The Ottoman Origins of Modern Iraq: Political Reform, Modernization and Development in the Nineteenth-Century Middle East 9780755610983, 9781848854253

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The Ottoman Origins of Modern Iraq: Political Reform, Modernization and Development in the Nineteenth-Century Middle East
 9780755610983, 9781848854253

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To my beloved parents Zahide and Nazım Ceylan

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LIST OF MAPS

1 2 3

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Baghdad in 1849 The Aleppo–Baghdad caravan route Baghdad, (1331/1913)

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LIST OF TABLES

1 Population estimates for Ottoman Iraq in 1875 2 Population estimates for the three province of Ottoman Iraq 3 Population estimate for the city center of Baghdad in 1869 4 Governors of Baghdad between 1831 and 1872 5 Governors of Baghdad and Müşîrs of the Sixth Army 6 Administrative divisions of Ottoman Iraq by 1871

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30 31 34 78 94 126

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LIST OF PHOTOGRAPHS

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18

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Baghdad Bridge over the Tigris Ottoman officials on a kelek on the Tigris River Azamiyah, on the left bank of the Tigris A camel caravan crossing the bridge of Mosul Infantry barracks of the Sixth Army in Baghdad Ottoman soldiers in Baghdad Provincial government house and the mosque attached to it Midhat Pasha, governor of Baghdad, 1869–1872 Provincial administrative offices on the left bank of the Tigris An inner view of Bab-ı Azam, Baghdad The clock tower and the military training area The custom house of Baghdad and the steamers operating between Baghdad and Basra Opening of a canal in Baghdad A horse tramline operating between Baghdad and Kazımiyah Students of idadi school in Baghdad İdadi School on the bank of the Tigris River Two future prime ministers of modern Iraq: Jafar Al-Askari and Nuri Al-Said The semi-official newspaper of the province of Baghdad, Zewra

25 28 33 47 63 65 74 81 98 184 187 194 201 203 205 208 210 216

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

A.MKT. MHM. A.MKT. UM. BOA. C. ML DİA El1 El2 FO HR.SYS. IJMES IOR İA İ.DAH İ.HAR. İ. MVL. İ. MMAH. İ.MMH. İ. ŞD. İÜEF MES MIT-EJMES TALİD TNA TTK M

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Sadaret Mektubî-i Mühimme Kalemi Evrakı Sadaret Mektubî Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi Cevdet Maliye Diyanet Vakfı İslâm Ansiklopedisi Encyclopedia of Islam, first edition Encyclopedia of Islam, second edition Foreign Office Hariciye Nezareti Siyasi Kısım International Journal of Middle East Studies India Office Records İslam Ansiklopedisi İrâde-i Dâhiliye İrâde-i Hâriciye İrâde-i Meclis-i Vâlâ İrâde-i Meclis-i Mahsûs İrâde-i Mesâil-i Mühimme İrâde-i Şûrâ-yı Devlet İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Middle Eastern Studies The MIT Electronic Journal of Middle East Studies Türkiye Araştırmaları Literatür Dergisi The National Archives Türk Tarih Kurumu Muharrem

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xiv

S Ra R Ca C B Ş

N L Za Z

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THE OTTOMAN ORIGINS OF MODERN IRAQ

Safer Rebîulevvel Rebîulâhir Cemâziyelevvel Cemâziyelâhir Receb Şaban Ramazan Şevval Zilkâde Zilhicce

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This book has long been in preparation and I have had the support and encouragement of many people. I have benefited from experts and academics in different fields and I am delighted to be able to thank them. First of all, I am grateful to Selim Deringil for his support; Tufan Buzpınar, Mehmet İpşirli, Selçuk Esenbel, Gökhan Çetinsaya, Hala Fattah, and Erol Özvar for reading and discussing my drafts; Coşkun Çakır, Şevket Kamil Akar, Yücel Bulut, Suat Mertoğlu, Mesut Uyar, Ayla Efe and Abdülkadir İlgen for their support, enthusiasm and contributions. My special thanks go to Ahmet Davudoğlu, who encouraged me to take up an academic career. I also owe debts to my dear friends Abdülhamit Kırmızı and Yunus Uğur, for their valuable critical comments and encouragement during my work. I am grateful to Salim Aydüz, Kutlu Akalın, Mehmed Ali Doğan, Hacer Topaktaş, Haşim Koç, Gülçin Koç, Bilge Özel and Serkan Yıldırım who provided me with sources I needed from abroad. I would also like to express my gratitude to staff members of the Prime Ministerial Ottoman Archives (Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivleri), the National Archives of the United Kingdom, Foundation for Science and Art, and the İSAM Library of the Diyanet Vakfı in İstanbul. With gratitude, I must also mention that Turkish Cultural Foundation and İ YEM partly funded my research abroad. A considerable part of the photographs used in this book is from Yıldız Photograph Album of Abdülhamid II. I would like to thank the Library of Rare Books, İstanbul University and Arabian Publishing Ltd. for their kind permissions.

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My special debt is to my wife, for her deep understanding and warm support, and my children, to whom I owe many stolen years. Needless to say, I am wholly responsible for all opinions, errors and omissions in this study.

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INTRODUCTION

I mention Baghdad first of all because it is the heart of Iraq, and with no equal on earth either in the Orient or the Occident, it is the most extensive city in area, in importance, in prosperity, in abundance of water, and in healthful climate ... People emigrate to it from all countries, both near and far, and everywhere there are men who have preferred it to their own country. Al-Yakubî*

Baghdad, being one of the most important cities of the Eastern world, has long had a special image in the minds of both Muslims and nonMuslims. Quite apart from the significance of Baghdad in the Muslim world as one of the first cities established in Islamic civilization, it has had fundamental importance for the Turks as well. Turks were quite active in Baghdad and Samarra during the whole of the ninth century, even before Turkish rule had been established in Anatolia. The region was not only the home of Ali Baba and the Sinbad tales, or the capital of Caliph Mansur and Harun Al-Rashid, but it was like the ‘red apple’ (kızılelma) for many outstanding rulers like Tughrul Bey, Timur, Shah İsmail, Selim I, Süleyman the Lawgiver (Kanuni), and Murat IV.1 The region is frequently credited as being one of the most important religious sites, as the location of tombs of many religious figures, such as the fourth Caliph Ali, Hussain (grandchild of the Prophet Muhammad), Imam Azam (the founder of the Hanafi * Ahmad ibn Abi Ya’kub ibn Ja’fer ibn Wadih al-Abbasi, known simply as al-Yakubi, was born in the first decades of the ninth century and died in Egypt in 284/897.

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school of thought), Abdulkadir Geylânî, Suhrawardi and many others; however, it was also the homeland of many Ottoman intellectuals such as Fuzûlî, Ruhî, Ahmed Vâsıf, Babanzâde Ahmet Naim and Ahmet Haşim, just to name a few.2 Baghdad had thus long been a center of many cultural and scientific activities. Apart from its importance in rhetoric and narrative, there is no doubt that Iraq, both in the past and present, represents a ‘miniature of the Middle East’. As will be presented in detail in this book, almost all of the principal ethnic elements (Turks, Arabs, Kurds, Persians and Armenians) co-existed in the province of Baghdad and perhaps the most authentic sects/religions (Sunnis, Shi‘is, Assyrians, Chaldeans, Jacobites etc.) also lived there. And this peaceful co-existence had given Iraq a unique character. Despite its rich historical and cultural background, the number of academic studies on Iraq is insufficient and there is no doubt that Ottoman rule in Iraq, when compared to other Arab provinces, needs more scholarly attention. The scope of this study is the history of Ottoman Iraq, namely the Iraqi provinces of Baghdad, Mosul, Basra and Shahrizor, during a period which can roughly be referred to as the Tanzimat period. Therefore, in this book, I prefer to use ‘the province of Baghdad’ so as to include all of these Iraqi provinces. One of the basic concerns of this study is to reveal the process of Ottoman centralization and modernization in the province of Baghdad, which was in the easternmost periphery of the empire. The dissolution of decentralist/autonomous structures and the extension of Ottoman central power at the expense of tribal dominions will be emphasized. The processes of modernization and centralization were closely related and this study clearly underlines the Ottoman origins of modern Iraq. On the other hand, the implementation of basic Tanzimat reforms in a province that was very different, in terms of its geography, demography and societal structure, from the provinces in the heartlands of the empire, is another concern of this study. Some of the Tanzimat reforms, such as the Land Code of 1858, clashed with the realities of the region, and I believe that an examination of the responses to the application of Tanzimat reforms will contribute significantly to the

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INTRODUCTION

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literature on the subject. In this context, this book will attempt to reveal how Tanzimat was perceived from Baghdad. It is for this reason that this study focuses heavily on administrative and political history; in any event, an examination of every aspect of nineteenth-century Iraqi history would be impossible for reasons of length and resources. Ottoman rule in Iraq is generally divided into five periods. The first period starts with the conquest of Süleyman (Kanuni) in 1534 and continues until the entry of the Safavids into Baghdad in 1623. The second period covers the era between 1638 and 1749, which signifies Baghdad’s re-conquest by Murad IV and the beginning of Mamluk rule in Baghdad. The third period, between 1749 and 1831, is generally known as the Mamluk period. The fourth period starts with the fall of Mamluk rule and ends with the governorship of Midhat Pasha in 1869. The fifth and final period ends in 1917, when Baghdad was occupied by British forces.3 This study will focus mainly on the fourth period of Ottoman rule; that is to say from 1831 to 1872. Midhat Pasha’s governorship (1869–72) is usually considered to be the beginning of the final period of Ottoman rule in Baghdad. However, unlike Cemil Musa Neccar, I prefer to include Midhat Pasha’s governorship into the fourth period, because it represented the culmination of the Tanzimat governorship in the province of Baghdad. Needless to say, the 1830s were testing times not only for the imperial center but also for its Middle Eastern provinces: the incursion of Muhammad Ali’s forces into Syria, European economic and military encroachments and uncertainty in the modernization project were major challenges, to name but a few. In view of these developments, this study takes the year 1831 as the beginning point, because this year is not only an important turning point in the whole history of Ottoman Iraq, but it also represents the transition of Iraq from a medieval to an international structure.4 Salman, for example, regarded the end of Mamluk rule as the end of the ‘feudal social order’ and the beginning of the modern age.5 The year 1831 also marked the end of decentralized rule and the beginnings of a centralized Ottoman administration. The period under study also falls into the third period of Albert Hourani’s periodization of Ottoman history, during which time the beginnings of modernization were witnessed.6 Therefore, this

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Map 1

Baghdad in 1849

study focuses heavily on the modernization of the Ottoman province of Baghdad. This book aims to reveal the dynamics of Ottoman rule in the province of Baghdad. In order to test the data, comparisons have been made with other Ottoman provinces. Damascus is seen to bear a significant resemblance to Baghdad, because, like Baghdad, it was also a center of the Ottoman army, housing the Fifth Army. This study is divided into six chapters. After a short introduction on approaches on Arab provincial capitals, and key concepts (such as Tanzimat reforms, centralization, modernization and Ottomanism), Chapter 1 contains a general introduction on the geography, people,

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and history of Ottoman Iraq. In Chapter 2, an attempt is made to analyze the decline and fall of the decentralist structures such as the Jalilis and Kurdish emirates. Parallel to the disintegration of the autonomous entities, the growing presence of the Ottoman State is emphasized. Chapter 3 examines the authority of the provincial governor in relation to the centralist and de-centralist forces. The increasing Ottoman state control and the improvements in the general security of the province will be mentioned here. Chapters 4 and 5 seek to consider the extent to which the Tanzimat reforms were carried out in Ottoman Iraq. Special attention will be given to the establishment of provincial administrative councils and the implementation of two significant laws, namely the Provincial Law of 1864 and Ottoman Land Code of 1858, in the region. The tribal structure of the region and the Ottoman politics of tribe will also be discussed here. Finally, Chapter 6 analyzes the modernization of various aspects of life in Baghdad. Emphasis will be placed on the new means of communication (the introduction of steam navigation, railroads and the beginning of telegraph communication) and the improvement of schooling and printing. It is well known to students of the history of the Middle East that academic studies on the later history of Ottoman rule in Baghdad are quite limited. Most of the works on Baghdad are either on the heyday of the Abbasid period, or on the contemporary history of Iraq; that is, the post-Gulf War era. When compared with other Middle Eastern cities such as Aleppo, Damascus, Yemen and Jerusalem, it becomes quite clear that Ottoman Baghdad has long been neglected by the academe. There are many works on the foundation of the ‘round city’ and the caliphate period. The Abbasid Empire, with its powerful rulers such as Caliph Al-Mansur and Harun al-Rashid, the Dar al-Hikmah as the center of scientific activities, and the ‘one thousand and one nights’ tales, have attracted the attention of many people. And this interest is well reflected in the literature. However, as far as Ottoman rule in the Arab world is concerned, it is generally regarded in the Arab historiography as ‘the dark ages’, because it was (and to some extent still is) thought that in this period the Arab people were subjugated by the Ottomans and this was perceived as a kind of imperialism.7

