The Oxford Handbook of the History of Psychology: Global Perspectives [Illustrated] 0195366557, 9780195366556

Table of contents :
Cover
Contents
1. The Internationalization of Psychology: A History
2. Australia
3. Brazil
4. Brunei Darussalam
5. The Caribbean
6. China
7. Colombia
8. Czech Republic
9. Egypt
10. England
11. Finland
12. France
13. Germany
14. Ireland
15. Italy
16. Japan
17. Lebanon
18. New Zealand
19. Philippines
20. Russian Federation
21. Saudi Arabia
22. Scotland
23. South Africa
24. Spain
25. Thailand
26. Turkey: A Case of Modernization at Historical, Political, and Socio-cultural Cross-roads
27. United States
28. Venezuela
29. Concluding Th oughts on Internationalizing the History of Psychology
Index
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
I
J
K
L
M
N
O
P
Q
R
S
T
U
V
W
X
Y
Z

Citation preview

The Oxford Handbook of the History of Psychology

OXFORD LIBRARY OF PSYCHOLOGY

editor-in -chief

Peter E. Nathan area editors

Clinical Psychology David H. Barlow Cognitive Neuroscience Kevin N. Ochsner and Stephen M. Kosslyn Cognitive Psychology Daniel Reisberg Counseling Psychology Elizabeth M. Altmaier and Jo-Ida C. Hansen Developmental Psychology Philip David Zelazo Health Psychology Howard S. Friedman History of Psychology David B. Baker Industrial/Organizational Psychology Steve W. J. Kozlowski Methods and Measurement Todd D. Little Neuropsychology Kenneth M. Adams Personality and Social Psychology Kay Deaux and Mark Snyder

OXFORD

LIBRARY

OF

Editor-in-Chief

PSYCHOLOGY

peter e. nathan

The Oxford Handbook of the History of Psychology Global Perspectives Edited by

David B. Baker

1

1 Oxford University Press, Inc., publishes works that further Oxford University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education. Oxford New York Auckland Cape Town Dar es Salaam Hong Kong Karachi Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Nairobi New Delhi Shanghai Taipei Toronto With offices in Argentina Austria Brazil Chile Czech Republic France Greece Guatemala Hungary Italy Japan Poland Portugal Singapore South Korea Switzerland Thailand Turkey Ukraine Vietnam

Copyright © 2012 by Oxford University Press, Inc. Published by Oxford University Press, Inc. 198 Madison Avenue, New York, New York 10016 www.oup.com Oxford is a registered trademark of Oxford University Press All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior permission of Oxford University Press

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data The Oxford handbook of the history of psychology : global perspectives / edited by David B. Baker. p. cm. — (Oxford library of psychology) ISBN 978-0-19-536655-6 1. Psychology—History. 2. Ethnopsychology—History. I. Baker, David B. BF81.O94 2012 150.9—dc22 2011016014

9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper

SHORT CONTENTS

Oxford Library of Psychology About the Editor Contributors

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Index

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OX F O R D L I B R A R Y O F P S YC H O L O G Y

The Oxford Library of Psychology, a landmark series of handbooks, is published by Oxford University Press, one of the world’s oldest and most highly respected publishers, with a tradition of publishing significant books in psychology. The ambitious goal of the Oxford Library of Psychology is nothing less than to span a vibrant, wide-ranging field and, in so doing, to fill a clear market need. Encompassing a comprehensive set of handbooks, organized hierarchically, the Library incorporates volumes at different levels, each designed to meet a distinct need. At one level are a set of handbooks designed broadly to survey the major subfields of psychology; at another are numerous handbooks that cover important current focal research and scholarly areas of psychology in depth and detail. Planned as a reflection of the dynamism of psychology, the Library will grow and expand as psychology itself develops, thereby highlighting significant new research that will impact on the field. Adding to its accessibility and ease of use, the Library will be published in print and, later on, electronically. The Library surveys psychology’s principal subfields with a set of handbooks that capture the current status and future prospects of those major subdisciplines. This initial set includes handbooks of social and personality psychology, clinical psychology, counseling psychology, school psychology, educational psychology, industrial and organizational psychology, cognitive psychology, cognitive neuroscience, methods and measurements, history, neuropsychology, personality assessment, developmental psychology, and more. Each handbook undertakes to review one of psychology’s major subdisciplines with breadth, comprehensiveness, and exemplary scholarship. In addition to these broadly-conceived volumes, the Library also includes a large number of handbooks designed to explore in depth more specialized areas of scholarship and research, such as stress, health and coping, anxiety and related disorders, cognitive development, or child and adolescent assessment. In contrast to the broad coverage of the subfield handbooks, each of these latter volumes focuses on an especially productive, more highly focused line of scholarship and research. Whether at the broadest or most specific level, however, all of the Library handbooks offer synthetic coverage that reviews and evaluates the relevant past and present research and anticipates research in the future. Each handbook in the Library includes introductory and concluding chapters written by its editor to provide a roadmap to the handbook’s table of contents and to offer informed anticipations of significant future developments in that field. An undertaking of this scope calls for handbook editors and chapter authors who are established scholars in the areas about which they write. Many of the nation’s and world’s most productive and best-respected psychologists have agreed to edit Library handbooks or write authoritative chapters in their areas of expertise. vii

For whom has the Oxford Library of Psychology been written? Because of its breadth, depth, and accessibility, the Library serves a diverse audience, including graduate students in psychology and their faculty mentors, scholars, researchers, and practitioners in psychology and related fields. Each will find in the Library the information they seek on the subfield or focal area of psychology in which they work or are interested. Befitting its commitment to accessibility, each handbook includes a comprehensive index, as well as extensive references to help guide research. And because the Library was designed from its inception as an online as well as a print resource, its structure and contents will be readily and rationally searchable online. Further, once the Library is released online, the handbooks will be regularly and thoroughly updated. In summary, the Oxford Library of Psychology will grow organically to provide a thoroughly informed perspective on the field of psychology, one that reflects both psychology’s dynamism and its increasing interdisciplinarity. Once published electronically, the Library is also destined to become a uniquely valuable interactive tool, with extended search and browsing capabilities. As you begin to consult this handbook, we sincerely hope you will share our enthusiasm for the more than 500-year tradition of Oxford University Press for excellence, innovation, and quality, as exemplified by the Oxford Library of Psychology. Peter E. Nathan Editor-in-Chief Oxford Library of Psychology

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A B O U T T H E E D I TO R

David B. Baker David B. Baker, Ph.D., is the Margaret Clark Morgan Executive Director of the Center for the History of Psychology and Professor of Psychology at the University of Akron. As a researcher and scholar he has authored, co-authored, or edited more than 60 publications, including four books. Dr. Baker is a fellow of the American Psychological Association and the Association for Psychological Science.

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CO N T R I B U TO R S

Ramadan A. Ahmed Department of Psychology College of Social Sciences Kuwait University Kuwait City, Kuwait Rubén Ardila Department of Psychology National University of Colombia Bogota, Colombia David B. Baker Center for the History of Psychology University of Akron Akron, Ohio Ludy T. Benjamin, Jr. Department of Psychology Texas A&M University College Station, Texas Joan Black Department of Liberal Studies University of Technology, Jamaica Kingston, Jamaica Adrian C. Brock School of Psychology University College Dublin Dublin, Ireland Roderick D. Buchanan History and Philosophy of Science Department University of Melbourne Melbourne, Australia Helio Carpintero Department of Psychology and Social Sciences Madrid Open University Madrid, Spain

Guido Cimino Department of Social and Developmental Psychology University of Rome “La Sapienza” Rome, Italy Alan Collins Department of Psychology Lancaster University Lancaster, United Kingdom Miriam Dembo Instituto de Psicología Universidad Central de Venezuela Caracas, Venezuela Renato Foschi Department of Dynamic and Clinical Psychology University of Rome “La Sapienza” Rome, Italy Rosemary Frey School of Nursing University of Auckland Auckland, New Zealand Gustavo Gauer Department of Developmental and Personality Psychology School of Psychology Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil William Barbosa Gomes Department of Developmental and Personality Psychology School of Psychology Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil C. James Goodwin Department of Psychology Western Carolina University Cullowhee, North Carolina

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Benyu Guo College of Education Science Nanjing Normal University Nanjing, China Aydan Gülerce Educational Sciences Department Boğaziçi University Istanbul, Turkey Horst U. K. Gundlach Heidelberg, Germany Brian D. Haig Department of Psychology University of Canterbury Christchurch, New Zealand Jiří Hoskovec Department of Psychology Charles University Prague, Czech Republic Yeh Hsueh Educational Psychology and Research College of Education University of Memphis Memphis, Tennessee Claudio Simon Hutz Department of Developmental and Personality Psychology School of Psychology Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil Abdel-Sattar Ibrahim Egyptian Global Association for Psychological Consultation October City & Mohandseen Giza, Egypt Brigitte Khoury Department of Psychiatry American University of Beirut Medical Center Beirut, Lebanon Narasappa Kumaraswamy School of Medicine University Malaysia Sabah Sabah, Malaysia Johann Louw Department of Psychology University of Cape Town Cape Town, South Africa

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contributors

Dannette Marie School of Psychology University of Aberdeen Aberdeen, Scotland United Kingdom; and Department of Psychology University of Otago Dunedin, New Zealand Françoise Parot CESAMES/CERMES3, UMR 8211 Université Paris Descartes Paris, France Rogelia Pe-Pua School of Social Sciences and International Studies The University of New South Wales Sydney, Australia Pia-Anna Perfecto-Ramos Department of Psychology Ateneo de Manila University Quezon City, Philippines Petteri Pietikainen Faculty of Humanities History of Science and Ideas University of Oulu Oulu, Finland Ligia M. Sánchez Instituto de Psicología Universidad Central de Venezuela Caracas, Venezuela Irina Sirotkina Institute for History of Science and Technology Russian Academy of Sciences Moscow, Russia Roger Smith Institute of Psychology Russian Academy of Sciences Moscow, Russia; and Department of History Lancaster University Lancaster, United Kingdom Chandraseagran Suppiah Centre for Foundation Studies Quest International University Perak Perak, Malaysia

Sarah Tabbarah Department of Psychiatry American University of Beirut Medical Center Beirut, Lebanon Miki Takasuna School of Human and Social Sciences Tokyo International University Kawagoe, Japan

Sombat Tapanya Department of Psychiatry Faculty of Medicine Chiang Mai University Chiang Mai, Thailand Nicholas J. Wade School of Psychology University of Dundee Dundee, Scotland, United Kingdom

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CONTENTS

1. The Internationalization of Psychology: A History 1 Ludy T. Benjamin, Jr. and David B. Baker 2. Australia 18 Roderick D. Buchanan 3. Brazil 34 Claudio Simon Hutz, Gustavo Gauer, and William Barbosa Gomes 4. Brunei Darussalam 51 Narasappa Kumaraswamy and Chandraseagran Suppiah 5. The Caribbean 59 Rosemary Frey and Joan Black 6. China 81 Yeh Hsueh and Benyu Guo 7. Colombia 125 Rubén Ardila 8. Czech Republic 138 Jiří Hoskovec 9. Egypt 162 Ramadan A. Ahmed 10. England 182 Alan Collins 11. Finland 211 Petteri Pietikainen 12. France 228 Françoise Parot 13. Germany 255 Horst U. K. Gundlach 14. Ireland 289 Adrian C. Brock 15. Italy 307 Guido Cimino and Renato Foschi 16. Japan 347 Miki Takasuna 17. Lebanon 366 Brigitte Khoury and Sarah Tabbarah 18. New Zealand 377 Brian D. Haig and Dannette Marie

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19. Philippines 395 Rogelia Pe-Pua and Pia-Anna Perfecto-Ramos 20. Russian Federation 412 Irina Sirotkina and Roger Smith 21. Saudi Arabia 442 Abdel-Sattar Ibrahim 22. Scotland 462 Nicholas J. Wade 23. South Africa 496 Johann Louw 24. Spain 513 Helio Carpintero 25. Thailand 538 Sombat Tapanya 26. Turkey: A Case of Modernization at Historical, Political, and Socio-cultural Cross-roads 547 Aydan Gülerce 27. United States 571 C. James Goodwin 28. Venezuela 594 Ligia M. Sánchez and Miriam Dembo 29. Concluding Thoughts on Internationalizing the History of Psychology 616 David B. Baker and Ludy T. Benjamin, Jr. Index

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C HA P TE R

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The Internationalization of Psychology A History

Ludy T. Benjamin, Jr. and David B. Baker

Abstract This chapter discusses the origins and development of the international organizations and meetings that have sought to bring together psychologists from all over the world, principally the International Congresses of Psychology, which began in 1889 and are organized now by the International Union of Psychological Science, and the International Congresses of Applied Psychology, which began in 1920 and now are planned by the International Association of Applied Psychology. From its largely European origins, this chapter shows how psychology grew as an experimental and applied science to encompass psychological organizations in more than 100 countries today. The early congresses were a mix of experimental psychologists and parapsychologists, with the latter group forming their own group after 1905. The subsequent development of the international congresses is a story of science, applications, and world politics. Keywords: International psychology, International Congress of Psychology, International Congress of Applied Psychology, parapsychology, International Union of Psychological Science, International Association of Applied Psychology, World War I, World War II

The International Union of Psychological Science (IUPsyS) was established in 1951, to serve as an organizing body for psychological societies and psychologists around the globe. Today, it boasts 71 member nations from Albania to Zimbabwe and thus, by member affiliation, represents most of the world’s psychologists, whether they are engaged in research, teaching, practice, or public service (see Appendix A). Yet, efforts to bring the world’s psychologists together are much older than the formation of the IUPsyS. This chapter traces the history of international psychology organizations, beginning in the late 19th century with the first of the international congresses. The beginnings of this history reside in the creation of a new scientific discipline, namely psychology, a field that left the house of philosophy and sought to join the house of natural science. This elopement had been delayed by a host of naysayers

who argued over centuries that a science of mind was not possible, that the study of mind could never achieve the level of objectivity needed to qualify as science. By the middle of the 1800s, that longheld view had been seriously challenged, for example, by John Stuart Mill (1843), who called for an empirical science of psychology, and by Wilhelm Wundt (1862, 1874), who called for and established an experimental science of psychology (Cattell, 1888). Wundt’s psychology laboratory was arguably the first on the scene but it was followed quickly by other laboratories in Germany, as well as labs in Denmark, Austria, England, and the United States. As the new psychology laboratories emerged, some psychologists sought ways to bring their kindred researchers together. British psychologist Joseph Jacobs, recognizing the value of an international organization of psychologists called for 1

the establishment of a “Society for Experimental Psychology.” Jacobs (1886) wrote: This is the age of Societies. Agriculture and ballooning, cart-horses and dentistry, engineering and forestry, all subjects from A to Z, are represented by associations intended to promote the interests of each particular subject. Psychology alone has no society connecting together the workers in the wide field which the science of mind can claim for itself. (p. 49)

Although no international society existed in 1886 when Jacobs made his plea, there was at least one national society in France. La Société de Psychologie Physiologique was founded in Paris in 1885, by Jean-Martin Charcot and Charles Richet. The society was established to link the new experimental psychology with the work of Charcot at the Salpêtrière. The Société never achieved that end, however, and proved mostly to be a forum for papers on hypnosis. Shortly after Charcot’s death in 1893 it ceased to exist (Ellenberger, 1970). But in France in the late 1880s, plans for an international gathering of psychologists were taking form, and Charcot’s Société would host the meeting (see Françoise Parot, 2011, on France, Chapter 16, in this volume).

The First International Congress of Psychology In the second half of the 19th century, international congresses in a wide number of fields were commonplace. Statisticians held their first such congress in 1853, physicians their first in 1867, and anthropologists their first in 1885 (Montoro, Tortosa, & Carpintero, 1992). The impetus for an international meeting of psychologists began with an article published in 1881, in a French journal (Nicolas & Söderlund, 2005). The author was a young Polish philosopher and parapsychologist, Julian Ochorowicz, who had earned a doctorate from the University of Leipzig in 1874 with a dissertation on the nature of consciousness. Evidently Ochorowicz was a friend of Théodule Ribot, who edited the Revue Philosophique, where he published his detailed proposal for an international congress of psychology. According to Sabourin (2001), Ribot was sympathetic to the idea but doubtful of its achievement. Yet, eight years later, the first International Congress of Psychology would meet in Paris, France, on the centennial of the French Revolution, the 10th anniversary of the opening

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of Wundt’s laboratory at the University of Leipzig, and in the midst of the grand World’s Fair being hosted in Paris. The meeting began on August 6, 1889. Charcot served as the honorary president of the congress but did not attend the four-day event. Instead, the audience was welcomed by Ribot, who gave an opening lecture on the status of contemporary psychology. According to William James (1889), who was in attendance as one of the few Americans present, Ribot showed “in simple but impressive words how [psychology] advances by combining physiological and pathological observation and experiment with the older introspective method, and [urged] the investigators of all countries to share in the work now become common” (p. 614). Ochorowicz was in attendance and must have been pleased to see the extraordinary culmination of his plan laid out so meticulously 8 years earlier. Nearly 400 individuals attended one or more of the sessions. Ochorowicz himself was involved in the sessions on parapsychological topics. Given William James’s involvement with psychical research (see Coon, 1992), it is interesting to read James’s description of this part of the congress: The most striking feature of the discussions was, perhaps, their tendency to slope off to some one or the other of those shady horizons with which the name of “psychic research” is now associated. Amongst those who took a more active part in the debate may be named MM. Marillier, Gley, Binet, Pierre Janet, Bertrand, Espinas, Bernheim, Liègois, Ochorowicz . . . Delboeuf, Forel, Galton, Sidgwick, F. W. H. Meyers. (James, 1889,1889 p. 615)

Certainly, the mix of individuals at this congress was considerable, from physiologists to philosophers and from physicians to parapsychologists. And, there were a few representatives of the new psychology, including Joseph Jastrow from the United States and Hugo Münsterberg from Germany. Although the meeting was billed as an international congress, the overwhelming majority of attendees were from France. By James’s account, only three came from the United States, four from England, and three from Germany. The breakdown of attendees by country suggests that more than 300 were from France. It seems likely that some of that audience consisted of lay individuals interested in psychology, no doubt most of those interested in hypnosis and paranormal phenomena. So, mixed with Galton, James, Binet, and Ribot, one may have

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found mediums, seers, palm readers, mental healers, and mesmerists. James (1889) described the social importance of the congress: The open results were, however (as always happens at such gatherings), secondary in real importance to the latent ones—the friendships made, the intimacies deepened, and the encouragement and inspiration which came to everyone from seeing before them in flesh and blood so large a part of that little army of fellow-students from whom and for whom all contemporary psychology exists. (p. 615)

For James, one of those social contacts was Hugo Münsterberg, whom James would invite 3 years later to become the director of the psychology laboratories at Harvard University. In bringing Münsterberg to Harvard, William James wrote to his novelist brother Henry that the university had acquired the “Rudyard Kipling of psychology” (Benjamin, 2006, p. 98). The final event of this inaugural congress was a grand social affair. An elaborate banquet was held on the first platform of the Eiffel Tower, the recently completed architectural wonder that was the centerpiece of the Paris World’s Fair. Perhaps prompted by this first international meeting of psychologists, discussions began about publishing international compilations of the new psychological literature. The German journal Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane began publishing an international bibliography as early as 1890. And, in 1895, similar bibliographies appeared in France in Année Psychologique and in the United States in a new publication entitled The Psychological Index (Benjamin & VandenBos, 2006).

Parapsychology and the Early International Congresses of Psychology When scientific psychology arrived on the scene in the late 1800s, it found itself in competition with an existing popular psychology in a variety of forms, what Leahey and Leahey (1983) have called psychology’s “occult doubles.” Phrenologists, physiognomists, spirtitualists, mesmerists, mental healers, and practitioners under other names as well offered a range of services to the public, including cures for melancholia, marital counseling, career advice, personnel selection, and parenting advice. For the public, these practitioners were the purveyors of psychology, a reality not lost on the new experimental psychologists who sought ways to distance their

discipline from these popular psychologies and looked for opportunities to inform the public about the new science of psychology and why it was the one true psychology. In founding the first journal of the new psychology in 1881, Wilhelm Wundt had wanted to call it Psychologische Studien but that title was already in use as a parapsychological journal. So, Wundt selected Philosophische Studien instead. When G. Stanley Hall sought to found the first American journal of psychology in 1887, he was given the sum of $5,000 from a benefactor interested in establishing a parapsychology journal. Hall had no intention of establishing such a periodical and evidently never informed the donor of the nature of what would become the American Journal of Psychology. When the donor learned of the ruse, he asked that his money be returned (Ross, 1972). Parapsychology had been a visible part of the program for the 1889 congress, and it promised to be on center stage at the second congress, planned for London, in 1892, and hosted by the British Society for Psychical Research. Indeed, the president of the London Congress was Henry Sidgwick, a philosopher and psychic researcher who was one of the founders and the first president of the British Society for Psychical Research (see Alan Collins, 2011, Chapter 14, in this volume). When the French were organizing the 1889 congress they had sought to identify psychological organizations in other countries for the purposes of distributing invitations. In the United States, their search led them only to the American Society for Psychical Research, and so they extended an invitation to that body. James and Jastrow became aware of this in attending the Paris Congress and likely brought that word back to American colleagues working in the new experimental psychology. It is possible that this situation proved to be an impetus for the founding of the American Psychological Association (APA) in 1892 (Sokal, 1992). Joseph Jastrow had been vehement in his insistence that experimental psychology was in no way connected to paranormal subjects. Many of his experimental colleagues shared similar views. But the program included multiple sessions on paranormal events and there were, no doubt, many in attendance for whom that was the only subject of interest. That this tension was recognized by the organizers of the London Congress is evident in this description of the program: “All branches of experimental psychology received a due share of consideration in the

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papers and discussion. Owing to the abundance of material, it was found advisable to place Neurology and Psychophysics in one section (A), and Hypnotism with kindred questions in another (B)” (Anonymous, 1892, p. 580). Those experimental psychologists who attended Section A heard presentations from an outstanding lineup including Alexander Bain, Francis Galton, Charles Richet, Pierre Janet, Hermann Ebbinghaus, Eduard Hitzig, Christine Ladd-Franklin, C. Lloyd Morgan, Edward B. Titchener, Gerardus Heymans, Henry H. Donaldson, Lightner Witmer, James Mark Baldwin, and James Sully. Although the attendance at the meeting was heavily British, it was evident that the percentage of international attendees was much greater than at the Paris Congress. The Third International Congress of Psychology was held in Munich, Germany, hosted by a heavily spiritistic association, the Gesellschaft für Psychologische Forschung. According to Gundlach (1997), “Carl Stumpf, who presided over the congress, tried his best to curb spiritism and hypnotism. But the academic societies for the less sensational areas of psychology continued to have difficulties in assembling enough members to ensure enduring organizations” (pp. 537–538). Thus, the better organized spiritualists, hypnotists, and psychical researchers were able to continue as a major force in these early congresses purporting to represent the new experimental psychology. Furthermore, the presentations at these congresses were of sufficient interest to the psychical community such that detailed reports appeared regularly in psychic journals such as the Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research (see, for example, Myers, 1889). The Fourth International Congress returned to Paris in 1900, hosted by Ribot, Richet, and Pierre Janet. According to Robert Woodworth (1900), who reported on the meeting for the journal Science, “Psychical research was thoroughly ventilated at the Congress” (p. 606). Compared to past meetings, the number of papers on psychical topics declined (Warren, 1900). There were several papers on celebrated mediums, one of whom was present. One review of the psychical portion of the congress was especially critical of the quality of those presentations. In summarizing the presentations, Newbold (1902) concluded, “It is to be regretted that the tolerant spirit displayed by the organizers of the Congress in granting a hearing to the representatives of views with which few of them had any sympathy should have been in some cases so ill rewarded” (p. 103). Perhaps because they were being 4

made to feel increasingly unwelcome, the psychical researchers decided to establish their own international congress, which would be known as the Institut Psychique. The paranormal group participated in one more congress, the fifth, held in Rome in 1905 (see Guido Cimino & Foschi, 2011, Chapter 19, this volume), but ties were officially severed there, and the spiritists, psychics, and mental healers found other venues in which they could share their common interests (Nicolas & Charvillat, 1998).

Politics, War, and the Congresses The Sixth International Congress of Psychology was held in Geneva in 1909, attended by 550 psychologists. The multiple languages of the congresses had always been a problem and were commented upon in most summary reviews. It was noted that discussion of papers was almost always in the language of the presenter and thus limited to a small number of attendees, especially for languages such as Russian, Chinese, and Japanese. Some steps were taken at this congress to deal with the language barriers. The major addresses and many of the minor papers were distributed in advance, often with abstracts in several languages. Further, Esperanto was recognized as an official language, and several brief reports were given in that form (Ogden, 1909). Some believed that it could be the international language of science, a hope that quickly disappeared. For Americans, the big news of the Geneva Congress was that the organizing committee accepted the invitation to hold the next meeting in the United States, in 1913. The American proposal was one of two considered for the next meeting, the other from Hungarian psychologists for a meeting in Budapest. The American proposal was ill-prepared at best. It was presented by Morton Prince as a petition to host the meeting, but without any indication of a host institution; that is, no university nor the American Psychological Association had indicated support for the meeting. The petition listed James Mark Baldwin as president of the congress and William James as honorary president. Yet, Baldwin had expressed no interest in the congress and had not signed Prince’s petition. And James was named without his consent or knowledge. The informality and disorganization of the proposal foretold of difficulties ahead. What followed were several years of bickering among the leaders of American psychology, especially James McKeen Cattell, James, Baldwin, and Titchener, that produced on-again, off-again plans for the congress that eventually went down to defeat in early 1912.

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By then, it was too late for any other country to put together plans for the meeting, and so it was cancelled. With the intervening years of World War I, the next congress would not be held until 1923, 5 years after the end of the war and 14 years after the Geneva Congress (Evans & Scott, 1978). The United States would have to wait 40 years from the first congress in Paris for its chance to serve as host country for the world’s psychologists. When the congresses resumed in 1923, with the meeting held in Oxford, England, the pattern of attendance changed, as did the balance of power in the administration of the meetings. First, attendance was down considerably compared to the last two meetings before the war due to the economic recession affecting much of Europe. In fact, attendance was reduced by half, to approximately 240 attendees at both the Seventh Congress in Oxford and the Eighth Congress in Groningen, Holland, in 1926. Second, whereas the Germans and French seemed to have been the dominant forces before the war, the British and Americans assumed a larger role in the post-war congresses; the psychologies of those two countries would grow in international influence as well. There was some concern about the reception of the German psychologists at the Oxford meeting in 1923, especially by the French participants. But all seemed to go well, as reported by Louis Thurstone (1923): “It was a source of satisfaction that the German and the French psychologists could meet each other as scientists and as men without allowing their political differences to affect seriously the activities of the Congress” (p. 560). The concerns about the German psychologists were merited, especially given the actions of Wilhelm Wundt, the acknowledged founder of the science of psychology. In 1914, 93 German professors and other intellectuals signed and published a document that was entitled “An Appeal to the Civilized World” (Lutz, 1932, vol. 1, pp. 74–78). Wundt was one of the signatories of that manifesto, which claimed that Germany’s invasion of Belgium was a matter of self-defense, and that Germany had the right to pursue whatever means necessary to ensure the future of German culture. Especially offensive to many academics was the German army’s destruction of the city of Louvain and its great university, which had been established in 1425. The signers of the manifesto argued that such destruction was justified and was, in fact, brought about as retaliation against actions of the citizens of Belgium. Some academics were so incensed by the message of the German manifesto that they

considered it to be a war crime (Hale, 1980). Wundt’s ultra-patriotic stand angered many of his international students and caused some of them to revise their academic histories, minimizing the purported influence of Wundt and German psychology. Wundt died in 1920, just 2 years after the end of the war. But the ill will toward Germany lived on for some years. Sadly, it would recur all too soon.

The International Congress of Applied Psychology In 1920, a new international organization formed, emphasizing applied psychology or what was then called psychotechnics. It held its initial meeting in Geneva, Switzerland, under the title International Congress of Psychotechnics Applied to Vocational Guidance. The timing, location, and subject of this conference were not accidental, as described by Horst Gundlach (1998): World War I left Europe for the most part shattered and wrecked, physically as well as morally. The devastation gave way to revolutions and civil wars, and despite armistices and peace treaties, nobody dared to hope for an enduring peace. Reconstruction and reconciliation seemed to be the only remedy to prevent a rekindling of hostility and further destruction in Europe. Innovative practical applications seemed what the science of psychology could offer to the reconstruction projects, and a neutral and affluent Switzerland seemed the most appropriate location for reconciling embittered adversaries. (p. 25)

The word Psychotechnik was coined in Germany in 1903, and subsequently translated for similar use in many other languages, mostly European. It was used to describe vocational guidance and personnel selection tests that used apparatus, instead of the paper-and-pencil psychological tests that were popular in the United Kingdom and the United States. Interestingly, the work of Alfred Binet and Henri Simon on a psychological test for measuring intelligence was first presented at the 1905 Rome Congress. But their work would have far more impact in the United States and would not be the subject of much discussion in the early International Congresses of Psychology. Using an ever-developing collection of psychological instruments, those involved in psychotechniks measured such behaviors and cognitive processes as reaction time, handand-body steadiness, motor fatigue, color perception, and puzzle assembly (Drunen, 1997). Despite the German origins of the term, it was used by the new benjamin, baker

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organization in the title of its congresses until it was replaced by the phrase applied psychology in 1955. The first congress was organized by two faculty members at the University of Geneva: Édouard Claparède, professor of psychology, and Pierre Bovet, professor of education and philosophy. The focus of the congress was on vocational guidance, a growing activity in Europe following the influence of American lawyer Frank Parsons and the import of his ideas to Europe shortly before World War I. The approximately 50 participants at the Geneva congress came from Switzerland, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Spain, and a few other European nations. There were no participants from the United Kingdom, United States, or Russia. And no Germans attended, presumably because of the high rate of inflation after the war. However, some German psychologists did attend the second congress in Barcelona, in 1921 (Gundlach, 1998). The significance of this initial congress was that it gave much-needed visibility and the beginnings of a voice to those psychologists worldwide who were interested chiefly in the application of their science. The early congresses focused on vocational guidance, but that subject proved too limiting, and it was dropped from the official congress title at the fourth congress in Paris, in 1927. The Barcelona meeting in 1921 drew a much larger audience, as did the 1922 meeting in Milan. After three annual meetings, the congresses appeared on an irregular schedule. There were two more in the 1920s (1927 and 1928), three in the 1930s (1930, 1931, and 1934), and then a 15-year hiatus, largely because of World War II, until the 1949 meeting in Bern, Switzerland. Today, the congresses are held every 4 years on an agreed-upon schedule with the International Congress of Psychology, so that one of the congresses occurs every 2 years, an agreement reached with IUPsyS in 1976. The organization responsible for the International Congresses of Applied Psychology is the International Association of Applied Psychology (IAAP), a name adopted in 1955 (Pickren & Fowler, 2003). Today, the IAAP has a membership of approximately 1,500 psychologists in 80 countries. The congresses that it organizes are important venues for the development of applied psychology, especially in the exchange of ideas that offer solutions to problems that are international in scope (see Appendix B).

“Finally, Finally in America” The Americans finally got their congress in 1929, the Ninth International Congress of Psychology, 6

hosted by Yale University in New Haven, Connecticut, where psychologist James Rowland Angell was university president. James McKeen Cattell served as president of the congress. As secretary of the congress, Switzerland’s Édouard Claparède excitedly proclaimed in one of the opening addresses, “Enfin! Enfin en Amérique!” (Claparède, 1930, p. 33). He added that, “For us of the Old World, America has danced before our eyes for 40 years as the promised land” (Langfeld, 1929, p. 366). Indeed, it had been 40 years since the first congress met in Paris in 1889. William James, who had attended that Paris meeting, was now dead, as was G. Stanley Hall, Hugo Münsterberg, and E. B. Titchener. John Watson had been forced out of academic psychology in 1920 because of his scandalous divorce. That left Cattell as the dean of American psychologists. Thus, the individual who, it can be argued, was most responsible for the failure of the Americans to host the 1913 meeting was now the welcoming and very active head of the 1929 Congress. The Americans were eager to make a great impression. Although scientific psychology’s roots were clearly European, Americans in the public euphoria of the Roaring Twenties were convinced of the preeminence of American psychology, and they intended to make that evident. Attracting international visitors was critical, and because of the expense of travel to the States, there was some concern about how to draw participants from abroad. A note in the 1928 Psychological Bulletin announced that “The Americans hope that the appointment of some foreigners for lecturers and lectureships can be arranged near the time of the congress, so that foreign attendance can be increased and international solidarity within psychology furthered still more” (Anonymous, 1928, p. 122). By almost all measures, the Ninth Congress was a great success. The American Psychological Association cancelled its meeting, and more than 700 of its members attended the congress, where they heard Karl Lashley deliver his APA presidential address. International registrants numbered 104 from 21 countries. Total attendance, including spouses, was more than 1,000, a number that far exceeded the previous record of approximately 600 attendees for the 1909 congress in Geneva, was four times the attendance of the previous congress in Groningen, and would not be equaled until the Brussels Congress (the 15th) of 1957. The distinguished invited addresses were given by Ivan Pavlov from Russia, Wolfgang Köhler from

the in ternationaliz ation of psychology

Germany, Albert Michotte from Belgium, Henri Piéron from France, Carl Spearman from England, and Edward L. Thorndike from the United States. Other international speakers included Kurt Lewin, Alexander Luria, Jean Piaget, William Stern, Robert Thouless, Karl and Charlotte Bühler, Mario Ponzo, Otto Klemm, and Wilhelm Wirth. The program was decidedly American, with 310 papers delivered by speakers from the United States compared to 73 presentations by international psychologists (not including papers read by title). It was the largest program to date, held over a period of 7 days. Not only were the Americans able to flood their guests with the substance of American psychology, but important liaisons were formed with many of the international psychologists by arranging lectures for them at a number of the East Coast universities (Boring, 1930; Langfeld, 1929; Poffenberger, 1929). One of the gifts given to each of the international participants was a copy of The Psychological Register, edited by Carl Murchison and hot off the Clark University Press. This impressive undertaking was the first international directory of psychologists. It listed psychologists individually by country and included their educational history and a list of publications to date. The 570-page book included approximately 1,250 psychologists from 33 countries, with slightly over half of the book devoted to psychologists from the United States and Canada. Murchison (1929) confessed to the difficulty of the task, in some cases, to identify legitimately trained psychologists in various countries and to get complete information from them as requested. But the compilation was by far the most complete to date and no doubt served an important function in stimulating contacts across borders. Interestingly, the book given to the international guests was identified as Volume 2. Volume 1 was to have been a compilation of psychologists who had died before 1929, going back to the ancient Greeks. But that book was never published. A greatly expanded version appeared in 1932 as Volume 3. Because of contacts made with international psychologists at the New Haven meeting, Volume 3 included nearly double the number of psychologists—approximately 2,400—from 40 countries (Murchison, 1932). These volumes proved helpful in subsequent congresses, particularly in arranging symposia for researchers working in common fields. Montoro, Tortosa, and Carpintero (1992) have argued that the Ninth International Congress was exploited by the Americans in advancing their

psychology. Nowhere was that more evident than in the presidential address delivered by Cattell (1930) entitled “Psychology in America.” Cattell clearly acknowledged America’s debt to Europe in the sciences, arts, humanities, and certainly in psychology, naming Wundt and Francis Galton as the two greatest psychologists who ever lived and noting that he worked with both of them. Although he was gracious in his praise of Wundt, with several of his German students in the audience, Cattell’s letters to his parents from his graduate study in Leipzig suggest that he held a very negative view of Wundt’s worth as a psychologist (Sokal, 1981). Perhaps he had changed his mind after 45 years. Cattell touted the contributions in applied psychology that had come from America, arguing for superiority in all applied fields with the exception of industrial psychology. He labeled the American Psychological Association as the “world’s greatest organization of psychologists” (Cattell, 1930, p. 22). He closed his remarks with a biblical metaphor illustrating the importance of such international meetings in the context of recent and continued international conflicts: International congresses are significant factors in the advancement of scientific research; they also promote international cooperation and good-will. The objects of the sciences are more ideal than the objects of the churches; their practices are more Christian. When in the fullness of time there is a family of the nations, when each will give according to its ability and receive according to its needs, when war among them will be as absurd as it would now be for members of this Congress to begin murdering one another, this will be due in no small measure to cooperation among scientific men of all nations in their common work. And it may be that psychology, the child among the sciences, and the United States, the child among the nations, shall lead them. (p. 31)

In spite of the bravado, the meeting was by most measures a very successful one that connected American psychologists and their international colleagues in important ways. Contacts made by some of the attendees from Germany and Austria would prove fortunate only a few years later, when the rise of the Nazi party forced them to look for jobs and security in America and other countries.

The Gathering Storm Following the meeting in the United States, the 1932 congress convened in Copenhagen. Attendance was benjamin, baker

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less than half of the American meeting, approximately 450 registrants and guests. The 1936 meeting was to have been in Madrid, but the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War forced it to meet elsewhere. Initially, the Spanish organizers felt that the meeting could be delayed until the summer of 1937, but when it became clear that the violence had escalated and showed no signs of ending in the near future, they were forced to cancel their hopes for the meeting (Carpintero & Lafuente, 2008). In an attempted move from the frying pan to the fire, the ideological watch office of the Nazi Party sought to bring the meeting to Germany (Geuter, 1984). But the organizing committee chose Paris instead, with the 11th Congress opening in July, 1937. Despite the lastminute relocation of the congress, the meeting was judged a successful one, with nearly 600 registrants from 36 countries. Two proposals were submitted at the Paris meeting for the 1940 congress, one from Otto Klemm to hold the meeting in Leipzig, Germany, the other from Karl Bühler to host the meeting in Vienna, Austria. Bühler told Klemm that if he supported the Austrian proposal for the 11th Congress, then Bühler would support a meeting in Germany for the 12th Congress. The Austrian proposal was accepted. When the Nazis invaded Austria in March, 1938, Bühler was arrested and put in prison for several months (Rosenzweig, Holtzman, Sabourin, & Bélanger, 2000). He and his wife Charlotte would eventually make their way to the United States, part of the diaspora of displaced European intellectuals (Mandler & Mandler, 1969). Klemm committed suicide in January 1939, likely related to the dismissal of Felix Kreuger, Wundt’s successor, from the Leipzig faculty. Kreuger was not anti-Semitic enough for the Nazi Party, which brought about his ouster in 1938. Klemm, who admired Kreuger, took over his position for the few months before his death. He was 54 years old (Wohlwill, 1987). With the German occupation of Austria, pressures grew within the congress organizing committee to move the meeting. The American Psychological Association passed a resolution opposing the meeting in Vienna or in any country where the progress of psychology would be “hindered by a government hostile to the tradition of free and unimpeded scholarship” (Olson, 1939, p. 129). Plans were made to move the 1940 meeting to Edinburgh, Scotland, but as the war in Europe escalated, it became clear that no meeting would be possible. Instead, the 12th International Congress of Psychology was delayed until several years after the conclusion of 8

World War II, meeting in Edinburgh in 1948, with an attendance of approximately 700, most of those from Great Britain. It was at this congress that the plans for the IUPsyS were formed.

The International Union of Psychological Science The idea for an international union had been discussed at the first international congress in 1889 and at subsequent meetings. But the growth of psychology internationally following World War II, especially the formation of many new national psychology organizations (see Appendix C), led to a renewed call for a formal organization that could promote international meetings and international cooperation among psychologists. Moreover, such international unions were being encouraged by the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). As noted at the beginning of this chapter, the Union was formally established in 1951, as the International Union of Scientific Psychology at the time of the 13th International Congress of Psychology in Stockholm. The name was changed in 1965 to the International Union of Psychological Science, perhaps to avoid the assumption that there could be a psychology that was unscientific. The rules of the Union allowed for the membership of one psychological organization from each country. Eleven psychological associations joined as charter members, representing Belgium, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States. In addition to those 11 charter members, societies from nine other nations were also added in 1951. Today’s 74 member nations range from the membership of the United States at 114,000 to Malta at 46. Other nations with large memberships include the United Kingdom (39,000), Spain (30,700), Australia (16,500), Germany (15,000), the Netherlands (13,000), Sweden (8,600), Indonesia (8,100), and Japan (7,300). See Appendix A for a listing of all member nations of the IUPsyS. The chief function of the Union is to facilitate the exchange of psychological knowledge among nations. Its goals were first stated formally in 1952 and modified in the years since. The aims of the Union were described in 2009 as follows: As stated in Article 5 of its Statutes, the IUPsyS works to promote “the development, representation and advancement of psychology as a basic and applied science nationally, regionally, and

the in ternationaliz ation of psychology

internationally.” It represents psychology in its full breadth as a science and as a profession. Article 6 of the Statutes states the aims of the Union as follows:

mutual agreement, so that one of the congresses occurs every other year (see Appendix B).

(a) To enhance and promote the development of the science and profession of psychology. (b) To exchange ideas and scientific information between psychologists of different countries. (c) To organize the International Congresses of Psychology and other meetings on subjects of general or special interest in psychology. (d) To contribute to psychological knowledge through publishing activities. (e) To foster the exchange of publications and other communications among different countries. (f ) To foster excellence in standards for education, training, research and the applications of psychology. (g) To enable the development of psychological scientists and national associations through capacity building activities. (h) To foster international exchange, especially among students and young researchers. (i) To collaborate with other international, regional, and national organizations in matters of mutual interest. (from the IUPsyS website, 2009).

Today, there are a great many specialized international congresses in psychology on such topics as sport psychology, personal construct psychology, psychology and law, cross-cultural psychology, analytical psychology, psychoanalysis, child psychology, psychology and religion, positive psychology, psychotherapy, psychology and spirituality, and even one on licensure, certification, and credentialing of psychologists. Some of these have been aided by the IUPsyS as part of its mission to enhance the development of the science and practice of psychology. The work of the IUPsyS extends the reach of psychology beyond disciplinary boundaries. The Union is currently involved in a worldwide program to develop sustainable water use. In cooperation with the World Health Organization, the Union is working on a revision of the international classification of diseases. Allied with other international groups, the Union seeks to bring psychology’s resources to bear on creating conditions that will sustain world peace. Opportunities abound to assist the development of psychology and psychologists in many countries where both the science and issues of mental health are not well developed. In recent years, the IUPsyS has discovered that its limited resources cannot begin to meet the needs that come to its door. It is hoped that this book, in describing the historical development of psychology in so many nations, will alert readers to the similarities and differences of problems faced by individuals in countries large and small, rural and urban, and that it may result in stimulating further advancement of the quality of psychological science and psychological services throughout an increasingly interconnected global society.

Perhaps the most immediate impact of the Union was a more structured and formalized mechanism for soliciting bids for the international congresses and working with the local hosts in the planning and conduct of those meetings. See Appendix D for a listing of all the International Congresses of Psychology. Consistent with the aims listed above, the Union began publication of a journal, the International Journal of Psychology, in 1966. Since 1992, it has published the proceedings of the International Congresses. It occasionally publishes other volumes, such as a history of the Union and all of the congresses from 1889 to 1996 (Rosenzweig, et al., 2000) and The International Handbook of Psychology (Pawlik & Rosenzweig, 2000). The Union participates with other international councils in matters of mutual interest, especially promoting the development of science worldwide. Further, it has organized and/or co-sponsored a number of regional conferences on a variety of psychological topics. As noted earlier, the International Congresses of Psychology and the International Congresses of Applied Psychology each occur every 4 years but are staggered by

Conclusion

List of Abbreviations/Acronyms and Technical Terms APA: American Psychological Association, largest national psychology organization, founded in 1892 IAAP: International Association of Applied Psychology; responsible for the international congresses of applied psychology that began in Geneva in 1920 and meet now every 4 years benjamin, baker

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ICP: International Congress of Psychology; held its first meeting inParis in 1889 and meets every 4 years IUPsyS: International Union of Psychological Science, founded in 1951; contains 74 member nations today. It is responsible for planning the international congresses of psychology UNESCO: United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization

Glossary Esperanto: A language developed in the 1870s that was intended to be an international language, but never received the support its developers had hoped psychotechnik: A word coined in Germany in 1903, initially used to describe psychological work in vocational guidance and personnel selection tests that used apparatus; it later became a synonym for applied psychology

Further Reading Brock, A. (Ed.). (2006). Internationalizing the history of psychology. New York: New York University Press. David, H. P., & Buchanan, J. (2003). International psychology. In D. K. Freedheim (Ed.), Handbook of psychology. Volume 1: History of psychology (pp. 509–533). Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley. Gundlach, H. U. K. (1998). The 1920 Geneva Congress. In H. Gundlach (Ed.), Applied psychology. Volume 1: The First Congress Geneva, 1920 (pp. 25–41). London: Routledge. James, W. (1889). The Congress of Physiological Psychology at Paris. Mind, 14, 614–616. Montoro, L., Tortosa, F., & Carpintero, H. (1992). Brief history of international congresses of psychology. In M. Richelle & H. Carpintero (Eds.), Contributions to the history of the International Congresses of Psychology (pp. 75–89). Brussels: Leuven University Press. Rosenzweig, M. R., Holtzman, W. H., Sabourin, M., & Belanger, D. (2000). History of the International Union of Psychological Science (IUPsyS). Philadelphia: Taylor and Francis. Sexton, V. S., & Hogan, J. D. (Eds.). (1992). International psychology: Views from around the world. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. Stevens, M. J., & Gielen, U. P. (Eds.). (2007). Toward a global psychology: Theory, research, intervention, and pedagogy. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.

References Anonymous. (1892). The International Congress of Experimental Psychology [London,1892]. Mind, 17, 580–588. Anonymous. (1928). Note. Psychological Bulletin, 25, 122. Benjamin, L. T., Jr. (2006). A history of psychology in letters (2nd ed.). Malden, MA: Blackwell. Benjamin, L. T., Jr., & VandenBos, G. R. (2006). The window on psychology’s literature: A history of Psychological Abstracts. American Psychologist, 61, 941–954.

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Boring, E. G. (Ed.). (1930). Ninth International Congress of Psychology: Proceedings and papers. Princeton, NJ: Psychological Review Co. Carpintero, H., & Lafuente, E. (2008). The congress that never was: The Madrid International Congress of Psychology (1936). History of Psychology, 11, 220–238. Cattell, J. McK. (1888). The psychological laboratory at Leipsic. Mind, 13, 37–51. Cattell, J. McK. (1930). Psychology in America. In Boring, E. G. (Ed.), Ninth International Congress of Psychology: Proceedings and papers (pp. 12–32). Princeton, NJ: Psychological Review Co. Cimino, G. & Foschi, R. (2011). Italy. In D. B. Baker (Ed.), The Oxford handbook of the history of psychology: Global perspectives. New York: Oxford University Press. Claparède, É. (1930). Esuisse historique des Congrès Internationaux de Psychologie. In Ninth International Congress of Psychology: Proceedings and papers (pp. 33–47). Princeton, NJ: Psychological Review Company. Collins, A. (2011). England. In D. B. Baker (Ed.), The Oxford handbook of the history of psychology: Global perspectives. New York: Oxford University Press. Coon, D. J. (1992). Testing the limits of sense and science: American experimental psychologists combat spiritualism, 1880–1992. American Psychologist, 47, 143–151. David, H. P., & Buchanan, J. (2003). International psychology. In D. K. Freedheim (Ed.), Handbook of psychology. Volume 1: History of psychology (pp. 509–533). Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley. Drunen, P. van. (1997). Psychotechnics. In W. G. Bringman, H. E. Lück, R. Miller, & C. E. Early (Eds.), A pictorial history of psychology (pp. 480–484). Carol Stream, IL: Quintessence Publishing. Ellenberger, H. (1970). The discovery of the unconscious: The history and evolution of dynamic psychiatry. New York: basic Books. Evans, R. B., & Scott, F. J. D. (1978). The 1913 International Congress of Psychology: The American congress that wasn’t. American Psychologist, 33, 711–723. Geuter, U. (1984). The eleventh and twelfth international congresses of psychology: A note on politics and science between 1936 and 1940. In H. Carpintero & J. M. Piero (Eds.), Psychology in its historical context (pp.). Valencia, Spain: University of Valenica. Gundlach, H. U. K. (1997). Psychological associations and societies. In W. G. Bringman, H. E. Lück, R. Miller, & C. E. Early (Eds.), A pictorial history of psychology (pp. 536–540). Carol Stream, IL: Quintessence Publishing. Gundlach, H. U. K. (1998). The 1920 Geneva Congress. In H. Gundlach (Ed.), Applied psychology. Volume 1: The First Congress Geneva, 1920 (pp. 25–41). London: Routledge. Hale, M., Jr. (1980). Human science and social order: Hugo Münsterberg and the origins of applied psychology. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press. Jacobs, J. (1886). The need of a society for experimental psychology. Mind, 11, 49–54. James, W. (1889). The Congress of Physiological Psychology at Paris. Mind, 14, 614–616. Langfeld, H. S. (1929). The Ninth International Congress of Psychology. Science, 70, 364–368. Leahey, T. H., & Leahey, G. E. (1983). Psychology’s occult doubles: Psychology and the problem of pseudoscience. Chicago: Nelson Hall.

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Lutz, R. H. (1932). The fall of the German empire, 1914–1918 (2 vols.). Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press. Mandler, J. M., & Mandler, G. (1969). The diaspora of experimental psychology: The Gestaltists and others. In D. Fleming & B. Bailyn (Eds.), The intellectual migration: Europe and America, 1930–1960 (pp. 371–419). Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press. Mill, J. S. (1843). A system of logic, racionative and inductive, being a connected view of the principles of evidence, and the methods of scientific investigation. London: John W. Parker. Montoro, L., Tortosa, F., & Carpintero, H. (1992). Brief history of international congresses of psychology. In M. Richelle & H. Carpintero (Eds.), Contributions to the history of the International Congresses of Psychology (pp. 75–89). Brussels: Leuven University Press. Murchison, C. (Ed.). (1929). The psychological register, Volume 2. Worcester, MA: Clark University Press. Murchison, C. (Ed.). (1932). The psychological register, Volume 3. Worcester, MA: Clark University Press. Myers, A. T. (1889). International Congress of Experimental Psychology. Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research, 5, 171–182. Newbold, W. R. (1902). Hypnotism. Psychological Review, 9, 102–103. Nicolas, S., & Charvillat, A. (1998). Theodore Flournoy (1854–1920) and experimental psychology: Historical note. American Journal of Psychology, 111, 279–294. Nicolas, S., & Söderlund, H. (2005). The project of an international congress of psychology by J. Ochorowicz (1881). International Journal of Psychology, 40, 395–406. Ochorowicz, J. (1881). Projet d’un congrès international de psychologie [Project for an international congress of psychology]. Revue Philosophique de la France et de l’Étranger, 12, 1–17. Ogden, R. M. (1909). The Sixth International Congress of Psychology. Psychological Bulletin, 6, 389–397. Olson, W. C. (1939). The forty-sixth annual meeting of the American Psychological Association. American Journal of Psychology, 52, 127–130. Parot, F. (2011). France. In D. B. Baker (Ed.), The Oxford handbook of the history of psychology: Global perspectives. New York: Oxford University Press.

Pawlik, K., & Rosenzweig, M. R. (Eds.) (2000). The international handbook of psychology. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. Pickren, W. E., & Fowler, R. D. (2003). Professional organizations. In D. K. Freedheim (Ed.), Handbook of psychology. Volume 1: History of psychology (pp. 535–554). New York: John Wiley. Poffenberger, A. T. (1929). Report of the Ninth International Congress of Psychology. Journal of Philosophy, 26, 634–637. Rosenzweig, M. R., Holtzman, W. H., Sabourin, M., & Belanger, D. (2000). History of the International Union of Psychological Science (IUPsyS). Philadelphia: Taylor and Francis. Ross, D. (1972). G. Stanley Hall: The psychologist as prophet. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Sabourin, M. (2001). International psychology: Is the whole greater than the sum of its parts? Canadian Psychology, 42, 74–81. Sokal, M. M. (1981). An education in psychology: James McKeen Cattell’s journal and letters from Germany and England, 1880–1888. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Sokal, M. M. (1992). Origins and early years of the American Psychological Association, 1890–1906. American Psychologist, 47, 111–122. Thurstone, L. L. (1923). The Seventh International Congress of Psychology. Psychological Bulletin, 20, 558–561. Warren, H. C. (1900). The Fourth International Congress of Psychology. Psychological Review, 7, 533–546. Wohlwill, J. F. (1987). German psychological journals under National Socialism: A history of contrasting paths. Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences, 23, 169–185. Woodworth, R. S. (1900). The Fourth International Congress of Psychology. Science, 12, 605–606. Wundt, W. M. (1862). Beiträge zur theorie der sinneswahrnehmung [Contributions to the theory of sense perception]. Leipzig: C. F. Winter. Wundt, W. M. (1874). Grundüzge der physiologischen psychologie [Principles of physiological psychology]. Leipzig: Wilhelm Englemann.

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Appendix A Member Nations of the International Union of Psychological Science (IUPsyS) Albania

Finland

Mexico

Slovakia

Argentina

France

Mongolia

Slovenia

Australia

Georgia

Morocco

South Africa

Austria

Germany

Namibia

Spain

Bangladesh

Greece

Netherlands

Sudan

Belgium

Hong Kong

New Zealand

Sweden

Bulgaria

Hungary

Nicaragua

Switzerland

Canada

India

Nigeria

Turkey

Chile

Indonesia

Norway

Uganda

China

Iran

Pakistan

Ukraine

Colombia

Ireland

Panama

United Kingdom

Croatia

Israel

Peru

Uruguay

Cuba

Italy

Philippines

United States

Czech Republic

Japan

Poland

Venezuela

Denmark

Jordan

Portugal

Vietnam

Dominican Republic

Korea

Romania

Yemen

Egypt

Lithuania

Russia

Zimbabwe

Estonia

Malta

Singapore

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Appendix B International Congresses of Applied Psychology Number

Year

Location

President

I

1920

Geneva, Switzerland

Édouard Claparède

II

1921

Barcelona, Spain

Édouard Claparède

III

1922

Milan, Italy

Giulio Cesare Ferrari

IV

1927

Paris, France

Édouard Toulouse

V

1928

Utrecht, The Netherlands

Franciscus M. Roels

VI

1930

Barcelona, Spain

Emilio Mira y López

VII

1931

Moscow, USSR

Isaak Naftulevich Spielrein

VIII

1934

Prague, Czechoslovakia

František Šeracky

IX

1949

Bern, Switzerland

Henri Piéron

X

1951

Göteborg, Sweden

John K. G. Elmgren

XI

1953

Paris, France

Raymond Bonnardel

XII

1955

London, United Kingdom

Clifford B. Frisby

XIII

1958

Rome, Italy

Leandro Canestrelli

XIV

1961

Copenhagen, Denmark

R. Tranekjaer

XV

1964

Ljubljana, Yugoslavia

Zoran Bujas

XVI

1968

Amsterdam, The Netherlands

H. R. Wijngaarden

XVII

1971

Liège, Belgium

Roger Piret

XVIII

1974

Montreal, Canada

L. Dorais

XIX

1978

Munich, Germany

R. Amthauer

XX

1982

Edinburgh, United Kingdom

Gerry Randell

XXI

1986

Jerusalem, Israel

Yehuda Amir

XXII

1990

Kyoto, Japan

Jyuji Misumi

XXIII

1994

Madrid, Spain

Jose Maria Prieto

XXIV

1998

San Francisco, United States

Joseph D. Matarazzo

XXV

2002

Singapore

Elizabeth Nair

XXVI

2006

Athens, Greece

James Georgas & Marina Manthouli

XXVII

2010

Melbourne, Australia

Paul Martin

XXVIII

2014

Paris, France

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Appendix C* National Psychological Societies Country

Society

Year Founded

Afghanistan

Afghan Psychological Association

2001

Albania

Association of Albanian Psychologists

1991

Argentina

Argentine Psychological Society

1930

Armenia

Union of Psychologists of Armenia

Australia

Australian Psychological Society

1945

Austria

Austrian Association of Professional Psychologists

1953

Azerbaijan

Azerbaijan Psychological Association

1997

Bahamas

Bahamas Psychological Association

Bangladesh

Bangladesh Psychological Association

Barbados

Psychological Association of Barbados

Brazil

Brazilian Association of Applied Psychology

Bulgaria

Bulgarian Psychological Society

Cambodia

Cambodian Psychological Society

Canada

Canadian Psychological Association

1938

Chile

Association of Psychologists of Chile

1959

China

Chinese Psychological Society

1921

Colombia

Colombian Federation of Psychology

1955

Croatia

Croatian Psychological Association

1953

Cuba

Cuban Union of Psychology

1964

Cypress

Cypress Psychologists Association

Czechoslovakia

Czechoslovak Psychological Association

1958

Denmark

Association of Danish Psychologists

1947

Dominican Republic

Dominican Psychologists’ Society

1979

Ecuador

Ecuador Society of Psychological and Psychiatric Studies

1942

Egypt

Egyptian Association for Psychological Studies

1948

El Salvador

Salvadoran Society of Psychology

1964

Estonia

Union of Estonian Psychologists

1988

Ethiopia

Ethiopian Psychologists’ Association

Finland

Finnish Psychological Society

1952

France

French Psychological Society

1901

Georgia

Georgian Psychological Association

1991

Germany

German Society for Experimental Psychology

1904

1949

(Continued)

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the in ternationaliz ation of psychology

Country

Society

Year Founded

Greece

Association of Greek Psychologists

1963

Guam

Guam Psychological Association

Guatemala

Guatemalan Psychological Association

1996

Hong Kong

Hong Kong Psychological Society

1968

Hungary

Hungarian Psychological Association

1928

Iceland

Association of Icelandic Psychologists

1954

India

Indian Psychological Association

1925

Indonesia

Indonesian Psychology Association

1959

Iran

Iranian Association of Psychology

1995

Iraq

Iraqi Educational and Psychological Association

Ireland

Psychological Society of Ireland

1970

Israel

Israeli Psychological Association

1958

Italy

Italian Psychological Society

1910

Jamaica

Jamaica Psychological Society

Japan

Japanese Psychological Association

1927

Jordan

Jordan Psychological Association

1996

Kenya

Kenya Psychological Association

Korea

Korean Psychological Association

Latvia

Latvian Professional Psychologists Association

Lebanon

Lebanese Psychological Association

Liechtenstein

Association of Liechtenstein Psychologists

Lithuania

Lithuanian Psychological Association

Malaysia

Malaysian Psychological Association

Malta

Malta Union of Professional Psychologists

Mexico

Mexican Psychological Society

Mongolia

Mongolian Psychologists Association

Morocco

Moroccan Psychological Association

Namibia

Psychological Association of Namibia

1990

Nepal

Nepalese Psychological Association

1982

Netherlands

Netherlands Institute of Psychology

1938

New Zealand

New Zealand Psychological Society

1967

Nicaragua

Nicaraguan Psychological Association

1981

Nigeria

Nigerian Psychological Association

Norway

Norwegian Psychological Association

1946

1958

1953

1934 (Continued)

benjamin, baker

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Country

Society

Year Founded

Pakistan

Pakistan Psychological Association

Panama

Panamanian Psychologists Association

1965

Peru

Peruvian Society of Psychology

1954

Philippines

Psychological Association of the Philippines

1961

Poland

Polish Psychological Association

1948

Portugal

Portuguese Psychological Society

1965

Puerto Rico

Association of Psychologists of Puerto Rico

1954

Romania

Psychologists Association of Romania

1965

Russia

Soviet Federal Socialist Republic Psychological Society

1957

San Marino

Organization of Psychologists of San Marino

Saudi Arabia

Saudi Educational and Psychological Association

Serbia

Serbian Psychological Society

1953

Singapore

Singapore Psychological Society

1979

Slovakia

Slovak Psychological Association

1957

Slovenia

Slovene Psychological Association

1954

South Africa

Psychological Association of South Africa

1982

Spain

Spanish Psychological Society

1952

Sudan

Sudanese Psychological Society

1987

Sweden

Swedish Psychological Association

1955

Switzerland

Swiss Psychological Society

1943

Thailand

Thai Psychological Association

Tunisia

Tunisian Society of Psychology

1961

Turkey

Turkish Psychological Association

1956

Uganda

Ugandan National Psychological Association

1992

Ukraine

Ukrainian Psychological Society

United Arab Emirates

Emirates Psychological Association

United Kingdom

British Psychological Society

1901

United States

American Psychological Association

1892

Uruguay

Psychological Society of Uruguay

1953

Venezuela

Venezuelan Psychological Federation

1957

Vietnam

Psycho-Pedagogical Association of Vietnam

1990

Yemen

Yemen Psychological Association

1990

Yugoslavia

Psychological Association of Yugoslavia

1950

Zimbabwe

Zimbabwe Psychological Association

∗Partially adapted from David & Buchanan (2003). Many countries have more than one psychological society. For the purposes of this listing we included only the first one to be established.

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the in ternationaliz ation of psychology

Appendix D International Congresses of Psychology Number

Year

Location

President

I

1889

Paris, France

Jean-Martin Charcot

II

1892

London, United Kingdom

Henry Sidgwick

III

1896

Munich, Germany

Carl Stumpf

IV

1900

Paris, France

Théodule Ribot

V

1905

Rome, Italy

Giuseppi Sergi

VI

1909

Geneva, Switzerland

Théodore Flournoy

VII

1923

Oxford, United Kingdom

Charles Myers

VIII

1926

Groningen, The Netherlands

Gerardus Heymans

IX

1929

New Haven, United States

James McK. Cattell

X

1932

Copenhagen, Denmark

Edgar Rubin

XI

1937

Paris, France

Henri Piéron

XII

1948

Edinburgh, United Kingdom

James Drever, Sr.

XIII

1951

Stockholm, Sweden

David Katz

XIV

1954

Montreal, Canada

Edward Bott & Edward Tolman

XV

1957

Brussels, Belgium

Albert Michotte

XVI

1960

Bonn, Germany

Wolfgang Metzger

XVII

1963

Washington, DC, United States

Otto Klineberg

XVIII

1966

Moscow, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Alexei Leontiev

XIX

1969

London, United Kingdom

George Drew

XX

1972

Tokyo, Japan

Moriji Sagara

XXI

1976

Paris, France

Paul Fraisse

XXII

1980

Leipzig, Germany

Friedhart Klix

XXIII

1984

Acapulco, Mexico

Rogelio Diaz-Guerrero

XXIV

1988

Sydney, Australia

Peter Sheehan

XXV

1992

Brussels, Belgium

Géry d’Ydewalle &Paul Bertelson

XXVI

1996

Montreal, Canada

David Bélanger

XXVII

2000

Stockholm, Sweden

Lars-Göran Nilsson

XXVIII

2004

Beijing, China

Qicheng Jing

XXIX

2008

Berlin, Germany

Peter Frensch

XXX

2012

Cape Town, South Africa

Saths Cooper

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C HA P TE R

2

Australia

Roderick D. Buchanan

Abstract Australian psychology has a relatively long history that mirrors the story of modern psychology in Europe and America. It was born of colonialism, and its institutional structure retains significant provincial features. The discipline had its roots in the British-style public universities in the major cites, spreading from this academic base into various applied fields. Educational and clinical psychologists spearheaded this diversification. Although independent practice has recently become more common among Australian clinicians, most nonacademic work has developed in various government programs and agencies. Teaching and research has come to reflect an internationalist perspective, but some local and particular influences have still given it a home-grown flavor. Keywords: Australian, psychology, history, colonialism, academic, applied, public, provincial

Australia is an old continent, an island country with no common borders. Geographical isolation has always shaped its ecological, biological, and social destiny. Australia has had a long history of human habitation, with the indigenous Aboriginal population having roamed the land for thousands of years. After Englishman Captain James Cook charted the east coast of the country in 1770, it was declared an ideal place for a penal colony. The First Fleet arrived 18 years later, and the country was transformed as an unruly outpost of the British Empire, the white colonial population boosted by the regular arrival of convict transports and freesettlers. A rural farming economy emerged alongside the growth of large city centers, especially along the southeast rim. Australia quickly became one of the most urbanized nations in the world. Nonetheless, it remains relatively sparsely populated, given a land mass just shy of that of the United States, with Anglo-American customs a little at odds with surrounding Asia. In the last decade of the 19th century, Australia consisted of six states—New South Wales, Victoria, 18

South Australia, Western Australia, Queensland, and Tasmania—governed largely by elected local parliaments. In 1901, federation united these states, along with the Northern Territory, under the Commonwealth. The Australian Capital Territory was created to accommodate the nation’s capital, Canberra. The site was chosen as a compromise between rival cities Sydney and Melbourne, the respective capitals of Australia’s the two most populous states, New South Wales and Victoria. The primary and secondary school systems developed under each state’s jurisdiction, and so did the universities, at least initially. However, control of the tertiary sector has gradually been handed over from the various states to the federal government in more recent times.

Academic Beginnings at the Turn of the Century The Western science of psychology followed the long path east of people, goods, and culture. As was the case in Europe and the United States, academic psychology in Australia began as an offshoot of philosophy, taught as one or several subjects in mental

philosophy. Not surprisingly, it first appeared at Australia’s two oldest establishment of higher education, the University of Sydney and the University of Melbourne, both established in the early 1850s. The University of Melbourne appointed the tall, red-bearded Scot, Henry Laurie, to a lectureship in philosophy in 1881, the first such post in the country. Sydney University followed suit with Francis Anderson in 1888, and both posts were quickly upgraded to chairs explicitly covering mental philosophy (O’Neil, 1987). Like almost all of the first generation of Australian academics, Laurie and Anderson were educated in Europe. Although Mother England was generally the strongest cultural reference point, these pioneer philosopher-psychologists had a predominantly Scottish background, for that is where psychology had gained its strongest institutional foothold in the United Kingdom in the late 19th century. Anderson’s Glasgow credentials gave Sydney philosophy and psychology a Scottish common-sense realism it has retained to this day. Gentleman-scholar Laurie had studied in Edinburgh, as had William Mitchell, who had been given a chair in philosophy at the University of Adelaide in 1894 (O’Neil, 1987). Even so, early Australian mental philosophy had a wider set of intellectual influences than the freethinking liberalism the 19th century Scottish “enlightenment.” As historian Alison Turtle (1988) put it, inspiration came from British empiricism and evolutionary biology, supplemented by German physiological psychology. For example, Laurie’s teaching of psychology at Melbourne emphasized the physiological experimentalism of Alexander Bain and the expansive social and scientific writings of Herbert Spencer. But he also came to admire, and wanted to emulate, the experimental and mental testing work being done in American and German universities. A similar pattern of appointments occurred at other Australian universities. For instance, Adelaide graduate G. Elton Mayo took up a post at the University of Queensland as lecturer in logic philosophy and ethics in 1911, before becoming a full professor of philosophy in 1919. By 1913, all six Australian universities had made appointments in philosophy that took in psychology in some form. Not all the subjects taught emphasized experimental observation, but all included it to some extent. No institution offered a full course in psychology, and separate departments were still a pipe dream. The year 1913 proved auspicious, however. When the University of Sydney took on Henry Tasman Lovell, it began expanding its subject offerings into a recognizable degree course. Taken in

conjunction with experimental education, these psychology subjects would make up a B.A. degree. By 1919, a full course was in place at Sydney. By adding a fourth “honors” year to this undergraduate program 6 years later, the institution established the first full major in psychology in the nation. While nominally under the control of philosophy until 1929, Sydney psychology had already achieved functional independence. That year, Lovell was elevated to a full chair in psychology, and it would remain the only such position until after World War II. The University of Western Australia in Perth followed Sydney’s example. The University had already chosen one of Laurie’s graduates, Philip Le Couteur, to teach mental and moral philosophy before the World War I. Le Couteur left in 1918, for a career as a private school headmaster, and for a time his position lapsed. In 1928, Hugh Fowler joined part-time lecturer Ethel Stoneman in the Western Australian philosophy department. Fowler had been educated at University College London under Spearman. His vision was clear: He wanted to establish an independent psychology department and gain a full-time position within it. Holding out on an offer from the Auckland Teachers’ College, Fowler achieved his ambition by the beginning of 1930 (Richardson, 1995). As the nation’s second oldest institution, the University of Melbourne might also have been expected to follow suit. However, Henry Laurie’s plans for expansion were largely shelved in the wake of a financial disaster that rocked an already cashstrapped university early in the new century. In 1912, he was succeeded by William R. Boyce Gibson as professor of philosophy, who immediately instituted “psychology, logic, and ethics” as a first-year elective. Several notable educationalists cum philosophers taught this subject, including Ken Cunningham and P.M. Bachelard. Although advanced psychology would also become part of the final honors syllabus, little provision was made for experimental work. In contrast, developments at the Teacher Training College adjoining the university gave experimental and applied psychology a much firmer footing in Melbourne (Buchanan, 1996). Educational institutions would prove to be an important complementary pathway in the development of Australian psychology, providing a particularly crucial entry point into applied professional practice.

Early Educational Initiatives Victoria was the first state to make primary education compulsory, secular, and free in 1872, with New buchanan

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South Wales and other states quickly following suit. Not surprisingly, the nation’s first Teacher Training College had been founded in Melbourne in 1890. Under the direction of Frank Tate, psychology was taught in the College as a component of the instruction given to teachers; this teaching was based largely on the texts of William James. In 1903, John Smyth succeeded Tate as principal and set up a crudely equipped classroom that represented the first experimental psychology laboratory in Australia. Smyth had gained his Ph.D. in Edinburgh and, like many of his generation, had visited Wundt’s laboratory in Leipzig. Enthusiastic about the experimental approach, Smyth put Matthew Sharman in charge of the laboratory in 1913 (Buchanan, 1996). That year, Lovell set up a similar laboratory in the Sydney philosophy department (Turtle, 1988). The use of standardized testing in France and the United States set an example that Australian educationalists and would-be psychologists eagerly followed in the prewar years. Testing soon became an integral part of teacher training. For example, students in the diploma of education course in the Melbourne Teachers’ College were introduced to tests of memory, attention, and fatigue, and to the new Binet intelligence tests. Binet’s 1911 scale also proved a hit with staff at the Sydney Teachers’ College. More significantly, the new mental tests provided for a practical administrative knowledge, the technical centerpiece for an emerging applied specialty. Up until the turn of the century, feeblemindedness had been a medical province. Now, the states began to make provisions for special education, with Victoria and New South Wales leading the way. In 1911, the Bell Street Special School set up in Melbourne, assessing and treating feebleminded and maladjusted children. Stanley Porteus was appointed head, despite the fact that he had no formal background in psychology. Porteus quickly came to the conclusion that the Binet tests were unsuitable for many of the children he encountered; they were far too dependent on verbal faculties and did not tap foresight, initiative, and planning. Instead, he developed his own set of maze tests of intelligence that he is remembered for. In 1917, Smyth also engaged Porteus as a lecturer in the Teachers’ College, the first appointment of a psychologist there. Australian psychologists were not yet ready to capitalize on the opportunities provided by wartime mobilization like their U.S. counterparts did with their massive testing program. However, in the early 20

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1920s, various state governments initiated school psychological services to deal with the special education needs of children identified as different—the delinquent, the precocious, and especially the intellectually deficient. In Tasmania, as one of the first generation of academic appointees, Morris Miller had worked closely with the state government drafting policy on mental deficiency. Miller became director of the new State Psychological Clinic, also attaining a professorship of psychology and philosophy in 1928. Many of these state educational psychologists were women, with new clinics staffed by Constance Davey in South Australia, Ethel Stoneman in Western Australia, and Lorna Hodgkinson in Sydney. Testing was a staple of their practice, and children the priority. Even so, both Miller’s clinic in Tasmania and Hugh Martin’s “worry clinic” in Sydney saw adults as well (Cooke, 2000; Turtle, 1988). The services these educational clinics offered were ad hoc and fragile, liable to fall by the wayside due to staff shortages and the vagaries of government funding. Nevertheless, this kind of educational and vocational counseling was the dominant mode of applied psychology in Australia between the wars, and it provided a lead-in for the development of clinical psychology as a distinct specialty. Another important national initiative linking psychology and education occurred in Melbourne in 1930, when the Australian Council for Educational Research (ACER) was set up, with assistance of the Carnegie Corporation. Ken Cunningham was made director. As an independent body, ACER’s brief was to study education, to form a central information resource, and to facilitate and support educational reform. It was sustained by U.S. funds for the first 13 years of its operation. It quickly became a major source of psychological research. Projects were undertaken in which specific grants were obtained, or else directly from core funding (Turtle, 1987). One of the first things ACER did was to adapt and standardize intelligence and aptitude tests across the nation.

Academic and Applied Growth in the 1920s and 1930s Psychology expanded steadily between the wars, within the academic institutions where it had taken root. For example, under Lovell’s stewardship, the number of Sydney graduates increased from five in 1929, to 21 in 1938. By the late 1930s, both Sydney and Western Australia offered an M.A. in psychology based in part on an experimental thesis.

Both universities also began to build connections outside academia, selling their expertise and tools to business, government, and the wider community. Sydney was particularly important for the development of industrial psychology. Bernard Muscio had taken up Anderson’s chair in logic and mental philosophy in 1922, and immediately set up Australasian Association of Psychology and Philosophy, the first professional representative body, and the Australian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy to go with it. Although the Association provided a valuable forum, psychologists would remain the junior partner in this alliance. Numbers and power went with the philosophers. For example, Association office holders tended to be philosophers, as were the editors of the Australian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy (O’Neil, 1987; Turtle, 1988). Bernard Muscio died suddenly in 1926, becoming antipodean psychology’s version of the tragic young genius. However, A.H. Martin took over Muscio’s interest in industrial psychology, establishing the Australian Institute of Industrial Psychology in 1927, affiliated with C.S. Myers’ Institute of Industrial Psychology in London. Martin had taken a Ph.D. in experimental psychology at Columbia with Thorndike and Woodworth. The Institute developed tests for use in vocational guidance and personnel selection, as well as helping train students. Martin remained honorary director for two decades, and the nonprofit Institute would survive until the 1970s. Not all aspects of the development of psychology in Australia can be situated in an “onward and upward” narrative. This is no better illustrated than the faltering attempts to create an institutional base for psychology in Melbourne. Despite its success, psychological laboratory work at the Melbourne Teachers’ College stalled in the years just after World War I, with the maverick innovator Stanley Porteus departing for the Vineland Training School in New Jersey. John Smyth set about reviving the College laboratory in the early 1920s, and chose Ken Cunningham to head a more ambitious laboratory program at the College. However, Cunningham soon left to do a Ph.D. at Columbia. He returned in 1927, but his higher ambition was thwarted by the fact that the University of Melbourne could still not provide a departmental home. Instead, he taught at the College, and in the University’s philosophy and commerce departments. Before taking on the ACER post in 1930, Cunningham helped to construct new intelligence and performance tests, and, in 1928, to institute the special teacher’s certificate for those dealing with the “mentally deficient.”

It was not as if the idea of a psychology department at Melbourne lacked powerful backers. During the 1924 conference, the Australasian Association of Psychology and Philosophy recommended that the status of psychology at Australian universities needed to be raised, with departments of social science established in all such institutions. Professors Alexander Gunn and W. Boyce Gibson strongly supported such moves. In 1925, they formed a professorial committee with a view to establishing a chair in psychology in the faculty of science. However, amid competing claims from other faculties, tightening budgets, and other circumstances that remain mysterious, the plan was quietly dropped. It has been suggested that the committee had distinguished industrial psychologist Elton Mayo in mind for the position of foundation chair. Mayo had just obtained a position at Harvard and would soon be most famously associated with the Hawthorne studies of worker efficiency. However, Mayo was reluctant to come back to Australia. The unavailability of the Committee’s chosen candidate, and the absence of alternatives, was apparently enough to scuttle their enthusiasm. Another decade would pass before such plans could be put on the agenda again (Buchanan, 1996).

Freud and the Clinic Between the Wars School psychological services were one strand of clinical work to emerge in the educational context of the early 1920s. These publicly funded clinics were set up to address delinquency, mental deficiency, and learning and behavioral problems. However, the intellectual and professional model provided by psychoanalysis played an important, ambiguous, but formative role in the development of clinical psychology down under. A handful of discussion pieces on Freud’s work had appeared in various Australian medical journals in the early years of the 20th century, but local interest appeared limited. With the ties of empire strong, Australia followed Britain into the Great War in Europe. However, the romantic image of battlefield adventure quickly gave way to the realities of trench warfare. The specter of shell-shock proved a rude awakening for somatically oriented psychiatrists, and therapeutic desperation opened the door to psychoanalytic approaches. Back in Australia, the clinical impact of these developments was muted by the fact that almost all shell-shock cases were cared for, at least initially, in England. Although there was significant discussion of psychoanalytic techniques in the aftermath of war, when the soldiers returned buchanan

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home, it was more a case of distant intellectual thunder (Damousi, 2005). Although some psychologists incorporated an interest in psychoanalysis, it did not occupy a central part of their academic teaching. Perhaps the most notable and influential exception to this was Tasman Lovell, who gave analysis equal billing with experimental and social psychology in his courses at Sydney. Drawn to psychoanalytic accounts of neurosis and psychopathology, he wrote extensively on dreams. Yet, he was no practitioner, and derived all his integrative knowledge simply from what he could read. Elton Mayo, on the other hand, tried to take a more hands-on approach, immersing himself in the analytic techniques of Freud, Jung, and Janet, and then attempting to apply them when working with returned soldiers immediately after the war. Although Mayo and Lovell had both dabbled in private practice in the 1920s, they had little company among their peers. To many Australian psychologists, psychoanalysis was everything psychology was not, far too subjective and unscientific. It was greeted with skepticism and indifference down under, much more so than it was in the United States. Intellectually, it ran up against the closed-shop of Anglo philosophical rationality. It also sat rather uneasily with an antipodean culture that stressed stoic independence and stigmatized most forms of mental distress. The way analysis sought to open up the psychological interior came across as invasive in a culture that guarded personal privacy. But more importantly and prosaically, it lacked critical mass. There were no training facilities and limited client service opportunities. During most of the interwar years, there were only two qualified analysts practicing in Australia— Roy Winn and Paul Dane—and both were medical men. In 1931, Winn left Sydney Hospital and set up in private practice as the country’s first full-time analyst (Damousi, 2005). Nevertheless, psychoanalysis did enter Australian popular culture to some extent, permeating the literature, arts, and politics of the major city centers. An interest with psychoanalysis tended to go with a leftist, “progressive” outlook; its enthusiasts were overwhelmingly elite Protestants. It was another of point of difference in the pervasive Anglican– Catholic divide that stratified Australian life up to the beginnings of multiculturalism in the 1970s. Colorful Melbourne psychiatrist Reginald Ellery, for example, managed to combine an interest in Freud with his advocacy of radical somatic treatments. Ellery’s socialist leanings and bohemian prose was very much in keeping with the modernist 22

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push of the Reed-Harris literary set. He opened his own practice in Melbourne in 1933, the first private psychopathic hospital in Victoria. In the lead-up to World War II, Roy Winn, Ernest Jones, and John Rickman worked together to enable psychoanalysts to migrate to Australia. In the end, only one made it—the Hungarian Clara Lazar-Geroe. She would become a central, matriarchal figure for psychoanalysis in Australia, settling in Melbourne and founding the nation’s first training institute there in 1941.

World War II and Its Aftermath The resumption of hostilities in Europe in 1939 did not have an immediate impact on Australian psychology, as like it did in the United Kingdom and on the continent. Only when things came closer to home, when the war in the Pacific escalated in 1942, did an urgent need for manpower management come to the fore. The discipline’s de facto leadership— Cunningham, Lovell, Martin, Miller, and Fowler— pushed psychologist’s expertise in personnel selection, job placement, and rehabilitation training to the various branches of the armed forces. All three branches—the army especially—began to rely on psychologist’s services in some way during the war, and all three set up psychological organizations to retain them afterward. The war also brought the discipline into contact with allied professional groups, especially psychiatrists, although not always harmoniously (Cooke, 2000; O’Neil, 1987). Wartime had a way of rewriting the rules, helping to generate closer ties with government and the armed services. World War II accelerated professional reform, in part because it brought Australian psychologists together. In a land defined by the cliché “the tyranny of distance,” the sheer scale of geographical separation had made it difficult to organize at a basic national level, let alone achieve a higher sense of disciplinary identity. Eager to use wartime opportunities to establish a united professional front, Australian psychologists began to canvas ideas for a new disciplinary body. A manpower survey in 1943 had revealed a small but growing field badly in need of organizational representation. Over 600 people possessed at least 2 years of psychological study at a tertiary level. They were young, mostly male, but vulnerable to the encroachment of untrained charlatans as well as rival professional groups. Yet Australian psychologists baulked at the idea of forming a stand-alone national body. Such a move had a few influential supporters—Fowler and Martin prominent

among them. However, most saw it as premature or simply not worth the trouble. In what now looks like a cringing compromise, they opted to create an affiliate body of the British Psychological Society (BPS), hoping to enjoy the prestige and privileges the Society might bestow. New Zealand-born Donald McElwain was key proponent of this safe and familiar option, already being a member of the British Society. Thus, the Australian Branch of the BPS was born in 1945, initially comprising 54 members. Given its age, size, and centrality, the Sydney department was the natural institutional base for the Branch, and the recently retired Lovell became its first president. The Branch would expand significantly over the next two decades, eventually outgrowing its provincial status (Cooke, 2000). Branch membership standards were deliberately set higher than those of the rather unrestrictive parent British body in an effort to curtail the untrained. Basic membership required at least a degree in psychology and experience in research, teaching or practice— equivalent to the middle-tier “Associate” level of BPS membership. The Branch soon launched the Australian Journal of Psychology. It would be a costly venture, given that all Branch members would automatically receive each issue. However, the Australian Journal of Psychology provided a communication channel that further strengthened disciplinary identity, as well as an outlet for empirical work the Australian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy refused. Even so, founding editor Don McElwain would have great difficulty rounding up sufficient copy to fill its pages in the early years, and the first edition did not appear until 1949.

Postwar Academic Growth The nation’s higher education system began to expand significantly in the postwar years, with academic psychology soon represented in all the major city centers. In a long overdue move, a psychology department was finally established at Melbourne in 1946. Oscar Oeser was appointed head; he became at 41 years of age Australia’s third professor of psychology—after Lovell and William M. O’Neil. Sydney had managed to advertise their chair just prior to that of their new southern counterparts and O’Neil got the nod ahead of Oeser. The South African-born Oeser had a diverse background, having been educated at Rhodes University, at Marburg in Germany and at Cambridge. Oeser was unable to take up the post immediately due to his work in Germany, so the department was put in place by acting head Don McElwain. With a Ph.D. from London and fondness of rugby,

McElwain transplanted much of the teaching structure of his former department in Western Australia. On his way to Melbourne, Oeser stopped off at the University of Western Australia in Perth, recruiting young staffers Sam Hammond, Cecily de Monchaux, and Fred Emery. Despite the rush, the department started teaching, albeit a little behind schedule, early in 1946 (Buchanan, 1996). Although social psychology had been researched and taught at Sydney and Western Australia, the foundation of the Melbourne department provided a huge boost for the growth of the field in Australia. Reflecting Oeser’s interests and expertise, significant longitudinal survey work was started in this early period. Melbourne became a center for research and teaching in social structure, attitudes, and prejudices—symptomatic of the optimism and sense of social renewal in the immediate postwar era. Much of this work was ground-breaking in terms of its scope and the multipronged methodology that Oeser labeled “functional penetration.” Influenced by Lazarsfeld, Mead, and Lewin, this work incorporated broad ideas from sociology and anthropology, and connected them with a social psychology of roles, norms, and attitudes. Collected volumes resulting from this work were edited by Oeser, Hammond, and Emery. These volumes covered attitudes to immigration, the role of the family in child development, and the place of work in the community. In the West, Ronald Taft and Alan Richardson were pursuing a similar line of research on migrant assimilation, and Taft would subsequently move to Victoria, taking up a post at Melbourne before moving on to a chair at Monash University (Feather, 2005). The Melbourne department produced many notable graduates, such as Leon Mann and Richard Trahair, and would remain an important institutional center for social psychology. Fred Emery later attained international renown for his research on work group relations and industrial democracy, mainly done at the Tavistock Institute in London (Bochner, 2000). Social psychology would gain a second-wave boost with the creation of the new universities in the postwar period, particularly Flinders University in South Australia and Macquarie University in New South Wales and the Australian National University in Canberra. Many of the newer universities would fill relative gaps in teaching and research, whereas older departments would consolidate and broaden their offerings and output. For example, the Sydney department added many new areas after the war, but would remain a strong center for experimental and buchanan

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behavioral research. William O’Neil had a rigorously catholic approach to the discipline, but came to specialize in history and philosophy. The department institutionalized the value of the historical perspective and retained informal links with philosophy, still housed next door in the years immediately following the war. The realist approach of Scottish émigré philosopher John Anderson, a long-time faculty member in the middle part of the century, would prove particularly influential. Anderson became an iconic aspect of the Sydney scene, he and his followers seeing off social conservatives then holding out against deconstructive intellectual trends (Turtle, 1997). The graduates the Sydney department turned out would also prove more influential than the department itself in the postwar period. For example, Sydney alumni Ross Day became the founding professor of the new Monash University department in 1965. Day initiated an extensive program of laboratory research in sensory perception, behavioral genetics, and human engineering. Another Sydney graduate, George Singer, would cast the even newer La Trobe University department in his own image; since its inception in 1972, it was a leading site for neurophysiological research, one the few such centers in the country (Buchanan, 1999). Australian universities maintained a structural model that was essentially British, even as the instructional content has become increasingly Americanized in recent times. At an undergraduate level, the 3-year degree major plus a fourth “honours” year remained standard, with most courses covering the gamut of the discipline and offering a range of elective choices. Despite the perceived need for uniformity, different departments did exhibit different emphasizes. For example, Sydney pushed history and philosophy at a third-year level, the University of New South Wales was strong on industrial psychology, whereas Monash University emphasized experimental and physiological subjects. The British model has only recently been challenged, and only at the University of Melbourne, where a more American structure of generalist undergraduate courses and specialized graduate training has been instituted in the last 2 years. Postgraduate programs were the area in which the most significant restructuring and growth occurred. Only an M.A. could be taken in psychology prior to the war, and it was not necessarily seen as a strictly research-based degree. By the mid-1950s, the M.Sc. became available, along with the Ph.D.—both bona fide research degrees requiring original scientific 24

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research. Student numbers were boosted by the introduction of a federally funded student scholarship scheme in 1960, part of the increasing level of commonwealth involvement in higher education in the postwar era.

The Expansion of Applied Work in the 1950s and 1960s World War II had underlined the burgeoning demand for psychologists in government, business, and social service sectors. But it had also highlighted the lack of training facilities in psychology. Academic expansion helped service this demand for applied expertise. Although the image shift was never as dramatic as it was in the United States, Australian psychologists would increasingly market themselves in practical terms. On the back of war work assessing military recruits, applied psychology expanded into the government service sector. Work in specialist clinics dealing with child guidance and the intellectually handicapped expanded in the postwar period, especially in New South Wales, where the state government boosted school guidance and counseling services dramatically. By 1973, there were over 400 district guidance officers and counselors employed by the state—many, but certainly not all, trained in psychology. Although the federal government pressured other state governments to follow suit, their response was generally more ad hoc and measured (O’Neil, 1987). These opportunities were augmented by new openings in the state mental hospitals dealing with adult psychiatric patients. As part of an attempt to modernize and reform these custodial asylums, many mental hospitals expanded their roster to include the services of psychologists. Growth was particularly strong in Victoria. In 1951, seven psychologists were employed by the Victorian Mental Hygiene Authority. By 1968, this number had swelled to 25. Although the corresponding number of psychiatrists increased from 10 to 97 over the same period, this still represented a significant increase. In addition, there was a small but growing cadre of psychologists branching out into private practice. Courses were developed to service this expanding role, with the University of Western Australia and Sydney University leading the way. Both had diploma courses in clinical psychology in place by the late 1950s. Other tertiary institutions, such as the University of Melbourne, got their clinical programs up and running in the early 1960s. These diploma courses were stepped up to master’s level

a decade later, with La Trobe, Macquarie, Newcastle, and Flinders following suit.

Professional Regulation and the Formation of the Australian Psychological Society A burgeoning market for psychological services helped convince academic leaders and young graduates of the future of applied work, but it also opened the door to the non-qualified and the charlatans. The Australian Branch of the BPS had cautiously approached the issue of professional regulation in the years following the war. Two versions of a Code of Ethics were produced: an initial 1949 version, and a revised and far more detailed 1960 version. It is worth noting that these initiates predated any such moves by the parent British body. However, the impact of these ethical standards was limited by the fact that, up to that time, only a handful of Australian psychologists had entered the uncharted waters of private practice. Moreover, any such code could only be said to apply to Branch members, leaving the fringe elements free to ply their trade. Even so, the most vexing aspect of professional regulation for the Branch was one of process, an issue that would eventually prompt Australian psychologists to go it alone to form an independent body. In the early 1960s, the Branch had received a complaint about the manner in which a Branch member was promoting his services. The protracted expulsion process—in which evidence was sent back to the parent British body for review and judgment— helped convince members of the desirability of local autonomy. At the same time, community disquiet and some lurid press coverage of the activities of various pseudo-psychological groups in Victoria led to a state government investigation, the Anderson Inquiry. Although the main aim was to suppress Scientology and other fringe psyche therapies, the inquiry set a precedent for the professional control of psychological services in other states. The final report of the inquiry branded Scientology “evil” and resulted in the State Psychological Practices Act of 1965. The Act provided for the registration of professional psychologists in Victoria, legitimating the qualified and sanctioning the nonqualified. However, the Act ceded control over the regulatory process, since the board set up to oversee it was an external body made up of psychologists, psychiatrists, and doctors, with a lay chairman. Australian psychologists could only hope that such a body would operate in the discipline’s best interests (Cooke, 2000). Articulating those interests would require an effective professional organization at the very least,

preferably one that was not beholden to a distant power. Even the simple matter of electing Branch members had made for irritating and embarrassing delays, given that it was necessary to send applications back to England to be voted on and/or dealt with. It had become clear that Australian psychologists could and should manage their own house when it came to professional ethics, and were best placed to deal with looming issues like training standards, course accreditation, and so on. Reforming the arcane Branch thus became a top priority; the only question was what form should it should take. Tellingly, it was the constitution of the American Psychological Association that provided inspiration— particularly the famous postwar revision of its charter as the “promotion of psychology as a science, as a profession, and as a means of promoting human welfare.” A proposal for independence put to branch members in 1965 was carried overwhelmingly. So, the Branch became the Australian Psychological Society (APS) the following year and relocated to Melbourne, with “around 900” members. Taking over from Branch chairman Richard Champion, Ross Day became the Society’s inaugural president. The formation of APS in 1966 signaled a new dawn for the Australian discipline, marked by a series of initiatives at a professional level, as well as some more subtle intellectual changes. Australian psychology remained inescapably provincial; what changed was the nature of that provincialism. Instead of looking to mother England and the Continent, Australian psychologists were more inclined to take their intellectual cues from the United States. Australian psychology would ever more reflect the theory concerns and research priorities of their American counterparts. They would be more likely to visit, attain jobs, or be educated stateside, and to publish in United States journals. The sun did set on the British Empire, but only rather slowly.

Developing an Academic Research Culture in the 1960s and Beyond Academic psychology grew in tandem with the expansion of the Australian university system in the postwar era. Thirteen new universities were created in the three decades following World War II, adding to the half dozen established prior to it, and almost all came with psychology departments. Much this was a result of the expansion of the tertiary sector, including the creation and rearranging the multiple tiers of the structure of this sector. After the publication of the Murray report—Australia’s own postSputnik overhaul of higher education—several new buchanan

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campuses were created by the early 1960s. In addition, colleges of advanced education were created in the late 1960s as vocationally oriented alternatives to the universities. They and the older institutes of technology began to offer degree courses in psychology in the early 1970s, and these institutions would in turn employ a sizeable chunk of academically engaged psychologists. With the exception of ACER, psychological research in Australian has mostly been performed in a university context. Prior to World War II, this had to be accomplished on shoestring budgets drawn from departments’ tight operating funds. Purposebuilt laboratories were almost unknown. This situation hardly improved after the war. Returning soldiers flooded campuses, making for high work loads for harried, often inexperienced staff. Ross Day (1997) remembered: “there was no culture of research. We were told about the discipline, rather than taught to question it or to criticize it (p. 5).” Things began to change for the better in the early-1960s, however. The federal government stepped in to fund basic and applied scientific research with a competitive, peer-reviewed grant scheme run by Australian Research Grants Committee, which later became the Australian Research Council. Since that time, psychological research has expanded markedly, and other funding avenues have opened up. Medically oriented researchers can turn to the National Health and Medical Research Council. Applied psychologists can tap into various specialist government bodies and industry groups, a trend especially encouraged more recently by universities looking to shore up their financial positions in the face of dwindling per-student government operating funds. By the 1980s, if not before, virtually every major research strand of the discipline came to be wellrepresented. At close of the 20th century, it would be difficult to point to a distinctly Australian psychology, at least not in terms of teaching and research. Peculiar emphases have been flattened out. For example, there has been a long strand of research and practice in the individual differences tradition, a direct lineage of ideas, technology, and personnel from the London School and the American testing movement. Although still present, it is nowhere near as relatively prominent as it was between the wars. Conversely, behaviorism made little impact in Australia academia, although its radical reformulation in the hands of Skinner and Spence enjoyed a lengthy run in Sydney and in some of the institutions founded by Sydney graduates (Turtle, 1997). 26

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Recent Professional Developments Much of the postwar growth in Australian psychology, particularly in the more applied areas like clinical, educational, counselling, and social psychology, could be attributed to the increasing participation of women. The majority of psychology graduates had been female as far back as the late 1950s. Although this proportion increased to over 75% by 1996, attrition rates have also decreased. A greater proportion of female graduates took postgraduate degrees and/or pursued careers in psychology from the mid-1970s onward. Marriage, family, and travel were not longer the source of career dissipation they once were. Even so, women still continued to be under-represented in the upper echelons of the discipline’s hierarchy, and it wasn’t until the 1990s that women outnumbered men within the APS (Cooke, 2000). Clinical psychology stood out as the most significant area of nonacademic employment, a Trojan horse for Australian psychology’s spread beyond the universities. In light of the special needs of this group, clinical practitioners had formed a separate division within the APS in 1965, a year before a similar division was created within the BPS. Applied practitioners of other stripes—educational, industrial/ organizational, and counselling psychologists— followed suit by forming their own APS divisions (later reborn or renamed as Boards) in the late 1960s and 1970s. However, none was as well-represented as that of clinical psychology. By the early 1970s, more than 300 clinical psychologists were working outside the universities in Australia. Over half worked in the state mental hospitals and public health services, while the rest were scattered around in various welfare agencies and other organizations. In addition, a small (over 10%) but growing cadre had struck out into private practice. Clinical practice still tended to emphasize diagnostic testing as a primary role. When and if any treatment was undertaken, it tended to be more Rogerian than Freudian. Pat Pentony had been instrumental in importing the client-centered approach to Australia. He and Elwyn Morey had initiated the first clinical course work in Australia at the University of Western Australia in 1949. Pentony would continue to promote the client-centered approach after moving to Canberra University College (now part of the Australian National University) in the 1950s, training notable researcher and practitioner Godfrey Barrett-Lennard. Although Australian clinicians increased their options, competition and control remained an

ongoing issue. Other states and territories followed Victoria’s example by creating independent registration boards. Nevertheless, the road to nationwide legal recognition was long and circuitous. Australia’s most heavily populated state, New South Wales, did not pass its Psychological Practices Act until 1990. The Australian Capital Territory was the last to fall into line 5 years later. All such acts were based on the Victorian template, but typically only restricted the use of title. The original Victorian act had provided a definition of practice. This definition was sufficiently broad to cover all aspects of the psychologists’ activities. Numerous exemptions were necessary to allow for the activity of doctors, teachers, and the clergy. However, this created a loophole that would undermine the original intent of the act. When Scientology was recognized as a legitimate religion for the purposes of the Federal Marriage Act in 1973, it meant they (and possibly many other fringe elements) could avoid legal sanction. This made definitions of practice in the legislation subsequently drawn up in other states seem fruitless. A rather uneasy “liberal tolerance” came into effect. No one professional group—certainly not psychologists— could claim a monopoly in a mental health marketplace (Cooke, 2000). As Australian clinical psychologists branched out from the public hospitals, health services, and clinics in the 1970s, they began to outgrow their narrow diagnostic role. Clinical practice took on a more autonomous, treatment-oriented footing, aided by the development of new, distinctly psychological treatment regimes. Therapeutic modalities became more diverse, with individual desensitization procedures and group and family therapy augmented by the arrival of cognitive-behavioral techniques in the 1980s (Lewis, 1988). Different approaches evolved in different regions. For instance, London Institute of Psychiatry alumnus Aubrey Yates helped introduce behavior therapy to Australia, joining the University of Western Australia faculty in 1960. Conversely, Gestalt and cognitive-behavioral approaches were initially centered in Melbourne, with Ian Campbell pioneering rational emotive therapy at the University of Melbourne. Client-centered and analytically informed approaches were the big losers in this readjustment, although the Rogerian influence is still very much in evidence in counseling and educational guidance (Birnbrauer, 1996; Grant, Mullings, & Denham, 2008). When the government employment sector was squeezed in the 1980s, increasing numbers of Australian psychologists turned to private practice.

In 1989, the APS saw fit to establish a committee on independent practice to monitor and represent them. By the mid-1990s, over 1,600 psychologists had set up independent practices—representing 22% of all Australian psychologists—outnumbering those employed in the universities (Cooke, 2000, p. 233). The 1990s saw the policy of deinstitutionalization come into full effect. Most of the venerable but decaying state asylums were closed, with their patients redistributed to other forms of institutional care or cast out into the community. Even in Victoria, Eric Cunningham Dax’s vision of hospitals without walls was supplanted by the amorphous notion of care in the community. It would prove a mixed blessing for Australian clinicians. On the one hand, it brought mental patients (and psychiatrists) out of the asylum—where the medical man once ruled. It made these erstwhile patients available to a range of mental health care workers, including psychologists, who increasingly treated the severely disturbed along with the worried well as part of community-based outreach teams. But this intensified competition between medical and paramedical groups in the relatively unregulated interface between the public and private arenas, and this brought a raft of new problems and negotiations. In a bid to achieve a degree of parity with their medical colleagues, Australian psychologists struggled to have their services included as part of the various public health programs that have been introduced since the 1960s. The APS had first lobbied for publicly funded health rebates for psychological services in the late 1960s, as part of the then Medical Benefits Scheme. The federal government rejected these claims, but the Society had a little more success getting some private health insurers to cover member services. When the Hawke government introduced the Medicare public health scheme in 1984, psychologists lobbied to be included as part of the services offered. However, disciplinary representatives were not able to guarantee adequate representation in rural areas, nor assure legislators that a mass exodus from the public to the private sector would not occur. Thus, their claims for inclusion were rejected, and little headway has been made on this issue for two decades since, despite multiple and seemingly persuasive submissions from APS. Finally, in 2006, the Howard federal government allowed for clinical psychologists to be included within a rebate scheme requiring referral from doctors, helping to boost a patchwork system of care that struggled to cope, especially in rural areas. buchanan

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Science and Practice Today Reform and expansion of higher education in the late 1980s, which included the upgrading of some former institutes to university status, as well as the creation of new universities, effectively doubled the number of Australian universities. By 1996, there were 38 university psychology departments in the country, only two of them private. Australian psychologists now contribute a small but significant proportion of psychological research across the world. This proportion has been growing steadily in the postwar decades, from 1.5% in the mid-1970s to 2.5% in the mid-1990s, with a 2.8% share of research published in major journals (Cumming, Siddle, & Hyslop, 1997). No one area stands out as particularly strong or weak in this context; local output in psychometrics, human experimentation and engineering, developmental, clinical, educational, and industrial psychology remain strong, sports psychology especially. Perhaps the only relative soft spot would be in (neuro)physiological psychology, with most Australian departments not yet tooled-up for this kind of demanding, “wet” research. Australian psychology is now distinctly Janusfaced—both learned science and artful profession— just as it is in the Europe, the United Kingdom, and especially the United States. Although multiplying the discipline’s options and reach, it was also a source of tension, particularly as the balance began to shift toward the applied fields. Recognizing the need to reflect the professional concerns of much of its membership, the rebadged APS took the decision to instigate a new journal, the Australian Psychologist, in 1965. The Australian Journal of Psychology had become a decidedly academic journal, a general outlet for theory-driven research that struggled to compete with overseas specialist journals. The Australian Psychologist was deliberately modeled on the American Psychologist. Its founding editor, Clive Williams of the University of Queensland, hoped much of the new journal’s copy would come from those outside the universities—an editorial line that was difficult to realize in practice. However, after a shaky start, the Australian Psychologist blossomed to become a key forum for professional comment and practical research. The accreditation process overseen by the Society had the effect of standardizing curriculums.Undergraduate course variations became less pronounced by the 1980s. What distinguished different departments were their postgraduate offerings—particularly the professionally oriented programs—and the 28

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lure they represented to students seeking careers in these fields. The basic start-up costs for undergraduate programs were low. Postgraduate applied courses were a different kettle of fish, especially the laborintensive clinical and clinical neuropsychological programs. These required hard-to-get specialist staff and links to teaching hospitals, requirements that older, more established departments found easier to meet. Clinical psychology helped paved the way for other applied fields—especially for clinical neuropsychology, which emerged in the late 1970s. The industrial psychology program Martin had pioneered in Sydney did not survive through the 1970s. However, several institutions, such as the University of Melbourne, initiated master’s programs in industrial and organizational psychology in the early 1970s. Industrial and organizational psychology would remain a staple of undergraduate instruction, and there are now around 16 postgraduate training programs in the field. The first Australian Industrial and Organizational Psychology conference took place in 1995 and has been held biennially ever since (O’Driscoll, 2008). Other applied areas, such as counseling and educational psychology, grew steadily, although their specific histories have yet to be charted. State and federal governments remain the key employers of these nonacademic psychologists, with over a quarter of psychologists on government payrolls in the mid-1990s. Although an equally large percentage was engaged in independent practice, the commercial private sector has remained relatively underdeveloped. The APS attempted to accommodate the interests of practitioners as well as academics by expanding the number of applied specialty Boards (now dubbed Colleges) in the 1980s and 1990s. Although the clinical Board retains the most members (over 700 in the mid-1990s), it was rivaled in strength by the counsellors and the educational and developmental psychologists. In 1981, two divisions were created within the Society, one for professional and one for scientific affairs, as the Society fully professionalized all aspects of its internal staffing and operations. By the early 1990s, those on the professional side of the divide were in the majority. Even though the accommodation of the divergent interests of academics and practitioners has not been without conflict, the Society has managed to avoid the kind of formal split the American Psychological Association suffered in the late 1980, with the formation of the science-oriented American Psychological Society (Cooke, 2000).

Local and Particular: Antipsychiatry in Australia Given the distinctly provincial nature of Australian psychology, historians and psychologists themselves have struggled to come to grips with the question of what, if anything, distinguishes it from the kind of psychology carried out in the major overseas centers. A superficial but reasonably accurate answer would be “nothing much,” assuming that it is all a matter of straightforward cultural importation. Nevertheless, the process should still be seen as a dynamic one: Some of these ideas have blossomed and have been deployed in some culturally unique and specific ways. This could probably best be illustrated with two quirky and compelling examples. As feminism, gay liberation, and the first stirring of patient advocacy washed up on Australian shores in the early 1970s, they helped create a home-grown version of the antipsychiatry movement. At the time, Australian psychiatry stood at an historical juncture; locked into essentially somatic mindset, its practice was tethered to increasingly decrepit, longstay state asylums. Leading figures in this movement focused on the corrosive, repressive nature of the doctor’s role, but they also promoted the idea politically engaged, community-based social psychiatry (Damousi, 2005; Laffey, 2003). Among psychologists, academic clinician Robin Winkler stood out as singular, crusading figure. Winkler immediately instigated an antipodean version of David Rosenhan’s famously iconoclastic 1973 “pseudopatients” experiment. Like Rosenhan, Winkler had his experimental confederates fake specified symptoms in order to gain admittance to mental hospitals, but he also had them visit general practitioners. A more explicitly political twist was added to his study, with the Whitlam Government’s new Medibank public health program about to be introduced. Thus, experimental confederates were asked to assess medical attitudes to this great leap into “nationalized” medicine (Owen & Winkler, 1974; Winkler, 1974). Like Rosenhan, Winkler argued for a new respect for patient rights in the face of the arbitrary discipline and numbing routine of institutional life. And he and his co-investigators did uncover pockets of resistance to Medibank among GPs (Owen & Winkler, 1974). In 1976, Winkler moved on to head the University of Western Australia’s clinical master’s program and departmental clinic before his untimely early death a decade later (Richardson, 1995). Jay Birnbrauer (1996) pointed out how Winkler’s career epitomized the shift in orientation of Australian

clinical psychologists in the 1970s: from institutionally based test artisans to socially active community consultants. Winkler had completed a Ph.D. on token economies in Sydney’s Gladesville psychiatric hospital in the late 1960s. Although speaking out on the choice of goals in behaviour modification— opposing the treatment of homosexuality, for example—he also attempted to alter public attitudes that stigmatizing and exacerbated psychological problems. The attacks Winkler led were symptomatic of a general questioning of medical authority in this period, with Australian critics contrasting the somatic model of illness and treatment with more psychological and sociological perspectives. Nevertheless, clashes with psychiatry were not as overt and pronounced in Australia as they have been overseas, in the United States, for example. There was not the same level of heated debate over patient jurisdiction, not the same kind of pitched battles over the ownership of psychotherapy (Buchanan, 2003). Both psychiatry and clinical psychology emerged from government-funded institutions of one sort or another in Australia. Until relatively recently, it was never entirely clear whether there existed a market for either group’s services outside these institutional confines. As has already been mentioned, Australia’s was not a therapeutic culture; engaging a third-party expert to assist in the pursuit of happiness or personal growth sat rather uneasily with an ethos of privacy and stoicism. This is one reason antipodean clinical psychology has developed according to a problem-solving orientation, geared to specific issues like drug and alcohol abuse, veteran’s affairs and post-traumatic shock, child welfare, and relationship difficulties. The psychoanalytic movement had a less divisive presence down under than it did abroad. Unlike the American psychoanalytic training institutes, for example, the institutes established in Melbourne, Sydney, and Adelaide readily admitted suitably qualified lay trainees. Several notable Australian practitioners— such as Ian Waterhouse—were turned out by these institutes after first training as psychologists. However, in other respects the Australian institutes were just as conservative as their overseas counterparts, and just as insular. They remained separate, even secretive entities that stood apart from the universities and medical schools. As a result, psychoanalysis never achieved a high level of integration within psychiatric training programs in Australia, nor within undergraduate instruction in psychology, where it was generally taught as just one of number of theories of personality, buchanan

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if at all. It was only in postgraduate training in psychology that a Freudian focus might be intense. Some clinical training courses, for example Melbourne University’s clinical master’s program, contained a stream that stressed psychodynamic ideas and techniques. Even so, if one wanted to become a recognized “analyst” in Australia, one still had to then go through the lengthy training regimes specified by one of the institutes. And, like some of their overseas counterparts, they were racked by internal divisions, especially from the late 1970s when a Lacanian school emerged to challenge a Kleinian orthodoxy (Damousi, 2005). Although psychoanalysis was co-opted as resource at times by both sides of the antipsychiatry debate, Australian analysts played only minor roles in framing mental health care provision. And when deinstitutionalization eventually came about in the 1990s, it was only as an indirect and delayed result of the antipsychiatric critique. With policy precedents available from America and England, economic expedience had more to do with the wave of mental hospital closures (Chesters, 2005). A complete history of these events has yet to be written, especially with respect to the state-by-state differences in philosophies and outcomes.

Local and Particular: Aboriginal Psychology Social psychology remained a strong feature of the Australian discipline. Nevertheless, Norman Feather (2005) concluded that it was notable only in terms of the diversity of its borrowings from American, British, and European traditions. But in this postcolonial world, if any subfield were to reflect local concerns it this one. Feather pointed to research on particularly Australian topics like attitudes toward high achievers (“tall-poppy syndrome”) and the devaluation of home-grown culture relative to that emanating from overseas (“the cultural cringe”). He also recounted the long and somewhat painful history of research in the “ethical and political minefield” of “Aboriginal affairs.” Pre-modern 19th-century appreciations of Australia’s first inhabitants emphasized their primitiveness. Known to Europeans as “Aborigines,” but to themselves by their various tribal names, their indigenous status became both a sticky label and the defining conceptual prism through which they were viewed. Overseas observers from Spencer to Freud found them a convenient example of evolutionary throwback. They were seen as a backward race, the lowest rung of the evolutionary totem pole. Local medical men and social policy makers saw

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indigenous Australians as alien and threatening. Although sympathetic in their appraisal of the results of contact with the “white man,” they were fearful of the degenerative effects this might entail for their own kind. Even so, they also wondered what might be learned from them as an example of adaptation to a hostile, non-European environment. Medical researchers suggested that the “savage” mind was simple and childlike, less prone to the kinds of breakdowns that went with the stress and pressures of civilization, and less sensitive to physical pain and discomfort. However, expert opinion varied as to if and how they could be assimilated or preserved at the margins, given the expectation they were a “dying race.” Psychologists’ formal involvement with “Aboriginal affairs” in the early part of the century came as part of attempts to manage this encounter. The first recognizable precedent was the Cambridge Torres Strait expedition of 1895, when C. G. Seligman had examined Aborigines from the Fitzroy and McKenzie River districts and concluded their sensory and perceptual skills were no different from that of Europeans. However, this finding was overtaken by testing with the standardized psychometric tools of Western psychology in the new century, which repeatedly illustrated the gap in intellectual capabilities. Interpretation of this gap would shift subtly over time, however (Anderson, 2002). Perhaps the most well-known early psychological research came from Stanley Porteus, the self-described (1969) “psychologist of sorts.” During the war years, Porteus teamed up with Richard Berry, chair in anatomy at the University of Melbourne, attempting to map mental deficiency onto physical anthropometry, especially cranial measurement. For Berry, Aborigines were merely another small-headed group, whose feeblemindedness was comparable to white delinquents and criminals. Porteus’ tests results did little to contradict his collaborators’ conclusions of inherent inferiority. Porteus departed for the United States at the end World War I. However, inspired by Wood Jones’ ideas of selective environmental adaptation, he returned in 1929, to set up a research base amongst the Arunta people. Using his own maze tests and other measures, Porteus likened Aborigines to that of 12-year-old white children, but hardly inferior to other racial groups. Distancing himself from Berry’s obsession with hereditary racial typing, Porteus saw his subjects as specifically suited to the local environment. Anthropologists were in turn critical of Porteus. For instance, A.P. Elkin suggested Porteus merely

measured rather “listened,” that his conclusions of inferiority were based on tests that still tapped culturally specific skills like speed, and neglected other skills like oral memory. Although psychological investigation of the indigenous population tailed-off in the Great Depression years, the comparative framework emphasizing deficit would remain. As Australia experienced successive waves of immigration in the 1950s and 1960s, the question of cultural integration took on a new urgency. Indigenous children began entering the school system in large numbers for the first time, along with the children of migrants from non– English speaking backgrounds. New assimilation policies were drawn up, including the forced removal of children from their families. Ironically, this was the very time when overseas researchers such as John Bowlby were stressing the importance of the maternal bond (McConnochie, 2008). At no stage did psychologists produce any research questioning these policies. However, to be fair, no other learned group did either. As late as 1980, psychologists such Seagrim and Lendon (1980) were weighing up the pros and cons of separation, suggesting “the age at which the change occurs and the consistency of affection . . . will affect the success of [the child’s] adaptation” (p. 202). Instead, Australian psychologists focused on the question of indigenous underachievement at school. The compensatory strategies they helped devise were designed to combat measured cognitive and motivational deficits—a result, it was assumed, of cultural deprivation or genetic inferiority. The political and social climate had nonetheless begun to change in the 1970s. Multiculturalism became the official watchword as the federal government abandoned the blunt goal of assimilation. More importantly, indigenous leaders began articulating the notion of self-determination, parallel cultural rights, and reparation for past wrongs. Through the 1980s, there was a dramatic decline in psychometric research with Aboriginal populations and an increasing interest in other aspects of the indigenous psychology. The 1988 World Psychology Congress held in Sydney was a watershed moment in Australian psychology’s self-representation to the international community. On the last day, a New Zealand delegate wondered aloud why there was so little material pertaining to the psychology of the indigenous population. The only example of this was some unfortunate historical material that had sparked outrage and shame among some local delegates. It was s

trigger for official action from those within the APS. Various symposiums and conferences were devoted to exploring the psychology of indigenous peoples— which saw the first presentations by Aboriginal speakers, as well as specific initiatives for including indigenous issues in teaching, for training Aboriginal psychologists, and for research (Gridley, Davidson, Dudgeon, Pickett, & Sanson, 2000). In 2000, the Australian Psychologist published a special issue canvassing the achievements to date and prospects for the future (e.g., Davidson, Sanson, & Gridley, 2000). There has been an explosion in research in this area since 1990, with a paradigm shift in perspective. Gone is the deficit model, replaced by an expanding focus on indigenous attitudes and values, on mental health and social justice. Reconciliation might still be an ongoing process, but at least psychology was now playing a part.

Conclusion Australia is one context in which the “out-ofphilosophy” origin story essentially holds true. Antipodean psychology was in the first instance a university-based discipline, although applied work in educational and clinical contexts followed close behind. Until World War II, however, it amounted to a limited array of isolated individuals, departments, and work sites. Its development lagged behind that in Britain, Europe, and America. Nevertheless, Australian psychology caught up surprisingly quickly, growing strongly in the postwar period to represent a mature but scaled-down version of these overseas centers. APS membership reflected this expansion. The Society had over 4,000 members by the mid1980s, topping the 10,000 mark by the turn of the century. Even so, there was twice that number of registered psychologists in the country. The number of Society-affiliated psychologists per head exceeds that of the BPS in Britain and the American Psychological Association in the United States—one illustration of the relative achievement of the discipline in international terms. Of course, the APS has nowhere near the stature and influence of those professional bodies, certainly not abroad and perhaps not even at home. Australian psychology’s penetration of everyday life is a little harder to gauge, but it does exhibit the full range of practical applications, as well as academic and applied career paths. Nonetheless, it cannot escape its colonial past and provincial present. It still lacks a sense of national identity. The national APS conference is poorly attended in comparison with specialty groupings at home and abroad. The discipline’s

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priorities and anxieties still reflect this outward gaze. Despite the distance, Australian psychologists still look to travel overseas whenever possible, and they often connect with each other through the major conferences held in North America and the United Kingdom. Publications in the most prestigious American and European journals are seen to count for more, degrees obtained at the major universities there, likewise. Overall, Australian psychology’s global outlook and competitiveness makes its success unqualified, if not unique.

Future Directions and Challenges These can partly be divided into scientific or applied spheres. On the science side: • Enhancing priority research areas, especially the neurosciences and interdisciplinary biomedical research, human factors and technological change, clinical and health psychology, and industrial and organizational psychology • Boosting the research funding base with public and private partnerships • Further development of international links with major overseas centers On the applied side: • More effective marketing of applied personnel and skills • Training of clinical and health care personnel; improving services in community care programs, especially those serving disadvantaged groups and rural areas • Closer ties with public and private-sector industry; developing cross-sectional perspectives on work structures, changing work patterns, and workforce diversity • Boosting psychologists’ role in improving educational outcomes and policy formulation • Further research and action on indigenous psychology, social justice issues, and sustainable development More generally: • Enhancing disciplinary cohesion and communication, especially links between research and practice • Raising psychologists’ profile in public policy debates • Maintaining qualification standards relative to the rest of the world, with training programs designed to meet wide-ranging global opportunities. 32

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References Anderson, W. (2002). The cultivation of whiteness: Science, health and racial destiny in Australia. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press. Birnbrauer, J. (1996). Development of clinical psychology in Australia. In P. Martin, & J. Birnbrauer (Eds.), Clinical psychology: Profession and practice in Australia (pp. 21–51). Melbourne: Macmillan. Bochner, S. (2000). Australia. In A. E. Kazdin (Ed.), Encyclopedia of psychology (pp. 331–338). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. Buchanan, R. D. (1996). A fiftieth anniversary history: The Department of Psychology, University of Melbourne, 1946–1996. Melbourne: Department of Psychology, University of Melbourne. Buchanan, R. D. (1999). Of Monkeys, mice and humans: Psychobiological research at La Trobe University, 1972–1997. Melbourne: La Trobe University. Buchanan, R. D. (2003). Legislative warriors: American psychiatrists, psychologists and competing claims over psychotherapy in the 1950s. Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences, 39, 225–249. Chesters, J. (2005). Deinstitutionalisation: An unrealised desire. Health Sociology Review, 14(3), 272–282. Cooke, S. (2000). A meeting of minds: The Australian Psychological Society and Australian psychologists, 1944–1994. Brisbane: APS. Cumming, G., Siddle, D., & Hyslop, W. (1997). Psychological science in Australia. International Journal of Psychology, 32, 409–424. Damousi, J. (2005). Freud in the Antipodes. Sydney: University of New South Wales Press. Davidson, G., Sanson, A., & Gridley, H. (2000). Australian psychology and Australia’s indigenous people: Existing and emerging narratives. Australian Psychologist, 35, 92–99. Day, R. (1997). Aspects of the history of Australian psychology: A personal memoir. Talk presented to School of Psychological Science, October 24, 1997, La Trobe University, Australia. Feather, N. T. (2005). Social psychology in Australia: Past and present. International Journal of Psychology, 40, 263–276. Grant, J., Mullings, B., & Denham, G. (2008). Counselling psychology in Australia: Past, present and future – Part one. Australian Journal of Counselling Psychology, 9(2), 3–14. Gridley, H., Davidson, G., Dudgeon, P., Pickett, H., & Sanson, A. (2000). The Australian Psychological Society and Australia’s indigenous people: A decade of action. Australian Psychologist, 35, 88–91. Laffey, P. (2003). Antipsychiatry in Australia: Sources for social and intellectual history. Health and History, 2, 17–36. Lewis, M. (1988). Managing madness: Psychiatry and society in Australia, 1788–1980. Canberra: AGPS. McConnochie, K. R. (2008). ‘Connecting the dots’: The role of psychology in indigenous Australia. Zeitschrift fur Australienstudien, 21–22, 103–118. O’Driscoll, M. (2008). Organizational psychology in Australia and New Zealand: Reflections on the recent past and issues for future research and practice. In A. Glendon, B. Thompson, & B. Myors (Eds.), Advances in organizational psychology (pp. 465–481). Bowen Hills, QLD: Australian Academic Press. O’Gorman, J. (2007). Psychology as a profession in Australia. Bowen Hills, QLD: Australian Academic Press.

O’Neil, W. M. (1987). A century of psychology in Australia. Sydney: Sydney University Press. Owen, A., & Winkler, R. C. (1974). General practitioners and psychosocial problems: An evaluation using pseudopatients. Medical Journal of Australia, 2, 393–398. Porteus, S. D. (1969). A psychologist of sorts: The autobiography and publications of the inventor of the Porteus Maze test. Palo Alto, CA: Pacific Books. Richardson, A. (1995). Psychology at the University of Western Australia (1913–1988) – A brief history. Bulletin of the APS, 17(3), 13–18. Seagrim, G., & Lendon, R. (1980). Furnishing the mind: A comparative study of cognitive development in Central Australian Aborigines. Sydney: Academic Press.

Turtle, A. (1987). Psychology in the Australian context. In G. Blowers, & A. Turtle (Eds.), Psychology moving east: The status of western psychology in Asia and Oceania (pp. 305–324). Sydney: Sydney University Press. Turtle, A. (1988). Education, social science and the ‘commonweal’. In R. Macleod (Ed.), The commonwealth of science (pp. 222–246). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. Turtle, A. (1997). Institution, ideology, icon: Psychology at Sydney, 1921–1996. Australian Journal of Psychology, 49, 121–127. Winkler, R. C. (1974). Research into mental health practice using pseudopatients. Medical Journal of Australia, 2, 399–403.

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C HA P TE R

3

Brazil

Claudio Simon Hutz, Gustavo Gauer, and William Barbosa Gomes

Abstract This chapter provides a broad overview of the history of psychology in Brazil from the first notions of psychological though in the country´s colonial period through the inception of scientific psychology in the late 19th and early 20th century, up to the consolidation of psychology as profession and scientific practice throughout the 20th century. Psychological ideas first arrived in Brazil through Jesuit clericals, who were in charge of the colony’s education from the 16th century to the middle of 18th century, when they were banned from the Portuguese Kingdom. Children of Native, European, and mixed ethnicity were in the same classes, and Jesuits assimilated the ideas of Native Brazilians about child development and education into their own propositions. Higher education was prohibited in the Portuguese colonies up to the 19th century. Brazilian nationals interested in pursuing academic degrees in law or medicine had to do so in Portugal or France, up to 1808, when the country´s first two Medical Schools were created. Throughout these schools, new European ideas about psychology arrived in Brazil. The school in Rio de Janeiro was more concerned about neuropsychiatry, psychophysiology, and neurology. In Salvador, the medical school focused on the study of criminology, forensic psychiatry, mental hygiene, social psychology, and pedagogy. In the early 20th century, psychological laboratories were first established in normal schools (aimed at training teachers for child education) and mental hospitals. Laboratories were implemented by Brazilian students of European and American psychologists, or by the foreign scholars themselves. They visited the country by official invitation, and some eventually settled here. Psychology was recognized as a profession in Brazil by a federal law in 1962. By that time, training and research in psychology were organized around major theoretical approaches, mainly psychoanalysis. It is argued that the current trend of psychology in Brazil is toward growing specialization and consolidation of its subdisciplines, reflected on a growing number of scientific societies and specialized periodicals. Keywords: Psychology in Brazil, history of psychology, teaching and research in psychology

The aim of this chapter is to provide a broad overview of the history of psychology in Brazil. It begins with the psychological ideas prevalent during the colonial period, advancing through the inauguration of scientific psychology in the late 19th and early 20th century, up to the consolidation of psychology as a profession and a scientific practice in the country. The history of psychology is a theme of great interest among Brazilian psychologists. This history 34

has been described since the middle of the 20th century by recognized Brazilian psychologists. The first account of experimental psychology in Brazil was written by Plinio Olinto (1944/2004). He worried about the lack of support for the conduct of experimental research at Rio de Janeiro institutions in the first half of the 20th century. However, the first comprehensive studies about the history of psychology in Brazil were in the form of articles published by two eminent Brazilian psychologists: Annita

Cabral (1950), a former student of Max Wertheimer (1880–1943) at the New School for Social Research in New York; and Lourenço Filho (1955), the founder of the New School’s theory, a clarification and application of the functional educational ideas of Édouard Claparède (1873–1940) and John Dewey (1859–1852). In the 1970s, Isaias Pessotti (Universidade de São Paulo), a former Brazilian Gestaltist who became a Skinnerian behaviorist, wrote two often-cited papers (Pessotti, 1975, 1988). Rogério Centofonti (1982) and Antonio Gomes Penna (1985, 1986) also wrote about the history of psychology in Rio de Janeiro. However, work to advance research in the history of psychology came with the symposiums of the National Association of Graduate Programs in Psychology (ANPEPP), which started in 1988. These meetings are a place for the clarification and discussion of research by workgroups from different areas of psychology. At the Sixth Symposium, held at Teresópolis, Rio de Janeiro, in 1996, appeared a group interested in the history of psychology, led by Marina Massimi (Universidade de São Paulo), who was a former student of Pessotti; Regina Campos (Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais), who received her Ph.D. at the Stanford University; and Maria do Carmo Guedes (Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo), who was a student of Carolina Bori (1924–2004). This group attracted researchers from universities around the country and became a reference for the study of the history of psychology in Brazil. The Brazilian historians in psychology were greatly influenced by Josef Brožek (1913–2004), a former professor at Lehigh University, Bethlehem, Pennsylvania. He visited Brazil in 1988 and in 1996, he attended the Sixth Symposium of ANPEPP (Massimi & Campos, 2004). Among the many Brazilian psychology journals, Memorandum: Memória e História em Psicologia is a major publication focused on history of psychology. A dictionary of pioneers in Brazilian psychology (Campos, 2001a) was published, and a historical dictionary of institutions (educational, medical, and governmental) that served as centers for the dissemination of psychology in Brazil was edited by Jacó-Villela (in press). The Professional Council of Psychology, an organization that controls the licensing of Brazilian psychologist, has financed some of these publications. Most programs include a history of psychology in the curriculum, and a textbook for use in university courses was prepared by JacóVillela, Ferreira, and Portugal (2005).

Psychological Ideas in Colonial Times Psychological ideas first arrived in Brazil through the Jesuit clericals (Catholic Company of Jesus) by occasion of their inauguration of the first school in the colony, in Salvador–Bahia, in the middle of 16th century. For about 200 years, the Jesuits took care of the education of the sons and daughters of the Portuguese, the Native Indians, and also of children born from interracial unions. They founded several schools and offered a scholastic teaching in Latin. They also tried to integrate Portuguese, Indian, and mixed-race children in the same classrooms. Had the Jesuit program prevailed, the Brazilian population probably would consist today mainly of native Brazilian descendants. The psychology of the colonial period was a mix of scholastic ideas and native Brazilian culture, mainly with respect to childhood education, as reflect by the writings of the Jesuits Fernão Cardim (1549–1625) and Alexandre de Gusmão (1629–1724). Cardim’s writings were first published in English in London, in 1625. They appeared in Portuguese late in 1847, in Lisbon (Veríssimo, 1916). Both books were republished recently in Brazil (Cardim, 1625/1980; Gusmão, 1685/2004). The Jesuits were very impressed with the loving relationships between parents and infants, observed especially in the care mothers took in breastfeeding their children. Native Brazilian parents related with their children without any kind of aggression, and they used toys and games to prepare them for adult life. Massimi (1990) found old Jesuit publications that brought light to their ideas about education. The Gusmão’s treatise A Arte de Crear Bem os Filhos na Idade da Puerícia (The Art of Well Training the Children When They Are Very Young) is considered the first manual on psychopedagogy written in Brazil, and it presents topics on child development, family relationships, learning, and motivation. Infancy was defined by Gusmão (1685/2004) as a period in which the child does not present rational actions for living, being dependent of adult help. The child was considered a blank tablet, ready to absorb any image. He believed that, depending on the education that one gives to a child, it would possible to predict her or his future. The idea was that any child could be educated (“domesticated,” in the author’s words). Gusmão also defended that girls should be educated, which was forbidden by the Portuguese Crown at that time. According to Massimi (1990), the Jesuits brought to the colony a very creative and innovative educational system, recognized throughout in missionary regions of southern Brazil and northern Argentina. But all that experience came to an end hutz, gauer, gomes

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with the expulsion of the Jesuits from Portugal and from its colonies in 1759. After that, there were no more schools in the Brazilian colony until the Portuguese Court moved to Brazil in 1808, with the help of the United Kingdom, to escape the invasion of Lisbon by Napoleon. The few books that Massimi could find from that period brought psychological ideas based on the writings of Augustine and Aquinas. The dictatorial Marquis of Pombal (1699–1782), the chief minister of King Joseph Emanuel of Portugal, used his power to modernize the Portuguese kingdom. In 1755, he abolished slavery in Portugal and prohibited the enslavement of native Brazilians by declaring them free citizens of Brazil. Pombal wanted to outlaw African slavery in Brazil as well, but he realized that slavery formed a central part of the Brazilian agricultural economy. Recognizing the importance of Brazil to the economic well-being of Portugal, Pombal tried to improve the efficiency of the Brazilian economy and administration, and to lessen tensions between colonists and their Portuguese rulers. He involved Brazilian-born individuals in the colonial government, introduced new crops, and established Portuguese as the official language in Brazil. (At the time, Brazilians used two different general languages, northern and southern dialects, both a mix of Portuguese and native Brazilian tongues [Freire & Rosa, 2003]). The Jesuits were expelled from the country because they did not agree with Pombal’s economic programs. However, Pombal was not able to organize a system of education for the Brazilian people. Until the early 19th century, the University of Coimbra was the institution of choice for Brazilians looking for a college education. In the first three centuries of Brazilian history, Coimbra graduated more than 2,500 Brazilian nationals. It is interesting to note that, at Coimbra, Brazilians were not considered foreigners, but rather Brazilian-born Portuguese, who could even become faculty there. This was the case, for example, of Francisco de Lemos de Faria Pereira Coutinho (1735–1822). Born at Rio de Janeiro, he was educated at Coimbra, becoming a professor there after graduation. Later, he joined an organization (Junta de Providência Literária) that aimed to study and plan the radical university reforms of the Pombal period. Coutinho was promoted and became an executive of that reform and president of the University of Coimbra for nearly 30 years. José Bonifácio de Andrada e Silva (1763–1838), the father of Brazilian independence, had been also a professor at Coimbra University before becoming 36

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a national hero in Brazil for his participation in the fight for the country’s independence. Like Coutinho and José Bonifácio, several other Brazilians were professors and lecturers at Coimbra (Teixeira, 1989). Although Coimbra had long been a main destination for Brazilian nationals who sought a university degree, Portugal was not interested in implementing higher education in the colony. However, local communities were clamoring for the establishment of universities. When the Portuguese royal family moved to Brazil in 1808, fleeing Napoleon’s invasion of Lisbon, one of their first acts was to authorize the creation of medical schools in the country. The Faculdade de Medicina da Bahia and Faculdade Medicina do Rio de Janeiro were both created in 1832. Such a concession certainly pleased the affluent families of Salvador, capital of the Bahia province, because their offspring had no longer to move to Coimbra or to Paris to become doctors. When the royal family arrived in Rio de Janeiro, then the capital city of the new Kingdom of Brazil, Portugal and Algarves, a medical school was also created there. Another consequence of the royal family moving to Brazil was the opening of Brazilian ports to friendly nations. Several activities that were prohibited, such as building roads and installing industries, were now allowed. The Bank of Brazil was created, as well as the Royal Press (prior to that, no book had ever been printed in Brazil). The political and economic turmoil of that period also contributed to the opening of theaters and to the organization of libraries. Several scientific and cultural European missions and expeditions came to Brazil during colonial and imperial times. Naturalists John Mawe (1764–1829) from England and Auguste de SaintHilaire (1779–1853) from France, zoologist Johann von Baptist Spix (1782–1826), and botanist Karl Friedrich Philipp von Martius (1794–1868) from Germany were among them. France sent an important artistic mission that included Grandjean de Montigny (1776–1868), who became Brazil’s first architecture professor, responsible for introducing the neoclassical style. Also in that mission were painters Félix Émile Taunay (1795–1881) and Jean Baptiste Debret (1768–1848), who depicted Brazilian sceneries and documented the Court’s most important events. Two other important visitors were Charles Darwin (1809–1882) and William James (1842–1910). Darwin came to Brazil first in 1832, and then in 1836, as described in his Beagle Diary.1 James spent 10 months in Brazil between 1865 and 1866, mostly in Rio de Janeiro, Belém, Manaus, and along the rivers and tributaries of the Amazon bay.

His letters, diaries, and drawings were recently published in a bilingual book (in Portuguese and English) (Machado, 2006). Soon after the country’s independence in 1822, law schools were opened in São Paulo and in Pernambuco. Along with the medical schools, these were the institutions that opened the long road to the creation of a Brazilian university. The organization of higher education in Brazil was guided by the French model, focused on professional education and managed under the supervision of the central government. Such a model did not stimulate research activities and seriously restricted academic autonomy. The first professors in the medical schools were military doctors. Only later were civilian professors appointed. However, those schools came to be consolidated as medical training centers after independence. The medical model and the textbooks were also French. At that time, Brazilians who wanted to become medical specialists went to Paris to study. Most professors at Brazilian medical schools were trained in Paris.

Psychology in the Medical Schools in the 19th Century The medical schools in Rio de Janeiro and Salvador– Bahia gained the status of comprehensive programs only in 1832, 10 years after Brazilian independence in 1822. In these schools, as well as in the law schools established in 1928 at Recife and São Paulo, the advances in European psychology, especially the attempts to understand the subjective motivations of behavior, were considered as necessary and important information for the curriculum. The study of subjective motives of behavior was considered as a way to help in the prevention of mental disease and delinquent behavior (Massimi, 1990). It was not until the 1850s that Brazil’s first psychology book was written by philosopher and medical doctor Eduardo Ferreira França (1809–1857). Born in Salvador, in the state of Bahia, Ferreira França graduated in medicine in 1834, at the University of Paris with the thesis “Essai sur l’Influence des Aliments et des Boissons sur le Moral de l’Homme” (“Essay on the influence of food and beverages on the spirit of man”). In his treaty Investigações Psicológicas (Psychological Investigations), originally published in 1854, Ferreira França (1972) attempted to reconcile two apparently incompatible French doctrines: Condillac’s2 materialism and Maine de Biran’s3 spiritualism. The central idea was that, although instincts were the substrata for the development and differentiation of all mental faculties, it was only through will, acting as a catalystic power, that they might

actually function. In that sense, he accepted Condillac’s argument for the primacy of empirical data as the basis for modern psychological science, but set it against the problem of necessary confidence in observations as a condition for knowledge: simple sensation is not a fact if an idea had not yet been created by it. Without rebutting empiricism, he was committed to prove the existence of a spirit that was modified by sensation, and stressed the importance of such a concept in explaining human psychology. At that point, Ferreira França appealed to Maine de Biran’s idea that voluntary action is the actualization of a power that is the true primary fact related to an “intimate sense”. Confidence, which is a condition for any sort of knowledge, would be implicated by that intimate sense. The two-volume book—of 284 and 424 pages, respectively—comprises seven parts, described by the author as “a classification of mental faculties according to the method of natural science”: (1) phenomena of consciousness and faculties; (2) modifiability (sensitivity, affectivity); (3) motion; (4) intellectual faculties I (internal and external perception, relation between them, of the qualities of bodies and of habits); (5) intellectual faculties II (brain sensitivity, sleep and dreams, consciousness, reasoning, memory, imagination, abstraction, composition, generalization, judgment, faculty of the future, faculty of faith, and of ideas); (6) instincts (physical, intellectual, social and moral); and (7) will. Ferreira França’s project was to write two books on the subject: one on experimental psychology—which he achieved in his Psychological Investigations, and the other on rational psychology, which he never wrote. In the introduction to a subsequent edition of Ferreira França´s book, Paim (1967) argued that França’s work, naïve as it could appear more than a century after its edition, clearly represented in psychology the marked eclecticism of an incipient intellectuality that aimed at preparing the ground for political liberalism in Brazil. The study of psychology in Brazil occurred mainly at the medical schools in the form of doctoral dissertations (Lourenço Filho, 1955). In the beginning, no empirical research or theoretical treatises were pursued, but small papers were presented with general considerations about some psychological aspects of psychiatric disease. The first of these monographs appeared in 1836, at the Medical School of Rio de Janeiro, with an old philosophical theme: Paixões e afetos da alma (Passions and Affects of the Soul). It was a vague association between biology and metaphysics presented by Manuel Inácio de Figueiredo Jaime. The first dissertation using a truly hutz, gauer, gomes

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experimental approach was prepared by Henrique Roxo (1877–1969) in 1900, in Rio de Janeiro: Duração dos Atos Psíquicos Elementares nos Alienados (Duration of Elementary Psychic Acts in the Alienated ) and its purpose was to support psychology as a fundamental and basic science. An examination of the titles of these dissertations (Lourenço Filho, 1955; Pessotti 1975) shows an interesting correspondence between their themes and the new developments of psychology in Europe. For example, from the medical school of Bahia came Algumas considerações psycho-physiológicas a’cerca do homem (Some Psychophysiological Considerations About Man) in 1851, by Cunha Mello; Influência da civilização sobre o desenvolvimento das affecções nervosas (Influence of Civilization on the Development of Nervous Afflictions) in 1857, by C. E. O. Cardozo; Qual o papel que desempenha a civilização nas doenças mentais (The Role of Civilization in the Development of Mental Diseases), in 1888; and Crime e Epilepsia (Epilepsy and Crime), in 1887, by Afrânio Peixoto. The same pattern could be seen in the dissertations from Rio de Janeiro, as exemplified by Psicofisiologia da Percepção e das Representações (Psychophysiology of Perception and Representation), in 1890, by Estelita Tapajós. The most polemic work (Almeida & El-Hani, 2007) was presented by Domingos Guedes Cabral in 1875, to the medical school of Bahia. It was the first Brazilian Darwinist work. Titled Functions of the Brain, Cabral’s thesis was not accepted because it negated the existence of God. Finally, a dissertation from the medical school of Rio de Janeiro seemed to anticipate the term clinical psychology. It was written by Odilon Goulart, in 1891, with the title Estudo Psychoclínico da Afasia (Psychoclinical Study of Aphasia). The term clinical psychology was used for the first time by Lightner Witmer (1867–1956), who transformed his laboratory at the University of Pennsylvania into a psychological clinic in 1896, and founded the journal The Psychological Clinic in 1907 (Hilgard, 1987). Interestingly, the two medical schools had different approaches to psychology. The school in Rio de Janeiro was more concerned with neuropsychiatry, psychophysiology, and neurology. In contrast, the school in Bahia was more focused in the study of criminology, forensic psychiatry, mental hygiene, social psychology, and pedagogy. By the beginnings of the 20th century, the two approaches converged in Rio de Janeiro, in a program developed to modernize the National Mental Hospital. The reform was lead by two psychiatrists from Bahia: Juliano Moreira (1873–1933) and Afrânio Peixoto 38

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(1876–1947) (Lourenço Filho, 1955). They were following the psychiatric French orientation of Pierre Janet (1859–1947), as preached by Henrique Roxo (1877–1969) and Antônio Austregésilo (1876–1960) at the medical school of Rio de Janeiro. These psychiatrists encouraged the installation of laboratories of experimental psychology in Brazil. They were also very receptive to the new ideas of psychoanalysis. Later, in 1927, Juliano Moreira was the first chair of the section of the Brazilian Society of Psychoanalysis, whose headquarters were in Sao Paulo (Perestrello, 1988).

The First Psychological Laboratories The recognition of psychology as an experimental science found acceptance almost immediately in Brazil. Brazilian physicians had contact with psychological laboratories in the European institutions where they were trained. These contacts encouraged the foundation of psychological laboratories in Brazilian hospital environments. In the same way, the promotion of experimental psychology as a scientific base for pedagogy stimulated the creation of laboratories in normal schools and studies of measurements of intellectual abilities. Some of these laboratories prospered, becoming important centers of research and practice, and a base for the creation of institutes of psychology that were subsequently incorporated into the universities. In Brazil, as in England, psychological laboratories faced plenty of opposition. The same reasons that prevented James Ward (1843–1925) from installing a psychological laboratory at Cambridge University in 1877 (Hilgard, 1987) were present in the first attempt to found a laboratory in Rio de Janeiro in 1897. The discussion was the same, as exemplified by the words of the Brazilian opponent Farias Brito (1862–1917), quoted by Lourenço Filho (1955, p. 267): “it would be ridiculous to subject the faculties of the soul to device analysis.” The planning and implementation of laboratories progressed through the collaboration of internationally recognized psychologists in planning the facilities (Gomes, 2003). Alfred Binet (1857–1911) collaborated with the Brazilian physician Manoel Bomfim (1868–1932) in planning the laboratory for the Pedagogium, an institution dedicated to the exposition of new methods of education and located in the old Federal District. The laboratory was installed in 1906. George Dumas (1866–1946), a French physician and psychologist, collaborated with the physician Maurício de Medeiros (1885–1966) to install a laboratory in a psychiatric hospital in Rio de Janeiro

in 1907. Ugo Pizzolli (1863–1934), an Italian psychologist, came to Sao Paulo to install a pedagogical laboratory in the Normal School. Waclaw Radecki (1887–1953), a Polish psychologist with doctor’s degree from the University of Geneva, arrived in Brazil in time to be invited, in 1923, to direct a laboratory that was built with equipment brought from Paris and Leipzig in a hospital environment in Engenho de Dentro, a suburb of Rio de Janeiro. Theodore Simon (1873–1961), who had worked with Binet in Paris, and Léon Walther (1889–1963), who had been Édouard Claparède’s assistant (1873–1940) at the University of Geneva, organized a laboratory at the School of Pedagogical Improvement, in Belo Horizonte in 1928. The following year, the laboratory started its activities under the direction of Helena Antipoff (1892–1974), a Russian psychologist with a doctoral degree from the University of Geneva, who fixed her residence in Brazil. Claparède himself came to visit the laboratory in Belo Horizonte (Antipoff, 1975; Campos, 2001b). The installation of these first laboratories is a beautiful passage in our history. The implementation occurred in applied environments, and the main activities were directed to research tests for mentally ill people or to develop assistance programs for school activities. Even then, the laboratories fulfilled the mission of fomenting research, forming researchers, and offering psychology services. The laboratory in Sao Paulo, later reactivated by Manuel Bergström Lourenço Filho (1897–1970), later became the base for courses in educational psychology and general psychology at the University of Sao Paulo (Pessotti, 1975). The laboratory in Engenho de Dentro became the base for the creation of the Institute of Psychology, currently part of the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (Centofanti, 1982). The laboratory in Belo Horizonte contributed to the training of professors who later started to teach psychology at the Federal University of Minas Gerais (Pessotti, 1975). Manoel Bomfim was never a great enthusiast of experimental psychology and neither was Nilton Campos (1898–1963), one of Radecki’s successors and later director of the Institute of Psychology in Rio de Janeiro. This fact perhaps explains the slow development of experimental psychology in Brazil, but it does not mean that those pioneers were not interested in research. Bomfim was to develop a psychological theory that highlighted the importance of language in the mediation between social-cultural influences and individual awareness, which anticipated the concepts that would come to be treated by authors Jean Piaget (1896–1980) and Lev Vygotsky

(1896–1934) (Antunes, 1999). Nilton Campos was the first professional to dedicate himself entirely to psychology in Brazil, focusing mainly on the methodological aspects of research (Cabral, 1950). Psychological practice seemed to penetrate Brazil hand in hand with research, although an institution dedicated to the training of psychologists was still lacking.

From Research to Application Radecki, in 1932, tried to transform the laboratory of experimental psychology into an Institute of Psychology by transferring its activities from a distant suburb of Engenho de Dentro to a more central area in the city of Rio de Janeiro. However, the project did not prosper due to budget issues (Penna, 1985). Centofanti (1982) stated, however, that other causes contributed to the failure of the project: opposition by Catholic groups and opposition by influential psychiatrists who were against the professionalization of psychology in the country. Those interested in the formation and training of psychologists would have to wait for several years for courses to be organized and dedicated to the field. In this period, research would provide support to the practice, with some groups turning to educational and learning issues, others to offering clinical assistance, and a few others to the field of industry, work, organization, and selection of personnel. The necessity for developing efficient methods for education and a belief in education as a base for a democratic society provided great incentive to research psychological testing. In 1924, Medeiros and Albuquerque (1867–1934) published a widely debated book on tests, strengthening the discussion on educational reform in Brazil (Lourenço Filho, 1955). In 1925, in Recife, Ulisses Pernambucano (1892–1943) created an Institute of Psychology within the Department of Health and Assistance of the State of Pernambuco. The Institute was mostly devoted to research and the application of psychological measurements (Medeiros, 2001). The research developed by Pernambucano and collaborators, and listed by Medeiros, included Pernambucano reviewed the Medric Binet-Simon-Terman scale and published articles such as “Test of the Standardization of Columbia Test”; “Psycho Technical Study of Some Aptitude Tests”; and “Alfa Test and Florence Goodnough’s Design Test.” In 1928, in Salvador, Isaias Alves (1888–1968), influenced by Medeiros and Albuquerque, provided the beginnings of studies on psychological measurements and, in 1928, published the book Individual Intelligence Test. hutz, gauer, gomes

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Between 1925 and 1932, Lourenço Filho developed his research on reading and writing in the laboratory of the Normal School of the State of Sao Paulo and developed the ABC test, which is utilized in several countries in Latin America (Lourenço Filho, 1927/1971). At the same time, some professors of educational psychology led the educational reforms that occurred in the 1920s in some Brazilian states. This reform movement included the normal school reform by Sampaio Dória (1883–1964) in Sao Paulo in 1920; the general reform of education by Lourenço Filho between 1922 and 1924, in Ceara; and the reform of primary teaching by Fernando Azevedo (1894–1974), between 1927 and 1930, in the Federal District. These reforms culminated in changes being introduced by Anísio Teixeira (1900–1971) in the Federal District, between 1932 and 1935, in primary and secondary schools, and in adult education. Teixeira was inspired by the New School, a theory based on works by psychologists like Claparède and Dewey (see Lourenço Filho, 1930/2002). Teixeira even created a municipal university inspired by the spirit of German universities—the University of the Federal District— that unfortunately lasted for only 4 years. It was suffocated by Catholic groups and private schools. Teixeira transformed the Normal School of the Federal District into the Institute of Education and organized a course for professor specialization and improvement, also instituting tests services and school measurements. For the course on educational psychology, Teixeira invited Lourenço Filho; and, for the head of tests services and school measurements, Isaias Alves, a former student of Edward L. Thorndike (1874–1949). Anísio Teixeira was a disciple and scholar of the educational psychology of John Dewey, with whom he studied in the United States. Researchers in psychology started to influence the practice through important administrative functions. In the educational field, Lourenço Filho was invited by the Ministry of Education to implement the National Institute of Pedagogical Studies (NIPS) in 1938. Thus, reforms in education, although part of practice, furthered research in psychology. Critical pedagogy scholars would describe this phase as the peak of “psychologism” in education (Freire, 1970). In the clinical psychology field, by the initiative of the Brazilian League of Mental Hygiene, created in 1922, offices of psychology were instituted together with psychiatrist clinics (Lourenço Filho, 1955). Our historians, however, highlighted only one clinic of child orientation in Sao Paulo, that founded in 1938 and headed by Durval 40

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Marcondes (1899–1981). The antecedents of that clinic came from a study group of physicians, educators, and engineers from the Institute of Hygiene in Sao Paulo, formed in 1926. Marcondes was the first physician to practice psychoanalysis in Sao Paulo. In the same way, Helana Antipoff left the laboratory of Minas Gerais to direct the Center of Youth Orientation in Rio de Janeiro, together with the National Child Department. Applied psychology was also appearing in other states. In Rio Grande do Sul, in southern Brazil, psychological practice was originated by the psychiatrist Décio de Souza (1907–1970), based on his research (Souza, 1945) and the training he obtained in the United States (Gomes, Lhullier, & Leite, 1999). Research and practice continued to walk together. Applied psychology in work situations followed economic progress and social transformations in great urban centers (Cabral, 1950). As in other parts of the world, such applications were undertaken by nonpsychologists and without much knowledge of psychological theory. In Brazil, Roberto Mange (1885–1955), a Swiss engineer, was in charge of introducing methods for the rationalization of work and psychological tests in the selection of students for a technical school. However, the relation between practice and research in this field was stimulated by Henri Piéron’s visits (1881–1964) who, in 1927, taught courses on experimental psychology and psychotechnics at the Normal School in Sao Paulo; and by Léon Walther who, in 1929, taught courses on psychology as applied to industry. The evidence of the relation between research and practice is clearly seen in a project that resulted from these visits: the creation of an institute of scientific work organization. The project did not prosper, but later the Institute of the Rational Work Organization (IRWO) was created with similar objectives. These applications in Sao Paulo permitted the development of research and professional training for this field. Psychological techniques were being widely used also in services for railroad personnel in Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. In Rio, Radecki’s laboratory participated in the selection of pilots for the Army Air Service, and in 1936, the Administrative Department of Public Service started to utilize psychological tests. However, the consolidation of research and training in the field came with the creation of the Institute of Selection and Professional Orientation (ISPO) of the Getulio Vargas Foundation, in Rio de Janeiro, in 1947. The first main organizer and director was the experienced professional and scientist Emilio

Mira y López (1896–1964) (Penna, 1985; Rosas, 1995). In this period, psychology began to be taught at the university. The University of Sao Paulo was created in 1934, and it was the first in Brazil to follow German Wilhelm von Humbolt’s (1767–1835) model of higher education: a university based on the principle of free and universal education, combining both teaching and research. The next, in 1935, was the University of the Federal District, also a research institution. The University of the Federal District had a short life (only 4 years), and was incorporated by the University of Brazil, which was mainly an aggregation of the higher-education institutions in Rio de Janeiro. The country was not ready for academic freedom. However, the University of São Paulo became the most important highereducation institution in Brazil because of the incentives it received from the state of São Paulo. Both universities had professors who came from France. In Rio de Janeiro, psychology was taught by the Belgian physician André Ombredane (1858–1958), a former assistant of George Dumas, and specialized in medical psychology. In Sao Paulo, psychology was taught, from 1935 to 1944, by Jean Maugüé (1904–1985). He was interested in the basic topics of psychology in affect, perception, memory, and personality, but he was critical of experimental psychology and did not encourage this area of inquiry. He was succeeded by the American social psychologist Otto Klineberg (1899–1992), who arrived in 1947 and radically changed the direction of the program. Maugüé was a celebrated monological lecturer who impressed his students with the depth of his presentations. In contrast, Klineberg was more participative, motivating students to question and discuss. He organized a sequence of courses in which students could address the different topics, in the following order: experimental psychology, theories and systems, social psychology, differential psychology, personality, and psychopathology (Cabral, 1950; Klineberg, 1975). The inclusion of psychology in the curriculum of the bachelor degree and teaching licensure in philosophy contributed to the training of psychologists in the 1940s and 1950s (Gomes, Lhullier, & Leite, 1999). The students were so interested in psychology that some programs offered internship practice in hospitals, as was the case at the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul. Paradoxically, the university seems to have collaborated more intensely in the development of psychology as a practical ability, than as a field of empirical experimentation and

investigation. The universities did not have resources to invest in equipment, and the old laboratories transferred to them were not renovated. Aniela Ginsberg (1902–1986) presented an interesting indicator of the quality of research undertaken by Brazilian psychologists at the beginning of the 1950s in a commemorative edition of the Report of Psychology from the Society of Psychology of Sao Paulo, in 1975. Ginsberg described a conference held in Curitiba, in 1953, The First Brazilian Congress of Psychology, and financed by the state of Parana. Ginsberg (1975, p. 82) said: The government of the state offered to each active participant (that presented a paper) the transportation ticket and free hosting, which increased the number but not the average level of the communications, although facilitating the contacts among psychologists from different states. Some good papers, though, appeared and almost all active psychologists at this time attended the conference.

We may infer from the report that the number of psychologists was increasing, but not the amount and quality of research. Therefore, the event was important for planning and for putting into motion the necessary political programs for the recognition of the profession and the creation of graduate programs. Ginsberg (1954) presented a detailed report about the event. In the 1950s, psychological training initially was offered in postgraduate courses at the specialization level.

Professional Psychology Made Official Discussions about regulation of the psychological profession had taken place in the Brazilian Sociedade Brasileira para o Progresso da Ciência (SBPC; Society for the Advancement of Science) meetings during the 1940s and 1950s (Pfromm Neto, 1979–1981). One landmark in that period was the establishment of the Associação Brasileira de Psicologia (ABP; Brazilian Association of Psychology) in 1954, by initiative of Annita de Castilho Marcondes Cabral (1911–1991) of the Universidade de Sao Paulo. The first president was Carolina Martuscelli Bori (1924–2004), a behavioral psychologist from the same university. The ABP did not have a long life, practically disappearing during the 1970s. Debates at SBPC and ABP fostered a movement toward the recognition of psychology as a profession and concurred with the establishment of a workgroup that proposed a law to provide its official regulation. hutz, gauer, gomes

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This workgroup was formed by Professors Lourenço Filho (Fundação Getúlio Vargas, Rio de Janeiro), Carolina Bori (University of Sao Paulo), Father Antonius Benko (Pontificial Catholic University, Rio de Janeiro), Enzo Azzi (Pontificial Catholic University, São Paulo), and Pedro Parafita de Bessa (Federal University of Minas Gerais, Belo Horizonte). It is noteworthy that all of them were working in Brazil’s southeastern state capitals. The southeast has been the country’s most economically developed region as a result of gold and diamond exploration in Minas Gerais since the 18th century; the establishment of Rio de Janeiro as the capital and home for the royal family in the 19th century (although that would change with the inauguration of Brasilia in 1960); and São Paulo as the main coffee producing center, as well as the country’s first center of industrialization in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. As with the economy, the most renowned universities of the period were centralized in that region, although other regional centers, such as Recife, in the northeast, and Porto Alegre, in the south, were home to considerable developments in psychological science and application. From the efforts of the work group, a first version of the bill came about in 1958 (Lourenço Filho, 1971). After further discussions and revisions, led by the ABP and other experts mainly from Sao Paulo, on August 27, 1962, Federal Law No. 4119 recognized the profession of psychologist in Brazil. It stated that psychology programs were to be hosted by the College of Philosophy, at that time, a kind of liberal arts and sciences university entity that offered a bachelor’s degree and teacher’s licensure. The bachelor’s degree was planned for training on research skills. The teacher’s licensure included a supervised teaching practice, mainly for the high school level. The first two diplomas were granted after a minimum of 3.5 years of training. However, in the case of psychology, a new kind of degree was created: the professional licensure. This degree allowed its holder to teach; to do psychological assessment, professional orientation, and selection; to perform psychopedagogical orientation; and to treat adjustment problems. Training normally took at least 4.5 years but, until now, was typically done in 5 years. The degree included a mandatory internship, or supervised practice period, which in most cases would encompass or be a choice among the already traditional applied areas of industrial, clinical, and school psychology. The original curriculum for all psychology programs in Brazil included the following mandatory subject matters: physiology, statistics, general and experimental psychology, 42

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developmental psychology, personality psychology, social psychology, general psychopathology, psychological assessment and counseling techniques, and professional ethics. Elective topics included group dynamics and human relations, psychotherapeutic theories and techniques, and industrial psychology. Thus, professional psychology training conformed to Brazilian higher-education tradition in offering a professional education, like medical, law, or engineering, immediately after secondary education or high school. The concept of master’s and doctoral degrees as programs with proper curricula, specific requirements, and a qualifying exam based on a research proposal for a master’s or doctoral thesis or dissertation, was yet to come. Although the profession was regulated only in 1962, many professionals held specialist diplomas in psychology from programs that had existed since the 1940s and 1950s, and had been practicing psychology long before the first psychologists trained under the new legislation would graduate. Those specialists, as well as other professionals who had been working as psychologists, had to submit to an accreditation process overseen by the National Secretary of Education. Further regulation of the psychology profession led to the establishment of a Federal Council and Regional Councils of Psychology in 1971. These councils oversaw the accreditation process, which in Brazil is very simple: It is only requires that the candidate present a psychologist’s degree obtained from an accredited program. The types of degrees and internship requirements have not changed significantly for many years. Only recently have new areas and approaches to internship emerged, and curriculum adaptations to social and regional demands were implemented because of new curricular guidelines released in 2000. These guidelines extinguished the bachelor’s degree in psychology, replacing it with a psychology teacher’s licensure and the degree of psychologist that allows professionals to register with the Councils of Psychologists and receive a license to work. The professional program actually requires much more work than an American undergraduate program, and it is similar to a master’s degree from a U.S. university. It is strongly oriented to practice, with an emphasis on internship. The objective is that students should get a considerable overview of the field and general practice in different areas.

Professional Training: Vicissitudes of a Rapid Expansion In the beginning, the prospects for the development of a psychological profession in Brazil seemed

positive (Figueiredo & Seminério, 1973). There were a large variety of research practices, the application contexts were increasing with the country’s industrialization and educational reforms, and a mass of prospective students was eager to practice the new profession. Last, but not least, most of the same group who conducted research was responsible for the applied psychology services in industries and schools, and they were teaching and supervising licensed professionals as well as psychology students. The path was one that led to a positive combination between research and practice. However, reality led psychological training in Brazil to follow a less positive agenda. The concern with a good training in psychology, which could contemplate a bond between teaching and research, was present in the first programs in psychology. It was greater or smaller, depending on the conditions of the development of the university in the region. However, the immediate and overpowering expansion of offering programs compromised the relation between teaching and research. There were three programs in 1962, 40 in 1974, 73 in 1984, and 111 in 1996, and over 400 at present. Few universities followed the example of pioneering institutions in searching for the guidance of foreigner professors. Most institutions counted on the collaboration of religious orders, professionals from similar fields, or professionals interested in psychology to start these programs. The tradition of the professional school model became dominant, and research was disappearing not from the curriculum, but from the classroom. A broad description of psychology developments in Brazil during the 1970s was presented by Osvaldo de Barros Santos (1918–1998) in a symposium sponsored by the Brazilian Society for the Progress of Science, in Brasilia. Santos’ presentation was published the following year in Revista Psico of the Pontiphical Catholic University of Rio Grande do Sul (Santos, 1977). The author revealed that, on December 31, 1975, there were 4,951 licensed psychologists and 61 professional psychology training programs with 8,795 students. Table 3.1 shows the specialties declared by the professionals (professionals could list more than one specialty). The information is incomplete, but very elucidative of the development of professional psychology in Brazil at that time. Due to a subset of factors apparently peculiar to Brazil’s intellectual training and mainstream educational philosophy, the theoretical and doctrinaire emphasis prevailed in the consolidation of

Table 3.1 Distribution of professional specialties of psychologists Specialties

Frequency

%

Clinical Psychology

1,234

30.1

Organizational Psychology

788

19.6

Teaching Psychology

719

17.5

Educational Psychology

505

12.3

Psychological Assessment

309

7.5

Social Psychology

102

2.5

Experimental Psychology

72

1.7

Research

71

1.7

291

7.1

4,091

100

Other Areas Total

psychology teaching in Brazil (Matos, 1988). The theoretical emphasis was associated with a trend to accept and legitimize psychology´s professional practices by affiliation to a psychological doctrine (psychoanalysis, humanism, or even behaviorism). There was little concern to assess or verify empirically the efficacy or effectiveness of such practices (Langenbach & Negreiros, 1988). This is also true even in the field of psychological testing, which has a long tradition of research in the country (psychological tests were the first tools of applied psychology in Brazil). Psychological assessment occupied an important share of the curricula in the 1960s and 1970s, but decreased considerably in the 1980s. From a total of 146 tests commercialized in Brazil in 1999 by 11 editors, only 28.8% of these instruments reported reliability, validity, and normative studies in their manuals (Noronha, Primi, & Alchieri, 2004). Fortunately, in 2003, the Brazilian Council of Psychology initiated a program to evaluate the status of the psychological tests that were being used in Brazil. The Council maintains online4 a list of tests that present good psychometric characteristics and that can be used by psychologist. In the 1980s, concern for the social needs of the country and the commitment of the society to re-establish democratic order also seemed to have interfered in the relation among teaching, research, and practice (Gomes, 2003, 1996). Social activism, often considered a red flag, determined scientific production for a given reason. Such impacts were well succeeded in the social activism, but confused the relation between tradition, theoretical trends hutz, gauer, gomes

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that promised social change and defense of human rights (e.g., critical theory, feminist theory, psychosociology), and alternative methodological approaches (e.g., qualitative methods, participatory action research, ethnomethodologies). At the same time, a clash arose between the quantitative research associated with the evils of capitalism and the qualitative research associated with subjectivity and social justice. These critical factors led to social psychology being replaced by a critical-historical social theory. The constraint in identifying it with the social psychology or with quantitative research in general was fairly strong during the 1980s and 1990s, when many colleagues preferred exchanging the research field for other fields, from traditional social psychology to other areas. Fortunately, these fields seem to be reappearing in the country today. At the same time, teaching suffered because of the lack of qualified professors, and from a lack of basic infrastructure as such laboratories, study and research rooms, and libraries (Gomes, 1996). In addition, many professors neglected to assess students, considering such practices inefficient and unnecessary (Gomes, 2003). Throughout this period, a remnant of the liberal educational trends of the 1970s, an influence of humanistic pedagogy, was transformed into radical permissiveness. In the 1990s, with the growing number of master’s and doctoral programs offered this general situation started to change.

Master’s Degree and Doctoral Programs Brazil’s higher-education system is historically made up of professional schools, which are considered graduate level institutions. There is no undergraduate concept. Therefore, graduate programs came immediately after secondary education, offered within a professional school. The first professional programs in psychology were organized at the end of the 1950s and in the early 1960s. Soon after, master’s degree programs emerged as “postgraduate level” education. The first master’s program inaugurated in Brazil was in clinical psychology, in 1966, at the Pontiphical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro. Following it, in 1970, was experimental psychology, in the school of psychology and human development at the University of Sao Paulo. The University of Sao Paulo also offered the first doctoral degree program in experimental and school psychology in 1974. The current configuration of the graduate programs results from the last major reform of higher education in Brazil, implemented between the late 1960s and early 1970s (Gauer & Gomes, 2002). Main consequences 44

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of the reform were the adoption by federal universities of the departmental structure and stimulus plans for full-time professorship. For postgraduate education, the reform defined the master´s and doctoral courses and their respective degrees as the standard for stricto sensu international graduate studies, which requires the completion of a master’s thesis and a doctoral dissertation. Note that, in Brazil, the term thesis is for comprehensive work at the doctoral level, and for a dissertation at the master’s level. The expansion of the master’s and doctoral programs in Brazil was associated with the development of two federal government agencies: Coordenação para o Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Ensino Superior (Foundation for the Improvement of Higher Education Personnel Coordination for Improvement of Higher Education Personnel - CAPES), and Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico (National Council for Research and Development - CNPq). The two agencies, founded in 1951, have played an important role in the qualification of higher-education teaching and research. The agencies started an ambitious line of scholarship financing to send students abroad to obtain master´s and doctoral degrees. The first impact of this effort was restricted to some selected universities from the most developed regions of the country. Conceptual issues about graduate programs and the role of science and technology also limited the impact of these early programs. The curriculum framework was not properly clarified to bring a comprehensive view of the field and to increment a systematic training in research methods. In general, these programs were made up of different courses based on the doctoral dissertations of the faculty. Thus, the courses pertaining to the curriculum of a program were not necessarily related to each other. At that time, this curricular situation was defined as a “patchwork quilt.” There was, however, a deficiency of instrumentation, accentuated by a lack of definition of research lines. Even so, some good results were produced by these programs in the training of creative and productive researchers, and that was important for the reforms introduced subsequently. However, there was a clear concentration of research in a few centers of excellence and a loss of interest in research in most professional programs in psychology. Even today, there are not enough doctors in psychology to attend to the demands of several regions of the country. Fortunately, the growth and changes in master’s and doctoral programs have had a positive effect on the relationship between teaching and research so far.

Examples were the cognitive psychology course at Universidade Federal de Pernambuco, created in 1976, and the development psychology course at Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, founded in 1988. These two programs could be characterized by a small number of faculty members; a well-clarified curriculum, combining research techniques with statistics and qualitative methods; lines of research that are clearly defined to explore and advance specific areas, such as cognition or topics in development psychology; and an emphasis on faculty continuing education and publication requirements. Also, they reinforced the importance of the relationship for students of in the five initial years of professional training (a graduate program in Brazilian terms) with the master’s and doctoral programs (postgraduate programs) through research. The postgraduate programs usually have the means to finance the participation of graduate students in research groups with master’s degree and doctoral students.

General Organization of Psychology in Brazil As mentioned before, professional psychological practice in Brazil is supervised by the Federal Council of Psychology and the 17 administratively and financially autonomous regional councils. The functions of the councils include determining the orientation of the field, serving a disciplinary role, monitoring professional practice, and promulgating ethical principles. The first ethics code was released in 1975. The Federal Council also functions as a court of professional ethics and acts as a consultative agency in matters relating to psychology. The regional councils have analogous functions, and they actually register all psychologists who work in their respective regions. University professors and researchers do not need to register unless they teach practical subjects or supervise students in applied settings. The academic and scientific activities are coordinated by psychological societies and associations. In fact, these organizations played an important role in professional regulation and the establishment of the Federal Council. Three of these associations should be mentioned: the psychological societies of São Paulo and Rio Grande do Sul, and the Brazilian Association of Psychology in Rio de Janeiro. After the professional consolidation, these organizations organized conferences and workshops around the country. As mentioned already, the first Brazilian association did not have a long life; the states

societies still exist, but they have become professional associations with little interest in research and placing more emphasis on clinical discussions. The first society that had an important function in the development of psychological science after the regulation of the profession was a regional society in the city of Ribeirão Preto, in the state of Sao Paulo. This society was organized in 1971 with a regional coverage but became the most important outlet for scientific discussion and the clarification of psychological science. In 1992, the regional society was officially transformed into a national society, the Brazilian Society of Psychology. However, this association was organized in such a way that the original group from Ribeirão Preto held all the power and acted in such a way that prevented it from becoming a truly national society. Thus, several groups that could have developed divisions (like those of the American Psychological Association [APA]) had no other choice but to create specific scientific societies in several fields such as psychological assessment, social psychology, organizational psychology, educational psychology, and others. The Brazilian Society still exists but could not continue publishing a journal, and its meetings are attended by less than 1,000 participants. Many specific area societies organize meeting that attract from 1,000 to 4,000 participants. The fight for the work rights of psychologists is carried by the unions. These organizations are not very strong in Brazil because most psychologists work as autonomous professionals and are not employed by private organizations. Psychologists who work for public organizations (city, state, or federal) belong to specific unions.

Psychology Journals in Brazil The first serial publication in psychology in Brazil, Arquivos Brasileiros de Psicotécnica (Brazilian Archives of Psychotechnique), started in 1949, edited by the Getúlio Vargas Foundation in Rio de Janeiro. Later, it was renamed Arquivos Brasileiros de Psicologia Aplicada (Brazilian Archives of Applied Psychology), and it was the most important psychological journal in Brazil. Today, more than 80 journals are dedicated to psychology in Brazil. Some of them publish also in English and Spanish, and some accept submissions only in English. Differently from most countries, university departments have historically edited most Brazilian psychology journals. Few publications come from scientific societies, but this trend is growing, as we will see in the next section. Because university departments usually encompass professors and laboratories from several fields of hutz, gauer, gomes

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psychology, most journals tend to be of a general scope. In a single issue of a major Brazilian psychology journal, one might find an experimental pharmacological trial with rats, a psychoanalytic case study, and a theoretical essay. In the last decade, a system was developed to evaluate psychology journals.5 A national commission, whose members were nominated by CAPES and ANPEPP started to evaluate Brazilian psychology journals. This system has helped improve the editorial process of many journals, and also has helped to index them in several data banks, which is important in the retrieval of information. The journals assessment is also used to evaluate postgraduate program scientific production as well as to evaluate researchers. Agencies will usually take into account the number of publications and the evaluation of the journals in which they appear when making decisions about grants. The journal evaluation commission had a tremendous impact on the field, improving the quality of articles and publications. The next evaluation will comparatively analyze Brazilian and foreign periodicals. Each journal will receive a rank and be classified according to several criteria (mostly indexed articles and impact). The Brazilian psychology journals may be accessed freely from two websites: Scielo (Scientific Electronic Library Online6), a Brazilian service that includes journals from major Latin American countries, Portugal, and Spain; and PEPsic (Electronic Psychology Journals7), a service offered by the Brazilian Council of Psychology. PEPsic also includes collections of thesis and dissertations.

Theoretical Affinities An overview of the history and the present situation of psychology in Brazil would be incomplete without an analysis of the theoretical affinities of different groups of professionals and researchers. Brazilian psychology, both scientific and professional, seems to be at a turning point, moving from an age of schools to a period of specialized maturity. This trend is relatively late when compared to more mature psychological communities, such as that found in the United States. It is characterized as a movement from all-encompassing theories and systems guidance of training, research, and practice, toward a more pragmatically oriented, specialized, and diversified (although not theory-free nor necessarily eclectic) approach to scientific psychology. The identification of that movement is corroborated by the creation of subdiscipline associations and periodicals. In line with that interpretation, the following is an attempt to describe the current status of some of 46

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the theoretical approaches to psychology predominant from the 1960s to the 1980s, and a preliminary appraisal of the major areas of interest of Brazilian psychologists as reflected by their societies and periodicals. Brazilian society has generally taken psychotherapy to be synonymous with psychoanalysis. This may be confirmed at any time in the media, where psychoanalysts are the favorite guests in debates on any subject connected with mental health or even contemporary trends in people’s social behavior. There is also a traditional confusion between psychology and psychotherapy, which has led psychology in Brazil to be understood by the general public as psychoanalytic psychotherapy. Whatever semantic confusions the general public embraces, they are not devoid of historical reasons that emerged from the academic context. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, many philosophers, educators, and doctors, in the spirit of the times of the early 20th century, brought psychoanalysis into the university as the comprehensive theory of psychology. The curricula of the nascent professional discipline of psychology often came to be mainly psychoanalytic, since those same scholars had been involved in their planning. That happened both through these scholars directly working on psychology curriculum projects, and indirectly, through their students’ work. Despite the possible impact from the behaviorist approach represented by Sao Paulo scholars, who were actively involved in regulating the profession (see previous sections on professional regulation), psychoanalysis still prevailed as the dominating approach. Even so, psychologists encountered some restrictions to receiving psychoanalytical training. For a long time, some psychoanalytical societies accepted only physicians. That situation began to change thanks to the Lacanian movement. Through Argentina and France, the ideas of Jacques Lacan (1901–1981) influenced Brazilian psychoanalysis from the early 1970s onward. One main tenet of that approach was the opening of the psychoanalytic field to other professionals, not just medical doctors, and psychologists were the most interested of them all. Presently, psychoanalytic training, even in traditional societies, is done mainly by psychologists. Psychiatrists are shifting to pharmacological treatments and to cognitive-behavioral therapy. Today, although many psychology curricula still have numerous psychoanalytic courses, psychoanalysis is seldom the only, or even the prevalent theoretical orientation. As with other major theoretical

approaches emphasized in the 20th century, it seems to have a relatively large, but somewhat stagnated community within psychology. There are some graduate courses of psychoanalytic orientation in Brazil, and most of their production is theoretical, rather than applied. An example is the journal Ágora: Studies on Psychoanalytical Theory, an online publication, accessible in Scielo (www.scielo.br). The behaviorist movement in Brazilian psychology has its origins with Fred S. Keller’s (1899–1996) visit to the Universidade de Sao Paulo and to the Universidade de Brasília, to help the planning and development of laboratories and courses (Keller, 1975). In fact, whereas most psychology courses in Brazil were psychoanalytic, the others were predominantly behavioristic in their orientation. However, the expansion of a behavioristic movement in Brazil seems to have been circumscribed to those two universities visited by Keller and to the circle of influence of their faculty. Behaviorism has a relatively small, but stable academic community. A few other universities came to that orientation through the influence of faculty trained or supervised at those institutions visited by Keller. Examples of that trend are to be found both in the north, such as at the Federal University of Para at Belem, and in the south, in two state universities of Parana, at Maringa and Londrina. The behaviorists are represented in Brazil by the Brazilian Association for Psychotherapy and Medical Behaviorism, founded in 1991. This society publishes a journal, the Brazilian Journal of Behavior Analysis that is supported by the postgraduate programs that offer training in the area. One important trend currently influencing the field of behaviorism in Brazil is cognitive-behavioral psychotherapy. Whereas behavioral therapies were never predominant due to a number of reasons— including the popularity of psychoanalysis and misguided political and ideological conceptions that labeled them as right-wing instruments of oppression—cognitive-behavioral therapies have considerable influence in the last one or two decades. This approach is represented by the Federal Brasileira de Terapias Cognitivas (Brazilian Federation of Cognitive Therapies) and by the journal Revista Brasileira de Terapia Comportamental e Cogntiva, created in 1999 (available on line at PEPsic - http:// www.bvs-psi.org.br/). Humanism received a great deal of attention from the late 1960s to mid-1970s. Carl Rogers (1902–1987) visited Brazil in 1977, 1978, and 1985 for workshops on his client-centered approach (Gomes, Holanda, & Gauer, 2004). Pierre Weil

(1924–2008), who introduced humanistic and transpersonal approaches to the country starting in the late 1960s, moved to Brazil and became professor of the Federal University of Minas Gerais at Belo Horizonte. Presently, there are a few established graduate-level research centers and a small number of clinics of humanistic orientation throughout the country. However, humanism in Brazil presents much the same trend as behaviorism, best characterized as maintained by a relatively small but stable community of research and application. An example of this movement is the publication Revista da Abordagem Gestáltica, created in 1994, accessible by PEPsic (http://www.bvs-psi.org.br/). Social psychology mostly dominated by the historic-critical approach constituted a strong movement and specialty organization in Brazil. This orientation attracts a considerable number of psychologists and faculty around the country, and they have a biannual meeting that is attended by up to 4,000 participants. They also have a very active society, the Associação Brasileira de Psicologia Social (ABRAPSO; the Brazilian Social Psychology Association), organized in 1980, and they publish the journal Psychology and Society. The journal’s articles highlight research and theory at the interface of psychology and society, taking a posture toward social psychology that is critical, transformative, and interdisciplinary. Along with social psychology, there is a growing interest for community interventions, institutional analysis, feminist studies, political psychology, and subjectivity. In health psychology, three different movements can be identified: collective health that brings psychologists to an interdisciplinary discussion about public policy for the health–illness care process; health psychology, a growing field of application and employment for psychologists, mainly by state agencies; and hospital psychology, a specialty that has been developing in Brazil since the 1950s and that has a notable appeal for students and newly graduated professionals. Hospital psychology seems to be a Brazilian peculiarity; it is a specialty that prepares psychologists to work in hospital environments. These fields do not have clear theoretical affiliations. Collective health and health psychology follow the general psychological view of Brazilian social psychology. Hospital psychology uses either a psychodynamic or even a cognitive-behavioral approach. One outlet for the research in this area is the journal Psicologia Hospitalar, created in 2001. The new areas of neuroscience, neuropsychology, and neuropsychological evaluation have attracted the attention of Brazilian psychologists. In 2005, hutz, gauer, gomes

47

an interdisciplinary conference was organized to present and discuss research about the interface between brain and mind, the Brazilian Conference on Brain, Behavior, and Emotions. The meeting has gathered professionals from psychology, medicine, pharmacology, and basic researchers on physiology and biochemistry. This event is already on its fourth edition.

Future Directions A possible sign of maturity of the discipline is the growing specialization and diversification of areas of research and application. One such indicator is the change from general psychology periodicals to specialized ones. That accompanies another movement, which is the creation of numerous scientific societies, also specialized in those areas, as seen in Table 3.2. Psychological testing has regained attention. There is a postgraduate program entirely dedicated to

psychometrics and psychological assessment at the University of San Francisco–Itatiba, Sao Paulo, and a national association (the Brazilian Institute for Psychological Assessment [IBAP], www.ibapnet.org. br) that publishes the journal Avaliação Psicológica (Psychological Assessment, http://www.bvs-psi.org.br/) and organizes a biennial meeting that attracts researchers from all over Brazil, Portugal, Spain, and several other Latin American countries. Research in neuropsychology has been conducted by departments, particularly, biochemistry and physiology. However, there is a well evaluated postgraduate program in psychology at the University of Sao Paulo dedicated to biopsychology. Neuroscience also has become an important field, and there is a growing interest in neuropsychological assessment. Psychology is a strong profession in Brazil and a developing science (Hutz, McCarthy, & Gomes, 2005). There are more than 160,000 licensed

Table 3.2 Psychological subdisciplines with scientific and professional societies and specialized periodicals in Brazil Sub-discipline

Association

Founded

Periodical

First volume

Social Psychology

ABRAPSO: Associação Brasileira de Psicologia Social

1980

Psicologia e Sociedade

1986

Neuropsychology

SBNp: Sociedade Brasileira de Neuropsicologia

1989

—

School and Educational Psychology

ABRAPEE: Associação Brasileira de Psicologia Escolar e Educacional

1990

Psicologia Escolar e Educacional

1996

Professional Counseling

ABOP: Associação Brasileira de Orientação Profissional

1994

Revista Brasileira de Orientação Profissional

1999

Hospital Psychology

SBPH: Sociedade Brasileira de Psicologia Hospitalar

1997

Revista da SBPH

1998

Psychological Assessment

IBAP: Instituto Brasileiro de Avaliação Psicológica

1997

Avaliação Psicológica

2002

Developmental Psychology

SBPD: Sociedade Brasileira de Psicologia do Desenvolvimento

1998

Organizational Psychology

SBPOT: Sociedade Brasileira de Psicologia 2001 Organizacional e do Trabalho

Psicologia: Organizações e trabalho

2001

Political Psychology

ABPP: Associação Brasileira de Psicologia Política

2001

Psicologia Política

2001

Health Psychology

ABPSA: Associação Brasileira de Psicologia da Saúde

2006

Mudanças: Psicologia da Saúde

1993

Cognitive Therapy

FBTC: Federal Brasileira de Teorias Cognitivas

2005

Revista Brasileira de Terapias Cognitivas

2006

48

braz il

—

psychologists in Brazil. Until a few years ago, young psychologists had a higher income than most professionals working in health or social care who had comparable years of education and training (social workers, nurses, public school teachers), although this is not true today. Also noteworthy is the fact that Brazilian psychologists are underpaid when compared to their colleagues in the United States and Europe. Most psychologists in Brazil work for about $US20 (or even less) per hour. However, the number of psychologists will keep growing over the next years. An important and rapid development of research has been observed in the last decade, and the offer of postgraduate training will continue to rise over the next decade. A possible new trend is the offering of professional postgraduate programs for improvement of the applied services. In fact, the social arena has attracted a great deal of attention in the last decades. Many students will prefer to work for nongovernmental agencies in poor neighborhoods than for multinational corporations. Therefore, training programs to work with community psychology, youth and families, ecological development, and populations at risk will be on the rise in popularity over the next years. Perspectives are that psychology will continue to capture the attention of the media and raise the interest of young students in years to come. Large national and regional meetings will attract more students, professionals, faculty, and researchers. The national system to fund research and student training has been growing every year and apparently will continue to increase the amount of grants available in the foreseeable future.

Notes 1. Darwin`s Beagle Diary (1831–1836), see The Complete Work of Charles Darwin Online http://darwin-online.org.uk/ content/frameset?itemID=EHBeagleDiary&viewtype=text&pag eseq=1 transcribed by Kees Rookmeaker from the facsimile published by Genesis Publications, 1979, Edited by John van Wyhe. 2. Étienne Bonnot, Abbé de Condillac (1714–1780). 3. François-Pierre-Gothier Maine de Biran (1766–1824). 4. For the status of psychological tests in Brazil, see Sistema de Avaliação de Testes Psicológicos (SATEPSI), http://www2. pol.org.br/satepsi/. 5. See http://www.anpepp.org.br/index-aval.htm. 6. Scielo: http://www.scielo.br. 7. PEPsic: http://www.bvs-psi.org.br/.

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Jacó-Villela, A. M. (Ed.). (in press). Dicionário histórico de instituições de psicologia no Brasil. Rio de Janeiro: Imago. Jacó-Villela, A. M., Ferreira, A. A. L., & Portugal, F. T. (Eds.). (2005). História da psicologia [History of psychology]. Rio de Janeiro: Nau Editora. Keller, F. S. (1975). On my experience in Brasil. Boletim de Psicologia, 16(69), 105–110. Klineberg, O. (1975). Trends of psychology in 1945 and in 1975. Boletim de Psicologia, 16(69), 29–30. Langenbach M., & Negreiros, T. C. G. (1988). A formação complementar um labirinto profissional. In Conselho Federal de Psicologia (Org.), Quem é o psicólogo brasileiro (pp. 86–99). São Paulo: Edicon. Lourenço Filho, M. B. (1927/1971). Contribuição ao estudo experimental do hábito. Revista de Biologia e Higiene, São Paulo, 1(2), 23–37. (Reimpresso por Arquivos Brasileiros de Psicologia Aplicada, 23(3), 21–32, 1971.). Lourenço Filho, M. B. (1930/2002). Introdução ao estudo da Escola Nova. Rio/Brasília: Imago/CFP. (Original published in 1930). Lourenço Filho, M. B. (1955). Psicologia no Brasil. In F. Azevedo (Org.), As ciências no Brasil Vol. II (pp. 263–296). São Paulo: Ed. Melhoramentos. (Reimpresso pelos Arquivos Brasileiros de Psicologia Aplicada, 23(3), 113–142, 1971). Lourenço Filho, M. B. (1971). A psicologia no Brasil nos últimos 25 anos. Arquivos Brasileiros de Psicologia Aplicada, 23(3), 143–151. (Original publicado em 1969). Machado, M. H. (2006). Brazil through the eyes of William James: Letters, diaries and drawings, 1865–1866. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Massimi, M. (1990). História da psicologia brasileira: Da época colonial até 1934. São Paulo: EPU. Massimi, M., & Campos R. H. F. (2004). Josef Brožek: História e memória (1913–2004). Memorandum, 6, 128–131. Matos, M. A. (1988). Produção e formação científica no Brasil. Em Conselho Federal de Psicologia (Org.), Quem é o Psicólogo Brasileiro (pp. 100–122). São Paulo: EDICON. Medeiros, J. A. (2001). Ulisses Pernambucano. Em A. M. JacóVilela, & M. R. Ferreira (Orgs.), Pioneiros da Psicologia Brasileira Vol. 2. Rio/Brasília: Imago/CFP. Medeiros e Albuquerque, J. J. C. C. (1924). Tests. Rio de Janeiro: Liv. Alves. Noronha, A. P. P., Primi, R., & Alchieri, J. C. (2004). Parâmetros psicométricos: Uma análise de testes psicológicos comercializados no Brasil. Psicologia: Ciência e Profissão, 24(4), 88–99.

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Olinto, P. (1994/2004). A psicologia experimental no Brasil. In M. A. M. Antunes (Ed.), A psicologia no Brasil–Primeiros ensaios (pp. 25–32). Rio de Janeiro: EDUERJ. (Original published in 1944). Paim A. (1967). História das idéias filosóficas no Brasil. São Paulo: Grijalbo/Edusp. Penna, A. G. (1985). Apontamentos sobre as fontes e sobre algumas das figuras mais expressivas da psicologia na cidade do Rio de Janeiro I. Textos do Centro de Pós-Graduação em Psicologia. Rio de Janeiro, Fundação Getúlio Vargas. Penna, A. G. (1986). Apontamentos sobre as fontes e sobre algumas das figuras mais expressivas da psicologia na cidade do Rio de Janeiro II. Textos do Centro de Pós-Graduação em Psicologia. Rio de Janeiro, Fundação Getúlio Vargas. Perestrello, M. (1988). Primeiros encontros com a psicanálise: Os precursores no Brasil (1899–1937). In S. A. Figueira (Ed.), Efeito psi: A influência da psicanálise (pp. 151–181). Rio de Janeiro: Editora Campus. Pessotti, I. (1975). Dados para uma história da psicologia no Brasil. Psicologia (USP), 1(1), 1–14. Pessotti, I. (1988). Notas para uma história da psicologia brasileira. In Conselho Federal de. Pfromm Netto, S. A. (1979–1981). A psicologia no Brasil. In M. G. Ferri, & S. Motoyama (Eds.), História das ciências no Brasil (pp. 235–276). São Paulo: EDUSP. Psicologia (Org.), Quem é o psicólogo brasileiro (pp. 17–31). São Paulo: Edicon. Rosas, P. (1995). Mira y Lopes: 30 anos depois. São Paulo: Vetor. Santos, O. B. (1977). A psicologia como ciência e profissão. Psico (PUCRS), 11, 44–54. Slavutzky, A. (Ed). (2001). A Invenção da vida: Arte e psicanálise. Porto Alegre, BR: Artes e Ofícios. Souza, D. (1945). Frustração e distúrbio da personalidade. Porto Alegre, BR: Globo. Teixeira, A. (1989). Ensino superior no Brasil: Análise e interpretação de sua evolução até 1969. Rio de Janeiro: Editora da Fundação Getúlio Vargas. Veríssimo, J. (1916). História da literatura brasileira. Retrieved August 30, 2009 from http://pt.wikisource.org/wiki/ Hist%C3%B3ria_da_Literatura_Brasileira.

C HA P TE R

4

Brunei Darussalam

Narasappa Kumaraswamy and Chandraseagran Suppiah

Abstract This chapter discusses the development of psychology and its various branches in Brunei Darussalam. Brunei Darussalam is an independent Islamic Sultanate located in the northern part of Borneo in Southeast Asia. Brunei is a multiracial and multicultural society with unique sociocultural beliefs. The main domain of the culture is deeply entrenched in Malay, Islam, and monarchy (Melayu, Islam, Beraja or MIB). The development of psychology as a subject and specialty is still at an early stage. Historically, educational psychology, guidance and counselling, and special education are the branches of psychology that are first to emerge, followed by clinical psychology. For the past 20 years, interest in psychology and its related branches has improved. In Brunei, the development of the field of psychology is closely related to rapid development of the economy after independence in 1984, specifically due to the rapid progress made at the Ministry of Education, the University of Brunei, the Ministry of Health, various government agencies and departments, and nongovernmental voluntary organizations. Currently, there is a positive acceptance of the role of psychology, counseling, special education, educational psychology, and clinical psychology by the government and society at large. Therefore, psychology has bright prospect of developing and expanding its role and impact on society. This chapter discusses various aspects of how psychology developed in Brunei, and suggestions are made for future development of psychology. Keywords: Psychology, sociocultural beliefs, bomoh, dukkha, guidance and counseling, mental health

Brunei Darussalam is an independent Islamic Sultanate located in the northern part of Borneo in Southeast Asia. As a Malay Muslim monarchy, Brunei is ruled according to Islamic values and its traditions, by the present King, His Majesty Sultan Haji Hassanal Bolkiah Mu’izzaddin Waddaulah (Ministry of Industry and Primary Resources, 2004). It is an oil-rich country with a land area of 5,765 square kilometers. It shares its borders with the Malaysian state of Sarawak. The capital, Bandar Seri Begawan, is located in a district known as Brunei-Muara, which is one of the four districts that make up Brunei Darussalam (the other districts are Tutong, Belait, and Temburong). According to the 2001 population census, Brunei Darussalam has a population of about 332,844, comprising

66.7% Malays, 11.1% Chinese, and 22.2% other races (Department of Statistics, 2002).

Sociocultural Beliefs in Brunei Darussalam Malay Culture and Religious Beliefs Multiple cultural elements and foreign civilizations had a hand in influencing the culture of this country. Brunei’s culture has been influenced by the four dominating periods of animism, Hinduism, Islam, and the West. However, it was Islam that has planted its roots deeply into the culture of Brunei; hence, it became a way of life and is adopted as the state’s ideology and philosophy (World Fact Book, 2005). The life of the average Brunei Malay revolves around his or her religion (Islam) with certain things being forbidden (haram), certain things tolerated 51

but not encouraged (makruh), and certain things that fall under the embrace of Islam (halal ). The consumption of alcohol, eating pork, eating meat not slaughtered under Islamic guidance, adultery, and coming into contact with the wet nose of a dog are haram. Smoking and eating shellfish are considered makruh. Bruneians shake hands by only lightly touching hands and then bringing the hand back to the chest; it is not customary to shake hands with members of the opposite sex (World Fact Book, 2005). Spiritual and religious factors play a vital part in mental health among the Malays, but they generally prefer to interpret psychological problems in physical terms in order to avoid the label of mental illness and the negative connotation that accompanies it. Many believe that symptoms of psychological problems are indicative of the loss of semangat or soul substance, which makes them physically weak and confused. They also belief that angin or the wind present in the stomach, nerves, and blood vessels causes hallucinations and delusions. Another common belief is that of being possessed by a spirit or Jinn (Genie). It is believed that after death, the ancestors may wish to stay in the bodies of their offspring. Problems arise when the possessed person refuses to allow the Jinn to stay in their body (Haque, 1998). Santau or black magic is also an important factor leading to psychological problems or which can be used to explain psychological problems. Santau is practiced either by using traditional ingredients mixed in food or drinks or through spirits such as Jinn for purposes of revenge, envy, gaining personal strength, and so on. These cultural beliefs lead the people to seek guidance from traditional healers called bomohs or pawan, who are considered keepers of hidden knowledge and who can get rid of the possession and cure psychological illnesses. Bomohs remain indispensable in Malay society even in this modern age of e-medicine. Malays in Brunei believe that a bomoh obtains inherited knowledge through prophetic dreams. The bomohs can be one of three general types. The first type is the one who supposedly uses the Qur’an as a guide for diagnosis and treatment of illness; the second is most closely related to Malay magic (ilmu batin); and the third uses herbs and traditional medicines (Haque, 1998). The strong influence of religion in Malay culture results in the general belief that mental disorders are an outcome of abandoning or neglecting of Islamic values (Haque, 1998; Haque & Masuan, 2002). 52

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Although these belief systems reflect the early influence of animistic and Hindu traditions, Islam perceives mental illness and mental health differently. The basic premise in Islamic literature is that human beings are made both of body and soul, the unity of which results in psyche (nafs) that reflects itself in the form of behaviors. Thus, human behavior is the result of the dynamic interplay between material and nonmaterial forces and is in control of human consciousness. Ongoing purification of thought and deeds brings a person closer to God and keeps a person mentally healthy. The Qur’an uses the term inshirah al sadr to refer to a state of mental health. The Qur’an also uses the term dhaiq al sadr to refer to states of psychological imbalance. Taqwa is associated with a state of well-being, whereas psychological or mental imbalance is attributed to ma’siyat, (Haque, 1998, 2004). Although Malay and Islam is the main culture of the people of Brunei, the Chinese (11%) are predominantly influenced by Chinese cultural and religious beliefs, which includes Buddhism, Taoism, and Christianity. Other races (22%) include indigenous people such as Dusun, Kadayans, Ibans, and others such as Indians, Pakistanis, etc. and mostly are either Muslims or Christians.

Chinese Cultural and Religious Beliefs The Chinese community in Brunei is made up of those from the Quemoy (Jinmen), Cantonese, Hakkas, Hainanese, Teochius, and Henghua (Xinghua) regions. As in other overseas Chinese communities, these different groups are located in different areas. The majority of Chinese are followers of Buddhism, and a small percentage are followers of Christianity. In Buddhist philosophy, life is full of sufferings (dukkha) for those who crave for this world (samdaya) but can be ended (nirodha) by a ceasing of desire, which leads to a state of ultimate happiness (nirvana). Buddhists believe in Karma; thus, mental illness can be viewed as the outcome of negative behaviors done in the past. Qualities necessary for good mental health are the qualities of right understanding, right thought, right speech, right action, right livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness, and right action. Mastery over moral conduct and control of evil actions lead to purity and spiritual advancement. An attachment to this material world is considered ignorance, which will lead to unhealthy character and restlessness in individuals (De Silva, 1996). The Lord Gautama Buddha in his sermons stated that it may be possible for a person to claim to have

been free from physical disease even for a hundred years, but it is not possible for a person to claim to have been free from mental disease even for a day, except for an Arahant or a perfected disciple or a Buddha. It is recognized by all Buddhist scholars that the ultimate aim of the Buddha is to produce Arahants, the culmination of the original Buddhist practice. If the Arahant is the only person with perfect mental health, the aim of the Buddha was to produce mentally healthy personalities. Thus, Buddhism may be considered an early form of psychotherapy (De Silva, 1996; Kalupaha, 1987). Early Chinese literature attributes good health to the person’s state of emotions. Thus, excessive, unbalanced, or undisciplined emotions are primarily the reason for any kind of illness. Emotion is an integral aspect of the body’s basic functions and is regulated by the circulation of ch’i (air or breath) that is partly innate and partly a product of one’s food and drink. Ch’i not only maintains the physical body but also the mental and spiritual processes. Abnormal emotions affect the functions of the ch’i—“anger makes the ch’i rise; joy relaxes it, sorrow dissipates it, fear makes it go down; cold contracts it; heat makes it leak out; fright makes its motions chaotic; exhaustion consumes it; worry congeals it’” (Faw, 1995). The need to adhere to Chinese values is also very important for people of this culture. A traditionalist Chinese has strongly internalized values in which primary allegiance is to the parents or the family of origin. Self-worth is measured by the material achievement one brings to the family in terms of education, occupation, and monetary gain. Mental disorders may arise when the person has failed to be a conforming son or daughter and is unable to bring the expected honor to the family. There is no room for blaming others, as the individual is himself or herself responsible for society, rather than the other way around (Faw, 1995).

Christianity, true mental health is not possible without a right relationship with God (Faw, 1995).

Christian Beliefs in Mental Health

One of the major landmarks in the development of psychology in Brunei is related to the establishment of the Brunei Teacher’s Training Centre in Brunei town to provide trained teachers for the massive educational expansion that took place beginning in 1956. The role of educational psychology become more prominent when, in 1984, the Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah Teacher’s College was upgraded to an Institute and thus became known as Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah Institute of Education (SHBIE) (Pg Mahmud, 2006). In 1988, SHBIE merged to become a part of Universiti Brunei Darussalam.

Christianity in Asia tends to attribute mental disorders to natural causes, such as normal life challenges and human wrongdoings over which God has ultimate control, meaning that no illness can inflict man without the will of God. Disorders may be inflicted upon a person to bring about a change in his or her life, to teach patience, and to increase a trust in God. In addition to biopsychosocial causes, the psyche or spiritual factors are also important for mental health and are used generously in the treatment of mentally ill persons. According to

History of the Development of Psychology in Brunei According to Mundia (2008), the development of psychology in Brunei, as compared within the Asian context, has not reached the level of Japan (Sato, 2001), which has a psychological association, nor the levels of India (Jain, 2005) and Pakistan (Suhail, 2004), whose universities offer a number of master’s and doctoral programs in psychology. However, although a small country in terms of both population and land mass, Brunei has made many achievements in psychology within a few years after independence from Britain in 1984. The Sultanate of Brunei was very powerful from the 14th to the 16th century. Its realm covered the northern part of Borneo and the southwestern Philippines. European influence gradually brought an end to this regional power. Later, there was a brief war with Spain, in which Brunei was victorious. The decline of the Brunei Empire culminated in the 19th century, when Brunei lost much of its territory to the White Rajahs of Sarawak, resulting in its current small landmass and separation into two parts (History of Brunei, Wikipedia). In 1888, Brunei became a British protectorate, retaining internal independence but with British control over its external affairs. On January 1, 1984, Brunei became a fully independent state. Since independence, rapid progress has been made in the development of the economy, expansion of medical facilities and mental health care, and expansion and reforms in the education sector, as well as in improvements to the various government departments and ministries. The development of psychology is somewhat parallel to this progress since independence.

The Role of Education in the Development of Psychology

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This change led to the formation of the department of educational psychology at SHBIE and paved the way for the development of psychology-related courses as an important aspect of the teacher training program. The department of educational psychology, which initially started with four psychologists (the heads of the department were a Indonesian with Ph.D. from the United States, a Briton with a Ph.D. from the United Kingdom, an Australian with a Ph.D. from Australia, and a Malaysian with a M.Ed from Malaysia) has since expanded and played a significant role in the development of psychology in Brunei. Over the years, it has developed programs such as the certificate in special education, certificate in counselling, bachelor of primary education (special education), postgraduate diploma in counselling, and master of education (special education). Apart from these, the department of educational psychology serviced many other programs in teacher training programs at the certificate, diploma, degree, or graduate level by offering core courses such as developmental psychology, psychology of learning and teaching, introduction to counseling, individual differences, children with special needs, measurement and evaluation, and learning and development (Handbook, 2008/2009). The department of educational psychology of the SHBIE organized the first international conference in psychology in September 1997 (the Ninth Asian Workshop on Child and Adolescent Development) and was attended by more than 250 participants, which include about 50 international paper presenters and participants. The proceedings of this conference saw more than 40 papers published (see Burns, 1997). Since 1997, the department has successfully organized three national seminar workshops for all local counselors. The department has also organized international and national conferences and seminars in collaboration with the Special Education Unit of the Ministry of Education. Since January 2009, the Universiti Brunei Darussalam has been undergoing a major reform. The SHBIE has been upgraded to a graduate school, which implies that it will only offer graduate-level programs. All departments in the SHBIE have undergone major changes, rebranding, and regrouping. Since March 2009, the department of educational psychology no longer exists. All lecturers in the areas of educational psychology, counselling, special education, and early childhood development

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are gathered into an academic grouping called psychological studies and human development (PSHD). This group consists of 22 academic staff including eight lecturers in educational psychology and measurement and evaluation, four in counseling, four in special education, and six in early childhood education. Among these staff, eight are expatriates and the rest are Bruneians. Another major change that has strong impact on and implications for future psychologists, especially in the roles of counseling, special education, and educational psychology, is that SHBIE will not offer an undergraduate program. It will only focus on graduate-level programs in which every student who aspires to become a teacher must complete the new master of teaching program to become a qualified teacher. It should be noted that, in the new master of teaching program (which is replacing all existing undergraduate teacher training programs), the roles of educational psychology, counselling, and special education have been drastically reduced. Another implication is that the certificate in counselling, the certificate in special education, and the bachelor of primary education (special education) degree is no longer offered at SHBIE. However, at the postgraduate level, it is anticipated that within the next few years there will be more programs at SHBIE in areas related to psychology. For example, a Master in Counseling course with 14 students was started in January 2011. There are also deliberations to introduce majors and minors in psychology, and elective courses in psychology for undergraduate programs at the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, Universiti Brunei Darussalam.

Health Care and Psychological Services Health care development in the Sultanate is undertaken as part and parcel of the overall socioeconomic development in Brunei. The provision of services for health, education, and welfare have been continuously developed together with providing basic infrastructure such as roads, housing, and the provision of safe water, electricity, proper sewage facilities, and modern telecommunication systems. The most recent significant initiative taken by the Ministry of Health, which is responsible for all aspects of health care in Brunei Darussalam, is the introduction of its first strategic health plan, the National Health Care Plan 2000–2010, which is the guiding principle for current and future implementation of programs and projects. It is designed to meet the challenges of the new millennium,

which include changing disease patterns, lifestyles, and population demography, and the escalating cost of health care and public expectations for better quality health care. As it stands, basic health services are accessible and provided free to citizens and permanent citizens of the country, including provision for overseas specialized medical care not available in the country. The quality of health in Brunei has seen much improvement over the years, and today it has achieved almost all of the Global Health Indicators set by World Health Organization (WHO). Raja Isteri Pengiran Anak Saleha (RIPAS) Hospital is situated in Bandar Seri Begawan, which is the capital. It is the largest and most comprehensive of the government medical facilities in Brunei with an 880-bed capacity and up-to-date modern medical facilities. Opened in 1984, the hospital has evolved from being a primary health care provider to a referral center and multidisciplinary institution providing a wide range of specialist’s services. The RIPAS Hospital psychiatry department presently functions with five specialists and four medical officers trained in psychiatry in the Western model. The Clinical Psychology Unit was started at RIPAS Hospital in October 2002, with one qualified clinical psychologist and three trainee graduate psychologists. It caters to the needs of not only psychiatry but also other specialties such as pediatrics, neurology, neurosurgery, oncology, endocrinology, and general medicine (Kumaraswamy, 2005). Usually, cases are referred to the Clinical Psychology Unit for psychological evaluation and treatment. About 40% of cases are referred by the department of psychiatry. At the clinical psychology unit, psychotherapy in the form of behavior therapy and cognitive-behavioral therapy are the main treatment orientations. Although the existence of the psychiatry department goes back to 1985, not much progress has been made in psychotherapy. More emphasis has been given to the medical model than to a psychological model, and medical treatment is more typical than is psychotherapy. In Brunei, most psychotherapy is provided by traditional healers (bomoh). It is popular in that it is widely believed that mental disorder is caused by evil spirits. A survey conducted in Malaysia, where a large population of Malays live, indicated that 80% of psychiatric patients first visit or consult with bomohs. The same situation prevails in Brunei as well. Even medical practitioners firmly believe that mental disorders are caused by evil spirits and that

bomohs are their first choice for treatment (Mohd, 1989; Razali, 1995; Razali, Khan, & Hasanah, 1996). Indigenous methods of care are prevalent in many societies around the world, particularly in Asia. Among the Malays, it is common for patients and their families to use both traditional methods of treatment as well as modern Western medicine, either concurrently or consecutively. This is especially so in cases of patients with mental disorders (Murphy, H. B. M., 1973). In these “traditional” methods of psychotherapy, the indigenous healer normally enters a state of trance and is able to communicate with the spirit world. Through this communication, the patient is told not only the causes of his disorders, but the prescribed treatment. Similarly, Islamic healers use Qu’ranic verses to drive out malevolent spirits possessing the patient.

Development of Guidance and Counselling The development of guidance and counselling can be divided into three main perspectives. First, development of guidance and counselling in Brunei is related to developments (discussed earlier) in the Ministry of Education and the Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah Institute of Education at Universiti Brunei Darussalam. Second, the development of counseling is related to developments in various ministries such as the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Social Welfare and Ministry of Defence. Third, the development of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) indirectly influenced the popularity of psychology and counseling. Early development of counseling in the Ministry of Education in Brunei can be traced to 1983, when the Career Guidance Unit was established under the administration of the Scholarship and Welfare Unit in the Department of Planning, Research, and Development. This was established to support guidance activities, especially career guidance and discipline management in secondary schools. Later, in 1986, it was replaced by the Counselling and Talent Guidance Unit in the Department of Schools. One of the aims of this unit is to prepare counselling teachers. For this purpose, the first basic course in counselling was conducted by two consultants, Dr. Mary Connor and Mr. John Bennet from United Kingdom, sponsored by the British Council. In 1999, another upgrading course was conducted by the same consultants. This course was continued until 1993. The Counselling and Talent Guidance Unit also provided basic courses in counseling

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for teachers, coordinated career talks and visits, and carried out activities related to Job Training Scheme. In 1993, this unit became the secretariat for the Drug Abuse Committee of the Ministry of Education. In 1994, this unit introduced peer counselling for all schools. This unit produced the first guidebook for guidance and counseling services for schools in Brunei in 2007 (Buku panduan, 2007). Although initially the counseling models used are similar to the British model, the current models used in counseling in Brunei schools are similar to those used in Asian countries such as Malaysia and Singapore. However, in the training of counsellors and the practice of counselling, it is emphasized that any counselling model in Brunei must adhere to the national ideology of Malay, Islam, and monarchy (MIB) (Mohiddin, A., 2008). Realizing the need for certified counselors, the Department of Educational Psychology, SHBIE, UBD introduced the certificate and postgraduate diploma in counselling as a one-year full-time in-service program for teachers and nonteachers (private and public sectors) in 1997. The certificate in counselling was for teachers and government officials who do not have a basic degree, and the postgraduate diploma in counselling is for teachers and government officials who have a basic degree. Both programs prepare candidates for positions as counsellors in primary and secondary schools and in other agencies in the private and public sectors. Apart from the Ministry of Education, counseling services are also provided by qualified counsellors in other government departments in the country. The Ministry of Defence has an excellent counselling center with a number of qualified counselors who were trained at certificate-level in the Universiti Brunei Darussalam and one counselor with a master’s degree in counselling. Initially, this center was set up to mainly deal with substance abuse and family-related problems. However, it now boasts a comprehensive system of support for all Ministry of Defence staff. The center is also playing an active role in promoting counseling-related activities for the society at large and in training paracounsellors for the Ministry of Defence. Other departments, such as the Narcotics Control Bureau and Drug Rehabilitation Centre, the Ministry of Welfare, Youth, and Sports, and the Prisons’ Department, also have provision for counseling. In April 2005, the government launched a counselling unit within the Institute of Public Administration for Civil Servants. The main objective is to provide counselling services for government 56

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servants. Currently, all the above departments and ministries have very limited numbers of qualified counselors (at most two in each department), but their functions are broad and their professional counselling roles are not very clear. Therefore, counselling-related facilities in these departments are still very basic and are at an early stage of development. For example, at the Drug Rehabilitation Centre, there are two counsellors with a certificate in counselling. At UBD, counseling services are provided by the counselling unit of the Student Affairs Unit (HEP) division of UBD. Two qualified counsellors provide counselling services to students who are referred to them for various academic and personal reasons, and to students who voluntarily seek help. Another important development in counseling is the formation of the Brunei Counselling Association (PERKAB) in 2000. The formation of the association was initiated in 1999 by two expatriates with a pro tem committee comprising mainly students enrolled for the certificate program in counselling and for the postgraduate diploma at the department of educational psychology, SHBIE, UBD. The main aim of PERKAB is to monitor and assist the development of professional counseling in Brunei. Since its inception, PERKAB has been carrying out various activities, including workshops, seminars, and publications to reach out to the public and fellow professionals.

Conclusion The development of psychology as a subject and a specialty in Brunei is at an infant stage. Historically, psychology emerged as a part of educational development, in particular guidance and counseling, educational psychology, and special education. For the past 20 years, the interest in psychology and its related branches has improved and is closely related to the rapid development of the economy after independence in 1984. Since independence, there has been a clear increase in the role of psychology, especially in mental health care and clinical psychology, counseling services, and services for children with special needs by means of inclusive education. An increasing number of Bruneians are gaining academic and professional qualifications in psychology-related areas. Asian countries have diverse sociocultural perspectives. Psychology is not growing as quickly as some other disciplines. Society, culture, and belief systems still play a major role in the development of psychology. On a positive note, with the advent of information technology,

awareness of psychology and the social sciences generally is expanding.

Future Directions It should be noted that psychology, and especially counseling services, does receive adequate publicity and support in Brunei. However, the stigma of mental illness and the acceptance of the role of clinical psychology and psychotherapy is still very challenging. This is because mental health professionals in Asian countries like Malaysia and Brunei face a unique challenge in the form of population groups that are multiracial and multicultural, and that practice various religious beliefs as part of health care. In such areas, it is important to raise awareness of the potential scientific and practical contributions of psychology. The mass media is one means of heightening awareness. For example, to dispel myth and educate people about psychology, treatment outcome research can be distilled and disseminated. There is clear evidence that many voluntary NGOs, such as the Association of Handicapped Children of Brunei Darussalam (Persatuan KanakKanak Cacat, KACA), the Paraplegic and Physically Disabled Association (PAPDA), the Brunei Counselling Association (PERKAB), and others have been gradually promoting the role of psychology. These NGOs are active in creating awareness by organizing many activities, including national and international conferences. In Brunei Darussalam within the past 3 years, new universities have been established. There is a strong possibility that these universities will consider introducing psychology-related courses. In addition, various government agencies have shown interests in using trained counsellors and in engaging consultants to improve mental health of staffs. Although the development of psychology in Brunei has been rather slow, there is ample evidence to suggest that it is gradually making an impact. The future and potential for the development and use of psychology in Brunei is progressing well and is promising.

Further Reading Kumaraswamy, N. (2001). Psychotherapy in an international setting: A Malaysian perspective. Resources In Education, ERIC/CASS, U.S.A. Kumaraswamy, N. (2002). Religion and mental health: A Hindu perspective. International Clinical Psychologist, 4(2), 7–9. Kumaraswamy, N. (2007). Psychotherapy in Brunei Darussalam. Journal of Clinical Psychology in Session, 63(8), 735–745.

Henderson, G., & Primeaux, M. (1981). Transcultural health care: Introduction. Boston, MA: Addison Wesley Publishing Company. Koay, T. L. (2005). Inclusive education in Brunei. Paper presented at Inclusive and Supportive Education Congress, International Special Education Conference, Inclusion: Celebrating Diversity? Glasgow, Scotland, August 1–4, 2005. Kumaraswamy, N. (2004). Current trends in psychology worldwide and their implications. A symposium, Argentina, 2004. Coordinator & chair: Michael. J. Stevens. Psychology in Asia, Narasappa Kumaraswamy-Brunei Darussalam(paper presented at symposium). Sim, W. K., Koay, T. L., & Liew, E. (1999). Teacher education in inclusive education. Proceedings of 2nd National Conference on Special Education (pp. 184–189). Brunei Darussalam, September 24–27, 1999(184–189).

References Burns, R. B. (ed.). (1977). Proceedings of the 9th Asian workshop on child and adolescent development: Preparing children and adolescents for the next millennium. Bandar Seri Begawan, Universiti Brunei Darussalam. Department of Statistics in the Department of Planning and Development. (2002). The population and housing census, Brunei Darussalam 2000. Brunei Darussalam: Prime Minister’s Office. De Silva, P. (1996). Buddhist psychology and treatment. In D. Bhugra (Ed.), Psychiatry and religion (pp. 112–124). London: Routledge. Faw, H. (1995). Psychology in Christian perspective. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker. Hand bookSultan Hassanal Bolkiah Institute of Education, Universiti Brunei Darussalam (2009). Haque, A. (1998). Psychology and religion: Their relationship and integration from an Islamic perspective. American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences, 15, 97–116. Haque, A. (2004). Religion and mental health from an Islamic perspective: The case of Muslim Americans. Journal of Religion and Health, 43, 45–58. Haque, A., & Masuan, K. A. (2002). Religious psychology in Malaysia. International Journal for the Psychology of Religion, 12, 277–289. Hassan, R. (2006, August 20). Psychotherapy in a multicultural society. The Star Newspaper—Health. Malaysia. History Of Brunei (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_ Brunei) Brunei History - Historycentral.com. Jabatan Sekolah-sekolah, Kementerian Pendidikan. (2007) Buku panduan perkhidmatan bimbingan dan kaunseling di sekolah-sekolah. Negara, Brunei Darussalam. Jain, A. K. (2005). Psychology in India. The Psychologist, 18(4), 206–208. Kalupaha, D. (1987). The principles of Buddhist psychology. Albany, NY: SUNY Press. Kumaraswamy, N. (2005). International Psychology Reporter, 9(2), 12–13. Clinical Psychology unitat Brunei. Mohd, R. S. (1989). The consultation of traditional healers by Malay patients. Medical Journal of Malaysia, 44(1), 3–13. Mohiddin, A. (2008). Kaunsekling Di Brunei- Dari Sini Mau Ke Mana. SUARA PERKAB, 1, 8–17. Mundia, L. (2008). Implementation of inclusive education in Brunei Darussalam: Review of possible implications for school counselors. Paper presented at the 3rd International

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Conference on Child and Adolescent Psychopathology held at Roehampton University, London, 14–15 July, 2008. Murphy, H. B. M (1973). Current trends in trans-cultural psychiatry. Proceedings of the Royal Society of Medicine, 66, 711–716. Mahmud, H. J., & Pg Damit (2006). Maktab Perguruan Brunei: Sejarah Penubuhan Dan Misi Visi Depan [Fifty years of teacher education in Brunei Darussalam: A special commemorative publication, 1956–2006]. Brunei Darussalam: Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah Institute of Education, Universiti Brunei Darussalam. Nation by Nation the story of the countries of the world. www.historycentral.com/nationbynation/Brunei/History21. html.

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Razali, S. M. (1995). Psychiatrists and folk healers in Malaysia. World Health Forum, 16, 56–58. Razali, S. M., Khan, U. A., & Hasanah, C. I. (1996). Belief in supernatural causes of mental illness among Malay patients: Impact on treatment. Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavia, 94, 229–233. Sato, T., & Fumino, Y. (2001). Psychology in Japan. The Psychologists, 18(3), 156–157. Suhail, K. (2004). Psychology in Pakistan. The Psychologists, 17(110), 632–634. World Fact book (2005). www.umsl.edu/services/govdocs/ wofact2005/geos/bx.html.

C HA P TE R

5

The Caribbean

Rosemary Frey and Joan Black

Abstract Climate, topography, social, economic, and political forces all played a part in shaping the societies of the Caribbean. Likewise, psychology as a field has been shaped and molded by the unique historical contexts of the Caribbean cultures into which it was sewn. Utilizing a case studies approach, this chapter traces the development and role of psychology in three distinct Caribbean societies: Jamaica, Cuba, and Barbados. Important events and institutions, as well as the contributions of key persons are noted. Keywords: Barbados, Caribbean, Church, Cuba, diaspora, Greater Antilles, Havana, Jamaica, Lesser Antilles, Mona, polyclinics, revolution, Vygotsky

The Caribbean islands have a rich history spanning their development over centuries. Change brought about by conflict, piracy, political upheaval, economic prosperity and hardships, social and moral development influenced by all the cultures of the world, and the never-ending desire to become independent and respected internationally, have all played roles in the region’s development. The people are proud of their Caribbeanness; a unique spirit derived from their life experiences, their music, foods, language, spiritual beliefs, and—for some— a sense of timelessness. Much has happened over the centuries to shape the psychological development of the people. Slavery took its toll on the self-esteem of African slaves, through its accompanying hardships of lack of family life and the inability to make choices and decisions governing their own lives. Uprisings, then and into the 20th century, sparked by a desire to be free—in body and spirit—have influenced the behaviors and thought processes of many, and this is echoed in the chant “Betta mus come.”

It can be seen then that the legacy of slavery and its aftermath have shaped the direction of psychology in the region. Referring to the large number of citizens who trace their roots to Africa, Ward and Hickling (2004) stated: These effects include the virtual annihilation of the indigenous population, the repopulation of the region by migration of European settlers, and the forced migration of African slaves. Each European colonial power reshaped the social environment in its own likeness and image, much of which remains in place today” (p. 442). And, in the words of Morgan and O’Garo (2008, p. 11): “The degradation of the soul which had occurred negatively impacted on Africans across the Diaspora with such devastating depth that we are still dealing with those very real issues today. Longstanding problems of violence, educational disparities and emerging health issues such as HIV/AIDS, all can be traced to the psychosocial fragmentation resulting from this colonial heritage. It stands to reason then that the direction of psychology in the region has

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been shaped by the need to address the psychosocial needs of the inhabitants of the islands.” As Ward and Hickling (2004) further state: Crime and violence is escalating, demanding an input from forensic psychology. The continuation of the plantation economy and old management practices, inherited from the colonial legacy and now perpetuated by the present ruling elite, have contributed to economic stagnation. These factors, and the need to adopt the latest technology, suggest a role for occupational psychology. Troubles in schools, an outdated selection system based upon the old English grammar school hierarchy, and families split by parents having to seek work abroad, all point to the need for educational and developmental specialists. A growing HIV/AIDS problem and mushrooming mental health needs further point to the need for health and clinical psychology. (p. 442)

Efforts over the decades to unite the islands and to create a united front, thereby enabling the people to gain an international voice in the political, economic, judicial, and all other arenas, have met with limited success. International organizations have, to some extent, empowered the islands to develop their resources, inclusive of their citizens, and to become not only self-governing but economically more viable. Much has been done in the education and health sector. Much has also been done at the community level, in an effort to create awareness and the ability to effectively govern and guide decisionmaking skills. The need for poverty alleviation drives many islands to seek creative ways of empowering their citizens to move forward, thereby enabling personal, national, and regional development. But nothing lasting and meaningful can be achieved unless the psychological wellness of the people can be developed and maintained. Unfortunately, research over the years has predominately dealt with psychopathology. Research examining psychological hardiness has yet to be addressed in the region. We begin then by setting the parameters for this discussion. Perhaps this is best done by establishing what this chapter will not cover. In the first instance, this chapter is meant to examine cases of the establishment of psychology as a field of study within the Caribbean. We make a distinction here between psychology and psychiatry. An extensive study of the latter can be found in the work of Hickling and Sorel (2005). Neither is this chapter an in-depth exploration of the legacy of 300 years 60

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of slavery and its effects on identity for the majority of the inhabitants of these islands who trace their ancestry to Africa (see for example Hall, 1990; Trimble, Helms, & Root, 2003). In general then, we undertake the more modest goal of outlining some of the key events and key players responsible for the establishment and growth of psychology in some of the societies within the region.

The Caribbean But first, what is the Caribbean? In the contemporary period, what is known as “the Caribbean” can be classified as consisting of two great chains: the Greater Antilles including Cuba, Hispaniola (Haiti, Dominican Republic), Puerto Rico, and Jamaica, and the Lesser Antilles incorporating the smaller Windward and Leeward Islands. Usually appended to these are the coastal countries of Belize and the Guianas (Premdas, 1996). The region can also be categorized on the basis of the language of the colonizers. Hence, the Spanish areas include Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and Puerto Rico (part of United States territory). French is spoken in Martinique, Guadeloupe, and French Guiana, which are currently departments of France, and Haitian Creole and French are spoken in Haiti, which gained independence in 1804. A Frenchbased Creole is also spoken in Dominica and St. Lucia. Dutch is spoken in Suriname (independent since 1975), Aruba, and the five-island Netherlands Antilles consisting of the islands of Curaçao, Bonaire, Saba, St. Maarten, and St. Eustatius (Premdas, 1996). The English-speaking islands are former and present dependents of Britain, known as the Commonwealth Caribbean. The independent states include Jamaica, Barbados, Guyana, Belize, the Bahamas, Antigua, St. Kitts-Nevis, Grenada, Dominica, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent; the dependent ones include the British Virgin Islands, Monseratt, Anguilla, Barbuda, the Cayman Islands, and the Turks and Caicos Islands, and those linked to the United States: the American Virgin Islands (Premdas, 1996). St. Maarten, is jointly run by The Netherlands and France and its inhabitants speak both French and Dutch. Of course, no single chapter can provide a detailed overview of psychology in each of these states. Rather, we will endeavor to provide prominent examples that characterize psychology’s development.

The Greater Antilles The islands of Jamaica and Cuba form part of the Greater Antilles, yet their colonial heritage and

postcolonial history are quite different. So too, then, was the course of the development of psychology within each of these societies.

The Jamaican Experience Jamaica is the largest English-speaking island within the Caribbean. It has at the moment a number of tertiary institutions involved in the training of psychologists, some with the assistance of external or off-shore institutions. But the impact of these specialists began many years before as some Jamaicans studied abroad and returned to practice their skills in private practice and within the education and health sector. In addition, some nonJamaicans made this island their home and, naturally, practiced their profession in all sectors of the society. The Church also played an integral role in the training of psychologists and the delivery of psychological services across all sectors of the society, and where possible, sought to extend its services to those with limited or no financial resources. The role of the Church will be explored further in an upcoming section. But first, where did the interest in psychology begin? The earnest development of the field can be attributed to the growth in the demand for the study of psychology in Western universities beginning in the 1960s and with the return to the region of psychologists trained abroad. In Jamaica, the growth of psychology was fostered to meet the growing sociopsychological needs of the society. To mention but a few, Leachim Semaj aided in the establishment of occupational psychology, while Peter Weller helped to develop clinical psychology, along with Audrey Pottinger and Rosemarie Johnson (Ward & Hickling, 2004). Weller is also noted for his work in the area of health psychology. The needs of the society also led to development in the area of educational psychology, including work by Elsa Leo-Rhynie and Orlean Brown-Earle. Ruth Doorbar founded the Jamaican Psychological Association in the 1970s. Later members of the executive committee of the Society included other key players such as Brigitte Matthies (clinical psychology) and Tony Bastick (educational psychology) (Hickling, Doorbar, Benn, Gordon, & Matthies, 2008). A brief biosketch of these individuals will be given in an upcoming section.

the university of the west indies The University College of the West Indies helped to foster the early growth of psychology as a discipline. The University was established in 1948.

Renamed the University of the West Indies (UWI) following independence and expanded to include three campuses in the 1960s, the institution’s inclusion of psychology as a program of study has been a relatively recent development. On the Mona Campus, instruction in psychology began at the level of individual courses starting in the 1970s. According to Chevannes (1999), the introduction of psychology was first nurtured by offerings in social psychology. The faculty members of the school of education taught psychology in the public health diploma program during the 1970s and 1980s, and the faculty of medical sciences included psychology as part of its master’s degree in public health. A number of programs that included psychology courses were offered by the faculty of social sciences; these included the certificate, diploma, and bachelor’s and master’s degrees in social work. The successful development of psychology in the faculty of social sciences was nurtured in part through the pioneering work of Clement Branche, who developed the psychology courses. The earliest attempt at recognition of the discipline at the degree level was a short-lived clinical psychology graduate program in the department of psychiatry from 1984 to 1986. It was not until the mid-1990s that psychology first appeared as an undergraduate specialization, with the advent of majors in psychology in 1995 (C. Branche, personal communication, April 20, 2009). By the late 1990s, John Maxwell (1999), then head of the department of sociology and social work, reported that by the third year of its offering (1997–1998), the psychology major was not only the largest in terms of student registration among the then department of sociology and social work offerings, but also the most rapidly expanding subject area within the faculty of social sciences. This was not surprising given the growing popularity of psychology in Western societies, particularly in North America, throughout the 20th century. According to a report by the National Science Foundation (NSF, 2008), the number of doctorates awarded in psychology rose sharply after World War II and again in the 1960s and 1970s. Student demand in Jamaica was driven by this trend. From the perspective of the department, the reporting of such student registration numbers provided additional support for the department as being the natural location of psychology within UWI Mona. At the university level, the study and training of practitioners of psychology was recognized at this point as a way to help solve the urgent problems frey, bl ack

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facing Caribbean societies. Kenneth Hall (1999), former principal of UWI Mona stated: “There is an intrinsic need for psychological training and workers to meet the exigencies of our society” (p. 3) Nevertheless, the establishment of psychology programs came late to UWI in comparison to other Western societies. According to Elsa Leo Rhynie (2009), one of the contributing factors for the late introduction of Psychology lay in the nature of the discipline itself. In addition: Placement and thus ownership of this interdisciplinary discipline created inter-faculty tension and conflict. . . . Courses in psychology were offered in different faculties and so a department of psychology could have been located in humanities and education, in the social sciences, in the physical or medical sciences. Efforts were made by all the faculties at Mona save the Faculty of Pure and Applied Sciences to establish the psychology department under their faculty umbrella. (Leo Rhynie, 2009)

The legitimacy of housing the delivery of psychology in the department of sociology and social work, rather than in another faculty in the University, came through the first psychology conference, hosted in February 1999, by the department. The theme of the conference was “Psychology and Caribbean Development.” Its stated purpose was to bring together professionals in psychology and related disciplines from across the region and the wider world to address the pressing challenges facing Caribbean societies. The keynote speaker was Wade Nobles, experimental social psychologist, acclaimed scholar in African psychology, and professor of Africana studies at the University of San Francisco. Conference panels covered topics such as mental health issues, violence, educational dynamics, and industrial/organizational issues. Other noted participants included the renowned social psychologist Donn Byrne, distinguished professor emeritus, University of Albany, State University of New York, and locally, Frederick Hickling, head, section of psychiatry in the department of community health and psychiatry at UWI Mona, as well as Peter Weller, clinical psychologist/counsellor at the UWI Health Centre (Sutherland, 1999). Presently at Mona, psychology is part of the Department of Sociology, Psychology and Social Work. The Psychology Unit is currently headed by Dennis Edwards, the only clinical neurospsychologist on the island. His research interests include the neuropsychopathology of language communication 62

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disorders, the neuropsychopathology of movement disorders, post-traumatic stress disorder and the relationship among aggression, violence, and conduct disorders. Edwards previously served as head of clinical services at The Mico College Child Assessment and Research in Education (CARE) Centre (D. Edwards, personal communication, 5 April 2009). Academic staff interests cover the areas of applied psychology, clinical psychology, industrial/organizational psychology, and social psychology (UWI, 2009).

The Church and Education in Jamaica The education system in the West Indies had its origins in the churches and missions (Dayfoot, 1999). The Church continues to play an important role in education into the 21st century and thus in the shaping of the teaching of psychology. It is important, therefore, to give a brief overview of the historical connections between the Church and education in Jamaica.

the jamaican church The “coat of many colors” that is the Jamaican church has its origins in many nations and denominations. Spain began occupation of the island in 1509, bringing Catholicism. The English conquest of Jamaica in 1655 brought about the introduction of the Church of England as the state church. Several Protestant denominations followed, including Moravians, Methodists, African American Baptists, English Baptist missionaries, Congregationalists from the London Missionary Society, and Presbyterians from Scotland. In post-emancipation years, these were followed by Congregationalists and Disciples of Christ from North America, and the Presbyterian Canadian Mission (Dayfoot, 1999).

educational missions During the pre-emancipation period (before 1838), the dominant view among the planters was that education of African slaves should be restricted to the primary level and directed toward increasing production. Davis (1998) tells us that among some missionaries of the Church of England, religion and education were viewed as being intimately connected. According to Davis (1998, p. 46): This ideological relationship was reflected in their endeavours to provide education as another aspect of the “civilising mission” of the Church. Consequently, the Church developed an increasing interest and pivotal involvement in education. . . .

It saw the need for education for citizenship, for moral training and for social control.

Thus, the Church played an integral role in establishing several elementary schools. High schools were later established utilizing trust funds. These included schools such as: Munroe (College), Hampton (High), Rusea’s (High), Manning’s (High), Jamaica College, Beckford and Smith, Wolmer’s (High), and Cornwall College (Davis, 1998). These trust funds were for the most part established by Anglicans (Davis, 1998). Full emancipation in 1838 drove the demand for more schools. Baptists and other missionary churches were responsible for much of the elementary education (Dayfoot, 1999). According to Davis (1998, p. 51–52), “The Baptists in Jamaica have been pioneers in education for the masses, ever since they sought to teach the slaves on the plantations.” A pattern developed in Jamaican and other West Indian societies of schools sponsored by churches and supplemented by financial aid from the government. According to Austin-Broos (1996, p. 66), “They [churches] thus sustained a relation to the state that could also be seen at the local level as reflecting ‘a certain autonomy’. They integrated the operation of church and school, and infused education with a Christian ethos.” Secondary schools were first established with the purpose of producing schoolteachers and church pastors. Among notable contributions, the Baptists established Calabar College in 1843, Montego Bay Academy was established by the Presbyterians in 1844, and the Moravians opened a teachers college for men at Fairfield in 1839 and one for women in 1861 (Dayfoot, 1999). It should be noted that, although the state took over management of the educational system in 1892, up until the 1980s, half of the teacher training colleges for elementary teachers were operated by church organizations (Miller, 1986). The establishment of tertiary education on a nondenominational basis would wait until the 20th century. According to Dayfoot (1999), the Baptist missionary James Phillippo, as early as 1843, argued for the establishment of a college in Jamaica, modeled on the University College of London. This vision was finally realized with the opening of the University College of the West Indies in 1948. Having given a very brief overview of the intimate connection between the Church and education in Jamaica, we turn our focus to several church-based institutions that provide both undergraduate and graduate training in psychology.

the caribbean graduate school of theology The Caribbean Graduate School of Theology (CGST) opened its doors in 1986, in Kingston, Jamaica, sponsored by the Caribbean Evangelical Theological Association, a consortium of some 50 undergraduate theological institutions spread across the Caribbean region and belonging to various church groups. Under the guidance of Zenas Gerig, a medical missionary from Michigan who served as project coordinator of CGST, the school began the training of professional counsellors and counselling psychologists to the master’s level. The mission of the institution as set forth in the vision statement of CGST (2009e) is to “provide Christians with quality and Christ-centered graduate level training, for the strengthening of the Church, the transformation of Society in the Caribbean and beyond.” At present, Anthony Oliver serves as academic dean of CGST. According to Oliver (A. Oliver, personal communication, March 10, 2009), Barrington Davidson, director of family life ministries, became a major contributor to the development of graduate students when he became head of the counselling psychology program and lecturer of a number of key courses. Davidson is also one of the leading marriage and family counsellors on the island. Admission to the program requires the successful completion of a Bachelor of Arts degree from an accredited university or college. In the case of the counselling program, the applicant must hold an honors degree or have a grade point average (GPA) of 3.0. All applicants must undergo psychological testing at the University Counselling Centre or with a qualified professional (if overseas) prior to acceptance (CGST, 2009b). In addition, because of the nature of the institution, CGST states that candidates for admission must abide by the following: “The CGST is an Evangelical Institution whose position and promotion of wholesome lifestyles excludes certain practices. The Graduate School forbids the use of alcohol, tobacco, illegal drugs and the practice of immoral acts” (CGST, 2009b). Applicants must also provide a statement of their conversion experience as well as recommendations from advisors and a completed health form (CGST, 2009b). The counselling program was designed to be completed in 2 years and consists of three facets, theological, theoretical knowledge, and hands-on training. The curriculum consists of 18 units of theoretical courses and two units of practicum (there are 3 credit hours per unit). This practicum frey, bl ack

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experience consists of 350 supervised hours. The program is further designed to be a stepping stone for further studies at the doctoral level in areas such as clinical psychology (CGST, 2009d). Scholarships are available through a collaboration of the University and the Jamaica Broilers Group of Companies (a local corporation) to help defray tuition costs. One of the four scholarships available is directed for a person in the counselling program and covers tuition costs. The recipient must be willing to serve a bond in Jamaica equivalent to the duration of the scholarship after completing the course of study (CGST, 2009c).

northern caribbean university, mandeville Northern Caribbean University (NCU) is a Seventhday Adventist owned and operated institution. For many years, it offered a bachelor’s degree in psychology and then, in 2000, it took in its first cohort of students for the M.Sc. in counselling psychology. In outlining the origin of the program, a report to the University Council of Jamaica (NCU, 2006) by the relevant college states that, “The increase in the incidence of terrible acts of violence, natural disasters, and the concomitant anxiety or fear induced by the widespread lawlessness accentuates the need for appropriately qualified counsellors, social workers, and psychologists” (p. 5). In addition, “These secular trends, and careful analysis of the current role of the University, led to the development of the M.Sc. in Counselling Psychology. It is a rational response to our society’s diverse mental health needs” (NCU, 2006, p. 5). The program is designed to produce counsellors capable of working in a variety of settings, including schools, industrial settings, and mental health facilities. Applicants seeking admission are required to have earned a bachelor’s degree from an accredited college with an average grade of B or higher. Students are required to maintain at least a B average (3.0 GPA) throughout the program. Fortyfive credits (three per course) are required to complete all the requirements for the M.Sc. degree (NCU, 2006). The University operates a counselling center on campus and NCU jointly partners with the Ministry of Justice to offer additional service at its off-campus center. This off-campus center gets referrals from the courts, the victims’ support unit, the Centre for Investigation of Sexual Offences and Child Abuse (CISOCA), medical doctors, and schools (NCU, 2006). 64

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the international university of the caribbean Officially launched November 24 2005, by the United Church of Jamaica, the International University of the Caribbean (IUC) consists of Knox Community College, Mel Nathan College, and the Institute of Theological and Leadership Development. This institution offers graduate psychology and counselling degrees through the Institute for Theological and Leadership Development (ITLD). The institute, founded over 20 years ago, initially offered a B.A. in guidance and counselling and now offers a range of master’s programs (Dodman, 2009). At the undergraduate level, bachelor’s degrees are offered in guidance and counselling and psychology. The graduate-level programs include master’s degrees in pastoral psychology and counselling (MAPPC) in partnership with St. Stephen’s College, Canada, and in consulting psychology (MCCP). Located on the University of Alberta Campus, St. Stephen’s College is an “ecumenical Christian College of the United Church of Canada” (University of Alberta, 2009). The partnership with IUC is one of St. Stephens’ numerous collaborations to contribute to a network of schools engaged in “theological education and transformation” (University of Alberta, 2009). In a broader sense, there are also historical connections between Jamaica and Canada as commonwealth countries as far back as the 17th century (Canadian High Commission, 2009). Graduate programs at IUC also include an M.A. in counselling psychology, M.Sc. in consulting psychology, M.A. in counselling and community development, a praxis professional doctorate in applied psychology (nonterminal degree), a praxis professional doctorate in pastoral psychology (nonterminal doctorate), and a doctor of psychology (Psy.D.) degree (Evans, 2009). Pioneering the development of all these programs was Maitland Evans, president of IUC and principal of ITLD (Evans, 2009). It should be added that the former president of IUC, Aldyn White, was also instrumental in the development of the guidance and counselling programs. Makesha Evans was involved in the development of all of the above programs, with the exception of guidance and counselling (Evans, 2009). According to Makesha Evans (2009) the rationale for developing these programs was linked to the mission statements of both IUC and ITLD to produce quality leaders capable of having a positive impact on both the nation and the world. To realize

this mission, IUC sought to create change at all levels of society, targeting specifically the home, school, church, and community. Trained counsellors and psychologists were and are still seen as critical instruments in realizing this transformation. Within Jamaica, there is a growing demand for the graduates of these programs in both the private and public sector. For example, the Planning Institute of Jamaica (PIOJ) (2009) as part of their “Vision 2030 National Development Plan” sees one of the main challenges for establishing effective social protection as the need for more social workers (p. 102).

Key Figures in Jamaica: A Thumbnail Sketch The hard work and the dedication of numerous persons both from the Caribbean and abroad have been responsible for the foundation and development of psychology in Jamaica, not to mention their immeasurable contributions to the larger society. The listing below presents a thumbnail sketch of but a few of these often unsung heroes. Anthony Ronald Boufoy-Bastick. As mentioned previously in this chapter, a number of the key persons in the development of psychology in Jamaica came from the United Kingdom or received their training there. Anthony “Tony” Bastick’s story represents a case of the former. Bastick received a teaching certificate of education in 1963, from St. Lukeís College Exeter, England. He went on to receive a bachelor of science in 1973 in mathematics, computing and statistics at Exeter University, England. In 1979, Tony Bastick received his Ph.D. in education and psychology from Brunel University of West London. Bastick currently holds the position of senior lecturer in psychology of education and educational testing, measurement and evaluation, department of educational studies, faculty of humanities and education, UWI Mona. His duties include supervision of postgraduate students and teachers in training as well as lecturing in research methods, educational and psychological testing and measurement, assessment and evaluation. Bastick’s publications include several books such as Intuition: How We Think and Act (Bastick, 1982) and Teaching Caribbean Students (2003), co-edited with Austin Ezenne. Clement Branche. Senior lecturer, former head of the Psychology Unit and current Head of the Department of Sociology, Psychology and Social Work at UWI Mona received a Bachelor of Science degree from UWI St. Augustine, [Trinidad], a certificate in social work from UWI Mona, and

a master of science from the London School of Economics. Branche served as coordinator for the psychology program and co-chair of the planning committee in 1999. In addition, he was the designer of a majority of the first course offerings in the Psychology Program. He is currently co-editor of the Caribbean Journal of Psychology and joint coordinator of the Social Affirmation Project, which deals with identity and community in the Caribbean. Having been nurtured in his early years of study in the department of social work at UWI, Clement Branche includes among his publications many articles concerning the issues of gender, family, and crime in Jamaica (see for example Branche, 1998, 2001). Other areas of interest include organizations and transformation in the Caribbean, self, identity, Caribbean society, and social theory and urban representations and everyday life in the Caribbean. Orlean Brown-Earle. Born November 24, 1964, Orlean Brown-Earle received her bachelor’s degree in education from the UWI in 1990. She went on to receive a master’s in education in 1996 and a Ph.D. in school psychology in 2000, both from Howard University. Orlean Brown-Earle is a child psychologist and family therapist. She specializes in children with learning and behavior problems in Jamaica and throughout the wider Caribbean. Through her advocacy, Orlean Brown-Earle’s work has aided in the development of psychology as an accepted profession in Jamaica. She is a noted columnist for the Jamaica Gleaner, writing in the area of child psychology (O. Brown-Earle, personal communication, July 8, 2009). Orlean Brown-Earle is also a volunteer provider of Christian psychology services to various governmental and nongovernmental agencies, as well as a private practitioner and consultant in Employee Assistance Programs (EAP) and child and family therapy. Orlean BrownEarle has published in the areas of disability awareness, culture, and depression. Her most recent publication “School Psychology in Jamaica” (2007) can be found in the Handbook of International School Psychology. Currently, she is an associate professor at NCU (O. Brown-Earle, personal communication, July 8, 2009). Barrington Davidson. Barrington “Barry” Davidson has been an individual, family, and marriage counsellor since 1981, receiving a Master of Arts degree in theology and counselling in that year from Fuller Theological Seminary. Between 1989 and 1991, he was supervisor at Project IV Family Outreach. Project IV is an agency based in Pasadena, frey, bl ack

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California, that serves ethnic minorities. As a supervisor, Barry Davidson worked with families with severe emotional and spiritual challenges. He also maintained a group practice in Pasadena with Winston Gooden, a licensed clinical psychologist. In 1991, he received a doctorate in family psychology from Fuller Graduate School of Psychology. In May of the prior year, Davidson received the faculty award for academic performance in marriage and family therapy at the school’s Awards Convocation. Also in California, he was a visiting lecturer at Azuza Pacific College in Azuza, California. Returning to Jamaica, Davidson was executive director of Family Life Ministries from 1991 to 2003. Family Life Ministries provides counselling services, as well as collaborates on social programs with community leaders and other public and private-sector organizations. Davidson also served as director of counselling for the CGST from 1991–1999 and professor in the department of counselling until 2000. Davidson served as a professor, instructing master’s-level students in family therapy at the UWI department of Sociology, Psychology and Social Work from 2000 to 2003 (B. Davidson, personal communication, 8 July, 2009). He is a former board member of Jamaica Youth for Christ and presently serves as a board member for Back to the Bible Broadcast and Caribbean Whole Person Services (Jamaica Gleaner, 2004). Ruth Doorbar (1923–2007). The late Ruth Doorbar received her Ph.D. in clinical psychology from New York University in 1953. Her early published works which developed out of her work with sex offenders included Psychiatric and Psychological Investigations of Convicted Sex Offenders (1952), co-authored with Ralph Brancale and Albert Ellis. Later research on transsexuals Transexualism and Sexual Reassignment (1969) was done in association with Johns Hopkins University. In 1958, Ruth Doorbar was elected to the New York Academy of Sciences as a result of her original research on meta-psychiatry. After 20 years as a clinical psychologist in New York, balancing practices in both Manhattan and Greenwich Village, Doorbar “retired” to Jamaica in 1973. Over the next 34 years, Ruth Doorbar worked as a mental health consultant with the Ministry of Health, as well as maintaining a private practice in St. Andrew. Doorbar continued to contribute to academic journals and was the host of a radio program (Jamaica Gleaner, 2007). Maitland Evans. Evans pursued a truly multicultural education, receiving his Ph.D. (Birmingham), 66

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D.D. (St. Stephens/St. Andrews Colleges, Canada), M.Ed. (Harvard University), and B.A. LTh. (UWI). Evans’ Ph.D. dissertation topic was entitled “Counseling for Community Change” (Dunne, 2006). Maitland Evans served as general secretary of the United Church of Jamaica and the Cayman Islands for 15 years. He also served two terms as moderator for the Council for World Mission, an organization comprised of 31 member churches from across the globe. In 2002, Maitland Evans received the Order of Distinction from the Governor General of Jamaica for service in the fields of religion and culture. The following year, he was the recipient of the prime minister’s Medal of Appreciation for services to community development. Evans is currently President of IUC and principal of ITLD. Recognizing the need for graduate education in pastoral counseling, Evans approached St. Stephens College to join in a partnership for the delivery of the Master of Arts in Pastoral Psychology and Counselling (MAPPC) at the United Theological College of the West Indies. According to Dunne (2006), Evans’ vision of education is one that is, “flexible, accessible, transformative, and that it recognize the students’ context of learning, He [Evans] identifies the process through which the ‘leaders on the ground,’ are enabled to respond to contemporary challenges with insight and compassion.” Evans’ training and experience as a pastor have been instrumental in his personal and professional journey. During the past 40 years, he has served as a pastor of the United Church in Jamaica and the Cayman Islands at Askenish in Hanover, and at Carron Hall in St. Mary and St. John’s in Hannah Town, Kingston. It was during his ministry in Hannah Town that the vision for the Mel Nathan Institute, as the human and community development agency of the United Church, was realized. Evans has provided sterling, visionary leadership in the United Church, the wider Jamaican community, and the international community. He has combined his formal studies in the areas of theology, counselling, and consulting psychology with a mission-centrad, practitioner’s approach to education (M. Evans, personal communication, July 8, 2009). Makesha Evans. Makesha Evans received a Bachelor of Science degree in pure and applied science from UWI Mona, as well as a Bachelor of Arts degree in psychology from the Open University. Following this, she went on to receive a postgraduate certificate in psychotherapy from the University

of Warwick and completed a Ph.D. in psychology also at the University of Warwick. Evans serves as the academic dean for social and behavioral sciences at the IUC. She also functions as lecturer, academic advisor, and research supervisor for several courses and programs. She is currently pursuing a Master of Arts degree in education through the University of Phoenix. Evans’ academic interests include distributed cognition and distributed education (M. Evans, personal communication, July 8, 2009). Frederick William Elliot Hickling. Frederick Hickling was born November 19, 1944, in Kingston, Jamaica. He received a bachelor of medicine degree in 1969 and a doctor of medicine (psychiatry) in 1975 from UWI Mona, and further postgraduate training in psychiatry at the Royal Edinburgh Hospital, University of Edinburgh, Scotland. Hickling served as a consultant psychiatrist at Bellevue Hospital in Kingston from 1972 to 1973, and as senior medical officer at the facility from 1976 to 1983. In the 1980s, he also served as consultant psychiatrist for the North Birmingham Mental Health Trust. From 1983 to the present, Hickling has served as a consultant psychiatrist and medical director of Psychotherapy Associates Jamaica, a psychiatric research and clinical service. Hickling also served as an associate lecturer at UWI Mona from 1980 to 1988. He is currently professor of psychiatry and head, section of psychiatry in the department of community health and psychiatry at UWI Mona. Frederick Hickling’s research areas of interest include African-Caribbean mental health, schizophrenia, community psychiatry, and psychotherapy. Among his numerous publications is the “The Roast breadfruit psychosis: Disturbed racial identification in African Caribbeans” (1999), an article that examines distorted racial identification in African Caribbeans living in the United Kingdom (Hickling, 2007). Rosemarie Johnson. Following in the tradition of many Caribbean persons, Rosemarie Johnson traveled abroad to pursue her tertiary training, receiving a bachelor of arts degree from the State University of New York in Binghamton in 1983, a master of science degree from Howard University in Washington D.C. in 1987, and a doctor of philosophy degree in clinical psychology also from Howard University in 1991 (R. Johnson, personal communication, July 16, 2009). She went on to become a trainer at the practitioner level in both neuro-linguistic programming techniques and time empowerment techniques at the Association of

Integrative Psychology, Honolulu, Hawaii in 2008. While in Washington D.C. between 1989 and 1995, Johnson worked as a statistician and research methodologist for the Department of Education in the Office of Civil Rights (OCR). Returning to Jamaica in 1995, she served as a lecturer in research methods and graduate coordinator in the department of education, UWI Mona. In 2002, she joined the psychology unit as a lecturer. Her areas of teaching and supervision cover experimental psychology, behavior modification, elements of counselling and psychotherapy, human development (graduate), clinical assessment (graduate), and coordinator of master’s degree in clinical psychology practicum training (R. Johnson, personal communication, July 16, 2009). In terms of academic research, Johnson’s interests include neurolinguistic programming, stress management, identity and self-esteem, violence, human sexuality, and factors influencing educational achievement. These interests are reflected in her numerous publications. Among Johnson’s recent publications are The Gifted Child: Psychological and Educational Considerations (2006) and Burnout and Occupational Stress among a sample of Jamaican Nurses (2007) co-authored with Tracy McFarlane (UWI, 2008). Rosemarie Johnson is currently in the second year of a research fellowship entitled Efficacy of Neuro-Linguistic Programming in Addressing the Academic, Behavioural, and Emotional Challenges of At-risk Adolescents, for which she received a Grace Kennedy Foundation Grant. (R. Johnson, personal communication, July 16, 2009). Johnson also serves as director of the Institute for Psychological Development in Kingston (2007– present). The Institute offers certificate courses for professionals in psychometry and behavior management, as well as professional development workshops in advanced psychotherapy, applied behavior analysis, and advanced behavior modification (R. Johnson, personal communication, July 16, 2009). She also maintains a private practice as a clinical psychologist in Kingston, providing consultation services for the employees and management of a number of corporations across the island. Elsa Leo-Rhynie. Elsa Leo-Rhynie assumed the post of pro vice chancellor for undergraduate studies at the UWI on August 1, 2002, following her tenure as deputy principal of the Mona campus since 1996. Prior to this, she served as professor and regional coordinator of the UWI’s Centre for Gender and Development Studies (1992–1996), executive director of the Institute of Management and Production (1987–1992), as research fellow, frey, bl ack

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then senior lecturer in educational psychology in the faculty of education, UWI (1977–1987), and as a secondary school science teacher in Jamaica (1968–1977) and England (1964–1967). Leo-Rhynie has published extensively in the areas of education, training, and gender concerns, and she has successfully supervised more than 50 students pursuing master’s and doctoral degrees in the areas of education and gender and development. She has directed research and evaluation projects in education for government and international agencies, and has also successfully undertaken consultancy assignments across the Caribbean region. In 1992–1993, she served as a member of the Jamaica National Task Force on Crime, chaired by the Hon. Justice Lensley Wolfe, and in 1993–1994, she was co-chair of the National Preparatory Commission, which prepared Jamaica’s Report on the Status of Women for the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing, China. LeoRhynie was appointed to the Privy Council of Jamaica in September 1996, and was awarded the national honor of Commander of the Order of Distinction (Officer Class) in 2000. For the past 15 years, Leo-Rhynie has chaired the Dudley Grant Memorial Trust, which advocates on behalf of early childhood education in Jamaica. She serves as a member of Council of the University of Technology, Jamaica, as well as a member of the governing boards of the University Hospital of the West Indies, United Way of Jamaica, the Grace Kennedy Foundation, and the ICWI Group Foundation (UWI, 2008a). Brigitte Matthies. Born and raised in Jamaica, Brigitte Matthies received a B.A. in psychology from Queens University in Kingston, Ontario, and a Ph.D. in clinical psychology in 1993 from McGill University, Canada. She did the majority of her clinical training in the United States (Richmond, Virginia and San Francisco, California). Bridgitte Matthies served as a lecturer at UWI Mona teaching psychology and supervising students in the areas of research, psychological assessment, and psychotherapy. In 2001, Matthies was responsible for the establishment of the Cognitive Behaviour Therapy Clinic at the UWI Hospital. Her diverse research interests include the behavioral effects of traumatic brain injury, cross-cultural differences in relationships and mental health problems (particularly phobias, depression, and eating disorders), the use of standardized psychological instruments in developing countries, the reasons for youth participation in sports, and the development of mental 68

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health education. Her research includes a study on childhood traumatic brain injury (2006) supported by the Inter-American Development Bank. Matthies joined the psychology department of California State University Los Angeles in 2003 (CSULA, 2007). Anthony Oliver. Oliver was born in St. Joseph in the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago. He began training at the West Indies School of Theology in Trinidad, in 1979. He traveled to the Jamaica Theological Seminary in 1982 to pursue his B.Th. degree and to serve as pastor of a rural district church. After graduation in 1984, he returned to Trinidad to serve as an associate pastor. Anthony Oliver returned to Jamaica in 1986 to pursue a M.A. in Biblical studies at the Jamaica Theological Seminary. In 1987, he served as the academic dean of the Jamaica Bible College in Mandeville and, the following year, became president of the institution. In 1993, Anthony Oliver took leave to pursue doctoral studies at Trinity International University in Illinois, receiving his degree in 1996. Upon his return to Jamaica, Oliver served as academic dean for the Jamaica Theological Seminary in 1997 and as interim pastor of Cumberland Community Church in 1998. Over the years, Oliver has ministered in a number of countries including Canada, Dominica, Grenada, Israel, Jordan, the United States, Trinidad and Tobago, and Jamaica (A. Oliver, 2001). Audrey M. Pottinger. Pottinger lectures in clinical psychology in the department of obstetrics, gynecology and child health at UWI Mona. She received a Bachelor of Arts degree from Rutgers University, a Master of Science degree from UWI Mona, and a doctor of philosophy in clinical psychology from the University of Aberdeen, Scotland. Her research interests include peer and educator victimization of children and adolescents, the relationship between violent death of a loved one and psychological wellbeing in adolescent boys, parental attitude toward violence and its influence on children’s interpretation of and response to community violence, and gender differences in coping responses and beliefs about infertility between Jamaican men and women undergoing in vitro fertilization (UWI, 2008). Along with numerous articles, Pottinger is author of a book entitled After the storm . . . There Is the Calm: An Analysis of the Bereavement Process (1999) (UWI, 2009). Leachim Tufani Semaj. Born August 17, 1951, Michael Anthony James renamed himself Leachim Tufani Semaj by turning his name backwards and

incorporating the Swahili word Tufani, meaning “the one who came with the storm to turn things around” (Allen, 2004). A specialist in human behavior and productivity, Leachim Semaj received his Ph.D. in social and personality psychology from Rutgers University in 1977. He received a postdoctoral fellowship in psychology, social learning laboratory, and educational testing services from Princeton in 1978–1979. Semaj has lectured at a number of universities (1974–1997) including Cornell University and Rutgers University, and at the UWI Mona campus (the department of sociology and social work, the school of continuing studies, and the department of psychiatry). Leachim Semaj’s published works include articles on Afrikanity, cognition and the extended selfpreference, the development of racial evaluation and preference, and Rastafari. He has served as an editorial consultant to the Journal of Black Psychology, Caribbean Journal of Education, Journal of Education Psychology, Caribbean Quarterly, and the Journal of Family Issues. Semaj has also served as a columnist for a number of local newspapers including The Jamaica Observer, The Gleaner, and The Jamaican Record. Currently serving as chief executive officer of Leahcim T. Semaj & Company Limited, Consultants in Human Behaviour, Productivity & Psychometric Testing, Semaj develops and implements public education projects; development training for board members, management, and staff; and marketing strategies. He conducts staff development and selection programs for companies of varying sizes and for government departments in Jamaica, Barbados, The Bahamas, Belize, St. Kitts, and Trinidad and Tobago (Allen, 2004). Peter Douglas Weller. Peter Weller was born in Savanna-La-Mar and grew up in Kingston, Jamaica. He graduated from Howard University with the B.Sc. (honors) degree in psychology in 1979. He received a scholarship to Emory University in Atlanta, Georgia, to pursue a combined master’s/ Ph.D. degree in clinical psychology, specializing in community psychology and family therapy in 1989. After receiving his Ph.D., Weller returned to Jamaica to work on the National HIV/STD Control Program. As the clinical psychologist with the program, Weller made a number of contributions including the development of behavior change programs including the Helpline (a telephone counselling service), the national mass media campaigns, speakers bureaus, and public relations campaigns

directed at the general public and persons involved in high-risk behaviors. Weller has also been instrumental in the development of a coordinated counselling and welfare program for people living with HIV, including training for caregivers and the development of support groups for people living with HIV (UWI, 2008b). Weller has also served as a consultant and advisor to a variety of agencies, including the National Family Planning Board, the Peace Corps, and Fathers Inc. He has served on the boards of the Jamaica Foundation for Children, the Council of Voluntary Social Services (CVSS; as deputy chairman), the National AIDS Committee, the Association for the Control of Sexually Transmitted Diseases (ACOSTRAD), and the Addiction Alert Organization. He is also a former president of the Jamaica Psychological Society and is currently employed at the UWI Counselling Service (UWI, 2008b). Adlyn White. White has served Manchester and the wider community of Jamaica in the fields of education and religion for the past 57 years. Untiring in her efforts, and using excellence as her hallmark, she has taught at the preparatory, primary, and tertiary levels. Her teaching career began at MorrisKnibb Preparatory in Kingston, then at Public School 118 in Queens, New York. She then went on to Church Teachers’ College, Mandeville. There she worked from 1969 to 1995, serving as lecturer, viceprincipal, and as acting principal on two occasions. Long before the era of computers in schools, White, along with the Manchester Association of Secondary, Tertiary Schools’ Health Education and Associated Development (MASTSHEAD) Foundation, set up a computer center at Church Teachers’ College. For the past 15 years, she has served as a member of the accreditation team of the University Council of Jamaica. In the field of religion, Adlyn White worked in Montego Bay as the first commissioned deaconess of the former Presbyterian Church, as well as being a volunteer director of women’s work (1970–1995). In 1993, she was appointed president of the ITLD. She was ordained as a minister of the United Church in 1973, and became its moderator in 1993. She has been chaplain of the Manchester Parish Council since 1975. In all the various capacities in which White has served, she has provided excellent leadership. As a motivator and team leader, she has refined the art of inspiring people. Her community involvements have been many and include institutions such as the Knox School Boards, Albion Primary frey, bl ack

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School, and the Manchester Parish Library (M. Evans, personal communication, July 7, 2009).

Cuba: Revolutionary Challenges Cuba has a very rich history, culminating in the 1959 revolt leading to the establishment of Fidel Castro as its president. Communism brought its pleasure and its pains. Russia aided Cuba’s development in many ways, including the training of Cuban nationals in many professional areas, psychology among them. Although Cuban psychologists are versed in the works of such Western icons as Freud, Adler, and Skinner, their approach to psychology is firmly rooted in the works of Lev Vygotsky. Cuban psychologists therefore visualize scientific psychology as taking a process- oriented rather than an entity-oriented approach (Reiber, 2001). According to Molina (2006), the revolution caused a “moment of rupture” in the development of Cuban psychology that would influence the direction of the field for the next 50 years. Molina (2006, p. 12) states: In this way, after the Cuban Revolution the transformations that took place changed, to a large extent, the course of psychology. . . . As the Spanish poet Antonio Machado put it, we were “making the road by walking it.” This contrasted with the situation in the rest of Latin America where the dominant influence was ideas imported from North American psychology.

One illustration of this difference lies in the fact that the work of professionals in psychology is carried out in public institutions, funded by the state, and with a set of priorities established by the state. There is no private practice in any area of psychology (Molina, 2006). By the 1980s, psychological professionals had made considerable strides in terms of recognition for their contributions to the social and productive realms in the society. In fact, Molina (2006) asserts the profession, which “was little known at the beginning of the sixties, had become essential in some areas by the beginning of the eighties.” All of this was made possible in part by an increase in the number of professionals with doctoral qualifications in psychology obtained abroad. In the 1970s, only three members of the faculty of psychology at the University of Havana had a Ph.D. By 1990, 50% of the staff (20 persons) had earned this degree (Molina, 2006). The knowledge garnered by these individuals led to invaluable contributions in terms of new avenues for research and 70

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the application of new approaches to societal problems (e.g., the development of new practices and theoretical creations in early childhood care). With the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from Cuba, financial support declined. In speaking of the perceived crisis in psychology, Rieber (2001) points out that Cuba’s crisis directly reflected “the political and economic consequences of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of a new ‘free capitalistic-like Russia’” (p. 118). Reiber (2001) explained that Cuban psychologists were trained in the Soviet Union and its allies such as East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. At that time, health and political psychology became important to the continued development of Cuba. Reiber (2001) stated, “Health psychology was central because most of the medical doctors left after the revolution and psychologists became para-medical substitutes for medical doctors until new doctors were trained to meet the needs of the Cubans” (p. 119). On the other hand, Reiber (2001) explained that political psychologists were necessary for the indoctrination of the people to ensure acceptance of their way of life. He points out that, since the 1960s, psychological health became one of Cuba’s major projects and continues to be so. Unfortunately, the departure of the Soviets forced the Cubans to seek alternative ways of surviving and developing their country. The National Group of Psychology was established in 1968 (Centro Nacional de Información de Ciencias Médicas [MINSAP], 2009). This event spearheaded new developments in health psychology and sought to bring them up to par with international developments in the profession. In essence, they sought to respond to the demands and needs for continuous improvement in the offering of health care and in doing so, sought to establish standards and offer technical advice. They are involved in counselling, research, and teaching activities across the island. In 1972, the Cuban Society of Health Psychology was founded. This became a reality because of the perceived need to focus on preventive health through the creation of polyclinics or primary care units (the target populations of these intervention programs include women, children, and schools), as well as through the 1969 establishment of a psychology group within the Ministry of Public Health. In 1984, the body was registered within the Ministry of Justice by its president, Noemi Pérez Valdés. Among other things, the Society sought to ensure the professional practice of all psychologists within the health sector.

Since its establishment, the Society, through the hosting of a number of national and international events or forums, seeks to facilitate the exchange of experiences among professionals. It hosted its first international conference in 1992, and continues to host one every 4 years since then. At these conferences, delegates from all over the world meet to discuss problems experienced within the field, as well as progress made in treatment and the control of the disease process (Centro Nacional de Información de Ciencias Médicas, 2009). Challenges remain however. Reiber (2001) commented that “except for a small group of elite psychologists, who run the profession, there is little money to support the work of psychologists in Cuba today” (p. 119). Despite this, psychologists are trying to function as well as possible. Today, a number of tertiary institutions (including the University of Havana) are involved in the training of psychologists within fields such as clinical psychology, health psychology, sport psychology, geriatric psychology, social psychology, and industrial/organizational psychology. A number of texts were written by lecturers at the university covering topics relevant to their programs of training.

psychology at the university of havana Before the revolution, there was no “school of psychology” in Cuba. Instead, psychology was conceived of as a subject within the areas of philosophy, letters, and pedagogy. One of the priorities after the revolution was the establishment of two schools of psychology at the Universities of Las Villas and Havana in 1961 and 1962. This section will focus on the latter. In 1959, a commission was created to promote and lay the foundations for the creation of a school of psychology in the University of Havana. On January 10, 1962, the school of psychology was established within the faculty of sciences. However, the new school had no physical premises within the University of Havana because all of the buildings on the campus were occupied. With the permission of Fidel Castro, school facilities were instead located in the buildings used by the University Catholic Group prior to the revolution. The school of psychology as well as the new school of geography, continue to occupy this location. According to the University of Havana website (2009), the faculty included teachers from diverse backgrounds. The selection of students for the program was assisted by the joint efforts of the Union of Young Communists (UJC) and the Federation of University Students (FEU). Between 1976 and

1977, the current school of psychology was established. This was due to the restructuring of the University of Havana as a result of the policy for institutionalizing the Cuban state. In terms of programs, the school of psychology at the University of Havana offers master’s degrees in clinical psychology, educational psychology, leadership and organizational development, educational psychology of organizations, social and community psychology, and women’s studies. Attached to the faculty of sciences is the Center for Counseling and Psychological Care (COAP). Established in 1999, this center provides services to the community as well as practical experience for the students of the school (University of Havana, 2009).

A Leader in Health Psychology At present, Cuba is known globally as a leader in health care delivery. This includes the practice of health psychology, which is believed to be internationally at the forefront in the introduction and expanded implementation of health psychology concepts and treatment modalities to ensure the recognition of psychological causes of illnesses. The goals of health psychology as stated by the department of psychology at the University of Havana is to promote cognitive, affective, and behavioral health and development at the level of the individual, the family, and in various settings (school, work, etc.) within the socialist society. In other words, Cuba has developed a niche for psychologists within the field of health that is adapted to the needs of the society. Preventative and community-based psychological care delivered in primary health care facilities is given a priority (Kristiansen & Soderstrom, 1990). Psychologists deal with a wide range of problems, both mental and physical, and approach their clients as biopsychosocial units. Their responsibilities are extensive and include disease prevention, treatment, rehabilitation, health promotion, research, and education (Kristiansen & Soderstrom, 1990). Health psychology has been successfully used in conjunction with traditional medicine to offer treatment to ailing persons, both nationally and in its much sought-after medical services for visiting foreigners (health tourism). Among the innovative forms of therapy is the development of the Psicoballet Care System in 1973. The goals of this approach, according to Farinas et al. (2004), include “achieving psychic balance, prevention and cure of emotional and behavioural disorders enabling the rehabilitation of mental illness, or sensory or motor rehabilitation of frey, bl ack

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socially negative behaviours.” In particular it’s specific objectives are to achieve balance, both psychological and social; achieve habilitation or rehabilitation; improve and develop physical motor skills; correct posture, muscle coordination, flexibility etc.; develop self-esteem; develop appropriate interpersonal relations; strengthen family ties; and eliminate negative social behaviors, transforming them into socially positive behaviors. The therapeutic work is conducted in cycles, which last from 6–9 months depending on the characteristics of the participants. The therapeutic benefits of Psicoballet have been widely tested across 30 years of applying the method in over 13,000 persons with various challenges, both physical and psychological. The Psicoballet Care System has also been utilized with groups in Puerto Rico, Martinique, Mexico, Brazil, Venezuela, and Argentina (Farinas, Simon, Gonzalez, Orraca, & Goytia, 2004).

Key Figures in Cuban Psychology Noemí Pérez Valdés. A graduate of the University of Havana (1954), Noemí Pérez Valdés (1926–2008) became a lecturer in 1961 and directed the Department of psychology, department of psychiatry, General Hospital. During 1960–1965, she served as head of the department of psychology at a pediatric hospital. She was responsible for Cuba’s first televised psychology program, called School for Parents. Since the 1980s, she played a significant role in helping to integrate psychology into the medical curriculum in Cuba. Perez tells us that Valdés “founded the Cuban Society of Health Psychology, the first in the world.” She served as its president until the time of her death (Perez, 2008). Valdés has written and published many papers and served both nationally and internationally, seeking to aid the development of all humans and to represent her country. She was a founding member of the Latin American Association of Health Psychologists, as well as a Society Franco-Cuban mental health specialists. She served on other bodies, including the Scientific Council of the Higher Institute of Medical Sciences of Havana and the Cuban Society of Psychologists (Perez, 2008). Gustavo Torroella González-Mora. A pioneer of psychology in Cuba, Hernández (2006) tells us that González-Mora (1918–2006) graduated from the University of Havana in 1942, with a doctor of philosophy degree in psychology and philosophy. It should be noted that during this prerevolutionary period, training in psychology (including at the University of Havana) was influenced by ideas and 72

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theorists popular in North America, such as Freud, Rogers, and later Skinner (Quevedo & Butcher, 2005). At that time, there was also a notable scarcity of professional training programs in Cuba (Quevedo & Butcher, 2005). This lack of available programs in Cuba led González-Mora to pursue additional training outside of the country. Hernández (2006) also reports that González-Mora did “postgraduate studies in Social Sciences at Duke University, North Carolina, USA and a master’s degree in Guidance and Counseling from Columbia University, New York.” González-Mora started his teaching career at the high school level (1942–1961). Hernández (2006) details the many accomplishments of this great pioneer, who spent his life contributing to the personal, academic, and psychological wellness of Cubans and persons across the Americas. GonzálezMora was professor of psychology, philosophy, and social sciences, and a consultant and supervisor of the Vocational Studies Center. He founded the first laboratory of experimental psychology in Cuba and was one of the founders of the school of psychology at the University of Havana (1962), where he taught for many years. In addition, González-Mora became a professor in the school of social work, where he taught methodology of social research and guidance. For several years, he led the department of educational psychology and was professor of psychology and educational technology evaluation and psychological diagnosis. Hernández (2006) writes, “University psychology began in Cuba in the mid-fifties at the Catholic University of Santo Tomas de Villanueva. From 1950 until 1958 (when the school was closed), Torroella was Professor of Psychometrics in Guidance and Counseling in the School of Psychology and Education.” It was also at this time that he created the National Institute of Applied Psychology (1956–1961). His areas of research interest included topics such as adolescence and youth, personality, perceptions of the world, guiding values and meaning of life, psychological and social life education, and human development. His work and contribution is acknowledged nationally and internationally. Between 1969 and 1985, GonzálezMora was involved in various research activities, including providing the Cuban contribution to a United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) multicountry study on youth. In later years (1986–1990), he created and directed the service guidance institute Enrique Jose Varona in Havana. From 1995 until his death,

González-Mora served as the coordinator and chair of group life education and, in 2002, as director of the Latin American and Caribbean Pedagogy Institute (IPLAC). In addition, González-Mora served as a member of the editorial board of The Latin American Journal of Psychology on behalf of Cuba. González-Mora was a prolific writer (over 200 articles), and Hernández (2006) states that “this icon believed in ‘the role of social sciences and psychology in particular on improving the person’. . . . He was convinced that the social function of science (was) to transcend the imposed psychological and academic settings to reach the peoples, their knowledge, beliefs and feelings . . . [he] saw his own life as a project dedicated to the human person and their improvement.”

The Lesser Antilles The Case of Barbados Mental health services in Barbados had their beginnings with the opening of The Mental Asylum, on the Jenkinsville plantation in the parish of St. Michael back in 1893 (Evans, 1999). This facility evolved into the Psychiatric Hospital located on the same site. According to a PAHO/WHO (2001) report, the Psychiatric Hospital’s services include acute psychiatric care, including child and adolescent care; long-stay psycho-geriatric care; forensic psychiatric care; and addiction services. Outpatient services include daycare programs, specialized services (social work, psychotherapy, occupational therapy), and consultation services. The Psychiatric Hospital in St. Michael appointed its first clinical psychologist in 1970. Bernard Heydorn was involved with the therapeutic care of children housed at the hospital and in the training of health and other personnel. The psychology department now offers psychometric testing, as well as the delivery of lectures and training to health personnel and community groups. The Child Guidance Clinic was restructured, with emphasis now placed on counselling troubled children. Play therapy was used to further enable this exercise. An in-service training program for psychology interns was also established and proved beneficial to students from outside Barbados, including those from Oxford University, England, the University of Florida, and other North American universities (Hill, 2009.). Psychotherapy came to the psychology department in 1976. Today, Anne Hill, a licensed psychotherapist, has been deeply involved in the drug rehabilitation program started in 1986, in response

to the admission of the first cocaine addict. She was instrumental in the development of a 6-week treatment program for addicts, as well as relapse prevention groups and education groups for substance abusers. Of special note is the fact that she established groups specifically for female drug abusers as they were believed to be overwhelmed in the predominantly male groups, and she included trainee nurses to allow them to garner much-needed experience. A true visionary, Anne Hill was also involved in the establishment of the first drug hotline in Barbados at the Abundant Life Assembly (Hill, 2009). There are two other psychiatric resources on the island, an eight-bed unit at the St. Elizabeth Hospital in Bridgetown, which cares for patients with depression or prior self-harm and community service clinics. Community mental health services include a district nursing service that follows-up persons who have been discharged from the hospital and a primary community mental health program offered from polyclinics. Operated by the Ministry of Health, these “polyclinics” are multiservice outpatient facilities that provide both public health and primary care (including mental health). The rationale behind these community service clinics is a move toward more community-based rather than institutional care (PAHO/WHO, 2001). The year 2008 saw the development of two important government-backed initiatives in Barbados. The first of these was the creation of the Mental Health Association and Support Group. The Associations’ tasks include carrying out public education programs on mental health issues, informing its members of new knowledge in the area, and serving as a lobbyist and support group. This support group is comprised of persons who have been affected by mental illness either directly or indirectly, including patients, family members, and residents of small communities who have affected members, as well as other interested persons (BGIS, 2008). The second initiative was the establishment of the National Mental Health Commission whose mandate is to “spearhead the process of mental health reform” in the country (BGIS, 2008). In terms of the establishment of psychology as an academic discipline, development of psychology at the Cave Hill campus of UWI fell prey to interdisciplinary conflict. In this instance, psychology began in the 1990s as a minor in the school of education; it was offered in association with the faculty of social sciences and included courses from both faculties. Based on funding constraints, the frey, bl ack

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development of a major in psychology was designed to draw on courses and teaching resources already available in the faculties of social sciences, education and science and technology. According to LeoRhynie (2009) the, “Outcome was a program which had a foundation core of subjects followed by options which reflected the different disciplinary emphases of the faculties. Students, therefore, were able to graduate with either a B.A. or a B.Sc. in Psychology. The first students entered these programs in the academic year 2001/2002.” Since that time, however, conflict between the faculty of social sciences and the faculty of humanities has led to the establishment of two separate programs. This has resulted in the offering, through the faculty of social sciences, of a B.Sc. in psychology as well as major/minor combinations of psychology with sociology, political science, management, and social work. The faculty of humanities and education offers the B.A. psychology program, along with major/minor combinations with history, linguistics, philosophy, and law.

Key Figures Bernard Heydorn. Bernard Heydorn was born in Georgetown, Guyana, in 1945. He attended Berbice High School and St. Stanislaus College in Guyana. Heydorn wears many hats: psychologist, educator, novelist, poet, columnist, and cultural researcher. He studied at the universities of Ottawa and Toronto in Canada, receiving a master’s in education, before going on to receive his Ph.D. in clinical psychology from Louisiana State University. Bernard Heydorn also served as the first clinical psychologist at the Psychiatric Hospital in Barbados, and as a research fellow at the UWI in St. Augustine, Trinidad. He is a recipient of the Wordsworth McAndrew Award, Guyana Folk Festival 2002 (New York), in recognition of his outstanding contribution to Guyana’s culture and heritage. His books include: Song of the West Indies, Walk Good Guyana Boy, Longtime Days, and Unlit Roads. Bernard Heydorn currently resides in Newmarket, Ontario, Canada, with his wife and three children (Caribbean Canadian Literary Expo, 2003). Anne Hill. Anne Hill received a Bachelor of Science degree from the University of London in 1979, and a master of science in human communication in 1980 from the same institution. She took up a position as a psychotherapist in the psychology department in the Psychiatric Hospital of Barbados in Bridgetown, Barbados, in 1986. Between 1987 and 1993 she worked in the drug rehabilitation 74

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treatment program. This involved conducting daily groups, individual therapy, and family therapy sessions. She also sat on a committee to develop a 6-week substance abuse program. Anne Hill also participated in community outreach education programs in the secondary schools, and set up the first drug hotline in a church, aimed at reaching the public. During this period she also worked in the Child Guidance Clinic and, in 1993, she started the first women’s psychotherapy group for both inand outpatients. Taking study leave, Anne Hill went on to do further training in clinical psychology, receiving a M.A. in 1998 and a Psy.D. in 2002, both from the Rosmead School of Psychology, Biola University, California. Hill undertook her clinical internship training at the Metropolitan State Hospital in Norwalk, California, in 2002. This internship included an attachment to the Clinic’s Off-unit Activity Program, “Stepping Stones,” which served referred inpatients. Treatment modalities included individual and group psychotherapy, family therapy, education-life skills group, psychological testing, and rehabilitation therapies. Returning to her duties at the Psychiatric Hospital in Barbados, in 2003, Hill is now a senior clinical psychologist at the facility. Her work includes individual, group, and family/couple therapy; psychological testing; play therapy; and crisis intervention. Hill still continues her work in Community Outreach. In May 2006, she initiated a community project with United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) entitled Violence across the Lifespan: Treatment Directions, with the goal of educating staff at the hospital and other government agencies in the treatment and counselling of children and adults exposed to violence (A. Hill, personal communication, July 24, 2009).

Caribbean Psychosocial Factors: Future Directions We have outlined some of the key historical points and players in the development of psychology in the Caribbean. The nature of the relationships involved in the development of psychology in the region is complex and involves an intermingling of many factors. However, we would like to end this discussion by highlighting two (of the many) pressing challenges facing the practitioners of psychology in the region.

HIV/AIDS In the Caribbean, the prevalence rate for HIV infection stands at 1.1% (UNAIDS, 2008). This figure

translates into an estimated 230,000 people living with HIV in the region, with approximately 20,000 new HIV infections and some 14,000 deaths from AIDS recorded in 2007 (UNAIDS, 2008). The major mode for transmission of the disease is unprotected heterosexual sex. Cultural, economic, and psychological factors all combine to influence the spread of HIV within the Caribbean (UNAIDS, 2008). The following represent some of the contributing factors: • Multiple partners. There are great differences between what constitutes fidelity based on gender within the Caribbean. According to a report by Brown and Chevannes (1998) “Men generally defended their right to and need for multiple partners; women’s concurrent or serial partnerships were most often seen by women as economic necessity and by men as unacceptable.” • Sexual identity. These differing views also are reflected in parenting practices with regard to the establishment of a child’s sexual identity. Brown and Chevannes (1998) stated: “clear double messages are sent: early sexual experimentation for boys is natural and expected; it even brings relief to parents that heterosexual identity is firm. But the message for girls is ‘Don’t’ out of fears of too early pregnancy. . . .” (p. 30). • In addition, according to Chevannes (2001), reproduction is seen as a key element in establishing both manhood and womanhood. For women therefore, “parturation acts as a rite of passage transforming her into a woman” (p. 491). Thus, impregnation and childbirth are a compelling force in Caribbean societies. These are strong influences that promote engaging in sexual activity at an early age. • Men as authority figures. The perception of men as holding the role of authority over women and children, as dictated by scripture, also enables the spread of HIV. A lack of empowerment on the part of women therefore is an important factor. According to Weller and Khan (2008), “Caribbean women (particularly young women) are proving especially vulnerable. Physiological susceptibility and the relatively common practice of younger women establishing relationships with older men (who by virtue of their age and experience are more likely to have acquired HIV) are thought to account for this finding” (p. 294). Weller and Khan (2008) concluded “Inequities in power and access to services, inability to negotiate safer behaviours,

and role expectations are just some of the factors known to contribute to these differences” (p. 297). • Cultural taboos. Cultural taboos in the Caribbean concerning homosexuality also contribute to the spread of the disease. According to Brown and Chevannes (1998) within the Caribbean, “There exists a great antipathy to homosexuality.” In addition, “Homosexuality is considered primarily a male ‘disease’” (p. 487). Chevannes (2001) offered as an explanation for the extent of the expressed hostility the following “In the Caribbean, especially in Jamaica, heterosexuality is part of the male public identity. High unemployment, higher labour-force participation and levels of education held by women, as well as the infusion of feminist thinking have led to a situation in which the public domain would remain the only major attribute left to sexuality. Public acceptance of homosexuality is thus taken as a threat to an identity under siege” (Chevannes, 2001, p. 490). • This view, combined with the perception of AIDS as a disease of homosexuals can be a deadly combination. A 2004 Human Rights Watch report states that “the association of HIV/ AIDS with homosexuality compounds the marginalization of many people living with HIV/ AIDS, who face additional stigma and abuse through the presumption that they have engaged in illegal sex. It also keeps those at the highest risk for the disease-including people who do not engage in homosexual sex- from seeking HIV related information and health services. . . . The Jamaican Ministry of Health acknowledged that homophobic violence and discrimination, and deep stigma associated with homosexuality are among the factors driving the epidemic” (pp. 13–14). Having briefly examined the behavioral context of the pandemic, it remains for Caribbean psychologists to address the problem at a number of levels. Counselling psychologists must address the needs of persons living with HIV/AIDS through both psychological support and treatment for mental disorders associated with HIV/AIDS. School and educational psychologists play a vital role in the development of age and stage interventions (Weller & Khan, 2008). Throughout the region, there are centers that seek to address the needs of children and adolescents affected by the disease. At UWI Mona, the Centre for HIV/AIDS Research Education and Service (CHARES) provides this service. frey, bl ack

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Health psychologists, social psychologists, political psychologists, and other social scientists must go beyond the individual level of analysis, and contribute to behavior change campaigns (for example, the UWI HIV/AIDS Response Program, UWI-HARP) and to the decision-making process in policy-making in the fight to control the spread of HIV in the region (Weller & Khan, 2008).

Crime and Violence The Caribbean islands, famous in tourist advertisements as relaxing oases of sun, sea, and sand, have also unfortunately become infamous havens of crime and violence. The subject has been the concern of many disciplines: criminology, sociology, public health, psychology and psychiatry, law and justice, and child development, among others. A study by Krug et al. (2002) reported that, in the Caribbean and Latin America, violence ranked fourth as a cause of death for persons between the ages of 15 and 44. Matthies et al. (2008) list a number of contributing factors to this situation, including the migration of parents, inadequate school systems and, linking the two, persistent economic pressures. The resulting crime and violence play out in a number of arenas, including the home, school, and the community. In the Jamaican context, poor communities provide a fertile breeding ground for the transformation of dispossessed male youth into gang members and community dons (gang leaders). In a system fueled largely by the trade in illegal drugs and weapons, these youth internalize the criminal values of the street and uphold the rule of the don as the legitimate authority (Harriot, 2000). Youth are both the instigators and recipients of crime and violence. Findings of a 12-country PanAmerican Health Organization/World Health Organization (PAHO/WHO) study indicate that one-third of school-going adolescents feared violence in their community and wished to move elsewhere (PAHO/WHO, 2000). In a study by Meeks et al. (2001) in Jamaica, only 28% of children thought their home neighborhood was very safe, and 33% were afraid of someone in their community or yard. Another PAHO/WHO nine-country study, conducted in 2000, reported that 40.1% of the teenagers interviewed indicated being angry enough to kill someone some or most of the time (Matthies, Meeks-Gardener, Daley, & CrawfordBrown, 2008). Given results like these, it comes as no surprise that homicide is the leading cause of death in the Caribbean (Matthies et al., 2008). 76

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Levels of domestic violence are also high in the region. Studies as far back as 1997 by PAHO/ WHO indicate that between 30% and 75% of adult women with partners in the region were subject to psychological abuse, and between 10% and 30% suffered physical violence (World Bank, 1997). Domestic violence also impacts children both directly and indirectly. Violence against children is defined by Matthies et al. (2008) as including “physical, sexual, and emotional or psychological abuse of children” (p. 418). Although research evidence on child abuse across the region is scarce, estimates indicate that the number of children suffering severe abuse in the region, including abandonment, stands at 6 million, and 80,000 children die each year as a result of parental abuse (Buvinic, Morrison, & Shifter, 1999). A vicious cycle therefore exists. The seeds of violence in the school and community at large are laid down in the family. In addition, as mentioned in the previous section, violence also occurs as a result of the persistence of high levels of homophobia within Caribbean societies. In the midst of these immense problems, what can psychologists do? Again, interventions are required at both individual and societal levels. Counselling can be provided to both the perpetrators and victims of domestic violence in an attempt to end the vicious cycle. School and educational psychologists can work to foster the relationship between students and teachers, and to build schools into safe havens for children (Matthies et al., 2008). There should be more community-level interventions such as the Peace Management Initiative (PMI) established by the Ministry of National Security in Jamaica to carry out mediation, counselling, and development projects. These actions, as well as governmental and nongovernmental organization– based antiviolence campaigns developed with the assistance of health, political, and social psychologists, as well as other social scientists, should be further developed to help stem the growing tide of violence within Caribbean communities.

Conclusion The development of psychology within the Caribbean islands has been influenced significantly by many factors, including the social, economic, and political climate over the years, going as far back as the pre-emancipation era. The legacy of slavery still haunts us today. Key events and players, including the Church, have impacted the training of psychologists and the delivery of psychological services to the islanders. HIV/AIDS, crime and violence,

parental migration, and economic hardships are but a few of the problems impacting negatively on the psychological hardiness of the people. Clearly, challenges remain for psychology, despite the efforts and accomplishments of many noble and talented individuals across the region. Even now, with the large increase in graduates of psychology programs across the region, questions still arise as to the purpose and role of the discipline in the Caribbean (Ward & Hickling, 2004). Yet, it is our firm belief that, given the pressing needs of the societies, the field will continue to grow and develop, creating an indigenous psychology capable of aiding in the advancement of the unique and dynamic peoples of the Caribbean.

Glossary Association for the Control of Sexually Transmitted Diseases (ACOSTRAD): A Jamaican nongovernmental organization established in 1978. The association provides public health education at all parish STD clinics and other health centers, as well as providing outreach to sex workers and their clients. Centre for HIV/AIDS Research Education and Service (CHARES): CHARES is located at the Mona Campus of the UWI. The center addresses the needs of children affected by HIV/AIDS. Centre for Investigation of Sexual Offences and Child Abuse (CISOCA): CISOCA is a branch of the Jamaica Constabulary Force. Its goals include creating an atmosphere that will encourage victims to report incidents of sexual offences and child abuse; ensuring the efficient and effective investigation into allegations of abuse; enhancing the rehabilitation of victims through counselling and therapy; and conducting public education programs on sexual offences and child abuse (UNICEF, 2009). Center for Counseling and Psychological Care (COAP): Attached to the faculty of sciences at the University of Havana, Cuba, this center provides services to the community as well as practical experience for the students of the school. Council of Voluntary Social Services (CVSS): CVSS is a national, nonprofit umbrella organization. The organization’s main goal is to ensure the development of the voluntary sector in Jamaica by coordinating the efforts of social service organizations. Employee Assistance Program (EAP): An EAP is a confidential, short-term, counselling service for employees with personal problems that affect their work performance. Federacion Estudiantil Universitaria (FEU; Federation of University Students): Student

organization created by Julio Antonio Mella, a cofounder of the Cuban Communist party. ICWI Group Foundation: Insurance Company of the West Indies foundation established to support education in the region. The Latin American and the Caribbean Pedagogy Institute (IPLAC): The Institute is involved in curriculum development, teacher training, and adult education in Cuba. Institute for Theological and Leadership Development (ITLD): ITLD is an educational and theological institution at the university level of study. The Institute is owned and sponsored by the United Church in Jamaica and the Cayman Islands. International University of the Caribbean (IUC): Operated by the United Church in Jamaica, IUC has campuses in Mandeville, Montego Bay, Ocho Rios, Port Antonio, Kingston, and Grand Cayman. MAPPC: The master’s degree in pastoral psychology and counselling offered by the IUC. MASTSHEAD Foundation, the Manchester Association of Secondary, Tertiary Schools’ Health Education and Associated Development: Charitable services organization in Jamaica initially established by the West Indies Alumina Company (WINDALCO). MCCP: The master’s degree in consulting psychology offered by the IUC. National Group of Psychology (MINSAP): Established in 1968, the National Group is involved in counselling, research, and teaching activities across Cuba. Northern Caribbean University (NCU): Seventh Day Adventist institution located in Mandeville, Jamaica. Planning Institute of Jamaica (PIOJ): Jamaican governmental agency charged with the mission of contributing to policy formulation on economic and social issues, as well as to external cooperative management to achieve sustainable development. Unión de Jóvenes Comunistas (UJC; Union of Young Communists): The youth organization of the Communist party of Cuba. University of the West Indies (UWI): The university has three main campuses: Mona, Jamaica; Cave Hill, Barbados; and St. Augustine, Trinidad and Tobago. The University serves the countries of the Commonwealth Caribbean: Anguilla, Antigua/ Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, the British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Dominica, Grenada, Jamaica, Montserrat, St. Christopher-Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago, and the Turks and Caicos Islands. frey, bl ack

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University of the West Indies HIV/AIDS Response Program (UWI-HARP): Established in 2001, UWIHARP represents an institutional response to the HIV/AIDS epidemic across all campuses of the UWI, as well as the open campuses throughout the Englishspeaking Caribbean (University of the West Indies, 2009).

Acknowledgment Joan Black, Lecturer in Psychology in the Department of Liberal Studies of the University of Technology, Jamaica, contributioned to the development of this chapter.

Further Reading This chapter was meant to provide the reader with a taste of the origins and development of psychology within the region, as well as some perspective of the challenges yet to be addressed. The following resources are recommended for further analysis. The Caribbean Region: Hickling, F., Morgan, K., Gibson, R., & Matthies, B. (Eds.). (2008). Perspectives in Caribbean psychology. Kingston, Jamaica: Caribbean Institute of Mental Health and Substance Abuse (CARIMENSA). The Editors serve up a compilation of articles dealing with culturally relevant current issues within the Caribbean ranging from culture and behaviour to psychological assessment, violence and personality disorder. Hickling, F., & Sorel, E. (Eds.). (2005). Images of psychiatry in the Caribbean. Kingston, Jamaica: Dept. of Community Health and Psychiatry, University of the West Indies Mona. This book provides an in-depth look at the development of Psychiatry within the English-speaking Caribbean. Ward, T., & Hickling F. (2004). Psychology in the Englishspeaking Caribbean. The Psychologist, 17(8), 442–444. This article provides a concise summary of the key players and key events shaping the development of psychology in the English-speaking islands within the Caribbean. Cuban Psychology: Bernal, G. (1985). A history of psychology in Cuba. Journal of Community Psychology, 13(2), 222–235. The paper examines the social and political forces that shaped the development of psychology as a field in Cuba. Dr. Bernal looks specifically at three periods representing major shifts in the society: colonial (1492–1898), pre-revolutionary (1898– 1958) and revolutionary (1959–1985), and examines how these periods shaped the growth and direction of psychology. Garcia-Averasturi, L. (1985). Community health psychology in Cuba. Journal of Community Psychology, 13(2), 117–123. Although dated, this article provides an in-depth exploration of the numerous roles of community health psychologists in Cuba. These include: educational interventions, counselling and psychotherapy, evaluation and consultation, training of health personnel, and research. The importance of preventative care is also examined. Molina, C. (2006). Psychology in Cuba after 1959. History & Philosophy of Psychology, 8(1), 12–29. Carolina Luz de la Torre Molina notes the key historical developments in Cuban Psychology beginning with the revolution in 1959 through the 1990’s. Shifts in theoretical and practical focus are highlighted.

