attitudes in some of the urban inhabitants (Jasiewicz & Mokrzyszewski, 1996, p. 80). Those attitudes were sustained instrumentally, and the disdain towards the countryside population was intensified. The situation of farmers in the last two decades of the Polish People’s Republic had not changed significantly, although the economic changes of the 1970s led to about 2 million people moving away from the coun1995, p. 92). The share of the rural population tryside (Łapinska-Tyszka, ´ in the social structure was decreasing systematically until 1990—down to about 38%, where it remained until the end of the next decade. At the beginning of the 1990s, the countryside was dominated by farmers (46.4%), workers and service employees (41.1%) and rural intelligentsia (about 12%) (Halamska, 2016, p. 22). The structure of farm sizes did not undergo any major changes during that time, similarly to the material situation of farmers. Farmers’ income was relatively stable due to anchorage in private property, on the one hand, and unsatisfied demand for agricultural products, on the other. When it comes to the size of property owned, small private farms were still the majority and large ones were rare. The fact that farmers considered land an autotelic value, working on one’s own property and linking one’s industriousness to the direct standard of living constituted destructive factors within the order created. They were drawn together by the aversion towards collectivisation and the idea of taking land away from them that had been recurring for many years. The issue of collectivisation was raised until the end of the 1980s (Jarosz & Pasztor, 1995, pp. 29–40). Some farmers were also making a living out of working in the industry. Through that, they participated in the dilemmas and problems of workers. They learned what kind of problem they had but, at the same time, were not significantly involved in solving them. Working at both farms and factories significantly limited their activity, such as participation in protests. After leaving the factory, they went directly to their other job on the small farms they owned. Such a situation had significant consequences for forming relations between these two groups. Farmers often took over certain elements of worker culture and lifestyle, thus leading to decreased distance between them in practice. With time, both groups had become similar (Zagórski, 1978, p. 20) in terms of material issues and culture.

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Workers from the countryside sustained tradition and emotional relationship with religion, as well as exhibited patriotism—at the same time having a negative opinion on the anti-religious and anti-church bearing communist elite (Styk, 1990, p. 151). The actions aimed towards eliminating private craftsmanship and commerce that had been conducted for many years caused tremendous devastation in this sphere of economy, but did not lead to the complete 1965, p. 37). The elimination of the little bourgeoisie (Szczepanski, ´ observations and studies carried out in the 1970s and devoted to the situation of this social stratum confirmed that private initiative still existed and was of use to the economy. It meant that some entrepreneurs survived the hardest period of persecution and ideological pressure. Self-employed people such as craftsmen, traders, small entrepreneurs and “freelancers” were included among the little bourgeoisie. A characteristic feature of this stratum was a specific kind of mentality, which was hard to reconcile with the fundamental assumptions of the order created. Working for one’s own account and functioning in a system of shortages led to new opportunities for craftsmen, providing them with incomes higher than those of the working class, farmers and the intelligentsia. It was reportedly a group with “very high income, high living standards and aspirations that regarded material value almost exclusively” (Marek, 1990, p. 271). Undoubtedly, it was precisely so to a large extent, especially with the other groups having been subjected to pauperisation. Noticing the advantage of this group in terms of the material situation meant being aware of one’s own failure and the efforts made to build social equality. Such incoherence of the order’s identity reduced its ideological credibility, which is where the demands for eliminating the little bourgeoisie stratum came from. In the case of the intelligentsia, what uniformisation of the social structure meant in practice was building this stratum with a new composition. It is necessary to remember that since the very beginning of the formation of the “people’s” state, this stratum had been an object of interest of communist social engineers. This happened due to pressure and actions, including a preference for individuals originating from popular classes in the creation of the intelligentsia. The idea implemented was to create a stratum having a revolutionary consciousness that was supportive and obedient towards the authorities and useful to them. The composition of this stratum was systematically and instrumentally expanded. At first, people finishing accelerated courses were included in it, and later also

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included white-collar workers in management positions at work establishments. Such actions enabled a controlled expansion of the composition of the intelligentsia, considering that being granted a position at a work establishment required acceptance of the bodies of the “workers’ party” (Wasilewski, 1989). It turned out that belonging to the intelligentsia depended primarily on a decision of the party apparatus. The authorities underlined its sacrifice and dedication to the new Poland: “In the light of total degradation of the group’s cultural function, it was argued that in the existing situation, it had a chance that it had never been given before. For it was blessed with building the only system in the world that ensures progress, equality and justice” (Palska, 1994, p. 67). Although the stratum formed was supposed to be free of any “destructive factors”, its relations with the authorities were far from harmonious and changed depending on the crises taking place within the country. It was similar in this aspect to the creative intelligentsia, which—after a period of fascination with the new order—exhibited mostly distrust and aversion, especially in the 1980s. It was when a large part of the intelligentsia avowed itself against the order, actively supporting the demands and actions of workers. The statistical data from the early 1970s indicated that over 90% of the Polish intelligentsia obtained education and vocation in the People’s Poland (Widerszpil, 1973, pp. 256–257). In 1973, 3,768,000 people declared themselves as white-collar workers, of whom about 45.8% had secondary and vocational education, and 16.8%—higher education (Anasz & Wesołowski, 1976, pp. 50–51). However, the unquestionable social advancement and increase in numbers of the intelligentsia did not translate to the improvement of its material situation—it was not a beneficiary of the changes taking place. The lack of proper remuneration, a sense of injustice, and having been wronged accompanied the intelligentsia until the last days of the order. In terms of income, the intelligentsia was actually levelled with workers and farmers. The statements apparently elevating the intelligentsia, such as “the intelligentsia and the working people of cities and villages”, only underlined its proletarianisation. This was confirmed by economic data (Adamski 2014a, p. 298; Mokrzycki, 1997, p. 41). Reminding of the condition of fundamental structural elements and relations between them allows noticing the “successes” of the authorities in the struggle with inequalities. What also attracts attention is the blurring of the economic border between workers and other social groups

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and the formation of a new income structuralisation. Still, these tendencies also appeared as a result of the reaction of the authorities to the salary demands of workers. The order was incapable of introducing new solutions and only reacted to current events. Meanwhile, the authorities were interested only in remaining in power. It was the purpose to which they subordinated all their actions. The formation of a large community of workers limited their relations with other groups. They had almost no contact with the intelligentsia (Babiuch-Luxmoore, 1989), outside of a part of the intelligentsia becoming involved on the side of the workers fighting for their rights. The workers built relations with each other at work establishments—it was where they formed basic bonds, especially in large enterprises (Panków, ´ 2010b, p. 62). Their relations focused on production tasks and existential problems. The contact with apparatus, often low level, was infrequent, limited and official and stemmed from the performance of employee obligations. Meanwhile, contact with farmers employed in factories became a part of workers’ relations. An additional plane for contact between workers and farmers was being formed based on the inflow of food products unavailable in state distribution from the countryside. Relations based on simple trading were coming back, but often did not lead to mutual closeness, but even aversion and lack of understanding. Workers were reluctant to accept product prices higher than in state-owned stores. Accusations of greed and avarice appeared, which confirmed that even such an ersatz of the market was an alien experience to the workers. There were no conflicts between the structural segments, excluding the nomenklatura since the majority of society existed at a similar standard of living. These conditions were reinforced by cultural and religious similarities and the strong integrating role of the Catholic Church. Socio-economic problems were growing every decade due to economic failure of the order. The frequently repeated attempts at overcoming these difficulties led to even larger crises. Since they wanted to remain in contact with society, the authorities informed of drawing conclusions for the future and even admitted making mistakes and indicated those responsible for the crisis situations. Any suggestions of repairs were kept in the spirit of maintaining order (i.e., in line with the ideology) and were adjusted for temporary needs. The authorities kept employing it for all the tasks carried out, although less orthodoxly. The ideology still remained the justification for all the reforms implemented, at least in propaganda. Thus, the order being created resulted from caring for the authorities’ interest,

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which was not consistent with any ideological assumptions, but rather relied on forced compromises, concessions, half-truths and instrumental interpretations and evaluations. The actions aiming at liberalising the order, which were a consequence of the ceaselessly returning crises, did not lead to the changes expected. The demand for carrying them out was so universal and strong—especially in the 1980s—that the authorities decided to make the reform of the order, a part of their official programme, a new ideology. It was reminded that it would be hard to find anyone standing against the reforms as everyone officially defined themselves as reformers (Morawski, 1990, p. 90). In the light of the order being rejected by society, the ideology of reform became a time-buying strategy of the authorities— which was confirmed, for example, by it being continued in the form of the so-called “second stage” of the reform. The economic situation confirmed that no justifications were required to change the economic system. Edmund Wnuk-Lipinski ´ estimated that the economic crisis in the late 1980s was experienced by about 60% of society, while a sense of crisis was foreign to about 12–15% of those surveyed. The material situation of the latter group was reportedly even improving (2003, p. 34). That majority was formed by nearly all social groups, while the one beyond the crisis was the nomenklatura—especially the high-level apparatus and some of the small entrepreneurs.

The Main Division of the Communist Era: “Us”–“Them” Next to economic transformations, the core for uniformising structure and appearance of non-antagonistic relations was creating a fully open aspiration realisation path. Limitation or closure of other paths made the ideologically elevated one the more probable choice. It claimed that “individual success was achieved within the party-structured collective” (Kenney, 1997b, p. 291). Without negating ideological motivations (as these were present too), the main motivations for starting a career within the political-party apparatus were political pressures, pragmatism and material and cool-headed calculations. The sources of acceptance for the order were described using three words: “stupidity, fear, interest” (Hirszowicz, 2001, p. 31). Work establishments and state management bodies were presenting the benefits for activists supporting the order (Lesiakowski, 2008, p. 74). In this manner, the structures of the state

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and the party, including the whole economic sphere, were filled with individuals “with revolutionary aspirations”, which were possible to realise together with the “worker’s party”. Only the official aspirations were considered worthy of realisation. Although the propaganda described this path as the only right one, the authorities could not supervise the spheres of family or spiritual life. In practice, it was possible to conduct social activity, but only on the condition of staying away from the spheres reserved for the authorities. With every year, a distance was forming within the structure—a space of inequality between the party apparatus and the rest of society. Its formation is presented most clearly by the course of relations between the workers and the factory management. However, it is not only these relations that shaped and constituted it, and the factory apparatus was not the only beneficiary of the order. Many groups supported the order, often simply being passive in exchange for promotions, stable employment or ´ a sense of security. According to Hanna Swida-Ziemba, the individuals most devoted to the order had a farmer background (1990, p. 231), and they appreciated the advancement received the most. It is estimated that in 1950 there were almost 150,000 vacant positions in the party apparatus, state apparatus, social organisations and elected institutions (Paczkowski, 2000, p. 15). Often, it was an advancement “through shortcuts”, consisting in “assigning” education to further people in exchange for supporting the order. Another example can be entering the ordersupervising services, ensuring numerous forms or privileges throughout life, effectively sustaining the loyalty of whole families. The order was eager to employ people without qualifications. For example, about 20% of the Security Office employees did not even have primary education (Paczkowski, 2000, p. 15). The revolution distributed the goods encompassed by shortages to many previously excluded groups. Its strength lay not only in values, but also in its resources for distribution. What turned out to be an important factor was creating a monopoly for the distribution of these goods—it was 2010b, implemented everywhere and then used to gain control (Panków, ´ p. 61). Pluralism was replaced by monopoly, and justice and decency were replaced by cynicism and support for one’s own group. This regards party activists, who had guaranteed promotion (i.e., they were transferred from one position to another despite a lack of competencies). Being related to the order enabled secure existence, although the sense of security was changing together with subsequent economic crises of the country.

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The privileges had an extensive character. Next to the examples listed above, the actions directed towards the intelligentsia with pre-war background during the first post-war years are worth reminding. Their impact consisted of enabling access to goods, usually food, that were difficult to obtain. The authorities provided referrals to recreational locations, assigned flats and provided support in obtaining passports (Zaremba, 2001, p. 88), as well as helped in satisfying other real-life needs. Until 1956, the party, military and union apparatuses had been receiving flats outside of the official distribution, as well as furniture and household appliances for them, which were used at the expense of the state, and it was also possible to receive domestic assistance services free of charge. The apparatus was also assigned free foreign vacations, cars and other rare goods (Zaremba, 2001, p. 89). Thus, the original distribution of privileges to the apparatus implementing the new order (i.e., mainly employees of the ministries of power, militia, state secret services and the military) was later limited by Władysław Gomułka to a large extent, but was never eliminated completely. The access to valued positions kept being ´ controlled, and the privileges were defined instrumentally (Swida-Ziemba, 1998, p. 296). The top-down distribution of income and goods regulated by the state was used for managing society. When it was employed for the first time, it was for the purposes of recruiting the original member resources. During different periods of the “people’s” state, the strategy of “collective corruption of the nation” was used, which consisted in “bribing (or rather neutralising) the social and professional groups potentially dangerous to the political system using higher salaries and various kinds of privileges” 2000, p. 37). The intensively reported demands of groups (Dzwonczyk, ´ important to the order modified the goods distribution rules systematically. Solving conflicts through increased access of certain groups to goods provided only a temporary moderation of social tensions. It turned out that it did not eliminate all the tensions and potential conflict areas, but only postponed their resolution. In the long run, it was only a temporary improvement in living conditions that brought about even greater crises. The systems of reward were supplemented with a set of potential penalties. The privileges assigned could always be taken away, and an employee could always be dismissed from their assigned job. Deprivation of privileges constituted a real and frequently employed threat. After 1945, the people organising strikes in industrial plants were brutally deprived of their jobs. The possibility of losing employment created a great deal of

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uncertainty and anxiety, which made it easier to manage society more effectively (Domanski ´ & Rychard, 1997, p. 14) and keep it obedient. In view of the expanded and tightened control of the party over the social life, this often meant tremendous problems—not only in finding work, but also in the functioning of the family. Employment blockades were applied even to blue-collar positions. Those particularly defiant, rebellious, insubordinate and resistant were being deprived of goods, rights, 2003, p. 42). Any manifestation of property and freedom (Karpinski, ´ glaring disobedience entailed the application of direct coercion means or even physical elimination. In order to survive, the order took advantage of criminal activities during the last two decades of its existence. The origins of the “us” vs “them” division should be sought in recruitment to the power apparatus, namely, in the campaigns to this end that were conducted by the Polish Worker’s Party at work establishments and among activists involved in installing the order with the use of violence. The “against us”—“with us” system constituted the beginning of the division of fundamental hierarchy subordinating and weakening other hierarchies, which led to the creation of the presence of a new hierarchy in consciousness, and it was characterised by further inequalities (Styk, 1990, p. 141). However, this does not mean that it was already possible to talk about the appearance of the distance between the forming power apparatus and society. However, this first bond—choosing the side of the order imposed by force and rejecting democracy—was later difficult to overcome and “branded” people for their entire life. Few people managed to break away from this “branding”. Choosing the side of the “people’s” authority forced defending it further on; the same as defending the point of one’s involvement or choices made in life. Participation in the elimination of the pro-independence underground bound to the order more than any ideology—after committing such deeds, it was impossible to abandon the camp of the authorities. However, it did not mean unconditional support for the government in all matters. The “us” vs “them” division was born at work establishments, where the relations between the apparatus and the workers were formed and where both sides’ spheres of hope were rising and falling. At first, both these groups were united in their desire to launch the factories, and there were no worldview-related differences between them—so there was “space” for new relations. In terms of appearances, those taking over the power in the country did not pay any major attention to matters of religion. Later on, the differences in beliefs and lack of involvement

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of the workers in the ideological activity created distance between these two groups. There was a vast number of causes of this phenomenon. The workers noticed the lack of competence among the management, the lack of liability for the property entrusted, the subordination of staff to the party apparatus and the better salaries provided by the order. Undoubtedly, other factors influenced the progressing process of the workers walling themselves off from the party apparatus at work and the appearance of a gap between them. There is no shortage of examples confirming the growing distance related to economic and dignity-related matters. The order was alienating itself, and its dysfunctional character was confirmed by further pathologies. This was exemplified by the incompetence and negligence of the authorities. It was not only the workers who felt that the state property was being wasted: “The mood at work was exhausting people horribly - it was sad, neurotic and unproductive” ´ 1998, p. 214). The condition of the economy generated (Swida-Ziemba a feeling of pointlessness and absurdity, and “it was not only individual behaviour that people considered pointless, but their whole lives were also becoming pointless” (Marody, 1991, p. 221). People noticed that the noble assumptions and the practice were diverging, that ideology was constantly put above economic calculation and that propaganda was full of hypocrisy and falseness. The workers on strike in Łód´z (in July 1946) noticed [in the newspapers] that the contemporary press was describing their actions in a manner completely inconsistent with the facts. The experiences of this kind became shared by a large part of society, which noticed the use of lies and manipulation. The experience of the inconsistency of individual experiences with the official course of events presented in the propaganda was a fundamental factor in delegitimising the order and its ideology. The appearance of the “us” vs “them” dichotomy was facilitated by actions aimed at eliminating the pre-war divisions. They led to the disappearance of many inequalities that were previously quite significant, also through the eradication of capital-holding classes, as well as to significant levelling of income (Wesołowski, 1965, pp. 118–127; Wesołowski, 1978, p. 45). The material buying power of the majority of society became similar, except for people included among the nomenklatura. The deficiencies of goods made distributing them a controversial experience, and the total lack thereof in a part of society made this matter a basis for social conflicts. This led to the appearance of a persistent discrepancy between the needs and the unsatisfied aspirations. The authorities made

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themselves the supervisor over human life through central management of the economy and access to employment, gratifications and privileges. By controlling the means of production, they cared for the realisation of their own needs. The economy became a tool of the authorities, and they treated it as if it was their property. The nomenklatura consisted of state officials, members of central bodies of the communist party and the lower-level party apparatus obedient to them and completely dependent on them, as well as any people that were considered useful and enjoying the trust of the party. The staff in structures of security and diplomacy and in high positions in the economy, military and public administration “were also included among the nomenklatura”. A characteristic part was the so-called “keys”, according to which people were designated for a few hundred thousand positions at the central, provincial, urban, district and communal levels, or in different spheres of functioning of the state and its institutions (Gilejko and J˛edrzejko, 2008, pp. 18–19). According to the participants of the strikes of the 1980s, the nomenklatura included people in mediumand high-level positions, starting with the department manager in large enterprises and institutions, through officers of the field apparatus of the political and administrative authorities, and ending with central bureaucracy, including its entities, subject to the formal procedure of more or less democratic elections (Adamski, 2014b, p. 26). They all became a party distributing the goods, forming a structure with quasi-class features in the “us” vs “them” social hierarchy. In the 1970s, the domination of the nomenklatura became politically formalised through the introduction of the order to vote on a single-party list (Staniszkis, 1983, p. 332). Social inequalities were evolving in the direction of two poles. According to the terminology later, almost all the segments of the structure—except the nomenklatura—were marginalised. Included among many confirmations of the occurrence of this division is the finding that the composition of the structure that was presented for many years did not reflect its true form and did not take into account its two levels— referred to using the “us” and “them” categories. They created a vertical hierarchy identical to the fundamental differences. In turn, the horizontal differences on both sides did not translate significantly to the everyday life of individuals. However, some of them were purposefully underlined in order to hide the position of the nomenklatura. The actual inequalities 2008, p. 60). The antagonisms within were hierarchical (Wnuk-Lipinski, ´ the contemporary classes were limited, and it was not them that caused

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recurring crises. The crises resulted from the subordination of social classes and strata to the nomenklatura class (Adamski, 2014a, p. 297), and it was exactly this inequality that “reflected” the fundamental “fracture” in the social structure (i.e., the dichotomous opposition). What led to opposition to the nomenklatura was the long-lasting experience of exclusion, entering into unequal social relations with that class and observing its actions or methods for solving crises. What also contributed to it was observing how the official ideology was implemented because the equality and justice in line with the principle of “to each according to their contributed effort” was non-existent. The one actually applied was “to each according to their usefulness and helpfulness to the authority” (Giza-Poleszczuk, 1991, p. 87). In a situation of a lack of goods, the mode of distributing them became symbolic. Had there been more goods, the privileges of the authorities would have incited weaker emotions: “The system provided material profits and symbolic recognition to its officers, activists and supporters, while bringing losses, the threat of repression and actual repressions to its opponents and enemies” (Grabowska, 2004, p. 120). A consequence of the existing blocks was the segmentation of the labour market into two dimensions: political and economic, thus confirming the existence of fundamental social dominations. The distribution of goods “to each in equal share” was supposed to be an instrument for righting the wrongs. Instead, it became a confirmation of power and domination. The existing blocks led, in the 1980s, “to the near-complete vanishing of professional competencies as a criterion for appointment to positions important from the point of view of the whole society’s interest” (Gilejko & J˛edrzejko, 2008, pp. 18–19). Maintaining the mechanism of recruitment to the nomenklatura was a way of sustaining the inequalities. Having a position in the structure of the party and the totalitarian state constituted a confirmation and certificate of having the right awareness, intellectual superiority and competitive advantage and having chosen the path of social progress. The propaganda assigned positive characteristics to the nomenklatura, which was supposed to consist of responsible people ready to make sacrifices, the elite of society. These opinions were consistent with how the nomenklatura imagined itself. The results of studies from the years 1984–1985 also showed that, in comparison to people who were not party members, the Polish United Workers’ Party members had a better opinion about their own financial situation, evaluated the achievements of the Polish People’s Republic positively and considered it

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a democratic state, allowed the possibility of the authorities limiting civil liberties “for higher purposes” and believed that the Catholic Church was not entitled to speak about political matters (Grabowska, 2003, p. 172). The post-war studies on the transformation of the social structure focused mainly on the working class, the farmer class and the intelligentsia. For a long time, they included neither the private initiative nor the arising nomenklatura. The studies did not consider elements testifying to the privileges of the latter. This was confirmed by Jacek Wasilewski when, in 1981, he underlined that the “edge” categories—less numerous but present at the “extreme” or “intermediate” structural locations— received very little attention. His studies of the social and professional careers of 282 high-level directors in Warsaw, aged 30–40, confirmed the impact of politics on the positions held. About 75% of the directors studied began their professional activity while working in the party (PZPR) organisations or youth wings of the party. As many as 40% of the directors came from intelligentsia families, 20% from farmer families and the rest from families that could be considered worker families (1981). The study results listed may constitute an attempt at describing a part of the party-state, low-level apparatus forming the foundations of 2010a, p. 209). the “bureaucratic nomenklatura” (Panków, ´ In 1979, Stefan Nowak noticed a conflict between the world of communist institutions, alienated and unfriendly (“them”), and the individuals participating in the life of these institutions (“us”) (1979, pp. 155–173). The existence of the nomenklatura was confirmed by further studies regarding the significance of socio-political divisions and evaluations of social conflicts. In the Polacy ‘84 studies, as much as 56.7% of respondents stated that they noticed the presence of conflict within society. The imaginations of that conflict were placed in the following relations by the people surveyed: a) government—society (43.8%); b) city—countryside (12.1%); c) government—opposition (9.2%); d) party members—non-members (5.8%); e) government—workers (5.5%). Thus, the majority of the people surveyed placed the conflict within the scope of society’s relation with the authorities (Markowski, 1990, pp. 23–24). It was defined in the form of a conflict between the authorities, understood as the governing party-state apparatus, and society, perceived as the whole of those who, willingly or not, were subordinated to these authorities (Szawiel, 2003, p. 267). The above examples confirmed the existence of the “us” vs “them” division, which became fixed in the social consciousness at the end of the 1970s (Jarosz, & Kozak, 2008, p. 289).

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In the 1980s, that division was more visible because the party-political apparatus was fighting to maintain its privileged place in the order. In 1984, the majority of the people surveyed also had a sense of the existence of the conflict between “us” and “them” and defined it in the categories of conflicting interests between the authorities and the rest of society (Jasiewicz & Adamski, 2014, p. 173). The division discussed existed already in previous years, but there was silence about it—and it was not defined using the “us” vs “them” categories. The strict control of the regime over all the spheres of life was an obstacle to the “us/society” vs “them/authorities” categories appearing in the discourse, but they were present in the consciousness ´ 2010, p. 7). It can be traced back to the first feelings of (Swida-Ziemba, individuals that the authority imposed after 1945 is foreign and does not represent the interests of society. Informing of it would mean admitting the lack of legitimacy of the authorities. It was hidden that the majority of society refused to legitimise the authorities and expressed a lack of consent to their further privileges. An example of such “useful” interpretations of the situation may be the statement that the dispute in Poland was actually taking place between the bureaucrats and technocrats and the rest of society (Markowski, 1990, p. 15), thus casting the blame on a part of the nomenklatura without defining those guilty specifically. The greatest confirmation of the division was the protests and behaviour of workers. They were not exhibiting appropriate ideological dedication, not appreciating the long-standing efforts of the authorities and refusing to be the basis for the authorities. “To the contrary, the workers, organised against this apparatus despite having been created in a sense by the communist state, first became its dangerous opponents 2010b, and then, in the long run, the diggers of its grave” (Panków, ´ p. 62). The workers and students initiated protests, strikes and rebellions. In the 1980s, the authorities considered them “an obstacle”—the removal of which from the road was a condition for implementing the reforms that meant staying in power. A consequence of the fear and sense of danger was the authorities’ choice to focus on the policy of force and increased supervision, which took the form of martial law in 1981. Its imposition dispelled any remaining illusions regarding the party, humiliated the central management of the economy and society and led to the completion of the mutual split. Both sides “subscribed” to the division of the communist times.

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With the passage of time, all the veils concealing the actual relations were falling, and the true image of the role of the nomenklatura was becoming clear. It was exactly the “way the apparatus of a state – calling itself a ‘worker’s’ and ‘socialist’ state – handled the popular, authentically worker-based movement and labour union left no one with any doubts 2010b, p. 64). Only two actors remained on the stage (…)” (Panków, ´ of events: the authorities and society (Morawski 1990, p. 78). “Solidarity” became a mighty, institutionalised and fully alternative channel of articulation of society’s demands—especially during the first stage of the movement’s existence. It took large swathes of public space away from the authorities which controlled them before, and it was a significant part in view of it being intended for everyone (Gilejko & J˛edrzejko, 2008, p. 18). The movement organised protests against the order but, to many individuals, it became a generational form of participating in the 2003, p. 50). Thanks to its rise, society public sphere (Wnuk-Lipinski, ´ was becoming the main actor of change, a mass and collectivist entity experiencing national unity and confirming the formation of a uniform society. The nation was elevated, and “us” meant the community united around common values, demanding a change of the order and capable of opposing the totalitarian authorities together (Gilejko & J˛edrzejko, 2008, pp. 18–19). It was not the “us” vs “them” division that led to the growth of social conflicts and the appearance of protests and strikes. The intensity of these phenomena resulted primarily from increasing inequalities between society and the authorities, the experience of continuous decline of the economic situation, the unfair, arbitrary distribution of goods in a situation of constant shortage thereof, and discrimination of and transferring the costs of the crises to classes that had already been deprived of privileges. The loss of hope, the experience of the inefficiency of the “command” economy, the lack of goods and the refusal to give freedom to society generated recurring conflicts. It was the deepening distance and the lack of security that marked the intensity of subsequent conflicts. This was related to the decline of consumption during the years 1980–1982 (Marody, 1991, p. 234) and the fact that acute economic deprivation 2003, p. 18). On the other hand, became commonplace (Wnuk-Lipinski, ´ with social security being at the lowest level and full employment being fiction, both these things were losing their significance. The long-lasting social conflict took the form of the “us” vs “them” opposition, which included all the wrongs and injustices of the Polish

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People’s Republic period (Wnuk-Lipinski, ´ 2003, p. 17). Other inequalities between classes or strata, including the existing socio-professional hierarchies, did not generate any major conflicts. The main inequality arose around conflicting interests, access to power and goods, participation in order-sustaining mechanisms and denial of respect. The division was complemented by the egoism of the authorities and their disdain towards the working class, farmer class and everyone who demanded freedom and personal dignity. Disdain towards those who demanded truth, honesty and morality. What can serve as confirmation of these asymmetric relations is the social evaluation of the social coexistence sphere present in the second half of the 1980s. Contemporary social relations were characterised using the evaluation of “ailments of everyday life”, among which the dominant one was “mutual unfriendliness among people”. A part of them was the evaluation of relations with the bettersituated groups. The attitude of the administration towards the citizens was evaluated negatively by 72.7% of the people surveyed, and the attitude of the superiors towards their subordinates—by 68.5% (Giza-Poleszczuk, 1991, pp. 74–75). In other studies conducted in the middle of the 1980s, 70% of the people surveyed believed that the officials and representatives of the authorities were insensitive to the people’s suffering (Borowski et al., 1985, pp. 94–108). At the same time, those surveyed were noticing that some groups—the intelligentsia and people holding major positions—“looked down” on other social groups and exhibited “arrogance” (Narojek, 1980). In the 1970s, the scholars friendly towards the authorities underlined that “elimination of antagonistic classes from the social life does not mean eliminating the hazard of social inequalities arising” (Malanowski, 1976, p. 374)—and that was exactly what happened, although in an arrangement different from the one they anticipated. The members of the party apparatus were also losing hope, as confirmed by a huge number of members leaving the Polish United Workers’ Party at the beginning of the 1980s. Fear, frustration and terror were growing among the nomenklatura people, and they started associating the contemporary crisis with a “total threat to everything – careers, privileges, values cherished and, according to some of them, even their own lives and the lives of their family members” (Tarkowski, 1994, s. 89). Such despair arose even before the martial law (Rakowski 1991, p. 49), but had its climax in the second half of the 1980s. The nomenklatura started questioning the profits they were receiving, noticing at the same time the growing cost of their long-standing support for the order.

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A confirmation of the objective interests of the nomenklatura were the decisions of Prime Minister Mieczysław F. Rakowski, enabling the creation of new companies and “self-enfranchisement” of the party apparatus by taking advantage of the state property in the 1980s. During that decade, social support for private ownership was growing rapidly 1989). The objective of the political actions of (Kolarska-Bobinska, ´ Rakowski’s government was maintaining the privileged position and reducing the discontent among some of the party activists. The Act on Certain Conditions of Consolidation of the National Economy of 24 February 1989 enabled the taking over the state property and the banking sector property by private individuals by way of rent or lease, or contribution of state property to a company. “This meant that the local party elites could create for themselves the conditions allowing them to survive the great change in a decent financial situation and with prospects for the future. Thus, a ‘side effect’ of this reform was the enfranchisement of the nomenklatura, who committed themselves to the private sector, creating arrangements that were often informal” (Materska-Sosnowska, 2009, p. 119). The said act enabled “nomenklatura-based privatisation”, (i.e., establishing “nomenklatura companies”) where the state property 2001, served private individuals, usually heads of enterprises (Karpinski, ´ p. 53). Examples of privatised companies appeared already in 1987. The propaganda presented the privatisation of this kind as a purposeful economic strategy. In practice, it was about transforming “a part of the political capital held into economic resources” (Tomescu-Dubrow, 2017, p. 294). Therefore, society was dominated by the conviction that limiting the impact of the nomenklatura and the people managing the enterprises on the common property will be a fundamental part of the economic changes. The management of the economy was supposed to be taken over by a new stratum of people characterised by high competencies (Jasiecki, 2010, p. 89). People believed that meritocratic principles would become the basis of the new order and that the political anchorages would become a thing of the past. It was supposed to be different than after 1945, when equality had also been promised but what was created in practice was a bureaucratic class that was inconsistent with “socialist democracy with 2010a, p. 209). The postulates the participation of the masses” (Panków, ´ listed were fitting the final overcoming of the “us” vs “them” division and were also supposed to be a confirmation of the values of the democratic order and free market. However, the resources and “advantages” formed

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during the Polish People’s Republic period were kept and sustained and made the basis for forming a democratic order. Some of the nomenklatura quickly found a “soft landing” in the neoliberal order and transformed 2003, p. 100), their political capital into economic one (Wnuk-Lipinski ´ taking advantage of resources accumulated: (Grabowska 2004, p. 60). Since a great deal of these resources was transferred to the new order, it also led to transferring of the “us” vs “them” division.

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Wasilewski, J. (1981). Kariery społeczno-zawodowe dyrektorów. Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolinskich. ´ Wesołowski, W. (1965). Przemiany społeczne w Polsce Ludowej. “Ksi˛azka ˙ i Wiedza”. Wesołowski, W. (1978). Teoria. Badania. Praktyka. Z problematyki struktury społecznej. “Ksi˛azka ˙ i Wiedza”. Wesołowski, W. & Mach, W. B. (1986). Systemowe funkcje ruchliwo´sci społecznej. Warszawa: IFiS PAN. Wesołowski, W. & Słomczynski, ´ M. K. (1978). Teoretyczne uj˛ecia struktury klasowej i warstwowej w Polsce w latach 1945–1975. In W. Wesołowski (Ed.), Kształt struktury społecznej. Studia do syntezy. Wrocław, Warszawa, Kraków, Gdansk: ´ Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolinskich. ´ Widerszpil, S. (1973). Przeobrazenia ˙ struktury społecznej w Polsce Ludowej. “Ksi˛azka ˙ i Wiedza”. Widerszpil, S. (1974). Czy zmierzch klasy robotniczej? In J. Szczepanski ´ (Ed.), Narodziny socjalistycznej klasy robotniczej. Instytut Wydawniczy CRZZ. Wilk, H. (2005). Propaganda współzawodnictwa pracy w Polsce w latach 1945– 1956. In G. Miernik & S. Pi˛atkowski (Eds.). Robotnicy przemysłowi w realiach PRL. Radomskie Towarzystwo Naukowe & Starachowice: Centrum Doskonalenia Nauczycieli “Nowator”. Wilk, H. (2011). Kto wyrabie ˛ wi˛ecej ode mnie? Współzawodnictwo pracy robotników w Polsce w latach 1947–1955. IH PAN & Wydawnictwo Trio. Wnuk-Lipinski, ´ E. (2003). Granice wolno´sci. Pami˛etnik polskiej transformacji. Instytut Studiów Politycznych PAN & Wydawnictwo Naukowe “Scholar”. Wnuk-Lipinski, ´ E. (2008). Socjologia zycia ˙ publicznego. Wydawnictwo Naukowe “Scholar”. Wnuk-Lipinski, ´ E. (2014). Nierówno´sci i przywileje jako podłoze ˙ konfliktu. In W. Adamski (Ed.), Fenomen „Solidarno´sci” i zmiana ustroju. Polacy 1980–2011. W. Adamski. Wydawnictwo IFiS PAN. Zagórski, K. (1978). Rozwój, struktura i ruchliwo´sc´ społeczna. PWN. Zaremba, M. (2001). Komunizm, legitymizacja, nacjonalizm. Nacjonalistyczna legitymizacja władzy komunistycznej w Polsce. Trio & ISP PAN. Zawisza, M. (2019). Robotnicy przemysłowi w województwie kieleckim w latach 1945–1949. IPN.