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This nationalist historiography, influenced by colonial historiography, is the leading reason for such a pessimistic approach to Ottoman/ Turkish rule in the region.8 One should also not ignore the effects of the Ottoman decline paradigm, as it assumes that the increasing weakness of the imperial center necessarily meant the decline of the periphery. Moreover, until recently there was (and to some extent still is) a ‘chronic reluctance of scholars working on Arab cities to explore Ottoman documentation’. Some Arab scholars find Arabic sources sufficent for the study of Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire and even argue that the ‘scholarship drawn from such sources is somehow more authentic and faithful to the so-called indigenous Arab population of these lands than history drawn from Ottoman sources’.9 As a result of these narrowminded approaches, the Ottoman period in the Arab historiography is either skipped or summarized very briefly. In the words of Ehud R. Toledano, ‘the nationalist narratives had either written the Ottomans out of Arab histories, or relegated them to the role of villains, responsible for the sorry state the Arabs found themselves in after the First World War’.10 No doubt the historiography on Ottoman Baghdad has its share of this negligence and it is quite astonishing that studies with grand titles such as The Making of Modern Iraq or Iraq: from Sumer to Saddam allocate only four or five pages, or a short chapter at most, to the whole of the Saljukid, Mongol and Ottoman periods.11 However, after the 1980s, a considerable number of monographs appeared that have significantly revised these nationalist narratives and brought about the ‘re-attachment’ of the nineteenth century to the Ottoman era in Middle Eastern and North African history.12 Two factors have been particularly influential in the proliferation of academic works on Iraq. The first factor was the emergence of archeology as a science, which was unknown before the nineteenth century. A century ago, antiquity and archeology were the only interests that attracted visitors from the West to Iraq. And it is not surprising that many European diplomats and travelers were greatly interested in the archeological characteristics of the region.13 The second factor was the rise of oil as a vital source of energy. There is no doubt that oil, as a

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new source of energy, attracted the interest of the Great Powers in the region. Needless to say, the resulting rivalry and wars for oil since the last quarter of the twentieth century paved the way for a dramatic increase in the publications on Iraq. In short, archeology and oil opened a new age in the history of Iraq.14 The fruits of this proliferation in publications have been especially visible in the last three decades. However, although the number of studies on Iraq proliferated, few were of a high academic standard or were based on rigorous archival research. S.H. Longrigg’s Four Centuries of Modern Iraq remains the pioneering study in the field.15 As for nineteenth-century Ottoman Iraq, a considerable part of the studies focus on Mosul. Dina Rizk Khoury’s State and Provincial Society in the Ottoman Empire: Mosul 1534–1834 and Sarah D. Shield’s Mosul Before Iraq presented detailed accounts of Ottoman rule in Mosul. While the former spotlights the linkage between provincial and imperial politics over three centuries, and emphasizes the provincial elite and its relations to the state and economy with regard to the processes of war-making and tax-farming, the latter attempts to present the economic history of nineteenth- and early twentiethcentury Mosul. On the other hand, Hala Fattah’s Politics of Regional Trade in Iraq, Arabia and the Gulf 1745–1900 analyzes the region through the complex dynamics that made up the ‘regional market’. The trade patterns, commercial axis between cities, and the implications of Wahhabi ideology are skilfully highlighted in a trans-regional perspective.16 Among the Arabic literature on the subject, Abd alAziz Sulayman Nawwar’s Târîh al-Irak al-Hadis min Nihâyeti Hükmi Davud Paşa ilâ nihâyeti Hükmi Midhat Paşa and Cemil Musa Neccar’s Al-İdâra al-Osmânî fî Vilâyati Bağdâd are at the forefront, but their use of Ottoman sources is limited to state and provincial yearbooks (sâlnâmes).17

Studying Arab provincial capitals Many approaches have been used in explaining various aspects of the Ottoman Arab provinces. Perhaps the richest of these approaches have been those employed in the urban history of the Ottoman Arab

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provinces.18 Starting from the early decades of the last century, scholars of urban history produced a vast literature on the Arab provincial capitals. Cities like Cairo, Aleppo, Damascus, Jerusalem, Tunis and Algiers were the most studied urban centers. The Iraqi provinces have until recently been ignored. Even in the studies of Andre Raymond they were only slightly touched on.19 Perhaps Mosul, out of all Iraqi provinces, has drawn the most attention; recent studies have shed considerable light on its history. There have been long debates on whether the ‘Islamic City’ was a proper explanatory framework for Middle Eastern cities, and many urban categories such as ‘port cities’, ‘large cities’, ‘medium cities’, or ‘dyad or triad cities’ have been used in the literature.20 Since this study is more of a political and administrative history, it will not delve into these debates, but a brief description of the urban history of Ottoman Iraq will be given in Chapter 6. The modernization that the Iraqi provinces underwent and the transformation of Basra into a ‘port city’ in the second half of the nineteenth century have been given considerable attention.21 In the mid-1960s Albert Hourani put forward a ground-breaking approach in the history of the modern Middle East and emphasized the vital role played by the local Arab elite (tribal sheikhs, ulema, merchants, etc.) who acted as intermediaries between the provincial government and the local populace. Since then, the ‘politics of notables’ and factionalism among local forces have been a dominant explanation, and this explanatory framework cannot be said to have been overthrown.22 As far as Ottoman Iraq is concerned, the patterns of local notables and ayan influences were distinctive not only due to the strategic position of Iraq as frontier province, but also because its social structure was dominated by strong tribal confederations. The Jalilis and Umaris in Mosul were good examples of great local families. In Baghdad, on the other hand, in the absence of local families with a tradition of leadership, the Mamluk (Kölemen) household could provide the needed ‘asabiyya.23 In this context, it was the Mamluk household rather than the ‘civilian’ elites that dominated Baghdad.24 The fall of the Mamluks in Baghdad in 1831 changed the local dynamics of the province, and the local elites began to increase their

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influence. The province of Baghdad in the Tanzimat period had religious and secular notables. While the former consisted of a provincial learned class (qadi, nakîbü’l-eşrâf, na‘ibs and müftis) the latter was dominated by tribal leaders. The ulema had a substantial role in everyday life in Baghdad, but, as Hourani noted, their social power must have been limited by the hold of Shi‘is and Bedouins over the countryside.25 Merchants, emîrs and aghas were also among the secular notables in the province, who derived their wealth mostly from land and trade. Towards the end of the Tanzimat era, the merchants in Iraq increased their volume of trade and wealth; in this context, the Jewish merchants of Baghdad came to occupy a significant place among the secular notables of the city. The elected members of the provincial administrative council overlapped significantly with the local notables. Hence, as will be analyzed in the third chapter, the minutes (mazbata) of the provincial administrative council give us an important idea about the local notables. The ‘politics of notables’ was, to a great extent, used for urban/ provincial factionalism. There were cases in which tribal leaders and urban notables formed coalitions against Ottoman rule in Baghdad. To take an example, the disaffected Kurdish chief, Bedir Han, formed alliances with the discontented urban notables of Mosul.26 As the Ottoman government began to deconstruct the tribal structure of the country, the influence of the secular notables in Baghdad decreased in time. With the re-assertion of Ottoman direct rule, the governorgeneral gradually restored his influence and authority, and the urban notables were overwhelmed by his power.27 The issue of internal and external forces as explanations of the history of the modern Middle East has been debated for a long time. Hourani warns us to be aware of two interlocking rhythms of change: that which reforming governments and thinkers and external forces tried to impose upon society, and that which a great stable society with a long and continuous tradition of thought and of life in common was producing from within itself, partly by its own internal movement, and partly in reaction to forces coming from outside.28

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Many scholars advocate the idea that ‘social and economic changes in modern Middle Eastern societies like Iraq are Western-induced’.29 As noted by Haj, by ascribing the social change to external forces this approach overlooked the importance of internal forces in shaping domestic development.30 For the late history of Iraq, there appears a similar tendency which ascribed the change to the East India Company, which made alliance with the Mamluk regime in Baghdad.31 With regard to nineteenth-century Iraq, external forces alone cannot account for change and modernization. Instead, both internal and external (Ottoman-Arab and European) forces were influential in the process of reform and modernization; however, the latter had only an auxiliary role per se. As will be detailed in this study, while the Tanzimat reforms were imposed by the Sublime Porte through the governors in Baghdad, the influence of the European powers cannot be denied. As far as the internal dynamics are concerned, the local sources have become the most salient sources for historians. Perhaps the most significant of these sources are court registrations, namely the sijills. Unfortunately, there is no single monograph based on the Baghdad sijills.32 The ongoing warfare in the region and the resulting destruction of historical places and sources made it almost impossible to use these sources. Until the 1990s, most historians did not question the process of incorporation of periphery economies into the world market, preferring instead to dwell on the after-effects of the Western impact on the developing societies of the Middle East, Africa and Latin America. Their interest was confined to explaining the rapid transformation of these economies after the impingement of an industrializing West in search of raw materials, a free supply of labor, and cheap markets.33 However, since the 1990s, a considerable number of works have attempted to analyze the history of the modern Middle East through the perspectives of ‘underdevelopment’ and ‘dependency’. Scholars, following the world-system theory, tried to answer questions like: to what extent was the nineteenth-century Levant/Middle East incorporated into the world economy? What were the effects of the first wave of globalization on Middle Eastern societies?34 The economic history of a particular Arab provincial capital, the effects of the Tanzimat, the implementation of the Anglo–Ottoman Commercial Treaty of 1838,

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INTRODUCTION

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regional and international trade networks and regional integration are the main issues addressed in these works.35 In this regard, it is safe to argue that in the second half of the nineteenth century, Ottoman Baghdad experienced quite a significant transformation. This period witnessed the incorporation of the region into the rest of the empire, and into the world economy. The introduction of the telegraph as well as the improvement of the steamship service on the twin rivers of Mesopotamia certainly strengthened Baghdad’s ties with the central lands of the empire. Furthermore, the pacification and elimination of Kurdish principalities in northern Iraq and semi-autonomous hereditary governors in Mosul, and the settlement of nomadic tribes, gave the region the stability it had needed for so long. There is no doubt that by the early 1870s, Ottoman Iraq was more connected to international networks. The two outlets of Iraq, namely Basra as the port city in the south of the region and the twin rivers in the north, played a significant role in this. The opening of the Suez Canal was perhaps one of the most important turning points in terms of the commercial development of Ottoman Baghdad. Within a few years there was an enormous increase in the export of agricultural goods, especially cereals.36 The Suez Canal brought the port of Ottoman Iraq, namely Basra, much nearer to the Mediterranean. All these regional developments contributed to the process of de-tribalization and led to a trend of sedentarization. Sedentarization was actually something the governors had been trying to achieve for a long time. Some of the governors, especially Midhat Pasha, took advantage of conjunctural developments to break the tribal structure of the region. Export-oriented agricultural production made land more valuable than ever before, and it increasingly became the source of the sheikhdom’s power. The commercialization of agriculture led the tribal sheikhs to give priority to rich estates, rather than their tribesmen. Land replaced manliness, courage, superior strength, and warrior prowess as the central ideal of sheikhly/tribal culture. However, almost all of these developments started towards the end of the period studied in this work. Although the world-system approach can provide a significant framework for explaining the economic as well as political processes in Ottoman Iraq, to do this one

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would have to analyze a longer time period – perhaps up to the First World War – which exceeds the limits of this study. Another group of studies analyzes Ottoman rule in the Arab provinces in the framework of imperial practices and discourses, which came to be labeled as Ottoman imperialism or colonialism.37 Through a literal interpretation of the imperial discourse as narrated in the archival documents, they argued that Ottoman rule in the Arab provinces was characterized by oriental and imperial practices. In fact, earlier, some of the Arab scholars (mostly nationalists and socialists) had made similar arguments that the Arab provinces were indeed colonized by foreign, Turkish rule. One of the recurrent themes emphasized in these arguments was the transfer of the provincial economic resources to the imperial center.38 It is true that the Ottoman use of imperial discourse, which was not infrequently derogatory towards nomadic cultures, can be found both in the state archives and private letters.39 Yet one should also note that this imperial discourse was not limited to a certain ethnicity, the Arab people in this case, but it can also be seen as directed towards the nomadic Turks in Anatolia as well.40 The question of whether the Ottoman administration in Baghdad was a form of colonial rule will be excluded from this work.41 Suffice it to say that the imperial discourse of the Ottoman rulers in Baghdad was part of the centralization, modernization and Ottomanism projects.