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References Allen, D. (2004). Dr. Leachim Semaj: The one who came to turn things around. The Jamaica Observer (Sunday, Nov. 7). Retrieved June 28, 2009, from http://www.jamaicaobserver. com/columns/html/20041106T230000—0500_69004_ OBS_DR_LEAHCIM_SEMAJ__THE_ONE_WHO_ CAME_TO_TURN_THINGS_AROUND.asp. Austin-Broos, D. (1996). Politics and the redeemer: State and religion as ways of being in Jamaica. New West Indian Guide, 70(l & 2), 59–90. Bastick, T. (1982). Intuition: How we think and act. Chichester, UK: John Wiley. Bastick, T, Ezenne, A. (Eds.). (2003). Teaching Caribbean students: Research on social issues in the Caribbean and abroad. Kingston, Jamaica: DES, UWI. Brancale, R., Ellis, A., & Doorbar, R. (1952). Psychiatric and psychological investigations of convicted sex offenders: A summary report. American Journal of Psychiatry, 109, 17–21. Bernal, G. (1985). A history of psychology in Cuba. Journal of Community Psychology, 13(2), 222–235. Branche, C. (1998). Boys in conflict: Community, gender, identity and sex. In W. Bailey (Ed.), Gender and family in the Caribbean (pp. 185–202). Mona, Jamaica: Institute of Social and Economic Research, UWI. Branche, C. (2001). Ambivalence, sexuality and violence in the construction of Caribbean masculinity: Dangers for boys in Jamaica. In C. Barrow (Ed.), Children’s rights: Caribbean realities (pp. 86–96). Kingston: Ian Randle Publishers. Brown, J., & Chevannes, B. (1998). Why man stay so–tie the heifer and loose the bull: An examination of gender socialisation in the Caribbean. Mona, Jamaica: University of the West Indies. Buvinic, M., Morrison, A., & Shifter, M. (1999). Violence in Latin America and the Caribbean: A framework for action. Retrieved April 19, 2009, from http://66.102.1.104/scholar? hl=en&lr=&client=firefoxa&q=cache:V97ZqbUIxdwJ:ww w.bvsde.paho.org/bvsacd/cd66/1073eng.pdf + % 22child +abuse%22+caribbean. California State University Los Angeles (CSULA). (2007). Faculty: Brigitte Matthies. Los Angeles, CA: CSULA. Retrieved July 18, 2009, from http://www.calstatela.edu/ faculty/bmatthi/. Canadian High Commission. (2009). Canada-Jamaica relations. Kingston, Jamaica: High Commission of Canada in Jamaica. Retrieved July 1, 2009, from http://www. canadainternational.gc.ca/jamaica-jamaique/contactcontactez.aspx?lang=eng. Caribbean Graduate School of Theology. (2009a). Admission requirements. Kingston, Jamaica: CGST. Retrieved April 16, from http://cgstonline.org/index.php?option=com_content& task=view&id=20. Caribbean Graduate School of Theology. (2009b). Agreement. Kingston, Jamaica: CGST. Retrieved April 16, from http:// cgstonline.org/index.php?option=com_content&task= view&id=20. Caribbean Graduate School of Theology. (2009c). Jamaica Broilers Group of Companies scholarship. Kingston, Jamaica: CGST. Retrieved April 16, from http://cgstonline.org/index. php?option=com_content&task=view&id=12&Item=55. Caribbean Graduate School of Theology. (2009d). Programmes. Kingston, Jamaica: CGST. Retrieved April 16, from http:// cgstonline.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view &id=12&Itemid=27.

Caribbean Graduate School of Theology. (2009e). Vision statement. Kingston, Jamaica: CGST. Retrieved April 16, from http://cgstonline.org/index.php?option=com_content&task =view&id=14&Itemid=29. Centro Nacional de Información de Ciencias Médicas. (2009). Degree in psychology. Cuba: Centro Nacional de Información de Ciencias Médicas. Retrieved February 17, 2009, from http://promociondeeventos.sld.cu/psico. Centro Nacional de Información de Ciencias Médicas (MINSAP). (2009). National Group of Psychology. Cuba: Centro Nacional de Información de Ciencias Médicas. Retrieved February 17, 2009, from http://promociondeeventos. sld.cu/psico. Chevannes, B. (1999). Message from the dean of the faculty of social sciences. Dept. of Sociology and Social Work Psychology Conference: Psychology and Caribbean Development (February 15–20). Kingston, Jamaica: UWI Mona. Chevannes, B. (2001). Learning to be a man: Culture, socialization, and gender identity in five Caribbean communities. Kingston, Jamaica: University of the West Indies. Davis, E. (1998). The history of theological education in Jamaica: The United Theological College of the West Indies and its antecedent colleges (1841–1966). Doctoral dissertation. Netherlands: Utrech University. Dayfoot, A. (1999). The shaping of the West Indian church: 1492–1962. Gainsville, FL: University Press of Florida. Dodman, J. ([email protected]) (23 February 2009). IUC information. Email to: J. Black (joaneblack@hotmail. com). Doorbar, R (1969). Psychological testing of male transsexuals: A brief report of results from the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale, the Thematic Apperception Test, and the House-Tree-Person Test. In R. Green, & J. Money (Eds.), Transsexualism and sex reassignment (pp. 189–200). Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins. Dunn, L., & Mondesire, A. (2002). Poverty and policy coherence: The case of Jamaica. Ottawa, Canada: North-South Institute. Dunne, V. (2006, January 15). Edmonton college honours two. Catholic Times. Retrieved July 17, 2009, from http:// findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0MKY/is_1_30/ai_ n26721664/?tag=content;col1. Evans, C. (1999). Psychiatry in Barbados: A personal experience. Psychiatric Bulletin, 23, 49–51. Evans, M. ([email protected]). (1 August 2009). Maitland Evans biography. Email to J. Black (joaneblack@hotmail. com). Evans, M. ([email protected]). (14 April 2009). IUC information. Email to J. Black ([email protected]). Farinas, G., Simon, I., Gonzalez, J., Orraca, Z., & Goytia, J. (2004). Psicoballet: Teoria y practica en Cuba y Puerto Rico. Puerto Rico: Publicaciones Puertorriqueñas, Inc. Garcia-Averasturi, L. (1985). Community health psychology in Cuba. Journal of Community Psychology, 13(2), 117–123. Hall, K. (1999). Message from the pro-vice chancellor and principal Kenneth O. Hall, Mona Campus, University of the West Indies. Dept. of sociology and social work psychology conference: Psychology and Caribbean development, Feb 15–20. Kingston, Jamaica: UWI Mona. Hall, S. (1990). Cultural identity and diaspora. Framework, 36, 222–237. Harriot, A. (2000). Police and crime control in Jamaica: Problems of reforming ex-colonial constabularies. Kingston, Jamaica: University of the West Indies Press.

Hernández, J. (2006). Gustavo Torroella González-Mora (1918–2006): Pionero de la psicología en Cuba. Revista Latinoamericana de Psicología, 38(3), 621–625. Heydorn, B. (2003). Caribbean-Canadian Literary Expo. Toronto: CCLE. Retrieved July 24, 2009, from http://www.webserv. ca/CCLE/Authors/heydorn.html. Hickling, F. (2007). Curriculum vitae. Retrieved July 7, 2009, from http://lists.mcgill.ca/scripts/wa.exe?A3=ind0707a&L=t cpsych&P=769085&E=2&B=—Boundary_(ID_32Kg%2F ccyJdTkcU7NZ6OyvA)&N=last+edited+cv+April+2007. doc&T=application%2Fmsword. Hickling, F., Doorbar, R., Benn, J., Gordon, K., & Matthies, B. (2008). The roles and responsibilities of clinical psychologists in the Caribbean. In F. Hickling, B. Matthies, K. Morgan, & R. Gibson (Eds.), Perspectives in Caribbean psychology (pp. 489–515). Hickling, F., & Hutchinson, G. (1999). The roast breadfruit psychosis - Disturbed racial identification in African Caribbeans. Psychiatric Bulletin, 23, 1–3. Hickling, F. Morgan, K., Gibson, R., & Matthies, B. (Eds.). (2008). Perspectives in Caribbean psychology. Kingston, Jamaica: Caribbean Institute of Mental Health and Substance Abuse (CARIMENSA). Hickling, F., & Sorel, E. (2005). Images of psychiatry: The Caribbean. Kingston, Jamaica: University of the West Indies. Hill, A. (2009). History. Barbados: Psychology Department, Psychiatric Hospital, Black Rock, St. Michael. Human Rights Watch. (2004). Hated to death: Violence and Jamaica’s HIV/AIDS epidemic. Human Rights Watch, 16(6b). Jamaica Gleaner. (2004, May 26). Barry Davidson: Healing families. Kingston, Jamaica: The Jamaica Gleaner. Retrieved July 6, 2009, from http://www.accessmylibrary.com/comsite5/bin/aml_landing_tt.pl?purchase_type=ITM&it. Jamaica Gleaner. (2007, April 18). Ruth Doorbar is dead. Kingston, Jamaica: The Jamaica Gleaner. Retrieved July 6, 2009, from www.jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20070418/ lead/lead5.html. Johnson, R. A. (2006). The gifted child: Psychological and educational considerations. In Psychology and Caribbean development. Kingston, Jamaica: Ian Randle Press. Johnson, R. A., & McFarlane, T. (2007). Burnout and occupational stress among a sample of Jamaican nurses. The Caribbean Journal of Nursing and Midwifery, 2, 17–23. Kristiansen, S., & Soderstrom, K. (1990). Cuban health psychology: A priority is the primary health care system. Psychology & Health, 4(1), 65–72. Krug, E. G., Dahlberg, L. L., Mercy, J. A., Zwi, A. B., & Lozanno, R. (2002). World report on violence and health. Geneva: World Health Organization. Retrieved from http:// www.who.int/violence_injury_prevention/violence/world_ report/en/full_en.pdf. Leo-Rhynie, E. (2009). Opening ceremony speech at the 8th Annual Psychology Conference. Mona: University of the West Indies. Matthies, B. (2006, January). We are making a difference. Childhood traumatic brain injury. Retrieved from http:// w w w. c a r i b e c d . o r g . j m / PA R E N T % 2 0 N E T WO R K / MAKINGADIFFERENCE/Traumatic%20Brain%20Injury %20Progress.pdf. Supported by the Inter-American Development Bank. Matthies, B., Meeks-Gardener, J., Daley, A., & Crawford-Brown, C. (2008). Issues of violence in the Caribbean. In F. Hickling, B. Matthies, K. Morgan, & R. Gibson (Eds.), Perspectives in Caribbean psychology (pp. 393–464). Kingston, Jamaica:

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Caribbean Institute of Mental Health and Substance Abuse (CARIMENSA). Maxwell, J. (1999). Message from the Head, Department of Sociology and Social Work. Psychology conference, Feb 15–20, University of the West Indies Mona. Kingston, Jamaica: UWI. Meeks-Gardner J., Powell C., & Grantham-McGregor, (2001). A case-control study of family and school determinants of aggression n Jamaican children (Working Paper No. 6). Planning Institute of Jamaica. Miller, E. (1986). Marginalization of the black male: Insights from the development of the teaching profession. Kingston: Institute of Social and Economic Research. Molina, C. (2006). Psychology in Cuba after 1959. History & Philosophy of Psychology, 8(1), 12–29. Morgan, K., & Gibson, R. (Eds.). Perspectives in Caribbean psychology (pp. 489–515). Kingston, Jamaica: Caribbean Institute of Mental Health and Substance Abuse (CARIMENSA). Morgan, K., & O’Garo, K. (2008). Caribbean identity issues. In F. Hickling, B. Matthies, K. Morgan, & R. Gibson (Eds.), Perspectives in Caribbean psychology (pp. 3–31). Kingston, Jamaica: Caribbean Institute of Mental Health and Substance Abuse (CARIMENSA). National Science Foundation. (2008). Science and education doctorate awards 2006. Arlington, VA: Division of Science Resources Statistics, NSF. Retrieved July 31, 2009, from http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/nsf09311/. Northern Caribbean University. (2006). College of teacher education and behavioural science: Submission for accreditation of a masters degree programme. Mandeville, Jamaica: NCU. Oliver, A. (2001). Biography (March). Kingston, Jamaica: CGST. PAHO/WHO. (2000). A portrait of adolescent health in the Caribbean, 2000. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, WHO Collaborating Centre on Adolescent Health. Perez, G. (2008). Dr. Noemí Pérez Valdés in memoriam. Cuba: Centro Nacional de Información de Ciencias Médicas. Retrieved February 17, 2009, from http://74.125.95.100/ translate. Planning Institute of Jamaica. (2009). Vision Jamaica 2030: National development plan (January). Kingston, Jamaica: Planning Institute of Jamaica. Pottinger, A. (1999). After the storm . . . There is the calm: An analysis of the bereavement process. Kingston, Jamaica: Canoe Press. Premdas, R. (1996). Ethnicity and identity in the Caribbean: Decentering the myth. Working paper #234. Retrieved 31 May 2011 from: http://www.nd.edu/~kellogg/publications/ workingpapers/WPS/234.pdf. Quevedo, K., & Butcher, J. (2005). The use of the MMPI and MMPI-2 in Cuba: A historical overview from 1950 to the present. International Journal of Clinical and Health Psychology, 5(2), 335–347. Reiber, R. (2001). The problem of psychosocial distress and the crisis in psychology. Psychology and Developing Societies, 13(1), 105–121.

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C HA P TE R

6

China

Yeh Hsueh and Benyu Guo

Abstract A central issue in the history of Chinese psychology is whether the history of ancient psychological thought and the development of modern Chinese psychology, with its Western origins, are disconnected intellectual endeavors. This chapter offers a brief account of change and continuity in Chinese psychology from about 550 BC to 1980. It highlights some ancient thinkers and observers, and their accomplishments. It also introduces the landmarks and pioneers of modern Chinese psychology in various sociopolitical contexts. In this account, the central issue presents itself as having been intertwined and integrated over time with Confucianism, Taoism, Buddhism, y¯ı n yáng wu˘ xíng theory, heart-central theory, and later dialectical materialism in the Chinese pursuit of a unified dialectical explanation of human behaviors. Keywords: Confucianism, Taoism, Buddhism, Y ¯ı n yáng wu˘ xíng, Heart-central theory, Dialectical materialism

Historians believe that some schools of Chinese psychological thought can be traced to 5,000 years ago.1 This history can be divided into three periods. The first period was from antiquity to 1840, marked by a slowly accumulated wealth of ancient psychological thoughts. The second was a premodern era from 1840 up to 1919, which brought the early introduction of Western psychological thought to China. The third period saw the accelerated growth of modern scientific psychology from 1919 to 1980. This chapter will outline these periods up to 19802 and examine key events that produced a long history of psychological thoughts but a short history of scientific psychology in China.3 It seems reasonable to set 1980 as the start of contemporary Chinese psychology, when Chinese psychologists began once again keeping abreast with the fields of psychology abroad in an unprecedented modernization movement. See Table 6.1 for a brief chronology of Chinese history.

The method we use to present this history follows a traditional descriptive approach commonly used by Chinese scholars to acquaint readers with a historical contour along which ancient psychological thought as cultural artifact advanced into modern psychology as a scientific discipline. Our account pivots on basic philosophies that were fundamental to Chinese psychological thoughts and their evolution over 2,000 years. However, we also will follow recent historiographical insights into psychology to give attention to social and historical interpretations of the thinkers and the events (Ash & Woodward, 1987). As contemporary psychology becomes more diversified and responsive to the demands of social institution designs and improvements (Cahan & White, 1992; White, 2003), the rise and evolution of modern Chinese psychology can be seen as a response to a frequently reorganized and renewed political system in the 20th century.

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Table 6.1 A brief chronology of Chinese history Xia Dynasty

2070–1600 bc

Shang Dynasty

1600–1046 bc

Zhou Dynasty Western Zhou

1046–771 bc

Eastern Zhou

770–256 bc

Spring & Autumn

770–476 bc

Warring States

475–221 bc

Qin Dynasty

221–206 bc

Han Dynasty

206 bc–220 ad

Three Kingdoms

220–280

Western Jin Dynasty

265–317

Eastern Jin Dynasty

317–420

Northern & Southern Dynasties

420–589

Sui Dynasty

581–618

Tang Dynasty

618–907

Five Dynasties

907–960

Song Dynasty

960–1279

Liao Dynasty

907–1125

Jin Dynasty

1115–1234

Yuan Dynasty

1206–1368

Ming Dynasty

1368–1644

Qing Dynasty

1616–1911

Republic of China

1912–1949

People’s Republic of China

1949–

At the same time, we have selected and organized materials in this chapter to expound a few important themes in Chinese culture and intellectual history. The foremost ideology is that of harmony between nature and the human (tiānrén-héyī), followed by the relationships between form and spirit, between perception and knowing, and between feelings and personality. A persistent historical theme in both early psychological thought and modern psychology was to promote psychology in service of education, largely in the Chinese culture (Blowers 1996; Hsu, Ching, & Over, 1980; Jing & Fu, 1995, 2001). In this light, it is reasonable to argue that the ancient psychological thoughts centered mostly on the basic issues of how to become a better person in 82

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the overarching relationship that embodies the foremost ideology—an omnipresent theme of moral life in society. In this chapter, we are selective in providing an account of a few outstanding thinkers whose ideas were transmitted and transformed by later generations. The chapter will be divided into six sections. The first section delineates the origins and integration of three main schools of intellectual thought that ran through the first period (antiquity–1840) and became identifiably Chinese: Confucianism (rú), Taoism (dào), and Buddhism ( fó ), which respectively became officially adopted at different historical times (Gao, 2005a; Murphy & Murphy, 1968; Yan, 1998; Yang, 1994; Zhao, Lin, & Zhang, 1989). These three schools of thought established an intellectual context for the development of later Chinese psychological thought. The second section highlights three areas of psychological discourse and accomplishments in ancient China, namely, the theory of yīn yáng and five elements (wu˘ xíng), the talent selection and employment theory, and the brain-central theory. The third section presents early introductions of Western psychological thought that played a useful role in linking ancient ideas to modern scientific psychology, although by all accounts, the ancient schools of psychological thought have rarely manifested themselves in modern Chinese psychology. This third section describes a premodern period of Chinese psychology (1840–1919). The fourth and the fifth sections are both about the era of modern scientific psychology in China. However, they are distinct from each other, as demarcated by the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, after which there was a consensus at least among psychologists in China that dialectical materialism would offer a solution to the disparate field (Executive Committee, Chinese Psychological Society, 1982; Pan, 1983, 1984). For this and other reasons to be mentioned later, the emerging periods of modern scientific psychology in China are presented in two sections, each covering a 30-year period, 1919–1949 and 1949–1980. The last section examines a number of longlasting issues in the history of Chinese psychology, both as described in the previous sections and from other sources. These issues include the intellectual continuity and discontinuity in the history of Chinese psychology, the pursuit of unified psychological theory and empirical research, the social institutional design in the field, and the fate and future of psychology in China. All these issues will inevitably

converge in conceptualizing ancient psychological thoughts and modern psychological science as either a unified history or two distinctly separate ones. Finally, from a broad international perspective, we speculate on the future of Chinese psychology based on an empirical epistemology to suggest possible directions of psychology in China.

Three Foundational Schools of Thought The history of psychological thought in China is a continuing transformation of ideas over a 2,000-year period. Two influential early thinkers are Laozi (Laotze) (ca. 571–471 bc), the founder of Daoist (Taoist) doctrine, and his contemporary Confucius (ca. 551–479 bc). Although Confucius was said to have been aware of Sakyamuni’s teaching and to have given a summary account of Buddhism to his students, it was several hundred years later when Buddhism officially entered Chinese intellectual discourse. These three schools of thought profoundly contributed to the development of ancient psychological ideas. About the rise of Chinese psychological thought, scholars (Gao, 2005a; Murphy, 1973; Murphy & Murphy, 1968; Yan, 1998; Yang, 1994) point to two early periods, Spring Autumn (770–476, bc) and Warring States (476–221 bc), when a great number of intellectuals debated with one another and numerous schools of thought competed to offer ideas to the ruling classes (Liu, 1990; Yan, 1999). Incidentally, this beginning was “in almost exactly the same era [. . .] the beginnings of Greek systematic philosophy appeared, from which developed the psychological systems which are the beginnings of the psychology of the Western world” (Murphy & Kovach, 1972, p. 7). The vibrancy and diversity of thinkers, educators, social observers, writers, politicians, military strategists, and tacticians were unprecedented and arguably never surpassed. The animated intellectual debates nurtured thinkers who later left indelible marks on Chinese history. The two most influential schools of thought were the Confucian and Daoist schools.

Psychological Ideas of Confucius Confucianism derived from the teaching of Confucius (551–479 bc), whose students preserved his teaching in a dialogue form in the book of Analects. The first emperor of the Qin Dynasty (221–207 bc) unified China and brought Confucian school of thought to its worst fate. He ordered all Confucian books to be burnt and all Confucian scholars buried alive. However, this school of thought revived from

the ashes and was officially adopted as the state doctrine in the Han Dynasty by Emperor Hànwu ˘ (140–86 bc). The establishment of Confucianism as the state ideology marginalized other diverse ideologies. Analects became the official book guiding the country’s life, a book that also showed the heritage of two major inspirational sources: I-Ching (or Zhōu Yì) and the Rites of Zhou (ca. 1200–770 bc) (Fan, 2004). Confucius’ teachings include notions of the unity of nature and people, the highest status of man in the universe, and the dependency of the spirit on the body, all being central to many psychological ideas on which later thinkers elaborated (Gao, 2005a; Yang, 1994). These central notions set forth an overarching principle in Confucian psychological thought, especially in relation to human learning and state governance. In modern psychological terms, these notions can be referred to as perception and cognition, emotions, will and volition, mental ability, and relationship between inborn qualities and experiences. We will briefly explain these notions below.

perception and cognition Confucius held that extensive experiences, including indirect experiences, are indispensable perceptual pathways toward knowledge. Perceptual experiences that one should have are “listening to many voices” and “living through many events.” Such perceptual knowledge followed by “careful examination” and “inquisitive probing” are the foundation of human thoughts or intelligence. Confucius was said to be the first in the Chinese philosophical tradition to differentiate sī (think), focusing the mind on the current happening, and lü (consider), focusing the mind on the future event. This distinction started a tradition of viewing human thoughts as moving through two phases, that is, from thinking to considering. In Confucius’ words, thinking is a methodic process using special techniques that include “persistent concentration,” “learning by drawing analogical inferences,” and “drawing on one’s own experiences in order to have sympathy for others” (See Analects: lıˇrén, shùér, yōngyě). These techniques are essential for human learning that is experience-based, mainly perceptual, leading to rational thoughts (Guo, 2009). In other words, learning and thinking complement each other for their coexistence. Confucius’ wellknown statement, “Learning without thinking generates confusion; thinking without learning ends in peril” suggests a dialectical organization of human cognitive improvement (Analects: wéizhèng). hsueh, guo

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emotions Emotional terms in Confucius’ teaching are based on a key concept, rén, an emotional unity of the two opposite poles, like and dislike. Other emotions all derive from these two contrasted emotionalities. Only a jūnzi, a person who has obtained a higher degree of self-perfection, can distinctly like or dislike another person (Analects: lıˇrén). These two emotional attributes of the jūnzi provided a theory of polarity in later Chinese thoughts about emotions. For 2,000 years, the Chinese discourse on emotions pivoted on these two polarities as sources of a variety of differentiated emotions (Yang, Ye, & Guo, 1999, p. 125). Confucius’ teaching on feelings and emotions is an integral part of his doctrine of morality. For example, his description of desires and nondesires underlies high morality in human relationships. He defined “desire” only in connection with high morality to say that humanity depends on the desire to be moral: “Man has to desire in order to be man; he has to relate to others by meeting his desire” (Analects: yōngyě ). Using the same logic, he argues, “Do not apply to others what you do not desire” (Analects: yányuān). These moral underpinnings of desires have a mediating function for creating good human relationships or desired moral relationships. Because of this ubiquitous morality embedded in desires, all desires are inevitably controlled through volition and conscious thoughts.

volition As defined in modern psychology, volition is not entirely compatible with the concepts of volition in the ancient Chinese discourse. For two millennia, Chinese have conceptualized two different aspects of volition: aspiration or will (zhì) and intention (yì). Confucius emphasized the need for three steps to realize aspiration: setting goals, following the faith, staying persistent. To this specific mechanism of aspiration, he added the embedded emotional and rational elements; that is, pursuing rén, controlling oneself, adhering to the principle, and being decisive (see these chapters in Analects: shù’er, yányuān, lıˇrén for rén; yányuān for self-control; tàibó for principle adherence; and zıˇhaˇn for decisiveness.).

mental ability In his long teaching career, Confucius did not articulate a concept of intelligence comparable to what we are familiar with today. But his comments on intellect and ability are recorded in Analects. For example, he categorized people by three levels of intellectual ability: superior, mediocre, and inferior, 84

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labels that became the common categories of intellectual ability over the past 2,000 years. However, this prescription of intellect levels was accompanied by a nonprescriptive view of what can happen to one’s intellect that involves volition, thus aspiration with clear goals, faith and persistence. Regardless of initial intellect ability, learning and experience will certainly upgrade one’s intellect level. This emphasis on the acquisition of intellect and ability through experience is consistent with how Confucius diminished the role of inborn dispositions and abilities. He squarely placed himself in the category of scholars who made extraneous efforts to learn, “I did not know anything at birth. My interest in history and my diligence in study made me a scholar (Analects: shù’ér). His famous statement, “people’s inborn characteristics are similar, but their habits are dissimilar” (Analects: yánghuò), was an opening line of the enlightenment text for children for 700 years, a statement that swung open the door for the later growth of Chinese thoughts about temperament and habits. This position was inherited by Mengzi (Mencius), a Confucian scholar second only to Confucius.

Mencius (Mengzi): Development of Confucian Psychological Thoughts Mengzi (372–289 bc) lived in a historical period called “Warring States,” when seven states fought with one another for 250 years until State Qin conquered the other six states. An outstanding thinker and educator, Mengzi was Confucius’ compatriot from the same region of China but at a different time. His thoughts inherited and developed Confucius’ teaching (Mencius, trans. James Legge, 1895; Sima, 1979). But, unlike Confucius, who explicated the reliance of the spirit on the form or the body, Mengzi’s position on this psychological issue has to be inferred from his remarks on how human thinking relies on the sensory organs, in line with Confucius’ view. Mengzi believed that eyes and ears supplied perceptual materials for the heart to think about. This view of the heart being the thinking organ persisted in the long history of Chinese thoughts. He believed that the world perceived through the sensory organs only reflected surface phenomena with which other aspects of the perceived world might interfere to cause difficulty in perceiving accurately. To surmount this difficulty in perception, Mengzi argued that the thinking function of the heart needed to intervene and penetrate the surface of a phenomenon to arrive at its essence because thinking is used to acquire knowledge.

This conceptualization of human thinking was unprecedented at his time. Moreover, for Mengzi, the emphasis on thinking as a dominating function of the heart overriding perceptions has a purpose: To define jūnzi and differentiate jūnzi from xiăorén. He insisted that a genuinely rational, or thinking, person was able to avoid distracting temptations and thus preserve his good inborn qualities. Such a person is jūnzi (Mèngzi: jìnxīnshàng). The view that the heart is the thinking organ also placed Mengzi among those idealists who believed that thinking is the supreme force of the spirit in the universe and that “all things in the world exist in my heart” (Mèngzi: jìnxīnshàng). One interpretation of this statement is that everything in the universe is of my thinking. Another is that the meaning of everything in the universe originates from my thinking. Either claim is rather strong in its idealistic stand that thinking dominates the existence and meanings of the objective world. A third interpretation takes a shade of the empiricist view to say that “my” thinking can reflect and capture the meaning of the universe. All these different interpretations were the basis for some debate about what kind of psychological theory to accept and to pursue in developing a modern Chinese psychology (also see the section on Modern Psychology [1949–1980]). As a Confucian scholar, Mengzi places human beings above all other beings. He reasoned in two steps: First, only human beings have feelings of sympathy, shame, modesty, and right and wrong, all of which were good inborn qualities that could develop into rén yì lıˇ zhì (roughly, love, brotherhood, ritual, and intellect) (Mèngzi: jìnxīnshàng). In comparison to the natural instincts that other animals have, these social emotions represent nobility in human beings. also called xīn (heart), the function of which is thinking. Thinking would transform the good inborn qualities to human nobility (Mèngzi: gōngsūnchoˇu and gàozıˇshàng). For this reason, he put forth the proposition that human beings are born to be good, possessed of the above four aspects of xīn. However, this basic goodness was a human potential—a possibility. Its materialization depended on education and environmental conditions, which were the key factors in making a human emerge and excel as a moral person (for a summary of contemporary literature on this topic, see F. Wang, 1999). At the root of human moral feelings are the four pillars of Analects: sympathy, shamefulness, modesty, and the sense of right or wrong. Central to these feelings is ren or jing (dutiful respect), which

arises from inborn feelings that regulate human social life. This inborn commonality in people also suggests a commonality in people’s desires. Everyone understands that everyone else has the same desires in response (physiologically) to pleasant smells, colors, sounds, odors, comfort, and other lowerlevel desires. At the same time, everyone pursues higher-level spiritual desires. It was not uncommon that the two types of desires were in conflict, and Mengzi’s admonition was to let the higher level of reasoning rule desires, performing an act of selfperfection toward good (Mengzi: jìngxīnxià). Mengzi’s view of the endeavor toward selfperfection retained the Confucian focus on aspiration or will, not motivation. Due to this emphasis, historians of psychology in China tend to use the phrase zhìyì (Yan, 1998; Yang, 1994), placing aspiration before intention, to highlight this traditional notion. In his view, a jūnzi should strive to incorporate clear rationality, firm beliefs, and unyielding persistence into his aspiration. However, this strife itself is not inborn. The cultivation of aspiration relies on the deliberate exercise of willpower. Willpower itself is rooted in thinking, which is superior to, and regulates, perceptions and emotions. Confucius and Mengzi are regarded as the founding fathers of the Confucian doctrine adopted as the state ideology in 134 bc and followed until the first decade of the 20th century. This deeply rooted doctrine dominated all aspects of the Chinese intellectual heritage, just like the Daoist tradition that emerged about the same time as Confucius attracted a large crowd of disciples.

Daoist (Taoist) School of Psychological Thought The two best-known founders of the Daoist philosophy were Laozi (Laotze, 571–477 bc), who was said to have written or compiled Dào Dé Jīng (Sima, 1979), and Zhuāngzi (Chuangtze, 369–286 bc), whose work was preserved in Zhuāngzi.4 Their names have often been combined as Lao-Zhuang, a joint symbol of Daoist philosophy. The principal psychological view in this tradition centers on the relationship between form and spirit, or body and mind. Zhuāngzi suggested a naïve materialism, in that the form provided a shell to carry the spirit. This shell–content relation evolves because “as the form changes, its heart changes along” (Zhuānzi: qíwùlùn). Derived from Zhōu Yì (I-Ching), which was also the source for Confucius, the view of change is key to the Daoist tradition. Nothing stays the same over time, including the body–heart relationship. hsueh, guo

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The quality of this relationship can be captured by a mirror metaphor that Zhuāngzi used. The mirror metaphor for the mind has been found in ancient thinkers’ interpretations of human consciousness or subconsciousness in different cultures (cf. Campbell, 2008; Hawkins, 1974). The earliest known Chinese mirror metaphor came from Zhuāngzi, who compared the mind to a mirror that could learn the dao of nature. He suggested two principles of using the mirror as the way to know dao. First, the mirror must be cleaned and polished frequently to get rid of all the spots and smears. A clean mirror can detect the nuances and find truth, void of distractions and obstructions. Second, one must use the mind (i.e., xīn or heart) like a mirror that reflects things without deliberately searching or forwarding (Zhuāngzi: yìngdìwángpiān). A clear reflection does not hide things, either. The metaphorical mirror connects human beings with the dao of nature, the two distinct parts of the universe. Nature (tiān) means things that are natural, a priori, and inborn whereas human (rén) means things that are human-made and learned. The relationship between nature and human was that between the preexisting and the experience-based. This relationship implies the priority of nature. But, as in Confucianism, Daoism places humans above all other animals to be directly in relation to nature. Laozi described this relationship as a hierarchy of four priorities in the universe: Dao, the heaven, the earth, and human beings. Humans are not as pure as the first three priorities because of human emotions. Emotions were a focus in Daoist school of thought in that they were considered secondary to the relationship between human and nature. The pure nature demands humans to abandon acquired “pollutants” and return to the pure nature. Daoist tradition does not deny feelings and emotions. Rather, it persuades that human emotions in their multiplicity and complexity will burden the morality and inborn nature of humans to bring down the human quality to that of animals. To maintain the human quality, purging desires and feelings was necessary. This view of human nature as simple, naïve, and good was similar to Mengzi’s view of human inborn quality. Starting from this position, it follows that acquired or learned ideas, moralities, and skills all damage the purity of a person, leaving his nature twisted and morals deviant—a departure from Mengzi’s teaching. From Confucian doctrine to Daoist doctrine, a shared theme is their emphasis on the basic relationship between human beings and nature, which 86

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lies in its oneness, its harmony, its being good in the beginning, and its ultimate goodness in the end. This agreement doubtless derived from their common root in Zhōu Yì or I-Ching (Gao, 2005a; Murphy & Murphy, 1968; Yan, 1998; Yang, 1994, 2000a). These doctrines also share the view of the dependence of spirit on form, therefore, not only making the two schools of thought complementary, but also extending these views into their interpretations of perception, thinking, emotions, and will. These interpretations centered on the basic issues of becoming a better person in the overarching relationship between nature and human beings. Daoist doctrine was marginalized when Confucianism became the state doctrine in 134 bc, although the Daoist worldview was well-established and even integrated with Confucianism over time. About 200 years later, China officially introduced Buddhism from India and added much to the native Chinese psychological thought.

Buddhist Influence Buddhist tradition originated from India (ca. 600 bc). With the Silk Road being opened up for commerce with the West, Buddhist classic texts and practice were gradually disseminated in China, often by word of mouth and by secular interest (Zhao, 1999, p. 134).5 Later, Buddhism was formally introduced to China when an emperor of the Han Dynasty (61 ad) sent his official scholars to India to study Buddhist teaching, translate the classic texts, and establish a school in Chang’an, the then Chinese capital, to disseminate this school of thought. Six hundred years later, China entered a golden era of Buddhist influence on, and integration with, indigenous Chinese ideologies. Early on, Buddhism in China “achieved its characteristic Chinese expression, which then remained stabilized and essentially unchanging century after century to a degree” (Murphy & Murphy, 1968, p. 128). Buddhists examined human thinking and inner life with nuanced depictions and incisive insights that became important intellectual forces in the past and continue to occupy an important place in contemporary intellectual discourse about the mind and its activities. Buddhism divides the universe into two categories, se (ru^pa in Sanskrit, forms or things) and xīn (citta in Sanskrit, a conglomeration of heart, mind, spirit, motive, sense, mentality, idea, thought, feeling). Simply put, sè stands for the material world and xīn the mental world. The heart, body, and objective world or jìng (i.e., gocara in Sanskrit that can be perceived by xīn) are inseparable from one

another, constituting a cosmos. However, although the phenomenal condition (se) lies at the start of the Buddhist doctrine, xīn and se (the mind and the world) are not equally weighted in Buddhism. The precedence of xīn over se has been widely adhered to by different schools. The working of xīn plays a dominant role in human life and epistemology, crucial in determining people’s reincarnation. In Mahayana, the dominant role the mind plays in the universe governs the three realms: that of sensuous desires, that of forms, and that of formlessness. Various Chinese Buddhist schools inherited these principles and provided varied interpretations of how the mind comes to know reality. Four of these interpretations are important to the Chinese psychological thought. The first interpretation follows the Mahayana’s enlightenment text, The Awakening of Mahayana Faith, a Buddhist classic text that offers a theory of origins of the truth or the existence of the mind as true reality. It states that the appearance of everything in this world is due to the rise and function of xīn (citta). Sentient beings or regular persons who all have the potential to reach truth are able to part with deluded thoughts or mistaken understandings. This is called “true mind,” which stands for ultimate wisdom and insight that cast light into the darkness of the world. Xīn can be so powerful as to possess the wisdom that surpasses any understanding accomplished by other means, according to The Awakening of Mahayana Faith. A second interpretation holds, “A single thought holds three thousand truths,” a theory that a Chinese school of Buddhism established during the Sui Dynasty (ca. 581–619 ad), articulating the relationship between xīn and things. “A single thought,” also called “yíniàn,” suggested the brief moment in which a thought appeared. “Three thousand” refers to all the possible existences in the world. It emphasized that everyone’s idea holds all the phenomena of the universe, all perceivable aspects of the world, and arises from the sensing of one’s prior good or evil experiences or prior-experience-conditioned genesis of an understanding. With this ideational nature, dominant or recessive understandings in the number of thousands can be present or embedded in the emerging understanding of one phenomenon (cf. móhézhıˇguān by Zhìyì, the fourth Patriarch). A third interpretation explains the genesis of everything in the world through differentiating various relationships between xīn and things. It describes the realms of reality among things. By putting things into realms, one can search for causes and properties of the truth—those of the

truth as they are or true thusness—of the universe. This school of Chinese Buddhism holds that the realms of reality themselves are true thusness in the universe or true forms of all things as they are. This interpretation of reality realms explains that all the existing and appearing phenomena have a priori true reality as a cause. A fourth interpretation states that phenomenal existences are entirely consequences of the mind’s acts that bring forth or push away things. The Chinese school of chán (zan) Buddhism, abiding by this interpretation, explained that the laws of the universe and the true thusness Buddha had accomplished exist in xīn, or the person’s inborn nature. The world outside, filled with deluded thoughts and foggy notions, screened xīn from appearing in its true nature. If the deluded thoughts and foggy notions were removed, xīn would immediately display the truth of the universe. Like the other three schools of Chinese Buddhism, this interpretation argues for xīn as the center of the universe and the source of all phenomena (cf. The Sutra Spoken by the Sixth Patriarch). The introduction of Buddhism at the time when the state doctrine of Confucianism dominated was by no means a historical accident. Confucius was believed to have been aware of Buddhist practice at a time when his teaching was just one of many schools of intellectual thought competing for the ruling class’ attention. He seemed appreciative of the Buddhist notion that the best way of governing the state is through nonintervention in people’s lives, a belief also shared by Daoists. The converging of Confucianism, Daoism, and Buddhism in Chinese intellectual history has been widely noted (Gao, 2005a; Yang, 1994; Zhao & Xu, 1997). They all see the human inborn quality as pure and good, and xīn has the prior role in understanding the universe. They all see the dependence of spirit on form, but view these as mutually engaging and changing each other. They all look at individual moral autonomy as the critical mechanism of the larger social cosmos, consistent across the personal, familial, and state levels of human social life. All strive for personal self-perfection in a moral universe to pursue the ultimate harmony of the state that must be built; in Confucian terms, the unceasing endeavor of jūnzi to embody nature–human oneness. These shared outlooks often leave lay people and scholars alike with difficulty in distinguishing the influences over time of a particular school on the development of Chinese psychological thought. hsueh, guo

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Some Accomplishments of Ancient Chinese Psychological Thought From antiquity through the end of the Qing Dynasty in 1911, Chinese psychological thought evolved slowly. But, during this long history, many accomplishments and contributions emerged. Generations of psychological thinkers had a similar conceptualization of the relationship between mind and body. They also shared a basic understanding of the relationship between mind, literally xīn, and external reality, nature. Derived from these relationships is the concept of human beings as an integral part of nature, above all other beings. Most Chinese schools of thought inherited the tradition of attributing foremost importance to people, thus forming unified concepts of psychological phenomena such as desires, emotions, will, and aspiration. There also appeared various theories about how different personalities came into existence, suggesting applications of established psychological thought. Limited by the space in this chapter, we will selectively present a few prominent achievements in the history of Chinese psychological thought.

Theory of Yin-Yang and Five Elements (yīn yáng wu˘ xíng) The Yin-Yang theory and the Five-Element (wu˘ xíng) theory were originally two separate schools of thought, although the origin of either was too remote to be identified. The Yin-Yang theory examines yin and yang as a unity of two opposing forces in the universe. Later, this theory was used to interpret the five elements, namely, metal, wood, water, fire, and earth, as being complementary and counteracting forces in the universe. Much later, during the Warring States Period (475–221 bc), these two theories began to be integrated. This integration underlies a view of the world as a unified system of relationships embedded in contradiction, process, movement, and change. A prominent example is The Yellow Emperor’s Classic of Internal Medicine. This book is China’s earliest comprehensive medical text. It was speculated that the book was written between 400 and 100 bc by multiple medical experts over time, containing medical achievements made from the Period of Spring and Autumn (770– 475 bc) through the Qin Dynasty and the early Han Dynasty (ca. 221 bc–220 ad). The book not only laid a foundation for the Chinese medicine theory, but also established a theory of naïve materialistic elements and spontaneous dialectics that had a far-reaching impact on Chinese psychological thought. The book treats the human body as an 88

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organic and systemic whole, and explains its structure, physiological functions, and pathological changes with the theory of yin-yang and five elements, including them in medical examination and treatment (Jing, 2003). However, the use of this theory goes beyond medicine. An essential idea in examining the human body with this theory is to demonstrate that the human body is a subsystem of the grand system of the universe. With this guiding idea, The Yellow Emperor’s Classic of Internal Medicine has established a unified system of psychological thought for over two millennia, leaving four notable conceptual impacts on Chinese psychological thoughts over time (Zhang, 2008). First, the relationship between form and spirit, for example, that between body and mind, is an interconnected system. The book states that form and spirit coexist in a human being as a system. The existence of form determines that of spirit. At the same time, the appearance of the spirit also redefines the form, and inevitably, the spirit will interact with the form as part of the system. This system view regards the human being as a tiny cosmos of the giant cosmos of the universe. It is not that one is an analogy of the other, but one is part of the other. This view sets itself apart from the Western conceptualization of the relationship between human beings and nature: “The vital law in the universe is that human beings and spirits6 are thoroughly interconnected” (sùwèn: zhìzhēnyàodàlùn). This view in fact reiterates the human’s place in the universe as being above all other species and things. Second, The Yellow Emperor’s Classic of Internal Medicine addresses a problem of general psychology, that is, the properties of the basic psychological process, including the origins and transformation of spirit, soul, intention, will, and thinking. For the human being, “What comes with birth is energy ( jīng). The interaction of two energies gives rise to spirit (shén). Spirit on the move brings forth soul (hún). Soul that moves with energy is willed soul ( pò). The physical part that appies willed soul to things is called xīn (heart). The memory xīn brings about is intention. The continuous accumulation of intention shapes aspiration. The change of aspiration results from thinking. Thinking ahead of time causes contemplation. Contemplation guided actions means wisdom” (língshū: bénshén). This account of the relationships of various mental activities may resonate, to some extent, with definitions of mental activities in modern psychology, but these relationships were conceptualized in terms of the natural forces of yin and yang.

Take, for example, individual differences in personality based on their naturally endowed amount of yīn and yáng. Five different types of yīn yáng balances can be distinguished: yīn-dominant, yīn-insufficient, yáng-dominant, yáng-insufficient, and yīn-yáng balanced. Each of these five yīn-yáng types can be further explained with the five element theory regarding temperament, body shape, skin tone, thought tendency and adaptability to the environment, namely, wood-like, fire-like, earthlike, metal-like, and water-like person. These five types of personality are further analyzed in analogy to the pentatonic scale of the traditional Chinese music to generate a total of 25 personalities. Third, The Yellow Emperor’s Classic of Internal Medicine posits that psychological activities are the functions of interior organs. Specifically, the presence of a particular psychic activity is due to the state and change of a particular organ. At the same time, multiple psychic activities rooted in different organs are coordinated as a whole by xīn (heart), thus each psychic activity depends on those of the other organs. Xīn is the central organ for all psychic activities. This heart-central theory in the book recognizes the importance of the brain, stating that “the brain is a large mass of pulp that makes the brain the source of the wisdom. All the energy channels meet in the brain, especially with a confluence of various yang energies. The brain is connected with the five sense organs” (Yan, 1988, p. 380; cf. Wen & Wen, 2007). This understanding provided conceptual hints to later Chinese medical scholars to reveal the brain’s functions. Fourth, The Yellow Emperor’s Classic of Internal Medicine explores psychopathology to point out that illness may occur if the equilibration is disturbed between the human being and the environment, between physiological being and psychological being. For example, if one’s emotional turmoil is too intense and persists for a long time, the heart (xīn) will pass on these unusual experiences to other organs, causing pathological change in them. Conversely, when a person’s internal organs suffer from irregularity in the bodily energy and blood flow, emotions will become abnormal. From the same relational point of view, the book takes into consideration the psychological and social experiences of the patient to be diagnosed. The patient’s social relationships, social status, habits, disposition, and personality are all important for diagnosing the illness. The theory of yīn yáng wu˘ xíng that runs throughout the Yellow Emperor’s Classic of Internal Medicine

offers explanations of the basic psychological processes, the relationship between spirit and form, between psychological and physiological activities, and between psychopathology and physiology. This theory not only paralleled the teaching and the cosmology of Confucianism, Daoism, and Buddhism during the same historical period, but also profoundly influenced later thinkers. The talent theory in ancient China is an example.

Talent Theory During the Wei Dynasty (ad 220–265) and the Jin Dynasty (ad 265–402), the ruling classes had an increased need for selecting talents to serve the government, giving rise to a discourse among government officials and intellectuals about the nature of talent and character, the relation between the two, and the assessment thereof. This discourse is considered to have made an important contribution to ancient Chinese psychological thought. The most prominent thinker was Liu Shao (ca. 168–249 ad) who was a legalist and writer.7 His writing demonstrated deeply ingrained Confucianism and Daoism, aided by the yin-yang theory. However, the only book he wrote that is still available today is Rénwùzhì (Descriptions of Talents and Characters). Although this book was preserved, it attracted only sporadic scholarly attention until the late 20th century (Bai, 1990; Li, 1995; Liu, 2007; Ma & Zhu, 1998; Ren, 1959; Zhu & Liu, 1989), when a surging interest in the modernization movement began demanding a theory of talents from the past. Interestingly, this is the only ancient Chinese psychological book that was introduced to Anglophone world (Shryock, 1937; Yan, 1998, p. 250). Many believe that this book is a landmark in Chinese intellectual history, unsurpassed until the introduction of modern scientific psychology (Wang, 1994). Some believe that it sets a theoretical framework for the Chinese method of psychological testing (Xiao, 2007).

classifying ability and character Liu Shao argued that all abilities had unique advantages. He divided human abilities into eight types and described particularly suitable official posts for each: The self-perfection type was good at improving himself and aspired for high morality; the legalist type was into establishing and enforcing; the strategist type was good at coming up with strategies and tactics; the interpersonal type could master all kinds of social relationships; the executive type enjoyed supervising the execution of projects; the political power player was good at temporizing; hsueh, guo

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the moralist type was prepared to distinguish good from evil and right from wrong; and the brave and fierce type was serious, stern, and intrepid in dealing with government affairs. Liu Shao’s discussion of character was even more extensive than his discussion of ability types. He grouped different characters with three different theories. With a five-element theory, he divided all the characters into five character types by metal, wood, water, fire, and earth. With a characterintellect constraining theory, he described nine characters that came into being as a result of the constraining effects of the person’s character on his intellect. Finally, he used a strength and weakness theory to categorize characters more meticulously into 12 types, with a focus on selecting the candidate for specific official posts, outlining the selection process and possible pitfalls. (Rénwùzhì: jíuzhēng and tıˇbíe).

assessing talent and character In his book, Liu Shao specified a process for identifying talents and characters. He explained the significance, feasibility, and difficulty of various aspects of the identification process. Talents and characters should be evaluated, first of all, by examining those directly perceivable characteristics, including spirit, energy, muscles,physical build, vitality, complexion, appearance, facial features, and speech. The difficulty in identifying talents and desirable characters was in the evaluators’ preferences and biases. Personal preferences could direct the evaluator’s attention to one strength but not others, probably missing outstanding talents and characters. Another difficulty arose from the fact that the person to be evaluated could act differently from what he actually was. Liu Shao gave seven examples to illustrate this kind of confusion of appearance versus reality in selecting talents and good characters (Rénwùzhì: xiàonán and qīmìu). The use of a comparative method, dialectical in nature, was a salient feature in Liu Shao’s writing. For example, without recognizing ordinary people’s abilities and characters, it would be impossible to know true talents and best characters. The dialectical principle is also embedded in his reasoning. For example, Liu Shao believed that a person’s strengths or merits were often an extension of his shortcomings. An observation of one can reveal the other without its being directly observed. For another example, the evaluation of one’s talent and characters should be conducted under both stable and unstable conditions to make a fair judgment of the person across contexts (Rénwùzhì: bāguān). 90

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Moving from Heart to Brain: Early Brain-Central Theories The Yellow Emperor’s Classic of Internal Medicine, written over 2,400 years ago, offered a first understanding in China of the primacy of the brain in people’s pathological symptoms and psychological life. However, for nearly 2,000 years after the book was written, no further discussion had been recorded until Li Shizhen’s (1518–1593) braincentral explanation appeared in the late Ming Dynasty (1368–1640). Li was the author of the then most comprehensive Encyclopedia of Chinese Herbal Medicine published in1590, and he explicitly stated that the brain was the home of the main spirit and soul. This new topic was taken up by philosophers and medical professionals in both the Ming and Qing Dynasties, who gave elaborated views of the relationships between the brain and human mind. Among those who developed a braincentral concept or theory, Fang Yizhi of the Ming Dynasty, and Liu Zhi and Wang Qingren, both of the Qing Dynasty, were thinkers of note. Fang Yizhi (1611–1671) was a scientist who lived in an era when the Qing Dynasty replaced the Ming Dynasty. Unlike Li Shizhen, who was a prominent scholar of Chinese traditional herbal medicine, Fang had been exposed to the Western medical concepts of organs that treated heart, liver, and brain as equally important (Ding, 1994). He believed that the brain and the mental process are connected because our mental activities, consciousness, memory, and imagination all depended on the receptive and storage functions of the brain substance. This brain substance, he hypothesized, was a fluid whose clearness or murkiness determined whether a person is clever or dull. Additionally, he examined how the brain was related to other body parts and posited that the brain had the function of channeling the energy from and to sensory motor organs (Fang, 1664). He inferred that these processes depended on energy channels— the conceptualized pathways for energy movement in the body. These channels could be divided into three levels: brain channels, essence fluid channels, and thin channels. In comparison with modern physiological concepts of how neurological signals are transmitted, the channels are similar in concept to the neural network, with the thin channels being equivalent to the transmitter of the neural cell. This was a remarkable conceptual advance in China even though Fang was unable to move away from the ancient view that xīn (heart) is the thought organ (He, 1992).

Liu Zhi (1660–1730) was a well-known Muslim scholar in the early Qing Dynasty. In his study of the brain, he made two notable contributions that surpassed Fang’s. The first was his explication of the central regulation by the brain. He speculated that all the perceptual and interior organs could each give rise to a special psychological function, but the brain’s function was to regulate all the organs, specifically in two ways. One way was to store physical and perceptual objects as formless abstract objects, transforming what is heard, seen, and perceived through the tactile sense into what could be stored in the brain. The other way was to interconnect the concrete with the formless or the abstract; that is, the channels in the brain are interconnected with all the sense organs and perceptual motor organs. The channels among all these organs correspond to the psychological functions of these organs (Liu Zhi: tiānfāng xìnglıˇ ). In the history of Chinese psychology, Liu Zhi was the first person who clearly put forth the notion that sensory activities and perceptual knowledge had a physiological foundation because the brain was the center of all perceptions. The second contribution he made was his articulation in specifying the locations of various brain functions. He believed that perceptual synthesis and cognitive abilities such as recall, contemplation, judgment, and recognition, are all functions of the brain. He pinpointed five locations on the brain as the loci of perceptual and cognitive functions. The precision of Liu Zhi’s conception was unprecedented at the time and preceded by 200 years the well-known localization of mental functions that Franz J. Gall advanced (Zhu, 2004). Wang Qingren (1768–1831) was a Chinese medical doctor in the mid-Qing Dynasty. He was best known for his theorization of brain functions based on anatomic analysis of the brain, sense organs, and limbs, in addition to his close observation of patients. Unlike Fang and Liu, who only integrated the Western notions with their own speculations, Wang Qingren conducted autopsies of hundreds of bodies, an act that could have brought him the death penalty (Yan, 1998). Based on these anatomic analyses, his brain-central theory offered a comprehensive description of psychological activities of his day. Reviewing various Chinese concepts of the brain since the era of Spring and Autumn (770–475 bc), Wang Qingren critiqued the 2,000-year-old notion that the heart was the center of thoughts and feelings, and advanced the proposition that intellect and memory are brain-based.

He began explaining the structure from the brain to the spinal cord as the foundation of his brain theory. He described pathways by which the ear, eye, mouth, and nose were connected to the brain and by which the brain regulated the sense organs. Wang also delineated how brain diseases could bring about psychological illness. His first-hand observations of stroke patients’ sense organs allowed him to suggest that the two hemispheres of the brain had different functions. He also attempted to interpret the causes of dreams and insomnia (Wang Qingren, 1830, Yīlíngăicuò: năosúishuō). This interpretation led to his view that the ceasing of all brain activities marked one’s death—a view that was ahead of his time. Contemporary scholars agreed that Wang’s theory ended the dominance of the ancient heart-centered theory of thoughts and feelings, a theory that ruled Chinese psychological thoughts for over two millennia. It also culminated in the effort over time to recognize the brain-centered theory, “anticipating a modern understanding of the brain as the center of all psychological organs and offering empirical evidence to support scientific arguments about brain functions” (Gao, 2005b, pp. 361–362).

Premodern Psychology (1840–1919) Although Western missionaries had begun introducing European psychological thoughts to China around 1600, it was 1840 that marked the beginning of premodern psychology because the Opium Wars made China acutely conscious of Western political, military, and commercial forces that could overpower China’s taken-for-granted self-image as the center of the world. At the same time, domestic peasant uprisings added intensity to the international conflicts that Western navies and commercial shipping brought to China’s ports and lands. Many Chinese intellectuals, particularly social reformers, looked to psychology to explain the national and international crises. Those who further developed early Chinese psychological thoughts during this period were often patriotic intellectuals who were profoundly concerned about China’s present and future. They were determined to integrate Western science to advance Chinese psychological thoughts. At the turn of the 20th century, Chinese writers began to translate Western psychological works, but mostly by way of its neighbor, Japan, a bridge in the psychological field between China and the West (Jing & Fu, 2001; Zhang, 2007). Even the Chinese term for psychology, xīnlıˇxué, is a close borrowing from the Japanese-coined term, shinrigaku (Azuma & Imada, 1994). hsueh, guo

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Missionaries’ Effort to Spread Western Psychological Ideas During the 16th century, new maritime technology expanded Western European countries’ ambitions to explore and colonize the world. Christian missionaries joined the exploration. Jesuits landed on China’s shore in 1565. They acquired not only local dialects but also written Chinese, enabling them to introduce Western thoughts to a society that valued classic text–based knowledge. They translated theological and philosophical works from the West, including ancient and medieval psychological books. Two better known books were Ricci’s 1596 Treatise on Mnemonic Arts (Ricci, 1965) and Alenis’ 1623 Introduction to Human Nature (Alenis, 1935). Both were written in Chinese.

matteo ricci (1552–1610) and his mnemonic arts Matteo Ricci was an accomplished Italian missionary who came to China in 1583 and wrote two books. One of them was Treatise on Mnemonic Arts (Xī Guó Jì Fă) (Ricci, 1965). This book combined a mnemonic system from the West and the six traditional ways of analyzing and understanding Chinese characters8 as tools for learning written Chinese. The book was a landmark in the history of Chinese psychology because it marked the first official entry of Western psychology and the first integration of the two types of psychological thought for a practical purpose. In this book, for example, Ricci demonstrated how to “build a ‘memory palace’ by assigning different objects to different locations in an imaginary building, making full use of the method of loci and mental representations” (Jing & Fu, 2001, p. 412) to produce an effective and accurate memory of things. The described methods of memorizing Chinese characters pioneered the application of psychology in learning written Chinese and teaching literacy. Theoretically, Ricci described recall as a function of the brain that is located in the lower back of the head. His claim about the brain as a seat of mind came only 6 years after Li Shizhen’s 1590 publication of The Encyclopedia of Chinese Herbal Medicine, in which the brain was considered a locus of temperament (Jing & Fu, 2001). However, Ricci theorized that all phenomena entered the brain in images through the five senses, as if impressing themselves on the brain. Because the moisture level and the solidity level vary from one part of the brain to another, memory impressions will be left in various depths. Although these explanations do not hold 92

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water today, they were entirely fresh at that time in China.

julius alenis (1582–1649) and his ideas on human nature Another Italian missionary, Julius Alenis, followed the footsteps of Ricci to arrive in China in 1613. Ten years later, he published Introduction to Human Nature (Xīngxué Cūshù) (Alenis, 1935) with the intention to justify and prove accepted theological and religious beliefs by describing human personality in great detail. This book consists of eight chapters that cover a wide range of psychological phenomena, including perceptions, cognition, symbols, memory, thinking, speech, desires, and dreams. Topics on physiological phenomena such as human growth, puberty, sleep, and death are also important in the book. Alenis’ view of physiology as a foundation for psychological activities is especially worth mentioning. He made use of available physiological knowledge to explain some psychological phenomena, and he related them to specific locations of the brain, reflecting the West’s progress in anatomy. In essence, this book was “an adaptation of Aristotelian psychology in Chinese” (Jing & Fu, 2001, p. 412). Additionally, Alenis introduced the association method by describing how to compare, contrast, and analogize different phenomena. He provided a set of articulated methods in association, recognition, and remembering. These features exerted a strong influence on emerging scientific thinking in Chinese psychology.

Chinese Scholars’ Contributions In the first 80 years of the 19th century, the court of the Qing Dynasty appeared at a loss for ways to deal with international affairs. China’s defeat in the Opium War and other wars against foreign powers shattered its stability and created two societal problems: multiple domestic uprisings to threaten the government and frequent demands from foreign powers for lands and compensation. Many patriotic Chinese intellectuals found fault with Confucian doctrine and promoted the idea that China should learn from Western innovations. Many political reformers in the Chinese government also turned to newly acquired psychological concepts in an effort to spread their social and educational reform plans. They cited psychological ideas from abroad to support their own reform ideas. Among the reformers were four prominent scholars and officials who drew on supporting arguments from the new psychology.

gong zizhen (1792–1841) Gong Zizhen was a prominent social reformer in the late Qing Dynasty whose psychological essays include “Between zhī (knowing) and jué (consciousness),” “For emotions,” and “Interpreting Gaozi,”9 all of which extensively discussed psychological concepts. Three of his ideas were recognized as important contributions: the distinction between zhī and jué, the argument for emotions, and innate neutrality at birth. In his article “Distinguishing zhī and jué” ( knowing and consciousness), Gong suggested that zhī and jué should be distinguished because the objects of zhī refer to those that are directly visible; the objects of jue refer to those that are invisible and abstract. Based on this distinction, he believed that zhī is a cognitive ability that both saints and people on the street have. In contrast, jué is a naturally endowed ability that only saints possess, “What can be known, saints know; what cannot be known, saints can become aware of ” (Gong, 1975, p. 127). This further distinction is not appealing to the modern mind, but the distinction between zhī and jué indeed added conceptual clarity to Chinese psychological thought. Gong was against the view of deliberate strict control of emotions that was promoted by the classic Confucian scholars and the ruling class. He was rather open to emotional expressions based on the belief that emotions arise naturally from human contact, through interaction between the heart and the external environment. For this reason, emotions are closely related to human needs. Any forceful suppression of emotions was unreasonable. Chinese scholars later considered his view as a theory of pro-emotions and called it a “naïve materialistic view” of emotions (Zou, 1984). For generations of school children in modern China, Gong has been known as an expressive writer whose poems and prose were filled with strong, explicit emotional expressions. Gong also opposed two long-held philosophical positions about human nature. One was Mengzi’s idea of inborn goodness in the Confucian classics and the other Xunzi’s idea of inborn evilness. Although Mengzi’s view of human inborn goodness was influential, Gaozi, who came from a different school of thought and reportedly was Mengzi’s contemporary and critic, refuted the notion of either good or bad inborn human nature. Gaozi argued that people were born to become socially good. In Mengzi’s main work, two chapters record the debate between the two men and interpret Gaozi’s ideas

(Mengzi: gàozishàng and gàozixià). Like Gaozi, Gong Zizhen argued that moral feelings and understandings were not determined before birth. They were the outgrowth of social life, a strong view consistent with his argument about emotions that arose only through interaction with the environment (Gong, 1975).

wei yuan (1794–1857) A contemporary of Gong Zizhen, Wei Yuan left his mark in the history of Chinese psychological thought with a book Gu˘weītángjì (Wei, 1878/1975) that has a chapter discussing psychological issues. He relied on the traditional view of channeled or focused energy as the source of psychological phenomena. But his interpretations of these classical positions ran against classic Confucian views. For example, he denied the existence of the jūnzi, who was born to know. He held that a person must interact with the environment in order to know and to become a learned person. Although intelligence could emerge as a combination of temperament and activities, activities cannot be overemphasized as the way of knowing. Compared to Gong’s advocacy for recognizing emotional needs, Wei was more moderate in endorsing feelings and desires. He preferred staying the same, being content, and lessening desires. On the other hand, like Gong, who was reform-minded, Wei was critical of some fundamentals of Confucianism that had underpinned the notion of state and governance for 2,000 years.

tan sitong (1865–1898) Tan Sitong was one of the best known premodern political reformers in China. He lived in the post Opium War era and once led a major but aborted political reform from within the government, known as Modernization Reform, for which he died. Historians often regard him as being within the school of capitalist modernization reformers. His psychological thought can be found in his writings: “On philosophy of humanity” (1896–1897) and “Theory of the whole” (Tan, 1981). His psychological ideas were grounded in the traditional Chinese philosophies, but with new interpretations influenced by Western ideas. For example, Tan borrowed the notion of “ether” from the field of physics, which hypothesized that the universe was composed of this material, to describe how ether generated the celestial bodies and nurtured all lives, including human beings. Following this reasoning, he believed that human beings came from the evolution of the material world and arrived at the top hsueh, guo

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of all living beings. What distinguished human beings from other animals was language and intelligence, a conclusion that seemed to return to Confucianism but through an entirely different reasoning, using the Western notion. Tan also attempted to explain how the neurological system produced sensory perceptions. Once again, he borrowed from Western science and described brain activities in terms of a flow of electrical signals. He held that the brain was the thinking organ, and that the heart and the brain communicated with and influenced each other through the substance of ether. This view appeared to be somewhat ahead of the brain-central theory in ancient China and the premodern period, when Fang Yizhi and Wang Qingren put forth their ideas about brain functions, but due to the speculative nature of his reasoning, Tan’s view fell back on the traditional view that human beings and the universe are of a whole system, except that he rendered the mechanism not through focused energy, but using the Western notion of ether to describe the link (Tan, 1981).

liang qichao (1873–1929) Equally well known as Tan, the political reformer of late Qing Dynasty, a scholar and government official, Liang Qichao participated in the Modernization Reform from within the government, and fled to Japan after the reform failed. Later, he traveled to Australia and the United States. However, although during the short-lived Modernization Reform he vehemently advocated for a constitutional monarchy, his 8-month tour in the United States convinced him that the constitutional, republic system was not suitable for China (Liang, 1903/2007). He turned to writing and education in the later part of his life to promote social change (Liu, 1997). In his historical writings, the influence of Western psychology appeared frequently to serve as a guiding argument for social reform. He analyzed the personalities and characters of remarkable historical figures in China to demonstrate how historical events evolved from these personal psychological characteristics (Shi, 2007). In the 1920s, Liang often used terms like “psychology,” “social psychology,” “citizen psychology,” “mass psychology,” “disposition,” and “personality” in his published historical studies. These usages added to his analysis and assisted him in explaining and illustrating historical facts and materials (Jiang, 2004). His passion for social psychology was so strong that he even explained, “Politics in society is 94

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a manifestation of its citizens’ psychological states.” He placed psychology at the center of all politics, stating, “The most important study in politics is the study of citizens’ psychology. In order to reform the political system, the key is to reform the citizens’ psychological states” (as cited in Gao, 2005a, p. 375). These radical ideas also ran against his knowledge of Confucianism, which he believed obstructed reform (Zhang, 2001). Liang believed that radical educational reform must precede the eventual implementation of political reform. A new educational system must integrate Western and Chinese moral traditions to bring up a new generation with the new moral characters that future China needed (Liu, 1997). It was necessary for Chinese to embrace a new education in which children’s physiological and psychological ages were benchmarks for education planning in order to make effective changes in China— an apparent influence from the formal schooling movement and progressive movements in the West. Liang argued that education must emphasize memorization and comprehension as a whole, the two inseparable and complementary psychological processes. He described the major function of education as “arousing interests on the one hand, and avoiding ruining interests on the other” (Liang, 1962, p. 950). Liang was the first scholar in China who compared and combined the study of Buddhism with that of psychology. Fundamental to all his arguments that held psychohistory and education as leading to political change as a whole was his understanding of Buddhism as a psychology itself, but with a long history, “I firmly believe that the study of Buddhism should begin from psychology in its classics; I firmly believe that the study of psychology should take Buddhism as the key object of study” (Liang, 1922/2009, also see Jiang, 2004). Liang was instrumental in separating Chinese psychological terminology from philosophical terminology and standardizing translated psychological terminology. He was said to be influential in urging Chinese scholars to adopt the Japanese translation shinri-gaku in kanji from the English word psychology as coined by the Japanese psychologist Amane Nishi in 1875 (Zhang, 2007). Liang stated, “Japanese translated from English the word ‘psychology’ into ‘xīnlıˇxué’ (the study of the heart’s law) and philosophy into ‘zhéxué’ (the study of wisdom). Although the two categories are fundamentally different and we should not blindly follow these categories, Japanese scholars put in much thought in

these translations and captured the original meanings in the West” (as cited in X. Yang, 2000a, pp. 86–87). Regardless of this admiration and nuanced discussion, Liang himself never separated psychology from philosophy, and he never argued that psychology should be an independent scientific discipline. One may argue that Liang’s view of psychology reflected his time, when psychologists were struggling to become independent of philosophy even in the United States (Boring, 1961). However, given China’s historical context and his own firm belief in the relation between Buddhism and psychology, Liang’s view of psychology and philosophy as a whole can be also well explained by the cultural outlook of nature–human oneness, as we argue later. Even though he was keenly conscious of the thoughtful Japanese distinction between the two fields, he was unmoved by this distinction and further cautioned his reader not follow it “blindly.” In summary, the above four scholars and social reformers of the 19th century, who either analytically critiqued the classics of some Chinese psychological ideas, such as Gong and Wei, or enthusiastically introduced Western psychology to Chinese audiences, such as Tan and Liang, all were interested in psychology of different kinds, as evidence shows, not for its own sake or its scientific pursuit, but for China’s social, political, and educational reform. Particularly toward the end of the 19th century, Western scientific ideas and psychology entered China through bloody domestic and international conflicts. Scholars like Liang and many others brought back Western psychology as a way of seeking new paths to social reform. Regardless of their different foci, influenced by the periods in which they lived, the four scholars and reformers had one commonality: They were all critical of some aspects of Confucianism that remained the foundation for China’s political system. This accumulative critique over time foreshadowed a cultural movement in 1919 that explicitly denounced Confucianism and ushered in modern scientific psychology amidst a spate of social revolutions.

Early Entry of Western Psychology into China Western psychology entered China via two routes: Japanese translations of Western psychological works and Western missionary schools of different denominations in China. Missionary schools offered the first psychology courses in China. During this period, Western psychological thoughts were introduced mostly from textbooks. Chinese students

who studied in missionary schools and later went on to the United States for further study often were exposed to Western psychology. Yan Yongjing was one of these students, and his translation of a U.S. psychological textbook, Mental Philosophy: Including the Intellect, Sensibilities and Will (Haven, trans. 1889) was an earliest effort to bring Western psychology directly to Chinese readers (Blowers, 1996; Jing, 2001). In 1904, Emperor Guangxu of the Qing Dynasty approved Memorial to Throne for Establishing School Constitution. Soon after, a national school system was developed that included formal schooling, normal education, and vocational education. The formal schooling consisted of 9 years of primary school, 5 years of middle school, and 6 years of pre-college and college, a sequence borrowed from Europe. The curriculum, however, was centered on Chinese classics, with Western sciences as supplements.10 Beijing Normal College (later Peking University) began to offer courses in psychology. These changes played a critical role in increasing Chinese awareness of psychology. In response to the need for more psychology textbooks demanded by new education, Wang Guowei translated two Western psychology textbooks, one on general psychology and the other on educational psychology, for normal school students. Together, Yan’s and Wang’s translations marked the beginning of the direct introduction of educational psychology to Chinese students.

yan yongjing (1838–1898) Yan Yongjing spent his childhood in a Shanghai church-run school and sailed in 1854 to the United States to study at Kenyon College in Ohio. During his study, he took some psychology courses. On his return, he became the president of St. Johns College, while teaching psychology on the side. The text he used was Joseph Haven’s (1816–1874) Mental Philosophy: Including the Intellect, Sensibilities and Will (Haven, 1875). In need of a psychology text for his daily teaching, Yan translated the book— ironically, from a Japanese version (Jing, 1994, p. 669; Kodama, 1991)—and it became the very first Chinese translation of a text on philosophical psychology.11 However, his effort to translate and teach with this book was confined to St. Johns College. The tremendous difficulty he encountered in translating English psychological terminology into Chinese was obvious in the title. Literally, in Chinese, the title is Study of Heart and Soul. Even greater difficulty was encountered as he searched for corresponding Chinese words for psychological jargon. hsueh, guo

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His solution was to coin new Chinese terms as he deemed necessary while adhering to the principle of using ancient Chinese prose as a text for the learned and the would-be-learned. This combined strategy for translation made the resultant text hard to follow. The Chinese psychological terminology he coined did not get much attention at the time and consequently was lost entirely. Nevertheless, Yan’s translation of Haven’s text has been widely held by Chinese psychologists as a milestone in Chinese modern psychology. Some consider it the beginning of scientific psychology in China (Blowers, 2006).

wang guowei (1877–1927) In contrast, another early attempt by Wang Guowei to introduce Western psychology to China was quite successful. Wang was a versatile scholar known for his accomplishments in literature, historical studies, and Western philosophy. He was drawn to psychology while studying Western philosophy between 1903 and 1905. During that period, he taught psychology at two normal schools in Jiangsu Province. Soon, Wang translated the English version of Outlines of Psychology by H. Høffding (1907), a Danish philosopher. This Chinese translation was the first scientific psychology book that had ever been translated into Chinese. The contents of this informative book were well organized and delineated. The 1891 English version translated by Mary Lowndes was an internationally popular psychology text that had eight editions from 1891 to 1919. Thus, it could not be a coincidence that Wang’s translation went through ten editions from 1907 to 1935. However, the popularity of this Chinese version could not have been accomplished without Wang’s thoughtful and skilled translation preserving the original merits of the book. A few years later, in 1910, Wang translated Psychology in Education by R. N. Roark (1895/1910). Wang took up this translation by using a Japanese version also. The contents of the book were accessible to students and faculty members in normal schools and colleges, directly addressing educational issues. It was a popular book. Many examples of psychological jargon in Wang’s translation were made comprehensible to educated Chinese readers. These translated terms continue to be used in present-day psychology in China. Some terminology in his translation even sets a standard for later translation efforts. In short, as an influential translator for later generations, Wang’s work is notable for two related facts: One, for whatever reason, he translated 96

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texts that were themselves translations, rather than using the original source. Two, the use of the Japanese version in one of these cases was an epitome of a broader movement in learning from the West by going to the east—Japan.

Japan as China’s Entry Port of Western Psychology The introduction of scientific psychology to China closely followed the Qing government’s educational reform at the beginning of the 20th century. The practical purpose was to substantiate the new teacher training curriculum at the national level, a focus and a model for later translating Western psychology throughout the century in China (Blowers, 2000; Clay, 2002; Xu, 1990; Zhao, 1992). Not until the early 1920s did most Chinese normal schools use psychology texts translated only from Japanese texts, which were often a compilation or digest of English texts or lecture notes. Even psychology textbooks written by Chinese authors were based mostly on Japanese sources and compiled by Chinese writers who had studied in Japan. It was increasingly common for Chinese normal schools and colleges then to employ Japanese teachers to teach psychology (Harrell, 1998), although this importing of Japanese psychological personnel slowed down as the United States used part of the Boxer Indemnity fund to support Chinese students in studying in U.S. universities (Blowers, 2000). Japan became an entry port of Western psychology to China. The first Japanese professor who taught psychology to Chinese normal school students was Unokichi Hattori (1867–1939), by invitation, in 1902, of the Beijing Normal College, the forerunner of today’s Peking University (Jing & Fu, 2001). Unokichi earned a Ph.D. from Tokyo Imperial University and visited both Leipzig University and Berlin University (Zhang, 2007). His lectures were compiled by a Chinese colleague into two volumes entitled Beijing Normal College Psychology Lesson Plans (Jīngshī Dàxuétáng Xīnlīxué Jiăngyì) (Liu, 2002). These plans focused on cognition, emotion, and volition; depicted features of scientific psychology; and provided examples of experimental methods. It is interesting that the lesson plans also included examples of Chinese classic notions of human thought to explain some psychological phenomena. The inclusion of Chinese notions suggests that the Japanese professor attempted to connect Western modern psychology with Chinese tradition and Chinese students. As a distinguished Japanese

psychologist and educator, Hattori’s contributions to teacher training at Beijing Normal College were officially acknowledged (Harrell, 1998; Jing & Fu 2001). Between 1900 and 1918, some twenty booklength publications were either translated Japanese psychology books, compiled Japanese sources on psychology, or edited notes series that Japanese psychology teachers authorized (Gao, 2005a, p. 385; Wan, 1987). These early translations and other forms of publications in psychology were mostly designed as textbooks or teaching materials at normal schools or colleges. Wan (1987, p. 110) listed 33 articles or books published by Commercial Press in Shanghai with psychological topics covering general psychology (17), educational psychology (4), child psychology (1), mental phenomena (3), hypnosis (3), and monster studies (5). Over 1,400 years ago, the Silk Road brought many Western ideas, including Buddhism, into the Chinese intellectual discourse and practice; the new “Silk Road” that brought ideas of Western psychology was Japan, a country that is only a narrow strip of water away from China. Interestingly, it was Ryo Kuroda, a Japanese psychologist, who published a 476-page book entitled, The History of Psychological Thoughts in China, in 1948 (Zhang, 2007), probably the first book exploring ancient Chinese psychological thought.

Modern Psychology (1919–1949) The year 1919 was an important turning point in China’s political and intellectual life. Following World War I, most victorious nations granted Japan’s demand in the finalized Treaty of Versailles, which turned over the German colony of China’s Shandong Province to Japan. When the news reached Beijing in the end of April 1919, it sparked the May 4th Movement that rapidly swept China and marked the beginning of its modern era. Students’ demand for the return of Shandong led to an extensive and profound discourse among intellectuals, coalescing a zeitgeist that had begun to emerge in the late 19th century. As described in the previous section, intellectuals and social reformers early on had introduced to China Western science, including psychology and political systems while becoming increasingly critical of Confucianism as a state doctrine, bringing forth the so-called New Culture movement. Pro-science and pro-democracy became two salient messages in the battle cries of the movement. During the 1920s, a good number of Chinese psychologists who studied overseas

returned to China, shaping the Chinese scientific community in a broad sense. They made great strides in catching up with advances in Western psychology even though the blooming of scientific psychology was often held back by political, economic, and individual adversities and by wars from the mid-1930s to 1949. But the scientific accomplishments of Chinese psychologists during this period were foundational for later development of the field. The vitality of Chinese psychology during this period was unparalleled until after 1980. Two remarkable people, Cai Yuanpei and Chen Daqi, were the pioneers in modern psychology. Both were affiliated with the Leipzig school and began teaching psychology at Peking University in the 1910s.

Pioneers in Modern Chinese Psychology cai yuanpei (1868–1940) Cai Yuanpei’s life spanned the premodern and modern eras of Chinese psychology. Cai was not only a scientist, but also a revolutionary, an educator, and a highly respected public intellectual. He was a leader in the New Culture movement and an advocate and supporter of China’s modern psychology, not to say that he himself was the first and the only Chinese student trained in Leipzig, Germany. During his time in Germany (1907– 1911), he spent 3 years in Leipzig, taking 40 courses including philosophy, psychology, ethnography, esthetics, and arts. He took Wundt’s experimental psychology course three times. Later, he spent 3 years (1913–1916) in France, studying arts and esthetics (Cai, 2003; Zhang, X. 2009). In 1917, Cai was appointed the President of Peking University. There, he supported Chen Daqi in creating China’s first psychological laboratory, followed by the founding of a new psychology department in Peking University. In 1929, when he was the President of Academia Sinica, Cai was instrumental to establishing the first Institute of Psychology. In adherence to Wundt’s scientific principle, he firmly held that the experimental method determined the scientific nature of psychology. This principle of science was applicable to psychology as a natural science as well as to psychology as a social science. Cai’s training in psychology gave him a vantage point from which to call for the application of psychology to education, especially following the overthrow of the Qing Dynasty and the May 4th Movement, which brought significant changes to the educational system. His vision for education was to use experimental psychology to cultivate the hsueh, guo

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individuality of each child. At the same time, treating education as a long process, he also supported the idea that child psychology should be the basis for designing pedagogy. Cai was not alone in his vision for psychology and education (Cui, 2009; Zhang, 2009). In this connection, Dewey’s visit to China from April 30, 1919 to July 11, 1921 was probably the most high-profile example of these widespread progressive ideas that carried a similar perspective on education. Some well-known psychologists of the day were also adamant about experimental education based on experimental psychology (e.g., Claparède, 1912; Piaget, 1970). There is reason to believe that Cai’s long stay in Europe and other visits to Western countries provided him with a perspective of psychology akin to the views that Baldwin (1913), Piaget (1915, 1918 as cited in Gruber & Voneche, 1977, pp. 26–37, 42–50), Vygotsky (1930/1994), and others expressed about societal development from lower stages to higher ones. Scholars pointed out that these theorists and many others at the time not only depicted the development of the individual and society, but also espoused a far-reaching vision that can be described in terms of ethics and esthetics in their unity (Cahan, 1992, 1995; Van der Veer & Valsiner, 1991, Vidal, 1989, 1994). Influenced by 19th-century grand theories like Darwin’s, psychologists anticipated individual and societal development with an ultimate esthetic future in a higher moral realm. Education based on developmental theories leads to the goodness of people, or in a word, to esthetics. Scholars who studied Cai Yuanpei all noted his urge for esthetic education that suggests a higher level of mental as well as ethical development. Cai (1983) particularly advocated for replacing religions with esthetics in education (also, cf. Lin & Jiang, 2005; Wang, 2008).

chen daqi (1886–1983) Unlike Cai, who traveled to Western countries to gain an in-depth understanding of the new science, Chen Daqi headed east to study Western psychology at Tokyo Imperial University in Japan. Chen spent 3 years (1909–1912) studying under Yujiro Motora (1868–1912). Motora had earned his Ph.D. in psychology with G. Stanley Hall at Johns Hopkins University, and also had studied in Germany (Azuma & Imada, 1994). One of the earliest of Japan’s psychology professors, Motora integrated Western psychological ideas with Buddhism to promote “mind” as the source of psychological phenomena. Chen received his education in psychology during the last 3 years of Motora’s life. After his return to China in 98

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1914, Chen was appointed professor of psychology, philosophy, and later the chairman of the philosophy and psychology departments at Peking University. He taught for 16 years (1914–1931) there before his interest turned away from psychology (Zhou, 1986). Chen created China’s first psychological laboratory in 1917 (Chen, Zhang, Li, & Han, 2001, p. 718). The next year, he published The Outline of Psychology (Chen, 1918), which became the first university psychology textbook in China. It was an instant success, reprinted 12 times in 10 years. This textbook “accurately and comprehensively reflected the scientific understandings and major achievements in psychology at Wundt’s time. It synthesized the rich contents and recent accomplishments of Western psychology” (Yan, 1990, p. 63). Also in 1918, Chen (1918/2004) did an empirical study of Beijing elementary school girls’ moral awareness. With two self-designed surveys for different age groups, Chen’s study marked the first empirical psychological study within China using a modern survey method and statistical analysis. Chen’s accomplishments and his association with a number of firsts in Chinese psychology placed him on the top of the list of the most important modern Chinese psychologists.

The Founding of the Chinese Psychological Society and Other Landmarks The pioneering work that Cai and Chen led in Peking University was inspiring. Many psychologists in other parts of China also plunged into similar endeavors. A number of landmark events are noteworthy, such as China’s first department of psychology in Nanjing, the founding of the Institute of Psychology, and the first few attempts to form professional organizations. Nanjing Normal College created the first department of psychology in China and offered elective courses in psychology in 1920. An education major was required to take courses from both the education department and psychology department. Many universities began to follow suit. By 1934, out of the 55 national, provincial, and private colleges and universities in China, 21 had a department or division of psychology (Guo, 2009, p. 3; Ministry of Education, 1934). In 1921, a group of Nanjing Normal College students initiated the Zhōnghuá (Chinese) Psychological Society and received support from their professors. Zhang Yaoxiang, a Columbia University graduate who returned to China in 1920, was elected president. The Chinese

Journal of Psychology, the society’s journal, was created the next year. At its peak, the society had 235 members, but it was not well organized and did not have regular activities, nor did the journal publish regularly (Chou, 1927a, b). Recent reviews listed a total of 14 issues published from 1922 to 1927 containing 150 original articles (Blowers, 2009; Zhao, 1992). The journal ceased publishing in 1927, and the society practically dissolved except for its name. Interestingly, more than half of the articles in this short-lived first psychology journal dealt with applied psychological topics concerning Chinese social and individual life. Many used Western psychological methods to confirm ancient Chinese ideas or practices. In 1936, some psychologists reinitiated this professional organization by founding the Chinese Psychological Association. Its inaugural meeting elected Lu Zhiwei, a child psychologist and linguist, as the first president and decided to publish its journal, Acta Psychologica Sinica. Unfortunately, the war with Japan broke out the next year, and this second attempt to form a scientific community halted abruptly. Once again, the articles in this new journal responded to the urgent social needs for strengthening China on the eve of foreign invasion. They were mostly about education and psychological or school testing. Geoffery Blowers (2009), a historian of Chinese psychology, summarizes a content analyses of this second short-lived journal: Authors of these articles, instead of using Western science as a means of confirming features of a cherished traditional culture, now sought that science as a means of helping China solve its immediate practical problems of low morale. Voices urging self-strengthening of the nation, echoing those from the previous late Qing period, were prevalent in the articles of this period. (p. 30)

Back in June 1928, Cai Yuanpei presided over the first Academia Sinica meeting in Shanghai (www.sinica.edu.tw/intro.htm), at which participants determined that an Institute of Psychology would be among the first ten institutes to be created. Cai invited Tang Yue (1891–1987), a Harvardtrained experimental psychologist and then Peking University psychology professor, to head this institute, which began to operate in May 1929. It was the predecessor of the Institute of Psychology both of the Chinese Academy of Science in China and of Academia Sinica in Taiwan due to the political divide after 1949. In addition, seven other short-lived journals also appeared, including Education and Psychology,

a biannual journal beginning in 1928; Psychological Biannual, launched in 1934; and Special Issues in Psychological and Educational Experiment, also launched in 1934. Gao Juefu (2005a, p. 398), a well-placed historian of psychology, surveyed Chinese psychological publications from 1920 to 1940. He noted that, of 371 publications in psychology, there were 206 edited or compiled books or articles, and 165 translated pieces. In other words, at least 4 of 9 publications were meant to introduce the latest Western psychological achievements, but the rest addressed various Chinese problems. Comparably, a comprehensive review by Zhao Liru (as cited in Xu, 1990) counts a total of 1,013 articles from all the psychological journals up to 1949, with 60% being about psychology applied to Chinese problems, thus showing psychologists’ extensive efforts to utilize Western psychology in service to answering Chinese questions. These publications were vital in disseminating psychology and facilitating the scientific socialization among Chinese psychologists then and future psychologists in decades to come.

Introduction to Different Western Psychological Theories The 1920s and the 1930s were particularly lively times for psychology, as various schools of psychology emerged. China’s May 4th Movement created a receptive milieu for a good number of Chinese who trained in universities of the West to return, bringing with them Western schools of psychology, including structuralism, functionalism, behaviorism, Gestalt psychology, and psychoanalysis, among others. During this period, no other academic institutions were better equipped than Peking University to disseminate experimental, also known as structural, psychology. Not only did Cai Yuanpei take Wundt’s experimental psychology course three times, but Chen Daqi and Tang Yue also had been trained in the same tradition, and their teaching at Peking University highlighted this school of thought. In the meantime, translated works of experimental psychology were also increasingly available. Two authoritative books were Wundt’s An Introduction to Psychology (Wundt, 1923) and E. B. Titchener’s A Primer of Psychology (Titchener, trans. 1931). These books inspired new efforts to generate secondary sources (e.g. Chen, 1932; Huang, 1932; Xie, 1930), and provided rich and eagerly sought materials for early scientific psychology and psychology education in China. hsueh, guo

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Despite this early impact of structural psychology, functionalist psychology was fast gaining ground in China. John Dewey, a leader in American pragmatism and progressivism, gave a 2-year Chinese lecture tour from 1919 to 1921 that stimulated a lively discourse among Chinese intellectuals (Rockefeller, 1991). Those Chinese who studied under Dewey and other like-minded scholars in the United States had already begun resettling in China, and promoting progressive ideas in education. Intellectuals like Ai Wei, Chen Heqin, Lu Zhiwei, Hu Shi, Tao Xingzhi, and Zhang Yaoxiang believed that functionalism manifested in Dewey’s and other American thinkers’ writings were more useful than a structural psychology. Chinese psychologists and educators before 1949 showed heightened interest in functionalism and made extensive efforts to translate the work of John Dewey, William James, Edward Thorndike, and Robert Woodworth, among others. Regardless of the functionalist attraction, behaviorist psychology probably was best known during this period, and its impact could not be overestimated. J. B. Watson’s publications of the day—including Behaviorism (Watson, trans. 1925), Psychology in 1925 (Watson, trans. 1928), and Experimental Studies of Emotions (Watson, trans., 1934)—were translated in whole or in part. Numerous introductions, commentaries, and interpretations were offered by Chinese psychologists, but none was more influential and radical than the work of Kuo Zing-Yang (also known as Guo Renyuan, 1898–1970). Kuo’s experimental studies of instincts and learned behaviors of chicks, cats, and mice made him the most cited Chinese behaviorist in China and abroad.12 Kuo studied with Edward Tolman at the University of California, Berkeley, from 1917 to 1923, and afterward remained actively in contact with a number of prominent U.S. psychologists. He never completed his Ph.D., and he pursued an administrative and political career later in his life, with his scientific work mostly on the side (Blowers, 2001). In the fall of 1920, while still an undergraduate, he presented a paper entitled, “Giving Up Instincts in Psychology” (Kuo, 1921) at a Berkeley conference on educational psychology, putting forth an argument that even many self-styled behaviorists were not ready to accept. Kuo’s argument to eliminate the notion of instinct from psychological research was at odds with the notion of innate instinct and motivation that William McDougal believed to be a source of social psychology. 100

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Kuo’s technique for observing the chick fetus by making an opening in the egg shell to observe its inborn instincts was known as a “Kuo window.” He published eight books, including Human Behaviors (Kuo, 1923), Behaviorism (Kuo, 1933), and The Dynamics of Behavior Development: An Epigenetic View (Kuo, 1967). Kuo probably will be remembered in the history of psychology for his ingenious experiment on how cats and mice, raised together, lived together peacefully, and also for his radical political pursuits (Blowers, 2001). In the 1930s, Gestalt psychology aroused much interest among Chinese psychologists, who quickly translated Gestalt psychology texts, such as New Theory of Child Psychology (Koffka, trans. 1933), Principles of Gestalt Psychology (Koffka, trans. 1936), Kurt Lewin’s Principles of Topological Psychology (Lewin, trans., 1945), and Aspects of Gestalt Psychology (Köhler & Koffka, trans. 1935). The person of note in the dissemination of Gestalt psychology was H. H. Hsiao (Xiao Xiaorong), who spent 1 year at Berlin University, Germany, to study Gestalt psychology while still a student in the United States. On his return to the United States, he published two articles in Psychological Bulletin and Psychological Review to introduce Gestalt psychology and address some confusing issues among U.S. psychologists (Hsiao, 1928a, 1928b). A few years later, Hsiao (1934) recalled that his pioneering effort to review Gestalt psychology in the two articles was a response to many misunderstandings among American psychologists, and “Professor E. G. Boring, Harvard Psychology Department Chair and other [US] psychologists have expressed their satisfactions in their critiques of my work” (Hsiao’s introduction, 1934). Hsiao’s (1934, in Chinese) book, Principles of Gestalt Psychology played an important role in introducing Gestalt psychology to Chinese audiences. He is well remembered for the Chinese term geshita that became a standard term for Gestalt in Chinese psychology. Compared to Gestalt psychology, psychoanalysis entered China almost two decades earlier, mainly through popular magazines and newspapers (Freud, trans. 1914, 1918, 1920a, 1920b, 1920c, 1928), with a secondary source book from the United States (Stone, 1987). The first translation of Freud’s original work was the collection of his five lectures delivered at Clark University in 1909 entitled The Origin and Development of Psychoanalysis (Freud, trans. 1925). Although the general Chinese reaction to psychoanalysis was not enthusiastic, the psychologists’ efforts to introduce Freud to China

maintained its momentum for two decades (Blowers, 1993, 2004). Two scholars who led these efforts to bring psychoanalysis to China were Zhang Shizhao (1882–1973) and Gao Juefu (1896–1993). While translating Freud’s 1925 autobiography in the early 1920s, Zhang wrote to Freud about his translation work and future plans. Freud replied to express his gratification and support of Zhang’s plan to promote psychoanalysis in China. Probably Zhang was the only Chinese who had corresponded with Freud, and his translation of Freud’s autobiography appeared shortly thereafter (Freud, trans. 1930). About the same time, Gao Juefu began translating Freud’s five lectures at Clark University that turned out to be merely the beginning of his persistent activities to disseminate Freud’s ideas in China. He published subsequently four articles on psychoanalysis (Gao, 1928, 1930, 1931, 1932). A productive writer and translator, Gao (1935) included two chapters in his book Modern Psychology, one entitled “Freudian Psychology” and the other entitled “Psychology of Dreams.” His two other translations of Freud’s original works were General Introduction to Psychoanalysis (Freud, trans. 1933) and New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis (Freud, trans., 1933, 1936). Gao’s decade-long efforts to bring Freud’s ideas to China opened a direct channel through which Chinese intellectuals learned about psychoanalysis. More important was his clearheaded analysis of Freud’s work, as shown in his introduction to his translation of General Introduction to Psychoanalysis: “Freud’s theory has been both complimented and critiqued extensively. It is always important for the reader to read any book critically, more so when reading Freud” (Gao’s introduction to Freud, 1933). However, unlike other psychological theories and interpretations, psychoanalysis did not meet enthusiasm in China as in some other parts of the world except for fragmented reception in education and social reform. Only one Chinese, Bingham Dai, who had training in psychoanalysis, practiced and taught analysis in China between 1935 and 1939. Psychoanalysis did not return until 40 years later (Blowers, 1996, 2004).

Appeal of Dialectical Psychology In the 1930s, young psychologists were already familiar with the new Soviet psychology, particularly the dialectical materialist view (Huang, 2000, pp. 137–145; Pan, 1984). However, the specialized psychological work from the new Soviet Union was rather rare. Most information about Soviet

psychology came from indirect sources (Pan, 1980). A collection of writings by Pavlov, Bekhterev, and Kornilove, “under the title of New Psychology in the Soviet Union, was practically the only book by Soviet authors” (Barabanshchikova & Koltsova, 1989, p. 117). But Marxism as a philosophy and a revolutionary theory was no stranger to Chinese intellectuals. Gao Juefu (1991), one of the best known translators of Western psychology, recalled that in the early 1930s, teaching Marxist ideas in colleges was considered part of “new philosophy” (p. 9). Although Marxism was first introduced to China in 1901 through a translation from Japanese sources (Tang, 2003), it was the May 4th Movement in 1919 that heightened the awareness of many intellectuals of the new philosophy. Amidst incessant domestic plights and international conflicts in China, many were drawn to Marxism. This movement gained its momentum in part because of the influence of the Bolshevik Revolution in 1918.13 Gao “[whose] life and work form a significant part of that development” of Chinese psychology (Blowers, 1995, p. 108); Pan Shu, “a founder of modern Chinese psychology” (Yue & Shen, 1995, p. 220), who later led China’s Institute of Psychology; and some other psychologists, had taken up Marxist ideas. Many psychologists’ publications also drew on this school of thought. For example, Ruan Jingqing (1932/1986, 1943) attempted to explain the origins of psychological phenomena using dialectical materialism. Although Ruan studied educational psychology in Tokyo Imperial University between 1934 and 1937, his dialectical view seemed even more enhanced by his psychological studies. Guo Yicen (1937; cf. X. Yang, 2000b, p. 239) published General Introduction to Modern Psychology, in which he adopted the Marxist worldview to organize his subject matter. Liu Zeru’s (1938) essay, “Examples in Studying Behaviors” employed a dialectical materialist view to criticize behaviorism and the mechanistic nature of Pavlovian theory. Cao Richang’s (1939a) article, “The Establishment of New Psychological Research Methods” also proposed that dialectical materialism be used to create a new psychology for the purpose of creating a new society. As follow-ups, Cao (1939b, 1939c) exemplified the effort to apply dialectical materialism to psychological studies and to explain psychological phenomena and development. Later, he analyzed several issues in psychological testing through the lens of dialectical materialism (Cao, 1943). Zhu Zhixian, a well-established child psychologist, also spent years in the early 1940s studying Marxist hsueh, guo

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theories in pedagogy and psychology, and published two articles (Zhu, 1940, 1946) that were attempts to apply dialectical materialism to problems in Chinese psychology. These early introductions and applications of Marxist dialectical materialism were among diverse modern psychological research before 1949. We will see soon that these efforts gradually converged into an official doctrine for later Chinese scientific psychology.

Accomplishments of Chinese Modern Psychology (1919–1949) During this 30-year period, Chinese psychologists had extremely unstable and disruptive environments in which they pursued their research. The autobiographic accounts available about this period consistently told stories of poverty, social unrest, political conflicts, ideological persecution, and frequent wars, homelessness, and relocations (e.g. Gao, 1991; Pan, 1983, 1984). Biographic accounts also highlight these hardships (Blowers, 1995, on Gao Juefu; Blowers, 1998, on Chen Li; and Blowers, 2001, on Kuo Zing-Yang; Huang, 2000, on Zhu Zhixian; Zhou, 1986, on Chen Daqi). However, most Chinese psychologists nevertheless developed their research and worked against adversities. Their accomplishments can be seen both in the older disciplines like physiological, general, and experimental psychology, and in the newer, fast-growing disciplines like child psychology, educational psychology, intelligence testing, industrial psychology, and medical psychology. Most attempted to address some issues in the Chinese context.

psychology of learning chinese characters How do Chinese people learn their written language? Many psychologists, notably those who trained in the United States, represented early efforts to address such a question related to the Chinese language. The first person who took on this task was Liu Tingfang (1900-2000), when he studied in Columbia University from 1916–1919. Not a psychologist himself, Liu investigated the relationship between learning the meaning of a written character and the number of strokes in the character, and also the relationship between the misused written character and the composition of strokes in it. Ai Wei (1890–1955), who also studied at Columbia University and later received his doctorate from the University of Washington, conducted the second study of learning Chinese characters. After his return to China in 1925, he turned his 102

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initial study into a 25-year-long research program published Problems of Written Chinese Characters (Ai, 1949), a book that exerted great impact on the usage of Chinese characters today. It lent evidence for establishing the national policy to simplify Chinese characters in the 1950s, and to change from the right-to-left vertical typeset to the leftto-right horizontal typeset. Another noteworthy early researcher was Shen Youqian, also known as Eugene Shen (1899–) who studied at Stanford University and used advanced technology to track readers’ eye-movements (Shen, 1926, 1927). Shen’s findings showed that Chinese readers gave shorter pauses as they read horizontally than vertically. However, each pause in the eye movement seems to allow the reader to go over more characters in the vertical format than in the horizontal format. In addition, the eye movement angles in reading Chinese are smaller than in reading English, whereas the eye movement pauses in reading Chinese are more frequent than in reading English. Finally, the reading rate in terms of the number of word units per second is faster in Chinese than in English. However, the legibility and reading of Chinese characters were not a simple matter of the direction of typeset. Chou Siegen’s (1903–1996) work, which started in the United States (Chou, 1928) and continued in China, suggests that more contextual factors need to be considered. Chou published four articles in The Journal of Experimental Psychology (Chou, 1929, 1930a, 1930b, 1935a), a series of experimental studies of written Chinese characters based on his dissertation at Stanford University. He invented a Quadrant Tachistoscope to display written Chinese characters, and presented his findings at the Ninth International Congress of Psychology at Yale University in 1929. He argued that the measure of either vertical or horizontal direction is necessary but not sufficient for determining reading speed. In his analysis, the three key elements in reading Chinese characters were position, direction, and temporal-spatial sequence (i.e., the eye moves top-down on each character). The last element, through interaction with the character configuration, is the most important conditioning factor (Chou, 1929, p. 175).

child psychology Child psychology in the 1920s was a lively field in the United States and in many European countries (Cahan & White, 1992; Cross, 1994 Hsueh, 2002; Sigel & White, 1982). In the 1920s, most

child psychologists in China had their training in the United States. Their return to China’s coastal regions provided the major impetus for the development of child psychology. Two leading psychologists in this field were Chen Heqin and Huang Yi (also known as Huang I). Chen Heqin (1892–1982) obtained a master’s degree in 1919 from Columbia University and returned to China to study children and education. He was the first Chinese child psychologist in the modern sense and is best known for the Drum Tower Kindergarten in Nanjing, a progressive school he created in 1923, inspired by Dewey’s ideas and guided by his own indigenous theory of early education. His book A Study of Child Psychology (Chen, 1925) synthesized his research, observations, experiments, and practices at Drum Tower Kindergarten. His research and writings have influenced generations of early childhood educators and later played a major role in guiding China’s early childhood education reform in the 1980s and the 1990s. By 1930, Chen’s interest had turned most of his attention to kindergarten and school education, and he became a leading childhood educator. At this time, another child psychologist, Huang Yi (1903–1944), came back to China with a newly minted Ph.D. in psychology from Yale University. Huang studied at Stanford, Smith College, and Yale, and worked closely with Kurt Koffka and Arnold Gesell (1944). He was a productive researcher. From the late 1920s, studying at Yale and Smith College, to his untimely death during the war in China, he published numerous books and journal articles in both English and Chinese, including a series of studies that replicated Piaget’s work in China (Huang, 1930, 1943, 1945; Huang & Lee, 1945; Huang, Yang, & Yao, 1945). Like Chen Heqin, Huang’s interest also turned to education while he continued to develop his psychological research. He created the first school to provide counseling services for children (1935–1937) in China. This school, which was affiliated with Zhejiang University, was brought to a halt at the outbreak of the war with Japan in 1937, but Huang’s (1935, 1939, 1948) effort continued as he moved with the university deep behind the front lines of the war. A number of his publications appeared posthumously.

educational psychology Moved by the spirit of the May 4th Movement, intellectuals in China joined efforts to promote Chinese writing in the vernacular and school

children’s learning. Ai Wei’s (1923, 1933, 1945) studies meticulously examined middle-school children’s reading ability and comprehension when learning classic writings and texts written in the vernacular. In collaboration with colleagues, Ai Wei compiled a battery of vocabulary and reading tests, investigated children’s reading interest, and compared children’s reading aloud and reading silently (Ai, 1933). Learning Chinese characters and reading Chinese texts are two prominent foci of educational psychologists’ research during this period, in the wake of the May 4th Movement. Aforementioned Chou Siegen was commissioned by The Chinese Society of Promoting Education for Ordinary People to study rural people’s learning of the written language. He spent 5 years, from 1932 through 1937, in a provincial county conducting a largescale study of the relations between age and literacy learning ability, involving participants ranging in age from 7 to 70. This study (Chou, 1935b, 1935c) resulted in an ability curve known as the “Chou Siegen curve.” The curve demonstrated the abilities of Chinese at different ages to learn written characters. Chou also offered his explanation about this curve. Overall, it was a booming time for educational psychology in China. In addition to the extensive emphasis on written characters, research also made headway on topics such as abacus pedagogy (Cao, 1934; Zhou, 1936), teacher psychology (Chen, 1937; Wang, 1937), personality and temperament (Ai, 1936; Qian, 1935), training (Pan, 1942), and calligraphy psychology (Gong, 1945). The first textbook in educational psychology was written by Liao Shicheng (1924), who will be introduced below, for his contribution in psychological testing.

general and experimental psychology Classic topics in general psychology were highly visible in Chinese psychologists’ works during this period, including perception, memory, and attention. Lu Zhiwei (1894–1970) earned a Ph.D. in psychology at Columbia University in 1920, and later spent a year at the University of Chicago in 1933. His dissertation used a statistical method to amend Ebbinhaus’ memory curve, and the findings were included in the third edition of Chaplin and Krawiec’s (1979) Psychological Systems and Theories. In the 1930s, Lu began to devote himself to studies of Chinese linguistic issues and became a leading Chinese scholar and teacher of phonology. Unlike many brilliant Chinese psychologists at the time who attended U.S. universities, Cao Richang hsueh, guo

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(1911–1969) earned a Ph.D. at Cambridge University, in England, between 1945–1948, where he studied the effect of time intervals between learning and recall, pattern recognition, and the learning of mirror images (Cao, 1946a, 1946b, 1946c). He established himself as an authority on learning and memory, and was a notable early promoter of dialectical materialism in psychological research (Cao, 1939a). He later became a deputy director of the Institute of Psychology in China. Also in the field of experimental psychology, Wang Jingxi (1893–1968), a graduate from Johns Hopkins University, was well known for his pioneering work in physiological experiments to study animal behaviors. He was the first to introduce the analog oscilloscope into China, in 1934, for neurological research on the vision field of the cat in relation to electric pulses on its leg (Zhang, 1983).

social psychology and medical psychology Modern social psychology was still in its infancy during the 1920s, and did not make big strides until the 1930s. It had been mostly dominated by theories rather than empirical studies (Argyle & Colman, 1995). Nevertheless, Chinese psychologists had been keenly interested in social psychology early on. Between 1921 and 1923, a number of books on social psychology were translated from the work in France, Britain, and the United States (Allport, trans. 1931; McDougall, trans. 1922; Wallace, 1930). In the meantime, social psychology emerged as a discipline from within China. A pioneer in the field of social psychology was Zhang Yaoxiang (1893–1964), who graduated from Columbia University with a master’s degree. Zhang had a few firsts in the history of Chinese psychology. As mentioned earlier, he was the first president of the shortlived Zhonghua Psychological Society, the first editor of its journal Psychology, the first to conduct (in 1922) a large-scale opinion poll in China, and the first Chinese psychologist who wrote the history of Chinese psychology (Zhang, 1940). He conducted research on youths’ feelings (Zhang, 1947) and on the commercial application of psychological principles (Zhang, 1925). A close friend of Zhang, Lu Zhiwei wrote China’s first book on social psychology entitled New Theories in Social Psychology (Lu, 1924). However, those who entered the field of social psychology were few, and without special training. In medical psychology, even fewer had special training. Ding Zan (1910–1968), China’s pioneer 104

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in medical psychology, taught medical psychology courses in the 1930s. He also worked in clinics and counseling departments in schools and factories in the late 1930s and the early 1940s, in Beijing and Chongqing (see Guo, 2009, pp. 292–297). Soon after the war with Japan ended, he went to the University of Chicago to study for 1 year in 1947. His main publications were Collection of Essays on Mental Health (Ding, 1945) and Psychological Self-cultivation of Youths (Ding, 1946). The earliest introduction of a Western psychiatric hospital in the city of Guangzhou was in 1898, followed by a second one in Beijing in 1906, but the influence of Western psychiatry developed very slowly. In fact, traditional Chinese medicine continues to exert the most practical influence to date (Liang & Lu, 2006). In the early 1970s, when Chinese psychology was eradicated, traditional Chinese medical psychology still gained the sporadic spotlight, for example, in testing patients’ attitudes to surgery and their ability to regulate their reactions to pain in order to examine acupunctural anesthesia effects (Barabanshchikova & Koltsova, 1989).

industrial and organization psychology China’s first industrial psychologist by training was Chen Li (1902–2004) who “brushed shoulders in his postgraduate student days with some of the most significant pioneers of psychology in the West” (Blowers, 1998, p. 315). In 1935, Chen returned from Europe to teach at Tsinghua University, where he created a fatigue laboratory. His book, General Introduction to Industrial Psychology (Chen, 1935) was the first Chinese textbook for industrial psychology. Before this textbook, Chen was already known for his dissertation on oscillation at the threshold and in mental work (Chen, 1933). Fifteen years later, he published an article entitled “A Factor Study of a Test Battery at Different Educational Levels” (Chen & Chow, 1948). These two studies together were the first in China that examined intelligence using factor analysis, which he had mastered in Spearman’s lab. An important finding from his analysis of factors suggested that, as a person ages, the composition of a factor becomes simpler and simpler. This finding provided evidence for Chen to critique his teacher, Professor Charles Spearman, who argued for the permanent g factor. The aforementioned Chou Siegen, who was known for his innovative studies of reading Chinese and literacy, began collaborating with Chen Li in 1935, in China’s earliest fieldwork in industrial psychology, but this study was cut short by the outbreak of war

in 1937. He and his colleague published only one book based on this project, The Rise of Chinese Industrial Psychology (Chou & Chen, 1936). H. H. Hsiao, who was best known for his clear introduction of Gestalt psychology to U.S. and Chinese audiences, made his mark in personnel psychology. He initiated a personnel psychology research organization in 1941, proclaimed the mission of personnel psychology (Hsiao 1944a), and produced three books, What Is Leadership? (Hsiao, 1943), Problems in Personnel Psychology (Hsiao, 1944b), and The Scientific Foundation of Psychological Construction (Hsiao, 1944c).

psychological testing The early development of psychological testing in China can be credited to two pioneers: Liao Shicheng (1892–1979), who was a prolific test developer (Liao, 1925, 1931; Chen & Liao, 1932), and Chen Heqin, who was most famous for his contribution to child psychology and early education. As a movement among psychologists of the day, psychological testing peaked in the 1930s, in response to desperate societal calls for strengthening the nation through effective education in the face of bullying of foreign powers (Blowers, 2009). Other notable contributors included Ai Wei, whose examination of middle school students’ reading comprehension and speed established him as an authority in test development. Thirty years later, Ai’s revised tests for all subject matters on all grade levels, including ability tests and intelligence tests for elementary school children, marked the beginning of China’s intelligence testing (Yang, 2000b, p. 312). While Ai was making headway in his school test development, H. H. Hsiao who also had a deep interest in child psychology (Hsiao, 1936a) began developing tests in other areas. He revised the Merrill-Palmer Intelligence Scale (Hsiao, 1936b), Goodenough DrawingA-Man Test (Hsiao, 1935a, 1939a, 1939b), and Pressey X-O Test for investigating emotions (Hsiao, 1935b). He also compiled group intelligence tests for various purposes (Hsiao, 1937, 1939b, 1945), various intelligence tests for elementary school entrance examinations (Hsiao, 1938a, 1939b), and intelligence tests for use in college entrance examination (Hsiao, 1938b). During this period, the Binet-Simon Intelligence Test was revised twice for Chinese application (Lu & Wu, 1936).

theoretical psychology Theoretical psychology had a special place in China. As mentioned earlier, many Chinese psychologists

turned to the dialectical materialist approach in the 1930s, in search of an overarching theory that could overcome the fragmentary multiplicity in psychology. One of these psychologists was Pan Shu, a leading figure in modern China who had his training between 1921 and 1927 in the University of California, Indiana University, and the University of Chicago. In 1945, at the Central University in Nanjing, he offered China’s first theoretical psychology course to incorporate dialectical materialism and he also developed his own theory—probably the only Chinese psychological theory (Yue & Shen, 1995). But his early interest in theoretical psychology went back a decade (Pan, 1937). From the 1950s to the 1990s, dialectical materialism as the guiding framework remained dominant in China. However, even among the older generation, the diverging understandings of this philosophical framework were palpable. Gao Juefu, whose translation work in both quantity and quality is considered first-rate in China (Blowers, 1995), appeared tentative in raising dialectical materialism over other schools of psychology in the West, especially as he evaluated Piaget’s dialectical theory (Gao, 1982). Historical examination of Western psychology was also observable at the time (Cui, 1926; Yi, 1935). Lu Zhiwei and Wu Dingliang’s (1933) “The History of Psychology has 34 chapters that systematically recount the evolving history of psychology from Plato to present” (Xiang, 2004, p. 99). But efforts as such to introduce the history of Western psychology also heightened the long-held awareness that ideas and methods of Western psychology had neither a root in nor applied well to Chinese social life. Pan Shu (1937) was one of the early critics who articulated this problem by focusing on the needs in China: [W]hat we need to do isn’t just to move German psychology or American psychology or other countries’ psychologies into China. We should research the special psychological problems occurring in China. This is our task in either theoretical aspects or applied aspects of psychological research. (as cited in Yue & Shen, 1995, p. 222)

This remark was further articulated in Pan’s (1984, 1987, Pan & Li, 1985) later writings, specifically in relation to the need for studying psychological problems from Chinese people’s social activities, a specific delineation of Marxist epistemology of dialectical materialism. hsueh, guo

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Modern Psychology (1949–1980) This period of modern Chinese psychology was one that can be characterized as stagnation. In China, psychologists who had trained in the West made lengthy efforts to learn Soviet psychology, which was dominated by Pavlov’s theory and Marxist ideology. Scores of psychology departments that had been functioning before 1949 were dissolved, leaving the whole country with only a handful of reconsolidated psychology departments and a top-notch Institute of Psychology in the Chinese Academy of Science, based on the Soviet model. “[P]sychology became a secondary discipline in the departments of philosophy or education” (Jing & Fu, 2001, p. 414). The steady growth of psychology education in universities before 1949 became gravely diminished in the restructuring of universities to follow Soviet models (Zhang & Xu, 2006). Willingly or unwillingly, psychologists accepted dialectical materialism as an increasingly dominant theory for all psychological studies. Many psychologists who published an account of the modern history of Chinese psychology often find little to say about this period. Jing Qicheng (1926–2008), former executive officer (1984–1989) of the Chinese Psychological Society, and his colleague gave only two paragraphs describing Soviet influences rather than any accomplishment of psychological research (Jing & Fu, 2001).14 An examination of extant historical accounts of this period (Brown, 1981; Chin & Chin, 1969; Ching, 1980; Jing & Fu, 2001; Pezold, 1987; Xu, 1990) suggests that the successive political movements overran most psychological research until the end of the Cultural Revolution, when Chinese psychology finally entered a new era around 1980. Chinese psychologists as a group, surviving one after another political movement between 1949 and 1980, approximately experienced four subperiods: (1) becoming re-educated as Marxist psychologists (2) contributing to socialist construction (3) experiencing total destruction in the Cultural Revolution, and (4) recovering from the disaster.

Becoming Re-educated and Reformed (1949–1956) The first few years of the People’s Republic of China saw the Korean War on the international scene and the sānfăn-wúfăn movements domestically.15 These events accompanied a drastic shift in social ideology, leaning toward the Soviet model of societal development. In this context, Chinese psychologists

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were faced with the colossal task of studying new social idealism and subjecting their work, and thus themselves, to disciplinary reform. Specifically, the task consisted of studying Marxist theories and Soviet psychology to create dialectical materialist psychology.16 The central government called on psychologists, in fact all intellectuals, to use Marxist theory as a guide, and to reform psychology based on Pavlov’s theory (Pan, 1984). In 1953, Pavlov forums were held in major cities of China, a centralized act to promote Pavlov’s theory among intellectuals, especially psychologists. As Chinese psychologists gradually grasped Pavlovian notions, they also learned from various schools of Soviet psychology. “Books by Soviet psychologists were translated into Chinese (Ivan Pavlov, Ivan Sechenov, Alexei Ukhtomsky, Sergiei Rubinstein, Boris Teplove, Alexei Leontyev, Alexander Luria, and others)” (Barabanshchikova & Koltsova, 1989, p. 118).17 In fact, at the time, Soviet psychologists had most say in building the field of psychology in China (Blowers, 1996). In the process of learning and reforming, Chinese psychologists found themselves engaged in a debate about the object of their psychological research. The central problem in this debate was the relationship between mental activities and neurological activities. In the first meeting of the Chinese Psychological Society, in 1955, psychologists reached a consensus strongly flavored by the Soviet ideology that blended Darwinism, Leninism, and Pavlov’s influence: “Psychological phenomena, or human psychological activities, are sophisticated, qualitatively new, higher neurological activities in human beings who evolved from lower animals” (Gao, 2005a, p. 417). Along with the reform was institutional restructuring. The Chinese Psychological Society in new China was created in Beijing in 1955, with a registered membership of 585 psychological workers. The first Society’s journal, Acta Psychologica Sinica, made its official appearance in 1956. The Nanjing University Department of Psychology was incorporated into the Psychological Research Division of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, and later was expanded and renamed as the Institute of Psychology under the directorship of Pan Shu. The founding of the Society and the Institute marked the conclusion of the re-learning and reforming period. The Institute as the core leadership of China’s psychology was responsible for coordinating and facilitating nationwide psychological research.

Tentative Development in Socialist Psychology (1957–1965) A few major social events took place around 1957. The central government tried to mobilize the country into an economic boom, the so-called “Great Leap Forward.” To do so, the government openly encouraged intellectuals to make criticisms and suggestions to the Communist party, calling it “hundreds of flowers blooming altogether,” a brief “period of postrevolutionary liberalism” (Blowers, 1998, p. 323), suggesting that different opinions would be heard and valued. Overnight, the sense of intellectual freedom skyrocketed and many psychologists felt that they would actively assume responsibility for changing society and improving people’s lives. One important discussion among psychologists was how to tackle the disconnection between academic psychology and the practical need for psychological knowledge in China to advance socialism. This discussion resulted in some advancement of applied psychological research and some decrease in theoretical work. Psychologists, however, found themselves in disbelief the next year. The central government caught intellectuals by surprise by retracting the policy of “hundreds of flowers blooming.” Many psychologists were openly denounced and classified as “rightists,” a label for those who criticized the government and expressed dissatisfaction to the leadership. Even leading scholars like Gao Juefu were not spared (Blowers, 1995; Gao, 1991; Shen, 2000). The enthusiasm of many psychologists was dampened. In the next 2 years, efforts were made to undo the damage and redress problems that the anti-bourgeoisie movement caused in psychology. However, at this time, China was trapped in an enormous crisis known as the “3-year natural disaster,” although historians of this period show that this crisis was by and large man-made as a consequence of the Great Leap Forward, the anti-rightist movement, and central leadership turning a deaf ear to what it did not want to hear. At the same time, the Sino–Soviet relationship turned from sour to openly antagonistic after 1956. China’s economic infrastructure and strategic planning, which modeled and relied on the Soviet Union, collapsed upon the withdrawal of all Soviet economic and technological support. Chinese psychologists became marginalized, foreshadowing an even more severe fate ahead. However, during this difficult period, the Institute of Psychology and the Chinese Psychological

Society coordinated several large-scale studies (1959–1960). Later, the Society established an educational psychology committee in 1962. Three important textbooks were published, General Psychology (Cao, 1963), Educational Psychology (Pan, 1964), and Child Psychology (Zhu, 1963), to meet the need of four Chinese universities enrolling 4-year undergraduate psychology majors. These textbooks were regarded as the first syntheses of Marxist dialectical and historical materialism and Chinese research in psychology (Barabanshchikova & Koltsova, 1989). In 1963, when the Chinese economy began to recover, the Society held its first academic conference since its inception in 1955. Its membership had doubled to 1,087 by 1965 (Hsu, Ching, & Over, 1980). Furthermore, developmental and educational psychology became prominent disciplines (Liu, 1982; Miao & Wang, 2003; Tardif & Miao, 2000). “From among 203 papers delivered, more than 75% dealt with education and developmental psychology” (Petzold, 1987, p. 222), a persistent theme that could be interpreted from a historical perspective. However, various attempts to advance psychological science fell short of psychologists’ expectations and aspirations. One of the most respected psychologists, Pan Shu (1984), recalled his time from 1949 to 1965, “I spent much time studying Soviet psychology at that time. Except a few theoretical articles I wrote, I did not conduct any original research for more than a decade” (p. 4). The first 15 years of new China saw psychology reduced to a tentative scientific endeavor, drastically restructured, and contingent on domestic and international politics, planned economy, and class-struggle-based ideology. Even this tentative endeavor came to a halt soon after the Cultural Revolution started in 1966.

Destruction of Psychology (1966–1976) The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, as it was then called, was an extreme expression of the destruction in China of psychology, along with other social sciences that carried “bourgeois” worldviews and values. Psychology was considered “bourgeois pseudoscience” (Wang, 1993, p. 90), even though it was located in the Chinese Academy of Science, as opposed to the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. Psychology in China had already stagnated; now, the machinery of the Cultural Revolution ran the field into the ground for 10 years. It was unclear to many whether the discipline could be treated any worse.

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In Chinese psychologists’ memories, the first and fatal indiscriminate blow to psychologists came from Yao Wenyuan, the rising star of the communist propaganda department. He chose as a start Chen Li and Wang Ansheng’s (1965a, b, c) articles in Acta Psychologica Sinica on the development of children’s abstractions of colors and forms. The findings of the study suggested that factors such as personality, interest, sex, and intelligence may affect these abstractions. Yao Wenyuan (Ge, 1965), who used a pen name Gě Mìngrén, a Chinese homophone for “a revolutionary,” singled out these articles immediately in the official speech organ, Guangming Daily. Yao asserted that the Western psychologists that Chen cited were all bourgeois, and Chen’s conclusions and method were a copy of the “experimental esthetics” of the Western bourgeoisie. Yao questioned, “What theoretical significance or scientific values do these fastidious studies have? Should we take pride in ‘proving’ or ‘complementing’ some foreign bourgeois psychologists’ views? Or should we guide psychological research with Mao Zedong Thought and use revolutionary critical spirit and originality to blaze a wide path for developing psychology?” (Ge, 1965, p. 4). The aftermath of this denunciation became the single most damaging event in a series of blows that wiped out psychology in China for the next 10 years (Brown, 1981; Gao, 2005a; Petzold, 1987). The Institute of Psychology of the Chinese Academy of Science was entirely eliminated in 1970, in the wake of destruction of university psychology departments, laboratories, and equipment. Psychology libraries and books were banned or burned. “Chinese psychology ceased to exist as a social institution” (Barabanshchikova & Koltsova, 1989, p. 120). Most psychologists went to the May 7th Cadre School in rural areas, a re-education program that all educated people were mandated to experience; some were forced to give up their profession, and still others like Lu Zhiwei, Cao Richang, and Ding Zan died untimely deaths. Psychology was no longer in existence; psychologists were re-educated through intense manual labor in rural China. Very few psychologists could survive the psychological torture of the day and continue to write about psychology at night. Pan Shu’s (1984) book appears to be the only psychology manuscript written during this period, and it was published after the Cultural Revolution. It is worth mentioning in passing that only traditional Chinese medical psychology remained active—without using the name of psychology—during this period (e.g., Barabanshchikova & Koltsova, 1989, p.120). 108

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Recovery and Rehabilitation (1977–1980) Mao Zedong’s death in 1976 was a turning point for China. After the downfall of the so-called Gang of Four,18 the central government announced the restoration of the Institute of Psychology to the Chinese Academy of Science in June 1977. Two months later, Pan Shu presided over the first planning meeting in Beijing to revive psychological science in China. Yao Wenyuan was already in jail as one of the Gang of Four. The throat-cutting denunciation of psychology he delivered 10 years earlier was a review point at the meeting, which served as a therapeutic session for everyone present to re-experience the trauma in order to move forward. Universities reopened, and three departments of psychology were restored successively—Peking University in 1978, East China Normal University in 1979, and Hangzhou University in 1980. After three decades of isolation from their counterparts abroad, the Chinese Psychological Society had its first Society meeting in May 1978, with the theme “Reassessing Wundt’s Psychology” in preparation for celebrating the founding of Wundt’s psychological laboratory. This meeting showed that, after 30 years “Chinese scientists were ready to follow the guidelines of world psychology” (Barabanshchikova & Koltsova, 1989, p. 120). It also afforded an opportunity to discuss how to advance developmental and educational psychology first and then use this experience to guide the field as a whole (Jing, 2001). In the same year, the Chinese Psychological Society created seven committees to recover the field of psychology; that is, developmental and educational psychology, psychological theory, medical psychology, sports psychology, general and experimental psychology, industrial psychology, and physiological psychology. The number of registered Society members reached 800, with the majority being educational and developmental psychologists (Hsu, Ching, & Over, 1980). The two early Society official journals, Acta Psychologica Sinica (in 1979) and Psychological Science (in 1981), were also back in production. With the approval of the State Council, the Chinese Psychological Society became the 44th member of the International Union of Psychology in 1980, officially marking its return to the international community of psychological science (Li, 2007; Yang, 2000b, p. 356). In the same year, Jing Qicheng (also known as C. C. Ching) (1980), who later became the deputy director of the Institute of Psychology of the Chinese Academy of Science wrote, “With Chinese psychologists rejoining the international community, perhaps we can

participate fully in the development and growth of our discipline” (p. 1089). This statement is filled with lingering tentativeness but great anticipation that suggests the steady recovery of modern Chinese psychology from a near-death experience.

Conclusion From antiquity to the modern time, Chinese psychology moved along a unique path in the world of psychology. Confucian, Daoist, and Buddhist doctrines integrated with one another, along with the theory of yīn yáng wu˘ xīng, and of the heart as the locus of thoughts and feelings. These doctrines remain central to Chinese culture today. However, from the 16th century onward, Western psychological ideas gradually entered China through increased contact and interaction with Westerners, culminating in a watershed moment for modern psychology early in the 20th century. In a broad sense, Chinese modern scientific psychology was first introduced as a core part of the political and educational reform in China’s premodern era. With the tidal wave of the May 4th Movement from 1919 onward came a host of Western, mainly U.S., trained Chinese psychologists of various interests and specialties. These psychologists went to the West through highly competitive selection, and their studies were funded mostly by the government (Chen & Tian, 2007; Shu, 1927). Most of them embraced the ideas and ideals they encountered in their experiences with Western science and democracy. Their return from the West opened up the era of modern psychology in China. In the meantime, the May 4th Movement spread the notions of science and democracy and paved the way for the reception of a host of young psychologists, who saw the important contributions they could make to revive China as an equal among nations. But the 20th century was a most turbulent era in China’s modern history. The founding of new China in 1949 reunified a land that suffered deeply from wars, poverty, foreign bullying, and natural disasters. It also, on the one hand, unified Chinese modern psychology, which had been animated by different schools of psychology in the West, but on the other, put it through a neardeath experience. Afterward, Chinese modern psychology did not change significantly until 1980, when leading Chinese psychologists from the 1920s and 1930s re-emerged to lead the resumed pursuit of the ongoing dream of modernization that had begun in the mid-19th century. This history of Chinese psychology has brought about four issues that were rooted in the past, but

have persisted and will likely continue into the future. The first one is a debate about whether there is an inter- and intraconnection between ancient psychological thought and modern scientific psychology. A second issue is the role of modern psychology in Chinese society, as both a science and a human institution. A third issue comes with a relatively recent indigenous psychology movement that once again raises the question about what Western psychology can do for Chinese culture. Finally, as a requirement for any scientific endeavor, there are questions about what kind of psychological theory Chinese psychologists should pursue. What is the best, or in Chinese terms, the correct theory to guide and interpret psychological research? The discussion can be connected back to the first issue about continuity or discontinuity between the old and new Chinese psychology. It must be acknowledged that ancient Chinese psychological thoughts are fundamentally distinguishable from the modern scientific psychology in the 20th century. The basic Chinese conceptualization of human thinking, feeling, and volition does not map well on Western classic psychological concepts. The distinction between the Chinese concept of aspiration and the Western classic notion of motivation is a case in point. The relationship between internal organs and emotions is another. The Chinese focus on the dialectical relationships of physical organs and social life in relation to psychological phenomena sets it even further apart from the modern scientific psychology. In this view, modern Chinese psychology made substantial progress in large part because of a group of dedicated psychologists tackling Chinese psychological issues by following their teachers’ work in the West. Two consequences are clear. First, there has always been a professional and open community of psychologists with specific theories, methods, and ways of teaching modern psychology. These dedicated, well-trained psychologists, along with many who studied psychology at different points in their careers (e.g., Chen Daqi, Chen Heqin, Liu Tingfang, and Zhang Shizhao) but left it entirely behind (see Pan, 1980) to pursue other careers, not only formed a community practice, but took psychological discourse to a wide range of common folks, particularly for the sake of the education that was essential to China’s modernization. No one in the long history of Chinese psychological thought had comparable training, frames of reference, and tools to investigate Chinese psychological phenomena within (to use Thomas Kuhn’s phrase) a scientific hsueh, guo

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paradigm. Second, regardless of the Westernness of modern psychology, it came and stayed mainly because of its utility for China’s modernizations, albeit being highly vulnerable to sociopolitical reconfigurations over time. Science and Western ideology (including democracy) were often synonymous, as favored in the May 4th Movement. Was the modern psychology practiced by Chinese psychologists disconnected from Chinese psychological thought? This debate became especially acute in recent decades, within the growing field of the history of Chinese psychology. At the heart of the issue is whether Chinese psychological thought should be separated from philosophy to form an independent domain of psychological science (Yan, 1997). Although this debate resonates with a similar issue in the United States during the 1910s (Boring, 1961), the Chinese problem presents a complex conflict between Chinese cultural beliefs and Western ideology. With this conflict in mind, we can see some continuity in Chinese psychologists’ aspirations to establish a modern psychological science in China. The May 4th Movement psychologists and psychology-minded intellectuals commonly saw psychology as a means for reviving and modernizing China, rather than merely making it a science, one that can be divorced from Chinese psychological thought, which emphasizes the unity of diverse relationships. This orientation was mirrored by John Dewey’s enthusiasm about the Chinese reception of his pragmatism in reconstructing Chinese society through education (Rockefeller, 1991). A unified society can do more than improving or modernizing itself. It also can promote scientific psychology. The “elder psychologist” Chen Li believed that psychology would advance faster and more effectively if it were unified and centrally maneuvered (as cited in Blowers, 1998). This perspective was widely shared by leading psychologists (Ching, 1984; Gao, 2005a; Pan, 1980, 1984; Liu, 1982; Yang, 1990, 1994; Zhao, Lin, & Zhang, 1989). This theme can be seen in the second issue, concerning the role of modern psychology in Chinese society as both a science and a human institution. The mission of the institution is to meet societal needs. Historians of Chinese psychology have noted that, in the first period of modern scientific psychology, especially in the 1930s, much of the psychological research was oriented toward education. This orientation was an expression of a deeper concern for modernization, rebuilding a country that could proudly take its place as a strong nation among all 110

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nations. Psychologists of different specialties turned their research interests to learning, literacy, teaching, and testing to improve education (Blowers, 2009; Ching, 1984; Jing, 1994; Liu, 1982), not to mention that many psychologists returned to China to find their own careers in education. One can argue that many U.S. psychologists followed a similar path in a bleak job market for the newly emerged psychological profession in the early 20th century (Hunter, 1952 as cited in White, 1991, p. 3). Edward Thorndike was a prominent example. However, both the long history of Chinese psychological thought and the modern plight of Chinese society suggest that the reason for Chinese psychologists to turn to education and for the Chinese field of psychology to be oriented toward education calls for a different cultural explanation. In this regard, Confucian ideology of the oneness of nature and humans is fitting: The individual’s striving for self-perfection should be an epitome of a nation’s self-perfection (modernization). The value of education has underlain different political ideologies from 1920s up to 1980. This cultural value expresses itself in the age of science and for the redesigning of human social institutions in response to societal needs. However, this view invites a question that has been often asked of contemporary Chinese psychology: Is there a Chinese psychology? This question accompanies the recent discourse on indigenous Chinese psychology (e.g., Bond, 1996; Yang, 1996; Yang, 1997), a question at the center of the third issue about whether Western psychology suits the Chinese culture. In answering this question, two positions may be noted, one soft and the other hard. The soft position holds that, before 1949, Chinese scientific psychology was heavily influenced by Western psychology, with a small amount of localized research (Liu, 1982; Yang, 1990; Xu, 1990). Others, taking a hard position, argue that modern Chinese psychology before 1949 was not Chinese psychology because “Chinese psychology was oriented mainly toward Western psychology and in fact was not different from the latter” (Higgins & Zheng, 2002, p. 230). They suggest that the research conducted after 1949 was more Chinese psychology. An influential voice along this line comes from Yang Kuo-Shu (1997), a leading figure in the indigenizing psychology movement, whose review shows that, by 1985, all Chinese personality studies “uncritically used methods and tools developed or standardized in Western (primarily American) cultural settings” (p. 236). However, different voices also can be heard that do not entirely

support this view (Blowers, 2009; Zhang & Xu, 2006; Zhao, 1992). Blowers (1996, 2009) and Zhao (1992) provide evidence to argue that indigenizing efforts were heavily under way during the period from 1920 to 1949. Nevertheless, located centrally in this discourse, Pan Shu (1980), the long-time director of the Institute of Psychology in China, acknowledged that the noncentralized psychological research field before 1949 in fact laid a foundation for later research development in China. He added that, for much of the time before the Cultural Revolution wiped out psychology, Chinese psychologists were busy imitating Soviet psychology and “lacked serious research” (p. 2). “We should have Chinese psychology . . . it is an honor for us to have such a task and obligation [to create Chinese psychology]” (Pan, 1980, p. 8). Pan’s remark implied that China did not have a Chinese psychology—yet. In part, it gave rise to the coordinated historical exploration of the field by Chinese scholars from the early 1980s on (Yang, 1994). The effort to search for and organize ancient psychological thoughts is still in its infancy. The interpretations of excavated ancient Chinese psychological thoughts are still short of indigenous perspectives: “all the historical studies [of Chinese psychological thought] are largely limited to established individual thinkers’ philosophical thought. The tasks of these studies have been to match ancient philosophical statements with modern psychological concepts” (P. Gu, 1999, p. 9). This interpreting practice may rely on the assumption that, as an established scientific enterprise, modern Western psychology has the guiding and organizing power. But, from a cultural perspective, it may also fragment a culturally established meaning system by requiring conceptual leaps to recognize the psychological quality of ancient statements. This problem takes us to a fourth issue about establishing a Chinese theory of psychology needed for guiding research. In the rise of modern Chinese psychology in the 1930s, some psychologists had begun their pursuit of a unifying theory to overcome the multiplicity of psychological science. This effort finally took over both the discourse and the social policy about psychology to establish Marxist dialectical materialism as the correct and indisputable guide for the new science (Pan, 1980, p. 4; Yan, 2006, p. 731). In critique of Chaplin and Krawiec’s (1979) view that no single perspective or theory can explain the complexity and multiplicity of human behaviors, Pan (1983) states, “As a whole, human psychologies do not seem so chaotic to be

understood in terms of general regularity. There is a great variety of erroneous reasoning, but there is only one truth” (p. iv). This theoretical unification, or centralization, is consistent with ancient psychological thought about how human beings think about themselves and the universe. In other words, when psychologists’ activities are examined in their own culture, the continuity of thoughts and ideas—thus cultural practice—seems to claim an undeniable thrust in conducting Western-style psychological studies amidst the frequent Chinese societal turmoil in the 20th century. Modern Chinese psychology has not been separable from Chinese culture. Among Chinese psychologists, both the moral pursuits of psychology in serving education and the aspirations for an ideological unity appeared to extend their cultural roots. Recall that Cai Yuanpei saw psychology as a modern means for shaping a societal future that would culminate in moral esthetics, a view that James Mark Baldwin and Jean Piaget also envisioned in the 20th century (Cahan, 1995). Interestingly, anthropologists (LeVine & Norman, 2001) recently demonstrated that scientific psychology as exemplified by the attachment theory and its applications in society is a moral reform closely tied to some specific cultural values. Likewise, various historical accounts of Chinese psychology as given in this chapter show two such moral themes in the history of Chinese psychology; namely, its dominant purpose in promoting education and learning using modern psychology, ultimately to promote the overarching goal of Chinese modernizations; and the persistent pursuit of unified ideology or scientific theory to guide research programs. These two themes represented a long-held belief in the utility of psychology, unified theory, and social hierarchy in making psychology a Chinese psychology. The latter belief is unmistakably Chinese, as shown in the Confucianism that integrated many earlier thoughts 2,000 years ago. The insistence on adopting Marxist dialectical materialism, for example, was on the surface a result of Westernization but underneath a belief in unity, an extension of centralization, and the continuity of cultural construction of humanity.19 Once this view of psychology in China is recognized, the connections of China’s modern psychology to its past will appear salient. Perhaps, at a certain point of development in Chinese psychology, psychologists will find it more and more meaningful to reach back in order to leap forward. But that may require a different scientific paradigm from hsueh, guo

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the one that has guided modern Chinese psychology as described in this chapter. One observation of the history of science across the world is enlightening. In their analysis of the history of science, Jean Piaget and his colleague Rolando Garcia (1983/1989), two developmental epistemologists and psychologists, compare the ancient Greeks’ belief that an object’s continuous movement required external force, which was opposite to the Newtonian notion of inertia or the ancient Chinese concept of movement—“If there is no opposing force, the movement would never stop” (p. 253). They ask why it took Western science 2,000 years to grasp the modern physics notion that the Chinese had understood all along. Their answer offers two unusual perspectives that appear relevant to the issue of the historical discontinuity in Chinese psychology. The first perspective is that scientific ideas in China have developed through a different pathway. Western science underwent various transformations from focusing first on objects to focusing on regulations (even Piaget’s own work had this orientation). Dialectic is a higher stage of scientific development that appeared in modern times in the West. But the Chinese followed a different pathway, becoming aware of regulations, or the dialectic, before gradually “taking consciousness of the object” (Piaget in Bringuier, 1980, p. 100). This perspective affirms the validity of multiple or opposite pathways in the development of science. The second perspective is that the societal ideology that is sociopolitical in nature conditions the type of science that is accepted and advanced. Other historians of psychology expressed a similar view (Murphy & Kovach, 1972, p. 5). The ideology of the Aristotelian era was entirely static, whereas the ideology in ancient China emphasized a state of constant change (Piaget & Garcia, 1983/1989, pp. 253–257). This perspective suggests that the Chinese focus on dialectic is an extension of its deep-rooted societal ideology. As discussed in this chapter, Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism are all known for their dialectical principles at the start, as is yīn yáng wu˘ xíng. This dialectical focus never faded out over the millennia in China. Ideological change over time will bring about stage-like change in science, which we may consider as being part of Chinese psychology in the early 20th century. These two perspectives together provide an explanation of why it has been difficult to indigenize Western psychology in China and to excavate ancient Chinese psychological thought. But, at the same time, it has been inevitable that the 112

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Chinese would borrow, assimilate, and reinvent Western psychology in bits and pieces, in an unflagging pursuit of a unified theory. When reiterating his belief in a unified theory like Piaget’s genetic epistemology, Garcia (in Bringuier, 1980) says, “[such a theory] is to give a general description and inclusive explanation of knowledge” (p. 103). Similarly, it seems that Chinese psychologists of different generations in the 20th century have continuously attempted to obtain a unified theory as an inclusive explanation of both Western psychology and their own, of both the long past and the changing present, of both nature and human as one system.

Future Directions The Chinese pursuit of a unified theory to explain human life and behaviors in the 20th century appeared weak while China was divided by war lords and invaded or colonized by foreign countries, but this pursuit strengthened once China was unified, a path that resembled similar contexts in ancient China. This orientation is still palpable in current sociopolitical conditions, with China’s rapidly changing market economy. How has socioeconomic change in China reshaped this orientation? Three related questions merit further research: • Given the claim that Chinese psychology before 1949 was mostly in imitation of Western psychology, to what extent do the available published literature, archival documents, and other sources support this and other similar claims? • How did the social, political, and scientific views of leading Chinese psychologists evolve with respect to the pursuit of a unified Chinese psychological theory? • How have post-1980 Chinese psychologists variously expressed their needs for a unified theory, especially Marxist dialectical materialism, in the rapidly changing China? It may be argued that those leading Chinese psychologists who advocated for dialectical materialism as the best guidance for all psychological research were closely associated with the ruling political power after 1949. This may represent a biased discourse in Chinese psychology. Very little research has been conducted to explore Chinese psychologists’ personal and professional views of scientific psychology in China. Rarely have Chinese publications in psychology reported controversies. A promising line of historical research is to examine

psychologists’ personal accounts of their careers, worldviews, and personal life by asking the following questions: • How do accomplished Chinese psychologists reflect on their aspirations to become psychologists or to develop a research career? • How do they conceptualize the variability and multiplicity of psychological research in China? Piaget and Garcia’s thesis at the end of this chapter suggests an unusual perspective on how the history of psychological thought and modern psychology in China could be compared with the history of Western science. The Chinese ideology and culture are thought to have uniquely mediated the Chinese school of scientific thought, including scientific Chinese psychology. However, little is known to substantiate this view. Two basic questions are: • How did early Chinese psychological thought become impacted by and incorporated into the sociopolitical ideology of the time? • How did modern psychology become a service to, a victim of, and a proponent for the sociopolitical ideology of the day? Finally, multiple historical accounts of Chinese psychology in the 1950s described its complete takeover by Soviet psychological theories, including those that have recently become popular in the United States and West Europe (e.g., those proposed by L. S. Vygotsky, A. R. Luria, and A. N. Leont’ev). Chinese psychologists were familiar with these leading Soviet psychologists more than 30 years ahead of Western psychologists. For better or worse, historians of Chinese psychology have rarely paid attention to these bitter-sweet experiences. • What lesson did Chinese psychologists learn from Soviet psychology then? • How did their experiences with Soviet psychology foreshadow their reception of Western interpretations and disseminations of these Marxist psychological theories at the turn of the new millennium?

Glossary of Chinese Terms Academia Sinica: The governmental science organization in China, founded in 1929. Acta Psychologica Sinica: Journal of the Chinese Psychological Society. Analects: Lunyu in Chinese, the primary classic text of Confucius, a record of the words and acts of

Confucius (551–479 bc), mostly in the forms of conversations with his disciples. This text continues to have a profound influence on Chinese and East Asian thought and values. Awakening of Mahayana Faith, The: Buddhist classic text that offers a theory of origins of the truth or the existence of the mind as true reality. Boxer Indemnity fund: After the Boxer Rebellion, a violent movement against foreigners, was crushed in 1901, foreign countries involved reached an agreement with China that they receive large sums of compensation, the so-called Boxer Indemnity (gēngzípéikuăn in Chinese). In 1908, the United States decided to forgive a large portion of its compensation, approximately $12 million in gold, with the condition that part of the fund be used to support Chinese students studying in U.S. universities. Brain-central theory: An explanation of human thinking, emotions, and behaviors as being centrally controlled and responded to by the brain, based on a growing understanding from the 16th century onward of various brain functions. Buddhism ( fó ): A religion and philosophy based on the teachings of Sakyamuni, also known as the Buddha, “the Awakened One” (ca. 563–483 bc). The Buddhist classic texts were first officially introduced into China around the 60 ad. chán: Buddhist term, known in English as zan from Japan; a Buddhist school of thought that explains the laws of the universe and the true thusness that exist in xin, or the person’s inborn nature. Confucianism (rú): A Chinese ethical and philosophical system based on the teaching of Confucius (551–479 bc). It is a complex system of moral, social, political, philosophical, and psychological thought that has had tremendous influence on the culture and history of East Asia. Chinese governments promoted the Confucian doctrine for over 2,000 years. Confucius (ca. 551–479 bc): Teacher, philosopher, political thinker who founded the school of rú, or Confucianism, which became the main doctrine in Chinese society. Cultural artifacts: A term used widely in anthropology, ethnography, and cultural studies to mean anything created by humans in the past and present that gives information about the culture of its creator and user. Cultural Revolution: Also known as The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution; a 10-year period of widespread social and political upheaval in China from 1966 to 1976, characterized by constant nationwide turmoil and economic stagnation. hsueh, guo

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Dào Dé Jīng: Daoist primary classic text that was believed to be written by Laozi (Lao-tze, 571–477 bc). Daoism: Also Taoism; Daoist doctrine that places humans above all other animals in relation to nature. This relationship has a hierarchy of four priorities in the universe (Dao, the heaven, the earth, and human beings). Humans are not as pure as the first three priorities because of humans’ emotions. Dialectical materialism: Marxist interpretation of natural and social reality that views all changes as the result of a constant conflict between opposites arising from the internal contradictions inherent in all events, ideas, and movements. “Materialism” is used in its philosophical sense to denote that the mind’s activities are reflections and reconstructions of the material world that is fundamentally social. Encyclopedia of Chinese Herbal Medicine: A classic text by Li Shizhen of Chinese herbal medicine, published in 1590 and still used today. Fatigue laboratory: A laboratory designed to study human physical activities, endurance, patterns of fatiguing, and mental concentration in various conditions in order to obtain new understandings in applied physiology, psychology, and sociology. Gang of Four: Nickname given to four powerful figures during the Cultural Revolution: Jiang Qing, Mao’s widow; Wang Hongwen, former vice chairman of the Communist Party; and Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan, both then Politbureau members. They were arrested and imprisoned after Mao’s death. Great Leap Forward: An economic and social movement from 1958 to 1961 aiming at mobilizing the vast population to transform China from a semiindustrial economy into a highly productive modern society. Heart-central theory: The ancient Chinese belief and interpretation of the heart as the center of all the organs and the locus of human thinking and emotions. hún: Soul. I-Ching (see Zhōu Yì). Idealism: A philosophical doctrine that holds that the ultimate nature of reality is derived from the mind or ideas. Idealists: Those who believe that thinking is the supreme force of the spirit in the universe, as Mengzi was said to claim that all things in the world exist in one’s heart. Jìng: Buddhist term (gocara in Sanskrit) in reference to the heart, body, and objective world that can 114

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be perceived by xīn and that are inseparable from one another, constituting a cosmos. Jīng: Energy. Jué: Consciousness. Jūnzıˇ: A key concept in Confucianism, to mean a person who has obtained a high degree of selfperfection, is learned, and distinctly likes or dislikes according to rén. According to Mengzi, a genuinely rational, or thinking, person who is able to avoid distracting temptations and to preserve his inborn good qualities. Korean War: Military conflict (1950–1953) between South Korea supported by the United Nations, and North Korea supported by China and the Soviet Union. Lăozıˇ (Lao-tze, 571–477 bc): One of the two best-known founders of the Daoist philosophy. Also see Zhuāngzıˇ. Lü (consider): Thinking about the future event. Mahayana: One of the two main branches of Buddhism or a category of Buddhist philosophies and practice. It holds that the dominant role the mind plays in the universe governs the three realms: that of sensuous desires, that of forms, and that of formlessness. The other main branch is Hinayana. Marxism: By the Soviet definition, a philosophy with three inseparable components: political economics, dialectical and historical materialism, and theory of societal development. May 4th Movement: A college student–led political demonstration in Beijing in May 1919 that rapidly swept China and marked the beginning of China’s modern era. It went from demanding return of Shandong Province, a German colony, to China after World War I to an extensive and profound discourse among intellectuals about China’s modernization, reinforcing a zeitgeist that had already begun to emerge in the late 19th century. May 7th Cadre School: A major form of reeducation in the rural areas for Chinese government cadres, intellectuals, and most of the educated population from cities. This school name was given after Mao Zedong’s May 7th Directive in 1966, at the beginning of the Cultural Revolution. Mengzi (also Mencius, 372–289 bc): An outstanding thinker and educator who advanced and elaborated Confucius doctrine; considered a founder of Confucianism. Modernization Reform: Also known as wùxübiànfă in 1898, a year called wùxü according to the Chinese lunar calendar. In this short-lived movement, a group of thinkers persuaded the emperor to lead a political reform (biànfă) that

promoted learning from the West, science, public education, and economic development. Movement of “hundreds of flowers blooming”: A policy period (1956–1957) in which the Chinese government openly encouraged intellectuals to make criticisms and suggestions to the Communist Party to promote the development of science, culture, and arts. Naïve materialism: A simple or primitive form of materialism that doesn’t grasp how the mind and consciousness can capture and reflect on complex organizations of natural and social phenomena. Newtonian notion of inertia: First of three of Newton’s laws of motion; that is, an object when not being subjected to external forces remains at rest or moves with constant speed. Opium Wars: Also known as the Anglo-Chinese Wars, the escalated conflicts over trade disputes and diplomatic difficulties between China’s Qing government and the British government after China attempted to restrict British opium traffickers. Pò: Willed soul or spirit of bravery. Quadrant tachistoscope: An experimental device for studying the legibility of written Chinese characters. Relationship between form and spirit: Often referring to the relationship between body and soul. Rén: A key Confucian notion of humanity that includes duty, piety, loyalty, faithfulness, and love. Mengzi also defines it as emotional unity of the two opposite poles, like and dislike, in jūnzi. He further shows that there are four pillars of rén, namely, sympathy, shamefulness, modesty, and the sense of right and wrong, all of which arise from inborn feelings that regulate human social life. Rightists: A label for those who criticized the communist government and expressed dissatisfaction to the leadership during the movement of “hundred flowers blooming” in 1957. Sakyamuni (ca. 563–483 bc): Spiritual teacher and founder of Buddhism, known as the Buddha or “the Awakened One.” Sānfán-wu˘ fán movements: Parallel political movements accompanying the social transition from the old Chinese society to a new socialist society in the context of the Korean War. “Sānfán” literally means “three against”—a mass movement against corruption, dissipation, and bureaucracy within state-run sectors of the society. “Wu˘fán” means “five against”—a movement specifically against private, thus capitalist, business owners’ bribing, tax evasion, stealing public properties, shoddy work with inferior

materials, and stealing of the government’s economic information (http://cpc.people.com.cn/ GB/33837/2534704.html). Sè: Buddhist term (ru^pa in Sanskrit); forms or things or the material world. Sī: Thinking about the current happening. Silk Road: An extensive interconnected network of trade routes across the Asian continent connecting China via its West territory to east, south, and western Asia and the Mediterranean world. Spontaneous dialectics: Simple and intuitive dialectic that does not go beyond a general description of dialectical phenomenon observed. Three-year natural disaster: A widespread crisis in China (1958–1961) as a result of breaking away from Soviet Union; a series of political movements, including the Great Leap Forward and the antirightist movement; and rampant natural disasters followed by a persistent famine. Tiān: Nature; things that are natural, a priori, or inborn. The relationship between nature and humans was that between the preexisting and the experience-based. Thus, this relationship implies the priority of nature. Tiānrén-héyī: The Chinese ideology that promotes harmony between nature and the human. Treaty of Versailles: A peace treaty at the end of World War I, signed on June 28, 1919, which contains the terms of turning the German colony of China’s Shandong Province over to Japan, sparking the May 4th Movement in China in the same year. True thusness: Buddhist term; the truths as they are or the causes and properties of the truth of the universe. Wu˘ xíng: Five complementary and counteracting elements in the universe; namely, metal, wood, water, fire, and earth. Xīnlıˇxué: Chinese term for psychology, borrowed from Japanese-coined term, shinri-gaku. Xīn: Buddhist term (citta in Sanskrit); a conglomeration of heart, mind, spirit, motive, sense, mentality, idea, thought, feeling, or the mental world. Xīn: Heart; in classical thinking, the thought organ or the central organ that rules all the psychic activities, which are not independent of one another. Yellow Emperor’s Classic of Internal Medicine, The: China’s earliest and the then most comprehensive medical text, written between 400 bc and 100 bc. Yīn and yáng: A unity of two opposing energies or forces in the universe. hsueh, guo

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Yīn yáng wu˘ xíng: Ancient Chinese theory for explaining both natural and social phenomena, the universe. Zhéxué: Philosophy or the study of wisdom. Zhì: Aspiration or will; a Confucian concept of self-perfection as a moral person with a three-step process: setting goals, following the faith, staying persistent. Zhí: Knowing or knowledge. Zhìyì: Aspiration and intention. Zhōu Yì (I-Ching): The Chinese classic of changes; the classic texts that a variety of schools of Chinese thought, including Confucianism and Daoism, drew heavily on. Zhuangzi (Chuang-tze, 369–286 bc): Believed to be one of the founders of the Daoist school of thought. His name is often combined with Laozi, another Daoist founder, known as the philosophy of Lao-Zhuang. Also see Laozi.

Endnotes 1. Yan Guocai (1999, p. 15) suggests that two main sources of psychological thought could be spotted in archeological artifacts such as stone and bone implements, already deciphered carapace-bone scripts, and bronze, many of which were fashioned 5,000 years ago. More evidence may be found in the Book of Odes, the Book of Changes, Zuo Zhuan (Tso Chuan), a commentary on the Spring and Autumn Annals, and Confucius’ Analects, etc., which were dated from 2,000 to 3,000 years ago. Most historians of Chinese psychology began with these relatively “recent” sources because these classic texts are readily accessible (Gao, 2005a; Yan, 1997). 2. There is a general consensus about this three-period view, for example, 1840–1900 as a focus (Blowers, 2006; Yan, 1997, 1998) and 1840–1919, 1919–1949, 1949–present as major historical periods (Gao, 2005a; Yang, 1990). However, no division has been established between modern and contemporary psychology in China. Most accounts available remain ambiguous. We chose the 1980s as an approximate ending date for China’s modern psychology, in keeping with the historians cited above, which may not adequately reflect the scholarly work in Taiwan and Hong Kong. 3. Chinese historians of psychology are fond of quoting Hermann Ebbinghaus as saying that psychology has a long past, but a short history, e.g., J. Gao (1982, pp. 1–5, 1995, p. 2), G. Yan (1999, p. 11); X. Yang, (1994, p. 1), and Zhao, Lin, and Zhang (1989, p. 6). 4. Like Confucius’ Analects, the book Zhuangzi, named after the philosopher, was compiled by his disciples. The book records Zhuangzi’s fables critiquing Confucius’ ideas (Sima, 1979). 5. Historians of Chinese Buddhism proposed different dates on which Buddhism was first introduced into China. Dates earlier than the official ones are based on interpreting vague statements from classic texts in which segments or phrases may suggest Buddhist introduction. One widely accepted date was proposed by Zhao Puchu (1999), a lay Buddhist monk and scholar, who described the first official introduction of Buddhism from India in 67 ad, when an emperor of the Han Dynasty sent an official delegate to India from the city of Luo Yang, the then

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capital of China with a follow-up effort to translate the Buddhist classics. However, China’s earliest official chronological record of historical events (Sima G., 1084/1956), History as a Mirror for Governing: History of Han Dynasty, Volume 37 (zīzhìtōngjiàn hànjìsānshíqī) suggests the date was 2 bc, when an earlier emperor of the Han Dynasty ordered an emissary to visit India and study Buddhism. Following this record, China’s Buddhist Association celebrated the first official introduction of Buddhism in 1998 to mark its 2000th anniversary. 6. The original Chinese for spirit here is shén which may be translated as god, but The Yellow Emperor’s Classic Internal Medicine (huángdìnèijīng: tàisùběn) defines it as ubiquitous spirits in the human body and activities that are enlightening, witty, transcending, and hard to capture by words or by any material means. 7. Historical records indicate that there were many writers, as well as many books on talent selection during the period when Liu Shao lived. Liu himself reportedly published 12 books on related topics, but only this one survived the test of time (Li, 1995, p. 3, Wang, 1994, p. 11). Incidentally, this one book was also the only one that was translated into English in the interest of psychology (Ma & Zhu, 1998; Shryock, 1937). 8. These six ways are summarized in one term—liushu—that refers to pictography, indication, inference from combined meanings, pictophonetics, homophone using borrowed character, and synonymous explanation. 9. A contemporary of Mengzi, Gaozi refuted the Confucian argument that human beings were born being good. Instead, Gaozi argued that human beings were morally neutral at birth. Gong Zizhen defended Gaozi against Mengzi’s thesis. All of Gong’s essays are collected in Gong (1975). 10. On January 13, 1904, the Qing government issued the decree that China establish a Western-style school system with clearly specified administration, pedagogy, and grade structure. This government decree exerted a far-reaching impact on China’s subsequent educational system, although the decree ceased its authoritative effect after the 1911 Revolution that ended the Qing Dynasty (Shizhou Ancient Books and Arts, 2006). 11. Jing and Fu (2001) reported that another Chinese book on psychology published in 1898 by W. Martin (Ding Weiliang), a U.S. missionary, was found in the University of Michigan library, entitled Aspects of Human Nature (Xing Xue Ju Yu), with a preface by Li Hongzhang, the Premier of the Qing government. This two-volume book was perhaps one of the earliest books on psychology written in Chinese. 12. On various occasions, Piaget (e.g. 1962, p. 152; 1971, p. 271) draws on Kuo’s work to support his own tertiary approach to human intelligence and knowledge. Kuo’s reputation continued after his death in 1970 (e.g., Blowers, 2001; Gottlieb, 1965, 1972; B. Guo, 2009; Hogan, 1978; Klinghammer, 1969; Rilling, 2000; Rodkin, 1996). 13. The Chinese Communist Party was officially established in 1921, but it was one of many parties at the time seeking ways to save China from victimization by foreign powers and division by war lords and regional governments (Yu, 1987). 14. Although historical accounts of this period (1949–1980) are often short, they differ in their evaluations about whether psychology made progress. Unlike Jing and Fu’s (2001) two-paragraph description of the time after 1949, Higgins and Zheng (2002) give only two short paragraphs to the period of 1920–1950, not only giving the impression that it was not remarkable, but also stating that Chinese psychology before 1949 “in fact was not different from [Western psychology]” (p. 230).

Liu Fan (1982), another member of China’s Institute of Psychology, gave an assessment from the field of developmental psychology similar to Higgins and Zheng’s, but he did not characterize psychological research after 1949 as Chinese by nature, nor did he offer evidence to show greater accomplishments after 1949 than before 1949 in developmental psychology. This debatable issue itself reflects a common problem in Chinese psychology: The evaluation of scientific psychology is more influenced by the political time and place of the evaluators than by disciplinary criteria. 15. Sanfan wufan movements can be examined as a social transition phase from the old Chinese society to a new socialist society in the context of the Korean War. “Sanfan” literally means “three against”—a mass movement against corruption, dissipation, and bureaucracy within state-run sectors of the society. “Wufan” means “five against”—a movement specifically against private, thus capitalist, business owners’ bribing, tax evasion, stealing public properties, shoddy work with inferior materials, and stealing of government’s economic information (Retrieved from News of the Communist Party of China. http://cpc.people. com.cn/GB/33837/2534704.html). 16. The word “materialism” is used in its philosophical sense to denote that the mind’s activities are a reflection and reconstruction of the material world that is fundamentally social. 17. U.S. psychologists’ sporadic interests in Soviet psychological theories appeared also in this period. The English translation of Vygotsky’s (1962) Thought and Language was a highlight that carried with it several ideas of important psychologists named here such as Sechenov, Leont’ev, and Luria. Leont’ev’s activity theory has widely been incorporated into today’s cultural psychology in the United States (Cole, 1996; Rogoff, 2003). Interestingly, Chinese psychologists have to relearn these Soviet ideas in the new millennium from their counterparts in the West. 18. The Gang of Four refers to Jiang Qing, Mao’s widow; Wang Hongwen, former vice chairman of the party; and Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan, both then politbureau members. 19. Similar to this view is an often-heard minority emphasis on traditional Chinese psychological thought as a distinct and future psychology (Han, 1992; Peng, 2007) that is termed “Chinese humanistic psychology” or “moral and rational top-down approach” from Chinese antiquity, as opposed to the “Western bottom-up approach” imported from Western psychology.

Further Reading Blowers, G. H. (1996). The prospects for a Chinese psychology. In M. H. Bond (Ed.), The handbook of Chinese psychology (pp. 1–14). New York: Oxford University Press. Blowers, G. H. (2009). Emulation vs. indigenization in the reception of Western psychology in Republican China: An analysis of the content of Chinese psychology journals (1922–1937). Journal of the History of Behavioral Science, 45(1), 21–33. Chen, Y., Zhang, K., Li, Y., & Han, B. (2001). Ten major events that impacted Chinese psychology in the 20th century [ℛ◐ ₥儹㈀❜₼⦌㉒䚕ⷵ♠⻤䤓◐ↅ⮶ℚ]. Acta Psychologica Sinica, 24(6), 718–720. Chinese Psychological Society. (Ed.). (2001). Contemporary Chinese psychology [ᇵ㇢ⅲ₼⦌㉒䚕ⷵᇶ]. Beijing: People Education Press. Gao, J. (Ed.). (2005). History of Chinese psychology (2nd ed.) [ᇵ₼⦌㉒䚕ⷵ⚁ᇶ]. Beijing: People Education Press.

Guo, B. (Ed.). (2009). Biographies and analysis of outstanding thinkers in the history of Chinese psychology [ᇵ₼⦌㉒䚕ⷵ兞 ␇ⅉ䓸♙␅䪣䴅ᇶ]. Hefei: Anhui People Press. Jing, Q., & Fu, X. (2001). Modern Chinese psychology: Its indigenous roots and international influences. International Journal of Psychology, 36, 408–418. Yang, X., Ye, H., & Guo, B. (Eds.). (1999). General history of psychology, Vols. 1–5[ᇵ㉒䚕ⷵ抩⚁ᇶ]. Jinan, Shangdong: Shangdong People Education Press. Zhao, L. (1992). The origins and development of modern psychology in China[ᇵ₼⦌䘿ⅲ㉒䚕ⷵ䤓怆䄟✛♠⻤ᇶ]. New Developments in Psychology (Special Issue/monograph). Beijing: The [Chinese Academia Sinica] Institute of Psychology. Zhao, L., & Xu, Q. (1997). A study of modern history of Chinese psychology[₼⦌扠䘿ⅲ㉒䚕ⷵ⚁䪣䴅]. In S. Wang, Z. Lin, & Q. Jing (Eds.), The science of Chinese psychology (pp. 278–304). Changchun, Jilin: Jilin Education Press.

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C HA P TE R

7

Colombia

Rubén Ardila

Abstract This chapter describes and analyzes the historical development of psychology in Colombia from its beginning to the present, including its future perspectives. The social and cultural context of the country is presented, with its fundamental characteristics. The psychological ideas that have been developed in Colombia are analyzed, beginning with indigenous psychologies and continuing with the influence of the ideas originating from Europe during the Spanish Colonial period, as well as during Independence, the formative period, and the present situation. Psychology as a science and psychology as a profession have been developed in Colombia starting from the second half of the 20th century. The role of psychology in the understanding and solution of social issues is outlined here. The main areas of psychological work and scientific research, the journals published in the country, the conceptual frames of reference of Colombian psychology, and the challenges and problems that it faces, along with the future perspective are described. Colombian psychologists and psychologists of Latin America and of the developing world in general, seek to obtain a delicate balance between a scientific psychology with general universal laws and a psychology that is relevant for the social and cultural context of the country. Keywords: Colombia, indigenous psychologies, research, professional developments, social commitment, perspective, Latin American psychology

Psychology as a science and as a profession in Colombia has a long tradition. It begins with the ideas held by primitive settlers of the territory concerning topics that we now refer to as psychological, and continues with psychology as practiced during the Spanish Colony, Independence, the Republic, and the social changes of the 19th and 20th centuries, to the present. As a profession in the modern sense, Colombian psychology goes back to 1947, with the first professional training program at the National University of Colombia, predating most countries of Latin America and many others around the globe. This long tradition as a branch of learning and as a profession explains why psychology in Colombia is a fields with a great number of university students,

a great number of professionals in practice, and numerous research and application fields (see Ardila, 1973, 1993, 2004). There are approximately 36,000 professional psychologists and approximately 34,000 psychology students, and 140 professional training programs at the university level, in a country of 44.7 million inhabitants. Colombian psychology was greatly influenced by European psychology, including the experimental psychology of Wundt, Weber, Fechner, Ebbinghaus, and their successors. In the first stage of psychology as a profession in Colombia, psychotechnics was preeminent. Psychotechnics was the name was given in to psychotechnology (applied psychology) in Europe, particularly in Spain, and was especially focused on the construction and use of psychological

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tests and in the assessment and evaluation of psychological processes. Psychoanalysis, especially Freudian and Lacanian soon appeared; however, it was not as influential and decisive in Colombia as it was in the Southern Cone of South America, in particular in Argentina. The appearance of behavior analysis was more recent, beginning approximately in 1970. Basiclevel studies; the founding of experimental psychology laboratories with an emphasis on operant behavior; psychological applications in diverse fields such as clinical (behavior therapy), educational (behavior analysis applied to education), industrial/ organizational (organizational behavior analysis), social (cultural design), and conceptual fields, led to new perspectives in psychology (see Oyuela, 2008). Psychology in Colombia developed research at a basic level, along with laboratories, professional journals, research programs, and theories, as well as fields of application and professional advances in these areas of application (education, work, sports, law, clinical and health, forensic, advertising). In addition, new contributions have been made in areas such as violence, peace, poverty, and the role of psychological factors in national development. Colombia’s unique social and cultural background served as inspiration. Today, Colombian psychology has achieved a great critical mass, with many conceptual and methodological reference frameworks, a great deal of basic and applied research, and a great number of application fields. The influence of traditional European psychology has diminished in the last decades (except that of Spain) and the influence of U.S. psychology has increased. Relations with Spain have increased and, in general, connections at an inter-American and Latin American levels have grown. Colombian psychology still lacks growth into the international (global) arena. This chapter analyzes psychology in Colombia from the perspective of its development, both as a scientific discipline and an applied field: the social and cultural context in which it appeared and diversified; research issues and research fields; scientific journals, conventions, and publications; professional organizations and their vicissitudes; the creation of a code of professional ethics for Colombian psychologists; topics related to training at undergraduate and graduate levels; and the future perspective of Colombian psychology in national, Latin American, inter-American, and global contexts. First all, we look at the country and its geographic and demographic characteristics. 126

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Colombia: The Country and the People Colombia is located in northwestern South America. It has coasts on the Caribbean Sea and the Pacific Ocean. The Amazon River is located in the south of the country. The geographic area of the country is 1,138,914 km2 (439,737 sq mi). The population is 44.7 millions (in 2009), which makes it the third largest Latin American nation in population, after Brazil and Mexico. Colombia borders Panama, Ecuador, Peru, Brazil, and Venezuela. The capital city is Bogotá, which has approximately 6 million inhabitants. Other important cities are Medellín, Barranquilla, Cali, Cartagena, and Bucaramanga. The country is named for Christopher Columbus, one European discoverer of the New World. See El Tiempo (2007). Several ethnic groups coexist in Colombia. The country is racially varied: 64% of the population is mestizo (white-Indian), 22% white, 4% Afro-Colombian, 6.5% mulato (white-Afro-Colombian), and 3.5% Indians (i.e., native Americans). The majority of the culture comes from Spanish tradition; it is a predominantly urban Western culture, but it coexists with diverse cultural groups and diverse subcultures. Colombia is a multiethnic and multicultural country. The main language is Spanish. The predominant religion is Roman Catholic: 92% of the population has been baptized in that religion and 61% affirms to be practicing Catholics. Other religious groups have increased their importance: Protestants, Presbyterians, Anglicans, Jews, and others account for small percentages of the population; 6% of the population affirms not to belong to any religion. The demography has changed from rural to urban in the last five decades, and at the moment, 76% of the population live in urban areas. The rate of illiteracy is 5.8%, which means that 94.2% of the population can read and write. There are differences between the urban and rural areas. Educational coverage has improved considerably in recent years. Approximately 94% of children have access to elementary education, and the goal is to increase this coverage. Basic education is free and mandatory. Educational levels are preschool, elementary, and high school, spanning 11 years. Next is the university level, with technical, technological, and professional modalities. Colombia greatly values education, which is reflected in the large number of colleges and universities. Great importance is given to the arts and humanities, and only in the last decades to science and technology. Colombia has a tradition of good

language use, being a homeland of writers and men and women of letters and, in addition, to plastic artists. Because of the quite varied geography (Andean mountains, two coasts, Eastern plains, tropical, subtropical, and high and cold regions), social and cultural development has been very uneven. Most of the population inhabits cities located in the Andes Mountains and in some of the semitropical valleys. Colombia is a country of regions, with several subcultures that influence its psychology and socioeconomic development. It is a country in which life in urban areas is very different from that in rural areas. There exists a great economic disparity and noticeable differences between social classes. The middle class has been growing, but division still exists between classes in relation to wealth. The percentage of people who live below the poverty line is approximately 40%, comparable to that of other Latin American countries. This is an extremely high percentage, which implies a great loss of human resources and human potential. Governmental and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) fight for the reduction of poverty.

Psychological Ideas Throughout history, in the territory of presentday Colombia, many native groups existed, including the Muiscas, Taironas, Caribbeans, Tolimas, Kunas, and others. In all of them have been found ideas related to the human being, family, child-rearing practices, the life cycle, old age, the way to know the world, sexuality, how we learn, how people relate to others, the normal and the abnormal, relationships between genders, harmony between people, and death and the afterlife. Such ideas were part of the worldview of diverse native cultures before the arrival of the Europeans. It was a traditional knowledge, transmitted orally from one generation to the next, teaching how to understand the world, understand human beings and their society, and interpret the events that happened. This “primitive man as a philosopher” surprised the Spanish colonizers, who sought to Christianize the native people and put an end to their myths in order to “civilize them.” Studies of these indigenous psychologies are based on observations that European colonizers made and registered, colonizers who saw the New World from their Eurocentric perspective. They are also based on current observations of little-Westernized native groups. Because it is not possible to carry out completely

valid and reliable research on these pre-Columbian ideas, what we know about the psychological ideas of the primitive inhabitants of the Americas (and of other parts of the world) is quite fragmentary. The Spaniards brought their own worldview, philosophy, and psychology to the Americas. These were based on Christian ideas, especially Thomistic ideals. The philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas and the psychological implications of such a philosophy were the center of intellectual activity in the universities of the New World. In Colombia, the earliest universities are St. Thomas University, Rosario University, and Javeriana University, all of them founded in the 16th century and run by religious communities. These universities were founded shortly after the Universities of Peru, Mexico, and Santo Domingo, the first universities of the Americas. The period of Spanish colonialism continued from approximately 1500 to 1810. Lasting more than three centuries, it is the longest period in the history of Colombia and in other Latin American countries. During this extensive period, institutions were created and the influence of Spain was consolidated, with along with its religion, philosophy, language, laws, social structures, production systems, economy, science, and technology. A very interesting figure of this period was José Celestino Mutis (1732–1808). He was born in Cadiz (Spain) and died in Santa Fe (Bogotá, Colombia). Mutis was a scientist of international importance who completed research work in botany, astronomy, mathematics, medicine, pharmacology, and other areas. He arrived in Nueva Granada (Colombia) as a physician for the Viceroy Pedro Messía de la Zerda, and he organized a botanical expedition to classify the plants of the country, their taxonomy, use, etc. He also introduced the ideas of Copernicus and the new scientific movements, first at Rosario University and soon after in the rest of the country. He assembled a group of young scientists who made the first steps in Colombian science. One of the pioneers of psychology in Colombia is Francisco José de Caldas (1768–1816). He was a pupil of Mutis and espoused the ideas of Alexander von Humboldt (1769–1859); he wrote about national character, giving special importance to the influence of climate on behavior. His work Del Influjo del Clima sobre los Seres Organizados (On the Influence of Climate on Organized Beings, 1808) is probably the first psychological research work done in Colombia. Caldas was also an astronomer, geographer, and naturalist in the broadest sense ardil a

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of the 19th century. His research was well-known in Europe[See Caldas (1808/1966)].

19th-century Psychology in Colombia The period of independence from Spain took place between 1810 and 1819 and was characterized by a bloody war led by Simón Bolivar. After the creation of the new Republic, the country tried to break all cultural ties with Spain and instead imported the most advanced ideas from France and England. During the 19th century, the ideas of Jeremy Bentham, J. J. Rousseau, the French Revolution, and the Industrial Revolution were implanted, and everything was done to eradicate what had come from Spain. These changes were carried out in education, including the in the universities, and within the faculties of philosophy, law, and medicine, which was where psychological subjects were most often taught. The psychology of the new republic sought to free itself of Thomist influence and instead move nearer to British empiricism and associationism. Positivism as a conceptual system had a great influence in education, philosophy, and the social organization of all new Latin American nations. The 19th century in Colombia was a period of great philosophical fervor and of important transformations in society. It was also important in the rest of Latin America and in most of the world. In Colombia, it was centered on the way to free the new nation from Spanish colonial influence and modernize the country. The conflicts between liberal and conservative ideas, between the secular perception of society and the Catholic perception, were fundamental. The influence of Spain for more than three centuries, between 1492 (discovery), and 1819 (independence), was very important. Spain had introduced an authoritarian regime based on beliefs and Catholic values. It affirmed that a natural order existed in the universe, under which exploitation, oppression, and slavery were justified. Submission to the king and his will was the core of the laws. In addition, the human being had to suffer, pass through a “valley of tears” to reach redemption in the afterlife. This Spanish tradition was deeply rooted in the new republics that obtained their independence from Spain during the first decades of the 19th century, and Colombia (formerly called New Granada) was one of the republics most oriented toward the Spanish culture. The Roman Catholic religion and the Spanish language were considered the backbone of the nation. 128

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In this agitated political turmoil of the 19th century, with its urgent quest to modernize the country, to steer it toward Europe (especially toward England and France), the question was what to do with Spanish tradition. The formation of the state and the incorporation of individuals into the new model of society and its social organization were core ideas at the time, and the dilemma of continuing with Spanish tradition or abolishing it completely caused many struggles and conflicts. Liberal and conservative ideas acquired very radical and extreme features in Colombia. Liberal philosophy was individualistic, modern, centered in science, industrialization, and in the ability of people to change the society. Conservative philosophical views on the other hand, were respectful of tradition, the Spanish legacy, the mandates of the Catholic religion, and the maintenance of social order. Topics like universal free and mandatory education, the death penalty, the role of religion in politics and education, caused many discussions, polemics, and even civil wars. In this heated sociopolitical context, psychological ideas were based upon the traditional Catholic philosophy of the notion of the soul, and the ways to secularize this notion of soul. Wundt’s ideas and German experimental psychology became known in Colombia along with sensationism, associationism, and British empiricism. The role given to psychology depended on the importance given it by the Catholic Church authority. Many Colombian leaders of this time admired the secular processes of countries like England, France, and the United States, and the new relationship they forged between the individual and the state. In such nations, society was centered upon the cult of the individual, great importance was given to free will, and individual initiative was valued. On the other hand, under the Catholic regime, people were part of the “herd” and personal initiative was censured, as was free competition and the search for material prosperity, which was associated with ambition and pride. The capacity of the individual to think for him- or herself, without help from the Church, was something condemnable, and to be labeled a “freethinker” was very negative. The secularization of the soul, the influence of German experimental psychology, Cardinal Mercier’s ideas from the Catholic University of Louvain, the critics against modern science, Darwinism, physiology, and the search for social advancement versus the respect for the Catholic

tradition, were elements that defined the developmental ups and downs of Colombia’s psychology during the 19th century. One of the fundamental concerns was how to balance the conceptualization of the nature of the soul as immaterial and eternal, according to the Church, with the discoveries of modern science (Darwin, Wundt, Bentham). The Roman Catholic Church held, for much of the 19th century, a privileged role in Colombian society and proved a great influence in politics and education. In intellectual and political debates, sometimes heated enough to cause civil wars, the influence of the Church was supremely relevant— the Church–state relationship, financial privileges, the upbringing of new generations, industrialization and progress—all were crucial issues. The 19th century in Colombia can be separated into two periods: the Radical Olympus (in Spanish Olimpo Radical) (1849–1884), and the Regeneration (1878–1903). The former was dominated by liberal, anticlerical ideas, defenders of the individual, the federal political organization model, adherents to free commercial trade, and defenders of the workers. Leaders of the Radical Olympus movement wanted to overcome the trappings of the Spanish colonial legacy. They wished to impose a secular education that would prepares the nation’s citizens for freedom. They longed to deprive the Church of its privileges and its central role in society. The main underpinning of the Olympus movement was the Rionegro Constitution (1863), postulated during the progressive government of Tomás Cipriano de Mosquera (1798–1878). Education was considered fundamental to the formation of the new society, and the scholastic philosophy was to be replaced with the “sensualistic” ideas by Bentham, Condillac, Destutt de Tracy, and other English and French thinkers. Knowledge was emphasized as coming from senses, as emanating from reality. As the historian Jaramillo Uribe (1956/2001) points out, “Benthamism as a philosophical doctrine was one of the aspects of the modern spiritual tendency toward the investigation of nature, the observation of facts as part of the development of science . . . and an expression of a yearning to become in touch with empirical reality and the concrete after so many years of meandering speculation and sterile application of concepts and methods of scholastic philosophy” (p. 118). The human mind, according to these new concepts, would grasp knowledge better when it was enriched with facts coming from sensorial experience.

The function of education was to provide experiences that would lead to the development of knowledge associated with its capacity to influence upon reality. The German Pedagogical Mission, which was brought to Colombia in 1870 by president José Eustorgio Salgar (1831–1885) during his radical and enlightened government, introduced Pestalozzi pedagogy, whose basic principles included the premises that every thought about the world had to be acquired by the senses, perceptual knowledge had to be the core for primary instruction, the senses had to be trained and become part of methodically objective teaching, and teaching must go from the known to the unknown. The psychology on which this pedagogy was based focused on the senses. Habits, observation, and classification are functions of the mind, as is the personal interpretation of phenomena. The individual conscience is the pivot for the development of human action. Memory is cultivated by perception and by ideas and their relationship. Higher education must be based on reasoning and judgment. Using this rationale, it is important to develop habits based on perception, observation, and classification of symbols. A person must interpret the world critically. Differences exist between individuals, and it is important to acknowledge this during the creation of knowledge. The individual’s conscience is the core in the development of actions. This psychological frame of reference emerged in the reformed educational system, which was secular (not governed by religion). The Catholic Church saw this as a huge risk to its predominance, to its role in schools and universities, and to its role as a guide of individual and social conduct. The ally of the Church, the Conservative Party, had great power and sought to defend traditional structures, hierarchies, social classes—everything that had been deeply rooted in New Granada (Colombia) during the Spanish colonial period. Personal independence, materialistic prosperity, and industrialization were linked with Protestantism, not with Catholicism. These ideas were the enemy of tradition and of the existing social structure, a kind of “modernism” borrowed from more advanced countries, especially England, France, and more recently, the United States. The answer from the Church and traditional society was the so-called Regeneration (1878–1903) that succeeded the Radical Olympus period. The return to traditional values and a search for order in society was the answer to this Europeanlike “modernism.” Rafael Nuñez (1825–1894), ardil a

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president several times between 1880 and 1894, inaugurated in 1878 this so-called “regeneration” of the country. His was a centralistic government, under the guidance of the Catholic Church and in agreement with the Conservative Party. Nuñez had been a progressive leader, an advanced thinker, poet and philosopher, author of various works including the National Anthem of Colombia. But he was convinced that centralism and not federalism, traditional values and not modern values, had to be the core of the country at that moment of its history. Regeneration, under the command of Rafael Nuñez and Miguel Antonio Caro (1843–1909), sought to find solutions to the problems of civil wars and of the institutional chaos of the country in the traditional values coming from Spain, such as the Catholic religion and the Spanish language. Authority came from God, and it was necessary to re-establish the nation based upon past values. The political Constitution of 1886 established a Concordat with the Holy See, which protected the Catholic Church, giving it back its guiding role in social and political life, including that of education on every level. The materialism of liberals and Freemasons, freethinking, sensationism, modernism, and mercantilism had to be replaced by absolute, divine values based on the Catholic Church as mother and teacher. This permitted religious leaders to take an active role in politics, state administration, and the upbringing of new generations. The conservative governments and the Church reestablished their traditional alliance and their main role in the country. In this confrontation against Radical Olympus, the role of psychology continued to be relevant. Experimental German psychology, with Wundt and his laboratory in Leipzig and his multiple followers, had taken the “soul” as an object of study using methods from experimental science, and had made a counterbalance to traditional religious doctrines. Secularization of the soul under the label of “mind” and “conscience” was something unacceptable for traditional Catholics. The solution that the Catholic Church found was a neo-Thomist one, led by Pope Leo XIII, who sought to reapply the school of thought of St. Thomas Aquinas as a philosophical frame of reference. According to the pope’s encyclical “Aeterni Patris,” it was important to advance in modern science and not be against it. Catholic thinkers had to be reminded that faith does not oppose the truth. Discoveries and true thoughts should be welcome, 130

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according to the pope’s neo-Thomist view. Cardinal Désiré J. Mercier (1851–1926) was entrusted by the Pope to direct the Superior Institute of Philosophy of Louvain in 1894, and he took charge of forming Catholics interested in the new scientific psychology. Cardinal Mercier insisted that psychology was not a spiritual or materialistic science, and that Catholics must work with it to make it advance. According to Mercier, Thomist thought recovered Aristotelian thought and made it possible to establish the compatibility between physiological phenomena and psychic life, a mutual agreement of “compromise” between science and religion that was very well-received in wide circles of Catholic intellectuals. For other scholars and historians of Colombian and Latin American culture, this neo-Thomism compliance, which sought to make eclectic alliances between science and religion, did nothing to advance science. Its ideas were only a way to mitigate problems and to integrate discoveries in astronomy (Copernicus), biology (Darwin), and psychology (Wundt) under the Catholic doctrine’s frame of reference (St. Thomas Aquinas and Cardinal Mercier), a commitment that did not benefit the development of scientific psychology in Colombia or the rest of Latin America. A pioneer of Colombian psychology in the 19th century was Manuel Ancízar (1812–1882). He wrote on varied aspects and published many books, among them Lecciones de Psicología (Lessons of Psychology, 1851), which is the first book written by a Colombian that includes in its title the word “psychology.” He described and analyzed numerous aspects of Colombian society and was the first rector of the National University of Colombia. Manuel Ancízar studied law and was a diplomat, politician, liberal thinker, and traveler. He was also a Minister of Foreign Affairs for the liberal government, an international consultant, and a journalist, and he organized a publishing house (printing press). He directed the Comisión Coreográfica (Choreographic Commission) that had the mission of describing the customs, cultural patterns, and ways of life of the Colombian people. This was the origin of his book La Peregrinación de Alpha (Alpha´s Pilgrimage). His ideas were in tune with the main philosophical trends in Europe and the United States, but were applied to the reality of Colombia in the 19th century. His work as first rector of the National University of Colombia was a challenge to the influential Catholic universities of that time.

20th-century Psychology in Colombia

Origins of the Profession

The 20th century began in Colombia with civil wars and attempts at social and political reorganization. There was also a dawning industrial development with the introduction of English and French technologies. Certain advances in the sciences were observed, for example in astronomy and linguistics. The United States also began to have increased influence in all of Latin America, including Colombia. The psychology of the first decades of the 20th century was carried out on the part of physicians, educators, and philosophers (see Ardila, 1973, 1993, 2004). We find research on mental retardation, schizophrenia, human development, hypnosis, brain and behavior, sexuality, and family done by Colombian physicians, most frequently as theses required to receive the degree of medical doctor. Books also were written from a psychological perspective on the subjects of health, childhood, development, and even death. For their part, educators were interested in the processes of learning and teaching, in the early education of children, in the role of reward and punishment, and similar topics. Finally, Colombian philosophers were noted for their presentation of theories and speculations about human nature. (See Rodríguez Valbuena, 2003). The Escuela Normal Superior was an institution that flourished in the 1940s and 1950s; its members worked in social sciences, education, and other areas, including courses and research in psychology, anthropology, and linguistics. It was created in 1937 and lasted a few decades. Luis López de Mesa (1884–1967) has been called the first Colombian psychologist because he was the first to identify himself as such. Actually, he was a physician who specialized in psychiatry and psychology, with degrees from Harvard. He held important positions in the government, such as Minister of Education and Minister of Foreign Affairs. He was rector of the National University of Colombia and a prolific writer. His written work, of great depth and very advanced for his time, includes the subjects of psychology, philosophy, sociology, cultural history, and other disciplines. A milestone in the history of psychology in Colombia is the foundation of the section of psychotechnics of the National University of Colombia in August of 1939, by Mercedes Rodrigo (1891–1982). This section gave origin to the Institute of Applied Psychology and the creation of the psychology (undergraduate) program on November 20, 1947.

The physicians, educators and philosophers who carried out the earliest work on psychology in Colombia had information about the developments made in Europe and the United States and often quoted the studies of foreign psychologists. However, since there was no professional training in psychology in the country, these efforts were quite scarce and fragmentary. The first program of professional training in psychology was created in the National University of Colombia by the work of Mercedes Rodrigo (1891–1982), a Spanish psychologist who had arrived in Colombia on invitation from the National University’s rector, Agustín Nieto Caballero (1889–1975). Rodrigo was a refugee from the Spanish Civil War; she had studied with Claparède at the University of Geneva, got her degree in 1923, and returned to Madrid. Her life was immersed in several of the important social and political events of the 20th century. Her life and work has been described in detail elsewhere, and she remains one of the most outstanding figures in psychology in Colombia (Ardila, 1988; see also Herrero, 2003).

Other Training Programs The Javeriana University in Bogotá founded a professional training program in psychology in 1962, the second in the country after the program at the National University of Colombia. Several others followed, not only in Bogotá but also in other cities. The earliest psychology training programs in Colombia are listed in Table 7.1. In the 1990s, due to the new political constitution of Colombia, universities were given autonomy. This led to the creation of many professional programs in fields such as medicine, business administration, psychology, law, and nursing. At the moment, in Colombia, approximately 140 programs of professional psychology training exist, and they are located in different cities throughout the country. There are approximately 34,000 psychology students at the undergraduate level (5-year professional training programs). See Pérez-Acosta & Perilla (2006).

Graduate Training The model of psychology training in Colombia differs from the Anglo-Saxon model (B.A. or B.S., M.A. or M.S., Ph.D. or Psy.D.). The model is more similar to the 5-year classical European professional model that includes supervised practices and a thesis. This is similar in other disciplines, such as ardil a

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Table 7.1 First psychology training programs in Colombia University and City

Year

1. National University of Colombia (Bogotá)

1947

2. Javeriana University (Bogotá)

1962

3. University of the North (Barranquilla)

1971

4. Catholic University of Colombia (Bogotá)

1971

5. Incca University (Bogotá)

1971

6. University of San Buenaventura (Medellín)

1972

7. University of Manizales (Manizales)

1972

8. University of Los Andes (Bogotá)

1973

9. Metropolitan University (Barranquilla)

1975

10. University of Valle (Cali)

1976

11. University of Antioquia (Medellín)

1977

12. University of St. Thomas (Bogotá)

1978

13. Konrad Lorenz University (Bogotá)

1981

14. Javeriana University (Cali)

1984

engineering, law, economics, etc. This is a professional terminal program. Graduate training is not required to practice the profession. However, training programs at a graduate level have been created in many fields of knowledge, among them psychology. We have three doctorate programs in psychology (in chronological order, University of Valle, Cali, 2004; University of the North, Barranquilla, 2005; University of the Andes, Bogotá, 2008). In addition, we have master’s degree and specialization programs in numerous areas of psychology, approximately 21 programs at a master’s degree level (the earliest one at the University of St. Thomas, Bogota, 1977), in fields such as clinical psychology, behavior analysis, industrial/ organizational psychology, consumer psychology, neuropsychology health psychology, forensic psychology, sport psychology, educational psychology, child psychology, psychological assessment and evaluation, social psychology, community psychology, family psychology, and others. The majority of the universities that offer these programs are located in the major cities of Bogotá, Barranquilla, Medellín, Cali, Bucaramanga, and Manizales. The number of Colombian psychologists with a Ph.D. is small. Of approximately 36,000 practicing psychologists in Colombia, the great majority only have the degree of psychologist (professional, 132

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5-year training program). It is not similar to the B.A. or B.S. of the United States, but rather to the M.A. or M.S., since it allows for professional work, practice, and research. The number of people with a master’s degree in psychology is not large, and even fewer people have a Ph.D. These individuals have usually received their doctoral training in the United States, Spain, Belgium, Russia, or Mexico. It is possible that the number of Colombian psychologists with a Ph.D. will increase in the near future, since a certain number are studying at a doctorate level abroad, as well as in Colombia. The required degree for professional work is a psychologist’s degree (5-year training, including practical work and a thesis).

Legal Recognition of the Profession The profession of psychology in Colombia was recognized in 1983 (Law 58). A reform and update of this law took place in 2006 (Law 1090). This law recognizes the profession of psychology in the country and regulates its practice. There is a code of ethics that has similarities with the American Psychological Association (APA) code of ethics but takes into consideration specific aspects of the country. Colombian psychologists also follow the Universal Declaration of Ethical Principles for Psychologists.

Fields of Professional Work The most important fields of professional psychology work in Colombia are listed in Table 7.2. Table 7.2 Main areas of professional work Area

Percent of Practitioners

Clinical Psychology

42.0%

Educational Psychology

20.6%

Industrial/Organizational Psychology

17.6%

Applied Social Psychology

5.3%

Other Areas:

(Less than 1%)

Sport Psychology Geropsychology Neuropsychology Forensic/Criminal Psychology Health Psychology Family Psychology

As mentioned before, the psychologist’s degree authorizes the practice of the profession; however, there is interest in pursuing graduate studies, to obtain greater expertise and qualifications. Colombian psychologists participate very often in continuing education courses, workshops, and conventions, and are frequent contributors to the Colombian Congresses of Psychology, Inter-American Congresses of Psychology (SIP), International Congresses of Psychology (IUPsyS), and International Congresses of Applied Psychology (IAAP). They also participate in conventions on clinical, experimental, neuropsychological, social/community, educational, economic, industrial/organizational, and other specific topics.

Scientific Research During the training of a psychology student, whether at an undergraduate or graduate level, scientific research is emphasized. There are courses on research methodology, statistics, laboratory work with animals and human participants (perception, learning, motivation, cognition, and other basic processes), and the use of computers. (see Oyuela, 2008) The work culminates with a degree thesis. Most Colombian psychologists learn how to do scientific research and how to use it in their professional work. But only a small percentage (around 6%) considers that scientific research in psychology is their main field of action. The rest are research “consumers,” not producers of new knowledge. Psychology in Colombia, as well as in other countries worldwide, is predominantly a profession, more closely resembling medicine or engineering than physics or biology (see Ardila, 2007). Behavior analysis and social psychology are research fields with the greatest number of publications by Colombian psychologists. The first field has a broad research tradition in the country, starting in 1970, although its emphasis has been diversified from being a laboratory science that worked with animal subjects to being a very wide area including human and nonhuman participants. It also includes work in verbal behavior, neurosciences, relational frames, cultural design, and numerous applied works (clinical behavior therapy, autism, behavior analysis in education, in organizations, etc.). Both basic as well as applied research is undertaken, which is primarily carried out in universities and research institutes. For a description of Colombian experimental psychology and the most representative research work, see Oyuela (2008) in his book about the country’s psychology laboratories.

Social psychology and community psychology have been fields of great interest in Colombia, and have given origin to numerous publications in specialized journals and books (see, for example, Arango, 2007). This tradition of social research also began in the 1970s, but it has had many ups and downs. Action research, developed by Orlando Fals Borda (1925–2008), based on the work of Kurt Lewin, has had influence in Colombian social psychology and community psychology, as have the ideas of Ignacio Martin-Baró (1942–1989) on liberation psychology. He was a leader of Latin American psychology, interested in political problems and in how psychological science could improve the lives of Latin American people. He was assassinated in El Salvador, and remains one of the great leaders and heroes of Latin American psychology, especially remembered for his work in and commitment to community and political psychology issues (see Aron & Corne, 1994). In addition to behavior analysis and social/ community psychology, many other areas have had a relative development as research fields in the country. Table 7.3 presents the main research fields of Colombian psychology. Financial support for scientific research comes from Colciencias (the Colombian equivalent to the National Science Foundation, or the Conycet/Conacyt of other countries). Financial support may also be received from universities, government ministries (of education, health, environment), and from both Table 7.3 Main research areas More Research Publications Social Psychology Experimental Analysis of Behavior Other Important Research Areas (alphabetical order) Clinical Psychology Developmental Psychology Educational Psychology Geropsychology Health Psychology Industrial/Organizational Psychology Measurement and Psychometrics Personality Psychobiology and Neuropsychology

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national and international private foundations. Although the resources are limited, as is the case everywhere in the developing world, such financial support exists and is used. Colciencias, especially, has been instrumental in the support of scientific research in diverse areas, including psychology. See Colciencias (2008). Colombian psychologists publish in their own scientific and professional journals, as well as in foreign journals, especially those of the United States and Europe. The following journals stand out as venues in which Colombian psychologists publish their research work: Revista Latinoamericana de Psicología (Colombia), Avances en Psicología Latinoamericana (Colombia), Revista Inter-Americana de Psicología/Inter-American Journal of Psychology (Brazil), Psicothema (Spain), the International Journal of Clinical and Health Psychology (Spain), and Universitas Psychologica (Colombia). Most Colombian psychologists publish their research results in journals in Spanish, and only in a very small degree in English-language journals.

Psychological Journals Colombia has an important tradition of publication in many fields of knowledge, including psychology. In 1956, the journal Revista de Psicología, of the faculty of psychology of the National University of Colombia, was issued for the first time. This was one of the oldest psychology journals in the Spanish language (after the Anales del Instituto de Psicología, Argentina 1935, and the Revista de Psicología General y Aplicada, Spain 1946). It was a journal covering all areas of psychology, in both applied aspects and research, but had only limited. The authors came, in the majority, from the only professional training center existing in the country at the time, the National University; there were, however, foreign contributors and contributions from authors not associated with the University. The Revista de Psicología was issued sporadically until the 1980s, when it completely disappeared. It played the important role of being the first and only forum of Colombian psychology during its formative period [see Gallegos (2010)]. The Revista Latinoamericana de Psicología (RLP, Latin American Journal of Psychology) was published for the first time in January 1969. During the past 40 years, it has become one of the main scientific journals of psychology and the voice of Spanishspeaking psychology. It has been issued without interruption, and it has been included in the most important international databases of psychology, among them the Institute for Scientific Information 134

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(now Thompson Scientific), Scopus, PsychINFO, Scielo, Psicodoc, Latinindex, and many more. It is the most representative journal of Latin American psychology today. It was published for 38 years by the Foundation for the Advancement of Psychology, and is now published by Konrad Lorenz University (Bogotá). Avances en Psicología Latinoamericana (APL, Advances in Latin American Psychology) was first issued in 1982, under the name Avances en Psicología Clínica Latinoamericana (Advances in Latin American Clinical Psychology). For the past 27 years, it has been published without interruption. It is also included in the main international databases. It has been in close relationship with the RLP. Initially, it was also published by the Foundation for the Advancement of Psychology, but for the last two years, it has been published by the University of Rosario (Bogotá). Other psychology journals include Acta Colombiana de Psicología, Psicología desde el Caribe, Universitas Psycologica, Suma Psicológica, Revista Interamericana de Psicología Ocupacional, and others. Table 7.4 presents the main psychology journals in Colombia, their year of foundation, and the organizations that publish them (in most cases a university).

Conceptual Frames of Reference Today, Colombian psychology is part of mainstream psychology; it shares the methods, content areas, problems, history, and trends of the rest of the world. In its different psychology departments, topics and problems similar to those found worldwide are discussed and analyzed (for challenges concerning the internationalization of psychology, see Brock, 2006). On the other hand, as part of the developing world, there is a deep interest in social relevance, in being useful, in seeking its own identity. Most Colombian psychologists work in applied fields, and only a small percentage is dedicated primarily to scientific research. Colombian psychology is first of all a profession. Matters related to social development, social issues, and the well-being of the majority are matters of great concern on the part of psychologists. Nevertheless, Colombian psychologists have made contributions in areas of basic knowledge, in perception, learning, the neurosciences, evolutionary psychology, lifespan development, social psychology, cognition, personality, individual differences, and others.

Table 7.4 Journals of psychology currently published in Colombia Name

First Issue

Published by

Acta Colombiana de Psicología

1994

Catholic University of Colombia

Avances en Medición

2003

National University of Colombia

Avances en Psicología Latinoamericana

1982

University of Rosario

Diversitas: Perspectivas en Psicología

2005

University of St. Thomas

International Journal of Psychological Research

2008

University of St. Buenaventura (Medellín)

Psicogente

1998

Simón Bolívar University (Barranquilla)

Psicología desde el Caribe

1998

University of the North (Barranquilla)

Psychologia, Avances de la Disciplina

2007

University of St. Buenaventura (Bogotá)

Revista Colombiana de Psicología

1992

National University of Colombia

Revista Iberoamericana de Psicología: Ciencia y Tecnología

2008

Iberoamerican University

Pensamiento Psicológico

2005

Javeriana University (Cali)

Revista Interamericana de Psicología Ocupacional l

1982

Cincel Ltda. (Medellín)

Revista Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales, Niñez y Juventud

2003

University of Manizales

Revista Latinoamericana de Psicología

1969

Konrad Lorenz University

Revista Neuropsicología, Neuropsiquiatría y Neurociencias

1999

University of Antioquia (Medellín)

Suma Psicológica

1994

Konrad Lorenz University

Tesis Psicológica

2006

University of Libertadores

Universitas Psychologica

2002

Javeriana University (Bogotá)

The main conceptual emphases or frames of reference of Colombian psychology are the following: Behavior analysis, both in its basic and applied aspects, as well as in its conceptualization. Psychology laboratories dedicated to behavior analysis (see Oyuela, 2008) exist, as well as research groups, university courses, and numerous applications. Colombian psychology has been behaviorally oriented over the last decades, similar to the orientation of other Latin American nations, like Mexico, Chile, and Brazil. During the 1970s, when the ideas of Skinner, Kantor, and other theoreticians of behavior analysis were introduced, “conflicts of paradigms” appeared that grew to be very violent. At present, behavior analysis, in its modern versions (Hayes, Staats, Rachlin, Baum) is an essential part of Colombian psychology. Psychobiology and neurosciences. The psychobiological approach to psychological processes has been a continuous field of interest for Colombian

psychologists. Psychobiology has been developed for several decades, as has neuropsychology, as an applied field (clinical neuropsychology). Recently, the interest in evolutionary psychology has been immense. Several laboratories and work groups are dedicated to neurosciences, in the National University of Colombia, the University of the Andes, the Autónoma University of Bucaramanga, and others. Piagetian and cognitive psychology. The ideas of Piaget and the Geneva School were very well received in Colombia starting in the 1970s, and have greatly influenced education and the processes of teaching and learning. There are researchers and research groups that are scientifically very productive in the areas developed by Piaget and his followers (see, for instance, Puche, 2003). The first doctorate program in psychology that was organized in Colombia—at the University of Valle (Cali)—had a strong Piagetian emphasis. ardil a

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In addition, cognitive psychology, in versions different from Piaget’s, has also had a good reception in the country, including computer modeling of behavior, artificial intelligence, and other topics. Psychoanalysis. Without ever being as highpriority and predominant as it was in Argentina and Uruguay, psychoanalysis had importance in Colombia. The first psychology professors were mainly psychoanalyst physicians during the 1950s and 1960s. The emphasis was basically Freudian. Clinical psychologists worked from the psychoanalytic perspective and then from a neo-psychoanalytic one. Afterward, Lacan and his ideas were very wellreceived. In most universities, psychoanalysis courses are taught, but they are more of literary interest than psychological. Nonuniversity centers and psychoanalytic training groups exist, covering all aspects of contemporary psychoanalysis. Psychoanalytical psychologists have made important conceptual and applied contributions. Humanist psychology. In Colombia, humanism, based on the work of Maslow, Rogers, and many other authors, was known and appreciated. Existential psychology, logotherapy, and the work of Viktor E. Frankl and others were much valued. At present, humanist psychology has been both continued and transformed by positive psychology (Seligman). The studies on optimism, happiness, subjective well-being, etc. are in their highest point in Colombian psychology. Liberation psychology. Ignacio Martin-Baró, a Spanish psychologist and priest who lived a part of his life in Colombia and El Salvador, proposed a psychological approach with a social commitment that he called liberation psychology. Latin Americans took it very seriously, and liberation psychology is considered to be one of the most original contributions of Latin America to psychology. In Colombia, it has influenced political psychology, community psychology, and in general, social psychology. Vygotski and cultural psychology. The controversies between Piaget and Vygotski to explain human development are well known. There is research on Vygotski at a conceptual level and its findings have been applied to educational areas. Various approaches and areas of emphasis coexist in Colombian psychology. Some university centers are more dedicated to one point of view than another, but in general, in all universities most of these approaches to psychology are respected. Probably the majority of psychologists share an interest in a unified psychology (see Ardila, 2006) and considers that the era of the “psychological 136

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school” is a thing of the past. In addition, it is considered that an eclectic approach does not necessarily better explain phenomena; the unity of psychology will be obtained with a unifying paradigm and not with an eclectic frame of reference.

Conclusion Colombian psychology has grown and diversified, from the mid 20th century, when it was a small profession and science centered in the university, to become a very large group of specialists, with a great critical mass. Today, it is a profession with several thousand practitioners, a science that is doing research with a certain level of refinement, and an area of knowledge with great social acceptance. However, Colombian psychology is not known for being very internationally oriented, and this situation must improve. It has, however, been able to respond to the social problems of the country and to developmental matters, and it is endeavoring to achieve a difficult balance between being part of a universal science and being a contextualized discipline, relevant in the here and now.

Future Directions On the other hand, probably the most important difficulties and challenges of Colombian psychology are the following: • The need for a clearer and more defined social image. The social perception of psychology as a science and as a profession should be made clear to the public. • Organize more graduate training programs at the doctorate and masters levels. • Obtain better financing for scientific research. As a developing country, Colombia must define its priorities and its budget. Although the problem is not exclusive of Colombia or exclusive of psychology, it is a fact that better funds for scientific research in psychology are required. • Develop new research and application fields. • The number of psychology students at the professional (undergraduate) level is very large, and therefore, rational planning is needed in respect to psychology training programs and employment possibilities. • Research on the great problems of human behavior, integrated to the international context and in concert with inter- and multidisciplinary groups (with biologists, neurologists, mathematicians, sociologists, economists,

anthropologists, and other specialists). Because of its great biodiversity and great cultural diversity, Colombia is a good laboratory for testing psychological findings. The profession faces these challenges and others. Organized psychology is centered in the Colegio Colombiano de Psicólogos (Colombian College of Psychologists, basically a professional organization), and in the Sociedad Colombiana de Psicología (Colombian Society of Psychology, basically a scientific organization). The national government, universities, psychological research centers, and other institutons have important tasks to carry out for the future development of Colombian psychology.

Further Reading Ardila, R. (1973). La psicología en Colombia, desarrollo histórico [Psychology in Colombia, historical development]. México, DF: Editorial Trillas. Ardila, R. (Ed.). (1993). Psicología en Colombia, contexto social e histórico [Psychology in Colombia, social and historical context]. Bogotá, CO: Tercer Mundo Editores. Ardila, R. (2004). Psychology in Colombia: development and current status. In M. J. Stevens, & D. Wedding (Eds.), Handbook of international psychology (pp. 169–178). New York: Brunner-Routledge. Peña-Correal, T. E. (2007). 60 años de la psicología en Colombia [Sixty years of psychology in Colombia]. Revista Latinoamericana de Psicología, 39, 675–676. Pérez-Acosta, A.M., & Perilla Toro, E. (2006). Una retrospectiva de la psicología en Colombia [A retrospective of psychology in Colombia]. Bogotá: Psicom Editores (E-book). Oyuela, R. (Ed.). (2008). Los laboratorios de la psique. Una historia de la psicología experimental en Colombia [The laboratories of the psyche. A history of experimental psychology in Colombia]. Bogotá: Universidad Javeriana.

References Ancízar, M. (1851). Lecciones de psicología (Lessons of psychology). Bogotá: Imprenta del Neogranadino. Arango, C. (2007). Psicología comunitaria de la convivencia [Community psychology of coexistence]. Cali, Colombia: University of Valle. Aron, A., & Corne, S. (Eds.). (1994). Ignacio Martín-Baró. Writings for a liberation psychology. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Ardila, R. (1973). La psicología en Colombia, desarrollo histórico [Psychology in Colombia, historical development]. México, DF: Editorial Trillas. Ardila, R. (1988). Mercedes Rodrigo (1891–1982). Revista Latinoamericana de Psicología, 20, 429–434. Ardila, R. (Ed.). (1993). Psicología en Colombia, contexto social e histórico [Psychology in Colombia, social and historical context]. Bogotá: Tercer Mundo Editores. Ardila, R. (2004). Psychology in Colombia: Development and current status. In M. J. Stevens, & D. Wedding (Eds.), Handbook of international psychology (pp. 169–178). New York: Brunner-Routledge. Ardila, R. (2006). The experimental synthesis of behaviour. International Journal of Psychology, 41, 462–467. Ardila, R. (2007). The nature of psychology: The great dilemmas. American Psychologist, 62, 906–912. Brock, A. C. (Ed.). (2006). Internationalizing the history of psychology. New York: New York University Press. Caldas, F. J. (1808/1966). Del influjo del clima sobre los seres organizados (On the influence of climate on organized beings). Obras completas (Complete works). Bogotá: Universidad Nacional de Colombia. Colciencias. (2008). Colombia construye y siembra futuro. Política nacional de foment a la investigación y la innovación (Colombia constructs its future. National policy to support research and innovation), Bogotá: Colciencias-CNCyT. El Tiempo. (2007). Gran encyclopedia de Colombia (The great encyclopedia of Colombia). 20 vols. Bogotá: Círculo de Lectores. Gallegos, M. (2010). La Revista Latinoamericana de Psicología en sus 40 años de historia. Universitas Psychologica, 9, 911–924. Jaramillo Uribe, J. (1956/2001). El pensamiento colombiano en el siglo XIX [Colombian thought in the XIXth. Century]. Bogotá: Uniandes-Colciencias. Herrero, F. (2003). Mercedes Rodrigo (1891–1982), la primera psicóloga española. Revista de Psicología General y Aplicada, 56, 139–148. Oyuela, R. (Ed.). (2008). Los laboratorios de la psique. Una historia de la psicología experimental en Colombia [The laboratories of the psyche. A history of experimental psychology in Colombia]. Bogotá: Javeriana University. Pérez-Acosta, A. M., & Perilla Toro, E. (2006). Una retrospectiva de la psicología en Colombia [A retrospective of psychology in Colombia]. Bogotá: Psicom Editores (E-book). Puche, R. (2003). El niño que piensa y vuelve a pensar [The child who thinks and thinks again]. Cali: University of Valle. Rodríguez Valbuena, M. G. (2003). La filosofía en Colombia. Modernidad y conflict (Philosophy in Colombia. Modernity and conflict). Rosario, Argentina: Laborde Editor.

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Czech Republic

Jirˇí Hoskovec†

Abstract After a review of psychological ideas documented in connection with important personalities of Czech history since the 14th century, the development of psychology as a science in the sociohistorical context through the centuries is reported. A scientific approach to psychology within the framework of philosophy and physiology, and before the background of the industrial Revolution, developed in the 19th century at the University of Prague, when it became a separate science. Over time, numerous scientists from abroad contributed to Czech psychology. The 20th century is divided into periods according to the political–historical situation. Focus is on the post-communist period after 1989, in which psychology underwent significant changes and broad development. Keywords: Czech Republic, History of psychology, Psychology of personality, Developmental psychology, Health psychology, Methodology of psychological research

Throughout the history of the Czech Republic, various names have been used for the area, which comprises the historical lands of Bohemia in the West, Moravia in the East, and part of Silesia in the Northeast at the border to Poland. In this chapter, “Czech” means the whole area; otherwise it will be specified as Bohemian, Moravian, or Silesian. In Czech lands, psychological ideas can be traced back to the 14th century. Thinkers communicated their ideas concerning problems, which in modern psychological terms might be labeled as abnormal, developmental, educational, mental hygiene, personality, pastoral, occupational, political, and social. Psychological aspects were handled in connection with theology, philosophy, and medicine. Recommendations concerning mental hygiene were, for instance, addressed under the topic of envy. Charles IV of Luxembourg (1316–1378), Czech King and later Roman-German Emperor, founded Charles University at Prague in 1348, the city of his residence. †

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In his autobiography, he recommended: “Do not envy one another, but love each other, since envy gives rise to hatred. He who hates cannot be loved, and perishes as a result of his rage” (Brožek & Hoskovec, 1997c, p. 13). Tomáš Štítný (ca. 1325–1406), a Czech philosopher of the same period, and probable alumnus of the University of Prague, explained in his moraleducational dialogues: “Envy is accompanied by hatred and false accusations. Envy will say: How unfortunate, that he is doing so well. May his good luck fail him. If we loved our neighbor, there would be no bitterness in our heart, and we would rejoice in the success of our fellow men” (Brožek & Hoskovec, 1997c, p. 25). Accordingly, John Hus ca. (1369–1415), the Bohemian church reformer, explicated: “Envy is the pain we experience, when contemplating the merits of our fellow men, whether it is their beauty, refined spirit, riches, abilities, intelligence, knowledge, popularity, or social status. The envious person wishes that those, who possess these advantages be deprived of them. He does not feel the pain of envy when he sleeps, but it endures and returns as soon as he awakes.

Envy leads to . . . . hate, slander, unfair criticism and discontent” (Brožek & Hoskovec, 1997c, p. 31). As a psychological intervention, mediation was offered as Petr Chelčický’s (ca. 1390–1460) historical contribution. In a situation in which various groups of Czech reformists were fighting each other, he created the idealistic basis for their union, the “Bohemian Brethren” (Masaryk, 1926). Petr Chelčický verified the possibility of nonviolent enforcement in politics. During the Renaissance period, the wide spectrum of scholarly interests and their mobility within Europe while studying and/or working are remarkable. For rulers, it was an expression of wisdom and self-image to support arts and science. The most ambitious was Rudolf II (1552–1612). To his Prague residence he invited astronomers, astrologers, alchemists, painters, sculptors, writers, and poets. He engaged Thaddaeus Nemicus, also called Thaddaeus Hagecius ab Hayek (1525–1600), a multitalented scholar, as his personnel counselor. Thaddaeus Nemicus was both a promising scholar and a fortune-teller. His interpretation of physiognomic details in respect to personality traits included predictions concerning the future development of the person (Malý, 1937). When in 1618 the Thirty Years’ War began, Paulus Stránský (1583–1657) was 35 years old. He refused to convert to Catholicism, and was forced to emigrate. In his book Respublica Bojema he described the national character of the Bohemians: “They do not tolerate severe discipline and dislike obeying orders. They get over injustices with difficulty. Privately and publicly they like splendor. When gay, they are tractable, when sad, they are peevish. When they are hungry, they do not sing (like Germans) and they do not dance (like French) but are angry . . . .” (Brožek & Hoskovec, 1997c, pp. 38–39). John Amos Comenius Nivnicensis (1592–1670), the Moravian educational reformer and pedagogue, may be called a leading thinker in child psychology and learning. He was priest of the reformist Brethren and emigrated. After traveling various countries, he settled in the Netherlands. Comenius postulated equivalent education for males and females, and democratic methods of teaching with respect to the individual capacity of the pupil. The age of reason in the Czech lands, overcoming religious illiberality and the consequences of the Thirty Years War, was based on the reforms of Maria Theresa (1717–1780), Czech and Hungarian Queen, Archduchess of Austria, and RomanGerman Empress, as well as of her successors.

Under her reign, Francis Josef Kinský (1739–1805) was director of the Austrian War Academy, and additionally played an important role in the foundation of the Royal Bohemian Academy of Sciences. Kinský’s manuals for soldiers, exhorting them to achieve self-sufficiency, braveness, virility, decisiveness, discipline, and self-control by physical, moral, emotional, and intellectual training were based on psychological principles. In connection with the Coalition War (1792–1796) against France, he analyzed the problem of “the means of distracting the French from their blind trust in their leaders” (1793). Concerning the teaching and learning of children, he stressed cultivation of the mother tongue and early learning of foreign languages (Brožek & Hoskovec, 1997c, pp. 42–44). The scholars mentioned above had long-term— spanning centuries—influence on Czech education and science (Brožek & Hoskovec, 1997c; Dvorský, 1931; Förster, 2008). Scientific endeavor in Czech psychology was applied by Georg Prochaska (1749–1820), born at Blízkovice. The Moravian physiologist studied neurophysiology, and established a link to psychology. He regarded inner senses as connections between perception and cognition. Sensorium commune he defined as the locality of the nervous system, where all external stimuli meet, and from where the inner stimuli spread to all parts of the body. The external stimuli are reflected, either consciously or unconsciously. These revealing ideas are subject matter for consideration. In his handbook on human physiology (Vienna, 1797), Prochaska observed attention, imagination, memory, emotion, self-control, opinion, rational judgment, intelligence, ingenuity, wit, and wisdom (Kruta, 1956).

Establishing Psychology As a Discipline In the Czech lands, psychology as a science developed in the 19th century at the University of Prague. D. Brett King and Michael Wertheimer described it in their biography of Max Wertheimer: “Prague was the jewel of Central Bohemia and had evolved to the capital, the largest city, and the cultural and economic center of the area (2005, p. 18).” Among the scientists developing psychology at Prague University was Jan Evangelista Purkinje (1787–1869), born at Libochovice, North Bohemia. After a professorship at the University of Breslau, he returned to Prague in 1850. He contributed to psychology in the fields of vision, space perception, vertigo, nervous system, acoustics, phonetics, senses, consciousness, and sleep. Purkinje (Figure 8.1, p. 249 hoskovec

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Fig. 8.1 Kinesiscope. The apparatus was developed by Purkinje and improved by a mechanical, clock-type drive and exchangeable discs of pictures. Purkinje demonstrated the moving picture while lecturing in Breslau and in Prague.

and 13.2, p. 250) had extraordinary powers of selfobservation for the discovery of subjective sensations, and was equally astute in his observation of others (Brožek & Hoskovec, 1987, 1997a; Kruta, 1961). In 1867, Ernst Mach (1838–1916), born in Chrlice, Moravia, came to Prague, where he lived for 28 years. With Purkinje, he shared an interest in problems of sensory and motion perception, adaptation of the human eye, and vertigo. Mach investigated perceptual processes for several years and published in 1886 the Analysis of Sensations. In 1916, Albert Einstein pinpointed that his critical approach was essentially promoted by Ernst Mach’s philosophical ideas (Hoskovec, 1998a; Oxford, 1999). In 1870, the sensory physiologist Ewald Hering (1834–1918), born in Altgersdorf, Saxony, came to Prague and stayed for 25 years. He took over the physiological laboratory after Purkinje. Hering’s explanation of color blindness through the theory of complementary colors (1880) opposed Helmholtz’s theory of color perception. However, today, both theories are compatible (Hoskovec, 1998d). 140

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In 1879, when Ernst Mach was rector of Prague University, Carl Stumpf (1848–1936), born at Wiesentheid, Bavaria, was appointed to a full professorship at the philosophical faculty of Prague University. Stumpf was a student of the phenomenologist Franz Brentano (1838–1917). In Prague (1883), he published the first volume of his Tonpsychologie (Hoskovec, 2000, 2001; Sprung, 1997, 2006). One year after Stumpf, Anton Marty (1847–1914), born in Schwyz, Switzerland, accepted a call to Prague, where he lived for 34 years. As with Stumpf, he was student of Franz Brentano. He purported that psychological experience and analysis can lead to the source and definition of the most important metaphysic terms, as for instance causality and substance. Marty engaged as well in the psychology of linguistics (Hoskovec, 1998c). In 1882, Prague University was divided into two branches, German and Czech. Ernst Mach, Ewald Hering, Carl Stumpf and Anton Marty continued to teach at the Prague German University. Gustav Adolf Lindner (1828–1887), born at Rožďalovice, Central Bohemia, taught from 1882 at the Prague Czech University. In his publication Ideas, on the Psychology of Society as a Basis for the Social Sciences (1871) he introduced the term social psychology and offered a program for this discipline. Another publication (with four English-language editions between 1889 and 1901) by G. A. Lindner is Empirical Psychology According to the Genetic Method (Brožek & Hoskovec, 1997b; Svobodová, 2005). A further student of Franz Brentano, Thomas Garrigue Masaryk (1850–1937), born at Hodonín, Moravia, started to teach at the Prague Czech University in 1882. His psychological interests included child psychology, history of psychology, hypnosis, imitation, and suicide (Brožek & Hoskovec, 1995). After his career as philosopher and university teacher, he became the first president of the Republic of Czechoslovakia, serving from 1918 to 1935. In 1884, Carl Stumpf left Prague for Halle, and a year later Friedrich Jodl (1849–1914), born in Munich, accepted a full professorship at the Prague German University, where he taught for 11 years. Jodl attempted to summarize the diverse psychological literature and to provide an objective report on the state of the art. He left Prague for Vienna, where in 1896 he published his widely utilized Prague psychology lectures as Lehrbuch der Psychologie (Hoskovec, 1998b). Ernst Mach, Ewald Hering and Friedrich Jodl left Prague in 1895. Anton Marty remained at the

one, equipped at his own expense. He purported that psychology must avoid speculation and be studied empirically. Rostohar’s methods were based on the conception of mental structures. After an interruption due to World War I, he transferred in 1923 to Masaryk University Brno (founded 1919). Rostohar established in 1926 the Psychology Institute at the philosophical faculty of Masaryk University, which gained a leading position in the country. Here, the Brno school of Gestalt psychology developed. From 1935 he edited the first, and that time only, Czech psychological journal. In 1934, Emil Utitz (1883–1956), born at Prague, started teaching philosophy, ethics, and psychology at the Prague German University. Emil Utitz was co-founder of the Czech-German “Circle Linguistique” of Prague, a philosophical forum. He survived a 3 years’ imprisonment in a concentration camp. After his return to Prague he published Psychology of Life in the Concentration Camp Theresienstadt, documenting the characters of prisoners under heavy strain (Utitz, 1947, 1948).

The Era of Psychotechnics

Fig. 8.2 Rotating chair originally used for the treatment of psychiatric patients, used by Purkinje for self-observation and in studying optokinetic nystagmus, vestibular nystagmus, and vertigo in subjects.

Prague German University until 1914. In 1896, Christian von Ehrenfels (1859–1932), born in Rodaun, now part of Vienna, joined the Prague German University. Ehrenfels stayed at Prague for 33 years. His article on “Gestalt Qualities” was published in 1890. During his Prague period, he was primarily interested in value theories, and he published a work on the subject in 1897. Among his students in Prague was Max Wertheimer (1880–1943), who developed von Ehrenfels’ view of Gestalt, and was, together with W. Köhler and K. Koffka, founder of the Berlin School of Gestalt psychology (King & Wertheimer, 2005). In 1910, while Anton Marty and Christian von Ehrenfels worked at the Prague German University, Mihajlo Rostohar (1878–1966), born at Brege, Slovenia, arrived (at Leipzig, he cooperated with W. Wundt) at Prague Czech University. In the years 1911–1912, Rostohar established in Prague the first Czech psychological laboratory, a private

At the beginning of the 20th century, psychotechnics underwent rapid development in the United States and Germany. Czech Psychotechnics began in 1920, when the Psychotechnical Institute (Psychotechnický Ústav) at Prague was founded within the framework of the Masaryk Academy of Labor. The aim was research on the efficiency of human physical and mental labor and the application of research findings. It served as a central and steering institution for the whole republic. Czech psychotechnics learned from Anglo-American research and experience. In addition, German pioneers in psychotechnics, such as Walter Blumenfeld from the Psychotechnic Laboratory at Dresden and Ewald Sachsenberg, assisted with advice. Gradually, vocational guidance centers were established all over the country, for instance, at industrial plants like the Vítkovice steel works and the Baťa shoe factory at Zlín. The few scientists named below made essential contributions to this field. Vilém Forster (1882–1932) from Prague Charles University developed a dynamic theory of nervous impulse (Forster, 1921). In addition, he transposed intelligence tests for Czech application and designed psychotechnical diagnostic aids, among others Forster’s multiple choice reaction apparatus, used for testing of pilots and drivers (Forster, 1928). A modification, the Ostrava dispositiv, is still used today (Brožek & Hoskovec, 1998a; Hoskovec & hoskovec

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Brožek, 2007; Janoušek, Hoskovec, & Štikar, 1993; Štikar, Rymeš, Riegel, & Hoskovec, 2003). A catalogue of occupations, including the mental and physical requirements and health hazards of each, was compiled (Lancová, Říha, Stejskal, & Šeracký, 1925). In the 1930s, Vilém Chmelař (1892–1989), later associated with Brno Masaryk University, was responsible for widening the network of vocational counseling throughout Moravia, where about 70 guidance centers were established. Josef Stavěl (1901–1986) started his career at the Psychotechnical Institute in Prague in 1927 and established a psychotechnical institute and network in Slovakia. In 1934, the Eighth International Congress of Psychotechnics was held at Prague, organized by František Šeracký. In that same year, Jan Doležal published his chapter Psychology and Psychotechnical Performance, which was that time the most thorough Czech study in this field (Doležal, 1934). Other publications concerning the work of the Psychotechnical Institute dealt especially with measuring intelligence (Váňa, 1933) and vocational counseling (Stavěl, 1934). Jan Doležal (1902–1965) reorganized the Prague Central Psychotechnical Institute in 1938, when he became its director. It was renamed the Institute of Human Labor. By that time, it was an interdisciplinary institution numbering more than 100 employees, psychologists, technical engineers, pedagogues, physiologists, and others. The rapid development of the institute ceased during the German occupation and World War II. In 1951, under the communist regime, it was closed, and part of its agenda was taken over by the Ministry of Labor. It then served for the study and improvement of vocational guidance.

World War II The Nazi occupation of Czechoslovakia was accompanied by closing all Czech universities on November 17, 1939, while the German University of Prague, as well as the Prague Institute of Human Labor continued under German supervision. There were changes of personnel, sometimes with tragic consequences for individuals. On the other hand, the Institute of Human Labor succeeded in accepting about 20 medical, technical, and psychology students whose study had been interrupted by the war, and it provided them with professional training, as preparation for postwar work. The Nazi occupation had a very negative impact on the Brno Psychological Institute as well, which had so far 142

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been a top location in Czech psychology. Director Mihajlo Rostohar left. Only a few psychologists succeeded under the subjugating ideological pressure. In Moravia, for example, Ludmila Koláříková, continued working in the area of child psychology, and Ferdinand Kratina pursued his study of the personality and imagination of children; and in Bohemia, Josef Stavěl, continued his investigation of interests (Koláříková, 1942; Kratina, 1942, 1944; Stavěl, 1940, 1941, 1942, 1944).

Revival after World War II When World War II ended with the surrender of Germany, the Czech universities reopened, but the German University of Prague was closed. The leading personalities of Czech psychology in this period were Václav Příhoda, Josef Stavěl, and Jan Doležal. Each of them presented a positive ideal, which had significant influence on many of their students. Václav Příhoda (1889–1979) was influenced by J. Dewey and E. L. Thorndike, and by the behaviorists. From 1922–1926 he studied in the USA. In the 1930s, he led a reform movement to improve the Czechoslovak educational system, namely to develop pedagogy and psychology on a scientific basis, preferably by experimental and quantitative methods. Josef Stavěl, as well as Jan Doležal, transferred after World War II to Prague University. Stavěl was oriented to motivation, personality, instincts, psychological testing, and counseling, as well as psychology in antiquity. Jan Doležal’s fields of interest were experimental psychology, psychology of work, and mental hygiene.

Czech Psychology in the Era of Communism 1948–1989 The communist putsch of February 1948 brought the country as a whole into the Soviet orbit for 41 years (Czechoslovak Socialist Republic). Czech psychology came to be dominated by a narrow-minded Marxist prescription. Fields like personality were very sensitive; others, like transpersonal psychology or psychoanalysis, became taboo. Jan Doležal published Science of Human Labor, which was a central theme. He defined work as the means by which man creates the external material culture and the inner psychosocial culture, with its values and information that affect his behavior (Doležal, 1948). In the first period of Communism, psychology ceased to be officially perceived as a science; on the contrary, it was called a “bourgeois pseudoscience.” Psychology was substituted by higher nervous activity and annexed to pedagogy.

In 1949, a wave of “ideological cleansing” occurred at all academic institutions, accompanied by the denouncing of staff and students from a position of dominance, which party members possessed automatically. Party ideologues and censors kept a watchful eye on lectures and on publications. In this era, Alois M. Marek, born 1917, psychologist and Dominican, remained in hiding for many years to avoid communist imprisonment. During this time, he wrote his book Psychology, based on prewar psychology and following M. Habáň’s psychology of spirituality (Habáň, 1937, 1941) dealing with self-recognition and the shaping of behavior in accordance with knowledge acquired through psychology. It was published after the fall of communism (Marek, 1992). The situation was relatively better for psychologists working in the health system, and later in counseling. Some psychologists with non-Marxist theoretic and research orientations moved into the clinical field, which had a positive effect on the research tradition in this area. In this period, Jan Doležal actively defended psychology against doubts of it being an objective science, and against tendencies to perceive it as a mere part of physiology or of pedagogy. The liberalization following Stalin’s death allowed a renaissance of psychology in the Soviet Union, which had reviving effect on Czech psychology as well. In 1957, the journal Československá psychologie (still in publication) was founded, and Jan Doležal was named editor-in-chief. In 1958, the Czechoslovak Psychological Society was established. Since 1959, Jan Doležal was director of the Psychological Institute of Charles University. He had organizational skill, was an outstanding methodologist, and was successfully synthesizing advanced theory with the demands of praxis. One long-term research field was improvement of skills and prevention of failures and accidents, with a special concern for human errors leading to broader negative consequences. Furthermore, driver psychology was included. The setting of communist ideology accepted a focus on research and development of skills, but the role of personality would not have allowed objective scientific expression, which influenced the orientation of J. Štikar and J. Hoskovec for some decades. (Brožek & Hoskovec, 1997b; Hoskovec, Pour, & Štikar, 1966, 1972; Janoušek, Hoskovec, & Štikar, 1993). In the later 1960s, the official approach concerning international cooperation and travel relaxed, and many psychologists took the chance of establishing

contacts outside the communist block, visiting congresses or working for a period at Western universities. For example, Josef Švancara (born 1924) served as visiting professor to Montreal University. He was at that time concentrating on the diagnostics of mental development, psychology of emotion and motivation, and disorders of mental development (Švancara et al., 1971, 1974). Jiří Hoskovec worked at Lehigh University with Josef Brožek, who became his life-long transatlantic research partner in the history of psychology and sources of information in psychology. Their informal “informationbridge” on psychology lasted for four decades. At Stanford, Hoskovec joined a project at the Laboratory of hypnosis research of E.R. Hilgard. Later, Stanislav Kratochvíl cooperated with E. R. Hilgard at the same laboratory. Furthermore, Kratochvíl visited Milton H. Erickson in Arizona, and took an opportunity to work with Martin T. Orne. Karel Balcar cooperated with Raymond B. Cattell at the Laboratory for research and measurement of personality at the University of Illinois at Champaign. Pavel Říčan (born 1933) participated in personality research at Raymond B. Cattel’s Laboratory for personality and group analysis at the University of Illinois. The Psychological Institute within the Academy of Sciences was founded in 1967, where Vladimír Tardy (1906–1987) studied mainly personality. He created a synthetic conception comprising a broad spectrum of approaches, with emphasis on the situation of the person at the time of the examination (Tardy, 1964). In the early 1970s, in the period of so-called Normalization, he was under political pressure and was forbidden to teach or publish. Jiří Odehnal (1923–2006) and Marie Severová (1924–1999), two psychologists from Charles University, were followers of Tardy in developmental psychology, mechanisms of socialization, and their application in forming skills in early childhood (Odehnal & Severová, 1966). After the invasion of the Warsaw Pact armies into Czechoslovakia to stop the so-called Prague Spring in the summer of 1968, another wave of restraint commenced. The effects of Normalization did not come suddenly but they came surely. In psychology, numerous changes took place in top personnel and in the administrative structure. The Institute of Psychology at the University of Brno was closed for 4 years, and the personnel underwent testing for ideological reliability. Among he was not one of the personnel testet, because evidently procommunist psychologists, Josef Linhart (1917–1991) hoskovec

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was one of the most influential protagonists of consequent enforcement of the official Marxist ideology in psychology. In this period, Václav Příhoda had retired from teaching and worked on his four-volume Ontogenes of Human Psyche. He analyzed man’s total life course, including the somatic changes, based on the workoutput at various ages of important personalities of world and Czech history (Příhoda, 1963–1974; English review, J. Brožek, 1981). Just like his colleague Tardy, Miloš Machač (1922– 1992) was placed under political pressure in the early 1970s and had to retire from leading functions, but he continued in his research of autoregulation methods and stress management. Karel Balcar (born 1939) concentrated on the theoretical development in psychology of personality. His book Introduction to Personality Research disregarded communist ideology, and it was due to luck that it was published and reached its audience (Balcar, 1983, 1991). After Gorbachev became general secretary of the communist party of the Soviet Union (1985) and initiated Perestroika (1986), the changes in Czech society were felt as a decrease of political pressure, although it took another couple of years for society to recover.

Czech Psychology After 1989: A Democratic Setting After overcoming communism by the end of 1989, a democratic order was to be established by means of political, ideological, economical, and social transformation—which entailed vital changes in the orientation of Czech psychology— reported through a selective review of the 12 most represented fields in the recent history of Czech psychological research and application since 1993, when the Czechs and Slovaks established independent states. In the transition period, Oskar Krejčí was adviser to two prime ministers and published his experience as Political Transition from the Psychological Point of View (Krejčí, 2004). International communication was one of the important basics of the new period. Miloslav Šolc (born 1944) reassumed the tradition of large international psychological meetings in Prague, a tradition that started with the International Conference of Psychotechnics in 1934. He initiated and organized four international congresses: The 10th European Congress on Work and Organizational Psychology “Globalization: Opportunities and Threats,” in May 2001; the 30th annual congress of The International Association for Research in 144

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Economic Psychology (IAREP), “Absurdity in the Economy,” in September 2005; the 10th European Congress of Psychology “Mapping of Psychological Knowledge for Society,” in July 2007; and the international congress “Career and Vocational Guidance in Rapidly Changing World” in November 2010 to the 90th anniversary of vocational guidance in Czech lands. Pavel Hartl (born 1934) filled a gap by publishing the gradually growing Czech Psychological Dictionaries until he arrived—in cooperation with his wife Helena Hartlová—at about 20,000 entries of Czech terms with English equivalents and 2,100 names (Hartl & Hartlová, 2010). Historically, Karel Černocký (1940, 1947) published a Czech psychological dictionary. The second edition had about 3000 entries. Bohumil Geist (1970, 2000) is the author of a psychological dictionary in Czech with about 4,500 entries. Milan Nakonečný published a lexicon of psychology and an encyclopedia of general psychology and foundations of psychology (1995, 1997, 1998). In addition there is Terminology and Documentation in Psychology (Švancara, 1980, 1999) and the Dictionary of Basic Psychological Terms with about 300 entries by a group of authors at Prague Charles University (Gillernová, Bahbouh, Mertin, Rymeš, Slaměník, & Šípek, 2000). About 100 contributions presented at a bilateral Czech–Slovak meeting of psychologists were published in a compendium titled Psychology for the Third Millennium (Heller & Šturma, 2000). Psychology of transformation and globalization, reflecting positive and negative aspects from the psychological point of view was studied by psychologists from Prague Charles University (Gillernová, Mertin, 2001; Riegel, Janoušek, Brichcín, & Straka & Šnýdrová, 2001). In connection with the acceptance of the Czech Republic as a member of the European Union the problem of skepticism toward the European Union was investigated. Vladimír Kebza remarked that a process of gradual sobering from the original spontaneous pro-European enthusiasm was promoted by a group of so-called Euro skeptics, presented mainly by Václav Klaus, Czech president since 2003. Key competencies for Europe as an issue for successful integration and their improvement from a psychological point of view were defined (Kebza, 2008, Riegel, Janoušek, Čapek, Skrbková, Straka, Vaněk & Vybíralová, 2004;).

Methodology in Psychology Czech methodology was developed by J. Doležal and V. Břicháček after World War II. Two conferences

dealt with quantitative and qualitative research and with methods of psychological research (Blatný, 2006; Heller, Sedláková, & Vodičková, 1999). An investigation of some specific characteristics of a theatre actor’s work served as example for the theoretical, narrative, hermeneutic approach, and contextual as well as participative methodology (Čermák & Lindénová, 2000). The Qualitative Approach and Methodology in Sciences of Man is the theme of annual conferences held since 2000. The editor of the contributions noticed a positive trend from a formerly defensive to a self-confident presentation of the qualitative approach. However, he missed a unified Czech terminology and suggested starting within the single specializations (Čermák, 2007; Čermák & Miovský, 2000, 2002; Miovský, 2004, 2005). The available software for the analysis of qualitative data was critically reviewed, and verbal reports and protocol analysis were studied (Heller, 2004, 2005). Three types and phases of qualitative data transformation: description, analysis, and interpretation were explained (Heller, 2007; Řehan & Šucha, 2007). The model of the narrative-oriented inquiry was explored, and six approaches to analysis and interpretation were demonstrated. The authors concluded that narrative analysis and interpretation are frequently overlapped, which requires a commitment to transparency as a basic principle of qualitative research, and emphasis upon reflexivity and other hermeneutic principles of understanding (Hiles & Čermák, 2008).

Psychology of Personality The Czech psychology of personality was first developed and applied by Josef Durdík (1837–1902), who concentrated to temperament and character, while Emil Utitz (1883–1956) studied character in strain situations. Vladimír Tardy (1906–1987) created a synthetic concept taking into account the actual situation of a person. How science can help man to be as he is longing to be and to find the right individual orientation is the main issue for Pavel Říčan (born 1933), who wrote a book on psychology of personality, re-edited in 2007. Karel Balcar (born 1939) followed the concepts of Raymond B. Cattell, Vladimír Tardy, and Pavel Říčan. According to Balcar’s theory of developmental motion the theoretical development in personality research is a spontaneous countervailing process between various approaches concerned with the question of decisive influences on mental lives (Balcar, 1983, 1991; Říčan, 1972, 1973, 1975, 1983, 2007b).

Oldřich Mikšík (1930-2009) investigated the mental variability of personality and developed the special questionnaire IHAVEZ for the diagnosis of this structure. His second questionnaire, SPIDO, serves for the diagnosis of the key components of the structure of mental variability on personality. He created a system for the complex psychological diagnosis of personality (program DIAROS), which is designed to identify qualitative parameters of interacting activities and their basic sources in personality (Mikšík, 1999, 2003; Mikšík, 2001, 2003, 2007; Mikšík & Wagnerová, 2001). Milan Nakonečný (born 1932) published books on the comprehensive psychology of personality, motivation of behavior, and emotions, while Milan Brichcín (born 1930) wrote about will and selfcontrol (Brichcín, 1999; Nakonečný, 1996, 2000). According to Vladimír Smékal (born 1935), psychology of personality is in a phase of development, in which a plurality of views is prevailing. In his Invitation to Psychology of Personality: Man in the Mirror of Consciousness and Action, he offers a classification and numerous stimuli for reflection about personality theories, models, and praxis (Smékal, 2002). At the Institute of Psychology of the Czech Academy of Science, one section is oriented to personality research. Topics of investigation included mental representation, mental modelling, psychology of adolescence, achievement motivation, and the relationship between self-assessment and interpersonal personality characteristics (Blatný & Osecká, 1997; Filó, Osecká, & Řehulková, 1994; Macek & Osecká, 1993; Sedláková, 1998, 2004). In lexicographic investigations of personality, Big Five in the Czech context were studied, as well as the combination of the dimensional Five-Factor Model with the circumplex configuration of traits, known as the Abridged Big Five Dimensional Circumplex (AB5C). In the AB5C, each trait is characterized by its position in relation to two factors of the five-factor structure, which makes ten two-dimensional circumplexes. The data were compared to relevant studies from abroad. (Hřebíčková, 1997; Hřebíčková, Čermák, Macek, & Urbánek, 2000; Hřebíčková & Ostendorf, 2005). Lída Osecká (1945–1999) studied typology in psychology applying cluster analytical methods. She analyzed the methodological and technical aspects whereby various types and ways of data transformation were compared and explained (Osecká, 1999, 2001, 2006). The application of cluster analysis in the NEO Personality Inventory should clarify whether the hoskovec

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three major personality prototypes (resilient, overcontrolled, undercontrolled) can be replicated in a Czech sample. The highest match was identified for the three-cluster solution (Hřebíčková & Urbánek, 2006). Marek Blatný (born 1965) investigated the role of dispositional personality in social perception, especially in the perception of the own ego, in psychology of self-comfort, in risk and protection factors, in the development of adolescents, in life-long human development, and in personality coherence. Blatný studied as well the role of dispositional personality traits in self-assessment. He purported that temperamental character traits, constituting the base of personality, and of individual differences of behavior and experience, are as important for shaping self-assessment as is the influence of the social situation. In a further step, intelligence was taken into account. Another project was an analysis of the stability of personality and of changes in adolescence (Blatný, 2001; Blatný & Plháková, 2003; Blatný & Urbánek, 2004). Ivo Čermák (born 1956) published a coherent and critical survey on aggression reviewing relevant scientific findings over the past 30 years. He reflected on biological, personality, and cultural aspects, including attempts to manage aggression at an individual and social level. A team of 13 authors from the Czech Republic and Slovakia concentrated to the question of how aggression, identity, and personality are related or interacting. They judged that the result presented a solid introduction to the problem, although not a complete theoretical and research model (Čermák, 1998; Čermák, Hřebíčková, & Macek, 2003). The application of the narrative approach is possible from early school age, when the ability to tell stories is forming, until old age. An exploration of the subjective sense of a passing life was done, based on life story telling. The categories, which could be identified, were submitted to a general narrative thematic analysis to reach better understanding of the “genres” of life stories (Čermák, 2004). The function of stories to shape one’s identity when searching for the meaning of life experience, for construction or reconstruction of the value or moral scale in normal times or in times of illness, and in facing the finality of life, was investigated (Chrz, 2007). Marek Blatný invited Czech protagonists of personality psychology to contribute to a compound in this field (Blatný, Hřebíčková, Millová, Plháková, Říčan, Slezáčková & Stuchlíková, 2010). 146

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Developmental Psychology The tradition of developmental psychology is connected mainly with child research, which goes back to J. A. Comenius (Čáp, 1992, 1997), and to František Čáda (1865–1918), who, in 1910, established the Society for Child Research and was predominantly concerned with the child’s language, games, and drawing. His student, František Šeracký (1891–1942), developed the psychotechnical testing of children and pupils. Belonging to the same generation, Cyril Stejskal (1890–1969) studied the development of child intelligence (Stejskal, 1934). Mihajlo Rostohar (1878–1966) investigated psychological basics of reading and drawing (Rostohar, 1928), and, in Brno, established a team for the research of the development of mental processes during childhood. Zdeněk Matějček (1922–2004) was oriented to diagnostics, and to the longitudinal research of adopted children, of children in dormitories, or of those living with foster parents, respectively, in SOS villages. Furthermore, he studied the mental deprivation of children. Matějček communicated his findings, addressing specialists and the public (Matějček, 1992, 2001; Matějček & Dytrych, 1997; Matějček & Pokorná, 1998). Josef Langmeier (1921–2007) cooperated with Matějček in the field of mental deprivation in childhood (Langmeier & Matějček, 1963, 1968). Studying children born unwanted, they investigated whether having children is a basic demand of man, and found that basic requirements it means the basic demands and requirements of the adults according to what they themselves reported to be important in their lives include stimulation, sense of life, security of life, self-esteem, and hope or perspective of life. Having a child did not represent a basic mental demand. The child may help, or to the contrary, prevent the fulfillment of basic demands (David, Dytrych, Matějček, & Schüller, 1988). The experimental and evolutional psychologist Jaroslav Madlafousek (1922–2008) studied the lifestyles of children and adolescents in father-absent families. Furthermore, Madlafousek led complex animal research projects (Madlafousek, 1997). Lenka Šulová (born 1954) conducted for one decade a bilateral French–Czech research project concerning the preschool child and its world. Furthermore, Šulová studied the early development of the child as well as the early interaction between the child and various family members, and under the conditions of foster parenthood (Šulová, 2005, 2006; Šulová & Zaouche-Gaudron, 2003).

The child’s learning to cope and the child’s coping with difficulties of life, how to prepare children for stressful situations, and self-efficacy in preschool children were themes studied by Simona HorákováHoskovcová (born 1973). Starting with the theory of the development of a child’s self-efficacy and stress resistance, her focus is on aspects of development with a contribution to personality development. The theoretical approach of the task is the social cognitive theory that allows some recommendations for how to support children in coping with daily stress, and eventually, how to increase resilience (Hoskovcová, 2004; Horáková Hoskovcová, 2006a, 2006b, HorákováHoskovcová & Suchochlebová Ryntová, 2009). Jarmila Kotásková (1933–1994) studied the moral development, personality patterns, and interaction of moral maturity and locus of control in various social contexts. Her results indicated the significant influence of reference persons on children through imitation and shaping. The attitudes and personality characteristics of reference persons showed to be more influential than educational measures or action (Kotásková, 1987; Kotásková, Kožený, & Vajda, 1993). Petr Macek (born 1956) studied adolescence. By a synthesis of theoretical approaches, he compared contemporary research results of Czech and foreign adolescents and found a multilayered social, cultural, and psychological phenomenon. Contemporary adolescents subjectively evaluated their lifestyle positively, which is a big change in comparison to Czech adolescents some decades ago. Especially thanks to mass media, many children long to become teenagers, and on the other hand, many adults avoid abandoning some of the advantages of adolescence, such as independence, liberty, the possibility of selection, and liberation from stereotypes and ordinariness (Macek, 1999). The use of new digital media by adolescents is reflected in research by David Šmahel (born 1974) (Subrahmanyam & Šmahel, 2010). The relationship between reasoning and the solution of a moral dilemma and the perception of responsibility in adolescents was another subject of investigation. Concerning abortion, the results yielded information that differences in solving the moral dilemma are influenced by general opinion, rather than by the level of moral reasoning (Jelínková, Tyrlík, & Macek, 2003). Research concerning social status and value orientation proved that the young generation is less pragmatically and hedonistically oriented than one would expect. Freedom, family security, matured love, happiness, sincere friendship, world peace, and

inner harmony are preferred life goals (Řehan & Cakirpaloglu, 2000). The shaping and development of the personality of Czech children, adolescents, and families at the end of the 20th century were studied in a set of psychological, sociological, and educational investigations (Smékal & Macek, 2002). A group of scientists from Masaryk University Brno investigated relationships in emerging adulthood using data from the ELSPAC study1 (Macek & Lacinová, 2006). Another topic of research was psychology of the multiple developments of man (Čáp, 1990). The development of values in adulthood applying the questionnaire PVQ21 was studied by Karel Hnilica. He found that, with age, in both men and women the importance of individualistic values decreases in favor of collectivistic values (Hnilica, 2007). The mental ontogenesis of man, the field Příhoda had studied from 1963 until 1974 underwent further investigation three decades later. Furthermore, developmental psychology with an introduction to neurophysiology and psychology of aging in the framework of gerontology were studied (Langmeier & Krejčířová, 2006; Langmeier, Langmeier, & Krejčířová, 1998; Švancara, 1997).

Psychology of Health In 1921, the European League for mental health selected Jaroslav Stuchlík to establish and organize a mental hygiene movement in Czechoslovakia; however, it took another 10 years until it was realized by Matěj Brandejs. He edited a specialized journal named Duše: Časopis pro duševné zdraví (Psyche: Journal for mental hygiene) published by J. Hanousek, Prague, 1931, 1932. The development of this discipline was interrupted by World War II and again in the 1950s, when it became part of the clinical arena. In 1961, Jan Doležal initiated the publication of a compendium of contributions on hygiene of mental life, which proved to be an important stimulus for this discipline (Doležal, et al., 1961, 1964). Libor Míček (1931– 2004) contributed by defining 12 principles for selfeducation and mental health (Míček, 1984). Slávka Fraňková’s (1931) orientation is human ethology and psychology of nutrition, nutritional behavior, nutrition and mental health, and social aspects of food (Fraňková, 1996, 1997, 2003). The psychological context of stress response and personality in relation to stress and health, as well as daily stress coping strategies were examined. Chicanery at work and social support as protective factor were observed (Šolcová, 1992, 1994, 1995; Šolcová & Kebza, 1999, 2005). hoskovec

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Miloš Machač (1922–1992) developed an autoregulative method for harmonizing of mental states and performance. Furthermore, in cooperation with his wife Helena Machačová (born 1941), a physiologist specializing in control of stress, and with Jiří Hoskovec, he studied emotions and efficiency, reacting to man’s dysadaptation to the dynamic changes of environment, in particular in the emotionalsomatic sphere. Machačová later studied behavioral prevention of stress, dealing with the nature of stress and stress management (Machač, 1976; Machač, Machačová, & Hoskovec, 1985; Machačová, 1999). At the Institute of Psychology of the Czech Academy of Sciences psychosocial contexts of subjective well-being from a theoretical and an empirical point of view were investigated. Personality aspects of coping with stress and coping strategies were studied. Personality styles characterized by positive emotivity (participating in the production of a certain behavior) correlated with engagement (active coping strategies). Personality styles characterized by negative emotions (dampening volition and behavior) correlated above all to disengagement (insulative, avoiding, coping strategies) (Blatný, Dosedlová, Kebza, & Šolcová, 2005; Millová, Kohoutek, & Blatný, 2008). Vladimír Kebza (born 1953) is oriented to the psychosocial determinants of health, coping with stress and human resilience, burnout syndrome, psychosocial support, and behavior in relation to health (Kebza, 2005; Kebza & Šolcová, 1998). Teachers and health was subject of research and of annual meetings at the faculty of education of Masaryk University Brno, dealing with stress load, weariness, drug problems, job satisfaction, and other problems related to certain pedagogical activities (Řehulka, 2003). Jaro Křivohlavý (born 1925) belongs to those psychologists who, during the communist period, did work that was useful for society and somehow officially appreciated or tolerated, but did not uncover their deeper interests. This explains why he started to publish his psychological trilogy on health, illness, and positive psychology at age 76. His personal concern is humanity and high morals (Křivohlavý, 2001, 2002, 2004). Health protective factors and health protective behavior of Czech entrepreneurs, aggression and self-esteem, psychosocial factors and inequalities in health were investigated by Iva Šolcová. In addition, she devoted attention to mental resilience under various aspects (Šolcová, 2006, 2007, 2008; Šolcová & Kebza, 2005, 2007). 148

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The faculty of humanistic studies of Charles University is oriented to the interdisciplinary study of the healthy development of personality, family, and community. The results of a longitudinal research project concerning the psychological aspects of health behavior of adults, who had been observed from birth until age 45 years, are presented in a monograph. Multivariate analysis was applied to find relations between anthropometrical, psychological, health, and educational data. The traditional personality traits, such as extraversion and introversion, appeared to be relatively stable in adulthood. More significant changes were observed in the value system, depending on individual life experience. For the prediction of health behavior, the following parameters showed to be important: subjective hardiness, sense of life, life satisfaction, plans for life, and the feeling that the individual has control over his own destiny (Havlínová, Břicháček, Kodl, Kožená, Prokopec, Tomášek, & Šefčíková, 2007). Jiří Mareš (born 1942) cooperated with interdisciplinary teams to study the medical, psychological, and pedagogic aspects of means and strategies for handling children’s pain, and problems of social support for children and adolescents (Mareš, et al., 1997, 2001, 2002, 2003). In addition, Mareš is conducting a work group investigating the quality of life of children and adolescents from a general, methodological, and empirical point of view (Mareš, et al., 2006, 2007, 2008). Karel Hnilica studied the influence of diagnosis and age on health, emotional life, and life satisfaction. The diagnosis of somatic problems and physical limitations delivers an explanation for symptoms, means for their control or improvement, and an explicit idea of the prognosis. Diagnosis can lead the patient to set new priorities, values, and goals. Preferably, individuals with similar diagnoses should be able to compare their health status with each other and with peers, and not with healthy and younger people (Hnilica, 2006).

Clinical Psychology The first clinical psychologist to gain official approbation, at that time, in Czechoslovakia in this field is Jan Srnec (born 1928), who is oriented to studying ethics in clinical psychology, while the tasks of clinical psychology, which in the course of time undergo changes, were defined by Přemysl Mohapl (1932– 1997) some decades later (Mohapl, 1992). Since the 1960s, Hana Junová (born 1937) helped to introduce and promote psychogymnastics as a method for psychotherapy, sociometry, and diagnostics.

A review study of contemporary theoretical approaches in clinical psychology in the context of clinical work in the Czech Republic was published (Baštecká & Goldman, 2001). Petr Goldman was the first to introduce confinement according to Leboyer in the Czech Republic. Diagnostics and the reparability of mental deprivation of children and adolescents was studied by Jarmila Koluchová (born 1928). She explained diagnostic approaches that highlighted differences between approaches to adults and children, for example the much quicker mental development and the shorter age periods of children. She emphasized that diagnostics and the detection of abnormalities in children and adolescents need a thorough knowledge of the general laws and theory of development, as well as practical experience with normal, mentally and physically healthy children of all age groups (Koluchová, 1987; Koluchová & Morávek, 1991). Clinical Child Psychology, a basic publication in the field, was re-edited several times (Říčan, Krejčířová, et al., 1991, 1995, 1997, 2006, 2008). Another psychologist oriented to the diagnostics of children and adolescents is Mojmír Svoboda (born 1941). He explained methods that served in the diagnosis of the individual developmental stage, deviations and their cause, individual characteristics of personality, and other topics (Svoboda, 2001). Specific problems facing parents of handicapped children, who are likely to suffer of low self-esteem, low assertiveness, missing relaxation, and timestress, are studied at Palacký University Olomouc, by a team that is generally oriented to handicapped children (Otípková, 2005, 2006). Psychodiagnostic methods of adults were documented in a monograph for students and practicing psychologists dealing with principles of diagnostics, methodology, clinical methods, tests, and diagnostic praxis (Svoboda, 1999, 2005). Clinical psychology and neuropsychology, and the possibilities of its application in psychiatry are studied by Jiří Diamant4 (Diamant, 1994, 1998). The publications concerning psychotherapy—its introduction, special issues, anxiety, and fear—by Jan Vymětal (born 1945) are among the basic texts for Czech psychotherapists and students (Vymětal, 1992, 2009; Vymětal, ed., 1997, 2006; Vymětal, ed., 2000, 2007). Experimental Hypnosis, a summary and critical analysis of the state of research in the field of hypnosis in Europe and North America was published by Stanislav Kratochvíl (born 1932); in it, he integrated his own findings and experience

(Kratochvíl, 1986, 1999). The same author wrote Clinical Hypnosis for psychotherapists, psychologists, psychiatrists, and medical doctors (Kratochvíl, 1990, 2001). Further publications, which are based on his clinical experience, cover sexual dysfunction (Kratochvíl, 1999, 2000, 2008), marital therapy (Kratochvíl, 1985, 1992, 2000, 2006), and the basics of psychotherapy (Kratochvíl, 1997, 1998, 2000, 2002). Psychology of hypnosis and suggestion is a review study of international sources and experience (Hoskovec & Hoskovcová, 1998). Jiří Hoskovec studied hypnosis and suggestion, and the possibilities of the application of hypnotic suggestion for three decades, starting in the late 1950s. Methods of suggestive, hypnotic, and imaginative psychotherapy are the theme of a publication by Mojmír Svoboda, describing procedures for inducing hypnosis from a practical point of view (Svoboda, 2003). Alcohol and drug dependency are treated in a monograph by Vladimír Řehan (born 1948), who founded the Czech journal Addictology (Řehan, 1994). The therapeutic influence of motivation on alcoholics was studied by Iva Stuchlíková (born 1962) in cooperation with František Man. In an original way, she analyzed emotions in the process of forming cognitive and motivational strategies in an educational-psychological framework (Stuchlíková, 2002). Furthermore, an international research project concerning high-risk alcohol use and motivational structure was carried out with American, Czech, Dutch, and Norwegian college students, applying the Motivational Structure Questionnaire (MSQ; Stuchlíková & Man, 1999a, 1999b). Sexology and sexual deviation are the subjects of investigation by Aleš Kolářský (born 1932), who is oriented to research, and by Petr Weiss (born 1954), who is researcher and therapist (Kolářský, 2008; Weiss, 2008).

Psychology of Work and Organization The beginnings of this discipline go back to 1920, when the Psychotechnical Institute was established, and are mentioned in the section covering the era of psychotechnics. Political events such as the German occupation and World War II caused a regression, and in 1951, under a communist regime, the Psychotechnical Institute was incorporated into the Ministry of Labor. Jan Doležal and Zbyněk Bureš successfully defended the psychology of work and organization against trials of liquidation. Their concept was to join research and application. hoskovec

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Zbyněk Bureš (1924–2009), whose field was reliability of performance, contributed to the discipline with two volumes on the psychology of work (Bureš, 1981, 1982). After his retirement, Bureš cooperated at the University of Western Bohemia in Pilsen with Jiří Růžička and Marie Mayerová, where they devoted their attention to motivation of work behavior; stress, motivation, and performance; and psychology in economic praxis (Růžička, 1994; Mayerová, 1997; Mayerová & Růžička, 1999). Work stress of university teachers, nonintelligent behavior, and the psychological context of satisfaction at work were studied at the University of Ostrava (Paulík, 1995, 2001; Paulík & Svatoš, 1998). A review of methods for the evaluation of psychological work load was published, explaining 15 methods that can be applied as a whole or individually for the analysis of work load at any working environment (Hladký & Žídková, 1999). The human factor in conflicts, accidents and their prevention, traffic psychology, ergonomics, and engineering psychology, as well as interdisciplinary research in the area of the training of skills and the practical application of the results of driver training were studied by a group of Prague scientists (Štikar, Rymeš, Riegel & Hoskovec, 1996, 2000, 2003, Štikar, Hoskovec & Štikarová, 2003, Štikar, Hoskovec & Šmolíková, 2006, 2008a,b). Furthermore, Oldřich Matoušek (born 1921) is oriented to work safety, engineering psychology, ergonomics, and optimization of human activity (Gilbertová & Matoušek, 2002). Ethics and psychology in business in comparison to ethics based on religion and ethics in medicine is a theme studied at the Institute of psychology at Charles University (Riegel & Janoušek, 2006). Vocational guidance, training of management skills, negotiation, team work, and questions of professional competence are investigated at the Prague University of Economics (Jarošová, Komárková, Pauknerová, & Pavlica, 2001). In addition, social communication and training of management skills are studied (Bedrnová & Nový, 2004). Further fields of interest are the psychological consequences of unemployment and the psychology and sociology of behavior in economy, the work market, diagnostics, and motivation of behavior at work (Hubinkova, et al., 2008). Research concerning unemployment is also done at Masaryk University Brno. Long-term unemployment has negative influence on the subjective evaluation of quality and meaningfulness of life, as well 150

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as on satisfaction with particular aspects of life. The duration of unemployment correlates significantly and negatively with education. Especially for older men, loss of work has greater impact on meaningfulness of life, the longer the worse (Buchtová, 2004). The area of space psychological research in the Czech Republic was reviewed for a Russian journal (Šolcová & Mikšík, 2009). Presentlyt Czech researchers participate on the Mars500 project (http://www. mars500.cz/en/), where they monitor the dynamic of the group of astronauts using the Sociomapping method (Bahbouh, 1994).

Psychology of Sports Physical exercise (the Sokol movement since 1862) and sports traditionally play an important role in Czech society, and also in strengthening national self-esteem. The first publication on the psychology of sports was a dissertation in 1928 published 20 years later (Pechlát, 1948). The autoregulative method, developed by Miloš Machač in the 1970s, was well accepted in sports. Four psychologists have studied methods, mental processes, personality, motivation, social interaction, social groups, social facilitation, aggression and violence, spectators, mass behavior of spectators, doping, autoregulation and ideomotor technique, psychological preparation of sportsmen, mental hygiene, and evaluation and self-evaluation in connection with sports (Machač, 1976; Slepička, Hošek, & Hátlová, 2006). The sport psychologist faces a special situation with his client, due to high expectations and the sensitivity of the triangular relationship between the athlete, his trainer, and the psychologist. Psychological intervention for top athletes moves, depending on the diagnosis, roughly in two directions: psychotherapy, when the performance is impaired, or mental training to achieve best performance (Šafář, 2006).

Social Psychology Social psychology developed as a consequence of the need to define and solve social phenomena connected with political and economic development in Europe in the 19th century, issues such as revolution, conflicts between large social groups, the accumulation of people in big industrial agglomerations, the phenomena of mass behavior and arousals, and the role of leaders. In 1871, G. A. Lindner published Ideen zur Psychologie der Gesellschaft als Grundlage der Sozialwissenschaft. A decade later,

he accepted a call to the Prague Czech University. The Slovak psychologist Anton Jurovský (1908–1985) influenced Czech social psychology in the first half of the 20th century. He concentrated on social groups, a theme that Jaromír Janoušek (born 1931) also studied, in addition to his interest in social communication, especially verbal communication (Janoušek, 2007). Ontology and epistemology of theory in social psychology, and the interdependence among social thinking, dialogue, and semiotics were studied by Ivana Marková3, who published Making of Modern Social Psychology: The Hidden Story of How an International Social Science Was Created (Marková & Moskovici, 2006). The structure, dynamics, and communication in married and family life were subjects of several publications (Plaňava, 2000; Plaňava & Pilát, 2002). Marital satisfaction and the interaction between spouses were analyzed. The closest correlates of satisfaction with family life are in mutual emotional closeness, sex life, joint decision making, and contentedness with financial management. Less important were common hobbies, spending leisure time together, and household maintenance (Plaňava, Rajmicová, & Blažková, 2003). The psychology of partner and marital relations were also studied by Lenka Šulová (1995). At the department of psychology at Prague Charles University, 15 contributions concerning the individual and the process of socialization in the environment of current society from the aspects of society, family, and school were edited (Šulová & Gillernová, eds., 2008). In an international research project,2 types of unsocial behavior were identified; for example, conduct problems, physical fighting, damage to public or private property, and shoplifting. Some of the findings are alarming, in particular the high prevalence of aggressive behavior and problem behavior related to substance use, including selling drugs for money. The authors suggested the implementation of comprehensive, tailored, and gender-specific programs in early adolescence (Blatný, Hrdlička, Sobotková, Jelínek, Květon, & Vobořil, 2006). Psychologists at J.E. Purkinje University in Ústí nad Labem and at the University of Ostrava (both founded 1991) are reacting to regional problems, such as social care, reintegration and prevention concerning unemployment, alcohol and/or drug abuse, and homeless citizens, as well as the support of children from socially weak families in achieving better education. Attention is devoted to

intercultural issues (Centre for Roman Culture). Publications are dealing with outdoor social work, socialization of individuals and the family as a preventive factor against drug abuse, with aggression, and with perspectives of education (Fleischmann, 2000; Fleischmann et al., 2006). Two monographs concerning psychological guidance for social work were edited, among others, suggesting programs to support socially weak Roma individuals, to counter and prevent drug addiction, and to provide aid for seniors (Paulík, 2002, 2004). Integration of handicapped children was studied. A further concern was to explore sexual education for the mentally challenged, so that they could develop social skills that would enable them to establish satisfactory sexual relationships, while being defended against sexual abuse or sexual harassment (Smékalová, 1998, 2006; Štěrbová, 2005, 2006). A longitudinal investigation of foster families defined various types according to their functioning (Sobotková, 1994, 2001, 2003). Mass Behavior and Terrorism in HistoricPsychological Context are the subjects of two review studies (Mikšík, 2005; Zeman, 2002). A two-volume compendium of Slovak and Czech contributions to social psychology was published in Prague (Výrost & Slaměník, eds., 2008).

Political Psychology Social representations of democracy, individualism and responsibility, dialogicality, trust, and democratic transition in post-communist Europe were themes studied by Ivana Marková3 (Marková, 2003, 2004, 2007; Marková & Moskovici, 2006). Jiří Diamant4 is clinical psychologist and neuropsychologist. Based on his personal experience, he wrote about psychological problems of emigration (Diamant, 1995). Martina Klicperová-Baker5 investigated democratic citizenship, civility, and democratic political culture in the Czech Republic; rudeness and civility; and Czech–American relations (KlicperováBaker, 2003; 2007; Klicperová-Baker, et al., 2003; Klicperová-Baker & Košťal, 2006). Democracy and its social psychological preconditions, which include civic culture, civility, and civic nationalism, was studied in the framework of an extensive survey based on representative samples from the Czech Republic, Belarus, Bulgaria, and Slovakia (N = 3,470 subjects). The results showed the international prevalence of democratic ideas as well as national specificities of political culture (Klicperová-Baker, Feierabend, et al., 2007). hoskovec

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Psychology of Art Phantasy, creativity, and personality were studied by Josef Viewegh (1928–2003), who devoted his study to the psychology of art and is the Czech nestor of the qualitative approach (Viewegh, 1999). Pavel Machotka6 approaches the psychology of fine arts both as psychologist and as an active painter and art photographer. He devotes special attention to the works of Paul Cézanne. In his book Style and Psyche he tried to uncover how the painter’s style may reflect the painter’s personality. By creating or acquiring his style, the artist is defining his self. For the painter, attaining his first style is like an invention. In addition, it is the assertion of a certain aspect of his Ego that can be revised later, as his style develops (Machotka, 1979, 1999, 2003, 2008). Jiří Kulka, clinical psychologist and psychotherapist, is concerned with positive psychology and the psychology of art and related aspects. Kulka presented artistic creativity as the outcome not only of a single talent, but of the entire personality (Kulka, 1991, 2008, 2006). Considering the important role of music in Czech folklore and culture as a whole, we should expect broad psychological interest and reflection. However, the psychology of music is locally a rare specialization. Marek Franěk (born 1956) is an environmental psychologist and musicologist. Since music can have positive, but also negative effects on man, and may under certain circumstances influence behavior or decision making, interest in social music psychology is increasing (Franěk, 2005).

Psychology of Spirituality The Czech Unitarians were founded by Norbert Fabián Čapek (1870–1942), who worked, in addition to his missionary activities, as an applied psychologist. In 1901, he published a booklet on how to recognize man’s attitudes and inclinations. In 1904, he founded the journal Prameny (Sources) for education, the development of mental powers, and the practical assessment of people. After spending 7 years in the United States, he returned to Prague as a counseling psychologist, accentuating spirituality. He died in the concentration camp in Dachau (Hoskovec & Brožek, 2006). M. Habáň (1899–1984), psychologist and Dominican, published in 1937 and 1941 a psychological textbook, which, according to the Czech historiographer Josef Förster, is a review of Thomistic

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psychology, especially for clerical catechization and pedagogic praxis, offering a clear system of catholic psychology in a tight context of rational psychology with ethics and theology, which was very popular among clerics (Förster, 2000; Musil, 2000). Life journey and psychology of religion and spirituality is the theme to which Pavel Říčan (born 1933) has devoted his work. He studied empirically the spirituality of adolescents and its significance in shaping the moral value identity (Říčan, 1990, 2004; Říčan, et al., 2007a). Abhidhamma in the praxis of meditation and coping with life, as well as meditative psychotherapy and mental hygiene are studied by Mirko Frýba (born 1943). After teaching clinical psychology and methodology, he settled in Sri Lanka as a Buddhist monk, now named Bhikkhu Kusalánanda (Frýba, 1991, 2003, 2008; Fromm & Frýba, 2001). The mental and spiritual culture of man were the theme of the thoughts and reflections of Vladimír Smékal (born 1935), as a sensitive reaction to the contemporary position of man in the Czech Republic. He recommended a search for the meaning of life and self-realization and offered stimulating thoughts for possible spiritual paths (Smékal, 2005).

Historiography of Czech Psychology English Ernst Mach and the Perception of Movement (Ley, 1997), Carl Stumpf (Sprung, 1997), and Jan Evangelista Purkinje and Academic Psychology in Prague (Brožek & Hoskovec, 1997a, 1997b) are chapters in W.G. Bringman et al.’s (1997) A Pictorial History of Psychology. Twenty personalities associated with Prague University over six centuries are portrayed in Psychological Ideas and Society (Brožek & Hoskovec, 1997c). Alena Plháková (born 1954) wrote for the journal History of Psychology the article Reflections on the Main Schools of World Psychology in the Czech Interwar Psychology (Plháková, 2008). Czech psychology during the communist period was reviewed by J. Brožek and Jiří Hoskovec (1966), J. Koščo (1976), J. Brožek (1977), and J. Švancara (1991), while Decarvalho and Čermák published a survey of humanistic psychology in Czechoslovakian (Decarvalho & Čermák, 1997). Articles concerning psychology in communist and post-communist Czechoslovakia, as well as on recent Czech psychology were published by J. Brožek and J. Hoskovec

(1993, 1998b), J. Hoskovec and J. Brožek (2000), and by J. Hoskovec (2004). A Brief History and the Current State of Czech Psychology in Central European Context is a chapter in a textbook for foreign students (S. Hoskovcová, 2006). Further articles deal with the history of psychology of work and organization in the Czech and Slovak industry, Czechoslovakia’s early international psychotechnics, and with the beginnings of vocational guidance in Czechoslovakia (Paulík, 2004, Brožek & Hoskovec, 1998a, Hoskovec & Brožek, 2007). Another article presents a review of forensic psychology in the Czech Republic (Polišenská, 2007). The historiography of psychology at the three universities offering an undergraduate program in psychology, located in Prague, Brno, and Olomouc, and at the Institute of Psychology of the Czech Academy of Sciences is presented in the article Historiography of Czech Psychology (Hoskovcová, Hoskovec, Plháková, Šebek, Švancara & Vobořil, 2010).

German Totalitarism in education and teaching during the communist regime in the Czech Republic was the theme of a project of the Swiss National Fund (Hoskovec, Štětovská, & Vogt-Frýba, 1991). A biography of Carl Stumpf, from philosophy to experimental psychology, was published in Germany (Sprung & Sprung, 2006).

French The influence of social and political changes on social psychology on the example of the Czech Republic is the theme of an article published in Belgium (Janoušek & Slaměník, 2004).

Czech History of psychology in general, a brief history of Czech and central European psychology, and the psychology of the 20th century are themes of several books (Hoskovec & Hoskovcová, 2000; Hoskovec, Nakonečný & Sedláková, 2002; Plháková, 2006; Tardy, 1972, 1973). Furthermore, a monograph on the Brno school of Gestalt psychology was published at Palacký University Olomouc (Förster & Plháková, 2004). An article on Czech psychology in the atmosphere of Prague Spring 1968–1970 was published by Josef Švancara (2001).

Personalities of Czech and Slovak psychology are portrayed in one chapter of an illustrated psychological explanatory atlas (Janoušek, Hoskovec, & Štikar, 1993). Personality psychology through its history in the Czech lands roughly until the end of the 20th century was reviewed (Förster, 2008). Studies concerning the history of empiric psychology and a genesis of systems of empiric psychology have been published (Švancara, 1993; Tardy, 1956). The collection of experimental apparatus from early psychological laboratories at Masaryk University Brno was documented in an illustrated catalogue (Vobořil, Květon, & Jelínek, 2008). A history of intelligence research and history of theoretical approaches to cognitive development, as well as a review concerning school psychology in the Czech Republic after 1989 were published as articles (Lazarová, 2008; Plháková, 1998, 2005). Furthermore, the history of psychoanalysis was reviewed in an article (Kocourek, 1992).

Slovak Damian Kováč7 published the essence of his previous work under the title Through Psychology to Metagnosis (Kováč, 2007).

Conclusion In the Czech lands, psychological ideas have been in circulation since the 14th century, in connection with the establishment of Charles University in Prague. Each further university, right up to those founded in the 20th and 21st centuries continued to stimulate creative work in psychology. From the middle of the 20th century, psychological research was also carried out at the Academy of Sciences. In times of totalitarianism, psychology was restrained. In times of liberalism, psychology fully developed, as happened in the 1920s and 1930s, when psychotechnics especially underwent rapid development, and as occurred after 1989, when Czech psychology took a deep breath after freeing itself from the corset of Communist ideology and widened its horizons. Despite political discontinuity, psychology is still seeking ideative traditional continuity.

Professional Streams and Perspective Since 1993, Czech psychology is oriented to research on the personality of children and adolescents, to typology of personality, to cognitive processes in the framework of life-long development, to the relationship of personality and health, to psychosocial

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determinants of personality and health, and to quality of life. Projects in these areas are in progress, and are planned until the end of the year 2011. The methodological approach is both quantitative as qualitative (narrative). Looking for perspectives, relevant remarks have been made by Vladimír Smékal (2000), who perceived psychology as standing at a cross-roads, poised either to continue in specialized isolated work on microtheories or to choose a new way to discover the rules that lie behind—or above—the confusion of phenomena that are already known and which might be the starting point for a unifying theory. I believe that fragmentation will continue, although I do not exclude integrative interpretations. Olga Kolaříková (1927–2005), at the end of her life, reviewed personality research of the 20th century (2005). Her conclusion was not so far from Smékal’s vision. She postulated that the concept of personality characteristics had perspective, but only if it was combined with other psychological approaches and with findings from nonpsychological expertise. These characteristics are to be studied in relationship with other psychological concepts, such as motivation, life story, or unconscious processes, in order to obtain a more coherent and integrative view of personality and to reach better understanding. Marek Blatný and Alena Plháková (2003) saw as a future trend the understanding of personality as a coherent system, in which the central integrative factor is the consciousness of one’s own existence, the human ego. In the Czech Republic, trends are moving toward increased interinstitutional and interdisciplinary cooperation among scientists.

Notes 1. Studies concerning children make extensive use of research data collected in the framework of the European Longitudinal Study of Pregnancy and Childhood (ELSPAC, by Jan Širůček) 1997–2000 at the Research Institute of Child Health in Brno. 2. The Institute of Psychology of the Czech Academy of Sciences and the Child Psychiatric Clinic of the Second Medical School of Charles University in Prague participated in the international investigation: The Social and Health Assessment (SAHA) originating from the Yale Child Study Center, in New Haven, Connecticut. 3. Ivana Marková (born 1938) is professor emeritus of Stirling University. She emigrated to Scotland in 1967. 4. Jiří Diamant (born 1930) lives in the Netherlands, where he emigrated in 1968. 5. Martina Klicperová-Baker (1956) from the Institute of Psychology of the Czech Academy of Sciences is also associated with San Diego State University. In addition to the printed material contained in her book, the authors offer access to their rich research data at http://www.psu.cas.cz/~klicperova-baker. 6. Pavel Machotka (born 1936) is living in Italy.

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7. Damian Kováč (born 1929) is one of the main personalities of Slovak psychology, mentioned because of his long-term cooperation in the joint state and after.

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Egypt

Ramadan A. Ahmed

Abstract This chapter presents a broad-based view of psychology in Egypt. The chapter starts by casting some light on Egypt: its land and population and its ancient legacy in medicine and related behavioral thoughts; then the chapter discusses briefly the relevant contributions of ancient Arab scholars in the medieval ages, Egyptian modern psychology pioneers, research interests, new trends in psychology in Egypt, models in Egyptian psychology, psychology associations, conferences and meetings, books and journals, psychology encyclopedias and dictionaries, job opportunities and the image of psychology, teaching psychology and the qualification of psychologists, efforts of Egyptian universities to promote psychology, the influence (impact) of Egyptian psychology/psychologists on the development of psychology in other Arab countries, private practice, ethics codes, and psychology and Islam. The chapter concludes by shedding some light on the strengths and shortcomings of psychology as practiced in Egypt. Keywords: Egypt, pharaonic Egypt, Islam, psychology

Egypt: Land and Population Egypt is a country occupying the northwestern corner of Africa, with a mountainous extension across the Gulf of Suez, and the Sinai Peninsula, which is usually regarded as part of Asia. It is strategically situated at the crossroads between Europe and the Orient and between North Africa and Southeast Asia. Egypt is an almost square block of mostly arid land: 995,450 square kilometers south to north (from 22° to 32°N) and 1,240 kilometers west to east (from 26° to 36°E). It is bounded on the north by the Mediterranean Sea, on the east by the Red Sea, on the South by the Sudan, and on the west by Libya. Most of its political borders are straight lines, drawn by the European colonial powers in the 20th century; all have been disputed since the time of their definition. From the dawn of history, human habitation hinged on the Egyptian people’s ability to harness 162

the River Nile, which annually flooded its banks, depositing a fertile alluvium of silt brought down from Lakes Victoria and Albert and from the mountains of Ethiopia. The creation of a basin irrigation system to capture the silt and store the floodwaters, and efficient devices to raise water from the channels and basins to the fields, was a prerequisite for the evolution of Egyptian agriculture between six and three millennia before the birth of Jesus Christ (Ahmed, 2004; Goldschmidt, 1994). Modern Egypt, which has pharaonic ancestors and Arab fathers, had an estimated population of 72 million in 2007: 49.6% of the population is female, and 25% of Egyptians are less than 16 years old. A statistical report (Al-Ahram, January 18, 2002) indicated that, in 2000, 32% of the Egyptian population was between 10 and 24 years old. In 2000, life expectancy rates reached 67 years for males and 71 years for females (Ahmed, 2004).

The common language in Egypt is Arabic, however, English, French, German, Italian, and Spanish, in that order, are also known and spoken in many places. Egypt is the world’s oldest continuous nation, with a recorded past of over 6,000 years. Often invaded, conquered, and occupied by foreign armies, Egypt has never lost its identity. The Egyptians of today, although they have changed their language once and their religion twice, descend mainly from the Egyptians who built the Giza Pyramids and the Temple of Karnak, who served Alexander the Great and his heirs, who submitted to Augustus Caesar and grew much the grain that fed the Roman Empire, who started Christian monasticism and the veneration of the Virgin Mary, and who advanced and sustained Muslim learning in what is now the longest-functioning university in the world, Al-Azhar University in Cairo (established in 969) (Goldschmidt, 1994).

Historical Roots of Psychology in Egypt Pharaonic Times The Egyptians of Pharaonic times thought so highly of medicine that some pharaohs, with all their majesty, bore medical titles, and their mightiest leaders prided themselves on knowing the sacred writings on medical activities. Accordingly, Herodotus said “In Egypt, there are physicians everywhere” (cited in Ghalioungui & Dawakhly, 1965, p. 9). Ghalioungui and Dawakhly (1965, p. 9–10) wrote: “But although Egyptian civilization was built on objective observation, residues of magic and sacerdotal medicine tainted their practice. To satisfy all kinds of patients, there were the healer-priest of the goddess Sekhmet who, though possessing some medical knowledge, acted as mediator between the patient and the gods; the magician, follower of Hika, god of magic, who exorcised demons and triumphed over fiendish charms or inimical spirits; and the lay physicians, or swnw. But even the last was not above spicing his drug and scalpel practice with some magical condiment, as can be seen from some of the titles he bore.” Moreover, the ancient Egyptians were the first to speculate that the brain was the center of the mind and the director of the body (Eion el-Soud, 2000). The field of psychology has not been alien to Egypt, nor, in the later centuries, to the Arab world as well. In ancient times, the Egyptians had already formed many psychological-philosophical ideas about phenomena such as hysteria, epilepsy, delusions, and dreams, and how to treat some mental

and physical abnormalities (Girges, 1967). Caudle (1994, p. 135) wrote, “One of the earliest known documents . . . is the Edwin Smith Surgical Papyrus, named for the first Westerner who owned it. This Egyptian document, which dates back to perhaps 3000 bc, describes behavioral effects of head injuries, and the brain and its convolutions. Its author, a surgeon, may have recognized in a primitive way that the brain controls behavior, a notion that became lost for thousands of years.”

Islamic and Arab Influences In the ninth century, and throughout the mid and late medieval period, psychological concepts were generated, coined, and discussed by a broad variety of Muslim and Arab scholars such as Al-Kindi (796–873), Al-Farabi (870–950), Ibn Al-Haitham (965–1039), Ibn Sina or Avicenna (980–1037), Al-Gazzali (1058–1111), Al-Damiri (1341–1405), and Ibn Khaldoun (1332–1406). These scholars developed more or less scientific ideas concerning a wide variety of topics that we find still discussed in psychology as it is known today (Ahmed, 1992, 2004; Ahmed & Gielen, 1998b). The works and ideas of Muslim and Arab scholars influenced, in differing ways, the establishment, march, and development of modern psychology in Egypt (Nagaty, 1961, 1993a, b; Soueif, 1965a; Al-Abd, 1986). One of the concepts espoused by the Qu’ran 1,400 years ago is that human development is seen as a part of a lifecycle and not as separate distinct stages (Soliman, 1990). The Qur’an also describes a huge number of psychological conditions, states, motives, emotions, and disorders.

Modern Psychology in Egypt Early Beginnings The last three decades of the 19th century witnessed three important events that influenced the establishment of psychology in Egypt. First, the Al-Abssia Mental Health Hospital, the first mental hospital in Africa and the Arab world, opened in Cairo in 1880. Second, newspapers and magazines, mainly published by a group of immigrant Lebanese and Syrian journalists, were established in Cairo and Alexandria. These newspapers and magazines paved the road for psychology in Egypt because they occasionally published articles in psychology for the lay public (Eion el-Soud, 2000). Third, Egypt started to expand its schooling system by establishing schools all over the country, including teachers’ schools, whose curriculum included some basic psychology training. ahmed

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The first Egyptian (and Arabic) book on psychology was written in Egypt in 1895 under the title Psychology by Sheikh Mohammed Sherif Saliem. The book was published in 1911 when the Egyptian Ministry of Education decided to use it as a reference for students at teacher schools in Cairo. In 1906 the term psychology appeared for the first time in the curriculum approved by the Ministry of Education in Cairo. In 1891, the Egyptian physician Mohammed Nagaty published a book entitled Insanity. The period from 1890 to 1920s witnessed copious writings on psychology, as Farag (1987) has noticed. In early 1920s, Henry Claparede, while on visit to Cairo, advised the government to established an institute for education aimed at qualification of school teachers. By establishing the Higher Institute for Education in Cairo in 1929, psychology started to be known as a distinguished scientific discipline (Soueif & Ahmed, 2001). Since its establishment in 1908, Cairo University offered few psychology courses as a part of its philosophy department’s curriculum. Until the early 1970s, psychology was introduced at Egyptian universities as part of the philosophy and/or sociology departments’ curricula. By 1974, separate psychology departments had been opened at the universities of Ain Shams, Cairo, and Alexandria, in that order. Soon, all other Egyptian universities established separate psychology departments. Between the 1940s and 1970s, psychoanalysis theory garnered huge interest from Egyptian psychologists, especially those who were working at Ain Shams University in Cairo. This was due to the efforts of one Egyptian pioneer, Mustafa R. Zewar, who studied psychoanalysis and medicine in France and who established in 1950 a psychology department based on multiscientific approaches at Ain Shams University (Zewar, 1986). In 1956, the National Centre for Sociological and Criminal Research (NCSR) was opened in Cairo. Among the activities and duties of the NCSR are the conducting of research, through its units, to investigate societal problems. Under the auspices of the NCSR, several psychological research studies have been conducted. Examples of these studies are the “cannabis project” (known later as the Lasting Program for Drug Abuse), and “the woman’s changing role in the society” project. Through the two periodicals issued by the NCSR since 1958 (i.e., The National Review of Sociological Research and the National Review of Criminal Research), several psychological research studies have been published, mostly in Arabic. 164

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Pioneers in Egyptian Psychology Psychology as a science started in Egypt in the mid-1930s, when the first Egyptian pioneers in psychology, Abdel-Aziz H. El-Koussy (1906–1992), Yousef Murad (1906–1966), Mustafa Zewar (1907–1990), and Ahmed E. Rageh (1908–1980), returned home after earning their degrees in England (Abdel-Aziz H. El-Koussy, in 1934) and France (Yousef Murad, in 1940; Ahmed E. Rageh, in 1938; Mustafa Zewar, in 1942). These pioneers had a great impact on the development of psychology and education in Egypt and other Arab countries (AbouHatab, 1992; Farag, 1987). As results of their efforts: (a) many graduate students were sent abroad, especially to the United Kingdom and France, and later to the United States, while others obtained their degrees locally under the supervision of these pioneers; (b) psychology programs were expanded and increased in number to cover a variety of topics and approaches; (c) programs for postgraduate studies (diploma, M.A., Ph.D. degrees in psychology) were set up; (d) psychological laboratories were established (the first Egyptian psychological laboratory was established in 1929); (e) psychological clinics were opened, the first in 1928, to serve the Higher Institute of Education; (f ) many publications appeared and a great number of research studies were conducted; (g) the Egyptian Association for Psychological Studies (EAPS) was founded in 1948; and (h) psychology as a distinct scientific discipline and as a profession received increasing recognition from the public and from officials, which later (in the mid-1970s) helped in establishing separate university psychology departments (Ahmed, 1992, 2004; Ahmed & Gielen, 1998b). In the late 1940s and early 1950s, the second wave of Egyptian pioneers in psychology appeared. These include mostly those Egyptian psychologists who graduated from schools in the United States and United Kingdom. The list includes F. B. Sayed [El-Sayed], L. K. Melieka, M. A. Ahmed, M. E. Ismail, and E. M. Kh. Morsy, and the first Egyptian woman psychology professor, Semia A. Fahmy. The list includes also M. I. Soueif, who earned his doctorate from Cairo University 1954. A few years later, another Egyptian woman, Ramazia el-Gharib, became the second woman professor of psychology at Ain Shams University in Cairo. Some Egyptian psychologists, especially the pioneers, contributed to international psychology. As an example, Vernon (1971, p. 17) wrote: “The symbol k for the spatial factor was first applied by El-Koussy (1935) who gave 26 tests to 162 boys

aged 11 to 13. He showed by tetrad analysis that eight of these obtained loadings on such factor with about the same variance as their g-loadings. According to introspective evidence all these tests seemed to require visual imagery for their successful solution. Other tests employing visual material, together with Cox’s Mechanical Explanation and Completion (i.e., mechanical comprehension) tests, and school marks in woodwork and drawing, gave only low correlations with this factor.” Vernon also wrote (1971, p. 66) “The Thurstones (1938a, 1941, 1948) included numerous spatial tests in their primary mental abilities investigations and obtained a factor which they call S, obviously the same as El-Koussy’s k, even as early as 5 to 6 years.” In the same page, Vernon wrote: “Emmett (1949) recently reanalyzed El-Koussy’s figures and showed that several visual tests, together with mechanical tests and woodwork marks, have almost as high k-loadings as the original eight tests.” As for F. E. El-Sayed (or F. B. Sayed, as mentioned by Vernon, 1971), Vernon (1971, p. 159) wrote: “Sayed (1951) compared plane and solid geometry at 6th form level with a variety of spatial and other tests, and claimed to find evidence of a 2-dimensional space factor in the former, 3-dimensional in the latter.”

Research Topics in Psychology in Egypt Although it is not possible here to refer to all psychological studies conducted in Egypt over the last 60 years, and to cover all psychological branches and topics, psychology research in Egypt may be classified in the following five categories (Ahmed, 1992, 1998, 2004; Ahmed & Gielen, 1998b).

prevailing paradigmatic research In the 1940s through the 1970s, psychometric, experimental, psychoanalytic, clinical, and applied approaches dominated the scene. Some new findings about the structure of intelligence and learning were produced (A. H. El-Koussy, 1935; F. E. El-Sayed, 1951, 1958). The informationprocessing approach emerged in the late 1960s, and many studies evolved from Egyptian psychology laboratories, especially at Ain Shams University (Abou-Hatab, 1984).

standardization of psychological tests Standardization of psychological tests, scales, and questionnaires imported from the West has been an important research interest of Egyptian psychologists since the early 1940s. In the mid-1930s,

El-Kappani and El-Koussy were early active psychologists who revised and standardized many psychological tests, obtaining norms suitable for use in Egypt (El-Koussy, 1985); their work is being continued by many others, such as L. K. Meleika, who adapted and standardized many psychological tests, such as the Binet Intelligence Test, the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Adults, and several subscales from the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI) (Abou-Hatab, 1977, 1992; Farag, 1987; Ahmed, 1992, 1999). Other psychological tests, such as Raven’s Matrices Test and Goodenough-Harris’s Draw-A-Man-Test were also adapted to the Egyptian milieu (Abou-Hatab, 1977; Farag, El-Sayed, & Magadi, 1976). Egyptian psychologists have showed an early interest in adapting and standardizing some projective tests, such as the Thematic Appreciation Test (Salama, 1956) and Rorschach’s Ink Blot Test (Galal, 1960), and in exploring the suitability of the Rorschach Ink Blot Test in measuring intelligence (Ghoniem, 1955). By the mid-1950s, Egyptian psychologists started to develop tests, measures, and scales for measuring intelligence and mental abilities. Examples include the study conducted by M. A. Ahmed (1951), who developed a battery for measuring Three-Dimensional Visualization and MentalSpatial Manipulation. Ahmed’s (1951) study demonstrates for the first time the existence of a distinct mental manipulation factor. It should be added here that, although Egyptian pioneers paid great attention to translating, adapting, and developing measures and scales for assessing intelligence and mental abilities (El-Koussy, 1935; Ahmed, 1951), the later generations of Egyptian psychologists have been involved mostly in translating, adapting, or designing measures for assessing personality traits and social aspects of behavior. In addition, almost all of the ten most used psychological tests in the United States have been translated and adapted to the Egyptian (and Arab) milieu, and only a few attempts have been made to build and development indigenous tests.

replication and cross-cultural studies From the early 1960s to the present, many Egyptian psychologists have conducted replication studies with cross-cultural comparisons. They include, for example studies on values (Hana, 1965); youth attitudes (Nagaty, 1962); personality (Abdel-Razek, 2005; Askar, 1996b; Gaber & El-Sheikh, 1978); test anxiety, trait anxiety, and arousability (El-Zahar & Hocevor, 1991); collectivism versus individualism ahmed

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(Darwish & Hubert, 2002); uncertainty avoidance (Darwish, 2005); societal risk perception (Ahmed, Macri, & Mullet, 2006); drug addiction (Ghanem, 2000); children’s perception of parental behavior (Askar, 1996a); adolescents’ gender role (Ahmed & Gibbons, 2007); modernization and parental permissiveness (Nagaty, 1963); identity disorders (Ahmed & Megreya, 2008); the factorial structure and measurement invariance of the Center for Epidemiological Studies-Depression Scale (CES-D) in Egypt and the United States (Gadelrab, 2006); and Piagetian research with children and adolescents (Ahmed, 1981, 1989). It was noted that, although the majority of Egyptian cross-cultural or replication studies have focused on the comparison between Egyptian and other Arab respondents, very few studies (among them Abdel-Razek, 2005; Ahmed, Macri, & Mullet, 2006; Ahmed, 1981; Darwish, 2005; Darwish & Hubert, 2002; El-Zahar & Hocevor, 1991; and Gadelrab, 2006) have compared Egyptians with subjects from the West. In his conclusion on the status of Arab psychology (Egypt included), Soueif (1998b, p. 581) wrote: “By and large cross-cultural research seems to be one of the few truly promising areas of research among Arab psychologists.”

special research problems A number of special research problems are pertinent to changing Egyptian culture and society. For example, in response to the rising rate of cannabis consumption since the late 1950s, many interdisciplinary studies were conducted to explore the various aspects of this problem. The first one of these studies was the “cannabis project,” led and supervised for more than 35 years by M. I. Soueif in collaboration with several psychologists working mainly at Cairo University (Ahmed, 1997; British Journal of Addiction, 1988; Soueif, 1990, 1991, 1998a Soueif & Ahmed, 2001). Later, the project was expanded to include studies on substances other than cannabis, such as opium and heroin addiction, addiction to nonprescription drugs, and cigarette smoking. The project employed in its studies several sectors of Egyptian society and population, such as intermediate and secondary students, university students, professionals, and industry workers. The project has inspired some Egyptian and Arab psychologists to deal with the problem of drug addition (e.g., Ghanem, 2000, in Egypt; Debies, 2001, in Saudi Arabia). Soueif has also led a group of psychologists in conducting a series of research studies dealing with extreme response sets (Soueif, 1958, 1965b), 166

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creativity (Soueif, 1978), and personality (Soueif, 1990, 1991). Modernization and parental permissiveness (Nagaty, 1963), women’s issues (Ahmed, 1991), and children’s drawings have also received wide attention from Egyptian psychologists (AbouHatab, 1977; Farag et al., 1976). During the last two decades, some Egyptian psychologists have focused on developing intervention programs that are aimed at modifying or improving different forms of behavior, in children and adolescents in particular. Examples of these efforts include Habib’s (2000) study on developing creativity in childhood stages; Abdel-Moety’s (2006) study on the impact of professional intervention in reducing the severity of violence among secondary school students; El-Sayed’s (2006) study on the efficacy of relaxation with visualization and biofeedback training in reducing the levels of generalized anxiety disorder in university students; and El-Beheary’s (2007) study, which explored the impact of a suggested emotional intelligence program on reducing children’s behavioral problems (i.e., aggression, introversion, and lying). Comparison between preand post-assessment showed a positive change in children’s behavior as a result of administering the program. Another study (El-Beheary, 2008) has focused on school violence: its negative impacts, prevention strategies, and therapeutic interventions. Another example of Egyptian intervention studies is the study by Mohammed (2006) that explored the efficiency of a suggested multimedia program based on the theory of multiple intelligence on the achievement and development of some thinking and achievement motivation skills among intermediate school students with learning difficulties in science. Other Egyptian psychologists explored the impact of using emotive-rationale therapy on eradicating superstitious ideas and beliefs among university students (Omara, 1985), the efficiency of an individual and group counseling program in reducing the level of aggressive behavior (Omara, 2004), or improving parental skills and reducing children’s behavioral problems by using a counseling program (AbdelSayed, 2003). Others have investigated the need for psychological counseling to confront identity crisis in adolescence (Morsy, 2002). A few Egyptian psychologists have focused on the effectiveness of proposed programs on improving the capabilities of the mentally retarded. Examples include the study by El-Beheary (2003), which explored the effectiveness of intervention programs based on the Intermittent Limited Extensive

Pervasive (ILEP) model of support for individuals with developmental disabilities. A few attempts have been made by Egyptian psychologists to improve reading process and language education, and to overcome learning difficulties. These attempts include Al-Farmawy’s (2004) study that explored the effectiveness of a suggested program to improve meta-reading skills, and Bedair’s (2004) study, which examined the effectiveness of some suggested strategies for efficient language education in kindergarten children. Some Egyptian studies have been conducted and aimed at improving psychological aspects through physical education and sports. Examples of these studies include that by Heda (2006), who investigated the impact of a swimming learning program on self-confidence in sample of 9- to 12-year-old blind girls. Results revealed a significant increase in the level of self-confidence due to administering the suggested swimming learning program. Since the mid-1970s, very few Egyptian psychologists have shown an interest in employing nonpsychometric approaches, such as psychoanalysis and phenomenological methods. Examples include S. J. Abdel-Hameed’s (2006) study that investigated wisdom among the aged by using a phenomenological approach as a framework.

new trends in psychology research in egypt Since the early 1990s, some new trends in psychology research in Egypt have become visible. Examples of research in this new trend of research are studies that focused on the impact of crisis and tragic events (Abdel-Rahman, 2003). Recently, some other Egyptian psychologists have engaged nontraditional topics. Examples include Abou-Hashem’s (2004) book Psychology of Skills, which deals with the acquisition and measurement of linguistic, mathematical, mental-cognitive, behavioral, and social skills. A book by Bedair (2004) suggested strategies for learning education in kindergarten. Other examples include Awad’s (2001) book Adolescents’ Pressures and Confrontation Skills: Diagnosis and Treatment; Abdel-Rahman’s (2006) Domestic Violence: Reasons and Therapy; and Mershed’s (2006) book on Aggressive Behavior Modification for Normal and Special Needs Children: A Guide for Parents. During the 1970s, few Egyptian studies have been conducted to deal with political issues. Among these studies are Hefny’s 1970 study on the differences between Ashkinism and Saverdem in Israel,

and Al-Mounefi’s 1984 study on political socialization in Egypt (Ahmed, 1998). Recently, some researchers have reactivated this trend. Examples include El-Sayed’s (1994) study on Political Behavior: Theory and Reality; Moussa’s (2001) study on “political psychology: political participation and its relation with some psychological variables in a sample of university students”; and Al-Mestkawy (2007) study “self-image and the other-image: between Arabs and Israel.” Some Egyptian psychologists explored the suitability of some intelligence theories. Examples include Khader’s (2004) study in which Sternberg’s triadic model of intelligence has been investigated in an Egyptian sample. Other Egyptian psychologists investigated social intelligence and related variables. Examples include Othman’s and Hasan’s (2003) study on social intelligence and its relation with learning motivation, shyness, courage, and academic achievement among male and female university students. Results revealed that social intelligence correlated significantly and positively with academic achievement, courage, and learning motivation, and significantly negatively with shyness. Male and senior students were significantly higher on most aspects of social intelligence compared with their female and junior counterparts. Emotional intelligence (EI) has received great attention from Egyptian psychologists during the last two decades. The work of S.Y. Al-Aaser at the Girls College, Ain Shams University, in Cairo paved the road for Egyptian (and Arab) psychologists to investigate EI and its related variables, through her translations of required materials, such as books and measures (i.e., Bar-On Emotional Intelligence Quotient Inventory, B-O EIQI), and through her supervision of several master theses and doctoral dissertations. Similarly, critical thinking and other cognitive aspects received considerable attention from Egyptian psychologists. An early study by Mahmoud (1966) investigated factors affecting critical thinking. Othman’s (1992, 1993) two studies focused on developing an index for critical thinking, personality, and the impact of critical thinking on reducing prejudice level among university students. In a more recent study, Faraag (2006) sought the relationship between university students’ critical thinking levels and factors such as gender, academic specialization (science vs. literature humanities vs. social sciences), and place of residence (urban vs. rural settings). Other Egyptian researchers (Ahmed & El-Shenway, 2005, February) investigated the ahmed

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relationship between critical thinking and extreme response sets in Kuwaiti and Egyptian secondary school and university students. The last three decades have witnessed a significant increase in the investigation of topics related to childhood. S. K. Ahmed (1997) published a comprehensive explorative bibliography on Egyptian psychology research studies on childhood issues that had been prepared for obtaining M.A. and/or Ph.D. degrees and submitted to some major universities in Egypt (Cairo, Ain Shams, Alexandria, Helwan, and Al-Azhar Universities) between 1990 and 1996. According to S. K. Ahmed (1997) the number of these studies reached 220. Perceptions of parental behavior and related psychological, social, and demographic variables have attracted Egyptian psychologists since the early 1960s. Several theoretical and Western and locally devised measures have been used. In general, results of Egyptian studies came in line with corresponding Western results (Ahmed, 2008). Developmental and cognitive issues have received reasonable attention from Egyptian psychologists during the last 10 years. Examples include AbdelHamid’s (2006, 2007) studies on counting in Egyptian children with Down syndrome. Other Egyptian psychologists investigated new issues in cognitive psychology, such as face matching and recognition, and the impact of cultural context (Megreya & Burton, 2007). A few psychologists have paid attention to psychosocial pathology. Among them is the Egyptian psychoanalyst Ahmed Fayek, who wrote in 2001 a book entitled Psychosocial Pathology: Toward a Theory on the Disturbing Relationship Between Individual and the Society. Some Egyptian studies have focused on topics such as measurement and the use of statistics in psychology. Examples include M. H. H. Mohammed’s (2005) study, which reviewed the applications of factor analysis in educational and psychological research published in two Egyptian psychology journals (Egyptian Journal of Psychological Studies and Psychological Studies) between 1999 and 2003, and revealed that about 25% of these studies have used explorative factor analysis. This body of research includes also Gadelrab’s (2006) cross-cultural study on the factorial structure and measurement invariance of CES-D Depression Scale in high school adolescents in Egypt and United States by using Confirmatory Factor Analysis. In another study by Gadelrab (2007), the focus was placed on the relationship between an item’s cognitive components 168

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and its difficulty using path analysis and the Rash Model. During the last few decades, very few collaborative attempts between psychologists and psychiatrists in Egypt have been achieved, mostly aimed at determining and assessing the physiological mechanisms of general ability (Tantawi, Sayed, & Farwiz, 1994). During the 1960s, some Egyptian psychologists began to show an interest in investigating topics related to sport psychology. M. H. Alawai was the first Arab psychologist in this field. Due to his efforts, psychology courses have been adopted in sports colleges in Egypt and other Arab countries. In addition to his several research studies in sport psychology, he supervised a huge number of master and doctoral theses conducted by several Egyptian and Arab sport psychologists, which covered a variety of topics related to sport psychology. Also due to his efforts, the Egyptian Association of Sport Psychology was established in the early 1990s, of which M. H. Alawai is the president. One of the major contributions of Alawai is his book entitled Encyclopedia of Psychological Tests for the Athletics (1998), in which he developed and translated from English more than 80 psychological tests cover almost all topics related to sport psychology. It is notable that Arab psychologists in general rarely build theoretical models in psychology. However, in Egypt, a number of psychologists have developed psychological models during the last 60 years. They are A. H. El-Koussy (the threedimensional model of intellect), Y. Murad (the developmental model), A. Z. Saleh (the learning model), F. E. El-Sayed (the hierarchical model of intellectual abilities), R. M. El-Gharib (the factorial analysis of practical ability), M. I. Soueif (the model of creative thinking and the personality model), and F. A. Abou-Hatab (the four-dimensional model for cognitive processes) (Abou-Hatab, 1984, 1988a; Abdel-Mawgoud, 2000; Mohammed, 2008).