CHAPTER 4

The Second Experiment: The Differentiation of the Social Structure

Ideological and Economic Reasons for Interfering with the Structure, and the Patterns of That Interference The change that began in 1989, usually referred to as the transformation, has been discussed in numerous publications. Thus, there is no need to retell the whole course or character thereof. Presented below are only selected aspects regarding ideological, economic or structural changes significant for explaining the social divisions. What kind of society was inherited after 45 years of the communist experiment, then? In the class-based approach, it had the privileged nomenklatura, which meant it consisted of two classes. According to the results of scientific studies available, it was economically poor, statist, relatively homogeneous in terms of the set of dominating values and filled with pride in the “collectivist victory” achieved. The collective community coming out of communism was evaluated negatively for many years. It constituted an object of disappointment, particularly to the neoliberal social engineers, ideologists and some scientists, blaming that inherited mentality for the failure of reforms. At the same time, it was a society united mainly around patriotic, national, religious and family ideas, ready for further sacrifices. It remained pro-egalitarian while accepting at the same time the appearance of differences in income and consenting to the appearance of inequalities © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 P. Borowiec, The Politicization of Social Divisions in Post-War Poland, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-26530-3_4

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(Dzwonczyk, ´ 2000, p. 64), albeit within a limited range. In 1988, study results showed that 80% of the people surveyed approved the introduction of market mechanisms and 30% were even willing to accept unemploy2014, p. 196). The consent to inequalities ment (Kolarska-Bobinska, ´ stemmed from the fact that they were supposed to result from the competencies, efforts and skills of individuals. The majority of society was open towards building a new order although, at the same time, it had little idea what economic differentiation meant and what all of its consequences would be. Claiming that society was entirely homogeneous after 1989 has no grounds, but it is true that it had gone far on the path to such a condition. It experienced homogenisation in many aspects of life, functioning for many years in line with the models forced upon it that led to identicalness or similarity. Such an opinion was also strongly influenced by observation of everyday life, the formulas used to describe it, the ubiquitous greyness, the common model of population behaviour, the ways of spending free time and the availability of the same kinds of entertainment. Homogeneity manifested in “relative similarity of consumption patterns, low quality of accommodation, poor household equipment and shabby appearance of stores and restaurants” (Hamilton & Hirszowicz, 1995, p. 195). The cultural and social unification was dominant, although differences in many of the spheres of life mentioned above were also noticeable. The differences present resulted from the unequal access to power that had existed for many years, control over the distribution of certain goods and supervision over the distribution of prestige sources. Indeed, society deprived the nomenklatura of the last of the above, assigned it to private initiative and looked with jealousy at the business people. After 1989, no major economic differences were visible, although the ownership structure was not uniform and wholly state-owned. The majority of society experienced poverty. Increases in possession of material goods were incidental and usually took place after social protests, which additionally exposed the existing subordination. This social condition was presented by Malcolm Hamilton and Maria Hirszowicz, who wrote that society had been nearly completely proletarianised (Hamilton & Hirszowicz, 1995). Uniformity was dominant in terms of race, ethnicity and religion. There were nearly no ethnic minorities or immigrants. Such a structure resulted

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from many years of uniformisation and the conviction that social uniformity was conducive to remaining in power, in line with the assumptions of the Marxist-Leninist ideology. It was precisely this kind of society that experienced another social, economic and political experiment, another change of revolutionary nature and dominance of another ideology over various spheres of life (Janicka & Wesołowski, 1997, p. 96). It experienced a long-lasting transition from communism to pluralism and formation of a democratic political system (Sadowski, 2010, p. 33) that was supposed to ensure participation in the order to all the parties interested according to their choices and individual capabilities. Once again, it participated in simultaneous dehierarchisation and hierarchisation of the social structure. The fact that the consciousness of a large part of society involved positioning itself in opposition to communism defined the attractiveness of alternative, liberal visions of the order. The “kneeling” before liberalism would not be so severe if it were not for the conviction that the fall of communism had finally resolved centuries-old historical dilemmas. The circulated thesis of the end of history strengthened the faith in the history of “having made a choice” and there being no alternative to liberalism. What was manifested was the feeling of historical triumph and having the support of the aforementioned history’s decisions. Additionally, geopolitical arrangements and conditions advantageous to liberalism arose in this part of the world. The situation in which liberalism found itself is described perfectly by the later words of Zygmunt Bauman: “The absence of a real enemy personifying a real alternative is the true Achilles’ heel of the victorious, triumphant and unrestrained capitalism” (2005, pp. 112– 113). Choosing the free market was so obvious that the changes were also referred to metaphorically as “the return to normalcy”. The idealistic vision of the West that had been created over the years turned out to have no alternatives and was additionally intensively sustained by the neoliberals. No internal contradictions, fields of conflict or possibilities of new inequalities were noticed within it. In practice, the decision to return to capitalism was made by society even earlier, after it experienced decades of failure of the order of the “people’s” state. The victory of capitalism over communism captured the imagination. It was a powerful force of ideological and political influence that made neoliberal solutions more obvious because it was also assigned a moral dimension—the triumph of good over evil. Meanwhile, neoliberalism received nearly the status of another perfect ideology leading to

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the “modernisation” of life and to social progress. The moral advantage was highlighted, and it was ceaselessly reminded that it was the order of freedom that became victorious. The moral elements were employed intensively to impose solutions stabilising the economic system (Pyszczek, 1995, p. 20). Such an approach provided some elites with political advantage at the beginning of reforms and the peace necessary for implementing them. It was also a part of social engineering used to avoid discussions regarding the shape of reforms, among others. In a controlled debate, criticism was nearly impossible. The domination of ideology was imposed—firstly at the level of economic solutions, but later attempts were also made to do this at the cultural level. The infatuation with the new ideology significantly limited the influx of reliable knowledge, including alternative visions of economic solutions. The first economic solutions implemented were free from criticism, confirmed by the analysis of scientific papers, political programmes and political discourse of the early 1990s. No one listened to the few representatives of the former ruling party’s high-level apparatus who rejected the free market. Radical transformations were wrapped in the metaphor of “shock therapy”, suggesting quick emergence of the target condition and limitation of duration of painful consequences. However, both the economic programme of the “Solidarity” Independent SelfGoverning Trade Union and the economic arrangements of the Round Table (Główczyk, 2002, pp. 54–58) were left out. It was recognised that creating “capitalism without capitalists and without private capital” (Jasiecki, 2002, p. 287) was possible but required a lot of time, social sacrifices and extensive transformations on the part of the state. The few differing concepts were silenced or pushed outside of the public discourse. For these reasons, there was “no sensible alternative” (Oblicki, 1989, p. 13) to the programme implemented as other economic solutions were excluded. For example, the interventionism of Keynesian economics was associated with the command economy of the previous system. This process was summarised excellently by Witold Morawski, who wrote in 1992 that an ideologisation of social life took place, and the “neoliberal orthodoxy prevailed” (1993, p. 5). The economic changes took place in two ways—first, the economic system was stabilised and then solutions from capitalist countries started to be copied. The general objective was to recreate the market economy. Copying was made a method of achieving a free market—it was supposed to be enough to transfer the templates to increase the chances of success.

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It was standard practice to refer to existing templates—this process was referred to as the implementation of liberal institutions (Bukraba-Rylska, 2004, p. 159). The “copying machine” was operated by a neoliberal convert, which is why private ownership was introduced everywhere, irrespective of the public interest or economic balance. Prior to that, some of the work establishments were driven to collapse even though it would have been possible to keep developing them by employing the previously applied form of ownership combined with subsidising or restructuring. A similar rapture was caused by the foreign capital, which resulted in its dominance in the banking, commercial and media sectors. Many years were required to notice that advanced democracies often willingly limit the access of foreign entities or private capital to many sectors of their market such as the banking or media sector. The thoughtless copying was justified by the intent to catch up with the West, ensure quick modernisation and become similar to progressive societies, which is why references were made to dreams typical of lagging peripheral regions (Krasnod˛ebski, 2005, p. 19). Thus, the domination of neoliberalism was sustained for over three decades and a part of it stemmed from the conviction that private property is the best choice and the non-personal mechanism of the market (even while the market was being formed) was an oracle. Such views were referred to on any occasion by nearly all the groups in power. “Soulless” measures, such as the rate of growth per citizen, were employed as the bases for evaluations, and not only economic ones (Bugaj, 2010, p. 28). They were used for measuring the effectiveness of management and social transformations. Strengthening these measures meant subordination to neoliberalism, which was reinforced using “neospeak” language, new clichés such as “market”, “competition”, “economic growth”, “GDP increase”, “middle class”, etc.). The new “spells” found their place in the language of ethics, science and politics. When presenting the reform as an alternative to communism, a reference to justice was made again. This time the message spread was that the differences and hierarchies present were just, and the inequalities were justified as they came from differences in talent, effort and competencies, making the reform almost an embodiment of perfect equality. The neoliberal market was considered “the only measure of the value of labour, production, consumption and ways of spending free time” (Turowski, 2009, p. 135), while the accelerated “production” of inequalities was dressed in the robes of justice. What was introduced was one of the catchy

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liberal “fairy tales” about everyone having equal opportunities. It did not matter that a part of society already had certain social capital, many security measures and a privileged position at its disposal. The resources were not equal at the starting point, even though some people did believe that the starting conditions were equal for everyone (Polska, 2011, p. 13). After two decades of transformation, when writing about economic actions, it was claimed that the Balcerowicz Plan did not have any particularly original features. It actually constituted a certain variety of the traditional “adjustment programme” that the International Monetary Fund applied in the countries whose economies found themselves in a state of macroeconomic destabilisation. However, an important difference consisted of the fact that, in that instance, it was used with regard to an economy that was rebuilding its political system rules at the same time (Bugaj, 2010, p. 22). It was noticed that next to the initial social approval, the economic changes also received the support of international institutions and the backing of Western advisers, the “capitalism consultants” (Jarosz, 2004, p. 48). They were carried out with the approval of international organisations and under the pressure of domestic and foreign 2010, pp. 67–68), as well as with the support economic experts (Panków, ´ of governments of the Western countries. After launching the stabilisation programme, the suppressed demand led to a sudden decrease in production and a shocking surge in prices, the control over which was relinquished in January 1990. The actual income and living standards of a large part of society kept decreasing. The liberalising actions aimed at opening the economy to the world led to the collapse of many enterprises. While it brought about an improvement in supply, leading to the store shelves being filled with goods and thus enabling access to basic articles, these products were not available to the majority of society because of their high prices. The bankrupting companies did not pay taxes, which led to the worsening of the national budget problems and a deepening of the deficit. The crises in public services—education, science and health care—were growing bigger (Sadowski, 1994, pp. 12–13). In 1990, Poland experienced hyperinflation (the annual inflation rate achieved +639.6% in 1989), while the foreign debt was 42.3 billion USD (which constituted 64.8% of GDP, according to the Central Statistical Office). Major market deficiencies were present, and the economy was under threat of collapse. Within three years, the unemployment rate reached 20%, which meant from 1.5 to 2 million 2010, p. 68). people in absolute numbers (Panków, ´

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The fast top-down actions were supposed to increase the effectiveness of changes and were also supposed to lead to quick “catching up with 2013). In Western countries, the market system the West” (Leszczynski, ´ had been formed for many years, spontaneously and in a bottom-up manner. In the Polish case, the state created the market using top-down actions. Through the application of statism and strong interventionism, the state was depriving itself of ownership, control and supervision over 1990, p. 6). Its supervision over the changes was the economy (Panków, ´ significant. In particular, when a major part of society was withdrawing its approval for the continuation of changes, the government continued the reforms in the direction taken. The political elites decided in detail who was to receive the tremendous capital accumulated during the Polish People’s Republic period. The politicians were deciding who would be invited to form the economy, also through the privatisation of work establishments. They, therefore, indirectly formed the structure of not only ownership, but also privileges (Heymann, 1998, p. 141). The state, which was practically supervising the building of the market, was given the task of self-limitation, supporting pluralism and neutrality, guarding the rule of fair competition and remaining outside of the ongoing ideological and political disputes. The state was supposed to become the guardian of the rights of individuals and enable self-realisation for everyone, irrespective of their views. It was underlined that the limitation of the state’s tasks should have no impact on the realisation of the fundamental tasks reserved for it exclusively. The tasks important to society were to be realised in spite of the liquidation of a part of state structures and lesser entitlements of the authorities, in line with the principle of the liberal doctrine. At least those were the elements and tasks of the state that were referred to in the discourse. The new dominant ideology perceived society in a way other than the communist one did. It recognised it as a sum of individuals, rejected the collectivist approach and failed to recognise any group values or egalitarian distribution of goods. It looked with aversion at the majority groups and rejected the previously implemented collectivist and centralist form of living. It believed in the unlimited capabilities of individuals to change the world, trusted individuals and clearly focused on them. It enabled individuals to realise their personal objectives and focus on individual ambitions (Smolar, 2008, p. 63), introducing a new hero into the arena of Polish history—homo oeconomicus , having a wide array of rights at their disposal, ready to make rational choices, searching for their own

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originality and ready to establish and realise new identities. The neoliberal ideology promoted the concept of an autonomous hero, existing beyond any social and historical context and treating society only as a tool for satisfying their own needs (Szacki, 1999, p. 15). A hero who was not attaching themselves long to any territory, fixed value or community, who practised individual freedom—according to Isaiah Berlin—in both a “negative” and “positive” sense thereof. This attitude became the basic guideline for the individual (Berlin, 2000, pp. 183–239). Anything expanding their capabilities was considered good, while any obstacles on their path were to be eliminated. The good and happiness of the individual formed the main part of the ideological framework. Property disposal was intended to be a common, egalitarian experience. The faith in the capability of human beings to have control over their own fate and to shape the conditions in which they live their life was sustained intensively. Abandoning the previously questioned model of work and effort towards the common good was supposed to “extract” the individualism that had been suppressed for many years. The individual was only offered to focus on their own interest, egoism and particularism and take advantage of their surroundings for their own gain to the widest extent possible. At the same time, success became the measure of the individual’s value, impacting what was good and just. The individual was assigned exclusive responsibility for their life (Pełczynska-Nał˛ ´ ecz, 1998, p. 221), and they were supposed to “pave” their own path towards privileged positions, where privileges resulted from their merits. This is how the foundations of justice were defined anew. The neoliberal consciousness dominated the perception of common good. Public matters were forced into oblivion, especially in the light of continuous demands to limit the tasks of the state. It needs reminding that such an affirmation of unrestrained individualism entailing a lack of interest in any common good was far removed from the ideas preferred by Solidarity, which fought for subjectivity in public life in the collective dimension (Magoska, 2005, p. 64). The limitation of the significance of communality after 1989 was challenging in view of the elevation of the idea of the nation during the communist period and the existence of strong communities—national, religious and familial, strengthened with a sense of victory over totalitarianism. These conditions were what decisively determined the issue of communality and separation after 1989. They automatically found themselves—not due to fault of their own—“on the path” of the expanding

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neoliberal ideology. It turned out exceptionally quickly that the postcommunist, homogeneous society did not resemble the diverse and colourful creation that neoliberalism had expected. The communities that denied the nomenklatura its privileged place within the structure found themselves in a similar predicament. Due to ideological reasons, they became a threat to the realisation of the above-listed objectives of the new order. The assumption that every vision of community life adopted by individuals was equal increased the criticism towards models suggesting subordination to national, religious or family values. Dominating identities and forms of living typical for them started to be undermined as they stood in the way leading to the maximisation of individual objectives. More and more often, collectivist communities were placed in opposition to individualism, freedom and democracy, even at the expense of “shaking” the social cohesion sustained by majority values. A conviction was promoted that the inherited “collective” mentality (Mokrzycki, 1991), traditionalism or egalitarianism constituted a hazard to the reforms implemented. The attachment to communities allegedly blocked undertaking business activity, and strong anchorage in family or nation stood in the way of practising individualism and taking responsibility for one’s own fate. Thus, it was said to block the social processes of differentiation. For these reasons, the individual was supposedly forced to re-evaluate their attitude towards religion, national or family bonds. It was claimed that individuals “need to make choices between life strategies that 1994, pp. 256–257). did not exist during communist rule” (Domanski, ´ It is impossible to understand why entrepreneurship would be in conflict with seeking support in family or neighbourhood. Even the simple observations of how small private companies arise show the role of family, friends and a certain social capital in their formation and functioning. Focusing solely on careers and the realisation of individual objectives weakens communal bonds, but they are not an obstacle to entrepreneurship. On the contrary, they strengthen it—as confirmed by the whole sector of family companies formed before and after 1989. The new dominant ideology rejected the decisive part of communist values (Morawski, 2001, p. 9) while remaining in preference of some other, but defining them differently. The distribution of goods stopped being subject to social control and no longer meant “to each equally”. Justice was seen in equality of rights and chances—everyone was to receive the same chance of obtaining social standing, development and gratification. It was combined with the rule that remuneration for work should

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be related to personal qualifications and efforts. Everyone was offered the 2005, p. 95). It was reminded rules of meritocratic justice (Skarzy ˙ nska, ´ that the true equality of chances did not exclude major inequalities in 2000, p. 160). Hierarchies were to be terms of income (Domanski, ´ created according to merits, and top positions were intended for those more capable, industrious and educated. When promoting these principles and values, the costs of reforms were also mentioned. It was argued that justice would be the rule for distributing these costs throughout the whole society, which constituted one of the symbolic protective shields of the reforms. It was even claimed that the market would contribute to the increase in the welfare of the whole society. Unfortunately, it was never mentioned that economic growth would generate growing inequalities 2000, pp. 23, 89). (Domanski, ´ With every passing year, the evaluation of the actions of those creating the free market was subjected to growing criticism. The fairness of conditions that contributed to the founding basis of the free market was questioned. In 1995, Jacek Kurczewski defined this beginning as the “distribution of ownership titles among the participants of the social game” and evaluated this period as follows: “it is true that everyone participates in the war for power, ownership and property, but the chances were not equal at the start and that inequality keeps reminding of itself every once in a while – with a sense of injustice on one side and arrogance on the other” (1995). Claiming that the basis for new ownership structures was a “distribution of ownership” is justified to a large extent, just as much as reminding that every revolution is based distribution and rewards the hosts of its activists and supporters. For years, there were not enough arguments to consider privatisation fair, and it was not justified by the forms of socialisation of ownership, privatisation carried out among employees or the sale of property to foreign capital with a transfer of the funds received to the state budget for social purposes. The privatisation among employees helped those employees in the short-term but, in the long term, it worsened their difficult situation as it meant separating them permanently from access to capital.

Problems with Structure, Waiting for the Formation of the Middle Class Despite the provision of existential safety at the basic level, the uncertainty that appeared prior to 1989 was a traumatic experience for many people. However, the reality conditions caused by the reforms decisively

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exceeded the previous sense of temporariness, danger, anxiety and fear. It was only then that a part of society learned what the lack of a sense of security really meant, especially in legal or economic aspects. The disintegrating and inefficient state confirmed the sense of temporariness. Such tendencies were deepened by a noticeable lack of projects or ideas for building new institutions, a lack of effective programmes of the continuation of changes and the realisation that the people governing the country and introducing the reforms had no control over them. They failed those who trusted them and did not know the purpose of change and when it would be achieved. In view of the growing political aggression and undermining of the authority of the post-Solidarity leaders, often exposing their pettiness and hypocrisy, the feeling of helplessness and loneliness among a part of society was growing dramatically. Additionally, the lack of distinct boundary between the two orders led to the appearance of an atmosphere of un-obviousness and unreality (Staniszkis, 1990, p. 10). There were “two orders” existing next to each other, both having their values and objectives. Transitional social conditions were arising that satisfied no one. Different forms of behaviour were becoming emphasised—on the one hand, the heroism in the daily fight for survival; on the other, aggression, economic and cultural violence and ruthless actions that ignored the good of others. Greed and rapacity of some people incited terror and fear in others, and the “resourcefulness at any cost” and previously unnoticeable greed became an element of the new order’s relations. In the Polish People’s Republic, many social groups became pauperised 2003, p. 35). Still, it was the 1990s that made a part (Wnuk-Lipinski, ´ of the social security measures crumble and undermined the foundations of the life of many social groups (Heymann, 1998, p. 152). They sped up the income diversification processes and bottom-up recreation of the middle class, as well as the formation of bases for new hierarchies (Lelen, ´ 2005, p. 46), which was impacted first and foremost by the phenomenon of unemployment. The income hierarchy was transforming and being formed internally, often surprising with the results. During the years 1991–1993, under the influence of the release of salaries in the private sector, the remunerations of entrepreneurs, enterprise directors and management staff were rising, while those of workers, mainly 1994, p. 150). The changes qualified workers, were falling (Domanski, ´ observed were the aftermath of a partial abolishment of state control over remunerations and stemmed from the new rules of the economic game. One of these rules, and at the same time a supervisory remainder

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of the state, was the tax on above-standard increases in remunerations— which forced, in practice, a decrease in remunerations of state enterprise and public enterprise workers and limited the competition possibilities of work establishments, thus encouraging privatisation. According to Ryszard Bugaj, this action led to the liquidation of state enterprises first of all (2010, p. 23). In 1993, the sectors that were privileged in the Polish People’s Republic were still dominating in the economy that was moving towards the market, but it was ‘other factors’ that became the driving 1994, pp. 153–154). force of the distribution mechanisms” (Domanski, ´ The reforms condemned not only workers but all the people employed in the public sector to have their remunerations reduced. The results of sociological studies show unambiguously that in the 1990s, the differences in financial and living conditions increased (Sikorska, 1998). However, the success of the appearing free market and navigating it depended on factors other than those highlighted by the liberal ideology. The observation of the changing reality confirmed that what was growing in significance was a specific social capital in the form or relations and arrangements from the previous system, the ability to trade and take advantage of legal loopholes, family capital and access to information. What turned out to be of exceptional value was employment in state administration, where salaries were paid regularly, and layoffs were limited. A job in state administration became a dream of a large part of society. After the first ten years of changes, a higher professional position combined with education ensured higher income than in the 1980s 2000, p. 160). (Domanski, ´ Restructuring, market orientation, privatisation of the economy and liquidation of unprofitable work establishments led to turbulent changes in the job market and contributed to mass layoffs, closure of work establishments and increase in unemployment. There was a rapid increase in unemployment. From the minimum level in 1989 to 12–13% in 1992 among the general professionally active population and up to 15.8% (2.9 1994, p. 156). Unemmillion people) in the first half of 1994 (Domanski, ´ ployment hit women first and foremost (Gramlewicz, 2016, pp. 142– 152). Households where a woman was the head of the family were becoming impoverished more frequently than others (Szelenyi, 2003, p. 9). Unqualified workers experienced the same. Long-lasting unemployment was suffered particularly by certain social groups. An example of that can be about 370,000 employees in the areas of the former state agricultural farms (Leopold, 1995, p. 20) who had no possibility of employment

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in other sectors of the economy. The number of long-term unemployed, not entitled to unemployment benefits, was growing. It included many young people and women. Unemployment of this kind was becoming a huge social threat (Reszke, 1995) and undermining the foundations of the new order. In practice, unemployment threatened many families’ functioning, especially when the sole provider lost their job. A state of privation appeared, translating to a reduced sense of self-worth, pessimism 2000). and depression (Sowinska, ´ The changes were accompanied by axiological and normative chaos (Kurczewska, 1995, p. 39), and the basis for it was provided by the “life according to double rules and moral standards” during the socialist times—the application of different principles and values depending on the situation. The new values imposed, the chaotically formed hierarchies and the diversity of income quickly turned out to be destructive to some of the old relations—mainly the family ones. They brought 1994, about many unexpected and undesirable consequences (Panków, ´ pp. 133–145). They also preserved pathologies such as ethical relativism, opportunism and clientelism, permissivism, mobbing and corruption (Miszalska, 2002, p. 165). The disappointment that reforms resulted only in a worsening of the financial situation made a part of society develop an “unfulfilled expectations” syndrome. The notions of “orphans of communism” or “social costs of the transformation” appeared, trivialising this phenomenon (Szumlewicz, 2006, p. 257). The people included among losers were those who had trouble adjusting, but not to the rules of the free market—as it was not present then. The problem was the conditions of the transition phase. The category of “losers” was also employed by some people employed in public services, higher education or administration (i.e., those who “were almost unaffected by the market being formed”). In this manner, the neoliberal ideology was showing its effectiveness—it solved the problem of groups that were not doing well in the transformation by stigmatising them. The phenomena mentioned above impacted a major part of society, which considered them new forms of injustice. Neoliberalism was not taking advantage of physical violence in order to rebuild the social structure, but rather “persuaded” those resisting the ruthless rules of capital creation—which had nothing to do with competition or market. It was a pathological, vigorous creation but also a controlled form of formation of the economy by active individuals. Everyone else was stigmatised by neoliberalism, which assessed that they could not adjust to the reality

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conditions that it created and called “the market”. It left many victims, who often chose suicide, in its merciless path. The above comments confirm that no one postulated retaining the communist social structure, and few wondered about its future. Abandoning it was the main focus of political actions and thinking. Considering the previous economy as anachronistic was equivalent to having an opinion on the social structure. However, taking into account that the appearance of a middle class in the social structure would also mean a rapid increase in inequality was rare in the political discourse (Domanski ´ & Rychard, 1997, p. 21). The answer given to the question of what the future social structure would be was as follows: it was to be dominated by the middle class. This class had been anticipated since the end of the 1980s, and its existence was supposed to mean that the free market had taken root. The intelligentsia and the business groups originating from the informal economy of the Polish People’s Republic became considered the middle class due to these demands. The middle class was supposed to emerge nearly automatically through the use of the “bulldozer strategy” (i.e., eliminating everything that was not in line with the neoliberal ideology). That is why everything resembling the middle class and any actions aimed at its formation received a positive evaluation. All other elements of the former order were included in the “bankruptcy estate” intended for rapid “recycling”. No one was interested in them, and their fate was to be decided by the free market. Through the renewal of social and economic life, a better order was supposed to appear in the post-communist structure. However, the “bulldozer strategy” was implemented selectively on the structural level, and no attempt was made to level the fundamental division inherited after communism, stemming from the previous unequal access to goods and power. The foundations of inequalities between the nomenklatura and society were not removed, and the privileged position of the former in disposing of valuable resources was also not eliminated. Changes did not bring unemployment to those in management positions, administration or education, including higher education. The majority of people in these groups remained outside of the sphere of common anxiety and consequences of the formation of the free market, which does not mean that they did not experience any of the other negative consequences of changes such as low salaries in the public services sector. The rise of the middle class was interpreted as a factor indispensable for promoting economic growth (Easterly, 1999). The middle class

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was also characterised by optimism, activity, frugality, creativity, capital accumulation and taking advantage of social advancement opportunities 2015). The ideologists of the market believed that the (Wyznikiewicz, ˙ middle class would ensure the secure persistence of democracy and be its most important stabilising element, the core of society and a conscious voter base (Lelen, ´ 2005, p. 52), also thanks to not being dependent of the state’s redistribution actions and programmes. According to Henryk Domanski, ´ the notion of the middle class made a brilliant career, not only scientific, but also ideological and political. There were even texts written about building a middle-class society (1994, p. 11). Creating it through privatisation, reprivatisation and enfranchisement became one of the objectives of subsequent governments—there was a broad consensus on this matter (Jasiecki, 2002, p. 88). Because of that, private capital was favoured at the expense of any other form of ownership. The creation of the middle class was made into a task and an argument for the supporters of the new order, an ideological call that was often not available for discussion. In the discourse, the middle class took the place of the working class, and some of the arguments employed in its favour were previously used concerning workers. Its existence was a condition for the functioning and survival of the order. Its representatives were supposed to be “the economic and political factor stabilising the 1991, p. 63). new socio-economic order” (Domanski, ´ The search for the middle class started with appreciating the role of the little bourgeoisie at the end of the 1980s. From that moment on, attempts and defining what the middle class was and presenting its composition began. However, the claim that this class may consist of the small business had problems entering the social consciousness, and few scholars supported it. Such an approach resulted from negative communist propaganda that had been targeted against this social group for many years. Despite these obstacles, the increase in the number of businesspeople was a fact. The dynamics of the expansion of this category were continued. At the end of June 1993, there were 1,689,063 private businesses operating, mostly dealing in commercial (661,000), service (372,000) and industrial 1994, p. 180). During the years 1998– activity (341,000) (Domanski, ´ 1999, the number of private entrepreneurs increased over four times, 2000, p. 16). The internal structure reaching a level of 6.6% (Domanski, ´ of businesspeople was transforming and experiencing rapid stratification. Already in the first years of the transformation, 20% of the wealthiest Poles were obtaining nearly 40% of the national income (Jasiecki, 2002, p. 106).

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Attempts were made to define the middle class using higher education. In the early 1990s, this meant believing that the new order would appear within the intelligentsia—a group that was pauperised entirely at that time (Kurczewski, 1993; Mokrzycki, 1994). In spite of the intelligentsia’s impoverishment, its exceptional level of awareness, appreciation of the values of free market and democracy and understanding of the 2000, interest of the transformation were all recognised (Dzwonczyk, ´ pp. 66–77). What spoke in favour of intelligentsia was the personal capital, education, specific mentality, state of awareness, pro-market attitude and, additionally, patience towards the degradation experienced. It was appreciated that it even accepted the worsening of its position in the labour market. It was underlined that such a situation would change with time and that knowledge and qualifications would be appreciated in the economy. Its ideological elevation was also justified by referring to its approval of principles of competition and individualism and its aversion towards collectivism and traditional values. The intelligentsia turned out to be a very useful stratum and had all the characteristics required, but it was hard to believe that it could become the middle class, dominating and stabilising society. Its dependence on budget remunerations spoke against giving it the status of the avant-garde of the change. And it was so indeed as, after 1989, the intelligentsia was experiencing financial degradation 2000, pp. 129–130) rather than appreciation. (Dzwonczyk, ´ Most politicians were spreading the conviction of its indispensability and claimed without a shadow of a doubt that the lack thereof is an obstacle to reaching prosperity, even though some researchers provided examples of countries where the wealthiness of society was achieved 1994, p. 271). The scientific deliberawithout this class (Domanski, ´ tions over the condition of the structure were dominated by searching for groups with similar characteristics or resources of goods. The middle class (Kurczewski, 1982) was supposed to be characterised by identical 2000, p. 27). Therelocation on the stratification ladders (Domanski, ´ fore, researchers were looking for the indicators characterising it—a good car, own home, stable income, higher education, specific social capital and other important resources. They were looking for individuals who “taken together, will constitute a centre of a specific lifestyle, mentality 1994, p. 268) by exerting influence on others. and views” (Domanski, ´ That is why the politicians were increasingly eager to include the business communities among the middle class and “glancing” hopefully at highlevel management staff with a high level of education and capital. These

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tendencies were confirmed by the financial advancement experienced by 2000, p. 16). people in high-level management positions (Domanski, ´ During the first years of the transformation, the economy was ruled by ubiquitous chaos and uncontrolled processes, often deliberate bankruptcies, property takeovers and employee layoffs. The consequences of the Balcerowicz Plan were radically different from the first plans and expectations (Bugaj, 2010, p. 22). The only thing not waning was the faith of the liberals that privatisation, reprivatisation and quick accumulation of capital would speed up the formation of the middle class, with effect on economic growth. However, the need for further waiting was underlined: “In short, the market rules need to operate for a certain time in order to generate a new social structure, and especially the middle class” (Wnuk2003, p. 54). In this aspect, the faith held by the neoliberals in Lipinski, ´ this class was similar to that held by the People’s Poland ideologists in workers. A group that significantly contributed to the formation of the middle class was the part of the nomenklatura that “converted its political authority position into wealth resources” (Wesołowski, 1994). It adapted to the new rules of functioning exceptionally quickly and took advantage of the previously formed capital resources and exhibited business activity. These processes were confirmed by the management staff composition, which often originated from the Polish People’s Republic state apparatus. Some members of the nomenklatura strengthened their position by 2010, p. 75). becoming owners, shareholders or businessmen (Panków, ´ The actions taken by that part of nomenklatura had nothing in common with the passiveness or withdrawal characteristic of a major part of society. It exhibited resourcefulness and knowledge of the economic system and took advantage of the previously acquired skills, information and experience. It does not come as a surprise then that, at the end of the 1990s, the high-level members of the party-state apparatus were considered the 2000, p. 110). main beneficiary of the changes (Domanski, ´ The neoliberal revolution had no scruples in dealing with the workers, 2009) that had allowed the main creators of the political change (Panków, ´ it to come into existence. It reduced, to a minimum, the demand for labour stemming from the centralist administration model. It also rejected top-down control over work establishments, undermined the respect towards manual labour and led to worker layoffs. It did not envisage high standing for them in the hierarchies created, as they had no capital at their disposal and did not exhibit mobility or entrepreneurship. Such

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heroes of the fight against communism were not useful as they were not driving changes, and the majority of them did not represent middle-class values. In practice, what commenced was its liquidation, which spread over time. Some worker groups from certain industries were taking up the fight, which led to strikes and protests that postponed their own downfall. During the first four years of the change, the actual income of employed workers decreased by as much as 38% (Główczyk, 2002, p. 137)—although during the years 1998–1999, qualified workers alone still had a significant share in the professional structure, constituting 2000, p. 17). 24.8% of the people employed (Domanski, ´ With the passage of years, the workers’ acceptance of the changes introduced was decreasing. At first, they believed in the creation of a “friendly market economy” regulated by the market and capitalist institutions and also in the continued growth of the industry (Gardawski, 1996, p. 206). None of these expectations were met. The decrease in the importance of workers was also influenced by consciousness-related and structural factors. The new order was promoting individual survival strategies which tore their way into the consciousness of individuals. The elevation of individualism led to undermining group solidarity and weakening its influence. Additionally, the workers turned out to be a non-uniform, internally divided group incapable of group solidarity encompassing the whole class. They were exceptionally diversified in terms of financial standing and divided by trade interests. These features accelerated their total decline. The strikes started regarded individual work establishments’ interests, and few resulted from class solidarity. Thinking only of one’s own situation was becoming increasingly dominant. The workers were learning at an accelerated pace the new forms of behaviour and strategies of “everyone saves himself” or “you care only for yourself”. With every decade, the workers kept losing their political importance. The myth of their capability to oppose the government in any social order was dispelled. Applying the free market principles to the economy first impacted the income of farmers. They were expecting an improvement in their financial standing as they had private property at their disposal (Szafraniec, 1998, p. 304) and had exhibited individual initiative for many years. Meanwhile, after the reforms were started, the demand for their products collapsed. The internal economic breakdown translated to reduced demand for food products while opening the economy to foreign food products led to the

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appearance of less expensive food from Western countries. The competition of the local products with subsidised ones caused problems with selling the produce and, thus, a drastic decrease in the income of farmers. This started a long-lasting process of transferring a large portion of the costs of the changes introduced to the countryside inhabitants. This situation was confirmed by two waves of protests, road blocks and farmers’ strikes. The first one occurred directly after 1989—a consequence of the release of prices. The second took place in the years 1998–1999 as a result of a decrease in agricultural product prices caused by import and inhibition of export to Eastern markets, including to Russia (Gorlach, 2001, p. 166). The competition between farmers working on small acreages with developed and subsidised Western agriculture was particularly difficult, especially since the food price mattered the most and the fashion for ecofriendly products was yet to come. Small-scale farmers were unable to adjust to the administration rules imposed, which had nothing to do with the free market in view of competing with subsidised food. The growing unemployment also impacted the worsening situation of the countryside among farmers/workers and the high inflation rate that translated to the increased cost of the repayment of farmer loans. Any support for the indebted provided by the state would have been incompatible with the neoliberal direction of the contemporary government. Most farms were left without any help whatsoever, and their situation did not arouse the 2003, p. 177). In 1994, nearly interest of the authorities (Wnuk-Lipinski, ´ 40% of rural families had at least one unemployed person in the household, and the number of “redundant labour force” at the countryside was estimated to be 450,000 people (Podedworna, 2001, pp. 176–178). What happened threatened the existence of many rural families. One of the consequences of these processes was the establishment of the “Self-Defence” (Polish: Samoobrona) radical social movement. The actions forced small-scale farmers to join the groups losing the transformation. This also happened as a result of wrongly conducted liberalisation of food product prices and too liberal opening of the Polish market to foreign goods. All these actions fitted the long-lasting enthusiasm regarding less expensive agricultural products only and the conviction that Western products of this type are of better quality. The focus on mass and inexpensive production shook the foundations of many family farms and began the process of extensive differentia1995, tion in both internal and regional dimensions (Kaczor-Panków, ´