From the center to the periphery: Tanzimat centralization, Modernization and Ottomanism The tension between the provincial forces and the central government has been identified as one of the most critical problems of Ottoman history in the post-classical period.42 In particular, the eighteenth century is very abundant in terms of decentralizing structures; it is for this reason that this century is usually referred to as the ‘Age of the Ayan’.43 This issue attracted the attention of many scholars who sought to use center-periphery relations as a key explanatory framework for Ottoman studies.44 While some scholars assumed a confrontation between the center and the periphery, some others made an implicit

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INTRODUCTION

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correlation between decline and decentralization, which is inherently assumed to be ‘bad’, as opposed to ‘good’ centralization.45 However, revisionist historians have increasingly refused to think in such polarized terms and begun to reconsider the ‘zero-sum game’ structure of the center-periphery relations in the Ottoman Empire. They propose to ‘reframe the Ottoman Empire as a polity whose administration went through cycles of greater and lesser centralization as a result of rational strategic and economic choices on the part of various segments of Ottoman society’.46 It was the ayan (provincial notables) and local dynasties who did mostly rise in prominence, preparing the ground for decentralization. When we look at the Arab provinces, the Karamanids (in Tripoli), alHusainiyyah (in Tunisia), the Ma‘ns and the Shihabî emîrs (in Lebanon) Zâhir al-Umar (in Palestine), al-Azms and Ahmad al-Jazzâr (in Syria and Palestine), the Suuds (in Necd), the Kurdish beys (in southeastern Anatolia and Kurdistan), the Jalîlîs (in Mosul), and the Mamluks (in Baghdad) were among the leading families and/or quasi-independent regimes. The Ottoman center could no longer tolerate autonomous notables and dynasties as intermediates between the sultan and his people, and Mahmud II made decisive attempts to end this situation after 1812. Mahmud II’s aim was to restore the centralized government system. Therefore, imperial centralization had started long before the Gülhane Edict of 1839. When we take a closer look at the province of Baghdad, it becomes clear that despite its importance, it remained, from its conquest in 1534 until the mid-nineteenth century, on the periphery of the Ottoman Empire.47 It was never as thoroughly integrated into the empire or as directly administered by the Ottomans as was the western half of the Fertile Crescent. Mamluk rule (1749–1831) was the apex of quasiindependent rule in the province. Perhaps the most striking sign of this was that the governors appointed by the Sublime Porte were considered to be ‘alien pashas’. When the Sublime Porte decided to put an end to Mamluk rule in Baghdad in 1831, the Mamluks ended the internal rivalry among themselves and united against the newly appointed governor, Ali Rıza Pasha. It is true that the imperial center could not appoint its own

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governors; or more correctly, the governors appointed by the central administration could not establish their authority and therefore they were soon withdrawn.48 The imperial center could, instead, elect one of the Mamluk candidates for the provincial governorship. However, this does not mean that it was a mere spectator to the provincial politics in Baghdad. At least four Mamluk governors were dismissed with the intervention of Sublime Porte.49 The international situation also played a role in the inability of Ottoman central government to intervene against local rulers. The wars with Russia in the first quarter of the nineteenth century, in particular, prevented the Sublime Porte from allocating the necessary military forces to the Arab provinces. In view of this, local rule in the easternmost periphery of the empire was particularly vulnerable to foreign influence and intervention, which the Ottoman central administration could not accept. It is quite interesting that Ottoman attempts at centralization and extension of direct rule in Baghdad and Mosul were eased by natural disasters. First, the plague of 1831 seriously weakened the Mamluk armies and decimated the capital. Then came a violent spring flood. The two disasters enabled the easy takeover of the city in the end. On the other hand, the locust invasion in Mosul in 1824–25, which devastated the Mosuli countryside and led to famine, exacerbated the political crisis in the city; consequently Jalili rule came to an end.50 This study takes the year 1831 as the beginning point, because this year is not only an important turning point in the overall history of Ottoman Iraq, but it also represents the watershed between the periods of ‘local rule’ and the period of restored Ottoman centralization.51 The trends of decentralization and provincial autonomy in Baghdad were reversed in the nineteenth century when administrative centralization and re-organization, undertaken by the Ottoman government as part of a comprehensive reform and modernization program, were extended to Iraq. The Mamluk period of Baghdad is usually referred to as the ‘Pashalik of Baghdad’. Literally, pashalik meant the place ruled by a Pasha; however, it seems that this term came to be used for the provincial periphery, where local forces had considerable strength. In Ottoman Iraq, both the introduction of Ottoman direct rule and later the Tanzimat

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reforms put an end to the old system of pashalik which in the past had in fact encouraged decentralization.52 The taxation system in the provinces was strongly affected by the center-periphery relations. As distance increased from the imperial center, the mîrî system became less common. For example, while Mosul had the traditional mîrî system, Baghdad, Basra and Al-Ahsa were farmed out to tax-farmers.53 It is well known that the change (in fact corruption) of the traditional timar system and the emerging system of life-tenure tax-farm (malikane) played a significant role in the strengthening of the local ayan.54 In this regard, the Tanzimat reforms were intended to centralize the system of tax collection. Hence, muhassıls, who were sent to the provinces, were to collect the provincial revenues in the name of the central treasury. Similarly, in Baghdad, changes in the taxation system came before the Tanzimat. It was in 1831 that the re-integration of Iraq into the Ottoman central government resulted in a change in the tax-farming methods. In the pre-1831 period, the Mamluks of Baghdad employed a system of lifetime tax-farming, which was a practice peculiar to the eighteenth century. After the establishment of Ottoman direct rule in Baghdad, the new governor, Ali Rıza Pasha, tightened the conditions of the contract and changed it ‘from lifetime contracts to a shorter period of from one to three years, under direct supervision of the imperial treasury in İstanbul’.55 In short, this change in the tax-farming system was in fact a reflection of imperial centralization. The imperial incentive for centralization in Baghdad was also strengthened by the fragility of the periphery. The Mamluk regime was not only fragile in its loyalty to the Sublime Porte, but also brittle in its relations with foreign powers. On the one hand, there were the Wahhabi forces that increasingly threatened Ottoman Iraq. Despite repeated orders from İstanbul, the Mamluks were reluctant to tackle this menace. On the other hand, the growing presence of Britain and France, both in İstanbul and Baghdad, enabled these powers to intervene in the appointments of governors in Baghdad.56 They lobbied overtly for certain governors in the province. Moreover, it is also well known that Britain and Iran were quite influential in inciting the Kurdish tribes within the province.

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THE OTTOMAN ORIGINS OF MODERN IRAQ

This state of fragility accelerated the Ottoman incorporation of Baghdad. As is well known, the primary objective of the Men of Tanzimat in their reform program was to transform the Ottoman Empire into a modern centralized state and to re-establish a firm control over its semi-autonomous and virtually independent provinces.57 And there has been a commonly accepted contention that ‘the Tanzimat reforms succeeded only in those regions of the empire more accessible to the central administration’.58 Hence, the hand of the central government in the provinces was strengthened and a centralized bureaucracy was created. There is no doubt that the Tanzimat policies, though this is not emphasized in the Gülhane Edict, re-emphasized the centralization policies of Mahmud II. As a corollary of this, the two decades after the 1830s witnessed the suppression of the ayan and local dynasties, who had established their hereditary rule over extensive territories. The Azms of Damascus came to an end in 1807, the Mamluks of Baghdad in 1831, the Jalilis of Mosul in 1834, and the Karamanids of Tripoli (Libya) in 1835.59 The Men of Tanzimat aimed to integrate the provinces with the imperial center.60 Parallel to this development, the Sublime Porte curbed the powers of the provincial governors, and provincial councils were founded as part of the decentralization policy.61 However, as will be discussed later in detail, this only increased the bureaucratic correspondence between the provincial periphery and the imperial center and to some extent paralyzed the provincial affairs. To remedy this, the regulations issued in 1850s restored the governor’s authority and powers. Instead of weakening the provincial periphery for the sake of imperial centralization, the Sublime Porte implemented Ottomanization and localization simultaneously and rescued the center-periphery relations from the framework of a ‘zero-sum game’.62 The imperial firmâns dated 1852 and 1858 reinstated the power of the provincial governor as the chief authority over all matters in the province and the sole agent of the central government.63 The Sublime Porte decided that a considerable concentration of responsibility in the hands of the provincial governors, as in those of the French prefect, would make for more effective central control. Henceforward, all correspondence between central ministries and their field agents was to

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17

be directed through the provincial governor.64 Apart from the restoration of the old powers of the provincial governors, the extension in the functions of the government was certainly a reflection of the mid-nineteenth century centralization. For example, the security of strategically significant passes was formerly provided by the derbentcis in return for exemption from the avarız tax. But with the Tanzimat reforms, such duties were given to the government security forces.65 Similarly, the councils in Baghdad, both in the sancaks and kazâs, served to integrate the provincial notables first with the local administration and then the imperial center.66 The trend of centralization in provincial administration was further emphasized with the implementation of the Vilâyet Law of 1864 and Land Code of 1858 in Baghdad. These reforms were attempts on the part of the center to increase its control over the periphery and to strengthen the power of the lower levels of government, including the administrative councils, by delimiting and specifying the powers and duties of the officials and councils on all levels of government.67 The 1864 Vilâyet Law created a highly centralized and hierarchical bureaucracy and the scope of authority of the provincial governor was further increased.68 Though some of the leading provincial officials were still appointed from the center, the governor was the supervisor of all provincial affairs within his jurisdiction. The provincial headquarters was the center for all provincial affairs. The centralist structure of the law of 1864 was further strengthened with the amendments in the law in 1871. Though the law of 1871 improved the provincial division of labor, it also increased the control of the central administration. Furthermore, the law also incorporated the nâhiyes fully into the provincial administration.69 The implementation of the Land Code of 1858 was another means of Ottoman centralization, because the main objective of the code was ‘to reassert the state’s right to its agricultural lands, supposedly usurped in part or totally by feudal or semi-feudal local forces in the provinces’.70 With the application of the code the process of de-tribalization, which promoted the power of the center over the tribal periphery, was accelerated. Nevertheless, the level of centralization and Ottomanization was heavily dependent on the personal capability of

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THE OTTOMAN ORIGINS OF MODERN IRAQ

the governor. Strong and initiative-taking governors such as Namık Pasha and Midhat Pasha achieved much towards centralization and Ottomanization. Therefore, it would not be wrong to argue that such governors acted as the ‘center in the periphery’.71 It is quite clear that the processes of centralization and modernization went hand in hand in the nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire. The fields of military power, education, law and communication were the leading areas where late Ottoman modernization measures were introduced. In accordance with its top-down character and its direction from center to periphery, it is possible to trace the reflections of Ottoman modernization at provincial level. The first area targeted by modernizing reforms was the army. Just as Ottoman modernization started in military institutions a century earlier, reform in Baghdad started with the establishment of the Sixth Army in Baghdad. As will be detailed in Chapter 2, this was quite important for the implementation of further modernizing reforms, because the new army was to act as a deterrent factor for any possible reactions. Ottoman modernization was not only visible in the provincial administration; its reflection in public works was also very significant. Until the nineteenth century, some administrative responsibilities were carried out by vakıfs, religious congregations (millets) and other local groups. However, with the Tanzimat reforms, the Men of Tanzimat considered public works, especially those related to municipal services, to fall among the duties of central, and therefore provincial, administration. Moreover, the process of modernization in the province was felt more overtly in the area of public works. Improvement in public works was significant for three major reasons: firstly, it was through the construction and/or repair of public works that an increasing state control was experienced among the local people. Secondly, public buildings displayed ‘the presence of the state at the local level’; the government house (hükümet konağı), clock tower, modern schools and hospitals being among the more visible signs of the state in the local landscape.72 And finally, public works in the tribal areas, especially roads, bridges, schools, hospitals and telegraph, played very significant roles in the process of de-tribalization. In the words of A.M. Hamilton, who was commissioned to construct a road in Rawanduz, there were

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19

two important factors in the construction of a road, commercial and administrative: Every state, in the past and now, used roads and highways to keep order and security. And once the highway network enters an area, the primitive people would accustom to the modern and civilized way of life, at least by copying that way of life. ... The roads constructed in Mosul and Kirkuk had already begun their pacifying roles.73 Therefore, the extension of public works and buildings also meant the extension of a modern way of life at the expense of traditional tribal structures. Needless to say, the improvement in the means of communication and transport between İstanbul and Baghdad facilitated the politics of centralization and Ottomanism. With the completion of a direct telegraph line between İstanbul and Baghdad in the early 1860s, Iraqi provinces became closer to the imperial center, and this enabled much faster communication between the two. Baghdad’s remoteness from the center had prevented the Sublime Porte from acting on certain provincial affairs on the spot. However, towards the end of the period under study the control of the center over the Iraqi provinces increased considerably. Similarly, the improvement of the roads and streets (both within the city and between cities), the enhancement of steam navigation, the introduction of modern schools, the opening of printing houses and the publication of the first Iraqi newspaper were not only means of modernization, but also of centralization and Ottomanism. For instance, the most characteristic feature of the organization of the new system of Ottoman education was its centralization, resulting in uniformity of administrative procedure, curriculum planning and methods of instruction for all schools of the same type. Al-Qaysi has described how this centralization was carried out in Baghdad: In administrative organization, the decisions of the entire teaching and administrative personnel depended upon the Ministry of Education in İstanbul. The financing of new schools and new

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THE OTTOMAN ORIGINS OF MODERN IRAQ

positions as well as a general increase in financial support took place only with the approval of a central authority. In curriculum planning, the same fields of instruction were covered in all schools of similar type and the same numbers of hours were provided for each grade.74 Perhaps the most striking means of modernization and Ottomanism was the publication of the first provincial newspaper, namely Zewra. Like other Tanzimat newspapers, Zewra acted as a teacher, and educated the people of the province towards a modern way of life. As we will see, Zewra’s guidance was not limited to a certain aspect of life, but it ranged through agriculture, education, public affairs and de-tribalization. A further reflection of centralization and modernization was observed in the imperial ceremonies. What Selim Deringil has ably shown for the imperial center during the Hamidian regime is also valid for Baghdad in the 1860s and early 1870s.75 By means of imperial ceremonies, which were given special emphasis during the second half of the century, the people of any locality could feel the presence of the center. This imperial symbolism included the celebration of certain events such as the anniversaries of imperial births and enthronements (velâdet ve cülûs-i pâdişâhî) and the use of philharmonic bands for certain provincial events.76 The Zewra newspaper contains very colorful narrations of these occasions.77 For example, during the anniversaries of imperial births and enthronements the governor of Baghdad accepted the visits and good wishes of provincial notables, high-ranking administrative and military officials and the consuls of the foreign states. This was followed by a feast organized by the governor. In the evening the administrative and military buildings were lighted with oil-lamps and the celebrations continued with fireworks until midnight. Such celebrations were also held in some of the sancaks of the province and local notables took an active part. The corvettes in the Basra dockyard also celebrated the birthday of the Sultan with a cannon salute.78 In a similar fashion, the military philharmonic band was on hand to celebrate the opening ceremony of a new bridge in Baghdad. The philharmonic band also played at the launch of new ships. And finally,

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INTRODUCTION

21

during the visit of Nasıreddin, the Shah of Iran, the welcoming ceremony included an official military parade and a demonstration of military practices and maneuvers (ta‘lîm ve tatbîkât).79 In a nutshell, all these ceremonies were indeed the reflections of growing state presence and modernization in Ottoman Iraq.