Psychology Associations in Egypt At present, there are five psychology associations in Egypt, the EAPS, established in 1948, and one of founding groups of the International Union of Psychological Science (IUPYs); the Egyptian Psychologists’ Association (EPA), established in the early 1990s; the Egyptian Society for Psychoanalysis (ESP), which was established by a group of Egyptian psychoanalysts in the early 1990s; and the Egyptian Association for Mental Health (EAMH), which was founded in the late 1970s

mainly by psychiatrists. The fifth Egyptian psychology association is the Egyptian Association for Sport Psychology, established in the early 1990s; its membership consists of sports psychologists and interested athletes, who work at Egyptian and some other Arab sports colleges.

Conferences and Meetings The first Arab conference of psychology was held in Egypt in May 1971, organized by the National Centre for Sociological and Criminal Research in Cairo. Since 1985, the EAPS holds an annual conference, which is usually well attended by Egyptian and Arab psychologists. The 25th Annual Convention of the Egyptian Association for Psychological Studies (along with the 17th Annual Convention of Arab Psychology) was held February 2–4, 2009 and hosted by the Faculty of Education, Ain Shams University, Cairo. The First Regional Conference of the Egyptian Psychologists’ Association was held in Cairo from November 18–20, 2007. The conference was well attended by Egyptian and Arab psychologists, in addition to a number of non-Arab psychologists. The Egyptian Society for Psychoanalysis held it third international conference October 29– November 2, 2008. The conference’s theme was “Terrorism and Violence.” The conference was well attended by researchers from Egypt, Arab, and non-Arab countries.

Publications In the early 1950s, Yousuf Mourad established, with his associates, the Group of Integrative Psychology (GIP). Under the auspice of the GIP, several organic Arabic-language and translated (from English and French), books have been published. Examples include (Ahmed, 1998) El-Drobey’s book Science of Characters, in 1951; Soueif ’s book Creativity in Arts, and in Poetry in Particular in 1954; and Dousseki’s book Panel Psychology, in 1957. L. K. Meleika’s efforts in introducing psychological diagnosis and treatment (therapy) should be considered. His publications include the books Neuro-Psychology Evaluation and the Development of Psychology, Behavioral Therapy and Behavior Modification, Psychoanalysis and Humanistic Approach in Psychotherapy, and Psychotherapy. During the last two decades, several publications on clinical and counseling psychology have appeared in Egypt. Examples include Soueif ’s (1985) book A Source Book of Clinical Psychology, Shoukeir’s (2000)

Clinical Psychology: Diagnosis, Psychotherapy, and Psychological Counseling, and Al-Aqad’s Psychology of Aggression/Hostility and Its Control: A New Cognitive Therapeutic Approach (2001). Some Egyptian psychologists have focused on translating Western psychology-related books such as the Scott, Williams, and Beck’s book Cognitive Therapy in Clinical Practice: An Illustrative Casebook (2002). Books in other fields of psychology in Egypt are numerous. Topics such cognitive styles, creativity, and motivation have ben covered by Al-Sharkawy, who published the following three books: Cognitive Styles in Psychology and Education, in 1995; Creativity and Its Application, in 1999; and Motivation and Academic and Vocational Achievement and Its Evaluation, in 2000. As for criminal psychology, several Egyptian books have dealt with the field, among them M. Fathey’s four-volume book Criminal Psychology: Science and Practice (1950–1965). During the last five decades, several Egyptian books have been published on industrial, vocational, and organizational psychology and/or vocational guidance. One good example is Taha’s (2007) book Industrial and Managerial Psychology. Several books in social psychology have been published by Egyptian psychologists during the last five decades. Examples include M. I. Soueif ’s book: An introduction to social psychology, 1962, and L. K. Meleika’s seven-volume pioneer book: Readings in social psychology in the Arab countries, 1965, 1970, 1979, 1985, 1990, 1994, 2002. M. H. Alawai published in 1998 his Encyclopedia of Psychological Tests for the Athletics, which includes more than 80 locally developed and translated psychological tests for the athletics.

Journals The first Arab psychology journal was published in Egypt in 1948, entitled Journal of Psychology, under the editorship of Y. Mourad and M. Zewar. The journal published articles in Arabic written by Egyptians, and in English and/or French written by Western psychologists and educators, such as H. Claparede and R. Zazazo. The journal stopped appearing in 1953 due to financial and administrative reasons. Compared with the other Arab countries, Egypt has a reasonable number of psychology journals. The EAPS began publishing its journal Egyptian Journal of Psychological Studies in 1991. In the same year, the EPA published its journal, Psychological Studies. Since 1996, the EAPS in collaboration with the Arab Association of Psychology (AAP) started to ahmed

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publish occasionally an English language journal under the title Arab Psychologist. Other Egyptian psychology periodicals include Arabic Studies in Psychology, published by a group of psychologists working mainly at Cairo University, and since 2007, published by the EPA. The department of psychology of Cairo University has started recently to publish its Annals of Psychology. Menia University also publishes its own psychology journal, Journal of Contemporary Psychology, until the late 1990s, and then the Arab Journal of Contemporary Psychology, since 2005, and the Egyptian Journal for Mental Health. Each of the faculties and colleges of Arts and Education of all 15 governmental Egyptian universities publishes its own annals/ journal for arts, humanities, and/or social sciences. The Center for Childhood Disabilities at Al-Azhar University in Cairo, publishes, since the mid-1990, its own journal under the title Journal of Childhood Disabilities. In 1993, the Centre of Psychological Counseling, Ain Shams University, in Cairo, started to publish its own journal, the Journal of Counseling, which appear once or twice yearly. The journal publishes articles and research studies written in Arabic by Egyptian and Arab psychologists. A few years ago, the Institute of Educational Research and Studies, Cairo University, Cairo, established a center for psychological counseling. Under the center’s auspices, some research studies on counseling and related topics have been conducted. The center also offers some psychological counseling services, which focus mainly on academic counseling and are directed at the university’s students. Recently, the Faculty of Arts, Ain Shams University, Cairo, established a center for psychological services. The center began in 2005 to publish in Arabic its own journal under the title Journal of Psychological Services. The Egyptian Journal of Psychiatry and the Egyptian Journal of Mental Health (published by the Egyptian Association of Psychiatry) publish occasionally some psychology articles and research studies (mainly in English) written by Egyptian psychologists. Since 1989, the International Islamic Association of Mental Health (established in Cairo in the 1980s) publishes its quarterly journal entitled The Assured Soul, which features articles and research studies in psychiatry and psychology. Finally, the Arab Council of Childhood and Development, Arab League, has published since 2005—and in collaboration with the Institute of Educational Research and Studies, Cairo 170

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University—Journal of Childhood and Development, in which some psychological studies on childhood are occasionally featured.

Encyclopedias and Dictionaries For the past several decades, Egyptian psychologists have showed an interest in preparing encyclopedias and dictionaries. One of the early efforts in this field was conducted by Egyptian psychiatrist W. Al-Kholy, in his A Short Encyclopedia of Psychology and Psychiatry, in 1976. Other examples include H. A. Zahran’s Dictionary of Psychology (1972), A. Alhefnee’s Encyclopedia of Psychology and Psychoanalysis (1978), K. M. Dessougui’s twovolume Thesaurus of Psychology (1988, 1990), G. A. Gaber’s and A. E. Kaffafi’s eight-volume Dictionary of Psychology and Psychiatry (1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995), and F. A. Taha’s Encyclopedia of Psychology and Psychoanalysis (2003). Some Egyptian psychologists have focused on preparing encyclopedias and dictionaries that deal with certain fields of psychology, such as special education. One example of this kind of effort is A. E. El-Shakhs and A. A. El-Damaty’s Dictionary of Special Education and Rehabilitation (1992). Other Egyptian psychologists, mainly those with educational interests, have prepared encyclopedias and dictionaries that deal with psychological and educational terms. Among those are M. M. Zaidan’s Dictionary of Psychological and Educational Terms (1979), M. A. Al-Khuli’s Dictionary of Education (1981), and A. Z. Badawi’s A dictionary for the social sciences ( 1982 ).

Job Opportunities Psychology graduates in Egypt, as in other Arab countries, join the mainstream of the profession by either providing psychological services to meet the needs of the public, or by teaching. Students who graduate with a higher degree in psychology from the faculties of arts have basically two career choices: a university teaching option with a Ph.D., or hospital work, in which they may be hired as psychologists by one of the Ministries of Health, Education, Social Affairs, Interior, or Industry. Here, they work as psychologists for inpatient or outpatient clinics, in one of the public hospitals or schools, or in an institution serving the physically and mentally handicapped, the aged, juvenile delinquents, prisoners, or industry. Students who graduate from the faculties of education are almost certain to move directly into a teaching position at one of the

national universities if they have perseverance enough to get M.A. and Ph.D. degrees in education, or at one of the public intermediate or secondary schools with anything less (lesser salary). Psychology graduates in Egypt (as in the most Arab and Third World countries) have difficulty in getting positions as psychologists due to the economic problems, insufficient qualification, and a lack of recognition of psychology’s importance. Only in the oil-producing Arab states do psychology graduates have a good opportunity to work in the field (Ahmed & Gielen, 1998b). Twenty years ago, the Ministry of Education in Cairo decided to provide each secondary school with one psychology graduate to work as a school psychologist; for that purpose, the ministry has hired over the last two decades more than 1,000 psychology graduates to work as school psychologists.

Image of Psychology As in many other Arab and non-Arab countries, Egyptian psychology faces a lack of recognition and awareness among the public. As Melikain (1984, p. 74) noted (Arab) “psychology has not been recognized as a potential contributor to development planning. Whatever consulting role psychologists have played has been primarily restricted in ministries of education and occasionally ministries of health. However, special education and human services are the areas in which [Arab] psychologists have made a significant impact.” Moreover, studies have shown that the image and awareness of psychology are weak among the public, and even among psychology students themselves (El-Sayed & Khaleefa, 1995; Y. A. Mohammed, 2005; Soueif, 1978). For example, El-Sayed and Khaleefa’s (1995) study showed that although a positive image of psychology and its applications was held by the well-educated public, compared with the lowereducated public, both groups’ images were far from a recent and accurate image of modern psychology. Y. A. Mohammed’s (2005) study found that, although psychology students in general have more positive attitudes toward psychology compared with other disciplines’ students, female psychology students—compared with their male counterparts—expressed more positive attitudes toward psychology and its importance in life.

Teaching Psychology and Qualification of Psychology Students In Egypt, 15 government-run universities contain 60 psychology departments that belong either to

faculties of arts (academic psychology) or to faculties of education (where the departments for educational psychology and/or departments for mental hygiene or health are located). In addition, women’s colleges in both Ain Shams and Al-Azahr Universities have departments for psychology, in which women only are allowed to enroll. Moreover, the 6th of October University (one of the private universities in Egypt) established in the mid-1990s its own psychology department. Finally, the American University in Cairo (AUC, established in 1920) has a branch of psychology. In general, students need 4 years to obtain a B.A. in general psychology. There is no specialization at the undergraduate level nor at the graduate level. Recently, Cairo University set a plan to offer an M.A. program in clinical psychology (Farag, 2008). Apart from the American University in Cairo, psychology courses are typically offered in Arabic. As a result, most of the teaching materials (and also journals and books) are in Arabic. The impact of using the Arabic language as a medium of instruction psychology is both positive and negative. On one hand, instruction in Arabic keeps psychology integrated with Arab culture; on the other hand, because Arabic is the medium of instruction, many Egyptian psychologists are not proficient in English and are less likely to publish in international journals. Consequently, there is a danger that Egyptian psychology will remain parochial in some respects. Teaching psychology at Egyptian universities follows the British system. All Egyptian universities have long been offering psychology programs at the B.A, M.A., and Ph.D. levels (along with several academic and professional diplomas). No accreditation system comparable to the American Psychological Association (APA)’s accreditation system for a doctorate program currently exists in Egypt. There is a need to establish standards to evaluate the comprehensiveness and quality of psychology undergraduate and graduate programs in Egypt (and in the other Arab countries as well). It is difficult to evaluate the comprehensiveness and quality of the curriculum because no country-wide rating system exists. Due to the expansion of psychology departments during the last four decades and students’ exposure to the field, graduate enrollments in master’s and doctoral programs have grown steadily. By 1998, an estimated 20,000 psychology graduates at the B.A. level and 2,500 M.A. and Ph.D.s were already active in Egypt. The ratio of active psychologists is at present about three psychologists per 100,000 population, ahmed

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which, although still markedly inadequate, is the highest of any Arab country (Ahmed, 2004; Ahmed & Gielen, 1998b). In general, psychology in Egypt (and in other Arab countries as well) is still taught in the colleges of arts or education. These generally accept students with lower scores on the secondary school certificate than is typical for colleges of engineering, medicine, and pharmacology. As in other Arab and Third World countries, psychology in Egypt has not been able to attract many highly qualified students, especially males. Top-quality secondary school graduates tend to select more lucrative and prestigious fields of study (Ahmed, 1992, 2004). In Egypt, as in the other Arab countries, the majority of psychology students are females (females comprise 70%–80% of psychology students). Consequently, and for several reasons, the number of female psychology graduates who tend to pursue their higher studies (i.e., M.A. and/or Ph.D.) has dramatically increased, compared with their male counterparts, especially during the last two decades. Similarly, the ratio of female psychology staff members at Egyptian universities is estimated at 50%–60% of the total number of psychology staff members in Egypt.

Efforts of Egyptian Universities to Promote Psychology in Egypt Recently, some Egyptian universities started to offer programs to qualify psychology graduates, as well as other graduates such as physicians, educationists, and social workers, in specialized fields such as speech disorders. Examples include the program on speech disorders offered by Girls College, Ain Shams University, Cairo. The Faculty of Education, Ain Shams University in Cairo, the oldest faculty of education in the Arab world and Africa, established a Center of Psychological Counseling in the early 1990s. The center has played an important role in encouraging and supporting psychological counseling in Egypt and other Arab countries as well. Several programs and diplomas are offered by the center, and a journal for counseling has been published since 1993, as the first and only specialized journal for counseling. In addition, the center holds yearly, and since 1995, an international conference on psychological counseling. The conference represents a good opportunity for Egyptian and Arab psychologists to present their research. Moreover, the Faculty of Education, Ain Shams University, established and has for many years offered several professional 1-year diplomas in education, 172

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mental health, and educational psychology, along with M.A. and Ph.D. programs. Among these professional diplomas is one for the qualification of school psychologists, and another that aims at qualifying psychology graduates in psychological testing. The Department of Psychology, Faculty of Arts, Cairo University, established in the early 1990s a psychological center that played an important role in conducting and publishing a good number of psychological research studies conducted mainly by the psychology staff of Cairo University. The center also holds several training programs to qualify psychology graduates in different topics, especially measurement.

The Influence (Impact) of Egyptian Psychology/Psychologists on the Development of Psychology in Other Arab Countries Psychology appeared in Egypt much earlier than in any other Arab countries. The pioneering role of psychology in Egypt has affected the march and development of psychology in other Arab countries. Gilgen and Gilgen (1987, p. 14) wrote “Egyptian psychology has had a strong influence within the Arab World.” The influence (impact) of Egyptian psychology can be traced as follows: • Establishing psychology departments. Several psychology departments have been established through the assistance of Egyptian psychologists. Examples include the Department of Psychology, Faculty of Arts and Education, Kuwait University, Kuwait, 1966; the Department of Psychology, King Saud University, Department of Psychology, King Abdel-Aziz University, Ryiad Saudi Arabia, in the 1970s; the Department of Psychology, Mohamed IV University, Fes, Morocco, in the 1980s; and the Department of Psychology, Sultan Qaboos University, Sultanate of Oman, in the late 1980s. • Qualification of Arab psychologists. Recent surveys (Ahmed, 1992; 2004; Ahmed & Gielen, 1998b; 2008) showed that a great number of Arab psychologists (from Syria, Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Yemen, Kuwait, Palestine, Bahrain, Algeria, Morocco, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, and Sultanate of Oman, in that order) have studied in Egyptian universities, especially at Ain Shams University and Cairo Universities, in that order. • Egyptian psychologists working in other countries. A great number of Egyptian psychologists

were (and are) working, permanently or temporarily, at universities located in several other Arab countries, and especially the Gulf oil-producing Arab states (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, and the Sultanate of Oman), Jordan, and Libya. In 1987, Farag, who called this phenomenon the “brain drain” estimated that 200 Egyptian psychologists are active in other Arab countries. • Professional membership. A good number of Arab psychologists hold membership in the EAPS, and/or the EPA. • Conference attendance. Many Arab psychologists participate actively at the annual conferences held by the EAPS and the Ain Shams’ Counseling Centre. As an example, at the first regional meeting of the EPA (November 2007), more than 20 Arab psychologists were present. • Periodicals and publishing. Due to relatively advanced publishing opportunities in Egypt, compared with other Arab countries, several psychology research studies written by Arab psychologists were published in Egyptian psychology periodicals.

Private Practice of Psychology in Egypt The private practice of psychology in Egypt started in the mid-1940s, when a very few psychologists began to offer diagnosis and treatment. The practice was greatly influenced by orthodox psychoanalysis orientations. In 1955, a great debate arose concerning passing a law to regulate the private nonmedical practice of psychology. Thanks to the efforts of some Egyptian psychology individuals such as A. H. El-Koussy, Chancellor M. Fathey, A. E. Rageh, and Y. Mourad, the legislation was passed. According to the 1955 law, to get a license to practice nonmedical therapy, Ph.D. degree holders must pass an exam held by a committee that consists of senior officials from the Ministries of Health and Justice, and the heads of psychiatry departments at Cairo and Ain Shams Universities. Between 1955 and 1990, the number of licensed psychologists who practiced privately was very small. The last two decades have witnessed an increase in the number of Egyptian psychologists licensed to practice therapy privately. It could be added here that behavioral therapy and emotional cognitive therapy are most common techniques used by Egyptian psychologists. Very few number of Egyptian psychologists use psychoanalysis.

Ethics Codes Egyptian psychologists realized early the importance of the existence of ethics codes. The 1955 law that organized the nonmedical private practice of psychologists includes some ethical rules and standards. The last three decades have witnessed attempts to establish a code of ethics for psychologists in Egypt (see Berkat, 1986; Hamaza, 1986; Mahmoud, 1993). In 1995, the Egyptian Psychologists’ Association called for a forum at which a proposal for an ethics code based on the APA’s regulations and ethics code was opened for general discussion. Later, the ethics code proposal was approved in a joint meeting of the EAPS and the EPA (Taha, 2003).

Psychology and Islam in Egypt The last five decades have witnessed a growing trend in Egyptian (and to a very lesser degree, Arab) psychology to relate psychology to Islam. Some psychologists focused on the contributions of the early Arab and Muslim scholars to psychology (Al-Abd, 1986; Al-Haj, 1993; Al-Mateily, 1993; Al-Othman, 1963; Al-Sharkawy, 1979; Al-Taib, 1993; Eissoy, 1975; Nagaty, 1961; Othman, 1989; Rabie, 1993; Soueif, 1965a), while others have tried to reintroduce psychology, counseling, and psychotherapy in an Islamic framework (Abou-Hatab, 1988b, 1993b; Al-Sharkawy, 1993; Al-Shenway, 1993; Eissoy, 1988; Ezz el-Din, 1993; Mohammed, 1993; Morsy, 1993; Nagaty, 1982, 1989, 1993b; Soliman, 1990; Taha, 1993). Although few Egyptian psychologists have written about the psychology of invitation (guiding) to Islam, to provide clerks and other religious authorities with a better understanding of non-Muslims (Al-Hady, 1995; Moussa, 1999), very few Egyptian psychologists have dealt with some typical Islamic phenomena, such Sufism (Al-Nagar, 1984). Moreover, other Egyptian psychologists have focused on preparing an ethics code for Muslim psychologists (Mahmoud, 1993). Such efforts can also be found in other Islamic countries, such as Pakistan, as noted by Ansari 1992 (cited in Ahmed & Gielen, 2008), but it is too early to judge the value of these efforts.

Conclusion Strengths and Shortcomings To summarize this review (and also according to Ahmed, 1992, 1998, 2004; Ahmed & Gielen, 1998a, b, 2008; Eissoy, 1989; Gielen, 2007; Safwat, 1996; Soueif & Ahmed, 2001), psychology in Egypt ahmed

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(and also in other Arab countries) can be characterized in the following ways: • A great number of Egyptian psychology research studies are method-rather than problem-oriented. • About 30% of all Egyptian psychological research studies have focused on personality and social psychology, whereas research topics such as cognition and clinical issues have received less attention from Egyptian psychologists. Furthermore, topics relevant to experimental, physiological, neurocognitive psychology, psychopharmacology, and animal behavior have only rarely been a subject of investigation by Egyptian psychologists. • A great majority of Egyptian research studies have been conducted by using school and university students. Very few Egyptian research studies have sought to include other populations as subjects. This practice, which can also be found in other areas of the world, greatly limits the external validity of most psychological research conducted in Egypt. It is doubtful, for instance, whether most findings based on samples of urban students can be readily generalized to mature citizens residing in the rural areas in Egypt, many of whom are illiterate or semiliterate. • About 90% of Egyptian psychology research studies are conducted by a single researcher. Studies that have been conducted by a research team are rare. Even rarer are those studies that include collaboration between researchers belonging to different specializations, such as psychology, medicine, law, and the like. This situation tends to limits not only the intellectual horizon of the researchers but also the scope of the envisaged research projects, as well as their sustained nature over time. • There is far too little continuity in conducting research. A typical Egyptian researcher starts working on a certain topic, but then moves on to study another topics while leaving most questions related to the first topic still unanswered. In most cases, the researchers do not follow-up their findings, which then become isolated. In addition, Egyptian psychologists often come under pressure to leave research for other jobs, such as teaching or administration. There is a certain irony in this situation: while Egypt is frequently characterized as “collectivist,” most Egyptian psychology researchers and those in some other social sciences appear to exhibit a rather individualistic, self-contained 174

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outlook that makes collaboration with others inside and outside their disciplines uncommon. Consequently, Egyptian psychologists tend to lack proper contact both among themselves and with their non-Egyptian and/or non-Arab counterparts. For instance, Egyptian psychologists are insufficiently aware of other Arab psychologists’ work (such as Greater Maghreb’s psychologists) and vice versa. • Egyptian (and Arab) psychologists in general do not tend to build theoretical models in psychology. For instance, during the last 70 years, only a very few psychology models have been elaborated in Egypt. Unfortunately, these models did not receive enough attention, in part because they had not been elaborated in a proper way. This suggest that Egyptian psychologists find it difficult to develop middle-range theories that can be used to suggest and integrate new research strategies and findings. • Egyptian (and Arab) psychology is not well represented in international and/or regional meetings. Inspection of the attendance of Egyptian psychologists is very limited compared with psychologists from some other Third World countries (Iran for example). Some reasons for this situation are that most Egyptian psychological studies are published in Arabic and, as a result, the Egyptian production in psychology is not known to non-Arabic readers (Khaleefa, 2006); Egyptian psychologists have difficulties communicating in English; and economic hardship prevents Egyptian psychologists from participation in such meetings. • Unlike psychologists from India, Taiwan, China, Hong Kong, Japan, Mexico, and the Philippines, Egyptian psychologists have so far failed to establish an indigenous Egypt/Arab psychology properly reflecting the Arab and Muslim culture, and which contributes substantially toward solving major societal problems. • Economic hardships have negative impacts on the development and progress of psychology in Egypt, because there is not enough funding to send a good number of highly qualified psychology graduates to countries such as the United States or United Kingdom to pursue their studies there. There is not enough funding to finance research, and there is not enough funding to support psychologists in attending international and/or regional meetings and conferences.

The preceding, rather skeptical diagnosis of Egyptian psychology shows striking similarities with the reported situation of psychology in many other Third World nations (Abou-Hatab, 1988a, 1993a, 1996, 1997; Ahmed, 1992, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2004; Ahmed & Gielen, 1998b, 2008; Khaleefa, 2006; Soueif & Ahmed, 2001; see also various country chapters in Stevens & Wedding, 2004), as follows: • Export–import relationship with Western psychology: Egyptian psychologists continue to import Western psychology in typically unsystematic ways. Much of Egyptian psychology, both academic and professional, reflects the assumptions, theories, methods, instruments, and research findings found in Western psychology. • Cognitive dependency: Most research findings, assumptions, models, theories, methodologies, and tools (e.g., tests and questionnaires) taught at Egyptian universities were imported from the West, including those that may already be judged to be of questionable validity in their countries of origin. • Severing the relationship with national heritage: Egyptian psychologists are relatively unaware of the cultural nature of their discipline and have neglected to integrate their national milieu with modern developments in psychology. • Conceptual fads and irrelevancy: Most of the imported knowledge was never tested in terms of its compatibility and relevance to the national culture and societal needs. A recent investigation of some of these concepts suggests that they often reflect conceptual fads (M. H. H. Mohammed, 2005; cf. Ahmed & Gielen, 2008; Farag, 2008; Gielen, 2007; Khaleefa, 2006). • Inhibition of creative psychological thinking: The epistemological dependence of Egyptian psychology on the West inhibits creativity in Egyptian psychologists and stifles the emergence of an indigenous psychology. It may also weaken the professional identity of Egyptian psychologists. • Loss of identity: Egyptian psychology and psychologists are not only suffering a lack or loss of identity; they are also suffering a loss of professional identity. In this context, Ahmed and Gielen (1998b, p. 40) have pointed to a “loss of a professional identity and in many cases, an alienation from one’s national culture. Such feelings of alienation have reinforced the

conviction of too many Arab [Egyptians are included] that they are lacking a definite professional identity.” • Misuse of psychology: In its beginning, psychology was practiced in Egypt in a way that often served societal needs. Later, and as happened in many developing countries, several forms of misuse of psychology started to appear in Egyptian psychology. Examples of these forms of misuse are adopting (adapting), developing, and devising tools without appropriate psychometric validation; and using and interpreting the psychological tools by many unqualified individuals, including unqualified psychologists, psychiatrists, and social workers. One example is found in many of Egyptian psychology departments, in which M.A. students are asked to develop their own scales and measures to be used only (in most cases) to collect the data required for their own studies. Another example was pointed out by Farag (2008), who states that, although no real and efficient clinical qualification was offered by Egyptian psychology departments, many holders of Ph.D. degrees in different fields of psychology such social psychology, personality, etc., tend to practice clinical psychology as nonmedical therapists. Farag (2008) added that even individuals who have M.A. and/or Ph.D. degrees in clinical or counseling psychology from any of Egyptian universities (and those are mostly based on investigations irrelevant to clinical or counseling psychology) are suffering a lack of actual, real, and efficient training. A review of the Egyptian literature in psychology produced during the last six decades shows that this production is not known to non-Arabic readers for several reasons, among them that most Egyptian (and also Arab) psychology literature is written in Arabic, and very few Arab studies have been published internationally (Khaleefa, 2006). Ahmed and Gielen (2008) arrived at some conclusions and suggestions concerning the status of Arab psychology, and such conclusions are applicable to Egyptian psychology as well: • Liberate Egyptian psychology from the excessive influence of Western (and especially American) psychology • Establish a realistic perception of the scientific, cultural, and political dangers involved in the dependency relationship between the “exporters” and “importers” of psychology. ahmed

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• Create an efficient integration of the national heritage and Egyptian society’s contemporary needs. • Develop research strategies, assumptions, models, theories, methods, and instruments (including tests and questionnaires) that are relevant to the national culture and society. • Emphasize the importance of successful psychological intervention. Mere understanding is not enough. • As Gielen (2007) suggested, Arab psychologists (among them Egyptians) should “think globally and act locally.” Egyptian psychologists, especially the younger ones, should be encouraged to achieve a two-fold goal: to base their research studies on solving problems within their own society, and at the same time, to conceptualize and publish their findings (which have been arrived at by using internationally accepted methodologies) in accordance with international standards. Thus, psychology in Egypt needs to become intellectually independent while also measuring up to international standards concerning theorizing, research, practice, and pedagogy. Only thus can psychology become an effective force for appropriate social change while also contributing to world psychology (Stevens & Wedding, 2004). • At present, the main challenge for Egyptian psychologists is to provide high-quality degree programs in traditional areas of psychology while creating new programs, particularly interdisciplinary ones, that will attract the finest students and faculty members. To do so, it is necessary to evaluate current and potential resources and build on these assets to develop areas of strength that will enhance the visibility of psychology in Egyptian higher education and better serve society (Ahmed & Gielen, 2008). • In addition, Ahmed and Gielen (1998b) have suggested the foundation of an institute of Arab psychology in Cairo, to develop more effective networks of communication and cooperation between different disciplines across national and cultural borders. The ultimate goal of such an institute would be to establish a creative culture supporting fresh theorizing, cumulative research, and informed criticism. In brief, much work needs to be done by Egyptian psychologists, as well as by those of many other nations in the so-called developing world, before 176

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psychology can assume its rightful place as a science and practice that is intellectually mature, socially useful and responsible, and internationally oriented while preserving its local identity and relevance.

Future Directions This critical review of the progress of psychology in Egypt indicates that some other questions should be answered: What are the variables responsible for the process of development in the society? Which factors could lead to enhancing the learning process, especially for younger students? What are the factors affecting social cohesiveness? What is the relationship between aggressive/hostility/extreme behavior and both social structure and religion? What is/are the factor(s) responsible for phenomena such as the high rate of divorce, high rate of crime, and especially crimes among family’s members and relatives? What variables are related to creativity and creativity development?

Further Reading Abo-Ghazala, S. A. G. (2008). The effectiveness of a counseling program based on reality therapy in improving marital adjustment. Psychological Studies (Egypt), 18(2), 333–370 (in Arabic). Al-Nassag, W. R. (2007). The optical density of the RNA and Nucleoprotein as a function of meta-emotional deficiency among mentally retarded children. Egyptian Journal of Psychological Studies (Egypt), 17(55), 419–460 (in Arabic). Behgat, R. M. (2005). Enrichment and critical thinking: An experimental study on gifted primary school children (2nd ed.). Cairo: Alem al-Koteb (in Arabic). El-Hussieny, H. H. (2006). A model for cognitive and noncognitive components of self-regulated learning, and its relationship with academic performance in the light of SelfSystem, and Expectancy-Value Model of Motivation. Egyptian Journal of Psychological Studies (Egypt), 16(50), 385–436 (in Arabic). Kafaffi, A. M. (1997). Developmental psychology: Psychology of childhood and adolescence. Cairo: Al-Riselat Establishment (in Arabic). Saleh, N. A. A. (2005). Lateral asymmetry in affective psychosis patients. Egyptian Journal of Psychological Studies (Egypt), 15(47), 397–432 (in Arabic). Shoukeir, Z. M. (2001). Social pathology and current problems. Cairo: The Anglo-Egyptian Bookshop (in Arabic). Soueif, M. I. (2001). Practice clinical psychology in the Egyptian cultural context: Some personal experiences. International Journal of Group Tensions. 30(3), 241–266. Tohamy, H. A. (2005). Sex differences in inter-hemispheric transfer. Egyptian Journal of Psychological Studies (Egypt), 15(47), 433–459 (in Arabic).

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Proceedings of the Seminar on “Psychology,” The International Institute of Islamic Thought (pp. 349–374). Cairo, Egypt, 1989 (in Arabic). Mohammed, N. A. (2008). The factorial structure of critical thinking in the framework of informative cognitive model of mental abilities. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Faculty of Education, Suez Canal University, Egypt (in Arabic). Mohammed, Y. A. (2005). University students’ attitudes towards psychology. Egyptian Journal of Psychological Studies (Egypt), 15(46), 1–22 (in Arabic). Mohammed, Z. M. K. (2006). The efficiency of a suggested multi-medium program based on the theory of multiple intelligences on achievement and development some thinking and achievement motivation skills among intermediate school students with learning difficulties in sciences. Journal of the Faculty of Education, Mansoura University (Egypt), 62 (Part 2), 89–144 (in Arabic). Morsy, A. M. M. (2002). Identity crisis in adolescence and the need for psychological counseling. Cairo: Maketbet el-Nahada al-Mesiria (in Arabic). Morsy, K. I. (1993). Developing the mental health: Individual’s responsibilities in Islam and psychology. Proceedings of the Seminar on “Psychology” 1989, The International Institute of Islamic Thought (pp. 255–294). Cairo (in Arabic). Moussa, R. A. (1999). Psychology of invitation to Islam between theory and application. Cairo: The Scientific Office for Computer, Publishing, and Distribution (in Arabic). Moussa, R. A. (2001). Political behavior: Political participation and its relation with some psychological variables in a sample of male and female university students. Cairo: Dar el-Fikr al-Arabi (in Arabic). Nagaty, M. O. (1961). Sensory perception in Avicenna (2nd ed.). Cairo: Dar el-Nahada al-Arabia (in Arabic). Nagaty, M. O. (1962). Youth’s attitudes and problems: A crosscultural study of youth in Egypt, Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, Jordan and the USA: The first report: Research aim and methodology. Cairo: Dar el-Nahada al-Arabia (in Arabic). Nagaty, M. O. (1963). Modernization and parental permissiveness: A cross- cultural research investigation of youth in Egypt, Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, Jordan, and USA. Cairo: Dar el-Nahada al-Arabia (in Arabic). Nagaty, M. O. (1982). Qur’an and psychology (3rd ed.). Beirut: Dar el-Shorouk (in Arabic). Nagaty, M. O. (1989). Prophet’s teachings and psychology. Beirut: Dar el-Shorouk (in Arabic). Nagaty, M. O. (1993a). Psychological studies of Muslim scholars. Cairo: Dar el-Shorouk (in Arabic). Nagaty, M. O. (1993b). Islamic foundations of psychology: A method. Proceedings of the Seminar on “Psychology,” The International Institute of Islamic Thought (pp. 319–347). Cairo, 1989 (in Arabic). Omara, A. Y. (1985). The rationale-emotive therapy for improving some supposititious ideas in a sample of university students. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Faculty of Arts, Ain Shams University, Cairo (in Arabic). Omara, M. A. (2004). The efficiency of an individual and group counseling program in reducing the level of aggressive behavior in a sample of secondary school students. Unpublished master’s thesis, Faculty of Education, Kefr el-Sheikh, Mansoura University, Egypt (in Arabic). Othman, A. A. I., & Hasan, E. A. M. (2003). Social intelligence and its relation with learning motivation, shyness, courage, and academic achievement among male and female students at the Faculty of Education, Zagazig University. Journal of

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the Faculty of Education, Zagazig University (Egypt), 44, 192–261 (in Arabic). Othman, F. E. (1992). An index of the characteristic of critical thinking personality. Journal of Psychology (Egypt), 6(22), 20–37 (in Arabic). Othman, F. E. (1993). Critical thinking and its relation with reducing the level of prejudice in a sample of university students. Journal of Psychology (Egypt), 7(27), 36–58 (in Arabic). Othman, S. A. (1989). Learning in Berhan el-Din Al-Zernaugi (2nd ed.). Cairo: The Anglo-Egyptian Bookshop (in Arabic). Rabie, M. S. (1993). Psychological literature in Moslem scholars. Cairo: Dar el-Marefaa al-Gamaiah (in Arabic). Safwat, A. (1996). Psychology in the Arab nation and its challenges in the future century. Psychological Studies (Egypt), 6(1), 1–4 (in Arabic). Salama, A. A. (1956). Administering the Thematic Appreciation Test on Egyptian cases. Unpublished master’s thesis, Faculty of Education, Ain Shams University, Cairo (in Arabic). Scott, J., Williams, M. G., & Beck, A. T. (2002). Cognitive therapy in clinical practice: An illustrative casebook. An Arabic translation by H. M. Abdel-Moety. Cairo: Zahra el-Sharak. Shoukeir, Z. M. (2000). Clinical psychology: Diagnosis, psychotherapy, and psychological counseling (3rd ed.). Cairo: The Author (in Arabic). Soliman, A. S. (1990). A psychological study of the stages of adulthood and old age in the Holy Qu’ran. Educational Studies (Egypt), 6(29), 259–295 (in Arabic). Soueif, M. I. (1958). Extreme response sets as a measure of intolerance of ambiguity. The British Journal of Psychology, 49(4), 329–334. Soueif, M. I. (1962). An introduction to social psychology. 1st. ed. Cairo: The Anglo-Egyptian Bookshop (in Arabic). Soueif, M. I. (1965a). Al-Farabi and Ibn Khaldoun. In L. K. Meleika (Ed.), Readings in social psychology in the Arab countries Vol. 1 (pp. 3–37). Cairo: The National House for Printing and Publishing (in Arabic). Soueif, M. I. (1965b). Response sets, neuroticism, and extroversion: A factorial study. Acta Psychologica, 24, 29–40. Soueif, M. I. (1978). Modern psychology. Cairo: The AngloEgyptian Bookshop (in Arabic). Soueif, M. I. (Ed.) (1985). A source book of clinical psychology. Cairo: Dar el-Maaref (in Arabic). Soueif, M. I. (1990). Drug abuse treatment in the Egyptian cultural context. The National Review of Social Sciences (Egypt), 27 (2), 83–96 (in Arabic). Soueif, M. I. (1991). Psychology in Egypt throughout half a century: A dialogue between science and society. Egyptian Journal of Psychological Studies (Egypt), 1(1), 17–30 (in Arabic). Soueif, M. I. (1998a). Drug use, abuse, and dependence. In R. A. Ahmed, & U. P. Gielen (Eds.), Psychology in the Arab countries (pp. 495–516). Cairo: Menoufia University Press. Soueif, M. I. (1998b). Conclusion. In R. A. Ahmed, & U. P. Gielen (Eds.), Psychology in the Arab countries (pp. 567–582). Cairo: Menoufia University Press. Soueif, M. I., & Ahmed, R. A. (2001). Psychology in the Arab countries: Past, present, and future. International Journal of Group Tensions, 30(3), 211–240. Stevens, M. J., & Wedding, D. (Eds.). (2004). Handbook of international psychology. New York: Brunner-Routledge. Taha, A. B. (1993). A Qu’ranic technique of cognitive behavior therapy. Proceedings of the Seminar on “Psychology,” (pp. 65–74). Cairo, 1989. Taha, F. A. (2003). Encyclopedia of psychology and psychoanalysis. Cairo: Dar Gharib (in Arabic and English).

Taha, F. A. (2007). Industrial and managerial psychology. Cairo: Mektabet el-Nahada el-Mesria (in Arabic). Tantawi, A. O. S., Sayed, S. Z., & Farwiz, H. M. (1994). Brain stem auditory evoked potential in the normal and mentally retarded and its relations to intelligence. Egyptian Journal of Psychological Studies (Egypt), 3(9), 1–27. Vernon, P. E. (1971). The structure of human abilities. London: Methuen & Co. Ltd.

Zaidan, M. M. (1979). Dictionary of psychological and educational terms: English/Arabic. Jeddah (Saudi Arabia): Dar el-Shorouk. Zahran, H. A. (1972). Dictionary of psychology: English/Arabic. Cairo: Alem el-Fikr. Zewar, M. R. (1986). On psycho: Collected papers. Beirut: Dar el-Nahada al-Arabia (in Arabic).

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C HA P TE R

10

England

Alan Collins

Abstract The domains of academic inquiry, management of practical problems, and popular engagement with psychological ideas have each contributed to the establishment of psychology in England. The mid-19th century saw the emergence of a set of conditions that allowed psychology as a separate discipline and practice to emerge. This chapter examines those conditions before considering the moves to institutionalization of psychology in the early 20th century. However, even by then, psychology’s presence in England was precarious, and it was not until the years between the two World Wars that it gained a more established position in universities, in places such as schools and factories, and in the popular imagination. This chapter examines how this was achieved and concludes with a brief review of the conditions immediately post-World War II that allowed for the large expansion of psychology in England that took place in the last third of the 20th century. Keywords: Phrenology, Psychophysiology, Feeblemindedness, Laboratories, Shell-shock, Child study, Popular psychology

The history of psychology in Britain has been characterized as sporadic and piecemeal and what is true for Britain is in this case also true for England. A central question for the emerging psychology, what Frederic Bartlett described as the “upstart subject,” was how should it justify its claims to speak with authority on human nature (Costall, 1999)? The most obvious answer, and the one most turned to in historical analyses, is science. But claims to authority were also made and justified in the context of the demands that arose in diverse locations such as asylums, schools, and war hospitals. It is no longer tenable to confine histories of psychology to histories of academic psychology, but once released from such constraint there can seem no obvious limit to the scope of the project—especially as one moves through the 20th century. It can help to consider a period when ideas of a psychological science and psychologically informed practices were first being developed and debated. In England, 182

that period is most readily identified and the early to mid-19th century.

The 19th Century and the Emergence of Psychology in England Phrenology Physiognomy promised that science or at least systematic study could reveal knowledge about the relations between appearance and character and, although often discredited, this general theory reappears in different forms throughout the 19th century, and even Cyril Burt seems to have been convinced of its value (Burt, 1925; Collins, 1999; Tytler, 1982). However, it is the development of phrenology as a means of reading the body to understand the person that has attracted most interest when trying to understand the emergence of psychology (Richards, 1992; Young, 1970). Phrenology began in the early 19th century through the work of Franz Gall, on what he called “craniology.”

Gall claimed that the mind was realized through the brain, which was divided into separate innate faculties responsible for various functions, such as combativeness, love of approbation, benevolence, veneration, and hope (Combe, 1836). He further claimed that the size of the brain areas devoted to these functions varied between individuals and that the shape of the skull reflected these variations. Assuming that size correlated with strength of the particular faculty, through careful measurement of the skull one could therefore measure individual differences in character. Thus, phrenology promised to ground judgments of individual differences in empirical observation. As a system, it was much ridiculed in the 19th and 20th centuries but to see it only as ridiculous is to miss its historical importance. Phrenology was initially popularized in Britain by Gall’s collaborator Johann Spurzheim, and by George Combe. There is evidence that it became very popular indeed through widely sold publications, such as Combe’s The Constitution of Man, via public lectures and meetings, and via phrenological readings of one’s skull and so character (Cantor, 1975; Cooter, 1984; Shapin, 1975).1 Phrenology was an accessible theory of individual difference but one that appeared to have the backing of empirical observation. Although it might seem a wholly deterministic theory, it was often interpreted as identifying areas of weakness that parents or the person themselves could seek to improve upon or compensate for. In this way, it resonated with wider concerns with progress and self-improvement. For example, in phrenological charts of character, which were leaflets filled in for individuals, the categories were fixed but the phrenologist could use extreme scores to indicate which faculties were “injuriously weak and require cultivation” and which were “injuriously strong and requires restraint.” As Robert Young has argued, the faculties chosen by phrenologists were rooted in Victorian values such as parental love (or philoprogenitiveness as it was often termed), conjugality, and vitativeness (love of life). Thus, the values of the society in which phrenologists lived were, quite literally, embodied in the brain, and this has led to characterizations of phrenology as a science in which wider cultural values and social life were immanent (Cooter, 1984; Shapin, 1975). Phrenology lingered on in England, and one could still find booths offering phrenological readings well into the 20th century (Cooter, 1984). However, it came under severe attack in the mid-19th century

and lost its lustre as a scientific theory, gradually becoming more of a curiosity and casual amusement. Nevertheless, its legacies for psychology in England were considerable. Perhaps most important were what it promised: It promised a materialistic account of mind, it promised that the functions of the mind were localized and adaptive, it promised that empirical means could be used to identify individual differences, and it promised that science could achieve authority over human nature. Phrenology failed to deliver persuasively on any of these but each of them had echoes in later psychological thought. Ideas such as function and adaptation became key concepts for major 19th-century theorists such as Herbert Spencer (Young, 1970, 1972). The project of cerebral localization of function was pursued later in the century by the likes of Broca, Fritsch and Hitzig, and Ferrier. The search for a science of individual differences was a central interest for Francis Galton, whose ideas were to have such an impact on English psychology. Phrenology also offered an appealing combination of human nature as fixed and so amenable to discovery, and of human nature as malleable and open to improvement. It would be to claim too much to argue that all of these ideas and movements were grounded solely in phrenology but the promises it seemed to open up, once glimpsed, were not easily dismissed.

Evolutionary Thought Phrenology emphasized individual differences, as did evolutionary thinking. In the second half of the 19th century, evolutionary thought, and not only Darwinism, provided a means by which science could embrace the study of humanity (Bowler, 1988; Young, 1985). It is hard to imagine what modern psychology—not just psychology in England but most psychology—would look like without the backdrop of evolutionary thinking. Darwinism implied that humans were a product of the same natural laws as all other creatures, that at least some psychological functions were a product of those laws, that those functions had survival value, and that the variations between individuals emphasized in movements such as phrenology were natural and vital to the survival of the species. Other implications followed. Ernst von Baer’s speculation that human development recapitulated human evolution provided a new scientific rationale for the study of children and was taken up in England by James Sully. Similarly, the study of animals took on greater significance for understanding human nature. The nervous system itself was seen collins

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as embodying evolution, with distinctions being drawn between older, more primitive structures and functions and newer, more complex structures and functions. Concepts such as adaptation, variation, and population became central scientific concerns. As the vast literature on Darwin and the history of evolution has shown, evolutionary thought could not be isolated from wider social and political issues because it blurred the distinction between what was natural to do and what was right to do. None of the issues already mentioned was immune from social and political debates. For example, as we shall see later, evolutionary thought gave a new urgency to late 19th-century debates over the physical and mental state of the national population or stock. Graham Richards has argued that the “two primary founders of British psychology” were Herbert Spencer (1820–1903) and Alexander Bain (1818–1903, see Richards, 1992, p. 258, also Rylance, 2000). Both men had sympathies with phrenology early in their careers, and both were profoundly affected by evolutionary ideas. Bain, a Scot, who spent an important part of his career in England, is discussed by Wade (2011, Chapter 20, this volume). Consequently, this chapter will concentrate on Spencer. Spencer was responsible for the most sustained attempt in 19th-century England to marry together evolutionary and psychological thinking (Smith, 1997). Although little read now and occupying only short sections in most general histories of psychology, he was a figure of enormous importance in the intellectual culture of England in the mid to late 19th century (Peel, 1971). In 1855, just 2 years after Morrell had published the first book originally written in English to have the word psychology in its title, Spencer published his Principles of Psychology. In private correspondence the young George Eliot described how her partner, George Lewes, was “nailed to the book,” and she herself imagined a biographical dictionary published a hundred years in the future in which psychologists would thank Spencer for his “great work XXX which gave a new impulse to psychology and has mainly contributed to the present advanced position of that science” (cited in Rylance, 2000, p. 213).2 Psychology was a central component of Spencer’s work, although his project was to produce a comprehensive worldview. He was crucially concerned with the recurrent Victorian theme of progress: how to explain it and how to ensure it. In this sense, his whole project was driven by an ethical concern with how to improve the lot of humanity (Smith, 1997). 184

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He promoted the idea that nature and society were governed by the same laws, and from this he derived his political as well as his scientific and philosophical views, which made what was natural and what was right two sides of the same coin. Spencer’s version of evolution was closer to that of Lamarck than to Darwin’s and consequently was more easily aligned with the notion of progress. Spencer regarded life as a constant struggle for limited resources, in which those who were best adapted were most likely to survive hence his phrase “survival of the fittest.” Together, these ideas led to an emphasis on adaptation to circumstance and the inheritance of these adaptations as the engines of evolution (Young, 1970). It also led to a politics and social philosophy that regarded any kind of state intervention as unwise tampering with the natural state of affairs. In Spencer’s time, thinking on how the mind worked was largely the province of mental philosophy, despite the prospects of a mental science that arose in phrenology. In England in this period, the fundamental idea of how knowledge was acquired and organized in the mind remained that of associationism. Through a rich intellectual heritage that owed a great deal to Scottish philosophers, associationism maintained that knowledge was acquired, maintained, and given order through the linking together of ideas (Warren, 1921). It was also central to Bain’s psychological thinking, and he relied on a physiological version of it in both The Senses and the Intellect (1955) and The Emotions and the Will (1859). Critics of associationism complained that it gave an inadequate account of the formation of complex ideas and, after Darwin’s ideas gained prominence, its implication of the mind as a tabula rasa seemed less plausible. In short, associationism produced a view of mind that “started with too little and ended with too much” (Rylance, 2000, p. 220). In Principles of Psychology, Spencer attempted to reconcile associationism and evolution (Young, 1970). For Spencer, the resolution lay in the Lamarckian idea of use inheritance, whereby later generations inherited the learned habits of earlier generations while during life individuals could also acquire new knowledge through association. Associationism was at odds with Spencer’s earlier belief in phrenology, and he gradually abandoned the latter primarily because of the rigidity of the phrenological schemes, although he continued to argue that different parts of the brain subserved different “kinds of mental action” (Spencer, 1855, p. 606). Spencer’s proposal of dedicated brain areas captured

three further characteristics of his worldview that were of consequence for later thinking in English psychology: that division of labor is a principle both for the natural and social worlds, that evolution goes from less complex to more complex forms, and that evolution leads to a move from homogeneity to heterogeneity (and so follows a greater emphasis on individuality). Spencer’s reputation declined in the late 19th century, and now his views can seem dated and unpalatable. The reasons for the decline in his reputation are complex but it was not helped by his tendency to repetition and to ignore new ideas and evidence from the sciences. In addition, his own combative personal style coupled with a lack of a university post meant that Spencer was increasingly intellectually isolated. His claims, which were formerly regarded as radical, seemed less and less credible in the latter part of the century. However, for a period, he was a key figure who was held in high esteem by the likes of Darwin, John Stuart Mill, and George Romanes, and there are elements from his psychology that continued through English psychology for much of the next 100 years. Most importantly, Spencer made ethical, political, and scientific concerns inseparable. Few now would be happy with the way in which he did so, through the idea of universal, natural laws being the sole guide to how we live, but his work illustrates the way in which psychological questions easily and quickly become entwined with political questions. More concretely, Spencer spoke to debates over which psychological qualities were inherited and which acquired or learned. His scheme of thought also shifted attention to the group as a source of inherited characteristics, and in mid-19th century England, the notion of human grouping that seemed to fit best was race, and he was a major contributor to scientific racialism (Richards, 1997). Thomas Henry Huxley reflecting on the impact of Darwin’s ideas claimed that, within 20 years, the scientific community had accepted evolution and evolutionary theory even though debates remained over major issues such as the means of transmission of inherited characteristics (Huxley, 1887). English psychology in its most significant forms emerged against this backdrop and, although evolution may not have united all of the scientific psychologists, by the end of the 19th century, it was impossible to escape its effects.3 For English psychology, it gave an added scientific legitimacy to the study of lower animals, to theories invoking instincts, to the investigation of variation, and to child study (see for

example works by Conwy Lloyd Morgan, Georges Romanes, Francis Galton, and James Sully). Mind began to be treated as something that was adapted and adaptive, with functions whose existence could be understood within an evolutionary framework (Lewes, 1874/1879). It also subtly altered the connotations and scope of terms that were fundamental to psychology. For example, the moral doctrine that one should do unto others as one would be done unto was, for Darwin, the result of evolved social instincts (Brooke, 1991). Although the term “instinct” was to go into decline as a psychological term, in the work of English psychologists such as William McDougall, it became one of the ways of explaining all forms of human behavior, including social interaction.4 Behavior itself moved from being a term that applied to how people conducted themselves in society to a scientific term that could be used to describe the activities of humans and animals, as evidenced by the appearance of the first book entitled Animal Behaviour written by Conwy Lloyd Morgan, the first psychologist to be made a Fellow of the Royal Society (Danziger, 1997; Hearnshaw, 1964; Morgan, 1900). Such a move was made possible by the framework provided by evolution. By bringing mind within its scope, evolutionary thought made English psychology a biological science more than a physiological one. Nevertheless, physiological thinking and physiologically justified practices, especially within medical contexts, were a further important condition for the emergence of psychology in England.

Medicine and Physiology In the early 19th century, a school of thought emerged in England that is usually characterized as “psychophysiology,” or as Richards has termed it, “the nervous empire” (Carpenter, 1874; Laycock, 1860; Maudsley, 1868; Richards, 1992).5 Although psychophysiology was often the preferred term, many of the developments in this loosely defined area took place in a medical context. Three of the earliest texts published in English with psychology or psychological in their title were oriented to medicine: a translation of von Feuchtersleben’s The Principles of Medical Psychology (1847; original 1845), Daniel Noble’s Elements of Psychological Medicine (1853), and John Bucknill and Daniel Tuke’s A Manual of Psychological Medicine (1858). One could treat medicine, psychiatry, insanity, and the asylum as belonging to one historical tradition, and psychology, the normal mind, and the world outside the asylum to another, but for 19th-century collins

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England, this would be a forced distinction. Many of the works in mental physiology attempted to show that medical, physiological, and psychological concerns were interdependent. The growth of mental physiology and medical psychology was also linked to the establishment and expansion of lunatic asylums and the kinds of practical demands to which they gave rise (Donnelly, 1983; Scull, 1993). The relationship between psychology and medicine that began with the psychophysiologists was to persist and to play its part in the eventual establishment of psychology in England. In 19th-century England, there was a common perception that industrialization and the growth of the towns was causing increased rates of insanity (Farr, 1837). There were also widespread concerns over issues such as alcoholism, violence, and criminal responsibility that fringed on insanity. In 1845, the Act for the Provision and Regulation of Lunatic Asylums for Counties and Boroughs made it compulsory for English counties to establish asylums for the insane. The act was concerned with social problems posed by the pauper insane, rather than issues of public health. The new institutions sharpened existing concerns over how to manage an asylum effectively, how to deal with those in them, and how to warrant claims to authority over them (Scull, 1993). Pivotal figures in such matters were the asylum medical officers, who formed the Association of Medical Officers in 1841, and began to publish their own journal (The Asylum Journal of Mental Science that became the Journal of Mental Science in 1855, and the British Journal of Psychiatry in 1963). The journal began to include more serious psychological content under the editorship of Henry Maudsley from 1862 (Hearnshaw, 1964). By the middle of the 19th century, social problems such as alcoholism were being given a psychological dimension and invited claims to psychological expertise that had practical consequences. The explanations that emerged were frequently expressed in the language of mental physiology. Two central figures in this movement were William Carpenter (1813–1885) and Thomas Laycock (1812–1876). Laycock was professor of the practice of physic at the University of Edinburgh, and he was responsible for founding a lecture series on medical psychology at that university (see Wade, 2011, Chapter 20, this volume). However, before this he had studied in London, Paris, and Göttingen, and had worked in his native Yorkshire for more than a decade. Laycock argued that the same principles of reflex function were applicable to all levels 186

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of the brain (Laycock, 1845). Such a scheme meant that levels of the brain regarded as responsible for voluntary action were governed by the same principles as those responsible for involuntary action, something that blurred the distinction between the two (Danziger, 1982). In Laycock’s system, consciousness had no causal properties but, like other mental properties, was an aspect of the physiology of the nervous system. He maintained that there was a teleological aspect to reflex action, which was conservation of the organism, much of which took place at an unconscious level. Thus, mind was an organized system with a purpose, but he downplayed the role of will. For Laycock, the origins of problems such as excessive consumption of alcohol may have been constitutional, but they were exaggerated by the conditions of life (Laycock, 1857; Danziger, 1982). Whereas Laycock downplayed the role of will, William Carpenter protected it. Carpenter was trained in medicine but spent much of his career writing on science and medicine, and he was appointed to the chair in physiology at the Royal Institute in 1844, shortly after publishing his The Principles of Human Physiology (1842). Carpenter was particularly important in publicizing the ideas of the new physiological psychology and although he later became a major university administrator, he continued to write on psychologically related themes, as in his The Principles of Mental Physiology (1874). Carpenter regarded childhood education, criminal reform, and the prevention of deviance as both social and scientific issues (Danziger, 1982). When it came to relations between mind and body, Carpenter was a dualist and an interactionist. He argued that many complex behaviors were a product of ideomotor actions in the cerebrum, but that these actions lay outside consciousness, resulting in something he called unconscious cerebration, an idea he used to explain phenomena such as hypnotism. For Carpenter, wilful actions depended upon attention being voluntarily brought to bear on a particular idea. By emphasizing autonomy of the will, Carpenter developed accounts of problems such as alcoholism that attributed them to a deficient will. Attempts to explain the relationships between mind and physiology became most controversial when they impinged on issues of materialism, determinism, free will, and morality. Laycock’s belief in psychophysical parallelism and his idea of cerebral reflex action were taken up by one of his most influential pupils, John Hughlings Jackson, and it

was his view of the mental as simply the subjective side of neurophysiological action that gained ground in the second half of the century (Danziger, 1982). The threat of Jackson’s approach was that it left no room for free will and so no room for moral responsibility (Daston, 1978). Where previously habitual drunkenness might have been attributed to lack of will, a moral failing, increasingly will was portrayed either as an illusion or as something that had a physical basis that could literally be weakened (Valverde, 1998). The conflicts around these issues cannot sensibly be simplified as science versus religion, but the perception was that the new psychophysiology threatened to undermine the authority of an increasingly beleaguered Christian church. The promised psychophysiology also threatened concepts such as personal and legal responsibility. At its most extreme, it implied that having defined classes of person who were not responsible for their actions, via mechanisms such as non compos mentis and the M’Naghten Rules, was not sustainable because all people lacked volition as traditionally conceived.6 In the later part of the century, one of the more extreme and prominent English advocates of the new mental physiology was Henry Maudsley (1835–1918). Maudsley was medically trained and had worked in asylums before taking up the post of professor of medical jurisprudence at University College London (Hearnshaw, 1964). He argued that free will was an abstraction with no causal powers, and he supported a deterministic view of human behavior (Maudsley, 1883). Like Carpenter, he proposed that many of the most significant organizing actions of the mind took place at an unconscious level and that insanity arose when this underlying organization was disturbed. According to Maudsley, the conscious was a superficial affair (Maudsley, 1876). Danziger has pointed out that Maudsley’s devaluation of consciousness was “essentially a practical devaluation” that revolved around how to understand and manage insanity (Danziger, 1982, p. 136 italics in original). For Maudsley, insanity had an organic basis requiring organic treatment. Consequently, consciousness and its study had little practical import. He also rejected introspection as a method for the new psychology: It could not be used to gain information on children, the insane, animals, and “primitives” (each by then was seen as a key category for psychological investigation), and it provided no insight into the material conditions and processes producing that experience (Maudsley, 1868, 1883).7 This view of

will did not lead to a neglect of moral issues. On the contrary, Maudsley’s writings were infused with moral concerns, and he developed accounts of insanity, especially insanity in women, which although ostensibly scientific and material, were more a reflection of the dominant social values of the period (Showalter, 1987). The scientific naturalism exemplified by Maudsley dominated the psychophysiology of the late 19th century but there was opposition. Opponents sought a position that allowed a science of mind and a belief in volition to coexist. Central to these alternative psychological accounts were the first person perspective and the concept of voluntary attention (Daston, 1978). The Cambridge philosopher James Ward (1843–1925) was someone whose writings emphasized both. Ward is little read now, but he was of immense importance in establishing psychology in England (Hearnshaw, 1964). His article on psychology in the Encyclopaedia Britannica was fêted by contemporaries, with Bain calling it a “masterpiece” (Ward, 1886). In 1875, Ward became a fellow of Trinity College Cambridge and wrote his fellowship thesis on “The Relation of Physiology to Psychology,” which was later published as “An Attempt to Interpret Fechner’s Laws” (Wall, 2007; Ward, 1876). As this suggests, Ward was not ignorant of physiology, nor was he unsympathetic to it. However, unlike mental physiologists such as Maudsley, Ward took the phenomenon of a conscious, active self to be the central problem for a science of psychology, meaning that there was a limited role for any psychology that sought to reduce this to unconscious neural actions. He also rejected the English associationist view of mind. Instead, inspired by Continental philosophers, he treated the mind as both active and organizing. It was an emphasis that was to be reflected in the psychological writings of later Cambridge psychologists, especially Frederic Bartlett, and many other English psychologists in the 20th century (Collins, 2006; Drever, 1966). Ward’s emphasis on active mind more obviously allowed room for “moral” concerns and promised a psychology in which introspection was central—irrespective of whether or not that method was judged “scientific” (Ward, 1886). What the sometimes considerable differences between thinkers like Spencer, Bain, Maudsley, and Ward reveal is a profound lack of agreement on the subject matter and methods of any such discipline as psychology, and on how it was to be accommodated in a world where others spoke with authority on human nature and where there were collins

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other grounds for moral judgement. To the extent that these disagreements slowed the emergence of psychology when compared to Germany or the United States, the sluggishness was not due to the opposition of philosophers so much as to disagreements “within the discipline itself ” (Daston, 1978, p. 208). The comparative stagnation of experimental work in English physiology also worked against the emergence of a psychophysiology. Some groundbreaking empirical work did take place, notably the work by the Scot David Ferrier on localization of function (Wade, 2011, Chapter 20, this volume), but it is significant that it often took place outside the university system (in Ferrier’s case, at the West Riding Lunatic Asylum in Yorkshire and at King’s College Hospital in London). The lack of a coherent scientific program in psychophysiology was also hindered by the comparative neglect of science and medicine in Oxford and Cambridge. Even in the early 20th century, when English physiology attained world renown through the work of scientists such as Sherrington and Adrian, psychology and physiology remained separated by language, method, and objects of study (Smith, 2000). For these reasons, the legacy of the psychophysiologists for English psychology might be regarded as slight. However, that conclusion should be resisted for three reasons. First, as Danziger notes, it reveals the history of psychology as a history of ideology and not just of science, to which he adds that psychology has had more impact “through its ideological than through its scientific contributions” (Danziger, 1982, p. 141). Second, the work of Ferrier and of Hughlings Jackson was at least as important for later psychological thought in England as was the work of the experimentalists such as Wundt (Wade, 2011, Chapter 20, this volume). Third, the psychophysiologists helped establish an idea that refused to go away; namely, that many pressing social ills, such as alcoholism, had a medical and psychological dimension and that the two could not easily be separated.

Institutional Beginnings Rylance has remarked that in Britain “19th-century psychology seems to me a mosaic always in process of completion, in which each of its many makers had a different vision of the pattern and rarely cooperated” (Rylance, 2000, p. 21). The late 19th century saw attempts to fix a pattern through the mechanisms of institutionalization: the formation of societies, the establishment of journals, and the creation of laboratories. These efforts reflected and reinforced a growing acceptance by many of the 188

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need for a discipline of psychology (Richards, 2001). They proceeded alongside the more practical engagements with social concerns that are considered in the next section. Probably the first British association that focussed solely on psychological concerns was the Psychological Society of Great Britain (PSGB) founded in London in 1875 (Richards, 2001). Established by the lawyer, publisher, and politician Edward Cox (1809–1879), it was dissolved when Cox died and the project lost impetus. Cox’s main interest was in the notion of “psychic force,” and Richards estimates that one-fifth of the society’s work concerned itself with hypnotism, apparitions, the paranormal, and similar topics. However, the society also considered what are now regarded as conventional psychological topics, such as memory and the relations between brain organization and psychological faculties. In most senses, the society was a failure: It was never very large (113 members at its demise), it lasted a short period of time, and it failed to develop a coherent program of research and reporting. Richards attributes this failure to a lack of agreement over subject matter—a familiar failing—and a distance between the pioneers of the society and the constituencies who might use or inform investigations. Nevertheless, Cox’s fleeting society was one the earliest and clearest statements of a mounting enthusiasm for organizations for investigating and reporting issues in a domain whose boundaries were yet to be agreed. A second societal base for systematic psychological investigation was the Society for Psychical Research (SPR). Founded in 1882, the society began in London, based on an earlier informal group led by the essayist and classical scholar Frederic Myers and the Cambridge philosopher Henry Sidgwick (Oppenheim, 1985). There was interest in psychical phenomena such as life after death, communication with the dead, telepathy, and ghosts. Altered states of consciousness, as manifested in hypnosis and hysteria, were also regarded as a central characteristic of psychical phenomena such as trances and automatic writing (Hinshelwood, 1995). Psychic phenomena attracted the attention of some serious scientists, including two Nobel prize-winning physicists: John Strutt (later Lord Rayleigh) and J. J. Thomson (Oppenheim, 1986). Psychical research also attracted interest from several of the first generation of English psychologists, including William McDougall, J. C. Flügel, and Charles Spearman. The English preoccupation with these matters in the latter years of the 19th century

has been attributed to a crisis of faith brought about by a decline in respect for orthodox Christian authorities, which was itself due in large part to intensive Biblical criticism and the rise of evolutionary thought (Chadwick, 1975; Oppenheim, 1985). Put crudely, at the time, the evidence for things such as séance phenomena was at least as strong as for Biblical miracles. However, as Peter Lamont has noted, it was also a crisis of scientific evidence and authority (Lamont, 2004). In particular, in their attempts to dismiss some of the more fêted and persuasive practitioners, such as Daniel Home, scientists sometimes seemed to resort to unscientific explanations.8 A further indication of the institutionalization of psychology in England was the founding of the journal Mind: A Quarterly Review of Psychology and Philosophy, in 1876. Mind was founded through the efforts of two Scots, Alexander Bain and his pupil George Croom Robertson (1842–1892), and in that respect is part of the history of Scottish psychology. In its first issue, Robertson was clear that one of the aims of the journal was to “procure a decision of this question as to the scientific standing of psychology” (Robertson, 1876, p. 3). From the outset, Mind was an international journal with early contributions from Wundt, James, Dewey, and Helmholtz. It gradually became more philosophical in outlook but the failure of the journal to encourage empirical research “was more to do with the history of English approaches to the study of mind and the lack of an institutional base for them . . .” than to editorial policy (Neary, 2001, p. 67). That is, the psychological tradition in England remained philosophical in the universities. Predictably, the foci of many of the debates in Mind’s early years were on the proper subject matter, method, status, and existence of something like psychology. To contribute to these debates, it was not necessary to hold a university position, which is just as well or it could have been a very subdued debate. What was key was to belong to the intellectual community of the likes of Bain and Robertson. The establishment of Mind was an attempt to provide a forum for elite debate and to differentiate between scientific or philosophical inquiry and the kind of popular speculation open to everyone (Neary, 2001). Although groups such as the SPR carried out experimental investigations, entering the last quarter of the century there was not a universitybased laboratory dedicated to psychology. The first attempt to found a research laboratory for the study

of psychophysical phenomena took place in Cambridge in 1877, when the philosopher James Ward and the logician John Venn lobbied the university for such a facility. The attempt was a failure, with the Cambridge Senate dismissing it (Bartlett, 1937).9 As we have already seen, Ward’s attempts at producing a comprehensive theory of experience and mind should not be underestimated but almost as important were his continuing efforts to get psychology established in Cambridge. Over the next few years, a number of scholars with psychological interests arrived there: George Frederick Stout, who was to write a popular—or at least much read—textbook on psychology, arrived in 1879; William McDougall in 1890; and in 1887, the American psychologist and co-founder of Psychological Review James McKeen Cattell spent 3 years at the university conducting experiments and giving lectures (Bartlett, 1937; Sokal, 1972). By 1896, a commentator in the Journal of Education could ask with a hint of exasperation: “Is it not a national disgrace that there does not exist one psychological laboratory in England?” and the following year a contributor to Nature made another national plea: “The science of experimental psychology, which is zealously pursued in Germany, in the United States, and elsewhere, clearly deserves more attention in this country” (both quoted in Valentine, 1999, p. 205). The language of these pleas made appeal to nation, country, and laboratory. For much of the 19th century, scientists had been arguing that science served a social function. The rhetoric about the precise nature of this function shifted, but by the last quarter of the century, the emphasis was on the assurance of military security and increasing national efficiency (Turner, 1980). However, state support for university science remained weaker in the United Kingdom than in other countries, notably Germany, and arguments for that support did not really yield significant changes until the early 20th century (Olby, 1991). Consequently, for the unestablished activity of experimental psychology, lobbying for space, equipment, and funding took place within the universities and through appeals for donations. Finally, in 1897, Ward and the professor of physiology, Michael Foster, obtained financial support from the University of Cambridge to purchase psychophysical apparatus for use by William Rivers (1864–1922). Rivers had been appointed to a university lectureship in 1893, but that lectureship was now retitled “Lecturer in Experimental Psychology and the Physiology of the Senses.” collins

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The University of London founded three psychology laboratories in the 1890s: University College in 1898, with James Sully as head; at Bedford College in 1901, headed by Beatrice Edgell; and one at King’s College in 1903, headed by C. S. Myers (Valentine, 1999). Funds for the University College laboratory were obtained via appeals for donations, which were forthcoming from individuals such as Henry Sidgwick (philosopher and founding member of SPR), Alfred Balfour (MP, later Prime Minister), John Lubbock (entomologist), Shadworth Hodgson (philosopher, also a member of SPR), and Francis Galton (Valentine, 1999). Equipment was loaned from the physics departments and more was bought from Münsterberg prior to his departure to Harvard. Sully saw the University College laboratory as a site for the investigation of a variety of topics with wide relevance to education, such as mental fatigue, but it is fair to say that these early laboratories focused primarily on psychophysics (Valentine, 1999). The laboratory, rather than the department, the school, or the degree course, was the icon of scientific investigation, and although these laboratories were small and often served teaching as well as research purposes, they had that iconic status and also provided a rationale for pleas for further funds (Capshew, 1992). An event that was certainly not confined to the laboratory but which has also taken on iconic status in the history of psychology in Britain and England, was the Torres Straits expedition that began in 1898 (Herle & Rouse, 1998). The expedition was headed by the anthropologist Alfred Haddon and included three academics who were crucial in establishing academic psychology in England: William Rivers, Charles Myers, and William McDougall. They conducted experiments that were broadly psychophysical: Rivers on visual perception; Myers on smell, hearing, and taste; and McDougall studied cutaneous perception and blood pressure (Richards, 1997). In the short-term, the expedition persuaded Rivers that psychology and anthropology could be interdependent, and later he persuaded a young Frederic Bartlett to pursue psychological questions with anthropological relevance. It also meant that when the trio was reunited during World War I, at Maghull Hospital in Liverpool, their shared anthropological experience appears to have made them more receptive to Freud’s ideas than they might otherwise have been. As discussed in more detail below, the engagement of these psychologists with Freud’s ideas and the demands of medical service in 190

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World War I were to have profound consequences for psychology in England. Not long after the Torres Straits expedition, on October 24, 1901, the Psychological Society was founded at a meeting in University College London, and it became the British Psychological Society (BPS) in 1906 (Edgell, 1947; Lovie, 2001). Ten people attended the meeting. The mix, as one might expect, reflected the fact that the discipline was not yet established: five could arguably be identified as psychologists (Boyce-Gibson, McDougall, Rivers, Smith, and Sully); Bryant was a headmistress, although she had used mental tests and had published experimental work in Mind (Cattell & Bryant, 1889); two were physicians (ArmstrongJones, Mott); and two were Cambridge graduates with interests in psychology (Hales, Shand). At the outset, membership was limited to those who published in psychology or who taught the subject (Lovie, 2001). The exclusivity of these rules, together with what was a small scholarly community, ensured that membership numbers remained low, with fewer than 100 by 1914 (Edgell, 1947). The society invited and attracted some significant figures from within the nascent psychology and from outside it, some of whom were British and some not including: Henry Head, John Hughlings Jackson, Francis Galton, Harald Høffding, William James, G.E. Müller, Theodore Ribot, Carl Stumpf, and Wilhelm Wundt. One obvious feature of the early membership lists is the large number of medical doctors, and there was considerable overlap with membership of the Neurological Society (examples being Rivers, Head, Sherrington, Mott, Rows). In the first 18 years of the BPS’s existence, before its dramatic reorganization in 1919, just 16 women were elected to membership (most of whom worked in England; Valentine, 2008). Valentine pointed out that these women’s careers were often varied but the most common career path was as a lecturer in teacher training colleges or within education departments of universities. They were also active in publishing and research, with Sophie Bryant publishing ten books and Caroline Graveson, Susan Isaacs, and Alice Woods each writing seven or eight (Valentine, 2008). Laboratories and societies are important but an emerging academic discipline also needed a means of disseminating knowledge and practice, in other words, it needed a journal. Since its inception, Mind had become more philosophical and less empirical, which was at odds with the new appetite for empirical enquiry. In 1904, Ward and Rivers

founded the British Journal of Psychology, and in 1914, the journal was taken over by the British Psychological Society. In its early volumes, there were some contributions from those who worked outside academia in England, such as the school inspector W. H. Winch, who conducted thoughtful experiments on memory (Collins, 2001; Winch, 1908, 1910). The journal also attracted international contributors such as Mary Calkins, Camille Nony, and John Watson. Nevertheless, for the first dozen years of its existence, the journal contents give a reasonably reliable picture of the kind of research going on in the discipline in Britain as a whole (Richards, 2004a, see below). Outside London and Cambridge, developments in academic psychology were more rapid in Scotland than in England. Nevertheless, toeholds were established in Bristol, Liverpool, Manchester, and at the London School of Economics (Hearnshaw, 1964, 1974). At the University College of Bristol, Conwy Lloyd Morgan (1852–1936) was made professor of psychology and ethics. Morgan’s main interests were in comparative psychology, and he is best remembered, if frequently misinterpreted, for his formulation of “Morgan’s canon,” which was primarily a guide to when it is and when it is not appropriate to use psychological descriptions of animals’ activities (Costall, 1993). In Liverpool, the prime mover for establishing a lectureship in psychology was the physiologist Charles Sherrington (1857–1952). Later a Nobel prize winner and an iconic figure in British science, Sherrington appointed W.G. Smith to a lectureship in experimental psychology in 1905 (Smith, 2000). At the University of Manchester, the philosopher Samuel Alexander sympathized with the new experimental psychology and had studied for a short period with Münsterberg in Germany. He was supported in his promotion of psychology by Sherrington who wrote to him in 1907 saying “With Education and Medicine for your practical clients in addition to some B.Sc. men, your new department will find work enough” (quoted in Costall, 2001, p. 190). Shortly afterward, the university recommended that a post in psychology be established to serve courses in science, medicine, education, and philosophy. The wording of Sherrington’s letter is significant, emphasizing as it did the appeal of psychology to “practical clients.” The first appointment to the Manchester lectureship and later the first full professor of psychology in England was Tom Pear (1886–1972). Somewhat unusually, Pear was offered the post while still an

undergraduate, on condition that he graduated with First Class honors, which he duly did (Costall, 2001). In London, the appointment of Graham Wallas (1858–1932) at the London School of Economics was significant as he became, in Hearnshaw’s judgment, “the first considerable British social psychologist” (Hearnshaw, 1964, p. 116). Wallas was a socialist who attempted to identify causal links between aspects of psychology and political behavior (Wallas, 1908). He may not be fashionable now but, as Herbert Simon has pointed out, for a period Wallas’ work was regarded as seminal, and students, including Simon himself, were still studying it in the 1930s (Simon, 1985). Despite this small flurry of appointments, before World War I there is a sense that psychology was peripheral and subservient rather than a whole new discipline being forged. By 1918, Edgell noted that the BPS was faced with a backlog of good material for publication, while publishing costs had increased markedly. About the same time C.S. Myers (1873–1946) reported there were moves to create specialist organizations focusing on psychology in relation to medicine, education, and industry, and each posed a threat to the society (Myers, 1936). Myers suggested that the BPS counter by catering for more specialist interests by creating subsections of the larger society. At the same time, membership rules should be relaxed to include anyone “interested” in psychology and not be limited to those “engaged” in it. The sections created were, unsurprisingly, medical, educational, and industrial, with the original society being the general section to which all also had to belong. The moves were bold and immediately successful, with membership increasing from 98 at the end 1918 to over 400 by the end of 1919. Events such as the formation and expansion of the BPS can seem like bureaucratic manoeuvring of little consequence when set against the development of ideas. However, the BPS was to become the key organization in the promotion and regulation of psychology for the rest of the century. The founding of the BPS and its reformation along the lines suggested by Myers provided a focal point for a discipline still in its embryonic stage, and without it, it is not clear that psychology would have achieved a distinct presence until much later. Its use of sections was also emblematic of one of the ways in which psychology simultaneously struggled free of other disciplines while at the same time remaining intimately connected with them. collins

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National Demands By the early 20th century, England had the beginnings of an academic discipline: university lectureships, laboratories, societies, and journals. But these were small and precarious and they were not the key factor in establishing psychology in England. Instead, Hearnshaw concludes that “Psychology was saved by its applications, educational, industrial and medical,” and it is no coincidence that these were the sections of the newly reorganized BPS (Hearnshaw, 1964, p. 211). Although scholars since Hearnshaw have refined some of his conclusions, his claim that psychology in England depended for its establishment on practicalities has largely been accepted (Rose, 1989). One refinement has been to claim that the emergence and establishment of psychology was not a case of preexisting psychology being applied to problems but of psychology being made possible by such issues and psychology transforming how such issues were understood (Rose, 1985). On such a view, the distinction between pure and applied psychology becomes problematic, and the priority of the academic discipline in understanding the history of the whole field is challenged. Consequently, having discussed the stirrings of the academic discipline in the late 19th century, it is now time to consider its emergence in practical settings during the same period. Three areas were of particular importance: the care and education of children, mental testing, and, as already discussed, the management of insanity or psychopathology. The child study movement and the impact of difficulties such as shell-shock are considered later in the chapter, but first I consider the importance of the rise of mental testing. It was claimed by James McKeen Cattell that psychological testing put psychology “on the map” in the United States after World War I (Samelson, 1979). Testing was also to play an important part in the establishment of psychology in England. The main impetus for testing was an indirect result of the expansion of formal and compulsory elementary education. Rather later than Scotland and much of Western Europe, England passed legislation for a national network of elementary schools in 1870, and legislation making attendance compulsory in 1880 (Sutherland, 1984). The legislative change was motivated by social fears over pauperism and crime, against which education was seen as a defence (Meyer, 1983). More broadly, the late 19th century saw a rise in concerns over “national efficiency” that was most associated with the Liberal movement but which was also embraced by Fabian 192

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socialists (Pugh, 2002; Searle, 2007). Efficiency legitimized state intervention in areas such as the family, but intervention was undertaken for “Bismarkian rather than humanitarian reasons,” as it promoted both an efficient workforce and a socially and politically more stable nation (Pugh, 2002, p. 100). One surprising outcome of compulsory education was the finding that some children from apparently good homes and with no clear physical problems were struggling to keep up with their schoolwork. The term that was soon used to describe such children was feebleminded (Rose, 1985). Compulsory schooling brought together children in large groups and made individual differences more apparent. Almost as soon as it was perceived as a problem, feeblemindedness was treated as responsible for a huge variety of serious social problems including delinquency, crime, unemployment, and poverty. The monitoring of children’s scholastic performance fuelled national debate on the state of the young, which in turn fed into wider debates about the state of the nation (Sutherland, 1984). Given the dominant views that abilities and deficiencies were inherited, that the lower classes reproduced in greater numbers than the middle classes, and that achievement in life was a reflection of underlying ability, many believed the situation was becoming worse (Pick, 1989). The newly detected problem of feeblemindedness reinforced the opinion that the state of the population and of the social fabric were intimately related and that anything threatening the state of the population also threatened social stability and progress. Race, nation, and population were thus frequently conflated, and increasingly, politicians, professionals, and all those concerned with the state of society saw the population as an object to be examined, protected, and managed (Rose, 1985). Consequently, feeblemindedness became more than a problem for schooling: It was an issue of national concern. There were political calls for action, and several Royal Commissions were convened to address the matter, culminating in the commission in 1904 whose prime concern was to consider the “Care and Control of Feeble-minded.” A practical concern ran through these inquiries and became a preoccupation of many of the professionals involved: How could the feebleminded be identified so as to allow separation or special treatment? One response was for medical doctors to examine children and to detect feeblemindedness in the same way they claimed to detect idiocy, via physical signs. The physician Francis Warner

explained to the psychology section of the British Medical Association in 1888 how a schedule of physical signs might be used by medical doctors to inspect schoolchildren, and between 1888 and 1894, he and his associates conducted brief physical examinations of 100,000 London schoolchildren in attempts to see feeblemindedness manifest on the bodies of the children (Warner, 1892, 1895). Like the earlier projects of physiognomy and phrenology, such attempts were largely unsuccessful, although they highlighted the growing English faith in numbers and empiricism as a means of addressing social problems (Hacking, 1990; Sutherland, 1984). The attempts also highlighted one alternative solution, which was to find a measure of the strength of the mind. In England, the major figure promoting attempts at measurement of the mind was Francis Galton (1822–1911). Galton was a prominent figure in Victorian intellectual life, and his commitment to measurement, numbers, and statistics was encapsulated in his reputedly favorite motto of “whenever you can, count” (cited in Wooldridge, 1994, p. 75). One of Galton’s many interests was exceptional ability, and in 1869, he had published Hereditary Genius: An Inquiry Into Its Laws and Consequences, in which he claimed that eminence in society reflected ability (where ability consisted of intellectual capacity but also energy). Galton argued that eminence could be treated as a measure of innate ability because he believed that within a (supposedly) fair society, life itself was a test of ability (Galton, 1869). Influenced by the ideas of his cousin, Charles Darwin, and earlier work on large samples, such as that by the Belgian Adolphe Quetelet, Galton became interested in variation in ability and its distribution within a population. Variation was no longer the error produced in measurement, which is how it was treated in many experiments; rather, it was something intrinsic to the thing being measured—that is, variation was a law of nature that applied to human abilities as much as to physical qualities. Consequently, he reformulated descriptions of the Gaussian distribution in the language of norms, deviation, and the normal distribution instead of the language of error (Hacking, 1990; MacKenzie, 1981). Galtonian science, as it is sometimes called, placed the emphasis in research on aggregates of data, measures of central tendency, variation, and population rather than on the universal mind that was the object of researchers such as Wundt (Danziger, 1990). It also implied that there was a clear link between

individual psychological capacities and social phenomena (Smith, 1997). Whatever its other shortcomings, Galton’s proposed measure of ability, eminence, was of limited use in predicting outcomes, which was what was required in the case of feeblemindedness, and he sought out other measures of ability. At the International Health Exhibition in London, in 1884, he tested physical qualities such as grip strength, reaction times, and keenness of senses in the belief that these would be indicative of mental capacity. The American psychologist James McKeen Cattell, who briefly set up a laboratory at Cambridge, also conducted studies in the same vein (Sokal, 1972, see also Spearman 1904, for other sources). However, like Warner’s inspections, these attempts were largely failures (Wissler, 1901). Despite their failure, what Galton’s measures of eminence, grip strength, and the like indicated was that measurement need not be confined to the university laboratory. Like Herbert Spencer, Galton maintained that evolutionary theory could and should be applied to social issues. However, for Galton, the result was not a laissez faire politics but a politics that advocated active social management. Central to this was the notion of, eugenics, a term that Galton himself invented (Galton, 1889). Galton promoted the idea and it gained some ground in Britain: the British Eugenics Society was formed in 1907, and the journals Eugenics Review and Annals of Eugenics in 1909 and 1925, respectively. In its early history in England, eugenics cannot sensibly be aligned with politics of the left or right, as there were famous supporters of state-directed selective breeding from both sides (for example, from the left, there was support from Bertrand Russell, George Bernard Shaw, Karl Pearson, and Beatrice and Sidney Webb). What a selective breeding program required was a technical means of differentiating the most able (for a positive eugenics) and the least able (for a negative eugenics), as well as a means of determining the relative contributions of innate endowment and of environment on performance on those measures (Burt, 1962). Although the social focus was on detecting feeblemindedness, Galton was always more interested in detecting the most able, and so the eugenics program also contributed to the idea that it was also desirable to detect exceptional ability. As is well known, the key development in claims to measure mental ability was not due to Galton’s efforts but to the work of Alfred Binet who was appointed by the French government to find a collins

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means of identifying subnormality in children. Together with Theodore Simon, Binet’s solution to the identification of feeblemindedness was to devise a series of tasks deemed to require intelligence to complete successfully and to develop age norms for these test and, in 1905, they published their first series of tests (rapidly revised in 1908 and 1911). As has been well documented, in Western Europe and the United States, over the next 20 years the social impact of these tests and their importance for establishing psychology was considerable (Rose, 1985; Sutherland, 1984; Samelson, 1979). In England, the promise of Binet’s tests was soon recognized, and their tests were quickly taken up. For example, an English translation of his tests appeared in 1908, following a visit to Paris by Miss K.L. Johnston to study Binet’s methods (Hearnshaw, 1964; Johnston, 1910). In 1909, a medical doctor, James Kerr, who was working for London County Council, drew the council’s attention to the Binet and Simon tests (Sutherland, 1984).10 Eventually, the Council agreed to the appointment of a psychologist to help in examining children being admitted to schools in order to detect those who were mentally defective (a term that gradually replaced feeblemindedness). Competition for the job was fierce, with an impressive short list.11 With an application supported by references from Sherrington and Spearman, the job was offered to the 30-year-old Cyril Burt, and it was described to him as a job that would make him the “fust official psychologist” in the world (Sutherland & Sharp, 1980). Burt (1883–1971) was to become the most famous and ultimately the most infamous psychologist in England: The former primarily for his work in psychology, education, and testing; the latter for revelations that he may have fabricated data from twin studies to support his claims that intelligence was largely inherited. Burt had been a student of McDougall’s at Oxford. From the outset, he was committed to the idea of the kind of differential psychology promoted by Galton, and in that sense he was rooted in the 19th century. However, his career-long interests in academic accounts of individual differences, his efforts in producing practical measures, and his willingness to engage in popularization of psychology are representative of the consolidation of psychology in England in the 20th century and of the role of testing within that consolidation. In his new post, Burt was required to examine children nominated for admission to schools for the mentally defective (Wooldridge, 1994). Once in 194

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post in London, Burt expanded the scope of his role to include gathering data on the numbers of backward children, the standardization of tests, and the discovery of what was to count as exceptional and what as average performances (Wooldridge, 1994). He spent much of his time adapting tests such as Binet’s and in constructing new ones (Burt, 1914, 1921). He was not alone: Philip Ballard, J. A. Green, Godfrey Thomson, and William Brown all contributed major works on the nature of such tests in the post-war period. In the 1920s and 1930s, the tests became widely used within education authorities (Sutherland, 1984). In line with Burt’s intentions, their use now changed from the original one of identifying feeblemindedness to being tests of intelligence that could be used to grade the entire population of children. From the outset, Burt had demonstrated his awareness of the significance of his and similar roles for psychology when he wrote to C.W. Kimmins, the Chief Inspector for London’s schools saying that: “I have come to realise in a very concrete way that a psychologist who is doing educational work is really starting a new and independent science” (cited in Wooldridge, 1994, p. 87). As in the United States, in England testing had become a major means of establishing psychology as a new domain of expertise. Someone less concerned with the practical application of tests but who was nevertheless a major figure in their development was Charles Spearman (1863–1945). Using Galton’s ideas on the “co-relation” of abilities, Spearman took results obtained from tests of children on Guernsey and estimates of ability from teachers and fellow classmates and concluded that these correlated and were underpinned by a common factor (Spearman, 1904). Spearman, who developed factor analytic techniques to support his claims, argued that performance on academic assessment was underpinned by two factors: a general intelligence factor g and a specific factor s, with the balance between these varying according to the task (Spearman, 1904). Although these ideas came under severe technical attack from other British psychologists, especially Godfrey Thomson, they were supported by others, such as Cyril Burt, and the idea of a general intelligence factor has proved tenacious in practical settings and in the academic literature (Deary, Strand, Smith, & Fernandes, 2007; Smith, 1997; Thomson, 1916, 1919). Spearman’s factor analysis, Karl Pearson’s work on correlation following on from Galton, and Ronald Fisher’s work on analysis of variance, were also major technical contributions to the discipline.

Within the testing tradition, the reputation of two researchers, Cyril Burt and Hans Eysenck, had a considerable impact on how the area was perceived more widely. Burt’s own reputation and his intellectual legacy have become inextricably linked. Subsequent to his death in 1971, there were accusations that he had concocted data supporting his claim that intelligence was largely inherited and that he engaged in other frauds, such as creating fictional research assistants (Kamin, 1974; MacKintosh, 1995). These accusations not only undermined Burt’s personal reputation but also cast doubt on the view of intelligence as largely innate that he had done so much to promote. Of course, this did not mean that claim and counterclaim on the inheritance issue disappeared—far from it—but the personal dimension added further fuel to an already polemical debate. A major figure in British differential psychology, whose Ph.D. research was supervised by Burt (although they fell out subsequently), was Hans Eysenck (1916–1997). Eysenck became director of the Institute of Psychiatry and one of the most cited and most controversial figures in British psychology. In the tradition of Galton and Burt, Eysenck emphasized the heritability of certain psychological characteristics. Although his research interests were wide, he is probably best known for his work on the biological underpinnings of personality. Like Burt, Eysenck was a controversial character but, unlike Burt, much of the controversy occurred within his lifetime. Eysenck saw himself as tolerant and politically to the left of centre and as rigorous in matters of evidence, but his opponents accused him of pandering to racism, and he was frequently embroiled him in heated and sometimes enduring controversies both political and scientific (Buchanan, 2010; Richards, 2004b). Eysenck was a major influence on a number of psychologists in England, including his successor as the head of the Institute of Psychiatry, Jeffrey Gray (1934–2004). How Eysenck’s ideas will fare in a discipline increasingly wedded to neuropsychological explanations remains unclear.

20th-Century Consolidation: Popularity and Claims to Authority By the end of Burt’s career, psychology was well established in England but in the early 1900s, its status as academic discipline and as professional practice remained precarious. Even with the spaces for expertise opened up by compulsory education, it could still have failed and been largely subsumed. The key period of consolidation for psychology in

England was the period between the two World Wars. It was a consolidation that continued in some of the areas already discussed, most notably education and testing, but which also took place in other domains ranging from the academic to the professional to the popular. One such area was the area of mental illness or medical psychology, a domain that was particularly important for psychology during and after World War I.

Shell-shock World War I was a watershed for psychology in England, as it was a watershed for so much else in Europe. When, as early as October 1914, there were reports of unusual symptoms impairing the fighting abilities of troops in action, the phenomenon, its extent, and its feared consequences came as a surprise to the military authorities. Soldiers in the trenches began to use the term “shell-shock” to describe the problem. The first use of the term in official medical writings was by Charles S. Myers, who, at the onset of war, was working at the psychology laboratory in Cambridge (Myers, 1915; Shephard, 2000). Myers was qualified in medicine but had not practiced and so was not allowed to treat patients at the beginning of the war. Frustrated, he visited the neurologist Déjerine at the Salpêtrière in Paris and observed his work with some soldier patients. Following this, he persuaded the Duchess of Westminster to appoint him to the staff of a hospital for soldiers being established at Le Touquet. Once there, he noticed patients exhibiting some of the same symptoms he had seen at the Salpêtrière, such as loss of speech or paralysis without any obvious physical cause, and because of his brief experience at Salpêtrière and his background as a Cambridge psychologist, he was accepted as a specialist in such cases—presumably because of a lack of alternatives (Shephard, 2000). Myers soon regretted his use of the term shellshock because of its connotations, and the term war neurosis was often preferred. However, in much of the more popular writing, the term shell-shock retained its grip. Early attempts to explain it drew on the explanatory frameworks of the Darwinian psychiatry of the pre-war era: a predisposing, inherited weakness combined with some exciting cause to produce a disorder with an organic basis. The psychiatrist Frederick Mott, a founder member of the BPS, proposed that the blast from exploding shells caused myriads of minor brain hemorrhages and these were responsible for the problems of the shell-shock victim (Mott, 1916). Many of the collins

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military authorities were inclined to see it as a moral failing or, more bluntly, cowardice. However, it quickly became clear to many that neither the moral nor the physiological explanation was adequate. The moral argument involved conceding that volunteers—the best of men—and officers were susceptible to moral weakness. The physical argument received little support from the results of autopsies, and many men who experienced shell-shock had not been anywhere near an exploding shell (Wiltshire, 1916). The possibility arose that shellshock was not the result of a physical shock but of a mental one. By mid-1916, Myers had seen more than 2,000 men with shell-shock (Myers, 1940). He pressed for specialist hospital facilities away from the front (Shephard, 2000). A number of war hospitals were established in Britain and two of these, Craiglockart in Scotland and Maghull in England, were especially important for psychology. The psychiatrist Richard Rows, who was working in Lancaster’s mental asylum at the beginning of the war, was put in charge of Maghull. The newly formed Medical Research Council took an interest in Rows’ attempts to develop psychological approaches for the treatment of war neuroses, and the Army medical chief was persuaded to send a group of psychologists to Maghull to learn about, develop, and practice these treatments. Such was the talent assembled and the nature of the group that Alan Costall has referred to Maghull as an “academy” (Costall, 1999). The group included some of the most eminent men working in English psychiatry and psychology, several of whom have been encountered already: William Brown, Millais Culpin, Grafton Elliot Smith, Bernard Hart, William McDougall, Tom Pear, William Rivers. Their intellectual focus at Maghull was on Freud. Freud’s ideas had begun to filter into English intellectual circles in the late 19th century, with one of the first to take notice being Frederic Myers, one of the founders of the SPR (which Freud himself was invited to join and did so in 1912; Hinshelwood, 1995). Havelock Ellis had reviewed Freud and Breuer in the 1890s, and although Ellis was not a Freudian, his own writings on the psychology of sex were clearly influenced by Freud and the two corresponded. In 1913, the London Institute of Psychoanalysis was founded by the Welsh doctor and Freud follower Ernest Jones (together with David Eder). In the same year, Jessie Murray and Julia Turner played important roles in establishing the Medico-Psychological clinic in London, which 196

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adopted psychoanalytical methods for the treatment of voluntary patients (Raitt, 2004). As a result, by the beginning of the war, Freud’s theories and ways of working were familiar to a small but significant number of psychiatrists, novelists, and reformers. Amongst the Maghull group, several had already encountered Freud’s ideas. Pear had already written on Freud’s ideas on repression and forgetting, and Bernard Hart had included Freudian ideas in his The Psychology of Insanity (Hart, 1912; Pear, 1914a, b). However, for others, the exposure to Freud was revelatory. Pear reminisced that: “Freud’s publications hit Rows like a tornado” (quote from interview with Pear in 1959; see Costall, 1999). The pressing problems of shell-shock, the intellectual energy of those gathered together, the provocation of Freud’s ideas and all that they promised for treatment combined to produce what Shephard has described as a “running symposium on the mind” (Shephard, 2000, p. 81). Discussions and treatments may have been dominated by Freud’s ideas but few of those at Maghull became strict Freudians. Several of them, including Rivers, rejected Freud’s strong emphasis on sexual origins of neuroses and invoked alternative ideas, such as conflicts between instincts of duty and fear (Rivers, 1920). They were also eclectic in terms of treatments. Although Rivers, Rows, and others adopted the method of “long persuasive talks,” they did not draw solely on Freud but also made use of Déjerine’s ideas and some, such as Brown, made use of hypnosis (Brown, 1921, p. 151). Crucially, however, the soldiers’ problems were being explained in mental terms, not physical ones, and the treatments adopted were largely rooted in talk and grounded in ideas such as repression. The importance of the shell-shock episode for English psychology can be exaggerated, and the role of war in the progress of science and medicine also risks being exaggerated. However, both contributed to a number of changes in psychology and psychologists that were of lasting consequence. First, it convinced those who worked at Maghull that some forms of abnormality were the result of mental conflict, and those who dealt in such explanations gained a small but significant degree of credibility (Stone, 1985). Soon others in the medical profession were persuaded, and consequently, psychology could make a plausible claim to a new form of authority (Pear, 1918; Rivers, 1919). The turn to mental accounts of behaviors deemed abnormal did not mean biology was ignored, and in his short career after the war, Rivers attempted to align

psychoanalytic-style explanations with neurological knowledge (Rivers, 1922). More generally, the shell-shock episode was an instance of the way in which psychology has not only studied problems or claimed to ameliorate them, it has transformed the nature of the problem itself (Rose, 1985). Second, the episode both promoted psychoanalysis and prompted modifications of psychoanalytic explanations of behavior by English psychologists (Brown, 1921; Rivers, 1922). Third, the war in general had a profound affect on British culture, and the psychologists were not exceptions. In the cases of Charles Myers and William Rivers, the effects were rather different. Bartlett reported on how his mentor, Rivers, was transformed after the war and became more animated and urgent in his research— he seemed to regain a sense of purpose (Bartlett, 1968). Myers, on the other hand, became convinced that psychology should now be an applied discipline, and this was reflected in his proposals for the different BPS sections on education, medicine, and industry, and in his move from Cambridge to work for the National Institute of Industrial Psychology (NIIP; Myers, 1918). But he also appears to have begun to find some of the experiments conducted in the prewar psychological laboratories and the explanations they prompted rather superficial. In the realm of memory, the idea that forgetting was a process as simple as decay just did not fit with his wartime experiences, and he urged experimentalists to introduce greater complexity and depth into their experiments and explanations (Collins, 2001). The war also provoked a widespread cultural concern with remembering, remembrance, and a search for meaning (Fussell, 1975; Hynes, 1990). In such circumstances, Myers could not reconcile himself to the limits of experimental psychology, and he left Cambridge. However, his successor, Frederic Bartlett, did reconcile himself to experimental psychology, and he went on to develop a laboratory and to exert a degree of personal influence that was unprecedented in academic psychology in England.

Working with Industry: The National Institute of Industrial Psychology The notion of individual differences being measurable through the use of psychological tests may have originated and gained impetus in the context of education, but it was not limited to that sphere. Very quickly, there was interest in how such tests might be extended to measure differences in qualities other than educational ability or intelligence. One area in which individual difference came under

new scrutiny was in industry. As we have seen, Charles Myers was profoundly affected by his experience during World War I, and he left Cambridge to join the NIIP in 1922. Together with the industrialist Henry Welch, Myers had founded the NIIP the year before. It was perhaps the most important institution for British psychology between the wars, and its stated aim was “To promote and encourage the practical application of the sciences of psychology and physiology to commerce and industry” (quoted in Kwiatowski, Duncan, & Shimmin, 2006, p. 184). The first meeting of the scientific committee of the NIIP indicates its promised status and the influence of Myers himself. Attendees included Frederic Bartlett, Susan Brierley (later Susan Isaacs), William Brown, James Drever, Beatrice Edgell, Eric Farmer, Percy Nunn, Tom Pear, Charles Spearman, Godfrey Thomson, Charles Valentine, and Myers himself. It is hard to think of many meetings before or since that gathered together a greater proportion of the “movers and shakers” of British psychology. Those working for the NIIP argued that the desire for industrial efficiency and the health of the worker were reconcilable demands and that industrial psychology could play a key role in that reconciliation. Myers was clear that NIIP should conduct itself in a way that was scientific, impartial, and commercially neutral (Bunn, 2001). It engaged with issues such as selection and training, vocational guidance, working hours, movement study, and accidents. The NIIP also tackled fatigue, an issue that had become urgent in the munitions factories of World War I, but which was now recognized as having a mental as well as a physiological component (Myers, 1920). It was engaged in both fitting the person to the job and the job to the person. There was also a degree of pragmatism, and the NIIP did not always limit itself to identifiably psychological issues but also ventured advice on matters of organization. In accord with James Ward’s thinking, but almost certainly strengthened by his own wartime activities, Myers was convinced of the importance of a psychology that addressed experience (Myers, 1931). For those sympathetic to the NIIP, the emphasis on experience went along with an approach to industrial psychology that was humanistic in tone, that refused to be solely an instrument of management, and which rejected the dehumanizing qualities of Taylor’s scientific management (Kwiatkowski et al., 2006). For others, this is a thin veneer, with language papering over an underlying collins

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project: to maximize efficiency in the workplace (Kreis, 1992). However, those who worked with and for the NIIP emphasized that the psychological world of the worker could not be ignored, and issues like boredom, worry, conflict, hostility, and frustration were barriers to efficiency and deserved scientific scrutiny. Almost inevitably, the psychologists of the NIIP met with hostility from workers who saw it as siding with management. Equally predictably, this hostility was itself seen as a product of psychological factors (Brierley, 1920). As already discussed, efficiency itself had gained a new dimension at the end of the 19th century: It was no longer simply the province of the individual company, it was also a national concern. Although sharpened by events such as the Boer War and World War I, the concern was also a product of a changing relationship between the state and the citizen (Rose, 1989). Acts such as the National Insurance Act of 1911 provided protection to the individual in times of hardship, such as unemployment, but in return, the worker made a contribution to the state and could be regarded as, in part, an employee of society. In such circumstances, industrial psychologists could argue that the tension between maximizing productivity and maximizing the workers’ rewards should be resolved for the greater good of the nation. Equally importantly for historians of psychology, it claimed that the tension between maximizing productivity and maximizing rewards was a psychological as well as an economic relationship. From the beginning, the NIIP struggled financially. When founded, it received donations from companies such as Rowntrees, Cadbury, Debenhams, and the Carnegie Trust, as well as subscriptions, donations, and consultancy fees (Kwiatkowski et al., 2006). The situation was not helped in the early 1930s, when the NIIP helped Rowntrees develop a highly successful new product (familiar to British readers as Black Magic chocolates). Unfortunately, one of Rowntrees’ main competitors was Cadbury, who also donated to the NIIP on an annual basis. Rowntrees did not want Cadbury to benefit from the techniques in marketing used in the development of their product. The episode compromised the NIIP and led to an internal ban on commercially sensitive research. It also signalled the beginning of the end of Myers’s period in charge of the NIIP (Bunn, 2001). The NIIP did continue after World War II, but shrank in size and importance until it was a relatively obscure and small operation by the time of its final closure in 1977 198

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(Shimmin & Wallis, 1994). But its ending should not obscure the importance of the NIIP. Between the two World Wars, it was the largest source of employment for psychologists in the United Kingdom and so provided for expansion of the discipline. It could point to concrete achievements and products, such as vocational tests and tests of fatigue (Welch & Myers, 1932). Through its activities, old problems were recast as having a psychological dimension, and psychologists claimed to make visible problems that had not been identifiable before. By deliberately engaging with the needs of industry, it brought psychology into contact with other domains of expertise and authority. Although hardly created as an exercise in marketing, it had made psychology itself more visible.

Child Study and Child Guidance Perhaps the key area of consolidation for psychology as science and practice in England in the 20th century was the study and care of children. Important though the rise of mental testing was, there was a wider engagement with the scientific study of children. In several Western societies toward the end of the 19th century, there were important transformations in how the child was viewed, with an increasing emphasis on parental dependence, sexual innocence, and lack of immediate economic worth (Jordanova, 1989). These changes were linked to a growing realization among politicians that children were of great and general social significance (Hendrick, 1992). The interest in sciences of childhood was further fuelled by the emergence of evolutionary thought, the apparent potential of childhood for providing insight into earlier evolutionary stages, the increased awareness of the poor physical and mental state of many children, fears over national degeneration broadly conceived, and ambitions to sustain and if possible enhance progress in all its forms. This in turn led to the child being studied by diverse groups, with psychologists being only one (Thom, 1992). However, before examining the nature of that role in the 20th century, a brief consideration of the growth of child study and child guidance in the late 19th century is needed. Two key works in bringing about a psychology of the child in England were Darwin’s Biographical Sketch of an Infant and Sully’s Studies of Childhood (Darwin, 1877; Sully, 1895). When Darwin retrieved the diary notes he had made on the development of his infant son William, in 1840, and published them as a “sketch” in the newly founded journal Mind in 1877, it was greeted by Hippolyte

Taine as heralding a “new field of science” (cited in Keir, 1952, p. 5). Although there had been many diary studies of children before Darwin, including one by Taine himself, such was Darwin’s status that his interest helped to legitimize the child as an object of science (Bradley, 1989). Seen as a product of evolution, the child was a mind and body that was, in the language of Spencer, adjusted to its environment. Through von Baer’s idea of human development as recapitulating development of the species, study of the growth of children could reveal something of the evolution of humanity and something of the nature of the adult mind, a project that Sully called “genetic psychology.” Despite setting up the lab at UCL, Sully believed experimentation was of limited use in producing psychological knowledge of the child (Gurjeva, 2001). He argued that better understanding of the growth of the child required observation. Observation was not to be in the laboratory, and unlike the observations of medical doctors, it was not to be a bedside inspection of those already deemed ill or abnormal; instead, it was to be observation of the child in his or her everyday life (Sully, 1886). Such a project clearly required observers, and here the growth of societies for the study and guidance of children was crucial. The formation of groups whose main aim was to gain detailed information on children was one response to growing concerns about their physical and mental condition (Warner, 1892, 1895). In 1894, the British Child Study Association was founded by British women teachers after contact with G. Stanley Hall (Stevens, 1906). In 1896, the Childhood Society was created as a result of earlier discussions at the British Medical Association meeting in Glasgow in 1888. The direct observation of large numbers of children in their home environments posed obvious logistical problems, but it also raised the issue of what qualities should be possessed by such observers? The ideal seemed to be an observer who possessed sympathetic insight gained from habitual interaction with children and who had undergone a psychological training that would inculcate the proper scientific attitude (Gurjeva, 2001; Keir, 1952). Without training, a person’s observations were unreliable, and without proper organization of the observations, it would be difficult to make sensible use of the information gathered. These preconditions pointed to parents, usually mothers, and teachers as obvious potential observers after some training. As a result, there developed a clear division along gender lines: observers, who were women, gathered information for

scientists, who were men. For example, Gurjeva reports that three groups of observers led by Misses Cree, Crombie, and Young were given the separate tasks of gathering information on the fears, pleasures, and occupation of children, and the information was then made available to Sully and to Earl Barnes (then professor of education at Stanford University, Gurjeva, 2001). Although in observation studies the emphasis was on mapping out the normal course of development, attention was also drawn to deviations from these norms, and Sully argued that deficits in intellect, instability in the emotions, and moral waywardness all required study (Sully, 1895). The early attempts to use observation to provide knowledge may have helped confirm the worth of the general project and the place of psychological issues within it, but the method as implemented soon came under attack. By the early 20th century, there was a growing tension between the perceived amateurishness of the process and the requirements of claims to a rigorous science. C. S. Myers, for example, railed against the large numbers of “untrained observers” (cited in Hearnshaw, 1964). The tension between professionalism and amateurism was clearly overlain by gender issues. Child study was linked from the outset with practical issues of child guidance and advice to teachers. Gradually, it became a part of university research, teacher training courses, child guidance clinics, and psychological services in local education authorities (Wooldridge, 1994). When Cyril Burt took up his post as official psychologist for the London County Council, child guidance was part of his remit. His influential book, The Young Delinquent, first published in 1925, contained a proposal for the establishment of psychological clinics “For the successful treatment and prevention of juvenile delinquency” (Burt, 1944. p. 617). Burt’s recommendations were wide-ranging and precise, and although they were not taken up as he envisaged, some child clinics did soon appear. In 1927, the first child guidance clinic was founded under the auspices of the Jewish Health Organization and was headed by the medical doctor Emanuel Miller. In 1928, the London Child Guidance Clinic was founded with a medical doctor, William Moodie, as its head, assisted by a psychologist, Lucy Fildes, who had been a student of Beatrice Edgell (on Edgell, see Valentine, 2001). In 1928, the pediatrician Margaret Lowenfeld established the Children’s Clinic for the Treatment and Study of Nervous and Difficult Children, which a short time collins

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later became the Institute for Child Psychology (Urwin & Hood-Williams, 1988). By 1937, there were 46 clinics recognized by the Child Guidance Council, although only 15 had full-time paid staff (Wardle, 1991). Many of these institutions were headed by medical doctors, which reflected the relative status of medicine and psychology. It has been pointed out that probably no more than 3,000– 4,000 children passed through the clinics each year, suggesting that their impact on child rearing was limited (Thom, 1992). Added to this was the scepticism of many parents and other professionals that psychology provided anything beyond common sense. Nevertheless, along with other developments, such as the NIIP, the child guidance clinics provided a role for the practising psychologist and promoted once more the idea of a legitimate, if fragile and contested, expertise. Between the two World Wars, several further developments confirmed the shift toward a professional child psychology and an established strand of psychological research. In 1919, the first head of the BPS Education Section was the educationalist Percy Nunn, and its first secretary was Susan Brierley. In his inaugural address to the section, Nunn commented, “the thinking public has become deeply impressed by the great practical value, actual and potential, of exact psychological inquiries” (Nunn, 1920, p. 169). A flavor of the educational problems seen as requiring psychological research is provided by the Report of the British Psychological Society’s Committee for Research in Education in 1923. It listed as general problems: the development of mental tests and of tests of attainment; the examination of correlations between mental age and attainment; the investigation of differing effects of different teaching methods; the study of individual children, including particular types of children; the exploration of group differences, including racial differences; the study of group psychology in relation to instruction and discipline; and inquiry into the value of psychoanalysis to education. In 1922, Brierley, who by then had remarried and was now known as Susan Isaacs, was employed to run the Malting House School in Cambridge. It was one of several progressive schools established during the period that sought to draw on psychological insights. Isaacs had trained as a lay analyst and was strongly influenced by psychoanalytic ideas, especially those of Melanie Klein. The school was small and lasted only a few years, but it allowed Isaacs to observe an educational experiment at close hand, and it was both shaped by and shaped her 200

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views on, for example, the balance between freedom and discipline in child development. When the school closed, Isaacs took up a newly formed post as head of department of child development at the Institute of Education, publishing prominent texts such as The Children We Teach and Intellectual Growth in Young Children (Isaacs, 1930, 1932, see Sayers, 2001). A final indication of the entrenchment of child psychology in England was its incorporation into the education of teachers and the founding of courses on the psychology of the child. Although many courses had included coverage of “the mind” before World War I, the place of psychology in the training courses was much strengthened after the war (Thomas, 1992). Percy Nunn’s Education: Its Data and Principles incorporated a psychology based on the ideas of McDougall, and it became a frequently used text in teacher training, although sometimes the values of such texts was doubted by the trainees (Nunn, 1920; Thomson, 2006). Charles Fox, another leading textbook writer, insisted that trainee teachers should engage in practical experimental work on well-established topics of psychological research such as imagery, memory and observation, and transfer of training. Also, many of the teacher training colleges themselves became sites of psychological research conducted by those who taught there (Thomas, 1996). In the period between the wars, there were marked shifts in psychological views of the child. The period had begun with the lingering claims that the development of the child was best understood as a recapitulation of human evolution. Early in the era, references to instincts were common. In particular, William McDougall emphasized that behavior was underpinned by purposive striving and an energy supplied by inherited instincts, and Percy Nunn propounded similar ideas (McDougall, 1908; Nunn, 1920). In psychology more widely, and especially in the United States (where McDougall moved in 1920), such an approach was limited in its impact largely because of the rise of behaviorism (O’Donnell, 1985). However, behaviorism never really gained the same status in English psychology. It contrasted markedly, for example, with the strong tradition, exemplified by Ward, of those who emphasized mind as active, constructive, and meaning laden. It also rubbed up against the concern to maintain a place for free will and morality already alluded to in the discussion of 19th-century psychophysiology. Finally, in child psychology, it was at odds with a belief that development was in

large degree about self-realization. The appearance of Piaget’s work in English, beginning in 1926, provided a new and different focal point. Initially, Piaget’s work met with some opposition partly because it was at odds with earlier claims by Burt that there was no evidence for qualitatively different thinking processes in young children (a claim seized upon and developed by English critics of Piaget such as Victoria Hazlitt (Hazlitt, 1930). But for the child psychology courses and in clinics, Piaget’s ideas fit well with elements of longer-standing traditions, such as the Froebelian approach and its emphasis on learning through play and through doing (Thomson, 2006).

Practical and Popular Psychology A small pamphlet entitled Neurasthenia: Its Nature, Origin and Cure by J. M. Graham, M. A. (copy reprinted in 1948) published in London as A Practical Psychology Handbook courtesy of The Psychologist Magazine, contained advice on the nature of neurasthenic symptoms, how they arose, and how to cure them. The pamphlet also advertised other titles in the same series including “The Inferiority Complex,” “Memory,” “Nervousness,” “Frayed Nerves–Ways of Restoring Their Tone,” “The Parents’ Problem or How to Tell Children about Sex,” and many others. What in the history of psychology are we to make of such publications and the activities associated with them? It is too easy to mock them and too glib to dismiss them as unimportant or peripheral to the history of psychology. As Mathew Thomson has recently argued, on the contrary, such publications should be given due emphasis as one way in which psychological ideas became ingrained in popular culture (Thomson, 2001, 2006). It is increasingly claimed that we speak and write of ourselves and of others in psychological terms (Rose, 1996). Such claims may beg the question of what is psychological but it is something of a truism to observe that more and more difficulties are described as “psychological” or as having a “psychological” element to them. It is not only difficulties that are described in such ways; in the 20th century, the very notion of “self ” became a psychological entity, and improvement of that self has become framed as a psychological activity. Clearly, to a large degree, the knowledge of psychological experts based in universities, clinics, prisons, factories, and other sites have all passed “down” psychological knowledge. What has been comparatively neglected is the contribution of popular movements that have demanded and forged new

ways of thinking and talking psychologically, producing what Hacking has referred to as vectors from below (Hacking, 1986, but see Valverde, 1998). This is not to say that there is or ever was a clearly defined split between the popular and the professional: The popular often aimed to be more than popular—they wished to be taken seriously—and the professional wished to be more than an isolated expert—they wished to be read. Also, as we have seen, Victorian England saw popular movements with a psychological aspect: phrenology, occultism, mesmerism, and spiritualism. However, Mathew Thomson has argued that, early in the 20th century, a new popular psychology emerged (Thomson, 2001, 2006). This was a patchwork quilt of writings and activities that grew up in the interwar period that was something more than the popularization of psychoanalysis, although that popularization was extensive and culturally important (Rapp, 1990; Richards, 2000). One strand of this ill-defined movement was called “practical psychology,” and one indication of its popularity was the practical psychology clubs that emerged in England between the two World Wars (Thomson, 2001, 2006). The clubs were forums for lectures and discussions of psychological problems and possible solutions, and there were associated mail-order courses and specialized pamphlets often of a self-help style. Although the clubs themselves were probably small, Thomson argues that these publications reached a much wider audience. A Federation of Practical Psychology Clubs was founded in 1922, largely inspired by the American Anna Maud Haslam, while on a lecturing tour of Britain. Clubs were not confined to London and the South East: clubs were also founded in the cities and towns of the north of England (by 1939, there were 53 clubs in places such as Blackpool, Harrogate, Sheffield, Manchester, Derby, Bradford, and Leicester; at the same time, there were just six chairs of psychology in British universities; see below). There emerged a number of publications associated with this popular movement, such as Practical Psychologist, Emblem, Applied Psychology, and Practical Psychology. Prominent in practical psychology writings and teachings was the idea that people had the power and the ability to improve themselves, especially their minds, using psychological knowledge (while many of these titles came and went in the 1920s, as the opening of this chapter indicates, similar publications continued to be reprinted into the 1940s). The strong selfimprovement thread apparent in practical psychology was not new and owed much to older notions collins

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of self-improvement through knowledge (Harris, 1993). As for so much else in English psychology at the time, it is difficult to ignore the impact of World War I, after which there was a rise of interest in remembering and remembrance, an intensified interest in spiritualism, and a deep concern over what it was in humans and self-proclaimed civilized societies that could allow such horrors to happen. These were now issues seen as having a psychological dimension and thereby promoted an interest in psychology that went well beyond the academy or formal institutions such as schools and clinics. In practical psychology, psychological knowledge was not a knowledge that could only be held by experts, and so in this respect was the antithesis of psychoanalysis. Although there were tensions between practical psychology and academic psychology, practical psychologists did attempt to communicate the ideas of academic psychologists in plain language and to translate them in ways that allowed them to be used to help solve problems. The titles of the handbooks they produced, such as Personality: How It Can Be Developed, How To Study, and Worry: Its Cause and Cure, nearly all oriented to identifiable problems. Besides being quintessentially practical in outlook, practical psychology also often had a strong spiritual dimension that ranged from links with Christian belief through to spiritual ideas not associated with organized religion. As Rose has argued, psychology has been “a generous discipline,” with its ideas and techniques readily crossing over into related professions and practices. Practical psychology clubs and their publications were clearly another means by which psychological concepts and thinking entered everyday thinking, talking, and writing about people. Whereas for Rose psychology has essentially been a constraining discipline, Thomson argues that the history of practical psychology demonstrates that psychological discourse was also a discourse of liberation.

Psychology in the English Universities When Sir Ray Lankester addressed the British Association for the Advancement of Science at York in 1906, he announced that psychology deserved its own special heading because “its emergence as a definite line of experimental research seems to me one of the most important features in the progress of science in the past quarter of a century” (Lankester, 1906, p. 25). Almost as telling were the areas of psychological research Lankester sought to highlight for praise: the experimental work in Germany by 202

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those such as Wundt and Ebbinghaus, work on hypnosis by Charcot in France, research by the English physiologists Sherrington and Horsley, and the writings of Baldwin in the United States. Nowhere does he mention an English psychologist in favorable terms (he discusses Lewes and Romanes, but only to criticize their views on instincts), and the ambivalence in his treatment of psychology was symptomatic of wider debates among academics. In 1939, 33 years after Lankester’s address, there were still only six chairs of psychology in British universities and only five in England (Cambridge, Manchester, and Bedford College, King’s College, and University College, all part of the University of London), and even more telling, there were only 30 lecturing staff in departments of psychology in Britain (Hearnshaw, 1964). It is significant that Lankester spoke of “experimental research” because, as we have seen, much of psychology’s consolidation as an independent discipline and practice in England did not depend upon the experiment, at least not as now understood. However, in the small university laboratories and departments of the interwar years, experimental research did become established. Eysenck’s retrospective judgment of British psychology shortly before World War II as “parochial, small-scale, and exceedingly feudal” may have been an exaggeration yet each accusation did have some merit (Eysenck, 1990, p. 53). As already discussed, outside London and Cambridge, there were developments in universities such as Manchester, Bristol, and Liverpool, and to that could be added others such as Reading and Nottingham. But these were, as Eysenck said, smallscale. The most obvious and notable absence from the list was Oxford. Oxford had established the Wilde Readership in Mental Philosophy in 1898, and its first three holders, Stout, McDougall, and William Brown, were major figures in English psychology. However, the terms of the readership prevented the holder from undertaking experimental work, although McDougall breached this restriction (Hearnshaw, 1964). Eventually, in 1936, Oxford established its Institute of Experimental Psychology, but less known is that Oxford’s All Souls College contemplated establishing a professorship of psychology, and they asked the philosopher Isaiah Berlin (1909–1997) to produce a report on the state “of psychological studies in England and elsewhere” (Berlin, 2001, p. 76). Berlin’s comments are revealing of how psychology was viewed as an academic discipline. Despite Berlin’s protestations that he was not even “an amateur psychologist,” his report was

shrewd and insightful. He first divided the discipline into two main strands: philosophical and experimental. Capturing the mood of the times, he implied that an appointment in the former area would be a waste, as Oxford was already rich in philosophers. In the experimental domain, he identified studies of character and habit (by which he meant the kind of psychometrics undertaken by Spearman, Burt, and colleagues at University of London), studies in industrial psychology (exemplified by Myers and the NIIP), the psychology of the child (exemplified by Piaget’s work), and work in therapy (exemplified by William Brown). Each of these he dismissed as possibilities on the grounds of expense or lack of facilities or wont of a coherent theoretical framework. He dismissed animal psychology because of the cost of facilities, but also because of the “occasionally, extremely silly statements on philosophical topics for which one or two of amongst them, e.g. Dr J. B. Watson, have become deservedly notorious” (Berlin, 2001, p. 79; although he does go on to concede the “very impressive quality” of their work in their field, the damage was done). He considers social psychology but includes it only as “an act of courtesy” as he argues it may not be an exact science and, as a subject, has yet to “have found its feet.” It was, for Berlin, an “amateur affair” which, despite flashes of brilliance from people such as Graham Wallas, was an area that had no “proper criteria for the discovery of truth,” and he concluded “unless a man of genius were found to become its Newton, it would perhaps be premature to subsidise it” (p. 80). Oxford was to remain an uncomfortable and at time unreceptive place for social psychology for decades thereafter, and although Berlin’s memorandum can hardly have been the cause of it, it does highlight an underlying antipathy that existed in the Oxford elite, something that is sometimes traced to the strong philosophical tradition in idealism that existed there (Hearnshaw, 1964).12 Berlin recommended that All Souls seek candidates in the areas of “the psychology of the senses, memory and cognition in general” (Berlin, 2001, p. 81). He clearly approved of its “rigorous standards.” Work on perception vied with work on intelligence to be the most reported area of study in the British Journal of Psychology between 1919 and 1939 (27% of papers vs. 21%, respectively, figures derived from Richards, 2004a). The differences between the psychometric approaches developed by Galton, Pearson, Spearman, and Burt in London, and the more experimental laboratory approaches promoted at Cambridge by Rivers, Myers, and

Bartlett produced what is sometimes referred to as the London–Cambridge divide. The differences can be exaggerated: Both, for example, accepted that research of practical consequence was important. However, the divide did have an impact on the academic discipline, and Eysenck was one who complained of the “light blue tinge” that developed in English academic psychology in the mid20th century (Eysenck, 1996).13 With such a small community, the actions of individuals could have a profound effect and a pivotal person from 1931, when he became the first Professor of Psychology at Cambridge, was Frederic Bartlett (1886–1969). When Bartlett wrote his book Remembering: A Study in Experimental and Social Psychology, he produced one of the few genuinely original works by an English psychologist in the interwar period that had both an international and a lasting impact (Bartlett, 1932; Collins, 2006b; Shotter, 1990). However, perhaps as important were his roles in building up the Cambridge department and giving it a particular direction, in promoting psychology nationally, and training a large number of students who went on to prominent academic positions. Notably, Berlin acknowledges Bartlett’s advice when constructing his memorandum for All Souls, and the judgments in that memorandum bear a close similarity to those of Bartlett himself. During the 1920s, Bartlett, whose early psychological work had been inspired by anthropological issues, increasingly promoted psychology as an experimental science. He appears to have retained some personal sympathy for areas such as social psychology: He taught courses on it, and Remembering was explicitly a contribution to that area of the discipline. Even so, he did little to promote these aspects of the discipline within the Cambridge department while he was its head (Costall, 1992). He succeeded in moving psychology from the faculty of moral sciences to the faculty of biological sciences in 1926, and this indicated the direction that Bartlett saw his department and the discipline as taking. With Bartlett as its chair, Cambridge became the dominant research laboratory in England prior to World War II (Crampton, 1978; Forrester, 2008). In addition, many of Bartlett’s students gained important positions in psychology, and by 1957, ten of the 16 professors of psychology in Britain had been trained by Bartlett and Myers. Bartlett was a nationally significant figure for psychology because of his role on bodies such as the Industrial Health Research Board (IHRB), and it was via the IHRB that Bartlett collins

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succeeded in persuading the Medical Research Council to establish an Applied Psychology Research Unit in 1944, with the Scot, Kenneth Craik, as its first and celebrated director (Collins, 2001; see Wade, 2011, this volume). The APU, as it became known, went on to become one of the elite research institutions in British psychology and, importantly in the light of English psychology’s previous parochialism, it eventually became a thoroughly international research center. The rising importance of experimental psychology within English academic discipline is exemplified by the work at Cambridge. However, the international impact of research by English psychologists was limited. The lack of behaviorist research did not help in a discipline dominated by the United States, and although the dismissal by philosophers in England of behaviorism as “silly” may now seem to some correct, to many at the time it must have smacked of arrogance. Relatively few psychological works written by English psychologists in the interwar period had a major impact on the discipline (a not very principled sample of exceptions might be Brown and Thompson’s Essentials of Mental Measurement in 1921, Spearman’s The Nature of Intelligence in 1923, Burt’s The Young Delinquent in 1925, Bartlett’s Remembering in 1932, and Susan Isaacs’ Social Development in Young Children in 1933). Eysenck’s verdict on academic psychology in Britain pre-World War II may have been extreme in its formulation, but the discipline certainly was not large, a few well-placed individuals wielded significant power, and it had failed to have much impact internationally. After World War II, all of these things were to change.

Expansion Post-World War II Kurt Danziger has commented in passing on the “relative insignificance of Britain as a psychological power in the 20th century” (Danziger, 1982, p.119). Although written in the context of a discussion that was contrasting its importance in the 20th century with its importance in the mid-19th century, if correct, this is a damning verdict on the academic discipline and professions as practised in Britain. However, the comment, made as it was in 1982, is a judgment more easily defended for conditions prior to World War II than those afterward. After the war, four avenues of development helped to make psychology in England much more internationally recognized than it had been before: the consequences of psychology’s role in the war effort, the emergence of structured psychological professions, 204

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a large expansion of the university sector, and a growing similarity between the England and the United States in approaches to the academic subject. These were set against the backdrop of the growth of the welfare state, increased spending on science and technology, and an increasing acceptance of the English language as the international language of science. Psychologists were more numerous and more involved in psychological work in World War II than in World War I. In part, this was because problems such as war neuroses were anticipated. But new areas were also opened up. For example, remote communication in noisy environments posed a set of problems to which psychological expertise was now seen as relevant. Psychological knowledge was also seen as relevant to issues such as morale and the effects of propaganda (Rose, 1989). Psychometric tests were used by War Office Selection Boards, and some of the most prominent figures in postwar British psychology played some part in these boards: John Bowlby, Eric Trist (later chair of the Tavistock Institute), Rex Knight (later professor of psychology at Aberdeen; see Wade, 2011, this volume), and J.C. Raven (Murphy, 2008). A small but important episode was the development of specialist brain injury units that allowed psychologists, and particularly Oliver Zangwill (1913–1987) and Carolus Oldfield (1909–1972), to come into contact with large numbers of such patients. Zangwill, who was to become chair at Cambridge after Bartlett, and Oldfield both saw the possibilities that investigating such patients promised for psychology, and these experiences were crucial in the later founding of human neuropsychology in Britain (Collins, 2006). In a war in which the weaponry and equipment was more complex than ever before, there was also a growing recognition that machines needed to be adapted to people’s psychological capacities (Burt, 1942). In much of its research during the war and immediately after, the Medical Research Council’s Applied Psychology Research Unit at Cambridge exemplified this approach and continued to investigate how psychological abilities limited human performance (Collins, 2001). The larger range of issues tackled by psychologists in World War II reflected the more established nature of the discipline, but also confirmed that there were domains to which psychologists could make their particular contributions. When the National Health Service (NHS) began in 1948, psychology was given a position on the Whitley Councils, and this ensured that clinical

psychology as a formally recognized profession in England began with the formation of the NHS, and it has been associated with it since that time. (Derksen, 2001).14 From the outset, the leaders of the new profession expressed concern that psychologists should not be relegated to the role of technicians who merely selected and administered tests. One attempt to avoid this eventuality was to attempt to create a model of psychologists as scientist-practitioners, and this was the model promoted by Hans Eysenck at the Maudsley (Eysenck, 1949). However, the model appears to have remained more of an ideal than a reality, and frequently clinical psychologists did appear to be little more than technicians (Pilgrim & Treacher, 1992). Although Eysenck stressed the research side of clinical work and the evaluation of therapies, the demands of the NHS required others to engage in actual clinical practice, and in this domain Eysenck’s colleague, Monte Shapiro (1912–2000), was more prominent (Hall, 2007). The Labour Government of 1945 extended the powers of the University Grants Committee, and in 1951, the Conservative Government raised the grants paid to universities. The war had convinced those in government of the importance of science and technology, and after the war, Britain increased spending on science to 2.3% of gross national product (it was 3% in the United States, but only 1.8% in West Germany and 1.5% in France; Marwick, 2000). Although much of this investment went to the natural sciences, inevitably psychology benefited. The founding of the Social Science Research Council in 1965 provided state funding of research in the social sciences, and psychology was a major benefactor of this new funding council. By 2007–2008, and now renamed the Economic and Social Research Council, it provided £181 million for research. The founding of many new universities and polytechnics in the 1960s and 1970s also allowed for the creation of new degree programs in new areas, and psychology was a major beneficiary. By the early part of the 21st century, psychology was one of the most popular of all undergraduate degree courses.

on what grounds. Fundamental as these debates were, for psychology in England to move from a precarious presence in an intellectual elite to one that we now almost take for granted required more than debates. It depended in large part on social problems, such as drunkenness, feeblemindedness, fatigue, and shell-shock, being given a psychological dimension. The gradual acceptance of such problems as at least partly psychological went hand in hand with the emergence of specialists who claimed a relevant expertise and the development of techniques, such as intelligence tests, that allowed practical interventions. “It’s psychological” has become a phrase that even professional psychologists are prone to use casually. As psychology consolidated its presence in university departments and in locations such as schools, clinics, and factories, it also gained a place in everyday arguing and thinking about people’s behavior, although the forms it took were not a simple adoption of the ideas of the authorities. The proliferation of psychological concepts, psychological techniques, and psychologists meant that, by the early 1960s, psychology had become what seemed a natural part of English academic, professional, and popular culture.

Conclusion

Notes

The struggle to establish psychology in England had qualities in common with that same struggle elsewhere, with debates over what counted as its legitimate subject matter and what were its appropriate methods. These discussions were set within larger debates in the 19th century over who was to have the authority to pronounce on human nature and

Future Directions Research on the history of psychology in England up to the period between the two World Wars is extensive. However, there is considerable need for more analysis of the development of the discipline, the professions, and the popularization of psychology in the post–1945 era. Thomson’s groundbreaking research on popular psychology deserves to be expanded into different periods and its implications for historical analysis of psychology examined further. The shift in the academic discipline toward neuroscience in the late 20th century has been an international one. Nevertheless, understanding both the local and international conditions that have allowed this shift should help research in the history of psychology to have an important contemporary relevance.

1. Combe’s importance in setting up lectureship at Edinburgh is discussed in Wade (2011, Chapter 20, this volume) 2. George Eliot (Mary Anne Evans, 1819–1880) is now widely regarded as one of the greatest novelists in the English language. Less often noted is how familiar and engaged she was with ideas in philosophy, politics, and science. When she moved to London in 1850, she moved in the same circle as thinkers and commentators with psychological interests, such as Herbert

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Spencer and George Henry Lewes, the latter becoming her long-term partner. Eliot was well informed on contemporary ideas in psychology and frequently included them in her novels. Lewes himself was an important Victorian figure writing on psychological ideas. 3. Richards (2002) rightly points out that there were important exceptions, notably James Ward and George Stout. Ward and Stout placed themselves more squarely in the tradition of mental and moral philosophy. 4. In the 1950s and 1960s, instinct experienced a significant revival in the work of ethologists such as Lorenz and Tinbergen (Richards, 2002). 5. Of course, this was not solely or even mainly a British movement, with key developments also taking place in Germany and the United States. 6. Non compos mentis was a legal canon developed prior to the 19th century to cover those not seen as able to conduct their own affairs (such as lunatics, idiots, and those liable to seizures). The M’Naghten Rules were developed in 1843, following the case of Daniel M’Naghten, whose defence was that he committed his crime in a state of temporary insanity. 7. These were not all original arguments, and they were to have echoes in a much more famous publication in the history of psychology, John B. Watson’s 1913 paper on psychology from a behaviorist standpoint. 8. At this time, Faraday’s argument that the scientist should begin with a “clear idea of the possible and impossible” was out of fashion. Instead, the scientist was expected to enter the laboratory without preconceived ideas of what he or she might find (Lamont, 2004, p. 918). 9. The story ran that one of the members of the Senate objected on the grounds that the new laboratory would “insult religion by putting the human soul in a pair of scales” (Bartlett, 1937, p. 98). Bartlett could not track down a formal record of the remark, and it is now considered apocryphal but it does capture an antagonism to materialist and deterministic explanations that was prominent in England at that time (Valentine, 1999). 10. Kerr was previously a medical officer of health in Bradford, and he had been a witness to the parliamentary committee on “Defective and Epileptic Children,” at which he expressed doubts over the validity of physical signs. 11. Wooldridge (1994) gives the short list as: Francis Aveling (later professor of psychology at King’s College), William Brown (to become, amongst other things, Wilde Reader in Mental Philosophy at Oxford), W.G. Sleight (a student of Spearman’s and then lecturer in education), S.H. Watkins (an assistant lecturer in education at University College Cardiff and the youngest on the shortlist), and W.H. Winch (an inspector of schools, but with some important publications in psychology already behind him and favorite for the post). 12. It should not be concluded that this was an antipathy especially reserved for psychology. McDougall’s recollection of T. H. Huxley’s experiences of science at Oxford is telling: “Huxley . . . said that, if he had to devise a punishment for a very wicked scientist, he would condemn him to be a professor of science at Oxford” (McDougall, 1930, p. 207). Michael Argyle, one of the earliest psychologists at Oxford, who clearly was a social psychologist, also commented that “they [scientists] had troubles themselves, and some could recall the first chemistry lab in a converted bathroom at Balliol” (Argyle, 2001, p. 333). 13. The “light blue” description refers to the fact that the sporting colors of Cambridge University are light blue and those

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of Oxford University dark blue. Other universities are not associated with a colour in such a reliably diagnostic manner. 14. The Whitley Councils negotiated terms of employment and pay for people employed in the public sector. To gain a place on these councils was recognition that a constituency existed that required representation in such negotiations.

Further Reading Bunn, G., Lovie, A. D., & Richards, G. D. (Eds.). (2001). Psychology in Britain: Historical essays and personal reflections. Leicester: BPS & Science Museum. Hearnshaw, L. S. (1964). A short history of British psychology, 1840-1940. London: Methuen. Rose, N. (1999). Governing the soul: The shaping of the private self (2nd ed.). London: Free Association Books. Rylance, R. (2000). Victorian psychology and British culture, 1850–1880. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Smith, R. (1997). The Fontana history of the human sciences. London: Fontana. Thomson, M. (2006). Psychological subjects: Identity, culture, and health in twentieth-century Britain. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

References Argyle, M. (2001). The development of social psychology in Oxford. In G. Bunn, A. D. Lovie, & G. D. Richards (Eds.), Psychology in Britain: Historical essays and personal reflections (pp. 333–343). Leicester: BPS & Science Museum. Bartlett, F. C. (1932). Remembering: A study in experimental and social psychology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bartlett, F. C. (1937). Cambridge, England, 1887-1937. American Journal of Psychology, 50, 97–110. Bartlett, F. C. (1968). W. H. R. Rivers. The Eagle, 62, 156–160. Berlin, I. (2001). The state of psychology in 1936. History and Philosophy of Psychology, 3, 76–83. Bowler, P. J. (1988). The non-Darwinian revolution: Reinterpreting a historical myth. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Bradley, B. S. (1989). Visions of infancy. Oxford: Blackwell. Brierley, S. (1920). The present attitude of employees to industrial psychology. British Journal of Psychology, 10, 210–227. Brooke, J. H. (1991). Science and religion: Some historical perspectives. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Brown, W. (1921). Psychology and psychotherapy. London: Edward Arnold. Buchanan, R. (2010). Playing with fire: The controversial career of Hans J. Eysenck. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Bucknill, J., & Tuke, D. (1858). A manual of psychological medicine. London: Churchill. Bunn, G. (2001). Charlie and the chocolate factory. The Psychologist, 14, 576–579. Burt, C. L. (1914). The measurement of intelligence by the Binet tests. Eugenics Review, 6, 36–50, & 140–152. Burt, C. L. (1921). Mental and scholastic tests. London: London County Council. Burt, C. L. (1925). The young delinquent. London: University of London Press. Burt, C. L. (1942). Psychology in war: The military work of American and German psychologists. Occupational Psychology, 16, 95–110. Burt, C. L. (1944). The young delinquent (4th ed.). London: University of London Press.

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Deary, I. J., Strand S., Smith, P., & Fernandes, C. (2007). Intelligence and educational achievement. Intelligence, 35, 13–21. Derksen, M. (2001). Science in the clinic: Clinical psychology at the Maudsley. In G. Bunn, A. D. Lovie, & G. D. Richards (Eds.), Psychology in Britain: Historical essays and personal reflections (pp. 267–289). Leicester: BPS & Science Museum. Donnelly, M. (1983). Managing the mind: A study of medical psychology in early nineteenth-century Britain. London: Tavistock Publications. Drever, J. (1966). The historical background for national trends in psychology: On the non-existence of English associationism. Journal of the History of the Behavioural Sciences, 1, 123–130. Edgell, B. (1947). The British Psychological Society. British Journal of Psychology, 27, 113–132. Eysenck, H. J. (1949). Training in clinical psychology: An English point of view. American Psychologist, 4, 173–176. Eysenck, H. J. (1990). Rebel with a cause: The autobiography of Hans Eysenck. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction. Eysenck, H. J. (1996). “ . . . such a light blue tinge.” In J. D. Mollon (Ed.), The Experimental Psychology Society, 1946–1996 (pp. 18–29). Cambridge: Experimental Psychology Society. Farr, W. (1837). The provincial medical and surgical association. British Annals of Medicine, 1, 692–695. Forrester, J. (2008). 1919: Psychology and psychoanalysis, Cambridge and London–Myers, Jones and MacCurdy. Psychoanalysis and History, 10, 37–94. Fussell, P. (1975). The Great War and modern memory. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Galton, F. (1869). Heredity genius, its laws and consequences. London: MacMillan. Galton, F. (1889). Natural inheritance. London: MacMillan. Gurjeva, L. (2001). James Sully and scientific psychology, 1870-1910. In G. Bunn, A. D. Lovie, & G. D. Richards (Eds.), Psychology in Britain: Historical essays and personal reflections (pp. 72–94). Leicester: BPS & Science Museum. Hacking, I. (1986). Making up people. In T.C. Heller, M. Sosna, & D. Wellbery (Eds.), Reconstructing individualism (pp. 222–236). Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Hacking, I. (1990). The taming of chance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hall, J. (2007). The emergence of clinical psychology in Britain from 1943 to 1958 II: Practice and research traditions. History and Philosophy of Psychology, 9, 1–33. Harris, J. (1993). Private lives, public spirit: A social history of Britain, 1870–1914. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hart, B. (1912). The psychology of insanity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hazlitt, V. (1930). Children’s thinking. British Journal of Psychology, 20, 354–361. Hearnshaw, L. S. (1964). A short history of British psychology, 1840–1940. London: Methuen. Hearnshaw, L. S. (1974). Sherrington, Burt and the beginnings of psychology in Liverpool. Bulletin of the British Psychological Society, 27, 9–14. Hendrick, H. (1992). Child labour, medical capital, and the school medical service. In R. Cooter (Ed.), In the name of the child: Health and welfare, 1880-1940 (pp. 45–71). London: Routledge. Herle, A. & Rouse, S. (1998). Cambridge and the Torres Strait: Centenary essays on the 1898 expedition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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C HA P TE R

11

Finland

Petteri Pietikainen

Abstract Modern psychology emerged during three distinct periods of Finnish history. The first, the nascent phase, began when Finland was a Grand Duchy of Russia (1809–1917). During this period, psychology was a part of philosophy, and philosophers were not engaged in experimental research. The second wave occurred after Finland’s independence in 1917, and during the civil war that followed. After World War II, psychology in Finland gained its independence as a separate academic discipline, psychology became a profession, and the new psychologists turned from Finland’s traditional German ties to the influence of American psychology. By the end of the 1960s, psychology had become a well-established, even fashionable academic discipline. The breakthrough of the “modern society” and the Nordic-type of welfare state in the 1960s and the 1970s constituted the third historical period, a period that carried through to the post-industrial Finland of the 21st century. Keywords: Idealism, nationalism, philosophy, civilizing project, national independence - Civil War, welfare state, leftist turn, pluralism, Eino Kaila

Modern psychology emerged during three distinct periods of Finnish history. The first, the nascent phase, began when Finland was a Grand Duchy of Russia (1809–1917). The second wave occurred after Finland’s independence in 1917, and during the civil war that followed. Psychology as an academic disciple was established in the first five decades after independence. The breakthrough of the “modern society” and the Nordic-type of welfare state in the 1960s and the 1970s constituted the third historical period, a period that carried through to the post-industrial Finland of the 21st century. There were many important Finnish psychologists before the 1970s, psychologists whose theories and research merit recognition in this history. Finnish psychology began to take its place among the leaders of modern psychological research during the last quarter of the 20th century, with the acclaimed research conducted by Risto Näätänen

(b. 1939) and the interdisciplinary Cognitive Brain Research Unit at the University of Helsinki. But this success does not in any way denigrate the work of earlier generations of Finnish psychologists. Their scientific ambitions were linked to the cultural task of civilizing the rather agrarian Finnish nation by way of educating Finns, so that they would become model citizens (this was called the “civilizing project”). In comparison with today’s academic environment and the current standards for psychological research, the Finnish scholars of the old human sciences worked under challenging circumstances at the threshold to modernity. Their labor addressed explanations and solutions to epic social changes, and they paved the way for what Finland is proud of today. It would be a mistake to describe the early events of the history of Finnish psychology without regard to the momentous sociohistorical events that those early pioneers of Finnish psychology 211

lived through. Therefore, this history was conceived with the assumption that a scientific continuum exists that bridges the successes of today’s psychology with its nascent stages, events that place the beginning of this history in candle light on board floors in only a couple of small 19th-century towns, among a few dedicated Finnish scholars.

The Historical Context of Finnish Psychology History of scientific psychology in Finland is closely connected with the rather tumultuous history of the nation (for a general exposition of the history of Finland, see Lavery, 2006). For more than half a millennium, Finland was a part of Sweden (from the 12th century onward), but in 1808–1809 it was occupied by Russian troops in the context of the so-called Napoleonic Wars. From 1809 to 1917, Finland was an autonomous Grand Duchy of Russia, with the Tsar of Russia being Grand Duke of Finland. During this period, Finland was the most modern region in Russia, and, as it was separate from Russia, it became a sort of political laboratory for the more liberal-minded Tsar Alexander II in the mid-19th century. At the end of the century, Russia began to tighten its grip on Finland, and there was strong, but nonviolent national resistance by Finns toward “Russification” of Finnish society and culture. After the October Revolution of 1917 swept away the old order in Russia, Finland gained its independence. Unfortunately, within a few weeks, Finns fought a brief and bloody civil war that resulted in social antagonisms that lasted for decades. The Reds (the Socialist revolutionaries and their supporters) lost to the Whites (the anti-Communists), and as a result, Finland became a parliamentary democracy. Deep antagonisms remained between the Reds and the Whites; however, Finland’s three wars during World War II (two against the Soviet Union between 1939 and 1944, and one against Germany in 1944–1945) united the Finnish people in common purpose. Most importantly, the unoccupied Finland retained its independence. After World War II, the Soviet Union exerted pressure on Finland, and Finland struggled to remain politically neutral by cultivating cordial relationships. At the same time, Finland remained a Westerntype market society, and it was more culturally oriented toward Western and especially Scandinavian influences than it was toward Eastern European cultures. During the 1960s and 1970s, Finland developed as a welfare society that resembled its 212

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Scandinavian neighbors, especially Sweden. The fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 and Finland’s membership in the European Union in 1995 were important milestones in its history. At the end of the 20th century, Finland was more prosperous, pluralistic, and self-confident than ever. In 19th-century Finland, intellectual life was concentrated in the handful of small urban centers, and the academic circles were also small. There was only one university in the country, and it was moved from Turku to Helsinki in 1828, about two decades after Finland had become part of the Russian empire as an autonomous Grand Duchy. At the Imperial Alexander University of Finland (University of Helsinki), natural sciences were of secondary importance, while philosophy and national Idealism reigned supreme. Such a constellation had direct bearing on the history of psychology, because psychology was officially a part of philosophy until the end of World War II. This meant that psychological research was mostly conducted by scholars trained in philosophy. This in turn meant that experimental psychology remained in the shadows, although there were some modest attempts to carry out psychological experiments at the end of the century. The word “philosopher” in the context of the history of psychology has often been used in a pejorative sense, and this is unfortunate. By way of comparison with contemporary experimental psychology, the early stages of Finnish psychology were carried out during the era of the “old” science. First generations of Finnish scholars were preoccupied with questions that today’s academics may find hard to relate to, or even understand, although these questions were relevant and important in the context of 19th-century Finnish science. Finland, like many other European nations, was born in conflict. Its unique history of conflict, nationalism, and development of society and culture is the context in which the history of Finnish psychology is understood.

The First Wave (ca. 1850–1917): The Nascent Stages of Modern Psychology in Finland Nationalism, Idealism, and the Birth of Psychology To put a face on the nascent stages of Finnish psychology, I introduce the influential philosopher, political activist, and statesman Johan Snellman (1806–1881). Snellman was a professor of philosophy at the University of Helsinki between 1856

and 1863. He was dedicated to the Finnish nationalist’s goal of creating a culture based on the idealist theories of the moral citizen. The ideal citizen was an individual who embodied the virtues of selfsacrifice, patriotism, obedience to authority, and modesty. The model person was motivated to selfimprovement through education (Bildung), and foremost, willing to contribute to the nation building. In the 1830s and the 1840s, Snellman published two books now recognized as important in the history of Finnish psychology. In 1837, he published the Textbook of Psychology. It was followed by his Idea of Personality (Idee der Persönlichkeit) in 1841. In his theory of personality, he postulated three developmental stages: individuality, subjectivity, and personality. A Hegelian idealist, Snellman was pessimistic about empirical knowledge leading to a unified conception of reality (Ihanus, 2000, p. 440). His contributions to early Finnish psychology were influenced by Hegel, and although the Hegelian tradition waned in the latter half of the century, German philosophical tradition remained influential. In the context of Finnish psychology during the latter half of the 19th century, nationalistic “Finnish-mindedness” was influenced by Idealism. In the history of the Finnish nation, Idealism denoted a longing for a national unity, reconciliation of individual and collective goals and ideals, and an organic state in which political as well as individual harmony would prevail. As historian Marja Jalava has observed, at that time, cultural climate in Finland was “dominated by the identification with authorities, the undervaluation of individual freedom, and the violation of the rights of those defying their superiors” (Jalava, 2005, p. 467). This authoritarian legacy has shaped much of modern Finland, which has travelled a long road to become today’s democratic and open society that endorses or at least tolerates individual rights, and values pluralism and political dissent. Those few scholars who ran against the nationalistidealist current were Swedish-minded and liberal in their intellectual and political outlook. They lived and worked in a crucial period when “Finland found itself as a nation” (ca. 1860–1910). During these five decades, Finland was in the process of organizing its ideological foundations for today’s independent nation, with (cultural) nationalism profoundly affecting politics, mentality, and all forms of cultural expression, including science. Psychologists during this time had closest collegial ties to Germany, the home of scientific psychology. As we shall see,

although this model of Idealism for psychology was predominant, it was not universally accepted. Snellman’s successor in the chair of philosophy, Thiodolf Rein (1838–1919) abandoned Snellman’s Hegelianism, but he continued to approach psychology from the nationalistic and idealistic perspective. Rein was an advocate of introspective psychology. In 1876, he published the first textbook in Finnish psychology, entitled Attempt at a Presentation of Psychology, or Science of the Soul (Rein, 1876, vol. 2, 1891). In his book, he presented psychology as an empirical-metaphysical science that searches for the essence of the soul in the realm of inner experiences. Thus, for Rein, the principal method of psychology is inner perception, or introspection. His understanding of “introspection” was pre-Wundtian in that he was not engaged in experimental studies of perceptions and observations. In fact, he looked with suspicion at experimental methods of self-perception. Like Hegel, his former master, as well as the physiologist Hermann Lotze, his new teacher, he was a proponent of emergent idealism, and he admitted that the contents and activities of the soul cannot be fully comprehended without knowing about their material foundation (Aho, 1993a, pp. 33–37). Numerous Swedish and Finnish language editions of Rein’s important early textbook introduced psychology to generations of students, as it was used until 1931. Rein contributed to our history of the nascent stage of Finnish psychology by introducing such modern Finnish terms as “sense experience,” “perception,” “imagination,” “consciousness,” and “instinct.” He also introduced the German philosopher Johann Friedrich Herbart’s metaphysical, pedagogical, and psychological ideas to the Finnish academia. In late 19th-century Finnish pedagogy, Herbart’s ideas dominated despite the criticism of psychological determinism (Aho, 1993a, pp. 41–50). Within the Hegelian–Snellmanian intellectual tradition prevalent in the late 19th-century Finland, an idealistic understanding of the organic unity of people combined with the practical necessity of creating a unified Finnish-speaking culture. At the turn of the 19th century, there occurred a massive change in the languages spoken in Finland. Large numbers of the social elite and the middle class changed from speaking Swedish to Finnish, which was considered the “true” language of the emerging nation state. Although Finland was officially bilingual, Finnishminded nationalists began to express outright hostility toward “Swedishness.” pietikainen

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In Finnish politics, prior to the socialist movement, the predominant division was between two parties, the Finnish-minded nationalists (of which Snellman was one) and the Swedish-minded liberals. Finnish nationalism revolved around monistic concept of one nation, one language, while cherishing the hope of independence from Russia. In contrast, the Swedish-minded party wanted to retain Swedish as the official language. The majority of Swedish speakers lived either at the southwestern coast or in the two major towns of Helsinki and Turku. They were more or less estranged from the greater population that spoke Finnish. By way of describing this conflict within Finnish psychology, “Finnish-mindedness” was conceptualized in terms of the idealist philosophical conception of the soul. Nationalists tried to capture the essence of the soul with the help of introspection, reflection, and an edifying discourse on the “spirit of the nation.” Snellman and Rein represented this position, and it was expressed in their teaching, which was characterized by Idealism, indeterminism (free will, etc.), and the cultivation of the idea of harmonious personality that unified moral, psychological, and political spheres, leading to higher unity. In contrast, “Swedish-mindedness” was expressed in the emerging psychology in terms of physiological and experimental sciences, and in its adherence to the secular Enlightenment tradition. Compared to idealists and religious Finnish Nationalists, the Swedish faction’s teaching was characterized by a more naturalistic, deterministic, and international approach to the study of the human soul (Aho, 1993a). Perhaps the greatest representative of “Swedishminded” scientific liberalism was Edward Westermarck (1862–1939), a Darwinian sociologist, anthropologist, and philosopher. Westermarck became professor of practical (i.e., moral) philosophy at the University of Helsinki in 1906, and shortly thereafter professor of sociology at the London School of Economics. He contributed to many areas of research: evolutionary study of the human mind, anthropology, sociology, moral philosophy, and history. He could be called a pioneer in evolutionary psychology: Using comparative method and ethnological data, he studied the origin of marriage and moral ideas, and focused on the relationship between cultural variety and universal human nature (Westermarck, 1891, 1906/1908). Westermarck was intrigued by the role of emotions in morals and family, and his evolutionary theory of the mechanism of how humans avoid 214

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inbreeding (incest aversion) is called the Westermarck effect, and is now widely accepted. He was an early scientific critic of Freud and especially Freud’s theory of the Oedipus complex. Westermarck was by far the most famous Finnish scholar in the field of the human sciences in the (early) 20th century, and many of his students played major roles in intellectual culture after Finland gained its independence from Russia in 1917. But his importance was lost after World War II, when sociologists and psychologists distanced themselves from what they saw as the old-fashioned Westermarckian legacy, with its preoccupation with human universals (Salmela, 1998; on the life and work of Westermarck, see also Stroup, 1982). Although Idealism dominated Finnish psychology during the 19th century, there were also a few pioneers of the experimental method. There were Finns who went to Leipzig, Germany, to study at Wilhelm Wundt’s physiological laboratory. These individuals formed the vanguard of modern Finnish scientific psychology, and they established important connections to the international scientific community (Aho, 1993a, pp. 78–89). From the early 1870s, continuing through to the conclusion of World War II, Finnish researchers had their closest ties to German science (Swedish universities and St. Petersburg, until 1917, were also important). Finnish academics read German publications and made frequent trips to German universities. The Finnish students in Wundt’s laboratory included Arvi Grotenfelt (1863–1941). Grotenfelt became Rein’s successor in the chair of philosophy at the University of Finland in 1905. Another student was Hjalmar Neiglick (1860–1989), a naturalist and a champion of the experimental method in psychology (Neiglick, 1887). He was opposed to Grotenfelt’s nationalism and Idealism, and his early death in 1889 at the age of 29 was a great loss to Finnish psychology. At the time of his death, he had planned to study moral emotions. Physiological psychology remained at the margins of 19th-century Finnish psychology. Idealism and cultural nationalism dominated academia, and only the small group of Swedish-minded liberals advocated experiments, naturalism, and materialism. But things were about to change at the turn of the century. Workers’ movements became a political force, Russia entered a violent period that had direct effects on its Grand Duchy, and the common people were no longer content with the rather idealized, patronizing, and unrealistic role imposed on them by the elite.

Psychology in the Early 20th Century In 1914, writer and author Henning Söderhjelm, whose doctoral thesis was on the psychology of instincts, made an acute observation about the state of psychology: We can say that, until this day, psychology has only been able to make our general picture of the soul more messy and complex. But this is only natural, because the picture of the soul that corresponds with the practical needs of everyday life does not correspond with reality. For this reason, psychology must first be broken into pieces before we can start building a new psychology. (Söderhjelm, 1914, p. 582)1

In fact, very few serious efforts were made to build a new psychology in the early 20th-century Finland. One institutional renewal was the splitting of the chair of philosophy into two chairs in 1906. Arvi Grotenfelt, who did not publish much in the field of psychology, was appointed the professor of theoretical philosophy, while Edward Westermarck was appointed the professor of practical philosophy (ethics, moral philosophy). Early in the century, many Finnish scholars were interested in parapsychology, which they aspired to use as a means to illustrate the alleged dualism between mind and body, to unlock the secret mechanism of telepathy, and to solve the question of whether there is life after death (Aho, 1993b). When the Society for Psychical Research was founded in 1907, Grotenfelt, the newly appointed professor, was elected as its first chairman. But this particular field appeared to be stubbornly inaccessible to empirical research, although Grotenfelt, who was influenced by the French students of hypnotism and the idea of the “subconscious,” continued to believe in the possibility of telepathy and even of the spirit world (Grotenfelt, 1926). Before long, the academic interest in “psychical research” waned, and the floor was open to lay people who were openly spiritualistic or just curious. Parapsychology was a novelty that appeared on the Finnish scene at a time when psychology as a field of scientific enquiry was still in its infancy. Unlike parapsychology, education was already deeply entrenched in the Finnish academic tradition, and from the 19th century onward psychology has played a role in pedagogy. Like their philosopher-colleagues, pedagogues followed the idealistnationalist tradition. The first book dealing with the psychology of education was Bruno Boxström’s Pedagogic Psychology (1900). Although his attitude

toward experimental science was less reserved than that of most philosophers, Boxström maintained that the higher and more noble functions of “mental life” (literally, “life of the soul”) are inaccessible to experimental methods. A more reliable guide to these higher spheres, he believed, was the Bible (Boxström, 1900, pp. 5–6). Boxström’s book was published at a time when industrialization and commerce, construction of the nation state and nationalist sentiments, as well as Russia’s tightening political grip on its Grand Duchy and the rise of the workers’ movement, created a Finnish version of the pan-European concern over “our nervous age.” Modern society, with its technological innovations and increasingly hectic pace of life, demanded so much nervous energy that many people appeared to succumb to nervous ailments, such as neurasthenia (literally “weakness of the nerves”), even in the still predominantly agricultural Finland (Pietikainen 2007; Uimonen 1999). In this new day and age, the old idealist school of the Finnish philosopher-psychologists began to seem rather outdated.

Civil Society, Politics, and the Birth of Democracy Finnish psychology in the 19th century had been a theoretical tool for the predominantly nationalist philosophers, who wanted to create a nation of purehearted patriots, a strong-willed but law-abiding folk who would not consider making political trouble. Mainly Swedish-speaking elites regarded the common people as honest and warm-hearted, even if a bit simple-minded and primitive, an assumption that was not exactly in tune with reality. Until the common people were galvanized into political activity at the turn of the century, ordinary Finns embodied the noble national spirit created by the founding fathers of Finnish nationalism, including Snellman. Early mass movements in Finland had been religious revivalist movements, and they were followed by the temperance movement, which was the largest popular movement of the late 19th century. The temperance movement was supported by women, the clergy, and many members of the educated classes, and it was as little politically disruptive as were revivalist movements. But, in 1896, the politicization and organization of workers showed its collective strength for the first time when construction workers went on strike. As a result of “the year of red striking,” employees and employers began to organize themselves into separate organizations. Many bourgeois lawyers defended the rights of workers to organize themselves and go on strikes, pietikainen

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and the turn of the century witnessed not only the organization of workers’ movement, but the flourishing of many different kinds of activities of civil society, the most popular of these being the cooperative movement and the temperance movement. In 1899, the Social-Democratic Party (SDP), the first real political party in Finland, was founded. By 1906, relative to the size of the Finnish population (about 2.7 million), the SDP had become the biggest socialist party in the world. Its members and supporters were mostly tenant farmers and agrarian workers, which made the whole party more agrarian than any other socialist party in Europe. In 1905, a general strike in Russia spread to Finland, and the ordinary citizens went out to the streets to demonstrate their right to organize and speak their minds freely. The following year, 1906, was a milestone in Finnish history as the old four-chamber Diet was replaced by a unicameral Parliament of Finland. In the first parliamentary elections in 1907, the Social-Democrats became by far the biggest party, winning 80 out of 200 seats in the Parliament. The new political system was remarkably modern and egalitarian, as Finland became the first country in the world to implement universal suffrage and eligibility. Finnish women were the third in the world to have the right to vote, but first to gain full eligibility: The world’s first female members of parliament were in Finland (19 women were elected to the Parliament of Finland in 1907). After 1907, traditional privileges, such as possession of an estate or inherited titles, no longer had political significance. The municipal voting system, however, remained inegalitarian (number of votes was tied to amount of tax paid) until 1917. Compared to Western Europe, democratic breakthrough in Finland was remarkably easy and peaceful. Almost in one fell swoop, Finland had turned from an autocratic, estate-based society to a parliamentary democracy struggling to expand its political autonomy as Grand Duchy of the restless and increasingly shaky Russian empire.

The Second Wave (ca. 1917–67): Conflicts, Nation-building and the Development of Psychology as an Independent Discipline The Civil War and Its Aftermath Finland was one of the many small European countries that gained independence in the aftermath of the Great War. In Finland’s case, the more immediate catalyst was the October Revolution in Russia. Only a few weeks after the revolution, the Bolsheviks declared a general right of self-determination, 216

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including the right of complete secession, “for the peoples of Russia.” On the initiative of the nonSocialist Senate, the Finnish parliament declared Finland independent on December 6, 1917. Later in the same month, the Soviet government issued a Decree that recognized Finland’s independence. What followed was not a national jubilee but a short but bloody civil war that lasted from January to April 1918. The reasons for the outbreak of the war are complex, but, roughly speaking, there was so much accumulated frustration, antagonism, and suspicion on both sides of the political spectrum, as well as a power vacuum resulting from the lack of national police and military forces, that, instead of seeking a forum for peaceful negotiations, there was a search for arms. The “Whites” (anti-Socialist bourgeois parties and their supporters) and the “Reds” (revolutionaries, workers, and tenant farmers) organized their military forces, and matters came to a head in early 1918, when the Red Guards declared revolution and took to arms. After 3 months of fighting in different parts of Finland, and especially in the more industrial areas, the Reds, many of whom had no clear political idea of what they were fighting for, were defeated by the Whites, who received crucial military support from Imperial Germany. In addition to many casualties (the majority of Reds died because of ad-hoc executions and in the concentration camps established after the war), Finns on both sides remained bitter and felt betrayed by the other camp (Alapuro, 2006). As could be expected, most academics had sided with the Whites, and after the war there appeared psychological and psychomedical analyses of the conflict (and especially of the Reds) in academic literature. The big question in the Finnish social studies after the war was the problem of irrational forces and their control. The trauma of the war prompted intelligentsia to search for social-psychological causes of war. Intellectuals relied heavily on mass psychology (Le Bon, McDougall) in their explanations, and they interpreted the “irrational” behavior of the masses with the theory of suggestion, a derivative of hypnotism. In his psychological analysis of the civil war, Lars Ringbom asserted that, compared to the Swedes, the Finnish mentality (“soul of the people”), like that of the Russian, is more susceptible to collectivism and morbid mass infections, such as socialism (Ringbom, 1918, pp. 56–57, 88–89). A common bourgeois perception was that the proletarian “masses” were suggestible to psychic infections, that their intelligence and willpower were insufficiently developed, and that they suffered

from mass hysteria or mass psychosis. Thus, the Hegelian-Snellmanian “civilizing project” turned into a national therapeutic project in the 1920s. There was a manifest need for national therapy: The trauma had to be healed, the folk had to be united. The Snellmanian dream of a unified Finnish nation was not realized, but the Winter War against the Soviet Union in 1939–1940 unified the opposing camps, and the wounds of the civil war were gradually healed. From the bourgeois perspective, one segment of the folk, the proletariat, constituted the menace of society. Although the folk as a whole was healthy and wholesome, the proletariat was sick—morally depraved, aggressive, irrational, and irresponsible. The increasingly negative view of the common people was fueled by the spectre of socialism. As Robert Nisbet argued in his The Sociological Tradition (1966), sociology was born as a conservative reaction to industrialization and mass-democracy. But in Finland, early sociological explanations were in fact psychological, or mass-psychological. There was an insufficient understanding of the workers’ burning need to attain economic security, and intellectuals tended to be more interested in gathering ethnographic data than in studying the social conditions of the people. The humanistic emphasis on Innerlichkeit, the inner change of human beings, resulted in the neglect of people’s material needs. Amid all this political and societal turmoil, psychology was at a standstill: Nothing much happened until the early 1930s. In the mid-1920s, Grotenfelt proposed the establishment of two chairs in psychology, and although he did not conduct experimental work himself, he made plans to build a psychological laboratory on the premises of the Lapinlahti Psychiatric Hospital’s laboratory. University faculty accepted Grotenfelt’s proposal, but the faculty’s suggestion fell through in the government’s budgetary proposal for 1928. This was a disappointment to Grotenfelt, but things psychological were nevertheless slowly moving forward. In 1921, a young philosopher, Eino Kaila (1890–1958), was nominated as professor of philosophy at the University of Turku, a private university (it was nationalized later) established right after World War I. In the following year, Kaila founded the first psychological laboratory in an academic setting in Finland. After Kaila (to whom I shall return shortly) became professor of philosophy in Helsinki in 1930, he founded the department of psychology (in 1932) there. Kaila’s department was really a very modest laboratory located in two cellar

rooms at the department of physiology. Meanwhile, Kaila’s successor (J.E. Salomaa) in Turku focused his psychological attention on the development of IQ studies.

Thorn in the Side of Finnish idealists: Lagerborg and His “Psychology of Reaction” Besides Kaila, there was energetic and polemical Rolf Lagerborg (1874–1959), Westermarck’s pupil, who introduced first psychoanalysis (which Westermarck himself criticized) and then behaviorism to Finnish academics. Lagerborg was singular in his advocacy of a kind of behaviorist research program that combined Watson’s S-R psychology with Pavlov’s and Bekhterev’s reflexology, as well as with Pierre Janet’s researches on psychopathology. He had already discussed the idea of creating “a psychology without soul” (i.e., without mind or consciousness) as a young troublemaker in 1905, when, in his book Das Gefühlsproblem, he introduced his “psychology of reaction.” Not unexpectedly, his materialistic and deterministic ideas annoyed the Finnish idealistic as well as more or less religious scholars. Both his application for a position of docentur (adjunct professorship) in 1906, as well as his application for a chair of professor extraordinarius (i.e., professor without chair) in 1931 were rejected on religious, moral, and/or political grounds. In the 1930s, he managed to infuriate the nationalistic right-wing students of the Academic Carelia Society, who demonstrated against Lagerborg as an “enemy of the nation,” for example, by sending a letter of complaint to the president of Finland (which prompted the president to decline to appoint Lagerborg as professor) and disturbing his classes (Aho, 1993a, pp. 144–48). He finally succeeded in attaining a professorship in philosophy at the Swedish-speaking Åbo Akademi University in Turku, in 1932, when his teacher Westermarck retired. In the 1920s, Lagerborg became acquainted with the behaviorist writings of John B. Watson, and his reaction to this new psychological paradigm was positive. Indeed, he became convinced that, in the near future, behaviorism would attain a dominant position within both psychology and philosophy. He discarded finalistic and intentionalistic psychology, labeling it dismissively as von oben (“from above”) psychology, and he included psychoanalysis, Gestalt psychology, and phenomenology in this inferior category. By contrast, von unten (“from below”) psychology included Lagerborg’s favorites, Russian reflexology and behaviorism pietikainen

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(Lagerborg, 1929). He described behaviorism as “a kindred spirit to the doctrine and methods of Bolshevism” in the sense that both behaviorists and Bolshevists “break the barriers passionately and unscrupulously,” but only to “build anew after savage destruction” (Lagerborg, 1927, p. 96). Provocatively, he praised Watson’s straightforward, proletarian directness, which he juxtaposed with the sublime, ornamental (i.e., boring and uninspiring) style of the humaniora (Ibid.). Lagerborg’s reform program, by which he aimed to replace psychoanalysis, Gestalt psychology, and phenomenology with the “exact science of behaviourism,” was not well received in the humanities-oriented Finnish academia, and behaviorism was destined to become a mere by-path in the history of Finnish psychology (Ihanus, 2000, p. 451). The philosophical-idealist orientation remained in a hegemonic position until the 1940s, and Finnishminded humanist-scholars attacked the naturalistic and materialistic intellectual currents in the name of “soul” and “spirit.” Lagerborg was himself a rather elitist humanist-scholar in that he was not engaged in empirical psychological research, which started to gain ground in the interwar years. He also held a rather dim view of the Finnish-speaking “masses,” whom he wanted to control with the help of his “psychology of reaction.” In his memoirs, he calls himself, not too modestly, “the ambassador of Lucifer” (using “Lucifer” as a symbol of the light of reason) (Lagerborg, 1942, pp. 389–90).

Eino Kaila: “The Father of Finnish Psychology” In the interwar years and throughout the 1940s, Finnish psychology was dominated by a single professor: Eino Kaila (1890–1958) (Takala, 1991; on the philosophical foundations of Lagerborg and Kaila, see Jääskeläinen, 1981). Kaila, “the father of Finnish psychology,” was an intellectual dynamo who dazzled people with his quick and analytic mind, vast learning, dramatic form of lecturing, and his aristocratic composure, which made his academic peers look inferior in every possible way. He had a strong theological family background, and his father became archbishop of the Lutheran state church of Finland. At the age of 16, he had a strong “inner experience” (while relaxing on a rowboat in the middle of the lake), which convinced him that his mission in life was to become a philosopher. He studied philosophy at the University of Helsinki and was at first interested in German and French philosophers (especially Henri Bergson, 218

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whose vitalism he later criticized), but by the time he was preparing his dissertation on motivation and decision, he had turned his attention to psychology. In 1916, he attained his doctoral degree and married the granddaughter of Johan Snellman. In addition to philosophy and psychology, he was enthusiastic about theatre and drama, and he wrote numerous reviews of plays and books. For a few years, he even worked as a dramaturgist at the Finnish National Theatre. In 1921, at the age of 31, he was appointed professor of philosophy at the newly founded University of Turku. As already mentioned, Kaila was responsible for the establishment of the first psychological laboratories at Finnish universities, and already in his 1916 dissertation he had dealt with the links between research on experimental motivation and the mechanistic psychology of association. In his early career as a psychologist, he was interested in the study of associations, French researches on psychopathology (especially Pierre Janet’s) and, like Lagerborg, in the biological phenomena of the psyche. In his large monograph on the Structure of the Psyche (Kaila, 1923) he showed some interest in the emerging field of Gestalt psychology, and by the end of the 1920s, he had abandoned psychology of association in favor of an expanded form of Gestalt psychology that would encompass a multilayered psychology of personality. Kaila presented his synthetic ideas on psychology in his classic book Personality (Kaila, 1934). It is probably the most well-known book in the history of Finnish psychology. Its popularity and fame is partly due to Kaila’s legendary reputation as the Finnish intellectual of the first half of the 20th century, but also to the lively and engaging way in which he discussed personality, a topic that was just starting to become fashionable in the international psychological community and that easily lent itself to a more popular exposition. If his 1923 monograph on the structure of the psyche had been exceedingly stuffy, wooden, and tiresome to the reader, his classic book on personality was something different. Kaila’s perspective on the psychology of personality was dynamic and holistic, as he described Gestalt psychological ideas, as well as experiments and theories in association with neurological, physiological, biological, typological, linguistic, psychopathological, psychoanalytical, evolutionary, and developmental and social psychological research. He was equally at ease with Kurt Lewin’s social psychological experiments, Kretschmer’s theory of constitutional types, and endocrinological research

on hormones, as well as with Freud, Darwin, Schopenhauer, and La Rochefoucauld. He also described his and his pupils’ work on graphology, his studies on reactions of infants to the human face (see Kaila, 1932), and psychological studies of twins. As the psychologist Juhani Ihanus has noted, Kaila’s book is the first comprehensive exposition of the psychology of personality in the world, and together with Gordon Allport’s 1937 book Personality, it is the only book of the period that is based on empirical research. In translation, his book influenced psychology in other Nordic countries, but in the rest of Europe it received only meagre attention (Ihanus, 2000, p. 452). This lack of interest in Europe may have been due to the relative obscurity of Finnish psychology, as well as to Kaila’s rather weak personal contacts with European psychologists (he was more active in the European and especially Austro-German philosophical scene). At the end of his book, Kaila turns his attention to something he coined the “life of deep spirituality” or “mental profundity” (syvähenkinen elämä), by which he referred to basic values or fundamental goods of life. These values (sense of wonder, reflective distance from worldly affairs, altruism, generosity, etc.) do not need support from any metaphysical doctrines or “moral world order.” In fact, he rather contemptuously described religions as “mental insurance companies.” The life of deep spirituality á la Kaila is based on biology (not metaphysics), and there is no life beyond empirical reality. This kind of biologically based “deeper life” obviously appealed to a secular and somewhat elitist humanist such as Kaila, to whom “social resentment” was part and parcel of democracy and to whom Goethe, rather than a “degenerated and socially damaged member of the proletariat,” exemplified the species-specific needs of humanity (Kaila, 1934, pp. 220, 352). Later, he dedicated a whole book to such “life of deep spirituality,” which he may have been prompted to write as a consolation to himself and to a nation badly wounded by war and deprivation (Kaila, 1943a). In the 1940s, his attention focused more on philosophical issues, and he wrote, among other things, a large article on quantum theory in the light of logical empiricism (Kaila, 1943b), a philosophical school that he was familiar with through his personal connections with the so-called Vienna Circle (Schlick, Carnap, Neurath, etc.; see Manninen, 2002). In 1948, he was invited to become a member of the newly founded Academy of Finland, and during the last 10 years of his life (1948–1958) he made no contributions to psychology.

As a philosopher, Kaila was keen on conceptualizing the science of behavior and creating more rigorous theoretical models that would have general validity. For example, there was a need to reconceptualize psychodynamic intuitions scientifically by employing exact concepts and empirically verifiable theories (Kaila, 1934). Thus, his intellectual legacy in the field of psychology rests more on his systematic requirement of high epistemological and methodological standards in psychological inquiry than on any particular theoretical or empirical contribution. As noted by the psychologist Martti Takala, “Kaila himself regarded the impact of verbal expression and symbol representations as his unique contribution to the psychology of personality” (Takala, 1991, p. 8). Kaila used his position as a high-powered professor to renew the curriculum of psychology studies at the University of Helsinki. He brought a number of special areas and subdisciplines to the curriculum, including experimental psychology of perception, Gestalt psychology, phenomenology, and psychology of personality, while excluding both behaviorism and psychoanalysis. This fitted well with his scientific orientation, as well as with the general mentality of the Finnish academic community, which considered psychoanalysis and behaviorism to be alien to the Finnish intellectual culture. It was probably the “crass materialism,” superficiality (behaviorism), and morbid preoccupation with basic instincts (psychoanalysis) of these two psychological currents that made them so unpalatable to the Finnish Bildungsbürgertum, which was (still) pursuing a kind of science that would contribute to the “civilizing process” of Finnish society. Behaviorism never really took off in Finnish psychology, and neither did psychoanalysis. In the interwar years, psychoanalysis had one serious but dispassionate supporter, physician Yrjö Kulovesi. He was himself a psychoanalyst who wrote a book and many articles on different aspects of psychoanalysis (Kulovesi, 1933). Later, psychoanalysis had a strong impact on Finnish psychiatry, so much so that, in the 1970s and 1980s, most chairs in psychiatry were occupied by psychoanalytically oriented professors (such as Kalle Achtè, Yrjö Alanen, and Johannes Lehtonen) (on the history of psychoanalysis and psychotherapy in Finland, see Ihanus, 1994, 1997).

First Academic Chair in Psychology In the mid-1930s, the time was ripe for the establishment of the first chair in psychology. It was not pietikainen

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at Helsinki or Turku—the two centers of intellectual culture—where Finnish psychology first found its institutional home, but at Jyväskylä, a small town in the centre of Finland (Takala, 1980). When the Pedagogical College was founded in Jyväskylä, a chair in psychology was established for educational and pedagogic purposes in 1936. The first professor of psychology in Finland was Niilo Mäki (1902–1968), Kaila’s pupil, who at the time of his appointment had not yet attained his doctoral degree. Kaila himself belittled the importance of such a chair in a provincial town and with a practical orientation. Three years later, one of Kaila’s pupils, Arvo Lehtovaara (1905–1985), was appointed professor at Jyväskylä. In his doctoral thesis, Lehtovaara had conducted a psychological study of twins, and he made a lasting contribution to Finnish psychology during his long career, first in Jyväskylä and then, after 1952, in Helsinki, where he was offered the post of professor extraordinarius in psychology. Lehtovaara wrote a textbook, Textbook of Psychology, Based on Empirical Method (1945) that was in use for decades, and the postwar generations of psychology students were introduced to academic psychology through this book. He was instrumental in developing psychology teaching and matriculation tests in high schools (Gymnasium), and he also devised a set of tests to be used in schools (Ihanus, 2000, pp. 454–455). In his posthumously published last book, he addressed evolutionary psychological issues a few years before evolutionary psychology emerged as a new discipline in the United States (Lehtovaara, 1985). Another pupil of Kaila was Kai von Fieandt (1909–2000), whose expertise was in the field of perception (a later edition of his important book on the psychology of perception, The Perceptual World, was published in English 1977; see von Fieandt & Moustgaard, 1977). On the strength of his research in this area, he became the first professor of psychology at the University of Helsinki in 1951, having been in charge of the chair as acting professor for a number of years (von Fieandt, 1979). Small wonder, then, that many of his pupils wrote dissertations on perception. In addition to a handful of academic psychologists, such as Kaila and Niilo Mäki, psychological knowledge in the 1920s and 1930s was disseminated by instructors and lecturers at the teachers’ colleges, and the public school (primary) teachers were rather well-versed in developmental and educational psychology, more so than secondary school teachers who rarely studied psychology at the universities. 220

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Applied psychology was also making inroads into Finnish culture: The Finnish State Railways founded the Psychotechnical Laboratory in 1922, and the first child guidance and vocational counselling centers were established in the bigger towns in the late 1930s (developments in applied psychology will be discussed later in the chapter). Many early students of psychology were theologians (von Fieandt, 1979, p. 15), who, during the interwar years, were becoming acutely aware of the need for renewal and change in the Lutheran State Church. “Modern” Finns expected more than threats of fire and brimstone when they went to sermons or consulted pastors. The Finnish State Church had begun its transformation into a therapeutic institution (on the history of the “psychochurch” in Finland, see Kivivuori, 1996).

The Institutional and Professional Breakthrough of Psychology From the end of the civil war until the end of World War II, Finnish science was tainted by nationalist, conservative, and value-monistic sentiments, exacerbated by developments in National-Socialist Germany, to which many Finnish academics had close collegial links. Eino Kaila supported National Socialism, mainly because he saw it as a bulwark against the threat of the Soviet Union. It was only toward the end of World War II that he turned his back on National Socialism, at least partly because of the persecution of the Jews (Manninen, 2007). Kaila had many kindred spirits in Finnish academia, but, as far as can be determined, there is no indication that other psychologists made National-Socialist statements or openly adhered to the theories or ideas presented by Nazi psychologists. World War II was a huge and violent burden to the Finns, but it was not a total disaster, because Finland, although defeated by the Russians in the so-called Continuation War (1941–1944), managed to remain unoccupied and independent. After the war, there were many war-related problems that the still small group of psychologists had to tackle, including the raising and education of war orphans and the rehabilitation of brain-injured war veterans. Instrumental in the development of rehabilitation was Niilo Mäki (1902–1968), who had been professor of psychology at the Pedagogic College at Jyväskylä between 1936 and 1939, and who had specialized in the study of brain damages already in the late 1920s in Germany (Mäki, 1949). Mäki was probably one of the first neuropsychologists in the world. He worked for many years at

the psychological-pedagogic unit of Finland’s Red Cross Hospital and was widely respected for his advocacy of the treatment and rehabilitation of children and youth. He was the president of the World Federation for Mental Health in the 1950s, as well as the chairman of the Finnish Society for Mental Health in the 1960s (Ihanus, 2000, pp. 460–461). After the war, there were discussions about psychologists’ contributions to psychiatric treatment. Psychologists wanted to enlarge their traditional domain of differential psychology and testing to “real” clinical work. The passing of the law on psychiatric care in 1952 enabled the entrance of clinical psychologists into the area of mental health. This annoyed many physicians, who felt threatened by the rise of the new clinical profession. Lauri Rauhala (b. 1914), a psychologist working at the Nikkilä Mental Hospital as its first in-house psychologist, defended psychologists’ right to examine and treat mental illnesses psychotherapeutically—to occupy a legitimate field in psychopathology in general and in the domain of “functional disorders” in particular (Rauhala, 1954). During the last quarter of the century, Rauhala became known in Finland as the foremost representative of phenomenology. Due to the war, the institutional independence of psychology was delayed, but after a few additional years of hiatus after the war, a new chapter in the history of Finnish psychology was opened. The 1950s witnessed the institutional breakthrough of Finnish psychology and its final separation from philosophy, as well as from the nationalistic-idealist tradition that had dominated psychology since the mid-19th century. Already after the war, “the number of students interested in majoring in psychology came up to hundreds and a special curriculum for that purpose was created by the faculty, although the subject was still called theoretical philosophy” (von Fieandt, 1980, p. 8). A department of psychology at the University of Helsinki was finally founded in 1951, and in the same year, the Helsinki University of Technology established a department of psychology specializing in industrial psychology. Later in the 1950s, departments were founded at the Universities of Tampere (1954) and Turku (1956). In the 1960s, departments of social psychology were founded in Helsinki and Tampere, and the department of psychology in Helsinki was divided into two separate subdisciplines, general and applied psychology. Von Fieandt was the professor in the first discipline, while Arvo Lehtovaara occupied the chair in applied psychology. By the

early 1970s, psychology departments were established also at the Swedish-speaking Åbo Akademi University (in 1962) and at the University of Joensuu in Eastern Finland (in 1973). In a little more than two decades, eight departments were founded, which testified to the increasing academic relevancy of psychological research and education, although a similar expansion happened also in some other disciplines. Psychology was a new discipline that, for a century, had been part of philosophy, and institutionally it remained at the faculty of arts and humanities. Consequently, psychologists—a new breed of Homo academicus in Finland—were looked at with suspicion by some professors in the more established fields within the humanities. A professor of history, Arvi “Perkele” Korhonen, for example, regarded psychology as an “occult science” in the early 1950s, and he caused delays in the publication of psychological dissertations because of his conviction that psychology was not (yet) a worthy and mature-enough science (von Fieandt, 1979, p. 9; Ihanus, 2000, pp. 455–456). An important step in the professionalization of psychology was the founding, in 1950, of the Finnish Psychological Society, which was the successor of the Psychological Society of Students, founded in 1935. Later in the decade, the Finnish Psychological Association was established as a trade organization, and the Society continued as a scientific society. Its major achievement was the founding of an academic psychological journal, Psykologia, in 1966. The first generation of professional psychologists represented a rather liberal and internationalist frame of mind, and they came to play a role in the building of the welfare state, which began in earnest in the 1960s. They were not yet, however, particularly politically active or radical in their views. But, during the two postwar decades, Finland changed dramatically due to very rapid industrialization, urbanization, and increase of affluence. In 1940, more than half of the population had made their living in farming (51%); in 1961, the percentage dropped to 31%, and, in 1980, only 11% of the population were farmers. In the 1980s, industrialization, which had been in full swing in the 1960s and the 1970s, was already declining, while service sector, new technology, and office-based knowledge expertise were becoming increasingly important parts of national production.

Research Directions After the War In postwar Finnish psychology, an ardent interest in North American psychological research came to pietikainen

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the fore. Students had a thirst for new intellectual and scientific nourishment, and they wanted to replace what they regarded as redundant “German speculation” with the empirical and democratic spirit of American science and culture (von Fieandt, 1979, p. 17; Takala, 1979, p. 17). Indeed, American influences began to dominate Finnish psychology, and the new possibility for Finnish academics to spend some time in American universities with the help of Fulbright grants meant a great deal not only to psychology but to the postwar Finnish science as a whole. Already early in the century, William James had been one of the most frequently translated psychological authors, and American psychology (and philosophy) was at least somewhat familiar to many educated Finns. Among other things, the American, multidimensional model of testing and describing interindividual differences became very influential after World War II. The multivariate method in general and the application of factor analysis in particular became all the rage, so much so that one American psychologist complained that “nowhere in Europe or in the U.S. had he had to discuss the problems of multidimensional measurement more intensively than during a couple of days in Finland” (Takala & Korkiakangas, 1981, p. 9). Occupational psychology became an important area of postwar applied psychology (Kirjonen, 1980; on the early history of Finnish work psychology, see Jääskeläinen, 1986). Psychotechnics had been imported from Germany to Finland after World War I, and instrumental in this import was Aksel Rosenquist (later Kurki), who, in 1922, was appointed supervisor and expert at the psychotechnical laboratory of the State Railways. Rosenqvist, who has the honor of being the first professional psychologist in Finland, carried out selection tests for prospective machine-shop apprentices. He popularized international industrial psychology and gave critical comments on Taylor’s “scientific management,” which was introduced to the Finns in 1914, when Taylor’s Principles of Scientific Management was translated into Finnish (Kurki, 1936, pp. 42–57). In 1924, the psychophysiological laboratory of the Finnish Air Force was established for the selection of pilots. During the war, these two laboratories focused mainly on the selection of military personnel, but postwar developments in society created a new demand for applied psychology. The Institute of Occupational Health was established in 1951, and right from the start there was a department of psychology at the institute. Heading the department was Ohto Oksala (1905–1984), 222

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another pupil of Kaila, who was also appointed the first professor of industrial psychology and management at the Helsinki University of Technology in 1952 (Häkkinen, 1980; Jääskeläinen, 1986). Thus, there began a close cooperation between occupational psychology and industrial, more technologyoriented psychology in postwar Finland. By the early 1960s, the department of psychology at the Institute of Occupational Health was, according to some estimates, “one of the largest institutes in the world specializing in occupational psychology” (including work on traffic research, shift work, psychotoxic effects of chemicals, and occupational mental health problems) (Kirjonen, 1980, p. 26). There was now an academic supply to the demand of industry and commerce to develop psychological methods of management and leadership, and an increasing number of psychologists were recruited by major companies and industries. This shaped Finnish postwar psychology, and it may also have helped create a more humane and democratic understanding of leadership, which was shaped by the rather authoritarian, “officer and gentleman”–type of management. Psychologists began to specialize in therapy and clinical work, and a therapeutic approach to different aspects of human life became more pronounced. The development of welfare programs facilitated this development, creating a new kind of societal demand for psychological services.

The Third Wave (1968–Present): The Birth of “Modern” Finland and the Expansion of Psychology Structural Change and the Expansion of Psychology Even more than other Nordic societies, Finnish society experienced fundamental changes in the 1960s, when the vestiges of the traditional, rather value-conservative and monocultural society gave way to a more liberal, forward-looking, and egalitarian welfare society. In the 1960s, large numbers of children of the postwar generation entered universities and the labor market, and the “modern” mentality that called for political, social, and cultural regeneration moulded the life and work of young academics. They wanted to turn away from what they saw as the obsolete lifestyles and values of their parents, who had first experienced war and then, after the war, concentrated on rebuilding society and their own lives, often from scratch. For the “generation of the 1960s,” doors to higher learning were flung open wide: there were more and more

universities, polytechnical colleges, and other institutes of secondary education in the country. Moreover, education was free, which gave unheardof educational opportunities to the children of workers and small farmers. Easy access to higher education facilitated further democratization of society and an upward social mobility for the common people, as well as for women, who were even hungrier than men for higher learning. Radical structural change also brought with it unemployment, internal migration from countryside to towns, and immigration to the still much more affluent Sweden, where there was a chronic shortage in the manual labor force (in the 1960s, about 300,000 Finns moved to Sweden, mostly to work in industry). In many ways, the latter half of the 1960s experienced the birth of the truly modern Finland. In the midst of this “birth,” in 1967, the Minister of Finance, Mauno Koivisto, delivered a speech at the 10-year anniversary of the Finnish Society of Psychology. Koivisto, who became Finland’s ninth president in 1981, had sociological training, and he had also studied psychology at the University of Turku. In his speech, Koivisto observed that “in one sense,” psychology had become rather popular— in fact, it was the “amateur psychological” concern with “how to become popular” that had become popular. He wondered whether this sort of popular psychology threatens the status of “scientific psychology,” the existence of which is predicated on its ability to give relevant answers to the questions related to the life situations of citizens in the continuously developing and complex Finnish society (Koivisto, 1967, p. 4). Koivisto was at that time in charge of the nation’s economy, so he fulfilled his political role by assigning psychologists the task of assisting national economists by probing the dynamics of human motivation. But this is only one of the societal challenges psychologists needed to address. Their expertise was also required in the fields of education, mental health, traffic planning, corporate management, and work democracy. Koivisto concluded, so far, psychologists are known to us as explorers and researchers of an individual and his or her abilities. Now they are becoming individual consultants and therapists. But the increasingly important question is, whether psychologists have also a role to play in the planning of society. (Koivisto, 1967, p. 8)

When Koivisto uttered these words, psychology and especially sociology had become fashionable

academic disciplines that appeared to have their fingers on the very pulse of society. Toward the end of the 1960s, the younger generation of psychologists answered Koivisto’s question in the affirmative: Yes, we want to contribute to the planning of a more just, humane, and democratic society. In Finland, the professional expansion of psychology coincided with the emergence of a radical sociopolitical consciousness. The 1960s also witnessed the professional expansion of psychology. Between 1957 and 1967, the number of psychologists tripled, and in 1967, there were 0.8 psychologists for every 10,000 inhabitants. The same increase occurred again during the next 10 years, and in the late 1970s, there were three psychologists for every 10,000 inhabitants (Nupponen, 1980, p. 14). During the following two decades, the number of psychologists doubled, and in 2000, there were three psychologists for every 5,000 inhabitants. These figures also meant that the variety of psychological expertise had greatly increased since the 1950s. By the end of the century, Finland had become one of the most “psychologist-dense” countries in the world (Ihanus, 2000, p. 465) (See Table 11.1). The overall increase of psychologists during these 22 years is significant, and the upward trend was particularly strong in the field of clinical psychology: compared to 1957, in 1979 there were almost 30 times more clinical psychologists. Clinical psychology alone comprised 42% of all fields of Table 11.1 The division of psychologists in 1957 and 1979, based on the membership statistics of the Finnish Psychological Association Divisions

N in 1957

N in 1979

1. Vocational guidance

22

222

2. Child and adolescent guidance

34

272

3. Primary and secondary-level education (1973)

—

60

4. Clinical psychology

22

624

5. Public health (1975)

—

167

6. Psychology of work

22

56

7. Teaching and research

11

74

In total

111

1475

Adapted from Nupponen, R. (1980). Professional psychology in Finland. Acta Psychologica Fennica, 7, 9–21, with permission.

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professional psychology. This phenomenon was largely due to the emphasis on prevention and psychiatric outpatient care, which led to a dramatic increase in mental health personnel in the early 1970s, thus creating new working opportunities for psychologists.

“Dialectics of the Psyche”: When Psychology Became Political In the late 1960s, Marxism entered Finnish academia for the first time in full force. Together with sociologists, the young generation of psychologists were at the forefront of leftist academic radicalism. The academic journal Psykologia changed its editorial board in the early 1970s and gave the journal the subtitle “science-political journal.” Psychology became “critical.” The crucial questions being asked now were such as “how to develop Finnish democracy and equality” and “how to advance people’s well-being and consciousness.” Young psychologists assessed their work from the broad sociopolitical perspective, which obviously had effects on the ways in which they defined themselves and their roles as professional “caretakers” and experts in the science of the soul. The traditionally strong Hegelian orientation in Finnish intellectual culture, now rejuvenated in the form of Marxism, came to the forefront again in the guise of ideas and programs of individual psychologists, associations, and departments. The department of psychology at the eastern University of Joensuu, for example, was theoretically focused on the “dialectics of the psyche” (Häyrynen, 1980, p. 128), while, on a practical level, the department established contacts with Soviet psychology in the early 1970s. Indeed, during the 1970s, Finnish psychologists cooperated not only with Soviet psychologists, but also with psychologists from other socialist countries, especially the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and Poland. For example, an agreement between the Finnish Psychological Society and the Psychological Society of the GDR was signed in 1979 (Psykologia, 3/1979, p. 57). Academic psychologists in Finland did not express concern, at least not in print, about the lack of fundamental human rights in these authoritarian one-party countries. An older generation of Kaila’s pupils had occupied chairs in postwar psychology, but this tradition came to an end in the 1970s, at a time when what can loosely be called cognitive psychology made inroads into Finnish psychology. Von Fieandt’s successor in Helsinki was Risto Näätänen (b. 1939), whose researches on attention and performance 224

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raised the level of scientific psychology in Finland. Traditionally, philosophical and, later, social-scientific orientations had characterized much of Finnish psychology, whereas a natural-scientific orientation had been more marginal. This prompted the young psychologist Veijo Virsu (b. 1941) to write an article on the sorry state of Finnish psychology to the leading daily newspaper (Helsingin Sanomat) in 1972. Virsu, who had conducted postdoctoral research on visual perception in the United States and England (Cambridge), observed that Finnish psychology was strongly socially oriented, whereas natural-scientific tradition was all but nonexistent. He attributed this orientation to psychology’s humanistic legacy, which explained why psychology did not exist at all in the departments of natural sciences. This led to a worrying situation in which psychology students lacked interest in natural-scientific research, and such a tendency was unfortunately exacerbated by the fact that teachers of religion in Finnish schools also teach psychology. As a result, natural-scientific thinking remained alien, even frightening, to Finnish psychologists, many of whom opposed attempts to expand the curriculum of psychology studies to the naturalscientific direction. But, in the future, wrote Virsu, social problems would not be solved without interdisciplinary cooperation between psychologists, zoologists, biochemists, geneticists, pharmacists, anatomists, and physiologists. Such developments have already gained momentum in Anglo-Saxon psychology, which Virsu compared favorably to what he portrayed as a rather unscientific Finnish psychology (Virsu, 1972). Virsu himself represented psychobiology, which in the early 1970s was indeed a very marginal field in Finnish psychology. But, by the end of the decade, the tide was turning and the more natural-scientific orientation broke through, especially in the form of neuropsychology. In 1980, Virsu was appointed professor extraordinarius in neuropsychology, and he continued his researches on visual perception and performance. But the humanistic and socialscientific orientations in psychology did not fade away, as can be seen in the rather negative reactions to the application of evolutionary theory to psychology in the 1990s.

Developments in the Late 20th Century The heyday of socialist fervor in academia was over by the end of the 1970s. And, even during this decade of ideology-driven science policy and dogmatic demarcation of party lines, psychological

research was not suffocated. Some notable psychologists in Helsinki conducted traffic safety research, while others focused on cognitive performance and the neural basis of sensations. Outside of Helsinki, significant research on aggression was conducted in Turku by Kirsti Lagerspetz (1932–2001), whose innovative longitudinal experiments with Swiss albino mice started in 1959 and resulted in substantial contributions to the study of aggression in the following decades, earning her international recognition rarely given to Finnish psychologists (on Lagerspetz’s studies, see e.g., Lagerspetz, 1961, 1969; Lagerspetz & Björkqvist, 1994). Developmental and educational psychology found an institutional home at the University of Jyväskylä, where first Martti Takala and then Lea Pulkkinen conducted longitudinal research on family dynamics and childhood development. In Helsinki, Risto Näätänen and members of his research group studied auditory information processing. In 1975, they discovered the so-called mismatch negativity (MMN), which refers to the measure of sensory processing in audition. The MMN can be recorded in response to any discriminable change in the stimulus stream (Näätänen, 1992; Näätänen & Alho, 1995). The research unit led by him—the Cognitive Brain Research Unit—was, in the 1990s, nominated one of the first national centers of excellence (funded by the Academy of Finland), and in 1997, Näätänen himself received the first national science reward—with good reason, since he is one of the most cited scientists in Finnish history. Another notable psychologist, Liisa Keltikangas-Järvinen, has, since the early 1980s, conducted research in the fields of psychosomatics and health psychology, and together with her colleagues, she is still contributing to studies on the psychological factors related to cardiovascular diseases, stress, and other physiological aspects of personality and health (Ylipaavalniemi et al., 2005). When psychological research was evaluated in the mid-1980s, it was concluded that Finnish research has contributed to international psychology especially in the areas of cognitive processes, aggression, neuropsychology, and psychophysiology (Suomen psykologisen tutkimuksen kehitys, 1985). Today, Finnish psychological research is characterized by pluralism and international (especially Anglo-American) orientation. There are several psychology departments with a wide variety of research orientations and programs, and distance from the once-dear humanistic tradition has increased. As well, social-scientific orientation, which had an almost

hegemonic position in the 1970s, is rather marginal in today’s psychology. Neuropsychology has a strong standing, but there is also room for such fields as occupational psychology, clinical psychology, and developmental psychology, which have been advanced since the 1950s. At the same time, psychology has become an increasingly female profession, and psychologists have become culturally visible as caretakers and guardians of the psyche, and as behavior experts who are in demand, especially in times of crises (such as during the Asian tsunami of 2004, which killed many Finnish tourists in Thailand). Psychologists as “secular priests” have also disseminated and supported psychocultural practices, including psychotherapy and consultation; cultivation of the language of psychological self-understanding, vulnerability, and trauma; and often media-friendly but facile interpretations of political and sociocultural phenomena (Hamilo, 2007; Kivivuori, 1996). Whereas ideology-driven psychologists of the 1970s almost forgot the existence of individual minds in their search for macro-level causes of behavior and consciousness, nowadays psychologists resemble emancipators of individual “potentialities,” as well as adjusters of individual psyches. It is not that Finnish psychologists disregard the sociopolitical reality; it is rather that, in the age of globalization, ideological standstill, and commercialization of the “psy-sciences,” psychologists have been socialized into focusing on the political institution called the individual, at the expense of collectives, structures, and belief systems (on the sociocultural role of the psy-sciences, see Rose, 1998, 1999). Every age has its own type of scientific culture, and psychological science in the early 21st-century Finland is almost antithetical to the science of the early 20th-century Finland: instead of nationalism, Idealism, and education of the people (Bildung), Finnish psychology now appears to be dedicated to internationalism, philosophical materialism, and empowerment of the individual.

Conclusion In this chapter, I focused on three historical waves that link Finnish psychology to political and sociocultural developments and contexts. The first wave comprises the period from the mid-19th century to 1917–1918. During this period, psychology was a part of philosophy, and philosophers were not engaged in experimental research. Instead, philosopher-psychologists in general and Finnish-minded nationalists in particular were inspired first by pietikainen

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Hegelian tradition and then by the more diffuse forms of idealist philosophy. The second wave of Finnish psychology started after Finland had gained independence from Russia in 1917, and the nation had experienced a civil war in 1918. In the 1920s and the 1930s, dichotomy between the workers (including small farmers) and the bourgeoisie (including wealthier farmers) colored much of political life in the young republic. In a half century, starting from the 1920s, psychologists slowly carved a professional niche for themselves as experts in the fields of mental testing, psychophysics, working life, child development, pedagogy and, finally, clinical work. Until the 1960s, the number of professional psychologists remained small, and academic psychological research was concentrated in a few university departments and carried out by only a handful of people. The most eminent individual in Finnish academic psychology was Eino Kaila. For Finnish psychology, his lifetime contributions remain unequalled. During Kaila’s professorship, from 1921 to 1948, modern experimental psychology was established within the Finnish academia. The third period of Finnish psychology took place after World War II. After the war, psychology in Finland gained its independence as a separate academic discipline. In the postwar period, psychology became a profession, and the new psychologists turned from Finland’s traditional German ties to the influence of American psychology. By the end of the 1960s, psychology had become a wellestablished, even fashionable academic discipline. Together with sociology, psychology seemed to be in a position to give relevant, up-to-date knowledge about human beings in a rapidly changing Finnish society. Today, psychology departments in Finland attract more students than at any other time in history. During the late 1960s and through the 1970s, Finnish universities were arenas of ideological and science-political assertions. Marxist psychology and Marxist-Leninist politics had a strong influence on psychology. Then, toward the end of the 20th century, the predominant ideologies changed, and Finnish psychology has now became pluralistic, international, and individualistic. Today, Finnish psychology contributes to international research, but the history of its development should be considered within the context of Finland’s birth as a nation.

Note 1. All translations from Finnish to English are the author’s.

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C HA P TE R

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France

Françoise Parot

Abstract This chapter describes the process by which, since World War II, psychology has been created as a discipline in France. The Republican system, within which the project of developing a scientific understanding of the individual was first laid down, was limited by the political desire to preserve liberty of conscience, the founding-stone of the Republic. Psychology, seen as a crisis of thought, was torn between the various requirements that faced each other down during episodes such as the fashion for Spencerism or the debate over hysteria. The overwhelming influence within the academic institutions of the physiologist Henri Piéron eventually gave rise to the discipline of psychology, once the practice of psychotherapy was accepted, which in turn was partly a consequence of the influence of psychoanalysis. Keywords: Discipline, Republic, consciousness, positivism, spiritualism, hysteria, reductionism, interiority, psychology

The appearance of the history of science in the 20th century has posed historians with the unavoidable question of where to begin? And, equally, of what exactly are we writing the history? One approach is to construct a history of the conceptions of a particular subject, of the various religious, philosophical, and scientific views of the field, and place the study in the longue durée of the history of ideas. Another is to describe the history of a discipline, of the institutions it developed, and the reviews and congresses that shaped its birth and development, or to describe the diversification of an ordered body of intellectual practices that are constrained by rules and methods, and above all, which are taught. Nowadays, the term “discipline” can be defined in many ways1—these are generally more vague and shifting in the humanities than in the natural sciences. To make the argument presented here clearer, “discipline” will primarily be used in terms of a long-term, taught knowledge, 228

which is the subject of an intellectual practice on a stable object of knowledge and which has identifiable frontiers. Histories of psychology in France, and in most Western countries, generally begin in the 19th century, with some variations here and there, and even some brief incursions into the 18th century. These kinds of histories can be anachronistic, for example when they confuse a scientific and an experimental approach.2 They also tend to be as much focused on constructing psychology as a discipline as on describing the history of that construction. Thanks to a great deal of work over the last half-century, the story of “the history of psychology” already exists,3 with, of course, some variations. However, the learned and well-documented chronologies that appear in such studies can obscure important conceptual problematics that have repeatedly appeared in discourses on psychology, creating key moments that are often described as “crises.”4

I will adopt a different approach and will consider psychology itself as a crisis in French thought. My argument can be summed up as follows. In the second half of the 19th century, the development of industrialized society led to the need to form a body of positive and useful knowledge about the individual, which would be both coherent with the individual’s new status—that of a natural being—and with the individual’s growing role as a social actor, a citizen, in a highly differentiated world. A fundamental problem flows from this dual identity of the individual, for we are both natural and social. This problem became even greater when scientific investigations of the nervous system revealed that this two-sided individual was subdivided even further. We are more self-conscious than any other animal, but we also contain a series of nonconscious brain processes, just like other animals. These processes are largely structured by language and are therefore symbolic. It gradually became apparent that this part of ourselves, which we do not control, determines our individuality. The epistemological approach that framed the investigations described below was affected by the difficulties that flow from these two factors. First, a combination of a healthy aspiration to “laïcité” (the French Republican opposition to the influence of religion in public affairs) and the use of positive knowledge led to the rejection of all forms of transcendence and to the desire to establish the causal laws that determine human behavior. Second, there was a contradictory resolve to preserve the free will that is the source of the Republic, not to replace religious determinism by a materialist determinism, but to preserve the realm of ideas and axioms that guide action, by learning from the lessons of history. Psychology therefore structured itself around the project of “naturalizing” the individual, that is to say—of explaining the individual using the laws of the natural sciences, while preserving a fundamental role for unconscious and symbolic functioning, and for free will, even though none of these factors could be fully explained by natural causality. (those who were engaged in this project will be described here as the “naturalizers.”) French psychologists continued to maintain their views about the dual essence of humanity, they remained dualist, and their institutions were continually split and torn (and remain so today). In the final quarter of the 20th century, however, French psychology began to abandon its specificities, and eventually, but not without difficulty, fell into line with American psychology.

By viewing French psychology as a continual, unresolved crisis, as the fruit of a perpetual resistance to naturalization, it becomes clear that the mere accumulation of empirical data, produced by observation and experimentation, was not enough to make psychology either a science or even a discipline. Another current appeared in France, always in opposition, which emphasized the importance of experience5 and of internal human life, of the reasons why we act as we do, and of the social and historical context of human behaviors that provide them with their meaning. This oppositional current stated that, to understand human behavior or thought, it has to be interpreted. In France, this current enjoyed the unfailing support of psychoanalysis, which remains a bulwark against naturalism. This chapter begins by describing the French intellectual and political framework through which the desire to create a psychology that would become “scientific” was expressed. This psychology retained its specifically human focus, and struggled to explain humanity’s social being using the categories of scientific causality; as a result, the field was in a permanent state of crisis. I will then analyze the stages in the tension between positivist psychology and an interpretative psychology, making clear the theoretical arguments that were involved and the consequent institutional responses. Finally, I will describe how, after World War II, psychology became a discipline, based on a formal division between experimental and clinical psychology, accompanied by a chorus of calls for unity. Since World War II, “psychology” has existed as a discipline, but the key questions that were first posed in the 19th century remain. For example: What controls the functioning of the mind? Are abilities, faculties, dispositions, and so on, characteristics of the matter that makes up the nervous system, or of the social existence of the individual? What are the symbolic procedures that structure unconscious processes? What proportion of normal and pathological behaviors is genetically determined? The large number of questions that still do not have final answers raises the issue of whether the discipline that studies these questions is in fact a science. As a result, for many philosophers and scientists in France, psychology is still placed together with philosophy.

The Matrix of the Crisis At the end of the 18th century, the Encyclopedia published by Diderot and d’Alembert stated that Nature is situated in time and that natural changes parot

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can be seen as being progressive. Both Turgot and Condorcet added that the human mind, like Nature (indeed, they virtually saw the mind as a product of Nature), also progresses. The ambition of trying to understand the world in its movement, to understand the laws that explain its progress, was intimately linked with the ambition of studying facts. In 1820, this interest in the “positive” (which preceded positivism) was expressed by both Comte and Lamarck; together with the demystification of Nature, it formed the basis of the naturalization of human being. Neither philosophy, nor metaphysics, nor theology produce facts about Nature; in observing Nature without these old ways of seeing, we find humanity. This idea applied to the whole of creation: Natural history, which up until then had been essentially classificatory, became biology, a science of living things. As the century progressed, these living things, which seemed to be outside the mechanical conceptions that dominated, became increasingly understood in their nonmechanical nature, as the same time as the naturalization of the human being proceeded apace. Retrospectively, it appears that all the 19th-century thinkers focused their efforts on this endeavor: make humans animal, make our bodies the inheritor of a long series of species, and do the same for our minds and our behaviors. All this had to be explained in naturalistic terms. This approach should not be understood as an attempt to find humanity’s “true” nature by stripping us of the outer garments added by society. Rather, it expressed the desire to build a natural being on the basis of an object that had hitherto remained outside the grasp of the science of Nature. This project played a major role in provoking the crisis described below.

Can There Be a Republican Science of the Human as Citizen? In the 19th century, French men were promoted to the status of citizens of a Republic that was continually in the process of being born, and which virtually took on an eschatological value—(the construction of the Republic was never complete). The early history of the Republic was marked by political and social convulsions, as it gradually came into being, turning into a system that one day would guarantee equality of rights and freedom of conscience for all, and would organize work and politics democratically. This system had an important specificity: It incorporated an imprescriptible norm:—“humans” and “citizens” were synonymous. 230

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This fundamental identity took no account of what differentiates humans from each other—(our class membership, for example)—and therefore tended to blur social relations and to encourage individualism. Durkheim (1898a) described this system as a religion of the individual, but immediately added that its individualism did not flow from egotistical individual desires, but was instead a social institution, of which the individual was not the cause but the result. The Republic views the citizen as an individual with natural rights, which flow from his or her existence, and therefore predate legislation. The role of legislation is to get as close as possible to these rights. On the basis of the dual identity that can be found at the heart of French thought, the “Ideologists”6 stated that society is the natural state of the human being, and that liberty is an attribute of individual will which makes each individual the master of his own destiny, free of the old dogmas. What was needed, they argued, was a science that rooted law in natural rights, a science that could investigate and explain this source of behavior and thought. Further, individual interiority had to be constructed as a source of action, that is to say, as a fiction or myth, like the Republic or national identity.7 French Republicans considered positivism to be “the greatest philosophy of the century”; there was, however, a profound contradiction between Auguste Comte’s (1798–1857) philosophy and Republican idealism. Comte’s ideas were absolutely opposed to Republican idealism; indeed, he argued that the sovereignty of the people or of a parliament, were dogmas with metaphysical origins. Nevertheless, the preconditions for a true Republican government are progress and order, and Comte theorized these ideas.8 In Discours sur l’esprit positif (1844), Comte presented progress as a development of order, as its goal. This entirely corresponded with Republican aspirations. The Republic had to be constructed on the basis of a method, just as the universe was constructed: “The Great Builder constructed the universe on the basis of laws that natural history is able to discover through the experimental method; this enables humans to ‘lay’ the world, on the basis of our unique understanding of order and efficiency, just as a mason ‘lays’ bricks.”9 To be positive is to lay science on a base of the precise observation of the real. In turn, this has consequences for the criteria of positivity. Comte was the supervisor of this process; he generalized this methodological enterprise to the entire edifice of knowledge.

In the 45th lesson of his Course on Positive Philosophy, Comte stated that psychology had no place in his system of sciences. He argued that the psychology of his time, be it that of Condillac or that of Pierre Maine de Biran (1766–1824), could not be a positive science, and that there was no space between physiology and sociology. For Comte, sociology was the science that governs the positivist edifice, because it allows “the regeneration of the social body.” For Comte, a positive theory of “affective and intellectual functions”—(the only positive system for studying the individual)—had to be both experimental and rational, focusing on the phenomena that Franz Joseph Gall (1758–1828) had studied and which emanated from the activity of the “cerebral ganglions.” Comte argued that such a physiological investigation would link the “moral” to the physical. Comte went on to define what psychology ought to be: It should be part of physiology, it should deal with mental illnesses, with children and with “savages,” and it should abandon introspection because it was a methodological solipsism. It should therefore also abandon the search for causes, be they first or final. Unlike theological conceptions of humanity, or those of the empiricists such as Condillac, or of the Ideologists, such a science should seek to establish only causal laws between observable and measurable phenomena. In his first Course, Comte argued that the search for causes should be renounced because causes are part of metaphysics; the mind, therefore, is not a fact. As a result, introspective psychology was placed outside the realm of positive science, together with all conceptions of human nature that might consider behaviors or thoughts to have been “generated” by the mind. When Comte stated “how vain is any research into what are called Causes, whether first or final,” he was arguing that all the sciences should be strictly objective, stripped of all imagination. At the same time, he rendered invalid any purely and truly psychological explanation of behaviors in terms of their internal sources. Comte’s ideas reveal that psychology simply could not be a science in 19th-century France, where the citizen was viewed as his own subject, the source of natural rights that should guide legislation. No science could explain the relation of the subject to himself in terms of the cause of his own acts.10 All that was required was physiology, which explains the functions of the human brain.11 The crisis of ideas that constituted psychology was therefore centered on the links among politics, philosophy, and science. French psychology was formed out of this

dilemma, as it was both attracted and repulsed by the reductionist tide that resulted in the fact that, today, only the brain is its true object of study.

What Do We Know About “Intellectual and Moral” Physiological Functions? pathological functioning The study of pathologies should help us understand normal functions; when Comte stated that physiology should study “intellectual and moral” functions, he was using the expression of the physician Philippe Pinel (1745–1826) who, in an emblematic episode in the history of French psychiatry that occurred in 1795, freed the patients in the Salpêtrière hospital from their chains. Pinel, who was an Ideologist, medicalized the lunatic hospital, made it a place of treatment rather than of help, and in so doing founded “alienism.” Pinel sought to identify the mental functions that were lesioned in each type of madness, which he considered as an effect of a potentially isolated element on the normal functioning of the whole. Madness was seen to have the same effect on the mind as Condillac’s analytical procedure: It revealed the elementary normal functions and their interrelations. The correlate of this analytical affirmation is the fact that no patient is completely mad, because no brain is completely lesioned. This also defined the norm by reference to the pathological state,12 an approach that remains a fundamental trait of the French conception of mental illness. Because no one is totally mad, it was felt that the alienist should study that part of the mind that is still open to reason and dialogue: a “moral treatment” which takes into account the patient’s past and the origins of the madness. Speaking and mere reasoning could help the patient and perhaps lead to a cure. This “treatment,” which placed the patient in the milieu that preceded his sickness (family, society), turned out to be difficult to put into practice in the hospital, for it required the physician to be readily available. Nevertheless, for more than a century, it remained the key way for the therapist to treat the mentally ill patient.13

not all functions are conscious At around the same time, those mentally ill people who did not end up in a hospital either because they were part of “good society” or because their illness was thought to be purely nervous (“neuroses”) often received a magnetic treatment. This was based on the idea of the Viennese physician Franz Anton Mesmer (1734–1815), who arrived in Paris in 1778 parot

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and argued that magnetism flowed through the whole of the body. The ladies of Paris flocked to Mesmer, to undergo the miraculous experience of the metal rods (protruding from a large wooden tub full of iron filings), which he thrust toward the patient until they nearly touched her body. The Académie Royale, however, refused to accept that the metal had any “real” effect and argued that the apparent effects of the treatment were entirely due to the patient’s imagination.14 Nevertheless, Mesmerism spread, giving rise to cures by “magnetic sleep” (in 1843, James Braid termed these procedures “hypnotism”), during which the magnetized women (or “magnetized somnambulists”) recovered lost and hidden memories while they were no longer “conscious.” The very real recovery shown by these women, like the “prescriptions” they developed for themselves and soon for other patients, proved what was described at the time as their clairvoyance.15 These practices made a great impression and led physiologists to turn to the key question of consciousness, and subsequently of free will. If no one is completely mad, and if, as a result, precise mental pathology can be detected only by specialists, it suggests that there are phenomena in human life—(and particularly of consciousness)— that are difficult to perceive because they are not truly, or at all, conscious. The magnetized somnambulists apparently had access to such latent states. Nineteenth-century medicine and nervous physiology, as developed through the work of Thomas Laycock (1812–1876),16 James Braid (1795–1860), and William B. Carpenter (1813–1885; he coined the term “unconscious cerebration” in 1842), were both built on these observations, and on the appearance of a unified science of the nervous system at the beginning of the century. Throughout the nervous system, and in all organisms that possess such a structure, the same law of reflex action was thought to control reactions to external factors. The identity of structure (the brain is merely the prolongation of the spinal cord) indicated there must be an identity of function, went the argument. These views led to mental pathologies being considered as illnesses of the nervous system. But the existence of illnesses that apparently had no lesions posed a major problem for anatomists. Psychiatrists, such as the German Wilhelm Griesinger (1817–1868), a pupil of Magendie (1783–1855), tried to explain these effects in terms of the overall functioning of the nervous system; this removed the requirement of discovering the underlying lesions and suggested the problem lay in more diffuse 232

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dysfunctions. In 1865, Griesinger published his Traité des maladies mentales, in which he presented madness as an alteration of the repression of unconscious reflex activity.17 For Griesinger, the ego— (the rational control of the self )—could be defined only functionally, as the ability to assimilate and reject representations, an ability that madness could undermine in various ways. These ideas about pathology and normal mental life led not only to the widespread acceptance that there were lesion-less pathological malfunctions (neuroses), but also to the suggestion that the conscious mind is not the master in its own house. These hypotheses became facts through the work of John Hughlings Jackson (1835–1911), a pupil of Laycock, who was the only one of this group to exert a powerful influence on French psychology. The dominant figure in French psychology at the time, Théodule Ribot (1839–1916), took Jackson’s ideas and applied them to his studies of the pathology of intellectual and emotional functions.

The Crisis of Conscience Under the Republic: The False Birth of Psychology In the middle of the 19th century, a profound crisis affected France. In the country of free-thinkers, the defenders of freedom of conscience led an anticlerical struggle that split France in two, and in which they also sought to distance themselves from metaphysics. This current was not a political party, but united people from across the political spectrum. The foundation of the Third Republic, at the end of the 1870s and the beginning of the 1880s, indicated that a new era had arrived and the “forces of progress” were gaining strength, resulting in the growth of laïcité and the promotion of science against state-sponsored spiritualism. This political confrontation coincided with a philosophical conflict that saw the end of metaphysics, and the realization that it was possible to develop a naturalized discourse about the mind and consciousness. This philosophical conflict caused a crisis that took the form of psychology.

The Fashion for Spencerism and a Fundamental Ambiguity The works of Comte, and in particular his Cours, were translated into English in 1853. The Cours suggested that progress had an end, and this antievolutionist position almost had more success in Britain than in France.18 Comte’s ideas made him a direct competitor of Herbert Spencer (1830–1903),

who had been converted to evolutionary thought19 by reading the studies of Charles Lyell (1797–1875), and whose ideas were at the heart of the French “crisis.” Inspired by work on embryology, according to which a homogenous origin always led to increasing heterogeneity, the essence of Spencer’s approach was to apply a general law of evolution to all fields of knowledge. At the beginning of the 1860s, French readers discovered the work of Spencer; at the same time, Clémence Royer’s translation of Darwin’s The Origin of Species appeared, and Claude Bernard (1813–1878) published his Introduction to Experimental Medicine (Bernard, 1865), in which he stated that the only method he considered to be valid— the experimental method)—“is that of the free thinker, because it is concerned only with the search for scientific truth” (p. 69). At the time French universities were in a state of unrest,20 Ernest Renan’s (1823–1892) course on religion at the Collège de France (“the Collège”) was suspended, while Hippolyte Taine (1828–1893) was persecuted by Victory Cousin (1792–1867), the spiritualist philosopher who reigned over the Sorbonne.21 Shortly afterward, the Ecole Normale Supérieure (“Normale Sup”) saw a rebellion by students, including Théodule Ribot. The opposing camps became increasingly radicalized and gradually took on clear identities: On the one hand, various kind of positivists, such as Emile Littré (1801–1881) or Taine, and on the other spiritualists such as Jules Lachelier (1832–1918) or Paul Janet (1823–1899). Lachelier and Janet were Catholics and also metaphysicians who held chairs at Normale Sup, the Sorbonne, and the Collège, and also had a major influence on academic life through their position on key examination boards (jurys d’agrégation). It was as though Spencer’s texts fell into a battlefield, but the very people who swore by his views for around a dozen years, claiming him for their camp, ended up rejecting him because he seemed to play into the hands of the enemy. Inevitably, opinions hardened, a sect-like mentality spread22: positivists became “scientists,” while the spiritualists became “clericals.” Among the “clericals,” some saw Spencer as one of their own and supported his evolutionist idea as a form of metaphysics because it made a single law the unprovable cause of all things and because it dealt with metaphysical questions about the origins of things and the nature of thought. For these thinkers, Spencer “respiritualized” evolutionism. But the anticlerical “scientists” emphasized one particularly important implication of this debate,

which was of decisive importance for the scientific outlook. All phenomena are determined, went the argument; the scientific method will make it possible to understand the causes of everything; but if everything in nature, including human actions, can be explained mechanically, what becomes of liberty? By implication, psychology was torn apart. By arguing that the world is governed by a natural law, Spencer’s psychology seemed to be a weapon of choice in the struggle against clericalism. The free thinkers took advantage of the fashion for Spencerism to advance their positions within the academic world. When the Third Republic was founded, Louis Liard (1846–1917), who had become the Director of Higher Education, appointed Ribot as a professor at the Sorbonne, a spiritualist stronghold, sending shock waves through the Parisian university milieu. Ribot was soon made chair of experimental and comparative psychology at the Collège de France. With the help of the publisher Félix Alcan, with whom he had been at the Normale Sup, Ribot became editor of the influential Revue Philosophique. In 1868, Victor Duruy (1811–1894) founded the Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes (EPHE) to compete with Germany. In 1889, the EPHE set up a laboratory of physiological psychology in the Sorbonne, with Henri Beaunis (1830– 1921), a physiologist from Nancy, at its head.23 This laboratory was part of the “natural sciences” section of the EPHE. However, the alliance with Spencer’s ideas soon collapsed, revealed as a marriage of convenience. In the 1880s, France experienced an economic recession during which state intervention became increasingly important. In 1850, Spencer had published a pamphlet entitled The Right to Ignore the State, in which he argued for a small state (following British liberal thinking of the time) and for social Darwinism24 based on selection of the fittest. By the 1880s, at a key point in the history of the Third Republic, these ideas were unanimously rejected.

1889–1900: Psychology Is Born as a Pair of Conjoined Twins The existence of the crisis seemed to make it possible for psychology to develop. Everything associated with the birth of a “discipline”—(organizations, journals, congresses)—appeared, as though this was an established subject that could be taught in universities and that had a valid body of knowledge. But on closer inspection, the newborn was not quite as it seemed: The subject was divided in two, but not completely. parot

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On the one hand, there was a psychology of the human being as a member of its species, of an object with intellectual and emotional functions. Although transformism was not accepted by everybody, the title of Ribot’s chair revealed its influence: Psychology needed to be comparative, and it should no longer simply be the psychology of the adult, civilized, normal, white man. The fact that such a human psychology could be compared to the psychology of animals, of children, of savages, or of madmen suggested that they all shared some characteristics. The characters that were the most shared and most open to positive study would be physiological. However, the physiology that inspired French thinkers of the time was unusual, and was another indication of “the French exception.” Even late into the 20th century, it continued to weigh on French psychologists: This physiology, which was closely associated with the Republican movement, was neo-Lamarckian (in France this was a sign of anticlericalism). The French biologist Félix Le Dantec (1869–1917) and many of his colleagues reacted furiously to the work of August Weismann (1834–1914), who rejected the inheritance of acquired characteristics on principle. In the name of a physicochemical conception of life, and a determination to hold to a determinist epistemology, they rejected natural selection as the cause of evolution, a thesis that they saw as being unprovable. From their point of view, there was no place for an unproven phenomenon that had no cause. The Republic could not be neo-Darwinian, for, as Alfred Giard (1869–1917) pointed out, this would open the doors to the very forces it opposed: “immanent or nonmaterial directive agents,” which would oblige it to “abandon the magnificent mechanical conception of the universe.”25 Although Ribot based his ideas on psychophysiology, he was neither a physiologist nor an experimentalist. When he addressed the massed ranks of students who came to listen to him, and called on them to study medicine and physiology as well as philosophy, he did not create a form of psychology, neither as a science nor as a discipline. Above all, he expressed the critical state of contemporary discourse on human nature. The year that followed Ribot’s appointment was particularly good. The First International Congress of Physiological Psychology was held August 6–10, 1889, at the same time as the Universal Exhibition. It was held at the initiative of the Society of Physiological Psychology (founded in 1885, it dissolved at the end of the Congress), presided by 234

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Jean-Martin Charcot (1825–1893), a neurologist who was the talk of Paris and was the official president of the meeting, even though he was barely seen in the Congress itself. The vice-presidents who oversaw this apparent international birth were Taine, the great psychiatrist Antoine Magnan, and Ribot. However, the general secretary of the society, the physiologist Charles Richet (1850–1935) was the godfather.26 But although the Congress sought to give a scientific character to psychology by adding the adjective “physiological,” Richet’s influence soon proved embarrassing: An important part of this international meeting of the great and the good27 was devoted to the study of an investigation carried out by the London-based Society for Psychical Research,28 which collected accounts of hallucinations. This Society had been founded in 1882 to study phenomena such as mesmerism, mediums, and spiritualism (the term “spiritism” appeared in English only in 1906; in French spiritisme and spiritualisme were used synonymously until the beginning of the 20th century). Its aim was to show “experimentally” the reality of spiritual phenomena. This explains why, for several years, the congress of “experimental” psychology involved both psychologists and spiritualists (Parot, 1994). The psychical research involved was, above all, related to telepathy, and the terminological confusion involved (“psychical” and “psychological” were for instance used interchangeably) revealed the bipolarity of the investigations being carried out on mind and spirit. At the First Congress, this kind of research was presented alongside studies of hypnotism, because the mediums used in the experiments appeared to be in a hypnotic state. Such alliances between scientific and spiritualist approaches, which now seem so odd, continued for around 15 years. During the Fourth Congress of 1900, which also took place in Paris and was also presided over by Ribot, it was announced that a privately funded International Institute would be set up in Paris, together with its own Bulletin: This was sometimes called the “Psychical” Institute and sometimes the “Psychological” Institute (Parot, 1994, p. 434). All those, such as Pierre Janet (1859–1947), who were interested in the supposed action at a distance of “spiritual matter” were involved; physicists such as the Curies or d’Arsonval also participated. By the beginning of the 20th century, however, the scandals that affected these seances led the scientists to withdraw from such spiritualist adventures. The positivist desire for a psychology that turned its back on metaphysics and became independent of

philosophy was compromised by such spiritualist temptations, which remained strong. Experimental psychology, the first to be born, still lacked a clear identity; it was stuck in limbo. On the other side, a psychology of subjectivity (and therefore of the undeterminable, of the nonreproducible) also appeared. Of the conjoined twins of psychology, this one appeared the more sickly and was almost stillborn. As described above, the physiologists had discovered that consciousness was not the whole of mental life and that automatic phenomena, such as reflexes acquired through habit, left traces in the nervous system, memory traces, that determine behavior. Although this could be counted a clear victory for the science of the nervous system, there was also an obstacle that had still to be overcome: The traces recovered by the subject are not necessarily isomorphic with the past as it was really experienced. Mental activity not only records events, it also constructs them, fashions them, and thus distorts them. For example, in 1846, Jules Baillarger (Baillarger, 1846) showed there was a distinction between sensory hallucinations and psychical hallucinations, which he attributed to the automatism of the intelligence—that is to say the mechanical, involuntary, and spontaneous exercise of memory on the one hand, and imagination, which creates psychical hallucinations, on the other. This “imagination” would remain a thorn in the side of the positivists. This view of the mind as the product of the imagination grew in influence, but there was nothing in the institutions of the time that could give this new form either a title or a space.

The Citizen Is Torn Apart In the second half of the 19th century, those who were interested in the dysfunctions of the mind focused on hysteria.29 This was not the only nervous pathology suffered by those in the West in general and in France in particular, but it was the key disease that interested French thinkers, in that it revealed the gap between Ribot’s positive (if not positivist) psychology and that which it could not encompass:— the imaginary, subjectivity, and interiority. It was as though the crisis of hysteria could be nothing other than French: It revealed the aporia of the Republic’s ambitions, because it highlighted the impossibility of explaining this disease of the will in terms of natural causality (Paget, 1873); it was impossible to use such categories to explain a phenomenon that was automatic, indeterminate, or even simulated and suggested by others, a phenomenon that was essentially a pathology of interindividual relations.

To escape from the gaze of the naturalizers, the individual twisted and turned; the citizen “went into crisis.” Mediums, somnambulists, major or minor hysterics were seen as a form of entertainment, and Paris—and in particular the Salpêtrière hospital (where only women were interned)—was the last place where, at the turn of the century, patients put on gory spectacles: the Grand Guignol.30 The crowds came flocking. Charcot clearly had a showman’s instinct, but he was also a great neurologist who intended to get the better of this illness that no one could clearly define, and which imitated other illnesses, in particular epilepsy. Charcot was inspired by an experiment carried out by Paul Broca (1824–1880), who had used hypnosis to anesthetize a patient prior to an operation in order to understand the anesthesia shown by some hysterics. Charcot was able to induce anesthesia experimentally by using hypnosis, and he concluded that the “natural” form showed by hysterics is produced by the same kind of phenomenon:— hypnotic suggestion.31 From this point of view, the hysteric is an awake somnambulist. Charcot claimed that this provided the key to understanding hysteria, which should be seen in terms of functional or dynamic lesions, which of necessity could not be localized. But the essential point is that Charcot put forward an organicist view of a “real” disease, which saw the disease as a consequence of a suggestive “disposition” that was, he argued, the distinctive mark of the hysteric. Charcot’s shows might have enjoyed a certain success, but he was not able to gain the acceptance of his colleagues. Charcot’s theses were criticized, and the alienists distanced themselves from this cut-price version of organicism. At the end of the 1880s, Hippolyte Bernheim (1840–1919), a professor from Nancy (who could have opted to become a German citizen at the end of the 1870 war), claimed that Charcot’s patients were manipulated by the junior doctors at the hospital (nobody was hypnotized by Charcot). Bernheim was contesting nothing less than the very reality of hypnosis as a physical state, arguing that it was instead based on the power of verbal suggestion. In so doing, he was implying that there could be a field of study outside of the domain of the natural sciences. For Bernheim, the hypnotized patients of the Salpêtrière were conscious—more or less. This nuance contained the key: It was a theatrical phenomenon, an expression of “culture,” as he put it, but it nevertheless remained a phenomenon. What Bernheim did not say clearly was whether the suggestion was a psychological state of the hypnotized parot

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or an act of mental manipulation by the “operator,” who, to put the patient to sleep, “had to have a calm and cold assurance” (Bernheim, 1891, p. 117), a kind of devilish control that echoed possession.32 This also had implications for views of the citizen: Could influence and suggestion not explain many phenomena of human life?33 If the subject who emerges from a hypnotic experience does not know consciously what he knows, if his unconscious mental world is a large part of himself, of what is he not aware? The “Ego” theorized by Ribot and the 19thcentury philosophers could not account for this part of what patients said about their experience, and which came from themselves only in their relation to others. It was as if Ribot’s psychology lacked the folk psychology of the time—that which everyone thought, and above all imagined, took place in their own interior world. This act of shared imagination gives each of us our individual mental life, which can only be accessed by words: Words create things; as we speak of a thing, the mental event suggested by the verbal exchange becomes the thing itself. For Bernheim, the symptoms of hypnosis were merely the effect of a suggestion: The speech that describes a physical pain elicits a verbal response, a verbal exchange with someone else—(as long as he is “calm and cold”)—and this exchange creates the symptom. Subject, speech, exchanges—the psychology of the free citizen, who was supposed to be determined solely by neurological laws, could not even put a name to these factors. From this point of view, free will is unreal; Bernheim’s interpretation of hypnosis suggested that the behavior of the free citizen is determined by factors that are more complex and more obscure, and above all more individual, than the universal laws of the natural sciences. The citizen can be influenced, manipulated.

The Stillbirth of Psychotherapy: The Failure of Pierre Janet Pierre Janet’s work could have led the study of automatisms to find a decisive place in the study of human behavior. Janet was a philosopher who was also a physician; he perfectly embodied the conflict that split views of human behavior at the time. As he put it, his training revealed the unstable compromise between incompatible tendencies: a strong taste for the natural sciences and for religious or even mystical feelings.34 Pierre Janet was influenced by his uncle, Paul Janet (“the last representative of the eclectic school of Cousin,” p. 124), who had

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introduced him to Albert Dastre (1844–1917), a physiologist who was a pupil of Claude Bernard. Pierre Janet initially worked closely with Dastre in his Sorbonne laboratory, and Dastre convinced him to round off his philosophical training35 by studying medicine. This dual education made Janet the typical pupil of Ribot; like his teachers, he was convinced that there was a continuum from the normal to the pathological, and that evolutionism was respectable. However, Janet avoided overpolemical positions, and this was undoubtedly useful in enabling him to take over from Ribot at the Collège in 1902, where he remained until 1934. Janet had one great advantage over Ribot: He studied and tried to treat mentally ill patients36 in the laboratory of psychology created for him by Charcot at the Salpêtrière in 1890.37 He analyzed what they said, searching among their complaints for the origins of their overall weakness, their psychasthenia: Whence came this deficit in relation to reality, and the obsessions that overwhelmed them? This question ran through the whole of Republican thinking. It related to the idea of will, of moral force, which characterizes the active individual and therefore the citizen, and of his illnesses, what Janet after 1900 called “psychasthenia.” Janet sought to change the consciousness of his patients through the power of words, and at the same time to enable them to better “manage” their mind, which needed to be directed, just like the conscience. Janet’s view of the subject had a depth that Ribot’s Ego lacked. From these depths, it was possible for ideas to appear, ideas that the general law of association (a purely surface phenomenon) could not describe. But Janet seemed unable to take the next step; it was as if the time had not yet come for the irrevocable split that would divide psychology. The crisis of conceptions of hysteria showed that it was possible to develop a treatment regime that combined talking with isolation, bed rest, and silence. Before World War I, Jules Dejerine (1849–1917), who succeeded Fulgence Raymond (1844–1910) at Charcot’s Salpêtrière clinic, preferred this treatment to hypnosis,38 but it was still seen as a kind of moral remedy. By depriving consciousness of some of its powers over itself, this crisis and this treatment gave those powers to the Other, to a person who could suggest, persuade and influence. To have this power, all that was necessary was to speak calmly and coldly,—with authority (this is very different from the empathy used by

today’s naturalizers). This phenomenon can be seen throughout the history of psychotherapy: One alienates the other and then cures them by the simple use of words. However, if this alternative approach was glimpsed, the road that led to it was soon blocked.39 In Les Médications psychologiques,40 Janet showed his appreciation of this situation when he stated that there was an epistemological link between psychotherapy and psychology, and suggested that if his approach was not widely taken up, this was because there was no real school of psychology (1919, pp. 465–466). He expected this would take some time to be resolved: “we will speak of this again in a century” (ibid. p. 468), he wrote. In fact, it did not take quite so long for psychotherapy to become a visible practice41 that was distinct from psychiatry and, in parallel, for psychology to become a genuine academic discipline. Janet repeatedly made clear that the essence of his therapeutic practice was the use of language, with its power to access the buried past and thereby weaken the past’s influence and restore the patient’s power over him- or herself. Hypnosis deprived the citizen of his or her free will; psychotherapy was intended to return the citizen’s control over his or her will, and over him- or herself. Persuasion liberated where suggestion hampered. For this to work, however, the therapist needed to be able to take control of the patient’s soul, not for any evil intent, but nevertheless, like Satan, the therapist had to cast a spell over the patient. To “de-alienate” was to take possession of that which was causing the alienation, performing a kind of exorcism. Given that France was still firmly attached to rationalist and moral ideals, the difference between possession and persuasion was sufficiently unclear for criticisms of the former to also affect the latter. Persuasion also infringed on the citizen’s freedom, on the enlightened conscience, that was so dear to 19th-century thought. In fact, more profound explanations of therapeutic influence came from outside France; the explanation of influence by authority (as suggested by Dejerine, for example42) was replaced by another concept, which Republican ideology found particular difficult to swallow: love. In the patient’s relation with the therapist, as in his relation with his parents, or with his lover, the individual loses or forgets himself. But the Republic does not need citizens who are governed by love and who lose themselves in this emotion; instead, the citizen should be governed by the Republic’s

institutions and keep in his or her place. It was in the Germanic countries, and in particular in Vienna, that psychotherapeutic persuasion was taken most seriously in terms of what it implies: transference.

The Impotence of Psychologists Before World War I, the crisis of French Republican thought gave birth to a view of humanity that was divided in two. On the one hand, there was a physiological psychology with aspirations to become a science; on the other, a dialogue-based construction of the singularity of individual experience and of its torments. Institutions were created, congresses took place, learned journals appeared, but no single force had complete control of “psychology.” Neither camp dominated.

The Elusive Psychologist One of Janet’s leading opponents was Alfred Binet (1857–1911). The two men were initially opposed because they were in competition for Ribot’s mantle. Ribot’s successor needed to have either a good feel for the institutions of the Republic, coupled with solid political support, or a coherent scientific approach, an intellectual weight in the academic milieu. Piéron had the former, Janet the latter. Binet, however, could not compete on either front, and he was unable even to get the chair at the Sorbonne (Georges Dumas won that battle). He did end up running the EPHE laboratory at the Sorbonne, which the “positivists” asked Liard to create, but he was unable to make it function because he could not find appropriate personnel, nor did he have the philosophers’ skill in handling such issues. Binet had a degree in law; in 1884, he married the daughter of Edouard Gérard Balbiani (1823–1899), professor of embryology at the Collège de France, and in 1894, he obtained his doctorate in natural sciences. However, he came from another, wealthier, milieu:—he was not part of the inner circle that ran the University and, although he more or less managed to run L’Année psychologique, which Henri Beaunis gratefully handed over to him in 1895, he did not become one of those great French academics who oversaw the training of the intellectual elite known as “the black hussars of the Republic.”43 Binet, together with Joseph Babinksi, went to work with Charcot; both men became fervent supporters of Charcot in his dispute with Bernheim (Babinski was the more convincing). However, Binet

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soon moved on from the uncertain terrain of hysteria and was inspired by his daughters, born in 1885 and 1887, who both delighted and intrigued him: they were so different. His responsibilities at the head of the Sorbonne laboratory and of L’Année psychologique meant he had to come to grips with the institutional organization of experimental psychology. However, he was more interested in his daughters, and in the behavior of particularly talented men, such as human calculators or playwrights. Binet had read Taine’s work De l’Intelligence, and, like most people at the time, he adopted associationist ideas, as shown by his 1886 book Psychologie du raisonnement. Binet was particularly interested in the diversity of human behavior, using an associationist approach that considered that chance events lead to different mentalities. Of course, mental illness or nervous malfunctions revealed these differences between individuals, but after living through the disputes over hypnotism and hysteria, Binet preferred to turn his attention to the study of children. Binet used a positive, experimentalist approach, as he was convinced that, to fully understand something, it had to be measured. Binet had a small number of close colleagues; he was not easy to work with. He was initially very pleased with Victor Henri, before changing his mind; the two men began work on a series of articles on memory and visual illusions in children, focusing on fears and suggestibility, and a notable article on individual psychology. This last study summarized their approach:44 They laid the bases of a differential psychology of mental faculties that Binet finally created a few years later with Théodore Simon (1872–1961), who joined the laboratory in 1899. Simon studied mentally retarded children, and the two men carried out a series of joint investigations that continued until Binet’s death in 1911. Their interests coincided with the key concerns of the Republic: Schooling had become compulsory and free, and field studies were required to create an effective pedagogy, not only to support teaching practise, but above all to classify the children who came flocking to publicly funded schools and to identify those who would be able to follow the usual curriculum from those who would not. As every psychologist knows, in 1905, Binet and Simon put forward the first metric scale of intelligence, which they subsequently amended in 1908 and 1911. They soon lost control of their creation, in particular in the United States.45 However, as Edouard Claparède (1873–1940) recalled (1939, p. 144), “At this time, the educational milieu in France 238

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understood nothing of Binet’s work, and hostility toward him was incredibly strong.” Perhaps Binet’s most influential role in the development of child psychology in France was his work in the Société libre pour l’étude psychologique de l’enfant (Free Society for the Psychological Study of the Child). This society had been set up by Ferdinand Buisson (1841–1932), chair of Educational Science at the Sorbonne, and Binet soon became its leading figure. In the first decade of the 20th century, Binet could not have imagined the subsequent success of the tool he had just developed. Neither his outlook nor his touchiness encouraged institutional recognition. Every time he applied for a post, he never got the job, and he had little support in the educational administration.46 Ribot, whom he greatly admired,47 said “Pedagogy is not a science; it is a career,”48 thereby devaluing Binet’s interests in practical matters. Binet did not tick all the boxes necessary for a successful academic career. Claparède, for example, who can hardly be accused of criticizing Binet’s practical outlook, pointed out that Binet did not attend any international congresses, and even at the Paris meeting of 1900, he merely put in the briefest of appearances (Claparède, 1939, p. 144). None of this helped him find support in the slowly forming academic community. Similarly, despite being the director of L’Année Psychologique, Binet does not appear to have attended the Institut Psychologique Général, where all the leading figures in the study of the human mind would meet to discuss. It could be argued that his later renown, in particular abroad, was due to the fact that he simply ignored the crisis of psychology in French thought, and that he did not have a Republican view of that crisis. Similarly, he does not seem to have appreciated the decisive importance of the Dreyfus Affair, which was so important for French intellectuals.

The Dreyfus Affair and a New Incarnation of Consciousness From 1894–1906, the Dreyfus Affair shook France to its foundations, occurring after years of political instability and against a background of antiSemitism. Captain Alfred Dreyfus was a Jew who was charged with espionage and condemned to hard labor in French Guyana, following a trial that caused a huge outcry. After many twists and turns, including the publication of Zola’s J’accuse, a group of intellectuals called the Dreyfusards was set up in 1898, to demand a retrial. The Dreyfusards included Lucien Herr (1864–1926), Lucien Lévy-Bruhl

(1857–1939), Charles Andler (1866–1933), François Simiand (1873–1935), and Emile Durkheim (1858–1917). The court case against Emile Zola increased their determination, and at around the same time, the Ligue Française pour la Défense des Droits de l’Homme et du Citoyen (French League for the defence of human and citizens’ rights) was set up, which the Dreyfusards soon joined. For several years, two opposing sides fought over the issue. The Dreyfus Affair not only blurred traditional political divisions, it also reinforced Republican hostility to nationalism, and led to the creation of two political parties. In 1905, the Section Française de l’Internationale Ouvrière (SFIO) was set up, regrouping the Parti socialiste français and the Parti socialiste de France; 4 years earlier, in 1901, the Parti républicain radicalsocialiste was set up as the first modern political party, in that it was an electoral machine. Together with the Ligue pour la Défense des Droits de l’Homme et du Citoyen, these parties formed the crucible for a new intellectual left, which soon became extremely active. The followers of Durkheim were scattered through these organizations. Before and after World War I, this movement played an important role in focusing attention on a question that the Republicans of the previous generation had ignored: What was the relationship between the collectivity and the citizen’s will, intelligence, memory,—his or her strictly individual characters? This question was closely related to the emergence of what was called the “social question” at the turn of the century. This issue played a decisive role in creating the “French exception” and involved the demand for individual rights and social welfare, which in turn required a voluntarist intervention by the state, including in the world of work. As occurred several times during the 20th century, an important part of the country was opposed to liberalism and individualism, and the Republic found itself obliged to accommodate a rise in feelings of solidarity and the growth of the social economy, as well as of the trade unions and the labor movement. But by adapting to these new developments, the Republic lost its eschatological character, the vision of the Republic as the best of all possible future worlds began to lose its grip. The contemporary slogan “Vive la sociale!” referred to a more social Republic, while at the same time denouncing the fact that the bourgeoisie controlled the republican system. This development in French ideology suggested that, in order to control social phenomena, it was

necessary first to understand them. This view, which was particularly strong at the beginning of the century, in turn led to a loss of confidence in liberalism/ individualism, and to the growth of a view of humanity that put less of an emphasis on biological determinism. Instead, it was argued, society has a causal role; many intellectuals who wanted to understand the social determinism of individuals turned to Durkheim’s sociology. Durkheim argued that individual representations are generally determined by preexisting and widespread collective representations.49 This claim found its way into psychological discourse: Even those who were both philosopher and alienists, such as Georges Dumas (1866–1946), Ribot, and in particular Charles Blondel (1876–1939), were open to this view. Consciousness, which had already been battered by the discovery of unconscious cerebral activities and by pathogenic buried memories, was now deprived of its omnipotent status. It was now thought that, without even realizing it, the individual is also affected by the collective. In 1910, Lucien Lévy-Bruhl accurately described the problem faced by a strictly individual view of psychology: “In mental life, everything that is not the equivalent of a mere reaction of the organism to incoming excitations is necessarily of a social nature” (Lévy-Bruhl, 1910, p. 4). As Comte argued, between physiology and sociology there was no space for “psychology.” Post-Comtian thought, in whatever form, could not easily find a space for a science of the isolated individual:—physiology and sociology would have to suffice to explain human behavior. Language, like all the works of mankind within which the children of each society grow up—(the social and familial determinants)—interacts with the biological constraints of the species to shape habits, ideas, and ways of thinking. For this reason, alongside neurophysiology, a new unified science,— a single human science,—was needed to study what Mauss later called “the total man” (1927, p. 213, for instance). This approach saw the light of day only briefly, after the end of World War I, but from the beginning of the century onward, the potential links between individual and collective factors were the subject of many debates. The war, and the terribly butchery that affected Europe, decimated the Durkheimian movement. Durkheim died of a broken heart in 1917, after his son was killed in the fighting. His journal, L’Année sociologique, did not survive the death of its founder. Nevertheless, the idea that individual and collective psychology could have a common subject of study parot

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Psychology Fails to Gain Its Independence: Henri Piéron One man in particular did not like Alfred Binet, nor Pierre Janet,50 and yet he came to incarnate positivist psychology. He was, inevitably, a physiologist. Henri Piéron51 (1881–1964) was born in 1881, in the right place at the right time,—the Boulevard Saint-Michel in Paris, and in the right milieu:— his father was a Republican scholarship-holder who ended up as a General Inspector of public education; father and son stood together on their balcony and watched the mortal remains of Victor Hugo being taken to their final resting place in the Panthéon in 1885. Piéron’s education was hard, but absolutely right for the role he was to play; in the year in which he passed his baccalaureate, he took part in demonstrations in support of Dreyfus, even though his father was in the opposing camp. The young man, who, following the fashion, sported a beard at the age of 17, showed a great deal of conformism, with a dash of revolt, that is to say— the perfect mixture for a Republican. He studied philosophy (some of his father’s friends taught the subject); he then went to the Salpêtrière, where he sat in on Janet’s consultations. He also met neo-Lamarckians such as Félix Le Dantec and Alfred Giard, who were among his father’s friends. After obtaining his agrégation in philosophy, Piéron went on to finish a doctorate in natural sciences with Dastre, on sleep, which he studied in the laboratory of psychology set up in 1898 by Edouard Toulouse (1865–1947) at the Villejuif asylum, which was an outpost of the EPHE. At Villejuif, Piéron was also trained in psychiatry, although he was never a qualified physician. A man who knew where he needed to be seen, he was a member of the Institut Général Psychologique, and in 1905, he joined the Société de Psychologie, which had been founded in 1900. He was also co-founder of the Société Clinique de Médecine Mentale, which published an organicist-influenced Bulletin that appeared until 1930. In 1903, Piéron married, after which he devoted both his own time, and that of his wife, to the administration of positivist psychology. After Binet’s death, the power-broker Louis Liard decided to appoint Piéron as director of the EPHE laboratory, which at the time included both Binet’s laboratory and that of Edouard Toulouse. He also took over the editorship of L’Année psychologique, 240

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which he ran until a few years before his death in 1964. Like J. B. Watson at around the same time, but for very different reasons, Piéron found himself in a position to influence the destiny of psychology. Like Watson, he did not hesitate to use his power, but to very different ends. Throughout his career, Piéron made links with those who ended up controlling scientific research in France, men such as Jean Perrin (1870–1942), Henri Laugier (1888–1973), and Paul Langevin (1872–1946). These men had the political power to restrict French psychology to providing an institutional response to a problem that was in reality both philosophical and political: Can consciousness be free? In 1907, Piéron was appointed as a lecturer at the EPHE. In his first lecture, he made a declaration that was at the heart of his answer to this fundamental problem: “It is both possible and necessary not to deny but simply to ignore the question of consciousness in studies of the mental life of organisms” (Piéron, 1908, p. 291). This clarion call for ignorance could imply that Piéron preceded Watson in developing behaviorism. But while Watson, a few years later, made the mechanism of conditioning the basis of his psychology, Piéron put sensation at the heart of a physiological approach that, over the next half-century, he presented as a form of psychology. Over the years, Piéron slowly took control of the administration of a reductionist form of psychology, first at the Institut de Psychologie, set up by Louis Liard in 1920, then at the EPHE laboratory in the Sorbonne, as chair of the psychology of sensations (created for him at the Collège de France in 1923), and at the Institut National d’Orientation Professionnelle (INOP; National Institute of Vocational Guidance), created in 1928 by the General director of technical education, Edmond Labbé, and finally as Editor of L’Année Psychologique. A fortress has thick walls, and it is difficult to hear what is said outside. As a result, a new crisis can lead to a breach that threatens the whole edifice, as things that have been ejected somehow worm their way back inside. Within the fortress built by Piéron, psychoanalysis, which grew in influence in the 1930s, was simply inaudible. Although Freud had been published in French, the translations had been restricted to neurological journals, while a few curious individuals made scattered references to his work on “psycho-analysis.” Like Darwin before him, the French read Freud with the “spectacles” that were available, those that gave a positivist answer to philosophical questions. Nevertheless, despite his elevated position, Piéron heard what was said about

the need for a collective psychology, about the importance of the social determination of human behavior. His response was clear: Such approaches should remain part of sociology; he had to protect his version of psychology from such influences. And, for a time, he succeeded.

The Conjoined Twins Turn Their Backs on Each Other: The Interwar Years and a Curious Division Is a Discipline Created by the Existence of Organizations? Between the two World Wars, Piéron created and ran institutions that, he argued, gave rise to psychology as a discipline. This period also saw the accumulation of (solid) facts, but it is not clear that these experimental facts, and the sophisticated pieces of equipment that produced them, in fact responded to questions that were thought to be “psychological.” To give a few examples: In Piéron’s L’Année psychologique, alongside many articles by Piéron himself, in 1920, there was an article by a psychophysiologist, M. Foucault, dealing with “A comparison of the perception of critical points with those of the lateral regions of the retina, when presented with prolonged excitation,” and another by the neo-Lamarckian Etienne Rabaud (a friend of Piéron’s who taught at the Institut de Psychologie) on “The paralysing instinct and diet.” L’Année also published many psychometric articles; for example, in 1928, Madame Piéron wrote on “French calibration of the Barcelona test,” as well as many articles on psychophysics, such as Piéron’s 1939 article on “Studies of the validity of Abney’s law, which suggest the integral addition of elementary luminous valences in composite fluxes.” Quite clearly, these are investigations of a narrow form of (psycho) physiology, even if occasionally articles appeared by Piaget or by Henri Wallon52 (1879–1962), a very good friend of Piéron. At the Sorbonne, in the 1930s, getting a certificate of higher studies in psychology could be a way of completing a licence in philosophy; this involved a lecture course by the philosopher Henri Delacroix (1873–1937) on “The analysis of intelligence,” or Janet’s course at the Collège on “Elementary intellectual behaviors.” The title of the dissertation the students had to write could have been set in 1880: “Is will an irreducible function, or the synthesis of preexisting functions?” French academia continued to teach psychology as though it was part of philosophy, asking more-or-less eternal philosophical questions, which were not scientific and which had

virtually no relation to what Piéron called “psychology.” Each year, 170 students took the course and around 120 passed. Was Piéron really training “psychologists” at the Institut de Psychologie? In 1930, the Institut awarded three kinds of diploma, each of which included Delacroix’s course at the Sorbonne: a diploma in general psychology, with psychopathology (lectures by Ribot’s student Georges Dumas) or with experimental psychology (lectures by Piéron); pedagogy (including a course of lectures by Henri Wallon); and applied psychology (including courses by Piéron and by Jean-Maurice Lahy [1872–1943], a psychometrician). In 1930, three out of four students passed general psychology, 10 of 16 passed pedagogy, and 4 of 9 passed applied psychology. The Institut de Psychologie is often praised, especially by modern historians; in fact, not many people attended it. In reality, it had very little weight (Voutsinas, 1967, p. 103). Psychology did not exist as a discipline because its object was not clearly identifiable, any more than its methods or its boundaries. On one hand, institutional turf wars pulled the subject toward physiology, with as its object the functioning of organisms “from the sea anemone to man,”53 as Piéron put it. On the other hand, the academicism and the rigidity of institutions as venerable as the Sorbonne or the Collège de France kept psychology in the realm of philosophy.

The Société de Psychologie : an Enchanted Intermediary? In 1905, a young Polish Jew called Ignace Meyerson (1888–1983) arrived in Paris. The nephew of Emile Meyerson, an epistemologist of physics, Ignace was soon involved in the Drefuysard milieu, in particular with historians who founded the Ligue des Droits de l’Homme. Following his uncle’s advice, Ignace studied medicine,54 followed by natural sciences. Because of the intellectual milieu into which his uncle introduced him—(highly politicized and focused on the “social question”)—Ignace, who joined the Parti Socialist in 1908, was influenced by the aspiration to create a science of the “total man,” which would unify sociology, anthropology, history, linguistics, and psychology. As soon as the war broke out, Meyerson enrolled in the Foreign Legion as a medical assistant. In October 1914, he began an internship in psychiatry, replacing Henri Wallon in Philippe Chaslin’s psychiatric ward at the Salpêtrière Hospital.55 There, he met Pierre Janet, at the time the professor of parot

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experimental and comparative psychology at the Collège de France (replacing Ribot). In 1919, he was hired as head of research in the psychology laboratory at the Sainte-Anne Asylum, where he became a friend of Georges Dumas, a great alienist and philosopher, and an athlete and notorious joker to boot. Meyerson seemed to be heaven-sent for the difficult task of overseeing the reappearance of the Journal de Psychologie normale et pathologique, founded by Janet and Dumas in 1904, which was published by the Société de Psychologie. The Journal duly reappeared in January 1920. From this point until Meyerson had to flee Paris during World War II, the attempts to create the science of the “total man” were focused on the Journal and on the Société.56 This did not accord with the desires of Janet who, before World War I, had wanted to create an independent psychology, following Ribot’s wishes, as set out in the 1890s; he had not wished to see the pages of the Journal open to other human sciences. But Dumas encouraged Meyerson down this road (in 1924, Dumas even joined the Institut de sociologie, set up by the Durkheimians). Because he was not saturated with the ideology of the Republic, Meyerson was “naturally” open to this broad-minded approach. He was less attached to positivism, less seduced by “mere facts,” measures, and the strict causality that were so dear to the experimentalists. His original approach of raising psychological questions and submitting them to experts in other fields made an impact in France. At Meyerson’s urging, the presidency of the Société was held successively by Philippe Chaslin, a psychiatrist and biologist; Etienne Rabaud, a neo-Lamarckian biologist; Henri Delacroix, a philosopher; Charles Lalo, a philosopher of aesthetics; Antoine Meillet, a linguist; Paul Rivet, an ethnologist; Abel Rey, a historian of sciences; Georges-Henri Luquet, a specialist in children’s drawings; and Jean-Maurice Lahy, a psychometrician of work. In 1923, Dukheim’s nephew, Marcel Mauss (1872–1950), became President of the Société de Psychologie. Like Meillet, his close friend of many years, Mauss declared that his ambition in the Société was to study the human individual as a whole being, one who lives at a particular point in space and time, in a specific society. In his presidential address, Mauss outlined what sociology needed from psychology in terms of the study of collective consciousness: The psychologists had to

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explain, on an individual basis, how collective representations evolved into ideas and motives (Mauss, 1923). Mauss called for the creation of a collective psychology that took account of the history of personalities, a history of mentalities. In fact, this history of mentalities was being constructed in Strasbourg, where two historians, Lucien Febvre (1878–1956) and Marc Bloch (1886–1944), taught alongside Charles Blondel. In 1929, Febvre and Bloch launched Les Annales d’Histoire économique et sociale; but Blondel was the first to take a clear position on the question of the historicity of the mind, even before the historians’ ideas took shape. Basing his convictions on careful consideration of “morbid mentality,” and on his readings of LévyBruhl, Blondel believed that, just like the mental life of “primitives,” the life of the mentally ill differs from that of others. Blondel was a friend of Meyerson and an important participant in the Société’s attempt to create a synthesis of the human sciences. They were doubly convinced of the necessity to construct a historical psychology. Inevitably, Piéron was a member of the Société. He knew Meyerson well, having employed him as secretary of the Institut de Psychologie and as assistant director of Piéron’s own laboratory. Although Meyerson was friendly with all the Durkheimians, he had not yet forged his own conception of psychology. Although he did not write on the subject—(in fact he wrote very little)—Meyerson listened and read widely, and wrote reviews of books for both L’Année and for the Journal. Piéron expected a great deal of Meyerson. When Piéron heard Mauss claim that, by dividing its subject into component parts, physiological psychology lost what makes us essentially human, his response went right to the heart of the matter: “to the extent that we abandon the study of the total man . . . we will be able to establish laws and advance science.”57 Mauss knew Piéron’s views very well, and with his slow and deep voice, began by excusing the psychologists, who were still taking the first steps in their subject. He then retuned to the fundamental concept of institutions and traditions, both of which do not exist in the animal societies that Piéron gave as an example of collective relations. Piéron did not reply. In the following issue of L’Année psychologique, Ignace Meyerson responded to Mauss in an appropriately friendly tone. He pointed out that Mauss was only a psychologist, and that to understand the “total man,” it was necessary to go beyond

psychology, and to take as one’s object “the history of the formation of thought. Whether we study this in a child, or we seek it through the avatars of institutions, we are making an historical study” (1924, p. 383).58 Meyerson’s approach did not set out a terrain for psychology. It was an approach he continually pressed on his new friend and colleague, Jean Piaget (1896–1980). In 1919, Piaget came to Paris for a 2-year stay. Like Meyerson, he took Lalande’s courses, along with those of Janet, Dumas, Piéron, and Delacroix. He met Théodore Simon and the autistic children he treated. On March 18, 1921, Piaget wrote to Meyerson, submitting an article for the Journal. At this point, something began of which the historians of psychology were completely unaware until Ignace Meyerson’s archives were studied and were found to contain 47 letters from Valentine Piaget (Jean’s wife) and 113 letters from Piaget himself, often accompanied by draft replies from Meyerson.59 The correspondence with Valentine covered 1927–1980, while that with Piaget covered 1921–1955. Posterity has forgotten Meyerson’s work, while it considers Piaget to have been the greatest Francophone psychologist. However, their correspondence shows that during the interwar years, it was Piaget who was asking Meyerson for help and advice, and Meyerson responded generously.60 Piaget’s works contain not the slightest reference to this relationship. Despite Meyerson’s influence on all those who came into contact with him, and even though his historical psychology was entirely coherent with Durkheimian ideas and was underpinned by an erudite study of the human mind, he found no followers. Meyerson did not have any heavy teaching or administrative responsibilities; he devoted his work, days, and holidays (generally taken with Piaget) to the Journal and to the Société. As a consequence, he never wrote a book, except his thesis (1948). After the Nazi invasion of 1940, Meyerson was forced to leave Paris and take refuge in Toulouse in nonoccupied France, were he met Jean-Pierre Vernant (1914–2007). The Journal and the Société continued their activities under Paul Guillaume’s supervision; in 1941, the Société became the Société Française de Psychologie. After the end of the war, Meyerson was marginalized by Piéron. Historical psychology was forgotten. Nevertheless, the Meyerson years showed the scale of the task, faced with what Mauss, in 1924, called “facts of a highly complex order, the most complex order that can be imagined” (p. 912).

Piéron Profits from the Success of Wallon’s Child Psychobiology and of Vocational Guidance During the interwar years, Henry Wallon, overshadowed by Piéron, nevertheless had a profound effect on views of child psychology. The two men had long been close friends, and Wallon shared Piéron’s approach. But while Piéron was supremely self-confident, Wallon was a timid, unsociable physician. Only his Marxist convictions, which he adopted in the 1930s, led him to play an important public role after the end of World War II. Like all his fellow psychologists, Wallon studied the victims of the 1914–1918 war. At a time when the Durkheimian approach was extremely fashionable, Wallon concluded that emotion is the basis of mental life, it links each individual to the social world. He chose to study children in order to investigate the influence of emotional life—(by definition, both relational and social)—on the development of mental representations (see, for instance, 1945). In his laboratory of psychobiology and at his medico-pedagogical clinic, he saw many “abnormal” children. His ideas, set out in a series of books, some of which were overblown, were opposed to those of Piaget. In the 1930s, they clashed: The psychologist who studied social relations, relations with others, fought with the psychologist who was focused on the relation of the child to the world of objects, logical relations in which social existence seemed to play a lesser role. Wallon’s work did not have the scope of Piaget’s, and he was also less able to create profitable professional relations. But Piéron gave his friend a helping hand and was able to ensure that he became extremely influential in French psychology. In 1929, Wallon was appointed as a professor at the INOP, and in 1937, Piéron created a special chair of psychology and child education at the Collège for his friend. Piéron realized that he could rely on Wallon’s organicist approach to encourage the psychobiology that was so dear to him. However, despite the appearance of a number of devoted pupils, and despite a growing reputation among those who studied children, in the two decades that followed the end of the war, Wallon’s work was eclipsed by that of Piaget. Wallon died in 1962. At around the same time, Piéron oversaw the development of the psychology of work in France through studies of vocational guidance. At the beginning of the century, through Edouard Toulouse, Piéron met Jean-Maurice Lahy, a leading

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French freemason, who campaigned against the introduction of Taylorism into French workplaces. Lahy based his opposition to this technique on a physiological conception of work that chimed with Piéron’s views. For Lahy, the key question was to determine the place of each individual in a scientific organization of the workplace, on the basis of their physiological aptitudes. Vocational guidance, which measured those aptitudes, was therefore the rational basis of the organization of work. It did not escape Piéron’s notice that vocational guidance would be an ideal terrain for the application of his psychophysiological approach,— far more so than psychopathology, which remained in the hands of the physicians. From this point onward, he became involved in the field and was indeed much more successful than with his Institut de psychologie. One of the earliest French organizations to help pupils orient themselves in the world of work was the Compagnons de l’Université Nouvelle, which was set up in 1918. In 1922, a study group entitled “L’éducation nouvelle” was created as a member of the Ligue Internationale pour l’Education Nouvelle.61 In 1929, this group included Henri Wallon, the physicist Paul Langevin, and the physiologist Henri Laugier; the president, inevitably, was Henri Piéron. Piéron ensured that vocational guidance came under the responsibility of the state’s technical education, rather than the system of training for work run by the capitalists (l’enseignement patronal ). In 1928, Piéron set up the Institut National d’Orientation Professionnelle, which soon recruited his wife, Mathilde, and his close friend, Laugier. The INOP Administrative Council included his friends Lahy, Wallon, Toulouse, and Langevin. Before the outbreak of World War II, 19 classes passed through the Institut: 476 diplomas were awarded, and the substantial number of 287 people found work in service of vocational guidance.62 This “applied psychology” was one of the bases that Piéron used to promote his physiological psychology. Nevertheless, the conditions required for French psychology to become a taught discipline still did not apply.

Toward Psychology: Changes in Psychopathology and Psychotherapy In the bulky work Traité de Psychologie, launched by Ribot before World War I and edited by Dumas (Meyerson was the editorial secretary), the alienist Dumas approached the question of pathological 244

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alterations in consciousness and ways of treating these phenomena. These issues were dealt with in three chapters of the book, which appeared in 1923: Chapter III (Interpsychology), Chapter V (Mental pathology),63 and Chapter VI (Psychopathology). In Chapter III, Dumas described various “intermental” mechanisms of action, such as demonstration, persuasion, and revelation, and also included a long passage on suggestion. In this part of the chapter, he referred to loss of will, and following Binet,64 underlined the importance of moral pressure. But he did not deal at all with any psychotherapeutic approaches based on suggestion and authority, such as those that had been employed before World War I. In Chapter V,65 Dumas set out his alienist approach, stating that neuroses such as hysteria or psychasthenia were forms of psychosis, and arguing that, in this field, one had to be content with more or less coherent syntheses of symptoms, as knowledge of their etiological, pathogenic, and anatomical causes remained extremely undeveloped. He also summarized the ideas of various psychiatrists, such as Emile Kraeplin, Esquirol, and Ernest Dupré, providing an overview of psychiatric pathologies that had barely changed since 1880. In Chapter VI, Dumas described Ribot’s pathological approach, the techniques involved, and its importance for classifying symptoms before the psychiatrist saw the patient. He then dealt with the relation of this psychology to psychoanalysis. He summarized Freud’s ideas, and, following the views of Blondel, which were being outlined at the same time, suggested they were of limited originality; he also vigorously contested the sexual etiology of neuroses. In passing, Dumas referred to the possibility of using Freud’s method of treating neuroses, but that was all. In this vast summary, there was no place for psychotherapy. Equally, there was no place in posterity for Bernheim, or for Janet (who had feared as much). Three years after this thick book was published, the Société Psychanalytique de Paris was founded. In the years that followed, psychoanalysis flourished in France, producing journals and holding congresses, but it remained marginal, each of its splits creating a new “school” with no links to the academic world. However, the growth in its intellectual and “therapeutic” influence can be seen in the pages of another work, L’Encyclopédie française, edited by Lucien Febvre and commissioned by the Minister of National Education. The first volume appeared in 1935; by 1965, when Febvre ceased

to be the editor, this Republican publication had extended to 21 volumes. Volume VIII, which Febvre asked his friend Henri Wallon to edit,66 dealt with “mental life.” In the opening pages, Febvre stated that the volume would not deal with a psychology based on “abstract and puerile measurements,” nor would it outline a catalogue of functions or faculties, but instead would present “a summary table of the mental development of Man” (p. 2),—a genetic, comparative, and normative summary. To carry out this work, Wallon called in not only the usual suspects, but also psychiatrists or psychoanalysts (Eugène Minkowski, 1885–1972; Daniel Lagache, 1924–1972; and Jacques Lacan; 1901–1981). In the pages of this volume of the Encyclopédie, it became clear that a link had been established between psychoanalysis, psychotherapeutic interpretative practices, and phenomenological philosophy, which had originated in Germany and was becoming fashionable in France. As this philosophical approach grew in influence, the importance of consciousness in French thought took on a new aspect through the category of “livedexperience” (le vécu). This philosophical concept of individual life gained an impact through the work of a philosopher-psychiatrist, Karl Jaspers (1883–1969). Jaspers argued that understanding a psychopathology required both an interpretation and an investigation of the factors that produced it.67 This dual theme of interpretation and explanation became a key part of French psychopathology, and interest in the lived-experience of the patient slowly replaced a focus on morbid consciousness. Phenomenological psychology—(the most important French expression of which was Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s La phénoménologie de la perception, 1945)—emphasized the importance of describing everyday lived-experience, and distanced itself from naturalization, which was implicit in a view that reduced consciousness to neuronal activity. In so doing, phenomenology made common cause with psychoanalysis, something that has continued in France, yesterday against psychophysiology, today against neuroscience. Febvre’s Encyclopédie revealed the beginnings of this strategic, but often unstated, alliance. Whatever the current status of psychoanalysis, there has been a slow recognition that language can play a therapeutic role, enabling individuals to recover a liberty that has been taken away by mental pathology, and which organicist psychiatrists are unable to restore. In the 1930s, the hostility of the physicians began to fade, through the

unexpected support of Catholic psychiatrists.68 Janet wrote that, without an established psychology, there could be no psychotherapy; it could be argued that the opposite was true.

The Postwar Years: Piéron’s Reign The war years changed everything. Meyerson’s friends died, just as Durkheim’s colleagues had died during World War I. The Republic did not come out of the period with its stature enhanced, even if attempts were made to forget the worst of its dishonest compromises. For those who were interested in understanding human behavior, the relation of individual and collective consciousness remained a key problem. In fact, the events of the war years raised a major moral question about individual behavior: Are we completely responsible for our acts, whatever they might be? Although this really was a question for philosophers, those thinkers who pursued the Durkheimian approach to collective representations and their influences were the historians of mentalities. Piéron strongly encouraged psychologists to avoid this terrain if they wanted to be part of the “scientific community” that was coming into being.

The Birth of a Discipline The “phoney war” of 1939–1940, the lively Parisian life, and the incomprehensible insouciance of some intellectuals during the Occupation all left their mark on French consciousness:—the citizen had failed in his duty. Some of those who realized this, such as Henri Wallon and Paul Langevin, began to rebuild the Republic by renovating the education system (this is a traditional reflex when “the Republic is in danger”69). The Langevin-Wallon plan was spearheaded by Piéron, who had been contacted to this end by his friend Langevin70 as early as 1944.71 Among the Plan’s proposals were compulsory schooling until the age of 18, with an emphasis on practical work. Like the Republic itself, the Langevin-Wallon plan was in perpetual construction; although the Plan was never put into practice, it nevertheless remained a key reference in the world of French teaching and its own unending reform. As well as educating the citizen, scientific research had to be relaunched, to provide the Republic with much-needed knowledge. Just before the war, Piéron was involved in the transformation of the small-scale Service Central de la Recherche into the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS).72 In the decade after the end of the war, he was heavily involved in the reorganization of the parot

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CNRS; he was not satisfied with the fact that psychology and sociology cohabited in the structures of the CNRS, even if they were now rid of philosophy. In 1944, he managed to convince the Collège de France to create a chair of collective psychology, even though this was a subject far from his own preoccupations. Furthermore, he did all he could to ensure that the chair was awarded to a childhood friend, the Durkheimian sociologist, Maurice Halbwachs (1877–1945). Halbwachs was appointed to the chair in May 1944, but shortly afterward he was deported by the Nazis and eventually died in Buchenwald in 1945. Piéron hoped that sociology would take over responsibility for collective psychology, which would thereby no longer be a weight on psychology. But he had still further to go before he could individualize psychology and give it the physiological orientation that he desired. Inevitably, Meyerson found no place on the chessboard that Piéron was redesigning. When Meyerson applied to succeed Paul Guillaume (1878–1962) at the Sorbonne, in 1947, a series of intrigues, some involving Gaston Bachelard (1884–1962), led to Daniel Lagache getting the job. Without knowing it, Lagache, a philosopher who was also a psychiatrist and a psychoanalyst, was transformed into one of Piéron’s pawns. Like Jean-Paul Sartre, a fellow student at the Normale Sup whom Lagache advised at the beginning of 1935 to take mescaline in order to provoke creative hallucinations,73 Lagache was no longer a Republican in the classic sense, but was open-minded, apparently more concerned with unity than with turf wars. A small book signalled his tacit alliance with Piéron, to whom it was dedicated: L’Unité de la psychologie: Psychologie expérimentale et psychologie clinique (1949). This work was not based on a novel epistemological approach, but instead consisted of a voluntarist summary that succinctly presented the division between the naturalist and the humanist approaches, and which closed with a credo that called for the mutual enrichment of the two views. Lagache considered that the essential tension that lay at the heart of the French way of conceiving the approach to the individual was old-fashioned. Although Lagache’s ecumenical approach was useful in that it helped ensure his institutional advancement, and it also served Piéron’s ends, it was not sufficient to create unity where there were fundamental divisions. At the time, however, Lagache’s incantation got unanimous support (in fact only from the experimentalists). At the same time as this call for unity was made, the first licence in 246

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psychology was set up. Most of the students who rushed to join the course—(and who still do so)— came for the clinical aspect, which in the second half of the 20th century in France enjoyed a substantial success. Rarely did they sign up with the intention of studying experimental psychology. This effect was so strong that, with time, the experimentalists came to proclaim the unity of the subject, above all to retain the unity of the diplomas in psychology and thereby gain access to a large number of students. Plans for an independent diploma in psychology were first discussed during the Occupation, at a meeting of the Institut de Psychologie in 1942. The meeting supported Piéron’s proposal74 to set up a certificate of higher studies in psychophysiology “that would be submitted to the Faculty of Sciences,” where it later received the unanimous support of the Council, on June 24, 1943. Under the aegis of the Institut, this program opened the doors to its first students in 1944–1945. “As at the same time there were two Certificates in Psychology in the Faculty of Letters (General Psychology and Child Psychology), all that remained for a Licence in Psychology to come into being was for Paul Guillaume to create a Certificate in the Psychology of Social Life, which he did in 1947” (Fraisse, 1965, p. 5) The psychoanalyst Daniel Lagache was in charge of teaching in this module.75 Students who completed these four certificates obtained “A Licence in Letters, specializing in Psychology.” Few young people followed this route: Most of the students were professional people—teachers, physicians, and lawyers. This remained the case until the end of the 1960s. The occupation of psychologist did not yet have any official status, so the licence led to no specific openings.76 Apart from neurologists and psychiatrists, those who were interested in psychopathology found no profession to exercise, and psychoanalysis was the sole refuge for those who wanted to avoid organicism. For other people to become researchers in experimental (physiological) psychology, another step had to be taken.

Paul Fraisse and Daniel Lagache: Experimental Psychology and Clinical Psychology Make an Unnatural Marriage of Convenience Piéron had long labored for the creation of a psychology that was not only independent, but also marked by a Comtean rigour; that is, it was physiological. But he encountered resistance and, by the time he retired in 1952, his project had still not

succeeded. However, he was able to appoint the persons who would succeed him in this work. While Maurice Reuchlin took over psychometrics, and Yves Galifret was in charge of psychophysiology, Paul Fraisse (1911–1996) was given responsibility for creating a discipline along the lines desired by Piéron. Lagache and Fraisse were on the same wavelength, and together they divided up the terrain, even if they publicly declared they believed in unity. Fraisse had studied philosophy, and had worked at the Catholic University of Louvain (Belgium) with Albert Michotte (1881–1965). Michotte had recommended Fraisse to Piéron, who in turn had recruited Fraisse to his laboratory, just before the outbreak of World War II. Fraisse was taken prisoner in 1940, escaped in August 1942, was recaptured, and finally repatriated in June 1943, as a noncommissioned officer, and returned to psychology. Piéron appointed him as assistant director of his laboratory, then, in 1946, made him secretary of the Institut de Psychologie, and in 1949, general secretary of the Société Française de Psychologie (Meyerson had previously occupied all three positions). In all these strategic positions, Fraisse replaced first Meyerson then Piéron himself, once he retired. As Fraisse wrote in his autobiography, he “believed” in the unity of psychology (Fraisse, 1992, p. 87). Nevertheless, neither this profession of faith nor his relations with Lagache prevented him, in 1961, from realizing Piéron’s desire to create a psychology that was independent of sociology within the CNRS, or, in 1965,77 from renaming the psychology section of the CNRS “psychophysiology and psychology, science of behavior” and transferring the section from the department of human sciences to that of exact and natural sciences. And that was that. Clinical psychology and psychopathology, which were the subjects of highly desirable university courses, were excluded from research in the Republic, but calls for unity continued, nevertheless. The experimentalists, however, had found their place in the CNRS, and worked there with developmental psychologists, psychosociologists, and differentialists,—all those who did not do clinical and psychopathology. Even though Fraisse was closely linked with the personalist movement,78 he described himself as a “laboratory positivist.” He was authoritarian, upright, and his institutional power became so great (he was also overall editor of the psychological publications for the prestigious Presses Universitaires de France) that he shaped the new generation of

postwar psychologists: Experimentalism was seen as the source of knowledge of the causes of observed phenomena, to the exclusion of any other hypothesis about generative causes. More than Ribot, even more than Piéron, Fraisse created French psychology as a discipline. His laboratory, through which everyone passed at one point or another, covered all parts of the subject, from perception to memory and language, from animal psychology to social psychology. He was the master of a field that was now enlarged and fully formed, and he was never seriously opposed. After Fraisse retired in 1980, his laboratory was no longer run with such an iron hand, and it ceased to be the heart of French scientific psychology. At this time, cognitive psychology, first in the shape of studies of information processing by the mind, which was metaphorically seen as a computer, was beginning to grow in influence. A number of laboratories already had groups working in Chomskyian psycholinguistics, thereby reintroducing the question of generative causes that Fraisse and his teachers had previously rejected. If grammar has a generative effect, the mental structures in which that grammar is inscribed and the presumed operations it effects to generate sentences are indeed “generative” causes, in the sense proposed by Comte. The success in France of the “Chomsky plan” was not unconnected with the events of 1968. The general contestation of knowledge and of its modes of transmission lay behind the rejection of behaviorism by the young French psychologists, and the desire to refocus on the question that Piéron and Fraisse’s experimentalism had effectively passed by, that is to say—free will, so dear to French thought and which was seen as a form of humanism. Chomsky’s appeal to Descartes and to reason, his opposition to Skinner and, in a neat link, his hostility to the Vietnam War, ensured his success in France. Most people did not realize that Chomsky’s view included the epistemological necessity of innate structures, or what Jerry Fodor later called “modules.” The French ended up adopting Chomsky but, paradoxically, were later extremely wary of the neurosciences with which his ideas were closely linked. The problem set out by Ribot and the French positivist philosophers at the end of the 19th century remained: Can “science” account for the bases of the Republic—consciousness and will, liberty and free-will? Over a century later, people still respond “Yes” then “No.” Psychology has become a discipline, but there is nothing to indicate that it is a science. parot

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Lagache developed an institutional power that was less widespread than that of Fraisse, but his intellectual dominance proved decisive for the future of psychology. He helped introduce into the process by which psychology became a discipline, an approach that came to save the subject as a whole: clinical psychology, colored by Lagache’s interests in “social life.” Instead of having as its subject a member of a biologically defined species, a subject that was both anonymous and universal, Lagache’s psychology focused on the personality, which was neither the subject, nor the person, nor the individual, nor the psyche, nor the character, nor the temperament. Although Lagache was fascinated by German phenomenology, which was fashionable at the time in France, he was also fascinated by the United States, like many of his contemporaries. He was inspired by U.S. “social psychology,” that developed by the German Kurt Lewin, who emigrated to the United States, or by Jacob Levy Moreno, who as well as being one of the advocates of psychodrama, also headed an Institute of Sociometry. Lagache took the term “clinical” from Witmer, and applied it to his own practice, carried out during the war on children and adolescents, and supported by projective tests in which, it was argued, profoundly internal states influenced responses to the tests and were thereby “projected.” Prior to this period, tests— (in particular intelligence tests)—were used by French psychometricians and child psychologists. A study of the “Bibliography of French Psychology,” published by the Bulletin de Psychologie, reveals that, between 1746 and 1946, many references were made to such intelligent tests, but nothing about projective tests; there were studies of character, but not of personality. In the following part of this study, which dealt with 1947–1957, projective techniques made their appearance, alongside studies of personality. In the decade following the war, Lagache’s clinical psychology and the concept of personality became rooted in France. For Lagache, this innovation was part of general psychology, which integrated an understanding of the characteristic features of a particular case, and which “detected the immanent meaning of psychological facts” (1949, p. 55) The role of the clinic was to make sense of behavior. But “psychopathology was, and remains, the best of schools for psychology”(Ibid., p. 33). Lagache emphasized (Ibid., pp. 33–34) that this clinical psychology had to be rooted in the “problems” raised by the human organism’s need to adapt and the apparently inevitable conflicts that occurred as a consequence. It would only be a bit of 248

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an exaggeration to say that while this form of clinical psychology did not involve a comprehensive study of personality, it nevertheless included the study of “problem” cases. This also explains the indestructible links between this version of clinical psychology and psychopathology (and with psychoanalysis). It may also explain why there was a declining interest in studying people who were not subject to conflicts. How can we understand the behavior of those who are well-adapted, and what kind of meaning can be given to their behavior? Indeed, is there even a place for “cases without problems”? In fact, do such people even exist? The suggestion that psychological problems are widespread may find its origins at this point. Whatever the case, from this point of view, the pathological does not shed light on the normal; it excludes the normal from the field of study. Lagache did not say as much, but in reality, the clinical psychology that he encouraged, and which had such success in France, addressed only pathological behaviors.

Conclusion Psychology as a Discipline and the Evanescence of Republican Ideology Psychology became a discipline once it was accepted that, through psychotherapeutic practice, the mind could be viewed in a non-naturalistic way, and the signs of its functioning could be interpreted. Nowadays, French psychologists usually train for 3 years, mainly in general programs, and then study all kinds of subdisciplines, from clinical psychology to psychophysiology. Unions and associations of psychologists have been set up. For a while, psychiatry lost its absolute domination over psychopathology: Neuroses, for example, are now virtually the sole preserve of psychologists. The profession of psychologist was officially recognized only in 1985, and it continues to be confused with that of psychotherapist. During the second half of the 20th century, the struggles for power over the discipline became polarized and, although this conflict was not new, it was a major threat that has existed ever since the subject left philosophy. From this point of view, psychoanalysis has played the same role in the universities, with respect to clinical psychology and psychopathology, as neuroscience has played with respect to experimental and cognitive psychology within the CNRS. Both have formed a pole of attraction that is difficult to resist. Although psychology has been able to find a place within French institutions, and although it was able

to resist the criticisms of Georges Canguilhem,79 Michel Foucault, and Jacques Lacan,80 this occurred because of the political and social changes that affected French society. The weakening of the Republican identity, which considered each human to be a citizen—(partly due to the appearance of other messianic and “oppositional” ideologies, such as Marxism or “the spirit of 1968”, the revolutionary, antiauthoritarian approach that was adopted by many young people and others after the massive wave of protests in France in May 1968)—left a space for a representation of the human that was marked by the psychological and by its negative aspects. From the end of the 1960s, the subject that had been promoted by psychoanalysis during the postwar boom81 was riven by internal conflict: The critical radicality that possessed the citizen of the French Republic was sublimated by the split in its internal life. France became a privileged terrain for psychoanalysis, Paris became a melting pot in which the ideas of Jacques Lacan, Louis Althusser, Michel Foucault, and Gilles Deleuze bubbled away. Freud’s theories were endlessly debated and amended; they became commonplace, omnipresent, and inescapable. The most striking example of their dogmatic weight in the realm of psychological ideas was the fact that France could not accept behavioral therapies and their inevitable offspring, cognitive-behavioral therapy. These approaches began to make an impact only at the end of the century. This dogmatism led to a conformist view of individuals, and of the certainties each of us has about ourselves and about the innumerable everyday psychopathologies under which we labor. Behaviors will tend to be understood if they are at least somewhat pathological. Whether or not they are the effects of the events of May 1968, the profound changes in lifestyle that have occurred since, and above all the affirmation not of individual rights but of community rights for women, homosexuals, the disabled, and so on, have further reduced the political identity of individuals. Psychological research now barely encounters any obstacle when it attempts to become part of neuroscience, whereas clinical psychology and psychopathology have encountered no truly innovative thoughts since the domination of psychoanalysis. Psychology has appeared as an autonomous discipline. However, it is possible that, as the subject of scientific psychology—(the mental life of humans)—becomes devoured by neuroscience, as it is identified with the brain, and as clinical

psychology remains constrained by its conceptual uncertainties, psychology itself may disappear. That would mean that the crisis that began in the 19th century had finally ended.

Future Directions • Does the history of psychology in other countries apart from France reflect a link between their political and social systems? • Have sociology and other human sciences in France also evolved a link with the Republican context? • Has the creation of psychology as a discipline taken a different route in different religious contexts (e.g., Protestantism)? • Has the growth of other national contexts (e.g., China, India) led to the appearance of other views of the link between political system and psychology?