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pp. 41–66). Financial differences were getting noticeably quicker in the countryside, stemming from the lack of competition capabilities of small farms compared to large private farming enterprises. The economic policy focused on reinforcing “the big ones” manifested itself in such entities being clearly privileged in terms of access to investment funds, loans and, 2010, p. 74). later on, EU funds (Panków, ´ The preserved records of political and scientific discourse confirm that farmers were stigmatised in the new order. Among other things, they were referred to as “the last peasants of Europe”, “post-traditional farmers” or “the problem class”. There were even statements that the structure of the countryside was “unique in the scale of Western and Eastern Europe” (Podedworna, 2001, pp. 172–174) and allegedly anachronic (FedyszakRadziejowska, 1995, p. 176). Such opinions were expressed as a result of comparing Polish farming with the agricultural structures of Western countries. It turned out that the reality of the countryside also did not fit the models the liberal government intended to pursue. In the middle of the 1990s, the structure of farmers was divided into three categories: (a) the “marginalised”, having a strong sense of powerlessness; (b) the “owners”, focused on taking over the land of their fathers; (c) the “businessmen”, perceiving the changes as a chance for growth (Gorlach, 1995). The agricultural policy of leaving agriculture to the free market led to a decrease in the number of people working on farms, small farms were going bankrupt and land was becoming accumulated in the hands of agricultural businesses. Processes of deagrarisation started in the countryside and a phenomenon of “bourgeoisie-ing” appeared, consisting of a growing share of the middle class in agriculture. The transformations made it harder to present the social structure of the countryside, which led to the appearance of forced simplifications of its description. It was noticed that farmers still dominated the countryside, but their share in the whole structure was becoming smaller. The analysis of sources of income of the countryside inhabitants in the years 1991–2013 presented a systematic decrease in the number of people who made a living off farming. The share of farmers, gardeners, foresters and fishermen decreased during the period in question from 46.4 to 27.4%, with a simultaneous increase in the share of people living off non-farming activity. This applied to all socio-professional groups in the countryside. A part of this process was the gradual disappearance of the farmers/workers group, who either

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retired or worked only in the industry. Some of them joined other professional groups. The changes in the structure of professional groups in the countryside were the most visible in the years 1995–2007 (Michalska, 2020, pp. 22–26). The economic changes forced the appearance of new professions and job positions and transformations of professional terminologies. These processes resulted to the greatest extent from the increase in the significance of the developing business environment and the service sector. A part of the consequences of these processes delighted some neoliberal politicians or ideologists. Some of the negative consequences were hidden, some appeared only after a few years, and some others were interpreted as positive for society. They created new hierarchies which were unstable and often short-lived and were formed according to blurred and impermanent criteria. Next to them, permanent tendencies were formed—one of which was strengthening the role of education and realising the importance of having a good profession or skills. In spite of that, the social and economic reality had not taken its final shape by that point and was changing intensively. At the same time, the researchers tried to describe the hierarchy and structure of society. The description started from a narrow elite of wealth and capital, white-collar workers of both higher and lower level, and ended with workers, lower classes and the 1994, p. 266). “underclass” characterised by extreme poverty (Domanski, ´ The structure was neither obvious nor unambiguous. After two decades of changes, the situation remained similar. At that point, the structure was said to have been created by entrepreneurs, managers, experts, directors and self-employed people—those working for their own account, whitecollar workers, qualified and unqualified blue-collar workers and farmers. The structural conceptualisation so conducted was considered optimal until the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century (Słomczynski ´ et al., 2017, pp. 375–376). The “shock therapy” pushed many groups to the margin of society and they experienced persistent destitution, material poverty and previously unknown degradation. The costs of transformation had the most significant impact on the poorest (Jarosz, 2008, p. 10), who inherited their destitution after the Polish People’s Republic. The consent lack of employment, the learned helplessness and the attitudes based on expecting support from the state all strengthened the processes leading to the expansion of the “underclass”. Any group where the position of an individual—determined by the income of the whole family divided

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by the number of family members—was lower than 50% of average national income was included among the “underclass”. According to Henryk Domanski, ´ from 1987 to 1992, this percentage rose twofold— from 11.7 to 23.4%—and then decreased to 18.2% by 1999 (2000, p. 125). Among the “marginalised”, the dominant groups were those later counted among those losing on the reform, mainly the former State Agricultural Farm (PGR) employees, owners of small, unprofitable farms and farmers/workers. The growing distances and income inequalities were becoming increasingly noticeable between the budget sector and the private one, as well as between the pauperised intelligentsia and certain groups of businesspeople that were becoming rich. In this process, the privatisation processes played a tremendous role, which were “a powerful generator of social inequalities, enfranchising certain people while simultaneously disenfranchising others” (Heymann, 1998, p. 143). The differences in income were becoming increasingly noticeable and translated to access to white-collar jobs, especially concerning people coming from farmer and worker families. The growing role in access to education was played by the parents’ financial standing and social background. Such tendencies confirmed that the equal chances promoted by the neoliberals (Domanski, ´ 2000, pp. 23–26) were only an empty, ideological slogan. With time, the high costs of reforms became more noticeable, resulting in them losing their charm and attractiveness (Jasiecki, 2002, p. 92)— although the neoliberals never lost faith in their “healing” impact on the economy. The approval for income diversification (Cichomski, 2001, pp. 27–59) was still present, but the inequalities themselves were becoming unacceptable to many people. At the turn of the century, the conviction that inequalities reflected skills, talents and efforts was growing weaker. These feelings were not placated by assurances that it was a temporary situation and that everyone would ultimately experience an improvement in their financial standing and reap the fruit of the free market. The inequalities noticed caused a deepening of the feeling of social loneliness and realisation of the constant degradation of material situations. At the same time, “the growing differences in financial standing were additionally accompanied by a sense of tremendous injustice” (Gortat, 1995, p. 44). As much as 92% of the Poles surveyed in 1999 thought that “the differences between the rich and the poor in our country are excessive” (Egalitaryzm, 2000). What dominated was

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forced pragmatism, consisting of approval of inequalities with simultaneous “rejection of their uncontrollable growth and glaring contrasts” 2000, p. 128). (Domanski, ´

Continuation of Communist-Era Social Division The political tension of the 1980s, the Round Table agreements, the result of elections of 4th June 1989, the socio-economic collapse and the formation of the Tadeusz Mazowiecki’s government all led to the appearance of the phenomenon of “common time” (Ziółkowski, 2006, p. 150). It was a period characterised by the disappearance of a sense of political conflict and a stronger experience of participation in the political community (Borowiec, 2013, p. 279 et seq.), waiting for an improvement in the economic situation, uncertainty of the future and not experiencing the “us” vs “them” division. While it lasted, political differences did not play a major role. In fact, for over a year, they were completely forgotten and everyone experienced unity; “they wanted to be and were together”. The actions of the Solidarity movement elites reinforced this unique perception of the moment. What can be considered a symbolic end of the “common time” is the proposal to “accelerate”, raised in April 1990 (To, co, 1990, p. 3). The “common time” was questioned politically, also through a different valuation of past and current events—especially through the negation of the pace of changes that was too slow. The idea of common hard work and rebuilding, a “joint march” towards the new order, was also rejected. This strategy was considered socially harmful as it kept society in a sense of artificial unity and blocked the building of democratic mechanisms based on disputes and recognition of differences. The “common time” was accused of creating and maintaining an untrue image of reality and trying to convince people that the “us” vs “them” division no longer existed. It was also accused of blocking the appearance of party pluralism, which was impossible to appear without actual differences. After the “common time” was rejected, negative evaluations of both the compromise and the changes carried out started to appear. The compromise itself (i.e., the method of “toppling communism”) brought about hope for bridging the existing gap, and actions were made towards this end. However, against the expectation of many people who dreamed of “bonding” society back together, it made the totalitarian future the foundation of the new order created. It was a result of the lack of partition

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between these periods, confirmed by inviting “them” to create the new reality. Thus, the automatically negatively evaluated past became a part of the present. The outrage of a part of society was caused by allowing participation in democracy to people who led the country to the brink of collapse and its population to existential vegetation, as well as ruined the lives and chances of a few generations. What completed this bitterness was the fact the people who committed crimes, both after 1945 and during the martial law period, had not been held accountable. It was a paradox that the compromise that should help solve the conflict by design actually helped survive the “us” vs “them” division and even reinforced it. The compromise established strengthened the persistence of division on many planes. It became an object of political dispute, a basis for the formulation of divergent opinions on reforms, undermining the changes made and harassment of the nomenklatura within the transformations. It contributed to asking the question about whether what happened in 1989 was “a revolution of the Solidarity” or only “a controlled change” (Dudek, 2004). The agreement aroused social emotions and led to doubts of not only an economic and political nature, but also a moral one. According to those criticising the compromise, the “them” side had no moral right to receive equal treatment, and such an approach towards it was effective at blurring the line between good and evil. It deepened the normative chaos and blurred the differences between doing right and wrong things. It also undermined the fair course of the transformation. In effect, it was supposed to lead to purposeful and conscious blurring of the borders between the sides of the division and built a false image of reality, negating the ultimately negative image of the communist order. The compromise led to the “us” vs “them” division persisting, but at the same time becoming ambiguous, as a result of “them” being supported by some Solidarity activists. The time of communism, although rejected, aroused positive memories in many individuals, or even nostalgia. A part of society bid farewell to it with regret, which is why it was more than a negative resource that the pro-independence groups could easily employ. Next to reprehensible actions, destruction and abuse, there were also phenomena present that were valued positively—such as altruistic individual and collective actions and good individual involvement leading to improvement of living conditions—which were a positive resource that could be referred to, in spite the fact that they ultimately led to reinforcement of the order and

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prolongation of its existence. Thus, the communist past was not onedimensional and purely evil, which was confirmed by previous analyses of how the social relations in the Polish People’s Republic were created. The growing intensity of the political dispute between the groups rooted in the “us” vs “them” division sustained the aversion and enmity on both sides. On the other hand, some post-communists expected quick failure of the “order of freedom” and were convinced that it would lead to a change in the perception of communism. The distances were not “damaged” by the “common time” period, but only preserved, and their exploitation was postponed. Attempts to eliminate the existing sense of injustice were not made easier due to opinions of some of the discourse participants, claiming that the distances were bridged due to the communists accepting the conditions for handing over the power and supporting the reforms loyally. The conviction that this division needed to be eliminated quickly, without holding the people who committed abuses in the Polish People’s Republic accountable—even symbolically— was supported by some intellectuals. They believed that it was possible to change the people’s attitude towards communism without compensating for the wrongs. It turned out, however, that it was not enough to tell society who to respect if it desired justice. That is why the slogans about the compromise having eliminated the division were a display of severe political naivety and suggested other potentially hidden and not too commendable reasons for promoting such views. On the other hand, to a part of society it was an attractive postulate to bridge the gap discussed, which is why it received significant political support. It constituted a valuable solution of the future of these people because of the encumbrances that the past generated for them. It allowed finding one’s place quicker in the new reality, limiting the uncertainty regarding the future and eliminating the source of strong anxiety originating in the past that was significant to them. This applied especially to people who committed violations of the law or belonged to the lawand-order services that helped sustain the regime. Eliminating the division allowed the people or groups affiliated with the former order to join the democratic politics quicker, incorporate the post-communist capital into the free market and maintain the interest groups formed. The division originating from the Polish People’s Republic was built on inequalities—which is why it was sustained not only by the demands for justice towards the past, but also by the everyday observation of persisting privileged position of the former party apparatus. Observing the

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significant participation of the former nomenklatura in the privatisation of enterprises and publicised business scandals preserved the changes in social consciousness. What angered society even more were the examples of successful ventures of representatives of the party apparatus, both political and economic. That is why the negative evaluations of communist inequalities were not only persisting, but even becoming stronger, thus solidifying the conviction that “nothing has changed”. A significant role in sustaining this division was played by individual experiences, examples of unfair or unnecessary privatisation and planned bankruptcies of companies, which people saw with their own eyes, as well as the experience of long-lasting unemployment. The people included among “them” were also those who unfairly—as it was sometimes suspected—expanded their economic resources. Their success resulted in negative feelings, especially when it manifested in ostentatious consumption that the majority of society could not afford. Such a consumption for show was not only incompatible with justice, but also a sense of decency. Due to the participation of the nomenklatura in creating the market, a part of society kept looking at economic inequalities through the prism of differences in goods and resources. It was highlighted that economic goods reinforce political successes and that the factors leading to richness are knowledge of legal loopholes and access to information. This privilege was noticed and mentioned already during the creation of political parties. The post-communist part of the political scene took a lot of advantage of the social capital accumulated (Kitschelt et al., 1999, p. 283). The parties had significant resources, financial and member base and experience in organisation. Thus, it is hard to claim that there were equal chances for development of party structures (Grabowska, 2004, p. 24). Such opinions stemmed from the fact that the post-communists were supporting their political actions using the money coming from business activity. The “us” vs “them” division had an impact on the shape of the forming pluralism and translated to the formation of the party system, as the parties established positioned themselves around its inequalities (Grabowska & Szawiel, 2003, p. 20). After 1989, most parties fit into the useful discursive interpretations typical for the division. Often the dispute participants were forced to choose the side of the division, for example, by either supporting or opposing lustration. For many years, it was almost impossible to be present in politics without having a clear opinion with regard to certain consequences of this division. However,

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there were also political groups that refused to fit into the division discussed and informed about it extensively, making a political advantage out of it. An example of that is the Confederation of Independent Poland (KPN), which attempted to overcome the “us” vs “them” division. This party saw no differences in the statements of both sides, did not accept polarity and rejected the division. It underlined the continuity between the Polish People’s Republic and the Third Polish Republic and the lack of differences between the elites and the identities to which they were referring. Remembering was a significant factor, but it was not the only one sustaining the “us” vs “them” division. Such an intensive use of it stemmed from more than just anchorage in past events. An example of sustaining unjust relations, which appealed strongly to imagination, was the pension privileges of officers of former repression services. The division made sure that the politics relied on issues that were still significant to a large part of society, issues that were experienced and aroused emotions. By politicizing the division, the politics maintained contact with voters, establishing relations not only with their past, but also their present. It is no wonder that by referring to “us”, they employed this division to contact society. It was done so for many years, not only at the moment of breakthrough at the beginning of the transformation. The politicization of the division meant taking advantage of resources of the past spent in opposition, exposing one’s own courage and fighting with the regime. However, these actions also sustained the division. Taking advantage of the “Solidarity background” and underlining the fact that political opponents used to be members of the party apparatus were methods of further solidification of the division. Additionally, the symbolic capital of Solidarity (i.e., the collective success in fighting totalitarianism) was employed as well. The behaviour of people sympathising with the division differed significantly. The majority of post-Solidarity activists underlined the need for further introduction of justice, while a part of the post-communists was hiding their past. To the opposition, the past was a useful resource and let the politicians underline that they were on the side of freedom in the “moment of trial”. The past achievements provided initial moral advantage, but after 1993, they underwent a major loss of effectiveness. Society realised very quickly that the political leaders of both sides were similar to each other, had the same shortcomings or lacked a sense of responsibility for the common good. Because of that, sympathising with “them” stopped being a discrediting thing and was

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even presented as something to be proud of. The long-standing, ineffective isolation of post-communist parties and politicians was growing weaker, translating to the decreasing role of the division. Taking advantage of the “us” category was initially exceptionally beneficial and provided an advantage. Looking through the programmes of 111 electoral committees in the parliamentary elections of 1991 (Dudek, 2002, p. 202) provides confirmation of intensive exploitation of the “us” vs “them” division, its meaning for building identity and positioning oneself and opponents. Most of the political groups presented their own interpretations of the division, underlining what of it remained valid and what lost significance. The analysis of the programmes confirms that the division became a space for presenting differences and showing what differentiates one group from the competing ones. Often those were issues related to lustration or decommunisation (i.e., regarding how to settle the existing instances of injustice). This attitude was hampered neither by the splitting of the political scene (during the years 1991–1993) nor by the later changes in it, the appearance of Christian democratic and national parties or the strengthening of the position of the post-communist party. All of these actions did not eliminate the “us” vs “them” division as it was anchored in the existing social wrongs. The division utilised the existing examples of injustice, confirmed by numerous calls to eliminate specific types of discrimination. It was especially the demand catalogue of the Solidarity parties that referred to the injustices created before 1989. Therefore, the first demands referred to compensating the victims of the non-democratic order, redressing damage and holding accountable the people who violated the law, acted to the detriment of the citizens and opposed the democratic demands of society. To this extent, the demands included conducting decommunisation, also understood as transforming the most important elements of the state and passing judgement on people who committed crimes and abuses. The postulates appearing in the programmes resulted from the persistence of many problems and the transfer of pathological relations to contemporary reality. The sense of being wronged sustained the line of division and made reckoning the most politically important issue. A significant role in strengthening such demands was played by the fall of Jan Olszewski’s government in 1992. The anti-communist formula of legitimisation of that government allowed it to present its fall as a coup of the postcommunist forces and a significant point on the battle axis between

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good and evil. The toppling of that government was allegedly caused by a coup d’etat carried out at night, with tense and nervous counting of votes. Its dismissal was called a “change at night”, performed by a “coalition of fear” (Gelberg, 1993) and fear of lustration. Those who led to that dismissal were assigned the status of a “post-communist plot” and presented as an example of both the “old and new nomenklatura”. The strategy of such reconstruction (i.e., instrumental politicization of the division from the Polish People’s Republic period) was commonly employed and constituted a useful tool for demarcating, moving and also maintaining the division boundaries. At the same time, it was a practice of repartition, the basis of which was the “us” vs “them” division, and it relied on a sense of injustice stemming from it that was still present. The division was often presented in the form of a dichotomous pattern of: “for reckoning with communism” vs “against reckoning with communism”. A part of the group supporting the reckoning with the past adopted conservative values and sustaining strong positive references to the nation and Catholicism. The side of “them” adopted a sceptical attitude towards the values preferred by the above groups, and it was also supported by Solidarity activists who were not in favour of the collectiveconservative vision of a good life. It was an important transformation of the depiction of the “us” vs “them” division, changing the identities of its sides, rationalising the political choices made and determining the political influences. In practice, the difference in attitude towards a reckoning with communism led to a split among Solidarity activists. The side of “them”—at least according to a part of society—was joined by those of the Solidarity activists who rejected the need for reckoning with the past and accepted the option of agreements with the post-communists that would protect them against criminal and political liability. Either side presented the other in the worst possible light, exposing its incompetence, bad intentions and representation of narrow groups of voters. Although the composition of the division sides was reconstructed instrumentally, this action still regarded the gap between “us” and “them” dating back to the communist times. Transferred into the new order, it had an impact mainly in the economic aspect, manifested as underlining the unauthorised disposal of goods by the nomenklatura. The takeover of a part of the goods was referred to as illegal, and there was no justification for such actions— which is why it was demanded that any impact on the former apparatus ´ 1990, p. 1). on the economic market should be terminated (Swidnicki,

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Some politicians suggested directly that the changes were made, first and foremost, in aid of the nomenklatura and existing criminal systems. This was allegedly confirmed by numerous business scandals that exposed relations between some party apparatus and the criminal underworld, often originating from former security services. Examples of property theft and participation of Security Service associates in business activity further testified to that. The danger for the whole economic system caused by the influence of secret services was being underlined. It was also claimed that the free market would be distorted in the case of the capital being at the disposal of only a small group of people. The party programmes included even declarations of depriving the nomenklatura of the illegally appropriated property and limiting its access to public life. There were also demands to deprive the officers of the former Security Service of the Polish People’s Republic of all retirement and pension privileges. A part of society considered enabling the nomenklatura to take over the state property a reason for delegitimising the new order. The evaluation of the processes taking place, stating that “the ‘new’ does not come from new or nothing, but from the transformation of the previously existing resources” (Jasiecki, 2002, p. 186), was extremely popular. This division was also applied to explain the causes for the lack of expected effects of changes. It was used to channel the worsening public sentiment and provided a simplified version of reality in which the postcommunists stood in the way to change and achieving a breakthrough. Such an attitude found its confirmation when the post-communists won further elections, thus not only making the “prophecies” of the return of nomenklatura come true, but also enabling further underlining of this division. It was even claimed that communism was back. Such rhetoric created a sense of the existence of the “us” vs “them” dichotomy and reinforced the atmosphere and sentiments known from the late 1980s. The election victories of the post-communists in 1993 and that of Aleksander Kwa´sniewski in the presidential elections of 1995 maintained the “us” vs “them” bipolar system, in which the poles were longer internally coherent, but still relatively obvious. On one side, there were those unjustly privileged and their defenders; on the other, a society that called for justice. In many individuals, the election victory of post-communists reinforced the sense of being wronged and renewed the emotions caused by injustice in the Polish People’s Republic. The division discussed was included within the situation description presented: “the communism continues” vs “the communism is gone”. It

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also took the form of “post-communism” vs “anti-communism” opposition. The constant highlighting of anti-communism meant more than maintaining the division, subscribing to it and transforming it instrumentally. Both the fight with the post-communism and consequences of past inequalities and the rejection of “witch hunting” or “collective responsibility” confirmed its persistence. The division was confirmed by the formation of two currents distinguished by Mirosława Grabowska: the post-communist one and the post-Solidarity one (Grabowska, 1996, 1999, pp. 25–28; 2003a, p. 195), which determined the competition of the parties. The currents distinguished were not a new division, but rather another politicization of the “us” vs “them” division and adjusting it to the new conditions. For many years, the continued presence of this division was a source of many disappointments and public regrets, which needs to be considered another particularly intelligent form of politicizing it that was created by the parties of the political dispute.

Transformation and Further Politicization of the “Us”---“Them” Division The Round Table agreements were an object of intensive criticism for many years, coming mainly from the side of right-wing parties and politicians. A quick change in the approach to this compromise also influenced the attitude of a part of society towards the social division analysed. It turned out that a large part of society rejected that compromise, which was confirmed by election results—both those in 1989 and later years. The way the voters cast their votes at the ballot box also confirmed that the division was present and that some of the voters did not accept bridging it and did not consent to forgetting its inequalities and going back to business as usual despite the wrongs committed. A part of society interpreted the agreement with communists as a “plot”. The confirmation of the existence of such a plot was, allegedly, the reluctance of some of the post-Solidarity communities to make a reckoning with the past. These interpretations were reinforced by the information appearing regarding the collaboration of some of the agreement signatories with the secret services of the Polish People’s Republic. What spoke against the agreement’s supporters was its political portion, ensuring that the former nomenklatura would retain its influence and blocking the quick introduction of full democracy and pluralism. Doubts were also raised by

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the provisions regarding the limitation of competition in the 1989 elections, prohibition of criticism towards the Polish People’s Republic, the martial law period (Grabowska & Szawiel, 2003, p. 19), principles of the communist system and limitation of discussions on responsibility for the past. This is why some of the right-wing groups very quickly encumbered the politicians who made a compromise with the communists with liability for sustaining post-communism. If the “us” vs “them” division stemmed from unequal access to goods by using authority to violate rights and blocking society’s demands of freedom, it comes as no surprise that not only the post-communists, but also some of the post-Solidarity parties reluctant towards lustration and decommunisation became an object of criticism from the point of view of lack of justice. An example of that is the demands for President Lech Wał˛esa to resign from office not only due to not having fulfilled his basic election promises, but also the lack of justice that he declared. Thus, Lech Wał˛esa was also included among “them”, which took place using accusations that he stopped the process of holding the communists accountable and defended their interests, and later also of relations with secret services during the Polish People’s Republic period. His opponents claimed that Wał˛esa chose the side of “them” when he failed to meet the obligations he made at the presidential elections. The political “dispute within the family” among the former Solidarity activists had the most impact on the modification of the division. However, the split among the former opposition activists and some of them taking the side of the post-communists did not eliminate the division but actually strengthened it. It stemmed from the fact that the main reason behind shattering the unity of opposition was a different attitude towards the past, including the forms of eliminating inequalities. The rejection to reckon with the past was received as support for “maintaining” the privileged position of people originating from the old order. For these reasons, the division constituted a resource useful to both sides of the political dispute—for transforming, modifying and developing its constituents and creating new, politically useful boundaries. It is necessary to remember that the structure of “them” changed only to a minor degree, as confirmed by the loyalty of voters, exceptionally strongly bound to the post-communist parties. There were many factors influencing such behaviour, but they undoubtedly included defending their own benefits stemming from old privileges and not only the concern about being held accountable for supporting the old order. Because of that, nearly all

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parties “guarded” the division and kept politicizing it. In certain periods, they even protected it against becoming a thing of the past. Taking advantage of the division, weakening some of its meanings, reconstructing it for their own benefit and eventually eliminating it and imposing a new one became the objective pursued by post-communist parties and politicians. A form of politicization of this division after 1989 was the instrumental use of the “us” category in the discourse on the part of the post-communist opposition. To this end, it took advantage of the change taking place and the takeover of power by the post-Solidarity camp. It was claimed that the “us” vs “them” division no longer existed because the “old authorities (‘them’) became the new opposition (the new ‘us’), while the anti-communist opposition (‘us’) became the new ruling group (the new ‘them’)” (Drzonek, 2001, p. 34). Such politicization of the division was a play on the part of some political communities that strived not only to reject the negative consequences of the division but also to take over its positive capital. It was a complete negation of the hierarchies of values formed earlier and the privileges and inequalities that arose and was an attempt at depriving the post-Solidarity communities of their fundamental resource reliant on the past. It only meant making it shallow and reducing it to the dimension of authority-based inequalities. Such a reversal of meanings of the “us” vs “them” division did not succeed as it had little basis in the inequalities that were being formed then. After 1989, a similar politicization of the division was also applied by some of the post-Solidarity elites that were systematically deprived of influence on political decisions. In view of tremendous social and economic problems, such an attitude was convincing to many voters. A part of society started treating the current authorities as “them”, irrespective of their past. It adopted such interpretations of the division, especially when it experienced a major disappointment towards the governing postSolidarity elites. The disappointment with elites solidified the conviction that they deserve being included in the “them” category while, at the same time, retaining faith in the cunning post-communists and remaining distrustful of any politics. Part of society kept considering the “people in power” disposers of undeserved privileges. A part of the politicization of the division was the negative definition of post-communist politicians and voters supporting them as people holding anti-Christian and anti-national beliefs, even though the communists flaunted their love for their socialist fatherland and referred to

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national values instrumentally. Their past attitude towards religion turned out to be part of the reason for their negative valuation. At the same time, including the post-communists among “them” had two main consequences—it delegitimised them but, at the same time, strengthened their community of the past and sustained the foundations of their identity. That is why a statement that anti-communism was functional for postcommunist parties after 1989 does not seem excessive. What became similarly useful was their political isolation applied for many years as well as all forms of symbolic exclusion. Refusing to respect them and treating them as equal partners in public life sustained their need to remain together, gathered around the feeling of mistreatment. These actions maintained hierarchies of inequalities and created new ones in which the post-communists appeared as those discriminated against. The exclusion of post-communists generated further defensive strategies that sustained the community of “them”. Such an approach strengthened [in them] the need for loyalty towards the group, their own biography and shared past. Additionally, the group of voters loyally supporting the post-communists in elections was becoming solidified. Their loyalty in elections stemmed from having similar past experiences (Grabowska, 2003a, p. 164). The errors and omission of post-Solidarity governments contributed to the undermining of solidified valuing and moral aspects of the sides of the division. Some of their mottos, demands and promises turned out to be empty slogans. Additionally, sometimes the behaviour of post-Solidarity elites had little to do with Christian morality. Being aware of this was a traumatic experience for some people. Thus, the original dichotomy of good and evil related to the division was undermined. This is why it was claimed with regard to some of the elites originating from Solidarity and reforming the economy that they are alienated and make decisions that are impossible to understand and seek privileged places in the economy for themselves and their friends and families. In this narration, the postcommunist parties played a significant role and the scale of attacks from them exceeded all expectations. This is confirmed by the words of Donald Tusk from 1993: “We all watch the election spots of various parties on TV. The Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) is the most eager to show poverty in Poland: the dilapidated walls of houses in the countryside, ruins, beggars. It is interesting that we see two different realities. As for me, I know how many new buildings were built in Poland, how the shop displays look and that new shopping centres and hotels appeared” (Jeszcze, 1993, p. 3).

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The phenomena described above have put and strengthened a question mark in relation not only to inequalities in Polish People’s Republic, but also to the intentions of some of the neoliberal elites. The demands to slow down the rate of changes hit the foundations of the “us” vs “them” division and even “forced” taking an interest in the newly formed inequalities, including the economic ones. What appeared with growing intensity was the allegation of worsening the existing inequalities and creating new ones. The politicizations of the “us” vs “them” division took a social character to a growing extent and were gaining in significance with every passing year. These actions integrated even stronger the communities of post-communist voters, who had a positive opinion of the communist past. The scale of economic inequalities led to a part of society changing their view on the “us” vs “them” division. They noticed no differences between the sides of the division and were ready to cast their votes for parties and politicians who were not related to those two political identities. They started identifying “them” with anyone in power after 1989, which is why the “new them” appeared, originating from “us” (i.e., the “new nomenklatura”) (Wasilewski, 1990). The religious aspect of the division discussed was a sphere of its constant reconstruction and a basis for noticing other unjustified wrongs. In the Polish People’s Republic, inequalities manifested in discriminating against the religious and limiting the freedom of religious cults. They were also revealed in the form of the rejection of these exclusions and opposing the authorities who denied others their fundamental rights, as well as in seeking an advocate of society’s rights in the institutional Catholic Church. The matters of religious inequalities and lack of possibility to freely perform the religious practices co-created the “us” vs “them” division, and it was around them that its most important distances were created. The exclusion of religious people from public life was the most important symptom of religious discrimination. The experience of this discrimination mobilised a part of society to stand against the totalitarian order, and defeating that order meant a victory of religious freedom. Religious people stopped being second-class citizens and joined the public discourse in various roles. After 1989, the role of the Catholic Church in leading to the fall of communism was constantly reminded, without avoiding triumphalism or a sense of moral victory. The Catholic Church, guided by its mission, did 2015, not abandon spreading moral and ethical principles (Krzeminski, ´ p. 23) or exerting influence on the formation of certain spheres of the

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order (Wnuk-Lipinski, ´ 2003, p. 113), often going beyond the influence assigned to religion. It not only intended to regain the rights belonging to it, but also became involved in defending its own economic interests. A part of these actions was recovering real estate that the communists had illegally taken away from parishes and orders after 1945. It soon turned out that the Church became one of the most important beneficiaries of the change, as the other groups that were also deprived of their property had problems asserting their rights. At the same time, religious symbols were returned to the public sphere, the bond between the Polish nation and Catholicism was stressed and it was argued that religious people needed to participate in politics. The participation of some of the Catholic Church representatives in political activity resulted in accusations that the Solidarity elites favour Church hierarchs and even that some politicians were “on the Church’s leash”. The involvement of some hierarchs in building support for certain parties and speaking on political matters was criticised. Imposing a single world view and making oneself an instance that settles disputes regarding the model of humanity was met with opposition among a part of society. Many people realised that new discriminations were appearing and new anxieties increasing the distance between two groups—non-believers and people trying to sustain the Christian model of life—were becoming visible. The answer to such feelings in a part of society was dissatisfaction, the formation of antiChurch postulates and demands for limiting the influence of the Church, moving religion to a private sphere and creating a secular state. At first, they received little support from society, but it grew over time—first, among individuals with post-communist views and later among secular left originating from Solidarity and young voters. This is how the “us” vs “them” division became less sharp due to transformation within its previous inequalities, within the framework of the reconstruction of social consciousness. The redefining of the division entailed the presence of new discriminations. It was useful and made post-communists aware that they suffered wrongs as well. However, the distances regarding the religions and world view were changing their fundamental direction. The religious—or, more specifically, the Catholic Church representing them—were presented as a source of domination and bias. They were questioned as the positive heroes of collective imagination and called the source of new oppression. This happened as a result of a part of society starting to perceive the Church as a community bound together with greed and hypocrisy and demanding further

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privileges, often at the expense of principles that were the basis of its existence. Additionally, it was perceived as an institution filled with a sense of superiority and considering itself an oracle, imposing a particular way of thinking onto others and contributing to the exclusion of individuals. This resulted from the fact that, according to the opponents of the Church, it was impossible to debate with its hierarchs as their messages were of an unquestionable nature, going beyond the character of religious doctrine and becoming oppressive. Numerous individuals, not only non-believers, started to perceive this situation as a threat and discrimination. This sort of politicization of the division was not a sociotechnical strategy, then. It made political the increasingly visible social division having its foundations in the new order building period and resulting from noticeable wrongs committed contemporarily and ascribed to the influence of the Catholic Church and politicians sympathising with it. It was of no importance that a feeling of being discriminated against was initially present in a small number of people, as this number kept growing with further individuals realised the existing and arising limitations. The politicization of this division between the “non-believers” and “believers” was a protest of the minority against the majority, as well as a protest of the non-believers against the Church that expanded its influence. The new division confirmed that the differences and inequalities regarding religion (Szawiel, 2003a, p. 277) still remain universal bases for divisions and that politicizing these inequalities is in the interest of politicians. The existence of a large religious group next to non-believer groups or groups of other faiths does not form social divisions, even if the religious morality of majority groups forms political views, impacts the formation of political parties and defines the political discourse. The existence of religious communities translates to the political behaviour of some of the voters and the formation of the party system, even more than the class issues, according to some scholars (Grabowska, 2003b, p. 57). A division appears when different religious beliefs translate to relations between individuals and communities. The appearance of discrimination, depriving other groups of individuals of equal rights and refusing to respect them, is the beginning of divisions and may stem from actions of either majority or minority groups that try to impose their views on others. Thus, in order for social divisions of a religious character to appear, the discrimination of other views or beliefs and refusing dignity to individuals in view of their beliefs or lack thereof is “indispensable”. That is how some postcommunists, who had denied others the right to religious freedom before