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CHAPTER 1

OTTOMAN IRAQ: GEOGRAPHY, PEOPLE AND HISTORY

In Iraq, perhaps more than anywhere else in the world, geography has played a very crucial role in the social, economic and political history of the country. It was the mountains in the north and the rivers in central and lower Iraq that came first.1 The mountainous country of northeastern Iraq has for centuries been the home of Kurds. The mountains were important shelters for Kurdish tribes who often rebelled against the provincial administration. Climatologically this region differs from the south: while the north was in a high rainfall zone, central and lower Iraq did not receive sufficient rain and therefore had been described as irrigation zones.2 The rainfall in the north was usually sufficient for agriculture, but life in the rest of the country was dependent on canals and irrigation. In the words of Charles Issawi, ‘in perhaps no other country in the world is prosperity so directly dependent on an intricate system of irrigation’.3 Agriculture was the most significant source of income in Ottoman Iraq. Since agriculture cannot be sustained by limited rainfall, the Euphrates and Tigris were the life-giving veins of the economy. The greatest concentration of villages was in the valleys and lowlands of the Tigris and Euphrates basins. Salinity was a serious problem that affected about two-thirds of the land and resulted in the abandonment

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of large areas of agricultural land. The low humidity, hot sun and high rates of evaporation, which decrease the benefits of winter rains, make these two rivers particularly valuable for irrigation. However, the Tigris and Euphrates flooded irregularly and the flood season did not coincide with the growing season of the crops. As Fernea pointed out: Unlike the Nile, no great distance exists between the headwaters of the Tigris and Euphrates and the alluvial plain. Thus the flood follows quickly upon the winter rains, the April peak coming too late for the winter crops and too early for the summer planting. ... [T]he Tigris regularly flooded into the streets of Baghdad in flood season and ravaged the countryside between the capital and the Gulf. On the other hand, in midsummer the supply dwindles radically and severely limits cultivation.4 In the center of the country, rain was both insufficient in quantity and untimely, since it usually rained mainly from December through March, which was too late for the winter sowing season.5 Central and lower Iraq was dominated by the Euphrates and Tigris, and they were the main sources of irrigation. When compared with the north, the central and lower parts were greatly influenced by the annual floods. Apart from being prone to sudden and unpredictable floods, the rivers in Mesopotamia frequently changed their riverbeds. These floods not only made large-scale irrigation difficult but also seriously damaged the bridges on the rivers and the harvest. That some European travelers compared the floods of these rivers to the great flood of Noah gives some clues about the effects of these floods on the people of Baghdad.6 The floods usually left behind many marshes that seriously affected sanitary conditions in Baghdad, giving rise to epidemic diseases, especially malaria and cholera. An ever-threatening problem in the delta of Iraq was that the Euphrates and Tigris have their annual flood season in March, April and May, which was too late for the winter crops. On the other hand, it was too early for the summer crops, making the farmlands vulnerable

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to summer droughts. Without effective organization of irrigation, without desalination and without a certain political stability, continued and stable agriculture was impossible.7 However, despite the floods, the contribution of the Euphrates and Tigris to agriculture is indisputable. The river waters were brought to the farmlands via canals, which made the river basins attractive for settlement and agriculture. The rich soil of Mesopotamia, when combined with the river waters, produced high crop yields and, as a result, agricultural produce was the leading export item. Aside from their contributions to agriculture, the rivers, as long as they were kept navigable, were very significant in the management and development of commercial activities, which will be described in detail in the following chapters. Climatic conditions in Iraq vary considerably, with temperatures ranging from 120º F in the summer to 20º F in the winter. During the summer (April to October) the weather is extremely hot and dry, which naturally affected the social organization of the people. The people of Iraq had to adapt their life to this climate. A common feature of Iraqi houses were the serdâbs, cellars built underground as a refuge from hot weather. In Lower Iraq, which was dominated by vast deserts and marshes, the climate is distressingly humid. Thanks to the marshes, floods and tides, the cultivation of rice and dates had a great share in Iraq’s commerce. Arab geographers used the term ‘al-Jazîrah’ to denote the northern part of the territory situated between the Tigris and the Euphrates.8 While the Euphrates retained its original name (Fırat), ‘Shatt’ was the usual abbreviated term for the Tigris used in Ottoman documents, stressing its proximity to the provincial center, because the city of Baghdad was established on the banks of the Tigris River.9 As many travelers noted, one of the most important features of Baghdad was this location on the Tigris. The greater part of the city lies on the eastern bank of the river, called Rasafa. The western bank was called Karkh or Zewra.10 The two parts of the city were linked by a floating bridge of pontoons. Another geographical characteristic of Iraq, especially in the south, is the tidal activities. Obviously southern Iraq has been the region most influenced by the tides. The effects of the tides are felt from the Gulf to Suq ash Shuyukh on the Euphrates, and to the tomb of

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OTTOMAN IRAQ

PHOTO 1

25

Baghdad Bridge over the Tigris

Prophet Uzayir on the Tigris. In this region the river waters rise for six hours and then they subside, repeating this process twice a day. The tides are highest in the beginning, the middle and the end of each lunar month. During the tides the water level in Basra and its environs increased up to 15 feet and this enabled the ships with greater tonnage to sail up to the city center of Basra.11 From the city center commercial goods were moved to the districts of the city in small boats. Normally, the rivers were not navigable to ships with a greater tonnage and therefore they had to await the tides. Due to the flow of tides, Basra harbor became accessible to ocean-going ships twice a month. The benefits of the tides were not limited to commercial activities; they had a crucial role in irrigation too. They provided natural irrigation especially for the region ranging from Qurna to the Gulf. As a corollary of this, the dates of Basra were well irrigated and they not only became famous, but also made up a large part of Iraqi exports.

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The geography and the chronic instability or insecurity of the region had considerable effects on the lifestyle of the people there. Agriculture was negatively affected by the lack of safety and stability and, as a corollary of this, it paved the way for the promotion of tribal pastoralism and nomadism.12 Moreover, in order to avoid being plundered, people in the region looked for safe places to practice agriculture. Apart from their effects on agriculture and sanitary conditions, the floods created marshy and watery places known as hevr, which became good shelters for the rebels.13 Since such places were difficult to reach, officials in Baghdad built retaining walls along the rivers to drain the hevrs.14 Moreover, in the northern and northeastern areas, people could hide out in remote mountain villages that were difficult to reach. Hence, the geography was a significant obstacle, especially in dealing with rebellious tribes, because even if the local forces overcame geographical difficulties such as the unevenness of the river basins, the dikes, the intersecting canals and the marshes, rebellious tribes had the opportunity to retreat into the marshes, over the Persian frontiers or into the vast deserts and steppes.15 The terrain on which the people lived also affected their allegiance to the government in Baghdad. For example, while the tribes on the Persian borders in the East or in the Syrian Desert in the West often clashed with the local government, the riverain tribes were more cooperative. The fact that tribes in the riverain area were more tied to the land than elsewhere and engaged in agriculture played an important part in their cooperation.16 In a nutshell, it should be noted that the ecological, demographic, economic and political problems of Ottoman Iraq are interrelated and cannot be separated from one another.17

Baghdad: The Eastern Periphery? The remoteness of Baghdad from the imperial center had profound implications. This remoteness went beyond the physical distance between the center and the periphery, and in time Baghdad became a metaphor for anything that was extremely far away. The best examples of this metaphoric usage can be found in Turkish proverbs: Ayranın olsun sineğin Bağdat’tan gelir,18 Sora sora Bağdat bulunur, Yanlış hesap Bağdat’tan döner and Aşığa Bağdat sorulur mu?19 Similar usages can

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also be seen in Turkish idioms, such as ‘Bağdat’tan gazel okumak’. In addition to the metaphoric use of the name Baghdad, it is quite interesting that although different in etymology, the name of the region, Iraq, is spelled exactly the same as the Turkish word ırak, meaning distance: Sevene Bağdat ırak değildir (To the lover, Baghdad is not far off) and Gözden ırak olan, gönülden de ırak olur (Out of sight, out of mind). These proverbs and idioms indicate that Iraq in general and Baghdad in particular have had a strong presence as clichés in the Ottoman/Turkish intellectual mind. In the classical period the distance between İstanbul and Baghdad took 197 days to traverse during military mobilizations.20 However, for non-military or civilian purposes the same route was much shorter to travel. In the second half of the nineteenth century, thanks to the steamer services, one could travel from İstanbul to Baghdad or vice versa in only 35–40 days.21 There is no doubt that the time spent in traveling to Baghdad prevented the Sublime Porte from intervening in provincial politics when necessary. For example, when one of the leading tribal sheikhs, Sufuk al-Faris, opposed Ali Rıza Pasha in 1834, the Porte decided to send Agah Efendi to investigate the situation in the province. However, when Agah Efendi arrived in Baghdad the problem had already been resolved.22 On the other hand, the time of transit from London to Baghdad had taken six months by the Cape Town route and four months by the overland route. However, in the first quarter of the nineteenth century it was reduced by one-third.23 The bad roads, which were frequently blocked by tribal insurgents, made Baghdad even more remote from the Sublime Porte.24 The sea or river routes were obviously faster and easier, and so they were most commonly used wherever possible. The most frequently used routes were as follows: İstanbul, İskenderun, Diyarbakır, Mosul, Baghdad; or İstanbul, Samsun, Amasya, Tokat, Sivas, Harput, Diyarbakır, Mosul and Baghdad.25 As Longrigg has rightly pointed out, the geographical position of Baghdad, which throughout history has made it part of the great Eurasian land bridge and a highway of peoples and of trade, gave it priority in modern times as a short-cut to India and the East – and as such made it a sphere of rival European diplomacy in the nineteenth century.26

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Both the Euphrates and the Tigris were crucial in reaching Baghdad. As tributary rivers, such as the Zap and the Diyala, join the Tigris, the flow of water increases and makes the Tigris more suitable for navigation. Among many kinds of river-crafts, kelek was the most commonly used by local people.27 Kelek navigated only downwards, however, and could not be used to travel upriver. It was only with the river steamers that one could navigate upward, but the journey took several times longer than the journey downriver. Ahmed Midhat, who worked with Midhat Pasha in the early 1870s, described Baghdad, therefore, as having a conical-shaped entrance and likens it to a mouse trap or the basket of a fisherman, both of which are easy to enter but difficult to exit.28 The flow of the rivers did not only affect travel per se. The direction of river flow also strongly influenced communication and social interaction between the cities and districts on the riverside.29 Due to its remoteness and the difficulties in land transport Baghdad was sometimes regarded as an undesirable posting for state officials.

PHOTO 2

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Ottoman officials on a kelek on the Tigris River

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OTTOMAN IRAQ

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The journey from Baghdad to İstanbul was not only long but also expensive and dangerous to health. Therefore, Baghdad was sometimes considered to be a place of banishment.30 It seems that Basra was seen in an even worse light than Baghdad, mainly due to its terrible weather.31 The dockyard in Basra in particular employed a considerable number of banished officers. And on rare occasions some of the subgovernors (mutasarrıfs) of Basra were sent to the city as banishment.32 A considerable number of provincial officials resigned from their posts to get away from Baghdad. The fact that they could not get used to the water and weather (âb-ı havasına imtizâc edememek) in Baghdad and Basra was the most common pretext for resignation.33 For these reasons, it was quite difficult to get talented bureaucrats to move to Baghdad.