Notes Unless otherwise stated, quotations have been translated from the original French. Where works have been translated into English, the titles of the translations are given in the references. I would like to thank Matthew Cobb for translating this chapter. 1. See Boutier, Passeron, & Revel, 2006. 2. See, for example, the informative article by Vidal, 2006. 3. See, for example, Carroy, Ohayon, & Plas, 2006; a less well-documented account can be found in Nicolas & Ferrand, 2008. 4. On the difference between a socially constructed crisis and intermittent crises proclaimed by those who are the agents of those crises, see Fabiani, 1985. 5. See the introduction of this notion in Husserl, 1913. 6. This was a group of thinkers that included Destutt de Tracy, Cabanis, Lamarck, Broussais, and Pinel. Their aim was to construct a science of ideas, an “ideology.” 7. “Le mythe de l’intériorité” is still used by French followers of Wittgenstein, such as Jacques Bouveresse (1976) or Vincent Descombes. 8. However, a key difference separated Comte from the Republican conception of progress. For Comte, positive knowledge is the definitive state of human knowledge. 9. Kremer-Marietti, 2007, p. 23. “To lay” is an intransitive verb used in masonry; it means to put a stone or a brick in its place. There are links that still unite French Republicans, who defend a nonreligious (“laïc”) approach to social affairs, and French freemasonry. 10. At the same time, Pierre Maine de Biran reestablished the unity of the ego, questioned by Hume, and helped construct the idea of self (see Goldstein, 2005). 11. Comte gives an extended account of Gall’s phrenology, because it explicitly linked moral faculties and physical characteristics (despite the many problems it raised). Phrenology put forward an extreme example of an agreement between the physical and the moral, of a psychophysiological parallel that, together with associationism, was typical of late 19th-century French psychology. Today, with the ideas of “mental modules” and the

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linked ideas of evolutionary psychology, this view is experiencing a resurgence. 12. The pathological therefore replaced the divine ideal of reason. Foucault wrote several texts on this question of norms. See Legrand, 2007. 13. Neither the history of psychiatry in France, nor that of psychoanalysis are the object of this chapter. 14. On this episode, see Darnton, 1968, who describes Paris at the end of the 18th century as “the Mecca of the marvellous.” 15. This was the beginning of the long French career of the somnambulists and the magnetizers. Their equivalents in the working class or the petit-bourgeoisie were spiritualists. The fashion for spiritualism, which “invaded” Europe in the middle of the 19th century, found fertile ground in France, where it was often presented as a new religion that was anticlerical (it was condemned by the Catholic Church) and above all declared itself to be positivist. In 1860, spiritisme appeared in the Dictionnaire français illustré et encyclopédie universelle, to designate not only someone who is convinced that something exists beyond matter, but also someone who believes in manifestations of the spirit. 16. In 1860, Laycock said that it was the experiments of the magnetizers carried out in London in 1837 that convinced him: “Mesmerist phenomena . . . formed a group of functional manifestations of the brain that were artificially induced and the hysterical girls or women were the most exposed to them” (Laycock, 1860). In 1876, the Revue Scientifique de la France et de l’Etranger published an article by Dumont that summarized the work of these various authors. 17. The idea that representations fall below the threshold of consciousness when they are repressed by more powerful representations was developed by Johann Friedrich Herbart at the beginning of the 19th century. 18. See, for example, Becquemont & Mucchielli, 1998. Their well-documented study is extremely useful to understand the impact of Spencer. 19. Terminological confusions occur frequently. Today, the French tend to argue that Darwin was an evolutionist whereas Lamarck was a transformist, and that Spencer’s evolutionism was a “philosophy” of evolution by complexification that was applied to everything. But in the 19th century, Spencer was an “evolutionist,” Darwin was a “transformist,” and Lamarck had long been forgotten. 20. It should be remembered that the University and its attendant intellectual milieu were much smaller than today. All the key actors in this tumultuous period knew each other, met each other, argued with each other. As Durkheim wrote in an extremely useful text: “In the educational year 1882–1883, the University of Paris had no more that 145 lecturers in all subjects” (1918, p. 23). 21. In the 1830s, Victor Cousin was appointed professor of philosophy at the Sorbonne, director of the Ecole Normale Supérieure, and then became a member first of the Académie Française, then of the Académie des Sciences Morales et Politiques. Finally, in 1840, he was appointed Minister of Public Education. His influence on the teaching of philosophy was considerable and included a nod in the direction of “spiritualism” in its psychological meaning. For Cousin, each human individual has a sense of truth (reason, mind) that philosophy has to bring to consciousness. The variety of philosophies that mankind has developed reveals a residue: common sense, which explains eclecticism. 22. It could be argued that it was only by eclecticism, which he learned from his teachers, that Ribot wrote to his friend Alfred Espinas in 1875, when Germer Baillière founded the Revue

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Philosophique for him, that the journal would have to embrace an “open, no sect-like approach.” In fact, calls for being “open” were a weapon in the struggle, even if it was the case that Ribot’s psychology was indeed marked by this eclecticism. 23. He was replaced by Alfred Binet in 1870. 24. The expression appeared in 1880, in the writings of the anarchist Emile Gautier. 25. A. Giard, 1890, cited by Gohau, 1979, p. 403. The whole of this issue of the Revue de Synthèse was devoted to the French neo-Lamarckians. They were the defenders of physiological psychology (like Henri Piéron), and they influenced Jean Piaget. Like Giard, for example, Piaget disagreed that mutation was an accident and argued instead that it was “the result of a new equilibrium” (Giard, cited by Gohau, 1979, p. 405). 26. In 1913, he received the Nobel Prize in Medicine for his discovery of anaphylaxis. 27. These included Babinski, Bain, Bechterev, Bernheim, Delboeuf, Durkheim, Espinas, Flournoy, Freud, Galton, Helmholtz, Jackson, James, Lombroso, and Vogt. 28. Charles Richet was the President in 1905, and Henri Bergson in 1913. On May 28, his presidential address was entitled “Ghosts of the Living and Psychic Research” (Bergson, 1972, pp. 860–878). 29. The best analysis of this decisive moment, which was used here, is that of Castel (1998). 30. In 1897, a theatre opened to put on these somewhat bloody and sexual shows, for which Alfred Binet wrote plays. Charcot put on some truly unforgettable spectacles at the Salpêtrière. 31. Pavlov used the same argument, initially on a dog. Using conditioning, he induced an experimental neurosis in the dog and claimed he had shown a natural mechanism for the development of a neurosis. See Parot, 2008. 32. Bernheim’s use of “coldness” to describe influence is curiously redolent of a passage, which all psychotherapists should read, in Book XII of The Literal Meaning of Genesis, by Saint Augustine (1970). He evokes the influence of the Devil on the possessed, and the difficulty of distinguishing it from that of God “when the evil spirit acts with a kind of calmness . . . in order to gain the confidence of someone by manifestly good suggestions in order to bring them insidiously to his own ends” (XIV, 28). Binet (1898, pp. 86–87) uses this image of “suggestive authority”: “the gaze is full of will, speech is full, sonorous, and articulates slowly.” Is calmness the secret of influence? 33. It can also be argued (and it was at the time) that criminals act under influence. Revealing the limits of the power of the consciousness or of the will also undermines the responsibility of individuals for his acts. 34. See his autobiography, 1930. 35. At the Ecole Normale Supérieure, he was the classmate of Bergson, Jaurès, and Durkheim, and with them he followed Emile Boutroux’s lectures in philosophy at the Sorbonne. 36. At various moments, Ribot sat in on Charcot’s lectures but he had no therapeutic practice as he was not a physician. 37. Jules Dejerine closed the laboratory 1910. Charcot invited Janet to work with him after the success of his thesis, L’automatisme psychologique, in 1889. 38. See Dejerine & Gauckler, 1911. Déjerine had himself cured of depression by his friend Paul Dubois, who practised psychotherapy at Berne. However, Dubois’ approach owed nothing to hypnosis or psychoanalysis. The patient who became known as the “wolf man” was treated by Dubois before Freud met him and kept him as his patient on his journey between Odessa and Berne.

Dubois’ therapeutic approach merely used language, a dialogue with the patient, which was intended to “persuade” him. A moral treatment, in other words (see Müller, 2003). 39. It can be argued that Charles Baudouin and his teacher Emile Coué (a pharmacist who enjoyed some success when he suggested that people who felt bad should convince themselves that they were feeling better) were the inheritors of Bernheim. However, popular success does not mean scientific progress has been made, and although an anecdote can be amusing, it does not necessarily contribute to the history of thought or of a discipline. 40. It was in fact published after the war. 41. It can be assumed that hypnosis or nonpsychiatric therapies of mental disturbances were used here and there. But there is no trace of this in the official journals, or in the archives of the institutions. 42. In the Foreword (1911, p. IX), Dejerine claims that the “unique basis” on which all psychotherapy is based is the well-meaning influence of one being on another, and that in this process, the patient must “confess his whole life,” that the therapist must be in “communion” with the patient. Clearly, the conception of psychotherapy was “imbibed” with the moral authority of the confessor. 43. Charles Péguy popularized this name for the young people trained at the Ecole Normale under the Third Republic to become teachers. Following the tradition of those protestants who fought for laïcité, they rejected any form of ornament and dressed in black. Today’s students at Sciences Politiques do the same, but voluntarily. 44. It was published in 1895 and not in 1896 as stated by Wolf (1973). 45. On this usage, see Martin, 1997. 46. Among them were Marey and Boutroux. 47. The academic world required more zeal: Although Janet and Dumas never missed one of Ribot’s lectures and were considerate and assiduous, Binet was more distant. More certainly, they were agrégés and he was not. 48. Quoted in Dumas, 1939, p. 46. 49. See the two main texts on this point; Durkheim, 1898b; Mauss & Fauconnet, 1901. 50. The correspondence between the two men reveals how cool was their relationship. Although many of Janet’s letters begin with “My dear friend,” this was a replacement for cordiality, and the content of the letters dealt solely with their respective interests. For example, in a letter of November 28, 1911, Janet, who would have been very pleased to succeed Binet at the Sorbonne laboratory, and had written a letter to the Minister by way of the physicist d’Arsonval (whom he had met at the Institut Psychologique International), wrote to Piéron; “If you are very powerful and if you want Binet’s place, set me up an independent laboratory at the Collège de France, or even better in a hospital, and I will energetically support you as Binet’s successor.” 51. On H. Piéron, see the inventory of his archives by Charmasson and Parot (1986), which can be found in the Archives Nationales, 520 AP 1 to AP51. See also his autobiography in Parot & Richelle, 1992. 52. Wallon and Piéron had known each other for some time. They had been neighbors on the boulevard Saint Michel. Wallon was a physician and a philosopher, a Dreyfusard, and a socialist. After World War II, he became a communist. 53. This was the title of Piéron’s work, which appeared in two volumes in 1945 and 1959. 54. He was not entitled to call himself a physician because he obtained French nationality only in 1923. On Meyerson, see Charmasson, Demellier, Parot, & Vermès, 1995, Archives d’I.

Meyerson, 521 AP 1 à 67, Paris, Archives Nationales; Parot (2000a). For an intellectual biography of Meyerson, see Parot (2000b). 55. In a letter to Delacroix, he wrote that this period was one of the dullest of his life. Psychopathology did not interest Meyerson, any more than psychoanalysis. He was the first person to translate Freud’s Traumdeutung into French. He said he did it simply for the money. In 1925, in a review of Blondel’s book on psychoanalysis, Meyerson wrote the he thought that Freud was “the last of the associationist Mohicans.” 56. According to tradition, the editorial secretary of the Journal was the Société’s general secretary. Meyerson held both posts. 57. Piéron, discussion of Mauss, 1924, p. 918. 58. Throughout the 20th century, the historians followed Meyerson. Febvre, Bloch, Braudel, Vernant, Le Goff, Chartier, and Revel, all acknowledged their debt to him. Psychologists like J. Bruner regretted that they did not know of Meyerson’s work. On these reactions, see Parot, 1996. 59. See the Meyerson Archives, 521 AP 57. 60. For example “Write to me soon with your suggestions” (November 9, 1924); “Give me some working hypotheses” (November 14, 1924). For a discussion of this relationship, see Vidal & Parot, 1996. 61. The Ligue was founded in 1921, held its first Congress in the north of France, at Calais, and included several overseas psychologists and philosophers who were interested in the key questions of education. 62. See the Piéron Archives, 520 AP 12. 63. Chapter IV was by Georges Davy, “La sociologie.” 64. In 1898, he published a widely read article in L’Année Psychologique. 65. This long chapter spans pages 811 to 1006. 66. Other volumes include other of Piéron’s influential friends: Paul Langevin and Jean Perrin with whom, together with Wallon, he reformed French research after the war. 67. Jaspers, 1928. This book includes an important appendix, “Les psychothérapies,” which shows that psychotherapy was practiced outside France. This work was translated with the help of Sartre and Nizan. 68. See Guillemain, 2006. 69. This expression has been repeatedly used since the beginnings of the French Republic, just after the 1789 revolution. 70. Langevin, Piéron, and Wallon were key players in the Groupe Français pour l’Education Nouvelle from the beginning of the 1930s. 71. At the same time, Piéron worked with Edouard Toulouse, who was focused on a study of biocracy, on transforming the Fondation Alexis Carrel into a Centre d’étude des Problèmes Humains (Piéron Archives, 520 AP13). 72. Psychology was attached to philosophy, but Piéron was in the biology section. 73. See, for example, Sallenave, 2008, p. 151. 74. Archives of the l’Institut de Psychologie, Rectorat de Paris, Conseil du 26 février 1942. 75. See the student notes, taken during his lectures, which were published in the Bulletin du Groupe d’études de psychologie de l’Université de Paris. 76. Professional status was discussed in virtually every issue of the Bulletin du Groupe d’études de psychologie de l’Université de Paris that appeared from 1948 onward. 77. Unfortunately, his success was posthumous; Piéron died in 1964.

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78. The Fraisse family, the families of Émmanuel Mounier and of Paul Ricœur, lived in a kind of commune, “Les murs blancs,” at Châtenay-Malabry, 10 km south of Paris, where they created a site with a “personalist library” that is still visited by overseas researchers. 79. Stated in particular during his 1956 lecture at the Collège de France, “Qu’est-ce que la psychologie?” (1958). 80. Repeated over and again in the works of both authors. 81. The welfare state was generous and, in the shadow of its generosity, individualism grew.

References Baillarger, J. (1846). Des hallucinations, des causes qui les produisent, et des maladies qui les caractérisent. Mémoires de l’Académie royale de médecine, 12, 373–475. Becquemont, D., & Mucchielli, L. (1998). Le cas Spencer. Paris: PUF. Bergson, H. (1972). Œuvres Complètes. Paris: Gallimard. Bernard, C. (1865). Introduction à la médecine expérimentale. Paris: Flammarion. Translated as An introduction to the study of experimental medicine. New York: Macmillan, 1927. Bernheim, H. (1891). Hypnotisme, suggestion, psychothérapie. Paris: Doin, Etudes Nouvelles. Translated as Suggestive therapeutics. A treatise on the nature and uses of hypnotism. London: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1889. Binet, A. (1886). Psychologie du raisonnement. Paris: Lacan. Translated as Psychology of reasoning. Chicago: Open Court, 1899. Binet, A., & Henri, V. (1895). La psychologie individuelle. L’Année psychologique, 2, 411–465. Binet, A. (1898). La suggestibilité au point de vue individuel. L’Année psychologique, 5, 82–152. Blondel, C. (1923). La personnalité. In G. Dumas (Ed.), Traité de Psychologie (pp. 523–574). Paris: Alcan. Boutier, J., Passeron, J. -C., & Revel, J. (2006). Qu’est-ce qu’une discipline? Paris: EHESS. Bouveresse, J. (1976). Le Mythe de l’intériorité. Paris: Ed. de Minuit. Canguilhem, G. (1958). Qu’est-ce que la psychologie? Revue de métaphysique et de morale, 1, 12–25. Carroy, J., Ohayon, A., & Plas, R. (2006). Histoire de la psychologie en France, XIXè-XXè siècles. Paris: La Découverte. Castel, P. -H. (1998). La Querelle de l’hystérie. Paris: PUF. Charmasson, T., & Parot, F. (1986). Archives d’Henri Piéron, 520 AP 1 à 51. Paris: Archives Nationales. Charmasson, T., Demellier, D., Parot, F., & Vermès, G. (1995). Archives d’I. Meyerson, 521 AP 1 à 67. Paris: Archives Nationales. Claparède, E. (1939). Simples souvenirs, Centenaire de Théodule Ribot, 1839–1939: Jubilé de la Psychologie scientifique française (pp. 139–150). Paris, Agen. Comte, A. (1975). Cours de philosophie positive. In M. Serres, F. Dagognet, & A. Sinaceur, Auguste Comte, Philosophie première: Cours de philosophie positive, leçons 1 à 45. Paris: Hermann, 1975. Translated as The positive philosophy of Auguste Comte. London: Chapman, 1853. Comte, A. (1844). Discours sur l’esprit positif. Paris: CarilianGuoeury et Dalmont. Translated as A discourse on the positive spirit. London: Reeves, 1903. Darnton, R. (1968). Mesmerism and the end of enlightment in France. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

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Dejerine, J., & Gauckler, E. (1911). Les Manifestations fonctionnelles des psychonévroses. Leur traitement par la psychothérapie. Paris: Masson. Dumas, G. (1923). Traité de psychologie. Paris: Alcan. Dumas, G. (1939). Discours de M. Georges Dumas. Centenaire de Théodule Ribot, 1839–1939: Jubilé de la Psychologie Scientifique (pp. 37–46). Paris: Agen. Dumont, M. (1876). L’action réflexe cérébrale. La Revue Scientifique de la France et de l’Etranger, 28(8 janvier 1876), 28–33. Durkheim, E. (1898a). L’individualisme et les intellectuels. Revue Bleue, X, 7–13. Durkheim, E. (1898b). Représentations individuelles et représentations collectives. Revue de métaphysique et de morale, 6, 273–302. Durkheim, E. (1918). La vie universitaire à Paris. In Conseil de l’Université de Paris (Ed.). Paris: Armand Colin. Reprint in E. Durkheim, Textes. 1. Éléments d’une théorie sociale (pp. 453–483). Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1975. Fabiani, J. -L. (1985). Enjeux et usages de la crise dans la philosophie universitaire en France au tournant du siècle. Annales ESC, mars-avril(2), 377–409. Fraisse, P. (1965). Henri Piéron (1881–1964). Annales de l’Université de Paris, 2, 1–8. Fraisse, P. (1992). Autobiographie. In F. Parot, & M. Richelle (Eds.), Psychologues de langue française; autobiographies (pp. 79–96). Paris: PUF. Gautier, E. (1880). Le Darwinisme social. Étude de philosophie sociale. Paris: Dervaux. Giard, A. (1890). Le principe de Lamarck et l’hérédité des modifications somatiques, leçon d’ouverture des cours d’évolution des êtres organisés. Revue scientifique, 46, 705–713. Gohau, G. (1979). Alfred Giard (1854–1920). Revue de Synthèse, 95–96, 393–406. Goldstein, J. E. (2005). The post-revolutionary self: Politics and psyche in France, 1750–1850. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Griesinger, W. (1865). Traité des maladies mentales. Pathologie et thérapeutique. Paris: Adrien Delahaye. Translated as Mental pathology and therapeutics. New York: Hafner, 1965. Guillemain, H. (2006). Diriger les consciences, guérir les âmes: Une histoire comparée des pratiques thérapeutiques et religieuses (1830–1939). Paris: La Découverte. Husserl, E. (1913). Idées directrices pour une phénoménologie et une philosophie phénoménologique pure 2 tomes. Paris: PUF, 1950 et 1982. ( Translation of Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie, I, 1913).Translated as Ideas pertaining to a pure phenomenology and to a phenomenological philosophy–First book: General introduction to a pure phenomenology. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1982. Janet, P. (1919). Les Médications psychologiques (3 vols.). Paris: Alcan. Janet, P. (1930). Autobiography. In C. Murchison (Ed.), History of psychology in autobiography Vol. 1 (pp. 123–133). Worcester, MA: Clark University Press. Jaspers, K. (1913). Allgemeine Psychopathologie. Heidelberg & Berlin: Springer-Verlag. Translated as Psychopathologie générale. Paris: Alcan, 1928. Translated as General psychopathology. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1963. Kremer-Marietti, A. (2007). Le Concept de science positive. Ses tenants et ses aboutissants dans les structures anthropologiques du positivisme. Paris: L’Harmattan.

Lagache, D. (1949). L’unité de la psychologie. Psychologie expérimentale et psychologie clinique. Paris: PUF. Laycock, T. (1860). Mind and brain, or the correlation of consciousness and organization t. II (pp. 466–467). Edimburgh. (Cited in Gauchet, M. (1992). L’inconscient cerebral (p. 46). Paris: Le Seuil. Legrand, S. (2007). Les normes chez Foucault. Paris: PUF. Lévy-Bruhl, L. (1910). Les Fonctions mentales dans les sociétés inférieures. Paris: Alcan. Translated as How natives think. London: Allen & Unwin, 1926. Martin, O. (1997). La mesure de l’esprit ; origines et développements de la psychométrie, 1900–1950. Paris: L’Harmattan. Mauss, M. (1923). Allocution présidentielle. Journal de psychologie normale et pathologique, 20, 756–758. Mauss, M. (1927). Divisions et proportions de la sociologie, L’Année sociologique, 2, 87–173. In M. Mauss (Ed.), Oeuvres. 3. Cohésion sociale et division de la sociologie (pp. 178–245). Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit, 1969. Mauss, M., & Fauconnet, P. (1901). Sociologie. In La Grande Encyclopédie Vol. 30 (pp. 171–172). Paris: H. Lamirault. Meyerson, I. (1925). Compte rendu du livre de Bondel (1924). Journal de psychologie normale et pathologique, 22, 814–815. Meyerson, I. (1948). Les Fonctions psychologiques et les œuvres. Paris: Vrin. Müller, C. (2003). Paul Dubois, pionnier de la psychothérapie. Psychothérapies, 23(1), 49–52. Nicolas, S., & Ferrand, L. (2008). Histoire de la Psychologie Scientifique. Bruxelles: DeBoeck. Paget, J. (1873). Nervous mimicry of organic diseases Lecture 1. Lancet, ii, 511–513. Parot, F. (1994). Le bannissement des esprits: Naissance d’une frontière institutionnelle entre spiritisme et psychologie. Revue de synthèse, 3–4, 417–443. Parot, F. (2000a). Psychology in the human sciences in France, 1920–1940: Ignace Meyerson’s historical psychology. History of Psychology, 3(2), 104–121.

Parot, F. (2000b). Introduction à I. Meyerson, Existe-t-il une nature humaine? Psychologie historique, objective, comparative (pp. 19–80). Paris: Sanofi-Synthélabo. Parot, F. (2008). La maladie mentale dans les thérapies comportementales: Approche historique et épistémologique. In J. N. Missa (Ed.), Les maladies mentales (pp. 63–93). Paris: PUF. Parot, F. (Ed.). (1996). Pour une Psychologie historique: Hommage à Ignace Meyerson. Paris: PUF. Piéron, H. (1908). L’évolution du psychisme. Revue du mois, mars, 291–310. Piéron, H. (1945, 1959). De l’Actinie à l’Homme (2 vols.). Paris: PUF. Piéron, H. (1992). Autobiographie. In F. Parot, M. Richelle (Eds.), Psychologues de langue française: Autobiographies (pp. 5–30). Paris: PUF. Ribot, T. (1879). Introduction à la psychologie allemande contemporaine. Paris: Alcan. Ribot, T. (1885). Les maladies de la personnalité. Paris: Alcan. Saint Augustin. (1970). La Genèse au sens littéral, Paris: Desclée de Brouwer. Translated as The literal meaning of genesis. New York: Newman Press, 1982. Sallenave, D. (2008). Le Castor de guerre. Paris: Gallimard. Vidal, F. (2006). The “prehistory” of psychology: Thoughts on a historiographical illusion. Physics, XLIII(1–2), 31–59. Vidal, F., & Parot, F. (1996). Ignace Meyerson et Jean Piaget: Une amitié dans l’histoire. In F. Parot (Ed.), Pour une Psychologie historique: Hommage à Ignace Meyerson (pp. 61–73). Paris: PUF. Voutsinas, D. (1967). Psychologie abstraite et psychologie concrète: En relisant Georges Politzer, Bulletin de Psychologie, 21(1–4), N 263, 69–120. Wallon, H. (1945). Les origines de la pensée chez l’enfant. Paris: PUF. Wolf, T. H. (1973). Alfred Binet. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

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Appendix Timeline of French Psychology 1778

Mesmer arrives in Paris

1795

Pinel freed the patients in the Salpêtrière hospital

1837

Comte’s 45th lesson on psychology

1876

Ribot becomes the editor of the Revue Philosophique

1888

Ribot becomes Professor at the Collège de France

1889

1rst Congress of physiological psychology is held in Paris; foundation of a laboratory of physiological psychology at the EPHE for Beaunis

1890

Charcot creates the Laboratory of psychology at the Salpêtrière for Janet

1894

Binet succeeds Beaunis at EPHE; beginning of the Dreyfus Affair

1895

Binet becomes editor of L’Année Psychologique

1900

4th Congress of psychology held in Paris

1904

The Journal of Normal and Pathological Psychology is founded par Dumas and Janet

1911

Piéron succeeds Binet at the EPHE laboratory

1919–1921

Piaget lives in Paris

1920

Creation of the Institut de Psychologie for Piéron

1922

Creation of the Groupe français de l’Education Nouvelle

1923

Piéron becomes Professor at the Collège de France; 1923–1924: Dumas edits the Traité de Psychologie

1926

The Société psychanalytique de Paris is created

1928

Creation of the Institut national d’Orientation Professionnelle

1935

Launch of L’Encyclopédie française edited by Lucien Febvre

1937

Wallon becomes Professor at the Collège de France

1944

Opening of the certificate of Higher Studies in Psychophysiology

1947

Creation of a Licence of Psychology by Guillaume

1952

Fraisse succeeds Piéron at the EPHE laboratory

1964

Fraisse succeeds Piéron at head of the Institut de Psychologie

1965

The psychology section of the CNRS is renamed “psychophysiology and psychology, science of behavior” and is transferred to the Department of Exact and Natural Sciences

1985

The profession of psychologist is officially recognized.

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C HA P TE R

13

Germany

Horst U. K. Gundlach

Abstract The chapter sketches the history of psychology in Germany in the last 500 years, with emphasis on the difference between psychology as science and psychology as discipline. It delineates the evolution of the concept of a science of psychology that became widely accepted in Germany during the Enlightenment. In the 19th century three trends shaped the development: the discipline of physiology became the hotbed of experimental psychology; psychology became a required topic in the teachers’ examination, and thereby a miniature discipline in the philosophical faculty; and the Wundtian psychological laboratory united these processes. In the 20th century, the resulting constraints were forced open by new applications of psychology that led to a full-fledged discipline of psychology with a corresponding profession. Keywords: Experimental psychology, Enlightenment, psychological laboratory, applied psychology, Germany, Wundt

The Time Frame Employed and an Explication of the Use of the Words “Science” and “Discipline” There is no consensus among authors of the history of psychology as to when psychology emerges. Some begin in antiquity, some in the 19th century, others somewhere in between. Some regard the existence of a concept of psychology, some of the label “psychology,” as their guideline. Some use as the criterion for inclusion the treatment of topics presently considered as belonging to the discipline of psychology, or to the science of psychology, in which science may be understood in a narrower or in a wider sense. The approach here is pragmatic. There is no evidence of any psychology in German antiquity, and whatever may deserve to be called psychology in the German Middle Ages (e.g., the De Anima Libri Tres by Albertus Magnus) is so highly integrated in the vast field of medieval theology and philosophy that it cannot be adequately treated here.1 Therefore, the

starting point will be the early modern times, when the term “psychologia” appeared on the scene and became widespread owing to Gutenberg’s invention. No particular consideration will be given to the question of when psychology was prescientific, protoscientific, or scientific. The word “science” will be used in its comprehensive sense as equivalent to the Latin scientia and the German Wissenschaft, not as a shorthand for “the new sciences” or “natural sciences plus mathematics.”2 For our understanding of the past of psychology, there is a greater problem than defining the divide between a prescientific, a protoscientific, and a scientific past. This is the difference between psychology as a science and psychology as a discipline. By “science” is meant the pursuit, in theory and, in the case of an empirical science, in research, of knowledge about things and processes deemed to belong to a specific area of themes regarded as separate or separable from other specific areas, a pursuit 255

that proceeds according to the accepted scientific standards of its time. A discipline, as understood here, is something altogether different.3 As its Latin root disciplina hints, a discipline consists of disciples, students, pupils, and of teachers, of a more or less canonized body of theoretical and practical knowledge, of the passing of examinations, and of the graduation after the final examination of the disciple into a socially recognized class of persons (i.e., experts in that branch of learning or field of knowledge or science they have been trained in). The latter may have the same name as the discipline. If that applies only with restrictions, we have what may be called an auxiliary discipline. A science may be the domain of one discipline, or a science may be the domain of various disciplines, or a science may be practiced by different scientists without being the domain of any particular discipline. And, of course, there are disciplines whose domains do not qualify as sciences. Here, it is only important to recall that a science does not have to be incorporated into a discipline. It may very well do without a formal transfer of the expert status from generation to generation. Psychology considered as a science is not the same as psychology considered as a discipline, and the science of psychology has been with us a long time before a discipline of that name came into existence.

On the Way to the Invention of a Science Named Psychology: RenaissanceHumanism and the 17th Century It is still not possible to point to an originator of the neo-Greek expression Ψυχολογια, or its Latinized equivalent, psychologia. This word, unknown to antiquity, was invented at the end of the Middle Ages4 in the context of reading and interpreting Aristotle, especially his tract De Anima or On the Soul, a compulsory object of university studies in the late Middle Ages. The neologism was slowly, but eventually favorably, received at European and particularly at German universities. It was at first only one of many names for an imprecisely defined field of knowledge that could encompass different topics from reflections on Aristotelian ideas to metaphysical speculations on a theological basis. Although it took time for psychologia to win widespread acceptance, the word itself slowly generated the concept of a field of knowledge or a science concerned with the soul, principally, but not exclusively, the soul of humans, that combined diverse branches of learning received from antiquity (e.g., physiognomy, characterology, oneirology or oneiromancy, 256

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doctrines on memory, on optical and other perception, on reasoning, on willing). It was not so much the content of this newly conceived and freshly labeled science that was original, but the assembling of ancient topics into a single specialty. Scholars in Renaissance-Humanism studied with mixed appraisals Aristotle’s De Anima and produced many commentaries and paraphrases. Most influential was Philipp Melanchton (1497–1560) and his Commentarius de Anima (1540), which saw numerous editions, the later ones titled Liber de Anima (1553). Historians of psychology therefore for some time considered Melanchton the originator of psychologia, but that was incorrect. Other authors employed the neologism instead of the Latin phrase doctrina de anima and put it into print. They were principally German Protestant humanist scholars like Melanchton himself. Johann Thomas Freigius (1543–1583) employed the title De Psychologia for a chapter in his Quaestiones Physicae (1579). Rudolph Goclenius senior (1547–1628), or, in the original German, Göckel, professor at the Calvinist university Marburg, called by his contemporaries the Christian Aristotle, became notorious in the historiography of psychology as he published a collection of essays that is the first book known to have Psychologia (1590), in Greek letters, on its title page. It was a success, and saw a number of editions. It is, however, difficult to assess how important this expression was for Goclenius. In his Latin philosophical lexicon (Goclenius, 1613) there is an entry anima, and in his Greek philosophical lexicon (Goclenius, 1615) an entry psyche, but in neither does he mention psychologia. Merz (1912, p. 200f.) refers to a remark by Thomas Whittaker that Goclenius might have picked up the word from a false reading of Proclus, where it should have been psychogonia, the generation of the soul. This is a sensible guess, as not only the content, but even the title of Goclenius’ celebrated book brings up that topic. Whatever Goclenius meant, other writers as well used the word in their book titles. The Strassburg philosopher Johann Ludwig Hawenreuther or Havenreuther (1548–1618) published a Psychologia in 1591, Goclenius’ disciple Otho Casmann (1562–1607) a Psychologia Anthropologica in 1594, the Leipzig philosopher Fabian Hippe, latinized Hippius (1564–1599), a Psychologia Physica (1600). Casmann envisioned an anthropologia,5 a science of the human being that consisted of somatologia, the science of the body, and of psychologia, the science of the soul. The human being, so Casmann believed, is neither the bodyless soul nor the soulless

body, but their union. This conceptual scaffold, the opposition of physis and psyche, or of the physical and psychical, a concept deeply entrenched in modern thinking, is very likely the backdrop accountable for the notion that there should be a general science, named psychology or otherwise, that unites into a single field of knowledge the various nonphysical topics already cultivated in antiquity. The 16th century produced only the intuition of a consolidated science of psychology. Nonetheless, many writers dealt with themes later assembled under this concept, as the pertinent psychology bibliography for the 16th century by Schüling (1967) proves. Some topics, then hotly disputed, do not belong to today’s psychology, like the immortality or the generation of the soul. The standard methods used in this century would be judged inadmissible in the present (e.g., appeal to accepted authorities, or inference from analogy). This picture did not change much in the 17th century. The word psychologia did not yet acquire extensive usage. Johannes Micraelius (1597–1658), in his important philosophical lexicon (1653/1662) offers for psychologia the bland definition doctrina de anima, nothing else. Schüling’s (1964) bibliography for the 17th century proves that again a large segment of the literature on psychology and its subtopics concerned the ancient authors, especially Aristotle. A sizeable segment of the literature, also mostly inspired by Aristotle, addressed theological reflections about the soul. The authors again are predominantly Protestants like Christoph Scheibler (1589–1653), who published a Collegium Psychologicum (1608–1609), or Johann Conrad Dannhauer, or Dannhawer (1603–1666), whose Collegium Psychologicum (1630) saw many legal as well as pirated editions. Dannhauer was the teacher of Philipp Jacob Spener (1635–1705), the founder of Lutheran pietism. This might have brought the expression to the attention of this mystical and spiritual movement. An important work by Jacob Böhme (1575–1624), who was, and still is, venerated among pietists, appeared posthumously under the title Psychologia vera (Böhme, 1632). It saw many editions and was considered significant enough to figure immediately on the Vatican index. German pietism, with its concern about one’s personal soul and its perdition or salvation, propagated a mood for soul-searching and introspection. It is therefore often declared to have prepared the ground for a broad acceptance of a science of psychology. It is admittedly accurate that pietist practices like conscientious self-observation and the keeping of

copious diaries on one’s feelings, sentiments, and thoughts resulted in a cultural climate of enhanced attention toward inner and intimate states and processes. But although the majority of important persons in German psychology came from a Protestant background, hardly any of those who made notable contributions to the development of the science of psychology were involved in the various waves of pietism and neo-pietism (Gundlach, 2004c). The polymath Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716), a towering influence in the intellectual life of Germany in the 18th and 19th century, markedly influenced the development of psychology and was an important reference for eminent psychologists like Herbart and Wundt. At a cursory glance, this seems surprising. Leibniz rarely used the word “psychology” for the doctrine of the soul, but rather employed “pneumatology,” which might be rendered as “doctrine of the spirit.” He did not develop a theory of psychology of his own, as his philosophical interests concentrated on ontology and epistemology. It is in this context that he developed ideas on psychological matters.6 He never published a definite philosophical system, but communicated through journal articles and his voluminous correspondence. After his demise, posterity collected his correspondence and manuscripts, and a succession of ever larger and more dependable editions appeared. Since 1901, the Berlin Academy of Sciences publishes a critical edition that now comprises about 70 volumes but still is not completed. This publishing history explains why it is not feasible here to follow the various lines of influence various editions had on later psychologists. Only a sketch of the principal ideas that stimulated later thinking can be given. It must also be mentioned that Leibniz’ use of words and concepts is not always consistent, but presents some variations over time, which can not be elucidated here. Leibniz confronted two philosophical currents of his times, René Descartes and Cartesianism with their opposition of extension and thought, as well as John Locke and his empiricism. In Leibniz’ conception of the mind, there are two kinds of processes, cognition and volition, which he calls perceptions and appetitions. The assumed constituents of perceptions, minute perceptions (petites perceptions), can aggregate to larger entities, the familiar perceptions. Perceptions vary in intensity, the lowest degrees being what he calls obscure perceptions. There are also confused or indistinct perceptions, and the higher degrees are the realm of clear or distinct perceptions. The former are not conscious, gundl ach

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whereas the latter are. Consciousness is effected by what Leibniz named with his newly minted word “apperception.” He called it the reflective knowledge of an internal state. Apperceptions are perceptions of perceptions, which are combinations of infinitely many minute perceptions. But it would be a misunderstanding to believe that he proposes a fundamental divide between two separate realms of consciousness and of unconsciousness. Quite to the contrary. Leibniz, one of the two inventors of the infinitesimal calculus, considered the lex continui or principle of continuity valid here also. It follows that there are no gaps and therefore no absolute oppositions. Between any two grades or stages is an infinite chain of intermediate grades or stages. Apparent rest is an infinitely minute movement, darkness is infinitely miniscule light, stillness is infinitely small noise. Unconsciousness and consciousness come into infinitely small gradations, and noticeable perceptions arise by degrees from those that are too minute to be observed. So, paradoxically, there are perceptions of which we are not conscious, the obscure perceptions. Then there are conscious perceptions, but they are not conscious at all times. In dreamless sleep or apathy is absence of any conscious perception. In a waking state, one is conscious of particular perceptions, but never of all. In analogy, there are unconscious and there are conscious appetitions or desires; that is, appetitions we apperceive, but the latter are not conscious at all times. Leibniz does not pay much attention to elaborating appetitions, as his principal expositions concern perceptions that now and then he also calls representations. It is crucial to note that the perceptions that are not apperceived are not at all unimportant. Unconscious or insensible perceptions are as important in pneumatology (read: psychology) as insensible corpuscles are in physics, and it would be just as unreasonable to reject the one as the other on the pretext that they are beyond the reach of our senses, as Leibniz explains in the Preface of his New Essays, his contestation of Locke’s Essay on Human Understanding. As he puts it, “at every moment there is in us an infinity of perceptions, unaccompanied by awareness or reflection; that is, of alterations in the soul itself, of which we are unaware because these impressions are either too minute and too numerous, or else too unvarying, so that they are not sufficiently distinctive on their own” (Leibniz, 1981, A VI vi 53/RB 53). Indeed, this infinity of perceptions is likened by Leibniz to the roar of the sea: “To hear this noise as we do, we must hear the 258

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parts which make up this whole, that is the noise of each wave, although each of these little noises makes itself known only when combined confusedly with all the others, and would not be noticed if the wave which made it were by itself ” (Leibniz, 1981, A VI vi 54/RB 54). This conception, together with Herbart’s concept of limen, finds its echo in Fechner’s psychophysics. The concept of unconscious perceptions, one might also say representations, is directed against the Cartesians, with their radical opposition of conscious thought and extension, as unconscious perceptions are neither conscious nor extended. It is also directed against the empiricism of Locke and many other philosophers of his times. It was to gain wide acceptance in the 19th century. The principle of continuity also removed the gaps that the Cartesians supposed to exist between the vegetable kingdom and the animal kingdom, and between the animal kingdom and humans. The difference between humans and animals Leibniz derived from the factor that humans can have more distinct perceptions than can animals. This paved the way for comparative psychology, and even for Fechner’s adventurous idea of plants having souls. Renaissance-Humanism saw the emergence of the word psychologia. This expression, whether used in a book’s title or only in the text, does not denote topics never dealt with before. On the contrary, it is a new name for a collection of old topics already treated by Plato, Aristotle, and later authors. The novelty the use of the new word indicates is that, at least among German scholars, a distinct science uniting those dispersed topics was on its way to be recognized. Leibniz, usually not seen as belonging to the Enlightenment, was in all events one of the scholars who prepared the intellectual climate for this European intellectual movement. Specifically, he created many psychological concepts to which later thinkers linked theirs.

Psychology in German Enlightenment The German version of the Enlightenment, Aufklärung, took an interest in the word “psychology” and in the concept of psychology. Although French and English universities generally ignored the ideas of the Enlightenment and decayed into a scholasticism, German universities were the spearhead of this intellectual movement.7 Here the word “psychology” could assume a fresh life, despite the scholastic aroma some scholars observed. The philosopher and jurist Christian Thomasius (1655–1728) is considered the first important figure

in the German Enlightenment. He was involved in the founding of the leading reform university at Halle, he fought scholastic stuffiness and encouraged that German replaced Latin as the language used in university lectures. His early work Introductio ad Philosophiam Aulicam (Introduction to Philosophy for the Courtier, 1688) presented an anthropology and psychology influenced by the French moraliste8 philosophers like François de La Rochefoucauld or Jean de La Bruyère, and by the Spanish author Baltasar Gracián. Thomasius’ psychological interests centered on characterology and personality. In his Die neue Erfindung (The New Invention, 1691) he pleaded for a new science of determining the heart of other persons, and in a following publication (1692), he developed and demonstrated the measuring of personality traits with rating scales.9 As he was generally an eclectic and keen on practical application, he never published an elaborate psychological theory, but psychological conceptions constitute the basis for his writings in various philosophical fields and exerted a major influence in his times. While Thomasius neither produced a coherent psychology nor made much use of the word “psychology,” the philosopher, mathematician, and jurist Christian Wolff (1679–1754) became the pivotal figure in definitively establishing a definable field of knowledge and attaching the word “psychology” to it. Wolff, like Thomasius professor at Halle and one of the outstanding figures of the German Enlightenment, produced the most methodical philosophical system in the 18th century. He published amply in German and, for the benefit of an international audience, in Latin as well. His monumental volumes, Psychologia Empirica (1732), empirical psychology, and Psychologia Rationalis (1734), rational psychology, charted the field.10 He claimed each area to be methodo scientifica pertractata, scientifically treated. To ensure that psychology is a science in the new style of Galileo and Newton, using number and measure, he pronounced the necessity of a psychometria, or psychometry, an art of measuring the mental realm. He is, however, not very explicit on how this would work. Psychology for Wolff is a fundamental science on a par with theology, ontology, and cosmology, and therefore belongs to special metaphysics. His division of psychology in two parts, empirical and rational, concerns the method, not the content. Whereas empirical psychology starts from experience about mental processes, rational psychology

starts from metaphysical principles about the soul. But the final results of the two methods, if properly applied, should coincide. The partitioning of psychology into these two segments will allow later authors to remove empirical psychology or even psychology as a whole out of metaphysics and place it into the domain of natural science. Wolff tried to build a system of the powers or faculties of the soul. It became the prototype of what later adversaries condemned as faculty psychology, a psychology that postulates for each kind of mental processes an underlying faculty (e.g., for remembering, a faculty of memory; for thoughts, a faculty of thinking). The task of empirical psychology is the search for the laws governing each faculty. Thinking and willing are the most abstract mental faculties. Many others are subordinate to these. Using the concept of mental faculties will remain standard for writers of Aufklärung. It is not until Herbart’s critique that its viability will be challenged. Wundt followed Herbart in this respect and censured whatever he perceived as attempts to revive this kind of psychology. Wolff was resourceful in creating a German terminology for philosophy and psychology that had a lasting effect on these fields. A famous example is his coining of Bewusstsein for consciousness. He does not use the German word Psychologie, but, true to his idea of creating a genuine German terminology, rather uses Seelenlehre, the literal equivalent to doctrina animae or psychologia. Later German authors vacillated between using Seelenlehre, Seelenkunde, or Psychologie. At the universities, the Greco-Latin word prevailed, and Seelenlehre disappeared from the educated vocabulary in the second half of the 19th century. Wolff’s pivotal role in the history of psychology is appropriately summarized by Georges Gusdorf: “It is to the credit of the Prussian philosopher that he has compelled the enlightened public opinion to adopt the word ‘psychology’ and the science (or branch of knowledge) denoted by this word” (Gusdorf, 1973, p. 25).11 Psychology may have become a generally acknowledged science at German universities, but it was not yet a discipline in the sense outlined above. Scholars pursuing psychological topics in the 18th century were experts in different fields (e.g., in philosophy, physics, physiology, law, or theology). They were not even necessarily affiliated to a university. Many intellectuals, authors, poets, essayists, and novelists treated psychological topics that, in Germany, had become a universal concern. gundl ach

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Although it is a received idea that pietism had paved the way for a German proneness to introspective soul-searching, it should be remembered that it was pietist professors at Halle who decried Wolff’s philosophy and had him forced out of Prussia. It was presumably Wolff’s scientific approach that had aroused their indignation. Five of the many authors who worked in this branch of knowledge between Wolff and Kant also merit mentioning here. Christian August Crusius (1715–1775), philosopher and later theologian, is the first to rebuke Wolff by strictly excluding empirical psychology from metaphysics (Crusius, 1745). Like Leibniz, he preferred the word “pneumatology” to “psychology.” Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten (1714–1762), a disciple a Wolff, in his book Aesthetica (1750/1758) created a new philosophical discipline, aesthetics, which relies on the mental faculties as postulated by Wolff. He carefully investigated sensations and feelings, considered with Wolff as a lower form of knowledge. They may lead to the enjoyment of beauty, not to genuine knowledge of the observed object for which reason is responsible. Hermann Samuel Reimarus (1694–1768), Protestant theologian, philosopher, and a follower of Wolff, cultivated comparative psychology. His Allgemeine Betrachtungen über die Tiere (General Reflections of the Animals) (1760) is full of new observations and is a fine classification of instincts. Humans, he observes, have only a few instincts, and this is the cause for the possibility and importance of moral decisions humans have to make. Johann Nicolas Tetens (1736–1807), a physicist and professor of philosophy and mathematics, in his Philosophische Versuche (Philosophical Essays, 1777) outlined the methods psychology should follow. The modifications of the soul have to be ascertained through inner experience, they have to be observed repeatedly, their origin has to be noted, and the circumstances under which they occur should be systematically varied. The observations have to be carefully compared, so that their constituents can be analyzed. Tetens is likely the first psychologist to give a thorough account of psychological methodology. Although it had been standard to propose two superior general faculties, cognition and volition, Tetens proposed a third faculty of equal rank, feeling, and this partition of the mind became widely accepted. Johann Gottlob Krüger (1715–1759), a physician and philosopher, tried to develop psychological conceptions in close connection to physiology. He published on sensations (1742), emotions (1746), and many other topics, but his most intriguing book is 260

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entitled Versuch einer Experimental-Seelenlehre (Essay on an Experimental Psychology, 1756). In the 18th and early 19th century, the German word “experimental” has the extensive meaning of experimental as well as empirical, a confusion derived from the French word experimental, which usually means empirical. So, a considerable part of Krueger’s book would qualify as nonexperimental empirical psychology, but in other parts, he clearly demands the use of experiments to advance psychology. Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), the most powerful philosophical influence for the 19th century, did not contribute much to psychology proper. Nonetheless, he notably stimulated the debate about the foundations of psychology. His critical philosophy certainly is under the spell of 18th-century psychology. His three Critiques follow the basic faculties as outlined by Tetens, the Critique of Pure Reason concerning knowing, the Critique of Judgment feeling, and the Critique of Practical Reason concerning willing. Kant’s contributions to psychology are largely negative. He rejects the possibility of a rational psychology. The foundation of rational psychology Wolff had introduced was the idea of the soul as an entity and a possible object of sensuous experience, which Kant deems impossible. Therefore rational psychology is impossible. Definitions of the soul could only be arbitrary, and any deduction from such a definition would remain arbitrary and useless as well. The surviving empirical psychology Kant sees as a part of anthropology, the study of man as part of nature. Empirical psychology studies the inner phenomena, the subjective contents of consciousness. In his Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht (1789) (Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, 1789/2006) he gave a sketch of a psychology, organized according to the three faculties of knowing, feeling, and willing. More famous and the object of interminable discussion is the remark Kant published in the foreword of his Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft (Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, 1786/2004): Yet the empirical doctrine of the soul12 must remain even further from the rank of a properly so-called natural science than chemistry. In the first place, because mathematics is not applicable to the phenomena of inner sense and their laws, the only option one would have would be to take the law of continuity in the flux of inner changes into account—which, however, would be an extension of cognition standing to that which mathematics provides for the doctrine of body approximately

as the doctrine of the properties of the straight line stands to the whole of geometry. For the pure inner intuition in which the appearances of the soul are supposed to be constructed is time, which has only one dimension. [In the second place,] however, the empirical doctrine of the soul can also never approach chemistry even as a systematic art of analysis or experimental doctrine, for in it the manifold of inner observation can be separated only by mere division in thought, and cannot then be held separate and recombined at will (but still less does another thinking subject suffer himself to be experimented upon to suit our purpose), and even observation by itself already changes and displaces the state of the observed object. Therefore, the empirical doctrine of the soul can never become anything more than an historical doctrine of nature, and, as such, a natural doctrine of inner sense which is as systematic as possible, that is, a natural description of the soul, but never a science of the soul, nor even, indeed, an experimental psychological doctrine. (Kant, 2004, 7)

In the 19th century, many psychologists perceived the introduction they witnessed of mathematics and experiments into psychology as the refutation of Kant’s pronouncements, whereas philosophers acting on the authority of Kant attacked this transformed psychology, while still others simply discerned one or another misinterpretations of Kant. A summary of Kant’s stance toward psychology is still difficult to give. Until the present, diverging interpretations have been given (e.g., Hatfield, 1992; Leary, 1982; Meyer, 1870; Mischel, 1967; Sturm, 2001, 2006). But historically it is important to underline that much of 19th-century psychology was overtly or covertly involved in a controversy around Kant’s pronouncement, whether properly understood or rather misunderstood. German Aufklärung from Wolff to Kant saw the rise and the general acceptance of a science that united into a single domain various fields of knowledge that had been pursued since antiquity. The neoGreek word Psychologie or equivalent German neologisms like Seelenlehre or Seelenkunde became the accepted appellation of this domain. Its scientific status, its proper epistemological approach, its methodology, its suitability for mathematical treatment, and its particulars were contentiously debated.

Psychology Circa 1800 The psychology that grew during the 18th century was more than just a philosophical specialty.

As Matthew Bell states: “During the 18th and early 19th centuries in Germany, psychology grew from a minor branch of philosophical doctrine into one of the central pillars of intellectual culture. In the process psychology’s evidential basis, theoretical structure, forms of articulation, and status both as a scientific discipline and as a cultural phenomenon took on a recognizably modern form. It became a fixture in the curricula of German universities, a subject in public and academic debate, and a popular publishing phenomenon, with collections of case histories, journals, and factual and fictionalised life-histories appearing in ever increasing numbers. . . . Indeed, it is hard to form a historically faithful picture of German intellectual and cultural life without an understanding of psychology’s role in it” (Bell, 2005, 1). Psychology was indeed so much accepted as a significant science that, in 1808, the first book on the history of psychology appeared, a posthumous work by the philosopher Friedrich August Carus (1808). Psychology had not yet turned into a cumulative science, as it looked more like a potpourri of appeals to various authorities, of personal conceptions, of occasional experiences and generalizations. At the end of Aufklärung, there is an increase in the affinity of empirical psychology to the medical sciences, in accord with the emergent ideal of the philosophical physician. A science of man, anthropology, became the ambition of many scholars. It was considered as consisting of two general parts, physiology and psychology, a pattern already foreseen by Otho Casmann. Whereas physiology already enjoyed conspicuous discoveries and made considerable progress, psychology tried various by-ways in its search for a scientific foundation. Empirical psychology in the manner of collecting disparate materials from one’s own experience, from dreams, lunacy and madness, from tales, novels, and travel chronicles became a fashionable and popular pastime, disconnected from abstract philosophical reasoning. The model was obvious empirical medicine, in which physicians collected their sundry observations and were at pains to organize the flood of data into something coherent. The most illustrious psychological fact collector was Karl Philipp Moritz (1756–1793), professor of archaeology, linguist, and novelist. He published a partly autobiographical novel, Anton Reiser (1785/1794) with the subtitle A Psychological Novel, in which he recounts his childhood and youth in a rigid pietist environment. He started the Magazin der Erfahrungs-Seelenkunde gundl ach

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(Magazine of Empirical Psychology) (1783/1793) with the explicit purpose of collecting and accumulating material for the building of a science of psychology. Ten volumes appeared of this, the world’s first psychological journal.13 It was the model for similar journals which, however, were less successful (e.g., the Allgemeines Repertorium für empirische Psychologie und verwandte Wissenschaften [General Repertory of Empirical Psychology and Related Sciences]) edited by the Protestant parson Immanuel David Mauchart (1764–1826). It appeared in six volumes from 1792 to 1801, and two further ones under a slightly modified title in 1802 and 1803. In the second half of the 18th century, three specific topics became fashionable that had considerable influence on later psychology. These were physiognomy, mesmerism, and cranioscopy or phrenology. Physiognomy, the art of diagnosing a person’s character from his facial features, was already practiced in antiquity. The first surviving treatise, Physiognomica, is ascribed to Aristotle, although this ascription is dubious. This art was transmitted through the Middle Ages to modern times. It regained wide interest through the activities of Johann Caspar Lavater (1741–1801), a Protestant theologian and pastor in Zurich, who had studied in Northern Germany and established many contacts with distinguished intellectuals like Johann Gottfried Herder and Johann Wolfgang Goethe. Lavater’s Von der Physiognomik (1772) and his fourvolume magnus opus, Physiognomische Fragmente (1775/1778), which included portraits of prominent and eminent persons, aroused profuse interest in Germany and beyond and inaugurated a popular fad of deciphering facial features. He recommended his speculations for practical applications in all sorts of domains, for example, to let princes diagnose the character of their ministers, and judges appraise the honesty of witnesses or the mischievousness of culprits. Lavater’s conception of character emphasized the notions of genius and of feeling and fitted well into the current trends of sentimentalism and Sturm und Drang, and also showed an affinity to pietist self-examination. Lavater and the physiognomic craze he initiated were not always taken seriously, but also satirized, famously by the Göttingen physicist and philosopher Georg Christoph Lichtenberg (1742–1799) in his Fragmente von Schwänzen (Fragment of Tails) (1783). He is also known for his aphorisms with a depth of psychological insight on a par with those of the moralistes. 262

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Physiognomy stayed alive in the 19th century as a topic of popular psychology or a tool for novelists depicting a character. Also scientific writers cultivated it, like the physician Carl Gustav Carus (1789–1869) in his Symbolik der menschlichen Gestalt (1853), or Theodor Piderit (1826–1912), who complemented traditional static physiognomy with dynamic mimic in his Grundsätze der Mimik and Physiognomik (1863), a book that influenced Charles Darwin and his The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals (1872). Physiognomy saw a peculiar revival in the 20th century when characterology (Charakterkunde) began to fascinate psychologists, and psychological diagnostics was in its infancy (Meskill, 2004). Under the term Ausdruckskunde, it was for some time considered a valuable diagnostic tool and even became one of the obligatory topics in the examination regulations that established a full-fledged discipline of psychology in Germany in 1941. Only in the late 1960s did German psychology turn away from this ancient, but imaginative art, supplanting it with research in nonverbal communication. The physician Franz Anton Mesmer (1734–1815) started another fad when he claimed to have discovered a new kind of magnetism, which he called animal magnetism, and affirmed that he could cure various ailments by passing a magnet over his patient. He started practicing in imperial Vienna in 1772, and quickly attracted an affluent clientele. He loaded his individual or collective healing sessions with an arcane atmosphere that induced individuals to behave entranced, somnambulistic, to hallucinate, and to become indifferent to pain. His magnetic cures were fashionable, until medical colleagues could prove a case in which deception was involved. Mesmer left Vienna and went to Paris, where he attracted crowds of patients and disciples. During the French Revolution, he fled to Switzerland and later retired to Germany. Mesmer’s theory and practice were soon adopted by quacks and charlatans, exercised the popular fantasy, and resurfaced in various forms of spiritism. The abnormal state of consciousness he had explored was later called “hypnosis’ by James Braid (1795–1860) and gained respectability when Jean-Martin Charcot (1825–1893) and others (re-)introduced it into medical practice. A further craze was initiated when the physician Franz Joseph Gall (1758–1828) convinced himself while doing research in hospitals and prisons in Vienna to have discovered that mental faculties occupy specific areas of the cortex of the brain,

that the potential of a faculty correlates with the size of the corresponding cortical area, and that the size of that area influences the external shape of the skull. A bulge in the skull above that area therefore would hint at a strong faculty, whereas a hollow would indicate underdevelopment. Gall created various diagrams of the alleged faculties and recommended his findings for practical psychodiagnostic applications. His approach was judged materialistic and directed against the teachings of the Church, so that, in 1801, his doctrines were officially forbidden in Catholic Austria. Gall then traveled all over Protestant Northern Germany and attracted a numerous disciples. His approach, which he called cranioscopy, was fashionable for a while and survived into the 20th century under the name of phrenology, quite often operated by charlatans. Nevertheless, Gall, himself not prone to any quackery, had opened the way for inquiries into the brain localization of various mental faculties that started a succession of tangible discoveries in the second half of the 19th century. Philosophy did not lose its connections to psychology, but post-Kantian representatives of German Idealism like Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762–1814), Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831), or Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling (1775–1854) did not have much regard for psychology. Rational psychology had been declared impossible by Kant, and empirical psychology was considered a crude heap of disconnected observations and classifications without much philosophical interest. Nevertheless, some of their followers tried to construct psychologies in accord with the doctrines of their masters (see Chapter 6), and Schelling’s cosmic Naturphilosophie had an impact of Fechner’s search for a psychophysical theory. Dissimilar from other philosophers of the turn of the century, Johann Friedrich Herbart (1776–1841), philosopher at Königsberg, intensively cultivated psychology and created a system or theory of a complexity never seen before in the history of psychology. Herbart’s (1824, 1825) account of psychology consists of two parts. The first one tentatively recognizes mental faculties in the traditional way, but the second starts from a wholly different theory that conceives of ideas or presentations as forces. On the surface, Herbart declared, this is similar to Wolff’s two parts in presenting psychology, namely empirical and rational psychology. The empirical part deals with facts of consciousness, and the rational concerns theories and laws and causes of mental phenomena. Here, however, Herbart (1816, p. 4)

declares faculty psychology as futile and nothing but a kind of mythology. Ideas (or presentations, as there are two ways to translate Herbart’s Vorstellung) should be conceived as forces, and the statics and dynamics of these forces need to be discovered. One of the simplest observations about our consciousness is the fact that whatever appears or disappears in it gets larger or smaller. It has a variable magnitude, and taking the hint from Leibniz and Kant, the lex continui applies. The mathematical method for treating magnitude changes is the calculus, invented by Leibniz and Newton. Even though mental magnitudes cannot be measured, as Herbart admits, they nonetheless can be approximately estimated. Theories on the changes of mental phenomena in the language of the calculus can lead to specific hypotheses about the variations of magnitudes of presentations involved, and then observations may disclose if these hypotheses match the real events or not.14 Paradigms for Herbart’s psychology are obviously Newton’s Philosophia and Leibniz’s calculus. Older psychologists did not have this mathematical tool, but now it offered the basis for a better understanding of mental processes. With its help, Herbart introduced new concepts like limen of consciousness, competition and inhibition of a representation by others, and a finer definition of apperception, the concept Leibniz invented. Although empirical physics, which uses experiments and artificial instruments, is its model, psychology remains different from it. Among the reasons for this Herbart counts that: “Psychology is not permitted to experiment with human beings, and psychology has no artificial instruments” (Herbart, 1834, p. 6). Herbart started another branch of present-day psychology when he noted similarities between the behavior of representations and of human individuals (Herbart, 1821). This concept inspired Herbartians to create social psychology (Jahoda, 2006), which appeared initially in two forms in Germany, one named Völkerpsychologie, as conceived by Moritz Lazarus (1824–1903) and Heymann Steinthal (1823–1899), and the other named Sozialpsychologie, as conceived by Gustav Adolf Lindner (1828–1887) or Albert Eberhard Friedrich Schäffle (1831–1903). Herbart and his school exercised a considerable influence on the psychology of the 19th and even early 20th century. This influence was launched only later in his life when the mathematician Moritz Wilhelm Drobisch (1802–1896) discovered his publications and attested the respectability of the mathematical reasoning. Herbart’s contemporary gundl ach

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philosophers ignored his psychology, probably because hardly a philosopher then could understand calculus. The next generation, however, comprised a throng of Herbartians among the philosophers, not least because university philosophers had received the new task of instructing future teachers in psychology and pedagogics, two subjects Herbart had furnished with the semblance of well-grounded sciences.

The Creation of an Auxiliary Discipline of Psychology The German states reformed their educational systems in the 19th century in a way that strongly affected psychology. This impact on psychology was not planned, but an unintended by-product of larger designs and innovations. The reforms started in Prussia after her defeat by Napoleon’s armies in 1806. First, the universities were turned into government agencies, with only residues of their medieval autonomy. Second, propedeutic instruction for university studies was placed into a new kind of secondary or grammar school with a standardized curriculum, the Gymnasium. Graduating from this type of school now entitled the student entry to any university in whatever faculty. Delivering propedeutics for studies in the higher faculties, those of theology, law, and medicine, had been the traditional charge of the philosophical faculty. Although losing this function, this faculty obtained a new one. It now had to train educators qualified to teach at a Gymnasium.15 For this new breed of professionals, a new examination was introduced. Whereas the master or doctorate examination in the philosophical faculty as in any other faculty was a university examination, the qualifying examination for Gymnasium teachers was a state examination, performed according to state laws and under the supervision of a board of state representatives. The aspiring Gymnasium teachers were required to prove their mastery of the subjects they were going to teach, but also of other subjects considered indispensable in their future profession. The first step in organizing these examinations was an edict in 1810, which was not yet specific about the examination subjects. They were specified in rescripts in 1824, and they included psychology. This is likely the first legislation ever to prescribe an examination in psychology. The part played by the subject of psychology in the Gymnasium teachers’ examination was certainly minuscule compared to weightier subjects. Nevertheless, the Prussian legislation, soon copied 264

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by other German states, was the seed for a slow, but substantial transformation of psychology (Gundlach, 2004a, 2007b). A further step in creating an examination subject named psychology was the introduction into the Gymnasium curriculum of philosophical propedeutics. This consisted traditionally of two topics, logic and psychology. Influential university professors had complained that the Gymnasium did not prepare their students well enough. The ministry consulted Georg Friedrich Wilhelm Hegel and Johann Friedrich Herbart. Each of them, Herbart (1891) in 1821 and Hegel (1970) in 1822, for different reasons, counseled to make philosophical propedeutics, and thereby psychology, a mandatory subject at the Gymnasium. A Prussian ministerial decree issued in 1825 ordered the establishment of such philosophy courses, and specifically of psychology courses, at the Gymnasia. This decree even detailed the content, naming, among others, sensations from the outer senses, imaginative faculty, memory and other mental faculties, association of ideas, and the difference among ideas, thoughts, and concepts as compulsory study matters (Neigebaur, 1835, 121f.). This was probably the first legislation ever to prescribe the content of courses in psychology. Again, Prussia led the way. Most, but not all, states of the German Confederation followed suit, among them the Austrian Empire, with the result that Austrian grammar school boys like Sigmund Freud or Ludwig Wittgenstein had to sit through psychology classes. An aspiring Gymnasium teacher now had two reasons to attend university lectures on psychology. He would be examined so as to fulfill the general requirements introduced in 1824, and additionally, he might be examined for his competence in teaching psychology at school. Other decrees regulated the training for the medical profession. A Prussian decree of 1826 charged that everyone who desired to become a medical doctor and a physician had to pass an examination in the philosophical faculty that explicitly included psychology (Horn, 1863, 31f.). This examination was compulsory for 35 years, being abolished only in 1861, since it was considered of debatable significance for the training of physicians. In sum, various laws and regulations introduced in the early 19th century engendered the need for examinations in psychology. They had consequences for the universities, as they made it necessary to regularly offer lectures in psychology. This produced another difficulty, as there were no chairs for psychology at any university. Since the role of

psychology in the teachers’ examinations was not momentous, and since Prussia was not an affluent state, the Ministry of Education did not create such chairs, but required professors of philosophy to regularly teach psychology in addition to the other subjects enumerated in the examination rescript (e.g., logic, metaphysics, ethics, history of philosophy, pedagogics). In much later years, it sometimes happened that the denomination of a philosophy chair was modified into the triple philosophy, psychology, and pedagogics. Whatever this implied, psychology was never mentioned in the first place. This solution came to be the model adopted in the other German states and also neighboring European countries, and it proved to be durable until the middle of the 20th century. This situation, a by-product of the educational and university reforms, had significant implications for psychology itself. Suddenly, something like a discipline of psychology had sprung into existence. Now, there were university teachers who ex officio had to teach psychology, and who tended to canonize their knowledge; there were disciples, and there were examinations in psychology. The passing of these, however, did not transform the disciple into a member of a class of experts in psychology, but played only a modest part in transforming them into Gymnasium teachers, or, during some decades, into physicians. What came into existence thanks to these reforms was not yet an independent discipline of psychology, but something we might call an auxiliary discipline. This is to indicate that it only played a minor part in the creation of professionals who did not define themselves through that discipline. This humble auxiliary discipline of psychology, the only form of a discipline of psychology in the 19th and the first half of the 20th century in Germany and in Austria, did not train psychologists at all, not even for the purpose of reproducing university teachers of psychology, since there were no chairs of psychology. Certainly, future university professors of philosophy were assumed to acquire as much knowledge in psychology as necessary to teach it to their main clientele—future teachers and physicians. But this did not turn them into professional psychologists. Altogether, the very idea of educating professional psychologists would have produced bewilderment in the 19th century. “Psychologist” was still a synonym for a “connoisseur of human nature.” A grave problem for the science of psychology resulted from the fact that there was no social

group responsible exclusively for psychology. Those responsible for teaching psychology had other, more important responsibilities, namely for philosophy and its main branches. They tended to teach only such an approach to the science of psychology as fitted their philosophical perspective, and they had no genuine incentive to teach more than was needed for the examinations. Students who attended psychology lectures did not do so to become professional psychologists, but because it was helpful, if not indispensable for their examination. Lecturing merely the required material had its advantages for the professors. Large numbers of students would visit such lectures, and professors in those times were remunerated for each student they attracted. These students would most likely choose the lecturer as their examiner, who then would receive another remuneration for each candidate. Finally, converting the lectures into textbooks could generate additional income. Teaching more or more complex material than required, however, would drastically reduce these benefits. Furthermore, lecturers of psychology could not profit from doing research in psychology. And, being philosophers, they had hardly any means to do such research. On the one hand, teaching and publishing in psychology became, if not a necessity, at least a beneficial undertaking for younger philosophers aspiring to become professors. On the other hand, turning into a specialist in psychology involved the risk of not being good enough in the essential subjects a professor of philosophy had to cover. In sum, the creation of an auxiliary discipline of psychology under the aegis of philosophy stimulated an increase in teaching and publishing on psychology, but deterred individuals from doing painstaking, time-consuming research or developing innovative theories. Finally, the existence of this new auxiliary discipline spawned a slow, but lasting change in semantics. The word “psychology,” until then the designation of a science or field of knowledge, took on another meaning, namely that of the auxiliary discipline that now appropriated this name. The science of psychology was (and still is) practiced not only in philosophy, but also in physics, in zoology, in the medical faculty (especially in physiology and psychiatry), and in other areas, obviously including topics that psychology as a discipline under the tutelage of philosophy does not include. Researcher from other disciplines who undertook research appertaining to the science of psychology now tended to avoid naming what they did “psychology,” gundl ach

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so they would not be mistaken for professional philosophers. A conspicuous example is Ernst Heinrich Weber (1795–1878), celebrated in many histories of psychology as one of the founding fathers of experimental psychology. He never remarked that his research belonged to psychology, but he mentioned that psychologists might profit from scrutinizing his studies. Not surprisingly, the introduction of the psychology examination in the context of the teachers’ education resulted in a myriad of lectures in psychology offered in Germany during the 19th century.16 Plenty of books on psychology were published in German, many more than in any other language. These were mainly textbooks propagating the tenets a particular school of philosophy. Most of these lack originality and are best understood as recapitulations of university lectures and study guides for students wishing to be examined by their author. Standard 20th-century histories of psychology do not consider this material in detail. What they portray as progress in the science of psychology took place mostly outside this auxiliary discipline of psychology. Many eminent individuals mentioned prominently in every history of psychology, did not belong to that auxiliary discipline; these include Ernst Heinrich Weber, professor of anatomy and physiology; Gustav Theodor Fechner, professor of physics; Hermann Helmholtz, first a professor of physiology, then of physics; and Wilhelm Wundt, first in the medical faculty, but later in life by accident a professor of philosophy and therefore responsible the auxiliary discipline of psychology—with grave consequences, as will be seen below.

The First Wave of Schools of Psychology The chair-holders of philosophy, now responsible for psychology, as well as aspiring younger scholars, had to lecture routinely on psychology, and they produced many books on that subject. Since the younger generation tended to follow luminaries of the older one, which was a reasonable stratagem for advancement, they formed competing philosophical schools. Consequently, after the introduction of the psychology examinations, a variety of schools of psychology sprang up that tended to canonize their subject matter according to the principles of their masters. There were Schellingians, Hegelians, Schleiermacherians, Krauseians, speculative theists, Herbartians, Benekenians, and yet a few independents. Even if many of these authors on psychology do not appear in presentist histories of psychology, the more noticeable will be named here 266

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to demonstrate the abundance of psychological literature in 19th-century Germany. This was the hotbed that made German the indispensable language of psychology until the World Wars. Many of these publications were predictably dry textbooks,17 but the better part of that literature proves that the readers were not only students eager to pass their examination, but that there was an educated public willing to purchase such literature. Among adherents of Schelling and his Naturphilosophie were the philosophers Carl August Eschenmayer (1768–1852) and Gotthilf Heinrich Schubert (1780–1860). They showed affinity to mysticism and pietism and to the dark and miraculous, which might be called a Romantic version of science. Eschenmayer, much interested in Mesmer’s magnetism, already pleaded for an applied psychology (1817). Schubert, also trained in medicine, wrote a popular Die Geschichte der Seele (History of the Soul) (1830) which went through five editions. Also popular was his Symbolik des Traumes (Symbolism of the dream, 1814). Ellenberger distinguishes striking “similarities with certain Freudian and Jungian concepts” (Ellenberger, 1970, p. 205). The Schellingian school is the only with an exceptional number of physicians like Karl Friedrich Burdach (1776–1847), Justinus Kerner (1786–1862) and Carl Gustav Carus (1789–1869). They endorsed the close association of physiology and psychology. Burdach, professor at Königsberg and famous for his research in physiology, published a sober work on comparative psychology (1842–1848). Kerner, poet, musician as well as physician, practiced Mesmerian magnetism and also dabbled in occultism. His works on somnambulism (e.g., Kerner, 1824) attracted wide attention. Later in life, he developed a projective technique using blots, which anticipated the psychodiagnostic test developed by Hermann Rorschach (Kerner, 1890). C. G. Carus, physician and painter, produced a comparative psychology (1866) and revived the ancient art of physiognomy (1853). His book Psyche (1846) is famous as “the first attempt to give a complete and objective theory on unconscious psychological life,” as Ellenberger (1970, p. 207) calls it. Unquestionably, it influenced all later thinking about the unconscious from Eduard von Hartmann to Carl Gustav Jung. Hegelians, although quite influential in philosophy, did not contribute pivotal books to psychology, but certainly played their part in the debate, as was expected from philosophers since the introduction of the psychology examination for teachers. To those

who contributed to the psychological literature belong Johann Eduard Erdmann (1805–1892), Kuno Fischer (1824–1908), Georg Andreas Gabler (1786–1853), Carl Friedrich Göschel (1781–1861), Peter Willers Jessen (1824–1875), Karl Ludwig Michelet (1801–1893), Ludwig Noack (1819–1885), Johann Karl Friedrich Rosenkranz (1805–1879), and Julius Schaller (1810–1868). The number of followers of Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768–1834) was small. Schleiermacher himself, a Protestant theologian and philosopher at the university of Berlin, developed an abstract theory of philosophical psychology that incorporates questions of theology. His lectures on psychology (Schleiermacher, 1862) were edited posthumously by Leopold George (1811–1873), a Schleiermacherian of some impact on psychology. He produced a textbook on psychology (George, 1834) and a treatise on the five senses (George, 1846), in which he takes the latest research in physics and physiology as basis of psychology. While at Marburg university, he even began a close cooperation with the local physiologist, Karl Ludwig, a friend of Helmholtz. Ludwig, however, followed a call to Zürich in 1849, which ended this early attempt of a joint attack on problems of psychology by a philosopher and a physiologist. Karl Christian Krause (1781–1832), a pantheist philosopher influenced by various sections of German idealism, was of only minor importance in Germany, but Krauseians like Heinrich Ahrens (1808–1874) and Guillaume G. Tiberghen (1818–1901) had a major impact on psychology in Belgium, and others, like Julian Sanz del Rio (1814–1869), an overwhelming one in Spain, where Krausismo was the dominant psychology until the 20th century. A quite different school of psychology belonged to the current of speculative theism, with Immanuel Hermann Fichte (1796–1879), son of Johann Gottlieb Fichte, and Hermann Ulrici (1806–1884) an early critic of Fechner’s psychophysics. Most numerous in psychology were the Herbartians, among them Friedrich Heinrich Theodor Allihn (1811–1885); Carl Sebastian Cornelius (1819–1899); Mathias Amos Drbal (1829–1885); Moritz Wilhelm Drobisch (1802–1896), about whom more below; Moritz Lazarus (1824–1903); Gustav Adolf Lindner (1828–1887); Heymann Steinthal (1823–1899); Ludwig Strümpell (1812–1899); Wilhelm Fridolin Volkmann (1822– 1877); Theodor Waitz (1821–1864); Theodor Wittstein (1816–1894); and Robert Zimmermann (1824–1898).

(Friedrich) Eduard Beneke (1798–1854), lecturer at the university of Berlin, proclaimed a new psychology that some contemporaries considered a disingenuous imitation of Herbartian psychology, with an implausible admixture of mental faculties. Beneke could not make a university career, as he had provoked Hegel’s ire, but his psychology became influential with professors at institutions that trained secondary school teachers below the level of the Gymnasium. Better known Benekenians were Johann Gottlieb Dreßler (1799–1867) and Carl Fortlage (1806–1881). A few psychologists were considered independent of philosophical schools, those like Friedrich Harms (1819–1880) or Maximilian Perty (1804–1884) or Friedrich Albert Lange (1828–1875). Lange was a critic of Herbart and Drobisch (Lange, 1865) and the one who recommended that the physiologist Wundt succeed him on his chair for inductive philosophy at Zurich, thereby making Wundt leave the medical for the philosophical faculty and opening to him unusual career venues. But the small number of independents only proves the extent to which psychological teaching and publications were bound to such schools and that these were seen as securing a university career. It would have been impossible to base such a career on psychology only. Even though philosophers produced much literature on psychology, the science of psychology was not their exclusive domain, but remained a multidisciplinary enterprise, as it had been in the 18th century. Important research took place outside the new auxiliary discipline in other disciplines, especially in physics, in physiology, and in the slowly emerging psychiatry. Since psychology was a required examination subject for physicians, this did not seem very peculiar at the time. For the future development of psychology, one question of consequence emerged: Should psychology be done in the way of the flourishing natural sciences, or should it continue in a mode close to philosophical metaphysics? Vocal advocates of the former were Moritz Wilhelm Drobisch (1842), but he was not the typical professor of philosophy as he occupied a chair in mathematics and only later an additional chair in philosophy. Others were Friedrich Eduard Beneke (1845a; 1845b), Theodor Waitz (1849), or Leopold George (1834, 1846). Their influence in philosophy was, however, modest. Rudolph Hermann Lotze (1817–1881) had studied medicine and philosophy at Leipzig and became professors of philosophy there in 1842, later also at gundl ach

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Göttingen, as successor of Herbart, and at Berlin. His influential Medicinische Psychologie oder Physiologie der Seele (1852) is an attempt to fuse psychology and physiology. Important authors from outside philosophy who demanded a psychology in the image of the natural sciences were Adolf Bastian (1826–1905), an ethnographer (Bastian, 1860) not affiliated to a university, and Wilhelm Wundt (1832–1920), still a physiologist when he was writing his famous Grundzüge der Physiologischen Psychologie (1874). The institutionalization of psychology in 1824 amounted to the creation of a discipline of psychology, albeit a pathetic one. The indeterminate relation between the science of psychology and this new discipline was unfortunate. The problems arose not from the fact that psychology was an auxiliary discipline. That was a fate shared with others (e.g., physiology), which nevertheless flourished. Physiology since the 1850s received its independent chairs and institutes. Psychology, however, stayed a lowly auxiliary discipline without such means. Professors of philosophy were obliged and also had pecuniary interests to deal with psychology, even if half-heartedly. Researchers from other specialties went on doing psychological research, but tended to leave the appellation to the philosophers. Further institutional change that produced additional unintended changes for psychology would come directly out of physiology.

The Emergence of a New Psychology in Leipzig and Heidelberg The German universities in the 19th century created innovative establishments that, until then, had not been seen in European universities: laboratories and institutes. These produced a tremendous boost in those sciences and disciplines that could secure the public funding of such institutions. The fervent competition between the different German states for the most attractive universities resulted in a rapid spread of this unprecedented type of research setting. Nearly all of these institutions belonged either to the medical or philosophical faculty. Subjects like physics, chemistry, zoology, etc., which then belonged to the latter faculty, were the fortunate ones, receiving new buildings, laboratories, assistants, and other employees. Other subjects in the same faculty, like philology, history, or philosophy either did not obtain such costly institutes, or received them rather belatedly. This created a divide inside that faculty, in which some professors handled vast budgets, whereas others had to get by 268

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with modest sums. The two sides of the divide assembled under the banners of Naturwissenschaften (natural sciences) and Geisteswissenschaften (literally: mental sciences or sciences of the mind, nowadays usually rendered as humanities), respectively. In the 20th century, the traditional philosophical faculties were eventually divided between the two camps. It is evident that the auxiliary discipline psychology, tied to chairs of philosophy, was shut out of the race for public funds for laboratories. Important parts of the science of psychology, however, found a home in the new laboratories of physiology and physics. In the 18th and early 19th century, sections of physics, such as optics, included not only topics like light, but also the eye and vision, and acoustics included, in addition to air waves, also the ear and hearing. This association seemed entirely natural to Aristotle and antiquity. In modern times, however, under the spell of the fundamental ontological division between the physical and the mental, it became questionable. In the course of the 19th century, the boundaries of physics were slowly, but drastically changed. What John Locke had named secondary qualities were excluded. And while the physicists slowly lost interest in such topics, physiologists took over and became the dominant researchers in sensation and perception, and even began to scrutinize the relationship between neurophysical and psychical processes. Two instances may illustrate that large chapters, if not the whole of the science of psychology, seemed to have found a home in a physiology that had become the heir of former parts of physics. Helmholtz, then professor of physiology, wrote his famous treatise on optics (Helmholtz, 1867), a groundwork for sensory psychology, as part of a general encyclopedia of physics, Gustav Karsten’s Allgemeine Encyclopädie der Physik. The Handwörterbuch der Physiologie edited by Rudolph Wagner (1842/1853) included not only articles on the senses in general (Purkinje, 1846) and on the individual senses, among them the celebrated article on touch by Ernst Heinrich Weber (1848), but also articles on psychology and psychiatry (Hagen, 1844); temperament, physiognomics, and cranioscopy (Harless, 1846); instinct (Lotze, 1844); and even on the soul (Lotze, 1846). Later handbooks of physiology, edited by Ludimar Hermann (1879/1883) or Wilibald Nagel (1904/1910), reveal a similar intense interest in psychological topics. In Leipzig, three scientists from different disciplines cultivated an exchange of ideas from which an unanticipated new model of psychology emerged, a professor of anatomy and physiology, a professor

of mathematics and later also philosophy, and a professor of physics. Ernst Heinrich Weber (1795–1878) belonged to a new breed of physiologists who had a thorough training in physics. In the 1820s, he explored the nervous response to tactile stimuli. He and one of his brothers, the anatomist Eduard Weber (1806– 1871), effected numerous experiments on their own skin. One of the results was the discovery that the smallest perceptible or just noticeable differences (JNDs) between two weights used as pressure stimuli form a constant ratio over a wide range of stimuli. Later, Weber examined JNDs between auditory and between visual stimuli, and encountered constant ratios again. What he had done was combine in an experiment exact measurement and psychological observation, and he obtained a so far unknown general regularity that is expressible in a simple mathematical formula. Weber remained cautious about interpreting his results in psychological terms, but he advised psychologists to consider it. This remark indicates that he did not consider himself a psychologist. When his results were first published in a Latin university program (Weber, 1829), they did not excite much attention. When he restated them later in publications on the sense of touch in general (1834, 1848, 1851), they became standard textbook matter in physiology, but were not yet noticed by authors of psychology textbooks. This changed when Fechner used them as a basis for his wider conclusions. Moritz Wilhelm Drobisch (1802–1896), already professor of mathematics in Leipzig when he was 24, published an anonymous review of Herbart’s book on the measure of attention (Drobisch, 1827). Herbart, so far ignored by his philosophical colleagues, gladly surmised that eventually a famous colleague not only reviewed his work, but even understood the mathematics. He published a grateful letter (Herbart, 1827), only to learn that the reviewer was not the supposed philosopher, but a young, obscure mathematician. Nevertheless, a close contact developed. Drobisch (1834) published on Herbart’s psychological theories in a way that furthered the public understanding of his basic ideas and made it an accepted ideas that psychology and mathematics can be fruitfully combined. It may be assumed that without Drobisch, Herbart would have remained an unnoticed academic outsider. In 1842, Drobisch became also professor of philosophy, taught psychology (Drobisch, 1842), and turned Leipzig into the capital of the now blossoming Herbartian school of thought. As he came from

a family of musicians, Drobisch, published extensively about musical intervals and clarified what Herbart already had emphasized—that the series of tones and the series of corresponding frequencies follow an arithmetic and a geometric progression, respectively. Fechner’s later psychophysics is but a generalization of this regularity. Gustav Theodor Fechner (1801–1887) studied medicine and physics in Leipzig and, in 1834, became professor of physics. He was a rigorous experimentalist who contributed distinguishedly to the theory of electricity and of light. After an episode of grave physical and mental illness around 1840, he returned to the university, which now allowed him to teach whatever he pleased. He then focussed on natural philosophy, ethics, aesthetics, and on the mind–body-problem. One morning in 1851, he woke up with a spontaneous inspiration consisting of the three tenets, that there exists a perfect parallelism between mental and bodily phenomena, that these are but two observer-dependent aspects of the same basic essence perceived from two different perspectives, and that the quantitative relations between these two realms constitute an arithmetic and a geometric progression, respectively. Overwhelmed by this illumination, he wrote to his friend and physicist colleague in Göttingen, the third of the Weber brothers, Wilhelm Weber (1804–1891). The response was reserved. The idea might be interesting, but as long as there was no empirical proof, it had no specific merit. Fechner then started a feverish search for such a proof. This led him to look closer at the findings of Ernst Heinrich Weber, whose experiments he reproduced and expanded on further sensory qualities, developing new scaling techniques on the way. Undoubtedly, his expertise in experimental physics was of great service. Whereas Weber had measured sensibility, Fechner took a big step ahead and proclaimed that he had discovered a way to indirectly measure sensations. This he considered the breakthrough toward a science that dealt with the numerical relations between mental and physical parameters, a new science he named psychophysics. Psychophysics consisted of two parts, outer psychophysics, which explored the relations between physical sensory stimuli and sensation, and inner psychophysics which, if taken in a narrow sense, was to examine the relations between brain processes and the corresponding mental processes, or, if taken in the broader sense, was meant to examine the relations between any material processes and the corresponding mental processes. The latter sense of inner gundl ach

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psychophysics is comprehensible only if one takes into account Fechner’s general Spinozist and Schellingian metaphysics and ontology, which assumes that the mental and the physical are only aspects of the same basic essence, and that therefore for any physical process there is a corresponding mental process and vice versa. This led to the postulation of souls and mental processes not only for humans and animals, but also for plants, planets, and anything else. The desire to prove this general ontology by rigorous scientific means was the driving force behind Fechner’s painstaking and persistent laboratory work on his own sensory organs. Since inner psychophysics cannot be proven by experiments, outer psychophysics was his means to make it credible. Fechner assumed the relation between physical and mental magnitudes to be logarithmic. He embarked to prove this to be valid for outer psychophysics; in other words, to prove that an arithmetical increase of a sensation demands a geometrical increase in the stimulus. He invented the formula S = k log R where S stand for sensation and R for stimulus (from German Reiz), which he called Weber’s law to honor Ernst Heinrich Weber’s pioneering work. Weber, however, never said he measured sensations; he only used sensations to determine the JNDs between stimuli; that is, to determine sensibility. Fechner published his intuition in 1851. A series of journals articles followed, and eventually his Elements of Psychophysics (1860). In the 1850s, there were decisive discussions, unfortunately undocumented, in the Mathematisch-physische Abteilung der Königlich sächsischen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften, the Mathematical-Physical Section of the Royal Saxonian Academy of Sciences, in Leipzig, where E. H. Weber, Drobisch, Fechner, and other members of the medical and the philosophical faculties of Leipzig University regularly convened to discuss their ongoing work (Gundlach, 1988). Fechner’s Elements caused a stir in psychology. Here was the contention that mental processes could not only be given numerical magnitudes, but also that these could be measured by experimental methods. Decades of controversy followed. Some authors attacked inner psychophysics which, however, was largely ignored; others debated what it actually was outer psychophysics measured—sensations or rather something else?18 Others repeated Fechner’s experiments, applied his methods to other sensory 270

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dimensions, and discussed or refined methodological detail. Something new and unanticipated had emerged in or for psychology, thanks to the work of the physicist Fechner, a master of experimental techniques, who was inspired and helped by the mathematician turned psychologist Drobisch and the sensory physiologist E. H. Weber. Of course, already Wolff had demanded a psychometria, and J. G. Krueger had claimed that psychology was in need of experiments, but their appeals were hardly substantiated. This was different, and from now on, psychologists had to deal not with fictitious numbers like Herbart did, but with numbers that were the results of actual laboratory measurements. Psychophysics was not all Fechner contributed to modern psychology. After his work in psychophysics, he forged another domain of inquiry, empirical aesthetics (Fechner, 1871, 1876), which he opposed to philosophical aesthetics, the former starting from below, from experimental research, the latter from above, from general assumptions about the nature of beauty. Here he developed, unaware of Thomasius’ suggestions, further methods of psychological measurement and laid the foundations for many scaling techniques that later became so prominent in psychological research.19 At the time Fechner did his pioneering work in Leipzig, in Heidelberg other impulses for a reform of psychology emerged. Hermann Helmholtz (1821–1894) had studied medicine, especially physiology, with his famous teacher Johannes Müller (1801–1858), known as the reformer of physiology and author of the leading Handbook of Physiology (1833/1840) of this times, which gave much room to questions of psychology like memory, thought, feeling, temperament, or sleep. Helmholtz and other students of Müller’s like Emil du BoisReymond (1818–1896), Karl Ludwig (1816–1895), and Ernst Brücke (1819–1892) opposed Müller’s vitalism, the assumption that an indwelling vital force directs the processes that makes living organisms distinct from inorganic objects. In his famous paper On the Conservation of Energy Helmholtz (1847) formulated the principle of conservation of energy. For physiology, this implied that, in living organisms, only such physical and chemical forces operate as in inanimate material, and it left no room for such mysterious entities as a vital force. Antivitalism soon became the predominant conviction in physiology. It discredited any notion of a soul as an animating principle in living organisms.

Helmholtz made a physiological discovery of great importance for psychology. Whereas Müller, as most of the physiologists of his day, had assumed that the velocity of the nerve impulse was similar to the one of the electrical current in inanimate metal and therefore beyond the range of our measuring devices, Helmholtz (1850) could show in the instance of a frog nerve that he could measure this velocity. It turned out to be considerably slower than expected, about 30 meters per second, and it was confirmed that in all nerves, including human ones, the nervous impulse was similarly slow and therefore measurable with the instruments available then. This inaugurated reaction time measurement, today still one of the widely used methods in psychological research. In 1858, Helmholtz had received a call as professor of physiology to Heidelberg, where a splendid laboratory was built for him. He hired as his assistant Wilhelm Wundt, the nephew of his predecessor, Friedrich Arnold. It was during Helmholtz’ stay in Heidelberg that the second and the final installments of his book on Optics (1867) and his treatise on the sensation of tones (1863) appeared, two books that proved indispensable for decades and are still cited today. Wilhelm Wundt, who had made most of his studies in Heidelberg, started to publish on sense perception (1862) and on psychology (1863) and to experiment with reaction time measurement. This new method excited much interest among physiologists and later also psychologists, as it promised to give access to the workings of the living brain and therefore to the material base of psychical processes. Again, an experimental method that used precise measurements and mathematical procedures was discovered that seemed to have the potential to turn psychology into a science on a par with physics or physiology. Psychophysical methods and reaction time studies slowly became indispensable for anybody seriously studying psychology. The immediate impact on the discipline of psychology was small, since most professors of philosophy—the official dispensers of lectures on psychology—had neither the training nor the facilities to do more than summarize what physicists and physiologists had discovered. This changed with the invention of psychological laboratories.

The Creation of Psychological Institutes and Laboratories The creation of psychological laboratories spawned another change in the relation between psychology

as a science and psychology as (auxiliary) discipline. This change again was not planned, but an accidental by-product of other decisions. In 1875, the university of Leipzig, one of the most respected in Germany, appointed Wilhelm Wundt, who in 1874 had attained Lange’s chair for inductive philosophy at Zurich, to a chair of philosophy. Initially, the philosophical faculty nominated a prominent philosopher, but he declined. Suffering from the typical discord between the humanities and the natural science chairholders, the faculty could not agree on another prominent philosopher and divided the chair. Two unrenowned candidates were chosen, one to cater to the interests of the humanities branch, one to the natural science branch. The latter was Wundt, not a philosopher by training, but a physiologist, who had researched and published on psychological topics and was therefore qualified to lecture on and carry out examinations in psychology. It was definitely an exceptional, though not a singular, occurrence20 to hand over to someone from the medical faculty a chair of philosophy. The reason for this decision was that the university needed someone to teach psychology. Wundt, who was accustomed to work in a physiological laboratory since his student days and who had aspired to a chair of physiology but could not obtain one since none was vacant (Ben-David & Collins, 1966), began to build a similar laboratory at Leipzig. He started with limited private means until he succeeded, in 1883, to obtain the official establishment of a psychological institute to house that laboratory, the first institution of its kind, and public funds to keep it running. The complex circumstances need not be described here as that has been done elsewhere (Bringmann & Ungerer, 1980; Métraux, 1980) without, however, taking the disciplinary structures within the university into account. In the historiography of psychology Wundt is often said without qualifications to adhere to the method of introspection or self-observation. This is misleading. He considered this method scientifically worthless, with merely one exception. Only when relatively simple mental processes could be experimentally and repeatedly evoked, then introspection untainted by reflection was possible. Under all other circumstances, it could not be but marred by subsequent cogitation that modelled the recollection of the already vanished experience according to preconceived notions. The psychological laboratory therefore, was for Wundt not just the locus of a sophisticated introspection, but the very gundl ach

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prerequisite for empirical work in basic psychical processes. Complex and unrepeatable mental processes, however, were not amenable to an experimental procedure, and therefore not tractable with unadulterated introspection. For the complex processes, Wundt proposed another research method that would lead to his Völkerpsychologie.21 Wundt’s psychological laboratory succeeded. He founded a journal that published the empirical studies effected in the laboratory and called it Philosophische Studien, a title that induced some chagrin in some of his colleagues in philosophy who would have preferred the title Physiologische Studien. Wundt and his students developed new laboratory instruments and found a reliable mechanic, Ernst Zimmermann, whose Leipzig firm soon became the world’s leading manufacturer for psychological instruments.22 Wundt was also a successful teacher. His lectures attracted many students, and his laboratory appealed to doctoral candidates, not only among neophiliacs, but particularly among students who wanted to become Gymnasium teachers in science and expected to be examined in psychology. They could relate more easily to Wundt’s empirical and experimental approach than to doctrines of psychology based on philosophical metaphysics. Wundt’s novel institution was soon copied. As if to show that the attachment of psychology to the chairs of philosophy was not one based on the subject matter of psychology, but on the requirements for the education of Gymnasium teachers, it was in the Leipzig medical faculty that the world’s second psychological laboratory was established. The neuroscientist Paul Flechsig (1847–1927), director of the psychiatric clinic at Leipzig university, appointed the physician and psychiatrist Emil Kraepelin (1856–1927), who had studied with Wundt, to organize it (Flechsig, 1909). As Kraepelin soon fell out with Flechsig, this new laboratory did not produce much results. But it started a series of psychological laboratories to be established by psychiatrists in various medical faculties. Kraepelin established his own psychological laboratory when he received a call to Heidelberg, and another one later in Munich. Robert Sommer (1864–1930) founded a laboratory in Gießen; Theodor Ziehen (1862–1952) one at the Charité hospital in Berlin. Kraepelin and Sommer also established their own journals specifically for the publication of the studies effected in their laboratories. A few colleagues in philosophical faculties followed Wundt’s example and organized psychological 272

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laboratories. Whereas the laboratories in the medical faculties usually had adequate public funds for their ensuing expenses, the laboratories in the philosophical faculties were severely underfinanced or even wholly paid for with private means. In Göttingen, Lotze’s successor Georg Elias Müller (1850–1934), inspired by Fechner’s work (Müller, 1878), created a laboratory in 1887, which was named Philosophical Seminary to camouflage its main purpose—experimental psychological research. This institution had a very modest budget, but Müller’s research on memory (Müller, 1911–1917) and perception nonetheless attracted numerous students. In Breslau, Benno Erdmann (1851–1921) started a psychophysical collection in 1888, which contained psychological apparatus for didactical purposes. Hermann Ebbinghaus (1850–1909), already known for his study On Memory (1885, 1913), influenced by Herbart and Fechner, came to Breslau in 1895 and converted Erdmann’s collection into a productive research institute, the Psychological Department of the Philosophical Seminary. In 1889, the prosperous Privatdozent at Freiburg, Hugo Münsterberg (1863–1916), privately financed a psychological laboratory in the Philosophical Seminary and an appendant journal. Also in 1889, the Bonn Privatdozent Götz Martius (1853–1927), after an extended stay with Wundt at Leipzig, paid for a laboratory called Psychological Apparatus. When Benno Erdmann came to Bonn in 1898, a psychological seminary was established. In 1894, the distinguished Berlin university called Carl Stumpf (1848–1921) to a chair of philosophy with the specific assignment to create a research institute that could compete with Wundt’s institution at Leipzig. Stumpf started with an unpretentious Psychological Seminary, which, in 1900, was renamed Psychological Institute and measuredly turned into a great establishment. Theodor Lipps (1851–1914) created a Psychological Seminary at Munich in 1894. In 1896, the former Wundt assistant Oswald Külpe (1862–1915) founded a psychological institute at Würzburg that could overcome its meager financial condition only through a generous donation by one of Külpe’s students. In 1898, Götz Martius, now a professor at Kiel, again financed his own psychological seminary. This was the not very brilliant status of experimental psychology at German universities around 1900, and nothing much improved after that date. If measured by the resources the German ministries of education were willing to spend for their respective universities to establish research

institutions for psychology, the success of Wundt’s innovation was not overwhelming. If one looks only at the resources appropriated to the science institutes in the philosophical faculties, it is even more modest. If one looks, however, at the magnitude of the changes Wundt produced in the public perception of psychology as something eventually turned into a real science, or at the number of students who were eager to concentrate their studies on this kind of psychology, or at the amount of donations teachers and even students were willing to invest in this new enterprise, then the success is striking. Wundt attracted not only German student on their way to become Gymnasium teachers, but students from various disciples in the philosophical faculty and also from the medical faculty. And he soon attracted foreign European and overseas students, who spread the Wundtian laboratory research paradigm around the globe. Today, hardly a student of psychology would not encounter Wundt if she followed up the intellectual genealogy of her teachers.

Consequences of the Creation of Psychological Institutes and Laboratories The spread of psychological institutes and laboratories in Germany, even if modest, resulted in a division among the philosophy professors responsible for psychology. Some had a psychological laboratory and knew how to do experimental research, others did not. As larger German universities had two or three philosophy chairs, an informal division of labor ensued that followed the Leipzig model, with one chair specializing in metaphysics and history of philosophy, the other in psychology, pedagogics, and philosophy of science, then usually called logic. The principal denomination of all these chairs remained “philosophy,” occasionally with “psychology” or “pedagogics” appended. Not surprisingly, this situation curtailed the academic prospects of all philosophers who were not interested or knowledgeable in experimental psychology and laboratory procedures. The laboratories led to another unintentional consequence. The new possibilities to do research in the science of psychology attracted advanced students. They had, however, only a limited opportunity to build an academic career on their research. Chairs of psychology did not yet exist. To become professor and run a laboratory, they would have to exhibit a broad horizon in philosophy to qualify for a corresponding chair. The other option was to turn to the medical faculty and try a career in physiology

or psychiatry, but also here full-time psychologists were not wanted. Students who chose to become specialists in psychology plainly sabotaged their own academic career. This was the disagreeable situation in which the auxiliary discipline of psychology and consequently the science of psychology found themselves in Germany around 1900 (Gundlach, 2004b). The uncertain connection between the science and the discipline became apparent when, in 1904, the Gesellschaft für Experimentelle Psychologie (Society for Experimental Psychology) was established. Its members came from many disciplines and faculties, mainly from philosophy, physiology, and psychiatry (Gundlach & Stöwer, 2004). Prescriptions to cure this predicament came from both sides. Philosophers who taught psychology but did not appreciate the new developments claimed that there were two different psychologies. The Berlin philosopher Wilhelm Dilthey (1833–1911) famously set a “descriptive and analytic psychology” against a “causally explanatory psychology” (Dilthey, 1894). The first was seen to be idiographic, and to employ description, interpretation, and empathetic understanding; in other words, mainly the kind of introspection Wundt had pronounced as scientifically worthless. The latter was seen to be nomothetic, and to search for general causal laws, while allegedly neglecting individuality, meaning, and value. The psychiatrist turned philosopher Karl Jaspers (1883–1969), who abhorred experimental psychology, coined the expression Verstehende Psychologie (Understanding Psychology) for the former approach (Jaspers, 1913). The Dilthey disciple, philosopher, and pedagogue, Eduard Spranger (1882–1963) gave it the slightly pretentious, if not pleonastic appellation of Geisteswissenschaftliche Psychologie, literally psychology in the mode of the mental sciences or sciences of the mind (Spranger, 1913b, 1921). Unnecessary to underline that this approach, under whatever name, had no use for experiments or laboratories. In its now more than 100 years of existence, it did not develop into much more than a learned folk psychology. Certainly, experimental psychology was not (yet) able to contribute substantially to the understanding of humans in the context of education or of history or psychiatry. The competency of Geisteswissenschaftliche Psychologie did not prove to be remarkably higher, as may be deduced from the observation that soon another theory that aspired to meaningfully fill this vacuum started a worldwide career of its own, psychoanalysis, a grandchild gundl ach

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of Schellingian Naturphilosophie and the brainchild of the Viennese physician and neurologist Sigmund Freud. Until today, it could not advance generally accepted scientific credentials. It is curious that neither Verstehende nor Geisteswissenschaftliche Psychologie tried to connect to Wundt who himself complemented experimental or physiological psychology with Völkerpsychologie. This expression has seen a number of misleading attempts to paraphrase it into English. Phrases like “social psychology,” “ethnic psychology,” “folk psychology,” or even “racial psychology” have been suggested, but “cultural psychology” might be the best approximation. The division Wundt postulated between physiological psychology and Völkerpsychologie was a methodological division, necessary because the former, using experimental introspection, could not clarify the higher mental processes. During the nearly 60 years that Wundt published, he modified and elaborated his concept of Völkerpsychologie. Despite these modifications, its principal purpose can be stated as the discovery of the general laws of mental development of humanity by means of analyzing language, myth, art, customs, and morals, and thereby determining the laws of higher mental processes involved in producing these cultural artefacts.23 A prescription that proposed a different solution to the problems that the invention of the psychological laboratory had engendered came from Oswald Külpe (1912). He suggested to transfer psychology from the philosophical faculty to the medical faculty. Obvious advantages would be that the latter faculty had no animosity against experiments and also many more funds available. A number of researchers in psychology resided already in that faculty. Finally, it would mend a strange lacuna in that faculty. As Georges Canguilhem (1978) has shown, the medical faculty consists of two parts, the one defined by normality and the other by pathology. In the case of psychiatry, there exists only the pathological discipline, but not a corresponding one concerned with normality. Külpe’s proposal was, however, unsuccessful. The particular situation of the philosophy chairs linked to a psychological laboratory eventually led to a culture clash. In 1912, the retirement of the neo-Kantian philosopher Hermann Cohen (1842–1818) vacated the philosophy chair at Marburg university. The philosophical faculty gave it to an experimental psychologist of only little merit in philosophy, Erich Rudolf Jaensch (1883–1940). In 1913, more than 100 German professors and 274

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lecturers of philosophy protested in a public appeal against what they called the occupation of philosophy chairs by experimental psychologists (Erklärung, 1913). They demanded the creation of new chairs for experimental psychology and the return of chairs occupied by devotees of this metier to pure philosophy. Of course, the signatories knew that the ministries of the German states would ignore their appeal and hold to the model of the combined philosophy-psychology-pedagogics-chairs needed to fulfill the examination requirements for Gymnasium teachers. The experimentally oriented psychologists had therefore good reasons to view the declaration as the brutish attempt to oust experimental psychology from the universities altogether. The ensuing battle of psychology24 poisoned the atmosphere (Ash, 1980), but the first World War, triggered in August 1914, made the nasty dispute disappear from public attention. The establishment of psychological laboratories and institutes certainly furthered the science of psychology, but it produced severe tensions in the auxiliary discipline of psychology, where a rift between the experimentally minded and the other academics produced resentments and even new social phenomena. The fact that more than 100 philosophers protested in trade union–style against what they perceived as an infringement on their territory illustrates that the ancient word “philosopher” had acquired a new meaning in the 19th century, and now denoted a member of a particular discipline, not an individual of a certain temperament or set of mind. A radical change in the situation of psychology was yet to be brought about by unplanned and unforeseen developments; namely, the application of psychology in spheres other than education.

The Military Application of Psychology and the Genesis of an Independent Discipline of Psychology Students who specialized in experimental psychology had to realize that their academic career possibilities were meager because there was only a tiny niche, not a full-time position for their specialty. Some tried to apply outside the universities what they had learned in the laboratories. First steps were made at the beginning of the 20th century. But the decisive event was the application of psychological methods during World War I (Gundlach, 1996). Aptitude testing procedures for chauffeurs, aviators, artillerists, wireless operators, sound ranging squads, and other specialists were developed and applied to

the satisfaction of the military. The psychologists involved in the development and application of theses tests were usually not university professors, but university assistants or Ph.D.s with expertise in psychology. After the war, many of these psychologists conquered new fields of applied psychology in industry, advertising, labor administration, and vocational guidance. This novel breed of applied psychologists, among them Fritz Giese (1890–1935), Otto Lipmann (1880–1933), Walther Moede (1888–1958), Curt Piorkowski (1888–1939), and Johann Baptist Rieffert (1883–1956), encountered an atmosphere that welcomed anything that promised to boost the war-torn industry of a defeated country that had to pay a hefty reparation bill. A general enthusiasm for psychotechnics, as applied psychology was called then with a word coined by William Stern (1871–1938), was widespread in the early years of the Weimar republic. Psychologists like Karl Marbe (1869–1953) or Giese called for the creation of a university curriculum and a standardized examination25 for applied psychologists to ensure the quality of persons working in this field that did not fail to attract charlatans. Germany, however, was nearly bankrupt after the lost war. The ministries of education did not show an interest in installing a new university curriculum. On the contrary, the public financing for psychological laboratories became more and more unreliable, and the position of researchers in experimental psychology precarious. Petitions by the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Psychologie (1929) (German Society for Psychology, the former Gesellschaft für experimentelle Psychologie) were to no avail. From the point of view of the ministries, philosophy professors not doing experimental research but manufacturing their psychological intuitions in the old armchair fashion were less expensive and thus preferable. Only the military application of psychology engendered a decisive change. In the Weimar republic, the military remembered the good services of the psychologists during the World War I. Whereas the Western powers who also had used services by their psychologists during the war dismantled these after their victory, the German military established a formal psychological department. Since the Versailles Treaty demanded a quite low ceiling to the number of servicemen, the military established strict selection procedures to get only the best from the masses of unemployed who, in the economic chaos after the defeat, saw their sole future

in the armed services. Personnel selection was the specialty applied psychology had provided during the war and could provide now. Since the Versailles Treaty prohibited cooperation between the army and the universities, the army even established its own psychological research institute. With the advent to power of the National-Socialist party in 1933, the Versailles restrictions on German armament were ignored, and money was poured into a massive military buildup. The army psychological ervice benefitted from this windfall, and when World War II was launched, nearly 200 psychologists worked in the army, navy, and air force. The war ministry had one seemingly trivial problem with those psychologists. As there was no university curriculum of psychology and no corresponding examination or diploma, it was difficult to put psychologists in their appropriate salary bracket. So, the war ministry, some university professors, and the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Psychologie cooperated in producing legislation to amend this. 1941 saw the installation, valid for all universities of Greater Germany, of a curriculum and an examination endorsing that the examinee had acquired the title of Diplom-Psychologe, or certified psychologist. Geuter (1984, 1992) has analyzed this innovation. The relevant law implied the creation of university chairs for psychology. This marked the installation of a full-fledged discipline of psychology in Germany. Now professors accountable for psychology only were created, students majoring in psychology came into existence, and specific examinations transformed the disciple into a member of a recognized class, the class of trained experts in psychology. The deteriorating military situation of Germany certainly impaired the prospects for this new profession. But after the war, most West German states retained this law after a slight de-Nazification. East Germany did basically the same, if more hesitantly. Where chairs with the denomination of psychology did not yet exist, they were introduced, and the obsolete ties between philosophy and psychology severed. Now professors of psychology could claim the public financing of a psychological institute and a laboratory, an assistant, and whatever else was considered necessary to fulfill their legal obligation of training certified psychologists. All this signified the institutionalization of an independent discipline psychology. It did not entirely clarify the relation between the science psychology and this new, independent discipline. But this discipline now tended even more strongly gundl ach

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to monopolize the word “psychology,” while other disciplines avoided using it, although they still discussed and did research on matters considered psychological at least since the Enlightenment.

The Second Wave of Schools of Psychology When it slowly became the standard view that psychology had to be seen as, at least partially, experimental science, those schools of psychology that flourished throughout most of the 19th century vanished. Only Herbartians survived in some niches. Parallel to the development of applied psychology in the 20th century, there originated a new surge of psychological school formation in Germany. Some of these schools based the specific characteristics of their viewpoint on the authority of Franz Brentano (1838–1917) and his influential Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt (1874). His distinctive conception of psychology needs some explanation. Drawing on Aristotle (Brentano, 1867), Brentano started by distinguishing psychical phenomena and physical phenomena, illustrated with examples like the following. Seeing a color combines the act of seeing with the content of the seen, the color. Loving somebody combines the act of loving with the content, the loved one. Brentano called the acts psychical phenomena and the contents physical phenomena. Every act implies a content or object, which is, in Brentano’s terminology, intentionally inexisting. The contents, although named physical, are not real objects in the sense of a naïve realistic epistemology, but phenomena; namely objects of sensation or fantasy or some other act. The subject matter of psychology, so Brentano said, are the acts, whereas the contents are the subject matter of natural science.26 Here, Brentano introduces a critical restriction. Only those physical phenomena that are contents of a sensation are the stuff of natural sciences, whereas physical phenomena that are content of a fantasy do not belong there—but they do not really belong to psychology as they are not acts. It has become customary in the historiography of psychology to use Brentano’s distinction to contrapose the act psychology of Brentano and his followers with a content psychology, allegedly pursued by Wundt and others. This is misleading. Wundt would consider Brentano’s distinction between act and content (i.e., between phenomena that are content of a sensation and phenomena that are content of a fantasy), not a product of observation, but of reflection, and therefore out of place in a strictly empirical psychology. Wundt starts with the content of consciousness, not of acts. 276

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Among the psychologists who fell under the spell of Brentano’s distinction between acts and contents was a former assistant of Wundt’s, Oswald Külpe (1862–1915), considered together with Karl Marbe (1869–1953) as the founder of the Würzburg school of psychology. When, in 1894, he became full professor of philosophy and aesthetics at Würzburg, he inspired a number of disciples to do what had been anathema for Wundt—explore higher mental functions introspectionally and experimentally. The more prominent members of this school were Narziss Ach (1871–1946), Karl Bühler (1879–1963), and August Messer (1867–1937). Marbe, occasionally considered simply a member as well, considered himself an independent force who had stimulated students to experimentally research thinking even before Külpe had done so. Külpe himself was not pleased with the talk about a Würzburg school, and it was mainly Messer who, in the 1920s, propagated this notion. A notable school of psychology that came into existence at about the same time as the Würzburg school was the school of neo-Thomist or neoscholastic psychology.27 It tried to incorporate the new, experimental psychology into the philosophical framework provided by Thomas Aquinas. This was certainly an international movement, but in Germany there was a seldom mentioned, additional motive for its flowering. In many German states, psychology had become a subject taught at the Gymnasia including their Catholic variants. Teachers at such institutions were expected to profess a psychology devoid of any mechanist or materialist tints that some Catholics perceived in the leading scientific literature. And, before becoming teachers, they had to pass their state examination, including psychology, like everybody else. As the new experimental psychology could not be ignored, it became imperative to design a psychology in harmony with Catholic teachings. This was done through appropriating the new psychology and blending it with the Aristotelian and medieval doctrina de anima. Constantin Gutberlet (1837–1928) and Joseph Anton Maria Geyser (1869–1948) were pioneers in this endeavor.28 Joseph Fröbes (1866–1947) was the first Jesuit to undergo training in experimental psychology, first in Göttingen with G. E. Müller, then in Leipzig with Wundt and Wilhelm Wirth. Fröbes published an authoritative textbook on experimental psychology. More than 200 years after Christian Wolff, he wrote Latin texts that integrated experimental psychology into neo-Thomist psychology, and probably

the only Latin book on experimental psychology.29 Other important figures in this current included a disciple of Fröbes and of Külpe, Johannes Lindworsky (1875–1939), who published on experimental as well as on theoretical psychology, and Alexander Willwoll (1887–1961) who produced, among other books, a Psychologia Metaphysica.30 Two other important schools of psychology attacked the same already defunct enemy, classical association theory, but had otherwise very different orientations, Gestaltpsychologie and Ganzheitspsychologie. Gestalt psychology originated in Frankfurt around 1910, when Wolfgang Köhler was assistant at Friedrich Schumann’s (1863–1940) psychological institute, Max Wertheimer stopped over to study the phi-phenomenon, and Kurt Koffka, working at nearby Gießen university, frequented Frankfurt for discussions.31 Important stimuli for the Gestaltists came from the Brentano disciples Christian von Ehrenfels (1859–1932) and Carl Stumpf (1848–1936). Ehrenfels (1890) had published an inspiring essay in which he elaborated the problem of configuration (Gestalt), chiefly with examples from acoustical perception. He pointed to the ease of recognition of a melody when it was transposed into another key, or, in general, when the elementary components were replaced but the configuration preserved. Carl Stumpf, whose preferred field of study was tone psychology (Stumpf, 1883, 1890), became an influential figure in German psychology when, in 1894, he accepted the chair of philosophy in Berlin and established a psychological laboratory there. He had studied with Brentano, but that became obvious only in the second half of his life (Stumpf, 1906, 1918). As the Berlin University was a very attractive place to study, he inspired a large number of students, among them the three major figures of Gestalt psychology. Max Wertheimer32 (1880–1943), a student of Külpe and Stumpf, did much of his research in Frankfurt on the perception of movement, a timely topic when the cinema was in its infancy. In the 1920s, Wertheimer taught in Berlin until he received a call to Frankfurt. The Nazi dictatorship discharged him because of his Jewish origin. He emigrated to the United States, where he continued his studies on higher mental processes (Wertheimer, 1945). His publications were few, but influential. Kurt Koffka33 (1886–1941) studied with Stumpf and later became assistant with Külpe at Würzburg. He taught at Gießen university and published on problems of Gestalt psychology and on developmental

psychology (Koffka, 1924). Since he saw no possibility of academic advancement in Germany, he resettled to the United States, where he published the most comprehensive book on Gestalt psychology (Koffka, 1935). Wolfgang Köhler (1887–1967) worked as assistant at Frankfurt, and then, on Stumpf ’s recommendation, as director of the Anthropoid Research Station of the Prussian Academy of Sciences on Tenerife, where, during his 7-year stay he did pioneering work on apes (Köhler, 1925). In 1922, he became Stumpf ’s successor at Berlin. There, he published his essential book on Gestalt psychology (1929). In 1935, after a confrontation with the Nazi regime, he emigrated to the United States. Closely connected to the Gestalt psychology movement was Kurt Lewin34 (1890–1947) who had studied and then taught at Berlin. He tried to give psychology a new groundwork by developing a psychological field theory (Lewin, 1935). In 1933, the Nazi government discharged him because of his Jewish origin. He emigrated to the United States, where he became an inspiration for a new generation of social psychologists (Lewin, 1952). The other holistic school in psychology, dominated by Felix Krueger (1874–1948), was the Ganzheit school, also called second Leipzig school of psychology to distance it from the Wundtian heritage. Krueger, in 1917, became the Wundt’s successor at Leipzig. He developed the main principles of Ganzheitspsychologie. Experience, he asserted, is not an accumulation of psychic elements, but a totality—in German, Ganzheit—and the primary experience of totality is feeling. This position declared itself to be antagonistic to any kind of psychic atomism or elementarism, the assumption that, as the material world is built from material atoms, so consciousness or experience is built from psychic atoms or elementary units. This doctrine, although popular in the 19th century, had hardly any adherents in Krueger’s times. Wundt, who is frequently seen as the target of the castigations of writers of a holistic persuasion, was, however, not an elementarist in this simplistic fashion. Krueger, well connected to nationalist circles, formed a school of Ganzheitspsychologie to which belonged, among others, Philipp Lersch (1898–1972), Johannes Rudert (1894–1980), Friedrich Sander (1889–1971), August Vetter (1887–1976), Hans Volkelt (1886–1964), and Albert Wellek (1904–1972). Some of them complemented the pursuits of this movement with characterology, a revival of interests from the 18th century gundl ach

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that, in addition, promised to be of value for the selection of officers in military psychology. A different holistic approach to psychology was advocated by William Stern (1871–1938), a disciple of Ebbinghaus. He espoused a personalistic psychology that he called Personalismus. He produced influential work in developmental psychology, differential psychology, applied psychology, and diagnostics, and is still famous as the inventor of the intelligence quotient. His psychological institute at Hamburg university was one of the largest in Germany. In 1933, the Nazi government discharged him because of his Jewish origin. He emigrated to the United States. A school of Personalismus could not develop. Of his coworkers, Heinz Werner (1890–1964) and Curt Bondy (1894–1972) also emigrated to the United States, while Martha Muchow (1892–1933) committed suicide. The 20th century saw the blooming of the school of Freudian psychoanalysis and of numerous break-away groups, like Adlerians, Jungians, Reichians, Schultz-Henckians, and of independents or “wild psychoanalysts” in Freud’s jargon. Although the theories and promises these different persuasions proclaimed impressed the general public, only few members of the German Society for Psychology took them seriously. Some, like William Stern, even showed vehement opposition. Among classically educated professors of the philosophical faculties, the word “psychoanalysis” alone, concocted with blatant disrespect for ancient Greek word formation rules, produced condescending mirth. The promise of new ways of healing could not entice them, as they were not involved in clinical psychology. In the medical faculties, however, some physicians explored these approaches seriously (Cocks, 1985). The talk of schools of psychology in the 20th century should not be taken too literally. There were certainly conflicting basic tenets between the various directions, but there were also personal loyalties and struggles about power, influence, and the occupancy of vacated chairs. In contrast to the schools of psychology of the 19th century, there existed some common ground for debate between the schools, as now there were some accepted methods and experimental procedures which, at least theoretically, opened the possibility of deciding some issues with an experimentum crucis. A fundamental rift between the schools existed in their political outlook. Although the Gestaltist were generally of a democratic persuasion, Krueger and his followers tended to the nationalistic and the totalitarian right. When the Nazi dictatorship was installed, they 278

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emphasized that their basic psychological concepts fitted well with the ideology of the new government. As the whole was superior to the element, so the nation was essential, and the individual dispensable. In 1933, Ganzheit adherents took over the German Society for Psychology and expelled members of Jewish background even before pertinent national legislation was decreed. It is now general consensus among German psychologists that the ousting of psychologists in 1933 because of their racial background or their political stance was a disastrous bloodletting from which psychology in Germany never really recovered (Graumann, 1985; Mandler, 2002).

Developments After 1945 At the end of the war in 1945, Americans and other allies looked not only for German rocket scientists, but also searched for the methods developed by German military psychologists. The procedures for selecting officers, for example, resurfaced in the United States as assessment centers. As the German Empire had disappeared from the map, four occupational zones were installed. Journalists talked about a “zero hour” whence everything was to start anew. For the discipline of psychology, there was no such zero hour. When most universities reopened in 1946, the professors of psychology went on, unshaken. to teach the curriculum for the psychology diploma installed during the war. The examination rules were slightly adjusted as politically inopportune subjects like Erbpsychologie (psychology of heredity) were omitted. Such modifications were done on the local level since the ministry that during the Nazi rule regulated everything nationwide had disappeared. Responsibility for cultural affairs was in the hands of the occupational powers or the reestablished Länder, most of whom would later constitute the Federal Republic of Germany. The changes in the examination rules were marginal and resulted in fairly uniform curricula that made it easy for students to switch universities in the course of their studies. Not only universities in the western occupational zones followed this path, also in the Russian zone, the later German Democratic Republic (GDR), the curriculum of 1941 was kept with some due modifications. In Austria, however, which in 1941 belonged to the German Empire and therefore had employed the same regulations, the curriculum and the psychology diploma were abandoned. This was not directed against the discipline of psychology, but was a fallout of the summary abolishment of all laws and decrees from the times of Nazi rule.

After the war, the occupational powers dissolved all German associations and societies including the German Society for Psychology. In 1946, Walter Jacobsen (1895–1986) and former military psychologists founded a professional organization of psychologists in Hamburg, the Berufsverband Deutscher Psychologen BDP (Professional Federation of German Psychologists). At first, it could operate only in the British zone, but it expanded soon to become the dominant organization of professional psychologists in the Federal Republic. Alarmed by this initiative, Johannes von Allesch (1882–1967), professor in Göttingen, revived the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Psychologie in 1947, initially for the British zone only. An analogous society was founded in the American zone in 1949, with Gustav Kafka (1883–1953) as president. In 1949, these two societies fused and the resulting German Society for Psychology became and still is the most influential organization of psychologists working at the universities or in research institutes in the German-speaking countries. The Deutsche Gesellschaft für Psychologie had changed its character on its way from its founding in 1904 as a society declared to represent the science of psychology to a society representing the independent discipline (Lüer, 2004). Psychologists living in East Germany (GDR) were also members of this society and attended its congresses. But that was made impossible by the erection of the insurmountable Berlin Wall in 1961. One year later, in 1962, a Gesellschaft für Psychologie der DDR (Society for Psychology of the GDR) was founded. It was dissolved after the reunification of Germany in 1990. Most of its members joined the German Society for Psychology. In postwar West Germany, most universities had a psychological institute run by one full professor of psychology with one assistant. The establishment of an independent discipline of psychology became permanent. Institutional ties with philosophy vanished without debate. The psychology lectures were orchestrated for the training of professional psychologists. Education majors still had to do their modest psychology examination, but psychologists regarded them as an inconvenience suitable at best for demanding more teaching positions. Many professors were former military psychologists, some of them not interested in reconnecting German psychology to international developments. The Nazi past was rarely spoken about. An exhortation to reflect on this doubtful past by the Polish-Jewish psychologist Franziska Baumgarten-Tramer (1948),

who had left Germany for Switzerland in the 1920s, produced a short retort by the president of the German Society for Psychology, Allesch (1950), and a comment by the emigré psychologist Heinz Ansbacher (1951), each in an American journal. Many psychology professors were adherents of Ganzheitspsychologie, abhorred mathematical and statistical methods, did not really like experiments, and hardly ever read foreign psychological publications. They dominated the governing body of the German Society for Psychology. In the second half of the 1950s, a revolt began against this old guard. The most vocal advocate for a radical overhaul of German psychology—which some authors call Americanization, others alignment to international psychology—was the former military psychologist, now Hamburg professor Peter R. Hofstätter (1913–1994) who, after the war, had spent some years in the United States. His inexpensive pocket encyclopedia Fischer-Lexikon Psychologie (Hofstätter, 1957) sold more than half a million copies and revolutionized German psychology textbook traditions. He provoked a controversy that focused on methodology (Hofstätter, 1956; Wellek, 1956, 1959) and confronted the speculative geisteswissenschaftlich methods of Ganzheitspsychologie and the empirical and statistical methods prevalent in American psychology (Métraux, 1985). “By the 1960s, the battle had ended in more or less complete victory of ‘Americanization,’” Ash (1995, p. 384) summarizes the outcome. A controversy over the Nazi past erupted when the 20th International Congress of Psychology was to be held in the West German capital of Bonn in 1960. It surfaced that the president elect, Friedrich Sander, a representative of the Leipzig School of Ganzheitspsychologie, had published ignominious proNazi papers. After his reluctant abdication, Wolfgang Metzger was appointed president elect of this congress, which was widely considered the signal for the readmittance of (West) Germany into international psychology. After this congress, the assistants of the old guard, most of whom realized that without a radical change their future would be compromised, staged a revolt. In 1961, they took care that the old guard governing the German Society for Psychology was replaced by experimentalists like Heinrich Düker (1898–1986), Kurt Gottschaldt (1902–1991), Wolfgang Metzger (1899–1979), Wilhelm Arnold (1911–1983), and Gustav Adolf Lienert (1929–2001). In the later 1960s, the number of chairs and professorships at psychological institutes multiplied in gundl ach

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the course of the expansion of German universities. Chairs with the simple denomination “psychology” disappeared. The new hyphen-denominations followed the examination topics. These were basically the subjects of the 1941 regulations with only one important addition, clinical psychology, which was not mentioned35 in 1941, but had slowly ascended to the status of a major subject during the 1960s. The multiplication of professorships opened the way to further specialization. There was, however, a disadvantage. Young researcher who did not focus on one or two of the examination themes like general psychology, differential psychology, developmental psychology, etc., were barred from attaining a full professorship as these were in turn defined by those subjects. Therefore, some old and some new subfields, such as linguistic psychology or comparative psychology or intercultural psychology or ecological psychology, were unintentionally, but effectively obstructed from flourishing in Germany. Even a distinctively German development, the socalled critical psychology, a Marxist-Leninist-inspired specialty spawned in Allied-controlled West-Berlin, could gain academic status only because a professor already some years in office was converted to it during the times of the student revolt (Gundlach, 2001). Presently, German psychology is well integrated into international psychology, and publishing in English and in English-language journals is a prerequisite for a university career. The development of psychology in East Germany officially followed the Soviet example. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, psychology labored under the suspicion of being a bourgeois pseudoscience. The prescribed formula was Pavlovism, but with the thawing in the Eastern bloc after Stalin’s death in 1953, Pavlovism faded and a Marxist-Leninist psychology managed to gain a standing of its own as an independent discipline. The traditional connections with philosophy were discarded voluntarily, as East German philosophy was completely remodelled into a Marxist-Leninist doctrine. Psychologists were anxious to evade dangerous ideological debates and preferred to do their research behind a face-saving Marxist-Leninist front. The socialist state ideology supposed that a new socialist society free of social conflicts had been built, but silently conceded that some potential for friction had been left over from the earlier bourgeois society, which psychologists, functioning as societal lubricant, might try to lessen. Psychological testing, however, remained suspect, as it was regarded as exploring inborn differences that the official ideology negated. The discipline of 280

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psychology gained political prestige when the International Union of Psychological Science (IUPsyS) decided to hold the 22nd International Congress of Psychology in Leipzig in 1980. The alluring ticket for this politically debatable decision was the prospect of celebrating on the premises the centennial of Wundt’s foundation of the first psychological laboratory in Leipzig in 1879, deemed “the birth hour of psychology as an independent science” (Klix et al., 1982). The East German political authorities considered this international congress a significant triumph in the Cold War and a major breakthrough in their efforts for an international recognition of the GDR, which were routinely stifled by West Germany. The specialization of psychology in the GDR was even more strongly predefined than in West Germany. The psychological institutes concentrated their research on specific fields: Berlin on general and cognitive psychology, Leipzig on educational and personality psychology, Dresden on industrial psychology, Jena on social psychology, and Rostock on clinical psychology. Psychology also proved suitable for political repression, as it became part of the curriculum at the academy of the secret state police, the infamous Stasi, in Potsdam, and, as so-called operative psychology, an ingredient of their repressive practices (Richter, 2001). The German reunification occasioned an assimilation of the psychological institutes in the East36 to the procedures customary in the West.

Retrospection Germany seems to be the locality where the word “psychology” began its first and decisive career, and where a science with that name was first proposed and widely accepted as a concern of consequence. Psychology started as a science with a broad definition, initially as the science of the soul, then as the science of psychic functions, then as the science of consciousness or conscious processes, then of experiencing and behaving. When psychology was created, no particular discipline was responsible for it, and authors from many disciplines contributed. If it was perceived as close to philosophy then, because philosophy was understood in the very broad sense that when Aristotle commented on something these comments were philosophy. In the early 19th century, a discipline originated with the same epithet, “psychology.” But it was only an auxiliary discipline in the framework of the training of teachers. At the same time and under the same directive of training teachers, something like

a discipline of philosophy appeared on the stage. This is not the place to discuss the changes the designation of the word “philosophy” has undergone in consequence of this disciplinization. Nevertheless, it has to be mentioned that the conventional view that the 19th century transformed psychology “from a philosophical to a natural-scientific enterprise” (see Green et al., 2001) is arguable as it neglects the transformation of philosophy in that same century. Furthermore, this conventional view cannot possibly be valid for all psychology, since that same century saw the proclamation of an explicitly philosophical psychology that is still alive, although seldom within the discipline of psychology.37 It became consequential that, by Prussian ministerial decree, the new auxiliary discipline of psychology was attached to the chairs of philosophy. In the eyes of many philosophers as well as nonphilosophers, this made the science of psychology look like a subfield of philosophy (i.e., they imposed the organizational structure of the university disciplines onto the sphere of the sciences). This, however, was not generally appreciated. The auxiliary discipline of psychology had been installed to produce and to furnish to the benefit of future teachers knowledge about reality, not about abstractions. Compared to sciences like physiology, physics, or chemistry, the philosophers responsible for psychology did not assemble commensurate amounts of knowledge. To correct this, the call for a new psychology that followed the example of the natural sciences arose. This, all the more, as physiologists, physicists, and others did produce important new psychological knowledge, even if they hesitated to call it such, as now there might occur a misunderstanding about the discipline to which they belonged. The accidental occurrence that Leipzig university, in need of somebody to fill in the vacancy for the psychology lectures and examinations for teachers, picked the physiologist Wilhelm Wundt, together with his dogged perseverance to get a laboratory for experimental research, made the insignificant auxiliary discipline a springboard toward unforeseen developments. Even though Wundt himself pleaded in favor of the personal union between philosophy and psychology, in the 20th century, a later generation applied his research methods to practical concerns, developed with the help of the military a new profession that then smashed that union, and eventually took care that an independent university discipline of psychology was created.

This discipline now claims a monopoly on the word “psychology,” and it tends to identify the domain of this discipline with the domain of the science of psychology. For the historian, this creates a grave problem. The topics this discipline investigates constitute only a part of what former definitions of the science of psychology encompassed. Other parts today seem to belong to physiology, neurophysiology, neurosciences, psychiatry, cognitive sciences, and whatnot. This seems to constitute also a problem, maybe even graver, to psychologists, for there is a noticeable tendency among researcher who received their training in this discipline to appear on the stage of science rather under designations like cognitive science, neuroscience, and others. The spectator might assume that the current use of the word “psychology,” with its attachment to a particular discipline and profession no longer fits that science, as the designation of which it originated at the end of the Middle Ages. But this is a worldwide puzzle, not at all specific for psychology in Germany, and should therefore not be elaborated here. The presidents of the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Psychologie (German Society for Psychology) established, in 1970, a tradition of giving biannual reports on the state of psychology38 as a discipline, a profession, and a science. These are valuable sources that register changes on the basis of a short time span. According to the latest reports, there are about 45,000 professional psychologists in Germany, more than half of them working as therapists. The facilities that produced most of these professionals are 44 universities inside Germany that offer an education in psychology. In the whole of the German-language area, this number amounts to 72. In Germany, there are about 700 professors of psychology and about 33,000 students majoring in psychology. The number of students is limited by a severe numerus clausus. Austria has no admission restrictions, and therefore attracts German students not admitted to a university in Germany. In Austria, the number of students majoring in psychology is consequently exorbitant, with Vienna University alone accommodating about 10,000. The situation of the profession in Austria is predictably less comfortable than in Germany. The course of psychology studies at German universities is presently undergoing a marked change, as the traditional examinations that lead to the diploma in psychology are abolished and replaced by a two-tier program leading first to the degree of Bsc. and then of Msc. in psychology. This is gundl ach

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part of the so-called Bologna process, the venture to create a European Higher Education Area (EHEA) with the declared intent of facilitating the mobility of students, graduates, and higher-education staff within Europe. The outcome for the profession and for the psychological institutes, professors, and students of this ambitious, still unfinished, but already severely criticized project is at present incalculable.

Future Directions Issues for future research and exploration in the realm of philosophy in Germany include: • The consequences introducing psychology as an examination topic for education majors in the 19th and 20th century. • The role of psychology in the medical faculty, especially in physiology, in psychiatry, and in the education of physicians in the 19th and 20th century. • The institutionalization of the profession of psychologists in several European countries • The development of the divide between psychology as done by psychologists and psychology as done by the emerging professional philosophers in the second half on the 19th century and the first half of the 20th century. • The consequences of introducing psychology as a secondary school subject in the 19th and 20th century.

Notes 1. On medieval psychology see Kemp (1990). 2. Much energy has gone into defining what is meant by Naturwissenschaft or Geisteswissenschaft or Kulturwissenschaft, and into clarifying where psychology belongs. It is, however, doubtful whether these expressions are descriptive, or rather academic catchwords in science politics. On the problematic equivocation of natural science and antimetaphysical, quantitative experimentation see Hatfield (1994, 1995). 3. Hatfield (1995, 220, n. 14) remarks: “The term ‘discipline’ can be understood in several ways, e.g., as the province of members of a professional society, as the province of the members of a recognized institutional administrative structure such as a university department, as a subject taught in school, or as a division of knowledge characterized by its subject matter and methodology.” This unfortunate multitude of meanings is indeed encountered in the history of science, and this is why the present use is explained in some detail. 4. Lapointe (1970, 1972); Vande Kemp (1980). 5. The word anthropologia, very likely invented by Casmann himself, started a career of its own, denoting a new branch of philosophy, ordinarily as a general term above psychology, occasionally as a contestant that displaced psychology.

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6. For details on this context cf. Bates (1986) and Kulstadt (1991). 7. Hammerstein (2005). 8. The appropriate translation of the French word moraliste is psychologist, since it is obviously derived from le moral, not la morale. But the word psychologie did not yet exist in French in the 17th century. It was not until Wolff’s Psychologia Empirica became translated (Wolff, 1756) that it entered the French vocabulary. 9. See McReynolds & Ludwig (1984). 10. Wolff’s books on psychology, whether German or Latin, are not available in English, but R. J. Richards (1980) translated the prolegomena to the Latin volumes. 11. Author’s translation from the French original with the liberty of rendering the French discipline as “science” since Gusdorf employs it as an equivalent to the Latin scientia rather than to disciplina. 12. In the original, empirische Seelenlehre, the German expression Wolff used and the equivalent to psychologia empirica. The English version is unnecessarily archaizing. Kant does talk about empirical psychology. 13. See Davies (1985). 14. More on Herbart’s mathematical psychology, see Boudewijnse, Murray, & Bandomir (1999, 2001). 15. The production of Gymnasium teachers was the chief function of the reformed philosophical faculty from the point of view of the ministry of education. But it also developed another one. It became what R. vom Bruch (1999) called the “engine of the modern research university.” Apart from their teaching obligations, the university professors were given the time and means to do fundamental and independent research. They especially obtained research institutes, research assistants, research libraries, etc. One such institute was to play a major role in the evolution of psychology: the famous institute Wundt established at Leipzig. 16. See Schneider, 1999, 93ff. 17. On some of the many textbooks, see Teo, 2007. 18. The question what exactly Fechner measured has not been completely resolved. The author tried to show that Fechner measured sensibility, not sensations (Gundlach, 1993, 1999). 19. More on this side of Fechner, see Arnheim 1985. 20. The case of Lotze may be mentioned: He had studied medicine and philosophy, and practiced as a physician before he became professor of philosophy at Göttingen and Berlin. He had, however, passed the qualifying examinations for a professorship, doctorate, and Habilitation, not only for the medical, but also for the philosophical faculty, whereas Wundt had passed these only for the Medical faculty. 21. See Greenwood, 2003. 22. On psychological instruments, see Gundlach 2007a. 23. Wundt’s ten-volume work (1900–1920) on the topic is not available in English, but there is a helpful short version (Wundt, 1916), if one only disregards the obtuse English term folk psychology used in the title and all over the book. See also Greenwood (2003). 24. Geiger, 1913; Hillebrand, 1913; Lambrecht, 1913; Marbe, 1913; Natorp, 1913; Spranger, 1913a; Wundt, 1913. 25. Marbe, 1921; Giese, 1922. 26. Brentano adheres to a phenomenal epistemology as he declares that what natural science does is assume forces that produce exactly those contents of sensations. Ernst Mach (1838–1916) worked with a similar epistemological position. In his very influential Beiträge zur Analyse der Empfindungen (1886),

in later editions titled Analyse der Empfindungen und das Verhältniss des Psychischen zum Physischen (1900) he expounds the view that sensations are the initial data of science. Occasionally, it is difficult to differentiate between the influence of Brentano and of Mach. 27. See Kugelmann, 2005. 28. Gutberlet, 1899, 1905, 1915; Geyser, 1908. 29. Fröbes, 1917, 1927, 1937. 30. Lindworsky, 1921, 1926; Willwoll, 1943. 31. On Gestalt psychology and Gestalt theory and their historical context, see Ash (1995). 32. For a biography of Max Wertheimer, see Brett & Wertheimer (2005). 33. On Koffka’s life, see Harrower (1983). 34. On Lewin, see Marrow (1971). 35. Nevertheless, the prospect of training nonmedical psychologists in clinical psychology existed already in 1941. The Reichsinstitut für psychologische Forschung und Psychotherapie offered courses and an additional examination for DiplomPsychologen that would lead to the title of Behandelnder Psychologe, or attending psychologist, a profession of nonmedical therapists recognized by the Ministry of the Interior. 36. For more on psychology in the GDR see Busse, 2004; Schmidt, 1980, 1987; Sprung & Sprung, 2004. 37. The American Psychological Association does have a section for this domain, presently called the Society for Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology. The German Psychological Society does not. 38. See, for the last decade, Hasselhorn (2009); Schneider (2005); Silbereisen (2003); Weber (2007).

Further Reading Ash, M. G. (1980). Experimental psychology in Germany before 1914: Aspects of an academic identity problem. Psychological Research, 42, 57–86. Ash, M. G. (2006). Psychological thought and practice in Germanspeaking Europe, 1900–1960. Physis. Rivista Internazionale di Storia della Scienza, n. s., 43(1–2), 133–155. Graumann, C. F. (1997). Psychology in postwar Germany: The vicissitudes of internationalization. World Psychology, 3, 253–277. Sprung, L., & Sprung, H. (2001). History of modern psychology in Germany in 19th and 20th century thought and society. International Journal of Psychology, 36, 364–376.

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Natorp, P. (1913). Philosophie und Psychologie. Logos. Internationale Zeitschrift für Philosophie der Kultur, 4, 176–202. Neigebaur, J. F. (1835). Die Preußischen Gymnasien und höheren Bürgerschulen. Eine Zusammenstellung der Verordnungen, welche den höheren Unterricht in diesen Anstalten umfassen. Berlin: Ernst Siegfried Mittler. Piderit, T. (1863). Grundsätze der Mimik and Physiognomik. Braunschweig: Vieweg. Purkinje, J. (1846). Sinne im Allgemeinen. In R. Wagner (Ed.), Handwörterbuch der Physiologie mit Rücksicht auf physiologische Pathologie Vol. 3/1 (pp. 352–359). Braunschweig: Friedr. Vieweg. Reimarus, H. S. (1760). Allgemeine Betrachtungen über die Tiere. Hamburg: Johann Carl Bohn. Richards, R. J. (1980). Christian Wolff’s prolegomena to empirical and rational psychology: Translation and commentary. Proceedings, American Philosophical Society, 124, 227–239. Richter, H. (2001). Die operative Psychologie des Ministeriums für Staatssicherheit der DDR. Frankfurt am Main: Mabuse-Verlag. Scheibler, C. (1608–1609). Collegium psychologicum I. De anima in genere, ejusque primo gradu, anima vegetante; II. de anima sentiente ejusque tribus potentiis, sensitiva, appetitiva et locomotiva; III. de anima rationali ejusque duabus potentiis intellectu et voluntate. Giessen: Chemlin. Schleiermacher, F. (1862). Psychologie. G. Leopold (Ed.). Berlin: Georg Reimer. Schmidt, H. -D. (1980). Psychology in the German Democratic Republic. Annual Review of Psychology, 31, 195–209. Schmidt, H. -D. (1987). German Democratic Republic. In A. R. Gilgen, & C. K. Gilgen (Eds.), International handbook of psychology (pp. 222–238). London: Aldwych Press. Schneider, U. J. (1999). Philosophie und Universität. Historisierung der Vernunft im 19. Jahrhundert. Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag. Schneider, W. (2005). Zur Lage der Psychologie in Zeiten hinreichender, knapper und immer knapperer finanzieller Ressourcen. Psychologische Rundschau, 56(1), 2–19. Schubert, G. H. (1814). Die Symbolik des Traumes. Bamberg: Kunz. (4 editions, 1821, 1840, 1862). Schubert, G. H. (1830). Die Geschichte der Seele. Stuttgart: Johann Georg Cotta. (5 editions, 1833, 1839, 1845, 1877). Schüling, H. (1964). Bibliographisches Handbuch zur Geschichte der Psychologie. Das 17. Jahrhundert. Giessen: Universitätsbibliothek. Schüling, H. (1967). Bibliographie der psychologischen Literatur des 16. Jahrhunderts. Hildesheim: Georg Olms. Silbereisen, R. K. (2003). Zur Lage der Psychologie - neue Herausforderungen für Internationalität und Interdisziplinarität. Psychologische Rundschau, 54(1), 2–11. Spranger, E. (1913a). Zum Streit um die Psychologie. Deutsche Literaturzeitung, 34, 708–715. Spranger, E. (1913b). Lebensformen, ein Entwurf. Halle: M. Niemeyer. Spranger, E. (1921). Lebensformen, geisteswissenschaftliche Psychologie und Ethik der Persönlichkeit. Halle: M. Niemeyer. Sprung, L., & Sprung, H. (2004). Outlines of a history of psychology in the German Democratic Republic (East Germany) and in the new federal states after the unification of Germany in 1900. Psychology Science Quarterly, 46(Suppl I), 47–64. Stumpf, C. (1883). Tonpsychologie Vol. 1. Leipzig: S. Hirzel. Stumpf, C. (1890). Tonpsychologie Vol. 2. Leipzig: S. Hirzel.

Stumpf, C. (1906). Erscheinungen und psychische Funktionen. Berlin: Verlag der königl. Akademie der Wissenschaften. Stumpf, C. (1918). Empfindung und Vorstellung. Berlin: Verlag der königl. Akademie der Wissenschaften. Sturm, T. (2001). Kant on empirical psychology. How not to investigate the human mind. In E. Watkins (Ed.), Kant and the sciences (pp. 163–201). New York: Oxford University Press. Sturm, T. (2006). Is there a problem with mathematical psychology in the eighteenth century? A fresh look at Kant’s old argument. Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences, 42, 353–377. Teo, T. (2007). Local institutionalization, discontinuity, and German textbooks of psychology. Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences, 43, 135–157. Tetens, J. N. (1777). Philosophische Versuche über die menschliche Natur und ihre Entwicklung (2 vols.). Leipzig: Weidmann & Reich. Thomasius, C. (1688). Introductio ad philosophiam aulicam, seu lineae primae libri de prudentia cogitandi et ratiocinandi [Introduction to philosophy for the courtier]. Leipzig: apud Autorem. Thomasius, C. (1691). Die neue Erfindung einer wohlgegründeten und für das gemeine Wesen höchstnöthigen Wissenschafft, das Verborgene des Hertzens anderer Menschen auch wider ihren Willen aus der täglichen Conversation zu erkennen. Halle: Christoph Salfeld. Thomasius C. (1692). Weitere Erleuterung durch unterschiedene Exempel des ohnlängst gethanen Vorschlags wegen der neuen Wissenschaft anderer Menschen Gemüther erkennen zu lernen. Halle: Christoph Salfeld. Vande Kemp, H. (1980). The origin and evolution of the term “psychology”: Addenda. American Psychologist, 35, 774. Wagner, R. (Ed.). (1842/1853). Handwörterbuch der Physiologie mit Rücksicht auf physiologische Pathologie (4 vols.). Braunschweig: Friedr. Vieweg. Waitz, T. (1849). Lehrbuch der Psychologie als Naturwissenschaft. Braunschweig: Friedrich Vieweg und Sohn. Weber, E. H. (1829ff). Annotationes anatomicae et physiologicae, Prolusio Vol. 5ff. Leipzig: n. p. Weber, E. H. (1834). De pulsu, resorptione, auditu et tactuAnnotationes anatomicae et physiologicae. Leipzig: Koehler. Weber, E. H. (1846). Der Tastsinn und das Gemeingefühl. In R. Wagner (Ed.), Handwörterbuch der Physiologie mit Rücksicht auf physiologische Pathologie Vol. 3/2 (pp. 481–588). Braunschweig: Friedr. Vieweg. Weber, E. H. (1851). Die Lehre vom Tastsinne und Gemeingefühle auf Versuche gegründet, für Aerzte und Philosophen. Braunschweig: Friedr. Vieweg. (English: (1978). The sense of Touch [De Tactu] translated by H. E. Ross, Der Tastsinn translated by D. J. Murray, with a preface by J. D. Mollon). London: Academic Press.). Weber, H. (2007). Bericht zur lage der psychologie. Die Psychologie in Zeiten des Umbruchs. Psychologische Rundschau, 58(1), 3–11. Wertheimer, M. (1945). Productive thinking. New York: Harper. Wellek, A. (1956). Mathematik, intuition und raten. Studium Generale, 9, 537–555. Wellek, A. (1959). Der Rückfall in die Methodenkrise der Psychologie und ihre Überwindung. Göttingen: Hogrefe. Willwoll, A. (1943). Psychologia metaphysica in usum scholarum. Freiburg: Herder.

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Wolff, C. (1732). Psychologia empirica methodo scientifica pertractata, qua ea, quae de anima humana indubia experientiae fide constant, continentur et ad solidam universae philosophiae practicae ac theologiae naturalis tractationem via sternitur. Frankfurt: Renger. Wolff, C. (1734). Psychologia rationalis methodo scientifica pertractata, qua ea, quae de anima humana indubia experientiae fide innotescunt, per essentiam et naturam animae explicantur, et ad intimiorem naturae eiusque autoris cognitionem profutura proponuntur. Frankfurt: Renger. Wolff, C. (1756). Psychologie ou traité sur l’ame, contenant les connoissances que nous en donne l’expérience. Amsterdam: J. Schreuder & P. Mortier le jeune.

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C HA P TE R

14

Ireland

Adrian C. Brock

Abstract At the start of the 1950s, there were no psychological services in Ireland and no Irish university offered qualifications in psychology. This situation changed dramatically in the period from 1955 to 1974. The chapter seeks to explain why psychology did not come to Ireland until this time and why it eventually came to Ireland when it did. The appearance of psychology in Ireland coincides with the modernization of the country. The issue of whether psychology was late in coming to Ireland is also discussed. It is argued that, although psychology was late in coming to Ireland when compared to the small handful of countries that were its original pioneers, it was not late by international or even European standards. Keywords: 1950s, psychology, Ireland, modernization, late

Internationalizing the History of Psychology I recently edited a collection of essays titled, Internationalizing the History of Psychology (Brock, 2006a). The book contains chapters on neglected countries in the history of psychology, such as Argentina, China, India, South Africa, and Turkey, as well as more global issues. In the preface to this work, I argued that examining the history of psychology outside its traditional centers in northwestern Europe and North America was not merely a matter of “filling in the blanks” in our knowledge. Such an examination could shed new light on psychology in relation to its social, economic, and political context. For example, in my own chapter in the book, I cast doubt on an influential theory about the relationship between psychology and liberal democracy, which has been based almost entirely on evidence from the United States and Great Britain, by examining the history of psychology in Cuba (Brock, 2006b).

Although it is in located in northwestern Europe, I believe that similar lessons can be learned from an examination of the history of psychology in Ireland. The received wisdom in the history of psychology is that scientific or modern psychology emerged in the last two decades of the 19th century. This is true if one limits oneself to the countries that are usually covered in the standard textbooks, which are mainly Germany, France, England, and the United States. It is perhaps no coincidence that these were the most industrially developed countries of the time. Ireland was not industrially developed at the time, and psychology did not become established in the country until the second half of the 20th century. This is equally true of other countries in Europe and elsewhere. By examining the reasons why psychology failed to become established in Ireland around the same time that it was established in its closest European neighbors, and why it arrived in Ireland when it did, we may be able to draw conclusions about the kind of social arrangements that lead to

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the absence or presence of psychology in different countries. Thus, while I accept that the history of psychology in Ireland has a special interest for people in Ireland and for people outside Ireland with Irish connections, I also hope to show that the ramifications of this topic go beyond what might be called “local history.”

Some Words of Caution Chapters in handbooks rarely present groundbreaking new research. As the guidelines for the authors of this volume show, they generally consist of concise summaries of existing research. This means, of course, that they are heavily dependent on the research that has preceded them. The authors of chapters on countries like Germany or the United States will have an embarrassment of riches to rely on. This is not the case here. As already mentioned, the establishment of psychology in Ireland took place in the second half of the 20th century and is still within living memory. Perhaps more importantly, Ireland is a small country. The population of the Republic of Ireland only recently reached 4 million. It was also, until the 1990s, a poor country by European standards, and the number of psychologists employed by the government in areas such as health and education was also small by European standards. Thus, there are very few psychologists in the country and the vast majority work in the more “applied” or practical branches of the subject. There are only seven universities in the country, and the biggest department of psychology, which is my own at University College Dublin, has 15 full-time lecturers or professors. This situation has obvious consequences for the state of scholarship on the history of psychology in Ireland. As in other countries, it is not a major branch of the subject. When I took up my present position in 1995, I was the first and only specialist in the history of psychology to be appointed to an Irish university and that remains the case today. I have not taken a major interest in the history of psychology in Ireland and, with one notable exception, nor have the small number of graduate students I have trained. The one exception is a M.A. thesis on the establishment of psychology in the major Irish universities, which was produced at my suggestion (Humphreys, 2007).1 Apart from being limited in its scope, it is based mainly on interviews and is little more than as a tentative start. The literature for the most part consists of brief accounts of the establishment of psychology in a particular university department or clinic, usually by the actors who were involved, and chapters for books or encyclopaedia, like this one, 290

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that were commissioned by editors in the United States. The history of psychology in Ireland is still largely unexplored territory, and this must be taken into account when providing an overview of the topic. Although this chapter will provide few new empirical findings, I believe it will be a contribution to the literature in a number of ways. First, the literature that exists is in a variety of newsletters and journals that are often difficult to obtain in Ireland and virtually impossible to obtain outside the country.2 My first aim is to bring the content of this literature together, to provide a summary of it. Second, none of this literature has been produced by specialist historians of psychology, and there are differing opinions on when psychology came to Ireland expressed within it. A second aim will be to resolve the issue of when psychology was established in Ireland. A related issue concerns the widespread claim that psychology was late in coming to Ireland. I will pose the question, “late in relation to what?” and suggest that, although it was in relation to the small handful of countries on which traditional accounts of the history of psychology are centered, it was not late by international standards. Finally, I will do something that is now commonplace among the professional literature in the history of psychology, but which has never been done in relation to Ireland before: relate the history of psychology in Ireland to its social, economic, and political context. As mentioned earlier, it is this more than anything else that enables the topic to go beyond matters of purely local interest. Thus, there are many aspects to the chapter that are original but its originality is mostly conceptual rather than empirical.

Defining “Ireland” Few contributors to this volume will feel obliged to define the country to which their work refers, and yet a survey of all the previous accounts of psychology in Ireland will reveal that it is customary in this case. This is largely due to a boundary dispute that dominated Irish politics for much of the 20th century. Although what follows may seem remote from the history of psychology, it will be useful in understanding the social and political context of these events. The geographical definition of “Ireland” is unproblematic. It is an island off the northwest coast of Europe that is bounded by the Atlantic Ocean to the west and by its much bigger island neighbor, Great Britain to the east. Until the early years of the 20th century, the political definition of

“Ireland” was synonymous with the geographical definition. All that changed in 1922, when the island was divided into an independent country, officially known as “Ireland,” and a constituent part of the United Kingdom, along with England, Scotland, and Wales, which is officially known as “Northern Ireland.” The background to this situation is the British occupation of Ireland for several centuries and the struggle for independence that ensued. Although military incursions into Ireland from England go back at least as far as the 12th century, it was not until the 15th century that English rulers tried to subjugate Ireland and bring it under English control. There followed a succession of rebellions by the native Irish over several centuries, which ultimately resulted in independence for a part of the country in 1922. The reason for this partial independence is that, as colonial powers are wont to do, the British government encouraged British people to settle in Ireland, often on land that had been expropriated from Irish rebels. The offer proved particularly attractive to large numbers of Scots who moved to the northeast of Ireland in the 17th century. This part of the country is only 12 miles or 20 kilometers from Scotland at its narrowest point. Thus, at the time of independence, the descendents of British settlers lived all over the country, but the northeast of Ireland was unique in that here they formed a majority of the population. They would have become a minority in an independent Ireland and wanted nothing to do with it, threatening in some cases to resort to violence to preserve the union with Great Britain. Thus, when the British government, worn down by centuries of Irish rebellion, offered independence to the Irish nationalists, it was a limited form of independence that did not include the territory now known as Northern Ireland.3 Whether or not it was intended, the offer was a master stroke in that it split the Irish nationalists into two, and civil war between the two factions ensued for over a year. Neither was happy about the offer of partial independence, but they were divided into the pro-treaty faction, Fine Gael, which wanted to accept the offer and use it as a basis on which to continue the struggle for total independence, and the anti-treaty faction, Fianna Fail, which wanted to reject the offer and carry on fighting until the British agreed to withdraw from the whole of Ireland. These two factions are the ancestors of the two main political parties in Ireland today.

Although the pro-treaty faction was initially successful, the anti-treaty faction eventually came to power and wrote a new constitution for the country in 1937. Here, it was stated that Northern Ireland was a part of the national territory, even if it was temporarily under British control, and its inhabitants were given the right to Irish citizenship. This is why the name, “Ireland” was chosen for the independent part of the country. It might not have jurisdiction over the whole country, but that was seen as a temporary situation. There are parallels here with West Germany, whose constitution did not recognize East Germany as a separate state and granted citizenship to its inhabitants. Although the collapse of the Soviet Union led to the reunification of the two Germany’s in 1990, the British have proved much harder to dislodge from Northern Ireland. As part of the Belfast Agreement of 1998, Ireland agreed to remove the parts of its constitution in which it claimed the territory of Northern Ireland. In spite of this, the name “Ireland” continues to be the official name of the country. It is the name by which it is known in international bodies, such as the United Nations and the European Union, and the name which is recognized by the United Kingdom. This situation has implications for anyone who is given the task of writing about psychology in Ireland. Should we include Northern Ireland or not? Different writers have responded in different ways. My decision is to leave out Northern Ireland. For one thing, I would not want to create a diplomatic incident by assuming that a part of a neighboring country is within my remit. Perhaps more importantly, the editors of this volume have emphasized that they want the history of psychology to be related to its social, economic, and political context. Once the two parts of Ireland became separate in 1922, we are effectively dealing with two different contexts. For example, much of the industry of Ireland was concentrated in the north, while the rest of the country was mainly rural. The Catholic Church had a great deal of power in the independent part of Ireland but not in the north, where the majority of people were Protestant. Northern Ireland, as part of the United Kingdom, was involved in World War II, whereas the independent part of Ireland was neutral. The only way in which a contextualist history of psychology in the whole of Ireland could be produced would be by examining two contexts rather than one. That said, events in Northern Ireland did occasionally influence events in the rest of the country, and these will be discussed where it is appropriate to brock

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do so. It is more a matter of the focus of the chapter being on events in the independent country that is known as “Ireland,” with events elsewhere being seen as the background.

Defining “Psychology” If it is important to be careful about the definition of “Ireland” that is being used here, it is even more so with the definition of “psychology.” It was stated earlier that previous writers have differed on when psychology came to Ireland. For example, E. G. Boring’s claim that Robert Boyle carried out the earliest work in experimental psychology is often mentioned. Similarly, it is claimed that Bishop George Berkeley of Trinity College, Dublin, wrote the first psychological monograph in 1710 (e.g., Brady & McLoone, 1992). The basis of these priority claims is the definition of “psychology” that is being used. About 20 years ago, two eminent British historians of psychology addressed the question of how we should understand the term “psychology” when writing its history. The first article is titled, “Of What Is History of Psychology a History?” (Richards, 1987) and the second, “Does the History Psychology Have a Subject?” (Smith, 1988). Both authors are concerned with the tendency to incorporate figures like Aristotle in the history of psychology, as in the famous textbook, The Great Psychologists from Aristotle to Freud (Watson, 1963). Aristotle’s claim to being regarded as a “psychologist” rests on a work whose Latin title, De Anima (On the Soul) is frequently used. However, the “soul” was for Aristotle something that all living creatures, including plants and trees, possessed. It also did not embody the personality of the host, as later theories of the soul would assume. Perhaps more importantly, there was no distinct area of knowledge called, “psychology” at the time that Aristotle was writing nor was there a class of professionals called “psychologists.” Even the words did not exist. The term “psychology” was first used around 1590, but it did not become popular in Germany and France until the second half of the 18th century, and it was not adopted by the English language until well into the 19th century (Lapointe, 1968). It is far from my intention to lay down the law about what might be called “psychology” and what might not. I am well aware that the meanings of words are social conventions that can change at any given time. Like Richards and Smith, my concern is for good historical scholarship. We study the past because it is different from the present, and we will fail to appreciate the difference if we insist on 292

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projecting today’s concepts and categories onto the past. Terms like “psychologist,” “philosopher,” “sociologist,” “political scientist,” and “economist” are irrelevant when dealing with figures from the recent past like Thomas Hobbes or John Locke. They were not bound by these categories because the categories did not exist. This does not mean, of course, that their work is no interest to historians of psychology. Nothing historical comes from nowhere. When psychology was established toward the end of the 19th century, the ground had already been prepared by developments in fields like philosophy, biology, and medicine. It is perfectly legitimate for a historian of psychology to study these developments, but they belong to the “prehistory” of psychology rather than the history of psychology itself. It does not matter so much what we call the one or the other as long as this conceptual distinction is made. Unless we are clear about when exactly psychology came to Ireland, we will not be in a position to relate this development to the social, economic, and political background of the time. The only Irishman who appears in standard texts on the history of psychology is Bishop George Berkeley, and his work is a part of the prehistory of psychology rather than the history of psychology itself. The same is true of the lesser-known figure of William Saunders Hallaran, director of Cork Lunatic Asylum in the early part of the 19th century, who is usually credited with being the first Irish writer on insanity (Hallaran, 1810; see also Brooks, 1973).

A Few Red Herrings The least that can be said for Berkeley and Hallaran is that they lived and worked in Ireland. This is not the case with several figures who are frequently mentioned in the historical sketches of psychology that exist. Robert Boyle is a case in point. It was stated earlier that E. G. Boring credited him with carrying out some of the earliest experiments in psychology, and that this has been cited by Irish writers (e.g., Brady & McLoone, 1992). Whether or not this is the case is open to debate. More striking, however, is the fact that Boyle did this work in England. He was born in Ireland, but he was educated at Eton and Oxford and stayed in England for the rest of his life. His work does not therefore belong to the history of science in Ireland, let alone the history of psychology in Ireland. A similar situation pertains to the claims surrounding the work of Francis Hutcheson (1694–1746), who is well known as a leading moral philosopher of

his day and, in particular, as the mentor of Adam Smith. Hutcheson was born in what is now Northern Ireland to a family of Presbyterian Scottish ministers who came as part of the Scottish settlement of the region in the 17th century. However, he was sent to the University of Glasgow at an early age, and it was at the University of Glasgow that he ultimately made his career. Here we have someone whose links to psychology are tenuous and whose links to Ireland are somewhat tenuous as well. Although the Canadian author of an article on Hutcheson in the Irish Journal of Psychology frequently describes him as “Irish” (Brooks, 1983), it is doubtful that Hutcheson himself would have considered himself Irish but, more importantly, he spent most of his life in Scotland. Here and elsewhere in the literature, I have the impression of people scraping the barrel to find a history of psychology in Ireland where none exists. There is a form of nationalism involved in that attempts are made to find a connection by ancestry, birth, or residence between Ireland and some “great man,” so that Irish psychologists can bask in the glow of his success. The two articles by Garland Brooks (1973, 1983) in the Irish Journal of Psychology were clearly designed to appeal to these sentiments. I see no harm in it as long as it is not confused with serious historical scholarship. A third example of this phenomenon will suffice. It concerns Father Michael Maher (1860–1918), the author of a well-known textbook, Psychology: Empirical and Rational, which first appeared in 1890 and went through at least nine editions over the following 50 years. Maher is not as famous as Boyle or Hutcheson, and I have not been able to find the details of his biography so far. However, the book was published by a leading Catholic college in the north of England, Stonyhurst College, as part of its “Philosophy Series.” Maher, who was himself a Catholic priest, is described in the book as “Professor of Mental Philosophy at Stonyhurst College,” and his qualifications are given as “M. A. London.” Once again, it appears that we have someone with a personal connection to Ireland, but who did not work in Ireland, being included as part of the history of psychology in that country. Moreover, the book is a million miles away from “psychology” as we now understand that term. As the cover of the book makes clear, it is traditional mental philosophy that is written from a Catholic point of view. For example, one of the chapters has the title “Immortality of the Soul” (Maher, 1900). This, no doubt, explains its popularity as a textbook in Catholic universities and colleges over the years.

The decision to establish a chair in “Logic and Psychology” at University College Dublin in 1908 is sometimes seen as evidence that psychology came to Ireland around the same time as it did in northwestern Europe and North America. First of all, the juxtaposition of “logic and psychology” should arouse suspicion. It might suggest that a rational or philosophical psychology was being pursued. This turns out to be the case. The first occupant of the chair, from 1908 to 1949, was a Catholic priest, Monsignor John Shine, whose lectures might be better described as traditional mental philosophy from a Catholic point of view. As in the case of Maher’s textbook, it was a matter of adopting the word, “psychology” without the scientific approach that most writers associated with that term. Further claims have been made on behalf of a book titled, Aigneloáicht by a certain “Sister Mary” from 1928 (Máire, 1928). It is said to be a Gaelic textbook on psychology for teachers (e.g., Brady & McLoone, 1992). If that is the case, then the title is somewhat odd. Sicholoáicht is the usual translation of “psychology” in Gaelic. Unfortunately, I have not been able to find a copy of this book to date and cannot therefore say what it contains. I would be very surprised, however, if it too is not an exercise in Catholic mental philosophy. Perhaps the important point to make here is that, in spite of all these claims of early Irish contributions to psychology, by the early 1950s, there were no psychological services of any kind in Ireland; not in mental illness, mental handicap, education, industry, or anywhere else. It is for this reason that the World Health Organization took up the issue with the Irish government around that time. Given that there were no psychological services in the country, there was no demand for psychologists and so none of the Irish universities offered degrees or other qualifications in the subject. The country was effectively a wasteland as far as both academic and professional psychology were concerned.

The Social, Economic, and Political Background It has already been noted that the countries where psychology was established at the end of the 19th century were some of the most industrially developed of the time. They include Germany, France, and England, as well as the United States. Ireland did not belong to this elite group of countries. Although it was formally a part of the “United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland” and thus brock

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part of the same country as England, it had very little industry and was desperately poor. Some of the poverty can be explained by the turmoil that came with the periodic struggles for independence from British rule. For example, the second half of the 18th century had been a period of comparative prosperity, but it ended in 1798 with a major rebellion against British rule and the inevitable military response. One of the consequences of the rebellion was the Act of Union of 1800, which abolished the Irish parliament and imposed direct rule from London. Most of the wealthy Irish landowners followed the political power to London, with the result that most of the wealth that was being generated in Ireland was spent elsewhere. Also, as Britain grew to become a major industrial power in the 19th century, the native industries of Ireland, especially the textile industry, could not compete with cheap, mass-produced British goods and went out of business. This was a time when countries like Germany and the United States imposed tariffs on British goods to protect their own infant industries but, as a part of the “United Kingdom,” Ireland did not have that option. Another major blow for the country was the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846. These had imposed tariffs on imported cereals, especially wheat, and were designed to protect British farmers. They were opposed by industrialists, who wanted to supply their workers with cheap imported food from the Americas, and the repeal of the Corn Laws is generally seen as a sign of their growing influence. It had a devastating effect on Irish agriculture, which could no longer compete with imported cereals, and thousands of tenant farmers were evicted from their land in order to make way for cattle and sheep. The most important single event in Ireland’s history in the 19th century—some might say in Ireland’s history overall—was the Great Famine of 1845 to 1852. It was initially caused by a fungus that destroyed the potato crop, but this only tells a small part of the story. Britain was affected by the same problem, but there the workers had alternatives to potatoes, like bread. In large parts of Ireland, there were subsistence farmers whose diet consisted almost entirely of potatoes and milk, and who could not afford to buy anything else. It has been estimated that the population of Ireland at the time of the famine was over 8 million. Today, the population of the island (including Northern Ireland) is around 6 million, and the difference can be accounted for by starvation and emigration. There are millions of people all over the world who claim Irish descent, mainly in the 294

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United States, Britain, and its former colonies, such as Australia and Canada, but also in Continental Europe and Latin America. Ireland must be one of the few countries in the world whose population in the 21st century is less than it was in the 19th century. The attention that has been rightly given to the Great Famine has served to disguise the fact that there were periodic famines of lesser magnitude throughout the 19th century. Thus, as Wundt was establishing his famous laboratory in 1879, Ireland was in the grip of yet another famine. It was not the kind of place where one would expect to see a flowering of science and technology. This situation was exacerbated by the sectarianism that prevailed in the educational system. Until 1845, the only university in the country was Trinity College, Dublin. It was founded in 1592 by Queen Elizabeth I of England as an Anglican or Episcopalian university. Members of other religions, including the vast majority of the Irish people who were Catholic, were barred. In 1845, the British government founded the three “Queen’s Universities” in Belfast, Galway, and Cork. These were secular and open to members of all religions. The Catholic hierarchy was no happier about secular universities than it was about Protestant universities and set up the “Catholic University of Ireland” (the precursor to University College Dublin) in 1851. However, it was still a modest affair by the end of the 19th century and, perhaps more importantly, it was dominated by the Catholic Church, which was to have important consequences for the establishment of psychology, as we shall see. Much of the energy of the Irish intelligentsia, such as it existed at the time, was devoted to national renewal and the ongoing struggle for independence from Britain. This continued throughout World War I, with the famous Easter Rising of 1916 and the continuing armed struggle in the years after the war. Finally, in 1922, the British government agreed to a limited form of independence for most of the island of Ireland. It was limited in that made Ireland a Dominion of the British Empire, similar in status to Canada and Australia, with the British monarch as the Head of State. Britain also insisted on the right to maintain naval bases on Irish soil. Perhaps most importantly, six Irish counties were to remain as part of the United Kingdom and would be henceforth known as “Northern Ireland.” As mentioned earlier, the offer split the nationalist rebels into pro- an anti-treaty factions, and a bitter civil war ensued. Thus, the new Irish government inherited a

country that was both impoverished and in political turmoil. Not long after that came the Wall Street Crash and the Great Depression, followed by World War II. The country continued to be very poor, and emigration continued for most of the 20th century. This situation alone cannot explain the failure of psychology to become established in Ireland. After all, there are poor countries all over the world that have at least a presence of psychology. Another contributing factor was that, in the years after independence, there was a profoundly conservative political environment that was not conducive to new developments. It can be characterized as a “postcolonial” era, in that unfinished business with the former ruling power dominated political life. One of the first steps in this regard was to negotiate an end to the naval bases on Irish soil in 1938, a move that was have important consequences in World War II. As Winston Churchill pointed out at the end of the war, the British navy would have been able to patrol a much greater area of the Atlantic against the threat of German submarines had it had the use of Irish ports. It was Ireland’s refusal to ally itself with Britain that led to its strict neutrality during World War II. The constitutional ties to Britain that were embodied in the original offer of independence were also gradually abolished until, in 1949, an independent republic was declared and Ireland left the British Commonwealth. The main source of resentment continued to be the British occupation of Northern Ireland, but no progress was made on that front. The desire to diminish British influence in the country also led to a policy of isolationism in economic and cultural affairs. A term that was frequently used in economic affairs was self-sufficiency. A belated attempt to establish some industry behind protective tariff barriers on British imports led to Britain retaliating by imposing tariffs on Irish goods, resulting in what was known as “the trade war” of the 1930s. Isolationism in cultural affairs led to a strict policy of censorship to prevent the Irish people from being “corrupted” by foreign ideas. This policy reached its height in the early 1950s, when over 1,000 books were banned in 1 year (Brown, 2004). Other measures that were taken as part of this nationalist policy include the reintroduction of the Gaelic language as a medium of instruction in Irish schools and the revival of indigenous sports, like Gaelic football and hurling. Sports like soccer, cricket, and rugby were of English origin and were viewed, like the English language, as alien impositions on the country. As we shall see, scientific psychology was viewed in the same light since it too was not an indigenous product.

Another factor that is of major importance for the fate of psychology during these years is that the Catholic Church held enormous power in Irish society in the period from the 1920s to the 1950s. This may seem strange, given what was written above about Ireland’s isolationism. There is, of course, nothing uniquely “Irish” about Catholicism, but it became a part of the Irish identity by adoption due to its suppression under British rule. Catholic services, as well as Catholic schools, were conducted illegally in fields. There is a comparable situation in Poland, which is also a predominantly Catholic country and which has also been occupied by more powerful non-Catholic neighbors for much of its history; in this case Germany and Russia. It too adopted Catholicism as a part of its national identity as a result. Thus, when the new Irish constitution came to be written in 1937, it referred to the special place that Catholicism had in Irish society. The church itself wielded enormous power, being in control of much of the education of the country, including the universities, and it was the main provider of social services (Inglis, 1998). One of the favorite slogans of the Protestant unionists in Northern Ireland was, “Home Rule Is Rome Rule” and it was not entirely without foundation. In recent years, many cases of the sexual and physical abuse of children by priests have come to light. It is not as if people were unaware that it was going on at the time, but the church was so powerful that few people dared to complain. This situation is of relevance to psychology since many members of the church were opposed to what they saw as a secular and/or materialistic approach to the soul. This can be clearly seen in an article titled, “Modern Psychology” by a certain Rev. J. Byrne O’Connell which appeared in the Irish Ecclesiastical Record in 1916. He writes: In view of the materialistic tendencies of modern thought, it is somewhat remarkable that it should have devoted so much attention to the study of Mind. It is true, of course, that this study is really an effect of the growth of Materialism, for the source of its inspiration lies in an attempt to prove that even mental phenomena are ruled by the same inexorable laws which sway the material universe. . . . It is, therefore, or the highest importance that we should form an appreciation of the theories underlying modern systems of Psychology, so that we may see how far they are compatible not only with Scholastic philosophy, but even with Christianity itself. (p. 325)

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There is a clear “us” and “them” tone to the article that sees science and religion, at least in this area of knowledge, as being fundamentally in opposition. This kind of suspicion extended to psychiatry as well. There is an article in the same journal from 1954 titled, “The Catholic Attitude to Psychiatry” in which the author openly questions whether psychiatry should be allowed (McLoughlin, 1154). The author concludes that it can play a valuable role in society as long as the psychiatrists are Christians and as long as their work is supervised by the church. With attitudes like this, it is easy to see how Ireland reached the 1950s without offering psychological services of any kind, and why scientific or modern psychology had not become established in the universities. I would not want to give the impression here that the members of the Catholic Church spoke with one voice on this subject. As in many organizations, it had its liberals and conservatives. As we shall see, there were even priests who had studied psychology and had formal qualifications in the field. It does go some way toward explaining, however, why psychology was kept out of the universities and wider society for so long, and why there was substantial opposition to its introduction when it eventually came. The general climate of isolationism in political, economic, and cultural affairs helped to contribute to this situation as well.

The Establishment of Psychology in Ireland The first psychologist to practice in Ireland was a Scotsman of Irish descent by the name of John McKenna (1919–1998). He gave the following account of the origins of modern psychology in Ireland: In the nineteen fifties, the World Health Organization directed its attention to developing member states who were underdeveloped in terms of mental health personnel;. Ireland was one of the Western countries where psychologists did not practice in the fields of education, health and social welfare. A joint decision was taken by the then Government and by the W.H.O. in 1953 to introduce psychological services to Ireland. It was hoped that by introducing psychology through a child and family mental health service, an entirely new concept in Ireland, that this would promote acceptance by established professional personnel in the field of mental health. Another strategy to facilitate acceptance was to see help of existing and culturally acceptable services in the introduction of new disciplines. Since the Order of St. John of God

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was one of the principal voluntary organizations serving the needs of persons suffering from mental illness and handicap, it was invited to initiate the new service. (McKenna, 1986, pp. 34–35)

It might sound incredible to modern ears that the introduction of psychological services would be controversial, but it is clear from McKenna’s account that the authorities had to tread carefully to avoid conflict with psychiatrists and, perhaps more importantly, the Church. It was only by placing the initiative in the hands of a branch of the latter that it would be “culturally acceptable.” Something else that is particularly striking from this account is that Irish psychology was not born in the universities, let alone in laboratories, and then “applied” in the wider society, as the traditional accounts would have it. It arrived in the form of a child guidance clinic. McKenna was very critical of this situation: Credit for many developments in health, education and commerce in the late fifties and early sixties must go to a few outstanding Civil Servants. They, rather than the Universities were the initiators, the creative workers who prompted change, unlike their counterparts in some other European countries. It seemed that the Universities were more committed to the maintenance of the status quo than to acceptance of the need for change. (McKenna, 1986, p. 36)

McKenna did find a valuable ally in the form of Monsignor Eamonn Feichin O’Doherty (1918– 1998), who had inherited the Chair in Logic and Psychology at University College Dublin from his mentor, Monsignor John Shine, in 1949. O’Doherty was an unusual priest in that, having completed his theological training in Rome, he did a Ph.D. in experimental psychology with Sir Frederic Bartlett in Cambridge. In an interview that I conducted with him in 1997, only a few months before he died, O’Doherty told me that Bartlett, as the Head of Department, did not usually supervise graduate students, but O’Doherty’s assigned supervisor had refused to work with him on the grounds that a Catholic priest had no business in a psychology department. Clearly, the hostility of some members of the Church toward psychology was reciprocated by some psychologists. However, as we see from the way that the problem was resolved, the hostility was by no means universal on either side. How did O’Doherty reconcile his position as a senior member of the church with this secular

approach to the “soul”? His view was one of “friendly incorporation.” He recognized that the social roles of the Church and psychology overlapped in certain respects, for example in the area of counselling, and believed that it was in the interests of the Church to ally itself with psychology in order to carry out its work more effectively. His attitude was similar to that of the author of the article on psychiatry referred to above who believed that it had a valuable role to play in society as long as it was practised by Christian psychiatrists under the supervision of the Church. It was perfectly possible to hold this view in the Ireland of the 1950s, where the Church was still a major force in society, in particular in the areas of education and social services. O’Doherty quickly realized that the introduction of psychological services in Ireland would lead to a demand for trained psychologists and began the task of organizing a course at University College Dublin that would lead to a qualification in psychology. As might be expected, he encountered opposition from more conservative elements within the university and only succeeded after one of the unions of teachers in Ireland, the Irish National Teachers’ Organisation (INTO) awarded him a grant to establish the course. The actual amount was small, but it was of great symbolic importance. There were no educational psychologists practising in Ireland at the time, but the union leaders would have been aware of the role that they played in the United Kingdom and elsewhere and that O’Doherty’s efforts would ultimately lead to a similar situation in Ireland. The result of his efforts was a 2-year “Diploma in Psychology” that was established in 1958. It was open to graduates in other subjects who had some work experience in education, health, or social services and wanted to retrain as psychologists. Bearing in mind that the graduates of this course were going to be the first clinical, educational, and occupational psychologists in the country, the decision to limit entry to mature students with previous work experience made a lot of sense. The decision was to backfire on him, however, when Trinity College, Dublin began to offer a B.A. degree in psychology in 1964, under the leadership of an Englishman, Derek Forrest (Department of Psychology, 1992). It may be necessary to remind the reader here of the traditional rivalry that existed between Trinity College and University College. The former had been established by the British at the end of the 16th century and was open only to Anglicans (known as Episcopalians in the United States) for much of its history, which effectively meant the

Anglo-Irish elite. Even when the ban on Catholics was lifted, the Catholic hierarchy forbade its members from going there since it was concerned about the kind of education they would receive. The Archbishop of Dublin at this time, John McQuaid, had famously expressed the view that it was a mortal sin for a Catholic to study at Trinity College (Cooney, 1999). One can imagine, then, his concern when Trinity College began to offer a degree in psychology and the traditional Catholic university of Dublin, University College did not. High school graduates who were interested in psychology were unlikely to study another subject or subjects at university for 3 or 4 years and then gain some work experience before taking the Diploma in Psychology at University College Dublin when they could study psychology at Trinity College. Thus, it was with some reluctance, and only after being pressured by McQuaid and others, that O’Doherty agreed to the introduction of a B.A. in Psychology at University College Dublin in 1967. He was still of the view that it was not suitable as an undergraduate subject. The Catholic connection at University College Dublin was very real. In his history of the university, McCartney (1999) has written: Seminarians and other religious made up a sizeable proportion of the student body, especially in arts and to a lesser extent science, from 1909 at least down to the move to Belfield in the nineteen-sixties. In the larger classes in arts the front rows of the lecturerooms were occupied by nuns with downcast eyes and in full religious habits. To these had to be added the generous sprinkling of seminarians occupying the rest of the lecture room. Clerical black was often the dominant colour of the garb facing lecturers in the arts area. This was especially so in such subjects as philosophy, where the lecturer himself was also likely to be dressed in clerical outfit and almost the entire class made up of students from the seminaries. (pp. 163–164)

Although O’Doherty was a relatively liberal member of the Church, he used his own textbooks in his classes. These were effectively a summary of his lectures, and they strongly reflected his religious views (O’Doherty, 1976a, 1976b, 1979). O’Doherty continued in the Chair of Logic and Psychology until his retirement in 1983, when he was succeeded by his former student, Father Michael Nolan. One may wonder at the involvement of members of the clergy in establishing psychology in Ireland, both as a university subject and as a profession. With the wisdom of hindsight, it probably brock

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could not have happened any other way in the Ireland of the time. It was only the Church and its representatives that had the social authority to bring about such a change. When Irish psychologists refer to the “founding fathers” of psychology, it is often accompanied by a wry smile to reflect the fact that they were “fathers” in more ways than one. A similar pattern can be seen at University College Cork, which together with University College Dublin and University College Galway, is a branch of the National University of Ireland. Cork is Ireland’s second city, and so it is no surprise that the earliest developments outside Dublin should take place here. Again, it was under the leadership of a Catholic priest, Father Peter Dempsey (1914– 2004). Like O’Doherty, Dempsey was an unusual priest. Among other things, he had an interest in occupational or industrial psychology and had written a book in this field, Psychology and the Manager (Dempsey, 1973). He also offered night classes in this subject, though they were stopped by the university authorities, who had a different view of the university’s social role. No doubt emboldened by the developments that were taking place in Dublin, Dempsey managed to establish a B.A. in “Applied Psychology” by 1964, and a department that bore (and continues to bear) the same name. The choice of the name has elicited much discussion. According to Swain (1995): The Department was founded in 1964 under Rev. Professor “Father Peter” Dempsey. There is an apocryphal story concerning the naming of the Department. It appears that the former Bishop of Cork, a Governor of the College, would not countenance the establishment of a Psychology Department on the grounds that psychology properly belonged under the mantle of philosophy. However, there was no objection to the impure strain known as applied psychology, and thus Fr. Peter gained his Chair. (p. iii)

What has lent credence to the rumor is that the psychology that has been taught and researched at University College Cork over the years is no more “applied” than its counterparts at University College Dublin and Trinity College Dublin. Like these institutions, it provides a general education in psychology that is recognized by the professional organizations of Ireland and the United Kingdom, and these bodies require that “core” areas such as experimental psychology, social psychology, personality, and developmental psychology be taught. Even if it

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could be shown that the department in Cork was more “applied” than its counterparts elsewhere, the question of why it took that direction would remain. Fr. Peter Dempsey’s interests alone cannot explain it. Although occupational psychology was one of his major interests, it was by no means his only interest. He also published theoretical books, such as The Psychology of Sartre (1950) and Freud, Psychoanalysis, Catholicism (1956). Moreover, his one book on occupational psychology was published long after the Department of Applied Psychology had been established (1973). The story of the Bishop of Cork may or may not be apocryphal, but I would not be quick to dismiss the view that the name “applied psychology” was chosen to overcome potential objections to the establishment of the field. We have already seen in the case of University College Dublin, and from the remarks of McKenna, that this development did not go unopposed. In their history of the Department at University College Cork, Kirakowski and Delafield (1982) concede that the name was chosen, at least in part, “to distinguish clearly between the activities of the new discipline and philosophy” (p. 45). Archival research may help to shed some light on this issue. The next university in Ireland to have a psychology department was University College Galway, but this development came as late as 1971 (Curtis & McHugh, 1986). Psychology is now taught in a wide variety of universities and colleges in Ireland but, with the exception of University College Dublin, Trinity College and University College Cork, its introduction is even more recent than that. It was stated earlier that the provision of psychological services in Ireland preceded the establishment of psychology as a distinct area of study in the universities. However, with the notable exception of John McKenna’s Child Guidance Clinic at the St. John of God Hospital in Dublin, these services did not expand until the 1960s and, even then, the expansion was very slow (McKenna, 1982; McLoone, 1982). McKenna (1986) points out that all the students who received practical training in psychology from 1955 to 1965 received it in his clinic since there was nowhere else in the country for them to go. Financial considerations undoubtedly played a role. It is rare for psychologists to be in private practice in Ireland. As in many other European countries, health care and education are largely provided by the government and funded from taxes. Moreover, as in other countries, the most popular form of private health insurance will only fund psychological

treatments if they are provided by someone with a medical degree (i.e., a psychiatrist). Thus, the government is the largest employer of psychologists by far, and the number of psychologists it can employ is limited by its finances. This was an important factor in the 1950s and 1960s, when Ireland was still a poor country by European standards and may account for the fact that the growth of psychology outside the universities was painfully slow. I have seen no evidence to suggest that there was opposition to the introduction of psychological services in the social services, in which people tend to be more pragmatic and less ideological than in the universities. The government’s Department of Education appointed a psychologist as early as 1959, but the provision of psychological services to schools did not occur until 1965. As in clinical psychology, growth was slow and tied to the government’s spending policies (Chamberlain, 1985). That the number of applied psychologists in Ireland was modest can be seen from the fact that, when the Psychological Society of Ireland was established in 1970, it had 130 members, and this figure includes both academic and professional psychologists, as well as people with a B.A. or Diploma in Psychology (the minimum requirement for membership) who were working in other fields. It also included a substantial number of psychologists in Northern Ireland. I have studiously avoided Northern Ireland up to this point, not from a lack of interest but, as I wrote at the outset, because its history is different from that of the rest of the country and would require a separate treatment. For example, what I have characterized as a “postcolonial reaction” did not incur in Northern Ireland since it continued to be a part of the United Kingdom. Thus, the various factors that delayed the introduction of psychology into Ireland, such as the policy of cultural isolationism and the power that the Catholic Church enjoyed in the political life of the country, did not occur in Northern Ireland, and so psychology came earlier than it did in the independent part of the country. The first degree in psychology here was established in 1952, at Queen’s University Belfast, by a Scotsman by the name of George Seth. This may seem late by the standards of some countries. Although psychology came to the United Kingdom relatively early— for example, the British Psychological Society was founded in 1901—its development across the country was uneven. Apart from a few notable centers, such as University College London and Cambridge, psychology was not established in most British

universities until after World War II. The establishment of the subject in Belfast conforms to this general pattern. Although there may not seem to be a lot of difference between the establishment of the degree in Belfast in 1952 and the establishment of the degrees in Dublin in 1964 and 1967, it is something of a false comparison. Belfast is not the intellectual center of the United Kingdom in the way that Dublin is the intellectual center of Ireland. A comparison of the two major universities in Dublin with London or Cambridge would be more apt. The establishment of psychology in Northern Ireland brought with it a development that was to play a role in the establishment of psychology in Ireland. The British Psychological Society, like its counterparts in other countries, has regional branches, and a regional branch of the organization was established in Northern Ireland in 1956. It was at the meetings of this group that psychologists from all over Ireland gathered in the early years of the profession, and it was here that the establishment of the Psychological Society of Ireland was planned. One of the main functions of these professional bodies is to represent the interests of psychology in the various branches of government and this could not be done by a British organization based in Northern Ireland. Thus, the society was established in 1970 and formally recognized by the “United Nations” of psychology, the International Union of Psychological Science in 1974. The Irish Journal of Psychology was established in 1971, and a monthly newsletter, the Irish Psychologist began publication in 1974 (McHugh & McLoone, 1980; Smith, 1980). One can see from all this that the 20-year period from 1955 to 1974 is central in the establishment of psychology in Ireland. Although the number of psychologists in the country was still quite small by European standards, it had gone from a situation in which there were no psychological services of any kind and in which no universities had a department of psychology or offered specialist qualifications in the field to a situation in which psychology had all the institutions that it had in other countries where the subject and the profession had been established much earlier.

The Social, Economic, and Political Situation Revisited I hope that my previous account of the social, economic, and political situation in Ireland prior to the 1950s was able to explain why psychology had

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not come to the country at the start of this decade. With such a dramatic change in the fortunes of psychology from the 1950s to the 1970s, the reader is justified in asking why these two decades were different from those that preceded them. In fact, there was a major change in Irish politics from about 1958, and the appearance of psychology in the country coincides perfectly with this change. The main force behind the change appears to have been economic. It is true that the Irish government had inherited a country with little in the way of industry and one that had been devastated by the long struggle for independence and the civil war that followed the offer of partial independence from Britain. It is also true that independence came at a difficult time from an economic point of view. The early years of independence coincided with the Great Depression of the 1930s and World War II. Although Ireland was not a combatant in the latter, the seas and airspace surrounding it were a part of the theatre of war and international trade was difficult, if not impossible. It too was a time of poverty, and emigration continued during the war years. Around 50,000 Irish citizens volunteered for service with the British armed forces, and many more took jobs in British factories to meet the labor shortages that resulted from having so many men and women under arms. One might have expected an improvement in this situation during the postwar years, but Ireland continued to be poor by European standards and emigration was still a fact of life. There was even a slight increase in emigration during the 1950s. The favorite destination of Irish emigrants in the 19th and the early part of the 20th century was the United States, but legislation there had made immigration increasingly difficult after 1929, and so the favorite destination of Irish emigrants in the 1950s was the United Kingdom, which had no restrictions on Irish immigration. There was some irony in a situation in which the children and grandchildren of those who had fought so hard for the independence of Ireland from the United Kingdom should now have to move to the United Kingdom to find work. The truth is that the economy had not been prioritized amid the nationalist agenda of the governments up to that point. The political life of Ireland in the first three decades of independence was strongly associated with one man, Eamon de Valera. A radio broadcast that he delivered to the nation on St. Patrick’s Day, in 1943, has become well-known

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since it summarizes the kind of country that he envisaged: That Ireland which we dreamed of would be the home of a people who valued material wealth only as a basis of right living, of a people who were satisfied with frugal comfort and devoted their leisure to things of the spirit; a land whose countryside would be bright with cosy homesteads, whose fields and villages would be joyous with the sounds of industry, the romping of sturdy children, the contests of athletic youths, the laughter of comely maidens; whose firesides would be forums of the wisdom of serene old age.4

From the end of the 1950s, Ireland’s politics were almost turned on their head. The nationalist issues that had dominated Irish social, economic, and political life were not exactly abandoned. It was more a matter of putting them to one side in order to make economic growth the national priority. It is well known that this new political agenda was enormously successful, and Ireland was transformed from one of the poorest countries in Europe to one of the richest in the space of less than 40 years. This change in the political landscape is usually dated to 1958, when a government policy paper outlined the case for foreign investment. In the following year, a new government came to power, headed by Sean Lemass, with an explicit modernizing agenda. It was also in 1959 that de Valera retired from active politics and assumed the largely symbolic role of President. In Ireland, the presidency is a purely ceremonial office, as it is in Germany and elsewhere. It was this government that began the policy of low corporate taxes that has served Ireland so well in recent years by attracting foreign investment. Ireland also had an educated, Englishspeaking workforce that was grateful for any kind of work. It was also under the Lemass government that the issue of Ireland becoming a member of the European Economic Community (the predecessor of the European Union) began to be openly discussed. This was a free trade area, and Irish membership would make the country even more attractive to foreign investors since any goods that were manufactured in Ireland could be exported to the other member states, which included France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Italy, without import duties or restrictions. A limiting factor was that the Irish economy was heavily dependent on trade with the United Kingdom, particularly with regard to the export of

agricultural produce. It would therefore cause problems if Ireland was a member of the EEC and the United Kingdom was not. Denmark was in a similar situation. Thus, both Ireland and Denmark conducted negotiations for membership of the EEC in tandem with the United Kingdom, and all three countries joined together on January 1, 1973. Another benefit to membership of the EEC was that the richer members provided financial assistance to the poorer ones, and Ireland was still one of the poorer members when it joined. It thus benefited from all kinds of European grants—for example, money to build new roads. Meanwhile, a combination of low taxes and government subsidies continued to attract foreign investment, about 90% of which was American. No doubt Ireland’s use of the English language and its traditional ties to the United States played a role, here but these factors alone would be unlikely to sway investment decisions. The biggest sectors are in information technology, where companies like Dell, Intel, IBM, and Microsoft have made multi-billion dollar investments, and pharmaceuticals, where eight of the top ten corporations in the world (e.g., Pfizer, GlaxoSmithKline) have manufacturing plants. This is, in short, how Ireland went from being one of Europe’s poorest countries to one of its richest in the space of a single generation. It also went from a long history of emigration to net immigration, and ethnic minorities have now become a feature of Irish society. With the push towards economic growth, the old nationalist agenda began to crumble. The government may still pay lip-service to preserving the Gaelic language, but most of the requirements to learn Gaelic have now been abolished and one can fully function in Irish society without any knowledge of Gaelic. Similarly, Gaelic sports continue to be played but they are less popular than what were traditionally regarded as “English” sports, like soccer and rugby. The power of the Catholic Church has declined dramatically since the 1950s. It has lost major battles over contraception and divorce during these years. Abortion is still illegal unless the life of the mother is in danger, but this is not a major issue since thousands of Irish women have abortions in the United Kingdom every year and many of them prefer the anonymity that comes with having it done away from home. Like the rest of Europe, Ireland has become increasingly secular, and this is reflected in attendance at church services and the difficulty that the Church now has in recruiting priests.5

Even the claim to the territory of Northern Ireland has been to put one side, a change in policy that would have been unthinkable to de Valera and his generation. As mentioned earlier, the Irish constitution of 1937 described Northern Ireland as part of the national territory and held the current division of the country as a temporary state of affairs. The official position of the Irish government and of many nationalist politicians in Northern Ireland was that reunification should take place by peaceful means. There were, however, those like the Irish Republican Army (IRA) who wanted to achieve the same goal by violent means, and it was thought that the claim to Northern Ireland in the Irish constitution provided them with encouragement. Thus, following a national referendum, the constitution was changed as part of the Belfast Agreement of 1998. The Irish government has not given up the hope of national reunification, but it no longer regards the territory of Northern Ireland as its own. The new politics and economics of Ireland have resulted in massive cultural changes. Ireland is now more like its neighboring countries in northwestern Europe than it is different from them. The declining role of the Church in Irish society is a case in point. The policy of strict censorship was gradually abandoned after the 1950s, as Ireland became more “open” to foreign ideas. It is therefore no accident that psychology came to Ireland around the same time. 1958 is generally taken to be the year in which this shift of policy occurred and that also happens to be the year in which the first formal qualification in psychology was offered by an Irish university. The 1950s also mark the beginning of the industrialization of Ireland on a large scale, and industrialization is generally accompanied by science and technology. Ireland could have not been so successful in areas such as information technology and pharmaceuticals without a solid scientific base in education and research. A recent article in the journal The Scientist is titled, “Ireland’s New Culture of Science”: In the past, Irish scientists had to emigrate in order to land a steady career. These “prodigal sons and daughters” now return to a rejuvenated economy and booming interest in the sciences and are contributing their experience, expertise and connections to the growth of Irish science. Ireland now courts the world’s greatest Irish and non-Irish researchers.6

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Although this article concentrates on the life sciences, similar developments have occurred in other sciences, and the growth of psychology is a part of that process.

Was Psychology Late in Coming to Ireland? I recently received an e-mail from a psychologist in the United Kingdom who was writing a textbook on the history of psychology and wanted to know when the first psychology laboratory was established in Ireland. I said that I didn’t know, but I could tell him that the first psychology clinic was opened in 1955 and the first qualification in psychology was offered by an Irish university in 1958. He expressed surprise at these dates, no doubt expecting me to have given some dates at the end of the 19th century or, at the very least, in the early years of the 20th century. My answers were so far out of his time-frame that he decided not to include Ireland in his comparison. He considered it to be an anomaly. This view is shared by many Irish psychologists, who accept that psychology did not come to Ireland until the second half of the 20th century. It is widely believed that psychology came “late.” “Late” is a relative term and so we need to ask, “late in relation to what?” It was certainly late in relation to the tiny handful of countries that are covered in the standard textbooks on the history of psychology, namely Germany, France, Britain, and the United States. As mentioned earlier, these were the most developed, industrialized countries of the time and were not representative of the world as a whole. In order to see this, we only need to look at the International Union of Psychological Science (IUPsyS), the federation of national associations or societies of psychology. It was founded in 1951 with 12 charter members, all of them Western countries with the sole exception of industrialized Japan. When the Psychological Society of Ireland was recognized by IUPsyS in 1974, it was the 40th member association to be admitted. Even today, the union has only 70 member associations.7 These figures should be contrasted with the 192 independent countries that are recognized by the United Nations. Thus, only 20% of the world’s countries were members of IUPsyS when the Psychological Society of Ireland joined in 1974. It might be objected that membership of IUPsyS is not an accurate reflection of how developed psychology is in different countries of the world. Perhaps there are countries where psychology is highly developed but which, for one reason or another, have either chosen or been forced to stay 302

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out of the organization. Perhaps there are countries that have been admitted to membership where psychology hardly exists. Fortunately, Adair, Coêhlo, and Luna (2002) have produced an alternative set of statistics that can be used. These are based on presentations at international conferences and contributions to the international literature on psychology. Based on these figures, they conclude that psychology has a “significant presence” in 47 countries and a “presence” in another 22 countries. Not only that, these 69 countries are almost identical to the 70 countries that are members of IUPsyS. In another 82 countries that were examined in the study, the authors came to the conclusion that psychology has a “minimal presence” in 19 and “no presence” in 63. One can see from these figures that psychology was by no means late in coming to Ireland when seen from a global point of view. However, it might be objected that Ireland should not be compared with Bolivia, Angola, Thailand, or Fiji, but with its European neighbors with whom it has a common history and culture. However, even here it can be pointed out that psychology came to other European countries just as late, or even later, than it did to Ireland. I am thinking here in particular of the countries of southern Europe, like Spain, Portugal, Italy, and Greece (Sexton & Hogan, 1992). Like Ireland, these countries were slow to develop industrially in comparison to countries like Britain, France, and Germany, and all of them except Italy were isolated from the rest of Europe for many years and relatively late in joining the European Union. Also, with the sole exception of Greece, they have the common characteristic with Ireland of being Catholic countries. The history of Spain during the 20th century might serve as a useful point of comparison. Unlike Ireland, Spain was not fighting for its independence in the early years of the 20th century. On the contrary, it had been a major colonial power. Spain under the Franco regime had similarities with Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy, whereas Ireland remained a democracy throughout the 20th century. In spite of these differences, there are some striking points of similarity. Both countries had a civil war in the early part of the 20th century that was followed by extremely conservative, if not reactionary, governments that remained in power for many years. Both countries also stayed neutral during World War II and were isolationist in their general outlook. This, together with the power of the Catholic Church, meant that both countries tended to emphasize

scholastic philosophy at the expense of scientific psychology. Although this type of society began to change in Ireland after 1958, Spain had to wait until after the death of Franco in 1975. These changes are reflected in the dates that each country joined the European Union. Ireland became a member in 1973, but Spain did not become a member until 1986. Psychology had a modest presence in Spain prior to the civil war but this situation changed dramatically after Franco came to power: All these promising developments vanished with the civil war (1936–39) and were replaced by a scholastic psychology, which put psychology more as a philosophical discipline than as an empirically based enterprise. A select group of people (among them José Germain, Mariano Yela, and José Luis Pinillos) were in part responsible for bringing psychology back to the realm of empirical sciences during the 1950s and 1960s, in a period in which the country was isolated from the rest of the world because of the Franco dictatorship. (Algarabel & Luciano, 2003, p. 193)

The first person with formal training in psychology was appointed by a Spanish university in 1957, several years after E. F. O’Doherty had gained his Chair in Logic and Psychology at University College Dublin in 1949. The first qualification in psychology to be offered by a Spanish university was a 2-year postgraduate diploma that was introduced in 1953. O’Doherty introduced a similar 2-year postgraduate diploma at University College Dublin in 1958. The first degree in psychology was offered by a Spanish university in 1968, by which time degrees in the subject had already been introduced by Trinity College Dublin in 1964 and by University College Dublin in 1967. The main professional body of psychologists in Spain, the Colegio Oficial de Psicólogos, was established in 1979, almost a decade after the Psychological Society of Ireland (Algarabel & Luciano, 2003; see also Carpintero, 2011, Chapter 21, this volume). Thus, even by the standards of other European countries, psychology was not unusually late in becoming established in Ireland. If we take a contextualist view of the matter, as I have done in this chapter, then talk of “early” and “late” with regard to the establishment of psychology is of little value. Psychology will become established when the social, economic, and political conditions for its establishment are right. It is therefore always “on time” with respect to these conditions and never “early” or “late.”

Conclusions The point was made at the outset that, far from developing in every country around the world at the same time, psychology only became well-established in a handful of countries in northwestern Europe and North America at the end of the 19th century. Moreover, these countries in which psychology became well-established had something in common: They were among the most industrially developed countries in the world. There are certain features that industrialized countries have in common. One is a highly educated population. It is impossible to function as an industrialized country without the necessary technical skills. A related point is that science is usually held in high esteem and supported because of the technological applications that it provides. Also, as science becomes more important, religion tends to decline and these societies tend to become more secular. What I am describing here is industrial civilization or, as it is known in some quarters, “modernity.” According to Kvale (1992): Psychology is a child of modernity. It was coined as a term in the age of Reformation in the sixteenth century, often, but probably erroneously attributed to the reformist humanist, Philip Melanchthon. Psychology was developed as a theoretical discipline by Wolff in the eighteenth century, and came to be regarded as a science after Wundt set up his experimental laboratory in 1879. (pp. 39–40)

I am somewhat reluctant to use the term because it has been used by so many writers in so many different ways that it has become almost meaningless. The widespread use of the term “postmodern,” which many people see as a different phase of modernity and not a change from modernity itself, has only served to confuse the issue even further. According to Kvale (1992), psychology is so closely linked to modernity that the very notion of a postmodern psychology is a contradiction in terms. This is not to say that something resembling psychology does not exist in traditional societies. Most traditional societies that have been studied by anthropologists have views on what it is to be human. There is even a branch of anthropology known as ethnopsychology, which studies these views. The well-known work of Catherine Lutz on the Pacific atoll of Ifaluk is a case in point (Lutz, 1988). In some respects, the term “ethnopsychology” is misleading since these views may or may not have a psychological dimension to them. brock

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By “psychological,” I mean reference to internal events that are not biological in nature. Thus, the term that is used by Graham Richards, “reflexive discourse” is to be preferred since it does not embody this assumption (Richards, 2002). An important aspect of this reflexive discourse in traditional societies is that it is grounded in religion rather than science. This was the experience of Kurt Danziger, who went to Indonesia in the 1950s to introduce the locals to Western psychology and found that there was already a local psychology there, ilmu djiwa, which had its origins in Hindu philosophy (Danziger, 1997). What Danziger does not mention in the book but has discussed with me in conversation is the almost inevitable conflict that arose between the two. The traditional views were supported by those who had a vested interest in the traditional society, such as large landowners, while Western views were supported by “modernizers” who wanted to bring about social change. We can see all these patterns in the Irish case. Ireland was not a modern society at the time that psychology was becoming established in some of its European neighbors at the end of the 19th century, and it did not become a modern society for another 80 years. However, as soon as it did become a modern society, psychology suddenly appeared. Prior to that, the authority on matters of the human soul was the Church, and many churchmen were opposed to what they saw as a secular and materialistic competitor. This view was not universal, however, and it was those members of the Church who saw no threat from psychology who were largely responsible for bringing it into the country. Only they had the authority to do so at the time. We have seen how Spain follows a similar pattern in that scholastic philosophy was encouraged under the ultra-conservative Franco regime, and scientific psychology did not become fully established until the country became a part of the European mainstream in the years immediately after his death. History is not something on which grand theories can be based. Although similar patterns can be found in different countries, there are unique aspects to every situation. Rather than commit what philosophers call, “the inductive fallacy” on the basis of one or two case studies, I am inclined to call for more studies on the social, economic, and political background to the introduction of psychology in specific countries, so that international comparisons can be made. It was stated at the outset that expanding the “database” of the history of psychology can do more than provide us with additional facts. It 304

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can increase our understanding of psychology itself. This is because the countries that have traditionally been the focus of history of psychology have certain features in common, and we need to look at countries that do not share these features in order to understand their significance. What the history of psychology in Ireland can show us is that the presence or absence of scientific psychology in specific countries is not to be taken for granted. It requires an appropriate set of social, economic, and political conditions before it can become established. Without these conditions, it is unlikely to appear.

Future Directions • Can the presence or absence of scientific psychology in other countries be linked to the presence or absence of “modern” values, as seems to be the case in Ireland? • Much of the available literature on the history of psychology in Ireland is based on the reminiscences of the actors who were involved. What are the limitations of this type of literature? • In what ways did the different social, economic, and political context of Northern Ireland influence the development of psychology there? • What are the fundamental psychological concepts of the Gaelic language, and how do these differ from their English-language counterparts? • The traditional view of psychology’s history suggest that it was established as a laboratory science and its findings were then “applied” in the wider society but, in Ireland, the latter came first. Is the Irish experience unusual in this regard? • The relationship between psychology and the Church in Ireland is very complex, with many members of the Church being opposed to what they saw as a secular approach to the soul; yet, some of the most important founders of psychology were priests. Was there a similar complex relationship between psychology and the Church in other countries? • Psychology first became established in the countries of northwestern Europe, which were largely industrialized and Protestant, the main exception being France, which was predominantly Catholic, but which had become increasingly secular in the wake of the French Revolution. Why was psychology relatively late in coming to the countries of southern and eastern Europe?

Acknowledgments This chapter is an expanded version of an invited lecture that was given at University College Galway in 1999 (Brock, 1999, October). I would like to thank Betty Bayer, who was spending a sabbatical in Galway at the time, for inviting me.

Notes 1. The present chapter is an expanded version of a guest lecture that was given at University College Galway in 1999 (Brock, 1999, October). A copy of this lecture was given to the student in question in 2001, and it was suggested that he use it as the basis for an M.A. thesis. 2. Here I must express my thanks to Ciarán Benson, who provided me with some of this literature. 3. There are several excellent introductions to the history of Ireland. They include Townsend (1999), Kee (2003), and Brown (2004). Where well-known events in Irish history are mentioned in this work, specific references will not be given. The reader can refer to these and other similar works. 4. The original broadcast can be heard at http://www.rte.ie/ laweb/ll/ll_t09b.html (retrieved November 20, 2009). 5. See for example http://www.independent.ie/nationalnews/bishop-gives-his-blessing-to — ordination-of-women317154.html (retrieved November 20, 2009). 6. http://www.the-scientist.com/fragments/libraries/pdf/ ireland.pdf (retrieved on November 20, 2009). 7. See the website of IUPsyS, http://www.am.org/iupsys/ members-affiliates/index.html (retrieved November 20, 2009).

References Adair, J. G., Coêlho, A. E. L., & Luna, J. R. (2002). How international is psychology? International Journal of Psychology, 37, 160–170. Algarabel, S., & Luciano, J. V. (2003). Psychology in Spain. The Psychologist, 16, 192–194. Brady, T., & McLoone, J. (1992). Ireland. In V. S. Sexton, & J. D Hogan (Eds.), International psychology: Views from around the world (2nd ed., pp. 229–340). Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. Brock, A. C. (1999, October). Psychology and modernity: The case of Ireland, 1922–1974. Unpublished guest lecture presented at University College Galway. Brock, A. C. (2006a). Internationalizing the history of psychology. New York: New York University Press. [Reprinted in 2009.] Brock, A. C. (2006b). Psychology and liberal democracy: A spurious connection? In A. C. Brock (Ed.), Internationalizing the history of psychology (pp. 152–162). New York: New York University Press. Brooks, G. P. (1973). The use of psychological concepts in the writings of an Irish psychiatrist in the nineteenth century. Irish Journal of Psychology, 2, 102–112. Brooks, G. P. (1983). Francis Hutcheson: An important Irish contributor to eighteenth-century psychological thought. Irish Journal of Psychology, 6, 54–68. Brown, T. (2004). Ireland: A social and cultural history, 1922–2001 (2nd ed.). London: Harper Collins. Byrne-O’Connell, J. (1916). Modern psychology. Irish Ecclesiastical Record, 7, 325–344.

Carpintero, H. (2011). Spain. In D. B. Baker (Ed.), The Oxford handbook of the history of psychology: Global perspectives. New York: Oxford University Press. Chamberlain, J. (1985). School psychology services in Ireland. Journal of School Psychology, 23, 217–224. Cooney. J. (1999). John Charles McQuaid: Ruler of Catholic Ireland. Dublin: O’Brien Press. Curtis, R., & McHugh, M. (1986). Time present and time past: A retrospection on the Department of Psychology, University College Galway (1971–1986). Galway: Department of Psychology. Danziger, K. (1997). Naming the mind: How psychology found its language. London: Sage. Dempsey, P. J. R. (1950). The psychology of Sartre. Cork: Cork University Press. Dempsey, P. J. R. (1956). Freud, psychoanalysis, Catholicism. Cork: Mercier. Dempsey, P. J. R. (1973). Psychology and the manager. London: Pan Books. Department of Psychology, TCD. (1992). Psychology Department: Trinity College Dublin: 30th anniversary, 1962–1992. Dublin: Paceprint. Hallaran, W. S. (1810). An enquiry into the causes producing the extraordinary addition to the number of insane. . . . Cork: Edwards & Savage. Humphreys, M. J. (2007, December). The foundation of academic psychology in the Republic of Ireland. Unpublished MA thesis, University College, Dublin. Inglis, T. (1998). Moral monopoly: The rise and fall of the Catholic Church in Ireland. Dublin: University College Press. Kee, R. (2003). Ireland: A history (2nd ed.). London: Abacus. Kirakowski, J., & Delafield, G. (1982). The Department of Applied Psychology at University College, Cork. Thornfield Journal, 10, 38–54. Kvale, S. (1992). Postmodern psychology: A contradiction in terms? In S. Kvale (Ed.), Psychology and postmodernism (pp. 31–57). London: Sage. Lapointe, F. H. (1968). Origin and evolution of the term “psychology.” American Psychologist, 1970, 25(7), 640–646. Lutz, C. A. (1988). Unnatural emotions: Everyday sentiments on a Micronesian atoll. Chicago: Chicago University Press. Maher, M. (1900). Psychology: Empirical and rational. London: Longmans Green & Co. Máire, A. N. Sr. (1928). Aigneolaíocht. Dublin: Browne & Nolan. McCartney, D. (1999). UCD: A national idea. Dublin: Gill & Macmillan. McHugh, M., & McCloone, J. (1980). The roots that clutch: The origins and growth of PSI. The Irish Psychologist, 6, 1–8. [Special Supplement]. McKenna, J. (1982). The development of clinical psychology. The Irish Psychologist, 6, 50–51. McKenna, J. (1986). The development of psychology in Ireland. Thornfield Journal, 14, 34–47. McLoone, J. (1982). Psychologists in mental handicap services. The Irish Psychologist, 6, 51–51. McLoughlin, J. (1954). The Catholic attitude to psychiatry. Irish Ecclesiastical Record, 7, 371–376. O’Doherty, E. F. (1976a). Human psychology. General psychology: The phenomenology of mental life Vol. 1. Dublin: Folens. O’Doherty, E. F. (1976b). Human psychology. Social psychology: The human personality and society Vol. 2. Dublin: Folens.

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O’Doherty, E. F. (1979). Human psychology. The nature, structure and dynamics of human personality. Dublin: Folens. Richards, G. (1987). Of what is the history of psychology a history? British Journal for the History of Science, 20, 201–211. Richards, G. (2002). Putting psychology in its place: An introduction from a critical historical perspective (2nd ed.). London: Routledge. Sexton, V. S. & Hogan, J. D. (Eds.) (1992). International psychology: Views from around the world. Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press. Smith, H. (1980). Reflections on PSI. The Irish Psychologist, 8, 45–46.

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Smith, R. (1988). Does the history of psychology have a subject? History of the Human Sciences, 1, 147–177. Swaine, R. (1995). The department of psychology, University College Cork. Irish Journal of Psychology, 16, iii–iv. Townsend, C. (1999). Ireland: The twentieth century. London: Bloomsbury. Watson, R. I. (1963). The great psychologists from Aristotle to Freud. Philadelphia: Lippincott.

C HA P TE R

15

Italy

Guido Cimino and Renato Foschi

Abstract This chapter traces the history of “scientific” psychology in Italy between the second half of the 19th century and the last decades of the 20th century. In the first period of “gestation,” through the works of scholars such as Roberto Ardigò, Giuseppe Sergi, Cesare Lombroso, and Gabriele Buccola, its origin was favored by three research traditions that arose within the sphere of positivist philosophy, anthropology, and psychiatry, and contributed to its “birth” in the beginning of the 20th century. In these years, a second generation of scholars—including Giulio Cesare Ferrari, Sante De Sanctis, Federico Kiesow, Francesco De Sarlo, and Maria Montessori—promoted a series of initiatives (debate on the scientific statute of the discipline; experimental research of general, applied, and clinical psychology; first university chairs; laboratories) that characterized the beginnings of the “new” psychological science. The latter proceeded then with fluctuating experiences—thanks to the contribution of Vittorio Benussi, Cesare Musatti, Enzo Bonaventura, and Agostino Gemelli—during the years between the two World Wars, marked by the predominance of the neo-idealist culture grafted onto the fascist regime, which favored in particular psychotechnics. After World War II, Italian psychology had a noteworthy scientific and institutional development up to the realization of the first university degree courses and of the law regulating the profession of psychologist. Keywords: Italian psychology, positivism, anthropology, psychiatry, scientific foundation, psychotechnics, neo-idealism, fascism, university degree courses

The Gestation of Italian “Scientific” Psychology Between Philosophy, Anthropology, and Psychiatry Modern psychology as a combination of theoretical, empirical, and applied knowledge and research on the human mind, attained in accordance with presumably scientific canons, and as an institutionalized discipline (i.e., taught in schools and universities; practiced by researchers and professionals in laboratories and centers of psychological assistance and consultation, and also in educational, workplace, prison, courtroom, and mental health facilities; endowed with specialist journals, editorial series, and associations; and discussed in national and international congresses), that is to say, psychology as a “science” and as a “discipline” has its origin, in the view

of many historians, between the middle of the 19th century and the first decades of the 20th century in various European and extra-European nations, with temporal fluctuations forward or backward depending upon the countries and interpretations involved (Cimino & Plas, 2006). In Italy, the emergence of the “new” psychology, at that time defined as “positive or experimental,” and even sometimes as scientific in order to distinguish it from the “old” prescientific psychology elaborated within the philosophical doctrines, can be attributed to this historical period, during which multiple events of a scientificcultural, sociopolitical, and institutional kind contributed to its genesis. During the last 30 years of the 19th century, in particular, a process took place that—in analogy 307

with the formation and appearance of a living being—can be defined as one of “gestation”; a complex and tortuous process in which a general movement of ideas, gradual initiatives of a cultural and institutional kind, and new research formulated with experimental method in the end converged in such a way as to then form, in the first 10 to 15 years of the 20th century, a “critical mass” that identified psychology as an autonomous science, distinct from philosophy as from physiology and psychiatry. One can in this regard speak of an incipient “embryonic” stage, in which the new psychological discipline was not yet completely formed, but in which its components began to be structured and organized, and of a second stage of actual “birth,” in the first decades of the 20th century, during which the preceding ideas and activities, by means of a second generation of scientists, developed and increased to the point of creating a multiform, articulated, and coordinated body of knowledge, research, applications, and institutions, which as a whole marked the birth of the new psychology with its scientific aspirations (Cimino, 2006, 2010; Cimino & Dazzi, 1998, 2003; Lombardo & Foschi, 1997; Marhaba, 1981). The “incubation” of modern psychology took place within the political-institutional context of the new Kingdom of Italy, in the socioeconomic area of a growing industrialization, and in the philosophicalcultural climate of evolutionist positivism; that is, in the midst of a background that favored and promoted the maturation of a scientific study of mental phenomena. For the actual birth of modern Italian psychology, however, a specific and decisive impulse was required on the part of several research traditions that developed in those years: from the core of the positivist philosophy of an evolutionist kind, especially with the work of Roberto Ardigò (1828–1920), there arose the much-discussed epistemological problem of founding a “positive psychology”—as it was then called—detached from the philosophical framework and conducted to the field of the natural sciences; from the sphere of the renewed human sciences, and in particular from the anthropology and criminal anthropology of Giuseppe Sergi (1841–1936) and of Cesare Lombroso (1835–1909), the need was expressed to identify the character traits of individuals and, then, to develop an “applied psychology” to be practiced in the areas of education, work, the prisons, and the courtrooms; and from the heart of psychiatry and of psychopathology the program originated—which Gabriele Buccola (1854–1885) began to put into practice—of studying mental phenomena 308

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with experimental method in persons both with and without mental disturbances, and of using in the clinical setting the results obtained. These three research traditions—philosophical-epistemological, anthropological, and psychiatric—present and active in the background of a sociopolitical and scientificcultural context of great ferment, were thus an essential part of the gestation process that produced the birth of the new Italian psychology in the beginnings of the 20th century.

The Historical, Sociopolitical, and Institutional Context After the Sabaudian Kingdom, or Kingdom of Sardinia (which comprised Piedmont, Liguria, and Sardinia), had united in a single nation the different states present on the Italian peninsula (Lombardy— until then annexed to Austria—the Duchies of Modena and Parma, the Great Duchy of Tuscany, the Pontifical State, and the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies), the Kingdom of Italy was proclaimed in 1861, and extended soon afterward with the conquest of Venetia in 1866, followed in 1870 by that of the city of Rome, which was destined to become its capital. The young Italian state found itself faced with enormous political, economic, and social problems: It was in fact necessary to unify the laws, regulations, institutions, and dialects, as well as the civil, cultural, and religious traditions of no fewer than seven different states. The Kingdom of Italy became established as a constitutional monarchy that gave to the Savoy dynasty—the creator of the country’s unification under Victor Emmanuel II—the right to rule, attributed the legislative power to an elected parliament, and assigned the executive power to a government that was an expression of the parliamentary majority. To accelerate unification, the parliament rejected the federal system of regional autonomies and designed a very centralized state structure. The legislative system, bureaucratic apparatus, and organization of finance, justice, and the armed forces, all of which had belonged to the prior Piedmontese state, were extended to the new Italian state; this created not a few imbalances and difficulties, especially in the south, where the sociopolitical background gave rise to repeated episodes of rebellion and banditry. During the last 30 years of the 19th century, in spite of the serious economic problems inherited from the wars of independence, the new institutional framework gave rise to the gradual construction of a modern State and the beginning of the country’s industrial transformation (already under

way in the more advanced provinces of northern Italy), with the realization of numerous public works. The industrialization had rapid effects upon the social life: The progress of science and technology transformed the entire production process; the cities enlarged with the increase of the population; the network of traffic and commerce developed; the ancient balance between city and countryside disintegrated; production and prosperity began to increase, especially in the north of Italy; and medicine began to defeat infectious diseases, a secular and distressing affliction of humanity. In short, the Industrial Revolution changed the citizens’ way of life, generating expectations that crystallized around the idea of a continuous and unrestrainable human and social “progress,” inasmuch as the crucial instruments seemed to exist for resolving any kind of problem. These instruments were identified especially with science and its applications to industry, agriculture, and health, with the free market, and with the availability of education and medical care to all citizens. With the industrial and capitalist revolution it was not long before the effects were felt of a great social discomfort: strong imbalance between the classes, economic growth of the middle class and miserable conditions of the proletariat, exploitation of work (particularly of minors), struggles for the conquest of the markets, uncontrolled urbanization of the indigent masses, social alienation, emigration, socioeconomic disparity between the north and the south of Italy, etc. This discomfort was diagnosed by the incipient Marxist ideology in different terms from those indicated by the dominant positivist thinking, which maintained that all difficulties would soon disappear as a result of the growth of the economy, knowledge, and widespread education. In any case, as in other European countries, particularly those of a Latin origin, one could witness the progressive emergence of new “subjects” bearing civil and political rights, as in the case of children, workers, women, those with physical or mental illness, the accused or imprisoned, and political militants, all of whom gradually became an object of concern for the modern secularized States, which thus began to promote the creation and reform of institutions specifically on their behalf, with the objective of both their betterment and social defense. One of the most challenging tasks of the new Italian state was that of reorganizing the instruction in the primary and secondary schools, and in the universities, and of combating the illiteracy that, in certain regions just after unification, involved almost

90% of the population. The laws of compulsory education and those regarding the educational system were central points of the liberal reformism of the young Kingdom of Italy, which endowed itself with a primary, secondary, and tertiary scholastic organization. In the secondary schools, from the Casati reform of 1859 up to the Gentile reform of 1923, psychology could be taught within the sphere of philosophy programs, which included various aspects of this discipline such as metaphysics, gnoseology, ethics, esthetics, and so forth, as well as pedagogy and psychology (a possibility that was instead abolished by the Gentile reform, which substituted all these areas with the history of philosophy). Some enterprising professors of a positivist orientation, such as, for example, Roberto Ardigò and Giuseppe Sergi, thus began to teach the new experimental psychology, of which they wrote the first manuals—particularly memorable are those of Sergi (1873/1874), Brofferio (1889), and Villa (1899)—for the use of students, who in some cases were then trained to perform limited experimental psychology research in the scientific laboratories of the high schools. As far as regards university instruction, the Kingdom of Italy had at the time of unification inherited from the single Italian states 22 university institutions, a rather high number in the European context of the time (especially if compared to the modest number of students enrolled), with universities of various dimensions and traditions, poorly distributed over the national territory. The last decades of the 19th century thus witnessed a reorganization of the university system, with the creation or requalification of institutes, laboratories, and medical clinics. The national government imposed upon all the country a model of centralized higher education that mandated that the universities and faculties (the latter reduced to four: medicine; mathematical, physical, and natural sciences; jurisprudence; literature and philosophy) adapt to the didactic requirements of the standardized curricula, and that they institute all the basic teaching requested by the Ministry of Public Instruction. From the unification of Italy until World War I, there was a notable increase in the number of university teachers, albeit in a differentiated and heterogeneous way depending upon location, with a consequent increase in the number both of professorial chairs won by competition and of the teaching established by appointment or presented as “free courses” conducted by scholars who had received the libera docenza; that is, who had passed a specific cimino, foschi

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qualification examination for higher teaching (similar to the German Privatdozenten).

The Philosophical-Cultural Context of Evolutionist Positivism and the Contribution of Ardigò A substantial political stability, a slow process of industrialization, and a change in the economic and social fabric, together with a reorganization and expansion of the primary, secondary, and university education, were therefore at the end of the 19th century the principal characteristics of Italian society, within which a cultural climate of a positivist kind was easily implanted. It established itself in those years as a fundamental ideology of the secular culture and rising middle class, which was desirous of affirming the primacy of the State against the power of the Church and its transcendent vision of the world. In fact, within the corpus of Italian philosophy, until then dominated by the religious spiritualism of Antonio Rosmini (1797–1855) and Vincenzo Gioberti (1801–1852), as by the Hegelianism of Augusto Vera (1813–1885) and Bertrando Spaventa (1817–1883) that developed principally in the southern universities, there emerged and developed, during the last 30 years of the 19th century, a matrix of positivist and evolutionist thought; that is, a new way to conceive and interpret reality such that it concerned many branches of culture—comprising philosophy, historiography, literature, art, law, and economy, as well as the so-called human and social sciences—and became particularly widespread in the scientific fields, especially among doctors and biologists. In Italy the positivist Zeitgeist stemmed more from Renaissance naturalism and Gian Battista Vico (1668–1744) than from thinkers beyond the Alps, but for the most part, it presented itself as a sort of “spontaneous philosophy of the scientists” that sprang from the simple—and at times simplistic— reflection on the successes that 19th-century science had obtained in every field, and on its extraordinary applications in industry, economy, and medicine; successes that had consequently given rise to a blind faith in progress and a deeply rooted conviction that scientific research could resolve all of humanity’s problems. The conquests of science and technology thus favored the expansion of positivist thought, which in spite of the differences encountered among the various countries and scholars, presented some common characteristics that were evident also in the first Italian psychologists: “scientism”; empirical and experimental method to be applied not only to 310

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nature but also to human beings and society; primacy of the “fact” and of the logical procedure of induction; faith in progress; abandonment of all metaphysics; mechanistic reductionism and materialism; evolutionism, etc. Thus, these characteristic features of positivist thought had forcefully presented the need to study also mental phenomena with “positive and experimental method,” subtracting them from philosophical speculation. Furthermore, since Italian positivism had a strong imprint of an evolutionary kind (inspired by Spencer and Haeckel, and often with a trace of Lamarck), this too had spurred the formation of a psychological science. An evolutionist positivism therefore provided the background and stimulus, during the last 30 years of the 19th century, for a theoretical discussion among Italian philosophers, pedagogues, anthropologists, biologists, physiologists, and psychiatrists, to make the study of mental phenomena independent from philosophical speculation, and to provide a scientific statute to the new psychology; that is, to determine its object and methods, as well as its relations and boundaries with philosophy on the one hand and with physiology on the other. It was precisely this widely felt need and the consequent epistemological reflection that, in fact, created in Italy a fertile ground for the gestation of the new psychology with scientific claims, even though laboratory experimentation was initially scarce and modest (with the exception of Buccola, who set up significant experiments), and began to be practiced in a more systematic way only from the beginning of the 20th century. Among the numerous treatments to confer a scientific character upon the study of mental phenomena, one that stands out in particular can be found in the works of the most important Italian positivist philosopher, Roberto Ardigò, whose theoretical proposal of a new science of the mind forms the basis for his being considered a precursor or pioneer of modern Italian psychology. After his religious studies and abandonment of the priesthood, Ardigò interested himself in the natural sciences and especially in physiology. In 1869, he had written the Discorso su Pietro Pomponazzi (Discourse on Pietro Pomponazzi), in which he had adhered to positivism, or rather, to the naturalism of a Renaissance origin, which, in accordance with the tenor of the time, he integrated with patriotism, secular liberalism, and reformatory socialism. It was, in fact, the doctrine of positivism that inspired his conception of psychology. Ardigò’s thought, which is quite complex, is developed in numerous works, many

of which concern purely psychological themes (on Ardigò, see Büttemeyer, 1969, 1998). In his volume La psicologia come scienza positiva (Psychology as a Positive Science) of 1870, in particular, Ardigò criticized the traditional psychologies inserted within a spiritualistic philosophical framework, such as for example the psychology of Rosmini, and instead maintained that psychology needed to become an autonomous science, distinct from philosophy as from physiology and the other natural sciences. Its object should be mental phenomena seen as an independent category of the facts of experience, to be investigated with the methods of the “positive sciences,” such as for example the quantitative psychophysical and psychophysiological methods that had been developed in Germany. Ardigò’s volume of 1870 thus represents the first Italian work to propose a modern concept of psychology, and in general to be dedicated to epistemological questions regarding this science. The reality of the mental world is, for Ardigò, the object of study for psychology, which must regard “the mental acts, not observable elsewhere than within consciousness,” that is, those that are experienced by means of introspection. For this reason— he affirms—“it will be necessary to have a science that is special and distinct from physiology” (Ardigò, 1870/1882, p. 173), to which—differently than in Comte’s opinion—psychology cannot be reduced. He proposed, moreover, to explain all of mental activity by beginning from sensations, in accordance with the model of the English associationists, from which the maxim: “Give me the sensations and their associability, and I will explain to you all the phenomena of mental life” (p. 199). He distinguished, then, sensation from perception: The former— considered the starting point of both mental activity and psychological analysis—is none other than the immediate conscious effect of a stimulation; the latter, instead, results from the association of revived previous sensations and the integration of “a very long series of unperceived judgments and reasons”; it is “a later and more complicated act”; “a whole that is not simple, as was believed, but very, very complex” (pp. 298 ff.). Last, he asserted that the association of sensations in accordance with laws to be sought and identified gives rise also to ideas, feelings, and wishes. This distinction between sensation and perception was proposed again by Ardigò in his essay Il fatto psicologico della percezione (The Psychological Fact of Perception) of 1882, in which, also on the basis of some of his experiments, he criticized the

theory of Sergi, who considered perception a mere physiological phenomenon characteristic of the cerebral structures, thus denying to it a special psychological value or meaning. Opposing himself then to Sergi’s physiologism that decisively denied the peculiarity of mental acts (which for Ardigò are in any case natural phenomena, even though not merely physiological in the same way as other functions of the organism), the positivist philosopher admitted introspection as a research method, but did not consider it the only valid one. He proposed also “the indirect study of mental acts”; that is, the investigation of mental phenomena by means of observable external elements, a study justified by the inseparable correspondence between the physical and the mental (Büttemeyer, 1998, p. 94). The importance that Ardigò attributed to the new psychological science is demonstrated by the fact that, already in 1876, he had proposed the creation of a psychology laboratory in the upper secondary school of Mantua where he was teaching. After having been called to the chair of the history of philosophy at the University of Padua, he advocated in 1882 for the need to institute the teaching of experimental psychology and began to acquire instruments in Germany for a psychology laboratory, material that would however be utilized only 40 years later, by Vittorio Benussi (1878–1927). All in all, Ardigò’s contribution to the birth of scientific psychology in Italy consisted principally in his having opposed the traditional spiritualistic and speculative psychologies while clearly delineating the new field of psychological studies to be pursued with different empirical and experimental methods, avoiding physiologistic reductionism, providing a meta-theoretical justification for the use of scientific methods, and advocating a university teaching of the discipline. However, in spite of his having purchased instruments for a laboratory project, he carried out little actual research, although it seems that he planned several experiments on perception and developed some statistical calculations (Büttemeyer, 1998).

Anthropology, Criminology, and the Contribution of Sergi and Lombroso Another typical characteristic of positivism was that of developing the so-called human and social sciences, which in the second half of the 19th century were based on an empirical and in part experimental ground, and were attributed with a model of explanation typical of the natural sciences. In Italy, the disciplines that particularly distinguished themselves cimino, foschi

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for their contribution to the genesis of new psychology were anthropology and criminology, both “informed” by positivist thought, to which they owed their development. Anthropology, as a discipline that studies human beings from the naturalistic point of view in their morphological and physiological features, with a comparative and differential analysis of forms and of structures, stemmed from the Age of the Enlightenment, but asserted itself and developed in the age of positivism with the refinement of the “anthropometric” methods; that is, the measurement of the body and of the skull (“craniology”), perfected in France by Quételet and Broca in the 1870s. The results of the measurements taken on broad population samples were in general treated statistically, such that this mathematical science began to enter into the sphere of the human sciences. In Italy, anthropology was cultivated and taught above all by Paolo Mantegazza (1831–1910) at the University of Florence, and by Giuseppe Sergi at the University of Rome. With them, the discipline was characterized not only by its anthropometric aspect, but also by the centuries-old attempt to relate the somatic features, especially those of the face and skull, to the character traits of individuals. In this sense, the physiognomy of Camper and of Lavater at the end of the 18th century, and the phrenology of Gall and Spurzheim in the beginnings of the 19th century, could be considered a part of anthropology. These research traditions, then, were anxious to find a way to “measure the mind” as well as the body, to realize a psychometry alongside an anthropometry, and to promote an empirical study of the character traits of individuals founded on the objective measurements of the face and body (Barsanti, GoriSavellini, Guarnieri, & Pogliano, 1986). The developments of anthropological research led to the establishment in several Italian cities— outside of the universities—of laboratories furnished with all the instrumentation for effecting somatic and cranial measurements (similar to the anthropometric laboratory opened in 1884 by Galton in London). They functioned as surgeries open to the public, in which it was possible to obtain information not only on one’s own morphological characteristics, but also on one’s physiological systems, psychological functions, and character traits; all of this with the goal of preventing disease and of providing a scholastic and vocational orientation. These institutions thus began to furnish also a service of psychological consultation, initiating in this way an applied and differential psychology. 312

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The most illustrious Italian anthropologist in the last decades of the 19th century was the Sicilian Giuseppe Sergi, he too a convinced supporter of evolutionist positivism. After his law studies at the University of Messina, and after having participated in Garibaldi’s venture for the conquest of Sicily, Sergi began to teach philosophy in the upper secondary schools, for which he wrote a small manual, Principi di psicologia sulla base delle scienze sperimentali (Principles of Psychology on the Basis of the Experimental Sciences), published in two parts, in 1873 and 1874 (then resumed and expanded in his book Elementi di psicologia [Elements of Psychology] of 1879, translated also into French in 1888 as La psychologie physiologique [Physiological psychology]), with the intention of offering students a new perspective of psychology, which at that time was part of the philosophy program. Convinced of the importance of a new psychological science for the study of human beings, he in 1876 presented to the Minister of Public Instruction, Ruggero Bonghi (1826–1895), a long memorandum in which he advocated the institution of an official teaching of psychology in the universities. The request was not granted; Sergi, however, in the academic year 1878–1879, held just the same a free course of psychology, perhaps the first one of its kind in Italy, at the University of Messina (cf. Marhaba, 1981, p. 45). In 1883, he was awarded the chair of anthropology in the faculty of sciences at the University of Bologna; then in 1884 was called to the chair of anthropology in the faculty of sciences at the University of Rome “La Sapienza,” where he also held complementary courses of physiological psychology alongside the official ones of anthropology. In Rome, Sergi succeeded in obtaining in 1889 from the Minister of Public Instruction, Paolo Boselli (1838–1932), a ministerial decree authorizing at his institute the creation of a laboratory of physiological and experimental psychology. In 1897, then, he founded and directed with Ezio Sciamanna (1850– 1905) the first journal that “in its name” referred to psychology, the Rivista quindicinale di psicologia, psichiatria e neuropatologia ad uso dei medici e dei giuristi (Fortnightly Review of Psychology, Psychiatry, and Neuropathology for the Use of Physicians and Jurists), of which very few issues were published. Last, Sergi was called upon to preside over the Fifth International Congress of Psychology, held in Rome in 1905 (on Sergi, see Cicciola, 2010; Mucciarelli, 1987a). Following the canons of the most classical positivism, beginning from the small volume of 1873–1874, Sergi denied to philosophy any cognitive or pragmatic

value and instead considered science capable of resolving all the problems concerning the knowledge of nature and the development of humanity, in accordance with the typical optimism and characteristic faith in progress of the positivist ideology of the time. Philosophy, in his opinion, should be replaced by anthropology, which he understood broadly as the science that studies human beings in all their aspects and thus investigates different classes of relevant phenomena—among them psychological phenomena—with the empirical and experimental methods typical of the natural sciences. Influenced by the materialistic evolutionism of Spencer, of whom he translated several works into Italian, Sergi considered mental phenomena the fruit of a phylogenetic process and consequently treated them like biological functions that arose in order to better adapt the individual to the environment. They were therefore to be reduced to physiological phenomena, studied with the methods employed in the physiology laboratories, and analyzed in relation to their adaptive function, with a formulation similar to later American functionalism. He consequently maintained, in a more restrictive way than Ardigò, that the proper method of psychology “cannot be different from the physiological one” and that psychology is essentially “physiological psychology” (cf. Sergi, 1881, pp. XVII–XX). Beginning with the volumes Teoria fisiologica della percezione (Physiological Theory of Perception) of 1881, and L’origine dei fenomeni psichici e loro significazione biologica (The Origin of Mental Phenomena and Their Biological Significance) of 1885, Sergi expounded his general theory of the mind, based on a purely physiological conception of perception and of mental activity. In his opinion, “sensation” in the higher animal species would be none other than a physical-chemical process of the nervous cells; this process then becoming localized in the brain at a certain stage of evolution, would become “perception”; that is, “a mental phenomenon.” Perception, therefore, would come about thanks to a nervous mechanism designated a “perceptive nervous wave.” This in turn would seem to consist in a physical-chemical modification of the nerves provoked by the sensory stimulus, which in propagating like a centripetal wave that extends to the brain, and then reconverting into a centrifugal wave that extends to the peripheral motor organs, would transform sensation into perception. Such a hypothesis, which was supported by several experiments conducted also by Sergi, was instead criticized by many, including Ardigò himself.

For the Sicilian anthropologist, perceptions are the first step of the cognitive activity that proceeds with the formation of ideas and reasoning— involving always larger and more complex parts of the brain—and with their conservation as “memories.” In addition to this kind of process, however, the mind/brain manifests also an affective activity, which expresses itself in giving rise to pleasant or unpleasant “feelings,” thus accomplishing its protective role in the struggle for existence. Perceptions, ideas, feelings, and wishes are thus the mental phenomena that constitute the object of the new psychological science, and after further scrutiny prove to be none other than biological phenomena, “a neuromuscular organic activity,” and not “an activity that is different and distinct from biology” as Spencer seemed to propose with a sort of psychophysical parallelism. Aside from concerning himself with a general theoretical knowledge of mental functions, Sergi was also and above all interested—in accordance with the approaches of the most innovative tendencies of anthropology—in understanding the characteristics and temperamental differences of individuals in order to carry out the practical task of improving their social conditions and well-being. For this purpose, he developed a “theory of feelings” to which he dedicated various writings, among which the books Dolore e piacere. Storia naturale del sentimento (Pain and Pleasure. The Natural History of Feeling) of 1894 (translated also into French and Spanish) and Les emotions (The Emotions) of 1901. In them he divided feelings into two categories: the physical pleasure/pain that accompanies perceptions and is caused by peripheral sensory excitations; and the emotion that is instead provoked by “intellectual causes” (i.e., by thought and memories, namely by solely cerebral phenomena). In addition, he outlined the idea—if not before, at least simultaneously with, the studies of James and Lange—that emotion follows, and does not precede, the physiological response of the organism. The neurophysiological functions at the basis of feelings are considered essential for life, since they activate volition and impel to action. The latter, however, is mediated and regulated by “character,” which can be defined as the predominating combination of an individual’s impulses, tendencies, attitudes, desires, and motivations that determine his or her “conduct,” like “something impressed, which remains constant, and is thus invariable like a seal”; in part hereditary and anthropologically marked, and in part acquired with the experiences of life, such that it can therefore be modeled and modified by means of education. Character thus has close ties cimino, foschi

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with feelings and intelligence on the one hand, and volition on the other hand, and it impels behavior that can prove to be useful or damaging to society and consequently to civilization. From this, Sergi derives the importance of “educating” feelings and character, and not just of “instructing” the intellect; of accomplishing an educational activity in order to form “good” citizens and prevent and rehabilitate the “deviations,” at least when the character is not too compromised by hereditary defects, in which case the best solution would be to isolate the person. Such a distinction between education and instruction is then at the base of his pedagogy, which he elaborates especially in the volumes Per l’educazione del carattere (For the Education of Character) of 1884, Psicologia per le scuole (Psychology for the Schools) of 1891, and Educazione e istruzione (Education and Instruction) of 1892. His pedagogy stems from the division of mental phenomena into the two separate areas of feelings and of thoughts, and it contemplates two different educational paths that can enable people to elevate themselves on the plane both of knowledge and of social conduct. The theory of feelings, character, and conduct was thus at the center of Sergi’s interests; it reconnected with his anthropological research and constituted one of the first systematic attempts carried out in Italy in the direction of a psychology of personality. All in all, with his doctrine of feelings and the analysis of character and conduct, the Sicilian anthropologist had seen the possibility of acting in the area of the education of young people and the rehabilitation of those who were “deviated,” whether due to mental illness or criminal behavior. In this way, he had laid the premises for the development also of applied psychology, especially in the form of educational psychology: an area of studies that would then be cultivated, in particular, by his pupils Sante De Sanctis (1862–1935), Giuseppe Montesano (1868–1951), and Maria Montessori (1870–1958), who interested themselves in the psychological and educational aspects of children, including those with mental retardation. Thus, Sergi too, like Ardigò, concurred in the development and affirmation of the awareness that a psychological science and discipline could and should be constructed. We must however emphasize that although Sergi had carried out a series of psychophysiological experiments, his research contribution did not represent a decisive novelty, as did instead the work of Buccola. From the convergence of the anthropological and psychiatric studies, there emerged in Italy during the 314

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last 30 years of the 19th century, through Cesare Lombroso, a distinctive orientation of anthropology, called criminal anthropology, it too pervaded with positivist thought. Lombroso, director of the Mental Hospital of Pavia and later professor of psychiatry and of criminal anthropology at the University of Turin, sustained the thesis that the tendency to commit crime is an innate character trait that is inherited, a sign of atavism enclosed in a phylogenetic line that leads from the animal to the human being, and he affirmed that the “real” criminals or “habitual delinquents”—which he distinguishes from the occasional delinquents and from those with mental illness—“do not commit crimes because of a conscious and free act of ill will, but because they have innate evil tendencies, which originate from a physical and mental organization different from the normal one” (Lombroso, 1876; see also Baima Bollone, 2009; Bulferetti, 1975; Colombo, 2000; Gibson, 2002). Thus, for Lombroso those individuals biologically predisposed toward crime can be identified and segregated by means of an attentive anthropological and psychological analysis extended also to the parents and ancestors; an analysis that, on the basis of his own delineation of determined morphological and characterological features (the so-called degenerative stigmata present within the sphere of the same family), results in an identification of the criminal “type.” This formulation of criminology therefore led to a renewed proposal and refinement of the traditional doctrines regarding constitutions and temperaments and to the creation of the biopsychological theories of types—such as the “constitutionalist” theory proposed in those years by Achille De Giovanni (1838–1916)—which became one of the inspiring sources of personality psychology (Lombardo & Foschi, 2002). Based on the Lombrosian doctrine, there then arose the “positive school of criminal law,” whose principal representative was Enrico Ferri (1856–1929), and which sustained the right of society to imprison the delinquent not so much because “responsible” as because “dangerous,” and affirmed the principle that prison punishment is not an expiatory act, but only a means of eliminating the social danger of criminals. The ideas of Lombroso and Ferri provoked heated controversy that arose from differing sides, on the part of both the orthodox Marxists and the reformist liberals, who reproached the anthropological-criminal school for overestimating the biological and psychological factors and for not taking sufficiently into account the social factors of crime. In reality, Ferri,

who was initially tied to socialist ideas, had given ample space to environmental causes, even while considering fundamental the innate predisposition. In any case, “positive” criminology, with its promotion of interest in the psychological features of those with delinquent behavior, contributed to laying the foundations for juridical and criminal psychology. The Lombrosian doctrine, which affirmed the possibility of identifying the degenerative somatic and mental traits, innate and hereditary (atavism), and easily recognizable by means of a careful anthropological and psychological analysis, had been extended also to the madmen and delinquents affected by insanity. This had occurred, for example, with Gaspare Virgilio (1836–1908), director of the Mental Hospital of Aversa, who sustained the analogy between insanity and criminality, both of a hereditary nature. Then, by means of the identification of the degenerative characteristics, it would have been possible to preventively identify those inclined toward insanity or criminal insanity or real criminal behavior, so as to be able to confine them within the ordinary or judicial mental hospitals or the prisons, contributing thus to the social order and the progress of civilization, in accordance with the ideal of the most dogmatic positivism. This conception, outlined by the moderate socialists (basically Lombroso and Ferri), was however contested both by critical Marxists and reformist liberals like, for example, Giuseppe Zanardelli (1826–1903), who had a less rigid and restrictive idea of criminal law and of prison and mental institutions. In conclusion, anthropology and criminology, promoting an interest in the differential character traits of individuals that could be identified and quantified with psychometric methods, contributed to laying the foundations for a psychology that could be applied to the world of school, workplace, crime, and those with mental disorders. They influenced the development of an applied psychology alongside an experimental psychology, both of which reached maturity together in the first decade of the 20th century.

Psychiatry and the Contribution of Buccola In addition to the impetus from anthropology and criminology, the science and discipline of psychiatry also provided a strong impulse for the birth of the new experimental psychology. Historical studies have usually identified the second half of the 19th century, after the unification of Italy, as the period in which psychiatry assumed the characteristics of science and gradually achieved its own disciplinary

autonomy. That is, it became a relatively autonomous medical specialization, distinct from the body of general medicine and with its foundation in particular hospital facilities (the mental asylums) and relevant university courses. The doctors who dealt with mental illness, over a time span that coincided with the end of the Risorgimento and the first decades of the newly unified state, thus provided for the foundation in Italy of modern psychiatry, which was achieved on both the scientific and institutional plane, it too favored by the expansion of the positivist culture. The new “organicist” psychiatry, which was related to the great German nosographic tradition represented by Wilhelm Griesinger (1817–1868), was adopted by most of the Italian psychiatrists, including Gaspare Virgilio in Aversa, Andrea Verga (1811–1895) in Milan, Leonardo Bianchi (1848–1927) in Naples, Enrico Morselli (1852–1929) in Turin, and Augusto Tamburini (1848–1919) in Reggio Emilia. In general, they sought and promoted a unitary study of the mind, to be conducted both from the neurological standpoint (with research on cerebral localization and the degeneration of the nervous system) and from the psychiatric one (with clinical and nosological studies of mental illnesses), as well as from the psychological one (with experimental investigations on normal mental functions). For this purpose, precisely in the years bridging the century, in which the process of consolidation of psychiatry came about, they opened the doors of their clinical centers and university institutes to the first research of a specifically psychological kind. Italian psychiatrists developed in particular the idea, already elaborated in France by Claude Bernard (1813–1878) and resumed by Théodule Ribot (1839–1916) and by the French psychologie pathologique, that there is a continuity between physiological and pathological phenomena, with no substantial difference between their basic mechanisms. They were convinced that mental illness was none other than an “altered” way in which the mind functions in particular conditions, a sort of “experiment” performed by nature itself, and they thus supposed that the knowledge of normal mental functions would allow an understanding of the pathological dysfunctions, as that the study of mental illness would, vice versa, allow an understanding of the mind’s functioning in conditions of normality. This way of considering the relation between physiology and pathology provided a decisive impetus to the promotion of psychological research with experimental method, to the point cimino, foschi

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that the first laboratories of psychology were opened in psychiatric hospitals or institutes of physiology, and experimental research was conducted by physicians who had a specialized training in the clinical care of patients with mental illness (Babini, 1996; Babini, Cotti, Minuz, & Tagliavini, 1982; Canosa, 1979; Cimino & Sava, 2008; Ferro, 1989; Guarnieri, 1991). Among the psychiatrists who expressed these ideas and convictions, three who were particularly prominent were Augusto Tamburini, director of the San Lazzaro Mental Hospital of Reggio Emilia from 1877 to 1907, who at the end of the 1870s had instituted in his psychiatric hospital a laboratory for psychometric research (Bongiorno, 2002); Enrico Morselli, who held the chair of clinical medicine of nervous and mental disease at the University of Turin, and had also opened the doors of his Institute to investigations of experimental psychology (Guarnieri, 1988; Rossi, 1984); and Leonardo Bianchi, professor of clinical medicine of nervous and mental disease at the University of Naples, neurophysiologist of international renown, high-ranking dignitary of Italian Freemasonry, Member of Parliament, for a short time Minister of Public Instruction, and convinced advocate of experimental psychology. These psychiatrists also founded new scientific journals with a positivist orientation, which although prevalently addressed to themes concerning mental pathology from an organicist point of view and related problems, also accepted articles on both theoretical and experimental psychology. Tamburini, Morselli, and Bianchi, for their theoretical contribution and—so to speak—institutional commitment in promoting laboratories and research, thus represent, after Ardigò and Sergi, other milestones along the way leading to the birth of the new psychological science and discipline. None of them, however, had ever in reality dedicated himself, except sporadically, to conducting experimental investigations in the field of psychology. Limited research in psychophysics, psychophysiology, and psychochronometry had been conducted only in some physiology laboratories, such as that of Angelo Mosso (1846–1910) in Turin, or of Moritz Schiff (1823–1896) in Florence. The first to dedicate himself in a continuous and systematic way to research of experimental psychology was the Sicilian psychiatrist Gabriele Buccola, a supporter of evolutionist positivism who, together with Roberto Ardigò and Giuseppe Sergi, was considered one of the first-generation pioneers of the emerging Italian scientific psychology. After receiving 316

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his degree in medicine from the University of Palermo, Buccola, in November 1879, in common with many of his colleagues and contemporaries, reached the decision to leave Sicily to continue his training elsewhere. He decided to devote himself to psychology and psychopathology at the San Lazzaro Mental Hospital of Reggio Emilia, directed by Augusto Tamburini, an institution that in the Italian panorama was in the avant-garde for the propagation of new psychiatric theories and therapies. Backed by Tamburini, Buccola initiated a research program on the reaction times of patients with mental illness and had the results published in the Rivista Sperimentale di Freniatria (Experimental Review of Psychiatry), an official publication of the mental hospital and principal Italian psychiatric journal, with which he collaborated as a member of the editorial staff. Later, in 1881, he transferred to Turin to take on the position of assistant at the University Psychiatric Clinic directed by Morselli, and that of physician at the local Royal Mental Hospital. In 1883, he obtained the qualification of university teacher and would have liked to return to Palermo, but on March 5, 1885, he died suddenly, thus ending the career of possibly one of the major protagonists of the emergent European experimental psychology (on Buccola, see Degni, 2006; Degni, Foschi, & Lombardo, 2007; Lanzoni, 1997; Sprini, Inguglia, & Intorrella, 2003; Università di Palermo, 1990). Buccola’s brief scientific season lasted only the span of a decade, from 1875 to 1885, and yet it was a very significant period, dense with important results. His first psychological essay, La dottrina dell’eredità e i fenomeni psicologici (The Doctrine of Heredity and Psychological Phenomena) of 1879, was preceded by brief articles on psychological heredity, positivism, and political-literary themes that had appeared in local reviews. In these writings, which represent a precious source for understanding his original experimental research, Buccola declared himself “evolutionist and transformist,” holding that also mental functions bowed to a progressive evolutionary principle of a Lamarckian kind and were therefore able to produce, from one generation to the next, always more appropriate and adaptive ideas. The consequence of this psychological evolutionism was then the possibility of constructing a knowledge that would be always more consonant with reality and always more capable of improving society, and thus of creating also a scientific psychology able to investigate mental phenomena with quantitative methods. The study of such phenomena, then, is what Buccola intended to accomplish concretely when,

in 1880, he formulated a series of experiments aimed at relating “subjective” mental processes to “objective” physical parameters. The principles of his evolutionist materialism led him to maintain that mental phenomena “are neither extra-spatial nor extra-temporal,” and that it is therefore possible to demonstrate the existence of a necessary time “for thought to take form.” This then gave rise to his psychochronometric investigations, carried out first in the Mental Hospital of Reggio Emilia and then, as of 1881, in the Psychiatric Institute of Turin. This research followed in the footsteps of that conducted in Wundt’s laboratory in Leipzig. However, it represented also a novel view, considering that it had been carried out in part on patients with mental illness and had demonstrated how, on the one hand, the mental illness altered reaction times and duration of the thought processes; and how, on the other hand, this alteration could be considered a symptom for the diagnosis of certain mental illnesses. This novel way of taking a classical procedure of experimental psychology, already practiced in the Leipzig laboratory, and readapting it with an applicative purpose to those with mental illness, seemed like a heresy to Wundt, who criticized Buccola for having perverted the nature of the new psychological science (Wundt, 1903, p. 386). Instead, it is precisely this application that illuminates Buccola’s originality. He succeeded in combining the instrumentation derived from the German laboratories, the statistic calculation of a Galtonian inspiration (the experiments were carried out on a significant sample, and the mean deviations in the reaction times were calculated with elementary statistical methods), and the idea, typical of the French school, of the complementarity and continuity between normal and pathological. In Florence, the physiologist Moritz Schiff and his pupil Alessandro Herzen (1839–1906) had already tried to determine the objective parameters of mental work such as expended energy, cranial temperature, or time employed in cerebral activities. They had thus already come close to psychochronometry—and, in fact, Buccola cites them several times in his works—but they had practiced principally from a perspective of the physiology of the nervous system. The Sicilian scientist, instead, went one step further and placed himself on a decisively psychological plane in his attempt to relate to a mental activity the objective measurement of the time it takes to unfold. For such research, the principal method was that developed by Donders, while the most suitable instrument for measurements on

the order of thousandths of a second was the Hipp chronoscope. Buccola thus carried out numerous experiments on the reaction times of persons with, and also without, mental illness, while extending the research to almost all the psychopathological forms most characteristic of nosology at that time. He varied the physical and mental internal conditions of the individuals, as well as the external conditions of the stimulations, and identified a series of variables (which he called “modifiers”) that modify the reaction time, among which he highlighted especially the role of attention. His investigations provided the starting point in Italy for studies on individual differences regarding the reaction times, as well as the concomitant functions of attention, and they opened the way to a differential psychology that was interwoven with a general psychology. In addition, the measurements that he proposed and carried out became a kind of psychological method to employ in psychopathology for classification and diagnosis, thus making it possible for the discipline to take a step forward with respect to both the mere description of symptoms, customary of psychiatry at that time, and the ambition of the anatomo-pathological investigations of the nervous system. In 1883, Buccola collected the results of his research in the volume La legge del tempo nei fenomeni del pensiero (The Law of Time in the Phenomena of Thought), which was the first monograph of experimental psychology written in Italy, constituting the most relevant Italian contribution to 19th-century psychology. In the 1880s, his investigations began to become known also internationally, since several of his works had been published in the Philosophical Review, in which they were described as “experiences nouvelles.” They were appreciated particularly by Emil Kraepelin (1856–1926), who was in contact with Buccola and who, ever since the 1890s, following in the footsteps of the Italian psychologist, laid the foundations for experimental psychopathology. All in all, the research activity carried out by Buccola represented the concrete and tangible demonstration of what the theoreticians of psychology as a natural science sustained; namely, that it was possible to subject mental phenomena, which up until then had been the exclusive domain of introspective analysis and philosophical speculation, to experimental and quantitative treatment, and consequently, that there did not in principle exist limits to the scientific explanation of mental processes. For his work, Buccola can thus be considered the first Italian psychologist to have carried out experimental research cimino, foschi

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in a systematic way, and, for the success obtained, he laid a cornerstone for the foundation in Italy of the new psychological science and discipline.

The Birth and Characteristics of Italian Scientific Psychology In the last 30 years of the 19th century, therefore, in a politico-institutional and socioeconomic context that was changing radically, permeated by the cultural climate of evolutionist positivism, the problem arose of founding a “new” experimental psychology and of developing psychological knowledge to apply to the world of the schools, work, prisons, courtrooms, and to those with mental illness. In the setting of this background there were in particular several intertwined and overlapping research traditions—philosophical-epistemological, anthropological-criminological, medico-psychiatric—that contributed to the development of those ideas and events that in the first decade of the 20th century would merge and coalesce in a single whole, marking the birth of the new psychological science and discipline. Little by little, in fact, at the beginning of the 1900s, the initial 19th-century generation of positivist scholars with a philosophical and/or medical background was followed by a second generation of scientists, for the most part physicians and psychiatrists by training—including Giulio Cesare Ferrari (1867–1932), Sante De Sanctis, Federico Kiesow (1858–1940), and Francesco De Sarlo (1864– 1937)—who began to teach official courses of experimental psychology in the universities; to open laboratories specifically designed for psychological research; to develop experimental investigations in diverse fields; to outline the first applications of the discipline in the clinical, educational, work, and judicial spheres; and to establish journals and associations of a specifically psychological nature: all activities that became permanently consolidated (Cimino, 2006, 2010). Previously, didactic, experimental, and editorial initiatives of a psychological kind had been sporadic and occasional (and not easy to reconstruct, given the variety and local autonomy of the Italian universities), to the point that it proves difficult to attribute priorities, such as the inception of the first university teaching, first psychology laboratory, or first academic journal dedicated to the discipline, even though Giuseppe Sergi would probably qualify for each of the three achievements. With regard to psychology laboratories in particular (which should be broadly understood either as spaces and equipment made available within an 318

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already existing institution, or as specific structures created for psychological research by means of a specific Ministerial Decree), we can mention that opened by Tamburini in the San Lazzaro Mental Hospital in Reggio Emilia in 1877, consolidated by Buccola in 1880, and then amplified by Ferrari in 1896, and another opened by Sergi in 1889 in the Institute of Anthropology at the University of Rome. An experimental psychology laboratory was promoted by Simone Corleo (1823–1891) in 1889 at the Philosophy Institute of the University of Palermo; a psychology laboratory was created by De Sarlo at the Institute of Higher Studies (then to become the University) of Florence in 1903; the Institute and laboratory of experimental psychology was founded by Kiesow in 1907, at the University of Turin, heir to the psychometric research conducted in the physiology laboratory of Mosso; and the Institute and laboratory of experimental psychology was activated in 1907, by De Sanctis at the Pedagogical Museum and later transferred to the faculty of medicine at the University of Rome (on the psychology laboratories, see Di Giandomenico, 2003; Legrenzi & Sonnino Legrenzi, 1999). In the first 10–15 years of the 20th century, therefore, numerous initiatives were promoted that, considered together, clearly indicate how in those years a new psychological science and discipline was definitively born in Italy. In 1905, in particular, several very significant events occurred simultaneously (Ceccarelli, 2010): a competition was announced for the first three university chairs in psychology (an initiative that was fostered and promoted by the Minister of Public Education at that time, Leonardo Bianchi), which would then be awarded to De Sanctis in Rome, Kiesow in Turin, and Cesare Colucci (1865–1942) in Naples; the Fifth International Congress of Psychology was organized in Rome, with Sergi as president and De Sanctis as scientific secretary; the Rivista di Psicologia applicata alla Pedagogia e alla Psicopatologia (Review of Psychology Applied to Pedagogy and Psychopathology), the first journal specifically dedicated to psychological studies and subsequently the most important Italian periodical in this sector for at least 30 years, was founded by Ferrari (Bongiorno, 2003). This journal would later be joined by the Archivio Italiano di Psicologia (Italian Archive of Psychology), founded in 1919 by Federico Kiesow and Agostino Gemelli (1878–1959), and by other periodicals of a briefer duration, such as the review Psiche (Psyche) directed by Roberto Assagioli (1888–1974). Also in 1905, the national pedagogical schools of teacher training

instituted compulsory courses of psychology and anthropology, initially entrusted to Sante De Sanctis and Maria Montessori, respectively. This concurrence of events suggests that the date of 1905 be considered, in a conventional way, the year of birth, or watershed between a “before” and an “after,” of a psychology that had by then become an autonomous science, no longer subordinated either to philosophy on the one hand or to physiology and psychiatry on the other, although preserving strong ties with both. Nor are reasons lacking for regarding the preceding 30–35 years as the period of its gestation; namely, as a phase in which a first generation of scholars began to elaborate ideas, activate discussions, publish writings, initiate some experimental research, promote the first laboratories and the first “free” teaching of a psychological kind, and on the whole to undertake initiatives of various kinds, all of which together led in the end to the— so to speak—happy event of the birth of an autonomous discipline that was thought to possess the typical features of a science. What were, however, the characteristics of Italian psychology in the years of its foundation, and in what way was it distinct from European psychology? From an overall synthetic glance, it emerges that in the first years of the 20th century: (a) the debate on the scientific statute of psychology continued and even expanded, in the sense that it attempted to better clarify what its object and methods should be, and consequently its place in the classification of the sciences—a debate that was conducted by scholars who declared themselves, or aspired to be, professional psychologists; (b) in the first laboratories of psychology, such as those of Reggio Emilia, Rome, Florence, and Turin, experimental research was being performed according to different models, inspired not only by the school of Wundt, but also by Brentano, James, Binet, and the French psychologie pathologique; (c) such research was often carried out with the idea of a complementarity between psychological and psychopathological knowledge, as a result of which a first embryo of clinical psychology was outlined—that is, specifically psychological knowledge and instruments were applied to individuals with mental disturbances; and (d) there arose the first initiatives of applied psychology, such as work psychology or psychotechnics, educational, criminal, and judicial psychology, as well as social and collective psychology. It is also important to observe the significant fact that these four characteristics seem to be summarized in a paradigmatic way by the four sections in which the International Congress of 1905 in Rome was articulated.

The Epistemological Confrontation In briefly commenting on these four points, we can begin to examine the debate that arose concerning the foundations of a psychology that aspired to be qualified as scientific. We have seen that, in the second half of the 19th century, philosophers and scientists with a positivist orientation had asked themselves whether and in what way it would be possible to study mental phenomena with the experimental and quantitative methods typical of the natural sciences. With various articulations and nuances, they had for the most part replied affirmatively that such a study was possible inasmuch as mental processes could in principle be reduced, or at least related, to physico-physiological phenomena, and in any case be analyzed in quantitative terms with experiments of psychophysics, psychophysiology, and psychochronometry, as Wundt had demonstrated in his Leipzig laboratory. The experimental method in psychology, conceived and practiced by the positivist psychologists, therefore led to relating mental phenomena and physico-physiological phenomena: The latter are quantifiable and measurable, and thus indirectly quantify and measure mental phenomena. That which is measured is not the mental process itself—which, as Kant had affirmed, has a qualitative, and not quantitative, dimension—but the preceding or subsequent physico-physiological phenomenon related to it. With this methodological approach, then, some scientists of the last decades of the 19th century had outlined research projects that proposed to connect the mental processes to physico-physiological events and had, above all, set up investigations of psychophysics and psychochronometry. On the threshold of the new century, these certainties expressed by the majority of physiologists and psychiatrists from the period of positivism, including Buccola (the only one who had in fact carried out numerous experiments in the field of psychology), began to be questioned by scholars of a second generation, who can be considered the first psychologists in the proper sense of the term. It should be kept in mind that their reflections and activities were inserted in a changed cultural climate in the years bridging the 19th and 20th centuries, during which, in all of Europe, the positivist philosophy and way of thinking were being criticized and discarded, while new tendencies of spiritualist, idealist, phenomenological, and pragmatist lines of thought were emerging. Also in Italy, the criticism of evolutionist positivism involved philosophers of a spiritualist or idealist or pragmatist orientation, cimino, foschi

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who contended with each other until the 1920s when the neo-idealist philosophy of Benedetto Croce (1866–1952) and Giovanni Gentile (1875–1944) would impose itself, thanks also to its being embedded in the fascist regime. It is therefore during this interval between the era of positivism and that of neo-idealism that some aspects of the positivist psychology of the preceding years were once again questioned and an attempt was made to overcome the “physiological reductionism” toward which the discipline had been addressed. To make this attempt were, among others, several scholars who drew their inspiration from American pragmatism, in which they detected not so much a philosophical system, as instead a valid alternative to the way of understanding the methodology of scientific research with respect to both positivism and neo-idealism. In any case, the Italian pragmatists, among whom can be included Giovanni Vailati (1863–1909) and for certain features Giulio Cesare Ferrari (who in fact published some of their writings in his journal), tried to go beyond the conditioning and limits of positivist science without at the same time renouncing the pursuit of a scientific psychology. Their theoretical and methodological proposals did not lead to concrete research projects, however, and they were interpreted as a missed opportunity that facilitated the manifestation of a renewed philosophical psychology and of an even more radical criticism on the part of neo-idealism (Lombardo & Foschi, 1997; on Italian pragmatism, see Santucci, 1963). Independently of the approach of the pragmatist movement, however, the second generation of Italian psychologists gained on the one hand a full awareness that the object of study for scientific psychology could not be only the lower mental phenomena, for which it seemed easier to prepare quantitative methods, but it should also and above all encompass the higher mental processes. On the other hand, they felt the need to extend the research to all of a multifarious mental phenomenology regarding those with mental illness, children, and various social groups. They therefore realized that, to study the complexity of mental life, the psychophysical and psychochronometrical methods and instruments used in preceding years were totally insufficient, and it was instead necessary to devise new methods of investigation that could, like the others, be considered of a scientific nature. Such methods had to be able to measure the higher mental functions or at least to relate them to objective, external parameters. Thus, the way had 320

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to be found, on the one hand, to connect these functions—for example, emotions or thought— to concomitant or subsequent physiological phenomena, and on the other hand to quantify them by means of the results obtained or the behavior enacted with the exercise of these functions. In one aspect, this led to the development of psychophysiology (which, moreover, could boast of some case studies in the preceding years), with its experiments that endeavored to relate the emotions to physiological manifestations (such as cardiac or respiratory rates, blood pressure, muscle contractions, etc.), or to relate thought to the energy expended in mental work (with experiments carried out with the ergometer) or to somatic parameters (such as facial muscle contractions, studied for example by De Sanctis). In another aspect, the way was paved for psychometrics based on test methods and their related statistical elaborations. That is, the aim was to identify and measure mental processes by means of tasks to be performed by the participant (usually a test), based on the belief that a certain kind of task or test would implicate or activate a particular mental process. In this way, the attempt was made to measure the intelligence and thought processes in adults and children, as well as in social groups such as students, workers, prisoners, and those who had mental disturbances. These psychometric methods, in particular, lent themselves very well for the purposes of applied psychology, which received a strong impetus from them in the direction of scholastic, judicial, work, and clinical psychology. If, on the one hand, this new formulation of the research, which could count upon a wide range of methods and instruments, went beyond the narrow investigations of the first positivist experimental psychologists, on the other hand, it situated itself in continuity with them, inasmuch as it continued to pursue the goal of relating the internal mental phenomenon to an external measurable physical parameter. However, several scholars who asserted the qualitative character of mental facts questioned precisely this quantitative psychology. They could not deny the utility of the experimental methods and of the techniques of measurement, although— as Brentano and James had already sustained— they considered them insufficient for knowing and understanding the complexity and peculiarity of the mind. They therefore rekindled the debate on the epistemological status of psychology and strove to raise an awareness that the methodological problems of the discipline were much more complicated than those of the natural sciences.

This dubious and critical attitude toward experimental and quantitative psychology is well expressed and summarized by Antonio Aliotta (1881–1954), who had worked with De Sarlo in the Florentine psychology laboratory and had published in 1905, the annus mirabilis, an exemplary book on La misura in psicologia sperimentale (Measurement in Experimental Psychology). In this volume, beginning from the problem posed by Kant concerning the possibility, or lack of it, of constructing a psychological science, Aliotta clarified in an original way the sense to be attributed to measurement in psychology with respect to the other sciences. After an accurate and exhaustive panoramic view of all the quantitative methods until then adopted in the psychology laboratories, Aliotta reached the conclusion that mental phenomena, being constituent elements of consciousness, cannot be subjected to a direct and naïvely realistic quantification as is possible for physical phenomena. That which is measured is not the mental event in and of itself, but something physical related to it. The use of mathematics in the study of mental facts can then be useful and sensible, on the condition that the measurement is considered the result of a conventional system invented for the purpose of giving a quantitative value to phenomena that are by nature qualitative. All things considered, if for Aliotta psychology as an experimental science appears to be fully legitimate, it nevertheless cannot—he concludes—exhaust the knowledge of the mind and it must inevitably “go beyond the frontiers of science,” something that he would do in the following years, teaching philosophy first at the University of Padua and then at the University of Naples (cf. Aliotta, 1905, p. 244; on Alilotta, see Pellegrino, 1989; Sava, 2000). In the first years of the 20th century, there thus persisted the problem of the foundation of a new psychology that aimed to be considered scientific. That is, the problem of the identification of its object, methods, and its relations and frontiers with philosophy and with the other sciences became, in a certain sense, more acute with respect to the preceding years. In any case, it continued to involve those scholars who considered themselves to all effects the first modern psychologists. Summarizing and simplifying as much as possible, we can say that a confrontation arose between two different orientations. On the one hand, there were those such as Colucci, Ferrari, De Sanctis, and Kiesow, who wanted to clearly separate psychology and philosophy and who made an effort to draw up for the former a scientific statute that would distinguish it also from physiology and psychiatry. On the other hand, there was

the reaction of those scholars, including Francesco De Sarlo, Antonio Aliotta, and Eugenio Rignano (1870–1930), who, although granting a certain utility and some space to experimental and quantitative psychology, maintained that its psychometric methods could not exhaust the knowledge of the human mind, which required a qualitative introspective analysis of the states of consciousness, detached from their relation to physico-physiological phenomena. They maintained the necessity of an “interpretation and understanding” alongside an “observation and explanation” (Sava, 2000). This dispute between a “scientific psychology” and a “philosophical psychology”—as they have been conventionally called—was neither novel nor was it peculiar to Italy. In any case, this controversy was a distinctive characteristic of Italian psychology in its initial stage of becoming organized as a science, as was demonstrated by the fact that the conflict exploded at the International Congress in Rome in 1905, at which the two opposing approaches confronted each other, and by the diatribe over the distribution of the first university chairs of psychology, which were contended by the faculties of both medicine and the humanities (Ferruzzi, 1998). The Italian psychologist-philosopher most attentive to the problem of an epistemological foundation of psychology was Francesco De Sarlo, who was influenced in particular by the thinking of Franz Brentano (1838–1917). After receiving his degree in medicine from the University of Naples, De Sarlo frequented for more than 2 years the Mental Hospital of Reggio Emilia, where he interested himself in pursuing with psychophysiological methods, along the lines of the French psychologie pathologique, the investigation of phenomena such as dreams, hypnosis, and the unconscious. He simultaneously cultivated his predominating philosophical interests, to the point that, in 1900, he was called to the chair of theoretical philosophy at the Istituto di Studi Superiori (University) of Florence. There, in 1903, he founded one of the first Italian laboratories of experimental psychology. This research center in the Florentine university produced significant results, initially collected in 2 years (1905 and 1907) of the journal Ricerche di Psicologia (Psychology Research) and later evident also in the works of his pupils, including Enzo Bonaventura (1891–1948) and Renata Calabresi (1899–1995), as well as Aliotta himself (on De Sarlo, see Albertazzi, Cimino, & Gori-Savellini, 1999). Beginning with his work I dati dell’esperienza psichica (The Data of Mental Experience) of 1903, cimino, foschi

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De Sarlo maintained the full validity of an “empirical or morphological psychology” founded on the observation and experimentation of “mental facts,” on the condition however of becoming integrated with a “philosophical or functional psychology” capable of understanding the meaning and the aim of “mental acts” by means of a direct, immediate, and “phenomenological” introspection (in accordance with the model of Brentano, whom De Sarlo had known and frequented), which grasps the qualitative aspect of the mental event seen in teleological perspective, that is, projected toward a direction and purpose. These two “psychologies” would correspond with two integrated, and not alternative, moments of inquiry, even though they operate with a certain autonomy. De Sarlo, however, never fully clarified their real relation. With such a formulation, the Florentine psychologist unquestionably distanced himself from the theories of the positivists, who tended to reduce psychology to biology and physiology; but he stood his distance also from the neo-idealist theses of Croce (with whom he entered into dispute), which had distinctly separated the “real” psychology as a philosophical science from a psychological pseudoscience without any theoretical-cognitive character, useful only for a practical and classifying function (Cordeschi & Mecacci, 1978). It is thus possible to acknowledge De Sarlo’s significant contribution of ideas toward the difficult construction of the new psychological science and discipline, and—also in view of his creation of a very active and productive laboratory—his own place together with the other protagonists of the emergent Italian psychology.

Experimental Psychology Research and Its Protagonists Against the background of this epistemological debate, which occupied the Italian psychologists at length, they began to set up experimental investigations based on different models, inspired not only by Wundt’s school, but also by other research traditions and practices present in Germany, France, and the United States. The picture of the psychological studies that developed in Italy during the first decades of the 20th century is quite diversified and not yet entirely explored. In general, we can perhaps affirm that the studies were carried out especially in several university institutes and laboratories, conducted by university professors with their students, as in the case of Colucci in Naples, Ferrari in Reggio Emilia, De Sanctis in Rome, Kiesow in Turin, De Sarlo in Florence, and a bit later, Benussi 322

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and Cesare L. Musatti (1897–1989) in Padua, Bonaventura in Florence, and Gemelli in Milan. The empirical and experimental research of these psychologists was in any case of a certain value and had also an international echo, as demonstrated by the fact that the autobiographies of several of them— Ferrari, De Sanctis, Kiesow, and Gemelli—were published in the well-known and popular work A History of Psychology in Autobiography. Cesare Colucci, neuropathologist by training, and pupil of the well-known neuroscientist Leonardo Bianchi, was able to integrate and alternate psychiatric and psychological research, in the conviction that, in order to understand the functioning of the mind, it was necessary to investigate it in conditions both with and without the presence of illness. In particular, resuming the studies of the physiologists Angelo Mosso and Luigi Mariano Patrizi (1866–1938), Colucci performed specialized psychophysiological research especially on vision. Although the most relevant part of his activity was developed in the field of psychiatry, it is nonetheless unwise to underestimate his overall contributions to psychology, which are analogous both quantitatively and qualitatively to those of the other principal psychologists of his generation. It should also be kept in mind that Colucci taught experimental psychology for more than 30 years at the University of Naples (first from 1902 by annual appointment and then from 1906 as full professor). He presided over the third Congress, held in Naples in 1922, of the Società Italiana di Psicologia (Italian Society of Psychology; SIP), of which he became the Director in 1935, after the death of De Sanctis. And, when on the basis of the Gentile reform of 1923 he was obliged to make a choice between the teaching of psychology and the direction of the psychiatric hospital, he chose to preserve the former (on Colucci, see Di Trocchio & Fiasconaro, 1998). In promoting the birth of the new psychological science at the dawn of the 20th century, another prominent psychologist was Giulio Cesare Ferrari, who was tireless in the organization and diffusion of the discipline and contributed decisively on several levels to the stable establishment of psychology in Italian culture and society. After receiving his degree in medicine in 1892 from the University of Bologna, he became an assistant in the San Lazzaro Mental Hospital of Reggio Emilia directed by Tamburini. In 1896, he went with a scholarship to Binet’s laboratory in Paris. After his return to Reggio Emilia, in 1896–1897 he transformed the small section of psychometric studies opened at the end of the 1870s

by Tamburini into an authentic laboratory of experimental psychology, with characteristics similar to Binet’s. In 1898, he entered into contact with William James and prepared the Italian translation of his Principles of Psychology, published in 1901 with significant editorial success. In 1903, after leaving the Mental Hospital and laboratory of Reggio Emilia, he was appointed director of the MedicalPedagogical Institute for the Mentally Deficient, in Bertalia (Bologna), and became one of the major Italian experts on child psychopathology and psychopedagogy, together with De Sanctis, Montessori, and Montesano. Ferrari was an exponent of the brief season of Italian pragmatism and, inspired by this line of thought, in 1905, he founded and directed the Rivista di Psicologia, which constituted the principle vehicle of Italian psychology studies. As a professor by annual appointment, he also began to hold courses of psychology at the University of Bologna, and in 1907 was named director of the Province of Bologna Mental Hospital, located in Imola, which he reorganized with modern methods, instituting among other things a service for the assistance of discharged patients (on Ferrari, see Lazzari, 2003; Mucciarelli, 1984; Quaranta, 2006). During his first years in Reggio Emilia, Ferrari undertook the classical research of psychophysics and psychophysiology, but soon turned his attention (influenced by Binet and James) to the higher mental functions such as thought, memory, emotion, and volition, adopting and adapting the French psychologist’s texts and employing them also on those with mental illness. The study of mental processes by means of tests was a great novelty—among other things, shared with De Sanctis—introduced into the panorama of Italian psychology, a novelty that allowed an identification of the individual differences related to the various mental functions in persons both with and without mental illness. In this way, from Binet’s experimentalism and from the French psychologie pathologique, Ferrari adopted the idea of integrating individual psychology and psychopathology with general psychology, establishing in a certain sense a complementarity—as Buccola had already done in his own way—between psychology and psychiatry. On the theoretical plane, Ferrari shared the positions of the pragmatists, who wanted to overcome the opposing doctrines of the positivists and neoidealists. He was in harmony with the thesis of James, who proposed to investigate not the contents of consciousness, along the structuralistic lines of

Wundt and Titchener, but rather the “stream of consciousness”—the mental process in itself—by analyzing the mental functions that the individual performs to adapt to the environment, and by paying attention to their practical utility. His adherence to the theories of James and the use of new instruments of measurement furnished by Binet induced Ferrari to seek for psychology a scientific statute that would overcome the physiological reductionism of the positivists (and in particular the biological-mechanistic approach of Sergi) and the associationist elementalism of the Wundtian school. Psychology, instead, had to be able to study complex mental phenomena that were both normal and pathological, not reducible to elementary components in accordance with a mechanistic-associationist model, but interpretable as functions to be investigated in their becoming and in their relations with the environment. The possibility of displaying and preparing mental tests, aside from permitting the study of higher mental processes and making general psychology and individual psychology complementary, also allowed Ferrari to develop studies of applied psychology, in particular those that could better achieve a practical usefulness in conformity with the intentions of the pragmatists. As a result he formulated research of judicial psychology, with investigations on juvenile delinquency; of educational psychology, with particular attention for those considered “deficient”; and of work psychology, with an initial identification of psychotechnical instrumentation. Of a medical-psychiatric training similar to Ferrari’s, another protagonist of the birth and affirmation of the new Italian scientific psychology was Sante De Sanctis. He made important and significant contributions in the first decades of the century, when the discipline was asserting itself as an autonomous science, and also in the period between the two World Wars, when psychology, at least for its theoretical aspect, was called into question by the dominant culture of a neo-idealistic trend. After 1920, in fact, among the principal psychological research centers still active and productive, in addition to Padua with Benussi and Musatti, Milan with Gemelli, Florence with Bonaventura and Calabresi, and Turin with Kiesow, another that distinguished itself was the laboratory of De Sanctis in Rome. This laboratory, since 1931, was directed by Mario Ponzo (1882–1960) (on De Sanctis, see Bianchi di Castelbianco et al., 1998; Cimino & Lombardo, 2004; Ferreri, 2001, 2003, 2008; Foschi & Lombardo, 2006; Lombardo & Cicciola, 2005; Lombardo & Foschi, 2008). cimino, foschi

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After receiving his degree in medicine in 1886 from the University of Rome, De Sanctis began to work in the psychiatric clinic directed by Ezio Sciamanna, and in 1893, went on a study trip in Europe, particularly to Paris, to the laboratories of the Salpêtrière. His contact with the French psychopathological literature led him to study the nature of dreams and sleep in some forms of mental illness. This subject then became the center of his thesis for a university teaching qualification in psychiatry, which he completed in 1896. It was a thesis that would later become a part of the volume I sogni. Studi psicologici e clinici di un alienista (Dreams. Psychological and Clinical Studies of an Alienist; translated also into German), published in 1899 simultaneously with Freud’s well-known Die Traumdeutung (The Interpretation of Dreams), in which several articles of the Italian psychologist are cited. Under the influence of Sergi, De Sanctis also cultivated, together with psychiatry, emerging experimental psychology, which he began to teach following his appointment in 1902, after receiving his university teaching qualification also in this discipline. In 1898, with a pioneering initiative, he instituted in Rome the so-called Asili-Scuola (Asylum-Schools, i.e. training schools) for children with mental disabilities. These schools were created with the aim of making the best of the abilities of these children and, insofar as possible, of assimilating them within society. In 1905, De Sanctis was the main organizer of the Fifth International Congress of Psychology, held in Rome. The following year he won one of the first three chairs of psychology opened to competition. In 1907, he succeeded in founding in the University of Rome his own Institute and Laboratory of Experimental Psychology, which he directed until 1930. At that time, he transferred to the chair of the Clinic of Nervous and Mental Diseases, and in 1931 left the teaching of psychology and the direction of the laboratory to Mario Ponzo, the winner of the competition, who had been a student of Kiesow. After having participated in the founding of the Società Italiana di Psicologia in 1910, he also became its first president, a position that he held until 1935. De Sanctis was the Italian psychologist and psychiatrist who, more than any other, knew how to span multiple fields of research, with hundreds of publications to his name, ranging from general to applied psychology, and from psychopathology to psychiatry. He had an excellent international reputation as demonstrated by his numerous articles published in foreign journals, several books translated 324

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into German and English, and his multiple contacts with scholars beyond the Alps. He also played a relevant institutional role for the acceptance of and insertion into Italian society of the new (general and applied) experimental psychology, and he steered the academic matters of the discipline in the first half of the century. Within the area of the debate on the foundation of a scientific psychology, De Sanctis maintained that it was necessary to clearly distinguish and separate, placing them on two different planes, the new psychological science from any other kind of philosophy, whether positivist, spiritualist, pragmatist, or of whatever other kind. He also assigned to psychology a clear scientific statute, based on the idea that its object of investigation is the entirety of “psycho-physical facts”—that is to say, of mental processes observed through introspection and of their “necessary concomitant, subsequent, and antecedent physico-physiological facts”—and that its methods are constituted by the various experimental techniques and procedures developed in the laboratories and integrated among themselves (“integrated method”). The psychological theory of De Sanctis is summarized in his treatise Psicologia sperimentale (Experimental Psychology), published in two volumes in 1929 and 1930, which constitutes the most complete and updated manual of general and applied psychology written in Italy in the first half of the 20th century. In it, the author summarizes the results of his most successful research, comprising especially the investigations on the psychophysiology of dreams and sleep, in which he perhaps made his most innovative contributions; the studies on attention, with the widely accepted proposal of the classification of this mental function in various normal and pathological forms; and the research on the “miming of thought,” that is, on the identification of the expressions and muscular contractions of the face in the presence of a pure thinking state free of emotional components (on this subject he had written, in 1904, the book La mimica del pensiero [The Mimicry of Thought], translated also into German). As far as regards applied psychology—understood as the science that studies the differential characteristics of individuals and groups in relation to various environmental, social, and cultural contexts—De Sanctis devised and performed experimental investigations on participants involved in various areas of activity, for example, in the fields of justice, crime, instruction, and work, and he succeeded in delineating areas of applied research—such as judicial,

prison, educational, and work psychology—that were seeking their space, role, and recognition as scientific disciplines. In addition to these studies, De Sanctis’ contribution to psychiatry and psychopathology was no less important. In this field, we can mention as particularly memorable his research on infantile neuropsychiatry, a specialized area that he founded and cultivated for years: from the creation in 1898 of the Asylum-Schools for the rehabilitation of children with mental problems, to the elaboration of appropriate tests for the evaluation of “mental insufficiency” (different from and more targeted than those of Binet); from the foundation in 1907 of the journal L’infanzia anormale (Abnormal Childhood, up to the publication in 1925 of the first treatise of Neuropsichiatria infantile (Childhood Neuropsychiatry), which marked the birth of a new medical specialization. Differently from Ferrari and De Sanctis, who were under the influence mostly of French psychology, Federico Kiesow studied and worked in Leipzig with Wundt and was in contact with the principal German physiologists and psychologists, such as Carl F. W. Ludwig (1816–1895) and Oswald Külpe (1862–1915). In 1896, Kiesow became Angelo Mosso’s assistant in Turin. In the Institute of Physiology directed by Mosso, he prepared two rooms with equipment for experimental psychological research, a setting that he later transformed into a larger, better-equipped, and autonomous Institute and Laboratory of Psychology after having won the competition for the Chair. He trained there several generations of psychologists, including Agostino Gemelli and Mario Ponzo, who then transferred to the universities of Milan and Rome, respectively. Kiesow continued to direct the institute and laboratory of Turin until his retirement in 1933, after which his chair was no longer opened to competition (on Kiesow, see Perussia, 2008; Sinatra, 2000). Kiesow brought to Italy the psychology of Wundt, arranging for the translation of his books and making known his thought. Following in the footsteps of his mentor, he carried out together with his students a large number of experiments on gustatory, tactile (sensitivity to contact and pressure), and thermal (sensitivity to heat and cold) sensation; on the sensitivity to pain; on sensorial thresholds; on reaction times (especially for tactile and painful stimuli); and on optical sensations and illusions. For such research, he employed the same Wundtian “elementalist” approach, adopting the instruments

available in the well-equipped physiology laboratory (such as the plethysmograph, the sphygmomanometer, Mosso’s ergograph, etc.) and inventing new ones, as for example different kinds of aesthesiometers for measuring cutaneous sensitivity. Of particular prominence were his investigations— defined as “classic” by Boring (1950, p. 429)—on gustatory sensitivity, which was less investigated with respect to the other sensory modalities. Remaining faithful to the elementalism of the Leipzig school, Kiesow decomposed the complex sensation of taste into its simple elements, which he identified as the sensations of bitter, sweet, salty, and acid. He tried to localize the perception of each of these elements in a specific part of the tongue and palate, thus furnishing a first picture of the geusic zones. From the analysis of his work, which is little known by historians, there emerges the figure of an able experimenter who was an ingenious inventor and constructor of instruments and equipment, and whose research on psychophysics and psychophysiology was on an international level. In a period in which other approaches were appearing on the worldwide scene, from functionalism to behaviorism, from Gestalt psychology to psychoanalysis, all quite critical toward the Leipzig school, Kiesow remained faithful to Wundtian structuralism. He took a stand against the anti-elementalist doctrine of James, which in Italy had the favor of Ferrari, and against the psychology of form, which, more than any other orientation, had in Europe attacked Wundt’s system and formulation, and had in Italy received particular attention at the University of Padua, first from Vittorio Benussi and then from Cesare Musatti.