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1989, later became the defenders of the freedom of others. On the other hand, the Catholic Church, which was a depositary of collective freedom, started to be perceived as a threat to its further expansion and as an entity limiting individual freedoms. The appearance of this division in the religious aspect was “facilitated” by the attempts at imposing a single system of values onto the whole of society. These attempts were considered a threat to people’s own choices, lifestyle models and visions of good and moral behaviour. In this process, neoliberal ideology played an important role, according to which there is no place in society for domination of religious or moral systems. Thus, it automatically perceived majority groups as a threat. A consequence of that was the attacks on “two strongly established elements: the socialist egalitarian experience and the Polish tradition, onto which that experience was superimposed in a sense” (Wolno´sc´ , 2015, pp. 63–64). Neoliberalism saw a threat in the Catholic axiology, and the believers saw it in the promotion of nihilism and relativism by some neoliberals and in considering all views equal. It turned out eventually that liberal democracy, focusing on the absolutisation of freedom, is not compatible with religion because of the latter’s strong and dominating identity- and culture-related aspect. The clash between the supporters of those two systems of values was becoming increasingly brutal with time. The Church decided that neoliberal values constituted a threat to its model of an individual’s life and, therefore, opposed the expansion of the neoliberal model—especially in the sphere of morality. In the new division, the wronged were those who felt threatened by the domination of the Catholic Church in public life. Now it was them who were filling the collective imagination. The category of privilege and domination was assigned to the institution of the Church, politicians supporting Christian morality and the believers themselves. This domination was considered the greatest threat to democracy and individual freedom. Demands to limit the influence of the Church appeared that included not only moving the matters of faith and religion to the 2003, p. 113), but also liberalising the private sphere (Wnuk-Lipinski, ´ Anti-Abortion Act and abandoning the Concordat Act. These postulates were complemented by the demands to limit the Church’s involvement in politics. Similarly to what happened during the communist period, some people formulated a claim that the Church was the root of all evil. Those and other demands stemmed from the domination of the Church and the appearance of examples of discrimination of values other than Christian

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ones. Some of the demands mentioned violated the right of believers to participate fully in public life, an example of which could be demanding to limit their right to spread their axiology and views in the public sphere. A social conflict was rising that was typical for developed or modern societies, and its radical character was exacerbated by the fact that some believers again felt being an object of disdain and experienced attempts at pushing them to the margin of social life. Numerous practices of repartition, presenting the existing injustice and discrimination in detail, were also employed instrumentally to politicize this division. One of the examples of that can be putting “enlightened Europeans” in opposition to “Catholic backwater”, the latter being synonymous with backwardness and clericalism. An alternative to this practice was putting “true Poles, patriots and Catholics” in opposition to “communists and traitors of the Fatherland serving the interests of Moscow”. Additionally, “those who wanted to serve Poland” were contrasted with “those who never thought of any service”, which translated to the moral dichotomy of: “clean hand Poland” vs “dirty hand Poland” (Pietrzyk-Zieniewicz & Zieniewicz, 1995, pp. 103, 118). There were many more practices displaying this division and partially referring to the past. After 1989, an attempt was also made to further politicize the political dichotomy of “left” vs “right”. The categories of “leftism” and “rightism” allowed the voters to understand better the matters of affiliation of parties and politicians. They were “employed at the level of both elites and 2017, p. 143). They entailed certain imaginations elections” (Lipinski, ´ and utilised simplifications such as the one that the free market characterises the right and the left always strived to minimise social inequalities (Karnowska, 2009, p. 139). The Polish experience proved that the “left” vs “right” dichotomy was employed for a long time to subordinate the political scene. Past experiences connected these categories with the “us” vs “them” division but, in practice, the two descriptions did not match in whole. It was not always possible to maintain the conviction that postSolidary is the right and the post-communists are the left. This is why the statement of Tadeusz Szawiel was so important—he underlined that in every instance, the “left” vs “right” pattern should be referred to as specific social problems and the existing party system (2003b, p. 222). Using the notions of “left” and “right” did not create a new social division, which does not mean, however, that they did not take over some of the meanings of inequalities, wrongs and the sense of injustice that

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were included in the “us” vs “them” division. Both categories were also taking advantage of the previously formed sense of superiority, intellectual advantage and disdain towards the opponents, as well as utilised the respect or prestige resources. The opposition between “left” and “right” was only a form of interpretation of the new party system and the connection with the dominance of the “us” vs “them” division. Such combinations resulted in the notion of the “left” being identified with pathological actions of communists, with an anti-Polish stance or social compassion, while the “right” was associated with patriotism, responsibility and also radicalism due to calls for lustration and decommunisation. Discrediting of the “left” continued for a long time by reminding of the achievement of “them” and presenting examples of the defence of interests and gravy trains of the post-communist communities. Similarly negative examples of actions, but stemming from contemporary times, were directed against right-wing communities. These political actions helped lead to the “left” vs “right” dichotomy no longer playing any major role later on. Because of that, some authors wrote about the decreasing adequacy of this pattern in relation to the Polish political scene (Dziemidok, 1998, p. 200), and the party system created was growing less consistent with this spatial opposition (Grabowska & Szawiel, 2003, p. 270). Significant weakening of the “left” vs “right” orientation as the axis of political rivalry and conflict in Poland was noticed, especially after 2005 (Górka, 2009, p. 58). The post-communist and post-Solidarity currents highlighted after 1989 did not reflect the new division anymore as they were not based on the new inequalities but only constituted politicization of the “us” vs “them” division. The previously formed identities had an impact on politics. It was the “society” vs “nomenklatura” division that shaped the political actions in conditions of the democracy and free market being created. This stemmed from the depth of this division, which translated to it being very useful, even in the form of a certain “security” for many politicians from both sides of the political scene who had benefited from this division for many years. “Making use” of remains after communism guaranteed the political scene actors’ stable functioning with a coherent and loyal voter base. It also limited the need to find other inequalities or forms of mobilising voters, thus condemning some political parties to stagnation in terms of the programme. It meant creating politics solely based on attitude towards the Polish People’s Republic (Wojtaszczyk, 1995, p. 90). That is why it is justified to claim that “the

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political conflicts present in Poland in the early 1990s can be divided, according to their source, into two main categories: those having their source in the former system and those that became a side effect of the system change” (Drzonek, 2001, p. 34).

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CHAPTER 5

Consequences of the Second Experiment: The “Winners”–“Losers” Division

A New Register of Wrongs and Transformation of the Social Structure The last decade of the twentieth century was a traumatic experience for a large part of society and the one that followed was not much better. The necessity of creating a free market, expending private ownership and continuing the economic reform was still promoted. The conviction that the model of neoliberal changes implemented after 1989 was the only option was dominant, even though the declared objective of the transformation had not been reached. Increasingly often, people had an impression that it was not about reaching any objective, but continuing changes infinitely. For the same reason, many individuals were growing disappointed with the changes. At the same time, the dogma of “no alternatives to neoliberalism” faltered, and new competing solutions appeared—an example of which is the sustainable growth concept. In the second half of the 2010s, there was an influx of politicians claiming that the objective of the transformation had been reached and spreading positive definitions of contemporary times. In 2015, they even claimed that it was a “golden age” (Borowiec, 2016, pp. 186–219). Such and similar opinions were typical of groups in power and obtained support from those voters doing well in the new reality. The order transformation provided certain chances that some individuals effectively took advantage of. It turned out that it was not only the privileged starting conditions © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 P. Borowiec, The Politicization of Social Divisions in Post-War Poland, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-26530-3_5

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that created “satisfying positions” in the economic order. However, the change made also had—as Maria Jarosz wrote—“a dark side to it” (Jarosz, 2010, p. 9). This “dark side” coincided with both expected and unexpected negative socio-economic consequences of rebuilding capitalism. Only a few people remembered the mechanisms of self-enfranchisement of the nomenklatura with the use of joint national property, which have already been mentioned in this book. Further discontentment was caused by entirely unjustified cases of certain minority groups—lawyers, bailiffs, judges, notaries or doctors—“elbowing their way through”. The bitterness was caused by these groups’ impunity and, frequently, audacity and conviction of having power and privilege at their disposal—which they expressed without second thoughts. The economic system created was described perfectly by Tadeusz Klementewicz: “In the global division of labour, we became an economy of sub-suppliers, experts at tightening the screws. Our speciality is cheap labour and a large internal market for foreign guests. Everything for the business: advantageous conditions for employing workers and a regressive fiscal system; the Polish neoliberal Leviathan has provided businessmen with major possibilities of labour cost reduction” (2019). Unemployment was driving the demand for work, which led to minimisation of its costs. The exploitation present in it was defined positively as “low labour costs”. At the basis of this exploitation was the unfortunate leap into capitalism using the method of original capital accumulation, the expression of which was mainly the so-called “transformation recession”. There was a shift of income and wealth from the poor to the rich (Kowalik, 2010, p. 168). Such a creation of inequalities automatically deprived a large part of society of capital, condemned it to exclusion and limited its development possibilities. A recurring practice was to change people’s employment basis to so-called “junk contracts” that employ people illegally or offer salaries at the level of biological existence (PAP, 2020). The strategy of “low labour costs” was not invented by critics of the neoliberal change for media purposes, but an experience of millions of employees. The above solutions constituted a part of the mechanism intended for the accumulation of capital. They were appreciated and evaluated positively by subsequent cabinets, irrespective of their ideological image or social justice principles adopted. Despite criticism of this development paradigm, it was sustained for over two decades as it brought benefits, although only to a part of society—including businesspeople and foreign

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investors. Increasing salaries was not recommended as it would supposedly lead to inhibition of economic growth. This was the caricatural form taken by some of the implemented market solutions, and they were what the whole economic system was built on. The model of development adopted in 1989 and the international economic conditions had a decisive impact on the economic order created, leading to the creation of a peripheral economy. The centralist supervision was gradually replaced by the “invisible hand of the market”, which—for many years—remained a “political hand” (Krasnod˛ebski, 2005, p. 93). The demands for changing the policy were not receiving a clear advantage in society in view of the enduring domination of the neoliberal ideology. This was confirmed by the privatisation of everything in the name of the neoliberal dogma. Privatisation encompassed healthcare and even municipal enterprises providing access to goods such as potable water or heating. This meant the privatisation of “public problems” ˙ 2016, pp. 103–105). The attempts to stop these actions failed, (Zuk, showing even more explicitly the presence of strong ideological blocks. The media institutions of the new order sustained the legitimisation of the relations created. Media provided information, opinions, interpretations and slogans beneficial to the order. The dominance so built limited the possibilities of the alternative ideas of justice “reaching” the shared consciousness. However, the majority of society considered neoliberalism an ideology imposed by the elites and not resulting from society’s beliefs (Wróbel, 2010, pp. 23–29). In the interpretation of changes so imposed, it was easy to believe that one is responsible for their own misery and that one became a client of changes. A sense of shame appeared, and the lack of participation in the division of goods confirmed the social uselessness. Those with a low level of education were told they were “unnecessary” within the whole order. Both the unemployed and those who remained employed at the cost of feeling humiliated realised their own dependency, helplessness and harmlessness. The lack of hope was participated by those who—according to the emerging opinion—did not contribute to the creation of wealth. It seems that the breakthrough moment that made people realise the existence of permanent subordination was the instrumental actions of the government aiming at increasing the retirement age—which were incompatible not only with their declarations during elections but also with society’s sense of justice. The increase in retirement age for blue-collar workers receiving the minimum wage meant condemning them to work

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until death and that many individuals would never receive their retirement pensions. In the eyes of a large part of society, such actions confirmed the pathology of the system formed. During the first two decades of changes, there were no bases for the realisation of post-materialistic values by individuals. What the majority experienced instead was a fight for biological survival. The assumption that “the dawn of free market logic and dominance of competition in public life were supposed to—according to the assumptions of economic liberals—result in the diversity of not only the consumption offers, but also ideas, lifestyles, religions, political concepts and, finally, cultural ˙ ˙ 2014, p. 9) found no confirmation. The observamodels” (Zuk & Zuk, tion of the free market showed the nature of individuals was often exceptionally predatory. It was easy to notice disconcerting egoistic behaviour, dominated by care only for oneself or one’s closest family and friends. The brutal elimination of competition was terrifying. The aspirations awakened released previously unobserved layers of greed and baseness. Equally horrifying was the everyday experience of unkindness, suspicion, aggression, lack of cooperation, brutalisation of manners and cult of strength and poorly understood resourcefulness and cleverness (Mokrzycki, 2000, p. 23). Some characteristics that were quickly becoming visible were primitive consumerism (Kozarzewski, 2010, p. 162) or individualism, constituting a rebound reaction after the previous shortage of goods. What turned out to be a hazard was the neoliberal turbocapitalism. The homo oeconomicus has triumphed (Le´sniewicz, 2019). Examples of ostentatious consumption led to the decline of previously cultivated family ties. Wealth and poverty started dividing the families, showing many individuals the hierarchies of superiority and inferiority among their close ones. Thus, the same family relations that earlier constituted a source of security became dehumanised. The employee experience of unfair relations at work, humiliation and exploitation created a sense of permanent injustice. A large part of society considered the order existing alien as if created for certain small groups only. This was confirmed by examples of political control over economic resources, consisting of the distribution of capital among the people and groups close to politicians. This made many individuals certain that politics was the main path leading to goods, just as it was before 1989. The “simplified” access to goods stemmed from participating in politics, and the election games—including compromises—preceded the distribution of more than just positions in the state apparatus. The top-down method

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of building the market meant releasing a lot of economic power into the hands of politicians, thus privileging them. Such opinions were not isolated but confirmed by incoming information on abuse during unfair privatisation and examples of pathological relations between business and politics. The examples of pathologies present in the discourse formed a negative attitude of a significant part of society towards subsequent cabinets and built distance between the government and society. The negative opinions on political elites and subsequent cabinets stemmed not only from observing their achievements or omissions. They resulted from subjective evaluation of one’s own situation and the effectiveness at adjusting to the order created and finding one’s place in it. Outside of the sphere of values, which was of great importance, economic interest became the decisive factor after 1989. The fact that political elites designed and implemented economic solutions that were supposed to improve the lives of everyone but eventually turned out beneficial only to specific groups and individuals raised growing objections. The distrust towards political elites confirmed that the initial way of thinking—full of faith and optimism—ceased to exist. The lack of sense of security and deprivation of dignity and opportunities caused severe anxiety and concern among a part of society. The gap between the expected living standard and the possibilities of achieving it was growing. Stating that “social inequalities are a natural and common phenomenon, similarly to the sense of injustice accompanying them” (Kinowska, 2010, p. 301) was not a description, but rather a form of justification for the order built. However, in the case of the neoliberal experiment, one of the objectives was to create economic differences (i.e., deepen the inequalities). Once the top-down communist redistribution of resources was rejected and the economy was switched to spontaneous and uncontrolled actions, inequalities started growing at a fast rate. Sociologists noticed these tendencies. They were confirmed by all the economic and social indicators—especially at the beginning of the twenty-first century (Sadowski, 2009). The opulence with a tendency to ostentatiousness was clearly visible, while destitution, poverty, marginalisation and exclusion were “in hiding”. Opinions appeared that an order that pauperises millions of people excludes them from benefits and pushes them to the margin cannot be just. The level of destitution and poverty could arouse terror despite problems with establishing reliable data regarding social differentiations (Panek, 2011, pp. 11–22). In the first decade of the twenty-first century,

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nearly one-third of society lived in poverty. In October 2008, 7.8% of households out of 13.2 million (i.e., about a million) lived in extreme poverty (Danecka, 2008, p. 109). Other data showed that nearly half of the population lived at the level of social minimum, at least two million children were living in poverty (Sadowski, 2010, p. 40). At the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century, Polish inequalities expressed using the Gini coefficient were ranked second highest among EU member states (Kowalik, 2010, p. 168). In 2019, the economy was characterised as follows: “According to the Central Statistical Office (GUS), 1.5 million people work under civil law contracts, 1.1 million are self-employed and 3 million work under fixed-term employment contracts. These people earn 30% less than their peers employed under permanent employment contracts. Add to this the unpaid or low-paid internships and hundreds of thousands of people trying to make ends meet while working in the grey market. It is not surprising that 1.5 million Poles are the working poor who barely exceed the minimum wage” (Klementewicz, 2019). It was increasingly frequent that poverty was experienced by large families and those that included pensioners (Danecka, 2008, p. 113). At the same time, it was usually rural areas in the eastern provinces (Gilejko, 2001, pp. 20–21) that were affected by poverty and exclusion (Kozarzewski, 2010, p. 159). In these places, whole families, whose members had been unemployed for months or years, were condemned to exclusion. According to the Central Statistical Office (GUS), in 2005, “among the households with at least one unemployed person, the rate of extreme poverty was about 27% (9% in families without anyone unemployed)” (Danecka, 2008, p. 115). The tendencies listed had been “enriched”, as confirmed by an article from the Gazeta Wyborcza daily entitled “What we are. Polish society after 12 years of transformation” (Polish: Jacy jeste´smy. Społeczenstwo ´ polskie po 12 latach transformacji) prepared based on a census. That summary, made on the basis of data ranging back to 1988, showed a society with an increased number of older people, including pensioners, a growing phenomenon of loneliness, an increase in the percentage of people dependent on “another person”, with a simultaneous decrease in the percentage of people “making a living from their own work” (Gilejko, 2008, p. 86). The range of stratifications was growing, as confirmed by studies. According to data from the Centre for Public Opinion Research (CBOS) from 2003, 90% of the people surveyed believed that the differences between the rich and the poor in Poland were excessive (Stosunek, 2003).

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In 2017, the same answer to the same question was provided by 86% of the surveyed (Stosunek, 2017). The assessment of own consumption capabilities was also puzzling. In 2000, over half of the surveyed believed that they cannot meet their fundamental needs, and only every 1 in 19 declares that the income achieved in their household enables them to live at a satisfactory level (Zaborowski, 2014, p. 347). Seven years later, the surveys of CBOS suggested that nearly 40% of the surveyed believed that as much as 50% of Polish society lived in poverty (Opinie, 2007). The rise in the unemployment rate did not slow down in the twentyfirst century. The data that regarded the year 2000 specifically can be considered “quite alarming” (Zaborowski, 2014, pp. 331–332). The peak was reached in 2001 when the overall unemployment rate exceeded 20% and, in some regions, it was even above 30% (Sadowski, 2010, p. 38). According to the census of 2002, the number of unemployed was even higher than that resulting from official communications. It amounted to 3.5 million people, while the unemployment rate was 21.2% (Gilejko, 2008, p. 87). The worst situation was experienced by those with long-lasting unemployment, who remained without work for over 12 months (Danecka, 2008, pp. 115–116). However, structural unemployment decreased, and the number of people remaining without work for over three years was on the decrease, too. The situation of women in the labour market was particularly difficult (Firlit-Fesnak, 2008, p. 13). Long-term unemployment was also more frequent among women. What turned out to be the “rescue” for the unemployment rates was the mass work emigration of young people, especially after the EU member states opened their borders to Polish workers. In this manner, the “surplus employees on the job market” were pushed beyond the order that had been unable to reduce unemployment for over 15 years. The neoliberal promise that the appearance of the free market would lead to an improved standard of living for the whole society was not fulfilled. It turned out that economic differentiation is ineffective in fighting destitution, as it aggravates rather than eliminates it, expanding 2008, p. 282). At first, it was the marginalised group (Wnuk-Lipinski, ´ believed that this was an element of a healing process; but later, it turned out that millions of people became impoverished, with only a small part of society experiencing an improvement in their situation. At the same time, the groups benefiting from it noticed, together with the increase in criticism of the free market created, a threat to the unemployed. That is why some of the beneficiaries “hardened their standing” and defended

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the existing solutions, depreciating at the same time anyone who dared criticise the new order. This is how populists “made themselves heard”, interfering with neoliberals’ joy from the policy implemented as it turned out that they were also an effect of the neoliberal way of governing. This process was described perfectly by Edmund Wnuk-Lipinski—who ´ observed “society in the field”. “Small towns will speak during the coming elections. The more their problems are ignored and pushed to the margin by politicians, the greater the probability that their small-town electorate will withdraw its support for the system changes and turn towards alternative political offers—even if that would mean searching for a new utopia” (2003, p. 125). Inequalities were presented using economic resources determining the possibilities of acquiring and accumulating other goods. It turned out that people’s education and professional standing increasingly determine 1998, p. 13). When the level of financial rewards obtained (Domanski, ´ writing about the social structure change processes, Andrzej Rychard underlined three differentiating factors: market regulation, non-market regulation and status of employee and employer (2005, p. 117). Building a new structure consisted of creating inequalities within the scope of disposal of resources necessary for existence, resulting from access to work. The economic differentiation translated to difficulties with clearly defining the structure’s shape, which was confirmed by the research conducted. In 2005, scholars presented the social structure using nine “class categories” (Słomczynski ´ & Janicka, 2005, p. 163). A more developed image of it was presented by Juliusz Gardawski, who applied the criterion of attitude towards productive forces and use of the national property (2001a, pp. 51–52). Next to the groups traditional for the Polish structure (i.e., farm owners and workers), there also appeared those formed by the “market transformation”—situated in the middle of the social structure, an example of which can be the small business or the managers, usually included among the middle class. The ideological and political pressure influenced the formation of the middle class. The expansion of this “returning class” (Gardawski, 2001b, p. 48) was one of the expected indicators of structural changes. Its appearance was supposed to “approximate” the Polish structure towards that of societies with a market economy. The middle class was formed by people from the “old nomenklatura” and, later, its composition was expanded with the so-called “new nomenklatura” (i.e., businesspeople related to

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subsequent cabinets or political parties after 1989) (Gilejko, 2010, p. 24). It was claimed that these groups were creating the phenomenon of political capitalism. At the same time, some of these people (such as owners of large companies) quickly entered the higher class. It is necessary to mention that the majority of the middle class was formed by people who did not take advantage of the privileges stemming from the previous order or later political acquaintances. The changes resulted in a systematic increase in the number of professional categories related to having high qualifications and exercising authority in the organisational structure. The number of people working on their own account, sole proprietors and businesspeople employing a small number of workers was growing. The most popular approach was recognising the middle class according to the income achieved. The basis for that was income per household member (net income) obtained from all sources by all the household members. According to the Klasa ´srednia w Polsce report of 1992, 41.3% of the population was optimistically included among the middle class, and in 2016—34.3%. Twenty years later, in 2019, the population of the middle class was optimistically estimated to amount to 11–12 million people (Kukołowicz, 2019). According to the studies of 2020, as much as 77% of the people surveyed considered themselves middle class (Klasa 2020). nizsza, ˙ At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the working class employed in the large industry constituted 22.4% of all professionally active citizens (Gilejko, 2010, p. 33), but, in spite of that, it was commonly considered “the greatest loser” concerning the changes. The condition of contemporary public life confirmed that the people of labour lost influence on the course of events—on the further course of the transformation. The workers directed their resentment against the politicians, as confirmed by their distrust towards political parties (as much as 75% of workers declared distrust towards them) and lack of attachment to any party (declared by 90% of them) (Łazarz, 2003). The exclusion of workers translated to their passiveness and withdrawal. Particularly bitter were those who experienced long-term unemployment and were forced to undergo retraining or change their jobs multiple times. At the same time, there was a growing number of workers employed in small and medium enterprises in the private sector, which meant “degradation of their professional status—including their earnings, working conditions and labour rights, including the right to associate” (Gilejko, 2008, p. 73). In view of the existing unemployment, such companies not only offered

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low salaries but also forced employees to work in a way that was against the provisions of the labour code (Gilejko, 2001, p. 22). Small businesses were characterised by limiting employee rights, including blocking the formation of labour unions. Studies showed that workers had a sense of being exploited excessively and that their work was mainly the source of wealth for company owners. They also noticed the growing distance between them and the enterprise owners (Gardawski, 2001b, p. 149). The changes in the agricultural structure took place even before Poland joined the European Union, and later they only got more intensive. According to the statistics, in 2005, there was 14.25% of employers and self-employed workers in agriculture, while this number was 24.3% ten years earlier. During that period, there was an increase in the number of large farms with an acreage of over 20 ha (Podedworna, 2006, p. 222). The processes mentioned above led to further internal differentiations, stratification among farmers and poor and rich farmers becoming more distinguishable. The situation of the countryside formed at the beginning of the twenty-first century corresponded neither to the expectations of the free market proponents nor the farmers themselves. However, the first symptoms of improvement appeared. This resulted from the growing knowledge about the agricultural market of the European Union. The functioning of the European agricultural market weakened the radical expectations of the neoliberals towards changing the structure of the Polish countryside. The subsidies to agricultural production received raised the hopes of the farmers and provided a basis for thinking that competing with European produce would take place on equal terms. It seemed that the “stream” of funds directed to agriculture could lead to the transformation and modernisation of farms and creating new jobs around agricultural production. Non-profitable farms were also supposed to receive a chance as subsidies were intended to help them change the form of their activity and focus on agritourism. Hopes appeared for greater participation of farmers in maintaining order, as well as opinions treating the countryside as a “deadweight” which was becoming a thing of the past (Fedyszak-Radziejowska, 1995, p. 181).

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Division of the Time of Economic Differentiation: “Winners”–“Losers” The observation of processes taking place and analysis of changes on the plane of gains or losses led many individuals to employ a dichotomous pattern to describe them. These realised losses and the differences noticed in goods resources turned out to be as a result of the comparison made, a path towards the formation of divisions. Being employed influenced that first and foremost. Both the common everyday language and the scientific publications mentioned processes in which “those ‘winning’ were the people who turned out best prepared to join the market economy in view of their education, qualifications, industriousness, overall dynamism in life and age” (Hausner & Marody, 1999, p. 128). On the other side were those who lacked those characteristics. This is how the division into “losers” and “beneficiaries of change”—something that “was born” among individuals—was reinforced in social consciousness. There were even references to the existence of two completely different classes. The notions of “losing” and “gaining” serving the general description of the basic differences were becoming solidified and fundamental for describing the changes taking place. It was underlined frequently in the discourse that unemployment is an experience that needs to be lived through, not a tragedy. Despite that, it was exactly the unemployed who first ended up in the category of “losers”, followed by those permanently deprived of employment and all those who experienced poverty and destitution. In the scientific discourse, they were referred to as the “costs of changes” or “structural victims 2008, p. 271). The first to be of the transformation” (Wnuk-Lipinski, ´ included among “gainers” were the owners of economic resources, who took advantage of the so-called “transformation pension” stemming from being in power, including from belonging to either old or new nomenklatura (Gilejko, 2008, p. 74). The group of winners also included all those who had capital at their disposal. It also included both the businesspeople and those who acquired their capital unfairly. Among the “gainers”, others included were the political elites and all the groups in power, irrespective of their ideological image. The connections between the spheres of economy and politics generated numerous scandals, thus sustaining the conviction that the authority defines economic resources. With time, the initial division into “losers” and “gainers” turned increasingly often into a permanent description. It was already underlined prior

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to 2005 that society can be defined using the “solidarity”–“liberalism” opposition (Cze´snik & Kotnarowski, 2011, p. 132). There was a clear emergence of those who won and lost in the change process. Additionally, the former stopped caring about the fate of those losing and began despising them, considering themselves exceptional and drawing that conclusion from the fact of managing to find their place in the economic order created. The satisfaction and pride stemming from the feeling of advantage were combined with the humiliation of others. The processes described turned out to be permanent, and the “losers” were growing convinced that their fate would never change. The “losers”–“winners” opposition became an understandable social description of the consequences of the change implemented. It underlined the significance of the competition for economic goods for interpreting reality. It also announced that the competition had already taken place, the final decisions had already been made and the contemporary situation of many individuals and groups could not change further. Meanwhile, the competition continued. Few individuals decided to withdraw from it, while many others became certain that they joined it without having any chance of winning it. It turned out that the spatial distribution of both these communities, related to specific cities or regions, was decisive for the result of the competition taking place, which more strongly limited some people’s faith in victory. In fact, a lot of people were condemned to lose as a result of it. The depth of the economic differences noticed between the inhabitants of individual regions either limited or increased the chances of success. The lack of complete knowledge of financial inequalities turned out to be useful to those benefiting from the change (Jasiecki, 2010, p. 75), who could keep increasing their advantage without any major obstacles. It led to sustaining faith in the sense of participation in further competition and reduced the tendency to reject participation in the order. The negative consequences for competition participants also stemmed from it being extended, practically ad infinitum. Such a situation meant functioning in constantly changing conditions without any feeling of stability. The consequences of the appearance of “winners” and “losers” were visible on the structural plane. The nearly economically homogeneous structure was changing. The level of wealth had the greatest impact on the individuals growing apart. This growing distance was first defined by the property owned and then other factors became more visible (such as education or income). The number of differences was increasing over

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time and, while not all of them coincided with the economic aspect, they undoubtedly showed the presence and deepening of an opposing relation within the structure, transforming into a conflict having a “total character” (Siewierski, 2001, p. 61). The processes taking place did not immediately form noticeable and permanent differences concerning the changes. Representatives of all social groups were on both sides of the social division, which featured both supporters and opponents of the change (Hausner & Marody, 1999, p. 129). The attitude towards the past and the identification with either post-communist or post-Solidarity communities did not overlap with the social maps of “losers” and “winners”. They were recruited from all the political and ideological camps. Any attempts at defining more precisely the composition of both sides—the “losing” one and the “winning” one—are not easy. The researchers employed various tools and methodologies to that end. The evaluations depended not only on the time in which they were performed but also on the intentions of the evaluator, their political preferences, the concept of justice supported, one’s vision of good life, etc. The attempts at describing the processes taking place and the quantitative composition of both sides were also taken by politicians or journalists who participated in the discourse themselves. Jacek Kuron, ´ a symbol of fighting poverty and unemployment in the 1990s, claimed that over 40% of society needed to be counted among “losers” and that only a few people were the privilege beneficiaries of the change process. Meanwhile, according to Dariusz Filar, the changes brought objective losses to about 33% of society, while about 17% profited from them (Gilejko, 2001, pp. 20–21). The comparison of stratification between 1989 and 1995 allowed noticing changes in the financial standing of many socio-professional groups. The presence of four such groups was noticed, defined as follows: “high income—gaining”, “low income—losing”, “medium income— losing” and “low income—gaining”. Those four categories were intended to describe the wealthiness transformation process taking place. That pattern was created based on evaluations and declarations of the people surveyed and therefore did not reflect the objective situation. An example of that is the last group, consisting mainly of pensioners, reportedly gaining at the time (Beskid, 1999, pp. 16–19). The pattern showed only the tendencies appearing. Further studies over successes and failures of the transformation, regarding the system change taking place during the years 1988–2000, were conducted using factor-based analysis employing

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three variables—income per person in the household, living standard of the household and financial capabilities of the family—all of which showed five inseparable categories of social positioning of individuals in 2000. They were as follows: the category of “losers”, situated the lowest and constituting 14.7% of the sample; the category of “non-winners”, constituting 45%; the category of “non-losers” encompassing 33%; the category of “winners” encompassing 15.2% of the sample and, finally, the category of “superwinners”, which encompassed 5.1% and included the most wealthy respondents. The individuals from the “losers” category were in a situation of threat to their biological basics of existence. The second category encompassed people with drastically reduced capabilities to satisfy their basic needs. The individuals in the third category achieved the level that satisfied their basic needs. The fourth category encompassed individuals who found their place in the new reality. The individuals in the last category, the “superwinners”, lived at a level that the other ones could only dream of (Zaborowski, 2014, pp. 332–333). The results confirmed that the division into the poor and the rich, the “losers” and the “winners”, was consolidating. Attempts were also made to define the composition of both sides using listing the elements of constituent groups, either professional or territorial. In the studies, the groups included most often among the “victims of the transformation” were the farmers, farmer-workers and unqualified workers (Zaborowski, 2014, p. 335). When talking about the “losers”, references were made to territorial factors, disproportions and developmental differences between the rural and urban areas. The economic data confirmed the stagnation of Poland’s eastern regions, where the agricultural economy had a high share. It also showed that unequal development resulted from the transformation as well, not only from actions and omissions during the communist period. The disproportions between major cities and the rest of the country were visible, and those cities dominated with regard to income (Kozak, 2010, p. 45). This process of unequal experience of development was defined perfectly by Tadeusz Klementewicz, who wrote that “the wealth generated stopped trickling down” (2019). Thus, the fundamental conditions of the agreement concluded between society and the liberal elites, saying that everyone would benefit from the transformation, were undermined. The first to “enter” the group of “winners” were the people who had capital at their disposal, the power elites, including both the highlevel nomenklatura and the people originating from Solidarity. These

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groups had “the positional and personal resources—particularly useful in system transformation conditions—greater than any other social groups at their disposal” (Jasiecki, 2002, p. 8). The community of the “winners” was defined not only by social researchers or politicians. The society included the “new nomenklatura”—i.e., the individuals who were assigned management positions through political involvement— who established their own private companies and took advantage of the network of contacts and access to goods developed as a result of their political activity. In their case, a major role was played by contacts, favours or possibilities of returning these (Jarosz, 2004, p. 46). The free market implemented created chances for entering the group of “winners” not only to those individuals who had resources in the form of political connections or past capital. The composition of the “winners” also included the individuals who achieved success through their own work, industriousness or an original business idea. Success appeared after over a dozen years of hard, intensive work that employed education, skills, qualification and the ability to sense the needs of society and discover gaps in the free market. What was decisive was often young age, openness towards the world, establishing international collaboration and knowledge of foreign languages. With time, the “winners” became interested in maintaining and stabilising the order that had been formed. The conviction that the winners (i.e., also the middle class) would become its supporters gained confirmation. Stabilisation was also necessary to enable the “winners” to take advantage of the goods they achieved and indulge in consumption they felt they deserved. They considered that they earned those goods and claimed that it happened according to fair rules of the market and according to the competition standards adopted, even if those standards deviated from the moral principles. For these reasons, they did not intend to hide their consumption or limit it. These tendencies gained confirmation not only in the public discourse but also in the course and results of all the parliamentary and presidential elections in the twenty-first century (Markowski et al., 2015). The division between the “losers” and the “winners” constituted an object of uncountable politicizations. Their main form was the opposition against the increasing inequalities and the attempts at concealing them. However, references were usually made to this division, thus politicizing in different ways the dichotomy of transformation “gainers” and “losers”. An example of such a repartition practice was underlining the

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existence of “two Polands”, and the most famous one was the opposition between “Poland B” and “Poland A” (K˛eska, 2008, p. 51). However, subsequent politicizations featured spatial or regional references that were characterised specifically. In these oppositions, the dominant aspects were economic and cultural. References to different attitudes and systems of values also appeared. The political differences, recalled during an analysis of election results, were a significant factor. This aspect of the division was referred to by the comments of Anna Giza-Poleszczuk regarding the phenomenon of the “two-vector nature”, consisting of the fact that two aspects of Poland were emerging. On the one hand, “a modern, cosmopolitan, well-earning and world-travelling Poland. On the other— the increasingly visible Poland lagging behind: traditional, rural, and marginalised” (2004, p. 265). Andrzej Rychard, in his book entitled Polska jedna czy wiele?, presented his own perspectives on the division functioning on different planes (2005, pp. 109–142). They were all created as a result of the transformation of the “us” vs “them” and the “losers” vs “winners” divisions, although it was hard to notice some of them in society. The divisions listed became the basis for the intensive creation of repartition practices. Here it is possible to list oppositions such as “Solidarity’s Poland”–“post-communist Poland” (Hall, 1996), “enlightened Poland”– “backwater Poland” (Bogucka, 1997) or “open Poland”–“closed Poland” (Pycha, 2015, p. 14). In 2015, it was suggested that “Poland broke into two halves, lordly and plebeian, content and wronged, modern and traditional” (Kalukin, 2015, p. 8). The dichotomy of “true Poles” vs “false Poles” fitted the same convention. The repartition practices referring to “two Polands” were often employed due to how easy it was to create them and prove their effectiveness. The sociological studies started to feature attempts at breaking this discursive two-way division and going beyond its consequences. The pattern presenting the existence of “multiple Polands” was suggested by Mirosława Marody. According to her, it was possible to distinguish “three Polands”, differing in terms of the method of obtaining income. The first one was the “capital Poland”, where income was obtained according to the market logic. The second one was “state-employed Poland”, where income originated from jobs assigned by the state. And the third one was “Poland on benefits”, where the income originated from various benefits offered by the state (1999).