Population and the people of Baghdad The population estimates for Ottoman Iraq varied considerably. Many estimates were made in the nineteenth century by travelers, diplomats, journalists and politicians. While the numbers given by Vital Cuinet seemed to be the most accurate among the European accounts, the Ottoman governmental statistics are comparatively the most reliable sources for population estimates. Baghdad represents the best example of the difference between European and Ottoman sources in this respect.34 As far as Ottoman Iraq is concerned, the demographic evolution of Iraq generally paralleled that of other Arab provinces; however, the population records are less perfect and inferior to those, for instance, of neighboring Syria.35 The lists indicating the provincial divisions of the empire in 1831 are good examples of this. Although most of the provinces were cited with their sub-provinces, the sub-provinces for Ottoman Iraq were not listed.36 This omission was obviously the result of Baghdad’s remoteness from the center, its geographical position on the periphery of the country, the tribal structure of the people, and the level of nomadism within the province. The first Ottoman population estimate of 1831 did not include demographic data concerning the Iraqi provinces of Baghdad, Mosul, Basra and Shahrizor. The population estimates prior to the late 1860s are said to be less reliable; therefore, one can only make informed speculations about earlier

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populations and is thrown back onto theory.37 One can also argue that the Ottoman administrative control, especially in the first half of the nineteenth century, when Ottoman centralization was improving, was not strong enough to register the population in Iraq. These factors certainly explain the imperfection of population records in the region; and to a great extent, they reflect the situation in the Iraqi countryside, because, unlike in the rural areas, we have more authoritative records pertaining to the urban centers of Ottoman Iraq. For example, the official newspaper of Baghdad, Zewra, provides significant data concerning the urban population of the city in the late 1860s. For the second half of the nineteenth century, the population estimates made by various authorities for Ottoman Iraq range from 2 to 4.5 million. The considerable difference between these two estimates is due to the fact that some population estimates lacked or excluded the demographic data for certain districts such as Mosul, Sulaimaniyah and/or Kirkuk, while some others added Kuwait, Najd and al-Ahsa to Ottoman Iraq.38 The first Ottoman data, though incomplete and imperfect, concerning Iraq’s demographic structure was presented in the first yearbook (sâlnâme) of Baghdad province in 1875.39

Table 1 Population estimates for Ottoman Iraq in 1875 Sub-provinces

Male population

Baghdad Mosul Sulaimaniyah Hillah Shahrizor Ammarah Basra Muntafiq Al-Ahsa Total

250,000 145,296 124,790 700,000 127,060 257,330 62,905 300,000 32,619 2,000,000

Number of households 65,000 48,946 23,570 100,000 39,270 50,065 19,084 50,000 9,065 400,000

Source: Sâlnâme-i Vilâyet-i Bağdad, sene 1292 /1875.

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Kemal Karpat, basing his estimates on Baghdad sâlnâmes, pointed out that the numbers, especially those concerning the nomads, were the product of guesswork.40 McCarthy’s calculation of the population of Ottoman Iraq, including Baghdad, Basra and Mosul, is presented below. Apart from the urban and rural populations, Ottoman Iraq had a considerable nomadic population. Although the weakest population estimates are, of course, those for the nomadic population, local sources indicate that the nomadic population was at least as numerous as the urban and rural populations respectively.41 It is not difficult to find the reasons for the omission of Bedouins in population estimates: since they were mostly mobile, it was almost impossible for the government officials to register them. Perhaps more important was the fear on the part of the nomadic people of military conscription and taxation. Any attempt by the provincial officials to count the population was regarded as an initiative on behalf of both military conscription and taxation. One can easily observe that during the nineteenth century there was an absolute as well as relative decline in the nomadic component of Iraq’s population. The percentage of nomadic people in Baghdad’s population in 1590 was 62%, and then it declined to 35% in the late 1860s and declined further to 17% in 1905.42 Obviously, one should be careful in using these figures, because it is not always possible to distinguish the nomads from the sedentary people, and there are also instances where the two categories intermingle. However, these figures are sufficient to indicate a tendency toward sedentarization.

Table 2 Population estimates for the three provinces of Ottoman Iraq Province

Year

Population

Baghdad Basra Mosul

c. 1898 c. 1908 c. 1909

1,300,000 1,150,000 828,000

Source: Justin McCarthy, ‘The Population of Ottoman Syria and Iraq’, Asian and African Studies, Vol. 15 (1981), p. 39.

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The demographic structure of the Iraqi population was not uniform and it varied considerably from region to region. The arid and semiarid areas in the west and south had very sparse populations. Nomadic tribes were important in these areas and in the extensive Al-Jazirah region, northwest of Baghdad. It was again in the irrigation zone that the social and economic unit was the tribe rather than the village. The Iraqi provinces had the lowest population per square mile. Basra had the lowest rank in this regard among the 36 provinces of the empire. Baghdad and Mosul were in 33rd and 32nd position respectively.43 Furthermore, the population growth, birth rate and family size showed significant differences in northern, central and southern Iraq. As Hasan has pointed out, the regional population rose about five-fold in the North, over four-fold in the Center, and well under three-fold in the South during the period 1867–1947.44 In terms of rates of population increase, this corresponded to 1.8% a year in the North, 0.7% in the Center, and 1.6% in the South during 1867–90.45 The demographic characteristics also varied from the urban population to the rural and nomadic populations. As stated earlier, the nomads constituted more than 50% of the total Iraqi population.46 As the result of Ottoman policy to settle the nomadic population, the number of nomads in Iraq declined considerably during the nineteenth century. This decline in the nomadic population was mostly felt in the Center and it was also reflected in the increase in rural population. The rural population consisted of agricultural and pastoral people: in other words, settled and semi-settled people. Whether settled or nomadic, the tribes formed probably the largest groups. The population of Muntafiq tribal confederation alone was estimated to be approximately one million people.47 The urban population, on the other hand, was composed of people living in the big cities and towns with more than 5,000 in population.48 People living in the urban areas earned their livelihood through handicraft industries, internal or regional (Middle Eastern) trade, or administration. For the city center of Baghdad, the Zewra newspaper reports a population survey done during the governorship of Midhat Pasha (1869–72). According to this survey, the number of households in the city center of Baghdad (including Azamiyah and Kazımiyah)

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PHOTO 3 Azamiyah, on the left bank of the Tigris

was 18,407.49 Here, we should note that the term hâne (household) in Baghdad usually included more than one house, because a household in Iraq referred to a place encircled with a wall. Within this place houses are situated around the (h)avlu (courtyard). And there were several houses around the same (h)avlu. Therefore, in order to gain a rough estimate of population, Mehmed Hurşit suggests multiplying the number of households by two or three.50 In another issue of the Zewra, the city of Baghdad was mentioned as having more than 150,000 inhabitants, including women; but this estimate excluded the gurebâ (lonely and destitute people) and foreign nationals.51 These population estimates also make it clear that we have more detailed data on urban populations, and as one moves from urban centers to the countryside the population estimates become more questionable. After the implementation of the Vilâyet Law in Baghdad, Midhat Pasha carried out a population survey for Baghdad that also

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included Azamiyah and Kazımiyah.52 Accordingly, Table 3 shows the distribution of urban population in the city of Baghdad in terms of religion and nationality. Another important feature of the population of Ottoman Iraq that is also partly evident from Table 3 is its multi-religious and multiethnic character. There is no doubt that the demographic structure of nineteenth-century Iraq was far more colorful than that of today. That Iraq has for centuries absorbed many immigrant and minority peoples, certainly contributed to this ethnic and cultural richness. In the world of belief, Iraq accommodated members not only of major religions such as Christianity and Judaism; it also made room for extreme beliefs like those of the Yezidîs, Shi‘is, Bahais and many others.53 It is not surprising that Ottoman Baghdad had the largest Jewish population in the Arab east. In the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries the Jews of Baghdad received two major waves of migrants from Iran, which were the result of persecution by the Shi‘a authorities.54 In the first quarter of the nineteenth century, they composed 10 to 15% of the total population in Baghdad.55 There was also a considerable Christian population, especially in Mosul.56 In the urban center of Baghdad, the

Table 3 Population estimate for the city center of Baghdad (including Azamiyah and Kazımiyah) in 1869 Nationality

Religion or ethnicity

Male population

Total

Ottoman nationals

Muslims Jews Christians

52,689 9,325 1,258

63,272

Foreign nationals

Persian British Russian French Austrian

2,126 265 14 3 3 65,683

Total

2,411

65,683

Source: Zewra, No. 9.

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Turkish population, as the ruling class, generally occupied the northern quarters of the city; the mercantile classes of Muslims, Christians and Jews, having separate quarters in the central parts of the town, were dispersed over the rest of the city. On the other hand, as far as the ethnic formation of the province is concerned, apart from the Turks, the Kurds, Arabs, Assyrians and Armenians were the leading groups in the Iraqi mosaic. Though the ethnic and religious groups had co-existed for centuries, there were regions with a high concentration of a specific group. Although the ethnic and cultural heterogeneity of any group could be distinguished by its physical appearance, it was regional identification that came to the forefront. For example, while the frontier-dwelling Kurds preferred to live in mountainous northeast Iraq, the Arabs formed the majority in central and southern Iraq. This ethnic division was also reflected in the world of beliefs. While the Sunnis, primarily Kurds and Arabs, dominated in northeast Iraq, the Shi‘is were mainly concentrated in the Holy Cities (Najaf and Karbala) and the southern parts of the province. Baghdad, situated near the geographic center, reflected within itself the division between the predominantly Shi‘i south and the largely Sunni north. The Shi‘i population was, therefore, mainly of Arab origin. It is also known that, as there were mass conversions among the Iraqi tribes from Sunnism to Shia beginning in the late eighteenth century and intensifying in the nineteenth century, the Shi‘i population increased considerably, constituting roughly half of Iraq’s population at the turn of the century.57 The center of the province was inhabited not only by Sunnis and Shi‘is, but also by many non-Muslims. The Jews and the Christians usually had a much higher concentration in the urban centers of Baghdad and Mosul, respectively. However, one should also note that this regionalism did not prevent the different religions from co-existing. There were certainly many towns and villages that had a very heterogeneous population. A final word regarding the demographic heterogeneity of Ottoman Iraq relates to the non-Ottoman population living in the province. Since Western interest in the region increased noticeably during the nineteenth century, citizens of foreign countries such as Persia, Britain,

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France, Russia, Austria and India became part of the local population. The number of foreigners increased proportionally with the increase of Western influence in the region. The development of Western interest in the province had many purposes: political, economic and religious considerations being the most important ones. For instance, American Protestant missionary activities, supported by the British consuls, took place in the province of Baghdad at least from the beginning of the 1840s.58 It is quite interesting that in 1897 the city of Baghdad alone had the biggest group of foreign nationals (which numbered 33,270) after that of the capital, İstanbul.59 The number of foreign nationals continued to increase in the second half of the century, and developments at the turn of the century, such as the Baghdad Railway project, further attracted foreign interest. The heterogeneity of the population was also reflected in the languages spoken. Arabic, Turkish and Persian were the leading languages, but people usually spoke more than one language. For instance, the frontier-dwelling Kurdish tribes in northeast Iraq spoke both Kurdish and Persian. On the other hand, there were many people in Baghdad who spoke Turkish and Arabic. Turkish was intensively spoken among the Turkoman people in Arbil and Kirkuk and among the Ottoman officials in Baghdad. Usually it was geopolitical locality that determined whether the inhabitants were monolingual or multilingual. For instance, the people in the cities with a Shi‘i concentration such as Najaf, Karbala, or the cities on the Persian border, felt it somehow compulsory to speak Persian in addition to Arabic or Turkish/Kurdish. Furthermore, while Kurdish was one of the leading languages spoken in the province, Turkish and Arabic were treated as the official languages.60 Needless to say, the population of Ottoman Iraq, like that of other Ottoman provinces, was undercounted. As McCarthy noted, foreign nationals were the best-recorded groups, because they were subject to passport and border controls. However, the distinction between Persian and Ottoman nationals was probably blurred. On the other hand, while the ‘rural millets’, Muslims, Armenians, Syrians and Chaldeans, were the most poorly surveyed groups, children, women and the Bedouins were the most striking groups to be omitted in the

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population estimates.61 For instance, the numbers in Table 1 do not include children and women. From time to time, there were discussions on whether nomadism was contingent on geography. Especially in Iraq, it was difficult for a peasant to fulfill the need for water, pasture, etc. in one region, which meant that he had to move all the time.62 Since good pastures were scanty even in the irrigation zone, the tribes frequently struggled for control over the pastures, and this necessitated permanent tribal mobility. The irregular navigability of the rivers and the lack of control over vital parts of the transport routes further contributed to the predominance of nomadism.63 However, as the local government grew increasingly stronger during the second half of the nineteenth century, the nomads were encouraged or forced to settle down, and therefore the proportion of nomads within the total Iraqi population diminished. On the other hand, a tribal organization could consist of nomads, semi-nomads, fellahîn (those dealing with agriculture) and ma‘dan (those engaging in herd breeding). For instance, the Banî Lâm tribe, among many others, was a good example of this kind of tribal organization. Some of them engaged in agriculture in certain months of the year and for the rest of the year they gained their livelihood from animal husbandry. Furthermore, the Bedouins had a mobile lifestyle, but this does not mean that the tribes were moving over the whole of hıtta-i Iraq. The tribes usually had a certain geographic area in which they lived and moved from one place to another, namely dirah. For example, the region from Qurna in the south to the great canal, known as Umm al-Jabal, was settled by the Muntafiq tribal confederation; and the region from Umm al-Jabal to Shatt al-Hayy was settled by the Banî Lâm tribal confederation.64 This tribally identified geography did not have clear-cut boundaries, but tribal territories were known not only by the members of the tribe but also by other tribes.