Clinical, Social, and Applied Psychology The research carried out in the Italian laboratories, for the most part by scholars trained in psychiatry, often had, in fact, the characteristic of being performed on persons both with and without mental disturbances. This type of approach formed the soil from which blossomed also in Italy, rather precociously, a kind of research and psychological practice to which, in 1907, Lightner Witmer (1867–1956) in the United States gave the name of “clinical psychology.” The Mental Hospital of Reggio Emilia, under the direction of Tamburini, had been the first to embark upon this path and had performed functions in some ways similar to those of the Salpêtrière at the time of Charcot. It was not coincidental that it was at the San Lazzaro Mental Hospital that Buccola, Ferrari, and De Sarlo received their training. cimino, foschi

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And, as we have seen, the sources of Buccola’s psychological research cannot be traced back solely to Wundtian experimentalism—on the contrary, Wundt himself criticized the applicative demands of the young Italian scholar—but Buccola himself explicitly indicated as his sources “transformist” evolutionism and Ribot’s psychologie pathologique. The birth of the new Italian psychology, especially in its clinical and applicative aspect, was thus influenced also by French psychology, as demonstrated by the fact that De Sanctis, Ferrari, and Montessori passed long periods of study in Paris. Thanks above all to the studies of these psychologists, all with their degrees in medicine, the new field of investigation and application of clinical psychology was taking shape at the frontier between psychiatry, psychology, and pedagogy. On the one hand, this new field examined the relatively lighter mental pathologies, such as intellectual deficit, mental retardation, neuroses, borderline personality disorders, antisocial behavior, and so forth. On the other hand, for the purposes of diagnosis, along with the traditional methods of descriptive psychiatry founded on the general nosographies of the mental illnesses, it also and above all utilized the typical instruments of psychology such as the psychometric techniques and various kinds of tests; as well as, for the purposes of therapy, the simple techniques of rehabilitation, hypnosis, and suggestion, together with clinical conversations. In the Roman Congress of 1905, for example, a presentation was made both of the Binet-Simon test and of one developed by De Sanctis for measuring the intelligence of children (Ceccarelli, 2002). In Italy, for the rest, between the end of the 19th century and the first 10 years of the 20th, there was a widespread diffusion of associations, leagues, and societies dedicated to popular education and to mental and physical hygiene. It is thus possible to affirm that the activities of De Sanctis and Montessori in Rome, as well as those of Ferrari in Bologna, were none other than the peak of an iceberg that was made up of many doctors from a progressive, democratic background, who initiated medical, psychological, and pedagogical experiences of a solidaristic kind (see Babini, 1996; Foschi, 2008; Guarnieri, 2001). In addition to an initial embryo of clinical psychology (although this term, in general, was not used in Italy until after World War II), in the founding years of the new discipline there appeared also the first endeavors to apply psychology to the world of work, to the judicial institutions, to crowds and society, and to scholastic education. 326

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With respect to the psychology of work, we can highlight the research of several authors, among them Mariano Luigi Patrizi, Zaccaria Treves (1869–1911), Ugo Pizzoli (1863–1934), and Guido Della Valle (1884–1962). These, following in the footsteps of the pioneering inquiries of Angelo Mosso’s “physiology of muscular fatigue,” developed—starting especially from the early postwar period—so-called “psychotechnics.” This was the analysis and measurement of the aptitudes, abilities, and vocations of individuals with the purpose of guiding them in their scholastic and professional choices and of selecting them for specific kinds of work (especially for work in the armed forces and as streetcar operators, railroad workers, or general workers). During the years of fascism, as we shall see, psychotechnics was the main sector of psychological research accepted by the culture of the regime (on the psychology of work and on psychotechnics, see Gundlach, Lafuente, Sinatra, Sokal, & Tannuci, 2009; Passione, 2001, 2003; Sinatra, 1999; Spaltro, 1974). In the early 20th century, alongside Lombroso’s criminology and “positive school of criminal law,” there developed also judicial psychology, a specialist branch that proposed to study from a psychological standpoint all the figures implicated in the judicial context—the accused, witnesses, victims, and judges—while extending its competency to the problem of the reliability of the testimony and confessions gathered in the course of the preliminary investigation and trial. This area of application of psychological research was cultivated not only by De Sanctis and Ferrari, but also by Gemelli, who was the major exponent of an original theory on delinquency, of Catholic inspiration, contrary to the thesis of Lombroso and the positive school. This theory, influenced by phenomenological and existential philosophical tendencies, posited free choice (free will) and the responsibility of the individual over and above biological and social forms of conditioning (Gemelli, 1908; see Ancona, 1961). The Lombrosian tradition developed also in the direction of a first nucleus of social psychology. In the midst of the positive school of criminal law, in fact, Schipio Sighele (1868–1913), a pupil in Rome of Enrico Ferri, elaborated an initial outline of “crowd psychology,” posing the question, several years prior to Gustav Le Bon (1841–1931), of the “delinquent crowd” and of the causes that incited the crimes committed during group meetings or collective protests. Sighele, in the volume La folla delinquente (The Delinquent Crowd ) of 1891, written precisely during the years in which the workers’

movement was becoming organized and mass demonstrations were viewed with concern by the governing class of the new Italy, attributed the origin of criminal crowd behavior to aggressive hereditary factors that emerged and became exalted by the very fact that many individuals were gathered together. Ferri and Sighele had declared themselves socialists, but they expressed a negative conception of the crowd and tended to criminalize associative and mass phenomena. The political parabola of Ferri and Sighele, from socialism to nationalism and then to fascism, demonstrates the elitism of the collective psychology produced by the scholars of the positive school, who basically considered the crowd dangerous, regressive, inferior, and in need of being subdued (Van Ginneken, 1992). Although in several lessons held in Milan between 1859 and 1866, Carlo Cattaneo (1801–1869)— one of the protagonists of the historical event of the unification of Italy, republican, and supporter of a federalist conception of the State—had already delineated a theoretical system of a “psychology of associated minds,” it was the study of delinquent crowd behavior that constituted the focal point around which Italian social psychology was developed. This latter was initiated by the physician Pasquale Rossi (1867–1905), a Freemason and socialist, who produced numerous studies definable precisely as “social psychology,” all with the purpose of integrating the crowd psychology of the positivist school with the idea that the psychological dynamics of the group are not necessarily negative and a cause of criminality, and that the collective, on a par with the individual, can be educated morally and intellectually. Rossi, contrary to the deterministic and pessimistic positions of Ferri and Sighele, expressed a freer, more articulated and optimistic conception of social psychology, grounding it in a critical and liberal socialism (Cornacchioli & Spadafora, 2000). Another exponent of the first generation of Italian social psychologists was Paolo Orano (1875–1945), also initially socialist and then nationalist and fascist. In 1902, Orano wrote a treatise, Psicologia sociale (Social Psychology), in which he integrated in an eclectic way Cattaneo’s psychology of associated minds, the theories of Le Bon and Tarde, and the viewpoints of Lombroso, Ferri, and Sighele. If his volume represents a first and inhomogeneous attempt to define the field of the new discipline, the book Psicologia sociale (Social Psychology) of Gualtiero Sarfatti (1878–1953), published in 1911, is instead an authentic systematic treatise of this branch of psychology; in it, in fact, one finds a classification of the

human sciences that outlines for social psychology its own space of investigation distinct and differentiated from both individual psychology and crowd psychology, as from sociology. Sarfatti can thus be considered the “father” of the Italian social psychology that would be developed after World War II; an area of studies that, beginning from the first Italian Congress of Social Psychology, in 1954, would become a very significant pole of Italian research (on the history of Italian social psychology, see Mucchi Faina, 1983, 2002; Sensales, 2002; Van Ginneken, 1992). Another area of applied psychology that displayed a noteworthy development in the first decade of the 20th century was that of scholastic and educational psychology. In those years, the psychopedagogical theories of Ferrari and De Sanctis flourished, and above all there was the beginning of the experience of Maria Montessori, who owed much to the tradition of positivist anthropology (on Montessori, see Babini & Lama, 2000; Foschi, 2008; Kramer, 1976/1988; Trabalzini, 2003). Maria Montessori, in a pioneering move for a woman who had already completed technical studies, enrolled in the faculty of medicine at the University of Rome “La Sapienza,” where she had as a professor, among others, the anthropologist Giuseppe Sergi. She additionally established contacts with researchers known for their progressive political commitment and for the shared idea concerning the social prophylaxis of diseases, which was considered an obligation for a science founded on positivist principles. Another important experience for Montessori was her association with Sante De Sanctis and Giuseppe Montesano, Roman precursors of child psychiatry, pupils of Sergi himself and of Ezio Sciamanna, a neuropathologist influenced by the Salpêtrière school. After obtaining her degree in 1896, Montessori began an intense collaboration with Montesano for the rehabilitation of children who had mental deficits; in 1902, however, she wanted to expand her horizons and in general interest herself more in the education of young people. In those years, Sergi encouraged her to occupy herself especially with anthropology, a discipline that, after her qualification as a university professor, she began to teach in 1905 at the Pedagogical School for teacher training. Between 1905 and 1907, Montessori studied and comprehensively investigated the experimental methodologies characteristic of the human sciences and elaborated an original educational method intended to constitute the basis for a scientific pedagogy founded on anthropology and psychology, cimino, foschi

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disciplines that had already acquired legitimacy as sciences. Thus, in 1909, in her well-known book Il metodo della pedagogia scientifica applicato all’educazione infantile nelle ‘case dei bambini’ (translated in 1912 as The Montessori Method: Scientific Pedagogy As Applied to Child Education in “The Children’s Houses”), she could claim the birth of a new pedagogical science of a positivist, empirical, and experimental framework, autonomous from philosophy with which, until then, it had been intertwined—a science that should contribute to undertaking and resolving social problems, such as that of education scaled to the child, or the prevention and treatment of juvenile delinquency (Montessori, 1909/1912). In 1907, Montessori had the great opportunity to collaborate as an expert with the Istituto Romano di Beni Stabili, which had the task of reclaiming and improving large blocks of buildings, furnishing them with services such as baths, sinks, gardens, and medical clinics. In the sphere of intervention of such an institution, she succeeded in planning and realizing some educational and recreational centers for children from 3 to 7 years old, in which she could apply and validate her educational method. These centers, directed by Montessori herself and then called Children’s Houses, arose in large number in Rome between 1907 and 1913 and were visited by many foreign scholars, among them Lightner Witmer, the American founder of clinical psychology. On the eve of World War I, the favorable climate toward the various applications of the human sciences changed rapidly, and a eugenic conception began to affirm itself. It was founded on the idea that, given the impossibility of modifying in a short time the genetic material and of transmitting the acquired characteristics hereditarily—as had been demonstrated at the end of the 19th century by August Weismann (1834–1914)—the intervention of the human sciences had to aim at controlling and managing those with “deviations” and not at trying to change them. This attitude caused strong disappointment in the Italian liberal-democratic areas that had encouraged the new educational experiences, and led Montessori herself to emigrate and seek her fortune abroad. “When Maria Montessori arrived in America at the end of 1913,” writes Rita Kramer “she was at the height of her fame—indeed, one of the most famous women in the world . . . the most interesting woman in Europe. . . . A woman who revolutionized the educational system of the world. . . . An eager public was waiting for Montessori in America” (Kramer, 1976/1988, p. 15; cf. Foschi, 2008). 328

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The Developments and Difficulties of Italian Psychology Between the Two World Wars From the 1920s to World War II, Italian psychology did not develop with the sustained rhythm that the premises and potentialities of the century’s first years would have led one to foresee and hope for. Some historians have consequently spoken of the “crisis,” arrest, or even retrocession—evaluated differently according to the interpretations—of psychology between the two World Wars, due to a philosophicalcultural climate that was unfavorable to the discipline and nourished by the prevalence of the neo-idealist thought of Benedetto Croce and Giovanni Gentile (having become the fascist regime’s cultural point of reference), which had denied any effective cognitive value to experimental psychology (Ferruzzi, 1998). In the light of more recent studies and investigations, however, this interpretation does not appear to be entirely correct, at least if one means by the term crisis a historical phase of arrest and regression. It is no doubt possible to ascertain that between 1920 and 1940 there was no further significant increase in the number of university chairs, laboratories, or journals. The chairs of Turin and Naples, after the retirement of Kiesow (1933) and Colucci (1937), would no longer be opened to competition, whereas the only chair awarded by competition was in Rome, when that of De Sanctis (who had gone on to the chair of the Clinic of Nervous and Mental Diseases) was assigned, in 1931, to Mario Ponzo, who came from Turin. Actually, two new chairs were opened during the 1920s: that in Padua, of Vittorio Benussi, assigned to him in 1922 on the basis of his renown, and that of Agostino Gemelli, obtained at the Catholic University of Milan in 1926. However, with Benussi’s death in 1927, his chair in Padua remained without successors (Musatti was not called to it, even though he was one of three candidates who proved himself competent in the 1930 competition held for the position in Rome; just as the other qualified candidate, Enzo Bonaventura, did not find a position in Florence), and the chair in Milan remained confined within a private institution. In 1938, there were only two chairs of psychology in Italy, that of Ponzo in Rome and that of Gemelli at the Catholic University of Milan. As far as regards the university teaching, therefore, and in the fact of the discipline’s presence and diffusion in the Italian cultural panorama—since the chairs constituted an authoritative propulsive center for many initiatives, from research to professional activity, conferences, journals, the publication of books, and

so forth—we can say that after the impulse of the first years of the 20th century, psychology underwent a considerable deceleration. Nor was there any particular increase in the number of laboratories; in general, research continued in the centers of experimental psychology opened at the beginning of the century, to which were added in the 1920s those of the University of Padua and of the Catholic University of Milan. Thus, a certain experimental activity continued in Rome with De Sanctis, Ponzo, and Ferruccio Banissoni (1888–1952); in Turin with Kiesow and his pupils (although it was interrupted in 1938 by the early death of Alessandro Gatti [1901–1938], who had replaced Kiesow in the direction of the laboratory); in Florence with Enzo Bonaventura and Renata Calabresi (here too the dismissal of Bonaventura brought about the end of the Florentine school); in Padua with Benussi and Musatti; and in Milan with Gemelli and his pupils. The laboratory of Ferrari in Reggio Emilia, after the early research of its founder, entered into a phase of torpor, and the Neapolitan laboratory of Colucci was without a significant development. To this sort of arrest on the institutional plane, however, there was no corresponding deceleration in research. We see, in fact, that the first nucleus of experimental and empirical investigations carried out in Italy during the first decades of the 1900s was added to in the following years by Benussi’s important studies on perception and suggestion, and by those of his pupil, Cesare Musatti, who is credited with importing Gestalt psychology theories into Italy and of valorizing psychoanalysis. Experimental research was further enriched by the results obtained in the Florence laboratory by De Sarlo’s pupils and in particular by the investigations on the psychology of space and time carried out by Enzo Bonaventura and Renata Calabresi. We should also keep in mind that it was precisely in the second quarter of the century that much of the research performed was that of the protagonists of the foundation of Italian scientific psychology; that is, Colucci, Ferrari, De Sanctis, and Kiesow. Finally, we must stress that it was precisely the period between the two wars that saw an increase of lively activity on the part of applied psychology, promoted and sustained by the research centers of Rome, Florence, Bologna, Turin, and above all Milan, where Gemelli was working. A particular prominence was attained by psychotechnics, appreciated and encouraged—unlike the experimental psychology of the laboratory—by the fascist regime, which saw in it an efficient

instrument and aid for the social, economic, and industrial politics of the government (Mucciarelli, 1982–1984, vol. II). However, in spite of this increase of performance on the scientific plane, Italian psychology—just like the other sciences—as a result of the tendentially autarchic political and cultural choices of the national government, remained during the 20-year period of fascist rule relatively isolated from the large international trends and research, as is demonstrated by the fact that behaviorism with all its variations left few traces and was not taken into consideration until after World War II.

Psychology in Padua: Benussi and Musatti Born in Trieste, later a pupil at the University of Graz where he studied under Alexius Meinong (1853–1920), who had assimilated Brentano’s teaching and in 1893 founded the first Austrian laboratory of experimental psychology, Benussi received his degree in philosophy in 1901, with a dissertation on the well-known image of Zöllner, whose illusory dimensions he investigated on the basis of research conducted with more than 9,000 experimental trials. In 1905, he participated in the Fifth International Congress of Psychology in Rome and obtained his first important recognition for his presentation of three much-appreciated reports; in one of which he described an original tachistoscope for collective experiments on several participants. In 1906, he obtained the university teaching qualification and in the following years interested himself principally in the perception of Gestalten and apparent movement, and in the psychology of time. In 1913, he began an experimental study of the respiratory symptoms of lying and occupied himself with the techniques of hypnotic suggestion and psychoanalysis, investigations that he would pursue in a preeminent way in Italy after World War I. The research of the Graz period brought great international notoriety to Benussi, to the point that Edwin G. Boring, in his classical History of Experimental Psychology, remembers him as “the most productive and efficient psychologist that Austria ever had” (Boring, 1950, p. 446; on Benussi, see Archivio Benussi online; Albertazzi, 2001; Antonelli, 1996, 2006; Mucciarelli, 1987b; Soro, 1994). For all the span of his scientific activity, Benussi investigated comprehensively the process of perception/apprehension (Auffassung) of the object by systematically utilizing introspection and submitting it to situations of experimental control. This research, influenced by the psychology of Brentano that was directed toward a study of mental “acts”—whether cimino, foschi

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perceptions, images, thoughts, memories, emotions, or desires—in their phenomenological entirety and subjective variability, led him to formulate two principles: that of “formal plurivocity” and that of the “representation of an asensorial origin.” According to the Triestine psychologist, then, alongside the constant perceptions tied to the stimuli of the sense organs (sensory perceptions such as, for example, chromatic ones), there coexisted perceptions (asensory perceptions unrelated to stimuli) brought about by a conscious and unconscious activity of the participant. But precisely this formulation, aimed at studying the perceptive process by subdividing it into sensory and asensory stages and aspects, aroused the criticism of Kurt Koffka (1886–1941), with whom there was an ensuing controversy, and differentiated Benussi’s theoretical-methodological position from that subsequently advanced by the psychology of form. Koffka, however, recognized in the Italian psychologist’s studies a moment of transition toward the theses formulated in those years by the Gestalttheorie (Antonelli, 1996). Continuing with the phenomenological experimentalism that he assimilated from Meinong, Benussi began also the study of the subjective experience of temporality. That is, he tried to establish the relations existing between the objective time of an event measured with appropriately precise mechanical equipment, and the subjective perception/evaluation of the duration of the event itself. These studies, collected in the volume Psychologie der Zeitauffassung (Psychology of Temporal Perception) of 1913, constituted in the following years the point of departure for those who— the first was Enzo Bonaventura—would interest themselves in the psychological problem of time. At the end of World War I, Benussi, as an Italian, encountered many obstacles in continuing a research career at the University of Graz. He decided to return to Italy and, with the help of De Sanctis, obtained in 1919 an annual contract as professor of experimental psychology at the University of Padua; later, in 1922, he was awarded the chair “for renown” and without competition. In Padova, he had to create ex-novo an Institute of Psychology, with a laboratory and library, adapting the instruments that Roberto Ardigò had acquired years before from the Zimmermann Company of Leipzig, and devising new ones. His institute, in the course of the years, was frequented by a circle of Italian intellectuals of diverse extraction and by gatherings of his first students, among them Cesare L. Musatti and Silvia De Marchi (1897–1936), one of the first Italian women to receive the degree with a thesis on experimental psychology. 330

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In the Paduan university, Benussi began a new period of experimental research, following up on the investigations conducted in Graz, and proposing to study the mental apparatus by means of the techniques of hypnosis and suggestion, in accordance with a psychodynamic perspective. He investigated principally those mental states with a strong emotional content, trying by means of hypnotic suggestion to induce in the participant particular emotional states while at the same time recording respiratory rate; in this way, he attempted to associate a physiological process (respiration) with a mental phenomenon (emotion), which thus became identified objectively by means of the pneumographic tracing. He consequently called this kind of research “real psychological analysis.” This kind of investigation led Benussi to interest himself in psychoanalysis, which he considered not only a therapeutic technique, but also and above all an open field of research on the mental processes that take place outside of consciousness and escape introspection. The viewpoint with which the Triestine psychologist approached Freud was in any case always the experimentalist one that wanted to produce proofs of the profound dynamics theorized by the father of psychoanalysis (Trizzino, 2008). Unfortunately, his investigations ended in 1927, following his tragic suicide, after which the direction of the laboratory of Padua—thanks once again to the involvement of De Sanctis—was taken over by the young Musatti, who, following in the footsteps of his mentor, initiated an important Paduan tradition of studies on the psychology of perception while continuing to occupy himself with psychoanalysis, albeit understood as psychotherapy and no longer as just a sector of empirical investigation. Even though Benussi conducted a part of his research in Graz during the first decades of the century, he nevertheless succeeded at introducing into Italy during the 1920s an innovative breath of fresh air in the experimental field, which influenced especially his pupil Cesare Musatti (on Musatti, see Reichmann, 1996, 1997, 1999; Romano & Sigurtà, 2000). During the first years of his university training in Padua, Musatti initially studied mathematics, but was then taken up with philosophy and followed the lessons of Aliotta, at that time a professor at the Paduan university. Returning from the front of World War I, Musatti began also to follow the courses of the new professor who had transferred from Graz, after which his interest in psychology became predominant. In 1921, he received his degree in philosophy with a thesis that explored the

theme of the value and limits of scientific knowledge. Sensitive to the epistemological issues raised by Aliotta’s teaching, he pursued reflections in this field with his essay La psicologia come scienza (Psychology as a Science) in 1924 and with the book Analisi del concetto di realtà empirica (Analysis of the Concept of Empirical Reality) in 1926. In the first years spent in the Paduan laboratory, Musatti dedicated himself especially to research on the psychology of perception; later, he actively occupied himself with psychoanalysis, becoming in both disciplinary areas one of the major Italian experts. His first experimental investigations regarded in particular the nature of the three-dimensional perception of bidimensional objects in movement, the so-called stereokinetic phenomena. In these studies the Gestalt conception of “assimilation” assumed an explanatory importance, already proposed by Benussi, but resumed and developed by his pupil. Musatti in the end traced stereokinetic perception back to a process for which one tends to “render similar” to preceding experiences one’s present perception. For this research, he has been interpreted as the major exponent in Italy of the psychology of form between the two World Wars. In effect, together with his pupils Fabio Metelli (1907–1987) and subsequently Gaetano Kanizsa (1913–1993), he came closest to that line of thought, which was ignored or criticized by other protagonists of Italian psychology (e.g., Kiesow and Rignano). Upon Benussi’s death in 1927, Musatti succeeded him in the direction of the laboratory of Padua and in the teaching of experimental psychology, for which he had an annual contract (he would not be called to the chair in 1931), and he continued the investigations of perceptology, pursuing the comparison with the Gestalttheorie, whose theses he in the end substantially accepted. In 1931, he published the volume Elementi di psicologia della testimonianza (Elements of the Psychology of Testimony), a book that he wrote following the controversy that arose in Italian public opinion concerning the value of testimony with regard to a famous judicial case of the loss of memory, the case of the “forgetful one of Collegno” (Roscioni, 2007). In this work, Musatti presented the problem of the truth of testimonial proof and excogitated some experiments that, through the use of cinematography, demonstrated how the witness’ reports were always reconstructions of events that contained elements of their own past experiences “assimilated,” in their remembrance, to the events that occurred, even though these elements did not belong to the reality of the facts (cf. Musatti, 1931/1991).

Together with the experimental research on the psychology of perception, Musatti—following always in the footsteps of his mentor—cultivated psychoanalysis as a second important field of study, which he explored for many aspects, committing himself to popularizing it at a highly qualified level, dedicating university courses to it, and resisting in the face of attacks by the idealist and Catholic culture that opposed it. Thus he became a part of the small group of Italian psychoanalysts who, in those years, were organizing in society. After the racial laws of 1938, Musatti was dismissed from the University of Padua because of the fact that his father was of Jewish origin and that he himself was of socialist ideas. On account of the intercession of Father Gemelli, however, he succeeded first in teaching at the University of Urbino and then in the Parini Liceo of Milan. He returned to the academic scene after the war, initially with a teaching contract at the faculty of medicine, and then in 1948 with the psychology chair in the faculty of letters and philosophy at the state University of Milan. He fully resumed his scientific activity, dedicating much of his energy especially to psychoanalysis, of which he would be considered one of the principal national experts. For his dedication on behalf of psychological studies, Musatti can be regarded, together with Gemelli, as a kind of “ferryman” of psychology who accompanied it from the difficult situation of the prewar period to the new, irrepressible stage of development in the second half of the century.

Psychology in Florence and Milan: Bonaventura and Gemelli In Florence, after an initial involvement in experimental investigations, De Sarlo and Aliotta dedicated themselves to philosophy, and the laboratory continued to function thanks to the commitment of Enzo Bonaventura, who set up excellent research on the perception of time. A pupil of De Sarlo until receiving his degree in 1913, Bonaventura distanced himself on account of a different way of conceiving experimental psychology, which he considered a field of studies truly autonomous from philosophy. Bonaventura’s research followed the trends of experimental investigation cultivated in the Florentine laboratory, where he worked for many years utilizing in an original way the instruments De Sarlo had collected, and to which he added others. Thanks also to his invention of the double-fall tachistoscope, he studied in particular the duration of the phenomena of learning and carried out investigations cimino, foschi

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on the perception of time and space. In 1929, he succeeded in publishing one of the best-known works in the field of psychology written in Italy during that period, Il problema psicologico del tempo (The Psychological Problem of Time) (on Bonaventura, see Gori-Savellini, 1990; Albertazzi, Cimino, & Gori-Savellini, 1999). The study of the “subjective experience of time” constituted a classical research program of experimental psychology that was developed in many European laboratories, a program that Bonaventura proposed again in Italy following Benussi and often working in collaboration with Renata Calabresi. In the study of temporal experience, the two Florentine psychologists concentrated their attention especially on the duration of an “act of perception/apprehension” that involved very brief times, on the order of thousandths of a second, and they tried to measure the so-called “mental present” or “experience of the present” (Cimino & Degni, 2010). In addition to these sectors of experimental psychology and in harmony with the tendencies of the period, Bonaventura cultivated also applied psychology, occupying himself primarily with scholastic orientation and clinical psychology. In regard to the latter, he approached psychoanalysis, formulating a relation between introspection as a moment of psychoanalytic inquiry, and introspection as a central aspect of laboratory research. Even though he had been entrusted with the direction of the Florentine laboratory, a position that he held from 1924 to 1938, and although he proved to be among the three candidates who qualified for a chair in the 1930 competition, he never succeeded in being assigned a chair, on account of the hostility of the academic world. In 1938, Bonaventura, who originated from a Jewish family, decided as a result of the racial laws to emigrate to Jerusalem. There, to deal with the difficult problems of integration of various communities within the “promised land,” he dedicated himself to the psychology of education and organized a center for children and their families. The Florentine school of psychology rapidly declined following his departure, and the University, which did not assign a chair to him so that he could pursue his research in its outstanding laboratory of experimental psychology, missed out on a great opportunity. In addition to Padua and Florence, after Rome and Turin, an important psychological research center of both experimental and applied psychology was realized in the Catholic University of Milan, thanks to the long and intense activity of Franciscan Brother Agostino Gemelli, whose secular name was 332

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Edoardo (on Gemelli, see Bocci, 2003; Cosmacini, 1985; Esposito, Fenaroli, & Vanetti, 2009; Mecacci, 1998; Preto, 1981). A graduate in medicine from the University of Pavia, where he had collaborated with the Nobel Prize–winner Camillo Golgi (1843–1926) on research concerning the anatomy of the nervous system, Gemelli was a lay intellectual who professed a sui generis agnostic conception of socialist inspiration, up until his religious conversion around 1903. After his entry into the Order of the Minor Franciscan Brothers, he received his doctorate in philosophy from the Catholic University of Leuven in Belgium, one of the most authoritative centers of neo-scholastic philosophy, which had opened its doors to the study of experimental psychology. Gemelli very soon interested himself in this discipline and, to explore more thoroughly its psychophysiological and psychopathological theories and methods, he spent long periods of time in Würzburg with Oswald Külpe and in Munich at the clinic of Emil Kraepelin, but above all he became the collaborator of Federico Kiesow in Turin. During World War I, he organized for the Italian army a laboratory of applied psychophysiology, in which aviators were selected for the dawning military air force. At the end of the conflict, in 1921, he founded the Catholic University of the Sacred Heart in Milan, where he held the chair of psychology, first by appointment and then since 1926 as a permanent position assigned directly by the Minister of Public Instruction on the basis of international recommendations (among which was a letter of presentation by Henri Piéron), and where, in 1924, he instituted a laboratory of experimental psychology. Gemelli was a complex and controversial scholar, accused in certain historiographies of collusion with the fascist regime. A thorough examination of his activity and work has instead demonstrated that he was never an organic exponent of the “fascist science” and that one can attribute to him, if anything, only a behavior inclined toward compromises in order to permit the survival of psychology and the Catholic University under a dictatorial regime. In the years between the two wars, Gemelli was an authoritative scientist who occupied a prominent position in the Italian cultural panorama. He held high-profile appointments, such as that of president of the Pontifical Academy of Sciences and of the Committee for the Application of Psychology of the Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche (National Council of Research; CNR); in addition, he founded, in 1939, the Archivio di Psicologia, Neurologia e Psichiatria (Archive of Psychology, Neurology, and

Psychiatry), one of the most important Italian journals to publish psychological studies. After July 25, 1943, when Mussolini was removed as the head of the government and the German troops occupied Italy, Gemelli from the Catholic University of Milan collaborated with the struggle of the Resistance, creating, for example, a system of underground false document fabrication to help persecuted individuals to flee the country. The neo-scholastic approach of Gemelli’s philosophy, in opposition to both positivism and neoidealism, led him to elaborate a conception of the human being as a “person.” That is, as an integrated biological and mental totality that must be considered in its unity, in its interrelation with physiological and psychological aspects, never presupposed to be separate. His directive idea did not implicate diffidence toward scientific laboratory investigation. On the contrary, Gemelli was a strenuous defender of experimental research against the criticisms of the neo-idealist philosophy, but he prescribed that the data collected had to be interpreted in light of the peculiar biological and spiritual bidimensionality of the human being, asserting that whatever was mental could not be regarded as a simple function of the nervous system. The need to grasp the totality and unity of the human being led Gemelli to a sort of methodological eclecticism and to considering acceptable and profitable the contributions of different schools, even though he had a predilection for a descriptive and “humanistic” psychology (and for this approach has been considered a sort of pioneer of Rogers’ psychology). In his opinion, even though reflexology, behaviorism, the psychology of form, and psychoanalysis, could usefully investigate particular aspects of mental life, they did however have a limit, which consisted precisely of the fact that the object and method of study of each were circumscribed and limited, and could not be extended to all of the human being, to that “bio-mental unicum” that could be understood only by means of a synthetic, organic, and unitary vision. This idea of the human being as a synthesis of multiple aspects, of diverse dimensions and behaviors, led Gemelli to interest himself in various fields of investigation, from psychophysiology to comparative psychology, from educational psychology to judicial and criminal psychology, from social psychology to work psychology and psychotechnics, with particular attention addressed to the professional orientation and selection of personnel. In these latter areas of applied psychology, he made perhaps his most

significant contributions, which received international recognition. The importance of this research went beyond even its scientific content; the very survival of laboratory psychology under the fascist regime was permitted because of Gemelli’s work. Thus, one must assign to Gemelli an unquestionable and prominent role in the interwar years, one that served to assure psychology’s continuity into the second half of the century.

Psychology Between Eugenics, Biotypology, Psychotechnics, and Psychoanalysis The assumption of power on the part of Benito Mussolini (1883–1945) in 1922 marked the end of liberal democracy and the beginning of an authoritarian regime that would end in 1945 with the definitive liberation of Italy from the fascist government. During these two decades, the human sciences, as with the other scientific disciplines, were progressively more closed toward any international contact, and they focused their attention principally on national social and economic problems. In this period, the main research themes of the human sciences were those of eugenics and biotypology, whereas psychological inquiry was for the most part confined to socially useful applications. During the years immediately preceding World War I, eugenics of a Galtonian bent had become an applicative sector of biological research and of evolutionist theories. In Italy, Lombroso had already in the 19th century elaborated an anthropology that anticipated eugenics, and with regard to criminals and madmen, had inspired the idea of a preventive intervention whose purpose was to safeguard and defend society, isolating those with delinquent behavior “by birth” and those with hereditary mental disorders that did not permit rehabilitation (Mantovani, 2004; Pick, 1989). However, the major Italian scientists were not aligned with the ideas of Lombroso, and within positive criminology itself there coexisted innatist and environmentalist positions, with points of view— such as that of Ferri—for which criminality could be the result also of social causes. Lombroso himself, moreover, had amply considered the occasional criminal the fruit of environmental circumstances. Sergi, Mantegazza, Morselli, and Tamburini, who in the Italian scientific community were no less authoritative than Lombroso, were, on the other hand, influenced by Lamarckian transformism, based on the idea that acquired characteristics could be inherited. It is thus not surprising that their pupils— above all, De Sanctis and Montessori—proved to be sincerely convinced of the educability and possible cimino, foschi

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rehabilitation of children with mental problems or of those with deviant behavior, on the condition that educational science was based on a “positive” psychology and experimental anthropology. Given these premises, in Italy there was always— also during fascism—a resistance on the part of psychologists toward accepting a practice of segregating those who were “diverse,” as there was also toward a eugenics that was intent upon isolating, by means of sterilization or a restriction of marriages and births, those who were considered degenerate. De Sanctis and Gemelli were always very cautious in this regard and did not accept the hypotheses of preventive intervention, even when, during the 1920s, the genetics of Mendel-Weissmann and the immutable transmission of hereditary patrimony seemed to have the upper hand and to be generally accepted. The approach of the Italian psychologists—and of those who, like Ferrari, Ponzo, and Banissoni, were not hostile to the fascist regime—remained always that of promoting and practicing a psychology, pedagogy, and social medicine that was more attentive to prophylaxis than to the restriction of deviations and the defense of society from the “degenerated” (cf. Cassata, 2006). This tendency then, during the 20-year period of fascism, did not benefit psychology’s taking root, and it remained substantially marginalized, considered an auxiliary science of medicine or economy. In spite of these cautions toward eugenics on the part of the most circumspect scientists, the doctrines that became affirmed during the 1930s were those “biotypological” ones elaborated by several biologists, anthropologists, and physicians. These doctrines proposed to correlate to specific physical types a corresponding number of psychological types, and contained several premises of biological racism. The Italian biotypology was elaborated principally by Achille De Giovanni and his pupils Giacinto Viola (1870–1943) and, above all, Nicola Pende (1880–1970), who classified individuals on the basis of correlations between morphological and endocrine characteristics on the one hand, and psychological and character traits on the other. This doctrine, then, ended up by constructing actual stereotypes of personality, from which could be derived racial prejudices regarding ethnic groups, social groups, and different cultures, even though, in and of itself, the theory intended to make only a scientific contribution to anthropology and psychology (Cassata, 2006; Israel & Nastasi, 1998; Maiocchi, 1999; Mantovani, 2004). During the interwar period, characterized by a basically autarchic science and the idea of a primacy 334

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of philosophy over the human sciences of a positivist matrix (an idea sustained by the Minister of Public Instruction and neo-idealist philosopher Giovanni Gentile, who, with the reform of the secondary school in 1923, had removed psychology from the teaching program of philosophy in the high schools), Italian psychologists took on a defensive stance, intent upon developing a more practical-applicative aspect of psychology than the theoretical-speculative one. In this regard, the position of Gemelli and Banissoni was paradigmatic, as between the 1930s and 1940s theirs were two authoritative voices of the discipline that accepted and promoted an atheoretical and aphilosophical conception of psychology precisely to avoid entering into conflict with neo-idealists. Their conception was one that, in a certain sense, made the discipline one “of limited sovereignty” and accentuated the isolation of Italian psychologists from larger international trends and research. Italian psychology of the 1930s was thus defined, not always correctly, as a “science without a theory,” which produced principally applied research while disguising itself as psychotechnics (cf. Lombardo & Foschi, 1995). This term, coined originally by William Stern (1871–1938) and introduced into Italy in 1910 by Guido Della Valle, designated the practical application of psychology for objectives that were socially useful with respect to the problems posed in educational and work areas. Some experiences of applied physiology in the area of work had already been set up in the first decades of the 20th century. Beginning in the 1920s, centers of applied psychotechnics and scholastic and professional orientation were then created in various parts of Italy. However, the most relevant event for the future was the constitution, in 1939, of a Commission for the Application of Psychology at the National Council of Research (CNR); it was presided over by Gemelli, with Ponzo as vice-president and Banissoni as secretary. It would later be transformed into the Experimental Center of Applied Psychology of the CNR (subsequently, the Institute of Psychology of the CNR). In fact, Gemelli and Ponzo were the Italian scholars who, more than any others, dedicated themselves to the applied areas of psychotechnics. To complete the picture of the psychological studies carried out between the 1920s and 1940s, we must remember that, in this period, psychoanalysis also emerged on the scene and began to be practiced, although up until the 1960s it was opposed both by the idealist and Catholic culture and by Marxist ideology, as by psychiatrists themselves (David, 1966/1990; Mecacci, 1998; Ceccarelli, 1999).

The first articles on Freudian theory appeared in 1908 in several journals (among them the Rivista di psicologia, Rivista Sperimentale di Freniatria e Medicina Legale, and Psiche), and some of Freud’s works began to be translated shortly afterward. It was only in the 1920s, however, that the interest for the new doctrine became broader and more consistent. In 1925, the Società Psicoanalitica Italiana (SPI) (Italian Psychoanalytic Society) was founded by Marco Levi Bianchini (1875– 1961), and then reorganized in 1931–1932 by Edoardo Weiss (1889–1970). Its membership comprised a group of pioneers, among them Nicola Perrotti (1897–1970), Emilio Servadio (1904–1995), and Cesare Musatti. In 1932, the Rivista Italiana di Psicoanalisi (Italian Review of Psychoanalysis) first saw the light, accompanied by the publication of the first popularized texts of Freudian theory: those of Morselli in 1926, Weiss in 1931, and Bonaventura in 1938. The new “science of the soul” spread also in literary circles, such as in Trieste—the city of Weiss, of Italo Svevo (1861–1928), and of Umberto Saba (1883– 1957)—and was met with a warm welcome especially in the University of Padua (first from Benussi and then from Musatti), which promoted experimental investigations of unconscious mental processes. With Musatti, psychoanalysis found an academic point of reference and, thanks to his involvement in Milan, was able to develop after the war. In Rome, it was introduced on the initiative of Weiss (who had moved there from Trieste), Servadio, and Perrotti.

The Maturity of Italian Psychology and the Profession of Psychologist The years following World War II were characterized by the end of the monarchy and the foundation, in 1946, of the Italian Republic. The republican constitution was written in a joint endeavor by liberal, Catholic, democratic socialist, and communist intellectuals who, after 1943, had together organized the Resistance and collaborated with American, English, and French forces toward the liberation of Italy from German occupation. The republican institutions, however, inherited from the fascist State many legislative regulations, such as the organization of public education elaborated by the philosopher and minister Giovanni Gentile. In the postwar period, the season of positivism could be considered closed, reappearing if at all only as a logical neo-positivism in some authors. Benedetto Croce, a longtime collaborator and friend of Gentile but soon passed into the ranks of anti-fascism, in the first years of the republican era played the role of maître à penser, similar to Gentile’s earlier role.

Neo-idealism was therefore, also in the early postwar period, the academic philosophy of reference, even though other tendencies such as Marxism, phenomenology, and existentialism were beginning to expand. In any case, all of these philosophical orientations displayed an attitude of diffidence—if not of open criticism—toward the human sciences, whose claim to measure and subject to general laws the behavior of human beings in their various activities was considered too reductive of their abundance, complexity, and unpredictability. The most orthodox Marxists, furthermore, considered psychology a “bourgeois” science that underestimated the historical and social roots of psychological phenomena and did not accord with the principles of historical and dialectical materialism (Legrenzi & Luccio, 1994). At the end of World War II, the institutional reality of Italian psychology had become impoverished. With respect to the situation of the first decades of the 20th century, there were fewer university courses and laboratory activities. It was therefore a difficult task of reconstruction and relaunching of the discipline that Gemelli and Musatti undertook in the postwar period, in opposition to both criticism from the philosophical sphere and the reduction of psychology to psychotechnics, as had already partially occurred in the 1930s and 1940s. Musatti, for example, in directing since 1955 a renewed edition of the Rivista di Psicologia founded by Ferrari, decided to publish in the periodical above all basic contributions of experimental research. Little by little, the pupils of Musatti and Gemelli, as did other psychologists trained in the various Italian universities, resumed their teaching of general and applied psychology in the universities, which began to open their chairs of psychology to competition. These would gradually increase throughout the 1960s and 1970s (up until their proliferation in the 1980s and 1990s, in correspondence with the many new degree courses in psychology), especially in the faculties of medicine and of education (this latter being the heir of the pedagogical schools for teacher training). Parallel to this, the laboratories of experimental psychology resumed their activities and increasingly sought to establish international contacts as a breakthrough with respect to the autarchic atmosphere that had set in during the 20-year period of fascism. This opening toward the more vivacious and emerging psychological trends permitted the introduction in the universities and laboratories of the most updated theories and research, initially of a behaviorist approach and then of a cognitive one, together with the new directions of psychophysiology, cimino, foschi

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personality psychology, development psychology, social psychology, and clinical psychology. In this work of reconstruction, in particular, a central role was played by the Institute of Psychology founded by Agostino Gemelli at the Catholic University in Milan. It became an important research center for the training and practice of some of the major Italian psychologists in the second half of the century. Among them were Giorgio Zunini, Leonardo Ancona (1922–2008), Francesco Alberoni, Marcello Cesa-Bianchi, Assunto Quadrio, and Enzo Spaltro. Musatti too contributed actively to relaunching psychology in Italy. In 1948, he succeeded in obtaining a university chair of psychology—the first after the war—in the faculty of letters and philosophy at the State University of Milan. In 1955, in addition to the Rivista di Psicologia, he refounded the Rivista di Psicoanalisi (Review of Psychoanalysis), while his Trattato di Psicanalisi (Treatise of Psychoanalysis), published in 1949 and faithful to original Freudian ideas, had become a widely known text that would serve as a basis for the training of entire generations of intellectuals. From 1967 to 1980, he directed the Italian edition of the Works of Freud. Until his death in 1989, Musatti represented a point of reference for the academic and institutional policies of Italian psychologists, and he played a key role as organizer of the psychoanalytic movement and advocate of Freudian orthodoxy. He also had many pupils, among them Gaetano Kanizsa, Fabio Metelli, Franco Fornari (1921–1985), and Enzo Funari, who, together with students of Gemelli, would then reconstruct and develop Italian psychology in the second half of the 20th century. Psychoanalysis, in turn, which in the years preceding World War II had been opposed by both the neo-idealist and the Catholic culture—and above all by traditional psychiatry—reorganized itself in the postwar period around the names of Perrotti, Servadio, and Musatti, and it relaunched both the Società Psicoanalitica Italiana and the Rivista di Psicoanalisi (David, 1966/1990). We should also mention that, in the 1970s, Gemelli’s pupil, Leonardo Ancona, in opposition to the ideas of his maestro, succeeded in the difficult task of achieving an acceptance of psychoanalysis on the part of the Catholic milieu, receiving for his work and activity the approval of Pope Paul VI (Ancona, 2003).

Clinical Psychology Between Psychiatry and Psychoanalysis In addition to a gradual resumption of laboratory psychology, both general and applied (especially 336

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developmental and social psychology), there also arose during the second postwar period in Italy a vivacious debate on the contents and frontiers of clinical psychology in its relations with psychiatry, psychoanalysis, and psychotherapy. The basic problem was that of establishing whether and to what degree clinical psychology, understood as a combination of knowledge and techniques (tests, conversations, etc.) of a psychological kind useful for the diagnosis and therapy of some mental disturbances, could autonomously confront mental illness. This problem was at the center of a Symposium held in Milan in 1952, promoted by the Società Italiana di Psicologia (Italian Society of Psychology), with the participation of the most authoritative university professors of psychology, the best-known directors of mental hospitals, and several illustrious foreign psychologists and psychiatrists invited for the occasion. Gemelli, who coordinated the convention, collected all the presentations into a special issue of the Arichivio di Psicologia, Neurologia e Psichiatria (Archive of Psychology, Neurology, and Psychiatry) published in 1953. From the papers presented and the texts published, a conception emerged of a clinical psychology with limited sovereignty, situated in a subordinated position within the riverbed of psychiatry: It was in fact considered a combination of professional skills that could be applied by a psychologist only under the supervision of a psychiatrist, or else—better yet— that could be possessed by psychiatrists themselves. This was, for example, the opinion of Gemelli (1956), as well as that of the authoritative psychiatrist Mario Gozzano (1898–1986), who proposed, as a training procedure for the qualification to work as a clinical psychologist, apposite university courses of specialization open to those with a degree either in medicine or in other humanistic disciplines. He admitted, however, that whereas the former could fully perform a professional practice comprising the diagnosis and therapy, the latter would have been able only to collaborate with psychiatrists in administering tests. Gemelli accepted the Gozzano proposal, which established different functions for doctors and nondoctors, and he forcefully posed the additional problem as to whether the implementation of a treatment based on psychotherapy could be entrusted also to a psychologist who was not a doctor. Most Italian psychologists, in agreement with psychiatrists, declared themselves contrary, affirming that psychotherapy was an exclusive skill of specialists with a degree in medicine. Gemelli therefore demanded from his pupils a medical degree, whether they were to

dedicate themselves to experimentation or to carrying out the profession of clinical psychologists; he moreover manifested his preference for a pragmatic psychotherapy, such as the counseling psychology of Carl Rogers (1902–1987). Another participant in the 1952 debate was the other “pivot” of Italian psychology in the second postwar period: Cesare Musatti, who was not a physician. Clinical psychology was for him essentially psychoanalysis, but—and contradicting in this way his personal biography—in his opinion, the psychoanalyst needed medical training. Over the course of years, he maintained this point of view, and at the beginning of the 1980s, when in Italy the problem arose of the legal recognition of the profession of psychologist, he wrote that, since the degree course in psychology provided a training of an experimental kind, the psychologist could not have become other than a researcher. Musatti was, therefore, one of the main exponents of a conception of psychology that distinctly separated experimental psychology from clinical psychology, which latter was for him the exclusive prerogative of physicians with traditional psychoanalytic training (Musatti, 1982; cf. Lombardo, 1994). In accordance with such a position, he thus instructed only two types of pupils, the experimental psychologists on the one hand, and the physician psychoanalysts on the other. In the decades of the 1950s and 1960s, among the few works dedicated to thoroughly examining the themes inherent in clinical psychology independently from both psychiatry and psychoanalysis, we must mention the book of Adriano Ossicini, Problemi di Psicologia Clinica (Problems of Clinical Psychology) of 1957. Ossicini—a Catholic intellectual, antifascist partisan, several times deputy in the ranks of the left, a graduate in medicine, professor of psychology at the University of Rome “La Sapienza,” and author of the law that in Italy instituted the profession of psychologist—developed in the 1957 volume a conception of clinical psychology new to the Italian psychological landscape. He conceived of this discipline as a theoretical-methodological body that integrates in a coherent synthesis the personality theories of Freud and Lewin, the theories of the mind derived from general psychology—inspired by the theme of the unité de la psychologie of Daniel Lagache (1903–1972)—and the methods of application based on tests, questionnaires, and interviews. All in all, he understood clinical psychology as an autonomous science that operatively combined the contributions of various fields of psychological research that were then selected and utilized for the

diagnosis of psychological disorders and for the formulation of a psychotherapeutic approach without the use of medication. In this sense, clinical psychology—as will be recognized by the law on the profession of psychologist—could be practiced by anyone who had only psychological training, and not necessarily medical or psychoanalytic training (Ossicini, 2002). The years that followed World War II were characterized first by the postwar reconstruction and then by an impressive economic expansion designated as the “Italian economic miracle.” Ossicini’s ideas, making their entrance in this period of great transformations and ferment, favored the affirmation and diffusion of clinical psychology and, in particular, of psychotherapy. The latter, from the private intervention practiced by a few and directed to a restricted number of patients in the upper middle class, became a practice that was increasingly extended to the entire social strata. Moreover, alongside psychotherapy of a psychoanalytical nature there arose other psychotherapeutic techniques using various approaches of a psychodynamic, cognitive-behaviorist, systemic-relational, or humanistic kind, together with group and family psychotherapy, all of which were well adapted to the new social realities of Italy at the time of its economic miracle. Parallel to the new tendencies of psychotherapy was also the crisis of traditional Italian psychiatry. During the 1960s, a renewal encouraged by Pier Francesco Galli in Milan saw the participation of several psychiatrists, among them Franco Basaglia (1924–1980), Giovanni Jervis (1933–2009), Agostino Pirella, and Sergio Piro (1927–2009), who radicalized the debate on mental health. They founded the movement of Democratic Psychiatry, which—within the general movement of antipsychiatry—contested the confinement in mental hospitals of those with mental illness, and any form of treatment that was coercive and imposed by authority. Inspired in part by the phenomenological-existential approach of Karl Jaspers (1883–1969) and Ludwig Binswanger (1881–1966), and displaying diffidence toward both clinical psychology and psychotherapy, as well as toward invasive medical therapies and the massive use of medications, this new democratic psychiatry maintained that mental disturbances could not be cured in the same way as other organic illnesses, since in the greatest number of cases the mental suffering is not the result of organic illness or dysfunction, but of environmental and social conditioning and pressures. The democratic psychiatry movement became the focal point of a coalescence of transversal social cimino, foschi

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and political forces that successfully promoted the passage of a law reforming the entire Italian system of mental health (law 180 of 1978, the so-called “Basaglia law”). This law abolished in Italy the institute of the state mental hospital and substituted it with forms of reinsertion and group therapy dispensed by the National Health Service. The Basaglia law continues to arouse numerous criticisms for the difficulty of its application, and its related legislative framework has been in any case reluctant to recognize a professional space for the psychologist, who appears to be an ambiguous figure whose qualifications are not clearly specified (Lombardo, 1994).

At the end of the 1960s, the economic development determined, among other things, a greater level of school attendance and unionization in Italian society. In this situation, Italian psychologists began to be increasingly influenced by the Human Relations Movement of Elton Mayo (1880–1949) and by the group psychology (T-Groups) of Kurt Lewin (1890–1947), both of which originated in the United States. During the 1960s and 1970s, work with T-Groups in Italy represented the only alternative to the practice, by then consolidated, of scholastic and professional orientation by means of tests and interviews (Rozzi, 1975; Spaltro, 1969, 1974).

Psychology in the Schools During the years of the economic “boom,” Italian psychology also was called upon to make a technicalprofessional contribution to society (Rozzi, 1975; Spaltro, 1974). This was first evident in the field of scholastic and professional orientation (Marzi & Chiari, 1960). The school-based psychological services made reference to a 1962 law that extended compulsory education until 14 years of age and indicated among the tasks of the scholastic institutes that of guiding young students in their choice of a subsequent course of study or work activity. In addition, between 1950 and 1970, one of the major commitments of the psychologist was that of the so-called dépistage—that is, to identify students with disciplinary or learning problems, in order to direct them to particular classes of rehabilitation, the so-called “differential classes.” These special classes, on the basis of the Decree of 1967, were intended for those “subjects who were somewhat less gifted intellectually and for the environmentally maladjusted, with anomalous behavior, for whom it was possible to contemplate a reinsertion in the common school” (Ossicini, 1973, p. 180). In the school year 1969–1970, the number of rehabilitation classes was almost 10,000 with about 140,000 students (Ossicini, 1973). In the 1970s, this situation led psychologists themselves to question psychological practices based for the most part simply on intelligence tests and applied in the schools to discriminate pupils. It voiced a criticism that denounced both the methodological inconsistency of the dépistage and the fundamental educational shortcomings of the differential classes, which instead of favoring the scholastic rehabilitation of children became a place of alienation and maladjustment for students coming from the poorest and most disadvantaged parts of the population. This criticism, posited by psychologists themselves, led to the abolition of differential classes in 1977. 338

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Degree Courses and the Recognition of the Profession of Psychologist In spite of the protests transmitted by the movement of 1968 that had collided with the fragile structures of Italian psychology, the latter had in any case grown during the 1960s. In the course of its development in the universities and other research centers, it had obtained full scientificcultural, social, and academic recognition. In 1969, the direction of the CNR Institute of Psychology passed from Luigi Meschieri (1919–1985), trained in the laboratory-of-psychology tradition in Rome, to Raffaello Misiti (1925–1986), who had promoted research in the experimental sectors, such as those of psychophysiology, psycholinguistics, and comparative animal psychology. The psychological disciplines, in line with tradition, were mostly taught in the faculty of education or of medicine, in which there were also several schools of post-degree specialization for the training of future professional psychologists. The growing social demand for such specialists then created the conditions for instituting in Italy the first course leading to a degree in psychology (Perussia, 1994). A fundamental stage of the itinerary that led to the creation of these courses was the 1967 Congress held in Milan on Scienze dell’uomo e la riforma dell’università (Human Sciences and the Reform of the University), coordinated by Musatti and CesaBianchi, in which various documents were presented, including a detailed plan for a degree course prepared by a Commission that included the participation of Renzo Canestrari, founder of the Institute of Psychology of Bologna; Gustavo Iacono (1926–1988), pupil of Gemelli; Gaetano Kanizsa and Fabio Metelli, pupils of Musatti; and Luigi Meschieri, professor at Urbino University. On this occasion, Father Ernesto Valentini (1907–1987)—a

Jesuit trained in the Rome laboratory—expounded a project for a degree course to be inserted within the faculty of education at the University of Rome, alongside the courses of sociology and pedagogy (Valentini, 1973). Last, in the academic year 1971– 1972, after having overcome a difficult institutional itinerary, the effort to embed the discipline in the universities became realized with the creation of the first two courses leading to a degree in psychology, in the universities of Rome and Padua (Calvi & Lombardo, 1989). The debate concerning the suitable university training of the psychologist was accompanied by another one regarding the psychologist’s role and professional recognition. In a 1982 article, Musatti had maintained that there was no space in Italy for psychology as a profession, and that his pupils were the living emblem of the two souls of 20th-century Italian psychology, that of “pure” research (Kanizsa) and that of psychoanalysis (Fornari). The latter, in fact, remained for Musatti the only expression of a professional activity. In his opinion, conditions were lacking for training professional psychologists as in other countries, in that there existed no affirmed academic tradition in that sense, and the professors themselves had degrees in medicine or philosophy or other disciplines (and they would in fact be the ones to occupy the chairs of the new degree courses in psychology) (Musatti, 1982; cf. Kanizsa, 1980). But precisely this restrictive conception of the psychologist’s role, in contrast to the discipline’s tumultuous and uncontrolled scientific and institutional developments, sparked the discussion on the function and responsibilities—which had to be regulated by law—of a professional psychologist. From the 1970s on, numerous legislative proposals followed one another to define the professional role of the Italian psychologist. As of 1985, the law proposed by Senator Adriano Ossicini took effect, establishing a specific training for both the psychologist and psychotherapist (Ossicini, 2002). The tormented itinerary of this law was hampered by various ideological-cultural forms of opposition (Lombardo, 1990). In 1989, finally, the Ossicini proposal was approved as a definitive law, which in its first article summarized the functions of the psychologist “in the use of cognitive and operational instruments for the prevention, diagnosis, rehabilitative and supportive activities in the psychological sphere, addressed to the person, group, social organisms, and communities.” It established for the psychotherapist the diploma of a post-university school of specialization recognized by the Ministry of the University.

Beginning in the 1970s, the trend of enrollment in the degree courses of psychology increased exponentially, paralleling the growing number of Italian universities proposing degree courses, post-degree schools of specialization, and doctorates in psychology (cf. Ponzio, 2008; Cimino & Ferreri, 2003). Furthermore, private schools of specialization in psychotherapy were founded in accordance with various approaches, and recognized by the Ministry of the University on the basis of the norms of the 1989 law (Carli, Cecchini, Lombardo, & Stampa, 1995). At present in Italy, there are enrolled in the regional registers tens of thousands of psychologists (an excessive number with respect to the needs of the country), who have carried out a period of practice in specific psychological structures or research centers, and have passed an examination of professional qualification.

Conclusion Italian Psychology in the International Context Going beyond a traditional historiography of psychology—one inspired by the classic work of Boring (1950)—which usually indicated the emergence of modern psychology as taking place in Germany with Wundt and the School of Leipzig in the 1870s, more recent historical studies have rediscovered and highlighted other roots of the new psychological science, which arose autonomously and proceeded parallel to—while often criticizing it—the Wundtian experimentalist, elementalist, and structuralist psychology. Kurt Danziger (1990), for example, has indicated at the origin of scientific psychology in Europe three different “research practices,” which emerged in three diverse cultural and social situations and structures: (a) research based upon the psychophysical and psychophysiological experiment typical of the Leipzig laboratory; (b) research founded upon the clinical experiment that arose in the French medical-psychiatric context; and (c) research guided by the psychometric experiment utilized by Galton in England. These different ways of understanding psychological research and practice were transmitted and circulated from one country to another, taking hold where they found already tilled ground that was ready to receive them. At the same time, however, filtered by the culture and science of each nation, they became transformed, adapting to its social and institutional needs and to its scientific and intellectual traditions and potentialities. In so doing, a process took place that has been defined as one of “hybridization” (or also “indigenization”) in which cimino, foschi

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psychological knowledge and practices originating externally combine with experiences matured internally, become local knowledge and practices and generate something new, which can in turn emigrate and create further hybridizations (Danziger, 2006; Kapchan & Turner Strong, 1999; Pickren, 2009). This is what happened in Italy during the different stages of modern psychology’s development, in which international influences, especially from the German and French areas, intersected and blended with specific and genuine Italian traditions of psychological studies, producing new and significant results. In the last decades of the 1800s, a politicoinstitutional and socioeconomic situation of great ferment and transformations, along with a lively scientific-cultural environment permeated by the ideology of evolutionist positivism, constituted the kind of fertile ground in which new plants could sprout from the cross-breeding of native and foreign seeds. It was in fact from this ground that a debate arose on the epistemological foundations of a new psychology, which concluded by identifying the object of the discipline as psychophysical and psychophysiological phenomena, and its method as experimental introspection conducted in the laboratory. It was this same ground that generated a strong incentive to develop the so-called human sciences on an empirical and experimental basis and to lay the foundations of an organicist psychiatry. The discussion on the scientific statute of psychology undoubtedly echoed reflections of German thought, but it proved to be also quite autonomous, drawing from the Italian philosophical-cultural tradition, which passed from the Renaissance through Galileo and Gian Battista Vico before arriving at Ardigò. One need only recall that the manifesto books of Italian positive psychology are those of Ardigò in 1870 and of Sergi in 1873 (that is, just prior to the Wundtian treatise Grundzüge der physiologischen Psychologie of 1873–1874), and that the first nucleus of a psychological laboratory was that of Tamburini, which was active in the late 1870s (thus more or less contemporaneous with the Leipzig laboratory that arose in 1879). Italian psychology, moreover, did not for the most part adopt the Wundtian structuralist paradigm, with the exception of Kiesow, who did so belatedly. It did, however, open immediately to the orientation of various thinkers, from Brentano to Külpe, from James to Binet, and to Claparède. That which was first incorporated from Germany was not so much the elementalist approach of the Leipzig School, 340

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but rather the methods and instruments of psychophysics and psychochronometry—methods that, capable of leading to the acquisition of quantitative data, initially justified the attempt to establish the new experimental psychology. From France, instead, the methods of measurement typical of positivist anthropology became known, triggering the research of psychometric methods for the identification of character traits. This created the premise for the elaboration of an original criminal anthropology on the part of Lombroso— which, albeit with much caution and criticism, was exported and adopted in all of Europe—and for the birth of a psychology to be applied to the world of schools, workplaces, prisons, and law courts. It was also from France, then, that the idea was transmitted of a complementarity of investigation between normal and pathological mental phenomena, an idea that Buccola put into practice in an innovative way by applying upon persons both with and without mental illness the psychochronometric methods typical of Wundt’s laboratory, as well as the statistical techniques inspired by Galton. From this there originated in Italy an embryo of experimental and clinical psychology. The research, applications, and institutions delineated in the last 30 years of the 19th century, during a period of gestation, gradually increased, took greater root in the schools and in society, and ended by constituting a critical mass that, as a whole, in the first decade of the 20th century, marked the birth in Italy of psychology as a science and autonomous discipline. The studies of general and applied psychology that were carried out in these foundational years were influenced by various international trends. The most significant points of contact with German thought and psychology can probably be identified in the relations between Brentano and De Sarlo, Meinong and Benussi, and Wundt and Kiesow. In particular, the influence of the German laboratories continued in the classical research on the lower mental functions (such as sensations, perceptions, reaction times, etc.), whereas, for research on higher mental functions (such as thought, memory, emotions, etc.), investigations were developed based upon the method of tests and inspired prevalently by Binet and the French school, whose presence made itself felt especially on Ferrari, De Sanctis, and Montessori. It is moreover possible to trace a series of international conditionings on psychopathology and clinical psychology; on the psychology of education or psychopedagogy; and also on judicial, social, and work psychology, all of

which came about in those years. However, one can also observe brilliant and autonomous realizations and inventions in the various areas of investigation. All of these influences could easily take hold inasmuch as the doors had already been opened to a new psychological science and discipline; numerous “pistils” had been formed that, once fertilized by pollen from beyond the Alps, developed new varieties of fruits. Independently of the metaphor, innovative research and contributions emerged, ranging from child neuropsychiatry, cultivated by Ferrari and De Sanctis and codified by the latter in his 1925 book, to Montessori’s psychology of education; from Benussi’s studies on perceptive phenomena, to those of Kiesow on the sensation of taste, and those of Bonaventura on the perception of time; from the investigation conducted by Sighele and his followers on collective and social processes, to the psychotechnics of Gemelli and of the scholastic and professional orientation centers opened in the 20 years between the two wars. During this historical period, the effects of the autarchic climate imposed by the fascist regime were undoubtedly felt also by Italian psychologists, as demonstrated by the fact that in those years behaviorism did not meet with acceptance in Italy. Psychology managed to preserve its roots, however, and, thanks to the work of Gemelli and Musatti, flourished in the second half of the 1900s, with teaching programs, degree courses, laboratories, and other continually expanding professional activities in correspondence with the needs of a highly industrialized, articulated, and complex postmodern society. In any case, psychological research, at the dawn of the 21st century, has become international in nature, and Italian psychologists have learned to confront the challenges of an increasingly competitive and globalized world, conveying their contribution in the by now universal language of English, the new Latin of the contemporary age. Thus, Italian historians should learn to broaden their horizon and observe the psychology of their country within an international perspective, immersing it in a broader geographic context in which psychological knowledge and practices circulate and become transformed.

socioeconomic events of unified Italy on the origin and developments of Italian psychology • Exploring relations between philosophical thought and the history of psychology, especially investigating and reconstructing the influence of positivist, pragmatist, neo-idealist, and phenomenological philosophy, of the Zeitgeist, and of the Weltanschauungen of each epoch on the origin and developments of Italian psychology • Exploring relations between international psychology and Italian psychology, especially investigating and reconstructing the influences of the German, French, English, and American schools on Italian psychology in the course of its history • Exploring relations between the human sciences and psychology, especially investigating and reconstructing the reciprocal influences that disciplines such as anthropology, criminology, pedagogy, and sociology have had with psychology in the course of the historical process • Exploring relations among psychiatry, experimental psychology, and clinical psychology, especially investigating and reconstructing the reciprocal influences between psychiatry and experimental psychology in the course of the historical process, analyzing in particular their contribution toward the birth and developments of clinical psychology • Debating the scientific statute of psychology, especially investigating and reconstructing the reflections and discussions on the foundation of scientific psychology developed by scientists and philosophers between the 19th and 20th centuries • Exploring relations between Fascism and psychology, especially investigating and reconstructing the influence that the fascist politico-cultural power had on Italian psychology between the 1920s and 1940s • Exploring relations between Catholicism and psychology, especially investigating and reconstructing the influence that the Catholic Church has had on Italian psychology in the course of its history.

Acknowledgment Future directions Topics for future research include: • Exploring relations between the history of contemporary Italy and the history of psychology, especially investigating and reconstructing the influence of the politico-institutional and

This text has been translated in collaboration with Barbara Olson Pasqualino.

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Japan

Miki Takasuna

Abstract The history of psychology in Japan generally began in the 19th century. It is described in terms of five eras: pre- and early Meiji (ca. 1860–1900), late Meiji (1900–1912), Taisho (1912–1926), Showa before and during World War II (1927–1945), and Showa after World War II (1946–1970s). Modern psychology in Japan was imported from Western countries during the early Meiji era and developed since then. Psychology as a discipline, including the establishment of psychological laboratories at universities, was implemented in the Taisho era, which heralded a remarkable expansion of psychology, both academic and practically applied. Compared with Gestalt psychology’s strong influence before World War II, psychology studies and lectures in Japan after the war became more U.S.-oriented. The 20th International Congress of Psychology, held in Tokyo in 1972, provided a venue for Japanese psychologists to finally be welcomed as full participants in the international community of psychologists. Keywords: History of psychology, Psychological laboratory, Westernization, Gestalt psychology, International Congress of Psychology, Japan

The novel concept of Western psychology was imported through various means and merged easily with Japanese culture. It was not surprising that this new discipline was accepted with relative ease, since it arrived in Japan shortly after the Meiji Restoration, which is often regarded as an era of political and cultural revolution. Japanese psychology was born, so to speak, half German and half British-American. In this sense, there was no “alternative psychology” in Japan, compared to what Kurt Danziger (1997) found in Indonesia in the 1950s. For example, Zen has been a traditional Japanese practice, but only a few psychologists referred to Zen before World War II, and it was only after the war that Zen became a topic of psychophysiological study or psychotherapy (Kato, 2005). It is important to view the early development of psychology in Japan in connection with the rise of other disciplines, since many of the disciplines in modern science arose during the same time period.

Modernization in Mid–19th-century Japan The field of psychology in Japan began as a new knowledge imported from Western countries during the early Meiji era (1868–1912). Throughout the Edo era (1603–1868), its impact had remained limited since the Tokugawa shogunate, a government of samurai warriors, enforced a closed-door policy (1641–1854) against almost all Western countries. In July 1853, a sea change occurred when Commodore Matthew Perry (1794–1858) appeared off Japan’s shores with his squadron of four American warships. Historians designate this year as the beginning of bakumatsu (the final period of the shogunate) (e.g., Tipton, 2002). Although the Japanese government reconciled one-sided treaties with its new partners—that is, the United States, Great Britain, and France—being accepted as an equal to the West provided an additional incentive for Japan to change its political system and open its door to Western social customs. Consequently, the 347

modernization or Westernization of Japanese society occurred rapidly within bakumatsu and continued until the early 1870s. As Mitsutomo Yuasa (1980) suggested, late 19thcentury Japanese science was known for its “expropriativeness.” In other words, Japanese scholars absorbed modern European science and technology without participating in its creation, yet successfully implemented it into Japanese society. Such expropriativeness was also somewhat reflective of in the way scholars were evaluated academically during the 1860s, since being able to understand Western languages was required to be considered a good scholar. However, later in the decade, scholars were not only required to study at a university abroad but also to officially matriculate (Abe, 1988). To emphasize the importance of Western knowledge, the Japanese government hired more than 9,500 foreigners (oyatoi-gaikokujin) per year (expressed as man–years; Jones, 1985), from 1868 until 1900. These teachers, technical instructors, and aides were responsible for transferring much of the new knowledge already established in Western countries. Other avenues for modernization included a widening acceptance of religions. Until then, Christianity was officially forbidden by the Japanese government from the beginning of the Edo era until 1873, when both Catholic and Protestant churches were acknowledged. Interestingly, many Japanese intellectuals considered Christianity to embody the spirit of Western civilization, and missionary schools (typically called eigakko or yogakko) gave these innovators access to Western knowledge. The schools not only produced clergymen but also leading social critics and scholars, such as Yujiro Motora1 (1858–1912), the first Japanese psychologist.

Disconnection from Eastern Thinking in the 19th Century Early papers (Kido, 1961; Watanabe, 1940) typically describe psychology’s existence in Japan in terms of its connection with Eastern thinking (i.e., Buddhism and Confucianism). However, more recent accounts stress that the effects of such thinking were merely considered background information (Azuma & Imada, 1994), or they were not mentioned at all (Oyama, Sato, & Suzuki, 2001). The disconnection of psychological knowledge between the Edo and Meiji eras highly contrasts with Chinese historiography, which generally began with the descriptions of Confucius (Jing, 1994; Jing & Fu, 2001). 348

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Although no foreign educator was registered to teach psychology at the university level during the Meiji era, a few foreigners visiting Japan presented lectures in philosophy. For Japanese students, it seemed that the entire history of Western philosophy— from ancient Greek times until German idealism— arrived in Japan all at once. The first generation of philosophers (including early psychologists) needed to translate Western literature into Japanese and to coin Japanese terms that corresponded to the new concepts. Some examples of newly invented words included those for “philosophy,” “object/ subject,” “consciousness,” “attention,” and “representation.” Thus, it is reasonable to imagine the challenge for young Japanese scholars to not only understand the concepts of Western philosophy and psychology and the new terms to describe those concepts, but also to use traditional ideographic kanji (Chinese characters) to write the words. The following sections organize the development of psychology in Japan into five major periods named for the three Japanese eras: Meiji (1868–1912), Taisho (1912–1926), and Showa (1926–1989). Each era corresponds to the reign of an emperor. Due to the radical changes occurring within two of the eras, the Meiji and Showa are further divided into two parts.

History of Psychology in Japan (ca. 1860–1970) Pre-Meiji Era and Early Meiji Era (ca. 1860–1900): Introduction of Psychology As Tomeri Tanimoto (1901) retrospectively described the development of psychology over the course of about 100 years in Japan, he identified three distinct phases described by what Japanese scholars (not always psychologists) were reading of major Western authors. The first phase is represented by Joseph Haven (1816–1874), the second by both Alexander Bain (1818–1903) and Herbert Spencer (1820–1903), and the third by Wilhelm Wundt (1832–1920). Since each phase also corresponds to the period during which the representative Japanese scholar was active, Tanimoto’s three-phase classification is used but is described anew in relation to the activities of the respective Japanese scholars.

Amane Nishi and Shinrigaku The current Japanese word for psychology, shinrigaku (shin means mind, ri principle, and gaku science), was coined by Amane Nishi (1829–1897), an early Japanese scholar who introduced Western sciences

to Japan before the Meiji era. Nishi visited the Netherlands from 1862 until 1865 to study law, economics, and philosophy at Leiden University under Professor Simon Vissering (1818–1888), although he was not officially matriculated (Abe, 1988). After the Meiji Restoration (1868), Nishi was asked to translate the book Mental Philosophy (1857/1875), written by the American philosopher Joseph Haven. Working from an 1869 edition, Nishi produced the first Japanese edition, which was published in three volumes (1875–1876) using Japanese-style binding. On the first page of the book (Haven, 1857/1875), Nishi explained that the title of the Japanese version, Shinrigaku, was an abbreviation of shinri-jo-no-tetsugaku (literally “mental philosophy”). His coined term, shinrigaku, although not exactly meaning “mental philosophy,” was used so frequently that it became the formal name for the new subject, as listed in curricula of various schools including universities. Seirigaku (sei means nature), originally conceived as the proper Japanese translation of psychology, never caught on in the academic field. The first English–Japanese dictionary of philosophy, Tetsugaku-Jii (1881), edited by Tetsujiro Inouye (1855–1944) and others, translated “psychology” as shinrigaku. Regardless of the term’s overwhelming popularity, Nishi continued to use the term seirigaku throughout his life.

Masakazu Toyama and Tokyo University The advent of “psychology” as a formal lecture subject in colleges and universities in Japan transformed the subject matter from something obscure or unknown to one of familiarity among academics. Masakazu Toyama (1848–1900) became one of the country’s pioneer educators in psychology, although his entrée into the field was not because of preplanning on his part. In 1877, Tokyo University, the first national university in Japan, was founded, and Toyama was appointed as one of only a few Japanese professors, the bulk of whom were foreigners. He came to the position with an overseas academic background that included learning English in London (1866–1868), then continuing on to the University of Michigan (1873–1876) to study chemistry and philosophy for 3 years before returning to Japan in May 1876 (Mikami, 1911). However, since no oyatoi-gaikokujin who specialized in psychology had been hired, Toyama became the first Japanese professor to lecture on this subject, as well as on sociology. Toyama’s choice of textbooks on which to base his lectures most frequently included the English writings of Alexander Bain, Herbert

Spencer, and William B. Carpenter (1813–1885). He often gave students unique assignments, such as having them write a report on a certain theme, read the report in front of the class, then lead a discussion around the presentation. Toyama did not generate any theoretical contributions to the psychology field in terms of writing papers or textbooks, but he was significantly involved in at least in two different ways. First, in 1888, he helped bring the new or experimental psychology to Japan by appointing Yujiro Motora, a new lecturer of psychology at Imperial University (renamed from Tokyo University in 1886). Second, he helped spread the concept of evolutionary theory in the Japanese academic field by working to secure the appointment of Edward S. Morse (1838–1925), an American zoologist, who visited Japan in 1877 to collect samples of brachiopods. Morse accepted Toyama’s offer of professorship at Tokyo University and, in September 1877, presented the first lecture on Darwinian evolutionary theory. Morse was astonished that his series of lectures was met with such enthusiasm in the form of tremendous applause (Isono, 1988). Morse not only introduced Darwinian theory to academics at the university but also contributed to popularizing the theory among the Japanese populace. Whereas Japanese intellectuals’ wide interest in Darwinism was reflected in a variety of academic periodicals, many of the missionaries and Christian teachers in Japan were uneasy with the idea of the theory becoming popularized (Watanabe, 1985). Overall, though, the theory of evolution was nationally accepted by Japanese without remarkable objection. This may have been due to the fact that people were familiar with wild monkeys, particularly Japanese macaques, which widely inhabited Japan. A popular pastime for Japanese people was and continues to be watching these charming simians mimic human behavior. By the 19th century, Buddhist views on reincarnation wielded a significant influence on how the Japanese viewed wildlife. Consequently, the populace did not find it difficult to imagine organisms developing from one species into another. In fact, a few decades before the Darwinian theory (Watanabe, 1940), at least one Japanese thinker, Ho Kamada (1754–1821) argued that humans were derived from another species, although Kamada’s hypothesis did not rely on any scientific observation.

Yujiro Motora and Psychophysics Toyama lectured in psychology at Tokyo University but carried out no psychology experiments. The fact takasuna

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that he also lectured on sociology indicated that his personal theories on the two subjects were much influenced by Herbert Spencer and British associationism, the theory that association is the basic principle of all mental activity. Modern psychology featuring psychophysics and experimental psychology was not fully introduced to Japanese students until 1888, when Yujiro Motora began lecturing on psychophysics. Motora was interested in Western knowledge from his youth and received lessons in English at Doshisha Eigakko (English academy) in Kyoto. Understanding and communicating in English would prepare him for his travels abroad to the United States in 1883. His first stop was Boston University, to study philosophy and theology, the choice of school made apparently due to a connection between the university and Motora’s Tokyo Eiwa School, a private school where he had worked as a teacher since 1879. After 2 years in Boston, Motora went to Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore, Maryland, mainly to study in the psychology laboratory founded in 1883 by G. Stanley Hall (1844–1924). Motora’s experimental studies on dermal sensitivity using psychophysical methods resulted in a paper he coauthored with Hall. The paper was published in the inaugural volume of the American Journal of Psychology, a journal edited by Hall himself (Hall & Motora, 1887). Apart from the experimental paper, Motora completed his dissertation, a theoretical study entitled “Exchange, Considered To Be the Principles of Social Life” (Suzuki, 2005). In June 1888, Motora was awarded a Ph.D. (in philosophy, not psychology) for his work. When Motora returned to Japan that same year, he became the principal of Tokyo Eiwa School, a position that included teaching courses in psychology and physiology. Around that time, Toyama, the dean of the College of Letters at Imperial University, also invited Motora to teach a psychophysics course. Consequently, Motora augmented his regular job with part-time lecturing at the university, beginning September 1888. This opportunity allowed him to not only implement the very first series of lectures on psychophysics or experimental psychology, but provided a venue to demonstrate a few experiments to the students. He subsequently published a series of papers in a philosophical journal from 1889 to 1891, titled “Psychophysics,” that was presumably based on his lectures at Imperial University (Sato & Sato, 2005). Imperial University was included in a list of psychological laboratories and seminars established 350

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early on (Sprung & Sprung, 1999). The university was referenced as having a psychological laboratory from 1888, the year corresponding to the 11th earliest institute established. However, although he gave lectures with brief demonstrations (which personified the concept of seminar in German), Motora was still only a part-time lecturer, so that it would have been premature for him to have initiated the university’s psychological laboratory or course of study. At some point in February 1889, Motora resigned from his position at Tokyo Eiwa School because the school, originally established by Methodist missionaries, criticized a lecture he gave on evolutionary theory (Koizumi, 2004). Following his resignation, Motora became a full-time lecturer at Imperial University, finally achieving professorship in 1890, the year he published the textbook Psychology (1890). It was Japan’s first textbook of scientific psychology and included several figures of the brain and geometrical-optical illusions. Although Motora referenced Wundt only once in the book, Wundt’s significance to Motora became apparent some years later, in 1898, when Motora translated Wundt’s Grundriss der Psychologie (1896) into Japanese, in collaboration with Taizo Nakajima (1866–1919), a Ph.D. student of Edward B. Titchener (1867–1927). Shortly thereafter, in 1893, Imperial University established a chair system that supported two professors in “psychology, ethics, and logic.” These positions were independent of the philosophy chair. Motora was appointed to one of the chairs and began lecturing not only on psychology but also on ethics and logic. Rikizo Nakashima (1858–1918), who obtained a Ph.D. at Yale University, was appointed to the second chair. Motora, Nakashima, and Inouye (a philosophy professor at Imperial University) collectively contributed to the third expanded and final edition of Tetsugaku-Jii (Inouye, Motora, & Nakashima, 1912).

Late Meiji Era (1901–1912): Establishment of Disciplinary Teaching The first half of the Meiji era was characterized by an acceptance of psychology, as reflected by the translation of foreign textbooks and the initiation of psychology lectures by the scholars who had studied overseas. Nevertheless, to advance the development of psychology, a more systematic educational program for teaching psychology was needed, at least for training students in conducting experiments in a psychological laboratory.

First Psychological Laboratory at Tokyo Imperial University During the late 19th century, psychology lectures were introduced into the curricula of Imperial University and other schools, yet no independent and systematic coursework for psychologists existed. When Motora began lecturing in psychophysics and psychology, he used one or two rooms to demonstrate experiments. This was before he devised a long-term plan to establish a psychological laboratory at the school. Finally realized in 1903, it was the first psychological laboratory in Japan, although Motora named it the “Psychophysical Laboratory.” The building measured about 420 square meters divided into six experimental rooms for visual, auditory, and reaction-time research studies, and separate rooms for apparatuses and a workshop (Oyama, Sato, & Suzuki, 2001, Fig. 2 for the original floor plan). The laboratory opening was followed by the implementation of a new course in 1904. At long last, undergraduates were allowed to major in psychology within the department of philosophy at the College of Letters. This revolutionary change implied that psychology was now accepted as an independent course of study in an academic curriculum, although it did not include a change in the bachelor’s degree awarded. One aspect of Motora’s laboratory research was his application of psychology to educational and clinical problems, specifically attention. The topic so particularly interested him that he pursued it long before the laboratory was built. To his credit, he managed to invent a machine that was used as a training device to help children suffering from attention problems. The outcome, which clearly demonstrated an improvement in the children’s concentration, was so well regarded that his work was published both in Japanese and German (Motora, 1911).

Matataro Matsumoto and Kyoto Imperial University Matataro Matsumoto (1865–1943), one of Motora’s first students, also made singular contributions to the development of psychology in Japan. After receiving his undergraduate degree from Imperial University in 1893, he continued there as a graduate student, performing experiments on acoustic space. However, he was disappointed by the lack of experimental accommodations and was frustrated by an instructor who was unable to help him with experimental techniques (Okamoto, 1976). Fortunately, he

chanced upon a lecture given by George T. Ladd (1842–1921), a professor of moral philosophy and metaphysics at Yale University. It was excellent timing, as this was the first time (of three times: 1892, 1899, and 1907) that Ladd visited Japan (Armstrong, 1921). Matsumoto introduced himself to Ladd, who encouraged Matsumoto to come to Yale. In 1896, Matsumoto entered graduate school in psychology at Yale to conduct experiments under Edward W. Scripture (1864–1945). In 1898, during the course of his studies, the Japanese government appointed Matsumoto the recipient of a national scholarship that included an all-expense-paid opportunity to study in Germany for 2 years. As he had not yet completed his Ph.D., Matsumoto traveled back and forth to Leipzig, Germany, to attend lectures given by Wundt, frequently crossing the Atlantic until 1899, when he received his doctorate from Yale. While staying in the United States and Europe, Matsumoto was asked to prepare to set up the new laboratories at Tokyo Imperial University and Higher Normal School; for the latter, he had already been nominated as a new professor. Matsumoto returned to Japan in 1900 and assumed a professorship at Higher Normal School (founded originally in 1872 as the Normal School), teaching general psychology and experimental psychology. He also taught experimental psychology as a lecturer at Tokyo Imperial University. In 1906, when a new College of Letters was established at Kyoto Imperial University (founded in 1897), Matsumoto was appointed to the psychology chair. This was the first chair specializing solely in psychology. Two years later, in 1908, Matsumoto established the second psychological laboratory in Japan at Kyoto Imperial University. Of the 786 Japanese registered in Ohizumi’s Dictionary of the Biography of Japanese Psychologists (2003), no Japanese received a Ph.D. in psychology in Germany from Wundt but he was a strong influence nevertheless. The only Japanese psychologist to receive a doctorate from Leipzig was Umaji Kaneko (1870–1937), who did so in December 1904, but the degree was in philosophy (Hartmann, 2005). However, his dissertation, Moralphilosophie Adam Ferguson’s (1903), was evaluated by Max Heinze (1835–1909) and Wundt. Motora chose to study for his Ph.D. under Hall, one of the first American students to attend Wundt’s seminars (Bringmann, Bringmann, & Ungerer, 1980). Matsumoto’s dissertation was directed by E. W. Scripture, who obtained his Ph.D. under Wundt. Thus, Wundt is shown to takasuna

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be the hub, suggesting that Japanese mainstream psychology during the Meiji era was influenced by Wundtian psychology that had been modified by American psychologists.

Japanese Scholars and International Conferences The first Japanese scholars to participate in the International Congress of Psychology (ICP) were Tomeri Tanimoto (1867–1946) and Tongo Takebe (1871–1945). Tanimoto specialized in pedagogy but had previously authored a textbook on psychology. Takebe was a sociologist. Both were studying in Europe at the time the Fourth ICP was held in Paris in August 1900. At the Fifth ICP, held in Rome in 1905, there were two Japanese scholars who not only presented a paper but also were appointed as committee members: Yujiro Motora and Yasusaburo Sakaki (1870–1929), a pediatrician. It was the first time that committee members were chosen from outside Europe and North America (Rosenzweig, Holtzman, Sabourin, & Bélanger, 2000). The paper Motora read at the fifth meeting, “The Idea of Ego in Oriental Philosophy” (Motora, 1905a), reflected his own experience with Zen meditation at a Buddhist temple in 1894 (Sato & Sato, 2005). His paper, written and presented in English, was quickly revised into a 32-page article and sent to press by a German publisher (Motora, 1905b). From this beginning, which coincided with the start of the 20th century, Japanese psychologists occasionally participated in the ICP, along with national conferences on psychology. Masatsugu Tsukahara (1872–1946), one of Motora’s early students, attended the first meeting of the German Society for Experimental Psychology in Giessen in 1904, while studying psychology in Germany. He was the first Japanese student to be dispatched to a foreign country to study psychology at the Japanese government’s expense.

Taisho Era (1912–1926): Academic Expansion and Practical Applications If the Meiji era was considered an age of enlightenment in the general history of Japan, the Taisho era heralded much more dynamic changes and conflicts, such as the socialist, labor, and women’s movements (Tipton, 2002). For the history of psychology, this new era saw an increase in the number of psychologists and psychological laboratories, along with the practical application of psychology to education, industry, therapy, and everyday life. This contrasts 352

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to the academic emphasis on basic psychology during the Meiji era.

Shinri Kenkyu: First Journal of Psychology In 1909, some young psychologists who graduated from the department of psychology at Tokyo Imperial University formed the Society for Popular Lectures in Psychology (Shinrigaku tsuzoku kowakai). They instigated the semi-academic psychological society to provide lectures as a way to enlighten the general public (running the gamut from high school students to housewives) about this new field. Yoichi Ueno (1883–1957), the society’s leading figure, was one of the first applied psychologists working in the field of industrial efficacy in Japan. The popular lectures were later compiled into yearly booklets, totaling five volumes (1909–1913) printed by Dobunkan Publishing, a medium-sized press that happened to employ Ueno at the time (Suzuki, 1997). The booklets sold well enough to later attract the interest of Dainippon-Tosho, a larger textbook publishing house based in Tokyo, which offered to publish a monthly journal on psychology. The first volume of the new journal Shinri Kenkyu (literally Psychological Research), was issued in Japan in January 1912. The journal was formally edited and published by the Society for Psychology (Shinrigaku kenkyukai) but virtually compiled by Ueno. Shinri Kenkyu comprised various sections including “Original Articles” and “Lectures,” the latter carrying one of the lectures read at the Society for Popular Lectures in Psychology until 1919, when they were concluded. Since the journal was sold commercially, a “Q & A” section was included, as was typically found in popular monthly periodicals. Shinri Kenkyu remained the only psychological journal until 1919, when Nihon Shinrigaku Zasshi (literally Japanese Psychological Journal ) appeared in Kyoto, reflecting the desire to have a pure scientific journal of psychology. The new journal was rather short-lived (the final volume appeared in 1922), mainly due to economics. Not long after, in 1923, Nihon Shinrigaku Zasshi, a new quarterly journal of the same name was published in Tokyo. Its editorial office was based in the department of psychology at Tokyo Imperial University. One new component of this journal was the many pages allotted to reports and letters written by young Japanese psychologists studying in Europe and the United States. For example, Mantaro Kido (1893–1985) sent a long, detailed report about the eighth meeting of the German Society for Experimental Psychology held in Leipzig during his stay in Germany (Kido, 1923).

His experience at the meeting became an impetus for him to goad Japanese psychologists into organizing a nationwide society for psychology. His vision was realized in 1927. The young psychologists also frequently sent notes on lectures they attended at the foreign universities. Shinri Kenkyu and Nihon Shinrigaku Zasshi were integrated into a new journal, Japanese Journal of Psychology (Shinrigaku Kenkyu), in April 1926. In addition to economic reasons, the new journal offered a more specialized place for psychologists to publish their studies. The Japanese Journal of Psychology was issued bimonthly by an editorial staff housed at the department of psychology, Tokyo Imperial University.

New Psychological Laboratories at Imperial and Private Universities Following Tokyo and Kyoto, Tohoku Imperial University (founded in 1907, Sendai) and Kyushu Imperial University (founded in 1911, Fukuoka) were the third and fourth imperial universities, respectively, although more than a decade would pass before psychological laboratories were established at both universities. Tanenari Chiba (1884–1972), an associate professor at Kyoto Imperial University, traveled to Germany for additional psychology studies at the end of 1920. While staying in Leipzig, he was nominated as the new chair of the psychology department at Tohoku Imperial University. Serendipity struck shortly thereafter when Chiba discovered a large collection of books and journals once owned by Wilhelm Wundt for sale at a bookstore in Leipzig. He knew immediately he must procure the collection for his new psychological laboratory. After a period of negotiation, he purchased what would be called the Wundt Collection (6,762 books and 9,098 reprints) and then successfully shipped them to Sendai (Takasuna, 2001). While in Germany, Chiba contributed a report to a German journal, which described experiments on perception conducted in Kyoto (Chiba, 1923). After returning to Japan in 1923, Chiba established a new psychology course at the faculty of law and letters at Tohoku Imperial University. Then, in 1926, a psychological laboratory was set up in the same building as the psychology department. In 1923, Kanae Sakuma (1888–1970) went abroad to Germany for 2 years to study Gestalt psychology. Back home, he was nominated to be the new psychology chair for the faculty of law and letters at Kyushu Imperial University. Although he mainly studied in Berlin, he happened upon a

collection of books and reprints that belonged to Carl Stumpf (1848–1936), a psychology professor retired from Berlin University. Sakuma managed to purchase the Stumpf Collection (ca. 2,000 items). He also bought the Barth Collection (ca. 4,000 items), another book collection belonging to the late Paul Barth (1855–1922), a philosopher and sociologist at Berlin University (Takasuna, 2003, 2006). Following his return to Japan in 1925, Sakuma became the first psychology professor at Kyushu and presided over the opening of a new two-story psychological laboratory in 1927. The end of 1918 marked the passage of the College Act, which finally allowed private schools to be officially acknowledged as colleges or universities, provided they met specific requirements. In due course, new psychological laboratories were founded at various private universities: Kwansei Gakuin (1923, Kobe), Nihon (1923, Tokyo), and Keio (1926, Tokyo). These were the oldest laboratories, although the exact year each of these private universities founded a psychology institute remains controversial (e.g., the year may indicate when the academic system produced qualified psychologists, when a psychological laboratory was built, when a room or building was equipped to conduct experiments) (Takasuna, 1997a).

Tsuruko Haraguchi and Female Psychologists During the 19th century, only men were allowed matriculation to a college or university in Japan. Around the turn of the 20th century, a few schools for women emerged with the word “college” attached to them (e.g., Japan Women’s College, founded in 1901 in Tokyo), but none of these schools was officially acknowledged as a college or university until 1947, when a new law (School Education Law) was enacted. Thus, by the end of World War II, despite the many private colleges and universities benefiting from the 1918 College Act, only a “women’s college” was still identified as a special school, a general name for various vocational schools. Since the private colleges and universities seldom allowed women students to enter, the highest level of education Japanese women could achieve was at one of two women’s higher normal schools, namely Tokyo Women’s Higher Normal School (originally established in 1874 as Women’s Normal School) and Nara Women’s Higher Normal School (founded in 1908). Graduation from either of these schools meant that the women were qualified only to teach at girls’ high schools. takasuna

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When Tsuruko Haraguchi (née Arai, 1886–1915) entered Japan Women’s College in 1902, psychology lectures given by Matsumoto interested her and, as graduation time neared, she consulted with Matsumoto about further study in psychology. Since women had no access to a graduate course in psychology at any college or university at that time in Japan, he encouraged her to study psychology abroad (Ogino, 1983). In 1907, following a year of preparation, she traveled to the United States, to the Teachers College of Columbia University, where she entered the graduate program and conducted experiments on mental fatigue under the direction of Professor Edward L. Thorndike (1874–1949). The Ph.D. she obtained in 1912 was the first for any Japanese women in any field. Two years later, she authored a voluminous book on mental fatigue in Japanese, to which Matsumoto wrote a preface (Haraguchi, 1914). The tome was largely an extended version of her doctoral dissertation. Despite a seemingly bright academic future, Haraguchi’s contributions to psychology were brief; she died of tuberculosis in 1915, at the age of 29. During her funeral, held at Japan Women’s College, Tomi Kora (née Wada, 1896–1993) was impressed by hearing about Haraguchi’s achievements during her eulogy and decided to follow in her path. After graduation, Kora went to the United States in 1917, where she obtained a master’s degree from Barnard College (Barnard being the sister school to Columbia) under the direction of Thorndike. She then went to Johns Hopkins University to complete her experiments on the effects of hunger in collaboration with Curt Richter (1894–1988), which lead to her Ph.D. from Columbia in 1922 (Wada, 1922). After a few years assistantship in the department of psychiatry at Kyushu Imperial University, Kora became a professor at Japan Women’s College, her alma mater. Following World War II, in 1947, she was chosen to become a member of the House of Councilors. Sugi Mibai (1891–1969) was the third woman psychologist to earn a Ph.D. in the United States. After graduating from Kobe College (again, not authorized as a college but as a women’s school) in 1915, she went abroad to the United States three times, intermittently from 1916 to 1931. She received her doctorate in 1931, under the supervision of Walter B. Pillsbury (1872–1960) at the University of Michigan. Among the above-mentioned imperial universities, Tohoku Imperial University was the first to matriculate women students. This was also so for 354

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the department of psychology, such that Tsuyako Kubo (née Kurose, 1893–1969) was able to not only graduate from Tohoku Imperial University in March 1926 but be one of the very first students (both male and female) majoring in psychology.

Tomokichi Fukurai and the Decline of Abnormal Psychology In the late 1880s to 1890s and 1910s, a boom of spiritualism was observed among people in Japan. The earlier boom might have been stimulated by introduction of the planchette or Ouija board, which was imported from the United States (Inoue, 1887). As a result, by 1890, a Japanese-style Ouija board had been in popular use for years. This spiritual period reflected not only the delayed import of overseas news on psychical research or parapsychology, but demonstrated a time enjoyed by simple amusements, whereas the latter boomlet of the 1910s reflected the argument that science could not thoroughly explain psychic phenomena (Ichiyanagi, 1994). Tomokichi Fukurai (1869–1952) graduated from Tokyo Imperial University and became interested in the hypnotic theory proposed by William James (1842–1910). Beginning in 1905, Fukurai lectured on abnormal psychology at Tokyo Imperial University. After practicing hypnotism and conducting experiments, he completed a dissertation of psychological research on hypnosis, which earned him a Ph.D. from Tokyo Imperial University in 1906. It was one of the first cases of a Japanese psychologist obtaining a doctoral degree without having studied abroad. In 1908, Fukurai was appointed associate professor under Motora at Tokyo Imperial University. Fukurai then pursued psychical research. Had he gone abroad to study, like many of his colleagues, he would have likely cast a critical eye on psychic research. Instead, from 1910 until 1911, he began experiments on clairvoyance, aided by subjects Ms. Mifune and Ms. Nagao. These experiments, including a public experiment, eventually caused a major dispute among academics, including psychologists and physicists (Ichiyanagi, 1994; Sato & Sato, 2005). Although Motora tried to dissuade Fukurai from further pursuing parapsychological research, Fukurai insisted on the existence of clairvoyance and “thoughtography,” the latter term he coined by finding that Ms. Nagao could project her thoughts onto photographic film in a camera. After Motora’s death in 1912, Fukurai published Clairvoyance and Thoughtography (Fukurai, 1913). Although an English version was later published

in 1931 (Fukurai, 1931), the book was criticized among academics because it lacked a valid scientific approach, which requires verification. Fukurai eventually resigned his post in 1913 over disparagement of the work. Fukurai was an elite psychologist who would later become the next professor at Tokyo Imperial University, but because of the controversy, Matsumoto instead became the next new professor there in 1913. Matsumoto then declared that psychologists in the department needed to focus on normal phenomena to regain the department’s credibility. His emphasis on promoting normal psychology effectively excluded not only parapsychology (psychical research) but also discouraged abnormal psychology (the psychology of mental illness). All future psychology lectures presented at the university were done so by “not mentioning abnormal psychology,” which stunted the rise of clinical psychology in pre-war Japan. The lectures descriptively titled “Abnormal Psychology” at Japanese universities were gradually replaced by the title “Clinical Psychology” around the 1930s.

Psychoanalysis In contrast to the decline of interest in abnormal psychology during the Taisho era, psychoanalysis had been known among psychologists and psychiatrists since the end of Meiji era. One thread that connected psychoanalysis to Japanese psychologists was found in the person of G. Stanley Hall. In 1909, Sigmund Freud (1856–1939), along with several prominent scholars, was invited by Hall, the president of Clark University, to a ceremony celebrating the school’s 20th anniversary (Rosenzweig, 1997). In the audience were two of Hall’s Japanese graduate students, Hikozo Kakise (1874–1944) and Sakyo Kanda (1874–1939). Kakise, a student of Motora at Tokyo Imperial University, visited the United States after graduation to study psychology under Hall for a Ph.D. Kanda was interested in religious psychology and went to Clark, at Motora’s advice, to study under Hall for his master’s degree. In spite of these influences, other than Kanda once writing a small paper that applied psychoanalysis to Japanese myth (Kanda, 1918), neither Kakise nor Kanda much influenced the development of psychoanalysis in Japan (Oyama et al., 2001). Yoshihide Kubo (1883–1942), who graduated from Tokyo Imperial University in 1909, was another of Hall’s Ph.D. students. He went on to write an introductory book, Psychoanalysis, in 1917, in which he revealed that he learned psychoanalytic theory during his study at Clark (Kubo, 1917).

Ultimately, psychoanalysis was studied and practiced mainly outside of academic psychology. Two pioneers of psychoanalysis in psychiatry were Kiyoyasu Marui (1886–1953) and Heisaku Kosawa (1897–1968) (Blowers & Chi, 1997; Myouki & Anzai, 2004). During World War I, Marui was studying psychopathology under Adolf Meyer (1866–1950) at Johns Hopkins University and learned psychoanalysis from him. From 1924, Marui presented lectures on psychoanalysis at the newly established department of psychology at Tohoku Imperial University. These may be the first systematic lectures on psychoanalysis given to psychology students in Japan (Oyama et al., 2001). Although Kosawa first studied psychiatry under the direction of Marui at Tohoku Imperial University, he decided to further study psychoanalysis in Vienna. On his return to Japan in 1933, he left the university to pioneer the field of psychoanalysis as a private practitioner in Japan. Long before Kosawa organized the Japanese Psychoanalytical Association in 1955, Kenji Ohtsuki (1891–1977) had established the Tokyo Institute for Psychoanalytic Study in 1928, in cooperation with Seiya Hasegawa (1876–1940) and Yaekichi Yabe (1875–1945). Ohtsuki studied literature at Waseda University and became interested in psychoanalysis through his friend, Yabe, and his mentor, Hasegawa. Although none of these three was a psychiatrist or psychologist, they published the first Japanese journal of psychoanalysis (SeishinBunseki) in May 1933. Ohtsuki and his colleagues contributed to publish a series of Freud’s works translated into Japanese during 1929–1933. Prior to the last issue of Volume 35 being disseminated in 1978, the journal had been published intermittently with a long suspension during World War II. The rivalry between Marui, the psychiatrist, and nonpsychiatrists Yabe and Ohtsuki, over which Japanese psychoanalytic society was worthy of Freud’s accreditation (Blowers & Chi, 1997) presents an interesting story about the position of psychoanalysts in pre-war Japan. Interestingly, psychologists were not involved with the development of psychoanalysis in general, and Japanese psychology did not consider psychoanalysis an important technique in psychotherapy.

Rise of Gestalt Psychology Psychological studies carried out in the 1920s and 1930s in Japan were distinguished by the popularity of Gestalt psychology. Complete knowledge of this school of thought did not arrive in Japan via takasuna

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Germany but from the United States, brought by Takagi, who had been studying psychology at Cornell University under Titchener from 1919 to 1921 (Matsumoto, 1937). Although he visited various universities in Europe during the last phase of his trip abroad, Takagi apparently first heard of Gestalt psychology from Titchener. Note that over the course of World War I (1914–1918), virtually no Japanese studied psychology in Europe. In 1921, after he returned to Japan, Takagi talked about Gestalt psychology at a meeting at Tokyo Imperial University, which was attended by Matsumoto’s past and present students. Among them was Sakuma, who eventually decided to study Gestalt psychology in Berlin. Later, one of his works on visual perception, in collaboration with Kurt Lewin (1890–1947), was published in Psychologische Forschung (Lewin & Sakuma, 1925). Chiba and Sakuma were the first two of about 30 Japanese psychologists studying abroad in Germany from the 1920s to the early 1940s. The cities of Leipzig and Berlin, which corresponded to the hubs for Chiba’s and Sakuma’s studies in Europe, respectively, were most frequently selected for study by Japanese psychologists by the end of World War II. These two decades were one of the most prolific periods for Japanese psychologists in terms of publishing studies in foreign journals, especially those written in German and in the field of perception. Besides Sakuma, Usao Onoshima (1894–1941) was another Japanese representative of Gestalt psychology. The two scholars even boarded the same ship from Japan to Europe in 1923. Onoshima and Sakuma studied in Berlin together for some time, although Onoshima’s work on acoustic perception did not appear in a German journal until he returned to Japan (Onoshima, 1928). Since Sakuma and Onoshima received much assistance from Lewin while staying in Berlin, they were there to welcome him at the Port of Yokohama in 1933, when he arrived to lecture in Tokyo and Fukuoka. Lewin’s visit triggered a further boom of Gestalt psychology in Japan, where its influence was already certain, as demonstrated by a Gestalt study group formed in Tokyo in the early 1930s prior to Lewin’s visit. Called Lewin Klasse (Lewin’s class), the name reflected Lewin’s overall influence on the field, including over Japanese psychologists. Lewin was pleased to hear of the group’s existence. The group’s name was later renamed the “Thursday Group,” since university students were afraid of mistaking the handwritten “Lewin” for “Lenin”

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(Sagara, 1984). One member of the group, Shiro Morinaga (1908–1964), left Japan in 1935 to study Gestalt psychology for 4 years at Frankfurt University in Germany under Wolfgang Metzger (1899–1979). His study on the perceptual effects of apparent equal width was published after he returned to Japan (Morinaga, 1941). Prior to and during World War II, Gestalt psychology influenced experimental studies carried out on perception and influenced the application of holistic theory to education. The immediate impact was seen in studies on perception, among which size constancy was most popular with Japanese psychologists (Oyama, Torii, & Mochizuki, 2005). One unique contribution to perceptual theory in the 1930s and 1940s, “psychophysiological induction,” was proposed by Torao Obonai (1899–1968), whose collected works were published posthumously in a book in English (Obonai, 1977). The theory first appeared in 1933 (Obonai, 1933), antedating the 1938 field theory by Wolfgang Köhler (1887–1967), as stated in Köhler (1965). Gestalt psychology also influenced the fields of educational psychology and developmental psychology, being somewhat mixed with Ganzheit psychology, another holistic psychology trend in Germany (Takasuna & Sato, 2008). Katsujiro Iwai (1886–1937), an associate professor at Kyoto Imperial University, spent 2 years in Leipzig, Germany, conducting experiments with children. Near the end of his stay, Iwai reported his findings at the 12th meeting of the German Society for Psychology, held in Hamburg in April 1931. He was the only Japanese to present research at a meeting of the society before World War II. The complete paper (Iwai & Rüssel, 1938), posthumously published, reflected the influence of the Ganzheit school of Leipzig. Ichiro Fukutomi (1891–1946), an associate professor at Keijo Imperial University, also studied at Leipzig in the 1930s. In the foreword of his German paper (Fukutomi, 1938), he wrote that he needed to study the theory of Ganzheit psychology in order to explain his experimental results. Although Iwai and Fukutomi understood the difference between the Gestalt and Ganzheit schools of thought, Gestalt overshadowed Ganzheit for most Japanese psychologists. Nevertheless, zentaisei (the Japanese translation of totality or Ganzheit) was used more frequently in Japanese education in the 1930s and 1940s, since the German word “Gestalt” was a somewhat more difficult concept for nonpsychologists to grasp.

Japanese Editions of Intelligence Tests for Children Japanese psychologists became interested in intelligence tests just prior to the Taisho era. The articles and reports on the Binet-Simon Intelligence Test, originally developed in 1905, were found in a wide variety of journals after 1907 (Sato, 1997). The first standardization of a Japanese edition of the BinetSimon-type test was attempted by Kubo in 1918 (Kubo, 1922). In 1925, Harutaro Suzuki (1875–1966) published an article based on the 1916 version of the Stanford-Binet test. After graduating from Shiga Normal School in 1897, he taught elementary school, eventually becoming interested in applying an intelligence test in special education. The SuzukiBinet Test was published first in 1930 and revised three times thereafter until 1976. Although he did not study psychology at any university, because of his extensive work on intelligence tests, Kyoto University awarded him a Ph.D. in 1950. As primary school attendance of boys as well as girls reached almost 100% in the beginning of the 20th century, more and more people wanted to enter the so-called higher schools, which brought about an “examination hell” due to a shortage of schools offering advanced education. This strain on the academic system peaked Kan’ichi Tanaka’s (1882–1962) interest into investigating whether any existing intelligence test could be available to students, instead of the ordinary written test used for the entrance examination. After Tanaka graduated from Tokyo Higher Normal School and taught at normal schools for a few years, he entered Kyoto Imperial University to major in psychology under Matsumoto. From his wide-ranging work on standardization carried out in the late 1930s and early 1940s, he published the Tanaka-Binet Intelligence Test in 1947, which became the most influential Japanese version of its kind. The test, issued from the Tanaka Institute for Educational Research (established by Tanaka in 1951), has been in use and revised several times since.

Showa Era: Before and During World War II (1926–1945): Attempts at Organizing the Profession Since the late Meiji era, the number of psychologists increased as the number of universities and laboratories increased. However, not until the beginning of the Showa era did Japanese psychologists organize a professional society as a means to collectively

pursue development of the field. The publication The Psychological Register Volume III (Murchison, 1932) listed 47 Japanese psychologists (including Kora, the only woman) as registered in a section dedicated to Japan (edited by Matsumoto). The list included 15 psychological laboratories established in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan. Read on to see why Korea and Taiwan were included.

Proliferation of Psychological Laboratories After the Sino–Japanese War (1894–1895) and the Treaty of Annexation (1910), Taiwan (also known as Formosa) and Korea became Japanese colonies, respectively. New imperial universities were also established in those colonial territories. Keijo Imperial University, founded in 1924 in Keijo (now Seoul, Korea), established the faculty of law and letters in 1926. Taihoku Imperial University, founded in Taihoku (now Taipei, Taiwan) in 1928, offered a psychology course within its faculty of letters and politics. Still, by the end of World War II, these imperial universities claimed only a dozen students majoring in psychology. From early in the Meiji Era, normal schools regularly integrated psychology lectures into the basic core curriculum. At Tokyo Higher Normal School (renamed from Higher Normal School in 1902) and Hiroshima Higher Normal School (founded in 1902), graduates could become qualified to teach at boys’ high schools. In 1929, when both normal schools were elevated to national “university” level. Tanaka subsequently obtained a chair in psychology at Tokyo Bunrika University, whereas Kubo became a professor of psychology at Hiroshima Bunrika University (bunrika literally means “liberal arts and science”). Despite the fact that Tokyo Women’s Higher Normal School and Nara Women’s Higher Normal School were not recognized as universities, some of the women graduates from these bunrika universities obtained a bachelor of arts in psychology. During the first half of the Showa era, new psychological laboratories were established at four private universities: Doshisha (1927, Kyoto), Hosei (1927, Tokyo), Waseda (1928, Tokyo), and Rikkyo (1932, Tokyo). Besides these four, the three private universities (Kwansei Gakuin, Nihon, and Keio) mentioned above, six imperial universities, and two bunrika universities, 15 psychological laboratories were established by the beginning of World War II. The department chairs for 13 of the laboratories were appointed by psychologists who had previously studied psychology abroad (Takasuna, 1997a).

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A few psychology journals edited by university laboratory staff existed before World War II. Among them, Tohoku Psychologica Folia was the first psychological journal in Japan to be written only in English or German. Folia was first issued in 1933, by the psychological laboratory at Tohoku Imperial University, with Chiba as its founding chief editor. Presently, it continues to be edited and published by the department of psychology at Tohoku University (renamed in 1949).

articles on the subject within 35 years by the end of World War II (Takasuna, 2005). Although the society’s first two presidents were biologists, psychologists took initiative from Sadaji Takagi (1893–1975), the third president and one of the first Japanese psychologists to apply Gestalt laws to animals. The periodical Animal Psychology, issued quarterly from 1934 to 1938, was followed by The Annual of Animal Psychology from 1944 until 1990, when it was renamed the Japanese Journal of Animal Psychology.

Founding of Japanese Psychological Association and Other Societies

Application of Psychological Studies in the Military

The first nationwide psychological society in Japan, the Japanese Psychological Association (JPA), was founded in April 1927. Its inception was announced during a session of “The First All-Japan Congress of Psychology” at Tokyo Imperial University, which was later counted as the first JPA meeting. Matsumoto was elected its first president, and 30 psychologists were chosen as committee members. The Japanese Journal of Psychology, which had begun publication the previous year, became the official periodical edited by the association. By 1941, JPA meetings were convened biannually (Nishikawa, 2005; Table 1). The exact membership is unclear, but more than 200 participants attended the first meeting, and about 70 papers were presented at sessions across 4 days. By the end of World War II (1926–1944), about 37% of the articles in the journal were classified under “Sensation and Perception,” which reflected the general trend of Japanese psychology before the war (Takasuna, 1997b). The Association of Applied Psychology was established in Tokyo in 1931, with the first volume of its periodical, Journal of Applied Psychology, appearing in 1932. While the Kansai Association of Applied Psychology had already been founded in 1927, because it lacked its own periodical, the Association of Applied Psychology is considered Japan’s second psychological society (e.g., Kaneko, 1987). The two societies often convened joint meetings, then integrated in 1946, after World War II, and finally emerged as the newly named Japan Association of Applied Psychology. Another psychological society in existence before World War II was the Society for Animal Psychology founded in 1933. Regrettably, Koreshige Masuda (1883–1933), the very first comparative psychologist in Japan, died the same year. After Masuda’s pioneering work at Tokyo Imperial University (Masuda, 1908/1909), several comparative psychologists followed in his path, resulting in over 100 papers and

By the beginning of the Taisho era, companies such as the Fukuske Tabi Corporation in Osaka were already making various attempts to apply psychology within the areas of advertising and industrial efficiency (Awaji, 1927). However, it was World War I that stimulated the military’s interest in applied psychology. Three major institutes were prominent in trying to apply psychological techniques to military affairs: the Institute of Aeronautics at Tokyo Imperial University, the Japanese Imperial Navy, and the Japanese Imperial Army. The Institute of Aeronautics at Tokyo Imperial University was originally established in April 1918, and after consulting with Matsumoto, a department of aeronautic psychology was also established there in 1920. The department conveniently arranged the aeronautical laboratories close to the psychological laboratory. Throughout the 1920s, Masuda and Yenjiro Awaji (1895–1979), based at Tokyo Imperial University, as well as Tanaka and Izuo Terasawa (1880–1970), based at Tokyo Bunrika University, chiefly studied the psychological and physiological influences of aviation (Awaji, 1928). From 1922 to 1924, Tanaka traveled to the United Kingdom and the United States to investigate the status quo of aeronautic psychology and to conduct some low-pressure experiments at Oxford University. After returning to Japan, Tanaka and Terasawa investigated the effects of lower pressure on psychological and physiological functions during a climbing expedition to Mt. Fuji. Early on, naval officers conducted their own research at Tokyo Imperial University’s psychological laboratory. In 1918, Matsumoto was appointed as an advisor to the Investigating Committee on the Navy’s Application of Experimental Psychology. From April 1918 to 1919, Matsumoto traveled to the United States to investigate the ways the military applied psychology to its servicemen. When Matsumoto returned to Japan, he wrote a report

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on the use of “army intelligence tests” in the United States. This motivated Japan’s military to develop a similar kind of group intelligence test that would be administered by psychologists in Tokyo. In 1925, an aptitude test division was established at the Naval Institute of Technology, with an intelligence test serving as an aptitude test conducted by the Navy in 1925 and 1926. The tests identified those best suited for such positions as telegraphers, artillerists, pilots (note that by the end of World War II, the Japanese flying corps had separate branches in the navy and the army), and machinists (Awaji, 1927). After the Manchurian Incident (1931), which began as a clash between the Japanese army and Chinese soldiers at the South Manchurian Railway in September 1931, and was viewed not only as a prelude to full-scale invasion in China but also as the pivotal event setting Japan on the road to World War II (Tipton, 2002), the navy did not have enough time to send its officers to universities to learn how to conduct the tests; so, in 1932, the Naval Institute of Technology created a division for experimental psychology. By the end of World War II, over 50 students majoring in psychology had been hired to work at the institute (Tsuruta, 1980). Raioh Nishizawa (1889–unknown), a psychologist who graduated from Tokyo Imperial University, lectured in psychology at the Military Academy of the Army as early as 1921. In 1924, the army conducted the first intelligence test, which consisted of nine subtests given to 4,633 subjects. The results suggested that some subjects had aptitudes for telegraphy, engineering, or combat (Awaji, 1928). However, in contrast to the navy, the army did not carry out full-scale psychological studies until the 1940s.

Effects of World War II on Psychology in Japan With the Manchurian Incident now past, Japan pushed forward into what historians called “the dark valley” (Spaulding, 1983; Tipton, 2002). September 1937 marked the official adoption of the “General Mobilization of National Spirit,” guidelines established by the Japanese Cabinet in a national effort to promote cooperation in various areas. One area, saving money, influenced psychologists because the general meetings of academic societies were regarded as costly. The JPA and Association of Applied Psychology decided to meld with two smaller societies (Kansai Association of Applied Psychology and Society of Mental Technology) and,

in July 1941, renamed themselves the Psychological Association. Both the 1942 and 1943 annual meetings of the new association convened in Tokyo; the 1944 meeting, planned for Kyoto Imperial University, was cancelled due to the worsening situation of World War II (Nishikawa, 2005). “National unity” (kyokoku-itchi) was another motto reflected in the national guidelines. The emphasis on “unity” or “totality” was observed in various journal articles and newspapers from the late 1930s until the end of World War II. In 1937, Onoshima became a functionary of the Minister of Education and set about reforming school curricula throughout Japan. Because psychology was lectured in high schools before World War II, psychology classes needed updating, along with revising the entire high school curricula. As such, in 1939, Onoshima proposed to many university professors a need to emphasize Gestalt and/ or Ganzheit psychology. The professors denounced his plan and, in the end, it was discarded (Sato, 1999). During the dispute, Onoshima incorporated the concept of totality derived from Gestalt and/ or Ganzheit psychology to support and strengthen the national policy. Engaging this method may have threatened the older generation of psychologists into believing that Onoshima’s intention was not only to modernize the psychology curriculum but also to change the way Japanese psychology was taught. In the 1930s, education in Japan took on certain aspects of totalitarianism or ultranationalism. The view, deeming all children be seen as equal to each other under the Japanese emperor, inhibited the concept of individuality. Thus, measuring intelligence during this time was more frequently administered as a group test than as individual tests. For example, from 1933 to 1936, Tanaka compared intelligence among various Asian groups (i.e., urban children from Korea, Manchuria, Taiwan, China, and Japan), with support from the Ministry of Education (Hoshino, 1997). By 1941, students were mobilized to the war effort, which led to a halt in psychology lectures at the universities and colleges. Psychology research was severely hampered, particularly toward the end of war, due mainly to the shortage of paper goods, which were necessary for taking notes and administering and scoring tests. Professional exchange was also stunted at that time. The Japanese Journal of Psychology managed only one issue of Volume 19 (appearing September 1944) before it ceased publication for 2 years. takasuna

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Showa Era: Post-World War II (1946–1970s): Catching Up on American Trends After defeat in August 1945, Japan experienced a period of so-called Occupation (1945–1952). Some historians regarded the various reforms during this period as the second great turning point in modern Japanese history after the Meiji Restoration (e.g., Tipton, 2002). General Douglas MacArthur (1880–1964) was in charge of the General Headquarters of Supreme Commander for Allied Power (GHQ/SCAP) that included a division called Civil Information and Education (CIE). This department was responsible for democratizing Japan and introducing an American system of education. The GHQ/SCAP, along with CIE, played an important role in the further development of psychology in Japan.

Increase in Psychologists from the New Education System Two changes in Japan’s educational system significantly impacted Japanese psychologists: a new curriculum for national universities, and the resumption of international exchange students. The 1949 reform of Japan’s educational system completely transformed Japan’s German-style educational system into an American-style system and increased the number of 4-year universities and colleges. Private universities, including women’s colleges, were now legally allowed to become universities. Every Imperial University and Bunrika University was renamed. Each prefecture’s Normal School was upgraded, as was each school of teacher education, which became incorporated as its own department on campus at the new national universities. Due to the Law for Certification of Education Personnel, also enacted in 1949, many universities began offering a teacher-training course for junior high and high schools, in which “educational psychology” and “adolescent psychology” were compulsory subjects. As a result, a rapid increase in the number of psychologists was needed to qualify teachers for these subject, as well as psychologists needed to teach at the newly established universities. By 1959, about 50% of the psychology faculty members at Japanese universities and colleges were engaged in teacher education (Fumino, 2005). One of the first student exchange programs following World War II was sponsored by the United States through the Government Appropriation for Relief in Occupied Areas Fund (GARIOA). In 1949, the GHQ/SCAP selected 360

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50 young professors from various Japanese universities and sent them to study in the United States. Five psychologists were among the first scholars selected for the exchange program: Sadao Nagashima (1917–1988), Hiroshi Ito (1919–2000), Toshimi Ueda (1921–1988), and Shinkuro Iwahara (1923–1978), all graduates of Tokyo Bunrika University (renamed Tokyo University of Education in 1949, then University of Tsukuba in 1973), and Toshiyuki Kondo (1917–1999) a graduate of Hiroshima Bunrika University (renamed Hiroshima University in 1949). That they all graduated from bunrika universities, whose graduates were influential in Japan’s educational world, reflected the GHQ/ SCAP’s belief in the importance of reconstructing the psychology field in terms of education. Ito and Iwahara, who both obtained degrees at the University of Missouri, studied an area of psychology that became characteristic of psychology in Japan after World War II. Ito, who obtained a master of education in guidance and counseling degree in 1950, recollected that it was only in the late 1940s that the term “counseling” became ubiquitous, even in the United States (Fumino, 1997). After being awarded his master of arts degree in 1950, Iwahara continued on in Missouri for a Ph.D., which he earned in1954. Although Iwahara had studied perception in Japan, he was so impressed by the development of statistics and the studies in animal learning under way in the United States that, after he returned to Japan, he ended up writing three books about statistics in psychology during the first half of 1950s. The GARIOA program lasted until 1952, when the Occupation ended, after which the Fulbright Program was initiated.

Establishment of Various Psychological Societies Japanese Psychological Association members resumed their activities in September 1946. The second issue of Volume 19 of the Japanese Journal of Psychology was at last published in March 1948, and a combined third and fourth number of Volume 19 was published in June 1949. From 1956 on, the journal has been published bimonthly. The inaugural volume of Japanese Psychological Research, the first fully English-language journal edited by the JPA, was issued in March 1954. The total subscription numbered over 1,000 that year and surpassed 3,000 in 1975 (Japanese Psychological Association, 1987). Several more psychological societies were established within two decades after the war: the Japanese

Group Dynamics Association (founded in 1949), Japanese Association of Educational Psychology (founded in 1952), Japanese Society of Social Psychology (founded in 1960), Japanese Association of Criminal Psychology (founded in 1963), and the Japanese Society of Clinical Psychology (founded in 1964). These five societies, as well as the JPA, Japan Association of Applied Psychology, and Japanese Society for Animal Psychology (renamed in 1958) served as co-hosts for the ICP held in Tokyo in 1972. Taking a long view from the oldest local psychological society, the Kansai Psychological Association (renamed from Kansai Association of Applied Psychology) founded in 1927, by the mid-1970s, ten local societies had been established in Hokkaido, Tohoku, Tokai, Hokuriku, Niigata, Kansai, Chugoku/ Shikoku, Okayama, Kyushu, and Okinawa.

New Trends: Neobehaviorism and Clinical Psychology There was a great thirst for information about new psychological findings after the extended drought brought on by an absence of available foreign journals during the 1940s. One fresh trend was neobehaviorism. Although a Watsonian type of behaviorism had already been introduced in various articles during the 1910s, it did not spark an interest in experimental study before World War II. However, after the war, the number of papers on learning increased rapidly, with about half the studies directed at learning in animals (Ono et al., 1971). Japanese psychologists were aware of the series of studies carried out by Edward C. Tolman (1886–1959) in the 1930s, which were similarly aligned with Gestalt theory, but Japanese psychologists were not inspired to study this area until after the war, when Clark L. Hull’s (1884–1952) papers on learning and behavior became available. An analysis (Takasuna & Fumino, 1997) showed that Hull was cited so frequently that about 12% of all papers published in the Japanese Journal of Psychology from 1949 to 1965 referred to his work, especially his Principles of Behavior (Hull, 1943). That the Japanese translation of this work appeared in 1960 confirms his influence in the history of psychology in Japan. Although the development of clinical psychology was hindered before World War II, several psychologists working at clinical institutions managed to make contributions, such as Yuzaburo Uchida (1894–1966), who developed the Uchida-Kraepelin Psychodiagnostic Test. In the 1950s, psychologists including Ito, Fujio Tomoda (1917–2005), and

Morio Saji (1924–1996) were responsible for bringing knowledge they had earlier acquired on psychological counseling into the field of applications. It was as early as 1953 that the Japan Association of Applied Psychology proposed to the Ministry of Education to introduce “school counselors” in elementary, junior high, and high schools. Progress was stymied by ongoing issues of how to qualify counselors. The discussions continued into the 1960s, when the JPA and other societies also discussed what determines a qualified “clinical psychologist.” By the late 1960s and early 1970s, a master plan outlining qualifications for clinical psychologists foundered during the student movement. The system’s lack of rigor in training and educating students was criticized, as well as the rationale behind classifying and discriminating people based on their psychological assessment using psychological tests. It goes beyond the scope of this chapter to describe the full history of what determines a qualified clinical psychologist in Japan, but counselors, psychotherapists, and clinical psychologists have been qualified only by societies. In other words, no national qualifications or licenses for psychologists were established in the 20th century (as was done for medical doctors and social workers), a gridlock that persists. In spite of the qualification obstacles, the 1970 JPA directory demonstrated that the field of clinical psychology had fully matured, as depicted by the various genres represented, although in different proportions: psychologists specializing in division III (clinical, personality, criminal) occupied more than a third of the entire membership, more than those specializing in divisions I (experimental, physiological), II (developmental, educational), or IV (social, cultural, industrial) (Kaneko, 1987; Table 4). Considering the circumstances before World War II, the number of clinical psychologists dramatically rose after the war.

The 20th ICP in Tokyo and Globalizing Japanese Psychology Japan was elected as one of the original 11 charter members of the International Union of Psychological Science (IUPsyS, organized in 1951) but not until 1960 was a Japanese psychologist, Koji Sato (1905–1971), elected to the executive committee. He was one of the most active psychologists in internationalizing Japanese and Oriental psychology, having founded Psychologia in 1957, an international psychology journal in the Orient. Owing to his effort, the 20th ICP was held in Tokyo takasuna

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from August 13–19, 1972. There were 2,562 registered psychologists from over 50 countries, 1,394 from outside Japan (JPA, 1987). This was the first ICP conference held in Asia and was considered “a first major step in the globalization of psychological science” (Rosenzweig, Holtzman, Sabourin, & Bélanger, 2000, p. 147). The program consisted of 32 long symposia, nine short symposia, eight review sessions, 56 paper sessions, and four film sessions. A remarkable feature was the free discussion session after each long symposium. Although favorably commented upon, this program addition was never repeated thereafter, according to the memory of Moriji Sagara (1903–1986), the ICP’s president as well as the JPA’s president (Sagara, 1982). As Kaneko (1987) argued, international exchange of Japanese psychologists with those in other countries had been inexcusably one-sided after a century of contact with Western psychology. Further, too few Japanese contributed to and participated in international activities. Circumstances changed after the ICP conference in Tokyo. Japanese psychologists have since been elected to the IUPsyS executive committee, and hundreds more Japanese psychologists participate in at least some ICP meetings. Thus, hosting an international meeting was the key that unlocked the door to globalizing Japanese psychology.

Conclusion Since the Meiji Restoration (1868) spurred the modern development of Japanese society, absorbing Western knowledge accompanied the Westernizing of Japanese life. Although the history of psychology in Japan was, as a whole, imported and accepted into the Western mainstream, following the West did not always breed success. One central, unresolved problem in Japan’s psychology field is the unification of psychologists. As pointed out by Misiak and Sexton (1966), “Perhaps the most serious problem for Japanese psychology of the 1960s is the lack of sound educational and training programs in the universities and the lack of standardization from university to university” (p. 298). The desire to unite psychologists and to bring the various societies under a single umbrella organization (as in the U.S. American Psychological Association) has been repeatedly thwarted by conflicts on how best to qualify psychologists. The 20th ICP conference in Japan in 1972 would have been a good opportunity to unite Japan’s psychological societies but, instead, various psychological societies had become established by the 1980s. 362

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The JPA may have been the first established psychological society in Japan, but by the late 1990s, it was no longer the largest. The Association of Japanese Clinical Psychology (founded in 1982) grew rapidly and established standards for what qualifies a “clinical psychologist,” which society members accepted in 1988. To counter the trend of emphasizing clinical psychology, the JPA introduced its own standards for what qualifies a “certificated psychologist,” which the JPA acknowledged in 1990. Unfortunately, dueling qualifications led to a mushrooming of qualifications acknowledged by the various societies, which has resulted in further fragmentation of the psychology field in Japan, a dilemma that continues into the 21st century.

Future Directions • Since many psychology-related terms were coined during the early Meiji era, meanings and concepts may have shifted during the 20th century. Further, because Japanese psychological terms use Chinese characters, which are basically ideograms and have been used to describe Buddhist ideas, they could have different connotations from the original Western words. • The history of psychology in Japan so far has concentrated mainly on its early phase of acceptance of Western psychology. But has Japanese psychology influenced the development of psychology in other Asian countries during the late 19th and early 20th centuries? Moreover, considering the overall effect of World War II, have Asian countries developed characteristics of psychology in common following the war? • Japan’s recent development of psychology has not yet been described. What reasons, including the practical, are responsible for the increased number of students and professors majoring in clinical psychology seen in the last few decades? In addition, did the student movement in the late 1960s to early 1970s influence the development of psychology in Japan? • Are there any specific psychology topics that have been developed or are discussed only in Japan? One topic known to fit this description is the so-called “blood type psychology,” which argues that the type of red blood cell relate to personality. The initial debate on the topic, discussed during the 1930s, was denied by medical doctors and many psychologists thereafter. Despite scientific rejection, such typology continues to be

popular among Asian lay people, including the Koreans and Chinese. This aspect can be classified as a part of folk psychology in Japan.

Glossary Imperial University: A classification within the Japanese national university system founded preWorld War II. Nine imperial universities existed in Japan by the end of the war, including one founded in Korea (Keijo Imperial University) and one in Taiwan (Taihoku Imperial University). Normal school/higher normal school: A normal school specifically trained students to teach at elementary schools, and a higher normal school specifically trained students to teach at high schools. After World War II, normal schools and higher normal schools were reorganized and incorporated into schools of education as a part of the universitywide system. Thoughtography: A term originated by Tomokichi Fukurai and referring to psychic power where one’s thoughts are projected onto the photographic film. Uchida-Kraepelin Psychodiagnostic Test: The personality test originally conceived by Emil Kraepelin (1856–1926) and modified by Yuzaburo Uchida (1894–1966). Through a simple addition task, personality is assessed in terms of such parameters as work curve and error ratio.

Acknowledgments I would like to thank Dr. Irmingard Staeuble (Berlin) and Dr. Tadasu Oyama (Tokyo) for their thoughtful comments and suggestions.

Note 1. I adopt here a European or American type of notation for Japanese names, thus family names comes after given names. Family names always come first in ordinary life in Japan.

Further Reading General psychology trends in Japan have been repeatedly reviewed in English papers and books. The citations below (1972–2005) are listed in chronological order: Azuma, H., & Imada, H. (1994). Origins and development of psychology in Japan. The interaction between Western science and the Japanese cultural heritage. International Journal of Psychology, 29, 707–715. Iwahara, S. (1976). Japan. In V. Sexton, & H. Misiak (Eds.), Psychology around the world (pp. 242–258). Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole. Kaneko, T. (1987). Japan. In A. R. Gilgen, & C. K. Gilgen (Eds.), International handbook of psychology (pp. 274–296). New York: Greenwood Press. Misumi, J., & Oyama, T. (Eds.). (1989). Special issue: Applied psychology in Japan. Applied Psychology: An International Review, 38, 307–451.

Oyama, T., Sato, T., & Suzuki, Y. (2001). Shaping of scientific psychology in Japan. International Journal of Psychology, 36, 396–406. Sato, T. (Ed.). (2005). Special issue: The history of psychology in Japan. Japanese Psychological Research, 47, 47–150. Tanaka, Y., & England, G. W. (1972). Psychology in Japan. Annual Review of Psychology, 23, 695–732.

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C HA P TE R

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Lebanon

Brigitte Khoury and Sarah Tabbarah

Abstract The history of psychology in Lebanon is closely linked to the start of the psychiatry field and dates back to the mid-19th century. Since then, the field has grown, despite major setbacks, such as the Lebanese civil war and the brain drain of professionals from the country. Psychologists are found currently in hospitals, mental health centers, community clinics, and academic settings. Psychologists are not present, however, in the Lebanese schools and industrial settings to the extent needed. Psychological research has also been more prevalent with the establishment of academic research centers. Academically, psychology is taught in almost all the Lebanese universities following one of three models: American, French or Arab. This chapter discusses the current state of psychology in Lebanon and talks about the contributions of the Lebanese psychological associations and societies, as well as the licensing and practice guideline challenges facing the profession of psychology in Lebanon. Keywords: Psychology, psychiatry, mental health, Lebanon, Middle East, licensing, practice

The presence of psychology in Lebanon is closely linked to the history of psychiatry and the first establishment of psychiatric services in the region, which dates back to the late 19th century when the Swiss Quaker Theophilus Waldmeir (1832–1915) decided to build an asylum for the mentally ill in Lebanon, Syria, to serve the Middle East (Ichimura & Kemsley, 2002). Prior to the establishment of the Lebanon Hospital for Mental Diseases, commonly known as the Asfuriyeh, people believed that mental afflictions were due to demonic spirits possessing the sick, and falsely thought that the cure was to beat them, chain them in “holy” caves, and have them exorcised by priests to rid them of such spirits (Lebanon Hospital for Mental Diseases, 31st report: 1929–1930). With the founding of Asfuriyeh, the treatment of psychiatric illnesses became both more humane and modern. This also allowed medical students from the American University of Beirut (AUB) to complete their training in psychiatry at the Asfuriyeh, which was the first local hospital for psychiatric training. About 50 years later, the 366

Psychiatric Hospital of the Cross opened its doors and is still present. Around the same time, the psychology program at AUB was founded, the first in Lebanon, closely followed by the other leading universities, such as St. Joseph University and the Lebanese University (Chamoun, 1984). Over the years, the presence of psychology was felt in all aspects of Lebanese life. Psychologists were working in schools, hospitals, institutions for the mentally ill, special treatment centers, and industries (Khoury, 1992; Saigh, 1984; Salloum, 1992). More recently, specialty treatment centers were established to help those suffering from different psychological problems, such as mental retardation, autism, drug and alcohol abuse, child abuse, domestic violence, and prostitution. Furthermore, research centers in psychology also were established, such as the Center for Behavioral Research at AUB, and the Institute for Development, Research, Advocacy, and Applied Care (IDRAAC), which promote the conduct of research in behavioral health and the view of psychology as a science.

As of 2009, a total of about 45 psychiatrists practice in Lebanon, working between their private clinics and general or psychiatric hospitals. A few have academic appointments at university medical centers, while others work in private practice and are affiliated to certain hospitals (Lebanese Order of Physicians, 2009). In 1998, the highest psychiatristto-population ratio in the Arab World was in Lebanon, at 1:45,000. In addition, Lebanon held the highest ratio of clinical psychologists-to-population in the Arab World, at 1:140,000, according to the data collected from a postal survey sent to presidents of associations or well-established authorities in the Arab region (Okasha & Karam, 1998). In 2001, the ratio of psychiatrists to the population in the Arab region was approximately 1.2:100,000 (WHOEMRO, 2006). Psychology in Lebanon is not a protected field and identification as “psychologist” is not a protected title. Hence, anyone with as little as a bachelor’s degree in psychology or any kind of training in psychology can be called a psychologist. Because of that, it has been very difficult to identify the number of psychologists working in Lebanon. However, data taken from the last World Health Organization (WHO) survey indicates that, as of 2006, about 60 clinical psychologists practice in Lebanon, most of them working in schools and hospitals, as well as in private clinics; in addition, Lebanon has 20 psychiatric social workers and 30 psychiatric nurses (WHO-EMRO, 2006). The following sections review the history and current status of psychology in different Lebanese settings, such as clinics, schools, industry, and research, as well as the different psychological associations that were established at various times in history.

The Clinical Setting The Lebanese Hospital for Mental and Nervous Diseases (Asfuriyeh) The Lebanese Hospital for the Insane (as it was originally called) was established in 1898 by the Swiss Quaker Theophilus Waldmeir to provide care for the mentally ill in the Near East region (Ichimura & Kemsley, 2002). At first, English psychiatrists provided the psychiatric care, which was later on taken over by Lebanese psychiatrists trained in England (WHO-EMRO, 2001). The plans for establishing the “first home for the insane in Bible Lands” began in 1896 (Ichimura & Kemsley, 2002). The hospital’s estate was purchased in 1898, located 6 miles from the capital’s center. It opened its doors for the first time in 1900, with ten patients. The hospital’s

constitution and laws were formally drawn up in 1907, and the Beirut Executive Committee operated the asylum under the London General Committee, which retained overall authority. In 1912, the property was designated as a wakf, meaning a religious foundation under Lebanese law, and it was conditioned that the hospital should be “international and interdenominational” (Ichimura & Kemsley, 2002). Over the years, the hospital expanded and built more wards. The asylum housed 150 people by 1924, 350 by 1935, and 410 patients by 1936 (Ichimura & Kemsley, 2002). By 1949, approximately 14,000 patients had been treated since the hospital’s opening almost 50 years earlier. In 1938, the hospital was renamed from the Lebanon Hospital for the Insane to the Lebanon Hospital for Mental and Nervous Diseases. It continued to be commonly known as “Asfuriyeh.” The Asfuriyeh was the fourth mental hospital to be built in the world, after the Bicêtre in France, York Retreat in England, and Lindhaus in Germany (Jreidini, 2008). Patients came from the entire Mediterranean area, as well as from some European areas where no other mental hospitals existed (Lebanon Hospital for Mental Diseases, 31st report: 1929–1930). Since 1922 and up to the closing of its doors in 1982, Asfuriyeh was affiliated with the American University Hospital, and it became the Psychiatric Division of the university hospital (Ichimura & Kemsley, 2002). Its executive committee included members from AUB and always included the dean of AUB’s faculty of medicine (Jreidini, 2008). In addition, the AUB’s medical college was involved with the asylum from its beginning, through the requirement that fifth-year medical students spend time at the mental hospital as the professor’s assistants. These students had a weekly class there for clinical instruction (Lebanon Hospital for Mental Diseases, 31st report: 1929–1930). The Asfuriyeh was able to establish, under the guidance of its superintendant Dr. Antranig Manugian (1910–2003), who was also the head of the division of psychiatry at AUB for 19 years, the first residency training program in the region (Jreidini, 2008). Following this affiliation, more recognition followed: in 1939, it was recognized by the Royal Medical/Psychological Association as a Training Center for the Mental Nursing Certificate (Ichimura & Kemsley, 2002). In 1948, Asfuriyeh opened the first school of psychiatric nursing in the Middle East, and it was used by the WHO as a training facility for specialized personnel. In addition to its being a training center for khoury, tabbarah

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nurses, Asfuriyeh was the main teaching center for mental diseases in the Near East (Lebanon Hospital for Mental Diseases, 31st report: 1929–1930). One interesting point to note is that there were no psychologists at the hospital, most likely due to the lack of such a specialty in Lebanon at the time. (Academic programs in psychology first started around the 1960s, and did not fully develop as a field with specialized training until the 1980s.) The techniques and treatments adhered to by the hospital followed worldwide medical advances and included electroconvulsive therapy and occupational therapy (Ichimura & Kemsley, 2002). The able patients residing at the hospital were encouraged to do manual work because of the cathartic qualities of being occupied rather than being idle (Lebanon Hospital for Mental Diseases, 31st report: 1929–1930). Such activities included general work of the hospital such as cooking, cleaning, doing the laundry, and pumping water, as well others such as sewing, gardening, picking of crops, wood-cutting, etc. In addition to work, patients who were able to—and regardless of their religion or sect—were encouraged to attend the weekly sermon conducted in simple Arabic. This united gathering may have contributed to the harmony in which the community lived (Lebanon Hospital for Mental Diseases, 31st report: 1929–1930). The Asfuriyeh was supposed to move to a bigger, more modern location on the outskirts of Beirut, but the civil war stopped the construction of the new facilities (WHO-EMRO, 2001). After the war, the hospital’s financial status never fully recovered, and it was in severe financial difficulties by 1972. The hospital authorities decided to sell the current facility and build a more modern one in the southern suburb of Beirut. The hospital was sold in 1973, but the Lebanese civil war, which erupted in 1975, stopped all construction plans. These resumed in 1977, but by the end of that year, the hospital was almost bankrupt. The hospital continued to operate from its original location until 1982, when it officially closed. The residing patients were supposed to be transferred to the new facility, but the still-empty hospital was bombed by Israeli warplanes on the eve of the relocation (Jreidini, 2008). The new hospital never opened its doors (WHO-EMRO, 2001).

The Psychiatric Hospital of the Cross (Hopital Psychiatrique de La Croix, HPC). The Psychiatric Hospital of the Cross was established by Father Jacob in 1919, as a Christian monastery. He later converted it into a shelter in 1937, 368

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and then into the Psychiatric Hospital of the Cross in 1951 (Psychiatric Hospital of the Cross official website). Currently, this is the only psychiatric hospital in Lebanon (WHO-EMRO, 2001). It served as the training hospital for AUB medical students until 1982. The hospital holds over 1,500 beds and is run by a Maronite order of nuns. Although it is a Christian charity, the hospital houses a large proportion of non-Christians (WHO-EMRO, 2001). The hospital treats around 2,200 patients yearly, and the modality of treatment provided is in accordance with the American Psychological Association (APA) and the WHO International Classification for mental disorders. The hospital has a complete team of mental health professionals, including psychiatrists, psychologists, and social workers. Nursing services are offered by nuns trained in nursing, and is of good quality (WHO-EMRO, 2001). The psychology department offers cognitive-behavioral therapy, psychoanalytic therapy, drama therapy, relaxation, counseling, and group therapy as well as art therapy and occupational therapy. It also provides psychometric testing for intelligence, abilities, and personality.

Ain WaZein Hospital Ain WaZein hospital is a health establishment of the Druze community (LAU, 2009). The nerstone was laid in 1978, and it opened its doors in 1989 (AinWaZein official website) It is located in the Chouf area, south of Beirut, but caters to a much wider region, reaching around 500,000 people. The medical center holds 100 beds, in addition to the elderly care center that holds 75 beds. This hospital offers counseling to its patients and their relatives (Ain WaZein official website). It has a counseling and psychotherapy team that includes three psychiatrists and one psychologist. The team treats a wide range of disorders such as schizophrenia, bipolar disorders, addiction, depression, and suicidality (LAU, 2009).

Mental Hospital of the Muslim Elderly Asylum (Dar al Ajaza Al Islamiya) Dar Al-Ajaza Al-Islamiya Hospital is located in western Beirut (WHO-EMRO, 2001). The psychiatry department in this hospital was established in 1959 (Dar Al-Ajaza official website, 2005). It currently contains four clinics serving residential patients and outpatients, as well as employees and workers. There are six doctors enrolled in the psychiatry residency program. The team is made up of four psychiatrists and one psychologist, in addition

to two social workers and two occupational therapists. Three physiotherapists also address the needs of the patients. The treatments offered include different modalities, such as cognitive, behavioral, psychoanalysis, and group therapy. The department couples psychotherapy with psychopharmacology for most effective outcomes. This program was launched after its accreditation by the Arab Council for Medical Specialization in 1997.

American University of Beirut Medical Center Psychiatric services at AUB began in 1889; however, it was not until 1997 that the department of psychiatry was established to offer primarily outpatient services and inpatient admissions within the general hospital. In 2008, an inpatient psychiatry unit was established (Jreidini, 2008). Before that, AUB-MC relied on Asfuriyeh and The Hospital of the Cross for the clinical training of its students and nurses. From 1971 to 1991, the psychiatry division was under the department of internal medicine. It was originally staffed with one full-time psychiatrist and one part-time psychiatrist. As the civil war started in 1975, the staff was reduced to one parttime psychiatrist and one psychiatric nurse, who treated a limited number of patients and provided teaching for medical students. No psychologists were on staff at that time. At the end of the civil war in 1991, a full-time psychiatrist was hired, in addition to three clinical associates in psychiatry to provide training for students. In 1997, the psychiatry division became a department with three full-time faculty, among which was the first full-time clinical psychologist at AUB-MC. The psychiatry outpatient clinics have catered to a large number of patients over the years. Services offered include psychiatric treatments and psychotherapy for adults, adolescents, and children; psychological assessments; and couples and family therapy, as well as group therapy. The psychiatry inpatient unit opened in 2008, with 16 beds available to adult psychiatric patients needing short-term hospitalization. Children and adolescents who need admission are admitted to the pediatric floor in the hospital. Patients admitted to the unit suffer from mood disorders, substance abuse disorders, psychotic disorders, and suicidal attempts. Psychological services are also offered on the unit, such as individual psychotherapy, art therapy, group therapy, psychoeducational groups, and

family support. The facility now serves, along with Hospital of the Cross, as the training site for AUB medical students and residents. Also in 2008, the psychometric and testing services were established as part of the department, which now is staffed with three full-time psychiatrists and two full-time psychologists. Plans for further growth and expansion are also in the making, including the establishment of a psychiatry residency program and a clinical training program as part of a master’s degree in clinical psychology offered jointly between the department of psychology and the department of psychiatry. In addition to the services offered at the department of psychiatry, AUB also houses a counseling center on university grounds. The three psychologists available offer free psychological services to its registered students. The center helps students deal with their personal difficulties or problems that interfere with their academic life (AUB, 2008).

Saint George Hospital University Medical Center and Mental Institute for Neuropsychological Disorders The department of psychiatry and clinical psychology was founded in 1980, and it works in affiliation with the Mental Institute for Neuropsychological Disorders (MIND) to provide psychiatric and psychological services to inpatients and outpatients alike. The multidisciplinary team is made up of psychiatrists, psychologists, psychiatry residents and psychology interns, and psychiatric nurses. MIND covers all age groups through the specialties of its three psychiatrists: child and adolescent psychiatry, adult psychiatry, and geriatric psychiatry. The staff also includes four psychologists: one specialized in adult psychology and addictions, two in child psychology, and one in psychometric testing. Together, this team caters to all ages and to all types of disorders. Most of the staff are also involved in research at IDRAAC (IDRAAC, 2006).

Other Centers Currently, Lebanon boasts 30 institutions for mentally challenged children, with or without physical handicaps (Khoury, 1992). A dozen of these institutions care for children with mood disorders and/or psychosis. Psychotic children are included in a program separate from that of the mentally challenged and are treated with the goal of being reintegrated into society. In Lebanon, there are clinical psychologists in five or six of the 30 institutions, by far an insufficient number (Khoury, 1992). Due to the insufficient khoury, tabbarah

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number of psychologists and their specialties, every psychologist must play multiple roles such as clinician, family counselor, social worker, and administrator. Closely related to the field are those Lebanese centers that deal with social as well as psychological issues. One such center is Skoun, which was founded in 2003 and is an outpatient treatment center for alcohol and drug addictions (Skoun official website). The Skoun team is made up of three psychotherapists, one psychiatrist, one outreach psychiatrist, and one general practitioner doctor. Oum el Nour is another Lebanese nonprofit nongovernmental organization (NGO) that handles drug rehabilitation in a residential setting. It has an extensive program combining inpatient treatment, outpatient follow-up, and family guidance. It offers group and individual psychotherapy, medical assistance, and social help for addicts to reintegrate within society (Oum el Nour website, 2007). Dar Al-Amal is a nonprofit, NGO founded in 1970, when the Sisters of Franciscans de Marie collaborated with social workers against prostitution. It has grown into a large organization that fights delinquency and offers minor females and women the chance at rehabilitation and reintegration into society. It also teaches prevention to girls aged 12–18 years of age who are at high risk of delinquency due to social and family conditions (Dar Al-Amal website, 2006).

Academic Programs of Psychology Many private schools in Lebanon were established by Western missionaries, and those with foreign support continue to be influenced by them through the education they provide (Prothro & Melikian, 1955). In other words, if a Lebanese individual studies psychology in his or her country, in public or private colleges, he or she will learn from a Western perspective the different types of Western diagnostic categories and treatment modalities. Furthermore, graduate training is often pursued abroad, in countries such as France, Britain, the United States, Canada, or Australia. Psychology students gain their theoretical knowledge as part of their training in such Western universities (Salloum, 1992). It should be noted, though, that while psychologists in Lebanon, especially academicians, conduct research that is often used in academic theses and lectures, this has not led to the development of new treatment techniques particular to Lebanese society for the practitioner to apply. Furthermore, although Lebanese psychologists are as concerned with mental 370

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abilities as the West is, they did not develop psychodiagnostic instruments of their own nor did they cross-validate existing Western ones (Khoury, 1992; Saigh, 1984). This may be due to a shortage of funding, as well as to a shortage of personnel with the proper training in measurement backgrounds to conduct such work. In academic programs, basic knowledge of psychology is covered during the first 2 years of undergraduate study, regardless of the program. More in-depth training follows during the next year or two before graduation and includes learning assessment and psychological methods in different psychological domains. Finally, specialized training that results in an advanced degree and the skills for professional practice is completed on a graduate level. Different psychology diplomas have been awarded over the years by different psychology programs: “license,” “maitrise,” B.A., M.A. DEA (Diplôme d’Études Approfondies or diploma in in-depth studies), DES (Diplôme d’Études Supérieures or diploma in superior studies), DESS (Diplôme d’Études Supérieures Spécialiées or diploma in superior specialized studies), and Ph.D. (Chamoun, 1992). These programs started with AUB, l’Ecole Supérieure des Lettres de Beyrouth, Lebanese University, Beirut Arab University, St. Joseph University (USJ), and St. Esprit University. These followed the American or Anglo-Saxon, French, or Egyptian/Arabic models. These models were often amended by the educational needs particular to Lebanon (Chamoun, 1984; Kazarian & Khoury, 2003).

The American Model The first course in psychology was offered at AUB in 1887. The first psychological work published in Arabic seems to be one written in 1874, by Daniel Bliss (1823–1916), the founder and first president of AUB. It was called First Lessons in Mental Philosophy (Al durus al’awaliya fil falsafah al’qliyah) (Prothro & Melikian, 1955). The American model was adopted at AUB in 1951, with the establishment of the first psychology department in the region (AUB, 2008). The AUB psychology program is especially based in experimental psychology and follows the educational curriculum of American universities (Chamoun, 1984). During the 1960s, both an experimental psychology lab and a center for behavioral research were established (AUB official website, 2008). The psychology department used to award a B.A. and a M.A. in experimental psychology, cognitive psychology, assessment, and social psychology (Chamoun, 1992). In 1976, the

psychology department merged with the communication, anthropology, and sociology programs to form the department of social and behavioral sciences (AUB, 2008). Currently, the undergraduate program is of a general nature, preparing students for advanced work in various specializations. It offers a B.A. in psychology, and a master’s degree in general psychology. The AUB offers also a graduate degree in educational psychology. It follows a research-oriented, behavioral model (Saigh, 1984). The 2 -year M.A. program with a subspecialization in educational psychology is offered by the department of education, and has a choice of two tracks: testing and measurement, and guidance and counseling. The lack of a clinical psychology graduate program forces students to travel abroad or transfer to the French system to complete graduate studies in psychology (Chamoun, 1992). Currently, a master’s degree in clinical psychology is being developed and should be put into effect shortly (AUB, 2008). The University of Balamand was founded in 1988, and the Lebanese government decree of the same year allowed the establishment of the faculty of arts and social sciences (University of Balamand official website). The department of psychology aims to graduate practitioners in various specializations, namely educational, school, clinical, guidance, work, and consultation. The program offers an undergraduate degree (B.A.) that requires 3 years to complete, a graduate degree (M.A.) requiring 2 years, and a postgraduate degree (psychological practitioner diploma). Notre Dame University (NDU) was established in 1987 by the Maronite Order of the Holy Virgin Mary. The department of social and behavioral sciences is part of the faculty of humanities and it offers a B.A. in psychology as well as a minor in psychology. The program offers three fields of concentration at the bachelor level: clinical psychology, educational psychology, and industrial psychology. The program follows the American model in its teaching. The program at NDU is specifically developed to promote the ability to social services in the community. The program recognizes that a B.A.level graduate will not be able to function as a private psychologist; however, he or she will be able to cope with working in a community (NDU official website, 2007).

The French Model The French curriculum model began with the creation of L’Ecole Supérieure des Lettres de Beyrouth,

which was affiliated with Lyon University in 1951 (Chamoun, 1984, 1992). This program was later adopted by the Lebanese University and St. Esprit University in Kaslik because of its cultural and historical continuity. The “licence” in psychology is a degree that was created in France in 1947 (Chamoun, 1992). This degree was given in accordance with the French university from 1951 to 1967, specifically with a certificate in psychophysiology. After 1968, the university was reformed and the “maîtrise” degree was added; L’Ecole Supérieure des Lettres de Beyrouth could give both degrees in accordance with Lyon University. This school closed in 1976 and was replaced by St. Joseph University (USJ), which founded the department of psychology and gave degrees up to doctorates in clinical and industrial psychology (Chamoun, 1984). In 1992, the department started an advanced degree, a diploma in superior specialized studies (DESS) in clinical psychology and psychopathology (Chamoun, 1992). The USJ follows a practitioner-oriented, psychodynamic model (Saigh, 1984). It offers an undergraduate licence program in psychology, a 2-year M.A. program called “master professional” in clinical psychology for future practitioners, and a 3-year Ph.D. program called diplome d’etudes approfondies (DEA) in clinical psychology, educational psychology, and education administration for future academicians. The French model was slightly amended to be used in the Lebanese University when it founded its psychology department in the faculty of arts in 1960–1961 (Chamoun 1984, 1992). The program offers an undergraduate degree that requires 4 years to be completed, with 2 years of general requirements and 2 years for licensing. It also offers graduate degrees equivalent to a master’s degree and to a doctorate. Although the university offered five specialties, three are being implemented, namely clinical, educational, and industrial psychology. The faculty of philosophy and social sciences was founded in St. Esprit University in Kaslik in 1949 by the Lebanese Maronite Order. The faculty includes a department of psychology and offers a licence in clinical psychology and industrial psychology over 3 years. It also offers 2-year master’s degrees in clinical psychology, school psychology, industrial psychology, and health psychology. Health psychology includes sections on handicaps, stress, and trauma. A doctorate degree is offered for master’s program graduates and requires 3 years to complete. The different programs allow graduates to khoury, tabbarah

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function in their chosen specialties as well as to conduct scientific research (USEK official website, 2008).

The Egyptian/Arabic Model Beirut Arab University (BAU) was founded in 1959 and is affiliated with Alexandria University in Egypt (Chamoun, 1992). The faculty of arts and philosophy was the second faculty to be established after the faculty of Law (Chamoun, 1984). Specialization in psychology was considered part of the philosophy bachelor’s degree, which led to a combined degree in both psychology and philosophy. This model is strictly academic, and does not offer any practical or clinical specialty. Currently, this university offers undergraduate and graduate studies reaching a doctorate level in Psychology (BAU official website, 2009).

The School Setting Lebanon has approximately 3 million people, with around 800,000 students attending about 2,600 schools. Public schools constitute the majority of the school system, comprising 56% of the total number of schools, followed by private schools with 25% and semi-private schools with 19%. There is an even division between students attending public and private schools (40% each) with the remainder attending semi-private schools (Saigh, 1984). Private schools noticed the importance of psychologists and established—in 1953 at Collège des Apôtres in Jounieh and in 1961 at Collège NotreDame de Nazareth—centers for school psychologists. They provided psychological services to students, their parents, and teachers (Chamoun, 1984). This gained momentum and in 1970, ten to 12 schools had such services out of 2,815. However, private schools retreated because of the cost, and the government did not see the need for psychologists in public schools. Although psychology was not present in the public sector, that did not stop the Official Secondary School for Boys in Ashrafieh from experimenting between 1978 and 1987 with group and individual therapy, university and career guidance, and problem-solving discussions; both students and their parents reaped the benefits of such experimentation (Salloum, 1992). By 1975, private schools began to terminate their contracts with psychologists, citing cost issues. As of 1984, there were six practicing school psychologists. During the last revision of the school curriculum, which took place in the late 1990s, it was recommended that each school have a school 372

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psychologist to assess and provide help for students. However, this remained a recommendation and not a mandatory measure imposed by the government in all schools (Abou-Jaoude, S., 2009, personal communication). In Lebanon, the roles of the guidance counselor, clinical psychologist, special educator, and psychometric specialist are combined (Saigh, 1984). The work of a Lebanese psychologist is divided in the following manner: 30% assessment, 30% intervention (such as psychotherapy), and the remaining 40% includes a wide variety of activities including consultation, research, teaching, and administration. The Lebanese government does not offer direct financial assistance for psychological services, but it does provide partial assistance for maintaining institutionalized special education programs that retain psychologists. The psychologist works on a consulting basis within regular schools (Saigh, 1984). The school personnel identify students with learning or behavioral problems and notify the parents. They may suggest that school psychologist services are needed. The fees are paid by the students’ parents or relatives. The majority of these psychologists (80%) hold master’s degrees and the remaining hold doctorates. Most of the M.A. holders (70%) are women but there is gender equality when it comes to Ph.D. holders. Most Lebanese psychologists work in and around Beirut. The scarce research conducted on school psychology in Lebanon (Bibi, 1992; Kurani, 1964; Seraphim, 1991) supports the need for such services (Bsat-Juma, 1994). In a study conducted in 1994, Bsat-Juma sampled directors, teachers, and parents of students in private school located in Beirut. Public schools were excluded from the study because they lacked school psychology–related services. Out of the final sample of 313 respondents, 69% perceived the need for school psychologists, specifically. The school psychologist is expected to fulfill the roles of consultant, diagnostician, therapist, educational planner, and researcher. The study expressed the need to introduce to the educational community in particular and society in general the types of services that a school psychologist can perform. Study respondents expected that school psychologists cater to students with social withdrawal, aggressive behavior, anxiety, delinquency problems, fears or phobias, mental retardation, physical handicaps, hyperactivity, and lack of concentration. Finally, the need for licensure and training of school psychologists was recognized as a necessity.

School psychologists contribute to Lebanon’s schools through their assessment and treatment of students in various settings including special education centers, hospitals, and schools (Saigh, 1984). They also contribute by teaching psychology in high schools and universities, and help in improving society’s attitude toward the field. School psychologists conduct research on child development, learning, personality and social psychology, assessment, psychopathology, and psychotherapy.

The Industrial Setting Over 90% of the companies that responded to the survey sent by Salloum in 1992 claimed that they did not have a psychologist as part of their institution. Many found that such a person is not useful for the company. However, psychologists can function in industry to help with selecting and training personnel, providing communication training, and improving work conditions. It is noted that the Lebanese military noticed the importance of psychology, which resulted in establishing an army Center for Psychotechnical Selection, in 1957. This center administered aptitude tests, intelligence tests, personality tests, and more. These tests were used to recruit, to identify problems in this specific domain, and sometimes to treat cases. Furthermore, one advertising agency hired two psychologists in 1981 (Chamoun, 1984). In 1982, a consulting agency for hiring employees hired a psychologist. It should be noted that both these companies were run by psychologists. Thirty psychologists are currently working in industrial settings, while three times more are needed in Lebanon. The need for psychologists in different areas is present, but the demand for them is still insufficient. Recently, more institutions and companies are setting up human resources departments as part of their organization, and these are often run or staffed by psychologists.

Lebanese Psychological Associations Over the history of psychology in Lebanon, the need for a psychological association has been voiced time and time again. Out of concern for having competent and ethical psychologists active in the field, Saigh (1984) noted the importance of legislation to regulate psychological practice. The author also claimed the need for school psychologists to have their own professional society. It is possible that through such a society, mental health clinics may be established to meet the assessment and treatment needs of rural children and adolescents in

an outpatient setting. This society could mandate work to cross-validate the existing tests used in Lebanon to verify their reliability and validity and to inspire psychologists to develop new instruments for assessment, thus catering to the Lebanese population. Chamoun (1984) noted that a Lebanese psychological association was not established because of debates over whether to include all those with psychology degrees or to restrict membership to such an association to only those practicing in the field. In 1992, a plan was laid out to establish the Lebanese Psychological Association (LPA). The LPA would be subject to Lebanese laws and regulations. The goals of the LPA were to unite all psychologists in Lebanon efficiently and give them moral and technical support; to contribute to the development of studies and research in psychology and answering questions in the field; to maintain the member’s high scientific level through continuous courses, conferences, and lectures, and contacts with sister associations; and to organize psychologists’ careers through implementing an advanced academic program, identifying which degree would allow its holder to practice in the field, and working toward a law regulating the career. However, it was not until 2004 that LPA saw the light of day, as a result of the work of many psychologists representing all the major universities in Lebanon. It remains active, expanding its activities as well as the numbers of its members (about 100). During its launch, the APA sent its director for education, Dr. Cynthia Belar, who presented a lecture to the members of the LPA and offered the moral support and expertise that the APA could share with such a young organization. The LPA has been quite active in organizing training workshops, bringing eye movement desensitization and reprocessing (EMDR) therapy to Lebanon, working on establishing guidelines and regulations for the practice of psychology in Lebanon, and advocating the role of psychology in Lebanon, as well as in the region. Its members represent all the universities in Lebanon as well as professionals from the community. The Lebanese Society of Psychoanalysis (La Société Libanaise de Psychanalyse) was founded by three Lebanese psychoanalysts who trained in France (SLP official website, n.d.). It was formally recognized by the Lebanese government in 1980. The society adopts a Freudian perspective, and the members apply this approach in their clinical work. The society includes 12 members as of 2008. The first colloquium was held in 1999, on the therapeutic function of khoury, tabbarah

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psychoanalysis. Monthly conferences and seminars are held on different concepts and theories, as well as on the history of psychoanalysis. The Société des Consultants et Psychotherapeutes (SCP) was established in 1998 by a group of psychology faculty members at the Lebanese University. Their aim was to expand the association to include all psychologists and to have a regulatory function in the profession of psychology. They held several conferences and workshops the first few years. However, they were unable to attract a large number of psychologists, and the association dissolved from its original format into another association in charge of training psychology students and providing them with supervision. The new association was called the Société des Practiciens en Psychologie et Consultants. In May 2008, they were able to obtain from the Ministry of Labor a permit to become a syndicate of psychologists. This so far has been the most official step taken by the government to recognize the field of psychology.

Licensing and Practice Guidelines Challenges One of the main problems facing the field of psychology in Lebanon has been the lack of licensing requirements and the nonexistence of a qualifying exam for practice or revision of credentials. Hence, there is no way to control for malpractice or professional misconduct (Saigh, 1984). This has also been one of the main tasks and challenges faced by each professional association in Lebanon. The problem remains unresolved due to the complexity of the matter and the multitude of programs and degrees seeking equivalence, as well as the difficulties inherent in having a large number of professionals agree on common licensing and practice guideline regulations. Another problem has been the negative view of psychiatrists toward psychologists. A large number seem to believe that psychologists are only fit to teach courses and give tests. This perception, however, is changing with the practice of ethical and competent school and clinical psychologists, as well as with the influx of psychiatrists trained in the West to work on multidisciplinary teams, who see the work of both mental health professional disciplines as complementing each other. The war in Lebanon also played a major role against the development of psychology, essentially forbidding the provision of services in areas subjected to life-threatening events. The school psychologist’s work is not yet recognized by the Ministry of Education, as the work of 374

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clinical psychologists is not yet recognized by the Ministry of Health (Salloum, 1992). Many attempts have been made to draw guidelines of practice and licensing regulations for psychologists. A recent task force made up of psychiatrists and psychologists joined hands in 2005–2006 to draft a document that was to be presented to the Order of Physicians (the licensing body for physicians and hence representative of all health matters to the government) and endorsed by this order, so that it could be presented to the parliament for the establishment of clear rules and regulations for the practice of psychology. Delays in this project were primarily caused by the fragile political and security situation in the country, and the parliament having to deal with other challenges. This project is being revived, however, and it is only a matter of time before clear guidelines for practice are established.

Conclusion Psychology in Lebanon has come forward immensely, but advancements are still needed in all its aspects. The American model of teaching needs to be elaborated and fortified to include specialized graduate and postgraduate degrees. The LPA has finally materialized and needs to continue its efforts to solidify the psychological community and work toward syndication. Once a syndicate, it can take active steps to protect the community as a whole, ensuring that only ethical and competent psychologists are allowed to practice. Research in Lebanon has certainly grown. It has participated in a high number of studies, and there is only room for improvement. Society has become better acquainted with the concept of psychology and thus has lost some of its misconceptions toward the field and grown more accepting of it. What remains is that psychologists must become more integrated in the labor community, working within their field of study, not outside it. The spread of psychologists into all areas of Lebanon will truly benefit the nation. The history of psychology in Lebanon may have been slow and somewhat bleak, but future promise is bright.

Future Directions Several areas are ripe for further research and exploration: • The need for an Arab psychology that takes into account the differing values and traditions of the Arab culture, especially as it manifests itself in mental illness, and often affects the psychological treatments

• The need to promote psychology in different facets of the Arab society such as schools, companies, organizations, and public health • The immediate need to have practice guidelines and best standards of practice for psychologists delineated, so that practitioners can abide by them and provide the best care possible • The encouragement and funding of psychological research in Lebanon and the Arab world that will advance the field of Arab psychology and establish its scientific foundations • The need for standardized, validated psychological tests in Lebanon and the Arab world for the implementation of proper assessment measures using culturally sensitive items and interpretations.

Glossary Asfuriyeh: Asylum of the mentally ill. It was founded in 1898 and closed its doors in 1982. Dar Al-Amal: Nonprofit NGO that deals with prostitution and delinquent behavior. Oum El-Nour: Nonprofit NGO that deals with drug rehabilitation. Skoun: Outpatient rehabilitation center that deals with alcohol and drug addictions.

Further Reading Attieh, N. (2008). Current developments of psychological practice in Lebanon: A plea toward certification and formal licensing. Retrieved from http://www.arabpsynet.com/HomePage/ Psy-books.htm. Ahmed, R. A. (1992). Psychology in the Arab countries. In U. P. Gielen, L. L. Adler, & N. A. Milgram (Eds.), Psychology in international perspective: 50 years of the International Council of Psychologists (pp. 127–150). Amsterdam: Swets & Zeitlinger. Saigh, P. A. (1989). School psychology research in Lebanon: A retrospective analysis and a look ahead. Professional School Psychology, 3(3), 201–208. WHO (2006). Mental health in the Eastern Mediterranean region: Reaching the unreached. Country profiles: Lebanon, 173–182. Retrieved from http://www.emro.who.int/dsaf/ dsa702.pdf. Stevens, M., & Wedding, D. (2004). Handbook of international psychology. Bruner-Routledge, New York.

References Ain Wa Zein (n.d.). Counseling services. Retrieved July 2, 2009, from http://www.awh.org.lb/patients/counseling_services. asp. AUB. (2008). In Faculty of arts and sciences department of social and behavioral sciences psychology program. Retrieved June

24, 2009, from http://staff.aub.edu.lb/~websbs/Psychology/ index.htm. BAU (2009). In Faculty of arts graduate program description and degrees. Retrieved December 3, 2009, from http://www. bau.edu.lb/fac-arts.php. Bsat-Juma, A. K. (1994). The need for school psychology role functions as perceived by directors, teachers, and parents in Beirut. Beirut: Lebanon. Chamoun, M. (1984). Le debut des sciences psychologiques au liban. In Liban La memoire culturelle: Jalons et tournants (pp. 49–61). Beirut: Mouvement culturel Antelias. Chamoun, M. (1992). Quarante ans de psychologie au Liban. Psyché, 1(1), 9–21. Dar Al-Ajaza Al-Islamiya Hospital (2005). In Medical services & nursing>clinics>psychiatry. Retrieved June 24, 2009, from http://www.dar-ajaza-islamia.org.lb/content_en.asp? contentID=16. Dar al Amal. (2006). About Dar al Amal. Retrieved July 9, 2009 from http://www.dar-al-amal.org/about_us.htm. IDRAAC. (2006). In mission statement. Retrieved June 24, 2009, from http://www.idraac.org/sub.aspx?ID=144&MID= 37&PID=29&SECID=29. Ichimura, J., & Kemsley, R. (2002). Lebanon hospital for mental and nervous disorders. In Mundus: Gateway to missionary collections in the United Kingdom. Retrieved June 24, 2009, from www.mundus.ac.uk/cats/4/1065.htm. Jreidini, H. (2008). History of the department of psychiatry. AUBMC News, 12(3), p.3. Kazarian, S., & Khoury, B. (2003). Psychology in Lebanon: Challenges and prospects. Lecture presented at the 1st MENA Regional Conference of Psychology, December 18–23, Dubai, UAE. Khoury, M. (1992). Le psychologue dans l’institution pour l’enfants handicapés mentaux. Psyché, 1(1), 23–24. Lebanese Order of Physicians. (2009). List of registered psychiatrists. Lebanese Psychological Association: Original regulations plan (1992). Nafsologia, 1(1), 13–16. LAU. (2009). Ain Wa Zein Hospital. Retrieved July 2, 2009, from http://medicine.lau.edu.lb/research/collaboratingcenters.php. Okasha, A., & Karam, E. (1998). Mental health services and research in the Arab world. Acta Psychiatrica, 98, 406–413. Oum el Nour. (2007). Retrieved July 9, 2009, from http://www. oum-el- nour.org/aboutus.htm. Prothro, E. T., & Melikian, L. H. (1955). Psychology in the Arab near east. Psychological Bulletin, 52(4), 303–310. Psychiatric Hospital of the Cross. Treatment. Retrieved June 24, 2009, from http://www.hopitalpsychiatriquedelacroix.org. lb/arabic/cure/index.htm. Saigh, P. A. (1984). School psychology in Lebanon. Journal of School Psychology, 22, 233–238. Salloum, S. R. (1992). La psychologie au Liban: Formation des psychologues et domains d’application. Psyché, 1(1), 35–51. Skoun. Retrieved July 9, 2009, from http://www.skoun.org/ what.html. Société Libanaise de Psychanalyse (2009). Historique et présentation de la SLP. Retrieved October 27, 2009, from http:// slp-lb.com/slp.html. Soueif, M., & Ahmed, R. (2001). Psychology in the Arab world: Past, present, and future. International Journal of Group Tensions, 30(3), 211–240.

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The Lebanon hospital for mental diseases, thirty-first report: 1929–1930. Retrieved from the Archives and Special Collection at Jafet Library, AUB. University of Balamand (n.d.). Department of Psychology. Retrieved October 22, 2009, from http://www.balamand. edu.lb/english/Arts.asp?id=1131&fid=117. WHO-EMRO. (2001). Country profiles: Lebanon. In World Health Day 2001. Retrieved June 24, 2009, from http:// www.emro.who.int/mnh/whd/CountryProfile-LEB.htm.

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WHO-EMRO. (2006). Mental health country profiles: Lebanon. In Reaching the unreached. Cairo: Author. Retrieved 19 October, 2009, from < http://www.emro.who.int/mnh/ mnh_countryprofiles_leb.htm>.

C HA P TE R

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New Zealand

Brian D. Haig and Dannette Marie

Abstract This chapter surveys the 140-year history of psychology in New Zealand, considers the forces that shaped its development, and comments on its contemporary character. The early history of New Zealand psychology was dominated by British influences, but today it is Anglo-American in nature. Nevertheless, it has a number of distinctive features, among which is its own indigenous Maori psychology. Academic psychology in New Zealand largely takes place within the country’s universities. It has emerged from an early institutional association with philosophy to become a separate subject with prominent applications in the clinical and industrial/organizational spheres of society. The chapter concludes with a brief consideration of two challenges that face the discipline as a basic and applied science. Keywords: New Zealand, history, British psychology, Duncan MacGregor, Thomas Hunter, Ernest Beaglehole, clinical psychology, industrial/organizational psychology, Maori psychology

Academic psychology in New Zealand has its early beginnings in settler society. Today, New Zealand’s system of education is largely state funded. Initially, the country’s tertiary education needs were provided for by the University of New Zealand, which had four constituent colleges. The country now has eight separate state universities, and 25 government-funded polytechnics and technical institutes. The study, teaching, and practice of psychology in New Zealand began in the early 1900s, largely shaped by British influences. Today, its primary research features are those of mainstream Anglo-American psychology. Private and state funding for social and behavioral science research is limited. Nevertheless, New Zealand’s university psychology departments have a strong research focus, and they are active in the training of clinical and industrial/organizational psychologists.

British Philosophy, Scottish Presbyterians, and Early Psychology The opportunity to immigrate to the New Zealand frontier was recognized by many as a chance to

move beyond the rigid class structure of British Victorian society. By the mid-19th century, however, clear regional differences had emerged in New Zealand that reflected the imported traditions held by the settlers. Although the colonial founders of the Canterbury region, for example, were largely of English stock and of an Anglican persuasion, in the Otago province, a few hundred miles to the south of Canterbury, the settlers were predominantly Scottish and Presbyterian. One of the significant cultural values that the Scottish brought to New Zealand was an appreciation of the importance of higher education. According to Graham (1981), the early settlers to New Zealand were required to move through various stages characterized by adjustment, establishment, and consolidation. Signalling that the nation’s settler society had moved through the first two phases and was in the process of consolidation, New Zealand’s first university college was opened in 1869, in Dunedin, Otago. In 1873, Canterbury College was founded in Christchurch, and together, 377

the Dunedin and Christchurch colleges were to form the University of New Zealand. The Auckland University College was incorporated into the university in 1883, and Victoria University College in Wellington was to follow suit in 1898. By the end of the 19th century, each of New Zealand’s four main centers had established university colleges. The history of New Zealand academic psychology formally begins at Otago.1 Just as the university college itself was principally Scottish in origin, so it was with the nascent development of the discipline of psychology. One of the first four foundation chairs to be created at Otago was dedicated to mental and moral philosophy, which included the teaching of a course in psychology and ethics. This chair was endowed by the Synod of the Presbyterian Church of Otago and Southland. The first professor of philosophy appointed to occupy it was an extremely well-accomplished, yet at 27 years of age relatively youthful, scholar named Duncan MacGregor (1843–1906). MacGregor was born in 1843 at Aberfeldy, Perthshire, Scotland. He received an M.A. in arts from the University of Aberdeen in 1866, where he had excelled in classics and philosophy and had studied under Alexander Bain, the philosopher and educationalist (Tennant, 1993). Such were his scholastic abilities that he was the recipient of the Ferguson Scholarship for mental science, a prestigious award that was open to graduates of all Scottish universities and bestowed by the University of Glasgow. MacGregor then went to the University of Edinburgh, where he completed studies in medicine, graduating with an M.B. and M.C. in 1870. At the end of that year, he married Mary Johnston and, after being invited to fill the new chair at the University of Otago (officially professor of mental philosophy and political economy, as it was traditionally called in Scotland), MacGregor and his wife arrived in Dunedin on June 22, 1871. The moral philosophy that Duncan MacGregor taught at Otago was directly imported from the mainstream teaching of the subject in Scotland. The required text for the topic was Henry Calderwood’s A Handbook of Moral Philosophy, and the exam for the degree was based on that of the Scottish curriculum (Veatch, 2005). Importantly, psychology at this time was not necessarily considered a discipline distinct from philosophy, and this would have been the attitude MacGregor brought to Otago with him (Jackson, 1997a). At best, psychology was regarded as a subset of philosophy, with the emphasis of inquiry being directed toward 378

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theorizing issues involving the nature of mind and body. Nevertheless, although MacGregor offered the Presbyterian-approved component on psychology and ethics, the original program he developed also included a course on the structure and function of the nervous system. The latter course was clearly derived from the associationist school of Scottish thought, and its offering by MacGregor, partially at least, set the precedent for the Otago neuropsychological research tradition, which is buoyant today. As well as being a moral philosopher of distinction, MacGregor was also a physician, and he is credited with performing the first operation at Dunedin Hospital using Listerian principles of antiseptic surgery. In 1873, MacGregor was appointed inspector of lunatic asylums for Otago Provincial District. He served as medical officer of the Otago Lunatic Asylum from 1876 to 1882, which at the time was the largest institution of its kind in New Zealand. MacGregor’s appointment had originally been viewed favorably by Dunedin’s Presbyterian community, which also commanded significant influence at the university. The Reverend Thomas Burns, the first minister of the central First Presbyterian Church, was also the university chancellor. Once settled into his appointment, MacGregor appears to have antagonized many of the Presbyterian leaders with his views that ranged from denouncing religious hypocrisy to raising the issue of equal rights for women, of which he was a firm supporter. Possessed with powerful oratory skills and a strong physical presence, it was possibly MacGregor’s very public expounding of social Darwinist ideas to explain the causes of civic problems that mostly raised the ire of the Presbyterian hierarchy. In 1876, the Synod that maintained MacGregor’s chair, and, therefore assumed the authority of an employer, acted. They attempted to divide the chair into two, thus curbing his subversive “rationalistic” influence, only to be defeated in their action by the university council, who refused to be intimidated by the Synod’s interference. The resentment that MacGregor felt about this dispute never properly left him. In 1885, he resigned from the university and entered public service in health administration. MacGregor was to take charge of the hospitals and asylums of the colony under the new Act, also of 1885, which from today’s vantage point seems a somewhat cynical choice of position considering he was a confirmed and ardent eugenicist (Tennant, 1993).

Of Sketchy Boundaries, Laboratories, and Letters It is to one of Duncan MacGregor’s students, Thomas Alexander Hunter, that the title of the founding father of New Zealand scientific psychology is most often reserved. Hunter was born in Croydon, Surrey, England, in 1876, and arrived in Otago as a 4-year-old with his parents in 1880 (Beaglehole, 1996). Like MacGregor, who had a fondness for Caledonian sports and tramping, Hunter also exhibited sporting prowess, and, while attending Otago University College, represented the province in rugby union. In 1899, Hunter was awarded an arts degree in mental and moral philosophy, taking first-class honors. Following a period of teaching at Waitaki Boys High School, Hunter accepted a fixed-term appointment in 19042 as lecturer in mental science and political economy at Victoria University College in Wellington. During this time, Hunter also sought to improve his comprehension of the German language so that he could read, in original form, the academic work written by Wilhelm Wundt, the acknowledged pioneer of experimental psychology. It seems Hunter considered that one viable route for psychology to achieve autonomous status from the more speculative philosophy was through an introduction to psychological training of empirical methods. With his appointment secured, and this objective in mind, Hunter took leave from his position at Victoria in 1906 and 1907, and embarked on an extensive tour of psychological laboratories in the United States and Europe. Hunter visited the laboratories and clinics at Harvard, Yale, Clark, Johns Hopkins, and Pennsylvania. In Germany, he attended the universities at Leipzig, Berlin, Gottingen, and Wurzburg. In Britain, he visited the only operating laboratory, which was at University College, Cambridge. This fledgling contribution to empirical psychology at the time by Mother England was to foreshadow the opposition Hunter would experience on his return home when attempting to correct for psychology’s subordinate status in relation to philosophy. Before departing on his 9 months abroad, Hunter had already established a correspondence with Edward Bradford Titchener of Cornell University, whose efforts and enthusiasm undoubtedly inspired him (Brown & Fuchs, 1971). Therefore, it was at Cornell, where he spent 3 months and was able to witness the functioning of Titchener’s laboratory, that he was trained in the new experimental methods. This visit convinced Hunter that the

development of a laboratory facility at Victoria could be instrumental in changing the armchair nature of psychology in New Zealand. The ongoing advice he received from Titchener, from the most fiscally prudent means to establish a laboratory through to the importance of ensuring that one’s instruments produced accurate measurements, also shaped the direction Hunter envisaged the new experimental psychology would adopt. On his return to New Zealand in 1907, Hunter was promoted to professor of mental and moral philosophy. After receiving a small fund in 1908, he was able to establish a psychological laboratory, the first of its kind in Australasia. However, it appears that even with so much promise, progress was staggeringly and insufferably slow. New Zealand was still regarded as an outpost of Britain, and the University of New Zealand, by its own Act, continued to operate an entirely external system of examination. The content of papers for examination was set by scholars residing in British universities. Completed exam scripts were subsequently shipped back to the United Kingdom for marking, then returned to New Zealand, and eventually passed back to students. Any amendment to the mental science curriculum first required a consensus of the heads of departments of the four university colleges. Local scholars were effectively hamstrung in their attempts to improve the curriculum. It was the passing of the externally set examination that was allimportant. For Hunter, this state of affairs was evidently deeply frustrating (Hunter, 1952). In 1916, the curriculum was considerably extended. A pass in the subject required a fundamental knowledge of psychological phenomena and the principles of experimental work. With regards to the latter, two of the texts that were required reading were Qualitative Experiments in Psychology and Quantitative Experiments in Psychology, both written by Hunter’s mentor, Titchener. In 1926, the status of psychology as an experimental science was substantially enhanced by being included as a subject required at the pass stage for the bachelor of science degree. In the same year, the findings of a Royal Commission on the state of New Zealand’s university system recommended that it no longer be necessary for each of the four constituent university colleges to offer the same courses of study or methods of examination for any degree or diploma. This recommendation for reform set the stage for the development of institutional diversity in the teaching, research, and application of academic psychology throughout New Zealand. By the late 1940s haig, marie

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and early 1950s, psychology was largely recognized in the four universities as a legitimate discipline, derived from, but independent of, philosophy (Brown & Fuchs, 1971; Jackson, 1997a). Although Hunter fought for the recognition of psychology as a distinct, empirically based science and established the country’s first laboratory, his own academic contribution to the field was relatively modest. Assessed in terms of today’s performance-based research criteria, it is likely that Hunter would be judged “research inactive.” However, it was through his vision and fortitude in matters of institutional liberalization and administrative reform that his reputation as the father of New Zealand psychology was secured. Thomas Hunter served as the vice-chancellor of the University of New Zealand from 1929 to 1947, became a Knight Commander of the Order of the British Empire in 1939, and retired in his 70s, having devoted 50 years of service to Victoria University College. In his personal memoir of the period, Clarence Edward Beeby (1902–1998) has suggested that the difficulties endured in developing academic psychology ought to be understood in the context of a time when New Zealand remained geographically and intellectually isolated (Beeby, 1979). According to Beeby, who obtained his doctorate under the supervision of Charles Spearman, the library at Canterbury College, where he taught, was bereft of texts on psychology, and only one periodical, the British Journal of Psychology, was available. Further, although there were keen minds interested in pursuing the burgeoning ideas about psychological phenomena percolating in other nations, it took 3 months to receive a reply to a letter sent to Europe. Keeping abreast of these developments from New Zealand was therefore nigh on impossible. Beeby himself made an important input to the professionalization of psychology in New Zealand. In 1927, he was appointed as a lecturer in experimental education and psychology. As a pragmatist, Beeby was largely interested in the benefits of an applied psychology to matters of improving education, and it is in this area that he made his most noteworthy contributions. We return to comment on Beeby later. Scottish and English émigrés to the country established the nation’s university system, and so the development of psychology was principally a reflection of the field’s standing in Britain. However, St. George (1990), drawing parallels with the Australian experience, has proposed that other ideas 380

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beyond those inherited from the British philosophical tradition were beginning to filter into, and shape the identity of, New Zealand psychology. The Wundt-inspired structuralist school had already made its mark in the formative discipline by being the favored approach to psychology of Hunter at Victoria. However, ideas developed by members of the American functionalist school including John Dewey, Edward Lee Thorndike, and Robert Sessions Woodworth were also being discussed. The Cambridge psychologists, Frederick Charles Bartlett and William McDougall, were being read, along with the works being produced by those with a more anthropological disposition, such as Alfred Cort Haddon and W.H.R. Rivers. In December 1930, Henry H. Ferguson accepted an appointment at the University of Otago. He was the first person to hold the title of lecturer in experimental psychology in New Zealand. Originally from Scotland, where he was to return on his retirement, Ferguson has provided a first-person account of the distinctions that were beginning to form within an applied psychology and the theoretical influences that were to underpin these developments. As he puts it: “Although psychology students were largely brought up in the Weber-Fechner-WundtMyers-Bartlett-Collins-Drever tradition, education students were encouraged along the line of DarwinGalton-Binet-Burt-Thomson-Thorndike” (Ferguson, 1979, p. 12). It is probably from the early attempts to examine domestic issues within New Zealand that a more localized form of psychology was to emerge.

Expatriates, Exiles, and Some Modern Psychologists The first New Zealander to achieve international recognition for his academic research was Ernest Beaglehole (1906–1965). Born in Wellington in 1906, Beaglehole attended Victoria University College and was encouraged by the stewardship of Thomas Alexander Hunter. In 1928, he graduated with a first-class M.A. in mental and moral philosophy. To pursue his studies further, he left New Zealand to attend the London School of Economics and Political Science. Under the supervision of the sociologist Morris Ginsberg, Beaglehole completed his doctorate in 1931. His thesis entitled Property: A Study in Social Psychology captured the attention of cultural anthropologist George Peter Murdock, and was to become a classic after being published by Allen and Unwin (Beaglehole, 1931). It included an extensive data set compiled from

30 specimen cultures, which was then examined from comparative, anthropological, and developmental perspectives. This eclectic, yet pioneering, approach to the collection, analysis, and interpretation of data predated the contemporary interdisciplinary framework by decades. Beaglehole was to then move to the United States, where he undertook postdoctoral research at Yale University as a Commonwealth fellow. At Yale, Beaglehole was introduced to New Zealand anthropologist Peter Buck, with whom he was to form a close and long-lasting relationship. In addition, he came under the influence of anthropologist-linguist and founder of psychological anthropology Edward Sapir. Sapir at the time was regarded as a revolutionary luminary, and he had attracted a number of talented aspirants around him, having fashioned a theoretical break from the orthodox approach to anthropology developed by Franz Boas. As a member of Sapir’s entourage, Beaglehole joined Ruth Benedict and Margaret Mead, both of whom were to become two of the most well-known and loyal proponents of the culture-and-personality school. Mead, incidentally, was to marry New Zealander Reo Fortune. Fortune had also been a student of Thomas Hunter and obtained a M.A. in mental and moral philosophy under his tutelage before heading off to Cambridge, where he switched to cultural anthropology (St. George, 1990). Following the completion of his commitments as a Commonwealth fellow3, Ernest Beaglehole and his wife Pearl accepted an invitation from Buck to collaborate on an extensive ethnographic survey that involved collecting data from Pacific cultures. For their part, the role that the Beagleholes adopted required them to journey to a remote northern Cook Islands atoll called Pukapuka. The result of their labor was the eventual publication, in 1938, of Ethnology of Pukapuka, which described the patterns of island life in detail. After travelling to Honolulu and undertaking fieldwork, a further publication entitled Some Modern Hawaiians, which was published in 1937, continued the Polynesian theme. Also in 1937, after accepting a senior lectureship in mental and moral philosophy at his alma mater, Victoria University College, Beaglehole returned to New Zealand. Although he continued publishing ethnographic fieldwork that focused on the changes occurring in South Pacific communities, Beaglehole’s focus crystallized on the concept of the character structure of New Zealand Maori. During the

1920s and 1930s, it became fashionable to write about Maori constructs, customs, and social structure. Raymond Firth helped establish this trend with the publication, in 1929, of his thesis “The Primitive Economics of the New Zealand Maori,” which had been completed at the London School of Economics and Political Science under the supervision of Bronislaw Malinowski. However, it is better to regard this vogue as a second-wave flourish. Elsdon Best, the field anthropologist and ethnographer, had been trying since the late 19th century to record and unpack the “authentic and unique psyche of Maori” before what he considered would be its passing. However, to pursue his interest in the character structure of Maori empirically, Beaglehole, in collaboration with his wife, developed and undertook a number of ethnographic studies, which involved probing the domestic affairs of a Maori community (Beaglehole, 1946a). The research performed by the Beagleholes was known under the pseudonym of “The Kowhai Studies.” The town in which the studies were undertaken remained shrouded in mystery for decades, apparently to protect the anonymity of the participants. Otaki, which is a small town in the North Island, was in fact the site of the Kowhai Studies. Similar to his focus on the impact of cultural diffusion in the broader Pacific region, Beaglehole was interested in examining the challenges to Maori of an advancing modernity. His major interest centered on how this influence interfered with the transmission of cultural roles and practices, including those relating to leadership, tribal cohesion, interethnic relationships, and identity. The outcomes of these studies were compiled in a book, Some Modern Maoris, which was published in 1946. Peter Buck, who was of Maori origin himself, provided the foreword, which would have been interpreted at the time as a stamp of cultural approval. The book courted controversy. It painted a disconcerting image of Maori, not helped by the Freudian analysis used to interpret the data, and was also regarded by some as distasteful because it delved into sensitive topics such as Maori funereal rites and customs. In 1948, Beaglehole was appointed the first professor of psychology in New Zealand. On the basis of the research he undertook at Otaki, he also served as an advisor to the government on issues concerning contemporary Maori society. In 1954, another set of ethnographic studies involving an unnamed Maori community was devised and supervised by Beaglehole. This research, performed at haig, marie

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Murupara over a 5-year period, and conducted under the pseudonym “The Rakau Studies” (1958) was financed by funds granted to the University of New Zealand by the Carnegie Corporation of New York. These studies sought to describe and analyze the “basic personality structure of Maori” from birth to adulthood and helped establish the careers of a number of graduate investigators who worked on the project, including James Ritchie, Jane Ritchie, Joan Metge, Margaret Earle, and David G. Mulligan. Six of Beaglehole’s students were to go on to become professors of psychology in New Zealand universities. Among this half dozen was Beaglehole’s heir apparent, biographer, and sonin-law, James Ritchie, who in 1964, was appointed as the founding professor of psychology at the University of Waikato (Shouksmith, 1992). Beaglehole brought home with him the Yaleinflected school of culture and personality. The mix of anthropology and psychology that he applied at both Otaki and Murupara heralded the formal academic origins of ethnopsychology in New Zealand. This approach was to become known as crosscultural psychology, and in its most recent incarnation has, with minor adaptations, been recycled as indigenous Maori psychology. Beaglehole might have followed Sapir, but he remained theoretically committed to Boas. That is, Beaglehole’s view was evolutionist in orientation rather that relativist. He believed that Maori could perhaps be made over into something better if they began to emulate the cultural patterns of their European neighbors. He believed that once this work-in-progress had been accomplished, then the higher goal of New Zealand becoming a bicultural nation would be achievable. Ivan Sutherland (1897–1952) had also been mentored by Thomas Hunter and was a graduate of Victoria University College. After completing his M.A. in mental and moral philosophy, he left for the University of Glasgow, where he undertook doctoral studies. During his academic training, Sutherland was reading the works of Bertrand Russell and had also come into contact with the intellectual movement of the Fabian society. After completing his doctorate in 1924, he returned to New Zealand, where he became active in local government politics and social reform. Just as Beaglehole had befriended Peter Buck, so Sutherland formed a close relationship with Apirana Ngata,4 who had been appointed Native Minister in the United Government of Gordon Coates in 1928. Sutherland was drawn to Maori issues, possibly because of his 382

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socialist leanings, and he accompanied Ngata on many of his excursions to examine Maori rural life (Ritchie, 1998). In 1937, Sutherland was appointed as professor of philosophy and psychology at Canterbury University College. In March of that year, an Austrian exile by the name of Karl Popper arrived to take up a lectureship in the department. Popper, too, had flirted with Fabian-style socialism. However, he had become disenchanted with it after the Viennese democratic socialists had failed to join with the bourgeoisie to form a united front against the rising tide of 1930s European fascism. In 1934, Popper had published his famous book, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (1959),5 while a year later Sutherland’s book, The Maori Situation (1935), was released. It appears that Sutherland and Popper couldn’t have been more different in their outlook or their academic interests. Sandall’s (2001) account of the nature of their relationship is insightful. According to Sandall, while Popper was busy penning The Open Society and Its Enemies (1966), Sutherland was down the corridor championing on behalf of Maori for a need to return to the closed system of tribal life. For Popper, tribalism and nationalism, wherever it existed, invariably involved the psychological subjugation of tribal members. It was only through freeing oneself from the taboos and rules that governed tribal institutions that an individual could meaningfully speculate on the moral problems of consciousness. Whereas Popper saw the potential for universal emancipation if people could only be unshackled from tribal and nationalistic bondage, Sutherland held the view that Maori who strayed from communal life would likely go mad. Pessimistic as this view was, it did in fact anticipate by 20 years the concept of acculturative stress, which was originally applied by David Ausubel (1960) to Maori adolescents and more latterly has been used to anchor the idea of “Maori mental health” (Marie, 1999). Popper believed that the shift from the closed to the open society by humankind constituted a revolution. Sutherland thought that the advent of the European colonization of New Zealand had irrevocably disrupted a state of Maori equilibrium and that it was a major factor in the corruption of the “collective Maori psyche.” The two men held diametrically opposed views. In the milieu of a world war, Popper supported a liberation from the bias and prejudice that created difference and separation between people and,

indeed, nations. He was a universalist, holding firm to humanistic values. Sutherland, on the other hand, was a cultural relativist. His stance with respect to Maori was classically Rousseauian. The conflict between the two continued unabated and was to have a corrosive influence on their department. In 1946, Popper left New Zealand for England to take a position at the London School of Economics and Political Science. Sadly, in 1952, Sutherland took his own life. James Ritchie (1998) wrote a brief biographic note on Ivan Sutherland, principally referring to his academic career. In it he makes no direct reference to the feud, nor does he mention Popper by name. Instead, Sutherland is memorialized for his altruism, which according to Ritchie, included assisting Jewish refugees during wartime.

The Influence of Education By 1920, psychology was established in all four colleges of the University of New Zealand and during the next two decades was taught as a chapter of philosophy within the bachelor of arts degree. The major impetus for the development of applied psychology during this period came from the field of education, principally through departments of education that were established in the colleges. Having earlier visited Lightner Witmer’s clinic in the United States, Thomas Hunter took the initiative in founding a Child Guidance Clinic in 1926 at Victoria College in association with Ivan Sutherland (Beaglehole, 1946b). This was the first child clinic in the country, but others were soon to follow. With strong encouragement from James Shelley, foundation professor of education at Canterbury, a young dynamic Canterbury graduate, Clarence Beeby, was appointed in 1927 to a joint position with philosophy as director of the new psychological and educational laboratories. Beeby was later to become the first director of the New Zealand Council for Educational Research, and subsequently the director general for New Zealand. He is rightly considered one of the outstanding New Zealanders of the 20th century. Within the laboratories, a child clinic was established largely with an educational and guidance focus. However, in the clinic, Beeby, Shelley, and later, Ralph Winterbourn, tackled a wide variety of problems (Small, 1997). They included school failure, delinquent and criminal behavior, sexual difficulties, impaired speech and hearing, mental retardation, vocational choice, and employment selection. Of course, these men had

limited recourse to research in these areas. It is, therefore, not surprising to read Beeby (1992) commenting that “In fact, many of the problems brought to Shelly and me demanded little more than common sense, a measure of detachment and a willingness to look at old assumptions from a new angle” (p. 72). At Otago a child guidance clinic was formally established in 1939, having operated informally since 1934. A further significant influence on the growth of applied psychology came through the establishment of vocational guidance services throughout the country. Ralph Winterbourn, who studied under Shelley, and joined the department of education at Canterbury College as a lecturer in the 1930s, was prominent in the promotion and organization of vocational guidance services. A detailed history by Winterbourn (1974) of the early beginnings of the vocational guidance movement traces its influence in the dissemination of psychological ideas and practices. Later, as professor of education at the University of Auckland, Winterbourn instituted the country’s first professional training program in applied psychology in the field of educational psychology.

The Rise of Clinical Psychology Before the emergence of psychology as a separate academic discipline, and clinical psychology as one of its specialities, clinical psychological matters were dealt with by medical practitioners within the government’s Health Department. Some in the department were quick to criticize the early specialist training programs in clinical psychology, claiming that they lacked sufficient academic rigor (David, 1964). Ironically, the most detailed examination of early clinical practice in New Zealand was Ernest Beaglehole’s (1950) strong, but psychologically and sociologically informed, critique of the medical model adopted by those in psychological medicine within the Health Department. Beaglehole’s central contention was that “If psychiatry is to keep up this association with man as a social being, it must at least broaden its traditional and narrow medical interest and become personality-in-culture-minded” (pp. 126, 127). In his brief account of the early history of clinical psychology in New Zealand, A.J.W. Taylor (1979) suggested that Beaglehole’s critique helped fuel the antipathy sometimes displayed between clinical psychologists and psychiatrists. With the benefit of hindsight, it seems fair to say that the speciality of clinical psychology was erected on a sound theoretical and empirical footing and haig, marie

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it is now regarded as a respectable part of psychology. There was a continuing history of some mistrust between clinical psychologists and psychiatrists due in reasonable part to a difference in models of human functioning—psychosocial for the former, biological for the latter. However, in the last two decades, the adoption of a biopsychosocial outlook on mental health throughout the country has led to a complementary relationship of cooperative endeavor. There is, for example, little evidence of a power struggle between clinical psychologists and psychiatrists for leadership in psychotherapeutic practice, as there currently is in Britain. Despite its current prominence, clinical psychology as an academic specialty has a short history in New Zealand. George Shouksmith from Edinburgh arrived at the University of Canterbury “with a brief to develop applied psychology.” Although an occupational psychologist, he began the country’s first postgraduate program in clinical psychology in 1960. Two years later, this program became a postgraduate diploma. The training program comprised a 2-year M.A. in psychology, along with a certificate of proficiency in clinical psychology. A third year of probationary employment in an approved clinical setting was required for the award of the diploma. Postgraduate clinical psychology training programs were soon established in a number of other New Zealand universities. Today, six of the country’s eight universities offer such programs, with an increasing number of students undertaking doctorates as part of their clinical education. At Otago and Canterbury, clinical trainees are strongly encouraged to take doctorates as pure research degrees similar to the British doctorate. However, the establishment of doctor of education degrees in most New Zealand universities in a period after the 1990s smoothed the way for the eventual adoption of a D.Clin.Psyc. qualification at both the University of Auckland and Massey University. As Evans and Fitzgerald (2007) note, the adoption of a professional doctorate in clinical psychology in New Zealand has not provoked strong claims that it is inferior in standard to the Ph.D., as had been the case in the United States. The clinical programs differ somewhat in their subspecialties. For example, the University of Auckland places an emphasis on clinical neuropsychology, the University of Waikato gives particular attention to community psychology, and Victoria University specializes in criminal justice psychology. Understandably, the early development of formal clinical training programs in New Zealand followed 384

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the British model with local adaptations (cf. Evans & Fitzgerald, 2007). For example, the first program at the University of Canterbury was served by clinical psychologists trained at the Maudsley Hospital in London. Thus, it embraced “the Shapiro model,” with its emphasis on clinical psychologists as applied scientists using established scientific methods. Today, however, New Zealand’s programs are perhaps influenced more by psychological theory and practice from North America than from Britain or wider Europe. The “Boulder model” of the clinician as a scientist-practitioner has been touted as the dominant framework for clinical psychology in North America. New Zealand’s clinical psychology programs quickly came to adopt a variant of this model of professional practice. Prospectuses of today’s university clinical programs continue to profess allegiance to the model, although it is clear that they do not fully meet the excessive demands of the original Boulder Model, with its requirement that clinicians carry out research in addition to their evidence-based practice. Interestingly, the universities of Canterbury, Victoria, and Waikato all display a distinctive commitment to scientist-practitioner training by explicitly adopting a model of psychological assessment of a client’s problems that closely parallels the processes of modern scientific inquiry (cf. Ward, Vertue, & Haig, 1999). In contrast to the standard hypothetico-deductive picture of the clinician as a tester of hypotheses, this model articulates a broad methodological framework that sees the clinician first detect clinical phenomena and then construct explanatory case formulations to make sense of those phenomena. An important part of the history of clinical psychology in New Zealand involved the development of legislative provision for the registration and certification of psychologists. The Psychologists Act was introduced in 1981, largely as a result of considerable work undertaken by The New Zealand Psychological Society.6 The Act established a registration board, specified the criteria for registration, and put in place a set of procedures for disciplining clinical practitioners when needed. The different routes to registration all required 6 years of university study combined with relevant practical experience. Mindful of the need to assure high standards of practice, a series of critical reviews of the Psychologists Act 1981 eventually led to the establishment of two categories of registration for psychologists: general and clinical, in which clinical psychology was broadly characterized as the evaluation, care, or counselling of individuals or groups.

With continuing calls for protection of the title of “psychologist”, which the Psychologists Act did not provide, the Act was replaced in 2004, by the “overarching” Health Practitioners Competence Assurance Act 2003. This Act regulates all the health professions in New Zealand, including clinical psychologists. Its primary purpose is to ensure the health and safety of the public, which it does through protection of title and scopes of practice. The scopes for psychologists are determined by the New Zealand Psychologists Board, which became the registering authority under the 2003 Act. Currently, there are three major scopes of practice: a general “psychologist” scope and the two vocational scopes, “clinical psychologist” (and a special scope for interns) and “educational psychologist” (New Zealand Psychologists Board, 2009). Controversially, the vocational scopes are not exhaustive, for they exclude industrial and organizational and counselling psychologists, notable among others. Stanley, Manthei, and Gibson (2005) have suggested that the dominance of clinical psychologists in the vocational scopes is indicative of an attitude designed to prevent counselling psychologists from having their own scope of practice.

The Struggles of Counseling Psychology Although the history of clinical psychology as an academic speciality in New Zealand began in the early 1960s, its younger cousin, counselling psychology, did not emerge as a visible presence until the 1980s. And, in marked contrast to the popularity and influence of present-day clinical psychology, counselling psychology has fought to establish its own identity and professional recognition within psychology. Although there are expressions of cautious optimism within its ranks, it is yet to attract the degree of support comparable to that provided by Division 17 of the American Psychological Association (Stanley & Manthei, 2004). In 1983, counselling psychology gained an initial foothold within the New Zealand Psychological Society as a small interest group, and two years later formed a Division of Counselling Psychology within the Society with 32 initial members. The Division gave some institutional expression to the desire of counselling psychologists to differentiate themselves from clinical psychologists, educational psychologists, psychiatrists, and psychotherapists. It endeavored to do this by emphasizing the promotion and enhancement of the well-being of the normal person and the prevention rather than the remediation of psychological

problems. However, the Division struggled to maintain an active presence, and in 2003, a new Institute of Counselling Psychology was formed, which raised hopes for a revitalization of counselling psychology (Stanley & Manthei, 2004).7 Unlike clinical psychology, New Zealand does not award degrees with specialization in counselling psychology as such. Instead counselling psychology is embedded within 2-year master’s of education degrees, which are offered in departments and schools of education. Counselling skills and practica take the place of a research thesis, and counselling graduates receive a certificate in counselling rather than a postgraduate diploma.

Industrial/Organizational Psychology The history of industrial and organizational (I/O) psychology in New Zealand dates back to the 1920s, when staff within the colleges of the federal university began to apply psychology to workrelated organizations (Jamieson & Paterson, 1993). On Ernest Beaglehole’s initiative, the British psychologist Leslie Hernshaw was brought to New Zealand from the National Institute of Industrial Research in England in 1939, to establish I/O psychology at Victoria College. From there, Hernshaw moved in 1942 to head the industrial psychology division of the department of industrial and scientific research. Five years later, he returned to England and a professorship in psychology at the University of Liverpool. At Canterbury College, the professor of education, James Shelley, who had wide-ranging interests, lectured in the field and engaged in vocational testing at the psychological laboratory he helped set up in 1927. Clarence Beeby continued this work and did some industrial research, while Ralph Winterbourn’s work in the clinic in the 1930s focused on vocational guidance. The spread of World War II into the Pacific region also played a direct hand in the promotion and development of I/O psychology in New Zealand. In particular, it led, in 1947, to the establishment of an Industrial Psychology Division within the Department of Industrial and Scientific Research, which was later transferred to the Department of Labour and Employment. The Division was committed to helping fulfil the strong need to significantly increase the levels of industrial production within the country, which it did through research, education, and service (Hearnshaw, 1948). Much of the development of I/O psychology in New Zealand in the last 50 years has taken place within the universities. The first university to include haig, marie

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I/O psychology in its curriculum was Canterbury. Massey University followed, and was joined later by the universities of Auckland and Waikato. Today, the psychology departments of these universities offer master’s degrees and/or postgraduate diplomas. Canterbury, for example, offers a master’s in applied psychology (endorsed in I/O psychology), and a postgraduate diploma. These were introduced through the initiative of the long-serving member of staff, Bruce Jamieson, in 1993 and 1986, respectively. In contrast with the number of clinical psychologists in the universities, the number of I/O psychologists has always been small. Currently, about a dozen of them are distributed across the psychology departments of the four universities, with a smaller number located in departments of management. Despite their small numbers, they have frequent interaction with their Australian counterparts and strongly participate in the interdisciplinary global network of I/O psychologists (O’Driscoll, Carr, & Forsyth, 2007). In the 1970s, the Division of Industrial/Organisational Psychology was formed within the New Zealand Psychological Society and today has a membership of around 100–150 individuals. Most of these are employed in consulting firms and the human resource sections of companies. All of the psychology departments with an I/O presence offer training programs leading to a specialization at the master’s level, and the further possibility for postgraduate diploma work and registration. Broadly speaking, the I/O programs subscribe to a scientist-practitioner model of training. Consistent with this model, I/O psychology is clearly viewed as scientific in nature, with course work in research methods, statistics, and measurement in addition to specific content areas. Although there is limited opportunity for I/O graduate trainees to apply what they have learned in real-world settings, most of them satisfy the practitioner component of the model in their employment in applied settings. Interestingly, Stuart Carr at Massey University has recently advocated a humanistic view of the scientist-practitioner in the field and made constructive suggestions about ways in which I/O psychologists can bring their knowledge and skills to bear on alleviating world poverty (Carr, 2007).

The Contemporary Scene Although at its beginning New Zealand psychology was predominantly influenced by British psychology, its current disposition is largely indistinguishable 386

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from mainstream Anglo-American psychology. However, despite its international character, it has a number of mildly distinctive features. We confine our attention to the unusual prominence of radical behaviorism, theoretical psychology, and indigenous Maori psychology.

The Prominence of Behaviorism Many things have been said about the nature and influence of behaviorism in psychology. The radical behaviorism of B. F. Skinner, and its modern manifestation in the experimental analysis of behavior, is commonly said to have dominated Anglo-American psychology from about 1930 through to 1960. Historians of New Zealand psychology have suggested that it also dominated New Zealand psychology, specifically during the later period of the 1960s and 1970s. Shouksmith (1992), for example, using the words of colleagues, said of this period “Such was the domination of behaviourism, even if it was . . . ‘a blind alley that had run its course’ . . . [it] had become for New Zealand a philosophical system ‘amounting to a religious dogma and theology.’” (p. 313). In our judgment, this is not an accurate assessment of the situation. Modern textbooks have frequently portrayed the history of 20th-century North American psychology as a series of Kuhnian revolutions, in which the introspectionist paradigm was replaced by a behaviorist paradigm in the 1920s, which in turn was replaced by cognitive psychology in the late 1950s. The history of North American psychology is not captured well by Kuhn’s theory of paradigms (Leahey, 1992), and the same can be said of New Zealand. The history of disciplinary change within the sciences suggests that multiple paradigms exert their influence within a discipline at any given time. For psychology generally, and New Zealand psychology specifically, this means that behaviorism was never the dominant paradigm that eclipsed rival paradigms. Nor is there good evidence to suggest that behaviorism was a theoretical blind alley that had run its course and been replaced by a rival paradigm. To the contrary, operant behaviorism remains alive and well in New Zealand psychology departments, as we shall indicate in a moment. Nor is it fair to characterize operant behaviorism in New Zealand as a philosophical system whose adherents held it akin to a religious dogma and theology. Indeed, Skinner’s extensive theoretical writings provide many arguments for his empiricist view of psychology, and his New Zealand followers were persuaded by these in

their subscription to radical behaviorism. Furthermore, these arguments were often made explicit in their teaching and research. Operant behaviorism is strongly represented in a number of New Zealand psychology departments. It was the British psychologist Leslie Reid (1924–), who brought operant psychology to New Zealand in the late 1950s. Reid had spent a year as a graduate student at Skinner’s laboratory at Harvard before taking up a lectureship in psychology at Canterbury. Michael Davidson, also from Britain, came to New Zealand as a postgraduate student in 1965. He has been an active and influential researcher in the operant field for more than 30 years at the University of Auckland, sometimes in collaboration with Dianne McCarthy and Doug Elliff. At Canterbury, Neville Blampied, Anthony McLean, and Randolph Grace have all contributed to the literature on operant conditioning, and pursued other research interests at the same time. The same can be said of Geoff White at Otago. However, it should not be thought that operant behaviorism is, or has been, the prevailing paradigm in New Zealand psychology. For example, Barney Sampson, a graduate from McGill University in Canada, brought to Auckland a broad Hebbian approach to experimental psychology, and psychology there has remained broadly experimental since. New Zealand’s most distinguished contemporary academic psychologist, Michael Corballis, also a McGill graduate, has fashioned a long and productive career in experimental research, with particular emphasis on brain laterality (e.g., Corballis, 1983). It is true that operant behaviorism seems to have had a more visible presence in New Zealand, compared with Britain and the United States, but an inspection of both published research and curriculum offerings clearly shows that New Zealand psychology in the last 50 years has been highly varied and multiparadigmatic in character.

The Unusual Presence of Theoretical Psychology The bulk of scientific research in psychology is concerned both with the detection of empirical phenomena and the construction of explanatory theories, although psychologists around the world give more attention to the empirical than the theoretical task. However, quite a number of psychologists in New Zealand have shown a strong concern with meta-theoretical issues in their discipline, a matter that has not always met with approval. From the 1950s through to the 1970s,

Cyril Adcock (1904–1987) of Victoria University leavened his research in personality and psychometrics with an examination of the nature of theory construction in psychology. More recently, at Victoria, John McClure’s theoretically informed interests in social perception and judgment have focused on people’s explanatory attributions of other people’s actions. McClure was a student of Graham Vaughan, long a productive researcher in social psychology at the University of Auckland. Vaughan was a firm believer in the value of theoretical psychology, and he strongly encouraged able graduate students with theoretical proclivities to engage in theoretical scholarship. Also at Victoria, Tony Ward’s diverse theoretical interests in clinical psychology have included a systematic study of the implications of naturalism for theory construction and clinical practice. Peter McKellar (1921–2003), professor of psychology at the University of Otago from 1968 until 1986, was a psychologist in the mould of William James. With a longstanding interest in human subjective experience as a proper part of psychology’s subject matter, McKellar defended and used introspective inquiry to conduct what he called “psychological natural history” in the domains of cognitive, abnormal, and cross-cultural psychology. Perhaps most significantly, he gave major impetus to the scientific study of mental imagery before the advent of the so-called “cognitive revolution” (McKellar, 1957). Theoretical psychology has had a visible presence at the University of Canterbury since the late 1970s. Ken Strongman, who has been professor of psychology there since 1979, has had an enduring interest in the study of emotion, and was principally involved in the explication and comparative evaluation of theories of emotion. It is unusual, but noteworthy, that three of his doctoral students in the 1990s—Kevin Moore, Darren Walton, and Gavin Sullivan—all undertook systematic investigations of Wittgenstein’s philosophical work and its implications for psychological science (Moore, 2000; Sullivan & Strongman, 2003; Walton & Strongman, 1998). In addition to his primary interests in the study of intimate relationships, Garth Fletcher has conducted a lengthy investigation and defence of the scientific credibility of folk psychology (Fletcher, 1995). Brian Haig, too, has been active in theoretical psychology during this period, concentrating on the conceptual foundations of behavioral research methods (e.g., Haig, 2005). Finally, Dannette Marie critically examined the notion of the mental health haig, marie

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of Maori in the 1990s from a scientific realist philosophical perspective (Marie, 1999) and, in the last few years, she has, in collaboration with Brian Haig, critiqued the political and methodological foundations of kaupapa Maori research (Marie & Haig, 2006). Despite the conduct of a considerable amount of research in theoretical psychology carried out in New Zealand, its presence is not looked upon with great favor by empirical researchers in the field. Theoretical psychology has a small presence in the university curriculum as it does in Australia. This contrasts with the current state of affairs in Britain. The British Psychological Society now requires departments to offer course material on historical and conceptual issues in order that graduating students who qualify for the society’s membership have a more informed understanding of the theoretical underpinnings of psychology (Sullivan, 2008). A number of scholars in New Zealand psychology departments have also actively engaged in feminist research and theorizing.8 Similar to Britain and the United States, however, the feminist or women’s perspective of psychology emerged in New Zealand during the 1970s and 1980s. The first conference on feminism and psychology was convened in Auckland in 1977. The following year, a proposal was submitted to The New Zealand Psychological Society advocating that a women’s-only division be established. This proposal was rejected by the society on the grounds that it was discriminatory and therefore unlawful. Thus, the fledgling academic feminist psychology in New Zealand was effectively stymied (Lapsley & Ritchie, 1997). In spite of this organizational setback, Waikato University offered the first course on psychology and women in 1984 (Lapsley & Wilkinson, 2001). It is during this period that a gender reversal in student numbers also occurred. Traditionally, more males graduated from the discipline with higher degrees than females, but this was to change quite dramatically from the 1980s onward, with women graduates dominating (Jackson, 1997b). Because feminist psychology lacks a professional infrastructure in New Zealand and has never been an integral component of the discipline, its character and status over the last two decades have been difficult to assess. This is compounded by the fact that tenets of a feminist psychology and the psychology of gender are taught in other fields such as education, gender studies, and sociology. Nevertheless, two distinguishing features of New Zealand feminist 388

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psychology are worth noting. One is the pronounced commitment to grounding issues in the local context. This commitment was put to the test when Maori women opted to shift their allegiance from feminism to the cause of Maori ethnic solidarity during the early 1980s. Paradoxically, the effect of this shift not only fractured the feminist movement in New Zealand, but also put a stop to any immediate hope for the development of a local and unified feminist psychology. A second distinguishing feature is that feminist psychologists have favored social constructivism as an epistemological framework, which might indicate a subtle continuation of the British influence on New Zealand psychology (Lapsley, Gavey, & Cram, 2001). Feminist psychology in New Zealand has recently drawn a strategic alliance with critical psychology, and there are researchers throughout the country who advocate this combined approach. Among them, Mandy Morgan at Massey University has been actively engaged for the last 15 years in metatheoretical scholarship on various aspects of the discipline of discursive psychology, including the nature of discursive analysis itself.

An Indigenous Psychology in the Antipodes The emergence of a specific focus on the psychology of Maori has its origins in early New Zealand ethnography and missionary ethnology. The second wave of interest in the area began in the late 19th century when there were fears that Maori were, to use the vernacular of the period, “a dying race” heading for extinction. Elsdon Best (1974; 1978), who constructed the “mythopoetic Maori,” was a significant contributor during this time, and his views about Maori and spirituality for example remain influential to this day. The psychological-anthropology tradition was introduced to New Zealand during this second wave and brought with it the cultureand-personality school. The applied focus of this school has mainly involved examining how Maori have assimilated into an urban environment. Educational attainment by Maori has also been a traditional focus. During the 1950s, psychoanalytic theories and models were employed in this research, as exemplified in the studies undertaken by Ernest and Pearl Beaglehole at Otaki and continued in the work of James and Jane Ritchie and other investigators at Murupara (Beaglehole & Ritchie, 1958; Metge & Dugal, 1958). As the influence of the psychoanalytic perspective waned, members of the culture-and-personality school combined the assumptions of cultural relativism with the methods

commonly used in experimental social psychology to create a cross-cultural synthesis (cf. Ritchie and Ritchie, 1999). Along with this shift, the focus on researching Maori shifted slightly toward examining issues involving psychological development with an emphasis on identity. A further interest involved investigating interethnic relationships including the issue of prejudice experienced by Maori. Graham Vaughan at Auckland, the Ritchies and David Thomas at Waikato, and Colleen Ward at Victoria have all been active in these areas (Vaughan, 1978; Thomas & Nikora, 1994; Ritchie & Ritchie, 1999; Ward, 2006). One of the characteristics common to contributors in this field is their commitment to the sociopolitical ideology of New Zealand biculturalism. The use of the acculturative stress model to examine problems in which Maori do not fare as well as their New Zealand counterparts has also been popular (Ratima, Potaka, Durie, & Ratima, 1993). It is unfortunate, however, that the historical assumptions underpinning the concept of acculturation and the psychometric properties of the model, have not been critically examined by those who favor it as an explanatory framework. A further problem evident in this focus of the second wave has been the detemporalizing of contemporary Maori, whereby concepts such as tapu (sacred) and whakama (shame), for example, are described as commonly influencing the mental states of Maori. Generally, such work does not include the caveat that today this is more likely to be the exception rather than the rule, and seldom do contributors to this literature provide empirical data to support their assertions (e.g., Sachdev, 1989, 1990). The third wave of interest in the psychology of Maori was stimulated by what is often referred to in New Zealand as “the Maori renaissance.” This renaissance9 arose in the 1970s, after a number of issues involving Maori rights and representation coalesced. The result was the development of a movement based on Maori ethnic solidarity. A dominant feature of this movement was the urgency placed on revitalizing Maori tribal structures, cultural customs, and personal identity. Health and education were considered suitable domains in which to introduce rejuvenating Maori cultural views. It is through the theoretical and applied associations that both health and education have with behavior that we see the emergence of the third-wave focus on Maori and psychology. Significantly, however, while the first and second wave interest was driven by what are colloquially known as “outsiders” or non-Maori investigators,

the third wave was principally focused on fostering a Maori-specific psychology by Maori and for Maori. Maori psychology, which is also referred to in New Zealand as “indigenous psychology” and “kaupapa Maori psychology,” emerged as a political reaction to so-called Western psychology (Abbot & Durie, 1987; Allwood & Berry, 2006). As part of the drive for Maori self-determination, which coincided with the rise of postmodernism in the social sciences, the notion that culture was the major determinant of identity for Maori, and therefore of cognition and behavior, took hold. Although reflecting assumptions evident in the first and second waves, the distinction during this period is that by adopting these assumptions themselves, Maori were able to provide them with a mark of unquestionable authenticity and authority. Sets of cultural dichotomies that were originally developed in anthropology, which outlined fundamental differences between Maori and other New Zealanders, were also revived in order to scaffold Maori models of health and education. The two models that have been influential in New Zealand psychology include te whare tapa wha (the four-sided house), which was developed by Mason Durie (1994), a prominent Maori transcultural psychiatrist, and te wheke (the octopus) developed by Rangimarie Rose Pere (1991), a Maori educationalist. These metaphoric frameworks are based on a loosely sketched holism in which the well-being of the collective serves as an index for the health of the individual. Both perspectives continue to be prominent in the development of social policies aimed at improving Maori representation and performance across the public sector. They have also served as the conceptual basis for therapeutic practices and interventions that target Maori. Because both frameworks reject orthodox psychology, including conventional methodology, on the grounds that they are “articles of import,” the reliability and validity of measures developed from them have not been properly evaluated. Maori psychology is particularly active at the universities of Massey and Waikato in the North Island of New Zealand, and it is often taught as a subfield of the discipline proper at other universities. This is particularly the case with respect to clinical psychology training. The New Zealand Psychologists Board has devised guidelines for standards of cultural competence for psychologists wanting to register under the Health Practitioners Competence Assurance Act 2003. These standards haig, marie

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require psychologists to accept uncritically, among other things, the validity of the etic and emic distinction promoted in cultural anthropology. Although there is no specific division in the New Zealand Psychological Society for Maori psychology, there is a National Standing Committee on Bicultural Issues, in which Maori psychologists exert considerable influence over the professional direction taken by the discipline. In March 2005, The Journal of New Zealand Psychology dedicated an entire issue to Maori psychology. No papers in the issue considered the origins of Maori psychology, nor submitted the ideas of Maori psychology to critical evaluation.

Present and Future Challenges Improving Psychology as a Science Most scientific research in New Zealand psychology today takes on the character of mainstream AngloAmerican psychology. Thus, it shares the strengths and weaknesses of the latter. With reference to the New Zealand scene where appropriate, we briefly point to a number of ways in which we think psychology in the English-speaking world can improve the quality of its research. It is often said that science is centrally concerned with the detection of empirical phenomena and the construction of theories to both explain and predict those phenomena. Although psychology has addressed both of these tasks, it has tended to give more attention to the former. Phenomena detection in psychology typically involves the use of statistical procedures to establish empirical generalizations. One of the best-known recent instances of phenomena detection in psychology is due to the labors of the American-born New Zealand political scientist and moral psychologist James Flynn (1934–), who, in the 1980s, discovered a consistent pattern of intergenerational gains in IQ scores (Flynn, 1987). Given that the detection of empirical phenomena is an important part of scientific progress, psychological researchers can improve their research efforts by emphasizing the importance of constructive replication as a means of phenomena detection. To do this, the field needs to abandon its penchant for establishing statistically significant differences and look to discover “significant samenesses.” The research goal here is not to fathom what model best fits a set of data but to ascertain whether the model holds across different data sets. Good science is as much concerned with the explanation of empirical phenomena as it is with 390

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their initial detection. Although psychologists’ statistical methods speak primarily to the detection of empirical phenomena, the past four decades in particular have witnessed significant advances in the methodology of theory construction. The advent of structural equation modelling in quantitative psychology, and the adoption of grounded theory method by qualitative researchers are two prominent cases in point. With the codification of methods of theory generation, theory development, and theory appraisal, psychology is now positioned to give its researchers helpful methodological advice on how to build worthwhile explanatory theories. The American Psychological Association has been active in promoting the informed use of statistical methods (Wilkinson & the Task Force on Statistical Inference, 1999). It now needs to provide helpful guidelines and proper explanatory justifications for carrying out the various tasks of theory construction. One important feature of theory appraisal in science is the repeated evaluation of theories as they are developed. The Hungarian philosopher of science, Imre Lakatos, developed a methodology of scientific research programs that enables researchers to evaluate theories for their contribution, to ongoing research programs (Lakatos, 1970). For Lakatos, good theories are judged to be theoretically progressive. Poor theories are judged to be theoretically degenerating. This methodology has had limited appeal in psychology. However, Bruce Ellis, formerly of the University of Canterbury, has shown how Lakatos’s methodology can illuminate the structure of evolutionary psychology, which he judges to be both theoretically and empirically progressive (Ketelaar & Ellis, 2000). It is to be hoped that more psychologists will endeavor to evaluate their theories with explicit regard for their developmental progress. As the principal discoverer of the phenomenon of intergenerational IQ score gains, James Flynn has gone on to theorize about the likely causes of these consistent gains, and other puzzling matters, by developing a new model of the interaction of genes and environment in collaboration with Williams Dickens of the Brookings Institution in the United States (Dickens & Flynn, 2001). Apart from offering a promising theory for a striking empirical phenomenon, Flynn’s research strategy is notable for its fact-before-theory sequences. This strategy is much more common in science than psychologists tend to realize, and it provides a needed complement to psychology’s longstanding emphasis

on the hypothetico-deductive testing of hypotheses and theories. Finally, psychology can look to improve the quality of its research by making a more deliberate effort to educate researchers about the methodological foundations of the methods they use. By and large, psychologists are reluctant to think critically about the research methods they use. Learning about their methods through methodology will enable researchers to better appreciate how particular research methods can properly contribute to the research process. In this regard, former New Zealander and prominent philosopher of science Rom Harré, who has made important contributions to psychological meta-theory, has shown how the philosophy of science can be constructed as science criticism to revise and improve the pedagogy of social psychological research (Harré, 1983). More generally, Proctor and Capaldi (2001) have urged psychologists to replace the narrow conception of science that pervades standard methodology texts with appropriate philosophy of science literatures in order to provide a more informed and up-to-date coverage of matters such as hypothesis testing, the role of explanation in science, and the importance of research traditions in science.

The Rift Between Academic and Professional Psychology In 1990, Michael Corballis insightfully reported on the uneasy tension that has developed in New Zealand psychology departments between the academic interests of many of its staff and the clinical interests of most of its students, a tension that seems less evident in I/O psychology. Although clinical practitioners pay homage to the scientistpractitioner model, their value system is basically different from that of scientists (Bevan, 1982; Corballis, 1990a). Far more psychology students take psychology to gain admission into clinical psychology programs than to learn about the science of psychology or to become behavioral scientists. This basic difference has been the well-spring for the institutional separation of basic and professional psychology in New Zealand in the last two decades. In the 1970s and 1980s, the New Zealand Psychological Society’s annual conference was a major meeting place for both academic and professional psychologists. Today, the situation is quite different. Academic psychologists no longer regard the conference as a major forum for presenting their ideas, choosing instead to present at conferences that cater to their academic specialties. The Society

is dominated by the professional interests of clinical psychologists, and to a lesser extent, I/O psychologists. The formation of the New Zealand College of Clinical Psychologists in 1989, as a specific service organization for clinical psychologists, has served to reinforce the institutional division between academic and clinical psychologists. Commentaries on Corballis’s (1990a) article, and his reply to them (Corballis, 1990b), make clear that the implications of the rift between academic and clinical psychologists for the integrity of psychology as a discipline in New Zealand are far from obvious and are a matter of some debate. Corballis concluded his examination of this challenging issue as follows: I really have no fears for the health of research psychology. I suspect that the major issues lie within professional psychology, but the appeal of psychology as a mental health profession is so great that it will surely survive. The decisions that have to be made concern how professional psychology should be organized, how and where training should take place, what is the right mix of academic and practical training, and how to inject greater cultural sensitivity. My guess is that the two sides of psychology will continue to draw increasingly apart. However, if professional psychology is given greater autonomy, my hope is that it will continue to draw on relevant aspects of psychological science, as well as on other disciplines, in a university setting. (Corballis, 1990, pp. 104–105)

That Corballis offered no solutions to the challenges he raised is indicative of the enormity of the task and suggests that the relationship between the scientist and the clinician remains as a matter of major importance for New Zealand psychologists to grapple with.

A Final Word As noted earlier, Maori scholars and some feminists, influenced by postmodernist thinking, have mounted a number of attacks on mainstream New Zealand psychology by criticizing the widely accepted mental outlook known as the Enlightenment (cf. Shimony, 1997). Attacks on the Enlightenment’s core commitment to the ideal of universal human rationality and its advanced expression in modern empirical scientific psychology, have been met with virtual silence, largely because of the powerful forces of political correctness currently at work in New Zealand society. Karl Popper was a passionate defender of the Enlightenment ideals haig, marie

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and strongly defended them by writing his influential book The Open Society and Its Enemies (1945) during his time in New Zealand. He also helped promote the importance of research within the university colleges at a time when it was undervalued. We believe psychologists are well justified in defending the values that emerged from the historical tradition of the Enlightenment and that they should be encouraged to enrich them with the hardwon products of modern psychological research and practice.

Future Directions Topics of interest for future research include: • The evolution of the New Zealand Psychological Society and its influence on the governance and character of psychology in New Zealand • The nature of Maori psychology and its relation to other indigenous psychologies, and to orthodox psychological science • The history of modern clinical psychology in New Zealand • The establishment of interdisciplinary relations of New Zealand psychology and other behavioral and social sciences • The origin and character of qualitative research traditions within New Zealand psychology.

5. The book was first published in German under the title, Logik der forschung in 1934 (with a 1935 imprint). A revised English translation was published as The Logic of Scientific Discovery in 1959, after which time its falsificationist view of science began to exert an influence in English philosophy and science. However, the impact of the book on the discipline of psychology has been more apparent than real. 6. The New Zealand Psychological Society was formed as an independent entity in 1968. Since that time, it has acted as a major focus for academic and professional psychologists in New Zealand. Before 1968, its functions were discharged by a New Zealand Branch of the British Psychological Society, many of whose members were also members of the British Psychological Society. A history of the formation of the Branch and its activities is provided by Mitchell (1961). The New Zealand Psychological Society comprises a number of area interest divisions, runs an annual conference, and publishes The New Zealand Journal of Psychology (St. George, 1987). Currently, the Society has nearly 1,000 full members and just over 200 student subscribers. 7. The New Zealand Psychologists Board finally granted counselling psychology a vocational scope of practice in 2010, after this chapter was completed. 8. St. George (1990) notes that there is no research on the place of women in New Zealand psychology. He tentatively suggests two names of women who might have contributed to the early development of New Zealand psychology: Catherine Braddock, who, not incidentally, was mentored by Thomas Hunter at Victoria College, where she graduated with a M.A. in 1916 and then went on to work with Titchener at Cornell University; and Avis Dry, who was perhaps the first woman to complete a doctorate in psychology in New Zealand. 9. Of interest is that the Maori renaissance was a secondwave renaissance, with the first having occurred in the 1920s. The concept of “Maoritanga,” which the second-wave renaissance reignited, was promoted during the 1920s in an attempt to present a unified Maori front (Webster, 1998).

Notes 1. There were, however, a myriad of contributors who had, since first contact between Maori and Europeans, contributed various reports of a psychological nature about Maori customs and behaviors. For example, in the same year that Otago University College was established, Sir George Grey presented a paper to the Ethnological Society of London entitled “On the social life of the ancient inhabitants of New Zealand, and on the national character it was likely to form.” Another popular outlet for mainly ethnological treatments on topics involving Maori was The Journal of the Polynesian Society, which is recognized as the earliest published anthropological journal. 2. In the same year, the four University Colleges in Dunedin, Christchurch, Wellington, and Auckland had become a federation, so that graduating students were awarded degrees from the “University of New Zealand.” 3. Of interest is the fact that some of these commitments involved working as a consultant for the United States Bureau of Indian Affairs and researching the customs of the Hopi people of Arizona, on whom the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis was based. 4. Peter Buck and Apirana Ngata had attended Te Aute Anglican College together and were prominent leaders of the Young Maori Party. Ngata was the protégé of James Carroll and served as Acting Prime Minister of New Zealand for a short period in 1931. Buck and Ngata both supported the use of anthropology as an administrative tool to develop policies concerning Maori affairs (Webster, 1998).

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Further Reading Kemp, S. (2007). The history of early psychological research in New Zealand. In A. Weatherall, M. Wilson, D. Harper, & J. McDowall (Eds.), Psychology in Aotearoa/New Zealand (pp. 1–6). Auckland: Pearson. Martin, A. H. (1925). The present status of psychology. Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy, 3, 40–51. O’Driscoll, M. P. (2007). Organizational psychology in Australia and New Zealand: Reflections on the recent past and issues for future research and practice. In A. I. Glendon, B. M. Thompson, & B. Myors (Eds.), Advances in organizational psychology (pp. 465–481). Brisbane: Australian Academic Press. Shouksmith, G, & Shoukshmith, E. A. (1990). Psychology in Asia and the Pacific: Status reports on teaching and researching in eleven countries. Bangkok: UNESCO. St. George, R. (Ed.). (1979). The beginnings of psychology in New Zealand: A collection of historical documents and recollections. Delta Research Monograph, No. 2, 95pp.

References Abbot, M., & Durie, M. (1987). A whiter shade of pale: Taha Maori and professional psychology training. New Zealand Journal of Psychology, 16, 58–77.

Allwood, C. M., & Berry, J. W. (2006). Origins and development of indigenous psychologies: An international analysis. International Journal of Psychology, 41, 243–268. Ausubel, D. P. (1960). Acculturative stress in modern Maori adolescence. Child Development, 31, 617–631. Beaglehole, E. (1931). Property: A study in social psychology. London: Allen & Unwin. Beaglehole, E. (1937). Some modern Hawaiians. Honolulu: University of Hawaii. Beaglehole, E. (1938). Ethnology of Pukapuka. Bernice P. Bishop Museum Bulletin 150. Honolulu: Bishop Museum. Beaglehole, E., & Beaglehole, P. (1946a). Some modern Maoris. Wellington, NZ: New Zealand Council for Educational Research. Beaglehole, E. (Ed.). (1946b). The university of the community: Essays in honour of Thomas Alexander Hunter. Wellington, NZ: Victoria University College. Beaglehole, E. (1950). Mental health in New Zealand. Wellington, NZ: New Zealand University Press. Beaglehole, E., & Ritchie, J. E. (1958). The Rakau Maori studies. The Journal of the Polynesian Society, 67, 132–154. Beaglehole, T. (1996). Hunter, Thomas Alexander 1876–1953. In Dictionary of New Zealand biography Vol. 3 (1901–1920). Wellington, NZ: Ministry of Culture and Heritage. Beeby, C. E. (1979). Psychology in New Zealand fifty years ago. In R. St. George (Ed.), The beginnings of psychology in New Zealand (pp. 1–6). Delta Research Monograph, No.: 2. Beeby, C. E. (1992). The biography of an idea: Beeby on education. Wellington, NZ: New Zealand Council for Educational Research. Best, E. (1974). The Maori as he was. Wellington, NZ: A. R. Shearer, Government Printer. (Original work published 1924). Best, E. (1978). Spiritual and mental concepts of the Maori. Wellington, NZ: E. C. Keating, Government Printer. (Original work published 1922). Bevan, W. (1982). The sermon of sorts in three parts. American Psychologist, 37, 1303–1322. Brown, L. B., & Fuchs, A. H. (1971). Early experimental psychology in New Zealand: The Hunter-Titchener letters. Journal of the History of the Behavioural Sciences, 7, 10–22. Carr, S. C. (2007). I-O psychology and poverty reduction: Past, present, and future? The Industrial-Organizational Psychologist, 45, 43–50. Corballis, M. C. (1983). Human laterality. New York: Academic Press. Corballis, M. C. (1990a). The two profiles of psychology. New Zealand Journal of Psychology, 19, 2–8. Corballis, M. C. (1990b). A two-faced reply. New Zealand Journal of Psychology, 19, 101–105. David. H. R. (Ed.). (1964). International resources in clinical psychology. New York: McGraw Hill. Dickens, W. T., & Flynn, J. R. (2001). Heritability estimates versus large environmental effects: The IQ paradox resolved. Psychological Review, 108, 346–369. Durie, M. H. (1994). Whaiora. Auckland, NZ: Oxford University Press. Evans, I. M., & Fitzgerald, J. (2007). Integrating research and practice in professional psychology: Models and paradigms. In I. M. Evans, J. J. Rucklidge, & M. O’Driscoll (Eds.), Professional practice of psychology in Aotearoa/New Zealand (pp. 283–300). Wellington, NZ: New Zealand Psychological Society.

Ferguson, H. H. (1979). Psychology at the University of Otago and beyond with special reference to the period 1931–1938. In R. St. George (Ed.), The beginnings of psychology in New Zealand (pp. 7–21). Delta Research Monograph, No. 2. Firth, R. (1929). The primitive economics of the New Zealand Maori. London: Routledge. Fletcher, G. (1995). The scientific credibility of folk psychology. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. Flynn, J. R. (1987). Massive IQ gains in 14 nations: What IQ tests really measure. Psychological Bulletin, 101, 171–191. Graham, J. (1981). Settler society. In W. H. Oliver, & B. R. Williams (Eds.), The Oxford history of New Zealand (pp. 112–139). Auckland, NZ: Oxford University Press. Haig, B. D. (2005). An abductive theory of scientific method. Psychological Methods, 10, 371–388. Harré, R. (1983). History and philosophy of science in the pedagogical process. In R. W. Home (Ed.), Science under scrutiny (pp. 139–157). Dordrecht, DE: Reidel. Hearnshaw, L. S. (1948). Industrial psychology in New Zealand. Occupational Psychology, 22, 134–139. Hearnshaw, L. S. (1965). Psychology in New Zealand – a report. Bulletin of the British Psychological Society, 18, 17–24. Hunter, T. (1952). The development of psychology in New Zealand. Quarterly Bulletin of the British Psychological Society, 3, 101–111. Jackson, P. (1997a). The early days of academic psychology in New Zealand: Otago’s philosophers. In G. M. Habermann (Ed.), Proceedings of the 1997 Annual Conference of the New Zealand Psychological Society, pp. 108–115. New Zealand: Psychological Society. Jackson, P. (1997b). Sex, history and psychology: Gender reversal in the production of psychology theses in New Zealand universities. In G. M. Habermann (Ed.), Proceedings of the 1997 Annual Conference of the New Zealand Psychological Society, pp. 116–121. New Zealand: Psychological Society. Jamieson, B., & Patterson, J. (1993). Industrial/organisational psychology in New Zealand. New Zealand Journal of Psychology, 22, 1–8. Kazantziz, N., & Deane, F. P. (1998). Theoretical orientations of New Zealand psychologists: An international comparison. Journal of Psychotherapy Integration, 8, 97–113. Ketelaar, T., & Ellis, B. J. (2000). Are evolutionary explanations unfalsifiable? Evolutionary psychology and the Lakatosian philosophy of science. Psychological Inquiry, 11, 1–21. Lakatos, I. (1970). Falsification and the methodology of scientific research programmes. In I. Lakatos, & A. Musgrave (Eds.), Criticism and the growth of knowledge (pp. 91–195). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Lapsley, H., & Ritchie, J. (1997). Women and psychology in New Zealand. Bulletin of New Zealand Psychological Society, 92, 26–29. Lapsley, H., & Wilkinson, S. (2001). Organizing feminist psychology in New Zealand. Feminism & Psychology, 11, 275–278. Lapsley, H., Gavey, N., & Cram, F. (2001). Editors’ introduction: Feminist psychology in Aotearoa/New Zealand. Feminism & Psychology, 11, 275–278. Leahey, T. H. (1992). The mythical revolutions of American psychology. American Psychologist, 47, 308–318. McKellar, T. P. H. (1957). Imagination and thinking: A psychological analysis. London: Cohen & West.

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Shimony, A. (1997). Some historical and philosophical reflections on science and enlightenment. Philosophy of Science, 64(Supplement), 1–14. Shouksmith, G. (1992). New Zealand. In V. S. Sexton, & J. D. Hogan (Eds.), International psychology: Views from around the world (pp. 303–313). Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press. Stanley, P., & Manthei, R. (2004). Counselling psychology in New Zealand: The quest for identity and recognition. Counselling Psychology Quarterly, 17, 301–315. Stanley, P., Manthei, R., & Gibson, K. (2005). The case for counselling psychology as an additional psychological speciality: A response to Fitzgerald and others. The Bulletin, 103, 26–28. Sullivan, G. B. (2008). What is the status of theoretical psychology in Australia and New Zealand? An investigation of contemporary teaching and research issues. Australian Psychologist, 43, 61–73. Sullivan, G. B., & Strongman, K. T. (2003). Vacillating and mixed emotions: A conceptual-discursive perspective on contemporary emotion and cognitive appraisal theories through examples of pride. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, 33, 201–224. Sutherland, I. L. G. (1935). The Maori situation. Wellington, NZ: Harry. H. Tombs. Taylor, A. J. W. (1979). Clinical psychology in New Zealand: An historical note. In R. St. George (Ed.), The beginnings of psychology in New Zealand (pp. 70–76). Delta Research Monograph, No.: 2. Tennant, M. (1993). MacGregor, Duncan 1843–1906. Dictionary of New Zealand biography Vol. 2 (1870–1900). Wellington, NZ: Ministry of Culture and Heritage. Thomas, D., & Nikora, L. (1994). Maori, Pakeha and New Zealander. Ethnic and national identity among New Zealand students. Journal of Intercultural Studies, 1, 29–40. Vaughan, G. (1978). Social change and intergroup preferences in New Zealand. European Journal of Social Psychology, 8, 297–314. Veatch, R. (2005). Disrupted dialogue: Medical ethics and the collapse of the physician-humanist communication: New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Walton, D., & Strongman, K. T. (1998). Neonate Crusoes, the private language argument, and psychology. Philosophical Psychology, 11, 443–465. Ward, T., Vertue, F., & Haig, B. D. (1999). Abductive method and clinical assessment in practice. Behaviour Change, 16, 64–73. Ward, C. (2006). Acculturation, identity and adaptation in dual heritage adolescents. International Journal of Intercultural Relations, 30, 243–259. Webster, S. (1998). Patrons of Maori culture. Dunedin, NZ: University of Otago Press. Wilkinson, L., & the Task Force on Statistical Inference. (1999). Statistical methods in psychology journals: Guidelines and explanations. American Psychologist, 54, 594–604. Winterbourn, R. (1974). Guidance services in New Zealand education. Wellington, NZ: New Zealand Council for Educational Research.

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Philippines

Rogelia Pe-Pua and Pia-Anna Perfecto-Ramos

Abstract This chapter traces the development of Philippine psychology from the introduction of a Western academic-scientific psychology in the early 1900s to the emergence of a Sikolohiyang Pilipino (Filipino psychology) indigenous perspective in the 1970s. It highlights the humble beginnings of the various psychology departments at different universities around the country, led primarily by Filipinos schooled abroad who were ardent followers of Piaget, Skinner, Freud, and the like. A shift toward a more nationalistic spirit led to the discovery of Filipino psychological concepts and methods. Debates involving the duality between Western psychology and indigenous Filipino psychology persist, yet acceptance and tolerance of both schools of thought is observed. To date, Filipino psychologists continue to discover and develop different ways and means of localizing, contextualizing, and indigenizing their topics, their means of doing research, and their manner of analyzing data. Western psychology also continues to be a strong force in the Philippines. Keywords: Academic-scientific, Filipino psychology, Sikolohiyang Pilipino, indigenization

Psychology has been in existence in the Philippines even before the first psychology department was established at the University of the Philippines (UP) during the 1920s. Virgilio Enriquez (1942–1994), known as the Father of Filipino psychology, claimed that, although the word “psychology” came to Philippine shores at a much later time, the practice of understanding behaviors, actions and attitudes, personalities, and mental processes of Filipinos has been in existence since the time of the babaylans (native priestesses and healers). These local healers practised the earliest forms of psychotherapy in the country, dating back before the time when the Philippines was supposedly “discovered” by the fleet sent by the king of Spain. According to Enriquez (1992), Philippine literature contained the earliest records of psychology in the Philippines. These works were initially scribbled on plant parts, or passed on orally to other succeeding generations.

Examples of these include the collection of Philippine proverbs, riddles, folk tales, myths, and epics. Writings in social studies about Filipino characteristics, customs, beliefs, and practices are likewise attestations of initial efforts of Filipino writers to observe and document Filipino patterns of behavior. The above approach of introducing the history of psychology in the Philippines is quite distinct from the way such history has normally been written, in which the substance relates to the development of academic-scientific and professional psychology (see for example Bulatao & Guthrie, 1968; Enriquez, 1977a; Licuanan, 1985; Montiel & Teh, 2004; Padilla & Aldaba-Lim, 1961; Salazar, 1985; Tan, 1999). This chapter will bring together the two parts of a duality in examining the development of psychology in the Philippines—on the one hand, the dominance of academic-scientific

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psychology; on the other hand, the emergence of an indigenous psychology. We will outline and describe the various influences to these two areas while situating the events within the socio-historic-political milieu in which they occurred. The chapter has five main sections representing the five main stages in the history of psychology in the Philippines. We begin with the amalgam of the Spanish-Catholic and the Western educational systems in the Philippines and their major influences to both Philippine society and psychology. A discussion on World War II follows, together with the influx of newer ideas from Western (mostly American) psychology. A look into how martial law and a political dictatorship brought waves of change to Philippine thought and action will be the focus of the third section. The historic and pervasive influences of Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA)1 and of how a people overthrew a government are highlighted in the fourth section. The final part looks into the events from the 1990s to the present and enumerates how Filipino psychologists have continued to heed the call for looking out for the people’s welfare as well as addressing the trend toward globalization, despite the numerous struggles and setbacks that came with it. The chapter concludes with a summary and suggests future directions for the field.

The Spanish-Catholic and American Educational Systems and the Beginnings of Philippine Academic-Scientific Psychology The Philippines was a colony of Spain for 333 years, beginning in 1565. Although Portuguese navigator Ferdinand Magellan and his crew reached Philippine shores in 1521, it was not until 1565 that Spanish King Phillip II (hence the name given to the country) appointed a governor-general to lead the country. This marked the beginning of Spanish colonial rule in the Philippines (Agoncillo, 1990). Formal education was introduced through primary, secondary, and tertiary schools established by religious congregations. The Spanish and Latin languages were taught, yet the primary objective of education was the inculcation of Catholic values, beliefs, and doctrines. Education was initially limited to the Spanish people in the Philippines until the late 19th century, when formal education became available to the children of wealthy Filipino families. By learning more about language and religion, a few of these Filipinos began to question the ways of the colonizers. These educated Filipinos were called “ilustrados” or “propagandists” and among them 396

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were the likes of Jose P. Rizal (1861–1896), the Philippine national hero. Propagandists spoke about the defects of the educational system implemented by the colonizers in the Philippines (Agoncillo, 1990). Their writings provided the much-needed impetus for the development of the Filipino Nationalist Movement and led to the establishment of the organization Katipunan by Andres Bonifacio (1863–1897), which later led a revolution to break free from the bonds of oppression and achieve independence (Constantino, 1975; Zaide & Zaide, 1999). Their writings and actions helped end Spanish rule in the country, yet not without leaving behind major influences in the lives of Filipinos. In July 1897, after Bonifacio was executed by the Spaniards, another revolutionary leader, Emilio Aguinaldo (1869–1964), established a republican government at Biak-na-Bato in the province of Cavite. A constitution was drafted to officially signify the separation of the Philippines from the Spanish monarchy and their formation into an independent state (Agoncillo, 1990). However, this was a revolutionary government and not a legitimate one. A pact was then executed that led to the surrender of the revolutionaries, the dissolution of their government, a laying down of arms, and an initial payment of 400,000 Philippine pesos out of 1.7 million Philippine pesos in exchange for the revolutionaries’ peaceful surrender (Ocampo,1998). It was also during this time that the American government offered to help the Filipino revolutionaries end more than three decades of Spanish influence. After the Spanish–American War, the United States entered into an agreement with the Spanish government regarding the status of the Philippines. The Treaty of Paris was enacted in 1898, and through it, the Spanish government sold the Philippines to the United States for US$20 million (Agoncillo, 1990). The United States was considered a stronghold at that time, with more advanced weaponry and state-of-the-art equipment. To provide the Spaniards with an honorable exit from the Philippines, a mock battle at sea took place between the U.S. military fleet and that of Spain. Spain surrendered, and Aguinaldo was advised by the Americans to establish a dictatorial government (Agoncillo, 1990) that lasted for a month and was then replaced with a revolutionary government. Philippine independence was formally proclaimed on June 12, 1898 (Constantino, 1975), and the first Philippine Republic was inaugurated on January 23, 1899 (Zaide & Zaide, 1999). During this time,

a free public school system was introduced. There was a sudden influx of literature in all fields of study. English became the medium of instruction. Courses were introduced at the tertiary level, including philosophy, history, and psychology. Psychology was already being taught to undergraduate students by professors from philosophy departments in universities and colleges as early as the 1900s. The content was mainly on Western thought as presented in textbooks—more particularly, on the works of Skinner, Pavlov, and Freud. Bulatao (1979; Bulatao & Guthrie, 1968) was among the first writers to outline the development of academic-scientific psychology in the Philippines. He offered some explanation as to why nonpsychologists taught the subject to college students for 20 years or more. Apparently, there were not many psychology graduates at the time, and one did not have to have a background in psychology in order to teach it. As long as one could read and comprehend the text, then one could teach the subject. This resulted in a failure to bring students into a much deeper understanding of and grounding in psychological thought and experience. It was not until the mid-1920s that Filipinos began taking the lead by pursuing further studies in the United States and establishing and eventually heading the psychology departments at different universities upon their return. Agustin Alonzo (d. 1981) received his Ph.D. in experimental psychology from the University of Chicago in 1926. He was the very first psychologist to head the department of psychology at the state-run UP. He was succeeded by Isidoro Panlasigui, who received his Ph.D. in education from the University of Iowa in 1928. In 1930, Sinforoso Padilla received his Ph.D. in psychology from the University of Michigan2 (Bulatao & Guthrie, 1968; Licuanan, 1985). During the 1930s, the University of Santo Tomas became the first institution to offer a B.S., a master’s, and a doctoral degree in psychology (Padilla & Aldaba-Lim, 1961). In 1932, Jesus Perpinan, who completed his Ph.D. from Iowa State University, set up the psychology department at the Far Eastern University (FEU). He also set up the FEU psychological clinic, which offered counselling, testing, hypnosis, and therapy (Licuanan, 1985). It was also around this time (1934) that the independence of the Philippines from the United States was formally approved through the establishment of the Commonwealth Republic. The Commonwealth Republic served as a transition government whose primary aim was to prepare the country for complete

independence from the United States. At the end of a 10-year transition period, a fully independent, true Republic of the Philippines was formed (Agoncillo, 1990). During this first era in academic-scientific psychology in the Philippines (1900–1945), the Filipino pioneers set out to establish academic departments in universities and colleges. Most of them had obtained their postgraduate degree overseas (mainly in the United States), thus reflecting varying, but mostly Western, schools of psychological thought. Bulatao (1979) categorized the Filipino psychologists at that time into four groups: “the pious pupils of Piaget, the daring disciples of Drucker, the fervent followers of Freud and the scientific students of Skinner” (pp. 33–35). Inspired by their mentors, they sought arduously to establish their clinical practice, in order to professionally apply their knowledge and skills, and to further inform their teaching. This unwavering initiative to educate, share with, and seek out new followers, however, was hampered by World War II, which broke out on December 7, 1941, when the Japanese militia attacked Pearl Harbor, a U.S. naval base in Hawaii. Japan took over a number of Southeast Asian countries, including the Philippines. The Japanese military declared an end to the U.S. Commonwealth Republic in the Philippines on January 3, 1942, and imposed martial law afterward. All forms of communication, as well as all means of education were put to a halt. President Manuel Quezon and U.S. Commander Douglas MacArthur moved out of Manila and into a more provincial location. They were forced to leave the country amidst continuing threats from the Japanese. A new government was established by the Japanese, led by a Filipino, Jose P. Laurel (Agoncillo, 1990). Under Japanese rule, the Philippines underwent turbulent times. The economy collapsed and the country experienced a nationwide rice shortage. The United States launched an air-raid on Manila in September 1944, reviving the war between the United States and Japan. General MacArthur returned to the Philippines with his military troops in October of the same year. By February 1945, the seat of government was once again turned over to the Commonwealth Republic. Due to President Manuel Quezon’s early death, Sergio Osmeña took his place as the new President of the Philippines (Agoncillo, 1990). The Philippines was liberated from the Japanese officially on July 5, 1945. A month after its liberation, an atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima and pe-pua, per fecto-ramos

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Nagasaki, Japan. Japan surrendered unconditionally to the United States, and the World War officially ended. There are very few records regarding any further progress or movement within psychology in the Philippines during the war. There is evidence that Sinforoso Padilla’s clinic operations were suspended during this period.

Post-World War II and the Furtherance of Western Influences The American government granted independence to the Philippines in 1946 and yet American influences, values, and practices continued to pervade the political, economic, cultural, and educational spheres. Most pervasive were the influences on the Filipinos’ mentality and language (Fernandez, 2006). Licuanan (1985) referred to the post-war era as the “founding fifties (p. 16)” of psychology in the Philippines, reflecting how the psychology departments and their heads resumed the task of setting up new departments or (re)strengthening their previously established departments. Estefania AldabaLim (1917–2006) is recorded as being the first Filipino to obtain a Ph.D. in clinical psychology from the University of Michigan. She set up the psychology program at the Philippine Women’s University (PWU) and established the Institute for Human Relations, the first recorded institute that concerned itself with mental health. Aldaba-Lim then became one of the founders of the Philippine Mental Health Association. By 1954, she had included education for mentally retarded children, training programs for teachers, and teaching human relations for secondary schools as part of the services extended by her institute. She was the first psychologist to set up a psychology practicum laboratory in the Philippines, making the PWU the first institution to offer a systematic practicum program for psychology in the Philippines (Bulatao & Guthrie, 1968). Within the same epoch, the Philippine government recognized the importance of having guidance counsellors in public schools, leading psychologists to shift their attention to the field of counselling (Bulatao & Guthrie, 1968). There was also an upsurge of academic interest in the development of Philippine-oriented psychological materials (Guanzon-Lapeña, et. al., 1998). This was also a time when Filipino psychologists became more conscious of their responsibility to society rather than of their role and responsibility within their discipline. With social relevance taking priority over the concern for experimentation, psychology seemed to take on a more humanistic form and a 398

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more realistic angle. This was quite contrary to what was happening in the West, where science took prominence over human welfare (Felipe, 1969). The decade of the 1960s saw the dominance of empiricism, experimental work, and the positivistic approach to psychology in the Philippines, albeit in applied areas. Tiglao-Torres (1997) noted that psychologists then relied heavily on correlations, and experimental and objective approaches of theory-testing, and insisted on using statistics to show relationships between variables. They also depended on procedural integrity for establishing validity (Hoshmand & Polkinghorne, 1992, in Tiglao-Torres, 1997). Psychologists began to shift their focus to the promotion of psychology as a discipline. Research in the early part of the decade focused on psychological testing and measurement, personality, and child development (Licuanan, 1985). A clear manifestation of the widening interest in and reach of the field of psychological testing was the establishment of testing centers. The Ateneo de Manila University (ADMU) established the Central Guidance Bureau in 1961, with Fr. James Culligan, S.J. as its first director. In addition to counselling services, this center offered testing services for employment and research purposes for business clients. Aldaba-Lim founded the Philippine Psychological Corporation in the same year. A few more developments in academe occurred during the 1960s. Alfredo Lagmay (1919–2005) received his Ph.D. in experimental psychology from Harvard University in 1960. He became the chair of UP’s psychology department and remained in that position for 22 years (Licuanan, 1985). In 1962, Jaime Bulatao returned to the Philippines after receiving a Ph.D. from Fordham University and established the department of psychology at ADMU (Licuanan, 1985). It was also during the 1960s that the Institute of Philippine Culture (IPC) was established, based at ADMU, to focus on research on Philippine values. Two main volumes of work were produced, one by Lynch (1961a) called Four Readings on Philippine Values and the other by the Psychological Association of the Philippines (PAP) (1965) called the Symposium of Filipino Personality (Tan, 1999). The IPC’s initial research focused on understanding the factors that may have held back the Philippines from becoming a developed and progressive nation. The Institute identified a number of Filipino values and traits that supposedly explained the country’s lack of progress. These values include pakikisama (going along with a group, smooth interpersonal relationships), bahala

na (fatalism) and the “crab mentality” (pulling down those who are successful), and the strong family orientation of Filipinos. Another research project, conducted by American psychologist Talcott Parsons, used five bipolar dimensions along which cultures could be placed. The five bipolar items in his study were: affectivity vs. affective neutrality (emotionality vs. objectivity), diffuseness vs. specificity (intertwined roles or specific ones), particularism vs. universalism, quality vs performance, and collective vs. self-orientation. According to his findings, the Philippines and all other developing countries leaned toward the negative pole on the five dimensions, whereas the developed countries fell under the more positive poles (Tan, 1997). Lawless and Tan (1968) and Enriquez (1978, 1993) later criticized these IPC research projects in terms of methodology and approach. This was a core target of “unpacking” undertaken by the indigenization movement in the following decade. The year 1962 proved to be a very significant and instrumental one for Philippine psychology. It was in this year that the Psychological Association of the Philippines (PAP) was founded by ten psychologists, including Sinforoso Padilla, Alfredo Lagmay (well-known for developing a culture-fair thematic apperception test using drawings of Philippine situations [Bulatao & Guthrie, 1968]), Jaime Bulatao, and Estefania Aldaba-Lim. The three main goals of the PAP were to advance learning, teaching, and research in psychology as a science; to advance the practice of psychology as an independent, scientifically oriented, and ethically conscious profession; and to promote human welfare (Tan, 1999). The establishment of the PAP was instrumental in encouraging psychologists to pursue research consistently. The PAP’s annual conferences (held since 1962 either in Metro Manila, the center of the Philippines, or in one of the provinces of the country) became the venue for disseminating research findings and promoting the exchange of ideas, and it served as a networking opportunity for professionals and students alike. The PAP published the maiden issue of the Philippine Journal of Psychology (PJP) in 1968; it contained 12 articles (Tan, 1999). The year 1965 is also a significant year in Philippine history since it eventually affected the development of Philippine psychology in a major way. Ferdinand Marcos, Jr. was elected as Philippine President and became the first President to be reelected for a second term in 1969. However, Marcos’ popularity declined shortly after his reelection due to reports of massive

corruption during his first term and cheating during the reelection. His term was marked by an increase in militarization, corruption, and human rights abuses. Nationalistic fervor returned in the 1970s, due mainly to poverty, population growth, and an increasing crime rate. The writings of Claro M. Recto, Lorenzo Tañada, Renato Constantino, and Jose W. Diokno were influential to the development of nationalistic thought during this period (Fernandez, 2006). Militant groups took their battles to the streets. Filipino psychologists joined the cause and marched alongside students at demonstrations and rallies. Students from the UP led many of these rallies, urging other Filipinos to show their nationalism and to reject the Marcos government. It was also during the early 1970s when Virgilio Enriquez returned to the Philippines after completing his Ph.D. in social psychology at Northwestern University in Illinois, in the United States. Instead of imposing his new knowledge on his Filipino students, his Western education actually drove him to become more Filipino-oriented in his teaching and research in psychology (Pe-Pua & ProtacioMarcelino, 2000, 2002). He started to conduct his classes in Filipino, and encouraged students to write and express in Filipino. He started introducing the concept of Sikolohiyang Pilipino (Filipino psychology). He criticized Western methods of psychology, claiming that such methods were not appropriate in the Philippine setting and that adopting Western thought brought about distorted views about the Filipino, perpetuated the colonization of the Filipino mind, and furthered the miseducation of the Filipino people. Amidst protests, violent dispersals and accusations of rampant graft and corruption, Marcos declared martial law in 1972 and suspended a number of rights of common citizens. Several protesters and opponents of the government were arrested and imprisoned. The number of political detainees increased rapidly. Curfews were imposed, and public assemblies were banned. As a result, political psychology emerged as a relevant field. Psychologists concerned themselves with the relationship between psychological processes and the political situations through studies on kinship and political power, political socialization, social conflict, democratic transition, and public opinion surveys (Montiel & Macapagal, 2000).

Martial Law and the Emergence of Nationalism in Psychological Thought Despite the turmoil of the martial law period, psychologists continued with their business of developing pe-pua, per fecto-ramos

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a Filipino psychology amidst Western influences and national political turmoil. Licuanan (1989) referred to this decade as the “relevant seventies” (p. 16), for this was the decade in which psychologists began to play a very pivotal role in national development. In 1971, Aldaba-Lim, who served as the Secretary of Social Welfare, became the ambassador for the United Nations Children’s Educational Fund (UNICEF) (Tan, 1999). She placed human welfare as her top priority and emphasized this by encouraging Filipino psychologists to apply their skills and knowledge for the betterment of their fellow men. It was also during this time that the need for practicing psychologists grew in number due to the rise in the number of overseas Filipino workers (Tan, 1999). This eventually led to psychology becoming the most popular course and degree major in the Philippines during the 1970s (Gines, 2006). It was also during this decade that Enriquez strengthened his position on the importance of developing a local indigenous psychology. Various “firsts” marked this era of Filipino psychology including, among others, the first master’s thesis written in Filipino (1972), and the first permanent graduatelevel course on Filipino psychology at the UP in 1978 (Church & Katigbak, 2002). The 1970s saw the birth of the second duality in Filipino psychology (Sikolohiyang Pilipino). Having been exposed to Western teachings, thought, and methodology, Enriquez felt that these were too limiting as they did not recognize cultural differences. He felt that Western psychology contributed to the colonial status of the Filipino mind. For him, such a psychology was used merely to exploit the people, and it failed to paint a real picture of who the Filipino truly was. He felt the need to extend the definition of psychology from being merely the study of behavior and mental processes to: A study of emotions and experienced knowledge (kalooban and kamalayan), awareness of one’s surroundings (ulirat), information and understanding (isip), habits and behavior (diwa) and the soul (kaluluwa) as the way to learning about people’s conscience. (Enriquez, 1976)

The definition was obviously more encompassing and more reflective of what is important in understanding the Filipino’s overall makeup or psyche. The history, nature, and contribution of Sikolohiyang Pilipino have been documented in a number of articles (Church & Katigbak, 2002l Enriquez, 1992; Gastardo-Conaco, 2005; Pe-Pua & ProtacioMarcelino, 2000, 2002, among others). 400

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Sikolohiyang Pilipino’s primary emphasis was and continues to be on identity and national consciousness, social awareness and involvement, language vis-a-vis psychology, and Philippine culture. It continues to encourage psychologists to use crossindigenous methodologies and to adhere to a multilanguage, multimethod approach, as well as to the use of appropriate field methods and the triangulation approach in research (Pe-Pua & ProtacioMarcelino, 2000, 2002). The indigenization framework used in developing Sikolohiyang Pilipino is one that favors the discovery of behavior and thought processes from within the culture; that is, indigenization from within. But the framework recognizes contributions from another indigenization approach characterized by the translation of concepts and methods (indigenization from without) (Enriquez, 1992). There has always been a tension between these two approaches. This tension was slightly addressed by developments over the next decades, when it would become clearer that, after indigenization efforts, the ultimate goal of Sikolohiyang Pilipino is to contribute to universal psychology. (More discussion on this further in the chapter.) The beginnings of this second duality in Philippine psychology are clearly seen in the way Enriquez opposed existing Philippine psychology fields at that time. He labelled industrial and clinical psychology as being too Western and suggested that focus be shifted to livelihood and health psychology. He encouraged students to do studies on Filipino folk practices and healing techniques and to look into the lives and attitudes of Filipinos living in rural areas. He pursued the development of a liberating, liberated, and interdisciplinary kind of Filipino psychology (Pe-Pua & Protacio-Marcelino, 2000, 2002). Enriquez established the Philippine Psychology Research House (PPRH) (which later became the Philippine Psychology Research and Training House, PPRTH) that houses more than 10,000 published and unpublished writings on Sikolohiyang Pilipino. In 1975, he founded the Pambansang Samahan sa Sikolohiyang Pilipino (PSSP) (National Association for Filipino Psychology), to coincide with the holding of the First National Conference on Filipino Psychology in Manila. The PSSP continues to hold annual conferences and to publish using the Filipino language (Pe-Pua & ProtacioMarcelino, 2000, 2002). Enriquez, together with two other colleagues from UP, started to publish articles on indigenizing

Philippine concepts. The three big names constituting the triumvirate of the indigenous movement are Enriquez, Zeus Salazar (a historian), and Prospero Covar (an anthropologist) (Mendoza, 2006). Lagmay was also instrumental in the development and encouragement of indigenization practices in the field of psychology. They challenged existing literature on Philippine values, specifically those published by the IPC in the early 1960s. Take, for instance, the concept of bahala na, which was originally interpreted as fatalistic resignation or a “leaving-it-all-up-to-God” type of attitude (Andres, 1994; Bostrom, 1968). Lagmay (1977) corrected this perception and reported that bahala na was not fatalism but more of determination and risktaking. People who say “bahala na” are not adopting a passive attitude, but rather an active attitude by telling themselves to be prepared for the upcoming difficult situations. Another example of how Sikolohiyang Pilipino corrected colonial interpretations of local attitudes and values was in redefining the concept of utang-na-loob. Kaut (1961) and Hollnsteiner (1961) translated the term as “debt of gratitude,” a type of debt in which one is expected to repay with interest. Enriquez corrected this notion by explaining that utang-na-loob is simply gratitude and solidarity that binds one to one’s community or country (Enriquez, 1977a; Pe-Pua & Protacio-Marcelino, 2000, 2002). Another concept that caught Enriquez’s attention was pakikisama, which Lynch (1961b) translated as smooth interpersonal relations by going along with a group or by conforming with a group’s or with the majority’s decision. However, as Enriquez looked more deeply into the Filipino language as a rich source of concepts meaningful for and significant to the local culture (Enriquez, 1978), he discovered that pakikisama is merely one of several levels and modes of interaction used by Filipinos. He then concluded that pakikisama was not the core value or core concept highly valued by Filipinos. Rather, it is kapwa (shared identity). Pakikisama is just one of the many levels embedded in the concept of shared identity (Enriquez, 1977b). Thus, he theorized that Filipinos were not concerned with maintaining smooth interpersonal relationships, but were more concerned with pakikipagkapwa (or simply kapwa), which means treating the other person as a fellow human being and identifying with him or her. Santiago and Enriquez (1976) further refined this understanding when they identified eight levels of interactions within kapwa. These levels are divided into two categories, the outsider

(ibang tao) and the insider or “one of us” (hindi ibang tao). Category 1: “Ibang Tao” or Not One of Us • Pakikitungo (transaction/civility with) • Pakikisalamuha (interaction with) • Pakikilahok (joining/participating with) • Pakikibagay (in-conformity with or in-accord with) • Pakikisama (being along with) Category 2: “Hindi Ibang Tao” or One-of-Us • Pakikipagpalagayang-loob (being in rapport/ understanding/acceptance with) • Pakiksangkot (getting involved) • Pakikiisa (being one with). Enriquez (1978; Santiago & Enriquez, 1976) stresses that the levels of interaction mentioned above range from the relatively uninvolved civility in pakikitungo to the total sense of identification in pakikiisa. According to Enriquez, the different levels show how the concept of kapwa is not just its English translation, others. Kapwa is actually shared identity. It is not just others but you and me together. It is not just them but we. Through such an example, it then becomes clear why pakikisama should not be viewed entirely negatively. Pakikisama is not just conformity. Pakikisama is the self being along with others. The levels in pakikipagkapwa therefore emphasize equality with the other, regardless of status in life. It implements the idea that people must treat one another as fellow human beings (kapwa tao) and takes into account a regard for the dignity and well-being of others. One of Enriquez’s major contributions to Filipino psychology in general and to Filipino personality in particular is the development of the Panukat ng Ugali at Pagkatao (PUP) (Measure of Character and Personality) in 1975. This was refined further by Ma. Angeles Guanzon. The test utilized dimensions of personality that were relevant to Filipinos. The development of this test paved the way for the creation of more Filipino-oriented personality tests, which are used in both corporate and clinical settings today. A few other psychologists who supported Enriquez’s campaign for an indigenous psychology emerged in the late 1970s. Rita Mataragnon argued for the use of a multilanguage, multicultural approach and suggested that studies begin at the emic or indigenous levels rather than at the etic or universal level (Mataragnon, 1979). Jaime Bulatao (1979) focused his attention on developing different ways pe-pua, per fecto-ramos

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of psychotherapy that are sensitive to the beliefs and practices of clients. He emphasized the need to be more receptive when dealing with clients by being more intuitive and contemplative, to the point of becoming less scientific (Bulatao, 1979). He did not mean to say that psychologists had to give up the scientific dimension of their work; he simply emphasized the need for psychology to take on a more human dimension. Annadaisy Carlota focused her efforts on developing another tool for measuring Filipino personality, the Panukat ng Pagkataong Pilipino (PPP) (Measure of Filipino Character). The progress of Sikolohiyang Pilipino continued to exert influence on Philippine psychology throughout the 1970s onto the 1980s. Its contribution in the area of personality and psychological testing was prominent among its achievements. The teaching of psychology was also influenced by Sikolohiyang Pilipino. Sikolohiyang Pilipino was first taught as a subject at UP in 1978 by Jose Ma. Bartolome and taken over by Rogelia Pe-Pua, a strong advocate of Sikolohiyang Pilipino who started her involvement in the field as Enriquez’ undergraduate research assistant. She then became an academic staff at the department of psychology at UP and was mentored by Enriquez. She put together the first book of readings on the topic, entitled Sikolohiyang Pilipino: Teorya, Metodo at Gamit (Filipino Psychology: Theory, Method and Application) (Pe-Pua, 1982, 1989, 1995). This continues to be used as a textbook in Sikolohiyang Pilipino and other psychology subjects in universities and colleges where this is now being taught (Enriquez, 1987, 1992). Two other compilations of readings added to the resources for teaching Sikolohiyang Pilipino, namely Sikolohiyang Pilipino: Isyu, Pananaw at Kaalaman (New Directions in Indigenous Psychology) (Aganon & David, 1985), and Indigenous Psychology: A Book of Readings (Enriquez, 1990; Pe-Pua & Protacio-Marcelino, 2000, 2002). It was also during the 1980s that Filipino historian Zeus Salazar articulated the four lines of filiations of Philippine psychology—a significant development since it signalled clearly how Philippine psychology has been in existence long before psychology as a discipline came to the Philippines. In a nutshell, the first filiation, academic-scientific psychology, refers to the dominant Western tradition, the birth of scientific psychology, and its introduction to Philippine universities. The second filiation, academic-philosophical psychology, is also part of the Western tradition and is mainly clerical. This was prominent among students and professors at the Catholic-run University of Santo Tomas and 402

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other higher-education institutions led by monks, preachers, and the Jesuits. The third filiation is ethnic psychology, which is the major basis of Sikolohiyang Pilipino. This includes indigenous psychology, psychology of Filipinos, and the practice of psychology by Filipinos. The last filiation is the psychomedical system, with religion as both cohesive element and explanation; for example, the local priests and priestesses and their theory of disease and techniques of healing from the 1500s to the 1600s; Messianic movements; and faith-healing in later years (Salazar, 1985). Another major contribution of Sikolohiyang Pilipino is in the area of research methods. In a recently published book chapter, Pe-Pua (2006) traced the history of the development of indigenous methods in the Philippines, examined their application, and provided a critique of these methods. To summarize, it was during the mid-1970s that Filipino researchers started to explore indigenous approaches to doing research. Notably, they tried the pakapa-kapa strategy (literally, “groping” as in “groping in the dark”) (Santiago, 1975) for discovering methods of gathering data that are attuned to the Filipino psyche. The result is a range of methods such as pagtatanong-tanong or a semi-structured way of interviewing (Gonzales, 1977; Pe-Pua, 1983, 1989, 2006), pakikipagkwentuhan or sharing stories (De Vera, 1976), pagdalaw-dalaw (visiting), pakikipagpalagayang-loob (level of mutual trust and rapport) (Gepigon & Francisco, 1978), and pakikisama (Nery, 1979) to name only a few (for a full review, see Pe-Pua, 2006). Pe-Pua brought indigenous research methods to the international arena when she published an article on pagtatanong-tanong in the International Journal of Intercultural Relations in 1989. In that article, she identified five guiding principles in the use of indigenous research methods: the researcher–participants relationship influences the quality of data; said relationship must be equal; participants’ welfare takes priority over data; research methods must be appropriate to the population studied and conform with existing norms; and the language used in research must be that of the participants (Pe-Pua, 1989, 2006; Pe-Pua & Protacio-Marcelino, 2000, 2002). Enriquez, Salazar, Covar, Pe-Pua, and others “succeeded in radicalizing, de-colonizing, rejuvenating, making relevant and re-inventing psychology in the Philippines” (Protacio-de Castro, included in Allwood & Berry, 2006, p. 252). Returning to the sociopolitical context, the economy of the Philippines continued to stagger,

and the political situation turned for the worse when once-exiled Philippine Senator Benigno Aquino Jr.3 was allowed to return to the country from the United States on August 21, 1983. Upon his arrival, he was assassinated by a gunman on the tarmac of Manila International Airport. His assassination brought millions and millions of Filipinos back to the streets, clamoring for change in the Marcos government. A snap election was held in which Marcos was pitted against the widow of the ex-senator, Corazon Aquino. The Commission on Elections declared Marcos the winner, but reports regarding massive cheating again sent Filipinos to the streets of EDSA amidst threats to their lives. Filipinos bravely stood in front of armored tanks, faced heavily armed soldiers, and stood behind rows upon rows of barbed wire. The demonstrations eventually pushed the Marcoses out of the Presidential Palace Malacañang as Aquino was sworn into office. A new era in Philippine life began as democracy was restored.

Post-EDSA Revolution and Psychology: Treading the Path of Peace and Progress As the Aquino government slowly tried to revive the ailing economy at the dawn of the 1990s, psychologists did their share in helping the Filipino people— especially those who had become victims of abuse or oppression—regain their lives. Psychologists took part in efforts to counsel freed political detainees and their families. They assisted with post-traumatic stress disorder in victims of the earthquake in 1990, and following the Mt. Pinatubo eruption and the great floods in Ormoc, which both happened in 1991 (Gines, 2006). The number of clinical practitioners and hypnotherapists increased. Bulatao (1987) even noticed the existence of three forms of hypnosis practised at that time: Western forms, local forms of altered consciousness associated with spirits, and a combination of both, which he called “Shamanistic hypnosis” (1987, p. 163). He believed this combination was the most effective form to help clients pursue a path of inner peace. Sikolohiyang Pilipino was not free from criticism, even in its early stage of emergence and during the 1990s (see for example, Bernardo, 2009; Church & Katigbak, 2002; Salazar, 2000; San Juan, 2006; Sta. Maria, 1996 & 2000). One of its weaknesses, as pointed out by Sta. Maria (1996, 2000) was the nonelaboration of the method of “phenomenological reinterpretation” used by Enriquez in coming up with his concept of pakikipagkapwa. She also mentioned that Enriquez was too reactive to what had

already been published and adopted a perspective that was pangkami (culture-bearers explaining their psychology to others) rather than pantayo (culturebearers exploring their psychology among themselves). Sikolohiyang Pilipino was accused of dwelling too much on slogans, not providing room for peer review, and lacking a culture of research. There were also criticisms of the indigenous research approach, but followers of Sikolohiyang Pilipino persevered with their phenomenological and qualitative approach. In addressing issues of validity and reliability, they offered triangulation and the use of a variety of methods in gathering data as required. A void was created by the untimely demise of Enriquez in 1994. Pe-Pua, who was earmarked to take over the daunting task of continuing his legacy, had migrated to Australia. Nonetheless, she continued to support the movement, published an article documenting the contribution of Sikolohiyang Pilipino (Pe-Pua & Protacio-Marcelino, 2000, 2002), and contributed a book chapter on indigenous research methods in the Philippines (Pe-Pua, 2006). She also taught pakapa-kapa and pagtatanong-tanong to her students of research methods at the University of New South Wales. The torch for furthering the advancement of Sikolohiyang Pilipino was passed on to Grace Aguiling-Dalisay (Gastardo-Conaco, 2005), who is known as the second UP graduate (the first being Danilo Tuazon) to defend her dissertation in the Filipino language (Aguiling-Dalisay, personal communication, January 25, 2009). She was supported by other former students and colleagues of Enriquez, such as Elizabeth Protacio-Marcelino, Ma. Angeles Guanzon-Lapeña, Flordeliza Lagbao-Bolante (1956–2011), and Jay Yacat. They formed the new generation of leadership in Sikolohiyang Pilipino. They took turns in heading the PSSP, continued organizing the annual conferences in Sikolohiyang Pilipino, operated the PPRTH, and published emerging papers in the field. They published the first monograph of the series Binhi (literal translation is “seed”), featuring the translation of Pe-Pua and Protacio-Marcelino’s article on the history of Sikolohiyang Pilipino (Pe-Pua & Protacio-Marcelino, 2002). During the late 1980s, a certain amount of tolerance for the existence of both schools of thought, Western psychology and Sikolohiyang Pilipino, seemed to emerge, brought about mainly by changes in the sociopolitical context of the country. With the tolerance came an acceptance of common problems pe-pua, per fecto-ramos

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and challenges shared by the two dualities. Primary among those challenges was how to encourage the growing number of psychology graduates to get into research and publication and to develop more of what Licuanan (1985) called the “theorizing practitioner” (p. 17). Just as the psychologists of the time faced numerous daunting tasks during the late 1980s to the early 1990s, so did the Aquino government. Apart from the numerous natural disasters mentioned earlier, the government had to face six coup attempts (Montiel & Macapagal, 2000). All these served to hamper the efforts of the Aquino government in developing programs that would help the flailing economy. Aquino then endorsed Fidel Ramos as the next presidential candidate. Ramos was sworn in as the new President in 1992, and by 1994, the Philippines started to experience economic growth. Dramatic growth was likewise experienced in the field of political psychology. When democracy was restored in 1987, studies began to focus on voting behavior, political influences of the church, political personalities, peace psychology, and related issues. Examples of studies as enumerated by Montiel and Macapagal (2000) include Filipinostyle electoral behavior in which candidates are somewhat “anointed” as the chosen one by the outgoing president (as in the case of President Ramos being “anointed” by Aquino). Studies on voting behavior indicate that voters chose candidates on the basis of personality, shared identity, and affiliation with show business, rather than on the basis of issues. The 1990s saw the emergence of two new influences on Philippine social science: postmodernism and feminism (Tiglao-Torres, 1997). Postmodernists reject the idea of universality and emphasize the need for local, specific, and historically informed analysis grounded on culture and the lived experiences of people. Postmodernists accept the idea of subjective experiences, and they believe that the meanings derived from the language used and the sociohistorical context in which it takes place, defines what is experienced. Feminists, on the other hand, challenge patriarchy, recognize that structures in society put women in subordinate positions, and call for equity and gender equality (Tiglao-Torres, 1997). Indigenous-feminist research methodologies likewise started to surface, such as the use of ginabayang talakayan (focused group discussions) in sexuality research (Aguiling-Dalisay, 1997). These two new influences emphasize meaning as opposed to methods and cognitive processes. A number of 404

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studies in psychology did focus on the ideas of postmodernists and feminists, especially research on gender issues, migration, abused women and children, and phenomenological studies on particular groups in society (such as garbage collectors, children living in dump sites, security guards, teachers, etc.), topics that fall under the broader field of social psychology.

Challenges of the 21st Century: Indigenization, Globalization, and Professionalization After Ramos’ successful term of office, movie actor Joseph Estrada emerged victorious in the Presidential race of 1998. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo became Estrada’s Vice-President. In 2001, EDSA II broke out due to rampant graft and corruption involving Estrada. Estrada stepped down from office in order to avoid bloodshed, and Arroyo was sworn in as his successor. She finished the term that Estrada started and stayed in power until 2004. During the 2004 elections, she was reelected, but not without protests from the opposing camp of another actor-presidential candidate, Fernando Poe, Jr. Poe was very popular among 70% of the Filipino population, so his losing the election was not taken lightly. However, on December of the same year, Poe suffered a heart attack and passed away. Nonetheless, this did not stop the demonstrations and rallies asking for the impeachment of Arroyo amidst accusations of massive fraud in the 2004 elections and charges of graft and corruption. However, due to disorganization and the lack of a clear focus and leadership from the opposing camps, Arroyo remained in the top seat of the country until 2010. In the midst of the challenges besetting the country’s political and economic spheres, psychologists have worked consistently in trying to professionalize their practice. Efforts to regulate the practice of guidance counsellors, clinical psychologists, and psychometricians have been pursued continuously by the heads of various organizations such as the PAP and the Integrated Professional Counselors Association of the Philippines. Other organizations include the Philippine Association for Counsellor Education, Research and Supervision, and the Association of Psychological and Education Counselors of Asia (Church & Katigbak, 2002). Republic Act No. 9258 was passed in 2004. Otherwise known as the Guidance and Counseling Act of 2004, the law set forth the qualifications, standards of practice, code of ethics, competencies, licensure

requirements, and minimum curricula required by practicing guidance counsellors in the field. Another defining moment came in Philippine psychological history when the first licensure examinations for guidance counsellors took place on August 21–22, 2008. Another effort at regulating the practice of psychology was the Republic Act 10029, more commonly known as the Philippine Psychology Act of 2009, that was signed into law on March 16, 2010, after three decades of advocating by the PAP. Passed by both houses of Congress and Senate and signed into law by then President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, the law serves to protect the public by ensuring that all psychologists and psychometricians undergo and pass a licensure exam prior to the practice of their profession. Conversely, the law seeks to protect licensed psychologists and psychometricians and differentiate them from other persons who claim to provide psychological counseling. (A copy of the law may be viewed at www.pap.org.ph). A new Code of Ethics for Philippine Psychologists (2009) was also ratified by the Board of Directors of the PAP in 2009. The Code of Ethics remained unchanged since the 1980s yet in the year 2008, efforts were made to revise and update it to include the practice of the growing variety of psychologists in the country (retrieved from http:// www.pap.org.ph). The urgency or continuing advocacy shown concerning the passage of the Guidance and Counseling Act of 2004, the Philippine Psychology Act of 2009, and the Code of Ethics for Philippine Psychologists (2009) attests to the fact that counselling and clinical work remain the dominant forms of psychological practice in the Philippines (Montiel & Teh, 2004). The second most popular field is industrial-organizational psychology. A large number of psychologists in academe either teach on the side or do therapy on the side. Then there are those who are active in government and nongovernmental organizations, as well as those who are involved in social work. Overall therefore, psychologists seem to be able to cut across different and varying fields and even serve the needs of those who are in other fields. The licensure and regulation of the practice of psychology in the Philippines are closely linked to educational practice. Tan (1999) observes that the qualitative improvement in teaching has lagged behind the quantitative growth of the student population. The creation of the Commission on Higher Education served to address this problem. Thus far,

despite challenges due to lack of resources and funds, the psychology departments at different universities continue to thrive. The attrition rate has been noted to be high at the postgraduate level, and it is suggested that proper advisement and regular follow-up take place to address the problem (Tan, 1999). Challenges such as low pay, and having to compete with unethical or incompetent practitioners and quacks are slowly being addressed through the passage of the new bills passed in the congress and senate and by establishing guidelines based on research (see Teh, 2003) regarding the level of professional fees one can charge. The lack of good psychological tests has been addressed locally, as evidenced by the development of more than 200 psychological tests and measurements (see GuanzonLapeña et. al., 1998). Locally developed tests for use in the professional, educational, and corporate fields are made available through various corporations such as the PPRTH, MAVEC Specialists Foundation, Inc., and Asian Psychological Services & Assessment Corporation, among others. According to Guanzon-Lapeña (Personal communication, December 14, 2008), there is no one local test distributor. There are many modes by which tests are distributed, including direct contact with the authors of the tests, or the organizations or universities that serve to distribute the tests. Among the over 130 universities and colleges in the Philippines that offer psychology degrees, three universities stand out in terms of performance and high profile in research and publication. They are the De la Salle University (DLSU), ADMU, and the UP (Bernardo, 2002). A number of factors can explain this. First, many of the academic staffs in these universities have received advanced training, many of them from overseas. Second, they have the resources for supporting research and other scholarly activities. Third, there are more pressures on them to publish, unlike with other universities and colleges where teaching (and clinical practice in some) is the only expectation of academic staff. In terms of field of research, Bernardo (1997) observed that social psychology has consistently been the field in which research predominates. This reflects a commitment among Filipino psychologists to work on areas that are of interest or significance to the Filipino people and society. This trend has made a number of writers conclude that Philippine psychology is leaning more and more toward an indigenous orientation (Aguiling-Dalisay, 2008; Bernardo, 2009; Sta. Maria, 1996). pe-pua, per fecto-ramos

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Research and publication also started to involve collaborations of Filipino psychologists with psychologists in other countries and with professionals from other disciplines such as anthropology and history (see Mendoza, 2006). This continues the interdisciplinary collaboration witnessed even from the early days of Sikolohiyang Pilipino. For instance, Salazar, a historian, continues to teach at the DLSU, where he has trained undergraduate students to do verbatim transcriptions in the native language. He also continues to publish his writings in Sikolohiyang Pilipino using the Philippine language. Other forms of collaboration and mutual cooperation in Philippine psychology also emerged during the 21st century. Conferences sponsored by the Society for Adolescent Medicine in the Philippines, Inc. (SAMPI) and the Psychiatrists’ Associations have been broadcasted and are open to practitioners in the field of psychology. The PAP created the PAP Junior Associates arm to keep undergraduate students up-to-date on developments in different fields of psychology in the Philippines. Another fact worth mentioning is that the PAP is among the founding members of the Afro-Asian Psychological Association established in 1990. Together with nine other psychological associations, the PAP set out to establish the Asia-Oceania Psychological Association in 1992. The PAP has also hosted a number of international conferences in the country since 1995 (Tan, 1999). To date, both the PAP and the PSSP continue to hold annual conferences. The PAP continues to publish the PJP, while the PSSP publishes monographs such as Binhi (since 2002) and textbooks such as Mga Babasahin sa Agham Panlipunang Pilipino (Readings in Philippine Social Science) (Navarro & Lagbao-Bolante, 2007).

Conclusion This chapter traced the development of Philippine psychology within a sociopolitical context. The first period of the introduction of academic-scientific psychology coincides with the American occupation of the country and the formalization of a Western educational system, after a long history of Spanish colonization, up to the events of World War II. This period saw the establishment of psychology departments in a few universities by Filipino psychologists trained in the Western tradition. The second period covers the “founding fifties” characterized by the strengthening of psychology teaching and practice, and the 1960s, characterized by a shift of focus to 406

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social problems and issues, and a strengthening of the discipline. It was during the 1960s that the PAP and the IPC were established. The period coincided with brewing turmoil in Philippine politics as people and the Marcos government clashed. The third period brought this turmoil to a height that pushed Philippine psychology toward a nationalistic character and saw the emergence of Sikolohiyang Pilipino, an indigenous perspective in the discipline. An increased awareness of the limitations of Western psychology led to a paradigm shift that resulted in the discovery of Filipino psychological concepts and methods. This saw the development of indigenous personality research and of indigenous research methods in the 1970s and its strengthening, as well as debates in the 1980s. The fourth period covers the mid-1980s to the early 1990s, when Philippine politics tried to consolidate toward peace and progress, and Philippine psychology saw the influence of postmodernism and feminism. The fifth and last period covers the contemporary preoccupation with professionalizing psychology (with two significant bills in the offing) in the 21st century, the challenges of globalization, and the need for collaboration, as Filipinos face the challenges of a new generation of political unrest and economic uncertainty. The historical development of Philippine psychology is flavored by the duality between Western psychology and indigenous Filipino psychology. Both have their merits and weaknesses. For a long time, Western psychology has dominated and it continues to be a strong force, as can be gleaned from the teaching curriculum in Philippine universities and colleges. The experimental method and the positivist orientation are still quite strong. However, Western psychology still faces its biggest criticism—that its theories are wanting in terms of reflecting local realities, and its methods are not always useful in understanding Filipino psychological thought and behavior. It is for this reason that the second duality emerged. Sikolohiyang Pilipino aims to provide a process for making psychology relevant by distancing itself from its colonial (Western) character. Bernardo (2009, p. 2) asserts that Sikolohiyang Pilipino’s greatest accomplishment is that it “liberated Philippine psychology from its colonial past and its neo-colonial present.” It has also influenced positivists and etic practitioners to pause, take a step back, review Western methodologies and theories, and question their validity, reliability, and applicability to the Philippine setting and to the

Filipino people. No doubt, because of Sikolohiyang Pilipino, the majority of psychologists in the Philippines are now coming up with different ways and means of localizing, contextualizing, and indigenizing their topics, their means of doing research, and even their manner of analyzing data. Despite the criticisms against it, Sikolohiyang Pilipino continues to have a strong hold on Philippine psychology, especially among those who believe that, for psychology to be truly Filipino, it must be about Filipinos and must be expressed in the language best understood by Filipinos. It has been observed that psychologists representing the dualities have now been more accepting of each other and have recognized the major contributions of each side. Where university departments were once beset by factions within, between the Western and indigenous psychologists, this has been replaced by cooperation and mutual respect. Even between PAP and PSSP, there is mutual participation and mutual interest in sharing ideas and innovations. Although the criticisms of each other’s orientations and approaches continue, these have always been civil and constructive. This is pakikisama (being along with) at its best and pakikipagkapwa (having a shared identity) at its finest.

Future Directions A number of issues face Philippine psychology in the future. A few of these are outlined here. Bernardo (1997) noted from his survey of publications in Philippine psychology that the research culture in Philippine psychology is weak. He attributed this to lack of research resources, lack of time for research due to the heavy teaching load of most academics, “an absence of a critical mass of researchers that are necessary to initiate and maintain a peer review system of research outputs,” (p. 48) and a lack of openness for review. Bernardo recommended that institutions create or strengthen this research culture in their own universities/corporations so as to serve as models for other institutions and individuals. He also believed that associations such as the PAP must play an important role in increasing the number of individuals doing and publishing research by providing the proper venues for dissemination and discussion of research. He likewise reiterated the need for Filipino researchers to take on a more active role in developing substantive and functional knowledge about the psychological life of Filipinos (Bernardo, 1997). To this can be added that, coupled with more resources (for example, research funding and teaching relief ) there should

be clear reward systems attached to increased research and publication productivity, whether this is in terms of material resources or recognition (e.g., academic promotion). Montiel and Teh (2004) reaffirmed this challenge to publish more regularly. Furthermore, they would like to see some standardization of curricula across universities and colleges, more collaboration with international colleagues or groups, and more interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary approaches in research, so that the results of such research would have a greater impact on Philippine society and on the Asian as well as wider global community. The second major issue is about theorizing in Philippine psychology. Sikolohiyang Pilipino has prospered for more than three decades, yet the question remains as to whether it has indeed made a significant contribution to or inroad in the discipline of psychology in terms of theory and methodology. Has psychology in other parts of the world changed because of indigenous psychology? A recent analysis of the origins and development of indigenous psychologies (IPs) in various regions of the world by Allwood and Berry (2006) showed that many IPs (including the Philippine experience) endeavor to contribute to universal psychology. As with the Philippine case, the lack of great visibility in the international arena poses a disadvantage in forming an adequate recognition of Sikolohiyang Pilipino’s contribution. Furthermore, as an offshoot of constraints in publishing, whether in English or in Filipino, no conscious attempt has been made to consolidate its achievements in various fields, in terms of the contribution. Thus, a clear future direction must take stock of the status of Philippine psychology in theorizing and methodology by looking at the origins and development by field (i.e., in personality, social psychology, child psychology, clinical psychology, and so on). The original goal of Sikolohiyang Pilipino is to provide one form to compare with others, ultimately moving toward a universal psychology. Enriquez (1979, 1992) refers to this as the cross-indigenous approach. The aim was never about isolating psychology or being insular. The need for theorizing has been expressed by a number of writers (Bernardo, 2009; Church & Katigbak, 2002; Gastardo-Conaco, 2005; Pe-Pua & Protacio-Marcelino, 2000, 2002; Yacat, 1997, among others). Gastardo-Conaco (2005) recommends that the body of knowledge that has been created on Sikolohiyang Pilipino be synthesized, so that theories can be refined and further tested and validated. pe-pua, per fecto-ramos

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The third issue is one that has emerged within the Sikolohiyang Pilipino movement and is related to the inclusivity–exclusivity dimension of carrying out indigenization research and consequently, publishing. This is the tension between the pantayo perspective (the insider view representing “us”–tayo and excluding “them,” sila) (Pe-Pua & ProtacioMarcelino, 2000, 2002) and the pangkami perspective (the culture-bearer speaking to the outsider about the indigenous) perspectives. For Salazar (1991, 2000), the pantayo approach is sufficient to understanding Filipino thoughts, to developing indigenous knowledge, and to addressing social issues effectively, through the use of the local language. He did not believe in a need to construct indigenous knowledge with a view of explaining this to the outsider since this additional task could hamper the full development of the indigenous knowledge. As Sta. Maria (1996) puts it, the pangkami approach tends to portray Sikolohiyang Pilipino to be too reactive, rather than integrative. In terms of the future, it seems likely that this debate will resolve itself through reconciliation, in which both perspectives could progress side by side without creating a contradiction. The pantayo approach is crucial for solidifying indigenous knowledge and the contributions of Philippine psychology. When this is done, the pangkami approach could become the vehicle for bringing indigenous knowledge to the next step, which is cross-cultural comparison following a cross-indigenous approach. Much has been said about the role that Sikolohiyang Pilipino has played in the development of psychology in the Philippines. As one of the most advanced movements in the world in indigenization, it is this aspect that makes psychology in the Philippines quite distinct. In terms of the future direction of Sikolohiyang Pilipino, Church and Katigbak (2002) offered seven pressing needs of indigenous Philippine psychology: “the formulation of indigenous theory; objective consideration informed by empirical data; continuing development and validation of indigenous measures; systematic investigation of the comparative and convergent validity of various indigenous and imported research methods; institutional/structural improvements leading to growth and stability of the indigenous research culture; maintenance of an appropriate balance between the pursuit of an independent psychology and the avoidance of insularity; and eventually, increased efforts to relate cross-indigenous approach toward a universal psychology” (p. 141). 408

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To conclude, psychology in the Philippines will continue to flourish. There will be more collaboration with colleagues from other countries and from other disciplines, and most certainly, collaborations between Western-trained Filipino psychologists and indigenous framework–oriented psychologists. As more universities make it a requirement of their academic staff to publish more actively, an increase in the number of publications can be expected. The younger fields, such as political psychology, peace psychology, and health psychology, will progress, as evidenced by the growing numbers of practitioners in the field. Psychotherapists, social psychologists, and industrial-organizational psychologists will continue to promote and work toward the welfare and well-being of the Filipino people.

Glossary Babaylans: Filipino native priestesses and healers who practiced the earliest forms of psychotherapy. Ginabayang talakayan: The indigenous research method of focused group discussions. Hindi-ibang-tao: One-of-us; level of relationship established with participants/ respondents, characterized by being in rapport/ understanding and acceptance, with being one with the other. Ibang-tao: Not-one-of-us; level of relationship established with participants/respondents characterized by being in civility with the other, to a level of being along with the other. Ilustrado: Refers to the Filipinos during the time of the Spanish colonization in the Philippines who were educated. Indigenization from within: Looking for indigenous psychology from within the culture itself, also known as cultural revalidation. Indigenization from without: Translation of concepts and methods into a particular language to make it more culturally appropriate. Kapwa: Shared identity Katipunan: Or the KKK (Kataas-taasang Kagalang-galangang Katipunan ng mga Anak ng Bayan), an organization established by a Filipino, Andres Bonifacio, to lead the Filipinos into an uprising against the Spaniards. Pagtatanong-tanong: The indigenous research method of interviewing, or a semi-structured way of interviewing. Pakikipagkwentuhan: The indigenous research method of sharing stories.

Sikolohiyang Pilipino: Filipino psychology; a field of psychology, introduced by Virgilio Enriquez, which emphasized identity and national consciousness, social awareness and involvement, and language in relation to culture and Philippine culture. It encourages the use of the multilanguage, multimethod approach in doing research.

Notes 1. The Epifanio de los Santos Avenue is a major thoroughfare in Metro Manila. On February 22–25, 1986, this highway served as the nonviolent “battleground” between millions of Filipinos and the Philippine military. The military was sent there with tanks, hand grenades, and armed weapons by the Marcos government. The people, mainly supporters of would-be president, Corazon Aquino, were armed with rosaries, prayers, religious statues, and flowers. The military’s heavy artillery proved weak against these weapons of the people. Marcos and his family left Malacañang Palace and headed to Hawaii, and Aquino assumed the presidency. The event is henceforth referred to as People Power I or the EDSA Revolution. 2. Benigno Aquino, Jr., popularly known as Ninoy, married Corazon Cojuangco in 1954. He entered politics at the age of 22 and subsequently became the youngest mayor, governor, and senator to serve in the Philippines. Imprisoned in 1972, when President Marcos declared martial law, Aquino was allowed to move his family to the United States, so that he could undergo heart surgery. He later served as a research fellow at Harvard University and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. In 1983, he returned to Manila from “exile.” Despite high security, he was assassinated as he deplaned on August 21. Although an investigative commission declared that several military allies of Marcos were responsible for the assassination, all defendants were acquitted in a 1985 trial. (http://encarta.msn.com/ encyclopedia_761560871/benigno_aquino.html) 3. Padilla’s PhD thesis is entitled “Further Studies on the Delayed Pecking of Chicks” (http://www.lsa.umich.edu/psych/ welcome/PsychDeptHistory.pdf ).