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The “us” vs “them” division was still present and continued to be politicized even in the twenty-first century. It allowed the creation of definitions of the time of transformation that underlined the feeling of having been wronged that was still present in many individuals. The constant existence of the “us” vs “them” division was confirmed by the results of scientific research. An example of that is the research carried out in 2007 (K˛eska, 2008, p. 80). The party sustaining, generating and maintaining this division in the social consciousness was society standing before the said “them”. The people surveyed often determined the composition of “them” using “discursive suggestions” of politicians. It turned out that “them” still included a part of the old nomenklatura—the one that achieved political and economic success. Thus, even though the division was based on the communist past, it did not define the parties solely in the categories of the former system but also based on new inequalities, differences in income and disposal of goods. Such a recognition of the division was solidified due to a negative evaluation of the social reality and dissatisfaction with the condition of the state. The disappointment with the state, the functioning of administration and public offices and the attitude of the public sector employees towards citizens made many individuals aware of the continued existence of “them”. The ineffectiveness of the state and the administration was noticed, as well as the lack of responsibility for the common good and the politicians’ interest being limited only to guarding their own interests. These pathologies not only delegitimised the ruling elites and increased the frustration of the losing groups and the sense of threat, but also maintained authentic polarisation, including the transformed “us” vs “them” division. For a part of Polish society, the promise of satisfaction of needs was fulfilled and some were also able to satisfy their non-material needs. Any satisfaction of needs or the lack thereof solidified the significance of the “losers” vs “winners” division. The former were enclosed in a world of fight for material survival, while the latter—especially their children— could focus on new experiences, thus manifesting their new advantages. In some people, they transformed into unrestrained consumption. On the other hand, others did not even dream of consumption as their lives consisted of fighting for elementary existence. Being excluded from consumption was painful, especially when a part of society experienced full “freedom of consumption”, i.e., a specific power available to the few

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˙ ˙ people having high income at their disposal (Zuk & Zuk, 2014, p. 10). In such conditions, the feeling of being a “loser” was becoming exacerbated. The dream of consumption led many individuals to intensify their action to increase their available funds. What became a reality were the claims of free market enthusiasts regarding material aspirations as “growth-driving mechanisms”. On the other hand, costs at the personality level appeared in the form of imperfectly satisfied consumption aspirations. This was particularly visible at the level of existing relations, many of which became transformed. Those originating from communist times rarely remained and most changed under the influence of the free market rules. In social relations, the decisive role started to be played by the material aspect. People who were not achieving success separated themselves from others, limited relations and started believing that the “loser” tag functioning in the public discourse could be justified in their case. The lack of participation in the “consumption show” (Greda, 2012, p. 87) generated a feeling of inferiority and being handicapped, as well as limited chances for adopting new identities. Instead of bringing equality for all, as assumed, consumption deepened the sense of injustice in people. Instead of making everyone similar, it made people experience differences in the disposal of goods. The differentiation of society was strengthened through media and symbolic measures (Zagórski & Strzeszewski, 2000). Mass culture did this, the new patterns of cynical consumption and the dominant media that also dealt with the “seduction” of consumers (Ziółkowski, 2006, p. 156). The anxiety and sense of injustice, due to unsatisfied consumption needs, were aggravated by producers of individual goods who left no choices to individuals in their advertisements. They convinced people that purchasing their products would make their dreams of happiness come true. They said that buying a specific product would be a conscious choice, fitting an individual into the current trends and showing support for its modernity and progress. It was supposed to provide safety, return health, increase the chances of finding a partner desired and protect against death, disease and other unpleasant events. But not only those above-listed forms of narration caused a sense of unfulfillment and bitterness and generated anxiety (Pieszek, 2012, p. 117). Such conditions also came as a surprise since the anxiety was supposed to be forever forgotten together with the fall of communism.

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The “Solidary”–“Liberal” Practice as a Confirmation of the Continuity of Divisions The economic inequalities between the “losers” and the “winners” were often politicized in political programmes and discourse. A part of these processes were also specific project of social and support activities. The polarisation was complemented by negative opinions on the economic changes and criticism of the consequences of the transformation carried out. Thus, the negative attitude of some voters towards inequalities and neoliberal mechanisms was not a temporary creation, but had existed in the discourse since 1989 (Obacz, 2018, p. 179) and constituted an element of consciousness of a significant part of society (Krzeminski, ´ 2005, p. 20). During the periods between elections, the inequalities were battled using various solutions limiting certain consequences of the reforms. These projects’ effectiveness and capacity for reducing inequalities turned out to be rather limited, as shown by the above-presented data regarding growing economic differences. Besides, the solutions implemented were often purely propagandist and only pretended to solve problems while not eliminating the discriminations present. It was a persistent and fundamental part of the dominant order, built around specific meritocracy and total rejection of ideas of redistribution, interventionism, statism or extensive social welfare system. What surprised society was the fact that the social policy was not carried out by the post-communist cabinets that referred to social sensibility. For these reasons, the post-communists were associated with neoliberals and accused of abandoning the leftwing programme, adopting the neoliberal ideology and participating in forming the “unjust and corrupting order of the Third Polish Republic” 2005). (Krzeminski, ´ To increase the chances of introducing solutions based on redistributive justice, repartitions were also employed that underlined the oppression of neoliberal hierarchies and vertical systems filled with aversion towards other individuals that refused to grant them dignity due to them not having basic goods at their disposal. The best-known repartitions reflecting these hierarchies were two dichotomies: “Fourth Polish Republic”–“Third Polish Republic” (Szalkiewicz, 2007, pp. 19–21) and “solidary Poland”–“liberal Poland”. The former focused on injustices resulting from the weakness of the state and the dominance of systems that took control over it. It played a significant role in the election

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´ campaigns (Spiewak, 2010, p. 22) that led to the formation of the cabinet and the office of the president being taken by Lech Kaczynski ´ in 2005. It focused more on social and economic inequalities. Both these dichotomies were similar, although they referred to different aspects of the “losers” vs “winner” division. A confirmation of that can be found in one of the election slogan related to the first dichotomy: “Fourth Polish Republic—Justice for All” (Michon, ´ 2016, p. 178). The “solidary Poland”–“liberal Poland” repartition referred to the “marginalised usefulness” of the idea of community and collective actions known from the times of fighting communism. In terms of symbolism, it referred to the period of August 1980 and the formation of “Solidarity” (Kubisiak, 2005). It also received a strong relation with the domination of the time of community that was previously defined as “us”. The word solidary carried positive historical connotations and linked contemporary times to the fight and values of the “Solidarno´sc´ ” Independent SelfGoverning Trade Union. It pointed to solidarity and social paternalism (Rubisz, 2010, p. 66) and referred to the redistributive justice concept in a different form. “Solidarity” meant caring for all the citizens through fair redistribution of goods (Nalewajko, 2010, p. 241). The solidarity preferred did not mean “economic backwardness, autarky or the communist uravnilovka (i.e., unreasonable and unjustified equalisation). It is only about enabling everyone, not only the richest, to take advantage of the fruit of economic growth. In other words, it is necessary to distribute the wealth fairly, which does not necessary mean doing it according to the ‘to each equally’ principle” (Figiel, 2009, p. 110). The practice did not reject the foundations of the meritocratic concept, but stated the need to eliminate the related distortions that appeared after 1989. It was not “friendly” to neoliberalism and valued it in a clearly negative way, rejected all of its pathologies. The practice did not make this ideology repulsive to society overnight. This repulsion was caused by its proponents, who had referred to that ideology for many years and sustained the conviction of its unique character. The conviction that neoliberalism meant ruthlessness and exploitation and furthered only the interests of the rich was not something that could be created within a single campaign. Thus, the practice was a “summary” of the long-standing criticism of neoliberalism and underlined its negative role in building social relations. The practice exposed the neoliberal fraud consisting of convincing that the differences between those losing and winning on the transformation would be only

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of ranking nature, would not bring about any other consequences and would be temporary. Starting with the moment of its appearance, the practice called for undermining the hierarchies shaped, formed an opposition between “just Poland” and “unjust Poland” and employed the justice idea resources intensively (Obacz, 2018, p. 200). The practice opposed the negative social and economic consequences of the implementation of neoliberal solutions and questioned continuing them in the previous form. It was without compromise as the feeling of a large part of society supported it (Zaborowski, 2014, p. 331). The repartition delegitimised the order since it added all the actions expanding the poverty and discrimination, as well as both existing and sustained forms of distribution and division of goods. In this manner, it “utilised” the issues known to a large part of society and was a discursive story about the negative experiences of a large part of society. It reached for both current experiences and past, already forgotten ones. Without any scruples, it took advantage of the hierarchy of wrongs society became aware of. By “opening old wounds”, it called to reduce them and eliminate them from the relations. The unfair economic hierarchy dominated the repartition, a part of which was the social hierarchies and the existing differences in the distribution of prestige and dignity. The consequences of economic failure translated to many spheres of life of individuals, and one of them was the attitude of those benefiting from the change towards the “losers”. It manifested in denying respect to societies, groups and people who had difficulties managing the new reality. They were convinced—unfortunately, also through humiliation—that they should be unhappy with themselves. It is not surprising, then, that it was a capacious space for generating emotions stemming from numerous wrongs, negative experiences and bitterness caused by the failures experienced. It directed its message towards those exploited at work, unfairly discharged, publicly ridiculed and referred to over the years as losers, clients or “costs of the transformation”. Sociological studies confirmed this—the systematically growing disproportion between the “losers” and the “winners” was not only noticeable, but caused growing negative emotions among the people surveyed (Jarosz & Kozak, 2008, p. 316). Referring to the discriminating side—having economic advantage and power at its disposal—as “liberal” constituted not only questioning of

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these advantages but also the method of obtaining them (i.e., the longstanding neoliberal politics associated with dishonest activities). Therefore, a substantial part of the practice was the moral asymmetry present between the two sides (Obacz, 2018, p. 175), consisting of denying advantage and respect to the beneficiaries of the transformation. In fact, those who achieved their success fairly were pooled together with those who employed morally questionable methods. By employing the “honest vs dishonest” opposition, the practice suggested that “liberalism” had a lining of unfairness, leading to many groups being deprived of benefits from changes as if it was only one side that “grabbed” all the goods for itself. Such an approach was followed by moral condemnation of the political elites who led the majority of society to poverty. The practice was a suggestion of an alternative morality, a new social justice and conducting politics based on equal utilisation “of the blessings of free Poland” (Borowiec, 2021, pp. 75–94). This is symbolised perfectly by one of the many statements from Lech Kaczynski ´ from 2009, who called for “a Poland for everyone, not only for the rich” (Lech, 2019). The practice did not define clearly the composition of “losers”, nor did it intend to specify all the “winners”. The affiliation was made nearly voluntary, and no one was limited in terms of identification and fitting their own experience of being wronged in the suggested dichotomous description of reality. That does not mean, however, that no one was invited to join the solidary or that the political opponents were not pushed away towards the “liberal”. The composition of both sides was described precisely in the discourse and sometimes consciously complemented. Depending on the course of the campaign, individuals or groups could become qualified among the “liberal”. Although there were certain unspoken limitations, the entrance to the solidary camp was open to everyone, while there were a few groups and individuals who had no access to the liberal one. Those included the groups that were directly associated with the liberal reforms and those political opponents who were responsible for the neoliberal reforms. In 2007, this meant the richest oligarchs who had good relations with politics, politicians with liberal views or representatives of former communist circles (Kochanowicz, 2007, p. 1). Therefore, a differentiating factor complementing the compositions of both sides of the repartition was also the attitude towards the communist past and “towards the consequences of transformation, as well as the evaluation whether the post-1989 political system is ‘just’” (Obacz, 2018, p. 220).

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The quick and extensive determination of the composition of the “liberal” side by the creator of this practice could have brought negative political consequences and limited the potential voter base. A voter counting themselves among “losers” may have learned that those applying the practice include them among the “winners”. Such an approach could thwart the socio-political impact of the practice. That is why a rational solution was to convince further groups that they were ignored and disregarded by the liberal governments, and some of them did experience such an attitude. The solidary were always identified with individuals who had trouble managing the existing normative chaos, not only in the sphere of economy. This is indirectly confirmed by the studies conducted by Mikołaj Cze´snik and Michał Kotnarowski, which showed how the dichotomy discussed was anchored in the social structure (2011, pp. 154–155). The practice discussed suggested a political and economic alternative and gave it a special meaning (Obacz, 2018, p. 206), as well as focused on popularising it. It was a political invitation to participate in democracy— through activity at the ballot box and also through increasing the share of “losers” in consumption. The practical actions were directed towards those most impoverished, and the funds granted to them were supposed to create a sense of improvement in life and bring a moment of satisfaction. The confirmation and continuation of the income redistribution were to lead to the creation of a welfare state where everyone would live at a high standard. The egalitarian policy applied was to lead to the elimination of the economic gap between the urban and rural population and between the inhabitants of the western and eastern regions of Poland. According to the politicians employing the practice discussed, the path to equalising the standard of living would include continuing the sustainable development policy and creating mechanisms modernising the economy ((pm) 2019). The above determination regarding the “solidary Poland”–“liberal Poland” dichotomy confirms that it was not a division, but another practice, speaking towards both those who lost and those who gained on the long-standing transformation, especially the economic one. It “recreated” a division fundamental for the Third Polish Republic period, similar to many other practices suggested to the recipients. All the repartitions “based” on the “losers”–“winners” division became further proposals and simplified definitions of the imperfect reality. They spoke to those who, for various reasons, were unable to take advantage of the fruit

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of the change, felt humiliated, wronged and treated unfairly. As it was underlined in the work entitled “A Discarded Past. The End of PostCommunism in Poland” (Borowiec, 2022), the practice was a political call directed at those who also wanted to “have a barbecue” (i.e., rest after their everyday work). They wanted peace and a sense that their years of hard work (as not everyone was avoiding it) also brought them benefits and satisfaction, that they could be “winners”. The relation between the “solidary Poland”–“liberal Poland” repartition and the “losers”–“winners” division of the transformation period is confirmed by numerous definitions presented in the political discourse, intended in practice to question this repartition and transform or even eliminate its revolutionary character. In 2005, Donald Tusk said: “Solidarity can never mean one against the other. (…) We will not build solidary Poland by dividing people—the way we both heard during the campaign and hear now—into the weaker and the stronger, the poorer and the richer, the workers and the businesspeople” (quoted after: Figiel, 2009, pp. 112–113). There are many examples of the “neutralisation” of the practice and weakening its harmful impact on liberal circles. In 2007, Bronisław Komorowski underlined that this opposition was “a fraud worthy of Goebbels”, completely untrue and instrumentally forged. Turning towards the politicians employing that dichotomy, he said: “You are lying to Poland by telling it’s split in half, while you sense yourself that it is completely not true” (PAP, 2007). Descriptions saying that the dichotomy is no longer applicable were also a redefinition of the practice: “Today there is no longer any such thing as a clash of liberal Poland with solidary Poland. All the parties are solidary nowadays, to a lesser or 2019). greater extent” (Kozinski, ´ Criticism of the practice also originated from the scientific community, although it rarely went beyond political attempts at weakening it 2005, pp. 20–21). The critics of the repartition discussed (Krzeminski, ´ underlined that the adopted method of understanding solidarity may lead to arresting the market processes and consolidating an obsolete economic model. It was noticed that the idea of solidarity understood in the collective aspect (community values) may lead to limiting individual freedoms (e.g., through top-down enforcement of principles and values considered 2011, p. 115). the only valid ones) (Sanecka-Tyczynska, ´ The politicization of the “losers”–“winners” division did not end with the “solidary Poland”–“liberal Poland” repartition being employed. Its

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direct extension, next to the whole discourse regarding social inequalities, was the “Poland plus”–“Poland minus” dichotomy (Baran, 2019), showing two different worlds, filled with differences, which the voters again had to choose between. The notion of “plus” referred to a part of programmes, particularly welfare and social programmes, implemented by the right-wing parties during the 2015–2019 term, being practical forms of changing the unjust hierarchies included in the “solidary Poland”–“liberal Poland” repartition. The most important element of the “Poland plus” vision was maintaining the redistribution policy introduced, which resulted from the continuously excessive economic differentiation of society. It was underlined that there were still both wealthy and poor regions: “However, certain large regions of our country have 30% of [what] Warsaw [has]. It is a tremendous difference. (…) You can find districts in Poland that may have an income per capita that is ten times lower than the one in Warsaw. It is a situation that needs to be changed, and the policy that we are implementing is leading towards that consistently” (Baran, 2019). That is why it was further declared that the introduction of equal chances for anyone, irrespective of their place of residence, would be pursued. A solution to these problems could be a welfare state, an institution modelled after the Western version of it, but improved, with Polish features that take traditional values into account. The task of such a state was to improve everyone’s standard of living up to the level enjoyed by the inhabitants of the wealthiest European countries. The appearance of such an institution was supposed to ensure decent living for everyone without having to form informal systems and fight for unjustified privileges. The welfare state was also supposed to be a state based on justice, freedom and solidarity. “Poland minus” was presented as a threat to the continuation of egalitarian activities as a dominance standing in the way of justice and equality. It was supposed to block all the actions aimed at increasing the living standard of families and stand on the way towards eliminating other hierarchies in which it retained its domination. It was supposed to counteract the elimination of inequalities carried out through social programmes. “Poland minus” was the past that fought for its present privileges. It still did not care “for the common good, for the interest of all citizens, but only for the interests of selected circles and social groups” (List, 2019). “Polska minus” was characterised by a lack of any plans for economy, growth or support for social groups and only guarded interests of certain groups. That is why it was reminded that it was a “Poland of injustice,

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inequality and powerlessness”, without the “500+” programme, extra pensions, time, funds recovered from VAT fraud networks and lowered 2019). “Polska minus” meant privileges for retirement age (Bogdanska, ´ a part of society, a return “in the direction of post-communism, in the direction of everything that limited our possibilities, hurt so many people and led to the chances we had during those past 30 years being taken advantage of only partially” (gah/PAP, 2019). The claim regarding the desire to return was illustrated with examples of questioning and undermining of all the initiatives leading to the elimination of inequalities. The trademark of “Poland minus” was the actions suspending any attempts at helping the poorest. It was claimed that such actions of the political opposition aimed at defending the privileged, who guarded their position. The presumptive victory of politicians defined as “Poland minus” was to mean the return to the undeserved elevation of the groups whose values were foreign to the majority of society. That Poland represented the strong and rich, reportedly supporting a further continuation of the moral revolution and destroying the state’s moral order. The threat was also supposed to result from the introduction of sexual education at schools for the youngest children. This education was described as “purposeful demoralisation, conducted in a calculated manner in order to focus the child on matters that they should not even think about at this age” (PAP, 2019).

The Practices of Repartition---Consequences of a Homogeneous Society At the beginning of the 1990s, the domination of the religious community and national community was universally noticed, but raised no objections. Both communities sustained a high level of social homogeneity. Such a structure was not an obstacle to introducing market-based economic solutions, but was not consistent with the cultural pluralism expected. Especially so, since in the 1990s, a part of society accepted the ideological message that the purpose of the order is also appreci˙ ˙ 2014, p. 9). However, focusing ating cultural differences (Zuk & Zuk, on the material dimension of life and problems with existential survival limited the rate of alternative lifestyles coming out of hiding. It turned out that they were not the first need of the majority of society experiencing economic difficulties. However, the cultural variety was expected, supported and sometimes intensively inspired by many individuals. The

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actions referred to as “looking for differences” fit into creating it, which is why sometimes this process consisted of building differences. The aim of such a “mechanical” differentiation was the emergence of differences from a homogeneous society. They consisted of extensive actions aimed at showing that there exist individuals using patterns different from those imposed by the monocultural reality. Some useful activity methods were marches, happenings, provocations or mocking initiatives aimed at discrediting the “old” values. They were also supposed to show alternatives to the dominant communities. The possibility of choice was to constitute a feature of the order created, where it was assumed that this was going to happen in a society of people having the time and freedom to shape their own lives at their disposal. In order to achieve the above objectives, it was necessary not only to improve the economic conditions or suggest new ways of life, but also to reduce the significance of those already dominating in society—and these were the models of majority communities: national and religious. However, it is necessary to remember that the majorities creating the dominant entities were not tight-knit, uniform and homogeneous communities—it was only the appearance they usually took in the consciousness and communications of those competing with them. According to the rules of democracy, they had an impact on the legislation and judicature, allowing privileges and advantages. Without limiting the influence of these groups, it was impossible for the values of minority groups to participate equally in the culture. Similarly to how the economic groups excluded after 1989 undermined the dominance of the neoliberal ideology, the minorities later excluded put their claims for dignity forward. The task they set for themselves was to weaken the dominant communities, the value orders of which prohibited making free choices. That is why the hazard was situated in Christian morality, claiming the right to decide what a decent life worthy of support is. The culprit was seen in the Catholic Church, which claimed the right to define what was good and what was evil (kb, 2019a). The groups demanding rights and dignity undermined the monopoly of religious communities for moralising, imposing lifestyles, instructing and admonishing. At the same time, it was added that there was no place in the world of “free choices” for those “denying others the right to choose”. The actions listed constituted a part of the process—in line with the arguments communicated—of implementing pluralism, eliminating existing prejudice and unblocking the inhibited and supervised processes of the emergence of

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authentic differences. From a long-term perspective, what began was the installation of the concept of a new vision of the human being, not only professing humanist values but also sanctioning materialism, consumerism (Ziółkowski et al., 2020, pp. 56–61), relativism and cultural post-modernism. Striving to make the values of cultural liberalism appear in reality, to extend the sphere of choice led to an inevitable clash with religious and moral standards and conservative values (Figiel, 2009, p. 118). It was impossible to introduce the alternative values without undermining the dominant communities’ cultural homogeneity and political privileges, eliminating homogeneity resulting in the feeling of “social closure” and breaking up with the single model of life imposed on individuals. Therefore, statements appeared regarding these communities not being compatible with contemporary times in view of limiting other individuals. At the same time, those criticising severed ties with these communities and argued that they had no obligations towards them. References were made to building an order to be “dominated by a variety of communities”. It was argued, however, that privileges for everyone do not appear as a result of the goodwill of the dominating groups and waiving their advantages to the benefit of the legacy, values and identities of minorities willingly waives power or domination for anyone. Thus, it was necessary to limit them politically and underline the necessity to reject all discrimination. Also, these were not imagined problems, created for a political game by small political circles. Reminding of the differences between the dominating groups and those deprived of rights, as well as showing the situation of minority groups, ethnic or sexual, was inevitable in view of individuals who experienced exclusion. The political actions fit into “forming space for these groups” in the homogeneous order and took a moral aspect. Diversity could not come into existence without systematic “uncovering and discovering” the dominated lifestyles. The delay in this process, typical for contemporary societies, was caused by the long-standing “us”– “them” division and the continuing socio-economic crisis. Forty-five years ´ under communist rule also were of significance here. As Paweł Spiewak noted: “Communism was a sort of a refrigerator that froze or hid deeper social divisions, which emerged only in conditions of liberty and democratic freedoms, and deepened significantly as a result of social processes taking place in recent years” (2005, p. 160). This applied mainly to

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cultural divisions stemming from the domination of religions, nation or a family-life model. The “unfreezing” did not take place automatically, but it was becoming increasingly intensive and noticeable with time. These matters were gaining significance. The state institutions played the decisive role in rivalry for which lifestyle is to be dominant. The observation of the actions of the neoliberal elites confirmed that considering the state an arena where various groups and cultural differences could appear had no confirmation in reality. The state that existed did not lead to assigning equal rights to all groups. The idea that no model of life cannot be privileged remained in the declarative sphere. The state was not neutral to which communities had a decisive voice. The ruling neoliberal elites took advantage of the state institutions and funds to support the values close to them. It was not a surprise that the ruling elites turned out to be “biased” in supporting various groups and their values. The authorities made choices according to their own values, and it was according to them that they stigmatised the existing constraints and privileges. They did not adopt a pluralist stance, but preferred individualist values while at the same time ridiculing and excluding the collective ones. Neoliberals were not too interested in communities and therefore rejected the need to create social cohesion and even attempted to disintegrate society, although they did not abandon creating and promoting “substitute” ideas or communities. An example of that is the concept of civic society that had been promoted for many years, which was sometimes set in opposition to the nation or the religious or ethnic groups. The undermining of the dominance of religious or national values meant questioning these communities’ contemporary meaning for the functioning of the order. The postulates to undermine the advantage of these communities resulted not only from the desire to replace the communality with autonomic individuals but even creating new categories of “us”. Such a task was also extremely difficult as “(…) the most energetic attempts at deriving “us” from “me”, at stemming a community from an individual, made by the most gifted thinkers ultimately end in failure” (Lash, 2009, p. 202). The politicians could not do it in practice, even those representing the interests of the excluded. It resulted from the fact that “a community does not consist of sharing the same interest. Political parties and social classes—characterised by common interests— are not communities” (Lash, 2009, p. 207). For the process to succeed, it needs to be based on values connecting the individuals, not interests. It

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is indispensable for the communities to be organised according to values, providing a basis for the framework of group identity. Only a community of values, justice and equality builds social coherence. The above claims undermined the existing hierarchies. These actions took place in line with the known mechanism of elevating the dominated groups. The fight for changing the hierarchy was also a fight with uniformity and its authority figures and symbols. The commencement of this rivalry with new fields of conflict with the dominant identities automatically invited uncertainty and threat into the social reality. It destroyed the joy, particularly the sense of victory of communities dominating after 1989. This was confirmed perfectly by a statement from many Church hierarchs outraged that there was not even enough time to “enjoy the victory over communism” in peace and even surprised by the demand and assessments directed towards them. Previously, a similar surprise was experienced by certain post-Solidarity politicians responsible for building the neoliberal economic world of wealth when the voters suddenly withdrew their support for them. Some post-Solidarity politicians were outraged that someone might not appreciate their effort, merits, involvement and sacrifice (Jakubowska, 2009, pp. 223–224). The level of unpreparedness of the majority groups to defend the values considered important was commonly noticed. They became the victims of the created illusion of strength and significance in which they were functioning. Questioning of dominance included examples of subordination, exclusion of LGBT individuals and stories of individuals unable to find a place for themselves in society existing, supplemented with definitions of new values and significance for society. Their disposal of exception aesthetics, sense of taste or sensibility was underlined. Their capabilities for creating politics and culture were discussed, and examples of historical achievements of people belonging to ethnic or sexual minorities were referred to. Their lifestyle, views and values were positioned on the polar opposite concerning the conservative values of the dominant communities. Examples of such returning of place in the political community were the campaigns of support of unbelievers, Romani and other ethnic groups. One of the symbolic actions, carried out since 2010, had been ˙ “I Miss You, Jew” (Polish: T˛eskni˛e za Toba˛ Zydzie) (Kowalska, 2010). A similar role was performed by Tolerance Marches or Equality Parades. Such actions were dedicated to many individuals from the minority groups “retrieved from oblivion”, and their role and contribution to the culture were presented. The sense of social significance was returned to them.

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The fight for the minority groups “coming out of the shadows” started with striving to be “seen” and “heard”, and translated into actions leading to political emancipation. In the election campaigns, intensive actions and messages of left-wing parties appeared. An example of that is the demand for the right to express opinions in media and present the fundamental standards and values, for example, by homosexual couples. This does not mean that all the representatives of these minorities had such a sense of discrimination and exclusion. However, bringing them to light—as the majority of society was unusually unaware of them—was made a political task by the left-wing parties. This extended the field of discourse by further fragmenting of unjust reality and took the dispute beyond the existing divisions. It hit the existing discourse blocks and the most widespread politicizations of economic inequalities. The excluded started becoming organised and fighting the reality that was hierarchical and homogeneous to them. It was a fight similar to that carried out by the economically excluded (i.e., the “losers” of the transformation process). With time, the activity of people and parties referring to the excluded led to a powerful question mark being put regarding the domination of the majority. Again, the repartition practices were employed for presenting these divisions. It was recognised that to achieve the elimination of inequalities, it was not enough to just request the rights, document the exclusion, destroy hierarchy, create an atmosphere of compassion and wait patiently for the way of life valuable to the excluded to become accepted. It is not enough to arouse social interest, and the campaigns aimed at supporting the excluded are not of much use either as the social division slowly disappears when using them. Repartitions turned out to be useful yet again, similarly to the cause of “us”–“them” or “losers”–“winners” divisions. This time, another division had become crystallised in the form of conflict between the values of majority communities and those of minority groups. It was also referred to suggestively by opposing the “order of conservative values” to the “order of cultural liberalism values” (Figiel, 2009, p. 118). The division so defined was created over time and first influenced the relations, being invisible and not translating to social conflicts. The repartition practices referring to that division and reflecting the discrimination of minorities and philosophical beliefs were offered intensively to voters by politicians. They appeared already after 1989 but intensified in the 2010s. In 2006, the “normal Poland”–“abnormal Poland” repartition appeared. In 2015, one of the politicians spoke of

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“open Poland” where, among others, “no one interferes too much in the life of citizens without good reason” (Pycha, 2015), suggesting that there also exists a “closed Poland” filled with domination and supervision by others. However, such inequalities appeared the strongest in another practice, contrasting “rational Poland” with “radical Poland” (Andrzej, 2015). This practice had already been employed in various forms since the 1990s and referred to voters who felt the domination of people “unwilling to compromise”, extremists, people of extreme views and tendencies (Beczek, 2015)—including those politically frustrated. The “radical” side, also referred to as the “Poland of quarrelling, Poland of conflict, Poland of rejection of each other” (PAP, 2015b) or “Poland of dispute and aggression” (PAP, 2015c), was dominated by fanatics threatening the freedom and not allowing others to take advantage of theirs. Those presenting a radical, national-Catholic, uncompromising vision of the world and their dominances were shown explicitly. It was claimed that they were replacing compromise with a “fundamentalist principle of getting one’s own way” (tw, PAP, 2015). Radicalism was a threat to the public debate and, therefore, there were appeals for not letting it “set the tone of the public debate in Poland, divide Poles into better and worse ones and destroy the chance for political compromises” ((JS) 2015). Further specifications left no doubt where the threat to the egalitarian order was present: “There is a fundamentalist radicalism growing in the young generation of Poles. Let us pray for them to emigrate as soon as possible, thank to which we will be able to protect the order” (mkd, 2015). Due to their numbers and the values they presented, the “radical” were allegedly generating negative emotions, fear and anxiety, and standing in the way of achieving rights and a decent living for the excluded. The dichotomy applied left no illusions. Next to the “radical” were the discriminated and the excluded, disposing of rationality, creating a “civic Poland” ((bs) 2015b), “Poland of freedom”, “Poland of responsibility” (PAP, 2015f), “European Poland” (MT, 2015) or “Poland of cooperation and Poland of national concord” (PAP, 2015b). One of the candidates (during the Polish presidential elections of 2015) directed the following words to them: “I turn to those of you who particularly value moderation, dialogue and compromises in public life—as a method of political activity; to those who do not stand on the barricades of radicalism and do not want to do it, those who reject seeking ideological wars, those who respect different sensibilities of other co-citizens, often

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different from their own. Let us not allow the radicalism to set the tone of the public debate in Poland, divide Poles into better and worse ones and destroy the chance for political compromises” ((JS) 2015). After losing in the elections, he kept declaring that he would be “a part of the front defending Poland against the radical right-wing groups” ((jsch) 2015). In another campaign, this time for parliamentary elections, the rivalry with the “radical” was continued by declaring that: “We will not let the radicals tear Poland apart” (PAP, 2015e). The philosophical matters, including the right to modern and progressive life and equal rights of the minority groups, manifested in these repartitions in underlining the problems of differences in approach towards the in vitro method. The candidate of the “radical” side in the presidential elections in 2015 represented “dangerous and tremendously outrageous” views on this matter. He was reportedly an opponent of this method because it was unnatural and incompatible with the teachings of the Catholic Church. It was also alleged that he supported a draft solution assuming the imprisonment of women taking advantage of the in vitro method (PAP, 2015a). An opinion was expressed that “an attempt at punishing with imprisonment for using in vitro is a type of cruelty stemming from fundamentalism” (Komorowski, 2015). The standing of one of the candidates so presented provided a basis for describing the dominance towards infertile individuals demanding the possibility of using the in vitro method. Thus, this practice, anchored in cultural differences between the dominant communities and the excluded minority groups, was supposed to present a reality dominated by the Catholic worldview. As a continuation of this practice, the “theocratic republic” was opposed to the “civic state”, and the act of refusal of domination of the former, a single system of values, was the declaration: “I do not want to live in a theocratic republic” ((RC) 2015a). The “theocratic republic” was supposed to appear after the right-wing parties’ success in elections and cause a major regression in Poland. There were warnings that steps were being made towards a new Poland—theocratic, right-wing, hierar´ 2015). On the other hand, there chical and based on symbols (Sroda, would be normalcy, defined in the electoral and political aspect through the following statement: “(…) My party provides people with a very large sphere of freedom. We do not want to control Poles but provide them with conditions in which they will be able to make independent decisions. We cannot accept censorship of the conscience that Law and Order intends to impose upon all of us” ((KT) 2015). The practice showed not

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only different values, but also the dominance of the “radical ones”, and rejected them simultaneously. It also presented two hierarchies, one with dominances, where the “radical” were dominating, and another, where the “rational” (Henzel, 2015) deserved a new, higher position in the hierarchies of the order. The practice equalised the chances, “added” certain privileges to some and removed certain privileges from others. However, it also entailed a lack of respect towards anyone identifying in any form with the radical, who preferred fundamentalist values, which—in the electoral aspect—was supposed to discourage voters from identifying with the right-wing parties. Respect and moral and intellectual high ground were assigned only to the rational, while others were denied these characteristics. The practice analysed was transformed intensively. One of the most exposed of its subsequent discursive version was the dichotomy of: “Poland of oppression”–“Poland of freedom”. It fit the division created whole and supplemented the “radical”–“rational” opposition. In the new variety, it was the freedom, responsibility for one’s own decisions and words, trust, openness and tolerance that were highlighted. The “Poland of freedom” was supposed to respect people’s views and, therefore, diversity. In 2019, the most frequently employed repartition practice, underlining the issues of freedom and respect for the law and including the objection against its violation by the authorities, was the “democratic opposition”–“non-democratic” government dichotomy (kb, 2019b). The “Poland of oppression” focused on being oppressive, was full of suspicion and distrust towards every citizen and was accused of interfering with their life. It was not changing and was still focused on “provoking citizens to commit wrong deeds to catch them red-handed and make an example of them before a court” (Bronisław, 2015). It lurked for those citizens and argued that there was always some dirt to be found on someone, wanting the draw out the worst from them. The representatives of that Poland were reportedly claiming that everyone has some dirty secret waiting to be discovered, “for example, during an investigation or a trial” (Głowacka, 2015). The “Poland of oppression” was to take the appearance of a theocratic state, a museum of fanaticism, similar to Iran, characterised by “medieval views” ((br) 2015). In such a state, the secular authorities would be guided by ultra-Catholic and ideological premises. It was suggested that the “‘oppressive’ wanted ‘an ideological war and taking us back to the Middle Ages” (Geje, 2015). For example, the following comment was made: “With all my sympathy towards the

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Middle Ages, I am noticing phenomena similar to those of those times: reckoning people for their views, pushing people beyond the Church community and beyond the sphere of patriotism” ((JM) 2015). On another occasion, the division was drawn even more precisely, using a statement that the voters are choosing between “a free Poland, proEuropean, respecting every citizen and telling them that their private property is undeniable, or a Poland that they described in the draft constitution, a place where the equal status of men and women is fading and where the independence of judges is undermined” (PAP, 2015d). The “Poland open to Europe” and “anti-European Poland” opposition appeared exceptionally often. The latter was also referred to as “xenophobic Poland with its back turned towards the European problems, aversive and aggressive” ((RC) 2015b). The European one focused on patriotism “that is not against other, against Europe, but is a part of the European identity and respects everyone with whom we live together within unified borders, in one great Europe” (PAP, 2015i). It showed on one side those “who are afraid of Europe and use it to scare people” and those “who are not afraid of Europe and do not make a scare out of it” ((pp) 2015). It was underlined that a condition of variety and tolerance was making compromises (Bronisław, 2015). There were references to an example of limiting the freedom of expressing opinions and demonstrating them in public places. Some of the examples referred to were anti-gay manifestations, claiming that one of the candidates taking part in the elections would undoubtedly be “a shield against this kind of discrimination and aggression against minorities, and not only sexual ones” (red, 2015). The dichotomy constituting the choice was defined as follows: “On one side are those who will not interfere with them or limit their citizen’s rights, their freedom. On the other—those whose interference will be permanent and who will want to fit them forcefully into their sole valid model of living” ((bs) 2015a). In the detailed practices, the dominating role of the Church and its numerous privileges were presented and, therefore, also the hazards for other lifestyles stemming from this. The presumptive election victory of right-wing parties in 2015 was supposed to lead to further expansion of the power of the Church hierarchs who were reportedly ruling “from the back seat” (Mordarski, 2015), thus strengthening the conservative orientations. From the perspective of those perceiving religion as a form of oppression and lack of freedom, the arguments were provided by

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the politicians themselves, who tried to show the threat posed by the left and show the meaning of religion for social life. It was said, for example, that “the Church was and is the promoter and holder of the only system of values that is commonly known in Poland or that a family is ‘one woman and one man in a stable relationship, and their children’” (G˛adek, 2019). Following that path, the system of values of the Church was set in opposition to nihilism, relativism and the “great offensive of evil”, “rainbow plague” and “LGBT ideology”. In 2019, Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki said the following to the conservative voters: “We are guarding our Polish values, not some ideological whims and moral 2019). Every person that did not respect the revolution” (Kozinska, ´ Church was destroying Poland and contributing to the end of the current Christian civilisation. Such creation of politics based on exposing the threat towards the Catholic-national ideology could strengthen the sense of exclusion in some individuals and mobilise them to fight for equal rights and strengthen the existing socio-political dispute. Another confirmation of the exclusion of minority groups was blocking the act on sex reassignment. It was made into a symbol, and claims were made that by vetoing that act, the president “(…) rejected the minority’s right to dignity. Because this is the only thing that act was about, nothing else. Besides, I would like Andrzej Duda to keep his word. He promised he would be the president of all Polish men and women. Also, the trans2015). The inequalities resulting from an gender ones” (Gałczynska, ´ inability to have one’s sex reassigned were noticed (PAP, 2015h). It was noticed that the Church assigns rights to the chosen and the right-wing speaking of the right of individuals living in marital relationships, making such individuals privileged. The majority of repartition practices in the campaign of 2015 referred to divisions stemming from the domination of community groups and subordination of many spheres of an individual’s life—not only legal, but also symbolic and cultural—to them. The repartition practice that clearly referred to this category of divisions was the one talking about “liberal, friendly and socially sensible Poland” (PAP, 2015g), with “hardcore conservatism, stagnation and emigration” standing on the other side ((FF) 2015). The “explosion of conservatism” was considered a threat along with voter support for right-wing parties. In the event of their victory, Poland was threatened by “the rule of Ku-Klux-Klan— Kaczynski ´ [Jarosław], Korwin [Janusz], Kukiz [Paweł]”. The offensive of

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conservative circles resulted in disappointment, but hope for “the liberalleftist world coming back” ((bs) 2015d) was noticed. The above hazards were also presented through the “European liberal Poland”–“national conservative Poland” opposition ((bs) 2015c). In the process of politicization of the inequalities experienced and the creation of repartition practices, i.e., the process that is being discussed here, there is nothing surprising if we remember that the post-communist society was still traditional and homogeneous in many aspects. This is shown perfectly by the repartition practices suggested by politicians who were referring to minority groups and the excluded, opposing the politicians referring to the dominant communities. The path to the subjectiveness of all the excluded groups always leads to employing political tools such as the repartition practices discussed in this book.