The Mamluks in Baghdad In the seventeenth century the weakening of the Ottoman central authority gave rise to local powers in the Iraqi provinces as elsewhere

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in the empire. The pashas were almost semi-autonomous, and the power of the Janissaries was great. The Ottomans at first attempted to rule the Iraqi provinces directly, but in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the weakened government in İstanbul was obliged to concede extensive autonomy to provincial governors, and some areas were beyond the reach of Ottoman authority for extended periods. The appointment of Hasan Pasha in 1702 and then his son Ahmed Pasha in 1724 to the governorship in Baghdad set the necessary stage for the beginning of a new period in Iraq. Hasan Pasha was brought up in Enderun and therefore wanted to set up a system in Baghdad that resembled the imperial palace administration in İstanbul. He established a hass oda, hazine (treasury) kiler odaları (kitchens) and a mekteb (school).65 Such a provincial administration was quite unusual for the central government. However, the dissolution of the provincial army, rebellion among the tribes and a generally disrespectful attitude towards the provincial government made Hasan Pasha consider a long-term solution.66 The Safavid rout by Afghan forces in 1722 gave him a golden opportunity. He brought Abkhaz, Georgian and Circasian slaves and educated them in the provincial palace along with the sons of local notables.67 The graduates of this mekteb entered the office of their patrons and eventually assumed significant positions in the provincial administration. Hasan Pasha tried hard to improve the province. He struggled to end the tribal rebellions and enhanced commercial life in Baghdad. He even conducted a campaign against Iran and conquered Kirmanshah in 1723.68 When Hasan Pasha died, his son, who was the governor of Basra, succeeded him. Ahmed Pasha followed his father’s path and completed the campaign against Iran by conquering Hamedan, Hürremabad, and Ardalan.69 Ahmed Pasha, like his father, contributed considerably to the welfare of the province. The long governorships of Hasan Pasha (20 years) and his son Ahmed Pasha (21 years) enabled the people of Baghdad to embrace these rulers. In the meantime, the Mamluk system became more established.70 After the death of Ahmed Pasha, the Sublime Porte appointed several governors to the province of Baghdad, but they were unsuccessful and did not stay long.71 Between 1747 and 1749, the Sublime Porte tried to prevent the creation of Mamluk power by appointing

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governors from the center. However, since the Mamluks had already established their strongholds militarily and politically, non-local governors were no longer accepted by the local people.72 There were a number of disadvantages for the non-local governors in Baghdad. First of all, they were feared by the people of Baghdad because they were regarded as tax-hungry. Secondly, due to a lack of experience in provincial politics, a non-local governor would not be in a position to keep the local actors, especially the great tribes, in check.73 It is also known that a number of governors appointed by the Porte had been killed by the local elites before they took over provincial power; some of them were killed even before they reached the city.74 The Sublime Porte even sent ex-grand viziers as governors to Baghdad, but even they could make no headway.75 Therefore, the Sublime Porte had to appoint the former governor of Basra, Süleyman, nicknamed Abu Laila,76 as governor of Baghdad in 1749. Süleyman Pasha was, without doubt, one of the fruits of the Mamluk system and he had a good knowledge of local affairs. The governorship of Süleyman Pasha (1749–62) marks the beginning of Mamluk rule in Baghdad. From this time onwards, the central government in İstanbul was not able to appoint governors from İstanbul, but only to select or confirm one of the Mamluks for the governorship. Only posts like that of provincial qadi, Janissary Agha and some governorships that could be given solely to local candidates, were directly appointed by the Sublime Porte.77 Süleyman Pasha favored the Mamluk system in the province and granted the Mamluks provincial posts. This meant a decrease in the significance of military and administrative officials appointed by the center. The main positions in the local administration were given to a patrimonial group and to the pasha’s coterie. Between 1762 and 1780 the Sublime Porte attempted to change this tradition in provincial appointments;78 however, the governors, mostly non-local, served for a short period of time and without much influence. Hence, the governorship was given to able Mamluk slaves and İstanbul, incapable of changing the situation, had to ratify the status quo. Thenceforth, when a governor died, it was usually one of his kethüdâs who assumed the new governorship. However, this process also

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resulted, not infrequently, in rivalry and overt insurrection against the new governor. The Sublime Porte could only confirm the governorship of the one who eliminated his rivals for provincial administration. For a long time, the Sublime Porte tried to nominate its own governors, but every time its attempts were in vain. Baghdad was an important frontier province and the Persian claims to Iraqi territories made the situation more fragile. Political instability and a leaderless provincial administration were the most dangerous choices for İstanbul. Therefore, whenever there appeared a problem in succession, the Sublime Porte tried to solve the problem as quickly as possible, which usually meant the recognition and appointment of the leading Mamluk candidate for the governorship. The Persian peril and the increasing fragility of the Pashalik necessitated strong governors and stability. The central administration in İstanbul sometimes thought of appointing strong governors like Tosun Pasha, then governor of Jeddah, or Kavalalı İbrahim Pasha to govern in the Pashalik, but the established Mamluk order prevented the appointment of a nonMamluk governor.79 Although some scholars consider the very beginning of the nineteenth century, especially the death of Süleyman the Great (in 1802) and the Russian occupation of Tiflis, which was the source of slaves, as the symbolic end of the Mamluk era in Baghdad,80 it lasted three more decades and the last Mamluk governor, Davud Pasha, has a distinct place in the history of the Mamluks. Davud Pasha was not only one of the leading governors of the Pashalik, but also the most intellectual governor in Baghdad after Midhat Pasha. He contributed considerably to the development and modernization of the province. He renovated the city wall, the streets, many mosques and madrasas. Moreover, he established weapon and textile factories to meet the needs of the army. His efforts in improving land and river transport were remarkable.81 During his governorship between 1817 and 1831 Davud Pasha set the necessary ground for a more autonomous provincial administration. When he did not obey the imperial firmân concerning the minting of coins, the Sublime Porte prepared to dismiss him. The overt revolt of Davud Pasha led to a military campaign by Ali Rıza Pasha, then the governor of Aleppo. The great plague of 1831 seriously diminished

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not only the Mamluk army but also the population of the city, and this helped considerably in the political and military takeover. The dismissal and defeat of Davud Pasha was certainly an important turning point in the history of Ottoman Iraq. It not only ended the almost one-century-long Mamluk rule in Baghdad, but also put an end to the autonomous nature of the provincial administration. The removal of Davud Pasha and the Mamluk regime was the first step in a long process, which aimed to bring the central state back to the provincial periphery.

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CHAPTER 2

‘BRINGING THE STATE BACK IN’: THE RE-ASSERTION OF OTTOMAN DIRECT RULE IN IRAQ

The Sublime Porte was surely not content with the longstanding Mamluk rule in Baghdad. However, the governors who were appointed by the Porte were not allowed by the local powers to govern the province. The alliances among the provincial governor, Janissary Corps and the local tribes forced İstanbul to accept the de facto situation in the Pashalik. There were several factors that made the Porte more resentful of the ruling Mamluk regime. First of all, the Mamluk pashas failed to comply with some of the imperial decrees and they were neglecting their legal responsibilities towards the Sublime Porte. For example, on many occasions, the Sublime Porte asked Süleyman Pasha (the Great) and Ali Pasha to take military action against the Wahhabi movement.1 Süleyman Pasha did well in the internal affairs of the province but he was not able to demonstrate the same success in the regional politics. The fear of failure and defeat against the Wahhabis made him delay taking action, thus allowing the Wahhabis to strengthen themselves. Secondly, the expansion of Persian control over the border zone was a source of resentment for İstanbul. Although the Erzurum

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treaty of 1823 settled the frontier problems, it was not to the advantage of Baghdad in all respects, because the treaty allowed Persian forces to remain in Kurdistan and Persian overlordship continued in Sulaimaniyah.2 Besides, the Persian threat was far from being merely symbolic, because two Iraqi provinces, Mosul and Basra, had been besieged several times in the eighteenth century. As Nieuwenhuis pointed out: The Persian threat and the tribal problems not only kept the pasha’s forces in the pashalik of Baghdad, but induced both Porte and Mamluks to co-operate despite conflicts. Tactical alliances between Persian authorities and pashas seem at times to have been established, but Mamluk attempts to seriously oppose the Turkish overlord remained absent.3 Moreover, Persia, as part of its centuries-long foreign policy, tried to benefit from the weaknesses of the Ottoman Empire. In the 1830s, after the defeat of the Ottoman military by forces of Muhammad Ali of Egypt, Persia sent an envoy to İstanbul who audaciously offered Persian military assistance in return for Baghdad province. If this offer was not acceptable, they also offered to pay (money) for it.4 In addition, during the Crimean War, Persia sided with Russia. It was even reported that she provided logistics (munitions and food staff) to Russia.5 Upon these developments, Reşid Pasha made military preparations. However, the Persian Shah later withdrew his support when religious notables admonished him not to cooperate with Russia against a Muslim state. Again in 1858, when the news reached Baghdad that the Persian Shah was approaching the frontier with 20,000 soldiers, Ömer Lütfü Pasha prepared his army and went to Sulaimaniyah, where he learnt that the Shah had turned back. In short, such instances indicated that the ‘Persian peril’ was a permanent threat to both provincial and imperial security. There were also some attempts to bypass the Mamluks by means of the Janissary Aghas and the Baban Beys; however, they all proved to be futile. The rejection of ‘alien pashas’ by the Mamluks was supported by the desire for continuity in local government. It was part of

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the general practice for the appointed governor to install a number of his kin and coterie in the provincial administration. Moreover, as the alien pashas were usually less aware of the regional problems than the long ruling Mamluks, it would have taken them a long time to gain control of regional problems. Certainly, the Mamluk rulers’ reluctance to pay the required annual payments was another overt revolt against İstanbul. Earlier we saw that the Sublime Porte attempted to regain control by sending senior officials like Halet Efendi and Sadık Efendi with extensive powers. When the efforts of these officials proved fruitless, it became clear to the Sublime Porte that Davud Pasha would not compromise unless confronted by military force; therefore, Ali Rıza Pasha was commissioned to carry out this task.6 The murder of Defterdâr Sadık Efendi by Davud Pasha was the straw that broke the camel’s back.7 Later Davud realized his mistake and apologized to the Sultan via the British ambassador in İstanbul. However, it was too late, because the overthrow of Davud Pasha had already become a matter of self-respect for the Sublime Porte. This was quite evident when the Sublime Porte had tried to collect the avarız payment, which amounted to 6,000 kese akçe in 1831;8 however, of this amount Davud sent only 1,000 kese. When military action became inevitable, the Sublime Porte had to mobilize an army of 15,000 soldiers. This cost the Porte 25,000 kese akçe, which was much higher than the required avârız tax. Furthermore, the lack of security in the region was also an important factor that stimulated the Sublime Porte to take action. The British consular reports describe the situation in the mid-1830s as follows: The Koords overran the settled population and with it cultivation and production, they had so completely cut off Baghdad from all direct communication with Constantinople, from all intercourse with the rest of the empire, ... the communications with Baghdad were entirely interrupted not only for caravans but even for Tatars ... and they laid Koordistan to a waste, a country of uncommon fertility and capability would soon have ceased to yield not only revenue but allegiance to the Sultan, and Baghdad and its dependencies would probably have erected itself into an

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independent Pashalic, or would have formed an appendage to the territories of a neighbouring power.9 Before the military campaign, Ali Rıza Pasha tried to ensure the support of leading tribes. While some of them, like the sheikh of Ka‘b, declined to support him and sided with Davud Pasha, Shammar alJarba and the Kurdish Mehmed Bey of Rawanduz supported Ali Rıza militarily.10 On the other hand, Davud Pasha was delivering hil‘ats in order to increase his faction. In the meantime, an imperial decree was issued which guaranteed a pardon for Davud and his family on condition that he left the city without fighting.11 When the news and the imperial orders concerning the dismissal and replacement of Davud with Ali Rıza Pasha reached the people of Basra and Kirkuk, they reacted with great joy. In Baghdad people attacked and plundered the saray, the provincial palace, and showed their support for Ali Rıza Pasha.12 Davud Pasha, realizing that his palace was no longer safe, fled and hid in one of his slaves’ houses. When the army led by Ali Rıza entered the city there was almost no opposition, except for a few short local skirmishes, because Davud had already lost the support of the local people.13 More important than this was the fatal impact of the plague, which diminished Davud’s army considerably.14 After his defeat, Davud Pasha was sent to İstanbul and then banished to Bursa.15 However, his dismissal was a watershed in the history of Iraq, because from then on Iraq was more strongly tied to Ottoman central administration.