Further Reading Bernardo, A. (2002). Finding our voice(s): Philippine psychologists’ contributions to global discourse in psychology. Asian Psychologist, 3(1), 29–37. Church, A., & Katigbak, M. (2002). Indigenization of psychology in the Philippines. International Journal of Psychology, 37(3), 129–148. Montiel, C., & Teh, L. (2004). Psychology in the Philippines. In M. Stevens, & D. Wedding (Eds.), Handbook of international psychology (pp. 467–480). East Sussex: Brunner and Routledge. Pe-Pua, R. (2006). From decolonizing psychology to the development of a cross-indigenous perspective in methodology: The Philippine experience. In U. Kim, K. S. Yang, & K. K. Hwang (Eds.), Indigenous and cultural psychology: Understanding people in context (pp. 108–137). New York: Springer. Pe-Pua, R., & Protacio-Marcelino, E. (2000). Filipino Psychology: A legacy of Virgilio G. Enriquez. Asian Journal of Social Psychology, 3, 49–71.

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Pe-Pua, R. (2006). From decolonizing psychology to the development of a cross-indigenous perspective in methodology: The Philippine experience. In U. Kim, K. S. Yang, & K. K. Hwang (Eds.), Indigenous and cultural psychology: Understanding people in context (pp. 108–137). New York: Springer. Pe-Pua, R., & Protacio-Marcelino, E. (2000). Filipino psychology: A legacy of Virgilio G. Enriquez. Asian Journal of Social Psychology, 3, 49–71. Pe-Pua, R., & Protacio-Marcelino, E. (2002). Sikolohiyang Pilipino: Pamana ni Virgilio G. Enriquez. Binhi, 1(1). Monograph series of the Pambansang Samahan sa Sikolohiyang Pilipino. Salazar, Z. (1985). Four filiations in Philippine psychological thought. In A. Aganon, & M. David (Eds.), Sikolohiyang Pilipino: Isyu, pananaw at kaalaman (New directions in indigenous psychology) (pp. 194–214). Manila: National Bookstore. Salazar, Z. (1991). Ang pantayong pananaw bilang diskursong pangkabihasnan (The pantayo perspective as cultural discourse). In V. Bautista, & R. Pe-Pua (Eds.), Pilipinolohiya: Kasaysayan, pilosopiya at pananalisksik (Philippine Studies: History, philosophy and research) (pp. 46–72). Manila: Kalikasan Press. Salazar, Z. (2000). The pantayo perspective as a discourse towards kabihasnan. Southeast Asian Journal of Social Sciences, 28(1), 123–152. San Juan, E. (2006). Towards a decolonizing indigenous psychology in the Philippines: Introducing Sikolohiyang Pilipino. Journal for Cultural Research, 10(1), 47–67.

Santiago, C. (1975). Pakapa-kapa: Paglilinaw ng isang konsepto sa nayon. In R. Pe-Pua (Ed.), Sikolohiyang Pilipino: Teorya, metodo at gamit [Filipino Psychology: Theory, method and application] (1982, reprinted 1989 & 1995; pp. 161–170). Quezon City: Surian ng Sikolohiyang Pilipino. Santiago, C., & Enriquez, V. (1976). Tungo sa makapilipinong pananaliksik. Sikolohiyang Pilipino: Mga Ulat at Balita, 1(4), 3–10. Sta. Maria, M. (1996). Is the indigenization crisis in Philippine social sciences resolved in Sikolohiyang Pilipino? Layag, 1(1), 101–120. Sta. Maria, M. (2000). Indigenous psychology, ethnopsychology, cross-cultural psychology and cultural psychology: Distinction implications for Sikolohiyang Pilipino. AsiaPacific Social Science Review, 1(1), 11–22. Tan, A. (1997). Values research in the Philippines. Philippine Studies, 45(4), 560–569. Tan, A. (1999). Philippine psychology: Growth and becoming. In L. Teh, & E. Macapagal (Eds.), Readings in general psychology (pp. 19–38). Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press. Teh, L. (2003). A survey on the practice of psychotherapy in the Philippines. Philippine Journal of Psychology, 36, 112–133. Tiglao-Torres, A. (1997). Methods, mind or meaning: Shifting paradigms in Philippine psychology. Philippine Journal of Psychology, 30, 17–38. Yacat, J. (1997). The place of Sikolohiyang Pilipino in a generalist psychology. Sikolohiya, 1(1), 66–70. Zaide, G., & Zaide, S. (1999). The Philippines: A unique nation (4th ed.). Quezon City: All Nations Publications.

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Irina Sirotkina and Roger Smith

Abstract There are three periods of Russian history that exhibit significant elements of continuity and discontinuity: the tsarist period, the Soviet or Bolshevik period, 1917–1991, and the contemporary period of the Russian Federation. The chapter describes the origins of psychology in connection with the freedom of human life and the modernization of the country. It traces institutionalization in clinical and academic settings and the large expansion of psychological activity in the Soviet Union. It discusses the shaping framework of politics as it affected the fate of Vygotsky’s and Pavlov’s work, as well as research and occupational areas like pedology and psychotechnics. From the 1950s, there was renewed growth, diversification, and contact with Western science. In 1989–1991, withdrawal of state support resulted in some emigration of psychologists, but rapid growth of popular psychology. Keywords: Bolshevik, institutionalization, modernization, Pavlov, pedology, popular psychology, psychotechnics, Soviet Union, Vygotsky

If it is impossible to recount a single story about the development of psychology in general, this is particularly true for Russia. (For the historical breadth of psychology, see Smith, 1997, 2008.) Russia, as a cultural and political entity, passed from being an imperial and autocratic empire within the European framework but with vast Asian lands, to being the first socialist state, the U.S.S.R., a massive experiment in centralized control, which for decades dominated half of Europe as well as half of Asia to become, after 1991, the Russian Federation, adopting a version of capitalism but not liberal politics. The status and support of science, including psychology, varied markedly during this history. At no time did any one version of what psychology is, conceived either as a science narrowly defined or as public knowledge of human nature, achieve a monopoly. Psychology became an established field during the 20th century, and this involved a confusingly large range of institutions. Versions of psychology 412

were present in the Soviet university sector, primarily committed to teaching, and, to a lesser extent, in the Academy of Sciences, dedicated to research (and teaching at doctoral level). Psychology was also present in applied areas of education (and in the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences), medicine, sport, cosmonautics, the army, and so on. Soviet psychologists bid to be major contributors to world science and claimed that their numbers included outstanding contributors to psychology, notably Ivan Petrovich Pavlov (1849–1936) and Lev Semyonovich Vygotsky (1896–1934). Soviet historians of psychology, in their last years led by the reform-minded Mikhail Grigor’evich Yaroshevskii (1915–2002), pictured Soviet psychology as a series of progressive achievements in science (Yaroshevskii, 1974, 1985). Yet, Pavlov did not claim to be a psychologist but a physiologist, and the state banned Vygotsky’s work for two decades after his death and, even later, publication proceeded slowly. Furthermore, U.S. historian of science David Joravsky claimed that the

Soviet pursuit of scientific psychology faced “the persistent frustration of efforts to overcome the duality of brain studies and mind studies,” and of consciousness and practice, which it was its selfproclaimed glory to have achieved (Joravsky, 1989, p. viii). He indicted the scientism of the field, comparing it unfavorably to Russian literature, in which he found a deeper and more humane contribution to human self-understanding. Then, in 1989, the value of incomes paid to scientists began to collapse, and in 1990–1991 a political decision was made to cut funding for science. Many scientists, including psychologists, left the country. Over the next decade, however, psychology became one of the most sought after student courses and publicly visible ways of thinking (for example, in TV talk shows and selfhelp books). There is still much to clarify in these complex circumstances. A good deal of the evenhanded historical work that will make this possible is only now beginning. Political events suggest a natural division into three periods, from the beginnings to 1917, 1917–1991, and 1991 to the present. Nevertheless, the nature and extent of historical continuity is a major question for historians of all areas of Russian and Soviet history, not just of science, and it is a contentious matter for Russian identity, politics, and cultural sensibility. The purpose here is to provide an overview. We therefore concentrate on the circumstances that encouraged a variety of claims about psychology and do not discuss the work of any one scientist in detail. We give more attention to the earlier shaping of the field than to the detail of postWorld War II practice in the field. (For a large anthology, with brief biographical introductions, see Zhdan, 2009.) We adopt a standard transliteration of names, except for well-known ones, such as Vygotsky. Rendering names of institutions in English, we incline not to capitalize, in order to avoid giving a false idea of what institutions were actually called—formal and informal names differed, some names changed repeatedly, others usually took the form of an acronym—but no strict consistency is possible. There is a large literature in Russian, and, despite the fact that writers have generally repeated clichés about the progress of science, it contains details not well known. There are two, albeit very different, interesting histories in English, Psychology in Utopia (1984) by Alex Kozulin (an émigré psychologist from the Soviet Union) and Joravsky’s Russian Psychology (1989), neither translated into Russian.

There is a huge literature on Vygotsky, including books in English sensitive to the historical dimension, like those by Kozulin (1990) and by René van der Veer and Jaan Valsiner (1991). The work of Daniel Todes is making available, for the first time, a meticulous historical assessment of Pavlov (summarized in Todes, 2007). A mid-20th-century Soviet historiography is still often implicit in views of how scientific psychology, as opposed to other varieties, developed. (See Petrovskii, 1967, for a once standard Soviet text.) According to this account, scientific, materialist approaches to human nature, influenced by medical physiology, evolutionary thought, and critiques of political economy, appeared with the generation of “revolutionary democrats” who initiated revolutionary politics in Russia in the 1860s. Soviet authors stressed the role of Ivan Mikhailovich Sechenov (1829–1905), who, they wrote, then introduced experimental physiology to Russia and argued in terms that had worldwide significance for knowledge of brain as the route to a science of mind. He supposedly gave rise to a distinctively Russian “school,” although there was no such thing, and the neurophysiologists who came closest to continuing his work, N. E. Vvedenskii (1852–1922) and Prince A. A. Ukhtomskii (1875–1942), were not psychologists. His article (1863), expanded as a pamphlet, Refleksy golovnogo mozga (Reflexes of the Brain, 1866), suggested physiological analogues for mental processes, and his research on central inhibition supposedly laid the basis for objective understanding of the will and thought. Then, according to this account, Pavlov, inspired by Sechenov, elaborated the theory of conditional reflexes as the basis for a comprehensive science of the nervous system, the basis of psychology and psychiatry, thus giving these sciences Russian roots. With the support of the Bolshevik state, the Pavlovian research program established the leadership of Soviet science and demonstrated the progressive, objective character of materialist thinking. Already by the 1960s, however, it was possible to more or less openly acknowledge that the theory—which Pavlov himself always called a theory of “higher nervous activity,” not a theory of psychology—could not possibly circumscribe the field, even if scientists continued to invoke Pavlov. The belief remained that Soviet research had, owing to its materialist orientation, made world-class contributions to a unified science—a position which the names of Nikolai Aleksandrovich Bernshtein (1896–1966), Aleksei Nikolaevich Leont’ev (1903–1979), sirotkina, smith

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Aleksandr Romanovich Luria (1902–1977), and Vygotsky appeared to justify. If no one now accepts such a story in these terms, both the general shape and many historical details of alternatives are still in question. The history of psychology’s epistemological, ideological, and institutional connections to physiology is indeed pivotal, but for many in the Russian intelligentsia this was not, and is not, a narrow scientific question, or reducible to struggles between factional interests (however much it expressed itself in such struggles), and encompassed ontological, ethical, and religious questions about being human. These large questions were at the base of much of the early interest in psychological matters.

Human Nature and Free Will in Tsarist Times Until February 1917, the Russian Empire was an autocracy in which the tsars ruled, as they held, by divine right. The state was deeply ambivalent about modernization and the place of science, technology, and medicine in that process, wanting the power of applied knowledge but distrusting secular ways of thought. The conservative establishment adhered to the Orthodox faith as the guarantor of political order. Thus, clashes between materialist and spiritualist views of human nature, debates on free will and responsibility, and, inevitably, early discussions relevant to psychology were intensely politicized. Materialism and radical political opposition to tsarism were firmly associated in pre-revolutionary Russia, while alternative views were often characteristic of a more moderate and sometimes conservative intelligentsia. The struggles between materialists and spiritualists in the second half of the 19th century shaped psychology as a separate domain of thought. Insofar as psychology was regarded as the science of the soul and institutionally part of philosophy courses in theology schools, psychology was present in Russia from the second half of the 18th century. (We draw on Joravsky, 1989, and Sirotkina, 2006, in this and the following two sections.) By contrast, if by psychology we mean a separate discipline, with university chairs and people employed as psychologists, then it appeared only after the October Revolution. All the same, by the end of the 19th century, many different kinds of activities called psychology had spread in philosophy, natural science, literature, medicine, education, legal practice, and even military science. Psychology was as much a cultural resource as it was a defined area of scholarship 414

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or paid occupation. Debates took place about the identity of psychology as knowledge that contributed to the self-awareness of Russian civil society in raw political circumstances—as such debates continued to do under the Bolsheviks and the post-1991 settlement alike. In 1850, in the aftermath of revolutions in Europe, the minister of education, P. A. ShirinskiiShikhmatov, had presented Tsar Nicholas I with a report limiting the teaching of philosophy courses exclusively to theology schools, and prohibiting the teaching of philosophy by means of logic and psychology on the grounds that philosophy was conducive to independent thinking and could endanger the regime. In 1855, the new tsar, Alexander II, seeking changes in the wake of the disastrous Crimean War, allowed the return of philosophy chairs. With the abolition of serfdom (1861) and reforms in legal administration (1864), Russia began a slow process of modernization. Many people believed that science was the key to overcoming an alleged backwardness, and they eagerly embraced the anthropology of Feuerbach or the evolutionary ideas of Darwin and Spencer. In 1862, Ivan Turgenev’s most polemical novel, Ottsy i deti (Fathers and Children), dramatized the relationship of the old and the new generations in Russia and introduced to literature a new figure, the “nihilist.” Nihilist students, considering themselves realistic and scientific, dismissed their fathers as, at best, soft-hearted liberals unable to act to change the stagnant regime, and they accused their university professors of “declaring out loud that man is primarily a spiritual being while themselves sinking into moral dirt” (N. K. Mikhailovskii, quoted in Sirotkina, 2006, p. 241). In the light of such views, in the 1860s, the authorities began to consider that teaching idealist philosophy, combating materialism and utilitarianism, thought to be synonymous with nihilism, might after all actually help in the fight for student minds. The discussion between physiologists and philosophers took shape in 1860, when the radical journalist Nikolai Gavrilovich Chernyshevskii (1828–1889) attacked traditional philosophy in an article and pamphlet, Antropologicheskii printsip v filosofii (The Anthropological Principle in Philosophy). He announced that man has only one nature—he is a natural being—and put forward a decidedly un-Orthodox ethics, “enlightened egoism.” Equating “natural” and “right,” he proposed embracing science, specifically physiology, in order to reform life by showing people how to follow their

inner nature. An honest response to scientific knowledge, he believed, will make possible “the New Man.” Pamfil Danilovich Yurkevich (1826–1874), then a philosophy teacher in the Kiev theological academy in the Ukraine, wrote an educated religious response, “Iz nauki o chelovecheskom dukhe” (“From the Science of the Human Spirit”), against the author whom he judged completely ignorant in philosophical matters. Others joined in, understanding that the polemics touched on the place of psychology as knowledge, and the whole discussion spilled over the pages of general literary magazines and attracted the attention of a wide audience. In 1861, the translation of The Physiology of Common Life by G. H. Lewes, a book that Pavlov cited as influencing his direction of study, continued the discussion. The young radical critic Dmitrii Ivanovich Pisarev (1840–1868) followed this up with “Protsess zhizni” (“The Process of Life”), an article that argued for the reduction of psychological phenomena to more elementary material processes. He outraged literature lovers by claiming that, for poor people, boots are superior to Pushkin. Another radical critic, Maksim Alekseevich Antonovich (1835–1918), hurried to interpret Lewes as support for naturalist studies of the mind, in preference to what he called vague philosophizing. Antonovich took Chernyshevskii’s side against Yurkevich, and the latter, from 1861 a Moscow university professor, intervened once again to defend both his discipline and himself, arguing that it is not possible to reduce physiological and psychological knowledge to each other. Unfortunately for the reputation of his argument, he received the support of political conservatives. Given that Chernyshevskii was by now in the Petropavlovskaia fortress in St. Petersburg for his political views and was widely viewed as a martyr of the repressive regime, this damned his opponents, including Yurkevich, as reactionary. While in prison, Chernyshevskii succeeded in publishing his novel, Chto delat’? (What Is to Be Done?, 1863), and it was this, with its physiological and utilitarian account of human nature, which quickly became the favorite reading of the young radicals (including V. I. Lenin). The question, “Komy i kak razrabatyvat’ psikhologiiu?” (Who Is to Develop Psychology and How?), was of such importance that Sechenov, a physiologist and doctor by training and a teacher in institutions of higher education, chose it as the title for an essay in 1873. His question was rhetorical, for he was already convinced that physiology was the scientific basis on which to build psychology.

He wrote for a general journal and received lively responses, both sympathetic and critical, reflecting the rich range of such discussions. In his earlier essay, “Reflexes of the Brain,” which he also wrote for a general audience, he had drawn on his own experiments (carried out in an anteroom of Claude Bernard’s laboratory in Paris), claiming to discover a midbrain center that inhibits motor activity. When he found what he thought was the center of reflex inhibition in the frog’s brain, he believed that this brought him closer to understanding human free will. He explained mental operations as reflexes with a delayed or suppressed end, conceiving of thought as action, but without the final stage of movement, initiated by the external world and mediated by the brain (Kostiuk, Mikulinskii, & Yaroshevskii, 1980; Smith, 1992, Chapter 3; Yaroshevskii, 1968). His objective was not to deny the significance of the will or of responsibility but the reverse: to demonstrate that a scientific rather than an idealist worldview makes it possible to act and change human behavior by changing the external conditions of life. The nation’s future, he implied, rests on the science of the will and not on tsarist and Orthodox exhortation to the soul. The results of Sechenov’s experiments to find centers of inhibition in the brain were ambivalent, and, typically for 19th-century and subsequent attempts to relate mind and brain, the whole issue turned out to be vastly more complex than first imagined. One of his scientific critics was the son, Aleksandr A. Herzen (1839–1906), of the famous political exile, Aleksandr Ivanovich Herzen, who developed the views of his mentor, then living in Florence, Moritz Schiff, that fatigue better explained the observed inhibitory effects. Yet, Herzen actively supported the view for which Sechenov was often thought to be the major spokesman in Russia, that every human action is determined and free will is therefore an illusion (Sirotkina, 2001). After working with a group of colleagues and students in the late 1860s trying to refute the criticisms of Herzen and others, Sechenov subsequently concentrated on blood physiology. The response to Sechenov’s popular essays on human nature and free will included one, in 1872–1873, from a liberal professor of law, Konstantin Dmitrievich Kavelin (1818–1885). Although sympathetic to Sechenov’s effort to ground psychology on reliable scientific knowledge, Kavelin had a different view of what this scientific base should be, and he argued that psychological methods must include introspection and the study sirotkina, smith

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of culture. He supported a psychology drawing on ethnographic materials about national character, a program that had existed since 1847, when the ethnographic division of the recently founded Russian Geographical Society circulated a request for information on the people’s way of life, including “intellectual and moral abilities.” This was part of a larger debate about national character, national resources, and national development, in the context of which a prominent linguist, A. A. Potebnia (1835–1891), began, in 1862, to publish studies of the relation between mentality and language (later an inspiration for Vygotsky). Kavelin feared that “Sechenov’s insistence on scientific determinism in psychology and his arguments against the freedom of the will might reinforce the ancient curse of passivity and helplessness” in the Russian people (quoted in Joravsky, 1989, p. 97). Indeed, the fatalism embedded in what Russian liberals perceived to be the determinist views of conservatives and radicals alike was a constant source of anxiety, since liberals aspired to make social and political reforms and to call the oppressed people to action. The question of free will also linked psychology to practical issues in the administration of justice. Following reforms and the introduction of a jury system, there were socialpsychological studies of evidence, jurors, and the criminal world, in which Russians widely rejected the idea of a criminal character, popular at the time elsewhere. In addition, there were studies of discipline and obedience in the army, and of suggestion and responsibility in large crowds—a significant legal issue in the 1905 revolution and the subsequent mass trials. Russian commentators drew on and enriched the French and Italian crowd psychology literature (Budilova, 1960, 1984). The clashes between materialists and spiritualists, and between scientists and the Orthodox Church, were strongest in the 1860s and 1870s. At that time, Sechenov himself quarreled with university officials, had his work altered by the ecclesiastical censor, and had to agree to publish the initial version of “Reflexes of the Brain” in a specialist medical rather than general literary journal. Other attempts were made to censor psychological texts, including the translation of Wundt’s Vorlesungen über die Menschen und Tierseele (Lectures on the Human and Animal Soul ) as Dusha cheloveka i zhivotnykh (The Soul of Man and Animals, a use of words with definite religious connotations in Russian), which resulted in a court case in 1867, followed by publication and moral victory for liberal views (Todes, 1984). Thereafter came a move 416

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toward accommodation, the acceptance of separate spheres for science and religion. Both Sechenov and Kavelin tried to avoid the Scylla of speculative psychology, traditionally associated with an emphasis on free will, and the Charybdis of rigid materialist determinism. As an older man, Sechenov put his efforts into teaching, including contributing to the special courses that were a significant means for women, banned (except for a few years) from the universities, to receive a higher education, and into studies of work and fatigue, and, although liberal and reform-minded, he was not directly involved with politics. It is likely that it was clear to him that his earlier attempt directly to explain mental processes by brain events had not succeeded. His principal scientific follower, Vvedenskii, shifted research toward the physiology of the neuron, sidelined the mind–body question, and kept his distance from politics (despite having been a radical student) in a manner that was characteristic of the late 19th-century generation, more involved with establishing science as a profession than with politics. Pavlov’s scientific training did not come from Sechenov. Yet, such was Sechenov’s later symbolic standing in Russian science that it became de rigueur for Soviet physiologists and, in due course, psychologists to locate themselves as members of a supposed “Sechenov school” (Yaroshevsky, 1982). The debates on human nature and free will continued during the period when there began to be support for experimental psychology in Russian universities. The promoters of Wundtian psychology, Nikolai Yakovlevich Grot (1852–1899) and Georgii Ivanovich Chelpanov (1862–1936), who had studied with Wundt, contributed by opposing Sechenov’s reflex theory and what they understood to be his denial of free will. They discussed mental causality and creativity and viewed the will as a subjective movement of consciousness (Budilova, 1960, Chapter 8). Grot, the editor of the first Russian psychological journal, Voprosy filosofii i psikhologii (Questions of Philosophy and Psychology, 1889–1918), opened its first issue with articles on free will and determinism. Chelpanov, who taught at Kiev and Moscow universities (at the latter holding a chair in philosophy and psychology), developed a critique of the materialist approach in his book, Mozg i dusha (Brain and Soul, 1900), which appeared in numerous editions before 1917. The balance shifted again with the Bolshevik Revolution. By that time, the institutional setting for psychology was already in place. Interestingly, in Russia, the experimental form of psychology first started in psychiatric institutions.

Psychology in Clinics and Universities before 1917 The divide between materialists (or people labeled materialists) and their opponents was in part a reflection of the academic context. The former had scientific and medical backgrounds and worked, as a rule, in medical schools; the latter held positions in history and philology departments, where philosophy traditionally belonged in Russian universities. Medicine was a significant setting for the advance of views supporting natural science because the state promoted medicine as important to modernization, despite the fact that, as a whole, doctors were reformminded in politics. Sechenov’s medical colleagues chose topics for public lectures similar to his own: For example, in 1876, the professor of pathological physiology, N. O. Kovalevskii, gave a speech on “Kak smotrit fiziologiia na zhizn’ voobshche i psikhicheskuiu v osobennosti” (“How Physiology Views Life in General and Mental Life in Particular”), at the Kazan’ university yearly meeting. Although it was the history and philology departments that traditionally taught courses in psychology, it was the medical schools that first introduced psychological laboratories and courses on experimental psychology. As early as the 1860s and 1870s, Ivan Mikhailovich Balinskii (1827–1902) at the Military-Surgical Academy (which changed its name in the 1880s to the Military Medical Academy) in St. Petersburg and Sergei Sergeevich Korsakov (1854–1900), a psychiatrist at Moscow university, began to purchase psychometric apparatus. Vladimir Mikhailovich Bekhterev (1857–1927) created the first laboratory—a special space for psychological experiments—in Kazan’ in 1885. This was a consequence of the 1884 university charter, which introduced separate chairs for neurology and psychiatry instead of a single professorship of mental and neurological diseases. Kazan’ university invited Bekhterev to take the newly founded chair of psychiatry (the Russian term was kafedra dushevnykh boleznei, chair of mental illnesses). Bekhterev, at that time studying and working abroad (including, in Leipzig, histological research in Paul Flechsig’s clinic and a visit to Wundt’s laboratory), was reluctant to cut short his trip, and he accepted only on the condition that the chair came with a clinic and a laboratory equipped for physiological and psychological experiments. Eager to appoint Bekhterev, the university obtained funds from the ministry of education. Bekhterev purchased standard physiological equipment and, with the help of his staff, himself constructed some devices: a large model of the brain

and a device for measuring the brain’s volume, a pneumograph (for recording breathing movements), and a reflexograph and reflexometer (for recording the knee reflex and measuring its force). Psychological studies in the laboratory were relatively marginal and conducted exclusively on the inmates of the psychiatric ward. A woman student, M. K. Valitskaia, did psychometric studies of patients with various diseases, E. A. Genik and B. I. Vorotynskii experimented with hypnosis, and P. A. Ostankov and M. M. Gran measured the speed of mental processes at different times of the day. Bekhterev summarized research results in an address, “Soznanie i ego granitsy” (“Consciousness and Its Boundaries”), to the annual university meeting in 1888 (Nikiforov, 1986). French influence in Russia was longstanding and fostered support for the tradition in pathology that considered illness, whether natural or induced by hypnosis or drugs, the best mode of psychological experiment. By contrast, the Wundtian approach— experiments with apparatus on subjects fully conscious of what is going on—appeared novel to Russian doctors. In particular, Wundt’s refusal to call hypnotic experiments psychological in the proper sense seemed strange to people who thought only experiments on animals and hypnotized subjects were truly objective. But this attitude gradually changed, especially through the influence of doctors who studied with Wundt. One of the first of these was the psychiatrist Vladimir Fiodorovich Chizh (1855–1922). He, like Emil Kraepelin, then also working with Wundt before he took up an appointment in Dorpat (Tartu, in Estonia), became enthusiastic about the project of reforming psychiatry with the help of experimental psychology. In Leipzig in 1884, Chizh began experiments on the timing of simple and complex reactions. Unlike Wundt, he also carried out reaction time experiments on mental patients, with the aim of finding psychological differences between them and normal subjects (Sirotkina, 2002, Chapter 2; 2008, Chapter 2). At a meeting of the Moscow Psychological Society in 1887, the psychiatrists Grigorii Ivanovich Rossolimo (1860–1928) and Ardalion Ardalionovich Tokarskii (1859–1901) demonstrated both Wundt’s experiments and hypnosis. In 1895, Tokarskii set up a psychological laboratory in the psychiatric clinic of Moscow university with the support of its head, Korsakov, to teach future psychiatrists about what he promoted as new and necessary techniques. It seems that a number of psychiatrists thought of experimental psychology as a way to create a more sirotkina, smith

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prestigious scientific image for their field; and it satisfied their desire to escape from hospital routine. Using experimental devices, however, they helped reshape what psychiatrists studied, transforming mental and moral capacities into psychic functions that act or fail to act in measurable ways. As soon as Chizh returned to Russia, in 1885, he organized a psychological laboratory in the St. Panteleimon hospital in St. Petersburg and equipped it with instruments and apparatus brought from Leipzig. In 1891, Chizh received the professorship at the university of Dorpat, held by Kraepelin since 1886, and he also inherited Kraepelin’s laboratory and his students, to whom he started teaching physiological psychology. Soon thereafter he launched a campaign to introduce the course into the nationwide medical curriculum. The psychiatric promotion of psychological laboratories appeared to leave behind the work traditionally upheld in philosophy. While philosophers were arguing that self-observation is the route to real knowledge of mind and that experimental psychology is but an introduction to a true science of mind, their colleagues from medical schools were already buying apparatus for measuring reaction times and practicing hypnotic experiments. When Chelpanov, reviewing the state of psychology in 1896, wrote about a “psychological institute” at Moscow university, organized with private funds on a Western model, he was referring to the laboratory at the university psychiatric clinic. Nevertheless, in the same year, a philosopher who had studied with Wundt, Nikolai Nikolaevich Lange (1858–1921), established a laboratory attached to the department of history and philology of the Novorossiisk university in Odessa (in the Ukraine). At Lange’s public defense of his higher dissertation, a member of the philosophical faculty praised him for establishing what he thought was the first university psychological laboratory; but the psychiatrists who attended the defense protested that this ignored the work already done by their colleagues. Also in 1896, the faculty of history and philology of Moscow university introduced a course in experimental psychology. Later, in 1914, the opening of a distinct psychological institute in Moscow University greatly forwarded the institutionalization of psychology as part of what might now be called the humanities curriculum. Before this, there had been some resistance to the very idea of an experimental psychology. If one believes the author of an encyclopedia entry on “experimental psychology,” at the end of the 19th century, it was still associated with “balances, 418

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laboratory glasses, ovens, jars, knives, pitiful victims of vivisection.” A lay person could ask “in confusion whether it is really possible to weigh the soul, to put it in a jar, to heat it over a fire, to dissect it” (quoted in Sirotkina, 2006, p. 252). There was also politically motivated resistance from the government. In the period of increased repression following the assassination of Alexander II, a university charter of 1884 seriously reduced university autonomy and made a new assault on philosophy. The government banned logic and psychology from all departments except history and philosophy, limited philosophy courses to ancient (Greek and Latin) philosophy, and closed history of philosophy chairs. Shortly before this, in January 1884, the philosophers Matvei Mikhailovich Troitskii (1835–1899) and Grot founded the Moscow Psychological Society. They wished to discuss philosophical issues, but because anything called “philosophical” could attract official disapproval, they used “psychological” as a euphemism. All the same, the title also alluded to Troitskii’s particular version of philosophy. An admirer of German idealism earlier in his life, he had gone to study in Germany and come back disillusioned. In Nemetskaia filosofiia (German Philosophy, 1867), he reported that he had found in British philosophy (notably Spencer) an alternative to what he judged as shallow and vague speculations. His position thus paralleled that of the French psychologist Ribot. The liberal and broad-minded Grot welcomed to the society people with various views and convictions, including philosophers, teachers, medical doctors, and writers (one of whom was L. N. Tolstoy). Its monthly seminar was a forum for both papers, many of which were on psychology, and public defenses of dissertations. For example, in 1885, Troitskii gave a talk on “Sovremennoe uchenie o zadachakh i metodakh psikhologii” (“The Contemporary Doctrine of Psychology, Its Objectives and Methods”), in which he treated psychology as a “natural center for other disciplines, which sets the tasks for ethics and law” (I. M. Kondakov, quoted in Sirotkina, 2006, p. 253). In 1888, 2 years after he had replaced Troitskii as professor of philosophy, Grot founded the journal, Voprosy filosofii i psikhologii, with the sponsorship of a wealthy Muscovite. The press attached to the journal also published translations of Kant, Leibniz, Schelling, Spinoza, Descartes, Wundt, and others. In the 1870s, Grot had been friendly with Kavelin, although in the latter’s debates with Sechenov he took the physiologist’s side. Subsequently, he was a follower of Spencer and

of Wilhelm Oswald, finding a solution to the mind– body problem and a basis for ethics in the hypothesis that a psychic energy is correlated with mechanical energy, heat, magnetic fields, and so on. In 1889, at the first International Psychological Congress in Paris, where the Russian delegation was the second largest after the French, Grot spoke on “La causalité et la conservation de l’énergie dans la domaine de l’activité psychique” (“Causation and the Conservation of Energy in the Sphere of Mental Activity”). Both Troitskii and Sechenov were among the honorary presidents of the congress. Unlike the Muscovites, who favored the empirical tradition, St. Petersburg philosophers inclined toward German idealism. M. I. Vladislavlev (1840–1890), the professor of philosophy, both translated Kant and taught psychology and logic and published one of the first Russian textbooks on psychology. His successor in St. Petersburg, A. I. Vvedenskii (1856–1925), who held a professorship there from 1890 until the end of his life, was also a Kantian. In his speculation on how one could recognize the signs of consciousness in another living being, he concluded that there is no such experiential criterion and that there must be an innate belief in the existence of consciousness in others. In Russia, as in Western Europe throughout the 19th century, the university curriculum structured the divisions of the field of philosophy. Russian institutions divided philosophy into the science of general principles, or metaphysics, and the science of special principles—general cosmology, biology, psychology, ethics, aesthetics, and the philosophy of history. Professors such as Vladislavlev commonly taught metaphysics and gave away “inferior” parts of their subject to assistants. Thus, in 1889, as a privat-dotsent (a nonsalaried teacher, receiving pay only from students’ fees), Vvedenskii lectured on logic and psychology, including perception, attention, will, consciousness, and personality. On his reading list were a translation of Alexander Bain, titled Psikhologiia (Psychology), De l’intelligence (On Intelligence) by Hippolyte Taine, Gründzuge der physiologischen Psychologie (Principles of Physiological Psychology) by Wundt, and Grot’s study of sensations, among other books. When Vvedenskii became professor, he stopped teaching psychology and gave it to the privat-dotsent, L. V. Rutkovskii, who altered the content of the course and used James Mark Baldwin’s Handbook of Psychology (1891) throughout. Until the early 20th century, university psychology was taught only in the lecture room; visits to a

laboratory were unheard of. When the privat-dotsent N. O. Losskii announced his lecture course with “practical exercises” for the 1905–1906 academic year, he expected his students to write essays and not do experiments. The first teacher to introduce students to the psychological laboratory was A. P. Nechaev (1870–1948), the promoter of “experimental pedagogy” in Russia. He initially had a laboratory, mainly for examining schoolchildren, at the pedagogy museum (which was also a research and teaching institution) in St. Petersburg. Nechaev taught a psychology course from 1906 until the beginning of World War I to all philosophy students, but he accepted only those who wanted to specialize in psychology in the laboratory classes. By the 1909–1910 academic year, there was diverse psychology teaching in St. Petersburg university: a lecture course by a philosopher, I. I. Lapshin; introductory classes in experimental psychology by Nechaev; and lectures on brain anatomy and physiology and clinical lectures on psychiatry by the physician S. A. Sukhanov. In 1912–1913, there was a new course on physiological psychology, based on Wundt’s Gründzuge der physiologischen Psychologie, and after the war, two new courses, one on pathological psychology and the other on giftedness. By the end of the first decade of the new century, academic psychology in Russia had, as elsewhere in Europe and North America, metamorphosed into a field taught and researched in multifold ways in diverse institutional settings, with a variety of assets targeted at different kinds of practice. Philosophical psychology was represented in Russia by the phenomenologists Gustav Gustavovich Shpet (1879–1938) and S. L. Frank, and the latter, in the momentous year of 1917, restated the notion of the soul in Dusha cheloveka: opyt vvedeniia v filosofskuiu psikhologiiu (The Human Soul: An Essay on the Beginnings of Philosophical Psychology). The new, experimental psychology found its home, first, in medical schools and, a decade later, in departments of philosophy. Chelpanov founded what became the largest psychological laboratory after World War I while he held the philosophy chair of Moscow university. The story of this laboratory and of the institute that housed it says much about psychology’s fate in Russia in the decades following the Revolution and the creation of the Soviet Union.

The Moscow Institute of Psychology and the Early Bolshevik Years In 1907, Chelpanov accepted the philosophy chair in Moscow university on the condition that sirotkina, smith

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the university would fund a laboratory for experimental psychology. Chelpanov had become interested in psychology attending lectures by A. N. Giliarov (1855–1938), the philosophy professor at St. Vladimir university in Kiev. He had then travelled to Leipzig to work with Wundt and, while teaching in Kiev, started a course in psychology with laboratory work. When Moscow University appointed him, he asked for a suitable space for a laboratory and for a reading room. All the same, at first the laboratory had no assistant positions, and Chelpanov’s first students, Konstantin Nikolaevich Kornilov (1879–1957) and N. A. Rybnikov (1880–1961) were his unpaid assistants. Together with a laboratory worker, Gubarev, they got the apparatus to work using Wundt’s and Titchener’s handbooks; at the end, they were able to publish their own laboratory guide for experimental psychology. Chelpanov announced a 3-year course in psychology based on laboratory work and a wellstructured teaching seminar. The topic for the first year was the mind–body problem, for the second, psychology’s subject matter, and for the third there was a range of topics from the psychology of attention and thinking to personality and functionalism. There was also a preparatory course, or “pre-seminar,” at the end of which students took examinations in psychology and in the German language and had to write an essay; only after this could students enroll in experimental psychology proper. Chelpanov’s course was highly successful, and it gave him ambitions to expand the laboratory. This became possible when a wealthy Muscovite, S. I. Shchukin, donated a large sum of money for the construction of a psychological institute for the university, in a building in which it still exists. Chelpanov traveled in Europe and the United States to see existing institutes; the result was a luxurious four-story building with well-equipped laboratories, opening formally on March 23, 1914 (Botsmanova, Guseva, & RavichShcherbo, 1994). To appreciate the role and history of this institute, which is in a way a microcosm of larger events, it is necessary to broaden the historical outlook. The list of practitioners who claimed some expertise in psychology was, by 1914, much larger that the list of those who were primarily philosophers. There was considerable interest in applied fields in Russia, connected in many cases with the socialist movement. In 1903, “in the interests of protecting the working class from physical and moral degeneration, as well as developing the workers’ ability to fight for themselves,” the first program of the 420

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Russian Socialist Democratic Workers Party demanded an 8-hour working day (quoted in Kostiuk, Mikulinskii, & Yaroshevskii, 1980, p. 41). In the same year, Sechenov conducted what turned out to be his last laboratory research, on fatigue. The elderly man experimented on himself, lifting a weight until he felt exhausted. He and other intellectuals were acutely aware of the problems created by the repressive tsarist regime, and they looked to science for answers. In this respect, the aspirations of psychologists coincided with those of the revolutionaries, and this proved to be to the advantage of psychology’s institutionalization. The early Bolsheviks—at least, the educated members of the Party—were true believers in science and, after the disastrous years of the European war, the Revolution, and the Civil War, gave it considerable attention. This interest, however, was double-edged. Bolshevik science policy favored the large scale, and in time it channeled massive resources into industry and research. It founded, and funded from the state budget, new research institutes and laboratories, some of them—like Pavlov’s—huge, and it gave existing facilities status as national, state institutions. As a result, however, science became the monopoly of a highly centralized state system, in which considerable numbers of warring bureaucracies had an interest, and scholars became state employees with no real autonomy. In the conditions of centralized direction of intellectual and academic thought, as well as administration, which the state imposed on all sectors, including psychology, from the late 1920s, this had severe consequences. At times, in circumstances in which there was intense competition for state funds and influence in science, this led to calamitous, even vicious, practices. After late 1921, when Lenin’s orders led to the expulsion of a large number of intellectuals from the country, with members of the Moscow and Petrograd psychological societies among them, accused of resisting the materialist struggle, it gradually became clear that the state would not allow scientists independently to judge the basis of objective knowledge. (St. Petersburg was renamed Petrograd during the war against Germany and Austria; it became Leningrad after Lenin’s death.) Like other areas of Moscow university, the institute survived 1917, even the anxious and cold winter (the building was not heated). It managed to publish three issues of the journal, Psikhologicheskoe obozrenie (Psychological Review), which had been started on the eve of the Revolution. In 1918 and 1919, the new Soviet ministry of education,

Narkompros (People’s Commissariat of Enlightenment) recognized the institute’s existence by financing the laboratory. In 1920, Chelpanov completed his blueprint for a “universal psychological apparatus,” which combined several traditional laboratory devices and would cost less than a set of separate instruments, and he asked the government for funding. The same year, he opened a new section on applied and work psychology. Even before the Revolution, Russian academics had nurtured a project for a network of research institutes, either within the universities or separate from them. After 1917, those psychologists willing to collaborate with the new authorities, again voiced this plan. The Bolsheviks in turn gave their support, partly because it satisfied their taste for the grandiose, partly because it fitted in with their scientism. The leading Party philosopher, Nikolai Bukharin, set the tone with a much to be quoted reference to the theory of conditional reflexes as “a weapon from the iron arsenal of materialism” (quoted in Joravsky, 1989, p. 226). The political situation encouraged a conception of research institutes as “big science” on the industrial scale thought to be integral to communism. In the background was the utopian image of “the New Man,” with its long history, the vision of refashioning human nature for new times, shaping the future. Reference to “the New Man” carried hopes that objective, materialist knowledge and a just social order would make possible a new human nature (Bauer 1952). Aleksei Kapitonovich Gastev (1882–1941), a poet and a revolutionary, who expressed the view “that the human being is nothing but a perfect machine . . . and that the technical progress of this machine is unlimited” (quoted in Kozulin, 1984, p. 16), became director of the Central Institute of Work, founded to rationalize labor processes. If Gastev’s ideas were utopian, the institute was nevertheless home to both Isaak Naftul’evich Shpil’rein (1891–1937) and Bernshtein. The former developed testing and psychotechnics, used for occupational placement; and this field grew to such an extent that the International Psychotechnical Congress came to Russia in 1931. Bernshtein began to develop a nonmechanistic approach to human motor activity, a major intellectual challenge to Pavlovian theory. Along with Gastev, Aron Borisovich Zalkind (1888–1936), who held positions in the new communist academic institutions founded to raise a generation of Marxist-educated cadres, strongly supported the idea of the plasticity of human nature. He put forward his

ideas, drawing like so many others on a reflex model, in the fields of education and testing. Zalkind argued that the business of psychology is to construct a new human personality along with the new society. In practice, this collapsed into recommendations for adjusting individuals to what was demanded of them. Academic changes began at the end of 1921, when the Bolsheviks, overcoming resistance, succeeded in reforming Moscow university. The government started to attack traditional notions of academic freedom by replacing old professors with “red” ones and by changing the student body. It instructed the universities to enroll everybody, regardless of previous education. The universities had to establish so-called workers’ departments (rabfak), because the majority of new students were not able to follow the lectures. The Party viewed this sector as a tool for bringing universities under its control. From the first year of its existence, 1920, the rabfak of Moscow university enrolled more students than all the other departments together. This large-scale affirmative action brought to the universities an army of students eager to make a career, often at the expense of studying. Every university, like all other institutions, had a Party cell, with members recruited mainly from the workers’ departments. The reform of university administration then took the form of establishing “people’s councils,” as opposed to academic ones, in which students from the working class sat side-by-side with professors. At the same time, the government founded new institutions, such as the Communist Academy, specifically to train people “from below” in Bolshevik principles, and these new “red” scientists and administrators were antagonistic to the old scholarly élite. In psychology, the opposition to élite “idealism” came out into the open at the first post-war Russian psychoneurological congress, held in Moscow in 1923, and especially in the public reporting of the event, which side-lined Chelpanov’s work in favor of nonmentalist contributions. To facilitate “Marxist leadership,” the Bolsheviks merged all the departments that traditionally taught the humanities into one department of the social sciences, and they united all the institutes, in which postgraduates prepared dissertations, into an administratively centralized Association. One of the Association’s first decisions was to legislate that only Marxist professors could teach a number of disciplines, including sociology, comparative ethnology, philosophy, and modern history. It also made an exam in Marxist philosophy mandatory sirotkina, smith

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for all doctoral candidates. It could sign up and sack teachers and students on ideological grounds, and it controlled each institute’s funds. In November 1921, the psychological institute became part of the Association, and the university permanently lost administrative control over it. Nevertheless, alongside these controls, and in spite of a shortage of everything, the postrevolutionary period was a time of significant quantitative growth. Before 1917, the Moscow institute had only one salaried position, the director’s; by 1922, there were about 30 posts. Besides the director, there were three “full members,” including Chelpanov’s eldest assistant, Kornilov. The “first-category researchers” included four persons from the younger generation: B. N. Severnyi, V. M. Ekzempliarskii, P. P. Sokolov, and N. N. Ladygina-Kots; the latter two had followed Chelpanov’s courses and started working at the laboratory before the Revolution. (LadyginaKots later became known for her research on primates.) Yet, as nearly half of the positions remained vacant, Chelpanov planned to open special courses in psychology for prospective researchers. By the summer of 1922, however, Chelpanov’s own position as director was endangered: an “old” university professor, a philosopher known for his critique of materialism, he stood out against the new “red” background. The main attack came from within the institute, from Kornilov, who, before he came to Moscow, was a teacher in a remote Siberian town. Kornilov had for some time worked on “reactology,” his own version of experimental psychology, involving the “objective” registration of reactions as opposed to introspection or selfobservation. He had kept it half-secret from Chelpanov, a loyal Wundtian, and he pursued his enthusiasm exclusively at home seminars. Kornilov found the postrevolutionary climate more sympathetic to his research and published his results in a book, Reaktologiia (Reactology, 1922). Kornilov claimed that his reactology was ideologically correct, while Chelpanov’s philosophy was idealist and hostile to Marxism. In fact, reactology came into existence at a time when Kornilov, in his own words, “had a poor knowledge of Marxist philosophy” (quoted in Sirotkina, 2006, p. 261). But Kornilov, the former schoolteacher, was preferable as the director of a Soviet institution than the élite professor. The change of directorship took place as an administrative reform. In December 1922, the Association of research institutes of Moscow university closed the psychological institute and made its staff redundant. The same resolution announced a 422

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psychological section in the newly founded institute of scientific philosophy, with Kornilov as the head. After his dismissal, Chelpanov wrote to L. D. Trotsky, who had some knowledge and interest in psychology. Deeply resentful of losing his life’s business, the old professor ended up by adopting Marxist rhetoric in fighting his opponents; this was a foretaste of much future conflict. But Trotsky, already out of favor with the Party, either could not or did not want to help. Kornilov, for his part, easily dismissed his old teacher’s complaints: If he, Kornilov, was a bad Marxist, Chelpanov was no Marxist at all. One of the few students who remained loyal, Shpet, sheltered Chelpanov; as the president of the newly founded Russian academy of the art sciences, a state-funded institution for art studies, he appointed Chelpanov to head the academy’s psychological section. When it changed hands, the institute lost Moscow University funds and did not receive any from the institute of scientific philosophy, whose budget had been drafted before it acquired the psychology section. The section nevertheless, formally, had seven research posts, and Kornilov applied to increase them to 20. To fill vacant positions, he invited the Marxist sociologist, M. A. Reisner, Chelpanov’s former student turned “objective” psychologist, P. P. Blonskii (1884–1941), and an animal psychologist from Odessa, V. K. Borovskii. “Junior researchers” included Luria, from Kazan’, who became the academic secretary of the institute, the specialists in psychotechnics, S. G. Gellershtein (1896–1967) and Isaak Shpil’rein, and the psychoanalyst Sabina Shpil’rein (Spilrein, 1885–1942, the sister of Isaak Shpil’rein). Kornilov also applied to the Association of research institutes to restore the psychological institute, and in the summer of 1924, it became the Moscow State Institute of Experimental Psychology. It was “reborn,” as Luria remembered, under the sign of reactology (quoted in Levitin, 1991, pp. 130–131; also Luria, 1979). This meant that all research referred to “reaction”: Kornilov studied “reactions of maximal inhibition,” Vygotsky “dominant reactions,” Bernshtein the impact of “reaction on the shape of the movement,” and so on. The term had different meanings, however, and, in spite of the rhetoric of Marxist materialism, Kornilov himself kept to the classical notion of reaction in his experiments. Psychotechnicians resorted less often to the language of “reaction”; because their work had practical importance, it was easier for them to justify it to the authorities.

Under the guise of new terminology, Kornilov’s staff pursued their own research interests. For instance, Luria’s reference to “affective reactions” was in fact a euphemism for a topic related to psychoanalysis. Working at the institute, he asked experimental subjects to respond to the stimulus word by an association while at the same time pressing the button of a dynamoscope devised by Kornilov. By “the joint motor method,” he and Leont’ev, who had come to the institute in 1923, studied “affective complexes” both in students during exams and in suspects under criminal investigation, leading to a story, reported by Kornilov, about Luria inventing a lie detector. Working with Kornilov, Vygotsky used the term “reaction” in his 1925 dissertation and in an article, “Problema dominantnykh reaktsii” (“The Problem of the Dominant Reactions,” 1926). (The choice of words was not so important for him and he used “reaction” and “reflex” as synonyms.) To compete with Chelpanov’s Vvedenie v eksperimental’nuiu psikhologiiu (Introduction to Experimental Psychology, 1915), Kornilov published a new Praktikum po eksperimental’noi psikhologii (Practical Guide to Experimental Psychology, 1927), written from the viewpoint of reactology. The junior staff—Bernshtein, Gellershtein, Luria, and Vygotsky—wrote most of the chapters, although they shared doubts about reactology’s heuristic value. Kornilov’s great ambition was to resolve the mind–body problem by means of experimental research. Vygotsky was skeptical, and Gellershtein also described the difficulties that arise in trying to analyze the relationships between mental and physical processes. In 1928, Bernshtein, Leont’ev, and Vygotsky left the institute, and Luria was replaced as academic secretary by a Marxist philosopher, Yu. V. Frankfurt, who was so influential that he nearly became academic secretary of the entire Russian Association of research institutes in the social sciences (the descendant of the Moscow University Association). At the same time, Kornilov, Zalkind, and Blonskii started feeling the effects of the project they had initiated. The genie of “Marxist psychology,” once let out of the bottle, gradually accumulated power. Psychologists spent time on endless ideological discussions. In 1930, a specially organized meeting, “the reactological discussion,” accused Kornilov of not being loyal to Marxism. His main critics were postgraduate students from the institute, well-schooled in the official philosophy (Umrikhin, 1991). In 1931, Zalkind and then

V. N. Kolbanovskii, whose only virtue was that he was an orthodox Marxist, replaced Kornilov. Yet, in the 1930s, the number of staff at the institute increased to about 100. This expansion was dependent on claims made for psychology as practice. The socialist state, beginning in the 1920s, created numerous positions that psychologists could occupy in the army, education, health care, social welfare, and so on, and the expanding number of psychology students made it easy to fill these places. Newly founded academic institutes, industry, educational institutions, and other places for applied research rivaled the existing universities as sites for research. It was symptomatic that Chelpanov’s other elder student (besides Kornilov), Rybnikov, having had enough of the contested area of experimentation, moved into the relatively quiet area of the study of children. In the climate of social reconstruction in the 1920s, it was easy to persuade institutions to establish positions for psychologists. Former experimental psychologists (including Chelpanov himself ) worked in art studies, medicine, education, “the scientific organization of labor,” and sport. The army was an important employer, and it established psychological laboratories within the ministry of defense and elsewhere. The staff of the psychological institute set up sections in social, child, and animal psychology, and in psychotechnics and psychopathology. Its staff also worked on testing soldiers with what were called “the American methods”; for the purpose of successful communication, compiled the “dictionary of the Red Army soldier”; and contributed to the training of army officers and Communist Party instructors. The science of psychology was in demand in a society making a conscious effort to modernize itself and to announce the creation of “the New Man.” Psychologists successfully claimed usefulness in the Soviet Union, and the state rewarded them with the field’s institutionalization. In the Stalinist state, however, this support had another side—almost complete dependency—and as a result psychology, like some other areas of science, suffered from repressive policy. From the beginning of the “Great Break” and Stalin’s “cultural revolution,” control over science included severe censorship and regular attacks on scientists, modeled on political campaigns. One of the first campaigns organized in psychology was the so-called “reactological discussion” in 1931, which finished Kornilov’s reactology and led to his dismissal from the Moscow institute. The result sometimes was the sirotkina, smith

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elimination of entire disciplines, as was the case with psychotechnics and pedology. To illustrate the mechanics of these campaigns, we will examine the fate of pedology, the science of the child.

Pedology, 1900–1936 The project of pedology—a science that flourished in the United States and some European countries, as well as in Russia, during the first decades of the 20th century—was to study child development in order to apply this knowledge to child care and education. The leadership of the Soviet Union initially supported it. Yet, a resolution of the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party, the so-called pedology decree of 1936, halted this and indeed threatened the existence of psychology as an academic and occupational field. Or, at least, this is the standard view of what happened. The story is actually rather complex. The 1930s were years of extreme, and frequently violent, hardship and social change, and decisions taken at the center often had chaotic and arbitrary effects. Pedology, which began as clinical-like studies of early childhood, transformed into a program of school-testing largely opposed by teachers, who saw it as interference in their domain. We therefore view the 1936 decree as part of a worldwide reaction against testing, comparable in particular to events in France, where schools abandoned Binet’s tests because the teachers were reluctant to use any nonpedagogical methods of control over their work. (This section draws on Sirotkina, unpublished work; also Rodin, 1998.) The ministry of education took the teachers’ side in the Soviet conflict and developed a strategy “to restore rights” that, teachers argued, pedologists had taken over. The decision to get rid of tests was also influenced by the fact that incorrect testing abused some schoolchildren; more importantly, there was accumulating evidence, in the U.S.S.R. as elsewhere, that the beneficiaries of testing were, as a matter of fact, always children from relatively advantaged backgrounds. What made the difference to the outcome in the Soviet Union was that, as a heavily centralized state, Party leaders headed the bureaucracy that administered the reaction against testing. Acting to protect themselves, Party officials and bureaucrats caused more damage than good. Archival documents suggest that the middle-level bureaucracy was responsible for the consequences of the decree, which turned out to be much more disastrous for psychology than one might have expected from the initial decisions taken at the higher level. For whatever reason, the result 424

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was that the other part of pedology—applied research on early psychological development—was abandoned together with testing in schools, and abandoned for a long period. Since a national debate about education had for decades been tied up with the fate of psychology, this had consequences across the whole field. Education was at the center of public discussion about the development of Russia. This went back to the ideas of the narodniki (a liberal movement of the 1860s to 1880s that called on the intelligentsia to educate workers and peasants) and to the thought of moral leaders such as Tolstoy, who opened a school for peasant children on his estate, taught there himself, and wrote textbooks for his pupils. The pedagogical movement benefited from women’s emancipation in Russia, and education became a sphere in which many talented women sought fulfillment. Psychologists, philosophers, and physicians, who contributed much to the movement, were sensitive to Western innovations, including pedology and German “experimental pedagogy.” Nechaev founded a laboratory of experimental pedagogy in St. Petersburg in 1901, and in 1906, the Moscow pedagogic union announced a course on pedology. Two years later, when an international pedological congress was held in Brussels, the first Russian congress of experimental pedagogy took place in St. Petersburg; indeed, between 1911 and 1917 Russian specialists in education and child psychology organized six congresses. There was extensive discussion of testy in Chelpanov’s institute. All this took place, however, more in the context of debates about what part psychology would play in a modernized Russia rather than in the context of the existing school system. Interestingly, where psychologists did apply tests, they assumed cultural explanations for inequality. Psychologists debated the appropriateness, in current conditions, of conducting pure as opposed to applied work, rather than nature versus nurture. The main promoter of pedology, Bekhterev, focused attention on studies of infancy and early childhood. In 1908, he founded the pedological institute in St. Petersburg for day-to-day observation and studies of children under institutional conditions, from birth up to the age of 3 years, involving leading psychologists, physiologists, and biologists in the project. Pedologists in St. Petersburg elaborated sophisticated techniques of observation and instructed nurses and teachers in kindergartens how to make observations or use a method of “natural experiment” developed by A. F. Lazurskii

(1874–1917). Moscow pedologists, in this like G. Stanley Hall in the United States, worked more with questionnaires and mothers’ diaries, and, just before World War I, Rybnikov organized the pedological museum to keep this material. The large number of publications on child development, both of Russian researchers and translations, shows how extensively the discipline grew. These investigations continued after the Revolution. In the early years of the Soviet regime, there was an overriding concern to improve the educational system of the country, to eradicate illiteracy, which was extremely widespread, and to raise a new generation of children untainted by prerevolutionary bourgeois values. The active interest of Lenin’s wife, N. K. Krupskaia, who supported developmental and educational research throughout the 1920s, certainly helped. Trotsky was another supporter. Although full of Soviet rhetoric, the resulting research programs were characteristic for educational thinking generally at the time. What did distinguish the Soviet attempt to solve social and economic problems through public education was that it was centralized and impatient. The Bolsheviks, who desired to create new people in the minimum possible time, rejected inheritance as a factor affecting the development of personal character, and believed that personal inadequacies that had survived as stigmas of capitalism would quickly die out with social transformation. At a time when “only a lazy one,” to use the Russian expression, did not employ Marxist rhetoric, new leaders of pedology—P. Ia. Basov, Blonskii, Vygotsky, Zalkind—argued for its Marxist character in negotiating support for the discipline. They claimed that pedology provided educational practice with a scientific basis and was therefore part of the project to create “the New Man.” Blonskii is especially interesting as an example of a scholar, trained in philosophy before the Revolution but also a member of the Socialist Revolutionary Party, who at once accepted the Bolshevik seizure of power and sought in the 1920s for a Soviet view of progressive education. In practice, he continued to draw on Western ideas, notably of Dewey, and in the context of the harsh conditions of the time—in which children often lacked food let alone books—his ideas remained largely theoretical. The psychologist-pedagogues succeeded in entering the Soviet scientific and educational establishment. In 1922, Bekhterev’s pedological institute, which had closed in the period of economic troubles, reopened under the auspices of the directorate

of science, a branch of the Commissariat of Education. Universities and teachers’ colleges introduced pedology into the curriculum, and institutions for both teaching and research in pedology opened. Indeed, in the 1920s, the favor shown toward pedology as an applied science led to reconsideration of the accepted hierarchy of university disciplines, and in some cases, for example, in the Leningrad pedagogical institute, departments of pedology absorbed psychology. Pedological institutions employed all kinds of specialists: hygienists, physiologists, lawyers, teachers. A number of them sheltered psychoanalysts, who were increasingly out of favor in the second half of the 1920s. Pedologists tested children to differentiate those who were unable to face the requirements of ordinary school; these children were then put into special schools for “the abnormal.” This was similar to Western practice, and, indeed, the model for testing was imported from the West and foreign tests were quickly translated, often without adaptation for Russian children. There was a lack of trained specialists, and teachers and physicians often acted as pedologists in the schools. Thus, by the 1930s, Russian pedology, which had begun as a research project carried on by a few creative academics, had become part of the educational bureaucratic system. It became clear that pedology failed to satisfy Party expectations for improving the situation of children. The number of children identified as retarded, as well as the number of special schools, grew—a result far from wishful thinking about transforming human nature. Moreover, some pedagogical surveys revealed that slow development of children was due to starvation, making expertise irrelevant (Kurek, 2004, p. 43). The outcome was that the 1936 decree declared pedagogy to be “empirical” and a “pseudo-scientific discipline,” and it stated that it has not “yet defined its subject-matter and methodology” and is “full of harmful, anti-Marxist tendencies” (quoted in Fradkin, 1990, p. 203). The decree also accused pedologists of taking away the oversight of academic and educational work from pedagogues. The interest of high-level political critics appears to have been sparked in 1935 by fights, after the ending of free lunches, between rich and poor children in a school attended by children of the Party élite. There were a series of commissions, headed by Stalin’s chief ideological enforcer, A. A. Zhdanov, leading to the decree. Three days after the decree’s publication, the Commissar of Education, A. S. Bubnov, sent a circular telegram in sirotkina, smith

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which he ordered the abolition of the position of school pedologist. According to the Commissar’s orders, people who worked as pedologists should be employed as teachers in primary schools or re-educated to take other teaching positions. In the sinister period of the second half of the 1930s, however, more than 300 pedologists and teachers, including members of the Commissariat of Education and its Commissar himself, were repressed and some of them disappeared. The term “pedology” was eliminated from academic use; all educational institutions that contained the word in their titles were closed or renamed. “Pedologist” became a synonym for the counter-revolutionary, the saboteur, or a person who constantly abuses students. The main target of the Party decree was pedological practice in schools. The decree ordered the re-examination of children in special schools and the transfer back to regular classes of those who had been put there by a pedologist’s mistake. Initially, the Commissar ordered the removal of three pedological textbooks from libraries; however, the final list of books consisted of 121 items. The books were taken out of libraries all over the country and destroyed. On the basis of similar advice from a middle-level administrator, 38 books on preschool development and education were also prohibited. The title of books or the name of the author determined the choice: If the title included the word “pedology” or “pedological,” or if the author had been associated with studies of child development, it went. For example, a Russian library contains a copy of the Russian translation of Piaget’s Le langage et la pensée chez l’enfant (Language and Thought of the Child, 1923, translated into Russian in 1932), from which someone has carefully torn out the introduction by Vygotsky and erased his name on the title page. Leading representatives of work linking developmental psychology and education, such as Blonskii, Zalkind, Vygotsky, and S. S. Molozhavyi, were severely criticized. Vygotsky had died in 1934, but Zalkind, the leading pedologist, was a direct victim of the decree: He died from a heart attack on the street when he learned about it. Molozhavyi, his closest colleague, did not want to give up and admit immediately that pedology was a mistake or, using the decree’s terminology, a “perversion.” Yet, after a few months, he had to write the Commissar of Education a self-accusing letter in which he asked for a job as a pedagogue. The universities invited pedagogues to fill positions formerly held by pedologists in order to “strengthen” the teaching of 426

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pedagogy at the expense of psychology. Psychology continued formally to be present in university curricula, but so-called pure psychologists, those who had not been involved in pedology, revised the courses. Thus, major psychology textbooks of the late 1930s to early 1940s were written by Kornilov and Sergei Leonidovich Rubinshtein (1889–1960), who were free from any pedological guilt simply through never having been interested in child psychology. Kornilov again became director of the Moscow institute of psychology, while Rubinshtein, an obscure librarian from the university in Odessa, acquired a prestigious chair at the pedagogical university in Leningrad. Rubinshtein had a prerevolutionary doctorate from Marburg, the home of the German neoKantians, and then taught in Odessa and at the Leningrad teachers’ college. He published “Problemy psikhologii v trudakh Karla Marksa” (“Psychological Problems in the Works of Karl Marx”) in 1934, and this appears to have propelled him to prominence. His paper argued, with a degree of philosophical sophistication, that Marx’s writings contain the anthropological basis for a science of psychology, and, in the context of the 1930s, it was possible to take the decision that this definitively laid the foundations for a unified science. The achievement was to show in theory that psychology could develop according to Marxist precepts, since Rubinshtein gave no methodological guidelines that could instruct psychologists in empirical research. In 1940, he published a major text, Osnovy obshchei psikhologii (Principles of General Psychology), a serious attempt to relate dialectical thinking and a conception of psychological processes as the resultant of internal and external forces, or “activity” (Payne, 1968). He became a member-correspondent of the Academy of Sciences, the first psychologist to achieve this position, crucial for the status of the field as a whole. In 1942, he was appointed to a newly established chair of psychology at Moscow university, and at the end of the war, he became the head of a new section for psychology in the Institute of Philosophy of the Academy of Sciences, and head of the institute of psychology, by then formally under the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences. Then a crude campaign, begun in 1947 in response to the struggle with Western powers, attacked “cosmopolites” (insufficiently patriotic scientists, also a euphemism for being Jewish) and “rotten Western science.” Successive purges in philosophy, genetics, linguistics, and psychology removed from positions of influence scientists not deemed purely Russian in

their intellectual roots and ethnic identity. On the back of these campaigns, administrative power changed hands. Rubinshtein himself was removed from all his positions by 1947, to return only after Stalin’s death (Zhdan, 2007, Chapter 2). As to pedology’s fate, it should be noted that child studies in Russia had in fact begun to decline before the decree: By the late 1920s, industrial-like testing had replaced clinical research on early child development, the core of prerevolutionary pedology. By 1930, all areas of psychology had to display ideological conformity and to prove loyalty to the regime. In this context, Soviet theoreticians were more concerned to discuss the failures of “bourgeois psychology” than to address the needs of practitioners working with children. Yet, in spite of the pedology decree, there was an expansion of interest in pedagogy, and pedagogy often served as an institutional setting for psychological work. Indeed, Boris Grigor’evich Anan’ev (1907–1972), the head of the psychology section of the institute of the brain in Leningrad, even judged the late 1930s a period of unprecedented activity in psychology, and there certainly were many studies published about pedagogy, sense perception (especially military aviation), and the character traits required for military and political cadres. After the German invasion in 1941, many academic institutions were evacuated (the Leningrad brain institute, for example, went to Samarkand, Uzbekistan), and there was almost continuous administrative reorganization and much movement of personnel (Gilgen et al., 1997). Psychological work continued in ways which had direct reference to the war situation, and this often involved close cooperation with people who were not, by training, psychologists. There was an important input into the rehabilitation of wounded soldiers (in three main centers—where Luria headed a staff of 30 in the south Urals, in Tbilisi, and in another group in the Urals, headed by Leont’ev), studies of sense perception (famously applied in the camouflage of buildings during the siege of Leningrad), and in work advising how to cultivate traits thought necessary in individuals, notably a strong will and love of heroism and the motherland. This last moral and political project occupied pedagogues of all kinds, and it also supported some work on individual differences, especially in studies by Boris Mikhailovich Teplov (1896–1965) of military leadership. The political interest in bringing up children was so strong that it led, in 1943, to the founding of the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences. Studies of child

development lay awkwardly between a framework of Pavlovian conditioning research and traditional views of moral and national character. Moscow and Leningrad universities continued throughout the war to teach psychology and indeed, at this time, created distinct psychology departments within their respective schools of philosophy. It is possible that the evacuation of psychologists led to greater knowledge about what psychology had to offer around the country. But many details are obscure, and there are difficult questions to answer about the relation between rhetoric and the severe conditions in which work actually went on. There was innovative work, and this continued after the war for a few years until political events dominated everything.

Pavlov, Psychology, and the Stalinist State Pavlov’s name has already appeared a number of times in this history, and certainly his is by far the best-known name of a Russian connected to psychology, around the world as well as in Russia. It is, however, a difficult and many-sided matter to assess his place in Soviet psychology. Because of his fame and importance to the Soviet regime, numerous Russian accounts of his life and work, of varying reliability, exist (Nozdracher, Poliakov, & Kosmachevskaya, 2004). His training and career was in medicine and physiology. In 1904 (when he was 55), the year in which he won a Nobel Prize for his work on the digestive glands, Pavlov was entrenched in St. Petersburg in the Imperial Institute of Experimental Medicine, founded with money from Prince A. P. Ol’denburgskii. Through dedicated management, Pavlov coordinated workers on his own research program and funded Russia’s largest physiological laboratory, using trainee doctors who needed quickly and efficiently to acquire laboratory experience in physiology. Todes characterized his institute as a “physiological factory” for the production of intellectual and physiological goods (Todes, 2001). Pavlov then extended the managerial technique developed for studies of digestion into a large-scale research program central to psychology. His strategy was to advance through three stages with almost military precision and oversight: “(1) establish experimentally the fully determined regularities in the salivation elicited by highly varied experiments on conditioned reflexes; (2) use these regularities to develop a model of the unseen processes in the brain that might have produced them; and (3) use this model to explain the behavior, affect and personality of his experimental subjects” (Todes, 2007, p. 47). sirotkina, smith

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Pavlov’s interests shifted around 1903 from the regulation of digestion, in which he freely recognized the importance of mental states, to the actual manner in which nervous regulation itself occurs. He formulated his basic and celebrated, although hardly original, distinction between the unconditional and the conditional reflex, experimenting with dogs and a buzzer. (“Unconditional” and “conditional” is the correct translation.) Starting from the premise that life depends on the organism’s ability to adapt, he shaped research on the reflex as the elementary physical unit of the adaptive process and further proposed that the same elementary unit underlies adaptation in which mind is an element. He then argued that, to achieve objectivity, the scientist must stay with the observable data, the data of conditioning, and not refer to unobservable and ill-defined elements of mind. “Pavlov always viewed his achievement as the transformation of . . . [the] familiar ‘psychic secretion’ into a reliable laboratory phenomenon and its use as a method for understanding the unseen processes in the brain that produce thoughts, emotions, and behaviors” (Todes, 2007, p. 47). In the early years of these new studies, Pavlov insisted that his researchers, whose written work all went through his hands, should express themselves in terms of the observed, “objective” experimental facts, eschewing reference to mind. He proclaimed his program was the route to knowledge of “higher nervous processes”; that is, to knowledge of brain functions (in which connection he certainly referred to unobservable events imputed to the brain), not “psychology.” He was convinced that he alone had found the method with which to create an objective science in the field that psychologists approached through research on mental processes. All the same, he quickly allowed back into laboratory discussion the language of consciousness and of psychological processes. What was distinctive about Pavlov’s research program was, first, the conditioning technique for studying adaptive regulation and learning, which many other scientists, including psychologists of different persuasions, thought valuable; and second, the claim that this technique made possible knowledge about brain processes, which few scientists outside his laboratory thought justified. He strongly opposed the direction in research, led by the English neurophysiologist, C. S. Sherrington, that turned away from brain processes (like Pavlov’s “irradiation”) to focus on the integration of neuronal connections at the spinal level. The study of the neuron and its electrical properties continued in the 428

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U.S.S.R., but under the leadership of Ukhtomskii and entirely restricted to physiological questions. By and large, Pavlov dealt with criticism by ignoring it, and his publications were syntheses of his school’s results not polemics. In 1929, however, tempted by the International Physiological Congress in Boston, he crossed the Atlantic and addressed Karl S. Lashley’s criticisms of his theory of the higher brain (cortex). Pavlov’s method of conditioning was much discussed in the United States, but discussed as a valuable method for the study of learning and not as the route to a comprehensive science of the brain. Pavlov reiterated his view, opposing Bekhterev as well as Lashley, that direct experimental study of the brain was not the way forward. He also made clear that he was not a behaviorist, since he had always acknowledged the significance of conscious cognitive and emotional states in his experimental subjects. The key to understanding Pavlov’s impact on his Russian contemporaries and the use Russians subsequently made of his work, appears to be his absolute commitment to natural science and to experimental data as the route to an enlightened human future. In public, Pavlov at times declared belief in the exclusive claim of natural science to knowledge; that is, he supported scientism. He did not discuss philosophical questions, perhaps hoping that experimental science would itself somehow answer them. Pressed to make his position clear at a meeting of the Petrograd Philosophical Society in 1916, he said: “I have not gone into that, the philosophical part. For me my subject and my principles have only methodological significance. I cannot agree that my methods constitute pure materialism. I pursue only the methods of useful research” (quoted in Joravsky, 1989, p. 158). Pavlov’s dedication to science attracted a large number of young and idealistic researchers, including a significant number of women, and it later made it possible to represent him as the exemplar of the home-grown Russian scientist who had grasped the materialist direction of future society. He was also, without question, extremely patriotic. At the same time, he was an educated man with wide and cultured interests. Before the Revolution, he was a liberal committed to movement toward a constitutional monarchy (he even stood for political office), and for many years he remained outspokenly critical of the Bolsheviks. His willingness to defend religious believers gave rise to the idea that he was himself a believer. Beginning in 1921, however, when Pavlov threatened to leave the country because of the dearth

of resources and Lenin personally intervened to grant him special funds, there began to be an accommodation. Pavlov was valuable to the Bolsheviks as a world-famous scientist, perhaps the most famous Russian scientist who had not left the country at the Revolution. Through the 1920s, the state increasingly funded his research, with the result that, by the early 1930s, he was head of three research establishments and coordinated the research of 50 to 60 coworkers annually. His realm included the “towers of silence,” built to isolate his dogs from uncontrolled stimulation, which dated from before World War I but were completed with Bolshevik funds, and the purpose-built science village at Koltushi, near Leningrad, where Pavlov hoped to lay the basis for eugenics. (In the 1920s, many Russian scientists, as elsewhere, were interested in the application of genetics to human affairs; for Russian psychogenetics, see Grigorenko & Ravich-Shcherbo, 1997. The interest became completely unacceptable in the early 1930s.) Pavlov was allowed to travel, signaling Soviet support for science and, in 1935, in the year before his death, much was made of his chairmanship of the 15th International Physiological Congress held in Leningrad and Moscow. At that congress, the organizers presented a medallion and an edition of Sechenov’s selected works to participants, thus symbolically claiming the existence of a united Russian tradition of understanding the human being through objective materialist knowledge. The political interest went beyond this: Since 1929, the year of “the Great Break,” the Communist Party members among Pavlov’s researchers had met regularly to formulate an ideologically correct strategy to take Pavlov’s program further. This mainly involved methodological corrections and a move against what these researchers criticized as a reductionist tendency in Pavlov’s theorizing, which they tried to overcome by emphasizing the synthetic capacity of the cortex as a whole. The core of Pavlovian research consisted of detailed experiments on the excitation and inhibition of conditional reflexes in dogs. It was relatively straightforward (however demanding at times because of limited resources) to organize large numbers of researchers in the purposeful extension of such knowledge. Pavlov himself then directly transposed knowledge of dogs into knowledge of humans, in spite of the fact that he never experimented on people and instead turned to clinical data. How far Pavlov was inclined to stretch knowledge of the conditioning of dogs to encompass human life is illustrated by his paper, given just after the tsar had

fallen in February 1917, on “Refleks svobody” (“The Reflex of Freedom”), in which he drew an analogy between dogs who quietly submit to experiments and “the reflex of slavery” in the Russian people (Joravsky, 1989, pp. 78, 209). During the 1920s, he extended the scope of his work to encompass dog and human personality types and neuroses, and human mental illness and higher mental processes, including language, in which context he introduced the notion of the “second signaling system” (that is, words as opposed to other stimuli). Pavlov thus turned his research program into a grandiose claim to have laid the basis for both a general science of psychology and the medical specialty of psychiatry. He ignored the work of psychologists, such as Vygotsky, going on around him. The quality of much of Pavlov’s later thought is questionable; but since he was an autocratic man working within a hierarchically organized, centralized, and autocratic culture, it was extremely difficult publicly to question his views. Moreover, in the last years of his life political pressure grew to identify his views with the official stance—ideology— of the Stalinized Communist Party. As a result, Pavlov’s approach to neurosis, human typology, and the second signaling system had influence for three decades, giving Soviet science and medicine a character not found elsewhere, even into the 1960s, a damaging character because of the weakness of Pavlov’s thought in these areas and because of the difficulties of openly criticizing it. The same occurred throughout the Soviet empire. Until the mid-1920s, however, Pavlov’s program was only one of three to give priority to the study of reaktsii (reactions) as the objective route to a science of human beings. In Moscow, Kornilov promoted his claim to establish a Marxist science under the banner of “reactology,” and in Leningrad, Bekhterev put forward “reflexology.” It is hard to know what work these words did beyond signaling the “objective,” that is, nonmentalist (or, in Soviet jargon, opposition to “idealist”) methodology. Both Kornilov’s and Bekhterev’s programs were eclectic in their assumptions and arguments. This was outstandingly the case with Bekhterev. Indeed, there are grounds for thinking his eclecticism, in a nebulous field split by institutional rivalry and disagreement on the most fundamental issues, a great strength. He was a man of enormous intelligence, energy, and ambition, who transferred from Kazan’ to the Military Medical Academy in St. Petersburg in 1893. In 1904, he founded a journal, Vestnik psikhologii, kriminal’noi antropologii sirotkina, smith

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i gipnotizma (Herald of Psychology, Criminal Anthropology, and Hypnotism; the journal later merged with Bekhterev’s other journals) for both clinical and experimental studies. In 1907, he succeeded in attracting funds for a new psychoneurological institute that became, in effect, a private university for the study of the human being. From this base, he expanded simultaneously into the medical disciplines of neurology and psychiatry, into the study of crime and legal psychology, into crowd psychology, into pedology, and into physiology and psychology, all the while keeping lines open to a humanist philosophical anthropology. In effect, he excluded no approach to the human subject, and he built up an institute devoted to all aspects of the human sciences. “Reflexology” was the term, rather than a systematically formulated theory, that held all this together as a program of research. He himself initiated research on what he called “associative reflexes,” and he certainly thought, in a way that closely paralleled Pavlov’s ideas, that this was the objective approach to behavior. Much more radical than Pavlov in the political and social struggles going on around them, fired by the conviction widespread in the liberal intelligentsia—and not least in the medical profession—that only political changes could lay the real basis for the improvement of the people’s condition, Bekhterev nevertheless worked pragmatically with the administrative establishment when possible. In 1905, in the first revolutionary period, he held that only political emancipation could save individuals from degeneration. He worked with other psychiatrists to try and improve actual conditions, for example, by promoting domestic rather than institutional arrangements for the mentally ill. With his institute already closed, he welcomed the February Revolution in 1917 and then accepted the Bolshevik coup. He later received permission to establish a new institute for brain research in Petrograd. Thus, in the 1920s, he and Pavlov entered into competition for scarce centrally controlled resources. With Bekhterev’s death in 1927, any claim that his institute might have had to leadership in the human sciences ended, although he had followers who argued for the Marxist content of his science. Bekhterev published much more extensively than Pavlov, including what purported to be a synthetic overview, Obshchie osnovy refleksologii cheloveka (1918; published in English as General Principles of Human Reflexology in 1932), but it had none of the tight focus of Pavlov’s own lectures on conditional reflexes, published in English in 1927 and 1928. Western readers discerned many points 430

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of contact between behaviorism in the United States in the 1920s and Bekhterev’s psychology. Pavlov was fiercely partisan about his science, but when his own program was not in question he was willing to allow others to proceed in other ways. In the context of intense competition for resources from the state in the 1920s, however, he did not show any doubts about his scientific righteousness. He was successful. After 1927, there was only one Soviet school of “higher nervous activity”— Pavlov’s. The large numbers of researchers trained with Pavlov continued his program, located institutionally and by virtue of its theoretical commitments, and increasingly by its important medical connections, with physiology and not psychology. Researchers trained by him inherited his institutions. At the head, after Pavlov’s death, was L. A. Orbeli (1882–1958), an able organizer and original scientist in his own right, willing to support corrections to Pavlov’s position. Pavlov was given to dogmatic and self-serving statements about the unique achievements of his school in science, and not adverse to pontification at the expense of others, especially in old age. If, then, later Pavlovians asserted the absolute authority of his legacy, it was not without some kind of precedent in Pavlov’s own self-assessment. This is at least so in relation to the public Pavlov; the private Pavlov was a more reflective man, not unfamiliar with doubt. And, although Pavlov in his last decade gave grudging respect to the Bolsheviks, above all because they so generously funded his program, he never, like the later Pavlovians, asserted the seamless philosophical continuity of his science and Marxism-Leninism (Rüting, 2002; Todes, 1995). The war of 1941–1945 profoundly disrupted, when it did not wipe out, every walk of life. By 1950, however, the disruption to science was of another kind. An editorial in Fiziologicheskii zhurnal (Physiological Journal) in 1948 indicated the direction: Scientists have “the urgent task . . . of making their ideological orientation clear and accurate . . . [and,] in particular, any attempts at a revision of the fundamental materialist postulates—the teachings of Sechenov, Pavlov, and Vvedenskii—are to be eradicated” (quoted in Sirotkina, 1995, p. 28). Chauvinistic, anti-Semitic, and pro-Pavlovian academic struggles removed Rubinshtein from his positions in Moscow, and Leont’ev acquired them, only then in his turn to face attacks. In a succession of three large-scale national conferences in physiology, psychiatry, and psychology, from 1950 to 1952, under political direction from above but carried

through by academics, a concerted effort was made to impose a uniform, united Pavlovian science of man. This was extremely damaging to psychologists, especially as a result of the so-called Pavlov Session of 1950, a joint meeting of the Academy of Sciences and the Academy of Medical Sciences, because it threatened to replace psychology by the study of “higher nervous activity” (that is, physiology) as the only politically sanctioned science of man. This threat came with a rhetorical justification in the form of a claim about scientific truth; in these circumstances, resistance, and even simple silence, appeared to place a scientist in opposition at one and the same time to science, to the beleaguered nation in the Cold War, and to the historic role of the Communist Party. If the pressure had been fully sustained, it would have replaced psychological methods, ways of thought, research, personnel, and institutions with physiological ones—and not just by physiology but by a congealed Pavlovian version of it. In fact, however, the physiologist A. G. IvanovSmolenskii (1895–1982) was the only influential scientist to challenge the right of psychology to exist as a science. Psychologists themselves largely kept quiet at the 1950 meeting. There, a struggle took place with Orbeli for the direction of the Pavlovian legacy. Orbeli, who was the administrative head of the large network of establishments doing Pavlovian work, defended the need for a variety of research, some of it clearly correcting Pavlov’s own conclusions, against die-hards who wanted to reduce everything to simplified reflexes. Ivan Solomonovich Beritov (Beritashvili, 1885–1974) restated his longstanding criticisms of the “unnatural” conditions of Pavlov’s experiments and his argument for a much more complex view of central processes, going beyond the poles of excitation and inhibition that dominated Pavlov’s thought. Orbeli was in fact replaced, but his statements at the conference made it clear to all that this was a preordained outcome, not the success of the correct Pavlovian scientific point of view. Perhaps we may conclude that the psychologists survived because the neurophysiologists themselves could not agree, except at an empty level of abstraction, what the Pavlovian program actually was. Moreover, struggles for administrative control left some opportunities open as well as closing down others. The 1951 conference in psychiatry sustained the pressure on psychologists, but the doctors, organized in a separate Academy of Medical Sciences, proved themselves more in a position to resist an

actual Pavlovian takeover, not least because there was little the Pavlovians could claim by way of something practical to offer to medicine. (Sleep therapy was an exception, but although Pavlov had advocated it, there was little specifically Pavlovian about it.) By the time of the 1952 psychology session, there was less political interest from above, and the psychologists were able to find ways to formulate agreement with the Pavlovian direction in words while sustaining possibilities for a renewal of psychological research. Much of what occurred is obscure as it involved conflicts over access to resources and institutional positions in which different bureaucracies and not just academics had a stake. The ideological thrust, however, is relatively clear. The Communist Party laid claim to being the exponent and instrument of the objective laws of history. Thus, Party ideologues maintained that in all areas there is only one form of truth, truth coterminous with MarxistLeninist thought and the actions of the Party, especially as they encompass the human sciences. The Soviet Union had pioneered the construction of, and according to Stalin actually achieved, the first socialist society built on these truths, and hence these truths must be, visibly, the outcome of native Russian developments. Moreover, Stalinist ideologues expected knowledge to legitimate itself through practice, and Pavlov’s science was attractive because they could understand conditioning as a straightforward human technology. Once the Party leadership had made it known it favored a Pavlovian version of the science of man, this science acquired the status of the objective science of the future, and any opposition to it became, de facto, opposition to the realization of that future. Stalinist politics thus bound particular scientific claims to the validity of the state. In this poisonous but in some respects intellectually seductive context—seductive since it gave intellectuals purpose and status in national life—it required great commitment and bravery to step outside the argument and maintain the “idealist” view that it is for independent specialists to arrive at scientific truth. This was especially difficult in these years also because of the almost complete isolation of Soviet scientists from the outside world.

The Vygotsky Legacy In addition to Pavlov’s, Bekhterev’s and Kornilov’s programs, other research in the 1920s and early 1930s of great importance for the future of the psychological field was carried out by young workers sirotkina, smith

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housed in the Moscow institute, while active in a number of institutions simultaneously. The three well-known names are those of Leont’ev, Luria, and Vygotsky. Their exact relations are the subject of some disagreements, but the last two worked together in the late 1920s and wrote joint publications. They were all familiar with each other’s activity from 1924, when Vygotsky joined the institute, perhaps because Kornilov saw in him an ally in forming a Marxist-Leninist alternative to Pavlov’s and Bekhterev’s reflex theories. In the late 1920s, they began to go separate ways. The scarcity of archival information from the early years and the 1930s, as well as the continuing influence that these people have on Russian psychologists, makes it a difficult and sensitive matter to reach an objective narrative. That all three were brilliant and serious scientists, with major points of view in psychology, no one questions. There is little reason, however, to refer to them as a “school” or, even less, “the Vygotsky school,” although, in the second half of the 1920s, Vygotsky did work regularly with a group of important students and collaborators— L. I. Bozhovich (1908–1981), R. E. Levina (1908–1989), N. G. Morozova (1906–1989), L. S. Slavina (1906–1988), and A. V. Zaporozhets (1905–1981)—and this group perhaps constituted a school for a short period of time. The major theoretical initiatives appear to have rested with Vygotsky in the 1920s. From a provincial background, in Gomel’ (in Belorussia) in Western Russia’s pale of settlement for Jews, he obtained one of the tightly restricted places for Jewish students at Moscow University where, during World War I, he studied law. He also enrolled in history and philosophy at the Shaniavskii private university (which had a progressive faculty but could not award degrees), and he was a close participant in Russian modernist art movements, enormously creative at this time. He had links with the Russian literary formalists who were interested in the manner in which language relates to meaning, and his early writing was in literary and theatre criticism. His proto-existentialist study of “Hamlet,” the final draft written in 1916 when he was a student of 20, appeared in Psikhologiia iskusstva (The Psychology of Art, full version 1968), with other work on aesthetics from these years, submitted as his thesis in 1925. He survived the period of civil war and famine in Gomel’, active in teacher training and local cultural life, and then he reappeared in Moscow with a paper read to the second postwar psychoneurological congress in 1924, on “Metod 432

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refleksologicheskogo i psikhologicheskogo issledovaniia” (“Methodology of Reflexological and Psychological Research”) (Kozulin, 1990; van der Veer & Valsiner, 1991; Yaroshevskii, 1993). It was quite possibly Vygotsky’s interest in art, especially in audience response, that led him into psychological questions. In his review of the methods of research on reflexes, his interest was the extension of psychological methods to encompass conscious processes, which he proposed to investigate by studying speech as their objective expression. He was already concerned with a dialectical comprehension of consciousness, encompassing its social nature. As Vygotsky argued in 1925: “The social dimension of consciousness is primary in time and in fact. The individual dimension of consciousness is derivative and secondary” (quoted in Kozulin, 1990, p. 82). He became deeply involved with pedagogical theory, publishing Pedagogicheskaia psikhologiia (Pedagogical Psychology, 1926), in which he drew extensively on Pavlov’s theory of learning, despite the fact that he was later to elaborate on this theory’s inadequacies in relation to the higher mental functions. In this book, Vygotsky came closest to supporting the Bolshevik ideal of creating “the New Man.” At this time, he also drew on Ukhtomskii’s idea of “the dominant,” the supposed presence of one center of dominance in the brain at any one moment, as a way to understand integration— a phenomenon that Pavlov’s theory appeared to deal with inadequately. Then, turning to increasingly focused studies of child development, Vygotsky broadly built on the widely held view that there are two lines of development, an individual “natural” growth and a “cultural” dimension in which the individual masters the “tools,” especially language, of collective existence. Vygotsky read extremely widely in classical and modern philosophy and in contemporary psychological authors. He was a rationalist (who much admired Spinoza), a believer in the progress of systematic knowledge and the possibility of wellorganized life based on this knowledge. The considerable energy he put into editing translated works illustrates his breadth; as an editor, for example, he was central to the reception of Gestalt psychology in the Soviet Union. His theoretical focus was the manner in which developing historical culture constitutes human beings as human. Thus, he believed, to be a person is not just to be a reactive machine. He took Marxist thought seriously as a possible framework for understanding this. Yet, as his approach is comparable with G. H. Mead’s

(of whose work he was apparently unaware; Vygotsky drew on Baldwin’s works of the 1890s), we may ask whether a dialectical framework was or was not essential to what became known as his “culturalhistorical” theory in psychology. (For an account of Soviet science sympathetic to the constructive role of dialectical materialism, see Graham, 1987.) Whatever the response, the outcome, for Vygotsky, was a theory of development that attributed prelinguistic thought to the child, a stage before the child, acquiring language in a second stage, incorporates the forms of representing the world taken from the surrounding society into all her or his psychological processes. Vygotsky’s deep literary and philosophical interests encouraged some later readers to turn to him in the hope that psychology might recreate itself as a humanistic science as opposed to a science of material and mechanical processes. If there had been one serious effort in the Soviet period to elevate psychology into a profound form of human selfunderstanding, it appeared to be Vygotsky’s. His writings were also attractive as they took part in a dialogue with world psychology rather than elaborating a monologue about Russian specialness. There is also, as Kozulin observed (1990, p. 1), something of a “literary quality” in his life: It resembled the life of a quasi-mythic character seeking a science of people as cultural beings, doing justice both to the expressive character of conscious life, as in art, and to the material realities, the subject matter of the natural and social sciences. Tragically, as Vygotsky was aware from 1920, he had tuberculosis, and, warned on several occasions that he might die, he worked in a fever of energy and impatience across an astonishingly broad front, both theoretical and applied. Thus, Vygotsky was also active in what Russians call “defectology,” the study of what are understood to be mental disabilities of all kinds, and he established and directed the Leningrad institute of defectology, which existed within the administrative structure of the university but also had links to the medical profession. In his research, for example, he compared the performance of children and schizophrenics. The attempt to establish the empirical dimensions of his general claims preoccupied Vygotsky and his coworkers in the late 1920s and early 1930s. After that, studies of child development became impossible, for the reasons we have discussed in the section on pedology. Then, beginning in the mid1950s, his work again aroused intense interest, and his writings began to reappear in print or appear for

the first time. His work became very influential and there was extensive discussion, in the West as well as in the Soviet block, from the mid-1960s. An abridged translation into English of his Myshlenie i rech’ (1934), as Thought and Language (1962), occurred in the context of a huge U.S. interest in Piaget’s work; but this edition, in effect, censored the theoretical, Marxist dimensions, as the editors apparently assumed that only empirical studies contribute to science. The publication and translation of Vygotsky’s work (including later, new translations of Thought and Language), coinciding with the educational psychologists’ interest in Piaget and criticism of behaviorist learning theories, developments leading to cognitive psychology, made Vygotsky appear the Russian psychologist who had a major contribution to make. Then, with people in the West and in the Soviet block attempting to establish a socially informed, even politically radical, basis for social psychology, Vygotsky found a new audience. Vygotsky distinguished between the preverbal, preintellectual roots of communication and preverbal forms of intelligence in the child, and he argued that verbal thought comes into existence when these classes of mental activity merge. This led him to a general approach to “the mental” as the realm of verbally, and hence culturally, generated meanings. His early papers pointed to the special difficulties facing reflexological or Pavlovian approaches to thought and language. At first implicitly and then explicitly, he identified human mental functions as the highest form of biological mastery, a mastery transformed by symbolic systems and speech into historically embedded cultural activity. The study of the human mind therefore requires research on this transformation, the collective transformation in the history of humanity and the individual transformation in the development of the child. In his thought about the social origin of higher psychological functions, he drew on Pierre Janet’s proposal that psychological functions appear twice, first as an interpersonal function and second as an intrapersonal one. It is customary to refer to Vygotsky’s psychology as “cultural-historical.” In fact, beyond a theory of child development, he wrote little that would provide precise guidance for such a science. He did, however, hope to build a unified understanding of the human mind and brain into a historically as well as biologically informed social psychology. He searched for the principle of organization of the mind in the interaction between the biological sirotkina, smith

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organism and the cultural, technological world outside the human organism, an interaction mediated by tools and language. Other scholars and psychologists, before and since, have had similar thoughts. From about 1927–1928, working especially with Luria, he tried to bring together an evolutionary approach, ethnographic studies, and research on child development. As mentioned, he took Marxism seriously for its possible contribution to this project; yet, when it came to providing an account of the mental “internalization” of culture, he owed much to the French sociological school of Émile Durkheim and Lucien Lévy-Bruhl and the German writer R. Thurnwald. Vygotsky was acutely aware that a unified field was something for the future; in the present, there were the achievements of literature and there was empirical work. In the summer of 1926, he wrote a study on Istoricheskii smysl psikhologicheskogo krizisa (The Crisis in Psychology, published in 1982), in which he respectfully reviewed the divergent schools in psychology and proposed that only a yet to be created theory of development could unite psychology as the study of the biological organism, consciousness, and culture. (Karl Bühler published a similarly titled study in the following year.) Vygotsky’s legacy in the Soviet context was to hold out the prospect of a psychology that could and would deal with the question of consciousness. In a setting where the ruling political party took a monopoly interest in the science of consciousness, this was a major challenge. It is not surprising that the book that Vygotsky published with Luria in 1930, Etiudy po istorii povedeniia (Essays on the History of Behavior), which referred to anthropogenesis and “the primitive mind,” received sharp criticism; nothing like it was to appear for many decades. In 1930, translations of Western work on psychology, by Piaget and by J. B. Watson, for example, were still appearing, but this ceased in 1931, and the kind of broad involvement with Western science that Vygotsky had taken for granted came under attack as “bourgeois idealism.” The whole notion of a cultural-historical theory, relating psychological processes to historical culture, became part of the realm of political decision making not scientific research. In 1931, Vygotsky and Luria attempted to study changes in perception, cognition, and memory taking place with the introduction of education to previously remote nomadic peoples in Uzbekistan. This study, however, came up against the politically sensitive matter of “the national question,” the ostensible submergence of nationality and ethnic 434

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identity in the common cause of communism. Any implication that one social group was more “primitive” than another was unacceptable. (Luria published this work in 1974, and by that time it was clear that the results said more about the kinds of questions the researchers asked than the subjects’ cognitive capacities.) After 1931, a new generation for whom there could be only one form of objective knowledge accused Vygotsky, along with Luria and Leont’ev, of deviations from Marxism-Leninism. Earlier it had been permissible for different disciplines or subdisciplines to argue their case; now such pluralism was deemed intolerably “bourgeois,” incompatible with Soviet ideals. Leont’ev and Vygotsky began openly to disagree about the stages of child development and about Vygotsky’s emphasis on symbols, language, and other people, as opposed to material activity, in mediating the internalization of culture. They had separated before Vygotsky’s death in 1934, by which time it was already inescapably clear that open discussion of development, freely using Western sources, had become not just unacceptable but dangerous. Then there was the 1936 decree to eliminate testing in the schools, implemented by a fearful bureaucracy. Providing an abstract foundation for theoretical psychology based on Marx became a more secure academic project than experimental work on children. Luria went to medical school and turned himself into an outstanding neurologist, in which capacity he continued the study of psychological functions through the comparison of normal and abnormal capacities, thus laying the groundwork for a later Soviet neuropsychology. He worked tirelessly through the war, faced with a flood of clinical material. Leont’ev had moved to Khar’kov in 1931, and there, during the period 1931–1936, he established joint projects with researchers from the Ukraine and sustained some active research in psychology. Perhaps even more importantly, he pursued an ideal of psychology as a science, which was exceptionally difficult in the 1930s. The only direct account of what is sometimes called “the Khar’kov school of psychology” (even if reference to a “school” implies more institutional stability than was possible at the time) is a report written at the end of the decade by Leont’ev himself, but published by his son, Aleksei Alekseevich Leont’ev (1936–2004), also a psychologist, only in 1988, under the title, Materialy o soznanii (Materials on Consciousness). The work, in a rather general way, sustained Vygotsky’s focus on mediation, conscious and material, between human

organism and culture. All the same, there was research on a wide range of topics. There was considerable movement of personnel and disruption of work, and publication sometimes occurred decades later. Archival research by E. E. Sokolova, Leont’ev’s grandson, D. A. Leont’ev, and others is currently establishing a clearer picture (Leont’ev, Leont’ev, & Sokolova, 2005; Yasnitsky & Ferrari, 2008). Leont’ev left Moscow with Luria (who returned to Moscow in early 1934) and a number of other researchers, including the younger scientists, Zaporozhets and Bozhovich, allegedly to find a quieter place to work. He headed the Ukrainian psychoneurological academy in Khar’kov, which had sections in general experimental and genetic (i.e., developmental) psychology, clinical psychology, and general theory of psychology. They were joined by Ukrainian researchers such as Petr Iakovlevich Gal’perin (1902–1988) and Petr Ivanovich Zinchenko (1903–1969), and their institutional base extended into the Ukrainian scientific institute of pedagogy and the Khar’kov state pedagogical institute. Vygotsky was a visitor. Much work focused on child development—it included a study of the role of heredity and environment on the development of identical twins, and there was pedagogically oriented work on formal versus practical learning, and on motivation. Vygotsky’s interest in defectology was evident in work in clinical psychology, and this area also continued in Moscow at the All-Union institute of experimental medicine and the experimental defectology institute. The 1936 decree was a direct blow to the work on development: Leont’ev was, for a while, dismissed from all research and administrative positions. In addition, the pedagogical institutes moved, following the administrative transfer of the Ukrainian capital to Kiev. Nevertheless, some psychological work continued in Khar’kov until 1941, and earlier and continuing research was published in these years. Leont’ev gradually elaborated a theoretical shift in the direction of what he called “activity theory.” When he began publicly to state his ideas in the late 1940s, and then again in the late 1950s, he argued that his work had advanced beyond Vygotsky by emphasizing the material activity of the human organism, rather than the psychological tools of symbols and language, in mediating between the world and mental functions. This engaged a debate with the large Marxist topic of praxis and concerned the controversial question within Marxist thought about the degree to which the symbolic systems of conscious life are autonomous (as Vygotsky’s early

aesthetic studies allowed). It also put Leon’tev in competition with the other major Marxist theorist of “activity,” Rubinshtein. The argument had consequences for the idea of “inner speech” and theories of the stages of human development. Another center of research in the 1930s, outside the politically exposed capital cities of Leningrad and Moscow, was in Tbilisi, Georgia, where Dmitrii Nikolaevich Uznadze (1886–1950) maintained a research program based on the concept of “mental set.” Gal’perin, in Khar’kov, also published similar work in 1941. Such work was remarkable in the Soviet context because the idea of “set” posited, in effect, an unconscious cognitive state, or structure, active in psychological processes, in diametric opposition to Pavlovian theory. The very word “unconscious,” indeed, if it had been used, would have invoked a repressed memory of “bourgeois” dynamic psychology. There had been, in Russia as elsewhere, extensive discussion of unconscious processes and of the Freudian unconscious (Etkind, 1993, and trans. 1997; Miller, 1998). This began in the first decade of the 20th century, as part of a broad medical interest in psychotherapeutic innovations, when the Moscow psychiatrist Nikolai Evgrafovich Osipov (1877–1934) introduced his colleagues to Freudian ideas (Sirotkina, 2002, Chapter 3, and 2008, Chapter 3). He studied with C. G. Jung, visited Freud in 1910, and in the years before World War I, with another physician, I. B. Fel’tsman, published a number of volumes in a “psychotherapeutic library.” In the very early revolutionary years, some enthusiasts welcomed Freudian thought as support for a materialist and sexual liberation of the individual person, but such hopes were short-lived. As a student in Kazan’, Luria started a local psychoanalytic society, and when he moved to Moscow he became secretary of the Moscow psychoanalytic society, founded in 1921 by I. D. Ermakov and Moshe Wulff. It is clear that Luria, Vygotsky, and many other psychologists took considerable interest in the field. Sabina Shpil’rein, who had been a member of the Swiss psychoanalytic society, joined the Moscow group in 1924. For a number of years, there was an experimental kindergarten, which had to endure accusations that it introduced children to sexual matters. By 1930, however, it had become difficult to sustain public commitment to Freudian psychoanalysis, and the notion of unconscious mental activity in general became tainted and repressed as “bourgeois.” Lenin’s remark that Freud had exaggerated sexual matters added weight to this judgment. sirotkina, smith

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It was particularly difficult to reconcile Freud’s later writings with optimism about changing human nature; and Wilhelm Reich, on his trip to the U.S.S.R. in 1929, met with a sharp rebuff to his hopes for a Freudo-Marxism. Some psychoanalytic activity persisted in the 1930s, but then disappeared. Discussion began afresh in the late 1960s, when psychologists carefully detached reference to unconscious processes from reference to psychoanalysis. The first signs of reassessment of psychoanalysis as a possible, if controversial, therapeutic method appeared in the 1970s. The Georgian school staged an international conference in 1979, which brought this discussion into the open in the Soviet psychological community and restored to public view the language of unconscious mental processes.

Diversification: The 1950s to the Present During and after the 1952 session, which spelt out the Pavlovian dictate in psychology, Leont’ev, Luria, Gal’perin, Teplov, Rubinshtein, and other psychologists found it necessary to exchange accusations of deviation and error. At the same time, even if obeisance to Pavlov was obligatory in public pronouncements, away from open sessions psychologists preserved what they could of psychological, as opposed to physiological, practice and institutions. By 1955, 2 years after Stalin’s death, it was possible to be a little more open, although there was to be an enduring conformity in Pavlovian rhetoric throughout the Soviet empire. No historians of psychology have worked systematically on the post-1953 period, in spite of the existence of a considerable memory, some published in Russian, of the changes among psychologists. (For material on psychogenetics, medical psychology, psychophysiology, the psychology of individual differences, pedagogical psychology, and, in the 1980s, social psychology—very relevant to perestroika [reconstruction], see Grigorenko, Ruzgis, & Sternberg, 1997.) Psychologists established a journal for themselves in 1955, which they had previously not had, Voprosy psikhologii (Psychological Questions). This continues to be the leading publication in the field. Leont’ev began to search out and to publish some of Vygotsky’s work (two volumes of papers appeared in 1956 and 1960), and he published his own Problemy razvitiia psikhiki (Problems of the Development of Mind, 1959). After meeting resistance, excited discussion of the new cybernetics began, and there was renewed contact with Western scientists in the 436

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emerging area of the neurosciences. Francophone psychologists, including Piaget, visited in 1955, and they received the clear but private understanding that they should distinguish the “real” psychological work going on from its public, Pavlovian presentation. Uznadze’s Eksperimental’nye osnovy psikhologii ustanovki (The Experimental Basis of the Psychology of Set) appeared posthumously in 1961, and Rubinshtein, reappointed to head the department of psychology at the institute of philosophy in Moscow, independent of Leont’ev’s control, published his theoretical papers. Teplov reoriented himself and worked with his students to reformulate Pavlov’s approach to characterology in terms a typological approach to individual differences as functions of the nervous system. A number of Western scientists became intensely committed to opening up contacts, learning about Russian science— Luria’s neuropsychological work, for example— and making available in the West translations or summaries of Soviet contributions (e.g., Cole, 1978; Cole, John-Steiner, Scribner, & Souberman 1978; McLeish, 1975; Simon, 1957). (Michael Cole became the editor of an English-language journal of translations, Soviet Psychology, founded 1962–1963, from 1991 the Journal of Russian and East European Psychology.) The institutional basis of psychology as a field became unassailable when Leont’ev acquired the chair of psychology at Moscow university and, for the first time, in 1966, established psychology as a separate and full academic department in the university. Universities in Leningrad, Yaroslavl’, Tbilisi, and Tartu immediately followed suit. From his position in Moscow university, and with his Party connections, Leont’ev exercized considerable influence and authority over the new generation of Russian students who began to move into academic positions in the expanding field. He attempted to reinforce the theoretical links of psychology with a properly understood Marxism, one which recognized, as Vygotsky had done, the need to integrate a cultural-historical approach with the natural science of the organism. In Leont’ev’s view, the concept of “activity” performed this integrative theoretical function. Leont’ev’s dominance was questioned in Leningrad, where Bekhterev’s student, Anan’ev, headed the psychology department in the university and developed a many-sided approach (somewhat in Bekhterev’s manner), in marked contrast to what went on in Moscow. As earlier, he supported experimental work (e.g., on perception) of military significance.

Meanwhile, the Pavlovian theory of “higher nervous activity” had come under sustained critical examination, especially with the publication and continuing research of Bernshtein. Bernshtein, although a physiologist not a psychologist, was important to psychology since his work was a major plank in the edifice demonstrating the scientific weaknesses of Pavlovian research. In addition, he had a high reputation for scientific and moral probity in harsh times. Discussion of his work in 1962, at the All-Union conference on philosophical problems of psychology and higher nervous activity, opened up the possibility of taking on the Pavlovians. His work demonstrated, except in the opinion of hard-line Pavlovians led by Ezras A. Asratian at the institute of higher nervous activity, that processes involving coordination and feedback, and not just an assembly of reflexes, are needed to account for the complex, multidimensional nature of movements. There is, psychologists could state, no one-to-one correspondence between movements and localized brain events. In consequence, it is legitimate to argue that the meaning, or mental dimension, of an action, including models of the future, play a part in movements. Such arguments went back to 1922–1924, when Bernshtein, working at the Central Institute of Labor, initiated a new direction of research on the control of movement. He hoped then and in the 1930s to engage in constructive dialogue with Pavlov, but Pavlov’s death induced him to withdraw his work. Significantly, he conducted research with humans not dogs, humans in their “natural” work situations, not animals in harnesses. In the brief period of relative liberalization immediately after 1945, he worked in and influenced sports physiology and the construction of prostheses. His book, O postroenii dvizhenii (On the Construction of Movement) won a Stalin (State) Prize in 1947; but then, in 1948, his ideas were attacked for their “idealism” and for insufficiently acknowledging Pavlov, and, implicitly, for being Jewish, and he lost his positions. His began again to publish articles in the late 1950s, integrating the physiology of movement with cybernetics, leading to mathematical modeling of movement (Sirotkina, 1995). The publication of his articles, Ocherki po fiziologii dvizhenii i fiziologii aktivnosti (Studies on the Physiology of Movement and the Physiology of Activity, 1966) based on research conducted up to 40 years earlier, was a landmark at the time: “a spectacular example of scientific integrity successfully withstanding the advances of an ideologically endorsed doctrine [i.e., Pavlovian theory]” (Kozulin, 1984, p. 3).

Younger scientists, including Iosif Moiseevich Feigenberg, who worked on a probabilistic theory of behavior, developed Bernshtein’s research after his death in 1966, and knowledge of it spread in the West. By the late 1960s, there was considerable diversification of viewpoint in Soviet intellectual circles, and this grew in the 1970s, albeit under conditions of enforced political passivity. There was new thinking in Marxist philosophy and substantial interest in a science of science, that is, in unified methods for the advancement of knowledge and practice, including psychology. The highly centralized system in academic life, as in the economy and politics, somewhat loosened in psychology with the creation in Moscow, in 1971, of a research institute of psychology in the Academy of Sciences, separate from the university department. Boris Fedorovich Lomov (1927–1989), a student from the Leningrad department, with an interest in “engineering psychology” connected to military aviation and the space program, came to head this institute. The institute developed research in applied, mathematical, physiological, and theoretical fields (this last with Rubinshtein’s students), and to some extent it was receptive to new directions in cognitive research. Andrei Vladimirovich Brushlinskii (1933–2002), a student and follower of Rubinshtein, later became director, and he argued that it was Rubinshtein’s theoretical work on “activity” that had made it possible to overcome the dualisms of subject and object, and of mind and brain (Brushlinskii, 1997, Chapter 5). As a supposedly all-embracing approach to psychology, Leont’ev’s “activity theory” ran into the same trouble as other all-embracing theories, putting forward a concept, in this case “activity,” as if it were both the subject of inquiry and the explanation at the same time. The most direct criticism came in the form of the systems thinking of Georgii Petrovich Shchedrovitskii (1929–1994). In 1979, Schedrovitskii, in spite of working in Moscow within the sphere of Leont’ev’s influence, also called into question the continuity of Leont’ev’s with Vygotsky’s theoretical principles. The exact nature of Vygotsky’s legacy continued, indeed, to be a point of contention. Since the second half of the 1950s, Shchedrovitskii had been a member of an informal group of scientists (the Moscow Methodological Circle) arguing the need for a general methodology in the human sciences based on cybernetics and what, in the West, would be called systems theory, which appeared innovative, even liberating, in the Soviet context. sirotkina, smith

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Shchedrovitskii articulated three epistemological principles for the study of behavior: Its base is human activity, and thus the scientist must understand objects in the external world as functions of this activity, not independent from it; activity is not individual but characteristic of a system; and there is a distinction between the object studied and its presentation as a scientific subject, and thus the scientific subject may take different forms according to the purposes of research. These ideas became influential among intellectuals in the 1980s, and especially after 1987 during the years of perestroika, which saw the opening of social policy and planning to rational discussion and change. The challenge to Soviet thought lay in the claim that practical decision making, not only theory, requires scientists to examine the theoretical procedures for choosing a given framework rather than taking it for granted. For example, Vasilii Vasilievich Davydov (1930–1998), who later became director of the psychological institute of the pedagogical academy in Moscow, applied Shchedrovitskii’s ideas to educational theory. He argued, in an area of education deemed by the state to be of fundamental importance, that science education should teach children theoretical constructs, going against the long-established view that teachers should build on the everyday activity of the child. The 1980s was a period of diversification and of increasing numbers of academic psychologists, with psychologists tending to show loyalty to subgroups rather than to one artificially maintained unified field. There was growing interchange on a regular basis with Western psychologists. For some scientists, this was a process of normalization, the return of their science to the path it would have followed had it not been for ideological distortions. Others, however, were keen to promote what they argued were distinctive Soviet strengths in science, including its dialectical orientation, broadly understood to include such important work as Vygotsky’s cultural-historical psychology and “activity theory.” Perestroika created optimism that it would be possible finally to detach such commitments from moribund Marxist dogma. There were considerable changes of personnel with the aging and death of an older generation. All in all, Soviet psychology began to share topics of research and the enormous diversity of activity found elsewhere. Any judgment about recent history must be open to argument and revision. (For one collection of papers relating Russian and United States psychology to social affairs in the 1990s, with some 438

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historical perspectives, see Halpern & Voiskounsky, 1997.) We note that the unanticipated political changes in 1989–1991 caused a dramatic drop in the income of scientists. A large number of psychologists emigrated, for economic reasons, or in order to pursue the kind of “professional” career thought impossible in Russia. Those who stayed had to make an income from Western grants, or by moving into business, or by opening up psychological practice of one kind or another, such as political advisory services, for which there was a sudden demand, or by teaching. After 1991, there was a continuously renewed political decision not to maintain anything like the previous levels of funding for science. As a result, for example, no Russian institution in psychology or library of any kind had a budget for Western books and journals. There are large questions to be asked about what kind of research, especially if it entailed the expense of rigorous experimentation, was possible under the new conditions. It appears that the problems were not only financial. Under both the Yeltsin and Putin presidencies, intellectuals lost the status and the moral direction, however difficult that sometimes had been, which they had had under Soviet rule. It was not clear to psychologists whether a career in the field required an attempt straightforwardly to emulate Western, especially U.S., professional practice, or whether Russian traditions and circumstances required a somewhat different course. If the former was the case, the absence of resources at home implied finding part-time, if not full-time, work in the West. If the latter was the case, it was necessary to open new opportunities in education, business, the media, and therapeutic work while still maintaining, in some yet-to-be-clarified way, connections with scientific ideals. The latter route was a challenge, since teaching, which was a source of income and plentiful because of the popularity of the field with students, was mostly at introductory levels and poorly paid. Moreover, many people started to display an overconfident and careless psychological expertise in the public arena. The remarkably rapid spread of “popular” psychology in books and the media markedly blurred the notion of who is and who is not a psychologist. There is a Russian Psychological Association, open to all who “work as psychologists” and are provided with recommendations from two members, although membership is usually accorded to those who have studied to a centrally controlled, state determined standard. But there is no legislation to prevent anyone claiming the title of psychologist. In Soviet times, the

centralized system gave those educated in the field a natural monopoly and provided the field with at least the appearance that it was exclusively a scientific discipline. Since 1991, however, the proliferation of books and people offering psychological advice of one kind or another has become of great concern to those who think that there is such a thing as “scientific” psychology. For the observer, this social change, involving people turning to psychological ways of thought and psychological practice in order to address the daily problems of life, is a major development in the history of psychology in Russia. Considerable numbers of newly graduated students in psychology are finding employment, at least some of them applying psychological knowledge. There have even been attempts to recreate psychology as an Orthodox religious psychology of the soul, although this in practice has tended to mean a return to statements of Orthodox belief isolated from scientific psychology. The history of the country encourages the unsubtle presumption, on both sides, of a conflict between “science” and “religion.” In 2007–2008, there began to be a bit more state money in the academic system, but whether and in what way this might improve the situation of scientific psychology is unclear. Thus, the years following the Soviet period, years of intellectual freedom, brought considerable disquiet. Psychology is a very piecemeal, diverse, and socially scattered activity, and it does not look as if this will change in the short term.

Future Directions Future topics of interest in Russian psychology include: • Even-handed archive-based research on the history of the Soviet period, especially for the 1930s to 1950s. Also, the transformation of oral and informal memory into source-based history for the 1960s to 1980s. This would encompass source-based biography of psychologists. • Empirical, socially sensitive research into the transformation of working conditions for psychologists from the 1980s to the present. • Further studies of psychology as occupational practices, rather than academic science, leading to research on the nature and reasons for the rapid move to a psychological culture in the public sphere in the post-Soviet period. • The development of historical psychology in different periods; that is, research on the

psychological conditions of life in interaction with psychological representations of human self-understanding.

Glossary Activity theory: The approach of A. N. Leont’ev, influenced by Marxist thought, which treats psychological processes as a property of the activity of humans in the social environment. S. L. Rubinshtein put forward a different and competing theoretical account of activity. Cultural-historical theory: The term in conventional use to describe L. S. Vygotsky’s general project in psychology, the understanding and explanation of conscious life as the outcome of the interaction between biological processes and history and culture. Marxism-Leninism:The official philosophy and ideology of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which was held to provide the framework for progress in all possible knowledge. Pedology:The name for the science of child development, and the practical activities in the upbringing of children supposedly based on this science, in Russia until 1936 (and in some other countries). Psychotechnics: An internationally used term for psychological forms of investigation into occupational operations, such as the control of transport and aircraft, merging into studies of personnel selection and the human–machine interface. Reactology: A term particularly attached to K. N. Kornilov’s theory of the objective approach to psychological processes via the study of observable reactions. Reflexology: A term particularly attached to V. M. Bekhterev’s theory of the objective approach to psychological processes via the study of observable reactions, reflexes, and the activity of the brain. Theory of higher nervous activity: I. P. Pavlov’s own general term for his research program on the study of conditional and unconditional reflexes as the way to objective knowledge of psychological processes and of the brain.

Further Reading Etkind, A. (1997). Eros of the impossible: The history of psychoanalysis in Russia (N. Ribins, & M. Ribins, Trans.). Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

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Joravsky, D. (1989). Russian psychology: A critical history. Oxford, UK/Cambridge, MA: Blackwell. Kozulin, A. (1984). Psychology in Utopia: Toward a social history of Soviet psychology. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Miller, M. A. (1998). Freud and the Bolsheviks: Psychoanalysis in Imperial Russia and the Soviet Union. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Todes, D. P. (2001). Pavlov’s physiological factory: Experiment, interpretation, laboratory enterprise. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. van der Veer, R., & Valsiner, J. (1991). Understanding Vygotsky: A quest for synthesis. Oxford, UK/Cambridge, MA: Blackwell.

References Bauer, R. A. (1952). The new man in Soviet psychology. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Botsmanova, M. E., Guseva, E. P., & Ravich-Shcherbo, I. V. (1994). Psikhologicheskii institut na Mokhovoi (Istoricheskii ocherk). Moscow: Psikhologicheskii institut. Brushlinskii, A. V. (Ed.). (1997). Psikhologicheskaia nauka v Rossii XX stoletiia: problemy teorii i istorii. Moscow: Institut psikhologii RAN. Budilova, E. A. (1960). Bor’ba materializma i idealizma v russkoi psikhologicheskoi nauke, vtoraia polovina XIX–nachalo XX v. Moscow: AN SSSR. Budilova, E. A. (1984). On the history of social psychology in Russia (E. Lockwood, N. Thurston, & I. Gavlin, Trans.). In L. H. Strickland (Ed.), Directions in Soviet social psychology (pp. 11–28). New York: Springer. Cole, M. (Ed.). (1978). The selected writings of A. R. Luria. White Plains, NJ: Merle Sharpe. Cole, M., John-Steiner, V., Scribner, S., & Souberman, E. (Eds.). (1978). L. S. Vygotsky: Mind in society. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Etkind, A. (1993). Eros nevozmozhnogo. St. Petersburg: Meduza. Translated as, Eros of the impossible: The history of psychoanalysis in Russia (N. Ribins, & M. Ribins, Trans.). Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997. Fradkin, F. A. (Ed.). (1990). A search in pedagogics: Discussions of the 1920s and early 1930s. Moscow: Progress Publishers. Gilgen, A. R., Gilgen, C. K., Koltsova, V. A., & Oleinik, Y. N. (1997). Soviet and American psychology during World War II. Westport, CT/London: Greenwood Press. Graham, L. R. (1987). Science, philosophy, and human behavior in the Soviet Union. New York: Columbia University Press. Grigorenko, E. L., & Ravich-Shscherbo, I. V. (1997). Russian psychogenetics: Sketches for the portrait. In E. L. Grigorenko, P. Ruzgis, & R. J. Sternberg (Eds.), Psychology in Russia: Past, present, future (pp. 83–121). Commack, NY: Nova Science Publishers. Grigorenko, E. L., Ruzgis, P., & Sternberg, R. J. (Eds.). (1997). Psychology in Russia: Past, present, future. Commack, NY: Nova Science Publishers. Halpern, D. E. & Voiskounsky, A. E. (Eds.). (1997). States of mind: American and post-Soviet perspectives on contemporary issues in psychology. New York/Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. Joravsky, D. (1989). Russian psychology: A critical history. Oxford, UK/Cambridge, MA: Blackwell. Kostiuk, P. G., Mikulinskii, S. R., & Yaroshevskii, M. G. (Eds.). (1980). Ivan Mikhailovich Sechenov, k 150-letiu so dnr rozhdeniya. Moscow: Nauka.

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Kozulin, A. (1984). Psychology in Utopia: Toward a social history of Soviet psychology. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Kozulin, A. (1990). Vygotsky’s psychology: A biography of ideas. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Kurek, N. S. (2004). Istoriia likvidatsii pedologii i psikhotekhniki. St. Petersburg: Aleteyia. Leont’ev, A. A., Leont’ev, D. A., & Sokolova, E. E. (2005). Aleksei Nikolaevich Leont’ev: Deiatel’nost.’ Soznanie. Lichnost.’ Moscow: Smysl. Levitin, K. E. (1991). Lichnost’iu ne rozhdaiutsia. Moscow: Mysl’. Luria, A. R. (1979). The making of mind: A personal account of Soviet psychology. M. Cole, & S. Cole (Eds.)., Introduction and Epilogue by M. Cole. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. McLeish, J. (1975). Soviet psychology: History, theory, content. London: Methuen. Miller, M. A. (1998). Freud and the Bolsheviks: Psychoanalysis in Imperial Russia and the Soviet Union. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Nozdrachev, A. D, Poliakov, E. L., Kosmachevskaia, E. A., et al. (Eds.). (2004). I. P. Pavlov: Pervyi nobelevskii laureat Russii (3 Vols.). St. Petersburg: Gumanistika. Nikiforov, A. (1986). Bekhterev. Moscow: Molodaia gvardiia. Payne, T. R. (1968). S. L. Rubinstejn and the philosophical foundations of Soviet psychology. Dordrecht, DE: D. Reidel. Petrovskii, A. V. (1967). Istoriya sovetskoi psikhologii: formirovanie osnov psikhologicheskoi nauki. Moscow: Prosveshchenie. Rodin, A. M. (1998). Iz istorii zapreta pedologii v SSSR. Pedagogika, 4, 92–98. Rüting, T. (2002). Pavlov und der Neue Mensch: Diskurse über Disziplinierung in Sowjetrussland. Munich: R. Oldenbourg. Rybnikov, N. A. (1994). Kak sozdavalsia Psikhologicheskii institut, and Iz avtobiografii. Voprosy psikhologii, 1, 6–15. Simon, B. (Ed.). (1957). Psychology in the Soviet Union. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Sirotkina, I. E. (1995). N. A. Bernshtein: The years before and after the “Pavlov session.” Russian Studies in History, 34, 24–36. Sirotkina, I. E. (2002). Diagnosing literary genius: A cultural history of russian psychiatry, 1880–1930. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Sirotkina, I. E. (2006). When did “scientific psychology” begin in Russia? Physis: Revista Internazionale di Storia della Scienza, 43, 239–271. Sirotkina, I. E. (2008). Klassiki i psikhiatri: Psikhiatriya v rossiisckoi kul’ture kontsa XIX—nachala XX vekov (Rev. and Trans. I. E. Sirotkina). Moscow: Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie. (Original work published 2002). Smith, R. (1992). Inhibition: History and meaning in the sciences of mind and brain. London: Free Association Books/Berkeley: University of California Press. Smith, R. (1997). The Norton history of the human sciences. New York: W. W. Norton. Smith, R. (2008). Istoriia psikhologii (Trans. A. R. Dzkuia, & K. O. Rossiianov, Ed. I. E. Sirotkina). Moscow: Akademiya. (Rev. from work published 1997). Todes, D. P. (1984). Biological psychology and the tsarist censor: The dilemma of scientific development. Bulletin of the History of Medicine, 58, 529–544. Todes, D. P. (1995). Pavlov and the Bolsheviks. History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences, 17, 379–418.

Todes, D. P. (2001). Pavlov’s physiological factory: Experiment, interpretation, laboratory enterprise. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Todes, D. P. (2007). Pavlov, Ivan Petrovich. In Complete dictionary of scientific biography Vol. 24 (pp. 46–49). Revised edition. Detroit: Charles Scribner’s Sons. Umrikhin, V. V. (1991). “Nachalo kontsa” povedencheskoi psikhologii v SSSR. In M. G. Yaroshevskii (Ed.), Repressirovannaia nauka Vol. 1 (pp. 136–145). Leningrad: Nauka. van der Veer, R., & Valsiner, J. (1991). Understanding Vygotsky: A quest for synthesis. Oxford, UK/Cambridge, MA: Blackwell. Yaroshevskii, M. G. (1968). Ivan Mikhailovich Sechenov, 1829–1905. Leningrad: Nauka. Yaroshevskii, M. G. (1974). Psikhologiya v XX stoletii: Theoreticheskie problemy razvitiia psikhologicheskoi naykinayke. Moscow: Izdatel’stvo politicheskoi literatury. Yaroshevskii, M. G. (1982). The logic of scientific development and the scientific school: The example of Ivan Mikhailovich

Sechenov. In W. R. Woodward, & M. G. Ash (Eds.), The problematic science: Psychology in nineteenth-century thought (pp. 231–254). New York: Praeger. Yaroshevskii, M. G. (1985). Istoriia psikhologii Moscow: Mysl’. Translated as, A history of psychology. (R. English, Trans.). Moscow: Progress, 1990. Yaroshevskii, M. G. (1993). L. S. Vygotsky: V poiskakh novoi psikhologii. St. Petersburg: International Foundation for History of Science. Yasnitsky, A., & Ferrari, M. (2008). From Vygotsky to Vygotskian psychology: Introduction to the history of the Kharkov school. Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences, 44, 119–145. Zhdan, A. N. (Ed.). (2007). Psikhologiia v Moskovskom universitete 1755–2005. Moscow: Moskovskii gosudarstvennyi universitet. Zhdan, A. N. (Ed.). (2009). Rossiiskaia psikhologiia: Antologiia. Moscow: Akademicheskii Proekt, Al’ma Mater.

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Saudi Arabia

Abdel-Sattar Ibrahim

Abstract As many other Arab–Islamic countries, Saudi Arabia shares stock in the Islamic psychological achievements’ legacy that started more than a 1,000 years ago during the Middle Ages (500–1000 AD). It was during that time that Islamic scholars began to develop more or less scientific ideas concerning a variety of topics, many of which belong to psychology as we know it today. Reference to these early events recurs throughout the first section of this chapter. In the remaining sections, the beginnings of modern scientific psychological studies in Saudi Arabia from about the middle of the 20th century will be described. Additionally, positive and negative sociocultural events influencing the current status and the future of psychology as a scientific and independent identity in Saudi Arabia will be discussed. Keywords: History of psychology, psychology in Saudi Arabia, early Islamic heritage in psychology, modern psychology in Saudi Arabia, cross-cultural psychology, modern psychology in Arab–Islamic cultures, psychology in Middle Eastern Arabian countries, Islamic psychology

Saudi Arabia, also called the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (Arabic: al Mamlaka al-Arabiyya Assuūdiyya), is the largest country of the Arabian Peninsula. Saudi Arabia is bordered by Jordan on the northwest; Iraq on the north and northeast; Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates on the east; Oman on the southeast; and Yemen on the south. The Arabian Gulf, also called the Persian Gulf, lies to the northeast and the Red Sea to its west. Saudi Arabia has an estimated population of 28,686,633 (including 5,576,076 non-nationals), and its size is approximately 21,49,690 km2 (830,000 sq mi). The rise of Islam in the 620s ad, the subsequent religious importance of the Arabian Holy cities of Makah (Makka al-Mukarramah, or Mecca), and Medina (the two holiest places in Islam), and the discovery of large oil reserves in the early 20th century, all have given this country a significant influence beyond its current borders. 442

Development of Psychology in Saudi Arabia Islamic and Arab countries, Saudi Arabia included, share stock in the Islamic legacy that started more than a 1,000 years ago. Islamic scholars in the 9th century began to develop more or less scientific ideas concerning a variety of topics, many of which belong to psychology as we know it today. Reference to these early events recurs throughout this first section of this chapter. In the second section, the beginnings of scientific psychological studies in Saudi Arabia from about the middle of the 20th century will be explored. Additionally, we will identify the positive and/or negative influences on psychology currently and its probable future in Saudi Arabia as an independent identity.

The Early Heritage As an Arab–Islamic culture, Saudi Arabia shares in the early Islamic achievements that occurred during

the Middle Ages. Upon the birth of Islam and the Islamic faith that occurred during that time (500–900 ad), Muslims assumed leading position of leadership in government, military, religious affairs, and knowledge. Scholars of all nationalities, particularly Arab and Persian, had contributed a variety of new perspectives to philosophical thought and had added valuable observations in medicine, including psychiatric and psychological (Elm el nafs) issues. Translations of the Greco-Roman heritage in religion, philosophy, medicine, and the sciences (such as optics, geology, math, and human psychology) were also initiated from different parts of the Islamic world, which extended from India to China to Europe. It is important to note, however, that the term “psychology” did not exist at this early stage in the same modern sense as we know it since the 19th century. Muslim scholars, in fact, made their historical contributions in psychology under the umbrella of religious writings, medicine, and philosophy. They used the term Nafs (self or soul) to refer to the similar Greco-Roman concept of psyche, which encompassed almost all concepts currently gathered under the umbrella of modern psychology. Early Islamic scholars contributed numerous themes to psychological thought under at least five categories: • Theories of mind • Methods of investigation • Psychophysiology (psychosomatics) • Abnormal and clinical psychology • Psychotherapy and healing. A word about these five areas is in order.

Theories of Mind and Intellect Many Islamic scholars, such as Abu Bakr Muhammad Ibn Sirin Al-Kindi (known in the West as Alkindus; 801–873), Abu Zayd Ahmed Ibn Sahl al-Balkhi (850–934), Muhammad Ibn Zakarīya Rāzi (known as Rhazes in the West; 865–925), al-Farabi (Alpharabius; 872–951); Ibn al-Haytham (known as Alhazen in the West; 965–1039); Al-Biruni (973–1048); Avicenna (known as Ibn Sina in the Arab world; 980–1037); Al-Ghazali (Algazel; 1058–1111); Ibn al-Nafis (1213–1288); and Ibn Khaldun (1332–1406), and many others, have made exceptionally distinguished contributions in the early development of psychological concepts. They gave explanations for many psychological phenomena and provided a significant amount of psychologically based concepts to deal with simple and complicated areas of human behavior in normal and

abnormal contexts. Their pioneering insights to this field were much wider than many would think, including contributions to the understanding, interpretation, and life applications of many modern psychological concepts, as described in the following sections.

Human Perception Avicenna (Ibn Sina), who is considered one of the first psychiatrists, was a talented boy who became a practicing physician at age 16 (Cesk, 1980; Nagaty, 1993). He considered psychology as a natural science and showed a deep and creative interest in many topics of a psychological nature, including psychophysiology, human perception, health psychology, speech difficulties, sex therapy, and herbal drugs, and he contributed to the nature versus nurture debate with his theories on empiricism and the tabula rasa. Reportedly, Avicenna’s ideas were introduced to Europe through the writings of another Muslim scholar, Ibn Rushed or Averroes (Hillier, 2006, pp. 1–23; Nagaty, 1961, 1993). One of Avicenna’s most influential theories in psychology and epistemology is his tabula rasa theory, a precursor to the nature versus nurture debate in modern psychology. He argued that the “human intellect at birth is rather like a tabula rasa, a pure potentiality that is actualized through education and experience.” Knowledge, he believed, is attained through “empirical familiarity with objects in this world from which one abstracts universal concepts, which, when compounded, lead to further abstract concepts.” He further argued that the intellect itself “possesses levels of development from the material intellect (al-‘aql al-hayulani) that potentiality can acquire knowledge to the active intellect (al-‘aql alfa‘il), the state of the human intellect at conjunction with the perfect source of knowledge” (Quoted in Bradly, 2006). He also was the first to divide human perception into five external senses (the classical senses of hearing, sight, smell, taste, and touch known since antiquity) and five internal senses, which he labeled the senses communis (seat of all senses), which integrates sense data into percepts; the imaginative faculty, which conserves the perceptual images; the sense of imagination, which acts upon these images by combining and separating them, serving as the seat of the practical intellect; wahm (illusion), which perceives qualities (such as good and bad, love and hate, etc.) and forms the basis of a person’s character whether or not influenced by reason; and intentions (ma’ni), which conserve all these notions in memory (Nagaty, 1961). ibrahim

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Another early contribution to sensory perception came from Ibn al-Haytham, in his Book of Optics (Quoted in Russell, 1982, p. 176). He wrote that every sensation is a form of “suffering” and that what people call pain is only an exaggerated perception; that there is no qualitative difference but only a quantitative difference between pain and ordinary sensation (Bradley, 2006, Chapter 5). Russell (1984, p. 176) also reported that Ibn al-Haytham was the first scientist to argue that vision occurs in the brain, rather than the eyes. He also pointed out, as modern psychologists proved years later, that personal experience has an effect on what people see and how they see, and that vision and perception are subjective (Bradley, 2006). Later, Al-Ghazali (Algazel) supported this view and stated that the self has motor and sensory motives for fulfilling its bodily needs. He wrote that the motor motives comprise propensities and impulses, and further, he divided the propensities into two types: appetite and anger. He wrote that appetite urges hunger, thirst, and sexual craving, whereas anger takes the form of rage, indignation, and revenge. Hague (2004, p. 368) argues that Al-Ghazali also indicated that impulse resides in the muscles, nerves, and tissues, and moves the organs to “fulfill the propensities.” Al-Ghazali also pioneered the notion that sensory motives (apprehension) are divided into five external senses (the classical senses of hearing, sight, smell, taste, and touch) and five internal senses, which he described as common sense (Hiss Mushtarik), which synthesizes sensuous impressions carried to the brain while giving meaning to them; imagination (Takhayyul ), which enables someone to retain mental images from experience; reflection (Tafakkur), which brings together relevant thoughts and associates or dissociates them as it considers fit but has no power to create anything new that is not already present in the mind; memory (Tadhakkur), which remembers the outer form of objects in memory and recollects the meaning; and the recall (Hafiza), where impressions received through the senses are stored. He wrote that, although the external senses occur through specific organs, the internal senses are located in different regions of the brain. He stated that these inner senses allow people to predict future situations based on what they learn from past experiences (Hague, 2004, p. 367).

Awareness of Psychological Explanations Early in history, Muslim scholars were able to formulize psychological interpretations to understand biological and social phenomena. Avicenna often 444

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used psychological methods to treat his patients (Hague, 2004, p. 366; Ibrahim, 2003, pp. 59–61) One such example involved a prince-patient (Amir) who had melancholia and suffered from the delusion that he was a cow. He would low like a cow, crying “Kill me so that a good stew may be made of my flesh,” and would not eat anything. Avicenna was persuaded to undertake the case, and sent a message to the patient, asking him to be happy, as the butcher was coming to slaughter him, and the sick man rejoiced. When Avicenna approached the prince with a knife in his hand, he asked, “Where is the cow so I may kill it?” The patient then lowed like a cow to indicate where he was. By order of Avicenna, in his role as the butcher, the patient was laid on the ground for slaughter. When Avicenna approached the patient, pretending to intend to slaughter him, he said, “The cow is too lean and not ready to be killed. He must be fed properly, and I will kill it when it becomes healthy and fat.” The patient was then offered food, which he ate eagerly; he gradually gained strength and was rid of his delusion (Ibrahim, 2003, pp. 60–63). In the 12th century, the Andalusian-Arabian philosopher and novelist Ibn Tufail (known as Ibn Tophail in the West) first demonstrated Avicenna’s theory of tabula rasa as a thought experiment in his Arabic novel, Hayy Ibn Yaqzan, in which he depicted the development of the mind of a feral child “from a tabula rasa to that of an adult, in a complete isolation from society” on a desert island. Hayy Ibn Yaqzan went on to become one of the principal sources of empiricism in modern social psychological theories’ role in language acquisition and other types of social behavior.

Dreams: Causes and Interpretation In the area of dreams, early Muslim scholars formulated some appropriate guidance in the interpretation of dreams. For example, Abu Bakr Muhammad Ibn Sirin wrote a famous book on dreams entitled Ta’bir al-Ru’ya and Muntakhab al-Kalam fi Taabir al-Ahlam (Expressing Visions and Dreams’ Interpretation). His book is divided into 25 sections on dream interpretation, from the etiquette of interpreting dreams to the interpretation of reciting certain Surahs (verses) of the Qur’an in one’s dream. In this book, some of his interpretations of dreams remind us of many modern interpretations in their use of symbolism and the psychosocial impact on dreaming. For example, he wrote that it is important for a layperson to seek assistance from an Alim (scholar) who could guide in the interpretation of

dreams with a proper understanding of the cultural context and other such causes that would influence interpretation. Years later, al-Farabi (Alpharabius) also wrote a chapter On the Causes of Dreams, in his Book of Opinions of the People of the Ideal City (utopia), in which he was the first to distinguish between dream interpretation and the nature and causes of dreams (Bradley, 2006, pp. 227–289).

Methods of Investigation Experimentation Ibn al-Haytham is considered by some (e.g., Khaleefa, 1999; Russell, 1996; 1982) to be the founder of experimental psychology and psychophysics for his pioneering work on the psychology of visual perception in the Book of Optics. He also was the first scientist to argue that vision occurs in the brain, rather than the eyes. He pointed out that personal experience has an effect on what people see and how they see, and that vision and perception are subjective (Russell, 1984, pp.176– 177). His Treatise on the Influence of Melodies on the Souls of Animals, published in the 11th century, was also an early treatise dealing with the effects of music on animals. In the treatise, he demonstrated how a camel’s pace could be hastened or retarded with the use of music, and he showed other examples of how music can affect animal behavior, experimenting with horses, birds, and reptiles (Bradley, 2006 pp. 230–289). Through to the 19th century, a majority of scholars in the Western world continued to believe that music was a distinctly human phenomenon, but experiments since then have supported Ibn al-Haytham’s view that music does indeed have an effect on animals (Bradley, 2006 pp. 230–289). Avicenna also wrote his famous “Floating Man” thought experiment to demonstrate human selfawareness and self-consciousness. His “Floating Man” thought experiment tells its readers to imagine themselves suspended in the air, isolated from all sensations, which includes no sensory contact with even their own bodies. He argues that, in this scenario, one would still have self-consciousness. He thus concluded that the idea of the self is not logically dependent on any physical thing, and that the soul should not be seen in relative terms, but as a primary given, a substance (Plott, 2000, p. 462). In the ninth century, the Arabian psychological thinker al-Kindi (Alkindus), used a psychological experimental method that led to his discovery that sensation is proportionate to the stimulus (Khaleefa, 1999, p. 2). Some years later, Al-Biruni pioneered

experiments that helped him identify the concept of reaction time (Khaleefa, 1999, p. 2). Ibn al-Nafis identified the aliqiwa annafsiyya— the “psychic faculties”—of cognition, sensation, imagination, and animal locomotion, after having empirically discovered that the psychic faculties come from the brain and not from heart, as was believed at that time. He further wrote that it is the brain that controls sensation, movement, and cognition (Sulaiman, 1982, pp. 306–312; Iskander, 1982, pp. 313–325).

Social psychological approach Al-Farabi (878–950), almost two decades before his death, wrote a rich commentary on Aristotle’s work and Plato’s The Republic. One of his most notable works is Social Psychology and Model City (utopia) (Arabic: Al-Madina al-Fadila), in which he theorized an ideal state; this work was among the earliest treatises to deal with the social determinants of psychology (retrieved from Encyclopedia Britannica Online, 2009). He also stated that “an isolated individual could not achieve all the perfections by himself, without the aid of other individuals.” He wrote that it is the “innate disposition of every man to join another human being or other men in the labor he ought to perform.” He concluded that to “achieve what he can of that perfection; every man needs to stay in the neighborhood of others and associate with them” (see Ahmed & Gielen, 1998, pp. 5–48). Later, Ibn Khaldun, who is recognized as a pioneering figure in sociology and the social sciences, made significant contributions to the area of social psychology. His book Muqaddimah (or Prolegomena) was a classic on the social psychology of the peoples of the Arabian Peninsula, particularly the Bedouin character (Oweiss, 1988).

Psychophysiology (Psychosomatics) Emotions and Behavior Pioneering medical practices were also attempted in psychophysiology and psychosomatic medicine. Avicenna, for example, recognized physiological influence in the treatment of illnesses involving emotions. He, for example, developed a system for associating changes in the pulse rate with inner feelings. In this regard, he identified love sickness (Ishq) when he was treating a very ill patient by “feeling the patient’s pulse and reciting aloud to him the names of provinces, districts, towns, streets, and people.” He noticed how the patient’s pulse increased when certain names were mentioned, from which he deduced that the patient was in love with a girl ibrahim

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whose home Avicenna was “able to locate by the digital examination.” Avicenna advised the patient to marry the girl he was in love with, and the patient soon recovered from his illness after his marriage (Nagaty, 1993, p. 15). Avicenna also gave psychological explanations for certain somatic illnesses, and he always linked the physical and psychological illnesses together. He described melancholia (depression) as a type of mood disorder in which the person may become suspicious and develop certain types of phobias. He stated that anger heralded the transition of melancholia to mania, and explained that humidity inside the head can contribute to mood disorders. He recognized that this occurs when the amount of breath changes: happiness increases the breath, which leads to increased moisture inside the brain, but if this moisture goes beyond its limits, the brain loses control over its rationality and this leads to mental disorders. He also wrote about symptoms and treatments for nightmare, epilepsy, and weak memory (Ibrahim & Ibrahim 2002, p. 24). Al-Kindi dealt with psychology in his First Philosophy and Eradication of Sorrow. In the latter, he described sorrow as “a psychical (Nafsani) grief caused by loss of loved ones or personal belongings or by failure in obtaining what one lusts after” and then added: “If causes of pain are discernible, the cures can be found.” He recommended that if we do not tolerate losing or dislike being deprived of what is dear to us, then we should seek after riches in the world of the mind. In it, we should treasure our precious and cherished gains, of which can never be dispossessed. He also stated that sorrow is not within us but is brought upon us by ourselves (Corbin, 1993, p. 154).

Abnormal and Clinical Psychology Classification and Assessment of Psychological Disorders Unlike medieval European physicians who relied on demonological explanations for mental illness, medieval Muslim physicians relied mostly on the clinical observation of mentally ill patients. They made significant advances to the understanding, classification, and innovative treatment of emotional and mental disorders, including establishing mental health hospitals for the first time in history (Coleman & Broen, 1976, pp. 67–70). They pioneered the provision of psychotherapy and moral treatment for mentally ill patients, in addition to other new forms of treatment such as baths, drugs and medications, music therapy, and occupational 446

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therapy (Ibrahim & Ibrahim,2002, pp. 60–63; Coleman & Broen, 1976, pp. 67–70). In the area of classification of mental illness, the Arab physician Najab ud-din Unhammad (870–925) made many careful observations about mentally ill patients and compiled them in a book which “made up the most complete classification of mental diseases theretofore known.” The mental illnesses first described by Unhammad included agitated depression, neurosis, sexual impotence, psychosis, and mania1 (Khaleefa, 1999). Avicenna also discovered a condition resembling schizophrenia, which he described as Junun Mufrit (severe madness) and which he clearly distinguished from other forms of madness such as mania, rabies, and manic depressive psychosis. He observed that patients suffering from schizophrenia-like severe madness show agitation, behavioral and sleep disturbance, give inappropriate answers to questions, and in some cases, are incapable of speaking at times. He suggested restraining such patients to prevent any harm they may cause to themselves or to others. Avicenna also dedicated a chapter of his Canon to mania, in which he described mania as bestial madness characterized by rapid onset and remission, with agitation and irritability (quoted in Youssef, Youssef, & Dening, 1996). Ali Ibn Abbas al-Majusi (d. 982) discussed mental illness in his medical text Kitab al-Malaki, in which he discovered and observed a type of melancholia—lycanthropy—associated with certain personality disorders. He wrote the following on this particular mental illness: Its victim behaves like a rooster and cries like a dog, the patient wanders among the tombs at night, his eyes are dark, his mouth is dry, the patient hardly ever recovers and the disease is hereditary. (quoted in Khaleefa, 1999)

As for the causes, symptoms, and treatment of mental illness, Islamic scholars and physicians called for a new, positive, humanistic understanding of mental illness, unlike the negative attitude toward mental illness adopted by most ancient and medieval societies, which believed that mental illness was caused by either demonic possession or as punishment from God. The first mental hospitals and insane asylums were built in the Islamic world as early as the eighth century, first, in Baghdad in 705, in Fes in the early eighth century, and in Cairo in 800 ad. Other famous mental hospitals were built in Damascus and Aleppo in 1270 (Quoted in Ibrahim, 2002, pp. 2–9). Medieval Muslim physicians relied

mostly on clinical psychiatry and clinical observations of mentally ill patients. Remarkable advances were made in psychiatry, psychotherapy, and the moral treatment of mentally ill patients. One of the most famous physicians and scholars of the 10th century was Muhammad Ibn Zakarīya Rāzi (Rhazes) (865–925 ad), who wrote two texts, El-Mansuri (the Victorious) and Al-Hawi (the Container), which presented comprehensive definitions, symptoms, and treatments for many illnesses related to mental health. Rhaze’s texts made significant advances in psychiatry and psychology. During his time, he also ran the psychiatric ward of a Baghdad hospital (Demerdash & Al-Sharif, 1984; Fadly, 1984; Karim, 1984). The concepts of mental health and “mental hygiene” were also introduced by a Muslim physician, Ahmed Ibn Sahl al-Balkhi. In his Masalih al-Abdan wa al-Anfus (Sustenance for Body and Soul ), Balkhi was a pioneer in psychotherapy, and the first to compare amrad el baddan wa Amrad Al nafs (physical and psychological disorders) and show “their interaction in causing psychosomatic disorders.” He recognized that the body and the soul can be healthy or sick, or “balanced or imbalanced,” and that mental illness can have both psychological and/ or physiological causes. He wrote that imbalance of the body can result in fever, headaches, and other physical illnesses, while imbalance of the soul can result in anger, anxiety, sadness, and other mental symptoms. He recognized two types of depression: one called huzn (sorrow or reactive depression), caused by known reasons such as loss or failure, and which can be treated psychologically through both external methods (such as persuasive talking, preaching, and advising) and internal methods (such as the “development of inner thoughts and cognitions which help the person get rid of his depressive condition”); and one called manakhulya (melancholy), caused by unknown reasons such as a “sudden affliction of sorrow and distress, which persists all the time, preventing the afflicted person from any physical activity or from showing any happiness or enjoying any of the pleasures,” and which may be caused by physiological reasons (such as impurity of the blood) and can be treated through physical medicine. He also wrote comparisons between physical disorders with mental disorders, and showed how psychosomatic disorders can be caused by certain interactions between them (Millon, 2004). Ibn Miskawayh (941–1030) wrote two books: Tahdhib al-Akhlaq (Cultivation of Ethics) and Al-Fauz al-Asgar (The Lesser Victory) (Demerdash &

Al-Sharif, 1984), in which he gave psychological advice on certain issues such as the fear of death, the need to develop traits to restrain oneself from faults, and the concept of morality. He also introduced concepts similar to “self-reinforcement” and “response cost,” in which he advised Muslims who feel guilty to learn to punish themselves physically or psychologically through charity, fasting, and similar avenues. The Arab Muslim physician An-Naysaburi (d. 1016) wrote the Kitab al-Uquala Wal-Majanin (The Book of Sanity and Madness), in which he used the term Mahwus (the manic) for patients with delusions and hallucinations. He attempted to explain the phenomenon of madness and insanity in psychological terms, rather than through the philosophical contemplation methods used by his contemporaries. He considered life as a blending of opposites, such as health and disease, and wrote that reason is mixed with madness so that even the sane are never free from madness.

Psychotherapy and Healing In his ninth century book Firdous al-Hikmah (The Paradise of Wisdom) Ali Ibn Sahl Rabban al-Tabari emphasized strong ties between psychology and medicine, and the need for al-‘ilaj al-nafs (psychotherapy) and counseling in the therapeutic treatment of patients (Plott, 2000). He wrote that patients frequently feel sick due to delusions or imagination, and that these can be treated through “‘wise counseling” by smart and witty physicians who could win the rapport and confidence of their patients, thus leading to a positive therapeutic outcome (Demerdash & Al-Sharif, 1984). In his chapter on mental illness, al-Tabari first described thirteen types of mental disorders, including madness, delirium, and Fasad Al-Khayal Wal-Aql (“the damage of imagination and mind”) (Demerdash & Al-Sharif, 1984). He also clearly highlighted mental illness as a specialty of its own. Rhazes also wrote an essay entitled “Maqala fil-LMalikhuliya” (“Article on Melancholy”) in which he first described psychosis, and he also described a type of melancholia: the “cerebral type.” He described the diagnosis of this mental disorder and reported its varied symptoms. The main clinical features he identified were sudden movement, foolish acts, fear, delusions, and hallucinations (Glick, Livesey, & Walis, 2005).

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techniques (e.g., Demerdash & Al-Sharif, 1984). This is seen from the following anecdote: Rhazes was forcibly summoned by the Prince (Amir) to treat him for a rheumatic affliction of his joints, which could well have been a psycho-physiological disorder. When Rhazes came to the Amir, he tried various treatments without success. Finally, he created a situation that made his patient the Amir angry and frightened. The Amir, furious partly from fear and partly from anger, sprang to his feet and ran after Rhazes. The latter ran away at once and went home, then wrote to the Amir a conciliatory letter explaining the purpose of his unconventional approach. In commenting about Rhazes’ approach from a modern psycho-physiological and behavioral therapeutic perspective, Demerdash and Al-Shrif (1984, p. 100–101) wrote that: In fact, Rhazes did two things. He created a sudden and actually stressful situation, but with one important difference, namely the Amir could do something about it. He was no longer helpless in the face of this new stress, as he was able to act. He responded to Rhazes’ insults and threats by running after him. (Demerdash, & Al-Sharif, 1984 p. 100)

We may note that this treatment technique would be termed “dragging” therapy by Seligman centuries later, in reference to the learned helplessness theory (Seligman, 2002a, b; Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000). Rhazes also reported about a psychotherapeutic case study of a woman suffering from severe cramps in her joints, which made her unable to rise. The physician cured her by lifting her skirt, putting her to surprise and shame. He wrote: “A flush of heat was produced within her which dissolved the rheumatic psychosomatic illness.” Although not meant by any means encouraging the use of such a technique in such a way, with some adaptation, this technique can probably lead to benefit for some patients! In fact, and interestingly enough, almost one thousand years later, in their 1979 book Hypnotherapy: An Exploratory Case Book, the famous American hypnotherapists Milton Erickson and Ernest Rossi (1979, pp. 36–38) referred to shock and surprise as two recognized forms of psychological treatment due to the fact that both can lead to involuntary autonomic reactions causing psychic disequilibrium which, in turn, open the possibility of a creative moment during which the patient is forced to engage in a search for psychic equilibrium. Erickson and Rossi (p. 36) suggested evoking momentary shock by using techniques such 448

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as interspersing shock words, taboo concepts, and emotions, techniques that remind us of the earlier pioneering and inventive attempts made by Rhazes in his search for psychological treatments.

Cognitive and Positive Psychotherapy More systematic examples of cognitive and positive psychotherapy practice were invented and practiced by al-Balkhi, who was the first to clearly differentiate between amradh annafs and amradh alaql (psychological vs. mental illnesses) or, in modern terms, neuroses and psychoses. He used this differentiation to classify neurotic disorders, and to show in detail how rational and spiritual cognitive therapies can be used to treat each one of his classified disorders. For example, he classified neuroses (Arabic: al amrad al nafisiyya) into four emotional disorders: fear and anxiety, anger and aggression, sadness and depression, and obsessions (wasawes). As quoted by Hague (2004, p. 275), al-Balkhi further classified three types of depression: normal sadness (huzn) which is today known as normal sadness or sorrow; manacholia or endogenous depression, which “originated within the body”; and ingibadh or reactive depression, which “originated outside the body.” Hague (2004, p. 361) cites another example from Al-Kindi and showed that he also developed cognitive methods to combat depression and discussed the intellectual operations of human beings. As quoted in Karim (1984), Ali Ibn Abbas alMajusi (d. 982) had also explained how the physiological and psychological aspects of patients can influence one another in his book Complete Book of the Medical Art. He found a correlation between patients who were physically and mentally healthy and those who were physically and mentally unhealthy, and concluded that “joy and contentment can bring a better living status to many who would otherwise be sick and miserable due to unnecessary sadness, fear, worry, and anxiety.” He also was among the first physicians to discuss the various mental disorders, and he placed more emphasis on preserving health through diet and natural healing than he did on medication or drugs, which he considered a last resort (Karim, 1984). Early Arabian scholars showed interest in positive concepts such as happiness, hope, helping, and optimism, a precursor to the concept currently known as positive psychology (e.g., Seligman, 2002a, b). Al-Ghazali (Algazel), for example, discussed the concept of the self and the causes of its misery and happiness. He formulated the theory that the self has an inherent yearning for an ideal, which it strives to

realize, and it is endowed with qualities to help realize it. He identified the connection between cognition and emotions in same terms we use in psychology today. He also listed the spiritual diseases as selfcenteredness; addiction to wealth, fame, and social status; and ignorance, cowardice, cruelty, lust, and greed. To overcome these spiritual weaknesses, alGhazali described the personality as an “integration of spiritual and bodily forces,” and he suggested the therapy of opposites (“use of imagination in pursuing the opposite”), such as ignorance and learning, or hate and love (Demerdash & Ali, 1984, Hague, 2004). Abu Zayd Ahmed Ibn Sahl al-Balkhi was probably the earliest scholar to discuss diseases related to both the body and the soul in a positive-cognitively tone, just as practiced by modern American pioneers of cognitive and positive psychology (e.g., Beck, 1976; Ellis, 1977; Ellis & Blau, 1998; Ellis & Dryden, 1987; Ellis & Harper, 1975; Seligman, 2002a, b). Balkhi had criticized many medical doctors in his time for placing too much emphasis on physical illnesses and neglecting the mental illnesses of patients, and argued that “since man’s construction is from both his soul and his body, therefore, human existence cannot be healthy without the ishtibak [connecting or woven] of soul and body.” He further argued that “if the body gets sick, the nafs [psyche] loses much of its cognitive and comprehensive ability and fails to enjoy the desirous aspects of life,” and that “if the nafs gets sick, the body may also find no joy in life and may eventually develop a physical illness” (Hague, 2004). Balkhi also introduced the theory that a healthy individual should always keep healthy thoughts and feelings in his mind, to deal with unexpected emotional outbursts—in the same way that drugs and suppliers are kept nearby as first aid for unexpected physical emergencies. He stated that a balance between the mind and body is required for good health and that an imbalance between the two can cause sickness. This is almost the same as the concept of cognitive therapy reintroduced a thousand years later by major American cognitive therapists (e.g., Beck, 1976; Ellis, 1977; Ellis & Blau, 1998; Ellis & Dryden, 1987; Ellis & Harper, 1975; and Seligman, 2002a, b).

Other Contributions Al-Kindi was the first to realize the therapeutic value of music. Among his achievements in this field, he was the first to experiment with music therapy, and he attempted to cure a quadriplegic boy using this

method (Millon, 2004). Later, in the ninth century, al-Farabi also dealt with music therapy in his treatise Meanings of the Intellect, in which he discussed the therapeutic effects of music on the soul (Millon, 2004). Animal psychology was also represented in the earliest literature on “the social organization of ants” and “animal communication and psychology,” written by al-Jahiz (766–868), an Afro-Arab scholar who wrote many works on these subjects (Hague, 2004, p. 376). As shown earlier, Ibn al-Haytham was among the first scholars to experiment with animal psychology. In his Treatise on the Influence of Melodies on the Souls of Animals, he demonstrated how an animal’s pace could be hastened or retarded with the use of music. Thanks to Ibn al-Haytham’s experiments on the influence of music on camels, horses and birds, that a majority of scholars in the Western world started to believe that music is not distinctly a human phenomenon, but also music does indeed influence animals (Russell 1982). These significant psychiatric and psychological contributions by Arab scholars, and the Latin translations they made of the Greco-Roman intellectual heritage, helped Europe to emerge from the Dark Ages. The European Renaissance coincided with a stagnation period for Arabs. The European Renaissance witnessed various technological, democratic, and psychosocial advancements in almost all aspects of life, including the inception and flourishing of modern scientific psychology in the 19th century. The inception of modern psychology in some Arab countries began in the early 20th century, but it took modern Saudis some few decades to recognize this discipline. In the next section we review the beginnings of modern psychology in Saudi Arabia.

Modern Psychology in Saudi Arabia The beginning of modern psychology studies in most Arab countries began in the early decades of the 20th century, namely in the 1940s and beyond, when many Arab psychologists, especially from Egypt and Lebanon, attempted to model the French and the Anglo-American psychological approaches of thinking in research, teaching, and practice. Two decades later, during the middle years of the 20th century, Saudi Arabia was introduced to modern psychological concepts. Exposure was hesitant, gradual, and accompanied by the first Saudi university in 1957. Now, psychology has become an increasingly specialized and independent discipline of research both in academia and professional aspects. It has taken a strong hold and has witnessed significant achievements in many fields of psychological ibrahim

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studies, teaching, and practice. Here, the current status of psychology in the kingdom will be explained as it pertains to its growth as an academic field of study in most Saudi universities, and in areas of practice, research, and writing. Its current features and its foreseeable future developments will be outlined as well.

Education The growth and modern history of psychology development to its current status in Saudi Arabia is easily understood in light of the current educational system in the Kingdom. Saudi Arabia has a nationwide educational system that provides free training from preschool through university to its citizens. Today, Saudi Arabia’s nationwide public educational system comprises 20 universities, more than 24,000 schools, and a large number of colleges and other educational and training institutions. The system provides students with free education, books, and health services, and is open to every Saudi. The Kingdom has also worked on scholarship programs to send students to study abroad, to the United States, Canada, France, the United Kingdom, Australia, Japan, Egypt, Malaysia, and other nations. Currently, thousands of students, including those from psychology departments, are being sent to higher-educations programs every year.

Psychology Departments The modern concept of the discipline of psychology as the scientific study of the human mind and behavior began in Saudi Arabia about a half century ago. Egypt and Lebanon, as mentioned earlier, were probably the two main gateways through which modern concepts were introduced and practiced in many Arab countries including Saudi Arabia. The first division of psychology in Saudi Arabia was established in 1963 at Umm Ulqurra University, but the first major and independent department was accompanied by the establishment of the first Saudi university in 1957, first named Riyadh University, and currently called King Saud University (KSU). The department of psychology was established in 1972 and was included in the college of education. The department offers a comprehensive set of psychology programs and varied psychological research activities. As in other departments that were under the umbrella of the college of education, the psychology department has been stipulated as a 4-year study program leading to a B.A. in psychology. The chairmanship of the department became the responsibility of an Egyptian professor, the late 450

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El-sayyed Mohamed Khairi (d. 1984), who had obtained his Ph.D. from the University of London in England. Khairi played a major role in terms of developing a scientifically based psychology in Saudi Arabia, as it is known today. Khairi’s main professional background was in statistics, research methodology, and individual differences. With such background, and along with his nonauthoritarian friendly personality, Khairi encouraged recruiting local Saudis and mixed nationals for employment in the newly born department. The department flourished, partly because of Khairi’s leadership, and partly because of the support he received from the young generation of Saudis who were appointed to the emerging department and sent for graduate studies abroad. The faculty of the department included numerous scholars and professors from a number of foreign nationalities, mainly from Arab backgrounds with Anglo-American postgraduate educations, and mainly from Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and the United States. This event has, in fact, marked the beginning of a new stage in the transformation of psychology in Saudi academia into its current scientific and modern outlook. Due to governmental policies of Saudization, Abdullah Alnafie (b. 1937), a Saudi national professor who obtained his M.A. in educational psychology from Indiana University, and later his Ph.D. in educational psychology and higher education from the University of Oklahoma in the United States, became the newly and the first appointed Saudi chairperson of the KSU department of psychology. Under Alnafie and the other Saudis coming after him, the KSU psychology department continued to grow to include more varied faculty members with varied specialties and expertise. Psychology departments at both undergraduate and graduate levels in Saudi Arabia seek to prepare and train psychologists for teaching, research, provision of community psychological services, and scientific investigation. It is mandated that the curricula reflect a respect for achieving balance between Islamic principles and scientific empirical education. Because Saudi Arabia follows a single-sex, segregated education, segregation between males and females is applied in all years of education, and consequently each department in all universities in Saudi Arabia (psychology included) offers separate divisions and in some cases separate faculty members. As far as the faculty numbers are concerned, psychology departments are moderately equipped with faculty members. Currently (2009), for example, the department of psychology at KSU alone has

53 faculty members at both the male and female divisions. Most staff members are graduates of various well-known international universities in the United States, England, Egypt, and Jordan. In addition, there are 12 lecturers and 18 teaching assistants, many of whom are pursuing postgraduate studies abroad after being awarded scholarships from the government to study abroad. Each department has also a number of psychologists and in some cases laboratory technicians, where psychological laboratories are available. Psychology undergraduate curricula includes several basic psychology courses (i.e., introductory, social, methodology, and statistics, educational, organizational, and abnormal). Clinical psychology and counseling have also been introduced for undergraduate students. In the academic year of 2007, there were 470 male students and 1,260 female students enrolled in the undergraduate program of the KSU. Presently, there are 20 universities in Saudi Arabia, but only four of them are known to offer undergraduate and graduate degrees in psychology. Those are KSU (established in 1957), King Abdul Azeez University (established in 1967), Imam Mohamed Ben Saud university, called the Imam University (established in 1974), and the King Faisal university, which only grants B.A. and M.A. degrees in psychology and counseling (Oyounissoud, 2000). Independent psychology departments, as of writing this chapter, are offered in only six universities among the kingdom’s 20 universities, each with at least one department of psychology with a B.A. program, either at the faculty of arts or the faculty of education, or both. The largest two psychology departments are in the school of education at KSU and at Al-Imam Ahmed Ben Saud University (both universities are located in Riyadh). A plan is being developed to offer psychology departments in other newly established universities as soon as the hiring of new faculty members and other arrangements are completed. Psychology departments in Saudi Arabia are in general developing into an integrated and balanced discipline of teaching that blends Islamic and Western curricula. Almost all psychology departments in the Kingdom share common features in terms of their blended curricula, rules of teaching, and regulations and requirements for graduate studies leading to M.A. and/or Ph.D. degrees. Therefore, a word about the main characteristics of graduate education in psychology departments is in order.

Graduate and Postgraduate Education Presently, at least four universities in Saudi Arabia are offering M.A. and Ph.D. programs in psychology. The state of psychology, in spite of its limited growth, is in much better condition than reported 25 years ago by Melikian (1984), who indicated that psychology departments in Saudi Arabia were poorly equipped and had a few specialized staff members, mostly non-Saudis. In the last two decades, however, the trend has changed, and psychology is now being offered in a number of universities as a degree program leading to a B.A., M.A., or Ph.D. For example, in 1978, the KSU department of psychology began offering a master’s program in psychology, and later in the academic year of 2004– 2005, a Ph.D. program in psychology was initiated (http://www.ksu.edu.sa/sites/Colleges/Education/ Psychology/). The master’s program of psychology at KSU program was initially offered in one area, counseling and guidance. Subsequently, the program was developed and expanded to cover several areas of psychological specialties, including counseling psychology, clinical psychology, developmental psychology, educational psychology, social psychology, industrialorganizational psychology, psychology of human exceptionalities, and measurement and evaluation. To be admitted to the master’s program, students are required to have a B.A. degree in psychology from an accredited institution, a minimum grade point average (GPA) of 3.75/5.00, or equivalent, written admission test, and an admission interview. Students are required to successfully complete a minimum of 24 credit hours in addition to writing a thesis (six credits). All master’s students are required to take 12 credit courses in four subjects: research methods and experimental design; advanced psychological statistics; advanced psychological measurement; and application and practicum studies. For the major and specialty courses, the student can select a minimum of 12 credits from one of five tracks or course-groups. The student is required to write a thesis (six credits) in order to be granted a master’s degree. The topic of the thesis should be related to the specialty of choice (i.e., psychology). The Ph.D. program consists of three different tracks for students to choose from: educational psychology, social psychology, and counseling. To be admitted to the Ph.D. program, students are required to have a master’s degree in psychology from an accredited institution, a score of 500 on the Test of English as Foreign Language (TOEFL), or a score of 5.5 on the International English Language Testing ibrahim

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System (IELTS). A successful score is required on an admission test that covers methodology and statistics, and general background in psychology. Additionally, students are also required to pass an admission structured interview. Obviously, the graduate curriculum of psychology departments in Saudi Arabia attempts to model the American educational system, and thus is heading accordingly to encourage research, practice credibility, and enhanced public image. The success of this model in Saudi culture is still to be evaluated.

Psychological Labs At least four psychology labs are sponsored by two departments in two universities; the KSA in Riyadh, and the King Abdel-Azeez University in the Western province. Most such labs are poorly equipped and attract limited faculty interest in solid experimental psychology. As a matter of fact, the author failed to find any piece of experimental research published locally or abroad that used a controlled experimental design. However, the department of psychology at KSU has two labs; the first for human and animal learning and cognition, and the second for physiological psychology. There are also many observation rooms with one-way mirrors and cameras.

Psychological Services Psychologists are recognized members in educational counseling and guidance centers that offer services to students and the public. Although not updated regularly, there is a departmental library in which students can find books, journals, theses, psychological testing tools, etc. Most psychology departments in Saudi Arabia have a psychological services unit (clinic). The first psychological services unit (PSU) was established at the KSU and attached to the department of psychology (with joint cooperation with the department of psychiatry at the same university). The PSU became an integral part of psychology department activities and is considered a model for other psychology clinics in the Kingdom. Help seekers can contact the unit, either in person or over the phone. At the first visit, an intake psychologist conducts an initial interview with the client to determine the nature of the needed services and the psychological tests necessary for an accurate diagnosis of the client’s presenting problems. The intake psychologist then assigns a therapist (senior psychologist or psychiatrist or both) to the client. Confidentiality is strictly followed in the handling of all client-identifying information. The PSU is equipped with audio visual systems facilities, 452

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video taping equipment, a relaxation training room, and a child assessment room. Since its opening, the unit has served more than 1,500 clients as of 2007. The PSU provides psychological services to faculty members, students, referred individuals from hospitals, the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Social Welfare, and other government agencies. These services include individual and group counseling or psychotherapy, biofeedback therapy, relaxation and skills training, and consultations. Whether the presence of such equipment will prove of significant value toward a genuine take-off of some internationally visible research remains to be seen. Diagnostic and treatment services provided by the PSU cover a wide range of psychological complaints and disorders including anxiety disorders, phobias and fears, social fears, panic disorders, depression and other mood disorders, obsessive-compulsive disorders, post-traumatic stress disorders (PTSD), somatoform disorders, sexual disorders, sleep disorders, adjustment disorders, and family problems. Assessment and treatment services are also provided for children’s disorders including learning disorders, attention deficit-hyperactivity disorders (ADHD), communication disorders, autistic disorders, conduct disorders, feeding and eating disorders, and the like. The unit provides personal counseling to help students who have difficulties related to adjusting to university, or who have interpersonal or family problems. Undergraduate and graduate students have the opportunity to practice assessment, counseling, and psychotherapy under the supervision of faculty members.

Psychology As a Teaching Subject Psychology courses are offered in many departments and colleges, including colleges of education, colleges of business and administration, and colleges of medicine. Psychology courses in such colleges are offered by faculty members affiliated with such schools (i.e., nonpsychologists). Psychology courses offered include educational psychology, organizational psychology, tests and measurement, personality theories, and behavioral sciences. Medical schools follow a forced curricula; thus, a course on behavioral science is offered to premedical students. This course is usually taught to students by psychiatrists or invited psychologists from other psychology departments in the same university. The only exception is at the School of Medicine at KFU in Dammam and Khobar, which has a separate division

for medical psychology established in 1990; the program was initiated by the writer after being invited to return from the United States for this purpose in 1990–2002. The KFU division of psychology is still currently attached to the psychiatry department, and has only two Ph.D. psychologists who collaborate with psychiatrists in teaching the behavioral sciences course. Clinical services offered by this division are limited to clients referred from psychiatrists and other medical staff members at the attached university hospital (the King Fahd Hospital of the University, KFHU). In general, the KFU division of psychology suffers from lack of practitioners and academicians, and is poorly equipped. From 1990 to 2005, Abdul-Aziz al-Dukhayyil, a Saudi psychologist at King Fahd University of Petroleum and Minerals (KFUPM; and later the rector of that university) was able to facilitate the growth and recognition of psychology as a science and profession. Dukhayyil’s background as a Saudi psychologist who obtained his Ph.D. in experimental and behavioral psychology from the University of Arizona in Tucson, in the United States, and as a strong advocate for promoting psychology as a behavioral science has helped him gain respect among both Saudi psychologists and nonpsychologists, and has led most colleges of the KFUPM to offer psychology as a teaching course. Now, psychobehavioral courses such as organizational psychology, general psychology, creativity, behavior analysis, and so forth, continue being offered to most students in the basic and/ or selective curricula of that university.

Research and Writings Interests in Saudi Arabia Saudi psychology graduates conduct most research activities in order to obtain academic M.A. or Ph.D. degrees. We have examined the archive of published research in several universities in the last 20 years. Out of 761 M.A. and Ph.D. degrees granted at the school of education (psychology department included) in the last 25 years, only 74 (9.7%) degrees were granted in psychological areas, and women counted for only 32 degrees (almost 4.3%). Several research papers were written on a wide variety of subjects including assertiveness training, creativity, moral development, marital adjustment, attitudes toward child rearing, locus of control, cannabis consumption, cognitive therapy, behavior therapy, and so forth. Other areas of research have been undertaken by faculty members for promotional purposes, and other research was carried out by other senior and

staff psychologists (mainly in cooperation with nonSaudis working in Saudi universities). Some leading psychological studies were published in Saudi journals and in European and American publications. Main fields of study that have received considerable attention included cross-cultural psychology, personality, social psychology, religion, educational, abnormal, clinical, and psychobehavioral and cognitive psychotherapy, whereas organizational, experimental, physiological, political, and criminal psychology subjects are almost absent. A number of empirical studies have been carried out in several scattered areas such as creativity (e.g., Ameerkhan, 1989), locus of control (e.g., Abu-elNeil, 1989), psychotherapy, religiosity (e.g., AbdelKhalek, 2009), social anxiety (e.g., Chaleby, 1992, 1986), various pathological aspects of personality (e.g., Ibrahim, 1982, 1985, 1993, 2008a, 2008b; Kent & Wahass 1996), and relationship with authority figures (Ibrahim & al-Nafie, 1991; Melikian, 1977, 1984). Some of these empirical studies have been published in leading local journals in Arabic or in Anglo-American periodicals in English. Generally speaking, empirical research activities are mostly fragmented and noncumulative. More recently, however, some efforts have been focused on developing series of studies on areas of clinical practice and cross-cultural psychology. For example, in the early 1990s Abdel-Sattar Ibrahim, AbdulAziz el Dukhayyil, and Radwa Ibrahim, placing their emphasis on Arabian children, began a series of clinical studies and writings that focused mainly on inventing and standardizing behavior assessment tools and behavior therapy practice techniques leading to publications in the field (e.g., Ibrahim, Dukhayyil, & Ibrahim, 1999; Ibrahim & Ibrahim, 1993a, 1993b, 1995, 2000). Theoretical reviews and conceptual studies that would add more focused comprehension to the state of psychology in Arab countries in general and Saudi Arabia in particular are rare. For example, Dwairy and Van Sickle (1996) reviewed the state of psychotherapy practice in Arabian countries including Saudi Arabia. It was found that, although Western psychotherapy can help to alleviate internal conflicts within the Arabic client, it could often result in greater conflict between the individual and his or her society due to the fact that many of the basic techniques of psychotherapy as practiced in the West are at odds with core beliefs of Arabic culture. Western psychotherapy, however, can be successfully adapted to current Arabian Middle Eastern culture. ibrahim

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Another review of psychological, psychiatric, and anthropological research done in Arab countries (e.g., Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Libya) was made by Ibrahim and his associates (see Ibrahim, 1993; Ibrahim & Ibrahim, 2008a; 2008b; Ibrahim & Ibrahim, 2003a; 2003b). By and large, it was found that the emerging psychopathological patterns in Arabian cultures were similar to those usually noted in the West. Large proportions of those with mental health problems in Saudi Arabia, however, receive inadequate psychological care. A comprehensive review of cross-cultural studies relating to psychotherapy practice led Ibrahim and Ibrahim (2000) to conclude that Saudi individuals, as in any other culture, develop different and unique cultural values and perspectives. Therefore, wellcompiled knowledge of culture will increase mental health practitioners’ effectiveness and credibility. This study identified five major shared social and psychological modal personality characteristics, hypothesized as follows: religious orientation; orientation toward kinship, communal attachments, and more orientation on others; reserved attitudes and behaviors toward opposite sex; ambivalent attitudes and relationships with authority figures; and external locus of control. Illustrative case studies and research findings have been cited in support of their assumptions (Ibrahim & Ibrahim, 2000). In the area of counseling and guidance programs in Saudi Arabia, Saleh (1987) focused on the educational goals of Saudi Arabia in general and the goals and objectives of the counseling and guidance program specifically. This study examined the development of the counseling and guidance program, the philosophical assumptions of the program, the administration of the program, and the training of the school counselor. In summary, research activities in Saudi Arabia, are, to a significant extent, of an academic nature and are mostly initiated by individuals for a limited purpose (e.g., academic promotion). We were unable to identify any research carried out to meet a request by any governmental health or academic institute for the purpose of responding to societal needs and/ or to help decision makers meet the challenges associated with adverse community psychosocial problems. Tools of investigation are more often imported from the West or from other Arab countries and, in most cases, used without local standardization. The freshness in these cases is that the data are elicited from Saudi respondents on the basis of that imported lacking standardization tools. Consequently, the end product looks like simple Arabic translations, 454

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with little bearing on meeting the psychological needs of the Saudia Arabian population, practice effectiveness, or credibility.

Women and Psychology The Ministry of Higher Education is the authority overseeing the Kingdom’s colleges and universities. The Saudi higher education system policy recognized “women’s right to obtain suitable education on equal footing with men in light of Islamic laws.” In practice, educational options for girls at the precollege level were almost identical to those for boys, except that boys took physical education and girls took home economics. Inequalities of opportunity, however, existed in higher education, stemming from the religious and social imperative of gender segregation. Gender segregation was required at all levels of public education, but was also demanded in public areas and businesses by religiously conservative groups, as well as by social convention. Because the social perception was that men would put the knowledge and skills acquired to productive use, fewer resources were dedicated to women’s higher education. This constraint was a source of concern to economic planners and policy makers because training and hiring women would not only help solve the increased needs of the Saudi work force, but would also help to satisfy the rising expectations of thousands of women graduating from secondary schools, colleges, and universities. For women, the goal of education as stated in official policy was ideologically tied to religion; that is, to bring a girl up in a proper Islamic way so that she might perform her duty in life, be a successful housewife and a ideal mother, and ready to do things that suit her nature, such as work in teaching, nursing, or medicine. Although women’s position in Saudi Arabia is looking toward a rather brighter future, the growth and development of psychology among females faces two problems that still negatively influence women. As compared to men, women have a limited chance to get their fair share of educational opportunities due to segregation from men at all education stages. Also, because women are not encouraged to drive cars by themselves or benefit from traveling abroad for governmental scholarships alone, women have limited opportunities to use their psychological expertise and skills. Despite the substantial expansion of college and university programs for women, it has insufficient to serve those graduates who seek admission to university level. The hope to create a women’s university

to fulfill the increased needs of Saudi women for varied educational experiences has been achieved by establishing Effat University (EU) at the beginning of the century. The EU was founded by Queen Effat, the wife of King Faisal, and currently operates under the umbrella of the King Faisal’s nonprofit charitable organization. The EU offers a bachelor of science degree in psychology and aims to provide its female students with a comprehensive, research-based understanding of the human mind and human behavior within sociocultural perspectives. The psychology program aims to enable its students to deal effectively with the highly demanding challenges of professional and personal lives and to improve quality of life by contributing to the solutions of societal problems. The major in psychology offers a concentration in one of two main areas: counseling psychology or educational psychology. The success of the EU in achieving its goals in a single-sex educational system is still to be seen.

Associations To our knowledge, there is one professional psychological association in Saudi Arabia: the Saudi Educational and Psychological Association (SEPA), located in Saudi capital of Riyadh. The SEPA is directly administered and professionally supervised by the department of psychology at KSU. Membership in SEPA is open to all psychology and education holders of B.A., M.A., and Ph.D. degrees. To date, most SEPA members are Saudis although there are also some members from other Arab countries who are working in the Kingdom. The SEPA is both academically and practice oriented. One of its basic missions is to provide and promote a professional and contact medium for psychological and educational practice–oriented individuals. The SEPA has published its own psychology journal, the Journal of Psychological Studies since 1991.

Private Health Centers The Kingdom has witnessed a rather new area of service provision that attracts some public concern. Several private agencies have launched new health and pseudo positive human resources psychology centers in a bid to cash in on increased psychological and sociomedical problems in the face of an overburdened primary psychological health care system. In many cases, these new health centers are staffed by business-oriented personnel, primary care physicians, religious clergy, and untrained psychologists to provide specialized medical, psychiatric, psychological,

and human resources services for many types of complaints, ranging from personal and family problems to severe mental illnesses, including schizophrenia, depression, addiction, and psychophysiological chronic diseases. Apparently, what was initially a predominantly academic field (and most particularly not a clinical one) is increasingly becoming a commercial activity. Such companies claim to offer positive psychology counseling services, and they are proliferating; this leaves positive psychology open to the accusation of selling self-help without considering the risk factors involved in providing services without enough training and experience to worried and suffering individuals. How such services will earn a solid base for a credible future is still to be seen.

The Islamic Psychology Movement The interest of Arabic psychologists in forming a psychology of religion that would focus primarily on Islamic religion and philosophy continued to shape their need to revive the legacy of early Muslim scholars. In the early 1960s, the late Ahmed Fouad al-Ahwani (Quoted in Farrag, 2000), argued for the creation of a branch for the psychology of religion that would focus primarily on the Islamic religion. Few years later, the late Mohamed Osman Nagaty, who obtained his Ph.D. from Yale University, published a book on Sensory Perception in Ibn Sina (Nagaty, 1961) in which he argued that Avicenna had in fact developed an early scientific and systematic approach to studying human and sensory perception. Nagaty soon became an advocate for the Islamic psychology trend. In the early 1970s, Nagaty (1914–2000) was requested by Kuwait University to establish its first psychology department, which was also the first psychology department in the Arabian Gulf countries. He continued his advocacy for the Islamic psychology movement by publishing two books entitled The Koran and Psychology (Nagaty, 1985) and the Prophet’s Sunna and Psychology (Nagaty, 1989). He soon helped to establish an independent course on Islamic psychology of religion to be part of the undergraduate curriculum of psychology along with all other modern psychology courses in Kuwait. After his retirement from Kuwait University, he was hired by the Islamic University in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, also known as Al-Imam Mohamed Ibn Saud University, as a psychology professor. According to his daughter Lyla Nagati (personal contact), he worked there till his death in September 9th, 2000 in Cairo, Egypt. With the rise of Islamic resurgence in the late 1970s, Muslim psychologists—and Saudi Arabians ibrahim

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in particular—continue to argue that, given the unique nature of Islam, which does not distinguish between Deen (religious) and Dunya (material) worlds, an endeavor to establish an Islamic psychology of religion was simply not enough. Many felt that it was necessary to take a comprehensive look at the entire field of psychology from an Islamic perspective. Over the last two decades of the 20th century, Muslim psychologists have been critical of what they call Western psychology, and have attempted to develop a paradigm that is more consistent with Islamic precepts. An essay by Badri entitled “The dilemma of Muslim psychologists” outlined the parameters of this quest (Badri, 1979). Badri objected to the tendency among Western and “Western-minded psychologists” to assess Islamic cultural traits as signs of pathology. The supporters of the Islamic psychology movement condemned so-called Western psychology, particularly psychoanalysis, in respect to Freud’s interpretation of the religious impulse. They also argued that Western psychology theories are culture bound and therefore should not be generalized to Islamic individuals nor to the psychosocial structures of Islamic societies. The trend toward Islamizing psychology has unfortunately taken a polarized turn against modern Western psychology, especially following the September 11, 2001, attacks on New York City, Washington, D.C., and Pennsylvania; the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq; the Abughraib and Guantanamo abuses; and the economic crises. Many Arabs have become disillusioned by Western philosophies and achievements, including psychology. Much of the efforts of Muslim psychologists focus on the need to distance themselves from Western psychology and to show that Islamic religion can be viewed as an alternative, comprehensive, and potentially more useful source of guiding psychological principles. Some limited attempts were made to produce a corpus of knowledge, following these views of the Islamization line of thinking. Generally speaking, however, the research efforts available, information collected, and practice effectiveness measurements have mostly been limited, speculative, and vaguely defined. Thus, more recently, many Arabian psychologists caution against such polarized attitudes. The most common feeling is that modern psychology, as currently practiced in most of the Western world, represents a body of knowledge that is diverse, useful, rich enough, and therefore, has some definite 456

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useful insights for all cultures, including the Muslim world. Those who hold positions do concede that modern psychology, especially in practice, has its merits in dealing with psychological and human suffering, and should not be discounted. Moreover, the Islamic psychology movement has not yet attained a form at which its actual implementation can be established in Arab countries as a credible and resourceful discipline for the practicing psychologist. To do so, it first requires guidelines that can be integrated into a coherent theoretical framework and a methodology that warrants replication, a purpose that this review hopes to promote.

Conclusion The discipline of psychology’s growth was determined by the interplay of a group of political and sociocultural factors that shaped its status as it stands today, and that will, obviously, define the direction this discipline takes in the foreseeable future. Among the main sociocultural factors that led to the emergence of modern psychology in Saudi Arabia were the modernization process following the oil boom in the mid-20th century, significant educational reform developments, the great numbers of Saudis who were sent on scholarships abroad in the West, and the emergence of modern psychology in neighboring Arabian countries, including the assistance they provided in the transmission process of growth across the country. Most important is the fact that the discipline made its first appearance in 1957, as part of educational modernization process that included the establishment of a number of universities, mostly modeling the Anglo-American system. Progress accelerated since the founding of completely independent and reasonably staffed departments of psychology within a group of these newly established universities. Whether the manner by which Saudi Arabia modern psychology emerged and has been growing over the last six decades will earn it a solid base for a promising future is still to be seen. The numbers of psychology books written in Arabic by Saudi Arabia authors are growing, mainly because the subject must be taught in Arabic. A number of psychologic research projects have been published by Saudis in cooperation with other foreign scholars who are working in major Saudi universities. Moreover, many Western tools of investigation (paper-and-pencil ones in particular) were either translated into Arabic and/or adapted to suit Saudis. Although job opportunities for psychologists are still limited, psychology graduates enjoy a reasonable

number of job options. Besides teaching, they may be employed by the Ministry of Education (as school psychologists) or the Ministry of Social Affairs (as providers of psychological care for the mentally handicapped, the aged, and juvenile delinquents). Other job opportunities are being established at the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Industry, and the Ministry of Armed Forces as military psychologists. The Ministry of Health employs the second biggest number of psychologists after the Ministry of Education. Psychologists employed by the Ministry of Health work as clinical or health psychologists, and as members of the psychiatric team at state-run hospitals and clinics. A major number of the psychologists in the Ministry of Health are employed at the Alamal Series of Addiction Treatment Hospitals in the three major cities of Riyadh, Jeddah, and Dammam. The psychologists’ main job at Alamal hospitals is to provide group and individual therapy and rehabilitation services, and they also may be involved in cooperative research projects with their colleagues in psychiatry. By and large, in spite of the reasonable numbers of psychologists employed in health services in Saudi Arabia, most employed individuals are not licensed, their role in the psychiatric team has been poorly defined, and they lack systematic training in practice. More recently, though, psychologists are being hired in medical schools and health institutions; we contend that such a movement could, in due time, lead to progress and would prove of great value for the future of psychology in Saudi Arabia. This and other future directions hindering or facilitating the growth of psychology, and where we go from here, is addressed next.

Eye on the Future In spite of recent developments in psychology in Saudi Arabia, the public image of Saudi psychology faces some difficulties and weaknesses. That no known systematic studies have been carried out about the public image of psychology in this part of the world would make us hesitant to come to definite conclusions about such a state of affair. In fact, it may be too early for Saudis themselves to digest the value of this newly born discipline, introduced to them only a few decades ago, when local universities began to be established. Keep in mind, also, that much of the teaching at these local universities still depends largely on non-national faculty members. This fact implies that the mostly foreign faculty members in the Kingdom live and act as outsiders, and therefore have to observe a whole host of subtle

restrictions that eventually make it almost impossible for them to play a significant role in developing a visible public image of this discipline. Add to this the fact that the present identity of this discipline has been tarnished by the conflict between theological-traditional-Islamic scholars and the views of Westernized intelligentsia. In such an atmosphere of ideological conflict, each group becomes emotionally involved in opposing the other, thus creating a cultural climate that usually does not provide a flourishing place for growth, nor for society to appreciate the role of behavioral sciences as it impacts everyday lives. In fact, and in spite of recent developments in psychology, contemporary Saudi psychology has been facing some difficulties as far as its public image is concerned. Psychology continues to face lack of recognition and awareness from both the public and fellow health practitioners (e.g., psychiatrists). Psychologists, up to now, play an insignificant role in societal planning and development. As mentioned, whatever consulting role psychologists have played has been primarily noticeable in psychological health (as team members in a few psychiatry departments) and education (as school teachers and special education specialists). Apart from these aspects, the image and awareness of the role of psychology as a science and a helping profession is still weak among the public, fellow health practitioners, and even among psychologists themselves. Some questions need to be answered in this regard: What are the identifiable negative aspects? What causes them? In what way they should be tackled? And how do they damage the growth of psychology in Saudi Arabia as a scientific discipline and as a career? Until such questions are investigated, any solid base for conclusions about the future remains uncertain. The growth of psychology as a research discipline also faces some difficulties. Research is usually connected with facilities and support offered by a governmental system; such support is badly in the face of the adverse effects caused by Saudi Arabia’s inflexible centralized bureaucracy in matters of budgeting and administration. The atmosphere of polarization between Islamists and modern psychology advocates in Saudi Arabia requires further investigation. The direction in which psychology is heading, in light of the ambiguous identity of psychology in such a charged cultural atmosphere, needs further exploration. Additionally, the lack of training in practice matters is adding a serious practical constraint that interferes with the healthy growth of this discipline ibrahim

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as a whole. What are the needs in such regard? Why have such matters not been taken seriously (or even addressed) by Saudi Arabia’s psychology departments? Further, as it currently stands, Saudi Arabia lacks many needed psychological assessment tools and well-trained psychologists who are appropriately capable of helping Saudi professionals to compete and to cash in on a primary psychological care system that can meet the Kingdom’s increased psychological and sociomedical problems. It is fundamental to design assessment tools, provide training programs for psychological therapies and interventions to enhance practice, and to offer help for those who need it, including the psychologically and mentally ill, women, children, and others. The future direction of psychology as a credible profession and rewarding career is determined by the efforts and roles taken by Saudi psychologists in the area of practice. The last, but not least concern, relates to the future direction of psychology as a humanistic discipline. In countries that follow a one-sided flow of information, as is seen in Arabian countries including Saudi Arabia, the role of media is constantly increasing. Mass media in its different forms (auditory, visual, and orthographical) has become the main source of information from which the public derives its opinions and thoughts. It also is the main means by which attitudes, trends, and knowledge can be formed and developed. The future direction of psychology as a humanistic discipline is determined by the roles taken by psychologists in this regard. Psychologists must be more involved in the policy- and decision-making process and all that entails, including advocating for and conducting research that could influence the way government, the mass media, and the press handle psychosocial issues, including those relevant to physical and psychological disabilities, mental illness, women, and minorities issues. Positively speaking, these concerns about the future of psychology under the cultural climate prevailing in Saudi Arabia do not necessarily signify that psychology has no future in this country. On the contrary, I am quite aware of a number of points that point to a positive outlook. Modernization, as a psychosocial movement, for example, is presently taking place in all aspects of Saudi lives. If it continues, it may provide a balance against the high level of polarizing extremist thought. Additionally, the discipline itself has been going through a series of meaningful transformations 458

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throughout the last two decades. Increasing numbers of psychologists have been returned from scholarship and graduate studies abroad. They appear to be making appreciable efforts in the progress of their discipline, and they will, hopefully, make this period a significantly suitable time for psychology to take further steps forward in Saudi Arabia.

Acknowledgments The author gratefully acknowledges Abdel-aziz Aldukhayyil, PhD and Radwa Ibrahim, PhD for their valuable review and suggestions of the current draft. Lyla Nagati provided information about her father, the late Mohamed Osman Nagati including his CV and a list of his publications.

Glossary and Abbreviations of Arabic Terms al-‘aql: Mind or intellect Al-Madina al-Fadhila: Utopia or Model City Elmo elnafs: The Arabic concept used by early Islamic scholars to refer the science of self or soul (i.e., psychology) Hasad: Evil eye or envy Junoon: Madness; usually used to refer to mental illness (i.e., psychosis) in old Arabic literature Nafs: Self or soul tabula rasa: Refers to the theory that the human mind at birth is a pure potentiality and is actualized through education and experience Wahm: Illusion.

Note 1. By and large, early Islamic scholars and physicians have used Arabic terms that would refer to almost the same concepts used today. For example, the word melancholia in Arabic would refer to melancholy or depression; the word majnoon or mareed aqli would refer to a psychotic or mentally ill person as we know the condition today.

Further Reading Ahmed, R. A., & Gielen, U. P. (1998). Psychology in the Arab countries. Cairo, Egypt: Menoufia University Press. El-Islam, F. (2001). Social psychiatry and the impact of religion. In A. Okasha & M. Maj (Eds.) Psychiatry: An Arab Perspective. England, London: World Psychiatric Association. Haque, A. (2004.) Psychology from Islamic perspective: Contributions of early Muslim scholars and challenges to contemporary Muslim psychologists. Journal of Religion and Health, 43(4): 357–377 [363]. Ibrahim, A-S., & Ibrahim, R. (2000). Cultural considerations in mental health needs and practicing psych -behavioral therapies: An Arab experience. In P. Lichtenberg, B. C. Christensen, J. T. Barth, & K. N. Anchor (Eds.), Advances in Medical.

Ibrahim, A-S., & Ibrahim, R. (2003). Anxiety, depression, hostility, and general psychopathology: An Arabian study. In A. J. Giuliano, K. N. Anchor, & J. B. Barth (Eds.), Advances in medical psychotherapy & psycho-diagnosis (pp. 173–184). Dubuque, Iowa: Kendall-Hunt Publishing Company. Nagaty, M. O. (1993). Psychological studies of Muslim scholars. Cairo: Daral.Shorook (in Arabic.) Okasha, A., & Maj, M. (2001). Psychiatry: An Arab perspective. London: World Psychiatric Association. Psychotherapy & Psycho-diagnosis. Dubuque, Iowa: Kendall-Hunt Publishing Company, pp. 139–151.

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C HA P TE R

22

Scotland

Nicholas J. Wade

Abstract The impact of Scotland on psychology was expressed before the discipline was notionally founded in the late 19th century. Scottish medicine and philosophy provided ideas that were to have widespread currency within the emerging psychology. On the one hand, the practice and teaching of medicine in the 18th century placed emphasis on the nervous system and its operations in determining normal and abnormal behavior. The links between brain and behavior were strengthened by medical research in the 19th century. On the other hand, the common sense approach to the philosophy of mind focused attention on the special senses and their relation to behavior. Alexander Bain (1818–1903) adopted the physiological tradition but rejected the dominant Scottish faculty psychology in favor of associationism. Despite these early yearnings, psychology was slow to develop institutionally in the 20th century. The features that distinguished Scottish medicine and philosophy have long since disappeared, but those features have influenced the ways in which contemporary psychology is practiced. Keywords: Senses, medicine, optics, common sense philosophy, phrenology

Scottish psychology, like Scottish medicine, has not been constrained by geography. Indeed, the two disciplines have nurtured one another and both have been supplied with intellectual sustenance from philosophy. One of the main sources of cohesion was the study of the senses and their influences on mental processes. Alexander Bain (1818–1903), shown in Figure 22.1,1 captured this essence in the title of his first volume on psychology, The Senses and the Intellect; these were “the two principal divisions of the science of mind” (Bain, 1855, p. v). He addressed the two other divisions—The Emotions and the Will—4 years later (Bain, 1859). Bain turned his back on the faculty psychology that had been dominant in Scotland for a century and returned to associationism: “In treating of the Intellect, the subdivision into faculties is abandoned. The exposition proceeds entirely on the Laws of Association” (Bain, 1855, p. vi). Bain’s textbooks were written in 462

London, and he returned to the city of his birth in 1860, as professor of logic and rhetoric at Aberdeen University. In addition to his texts on psychology, Bain wrote books on English grammar, ethics, logic, rhetoric, and phrenology. The last mentioned played an important role in the institution of psychology in Scotland, and Bain provided a particularly sober appraisal of it: “Phrenology, notwithstanding its onesidedness, has done good service, by showing with more emphasis than had ever been done before, that human beings are widely different in their mental tastes and aptitudes, and by affording a scheme for representing and classifying the points of character, which is in many respects an improvement upon the common mode of describing individual differences” (1861, p. v). Bain is a significant figure not only for his textbooks, which provided the model for many that followed, but also because (in 1876) he founded

Fig. 22.1 Bain’s psychology. The central illustration reflects the importance of Bain’s Mind, which was initially edited by one of his former students; it also incorporates a model of a neural processing designed by Bain to give differential output with input of varied intensities. The portrait is from Bain (1904), the text is from the first volume of Mind, and the neural network is from Mind and body (1873). Bain is flanked by the title pages of his two textbooks on psychology (Bain, 1855, 1859). Image © Nicholas Wade.

Mind, which was the first journal concerned principally with psychological issues. Bain’s good friend and fellow Aberdonian, George Croom Robertson (1842–1892), edited the journal from London, where he was professor of mental philosophy and logic at University College (see Bain, 1893; Neary, 2001). It provided a platform for a lively interaction between emerging psychology and established philosophy. Bain published many articles in Mind, often elaborating or defending positions stated in his books. For example, his book Mind and Body (Bain, 1873) can be taken as the origin of ideas about neural networks; Bain’s ideas were essentially repeated by Donald Hebb (1904–1985; 1949) 70 years later, although Hebb was unaware of Bain’s work (see Wilkes, 1997; Wilkes & Wade, 1997). Bain displayed an understanding of the cognitive issues at the heart of memory as well as an acute awareness of the neurophysiology of his day. Nonetheless, 10 years after publication of Mind and Body, Bain (1883) expressed doubts (in Mind ) about his excursion into psychical numeration, both in terms of the potential number of nerve cells required for the possible associations, as well as for the constant elaborations of partially formed associations. He did not doubt the legitimacy of his neural network hypothesis “but subsequent reflection led to the belief that the number of psychical

elements, although run up to hundreds of thousands, was still inadequate” (Bain, 1904, p. 313). Thus, Bain was convinced of the logic of his approach, but he did not pursue the ideas because he doubted the arithmetic on which it was based. During the 19th century, Bain witnessed a revolution in understanding the senses and their relation to the brain. This occurred largely because of advances in optical instruments, in anatomy and physiology, and in clinical medicine. The gross anatomy of the brain was clarified (Clarke & O’Malley, 1968), and its microanatomy was subjected to achromatic scrutiny (Harris, 1999; Schickore, 2007), the cell and neuron doctrines were advanced (Spillane, 1981), function was related to structure, initially fancifully and later with surgical precision (Finger, 1994), and a wide range of cognitive dysfunctions were linked with abnormalities in brain structures. Mind and Body was published before the neuron doctrine had been established in the 1890s, and yet Bain’s neural models suggested the individuality of nerve cells, and his text states that explicitly: “nerve-fibres proceed from the nervecentres to the extremities of the body without a break, and without uniting or fusing with one another; so that each unfailingly delivers its separate message. . . . Every nerve ends in a corpuscle; and from the same corpuscle arises some other fibre or fibres wade

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either proceeding back to the body direct, or proceeding to other corpuscles, whence new fibres arise, with the same alternative” (1873, pp. 30–31). Thus, Bain captured the essence of emerging neuroscience and applied it to an age-old aspect of psychology. In his survey of British psychology, Hearnshaw (1964) also commenced with Bain, but suggested that it might be a misleading strategy. There had clearly been many others, from Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) onward, who had mused about mind and behavior and might warrant the accolade of being “the first psychologist.” But this was the mantle bestowed on Bain by Flugel (1933), too: “Bain must forever remain a figure of significance; for he was in a certain sense the first psychologist— the first, that is, to make psychology his life work, the first for whom the study of the mind appeared as a task worthy, in itself and for its own sake, of a man’s best efforts” (p. 79). There is greater justification in commencing with Bain in the Scottish context. He was to psychology what the 18th century Scotch doctors were to medicine: They reflected on new ways of looking at mind and medicine, respectively. Bain’s attempt to integrate physiology with psychology represented a break with the past, but Bain was, of course, influenced by his past. It is thus instructive to cast an eye on the forces against which he reacted and those which in their turn informed his response, both in the domains of physiology and philosophy.

The Physiological Tradition Medicine in Scotland was in its heyday during Bain’s life. Its medical schools in Aberdeen, Edinburgh, and Glasgow (and to a lesser extent, St. Andrews) attracted students from around the world. Their preeminence had been achieved by physicians and surgeons from the previous century, and was continued throughout the world by those trained in its institutions (Comrie, 1932; Craig, 1976; Dingwall, 2003). Indeed, far more medical students were trained in Scotland than were required to minister to its population. In the 18th century, many Scotch doctors (as they were then known) journeyed south of the border to practice their skills, and London became a center for Scotch medicine. The extent of the resentment that this engendered was encapsulated in the title of an anonymous pamphlet, published in London in 1747: An address to the College of Physicians and to the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge occasioned by the late swarms of Scotch and Leyden physicians. That is, the Scotch physicians had obtained their training in medical 464

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schools in Scotland and many had presented their dissertations at Leyden, where Hermann Boerhaave (1668–1738) had held court (Kaufman, 2003). Samuel Johnson echoed the spirit of the times, but with added vitriol. In one interchange, when someone commented on the loss of Old England, Johnson remarked: “Sir, it is not so much to be lamented that Old England is lost, as that the Scotch have found it” (Boswell, 1986, p. 223).

Edinburgh Medical School Scotch medicine was successful, and became of increasing relevance to the emerging psychology, because it shifted Boerhaave’s mechanistic interpretations of physiology in the direction of the nervous system. The brain and its influence on behavior became the centre of attention rather than the body and its mechanical functioning. This realignment was effected by many physicians, like William Porterfield (1696–1771), Alexander Monro, primus (1697–1767) and secundus (1733–1817), Robert Whytt (1714–1766), but perhaps most of all William Cullen (1710–1790). Unfortunately, there does not appear to be an extant portrait of Porterfield, but “perceptual portraits” of the Monros, Whytt, and Cullen are shown in Figure 22.2. All studied the senses and made astute observations on their function. Porterfield is the least known of this group, and relatively little is known about his life, but he brought a philosophical flavor to the medicine of his day (see Wade, 2007a). He studied medicine under Boerhaave at Leyden and was awarded his medical degree from Rheims in 1717. He was elected a Fellow of the Royal College of Physicians of Edinburgh in 1721, was its librarian and secretary from 1722–1725 and president from 1748–1752. In 1723, the members of the College “signed a recommendation in favour of Dr. William Porterfield, to teach the Institutes and Practice of Medicine . . . to such of the inhabitants of the Good Toun of Edinburgh, as have sons who are to follow Medicine” (Ritchie, 1899, p. 295). He was appointed professor of medicine by the town council of Edinburgh in 1724, a post he held for 2 years, although there is no record confirming that he actually delivered any lectures (Bower, 1817). Porterfield was an active member of the Edinburgh Society for the Improvement of Medical Knowledge, founded in 1731, and he contributed two long articles on eye movements to their journal. In his initial essay, Porterfield (1737) described the external movements of the eyes by the actions of the straight

Fig. 22.2 Scotch doctors. Left, a composite image of the three Alexanders Monro, primus (1697–1767), secundus (1733–1817), and tertius (1773–1859). Alexander Monro (primus) became first professor of anatomy in Edinburgh, and the Monro dynasty held that chair for 126 years. Center, Robert Whytt (1714–1766) combined with the title page of his Observations (Whytt, 1765). Right, a lined William Cullen (1710–1779) is shown with lettering from his First Lines (Cullen, 1777–1779). Image © Nicholas Wade.

and oblique muscles. This essay can be regarded as providing the impetus for more detailed examination of eye movements later in the century (see Wade, 2007b; Wade & Tatler, 2005). In the second essay, Porterfield (1738) discussed the internal movements of the eye—principally those involved in accommodation. He described the first optometer, for measuring the near and far points of vision. Moreover, his studies of an aphakic man (lacking the crystalline lens in an eye) who was unable to accommodate established the importance of the lens for accommodation—a term he coined: “That our Eyes change their Conformation, and accommodate themselves to the various Distances of Objects, will be evident to every body, who but reflects on the Manner and most obvious Phænomena of Vision” (1738, p. 126). Twenty years later, he published his two-volume Treatise on the Eye, the Manner and Phænomena of Vision (Porterfield, 1759a, b). Between the dates of writing the essays and the Treatise, Porterfield endured the suffering of having a leg amputated and experienced tickling and pain sensations in the location of the lost limb. In his Treatise, he provided an account of his phantom limb experiences and gave them a theoretical interpretation. This was the first self-report of the phenomenon by a physician (see Wade, 2007a, 2009a; Wade & Finger, 2003). In contrast to Porterfield, a great deal is known about the Monro dynasty (Comrie, 1932). Over the three generations of father, son, and grandson they occupied the chair of anatomy at Edinburgh University for 126 years. All the Monros wrote on the brain although it cannot be said they did so with equal perspicacity. Alexander Monro (primus)

studied under both Boerhaave at Leyden and Cheselden at London. His father (John Munro) was an army surgeon who had studied at Leyden, and he sought to establish a medical school at Edinburgh along the lines of that at Leyden. Monro (primus) was the first professor of anatomy of the Edinburgh Medical School, founded in 1726. His Works were published by his son (Monro, 1781), and they are concerned mainly with anatomy and surgery, although there is a chapter on the nerves (see Monro, 1732). Monro discussed the contemporary ideas about nerve communication (vibration or liquor) and presented evidence against both. His distrust of the notion of fluids passing along the nerves led him to carry out an experiment in which a nerve was tied: no swelling followed, as would have been expected from a circulating fluid. He did much to set Edinburgh medicine on its course as an advocate for nervous rather than mechanical involvement in animal economy or what we would now call physiology. He did discourse on brain injury during his lectures and noted that recovery from injury to the brain was rare. Monro (secundus) is considered to have been more distinguished than his father. He was also more disputatious. His contributions to brain anatomy were greater, and he wrote a treatise on it, as well as on the eye and on the ear (Monro, 1783, 1797). In 1758, he reported that the ventricles of the human brain all communicate with one another. This claim of discovery was highly controversial, and Monro was in public dispute with William Hunter (1718–1783) regarding it. Like his father, Monro (secundus) was sceptical about the involvement of electricity in nerve transmission. In many wade

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ways, Monro (tertius) is an enigma. He used his grandfather’s lecture notes (without changing the dates) but did contribute to work on the brain and general anatomy. He published his Morbid Anatomy of the Brain in 1827. Significantly, this was entitled Volume 1; no volume 2 appeared. It seems unlikely that his book was widely read, as the copy of it in his own University still has some unopened (uncut) pages. The emphasis on the functions of the nerves and brain was maintained by Whytt, who studied anatomy under Monro (primus) after obtaining his arts degree at St. Andrews. Like Porterfield, he took his medical degree at Rheims and studied in London and Leyden before returning to Scotland to practice medicine. He was appointed to the chair of the theory of medicine at Edinburgh when only 33 years old, and occupied it for the remainder of his relatively short life. Whytt devoted his energies to physiology; more particularly, he examined the activity of the nervous system in a variety of its expressions, both voluntary and involuntary. He is most noted for his work on the involvement of the spinal nerves in involuntary responses to stimuli, which set the scene for the study of reflexes in the 19th century (see Neuburger, 1981; Robinson, 1995; Rocca, 2007). Whytt (1751, 1755) showed that the involuntary actions occurred with only small amounts of the nervous system intact. Further experimental support for this was derived from the localized operation of a pupil reflex (which became known as Whytt’s reflex) and pupil dilatation. His interpretations of these reflex phenomena brought him into conflict with Albrecht von Haller (1708–1777), which extended his reputation throughout Europe (see Frixione, 2007). Cullen has been compared with Boerhaave for the influence he exerted on the teaching of medicine. He was an authority on chemistry as well as medicine, and was appointed professor of medicine in Glasgow in 1751 (see Chambers, 1835). He moved to Edinburgh in 1755 to become professor of chemistry, and lectured for the first time in English rather than Latin. In 1766, he succeeded Whytt as professor of medicine. Cullen not only attracted many students to Edinburgh, but he also emphasized the importance of the nervous system in disease. He translated Haller’s First Lines of Physiology, and his own textbook First Lines of the Practice of Physic (1777–1779) was in turn translated, and was widely influential. In Edinburgh, medical students had access to patients in wards where instruction was given. The popularity of these new teaching methods 466

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was evident: “The output from the Scottish Medical Schools, but Edinburgh in particular, was considerable during the second half of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. The training that their students received at that time was second to none, and many American students that returned to the United States played a prominent role in establishing the Medical Schools in that country” (Kaufman, 2003, pp. 8–9). Among those American students taught by Cullen was Benjamin Rush (1745–1814), later to be known as the “father of American psychiatry” (Roback, 1961). Of his time as a medical student Rush wrote: “The two years I spent in Edinburgh I consider as the most important in their influence upon my character and conduct of any period of my life. The public lectures and private conversations of the Professors not only gave me many new ideas, but opened my mind so to enable me to profit by reading and observation” (Rush, 1948, p. 43).

Charles Bell Cullen’s concerns with the nervous system and its widespread effects were continued by Charles Bell (1774–1842; Figure 22.3) who was born and died in Edinburgh, but made his mark in London. There was little hope of being appointed to a chair of anatomy in Edinburgh while the Monro’s held sway. Bell moved to London in 1804, but his artistic talents had already been displayed in his book on the brain (Bell, 1802), which consisted of engravings from his own drawings. In the following year, he published a set of engravings on the nerves of the body, as well as the third volume of the Anatomy of the Human Body, with his brother, John Bell (1763–1820). The subtitle of volume 3 is Containing the Nervous System, and it consists of two parts. The first is on the nervous system and the second is on the senses, of which vision was by far the dominant modality: 148 pages were devoted to vision, 80 to hearing, and a meager 26 pages to the remaining senses of smell, taste, and touch. The route to understanding the brain was through the senses. Not only did Charles Bell distinguish between the sensory and motor nerves, but he also emphasized the importance of the muscle sense, and presented arguments for specificity of sensory nerves. This last was expressed in his Idea of a New Anatomy of the Brain: “In this inquiry it is most essential to observe, that while each organ of sense is provided with a capacity for receiving certain changes to be played upon it, as it were, yet each is utterly incapable of receiving the impression destined for another organ of sensation. It is also very remarkable that an

Fig. 22.3 Bell’s anatomy. The portrait is from the frontispiece engraving in G. Bell (1870); it shows Charles Bell, aged 30, shortly after he had moved to London to practice surgery. There, he attained distinction, and was knighted in 1831. In 1836, he returned to Edinburgh, to occupy the chair of surgery. The nerves of the head, in which Bell’s portrait is shown, was originally drawn by him, and it appeared in the third edition of his book on the Anatomy of Expression (Bell, 1844). He demonstrated that the muscles of expression are controlled by the seventh cranial nerve, damage to which can result in Bell’s palsy. He is facing the title page of his book on the nervous system (Bell, 1803). Image © Nicholas Wade.

impression made on two different nerves of sense, though with the same instrument, will produce two distinct sensations; and the ideas resulting will only have relation to the organ affected” (Bell, 1811/2000, pp. 8–9). Flugel (1933) referred to him as “another of the famous Scotchmen who figure so prominently in the history of psychology” (p. 46). Because of his work linking the senses and their muscular attachments to brain function, Bell has been called the father of physiological psychology (Carmichael, 1926). In 1806, with the publication of his Essays on the Anatomy of Expression in Painting, Bell became widely recognized. The early years in London were very productive, as he commenced his studies of the dorsal and ventral spinal roots. He fully appreciated the import of his Idea, as indicated in a letter to his brother, George, written in 1810: “I write to tell you that I really think I am going to establish my

Anatomy of the Brain on facts the most important that have been discovered in the history of the science. You recollect that I have entertained the idea that parts of the brain were distinct in function, and that the cerebrum was in a particular manner the organ of mind. . . . Experiment 1. I opened the spine and pricked and injured the posterior filaments of the nerves—no motion of the muscles followed. I then touched the anterior division— immediately the parts convulsed. Experiment 2. I now destroyed the posterior part of the spinal marrow by the point of a needle—no convulsive movement followed. I injured the anterior part, and the animal was convulsed” (Bell, 1870, pp. 170–171). Bell’s Idea was published privately in the next year, and sent to 100 friends; not one of them responded with any comments. Bell did not continue with the experiments, but John Shaw (1792–1827), his brother-in-law, did make reference to them in his wade

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publications. Ten years after publishing the Idea, Shaw demonstrated Bell’s experiment in Paris to a group that included the physiologist François Magendie (1783–1855) and the phrenologist Johann Gaspar Spurzheim (1776–1832). The bitter dispute between Bell and Magendie concerning priority of discovery of what has become known as the Bell-Magendie law has been chronicled by Cranefield (1974).

David Ferrier As noted above, Bain wrote extensively about phrenology, and it was to play an important part in the institutionalization of psychology in Scotland in the early 20th century. At Aberdeen, Bain taught David Ferrier (1843–1928; Figure 22.4), who followed Bain’s advice to study psychology at Heidelberg, after which he became a medical student at Edinburgh University, graduating in 1868. He moved to London in 1870, first to the Middlesex Hospital and then to King’s College Hospital occupying the chair of forensic medicine, and later a specially created chair of neuropathology. He was a founding editor of the journal Brain in 1878, and

Fig. 22.4 Ferrier’s functions of the brain. Ferrier’s portrait (derived from an illustration in Haymaker & Schiller, 1970) is represented in a drawing of the human brain that is marked with the motor map of monkey cortex: the numbers specify localized movements, with the letters representing movement areas for the hand and wrist (from Ferrier, 1876). The portrait is combined with the title page of the second edition of his book. Image © Nicholas Wade.

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was instrumental in instigating one of the first surgical removals of a tumor from a human brain. He was knighted for his services to medicine in 1911. In 1928, as a mark of his contributions to medical science, The Royal Society instigated the Ferrier Lectures, which are delivered every 3 years by distinguished scientists. The involvement of certain cortical regions in motor control had been proposed by John Hughlings Jackson (1835–1911) on the basis of his studies of epilepsy and these, too, were the stimulus for Ferrier’s investigations. Both Jackson and Ferrier were influenced by the professor of medicine at Edinburgh, Thomas Laycock (1812–1876), who advocated that reflex actions operated in the brain as they did in other nerve tissue (see Collins, 2001, Chapter 14, this volume). It had long been considered that the brain was unaffected by direct stimulation, but this view had been overturned by Gustav Fritsch (1837–1927) and Eduard Hitzig (1839–1907) in 1870. They electrically stimulated the exposed brains of unanesthetized dogs and found specific precentral areas that resulted in muscular contractions: they divided the cortex into two parts—motor and not motor. Thus, a new physiology, based on cortical localization, was being established. There were few institutions where experimental physiology could be practiced in Britain, and many of Ferrier’s initial experiments were conducted in the laboratories of the West Riding Lunatic Asylum, and the results were published in its Reports. In 1873, Ferrier commenced a series of experiments on anesthetized frogs, pigeons, guinea pigs, rabbits, cats, dogs, and monkeys in which he stimulated localized areas of the cortex; he also carried out ablations of the same areas. He described his initial method as “the application of the stimulus of an induced current of electricity directly to the surface of the brain of animals rendered only partially insensible during the process of exploration, complete anæsthesia annihilating all reaction” (1874, p. 229). As a consequence of these experiments, he concluded that “The whole brain is regarded as divided into sensory and motor regions . . . The motor regions are regarded as essential for the execution of voluntary movements, and as the seat of a corresponding motor memory (motor ideas), the sensory regions being looked upon as the seat of ideas derived from sensory impressions. . . . From the complexity of mental phenomena, and the participation in them of both motor and sensory substrata, any system of localization of mental faculties

which does not take both factors into account must be radically false. A scientific phrenology is regarded as possible” (1874, pp. 231–232). Thus, a new physiology, based on cortical localization, was being established at around the same period that the new psychology was emerging. The spirit of these exciting times was captured by Ferrier: “The discovery of the electrical excitability of the brain by Fritsch and Hitzig has given a fresh impetus to researches on the functions of the brain, and throws new light on many obscure points in cerebral physiology and pathology” (1876, p. xiv–xv). The significance of his research was rapidly realized, and the first edition of Functions of the Brain (Ferrier, 1876) was based upon them. Later, he was able to map the monkey motor cortex with greater precision. Ferrier was intensely productive in the decade that separated the first edition of Functions of the Brain from the second. It was in the Gullstonian lectures (Ferrier, 1878) that the celebrated case of Phineas Gage was discussed (see Macmillan, 2000, 2008), and Ferrier assessed the deficits as not being “in opposition to the experimental facts which I have adduced as to the effect of lesions of the frontal lobes” (1878, p. 30). Ferrier was able to show that precise movements of muscle groups followed localized stimulation in the precentral area, sensory defects resulted from more posterior ablation, and lesions in the frontal cortex disturbed intelligent behavior: “The removal of the frontal lobes causes no motor paralysis, or other evident physiological effects, but causes a form of mental degradation, which may be reduced in ultimate analysis to loss of the faculty of attention” (1876, p. 288). There was relatively little clinical evidence relating to damage of the frontal lobes, but Ferrier did make passing reference to the “American crow-bar case,” in which an iron bar “passed clean through the top of his [Phineas Gage’s] head, near the sagittal suture in the frontal region” (Ferrier, 1878, p. 28). Gage lived for almost 13 years after the accident, and his condition continues to be a source of wonder to neuroscientists. Ferrier’s animal experiments, yielding more precise localization of functions, had implications for human brain surgery. The first such use of localization to facilitate the region of intervention was conducted by a young Glaswegian surgeon, William Macewan (1848–1924), in the late 1870s and early 1880s, despite the fact that it is usually attributed to Alexander Hughes Bennett and Rickman John Godlee (see Macmillan, 2004, 2005). Ferrier assisted Bennett and Godlee in their operation, carried out

in London in 1884. Using cognitive signs to site the locus of a tumor and to remove it surgically represented a closer alignment between physiology and psychology. Indeed, this “new physiology,” heralded by Ferrier, Jackson, Macewan, and others, had its origins at about the same time as the “new psychology” of Wilhelm Wundt (1832–1920) in Germany. However, it was the former that influenced 20th-century psychology in Scotland (and in Britain generally) rather than the latter.

Evolution The teaching of medicine at Edinburgh played a significant role in the emergence of evolutionary theory. Erasmus Darwin (1731–1802), two of his sons and his grandson, Charles Robert Darwin (1809–1882), were all medical students there, although Charles did not complete his studies. Speculations about evolution from more primitive forms were voiced by Greek philosophers, although they were not widely adopted in the 18th century (see King-Hele, 1999). Two other Edinburgh graduates had advanced evolutionary ideas like those of Charles many years earlier. In 1773, Lord Monboddo (James Burnett, 1714–1799), a graduate in law, suggested that there was a close relation between apes (then referred to as ouran outangs) and humans, although he was ridiculed for making the proposal. He argued that ouran outangs were humans without language and that language itself was not a natural system for humans: “They are exactly of the human form; walking erect, not upon all-four, like the savages that have been found in Europe; they use sticks as weapons; they live in society; they make huts of branches of trees, and they carry off negroe girls, whom they make slaves of, and use for both work and pleasure. . . . But though from the particulars above mentioned it appears certain that they are of our species, and though they have made some progress in the arts of life, they have not come to the length of language; and accordingly none of them that have been brought to Europe could speak, and what seems strange, never learned to speak” (Monboddo, 1773, pp. 174–175). He further supported his speculations by recourse to his knowledge of selective breeding within farming. Monboddo was an eccentric who adopted many of the characteristics attributed to the ancient Greeks, and it has been argued that his eccentricities distracted scholars from taking his evolutionary ideas seriously. A process akin to natural selection was clearly outlined by William Charles Wells (1757–1817); wade

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he was born to Scottish parents in South Carolina, but was educated in Scotland, being awarded a medical degree from Edinburgh. In 1813, Wells presented to the Royal Society an account of a white woman part of whose skin was black, but it was not printed in the Society’s Transactions. It was published, together with the essays on single vision and on dew, after his death (Wells, 1818, reprinted in Wade, 2003a). Wells implicitly rejected the notion of inheriting acquired characteristics by noting that “a white man, rendered brown by the sun’s rays, begets as white children as those of another of the same race, the colour of whose skin has never been altered” (1818, p. 431). He denied that the susceptibility to disease was dependent upon skin color, but on adaptation to those prevailing conditions over many generations. He did acknowledge that “amongst men, as among other animals, varieties of a greater or less magnitude are constantly occurring,” but he considered that the differences were less pronounced in “a civilized country” where intermarriage would reduce the range of variations. Despite this, he did mention some distinguishing features between geographically close clans in Scotland. Wells then went on to make his most insightful speculations:

only race, in the particular country in which it had originated. (Wells, 1818, pp. 435–436).

Although the conjecture was overlooked at the time, it was not entirely forgotten. It was brought to the attention of Charles Darwin after publication of the Origin of Species in 1859, and it was acknowledged by him in later editions. In the fourth edition, Darwin noted that “In this paper he [Wells] distinctly recognises the principle of natural selection, and this is the first recognition which has been indicated; but he applies it only to the races of man, and to certain characters alone” (1866, p. xxi). This somewhat grudging acknowledgment suggested that Wells did not apply the principle of selection to animals other than humans, nor did it have widespread influence because Wells’ ideas continued to be overlooked (see Shryock, 1944; Wade, 2010). Indeed, Darwin did not provide an account of the historical influences on the emergence of his theory until the later editions of the Origin. This has obscured the importance of ideas prevalent among Scottish philosophers and physicians regarding evolution and Darwin’s exposure to them (Darlington, 1961; Derry, 2010).

Institutions of Medicine Again, those who attend to the improvement of domestic animals, when they find individuals possessing, in a greater degree than common, the qualities they desire, couple a male and a female of these together, then take the best of their offspring as a new stock, and in this way proceed, till they approach as near a point in view, as the nature of things will permit. But, what is here done by art, seems to be done, with equal efficacy, though more slowly, by nature, in the formation of varieties of mankind, fitted for the country which they inhabit. Of the accidental varieties of man, which would occur among the first few and scattered inhabitants of the middle regions of Africa, some one would be better fitted than others to bear the diseases of the country. This race would consequently multiply, while the others would decrease, not only from their inability to sustain the attacks of disease, but from their incapacity of contending with their more vigorous neighbours. The colour of this vigorous race I take for granted, from what has already been said, would be dark. But the same disposition to form varieties still existing, a darker and darker race would in the course of time occur, and as the darkest would be best fitted for the climate, this would at length become the most prevalent, if not the

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The institutions supporting medicine were well organized in Scotland (Comrie, 1932; Dingwall, 2003), and indeed many of those in London were founded by Scotch doctors. In Edinburgh, the Royal College of Surgeons was granted its royal charter in 1506, long before the Royal College of Physicians of Edinburgh (1681). Physicians and surgeons are now united in Glasgow, and the fledgling college was accorded its royal charter in 1599. The organizational influence of the Scotch doctors was not restricted to Scotland. Those who sought pastures of practice in London made institutional marks there, particularly in the late 18th century. One reason for the blossoming of medical societies in London was a consequence of obstacles raised by the College of Physicians regarding requirements for Fellowship (see Clark, 1966). Many of the founders were Scotch doctors who did not qualify for fellowship without an English medical degree. For example, in 1767, William Hunter and George Fordyce (1736–1802) collaborated to establish the Society of Licentiate Physicians, in order to campaign for the rights of licentiates in the College. Fordyce was involved in the formation of another society in 1783, with John Hunter (1728–1793); it was called the Lyceum Medicum Londinense, and

was principally concerned with encouraging medical students to present the results of original research at its weekly meetings. John Hunter “was always solicitous for some improvement in medical education” (Home, 1794, p. xxxii). Although many small societies blossomed, the blooms were usually short-lived, although some made lasting contributions to medicine. The societies they formed often discussed issues relating to brain and behavior. An example is the Society for the Improvement of Medical and Chirurgical Knowledge, which was founded in 1783, by John Hunter and Fordyce. Andrew Marshal (1742–1813) was one of the early and active members. John Hunter learned his medicine from his older, and then more renowned, brother, William; they were born in Lanarkshire, and William studied under Cullen in Glasgow and then Monro (primus) in Edinburgh before moving to London in 1740. After offering lecture courses in anatomy, he founded the Great Windmill Street medical school in 1769. John learned anatomy from dissection and became a surgeon of great note (see Chambers, 1835; Moore, 2005). The London legacies of the brothers Hunter were profound. Fordyce was an Aberdonian who received his medical degree from Edinburgh; his appetites were gargantuan and he was an acquaintance of Dr. Johnson (Howell, 1928). Marshal was from Fife and also received his degree in medicine from Edinburgh before moving to London (see Wells, 1813). The meetings of the Society for the Improvement of Medical and Chirurgical Knowledge were not always sedate. An instance relates to a particular intense debate concerning the state of the brain in mania. Matthew Baillie (1761–1823) and Marshal had an active interest in the morbid state of the brain. At two meetings in 1789, altercations took place between John Hunter and Marshal. At the first, Marshal noted that his dissections of the brains of those who had died insane were always abnormal. Hunter’s opposition to this opinion was vehement, and when he was asked to retract it at the next meeting, he refused and a fight broke out. Both Hunter and Marshal had fiery temperaments, and their enmity continued. Prior to the altercation, they had been on good terms (see Wade, 2005a). Some of Marshal’s unpublished papers were assembled and printed after his death by his former assistant, Solomon Sawrey (1765–1825; Marshal, 1815). Between 1786 and 1794, Marshal dissected the brains of 22 patients, most of whom had died in Bethlem Hospital. He described the characteristics of mania

for each patient, followed by the morbid appearances of the brain. As with Baillie’s single case, most brains had distended ventricles and the brains themselves were often abnormally firm. His general conclusion was: “In all instances of insanity, in delirium, in high symptomatic fever, in hydrocephalus, & c., it seems to be the morbid action of the vessels of the brain which constitutes the disease, and by which we are able, in any satisfactory way to account for the symptoms. This morbid action may be more or less transient; when accompanied with, or brought on by, general fever, the febrile action may go off, and the patient left sane; or the febrile action may subside, and the maniacal, as it were, may be substituted, and the mania may be permanent” (Marshal, 1815, p. 268). The altercation is of interest because it displays the state of knowledge concerning the brain and its functions at the end of the 18th century. Marshal’s assertions must have irritated Hunter because they suggested a closer link between brain structure and insanity than he was prepared to entertain. At that time, relatively little was known about the detailed anatomy of the brain and its relation to function. This was a consequence in part of lack of understanding about nerve function as well as shortcomings in anatomical dissections of the brain (see Finger, 1994; Macmillan, 2000). Hunter also maintained a view of diffused vitality throughout the body that was being indirectly undermined by Marshal’s more localized ideas. Moreover, Hunter was in the process of completing his book on blood, which presented precisely this case: “I consider that something similar to the materials of the brain is diffused through the body, and even contained in the blood; between this and the brain a communication is kept up by the nerves” (Hunter, 1794, p. 89). On a more empirical note, Baillie (1793), wrote briefly about diseased appearances of the brain and alluded to one such condition, in which the brain is found to be: “considerably firmer than in the healthy state, to be tougher, and to have some degree of elasticity . . . Under these circumstances the ventricles are sometimes found enlarged in size, and full of water . . . When these changes take place in the brain, the mind is at the same time deranged: there is either mania, or lethargy; or the person is much subject to convulsive paroxysms” (pp. 300–301). In a footnote applying to this quotation, Baillie observed that: “Mr. Hunter is the only person whom I have heard to remark this property of elasticity in the brain of maniacs. It was very remarkable in the only case of this kind which wade

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I have had an opportunity of examining” (p. 301). It is unfortunate that a Society founded for the promotion of medical and surgical knowledge should have delayed the transmission of useful information about the functions of brain in insanity because of personal animosities. However, the conflict cannot be attributed to any abnormality in Hunter’s brain. After his death: “The internal structure of the brain was very carefully examined, and the different parts both of the cerebrum and cerebellum were found in the most natural and healthy state” (Home, 1794, p. lxiv).

Mental Illness The emphasis on the involvement of the nervous system in disease generally increased interest in those who were classically known as mad or insane. In the second edition of his First Lines of the Practice of Physic, Cullen introduced the term neuroses: In a certain view, almost the whole of the diseases of the human body might be called NERVOUS: but there would be no use for such a general appellation; and, on the other hand, it seems improper to limit the term, in the loose inaccurate manner in which it has been hitherto applied, to hysteric and hypochondriacal disorders, which are themselves hardly to be defined with sufficient precision. In this place I propose to comprehend, under the title of NEUROSES, all those preternatural affections of sense or motion which are without pyrexia [febrile disease], as a part of the primary disease; and all those which do not depend upon a topical affection of the organs, but upon a more general affection of the nervous system, and of those powers of the system upon which sense and motion more especially depend. Of such diseases I have established a class, under the title NEUROSES, or NERVOUS DISEASES. These I again distinguish, as they consist, either in the interruption and debility of the powers of sense and motion, or in the irregularity with which these powers are exercised; and have accordingly arranged them under the four orders of Comata, Adynamiæ, Spasmi, and Vesaniæ, to be defined as we proceed to treat them more particularly. (Cullen, 1786a, pp. 121–123)

He related insanity, mania, and melancholy to disorders of the brain: I believe that physicians are generally disposed to suspect organic lesions of the brain to exist in almost every case of insanity. This, however, is probably

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a mistake: for we know that there have been many instances of insanity from which the persons have entirely recovered; and it is difficult to suppose that any organic lesions of the brain had in such case taken place. Such transitory cases, indeed, render it probable, that a state of excitement, changeable by various causes, had been the cause of such instances of insanity. (Cullen, 1786b, p. 139).

However, he was aware that individuals recovered from bouts of insanity, and so caution was required in making this connection. Cullen discussed the state of the brain in those who had died from mental illness, and even suggested that melancholia was a consequence of abnormal brain structure. His nosology was influential throughout Europe, although it was not uncritically received (see Berrios, 1996). Cullen’s classification was noble, but his system did not endure; Bell (1827) summarized the problems with it succinctly: “Of necessity in such a system nominal varieties are made diseases when there is no real distinction; and diseases of totally different nature are classed together” (p. 2). The treatments of the insane were not too enlightened, and when they were administered, they were likely to be in poorhouses, prisons, or madhouses (see Hunter & MacAlpine, 1963; Porter, 1987, 1997). An example of a novel treatment, proposed by Erasmus Darwin (1801), was rotating the patient in what was essentially a human centrifuge (see Wade, Norrsell, & Presly, 2005). The technique was eagerly adopted by two more Edinburgh medical graduates, Joseph Mason Cox (1763–1818) and William Saunders Hallaran (c. 1765–1825), who extolled its virtues. Rotating patients in a human centrifuge seems rather crude to us, but it should be seen in the context of the competing treatments that were available. Moreover, Porter (1987) singled out Cox and Hallaran for their awareness of the particular problems faced by patients in asylums. The alternative treatments to swinging listed by Cox (1813) were vomiting, purging, bleeding, digitalis, bathing, blisters, camphor, sedatives, and stimulants. Rotation in a chair produced some of these effects, like vomiting, and it was certainly one way of calming the otherwise violent patient. Cullen tried to simplify the classification of diseases, with varying emphasis on the involvement of the nervous system. The descriptive analysis of mental disorders was also influenced by Scottish philosophers (Berrios, 1996). Refining the distinctions between diseases was accompanied by more

humane treatments of those who were called insane. In the 18th century, the insane were either incarcerated or confined to madhouses, which were privately run. The conditions did not favor remission, and there was a growing dissatisfaction with the lot of the inmates. The first public mental health institution in Scotland was opened in Montrose, on the east coast, in 1781 (Presly, 1981, 1983). Its founding was due, in large measure, to public subscriptions instigated by Susan Carnegie; her desire was “to rid the Town of Montrose of a nuisance, that of mad people being kept in prison in the middle of the street, and the hope that by providing a quiet and convenient Asylum for them, by good treatment and medical aid, some of those unfortunates might be restored to society” (Presly, 1981, p. 1). It was initially called the Montrose Lunatic Asylum, Infirmary, and Dispensary, and became Montrose Royal Asylum; it set the pattern for others. In the following decades, six more Royal Asylums for the Insane were established, and by the middle of the 19th century, laws were enacted in Scotland to make adequate provision for them (see Bartlett & Wright, 1999; Melling & Forsythe, 1999). At about the same time, institutions for the mentally retarded were established in distinction to those for the insane (Comrie, 1932). An early physiological analysis of “mental derangement” was published by Alexander Crichton (1763–1856) in 1798. He was born in Edinburgh and received his University education there, but was soon to join the band of Scotch doctors in London, where his Inquiry was written. Crichton’s concern with the “mentally deranged” was largely theoretical and derived from his translations of books rather than with treatment of those in institutions for the insane. He did not return to the topic in his later writings, and spent the years between 1804 and 1819 as physician to the Imperial court in Russia. Crichton approached a range of mental conditions using concepts like irritability and sensibility, derived from Haller, and he incorporated ideas about the passions present in Locke’s philosophy (see Berrios, 2006; Charland, 2008b). His physiological ideas on “mind in general” and its derangements were to have profound influence upon Philippe Pinel (1745–1826) in France, although their views were not always in accord, particularly with regard to the moral dimension in mental disorders (see Charland, 2008a). Crichton saw the balance between pleasure and pain in physiological terms: “When our animal desires and aversions are opposed, or not gratified, new desires and aversions

arise, which are attended with painful and pleasurable feelings that are totally distinct from those which gave birth to the primary desire or aversion” (1798b, p. 112). The nervous system played an integral part in his analysis but the physiology he adumbrated was based upon notions (like irritability) that were losing their appeal. Crichton struggled with the nature of nerve action but was unable to reach a satisfactory resolution: “What is the nature of the corporeal change produced in our nerves by the action of an external body, to which the name of nervous impression has been given?” (1798a, p. 62). At precisely that time, a possible answer to this puzzle was being tentatively advanced elsewhere in Europe. The emergence of medicine and physiology as sources of psychological speculation was due in no small part to Franz Joseph Gall (1758–1828). From the early 19th century, anatomists dissected neural pathways in the brain with increasing precision, and these were related to the developing understanding of nerve transmission. The anatomical and physiological discoveries were applied to individual differences in the gross structure of the brain and to disorders of its function due to trauma or disease. In 1791, the year that Luigi Galvani (1737–1798) published his speculations on animal electricity, Gall advocated cortical localization of mental functions. He also drew a clear distinction between the gray matter of the cerebral cortex and the underlying white matter. These advances were described before his publications on organology—or phrenology as it was later called—assessing mental characteristics from the external shape of the skull. Belief in physiognomy was of long standing, and phrenology was an attempt to combine it with the emerging evidence for cerebral localization. It was essentially trying to map human psychology onto the surface of the brain. Since there were clearly individual differences in human abilities and propensities, these could be compared to variations in the activity (and size) of specific brain regions: The skull followed the form of the brain and so the over- or underdevelopment of those regions could be assessed. The astonishing breadth of Gall’s theory was succinctly stated by Bain: “The number of points relating to the human mind that have been raised by Gall and his followers is so great that one might, in discussing them, go over nearly the whole debatable ground of mental science” (1861, p. 14).

Optics The study of optics was not strictly within the medical tradition, but it was certainly concerned with wade

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perception. Two of the great 19th-century figures in visual optics were Scottish, and they left their marks on both the art and science of vision. David Brewster (1781–1868; Figure 22.5, left) devised the two most popular philosophical toys of the century—the kaleidoscope and the lenticular model of the stereoscope. His protégé, James David Forbes (1809–1868), was his successor as principal of the United College of St. Andrews and he carried out experiments on color mixing with a rotating disc. His work was continued by James Clerk Maxwell (1831–1879; Figure 22.5, right) who quantified the laws of color combination. Both Brewster and Maxwell benefited from the explosion of experimental ingenuity that was taking place in all areas of science. The senses were at the center of many of the dramatic departures, and the experimental advances in turn influenced theories of perception. The instruments of sensory discovery, particularly in vision, were found to have a popular as well as a scientific attraction, and they were called philosophical toys (see Wade, 2004). They were designed for the experimental study of natural phenomena, but they could provide amusement, too. Philosophical toys were usually based on simple optical or visual principles that were expressed in novel ways. For example, Brewster’s kaleidoscope is a simple optical instrument involving two plane mirrors inclined at an angle like 45 degrees (which can

be divided into 360 degrees) and located in a tube (Brewster, 1819). Viewing through one end of the tube multiplies the images of objects at the other. It took the popular imagination by storm in the second decade of the 19th century, but it remained an instrument of amusement rather than science. The stereoscope, on the other hand, was of vital importance to visual science, in addition to providing immense popular entertainment. It was invented by Charles Wheatstone (1802–1875) in 1832, although he did not publish an account of it until 6 years later (Wheatstone, 1838). The stereoscope, perhaps more than any other instrument, ushered in the era of experimentation to vision. Wheatstone’s model is a simple optical device that presents slightly different figures to each eye; if these figures have appropriate horizontal disparities then depth is seen. The most popular model of stereoscope was Brewster’s (1849) lenticular version; it consisted of a single lens cut in half so that the two half-lenses, when appropriately mounted, acted as magnifiers as well as prisms, fusing adjacent stereophotographs. He illustrated a wide variety of methods for combining paired images for stereoscopic viewing (Brewster, 1851). In the year after Wheatstone’s first article on the stereoscope appeared, his friend, William Henry Fox Talbot (1800–1877), made public his negative-positive photographic process. Brewster introduced Talbot’s

Fig. 22.5 Left, Brewster’s stereoscope. The portrait of Brewster is combined with an illustration of his lenticular stereoscope in Brewster (1856). Right, Colour mixer. Maxwell’s portrait is derived from a frontispiece engraving in Maxwell (1890); the motif of a color triangle is after a figure in Campbell and Garnett (1882). Image © Nicholas Wade.

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calotypes to Scotland, and he championed the paper negative over its rival daguerreotypes, even though the latter produced sharper images at that time. Comparing the two processes, Brewster (1843) made the astute prediction that the production of multiple copies from a single paper negative would act to its advantage, together with the fact that it “will not cost as many pence” as a daguerreotype. Brewster also made a binocular camera for taking stereoscopic photographs (see Wade, 1983). Philosophical toys were also concerned with movement, and one motion illusion that remains of interest to this day was named after it was observed in Scotland. The waterfall illusion refers to the appearance of upward motion in stationary objects following prolonged observation of descending water. It is more generally called a motion aftereffect, because it can be seen after observing many other moving stimuli. The waterfall illusion was initially reported by Robert Addams (1834) after looking at the Falls of Foyers on the south side of Loch Ness. The motion aftereffect had been reported earlier in other naturalistic settings, but it became widely known as the “waterfall illusion” possibly because of the ease of inducing it with descending water. Alas, there is nothing at the site to indicate the reverence in which it is held by some visual scientists. The beauty of the Falls of Foyers, on the other hand, has long been remembered, and it is because of this that Addams visited it. Such was its fame that it has been celebrated in verse by Scotland’s poets, best and worst. Robert Burns composed “Lines written with a pencil, standing by the Falls of Foyers, near Loch Ness,” in 1787, and about a century later, William Topaz McGonagall wrote a lengthier poem, called “Loch Ness,” in part of which he also delighted in the spectacle of the Falls. The poems can be read in Wade and Hughes (2002), and they perhaps show Burns at his worst and McGonagall at his best. Brewster also made forays into color vision, suggesting that sunlight was composed of three colors (red, yellow, and blue), and introducing the term color blindness into our language. Formerly, it was referred to as Daltonism, after the chemist John Dalton (1766–1844), who described his own inability to distinguish red from black. Color blindness was preferred as a description of the condition because “no person wishes to be immortalized by his imperfection” (Brewster, 1844, p. 139). Maxwell also examined color blindness but with much more precision. He rendered the investigation of color vision a quantitative science and applied it to the

analysis of anomalies in color perception. He revived Thomas Young’s (1774–1827) three-color theory and argued, like Young, that there were three different color receptors in the retina. Support for this derived from his studies of color-defective individuals, who could be classified according to the color receptors that were absent or anomalous. Maxwell introduced the method that has become standard in experiments on color mixing: “The coloured paper is cut into the form of discs, each with a small hole in the centre, and divided along a radius, so as to admit of several of them being placed on the same axis, so that part of each is exposed” (Maxwell, 1890, p. 122). When the device, often called Maxwell’s disk, was rotated rapidly the colors combined: “I have found by independent experiments, that the colour produced by fast spinning is identical with that produced by causing the light of the different colours to fall on the retina at once” (Maxwell, 1890, p. 123). Later, smaller discs were added so that comparisons could be made during rotation. Most color defectives could match any color with only two of the primaries. The resulting equations led to the proposal of a three-dimensional color solid, with variables that would now be called hue, saturation, and intensity. The location of white in the color solid was of critical importance: Hue was determined by the angular position with respect to white, and saturation by the distance from white. Maxwell considered that color was the province of physics rather than phenomenology: “I think there is a good deal to be learned from the names of colours; not about colours, of course, but about names” (Campbell & Garnett, 1882, p. 289). Color deficiencies and spatial vision continued to be topics of research for students of vision in Scottish Universities, but the optical tradition tended to be more closely aligned to medicine than to philosophy.

The Philosophical Tradition The path pursued by philosophy in Scotland has been entwined with those of religion and education. When the Scottish Parliament declared the country Protestant (in 1560), there was a movement (led largely by John Knox) to foster education so that all the citizens were able to read the Bible. His plan involved primary schools associated with the Kirk, grammar schools for burghs, as well as support for the universities. The Scottish Enlightenment in the 18th century was, in large measure, a consequence of changes in the educational system in Scotland. The last Act of the Scottish Parliament wade

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(in 1696) was to require all landowners to pay for a teacher for the children on their estate (see Scotland, 1969). Through this “Act for setting schools,” and its alliance with the Kirk of Scotland, the majority of Scots were better educated than their English counterparts. Those with talent were encouraged to study further at University, of which there were four at that time. Edinburgh University is the youngest of Scotland’s ancient universities; it was founded in 1583 as the first nonecclesiastical university in Scotland (see Bower, 1817). It was initially called The Tounis College, and appointments were made by the town council. It experienced a tremendous growth in students and in influence throughout the 18th century, particularly in medicine. St. Andrews University is Scotland’s oldest, being founded in 1413 (see Cant, 1970); by the middle of the 16th century, there were three colleges: St. Salvator’s (1450), St. Leonard’s (1511), and St. Mary’s (1538). The first two were united in the 19th century. King’s College, Aberdeen was founded in 1495, and it was amalgamated in 1860 with Marischal College, founded in 1593 (see Anderson, 1906). Glasgow University is Scotland’s second oldest; it was founded in 1451, and like the city itself, had an enormous expansion in the 19th century (Brown & Moss, 1996; Coutts, 1909). Initially, the organization and teaching followed those in continental universities: a regent (lecturer) guided students through the whole of their course; subject specialization was slow to arrive. A more local flavor was introduced with the Reformation of 1590. Each of the universities sought its own survival plan with the withdrawal of Church support, although religion still determined many of the appointments made. Professors were appointed to teach specific subjects, and their income was derived, in large part, from the fees paid by students. Brewster summarized the situation well in a letter written to Forbes, when the latter was applying for the chair of natural philosophy at Edinburgh in 1830: “I cannot tolerate the idea of a Professorship being an object of your ambition, if you mean a Scotch one. There is no profession so incompatible with original enquiry as a Scotch professorship, where one’s income depends on the number of pupils” (Shairp, Tait, & Adam-Reilly, 1873, p. 59). The governance and teaching of the universities was brought into closer harmony with the Universities (Scotland) Act of 1858.

Scottish Philosophy Mental processes have been deliberated upon in philosophy for many centuries, and numerous 476

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insights, particularly regarding the senses, have been derived from observation of natural phenomena (see Wade, 1998). When observation was wedded with experiment, more systematic efforts were made to examine mental phenomena. The modern phase of psychology is considered to have been formulated in the 18th century: “A new ‘science’ came into being—the ‘science’ of the mental or psychic life. This new ‘science,’ whose organization is to be credited to the German Christian Wolff (1679–1754) and to the Scotsman Thomas Reid (1710–1796), consisted primarily of a systematization of the materials which came to be the contents of psychological treatises” (Kantor, 1969, p. 134). In the early 1730s, Wolff wrote two works that included psychology in their titles, one on empirical and the other on rational psychology. The terms used by Reid and his colleagues were mental and moral philosophy or the philosophy of the human mind. Similar sentiments were expressed by a fellow Aberdonian philosopher, George Campbell (1719–1796), in his Philosophy of Rhetoric (Campbell, 1776). Indeed, another of Reid’s colleagues at Aberdeen, James Beattie (1735–1803), did use the term “psychology” in his lectures and books. Psychology was the first part of his Elements of Moral Science, and he defined it as: “This science explains the nature of the several powers or faculties of the human mind. By faculties of the mind, I understand those capacities which it has of exerting itself in perceiving, thinking, remembering, imagining, &c.; and by the mind itself, or soul, or spirit, of man, I mean that part of the human constitution which is capable of perceiving, thinking, and beginning motion, and without which our body would be a senseless, motionless, and lifeless thing. These faculties were long ago divided into those of Perception and those of Volition; and the division, though not accurate, may be adopted here. By the perceptive powers we are supposed to acquire knowledge; and by the powers of volition, or will, we are said to exert ourselves in action” (Beattie, 1790, pp. 1–2). Perception was itself broken down into nine subfaculties: external sensation, consciousness, memory, imagination, dreaming, speech, abstraction, reason, and conscience. Beattie was reflecting the influence of Reid and the division of psychological processes into faculties that were innate properties of the mind, and they exerted control over habits or behavior. Within the universities, philosophy had been a part of the medieval arts curriculum that consisted

Fig. 22.6 Scotch philosophers. Left, Humean understanding. The portrait of David Hume (1711–1776) was derived from an engraving by William Holl after a painting by Allan Ramsay; he is embedded in text from his book An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (Hume, 1740). Right, Reiding the mind. The portrait of Thomas Reid (1710–1796) is after frontispiece engraving in Reid (1821) and the text is taken from Reid (1810). Image © Nicholas Wade.

of metaphysical, moral, and natural philosophies, and students were exposed to some Aristotelian psychology. From the beginning of the 18th century, philosophy played a more central role in university arts courses. Five Scottish philosophers of note are shown in Figures 20.6 and 20.7. McCosh (1875)

has surveyed what he called Scottish philosophy, and he marked its identity: it “possesses a unity, not only in the circumstance that its expounders have been Scotchmen, but also and more specially in its method, its doctrines, and its spirit” (p. 6). The Scottish philosophy involved a grounding in

Fig. 22.7 Common-sense philosophers. Left, Monument to Philosophy. The Dugald Stewart monument on Calton Hill in Edinburgh was erected in honor of Dugald Stewart (1753–1828), professor of philosophy at its University; it was built in 1831 and occupies a commanding view of the city. Center, Brownian emotion. The portrait of Thomas Brown (1778–1820) is derived from a frontispiece engraving in Welsh (1825), together with the title page of his book on the Philosophy of the Human Mind (Brown, 1820). Right, Hamilton’s works. William Hamilton (1788–1856) presented many of his ideas in support of common-sense philosophy in lengthy and erudite footnotes to Reid’s (1846) works. Image © Nicholas Wade.

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observation, but what was observed was consciousness. Indeed, the observational link between physiology and philosophy was eloquently encompassed by Thomas Reid (Figure 22.6, right): “All that we know of the body, is owing to anatomical dissection and observation, and it must be by an anatomy of the mind that we can discover its powers and principles” (1764, p. 5).

Hume and Reid One of those mental anatomists was David Hume (1711–1776; Figure 22.6, left). He stands in the empiricist line from John Locke (1632–1704) through George Berkeley (1685–1753), and he rejected the rationalist notions of cause and effect in favor of skepticism. Hume proposed that, although events occur in sequence, the perception of causality is a consequence of repeated mental associations between contiguous impressions, and the true nature of causality could never be known— hence, he is often referred to as the skeptical philosopher. Although he accepted that all experience derives from the senses, he did not make appeal to a higher perceiver, as Berkeley had; rather, he considered that external reality is unknowable. Hume was born and died in Edinburgh, although he spent much of his life in England and France. It was during his first visit to France that he wrote his celebrated Treatise of Human Nature (published anonymously in 1739 and under his own name in 1740), laying the ground for a “science of man” based on observation and experiment; he followed this 8 years later with a shorter version entitled An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (Hume, 1748). Hume’s science was modeled more closely on the inductive approach of Francis Bacon (1561–1626) than on the deductive method of Isaac Newton (1642–1727), and Hume did much to foster a realization that all areas of human endeavor require an understanding of human nature. He placed great emphasis on the association of ideas and, despite its origins in Greek philosophy, he considered it to be his most important contribution to establishing a science of the mind; it has had a profound impact on psychology, particularly on behaviorism. Hume referred to it initially as the “connection of ideas,” but in the text in which he is presented (in Figure 22.6, left), he used the term “association of ideas,” as had Locke earlier. On the page following that reproduced, he states that the three principles of association are resemblance, contiguity in time or place, and cause and effect. Contiguity refers 478

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to the likelihood of remembering experiences that occurred frequently together; the sight of a glass of beer can evoke its bitter taste. Association by cause and effect was considered to be the most important; events that occur in sequence, and may appear to be causally related, are recalled together. The stone thrown in the water is linked with the ripples it sets in train. The importance of the senses and perception to human understanding was eloquently stated by Reid: “All that we know of nature, or of existences, may be compared to a tree, which hath its root, trunk, and branches. In this tree of knowledge, perception is the root, common understanding is the trunk, and the sciences are the branches” (1764, p. 424). He reacted to Hume’s skepticism (and to Berkeley’s idealism) by arguing that the evidence of external reality is provided by the common activities of the senses and is supported by common sense intuition. He was not the first Scotch philosopher to cast doubt on the prevailing empiricist theories. The seeds of discontent with Berkeley’s New Theory of Vision (1709) had been sown by Porterfield (1759a, b). Despite the title to his Treatise on the Eye, Porterfield’s agenda was philosophical as well as physiological. He adopted a nativist view of vision. For example, he disputed Berkeley’s proposition that touch could guide vision in the perception of the third dimension of space: “for the tangible Ideas are as much present with the Mind as the visible Ideas, and, on that Account, must be equally incapable of introducing the Idea of any Thing external” (Porterfield, 1759b, p. 307). He used essentially the same arguments to contradict Locke’s (1694) answer to a question posed by William Molyneux (1656–1698) regarding perception in someone who was born blind but had their vision restored. This has become known as Molyneux’s Question, and it has stimulated considerable interest and speculation ever since (see Fine et al., 2003; Morgan, 1977; von Senden, 1960; Wade & Gregory, 2006). Porterfield addressed the question in the second volume of his Treatise: “To this Question, both these profound Philosophers [Molyneux and Locke] pronounce in the negative . . . and yet, notwithstanding the great Deference I have for the Opinion of so able Judges, I cannot help thinking that they are mistaken; for, I have already demonstrated, that the Judgments we form of the Situation and Distance of visual Objects depend not on Custom and Experience, but on an original, connate and immutable Law, to which our Minds have been subjected from the Time they were

first united to our Bodies; and therefore the blind Person, immediately upon receiving his Sight, must, by virtue of this Law, by his Eyes alone, without any Assistance from his other Senses, immediately judge of the Situation of all Parts of the Globe and Cube” (Porterfield, 1759b, pp. 414–415). In his book on Molyneux’s Question, Michael Morgan referred to Reid as “the first nativist in anything like a modern mould” (1977, p. 106), but the claim could equally be made for Porterfield (see Wade, 2007a). For both of them, perception was the anchor to reality and, despite the title of his book (An Inquiry into the Human Mind), Reid wrote almost exclusively about the senses, with the lion’s share being devoted to vision. As his student and follower, Stewart (1811) noted: “In Dr Reid’s first performance, he confined himself entirely to the five senses, and the principles of our nature necessarily connected with them” (p. 447). Reid’s emphasis upon vision did not blind him to the importance of the remaining senses: “Notwithstanding what hath been said of the dignity and superior nature of this faculty [seeing], it is worthy of our observation, that there is very little of the knowledge acquired by sight, that may not be communicated to a man born blind” (1764, p. 172). In the context of touch he noted that: “we perceive not one quality only, but many, and those of different kinds. The chief of them are heat and cold, hardness and softness, roughness and smoothness, figure, solidity, motion, and extension” (1764, p. 99). Reid made an explicit separation between the processes of sensation and perception that is now embedded in the language of psychology: Although there is no reasoning in perception, yet there are certain means and instruments, which, by the appointment of nature, must intervene between the object and our perception of it; and by these our perceptions are limited and regulated. First, If the object is not in contact with the organ of sense, there must be some medium which passes between them. Thus, in vision, the rays of light; in hearing, the vibrations of elastic air; in smelling, the effluvia of the body smelled, must pass from the object to the organ; otherwise we have no perception. Secondly, There must be some action or impression upon the organ of sense, either by the immediate application of the object, or by the medium that goes between them. Thirdly, The nerves which go from the brain to the organ, must receive some impression by means of that which was made upon the organ; and probably,

by means of the nerves, some impression must be made upon the brain. Fourthly, The impression made upon the organ, nerves, and brain, is followed by a sensation. And, last of all, This sensation is followed by the perception of the object. (Reid, 1764, pp. 424–425).

Sensations referred to the immediate actions of the senses whereas perceptions are always associated with objects that continue to exist whether or not they are perceived. Perceptions could be innate or acquired. As the text enclosing Reid’s portrait in Figure 22.6 (right) reads: “Let scholastic sophisters entangle themselves in their own cobwebs; I am resolved to take my own existence, and the existence of other things, upon trust; and to believe that snow is cold, and honey sweet, whatever they may say to the contrary. He must either be a fool, or want to make a fool of me, that would reason me out of my reason and senses” (Reid, 1764, pp. 34–35). His descriptive psychology could be studied by reflection on mental activity, by an analysis of the use of language, and by observations of behavior. Reid provided a bridge between the extreme rationalists and empiricists. His belief in the power of reason was tempered by a desire to accumulate evidence empirically. He conducted experiments on space perception to show how people with squints gradually overcome double vision: “We see, therefore, that one who squints, and originally saw objects double by reason of that squint, may acquire such habits, that when he looks at an object with his best eye, he shall have no distinct vision with the other at all” (Reid, 1764, p. 356). This was supported by evidence from examinations of the visual acuity in each eye of 20 such individuals. However, his philosophical position was not based upon empirical evidence; rather, it was occasionally supported by it. Reid’s influence on psychology has been acknowledged by some, but by no means all, historians of the subject. Robinson (1995) remarked: “Thomas Reid is a much underrated figure in histories of psychology and philosophy, although his insights have been rediscovered several times in both disciplines” (p. 180). Reid was born in Strachan, in the north east of Scotland, and entered the ministry after studying at Marischal College, Aberdeen. In 1752, he became professor of philosophy at King’s College, Aberdeen, and he was appointed successor to Adam Smith (1723–1790) as professor of moral philosophy at Glasgow wade

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University in 1764, the same year his Inquiry into the Human Mind was published. He remained staunchly religious throughout his life, and his advocacy of science often sat uneasily with his beliefs. Kantor (1969) summarized it well: “Almost every page of Reid’s writings testifies to his intellectual dualism. On the one hand, he displays his knowledge and approval of the natural scientists, while on the other, he vigorously parades his religious convictions” (p. 145). The senses were the source of Reid’s Inquiry, and he saved the cognitive processes for future analysis. Nonetheless, he saw the virtues of restricting himself to the senses before venturing further into the human mind. He took Galileo and Newton as examples of the strides that can be made by restricting the journey. Reid’s conclusion was measured: “we have attempted an inquiry into one little corner of the human mind; that corner which seems to be most exposed to vulgar observation, and to be most easily comprehended; and yet, if we have delineated it justly, it must be acknowledged, that the accounts heretofore given of it, were very lame, and wide of the truth” (1764, p. 251).

Stewart, Brown, and Hamilton Reid is considered to be the founder of the Scottish common-sense school of philosophy, and he was followed by Dugald Stewart (1753–1828), Thomas Brown (1778–1820), and William Hamilton (1788–1856), all of whom taught at Edinburgh University (see Figure 22.7). In formalizing this “common sense school” they were opposed to associationism, particularly when it was couched in physiological language. More specifically, they were critical of the attempts by David Hartley (1705–1757) to unite the physical and psychological worlds by means of a speculative neurophysiology. His sources of inspiration were Newton’s theory of vibrations, Locke’s principle of association, and a host of perceptual phenomena. Hartley’s theory was expressed in his book Observations on Man, His Frame, His Duty, and His Expectations, published in 1749, in which his theory of vibrations and associations was applied to perception and thought. Reid was an advocate of the Newtonian method of “observation and experiment” but he did not think that these could be applied by the “anatomist of the mind.” The position of the common-sense school was suitably summarized by Stewart: “The Physiological Theories which profess to explain how our different mental operations are produced by means of vibrations, and other changes in the 480

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state of the sensorium, if they are not altogether hypothetical and visionary, cannot be considered, even by their warmest advocates, as resting on the same evidence with those conclusions which are open to the examination of all men capable of exercising the power of Reflection” (1810, p. iii). Reid’s school of thought provided much for his followers to pursue. Brett’s (1962) assessment of the common-sense philosophers who followed was only a trifle unjust: “Dugald Stewart corrects Reid, Brown corrects Stewart, and Hamilton corrects everybody” (p. 444). A flavor of Hamilton’s style can be found in his lectures, in which even praise of Reid is barbed: “The doctrine of perception may thus be viewed as a cardinal point of philosophy. It is also exclusively in relation to this faculty, that Reid must claim his great, his distinguishing glory, as a philosopher; and of this no one was more conscious than himself ” (Hamilton, 1861, p. 38). On Brown: “Reid had errors enough to be exposed, but Brown has not been so lucky as to stumble even upon one” (p. 39). Reid proposed that some faculties are innate and others are dependent on learning: “Of the various powers and faculties we possess, there are some which nature seems both to have planted and reared, so as to have left nothing to human industry. . . . There are other powers, of which nature hath only planted the seeds in our minds, but hath left the rearing of them to human culture” (1764, p. 7). Despite this statement, and many of the elaborations by Hamilton (1861) in his lectures, there has been some debate about whether Reid advanced a “faculty psychology” (see Murray, 1988). Stewart made many of Reid’s ideas accessible to a wider readership; he was noted for his elegant writing, but not for his originality. He was a strong advocate of the “philosophy of the human mind,” which was “a science, so interesting in its nature, and so important in its applications, that it could scarcely have failed, in these inquisitive and enlightened times, to have excited a very general attention” (Stewart, 1792, p. 2). Nonetheless, he complained that it had suffered from the “unprofitable disquisitions of the school-men.” Stewart argued that there was a small number of faculties the study of which would yield general laws, after the manner of physics. The facts, accumulated by observation and reflection, should not be interpreted in terms of any putative physiological processes, as Hartley had attempted. Moreover, the philosophy of mind should not draw upon the methods of physics or of any other branch of science. Stewart elaborated

Reid’s ideas and presented them in more amenable form, but he added little to them. The preface to a new edition of his Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind, published 30 years after his death, commenced somewhat disarmingly thus: “Though Dugald Stewart has not added many new truths to the Philosophy of Mind, and has hardly attempted to solve its more abstruse and intricate problems, he has done much to render it intelligible, popular, and useful” (Stewart, 1859, p. iii). Stewart’s philosophy of mind became Brown’s physiology of mind. Brown was trained in medicine as well as philosophy, but the former did not often intrude into his musings on mind. He was much more astute when writing about the senses, and argued persuasively for a separate muscle sense: “To what organ, then, are we to ascribe the external influences, which give occasion to these feelings of resistance and extension? It is not touch, as I conceive, that either of these be traced. Our feeling of resistance, in all its varieties of hardness, softness, roughness, smoothness, solidity, liquidity, &c. I consider as the result of organic affections, not tactual, but muscular; our muscular frame being truly an organ of sense, that is affected in various ways, by various modifications of external resistance to the effort of contraction” (Brown, 1820, pp. 78–79). It was in the same theater of the senses that Hamilton advanced understanding of the muscle sense, although he had a more thorough knowledge of the earlier German literature than Brown. Boring (1942) credited Charles Bell with establishing the concept of the muscle sense, although Bell’s claim was rejected by Hamilton (1846) in his brief but scholarly history of it. The term Muskelsinn had been used by German writers in the 18th century, and it was suggested that the idea was described even earlier (Wade, 2003b). More precise evidence of a movement sense was to derive from an Edinburgh chemist working in the medical tradition—Alexander Crum Brown (1838–1922). This was also the area in which Thomas Brown crossed swords with Erasmus Darwin. Darwin’s Zoonomia excited great interest when it was published in 1794 and 1796, not least in Brown. His marginal notes and trenchant criticisms resulted in a tome of almost 600 pages in which Darwin’s structure was dissected chapter by chapter (Brown, 1798). Initially Brown, an 18-yearold student at Edinburgh University, wrote to Darwin praising the book and promising a lengthier appraisal. Darwin appreciated the praise but was disparaging about the appraisal, so much so that

Brown’s biographer (Welsh, 1825) forbore to reprint Darwin’s response. Following more congenial correspondence, Brown committed his thoughts to print. Brown attacked Darwin’s theory of vertigo (based on afterimages) by drawing attention to its inconsistencies (Wade, 2005b). Brown observed that the objects that appeared to move following body rotation were those that were in front of the eyes, not those that had been passed during rotation. To produce a clear afterimage, Brown rotated his body while looking at a book held in front of him; when rotation ceased, he did not experience any afterimage of the book. When he rotated his body with his eyes open and then stepped into a darkened room he did not experience any visual vertigo. On the other hand, when he rotated in one room (with his eyes open) and then stepped into another lighted room, it was the objects in the latter that appeared to rotate. Finally, he bandaged his eyes during body rotation and removed the cover after rotation ceased, only to experience visual motion once more. For these reasons, Brown rejected Darwin’s theory and adopted one rather like Porterfield’s (1759b). Neither Darwin nor Thomas Brown had any knowledge of vestibular function and its relation to vertigo. This was discovered independently by Ernst Mach (1838–1916), Josef Breuer (1842–1925), and Crum Brown in the 1870s. Brown (1874, 1875) based his analysis on thresholds for detecting body rotation on a revolving stool; the thresholds were lowest when the head was positioned so that one of the semicircular canals was in the plane of rotation. In 1878, he made a particularly astute prediction: if deaf-mutes have defects in all the parts of the inner ear, then they will not be able to experience vertigo: “A great deal of valuable information might be obtained by carefully testing the delicacy and accuracy of the sense of rotation in deaf-mutes. Many deaf-mutes have not only the cochlea, but the whole internal ear, destroyed; if, then, the inmates of deaf and dumb establishments were systematically tested by means of such experiments as Mach and Brown made upon themselves, experiments which would, no doubt, greatly interest and amuse them, and if the condition of the internal ear were, in each case of post-mortem examination of a deafmute, accurately noted, we should soon obtain a mass of information which would do more to clear up the relation between the sense of rotation and the semicircular canals than any number of experiments on animals unable to describe to us their sensations” (Brown, 1878, p. 658). A few years later, wade

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William James (1842–1910; 1882) put this to the test with a specially constructed device for rotating the body. Almost all normal observers experienced vertigo. However, of over 500 deaf-mutes tested, almost 200 experienced no dizziness. By the end of the 19th century, there was mounting evidence that Reid’s restriction of the senses to five was demonstrably wrong. This realization virtually coincided with the demise of the system he had introduced, but it was not the cause. Hamilton had a detailed knowledge of Continental philosophy and brought these influences, and particularly the ideas of Kant, to bear on his analysis of mental processes. Nonetheless, the “common-sense school” essentially died with Hamilton. Indeed, McCosh’s (1875) history of Scottish philosophy ended with Hamilton, too. This is McCosh’s sober appraisal: “I admit that Sir William Hamilton had deeply observed the operations of the mind, and that his lectures contribute more largely to psychology than any work published in his day. But his induction is too much subordinated to logical arrangement and critical rules” (1875, p. 386). Support for this view is derived largely from the manner in which he elaborated upon the useful concepts he introduced. For example, in preferring the term “cognition” to “knowledge” in his lecture on perception (1861), he embarked on a lengthy discourse regarding their grammatical uses. However, largely through McCosh’s influence as president of the putative Princeton University, the Scottish philosophy was to play a formative role in the development of psychology in America (see Maier, 2004).

Language The philosophical thrust of Scotch scholars was by no means limited to perception as there was also a vibrant linguistic current running through it. It is alleged that James IV of Scotland (1473–1513) oversaw one of the few isolation studies to determine the origins of natural language, although the evidence that it was actually carried out is wanting (Campbell & Grieve, 1982). Two children were said to have been raised on an island in the Firth of Forth by a dumb woman; the intention was to discover the language they eventually spoke. As with other such studies, it is very difficult to determine what was done and what the outcome was, but the fact that the story was repeated provides an indication of the interest in the question. Indeed, in the 18th century, Lord Monboddo (1773) wrote extensively on the origins of language and argued that it evolved from animal cries: “It is therefore inarticulate cries 482

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only that must give rise to language; and, as every thing of art must be founded on nature, it appears at first sight very probable, that language should be nothing but an improvement or refinement upon the natural cries of the animal, more especially as it is evident, that language does no more than enlarge the expression of those natural cries: for such cries are used by all animals who have any use of voice to express their wants” (pp. 318–319). His position was succinctly summarized in a letter, published shortly after the appearance of his book: “first, that Language is not natural to Man—second, that it is possible (for I say no more) that it may have been invented—and, lastly—upon that supposition—to shew how it was invented” (Knight, 1900, p. 82). Another Aberdonian, James Beattie (1788), wrote about the origins of language and he introduced the concept of a universal grammar. Like Monboddo, Beattie argued that speech facilitated reasoning, and he gave a definition of it: “For we must not call by the name of Speech that imitation of human articulate voice, which parrots and some other birds are capable of; Speech, implying thought, and consciousness, and the power of separating and arranging our ideas, which are faculties peculiar to rational minds” (Beattie, 1788, p. 2). For George Campbell (1776), as for many other 18th-century philosophers, rhetoric was seen as informing mental science and thereby psychology (see Walzer, 2003). Note that Bain lectured on English at Aberdeen University, and his book on rhetoric (Bain, 1867) was intensely psychological. The expression of language was taken to mark that of the mental processes underlying it, of which association was taken as one.

The Social Dimension The senses played a role in the early expression of the social dimension in Scottish psychology. Francis Hutcheson (1694–1746) was professor of moral philosophy at Glasgow University, and he extended the senses into the social domain (Hutcheson, 1747). In addition to those defined by anatomy, there were public and moral senses as well as a sense of honor. Not only were these additional senses considered innate but they were also open to formulation: moral importance was considered to be a function of benevolence and ability. It is not surprising that one who extended the senses into the social sphere also wrote on aesthetics (Hutcheson, 1725). His ideas influenced David Hume and Adam Smith, although his religious

orthodoxy was instrumental in preventing Hume from achieving an academic position (Jahoda, 2007). Within philosophy, the common-sense school did not leave a lasting legacy, but the ideas it expressed were to be influential in the development of psychology, particularly in America in the 19th century (Hilgard, 1987). Hearnshaw remarked that “The role of these Scotsmen in the shaping of psychology has often been underestimated” (1987, p. 93). Roback (1964) went further and argued that both Scottish philosophers and psychologists molded the student mind in the United States by stimulating their teachers to write texts in a similar manner. The impetus for adopting these views derived in large part from John Witherspoon (1722–1794) in the 18th century and from James McCosh (1811–1894) in the 19th. Witherspoon arrived in America in 1768 and, as president of the College of New Jersey, introduced the works of Reid and Beattie. A century later, McCosh, as president of the same College, saw its transition to Princeton University, and was a powerful advocate of Scottish philosophy (McCosh, 1875). McCosh had studied under Hamilton, and one of his students, James Mark Baldwin (1861–1934), was founding editor of the Psychological Bulletin and a co-founder of the Psychological Review. The modifications to Reid’s ideas by Stewart, Brown, and Hamilton lessened the opposition to associationism, but still provided a clear target to which Bain could flight his intellectual arrows. The new physiology could be enlisted to provide the ideas upon which a new psychology could be based, but it was not of the variety advocated by Wundt.

Institutional Psychology Psychology was preached in Scottish universities long before it was practiced in departments devoted to its study. Several societies were formed to discuss various aspects of the philosophy of mind, many features of which we would now consider to be psychology, although that term was rarely used. Thomas Reid was one of the driving forces behind the Philosophical Society in Aberdeen, which met fortnightly to discuss issues of science, many of which were psychological (Boyle, 1997; Valentine, 1900). Reid presented many papers concerning the senses to this society. It was founded in 1758 and thrived until 1773, long after the departure of Reid to Glasgow in 1763. Amongst the other six distinguished founders of the Society were John Gregory (1724–1773), James Beattie, and George Campbell.

Beattie was a philosopher at Marischal College and delivered lectures on psychology, as well as natural theology, moral philosophy, and logic (Forbes, 1807). As a student of divinity at Marischal College, Campbell had been a member of a Theology Club, the experiences of which he transferred to the Philosophical Society. By this stage, he was principal of the college, and the lectures he delivered to the Philosophical Society formed a basis for his Philosophy of Rhetoric (Campbell, 1776). Similar forces were at play in enlightened Edinburgh, where the Select Society drew intellectuals to its heart (Porter, 2000). It blossomed briefly, but set in train the exchange of ideas that flourished for decades. It was founded in 1754 and counted amongst its members Allan Ramsey (1713–1784), Adam Smith, David Hume, Adam Ferguson (1723–1816), Lord Monboddo, and Lord Kames (1696–1782). The society was select socially as well as intellectually, and it ceased to function in 1763.

Aberdeen Despite these early yearnings, psychology as a discipline independent of philosophy or medicine had to wait many decades. The power of the established departments was not to be diluted by the hybrid psychology. Bain had laid the foundations for the subject, but they were built upon in other countries. He had traveled widely in Europe and was acquainted with many of the leading figures in philosophy and physiology in Germany, like Hermann Helmholtz (1821–1894) and Wundt, and it was in their country that psychology was instituted rather than Bain’s (see Danziger, 1994; Rieber & Robinson, 2001). He had also lectured on psychology and geography at Bedford College, London, before his appointment to the chair of logic at the newly integrated University of Aberdeen. Nonetheless, Aberdeen can lay claim to having the first established lectureship in psychology. A bequest by a former student of Marischal College, William Anderson (ca. 1799–1870), resulted in the establishment of a lectureship in comparative psychology (see Boyle, 1997; Knight, 1962). The first incumbent was George Frederick Stout (1860–1944; Figure 22.8, left), who was appointed in 1896. His interest had developed through his association with James Ward (1843–1925) at Cambridge (see Collins, 2011, Chapter 14, this volume). Ward had written the entry for psychology for the edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica that was published in 1886; he enlarged the article into a book (Ward, 1918). Stout was the editor of Mind; his book wade

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Fig. 22.8 Aberdeen psychologists and works they produced there. Left, Philosopher’s manual. George Frederick Stout (1860–1944) and his Manual of Psychology (1898). Center, McIntyre’s Bruno. James Lewis McIntyre (1868–1929) and his life of Giordano Bruno (1903). Right, Modern psychologist. Rex Knight (1903–1963) and the first page of his textbook (Knight & Knight, 1954); he was the first professor of psychology. All portraits derived from illustrations in Boyle (1997). Image © Nicholas Wade.

Analytic Psychology (1896) was published in the year he moved to Aberdeen, and his Manual of Psychology (1898) was written during his relatively short stay there. In it he indicated clearly his interactive view of psychology: “It thus appears that psychology must take into account not only the subject but also the object. This is necessary because subjective states and processes cannot be adequately described without reference to their objects. It is impossible to name a thought without naming it as a thought about something or other. But psychology is only concerned with objects, if and so far as they are necessarily implied in the existence of corresponding states and processes in the subject” (Stout, 1898, p. 2). The Manual was read by a generation of students and ran to many editions. In 1899, Stout was followed by James Lewis McIntyre (1868–1929, Figure 22.8, center) who remained in the post until his death. He obtained both a master of arts and a doctorate of science from Edinburgh University, and wrote on the history of science (McIntyre, 1903). The book was published in his early years as Anderson lecturer but after that, most of his time was taken with educating students. McIntyre augmented his lectures in psychology with experiments for students to perform, and established the subject as a laboratory discipline within the University. His dedication to teaching was such that it was doubted whether a replacement could be found if they appreciated the commitment that would be required (Boyle, 1997). However, Rex Knight (1903–1963, Figure 22.8, 484

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right) was appointed to the lectureship in 1929, and he was elevated to the Anderson chair of psychology when it was created in 1946. By this stage, the named chair was not explicitly associated with comparative psychology. Knight was a charismatic lecturer and attracted many students to study psychology locally through his lectures and more widely through his influential textbook (Knight & Knight, 1954), published with his wife, Margaret (1903–1983). In his review of psychology’s past at Aberdeen, he commented ruefully: “It is true that until 1937, when he was joined by his wife, the Anderson Lecturer was probably the only person north of Dundee in a post in psychology” (Knight, 1962, p. 10). The city that nurtured Bain and provided the first lectureship in psychology in Scotland did not foster its growth until the second half of the 20th century. Moreover, the development of psychology did not favor an area in which Bain’s sympathies were clearly expressed: “Phrenology is thus set up, in contradistinction to the pre-existing systems of mind, as rendering a full account, for the first time, of the influence of the brain upon mental life; as affording new lights in the very perplexing inquiry as to the primitive or elementary faculties and feelings; and as constituting a theory of human character” (1861, p. 16). Such ideas were not echoed in the early stages of psychological instruction at Aberdeen University, whereas it formed a fundamental feature of psychology’s institutional origins at Edinburgh University.

Edinburgh Phrenology is a leitmotif in the accounts above; since the early 19th century, it was one of the bonds between the physiological and philosophical traditions, but not one that cemented their approaches to brain and mind. It was also an element in the institutionalization of psychology in Scotland. Phrenology was viewed in both strongly positive and decidedly negative terms in Edinburgh. Spurzheim visited the city in 1816 and stayed there for several months to try to sway his detractors through a series of public lectures. Among those he convinced of the new “science” was George Combe (1788–1858, Figure 22.9, left), who, in 1820, was one of the founders of the Edinburgh Phrenological Society, the first of its kind in the world (Kaufman, 2005). Combe wrote extensively on phrenology, often defending it from attacks by his fellow citizens. Dugald Stewart’s lack of sympathy for physiological interpretations of mental phenomena extended to Gall’s system of phrenology (as it later became called), and Stewart’s views were absorbed by his students. Among the latter was Thomas Brown, who penned an anonymous attack on phrenology in the Edinburgh Review. Hamilton was another ardent antagonist of phrenology and, in combination with Monro tertius, sought to provide anatomical evidence against it (Kaufman, 2005; Van Wyhe, 2004). Nonetheless, it was not the assault on phrenology that hastened the institutionalization of psychology but financial support offered by one of its adherents, William Ramsay Henderson. The Henderson Trust placed the Edinburgh

Phrenological Society on a firm financial footing, and the funding for the founding lectureship in psychology was based indirectly on the proceeds from phrenology. George Combe set up a similar trust, and it is from this source that the Combe lectureship in psychology was funded. As Drever (1932) later noted: “Certain conditions were laid down: (1) that the lectureship should be called the George Combe Lectureship in General and Experimental Psychology, and that it should be independent of any existing chair or lectureship, (2) that the George Combe lecturer should make provision for the teaching of applied psychology, particularly as regards the application of psychology to education, (3) that the Lecturer should be appointed by the University Court and the George Combe Trustees jointly, and (4) that the Lecturer should report annually to the Trustees with reference to the success of the Lectureship” (p. 24). The first incumbent was William George Smith (1868–1918; Figure 22.9, center). He was trained in philosophy (at Edinburgh) and then studied under Münsterberg at Freiburg and Wundt at Leipzig, where he was awarded his Ph.D. Smith spent 5 years in America at the end of the century, first with William James (1842–1910) and then at Smith College. He returned to Britain to take posts at King’s College, London, and then in physiology at Liverpool before his appointment to the Combe lectureship in 1906. Smith was trained in physiology as well as philosophy and psychology, which resulted in thorough training of psychology students. He was one of the

Fig. 22.9 Edinburgh psychology. Left, Combe’s phrenology. The portrait of George Combe (1788–1858) is combined with a phrenological head marked with the 35 regions he applied in his Elements of Phrenology (Combe, 1850). Center, Combe’s lectureship. William Smith (1868–1918), together with the advertisement for the lectureship to which he was appointed. Right, Drever (primus). James Drever (1873–1950), the first professor of psychology, is shown in a page of his own text describing perception (Drever, 1921). Image © Nicholas Wade.

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founders of the British Psychological Society (in 1901); Collins (2011; Chapter 14, this volume) and Lovie (2001) provide more detailed accounts of the foundation of the Society. James Drever primus (1873–1950; Figure 22.9, right) followed Smith, and he became Professor of psychology in 1931. Drever also received his degree in philosophy from Edinburgh but became more involved with education. He had been a teacher and then lectured in education before taking the Combe lectureship. His concerns were mainly in the application of psychology to education and industry (Drever, 1921, 1925), but he did continue the Edinburgh involvement with color vision (Collins & Drever, 1925). Drever was the only Scottish psychologist with an entry in Murchison’s History of Psychology in Autobiography (1930, 1932). He published several books with Mary Collins, who had been a student of Smith. Drever compiled his Dictionary of Psychology over many years, but he died before it was finally published. His son, James Drever secundus (1910–1993), saw it through the press. It appeared in 1952 and proved immensely popular over many years. The Dictionary defines a “psychologist” as “One with an expert knowledge of the method and facts of the science, either generally, or in some special field; an expert in some of the fields of practical application of psychology; in America and in this and other countries, the expert is marked by his status in a recognized psychological association or society.” Drever secundus had succeeded Drever primus as professor of psychology in 1944, thereby maintaining Edinburgh’s tradition of hereditary chairs. In addition to establishing courses on experimental psychology, Smith nurtured the links with the study of education at the Moray House Training College. As Hearnshaw (1964) has noted, the development of psychology in Scotland during the middle of the 20th century was intimately entwined with the bachelor of education degree. The bonds between psychology and education were strengthened further with the appointment of the statistician, Godfrey Thomson (1881–1955), as director of studies at Moray House in 1925. He later became Bell professor of education at Edinburgh University (Bartholomew, Deary, & Lawn, 2009). Thomson developed tests for intelligence, and one of these (Moray House Test No. 12) was applied to the whole population of 11-year-old school pupils in Scotland on June 1, 1932. A subsequent survey was carried out in 1947. Studies of samples from the 87,498 children tested for the first and 70,805 for 486

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the second Scottish Mental Surveys have provided evidence of the links between intelligence and all manner of physical and psychological processes (see Deary, Whalley, & Starr, 2009).

Glasgow Hamilton’s shadow was cast over the fledgling psychology at Glasgow as it had been at Edinburgh. The professor of logic and rhetoric from 1864–1894 was John Veitch (1829–1894), who was an assistant to Hamilton. Veitch came to Glasgow after occupying the chair of logic, rhetoric, and metaphysics at St. Andrews. His conservative attitudes to philosophy did little to hasten the embrace of psychology. However, Glasgow lagged only 1 year behind Edinburgh in establishing a lectureship in psychology (in 1907), and the post was filled by Henry Jackson Watt (1879–1925; Figure 22.10, left). Watt graduated in philosophy at Aberdeen and, like William Smith, gained his training in psychology in Germany. Initially, he worked with Carl Stumpf in Berlin and then with Oswald Külpe in Würzburg. Also like Smith, he worked with Sherrington in Liverpool. His interests were in the senses and their relation to cognition. Watt wrote books on hearing and on music (Watt, 1917, 1919) during his period of internment during World War I. After his return, he wrote a monograph on the interpretation of dreams (Watt, 1929), which was published after his early death. Watt’s successor was Robert Henry Thouless (1894–1984), who was lecturer in charge of psychology from 1926–1938. His early interests were in perception, and it was during his lectureship in Glasgow that he formulated equations for quantifying perceptual constancy (Thouless, 1931a, b). He proposed a ratio involving differences between perceived and projected values on the one hand and physical and projected on the other (as Brunswik had done in 1928), although Thouless used logarithmic transformations to avoid anomalies that arose with the direct ratios. He referred to perceptual constancy as “phenomenal regression to the real object,” and provided plentiful evidence to support its operation for shape, size, orientation, brightness, and color perception. In 1938, Thouless was followed by Philip Ewart Vernon (1905–1987). Vernon’s early interests, like those of Watt, were in auditory perception, but he became more concerned with the measurement of personality and intelligence. Prior to his appointment to the Glasgow psychology department, he had been the head of psychology at Jordanhill Training Centre in Glasgow. Vernon brought

Fig. 22.10 Glasgow psychology. Left, Sound psychologist. The portrait of Henry Jackson Watt (1879–1925) is after a photograph kindly provided by Prof. A. Sanford; Watt is represented in text from his book on sound together with its title page. Right, Art therapist. Ralph William Pickford (1903–1986) was the first professor of psychology at Glasgow. He is shown in a design spelling the word ART and it reflects his interests in visual esthetics. The portrait was based on a photograph on the inside cover of his Psychology and Visual Aesthetics (1972). Image © Nicholas Wade.

a quantitative approach to the study of individual differences and published widely on this topic; during his 9 years at Glasgow, Vernon published his book on The Measurement of Abilities (Vernon, 1940). The sensory dimension was pursued by Ralph William Pickford (1903–1986; Figure 22.10, right), who co-authored a widely adopted text book on the senses (Wyburn, Pickford, & Hirst, 1964). He investigated aspects of color vision throughout his academic life. Pickford moved to Glasgow in 1930, as assistant to Thouless and became the first professor of psychology in 1955, a post he occupied until 1973. Pickford’s interests were eclectic, as were those of Thouless, and both were attracted to the spiritual or parapsychological aspects of behavior. Thouless was president of the Psychical Research Society in 1942, and Pickford, despite being the first president of the Experimental Psychology Society (1946–1949), was fascinated by art, aesthetics, and psychoanalysis. Thouless carried out many card-sorting studies and introduced the term psi to describe phenomena associated with extrasensory perception and psychokinesis (Thouless, 1947). Pickford is considered as one of the modern pioneers of art therapy, and wrote extensively on esthetics (see Hogan, 2001;

Pickford, 1972). They shared an approach to lecturing that is fast disappearing: “Pickford’s lecturing style was unusual, but effective. Most of his career he used no notes, and passed on to his younger lecturers a piece of advice which he himself received from Thouless, that one should never give a lecture to Scottish students from which it was possible to take notes, otherwise they would never buy textbooks” (Weir, 1986, p. 384).

St. Andrews Hamilton’s influence was felt in the philosophy taught at St. Andrews. Both James Ferrier (1808–1864) and Veitch studied under him and conveyed similar ideas to their students. The situation changed with the appointment of Stout to the chair of logic and metaphysics. Following his sojourn in Aberdeen, he moved to Oxford University in 1899, and then to St. Andrews University in 1903, where he remained until 1936. His textbook, Manual of Psychology, was already in use on his arrival, and the first chapter was concerned with the scope of psychology. He advocated the experimental approach but retained a place for introspection: “What introspection does is to supply us with a direct instead of a hypothetical knowledge of wade

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mental process” (1898, p. 16). Stout’s reputation was based on his works in psychology but he never left philosophy behind: “To assess the contribution of Stout to psychology is, in effect, to assess the contribution of the ‘armchair psychologist’ to psychology as a natural science” (Mace, 1973, p. 322). Nonetheless, his move to St. Andrews should have augured well for the growth of the subject at the most ancient of the Scottish universities, but such was not the case. Psychology remained the handmaiden of philosophy, and when a lectureship was established, in 1914, it was for logic and psychology. By this stage University College, Dundee, had been affiliated with St. Andrews and lectures were given in both locations. The incumbent in Dundee was Charles Dunbar Broad (1887–1971), and Cecil Alec Mace (1894–1971; Figure 22.11, left) was appointed at St. Andrews. Mace slowly introduced the first courses in experimental psychology and eventually set up a laboratory in 1927. Much of Mace’s applied research on incentives among industrial workers was conducted in Dundee (Pratt Yule, 1962). Rex Knight spent the period from 1928 to 1929 at St. Andrews, and Mace’s lectureship was designated as experimental psychology

in 1931. The later editions of Stout’s Manual were revised in collaboration with Mace (and with the assistance of Knight). Mace commenced his Introduction thus: “The progress of Psychology in recent years has been so much a matter of the intrusion of novel ‘points of view,’ and so little a matter of consistent growth in a single direction that particular interest must attach to the developments of so distinguished a representative of the central position of British Psychology as Professor Stout. Of these developments it has fallen to my lot to be in part the scribe” (Stout, 1929, p. vi). Note that the reference is to “British psychology”; the Scottish dimension was essentially lost, both in approach and personnel. Mace left St. Andrews in 1933, to be replaced by Oscar Oeser (1904–1983). In the 1960s, the teaching of psychology became embroiled in the strained relations between St. Andrews and Dundee, and after 1959, almost all the courses were taught at Dundee, where a chair of psychology was established in 1963. The institutions became independent in 1967, and a department of psychology in St. Andrews was founded in 1969, with the chair being occupied by Malcolm Jeeves (Figure 22.11, right).

Fig. 22.11 St. Andrews psychology. Left, Studious psychologist. Cecil Alec Mace (1894–1971) embedded in text from his Psychology of Study (1932), written when he was lecturer in logic and psychology. The portrait of Mace smoking his pipe is derived from a frontispiece illustration in Carver (1962). Right, Neuropsychologist. Malcolm Jeeves was the first professor of psychology at St.Andrews. His research was concerned with neuropsychology, particularly with the functions of the corpus callosum. He was president of the Royal Society of Edinburgh (1996–1999), the emblem of which is present in the background of the design. Image © Nicholas Wade.

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New Universities Up to the early 1960s, there were still just four universities in Scotland—the ancient institutions at St. Andrews, Glasgow, Aberdeen, and Edinburgh. As a consequence of the Robbins Commission into Higher Education, four new ones were created in that decade: Strathclyde (1964) in Glasgow, Heriot-Watt (1966) in Edinburgh, Stirling (1967) and Dundee (1967). Stirling was the only true new university as the others were based in educational institutions of long standing. The number of Scottish Universities has expanded dramatically in the last two decades (there are now over 20), and psychology is taught in many of them. Degrees in psychology, as in other arts and sciences subjects, are obtained after 4 years of study, unlike the 3-year English degrees. The first 2 years involve a range of subjects, with specialization in the final 2 years. The teachers in psychology departments are international, as is the psychology that is taught and investigated.

Conclusion The distinguishing features of Scottish medicine and philosophy did not penetrate far into the psychology of the 20th century. The rise of behaviorism on the one hand and Gestalt psychology on the other also seemed to pass relatively unnoticed within British psychology generally. Some perceptual research was able to ride this wave of indifference because it was nurtured in a more favorable and physiological climate. The constructive aspects of both memory and perception were emphasized at the expense of their holistic or sequential features. Perception remained at the heart of British psychology, and it was attached to a new type of theory linking perception to prediction and action. The link was forged by a Scot (Kenneth Craik, 1914–1945) but not in Scotland. Craik was born and educated in Edinburgh and studied philosophy at its university. He conducted graduate research in psychology under Frederic Bartlett (1886–1969) at Cambridge University, and became director of the applied psychology research unit there in 1944 (see Collins, 2011, Chapter 14, this volume). Craik’s initial work at Cambridge was on visual adaptation, and he demonstrated that the eye operates like a range-setting device. During World War II, he applied his ingenuity for mechanical construction in designing aircraft simulators for studying human– machine interaction in complex tasks. He drew parallels between the operations performed by minds and machines, and suggested that perception and

performance are based on mental models of the environment (Craik, 1943, 1966). The machine metaphor has proved to be particularly attractive to experimental psychologists (see Wilkes, 1997). Craik was only able to enlist relatively simple machines, but his insight lies at the heart of the cognitive revolution that was to sweep through psychology (Gardner, 1987). He worked with analogue devices as the digital computer was still embryonic. Nonetheless, he appreciated the importance of servo systems in adapting to the environment. His concern with prediction rather than reaction (shared with Bartlett) reflected his dissatisfaction with behaviorism. After his untimely death, computing machines increased in speed and complexity so that the tasks that they could simulate became more explicitly cognitive. Concepts from engineering, like information and self-organization, were integrated with a growing knowledge of neurophysiology, with the result that the computer became a metaphor for the brain. The machine metaphor is an appropriate one with which to conclude. In the last decades, computers have transformed psychology. On the one hand, they have replaced the many specialized instruments for conducting psychological experiments (Wade & Heller, 1997). On the other, they have fostered collaborations that are not restricted by geography. Computers and their connectivities, particularly the personal varieties, have homogenized psychology. There is now as little justification for talking about a Scottish psychology as a Scottish computer. It was argued at the beginning of this chapter that, in a historical sense, Scottish psychology was not constrained by geography. This sentiment now applies to the whole of psychology. Scottish psychology in the late 20th and early 21st centuries is essentially of the type practiced throughout the Western world. It displays the focuses and fashions evident elsewhere in Britain, Europe, and North America. The features that distinguished the Scottish school have long since disappeared, but those features have influenced the ways in which current common psychology is practiced.

Future Directions This chapter has explicitly neglected the development of psychology in Scotland’s new universities that were founded since the 1960s. The growth and diversification of these new academic departments will warrant future analysis. The application of psychology in the wider community has been similarly side-stepped. There have wade

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been profound changes in recent years concerning the ways in which psychological services are made available, and these have been driven, in part, by political forces. It might be too early to assess the impact of the changes, but they will provide a source of suitable enquiry. The Scottish educational and legal systems retain basic differences to those practiced in England. This applies to undergraduate university courses in psychology, which are still of 4 years’ duration, but less so to postgraduate research. The extent to which these national differences have influenced the flow of research personnel between the countries is worthy of further study. The internationalization of psychology is reflected in the personnel employed to teach the subject in universities. Such is clearly the case in Scotland, and it could be charted in the changes that have taken place in the last half century.