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CHAPTER 6

The Formation of Social Divisions and the Theory of Practices of Repartition

Ideological and Structural Context and Social Divisions The retrospective look at the Polish changes allowed creating a pattern of the formation of divisions and their Polish specificity in reference to the theoretical knowledge available. It also led to the discovery of repartitions employed to politicize the divisions. The conclusions presented earlier in this work and the status of knowledge on the divisions indicate that they are constituted by historical circumstances (i.e., actions taken that lead to the appearance of inequalities). The historical perception of the divisions shows that the main drive behind these phenomena was dynamic processes, mainly of an economic nature. The analysis also showed that not all the Polish divisions had to last long to take a permanent place in consciousness. They were often formed in a much shorter time. This applied to both economic divisions and unequal distribution of dignity, respect, freedom, etc. Taking into consideration the political circumstances leading to inequalities is indispensable, but focusing solely on them leads to attempts at explaining the divisions into a dead end. Attributing the impact on the Polish divisions to historical events such as reformation, democratic and national revolutions or industrial revolutions turns out to be groundless. It is difficult to demonstrate how they determine the contemporary reality. The globalisation processes taking

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 P. Borowiec, The Politicization of Social Divisions in Post-War Poland, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-26530-3_6

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place and the noticeable impact of the information society or technological systems only confirm such conclusions. The Polish divisions “have taken on a life of their own” and are often formed by other factors. This results from the dynamic and slightly different structures of modern societies, idea resources and values that contribute to creating them. Assigning the role of an effective tool for discovering the truth about Polish phenomena to the concept of Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan is a mistake, the same as using them to “measure” divisions present during the communist times (Grabowska, 2004, p. 18). Thus, the classic concepts should be treated solely as inspirations for the studies conducted in contemporary times. A consequence of the above conclusions is also the rejection of the mechanism of formation of divisions through a society-dividing event. This pattern, stemming partially from the ideas of Lipset and Rokkan, has often been employed in Polish studies. In this vein, the fall of communism itself was supposed to be such a dividing event (Grabowska, 2004, p. 15), creating social and political divisions (Figiel, 2009, p. 35). Such an expression could be accepted at the level of political discourse, but its uncritical overuse may lead to erroneous conclusions. The divisions were created by the unjust social space of communism that had been formed for many years, and its fall was expected to eliminate them; but in the Polish case at least, it sustained them for many years. The fall of communism did not create new inequalities within a few months but only transferred a great deal of pre-1989 ones to the new reality. The divisions were created by communism, understood as a process (i.e., a long-lasting separation of two groups from each other and the creation of inequalities and distances). It has been a wrong approach to ascribe the power of creating divisions to events with a “short duration”, such as assassinations, disasters, events with political participation or differences in opinions and evaluations present in the discourse. They do not create divisions, also in view of their inflation, artificial generation and rate of fading away. After about a dozen days, no one remembered most of them. This is why frequent attempts at forming divisions based on an event, even one with tragic consequences, end in failure. It is also why the majority of events turn out meaningless for the divisions unless they fit into already existing ones— and then they strengthen or weaken them. The divisions are created over time, and events (i.e., points on the axis of time, even those generating political disputes) do not generate them. At the same time, these

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points, when accompanied by instrumental politicization, lead to the generation of emotions. The divisions are also not created by discursive dichotomies, polarising oppositions or other forms of politicization of the existing problems with reality. If they divide, this is only because they fit themselves into the already experienced wrongs. These comments are confirmed by observation of the formation of Polish divisions. Making events the bases for the generation of divisions entails their visible inflation as it forces a quick replacement of one division with another. It shows that the divisions are not characterised by persistence, but only by political usefulness. The lack of persistence makes such divisions problematic, which was discussed by Piotr Obacz (2018, p. 108). His comments confirm that divisions cannot be “swapped” for new ones by politicians every few years. The divisions do not disappear a few months after the elections, in contrast to repartition practices, which are precisely like that. Certain practices are replaced with others. Divisions are inequalities realised, and the main role in their creation is played by both the objective conditions of the order, measured using gauges and indicators and the subjective opinions and attitudes of individuals. The wrongs experienced play a role—both the actual ones and those imagined. They force individuals to focus on the differences present in the social space. The social order, mainly its economic and political dimension, forms the basic dependencies between individuals. They are supplemented with determinants hidden in the educational, religious or ethnic space. They constitute substantial, but not sole, fields for distances. Presently, this catalogue has been expanded, thus confirming that any matter regarding human existence can form inequality. Currently, the differences stemming from the character of work or division of labour lead to divisions less frequently. Some of those differences now exist “beyond the sense of injustice” of individuals. However, it is still the economic inequalities, also those with a structural aspect, that have an impact on asking questions about the justice of the order and the conditions of its moral aspect, as well as lead to the injustices being noticed (Domanski ´ & Rychard, 1997). This is why the economic structure, being a system and subordination of constituents, not only determines but also “helps notice 1995, p. 41). quicker” own exclusions (Kaczor-Panków, ´ This means that a significant “fragment of the mechanism” of the appearance of divisions is present in the relations between the structure and the individual, in their connection and mutual impact. Relations 2005, p. 26) between individuals and the social structure (Skarzy ˙ nska, ´

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are not automatic and uniform—many deviations and differences occur among them. They were discussed many times in the sociological literature. One of the significant consequences of these relations is the resignation from treating the structure as the sole determinant having an impact on the functioning of individuals. Such an approach is applicable when explaining the divisions. Thus, next to structural circumstances, the impact on the formation of divisions comes from other factors in the form of ideological structures together with their values—justice and equality. Personality and mental determinants constitute an importing variable leading to divisions as they help the individual build social experiences and transgress them. The significance of ideologies for divisions—which are variable but persistent constructs—raises no doubts. This is shown by the political sphere and its most important part—the values imposed by politicians that “co-create” the existing inequalities, “supervising” how people talk and think about them. This underlines and confirms the role of ideological determinants of divisions and the significance of politics for creating and supervising orders, irrespective of the scope and methods of subsequent discursive politicization of inequalities typical of these divisions. Politicizations of divisions often indicate the structural inequalities ambiguously or even completely ignore them, but they always include valuing. It is impossible to employ evident economic inequalities to create discursive definitions of divisions without anchoring them in the value of justice. At the same time, economic inequalities are not always present between the structural elements—often, divisions appearing stem from other reasons. It is then that ideologies play an even bigger role. Additionally, the structural distances do not translate automatically to the shape of the politics, just as the divisions do not always reflect the existing structures. Often, they stem from erroneous perceptions thereof. Divisions often deviate from structural inequalities documented using empirical research, as if ignoring them. However, similarly to conflicts, they are not an inherent feature of every society. The refusal to accept the assignment of indispensable goods and unequal and unfair distribution thereof constitutes the beginning of division formation. The clearest example presenting the path towards divisions is the unequal access to power resources, which is so common in interpersonal relations. This is particularly visible based on inequalities between those disposing of political power and the rest of society, which translates to unequal distribution of other goods. It is for this reason that

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power is considered “the matrix of all inequalities”. Feeling the negative consequences of the presence of power may accelerate the formation of other negative orientations of society towards those possessing other goods. It can also translate to a deeper sense of injustice. Every authority generates divisions, even when it declares a need to eliminate other inequalities or does it intensively. Removing certain inequalities through the extensive application of various instruments does not limit the creation of other ones, which is confirmed perfectly by the achievements of Polish communists. The mechanism of creation and application of repartition practices useful for the communist revolution confirms these comments. In part, they referred to actual inequalities, and it was obvious that such inequalities were present, not devised. The communist authorities found in the past inequalities a source of legitimisation and shaped their visions of the future in relation to them. They drew the most useful examples for their propaganda from the feudal and capitalist inequalities, branding them as unacceptable. Eliminating them became the purpose and meaning of existence. It included hope in the change imposed, which is why it exposed and politicized the inequalities that it inherited had a structural background. The communists did not devise the fundamental divisions or examples of injustice and poverty experienced by people—they were real. They had no scruples about politicizing the contemporary divisions, adjusting them instrumentally to the political situation. They always took advantage of ideology and reminded of the humiliated, forgotten and exploited people while elevating these people from the unacceptable capitalist inequalities was the declared purpose of the social solutions introduced. A significant role in the formation of divisions is played by the imposed ideological and political orientations and the justifications and evaluations disseminated that confirm the lack of justice. As an element of the existing ideologies, the systems of values impose and underline the experience of wrongs and deny them the right to keep appearing. Ideologies show which inequalities are justified and which should be denied the right to exist, present the relation between justice and other values—particularly with the concepts of a good life—and argue how the understanding of justice translates to the effectiveness of individuals at satisfying their needs. Systems of values inspire individuals and prepare them for specific actions, first formulating the bases for making them aware of their own inferiority

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(i.e., being excluded from society). They prepare the ground for collective realisation of the presence of distances. They reinforce or weaken the individual convictions regarding the order and its relations being allowed to remain or forced to change. The ideological and political orientations constitute a set of variables that shape the public sentiment and the 1995, p. 41). These dominant evaluations and opinions (Kaczor-Panków, ´ variables reflect the influence of the surroundings and both form and are formed by politicians and symbolic elites. The role of ideology in the creation of divisions is also shown by analyses by Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan. The significance they ascribed to long-lasting processes, such as reformation, democraticnational revolutions or industrial revolution, imposes a perspective on their ideological circumstances. The divisions they analysed appeared around the consequences of actions inspired by equality and justice. Both these ideas, irrespective of whether they were elevated or rejected, became the legislation of many orders that were born, a basis for the activity of people demanding freedom from external national dominations, restoration of a group and individual dignity and granting the right to self-determination. Their significance became solidified in time as a result of long-lasting processes. The negation of the previously existing forms of injustice changed the world and was the substantial meaning of the historical experiences of humankind. Prior to modernity, the above-mentioned political values were completely absent (Bauman, 2007, p. 136). The previous observations of the Polish changes and research results confirm that equality and justice were the content of divisions. It turned out that the economic, ethnic or religious structuralisation categories increasingly often lose their monopoly for generating divisions. The economic divisions with sources stemming from the character of ownership or the level of income arouse social emotions less and less frequently. They cease being the main requirements for the future conflict-free order. Increasingly often, it is the unequal treatment of minority groups and a lack of equal distribution of dignity and respect that generate a sense of injustice. The opacity of modern society leads to the deepening alienation of many individuals, which is why they refuse to accept the presence of existing relations. This is confirmed by their problems with finding their place in these relations. Additionally, the diversity promoted becomes the reason for reading the reality only in the categories of inequalities or even seeking them. The weakening of the significance of

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the economy for creating divisions is also a consequence of Polish society moving from materialistic values to post-materialistic ones. This is why other inequalities, e.g., related to gender and sexual violence, now constitute the basis for the appearance of divisions. Additionally, the evident limitations in access to many important spheres of life experienced by individuals and exclusions due to different lifestyles constitute spaces for new divisions. The emergence of divisions that are less related to the fundamental characteristics of the social structure resulted from the weakening of the political mechanisms of “concealing” cultural inequalities. The ideological blocks and instrumental interpretation hid effectively for many years the existence of certain inequalities, even those that featured strong empirical grounds. Despite existing, many of them did not raise any major social outrage as this is what the dominant ideologies “decreed” and convinced the majority of society to accept it. The neoliberal ideology turned out to be exceptionally effective in such actions. It was undoubtedly at the forefront of incapacitating society with its visions of social justice. It focused on blocking the truth about many pathological spheres of life in which the individual was denied dignity from “leaking” to the discursive space. The “breeding grounds” of divisions are always social relations. Such an approach leads to better noticing of aspects and a variety of mechanisms underlying the formation of divisions. This applies not only to inequality of domination, although it is the most apparent in its case. All the relations, and especially the relation of power, “impose and expose” the characteristics of a given order. The internalised interactions constituting the relations, as well as their methods of recreation, the impact of roles on their course, etc., constitute their “social regulations”, thus specifying their course (i.e., determining it). They impose automatism on them and also define their course in the categories of superiority and inferiority of sides. However, it is never certain that the partners will recreate their course precisely according to the existing templates. What is important about the divisions is that the relations, next to showing hierarchy, force subordination to unequal systems. Each interaction includes what the individual is entitled to and the imagination of what they should have according to themselves. Meanwhile, the lack of knowledge of hierarchies does not prevent them from appearing within the framework of the relation recreated. The new hierarchies may take forms that did not exist previously, and the same inequality may be considered just in one order and unjust in another. This was described by Anna Giza-Poleszczuk:

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“How people perceive others – the potential or actual partners in interaction, how they perceive the chances of the satisfactory establishment of relations with them and what rules, principles or moods they notice as applicable in the course of contact with others is, in essence, a description of how a given society appears in an individual’s experience or how it is present in it” (1991, p. 69). What takes place in relations is the reading of hierarchies and assigning importance to them using the evaluations of justice. The evaluations of individuals place them in hierarchies through “adjusting oneself to them”. This is clearly visible in such dimensions of the existence of distances and diversity as ethnicity, wealth, religiousness, power, respect and dignity. Personal experiences impose an evaluation of the order on the individual. The inequalities are confirmed in these experiences in the form of unrealised aspirations and everyday contact of individuals with one another. Direct contact is significant—even a trifle conversation may make someone realise limitations or subordination. The perception of relations as just or unjust is a complex process in itself and goes beyond the scope of this book. However, the distances discovered individually speak the most to individuals. Participating in an unjust relation translates to emotions, a sense of discomfort or humiliation. Experiencing injustice “binds an individual to others” and results in every further action of an authority institution—even one having nothing to do with the further exclusion of those wronged—being perceived as discrimination by the individual. In such situations, the wrongs “expand” within individuals even if they are not wrongs at all. The order constantly provides the individual with reference systems for solidification of their opinion on their own humiliation (Narojek, 1982, p. 195). The perception of inequalities is conditioned by psychological factors (Lachowicz-Tabaczek & Pachnowska, 2007, p. 390), which is why every common unkindness, distrust or malice and envy may be significant for consolidating divisions. During each interaction reinforcing the feeling of deprivations, imaginations of justice, realised interests, resources at one’s disposal or benefits imagined are employed. These characteristics are reinforced using the current policy and alternative ideologies. The constant reminding of subordination has an impact on the reception of the order (e.g., accelerates searching for those culpable of such a situation). It is also worth remembering that— according to Levis Coser—distances are born not only at the moment of noticing differences or injustices but also once a handicapped individual starts thinking about withdrawing their acceptance of such a condition.

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The experience of handicap will start the search for other wronged people, which constitutes sustaining the positive imagination of oneself. An individual does not want to be left alone with their sense of “not managing within the order”, of having been “used” by the order or not fitting it. Additionally, they feel helpless, powerless and humiliated. It is not important that some individuals experience discrimination “retroactively” and “realise it” under the influence of ideologies spread by political actors (i.e., “spoon-fed” interpretations of what injustice and equality are). The availability of other interpretations and their variety does not foster transparency of the perception of inequalities. It reinforces their inflations, forgetting some of them and then further returning to them. They also have a potential for divisions, even when hiding among small groups of the excluded, when they exist at the fringes of the discourse, with a stigma of radicalism or incompatibility with modernity and when their opponents perceive them as threats to the existing order. The divisions appear where the individually experienced distances take a collective aspect when they become a common experience. They appear when the sense of injustice “escapes beyond” the individual consciousness, beyond the individual experience of injustice. For such feelings to appear, it is enough to be aware of the lack of place for oneself or chances for competing with others effectively. Such situations are described by statements such as: “I do not feel good in society”. Thus, the divisions present are concealed and hidden in individual attitudes. The privileged and the excluded rarely maintain mutual interactions and usually are unable to discuss differences. Individuals tend to interact with others who are similar to themselves in many ways. The interactions between different individuals tend to increase the difference. Once they happen, they are awkward and full of distance. Nothing is as good at reinforcing the convictions of the presence of persistent inequalities within an order as the observation of violation of common rules or rights by a part of society or by the authorities. The cases showing that some are allowed to do more than others provide bases for the delegitimisation of the whole order. The lack of adherence to the agreed upon order of supply or access to a rare good not only arouses a sense of injustice but also creates the imagination of other privileges of such a group. They are created through thoughts like “they have everything” and “they can do everything”. In spite of the equality declared, “they” have privileged access to rare goods. In such a situation, any attempts at convincing uniform standards and equality of rights

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only provoke the discriminated. They only reinforce the conviction that the interest of the chosen is given priority over the interest of others. Thus, the experience of inequalities in a redistributive aspect is not only a subjective interpretation on the part of the individuals. The hierarchies created do not leave much choice—they impose paths of aspiration realisation to individuals, both upwards and downwards, within the hierarchy. To obtain the missing goods of all kinds—both material and respect-related, they need to take action in both directions. This is shown perfectly by the communist hierarchies. At that time, in the conditions of the contemporary order and limited resources of goods, it was impossible to satisfy all needs by maintaining the level of goods available to the nomenklatura and providing them to the excluded as well. The two paths of completely different models of aspirations and lifestyles could not have existed next to each other officially and without conflict. Accepting life values of the freedom- and market-oriented order meant rejection of the communist hierarchies. In view of the lack of goods, the promotion of identical claims and equal methods of satisfying them turned out to be impossible to implement in practice. The occurrence of a structural tension inside the order, mentioned, among others, by Neil Smelser (1963), accelerates the formation of divisions. It generates the politics of protest and leads to the appearance of not only social movements, but also divisions. These processes are driven not only by living through injustice on one’s own, but also experiencing it every day (i.e., being reminded of it through recurring relations). At its core is the experience of being wronged, realising one’s inferiority or a lack of equality in relations. The tension is created as a result of the realisation of such relations. The sense of injustice is related to the 2014, p. 143). Depriappearance of relative deprivation (Wnuk-Lipinski, ´ vation is also a significant factor for reinforcement of the sense of injustice as a result of comparing one’s own aspirations and actual position with the situation of others. The long-lasting inability to satisfy the aspirations of individuals (see Adamski et al., 1986; Białecki & Zaborowski, 1998), comparing oneself and valuing one’s own position (Białecki et al., 1996, p. 253; Lachowicz-Tabaczek & Pachnowska, 2007, p. 393), were— as demonstrated by studies—the ever-present characteristics of Polish society. The assumption that the divisions start in the individual’s consciousness and stem from their experiences makes them anchored entities rather

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than products of political games, a domain of interpretation and politicization of even the most traumatic events. It also takes into account the significance of psychological and consciousness-based constructs for their formation. Connecting the structural level with the individual experiences shifts the politicization of divisions (i.e., also the repartitions, from the level of “unclean trickery”) to the level of understandable and rational actions. It also shows that the divisions are not formed as a result of mechanical distinguishing of inequalities by means of obvious (i.e., easily noticeable criteria) such as education, profession, religion or sex. It is not the criterion of distinguishing inequalities that matters, even though it may sometimes reflect the actual division. It is not enough to say that religion constitutes a plane of division because there is a conflict or a difference of opinion regarding how to arrange the relations between the state and the sphere of spiritual life (Zuba, 2015, p. 17). The divisions are “complemented” by the sense of injustice of one of the parties, stemming, for example, from actions of the authorities, believers, Church hierarchs or politicians referring to a specific religion. The divisions are created around the line determined by an experience of discrimination, which was demonstrated clearly by the period of communism. Thus, the lone presentation of quantitative data regarding believers or non-believers and stating that society is divided along the criterion of approach towards religions say nothing about the division. In Poland, it is often that two parts of the Polish territory—eastern and western—are often compared, and it is mentioned then that there is a division between them. Yet, in practice, they just differ, for example, in terms of economic growth. For a division to be created, something more than distinguishing differences is necessary. A social division is always present between communities having a final composition that is difficult to determine. A significant increase in the numbers of a given group within a society does not lead to the automatic formation of a division axis around it. A division is characterised by members of two communities having difficulty establishing and maintaining mutual relations and feeling the existence of dissonances, leading them to limit their relations to the indispensable minimum. The members of these communities are aware of the persistence of differences, usually manifesting in the form of having unequal resources of goods at their disposal. From these inequalities, they derive their sense of having being wronged, a sense of injustice, a lack of equality or a lack of rights important to their existence. At the same time, the privileged individuals

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consider the system just and think that it requires sustaining. For these reasons, they may not even notice their higher position or think that the goods at their disposal have been distributed fairly, given their extraordinary work, talents and skills. On the other hand, the non-privileged 2014, individuals refuse to legitimise the inequalities (Wnuk-Lipinski, ´ pp. 142–143). Thus, the division is present when the group members are aware of injustice and opposing interests (K˛eska, 2008, p. 43). When analysing the divisions, it is valid to separate the differences that can be measured precisely (i.e., resources of goods from the cultural diversity present). Different clothing, the behaviour or even lifestyle noticed in someone else does not lead to distances and does not create or solidify hierarchies. And this is the situation when diversity is the cultural model of good social life, similar to the presence of different opinions on phenomena, facts or actions of other individuals. The opinion that “Polish democracy is doing fine” may exist next to the opinion that “Polish democracy is not doing fine”. It is valid to notice diversity and pluralism in this. Divisions may appear if differing evaluations and differences of opinion are followed by valuing, messages of superiority or inferiority of individuals expressing such evaluations or when people having a different opinion are denied respect or even become objects of disdain, when discrimination appears—i.e., when the people with a different opinion are denied intellectual qualifications, the right to participate in democracy or the right to express their opinion, when the different lifestyle of individuals is followed by emotions confirming their exclusion and when disdain or superiority is expressed towards others. Thus, what Zygmunt Bauman, among others, was optimistically presenting as the intensification of polyphony, cultural colourfulness of the urban life, mass culture and fullness with diversity or types of people or lifestyles (Bauman, 2007, p. 120), is an example of progressing homogenisation, a form of specific diversity of unity. The passage of inequalities to social consciousness takes place in various ways and depends on many factors, similar to the politicization of inequalities. In totalitarian regimes, only the divisions beneficial to the authorities are instrumentally exposed intensively and cynically. The other ones may remain dormant for a long time. In a democratic system, the probability of realising the injustice and the political actors considering the inequalities is greater. It is even recognised that actions towards that form the basis of democracy (Zuba, 2015, p. 17). In that system, all the divisions are easier to notice, although often even the pluralist socio-political

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environment does not ensure social interest in them. The constant experience of inequalities (e.g., economic ones) does not guarantee social visibility of injustices. Those economically excluded are pushed to the margin of society and suffer alone. Among those responsible for it are the dominant ideologies and their propagators, controlling interpretation of what injustice is and imposing the conviction that the suffering of the excluded is justified and fair. Inequalities are accompanied by whole systems explaining them or legitimising a specific shape thereof. The degree of their organisation decides the chances of articulation of specific divisions. Injustices are blocked in all order, although the scope of such blocks varies. However, it is impossible to conceal social distances forever. That is why certain divisions and inequalities turn out to be functional with regard to the order, although changing how they are evaluated requires actions, not only the passage of time. Examples of such situations are provided by the period during which the neoliberal ideology imposed on the excluded—deprived of jobs—the feeling that their situation stems from their lack of activity and qualifications. For over two decades, it kept society in an atmosphere of an apparent, recovered, “right” justice. In a democratic order where media play an important role, it is them who have an impact on highlighting discrimination. The injustice experienced, for example, by a celebrity has a greater chance of reaching the public consciousness than discrimination against the so-called “common man”. Everyone will learn about a celebrity who was humiliated, mobbed or abused at work, while no one will learn about a worker from the lower classes. Should both of those cases not be noticed and highlighted? However, it is most likely that the injustice experienced by the celebrity will be of greater interest to the media broadcasters, while individuals with lower social standing experience discrimination in loneliness. It is not surprising, then, that these two experiences have different paths towards politicization and the two examples of injustice have decidedly different chances for disclosure. The examples mentioned here show the unequal chances of the two types of discrimination becoming highlighted and gaining publicity. The discrimination examples disseminated may become a direct inspiration for politicizing injustice experiences by a greater number of victims. Every such actual case is a reference to a part of society. It refers to similar experiences and becomes a specific materialisation of politics. In political programmes, such individual examples often change into specific solutions, either legal or institutional, aimed at eliminating the risk of

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occurrence of such discrimination in the future. They are complemented by sets of information on the unjust socio-political reality. By inviting the discriminated to be active as well, the political actors call for the elimination of injustice. The actors’ attempts at fitting into existing divisions increase chances in elections, but also promise effective transformation of a disappointing fragment of reality. Through taking advantage of divisions and subjecting them to politicization, politics become connected to the issues of individuals. This is reflected in the words of Seymour M. Lipset: “In the new electoral democracies, the parties will be imminently unstable until the moment they find support in the deeply rooted source of division, similarly to what happened in the case of older, institutionalised democracies of the West” (Lipset, 2000, pp. 48–49). The politicization of divisions and creating practices around them becomes an instrument leading to the institutionalisation of conflicts (i.e., exposing conflicting interests and making them the object of a political dispute). It is complicated to capture the moment of birth of divisions, but it is easier to notice the beginnings of their politicization. Often, the divisions “reside for many years” within a society without being politicized, but sometimes the politicizations drive their growth. The first discursive mentions of the division constitute those. It is rather unjustified to claim that they originate when the division becomes significant in the discourse. However, every individual publicly arguing that inequalities exist is an entity activating the politicization. Every politicization is a rejection of indifference, a farewell to passiveness and a demonstration of involvement, an abandonment of silence being a consent to the concealment of an imperfect reality and a refusal to agree to the legitimisation of the existing condition. Both remembering the distances and forgetting them constitute their valuation and manifest in action or omission. In such a case, action means considering that the inequalities existing constitute a social issue. At the same time, the social recognition of inequalities and making them the foundation of divisions testifies to the elevation of one of the many concepts of ideological justice or equality.

Mechanism of Dichotomous Practices of Repartition The analysis of methods of making repartitions public, particularly of the contexts of presenting them, indicates that they require conducive conditions. They appeared on the side of political subjects both at the

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moments of experienced helplessness and at the moments of political tension during a period of decrease in political support when the situation of a political party or a politician propagating the practice was becoming difficult. They appeared in situations that forced reaction—in decisive moments of a campaign when politicians wanted to retain control over events. That is why repartitions often serve to “stop an imminent failure” and salvage political standing. The practices applied were a part of the political game even when they were an element of an election plan, a measured, internally coherent political structure relying on objective data on the condition of society. They were presented when the polarisation became aggravated, when the economic situation worsened or when further drastic discrimination appeared. They depended on the environment and appeared when the conditions were conducive to that. For these reasons, the practices are the politics of contexts, and each can be assigned an appropriate system of determinants, as well as receive a specification of the features of time in which it appears. Similarly to myths, they are a social creation related to the context. Only by placing practices in relation to divisions and with conditions of the environment, is it possible to explain and understand them. The practices appear when the social issues deepen, when incomes become polarised and the differences grow, and when the authorities usually consider them justified for instrumental and ideological reasons. Establishing such preconditions is not optimistic as it means that repartitions correlate positively with deep stratifications and depend on the existing spaces of injustice experienced by people. The more of them, the more frequently they appear and, after all, there is still plenty of injustices that require eliminating in Polish society. It turns out that the more intensively the individuals are denied quality, the bigger the chance for the appearance of repartitions. A lack of justice also increases the probability of obtaining support for the suggested changes, which translates to eliminating or reducing inequalities. This is the purpose of making discrimination public and rooting them in the injustice experienced by many people. And this, in turn, sounds more optimistic as repartitions may reduce human suffering. It is not certain, though, as the practices are risky actions, the result of which is never possible to predict. The divisions first condition the practices and are then socially constructed within them. This happens, at first, when they are realised by individuals on their terms, leading to reinforcement of the “communities of the wronged” and later, when they are developed, transformed

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and supplemented with complementations so that they are read in line with the experiences of the voters. The divisions are a substantial part of the practices and govern them. They become active in them using not only the imaginations of inequalities referred to in the discourse but also objective data, such as precisely shown dominations and actual limitations, examples taken straight from reality. In this way, they underline the contradictions and conflicts present within a society. When they meet this condition of being “rooted”, they arouse feelings, remind of interests and solidify the appropriate meanings and expectations of individuals. They constitute collective waiting for changes resulting from subjective evaluations and objective conditions of reality. They are considered valid choices as they receive their own confirmations as well as those of those closest from the environment that has similar experiences and opinions. On the general level, they take the form of simplified but ideologised declarations of changes. The repartitions constitute a collective promise of a change that is impossible to achieve individually as it exceeds the capabilities of any individual. The structure of repartitions is created by antagonist polarisation (Ziółkowski, 2019, p. 311), a dichotomous, discursive, understandable opposition, such as “rulers”–“ruled”, “poor”–“rich” (Olczyk, 2009, pp. 327–330) or “better”–“worse”. As Mirosław Karwat underlined: “(…) the polarisation means considering situations in the categories of absolute opposition and separation of parties—like two polars that cannot have any contact or even a common buffer. They do not want to have anything in common; they do not want to recognise anything, even some goods or paramount values or principles that could connect them” (2005, pp. 66–67). The parties to such opposition focus on themselves and the other party, accept the pattern of bivalent logic and make dichotomy the most important evaluation of a given order (Karwat, 2017, p. 143). The practices focus on two mutually exclusive states and, additionally, are a negation of differences between them. The bipolarity reflects the presence of a conflict, usually already in an open form. The antagonism of the dichotomy is indispensable as any approach towards the enemy community may weaken the conviction of the true character of the inequalities presented among the supporters. The oppositions are built around the injustices experienced in the order, which is why they have no scruples in reaching for Manichean morality, optics and phraseology (Ziółkowski, 2017, p. 101). Normativeness controls dichotomies radically, imposes unambiguous opinions

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on the parties and does not shy away from expressiveness. The oppositions valuate, presenting the rejected world image, as well as the image of the world as it should be. That is why, they take the easily understood moral dimension of “good”–“evil”, transitioning automatically to a group one of “us”–“them” (Ziółkowski, 2013, pp. 158–159). They are supplemented with complementary opposition formats, such as “true”–“false” or “just”–“unjust”. The dichotomies have a moral aspect, in which the most important consequence is one of the parties being denied the right to respect. Thus, the following oppositions appear: “just”–“unjust”, “workers”–“slackers”, “people of labour”–“freeloaders” (Giza-Poleszczuk, 1991, p. 84). The differences displayed usually regard values that are fundamental to the discriminated, which confirms that on one side there are the wronged and on the other, the people disposing of unjustified, immoral advantages. The latter additionally keeps generating a sense of insecurity and either constitutes a threat or only sustains it. The wronged, feeling threatened, are usually communities of righteous people, honest, selfless and guided by values. They always support truth, freedom and justice. That is why the oppositions created take the “form of cosmic struggle of the forces of light with the forces of darkness” (Słupik, 2005, p. 26). Underlining the presence of goods and indicating the evil makes the dichotomies impose a clear and understandable direction of values. They enable closing the discourse off against inconvenient topics, often taking advantage of moral blackmail. Immorality, anxiety and uncertainty originate from “them”— the privileged, who sustain unjust relations and turn a blind eye towards discrimination. The practices take advantage of the structure of dichotomy that is reusable and situates the community not only horizontally and spatially—which every dichotomy indicated—but also vertically, in the “top”–“bottom” hierarchy system (i.e., “superiority”–“inferiority” and “dominance”–“subordination”). Such a vertical arrangement reflects the differences, i.e., unjust conditions that are rejected and the just conditions that are suggested. The practices are epiphanies of social hierarchies. A vertical hierarchy presents the source of suffering and its elimination. Their combination in a dichotomy is a promise to the discriminated. The practices are not stories of how the subordination and exclusion happened, but provide meaning to the experience of exclusion and a lack of privilege. They clearly show the presence of dependencies and control of certain groups over the life of other ones. The creators of practices

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are arbitrary disposers of resources, influence, power, income, cultural capital, patriotism, respect and other rare goods for both sides of the dichotomy. However, they always do it in political agreement with the wronged. Thus, the inequalities are subjected to radical demystification and subsequent mystification. The assignments in repartitions confirm the privileges according to the negated vision of justice and appear in the interest of the discriminated groups with which they identify. The two communities are present as unequal, with advantages and limitations ascribed to them. At the same time, the unjust hierarchy is questioned and, next to it, another one is proposed as an “alternative world”. The practices demand a balance between the mutually very distant sides, which means changes in disposing of the goods, suggested—according to the repartition creators—in line with the expectations of the wronged. The officially declared objective is never the inversion of the inherited “top”– “bottom” hierarchy, but its equalisation—which does not mean that the inversion does not occur in practice. Usually, the practices are self-limiting and abandon rejecting the whole order, which—on the one hand—makes them more acceptable and—on the other—does not condemn them to a failure in execution. The visions of order suggested in repartitions are general and imprecise but are not based, contrary to myths, solely on an “act of faith”, although they do not abandon it either. They show the unequal reality. Even if some individuals have difficulty noticing these inequalities, they attempt to unearth the frequently rejected and concealed difference. They strive to reflect the existing injustices experienced by people, even though they do not shy away from distorted images of the order. The practices connect objective conditions with subjective imaginations of reality. That is why the categories that serve generating inequalities and structurisation—such as ethnicity, nationality, religiousness, level of income, origin or place of residence—“will find application in the practices” in the first order. Using them makes it easier to form repartitions, as always when such categories are applied, there are some “others” existing next to “us” and, additionally, they usually dispose of a level of valued goods that is different from ours. The structure of repartitions relies on the group level, which is the level of their existence, but they reach lower on purpose, turning to the individual experiences and wrongs. In individual experiences—private and frequently deeply hidden, subjective evaluations—they find their bases for existence. They constitute invitations to participate in the open space,

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extended practically to anyone who experienced injustice. It is the individual level that the strength of their influence stems from. That strength reinforces the collective consciousness of the sense of injustice. The practices are also consequences of individually identified differences, wrongs, aversions and a lack of respect or dignity. They are first processed individually and then driving collective social thinking through recalling similar events from the past or identical associations, arousing and sustaining emotional states. The practices introduce chaos into the existing hierarchies through an absolute rejection of unjust relations. Questioning of the relations is radical, “there is no consent” to compromises, and the practices do not allow any consensus consisting of co-opting a part of the wronged into the privileged group. A repartition excludes negotiating the injustice, through which it assumes a radical, nearly revolutionary character. That is why partial concession and actions in aid of the discriminated are not enough to and do not eliminate the divisions (i.e., the injustice). An example of that can be the Round Table agreements which reconstructed the order significantly and changed its most important values but did not eliminate all the wrongs and injustice stemming from the “us”–“them” division. They did not eliminate that division. The political compromise adopted, and allowing some of the individuals to participate in the order reduced its significance but kept it existing after 1989. Therefore, it was politicized, and further repartitions regarding it were still arousing emotions and maintained in a part of society the need for justice in relation to both the past actions and those designed to take place in the future. The dichotomy provides repartitions with static foundations for enduring, but it would be a mistake to focus only on that element of its structure. The most important and significant one is its dynamic structure, which is poorly visible but determined by the openness towards interpretations, the capability of permanent redefinition and processing of content, and complementation through specifications, symbols and references. This enables individuals and groups to interpret, transform and fit into the dichotomies suggested. Additionally, it enables binding the practices to social issues, which sustains dynamics in the practices, ensuring adaptation of past-related resources, including bringing them effectively into the present. The identification of differences made imposes a reduced image of the world into which unlimited sets of imaginations are fitted.