The end of the Jalilis in Mosul After the destruction of the Mamluk dynasty and the extension of Ottoman direct rule in Baghdad, steps were taken against the Jalilis of Mosul and the Kurdish emirates. The Jalili household in Mosul descended from Abdul Jalil and in 1726 İsmail Pasha became the first Jalili governor of Mosul. The Jalilis gained the favor of the central administration as tax-farmers and procurers of provisions. The fight put up by Hussain Pasha al-Jalili against the invasion of Nadir Shah of Persia in 1775 played an important role in winning the support of the rulers in the Sublime Porte. In the course of time, the Jalilis became the

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most powerful actors in Mosuli politics by ‘combining their position as premier procurers of provisions with that of holders of large malikanes and their administrative positions as provincial governors’.16 Though the Jalili contribution to the development of Mosul was undeniable, in the late 1820s there were frequent public complaints that they were ruling unjustly and extorting the public revenues for their own interests. Normally the Pashalik of Baghdad during the Mamluk era did not include northern Iraq and Mosul. It was limited to Baghdad and Basra. However, in their heyday, the Mamluk sphere of influence had extended to southeastern Kurdistan, the Mosuli hinterland, Jizrah and Mardin.17 The Mamluk rulers tried to expand their control over Mosul and lobbied accordingly. Davud Pasha, when writing to the Sublime Porte about the appointment of new governor to Mosul, wanted the new governor to be under his supervision (taht-ı vezâret). However, the Sublime Porte prevented this on the grounds that it did not want Mamluk rule to be a second Muhammad Ali affair, and therefore tried to keep it limited to Baghdad and Basra. On the other hand, the Jalili rulers, being aware of Mamluk attempts to intervene in Mosuli politics, kept a distance from Baghdad politics.18 For example, they did not support Baghdad’s military campaigns against the Kurdish emirates in the northeast. Far from supporting the Mamluks, when it suited them the Jalilis allied with the Kurdish Babans and/or the Sublime Porte against the Mamluks and became the leading source of information for the Sublime Porte on the deeds of Mamluk rule.19 Moreover, as Nieuwenhuis rightly pointed out, the Ottoman central administration backed Jalili rule, because a weak Mosul would give the Mamluks an opportunity to extend their influence further and dominate the southeastern region of the empire to a greater extent than the Porte was willing to accept.20 But the Sublime Porte’s backing lasted as long as Mamluk rule in Baghdad prevailed. In the late 1820s the fierce rivalry between the Jalilis and the Umaris,21 the second biggest household in Mosul, weakened and brought about the end of Jalili household. The chaotic years of the late 1820s and the decline of the Jalilis sharpened Davud Pasha’s appetite for expansion towards Mosul. In fact, this was one of the reasons that made the Sublime Porte act at the expense of Mamluk rule. The

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abolition of the Janissary Corps in 1826 further exacerbated the civil strife, because there was an alliance between the Jalilis and Janissary regiments.22 The last Jalili, Yahya Pasha, who ruled between 1822 and 1827, was banished to Aleppo. In 1831 Ali Rıza Pasha of Baghdad appointed an Umari Pasha to Mosul. However, Yahya Pasha did not waste time in Aleppo, where he was in exile, and took Mosul back by force in 1833. The resulting hostility between Ali Rıza Pasha and Yahya Pasha was exacerbated by the latter’s relations with the Shammar tribal confederation at the expense of the former.23 Ali Rıza Pasha led a military campaign in which Yahya Pasha lost the city by force and was banished, this time to Tekirdağ.24 In the same year Mehmed Said Pasha became governor.25 One year later, in 1834, on the recommendation of the governor of Baghdad İnce Bayraktar Mehmed Pasha was appointed to Mosul. The new governor, in collaboration with Mehmed Reşid Pasha of Sivas, strived to subjugate the Kurdish beys and contributed a great deal to the development of the city.

PHOTO 4 A camel caravan crossing the bridge of Mosul

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The fall of the Kurdish emirates in northern Iraq The Kurdish emirates were mainly concentrated in northern Iraq and Shahrizor (Kirkuk), the latter being the administrative center of the region. The emirates were nominally tied to the governor in Baghdad and the governor had the right to appoint and dismiss the head of the emirate; however, the de facto situation was that the governor had to select from one of a certain number of dynasties. The Ottoman authority in the region during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries was largely nominal; however, it was also powerful enough to interfere in the internal politics of the Kurdish emirates.26 In practice, the emirates acted almost independently during the Mamluk period and the relations between the Kurdish Beys and the Mamluk rulers were based on mutual gains: while Baghdad benefited from the region in terms of their military capacity, especially during the campaigns against Arab tribes, the emirates in return benefited economically and politically by being exempted from certain taxes and acting almost independently.27 The Mamluk governors also sought the support of Kurdish emirates during their accession to the governorship. Rawanduz, Bahdinan, Baban and Botan were the leading Kurdish emirates. The balance of power between these emirates and Baghdad depended on the personality of both the governor in Baghdad and the individual Kurdish bey himself. Sometimes the Kurdish beys were pro-Baghdad, but sometimes they opted for Persia. Indeed, it was this alternating loyalty that angered the Ottoman central administration most. The Persian influence in the region and the tendency of the Kurdish emirates to take shelter from the Persian Shah whenever they were squeezed by Baghdad, were the leading factors paving the way for the re-assertion of Ottoman direct rule in the region. The Rawanduz (Soran) emirate Rawanduz was the center of the Soran emirate, whose emîrs, during the 1820s and 1830s, could revive the former glory of the emirate and expand its territory at the expense of other tribes and districts. From time to time, Baghdad used the Rawanduzi emîrs as a counter-balance against Iran in the Kurdistan region. One of these emîrs, Muhammed

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Kör (also known as Mir Kör, or Kör Mir, the blind), who began to establish his power from 1826 onwards, therefore had cordial relations with Baghdad. After replacing his father in 1814 at the age of 31, he began to consolidate his power by eliminating his rivals. He soon became one of the most famous beys of the Soran family. Even when he began to expand his authority as far as Little Zab and Arbil, and then in 1833 as far as Amadiyah, Zakho, Dohuk, Jizrah, Mardin and Nusaybin, the local government in Baghdad could not stop Muhammed Kör.28 Instead, as a frequently used method of conflict resolution, he was appointed as mîrimîrân and the region including Arbil and Köprü was left to him. Muhammed Kör not only plundered and dominated the local tribes but also dared to mint coins in his name.29 He not only marched against the Yezidîs and killed thousands,30 but also fought with the Bahdinans and the Botans. However, his attacks on Nusaybin and Mardin upset Baghdad the most. The revolt of Muhammed Ali Pasha of Egypt was the main reason for letting the Kurdish emirates act freely. However, the rumors that Muhammed Kör was in contact with İbrahim Pasha, son of Muhammed Ali, accelerated Ottoman military action against Mir Kör.31 Upon these developments and on the advice of the governor of Baghdad, the Sublime Porte, for the first time since the seventeenth century, appointed Mehmed Pasha (İncebayraktar) as the governor of Shahrizor (Kirkuk).32 The general contention that the control of Baghdad and its environs would be easier if Kurdistan was once again taken under control probably played significant role in Ali Rıza Pasha’s initiative. The appearance of an army in 1835 under the command of Mehmed Reşid Pasha, former grand vizier and governor of Sivas, meant the beginning of the end of the Rawanduz emîrs. Reşid Pasha suppressed the mutinous Mardin and switched that area permanently from Mosul to Diyarbakır.33 In doing this, he was supported militarily by İncebayraktar of Mosul and Ali Rıza of Baghdad. Instead of shedding the blood of thousands, the Rawanduzi Muhammad Kör had been offered peaceful surrender in return for his life. Having no choice other than surrendering, Mir Kör departed in 1836 for İstanbul, where he was welcomed by the Ottoman sultan; however, he died mysteriously on his return to Rawanduz.

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The fact that Rasul Bey, brother of the rebellious Mir Kör, was brought into the administration in Rawanduz, indicates that Baghdad was not yet ready to hold power in local politics. When Rasul Bey attempted to gain local autonomy, the new governor in Baghdad, Necip Pasha (1842–49) retaliated fiercely, forcing him to flee to Persia in 1847.34 Rasul Bey was the last Rawanduzi emîr and with his desertion the Soran emirate came to an end. From this time onwards, Rawanduz was under Ottoman direct rule and ruled by Turkish officials. Thenceforth, Rawanduz shrank once more to a place of minor significance. The Bahdinan emirate Apart from the Rawanduz emirate, the deployment of the Ottoman army was to change the fate of other Kurdish emirates as well. As Longrigg noted: In 1837, troops from outside Iraq, under Hafız Pasha, again crushed the Sinjar Yazidis; and in 1838 the Incebayraktar took up the unfinished work in Kurdistan. Amadiyyah was finally annexed after a siege, Aqrah and Dohuk followed: the Kurdish rulers and their families became harmless pensioners in Mosul or Baghdad.35 In this context, the 1830s witnessed the disintegration of another Kurdish principality, namely the Bahdinans. The emirate, which was centered on the city of Amadiya, was led by İsmail Pasha, but his brother was taken hostage by Ali Rıza Pasha. The emirate included Akra, Shush, and the Zabari lands on the Great Zab river to the east and occasionally Zakho to the west. The principalities of the Botan and Hakkari bounded it in the north and that of Soran in the south.36 The above-mentioned territorial expansion of the Rawanduz emirate occurred at the expense of the Bahdinans and therefore the first and the most damaging blow came from the Muhammad Kör of Rawanduz. As MacKenzie noted: In 1833 Muhammad [Kör] Pasha, of Rawandiz, captured Aqra and Amadiya, deposing the ruler Said Pasha, and proceeded

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to take Zakho. Although his sway only lasted a few years the Bahdinan family never fully recovered its power and in 1838 the area was finally incorporated in the sancâk of Mosul.37 When Mir Kör defeated İsmail Pasha of the Bahdinans, he made his brother Rasul the new ruler of the Bahdinan emirate.38 However, after the suppression of Mir Kör by Ottoman forces, İsmail Pasha was able to re-establish his leadership for some years. Another blow to Bahdinan rule in Amadiyah came from Baghdad. Ali Rıza Pasha marched against the Bahdinan emirate and brought both İsmail Pasha and his brother to Baghdad, of whom the former died there. Ali Rıza Pasha also appointed one of his relatives, Mehmed Said Pasha, to Amadiyah.39 The final blow to the emirate came from the governor of Mosul, then İncebayraktar Mehmed, who put an end to the principality and tied Amadiyah to Mosul.40 The Baban emirate The Kurdish Baban dynasty was the foremost Kurdish tribe in the region. The Babans, who ruled a wide territory ranging from Sulaimaniyah and Shahrizor to Köysancak and Khanaqin, for a century and half, endured until 1850. Sulaimaniyah was the center of the Baban dynasty. Traditionally, the Babans were alternately pro-Baghdad or pro-Kirmanshah. In order to increase their influence over the emirate both the governor of Baghdad and the Shah of Persia intrigued and interfered in family quarrels, but almost all the time the Babans belonged nominally to the Ottoman Empire.41 They collaborated with the Ottoman government and therefore they were given the high Turkish title of pasha. The princely position (or at least princely pretensions) of the dynasty was threatened by the rivalry among the sons of Abdurrahman Pasha (the greatest Baban, in power between 1789 and 1812), for the Baban leadership. The family was also weakened by constant intrigues with (and by) Persian supporters for this or that candidate. As noted by Nieuwenhuis, during the period between 1802 and 1831, the dominant Baban faction played the Ottoman card, but

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Persian threats and campaigns soon forced them to take the stronger side. This had negative consequences for the Babans in the sense that they paid higher tributes to Kirmanshah than to Baghdad.42 Control over Sulaimaniyah and Baban territory was significant for the governor in Baghdad, because in order to defend the Persian border, which had been one of the most important tasks for the Pasha in Baghdad, a certain degree of influence and authority was needed there. This influence at the beginning of the nineteenth century was virtually nil.43 The final expulsion of the Baban rulers, which was inevitable under the centralizing policy of the Sublime Porte after 1830, was made easier by the appearance of signs of Ottoman–Persian frontier agreements in 1823 and 1847 and the destructive rivalries of the sons of Abdurrahman Pasha. In spite of a brief ‘Indian summer’ when new weapons and modern military methods were introduced in the Baban armed forces, the centralizing efforts of the mid-century governors of Iraq finally prevailed in 1850, when the last of the Baban princes left Sulaimaniyah. It is also argued that the demise of the Babans was sealed in 1847 with the Ottoman–Persian border agreement, in which Persia promised to give up her claim on Sulaimaniyah. The emirate was totally dissolved when Ismail Pasha replaced the last Baban. Ismail Pasha, who was a high-ranking officer in the Sixth Army, was the first Ottoman official to rule in Sulaimaniyah as kaymakam.44 The Botan emirate The Botan emirate deserves mention because it has a special place in Kurdish history. The Botan emirate, of which the Bedirhan family was the most important branch, was also the victim of Ottoman centralizing reforms in the region. Bedirhan Pasha (1802/3–1869/70) became the ruler of the Botan emirate in 1835. He bore the title of mütesellim and was a strong ruler who in 1839 fought against the forces of İbrahim Pasha of Egypt at the battle of Nizip. Like the rulers of other Kurdish emirates, Bedirhan Pasha enjoyed considerable authority, surpassing in some ways the authority of the Ottoman governor in the region.45 However, this fact should not prevent us from considering