Bunn, G. C., Lovie, A. D., & Richards, G. D. (Eds.). (2001). Psychology in Britain. Historical essays and personal reflections. Leicester: BPS Books. Deary, I. J., Whalley, L. J., & Starr, J. M. (2009). A lifetime of intelligence. Follow-up studies of the Scottish mental surveys of 1932 and 1947. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. Herman, A. (2003). The Scottish Enlightenment: The Scots’ invention of the modern world. Edinburgh: Fourth Estate. Hearnshaw, L. S. (1987). The shaping of modern psychology. An historical introduction. London: Routledge. Jahoda, G. (2007). A history of social psychology. From the eighteenth-century to the second World War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Robinson, D. N. (1995). An intellectual history of psychology (3rd ed.). London: Arnold. Scotland, J. (1969). The history of Scottish education Vol. 1. From the beginning to 1872. London: University of London Press. Scotland, J. (1969). The history of Scottish education. Vol. 2. From 1872 to the present day. London: University of London Press.

References Acknowledgments I would like to express my thanks to Peter McGeorge for providing the book by Boyle (1997) on Aberdeen psychology, to Peter Wright for discussions regarding Edinburgh psychology, to Tony Sanford for material on Glasgow psychology as well as for a portrait of Henry Watt, to Andy Whiten for information regarding St. Andrews and the editor, David Baker, made some helpful suggestions for the final version. Mike Swanston and Alan Wilkes read drafts of this chapter as well as being the sources of many sober reflections on psychology and its history.

Note 1. Bain is represented in what I refer to as a “perceptual portrait,” and this will apply to all the figures that follow. Perceptual portraits represent people in an unconventional style. Their aim is both artistic and historical. They generally consist of two elements—the portrait and some appropriate motif. The nature of the latter depends upon the endeavors for which the portrayed person was known. In some cases, the motif is drawn specifically to display a phenomenon associated with the individual, in others it is derived from a figure or text in one of their books, or apparatus which they invented. The portraits and motifs have themselves been manipulated in a variety of ways, using graphical, photographical, and computer graphical procedures. The illustrations often require some effort on the part of the viewer to discern the faces embedded in them. Further examples can be found in Wade (1990, 1995, 2006, 2009b, 2011) and at http://neuroportraits.eu/.

Further Reading Broadie, A. (Ed.). (2003). The Cambridge companion to the Scottish Enlightenment. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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Schickore, J. (2007). The microscope and the eye: A history of reflections, 1740–1870. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Scotland, J. (1969). The history of Scottish education. Vol. 1. From the beginning to 1872. London: University of London Press. Shairp, J. C., Tait, P. G., & Adams-Reilly, A. (1873). Life and letters of James David Forbes, F.R.S. London: Macmillan. Shryock, R. H. (1944). The strange case of Wells’ theory of natural selection. In M. F. A. Montagu (Ed.), Studies and essays in the history of science and learning offered in homage to George Sarton (pp. 197–207). New York: Schuman. Spillane, J. D. (1981). The doctrine of the nerves. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Stewart, D. (1792). Elements of the philosophy of the human mind. London: Strahan and Cadell. Stewart, D. (1810). Philosophical essays. Edinburgh: Creech and Constable. Stewart, D. (1811). Biographical memoirs, of Adam Smith, LL.D. of William Robertson, D.D. and of Thomas Reid D.D. Edinburgh: Creech, Bell and Bradfute, and Constable. Stewart, D. (1859). Elements of the philosophy of the human mind. Boston: Munroe. Stout, G. F. (1896). Analytic psychology. London: Swan Sonnenschein. Stout, G. F. (1898). A manual of psychology Vol. 1. London: Clive. Stout, G. F. (1929). A manual of psychology (4th ed.). London: Clive. Thouless, R. H. (1931a). Phenomenal regression to the real object. I. British Journal of Psychology, 21, 339–59. Thouless, R. H. (1931b). Phenomenal regression to the real object. II. British Journal of Psychology, 22, 1–30. Thouless, R. H. (1947). The psi processes in normal and “paranormal” psychology. Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research, 48, 177–96. Valentine, J. (1900). A society of Aberdeen philosophers one hundred years ago. Transactions of the Aberdeen Philosophical Society, 3, ix–xxiv. Van Wyhe, J. (2004). Phrenology and the origins of Victorian scientific naturalism. Aldershot, Hampshire: Ashgate. Vernon, P. E. (1940). The measurement of abilities. London: University of London Press. Von Senden, M. (1960). Space and sight. P. Heath (Trans.). London: Methuen. Wade, N. J. (Ed.). (1983). Brewster and Wheatstone on vision. London: Academic Press. Wade, N. (1990). Visual allusions: Pictures of perception. London: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. Wade, N. (1995). Psychologists in word and image. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Wade, N. J. (1998). A natural history of vision. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Wade, N. J. (2003a). Destined for distinguished oblivion: The scientific vision of William Charles Wells (1757–1817). New York: Kluwer/Plenum. Wade, N. J. (2003b). The search for a sixth sense: The cases for vestibular, muscle, and temperature senses. Journal of the History of the Neurosciences, 12, 175–202. Wade, N. J. (2004). Philosophical instruments and toys: Optical devices extending the art of seeing. Journal of the History of the Neurosciences, 13, 102–24. Wade, N. J. (2005a). Medical societies and insanity in lateeighteenth century London: The fight between Andrew

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Wheatstone, C. (1838). Contributions to the physiology of vision - Part the first. On some remarkable, and hitherto unobserved, phenomena of binocular vision. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, 128, 371–394. Whytt, R. (1751). An essay on the vital and other involuntary motions of animals. Edinburgh: Hamilton, Balfour, and Neill. Whytt, R. (1755). Physiological essays. Edinburgh: Hamilton, Balfour, and Neill. Whytt, R. (1765). Observations on the nature, causes, and cure of those disorders which have commonly been called nervous

hypochondriac, or hysteric. Edinburgh: Becket, Du Hondt, and Balfour. Wilkes, A. L. (1997). Knowledge in minds: Individual and collective processes in cognition. Hove, East Sussex: Psychology Press. Wilkes, A. L., & Wade, N. J. (1997). Bain on neural networks. Brain and Cognition, 33, 295–305. Wyburn, G. M., Pickford, R. W., & Hirst, R. J. (1964). Human senses and perception. Edinburgh: Oliver & Boyd.

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C HA P TE R

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South Africa

Johann Louw

Abstract South African psychology shows many similarities with the way the discipline developed internationally. Six features are identified and used to describe the historical development of the discipline in this country: its responsiveness to local contexts, in particular the links developed between psychological expertise and social problems; how the politics of race weaves in and out of psychological writings and practices; a shift to greater practicality in the fields of education, health, and labor; growth as a subject taught at university and as a professional practice; professionalization; and the significant increase in the number and proportion of women among the ranks of psychologists, especially after 1980. Developments during World War II and the statutory recognition of the discipline are regarded as pivotal events for its subsequent expansion. Keywords: apartheid, education, feminization, labor, mental health, professionalization, race, social context

The history of psychology in South Africa often is presented against the backdrop of the country’s notorious race-based politics—apartheid. The assumption or expectation is that psychology developed along a quite different trajectory than elsewhere; that the exceptional sociopolitical circumstances in this country also made the history of psychology deviate from international developments. Surprisingly, however, the opposite is true, and the development of psychology in 20th-century South Africa parallels its development internationally, especially in the United States and Europe. The structure of the chapter is mainly chronological, via a division in four major periods: before World War II; the war itself; post-World War II; and post-1994, after South Africa’s first fully democratic elections. Significant events in each period will be highlighted. More importantly, though, I will argue that these events are manifestations of underlying processes that South African psychology shares with the international development of the discipline. These processes include: responsiveness of the 496

discipline to local contexts; political and social dimensions (in particular race in South Africa); an emphasis on practice; growth of the discipline as an academic discipline as well as a professional practice; professionalization; and feminization (late in the 20th century).

Before World War II Psychology entered the South African scene in the years between 1910 and 1920 as an academic discipline in the fledgling universities of the time. In the years following World War I, the South African university system expanded rapidly, and psychology was part of it. Initially, the discipline was institutionalized in departments of philosophy, logic and psychology, or even in a department of “mental and moral science.” During the 1920s, these early starters began to separate from departments of philosophy to form independent departments of psychology, with their own chairs. Rhodes University in Grahamstown claims to be the first such department of psychology, formed in 1926, although the Universities of

Stellenbosch, Cape Town, and the Witwatersrand claim to have reached this milestone earlier. Growth was slow: by 1930, only five independent departments existed, and by 1940, only 250 lecturing positions in psychology existed at all universities (Louw, 1997). Before the 1940s, psychology was institutionalized almost exclusively at universities, with little activity outside the departments of psychology. The teaching syllabi in the departments mirrored those from European and British universities: at Stellenbosch University, for example, the department was strongly under the influence of German experimental psychology and was one of the first to run a psychology laboratory. The department of psychology at the University of Pretoria favored psychotechnics, characterology, and typology (in particular Sheldon and Kretschmer’s work). At the University of Cape Town, teaching was geared more toward a British tradition. H. A. Reyburn, the chair of that department, was trained at Glasgow University, and was quite eclectic in his research interests, doing work on dual-medium instruction in schools, differential tests of intelligence, the structure of temperament, vocational selection for the medical profession, and more. He produced the first introductory psychology textbook in South Africa, An Introduction to Psychology, prior to 1930. The senior lecturer in the department was J.G. Taylor, a strong behaviorist, who would play a significant part in the development of behavior modification techniques in South Africa. The first psychology journal also originated from a university department. In 1932, Paul Skawran, the professor of psychology at the University of Pretoria, founded and edited the South African Journal of Psychology and Education. Only two issues were produced, and then it ceased publication. The department of psychology at the University of the Witwatersrand deserves special mention for I. D. MacCrone’s groundbreaking research on attitudes. Its significance was twofold: first, it had a lasting and enduring influence on South African psychology—so much so that the themes of prejudice, racial attitudes, and authoritarianism dominated the local social psychology scene after World War II. Second, while others looked for essential mental differences between “the races,” he looked toward the social stereotypes of the dominant groups for explanations of the “the race problem” in South Africa. In 1937, he published a major book in which he presented a historical argument for the foundation of race attitudes in South Africa. According to

his frontier hypothesis, life on the frontier of the colony in the 19th century shaped race attitudes and color prejudices among the white settlers. Although there was no frontier to speak of in the 20th century, these racial attitudes were maintained among whites deep into the 20th century. Although psychology in this time was concentrated at universities, a history that would take the academic discipline as its starting point would be a serious misrepresentation and miss much of significance. It certainly would miss the outstanding feature of 20th-century psychology in this country: the steady drift from an academic discipline based in universities to an applied/practical discipline with the majority of its practitioners in diverse fields of practice. For example, in 2004, there were still only approximately 400 academics in departments of psychology, educational psychology, and organizational psychology, compared to at least 5,500 professionally registered psychologists. Thus, psychology in 20th-century South Africa transformed itself from a marginal academic discipline to a fully fledged profession whose technical expertise was in great demand. The roots of this shift lie in the period before World War II and in the educational domain in particular.

Education Before 1929, there was very little evidence of applied social and educational research in general at South African universities, or outside of them. The state itself was minimally involved in such research. During the 1930s, this changed, partly as a result of the formation of a national research institute in 1929 (the National Bureau for Social and Educational Research), and partly as a result of a major multidisciplinary investigation into a new social problem: “the poor whites.” Both developments would not have been possible without the substantial support of the Carnegie Corporation of New York. Poverty among black1 people for a long time was not regarded as a social problem, but in the 1920s, thousands of white people, mainly Afrikaansspeaking, became visibly poor. General consensus was that something had to be done about it. In 1929, the Carnegie Corporation made a substantial sum of money available to fund an investigation (founding what was known as the Carnegie Commission), mainly as a result of the efforts of E. G. Malherbe. Malherbe was an educational psychologist trained at Columbia University, and together with R. W. Wilcocks, the Berlin-trained professor of psychology at Stellenbosch University, louw

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ensured that psychology would play a significant role in the Commission’s work. The children of poor whites featured prominently in the educational and psychological investigations, especially in light of the question of whether they were “feebleminded” or not. Tests of intelligence were administered to thousands of poor white school children all over South Africa. The results were not too discouraging: poor white children obtained lower scores on the tests than did white school children in general, but the majority fell within the limits of normality. Thus, the matter could be rectified through education, the Commission thought. A more vocationally orientated schooling system for these children in particular was recommended, as well as school feeding programs to improve their nutrition. Through the work of the Commission, and the significant role that psychological testing played, scientists and policy makers became convinced of the usefulness of these tests. They could produce “facts” that could be used as instruments of social planning. The first psychological tests developed in South Africa preceded the Commission’s work. From about 1916 onward, quite a number of adaptations of the Binet-Simon test were done. The first South African individual test of intelligence, the Official Mental Hygiene Individual Scale, was published in 1926, but it was still based on the Stanford Revision of the Binet-Simon. When the National Bureau for Social and Educational Research got going with its work in the 1930s, as a national research institution, psychological testing indeed formed an important part of its activities. E. G. Malherbe was put in charge of the Bureau. In line with the recommendations of the Carnegie Commission, intelligence tests were introduced in white schools to channel “feebleminded” pupils into separate schools and others into different ability groups. It certainly is fair to say that, during the 1920s and 1930s, the development and application of these tests reached unusually high levels. Foster (1990), for example, pointed out that, in the 1916 Mental Disorders Act, mental defectives were defined in behavioral or social terms, with little mention of intelligence. Twelve years later, they were described and categorized almost entirely in terms of scores on intelligence tests. Although the concern with poor children and mentally handicapped children focused almost exclusively on white children, black children also came under psychometric scrutiny. Generally, they 498

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performed worse than white children on these tests, and the question in the 1930s was how to interpret these differences. For some, such as M. L. Fick, an important government psychologist and developer of tests, with a doctorate from Harvard University, the innate superiority of white school children was unequivocal. He published a monograph in 1939, The Educability of the South African Native, that formulated these results and interpretations sharply and unambiguously: “Although all the facts regarding the educability of the Native may not be in, the available objective data point to a marked inferiority on the part of the Native in comparison with Europeans. This inferiority occurring in certain tests in which learning or environmental conditions are equalized for the Native and the European groups does not appear to be of a temporary nature” (Fick, 1939, p. 56). Many psychologists, however, were inclined toward an environmental interpretation for these results. The most sophisticated defense of this position came from Simon Biesheuvel of the University of the Witwatersrand in 1943. In his book African Intelligence, he gave a critique of the assumptions underlying cross-cultural intelligence testing, and argued that levels of schooling, parental education, home accommodation, and nutrition made such comparisons between black and white virtually impossible. This book at the time was regarded as an international landmark. This difference of interpretation gives a first indication that psychologists were sharply divided on matters where the politics of race and psychology intersected. After the war, this would be of even greater consequence for the discipline. Intelligence tests were not the only ones being developed during the 1920s and 1930s. The first tests for vocational placement appeared in 1927, for plumbers and carpenters, later expanded to tailors, dressmakers, and typists. These tests were developed mainly at the University of Stellenbosch, and were regarded as useful to provide vocational guidance to school children, as well as for personnel selection purposes. At the University of Stellenbosch itself, this work was recognized as sufficiently important to justify the introduction in 1927 of the first chair in applied psychology (and psychotechnics) in South Africa. The first incumbent of this chair was H. F. Verwoerd, who later would become prime minister of South Africa, and would be called “the architect of apartheid.” The appeal of psychological testing, both in terms of more general policy making and guidance

and personnel selection, was in its perceived potential to provide objective information about social and individual problems. Internationally, science had become the authority to justify social policies, and all the men who played a role in the developments described here had received training abroad. They had all absorbed the view that science was to provide “facts,” that would be useful in decision making. These efforts also positioned psychology as a discipline that could provide those facts; a discipline with the knowledge and techniques to produce them. This was essential for the future development of psychology. A claim was made for psychology to be acknowledged as the discipline with the necessary expertise to organize and direct specific aspects of social life. Vocational advice and guidance, for example, became “psychological” fields of professional activity, in which psychologists were regarded as uniquely qualified to perform the kinds of tasks that would be useful. In 1937, psychological and guidance services were launched in three of the four provinces, when the first psychologists were appointed in the provincial departments of education. In the process, education became the first domain of practice in which psychologists would stake a claim to relevant expertise, and to be accepted as such. They would remain psychological fields of practice until the present.

Mental Health Although psychology’s involvement in the mental health domain would only take off after World War II, the period preceding the war structured much of the institutional apparatus for mental health. As such, it forms a kind of “prehistory” of clinical psychology and deserves discussion as such. The Cape Colony, which in 1910 would become the Cape Province in a unified South Africa, had been a British colony for most of the 19th century. British colonial influence therefore was noticeable in a number of ways, one of which was the extension of social control over deviancy. The differentiation of the insane from other categories of dependent people, for example, was a prominent feature of this process. For most of the 19th century, no separate facilities existed for the insane, and they were housed with the physically ill, lepers, and paupers. Differentiated institutions for the insane emerged only toward the end of the 19th century. The best-known of these was Valkenberg Asylum in Cape Town, completed in 1896, and still in use as such at present. It imported a British model for the construction of asylums, and

was designed on a dispersed pavilion plan by Sydney Mitchell, an architect from Edinburgh, Scotland. The separation of the insane from the rest of the dependent populations went hand in hand with an increasing racial segregation of the patient populations as well. Segregation by race in asylums was of course a widespread practice in many countries at the time–certainly in the United States and India. Valkenberg was built exclusively for the white patient population. In 1916, a section of the asylum was opened to accommodate black insane patients, but in a separate section across a small river. In 1894, an asylum for the black insane was opened in Grahamstown, in the eastern part of the Cape Colony. Although this strict separation of asylums according to race disappeared after a while, the patient population within the asylums were rigidly separated until the end of the apartheid era late in the 20th century. Mental health legislation is another aspect in the prehistory of the relationship between psychology and mental health that deserves mention. A significant step was taken in 1916, when the Mental Disorders Act was passed to provide for “mentally disordered or defective persons”: “idiots,” “imbeciles,” and “the feebleminded.” It meant that those individuals had to be recognized (diagnosed) as such, and registered to qualify for services and facilities. As noted earlier, the scope it provided in the 1920s for psychological testing was significant. The Act also created a new position, that of Commissioner of Mental Hygiene. Its first occupant was a medical practitioner, and the first psychologist was appointed in 1923 in a subdepartment of Mental Hygiene. There was little dispute at the time that the medical profession was the appropriate one to deal with the mentally defective and to be in charge of the specialized institutions for their care and confinement. All superintendents of asylums, for example, were medical personnel, and would remain so (Foster, 1990).

Labor Some South African psychologists had argued for the potential utility of psychological knowledge to industry. When the University of Stellenbosch created a chair in applied psychology in 1927, the department certainly included business and industry among those who could benefit from psychology. At the University of Cape Town, the senior lecturer in the Department, J.G. Taylor, gave a series of lectures in 1925 to the Economic Society, one of which dealt with industrial efficiency and the work of the National Institute of Industrial Psychology louw

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(NIIP) in England. It seems there was even interest from industry’s side, as one of the gold mines contracted someone from the NIIP to advise them on scientific management techniques in shoveling gold-bearing ore. Nevertheless, none of these sentiments on practical relevance of psychology in this domain translated into actual career opportunities for psychologists. To conclude: by the early 1940s, psychology in South Africa did not extend much beyond the universities—the few exceptions given above notwithstanding. Most of the expansion outside the universities occurred in the educational domain, with only faint stirrings in mental health. Very little was being done to make psychology attractive to people in the industrial or labor domain. Although the decision to mark World War II as an important transition in the history of South African psychology is to some extent an arbitrary one, there is also justification for the argument that the war really acted as an important stimulus to subsequent developments. I intend to show that it is in industry and labor where the war made a difference.

World War II Three developments during World War II are noteworthy: • The creation of a Personnel Research Section in the Leather Industries Research Institute, with Isobel White in charge • The activities of the Army Education Scheme, under E. G. Malherbe • The establishment of the Aptitude Tests Section of the South African Air Force, with Simon Biesheuvel in command.

The Leather Industries Research Institute South Africa’s participation in World War II on the side of the Allied Forces had a significant impact on the manufacturing industry. Industries that benefited from the interruption of imports did especially well, and the engineering and metal, food and drink, clothing and textiles, chemicals, and leather industries were particularly well-placed in this regard. Rhodes University College, as it was known then, established a department of tanning, hides and skins research in 1936, to support the leather industry in the Eastern Cape. When the South African Army faced difficulties in securing an adequate supply of army boots, the industry, together with individuals from this department, formed a Leather Industries Research Institute (LIRI) in 1941. The leather 500

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industry was labor intensive, and it was thought that especially the footwear section could benefit from some kind of personnel research. By happy coincidence, a suitable person was on hand in Grahamstown to launch a Personnel Research Section within the Institute: Isobel White. She had done courses in industrial psychology at Edinburgh University, worked in factories in Manchester and Birmingham, and carried out research for the NIIP in London. The Section addressed itself to “the human side of production,” typical of the time. It applied “the science of industrial psychology” to place individuals in those jobs they were most suited for, arrange working conditions to minimize fatigue, and optimize industrial relations. It introduced a more systematic way of keeping personnel records in the factories, developed personnel selection test batteries, studied accidents that occurred, and surveyed environmental conditions in the factories. The Section’s work showed the strong influences of human factors psychology of the time, and of the Industrial Fatigue Board and the NIIP in England. Recognition for the Section’s work came in 1944, when the department of psychology at Rhodes University introduced a 1-year diploma in personnel welfare and management. The department collaborated with the staff of the Personnel Research Section of the LIRI: the university provided the academic training, and the Section the practical preparation for the diploma. White’s involvement with the LIRI also set in motion the first steps in the formation of the South African Institute for Personnel Management. People working in the personnel field reported that they worked in isolation from others who did similar work. Following White’s request in 1943, the Institute for Personnel Management in London agreed that a branch be established in nearby Port Elizabeth. In 1946, membership was strong enough (147) to form a South African Institute for Personnel Management. The work of the LIRI’s Personnel Research Section formed a watershed in the relationship between industry and psychology in South Africa. There were real demands in this manufacturing sector for psychological expertise to manage “the human factor.” Psychologists were able to respond to these institutional demands on the basis of their claims to have an applicable knowledge base, relevant to the needs of this labor market.

The Army Education Scheme During World War II, the Armies of the Allies introduced education schemes to provide education to

Fig. 23.1 Isobel White conducting aptitude tests for machinists in the shoe trade. (Photograph from the collection of I.H.B. White, and used with permission).

rank-and-file soldiers, and to find out “what they think.” It was a novel effort on the part of military leaders to assess troop morale through polling, and then to direct attempts to address soldiers’ concerns through a process of “democratic education.” The best known was the work carried out by social psychologists in the U.S. Army’s Information and Education Division, published in the four-volume series, The American Soldier. The Army Education Scheme (AES) was established in 1941 in the South African Army, the same year in which similar services were introduced in the British and Australian armies. It was devised as a model of adult education with a specific focus on civic and political concerns, to enable the soldiers to “defend democracy.” The AES had to explain to the soldiers the reasons for the war, and the democratic ideals that underpinned their efforts. The South African government was always concerned about what would happen after the war, as the country’s entry into the war was bitterly contested. In May 1944, the AES conducted a survey among 7,000 white soldiers to ask their opinions about matters of national concern: political, racial, and social. The survey was conducted by the psychologist Bernard Notcutt, who would later chair the department of psychology at the University of Natal in Pietermaritzburg. In 1945, the results were published in a booklet, “What the Soldier Thinks”.

The responses to the survey were encouraging to the version of South Africanism that the AES officers were promoting. (Staffed mainly by political liberals and left-wingers, the AES wanted to promote a nonracial, liberal-democratic South Africa.) For example, 47% of the sample agreed with the statement that “Natives ought to be given education of the same kind as Europeans,” and 42% agreed that “Natives should be given more political rights than they have at present, but only gradually as they become more civilized.” A considerable percentage of soldiers also favored some state control over mines, industries, and farms. When the information about these responses leaked out, the Information Officers, as they were called, were accused of socialistic and communistic ideas. (Indeed, very similar concerns were raised against the activities of the British and Australian versions of the Service.) This survey was one of the largest carried out by South African social scientists at the time, and was further expression of the belief that knowledge, here of soldiers’ opinions and attitudes, was useful in managing or educating them. In addition, it established strong links between the researchers active in the field, especially in a country where the field is not that well-populated in any event. The men (almost exclusively) who formed part of these research efforts, took up important positions in the local social science research community. louw

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The Aptitude Tests Section of the South African Air Force The wartime activities of psychologists involved in the personnel matters of the South African Air Force (SAAF) during World War II were directly responsible for the growth of industrial psychology after the war. There is evidence of earlier involvement of South African psychologists in selecting pilots for the SAAF, following the success that senior officers perceived of similar efforts in the France. The department of psychology at the University of Pretoria, under Paul Skawran, indeed developed a test battery for this purpose, but the work done by the Aptitude Tests Section (ATS) superseded these efforts. The Chief of General Staff of the South African Defence Force approached the University of the Witwatersrand during the war to inquire about the possibility of setting up a unit for the selection and classification of pilots. The task was taken up by Simon Biesheuvel, a lecturer in the department of psychology, who was already involved in the work of the AES. The ATS followed the tried and tested method of determining who is suitable for flying duties: they started with a job analysis of flying training and flying duties, followed by the construction of a test battery to assess suitability on the defined characteristics, and finally undertook research to determine whether these tests predict actual performance. In May 1942, the Air Force introduced the tests

developed by Biesheuvel’s section as a selection and classification device for aircrew. The selection work of the section was soon extended to the selection and classification of artisans in the Air Force. In addition, the ATS was drawn into the equivalent of psychotherapeutic tasks, as operational stress took its toll on aircrew. They also ventured into industrial relations: They took steps to modify attitudes, identified sources of grievance, and investigated absenteeism. Finally, they established a psychophysiological laboratory to investigate the psychophysiology of high-altitude flying and related medical problems. By the end of the war, the ATS had amassed an impressive body of expertise on the application of psychology to industrial and personnel matters. It had a staff of nearly 90, and had tested thousands of men. When they were demobilized after the war, it released this expertise at a time when the relationship between science and industry was receiving unprecedented attention. In 1945, the scientific adviser to the Prime Minister (J.C. Smuts) was given the task to set up a scientific and industrial research organization in the country. There was widespread dissatisfaction with the quality and quantity of industrial research conducted in South Africa, as this was thought to hamper growth. The Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) was established in the same year, to address these concerns. By that time, the effort to place industrial production, as well as

Fig. 23.2 Apparatus constructed in 1943 to measure arm–leg coordination in prospective pilots. (Photograph from the collection of S. Biesheuvel, and used with permission).

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the management of human behavior, on a scientific footing, was already well established in the Western world. The CSIR would be the vehicle to achieve this in South Africa as well. Conditions could not have been better to include in this Council a unit that would concern itself with the “human side of production.” The war increased the country’s industrial capability, and drew attention to corresponding skills shortages. From the manufacturing and gold mining industries, voices went up that bemoaned the lack of attention to the human element in industry. Indeed, in 1945, it was officially proposed to reconstitute the ATS as a national institute for personnel selection and research. In 1946, the National Institute for Personnel Research was formed as a unit in the CSIR, with Biesheuvel as its director. Eight scientific officers assisted him—all of whom who had done duty in the ATS (interestingly, five of the eight were women). This, to all intent and purposes, was the starting point of industrial psychology in South Africa.

In many countries, the period following World War II was decisive in establishing psychology as a science and a profession. This development can be traced in a number of ways: its growth as an academic discipline (new specialist areas, increasing student numbers, more staff appointed); as a profession (increasing emphasis on practical/applied matters, the growth of clinical psychology, state recognition and sanction, employment patterns of psychologists); and as an international enterprise, with the formation of international disciplinary associations such as the International Union of Psychological Science in 1951. By the 1950s, psychology was sufficiently established as a field of study in South Africa that all universities had a department of psychology, and newly established universities would have a department included as a matter of course. At present, there are 17 universities in the country, all with departments of psychology.

of this government were increasingly out of step with developments in societies in Europe and North America. As the tide turned against the race paradigm in these societies (and science), South Africa’s policies solidified the system of racial domination widely known as apartheid. In a few instances, direct clashes occurred between the state and more liberal psychologists who dissented with state policy. The response of the state was to stifle that resistance fairly brutally. In 1964, Kurt Danziger, the head of the department of psychology at the University of Cape Town, gave evidence in the political trial of another academic at the same university. He presented the case in court that solitary confinement, as introduced by the Public Safety Act of 1953, placed detainees under such duress that the evidence obtained during the period of detention was unreliable and should be disregarded by the courts. The Minister of the Interior acted swiftly: He asked Danziger for the immediate return of his South African passport. Danziger had to apply for a German passport to leave the country to take up a period of study and research leave. However, holders of foreign passports needed an exit permit to reenter South Africa, and this was refused. Danziger therefore had to obtain an ordinary exit permit, and when he left the country, he lost his South African citizenship and was considered a “prohibited person”—someone not allowed into South Africa again. In the 1980s, politically active psychologists became involved again in political cases brought before the courts. In 1987, at the height of state repression, a book, Detention and Torture in South Africa, appeared that returned psychology to the terrain of detention and torture (Foster, Davis, & Sandler, 1987). Interviews with 176 political detainees revealed that 83% experienced some form of physical torture during detention. The publication of the report unleashed a media storm, in which it was clear that a campaign against the findings of the report was being orchestrated from the government’s side.

Race Politics

Studies of Racial Attitudes Continued

If the sociopolitical situation in South Africa prior to the war formed an important contextual factor in explaining developments in psychology, it moved to center stage after the war. The expectation that South African society would become relatively more open, and common citizenship at least a possibility, was shattered by the election of the National Party in 1948. The explicit racial segregationist policies

I. D. MacCrone continued his racial attitude studies after World War II, but he increasingly tried to develop theoretical concepts that could help explain the findings of the more descriptive studies. In 1955, he put forward his notion of the Calvinistic-puritanical personality type as something that underlies the peculiar structure of white attitudes toward blacks. It involved factors such as ethnocentrism (group centeredness),

Post-World War II Developments

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intro-punitiveness (being repressive with self), extrapunitiveness (being severe with others), religious conservatism (fundamentalism), and reactionary racialism (Louw & Foster, 2004). The shift toward studies of racial prejudice and attitudes was an indication of a wider change of approach in studying race. Instead of searching for genetic interpretations of race differences, the international literature switched to a discourse of cultural differences. MacCrone’s attitude research fitted well with this new “race relations” paradigm. Thus, he continued to regard difficult group relations in South Africa not in terms of “the native problem,” but rather as one that had to do with white attitudes. The work on race attitudes remained largely within academic psychology, as Louw and Foster (2004) indicated. MacCrone’s work was hardly applied in terms of administration or policy, and the political developments in the 1950s and 1960s made that increasingly unlikely. In the late 1950s, MacCrone became vice-chancellor of the University of the Witwatersrand, and led national campaigns against government policy of segregating universities on a racial basis. It is at this time that the idea of South Africa as a kind of social laboratory for the study of intergroup relations took hold. It attracted two well-known social psychologists, Gordon Allport and Thomas Pettigrew, to South Africa in the 1950s to take advantage of this situation. Allport had been invited to give the Hoernlé Lecture at the University of Natal in Durban and travelled to South Africa on a Ford Foundation grant. Their work focused on the authoritarian personality and had a lasting influence on the study of race attitudes in South Africa (Louw & Foster, 1991).

Labor, Psychology, and the National Institute for Personnel Research Although the National Institute for Personnel Research (NIPR) started out as a tentative venture, after only 2 years it made such rapid progress, and industry was so prepared to pay for its services, that it was converted into a permanent Institute of the CSIR. By 1948, the NIPR had attracted new contracts from a wide range of industries: a gold mine, clothing manufacturers, a steel manufacturer, and the South African Air Force, as a continuation of the work of the ATS. In 1946, the Gold Producers’ Committee of the South African Chamber of Mines approached the NIPR to develop psychological tests for the classification of African mineworkers, and the selection 504

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of African supervisors for underground operations. If a single study can be identified as a watershed in the development of industrial psychology in South Africa, it has to be this one. Gold was a keystone to the South African economy for most of the 20th century. Until the 1980s, gold exports were the predominant source of foreign exchange earnings, and South Africa was the world’s largest gold producer until 2007. Changes in the production of gold (e.g., increased mechanization) from the late 1940s made it easier to convince gold producers that their labor problems were amenable to psychological intervention. As machines were increasingly used underground, more semi-skilled (as opposed to unskilled) workers were required. More black workers had to be trained in these skills, and during the 1950s, mining companies spent large amounts of money on developing training facilities. The NIPR was approached to provide a “scientific” way of grading workers prior to training, according to their ability to benefit from the different forms of training on offer in the gold mines. Psychological testing, with its history of classifying human beings, was the obvious response to this request. The NIPR constructed two test batteries: the General Adaptability Battery, to screen and classify new recruits to the mines; and a set of leadership group tests, to select supervisory labor. Thus, African recruits could be graded into three categories: unskilled, who were suitable only for manual tasks; semi-skilled, those who would respond to training for mechanical duties such as laying tracks; and supervisory work, those who would supervise the workers in these two categories. In constructing these tests, the NIPR faced interesting technical challenges. The workers were drawn from many countries in southern Africa, and spoke many different languages, with virtually no knowledge of English. The workers also were mostly illiterate, and very few of them had previous experience of working in modern industrial jobs. The tests had to be robust enough to deal with a large daily intake of migrant laborers and rough handling. Finally, the tests had to be administered and interpreted by nonspecialist staff. As a result, the tests were not of a paper-and-pencil nature; were not based on language, including the instructions (which were mimed); and invited action rather than the spoken or written word. The mining groups certainly perceived the introduction of the psychological tests as successful. They reported benefits like a reduction in training time, lower accident rates, and improvement in

Fig. 23.3 African mineworkers doing a disc-sorting test, in which metal discs stamped with letters and figures had to be sorted from the tray on the candidate’s left into their appropriately marked compartments in the tray on his right. (Photograph from the collection of S. Biesheuvel, and used with permission).

supervision. By 1955, all the mines in the group that commissioned the tests were using them, and by 1969, some 25 test centers, serving approximately 60 mines, had been established in the industry. The General Adaptability Battery remained in use until 1971, when it was replaced by the Classification Test Battery, which performed the same function. In addition, the NIPR conducted validation studies

and impressive correlations were reported between test scores and subsequent job success. The NIPR, in addition, did work that went well beyond the development of classification tests for the gold mines. It introduced a mathematical-statistical division to provide test validation techniques and services to other divisions, and thus improve psychometric rigor and statistical sophistication in the

Fig. 23.4 African mineworkers being tested in a leaderless group test situation. The task involves transporting a drum across a gap without touching the ground. (Photograph from the collection of S. Biesheuvel, and used with permission).

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work of the Institute. A second addition was an electroencephalographic (EEG) division. Biesheuvel had always been interested in temperament, and how to measure it, and saw in the EEG work the possibility to obtain an objective measure of the temperament variable. This division put encephalography in South Africa on a scientific footing. Its findings were applied to the nature of intelligence, temperament, vigilance, the effect of alcohol and drugs on behavior, and the involvement of neurological factors in fatigue and accidents. In the 1960s, the work shifted toward the fitness of the work situation, rather than simply the fitness of the individual. In this, the influence of the Tavistock Institute of Human Relations was discernible. Research was devoted to social anthropological and sociological questions, and how attitudes (for example) influenced productivity, job preference, absenteeism, job evaluation, and so on. The NIPR also conducted research on racial differences that went in many directions. Some had to do with tests of skill and temperament; some with perception (such as depth perception in Africans); and some with EEG differences between blacks and whites. The NIPR’s work on African workers expanded in the mid-1950s to include a study of African clerks in the government service. The work was conducted by Rae Sherwood, under Biesheuvel’s direction. The results of what can even today be regarded as one of the most sophisticated studies done in the field landed the NIPR, and Biesheuvel and Sherwood personally, into grave difficulties with the government. The study found that the roles expected of African people in government service and in the wider society placed a minimum emphasis on their ability, self-determination, and the exercise of initiative. Instead, those who were compliant and ingratiated themselves to their supervisors were valued more by white government officials. The subordinate status expected of them in the workplace limited their roles as workers and as citizens, exposed them to censure from other Africans, and limited the efficiency of employees as well as the organization itself. Sherwood obtained permission from the government as sponsor of the research to use the study as the basis of her Ph.D. at the University of the Witwatersrand and to publish the initial results. Her paper appeared in 1958 (Sherwood, 1958) and set a chain of events in motion that culminated in Biesheuvel resigning as director of the NIPR. The Institute was always regarded with suspicion by government, as it was too liberal in its general stance 506

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on racial politics. This study (as did others) delivered results that were unpalatable to government, and from 1961 onward, the NIPR found it increasingly difficult to land government contracts. Biesheuvel eventually resigned as director to move to the private sector. Sherwood herself was unable to submit the work towards her Ph.D. Only in 1973, upon reapplication, did she obtain permission to have it submitted and examined. Still, the thesis was embargoed, marked “Definitely not for consultation.” This work existed in limbo until 2008, when I happened to come across it in the archives of the University of the Witwatersrand, still sealed. Upon request, the University lifted the embargo, and the work is now freely available (see Sherwood, 1960). In 1966, the NIPR ventured into military terrain again, when it was approached by the South African Navy to select submariners to serve on its newly acquired submarines. The NIPR used an extensive battery of psychological tests, interviews, and group assessment procedures to accomplish this task. Again, there is evidence that the measures were successful, as indicated by the low percentage of selected candidates who did not complete the training. In general there is little information available on the psychological work conducted in South Africa after World War II, especially work done by the Military Psychological Institute of the South African Defence Force.

Clinical Psychology and Professionalization Over the last few decades, there has been a global trend within psychology to move from a sciencebased academic discipline to a profession dominated by practice (Sexton & Hogan, 1992). The work of the NIPR provided a significant impetus to the professionalization of psychology in this country. Psychologists certainly came out of the war with increased prestige in the business community. In the ATS, psychologists and the military authorities cooperated to manage the problems of human performance, and in the LIRI, psychologists and management cooperated on problems of productivity. Despite establishing itself as discipline within the educational and industrial (or labor) spheres quite early on, the real push toward professional recognition came from the mental health field. The first psychologists (two to be exact) to hold positions outside a university setting were appointed in government departments in the mid-1920s, typically departments that dealt with mental health (or “mental hygiene” as it was referred to). By the 1940s, there was a mere

handful of “clinical psychologists,” as they were to be called later. They practiced in isolation, for the most part without official recognition. Nevertheless, the universities were starting to react: at the University of Stellenbosch, A.B. van der Merwe was appointed in 1945 to teach clinical psychology, and in the same year the department of psychology at the University of Pretoria introduced clinical psychology as a subsection of its master’s degree. In 1947, the Tara Mental Hospital for Nervous Diseases in Johannesburg became the first official body to appoint “clinical psychologists” to its staff. The slow but increasing movement of psychologists into the mental health field after World War II did not escape the notice of the medical profession. The South African Medical Association expressed interest in “medical psychology” at its 1946 annual conference, and in 1948, the South African Medical and Dental Council (SAMDC), the licensing and certification body for the medical and dental professions, invited psychologists to consult with them on the matter of establishing the registration of psychologists on a medical auxiliary services register. It became clear to the participants in the subsequent discussion that without a national body representing psychologists, this task would be very difficult. In 1948, the first national psychological association, the South African Psychological Association (SAPA), was formed, and one of the first issues it faced was the registration of professional psychologists. In 1951, SAPA contemplated the establishment of an examinations board for professional psychology, the introduction of postgraduate diplomas in various categories, and controls on the title “psychologist” via legislation. It also proposed an independent (from the SAMDC) register for psychologists, which would include the categories of clinical, personnel, industrial, and educational psychology. This proposal however was rejected by the Minister of Health, which left psychology in a rather awkward situation. In 1953, SAPA opened professional registers for psychologists, kept by SAPA itself, so that clinical psychologists could have the option to have limited official recognition. In 1955, the government created voluntary registers for clinical psychologists, with a master’s degree in psychology as a minimum requirement. The universities responded to these changes by increasing the number of courses in clinical psychology, and by 1959, all universities either had such courses in place or were planning to introduce them. This situation prevailed until 1974, when the discipline was recognized as a fully fledged

profession, with promulgation of the Medical, Dental, and Supplementary Health Service Professions Act, no. 56. It established three tiers of professional practice: psychologists, psychometrists, and psychotechnicians, and defined the minimum training requirements for each tier. The psychotechnician category was closed in 2002, and a category “registered counselors” added. The term “psychologist” is restricted to only those who meet the training requirements and are registered as such. Psychologists at present can register in five categories: counseling, educational, research, industrial, and clinical psychology. The Act also established a Professional Board for psychology under the SAMDC, to oversee and regulate the profession. It is fair to say that psychology’s real expansion and indeed quite spectacular growth dates from the 1970s, when it received formal statutory recognition as a profession. In the beginning, growth in numbers registered was slow: in 1968 only 58 psychologists were registered with the SAMDC, and in 1989, 2,419. From 1990, the growth in numbers accelerated, and nearly 300 psychologists were added per year. In 2004, 5,558 psychologists were registered with the Professional Board for psychology.

National Psychological Associations When the SAPA was formed in 1948, 34 members joined. J. A. la Grange of the University of Stellenbosch was its first president, and I. D. MacCrone of the University of the Witwatersrand its vice-president. Until then, the South African Association for the Advancement of Science served as the major contact point for psychologists. Section F of the Association included psychology, education, history, political economy, sociology, and statistics at various times. The Association’s journal, the South African Journal of Science, also served as the main local outlet for psychologists’ publications. (A small caveat is necessary here. In the 1940s, the psychoanalyst Wulf Sachs established the South African Psycho-analytic Society, but it could not be sustained after his death in 1949.) In 1956, “race relations” brought the hidden divisions in the psychological community into sharp relief when Josephine Naidoo, who was classified as “Indian” according to South Africa’s Population Registration Act of 1950, applied to join SAPA. Her application forced the association to consider for the first time the issue of black membership. After 5 years of acrimonious debates, the Association decided that its constitution did not exclude black South Africans from becoming members, and that louw

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she had to be admitted as a member. Within months, approximately 200 people gathered in Pretoria to establish an alternative national association, the Psychological Institute of the Republic of South Africa (PIRSA), with its membership restricted to whites only. The existence of two South African psychological associations continued until 1983, when the two associations amalgamated to form the Psychological Association of South Africa (PASA). At the time of amalgamation, PIRSA’s membership was in decline (372), and SAPA was not doing a whole lot better with a membership of 525. The new association had no membership restrictions other than formal psychological qualifications. There can be little doubt that the shifting political climate had a lot to do with it, as PIRSA removed the “race clause” from their constitution in 1978. The academic boycott, in which academic exchanges between foreign and South African scholars became progressively more difficult, contributed to the change in climate. In addition, it was not very effective for two associations to negotiate on behalf of psychologists with other professional bodies, in particular with the medical profession. The political mood of the 1980s, with increased state repression against it opponents, and increased resistance to apartheid, however, made the amalgamation look like something too little, too late. Particularly troublesome was the fact that black psychologists were not joining the new association in proportion to the numbers who were qualifying from universities. As political repression increased toward the end of the 1980s, these divisions became more and more pronounced. Two organizational responses to the growing conflict in South Africa were noteworthy. First, in 1983, the Organisation for Appropriate Social Services in South Africa (OASSSA) was formed by a group of psychologists who wanted a national association that was progressive in its political outlook, more representative of the country’s population, and more committed to democracy in South Africa and in the association. It focused on the provision of appropriate mental health and social services for those who had suffered under apartheid. Even so, its membership remained predominantly white. A second significant development occurred in 1989, when a group of black psychologists, the Psychology and Apartheid Committee, organized a “Psychology and Apartheid” conference at the University of the Western Cape. Black psychologists were the majority in attendance, were the keynote 508

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speakers, and formulated the agenda, to paraphrase the organizers (Nicholas, 1993). In addition, a new journal was formed in 1983, with a much more overtly political position than the national journal, the South African Journal of Psychology. It was called Psychology in Society (PiNS), and still appears regularly. On the inside cover it set out its manifesto: Psychology in Society is a journal which aims to critically explore and present ideas on the nature of psychology in capitalist society. There is a special emphasis on the theory and practice of psychology in the South African context. (Psychology in Society, 1983, p. i)

In 1999, the changed political climate showed itself in a somewhat different manifesto for PiNS: “Psychology in Society (PINS) aims to foster a sociohistorical and critical theory perspective, by focusing on the theory and practice of psychology in the southern African context.” This is still its current editorial statement. Thus, Foster (2008) was able to identify four groupings of psychologists in the 1980s. The largest group was found in PASA, even though psychologists did not join in substantial numbers—in 1990, it had 1,820 members. A second group left the country in a steady stream, many of whom cited opposition to apartheid as a major reason for emigrating. (Indeed, in the six decades following World War II, South Africa has been a net exporter of psychologists, as South Africa’s political isolation made it less and less attractive for foreign scholars to take up positions here. The net loss continued after 1994. It is fair to conclude that leading psychologists who might have created an influential South African psychology have been lost to the country.) A third cluster was aligned with OASSSA and PiNS. The final grouping was from the new generation of black psychologists, who formed the Psychology and Apartheid Committee and raised explicitly the political issues involved in psychology in South Africa. Prominent in the latter were psychologists like Lionel Nicholas and Saths Cooper, who are still active in national and international psychology. This situation was untenable, especially after the shift in the political landscape that occurred with the release of Nelson Mandela in 1990. On January 28, 1994, after 2 years of negotiations, psychologists finally managed to form one unified association: the Psychological Society of South Africa (PsySSA). As one could expect, this was not an easy transition. The new organization and one of its constituting

associations, the Society for Industrial and Organisational Psychology of South Africa (SIOPSA), became embroiled in three court cases in 2003. At issue was, among other things, the status of the constitution of SIOPSA. PsySSA lost all three cases and had to pay punitive costs. A predominantly black leadership was elected at the first general meeting of the PsySSA. Although the general membership of the Association is largely white, the majority of officebearers have remained black since then. In 2007, PsySSA had 2,717 members, and is affiliated with the International Union of Psychological Science and the International Test Commission.

Growth at Universities At the universities the discipline experienced a spectacular period of growth since the 1980s. The number of students who complete 3 years of university study in psychology increased tenfold from 1970 to 1993, and undergraduate classes are so large at most universities that student numbers in psychology frequently have to be restricted. The picture at postgraduate level is not much different, where there is fierce competition to gain entry into professional training programs. Furthermore, in 1996 6% of all doctorates awarded in South Africa were in psychology, placing it in third place among the disciplines in terms of the number of doctorates awarded. As indicated earlier, in many instances, departments of psychology were quick to respond to developments in the fields of professional practice. These offered opportunities for recognition of psychology. The University of Stellenbosch established a chair in applied psychology as early as 1927, Rhodes University joined forces with the manufacturing industry to train personnel officers, and the first master’s level training in clinical psychology emerged by the end of the 1940s. At present, all South African departments of psychology offer training that leads to registration in at least one of the five categories of professional practice, and competition for places in these postgraduate training courses is growing. Less than 20% of all applicants for clinical training are accepted, 30% for counselling, and about 75% for industrial psychology (Louw, 1992). From a first-year class of psychology students in 1993, only 6.8% went on to complete a first postgraduate degree (four-year) in psychology and only 2.9% of them completed a master’s degree in psychology (Richter et al., 1998). The number of undergraduate students enrolling into psychology as a major has increased from 13,963 in 1990 to

20,518 in 2002. This growth, however, has kept pace with the general growth in undergraduate student numbers at universities: in 1990, psychology majors formed 5.8% of total undergraduate enrolments; in 1995, 6.3%; and in 2002, 5.8% (Skinner & Louw, 2009). No discussion about post-war developments in psychology at South African universities would be complete without touching upon the early beginnings of behavior modification at the University of the Witwatersrand. Although it developed, strictly speaking, outside departments of psychology, Joseph Wolpe developed his reciprocal inhibition technique for patients with phobias at the University’s Medical School, between 1947 and 1954. Working in South Africa at the same time as Wolpe, and frequently in association with him, were other important contributors to the development of behavior therapy, including Leo Reyna, J. G. Taylor, Stanley Rachman, and Arnold Lazarus. Although behavior therapy took root here in the 1950s, virtually all of the major figures had left the country by the early 1960s for centers in the United States or the United Kingdom. In the 1970s, a significant voice was added to the local psychological discourse; that of Chabani Manganyi, the first black clinical psychologist trained in South Africa. In his first book (1973), Manganyi utilized psychological insights to write about the experience of being black in South Africa, and in the second (1977), he gave an introspective account of being a black scholar on sabbatical leave in the United States, and on black attitudes in South Africa at the time. It is fair to say that he remained on the periphery of psychology in South Africa, although he would chair the department of psychology at the University of Transkei in the 1980s, and occupy senior positions in South African higher education in the next two decades. After the first democratic elections in 1994, he became the director-general in the national Department of Education.

Feminization Psychology as a profession in South Africa is dominated by women, as in many other countries in the world, and all indications are that this trend will intensify in future. In 1975, 26% of all registered psychologists were women. At the end of May 2004, 3,465 women (62% of the total registrations) were registered as psychologists, compared with 2,093 men (38%). Psychology as an academic discipline is also dominated by women. The majority of students louw

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majoring in psychology are female—already 60% in 1990, rising to 74% in 2002. Indeed, the feminization of psychology as a discipline has occurred at a much more rapid rate than the feminization of the general undergraduate student body: In 2002, 58% of the general student body were women. This trend is even stronger at the master’s level of graduation. In 1996, 62% of master’s degrees awarded in all disciplines were awarded to men; the corresponding figure for psychology in 1995 was only 31%. The percentage of men graduating with master’s degrees in psychology dropped further to 22% in 2002, whereas the percentage for women increased to 78%. The master’s qualification is the pipeline qualification to practise as a professional psychologist, and the indication from these graduation trends is that women will continue to dominate the professional practice of psychology. Women also are in the majority at academic departments of psychology. In 2005, 52% of all academics in psychology were women, compared to 40% in the general academic population (Skinner & Louw, 2009). When gender and race are considered together, it is clear that white women dominate the profession. Shefer, Shabalala, and Townsend (2004) calculated that 82% of registered psychologists are white (although they acknowledge that this might be an estimate, as many psychologists refuse to indicate the race category they belong to on the official forms of the Professional Board for Psychology), and 62% are women (Skinner & Louw, 2009). This demographic is unlikely to change dramatically in the near future, as in 2002, black women accounted for only 24% of all master’s degrees awarded in psychology, compared to 54% for white women. A similar picture emerges in the second-tier professional category of “registered counselor,” in which 85% of them are women, and 59% are white (Abel & Louw, 2009).

After the Democratic Elections of 1994 Much of the history described in the previous sections can be regarded as a search for social relevance for the discipline. Indeed, many of the achievements of psychology in the 20th century can be ascribed to a successful claim to such relevance. The needs of social centers of power are important in terms of justifying why the discipline is relevant to social life. It stands to reason that when shifts in sociopolitical power relations occur, traditions in the social sciences are likely to be profoundly affected. 510

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In 1994, South Africa experienced a dramatic shift in political power relations when the first democratic election brought into power a government dominated by the African National Congress under the presidency of Nelson Mandela. For psychologists, one could almost hear the question being formulated: How can psychological practices be justified in a new regime? One response was predictable; namely, that psychologists would attempt to gain social approval by changing the direction of their research to focus on social problems that might seem significant to the new center of power. Thus, when the new government published its Reconstruction and Development Program to restructure South African society after 1994, psychologists reacted with renewed zeal to map out their potential role in the program. Another observation is that, since 1994, South African psychology has aligned itself with international developments. The end of the academic boycott contributed substantially to this. The formation of the unified national association, PsySSA, made it easier to join international bodies such as the International Union of Psychological Science, and to enter into joint agreements with associations such as the American Psychological Association. Research organizations have been reconfigured in the 1990s. Three of the major organizations are the National Research Foundation (NRF), the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC), and the Medical Research Council (MRC). The NRF is the major funding agency for research in the human and natural sciences, and for providing research facilities. The MRC’s research is aimed at the improvement of health and quality of life of the South African population, with research priorities in human immunodeficiency virus (HIV)/acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS), tuberculosis, malaria, human genomics, women’s health, crime, violence and injury, and alcohol and drug abuse. Psychologists are active in all these priority areas, and in some cases head the units. The HSRC is a statutory body that supports and conducts policy-relevant research in the social sciences. Again, psychologists are active in all its research programs, but two particularly strong programs in this regard are those for Child, Youth, Family and Social Development, and Social Aspects of HIV and AIDS and Health. Professionalization of the discipline continues unabated, as some of the numbers quoted above will illustrate. The first post-1994 Professional Board also tried to restructure the profession, inter alia to make a doctorate the minimum requirement

for practising as a psychologist. This proposal, quite advanced by 2004, had to be abandoned in the face of opposition from the higher education sector. Other proposals, such as the introduction of registered counselors as lower-level psychological practitioners, and a compulsory year of community service for clinical psychologists, were more successful. In academia, the critical psychology tradition that persisted during the apartheid era continues. Psychology in Society appears regularly, often with special issues focusing on masculinity, racism, HIV/ AIDS, and other topics of interest. The national journal, the South African Journal of Psychology, equally addresses itself to some of the major issues bedevilling current South African society, such as racism, for example. A textbook specifically on critical psychology appeared in 2004 (Hook, 2004). Since the early 1990s, the publication of locally produced textbooks accelerated. The text by Hook mentioned above is one example, but others include the publication of at least three new introductory textbooks, and on social psychology, community psychology, research methodology, and psychopathology. Apart from the two psychology journals mentioned above, a third journal appeared in 1992: Psychoanalytic Psychotherapy in South Africa. It provides a forum for local clinicians working within a psychoanalytic framework to present and discuss their work. Many psychologists became involved in the activities of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, formed in 1995. A few psychologists acted as commissioners, whereas many more provided counselling services to those who testified. The Commission also became the focus of numerous research projects, examining how it carried out its duties, and an evaluation of psychological reports submitted to it. In 2000, both the South African Journal of Psychology and Psychology in Society devoted special issues to the work of the Commission. Although the changes are slow, there is an attempt to change the race profile of the psychological community (as I indicated above, the gender profile of the discipline is heavily skewed toward women). One particular noteworthy development was to change the racialized profile in academic authorship, with the formation of the Black Research and Authorship Development Forum in 1995. One of the outcomes of this Forum was the publication of Contemporary Issues in Human Development: A South African Focus (De la Rey, Duncan, Shefer, & Van Niekerk, 1997).

Conclusion It is now a virtual truism to say that psychology is embedded in extradisciplinary contexts. This review of the history of psychology in South Africa yet again reinforces this statement. The discipline’s relative popularity, in this country but elsewhere as well, is closely tied to its ability to convince powerful groups of the usefulness, or “relevance,” of the discipline’s work. This process often is referred to as legitimation, which Geuter (1992, p. 163) defined as the “attempts to use specific arguments to prove the necessity or usefulness of psychology to those important for the recognition of the subject.” From 1920s onward, and accelerating after World War II, South African psychologists succeeded in promoting a societal identity for the discipline that recognized and accepted its knowledge and skill in the domains of mental health, education, and labor. Professionalization was central to this development, as it created the state-sanctioned role of professional practitioner for the discipline. This relatively new role also made the discipline attractive as a subject to study at university, because of its link to a professional market of skills and formal recognition. Finally, another truism: The divisions that run through a society also divide psychologists. In South Africa, the politics of race was a divisive factor for psychologists, as many events described in this review made clear. It would be tempting to interpret political developments of the 1990s as bringing such divisions to a close, but that would be unrealistic and ahistorical. The legacy of apartheid endures in ordinary life and everyday relationships, and the brief descriptions of events post-1994 illustrate the extent to which we still grapple with it in psychology as well.

Future Directions The tension in psychology between science and practice shows no signs of abating. Much of attraction the discipline has for students and the general public resides in its practice aspects, and the promise it holds for explicating aspects of individual lives. For organizations and institutions, psychology has become an administratively useful science, which facilitates the social management of individuals. There is the real possibility that the science base of psychology may be neglected in the continuous search for new techniques and interventions to address individual and social ills. Professional psychology remains an ongoing project. Five years ago the Professional Board for Psychology launched a practice framework that could louw

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only be partially implemented. This framework is under constant revision, as the profession wrestles with the challenges of practicing psychology in a country like South Africa. At present, the Board is considering the introduction of a category of “mental health assistant” to provide basic mental health services (excluding psychotherapy). In addition, there is a proposal before the Board to expand the rather rigid five registration categories for psychology for the first time since 1974, to include at least neuropsychology as a recognized professional field of practice. This proposal, to launch a new category of neuropsychology, is about to be implemented. Mental health will remain a dominant theme in South African psychology. For a start, its professional framework is couched in terms drawn from the domain of health, under a Health Professions Council. Furthermore, nearly 60% of its professional practitioners are either clinical or counseling psychologists. More importantly, many of the difficulties South Africans face in their daily lives are framed in mental health terms. There is much discussion about risks to physical and mental health in South Africa, which are expressed in indicators such as unacceptably high levels of child mortality and inadequate education and health care. Behaviors linked to HIV/AIDS, sexually transmitted diseases more generally, and alcohol and drug abuse add substantially to this risk. In addition, the “burden of disease” falls on the most vulnerable in society— the poor and the unemployed—and much of the professional discourse in South African psychology is about mental health service provision to these underserved sectors. The quest for an “indigenous psychology” or an “Afrocentric psychology” remains an elusive one. Despite regular calls to develop such forms of psychology, ranging from cautious pleas for a better fit with local conditions, to ambitious claims for new ontologies and epistemologies, this endeavor struggles to get off the ground. The future of this movement remains open-ended, and difficult to call. Finally, psychologists have to guard against regarding the end of apartheid as if it is “the end of history”; that history was what happened with psychology before 1994. In their recent book on the history of psychology in South Africa, Painter and Van Ommen (2008) have identified exactly such a tendency to regard psychology increasingly as a neutral, ahistorical science and practice. It would be a sad paradox if the end of apartheid also ended a critical consideration of psychology and how it attempts to shape our conduct and thought. 512

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Note 1. I follow the standard South African practice of using the term “black” when referring to all previously disenfranchised people. When referring to (black) African people in particular, the term “African” will be used.

References Geuter, U. (1992). The professionalization of psychology in Nazi Germany. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hook, D. (Ed.). (2004). An introduction to critical psychology. Cape Town: University of Cape Town Press. Louw, J. (1992). South Africa. In V. Sexton, & J. D. Hogan (Eds.), International psychology (pp. 353–63). Lincoln, NE.: University of Nebraska Press. Louw, J. (1997). Social context and psychological testing in South Africa, 1918–1939. Theory & Psychology, 7, 235–56. Louw, J., & Foster, D. (1991). Historical perspective: Psychology and group relations in South Africa. In D. Foster, & J. LouwPotgieter (Eds.), Social psychology in South Africa (pp. 55–90). Johannesburg: Lexicon. Louw, J., & Foster, D. (2004). Race and psychology in South Africa. In A. Winston (Ed.), Defining difference: Race and racism in the history of psychology (pp. 171–97). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. MacCrone, I. D. (1937). Race attitudes in South Africa. London: Oxford University Press. Manganyi, N. C. (1973). Being-black-in-the-world. Johannesburg: Ravan. Manganyi, N. C. (1977). Alienation and the body in racist society. New York: NOK Publishers. Nicholas, L. (1993). Psychology and oppression. Johannesburg: Skotaville. Painter, D., & Van Ommen, C. (2008). Abbreviated histories: Some concluding remarks. In C. Van Ommen, & D. Painter (Eds.), Interiors. A history of psychology in South Africa (pp. 436–46). Pretoria: University of South Africa Press. Psychology in Society. (1983). Editorial statement. 1, i. Psychology in Society. (1999). Editorial statement. 25, i. Reyburn, H. A. (n.d.). An introduction to psychology (2nd ed.). Cape Town: Maskew Miller. Richter, L. M., Griesel, R. D., Durrheim, K., Wilson, M., Surendorff, N., & Asafo-Agyei, L. (1998). Employment opportunities for psychology graduates in South Africa: A contemporary analysis. South African Journal of Psychology, 28, 1–7. Sexton, V. S., & Hogan, J. D. (Eds.). (1992). International psychology: Views from around the world. Lincoln, NB: University of Nebraska Press. Shefer, T., Shabalala, N., & Townsend, L. (2004). Women and authorship in post-apartheid psychology. South African Journal of Psychology, 34, 576–94. Sherwood, R. (1958). The Bantu clerk: a study of role expectations. Journal of Social Psychology, 47, 285–316. Sherwood, R. (1960). The African civil servant–a socio-political study. Unpublished PhD thesis, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. Skinner, K., & Louw, J. (2009). The feminization of psychology: Data from South Africa. International Journal of Psychology, 44, 81–92. What the Soldier Thinks (1945). Pretoria: General Staff Headquarters, Union DefenceForce.

C HA P TE R

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Spain

Helio Carpintero

Abstract This chapter presents the main lines of the development of Spanish psychology in the 20th century. It also includes a brief notice on its roots in modern times, and also a short view of those contributions carried out by a few psychologists forced to go into exile after the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939). Its flourishing time arrived with the creation of a degree in psychology, and the appearance of many active groups dedicated to research, teaching, and practice. Present-day psychology in Spain has one of the largest bodies of professionals, covering numerous specialties and reaching a high degree of sophistication and competence. Research, mainly in university departments and private institutions, is analogous to that done in prestigious centers of developed Western countries. Keywords: Spain; contemporary psychology; Spanish psychologists; Latin American psychology

In the field of psychology, Spain has been a country more used to receiving than creating. It is true that, during the Renaissance, some philosophers and doctors made valuable contributions to knowledge. However, throughout the modern age, Spaniards, heavily influenced by the religious beliefs of the Catholic Counter-reformation, remained removed from the philosophical and scientific movements that were taking place in Western Europe. In the late 19th century, certain groups in the country took upon themselves the task of overcoming this historical backwardness, launching a process of “Europeanization” to update the country. They tried to obtain widespread education, a democratic organization, and the industrialization of the country while incorporating positive science and new philosophical insights. Among the elements included in this new worldview was the new psychology, of which its applied aspects could well serve the purpose of the desired changes.

This process gave rise to a great deal of resistance. In psychology’s development in Spain there have been several crises; by far the most important was the Spanish civil war, which took place between 1936 and 1939. It had damaging effects upon the growing psychological tradition. Scientific progress was interrupted but, at the same time, a second line of progress was generated outside the country, as a direct consequence of the exile after the war of a large group of Spanish intellectuals and technicians to various Latin American countries. To offer an overview of Spanish psychology today, we will very briefly recall its roots in Renaissance days. Then, we will consider the incorporation of the modern science of the mind and its progress and achievements throughout the first third of the 20th century, until the outbreak of the civil war. Then, we take a brief glance at the tradition of psychology in exile, and, returning to the peninsula, will note in passing the postwar effort to return to a mere

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philosophical psychology, and the continuously growing movement toward a technological and scientific psychology, which has finally flourished here.

A Brilliant Background: The Renaissance Past Spain in the 16th century had a vast empire, resulting from the discovery and conquest of the American continent. Ideologically, its policy was largely determined by the Catholic religion and the need felt by the devoutly Catholic Spanish crown to stop the Lutheran reformation, through its long opposition to Luther and his political and religious advocates and allies. The Renaissance gave rise to an enormous concern for the human being, his education, his nature and power, and his final destiny. In the Renaissance, Medieval Christian thought was confronted by the great Greek and Latin classics, and as a result humanism emerged. Lutherans placed individual conscience well above the ecclesiastical institution, and reflections upon the dignity and poverty of the human condition attracted the reflections of thinkers and philosophers. As a result, mind and soul, the subject matter of psychology, became debatable and controversial topics. Psychology was strongly in demand by all those who were in search of a light for their doubts. It is possible to reduce the salient Hispanic contributions of those days to three names: Juan Luis Vives, Juan Huarte, and Gomez Pereira (Carpintero, 2004). Juan Luis Vives (1492–1540) was one of the most prestigious European humanists of those days. He maintained a close friendship with figures such as Erasmus and Sir Thomas More, and was also a one-time friend of King Henry VIII of England, who finally rejected him due to his loyal feelings toward Henry’s Queen Catherine of Aragon. He was always an advocate of peace, harmony, and culture. Born in Valencia, trained in Paris, and having settled in Bruges, he lived to write and meditate (Noreña,1970). His most significant psychological work is his treaty De Anima et Vita (1538) (Treatise of the Soul ). In Foster Watson’s words, Vives could be called the “father of modern psychology” (Watson, 1915). Psychology was for him mainly a means for understanding the rational being and organizing his education. Therefore, in his book, he gave up investigating what the “essence” of the soul could be, interested as he was only on how it worked and expressed itself. There, he adopted a clear position 514

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in favor of empiricism. He firmly maintained an associationist view of the mind, whose contents were interconnected according to the laws of association, and he stressed the importance of “passion” or inclination toward good and against evil ends (Clements, 1967). Assuming that psychological phenomena were founded on individual temperament, he admitted that their roots were placed in the bodily constitution, but he also believed that education was capable of guiding and controlling the movements and impulses of the mind, when duly trained. Vives’ idea of basing all education on an adequate knowledge of the student’s psychological character was deepened and broadened by a physician, Juan Huarte (ca. 1530–1589), in his book Examen de ingenios para las ciencias (1575) (it was translated into English as The Examination of Men’s Wits). This is a treaty about individual differences in skills and abilities, and how they are related to the different professions and their corresponding training. The book has often been considered as the first treaty on the psychology of vocational guidance, directly based on the study of individual differences (Read, 1981). Huarte was a physician trained in accordance with Galen’s ideas. He did not accept the medieval view on the localization of functions in the head, and considered that psychological traits were all due to individual “temperament.” Dryness, moisture, and heat, rooted in body “humours” as Galen taught, were the body-based qualities that would favor the possession of different mental abilities. Dryness favors reasoning, moisture favors memory, and heat, imagination. Thus, body build and individual qualities would permit individual personalities to be assessed, and above all, their relative efficiency in different studies and professions could be predicted. Job performance, based on psychic capacities, could be suitably determined through the examination of body, mood, and type. According to this theory, before individuals chose their future, it would be wise for them to be examined and oriented as to the best way to employ their talents and gifts. Such a policy would avoid expense, economic losses, and personal frustration The book had a deterministic view of human behavior, and Huarte considered behavior to be firmly rooted in organic causes. Such a view was wholly unacceptable to the Catholic Church. In Spain, the Inquisition persecuted Huarte, and he was forced to change several parts of his book in a second edition that appeared posthumously in 1594.

However, the book continued to be edited in Europe without changes, in its original version. It was translated into all leading European languages, reprinted many times, and copied and imitated on several occasions, but his ideas on vocational guidance remained without application in Spain. Another physician, Gomez Pereira (1500–1558?) wrote an original work, Antoniana Margarita (1554), in which he declared himself in favor of a consideration of animals as true machines. This is a bold doctrine that teaches that animals have no feelings, and that their conduct is purely “mechanical.” Pereira believed that sensation and feeling would imply some rationality, as these processes would imply a certain type of knowledge, and therefore, a judgment due to reason. Accordingly, a spiritual soul might have to be attributed to animals, and, as a consequence, these had also to be endowed with immortality, a benefit Pereira wanted to reserve only to human beings. Reasoning in such a way, he maintained that animal behavior was a purely instinctive and mechanical process. The theory has been repeatedly considered as a precedent of Descartes’ animal mechanicism, which sees animals as a pure machines, built upon reflex structures (Bandres & Llavona, 1992). These three thinkers had an uneven influence on scientific and cultural circles, but were all effective in leaving some traces in the anthropology of the time. But the hardening of the Counter-reformation, strongly supported by King Philip II, did not allow any doubts after the criticism of Huarte’s book. The crown clearly favored those attitudes that refused to inquire into conflicting and problematic topics that could cause troubles with the Church and the Inquisition. It was wise not to enter into dangerous discussions, and, as a consequence, the cultivation of the new philosophy and modern science virtually disappeared throughout Spain. Spain was thus deprived of the intellectual stimulation brought by the Modern Age, specially in those fields in which scholars were looking for a free-thinking environment that questioned the existing conservative worldview. Only in the less risky worlds of literature and visual arts, situated far above conflicting and problematic topics, did creativity continue to shine at a remarkable level in a country which, although living its Golden Age, had renounced the benefits of freedom of thought.

The Introduction of Modern Psychology In the early 19th century, a historical process of national decomposition began. With the exception of Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippine Islands,

the rest of the old Spanish colonies became independent nations (1824), forming the numerous Latin American countries of today. After the failure of a French invasion by Napoleon, the country was organized as an absolute monarchy under the king Ferdinand VII. He persecuted liberal groups and created a divided society (usually called the “Two Spains”), setting conservative groups against those supporting the idea of a constitution. Many liberals emigrated and were forced to live in exile for years (Carr, 1966). After decades of social and political unrest, followed by a revolution and a brief period under a republican regime (1874), the process ended with the restoration of the Bourbon monarchy in 1875. During this conflicting period, a spiritualism based on French thought first flourished, although it had to face challenges from small groups that promoted phrenology and other materialistic doctrines. In the days of the republican regime, positivism, evolutionism, and other similar movements spread among the more progressive groups of the country. None of them reached a dominant position. Under the restored monarchy, the country achieved social stabilization, with a democratic regime. Under a new constitution, a process of modernization was launched, and the country entered a calmer and more peaceful climate that made social reconstruction, industrial growth, economic recovery, and cultural progress possible. Reformism was greatly enhanced by the creation of a cultural organization, the so-called Institution for Free Education (Institución Libre de Enseñanza), which wanted a bottom-up transformation of the country, beginning at the school level and holding as its aim the eventual social reform of the whole of society. A major crisis occurred when Spain was forced to enter into a war with the United States. It was defeated in 1898, and its last colonies were lost. This disaster had as a consequence a vast claim for “national regeneration.” A very active group of intellectuals and writers, members of the so-called “Generation of ‘98,” drew the attention of society to the common problems. It was followed by a younger generation (“Generation of 1886”) that took up that call and proposed a “Europeanization” of the country. They assumed the task of incorporating and updating philosophical ideas and importing the science and technology of that time. A flourishing period then began, one that has been called Spain’s “Silver Age.” In art and science, in philosophy and literature, a great number of carpintero

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creative people occupied the scene and brought new hope to a country striving for modernization. Eventually, the social landscape of the country began to change as well. However, several new conflicts appeared: a political one, between central power and minorities looking for independence in some regions; a social one, between a very conservative bourgeoisie and the demands and pressures of the proletariat; and a religious one, between those demanding an openly religious state and those maintaining a lay constitution and regime. All these tensions would in the end lead to the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939).

Main Periods Modern psychology began to be cultivated mainly as a tool that could help to solve certain needs and problems of an expanding society. Founded as a science in the second half of the 19th century, psychology had no original sources in Spain, but was imported from outside—mainly from Germany and France. Although interest in psychology may be detected among some small groups in the last decades of the 19th century, it was with the arrival of the new century that the process of institutionalization of this branch of knowledge began. This process roughly parallels the following eras, and they can be taken as a schematic proposal. 1902–1939. These decades are marked by a growing movement toward applied psychology, and a wide interest in psychotechnology. A larger part of that movement corresponded to a newly created Institute for Professional Guidance, established in Barcelona, soon followed by another similar center created in Madrid. Both were charged with the purpose of providing psychological support to the growing industrial development that was taking place by those days. These two groups may be seen as two “schools”—the School of Barcelona and the School of Madrid—in close contact but, with different characteristics. At the same time, there was a weak impulse in favor of psychology in universities. The most significant item is here represented by the creation of a chair of experimental psychology in the University of Madrid, in 1902. It was not accompanied by a corresponding laboratory, and had little impact in the academic world; however, professionalization in the field was steadily rising during this period. 1939–1950. The Civil War (1936–1939) put an end to these impulses toward the growth of psychology, forcing most of the previously existing technicians and psychologists into exile. The new regime, from its beginning, was not in favor of modern psychological practices, and on the academic side, it promoted 516

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a return to the old psychological doctrines of scholastic philosophy (mainly based on St. Thomas Aquinas’ works), a tendency also dominant in the arts and humanities of the time. But, at the end of the 1940s, a small group headed by psychiatrist and psychologist Jose Germain, and strongly backed from outside by the well-known Italian psychologist Father Agostino Gemelli, began the recovery of the previous psychotechnological tradition. 1950–1970. Germain’s group took the measures needed to institutionalize the field. A national center for applied psychology was reestablished, which organized a network of local and regional centers mainly focused on psychological assessment. Although no psychology degree existed, a step forward was taken with the creation of two professional postgraduate schools, at the universities of Madrid and Barcelona, from which a diploma leading to professional work could be obtained after 2 years of studies 1970–2000. Finally, in recent decades, the creation of a degree in psychology (in 1968) brought with it many important changes that have produced a new situation: many departments and faculties were created all over the country, thousands of students chose this specialty as their career, and, after graduating, enlarged and filled out the job market of psychologists, also forming a large professional organization, the Colegio Oficial de Psicologos (Spanish Association of Psychologists). Let us now consider these periods in more detail.

Period I (1902–1939) Psychology: The Early Groups In the early 20th century, some steps were taken to incorporate the new psychology, both in science and in its potential uses. The groups promoting these advances were operating in the country’s two largest cities, Madrid and Barcelona, which maintained an active intellectual life and were the scene of many social disputes. These groups may be seen as forming, in a very broad sense, two “schools,” one in Madrid and the other in Barcelona, not wholly unrelated, but each with its own peculiarities. Both were headed by physicians interested in recent developments of the scientific study of mental phenomena. Their students also became highly motivated in the same direction, and all of them were attracted by the possibilities of its social applications. With the rise of industrialization, some related needs emerged. School problems, personnel selection, and occupational accidents and rehabilitation

were among the main questions that demanded psychological intervention (Carpintero, 1982, 1994). It has sometimes been said that in Spain, scientific psychology entered by the hand of the applied type; this seems to be a correct view. In the long run, theoretical questions would gradually become salient, but always in close connection with its interventional dimension.

the madrid school In Madrid, the core group working in psychology was formed by those related to the Institución Libre de Enseñanza (Free Institute of Education, ILE). This institution was “the most serious attempt to create the intellectual preconditions of liberal democracy” (Carr, 1966). The soul of the ILE was Francisco Giner de los Rios (1839–1915), educator, professor of law and philosophy, whose doctrinal basis was Krausism. This was the philosophical system of a German idealist, the philosopher K.C.F. Krause (1781–1832), who taught the radical union of nature and spirit, and of philosophy and science, and stressed the freedom and moral sense of the person considered as an embodied spirit that had to be respected by laws. Giner was acquainted with Wundtian and other recent psychological theories. He recommended to his disciples the cultivation of the new science, and in the Institute’s magazine, the Bulletin of the ILE (BILE), used to disseminate ILE ideals through society, there appeared for the first time in Spain psychological articles written by people such as John Dewey, James Mark Baldwin, G. Stanley Hall, Alfred Binet, and Edouard Claparède, among others. It was thanks to Giner’s influence that a new chair, specifically devoted to experimental psychology, was created in the University of Madrid. Psychology was by that time situated in a conventional fashion as part of the philosophy curriculum, so the new chair, placed in a faculty of sciences, was conceived as a means to change the situation, bringing with it the facts and ideas of the new scientific psychology. A psychiatrist close to the ILE, Luis Simarro (1851–1921), a disciple of Charcot and rival and friend of neuroanatomist Santiago Ramón y Cajal, was appointed to that chair in 1902. He maintained some associationist views that were integrated into a psychophysiological framework. He unsuccessfully tried to establish a research laboratory and only a very few written works remain from him. But some of his students (e.g., Martin Navarro, Francisco Santamaría, Fermin Herrero, J. Vicente Viqueira, Domingo Barnés, among others) would, in the long

run, produce well-informed elementary textbooks and apply their new ideas to educational settings, spreading the interest for psychology throughout Spanish culture (Carpintero, 2004). From Simarro’s works—most of them short articles—the main lines of his thought can be inferred. At the same time, he was very active in the defense of human rights, and was associated with several significant cases in which the cause of political freedom was at stake. One famous case was that against a Mason and free-thinker teacher, Francisco Ferrer, presumably involved in a dramatic social uprising— the Barcelona Semana Tragica (Tragic Week) that took place in Barcelona, in 1909. He was summarily arrested and executed, in the middle of a general liberal protest that enveloped the whole of Europe. Simarro put all his effort into maintaining Ferrer’s innocence and protesting the unfair way in which the authorities had treated him. Deeply influenced by Ernst Haeckel’s monism and evolutionary thought, he maintained the idea of psychology as a natural science, avoiding substantialism and spiritualism, and trying to combine the views of Wundtian experimentalism and those of James’ functionalism. Such an eclectic theory made him approach the analogous views defended by German psychophysiologist Theodor Ziehen. He stressed the importance of associationism, and emphasized the role played by Renaissance humanist Luis Vives as a predecessor of the recent versions of such theory. He thought that the process of habit formation was due to a basic phenomenon, which he called “iteration,” responsible for the organization of nervous pathways in the nervous system. Like many other thinkers of that time, he conceived mind, like reflex action, as an instrument for life and also a product of evolution. He did some empirical research on mental fatigue, created some simple tests for the study of attention, and, above all, kept himself well informed of the progress of psychological research, inspiring interest and curiosity among his disciples. One of his collaborators was Cipriano Rodrigo Lavin (1881–1972), a physician who became deeply involved in psychological teaching as an assistant to his master’s chair. He received further training at the laboratory of Sir F. Bartlett at Cambridge (1920–1921), and undertook some unpublished research on the reproduction of hand movements. On his return to Spain, he was finally able to organize a small laboratory in Simarro’s department and, when his master passed away, he was put in charge of the whole curriculum. Most of his programs and notes for courses, all of them unpublished, carpintero

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have recently been found, and they offer valuable information on the variety of interest and the extent of his knowledge on sensory processes and applied psychology to guidance and assessment (Quintana et al., 2008). Unfortunately, as a consequence of the civil war, he was separated from the University and lost all possibilities for a substantive work, while his laboratory disappeared without a trace. Another of Simarro’s students, Juan Vicente Viqueira (1886–1924), was professor of philosophy at high school, and had further training in psychology under G.E. Müller at Göttingen (Germany). As a result, he was the first Spanish psychologist to publish a paper on a task of syllable memorization in the Zeitschift für Psychologie und Physiologie des Sinnesorganes (Viqueira, 1915). His most mature work is his historical presentation of contemporary psychology, a book in which he emphasized the central role played by Wundt, with whom he tried to connect the rest of his doctrines, conceived as reforms or reconstructions of Wundtian insights (Viqueira, 1930). At the head of that emerging group of psychologists was one of Simarro’s students, the psychiatrist and neurologist Gonzalo Rodriguez-Lafora (1886–1971). He had also been trained under Ramon-y-Cajal, and was an active member of the “Generation of 1886.” He made substantial advances in the institutionalization of psychology, as we will see. He also encouraged one of his younger students, the psychiatrist José Germain, along the same lines, and Germain would finally become one of the leading persons in this process. Lafora received further training in Germany under Kraepelin and Alzheimer, and collaborated with S.I. Franz in the United States in his studies on brain damage and learning. He was also a close friend of the philosopher Jose Ortega y Gasset, and in 1920, he founded with him and the psychiatrist Jose M. Sacristan an important journal, Archivos de Neurobiología (Archives of Neurobiology) that also opened its pages to psychological papers (Moya, 1986; Valenciano, 1977). Lafora did some pioneering work in the field of clinical child psychology and psychiatry, and his book Los niños mentalmente anormales (Mentally Abnormal Children,1917) was the first monograph that offered a broad panorama of the field. It also included therapeutic guidelines for teachers in charge of the education of these children, while recommending a holistic approach in handling such cases. In his neuropathological studies, he was able to describe for the first time myoclonic epilepsy 518

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(or Lafora’s disease) and some cases of diencephalic brain regulation of sleep in cats (1933). Later, he focused increasingly on psychopathological problems and mental hygiene. Also noteworthy is Lafora’s attitude toward psychoanalysis, which began to spread in Spain in the early 1920s. He had a positive appraisal of its ideas about personality and its methodological ways of approaching patients, but strongly disagreed with Freudian ideas about psychosexuality, being more in favor of the Jungian concepts of personality types. His final idea on personality clearly integrated both a biotypology grounded on somatic bases, which provided an inborn layer for personality, with a learned structure of a psychosocial character (Rodriguez-Lafora, 1937). Lafora, like many other progressive-minded people, had to flee Spain after the civil war. He lived for a few years in Mexico, eventually returning to Spain, where he died. Despite his absence, he had sowed the interest for psychology among his disciples, and this interest continued under Germain’s leadership.

the barcelona school Barcelona, at the turn of the century, was a big city, center of a very active region, Catalonia, and fully oriented toward Europe. Its inhabitants were dominated by the spirit of modern times. It had a growing industry, a rising entrepreneurial middle class, and a very important group of cultivated thinkers, interested in the arts, science, and education. There were also some small but active groups claiming autonomy and even independence for Catalonian society within the Spanish nation. The outstanding figure in the field of life sciences here was the researcher Ramon Turró (1854–1926). The group of scientific researchers and medical doctors that had gathered around him was able to maintain the activity of a laboratory dedicated to biological problems and sponsored by the local government. Turró, basing on his research on immunization processes, developed a homeostatic conception of the organism that stemmed from Claude Bernard’s physiological theories. The activity of organisms was rooted in needs, and action was directed toward its reduction. Hunger was for Turró the basic need, and all knowledge in the end is related to it. According to such a view, he dismissed Kantian epistemology and maintained a positive philosophy, conceiving learning as a process based on trophic reflexes. These are the means of reducing such a need and supplying the organism with specific substances, creating in

this way a network of objective knowledge. Organic sensations, according to Turró, would then be placed at the core of all epistemic activities (Siguan, 1981). One of his students, the physiologist Augusto Pi-Sunyer (1879–1965), furthered these ideas, offering a broader theory that stressed the “functional unity” of the organism. All physiological mechanisms were here conceived of as dynamic elements promoting organic unity, melding both the somatic and the psychological dimensions. He considered such dimensions as merely two aspects of the whole organism. These ideas stimulated one of his younger students, Emilio Mira, who would become one of the leading psychologists of the country and the leading figure of this School.

other minor groups Apart from these two schools of thought, two other groups did some interesting work related to psychology. The first is the school of neurology and histology formed around the leading figure of Santiago Ramon y Cajal (1852–1934), Nobel Prize winner for medicine 1906, and one of the greatest neuroanatomists of all times. On the basis of his discoveries of the neuron cell (in 1888) and the structure and dynamics of the nervous system, he set forth the grounds for contemporary neurosciences. Cajal and his students concentrated on neurological questions, but he kept an eye on psychological matters, such as hypnotism and dreams. Moreover, he dared to suggest some hypotheses on the work of neurons in mental processes, although only in a tentative way. His main tenet was the discrete nature of neural tissue, formed by cell units, that determined the basic operations of the whole system, which was built as an associative network. Madrid was the setting for most of his scientific achievements (Cannon, 1949; Lopez-Piñero, 1985, 2006). Many other brilliant researchers joined the Cajal school and provided significant new discoveries; among them were the contributions of Nicolas Achucarro and Pio del Río-Hortega, who deeply explored the nature and properties of glial cells; and, later, those of Rafael Lorente de No, whose findings on the feedback loops of neurons paved the way for Hebb’s well-known ideas on cell assemblies. But such lines of thought are wholly specific, and they will not be mixed here with our history of psychology. Finally, another group to be considered here is one that was inspired by the principles of scholasticism, which was firmly adhered to in those days by the Catholic Church as a whole. This school was formed by a few people, most of them members of

the Church and trained according the guidelines of the neo-scholastic movement of thought. They were deeply influenced by the psychological doctrines developed at the Louvain University (Belgium) under the leadership of Cardinal Desiree Mercier. They were largely oriented toward philosophical questions concerning education and anthropological views, fields in which they made several contributions. In this context Juan Zaragüeta (1883–1974), a very distinguished priest, professor at the University of Madrid, and deeply influenced by the philosophy of values, mainly focused on educational questions. A noteworthy exception is represented by a group of clerics from the Company of Jesus (the Jesuits) who were interested in psychotechnological work, mainly for internal use by the order’s educational system. The most significant name in this group is undoubtedly that of Father Fernando Palmes, S.I. (1879–1963), a Jesuit, who was also interested in experimental topics.

The Psychotechnological Movement The end of World War I in 1918 brought increasing social interest in psychotechnology and its techniques, which had proved their practical utility in helping many armies carry out job selection with their troops. Although Spain did not enter the war, interest in those techniques began to grow among technical and industrial groups. The brilliant days of Spanish psychotechnology had begun.

psychotechnology in madrid In 1914, a National Patronage for Mentally Impaired Children was founded. It was charged with the education of retarded children. It was closely connected with other institutions created for sensorially defective children, and the work was carried out by teachers specializing in therapeutic education. Soon after, an Institute for Professional Retraining for Injured Workers was also established; among other specialties it included a service for psychological guidance that would provide advice and support for those workers who, after suffering a major injury, needed help to begin a new working career that accommodated their injury. The “Madrid School” began its contributions to this field under the direction of G.R. Lafora, who was deeply interested both in educational and therapeutic applications. Lafora, after a brief collaboration at the National Patronage, contributed to the creation of several private institutions that would care for mentally impaired or deficient children, offering both medical and psychological help. Around him, carpintero

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a small group mainly formed by Jose Germain and a psychotechnician, Mercedes Rodrigo, began to prepare testing instruments and did research in evaluation and clinical topics. A significant achievement was the edition, in 1930, of the Stanford-Binet test, with a set of norms adapted to the Spanish population (Germain & Rodrigo, 1930).

psychotechnological work at the school of barcelona As mentioned earlier, in Catalonia the regional government—the Mancomunitat de Catalunya— was greatly interested in updating its social structures and industries, and it favored scientific and cultural development, looking at the same time for social benefits. The group espousing a positive mentality, and that was created under the direction of Ramon Turró and his disciple Augusto Pi-Suñer, did remarkable work on biological topics. Shortly after, a new center on psychotechnology was founded there, and a brilliant young doctor, Emilio Mira (1896–1964), trained in that school as a student of Pi-Suñer, joined. He soon became the true head of a movement that, while strongly based on biological tradition, would become fully oriented toward applied psychotechnology (Iruela, 1993). This center’s origins were founded in a Social Museum created by local authorities in Barcelona to gather information and offer help to working people and to those applying for jobs. It included a center for education and guidance for young people, and a Secretariat d’Aprenentatge (Bureau for Apprenticeship) that was soon to become the Institut d’Orientacio Professional (Institute of Professional Guidance) in 1918. Its psychometric laboratory was put in Mira’s hands. The story of this Institute is well known (Kirchner, 1981; Siguan, 1981). It was entrusted with the application of psychological instruments to personnel selection. People applying for jobs with the local police or as city bus drivers had to pass a test before admission, and young people in search of work were tested and then oriented according to their abilities. Emilio Mira was a creative person. He devised a new apparatus for testing speed appreciation and distance measuring (the axiesterometer), but above all he conceived a clinical test, the Myokinetic Psychodiagnosis (or PMK), that could procure highly accurate diagnoses of psychopathological troubles through the evaluation of the subject’s drawing of different types of lines (staircase, circle, chain, zigzag lines, among others) made only under 520

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motor kinetic control. He applied it to juvenile and adult populations, and through the analysis of criteria groups, was able to build an atlas of differential traits that might serve to characterize pathologies such as depression, organic syndrome, and psychosis, among other illnesses (Mira, 1943). He connected the Institute with most European centers for psychological guidance. When the International Association for Psychotechnology was created in Geneva, in 1920, thanks to the efforts of Edouard Claparède, Jean M. Lahy, Walter Moede, and other well-known specialists, Mira joined that group of pioneers and was charged with the organization of two other meetings, the second (1921) and the sixth (1930), both of which took place in Barcelona. As a practical result, he received from the congress a request made to the Spanish government to include psychological testing as a requirement to be met when applying for a driving license. Such a request was positively answered; a first policy plan for traffic safety was established in Spain early in the 1930s. Among other requirements, a psychotechnical test was included as a condition to be fulfilled by all applicants for a licence. In those meetings, Mira declared himself in favor of a guidance intervention based not on a single test, but on an assessment process that would include multiple measures of personality and special abilities, thus trying to evaluate the person as a whole. He was also very active in creating a psychotechnological network in the country. A series of centers (the so-called “laboratory-offices”) were set up in several provinces, under the direction of the two main Institutes, the one in Barcelona, headed by Mira, and another created in Madrid, under the direction of Germain. They were established in 1928 as a guidance service that could help young people apply for preprofessional training. All these measures were adopted under the dictatorship of General Miguel Primo de Rivera (1923–1931), who, with such social measures, wanted to obtain the support of the workers. The civil war put an end to this process. Mira remained loyal to the Republican government and fled from Spain to Latin America when the conflict was over and the rebels seized power. We will add some words on him when considering emigrés psychology.

The Entourage of Psychology In Spain during the first decades of the 20th century, a social and cultural renovation shook the country. A flow of ideas and techniques entered

from Germany and other more developed countries, and active exchanges began to flourish in most fields of human culture. Apart from the contributions arising from the ILE, those cultural innovations that appeared on the scene have been attributed to the efforts of the “elites” of the then active social generations, the “Generation of ’98” and the “Generation of 1886.” The former were “patriots distressed at the backwardness of Spain” (Carr, 1966, p. 530), and they demanded that the new techniques that were needed should fuse with the Spanish genius. They drew inspiration for their own masterpieces from the values of the countryside, the common people and their pastimes—as in the case of writers like Antonio Machado, Pio Baroja, or Miguel de Unamuno, among others. The Generation of 1886, which included many well-known figures (Jose Ortega y Gasset; Americo Castro; Gregorio Marañon; Pablo R. Picasso; Juan Ramon Jimenez, winner of the 1956 Nobel Prize for Literature; and Manuel Azaña, among others) has been rightly considered as major protagonists in the introduction of European ideas and techniques into the still underdeveloped Spain of those days. The philosopher Ortega, perhaps the leading person of that generation, clearly synthesized their common view: “Spain is the problem, Europe is its solution” (Ortega-y-Gasset, 1946, I, p. 521); and, for him, Europe was totally equivalent with “science.” Both generations showed a positive feeling toward psychological topics. The ’98 elite considered the absence of will in society as the clue to explain the recent “disaster,” and some of them profited from the analyses of the phenomenon of abulia that had been described by French psychologist Théodule Ribot. The household remedy proposed was the recovery of self-esteem and a general movement toward self-knowledge and social regeneration. The philosophical voice of the group, Miguel de Unamuno (1864–1936), developed some preexistentialist topics dealing with life and, above all, with death, which had become an obsession with him. He felt himself close to the ideals of philosophers such as Kierkegaard and William James, and stressed the need for a profound reflection upon the nature of the human being, whose condition he tried to clarify through his poetry and novels. Related to the 1886 generation, we will consider the contributions of two very distinguished members of it, Ortega and Marañon.

contributions from outsiders The interest in psychology was not limited to its applied aspects. The 1886 generation wanted to

base the recovery of society on a new interest in competence, knowledge, and theory. Throughout a multiplicity of dimensions, from philosophy to medicine and technique, experimentation produced remarkable results. The interest in philosophy was largely promoted by the great thinker Jose Ortega y Gasset (1883–1955), professor of philosophy at the University of Madrid. This continued until the war, when he fled Spain, only returning in the final years of his life to pursue for a purely private lifestyle (Marías, 1983). Ortega believed it necessary to promote philosophy and science in the country to raise the level of ideas in Spanish society. He founded a publishing house and a magazine (Revista de Occidente), he wrote newspaper articles, gave lectures all over the country, and arranged the translation into Spanish of important works, all with the purpose of carrying out a true education of the country. He largely favored the introduction of contemporary views on the human mind that stressed its creative and social dimensions. He selected for translation the works of phenomenologists (Husserl, Scheler), Gestalt psychologists (W. Köhler, K. Koffka), the psychoanalytical school (Freud, Jung, Adler), or cognitive thinkers such as J. Piaget, E. Spranger, or K. Bühler, among others. The time was ripe for psychological ideas. Ortega himself made great efforts in developing a personal philosophy centered on the idea that biographical life (“my own life”) was the key structure upon which all philosophy should be built. His philosophy is rooted in the psychology of “intentionality” of Franz Brentano and Husserl’s phenomenology, and on Dilthey’s description of life. Its developments are in some ways parallel to the philosophies of Heidegger and Sartre. All of them consider the human being as a structure, “the-man-in-the-world,” in which the continuous interaction between oneself and circumstances takes place, providing the metaphysical “arena” in which other real beings have to appear and exist. The structures “mediating” those interactions are psychological ones, and they appear as social and historical conditions. The person projects himself and his life, according to social models and beliefs, and he obtains from that a sort of social personality. One of Ortega’s best-known contributions to the world of social science and psychology was his analysis of the personality of what he called “the mass man.” This represents for him a type of person who is not faithful to his original vocation, but only maintains the motives and desires of his group, imposes its will, carpintero

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benefits from civilization, but does not respect either “others” or the norms and values of different groups. He lives an “unauthentic” life, in a way that is ethnocentric and annihilates freedom for all opposing views. This person does not accept the leadership of the social elite; he only accepts his own direction, and so creates the worldly phenomenon of “the revolt of the masses” (Ortega-y-Gasset, 1930). The “mass man” is a personality type that is wholly coincident with the so-called “fascist” personality (W. Reich, 1933) and the “authoritarian” personality (T. Adorno, 1950). Such a type of man has proliferated in the Western world in the 20th century, and according to Ortega, the fact is due to, first, great scientific and technical development; second, an enormous and rapid population growth, and, last but not least, a superficial instruction that falls far short of a true education. The second contribution to be considered here is due to another member of the same generation and closely related to psychology: the physician Gregorio Marañón (1887–1960), endocrinologist and general practitioner, with a great humanistic and historical foundation. As an endocrinologist, Marañón was interested in the psychological dimensions of biological topics such as sexuality, constitutional types, and women’s climacterium; his most salient contribution took place in the field of human emotion. His research on emotion dealt primarily with the role of hormones and somatic changes in the creation of feelings. For example, he administered adrenaline injections to his subjects and asked them to examine and describe their feelings under influence of the hormone. Many experienced had no emotional overtones; others had the experience of “cold feeling,” which they characterized as feeling “as if” they were touched but only in an apparent way (I feel as if I were afraid), not in a real one. Their experiences turned into “real” or “warm” emotions as soon as the experimenter gave them information related to their pains or difficulties, thus completing, so to say, feeling with knowledge. The need for an idea or a memory related to emotional feeling was the key of Marañon’s discovery. He defended that bodily changes alone would not bring forth an emotion (against the classic view of W. James). On the contrary, the need for a cognitive factor (experience, memory, etc.) had to be established for the full phenomenon to take place. His theory became a direct antecedent of the cognitive theory of emotion espoused by Schachter and Singer, who, in their classic article acknowledged their debt to the Spanish researcher (Schachter & Singer, 1962). 522

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Moreover, Marañón also did important work in the area of biographical and psychohistorical studies, as he analyzed and wrote several important biographies ranging from the Roman emperor Tiberius, to King Philip IV of Spain, and other significant figures in Spanish history. In these biographies, he combined historical data with psychological and medical information to give a complex picture of these personalities. These contributions enriched and gave significant support to psychological matters among the Spanish “intelligentsia” of those days.

Period II (1939–1950): The Impact of Civil War Spain suffered a dramatic struggle between opposing groups that maintained uncongenial views about the country and its social and political structure. A progressive, open-minded, liberal sector of society aroused, with its reforms and changes, the opposition of the more conservative groups, deeply influenced by their religious beliefs and reluctant to accept the developments of such liberalism. In 1931, a major political change put an end to the monarchy and brought, for the second time, a republic power in to Spain. Many traditional values and conservative attitudes lost their strength. Social and political unrest grew rapidly, and independent movements gathered strength, mainly in Catalonia and the Basque country. In fact, three main roots created a climate of conflict that, in the long run, proved to be fatal: the rise of regional separatism in some regions with historical and linguistic peculiarities; the opposition between partisans of a confessional state and those in favor of a lay organization; and the conflict between social classes, along with the emergence of left-wing organizations opposing the conservative positions of some oligarchies. In such a scenario, the introduction of new political ideals both by fascist and communist groups paved the way for a breakdown of the social peace, ending in a civil war declared between the so-called “two Spains” (Figueiredo, 1933). On July 1936, the civil war began with a military uprising that took place in Morocco. The Spanish war was a prelude to the bigger conflict of World War II, and during it democratic and totalitarian ideologies (fascism and communism) fought for 3 years. The conflict received outside help; the rebels from Nazi Germany and fascist Italy; the Republic, from the Soviet Union and democratic countries. By 1939, the military group seized power, and

General Francisco Franco was placed at the head of the new regime. The war had a great impact on the development of psychology. Some consequences were of a social nature; others of an intellectual character. Among the former, one should not forget the cancellation of the XI International Congress of Psychology, which was scheduled for the fall of 1936 in Madrid. At that precise time, the city had been converted into a battle front. All the work made to prepare for the meeting went to waste (Carpintero & Lafuente, 2008). Moreover, most of the existing institutions and journals that had been created in the previous years ceased publication. The Revista de Psicologia i Pedagogia, Archivos de Neurobiologia, the Revista de Occidente, or the Boletin de la Institucion Libre de Enseñanza, among others, were closed down. The chair of experimental psychology disappeared, and the teaching of psychology was concentrated in the faculties of philosophy, which had deeply changed its intellectual orientation. If, in the past, psychotechnology and the modern schools of psychology had dominated the scene, after the war, the only one accepted was the neo-Thomist doctrine, a philosophical approach that occupied the chairs and congresses of the new educational scene. Still more important was the creation of an important body of émigrés that spread throughout the different countries of Latin America, where they continued to work in psychology. It was an intellectual loss for Spain that implied the disappearance of institutions and journals, the interruption of many research projects, the vanishing of that tradition, and the waste of human capital represented by the large number of specialists who were forced to flee.

countries, which warmly accepted these newcomers and gave them support to rebuild their lives. Their activities in their new settings are a clear expression of the values and interests that guided them in prewar times. They promoted academic and professional development in their new homes, and in many places, they contributed to creating the study of psychology. They also founded specialized centers or journals that provided emerging professionals with a supporting network. Let us mention here briefly their names and associated achievements, as they form a frequently forgotten part of the tradition of psychology in Spain despite its value and the sacrifice it represented. Emilio Mira (Brazil) promoted specialization in psychotechnology all over the Southern Cone; Angel Garma (1904–1993) contributed to the development of psychoanalysis in Argentina; Mercedes Rodrigo (1891–1982) initiated the career of psychologist in Colombia, while Guillermo Perez Enciso (1917–2007) and Jose Peinado (1909–1995) did the same in Venezuela, and Antonio Roman-Duran in Guatemala; Gonzalo R. Lafora and J. Peinado opened research and clinical centers in Mexico; Juan Cuatrecasas (1899–1990) did psychophysiological research in Argentina, as did Julián de Ajuriaguerra (1911–1993) in Switzerland, and Rafael Lorente de No (1902–1990) in the United States. Professional work was also done by Francisco del Olmo and Cesar de Madariaga (1891–1961) in Venezuela. Summing up, these scholars represented an impressive human and scientific capital, lost to their native country, but enriching the Latin American tradition, and they largely contributed to its professional progress. They also reinforced international contacts and helped to rebuild a cooperative network among psychologists of all Spanish-speaking countries.

The Exiled Psychologists Psychology had attracted many open-minded people, progressive in their social ideals and deeply involved in the project to improve and modernize Spanish society. They had seen psychological techniques as a means for achieving desired changes in a plurality of settings—schools, business, and the mental health services. A large number of those early psychologists, who were preparing the ground for the profession in the years that preceded the war, were social reformers and maintained progressive views on society. Most of them had been aligned on the republican side during the war, so they chose to leave when the conflict ended with the defeat of the Republic. The majority of them went to Latin American

Psychology on the Mainland: The New Horizon At the end of the war, a strongly conservative regime was imposed by the army headed by General Franco. As we have seen, thousands of people went into exile, and the prewar process of liberalization and democratization was completely stopped. Inside the country was strong repression: freedom was curtailed, strict censorship was applied to the press and mass media, and a one-party regime was established. The government declared itself confessional, rejected all regionalisms, and aligned itself with fascist regimes. Only after the defeat of fascism in World War II did the Spanish government begin to approach the Western democracies, becoming carpintero

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a United Nations member in 1955. A process of economic recovery introduced a slight liberalization in the early 1960s (beginning in 1963), but democracy did not arrive until the death of Franco in 1975. Then a new era began for the country. Soon after the war, psychology in Spain again became a philosophical matter. A Dominican friar, Father Manuel Barbado (1886–1945), occupied the chair of the University of Madrid and was also appointed director of an Institute of Philosophy, created as part of a newly founded body (the Higher Council for Scientific Research) that was in charge of research and scientific culture. His influence was great, and he maintained that, in his view, Saint Thomas Aquinas and Aristotle should be acknowledged as the main authorities on psychological issues. Only on that basis could the teaching of philosophy and psychology be built at the high school and university levels. The proximity to fascism and Nazi Germany also facilitated discussions about races and their impact on social and political behavior. Among some conservative groups, those topics became important. A psychiatrist, head of the Psychiatrist Service of Franco’s army, Antonio Vallejo-Najera (1889–1960), carried out a research project to analyze the personality of Marxist and “red” soldiers. Its title was “Psychical Nature of the Marxist fanatics.” He put under scrutiny those people who had been fighting in the republican army and were imprisoned in several concentration camps. He mainly employed a biotypological approach, and he seems to have concluded that most of those people belonged to a degenerative type, with a medium to low intelligence level and an innately revolutionary social personality (Bandres & Llavona, 1997; Vallejo-Najera, 1939).

the recovery of the scientific level A young and hopeful group of students gathered in Madrid around the figure of Jose Germain, who had played a leading role in the prewar days, as we have seen, and had been left out of the scene by the new regime. Thanks to the support and influence of well-known Italian psychologist Father Agostino Gemelli, a friend from earlier days, Germain was finally put in charge of starting up a small department for experimental psychology in the Higher Council for Scientific Research (the Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas or CSIC). It was founded in 1948, and it later would become the seed of contemporary psychology in Spanish universities. 524

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A few of the names in the group included Mariano Yela, Jose Luis Pinillos, Miguel Siguán, Manuel Ubeda, Jesusa Pertejo, Francisco Secadas, Juan Garcia-Yagüe, Alfonso Alvarez-Villar, Jose A. Forteza, and Marcelo Pascual. All of them, in various ways, would later be in charge of organizing the teaching of psychology in universities, and they also became involved in the first research projects carried out in the new departments. To strengthen the position of psychology in the new political environment, several steps were taken. First, these scholars planned to do work that had social meaning in itself; second, they also tried to create the accoutrements that would permit the institutionalization of the field, including a scientific journal, and a scientific and professional association. Third, they established a school for training professionals. The CSIC made it possible to initiate the strongly desired recovery of the scientific level. The need for technical instruments adapted to the Spanish population became a priority. Thurstone’s Primary Mental Abilities (PMA) and other more specific tests, such as Eysenck’s Personality Inventory (EPI), and Murray’s Thematic Perception Test (TAT), among others, were translated, adapted, and put into the hands of young professionals who were entering the world of intervention. Germain did not build his group under a rigid discipline of thought. On the contrary, he favored among his students the development of various lines of research and a variety of conceptual and methodological points of view. As a consequence, a variety of interests flourished inside the group, from mathematical psychology to clinical and social research. Such pluralism was moderated by a humanistic view that enveloped all psychological questions. A large program on job selection, designed to carry out a technical selection of pilots for the Spanish Air Force was established with support and expert advice on the technical equipment coming from the U.S. Air Force. The project ran very well, and it represented a significant achievement for the group, which enforced its position in society.

Period III (1950–1968): A Profession Begins Hitherto, all psychological work had been carried out by people not formally trained as psychologists. The time was now ripe for the creation of a university degree that could put this field at the same level as other professions working in society.

In his effort to consolidate the role of psychology in Spain, Germain founded a scientific journal and a society. The journal, the Revista de Psicologia General y Aplicada, appeared in 1946, and immediately became the main magazine for research and information in the field (Carpintero & Tortosa, 1996). Its broad scope, and its variety of national and international collaboration made it for years a first-class publication. He also built, in 1952, the Sociedad Española de Psicologia (Spanish Psychological Society), which soon began to ask for the creation of a degree in psychology. This measure would allow not only the foundation of the necessary academic background for research and training, but also the appearance of those professionals who would apply psychological in society. As a result, a school of psychology was created in 1953, as a new center of the Universidad Complutense de Madrid. It is true that 1953 was a period of relative political smoothness, with the Christian Democrat J. Ruiz-Gimenez as Secretary of Education, a man in favor of the new studies. But in only 2 years, he had to resign and his help was abruptly lost. The school offered, not a degree in psychology, but a diploma, which was obtained after 2 years of postgraduate training. The school covered, after a year of common studies, the three classic specialties: educational, clinical, and industrial psychology. Training included some core disciplines (general, experimental, and social psychology; psychometrics and statistics; psychophysiology; history of psychology; methodology; and philosophical anthropology), and many other topics related to the three mentioned options for specialization. Students needed to have a previously obtained master’s degree, usually in education, medicine, philosophy, or law, in order to enroll. The school was headed by Professor of Education Juan Zaragüeta (1883–1974), an old student of Desirée Mercier at Louvain University, and technically organized by J. Germain and his students. Germain’s disciples formed the core of this center, with the cooperation of some leading experts coming from psychiatry (such as Juan-Jose LopezIbor) and education (Victor García-Hoz). In the 1960s, two other schools were established at the University of Barcelona, one dedicated to clinical psychology (under the direction of J. Obiols, professor of psychiatry), the other covering the remaining specialties (under the direction of M. Siguan, in 1964). In all, the three schools trained approximately 3,000 people before the creation, in the early

1970s, of the degree in psychology (Huertas, Padilla, & Montes, 1997). Its promoters wanted to establish a complete degree through which adequate training could be offered to students, but the government refused to sponsor such a plan and considered these courses as the best option. One of Germain’s disciples commented that, with such measures, the psychology building had been made upside-down. Psychologists began to organize themselves as a liberal profession, with private centers that offered their services to laymen.

The Early Masters In spite of the difficulties and limited support received from society, in the late 1950s, as the country entered an era of economic development, the growing group devoted to scientific psychology finally dominated the scene, bringing to an end the old scholastic remnants. Although the interest in psychology and its applications began to develop in the pre–civil war years, until the creation of the schools, no formal training had been provided by any institution, except for some occasional seminars. Universities and a university degree were the goal for all those working in the field. In those years, the job market for psychologists was very limited in quality and quantity. There were in each of the approximately 50 administrative provinces a center or institute for applied psychology, basically oriented to assessing those people wanting some special license for driving or weapons possession. At that time, most of the growing industrial organization and working activities were placed under the control and ownership of the government, and there was no special need for psychological assessment. Religious control of individuals and governmental supervision of society made the psychologist’s work in those days practically useless. Germain’s students began to enter universities, occupying and organizing chairs and new departments there. Psychology was then located in the faculties of philosophy and education. Such was the case in Madrid, Barcelona, and some other big cities, like Valencia. M. Yela, J.L. Pinillos, M. Siguan, and F. Secadas, all old members of the CSIC headed by Germain, finally became the first lecturers in scientific psychology in Spanish universities. Their work was very important in creating the new framework of science and profession in the field that would permit future development. With the advent of a degree in psychology, a new period began. Before examining it, let us examine carpintero

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some of the pioneers who did so much to create the basis for the subsequent tradition.

the first professors In the early 1960s, academic life flourished in Spain, mainly in universities. There were a few chairs of psychology, situated in the studies both of philosophy and education. The discipline was also included in the medicine degree, but here the lectures were entrusted to the professors of philosophy, as a way to ensure its theoretical orientation. Most of the members of the “Germain school,” so to speak, became the effective pioneers of the new psychology here. Mariano Yela was the first professor trained in scientific psychology who would occupy a psychology chair in a university. Yela (1921–1994) had earned a degree in philosophy, then received postgraduate training in psychology, in the United States. He worked under L.L. Thurstone in Chicago doing research in mathematical psychology and factor analysis, topics to which he became a significant contributor. He also did some work in the psychophysiological study of sensory processes under William Neff, and became acquainted with Carl Rogers’ client-centered therapy. Back in Spain, he was one of the most active members of the Germain group in CSIC, and became involved in all institutional projects that were launched there: he taught at the Madrid school, was editor of the RPGA journal, and for years, he also chaired the psychological society. As a young psychologist, he was also the person in charge of the human resources department at a large factory on the outskirts of Madrid; here, he gained substantial experience in applied operations. In 1957, he obtained a chair of psychology at the Universidad de Madrid, and there organized a research group working on intelligence and language, applying a factorialist approach to those topics. At the same time, he combined these tasks with a part-time teaching post at Louvain University (Belgium), where he collaborated with Albert Michotte in experimental research and taught several courses in factor analysis. In his personal view on the structure of intelligence, he tried to combine the general factor proposed by Spearman and the plurality of other specific ones, as had been maintained by Thurstone. The whole field was seen as being partly continuous, and partly discontinuous and differentiated. Covariation and diversity, according to him, were always found in those types of processes. It does not matter if one looks at the theoretical activities of 526

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intelligence, or at its practical side. Later, besides a general technical factor, he proposed other special abilities related to perceptual and motor developments. In the 1960s and 1970s, when the splendor of behaviorism came to an end, Yela offered an interesting and creative interpretation of the phenomenon of behavior, as seen from an integrated theory based on both phenomenology and behaviorism. In his view, behavior had to be analyzed, on the one hand, as a physical movement that implied a bodily structure in its production, but, on the other hand, it could not be deprived of its “meaningful dimension.” Human action, he stressed, always combines physical and intentional (i.e., conscious) sides. Due to its physical dimension, behavior must be placed in a space and a time field; but, as a consequence of its intentional aspect, it also belongs to a subjective and mental horizon. Neither a simplification and reduction to pure meaning nor to physical movement could capture the complexity of human action. Clearly, what was needed in psychology was a complex and integrative approach, one he tried to promote within his work. As part of his legacy, an important collection of tests were put in the hands of professionals, many of them useful instruments for day-to-day labor. They cover various dimensions of the intelligence field; some of them explore it by means of pencil-andpaper performance, others take into consideration motor ability and manual labor. Another leading person in the field is Jose Luis Pinillos (1919–), professor of psychology in the Universities of Valencia and “Complutense” of Madrid. After receiving a Ph.D. in philosophy from the University of Madrid, Pinillos received further training in psychology in Germany (with H. Rothacker) and at the Maudsley Hospital (London, U.K). There, he became a student of Hans J. Eysenck, with whom he maintained a permanent and close relationship. Early in his life, he was interested in social topics, and did interesting research on Spanish regional stereotypes. In the early 1950s, he also conducted studies of attitudes and preferences among young Spanish students, in order to prove that the new generation had an open mentality very different from the conservative image that the country’s new government wanted to enforce everywhere. Although the state was confessedly Catholic, young people showed little religious conformity and were very critical toward the authority. The main results of that survey were leaked to foreign news agencies, and its author found himself in trouble, remaining outside of Spain for some time.

In 1975, he published an important textbook, Principles of Psychology, which has been the most widely diffused manual of general psychology in the country. In its pages, a view of the discipline is offered in a scientific, natural outlook, without sacrificing its basic philosophical issues, and with continuous references to the history of its various topics. This view stresses the idea that the adequate object for psychology is both behavior and consciousness, or subjective experience. Both dimensions have an adaptive value and must be integrated into a whole, giving rise to a conscious and purposeful type of behavior that takes place in a world that is both physical and social. Firmly grounded in evolutionary bases, he looked for an essentially human science, in which the highest degrees of complexity could be taken into account (Pinillos, 1975). Consciousness is here viewed as a central topic, and it has received great attention in his work. Under the influence of both phenomenology and neurosciences, he considers consciousness an essential, substantive property of human beings. Thanks to this state, the subject opens himself to an objective world in front of him, and an essential polarity in his world is established. On the other hand, man’s adaptation is widened through consciousness, and his behavior is not limited to a mere response to stimuli—or respondent behavior—but it is also a planned, goal-oriented, and purposeful. In such a condition, a subject that can be determined by itself may emerge, and, up to a point, it is superimposed on the natural action of stimuli and eliminates their immediate causality (Pinillos, 1983). Under the influence of Hans Eysenck and Hans Brengelmann, two well-known behaviorally oriented psychologists, Pinillos largely contributed to the introduction of behavior modification and other behavioral techniques in Spain. It must be noted, however, that he never accepted the loss of the conscious experience in psychological theorizing, thus paving the way for the development of a cognitive view among his students and collaborators. Another significant figure of the recent psychological tradition in Spain is Miguel Siguan (1918–2010), an old student of Germain’s, who became the head of the academic psychology in Catalonia, after having occupied the psychology chair at the University of Barcelona in the early 1960s. As mentioned above, he organized a school of psychology in Barcelona, before the creation of the degree in psychology, and he was also the founder and first editor of Anuario de Psicología, a scientific magazine of a broad thematic spectrum.

In his early days, he was deeply interested in social and organizational research. He carried out an important research project on the psychosocial aspects of migrations that took place in Spain after the civil war, in the 1950s and 1960s. People from various areas, living under a depressed agricultural economy in the country, looked for a better living and took themselves to those areas, like Catalonia, the Basque country, and Madrid, where new industries were growing. The profound change in their living conditions, their motivation, and the changes in family and social norms, were explored through questionnaires and interviews, with qualitative techniques oriented to building “life stories.” An interesting panorama of the new society emerged from those studies. A general presentation was offered in his book Del campo al suburbio (From the Rural World to the City Slums, 1959a). He also presented a broad view on the central questions in the field of human relations in industry in his book Aspectos humanos del trabajo industrial (Human aspects of industrial work, 1959b) In more recent times, his field of interest has been language, mainly considered in its social dimension. He has mainly focused on bilingualism, a problem that emerged with force with the decentralized regime put in place by the democratic constitution of 1978. That began a strong movement in favor of the full recovery and social use of those languages, other than Spanish, that had been maintained by various bilingual regions in Spain. Catalonia, the Basque country, and Galicia had kept as a social treasure their own languages, Catalan, Euskera, and Galician, respectively. As a consequence, bilingualism became a prime topic, and Siguan developed this line of study by promoting specialized conferences, empirical research, and a variety of publications (Siguan, 1984). Siguan has always maintained a close connection between his group and the Geneva School, and some of his students have had further training there, in subjects such as developmental cognitive psychology, genetic epistemology, and other related topics.

other voices Germain’s group was limited in size, but was able to push ahead with various research lines, which in the long run were seen through to a solid conclusion. Others of its members are also worth mentioning here. One of them is Francisco Secadas (1917–), professor of psychology at the University of Valencia, and then at the Autonomous University of Madrid. He specialized in developmental psychology and carried out a vast plan of empirical analysis of the carpintero

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behavioral and mental sequences in child development. In a complementary way, he tried to deepen the understanding of the evolution of play behavior in children. Moreover, Father Manuel Ubeda, O.P., of the Dominican Order (1913–1999), a physician and psychophysiologist, introduced modern topics in psychophysiology in his lectures at the school of psychology, while Jesusa Pertejo (1921–2007), also a physician and psychologist, gave a strong impulse to the application of dynamic views in clinical psychology, especially in the field of child psychotherapy, and in her early days did significant work on projective techniques. Others, like Juan GarcíaYagüe (1924–), working in educational psychology, helped to increase the variety and quality of testing instruments for school psychology; and Jose Forteza (1929–1998) played an important role in consolidating work and industrial psychology, mainly through his research on work motivation. More or less directly related to this group were Miguel Cruz (1920–), an expert in classical Islamic psychology, and Maria Eugenia Romano (1917–1987), an expert in projective techniques. All of them contributed in various degrees to strengthening their common field in the world of universities, scientific societies, and national and specialized congresses, and this resulted in a new era for psychology in the country. As it has been previously noted, it is characteristic of all the members of the Germain group that they were interested in combining theory and applied work and, although primarily oriented toward the academic world, they could not withdraw themselves from the social and practical aspects of their profession. Most became involved also in teaching, first at the school of psychology, then at the departments that were created in universities. Such traits have to be considered against the absence of a laboratory and the limited use of experimental techniques in their work. Moreover, Germain showed a great capacity for implementing a research team, but he was in no way a pure theoretician, and while feeling himself close to the Gestalt views, he did not impose a systematic view on his students, who enjoyed a radical pluralism in their work. And, last but not least, most of these young researchers came to psychology after having had previous training in philosophy, a fact not without consequence upon their concrete scientific interests. It is not surprising that, when academic psychology finally arrived at the universities, the center that Germain had kept alive—the National Institute of 528

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Applied Psychology and Psychotechnology—lost relevance, giving way to the newly created departments and seminars.

Period IV (1968–1980): Psychology in Democratic Spain Although Franco’s political regime resisted all adversities and opposition until the last day of the dictator’s life, in the final years of his government, growing social unrest and dissent, the rise of Basque terrorism, and international pressure acting from outside introduced some internal changes, and society began to look forward to the future. It may be said that the turning point for the present history must be placed around 1970. Only 2 years before had the degree in psychology been created as a specialty within the broad field of arts and humanities. That moment may be seen as the beginning of the explosion of the field in all directions: the academy, and the profession, moved from a “small” to a “large” level of evolution and complexity. The degree was conceived as a new branch of the faculties of philosophy and humanities. This degree included 2 years for common subjects, followed by 3 years of specialty subjects. There were only a few universities (e.g., Madrid, Barcelona) in which these studies began, but public demand for them rapidly spread throughout the country. Psychology reached first place in the students’ preference for the new generation and, as a consequence, most existing universities included that degree among their options. Registered students increased rapidly, from 3,666 in 1972 to 17,130 in 1982, 47,161 in 1992, and 56,390 in 2006, multiplying by a factor of 20 in only three decades (Hernández, 2003). (It is interesting to add that the figures of 2006 split into two uneven parts: private universities, 6,990, and state universities, 49,900 students [Mestre, private communication]). Today, the entry of students is limited (numerus clausus) in practically all universities, and a certain level of high school grades is required to be accepted. Classes with massive numbers of students were very common in the recent past, but now a more reasonable teacher–student ratio is being reached in most centers. These quantitative changes implied many other variations, both in scientific and social aspects. Let us first consider the former, and then turn to the professional questions.

Changes in the Academy Psychology, born among arts and humanities, was soon located in the social sciences division.

In recent days, it has also been placed in the health field. The degree was conceived as offering just one title, without any further specification, although allowing a certain degree of specialization through the selective choice of optional subjects. These permitted the student to focus on clinical, educational, or organizational, and in certain cases, in social or experimental psychology. The list of compulsory subjects included basic psychological processes; research methods, designs, and techniques; psychobiology, developmental psychology; social psychology; personality; psychological assessment; history of psychology; psychopathology; intervention techniques and psychological treatment; educational psychology; psychology of groups and organizations; and psychology of thought and language, plus a practicum, oriented toward application and usually obtained through attendance in a professional center or a psychology unit in an institutional setting. In many universities, a center for applied psychology has been established, as a complementary unit, with three main goals: teaching, research and, above all, assistance. They provide assessment and treatment of psychological disorders to all the members of the university, and normally they also admit people from outside. The work carried out here forms the basis for specialized training, and it usually paves the way for further research. Participants include recent graduates and teaching professors who supervise each case. All the aforementioned subjects were distributed into six specialized areas, a division that has broken the initial communication and close interaction between people working in psychology, while reinforcing specialization and division of labor. Associations, meetings, competitive exams for teaching jobs, and a large part of academic activity became largely influenced by these divisions. These became inner circles inside which most of the academic life of each teaching person takes place, totally regardless of the topics and problems of other circles. Such division has recently been overcome, largely due to the process of unification in higher education introduced by the European Union. Currently, although universities are allowed to organize the curriculum of the degree in accordance with their interests and academic resources, a shorter time has been given to general training, which has to be concentrated in 4 years; this puts all the matters for specialization into postgraduate training, conceived as a master’s course, and focused on some of the practical areas of psychology.

theoretical preferences As has been previously mentioned, the group of pioneers that gathered around Germain and initiated the process of recovery of scientific psychology in the country had no theoretical commitment except for a vague functional and humanistic viewpoint that dominated their projects. They had a wide range of preferences, from factor analysis to dynamic and humanistic psychology, and such theoretical pluralism kept them free from all sorts of dogmatism when carrying out the reconstruction of the past tradition. Since the creation of the degree, young people joined new departments and centers oriented toward those theoretical schools that dominated their own specialties and were influential in the network of high-impact publications. Since the 1960s, a widely conceived behavioral orientation began to dominate the academic world. Interest for applications gave prominence to all questions related to behaviour modification and therapy. A pioneer journal, Analisis y Modificacion de Conducta, was founded by Vicente Pelechano, a well-known professor and researcher, in 1975; it has been for years the main communication channel in behavioral psychology, both theoretical and applied. Also in the early 1970s there appeared a paper on operant conditioning, evaluating the utility for research of the use of turtles as experimental subjects (Bayés, 1972). This article has been considered the mark of a new epoch in our tradition, now characterized by its behavioral orientation. Other journals appeared in the following years, and meetings and symposia gathered for the discussion of a variety of behavioral topics and clinical cases. The advent of cognitivism may be placed around 1980. An epoch-making meeting took place in 1979, supported by the well-known Juan March Foundation and chaired by J.L. Pinillos (the proceedings were published in 1980, [Pinillos, 1980]). Its sessions were marked by a theoretical confrontation between behavioral psychology and the cognitive views, and the coming task of adapting the mainstream of psychological thought to the new level represented by cognitivism made its appearance. By the end of the session, most members declared themselves as convinced supporters of the cognitivist model (Pinillos, 1980; Vera, 2005). It is also remarkable that many papers and symposia that took place in the Seventh National Congress of the Spanish Psychological Association (at Santiago de Compostela, in 1982) were built according to the concepts and terminology of the new informationprocessing paradigm. In 1988, a specialized journal, carpintero

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Cognitiva, was founded, and since then, an increasing number of papers, meetings, books, and research projects have been conceived according to the guidelines of this new “school.” For its part, psychoanalysis has maintained a significant place, more so in practical and professional circles than in the academic world. Freudian ideas gained wide attention both from the lay public and clinical professionals, since the old days of 1922, when a Spanish Complete Works edition was published, according to a suggestion from the wellknown philosopher J. Ortega y Gasset (Carpintero & Mestre, 1984). But, in the postwar years, limited circulation was imposed on such ideas, which were not fully in accordance with the conservative ideology then in force. With the support of groups in Germany and Switzerland, a psychoanalytic association was founded in 1959, the Portuguese-Spanish Society of Psychoanalysis, which finally changed into a Spanish Society of Psychoanalysis in 1967. It included those practitioners and clinicians oriented in the dynamic line and interested in creating the basis for a national group inside the International Psychoanalytic Association (Bermejo, 1994). But while clinicians became interested in the new orientation, the academic world showed itself reluctant to embrace these concepts, which evidenced a great discrepancy with evolving scientific views. Such a situation has been maintained over the years, and the arrival of a large group of dynamically oriented clinicians from Latin American countries, mainly from Argentina, in the 1970s, represented an important strengthening for the “school” in Spain. More limited enthusiasm has been obtained by humanistic psychology, incorporated in the 1970s, and well accepted by practitioners working in organizational and personnel psychology. A center for psychotherapy applied to human relations was established in 1973, and another pioneer center for Gestalt therapy 3 years later. At least three associations and a journal were created in 1981. This clearly reveals the existence of some active groups that were in search of a space for intervention in society. Internal crises and divergences have emerged since then, and its presence in the general field is limited to some therapeutic groups of various theoretical orientations (Arias & Lafuente, 1996).

a note on textbooks Often, some textbooks obtain a high degree of representativeness inside a discipline because their authors manage to create a conceptual frame that has a high correspondence with the dominant views 530

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of a certain scientific community. The expectations of their authors match those of students and teachers, at a certain level, and the doctrinal lines that are often implicit in articles or shorter works are here openly manifested. Here, we examine Let us some handbooks of psychology that could represent a few cross-sections taken throughout the present story. In 1954, Germain promoted the translation of the Handbook of Psychology (its original version is in German), which had been directed and edited by his colleague and friend David Katz. It included chapters by Katz himself, G. Ekman, E. Kaila, J. Piaget, and B. Inhelder on basic processes and development, and also included two presentations devoted to the doctrines of Jung and Adler, among other topics. The book was also enriched with a chapter on the work of psychology, written by Yela, and featured a foreword by Germain (Katz, 1954), in which he underlined the broad perspectives and many facets of the book. In fact, it was neither a behaviorist nor a dynamic approach, but a textbook basically oriented toward a Gestalt-structural approach, broadly speaking. A few years later, in 1968, Yela performed a parallel task in promoting the translation of E.R. Hilgard’s Introduction to Psychology, a well known U.S. handbook, much more oriented toward behavioral psychology, although open to some considerations related to the human mind and personality (Hilgard, 1968). With it, the influence of American psychology upon the Spanish tradition was openly established, and would increase continuously since then. Shortly afterward, in 1975, Jose Luis Pinillos published his Principles of Psychology, a book that, as has been said before, would become the classic manual for students and graduates for at least two decades. This is a very well-written book with excellent information, and its pages are firmly founded upon three pillars—the conscious mind, behaviour, and the brain—perfectly conjugated in its unity. The book marked the transition toward a “subjective behaviorism” or an incipient cognitive psychology. Perhaps the last step might be here dedicated to a larger work, the comprehensive Tratado de Psicologia General (Handbook of General Psychology) published in 1989, in nine volumes, and edited by Juan Mayor and Jose Luis Pinillos. This work has been compiled with the participation of a broad group of professors and researchers. In fact, they represented quite accurately the variety of styles and theoretical lines that existed in that moment in the

academic world (Mayor & Pinillos 1989). History, methods, learning, memory, language, attention and perception, personality, intelligence, thinking and reasoning, and beliefs and attitudes were its basic content, and, for the first time, a collective work on psychology was strictly carried out by Spanish researchers and professors, with some short additions coming from the Latin American world. Latin American psychologists Emilio Ribes and Ruben Ardila appear here associated with many of their colleagues from Spain. As complementary information for an overview of that period, the book’s volume editors are Jaime Arnau and Helio Carpintero (history and methods), Ramon Bayes and Jose L. Pinillos (conditioning and learning), Jose L. FernandezTrespalacios and Pio Tudela (attention and perception), Juan Mayor and Manuel de Vega (memory and representation), Rosario Martinez-Arias and Mariano Yela (thinking and intelligence), M. MartinSerrano and Miguel Siguan (communication and language), Angel Rodriguez and Julio Seoane (beliefs, attitudes, and values), Silverio Palafox and Jaime Vila (motivation and emotion), and Elena Ibañez and Vicente Pelechano (personality). (The treatise should have included three additional volumes: one on development, by Alvaro Marchesi and Jose L. Vega, and another two dedicated to the study of behavioral contexts that would have been prepared by Rocio Fernandez-Ballesteros, Jose M. Peiró, Candido Genovard, and Aquilino Polaino). All these names represent the first and in some cases the second “generation” of students of Germain’s disciples, and the work is testimony to a remarkable continuity. Although these names and topics do not embrace the whole discipline, it is true that such names represented the most active group of persons in the academic psychology of those days, and the topics included covered well enough the basic lines of the scientific field.

Voices Outside the University Some independent voices came and, up to a certain point, became integrated in the chorus formed around psychology. Leaving aside the group of psychiatrists that directly focused on psychopathological questions from their own perspective, there are two significant names, also coming from the medical sphere, whose contributions were well above average and became well integrated into the psychological tradition: Jose M. Rodriguez-Delgado and Juan Rof-Carballo. Rodriguez-Delgado (1915–) (usually cited as J.M.R. Delgado in current English literature) is

a well-known neurologist who spent many years working at Yale University, in close relationship with the great physiologist John Fulton; he later returned to Spain for retirement. He did relevant research on emotional mechanisms in the brain, and on pain and pleasure in diencephalic centers. Working on a line opened up by the experimental studies of James Olds and Peter Milner on brain stimulation through implanted electrodes, Delgado showed that, by electrical stimulation of certain diencephalic structures in monkeys and bulls, a physical control of behaviour could be reached, with the possibility of inducing and/or inhibiting specific behaviors related with sexual and social dominance or submission, aggression, and other emotional reactions. A picture of a bull abruptly halted in mid-attack through a signal operated by Delgado himself by radio command circulated in magazines and mass-media all over the world, as a sort of strange synthesis of science and bullfighting (Rodriguez Delgado, 1969). Based on his researches, Delgado hypothesized the possibility of creating a “psychocivilized society” using this mind control through direct stimulation as an instrument to establish a social order. Such “utopia” has not been put to the test for many reasons, all of them related to the invasive nature of that technology. Very different in nature have been the contributions made by Juan Rof-Carballo (1905–1990), a distinguished personality in the field of psychosomatics. In his work, he combined psychoanalysis and psychosomatic medicine with data coming from contemporary neurology and ethological studies on imprinting. All these theories served a common purpose: the understanding of the process of ontogeny, and the development of a child, who is at birth an immature being who builds his primary constitution through a transactional network of actions and reactions established between him and his mother. He called such a network an “affective warp,” that would create in the person the basic system of emotions and preferences, intellectual orientations, and a conception of the world. Upon such a basic layer the rest of life would be built. His view of this emotional network as a basis upon which the personality would be raised, forced him to explore the neurological structures that form the limbic system—what he usually called the “deep brain”—that serves emotions. These structures would make possible the mother–child symbiosis that creates, in an unconscious way, the first steps of adult life and the basis for self- identity through a network carpintero

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of internal tensions that is transmitted through the generations. Recurrence or reactivation in the progenitors of the emotional tensions of their own children during their child-rearing makes warps across situations remote influence of family history, in terms of conflict and solutions from past generations. On his views of the development of personality through dialogue with others, Rof tried to combine some of the insights maintained by psychoanalysis with those originating in the ethological discoveries and the discoveries related to the emotional brain. But most of these suggestions failed to produce long-term research, as he did not have an effective “school,” being considered outsider the university frame.

The Professional Side If applied psychology made easy the arrival process of the related theoretical discipline, as has been shown, the big explosion of the field was also a consequence of the enormous demand for training that characterized the young student generation of the 1950s. Most of these students, once they obtained their degree, went out into society looking for a job or a place where they could put into effect the ideas they had learned. They rapidly created centers and entered a great variety of local and private institutions, bringing with them the ideal of a mentally healthy society made up of mentally healthy individuals—and they certainly found a very receptive society around them. Very soon (in 1980), an association was established to support these new professionals, the Colegio Oficial de Psicologos, or Spanish Association of Psychologists.

professional association of psychologists Soon after the arrival of the first graduates into the job market, a professional group was established, strongly supported by left-wing political organizations; later, in 1975, a division of psychologists was created within the larger body of the union of graduate specialists in arts and humanities. They raised the banner of scientific psychology as a public service. The time was ripe for such messages, as General Franco, who had ruled the country for more than 30 years in an authoritarian way, had just passed away (November 20, 1975), and new expectations filled the social climate. Psychologists proved to be an active group in the coming of democracy, and had a certain influence in local associations, labor groups, or student–parent 532

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associations. Finally, on December 31, 1979, the Colegio Oficial de Psicólogos (COP; Professional Association of Psychologists) was established, as a body aiming to protect and promote these professionals and their interests and goals (Prieto, Fernandez Ballesteros, & Carpintero, 1994). As a first consequence of its existence, the psychologist’s degree came under legal control and protection. Those professionals who want to work as accredited psychologists have to be registered in its files. At present, over 40,000 people are registered with the COP. The “Colegio” has been recently organized as a federation of societies, and very recently it has added the old scientific association (Sociedad Española de Psicologia) that was founded by Germain. Most of those societies have a geographical basis, in parallel with the present-day political structure of the country, the Estado de las Autonomías (a quasifederative political organization of regional governments, largely autonomous from the central one). COP promotes congresses, seminars, and training activities on practical issues; is currently editing several scientific and professional journals; and has gained an important presence in international forums and working groups and networks organized in Europe and Latin America. It is also an active member of the general assembly of the International Union of Psychological Sciences (IUPsyS), and of other international associations. Significant developments have taken place in the main areas of the profession, as befits a mature organism. Let us here consider the more salient topics. Clinical Psychology In this area, a remarkable recent achievement is the creation of a title of clinical psychologist, under the joint support from the Department of Education and the Department of Health of the central government. A diploma has been established that will acknowledge the condition of “specialist” in that field in those who, after graduating, have received further training in an internship obtained in hospitals and health services belonging to the National Health Service (NHS). This is a figure that parallels the specialization in the various branches existing in medicine. It is called the Psicólogo Interno Residente (Internship in Psychology or PIR) project. This project, approved by the government, considers clinical psychology as a health speciality. This would imply that, in all National Health Service centers,

there would be specialized places for clinical psychologists dealing with psychological dimensions of health and illness (Barrio & Carpintero, 2003). According to this, graduates in psychology, having passed an admission test, will pursue this postgraduate degree that will allow those that complete it to be accepted as “psychologist specialized in clinical psychology” all over the country, fully supported in the health services. The PIR student will spend 3 years in the program, holding a scholarship from the government and working with patients with psychological problems under strict supervision from psychiatrists and psychologists, in a rotating system that will enable him or her to become familiar with different areas related to mental health services. During the first year, the PIR candidate carries out his or her training in a hospital, and afterward in psychiatric services and centers with rehabilitation programs. Such a program has its own story. It began in 1983, but its final approval came in 1993, and it was fully regulated in 1998 (Olabarría, 2003). Every year, the government offers a limited number of admissions, and people applying for the program are required to pass a very demanding examination. Significantly, a recent confrontation has taken place between the Professional Union of Psychologists and the equivalent professional organization of medical doctors. The issue at stake was the psychologist’s right to carry out clinical activity; that is, diagnosis and treat people suffering from psychological disorders. Doctors claimed that, under the unity of the person who usually suffers from psychophysical troubles, the physician should keep the direction of all possible therapeutic treatment that might be implemented; psychologists would help with their collaboration in developing a treatment plan. The quarrel was raised as far as the Spanish Supreme Court, which, in 2002, settled the dispute by enforcing the right of the psychologist to exert those clinical activities in everything pertaining to the psychological field. Some other aspects may complement this view. Close to this field, the new speciality of health psychology has rapidly grown. It has its own identity and characteristics, in parallel with its development in other Western countries. It began as a postgraduate specialization that received support from social and basic psychology departments, mainly interested in questions relating to health care, medicine, and personality. It aims at providing psychological attention to people suffering from organic illnesses (Rodriguez Marin, 1994).

Gerontopsychology is another growing field, attracting many professionals and receiving both private and institutional support. Recently, several master’s degrees have been established dedicated to such a topic; they seem well grounded in a social need, as the elderly sector of the population is rapidly growing in Spain (Fernandez Ballesteros, 2006). Educational Psychology The field of educational psychology was, since its early days, an area highly in demand by students and largely attended by people coming from degrees in education and school teaching. The panorama abruptly changed in 1992, when a new degree in psychopedagogy (or pedagogical psychology) was established by the government in those faculties of education that asked for permission to include it in the studies offered. Those having completed 3 years in education could obtain a degree in psychopedagogy after 2 more years of study, mostly filled with educational courses. The new degree was conceived so that its professional role could be seen as being interchangeable with the previous one of the educational psychologist. Its closeness to the world of the school has been reinforced by the fact that most of those who pursue such a degree proceed from previous studies in education, and frequently have already obtained a teaching post. It should be noted that data from the employment of psychologists in the 1980s showed that the largest group of registered professionals was working in educational institutions (38.5%) (Díaz & Quintanilla, 1992). Centers for school guidance began to multiply everywhere in 1977, and a growing sector worked in special education and family and school problems. Jobs for school guidance and vocational counselling are now open to those graduates who have obtained this degree or the one in psychology, a fact that introduces a source of potential conflict in the field. Other Specialities According to a conventional view, the other generally acknowledged field of applied psychology is focuses on work and organizational problems. This speciality has become a complex and rich field that maintains several journals, organizes meetings and congresses, and has a large international connection. Several groups are now participating in many European networks and projects, carrying on a variety of work with a diversity of thematic profiles—corporate culture carpintero

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and climate, assessment and design of jobs, organizational diagnosis, and organizational and management development, to which must be added the classical activities of personnel selection and training (Peiro & Munduate, 1994). The richness of applications in social areas is beyond the scope of this chapter. Specialities as sport psychology, traffic safety, social services, and forensic and law psychology are now fully organized, and they secure a solid future for the profession. Taking all these data together, it may be clearly seen that the psychologist’s role has an enormous reach into all dimensions of human activity. It has received great support from many social groups. with activities related to behavioral problems, Competitive interactions are always at the basis of social life in a complex society.

Period V: 1980–Present The present state of Spanish psychology has its roots entrenched in 1980. In that year, two influential and significant circumstances occurred. The first independent faculty of psychology in a university was established. And, the Professional Union of Psychologists, which has already been described, was founded. Both events finally crowned earlier efforts, both in the professional and the academic areas, along two dimensions—science and profession—that had evolved in parallel direction in Spanish society. Spain had lived relatively isolated from the international arena during Franco’s days because of the lack of democracy within its system. With the advent of democracy and the establishment of a democratic constitutional monarchy since 1975 (our present Constitution was voted in 1978), the country recovered its place among other nations. In 1984, Spain became a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and 2 years later, it was accepted as a member of the European Union, which had been established by the Treaty of Rome in 1957. In parallel to the internationalization of the country, a similar process was displayed in the field of psychology. Germain had been able to keep alive some of the connections with foreign centers that had been created in the prewar years. He maintained friendly contact with people such as Jean Piaget, A. Gemelli, H. Piéron, P. Pichot, and D. Super, among others. When psychology was fully incorporated into the university level, new names were added to that list. B. Inhelder, Hans Eysenck, Hans Brengelmann, H. Rimoldi, R.B. Cattell, L.J. Cronbach, and others became familiar names to young students. One sign of the new democratic climate was the meeting 534

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on socialization processes that gathered at Alicante in 1981, with figures such as like J. Wolpe, D. Meichenbaum, J. Cautela, among others in attendance. The list of international contacts has grown continuously since then, and a large number of professors in our universities have widened their experience under the direction of well-known researchers like Jerome Bruner, Alan Baddeley, Noam Chomsky, Paul Fraisse, Marc Richelle, Charles Spielberger, Robert Sternberg, Albert Bandura, Arthur Staats, and Martin Seligman, only to mention those who have had close disciples among our present-day psychologists. The world of specialized journals has also broadened. In 1985, an entire magazine, Psychological Assessment, founded a few years earlier by Rocio Fz. Ballesteros, became the European Journal of Psychological Assessment. Currently, an English-language journal is edited at the University “Complutense” of Madrid that focuses on the field of processes and experimental psychology in general, The Spanish Journal of Psychology. Spanish psychologists are now presenting papers and organizing symposia and other events in the international world, and a cursory view of these developments can be found in an overview of our psychology recently included in the Annual Review of Psychology (Prieto et al, 1994). There has also been great activity in the area of the history of psychology, and one of its main results has been the recovery of the tradition of the prewar days, now integrated into the great development of the present. All these data only are presented here to prove, if needed, that the horizon of Spanish psychology is now an international one, as must always be the case for a truly scientific enterprise. This undeniable success cannot be interpreted in the sense that the psychologist’s role is now firmly established among us on unshakable grounds. Its enormous spread into all directions of human activity has awakened certain frictions among other professional groups that also deal with behavioral problems, and that wish to limit the psychologist’s ability to intervene in such cases. Presently, however, most indicators of professional activity—number of professionals, volume of specialized associations and journals, number of congresses and meetings every year, specialized master courses, and many others—give evidence of the strength and potentialities of the field.

Conclusion The view offered here on the main topics and problems affecting psychology in Spain shows, in our

opinion, that there are many similarities with those affecting the discipline in most of the developed countries of the Western world. After the dramatic setback created by the civil war, a remarkable development has taken place in the academic world, one that has brought a multiplicity of institutional resources for professionals working in various fields. Significant connections have also been established between academic and professional ones, and a growing collaborative work can be found in recent years. Theoretical pluralism, which appears to be a constant trait in all areas of psychology, is also apparent, but the trend seems to be a move toward greater objective and experimental points of view. An endless movement favoring the introduction of the ideals and techniques of modern psychology to human affairs and activities has obtained positive gains, a fact that explains the large volume of practitioners that occupy the existing associations and the extraordinary number of journals that bring to the fore rich and varied experimentation and research. The role of the psychologist has been dramatically reinforced in recent time, when many professionals helped people suffering from tragic terrorist attacks, such as those that took place in Madrid, in 2004, and from other natural or technical catastrophes. The impressive support, both technical and personal, offered to people by these professionals has been acknowledged and appreciated as an effective means of facing major social upheavals. The relevance of psychology for society has been consolidated. The field of psychology is now adapting to the general European guidelines for the educational field and professional activities. The new guidelines will, no doubt, have repercussions in the field. Psychologists maintain a scientific approach to mental and behavioral problems, looking for intervention procedures well based on empirical evidence. Present day globalization, and the new technology of information and communication are largely determining their work. Psychology is becoming more and more an essential instrument to ensure the quality of life for all our contemporaries.

Future Directions Some topics of future research in Spanish psychology include: • A more precise analysis of the influences exerted by the Spanish psychologist émigrés of 1939 upon the scientific and professional traditions formed in various Latin American

countries in the second half of the 20th century. A new network of interactions followed the arrival of A. Garma, G. Rodriguez Lafora, M. Rodrigo, and many others in their new adoptive countries, and it would be interesting to evaluate the effects of their presence, both along scientific and professional dimensions. • An evaluation of the impact produced by the leading figures of this tradition on the psychological literature of the 20th century. Apart from the large impact that Cajal has had on neuropsychological theories, it would be also worthy to evaluate the influence of some other contributions—such as Lorente de No’s neuronal assemblies, Marañon’s cognitive theory of emotion, R. Delgado’ s idea of physical control of mind, and so on. This might cast a new light on our own tradition and achievements. • A complementary view obtained from the analysis of the differential influences exerted by the leading names of contemporary psychology— Baltes, Seligman, Bandura, Eysenck, Hebb, Luria, Bruner, er, etc.—upon Spanish researchers. Such data would clarify the effective position of Spanish psychology in relation to the various theoretical lines that form the core of contemporary psychology.

Further Reading Applied Psychology (1994). Volume, 43(2). (With articles related to different psychology specialties.) Carpintero, H. (2001). The development of contemporary Spanish psychology. International Journal of Psychology, 36 (6), 378–383. More information can be obtained from the following journal issues, dedicated to the history and development of Spanish psychology: Peiró, J. M., y Carpintero, H. (1983). History of psychology in Spain through its journals. En G. Eckardt, y L. Sprung (Eds.), Advances in historiography of psychology (pp. 229–240). Berlin: Deutscher Verlag der Wissenschaften. Spanish Journal of Psychology (2001). Volume, 4(2). (With detailed review articles on recent trends of research in Spanish psychology.)

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Bandres, J., & Llavona, R. (1997). Psychology in Franco’s concentration camps. Psychology in Spain, I(1), 3–9. Barrio, V. del, & Carpintero, H. (2003). Clinical psychology in Spain. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 59(6), 687–699. Bayés, R. (1972). Utilización de tórtolas en el laboratorio operante. Revista Latinoamericana de Psicologia, 4(2), 227–234. Bermejo, V. (1993). Freud & el psicoanálisis en la psicología española de los años cincuenta. Revista de Historica de laPsicologia, 14(3–4), 255–270. Bermejo, V. (1994). La institucionalizacion del psicoanalisis en España en el marco de la A.P.I [International Psycho-Analytic Association], Revista de Historia de la Psicologia, 15(3–4), 49–62. Cannon, D. (1949). Explorer of the human brain. The life of Santiago Ramon & Cajal (1852–1934). New York: H. Schuman. Carpintero, H. (1982). The introduction of scientific psychology in Spain (1875–1900). En W. Woodward, & M. G. Ash (Eds.), The problematic science, psychology in nineteenth century thought (pp. 255–275). New York: Praeger. Carpintero, H. (1994). Some historical notes on scientific psychology and its professional development. Applied Psychology, 43(2), 131–150. Carpintero, H. (2004). Historia de la psicología en España. Madrid: Pirámide. Carpintero, H., & Lafuente, E. (2008). The congress that never was. The Madrid International Congress of Psychology (1936). History of Psychology, 11(4), 220–238. Carpintero, H., & Mestre, M.V. (1984). Freud en España. Un capítulo de la historia de las ideas de España (279 págs.). Valencia: Promolibro. Carpintero, H., & Tortosa, F. (1996). La psicología Española a través de la Revista de Psicología General & Aplicada. Revista de Psicología General & Aplicada, 3–4, 373–410. Carr, R. D. (1966). Spain 1808–1939. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Clements, R. D. (1967). Physiological-psychological thought in Juan Luis Vives. Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences, 3, 219–235. Diaz, R., & Quintanilla, I. (1992). La identidad profesional del psicólogo en el Estado Español. Papeles del Psicólogo, 52, 22–74. Fernandez Ballesteros, R. (2006). GeroPsychology. An applied field for the 21st century. European Psychologist, 11, 312–324. Figueiredo, F. (1933). Las dos Españas. Santiago: Universidad de Santiago de Compostela. Germain, J., & Rodrigo, M. (1930). Pruebas de inteligencia. Madrid: Espasa Calpe. Hernández, A. (2003). Los estudios universitarios de psicología en España (1). Evolución de centros, alumnos & relación oferta-demanda. Papeles del Psicólogo, 86, 13–24. Hilgard, E. R. (1968). Introducción a la psicología (2 vols.). Madrid: Morata. Huertas, J. A., Padilla, J. M., & Montes, A. (1997). La supervivencia de la psicología endiversas instituciones madrileñas después de la guerra (1939–1953). En F. Blanco (Ed.), Historia de la psicología española (pp. 219–243). Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva. Iruela, L. (1993). Psiquiatría, psicologìa, & armonía social. La vida & la obra de Emilio Mira & Lopez. Barcelona: Universidad de Barcelona. Katz, D. (Ed.). (1954). Manual de psicología. Madrid: Morata.

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Vera, J. A. (2005). 1979. Un año para recordar en la historia de la psicología española. Revista de Historia de la Psicologia, 26(4), 213–241. Viqueira, J. V. (1915). Lokalisation und einfaches Wiedererkennen. Zeitschrift Für Psychologie und Physiologie des Sinnesorgane, 73, offprint, 1–15.

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Thailand

Sombat Tapanya

Abstract This chapter discusses the history and development of modern psychology in Thailand, both as a profession and as an academic subject. The challenges and opportunities for the profession, its relationship with other professions in the mental health fields, and the potential for contributions that Thai psychologists could make both within the field and in society in general are discussed. Keywords: Thailand, history, psychology, development, mental health.

Thailand, formerly known as Siam, with an approximate geographical area of 514,000 km2 and a population of around 67,000,000 (National Statistical Office, 2010) is one of the best-known countries in South East Asia for its rich cultural heritage, abundance of natural resources, and attractive tourist destinations. The official language is Thai. The largest ethnic group is Thai, and the largest religious group (over 90%) is Buddhist, with smaller groups of Muslims who concentrate mostly in the southern provinces, and Christians in various regions of the country (WHO-AIMS, 2006). In the past decade, in addition to the global economic downturn and environmental problems affecting the population, Thailand has been facing major challenges in the forms of various social ills including persistent drug problems, alcoholism, HIV/AIDS, the breaking down of families and weakening of communities through high social mobility and rapid urbanization, and political unrest in the southern part of the country that has cost thousands of lives and traumatized many more. Similar to global trends, chronic, behavior-related diseases such as cardiovascular disease and strokes, obesity, and diabetes continue to top the list of major causes of death, along with traffic accidents, interpersonal violence, 538

and suicides (Wibulpolprasert, Sirilak, Ekachampaka, Wattanamano, & Taverat, 2009). Just as the presence of psychological casualties of war and the Veteran Administration (VA) hospital system helped to created clinical psychology in the United States (as with similar institutions in some parts of Europe), social situations in Thailand shape the functions and responsibilities of Thai psychologists. Thailand is faced with rapid socioeconomic changes and the weakening of social ties and family unity, as well as the constant bombardment of consumerism, in which instant gratification, sometimes through violent means, is the norm. Political instability and economic hardships in neighboring countries such as Myanmar, Laos, Cambodia, and various ethnic minority groups also create a situation in which hundreds of thousands of migrant workers (including a large number of children and women) spill across the Thai border. Thousands were placed in camps for displaced persons, and many remained there for years. Such social conditions result in a loss of the sense of community, increased sense of alienation, the use of drugs and alcohol, and the ever-increasing prevalence of chronic, behaviorally related illnesses and diseases and interpersonal violence.

In light of the current situation, Thai psychology has received steadily increasing recognition as a profession poised to rise to the occasion and respond to the challenges. Since psychology as a profession in Thailand is still in its early stage of development and progress has been extremely slow, it remains to be seen if the profession will make itself worthy of these expectations.

Development of Psychology in Thailand Although the study of the mind has existed in Thailand since the introduction of Buddhism into the country almost a millennium ago, psychology as an academic subject has emerged only a little over a half century ago. Modern (meaning Western and mostly developmental or educational) psychology was first taught in a Teacher’s College in Nakorn Pathom, a province situated next to the capital city, Bangkok, in 1930 (Chumsai, 1965). Within the same year, a psychology course was also initiated in the faculty of education at Chulalongkorn University, the oldest and most prestigious university in Bangkok. Such development was in keeping with the trend at the time to replace monastic apprenticeship with Western-style education through formal schooling—thus the need to produce a large number of school teachers. In 1946, the Ministry of Education, with support from UNESCO, established an International Institute for Research in Children at a College of Education in Bangkok, which represents the beginning of research in and teaching of child psychology. In 1975, the Institute’s name was changed to the Behavioral Sciences Research Institute and it expanded its research and teaching activities further, producing graduates in developmental psychology, educational psychology, social psychology, and experimental psychology (Chinkulkitniwat, 2002). In 1964, Chiang Mai University, the newly established state university of Northern Thailand started offering the first bachelor’s degree program in psychology with a clearly identified clinical psychology track. As part of the 4-year curriculum, students were required to do a one-semester practicum at a local psychiatric hospital, followed by a summer internship at one of the selected few psychiatric hospitals in Bangkok. However, the training was exclusively limited to psychological assessment with very limited exposure to psychotherapy, due to the fact that hardly anyone in Thailand was practicing psychotherapy during that period. Shortly after, Chiang Mai University also began to offer degree programs in school psychology and organizational psychology

(industrial psychology was the preferred term at the time). The first Thai university to offer a master’s degree program in clinical psychology was Bangkok’s Mahidol University, a large university with a focus on medical sciences, in 1979. In fact, the psychology program was initiated in its medical school and continues to produce graduates from there until today. During the past few decades, increasing numbers of Thai universities have established master’s degree programs in various subfields of psychology, such as organizational psychology, counseling psychology, developmental psychology, and social psychology. Recent trends indicate that master’s degree programs, particularly in the fields of education and business administration, have been more popular and have been offered in almost all universities with varying degrees of academic standards and quality. At Chulalongkorn University, the department of psychology has become the first in the country to offer doctoral programs in counseling psychology, social psychology, and in developmental psychology, in 2001 (http://www.chula.ac.th/college/ psychol/history.htm). Although the number of universities in Thailand has continued to increase steadily, especially private universities, some of which have affiliation with foreign universities and offer programs with English as the language of instruction, not many offer psychology degree programs. More popular subjects appear to be those that are more “marketable,” such as business administration and computer science. According to a recent report (WHO-AIMS, 2006), as late as 2004, the total number of professionals working in mental health facilities or private practice per 100,000 population in Thailand is 7.29. The breakdown according to profession consists of the following: 419 psychiatrists (0.66 per 100,000 population), 110 other medical doctors (not specialized in psychiatry, 0.17 per 100,000 population), 2,406 nurses (3.81 per 100,000 population), 163 psychologists (0.26 per 100,000 population), 465 social workers (0.74 per 100,000 population), 125 occupational therapists (0.20 per 100,000 population), and 912 other health or mental health workers (1.45 per 100,000 population). As for the growth rates of the profession, judging from the number of professionals graduated in 2004 from academic and educational institutions, the following list indicates that the number of psychology graduates is rather low compared to other professions: 32 psychiatrists (0.05 per 100,000 population), tapanya

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1,458 other medical doctors (2.31 per 100,000 population), 4,008 nurses (6.35, per 100,000 population), and 21 psychologists with at least 1 year training in mental health care (0.03 per 100,000 population) (WHO-AIMS, 2006). With this trend, it is highly unlikely that there will be enough psychologists to serve the Thai population in the near future.

Development of Psychological Services In 1953, with support from the World Health Organization and the Thai Ministry of Public Health, the first mental health clinic, the Child Guidance Center, was established in Bangkok (100 Years, 1989; Sobhanoe, 1969). Since at the time no psychology degree programs were available in any Thai universities, the first group of Thai psychologists was recruited from graduates of arts, language, and education programs from universities in Bangkok (Thai Psychiatric Association, 1977). It was at this time that the term “clinical psychologist” was first introduced to the Thai language. The job title “psychologist” was first officially recognized by the Thai government in 1959 (100 Years of Mental Health and Psychiatry, 1989). The pioneering group of Thai psychologists was trained on the job by senior psychiatrists who had received some rudimentary training in psychological assessment in the United States as part of their training in psychiatry at Johns Hopkins Medical School in 1929 (Sukawat, 1969). Thus, the first generation of Thai psychologists functioned as psychological technicians working primarily with children; most of their professional time was devoted to administering psychological tests and writing reports to be submitted to psychiatrists—their exclusive source of referrals. Psychiatrists used psychological test results to aid their diagnosis and treatment planning. Over the years, some attempts were made to develop Thai versions of intelligence and projective tests. However, success in this endeavor is still out of reach, and at present all Thai psychologists are still using translated versions of American or European tests such as Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS; Wechsler, 1939), Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children (WISC; Wechsler, 1949), The Bender Visual Motor Gestalt Test (Bender, 1938), The Thematic Apperception Test (TAT; Cramer, 2004), Sentence Completion Test (Lah, 1989), and the Rorschach Inkblot Test (Klopfer & Davidson, 1962). Although the last instrument, the Rorschach inkblots, needs no translation, interpretation of its responses in the Thai context continues to be 540

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debatable. Adding to this list is an increasing number of objective tests in the form of questionnaires that have been translated and used after their satisfactory psychometric properties have been established (Patrayutawat, 2002). The first comprehensive Thai textbook of modern psychology written and published in 1944, by M.L. Tui Chumsai (Chumsai, 1965), who received his Ph.D. in psychology from the University of Michigan and was once visiting professor at Northwestern University in 1952 and Cornell University in 1955. He played a major role in establishing a psychology program at Chiang Mai University, Thailand, during 1964–1969, while he was the first dean of the faculty of humanities there (http:// www.human.cmu.ac.th/about.php?mod=history). The book was meticulously written and covered most of the essential topics required for an extensive text (over 500 pages). Some of the topics included motivation, emotion, intelligence, aptitude, individual difference, sensation, perception, cognition, socialization, personality, sleep, learning and conditioning, and memory and forgetting. The third and last edition of the book was published in 1965. A more recently published text on clinical psychology Clinical Psychology: From Theory to Practice (Sukatungka, 2002) is required reading for graduate students in clinical psychology at Mahidol University. The latest substantial work in this area is a Thai text Manual of Psychological Assessment (Patrayutawat, 2002), which is a collection of almost all of the paper-and-pencil tests or questionnaires available in the Thai language, along with descriptions of their psychometric properties. Judging from the scarcity of available Thai texts on the subject, this text stands a good chance of being widely used among Thai psychologists in the future. Similarly to psychological tests, the majority of current Thai psychology texts in use are translations and compilations of various foreign works, with hardly any original research by Thai scholars. This may change in the near future, especially since the work of Western psychologists (notably American Jon Kabat-Zinn’s mindfulness meditation approach, based on Buddhist meditation method) has gained wider acceptance and has begun to establish a foothold in mainstream psychotherapy (Kabat-Zinn, 1992). A few Thai psychologists with strong background in Buddhist studies and practice have also begun to focus more efforts in this area. There are very few psychology journals published in Thailand and all are in Thai, for example, the Journal of Clinical Psychology (founded in 1969),

the Psychology Journal (first published in 1993), and the Guidance Journal (first published in 1966). These three journals cover a whole spectrum of applied psychology from the clinical area (Journal of Clinical Psychology) to the educational area (as in the Guidance Journal ). In recent years, an increasing number of Thai psychologists with more extensive training and experience have begun to be involved in shaping national health policy through administrative duties. Some psychologists who work in the Ministry of Public Health have been active in designing and implementing training programs and developing educational materials, such as those used for disaster mental health (necessitated by the 2004 tsunami, in which over 8,500 Thais perished), AIDS counseling, telephone counseling, suicide prevention, and stress management. Psychologists working in hospitals have neither admitting privileges nor prescription privileges, and they still rely heavily on assessment as a primary function, although the number of psychologists involved in counseling and psychotherapy is slowly increasing. With over 100,000 monks currently living in numerous monasteries throughout the country, a few innovative attempts to use Buddhist monks to provide mental-health services have been made over the years. Sporadic efforts have been made to train monks in basic counseling skills, although there have been no systematic and well-coordinated countrywide projects to date. A severe limitation to this approach is that most of the monks have neither interest nor inclination to be involved. With the exception of a few revered monks under whose guidance large numbers of Thais seek spiritual refuge and fulfillment, the majority of Thai monks are not well-educated and regard their function as mainly performing rituals and chanting prayers. Many monks also reside in well-populated areas, whereas there are far fewer of them in rural temples in remote areas. Indigenous healers in rural provinces have been largely ignored in Thailand, and only a few hospitals have attempted to integrate folk healers into their system of care. However, with the current surge of interest in alternative approaches to medicine, an increasing number of rural, provincial hospitals have begun to set up traditional Thai medicine clinics within the hospital compounds, where patients can receive services from massage therapists and herbalists. Training in Thai traditional massage has been popularized during the past two decades; the Public Health Ministry has established a Traditional Thai Medicine Department to provide

this training. Unfortunately, this surge in the popularity of massage and the abundance of massage schools have deluged the market with graduates, resulting in the ubiquitous massage shops on almost every street in all major Thai cities. Counseling those with HIV/AIDS is another area in which psychologists have been active in working with multidisciplinary teams. Psychologists working in this area have made important contributions and are widely respected by their Thai physician colleagues, who appreciate and understand the critical role of behavioral change in addressing this serious and recalcitrant problem. It is likely that recognition in this area of work may generalize into the treatment of other behavior-related health problems in which psychologists can play an important role. With the extremely small number of psychologists in the workforce, however, very few may take up the challenge (Tapanya, Sombatmai, & Boripantakul, 2004). With recent increasing concern among Thai authorities and health professionals about violence in various forms—domestic violence, child abuse and neglect, youth violence, and political violence— more attention and efforts have been dedicated to the problem. In late 2008, the Coordinating Committee for the Prevention and Management of Violence Against Children and Youths was established by the Ministry of Social Development and Human Security with over 40 members from both governmental and nongovernmental offices. A Thai clinical psychologist has been appointed deputy chair of the committee and is able to provide important input from the psychological perspective. The group is responsible for creating strategies to deal with the problem of violence against children and youths. In a few months, it is expected to submit a proposal to the government with recommendations to be supported by policy, procedures, and budget. Among the intricate web of interacting factors that have been identified as influencing violence in Thai society, one area has received significant attention: disciplining methods used by parents and teachers. A few recent studies indicated that Thai parents and teachers are not well-trained in effective methods of disciplining children and rely heavily on harsh and humiliating approaches aimed at controlling children’s behavior rather than teaching valuable skills (Kotjarasa & Yongkittikul, 2002; Tapanya, 2006). Such style of disciplining has been found to be associated with childhood aggression (Lansford et al., 2005; Strassberg, Dodge, Pettit, & tapanya

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Bates, 1994). Thai psychologists have been involved in working with the Ministry of Education and international organizations such as UNICEF, Save the Children, and Plan International, in designing training manuals and conducting training seminars for teachers and parents in the area of positive discipline. Ongoing projects have been initiated at various schools throughout the country, and thousands of teachers, with smaller numbers of parents, have been trained through this effort. The trend toward increasing interest in this area among teachers and parents is still ongoing at present. This is another indication that Thai psychologists are enjoying increasing acceptance and appreciation from other professions in the health care field, outside of psychiatry. In perhaps in the rarest of efforts, a few Thai psychologists have been involved in providing supervision and various intervention methods such as counseling and child protection through their collaboration with Burmese social workers in refugee camps in the border areas. There are currently about 140,000 refugees, mostly from Myanmar’s ethnic minorities, residing in various camps along the northern and western borders of the country. With harsh living conditions and an oppressing sense of hopelessness, mental health problems including depression, alcoholism, drug addiction, and abuse of women and children continue to plague the population. A training project in psychotraumatology is being offered by a group of international therapists from Germany, India, Indonesia, China, and Thailand, through support from various German humanitarian organizations such as Terre des Hommes Germany and the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ). The first training seminar took place in October 2009, in Kanchanaburi, a western province 1 hour away from Bangkok. Twenty trainees, about half of whom are psychologists, were recruited from Thailand, five from Cambodia, and five from the Thai refugee camps. Two following seminars for the same group were scheduled for February and October 2010.

Professional Identity The term “psychologist” itself may even be confusing or misleading in the Thai context. As in the United States and other Western countries, this could mean only those with license to practice psychology or those with graduate degrees in psychology. However, there is tremendous variability in the levels of education and training for psychologists 542

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in Thailand. At the latest count, 449 clinical psychologists have passed the license examination organized by the Ministry of Public Health since 2005 (http:// mrd-hss.moph.go.th/Admin/filestat/36.pdf ). If it was acceptable to regard as psychologists those who hold degrees in psychology and teach or conduct research in the field but do not practice counseling or psychotherapy, then there would be far more psychologists in academic settings than in clinical settings. Since psychology as a subject was first introduced to those who study education, academicians in Thailand were more familiar with the subject in the context of education or teaching– learning, rather than in the clinical context. With their presence in similar fields of work, the public still often confuses psychology with psychiatry and psychologists with psychiatrists, and many Thai psychologists are often asked to explain the differences between the two professions. Public education and the stronger presence of Thai psychologists in Thai society are required to clear up this confusion.

Organizations for Psychology There are currently four governing organizations for Thai psychologists: the Thai Clinical Psychologist Association, the Thai Psychological Association, the Thai Mental Health Association (established in 1959) (Kertpitak, 1987), and the Thai Guidance Counselor Association (established in 1970) (http:// www.thaiguidance.org/history.htm). The Thai Psychologist Association (whose official Thai name is the Thai Clinical Psychologist Association; the word “clinical” was omitted from the English title, reflecting some reluctance to use the word) was first established in 1983, and has a current membership of around 250. This is in comparison to the Thai Psychiatrist Association, which was established 30 years earlier in 1953, and has a current membership of around 400, and the Thai Psychiatric Nurse Association, which was established in 1986, and has over 900 members. Thus, the Thai mental health professions can list psychiatry as the most senior of the professions, psychiatric nursing the most numerous, and psychology the smallest. Through the strong influence of the medical profession and the medical model, psychiatrists traditionally hold higher positions in mental health organizations and have greater political clout and access to resources to make things happen in their favor. A case in point is the current monthly “license fee” that government hospitals pay to health care

professionals: A physician or a psychiatrist receives 15 times the amount of fee for a psychologist, and all licensed psychologists receive the same amount, regardless of their level of education or training (which could range from undergraduate to doctoral degrees). In terms of professional status and privileges, psychologists are still undervalued relative to other health care professionals, such as nurses and physical therapists. In part, this results from the fact that training standards for those professions are more rigorous and extensive than those for psychologists, and the professional licensing required of nurses and physical therapists is also stricter. In 2003, as part of the efforts to elevate professional status and standards to keep up with other health professions, a new law was passed that requires Thai clinical psychologists to undergo licensing examination. The Thai Royal Decree dated July 23, 2003, announced that clinical psychologists were required to have a license in order to practice psychology. According to the Royal Decree, “clinical psychology” is defined as “conduct performed for human beings relating to the examination, diagnosis, and treatment of psychological disorders resulting from conditions of the mind, personality, intelligence level, emotion, behavior, adaptation, stress, or neurological pathology; including research, promotion, and assessment of mental health through methods or instruments specific to clinical psychology that have been approved of their status by the Ministry.” Individuals who will be qualified to take the license examination must hold a degree in clinical psychology or the equivalent from an educational institute approved by the professional committee, and must have undergone at least 6 months of internship at an approved hospital or organization. Those who are not Thai citizens and are graduated from overseas institutes must have a clinical psychology license from an approved institution in their own country (The Royal Gazette, 2003). Admittedly, the current requirements are rather minimal compared to those in other more advanced countries, but it is at least a base from which we can build to develop higher standards in the future. Committees have been set up to determine curriculum contents, internship, and training requirements for eligible psychologists. There are also optimistic expectations as to how this would positively affect training and educational programs in clinical psychology throughout the country. Currently, about 450 Thai clinical psychologists have passed the licensing examination.

Relationship with Other Professions Within the Thai medical community, physicians have often referred to psychologists and other health care professionals (such as nurses, social workers, physical therapists, occupational therapists, speech therapists, etc.) as “paramedical” or “nonmedical” professionals (sometimes abbreviated to “non-MD”), terms that reflect condescension and sound as divisive and alienating as the terms “barbarians” or “outsiders” that certain dominant ethnic groups use to identify those outside of their own kind. Until recently, most psychiatrists preferred to limit the role of psychologists who work in psychiatric hospitals to that of technicians who take orders from psychiatrists, administer tests, and write reports. During the past two decades, as more psychologists have had the opportunity either to train in foreign countries or receive training from those returning from overseas or from visiting foreign experts, the role of psychologists has been expanded to include treatment, the promotion of mental health, and research. The fact that there are only about 400 psychiatrists in the country, with 80% of these practicing in urban areas, also made it necessary for psychologists to take up other functions, such as individual and group psychotherapy, the promotion of community mental health, counseling for drug addicts and HIV-positive individuals, and work in various areas relating to mental health. Relationships with psychiatry are usually courteous albeit often strained. On a professional level, psychiatrists, with a few exceptions, regard psychologists as either second-class members of the mental health team or as subordinates to be given orders and dismissed after their duties have been performed. Relationships with other professionals in health care, education, child protection, and others have been courteous, respectful, and mutually beneficial. Many Thai psychologists have been invited to teach, conduct research, offer training seminars, and work alongside interdisciplinary teams with good results (Tapanya, Boripantakul, & Sombatmai, 1999).

Career Prospects Although there are too few psychologists to serve the Thai population, matters are made worse by the availability of relatively few jobs for the existing pool of psychologists. Those jobs that are available usually require only a bachelor’s degree, the pay is minimal, and the potential for career advancement is limited compared to other health professions. tapanya

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Most Thai psychologists perform professional services without sufficient supervision from experienced psychologists with more extensive training. A more recent trend shows that students prefer to enter the field of organizational psychology more so than other subfields of psychology, with the hope that they will be employed in private sectors and receive higher salary. The possibilities of being gainfully employed in this field far exceed clinical psychology since there are many more business firms than psychiatric or mental health institutes to choose from. Although buzz words and phrases such as “holistic approaches to health care” and “multidisciplinary teams” have become widespread among medical schools and government hospitals, no serious attempts have been made to increase the number of Thai psychologists. Graduates from psychology programs have not increased substantially. The size and number of staff in the psychology departments in many universities has not grown in leaps and bounds. In fact, some may have even become smaller as older faculty members retire and fewer new members are accepted to fill the void. The primacy of medicine and the selection of physicians for top management and administration positions mean that there is little room for other professionals such as nurses, social workers, or psychologists to be promoted in medical establishments. In addition, there is no precedent for freestanding or autonomous departments of psychology or behavioral science in medical schools. Almost all psychologists in medical settings work in departments of psychiatry. Only a few work in other departments, such as in pediatrics, family medicine, and neurology. In the majority of universities, the psychology department is typically structured under the faculties of humanities, education, or social sciences. Because of the limited opportunity for career advancement within hospitals and medical settings, some psychologists began to expand their professional roles and have formed affiliations with nontraditional agencies and organizations. A few of these alliances have been quite successful (Tapanya et al., 2004), and the psychologists involved have become well-known among governmental, nongovernmental, and private organizations. These psychologists often initially became involved by conducting workshops for health promotion and for the prevention of mental or behavioral problems. Some led working groups that created practice manuals for child abuse prevention; others developed intervention and training programs for health 544

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volunteers who work with AIDS patients and HIVpositive individuals with support from international organizations such as WHO and UNICEF (Tapanya et al., 2004). Thus, one might concede that there are many opportunities outside the medical establishment where Thai psychologists can make significant contributions to help shape Thai society and where they are well appreciated and respected.

Theories, Methods, and Interventions The early influences on clinical psychology came from a pioneer group of psychiatrists who were developing their own professions in the early 1950s. After the establishment of the Child Guidance Center in Bangkok in 1953, a few Thai physicians were sent to the United States and Canada, and one was sent to England to receive training in psychiatry and psychological assessment. An Austrian psychologist, Dr. Margaret Stephan, was also appointed as consultant and supervisor at the Child Guidance Center around the same time (Sukawat, 1969). For this reason, psychoanalytical theories, being the major influence during the time, were the first main approaches to be accepted and widely used. In the early 1970s, under the influence of the “human potential movement,” with its accompanying widespread popularity in the Rogerian approach, Gestalt therapy, encounter groups, transactional analysis, transcendental meditation, and a host of other “new age” methods of personal growth in Western countries, some Thai psychologists who were trained overseas began to import these approaches to their homeland. As some of the methods, such as “self-awareness training,” seemed to fit in well with the background of many Thais who were Buddhists and were familiar with the practice of mindfulness training and meditation, the personal growth movement was well received by the young adult population at the time, especially within the university communities and later among private business organizations. During the same period, a few psychologists received training in behavioral approaches to therapy (such as behavior modification, assertiveness training, and relaxation training) through education received overseas. After returning home, they also began to teach and conduct research in the field and attracted some other psychologists to join in the effort. However, the number of psychologists interested in this area has been rather small. The human potential movement seemed to fade away within two decades when, in the 1990s, the increasing ease of international travel and exchange,

along with greater accessibility to the Internet and improved computer literacy, helped to encourage some Thai psychologists to become more interested in translating and adapting Western psychological assessment tools for use with the Thai population. More paper-and-pencil assessment tools are now available in Thailand. Through the Internet, many Thai psychologists now are up to date with current development in their various fields of interest, although this does not mean they have better opportunities for training since this could not possibly be accomplished through long-distance education. Within the current decade, Thailand has experienced a reemergence of Rogerian client-centered approaches in psychology, education, and medicine. This is reflected by the strong development of counseling psychology through a rapid increase in the number of graduate programs in the field, the advocacy of “student-centered” approaches in education, and “patient-centered” approaches in medicine. One can only speculate that perhaps the swing of the pendulum of time has left society too dependent on technology at the expense of human interactions and relationships, and has fostered a general longing for more human contact. Another development also occurred during this decade, along with the emergence of health psychology in the West. A number of Thai psychologists began to take notice of the opportunity to make greater contributions in the health care fields. Some have received training and education in the area of motivational enhancement and adherence to medical regimens and have begun to involve themselves in research and practice in this field. A good example to illustrate this point may be seen in a recent development in the field of AIDS care in Thailand. Since the use of highly active antiretroviral therapy (HAART) has become more familiar among Thai health workers, they also discovered serious problems with nonadherent patients: the failure of the drugs to take effect in lowering virus load and a strong likelihood of developing new strains of HIV that are resistant to the medicine. Hence, a new project involving over 700 patients from 15–17 hospitals in the northern region of Thailand has been proposed with the collaboration between the Thai government and the Bangkok Office of Population Council. For this project, two Thai psychologists who have done extensive work in the area of adherence enhancement were invited to head the team on designing an adherence counseling program. From this program, AIDS workers will be trained how to help patients increase and maintain

their level of adherence. This is another indication that Thai psychologists are enjoying increasing acceptance and appreciation from other professions in the health care field, outside of psychiatry (Tapanya et al., 2004). Continuing strong efforts in human rights and children’s rights by international agencies such as UNICEF and various nongovernmental organizations continue to help remove corporal punishment from schools and have advocated the introduction of a new child protection law (the Child Protection Act 2003), which came into effect in the early part of 2004. Thai psychologists have also been active in this development, participating in the national and provincial committee for the development of the Guidelines for Minimal Standards of Child Care and Guidelines for the Assessment of Risk Factors in Child Rearing. These guidelines will be used by government officials and child protection workers in the effort to ensure that Thai children are well cared for and that risk factors for abuse and neglect are reduced. Although Thai psychologists are aware of all the major approaches in treatment, such as psychoanalytic, behavioral, humanistic, and cognitive methods, it is hard to pinpoint which practitioners are really dedicated to and well-versed in a particular approach, primarily because there have been as yet no systematic training programs in psychotherapy in Thailand. Although this situation may change soon since, during the past few years, some groups have begun to receive training in certain types of therapy, such as cognitive-behavioral therapy, family therapy, and eye movement desensitization and reprocessing (EMDR), in a more rigorous and sustained manner.

Future Directions With the inception of the profession from within the medical establishment, the future seems limited for Thai clinical psychologists, especially those in traditional psychiatric hospitals, who see little room for professional growth. Indeed, over the past two decades, it has been common for psychologists with the strongest academic and clinical backgrounds to leave hospital settings for more professionally rewarding opportunities, such as those found in as universities or private sectors. The majority of those who remained in the psychiatric hospitals were either very dedicated to the patients they served, or else found that their limited educational background and training made it difficult to find employment elsewhere. tapanya

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However, in the face of ever-changing social conditions and increasing demands for services and interventions in the mental health fields, it is critical for Thai psychologists to improve their education and training opportunities as much as possible in order to realize their full potential. In summary, Thai psychologists face multiple challenges. There is a tremendous need to standardize training requirements and upgrade the educational requirements for the profession, so that at least some graduate training is the norm rather than the exception. The power and influence of the profession also is limited by the relatively small number of psychologists in Thailand, and by the profession’s history of being in a supporting role for psychiatry. However, Thai psychologists are actively investigating new professional roles and creating new opportunities for the application of psychological skills in diverse settings, not necessarily only within the health care system. Thai psychologists should not confine their attention and activities, whether in research or service provision, to mental health issues only, but should address larger problems facing Thai society, such as social injustice, oppression, exploitation, and violence, as such problems are the root cause of health and mental health problems, and threaten the health of the nation in general.

Further Reading Tapanya, S. (1989). Community psychology in Thailand. American Journal of Community Psychology, 17, 109–119. Tapanya, S. (2001). Psychology in medical settings in Thailand. Journal of Clinical Psychology in Medical Settings. 8(1), 69–72. Tapanya, S. (2004). Psychology in Thailand. In M. J. Stevens, & D. Wedding (Eds.), Handbook of international psychology. New York: Brunner-Routledge.

References 100 Years of Mental Health and Psychiatry. (1989). Bangkok: Tanawich. Bender, L. (1938). A visual-motor Gestalt test and its clinical use. American Orthopsychiatric Association Monograph Series, Number 3. Chinkulkitniwat, B. (2002). Introduction to psychology. In C. Ngerndee, & T. Surinya (Eds.), General psychology (8th ed.). Bangkok: Faculty of Social Sciences, Kasetsart University. Chumsai, T. (1965). An introductory textbook in general psychology (3rd ed.). Bangkok: Thai Wattanapanich. Cramer, P. (2004). Storytelling, narrative, and the Thematic Apperception Test. New York: Guilford Press. Kabat-Zinn, J., Massion, A. O., Kristeller, J., Peterson, L. G., Fletcher, K. E., Pbert, L., et al. (1992). Effectiveness of a meditation-based stress reduction program in the treatment

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of anxiety disorders. American Journal of Psychiatry, 149, 936–943. Kertpitak, P. (1987). Introduction to mental health (p. 13). Bangkok: Bundit Karnpim Publishing House. Klopfer, B., Davidson, H. H. (1962). The Rorschach Technique: An Introductory Manual. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World. Kotjarasa, S., & Yongkittikul, C. (2002). Relationship between styles of parenting and behavior among Thai adolescents. Proceeding of the East-West Psychological Science Research Center, Vol. 2. Lah, M. I. (1989). Sentence completion tests. In C. S. Newmark (Ed.), Major psychological assessment instruments Vol. II (pp. 133–163). Boston: Allyn & Bacon. Lansford, J. E., Chang, L., Dodge, K. A., Malone, P. S., Oburu, P., Palmarus, K., et al. (2005). Physical discipline and children’s adjustment: Cultural normativeness as a moderator. Child Development, 76, 1234–1246. National Statistical Office of Thailand. (2010). Current Thai population. Retrieved from http://portal.nso.go.th/otherWSworld-context-root/indext.jsp. Patrayutawat, S. (2002). Manual of psychological assessment. Bangkok: Medical Media. Sobhanoe, S. (1969). Psychiatric services in Thailand. Journal of Psychiatric Association of Thailand, 14, 235–238. Strassberg, Z., Dodge, K. A., Pettit, G. S., & Bates, J. E. (1994). Spanking in the home and children’s subsequent aggression toward kindergarten peers. Development and Psychopathology, 6, 445–461. Sukatungka, K. (2002). Clinical psychology: From theory to practice. Bangkok: Medical Media. Sukawat, C. (Ed.). (1969). Eighty years of psychiatry in Thailand. Bangkok: Gurusapa Publishing House. Tapanya, S., Boripantakul, T., & Sombatmai, S. (1999). Mental health care manual for HIV positive and AIDS patients in community. Lampang, Thailand: Programs in Appropriate Technology for Health. Tapanya, S., Sombatmai, S., & Boripantakul, T. (2004). Adherence counseling manual for the treatment of HIV positive and AIDS patients with antiretroviral medications. Horizons Program/Population Council. Chiang Mai, Thailand: Joy & Pom Production House. Tapanya, S. (2006). Survey of teachers’ attitude and behavior on students disciplining. Thai Health Foundation. Unpublished. The Royal Gazette. (2003). Licensing of clinical psychology. Vol. 120, Section 72 A. 23 July 2003. Retrieved from http://203.157.7.36/mdsrv/main.php?st=AA&main_recno=20. The Thai Psychiatric Association. (1977). Text book of psychiatry. Bangkok: AksornThai. Wechsler, D. (1939). The measurement of adult intelligence. Baltimore: Williams & Wilkins. Wechsler, D. (1949). The Wechsler intelligence scale for children. New York: Psychological Corp. Wibulpolprasert, S., Sirilak, S., Ekachampaka, P., Wattanamano, N., & Taverat, R. (2009). Thailand Health Profile 2005–2007. (Edited). Bureau of Policy and Strategy, Ministry of Public Health. Retrieved from http://www. moph.go.th/ops/health_50. WHO-AIMS. (2006). Report on Mental Health System in Thailand. Nonthaburi, Bangkok: WHO and Ministry of Public Health.

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Turkey A Case of Modernization at Historical, Political, and Socio-cultural Cross-roads

Aydan Gülerce

Abstract The establishment of psychology in Turkey is reviewed both as an academic discipline and as a profession, beginning with its early inception during the late Ottoman Empire and continuing to the present. A brief historical account of the drastic social transformations of the vast premodern empire into the modern secular state-nation in response to European modernity, and its capitalist social order, social institutions, and individual citizen is provided first as a macro sociopolitical context for this journey. Various phases of the history of psychology in Turkey are described in connection with the specific topics of the transfer and translation of Western psychology, scientification and institutionalization, expansion and education, localization and (re)production of knowledge, professional practice, and status and organization of psychology. Some reflections on mainstream psychological knowledge/practice also are offered. Keywords: Psychology in Turkey, lack of indigenization, secularization, alternative modernities, Turkish modernization, globalization, psychology’s role in society, nation building, construction of Turkish subjectivities

Psychology in Turkey is no different from mainstream (Anglo-American) psychology in the sense that it appeared for some time somewhat immune to the constructive role of writing its own history. Thanks to various pivotal works (e.g., Danziger, 1990; Hacking, 1995; Rose, 1996; 1989), the sociocultural and historical locality of parochial and hegemonic Psychology, as well as how Psychology and its subject matter (human subjectivity) make up and co-construct each other, have been revealed over the past two decades.1 In the meantime, various international collections with descriptive, sociohistorical, or comparative national/cultural interests (e.g., Gilgen & Gilgen, 1987; Sexton & Hogan, 1992; Stevens & Wedding, 2004) looked at the histories of Psychology around the world, including Turkey. Although the common practice is to seek protagonists and turning points in the establishment of modern Psychology in each society, there is

no room left for doubt that the internationalization of universalist and normative Euro-American psychology, either explicitly or implicitly, is frequently valued among psychologists globally. Not only that, the dissemination of psychological knowledge/ practice also is well assimilated as a unidirectional process from the “developed central West” to the “underdeveloped peripheral rest” for the sake of Enlightenment’s (then modernity’s) grand narrative of progress and in the name of utopic emancipation and liberation. The historical, political, economic, religious, cultural, social, and even linguistic conditions, as well as the contingency of human psychological experience, knowledge, and practice on those conditions, are easily overlooked by most parties around the globe, and Turkey is no exception (Gergen et al., 1996). Even when cultural diversity is recognized via cross-cultural psychology and multiculturalist discourses, the habit of treating culture 547

and national identity as static, essentializing and as reifying categories remains. Thus, the differences as well as the similarities in historical (pre-modern, modern, and postmodern) conditions of possibility are ignored. It would be a serious mistake or naivete, for example, to ignore the prolonged past of the traditional subject matter of psychology in Turkey, to deem it premodern philosophy, or to devalue its spirituality and wisdom knowledge, as is frequently the case in the West. However, it is equally curious to speculate why an indigenous psychology did not emerge over the past century in this land, which is known both geographically and metaphorically as the “oldest cradle of civilizations.” Why has Psychology failed to find itself a comfortable place in this liberal democratic society (cf., Brock, 2006) in three-quarters of a century, in spite of its early entry that predated the change of the regime? How do we conceptualize the lack of fit and asymmetrical interaction patterns between mainstream Psychology and everyday Turkish practices, culture, and thought? What does the state of alienation and muteness of a spiritualist, altruist, holistic, and pluralist tradition experienced before the hegemonic dichotomic, materialist, selfcentric, reductionist, and universalist thought have to say to a rapidly internationalizing/globalizing, insensitive, and ignorant Psychology? And how? How do we analyze the sociopolitical impact of the micropowers of technologies of the self and their subjectifying psychological practices (cf. Rose, 2000) on the modernization, development, and democratization of Turkish society? It is with these and other critical questions in mind, and from a biased trans(post)disciplinary and trans(post)national position, namely the Selfreflective transformative/transformational perspective (e.g., Gülerce, 2006a; 2009a), that I here attempt a brief historical account of the “underdeveloped,” “awkward,” or “self-alien” Psychology in Turkey. Thus, I hope that the reader may draw some parallels between mainstream Psychology’s disciplinary identity formation within the cartography of all knowledge and the hierarchical relations between modern disciplines, particularly concerning its meta-scientific commitments and method, and the imitative, yet hesitant development of Psychology in Turkey, which is heavily embedded in a dynamic political, cultural, and religious geography that places it between “the West and the rest,” as they have tremendous similarity in character. Turkey’s meeting with modern Psychology, which approximately occurred at the same time as the young 548

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discipline’s establishment in European and American centers, also coincides with its major societal transformation from the vast, premodern Ottoman Empire to the young secular, modern nation-state of the Turkish Republic. So, in what follows, I first summarize this unique transition experience at many levels, to describe the sociopolitical glocal (both global and local at once) context for the history of Psychology in Turkey. I then overview the significant people, events, and institutions in various phases of psychology’s developmental trajectories, both as an academic discipline and profession, to account for its multiple origins without scientific, philosophical, and (meta) theoretical foundations. I contour the historical picture in terms of the translation and transfer, scientific and public status, institutionalization, education and training, research and social relevance, professional practice and regulation, expansion and popularization of psychology in Turkey, which those phases highlight. I will try to further contour, if not to complete, the picture by providing some general information and ideas on the current situation in each area. As my ultimate hope is that the resilience of psychology as a traditional subject matter in Turkey (despite institutional and intentional efforts and high aspirations to “be like” or “develop as” mainstream American psychology) will be used in the service of radical (meta)scientific transformations of global Psychology, I also offer some reflections from within the junction of North, East, West, and SouthP. This, prior to anything else, calls for a brief account that will situate the development of modern Psychology in this land, within its broader global historical and philosophical context.

Long Historical and Deep Philosophical Resources Because of a widespread tendency to treat culture asa “noun-phenomena” rather than a dynamic process, and as synonymous with nation, race/ethnicity, language, religion, or geographical region, etc., it is understood as an essentializing, static, and analytical category—if it is recognized at all. It is almost exclusively used in the academic literature to make some comparisons based on Eurocentric attitudes and standards. Moreover, as another enduring habit of universalist Western thought, other worldviews have been viewed in terms of differences, rather than similarities, which frequently are understood as species-specific human universals. Differences, on the other hand, refer to the underdevelopment, deprivation, or deviance of some individuals, groups, or societies. Thus, culture has served as an explanatory substantive and

has been presumed to be unchangeable. Although, “Turkish culture” is not an exception, I know of no better case with which to challenge all these invalid presumptions and problematic definitions. Let us begin by roughly locating Anatolian Turks in historical geography, if only to challenge further the issues of where to begin and of the linear, unidirectional, and deterministic presumptions of development (Gülerce, 1997) and cultural dissemination from one center to the periphery, when reading or writing history. A rather recent exhibit that took place at the Royal Academy of Arts in London, entitled “Turks: A Journey of Thousand Years 600–1600,” for instance, displayed many historical artifacts for very first time in the Western world. This particular exhibit alone made it strikingly apparent that the artistic achievements and cultural richness of the nomadic Turkic-speaking peoples of the past were reflected their adaptability to, and influence on, the regional cultures of the people they ruled since early times. The Kok Turks, for example, were one of the largest and most enduring Turkic-speaking peoples living on the northern borders of China proper between the 4th and 6th centuries ad. In the 6th century, they established the first great empire as a nomadic confederation of shamanistic tribes. In the 7th century, however, they broke up, and the eastern part became assimilated with the Chinese civilization, giving rise to the Mongols. The western part was influenced by the Islamic civilizations of the Middle East. The Uighur Turks remained in northern Mongolia, and the Kırgız Turks moved to the steppes further to the north. The Oğuz Turks (called the Turkmen in Europe) dominated the area between Mongolia and Transoxiania. Their contacts with Muslim missionaries (who interpreted Islam in a particular way), merchants, and warriors led to further assimilation. Turkic peoples who migrated to Anatolia were the Seljuiks (1040–1243), the Timurids (1370–1500), and the Ottomans (1453–1923). After conquering Constantinople and renaming it Istanbul (in Turkish), the Ottomans put an end to the Byzantine Empire. Famous sultans like Mehmet the Conqueror, Soliman the Magnificent, and their successors ruled many diverse peoples of the Balkans and Hungary in the west, North Africa, and the Arabian peninsula in the south, and the Crimea in the north. By the 16th century, the Ottoman Empire had become one of the grandest and longest-lived empires in human history. The empire could not resist the industrial and intellectual revolutions of modernity originated in northern Europe that followed Enlightenment rationality, however, and it gradually declined and was fragmented. Following the World

War I and the War of Turkish Independence, the Republic of Turkey was founded in 1923 by Mustafa Kemal (Ataturk), the commander who had fought in the Gallipoli wars as well as others for independence to establish a parliamentary and secular nation-state, and to end the Caliphate. Under his leadership, the society realized radical social reforms in its early years. Most historians’ begin a historical background of current Turkish society with the advent of nomadic Turks into Anatolia in the 11th century. Yet, this has been a controversial date itself, and most recent evidence from DNA matching between current Anatolians and archeological samples further indicated their much earlier residence, thus raising many new questions. From different disciplinary evidence, it was also argued that Indo-European languages did not derive from the Russian plains, but from the Hittites who spoke Anatolian languages (Renfrew, 1987). It would be interesting to argue for, or simply note that, despite the Western world’s Orientalist constructions and stubborn reproductions of Turkishness as an (“mild”) Islamic identity (as a “role model” for the Arabic Islamic world), the Hatti and the Hittite cultures and civilizations have much deeper and constructive role in the cultural/ intellectual identity of the Anatolian Turks than Islam. In fact, anyone with some philosophical, political, and critical interests in archeology and the genealogy of historical, philosophical, and psychological knowledge cannot ignore the earlier civilizations of Anatolia that date back thousands of years before Christ. That is precisely because no one who actually lives in or visits Turkey today can (or should) avoid mingling with their remains, literally and metaphorically, on just about every corner. Thus, it is equally hard to ignore their current reproductions in everyday life and the sociocultural discourse this engenders in a country that is very like an outdoor “museum” to an “outsider”. Being able to speak about Turkey in general, or on the history of psychology in Turkey in particular, calls for an appreciation of the transformative accumulation of those past civilizations and the blending of many peoples of diverse origins. Clearly, a polyphony of voices from those civilizations and cultural traditions, which had distinct orientations toward human psychological life-worlds, have been appropriated. Yet, there can be found no systematic historical account to chart the effects of all these on today’s psychology in Turkey (nor may one be necessary). Although what is to follow is far from compensating such a lack, I nevertheless expect to invite the gülerce

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historian (of modern psychology) to redefine the depth (and the moral tone) of his or her vision. Although it is not a usual practice in Western history of psychology, even an extremely quick look back in time over Turkey’s humanitarian history can begin with the Paleontologic period (600,000–10,000 bc), as the oldest settlements in Anatolia (e.g., Yarimburgaz and Karain) still vividly represent all phases of the Paleolithic Age with no interruption. Not only that the earliest evidence of Neolithic (8000–5500 bc) agricultural life is found in the region (e.g., Hacilar and Catalhoyuk, but also no anthropological evidence of origin of these people have been traced elsewhere They are most famously known for their worship of the Mother Goddess (the symbol of contemporary feminists) and Taurus (symbol of fertility), as well as for their great artistic achievements. Chalcolitichic (5500–3000 bc) centers (e.g., Beycesultan, Alacahoyuk, Alisar, and Canhasan) are the indications of not only sophisticated metal industry, but also of highly sophisticated in interpersonal communication skills and trade relations with people from Syria and Mesopotamia on the east and the Balkans and Mediterranean regions on the west. During the Bronze Age (3000–1200 bc) Hatti and later Hittite cultures appear, both of which deserve a closer look. The advanced intellectual level of these people who lacked a native written tradition, especially the complexity of their cosmic views (e.g., the sun-disc with its radial lobes representing the planets) and monumental architecture (e.g., the 60-room palace at Kultepe), is well-known. It was the Hatti who gave their name to Anatolia (the land of Hatti). They built Karums (market cities), where trade with Assyrians took place. Written history started in Anatolia with the introduction of the Assyrian language and the use of cylinder seals by traders. The tablets from this period are in cuneiform script and are not only about trading activities but also detail the private psychological lives of people. Hittites migrated to Anatolia in 2000 bc and admittedly found Hattis highly civilized. They peacefully diffused with the Hattians through intermarriages and shared in the worship of the native deities. By the 18th century bc, they established a powerful empire, with a culture that was a true mixture of native Anatolian and Hurrian traditions. They (Empire Muwattalis) fought with the Egyptians (King Ramses II) at the famous battle of Kadesh, where both parties claimed victory. Following the first recorded international political peace treaty in the world, the kings and the queens exchanged personal letters for 13 years, and Hattusilis’ daughter 550

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married the Egyptian Pharaoh. Indeed, the Hittites were known to be very cosmopolitan toward the Sumerian, Assyrian, and Babylonian peoples. They used a hieroglyphic writing other than the cuneiform script, and were the first literate civilization in Anatolia. Their Law Code appears to be more humane and democratic than others in the ancient world, and it later influenced Ionians to take the first steps toward democracy, which was exported to the West through them. Their religion had thousands of deities and the Sun-goddess Hepat, for instance, was the precursor of Hera (Zeus’s wife) and Eve (Adam’s wife). Furthermore, the significant number 12 first appeared in a relief of 12 gods in Yazilikaya that was repeated in the 12 gods of Olympus, the 12 cities of Panionium, the 12 Apostles, the 12 Imams of Islamic mysticism, the 12 zodiac signs, 12 in a dozen and 12 months in a year. Following the Phrygians’ (known as the “Sea Peoples”) destruction the Hittite Empire in 1200 bc, including Troy and other cities in Anatolia, Anatolia entered a Dark Age. About four centuries later, most advanced civilizations simultaneously flourished on each corner of the peninsula: Phyrigia, Lydia, Caria, Urart, and Ionia. During the 8th century bc, the Phrygian kingdom reached its zenith, with Midas (famous for the Gordian knot and other epic stories in mythology). In the meantime, the Urartians, descendants of Hurrians, had established their own state around Lake Van in 1000 bc and competed with Assyrians to rule eastern and south eastern Anatolia for three centuries. Between 1100 and 600 bc, growing populations of three Hellenistic tribes, the Ionians, Dors, and Aeolians, moved to Western Anatolia. Ionians, in particular, were heavily influenced by the preexisting Anatolian cultures, as is well-documented. They rapidly developed the Ionian Golden Age. However, it was Ionians who set the earliest date of Greek–Anatolian competition in history. Ionians in Anatolia were intellectually more advanced than the Ionians in Greece and the islands. Among them were famous historical characters such as Diogenes, Eusope, Herodotus, Homeros, and Thales (father of philosophy), living near Mount Ida (where Paris presented the golden apple to Aphrodite according to mythology). These pre-Socratic people are important to the history of psychology, because more than myth and religion, they valued reason and observation in seeking answers to their questions about ontology and cosmology. They were monists. Panionium, the league of a religious and cultural organization of 12 cities (Miletus, Myus, Priene, Samos, Ephesus, Colophon, Lebedos, Teos, Erythrae,

Chios, Clozomenae, and Phocaea) that the Ionians established was destroyed by the Persian King Cyrus the Great in 546 bc. It was then that most Ionian philosophers, intellectuals, and artists migrated to Athens and Rome. Thus, the foundations of the highly admired Greek civilization and the roots of democracy later established in Athens in 508 bc were built much earlier in Anatolia (Akurgal). Ionians who remained in Anatolia, on the other hand, were ruled by the Persians until Alexander the Great’s conquest of the Persian Empire (334–325 bc). Plato (427–347 bc) and his pupil Aristotle (384–322 bc, father of philosophical and metaphysical psychology) also lived and tought in Ionia. Alexander the Great was influenced by both philosophers and that is perhaps why his cultural policy was known to be respectful of the Eastern World and why he made significant attempts toward integration of the East and the West. This is totally unlike what occurred during the anarchic times of the Diadochi in the Hellenictic age (300–133 bc) following his death in 323 bc. Greek dominance in Western Anatolia lasted for another century until Julius Caesar’s famous “Veni, Vidi, Vici” after the battle in Central Anatolia and before his meeting with Cleopatra in South Anatolia (Antioch) in 30 bc. That part of Anatolian history occurring after the birth of Jesus Christ, and encompassing St. Paul’s and St. Barnaba’s visits to Anatolia, the Seven Churches, St. Nicholas’ birth in Antalya, and the Virgin Mary’s residence and death in Ephesus (Efes) is better known to Western and Judeo-Christian readers. The first Christians who escaped Romans and Arabs carved churches in the underground cities of Cappadocia in central Turkey. Pergamum had the sacred area of Asclepion, which was known as the healing complex, and it continues to host international meetings of various professional psychology groups (e.g., group therapists) annually. In 330 ad, the Roman Emperor Constantine made the ancient city of Byzantium (Istanbul) his second capital (in addition to Rome), naming it Constantinople. Hence, the empire later took the name of the Byzantine Empire. The Roman Empire had been divided in 395 ad by Theodosius I: The Western, or the Latin part collapsed in 476 ad; the eastern, or the Hellenistic part survived longer and turned itself toward the Orient to expand. Justinianus, the last Caesar of the Roman Empire, also conquered North Africa and Spain, making the Mediterranean Sea a Roman lake. He had St. Sophia, known to be the greatest Christian church on earth, built in Constantinople. In 1100 ad, the Empire

experienced inner conflicts between its generals and its bureaucracy, while Seljuks were conquering Anatolia. The brutal Fourth Crusade in 1204 ad turned the great capital over to the Latin Empire until it was regained by Nicaea, who reestablished the Greek, Byzantine Empire in 1261 ad. His followers worked hard to unite the Orthodox and Catholic churches in return for Western aid against the migration coming from the Central Asian steps: the Turks. In short, Turkishness throughout history has meant appropriating, having, or living within many worlds throughout time. Thus, in my analysis, artificially constructed and frequently imposed Cartesian dichotomic oppositions such as East and West, Islam and Christian, Arab and Hindu, and so on and so forth have little historical, ecological, cultural, or psychological validity or relevance in Turkish intellectual, philosophical, or moral reasoning. Instead, the enduring cultural characteristic of Turkishness has been the seeking and finding of harmony in amalgamations of multiple discourses of human civilization and of plural life-forms. This sets an example for what I call cultural cosmopolitanism (that is different from the contemporary notion of “cosmopolitanism” in social and political theories). As indicated above, early Anatolian civilizations were highly advanced and egalitarian in that they influenced other cultures at the time, including Hellenistic thought. Hellenistic philosophy and science in turn helped the development of Islamic culture and thought between the 7th and 9th century. The first contacts of the Muslim Turks with the Christian Western world started in the 11th century. During the 12th and 13th centuries, many works by Islamic scholars were translated from Arabic to Latin. All humanistic religions led to introversion and spiritualization as the necessary foundations of modernity. However, while the Buddhist and Islamic worlds remained stuck in the scholastic, the Christian world was able to move beyond it over the centuries with the help of many historical conditions such as Renaissance. This observation itself calls for a critical, philosophical, and /psychological analysis. Clearly, Buddhism, Christianity, and Islam relied on a very different ontology and a view of life that differed widely from those of mythology or paganism. They all gave way to spiritualism and introversion. Indeed, it is no coincidence that St. Augustine (354–430), known as the greatest of the Church Fathers, is also frequently acknowledged as the “first modern psychologist” in the Western literature. His Confessions exemplified the power of introspection gülerce

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and self-analysis. Nevertheless, it is Plotinus (205–270) of Egypt who has more crucial value for this particular text. He articulated the notion of self-consciousness that anticipated Locke’s “reflection” and Wundt’s “introspection” even prior to St. Augustine. But his greatest significance lies in his attempts to integrate Plato and Aristotle with the monist Oriental conceptions of the world and the human soul. During the 4th–10th centuries, while Western thought languished in the Dark Ages, his ideas, and those of many Jewish, Arab, and Turkish scholars flourished in the Middle East, producing a list of names whose scope exceeds this chapter. It may be relevant to note, however, that the gnostic hermitism of Babil and the dualist manicheism of Iran also had strong influences on the Islamic philosophies of kelam (philosophy of religion), fikih (philosophy of law), and tasavvuf (mysticism). Some works by Razi (Ebu Bekr Zekeriya), El-Kindi, Ebu Ali Rica, Ebu Atahiyye, Ibn ul-Mukaffa, Ibn Ravendi, and Farabi, for example, were translated into Latin in their times. Without providing a detailed discussion, here I would like to draw brief attention to Farabi (870–950), because he made significant philosophical contributions to the formation and development of Turkish psychological common-sense which in turn cultivated the intellectual milieu for the advent of psychology as a modern discipline. In his works, namely El-Talim us-sani (first encyclopedia of Turkish-Islamic philosophy), Resail-i Ihvan-us-safa, Ihsa-ul-ulum, and Mevzuat ul-ulum, for example, Farabi came up with a scientific classification and method that was different from those formulated by Aristotle. Farabi’s scientific method is based on three sources of knowledge: senses, intellect, and speculation. Again, and different from Aristotle’s active and passive types of intellect, Farabi defined four types of intellect: potential, effective, adoptive, and agentive. It is difficult to distinguish Farabi’s natural sciences from metaphysics and psychology. Thus, his psychology is strongly determinist and yet is connected with a quite different metaphysics than the so-called Western thought system and the mysticism of the East. On the other hand, Farabi influenced Western philosophy, although it is not (commonly) acknowledged. Some of his works were translated into Latin by 11th- and 12th-century European scholars, including Johannes Hispalensis and Gundissalvi. His philosophical psychology influenced Albertus Magnus, a philosopher of the Middle Ages, but more significantly, Farabi influenced Saint Thomas’ theses of God, particularly 552

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with his fazilet-al-ulum (virtues of knowledge) (Ülken, 1967/1993). Scholasticism emerged in the West during the Middle Ages. It was St. Thomas Aquinas, whose conciliatory efforts between revelation (faith) and reason toward one truth, however, that helped to overcome this polarity in Europe. His successful arguments for the acceptance of Aristotle by the Church set the stage for Galileo’s mathematical reasoning, Bacon’s experimentation and inductive reasoning, Bruno’s deep philosophical speculation, Vives’ attacks on the formalism of scholasticism and early pragmatism, and Paracelsus’ critique of demonic possession as the etiology of mental illness and support for the Inquisition. During the 13th and 14th centuries, mystic philosophies that were based on the inclusion and integration of the diverse and of love were developed by Yunus Emre, Haci Bektasi Veli, and Mevlana Cellaleddin-i Rumi in central Anatolia, and these maintained a strong influence on the Turkish worldview. During the 16th and 18th centuries, while modern philosophy evolved through the ideas of Hobbes, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Newton, and Locke in the West, intellectual and philosophical thought in Turkey was further withdrawn from those contemporary discussions, as it refocused on the revitalized dualistic debate from the Middle Ages between Islamic philosophies of Gazali (strong spiritualist) and of Ibn Rusd (somewhat Aristotelian) without any synthesis. In terms of social practice, on the other hand, and in contrast to the medieval European practices of condemning people to death and other brutal punishments for witchcraft, mental illness, and possession by the devil, humane healing practices from the Asclepion tradition of the 2nd century ad were carried on with no indication of an interruption in Anatolia over many centuries. These practices were mostly based on verbal suggestion and herbal medicine, but also included methods corresponding to today’s music, art, occupational, and group therapies, and some indigenous techniques like the sound of water, singing, and dance. Secular modern social science detached itself from Islamic religion in early 20th century, and but also from a truly critical and reflective orientation until the recent decades. In brief, it might be important to bear in mind two conclusions that can be deduced from this section: First, globalization is not a recent, postmodern, and unidirectional (from West to East, or to the rest) phenomenon. Second, no distinct intellectual “Enlightenment” period in the Western sense of the

word occurred in Turkey, as the Lumiere did in France or the Aufklarung in Germany. Nor did something similar to the revolution of the Meiji in Japan in 1868 to overcome West versus East dualism take place, to give rise to (indigenous) modernity. Rather, there had been a prolonged monist sense of holism and undifferentiation of the firmly bounded, mostly dualist categories until the confrontation with modern Western thought. Since then, what appears is a strong and deep-seated resistance to selfor other-imposed change in mentality. This illustrates what I call historical immunity. Otherwise, reactive and temporal imitations and/or proactive creative appropriations of novelty have been evident. These observations are expected to make more sense when reviewing modern Turkey’s social transformations in the following section.

From the Ottoman Empire via European Modernity and War to Turkey The historical paths of psychology as a modern science, discipline, profession, and subject matter in Turkey were viewed as signs of the society’s alternative modernization and democratization (Gülerce, 2006b). If such a narration is to be utilized in turn as reflected feedback for potential transformations of glocal (both global and local at once) psychology, then we may need to better understand certain continuities and discontinuities in the external (to the discipline of psychology) historical context. In this section, I will offer a brief overview of the sociopolitical background for Turkey’s social transformations during the past century of its modernization history. First of all, Turkey’s modernization is frequently acknowledged as (voluntary) “Westernization,” not “colonization”, but “imperialization.” It is conceptually and historically differentiated from India’s colonization, for example, as well as from the experiences of Iran, China, and Japan, which are not quite synonymous to “Westernization” and “colonization” either. Originally, the term “Westernization” referred to the particular changes that occurred in the Russian Empire in the last two decades of the 17th century, and in the Ottoman Empire in the second half of the 18th century. Those times also correspond to the early stages of the West itself “becoming the West” (Belge, 2002). The West’s self-definition as such, on the other hand, followed the French Revolution and the Industrial Revolution a century later. The Ottoman Empire could not effectively cope with the Industrial Revolution and the dissemination of the world capitalist system, hence it declined. However, the modernity (as historical conditions) that emerged

in northern Europe following the Enlightenment led to significant changes not only in the military but also in other institutional and economical structures of the multilingual, multicultural, multiethnic, and multireligious Ottoman society. The vast Empire could not stay out of the war, just as the Russian Empire could not, but unlike Iran, China, and Japan which were saved by their distance from to Europe. Modernist reforms seemed necessary in order to survive and to keep the empire intact. In fact, the introduction of the modern notion of the individual via literature, but also psychology as a supplementary field to pedagogy in order to construct the new subject of Western modernity, took place also as part of these reforms since the second half of 18th century. The gradual and radical transformations of the premodern Empire into the modern Turkish nationstate have been described by Tekeli (2002), for instance, in four phases. Following the first period of ignorance of the emergence of (external) European modernity, and then the gradual awareness of its impact on (internal) societal problems, various changes took place in the second phase that correspond to the reigns of Sultan Selim III (1789–1807) and Sultan Mahmut II (1808–1839). The reforms, other than revisions in the military, included, for example, the institutionalization of individual ownership and rights, the differentiation of public and private spaces, and the replacement of military personnel with bureaucratic public administrators. There are no indications for sound analyses or understandings of European societies, but there was obvious admiration and idealization, especially of France and the 1789 revolution. Many diplomats and students were sent abroad to observe the developments not only in industry, technology, and science, but also in European culture and social life. Modern educational institutions were established and foreign instructors were invited to Istanbul. Although the relations with France changed after France’s colonialist expansion and Bonaparte’s invasion of Malta and Egypt (1798), the appropriation of European modernism as the guiding political orientation through Western technology, knowledge, law, and art remained. It would be misleading, however, to overlook the resistance of the (Islamist) tradition against the modernizing, Westernizing bureaucrats, and to envisage a smooth or harmonious process, a subject that I will return to later. The third phase corresponds to the ruling periods of Abdulmecit I (1839–1861), Abdulaziz (1861–1876), and Abdulhamit II (1876–1909); the Tanzimat (reordering) led by Mustafa Reşit Paşa, gülerce

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Âli Paşa, and Keçecizade Fuat Paşa; the first and second constitutional eras; the formation of the Ittihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti (the Committee of Union and Progress); and the Young Turk revolution (in 1908) of the modernist/Westernist Ottoman elite. The Young Turk regime lasted until 1918, and it is during this period of turning to the West for social transformations that important literary and psychological books were translated primarily by the members of the Ittihat ve Terakki, young civilianmilitary Turkish intellectuals. The final phase is the period of the strategic interests (known as the Eastern Question) of the Russian Empire and the European powers like Austria, France, and United Kingdom in the declining Ottoman Empire (described as “the sick man”), the instability in the Balkans, followed by the fragmentation and the collapse of the Empire, and World War I. All laid the ground for the political birth of the Turkish Republic, which was declared in 1923. The Calipship was abolished the next year. Although Islam is not the official religion endorsed by the secular state, still 99.8% of Turkey’s population of 72 million is (mostly Sunni) Muslim and 0.2% is (mostly Christian and Jew) minority today. Once the legitimate power of the Sultan was replaced by democratic popular preferences, rapid modernization became an open and official national project of the new nation-state. Although Mustafa Kemal’s great leadership aimed at a radical reconstruction of the society as a secular, modern nation in many domains of public life, economic development was given vital priority until World War II. The political revolutions and social and legal reformations included the Tevhid-i Tedrisat (Unity of Education) in 1924, the introduction of the hat (in place of the fez) and the Western calendar in 1925, women’s right to be elected for the parliament, a secular legal system and the Civil Code in 1926, the metric system, the international numeric system and the Roman alphabet (to replace the Arabic script though the language was Ottoman Turkish) in 1928, the surname law (to replace the nicknames and personal titles) in 1934, and so on. As a symbolic token of appreciation of all these reforms, for example, Mustafa Kemal was honored with the title/surname Ataturk, which means “the father of the Turks” by the people. The basic six principles of Kemalism (or Ataturkism, after his death) consisted of republicanism, nationalism, laicism, populism, reformism, and statism in economy. After Ataturk’s death in 1938, one-party rule (the Republican People’s Party) continued until the 1950 election, when multiparty politics “smoothly” 554

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transferred power to the opposition (the Democratic Party). Since then, the number of political parties has multiplied, but the procedural democracy has been interrupted by periods of political instability and intermittently by the military in 1960, 1971, 1980, and in 1997, the last one being known as the “postmodern coup” against the Islamic-oriented government. Military intervention withdrew itself each time and returned political power to the civil (people’s) democratic choices. In the meantime, Turkey joined the UN in 1945, and NATO in 1952. In 1964, Turkey became an associate member of the European Community, and began accession membership negotiations with the European Union in 2005 while continuing its reforms to strengthen its democracy and economy. On the other, since 1984, Turkey’s military and political/economic attention has been captured predominantly by the terror unleashed by the separatist PKK (the Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan in Kurdish, meaning the Kurdistan Worker’s Party), which has claimed over 38,000 lives so far in this multiethnic and multilingual society. To summarize, the radical reforms that took place in such a short period of time and in rather top-down fashion during the early Republic era constituted drastic breaks in the official discourse and social life of the Ottoman past. The dismissal of the constitutional article defining Islam as the official religion of the state, the removal of religion and Islamic modernization practices from the public sphere, redefining faith and religious practice as an individual and private matter, and the lack of the reinsertion of any cultivating value system to substitute for religioussocial community ties, further deepened the split between the Westernized elite and the traditional masses (cf. Mardin, 1992; Mert, 1994). Although the official intent of the separation of the divine from worldly matters was a precaution against the exploitation of religion for political purposes, ironically, secularism became the state’s instrument for control and supervision of political Islam (e.g., Berkes, 1998; Davison, 2002; Tuncay, 2002; Zurcher 1997). Yet, for both Lewis (1968) and Tunaya (1992) secularism as the Kemalist’s policy of religion was not an anti-Islamist ideology that “de-established” or “reduced” it to the religion of a modern, Western nation-state. They both saw the top-down quality of the Kemalist secularist transformation project as inevitable for the success of modernization and nation-state building, not as a goal to destroy Islam. Hence, popular religion always existed beneath the surface. While on the surface Kemalism substituted modern, Western science for religion as

a source of national identitybuilding, it failed to develop an ethos or ideology sufficient to meet the deeper spiritual and cultural needs of the majority of its own people’s (cf. Mardin, 1997). As a result, according to prominent sociologist Mardin (1992, p. 38), the secular Republic faced difficulties in overcoming the “personality and identity crisis of the individuals.” What we infer from this analysis is not only the weak local impact of psychology as a science used in the construction of the governable subject for the liberation of a “new” (“Turkish”, not Ottoman”) society, but also the psychologization and individualization of sociopolitical and historical matters under the strong global impact of (Western) psychology and of (Western) normative modern theories of societal and individual development. However, what might seem as crisis or a deviation to be corrected from that perspective can be understood as adaptive and developmentally appropriate from an alternative perspective of modernity and psychological theorizing (Gülerce, 2006a). In short, in spite of existing few good works (particularly those examining the increasingly speculative interest in Turkey’s modernization struggle as a predominantly Islamic secular society and the sociopolitical dynamics of its ongoing transformations), there still is a great need for more multidisciplinary, multinational, and multilingual historical studies in this particular topic. Nonetheless, from within this brief political historical framing we now may turn to reviewing psychology’s search for a disciplinary and professional niche in Turkey.

Cultivation of Modern Psychology in Modernizing Turkey Turkey has been at the cross-roads of important meaning centers, mediating many cultural traditions throughout history, and has been embedded in various great (pre-Hellenistic, pre-Islamic, and Islamic) civilizations and philosophies in its long past, each of which had unique ways of dealing with the subject matter of (modern) psychology. Nomadic Turks abandoned shamanism and converted to Islam in the 9th century, prior to settling in Asia Minor (Anatolia), which presented them with yet another rich cultural heritage, that of the Hattians and Hittites, both of which predated Greek mythology. During the 13th and 14th centuries, the Tasavvuf (mystic philosophy) tradition of Turkish Sufism was developed by Yunus Emre, Haci Bektasi Veli, Yesevi, and Mevlana Cellaleddin-i Rumi in Central Anatolia and left strong traces on the mind–body question in general and the present day

common-sensical constructions of Turkish subjectivity in particular. As its teachings were carried mostly through music, poems, and stories in this oral culture, intellectual and philosophical discussions with Christianity became difficult and eventually led to Islam’s historical divergence from it in the 17th century, in favor of spiritualism over the worldly, solidified objects of the West’s preference. As mentioned earlier, religious, intellectual and philosophical thought in Asia Minor remained split between spiritualist and materialist positions on the dycothomic questions such as the soul vs. mind–body Despite secularization efforts, including changes in the alphabet and language, and the migration/ importation of Western science in early years, Islamic philosophies strongly dominated everyday public discourse/practice and, more significantly, private space. To minutely review the history of psychology in modernTurkey, therefore, requires fluency in old Turkish, Arabic, Ottoman, Persian, Russian, and other European and Asian languages, as well as an interdisciplinary framework from which to understand the historical transformations of issues relevant to psychology. This is not, however, the main reason why even a mainstream or an imported history of psychology is not taught in Turkey (let alone the fact that Turkish psychologists are not interested in historical studies of their modern discipline or of particular psychological constructs). In most cases, Turkish psychologists are blind followers of standard practices and academic requirements that are overidentified with ahistorical, acultural, universalist, and positivist Anglo-American psychology. It may be wise, however for Turkish graduate students who are currently specializing abroad in the (critical) history of psychology to take the topic more seriously, in line with the current historical and critical interest in psychology. Otherwise, of course, there have been various articles on the history of Turkish psychology in general or on particular subfields, most of which have been provided on “external demand” (e.g., Acar and Şahin, 1990; Bolak, 2004; Kağıtçıbaşı, 1994) or “external gaze” (e.g., McKinney, 1960; LeCompte, 1980). These accounts are clearly interested in the development of psychology as a positivistic scientific discipline, and unanimously mark a particular event in 1915 as the “birth” of the discipline in Turkey. These works are not necessarily engaged in the history of the indigenous psychological phenomena nor do they explore the sociocultural constructions of personhood and subjectivity, as already mentioned. A thorough discussion of such gülerce

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issues is not the aim of this present chapter either. Yet it seems important to point at the earlier appearance of “scientific” modern psychology before 1915, and perhaps offer some insights or a meaning context for future research and to shed light on the lack of any indigenous or Islamic psychology in this region. A rather recent historical account of psychology’s struggle to establish itself as an autonomous and legitimate discipline in Turkey suggested an understanding of the events, institutions, and individual characters as a Lacanian symptom of the societal/ global historical conditions for, and transformations of, “Turkish psychology” in particular, and the society’s alternative modernization in general (Gülerce, 2006b). The narrative described five distinct historical periods, namely the Ottoman beginnings and the early European influence until the World War I, the rise of nationalism and the independence movement until the World War II, the interest in sociocultural change and field research until the 1950s, the American influence and the institutionalization process until the 1990s, and globalization, postmodernity, and the popularization of psychology until the present. I will stay close to the same periodization in the current historiographic overview. I also find each period highly relevant in accentuating certain aspects of the journey of psychology in Turkey, mirroring the periods of transfer and translation, scientification and institutionalization, expansion and education, localization and (re)production of knowledge, and professional practice, status and organization, of psychology. I will use these subheadings instead for the following discussion of connecting the past with the present of psychology in Turkey.

Transfer and Translation From its early days to the present, transfer and translation from multiple Western sources has dominated knowledge reproduction in modern psychology in Turkey. During the second half of the 19th century, many Turkish scholars were sent to Europe for advanced studies as part of the systematic modernization efforts of the Ottoman Empire mentioned earlier. Important literary works were translated into the Ottoman language to describe the modern individual and modern private and public life. Also quite a few foreign (i.e., American, Austrian, British, French, German, and Italian) schools, institutions of higher education, and cultural centers were established, where not only was the medium of education a foreign language, but also Western lifestyle, values, 556

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and etiquette. For example, Robert College (a highereducation division of which became Boğaziçi University in 1971) was founded in 1863 by two American philanthropists. Although Islamic science education has been carried out in medreses until the Tevhid-i Tedrisat in 1924, the first university that appropriated European universities, Dar-ül Fünun-i Osmani (now Istanbul University), was established in 1868. It is here that the known first public lectures on psychology, namely Emcaz u Ekalim (Temperament and Climate) were given by Aziz Efendi in the evenings during the month of Ramadan of the following year. Yet, despite the initial plan to include a psychology course (Ilm-i ahval-i nefs: the science of the states of the will) in the Darülfünun-i Osmani Nizamname (curriculum), it was not actualized for another 40 years (Ergin, 1977). On the other hand, Robert College, which provided an “American-style” education and even had Allport as visiting scholar2 in 1918, did not have a psychology course or department until 1975. The first psychology book that used the term psikoloji was Psikoloji, yahut Ilm-i Ahval-i Ruh (Psychology, or the Science of the States of the Soul ) and was written in 1872, by Hoca Tahsin, known also as Ahmet Nebil (1812–1880) in the Ottoman language. Hoca Tahsin was a modernist, promoting psychology as a Westernization tool while he was strongly against Islamic interpretations of the soul. He kept the Western term psychology itself and imported its method, but coupled it with the old concept of “the soul.” Although there was no equivalent word in Turkish for psychology, the choice of a Turkish term for the discipline had been made quite differently, for example, from the Chinese case in similar situation, in which a deliberate effort was made toward indigenization when “Yan chose three Chinese characters not previously conjoined—xin-lingxue meaning, literally, ‘heart-spirit study’ (Blowers, 2006, p. 96)” in his translation of the term and concept of psychology to the Chinese context. The same attitude can be seen in Yusuf Kemal’s book Gayet-ul Beyan fi Hakikat-ul Insan yahut Ilm-i Ahval-i Ruh (Definitive Explanation of the True Essence of Human Kind, or the Science of the States of the Soul ), which came out in 1876. In the meantime, Wundt published Principles of Physiological Psychology in 1874. While he was establishing his psychological laboratory at the University of Leipzig in 1879, Ottoman intelligentsia were discussing psychological matters within the philosophical and political frameworks and the emancipation of psychology from philosophy, just as their

counterparts in the West, although their understanding of it was an interpretive discipline, much closer to Taine and Ribot’s “new psychology,” which lay between introspection and reductionistic psychophysiology, and Janet’s “liberal philosophy” or Charcot’s “medical psychology” in France. However, there is no known Turkish delegate who participated in the First International Congress of Psychology that Charcot organized in Paris in 1889. The three names that are known to have been actively transferring and advocating psychology as a new intellectual field from several perspectives in the late Ottoman period are Ahmet Mithat (1844–1912), Baha Tevfik (1881–1916), and Mustafa Satı (1880–1968), also known as SatiEl-Husri. Ahmet Mithat produced the first translated psychology book, Çocuk: Meleket-i Uzviye ve Ruhiyesi (The Child: Capacities of the Body and the Soul) by G. Compayre, in 1902. He also wrote Nevm ve Halat-ı Nevm (Sleep and Sleep States) and explored various meanings of the soul and consciousness. Baha Tevfik, who was a socialist activist, wrote the first Turkish textbook on psychology, entitled Ilm-i Ahval-i Ruh’un Mukaddimesi (Introduction to the Science of the States of the Soul) around 1911. The book consisted of sections on scientific taxonomy, the place and significance of philosophy, the definition and subject matter of psychology, consciousness, the difference of psychology from physiology, determinism, method in psychology, experience, istintaç (deduction), branches of psychology, temayulat ve ihtirasat (tendencies and ambitions), iradat ve irade-i cuziyye (will-power and free-will), ruh-i insan (the soul of the human-being), umumiyet-i ruh (generalizability/universality of the soul), aesthetics, motion and the philosophy of beauty, fikret (thought), memory, arzu ve heves (desire and motivation), itikad (belief ), tasavvur (imagination), and hiss-u idrak (the sense of perception). Tevfik passionately worked toward establishing an ethics that is based on psychological science and was a strong materialist, working against spiritualists. His monograph Felsefe-i Ferd (Philosophy of the Individual) was published in 1915. Tevfik also wrote Teceddüt-i Ilmi ve Edebi, and made some translations, such as Feminizm (Feminism) from Odette Lacquerre, Tarih-i Felsefe (Historical Philosophy) from Alfred Fouillee, Madde ve kuvvet (Material and Force) from Ludwig Büchner, and together with Ahmed Nebil and Memduh Süleyman, Niçe Hayatı ve Felsefesi (Nietzche: His Life and Philosophy) from Andrea Lichtenberger. He was the senior editor of a journal called Zeka (Intelligence), which was established in 1912.

Mustafa Satı is better known for his translations from Binet, Ribot, and James, but also for his classical handbooks on pedagogy and ethnography, and articles in the journal Mektep (School ). Abdullah Cevdet Karlıdağ (1869–1931), one of the founders of the Ittihat ve Terakki, hence a strong advocate of Western civilization and modernity as mentioned above, was another prolific writer. He translated of over 50 books, including three by Gustav Le Bonn (e.g., Psychologie des Foules, which was published in Egypt under the title of Ruh-ül Akvam [The Soul of the Masses]) and one by L. Büchner. His colleague, Hüseyin Cahit, who was fluent in French, English, and Italian, and other contemporaries like Mustafa Hayrullah Diker, Ali Haydar, Avni Basman, and Mustafa Şekip Tunç, translated a considerable number of important psychology books of the time, including works by H. Bergson, A. Binet, E. Boutroux, E. Clarapède, J. Dewey, H. Ebbinghaus, S. Freud, H. Hoffding, W. James, and T. Ribot. The fact that most published psychology books were translations rather than original authorship is not limited to that period. Over its disciplinary history of a century, the total number of translated textbooks that appeared in the Turkish language is less than a hundred, edited books are less than ten. The original authorship books are all similar, and are as original as knowledge transfer. On the other hand, many popular Western psychology books have been translated in increasing numbers by nonacademics, particularly over the last two decades. Even academics, particularly those educated in Anglo-American schools and who work at English-language universities, either lack, or do not have a good command of the Turkish vocabulary for psychological subject matters. The translation of psychological concepts and terms has always been a serious challenge that usually has been avoided. It was a challenge that was taken seriously in late 1970s, however, by faculty members of the psychology department of Hacettepe University,3 in order to provide Turkish psychologists with technical terms that are equally sensitive to both the Turkish language/culture and to their conceptual meaning connotations. This same group also produced a psychology glossary, using the translation of a selected textbook, A Brief Introduction to Psychology (Morgan, C. T, 1974), after prolonged group discussions. In spite of its limitations for contemporary psychology, the book is in its 18th edition, and is being used as the primary course material by all students of psychological sciences in Turkey. Notwithstanding, the field in general suffers additionally from terminological and conceptual gülerce

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confusion due to the imprecise and interchangeable use of jargon and the limited translations of psychological terms or works without a sound understanding of the background concepts, theories, and crucial issues. The selection criteria vary between the publishers, and this further complicates the picture, mirroring a similar terminological/conceptual confusion among the original works themselves, which are derived from a mixture of subfields, representing different paradigms, sectors, and audiences psychology. These works frequently enter translation and publication in Turkey without critical reflection. The problem has become even worse with the enormous postmodern/global expansion of the psy-complex via mass media channels like TV, newspapers, magazines, the Internet, etc. (Gülerce, 2008).

Scientification and Institutionalization It is no coincidence that early psychology books were translated mostly from French and English. However, during the downfall of the Ottoman Empire, as the relations with United Kingdom and France were going downhill, the Ottomans were developing closer relations with Germany. Germany became the admired (new) West also for its resistance against those colonialist powers. Germany shortly developed imperialist interests in Ottoman resources as well. Yet, not only were German engineers and technology were exported for the construction of the Istanbul-Izmit-Ankara railroad in 1888, and the Ankara-Baghdad and Ankara-Mecca railroad projects, but German faculty also were invited to come and teach in Istanbul by the Young Turks, as part of their negotiations. The Young Turks believed in the necessity of modernization in education as a prerequisite for the modernization of the society, hence they highly valued pedagogy, although they gave a secondary, complementary place to the “young” discipline of psychology. Although they closely supervised and approved the list, the (14 + 5) names were carefully selected and suggested by Professor Dr. Franz Schmidt (privy counselor of education) to provide German guidance in building up the Turkish educational system. Georg Anschütz (1886–1953), who was to establish the first psychology laboratory under the philosophy department in Dar-ül Fünun, was among the first group of 14 scholars who came to Istanbul in 1915. Anschütz, although his name unknown to many psychologists, was either acknowledged as the “founder” of psychology in Turkey or devalued more recently, particularly for his later involvement in Nazi administration in Germany. He remains a man 558

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of mystery, the subject of various speculations and even conspiracies. Nevertheless, he seems to have had a broad background, wide interests, and affiliations with important figures at the time, particularly considering his early career prior to coming to Istanbul at the age of 29.4 For instance, he wrote his dissertation with Theodor Lipps, and later, a book on his conceptualization of the human mind entitled Theodor Lipps’ Neuere Urteilslehr (Theodor Lipps’ Recent Tenet of Urteil [judgement/logic]). He studied philosophy, psychology, and education in Leipzig and Munich, and worked in Würzburg and Berlin. In 1909, he also worked 1 full year with Alfred Binet in Paris in his famous laboratory, and translated Binet’s book Les idees modernes sur les enfants under the German title Die neuen Gedanken über das Schulkin (New ideas about the School Child) together with W.J. Ruttmann (the work appeared in 1927). He worked on diagnostic testing in psychiatry in Munich until 1912, with Wundt and Sranger. He wrote three other books during this period: Spekulative, exakte und angewandte Psychologie: Eine Untersuchung über die Prinzipien d. psychol. Erkenntnis (Speculative, Basic and Applied Science: An Investigation on the Principles of Psychological Knowledge; 1912); Über die Erforschung der Denkvorgänge (About Research on Thought Processes; 1913), and Die Intelligenz (Intelligence; 1913). From 1913 on, Anschütz worked at the experimental pedagogy laboratory established by Ernst Meumann at the University of Hamburg in 1911. By the time he was appointed to help build the Turkish education system, he was the director there already for several months after Meumann’s death. This brief biography, let alone his later works in psychology, should shield him from unjust attributions about the depth and breadth of his approach; he was clearly more than a “technician,” despite bringing with him technology (including the BinetSimon intelligence test) to establish an experimental psychology laboratory. However, it is important to take into account the wartime conditions that he faced, including the “readiness” of the local intellectual/political context to provide a cultivating environment. As with the other 13 German scholars, for example, he was contracted to establishan Institute; he received an assistant and interpreter for the first year, and was expected to learn/teach in Turkish the next year. Anschütz was not among the six who actualized this requirement. As with the others, he had few students, and not a single audience for many months, because of wartime conditions. What he left in Turkey is one article that he wrote before he returned Germany, in defense of the experimental

methodology for psychology, entitled “İnsanların Ahval-i Ruhiyeleri Arasındaki Ferdi Farklar Hakkında Tetkikler” (“A Study of Individual Differences Between People’s Psychological States”) (Anschütz, 1916). At the end of the war, on November 2, 1918, the bilateral contract with German professors as well as teachers was annulled. On November 22, they were expelled, together with other Germans domiciled in Turkey. Although psychology remained a chair for a long time, during the war years the first sociology department was established by Ziya Gökalp (1876–1924) in the same (Istanbul) university. Ziya Gökalp (originally Mehmet Ziya) was a very active political figure who is known for his strong nationalism, Turkism, and then Turanism. After the Second Meşrutiyet, he joined the Ittihat ve Terakki as Diyarbakır’s (the key region of connection between the East and West) representative, and published the newspaper Peyman. He was elected to the executive council of Ittihat ve Terakki in Selanik in 1910, and to the Meclis-i Mebusan (the governor’s assembly) in 1912. He moved to Istanbul and established the journal Genç Kalemler (The Young Pens) there. Following the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in World War I, he was accused of Armenian genocide by the occupation forces. He was prosecuted and was exiled to Malta in 1919 by the British. He wrote Malta Mektupları (Malta Letters) during his 2 years in exile. He then returned to Diyarbakır, and was selected to the second Grand National Assembly by Mustafa Kemal in 1923. His major works included Türkçülüğün Esasları (Fundamentals of Turkism; (1923), Doğru Yol (The True Path; 1923), Kızıl Elma (The Red Apple; 1928), Türkleşmek, Muasırlaşmak, Islamlaşmak (Turkification, Modernization, Islamization; 1929), Türk Medeniyet Tarihi (History of Turkish Civilization; 1926), Altın Işık (The Golden Light; 1927), and Yeni Hayat (The New Life). Most of these were published after his death and aimed to synthesize Turkish culture, Islamic morality, and positivism as the source of Western technological and scientific development; his work continues to have significant impact on Turkish political thought and life. During his teaching in Dar-ül Fünun until his exile, Gökalp gathered important figures in the faculty of literature and founded the Institute of Sociocultural Studies. The team applied an interdisciplinary approach to sociocultural phenomena and included Ahmet Emin Yalman (statistics), Köprülüzade Fuat (history of Turkish literature), Kazım Şinasi (historical method), Ismail Hakkı Baltacıoğlu (pedagogy), and Mehmet Emin (history of philosophy). Their main

(political) interest was in seeking social scientific solutions to many socioeconomic problems that emerged with the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. German philosopher (of critical ontology) Günther Jacoby of Greifswald University also taught in Istanbul University between 1915 and 1918. He contributed to Gökalp’s team with his views on pragmatism, as well as on the Principles of Psychology. Jacoby had exchanged letters with William James on pragmatism and was invited to Harvard in 1910. After James’ death the same year, Jacoby was a visiting scholar to the University of Illinois, then visited Tokyo and North Africa. He fought against France during the World War I (and was wounded) prior to his appointment in Istanbul by the German ministry of culture. We know that he worked on Herder’s philosophy while in Istanbul, and on his “life work,” an ontology of reality. He also fought in Russia and was active in the Nazi movement, although he was not able to find a teaching position until 1945 because his grandparents were Jews. Gökalp hired Mustafa Sekip Tunç, after Jacoby and Anschütz, in 1919. Tunç had studied psychology in the J. J. Rousseau Institute in Geneva. He, together with Emin and Baltacıoğlu, published the journal Dergah (Dervish Convent) between 1905 and 1918. They were very much influenced by the ideas of Emile Boutroux, William James, and especially of Henri Bergson, and were against Gökalp’s positivism and evolutionism. As a disciple of Emile Durkheim, Gökalp minimized the significance of the individual, wasagainst liberalism, and idealized the notion of solidarity between the professional groups versus the classless society of Marxism. Tunç was an opponent of Gokalp’s particular view of the relationship between the individual and society that privileged sociology as the only method of social knowledge (Ulken, 1966). During the Turkish War of Independence, Tunç and the Dergah group drew their sociopolitical ideas mostly from Bergson’s notion of élan vital to explain Turkish resistance to invasion by European states. Despite all the efforts of the Young Turks, no radical transformation was achieved in education. Indeed, it became one of the primary reform projects of the Mustafa Kemal government, which used several Western consultants. For instance, in 1924, John Dewey was invited to give an evaluation. His report took quite a liberal approach to the educational system and included advice to establish a psychology institute (Dewey, 1939). The following year, Kühne, a German pedagogue, prepared a report on technical and professional education. Crucial change gülerce

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followed an evaluation report on Dar-ül Fünun (-i Osmani) that was provided by a Swiss scholar, Albert Malche from the University of Guelph, in 1933. As this report also spelled out, psychology was thought of as a theological subject again at Dar-ül Fünun at that time. The Ankara government was already unhappy about the political resistance of Dar-ül Fünun intellectuals. Following this report, University Reform took place and Dar-ül Fünun became Istanbul University. During this transformation, most faculty were fired, and their positions were filled with Turkish scholars returning from studies abroad and by German refugees who came to Turkey following the rise of the Nazis. Istanbul University gained a reputation as the largest German university outside Berlin. Among the faculty, for example, was Eric Aurbach, who taught for 11 years there and wrote his well-known Mimesis while in Istanbul. The German psychologist in this group was Wilhelm Peters (1880–1963), from Jena University. He established the first Experimental Psychology Institute, with a laboratory and a library, in 1937. He also helped with the establishment of the first psychological association and psychology journal (The Journal of Experimental Psychology) in Turkey (Toğrol, 1983). The latter was established in 1940 (Bilgin, 1991). Two other psychologists, Walter Miles from Yale University and Mümtaz Turhan, who completed his Ph.D. in the Gestalt tradition in Wertheimer’s school in Frankfurt, were other figures of the time who taught psychology of perception. With these developments, psychology received recognition as a new scientific endeavor, although it was not established as an independent department in Istanbul University until 1981. After the establishment of the Turkish Republic, on the other hand, the Teacher Training Institute was established in the capital, Ankara. The Institute offered courses on developmental psychology, educational psychology, and testing and measurement, as teachers were seen as nation-building agents in the radical modernization project. One bright student who received a state scholarship to study abroad as part of the teacher training project was internationally well-known Turkish psychologist Muzaffer Sherif. He went to Harvard University after receiving his M.A. from Istanbul University in 1929. However, he took more political science and sociology courses than psychology while in America. For example, he became interested in unemployment during the period of the Great Depression. Before returning 560

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to Turkey to teach at the Ankara Gazi Institute, he visited the University of Berlin in 1932 and participated in Kohler’s Gestalt psychology seminars. There, he became interested in the use of slogans by Hitler’s regime and consequently chose the research question for his doctoral thesis: “How do slogans help with attitude change and the rise of social norms?,” although his thesis was more conservatively titled “A Study of Some Social Factors in Perception.” After a short teaching experience in Turkey, he returned to the United States, initially to Harvard and then to Columbia University, where he completed his Ph.D. as a Rockefeller Fellow in 1935. Sherif published his thesis as the well-known book, The Psychology of Social Norms, in 1936. After studying in Paris, Sherif took the first psychology chair position in the newly formed faculty of languages, history and geography at Ankara University. Yet, the recognition of psychology as an academic subject came two decades later.

Expansion and Education In the 1950s, Turkish government, and hence psychology, were mostly in alliance with American research and technology. The fear of communism and the fantasy of the USA as powerful protector, and favoring it against the USSRdominated the political climate. Following Turkey’s participation in the Korean War and its accession to NATO, American psychologists came to teach at the Ankara Gazi Institute. Turkish students were selected on the basis of intelligence test scores for scholarships to study in the United States (Vassaf, 1987). Early European influences and psychology books were replaced with translations of American textbooks. During this period, priority was given to the organization in higher education (Bilgin, 1983) and to the training of high school teachers of psychology, sociology, and philosophy (Başaran & Şahin, 1990). The staff was supported by some faculty from American universities and by Fulbright funds (McKinney, 1960). In 1964, the Hacettepe University psychology department was established in Ankara as a model, and rapidly grew, including in its ranks 12 Turkish faculty members who had Ph.D.’s either from the United States or England (LeCompte, 1980) to educate a new generation of psychologists in Turkey. That was followed by other undergraduate programs that were established in the Middle East Technical University in Ankara in 1968, in the Bogazici University, in Istanbul in 1975 (in both of which the medium of teaching remains English), and in the Ege University in Izmir in 1976. With the inclusion of new universities and psychology departments, and the increasing number

of U.S.- educated psychologists in them, American influence was widespread and has predominated psychology in Turkey ever since. By the late 1980s there were only six psychology departments, accommodating approximately 300 new students every year. At present, there are 19 psychology (21 psychological counseling and guidance and one social work) departments with over 1,200 incoming students each year. With few exceptions, all are located in three major cities (Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir) that account for almost onethird of population. At present Turkey has 80 (165) universities all together, in 52 (71) cities; 53 (104) of them are state universities and 27 (61) are private schools or foundations.5 Still, only approximately one-third of high school graduates can be placed full-time, and about half of them are placed in distant education. The procedure is regulated by the Student Selection and Placement Center (ÖSYM) primarily on the basis of the students’ preferences and the scores obtained on the entrance exam, as well as the centralized exam itself. Psychology’s popularity among the students, who are mostly female, shows a tendency to increase, although psychology is approximately 20% of the students’ first choice who are enrolled in a psychology program. That cannot be said for their entrance, despite the scholarships that are given by private universities to students with high scores who prefer the state universities over the private universities. Whereas the interest of the private universities in offering psychology program is limited, being restricted to the needs and values of the market economy, state universities lack sufficient staff and resources. This is largely due to constant transfers to and recruitments by private universities, which provide significantly higher salaries and benefits, and better working and housing conditions. The state universities also lack sufficient research funds, financial autonomy, and egalitarian policies for knowledge production. The Turkish Higher Education Council (YÖK), founded in 1982, centrally regulates the core academic curricula, although the departments and the faculty have flexibility in terms of electives and the content of their courses. The 4-year undergraduate programs are quite rigorous in their core general and elective area courses, which are largely based on a typical American model. Graduate student candidates also are expected to take a standardized screening test and an English proficiency test or TOEFL if the medium of instruction is English (as is the case in most programs), prior to other selection tests and personal interviews that are given by the departments themselves. The YÖK

awards and recognizes academic degrees only in five specialties of psychology: developmental, experimental, applied (clinical, organizational and school), social psychology, and psychometrics. Master’s programs are offered by only one-third of the psychology departments, and typically have quotas of between 5 and 10 students each year, which are not filled evenly among the programs. The number of doctoral programs offered changes from year to year or from one department to the other, but is low, with even fewer students than in master’s-level programs. Also, significant number of undergraduate and graduate students study abroad, predominantly in North America and Europe, and not all of them return to practice in Turkey. About one-third of the students holding a graduate degree work in an academic setting. There is no formal requirement, but there is a tremendous informal need and silent demand for continuing education and in-service training that can hardly be met by the few workshops organized every year by the Turkish Psychological Association or by private practitioners without any criteria of evaluation.

Localization and (Re)production of Knowledge In spite of the hegemonic influence of Western scientism and universalism on mainstream Turkish psychology and reproductions of standard knowledge practices, several individual psychologists have become exceptions to this collective case with their particular contributions to psychology. As mentioned earlier, indigenization, in the sense of a struggle to reclaim the local identity against the intellectual hegemony of the West (Sinha, 1997) has not been a common attitude of psychology in Turkey, and there is no identifiable Turkish psychology. However, there has been a high sensitivity and strong interest in the social relevance, contextualization, and localization of knowledge via field research, particularly—and expectedly so—in social psychology, following the legacy of two important Turkish psychologists, Mümtaz Turhan and Muzaffer Sherif. These researchers made critical contributions against the racist and nationalist ideology that reached its peak in the 1940s and advocated for socially relevant sociocultural field research in those years. Although Turkey managed to stay out of World War II, the ideologies of German fascism, Anglo-Saxon democracy, and Marxism were in strong competition among the Turkish intelligentsia of those years. Mümtaz Turhan (1908–1969) of Istanbul University, who studied with Sir Frederic Bartlett between 1940 and 1946 in Cambridge University, gülerce

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where he obtained a second Ph.D., made a significant shift in his orientation and research interests under the influence of his social psychology education there. He conducted cultural anthropological field research in the villages of Erzurum, observing and interviewing the villagers, whose ancestors had migrated from the Caucasus 150 years earlier. He explained the resistance to culture mixing during “cultural contact” using psychological factors. He strongly defended the importance of studying sociocultural change in Turkey and wrote three major books on the subject: Kültür Değişmeleri (Cultural Changes) in 1951, Maarifimizin Ana Davaları (The Main Problematics of Our Education) in 1954, and Garplılaşmanın neresindeyiz? (Where Are We in Westernization? ) in 1961. In contrast to Gökalp, he argued for a conceptual distinction between culture and civilization. He believed that it was wrong to view the West as if it represented one nation and one homogenous culture. For him, Western technology could cross national borders, but it was much more difficult for its cultures to travel in the same way. He also provided sociopolitical insights for Turkey’s underdevelopment and strategies against the dominant ideological discourse. He suggested that a bureaucratic mentality could explain Turkey’s resistance to Westernization since Tanzimat. During his residence in Ankara from 1937 to 1944, Sherif worked together with other leading figures in social sciences there. These include the sociologists Behice Boran and Niyazi and Mediha Berkes, the ethnologist W. Eberhart, the folklorist Pertev Naili Boratav, the anthropologist Muzaffer Senyurek, and the philosopher Nusret Hizir. All of them were politically minded and influenced by Marxist ideas, although not openly acknowledged. This group also differentiated its structural/functionalist approach from and against the dominant “humanistic knowledge” orientation in Istanbul University. They criticized the scholastic transfer of European social/ philosophical knowledge of the 19th century, and advocated empirical production of scientific knowledge, based on analyses and the formulation of novel relations (Tekeli, 2000). Sherif (whose contemporary Turkish name was Muzaffer Serif Basoglu) published his political interest in the anti-fascist social movement in journals entitled Adimlar (The Steps) and Yurt ve Dunya (The Nation and the World), and in his book, Degisen Dunya (The Changing World) (Basoglu, 1945). He also translated some books. He defended the view that the production of local knowledge should come prior to the transfer of knowledge from elsewhere, and made suggestions for higher education 562

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in this regard. He himself studied the impact of technology on rural peasants’ perception and judgment in five villages. In his third book, published in 1943, Irk Psikolojisi (Race Psychology), Sherif boldly argued against any race being superior to others. His critiques of Turkish state policies of the time led to his prosecution by a military court. Pressure by the Harvard Alumni Association and the Allies’ advantageous position toward the end of the war helped to secure his release after a month and a half in solitary confinement. He was then awarded a Fellowship by the U.S. State Department to work with Hadley Cantril at Princeton University. Thereafter, his work and achievements in the United States, which were clearly no longer visibly political, and his influence on experimental social psychology, his work with groups and conflict resolution, and other topics are better known to the international reader (e.g., Sherif, 1935, Sherif & Sherif, 1953, 1969, Sherif et al., 1955, 1961). The inclination toward local knowledge and socially interested psychology were lost until the 1960s, during the American alliance period. Following a bilateral agreement with Germany in 1961, Turkey underwent significant international and domestic migration. Large numbers of village workers went first to West Germany and then to other European countries. There was also internal migration to the metropolitan regions of the country. While one of Sherif’s psychology students, Başaran (1969), carried out research in rural villages on various attitudes and social change, another in sociology helped to establish a new era in experimental social science in Turkey. Inspired by Sherif’s methodology, Kıray (1964) studied urban transformation through industrial development. The State Planning Organization and the Turkish Social Science Association were established, and both supported empirical research on rural and urban transformation. Following this trend, noteworthy research in social psychology studied the psychological aspects of social change among high school students (Kağıtçıbaşı, 1973), and in a village (Kandiyoti, 1974), on social norms involving the family (LeCompte & LeCompte, 1973) in the 1970s; and the changing family structure, values, attitudes, gender roles, socialization (Kağıtçıbaşı, 1984; Imamoglu, 1998) in response to both internal (urban) and external (Germany) (im) migration (Gitmez, 1983) in the 1980s. Cross-cultural psychology provided, and dominated, the field with a major paradigm and its overused theme of individualism–collectivism even in critique (e.g., Göregenli, 1997; Kağıtçıbaşı, 1997). Turkish psychologists

demonstrated the possibilities for balanced (Imamoglu, 1987), transformational (Gülerce, 1990), integrative (Fişek, 1991), and compatibility (Kağıtçıbaşı, 1996) models of indigenous (Turkish) and universalistic (American) conceptualizations in the areas of family and human development, and organizations (e.g., Aycan, 2001). Over the last decade, intervention research with the less privileged groups and the early enrichment, capacity building, and empowerment of women’s programs (e.g., BolakBoratav, 2002; Bekman, 1998; Güvenç, 2000; Kağıtçıbaşı, 2002)—and hence the modernist mission of liberation under the UN Human Development Program—gained more importance, whereas Gülerce (2009) addressed various critical issues in this framework and its practices. Today, other academic research in Turkey takes place in most areas of psychology from neuropsychology (e.g., Karakaş, 2002) to traffic psychology (e.g., Yasak, 2001), a more inclusive citation for which can be found in earlier reviews for certain periods and subfields (e.g., Acar & Şahin; 1990; Bilgin, 1988; Bolak, 2004). There are few publication outlets for psychologists in Turkey. Also, the centrally regulated (by the YÖK) academic requirements to publish in “international” journals included in well recognized citation indexes such as the Social Citation Index further encourage Turkish psychologists to adopt, adapt, and reproduce Western research questions, methods, and models. In 1991, the Psikoloji Dergisi became the Turk Psikoloji Dergisi (Turkish Psychology Journal; TPA). In 1994, it was included in the Social Science Citation Index, which is a strong criterion of judgment for the quality of publications in academic recruitments and promotions. The peer-reviewed quarterly journal accepts strictly empirical research articles in the standard mainstream format. An analysis of the contents not only of the journal throughout its 30 years but of the master’s and Ph.D. theses written in local universities shows no signs of originality, although considerable scientific rigor is apparent in most cases. The TPA also publishes the Turk Psikoloji Yazıları (Turkish Psychological Review) for translated review articles without any meta-analyses and the Turk Psikoloji Bülteni (Turkish Psychological Bulletin) for translations from various international journals that further teach young psychologists how to do psychology.

Professional Practice, Status, and Organization In terms of the early history of psychological practice, it is well documented that healing practices from the Asclepion tradition of the 2nd century ad

were carried on in Anatolia over many centuries. Interestingly, there is no indication of any interruption whatsoever of these humane practices even during the medieval period, when practices of condemning people to death and other brutal punishments for witchcraft, mental illness, and possession by the devil were observed in Europe. Those Anatolian psychological practices included various indigenous methods that correspond to the music, art, occupational, and group therapies of today. During the Selcjuk (1040–1157) and Ottoman (1299–1923) Empires, a professional differentiation in health care was observed among the two types of practitioners: the otaci described the practitioner who prescribed herbal medicine and massage therapy, and the efsuncu employed traditional healing technique, which is nothing but verbal suggestion, a “talking cure” administered at the tekke (an Arabic term referring to the buildings, like other community houses or dergah and asitane, where Sufis gathered despite the fact that the teachings of Sufism were tutored individually). A well-known indigenous technique called the “key method,” for instance, has been employed successfully in so-called hysterical stuttering cases (Unver, 1973). In the early 20th century, secular modern social science and medicine were detached not only from Islamic/Sufi philosophies and traditional practices, but also from a truly critical and reflective orientation. During the Ottoman modernization efforts and the importation of psychological practices, Mustafa Sati appears to be the first person to employ aptitude tests. He also wrote in the journal Mektep (The School ) on topics such as students’ abilities, intelligence, and educational psychology. The Stanford-Binet intelligence test was translated into Turkish in 1915 (Antel, 1939; Tan, 1972). While in teaching in Turkey, Sherif also directed theses on the standardization of Terman-Merril Army Beta tests and established a psychometrics laboratory. In brief, from psychophysics to intelligence and personality, all types of testing and measurement, seen as the tangible and “scientific” tools of the applied discipline, have been idealized and made an important part of psychology’s professional identity in this technology-dependent society. Various psychology tests such as Wechsler, Raven’s Progressive Matrices, Porteus, Cattell, the Thematic Apperception Test (TAT), Rorschach, the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI), and the like also made early entries into Turkish psychology. Not only were many of these instruments used without adaptation and standardization for many years, but they were misused in the hand of unqualified “psychologists” gülerce

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in the education and mental health systems (Vassaf, 1982). A majority of the 200 psychological tests in active use are verbatim translations, without adaptations, and only approximately one-fourth of them are original constructions by Turkish psychologists (cf., Oner, 1994). A pioneer clinical psychologist, Işık Savaşır, of Hacettepe University, has warned many practitioners of this issue and has meticulously standardized the most popular tests, such as the MMPI (Savaşır, 1981) and the WISC-R (Savaşır & Şahin, 1987). She did not only train a good number of highly skilled clinical psychologists to be more sensitive to professional ethics and local culture, but also cha(lla) nged many psychiatrists’ ignorance of, and prejudices against, clinical psychology. Until the 1990s, public perceptions of mental health and attitudes toward modern practices such as psychological counseling and psychotherapy indicated large incongruencies with contemporary Western notions and conventions (cf. Gülerce, 1991). Except for a small, wealthy, educated, Westernized, urbanized, and modern/alienated proportion of the population, traditional support systems like family, relatives, and friends are still preferred over professional help provided by psychologists. Although the number of private practitioners drastically increased in major cities since the 1990s, in general, their services are far from matching Western(ized) standards in terms of both quantity and quality. Needless to say perhaps, psychological practice has not entered the health and education systems with preventive community approaches and structural/systemic interventions. Psychologists rely on the traditional modality of individual treatments of intrinsic pathology. Although there has been a gradually growing interest in family therapy over the last decades, the medical model and atomistic modernist philosophy are still well preserved in those practices. A majority of Turkish psychologists hold a B.A. degree, which is sufficient for employment as psychologist. This is despite informal academic advice and the social pressure within the professional community for at least an M.A. degree in some area of specialization in psychology to be considered an “expert.” By the 1990s, 85% of employed psychologists were women, and 46% were working in medical settings, 16% in academia, 15% in preschool child services, 8% in counseling and guidance services in schools, 8% with special groups, 6% in private practice, and 1% in organizations (Bilgin, 1991). Feminization of the field is still considerably high, but salaries and status are low. The field still attracts mostly the privileged. Considerable number 564

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of psychology graduates work in other service sectors with better salaries or are unemployed housewives, educated mothers who ironically hire caretakers for their own children. Although, there is more diversity in jobs for psychology graduates at present, with the inclusion of new sectors in the business settings, public relations, human resources departments, and various positions offered by the state in the ministries of justice, social security, and interior, the majority work in the health system. On the other hand, most hospital settings, state or private, are still orthodox in their male- and psychiatry-dominated hierarchical models, despite some change in recent years. Psychologists are treated as test-administering technicians or auxiliary personnel at best. Psychology is frequently confused with psychiatry and psychological counseling by the lay person. It almost exclusively means clinical psychology even to the most educated, and that is popularly associated with psychotherapy and psychoanalysis, also in their romanticized forms. In terms of the psychologist’s job definition within the professional community, however, testing has been its defining role since its very early days. There is no law to regulate the practice or profession of psychology in Turkey. The Turkish Psychology Association was established in Istanbul as early as 1956, but has been inactive in organizing psychologists in Turkey for many years. Having been frustrated with the inefficiency of this association, a group of idealistic and energetic psychologists (among whom developmental psychologist Nail Şahin deserves special recognition for his leading efforts) formed the Psikologlar Derneği (Psychologists’ Association) as a separate professional body in Ankara, in 1976. They also have published the Psikoloji Dergisi (Psychology Journal) somewhat regularly since 1978. The journal still serves as the major outlet for the academic community. The first national congress of psychology was held in 1981, and it continues to meet biannually under the organizational support of some major university’s psychology department. Additional associations, conferences, and symposia in various specialization areas began to appear in the 1990s. The two associations merged in 1991 under title of the Turk Psikologlar Dernegi (Turkish Psychological Association; TPA), which is based in Ankara with several branches in major cities. The TPA became a member of the European Federation of Psychologists Associations (EFPA0 in 1991, and of the International Union of Psychological Science (IUPsyS) in 1992. Currently, the TPA has approximately

1,800 members. A significant part of its membership consists of academics. The remainder work in applied settings, such as hospitals, schools, guidance and research centers, business firms, private clinics, counseling centers, social research centers, nursing homes, rehabilitation centers, and various nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in the major cities. Including the estimated number of practicing psychologists who are not members of TPA, the ratio of practicing psychologists to population (of 72 million) is much lower than that of industrialized countries (cf. Sexton & Hogan, 1992). Thus the profession is not a significant presence in Turkey outside academia, and as such lacks a strong voice as a societal actor in civil society. Although the state’s recognition of psychology as a profession has been slow, even the modernized/ Westernized sector of the public did not take it seriously for a long time either. The lack of any regulation other than one’s good training and internalized ethical values, and hence the wide range of quality in practice, hindered the establishment of a respectable image of the profession. As well, since the 1980s, beginning with the privatization and plurality of mass media channels and postmodern technologies of communication, popular culture has been saturated with all types of psychological discourse and vulgar information. Many self-help books, pop psychology magazine articles, and the psy-complex of Western societies (Rose, 1985) have been rapidly translated. The prolonged detachment of academics and professionals from real social problems and from the actual people has inevitably led to the void being filled by media figures and celebrities who, like Gramsci’s “organic intellectuals,” show an absence of critical meta-commentary or interpretation. From the everyday to international political discourses, psychologization has rapidly taken over the society. The public is presented with a wide range of representatives of the profession and the field, thus finding opportunities to become “informed consumers” of psychological knowledge/practice. In 1999, hundreds of volunteer psychologists and psychology students participated in organized interventions for emergency relief and post-traumatic stress counseling immediately following the devastating earthquakes, and this significantly improved the prestige of psychological practice in the eyes of the general public. Despite this and the TPA’s repeated attempts over the decade, there has been no change in their legal status or their supplementary role in the institutional hierarchy. Currently, the TPA aspires to mimic the American Psychological Association (APA)

in many respects, including its ethic codes and its categories of subspecializations, and has already made a call for establishing divisions, ironically at a time of increased critical discussions about the fragmentation of the APA and the extreme specialization of psychology. At present coordinating branches of the TPA exist in only four other major cities, in addition the central office in the capital, and these are working to build a professional community.

Further Reflections We have reason to reconsider that psychology as a new “scientific” field already was beginning to evolve among the Ottoman intelligentsia toward the end of 19th century. Attention has been focused on the differentiation of the subject matter from philosophical problems, and on its secularization from Islamic philosophies, although the basic orientation was toward philosophical, hermeneutic, speculative and introspective psychology. Early translations and transfers of knowledge were dominantly from French psychology. Yet, during the Young Turks’ eager modernization efforts, an agreement was made with the German government to build up the Ottoman educational system as well as to obtain other technological transfers. Since the international consensus on the origin of modern psychology at the time was (and still is) Wundt’s psychophysiological method (i.e., Boring, 1929), we can infer easily why Anschütz and the laboratory he established in 1915 have been considered as the origins of “scientific psychology” in the Ottoman Empire. Yet, the establishment of psychology as an academic knowledge field, discipline, and profession, especially in applied areas such as school/counseling, clinical/community, and organizational/industrial psychology, has been very slow, during in its first century, particularly when compared with the reported developments of other modernizing societies outside the so-called “Western center,” and when judged by the quality of individual academic psychologists that Turkish society has produced despite the significant amount of brain drain in the field. These observations press us to look for possible reasons for resistance beyond the understandable “external” sociopolitical and economic conditions created by the wars for the society of the young nation-state of the Turkish Republic during its process of Westernization, secularization, democratization, and individuation (Gülerce, 2007a). We cannot overlook the built-in epistemological and ontological features of the discipline that various critiques, frequently referred to as postmodern, have discussed already. gülerce

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As a corollary to mainstream scientism, cultures and societies are incorrectly presumed to be homogeneous, and that brings us to internal sociopolitical conditions and dynamics. As a matter of fact, the earlier discussion on the Ottoman and Turkish societies’ “voluntary adoption” of Westernization needs to be read along these lines, as the official state discourse that does not necessarily correspond to the perceptions of the population. As an Orientalist discourse needs an Occidentalist discourse within the “host” society in order to be sustained in the West, Kemalism served this purpose (cf. Gülerce, 2007a, b). Although it was strongly supported by the elite and bureaucrats in early modern Turkey, and was disseminated rapidly on the surface through state plans and regulations, Western modernization, institutionalization, and democratization was not truly actualized by the majority at all levels and sectors. One obvious reason is that these programs gave priority to the constitution of a secular social state based on law, populism, and economic development, hence were directly concerned with the public space through the legal, political, economical, and pedagogical discourses. On the other hand, the lack of local intellectual and economic “emancipations” in the sense of Western enlightenment and industrialization, as well as the establishment of liberalism or a bourgeoisie and industrial working class, left not only the majority of the population untouched internally, but left untransformed the private space (and the psychology of individuals) of even the elite, caught up in competing traditional, religious, moral, medical, and psychological discourses. The subject is frequently described as the complying kul (janissary, the conformed subject) in the undifferentiated tebaa (the social community of the conformed subjects) in the Ottoman Empire, whereas the modern Western concept of the individual is defined as a citizen with human and moral rights. Western psychological discourse served the sociopolitical role of constructing the subject for the project of constructing a modern civil society. It would make more sense to review the development of psychology from within different communities and discourses of this heterogeneous society. Indeed, sociopolitical analyses that were discussed earlier defined a split between the Islamist and Kemalist communities. Yet, a critical conceptual and discourse analysis (Gülerce, 2007b) described not two, but four split discourses and imagined communities in the society. These discourses representing different communities in modern Turkey 566

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(un)welcomedpsychoanalysis to the society in various degrees for various reasons (Gülerce, 2008). We can understand the ambivalent admiration and resistance toward Western psychology with its deep seated Cartesian dichotomies, and the notion of autonomous, rationalist, materialist and individualist individual in similar lines of multiplicity and diversity by various means. Furthermore, it would be misleading to read the history of psychology in Turkey only as a passive response to external, global, and macro politics working inside or outside the discipline, and to ignore the significant determining impact of the internal, local and micro politics inside the scientific community, which inseparably make up and continuously redefine each other. After all, it is the human scientists that make science and the scientific community (cf. Kuhn, 1962). Thus, there is a need for further research into those names and contributions that have been excluded, marginalized, or oppressed during mainstream psychology’s disciplinary and professional discourse in Turkey. This makes the history of psychology in Turkey a highly promising field.

Conclusion What must be already obvious is that the journey of psychology as an autonomous discipline and profession in Turkey has been under the direct influence of internal government control and international political relations. In parallel to the official modernization efforts during both the late Ottoman and early Republican times, and depending on the foreign country in close political proximity at the time, EuroAmerican psychology has been indirectly imported from various sources. Thus, French, British, German, and American psychologies, have made multiple entries during different historical periods. Although each left certain traces (mostly as technology rather than as any school of thought or scientific paradigm), hegemonistic American(ized) psychology and its positivist, empiricist, determinist, cognitivist, ahistorical, and acultural paradigm had an overpowering effect on the academic discipline in Turkey. Although this is not unusual and is similar to the psychological knowledge and practices in many other modern and “developing” societies today, it has not developed psychology particularly as a profession in social practice, as one might have expected. The very fact that there are no available statistics on employed psychologists in the State Statistics Institute’s nor in the TPA’s records, as well as the absence of laws, legislation, professional boards, licensing, or any sort of

regulations for practice should be significant signifiers of the discipline’s developmental status in society, despite its inception a century ago. Psychology in Turkey has not yet achieved official or legitimate recognition in this modernizing, institutionalizing society. On the other hand, just as with the modernization experience of the society, the history of Psychology is being constantly confronted by pervasive local traditional, religious, philosophical, cultural, and political discourses, as well as by poor economic and educational conditions. Characteristic features of Western modernist scientific thought and mainstream Americanized psychology are frequently described as reductionist, rationalist, elementalist, dichotomic, predeterministic, normative, quantitative, control-oriented, manipulation-based, self-centric, ethnocentric, individualistic, and so on. These characteristics simply do not fit with local ontological and epistemological premises of personhood as they were projected, constructed and identified as the opposites of the Western self as in the othering process (cf. Said, 1978). Despite rapid changes in social structure and organization of Psychology in academia mainstream psychology’s subject matter and hegemonic methodology do not have high correspondence and validity in people’s reality. Thus, psychology still did not find a genuinely cultivating intellectual habitat in this culture which is implicitly treated as ‘exotic’, ‘deviant’, ‘primitive’, ‘traditional’, and so on by the normative principles of the discipline. Nonetheless, two domains of agreement in dialogue between the seemingly clashing (Huntington, 1997) traditions over modernity appear to be the phallocentric idealization of, and preoccupation with, “hard” scientific instruments, and “instrumental rationalityBy technology, I am not only referring to psychological laboratories and tests, of course, but also to the concepts, theories, epistemologies, ontologies, thought patterns, methods, practices, values, lifestyles, etc. as technologies of the self (cf., Rose, 1996). Indeed, from its early inception until the present, psychology has been dependent on Western technology. Psychology could be accepted by political powers only if found convincingly useful in the construction of the subject as a governable citizen for the modern nation-state, and thus only understood for its pedagogic value. Despite the fact that psychology has been imitative of mainstream (American) psychology from its curricula to its organizational aspirations, it does not yet have an agency in this society, which has been hesitant to transform

its traditional institutions and authoritarian practices further towards a liberal democratic societal enabling more individual freedom and rights. A truly indigenous psychology (defined as the emergence of psychology within a particular culture), say modern Turkish psychology, Sufi psychology, Islamist psychology, etc., has not been realized. Nor do I advocate or even see the possibilities for it, as that would be oxymoronic (see Gergen et al., 1996). There have been strong signs of indigenization (defined as adaptation/revisions of imported tools, models, concepts) from culturally aware psychological testing to socially relevant empirical and theoretical studies related to the issues of migration, gender, family, psychological health, and social transformations. Notwithstanding the few research projects undertaken under the influence of sociology and cultural anthropology during the 1970s, the cross-cultural psychology paradigm offered academic psychology a long-sought way of belonging to an international community. It is frequently overlooked, however, how the migration of particular constructions of the psychological, and the universalization/globalization of the discipline and its social order of origin are reified and objectified via cross-cultural psychological research, knowledge, and practice. In the absence of methodological critique and meta-theoretical reflections it is not quite understood how the self and other intelligibilities are massively repressed even when claims are made otherwise (cf.; Gülerce, 1996; Moggadham, 2006; Steauble, 2005). Psychology in Turkey does not yet think for itself. Not only is the disciplinary knowledge that can be freely or readily available in Turkey limited and predominantly presented in the English language, but psychology is both thought and (re)produced in English for most part, in undergraduate and graduate education and in academic research. Furthermore those who enter these programs also come from secondary schools whose medium of education is in the same (English) or some other European (German, French, Italian) language. The situation facing the transfer and translation of knowledge has already been discussed in relation to both narrow definition of linguistics and in the larger sense of discursive practices. Psychology in Turkey does not yet have a language and episteme for itself. To summarize, psychology in Turkey, leaving the individual accomplishments of well-educated and highly qualified academic psychologists aside, is in an infantile state in its disciplinary and professional development. Many Turkish colleagues, perhaps, gülerce

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would find my evaluation pessimistic as they tend to interpret the global expansion of psychology (cf. Staeuble, 2005; 2006,) and proudly celebrate its reflections on Turkey as self-achievements (e.g., Başaran & Şahin, 1990). That would be the case, however, if I viewed its development and imitative “as-if ” character between the Euro-American (Judeo-Christian) modern and Turkish (Islamic) traditional knowledge/practices from the former’s normative and corrective perspective, and in terms and standards of its modernist grand narrative of linear, universalistic, flat, static, and teleologic progress (cf. Gülerce, 1996). Yet, in terms of disciplinary and professional identity formation, and judged by the same criteria, mainstream psychology has exactly the same imitative “as-if ” character and “physics envy” between the hard and soft sciences, the objective and the subjective, the natural and the cultural, the quantitative and the qualitative, theory and practice, the external and the internal, emic and etic, and between many other Cartesian dichotomies of its own reconstruction. It is equally infantile and underdeveloped, lacking firm boundaries and identity. Yet, this common borderline condition is not to be understood or treated as sociocultural divergence (emerging within the international/global context of Turkish modernization) or as scientific pathology (a method of mainstream Western psychology). That is its style of ‘identification’ Reflecting the multiple intellectual resources of psychology in Turkey, psychology has been a multiparadigmatic and pluralist endeavor (cf. Gülerce, 2009c). Thus, ironically, it is a good thing perhaps that psychology in Turkey has not yet developed as much as “it should” over a century. Once its co-constructive interdependence within the global knowledge/power dynamics is better understood, “the psychology of Turkey” could provide a means through which global psychology mirrors, examines, and transforms both itself and psychologies elsewhere, and thereby liberates both. This should occur before, rather instead of, attempts to “emancipate” or “liberate” the less privileged using unsuitable methodologies and ethics that only reproduce the status quo, which can easily be done even in the name of critique (Gülerce, 2001). Otherwise, by the first decade of 21st century, psychology both in Turkey and in the larger postmodern society does not yet have a “meaning” for itself.

Future Directions There are reasons to be optimistic about the future of psychology in Turkey and elsewhere if we agree on the conclusions drawn here. They immediately hint 568

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at directions for future progress (cf. (Gülerce, 2009). Once again, the “underdevelopment” of psychology in Turkey, as elsewhere outside the hegemonic First World, is not something negative that needs to be corrected or disciplined as a deviance from the modernist constructions of Western norms and ideals. There have been multiple meaning-making centers in the histories of humankind and the spiritual world of meaning, and these cannot be colonized despite the overpowering effects of Western thought in psychological sciences. Therefore, any contextually contingent divergence from the mainstream expectations of assimilation should feed back into the alteration of (meta)scientific commitments and methodological presumptions of its own universalistic dissemination models of development from one (self ) center toward further global convergence of abstract principles. Psychology could further deconstruct and historically decontextualize its reductionistic mainstream knowledge and practices, and redefine itself in connection with multidisciplinary understandings of human phenomena within the historical context. It is expected that third-generation Turkish psychologists who are being raised in the postmodern global context and have better access to diverse thought systems inside or outside the fragmented academia will find some value in thinking in their own language on their own problematized questions, which are interdependently connected to global dynamics in spite of the fact that selfalienation and interpellation of the field by scientific, cultural, official, traditional, religious, and ideological discourses is so strong. Mainstream psychological theory, which not only divorced itself from practice, but also marginalized difference, novelty, and critique, including psychoanalytic theorizing, urgently needs to self-reflect and reexamine its own historicity. The global expansion of psychology needs to be understood in direct relation to the macro structures and processes of globalization. Psychology clearly remains trapped within the hegemonic individualistic, foundationalist, essentialist, and positivistic epistemology that cannot enter macro political discussions. The domination of social theory and political/ economic analyses further prevent the possibilities for the innovative, creative, and liberatory potential of psychology for both the individual and society. Therefore, eager post-9/11 attempts toward a global psychology (e.g., Stevens & Gielen, 2008) via a universal code of ethics, calls to respond to regional issues of conflict, and further internationalization

without careful unpacking, would equally seem parochial, and fall short of the desired transformations, prior to gaining some interdisciplinary recognition and political impact for psychology within its very own local Western capitalist social order.

Notes 1. Following Danziger’s useful distinction, Psychology refers to the institutionalized modern discipline whereas psychology points to the subject matter’. 2. Gordon Alport taught sociology and English at Robert College before he took up his fellowship at Harvard the following year. 3. The team included the legendary methodologist Iffet Dinç and Sirel Karakaş in experimental psychology, Hüsnü Arıcı and Rükzan Eski in statistics, Orhan Aydın, Olcay Imamoğlu, and Deniz Şahin in social psychology, Gülden Acar (later Güvenç) and Rüveyda Bayraktar in developmental psychology, and Işık Savaşır, Perin Uçman (later Yolaç), and myself in clinical psychology. 4. I would like to thank Prof. Lutz H. Eckensberger of the Goethe Institute, Frankfurt for providing relevant information and confirming the German translations. 5. Numbers in parenthesis indicate the expected numbers by the publication of this book in 2011.

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Gülerce, A. (2009c). Self-reflective and transformational/ transformative co-ordinations of the psychological. In J. Goertzen, & B. Smythe (Eds.), Special Issue: Pluralism in psychology. New Ideas in Psychology, 28, 210–218. Hacking, I. (1995). Rewriting the soul: Multiple personality and the sciences of memory. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Imamoğlu, E. O. (1987). An interdependence model of human development. In Ç. Kağıtçıbaşı (Ed.), Growth and progress in cross-cultural psychology (pp. 138–145). Lisse, Holland: Swets and & Zeitlinger. Imamoğlu, E. O. (1998). Individualism and collectivism in a model and scale of balanced differentiation and integration. Journal of Psychology, 132, 95–105. Kağıtçıbaşı, Ç. (1994). Psychology in Turkey. The origins and development of psychology: Some national and regional perspectives. International Journal of Psychology, 29, 729–738. Kağıtçıbaşı, Ç. (1973). Psychological aspects of modernization in Turkey. Journal of Cross-cultural Psychology, 4 (2), 157–174. Kağıtçıbaşı, Ç. (1996). The autonomous relational self: A new synthesis. European Psychologist, 1, 180–186. Kağıtçıbaşı, Ç. (1997). Individualism and collectivism. In J. W. Berry, M. H. Segall, & Ç. Kağıtçıbaşı, (Eds.), Handbook of cross-cultural psychology Vol. 3, (pp. 1–49). Boston: Allyn & Bacon. Kağıtçıbaşı, Ç. (2002). Psychology and human competence development. Applied Psychology: An International Review, 51, 5–22. Kandiyoti, D. (1974). Some social psychological dimensions of social change in a Turkish village. British Journal of Social Psychology, 5, 47–62. Karakaş, S. (2002). From time-domain wave-forms to oscillation dynamics: An evolving approach to brain’s electrical activity. International Journal of Psychophysiology, 45, 35–40. Kıray, M. (1964). Eregli, agir sanayiden once bir sahil Kasabasi [Eregli, a town on the shore prior to the heavy industry]. Ankara: DPT Yayinlari. LeCompte, W. F., & LeCompte, G. K (1973). Generational attribution in Turkish and American Youth: A study of social norms involving the family. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 4(2), 175–191. LeCompte, W. A. (1980). Some recent trends in Turkish psychology. American Psychologist, 8, 745–749. McKinney, F. (1960). Psychology in Turkey: Speculation concerning psychology’s growth and area culture. American Psychologist, 15, 717–723. Mert, N. (1994). Laiklik Tartışmasına Kavramsal Bir Bakış: Cumhuriyet Kurulurken Laik Düşünce. İstanbul: Bağlam. Morgan, C. T. (1974). A brief introduction to psychology. New York: McGraw Hill. Rose, N. (1996). Inventing our selves: Psychology, power, and personhood. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Rose, N. (1989). Governing the soul: The shaping of the private self. London: Routledge. Rose, N. (1985). The psychological complex: Psychology, politics and society in England, 1869–1939. London: Routledge and & Kegan Paul. Savasir, I. (1981). Minnesota cok yonlu kisilik envanteri el kitabi: Turk standardizasyonu [Minnesota multiphasic personality inventory manual: Turkish standardization]. Ankara: Sevinc Matbaası. Savaşır, I., & Şahin, N. (1987). Wechsler çocuklar icin zeka ölçeği el kitabi [Wechsler intelligence scale for children manual]. Ankara: ÖSYM.

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Sherif, M. (1935). A study of some social factors in perception. Archives of Psychology, 27(187). Sherif, M., & Sherif, C. W. (1969). Social psychology (Int. Rev. Ed.). New York: Harper & Row. Sherif, M., & Sherif, C. W. (1953). Groups in harmony and tension. New York: Harper & Row. Sherif, M., Harvey, O. J., White, B. J., Hood, W. R., & Sherif, C. W. (1961). Intergroup conflict and cooperation: The Robbers Cave experiment. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Book Exchange. Sherif, M., White, B. J., & Harvey, O. J. (1955). Status in experimentally produced groups. American Journal of Sociology, 60, 370–379. Staeuble, I. (2005). The international expansion of psychology: Cultural imperialism or chances for alternative cultures of knowledge. In A. Gülerce, et al. (Eds.), Contemporary theorizing in psychology: Global perspectives. (pp. 88–96). Staeuble, I. (2006). Psychology in the Eurocentric order of the social sciences: Colonial constitution, cultural imperialist expansion, postcolonial critique. In A. C. Brock (Ed.), Internationalizing the history of psychology (pp. 183–207). New York: New York University Press. Stevens, M. J., & D. W. Wedding, D. W. (2004). Handbook of international psychology. East Sussex, UK: BrunnerRoutledge. Stevens, M. J., & Gielen, U. P. (2008). Toward a global psychology: Theory, research, intervention and pedagogy. Tan, H. (1972). Development of psychology and mental testing in Turkey. In L. J. Cronbach, & P. J. D. Drenth (Eds.), Mental tests and cultural adaptation (pp. 3–12). The Hague: Mouton. Tekeli, I. (2000). Degismenin sosyologu: Mubeccel Belik Kiray [The sociologist of the change: Mubeccel Belik Kiray]. In F. Atacan, F. et. al. (Eds.), Mubeccel Kiray icin yazilar [Writings for Mubeccel Kiray]. (pp. 9–40). Ankara: Baglam. Tekeli, I. (2002). Türkiye’de Siyasal Düşüncenin Gelişimi Konusunda Bir Üst Anlatı [A metanarrative about the development of political thought in Turkey]. In Uygur U. Kocabaşoğlu (Ed.), Modernleşme ve Batıcılık [Modernization and westernism] (pp. 19–42). İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları. Togrol, B. (1983). Turkiye’de psikolojinin gelisim ve tarihcesi: Istanbul Universitesi. [History and development of psychology in Turkey: Istanbul University]. In Bilgin (Ed.), I. Ulusal Psikoloji Kongresi (pp. 82–91). Izmir, Turkey: Ege Universitesi Edebiyat Fakultesi Yayinlari. Tunaya, T. Z. (2002). Atatürkçü Laiklik Politikası. In Tarık Zafer Tunaya (Ed.), Devrim Hareketleri İçinde Atatürk ve Atatürkçülük. İstanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları. Tunçay, M. (1992). T.C.’nde Tek-Parti Yönetiminin Kurulması (1923–1931). İstanbul: Cem, 1992. Ulken, H. Z. (1966). Turkiye’de Cagdas Dusunce Tarihi [History of modern thought in Turkey]. Istanbul: Ulken Yayinlari. Vassaf, G. (1982). Mental massacre: The use of psychological tests in the Third World. School Psychology International, 2, 43–48. Vassaf, G. Y. H. (1987). Turkey. In A. R. Gilgen, & C. K. Gilgen (Eds.), International handbook of psychology (pp. 383–389). Westport, CT.: Greenwood Press. Yasak, Y. (2001). Trafik Psikolojisi. Türk Psikoloji Bülteni, 23, 120–135. Zürcher, E. (1997). Turkey: A modern history. London: I. B. Tauris.

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United States

C. James Goodwin

Abstract Psychology in the United States emerged in the 19th century, advanced by the work of such pioneers as William James, and came to maturity in the 20th. One constant theme has been the creative tension between basic laboratory science, which emphasized research aimed at understanding human behavior and mental processes, and the professional practice of psychology, with its emphasis on application. In the first part of the 20th century, different “schools” of psychology developed (e.g., structuralism, functionalism, behaviorism, Gestalt), each proposing alternative ways of conceiving of psychology’s goals and methods. At the same time, psychologists vigorously developed applications for psychology, creating mental tests, finding ways to aid business and education, and helping those in psychological distress (clinical psychology). After World War II, psychological science rapidly expanded, led by the evolution of cognitive psychology, and psychological practice continued to be grow and make substantial contributions. Keywords: Structuralism, functionalism, behaviorism, Gestalt psychology, mental testing, industrial psychology, clinical psychology, diversity in psychology

Historically, psychology in the United States has been an amalgam of imported and homegrown ideas about human behavior and mental processes. From abroad, it has taken ideas about the human condition from England (e.g., Darwin and Galton), Germany (e.g., Wundt, Ebbinghaus, Wertheimer), France (e.g., Charcot, Binet, Janet), Switzerland (e.g., Jung, Piaget), Russia (e.g., Pavlov), and Austria (e.g., Freud), to name just a few of the obvious influences. To these imports, psychological scholars in the United States have stirred in a uniquely American pragmatism to produce a richly diverse scholarly discipline with a wide variety of practical applications.1 This chapter will be incomplete, of necessity, but will try to give the reader an understanding of psychology’s history in the United States. The focus will be on the 20th century, but the roots go deeper, and the 19th century will be examined briefly. Also, there will be equal emphasis placed on the two

major strategies that have characterized psychologists working in the United States—conducting basic research designed to uncover the essential principles of psychological science, and applying psychological knowledge in areas ranging from business to education to health care, in order to provide some benefit to society.

Nineteenth-century Roots Because of the influence of Edwin G. Boring’s famous History of Experimental Psychology (Boring, 1929), psychology in the United States is often thought to have begun with the work of William James (1842–1910), the famous philosopher/psychologist. As Boring put it, “James began psychology in America with his recognition of the new experimental physiological psychology of Germany” (p. 493). James certainly had an enormous influence on the development of psychology in the United States, and Boring 571

was making a reasonable point about the significance of the laboratory psychology that emerged in Germany in the 1860s and 1870s, but a pre-Jamesian psychology existed in the United States, usually taught under the course title of intellectual or mental philosophy. The best-known chronicler of pre-Jamesian psychology in the United States was Thomas Upham of Bowdoin College (1799–1872), whose textbook became the standard introduction to the field. The book initially appeared in 1827 as Elements of Intellectual Philosophy (later changed to Elements of Mental Philosophy); it sold vigorously well into the 1870s. It contained many of the topics found in modern psychology textbooks—sensation, perception, memory, emotion, motivation, and so on— although it lacked any serious treatment of the brain and nervous system (Fuchs, 2000). The book is normally considered “pre-scientific,” but Upham went to great lengths to separate mental philosophy from metaphysics, with the former having a stronger functional value, he argued, because it was empirical (i.e., based on direct observation) rather than speculative. The book was strongly influenced by faculty psychology, an approach that emphasized the naming of specific “faculties” (e.g., the intellectual faculty of memory, the emotion faculty of anger), descriptions of the functions served by these faculties, how they could be improved or controlled, and so on. Faculty psychology also provided the underpinning for phrenology, a prominent 19th-century attempt to localize brain function that eventually degenerated into pseudoscience. Intellectual or mental philosophy was typically taught in the colleges and universities with religious affiliations that characterized higher education in the United States through the end of the Civil War. In the latter part of the 19th century, however, the face of higher education began to change, and psychology changed with it. One major development was the incorporation of the German university model, which emphasized original research and the academic freedom to pursue research, wherever it might lead. Out of this system emerged the new scientific approach to the study of psychology that Boring was referring to when naming William James America’s first psychologist. The first university in the United States to deliberately mimic the German model was Johns Hopkins in Baltimore, founded in 1876. Others soon followed (e.g., Clark University, the University of Chicago, Stanford University), and many older universities (e.g., Harvard, Yale) began to shift their educational philosophies to accommodate the new movement. 572

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Furthermore, during the final two decades of the 1800s, dozens of young scholars from the United States went to Germany to learn about the new scientific psychology. They returned, began to populate the new and evolving American universities as faculty, and brought about a revolution in the way psychology was conceptualized in the United States. As just one indication of the major changes that occurred, by the turn of the 20th century, approximately 40 laboratories of experimental psychology had appeared in United States universities (Benjamin, 2000); 20 years earlier there had been none.

William James In 1903, when James McKeen Cattell of Columbia asked psychologists to rank their peers for eminence in the newly emerging field of psychology, William James was not only listed on every one of the ballots, he was ranked first on every return (Hothersall, 2004). He was also only one of two people ever named President of the American Psychological Association (APA) twice, and at least a dozen wellknown psychologists, in autobiographical statements, made it clear that James had a strong influence on the direction of their careers (King, 1992). This status as the dean of psychology in the United States came about in part because of his pioneering teaching on the subject at Harvard in the 1870s and 1880s, but mostly because of the publication of his Principles of Psychology in 1890, which many historians regard as psychology’s most important and influential book. Yet, James was ambivalent about the scientific status of psychology, once writing that it was “no science, it is only the hope of a science” (James, 1892, p. 468), and over the years, he grew increasingly concerned about the narrowness of a purely laboratory psychology. Nonetheless, he is as responsible as anyone for altering the direction of psychology in the United States, from the pre-Jamesian faculty psychology that had fuzzy boundaries with philosophy, to a psychology that at least aimed at being broadly scientific in approach. In the massive two-volume Principles, James summarized the psychological knowledge of the time and provided a blueprint for future research in psychology. He defined psychology as the science of mental life, and he urged psychologists to be open about methodology—while advocating introspection, a careful self-assessment of mental activity, he also believed that any method shedding light on the mental life was worth using. James was also in the middle of a debate illustrating an issue that has always been problematic for psychology. The general problem concerns a disconnect

between public understanding of psychology and psychologists’ self-definition of their field. Throughout the history of psychology in the United States, the public perception of psychology has incorporated topics that professional psychologists have considered pseudoscientific, of no value in increasing our understanding of the human condition, and harmful to the status of the field. The topics range from the phrenology of the 19th century to graphology (analyzing handwriting to determine personality) in the 20th century. In James’s day, the controversial topic was spiritualism. It was immensely popular in the late 19th century, and understandable in the context of a time when dramatic new and hard to understand (by the public) discoveries were commonplace, and a time when the desire to contact the dead was widespread in the wake of the devastating American Civil War (Coon, 1992). It was thought, for example, that if people could communicate with others over many miles by telegraph, using some invisible and mysterious form of energy, why not communicate telepathically with other minds, even minds whose bodies have died? There was even some linguistic confusion—the word psychic, for example, sometimes meant what it does today (i.e., in the realm of the paranormal), but in the 19th century it was also used as a synonym for “psychological.” Although his colleagues were denouncing spiritualist claims, attempting to expose mediums as frauds, and, in general, trying to set the boundaries for a scientific psychology that excluded spiritualism as pseudoscience, James kept an open mind, arguing that spiritualist phenomena needed to be examined systematically and without bias. He extensively studied the Boston medium Leonora Piper, awed at first by her apparent ability, but never reached a firm conclusion about whether her abilities were beyond the realm of normal psychological phenomena.

Establishing Psychology as a Discipline For psychology to become defined and recognized as a legitimate academic discipline, certain steps needed to be taken. Two individuals, G. Stanley Hall and James McKeen Cattell, made a number of contributions to psychology, but they were especially known for “professionalizing” the field, increasing its recognition as a serious professional and scientific discipline by creating journals, laboratories, university graduate training programs, and guild organizations. Hall (1844–1924), a student of James and a faculty member at Johns Hopkins, created the first laboratory of experimental psychology there, in 1883. Four years later, he created the first successful journal of

psychology in the United States, the American Journal of Psychology (with the help of a large donation from an individual who, by confusing psychological and psychic, mistakenly thought he was supporting a pro-spiritualism journal). And 5 years later, in 1892, Hall created the APA, which is today the largest professional organization for psychologists in the world. Hall was also an important figure in the training of psychologists, both for his work at Johns Hopkins, and for establishing the psychology program at Clark University, which opened in 1889 (Hall was named its first president). Hall was instrumental in fashioning the university as the first in the United States designed exclusively for graduate students in the sciences (an undergraduate division was added later). Cattell (1860–1944) established laboratories at the University of Pennsylvania and at Columbia University, and was head of the psychology program at Columbia from 1891 to 1917, where he built one of the strongest graduate programs in psychology in the country. Two of Cattell’s best-known students were Thorndike and Woodworth, both of whom remained at Columbia after earning their degrees. Edward Thorndike (1874–1949) completed a famous “cats in puzzle boxes” study for his doctoral dissertation (Thorndike, 1898), and then became a prominent educational psychologist. Robert S. Woodworth (1869–1962) was a legendary teacher at Columbia and author of two famous textbooks—an introductory text (Woodworth, 1921) that went through four editions between 1921 and 1940, and his Experimental Psychology (Woodworth, 1938), known for institutionalizing the modern distinction between experimental and correlational studies, and for establishing the experiment as the manipulation of an independent variable, the control of all other irrelevant factors, and the measurement of dependent variables (Winston, 1990). Cattell had earned a Ph.D. from Wundt at his famous Leipzig laboratory in 1886, but was more influenced by Francis Galton of England than by Wundt. Cattell is sometimes referred to as the “American Galton” (Goodwin, 2008) because he took Galton’s ideas about mental testing and brought them to the United States. In an 1890 article (Cattell, 1890), Cattell coined the term “mental test,” and described a series of tests, which mainly emphasized sensory skills (e.g., sensory thresholds) to measure basic ability. This approach failed when Cattell’s student Clark Wissler discovered that performance on the tests did not correlate with academic performance among college students at Columbia (Wissler, 1901). goodwin

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The Galton-Cattell mental testing approach collapsed right at the same time that a different strategy, developed in France by Alfred Binet, was showing promise (more on mental testing below). Cattell’s professionalization activities had a more lasting impact on psychology than did his work on mental testing. In addition to building a strong training program at Columbia, Cattell was also active in the leadership of APA, but his major contribution was related to journal publication. He revitalized the moribund journal Science, starting it on the path toward its modern reputation as science’s premier journal (Sokal, 1981). He was also instrumental (along with colleague James Mark Baldwin) in the creation of two publications that have become major journals in psychology—Psychological Review (founded 1894) and Psychological Bulletin (founded 1904). In 1921, Cattell created the Psychological Corporation, originally designed as a consulting agency to provide psychological expertise to business and industry.