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The individuals accept repartitions as their own because they fit the imaginations and expectations that they have formed. They are compatible with their experiences and observations. This stems from cognitive properties since a structured image of the order is easier to accept and absorb. They identify themselves with the practices due to constant supplementation of their definitions with subsequent examples of injustice that, in turn, allow them to use the practices in thinking and telling others about them. The practices help individuals find their place in a complex reality. Thus, repartitions are one of the many forms of—and exceptional tools for—reducing the complexity of reality. The notions employed for naming the poles of dichotomy have certain pre-established general meanings within society. They are not alien to it, making them specific and inclusive simultaneously. Their final, purposefully defined meanings do not lead to misunderstandings—they are actually expected. The range of usable meanings and their multidimensional character does not limit their fundamental characteristic (i.e., focus on the substantial values). In this manner, the practices reflect the inequalities and control their perception. The practices, which are open spaces, suggest places where people can gather who often have trouble understanding complex politics. They constitute partially filled places, but are still open to new individuals, systematically persuaded and pulled towards one of the sides. The borders are always open to everyone accepting the differences presented. Persuading and retaining individuals is made easier by the oppositions suggested, in which only one side is entitled to goodness and the right to justice. The idealisation and elevation of one side always mean the depreciation of the other or negative connotations with it. Such meanings are not included only directly in oppositions, but appear in discursive supplementations and specifications of what these practices mean. Not constituting bases for dichotomies but rather complementations thereof, they follow keywords used for promoting and differentiating the repartition practices. As underlined above, the terms employed do not reflect reality in an accurate manner as it is not their purpose. They only strive to reflect the subjective imaginations and objective conditions to not be an artificial, solely instrumental product without ties to reality. They constitute an attempt at recreating fragments of reality or the whole of it, but they are more like constructing it and adjusting to the experiences of the largest possible number of individuals. It turns out that a significant role is played by the politicians’ knowledge of meanings that the individuals assigned

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to a reality in which they function, ceaselessly striving to understand the subsequently appearing motivational meanings, especially individual ones. Then, the politicians use repartitions to help the ideas and values considered important speak. At the foundation of the creation of repartitions is also the conviction that the language previously used to present inequalities turned out to be ineffective. Changing the language and using it to draw the line of the political dispute is the abandonment of previous politicizations of the division, which means waiving them. It is a new form of politicization. The language used for the complementing narration on the repartition content shapes its interpretations and helps perceive reality and adjust the repartition to it. The practices and their language aspect are focused on communicating with the recipients, thus constituting also an element of verbal attack on competitors. The simplicity of repartition manifests itself in the terms applied, which are metaphors defining the parties, in the composition tools employed. The language of dichotomy is treated instrumentally, serving manipulation and subordinating itself to the propaganda apparatus, approximating literary activity at times. It is not an easy task to represent the actual cases of injustice accurately and substantively at the same time, especially if one wants to additionally include in the practice the persuasion required that everyone expects. Often, attempts are made to make the terms or metaphors used seem neutral and objective, thus trying to convince individuals and shape their perception, thinking and actions. Although they often pretend to be objective, or even scientific, behind the veil of neutrality there are always ideologies—the virtues of justice and equality, which are the most effective in guiding people and influencing their choices. The insufficient clarity of certain dichotomies does not make them impossible to be understood by their recipients. The presence of the sphere of meanings and symbols in practices makes it easier to receive them, and their structure (i.e., polarity of standings) is also a facilitation. This does not mean that the misunderstandings regarding meaning, which often make receiving the practices difficult, do not appear. Complementation of an opposition relies on a large number of words, often equipped with non-obvious evaluating tones. Their pretended naturalness is thus an illusion or instrument for increasing their effectiveness, but it does not apply to certain practices. However, these apparently neutral oppositions always become filled with political content. That is why some researchers sometimes combine the

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attractiveness of different dichotomies with skilful use of language, determining the movement of individuals’ thoughts according to the directions imposed in the oppositions (Kołakowski, 1994, p. 71). Without a doubt, it is the task of the practices to anchor the individuals in the communities of the wronged. Repartitions aim at including in these communities the undecided individuals standing aside, not having strong loyalties yet or having an unstable identity. They do not leave much space for choice. The practices, being responses to the subordination of individuals, refer to the excluded through declaring demands for changing the situation and determining political actions. In this manner, they sustain collective identities and confirm the existence of similarities, even if they regard small groups of excluded—minorities that are only starting to fight to change the relations. The practices channel the discontent, also through forced and purposeful interference with the sphere of emotions, subjective imaginations and realised and actual interests. Such an integrative subordination to the practices constitutes an effective dam for the politics abandoning significant current social issues. The practices take advantage of manipulation and playing on emotions. The axiological and emotional aspects play a significant role in them. It constitutes an instrument serving to activate hidden resources of suffering and accumulated frustration or even the desire for revenge. What dominates is emotions, colloquial thinking and a sense of the appearance of long-awaited justice. That is why remaining beyond the pole suggested in the repartition turns out to be impossible. An individual fits into the “world of emotions” of the side with which they identify. The lack of emotionality and standing aside concerning the opposition imposed is excluded in the case of intensive emotional messages. With regard to systematically and purposefully presented examples of wrongs and images of injustice that cover the social consciousness space, it is difficult to remain indifferent. The examples of violating the idea of justice referred to in the discourse, combined with the utilisation of strong, often primitive, but moralising tone is a kind of manipulation that always impacts feelings. The emotional message plays a fundamental role in planning, actual action and realisation of the objectives set. The parties to a dichotomy participate “in emotions”, but it is the wronged to whom symbolic advantage is attempted to be assigned. This is why the creators of repartitions refer to the values, stereotypes, convictions and ways of thinking. At the same time, it does not mean the other party does not fill its own space with messages. Those applying the practices rarely decide to go

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beyond the canon of symbols that dominates at a given moment. The new ones, not having anchorage in the past, are usually not used. The focus is on persistent symbolic meanings, referring to the imaginations already shaped in the past as they turn out to be the most useful. Thus, the symbols employed are not empty—as the opponents of certain practices would like—because can the above be said about symbols or values of the minority groups who demand equality or the groups referring to economic equality? In repartitions, the values are given respect. The creators of practices are partial. They do not pretend to be impartial, do not abandon the difference and underline it on purpose, striving to inflate the inequalities. The practices make a determination of which values are important, which forms of life are worthy, carry respect, and which past and present states—which are part of those behaviours and actions—require condemnation. They impose a hierarchy of values or a preferred form of living that is the best for the order. The assignment of value in repartitions follows the opposition and both positive and negative palettes of valuation are present. It was perfectly visible in the “solidary”–“liberal” practice where purposeful supplementations were used for unambiguous valuation of meaningful content of the parties to the dichotomy. The features of the rejected condition and perceptions of justice typical of it were underlined systematically, with features of the expected order being elevated. References were made to the existing systems of values, some of which were presented negatively to the recipient, while others were elevated. The values were ceaselessly managed instrumentally, with uncompromising incorporation of new ones into the existing hierarchies. The perception of practices is not complete without underlining the ideological perspective, which can be noticed using the sphere of polit2005, p. 94). In interactions, ical values: justice and equality (Skarzy ˙ nska, ´ the individuals evaluate their behaviour with regard to the definitions of justice and lawlessness that they recognise. These values constitute the basic sources of legitimacy of the order, which is why there is no surprise in them “organising” the dichotomies. The purpose of practices is to underline the truth about injustice and the negation of unacceptable inequalities. They do not serve to sustain the complacency of the satiated. Repartitions often constitute a continuation of ideological disputes that had been carried out for quite a while, although it is often difficult to clearly read the ideological codes included in them. As a continuation of

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the disputes conducted, they become a confirmation of permanent divisions. Often, the individuals supporting one of the parties to a dichotomy are unaware that they choose a specific ideology and support specific visions of a good life. However, they are aware that they choose specific political options and specific politicians or support individual, specific political decisions. They have support for a better life for themselves and those similar to them, reacting to injustice. The following ancient words of wisdom are quoted in numerous works: “If you desire peace, care for justice”. These values, next to equality, constitute the main factor not only leading to divisions but also being at the core of repartitions. Besides, can anyone suggest ideas better for organising collective actions than justice and equality? Are there any more important modern values around which the individual can become organised? In modern times, they can be considered something that Karl Marx referred to as “ruling ideas”, ones that are unquestionable and reflect the fundamental features of orders, even if they are variable in time. Their position stems from their “centrality” for human interac1983, p. 18) and shaping the lives of individuals. They tions (Skarzy ˙ nska, ´ organise societies, provide a sense of purpose, “raise” individuals from humiliation and justify orders and forms of mutual treatment among people. They constitute a mechanism of controlling the orders, transforming them in time, providing reality with a specific rate of change, and openness to changing the unjust conditions. Their significance is not diminished by the fact that, due to being utopias, they both have multiple meanings and are variable. They never ensure a long and secure duration of meanings; they subject themselves to transformations and exist in hiding, only to “soon return again in glory” They generate disputes and political conflicts, thus competing with each other. The ideas listed often turn out significant for every state power, which is why they are often absolutised to present the authorities as just in the moral categories (Zaremba, 2001, p. 16) and thus legitimise their power. They are instrumentally taken advantage of equally often, in spite of—or perhaps in view of—their non-certainties, interpretation difficulties and internal contradictions. Irrespective of their shortcomings, both these ideas shape the visions of good order. The individuals evaluate their behaviour in interaction with regard to the definitions of justice and lawlessness that they recognise. However, for a significant majority of individuals, the just thing will always be the thing that is consistent with their interests.

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The virtues of justice and equality are of the greatest significance in modern politics. They mobilise to political activity and help individuals take a stand with regard to the unjust reality. Indifference is impossible and even becomes insulting. It is only according to the values that it is possible to evaluate the developed relations and consider them worthy of retaining or rejecting them. Michael Sandel perceived justice as a force that regulates interactions between individuals once social conflicts appear (Mandle, 2007). Such evaluations sustain the need for changes, and the overarching political objectives limit individual egoisms and mobilise the communities integratively. The decision to reconstruct the relations is an attempt at realising justice. The ideological values form divisions and help them transform into practices. Each practice guided by disappointment—even the most ridiculed and questioned one, being an object of constant redefinition or only evaluation through the prism of instrumental dividing of society—is a suggestion of the just hierarchy expected. It does not confirm relativism. On the contrary, it is an anchorage of universal values, even though they are understood differently. The rejection of injustice activates the practices and provides them with actual possibilities of social influence. The values organise the practices and determine their mechanism, ensuring their effectiveness, persistence and transformation. They consolidate and sustain optimism, while the moralist justification constitutes the strengthening of paths leading to the elimination of injustice. Repartitions “breathe” justice and equality; without them, they may not become useless, but definitely impossible to create. They reinforce hope, enthusiasm and the sense of the necessity of further activity. They build a moral trap that is very hard to untangle oneself from. The values of justice and equality together create an ideological hegemony, and their interpretations bring acceptance of groups having authority in the state. One of the consequences of that process is their observable dominance in a specific range of time and, therefore, the preparation of grounds for taking advantage of repartitions that reject it. The hegemony of virtues of justice and equality results in their differing definitions having a problem with reaching the recipients, but later they become a serious alternative. Usually, the ideas of a just and good life become depreciated the more they clash with the sets of everyday issues of social orders that are difficult to solve. They crumble and even collapse under the impact of problems for which they cannot find a solution.

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The rivalry of a different vision of justice impacts the creation of practices and binds the individuals with repartitions. The choice depends on the accepted concepts of fundamental ideas. Such a rivalry is described in the comments of Edmund Wnuk-Lipinski ´ regarding the possibility of replacement—during the period of transformation of Polish society—of the so-called “revolutionary justice” with the justice of “those who are the strongest at a given moment” (2003, p. 176). The practices are attempts at showing where the limits between communities run. Such definition of fields of affiliation contributes both to rivalry and limitation thereof. The determination of affiliation assigns individuals to groups similarly to territory marking among animals. The territories marked are spaces in which the communities focus on imagination. “Staying” together shows similarity that translates to trust and a sense of security. Repartitions, even those employed by the totalitarian authorities, led to the internal integration of groups and, at the same time, to control over them using the embedded sets of values acceptable to individuals. Identifying with individuals sharing the same values turns out to be a value. This does not contradict the fact that practices aggravate the political rivalry and contribute to the formation of conflict or lead to the accumulation of enmity. The intensively presented narration of the inequalities present forms closeness and social ties. Reminding about them strengthens ethnocentrism and promotes group stability. Repartitions turn out to be a legitimate method of building a political bond, modelled after the mechanism that Ernesto Laclau noticed in populism (2005). What brings closer to a bond is the place occupied in the structure, the position in relation to rare goods and the current situation in life, especially the financial one. The creation of bonds is also impacted by the method of presenting both parties—the one which the repartition author identifies with, bestowed with virtues, and the opposing one, dominant and excluding. The practices integrated individuals, strengthening the “common reality”. Repartitions reach for drama and do not shy away from causing and sustaining anxiety or a state of contentment and appreciation due to ascribing moral superiority to one of the parties. They rely on whitewashing individuals and encumbering political opponents or power circles with inequalities. The creators of a given practice assume that the voters sympathising with it will accept the opposition and not verify it in terms of truth and falseness. That is why they focus on taking advantage of the

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involvement of the recipients and their affiliation with both communities. The creators of practices offer a message about the importance of a single group, usually about its unjust humiliation. This fits the individual tendencies to putting particular weight on things that the individuals can relate to. The creators of repartitions rely on the tendency of the individuals to assign to themselves not only exceptional significance or being moral and good, but also to include themselves in positive events and transfer the responsibility for bad ones to others. The practices help individuals understand reality. They are based on the fact that the recipients are incapable of processing every single piece of information reaching them and absorbing such a large amount of knowledge about reality. What reaches them is only a slice or a fragment of it. Thus, they employ simplifications in thinking in order to absorb a part of the information. They go beyond formulating their own evaluation. The practices take advantage of the phenomenon of the emer2005, p. 28). They gence of accumulated social experience (Skarzy ˙ nska, ´ provide the recipient with a suggestion of the image of phenomenon, focusing on a selected aspect thereof and consciously imposing central and general beliefs. They mean focusing on one or a few aspects at the expense of others, equally important (Gierowski et al., 2008, pp. 104– 105; Reykowski, 1990, p. 14). The practices also save the individual the trouble of thinking about the complex reality. The centration included in the practices clearly forces looking at the order using the point of view of a politician, completely discrediting other arguments and views. Repartitions introduce order and simplicity into the evaluation of reality and support the conviction of a “simple world” because—similarly to myths— “they contain ready-made answers to questions about sources and causes of evil, while deciding at the same time who can and who cannot be trusted and how to behave” (Reykowski, 2000, p. 385). By releasing the individual from the necessity to think, they propose anti-pluralism that is attractive, especially to those wronged. However, repartitions are not a source of knowledge on reality that is impossible to undermine, although they do try to pretend to be one. Relying on the subjectivity of the recipients to a great extent, they cannot guarantee certainty. Additionally, they grow distant from objectivism due to taking advantage of ideologies that falsify reality. The injustice examples provided perform a mobilising role in them, but they are a simplification. They seduce by releasing from thinking—accepting them does not require high intellectual qualifications. The practices, being a reduction,

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constitute a form of combining the convergent individual experiences and are tools for tearing the individual away from the everyday chaos, the world that is blasting through and impossible to understand. Being suggestions of simplifications, they rely on a lack of complete knowledge of reality but, at the same time, assume that the hierarchies presented should be politically rejected and that the recipient will not accept them. They instead accept the postulates and methods of solving the issue of division elimination included in the practices. The use of a dichotomous opposition is not intended to create discussions, arrive at an agreement or explain situations together. It creates unambiguity and clarity. The authors of practices and their propagators strive to present them as sufficiently justified, undisputed and not raising any doubts—and one cannot hold it against them. It cannot be any different as it is hard to expect them to doubt the just image of reality they are presenting and precede it with a reservation such as “it seems that”. The practices are imposed closures of the political dispute over the status of the current situation, which is why they are full of calculation and intolerance, as well as without alternatives and destructive. Many commenting and observing individuals reject the practices due to their radicalism, but can they be any different if their guiding themes often involve the excluded fighting for existence and if they reflect the relations between groups having problems with approaching each other? The practices involve demands for limiting the rights or privileges of a part of society and modifying the dominant template of justice. Spreading such demands needs to be preceded by individual questions about the principles of the order. This happens before the individuals start noticing that the change in the form of the distribution of goods lies in their objective interest. It stems from this that the practices are radical and, since they offer no alternatives, it is difficult to go beyond the dichotomy adopted— which becomes nearly incapacitating. The uncompromising nature of equality-related demands takes an anti-system dimension when they focus on radical forms of introducing justice directed against the order. An example of such absolutisation can be the parties being anchored around different ways of perceiving the world (e.g., “Poland with democratic tendencies”–“Poland with authoritarian tendencies”). It is hard for a compromise to be reached between such parties. There is not a trace of doubt in them, which is why they delight the supporters and irritate the opponents. Political parties, utilising repartition practices, focus on monopolist activities and strive to reduce the chances of competition

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(Szpringer, 1996, p. 75). Chantal Mouffe claimed that every discursive hegemony means temporary closures (i.e., exclusions) (2013). The phenomenon analysed here applies to alternative visions of justice, having problems with leaving the margin [of society]. That is why the majority of practices can be considered creations of counter-hegemony. A practice attempts to form a community around similar experiences, thus forcing a reflection over the modern reality. Often, those taking a collective place on a specific side are not connected by anything other than similar imaginations of what should be included there. Thus, they do not create any clear and recognisable community. Their structural meanings enable individuals and communities having similar imaginations to become related to them. They facilitate abandoning the feeling of alienation, which applies not only to minority groups or individuals. They provide an opportunity for finding oneself among the excluded, for the creation of more numerous communities. This is where a peculiar egalitarianism of the practices of division manifests, providing an individual with an illusion of choice that is of value to them. It sustains the conviction of uniqueness and moral superiority and justifies failures and setbacks experienced in life. This, in turn, provides social elevation, an advancement based on declarations of others and own evaluations in hierarchies, being an illusion of elitism and, in truth, eventually a demand for egalitarianism. Looking at the practices from the point of view of a non-privileged party is the fundamental method for evaluating a given practice. This is shown perfectly by examples of experiences of the excluded in the “us”–“them” or “solidary”–“liberal” divisions. In all the politicizations of these divisions, the non-privileged are mainly the individuals experiencing economic exclusion, balancing on the verge of existential security. Often, they are completely marginalised. They are excluded from consumption and participation in public life and deprived of dignity and respect from the winners. They are individuals who have been pushed to the margin because their political representatives are refused equal participation in power. The authorities considered the postulates of the excluded too radical and not compatible with the “perfect” orders already created. In all repartitions, also those employed by minority groups, the pattern of defensive narration takes a similar form: your postulates are radical. Thus, they were expected to remain silent and suffer in that silence. Do repartitions exclude one of the parties by stigmatising it? Such allegation is raised by the political opponents of the practices. The critics focused on reinterpreting or excluding them, always guarding the interest

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of the political or social option they support. It is not so, for is it possible to hurt those unfairly privileged in society? The message of the practice is that the privileged should share the goods, change the rules of distribution and allow the excluded to participate in public life. That is why the practice is a form of radical turning of attention to the injustice, not excluding but restoring just relations. In the discourse, there are arguments that what has been defined in this work as repartitions is an action aimed at searching for things that divide, not the common ones. Such arguments seem to assume that the discrimination questioned does not stem from the dominating ones and does not prevent individuals from establishing relations and ties. Every politicization of divisions ultimately attempts to bring certain groups together, although often it is hard to find any impartiality or objectiveness in it. The practices polarise society by building two opposing camps, but they are not the only politicizations of a specific division and, therefore, it is not valid to say that they promote aversion and intolerance and prevent compromise. They call for reaching it. Some people perceive the practices as instruments for raising anxiety, but they are rather a measure that brings a sense of security. A sense of threat is embedded in unjust hierarchies. The features listed make the practices a self-driving mechanism, which underlines their expressions: a ruthless grimace targeted at the privileged and a smile of hope directed towards the excluded. The practices are a form of controlling the present and an attempt at shaping the future. They constitute an institutionalisation of rivalry between groups, indicating conditions that need to be rejected and demonstrating measures and range of possible activity. They increase the sense of worth of one social group at the expense of another. Thus, they are not only tools that enable differentiating oneself from a political competitor. Their effectiveness stems from being focused on the future in which the expected consequences are to appear. They do not leave the inequalities existing to randomness or a stroke of luck. All the practices state the following clearly: “the tomorrow cannot be a continuation of the today”—and this is what irritates those who dream of the today being identical to the tomorrow. The practices make the future more predictable and controlled, assuming that the realisation of demands included in them leads to improving the reality. The practices make people realise the necessity of a community of actions. They constitute suggestions intended for mobilising the excluded to public expression of objection to the problems of the order. They

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strive to activate actual socio-political forces transforming everyday life. It is not inertia—as some people think—that keeps the orders stagnant, but the stabilising actions of those who benefit from them. The practices are examples of top–down influence focused on both mass and individual recipients. They force a certain behaviour of the recipient as it is impossible to take the role of an indifferent observer who wants to seek objective information without considering the postulates of change. The practices constitute political communication in the form of recollection, agreement and domination. They are born from disappointment and objectification, but they provide empowerment. They express disagreement, which is why they include both the aspect of scepticism and the conviction of the necessity to continue the political struggle. Persuasion to act is a part of repartitions, especially when numerous factors exist that 2007, pp. 65 et seq.). impact voter activity and turnout (Dzwonczyk, ´ They are intended to uproot individuals from indifference and idleness. That is why sometimes it is said that practices are manufactured only in order to activate selected groups. It is also with the intention to make the activity of these groups legitimise the authorities, which took place during the communist era in Poland when the practices were used for falsifying reality. By using them, “the rulers of the state hid behind the masks of ´ 1998, p. 290). revolutionaries” (Swida-Ziemba, The practices total the efforts of individuals and transform them into collective action. The individuals do not solve the issues defined by using repartitions on their own. This requires involving other actions, taking advantage of imagination, adopting interpretations related to the practice and, subsequently, specific activity. In such cases, they may have a nature of significant sociotechnical and manipulation instruments increasing the dynamics of political life. Abusing these instrumental and persuasive features of the practices does not deprive them of significance or usefulness for transforming the order when the useful capital accumulated is the current political gains in the form of support and some of the citizens identifying with specific parties (i.e., with the political sphere).

Conditions for Applying and Redefining Repartition Repartitions, being projects of changes and promises of changes will never ensure the realisation of the project they declare. Similarly to other politicizations, they never provide any certainty of becoming a new reality,

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similarly to how they do not always serve effective conduct of politics. Even when repartitions make it easier for their creators to gain or retain power, this does not mean the elimination of inequalities. The practices need to be translated effectively into specific actions. Polish politics are a history of unrealised promises and change projects also presented with repartitions. The practices consist of negative valuations, which is an intrinsic part of them and employ criticism of social relations to describe the detrimental order. They cannot exist without questioning the relations. Such a negation of relations leads to rejection and undermining of the practices themselves. By criticising the order, they expose themselves to attacks from its defenders. A part of those ceaseless attacks is the suggested redefinitions of repartitions and their subsequent differing valuations, politically useful to the opponents. The repartitions, particularly those undermining the foundations of the order, become an object of ruthless political disputes. Repartitions are tools serving communication between political actors, practice initiators and creators and the wronged, taking advantage of the injustice they experienced and their imaginations of them. It is a process of finding social anxieties and dissatisfaction in the present, noticing individuals and groups that experience blocks for their expectations being satisfied and for their most basic forms of development of their life being implemented. Noticing divisions that can be found in practices forces looking to the past as creating an effective practice without recognising the causes hidden in the past is impossible. The examples of injustice legitimising the practice presented in the discourse are always past-oriented. The reception of practices is always limited by the interpretations made by their opponents, the politicians defending the privileged or supporting their position and other participants of the discourse. Some political actors do not notice the divisions, for ideological or political reasons, and often because they also contributed to their appearance. These tendencies can be clearly seen in the attitudes of many communities towards the politicization of the “us”–“them” or “losers”–“winners” divisions. Their opponents openly rejected any repartitions, negated the methods of presenting inequalities and questioned their existence. They openly underestimated the existing discrimination and wrongs, sustaining their own contempt for the humiliated and excluded. At the same time, they sought different meanings and interpretations in repartitions and the original perceptions thereof. A part of such activation of repartitions

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was transforming them through the manipulation of metaphorical meanings. The parties were ascribed different personal compositions and values preferred, and it was confirmed that an opposition between the parties existed, but it regarded other things. In this manner, the practices were questioned. An example of such transformation (completely admissible) was the behaviour concerning the “solidary Poland”–“liberal Poland” practice, which was assigned new axes, thus showing the presence of other inequalities. The “solidary” side was assigned traditionalism, while the “liberal” one—modernism (Zuba, 2015, p. 18). The attitude towards modernity, openness and social progress was made the axis of such a reinterpreted practice. The reinterpretations of the “solidary Poland”–“liberal Poland” practice were extraordinarily numerous. The more intensively they were applied, the more they constituted confirmations of the actual poverty of those who lost in the transformation. Employing redefinitions testifies to the accuracy of the original dichotomy and its adequacy in presenting inequalities. Performing redefinitions requires skill as it always consists of undermining the original, most obvious associations and values. What happens frequently is reaching for ridiculing and the application of satirical references, as well as reminding the alleged socially and politically detrimental consequences of it. Such actions are often effective, especially in a situation when the authors of the redefinition are backed by a monopoly of media and information. All the discourse regarding the practice conducted by communities averse to it has the task of neutralising it, depriving it of impact or defacing its truths regarding inequalities. The same purpose is served by creating information noise and interfering with communication between the practice creators and recipients. It is done similarly to underestimating the demands included in the practice—by underlining that they are late because they have already been realised (e.g., by the authorities against whom a given practice is directed). Often, the encountered form of weakening the practice’s significance is the publicisation of the incompetence of its authors: “maybe their slogans are right, but they are unfeasible due to the people who spread them”. They are discredited by connecting them with a conspiracy-based perception of the 2009, p. 245) on the part of the repartition authors. world (Głowinski, ´ The degree and intensity of such actions depend on the level of a sense of threat among the representatives of the privileged. They perceive the practice as a strategy; the beginning of something leading to depriving

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them of a part of their current goods and privileges. Success of a redefinition strategy means a situation when the recipients often no longer know what the original practice was describing and what it called for. The practices constitute an attempt at reflecting an already existing conflict, which stems from a clash of interests of two communities. They contain knowledge of the experience of many individuals, resulting from the order rejecting their interests. Thus, they are not a case of making the first step towards dialogue. Therefore, all the suggested redefinitions thereof constitute a defence of inequalities and strive to maintain the status quo at all costs. Redefinitions need to be read as a refusal to solve the conflict and transfer goods between parties. They are a defence of the negated perceptions of justice. An excellent example of such political helplessness was the publicised political redefinitions of repartitions that referred to the “us”–“them” or “losers”–“winners” divisions. The suggested redefinitions of those practices constituted a rejection of dialogue on the part of representatives of the privileged. The purpose of redefinitions was to maintain the hierarchy (i.e., the current situation), but it was not always possible to achieve. In a democracy, repartitions are destined to be questioned by political competitors. It is not surprising as they testify to the failure of the order, causing discomfort in its creators and supporters. It is especially the authorities striving to remain in power who notice threats in alternative concepts of justice and forms of organisation of order. The description of pathologies of reality presented in the practices requires a reaction. In Polish politics, that questioning is usually based on simply accusing those who apply this practice of dividing society, which is supposed to constitute an offence excluding them from the democratic rivalry. In a situation of a media monopoly, such interpretations may turn out effective to an extent. They can be convincing, especially when the rivalry is based on polarisation, in a discourse governed by strong emotions, in a situation when “everyone listens only to their own” (Zaremba, 2019). When the voters follow the messages of parties, often supporting their most illogical and irrational suggestions and rejecting criticism and rational verification completely, they provide support to the practices or redefinitions thereof without any deeper consideration regarding what they refer to. The degree of politicization of divisions with the use of repartitions changes over time. During certain periods there is a greater intensity of it, and sometimes they appear completely unexpectedly, even outside of campaigns. Interruptions in their application, stemming from a lack of

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political tensions or the political discourse being dominated by another problem (such as a pandemic), also occur. Repartitions often become a weapon of opposition leaders, anti-system parties and populist movements, which is why they are often associated with a populist atmosphere. Sometimes it is impossible to separate repartitions from populism, and they become a single political instrument. The populists usually employ in repartitions the well-known and utilised “oppressed people”—“evil and egoistic elites” opposition. The universality of this opposition, irrespective of the historical period, is puzzling. “In the past, this was called the authorities being out of touch with the masses. Today it is referred to more gently as the alienation of political elites who started to live their own lives, their own disputes and the power struggle and stopped reac2003, p. 176). The tions to the actual needs of people” (Wnuk-Lipinski, ´ fact that the populists employ repartitions does not disqualify them as they are often justified when they regard actual cases of injustice. This is similar to populism, which is often the path to the empowerment of new social forces (Klementewicz, 2010, p. 109) when referring to the presence of inequalities. Thus, not all practices are populism unless we consider any demand to change relations populism. It is hard to find a clean presence of populism in repartitions. Besides, repartitions, being functional towards the order, threaten not only the authorities and are an instrument that can be used irrespective of the anchorage in power, even though it is closely related to it. This stems from the characteristics of the phenomenon of power, which is inequality— a hierarchy that always constitutes injustice for some of the individuals. Acting against the authority appears not only in totalitarian orders, although the practices created then are more frequently focused on the individuals and groups excluded, which always constitute a threat towards the authorities. It is usually then that the authorities present the excluded (i.e., “the healthy part of society” as a degenerated margin). That is why from the point of view of the privileged groups disposing of power, it is justified to talk about the populism of repartitions—which are a tool of the groups standing against the authorities. The majority of practices take advantage of a scapegoat, putting the whole blame for the inequalities created on one of the parties. It is often that populists, similarly to what happens in repartitions, recreate the vertical hierarchy that they define clearly as requiring changes. This happens with greater intensity during breakthroughs and social and economic transformations.

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“The populists joint the political activity in a situation of acute structural crisis” (Marczewska-Rytko, 2011, p. 25), taking advantage of radical politicizations. All the politicians declare that they listen to the “voice of the people”, but they do not always take action that would fit their expectations. However, the opposition parties care the most for the conviction of their connection to the people. Reading the expectations of this part of society provides the capability of realising the demands of groups marginalised in the social structure. The evidence confirming the existing discrimination may lead to the creation of either a populist strategy or repartition practices, which means that divisions and inequalities can be used for populist actions in general, to which it is difficult to ascribe such characteristics. An example is the “losers”–“winners” division, the politicization of which consisted of both populist actions and rational messages and demands, showing actual paths to changing the situation, even though the defenders of the order often called all the politicizations populist. The stigma of populism turns out to be useful for naming the criticism and critics of the order. A review of sources employed to write this work proves that those who employed repartitions were accused of dividing society (i.e., going beyond the admissible forms of conducting politics defined by those controlling the discourse). A politician employing repartitions was compared to an unethical athlete who reached for illegal supporting measures. Those accused of committing such evil deeds were mostly the same who bravely indicated the inequalities that needed to be rejected. Such an approach to criticism stems not only from a lack of objectivism. It is a consequence of the existence of a specific form of social consciousness, a political “protective curtain”. It consists of the support of specific political camps noticing the dividers only among those whose views they do not share. Such a position is also influenced by the interests of those evaluating and criticising the repartition, which is usually linked to the interests of groups remaining in power. That is why it is extremely rare for those supporting the order to react without emotions to the repartitions appearing that undermine it. When the creators of repartitions are the politicians whom the voters sympathise with, they immediately exonerate them by saying that their hand was forced, for example, as a result of ruthless attacks of their opponents. As a result of that, politicians to whom bad intentions are ascribed and that are said to divide society, always appear on the other side of the political dispute.

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Effective repartitions require their creators to possess particular skills in analysing reality and both political and cognitive competencies. The skills of situation analysis, discovering actual divisions and connecting them to examples of discrimination. They also need to be connected to earlier evaluations of reality performed by parties or politicians who spread the repartition and be coherent with previous postulates included in the programme. What requires certain skills is also the ability to take advantage of emotions. Such skill needs to be considered particularly useful. It is indispensable to possess the ability to “read and then supervise” time and connect past events and processes to present ones as every division is a creation of the past. Choosing it and then identifying it using practices constitutes valuation of time sections by social groups and, usually, extracting negative aspects from both the past and the present. Underlining the above skills does not change the evaluation that the practices are structurally simple instruments based on an obvious template. This structural simplicity regarding building and managing the practices and communicating with the recipients contributes to them being used frequently. After being announced, most practices are subject to ceaseless verification of usefulness and confirmation that they reflect actual inequalities that the individuals experience. In those who observe politics, certain repartitions cause profound embarrassment as the oppositions suggested turn out to be primitive and often blunt, leaving no space for imagination. In such cases, what appears is the feeling that the sole purpose of their creation was to discredit their opponents and their supporters. It is as if depriving the whole of a certain community of its dignity guaranteed a sense of superiority, uniqueness and moral high ground to the depriver. Often, the influence of such narration is temporary. It does not translate to long-term political support and does not create any grounds for actual respect. It is as if the contempt towards the privileged was the last resort against admitting failure. The effectiveness of repartitions results from their connection with inequalities and divisions that are the most important within a given structure. Taking advantage of fictional inequalities having no confirmation, in reality, leads to the devaluation of repartitions and even ridiculing them, and ultimately to their delegitimisation. Such practices cannot arouse emotions, encourage the individuals or masses to act, integrate or provide advantages. The world of communist propaganda learnt that perfectly as the arguments supporting many communist repartitions, memorised and collected with effort, were of no avail. The fact that the order skillfully

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and instrumentally utilised them did not change anything. The practices were diverging from social reality and, even if the arguments for them had some grounds, they were delegitimised by their creator—the propaganda apparatus of the order deprived of legitimisation. What that order lacked was the most valuable good—freedom, which made the repartitions unreliable. The monopoly of propaganda made it easier to create and transmit the repartitions, but using them in such conditions automatically turned their status into lies. Next to the populist atmosphere, another factor supporting repartitions is the mediatisation of the political scene and being guided in communication by images capable of interesting the recipients. The changes in the media sphere led to politics becoming reduced to the level of a media spectacle (Karwat, 2012, p. 568). The expressive, often controversial presentation of social problems constitutes a significant advantage in fighting for recipients in the media. The effectiveness of the practices depends on the method of their presentation and the evaluations made through media. The influence of even the most perfectly designed repartition can be limited and, in the case of a media monopoly, significantly inhibited. At the same time, the media’s search for topics that arouse strong emotions and regard “political management of society” provides opportunities for repartitions and sometimes even elevates them among all of the other information. That is why practices become an instrument of increasing the interest in media by providing a growing number of recipients and, therefore, the funds necessary for further functioning. Consequently, frequently, it is the media who “‘seduce”’ the recipients with practices—not to promote a specific political option, but in their own interest. Repartitions appear as significant items in information and propaganda communications. The policy of media forces focuses on differences, controversies, divisions and the existing or even artificial distances. The above comments confirm the determination that repartitions depend the most on the democratic order. It is in it that they show the full extent of their capabilities. There they can exist as a fragment driving the order or inspiring the changes required. Totalitarianism also took advantage of the practices, but did that while having complete control over their formation, use and transformation. It did not allow the appearance of their reinterpretations in the official discourse. This does not mean, however, that certain inequalities of the order were not weakened instrumentally (i.e., explained by the totalitarian regimes). Repartitions

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appeared only to “protect” the privileged groups, cooperating or constituting the social resource for the authorities. The task of the repartitions was to maintain the existing relations of the authorities and satisfy the particular interest of the dominant groups supporting the authorities. They served to constantly confirm the need for the persistence of the totalitarian order.

Practices of Repartition---Homogeneity Destruction Instruments The analysis has demonstrated that repartitions are applicable in order full of profound inequalities and divisions. Such conclusions can be drawn from the historical and economic experiences of Polish society after 1945. Back then, taking advantage of the practices stemmed from the influence of pre-war divisions and later from the formation of the “us”–“them” division, its persistence until 1989, and then the “losers”–“winners” division resulting from the radicalism of creation of the free market and errors made concerning that. The majority of repartitions analysed in this work resulted from the divisions listed above. However, not all of the inequalities transformed into social divisions. It happened when the excluded were under strong ideological control and political supervision. Additionally, the nearly homogeneous social structure often limited a wider presentation of certain inequalities to society, especially when they afflicted small communities or individuals not remaining in contact with one another. The homogenised structure hampered the emergence of divisions as the discriminated had trouble meeting one another. That is why repartitions exposing problems of minority groups appeared with lower intensity. On the other hand, there were other tendencies that appeared in Polish society. As the material standard of living and the economic self-sufficiency of some individuals improved, the economic divisions that earlier constituted the basis for inequalities lost their dominant role. Additionally, the political groups remaining in power were intensively obscuring certain inequalities purposefully and instrumentally, in the interest of its power and the unjust relations formed. It turned out that the instruments intended for “hiding” divisions are also at the disposal of the democratic order, which, similarly to the totalitarian ones, blocks the appearance of truth about the excluded in the discourse.

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In the context of the creation of repartition practices, the existence of a homogeneous society meant the domination of a single vision of justice in the discourse and imposing it upon everyone, thus permanently excluding the individuals referring to other concepts of a good life. Despite functioning in such a controlled society, the excluded were finding ways of building communities that demanded justice. To this end, they also reached for repartitions, which turned out to be not a threat, but a deliverance to the democratic, homogeneous order. It turned out that the practices still seem indispensable in a society where certain divisions are less noticeable. The homogeneous society formed as a consequence of communism limited the visibility of the exclusion of many minority groups. Chantal Mouffe similarly analysed the issue of homogenisation of orders and “ejecting” differences and conflicts beyond their margin. She saw a threat to democracy in the liberal thought and solutions suggested by it. That threat is supposed to result from the rationalist liberal thought negating the need for conflict, dispute and discord—things that form the basis of democracy. In party systems, this is to manifest itself through programme similarity, a lack of possibility of actual differentiation and forcing consensus at all costs. In such situations, democracies are to suggest “elections without choice” to citizens (Muller, 2017, p. 83). The more uniformity in society, the more it encloses the politicians within the present. Uniformity suggests that there is no future different from the present, it is decidedly more difficult to recreate differences, and there are problems with the imagination of any other future. Any images different from those presented by the present encounter difficulties in their path. Uniformity tries to pass as predictability and becomes an illusion of the security sought. It satisfies itself with continuation and enduring and loses energy in order to sustain the conviction that it constitutes an achievement. It does not provide any grounds for being surprised by imperfections and for planning the future by entering into it with different actions. It deprives of grounds for taking action and reduces the demand for politicians and alternative political programmes to the minimum. What suffices is the administrators, who keep society in the condition considered the target one. Any ideologically supported uniformity pays no attention to the future. It expects nothing from and has nothing to offer it. It has neither any respect towards suggestions of farreaching changes, visions of transformations, nor any time for these. Here a sentence from Donald Tusk can be quoted: “If anyone has a vision, they better go see a doctor” (Cimoszewicz, 2018). Although, in this case, it

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did not testify to acceptance of the existing social uniformities, but only legitimisation of the idleness of his political party. A homogeneous society can be presented as a perfect reality but, in practice, it questions the right to change. Repartitions appear when the minority lifestyles and values, different from the dominant ones, have trouble with “getting out of” subordination, remaining under control and domination of values or identities of majority groups. They lack the resources to dispose of the domination, which is why they must keep pretending acceptance for the existing order. Then, the imposed ideology imprisons them by forming a supervising shell in the form of sets of institutions, rules and standards constituting a whole that is difficult to break. A part of that shell is the domination of a single vision of justice which is difficult to question and reject promptly. Then even the existing democratic order does not discourage them from living according to their own values. In such social conditions, the practices help and become the audible voice of the excluded. They can lead to empowerment and self-realisation of social groups and individuals or at least help publicise such demands. The practices are not only messages about discrimination of individuals, but also support the process of the knowledge on discrimination reaching the public opinion to ultimately enable and accelerate the actions aimed at changing relations. The dominant reluctance to give rights to minority groups, present among majority groups, is in itself an invitation to create repartition practices. It turns out that repartitions are used for underlining and, at the same time, negating the homogeneities present in a society characterised by significant uniformities. This does not apply only to a society formed under the influence of a communist ideology focused on creating unity at all costs, but all kinds of formed societies where the conviction of the existing equality is an ideological part of the domination sustaining mechanism created, societies where the diversity is fictional and expressed only in the form of different styles of clothing, forms of consumption or participation in mass culture. The majority of such diversities do not diverge from homogenisation and usually served to hide deeper inequalities that are significant to the order. The diversity expressed in the above forms is usually a creation for the needs of a media game, artificially created images imposed not only in the interest of ideology and politics but mainly of the market. Often, this kind of diversity only forms a screen behind which the actual homogeneity and far-reaching uniformisation of the majority are hidden. Spreading such diversity usually constitutes a part of the process

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of closing the political discourse to the problems of others excluded or the people who are yet to be excluded. Social homogeneity does not tolerate actual differences, is afraid of them, fights them and notices in them (and rightly so) the greatest enemy for domination of the ideologies that support it. In a homogeneous society, often presented as a perfect one, the conflicts and social divisions related to them do not disappear. Some of them “expose themselves”, generating protests and manifestations and leading to the formation of social movements. On the other hand, other divisions existing for many years become blurred and lose significance without having any major support in the structure, which is why they stop being an object of politicization. A critical attitude (i.e., employing repartitions) with regard to the divisions that no longer exist causes a reflex of pity, and no one cares to redefine them or react to them. Sometimes there are present inequalities that are considered irremovable and ideologically decreed as such. Different ideological justifications adhered to them, and they became a part of long-term political strategies. Homogeneity does not notice the borderlines between groups. It does not mean that they do not exist; it just pretends they are not present. Transgressing them violates the peace of the order and introduces anxiety among the groups that support it and benefit from it. They stopped being noticed despite some people making a living out of finding the wronged and establishing political care over them. Usually, the lack of interest in them stems from the fact that the benefits of remaining silent about them exceed the benefits resulting from exposing the inequalities. Or, alternatively, it may be the dominant ideology that made all the injustices of the order invisible. The examples already listed in the previous chapter confirm the “benefits” resulting from employing the practices in nearly uniform social contexts. In such cases, the practices are created by people who refer to representing the interests of minority groups—the excluded, deprived of chances for implementing a change in social relations due to remaining outside of the main current of public life. The people originating from niche cultures with visions of equality and justice are different from the dominant ones. This regards situations where individuals have trouble presenting the wrongs suffered and convincing the majority of them having taken place. Such cases also include matters related to a sense of a lack of sexual freedom, limitation of free speech or a lack of tolerance for alternative lifestyles. The practices have been applied not only by leaders competing for the highest position in the state and strived to convince

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the excluded to joint their side. They have also been employed by antidiscrimination movements referring directly to values defined as left-wing, whose banners have born not only individualism but also postulates of appreciation of all differences. The usefulness of repartitions for the order was confirmed by means of the above-quoted descriptions of the formation of the practices in politics. They confirm that the idea of justice also constitutes them, irrespective of the existence of a nearly homogeneous society. The examples analysed show their application in a situation of presence and domination of clearly formed hierarchies and being under the influence of large communities and their dominating values. This confirms, then, that repartitions were aimed against those dominances and advantages, which means that talking about the impossibility of the formation of divisions when a single group within the order performs the role of a monopolist is not valid (Herbut, 1997, p. 42). Homogeneity creates repartitions and generates demand for them. It is when they become instruments for “hitting” subsequent privileged majorities, underlining their unjustified advantages and reminding them of the need to eliminate further hierarchies. At such moments, taking advantage of repartitions gains special significance, particularly through media and sociotechnical actions upon which the promotion of rules and values by minority groups depends. Also, it is definitely not limited solely to presenting the repartitions. Promoting them is a fragment of other politicization aimed at changing the situation of the excluded. A part of them is creating the “demand for values”, just like it happens in the case of new technological devices. In such strategies, the practices become the instruments of supporters and propagators of cultural privilege destruction. They take the form of dichotomies in which the minorities are presented as threatened by the lifestyle of majority groups (excluded and discriminated). Repartitions are complemented with further examples of discrimination and facts, sometimes even subjected to mythologisation. Minority groups are presented as disposing of special skills that are valuable and necessary to society. That is why repartitions regarding discriminated groups often require the distribution of resources according to new rules. They call for assigning a higher place to such individuals—this time, just one. However, they do not demand privileged treatment, but only justice they deserve because of exhibiting exceptional characteristics.

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A high level of homogeneity does not limit the frequency of employing repartitions. On the contrary, it often forces employing them. Similarly to the presence of numerous differences between individuals, it does not translate to a greater number of divisions. The logic of political rivalry and competition is also of little significance to repartitions, so often reminded in the discourse. In a homogeneous society, in relation to the existing and dominant communities, forming a new community of political feelings is always more difficult. That is why representatives of minorities politicize the divisions regarding them, becoming involved in seeking people similar to them, the excluded. Their minority character constitutes a hindrance as they find it harder to activate and integrate. However, the practices carry a special facilitation in finding similar people; perhaps that is why they can become the main (and sufficient) instrument for uniting the excluded. In other words, inequality can be perceived individually, which means it can be socially invisible, and this is when the practice becomes a rallying point for dispersed individuals. The Polish experiences indicate that the practices are not instruments that can be used frequently and in all circumstances. They are unfit for daily, ceaseless application (i.e., systematic and mostly artificial stimulation of recipients). They are not similar to political advertising, which is employed without limitations. It is impossible to accelerate the production of practices at will. Their excess or far-reaching variability in terms of referring to constantly changing divisions may also have negative consequences. These limitations stem from the capabilities of consumption of the practices by the recipients. They are unable to anchor themselves in subsequent, different practices within a relatively short time span. It is exceptionally difficult to change one’s own place and that of one’s voters within the social space (i.e., the side determined by the dichotomy). However, these oppositions can be constantly supplemented and systematically complemented with further similar examples of inequalities and descriptions of further examples of injustice. Abandoning them quickly would suggest that the character of the issues troubling the individuals is not serious. Instead of the so-expected and desired building of trust in the “politicians–individuals” relation, distrust would appear. It would increase the distance between the individual and the practice creators, thus destroying hope that the practices brought together with their appearance. For the above reasons, an important matter is sustaining a meaningful practice—i.e., one solving the fundamental problem of the existing division—in the discourse.

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The above comments confirm that justice still remains a serious matter and a superior value—one that is still in short supply in society. It disposes of strength even when ambiguity makes it impossible to ultimately define it. Also, in the case of minority groups reaching for it. This confirms that a rational reflection on society still exists and that the dreams of a better world can drive individuals and stimulate them to act. It also confirms that the change projects are still alive, that individuals still believe in their own capacity for rebuilding the world and that they still want to lead to replacing the uncontrolled and turbulent social transformations with a rational design. In those so frequently criticised practices still lies a note of the Enlightenment’s faith in the just order being able to achieve as a result of the purposeful and considerate organisation of social processes supported by science. However, it is better to listen well to the messages carried by repartitions, even if these are only interpretations subjected to further reinterpretations. The knowledge shaping the repartition practices does not come from intellectual analyses but is gained through experience and the spread of knowledge on human suffering through noticing groups and individuals functioning on the margin of society. The structure, together with its contradictions and shortcomings, often legitimises not only participation in politics but also revolutionary actions, although the contemporary observations made in homogeneous orders with invisible constituents of the structures raise certain doubts. At the same time, the social divisions themselves keep structuring politics, even though they are not transferred automatically to parties (Grabowska, 2003, p. 56). However, the presence of divisions has an “impact on the way of shaping the space of national political rivalry” (Herbut, 1999, p. 112). This is completely unquestionable—and confirmed by numerous studies also devoted to the Polish party system. The political actors take advantage of divisions in the rivalry, “approximating” different fractions of society that they want to represent and taking root among them. The politicization of social life always leads to the enrichment of the political sphere (Karwat, 2012, p. 15). However, the additional politicization of divisions, or rather a fragment thereof in the form of repartitions practices, also turns out to be “an effective method of gaining control over the election market and recruiting a stable clientele” (Herbut, 1999, p. 113). The politicians who refer to intellectual analyses and ideological treaties in their practices quickly realise that they are completely out of touch with social issues. All the tricks performed with practices and applying them without connection to social divisions (i.e., without the sense of injustice and inequality) do not lead to obtaining any significant social support.

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CHAPTER 7

Conclusion

Polish society participated in two sudden changes, bringing hope for a life in dignity, embodiment of dreams to many, and generating negative consequences—discrimination, injustice and atrocity. Still, the intensity of employment of physical violence, leading to the creation of resources of injustice and wrongdoings, was not identical in these two changes. The declared purpose of these changes was to build a just order. They promised improved material conditions, welfare and satisfaction of the basic needs of society. They persuaded, forced and encouraged everyone to participate in the work towards the realisation of either the socialist society concept, or capitalism and free market. They excluded and stigmatised those who did not want to participate in these actions. Both revolutions mentioned restoring respect and dignity in public space. However, they were ruthless in designating their enemies, although they excluded them to a different extent. They made human happiness—something hard to attain—the purpose of the actions made, which is why they were eventually forced to manipulate the states of reality achieved. They were both focused on practical actions and wanted to transform the order found, including social relations, clearly rejecting the previously applicable values and forms of living. They shattered society in a different manner and for various purposes. The first revolution strived to atomise individuals and, at the same time, build controlled social classes to be able to

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rule over them, while the other empowered individuals and even purposefully weakened large communities in order to bring hope to the excluded, striving to release their models of living from subordination. Comparing these two experiments is not an instrumental attempt at “equating them morally”, but at highlighting that the changes conducted were similar in many aspects, that they were based on similar mechanisms and that they often employed the same political instruments. Both were based on rejecting the inequalities experienced by individuals and intensively politicized their negative experiences. For these reasons, both experiments extensively referred to differently understood ideas of justice and equality. They called for giving all individuals a universal right to equality and dignified existence, although they gave different meanings to these postulates. Both these experiments constituted, to a large extent, a reflection of the large, centuries-old political dispute regarding the vision of a good life. In this manner, they became anchored in the intellectual achievements of humankind. Their sources were located in the fundamental image of good social order. At the same time, both these changes were, to a great extent, imposed and implemented top-down without discussion, although within a varying scope and with various scales of the physical violence employed. Additionally, they had support in history and were eager to create a new reality while convinced that history made the final choice and decided to stand on their side exactly. Some of the similarities listed in this book were underlined in view of their significance for the main research problem, while others were purposefully omitted. They have been presented in other elaborations that are publicly accessible and regard the history and transformations of Polish society. Some of the features of both changes were reminded to underline the universal nature of mechanisms of formation of Polish divisions, to capture the forms of their politicization and the repartition practices first and foremost. This approach to both changes, performed chronologically and comparatively, allowed building the foundations of the formation of divisions and the nature, character and application of repartitions. The analysis showed that divisions are creations that require time and are determined by social and economic environment conditions. They arise quicker than the creations in the classic determinations of Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan and are determined by political and economic activities leading to the formation of not only noticeable, but also onerous structural inequalities. It turned out that the economic structure still

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conditions social life to the greatest extent. The unequal arrangement of individuals within the social structure, i.e., according to the factors determining their lifetime chances, leads to individuals reflecting on the ubiquitous lack of justice. Justice is evaluated by comparing one’s chances and possibilities for satisfying one’s needs with the actual satisfaction of needs by other individuals. Additionally, the capacity for evaluating one’s own position stems from mental predispositions, personal experiences and subjective and psychological factors, and cognitive differences and differing interpretations of existing inequalities govern them. They often lead to a sense of individual injustice, exclusion and discrimination. These conditions find confirmation in unequal social relations undertaken and recreated by individuals. The collective anxiety arising or—in a wider perspective—specific claims appearing are usually shaped by ideological and moral beliefs, mainly by the disseminated visions of the values of justice and equality. The meanings and interpretation of these values are particularly important for the excluded individuals. They are usually hidden deeply and marginalised. They are only accepted by minorities— groups without any major influence or hope of gaining significance. Social divisions are formed when inequalities become a part of the collective consciousness, when they go beyond the individual sense of injustice and become the experienced social distances. These studies have shown the divisions to be actual and real structural problems and social tasks, dynamic and universal, originating from social relations. The perspective presented in this work assumed that the appearance of divisions is a consequence, first and foremost, of the existence of wrongs, inequalities and discriminations, which stems indirectly from the internal contradictions between elements having a structural and functional genesis. It is those that become the sources of tension. They are confirmed by the individuals constantly drifting away from one another, usually due to disposing of different resources of goods. A significant place for the divisions is the process of creation and transformation of relations, leading to inequalities due to the multifaceted, purposeful political actions spread over time, as well as spontaneous social transformations. The divisions are structures created socially as a result of the individuals’ continuous confirmation of their own advantages and limitations. The existing and recognised imaginations of justice and equality play the central role in this process of assigning meanings. According to the concept preferred in this work, the divisions are not created as a result

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of sociotechnical tricks, fictional oppositions or intensive propaganda activities. The formation of divisions shows the unique role of morality, hidden in the visions of societies, in the concept of a good life implemented for decades (often even driven to extremes). They contain universal values of justice and equality and expectations towards orders, as well as constitute in the individuals the disappointment regarding the orders. Thus, the ideologies serve to impose domination of selected values. Both the experiments discussed in this work eliminated the division found and officially declared such objectives. The first one, after 1945, strived to equalise the pre-war social structure that was full of inequalities, but led to the formation of the “us” vs “them” social division. The second one, after 1989, tried to eliminate the communist-era division using economic reforms, but only sustained it and led to the formation of new ones, the dominant one among them being that between the “losers” and “winners” in the transformation. It not only generated inequalities but, in the political discourse, it applied extensive forms of exclusions and discrimination, both open and hidden, with ruthless “ideological cruelty”. The observation of Polish divisions confirmed that the political and economic attempts at eliminating the division found created new spaces of injustice that were exploited politically afterwards. Subsequent hierarchies of inequality appeared intensively, officially referred to as just, which, to many people, deviated from what they understood as justice. They were noticed first by a few individuals and later realised socially. Often they were also politicized at the same time. In both experiments, the authorities created new inequalities while trying to eliminate existing ones. Then they were hiding the new ones intensively, but ineffectively, which is why they quickly became a powerful source of threat to the orders, as they threatened the life of a part of society. In view of the inequalities existing in every order, repartition practices turned out to be one of the intangible products of society that serves to transform the reality, mainly in the material aspect, but not only. They become a mechanism of the planned social change and interference aiming at transforming the social structures, an indirectly significant, but not the sole instrument used for controlling the social life by driving individuals to act. Repartitions are attempts at recreating the existing relations of society with itself based on the realisation of its own pathologies, states of wrongdoing and injustice and its existing weak points, often

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hidden deep within its structure. Repartitions are, first of all, an attribution of guilt valued over the needs of the excluded. But later, it turns out that they are products of political actors who notice collective needs and, because of that, initiate actions aimed at the transformation of relations. They strive to move past the present, leave the historically shaped condition and go beyond the existing order and relation (i.e., create an alternative reality). Repartitions constitute consequences of the existing divisions, of the inequalities not only socially realised and felt, but also usually already questioned by individuals. Politicizing them using repartitions is a confirmation of loss of control of the orders over supervising the divisions. The main role of the practices is always criticising the order. Thus, they constitute only a part of the technical instruments that politicians employ to eliminate evil from the life of societies. They lead to extracting and underlining the evil existing in the inequality hierarchies created. They expose the main inequalities and the mechanisms supporting them. Thus, they take the dimensions of simplified “dichotomous images” of reality but, at the same time, developed, internally open and capacious definitions available to all individuals who experience injustice. The practices are not only a method of conducting political activity to increase voter support or recover position in politics. They perform the role of instruments serving to eliminate divisions and inequalities, perfectly visible on the level of social structure, as well as for crushing the homogeneous society in which it is harder to notice those discriminated against. They have a significant share in creating the change, also constituting a claims policy that is possible in practice. They reflect tensions resulting from unjust privileges. When they are answers expected by the wronged, they lead to a reduction in structural tension and are political methods of dismantling the substrate that leads to a violent conflict. They anchor the excluded in the new reality—an alternative to that presently existing. They keep them convinced that their involvement and becoming a part of repair mechanisms is necessary. It seems that they drive the conflict but, in practice, they mainly serve to stabilise every order by neutralising problems and enabling solving them, thus postponing the necessity for radical destruction of the relations found. Repartition practices are not manufacturing divisions as it is hard to divide those already divided. They are calls for rejecting the space of injustice experienced together and present inequalities between the

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parties that require mutual approximation. The subordination of particular groups neighbours there with the domination of others. However, this is not an example of resignation and accepting one’s fate. The practices show images of inequalities but are filled with hope and strength, as the promises of changing the situation are a part of them. They serve to solve the dysfunctional character of structures through the propagation of alternative hierarchies. That is why skilful reading of the order, i.e., the distances and inequalities existing, eventually makes the repartitions effective. They lead to handling the fundamental issues, not the accessory or substitute ones. They provide empowerment to the excluded. They make a democratic choice a true choice that is additionally anchored around justice and equality. At the same time, the repartitions mobilise and help in fighting for political support and forcing one’s own programme through. Politicians employ repartitions to achieve their own objectives effectively and to ensure and maintain voter support. Therefore, they still constitute an important part of politics and ensure their existence. Meanwhile, the voices of outrage and condemnation directed against the actors who take advantage of repartitions are nothing but a further politicization of divisions that serves to sustain them. Thus, when politicians say that repartitions “divide the country”, they usually act in this manner to defend the current distribution of goods (i.e., they strive to maintain the position of the privileged groups). Repartitions are one of the few confirmations of the existence of politics based on an alternative system of equality and justice. As long as the dispute regarding these ideas lives on, we can keep talking about the persistence of moral sensitivity in politics, on the existence of actual public debate and not a sort of game of politicians played only for instrumental purposes. And we can also keep talking about the reference to the grand Enlightenment Era legacy, or rather sustaining it. They are a confirmation that politics keep “serving”, irrespective of the interpretation of what equality and justice are, the search for a good life. They provide evidence that politics do not yield, do not abandon a part of their rights and are capable of further determining the direction of changes (as they regard the actual problems to be solved) significant to social groups. The appearance of politicizations of the divisions, including repartitions, guarantees that society keeps managing its future and that it builds alternative definitions of reality by taking advantage of differentiating judgements.

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In view of the rate of changes that is uncontrollable, of the impossibility to identify their direction, the practices are that tiny particle—an element of the democratic order—which includes symbolic violence and aggression that people need to learn to tolerate. It cannot be any different as the division itself is a confirmation and sustaining of violence, and its elimination is impossible if the violence is fully abandoned. That is why practices become instruments for designing and maximising the expected political objectives. It is a sort of conveyor belt, a part of the unbreakable game on a scale most important to individuals. Therefore, they build actual and real alternatives for voters. They enable the belief that politics are truly where the suffering human heart is. They confirm that society is ahead of politics and keeps the instruments of agency in its hands.

Index

A Adamski, Władysław, 80, 85, 92, 93, 95, 206 agricultural reform, 26, 35, 36, 45, 51, 60

B Balcerowicz, Leszek, 110, 121 Bartolini, Stefan, 6 Bauman, Zygmunt, 107, 202, 208 Berlin, Isaiah, 112 Brezhnev, Leonid, 78 Bugaj, Ryszard, 109, 110, 116, 121

C Catholic Church, 23, 86, 94, 139–142, 177, 183 Central Statistical Office (GUS), 110, 156 Centre for Public Opinion Research (CBOS), 156 collectivisation, 15, 36, 38, 51, 83

communism, 2, 15, 17, 23, 25, 26, 36, 44, 47, 49, 65, 75, 77, 78, 105, 107, 109, 117, 118, 122, 127–129, 133, 134, 139, 144, 168, 170, 180, 198, 207, 236 Concordat Act, 142 Confederation of Independent Poland (KPN), 131 Coser, Levis, 204 Cze´snik, Mikołaj, 6, 162, 173

D Dembowski, Edward, 23 Democratic Left Alliance (SLD), 138 Domanski, ´ Henryk, 3, 4, 39, 73, 90, 113–116, 118–122, 125–127, 158, 199 Duda, Andrzej, 16, 186

E European Union (UE), 160

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 P. Borowiec, The Politicization of Social Divisions in Post-War Poland, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-26530-3

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INDEX

F Figiel, Agnieszka, 6, 170, 174, 178, 181, 198 Filar, Dariusz, 163 Flanagan, C. Scott, 6

G Gardawski, Juliusz, 122, 158, 160 Gazeta Wyborcza, 156 Gierek, Adam, 64, 79 Giza-Poleszczuk, Anna, 72, 74, 81, 93, 97, 166, 203, 213 Gomułka, Władysław, 25, 31, 64, 89 Grabowska, Mirosława, 5, 6, 15, 65, 93, 94, 99, 130, 135, 136, 138, 141, 144, 198, 241

H Hamilton, Malcolm, 106 Herbut, Ryszard, 6, 239, 241 Hirszowicz, Maria, 15–17, 58, 87, 106 homo oeconomicus , 111, 154

I Independent Self-Governing Trade Union “Solidarity”, 82, 108, 170 industrialisation process, 39, 40, 47 Inglehart, Ronald, 6

J Jaroszewicz, Piotr, 79 Jarosz, Maria, 94, 110, 125, 152, 165, 171

K Kaczynski, ´ Jarosław, 186 Kaczynski, ´ Lech, 170, 172

Karwat, Mirosław, 5, 212, 234, 241 Kenney, Padraic, 31, 34, 48, 65, 66, 68, 71, 72, 74, 75, 87 Kitschelt, Herbert, 6, 130 Klementewicz, Tadeusz, 152, 156, 164, 231 Knutsen, Oddbjørn, 6 Komorowski, Bronisław, 174, 183 Kopernik, Mikołaj, 23 Korwin-Mikke, Janusz, 186 Ko´sciuszko, Tadeusz, 23 Kotnarowski, Michał, 6, 162, 173 Kukiz, Paweł, 186 Kurczewski, Jacek, 114, 120 Kuron, ´ Jacek, 163 Kwa´sniewski, Aleksander, 134

L Laclau, Ernesto, 222 Lenin, Vladimir, 23, 24 Lipset, M. Seymour, 6, 198, 202, 210, 246

M Mair, Peter, 6 Markowski, Radosław, 6, 94, 165 Marody, Mirosława, 3, 34, 44, 61, 62, 91, 96, 161, 163, 166 Marx, Karl, 6, 19, 58, 220 Mazowiecki, Tadeusz, 127 Michnik, Adam, 2 Mickiewicz, Adam, 23, 24 Morawiecki, Mateusz, 186 Morawski, Witold, 87, 96, 108, 113 Mouffe, Chantal, 225, 236

N nomenklatura, 51, 61, 62, 76, 82, 86, 87, 91–99, 105, 106, 113, 118, 121, 128, 130, 133–135, 139,

INDEX

144, 152, 158, 161, 164, 167, 206 Nowak, Stefan, 42, 94 O Obacz, Piotr, 6, 169, 171–173, 199 Olszewski, Jan, 132 P Poleszczuk, Jan, 67, 68, 71, 73 Polish Committee of National Liberation (PKWN), 24, 26, 35 Polish People’s Republic (PRL), 29, 61, 64, 81, 83, 93, 97, 99, 111, 115, 116, 118, 121, 125, 129, 131, 133–136, 139, 144 Polish Socialist Party (PPS), 27, 44 Polish United Workers’ Party (PZPR), 15, 27, 44, 72, 93, 97 Polish Workers’ Party (PPR), 26, 27, 44 Provisional Government of National Unity, 26 R Rakowski, F. Mieczysław, 97, 98 Red Army, 33 Rokkan, Stein, 6, 198, 202, 246 Round Table, 108, 127, 135, 215 Rychard, Andrzej, 14, 61, 76, 79, 80, 82, 83, 90, 118, 158, 166, 199 S Samoobrona, 123 Sandel, Michael, 221 Scarbrough, Elinor, 6 ´ Sciegienny, Piotr, 23 Second Polish Republic, 13, 17, 33 Security Office (UB), 15, 69, 74, 88

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Smelser, Neil, 206 socialism, 14, 20, 24, 29, 31, 32, 40, 51, 78, 79, 81, 82 Solidarity, 82, 96, 108, 112, 127, 128, 131–133, 135–138, 140, 162–164, 166, 170, 174 ´ Spiewak, Paweł, 170, 178 Stalinism, 19, 68 Stalin, Joseph, 15, 21, 24, 64 Stanley, Ben, 6 State Agricultural Farm (PGR), 126 ´ Swida-Ziemba, Hanna, 2, 14, 16, 19, 23, 43, 63, 67, 68, 71, 72, 75, 80, 88, 89, 91, 95, 227 Szawiel, Tadeusz, 47, 94, 130, 136, 141, 143, 144 Szela, Jakub, 23 T Third Polish Republic, 131, 169, 173 Trotsky, Leon, 20 Tusk, Donald, 138, 174, 236 U Union of Polish Youth (ZMP), 43 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), 15 uravnilovka, 170 W Wał˛esa, Lech, 136 Wasilewski, Jacek, 4, 85, 94, 139 Wnuk-Lipinski, ´ Edmund, 14, 79, 87, 92, 96, 97, 99, 115, 121, 123, 140, 142, 157, 158, 161, 206, 208, 222, 231 Z Zarycki, Tomasz, 6