Early 20th Century: Competing Systems As psychology in the United States entered the 20th century, some degree of consensus had developed that psychology, at least the version to be found in academia, was the scientific study of conscious mental activity—the APA’s constitution, for example, identified the purpose of the organization as “the advancement of Psychology as a science. Those who are eligible for membership are engaged in this work” (Cattell, 1895, p. 150). Yet, there was disagreement over the best way to study conscious experience, and it was not long before some psychologists questioned whether psychology ought to be the study of behavior rather than consciousness. Early in the 20th century, these competing ideas came to be labeled “schools of psychology” (e.g., Heidbreder, 1933), and the predominant ones in the United States were two imports (structuralism and Gestalt psychology) and two homegrown products (functionalism and behaviorism).

Structuralism One has to be careful when describing structuralism as originating outside of the United States, because it can perpetuate one of psychology’s enduring myths. For a long time in psychology, it was taken for granted that structuralism originated in Germany, with Wundt, and came to the United States in the person of E. B. Titchener (1867–1927), a British psychologist who earned a Ph.D. from Wundt in 1892. Titchener was said to be Wundt’s intellectual “son,” 574

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spreading the gospel of structuralism to the new country. To this day, textbooks in psychology can be found that describe Wundt as a structuralist (e.g., Goldstein, 2008). Titchener was indeed a student of Wundt and he did indeed come to Cornell in 1892. But the system that came to be called structuralism was Titchener’s alone, however, and can be considered an import in the sense that it arrived in the United States when Titchener arrived. For more on this issue, and why the altered understanding of Wundt shows that history needs to be rewritten continually in light of new findings and new ways of looking at things, see Goodwin (2008, pp. 117–120). Structuralists believed that psychology was the scientific study of human conscious experience, and that the goal of psychology was to analyze this experience, dissecting it into its constituent structural elements. As Titchener described it, the psychologist’s goal “is to ascertain the nature and number of the mental elements. He takes up mental experience, bit by bit, dividing and subdividing, until the division can go no further. When that point is reached, he has found a conscious element” (Titchener, 1896/1899, p. 16). Titchener drew an analogy to anatomy—just as an anatomist aims to understand the basic structure of the human body, the psychologist, Titchener argued, must aim for a thorough understanding of the structure of the human mind. To accomplish this difficult task, Titchener believed that precise laboratory research was needed, using established methods such as reaction time, but also using a form of introspection (“systematic experimental introspection”) that went far beyond the self-reflection that William James had in mind, or the simple self reports that occurred in Wundt’s lab (e.g., reporting whether one weight was heavier than another). In Titchener’s laboratory, research subjects (called “observers” then, because they were observing their own conscious experiences) would participate in a trial of an experiment (e.g., making discriminations between fine shades of color), and then give a verbal description of what the immediate conscious experience was like for them. Titchener recognized that subjectivity could creep in, so he insisted on an extremely high level of training for his introspectors—they would become, in effect, introspecting machines. Again in Titchener’s words, the “practiced observer gets into an introspective habit . . . so that it is possible for him, not only to take mental notes while the observation is in progress, without interfering with consciousness, but even to jot down written notes, as the histologist does while his eye is [on] the ocular of the microscope” (Titchener, 1909, p. 23).

The introspection practiced in Titchener’s laboratory is difficult to envision for modern psychologists because it is no longer done. Some understanding can be achieved by reading an actual introspective account, such as the following. It was from a study on attention by Karl Dallenbach, a Ph.D. student of Titchener’s (and a famous experimental psychologist in his own right). Dallenbach’s observers listened to pairs of metronomes running at different speeds and were told to keep a running total of the total number beats that occurred between coincident beats, a task requiring considerable attention. At the same time, they were given a second task, such as adding numbers and saying them out loud. Dallenbach was not interested in accuracy (the task was impossible to do well), but in what the conscious experience was like. Here is one observer’s description: The sounds of the metronomes, as a series of discontinuous clicks, were clear in consciousness only four or five times during the experiment, and they were especially bothersome at first. They were accompanied by strain sensations and unpleasantness. The rest of the experiment my attention was on the adding, which was composed of visual images of the numbers, sometimes on a dark grey scale which was directly ahead and about three feet in front of me. This was accompanied by kinaesthesis of eyes and strains in chest and arms. When these processes were clear in consciousness the sounds of the metronomes were very vague or obscure. (Dallenbach, 1913, p. 467)

On the basis of this and other, similar introspections, Dallenbach completed an analysis of the severe limits on human attention, research that foreshadowed the attention research that developed in England in the 1950s (e.g., Broadbent, 1958). The experiment also serves to illustrate Titchener’s goal of identifying the structural elements of conscious experience. He believed there were three such elements—sensations, images, and basic feelings. If you look back at the Dallenbach introspective account, all three of these elements can be discerned. Ultimately, Titchener’s system, at least in its early years, amounted to a classification system, a way of categorizing human consciousness through analysis. Thus, sensations were said to have certain attributes that needed to be identified through introspective research. The attributes of sensation were determined to be quality (e.g., two different colors have two different qualities), intensity, duration, and clarity. Images had similar attributes, but compared to

sensations, they were “relatively pale, faded, washed out, misty” (Titchener, 1909, p. 198). Feelings (affect) had quality (but only two—pleasantness and unpleasantness), intensity, and duration, but not clarity. Titchener also sought to show how elements combined to produce higher mental processes. The perception of a tree, for instance, was said to combine sensory elements (form, color, perhaps motion), and memory images (of other trees we have seen and learned to label as such). Central to Titchener’s system was the belief that experimental psychology should be limited to a study of the generalized adult mind. This meant that he aimed to discover general principles about human conscious experience, and a corollary was that he was uninterested in individual differences in the structure of consciousness. He was also uninterested in studying anyone but adults. The study of children, animals, and the insane was interesting, he argued, but outside the realm of “pure” psychology—none of them was capable of proper introspection, the backbone of scientific methodology for him. As will be seen, this attitude was in sharp contrast to that of most of his peers in the United States. Titchener’s legacy is not his structuralist system, which essentially died when he did in 1927. Rather, it is his unyielding belief in the importance of basic laboratory research as a means toward understanding human mental processes. In addition to developing his research program, producing students who carried it on at other schools (e.g., Walter Pillsbury at the University of Michigan), Titchener promoted the laboratory in two other ways—through his famous laboratory manuals and through the creation of a select group of “Experimentalists” who met annually to promote basic research. Edmund Sanford of Clark University (a close friend of Titchener’s) published the first Englishlanguage laboratory manual in the early 1890s, important because it contributed to the standardization of training in experimental psychology (Goodwin, 1987). Titchener applauded his friend’s effort, but felt that Sanford had not gone far enough, especially in explaining laboratory work to instructors who, he believed, usually fell short of his definition of well trained. So Titchener wrote his own set of manuals, one set for so-called qualitative experiments and one for quantitative experiments. The qualitative experiments (Titchener, 1901) included experiments on basic sensory, perceptual, and cognitive processes, almost all of them including some form of introspection. The quantitative experiments (Titchener, 1905) primarily involved those in goodwin

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psychophysics (threshold experiments, as in modern vision tests) and reaction time, for which numerical data were collected. To solve the problem of inadequately trained instructors, Titchener accompanied each student manual with a detailed instructor’s manual. Although the student manuals were each quite elaborate in its instructions about how to set up and conduct experiments, the instructor’s manuals were even more comprehensive—twice the length of the student manuals. Titchener’s manuals became the standard way for students in the United States to be trained in basic laboratory procedures for the first quarter of the 20th century. They can even be used today for good demonstration experiments on various psychological phenomena, especially those in the areas of sensation and perception. Titchener’s second strategy for promoting laboratory research was to create an informal organization of like-minded experimental psychologists in 1904. Believing that the APA was not adequately supporting the primacy of laboratory research, Titchener formed his own group, which met annually until his death in 1927 (Goodwin, 1985). It eventually evolved into the Society of Experimental Psychologists, which exists today as an honorary society for prominent experimentalists (Goodwin, 2005). At least until the 1920s, the group was relatively small, with about a dozen to twenty of them meeting each spring, rotating from one laboratory to another. The meetings promoted research productivity among its members, but it had an adverse effect on one group of psychologists would might have wished to become prominent experimentalists—women. Thinking of his informal group as analogous to a British men’s club, Titchener and his peers believed women would inhibit the freedom of critical discussion (i.e., if women were present, the men would have to act like “gentlemen”). The exclusion of women is somewhat paradoxical because Titchener had women in his laboratory as doctoral students (Cornell was one the few universities at the time that accepted female graduate students) and he supported them in their searches for positions. Furthermore, the first woman to earn a Ph.D. in psychology, Margaret Washburn (1871–1939), was also Titchener’s first doctoral student.

Gestalt Psychology A second psychological system to arrive from Europe was Gestalt psychology. The movement began in Germany in the early part of the 20th century and had impact in the United States in the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s. Central to Gestalt psychology was the argument that trying to understand psychological 576

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phenomena through the process of analysis into component elements was misleading at best. Hence, they objected to Titchener’s structuralist strategy as a way to understand mental processes. And when behaviorism (below) came into prominence, they objected to the analysis of complex behavior into conditioned reflexes. For the gestaltists, the whole of the experience or the behavior was always greater than the sum of the individual mental elements or reflexes. Although the gestaltists saw their movement as a general psychology, they are remembered most for their work on perception and thinking/ problem solving, at least in the United States. The Gestalt movement is normally thought to have begun in 1912 with a paper by Max Wertheimer (1880–1943) on apparent motion, a perceptual phenomenon that seemed to resist analysis. Two adjacent lights flickering on and off at a certain rate appear to be a single light moving from one position to another. The whole of the perceived movement was more than the sum of its two flickering lights. The first thorough description of Gestalt psychology in the English language was a 1922 paper— “Perception: An Introduction to the GestaltTheorie”—by the second of the movement’s originators, Kurt Koffka (1886–1941). The fact that Koffka’s paper had “perception” in its title contributed to a false belief among American psychologists that the Gestalt movement concerned itself primarily with perceptual processes. And this impression lingers—in modern general psychology texts, Gestalt psychology is described primarily in perception chapters. Gestaltist psychology also appears in modern textbook chapters on thinking and problem solving, thanks primarily to research by Wolfgang Köhler (1887–1967), the third of the Gestalt leaders. Although director of an anthropoid research colony in the Canary Islands during and shortly after World War I, Köhler (1917/1926) completed a series of famous studies that seemed to show that if primates had visual access to all the components of a problem situation (e.g., combining two sticks to reach an otherwise inaccessible banana), they could solve the problem insightfully. Psychologists in the United States read about Gestalt psychology, but they also encountered the gestaltists directly—all three of the leaders, as well as several of their prominent colleagues (e.g., Kurt Lewin) and students (e.g., Carl Duncker) emigrated to the United States. Koffka came first, in the 1920s, settling into an academic position at Smith College. The others came in the 1930s, in direct response to the threat posed by the growing Nazi movement,

which began removing Jewish professors from academic positions as early as 1933, the year that Hitler’s National Socialist Party came to power. Wertheimer, who was Jewish, accurately assessed the threat and came with his family to New York, taking a position at the New School for Social Research (his son, Michael, is a prominent historian of psychology today). He wrote an important book on thinking and problem solving just before his death; it was published posthumously as Productive Thinking (Wertheimer, 1945). Köhler was not Jewish, but he came to the United States when the Nazi regime effectively destroyed his prestigious psychology institute at the University of Berlin by imposing severe restrictions on academic freedom and by harassing his junior colleagues and students. Before he left, Köhler penned the final anti-Nazi article to appear in a during the Hitler era, castigating the regime for its policy of purging the universities of its Jewish professors (Henle, 1986). Köhler, who took a position at Swarthmore College, spent the most time in the United States of the three originators of the Gestalt movement, and he was the only one of the three to be elected president of the APA (in 1959).

Functionalism Titchener’s insistence that psychology focus exclusively on the generalized adult mind was ignored by majority of his peers in the United States. Rather, most of them subscribed to a set of beliefs that collectively have come to be called functionalism. Like Titchener, they believed that psychology was the scientific study of our mental life and that introspection was a useful technique. Unlike Titchener, however, their interests were much broader, encompassing other methods, examining not just general principles but individual differences, willing to study other populations, and especially interested in application. If there was a central theme to functionalism, it was evolution—functionalism clearly showed the effects of Darwin’s influence. The contrast with a structuralist philosophy was drawn most clearly by James Angell (1869–1949) of the University of Chicago in a famous APA presidential address (“The Province of Functional Psychology”), delivered in December of 1906 and published the next year (Angell, 1907). Whereas structuralists were interested in the “what” of consciousness, Angell pointed out, functionalists focused on the “why” and “how.” The structuralist asked the question, “what is consciousness?” while the functionalist asked “what is consciousness for?” In Darwinian

language, the central issue for functionalists was the manner in which consciousness “functions” to help the individual adapt to the environment and survive in the struggle for existence. With their emphasis on the adaptive function of consciousness, functionalists were led to examine a much wider range of topics than considered appropriate by Titchener. The study of animals (comparative psychology), for example, enabled researchers to investigate the evolution of consciousness. The study of children and other age groups allowed for the study of how the ability to adapt developed over the course of a lifetime. The study of mental illness yielded understanding about failures to adapt. And by studying individual differences and developing ways to measure these differences (i.e., mental testing), functionalists could begin to understand how some adapted better than others. William James is often considered a forerunner to functionalism. For example, in his Principles, he wrote about the functions of consciousness (focusing attention on essential problem solving) and habit (its automaticity frees up time for problem solving). But even though functionalist thinking spread broadly across the academic landscape in America, it is usually associated with two schools— primarily Chicago, but also Columbia. Functionalism was more of an attitude than a formal school of thought, but if there was a starting point, it has normally been assigned to an article written by John Dewey (1859–1952) of the University of Chicago in 1896 called “The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology.” Taking what would become the standard functionalism line, Dewey argued that trying to analyze the reflex into its components was a fruitless strategy; a better approach was to determine how reflexes helped the individual to adapt successfully. Ironically, it was Titchener who gave the movement a name, contrasting functionalism explicitly with his structuralism in an 1898 paper, “Postulates of a Structural Psychology.” Angell’s above-mentioned APA presidential address was in part a response to the Titchener paper. It was in the 1898 paper that Titchener drew his analogy between structuralism and anatomy and went on to argue that, just as anatomy precedes the study of physiology, so should the analysis of the structure of consciousness precede a study of its functions. Angell explicitly rejected this analogy. As a general way of looking at psychological phenomena, functionalism had a significant impact on psychology in the United States. Even today, psychology in that country can be considered largely goodwin

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functionalist in spirit. In 1913, however, it, along with structuralism, came under attack from a young psychologist who had earned a Ph.D. from the center of functionalist thinking, the University of Chicago. That psychologist, John Watson, initiated a second homegrown movement that eventually came to the forefront of experimental psychology in the United States.

Behaviorism John B. Watson (1878–1958) was a farm boy from Traveler’s Rest, South Carolina, whose early love of animals probably influenced the direction of his thinking as a psychologist—in an interview, his son rather sadly reported that his father “preferred the company of animals to people most of the time” (Hannush, 1987, p. 150). At the functionalist University of Chicago, where he earned a doctorate in 1903, Watson discovered that he could not introspect very well (in a course using Titchener’s manuals); he also developed a strong suspicion that a psychology defined as the study of consciousness was a dead end. Instead, influenced by the need to develop objective measures in the animal research that appealed to him, he gradually came to the conclusion that psychology needed to change direction if it was to become truly scientific. After earning his degree, Watson stayed at Chicago for a few years, and then went to Johns Hopkins University in 1908, where, for 12 years, he developed a strong research program and a reputation as an ardent proponent for the idea that psychology ought to be the study of behavior, not the study of mental processes. This idea was most vividly outlined in a 1913 paper (“Psychology as the Behaviorist Views It”) that eventually became known as a “behaviorist manifesto.” In the opening paragraph he did not mince words, and it has become one of psychology’s most quoted passages. Psychology as the behaviorist views it is a purely objective experimental branch of natural science. Its theoretical goal is the prediction and control of behavior. Introspection forms no essential part of its methods, nor is the scientific value of its data dependent upon the readiness with which they lend themselves to interpretation in terms of consciousness. (Watson, 1913, p. 158)

Watson was elected APA president in 1915, 2 years after publishing his manifesto, and he spent his remaining 5 years at Johns Hopkins promoting behaviorism and producing research with the aim of “predicting and controlling behavior.” 578

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His best-known research was on emotional responses in children (Watson & Morgan, 1917), in which he first identified the stimuli that produced basic emotions (loud noise or loss of support resulted in a fear response, for example), and then tried to show that emotional reactions could be conditioned by controlling the environment. This latter experiment, sometimes called “Little Albert” study (Watson & Rayner, 1920), became famous as an apparent demonstration of the power of conditioning on one’s life, even though it was later shown to be severely limited methodologically and several attempts at replication failed (Harris, 1979). In the wake of a messy divorce scandal, Watson left academia in 1920 and developed a successful career as an advertising executive, applying his scientific thinking skills to marketing and becoming a pioneer in marketing research (Coon, 1994). He also continued to advocate for behaviorism, publishing a widely read book, Behaviorism, in 1924 (Watson, 1924/1930), and a book on child rearing 4 years later (Watson, 1928). The latter contains another famous Watson quote, in which he promised to take a dozen infants and raise them to be any type of person one wanted, provided he would have complete control over the children’s environments. Part of behaviorism’s attraction in the United States, and at the heart of Watson’s efforts to sell behaviorism, was that it promised applications to improve everyday living, an appeal that has always resonated with pragmatic Americans (Buckley, 1989). Behaviorism did not have much of an immediate effect. Watson’s 1913 manifesto, for example, was viewed at the time as just another in a growing chorus of concern about introspection as a method (Samelson, 1981). By 1930, however, behaviorist thinking came to dominate academic psychology in the United States (while having considerably less impact outside of the country). Watson’s continued proselytizing contributed, but another major factor was that research of the Russian physiologist Ivan Pavlov became widely known when a series of detailed lectures about his conditioning work was translated into English (Pavlov, 1928). Pavlov, who won a 1904 Nobel Prize for his research on the physiology of digestion, had been conducting his conditioning research since just before the turn of the 20th century. English-speaking psychologists had some understanding of his work prior to the published lectures (e.g., Watson referred to it), but it was not widely appreciated until the lectures were published in the 1920s. Pavlov’s systematic research program suggested a research paradigm to experimental

psychologists who were beginning to recognize the value of a behaviorist approach. Pavlov’s visibility was heightened when he made a vigorous and widely acclaimed presentation of his work at the Ninth International Congress of Psychology in 1929, held at Yale University (replacing the annual APA meeting that year). In the 1930s, 1940s, and into the 1950s, behaviorism developed a firm grasp on experimental psychology in the United States, if not elsewhere. The second generation of behaviorists, sometimes referred to as neo-behaviorists, included such psychologists as Edward Tolman, Clark Hull, and Edwin Guthrie, and perhaps the most famous behaviorist of all, a worthy successor to Watson as a promoter of behaviorist thinking, B. F. Skinner (1904–1990). Neo-behaviorists often disagreed on a range of issues concerning the nature of conditioning (e.g., the necessity of reinforcement), but they all had two things in common. First, following from an evolutionary assumption, they all agreed that nonhuman animals could be the main subjects in experiments, and that what was discovered with them would be principles that would apply, with some calibration, to humans. Consequently, all the major research universities developed animal laboratories during the heyday of neo-behaviorism. Second, all the neo-behaviorists took as a matter of faith that, although genetics could not be overlooked, the most important determiner of behavior was an individual’s learning (i.e., conditioning) history. Hence, it became essential to clearly understand the laws of conditioning, an activity that occupied hundreds of researchers in the animal laboratories just mentioned. As will be seen in the final main section of this chapter, behaviorism was eventually replaced with cognitive psychology (except for ardent Skinnerians) beginning in the mid–1950s.

It continues in modern times in the form of questions about relevance that are not far from the thoughts of most Americans (“What good is X?” “How is X going to improve my life?”). At the turn of the 20th century, most psychologists were employed as members of philosophy departments, and they often had an uphill battle to convince their colleagues—and especially university administrators—that they needed sufficient funds to build and maintain laboratories. One way to argue for such a budget was to contend that the outcomes of laboratory research were widely beneficial. As just one example of this effort to demonstrate the relevance of the new laboratory psychology, consider a book published by E. W. Scripture in 1895, titled Thinking, Feeling, Doing. It was a deliberate attempt to popularize the new laboratory psychology and to show that psychology had practical application. As he wrote in his Preface, Scripture hoped the book would “be taken as evidence of the attitude of [psychology] in its desire to serve humanity” (Scripture, 1895, p. iii). He then proceeded to show how basic laboratory procedures could be used in the everyday world, and he drove home his point with the aid of 207 photos and drawings. For instance, he showed that laboratory reaction time methodology could be used to improve athletic performance, at least in principle (the book was long on examples, short on data)—sprinters could be trained to improve their starting times, and boxers and fencers could improve both their reaction speeds and the accuracy of their efforts. The attempts to apply the principles of psychology to “serve humanity” occurred in several areas. This chapter will examine the history of mental testing, the application of psychology to business and industry, and the development of remediation for psychological problems (clinical psychology).

Application: As American as Apple Pie

Mental Testing

Issues endemic to the competing schools of thought occupied academic psychologists throughout the first half of the 20th century, and the research generated to support one position against another advanced the field of psychology as a whole. But there was another powerful force affecting psychology in the United States during this time— a desire to show that the knowledge emerging from psychological laboratories could have practical applications. This desire reflected the traditional American pragmatism that permeated the social, political, economic, and institutional context of the United States in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.

We have seen that the Galton-Cattell mental testing strategy, with its emphasis on measuring basic sensory/perceptual phenomena, failed to predict academic performance at Columbia. A different strategy developed in France, led by Alfred Binet (1857–1911), who was part of an effort to measure mental ability as it applied to schoolwork. The goal was to identify children in need of special schoolrelated training, and Binet, with his colleague Theodore Simon, delivered a test in 1905 that eventually developed into the modern intelligence quotient (IQ) test. It is worth noting that IQ testing began, not as an attempt to measure native mental goodwin

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ability, but as an effort to improve the academic performance of school children. Binet’s test first came to the United States through the efforts of Henry Goddard (1866–1957), a student of Hall’s at Clark University who was head of the Vineland Training Institute in New Jersey. Vineland was a group home for “feebleminded” children (as such children were labeled in the early years of the 20th century). One of Goddard’s goals was to sharpen the existing classification system that identified different degrees of disability, and he came to believe that the Binet-Simon tests were the perfect tool. They were scored in terms of mental age, and Goddard developed three categories—idiots he defined as those scoring at a mental age of 1–2 years and imbeciles achieved a mental age of 3–7 years. Goddard was especially interested in a third category, because he believed these individuals, adolescents or young adults with mental ages between 8 and 12, were especially troublesome to society. They were sufficiently capable to live more or less on their own, but they tended, he believed, to be unproductive members of society at best, and very likely to be criminals, wards of the state, prostitutes, etc. For this group, he invented a new term, the moron. He believed that the Binet-Simon tests should be used to identify them, so that they could then be placed in institutes like Vineland, thereby reducing a number of societal ills (Goddard, 1912). The first extensive standardization of the Binet tests occurred in 1916, undertaken by Lewis Terman (1877–1956), another of Hall’s students and a Goddard colleague. Terman elaborated on the test, and it came to be known as a Stanford-Binet intelligence test (Terman chaired the psychology department at Stanford); his standardization effort produced a set of norms against which to compare individual scores. Terman also used the recently developed concept of IQ as a way to simplify the overall test score. The Stanford-Binet was first published in 1916, has been revised and restandardized several times, and continues to be a popular IQ test today. Terman was also known for conducting what is probably the longest-running longitudinal study in psychology’s history. His belief in the value of IQ led him to study those with exceptionally high scores—“gifted” students. These individuals he believed would be the leaders of the future. The study began in the 1920s with almost 1,500 children; Terman completed several follow-up studies, and his students kept the project going long after Terman’s death (Minton, 1988). In general, the gifted group became highly successful in a broad range of fields, 580

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which Terman believed challenged the widespread belief that gifted children were socially inept and seldom lived up to early promise. Influenced by Terman (and Goddard), a number of psychologists in the United States began to develop a set of beliefs that remain controversial today—that basic intelligence can be assessed with IQ tests, that the resulting number is a measure of native ability, and that this ability is largely unaffected by environmental circumstance. Furthermore, most of those involved in the IQ testing movement were at least sympathetic with the goals of eugenics, the idea that deliberate steps should be taken to improve human native ability. Eugenics was developed in England by Galton (who invented the term), and it became popular in the United States, especially among psychologists interested in intelligence testing. Advocates for eugenics in the United States tended to focus on three goals—encouraging “bright” families to have children; identifying the feebleminded and segregating them from society (e.g., at places like Vineland), thereby preventing reproduction; and carefully restricting immigration to those thought to be mentally capable. Robert Yerkes (1876–1956), a third American psychologist of importance in the early years of intelligence testing, held beliefs similar to those of Goddard and Terman. Yerkes’ first love was comparative psychology, but he became involved in the testing movement when the United States entered World War I in 1917, leading an Army program to adapt IQ testing to a military environment. The result was the first group intelligence test, a necessity given the large number of soldiers involved (the StanfordBinet must be given to one child at a time). Yerkes convinced military authorities that such tests could be useful as a way to classify soldiers for the right positions, identify potential officer material, and so on. Yerkes and a large team of psychologists quickly developed two tests, which came to be known as Army Alpha and Army Beta. Alpha was for soldiers who were literate, and included a number of verbal tests (e.g., arithmetic, practical judgment, analogies). Army Beta, on the other hand, was developed for the approximately 30% of recruits who could not “read and understand newspapers and write letters home” (Yoakum & Yerkes, 1920, p. 12); it included several nonverbal tests (e.g., completing mazes, identifying pieces missing in pictures). Close to 2 million soldiers were given one test or the other, but it is unlikely that the tests had much of an impact on the military, and the testing program was discontinued shortly after the end of the war (Kevles, 1968).

The decade of the 1920s in the United States, the so-called “Roaring Twenties,” was a period of postwar optimism, tremendous growth, and the beginning of a sense that the country could be a world power, all lasting until the New York Stock Exchange crash in 1929 that precipitated a decade of economic depression. The optimism and growth extended to the field of psychology, especially in applied psychology and in the area of mental testing. Claiming greater effect for the Army testing program than was justified, Yerkes proved to be an effective propagandist for the value of large-scale group intelligence testing, and it quickly moved from the army to the schools. Yerkes and Terman, for example, joined forces with like-minded individuals and created the widely used National Intelligence Tests, and the end of the decade saw the creation of the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT). Testing quickly extended into almost every realm of American life, prompting one satirist to refer to the IQ test as “this bright little device [that] in practically every walk of life [was] being introduced as a means of finding out what people don’t know, and for what particular business they are especially unsuited” (quoted in Dennis, 1984, p. 23–24). Despite widespread use, doubts about testing also emerged in the 1920s. They began when Yerkes (1921) produced his final report on the Army testing program. Buried in a mass of detail was the revelation that the average mental age of the U.S. soldier was just over 13. This result was disturbing, especially if Goddard was right about the mental age of morons (8–12)—it suggested that the average young American male was borderline feebleminded. The reaction to this outcome took two forms. Believers in mental testing and eugenics argued that drastic measures were needed to improve native ability. Some went so far as to begin arguing for a form of negative eugenics—identifying mental incompetents through IQ testing and preventing them from reproducing through sterilization procedures. A number of states did just that, and eugenic sterilizations occurred in the United States as late as the 1970s. Furthermore, the federal government in 1924 passed a “National Origins Act,” which restricted the flow of immigration into the country. Yet, intelligence testing was also creating a number of skeptics in the 1920s (e.g., the noted anthropologist Franz Boas). They also reacted to the Yerkes report with alarm, but with a different concern. Worried that too much faith was being placed in a questionable instrument, they began to attack the core ideas of those believing in IQ testing. In a series of articles,

for example, the noted columnist Walter Lippmann castigated what he saw as an unwarranted faith in testing, arguing that nobody had ever bothered to define intelligence; that to consider intelligence inherited ignores “a thousand educational and environmental influences from the time of conception to school age” (Lippmann, 1922, p. 10); and that to doom a child for a poor test performance was decidedly un-American. He even likened intelligence testing to other fads such as phrenology and palm reading. Terman’s published reply, which he later regretted, was that Lippmann was an amateur, not capable of understanding the complexity of IQ testing, and should mind his own business. But Lippmann was not the only factor working against widespread acceptance of IQ testing. Toward the end of the 1920s, behaviorism was beginning to have an impact, with its message that the environment might be more important that heredity, and even within the testing community, some were beginning to question the uncritical acceptance of the widespread use of tests. Anne Anastasi (1908–2001), a graduate student in the late 1920s and eventually the author of the bestknown English-language textbook on psychological testing, would later write that “[t]he testing boom of the 1920s probably did more to retard than to advance the progress of testing” (Anastasi, 1993, p. 17). By the 1930s, mental testing had lost momentum; furthermore, the flirtation with the eugenic argument became an embarrassment for some American psychologists when eugenicist ideas were put into horrible practice in Germany in the 1930s and 1940s. IQ testing never disappeared, of course, and remains a major component of the testing industry today. The debate over the nature of intelligence, and the question of what is measured by an IQ test, also continues.

Business and Industry Shortly after the turn of the 20th century, psychologists in the United States began to apply what they were learning in the laboratory to the world of business and industry. They had ideas about how to use advertising effectively, how to select employees, how to improve productivity, and how psychological science could demonstrate a product’s beneficial effects. The mental testing movement also had an impact on the business world by providing measurement tools. Four psychologists (out of many) will be highlighted here, one from Germany and three from the United States. Three of the four were trained as experimentalists before making their reputations as applied psychologists. goodwin

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Hugo Münsterberg (1863–1916) arrived in the United States from Germany in 1892 and, except for a brief return to his native country in the mid1890s, remained in America until his sudden death (while lecturing). He earned a doctorate from Wundt at Leipzig, and came to the United States at the invitation of William James, who recruited him to take control of the psychology laboratory at Harvard. Once in Boston, Münsterberg’s interests began to shift to applied psychology. Although he indeed ran the laboratory competently, he made important contributions to applied psychology, first to what is now called forensic psychology, with his book On the Witness Stand (Münsterberg, 1908), and later to what he called economic psychology, now known as industrial/organizational psychology. Münsterberg’s contribution to industrial psychology was summarized in Psychology and Industrial Efficiency, published in Germany in 1912 and in the United States a year later (Münsterberg, 1913). It included such topics as how best to train workers, how attention and fatigue affected productivity, and how psychological knowledge could affect buying and selling. Its most important contribution was a long section on employee selection, in which Münsterberg described several of his consulting activities—helping various companies improve their ability to hire good workers. Münsterberg described two different strategies in his chapters on employee selection. One was to analyze a job by breaking it into the component abilities that would produce effective performance. For example, consulting with the Bell Telephone Company, Münsterberg completed a job analysis of operators. The female operators often handled as many as 300 calls a day, worked long hours at low pay, and many did not stay on the job for long. Although not especially concerned with the welfare of their workers, the company was concerned about the turnover rate—considerable time was spent training operators, and the company wished to reduce its training costs. Münsterberg examined the typical activities of the operator, determined which cognitive skills were involved (he identified 14 separate ones), and developed or used existing tasks to evaluate performance. For instance, he tested memory by having operators study and recall sets of numbers, and attention by asking them to cross out specific letters on a newspaper page as quickly and accurately as possible. Although Münsterberg failed to include any data on the project, he reported that his tasks successfully discriminated between excellent and poor operators. 582

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That being the case, the tests presumably could then be used during the employee selection process. Münsterberg’s second strategy was more holistic. Instead of breaking down a task into its components, he looked at it as a whole and developed a simulation designed to capture the essence of the job in question. He used this strategy when working with the Boston Elevated Railway Company, trying to identify workers who would be effective drivers of electric trolleys. He created a clever simulation and claimed that it discriminated among drivers of different abilities, but Münsterberg again failed to supply any data. Three American applied psychologists of note were Walter Dill Scott, Harry Hollingworth, and Lillian Gilbreth. Like Münsterberg, Scott and Hollingworth were trained as experimental psychologists, but turned to applied psychology out of circumstance or financial necessity. Gilbreth was notable for earning the first Ph.D. granted explicitly in the area of industrial psychology (Perloff & Naman, 1996), and she was able to fashion a remarkably productive career, especially considering that she had 12 children along the way (her family was the model for the 1948 book and 1950 movie Cheaper by the Dozen). In 1901, Walter Dill Scott (1869–1955), like Münsterberg, earned a doctorate in experimental psychology from Wundt at Leipzig, and he was a young professor at Northwestern University in Chicago when he was approached by the head of a local advertising agency and asked to write a series of articles on the psychology of advertising. Scott eventually organized these articles into a book, The Psychology of Advertising (Scott, 1903), the first book on the topic. Scott applied what he knew about experimental psychology to advertising—for instance, he urged advertisers to use repetition (but not too much) and association processes to make readers of advertisements more likely to remember them. He also argued that consumers were seldom rational in their buying choices, so advertisers should take advantage of suggestibility and emotion when trying to sell their products. Although he spent most of his career at Northwestern, eventually becoming president of the university, Scott spent a brief time in Pittsburgh working with another applied psychologist Walter Van Dyke Bingham, who presided over a “Division of Applied Psychology” at the Carnegie Institute of Technology (later Carnegie-Mellon University). While there, Scott is believed to have been the first psychologist ever given the title professor of applied psychology (Landy, 1993).

Harry Hollingworth (1880–1956) was another experimentalist who turned to application, his transformation motivated by difficult financial circumstances. He earned his doctorate at Columbia University in 1908 and then joined the faculty at nearby Barnard College. Low salary and a desire to have his talented wife, Leta, begin graduate school led him to a career in applied psychology. It began fortuitously, with an invitation in 1911 to conduct a series of studies for the Coca-Cola Company, which was under fire for adding what some thought was a dangerous drug (caffeine) to its soda recipe. Together, the Hollingworths conducted an elaborate series of studies of caffeine effects, using sophisticated double-blind procedures. They found that, although taking caffeine in the evening could interfere with sleep, the drug in general had no adverse effects on the cognitive tasks they used (Benjamin, Rogers, & Rosenbaum, 1991). The experience convinced Hollingworth that a career in applied psychology could be both lucrative and professionally satisfying, although later in his life he indicated that the applied work was, in his mind, secondary in importance to his work as an experimental psychologist. As he put it late in his life, his “real interest, now and always, has been in the purely theoretical and descriptive problems of my science, and the books, among the twenty I have written, of which I am the proudest, are the . . . ones which nobody reads” (quoted in Poffenberger, 1957, p. 138). Lillian Gilbreath (1878–1972) started her career in applied psychology by assisting her husband, Frank, who was an early pioneer in the use of timeand-motion studies to improve worker productivity and efficiency. In the process, she earned two doctorates and began raising her dozen children (one died in infancy). After Frank’s sudden and fatal heart attack in 1924, Gilbreath persevered on her own, continuing the consulting business begun with him, and expanding her interests. For example, she became a pioneer in the field of ergonomics, the study of how systems and objects can be made to be most efficient for human use. Building on her experiences as a mother and housewife, she invented several home-related objects that made life easier for women (e.g., making efficient use of refrigerator space by adding shelves to the insides of the door). The work of Münsterberg, Scott, Hollingworth, and Gilbreth, as well as many others, helped establish the United States as a world leader in the field of industrial psychology. There were some parallels with the history of intelligence testing movement, however. We have seen that the 1920s saw an explosion

of interest in testing (and in applied psychology in general), followed by some disillusionment in the 1930s. A similar scenario occurred in industrial psychology—great interest and development in the early and mid-1920s, followed by problems in the late 1920s and 1930s. The Great Depression had a major effect, with some business executives becoming critical of psychological applications to business that did not seem to be as effective as advertised and many academic psychologists beginning to question whether psychology had advanced sufficiently as a science to be able to deliver useful and valid applications (Benjamin, 1986). Industrial psychology, however, was able to develop a measure of academic respect in 1932 with the publication of the field’s first major textbook, Industrial Psychology (Viteles, 1932). Also, psychologists played an important role in a long series of studies in the late 1920s and early 1930s conducted at the Western Electric Plant in Hawthorne Illinois, under the direction of Elton Mayo. These studies seemed to show that worker productivity resulted more from workers’ beliefs that they were being cared for and treated well than from actual physical working conditions (e.g., lighting levels), but historians have argued that the studies also helped to impede unionization by making it appear that managers cared deeply about the welfare of their workers (Bramel & Friend, 1981). The research gave modern students in research methods courses a new term to memorize—the “Hawthorne effect.” As applied to the research environment, the effect refers to a tendency for research subjects to be cooperative, knowing that they are the special objects of the attention of researchers who care about their performance in the study.

Clinical Psychology The modern form of clinical psychology in the United States, with its emphasis on the diagnosis, treatment, and research into the causes of mental illness, has its origins in World War II and its immediate aftermath, and it will be considered below in the section on postwar developments. Prior to the war, however, psychologists and others were involved in clinical practice and mental health issues in a number of ways, and the term “clinical psychology” dates to the turn of the 20th century, in the work of yet another psychologist with training in experimental psychology who turned to the realm of applied psychology. Lightner Witmer (1867–1956), trained by Wundt and a classmate of Titchener, earned his Leipzig doctorate in 1892 and became director of the psychology goodwin

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laboratory at the University of Pennsylvania. There, he began establishing a research program, became an active member of Titchener’s Experimentalist club, and had every expectation of making a name for himself as an experimental psychologist. But fate intervened in 1896, in the form of a local public school teacher who brought a 14-year-old student to Witmer’s lab. The student seemed to have great difficulty with spelling, even though he appeared otherwise competent in school. The student was the first in a parade of similar cases, leading Witmer to think that a portion of his laboratory could operate as a “clinic” for the study and amelioration of school-related disorders (McReynolds, 1997). Witmer developed a clinic routine that included gathering information from physicians about physical health and from social workers about home life, using laboratory measurements to produce information about various cognitive skills (e.g., memory, attention), and then developing training/therapy programs. The success of Witmer’s clinic led him to create the journal The Psychological Clinic in 1907; in the lead article of the first issue he coined the term “clinical psychology” (Witmer, 1907). The article described his own work and called for increased research and for the training of clinicians. Although his clinic initially examined school-related learning disorders, it later expanded to related areas, including a clinic for speech disorders and a vocational clinic where young people could go for testing and advice about careers. This latter part of the operation was run by Morris Viteles, author of the prominent industrial psychology textbook referred to earlier. By 1931, the Witmer clinic had case files numbering just under 10,000 (Fernberger, 1931). Although Witmer referred to the work that he did as clinical psychology, it was initially limited to school-related cases and did not deal with the broader problems of mental illness. One individual who dealt directly with this issue, by experiencing treatment for mental illness firsthand, was Clifford Beers (1876–1943). Beers was a college graduate starting a promising career in the insurance industry when depression and a suicide attempt landed him in the first of several mental institutions. After spending 3 years at three different institutions, he emerged and wrote a disturbing account of his experiences—The Mind That Found Itself (Beers, 1908). Beers detailed a string of abuses—neglect by physicians, an absence of any form of therapy, and physical assaults by the attendants whose job it was to maintain order (and whose main qualification seemed to be physical strength). Yet, Beers survived, 584

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so a second message of the book was that one could recover from mental illness. In 1908, he founded the National Committee for Mental Hygiene, and devoted the rest of his life to advocating for improved treatment for the mentally ill. Dorothea Dix (1802–1887), a second reformer of note, preceded Beers, and had a more widespread impact. Disturbed by the lack of effective institutional care for the mentally ill who could not afford private care, she launched a protracted campaign of reform in the 19th century and brought about dramatic change. Her modus operandi was to tour facilities (ranging from almshouses to jails to hospitals) that might house the mentally ill poor in a given state (she started with Massachusetts), and then write an exposé of the typically appalling conditions in an attempt to goad legislators into action. She was an effective lobbyist, despite being a woman at a time when intelligent women were generally ignored, and her efforts led to reform in many states and the creation of no fewer than 47 public mental hospitals and schools for the feebleminded (Viney & Zorich, 1982). In addition to reform efforts, psychological treatment for the mentally ill received a boost with the 1909 visit of Sigmund Freud (1856–1939) to the United States. Invited by G. Stanley Hall to be the featured speaker at a conference celebrating the 20th anniversary of Clark University’s opening, Freud delivered a series of five lectures. They were popular and launched serious consideration of his psychoanalytic therapy among physicians in the United States who, having few effective tools at their disposal, were open to new ideas. Boston-area physicians such as Morton Prince (who founded the Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology in 1906) and James Jackson Putnam incorporated psychoanalytic techniques into their practices, and articles on psychoanalysis began appearing regularly in Englishlanguage professional journals—about 170 of them in medical journals between the years 1912 and 1918 (Green & Reiber, 1980). By the 1920s, several psychoanalytic societies had been formed and training institutes had been established (Shorter, 1997). Among psychologists interested in working with the mentally ill, in contrast with physicians (psychiatrists), the practice of clinical psychology made little progress in the years prior to World War II. No recognized graduate training programs existed, clinicians tended to be underpaid technicians administering mental and psychological tests to patients (under the supervision of psychiatrists), and the American Psychological Association was geared

primarily toward academic and research psychology. There were, however, some attempts made to organize and to enhance the professional status of clinicians and other applied psychologists. At the 1917 APA meeting, for example, J. E. Wallace Wallin organized an effort to create a new organization to “advance professional service in the field of clinical psychology” (Wallin, 1966, p. 107). The result was the American Association of Clinical Psychologists, which lasted 2 years before being absorbed into APA as a “clinical section” of the Association. It had limited success in promoting the status of clinicians, however, prompting clinicians and other applied psychologists to form the American Association for Applied Psychology in 1937 (AAAP). By 1940, it claimed 600 members (APA membership was 4,000 at the time) and included sections in clinical, educational, consulting, and industrial psychology (Hilgard, 1987). Yet, as will be seen below, it was only the conditions existing after World War II, with its appalling effects on the mental health of soldiers, that prompted the development of the modern clinical psychologist.

Diversity The history of psychology in any country will reflect the broader history of that land. In the United States, where women were not granted the right to vote until 1920, and where most African Americans were considered property until the middle of the 19th century, it is not surprising that the story of the history of psychology, especially in the years up to the middle of the 20th century, is largely a story of the efforts of white men. Nonetheless, important work was accomplished by a number of individuals who were not men and/or not Caucasian.

Women in Psychology’s History In the United States at the start of the 21st century, women are gradually starting to dominate the field of psychology. About 70% of undergraduate psychology majors are female, the majority of graduate students are women, and the professorate is shifting as well, as men in their 60s begin to retire. The modern female psychologist can look back with pride at the careers of several American women psychologists, who toiled at a time when it did not seem that women had much of an opportunity to contribute. These included Mary Whiton Calkins, Margaret Washburn, Leta Hollingworth, and Lillian Gilbreth (discussed earlier), among others—see Furumoto and Scarborough (1987) for a thorough analysis.

In 1905, Mary Calkins (1863–1930) of Wellesley College became the 14th person elected to the presidency of the APA, the first woman to hold the office. It was one highlight in a career that would be remarkable in any historical era, never mind one in which intellectual women were considered to be at risk for serious health issues (too much intellectual activity was believed harm reproductive systems); when women were expected to spend their lives in the home, raising families and/or caring for aging parents; and when educational opportunities for women were severely constrained (Furumoto, 1979). In that late 19th-century world, Mary Calkins had the good fortune to have supportive parents who sent her to one of the few places where women could earn a quality undergraduate degree, Smith College, in Massachusetts. Following that, she joined the faculty at another prominent women’s college, Wellesley College, teaching Greek and philosophy. When the college decided to offer instruction in the new laboratory psychology that was becoming popular, Calkins was chosen to direct the effort, but specialized training was needed. She quickly discovered that women were seldom welcomed into graduate school, but William James of Harvard was impressed with her and convinced Harvard authorities to admit her as a “guest” into his course. She also was able to gain direct laboratory training in Hugo Münsterberg’s Harvard laboratory, completing a dissertation on memory and association (Calkins, 1894, 1896) that, among other things, included the creation of what became a standard memory methodology—paired associates learning. Despite pleas by James and Münsterberg that Harvard award her a doctorate, the Harvard administration demurred (after all, she was just a guest), and Calkins never did receive the Ph.D. she earned. Undeterred, she returned to Wellesley, established a laboratory there, continued doing her memory research (Madigan & O’Hara, 1992), became a leader in the APA, developed a meta-theoretical position that she called self psychology, and eventually came to be known as an important pioneer in both psychology and philosophy (like her mentor, James, she shifted interests later in her career from psychology to philosophy). Margaret Washburn (1871–1939) experienced problems similar to those of Calkins when she attempted to enter graduate school. Like Calkins, Washburn was sent by supportive parents to one of the high quality woman’s colleges that began appearing in the 19th century (Vassar College in this case). She then paralleled Calkins’ postgraduate experience, goodwin

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allowed to take graduate courses at Columbia, but only as a guest. Her mentor, James McKeen Cattell, sensing her promise, recommended that she switch to Cornell University, one of the few places in the United States where females could be admitted as official graduate students. There, she came under the wing of structuralism’s E. B. Titchener, becoming his first Ph.D. student. Washburn earned her doctorate in 1894, the first women to earn a Ph.D. in psychology. She eventually returned to Vassar, where she became a legendary professor and widely known for writing a prominent textbook in comparative psychology, The Animal Mind (Washburn, 1908). It went through four editions. She was also highly visible professionally, elected APA president in 1921 and co-editing the American Journal of Psychology for ten years. After Titchener’s death in 1927, she became one of two women (the other was June Downey of Colorado) made charter members of the prestigious Society of Experimental Psychologists, the group that succeeded Titchener’s all-male Experimentalists group. Leta Hollingworth (1886–1939) was mentioned earlier as the wife of applied psychologist Harry Hollingworth. Together they completed the CocaCola and caffeine study, one benefit being sufficient money for Leta to attend graduate school. She earned a doctorate from Columbia’s Teachers College in 1916, working with Thorndike, and then remained there as a faculty member. In her academic career she made the study of gifted children a major focus, teaching what might have been the first course on the subject in 1919 (Klein, 2002), and writing the first textbook on educating gifted children, Gifted Children: Their Nature and Nurture in 1926 (L. Hollingworth, 1926). She advocated enrichment over grade acceleration for these children, arguing that they should remain with the same-age peers as much as possible when growing up. Hollingworth was also well known for tackling the issue of the alleged intellectual inferiority of women. In a chapter called “Vocational Aptitudes of Women,” which appeared in her husband’s vocational psychology text (H. Hollingworth, 1916), she summarized research showing that (a) no differences between males and females occurred on a variety of cognitive tasks and (b) that women’s cognitive functions did not deteriorate during menstruation.

Ethnic Minorities and Psychology’s History The institution of slavery in the United States produced effects that lasted far beyond its abolition at the end of the Civil War in 1865. Opportunities for 586

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women were limited in psychology’s early years, but the situation was even worse for minorities, especially for African Americans, who faced cultural and institutional segregation that produced inferior education and second-class status in a country that was supposed to be classless. Needless to say, these obstacles made it extremely difficult for African Americans to make much of an impact on the early history of psychology. As Robert Guthrie put it in the title of his well-known history of the African American experience in psychology, “even the rat was white” (Guthrie, 1976). Despite the formidable obstacles, a number of African Americans persevered and made important contributions to psychology in the United States. Consider, for example, Francis Sumner, Kenneth Clark, and Mamie Phipps Clark. Francis Sumner (1895–1954) was the first African American to earn a Ph.D. in psychology, and he helped establish psychology at Howard University, perhaps the best known and most prestigious of the historically black colleges and universities. After earning a college degree at Lincoln University in Pennsylvania, the first of the black colleges in the United States (founded 1854), Sumner caught the attention of G. Stanley Hall, who gave Sumner a university fellowship so he could travel to Massachusetts and attend Clark University. Although Hall generally conformed to prevailing opinion about racial differences in ability, he recognized talent, and during his tenure as Clark’s president, three African Americans earned master’s degrees and two earned doctorates (Guthrie, 1976). Sumner earned his doctorate in 1920, with a dissertation that critically analyzed Freud’s and Jung’s theories of personality. Like other black scholars, he then found his opportunities limited, and he taught at two black colleges before finding his way to Howard University in 1928. There, he established the leading psychology program at a historically black university—for instance, of the approximately 300 African Americans who had earned doctorates by 1975, 60 of them had earned their undergraduate or master’s degrees at Howard (Bayton, 1975). Two of Sumner’s better-known students at Howard were Kenneth (1914–2005) and Mamie Phipps Clark (1917–1983). Both earned bachelor’s and master’s degrees at Howard, and both went on to earn doctorates from Columbia. It was Mamie’s master’s thesis at Howard that began a series of events that made the two of them famous. Concerned that segregation had direct effects on the self-esteem of African American children, she devised a study showing that these children preferred white over

black dolls. A series of similar studies by the Clarks eventually made their way into the famous 1954 Brown v. Board of Education Supreme Court case that outlawed segregation. It was the first time that social science had had an effect on a Supreme Court decision, in this case a decision seen as one of the most important of the 20th century (Benjamin & Crouse, 2002). After earning their doctorates, Mamie Phipps Clark devoted her career to children as Executive Director of the Northside Center for Child Development in Harlem, New York. Kenneth chose an academic career, joining the faculty at City College of New York. In 1971, he became the first (and so far the only) African American elected president of the APA. During his term of office, Clark created the Association’s Board of Social and Ethical Responsibility for Psychology, which in turn led to the formation of the APA’s Board of Ethnic Minority Affairs (Pickren & Tomes, 2002).

Postwar Psychology in the United States Psychology in the United States showed steady growth in the years prior to World War II, but the slope of the curve changed dramatically after the war. Consider membership in APA. After its first 53 years, just after the war, membership stood at approximately 5,000; since then, after about another 60 years, full membership in the organization has grown to 100,000 (Goodwin, 2008). A second reflection of growth has been an increased level of specialization in psychology, a point to be elaborated below. This last main section of this chapter will be divided between the science and practice of psychology, a division that reflects an issue that has been relevant for psychology in the United States since the 1890s. As early as 1898, Lightner Witmer, concerned that science was not front and center at APA, suggested that experimental psychologists break away from the fledgling organization to form their own group (Goodwin, 1985). The idea went nowhere, but just 6 years later, Titchener formed his group, the Experimentalists, which evolved into the Society of Experimental Psychologists after Titchener died in 1927. Also in the 1920s, experimental psychologists became alarmed at the sudden post-World War I growth of interest in applied psychology—one of E. G. Boring’s goals in writing his legendary 1929 history (of “experimental” psychology) was to (re) establish experimental psychology as the center of psychology in the United States (O’Donnell, 1979). Yet, as described earlier, applied psychology continued to grow between the world wars, and included

such events as the creation of the AAAP in 1937. In the spirit of cooperation and unity that pervaded the United States during World War II and its immediate aftermath, scientists and practitioners came to together to reorganize the APA in 1946, creating a divisional structure so that advocates of special interests could have an institutional base for their professional well-being. Prior to World War II, the scientists, primarily working in academics areas, dominated APA; after the war, a shift began, and by 1962, psychologists working outside of academia outnumbered academicians for the first time (Tryon, 1963). This trend continued for the rest of the century, and APA psychologists with primarily research interests felt increasingly marginalized. The result was predictable—just as practitioners in the 1930s formed their own group (AAAP) when they felt powerless within APA, so did the scientist/academicians in the second half of the 20th century. First, a group of experimental psychologists formed the Psychonomic Society in 1960, a group focused entirely on promoting psychology as a science (Dewsbury & Bolles, 1995). Most members of this new group remained APA members and continued agitating for APA to become more of an advocate for science. This effort culminated in an attempt to reorganize APA again in the 1980s, but the effort failed. This failure led a group of scientists to leave APA and form the American Psychological Society (APS—it is now called the Association for Psychological Science) in 1988. APS has since become a vigorous organization (approaching 20,000 members at its 20th birthday in 2008), with a lively annual meeting and a strong journal program. Although the scientist–practitioner split in psychology, reflected in the two main organizations, APA and APS, overemphasizes the overlap that occurs between the two worldviews, it is a useful way to organize the final portion of this chapter.

Psychological Science The major development in academic/scientific psychology after World War II was a substantial growth of interest in cognitive psychology—the study of such mental processes as memory, perception, attention, language, and thinking. Behaviorism, which had dominated the experimental psychology of the 1930s and 1940s, and had looked skeptically on the scientific value of studying nonobservable mental processes, gradually gave way (except for Skinnerians) during the 1950s and 1960s. By the 1980s, although the change from behaviorism to cognitive psychology goodwin

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was more evolutionary than revolutionary (Leahey, 1992), books began appearing with the phrase “cognitive revolution” in their titles (e.g., Baars, 1986). Cognitive psychology began to emerge in the 1950s, and factors both within and outside of psychology contributed to its rapid development (Segal & Lachman, 1972). Within psychology, the 1950s brought a growing recognition that conditioning principles, the core of behaviorism, could not explain much of complex human behavior, especially language. Outside of psychology, the rapid growth of computer science suggested to experimental psychologists a metaphor for mental processes. Soon, models of mental processes began to look like computer flow charts and the language of cognitive psychology (e.g., memory storage and retrieval) began to sound like computer science language. For example, in a famous 1956 paper, George Miller defined the “storage capacity” of short-term memory as 7±2 “chunks of information,” and in 1968, Atkinson and Shiffrin institutionalized a short-term/long-term memory distinction, complete with a diagram containing boxes and arrows that continues to be found in memory chapters of modern general psychology textbooks. By 1967, Neisser, in a book (Cognitive Psychology) that some believe gave the movement its name, could write that A generation ago, a book like this one would have needed at least a chapter of self-defense against the behaviorist position. Today, happily, the climate of opinion has changed, and little or no defense is necessary. . . . The basic reason for studying cognitive processes has become as clear as the reason for studying anything else: because they are there. . . . Cognitive processes surely exist, so it can hardly be unscientific to study them. (Neisser, 1967, p. 5)

Interest in cognitive psychology grew rapidly in the 1970s. Interest groups began to form (e.g., SWIM—Southeastern Workers in Memory), new journals began to appear (e.g., Cognitive Psychology in 1970), granting agencies became more receptive to cognitive research, and psychology departments opened new laboratories and hired increasing numbers of cognitive psychologists. Also, the influence of cognitive psychology began to appear in other areas of psychology. Social psychologists began studying social cognition biases; personality psychologists incorporated cognitive variables into their theories; development psychologists turned their attention to the development of cognition in children and its decline in later life; those interested in abnormal psychology developed cognitive theories of depression; and even 588

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those studying animal behavior, who would traditionally have been behaviorists, began to investigate “animal cognition.” By the 1980s, cognitive psychology was even expanding its reach beyond psychology, and the interdisciplinary field “cognitive science” appeared. Cognitive science became an interdisciplinary field, encompassing psychology, computer science, mathematics, linguistics, and even anthropology and epistemology. One major activity of cognitive science is the study of artificial intelligence. Although cognitive psychology was the major area of growth within research psychology in the latter half of the 20th century, and its influence spread to other areas, it is important to note that other areas of study also showed vigorous expansion and increased specialization. Detailed treatment is well beyond the scope of this chapter, but virtually all the chapters of a general psychology textbook (e.g., developmental psychology, social psychology) can be seen as subdisciplines of psychology that have themselves developed highly specialized research areas. The most comprehensive historical treatment of the development of psychology’s subdisciplines can be found in Ernest Hilgard’s Psychology in America: A Historical Survey (1987).

Psychological Practice Although psychological scientists were elaborating their specialty areas of research after World War II, practitioners were developing their crafts. Clinical psychology in particular showed dramatic change during the first two postwar decades. The cruel circumstances of World War II contributed mightily. As in most wars, the toll on its soldiers was as much mental as physical. At the end of World War II, for instance, of the approximately 75,000 wounded soldiers who populated various Veterans Administration (VA) hospitals, about 60% suffered from various warrelated mental disorders (Sexton, 1965). Psychiatry, unable to handle the overwhelming caseload, increasingly turned to psychologists for help, and, shortly after the end of the war, the government launched programs to enhance the training of clinical psychologists. During 1946–1947, for example, the VA funded training programs in 22 universities (Capshew, 1999). Increased opportunities for clinical psychologists quickly led to a realization that no standardized training program existed. The leader in providing a solution to this problem was David Shakow (1901–1981), at the time chief psychologist at Worcester State Hospital in Massachusetts, and quickly developing a reputation as an authority in

the study of schizophrenic disorders (Cautin, 2006). Under Shakow’s leadership, a pivotal conference was held at the University of Colorado at Boulder in the summer of 1949 (Baker & Benjamin, 2000). This conference yielded a training model promoted by Shakow that continues to lead the field today— Shakow and his colleagues called it a “scientistpractitioner” model, but it is often simply referred to as the “Boulder” model. At its core is a threepart emphasis on research, diagnosis, and therapy. Clinicians trained according to this model would complete a research-based Ph.D. dissertation in a graduate school environment, while they were also becoming experts at the diagnosis of mental illness and its treatment. The 1950s and 1960s saw clinical psychologists growing in numbers and their field growing in status. As befits a professional organization, clinicians developed national organizations, began new journals, standardized training (i.e., Boulder model), and began political action to achieve certification to practice. The APA began accrediting clinical programs, for example, and states started to license psychologists, beginning with Connecticut and ending with Missouri in 1977 (Benjamin & Baker, 2004). At the same time, the therapeutic repertoire for clinicians was broadening. In the early 1950s, Hans Eysenck of England published a brief but devastating review of existing research on therapy effectiveness, showing that traditional, Freudian-based insight therapies did not produce any more improvement than the absence of therapy (Eysenck, 1952). The outcome was an increased interest in alternative therapeutic strategies, along with a resolve among clinicians to examine therapy effectiveness carefully. One new form of therapy, deriving from what remained of the behaviorist philosophy, was termed behavior therapy. It was based on the assumption that if many forms of mental illness resulted from environmental influence and one’s conditioning history, then the solution was also environmental control and conditioning. Eysenck was an early leader, coining the term “behavior therapy” in his edited book, Behaviour Therapy and the Neuroses (Eysenck, 1960) and launching the movement’s first journal, Behaviour Research and Therapy in 1963. Therapies based on both classical and operant conditioning principles soon appeared, the best known being systematic desensitization, which derived from work completed in the 1950s by Joseph Wolpe (1915–1997), a South African who later became an American citizen. Based on the assumption that it is impossible to be anxious and relaxed at the same time, desensitization

attempted to replace conditioned anxiety responses with a relaxation response. Other forms of behavior therapy, including token economies that reinforced specific healthy behaviors, derived from Skinner’s operant research (Kazdin, 1978). A second new therapy approach, which was already gaining a degree of momentum even before the Eysenck paper, was grounded in what was called humanistic psychology—its most prominent exemplar was the client-centered (later, person-centered) therapy of Carl Rogers (1902–1987). Humanistic psychologists generally held that psychoanalytic and behavior therapies tied the client too tightly to the past, that accepting personal responsibility for one’s actions was a step toward good psychological health, and that all people had within themselves the capacity for positive growth toward the holy grail of “self-actualization” (achieving one’s full potential). Rogers’ therapy focused on the creation of a therapeutic atmosphere that enhanced personal responsibility and growth and, in line with Eysenck’s call for better research on therapy effectiveness, Rogers systematically evaluated his therapy and demonstrated its effectiveness (Rogers, 1961). One final point worth noting about the history of clinical psychology in the United States is that, although the Boulder model continues to be the most common training model, a second approach developed in the 1960s, leading to another conference in Colorado, this time in the ski resort of Vail in 1973. Some clinicians began to believe that the Boulder model emphasized research at the expense of training for practice, and they argued for an alternative model that continued to include research training, but placed a heavy emphasis on practice. It could be called a practitioner-scientist model, and it is sometimes called the “Vail model.” Products of this training earn a Psy.D. instead of a Ph.D. Although many Psy.D. programs are housed in universities, a large number exist in private training centers. Today, while Boulder Ph.D. programs outnumber Vail Psy.D. programs by about three to one, the APA accredits both types of clinical training (Baker & Benjamin, 2000). Psychological practice in the years following World War II was not limited to clinical psychology, of course. Psychologist-practitioners made important contributions as professional industrial-organizational psychologists, counseling psychologists, and school psychologists, among many others. Detailed treatment of these areas of practice is beyond the scope of this chapter, but a good summary and historical analysis can be found in Benjamin and Baker (2004). goodwin

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Conclusion Recent Developments and Trends At the start of the 21st century, psychology in the United States is a vigorous and multifaceted discipline. It has a strong tradition of both science and practice and, with undergraduates continuing to major in psychology in large numbers and with many more applicants than graduate programs can accept, there is every reason to think that psychology will continue to grow and prosper. This last section of the chapter considers several recent trends in psychology and speculates about the future of the discipline. The end of the 20th century saw several strong trends developing, and these have continued into the new century. First, although the study of the relationship between the brain and behavior has a long history, and physiological psychology was an important subdiscipline throughout the 20th century, the end of the century brought accelerated interest in the brain and the term “neuroscience” began to appear. The prime reason was technological—sophisticated and precise brain-scanning techniques such as functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) enabled researchers to see the brain in action, correlating neural activity with behavioral events. By the end of the century, it was becoming fashionable to attach the term neuroscience to other disciplinary labels— hence, there now exists, cognitive neuroscience, developmental neuroscience, and even social neuroscience, each with its own journals. A second trend has been the rediscovery of Darwin in the form of evolutionary psychology. Historians have always credited Darwin with having an enormous influence on psychology— evolutionary thinking was the foundation for functionalism, the notion of an evolutionary continuum among species produced comparative psychology, and the evolutionary principle of individual variation within species helped give rise to the research tradition that investigates individual differences. But in the last third of the 20th century, Darwin’s theories of natural and sexual selection began to have a direct effect on theorizing in psychology. Today, evolutionary psychologists argue that many human behaviors, especially social behaviors, have evolved from the same selection pressures that brought about the evolution of anatomical structures. Evolutionary psychologists have been particularly prominent in research concerning male–female relationships, analyzing various behaviors (e.g., mate preference) in evolutionary terms. As an indication of the popularity of this movement, psychology 590

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departments now regularly offer courses in evolutionary psychology, and textbooks have begun to appear (Buss, 1999). A third recent trend in psychology in the United States has been a consequence of the increased capacity of computers. One obvious effect has been in the ability to complete statistical analyses that are simply too complex and time-consuming to do by hand or with hand calculators. For example, the rise of multivariate analyses directly parallels the evolving capacity of computers. Computers have also revolutionized the research process, from the digitizing of stimulus presentation in research and the automatic recording of behavior to the opportunities for increased collaboration among laboratories. Cognitive scientists, as mentioned earlier, have used computers to develop increasingly sophisticated artificial intelligence applications. On the practice side, computerized psychological testing and diagnosis have become commonplace. A final trend, in evidence at mid-20th century and gathering momentum ever since, is the tendency toward increased specialization in the discipline. It is a natural consequence of increased knowledge about psychological phenomena, but it has brought along with it concerns about the future of the discipline. At the start of the 21st century, is there a field of psychology, or are there many psychologies? Do neuropsychologists and industrial psychologists have anything in common? As far back as 1979, at an APA symposium celebrating the centennial of Wundt’s laboratory founding, cognitive psychologist George Miller (1992) examined the problem and “discovered several other psychologies, all claiming proprietary rights to the label, all competing for disciples, and each contemptuous of others. In short, I discovered that psychology is an intellectual zoo” (p. 40). Increased specialization, and the apparent fragmentation of a discipline that seems to accompany the specialization, is an inevitable by-product of the passage of time. As time goes by, more and more is discovered, and in more precise detail. Hence, the future of psychology as a single discipline may be problematic. However, there is one sense in which the general term psychology can apply to all the specialized work that exists in the field, and that concerns the past. Today’s highly specialized subfields in psychology might not have a great deal in common with each other, but they do share a common history. As one of psychology’s premier theoreticians, Sigmund Koch, once wrote, “there is a sense in which we are nothing if not our history. Our history is our binding force” (Koch, 1992, p. 966).

Note 1. The use of the terms “America” or “American” in this chapter, when used to refer only to the United States, is of course problematic. After all, both North and South America exist, each with numerous countries. Nonetheless, to avoid using the term “United States” excessively, this chapter will occasionally, but sparingly, use the term “America(n),” with no offense to the other nations of the Americas intended. When used, I hope it will be clear from the context of the sentence that reference is to the United States.

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McReynolds, P. (1997). Lightner Witmer: His life and times. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. Miller, G. A. (1956). The magical number seven, plus or minus two: Some limits on our capacity for processing information. Psychological Review, 63, 81–97. Miller, G. A. (1992). The constitutive problem of psychology. In S. Koch, & D. E. Leary (Eds.), A century of psychology as science (pp. 40–45). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. Minton, H. L. (1988). Lewis M. Terman: Pioneer in psychological testing. New York: New York University Press. Münsterberg, H. (1908). On the witness stand. New York: The McClure Company. Münsterberg, H. (1913). Psychology and industrial efficiency. New York: Houghton Mifflin. Neisser, U. (1967). Cognitive psychology. New York: AppletonCentury-Crofts. O’Donnell, J. M. (1979). The crisis of experimentalism in the 1920s: E. G. Boring and his uses of history. American Psychologist, 34, 289–295. Pavlov, I. P. (1928). Lectures on conditioned reflexes (W. H. Gantt, Trans.). New York: International Publications. Perloff, R., & Naman, J. L. (1996). Lillian Gilbreth: Tireless advocate for a general psychology. In G. A. Kimble, C. A. Bonneau, & M. Wertheimer (Eds.), Portraits of pioneers in psychology Vol. II (pp. 107–116). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. Picken, W. E., & Tomes, H. (2002). The legacy of Kenneth B. Clark to the APA: The Board of Social and Ethical Responsibility for Psychology. American Psychologist, 57, 51–59. Poffenberger, A. T. (1957). Harry Levi Hollingworth: 1880–1956. American Journal of Psychology, 70, 136–140. Rogers, C. R. (1961). Some directions evident in therapy. In C. R. Rogers (Ed.), On becoming a person (pp. 73–106). Boston: Houghton-Mifflin. Samelson, F. (1981). Struggle for scientific authority: The reception of Watson’s behaviorism in 1913. Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences, 17, 399–425. Segal, E. M., & Lachman, R. (1972). Complex behavior or higher mental processes: Is there a paradigm shift? American Psychologist, 27, 46–55. Scripture, E. W. (1895). Thinking, feeling, doing. New York: Chautauqua-Century Press. Scott, W. D. (1903). The theory of advertising. Boston: Small & Maynard. Sexton, V. S. (1965). Clinical psychology: An historical survey. Genetic Psychology Monographs, 72, 401–434. Shorter, E. (1997). A history of psychiatry: From the era of the asylum to the age of Prozac. New York: Wiley. Sokal, M. M. (Ed.). (1981). An education in psychology: James McKeen Cattell’s journal and letters from Germany and England, 1880–1888. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. Thorndike, E. L. (1898). Animal intelligence: An experimental study of the associative processes in animals. Psychological Review Monographs, 2 (whole no. 8). Titchener, E. B. (1898). Postulates of a structural psychology. Psychological Review, 7, 449–465. Titchener, E. B. (1896/1899). An outline of psychology. New York: Macmillan. (Original work published 1896). Titchener, E. B. (1901). Experimental psychology: A manual of laboratory practice. Vol. 1: Qualitative experiments. Part 1: Student’s manual; Part 2: Instructor’s manual. New York: Macmillan.

Titchener, E. B. (1905). Experimental psychology: A manual of laboratory practice. Vol. 2: Quantitative experiments. Part 1: Student’s manual; Part 2: Instructor’s manual. New York: Macmillan. Titchener, E. B. (1909). A text-book of psychology. New York: Macmillan. Tryon, R. C. (1963). Psychology in flux: The academicprofessional polarity. American Psychologist, 18, 134–143. Upham, T. C. (1827). Elements of intellectual philosophy. Portland, ME: Hyde. Viney, W., & Zorich, S. (1982). Contributions to the history of psychology: XXIX. Dorothea Dix and the history of psychology. Psychological Reports, 50, 211–218. Viteles, M. S. (1932). Industrial psychology. New York: Norton. Wallin, J. E. W. (1966). A red-letter day in APA history. Journal of General Psychology, 75, 107–114. Washburn, M. F. (1908). The animal mind. New York: Macmillan. Watson, J. B. (1913). Psychology as the behaviorist views it. Psychological Review, 20, 158–177. Watson, J. B. (1928). Psychological care of infant and child. New York: W. W. Norton. Watson, J. B. (1924/1930). Behaviorism (2nd ed.). New York: W. W. Norton. (Original work published 1924).

Watson, J. B., & Morgan, J. J. B. (1917). Emotional reactions and psychological experimentation. American Journal of Psychology, 28, 163–174. Watson, J. B., & Rayner, R. (1920). Conditioned emotional reactions. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 3, 1–14. Werthemier, M. (1912). Experimentelle studien über das sehen von bewegung. Zeitschrift für psychologie, 60, 321–378. Werthemier, M. (1945). Productive thinking. New York: Harper. Winston, A. S. (1990). Robert Sessions Woodworth and the “Columbia Bible”: How the psychological experiment was redefined. American Journal of Psychology, 103, 391–401. Wissler, C. (1901). The correlation of mental and physical tests. Psychological Review Monograph Supplements, 3, No. 6. Witmer, L. (1907). Clinical psychology. The Psychological Clinic, 1, 1–9. Woodworth, R. S. (1921). Psychology. New York: Holt. Woodworth, R. S. (1938). Experimental psychology. New York: Holt. Yerkes, R. M. (Ed.). (1921). Psychological examining in the United States Army. Memoirs of the National Academy of Sciences, 15, 1–890. Yoakum, C. S., & Yerkes, R. M. (1920). Army mental tests. New York: Holt.

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Venezuela

Ligia M. Sánchez and Miriam Dembo

Abstract The history of Venezuelan psychology is told from an academic perspective, since its beginnings in 1949 to the present, when approximately 10,000 psychologists are leaving their mark on multiple endeavors in the life of the country. The characteristics of undergraduate and graduate studies in psychology are described. A panoramic view is given of psychology as a discipline and a profession by an account of its fields of research and application. Among new developments stands the indigenous character of social psychology and the recent appearance of its numerous branches. Emphasis has been placed on the need for psychology to contribute to the solution of national problems without abandoning its development as a science and its preoccupation for the welfare of the individual. Keywords: Venezuela, psychology, history, academic perspective, research and applications, professional practice, indigenous character, social psychology

Of the many perspectives from which a history of psychology can be told, we have given primary consideration to academic psychology because, as many authors have acknowledged, among them Ellis (1992), any consideration of the training of psychologists, past, present, and future is, in a certain way, a whole history of psychology. In following this line of thought, we have tried to do justice to the founders and outstanding figures in our history, to describe the training offered by different Venezuelan universities, to signal the birth of various theoretical perspectives and areas of application, and to take into account the ups and downs that have taken place in the social and political history of the country, as well as their repercussions on the history of psychology during the sixty years that have elapsed since its appearance in academic life in Venezuela. Every discussion of the training of psychologists starts, inevitably, with the consideration of its dual nature: science and profession. The need to establish a logical continuity between them is an ideal goal 594

which, in the majority of cases, has not been reached. Many factors play a role in the structuring of a program of studies: the zeitgeist of the times; the status of the other sciences; the epistemological conceptions prevailing at a given moment; the social historical and economic circumstances of the country and the university; the demands of society and particularly the opportunities to be found in the work markets (Dembo, 1993). The title of this book already presumes that there must be differences in the way psychology has developed as a science and a discipline throughout countries, in view of the variety of cultural, scientific, social, and institutional aspects that characterize them. This kind of assumption has given rise to the concept of “indigenous psychologies” which, as Kurt Danziger points out, consists of [A] self-conscious attempt to develop variants of modern professional psychology that are more attuned to conditions in developing nations than

the psychology taught at Western academic institutions. . . . In some cases indigenization involves relatively superficial changes to received disciplinary practices . . . but in other cases the changes entailed by indigenization are more profound, leading to a fundamental restructuring of psychological research methods and to a replacement of traditional psychological categories and concepts. . . . (Danziger, 2006, p. 215)

Writing on this subject, Adair (1999) comments; “the meaning of indigenous psychology and how it is to be achieved is vaguely conceptualized and not well understood, even by those who call for indigenous psychologies within various countries” (Adair 1999, 404). Without further dwelling in this concept and its implications, in this chapter, we have written about the paths Venezuelan psychology has followed with reference to its history and a consideration of the circumstances we believe to be responsible for its past development and present status. At the beginning, during the period of 1956 to 1970, Venezuelan psychology followed closely the ways of study and research practiced by European and North American institutions. Within this framework, many students received their training in clinical, educational, guidance, social and organizational psychology, and became competent practitioners, educators, and researchers. In the decade of the 70’s some Venezuelan psychologists started to focus on the serious sociopolitical, economic, and educational problems of the country and attempted to generate a psychology sensitive and responsive to these needs. During this period, important changes were introduced in undergraduate curricula, and the first graduate courses were produced. Responding to the demands of professional groups and associations, Erik Becker Becker, at the time head of the association of professional psychologists, introduced in the National Congress a project of a law for the regulation of professional practice of psychology in Venezuela. The law was approved in 1978. Since the 80’s, parallel to traditional topics and methods that still constitute an important part of the curriculum, new ways of practicing, interpreting, and doing research have been proposed under the headings of community psychology, political psychology, environmental psychology and health psychology. In Moghaddam’s terms (1990) a modulative psychology started to give way to a generative psychology. This brief history of psychology in Venezuela refers to the most significant episodes and important

figures in the evolution of the discipline across the last 60 years. It also includes a presentation of undergraduate and graduate training, signaling that, in Venezuela, an undergraduate degree capacitates for professional practice. A panoramic view of psychology as a profession describes fields of research and application and the effect of psychological practice on social change. Concluding remarks point to psychology as a wellestablished profession with a large demand, mostly in areas of health and education. The multiplicity of ramifications, especially those pertaining to social psychology, originates preoccupation about the integrity of the discipline. Sociopolitical problems in the country make it likely that in the near future the problems that will require greatest attention will be political behavior, violence, communication, conflict resolution, and the link between violence and poverty.

The Beginnings Prior to the opening of the first school of psychology in Venezuela, there was much interest in psychology on the part of other professionals who believed that this discipline could make a contribution to the understanding and solution of psychiatric, educational, and legal problems, among others. Some governmental organizations, all of them part of the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare, started to use psychological tests and observation procedures. Among them were the Venezuelan Children´s Council (1936), founded and directed by Venezuelan psychiatrist and educator, Rafael Vegas; the Mental Hygiene League (1942), directed by Alberto Mateo Alonso, Spanish psychiatrist who migrated to Venezuela in 1940; and the Mental Hygiene Division (1946), created by another immigrant, the Spanish psychiatrist José Ortega Durán. In addition, in the 1950s, some of the oil companies operating in Venezuela started to employ North American, European, and Venezuelan psychologists trained in the United States for work in personnel selection and training, as well as the selection of high school graduates for scholarships that these companies offered to outstanding students interested in engineering and other careers related to the oil industry. Among them were John Boulger, an American psychologist; Francisco del Olmo, a Spanish psychologist; and Venezuelan psychologists trained in the United States, Juan Moretti Garanton and Miriam Dembo. In the decade of the 1940s, at the end of the Spanish Civil War and the fall of the Spanish Republic, many outstanding Spanish intellectuals sánchez, dembo

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and important figures in the humanities and sciences migrated to Latin American countries, including Venezuela. Mention must be made of those who contributed to the development of psychology in Venezuela and were the founders of the first school of psychology in the country: Guillermo Pérez Enciso (1917–2007), Francisco del Olmo (1907–1987), Alberto Mateo Alonso (1912–1969), José Ortega Durán (1905–1965). Among them, Pérez Enciso was, undoubtedly, the one to make the most significant contribution to the development of psychological studies in Venezuela. Upon his arrival in Venezuela, Guillermo Pérez Enciso offered a course in psychology in 1945, one of the first given in the country, at the Instituto Pedagógico (Pedagogical Institute), a college-level institution devoted to the training of high school teachers. He also wrote the first introductory textbook in psychology printed in Venezuela, and perhaps the first to be written in the Spanish language (Pérez Enciso, 1956). For many years, this book was used in introductory courses in psychology not only in Venezuela but in many Spanish-speaking countries. When the school of psychology at Universidad Central de Venezuela (UCV) was founded in 1956, Pérez Enciso was its first director, and during his entire career, a highly respected faculty member. When university regulations and programs made it possible, in 1975, he also promoted the opening of graduate courses in psychology at UCV. Francisco del Olmo was well known for his interest in psychometrics. He adapted and elaborated psychological tests for use, primarily, in personnel selection in industrial, educational, and military institutions. Alberto Mateo Alonso was a psychiatrist who, upon his arrival in Venezuela, founded the League of Mental Health, an institution in which people with small economic resources could obtain vocational and psychological guidance. José Ortega Durán was also a well-known psychiatrist, sensitive to social problems. When he came to Venezuela and became director of the division of mental health, in the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare, he introduced the “free lunch” program for the population of children in public grammar schools. One of the research projects developed at the Institute of Psychology and Psychotechnics (UCV), under his direction (1953–1954), consisted in the application of group intelligence tests to 4,000 children in the public grammar schools of Caracas for the identification of talented students for scholarships. When the school of psychology opened, he designed and taught courses in psychometrics and vocational guidance. 596

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Venezuelan Association of Psychologists A group of foreign psychologists who lived and worked in Venezuela, as well as Venezuelan psychologists who had studied abroad, gathered, in a friendly and informal manner, during several years, to discuss a variety of subjects related to the profession, to share information, and to deliberate about the future of psychology in the country. Several of them started to teach at the newly founded schools of psychology. In 1957, 22 members of this group decided to create the Asociación Venezolana de Psicólogos (Venezuelan Psychological Association) as a professional organization. The Constitutive Act stated that this was created for the purpose of: 1. Protecting the dignity of Psychology as a science and a profession. 2. Promoting psychological research in Venezuela. 3. Guarding the applications of Psychology to individuals as well as society and to normal as well as abnormal behaviors. 4. Maintaining interest in psychological studies and promoting or sponsoring means of information. 5. Strengthening relations between Venezuelan psychology and that produced in other countries. (Asociación Venezolana de Psicólogos, 1958). The members of the Association had to have college degrees in psychology. Degrees in other disciplines were admitted, if the incumbent had 5 or more years of work experience in psychology or allied fields. Psychology students could be admitted as affiliates (Asociación Venezolana de Psicólogos, 1958). The Association produced several publications, and it gained recognition when papers presented by its members were accepted for the annual convention of the Venezuelan Association for the Advancement of Science, the most prestigious scientific entity in the country. Presentation of papers at the convention was subject to evaluation and approval by a committee of scientists members of AsoVAC. The titles of some of the publications reflect the variety of interests of its members: Applied Psychology and Modern Traffic (De Madariaga, 1959), The Mental Health Team Concept (Dieppa, 1959), The function of language in the formation of thought (Peinado Altable, 1960), Educational Psychology Today: Contents and Limitations (Angelini, 1961), Structure and Meaning of Personality Tests (Pinillos, 1961) and General Principles and Norms for a Code

of Ethics for Psychologists (Asociación Venezolana de Psicólogos, 1959).

Academic Programs Until the late 1920s, when an extraordinary source of wealth in the subsoil began to be exploited, Venezuela was predominantly an agricultural country, where the vast majority of inhabitants lived in poverty. There were marked class differences, but some of its inhabitants discovered the possibility of ascending the socioeconomic ladder through education and professional training, which were offered free of charge by the national universities. Education has been, for many Venezuelans, an instrument for social mobility and a means of access to a better quality of life. The economic necessity to enter the labor market as early as possible is, undoubtedly, one of the reasons why, in Latin America, undergraduate studies qualify for professional practice. Ruben Ardila (1982) has made reference to a “Latin American Model,” which is oriented toward undergraduate professional training and is called “final,” in the sense that it does not require graduate studies. Ardila compares it to the “North American Model,” in which undergraduate studies are mainly based on general arts and science courses, whereas professional training requires a master’s or a doctoral degree.

Schools of Psychology The year 1949 marks the beginning of academic psychology in Venezuela. This was the year when the Institute of Psychology and Psychotechnics was founded by UCV as a first step in the creation of a school of psychology. The first director was Raúl Ramos Calles, a well-known psychiatrist, with a wide interest in psychology. The other founding members were Francisco del Olmo, and Vidalina Ramos. At the time, psychometrics was at the center of attention in psychological studies, research, and applications and, as would be expected, the main purpose of the Institute was to develop and adapt those psychological tests that were in demand in educational, clinical, and industrial centers. The Institute also produced booklets and other materials for use in vocational guidance of students applying for entrance to the university (Instituto de Psicología y Psicotecnia, 1951). Among its long-term objectives was the planning and organization of undergraduate training of psychologists at this university (del Olmo & Salazar, 1981). In what follows, it would be well to keep in mind that, in Venezuela, the term “school” refers to the

professional units of a university, such as the school of medicine, of engineering, of psychology, among others. However, the study of psychology at UCV did not begin as a “school” but as a section in the philosophy and literature department, in 1956. Since it did not then have the human and material resources for training in psychology, the program of studies was heavily loaded with philosophical subjects, which were readily available in the department. In addition to limited resources, the section was created at a time when the dictatorship of Marcos Perez Jimenez (1952–1958) was near its end and the turbulent social and political atmosphere of the country was not favorable for the development of academic projects. Two years after the section opened, the country’s dictator fell from power. This produced a new environment of liberation and renovation that, in turn, led to a revision of the section’s academic program and its eventual transformation into a school of psychology. The school’s first director, Guillermo Pérez Enciso, in an interview made in 1981, recalled both the improvisation as well as the enthusiasm of those years (Barrios, 2006). A year later, in 1957, Universidad Católica Andrés Bello (UCAB) (Catholic University Andrés Bello) opened its school of psychology with a curriculum similar to that existing at UCV. However, it had a strong influence from its founders, mostly educators and psychiatrists. Among the educators were Luis Olaso (SJ); Luis Azagra (SJ) and Luis Ojer; and among psychiatrists: José Miret Monzó, Fernando Rísquez, and Luis Maggi Calcaño (Gómez Álvarez, 1981). These two universities, both located in Caracas, were the only ones in Venezuela to offer training and research in psychology during the next 21 years. The program of studies was very similar in both schools, and it followed the notion of psychology as a biopsychosocial science. The biological subjects included biology, neuropsychology, and psychophysiology. The strictly psychological subjects were general psychology, developmental psychology, social psychology, differential psychology, psychopathology, personality, and psychological theories. The social area was covered by sociology, anthropology, ethics, and philosophy. To these must be added the methodological subjects, such as mathematics and statistics, as well as theory and practice of tests and projective techniques. There was also a line of subjects related to teaching: pedagogy, didactics, and teaching practice. In the last 2 years of study, students were given some basic professional skills in applied areas: clinical, school, guidance, and industrial. sánchez, dembo

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Finally, there was an epistemological subject included for the analysis of psychological theories. As described, this syllabus was in effect, with minor retouches, until 1970, when a reform movement introduced important changes that originated new ways to address psychology and to teach it.

May 1968 and the Academic Renovation Movement in Venezuela Since the 1920s, Venezuelan university students have played an active and important role in national politics, rebelling and fighting against dictatorial regimes during various periods in the country’s history. Therefore, as could be expected, in the late 1960s, Venezuelan students joined the movement that French students initiated in what was known as “May 1968.” Like students in Europe, the United States, Japan, and China, they were demanding changes, not only in university life but also in society. They were fighting for more democracy and social justice, and, in so far as the university, for a greater participation in government and academic decisions. It is interesting to note that, not only the students but many faculty members were in agreement with the necessity for change. They strived for a professional trained in accordance with the principles of a scientific discipline, capable of a critical attitude toward his practice, inspired by the knowledge of his country’s problems and in accord with the new proposals (Cadenas, 1981). After months of discussion among students, professors, and university authorities, agreements were reached concerning the main aspects of the study syllabus. The result was a program of study that established a difference between the two existing psychology schools at that time. In both schools, the period of 5 years of training was maintained. However, at UCV, 3 of those 5 years were earmarked to teaching psychology as a science, with emphasis in theoretical and methodological aspects. The remaining 2 years were devoted to prespecialized training in one of the following areas: counseling, clinical, educational, industrial, and social psychology. The students had to choose one of the areas or combine two or three of them. Internships in each of the chosen areas were mandatory, as well as a thesis included for the purpose of promoting interest in scientific research. In UCAB, the thesis was also demanded, but prespecialization was considered premature for undergraduate work. A generalist approach was adopted in which the first 3 years were focused in 598

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psychology as a scientific discipline and the last 2 years were devoted to psychology as a profession. Internships were mandatory in all five areas of application. This model is still in effect at this university today. As mentioned above, for 21 years, UCV and UCAB were the only two universities that offered undergraduate training in PSYCHOLOGY. It was not until 1978 that Universidad Rafael Urdaneta, a private university, opened its school of psychology. This university is located in the city of Maracaibo (Zulia State), a region known as the country’s largest center of oil production. This is one of the richest and most populated areas of the country, and there was a demand for a school of psychology that could respond to the educational, social, and organizational needs of the region. The study program at this university also disregarded prespecialization and adopted a generalist model similar to the one followed at UCAB (Ramírez, 1981). Since 1959, the population in Venezuela has doubled every 20 years. It has also become increasingly conscious of the importance of education. In spite of the number of applicants, from 1978 to 2000, the country only had three schools of psychology. The increased demand for studies in psychology can perhaps be attributed to the variety of possible applications the field offers. At the beginning of the 21st century, five new schools of psychology opened. Four of them are private and located in different geographical regions of Venezuela: one in Caracas and four in the provinces: Universidad Bicentenaria de Aragua, in Maracay (2001), Universidad Arturo Michelena in Valencia (2003), Universidad Metropolitana in Caracas (2004), and two in Barquisimeto: Universidad Yacambú (2004) and Universidad CentroOccidental Lisandro Alvarado UCLA (2007). The three cities in the provinces, where the new schools opened, are among those with the largest economic development in the country and also those with greater emphasis in the training of a “general” psychologist, capable of approaching problems in different areas of psychology. It is estimated that, in a population of 26 million, there are, at present, nearly 10,000 psychologists graduated in Venezuela. Dembo (1993) has pointed out that, in Venezuela, undergraduate studies have remained stable through the years, despite differences in theoretical orientation among the schools, as well as the various styles of approaching social and historic

situations in the country. These comments still depict the situation today: [W]hat we can call the official, traditional, Psychology in Venezuela has reached its unification and identity through the training programs of psychologist, which have remained extraordinarily stable through time and diversity of institutions. Professional organizations have, without a doubt, contributed to warrant this stability. . . . (Dembo, 1993, p. 9)

In 2009, directors of the schools of psychology at UCAB, Universidad Rafael Urdaneta, Universidad Arturo Michelena, Universidad Centro-Occidental Lisandro Alvarado, Universidad Metropolitana, and UCV gathered to create the Asociación Venezolana para la Formación Académica en PsicologíaAVEFAP (Venezuelan Association for Academic Training in Psychology). Its main objective is to promote and maintain high-quality training of psychologists, in line with international standards for undergraduate and graduate studies (AVEFAP, 2009).

Professional Association When the first group of psychologists graduated at UCV in 1960 and at UCAB in 1961, the graduates of both institutions participated in the creation of the first professional guild of psychologists in Venezuela: the Colegio de Psicólogos de Venezuela. When this happened, members of the Venezuelan Association of Psychologists considered that it would not be convenient, in the early stages of the profession, to have two societies of psychology. As a result, members of the earlier one decided to put an end to it and, in deference to the new graduates, joined the latter. One of the first tasks undertaken by the organization was to draw up a law regulating the practice of the profession. It took 15 years to have the law approved by Congress, due mainly to disagreements with psychiatrists, who considered mental health was their field of action whereas psychologists would not accept what appeared to be a subordinate role. Finally, an agreement was reached concerning the definition of the field of psychology and psychological practice. To avoid further disputes, the matter was resolved by assigning the Federation of Psychologists of Venezuela to the Ministry of Education while psychiatrists, of course, were already affiliated to the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare. The law was finally introduced into National Congress, and it was approved in 1978

(República de Venezuela, 1978). It should be noted that, in Venezuela, unlike in other countries, those universities that grant the degrees are the ones that accredit professional capacity, while the professional societies are only responsible for the supervision and enforcement of the laws. The law regulating psychological practice contained a definition of psychology and psychological practice as follows: Article 2. Psychological Practice is understood as the use of knowledge acquired through the scientific study of human and animal behavior, for research and teaching in psychology, as well as for providing professional services, with or without payment, to individuals or to public institutions. This knowledge enables psychologists to make contributions in areas concerning human and animal behavior through the exploration, description, explanation, prediction, guidance, and modification of situations, in the context of pure research as well as within the framework of applied research, teaching, and private or institutional professional practice. This knowledge also enables psychologists to contribute to the prevention of difficulties in the normal psychological development of individuals; the preparation of programs encouraging personal, educational, and social development; and the solution of behavioral problems through the use of psychological techniques and procedures. (Translated in Salazar & Sánchez, 1987)

This Law also established a new professional organization: the central authority of the Federación de Psicologos de Venezuela (Venezuelan Federation of Psychologists), which integrates the Colegios de Psicólogos, corresponding to the different geopolitical divisions (states). These organizations are nonprofit corporations with professional, legal, and economic functions, and they exist in the capitals of states where 10 or more practicing psychologists reside.

Graduate Training in Psychology As reported above, in Venezuela, undergraduate studies enable psychologists for professional practice. This can partially explain the late development of graduate programs in the country. There are three types of graduate programs in Venezuela: The master’s and doctoral programs are mainly addressed to research; the specialization courses are oriented to professional necessities, although not all specialization courses are available at universities. In some areas, they are offered in hospitals, corporations, and nonuniversity-level educational institutions. sánchez, dembo

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Specializations During the early 1960s, graduate training in clinical psychology was offered mainly through courses developed by different hospitals because, at the time, universities did not offer graduate programs in this area to satisfy the demand. Among the institutions that offered this specialization were the Hospital Psiquiátrico (1962), Hospital El Peñon (1963), Hospital Militar (1965), and Hospital Universitario, all of them in Caracas (Barrios, 1996). However, at present, two Universities, UCV and UCAB, offer specialization courses in clinical psychology. As time went by, it became evident that not all psychologists were interested in research. For this reason, many universities developed a number of specializations to satisfy the country’s needs as well as the demands of psychologists dedicated to professional practice. Today, there are specializations in behavior analysis (Universidad Simón Bolívar [USB], 1977), group dynamics (UCV, 1977), psychosocial intervention (UCV, 1977), behavior modification (UCV, 1977), instructional psychology (UCV, 1981), human assessment and development (UCAB 1982), cognitive psychology (UCAB, 1988) child development and its deviations (UCAB, 1989), clinical psychology (UCV, 1990), cognitive behavior technology (USB, 1994), human assessment and development (USB, 1994), and communitarian clinical psychology (UCAB, 1999).

Diplomas Practicing psychologists have created a demand for short courses on very specific topics, sometimes because they wish an update on specific areas of application and others because they look for information on new developments. To respond to this demand, several universities have created courses of a professional nature and approximately 1-year duration called diploma courses. At UCV diplomas in psychology have been offered since 2005: one on social participation and construction of citizenship, and another on neuropsychological evaluation.

Master’s and Doctoral Programs Universidad Simón Bolívar (USB) pioneered graduate education when, in 1974, it offered a master’s degree in psychology. This university does not offer undergraduate studies in the discipline, but its section of science and technology includes a group of psychologists who obtained undergraduate degrees at UCV and UCAB, as well as graduate degrees in Europe and the United States, and are doing research in their field. Among the founders of this course are 600

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Senta Essenfeld, Marina Gorodekis, Elena Granell, and Eleonora Vivas. This master’s program, of behavioral and humanistic orientation, is aimed at the development of research, as well as theoretical and practical training of psychologists and other professionals interested in psychology (Granell & Vivas, 1981). When university legislation allowed the creation of graduate studies at UCV, in 1975, a group of professors at this university promoted a master’s program in experimental analysis of behavior, which opened in 1976, followed by master’s-level courses in methodology, group dynamics and social psychology. Afterwards, master’s degrees in instructional psychology (1981) and in human development (1986) were added to the graduate program at UCV. Master’s degrees in cognitive psychology (UCAB, 1988) and child development and its deviations (UCAB, 1989) were added to the graduate program at UCAB. A private university, Universidad Rafael Urdaneta, also initiated master’s programs in educational psychology (1985) and clinical psychology (1991). The master’s in experimental behavior analysis was founded by a group of UCV professors (Henry Casalta [1938–2004], Miriam Dembo, Julia Becerra de Penfold [1931–2008], Roberto Ruiz, and Rodolfo Tarff). This group of academics was composed largely of former students of Professor Guillermo Pérez Enciso who, through his teaching, had guided them toward a scientific and experimental approach to psychology. In addition, a number of clinical and educational psychologists were interested in the application of behavioral principles to the solution of educational, clinical, and health problems. At the same time a laboratory for classical and operant conditioning was installed at the Institute of Psychology (UCV) as a basis for research and demonstrations. For the installation of the laboratory, the advice and cooperation of William N. Schoenfeld and his associates Brett Cole and Daniel Sussman was fundamental. Their work at Queens College of the City University of New York was the starting point for the initial research developed in this laboratory. Three years later, in 1979, another laboratory was established by professors Miriam Dembo, María Teresa Guevara, Thais Navarrete, and Doris Villalba, for studying child behavior (Dembo, Villalba, Guevara, & Rangel, 1986). In this area of research, the cooperation of Sidney Bijou, at that time a professor at the University of Arizona, was invaluable. This line of

investigation was also strongly supported by Barbara Etzel and Judith Leblanc from the department of human development of Kansas University (Dembo & Guevara, 1992). Another area of graduate studies that promoted a great deal of research was the master’s program in social psychology, created in 1976 at UCV by José Miguel Salazar (1931–2001). This Venezuelan psychologist studied at Michigan University and, in 1957, obtained his Ph.D. in social psychology at London University. He is considered “the father of social psychology in Venezuela.” One of his early focuses of interest was the study of the Venezuelan national character, which he thought to be of major importance for social changes. He believed that social psychology could and should exercise social and political influence for needed changes in Venezuela and in Latin America. He also pointed out the importance of the study and comprehension of nationalism in Venezuela and Latin America, for the mobilizing or weakening capacity that this concept may have (Montero, 2002a, Salazar, 1983). Salazar was able to surround himself with a group of his pupils and some psychologists with similar interests. With this talented group, he edited the first book of social psychology written in Spanish (Salazar, Montero, Muñoz, Sánchez, Santoro, & Villegas, 1976). In 1975, this group created AVEPSO, the Venezuelan Association of Social Psychology. This association assumed the task of promulgating social psychology in publications and scientific events. In Venezuela, this branch of psychology developed a characteristic of its own, away from the objectives and methods of traditional social psychology. It was concerned with the country’s social and political problems and aimed not only at its study but also at the intervention and resolution of these problems (Sánchez, 1997). It is worth noting that Salazar and another outstanding social psychologist, Maritza Montero, were conferred the National Social Sciences Award for their research in psychology. The master’s in instructional psychology was initiated in 1981, by professors Alfonso Orantes, Beatriz Lepage, and Nelson Díaz Mora. Its purpose was to train professionals to deal with educational problems and to discover those factors that affect the efficiency of educational procedures (Orantes, 2006). Some of their investigative lines are analysis of expert/novice differences, aids and strategies for learning, representation of knowledge and new technologies of instructions (Facultad de Humanidades y Educación [FHE], 2001).

The master’s program in the psychology of human development was conceived in 1986, by Josefina Fierro (1922–1992), Nusia de Feldman, María L. Platone, Ileana Recagno, Alida Cano, and Omar V. Menéndez. Its purpose is to prepare researchers and advisors in psychological development, from prenatal life to senescence. It also trains professionals for the planning and application of social policies adapted to Venezuelan-specific characteristics: family structure, educational level, and socioeconomic conditions. Research encompasses problems and topics such as infant development and social-cognitive stimulation, effects of social exclusion, language development, the role of parenthood, and social-cultural perspective of cognitive development (FHE, 2001). The doctoral program in psychology at UCV began in 1989, under the initiative of professors Miriam Dembo, Maritza Montero, Maria Luisa Platone, José Miguel Salazar, and Ligia M. Sánchez. It is addressed to psychologists and allied professionals interested in acquiring research skills. The doctoral dissertation is at the center of the individualized program, designed for each participant according to the theme of his or her thesis. It requires a minimum of schooling but includes a small number of courses, internships, monographic essays, and teaching experience. All requirements must be aimed at the development of the research project (Dembo, 1999). There is also a doctoral program in psychology at UCAB, initiated in 2005, by professors Gustavo Peña and Guillermo Yaber, which is more in line with the traditional doctoral model: It is nonindividualized, it places emphasis in methodological expertise, and it is also oriented toward research.

Fields of Research and Application For many years, the main purpose of universities in Latin America was the training of professionals. Research was not a primary concern. In Venezuela, Francisco De Venanzi, an illustrious scientist and rector of UCV was a true knight for the development of research at the university. During his term as rector (1959–1963), he put into effect a three-fold program for the support of institutional research. In essence, he proposed that: The majority of faculty members should be employed full-time; an attempt should be made to attract professors from well-known advanced research centers; and scholarships should be available to faculty members who wished to acquire graduate training at universities recognized for their research programs (De Venanzi, 1963, 1990). sánchez, dembo

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There is no question that the beginning of graduate studies in psychology, in 1974, opened new possibilities for promoting research. The inclusion of a thesis as a requisite for graduation at all university levels, and the requirement of a research report for the promotion of faculty members were measures aimed at the development of research in Venezuelan universities. Another factor that stimulated research activities was the presence of financing institutions like Consejo de Desarrollo Científico y Humanístico (CDCH; Council for Scientific and Humanistic Development), which were incorporated at all public universities. At the same time, and for similar purposes, the Venezuelan government created the Consejo Nacional de Invesigaciones Científicas y Tecnológicas (CONICIT; the National Council for Scientific and Technological Research). However, as usual, the human factor, the talent and interest of some members of the faculty, has been the prime motivator in the development of research in the universities. Among the pioneers, mention must be made of José Miguel Salazar, who was the first professor of experimental psychology at UCV, where he managed to interest his students in science by incorporating them into small research projects. Henry Casalta was a member of the first group of psychology students who graduated from UCV. He was outstanding in many respects, and throughout his career, he was devoted to teaching and, mostly, to research. Eduardo Santoro was also among Salazar’s first students and has inherited his chair. He is a highly valued member of the faculty, recognized for his efforts to instill interest in research among his students. At UCAB, Andrés Miñarro (1936–2006), Gustavo Peña, and Chilina León de Viloria have also been pioneers and promoters of research. Several publications have analyzed and evaluated the production of psychological research in Venezuela, among them Santoro (1981), Salazar & Rodríguez (1986), Salazar (1991), and Sánchez (1999). Although in academic circles there has been a manifest interest in a variety of fields, this does not mean that a great deal of research has been produced in the country. Perhaps practitioners in applied areas are also contributing to new knowledge but, at the present moment, there is no information in this regard. A few of the studies carried out in academic contexts have been selected to give an idea of fields of research and application. They cover a variety of institutions and reflect the interests of faculty 602

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members and graduate students, as well as the needs of the country. An attempt has been made to give a panoramic view of topics, authors, and institutions, but surely and inevitably, we must have omitted many valuable publications.

Human Development The team working in the unit of human development, at the Institute of Psychology (UCV), has studied the patterns of child-rearing and family interactions in samples of low-income populations. Ileana Recagno has been a pioneer in these studies and, in 1994, she and Maria Rosa Orantes, participated for Venezuela in the Harvard project “Maternal schooling, child care and risks for child survival.” Within the framework of this study, other areas were developed such as reading comprehension, mother–child interactions, and ethnography of the low-income family (Recagno, 1982; Recagno-Puente, 2002). Presently, the unit includes Cristina Otálora and Leonor Mora who, alongside their graduate students, have widened the scope of research by incorporating different stages of the human life cycle, motherhood and fatherhood, and other aspects of family life from a gender perspective. They have also introduced changes in the method of study, by including all family members as a source of information. (Mora, 2003; Mora, Otálora, & Recagno, 2005; Otálora 2001; Platone, 2000; Recagno-Puente, Otálora, & Mora, 2006; Recagno-Puente & Platone, 2002). At UCAB, studies have been conducted at the Center of Research and Humanistic Education on the development of values in university students (Angelucci, Dakduk, Juárez, Lezama, Moreno, & Serrano, 2007; Angelucci, Juárez, Dakduk, Lezama, Moreno, & Serrano, 2008; Dakduk, Angelucci, & Serrano, 2008). At the same Center, Carmen León designed the human development integrating model, which comprises octagonal integrative models for childhood, adolescence, adult life and old age (León, 2007, 2008). As part of an international study, research was conducted on preferences for temperamental styles by age and sex (León, Oakland, Wei, & Berrios, 2009). Presently, there is an ongoing study on youth culture in students across Latin American universities sponsored by AUSJAL (Campagnaro, in press).

Educational and Counseling Psychology Professors from UCAB have recently published a comprehensive report that covers current issues in educational psychology in Venezuela. The report

includes the results of a survey among school psychologists concerning research and practicerelated information. Results of the survey are summarized in the following quotation: Applied research is considered fundamental to school psychology. The most important researchrelated issues include the development and evaluation of intervention strategies to determine their effectiveness in the Venezuelan reality; the design, adaptation and validation of tests and other instruments; the management of school violence; and interventions with high risk groups. (León, Campagnaro, & Matos, 2007, p. 433)

The department of behavioral science and technology at USB has also conducted research in educational and cognitive psychology as part of its graduate program. Studies have included evaluation of educational material, styles of learning, reading, emotional learning, and information and communicational technology (Pujol, 2004; Pujol, Lugli, & Arroyo, 2007). At the school of psychology, UCV, there have also been numerous studies in the area of educational psychology, especially those related to the effect of school, family, and community in the education of children in popular settings. Many studies are of a comparative nature concerning different theoretical and methodological approaches to learning and cognitive development (Cano, 1999, 2005, 2007; Cubillos, 2006). Psychological counseling started in Venezuela as a discipline with a strong educational bias, and it has been systematically and directly associated with the practice of psychology in educational settings. Casado (1995) and Rodríguez (2006) have pointed out that psychological counseling has been plagued by a confusion about its objectives and strategies, which has led to a confused professional identity afflicted by poorly defined roles and functions. Student services are an important source of employment for counseling psychologists, at both public and private high schools and universities (Platone & Brazón, 2002). There are various roles and functions for counseling psychologists in these setting, among them interventions related to academic counseling, therapy, group therapy, and community-based programs. Pedro E. Rodríguez, Alcira Texeira, and Emma Mejía, faculty members of the school of psychology at UCAB, have recently (2009) written a wide ranging chapter concerning this topic in Venezuela to be included in International Handbook of Cross-cultural Counseling (Lawrence,

Heppner, AEgisdóttir, Alving Leung, & Norsworthy, 2009).

Organizational Psychology Occupational stress has attracted attention from professors at USB (Feldman, Payne & Vivas, 2002; Feldman, Chacón, Bagés & Pérez, 2005; Yáber, Corales, Valarino, & Bermudez, 2007). Their line of research includes strategies for leadership in business management, and behavioral strategies in the organization of political parties (Gorrochotegui, 2007; Mayorca, Ramírez & Viloria, 2008; Yáber & Valarino, 2007).

Health and Clinical Psychology Lately, health and clinical psychology has become a popular area of research. It is present in most Venezuelan universities, with slight differences in the topics they cover. At USB areas of interest on the part of professors and graduate students include health promotion (de Arellano, Bridges, Hernández, Ruggiero, Vasquez et al., 2009; Redondo, Calvanese, García, & Hernández, 2009). Another area of study is the prevention and treatment of chronic illnesses (Guarino, 2005; Guarino, Feldman, & Roger, 2005). Other studies evaluate satisfaction in hospitalized patients (Feldman, Vivas, Lugli, Alviarez, & Bustamante, 2006), insomnia (Benaím et al., 2009), coping (Guarino, Sojo, & Bethelmy, 2007), and eating disorders in Venezuela (Vivas & Lugli, 2006). Since 1988, Universidad Rafael Urdaneta in Maracaibo, State of Zulia, has a center for psychological research (CINVEPSI). The members have focused their attention on the psychosocial reality of their region, its needs and solutions, and have done work in traffic accidents, family violence, attachment, psychosocial aspects of medical illnesses (Montiel-Nava & Peña, 2008; Montiel-Nava, Montiel-Barbero, Peña, & Polanczyk, 2008), stress in the health teamwork, aging (Molero, Altimari, Duran, Garcia, Pino-Ramirez, & Maestre, 2006), eating disorders (Quintero-Párraga, Pérez-Montiel, Montiel-Nava, Pirela, Acosta, & Pineda, 2003), and drug dependence and adherence to treatment (PinoRamírez et al., 2006). The Universidad de los Andes, located in the state of Merida, at the foot of the mountains in the western part of Venezuela, founded a laboratory of psychological research in 1978. This laboratory has been a part of the school of medicine since the university does not have a psychology department. At the beginning, the founders were interested in sánchez, dembo

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achievement motivation and its relation to academic performance. They also did research in self-esteem, locus of control, and interpersonal relations. During the first 15 years, the team wrote 100 research articles on these topics. Some books were also the results of their work: Creativity (Escalante, 1983), Learning with Piaget (Escalante, 1991), Language and Personal Efficiency (Morales, 1992), and The Successful Students: Who Are They? (Romero & Salom, 1992). Today, the group of professors at this renamed Center of Psychological Research have turned their interest to the social psychology of health. The results of their work have been published in a book, Contributions to Social Psychology of Health (Esqueda, Escalante, D’Anello, Barreat, & D’Orazio, 2006). With this book, they won the Best University Book award, which is a yearly prize of national scope. Evidence of their skills is the fact that they teach methods of research at the schools of medicine, education, and criminology of the same university (www.ula.ve/medicina/cip). Presently, they are doing research on the psychosocial aspects of poverty (Barreat, 2007), post-traumatic stress (D’Orazio, 2006), effects of laughter and humor on physical and psychological health (D’Anello, 2008), psychosocial variables associated with compliance of medical treatment (D’Anello, 2006a), protective factors in the professional burnout syndrome (D’Anello, 2006b), alcohol, smoking, and AIDS (Escalante, 2006; Escalante & Escalante, 2006).

The other unit of research connected with graduate programs is the Child Development Center. This project designed a strategy for carrying out simultaneous teaching, research, and service to the community. The Center has been in operation for over 20 years, and it consists, basically, in a preschool classroom that accommodates 12 to 14 children between 3 and 5 years of age. Occasionally, a child with problems (autism, retarded development, and/or aggressive behaviors) is also admitted, which permits the study of behavioral strategies that may be used for the inclusion of these children in a normal classroom. All the children receive individualized education and care, as graduate students and professors do research, fundamentally based on systematic observation of the children while they learn, play, and perform the activities programmed for them, according to their age and development (Dembo & Guevara, 1996/2000; Guevara, 1993, 1994; Rangel & Lacasella, 1999). Another line of research undertaken in the Child Development Center is the use of computers for teaching in the preschool classroom (Rangel & Ladrón de Guevara, 2001). Recently, the Center published a series of booklets containing preschool programs of education that include the areas of language, numbers, discrimination, dramatization, and fine motor skills (Dembo & Guevara, 2007; Rangel, Lacasella, Guevara, & Dembo, 2008a, b, c, d, e).

Neuropsychology Behavior Analysis The unit of behavior analysis at the Institute of Psychology (UCV) comprises two laboratories: the laboratory for classical and operant conditioning and the Child Development Center. Miriam Dembo and María T. Guevara (1992) have made a complete presentation of both laboratories. In brief, the first one studies theoretical and methodological issues (Casalta, 1981, 1984; Casalta & Becerra, 1994; Contreras, 1998; Ruiz, 1975, 1981) and conducts research in areas such as probability of reinforcement and stability of behavior (Penfold & Dembo, 1985; Ruiz, Becerra, Casalta, Dembo, & Tarff, 1981; Ruiz, Becerra, Casalta, & Navarrete, 1981), behavior modification and education (Bijou & Ruiz, 1981), self-control studies (Dembo, Becerra, & Vegas, 1983), avoidance behavior (Casalta, 1984), two types of conditioned reflex (Ruiz, 1984), auto-shaping and auto-maintenance (Burgos, 1989), auto-conditioning of the cardiac response (Becerra, Tarff, & Llorens, 1984), pain (Contreras, 1991), and stress (Contreras, 1999). 604

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The department of neuropsychology of the Institute of Psychology at UCV studies the relations brain–behavior in order to understand the alterations in the functioning of the cortical areas as a consequence of a cerebral trauma or lesion (Gómez, 2003). Otto Lima Gomez and his associates Maria J. Roca and Lisbeth Esaá produced a version of the Luria protocol, normalized and validated in a sample of the Venezuelan population. The neuropsychological evaluation conducted at this center with the Luria-UCV protocol results in a description or characterization of the conserved or diminished cortical functions (Gómez, Roca, & Esaa, 1999; Gómez, Roca, Esaá, Sánchez, & Ruiz, 2004, 2009).

Research and Social Change Venezuela’s enormous social problems, food deficit, housing deficit, and lack of adequate health care spurred consideration of a research methodology that pursues the integration of education and research, hand-in-hand with community services.

An example of a study that conjugates education with field studies oriented to social problems was the project Plan Coche (named after a populous zone in Caracas). This project was a collaborative effort between the school of psychology at UCV and the National Housing Institute (INAVI). They agreed to study and/or intervene on a list of problems, such as the assessment of 25 preschool programs; a study of adolescent attitudes; the management of free time in adolescents; the detection and control of aggressive behaviors of young people in the community; a study of beliefs, attitudes, and habits related to health; research on the cognitive development of Venezuelan children; property as an object of psychosocial study; and the study of the reciprocal image that exists between young people and adults (Cadenas, 1976; Villalba, Muñoz, & Losada, 1975). Also worth mentioning is the work of Mercedes Pulido de Briceño, founder of social psychology studies at UCAB. Along with her students, she performed a study of the profile of a Venezuelan population living in the populous neighborhoods that surround the university campus (Banchs, 1990). Years later, Pulido de Briceño also participated in national politics, was elected member of the Venezuelan National Congress, and appointed Minister for Family Affairs. From these positions, she participated in the reform of the Venezuelan Civil Code and was able to change the status of children born out of wedlock by granting them rights equal to those of “legitimate” children. This was an important achievement since a large number of children in Venezuela are born out of wedlock. Because the lack of proper housing is one of the biggest problems in Venezuela, there are many psychosocial studies on this topic. One of the projects that has engendered great repercussion is the experience with the La Esperanza Civil Association, known as the Casalta Project. It constituted a process of facilitation and empowerment of a group of families who had lost their homes, victims of landslides in the mountain where they used to live. This project was accomplished with the technical assessment of the architecture and engineering departments at UCV and governmental institutions concerned with housing. The psychosocial intervention was carried out by students and professors of both the school and institute of psychology. This psychosocial intervention process included community psychology techniques, such as the detection of the problem as perceived by the community, group management training, and leadership and

assessment training in negotiation with governmental institutions. This was a successful project that ended with the occupancy of new houses built by the inhabitants themselves (Sánchez, 2000; Wiesenfeld 2000). Although most of the studies mentioned were carried out by students and professors of public and private universities, psychologists working in other institutions have also designed and executed novel solutions for important social problems. One such projects that has gained national and international recognition was conceived and developed by psychologist Aleida Salazar while working in a large welfare foundation called Fundación del Niño. As in many Latin American countries, most Venezuelan families, especially in the working class, are mother-centered. The father is absent, and the mother has to work, leaving the children unattended. The project that Salazar designed and put into effect was called Hogares de Cuidado Diario, which means homes for daycare. The outstanding feature of this program was that the caretakers were not professionals but women from the same neighborhood who were paid to take into their homes six to eight children between the ages of 0 to 5 years. The women participating as mother substitutes were trained to supply basic physical and health care to the children and give rudimentary preschool instruction. The homes were visited weekly by social workers and preschool teachers (Gómez, 1988; Montenegro, Piña, & Veracochea, 1977).

Community Psychology In the last 20 years, in Venezuela and other Latin American countries, many psychologists and social scientists in general have felt inclined to contribute to efforts aimed at improving the quality of life of their fellow citizens. This is reflected in the numerous branches of social psychology that are now objects of attention (in addition to traditional areas of application), including community, environmental, political, health, and emergency psychology. Latin American Community Social Psychology, has given rise to various branches, which have in common a number of ideas, among them: the need to engage in the transformation of a society marked by inequality and exclusion, to strengthen democracy and empowering civil society, to adopt a critical perspective of science and common sense and of the ideological aspects that they may be transmitting. . . . (Montero & Sonn, 2009, p. 2).

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Community psychology came into being as a result of the need to offer solutions to urgent problems in Latin American communities, rather than merely studying them. Initially, it was interested in problems and practices that traditional social psychology did not attend. Later, it elaborated definitions, established new concepts, and adopted a methodology based on active participation of the members of the community. Montero and Varas (2007) have published a state-of-the-art account of the development of community psychology in Latin America. Maritza Montero has been a leading figure in community psychology, with many years of research in low-income groups in Venezuela. She has numerous publications in national and international journals, and three of her books are used as textbooks by several universities in the Spanish-speaking world (Montero, 2003, 2004, 2006a, b). Among those who have also made important contributions to this area in Venezuela are Alejandro Moreno (1983), Karen Cronick (1988, 2002), Fernando Giuliani (Giuliani & Wiesenfeld, 1997), Lodo-Platone (2004), María L. Platone (1998), Eneiza Hernández (1994, 1996), Euclides Sánchez (Sánchez, Wiesenfeld, & López, 1998), and Esther Wiesenfeld (Wiesenfeld & Sánchez, 1996; Wiesenfeld, Sánchez, & Cronick, 1995). Within this framework is a specialization in clinical community psychology at UCAB (Campagnaro, 1999). In addition to this course, the school of psychology has developed a series of successful projects that extend support to low-income communities in social, educational, and clinical areas. Among its social programs, UCAB maintains a center, the Parque Social Padre Manuel Aguirre (Social Park of Father Manuel Aguirre), which offers specialized psychological and legal services at low costs to persons in the neighborhood with limited financial resources.

ones or were separated from their families. The work done on that occasion was the basis for the creation of new areas of national and international assistance: family reunions (Montero, Lozada, & Mora, 2000), psychosocial attention in schools (Lozada, 2006a, b; Lozada & Rangel, 2001), attention to secondary victims (Sanchez, 2003; Sánchez & Gómez, 2000), and psychosocial community work (RodríguezÁlvarez, Pino-Ramírez, & Bustos, 2003).

Environmental Psychology

Emergency Psychology

As a derivation of community social psychology, environmental psychology became an area of research at the Institute of Psychology, UCV. It was developed by Esther Wiessenfeld, Euclides Sánchez, and Karen Cronick, in response to requests from organizations and communities outside the university for projects dealing with problems such as housing, residential processes, family participation in housing construction, evaluation of residential satisfaction, and meaning of eviction. The strategies employed in these studies have been action research, qualitative research, and participative evaluation (Montero, 2000; Sánchez, 2001, Sánchez & Wiesenfeld, 2009; Wiesenfeld, 1997; Wiesenfeld & Sánchez, 1996; Wiesenfeld & Amaro, 2007). In 2002, Zuleima Santalla de Banderali, a professor at UCAB, initiated a line of experimental research concerning the impact of physical characteristics of visual stimuli, such as color, complexity, and contrast, on aesthetic judgments of likability and/or preference (Santalla-Banderali, 2006). Similar studies have been conducted by the same author and collaborators using everyday or electronically produced sounds and noises as physical stimuli and their influence on free and/or serial memory, selective and maintained attention, comprehension and memory of texts, and audiovisual material on esthetic judgment of pleasantness (Alvarado, Santalla, & Santisteban, 1998, 1999; Santalla, 1992, 1999; Santalla & Santisteban-Requena, 1996; Santalla, Alvarado, & Santisteban, 1999).

In December 1999, a landslide in the state of Vargas caused many deaths and left homeless thousands of families who inhabited the frail huts on the slopes of the mountains. One of the most painful aspects of the tragedy was the separation and/or disappearance of family members. As a result of these tragic events, psychologists and other academics from of several Venezuelan universities formed the Red de Apoyo Psicológico (Network of Psychological Support) for the assistance of the homeless and those who lost their loved

José Miguel Salazar had, from the beginning of his career, a strong interest in how a common region, country, or culture gives rise to national characteristics and eventually national identity among the individuals that share it (Salazar 1970). In 1983, he wrote Psychological Basis of Nationalism. He promoted studies on nationalism in Brasil, Chile, Colombia, México, the Dominican Republic, and Venezuela and, as a result, he proposed the concept

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Political Psychology

of Latino Americanism as a potential political movement (Salazar, 1987). In 1994, the Institute of Psychology at UCV inaugurated a section of political psychology headed by Mireya Lozada and Carlos Silva (Lozada & Silva, 1999). Areas of study for this project include democracy, public space, and everyday living. Among problems studied are social otherness and citizenship, social imaginaries and, more recently, political polarization (Lozada, 2006a, 2007; Silva, 2002, 2004b). The research methods used range from discourse analysis to programs of intervention and psychosocial support. A recent experience has been the psychosocial intervention in the political conflict afflicting the country and the establishment of links with different social, public, and private, Venezuelan and foreign, organizations. Maritza Montero (2002b, 2006a,b) at UCV, Manuel Llorens and Angel Oropeza at UCAB, and Marìa T. Urreiztieta (2008) and Guillermo Yáber (Yáber & Ordoñez, 2008) at USB have also done work in political psychology. This has become an interdisciplinary area with the incorporation of professors in linguistics and philosophy. The methodology most frequently used in these studies is discourse analysis. In Venezuela, recent trends in social psychology also include psychology of liberation (Lozada, 2006b; Montero, 1994; Montero & Sonn, 2009), critical psychology (Mercado-Martínez, Gastaldo, Bosi, & Sánchez, 2004; Montero & Montenegro, 2006; Silva, 2004a), and globalization psychology (Lozada, 2005; Montero, 2007; Montero, Moghaddam, & Ehrneling, 2006; Wiesenfeld, 2006). These new perspectives of social psychology have also been adopted by researchers at USB, who have studied issues such as daily living, violence, globalization processes, and cultural malaise (Hernández, 2008; Hernández, & Hernández 2008). What interweaves these subjects is the perspective of investigation used, since all the studies mentioned have been carried out with qualitative methods and from a phenomenological and hermeneutical point of view, which explains why an epistemological reflection has been an explicit part of them.

Publications In its 60 years of existence, the field of psychology has not spawned many publications in Venezuela, and some of the initiatives in this field have been short lived, a few for economic reasons but also perhaps due to a scarce tradition in scientific

periodicals in our country. Those that have survived merit mention. Psicología (Psychology). This is the journal of the school of psychology at UCV. Its publication started in 1975, and it is still in existence, being the oldest of the psychological journals in Venezuela. It is financially sponsored by the university and has had very few interruptions. It covers a wide variety of topics of interest to students, professors, and psychologists in general. It also publishes abbreviated versions of undergraduate and graduate theses that have been approved with honors. Boletin de Avepso (AVEPSO’s Bulletin). This bulletin is published by the Asociación Venezolana de Psicología Social (AVEPSO), and it has been in existence since 1978. It publishes articles in social psychology written by national and international authors working in this field. This Association has also published 11 monographic titles and a series called “Psicoprisma” devoted to divulging research strategies in social psychology. This journal is edited by professors at UCV. Comportamiento (Behaviour). This journal has been published since 1990 by the behavioral science and technology section, the graduate program in psychology, and the psychophysiological section of USB. According to the editors “This magazine considers for publication original works based on empirical and theoretical research, in any of the behavioral science areas” (http:///www.comportamiento.dsm. usb.ve/). Analogías del Comportamiento (Analogies of Behavior). This journal is published by UCAB, founded on 1994, and devoted to research in several areas of psychology. Revista Venezolana de Psicología Clinica Comunitaria (Venezuelan Journal of Community Clinical Psychology). Founded in 1999 at UCAB, initially its purpose was to endorse a graduate course in this specialty but, presently, it has a wider scope.

Conclusion In its 60 years of existence in Venezuela, psychology has attracted large numbers of students and produced outstanding scholars, as evidenced by national and international publications and frequent participation in scientific events. Interest in psychology is also evidenced in the increase of the number of schools of psychology in various locations of the country. There is considerable demand for psychologist in government institutions, particularly with regard to education but also in areas of health and the judiciary. Psychologists in Venezuela have also sánchez, dembo

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conquered fields such as publicity, marketing, surveys, and consumer psychology. In sum, psychology in Venezuela has become a well-established profession. But, more than employment, many Venezuelan psychologists aspire to have individual private practice and, in this regard, they encounter the problem of delimiting their field of professional action from those of psychiatrists, educators, industrial relations personnel, sociologists, and social workers. Moreover, under many circumstances, psychologists require working as a team with professionals from other disciplines. The proliferation of fields of psychology raises once more the question of their impact on the integrity of psychology as a discipline. Perhaps the difference between these new ramifications resides only in the area of application and the social relevance of the problems analyzed and intervened. Many psychologists think there is only one psychology and many different problems. In a sense, the present challenge consists in converting the specialties born in the practice of psychology into scientific formulations. Venezuelan psychology cannot be characterized as indigenous. However, in the area of social psychology there are clear orientations toward an indigenous psychology. As defined by Adair, indigenous psychology is “an approach that attempts to assess the increasing tendency of researchers within a country to address, within their research there own cultural and social problems” (Adair, 1999, p. 398).

Future Directions To answer the request of this volume’s editor to include comments about future directions for Venezuelan psychology, we conducted a survey among Venezuelan colleagues, some of them professors from several universities. Although the number of responses was small (15 out of 55 answered), they allowed us to obtain an idea of their opinions concerning difficult problems to be solved, topics that remain to be addressed and, future directions for the field.

answered the survey referred, in one way or another, to these topics as objects of necessary intervention and research. Another issue frequently mentioned was the need for a greater projection of the importance of psychology as a profession, through the strengthening of professional associations.

Topics That Have Not Been Approached There has been a lack of epidemiological studies needed to disclose major psychological issues in the country, and to define programs for the prevention, intervention, and solution of psychological problems. As an example, it would be useful to know the psychosocial variables that affect mental health, to collect local psychometric information, to appraise educational problems, and to reveal the values and antivalues of the Venezuelan population. Among those branches of psychology as a discipline and a profession that have not been fully developed in the country are forensic, judiciary, and legal psychology. Due to present circumstances, issues such as violence, political behavior, and personal safety are now priorities of attention.

Future Developments Ideological clashes, as well as critical social, economic, and political situations, have blurred the vision of the future. At present, social problems such as poverty, violence, and political confrontations have polarized the country and made it difficult to envision the future. The traditional areas of practice and research will probably incorporate new views and a more indigenous perspective. According to the results of the survey, in the following years, psychologists will be oriented to problems such as political behavior, violence, communication, conflict resolution, and the relation between violence and poverty, as well as the growth of organizational psychology. However, a boomerang could lead psychologists to take refuge in their consultation cabinets, laboratories, and educational and organizational institutions, orienting their efforts once more to the study and understanding of human behavior in the diverse situations in which people happen to live.

Difficult Problems To Be Solved The consideration of problems not yet solved depends, of course, on the areas of psychology in which one dwells. However, some crucial national problems are the concern of psychologists working in a variety of fields. This is the case with poverty, violence, exclusion, education, mental health, and political friction. The majority of psychologists who 608

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Salazar, J. M. (1991). Abordajes y temáticas y grupos en la investigación psicológica en Venezuela [Approaches, subjects and groups in psychological research in Venezuela]. Conferencia presentada en las Jornadas conmemorativas de los 35 años de la Escuela de Psicología de la UCV, Caracas, VE. Salazar, J. M., Montero, M., Muñoz, C., Sánchez, E., Santoro, E., & Villegas, J. (1976). Psicología social [Social psychology]. México: Trillas. Salazar, J. M., & Rodriguez, P. (1986). La investigación psicológica en Venezuela de 1970 a 1980. [Psychological research in Venezuela from 1970 to 1980]. En Contribuciones a la psicología en Venezuela Tomo II [Contributions to psychology in Venezuela Vol. II]. Caracas, VE: Ediciones de la Facultad de Humanidades y Educación, UCV. Salazar, J. M., & Sánchez, L. M. (1987). Venezuela. In A. Gilgen, & C. Gilgen (Eds.), International handbook of psychology. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. Sánchez, E. (2000). Todos con la Esperanza. Continuidad de la participación comunitaria [Everyone with La Esperanza. Continuity in community participation]. Caracas, VE: Comisión de Postgrado, Facultad de Humanidades y Educación, UCV. Sánchez, E. (2001). La organización y el liderazgo en la comunidad participativa [Organization and leadership in the participatory community]. Revista de la AVEPSO, XXIV(2), 81–102. Sánchez, E., & Wiesenfeld, E. (2009). La psicología ambiental en Venezuela: Del pasado al futuro [Environmental psychology in Venezuela: From past to future]. Revista Medio Ambiente y Comportamiento, 9(3). Sánchez, E., Wiesenfeld, E., & López, R. (1998). Trayectoria y perspectivas de la psicologia social comunitaria en Latinoamerica [Trajectory and perspectives of community social psychology in Latin America]. In A. Martin Gonzalez (Ed.), Psicología comunitaria. Fundamentos y aplicaciones. [Community psychology. Foundations and applications]. Madrid: Visor. Sánchez, L. M. (1997). 20 años de psicología en Venezuela 1958–1978. Informe final del Estudio Histórico y Situacional de la Psicología en Venezuela [20 years of psychology in Venezuela 1958–1978. Final report of the historical and situational study on psychology in Venezuela]. Presentado ante del Consejo de Desarrollo Científico y Humanístico. Caracas, VE: Instituto de Psicología, UCV. Sánchez, L. M. (1999). Psychology in Venezuela: Perceptions and opinions of research psychologists. Applied Psychology: An International Review, 48(4), 481–496. Sánchez, L. M. (2003). La tragedia de Vargas: Dos experiencias de extensión universitaria en la comunidad [The Vargas tragedy: Two experiences of university extension in the community]. Acta Científica Venezolana, 54(1), 98–105. Sánchez, L. M., & Gómez, M. (2000). El taller “Compartir aprendizajes” [The workshop “Sharing learnings”]. Revista Avepso, XXIII(1–2), 241–250. Santalla, Z. (1992). El ruido y sus efectos en procesos cognitivos [Noise and its effect on cognitive processes]. Dissertation, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, España. Santalla, Z. (1999). Reacciones ante el ruido en jóvenes del área urbana de Caracas y Madrid [Reactions to noise in youngsters from urban areas of Caracas and Madrid]. Analogías del Comportamiento, 4, 81–110. Santalla, Z., Alvarado, J. M., & Santisteban, C. (1999). ¿El ruido afecta a la focalización de la atención visual? [Does noise

affect the visual attention focalization (process)?]. Psicothema, 11(1), 97–111. Santalla, Z., & Santisteban-Requena, C. (1996). Efectos de condiciones acústicas ruidosas sobre el rendimiento en tareas de comprensión lectora y recuerdo de contenido de textos [Effects of noisy acoustic conditions in reading comprehension and memory of texts]. Analogías del Comportamiento, 2, 101–118. Santalla-Banderali, Z. (2006). Impacto de la condición sonora y ciertas características físicas de los estímulos visuales sobre los juicios estéticos de agradabilidad [Impact of sound condition and some physical characteristics of visual stimulus on aesthetics judgments of likeability]. Promotion report. Caracas, VE: UCAB. Santoro, E. (1981). Investigación en psicología [Research in psychology]. Jornadas de Psicología Experimental, Escuela de Psicología, Facultad de Humanidades y Educación, UCV. Silva, C. (2002). Todos somos otros. Discurso, espacio público y vida cotidiana en la Venezuela actual. (We all are others. Discourse, public spaces and everyday life in present Venezuela) Caracas, VE: Comisión de Estudios de Postgrado, Facultad de Humanidades y Educación, UCV. Silva, C. (2004a). The situational forms of otherness: A discourse analytic approach to relationships in public spaces. Critical Psychology, 9, 47–60. Silva, C. (2004b). Dos veces otro: Polarización política y alteridad [Being another twice: Political polarization and otherness]. Revista Venezolana de Economía y Ciencias Sociales, 10(2), 129–136. Urreiztieta, M. T. (2008). La comprensión por el contexto: Los movimientos sociales y los contextos de la acción colectiva [Understanding by the context: Social movements and the contexts of collective action]. Espacio Abierto Cuaderno Venezolano de Sociología, 17(001), 87–108. Villalba, C., Muñoz, C., & Losada, J. (1975). Plan Coche [Coche project]. Psicologia, II(2), 92–93. Vivas, E., & Lugli, Z. (2006). Trastornos del comportamiento alimentario en Venezuela: Panorama actual [Eating behavior disorders in Venezuela: Present situation]. In J. M. Mancilla, & G. Gòmez Péez-Miltré (Eds), Trastornos alimentarios en Hispanoamérica [Eating disorders in Hispanic America] (pp. 173–202). México: Editorial Manual Moderno. Wiesenfeld, E. (1997). Lejos del equilibrio: Comunidad, diversidad y complejidad [Far from balance: Community, diversity

and complexity]. In E. Wiesenfeld (Coord.), El horizonte de la trasformación, acción y reflexión desde la psicología social comunitaria [The horizon of transformation, action and reflection from (the point of view) of community social psychology]. AVEPSO, 8, 7–22. Wiesenfeld, E. (2000). La autoconstrucción. Un estudio psicosocial del significado de la vivienda. [Self construction. A psychosocial study of the meaning of housing]. Caracas, VE: Consejo Nacional de la Vivienda. Wiesenfeld, E. (2006). El rescate de las comunidades en el marco de la globalización [Redemption of communities within the frame of globalization]. Athenea Digital, 9, 46–57. Wiesenfeld, E., & Amaro, A. (2007). Cuando mudarse es más que cambiar de vivienda [When moving is more than changing a house]. In J. Gissi, & D. Sirlopu (Eds), Nuevos asedios a la psique latinoamericana [New sieges to the LatinAmerican psyche] (pp. 106–128). Santiago, CL: Ediciones Universidad Católica de Chile. Wiesenfeld, E., & Sánchez, E. (1996). Psicología social comunitaria [Community social psychology]. Caracas, VE: UCVDirección de Postgrado-Tropikos. Wiesenfeld, E., Sánchez, E., & Cronick, K. (1995). Psicología social comunitaria en Venezuela [Community social psychology in Venezuela]. In E. Wiesenfeld, & E. Sánchez (Eds.), Psicología social comunitaria. Contribuciones Latinoamericanas. [Community Social Psychology. Latin American contributions]. Caracas, VE: UCV-FHE-CEP-Tropikos. Yáber, G., Corales, E., Valarino, E., & Bermudez, Q. J. F. (2007). Estrés ocupacional en despachadores de carga eléctrica en Venezuela [Labor stress in expeditors of electric cargo]. Revista Latinoamericana de Psicología, 39(2), 297–309. Yáber, G., & Ordoñez, L. (2008). Gerencia de sistemas conductuales y diagnóstico organizacional de partidos políticos [Management of behavior Systems and organizational diagnostic of political parties]. Acta Colombiana de Psicología, 11, 145–153. Yáber, G., & Valarino, E. (2007). Clasificación, organización y gestión de la investigación en los postgrados de administración y gerencia [Classification, organization and management of research in graduate courses of administration and management]. Informe de Investigaciones Educativas, XXI, 35–56.

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Concluding Thoughts on Internationalizing the History of Psychology

David B. Baker and Ludy T. Benjamin, Jr.

Abstract This final chapter reviews the development of international psychology, with a focus on internationalizing the history of psychology. A summary of the contributions to this volume is offered that highlights the impact of contextual factors in the development of psychology around the world. Acknowledgment is made of the importance of an indigenous approach in creating an international history of psychology. As psychology becomes more international, it is important that efforts are made to ensure that the records of individuals, organizations, institutions, and events are properly preserved and maintained. Keywords: International psychology, indigenous psychology, education and training, applied psychology, archives

As we write this final chapter, the first half of 2010 has come to a close. It has been 6 months of international news. In January, Haiti felt the devastating effects of a magnitude 7.0 earthquake. The ongoing efforts to provide medical care, food, and shelter for the beleaguered inhabitants of Haiti are international and intensive. July 2010 brought an estimated audience of more than 700 million television viewers to the World Cup soccer championship match between Spain and the Netherlands in South Africa. Both events have been communicated to the world via all manner of social and conventional media, demonstrating advances in the rapid transmission of news and information. Nations that typically might not find common ground can put aside differences to help rebuild a fractured country or enjoy the spectacle of sport. These international events remind us that we are part of the world community. It is our hope that this volume, while not saving lives or winning championships, is participating in, and contributing to, a process of greater international understanding. 616

It is clear that international developments in psychology are prominent on the current radar in our field. We find ourselves living in a time when the world seems much smaller; we are more readily connected in real time and more interdependent. We speak of a world economy and concern ourselves with issues such as global warming. Solutions to many of the issues that confront the world (illness, violence, substance abuse) can be found in the advances being made in psychological science and practice. Many have decried the dominance of Western (mainly American) standards in defining the subject matter and methods of psychological science and practice (Moghaddam, 1987). This same criticism has also been leveled against the history of psychology (Brock, 2006). Few would argue that the standard narrative of the history of psychology emphasizes European and American traditions over others. It is not our intention to take sides in such debates, but rather to acknowledge that we live in times that ask of us greater efforts at international understanding.

The contributors to this volume were asked to provide a narrative describing the history of psychology in their country. We asked them to consider the rise of psychological science and practice against the backdrop of the political and socioeconomic forces that have shaped their psychologies. Each has told a unique story, and in doing so, has added another element to our understanding of the history of psychology. Some stories are better known than others. The history of psychology in countries such as the United States, England, and France has been well covered for decades. Other histories, such as that of the small nation of Brunei, have never been told and are found here for the first time. Taken together, these stories begin to illustrate a new world map, one whose boundaries are less about geography and more about the meaning and need for a science and practice of psychology on a global scale.

Embracing Diversity As was noted in the opening chapter, efforts to bring the world’s psychologists together has a history that began in the late 19th century. Almost as soon as the new science of psychology appeared in Europe, the new psychologists sought to share their experiences. Throughout the 20th century, international organizations have appeared and forums have been conducted. On the other hand, international psychology as a topical area is a relatively recent development (Gilgen & Gilgen, 1987). Due to a confluence of social, political, economic, and technological developments, the 1990s were witness to a proliferation of publications, organizations, and activities bearing the imprimatur of international psychology. The book International Psychology: Views from Around the World (Sexton & Hogan, 1992) was typical of the new genre. It included 45 chapters, each describing the psychology of a particular country. In the introduction, the authors voiced the growing concern that too much of psychology was American psychology: Many feel that North American psychologists have contributed little to international understanding. In their pursuit of psychology as a science, the history and tradition of other cultures were considered irrelevant. And yet the benefits of such an understanding are already apparent and would seem to be increasing. (p. 2).

International psychology seeks to promote communication and collaboration among the world’s psychologists and is viewed as a broad-based effort that includes such disciplines as cross-cultural psychology, cultural psychology, ethnic studies, and

indigenous psychology (Stevens & Wedding, 2004). More recently the term global psychology has been introduced and seeks to expand upon the goals of international psychology to encompass “the application of psychological science to pressing global concerns, such as overpopulation, global warming, HIV/ AIDS, and human trafficking” (Stevens & Gielen, 2007, p. xiv).

International Psychology and the History of Psychology In fulfilling its mission, international psychology focuses on contemporary issues and developments in psychology around the world. Through a myriad of organizations and publications, international psychology has provided increased understanding of psychology in countries throughout the world. Detailed descriptions of the activities of psychologists including their education and training, research interests and activities, professional practice and priorities are helping to foster communication and collaboration, activities that are central to the mission of international psychology (Stevens & Wedding, 2004). In this regard, we believe that an elucidation of the history of psychology in countries throughout the world will add depth and richness to international psychology. Examining psychology’s past, be it an individual, event, institution, or country, provides meaningful understanding of the past and an enriched understanding of the present. History points out the mistakes made and provides perspective. As historian of science Roger Smith has noted “‘without historical knowledge it is simply impossible to understand contexts, the viewpoints of the present as well as the past’” (Smith, 2007, p. 133). Efforts to bring an international focus to the history of psychology are receiving increased attention (Brock, 2006; Kugelman & Belzen, 2009; Pickren, 2009). An important part of the movement toward an international psychology has been the recognition that the development of psychology in North America and Europe tells only a selective part of the story. As Stevens and Wedding (2004) note: International psychology is an antidote to the uncritical application of Western psychology. By questioning claims of objectivity that supersede culture in a universally applicable investigative methodology, international psychology affirmed the necessity of constructing meaningful understanding and applications based on a constitutive view of human functioning. (p. 4)

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The call for an international psychology that embraces traditions other than the ever-present Western point of view suggests that other psychologies exist, are deserving in their own right, and offer frames of reference that enhance psychological science and practice. Consideration of these issues is found most frequently in discussion of an indigenous history of psychology.

Indigenous Histories of Psychology The term “indigenous psychology” is appearing with greater regularity, although its uses and definitions vary. Kim and Berry (1993) define indigenous psychology as “the scientific study of human behavior or mind that is native, that is not transported from other regions, and that is designed for its people” (p. 2). This definition is broad enough to capture the essence of the concept. The concept is not a new one and draws from the traditions of linguist Kenneth Pike (1912–2000), who made a distinction between “emic” and “etic” approaches to the cultural study of language. Pike (1967) derived emic from phonemics and used it to refer to the subjective understanding and meaning of language whereas etic (from phonetics) referred to the objective and scientific study of language. According to Headland and McElhanon (2004): “Pike used emic to refer to the intrinsic cultural distinctions meaningful to the members of a cultural group and etic to refer to the extrinsic ideas and categories meaningful for researchers” (p. 305). Pike’s work highlighted an internal versus external point of view in cultural studies, a distinction that has found its way into other social sciences, including the history of psychology. Striking the balance between emic and etic approaches to psychological knowledge has waxed and waned over the short history of psychology. Local centers of psychological knowledge spread throughout the world in the late 19th and early 20th century. The clinical traditions of France, the psychophysics of Germany, and the anthropometric emphases of London are but a few examples. These practices, local in origin and meaning, found receptive colleagues and students throughout the world. However as historian of psychology Kurt Danzinger (2006) has observed, the domination of American psychology in the postwar period has marginalized indigenous psychology. Danziger (2006) acknowledges the tension that exists between universal principles of psychological processes (the etic) and local conditions (the emic): So we get a dualistic model: on the one hand, basic processes that are regarded as inherent features

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of individual organisms and individual minds; on the other hand, local social conditions that affect the specific manifestations of these processes. The core of psychological science is constituted by the investigation of universally valid basic processes; the study of human psychology in social and historical context, however, is regarded as peripheral to this core endeavor, less important because its results are not universally generalizable. (p. 213)

But the times, as they say, are a’changing. Historians of psychology are beginning to focus on and value the indigenous point of view (Brock, 2006; Pickren, 2009). The late Salvadorian priest and psychologist Ignacio Martín-Baró advanced the concept of liberation psychology (Blucker, 2007). He believed that North American psychology was based upon a set of assumptions that did not fit other countries such as El Salvador. The solution, according to Martín-Baró, was the creation of an indigenous psychology. This could be accomplished by rejecting the assumptions of North American psychology in favor of local traditions and contexts. Indeed, it is the intention of this volume to bring together a collection of indigenous psychologies. We hope this begins a process whereby the histories of psychology of a particular country can be examined both in their own right and in relation to others.

The Power of Time and Place We asked authors to consider the rise of the science and practice of psychology within the larger social and political context of their respective countries. Each chapter contains elements that tell of a unique cultural history. Eventually, nearly all of the narratives locate modern psychology within the context of the received traditions of Western psychology. In examining the chapters individually and collectively, a number of themes emerge that can serve as a taxonomy of sorts for organizing an emerging international history of psychology.

Antiquity and Modernity In many ways, the history of psychology around the world is akin to the history of human civilization. For example, the teaching of Confucius (551–479 bc) on such topics as the unity of nature and people, the interaction between spirit and body, and the relationship between human learning and state governance have influenced Chinese life, culture, and politics for more than two millennia. As Hsueh and Guo (2011, Chapter 6, this volume) indicate, echoes of Confucius

can be found in such modern psychological concepts as perception and cognition, emotions, will and volition, mental ability, and the relationship between inborn qualities and experience. The origins of psychology in the Middle East tell of Islamic and Muslim traditions that clearly elucidate psychological themes. As the chapters on Saudi Arabia and Egypt make clear, the Middle Ages were times of great innovation among Islamic scholars on theories of mind, human perception, and psychopathology. Likewise, the 16th-century traditions of influential thinkers such as Juan Luis Vies of Spain provided treatises on the mind and soul that became part of the emergence of empiricism during the Renaissance (Clements, 1967). In 17th-century Scotland, advances in physiology existed alongside philosophical analysis of mind that merged in 19th-century German psychophysics, giving rise to the science of psychology. As anyone who has taken (or taught) a course on the history of psychology knows, there is usually some acknowledgment of the similarity of ancient thought to modern expressions of psychological science and practice. Rarely, however, do they provide the type of depth, diversity, and continuity that are presented in this volume. What begins to emerge from these narratives is a history of psychology that is indigenous and at the same time universal.

Spirituality and Religion The relationships between faith traditions and psychology are numerous yet often underacknowledged. Increasingly historians of psychology are beginning to explicate these relationships and are doing so from an international perspective (Kugelman & Belzen, 2009). The present volume offers multiple examples of the ways in which religion has shaped social and political forces that have had a bearing on psychological science and practice. The history of psychology in the Russian Federation shows that the divine right bestowed upon the czars allowed Orthodox faith to maintain the status quo and resist the impulses that were pressing for secular modernization. According to Sirotkina and Smith (2011, Chapter 20, this volume), Thus clashes between materialist spiritualist views of human nature, debates on free will and responsibility, and, inevitably, early discussions relevant to psychology were intensely politicized. Materialism and radical political opposition to tsarism were firmly associated in pre-revolutionary Russia, while alternative views were often

characteristic of a more moderate and sometimes conservative intelligentsia. The struggles between materialists and spiritualists in the second half of the 19th century shaped psychology as a separate domain of thought.

Before there was a science of psychology, many English-speaking countries relied on mental and moral philosophy as a guide to understanding mind and behavior. In 19th-century America, this was exemplified in the teachings and writings of Thomas Upham (1799–1872) of Bowdoin College. His 1827 textbook Elements of Mental Philosophy was a major best seller for nearly 50 years (Fuchs, 2000). Typical of the genre, the book described a “faculty psychology,” an approach that ascribed mental traits such as attention, intellect, and emotions to distinct units of mind. Much in the tradition of Scottish moral philosophy, faculty psychology attempted to define the meaning of a moral and just life. Such a perspective made this nascent psychology an acceptable topic of instruction in America colleges and university’s most of which had clear religious affiliations (Goodwin, 2011, Chapter 27, this volume). The impact of religion on psychology was substantial in 20th-century Ireland. The growth and development of psychology in 20th-century Ireland was slowed by a confluence of events related to the political and economic consequences of independence from Britain. Independence brought with it a reassertion of the primacy and authority of the Catholic Church. This was especially evident in education (including higher education), where Church doctrine dictated what would be taught and how it would be taught. Brock (2011, this volume, Chapter 18) notes, “The situation is of relevance to psychology since many members of the church were opposed to what they saw as a secular and/or materialistic approach to the soul.” This opposition extended to social services that were not part of the faith tradition leading Brock to conclude, “With attitudes like this, it is easy to see how Ireland reached the 1950s without offering psychological services of any kind and why scientific or modern psychology had not become established in the universities.” In many ways, the relationship between psychology and religion in Ireland is typical of the common tensions that have existed between faith and reason throughout the history of psychology.

Industrialization and Applied Psychology A clear distinction exists between those countries that are industrialized and those that are not. baker, benjamin

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The differences are evident in all manner of economic indicators and also in the development and direction that psychology has taken around the world. The mass industrialization of Western nations during the 20th century gave rise to many of the principles and practices in psychology that are omnipresent today. In many ways, applied psychology appeared in industrialized nations as an expression of the utility of psychological science to solve a variety of human problems. Industrialization led to a shift from rural to urban life, and created new industrial urban centers that were the embodiment of the modern. Technology thrived and brought a host of modern conveniences like electricity and automobiles, as well as a culture of consumerism that kept the economy moving. As expenditures for goods and services increased, so too did demand for human labor. It was here that psychology offered a growing list of tests and tools for assessing aptitude and ability. Darwin’s revolutionary work on evolution generated significant interest in the measurement of individual differences, including the efficient matching of person and environment. Whether in business, education, industry, or the military, applied psychology helped to meet the need for a differentiated labor force. With the advent of World War I, these applications of psychology gained favor through the selection and training of military personnel. In the United States and in European countries like Germany, the military provided a stable and sustainable base for applied psychology.

Conflict and Colonization Perhaps the greatest influence on the emergence of psychology around the world has been the neverending struggle for power and control. Although the mechanisms and means may vary (invasion, civil war, world war, economic crisis, etc.), the outcomes are fairly similar. Throughout history, political ideologies and practices have exerted tremendous influence over the development, application, and value of knowledge. Consider that psychology emerged in Turkey largely as a result of the demise of the Ottoman Empire and the ascendancy of European modernism that led to the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923. Commenting on the change Gülerce (2011, Chapter 26, this volume) observed: Diplomats and students were sent abroad to observe the developments not only in industry, technology and science, but also culture and social life in Europe. Modern educational institutions were established and

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foreign instructors were invited to Istanbul. Although relations with France changed after France’s colonialist expansion and Bonaparte’s invasion of Malta and Egypt (1798), the appropriation of European modernism as the guiding political orientation through Western technology, knowledge, law and art remained.

In many parts of the world, colonization has shaped psychological science and practice. Colonization in essence overrides existing culture and replaces it with the worldview of the colonizer. The chapters on psychology in South America and the Caribbean are examples. In Colombia, an indigenous psychology that predated the arrival of Spanish colonizers in the 15th century thrived. According to Ardila (2011, Chapter 7, this volume): In the territory of present-day Colombia many native groups existed, including the Muiscas, Taironas, Caribbeans, Tolimas, Kunas, and others. In all of them have been found ideas related to the human being, family, child rearing practices, the lifecycle, old age, the way to know the world, sexuality, how we learn, how people relate to others, the normal and abnormal, relationships between genders, harmony between people, death and the afterlife.

Spanish colonizers insisted that Christianity would bring a civilizing influence to a native population they viewed as primitive. In that process, the indigenous culture all but disappeared. Beginning in the 15th century, the indigenous tribes of the Caribbean Islands were overwhelmed by explorers and exploiters from Spain, Britain, France, Holland, and the United States. African slaves populated many of the Caribbean Islands, forced to work in the plantations that produced sugar and spices that were traded throughout the world. The legacy left by this history is summarized by Frey (2011, Chapter 5, this volume): Longstanding problems of violence, educational disparities and emerging health issues such as HIV/AIDS all can be traced to the psychosocial fragmentation resulting from this colonial heritage. It stands to reason then that the direction of psychology in the region has been shaped by the need to address the psychosocial needs of the inhabitants of the islands.

Examination of the impact of colonization on the suppression and expression of psychology from an indigenous perspective is an example of new ways in

which the history of psychology is becoming internationalized (Brock, 2006; Pickren, 2009).

Looking Forward All of the chapters in this volume describe psychology as a discipline that offers some promise of understanding and improving the human condition. The science and practice of psychology has evolved around the world on different trajectories and timelines, yet converges on the recognition of the need for a human science that can confront the challenges that face the world today. Problems of disease, poverty, education, mental illness, the environment, and armed conflict are human problems that require human answers. Psychology is well suited to respond and, as many of the chapters in this volume attest, the need for trained professionals is widespread. Stevens and Gielen (2007) estimate that there are more than 1 million psychologists in the world. Traditionally, the greatest number of psychologists was found in the United States. This is no longer true. It has been estimated that there are more than 300,000 psychologists in Europe, 200,000 in Latin America, and 277,000 in the United States (Stevens & Wedding, 2004). Using such estimates is difficult because of the significant variability in defining just who is a psychologist. In many places, a baccalaureate degree provides entry into the profession, whereas in others the doctorate serves as the terminal degree. In addition to degree attainment, there are issues of professional regulation including licensing requirements. For more than 50 years, professional psychologists in the United States have been governed by a model of training that specifies the doctorate as the entry-level degree into the profession. Efforts to provide some international uniformity in professional standards is under way and the efforts of the European Federation of Psychologists’ Association (EFPA) is an example. The 2006 Declaration on the European Standards of education and training in professional psychology (EuroPsy) offered a recommended set of standards for psychologists in independent practice that includes (European Federation of Psychologists’ Association, 2010): 1. Completion of education and training in psychology at a recognized University level of at least 6 years duration, including: a. A university degree in psychology, which has a duration equivalent to at least 5 years of full-time study b. At least 1 year of supervised practice (included in or added to the university degree program), and

2. Commitment in writing to the ethical code of psychologists in the country of practice and the European Metacode of ethics for psychologists. In a similar vein, the Strategic Plan for the International Union of Psychological Science, adopted in 2008, lists the development of a common core in psychology as a major goal (International Union of Psychological Science [IUPsyS], 2010). Included in this charge is the development of standards and discipline-wide guidelines covering the definition and recognition of psychology and psychologists, education and training, curriculum development, ethics, and the responsible conduct of research and professional practice. As international psychology grows and examines just what it means to be a psychologist, it is fair to ask what role the history of psychology will play. We hope that this volume contributes to efforts to internationalize the history of psychology. The chapters in this volume remind us that there are unique contexts and circumstances that influence the ways in which the science and practice of psychology are assimilated into our daily lives. Making these contexts and circumstances explicit through historical research and writing provides many benefits. Clearly, the field of psychology is becoming more and more specialized and, as it does so, it requires more specialized knowledge. In essence, the questions we ask are more narrow and specific, often at the expense of the larger, more meaningful questions. It can be argued that specialized knowledge acquires its meaning only from an understanding of its place in a broader intellectual context, an understanding made possible through the study of our history (Benjamin & Baker, 2009). Given the important role that the history of psychology can play in advancing the discipline, we are hopeful that the history of psychology will find a place of significance in international psychology. Indeed, the purpose of this volume is to bring a historical perspective to international psychology. It is clear that there are colleagues around the world who are very much interested in, and see the value of, a historical approach to understanding psychology. Some of the authors in this volume have considerable experience and expertise in the history of psychology, many others do not, but this did not deter them from accepting the challenge of making the historical record more inclusive. We believe that declaring the value of our shared history begins at the undergraduate level. Given the lack of any consensus about a core curriculum baker, benjamin

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in psychology, it is not surprising that there is little available information about the teaching of the history of psychology at the undergraduate or graduate level around the world. In the United States, the history of psychology has had a presence in higher education throughout the 20th century. As a result, a substantial portion of the scholarship and research on the history of psychology (including textbooks) originates in the United States. In some ways, the status of the history of psychology in the United States serves as a bellwether. In this regard, it is interesting to consider the conclusions of Fuchs and Viney (2002), who studied the status of the teaching of the history of psychology in the United States: That the course is offered by most departments and that many psychologists are committed to it is a positive sign for the future of the course. However, that optimistic interpretation is balanced by the small but nevertheless disturbing indication that some psychologists do not value the course sufficiently to commit staffing resources to it, that some departments will drop the course should the present instructor cease to offer it, and that a number of departments do not require the course for psychology majors. (p. 12).

It is not enough to simply label the history of a psychology as a value that psychologists should share. It is also necessary to create and maintain organizations and institutions that can provide resources for those interested in the history of psychology. In North America in the mid-1960s, a critical mass of sorts was achieved for those interested in teaching, research, and scholarship in the history of psychology. Within the span of a few years, two major organizations appeared: Cheiron: The International Society for the History of the Social and Behavioral Sciences, and Division 26 (Society for the History of Psychology) of the American Psychological Association. Both sponsor annual meetings, and are affiliated with scholarly journals that provide an outlet for original research. Cheiron-Europe (now known as the European Society for the History of the Human Sciences; ESHH) was founded in 1982, and through annual meetings and a newsletter, serves as an important outlet for researchers and students interested in the history of psychology (Lafuente & Ferrándiz, 1991). In 1988, Sociedad Española de Historia de la Psicología (SEHP; the Spanish Society of the History of Psychology) was formed. In addition to an annual meeting, they publish Revista de Historia de la Psicología (Journal of the History of Psychology). 622

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An important institution in the generation of new knowledge is the doctoral training program in the history and theory of psychology at York University in Toronto, Ontario, Canada. A specialization in the theory and history of psychology is also offered in the department of psychology at the University of Groningen in the Netherlands. For the history of psychology to flourish, it is essential that there are repositories for original source material that can provide the data for historical research. The published record provides access to original source material through monographs and serials that are widely circulated and available in most academic libraries (including reference works such as indexes, encyclopedias, and handbooks). Hard-to-find and out-of-print material (newspapers, newsletters) are now much more easily available thanks to their proliferation in electronic resources. Too often, valuable sources of information (obituaries, departmental, and oral histories) that are vital to maintaining the historical record are not always catalogued and indexed in ways that make them readily available and visible. The most important of all sources of data are archival repositories. Within such repositories, one can find records of individuals (referred to as manuscript collections) and organizations (termed archival collections). Manuscript collections preserve and provide access to unique documents, such as correspondence, lab notes, drafts of manuscripts, grant proposals, and case records. Archival collections of organizations contain materials such as membership records, minutes of meetings, convention programs, and the like. Archival repositories provide, in essence, the “inside story,” free of editorial revision or censure and marked by the currency of time as opposed to suffering the losses and distortion of later recall. In much the same way, still images, film footage, and artifacts such as apparatus and instrumentation aid in the process of historical discovery. As the history of psychology internationalizes there is more interest in, and awareness of, archival repositories. Most collections are organized on a national basis. The Center for the History of Psychology (CHP) at the University of Akron is one of the oldest and largest collections in the world devoted to the history of psychology. Since its founding in 1965, it has amassed an outstanding collection of materials including manuscripts, organizational records, instruments and apparatus, film, photographs, sound recordings, rare books, and psychological tests. Detailed information about these holdings can be found on the CHP website (www.uakron.edu/chp). Also in the United States is

the American Psychological Association Archives (http://www.apa.org/about/archives/index.aspx). It provides records related to the American Psychological Association, the largest psychological association in the world. Germany is home to the Adolf-Würth-Center for the History of Psychology located at the University of Würzburg. Under the direction of Armin Stock, it offers a wealth of matieral (http://www.awz.uni-wuerzburg.de/en/archive/). The Virtual Laboratory at the Max Planck Institute for the History of Science in Berlin (http://vlp.mpiwg-berlin. mpg.de/index_html) also offers a rich collection of primary source materials in early experimental psychology. In Italy, there is a flurry of archival activity. At the University of Bari, the A. Mari Laboratory of the History of Applied Psychology opened online in 2003. The website (http://laboratoriodistoriadellapsicologia. com/index.php?section=home) includes images and explanations of a wide range of instruments and apparatus used in psychological research. The University Bicocca of Milan opened the Benussi Archive in 2005, followed by the Historical Archives of Italian psychology (http://www.archiviapsychologica.org/index. php?id=1040) in 2008. Efforts are under way to gather material from around Italy to include on a single website, to create a virtual study and work place (M. Sinatra, personal communication, June 6, 2010). In South America, there is growing interesting archival collections. The Archives of the Federal University of Minas Geris on the History of Psychology in Brazil were established in 1997 (Campos, 2010). The archives hold a number of collections related to the growth of psychology and education in Brazil. Argentina has a number of growing collections in the history of psychology. At the National University of Cordoba, the Historical Archive of the Department of Psychology was created in 2007 and the Testimonial and Documentary Archive of the Department of Psychology is located at Buenos Aires University. Important documentary material related to history of psychology can also be found in the General Archives of the Argentine Republic that includes among its holdings case-histories of patients at the National Hospital of Women Mentally Ill (H. Klappenbach, personal communication, May 15, 2010). In many places such as Japan, efforts to establish archival repositories are under way (M. Takasuna, personal communication, April 12, 2010). Like colleagues in other countries, Japanese historians of psychology are finding the digital environment well suited to sharing historical data (http://www.l.utokyo.ac.jp/psy/psychoHP/history/english/index. html).

In the end, we are left with an important question: So what? What is the importance of an international history of psychology? What do we gain? The history of psychology will not end war or reduce poverty, but that is not the point. It is easily argued that an international history of psychology offers some instrumental benefits. The examination of psychology’s past provides not only a more meaningful understanding of that past, but a more informed and enriched appreciation of our present, and the best available data for making predictions about our future. It aids critical thinking by providing a compendium of the trials, tribulations, and advances that accrue from the enormous questions we ask of our science and profession, and it offers the opportunity to reduce the drift we seem to experience in relation to each other. The world is getting smaller and the challenges larger. Now, more than ever, we need to look to those places of mutual interest and understanding. Our shared history—rich in its similarities and differences—is an excellent place to start.

Further Reading Brock, A. (Ed.) (2006). Internationalizing the history of psychology. NY: New York University Press. David, H. P., & Buchanan, J. (2003). International psychology. In D. K. Freedheim (Ed.), Handbook of psychology. Volume 1: History of psychology (pp. 509–533). Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley. Pickren, W. E. (2009). Indigenization and the history of psychology. Psychological Studies, 54, 87–95.

References Ardila, R. (2011). Colombia. In D. B. Baker (Ed.), The Oxford handbook of the history of psychology: Global perspectives. New York: Oxford University Press. Benjamin, L. T., & Baker, D. B. (2009). Recapturing a context for psychology: The role of history. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 4, 97–98. Blucker, R. (2007). Ignacio Martín-Baró and the birth of a liberation psychology. Unpublished manuscript, Texas A & M University. Brock, A. (Ed.) (2006). Internationalizing the history of psychology. NY: New York University Press. Campos, R. H. F. (2010). Sources: The UFMG archives of the history of psychology in Brazil. History of Psychology, 13, 201–205. Clements, R. D. (1967). Physiological-psychological thought in Juan Luis Vives. Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences, 3, 219–35. Danziger, K. (2006). Universalism and indigenization in the history of modern psychology. In A. Brock (Ed.), Internationalizing the history of psychology (pp. 208–25). NY: New York University Press. European Federation of Psychologists’ Association. (2010). Declaration on the European Standards of education and training in professional psychology–EuroPsy. Retrieved June 1, 2010 from http://www.efpa.eu/.

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Frey, R. (2011). The Caribbean. In D. B. Baker (Ed.), The Oxford handbook of the history of psychology: Global perspectives. New York: Oxford University Press. Fuchs, A. H. (2000). Contributions of American mental philosophers to psychology in the United States. History of Psychology, 3, 1–18. Fuchs, A. H., & Viney, W. (2002). The course in the history of psychology: Present status and future concerns. History of Psychology, 5(1), 3–15. Gilgen, A. R. & Gilgen, C. K. (Eds.). (1987). International Handbook of Psychology. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. Goodwin, C. J. (2011). United States. In D. B. Baker (Ed.), The Oxford handbook of the history of psychology: Global perspectives. New York: Oxford University Press. Gülerce, A. (2011). Turkey. In D. B. Baker (Ed.), The Oxford handbook of the history of psychology: Global perspectives. New York: Oxford University Press. Headland, T. N., & McElhanon, K. A. (2004). Emic/etic distinction. In M. Lewis-Beck, A. Bryman, & T. F. Liao (Eds.), The Sage encyclopedia of social science research methods (p. 305). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Hsueh, Y. & Guo, B. (2011). China. In D. B. Baker (Ed.), The Oxford handbook of the history of psychology: Global perspectives. New York: Oxford University Press. International Union of Psychological Science (IUPsyS). (2010). IUPsyS 2008–2012 strategic plan. Retrieved June 1, 2010 from http://issuu.com/iupsys-info/docs/2010–4–1-brochure. Kim, U., & Berry, J. W. (1993). Indigenous psychologies: Research and experience in cultural context. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

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Kugelmann, R., & Belzen, J. A. (2009). Historical intersections of psychology, religion, and politics in national contexts. History of Psychology, 12, 125–31. Lafuente, E., & Ferrandiz, A. (1991). Estado actual de la historiografia de la psicologia en españa. Un analisis de la revista de historia de la psicologia (1980–1987). Revista De Historia De La Psicologia, 12, 37–46. Moghaddam, F. M. (1987). Psychology in the three worlds: As reflected by the crisis in social psychology and the move toward indigenous third-world psychology. American Psychologist, 42, 912–920. Pickren, W. E. (2009). Indigenization and the history of psychology. Psychological Studies, 54, 87–95. Pike, K. L. (1967). Language in relation to a unified theory of the structure of human behavior (2nd ed.). The Hague: Mouton. Sexton, V. S., & Hogan, J. D. (Eds.). (1992). International psychology: Views from around the world. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. Sirotkina, I., & Smith, R. (2011). Russian Federation. In D. B. Baker (Ed.), The Oxford handbook of the history of psychology: Global perspectives. New York: Oxford University Press. Smith, R. (2007). Why history matters. Revista De Historia De La Psicologia, 28, 125–146. Stevens, M. J., & Gielen, U. P. (Eds.). (2007). Toward a global psychology: Theory, research, intervention, and pedagogy. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. Stevens, M. J., & Wedding, D. (2004). Handbook of international psychology. NY: Brunner-Routledge.

INDEX

Page numbers followed by “f ”, “t”, or “n” denote figures, tables, or notes, respectively

A AAAP. See American Association for Applied Psychology AAP. See Arab Association of Psychology Al-Aaser, S. Y., 167 AB5C. See Abridged Big Five Dimensional Circumplex ABC test, 40 Abdel-Hameed, S. J., 167 Abdel-Rahman, A. I., 167 Abhidhamma, 152 Abnormal Childhood, 325 abnormal psychology, 354–55, 446–47 Aboriginal psychology, 30–31 Abou-Hashem, E. M., 167 Abou-Hatab, F. A., 168 ABP. See Brazilian Association of Psychology ABRAPSO. See Associação Brasileira de Psicologia Social Abridged Big Five Dimensional Circumplex (AB5C), 145 Al-Abssia Mental Health Hospital, 163 Academic Carelia Society, 217 Academy of Pedagogical Sciences, 426–27 accreditation system in Brazil, 42 in Egypt, 171–72 in Italy, 339 in Lebanon, 374 in New Zealand, 384–85 in Philippines, 404–5 in United States, 589 ACER. See Australian Council for Educational Research Ach, Narziss, 276 ACOSTRAD. See Association for the Control of Sexually Transmitted Disease Acta Colombiana de Psicología, 134 Acta Psychologica Sinica, 99, 106, 108 activity theory, 117, 435, 437 acts, 276, 329–30 ADMU. See Ateneo de Manila University Adolescents’ Pressures and Confrontation Skills: Diagnosis and Treatment (Awad), 167 AES. See Army Education Scheme Aesthetica (Wolff), 260 African Intelligence (Biesheuvel), 498

Afro-Asian Psychological Association, 406 After the Storm...There Is the Calm: An Analysis of the Bereavement Process (Pottinger), 68 Aganon, Allen, 402 Aggressive Behavior Modification for Normal and Special Needs Children: A Guide for Parents (Mershed), 167 Ágora: Studies on Psychoanalytical Theory, 47 Aguiling-Dalisay, Grace, 403 Ahmed, M. A., 164 Ahmed, M. H., 165 Ahmed, S. K., 168 Ahrens, Heinrich, 267 al-Ahwani, Ahmed Fouad, 455 Aignelocáicht, 293 Ain Shams University, 164, 170, 172 Ain WaZein hospital, 368 Ai Wei, 100, 102–3, 105 Alawai, M. H., 168–69 Alberoni, Francesco, 336 Alcan, Félix, 233 Aldaba-Lim, Estefania, 398–400 Alenis, Julius, 92 Alexander, Samuel, 191 Alexander II, Tsar of Russia, 212, 414 Alexander the Great, 551 Alhefnee, A., 170 Aliotta, Antonio, 321 Alkindus, 163, 443, 445 Allesch, Johannes von, 279 Allgemeine Encyclopädie der Physik (Karsten), 268 Allihn, Friedrich Heinrich Theodor, 267 Allport, Gordon, 219, 504, 569n2 All Souls College, 202–3 Alnafie, Abdullah, 450 Alonzo, Agustin, 397 Alpha’s Pilgrimage (Ancízar), 130 Althusser, Louis, 248 Alvarez-Villar, Alfonso, 524 Alves, Isaias, 39–40 American Association for Applied Psychology (AAAP), 585, 587 American Journal of Psychology, 3, 350, 573 American Psychological Association (APA), 6, 28, 368, 572, 623 American Psychological Society, 28 American Psychologist, 28 American Society for Psychical Research, 3

American testing movement, 26 American University of Beirut (AUB), 366, 369–71 Analects, 83 Analisis y Modificacion de Conducta, 529 Analogies of Behavior, 607 Analysis of Sensations (Mach), 140 Analysis of the Concept of Empirical Reality (Musatti), 331 Anana’ev, Boris Grigor’evich, 427, 436 Anatolians, 549 Anatomy of the Human Body (Bell & Bell), 466, 467f Ancízar, Manuel, 130 Ancona, Leonardo, 336 Anderson, Francis, 19 Anderson, John, 24 Anderson, William, 483–84 Anderson Inquiry, 25 Andler, Charles, 239 Andrada e Silva, José Bonifácio de, 36 Angell, James, 6, 577 Animal Behavior (Morgan), 185 animal magnetism, 250n16, 262 An Introduction to Social Psychology (Soueif ), 169 Ankara Gazi Institute, 560 Annals of Eugenics, 193 Annals of Psychology, 170 An-Naysaburi, 447 Année Psychologique, 3 Annual Review of Psychology, 534 ANPEPP. See National Association of Graduate Programs in Psychology Anschütz, Georg, 558, 565 anthropologia, 256–57, 282n5 The Anthropological Principle in Philosophy (Chernyshevskii), 414 anthropology, 311–15 Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (Kant), 260 anthropometry, 312 Antipoff, Helena, 39–400 antipsychology, in Australia, 29–30 antiquity, 618–19 Antoniana Margarita (Pereira), 515 Antonovich, Maksim Alekseevich, 415 Anton Reiser (Moritz), 261 APA. See American Psychological Association

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apartheid, 498–99, 508 “An Appeal to the Civilized World,” 5 apperception, 258 applied psychology, 5–6, 39–41, 274–76, 298, 325–28, 619–20. See also psychotechnics Applied Psychology, 201 Applied Psychology Research Unit (APU), 204 APS. See Australian Psychological Society Aptitude Test Section (ATS), 502 APU. See Applied Psychology Research Unit Al-Aqad, A. A., 169 Aquino, Benigno, Jr., 403, 409n2 Aquino, Corazon, 403 Arab Association of Psychology (AAP), 169–70 Arab Council for Medical Specialization, 369 Arab Council of Childhood and Development, 170 Arabic Studies in Psychology, 170 Arab Journal of Contemporary Psychology, 170 Arab League, 170 Arab Psychologist, 170 Archive of Psychology, Neurology, and Psychiatry, 332–33, 336 Archivos de Neurobiologia, 523 Ardigò, Roberto, 308–11, 340 Ardila, Ruben, 531, 597 Aristotle, 256, 292, 551 Army Education Scheme (AES), 500–501 Arnold, Wilhelm, 279 A Arte de Crear Bem os Filhos na Idade da Puerícia (Gusmão), 35 art psychology, 152 Asfuriyeh. See Lebanese Hospital for Mental and Nervous Diseases Asia-Oceania Psychological Association, 406 AsoVAC. See Venezuelan Association for the Advancement of Science Aspects of Gestalt Psychology (Köhler & Koffka), 100 Assagioli, Roberto, 318 Associação Brasileira de Psicologia Social (ABRAPSO), 47 Association for the Control of Sexually Transmitted Disease (ACOSTRAD), 69 Association of Handicapped Children of Brunei Darussalam, 57 Association of Integrative Psychology, 67 Association of Japanese Clinical Psychology, 362 Association of Medical Officers, 186 Association of Psychological and Education Counselors of Asia, 404 Ateneo de Manila University (ADMU), 398 ATS. See Aptitude Test Section AUB. See American University of Beirut

626

index

Auckland University College, 378 Ausdruckskunde, 262 Australasian Association of Psychology and Philosophy, 21 Australia academic expansion of, 23–24 antipsychology in, 29–30 behavioral therapy in, 27 behaviorism in, 26 clinical psychology in, 26–28 Code of Ethics, 25 deinstitutionalization in, 27 education system of, 18–20 history of, 18 multiculturalism in, 31 psychoanalysis in, 21–22, 29–30 research in, 25–26 Scientology in, 25 standardized testing in, 20 women in, 26 Australian Council for Educational Research (ACER), 20 Australian Industrial and Organizational Psychology Conference, 28 Australian Institute of Industrial Psychology, 21 Australian Journal of Psychology, 23, 28 Australian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy, 21 Australian National University, 23 Australian Psychological Society (APS), 25, 31–32 Australian Psychologist, 28 Australian Research Council, 26 Austregésilo, Antônio, 38 Ausubel, David, 382 automatisms, 236–37 Avances en Psicología Latinoamericana, 134 AVEFAP. See Venezuelan Association for Academic Training in Psychology Awad, R. R., 167 Awaji, Yenjiro, 358 The Awakening of Mahayana Faith, 87 Azevedo, Fernando, 40 Al-Azhar University, 163 Azzi, Enzo, 42

B Babinski, Joseph, 237 Bachelard, Gaston, 246 Bachelard, P. M., 19 Bacon, Francis, 478 Badawi, A. Z., 170 Baer, Ernst von, 183 Baillarger, Jules, 235 Baillie, Matthew, 471 Bain, Alexander, 3, 19, 184, 189, 348, 378, 419, 462–64, 463f, 490n1 Balbiani, Edouard Gérard, 237 Balcar, Karel, 143–44 Baldwin, James Mark, 4, 111, 483, 517 Balfour, Alfred, 189 Balinskii, Ivan Mikhailovich, 417

al-Balkhi, Abu Zayd Ahmed Ibn Sahl, 443, 447, 449 Ballard, Philip, 194 Banisonni, Ferruccio, 329, 334 Barbado, Manuel, 524 Barbados, 73–74 Barcelona School, 518–19 Barnes, Earl, 199 Baroja, Pio, 521 Barrett-Lennard, Godfrey, 26 Barth, Paul, 353 Bartlett, Frederic, 182, 187, 190, 197, 203–4, 296, 380, 489 Bartolome, Jose, 402 Basaglia, Franco, 337 Basaglia law, 338 Basov, P. Ia., 425 Bastian, Adolf, 268 Bastick, Tony, 61, 65 BAU, Se Beirut Arab University Baudouin, Charles, 251n39 Baumgarten, Alexander Gottlieb, 260 Beaglehole, Ernest, 380–82, 388 Beattie, James, 476, 482–83 Beaunis, Henri, 233, 237 Becker, Erik, 595 Bedair, K., 167 Beeby, Clarence Edward, 380, 383, 385 Beers, Clifford, 584 Behavioral Therapy and Behavior Modification (Meleika), 169 behaviorism, 26, 47, 126, 133, 135, 200, 217–19, 386–87, 578–79, 604. See also neobehaviorism Behaviorism (Watson, J.), 100, 578 behavior therapy, 27, 447–48, 589 Beijing Normal College Psychology Lesson Plan (Hattori), 96 Beirut Arab University, 372 Beirut Executive Committee, 367 Bekhterev, Vladimir Mikhailovich, 417, 425, 429–30 Belar, Cynthia, 373 Belfast Agreement of 1998, 291 Bell, Charles, 466–68, 467f Bell, John, 466, 467f Bell, Matthew, 261 Bell Street Special School, 20 Benedict, Ruth, 381 Beneke, Eduard, 267 Benko, Antonius, 42 Bennet, John, 55 Bennett, Alexander Hughes, 469 Bentham, Jeremy, 128 Benussi, Vittorio, 311, 325, 329–31 Benussi Archive, 623 Berkeley, George, 292 Berlin Academy of Sciences, 257 Berlin University, 353 Bernard, Claude, 233, 236, 315 Bernheim, Hippolyte, 235–36 Bernshtein, Nikolai Alesandrovich, 413–14, 421–23, 437

Berry, Richard, 30 Best, Elsdon, 381, 388 Bianchi, Leonardo, 315–16, 322 Bianchini, Marco Levi, 335 Biesheuvel, Simon, 498, 502, 506 Bijou, Sidney, 600 BILE. See Bulletin of the ILE Binet, Alfred, 38, 193–94, 237–38, 250n50, 517, 558, 579–80 Binet Intelligence Test, 20, 165 Binet-Simon Intelligence Test, 105, 326, 357 Binswanger, Ludwig, 337 Biographical Sketch of an Infant (Darwin, C.), 198 biotypology, 333–35 Birnbrauer, Jay, 29 Al-Biruni, 443 Blampied, Neville, 387 Blatný, Marek, 146, 154 Bliss, Daniel, 370 Bloch, Marc, 242 Blondel, Charles, 239, 242 Blonskii, P. P., 422–23, 425–26 Blowers, Geoffrey, 99, 111 Blumenfeld, Walter, 141 Boas, Franz, 381 Boerhaave, Hermann, 464 Böhme, Jacob, 257 Bois-Reymond, Emil du, 270 Boletin de Avepso, 607 Boletin de la Institucion Libre de Enseñanza, 523 Bolivar, Simón, 128 Bologna process, 282 Bolshevik Revolution, 416 Bolshevism, 216–18, 419–24 Bomfim, Manoel, 38–39 Bonaventura, Enzo, 321, 329, 331–33 Bondy, Curt, 278 Bonghi, Ruggero, 312 Bonifacio, Andres, 396 Book of Optics (Ibn al-Haytham), 444 Bori, Carolina, 35, 41–42 Boring, E. G., 292, 329, 571–72 Borovskii, P. P., 422 Boselli, Paolo, 312 Bowlby, John, 31, 204 Boxtröm, Bruno, 215 Boyle, Robert, 292 Bozhovich, L. I., 432 BPS. See British Psychological Society Braid, James, 232, 262 Brain and Soul (Chelpanov), 416 Brancale, Ralphe, 66 Branche, Clement, 61, 65 Brandejs, Matĕj, 147 Brazil accreditation in, 42 applied psychology in, 39–41 behaviorism in, 47 colonialism in, 35–37 education system of, 35–36

higher education in, 41–42, 44–45 humanism in, 47 postgraduate training in, 49 professional training in, 42–44 psychological assessments in, 43 psychotherapy in, 46 social activism in, 43–44 social psychology in, 44 sub-disciplines in, 48t theoretical affinities of, 46–48 Brazilian Archives of Applied Psychology, 45 Brazilian Archives of Psychotechnique, 45 Brazilian Association for Psychotherapy and Medical Behaviorism, 47 Brazilian Association of Psychology (ABP), 41 Brazilian Federation of Cognitive Therapies, 47 Brazilian Journal of Behavior Analysis, 47 Brazilian League of Mental Hygiene, 40 Brazilian National Council for Research and Development (CNPq), 44 Brazilian Society for the Advancement of Science (SBPC), 41 Brazilian Society of Psychoanalysis, 38 Brazilian Society of Psychology, 45 Brengelmann, Hans, 527 Brentano, Franz, 140, 276, 321 Breuer, Josef, 481 Brewster, David, 474–75, 474f Brewster’s stereoscope, 474f Břicháček, V., 144–45 Brinchcín, Milan, 145 British Association for the Advancement of Science, 202 British Child Study Association, 199 British Eugenics Society, 193 British Journal of Psychiatry, 186 British Journal of Psychology, 191, 380 British Psychological Society (BPS), 23, 190–91, 200, 299 British Society for Psychical Research, 3 Brito, Farias, 38 Broad, Charles Dunbar, 488 Broca, Paul, 235, 312 Brock, Adrian, 289 Brožek, Josef, 35, 143 Brooks, Garland, 293 Brown, Crum, 481 Brown, Thomas, 477f, 480–82 Brown, William, 194, 196, 204 Brown-Earle, Orlean, 61, 65 Brücke, Ernst, 270 Brunei Counseling Association (PERKAB), 56–57 Brunei Darussalam Chinese culture in, 52–53 counseling in, 55–56 education system of, 53–54 guidance in, 55–56 health care in, 54–55 higher education in, 54 psychological services in, 54–55

sociocultural beliefs of, 51–52 Brushlinskii, Andrei Vladimirovich, 437 Bryant, Sophie, 190 Bubnov, A. S., 425–26 Buccola, Gabriele, 308, 315–18 Buck, Peter, 381, 392n4 Bucknill, John, 185 Buddhism, 52–53, 82, 86–87, 94, 116n5, 551 Bühler, Charlotte, 7 Bühler, Karl, 7–8, 276 Buisson, Ferdinand, 238 Bukharin, Nikolai, 421 Bulatao, Jaime, 398–99, 401–2 Bulletin, 240 Bulletin de Psychologie, 247 Bulletin of the ILE (BILE), 517 Burdach, Karl Friedrich, 266 Bureš, Zbynĕk, 149–50 Burnett, James, 469 Burnout and Occupational Stress Among a Sample of Jamaican Nurses (Johnson, R. & McFarlane), 67 Burns, Robert, 475 Burns, Thomas, 378 Burt, Cyril, 182, 194–95, 199, 204 Byrne, Donn, 62

C Caballero, Agustín Nieto, 131 Cabral, Annita, 34–35, 41 Cabral, Domingos Guedes, 38 Cadbury, 198 Cairo University, 164, 170, 172 Cai Yanpei, 97–98, 111 Calabar College, 63 Calabresi, Renata, 321, 329, 332 Caldas, Francisco José de, 127–28 Calderwood, Henry, 378 Calkins, Mary, 191, 585 Cambridge University, 38 Campbell, George, 476, 483 Campbell, Ian, 27 Campos, Nilton, 39 Canestrari, Renzo, 338 Canguilhem, Georges, 248, 274 cannabis consumption, 166 Canterbury College, 377–78 Cao Richang, 101, 103–4, 108 CAPES. See Foundation for the Improvement of Higher Education Personnel Coordination Cardim, Fernão, 35 Cardozo, C. E. O., 38 CARE Centre. See Child Assessment and Research in Education Centre Caribbean, 60, 74–76 Caribbean Graduate School of Theology (CGST), 63–64, 66 Caribbean Journal of Education, 69 Caribbean Journal of Psychology, 65 Caribbean Quarterly, 69 Carnegie Corporation, 20, 382

index

627

Caro, Miguel Antonio, 130 Carpenter, William, 186, 232 Carr, Stuart, 386 Carroll, James, 392n4 Carus, Carl Gustav, 262, 266 Casalta, Henry, 602 Casati reform, 309 Casmann, Otho, 256, 261 Castro, Fidel, 70–71 Catholicism, in Ireland, 295–96 Catholic University of Louvain, 128 Catholic University of Santo Tomas de Villanueva, 72 Catholic University of the Sacred Heart in Milan, 332 Cattaneo, Carlo, 327 Cattell, James McKeen, 4, 6, 189, 192–93, 572–74 Cattell, Raymond B., 143, 145 Čáda, František, 146 Čapek, Norbert Fabián, 152 Čermák, Ivo, 146 Československá psychologie, 143 Center for Counseling and Psychological Care (COAP), 71 Center for Epidemiological StudiesDepression Scale (CES-D), 166 Center for Psychotechnical Selection, 373 Center for the History of Psychology (CHP), 622–23 Centofonti, Rogério, 35 Centre for Investigation of Sexual Offences and Child Abuse (CISOCA), 64 Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), 245–47 Cernocký, Karel, 144 Cesa-Bianchi, Marcello, 336 CES-D. See Center for Epidemiological Studies-Depression Scale Cézanne, Paul, 152 CGST. See Caribbean Graduate School of Theology Champion, Richard, 25 character, talent theory and, 89–90 characterology, 262, 277–78 Charcot, Jean-Martin, 2, 234–35, 262 Charles IV of Luxembourg, 138 Charles University, 138 Chaslin, Philippe, 241–42 Chelcický, Petr, 139 Chelpanov, Georgii Ivanovich, 416, 418–22 Chen Daqi, 97–98 Chen Heqin, 100, 103, 105 Chen Li, 104–5, 110 Chernyshevskii, Nikolai Gavrilovich, 414–15 Chiang Mai University, 539 Chiba, Tanenari, 353, 356 Child Assessment and Research in Education (CARE) Centre, 62 Child Guidance Center in Bangkok, 544

628

index

Child Guidance Clinic, 74 Child Guidance Council, 200 Childhood Neuropsychology, 325 Childhood Society, 199 child psychology, 102–3, 198–201, 238, 541–42 The Children We Teach (Isaacs), 200 China Buddhism in, 86–87 child psychology in, 102–3 colonialism in, 92 early psychology in, 88–91 education psychology in, 103 experimental psychology in, 103–4 foundational schools of thought, 83–87 history of, 82t modern psychology in, 97–106 premodern psychology in, 91–97 psychoanalysis in, 100–101 social psychology in, 104 Soviet Union and, 113 Western psychology in, 95–97 Chinese Academy of Science, 106, 108 Chinese culture, in Brunei Darussalam, 52–53 The Chinese Journal of Psychology, 98–99 Chinese Psychological Association, 98–99, 106–8 Chinese Society of Promoting Education for Ordinary People, 103 Chizh, Vladimir Fiodorovich, 417–18 Chmelař, Vilém, 142 Chomsky, Noam, 247 Chou Siegen, 102–5 CHP. See Center for the History of Psychology Christianity, 53, 348, 551 Chulalongkorn University, 539 Chumsai, M. L. Tui, 540 Churchill, Winston, 295 Church of England, 62–63 CIE. See Civil Information and Education Cipriano de Mosquera, Tomás, 129 Circle Linguistique, 141 CISOCA. See Centre for Investigation of Sexual Offences and Child Abuse Civil Information and Education (CIE), 360 Clairvoyance and Thoughtography (Fukurai), 354–55 Claparède, Édouard, 6, 35, 39, 169, 238, 517 Claparede, Henry, 164 Clark, Kenneth, 586–87 Clark, Mamie Phipps, 586–87 Clinical Child Psychology, 149 Clinical Hypnosis (Kratochvíl), 149 clinical psychology in Australia, 26–28 in Czech Republic, 148–49 in Finland, 223–24 in France, 246–48 in Italy, 325–28, 336–38

in New Zealand, 383–85 in Saudi Arabia, 446–47 in South Africa, 506–7 in Spain, 532–33 in United States, 583–85, 588–89 in Venezuela, 603–4 Witmer and, 38 Clinical Psychology: Diagnosis, Psychotherapy, and Psychological Counseling (Shoukeir), 169 CNPq. See Brazilian National Council for Research and Development CNR. See National Council of Research of Italy CNRS. See Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique Coalition War, 139 COAP. See Center for Counseling and Psychological Care Coates, Gordon, 382 Code of Ethics, 25, 405 cognition, Confucianism and, 83 Cognitive Brain Research Unit, 211 cognitive psychology, 45, 135–36, 448–49, 587–88 Cognitive Styles in Psychology and Education (Al-Sharkawy), 169 Cohen, Hermann, 274 Colciencias, 133–34 Colegio Oficial de Psycólogos (COP), 303, 532 Collection of Essays on Mental Health (Ding), 104 collective health, 47 Collège de France, 233 Collegium Psychologicum (Dannhauer), 257 Collegium Psychologicum (Scheibler), 257 Collins, Mary, 486 Colombia behavior analysis in, 133, 135 behaviorism in, 126 cognitive psychology in, 135–36 colonialism in, 127 demography of, 126–27 education system in, 127–28 higher education in, 131–32, 132t journals of, 135t poverty in, 127 professional work in, 132–33, 132t psychoanalysis in, 126, 136 psychobiology in, 135 religion in, 128–30 research in, 133–34, 133t social psychology in, 133 Colombian College of Psychologists, 137 Colombian Congresses of Psychology, 133 Colombian Society of Psychology, 137 colonialism, 35–37, 60, 92, 127, 620–21 Colucci, Cesare, 318, 322, 329 Columbia University, 102 Combe, George, 183, 485, 485f Comenius, J. A., 146 Commentarius de Anima (Melanchton), 246

communism, 70, 142–44 community psychology, 605–6 Compagnons de l’Université Nouvelle, 244 Complete Book of the Medical Art (al-Majusi), 448 Comportamiento, 607 computers, 590 Comte, Auguste, 230–32 Condorcet, Nicolas de, 230 Confucianism, 82–84 Confucius, 83, 348 Connor, Mary, 55 Constantino, Renato, 399 The Constitution of Man (Combe), 183 contents, 276 Cook, James, 18 COP. See Colegio Oficial de Psycólogos Corballis, Michael, 387, 391 Cork Lunatic Asylum, 292 Corleo, Simone, 318 Cornelius, Carl Sebastian, 267 Costall, Alan, 196 Coué, Emile, 251n39 Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR), 502–3 counseling in Brunei Darussalam, 55–56 in Jamaica, 63–64 in New Zealand, 385 Course on Positive Philosophy (Comte), 230, 232 Cousin, Victor, 233, 250n21 Coutinho, Francisco de Lemos de Faria Pereira, 36 Covar, Prospero, 401 Cox, James Mason, 472 Cox’s Mechanical Explanation and Completion test, 165 Craik, Kenneth, 204, 489 Creativity and Its Application (Al-Sharkawy), 169 Creativity in Arts (Soueif ), 169 Crichton, Alexander, 473 Criminal Psychology: Science and Practice (Fathey), 169 criminology, 311–15 The Crisis in Psychology (Vygotsky), 434 critical psychology, 279 Critique of Judgment (Kant), 260 Critique of Practical Reason (Kant), 260 Critique of Pure Reason (Kant), 260 Croce, Benedetto, 320, 322, 328, 335 cross-cultural psychology, 165–66, 382, 454 Crusius, Christian August, 260 Cruz, Miguel, 528 CSIC. See Higher Council for Scientific Research CSIR. See Council for Scientific and Industrial Research Cuatrecasas, Juan, 523 Cuba, 70–73 Cuban Society of Health Psychology, 70, 72

Cullen, William, 464, 465f, 466, 472–73 Culligan, James, 398 Culpin, Millais, 196 Cultivation of Ethics (Ibn Miskawayh), 447 Cultural Changes (Turhan), 562 cultural cosmopolitanism, 551 cultural-historical theory, 433–34 Cultural Revolution, 106, 107–8 cultural taboos, 75 culture, 111 Cunningham, Ken, 19–20 Czechoslovak Psychological Society, 143 Czech Psychological Dictionaries (Hartl & Hartlová), 144 Czech Republic clinical psychology in, 148–49 communism in, 142–44 developmental psychology in, 146–47 health psychology in, 147–48 historiography of, 152–53 organizational psychology in, 149–50 social psychology in, 150–51 work psychology in, 149–50 World War II and, 142

D Dai, Bingham, 101 d’Alembert, Jean le Rond, 229–30 Dallenbach, Karl, 575 Dalton, John, 475 El-Damaty, A. A., 170 Al-Damiri, 163 Dane, Paul, 22 Dannhauer, Johann Conrad, 257 Danziger, Kurt, 204, 304, 339, 347, 503, 594–95, 618 Dao De Jing (Laozi), 85 Daoism, 82–83, 85–86 Dar Al-Ajaza Al-Islamiya Hospital, 368–69 Dar Al-Amal, 370 Darwin, Charles, 36, 183–85, 198–99, 233, 262, 469–70 Darwin, Erasmus, 472, 481 Das Gefühlsproblem (Lagerborg), 217 Dastre, Albert, 236 The Data of Mental Experience (De Sarlo), 321–22 Davey, Constance, 20 David, Maria, 402 Davidson, Barrington, 63, 65–66 Davidson, Michael, 387 Davydov, Vasilii Vasilievich, 438 Dax, Eric Cunningham, 27 Day, Ross, 25 Debret, Jean Baptiste, 36 De Giovanni, Achille, 334 Dejerine, Jules, 236, 250n38 Delacroix, Henri, 241–42, 251n55 Deleuze, Gilles, 248 The Delinquent Crowd (Sighele), 326 De l’Intelligence (Taine), 238 Della Valle, Guido, 326, 334 del Olmo, Francisco, 596

De Marchi, Silvia, 330 Dembo, Miriam, 600 Democratic Psychiatry movement, 337 Dempsey, Peter, 298 Dergah, 559 De Sanctis, Sante, 314, 318–19, 323–27, 329 De Sarlo, Francesco, 318, 321–22, 329 Descartes, René, 257 Descriptions of Talents and Characters (Liu Shao), 89 Dessougui, K. M., 170 de Valera, Eamon, 300–301 developmental psychology, 45, 146–47, 225, 433, 602 De Venanzi, Francisco, 601 Dewey, John, 35, 40, 100, 110, 380, 517, 559 dialectical psychology, 101–2, 112 Diamant, Jiří, 149, 151 Dickens, Williams, 390 A Dictionary for the Social Sciences (Badawi), 170 Dictionary of Education (Al-Khuli), 170 Dictionary of Psychology (Zahran), 170 Dictionary of Psychology and Psychiatry (Gaber & Kaffafi), 170 Dictionary of Psychosocial and Educational Terms (Zaidan), 170 Dictionary of Special Education and Rehabilitation (El-Shakhs & El-Damaty), 170 Dictionary of the Biography of Japanese Psychologists (Ohizumi), 351 Diderot, Denis, 229–30 Dilthey, Wilhelm, 273 Ding Zan, 104, 108 Diokno, Jose W., 399 discipline, 255–56, 282n3, 307 Discourse on Pietro Pomponazzi (Ardigò), 310 Discours sur l’esprit positif (Comte), 230 diversity, 31, 585–87, 617 Dix, Dorothea, 584 The Doctrine of Heredity and Psychological Phenomena (Buccola), 316 Doležal, Jan, 142–45, 147, 149 Domestic Violence: Reasons and Therapy (Abdel-Rahman), 167 Donaldson, Henry, H., 4 Doorbar, Ruth, 61, 66 Dória, Sampaio, 40 Drbal, Mathias Amos, 267 dreams, 444–45 Dreams. Psychological and Clinical Studies of an Alienist (De Sanctis), 324 Dreßler, Johann Gottlieb, 267 Drever, James, 485–86, 485f Dreyfus, Alfred, 238–39 Drobisch, Moritz Wilhelm, 263–64, 267, 269 Drug Abuse Committee of the Ministry of Education of Brunei Darussalam, 56

index

629

drug addiction, in Egypt, 166 drug rehabilitation, in Barbados, 73 Düker, Heinrich, 279 al-Dukhayyil, Abdul-Aziz, 453 Dumas, Georges, 38, 239, 242, 244 Duration of Elementary Psychic Acts in the Alienated (Roxo), 37–38 Durdík, Josef, 145 Durie, Mason, 389 Durkheim, Emile, 239, 434 Duruy, Victor, 233 The Dynamics of Behavior Development: An Epigenetic View (Kuo), 100

E EAMH. See Egyptian Association for Mental Health EAPS. See Egyptian Association for Psychological Studies Earle, Margaret, 382 East Germany, 279 Ebbinghaus, Hermann, 4, 116n3, 272 Ecole Normale Supérieure, 233 Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes (EPHE), 233, 240 Economic and Social Research Council of England, 205 Edgell, Beatrice, 189, 199 Edinburgh Medical School, 464–66 Edinburgh Review, 485 EDSA. See Epifanio de los Santos Avenue Education: Its Data and Principles (Nunn), 200 educational psychology, 53, 103, 225, 437–38, 533, 602–3 Education and Instruction (Sergi), 314 Education and Psychology, 99 education system. See also higher education of Australia, 18–20 of Brazil, 35–36 of Brunei Darussalam, 53–54 in Colombia, 127–28 of Cuba, 70–71 in Egypt, 171–72 in England, 192–93 in France, 233, 238 in Italy, 309, 318–19, 338 of Jamaica, 62–65 in Japan, 360 in Lebanon, 372–73 Montessori and, 327–28 in New Zealand, 383 in Philippines, 396–98 in premodern China, 94 in Saudi Arabia, 450–51 in South Africa, 497–99 in Spain, 528–29 in Turkey, 560–61 in Venezuela, 597–99 Edwards, Dennis, 62 EEC. See European Economic Community

630

index

Efendi, Aziz, 556 Effat University, 455 EFPA. See European Federation of Psychologists’ Association ego, 236 Egypt, 162–63 accreditation in, 171–72 drug addiction in, 166 education system in, 171–72 ethics codes in, 173 higher education in, 164 influence of, 172–73 Islam in, 173 job opportunities in, 170–71 modern psychology in, 163–65 private practice in, 173 psychoanalysis in, 164 psychology promotion in, 172 public perception in, 171 research in, 165–68, 174 Western psychology in, 175 Egyptian Association for Mental Health (EAMH), 168–69 Egyptian Association for Psychological Studies (EAPS), 164, 168–69 Egyptian Association for Sports Psychology, 169 Egyptian Journal for Mental Health, 170 The Egyptian Journal of Psychiatry and the Egyptian Journal of Mental Health, 170 Egyptian Journal of Psychological Studies, 169 Egyptian Psychologists’ Association (EPA), 168–69 Egyptian Society for Psychoanalysis (ESP), 168–69 EHEA. See European Higher Education Area Ehrenfels, Christian von, 141, 277 EI. See emotional intelligence Einstein, Albert, 140 Eksperimental’nye osnovy psikhologii ustanovki (Uznadze), 436 Ekzempliarskii, V. M., 422 Elements of Electrophysics (Fechner), 270 Elements of Mental Philosophy (Upham), 572, 619 Elements of Moral Science (Beattie), 476 Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind (Stewart), 481 Elements of the Psychology of Testimony (Musatti), 331 Eliot, George, 184, 205n2 Elkin, A.P., 30–31 Ellery, Reginald, 22 Elliff, Doug, 387 Ellis, Albert, 66 Ellis, Bruce, 390 El-Mansuri (Rhazes), 447 ELSPAC. See European Longitudinal Study of Pregnancy and Childhood Emblem, 201

EMDR therapy. See eye movement desensitization and reprocessing therapy emergency psychology, 606 Emery, Fred, 23 emotional intelligence (EI), 167 The Emotions (Sergi), 313 The Emotions and the Will (Bain), 184, 462, 463f Empirical Psychology According to the Genetic Method (Lindner), 140 Encyclopedia, 229–30 Encyclopedia Britannica, 187 Encyclopedia of Chinese Herbal Medicine (Li), 90 Encyclopedia of Psychological Tests for the Athletics (Alawai), 168–69 Encyclopedia of Psychology and Psychoanalysis (Alhefnee), 170 England child psychology in, 198–201 education system in, 192–93 higher education in, 202–4 industrial psychology in, 197–98 institutional beginnings in, 188–94 medicine in, 185–88 physiology in, 185–88 post-World War II expansion of, 204–5 psychological testing in, 192–95 religion in, 188–89 World War I and, 195–97 Enlightenment, 258–61 An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (Hume), 478 Enriquez, Virgilio, 399–402 environmental psychology, 606 envy, 138–39 EPA. See Egyptian Psychologists’ Association EPHE. See Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes EPI. See Eysenck Personality Inventory Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA), 396, 403, 409n1 Epilepsy and Crime (Peixoto), 38 epistemology, 319–22 Eradication of Sorrow (Al-Kindi), 446 Erbpsychologie, 278 Erdmann, Benno, 272 Erdmann, Johann Eduard, 267 Erickson, Milton, 143, 448 Ermakov, I. D., 435 Eschenmayer, Carl August, 266 Escuela Normal Superior, 131 ESP. See Egyptian Society for Psychoanalysis Esperanto, 4 Essay on an Experimental Psychology (Krüger), 260 Essay on Human Understanding (Locke), 258 Essays on the History of Behavior (Vygotsky & Luria), 434

Essentials of Mental Measurement (Brown & Thomson), 204 Estrada, Joseph, 404 ethnic minorities, 586–87 Ethnology of Pukapupka (Beaglehole), 381 ethnopsychology, 303–4 eugenics, 193, 333–35, 580 Eugenics Review, 193 European Economic Community (EEC), 300–301 European Federation of Psychologists’ Association (EFPA), 621 European Higher Education Area (EHEA), 282 European Journal of Psychological Assessment, 534 European Longitudinal Study of Pregnancy and Childhood (ELSPAC), 147, 154n1 Evans, Maitland, 64, 66 Evans, Makesha, 64–65, 66–67 evolution, 183–85, 469–70 evolutionary psychology, 590 evolutionist positivism, 308, 310–11, 318 Examen de ingenios para las ciencias (Huarte), 514 Experimental Hypnosis (Kratochvíl), 149 experimentalism, 247 experimental psychology, 44, 103–4, 322–25, 418 Experimental Psychology (De Sanctis), 324 Experimental Psychology (Woodworth), 573 Experimental Review of Psychiatry, 316 Experimental Studies of Emotions (Watson), 100 The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals (Darwin, C.), 262 eye movement desensitization and reprocessing (EMDR) therapy, 373 Eysenck, Hans, 195, 202, 205, 526–27 Eysenck Personality Inventory (EPI), 524 Ezenne, Austin, 65

F Faculdade de Medicina da Bahia, 36 Faculdade de Medicina do Rio de Janeiro, 36–37 Fahmy, Semia A., 164 Fang Yizhi, 90, 94 al-Farabi, 163, 443, 445, 552 Far Eastern University (FEU), 397 fascism, 326, 334 Fathers and Children (Turgenev), 414 Fathey, M., 169, 173 Fayek, Ahmed, 168 Feather, Norman, 30 Febvre, Lucien, 242, 244–45 Fechner, Gustav Theodor, 266, 269–70 Federal Council of Psychology of Brazil, 42, 45 Federal Marriage Act of Australia, 27 Federal University of Minas Gerais, 39

Federation of Practical Psychology Clubs, 201 Federation of University Students (FEU), 71 Fel’tsman, I. B., 435 feminist psychology, 388, 404 Ferguson, Adam, 483 Ferguson, Henry H., 380 Ferrari, Giulio Cesare, 318, 320, 322–23, 326, 341 Ferreira França, Eduardo, 37 Ferrer, Francisco, 517 Ferri, Enrico, 314, 326–27 Ferrier, David, 188, 468–69, 468f FEU. See Far Eastern University; Federation of University Students Fianna Fail, 291 Fichte, Immanuel Hermann, 267 Fichte, Johann Gottlieb, 263 Fick, M. L., 498 Fifth International Congress of Psychology, 318 Fildes, Lucy, 199 Filho, Lourenço, 35, 38–40, 42 Filipino Nationalist Movement, 396 Fine Gael, 291 Finland, 211–12 behaviorism in, 217–19 civil war of, 216–17 clinical psychology in, 223–24 democracy in, 215–16 expansion in, 222–24 higher education in, 221–23 institutionalization in, 220–21 modern psychology in, 215 premodern psychology in, 212–14 psychoanalysis in, 219 psychological divisions in, 223t research in, 221–22 Finnish Psychological Association, 221 Finnish Psychological Society, 221 Finnish Society for Mental Health, 221 First International Congress of Physiogical Psychology, 234 First Lines of the Practice of Physic (Cullen), 466 First Philosophy (Al-Kindi), 446 Firth, Raymond, 381 Fischer, Kuno, 267 Fischer-Lexikon Psychologie (Hofstätter), 279 Fisher, Ronald, 194 Five Element theory, 82, 88–89 Five-Factor Model, 145 Flechsig, Paul, 272 Flinders University, 23 Flügel, J. C., 188 Flynn, James, 390 Fodor, Jerry, 247 Fordyce, George, 470 Fornari, Franco, 336 Förster, Joseph, 152 Forster, Vilém, 141 Forteza, Jose A., 524

For the Education of Character (Sergi), 314 Fortlage, Carl, 267 Fortune, Reo, 381 Foster, Michael, 189 Foucault, Michel, 241, 248 Foundation for the Improvement of Higher Education Personnel Coordination (CAPES), 44, 46 Four Readings on Philippine Values (Lynch), 398 Fowler, Hugh, 19, 22–23 Fox, Charles, 200 Fragment of Tails (Lichtenberg), 262 Fraisse, Paul, 246–48 France clinical psychology in, 246–48 education system in, 233, 238 institutionalization of, 248 post-World War II, 245–48 psychopathology in, 244–45 psychotherapy in, 244–45 research in, 245–46 spiritualism in, 234–35 Third Republic of, 232–37 timeline of, 254 Franĕk, Marek, 152 Frank, S. L., 419 Frankl, Viktor E., 136 Frannnková, Slávka, 147 Free Institute of Education (ILE), 517–18 free will, 187 Freigius, Johann Thomas, 256 French Revolution, 128 Freud, Psychoanalysis, Catholicism (Dempsey), 298 Freud, Sigmund, 100–101, 196, 240–41, 264, 334–35, 355, 435–36, 584 Fritsch, Gustav, 468 Fröbes, Joseph, 276 Frýba, Mirko, 152 Fukurai, Tomokichi, 354–55 Fukutomi, Ichiro, 356 Funari, Enzo, 336 functionalism, 577–78 Functions of the Brain (Cabral), 38 Functions of the Brain (Ferrier), 469

G Gabler, Georg Andreas, 170, 267 Gage, Phineas, 469 Galifret, Yves, 247 Gall, Franz Joseph, 182–83, 231, 262–63, 473 Galli, Pier Francesco, 337 Gal’perin, Petr Iakovlevich, 435–36 Galton, Francis, 3, 7, 183, 189–90, 193, 573 Galvani, Luigi, 473 Gang of Four, 117n18 Ganzheitpsychologie, 277–79, 356 Gao Juefu, 101, 107 Gaozi, 93, 116n9 Garcia, Rolando, 112

index

631

García-Yagüe, Juan, 524, 528 GARIOA. See Government Appropriation for Relief in Occupied Areas Fund Garma, Angel, 523 Gastev, Aleksei Kapitonovich, 421 Gatti, Alessandro, 329 Al-Gazzali, 163 GDR. See German Democratic Republic Geisteswissenschaften, 268, 282n2 Geisteswissenschaftliche Psychologie, 273–74 Gellershtein, S. G., 422 Gemelli, Agostino, 318, 325, 328, 331–33, 336, 341, 516, 524 General Headquarters of Supreme Commander for Allied Power (GHQ/SCAP), 360 General Introduction to Industrial Psychology (Chen, L.), 104 General Introduction to Modern Psychology (Guo), 101 General Introduction to Psychoanalysis (Freud), 101 General Principles of Human Reflexology (Bekhterev), 430 General Reflections of the Animals (Reimarus), 260 genetics, 334 Geneva School, 135–36 Genik, E. A., 417 Gentile, Giovanni, 320, 328, 334–35 George, Leopold, 267 Germain, Jose, 516, 520, 524, 534 German Democratic Republic (GDR), 278–79 German Pedagogical Mission, 129 German Philosophy (Troitskii), 418 German Society for Experimental Psychology, 352 German Society for Psychology, 275, 278–79, 281 Germany applied psychology and, 274–76 Enlightenment in, 258–61 higher education in, 281–82 institutionalization of, 273–74 post-World War II, 278–80 psychoanalysis in, 278 Renaissance and, 256–58 research in, 271–74 reunification of, 280 Gesell, Arnold, 103 Gestalt psychology, 100, 141, 217–18, 277, 329, 355–56, 576–77 Getúlio Vargas Foundation, 45 Geyser, Joseph Anton Maria, 276 el-Gharib, Ramazia, 164, 168 Al-Ghazali, 443–44, 448–49 GHQ/SCAP. See General Headquarters of Supreme Commander for Allied Power Giard, Alfred, 234, 240 Gibson, William R. Boyce, 19, 21 Giese, Fritz, 275

632

index

Gießen University, 277 The Gifted Child: Psychological and Education Considerations (Johnson, R.), 67 Gifted Children: Their Nature and Nurture (Hollingworth, L.), 586 Gilbreath, Lillian, 583 Giliarov, A. N., 420 Giner de Los Rios, Francisco, 517 Ginsberg, Aniela, 41 Ginsberg, Morris, 380 Gioberti, Vincenzo, 310 GIP. See Group Integrative Psychology Glasgow University, 476 Global Health Indicators, 55 globalization, 144, 361–62, 404–6 global psychology, 617 Goclenius, Rudolph, 256 Goddard, Henry, 580 Godlee, Rickman John, 469 Goethe, Johann Wolfgang, 262 Gökalp, Ziya, 559 Goldman, Petr, 149 gold mining, 504, 505f Golgi, Camillo, 332 Gong Zizhen, 93 González-Mora, Gustavo Torroella, 72–73 Gooden, Winston, 66 Goodenough Drawing-A-Man Test, 105 Göschel, Carl Friedrich, 267 Gottschaldt, Kurt, 279 Goulart, Odilon, 38 Government Appropriation for Relief in Occupied Areas Fund (GARIOA), 360 Gozzano, Mario, 336 Grace, Randolph, 387 Gracián, Baltasar, 259 Graham, J. M., 201 Gran, M. M., 417 Graveson, Caroline, 190 Greater Antilles, 60–61 Green, J. A., 194 Gregory, John, 483 Griesinger, Wilhelm, 232, 315 Grot, Nikolai Yakovlevich, 416, 418 Grotenfelt, Arvi, 214–15 Group Integrative Psychology (GIP), 169 group psychology, 338 Grundriss der Psychologie (Wundt), 350 Grundsätze der Mimik and Physiognomik (Piderit), 262 Guangming Daily, 108 Guanzon, Angeles, 401 Guanzon-Lapeña, Angeles, 403 Guevara, María Teresa, 600 Guidance Journal, 541 Guillaume, Paul, 243, 246 Gundissalvi, 552 Gundlach, Horst, 5 Gunn, Alexander, 21 Guo Yicen, 101 Gusmão, Alexandre de, 35 Gustdorf, Georges, 259

Gutberlet, Constantin, 276 Guthrie, Edwin, 579 Guthrie, Robert, 586 Guweitangji (Wei), 93 Gymnasium, 264–66, 282n15

H Habánnn, M., 143, 152 Haddon, Alfred, 190, 380 Haig, Brian, 387–88 Halbwachs, Maurice, 246 Hall, G. Stanley, 3, 98, 199, 350, 355, 425, 517, 573, 584 Hallaran, William, 292, 472 Hamilton, William, 477f, 480–82, 487–88 Hammond, Sam, 23 A Handbook of Moral Philosophy (Calderwood), 378 Handbook of Physiology (Müller), 270 Handwörterbuch der Physiologie (Wagner), 268 Hanousek, J., 147 Haraguchi, Tsuruko, 353–54 Harms, Friedrich, 267 Harré, Rom, 391 Hart, Bernard, 196 Hartl, Pavel, 144 Hartley, David, 480 Hartlová, Helena, 144 Hartmann, Eduard von, 266 Hasegawa, Seiya, 355 Haslam, Anna Maud, 201 Hassanal Bolkiah Mu’izzaddin Waddaulah, 51 Hattori, Unokichi, 96–97 Haven, Joseph, 95, 348–49, 349 Hawenreuther, Johann Ludwig, 256 Al-Hawi (Rhazes), 447 Hawthorne effect, 583 Hayy Ivn Yaqzan (Ibn Tufail), 444 Hazlitt, Victoria, 201 Head, Henry, 190 Health Practitioners Competence Assurance Act 2003 of New Zealand, 385 health psychology, 47, 71–72, 147–48, 533, 541–42, 603–4 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 263–64 Heinze, Max, 351 Heller, Dagmar, 144 Helmholtz, Hermann, 266, 270–71, 483 Helsinki University of Technology, 221 Henri, Victor, 238 Herbart, Johann Friedrich, 213, 258, 263–64, 269 Herder, Johann Gottfried, 262 Hereditary Genius: An Inquiry into Its Laws and Consequences (Galton), 193 Hering, Ewald, 140–41 Hermann, Ludimar, 268 Hernshaw, Leslie, 385 Herodotus, 163 Herr, Lucien, 238–39

Herzen, Aleksandr A., 415 Herzen, Alessandro, 317 Heydorn, Bernard, 74 Heymans, Gerardus, 4 Hickling, Frederick, 62, 67 Higher Council for Scientific Research (CSIC), 524 higher education American model of, 370–71 Australian reform of, 28 in Barbados, 73–74 in Brazil, 41–42, 44–45 in Brunei Darussalam, 54 in Colombia, 131–32, 132t in Egypt, 164 in England, 202–4 in Finland, 221–23 French model of, 371–72 in Germany, 281–82 in Ireland, 294–95, 297 in Italy, 338–39 in Jamaica, 61–62, 63–64 in Japan, 357–58 in Lebanon, 370–73 in New Zealand, 377–78 in Russian Federation, 419 in Saudi Arabia, 451–52 in Scotland, 470–72, 489 in South Africa, 496–97, 509 in Turkey, 556–57 in Venezuela, 599–601 Hika, 163 Hilgard, Ernest, 530, 588 Hilgard, H. G., 143 Hill, Anne, 73–74 Hippe, Fabian, 256 Hiroshima Higher Normal School, 357 Hispalensis, Johannes, 552 historical immunity, 553 History of Experimental Psychology (Boring), 329, 571 The History of Psychological Thoughts in China (Kuroda), 97 History of the Soul (Schubert), 266 Hittite Empire, 550 Hitzig, Eduard, 4, 468 HIV/AIDS, 59, 74–76, 511–12, 538, 544 Hnilica, Karel, 147–48 Hodgkinson, Lorna, 20 Hodgson, Shadworth, 189 Høffding, Harald, 95, 190 Hofstätter, Peter R., 279 Hogan, John D., 617 Hollingworth, Harry, 583 Hollingworth, Leta, 586 Horáková-Hoskovcová, Simona, 147 Hoskovec, Jiří, 143, 148–49 Hsiao, H. H., 100, 105 Huang Yi, 103 Huarte, Juan, 514–15 Hull, Clark, 361, 579 Human Behaviors (Kuo), 100 humanism, 47, 256–58

humanist psychology, 136, 589 human potential movement, 544 Human Relations Movement, 338 Humboldt, Alexander von, 127 Hume, David, 477f, 478–80 Hunter, John, 470–71 Hunter, Thomas Alexander, 379–80, 383 Hunter, William, 470 Husca, John, 138 Hu Shi, 100 Hutcheson, Francis, 292–93, 482–83 Huxley, Thomas Henry, 185, 206n12 hypnosis, 4, 232, 235–36, 262, 354, 417, 448 hysteria, 235

I IAAP. See International Association of Applied Psychology Iacono, Gustavo, 338 IAREP. See International Association for Research in Economic Psychology Ibn al-Haytham, 163, 443–45 Ibn Khaldoun, 163 Ibn Khaldun, 443, 445 Ibn Miskawayh, 447 Ibn al-Nafis, 443, 445 Ibn Sina, 163 Ibn Sirin, Abu Bakr Muhammad, 444 Ibn Tufail, 444 Ibrahim, Abdel-Sattar, 453 Ibrahim, Radwa, 453 I-Ching. See Zhou Yi ICP. See International Congress of Psychology Idealism, 212–14, 263, 418 Idea of a New Anatomy of the Brain (Bell, C.), 466–68 “The Idea of Ego in Oriental Philosophy” (Motora), 352 Idea of Personality (Snellman), 213 Ideas, on the Psychology of Society as a Basis for the Social Sciences (Lindner), 140 Ideen zur Psychologie der Gesellschaft als Grundlage der Sozialwissenschaft (Lindner), 150–51 IDRAAC. See Institute for Development, Research, Advocacy, and Applied Care IELTS. See International English Language Testing System Ihanus, Juhani, 219 IHRB. See Industrial Health Research Board ILE. See Free Institute of Education ILEP model. See Intermittent Limited Extensive Pervasive model Imperial Institute of Experimental Medicine, 427 Imperial University, 350 indigenous psychology, 388–90, 400, 404–6, 408, 567, 594–95, 618

Indigenous Psychology: A Book of Readings (Enriquez), 402 Individual Intelligence Test (Alves), 39–40 Indonesia, 304, 347 Industrial and Managerial Psychology (Taha), 169 Industrial Health Research Board (IHRB), 203–4 industrial psychology, 104–5, 197–98, 385–86, 499–500, 583, 619–20 Influence of Civilization on the Development of Nervous Afflictions (Cardozo), 38 On the Influence of Climate on Organized Beings (Caldas), 127 Innerlichkeit, 217 INOP. See Institut National d’Orientation Professionnelle Inouye, Tetsujiro, 349 Inquiry into the Human Mind (Reid, T.), 580 Insanity (Nagaty), 164 Institute and Laboratory of Experimental Psychology, 324 Institute for Child Psychology, 199–200 Institute for Development, Research, Advocacy, and Applied Care (IDRAAC), 366 Institute for Professional Guidance, 516 Institute for Psychological Development, 67 Institute for Theological and Leadership Development (ITLD), 64 Institute of Experimental Psychology, 202 Institute of Industrial Psychology, 21 Institute of Management and Production, 68 Institute of Occupational Health, 222 Institute of Philippine Culture (IPC), 398–99 Institute of Psychiatry, 195 Institute of Psychology in China, 104 Institute of Selection and Professional Orientation (ISPO), 40–41 Institute of the Rational Work Organization (IRWO), 40 Institut National d’Orientation Professionnelle (INOP), 240, 244 Institut Psychique, 4 Institut Psychologique Général, 238 Integrated Professional Counselors Association of the Philippines, 404 Intellectual Growth in Young Children (Isaacs), 200 intelligence testing, 193–95, 238, 357, 498, 579–81. See also psychological testing Inter-American Congresses of Psychology (SIP), 133 Intermittent Limited Extensive Pervasive (ILEP) model, 166–67 International Association for Research in Economic Psychology (IAREP), 144 International Association of Applied Psychology (IAAP), 6, 133

index

633

International Congress of Applied Psychology, 5–6, 9, 13 International Congress of Psychology, 2–5, 9, 17 International Congress of Psychology (ICP), 352, 361–62 International English Language Testing System (IELTS), 451–52 The International Handbook of Psychology (Pawlick & Rosenzweig, eds.), 9 Internationalizing the History of Psychology (Brock, ed.), 289 International Journal of Clinical and Health Psychology, 134 International Journal of Intercultural Relations, 402 International Journal of Psychology, 9 international psychology, 616–18 International Union of Psychological Science (IUPsyS), 1, 8–9, 133, 168 Ireland and, 302 Japan and, 361–62 member nations of, 12 Spain and, 532 Strategic Plan of, 621 Turkey and, 564 International Union of Scientific Psychology, 8 International University of the Caribbean (IUC), 64–65 internships, 42 INTO. See Irish National Teachers’ Organisation Introduction to Experimental Medicine (Bernard), 233 Introduction to Human Nature (Alenis), 92 Introduction to Personality Research (Balcar), 144 Introduction to Philosophy for the Courtier (Thomasius), 259 An Introduction to Psychology (Reyburn), 497 An Introduction to Psychology (Wundt), 99 Introduction to Psychology (Hilgard), 530 Intuition: How We Think and Act (Bastick), 65 Investigaçóes Psicológicas (Ferreira França), 37 Invitation to Psychology of Personality: Man in the Mirror of Consciousness and Action (Smékal), 145 IPC. See Institute of Philippine Culture IPLAC. See Latin American and Caribbean Pedagogy Institute IRA. See Irish Republican Army Ireland, 290–93 applied psychology in, 298 famine in, 294 health care in, 298–99 higher education in, 294–95, 297 history of, 293–96 investment in, 301 IUPsyS and, 302 modern psychology in, 296–99

634

index

post-World War II, 299–301 poverty in, 294 Ireland Journal of Psychology, 299 Irish Ecclesiastical Record, 295–96 Irish Journal of Psychology, 293 Irish National Teachers’ Organisation (INTO), 296 Irish Psychologist, 299 Irish Republican Army (IRA), 301 IRWO. See Institute of the Rational Work Organization Isaacs, Susan, 190, 200, 204 Islam, 51–52, 163, 173, 442–43, 455–56, 551–52, 555 Ismail, M. E., 164 ISPO. See Institute of Selection and Professional Orientation Istituto Romano di Beni Stabili, 328 Italian Archive of Psychology, 318 Italian Psychoanalytic Society (SPI), 335 Italian Review of Psychoanalysis, 335 Italian Society of Psychology (SIP), 322, 336 Italy accreditation system in, 339 applied psychology in, 325–28 clinical psychology in, 325–28, 336–38 education system in, 309, 318–19, 338 epistemology in, 319–22 evolutionist positivism in, 310–11 experimental psychology in, 322–25 higher education in, 338–39 industrialization of, 309 institutionalization of, 335–36, 338–39 pragmatism in, 320 psychiatry in, 315–18 psychoanalysis in, 333–35 research in, 341 social psychology in, 325–28 World War I and, 327–28 World War II and, 327–28 ITLD. See Institute for Theological and Leadership Development Ito, Hiroshi, 360 IUC. See International University of the Caribbean IUPsyS. See International Union of Psychological Science Ivanov-Smolenskii, A. G., 431 Iwahara, Shinkuro, 360 Iwai, Katsujiro, 356

J Jackson, John Hughlings, 186–87, 190, 232, 468 Jacobs, Joseph, 1–2 Jacobsen, Walter, 279 Jacoby, Günther, 559 Jaensch, Erich Rudolf, 274 Jaime, Manuel Inácio de Figueiredo, 37 Jamaica, 61–70 counseling in, 63–64 education system of, 62–65

religion in, 62–65 slavery in, 62–63 Jamaica Broilers Group of Companies, 64 Jamaica Gleaner, 65, 69 Jamaica National Task Force on Crime, 68 Jamaican Psychological Association, 61 Jamaica Observer, 69 Jamaica Record, 69 Jamaica Theological Seminary, 68 James, William, 2–4, 36–37, 100, 222, 323, 354, 481–82, 572–73 Jamieson, Bruce, 386 Janet, Paul, 233, 236 Janet, Pierre, 4, 236–37, 241–42, 250n50 Janoušek, Jaromír, 151 Japan abnormal psychology in, 354–55 Christianity in, 348 education system in, 360 as entry port of Western psychology, 96–97 eras of, 348 Gestalt psychology in, 355–56 higher education in, 357–58 IUPsyS and, 361–62 modernization of, 347–48 occupation of, 360 psychoanalysis in, 355 research in, 353 women in, 353–54 World War I and, 358–59 World War II and, 357, 359 Japan Association of Applied Psychology, 358–59 Japanese Association of Animal Psychology, 361 Japanese Association of Applied Psychology, 361 Japanese Association of Clinical Psychology, 361 Japanese Association of Criminal Psychology, 361 Japanese Association of Educational Psychology, 361 Japanese Association of Social Psychology, 361 Japanese Group Dynamics Association, 360–61 Japanese Journal of Animal Psychology, 358 Japanese Journal of Psychology, 353, 358–60 Japanese Psychoanalytical Association, 355 Japanese Psychological Association (JPA), 358–61 Japanese Psychological Journal, 352 Japanese Psychological Research, 360 Jaspers, Karl, 273, 337 Jastrow, Joseph, 2–4 Javeriana University, 127, 131 Jeeves, Malcolm, 488, 488f Jervis, Giovanni, 337 Jessen, Peter Willers, 267 Jing Qichen, 108

Jodl, Friedrich, 140–41 Johnson, Rosemarie, 61, 67 Johnston, K. L., 194 Jones, Wood, 30 Joravsky, David, 412–13 Journal de Psychologie normale et pathologique, 242 Journal of Applied Psychology, 358 Journal of Black Psychology, 69 Journal of Childhood and Development, 170 Journal of Childhood Disabilities, 170 Journal of Clinical Psychology, 540–41 Journal of Counseling, 170 Journal of Education, 189 The Journal of Experimental Psychology, 102 Journal of Family Issues, 69 The Journal of New Zealand Psychology, 390 Journal of Psychological Services, 170 Journal of Psychological Studies, 455 Journal of Psychology, 169 JPA. See Japanese Psychological Association Jung, Carl Gustav, 266, 435 Junová, Hana, 149 Jurovský, Anton, 151 juvenile delinquency, 199

K Kaffafi, A. E., 170 Kafka, Gustav, 279 Kaila, Eino, 217–19, 226 Kakise, Hikozo, 355 Kamada, Ho, 349 Kames, Lord, 483 Kanda, Sakyo, 355 Kaneko, Umaji, 351, 362 Kanizsa, Gaetano, 331, 336, 338 kanji, 348 Kansai Psychological Association, 361 Kant, Immanuel, 260–61 Karma, 52 Karsten, Gustav, 268 Katipunan, 396 Katz, David, 530 Kavelin, Konstantin Dmitrievich, 415–16 Kebza, Vladimír, 144, 148 Keller, Fred S., 47 Keltikangas-Järvinen, Liisa, 225 Kemal, Mustafa, 554, 559 Kemal, Yusuf, 556 Kemalism, 554, 566 Kerner, Justinus, 266 Kerr, James, 194 Khairi, El-sayyed Mohamed, 450 Al-Kholy, W., 170 Al-Khuli, M. A., 170 Kido, Mantaro, 352–53 Kiesow, Federico, 318, 325, 332 Kimmins, C. W., 194 Al-Kindi, 163, 446 kinesiscope, 140f King, D. Brett, 139 King Saud University (KSU), 450

Kinský, Francis Josef, 139 Klaus, Václav, 144 Klein, Melanie, 200 Klemm, Otto, 7–8 Klicperová-Baker, Martina, 151, 154n5 Klineberg, Otto, 41 Knight, Rex, 204, 484, 484f, 488 Koch, Sigmund, 590 Koffka, Kurt, 100, 103, 141, 277, 330, 576 Köhler, Wolfgang, 6–7, 100, 141, 277, 356, 576 Koivisto, Mauno, 223 Koláříková, Ludmila, 142 Kolaříková, Olga, 154 Kolbanovskii, V. N., 423 Koluchová, Jarmila, 148 Kondo, Toshiyuki, 360 Kora, Tomi, 354 The Koran and Psychology (Nagaty), 455 Korean War, 106 Korhonen, Arvi, 221 Kornilov, Konstantin Nikolaevich, 420, 422–24, 429 Korsakov, Sergei Sergeevich, 417 Kosawa, Heisaku, 355 Kotásková, Jarmila, 147 El-Koussy, Abdel-Aziz H., 164–65, 168, 173 Kovác, Damian, 153 Kovalevskii, N. O., 417 Kozulin, Alex, 413 Kraepelin, Emil, 272, 317, 332, 417 Kramer, Rita, 328 Kratina, Ferdinand, 142 Kratochvíl, Stanislav, 143, 149 Krause, Karl Christian, 267, 517 Krejčí, Oskar, 144 Křivohlavý, Jaro, 148 Krueger, Felix, 8, 277 Krüger, Johann Gottlob, 260, 270 Krupskaia, N. K., 425 KSU. See King Saud University Kubo, Tsuyako, 354 Kubo, Yoshihide, 355, 357 Kulka, Jiří, 152 Külpe, Oswald, 272, 274, 276, 325, 332 Kuo Zing-Yang, 100 Kuroda, Ryo, 97 Kyoto Imperial University, 351–52 Kyushu Imperial University, 353

L Labbé, Edmond, 240 La Bruyère, Jean de, 259 Lacan, Jacques, 46, 248 Lachelier, Jules, 233 Ladd, George T., 351 Ladd-Franklin, Christine, 4 Ladygina-Kots, N. N., 422 Lafora, Gonzalo R., 523 Lagache, Daniel, 246–48, 337 Lagbao-Bolante, Flordeliza, 403 Lagerborg, Rolf, 217–18 Lagerspetz, Kirsti, 225

Lagmay, Alfredo, 398–99, 401 la Grange, J. A., 507 Lahy, Jean-Maurice, 242–44 Lakatos, Imre, 390 Lalo, Charles, 242 Lamarck, Jean-Baptsiste, 230 Lamont, Peter, 189 Lange, Friedrich Albert, 267 Langevin, Paul, 240, 244 Langmeier, Josef, 146 Lankester, Ray, 202 L’Année psychologique, 237–38, 241 L’Année sociologique, 239–40 Laozi, 83, 85 Lapinlahti Psychiatric Hospital, 217 Lapshin, I. I., 419 Lashley, Karl, 6, 428 La Société de Psychologie Physiologique, 2 Latin American and Caribbean Pedagogy Institute (IPLAC), 73 The Latin American Journal of Psychology, 73 La Trobe University, 24 Laugier, Henri, 240, 244 Laurie, Henry, 19 Lavater, Johann Caspar, 262 Lavin, Cipriano Rodrigo, 517–18 The Law of Time in the Phenomena of Thought (Buccola), 317 Laycock, Thomas, 186, 232, 468 Lazarus, Arnold, 509 Lazarus, Moritz, 263, 267 Lazurskii, A. F., 424 Leather Industries Research Institute (LIRI), 500 Lebanese Hospital for Mental and Nervous Diseases (Asfuriyeh), 367–68 Lebanese Psychological Association (LPA), 373 Lebanese Society of Psychoanalysis, 373–74 Lebanese University, 366 Lebanon, 366–67 accreditation system in, 374 education system in, 372–73 higher education in, 370–73 psychological testing in, 373 Le Bon, Gustav, 326 L’Ecole Supérieure des Lettres de Beyrouth, 371 Lectures on the Human and Animal Soul (Wundt), 416 Le Dantec, Félix, 234, 240 Lehtovaara, Arvo, 220–21 Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, 257–58, 263 Lemass, Sean, 300 L’Encyclopédie française (Febvre, ed.), 244–45 Leont’ev, Aleksei Nikolaevich, 413–14, 423, 430, 434–36 Leo-Rhynie, Elsa, 61–62, 67–68 Lersch, Philipp, 277 Les Annales d’Histoire économique et sociale, 242 Les Médications psychologiques (Janet, Pierre), 237

index

635

Lesser Antilles, 73–74 The Lesser Victory (Ibn Miskawayh), 447 Lessons of Psychology (Ancízar), 130 Levina, R. E., 432 Lévy-Bruhl, Lucien, 238–39, 434 Lewes, George, 184, 415 Lewin, Kurt, 7, 100, 218, 247, 277, 356 Lewin Kurt, 338 Lian Qichao, 94–95 Liao Shicheng, 105 Liard, Louis, 233, 240 liberation psychology, 136, 618 Liber de Anima (Melanchton), 246 Lichtenberg, George Christoph, 262 Lienert, Gustav Adolf, 279 Ligue Française pour la Défense des Droits de l’Homme et du Citoyen, 239 Lindner, Gustav Adolf, 140, 150–51, 263, 267 Lindworsky, Johannes, 277 Linhart, Josef, 143–44 Lipmann, Otto, 275 Lippmann, Walter, 581 Lipps, Theodor, 272, 558 LIRI. See Leather Industries Research Institute Li Shizhen, 90 Littré, Emile, 233 Liu Shao, 89–90, 116n7 Liu Tingfang, 102 Liu Zeru, 101 Liu Zhi, 90–91 Locke, John, 257–58, 268, 478 The Logic of Scientific Discovery (Popper), 382 Lombroso, Cesare, 308, 311–15 Lomov, Boris Fedorovich, 437 London Child Guidance Clinic, 199 London School, 26 Longtime Days (Heydorn), 74 López de Mesa, Luis, 131 Losskii, N. O., 419 Lotze, Rudolph Hermann, 267–68 Lovell, Henry Tasman, 19, 22 Lowenfeld, Margaret, 199–200 Lowndes, Marty, 96 Lozada, Mireya, 607 LPA. See Lebanese Psychological Association Lubbock, John, 189 Ludwig, Carl F. W., 325 Ludwig, Karl, 267, 270 L’Unité de la psychologie: Psychologie expérimentale et psychologie clinique (Lagache), 246 Luquet, Georges-Henri, 242 Luria, Aleksandr Romanovich, 7, 413–14, 427, 434, 436 Lutz, Catherine, 303 Lu Zhiwei, 99–100, 103, 105, 108 Lyell, Charles, 233 Lynch, Frank, 398

636

index

M Macapagal-Arroyo, Gloria, 404–5 MacArthur, Douglas, 360, 397 MacCrone, I. D., 497, 503–4, 507 Mace, Cecil Alec, 488, 488f Macek, Petr, 147 Macewan, William, 469 MacGregor, Duncan, 378 Mach, Ernst, 140–41, 481 Machač, Miloš, 144, 148, 150 Machačová, Helena, 148 Machado, Antonio, 521 Machotka, Pavel, 152 Macquarie University, 23 Madariago, Cesar de, 523 Madlafousek, Jaroslav, 146 Madrid School, 517–18 Magazine of Empirical Psychology, 261–62 Magellan, Ferdinand, 396 Magendie, François, 468 Magnan, Antoine, 234 Magnus, Albertus, 552 Maher, Michael, 293 Maine de Biran, Pierre, 231, 248n10 The Main Problematics of Our Education (Turhan), 562 al-Majusi, Ali Ibn Abbas, 446, 448 Mäki, Niilo, 220–21 Making of Modern Social Psychology: The Hidden Story of How an International Social Science Was Created (Marková & Moskovici), 151 Malche, Albert, 560 Malherbe, E. G., 497–98 Malinowski, Bronislaw, 381 Manchester Association of Secondary, Tertiary Schools’ Health Education and Associated Development (MASTHEAD), 69 Manganyi, Chabani, 498 Mange, Roberto, 40 Mann, Leon, 23 Mantegazza, Paolo, 312 A Manual of Psychological Medicine (Bucknill & Tuke), 185 Manual of Psychology (Stout), 484, 487 Manugian, Antranig, 367 Maori culture, 381–83, 388–90 The Maori Situation (Sutherland), 382 Mao Zedong, 108 MAPPC. See master’s degree in pastoral psychology and counseling Marañón, Gergorio, 522 Marbe, Karl, 275–76 Marcondes, Durval, 40 Marek, Alois M., 143 Mareš, Jiří, 148 Maria Theresa, 139 Marie, Dannette, 387–88 Marková, Ivana, 151 Marshal, Andrew, 471 martial law, 399–403 Martin, A. H., 21–23

Martin, Hugh, 20 Martin-Baró, Ignacio, 133, 136, 618 Martius, Götz, 272 Martius, Karl Friedrich Philipp von, 36 Marty, Anton, 140–41 Marui, Kiyoyasu, 355 Marxism, 101–2, 106, 224, 226, 248, 279, 309, 314–15, 421–24 Masaryk, Thomas Garrigue, 140 Masaryk Academy of Labor, 141 Masaryk University Brno, 141 Massey University, 384 Massimi, Marina, 35 mass psychology, 216 master’s degree in pastoral psychology and counseling (MAPPC), 64 MASTHEAD. See Manchester Association of Secondary, Tertiary Schools’ Health Education and Associated Development Masuda, Koreshige, 358 Mataragnon, Rita, 401 Matĕjček, Zdenĕk, 146 Mateo Alonso, Alberto, 595–96 materialism, 130, 313, 421 Materials on Consciousness (Leont’ev), 434 Matsumoto, Matataro, 351–52, 355, 358–59 Matthies, Brigitte, 61, 68 Mauchart, Immanuel David, 262 Maudsley, Henry, 186–87 Maugüé, Jean, 41 Mauss, Marcel, 242 Mawe, John, 36 Max Planck Institute, 623 Maxwell, James Clerk, 474 Maxwell, John, 61 May 4th Movement, 97, 109–10 Mayerová, Marie, 150 Mayo, G. Elton, 19, 21–22, 338 Mayor, Juan, 530–31 McCarthy, Dianne, 387 McClure, John, 387 McCosh, James, 482–83 McDougall, William, 100, 185, 188, 190, 196, 200, 380 McElwain, Donald, 23 McFarlane, Tracy, 67 McGonagall, William Topaz, 475 McIntyre, James Lewis, 484, 484f McKellar, Peter, 387 McKenna, John, 296, 298 McLean, Anthony, 387 McQuaid, John, 297 Mead, G. H., 432–33 Mead, Margaret, 381 Measurement in Experimental Psychology (Aliotta), 321 Measure of Character and Personality (PUP), 401 Measure of Filipino Character (PPP), 402 Medeiros, Maurício de, 38

Medical-Pedagogical Institute for the Mental Deficient, 323 medical psychology, 104 Medical Research Council, 196 Medicinische Psychologie oder Physiologie der Seele (Lotze), 268 Meiji era, 348, 350–52 Meillet, Antoine, 242 Meinong, Alexius, 329 Mektep, 563 Melanchton, Philipp, 246 Melbourne Teachers’ College, 19–21 Meleika, L. K., 164, 165, 169 Mello, Cunha, 38 Mel Nathan Institute, 66 Memorandum: Memória e História em Psicologia, 35 memory, 588 Mengzi, 84–85, 93 Menia University, 170 Mental Health Association and Support Group of Barbados, 73 Mental Hospital of Aversa, 315 Mental Hospital of the Muslim Elderly Asylum, 368–69 mental illness, 472–73 Mental Institute for Neuropsychological Disorders (MIND), 369 Mental Philosophy (Haven), 349 Mental Philosophy: Including the Intellect, Sensibilities and Will (Haven), 95 Mercier, Désiré J., 130 Merrill-Palmer Intelligence Scale, 105 Mershed, N. A. S., 167 Meschieri, Luigi, 338 Mesmer, Franz Anton, 231–32, 262 Messer, August, 276 Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science (Kant), 260–61 metaphysics, 260 Metelli, Fabio, 331, 336, 338 Metge, Joan, 382 Metzger, Wolfgang, 279 Meyer, Adolf, 355 Meyerson, Ignace, 241–43 Mibai, Sugi, 354 Michelet, Karl Ludwig, 267 Michotte, Albert, 7, 247 Micraelius, Johannes, 257 migrant assimilation, 23 Mikšík, Oldřich, 145 Mill, John Stuart, 1, 185 Miller, Emanuel, 199 Miller, George, 588, 590 Miller, Morris, 20 The Mimicry of Thought (De Sanctis), 324 MIND. See Mental Institute for Neuropsychological Disorders Mind, 462–63, 463f Mind: A Quarterly Review of Psychology and Philosophy, 189–90 Mind and Body (Bain), 463 The Mind That Found Itself (Beers), 584

Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI), 165, 563 MINSAP. See National Group of Psychology of Cuba Mira, Emilio, 520, 523 Mira y López, Emilio, 40–41 Misiti, Raffaello, 338 mismatch negativity (MMN), 225 Mitchell, William, 19 Mithat, Ahmet, 557 MMN. See mismatch negativity MMPI. See Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory M’Naghten Rules, 186–87, 206n6 Model City (Al-Farabi), 445 modernity, 618–19 modernization, 458 Modern Psychology (Gao), 101 Moede, Walther, 275 Mohammed, Y. A., 171 Mohapl, Přemsyl, 148 Molozhavyi, S. S., 426 Molyneux, William, 478–79 Monash University, 23–24 Monboddo, Lord, 483 Monchaux, Cecily de, 23 Monro, Alexander, 464–66, 465f Montego Bay Academy, 63 Montero, Maritza, 606–7 Montesano, Giuseppe, 314, 327 Montessori, Maria, 314, 319, 327–28 The Montessori Method: Scientific Pedagogy As Applied to Child Education in “The Children’s Houses” (Montessori), 328 Montigny, Grandjean de, 36 Moodie, William, 199 Moore, Kevin, 387 Moralphilosophie Adam Ferguson’s (Kaneko), 351 Moreira, Juliano, 38 Moreno, Jacob Levy, 247 Morey, Elwyn, 26 Morgan, Conwy Lloyd, 4, 185, 191 Morgan, Mandy, 388 Morgan, Michael, 479 Morinaga, Shiro, 356 Moritz, Karl Philipp, 261–62 Morozova, N. G., 432 Morselli, Enrico, 315–16 Morsy, E. M. Kh., 164 Moscow Methodological Circle, 437 Moscow Psychological Society, 417 Moscow University, 420–21 Moskovici, Serge, 151 Mosso, Angelo, 316, 322, 326 Motivation and Academic and Vocational Achievement and Its Evaluation (Al-Sharkawy), 169 Motora, Yujiro, 98, 348, 349–52 Mott, Frederick, 195 Mourad, Yousuf, 169, 173 Muchow, Martha, 278 Müller, Georg Elias, 190, 272, 276

Müller, Johannes, 270 Mulligan, David G., 382 Münsterberg, Hugo, 2–3, 272 Murad, Yousef, 164, 168 Murchison, Carl, 7 Murdock, George Peter, 380 Musatti, Cesare, 322, 325, 329–31, 335–37, 339, 341 Muscio, Bernard, 21 Mussolini, Benito, 333 Mutis, José Celestino, 127 Myers, Charles S., 21, 189–90, 191, 195–97, 199 Myokinetic Psychodiagnosis (PMK), 520

N Näätänen, Risto, 211, 224–25 Naftul’evich Shpil’rein, Isaak, 421 Nagashima, Sadao, 360 Nagaty, Mohamed Osman, 164, 455 Nagel, Wilibald, 268 Nakajima, Taizo, 350 Nakashima, Rikizo, 350 Nakonečný, Milan, 144–45 Nanjing Normal College, 98 Nara Women’s Higher Normal School, 353 National Association for Filipino Psychology (PSSP), 400–402, 406 National Association of Graduate Programs in Psychology of Brazil (ANPEPP), 35, 46 National Centre for Sociological and Criminal Research (NCSR), 164, 169 National Council of Research of Italy (CNR), 332, 334 National Group of Psychology of Cuba (MINSAP), 70 National Health Service of England (NHS), 204–5 National Institute for Personnel Research, 504–6 National Institute of Applied Psychology of Cuba, 72 National Institute of Industrial Psychology (NIIP), 197–98, 499–500 National Institute of Pedagogical Studies (NIPS), 40 National Insurance Act of 1911 (England), 198 nationalism, 212–14, 399–403 National Mental Health Commission of Barbados, 73 National Mental Hospital of Brazil, 38 National University of Colombia, 125, 130–31 National University of Ireland, 298 naturalism, 187 The Nature of Intelligence (Spearman), 204 Naturphilosophie (Schelling), 263, 266, 274 Naturwissenschaften, 268, 282n2 Naval Institute of Technology of Japan, 359

index

637

Navarrete, Thais, 600 NCSR. See National Centre for Sociological and Criminal Research NCU. See Northern Caribbean University NDU. See Notre Dame University Nechaev, A. P., 419, 424 Neff, William, 526 Neiglick, Hjalmar, 214 Nemicus, Thaddeus, 139 neobehaviorism, 361 neo-idealism, 320, 335 NEO Personality Inventory, 145–46 Neurasthenia: Its Nature, Origin and Cure (Graham), 201 Neurological Society, 190 neuropsychology, 47–48, 225, 590, 604 Neuro-Psychology Evaluation and the Development of Psychology (Meleika), 169 neuroscience, 48 neuroses, 248, 472 New Essays (Leibniz), 258 New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis (Freud), 101 The New Invention (Thomasius), 259 New Psychology of the Soviet Union, 101 New School for Social Research, 35, 577 New Theory of Child Psychology (Koffka), 100 Newton, Isaac, 478 New Zealand, 377 accreditation system in, 384–85 behaviorism in, 386–87 clinical psychology in, 383–85 counseling in, 385 education system in, 383 higher education in, 377–78 industrial psychology in, 385–86 organizational psychology in, 385–86 research in, 390–91 theoretical psychology in, 387–88 New Zealand College of Clinical Psychologists, 391 New Zealand Psychological Society, 384 Ngata, Apirana, 382, 392n4 NHS. See National Health Service of England Nicholas I, Tsar of Russia, 414 NIIP. See National Institute of Industrial Psychology Ninth Asian Workshop on Child and Adolescent Development, 54 Ninth International Congress of Psychology, 579 NIPS. See National Institute of Pedagogical Studies Nisbet, Robert, 217 Nishi, Amane, 348–49 Nishizawa, Raioh, 359 Nivnicensis, John Amos Comenius, 139 Noack, Ludwig, 267 Noble, Daniel, 185 Nobles, Wade, 62

638

index

Nolan, Michael, 297 non compos mentis, 187, 205n6 Nony, Camille, 191 Northern Caribbean University (NCU), 64 Northern Ireland, 291, 299 Notcutt, Bernard, 501 Notre Dame University (NDU), 371 noun-phenomena, 548 Nuñez, Rafael, 129–30 Nunn, Percy, 200

O OASSSA. See Organization for Appropriate Social Services in South Africa Obonai, Torao, 356 Observations on Man, His Frame, His Duty, and His Expectations (Hartley), 480 Ocherki po fiziologii dvizhenii i fiziologii aktivnosti (Pavlov), 437 Ochorowicz, Julian, 2 O’Connell, J. Byrne, 295–96 OCR. See Office of Civil Rights October Revolution, 414 Odehnal, Jiří, 143 O’Doherty, Eamonn Feichin, 296–98, 303 Oeser, Oscar, 23 Office of Civil Rights (OCR), 67 Ohizumi, H., 351 Ohtsuki, Kenji, 355 Oksala, Ohto, 222 Ol’denburgskii, A. P., 427 Oldfield, Carolus, 204 Olinto, Pinio, 34 Oliver, Anthony, 63, 68 Olmo, Francisco del, 523 Ombredane, André, 41 O’Neil, William M., 23–24 On Memory (Ebbinghaus), 272 Onoshima, Usao, 356, 359 On the Conservation of Energy (Helmholtz), 270 On the Soul (Aristotle), 256 Ontogenes of Human Psyche (Príhoda), 144 The Open Society and Its Enemies (Popper), 382, 392 Opium Wars, 91 O postroenii dvizhenii (Bernshtein), 437 optics, 473–75 Optics (Helmholtz), 271 Orano, Paolo, 327 Orbeli, L. A., 430–31 organizational psychology, 104–5, 149–50, 385–86, 603 Organization for Appropriate Social Services in South Africa (OASSSA), 508 The Origin and Development of Psychoanalysis (Freud), 100–101 The Origin of Mental Phenomena and Their Biological Significance (Sergi), 313 The Origin of Species (Darwin, C.), 233, 470 Orne, Martin T., 143 Ortega Durán, José, 595–96

Ortega y Gasset, Jose, 518, 521–22, 530 Osecká, Lída, 145 Osipov, Nikolai Evgrafovich, 435 Osmeña, Sergio, 397 Ossicini, Adriano, 337, 339 Ostankov, P. A., 417 Ostrava dispositiv, 141–42 Oswald, Wilhelm, 419 Ottoman Empire, 548–50 Ouija board, 354 Oum el Nour, 370 The Outline of Psychology (Chen), 98 Outlines of Psychology (Høffding), 96 Oxford University, 202

P Padilla, Sinforoso, 397, 399 PAHO/WHO. See Pan American Health Organization/World Health Organization Pain and Pleasure (Sergi), 313 Palacký University Olomouc, 149 Palmes, Fernando, 519 Pan American Health Organization/ World Health Organization (PAHO/ WHO), 76 Panlasigui, Isidoro, 397 Pan Shu, 101, 105–6, 108, 111 PAP. See Psychological Association of the Philippines PAPDA. See Paraplegic and Physically Disabled Association Parafita de Bessa, Pedro, 42 Paraplegic and Physically Disabled Association (PAPDA), 7 parapsychology, 3–4 Parson, Frank, 6 Parsons, Talcott, 399 PASA. See Psychological Association of South America Pascual, Marcelo, 524 pathological functioning, 231 Patrizi, Mariano Luigi, 322, 326 Pavlov, Ivan Petrovich, 6–7, 412–14, 427–31, 437, 578–79 Pavlov’s theory, 106, 437 Pawlick, Kurt, 9 Peace Management Initiative (PMI), 76 Pear, Tom, 191, 196 Pearson, Karl, 194 Pedagogical College, 220 Pedagogical Psychology (Vygotsky), 432 Pedagogic Psychology (Boxtröm), 215 pedology, 424–27 Peinado, Jose, 523 Peixoto, Alfrânio, 38 Peking University, 96, 97, 108 Pelechano, Vicente, 529 Pende, Nicola, 334 Penna, Antonio Gomes, 35 PEPsic, 46 Pe-Pua, Rogelia, 402–3 perception, 83, 94, 257–58, 443–44

perception/apprehension, 329–30 The Perceptual World (von Fieandt), 220 Pere, Rangimarie Rose, 389 Pereira, Gomez, 514–15 Pérez Enciso, Guillermo, 523, 596 Pérez Valdés, Noemi, 70, 72 PERKAB. See Brunei Counseling Association Pernambucano, Ulisses, 39 Perotti, Nicola, 335 Perpinan, Jesus, 397 Perrin, Jean, 240 Perry, Matthew, 347 Personalismus, 278 Personality (Allport), 219 Personality (Kaila), 218 personnel psychology, 105 Pertejo, Jesusa, 524, 528 Perty, Maximilian, 267 Pessotti, Isaias, 35 Peters, Wilhelm, 560 Petony, Pat, 26 Petrograd Philosophical Society, 428 Pettigrew, Thomas, 504 phenomenology, 221, 248 Philippine Association for Counsellor Education, Research and Supervision, 404 Philippine Journal of Psychology, 399, 406 Philippine Psychological Corporation, 398 Philippine Psychology Act of 2009, 405 Philippine Psychology Research Training House (PPRTH), 400, 402 Philippines, 395–96 accreditation system in, 404–5 education system in, 396–98 globalization in, 404–6 indigenous psychology in, 404–6 institutionalization in, 404–6 martial law in, 399–403 nationalism in, 399–403 research in, 402 Western psychology and, 398–99 World War II and, 397–98 Philippine Women’s University (PWU), 398 Phillip II, king of Spain, 396 Phillippo, James, 63 Philosophical Essays (Tetens), 260 Philosophical Review, 317 Philosophische Studien, 3, 272 phrenology, 182–83, 249n11, 263, 473, 485, 572 Physiognomische Fragmente (Lavater), 262 physiognomy, 262 physiological functions, 231–32 Physiological Journal, 430 physiological psychology, 28, 313 Physiological Theory of Perception (Sergi), 313 physiology, 185–88, 268–69 The Physiology of Common Life (Lewes), 415 Piaget, Jean, 7, 39, 111–12, 135–36, 201, 243, 434

Pickford, Ralph William, 487, 487f Piderit, Theodor, 262 Piéron, Henri, 7, 40, 237, 240–41, 243–48 Pillsbury, Walter B., 354 Pinel, Philippe, 231, 473 Pinillos, Jose Luis, 524, 526–27, 529–31 PIOJ. See Planning Institute of Jamaica Piorkowski, Curt, 275 Piper, Leonora, 573 Pirella, Agostino, 337 Piro, Sergio, 337 PIRSA. See Psychological Institute of the Republic of South Africa Pisarev, Dmitrii Ivanovich, 415 Pi-Sunyer, Augusto, 519–20 Pizzoli, Ugo, 39, 326 Planning Institute of Jamaica (PIOJ), 65 Plato, 445, 551 Plháková, Alena, 152, 154 PMA. See Primary Mental Abilities PMI. See Peace Management Initiative PMK. See Myokinetic Psychodiagnosis pneumatology, 257 Poe, Fernando, Jr., 404 Political Behavior: Theory and Reality (El-Sayed), 167 political psychology, 70, 151, 167, 606–7 Political Transition from the Psychological Point of View (Krejcí), 144 Ponzo, Mario, 7, 323–25, 328 Popper, Karl, 382–83, 391–92 popular psychology, 201–2 Porterfield, William, 464–65, 478 Porteus, Stanley, 20–21, 30–31 positive psychology, 308, 340, 448–49 postmodern psychology, 303, 404 Potebnia, A. A., 416 Pottinger, Audrey, 61, 68 poverty, 127, 294, 300 PPP. See Measure of Filipino Character PPRTH. See Philippine Psychology Research Training House Practical Guide to Experimental Psychology (Kornilov), 423 Practical Psychologist, 201 practical psychology, 201–2 Prague Central Psychotechnical Institute, 142 Prague Czech University, 140 Prague Spring, 153 Prameny, 152 Pressey X-O Test, 105 Příhoda, Václav, 142, 144 Primary Mental Abilities (PMA), 524 A Primer of Psychology (Titchener), 99 Prince, Morton, 4, 584 Principles of Behavior (Hull), 361 Principles of General Psychology (Rubinshtein), 426 Principles of Gestalt Psychology (Koffka), 100 The Principles of Human Physiology (Carpenter), 186

The Principles of Medical Psychology (von Feuchtersleben), 185 The Principles of Mental Physiology (Carpenter), 186 Principles of Physiological Psychology (Wundt), 556 Principles of Psychology (James), 323, 572 Principles of Psychology (Pinillos), 527, 530 Principles of Psychology (Spencer), 184 Principles of Psychology on the Basis of the Experimental Sciences (Sergi), 312 Principles of Scientific Management (Taylor), 222 Principles of Topological Psychology (Lewin), 100 Privy Council of Jamaica, 68 Problems in Personnel Psychology (Hsiao), 105 Problems of Clinical Society (Ossicini), 337 Problems of Written Chinese Characters (Ai), 102 Problemy razvitiia psikhiki (Leont’ev), 436 Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research, 4 Prochaska, Georg, 139 Proclus, 256 Productive Thinking (Wertheimer, Max), 577 Professional Council of Psychology (Brazil), 35 Professional Federation of German Psychologists, 279 Property: A Study in Social Psychology (Beaglehole), 380 The Prophet’s Sunna and Psychology (Nagaty), 455 Protacio-Marcelino, Elizabeth, 403 Prussian Academy of Sciences, 277 PSGB. See Psychological Society of Great Britain PSHD. See psychological studies and human development Psicoballet Care System, 71–72 Psicología, 607 Psicología desde el Caribe, 134 Psicologia Hospitalar, 47 Psicothema, 134 PSSP. See National Association for Filipino Psychology Psyche, 318 Psyche (Rorschach), 266 Psychiatric and Psychological Investigations of Convicted Sex Offenders (Doorbar, Brancale & Ellis), 66 Psychiatric Hospital of Barbados, 73 Psychiatric Hospital of the Cross, 368 Psychiatric Institute of Turin, 317 psychic phenomena, 188, 354–55 psychoanalysis, 21–22, 29–30, 46, 100–101, 126, 136, 164, 219, 278, 330, 333–35, 355 Psychoanalysis (Kubo), 355 Psychoanalysis and Humanistic Approach in Psychotherapy (Meleika), 169

index

639

Psychoanalytic Psychotherapy in South Africa, 511 psychobiology, 135 Psychoclinical Study of Aphasia (Goulart), 38 Psychologia, 361 Psychologia (Goclenius), 256 Psychologia Anthropologica (Casmann), 256 Psychologia Empirica (Wolff), 259 Psychologia Metaphysica (Willwoll), 277 Psychologia Physica (Hippe), 256 Psychologia Rationalis (Wolff), 259 Psychologia vera (Böhme), 257 Psychological Apparatus, 272 Psychological Assessment, 49, 534 Psychological Association of South America (PASA), 508 Psychological Association of the Philippines (PAP), 398–99 Psychological Biannual, 99 Psychological Bulletin, 6, 100, 483, 574 The Psychological Clinic, 38, 584 The Psychological Fact of Perception (Ardigò), 311 The Psychological Index, 3 Psychological Institute of the Republic of South Africa (PIRSA), 508 Psychological Practices Act of Australia, 27 The Psychological Problem of Time (Bonaventura), 332 The Psychological Register, 7, 357 Psychological Review, 100, 189, 420, 483, 574 Psychological Science, 108 Psychological Self-cultivation of Youths (Ding), 104 psychological services, 54–55, 293, 452, 540–42 psychological societies, by country, 14–16 Psychological Society of Great Britain (PSGB), 188 Psychological Society of Ireland, 299, 302 Psychological Studies, 169 psychological studies and human development (PSHD), 54 psychological testing, 105, 486. See also intelligence testing in Brazil, 43 in East Germany, 279 in England, 192–95 in Lebanon, 373 psychometric, 204 Rorschach and, 266 in Saudi Arabia, 452 in South Africa, 504–6 in Spain, 520 standardization of, 165 in Thailand, 540 in Turkey, 563–64 in United States, 579–81 Psychologie du raisonnement (Binet), 238 psychologie pathologique, 315 Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt (Brentano), 276

640

index

Psychology (Marek), 143 Psychology (Motora), 350 Psychology (Saliem), 164 Psychology: Empirical and Rational (Maher), 293 psychology, history of, 622–23 Psychology and Society, 47 Psychology and the Manager (Dempsey), 298 Psychology as a Positive Science (Ardigò), 311 Psychology as a Science (Musatti), 331 Psychology for the Schools (Sergi), 314 Psychology for the Third Millennium (Heller & Šturma), 144 Psychology in 1925 (Watson), 100 Psychology in America: A Historical Survey (Hilgard), 588 Psychology in Education (Roark), 96 Psychology in Society, 508, 511 Psychology in Utopia (Kozulin), 413 Psychology Journal, 541 Psychology of Aggression/Hostility and Its Control: A New Cognitive Therapeutic Approach (Al-Aqad), 169 The Psychology of Insanity (Hart), 196 Psychology of Life in the Concentration Camp Thereienstadt (Utitz), 141 psychology of reaction, 217–18 The Psychology of Sartre (Dempsey), 298 Psychology of Skills (Abou-Hashem), 167 Psychology of Temporal Perception (Benussi), 330 psychology promotion, in Egypt, 172 Psychology Research, 321 Psychology Society of South Africa (PsySSA), 508–9 psychometric tests, 204 psychometry, 259, 270, 312 psychopathology, 89, 244–45 Psychophysical Laboratory, 351 psychophysics, 269–70 psychophysiology, 188, 445–46 Psychophysiology of Perception and Representation (Tapajós), 38 Psychosocial Pathology: Toward a Theory on the Disturbing Relationship Between Individual and the Society (Fayek), 168 Psychotechnical Laboratory, 220 Psychotechnic Laboratory at Dresden, 141 psychotechnics, 5, 125–26, 141–42, 222, 326, 329, 333–35, 422, 519–20 psychotherapy, 46, 73, 237, 244–45, 447–49 Psychotherapy (Meleika), 169 Psykologia, 221, 224 PsySSA. See Psychology Society of South Africa Pulido de Briceño, Mercedes, 605 Pulkkinen, Lea, 225 PUP. See Measure of Character and Personality Purkinje, Jan Evangelista, 139–40, 141f

Putnam, James Jackson, 584 PWU. See Philippine Women’s University

Q Quadrio, Assunto, 336 Quaestiones Physicae (Freigius), 256 Qualitative Approach and Methodology in Sciences of Man, 145 qualitative data analysis, 145 Qualitative Experiments in Psychology (Titchener), 379 Quantitative Experiments in Psychology (Titchener), 379 Queen’s University Belfast, 299 Questions of Philosophy and Psychology, 416 Quetelet, Adolphe, 193, 312 Quezon, Manuel, 397 Qur’an, 52, 163, 444

R Rabaud, Etienne, 241–42 race politics, 503–4 Rachman, Stanley, 509 racial segregation, 499, 586–87 Radecki, Waclaw, 39 Radical Olympus movement, 129–30 Rageh, Ahmed E., 164, 173 Raja Isteri Pengiran Anak Saleha (RIPAS) Hospital, 55 Ramon y Cajal, Santiago, 519 Ramos, Fidel, 404 Ramsey, Allan, 483 rational emotive therapy, 27 Rauhala, Lauri, 221 Raven, J. C., 204 Raymond, Fulgence, 236 Readings in Social Psychology in the Arab Countries (Meleika), 169 Reaktologiia (Kornilov), 422 Recto, Claro M., 399 Reflexes of the Brain (Sechenov), 413 reflexology, 429–30 Regeneration movement, 129 Řehan, Vladimír, 149 Reich, Wilhelm, 436 Reid, Leslie, 387 Reid, Thomas, 476, 477f, 478–80 Reimarus, Hermann Samuel, 260 Rein, Thiodolf, 213 religion, 51–53, 62–65, 128–30, 188–89, 291, 295–96, 551–52, 619. See also specific religions Remembering: A Study in Experimental and Social Psychology (Bartlett), 203 Renaissance, 256–58, 514–15 Renan, Ernest, 233 Report of Psychology, 41 The Republic (Plato), 445 Resiner, M. A., 422 Respublica Bojema (Stránský), 139 Reuchlin, Maurice, 247 Review of Psychology Applied to Pedagogy and Psychopathology, 318

Revista Brasileira de Terapia Comportamental e Cogntiva, 47 Revista da Abordagem Gestáltica, 47 Revista de Occidente, 521, 523 Revista de Psicología, 134 Revista de Psicologia General y Aplicada, 525 Revista de Psicologia i Pedagogia, 523 Revista di Psicanalisi, 335–36 Revista di Psicologia, 335–36 Revista Inter-Americana de Psicología/InterAmerican Journal of Psychology, 134 Revista Interamericana de Psicología Ocupacional, 134 Revista Latinoamericana de Psicología, 134 Revista Psico, 43 Revue de Synthèse, 250n25 Revue Philosophique, 2, 233 Rey, Abel, 242 Reyburn, H. A., 497 Reyna, Leo, 509 Rhazes, 443, 447–48 Rhodes University, 496–97 Ribes, Emilio, 531 Ribot, Théodule, 190, 203, 232, 236, 315 Říčan, Pavel, 143, 145 Ricci, Matteo, 92 Richards, Graham, 184, 304 Richardson, Alan, 23 Richet, Charles, 2, 4, 234 Richter, Curt, 354 Rieffert, Johann Baptist, 275 Rignano, Eugenio, 321 RIPAS Hospital. See Raja Isteri Pengiran Anak Saleha Hospital The Rise of Chinese Industrial Psychology (Chou & Chen, L.), 105 Ritchie, James, 382–83, 388–89 Ritchie, Jane, 382, 388–89 Rites of Zhou, 83 Rivers, William, 189–90, 196–97, 380 Rivet, Paul, 242 Roark, R. N., 96 Robertson, George Croom, 189 Rochefoucauld, François de La, 259 Rodrigo, Mercedes, 131, 520, 523 Rodriguez-Delgado, Jose M., 531 Rodriguez-Lafora, Gonzalo, 518 Rof-Carballo, Juan, 531–32 Rogers, Carl, 337, 589 The Role of Civilization in the Development of Mental Diseases (Cardozo), 38 Roman-Duran, Antonio, 523 Romanes, George, 185 Romano, Maria Eugenia, 528 Rorschach, Hermann, 266 Rorschach’s Ink Blot Test, 165, 563 Rosario University, 127 Rosenhan, David, 29 Rosenkranz, Johann Karl Friedrich, 267 Rosenquist, Aksel, 222 Rosenzweig, Mark R., 9 Rosmini, Antonio, 310–11

Rossi, Ernest, 448 Rossi, Pasquale, 327 Rossolimo, Grigorii Ivanovich, 417 Rostohar, Mihajlo, 141–42, 146 Rousseau, J. J., 128 Roxo, Henrique, 37–38 Royer, Clémence, 233 Ruan Jingqing, 101 Rubinshtein, Sergei Leonidovich, 426–27, 430, 436 Rudert, Johannes, 277 Rush, Benjamin, 466 Russell, Bertrand, 382 Russian Federation, 412. See also Soviet Union educational psychology in, 437–38 experimental psychology in, 418 Freud and, 435–36 higher education in, 419 institutionalization in, 418 Marxism in, 421–24 October Revolution and, 414 pedology in, 424–27 Stalinism in, 427–31 Russian Psychological Association, 438 Russian Psychology (Joravsky), 413 Ruttmann, W. J., 558 Rûžička, Jiří, 150 Rybnikov, N. A., 420, 424–25

S SAAF. See South African Air Force Saba, Umberto, 335 Sachsenberg, Ewald, 141 Sacristan, Jose M., 518 SAHA. See Social and Health Assessment Saint George Hospital University Medical Center, 369 Saint-Hilaire, Auguste de, 36 Saji, Morio, 361 Sakaki, Yasusaburo, 352 Sakuma, Kanae, 353, 356 Sakyamuni, 83 Salazar, José Miguel, 601, 606 Salazar, Zeus, 401–2 Saleh, A. Z., 168 Saliem, Mohammed Sherif, 164 Salomaa, J. E., 217 SAMDC. See South African Medical and Dental Council SAMPI. See Society for Adolescent Medicine in the Philippines, Inc. Sampson, Barney, 387 Sander, Friedrich, 277, 279 Sanford, Edmund, 575 San Lazzaro Mental Hospital, 318, 325–26 Santos, Osvaldo de Barros, 43 Sanz del Rio, Julian, 267 SAPA. See South African Psychological Association Sapir, Edward, 381 Sarfatti, Gualtiero, 327

Sartre, Jean-Paul, 246 SAT. See Scholastic Aptitude Test Sati, Mustafa, 557 Sato, Koji, 361–62 Saudi Arabia, 442–43 abnormal psychology in, 446–47 behavior therapy in, 447–48 clinical psychology in, 446–47 cognitive psychology in, 448–49 education system in, 450–51 higher education in, 451–52 Islam in, 442–43, 455–56 modernization in, 458 modern psychology in, 449–54 psychological services in, 452 psychophysiology in, 445–46 psychotherapy in, 447–49 research in, 452–54 women in, 454–55 Saudi Educational and Psychological Association (SEPA), 455 Savisir, Isik, 564 El-Sayed, A. M., 167 El-Sayed, F. E., 164–65, 168 SBPC. See Brazilian Society for the Advancement of Science Schäffle, Albert Eberhard Friedrich, 263 Schaller, Julius, 267 Scheibler, Christoph, 257 Schelling, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph, 263, 266 Schiff, Moritz, 316–17, 415 Schleiermacher, Friedrich, 267 Schmidt, Franz, 558 Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT), 581 “School Psychology in Jamaica” (BrownEarle), 65 Schubert, Gotthilf Heinrich, 266 Sciamanna, Ezio, 312, 324, 327 Scielo, 46–47 Science, 4, 574 Science of Human Labor (Doležal), 142 Science of the Soul (Rein), 213 The Scientific Foundation of Psychological Construction (Hsiao), 105 The Scientist, 301–2 Scientology, 25, 27 Scotland evolution in, 469–70 higher education in, 470–72, 489 institutionalization in, 470–72 language in, 482 optics in, 473–75 philosophy in, 475–82 SCP. See Société des Consultants et Psychotherapeutes Scripture, E. W., 579 Scripture, Edward W., 351 SDP. See Social-Democratic Party of Finland se, 86–87 Secadas, Francisco, 524, 527–28

index

641

Sechenov, Ivan Mikhailovich, 413, 415–16 Section Française de l’Internationale Ouvrière (SFIO), 239 Seishin-Bunseki, 355 Seligman, C. G., 30 Semaj, Leachim, 61, 68–69 The Senses and the Intellect (Bain), 184, 462, 463f SEPA. See Saudi Educational and Psychological Association Šeracký, František, 142, 146 Sergi, Giuseppe, 308–9, 311–15, 327, 340 Servadio, Emilio, 335 Seth, George, 299 Severnyi, B. N., 422 Severová, Marie, 143 Sexton, Virginia Staudt, 617 sexual identity, 75 SFIO. See Section Française de l’Internationale Ouvrière El-Shakhs A. E., 170 Shakow, David, 588–89 Al-Sharkawy, H. M., 169 Sharman, Matthew, 20 Shaw, John, 467–68 SHBIE. See Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah Institute of Education Shchedrovitskii, Georgii Petrovich, 437–38 Shchukin, S. I., 420 Shelley, James, 383, 385 shell-shock, 195–97 Shen Youqian, 102 Sherif, Muzaffer, 560 Sherrington, Charles, 191, 428 Sherwood, Rae, 506 Shine, John, 293, 296 shinrigaku, 91, 348–49, 349 Shinri Kenkyu, 352–53 Shirinskii-Shikhmatov, P. A., 414 A Short Encyclopedia of Psychology and Psychiatry (Al-Kholy), 170 Shoukeir, Z. M., 169 Shouksmith, George, 384, 386 Showa Era, 348, 357–60 Shpet, Gustav Gustavovich, 419 Shpil’rein, Isaak, 422 Shpil’rein, Sabina, 422, 435 Sidgwick, Henry, 3, 189 Sighele, Schipio, 326–27 Siguán, Miguel, 524, 527 Sikolohiyang Pilipino: Isyu, Pananaw at Kaalaman (Aganon & David), 402 Sikolohiyang Pilipino: Teorya, Metodo at Gamit (Pe-Pua), 402 Silva, Carlos, 607 Simarro, Luis, 517 Simiand, François, 239 Simon, Herbert, 191 Simon, Théodore, 194, 238, 243, 579–80 Singer, George, 24

642

index

SIOPSA. See Society for Industrial and Organisational Psychology of South Africa SIP. See Inter-American Congresses of Psychology; Italian Society of Psychology Skawran, Paul, 497, 502 Skinner, B. F., 247, 386–87, 579 Skoun, 370 slavery, 60, 62–63, 586 Slavina, L. S., 432 Šmahel, David, 147 Smékal, Vladimír, 145, 152, 154 Smith, Adam, 483 Smith, Grafton Elliot, 196 Smith, William, 191, 485f, 486 Smyth, John, 20–21 Snellman, Johan, 212–13 Social Affirmation Project, 65 Social and Health Assessment (SAHA), 154n2 Social-Democratic Party of Finland (SDP), 216 Social Development in Young Children (Isaacs), 204 socialist psychology, 107 social psychology, 44, 104, 133, 150–51, 247, 325–28, 561–62 Social Psychology (Al-Farabi), 445 Social Psychology (Orano), 327 Social Psychology (Sarfatti), 327 Société Clinique de Médecine Mentale, 240 Société de Psychologie, 241–43 Société des Consultants et Psychotherapeutes (SCP), 374 Société des Practiciens en Psychologie et Consultants, 374 Société Psychanalytique de Paris, 244 Society for Adolescent Medicine in the Philippines, Inc. (SAMPI), 406 Society for Animal Psychology, 358 Society for Experimental Psychology, 273 Society for Industrial and Organisational Psychology of South Africa (SIOPSA), 509 Society for Popular Lectures in Psychology, 352 Society for Psychical Research (SPR), 188–89, 215, 234 Society for Psychology, 352 Society for the Improvement of Medical and Chirurgical Knowledge, 471 The Sociological Tradition (Nisbet), 217 sociology, 217, 231, 247 Söderhjelm, Henning, 215 Sokolov, P. P., 422 Sokolova, E. E., 434 Šolc, Miloslav, 144 somatologia, 256–57 Some Modern Hawaiians (Beaglehole), 381 Some Modern Maoris (Beaglehole), 381

Some Psychological Considerations About Man (Mello), 38 Sommer, Robert, 272 Song of the West Indies (Heydorn), 74 Sorbonne, 233, 246 Soueif, M. I., 164, 166, 168–69 A Source Book of Clinical Psychology (Soueif ), 169 South Africa clinical psychology in, 506–7 education system in, 497–99 higher education in, 496–97, 509 HIV/AIDS in, 511–12 industrial psychology in, 499–500 institutionalization in, 506–7 mental health in, 499 psychological testing in, 504–6 race politics in, 503–4 research in, 510 women in, 509–10 World War II and, 500–503 South African Air Force (SAAF), 502–3 South African Journal of Psychology, 508, 511 South African Journal of Psychology and Education, 497 South African Journal of Science, 507 South African Medical and Dental Council (SAMDC), 507 South African Psychological Association (SAPA), 507 Soviet Union, 113, 212, 216–17, 412. See also Russian Federation Spain, 303 Civil War, 516 clinical psychology in, 532–33 educational psychology in, 533 education system in, 528–29 industrialization in, 516–17 institutionalization in, 532–34 modern psychology in, 515–16 psychological testing in, 520 psychotechnics in, 519–20 Renaissance and, 514–15 Spaltro, Enzo, 336 Spanish Association of Psychologists, 516 Spanish Journal of Psychology, 534 Spanish Psychological Society, 525 Spaventa, Bertrando, 310 Spearman, Charles, 7, 188, 194, 204, 380 Special Issues in Psychological and Educational Experiment, 99 speech disorders, 172 Spencer, Herbert, 19, 183–85, 193, 232–33, 348 SPI. See Italian Psychoanalytic Society spiritism, 4 spiritualism, 37, 234–35, 250n15, 548, 573 spirituality, 619 Spix, Johann Baptist von, 36 sports psychology, 150, 167 SPR. See Society for Psychical Research

Spranger, Eduard, 273 Spurzheim, Johann Gaspar, 183, 468 St. Joseph University, 366, 371 Stalinism, 427–31 Stavel, Josef, 142 Steinthal, Heymann, 263, 267 Stejskal, Cyril, 146 Stephan, Margaret, 544 stereokinetic phenomena, 331 Stern, William, 7, 275, 278, 334 Stewart, Dugald, 477f, 480–82 Štikar, J., 143 Štítný, Tomáš, 138 Stoneman, Ethel, 19–20 Stout, George Frederick, 483, 484f, 488–89 Stránský, Paulus, 139 Strongman, Ken, 387 structuralism, 574–76 structural psychology, 99 Structure of the Psyche (Kaila), 218 Strümpell, Ludwig, 267 Strutt, John, 188 Stuchlík, Jaroslav, 147 Studies of Childhood (Sully), 198 A Study of Child Psychology (Chen, H.), 103 Stumpf, Carl, 4, 140, 152–53, 190, 272, 277, 353 Šturma, Dieter, 144 Style and Psyche (Machotka), 152 subjectivity, 235 Sukhanov, S. A., 419 Sullivan, Gavin, 387 Sully, James, 4, 183, 189–90, 198–99 Šulová, Lenka, 146 Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah Institute of Education (SHBIE), 53–56 Suma Psicológica, 134 Sumner, Francis, 586 Sutherland, Ivan, 382–83 Suzuki, Harutaro, 357 Suzuki-Binet Test, 357 Švancara, Josef, 143–44, 153 Svevo, Italo, 335 Svoboda, Mojmír, 149 Symbolik der menschlichen Gestalt (Carus), 262 Symbolism of the Dream (Schubert), 266 Symposium of Filipino Personality (Tan), 398

T al-Tabari, Ali Ibn Sahl Rabban, 447 tabula rasa theory, 443 Taft, Ronald, 23 Taha, F. A., 169 Tahsin, Hoca, 556 Taihoku Imperial University, 357 Taine, Hippolyte, 198–99, 233, 238, 419 Taisho Era, 348, 352 Takagi, Sadaji, 356, 358 Takala, Martti, 219, 225

Takebe, Tongo, 352 Talbot, William Henry Fox, 474–75 talent theory, 89–90 Tamburini, Augusto, 315–16 Tan, Allen, 398 Tañada, Lorenzo, 399 Tanaka, Kan’ichi, 357 Tanaka-Binet Intelligence Test, 357 Tanaka Institute for Educational Institute, 357 Tan Sitong, 93–94 Taoism. See Daoism Tao Xingzhi, 100 Tapajós, Estelita, 38 Tardy, Vladimír, 143, 145 Tasavvuf, 555 TAT. See Thematic Apperception Test Tate, Frank, 20 Tatrado de Psychologia General (Mayor & Pinillos, eds.), 530–31 Taunay, Félix Émile, 36 Taylor, A. J. W., 383 Taylor, Frederick Winslow, 222 Taylor, J. G., 497, 499, 509 Teaching Caribbean Students (Bastick & Ezenne, eds.), 65 Teixera, Anísio, 40 Teplov, Boris Mikhailovich, 427, 436 Terasawa, Izuo, 358 Terman, Lewis, 580 Terminology and Documentation in Psychology (Švancara), 144 terrorism, 151 Test of English as Foreign Language (TOEFL), 451 Tetens, Johann Nicholas, 260 Tetsugaku-Jii (Inouye, Motora & Nakashima), 350 Tevfik, Baha, 557 Textbook of Psychology (Snellman), 213 Textbook of Psychology, Based on Empirical Method (Lehtovaara), 220 T-Groups, 338 Thai Clinical Psychologist Association, 542 Thailand, 538–39 HIV/AIDS in, 544 organizations of, 542–43 professions in, 543–44 psychological services in, 540–42 psychological testing in, 540 Thai Mental Health Association, 542 Thai Psychological Association, 542 Thematic Apperception Test (TAT), 165, 524, 563 theoretical pluralism, 535 theoretical psychology, 105, 387–88 Thesaurus of Psychology (Dessougui), 170 Thinking, Feeling, Doing (Scripture), 579 Third Republic, 232–37 Thirty Years War, 139 Thomas, David, 389 Thomas Aquinas, 127, 552

Thomasius, Christian, 258–59 Thomson, Godfrey, 194, 204, 486 Thomson, J. J., 188 Thomson, Mathew, 201 Thorndike, Edward L., 7, 100, 110, 354, 380, 573 Thought and Language (Vygotsky), 433 thoughtography, 354 Thouless, Robert, 7 Through Psychology to Metagnosis (Kovác), 153 Thurnwald, R., 434 Thurstone, Louis, 5, 526 Tiberghen, Guillaume G., 267 Titchener, Edward B., 4, 99, 350, 379, 574–76 Todes, Daniel, 413, 427 TOEFL. See Test of English as Foreign Language Tohoku Imperial University, 353 Tohoku Psychologica Folia, 358 Tokarskii, Ardalion Ardalionivich, 417 Tokugawa, 347 Tokyo Eiwa School, 350 Tokyo Higher Normal School, 357 Tokyo Imperial University, 98, 349–51 Tokyo Institute for Psychoanalytic Study, 355 Tokyo Women’s Higher Normal School, 353 Tolman, Edward C., 100, 361, 579 Tomoda, Fujio, 361 tone psychology, 277 Tonpsychologie, 140 Toulouse, Edouard, 240 Toyama, Masakzu, 349 TPA. See Turkish Psychological Association Trahair, Richard, 23 Traité de Psychologie (Dumas, ed.), 244 Traité des maladies mentales (Griesinger), 232 Transexualism and Sexual Reassignment (Doorbar), 66 transformism, 234 translation issues, 95–96 Treatise of Human Nature (Hume), 478 Treatise of Psychoanalysis (Musatti), 336 Treatise of the Soul (Vives), 514 Treatise on Mnemonic Arts (Ricci), 92 Treatise on the Eye (Porterfield), 465, 478 Treaty of Annexation, 357 Treves, Zaccaria, 326 Trinity College, Dublin, 292 Trist, Eric, 204 Troitskii, Matvei Mikhailovich, 418 Trotsky, L. D., 422 Tsinghua University, 104 Tsukahara, Masatsugu, 352 Tuke, Daniel, 185 Tunç, Mustafa Sekip, 559 Turgenev, Ivan, 414 Turgot, Anne Robert Jacques, 230

index

643

Turhan, Mümtaz, 561–62 Turkey, 547–48 education system in, 560–61 higher education in, 556–57 indigenous psychology in, 567 institutionalization in, 558–60, 563–65 modern psychology in, 555–56 psychological testing in, 563–64 religion in, 551–52 social psychology in, 561–62 Western psychology in, 566 women in, 564 Turkish Psychological Association (TPA), 564–65 Turkish Psychological Bulletin, 563 Turkish Psychology Association, 564 Turkish Psychology Journal, 563 Turró, Ramon, 518–20 Turtle, Alison, 19

U UBD. See Universiti Brunei Darussalam Ubeda, Manuel, 524, 528 UCAB. See Universidad Católica Andrés Bello Uchida-Kraepelin Psychodiagnostic Test, 361 Uchido, Yuzaburo, 361 UCV. See Universidad Central de Venezuela Ueda, Toshimi, 360 Ueno, Yoichi, 352 UJC. See Union of Young Communists Ukhtomskii, A. A., 413, 432 Ulrici, Hermann, 267 Unamuno, Miguel de, 521 unconscious celebration, 186 UNESCO. See United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization Unhammad, Najab ud-din, 446 UNICEF. See United Nations Children’s Fund Union of Young Communists (UJC), 71 United Church of Jamaica, 66 United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), 74, 400 United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), 8–9, 72 United States, 622 accreditation system in, 589 clinical psychology in, 583–85, 588–89 post-World War II, 587–88 psychological testing in, 579–81 research in, 587–88 women in, 585–86 Universal Declaration of Ethical Principles for Psychologists, 132 Universidad Católica Andrés Bello (UCAB), 597–98 Universidad Central de Venezuela (UCV), 596, 600–601 Universidade Federal de Pernambuco, 45

644

index

Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, 45 Universidad Simón Bolívar (USB), 600 Universitas Psychologica, 134 Universiti Brunei Darussalam (UBD), 53–56 University Bicocca of Milan, 623 University Catholic Group, 71 University College Cork, 298 University College Dublin, 293, 297 University College Galway, 298 University College London, 187 University Council of Jamaica, 64 University Grants Committee, 205 University of Aberdeen, 483–84 University of Adelaide, 19 University of Auckland, 384 University of Balamand, 371 University of Brazil, 41 University of Breslau, 139 University of Coimbra, 36 University of Florence, 312 University of Geneva, 39 University of Graz, 330 University of Havana, 70–71 University of Helsinki, 211–13, 221 University of Las Villas, 71 University of London, 189 University of Melbourne, 19, 23–24 University of New South Wales, 24 University of New Zealand, 379 University of Otago, 377–78 University of Padua, 311 University of Prague, 139–40 University of Queensland, 19 University of Rome, 312 University of Santo Tomas, 397 University of São Paulo, 41, 44 University of Sydney, 19, 24 University of the Philippines (UP), 395 University of the West Indies (UWI), 61–62, 73–74 University of Turin, 314 University of Western Australia, 19, 24 University of Western Bohemia, 150 Unlit Roads (Heydorn), 74 UP. See University of the Philippines Upham, Thomas, 572, 619 Uribe, Jaramillo, 129 USB. See Universidad Simón Bolívar Utitz, Emil, 141, 145 UWI. See University of the West Indies Uznadze, Dmitrii Nikolaevich, 435–36

V Vailati, Giovanni, 320 Valentini, Ernesto, 338–39 Valitskaia, M. K., 417 Vallejo-Najera, Antonio, 524 Valsiner, Jaan, 413 van der Merwe, A. B., 507 van der Veer, René, 413 Vaughan, Graham, 387, 389

Vegas, Rafael, 595 Veitch, John, 486 Venezuela behaviorism in, 604 clinical psychology in, 603–4 community psychology in, 605–6 developmental psychology in, 602 educational psychology in, 602–3 education system in, 597–99 healthy psychology in, 603–4 higher education in, 599–601 indigenous psychology in, 594–95 neuropsychology in, 604 organizational psychology in, 603 research in, 604–7 Venezuelan Association for Academic Training in Psychology (AVEFAP), 599 Venezuelan Association for the Advancement of Science (AsoVAC), 596 Venezuelan Association of Social Psychology, 601 Venezuelan Children’s Council, 595 Venezuelan Federation of Psychologists, 599 Venezuelan Journal of Community Clinical Psychology, 607 Venezuelan Psychological Association, 596 Venn, John, 189 Vera, Augusto, 310 Verga, Andrea, 315 Vernant, Jean-Pierre, 243 Vernon, Philip Ewart, 486–87 Versailles Treaty, 275 Verstehende Psychologie, 273–74 Verwoerd, H. F., 498 Vestnik psikhologii, kriminal’noi antropologii i gipnotisma, 429–30 Vetter, August, 277 Vico, Gian Battista, 310, 340 Victoria Mental Hygiene Authority, 24 Victoria University College, 378, 380–81 Viewegh, Josef, 152 Villalba, Doris, 600 Vineland Training School, 21 Viola, Giacinto, 334 Viqueira, Juan Vicente, 518 Virgilio, Gaspare, 315 Virsu, Veijo, 224 Vives, Juan Luis, 514 Vladislavlev, M. I., 419 Volkelt, Hans, 277 Völkerpsychologie, 272, 274 Volkmann, Wilhelm Fridolin, 267 Volprosy psikholgii, 436 Von der Physiognomik (Lavater), 262 von Feuchtersleben, Ernst, 185 von Fieandt, Kai, 220–21 Voprosy filosofii i psikhologii, 418 Vorotynskii, B. I., 417 Vvendeskii, A. I., 419 Vvendeskii, N. E., 413, 416

Vyemĕtal, Jan, 149 Vygotsky, Lev Semyonovich, 39, 117n17, 136, 412–14, 423, 425–26, 431–36

W Wagner, Rudolph, 268 Waikato University, 388 Waitz, Theodor, 267 Waldmeir, Theophilus, 366–67 Walk Good Guyana Boy (Heydorn), 74 Wallas, Graham, 191, 203 Wallin, J. E. Wallace, 585 Wallon, Henri, 241, 243, 245 Walther, Léon, 39, 40 Walton, Darren, 387 Wang Guowei, 95–96 Wang Jingxi, 104 Wang Qingren, 90–91, 94 Ward, Colleen, 389 Ward, James, 38, 187, 189, 197, 483 Ward, Tony, 387 Warner, Francis, 192–93 war neurosis, 195 Waseda University, 355 Washburn, Margaret, 576, 585–86 Waterhouse, Ian, 29 Watson, Foster, 514 Watson, John B., 6, 100, 191, 203, 217, 240, 434, 578 Watt, Henry Jackson, 486, 487f Weber, Eduard, 269 Weber, Ernst Heinrich, 266, 268–70 Weber, Wilhelm, 269 Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Adults, 165 Weismann, August, 234, 328 Weiss, Edoardo, 335 Wei Yuan, 93 Welch, Henry, 197 Wellek, Albert, 277 Weller, Peter, 61–62, 69 Wells, William Charles, 469–70 Werner, Heinz, 278 Wertheimer, Max, 35, 139, 277, 576–77 Wertheimer, Michael, 139 Westermarck, Edward, 214–15 What Is Leadership? (Hsiao), 105 What is to Be Done? (Chernyshevskii), 415 Wheatstone, Charles, 474 Where are We in Westernization? (Turhan), 562 White, Aldyn, 64, 69–70 White, Geoff, 387

White, Isobel, 500, 501f Whitley Councils, 204–5, 206n14 Whittaker, Thomas, 256 WHO. See World Health Organization Whytt, Robert, 464, 465f Wilcocks, R. W., 497–98 Williams, Clive, 28 Willwoll, Alexander, 277 Winkler, Robin, 29 Winn, Roy, 22 Winterbourn, Ralph, 383, 385 Wirth, Wilhelm, 7 Wissler, Clark, 573 Witherspoon, John, 483 Witmer, Lightner, 4, 38, 325, 383, 583–84 Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 264 Wittstein, Theodor, 267 Wolfe, Lensley, 68 Wolff, Christian, 259–60, 476 Wolpe, Joseph, 589 women. See also feminist psychology in Australia, 26 Caribbean psychosocial factors and, 75 in England, 190 in Japan, 353–54 in Saudi Arabia, 454–55 in South Africa, 509–10 in Turkey, 564 in United States, 585–86 Woods, Alice, 190 Woodworth, Robert S., 4, 100, 380, 573 work psychology, 149–50 World Federation for Mental Health, 221 World Health Organization (WHO), 9, 55, 293, 296, 367–68 World Psychology Congress, 31 World War I, 195–97, 274–75, 327–28, 358–59 World War II, 275–76 Czech Republic and, 142 Ireland and, 295 Italy and, 327–28 Japan and, 357, 359 Philippines and, 397–98 South Africa and, 500–503 Wu Dingliang, 105 Wulff, Moshe, 435 Wundt, Wilhelm, 1–3, 5, 7, 99, 190, 214, 266, 271–73, 348, 350–52, 416, 419, 469, 556–57

X Xunzi, 93

Y Yabe, Yaekichi, 355 Yacat, Jay, 403 Yale University, 351, 381 Yang Kuo-Shu, 110–11 Yan Guocai, 116n1 Yan Yongjing, 95–96 Yao Wenyuan, 108 Yaroshevskii, Mikhail Grigor’evich, 412 Yates, Aubrey, 27 Yela, Mariano, 524, 526 The Yellow Emperor’s Classic of Internal Medicine, 88–89, 116n6 Yerkes, Robert, 580–81 Yin-Yang theory, 82, 88–89 Young, Thomas, 475 The Young Delinquent (Burt), 199, 204 Yuasa, Mitsutomo, 348 Yurkevich, Pamfil Danilovich, 415

Z Zahran, H. A., 170 Zaidan, M. M., 170 Zalkind, Aron Borisovich, 421, 423, 425–26 Zanardelli, Giuseppe, 315 Zangwill, Oliver, 204 Zaporozhets, A. V., 432 Zaragüeta, Juan, 519, 525 Zazazo, R., 169 Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane, 3 Zewar, Mustafa, 164, 169 Zhang, Shizhao, 101 Zhang Yaoxiang, 98–100, 104 Zhao Liru, 99 Zhao Puchu, 116n5 Zhdanov, A. A., 425 Zhejiang University, 103 Zhou Yi, 83, 85–86 Zhuangzi, 85–86, 116n4 Zhu Zhixian, 101–2 Ziehen, Theodor, 272, 517 Zimmermann, Ernst, 272 Zimmermann, Robert, 267 Zinchencko, Petr Ivanovich, 435 Zola, Emile, 239 Zoonomia (Darwin, E.), 481 Zunini, Giorgio, 336

index

645