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the Bedirhani contribution to the Ottoman forces in stabilizing the region. The Bedirhans were loyal to the Ottoman administration, at least until 1842. In 1842–43 the Sublime Porte, aiming to weaken the Bedirhani authority by dividing its lands, attached Jizrah to Mosul. Indeed, changes in the provincial borders were a common reflection of the Tanzimat applications. While the emirate’s core lands remained in the province of Diyarbakır, Jizrah, which was very important for the Bedirhan family, was attached to Mosul, whose governor was at odds with Bedirhan Bey.46 This administrative adjustment resulted in a revolt, which was later alleged to be a Kurdish nationalistic movement.47 However, it is commonly accepted that one of the most serious reactions against the application of Tanzimat came from the JizrahHakkari region.48 Understandably, relations between Bedirhan Bey and the Sublime Porte were uneasy between 1842 and 1847. However, Bedirhan Bey’s attacks on Nestorians in 1843 and 1846 also contributed to the decision by the Sublime Porte to march against the Bedirhans, because these attacks aroused much discontent among the Great Powers and caused considerable pressure on the Sublime Porte.49 The Bedirhan revolt was suppressed and Bedirhan Bey was taken to İstanbul on 12 September 1847.50

The sacred cities of Karbala and Najaf The re-assertion of Ottoman direct rule was not limited to regions like Jalili Mosul, Mamluk Baghdad and Iraqi Kurdistan; there were other places like the two shrine cities of Karbala and Najaf, where Ottoman direct rule was re-established. As Karbala contained roughly 10,000 Iranians, it was considered as an Iranian-dominated stronghold, and hence as a ‘potential fifth column’.51 While in the eighteenth and early nineteenth century the city was governed by Mamluk-appointed Sunnis from Baghdad, after the first quarter of the nineteenth century local notables came to be the actual rulers of the city. The Shi‘i worldview that perceived the Ottoman ruler as a heretic and usurper of an office that should by right belong only to the Twelfth (Hidden) Imam (who went into occultation in the ninth century) was

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reflected in the autonomous character of the city.52 In time, Karbala came to be an important shelter for runaway malefactors and gangs, called yaramaz, from both Iran and Iraq. As the city became inaccessible for provincial officials, many Ottoman governors would not dare to enter it either. Ali Rıza Pasha’s Bektashi leanings, especially his annual mourning for the Imam Hussain, resulted in a short rapprochement between the Sunni ruler and the Shi‘i inhabitants of the city.53 However, his attempt to appoint a governor for Karbala increased tensions again. It was only after Necip Pasha’s military operation in 1842 that the city was surrendered after a serious conflict. Necip Pasha appointed a Sunni governor, an assistant Sunni judge and a Sunni preacher to deliver the Friday sermons in the name of the Ottoman sultan.54 The situation in Najaf was similar to that in Karbala. The two cityclans, Shumurd and Zuqurt, which represented wealthier and poorer quarters of the city respectively, not only wracked Najaf with violence throughout the nineteenth century, but also showed clear opposition to Ottoman rule.55 A revolt in 1852, caused by longstanding disaffection with the regime, was suppressed by Ottoman troops. However, final submission to the Ottoman rule took place in 1854.56 *

*

*

In a nutshell, it would be not wrong to say that the two decades between the 1830s and 1850s was a period characterized by the disintegration of the semi-independent dynasties and the consolidation of the Ottoman central administration in Baghdad. As far as Iraqi Kurdistan was concerned, the Ottoman governors, namely Ali Rıza Pasha and Necip Pasha, thought that due to frequent Persian intervention in regional domestic affairs and the rivalry among the Kurdish beys, stability could not be achieved under the rule of the existing Kurdish emîrs. Ottoman governors felt the need to replace both the Kurdish emirs and the Shi‘i rulers with Turkish ones; therefore, the two decades between 1830 and 1850 witnessed the dissolution of Kurdish emirates and Shi‘i zones and re-establishment of direct Turkish rule in these regions.

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Asâyiş ve Emniyet: Provincial security in Baghdad The re-assertion of Ottoman direct rule and the submission of local forces was a very important step for the improvement of provincial security. The main efforts of the Ottoman government were initially intended to consolidate its hold over its dominions. However, the elimination of decentralist forces did not mean the resolution of all security problems within the province. Between 1831 and 1872, not only were autonomous entities eliminated, but local rebels were also reduced to insignificance. The chronic lack of security gradually but definitely improved. As Rifat Abu Al-Haj stated: Iraq had been constantly exposed to the bâdiya (desert raids and Bedouin domination) and thus persistently subjected to its raids and dominance. And although other Arab societies share in the same experience as Iraq in this constant exposure to the bâdiya, what makes Iraq’s case unique is the intensity of the exposure and the swiftness of the oscillation.57 Therefore, the most striking threat to provincial security was the recalcitrant attitude of the nomadic tribes. By consistently harassing and robbing commercial caravans, Bedouin tribes often halted longdistance trade for months. The Baghdad–Damascus trade route had been attacked several times, notably in 1843 and 1857,58 and the mail carts were also robbed from time to time.59 Moreover, farming villages and their surrounding fields were frequently looted and burned. In fact, right until the dissolution of the empire the Ottomans found it difficult to pacify the tribes here. For example, the Ottoman governors struggled to subdue Shammar Jarba for the entire period under consideration. As will be discussed in Chapter 5, the main objective of the Ottoman policy on tribes was to break tribal unity and incorporate them into the provincial political mechanism. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the effects of increased state control were only felt from the mid-1850s. The most acute security problem of the province was the inadequacy of the provincial army. The Mamluk period witnessed some reform

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of the provincial army, but it was still not strong enough. Süleyman the Great (1780–1802) had increased the number of Georgian bodyguards and organized them as a military force. During the governorship of Davud Pasha, foreign instructors trained the provincial army and relatively modern arms were introduced.60 This army was also supported by tribal mercenaries. Longrigg described the condition of Baghdad’s Janissary Corps at the beginning of the nineteenth century as follows: The character of the Janissaries in Iraq had changed much in the preceding century. Fewer and fewer, and finally none, of their officers came from Stambul. Drafts of recruits ceased to arrive from abroad, and the lack was made good by local enlistment. Their last appearance, perhaps, as a force with any pretence of imperial character was in the succession struggles of 1802. Thereafter – and indeed before – the Janissaries were but a corps locally raised, locally paid, and similar in all essentials to the Baratli or Tufenkchi, though still ready with the phrases into which tradition had crystallized, and differing somewhat in dress and function.61 When Mahmud II abolished the centuries-old Janissary Corps and established Asâkir-i Mansûre-i Muhammediye in İstanbul, he also sent orders to the provinces to take similar actions. However, Davud Pasha kept the orders secret and he gathered all Janissaries together. Then, he enrolled all of the Janissaries into the newly created Nizâmiye Army.62 The tribal structure of the province was the most important obstacle to provincial security. In Baghdad, banditry was a way of life for certain tribes, and murder, highway robbery (kat‘-ı tarîk), and plunder were frequent occurrences.63 Guns were commonly used by males ranging from the very young to the very old. It was not unusual for 15-year-old boys to join the bandits. The tribes not only raided one another but constantly levied tributes on caravans that passed by their territories. A further effort to improve the provincial security was the strengthening of the Aleppo–Baghdad route. This route was very important in

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terms of commercial trade between the cities; however, it was exposed to tribal attacks. The fact that the desert lay just to the west of this route also increased its vulnerability. In 1851, the local governors proposed the construction of 20 forts, each manned with artillery and soldiers.64 However, the Sublime Porte found the project too costly and it was delayed on the grounds that the Sixth Army was not yet able to supply the required soldiers and munitions for these 20 forts. Despite the delay of this project, individual governors contributed to the improvement of security along the Aleppo–Baghdad route. For example Reşid Pasha built more than ten forts in Samava, Hindiyyah and Suq ash Shuyukh.65 Reşid Pasha also tried hard to improve security in the province, not least by constructing several forts along the Euphrates River. Moreover, in order to control the tribes that took shelter in the marshes and swamps, the Pasha built 200 small riverboats and 20 medium-sized boats.66 As will be discussed in the final chapter, the beginning of the

Map 2

The Aleppo–Baghdad caravan route with major rest areas

Source: Based on the map in Douglas Carruthers (ed.), The Desert Route to India, 1929.

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steamer service on the Tigris and Euphrates further increased the general security along the river routes.

Introduction of Kur‘a-i şer‘iyye (conscription by ballot) While the provincial army of Baghdad experienced considerable development and modernization during Davud Pasha’s governorship, one of the most important changes came with the introduction of kur‘a-i şer‘iyye (conscription by ballot). In accordance with the Tanzimat principles, various regulations were issued between 1843 and 1846 concerning the conscription system. Accordingly, the kur‘a-i şer‘iyye replaced the old ocak usulü. However, Ottoman governors in Iraq had considerable difficulty in conscripting the local populace, because conscription was vehemently opposed by the Bedouins in particular. Before the introduction of kur‘a-i şer‘iyye in a region, the population had first to be surveyed. In this population survey (tahrîr-i nüfûs) only males were counted and those of the age for military service were included in the ballot. Each district had to provide a certain number of soldiers and this number was determined by a lottery. For instance, in 1863, only 100 persons out of 432 were conscripted in the city center of Mosul.67 In another case, out of 3,402 males who were liable for military service, 414 males were put to the lottery, of which 82 were taken to the army.68 The population survey and the kur‘a-i şer‘iyye could not be done everywhere at the same time. They were done gradually, and the tribally dominated areas were the most difficult areas in which to carry them out. Therefore, the survey of the tribal population was usually delayed. For example, in 1849, after receiving imperial regulations concerning kur‘a-i şer‘iyye to Baghdad, officials began surveying the population of Baghdad, but the survey of the nomadic Muntafiq tribe was put off until another time.69 The implementation of kur‘a-i şer‘iyye in Baghdad gave rise to an increased demand for clerks and scribes.70 Conscription by ballot continued from its introduction in Baghdad in the late 1840s and early 1850s until the end of the 1870s. The areas with security problems were conscripted relatively late. While in Mosul conscription was initially introduced in the 1840s, it was only introduced to Kirkuk in 1864.71

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In Mosul, İncebayraktar Mehmed Pasha commissioned Kasım Bey to introduce kur‘a-i şer‘iyye, but Kasım Bey was killed by rebels in 1843. İncebayraktar ordered his soldiers to punish the murderers of Kasım Bey and banished some of the city notables to Basra.72 Consequently, the people of Mosul inevitably complied with the orders of the Pasha. On the other hand, conscription by ballot was introduced late in Baghdad. Ömer Lütfü Pasha tried to introduce kur‘a-i şer‘iyye in Hillah, Karbala, Hindiyyah, Divaniyah and Shamiyah in 1857 and 1858; however, these places did not submit easily, and many soldiers died in the conflicts there.73 Ömer Lütfü Pasha set the başıbozuks free and wanted to replace them with regular soldiers. He partly implemented kur‘a-i şer‘iyye in the city of Baghdad.74 Earlier, in areas including the city of Baghdad, where kur‘a-i şer‘iyye had not yet been introduced, local people were conscripted by force. In addition, vacancies in the army were filled by volunteers. However, besides the volunteer participation, there were also soldiers recruited without kur‘a-i şer‘iyye, possibly by means of military force.75 The use of force, which sometimes included imprisonment, usually resulted in disturbances. In 1863, when Namık Pasha tried to conscript the people of Baghdad, the craftsmen in the city bazaar began to close their shops as a sign of protest. Namık Pasha immediately sent his officials and forced the shops to open.76 Even by the end of Midhat Pasha’s governorship (1872), tahrîr-i nüfûs and kur‘a-i şer‘iyye had not been completed throughout the province. Midhat Pasha’s governorship witnessed significant developments both in kur‘a-i şer‘iyye and the general security of the province. Provision of security was one of the first things Midhat Pasha had to deal with. He knew that security was an essential factor for the development (terakkî) and modernization of a country. In many of his speeches he stressed the dichotomy between the (agricultural and commercial) potential of the country and the prevailing insecurity.77 Like his predecessors, Midhat Pasha was appointed to Baghdad both as governor of the province and the commander of the Sixth Army.78 In fact, one of the reasons for Midhat Pasha’s appointment to the Baghdad governorship was the re-organization of the Sixth Army.79 He first changed the recruitment system of the Sixth Army and dealt with the tribal

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rebellions. He successfully introduced military conscription in the city of Baghdad.80 In his memoirs Midhat Pasha mentioned that the kur‘a-yı şer‘iyye was introduced in Mosul and Kirkuk, but it was unheard of in Baghdad.81 The fact is that when Midhat Pasha arrived in Baghdad, the question of military recruitment was one of the urgent affairs in the province.82 Conscription was compulsory for every individual living within the empire, but this was hard to apply in Baghdad. Governors prior to Midhat Pasha tried to recruit local people gradually, but they frequently encountered tribal rebellions. Due to the changes within the Sixth Army, it became necessary for Midhat Pasha to fill the vacant ranks by recruiting from the population of Baghdad.83 His attempts caused resentment among the tribes and led eventually to rebellion. Midhat Pasha accomplished the kur‘a-i şer‘iyye in Talafar, Sinjar, Kirkuk, Arbil, Zangibar, Baghdad, Karbala, Samarra and Divaniyah, but the process was by no means easy. The Bedouins reacted to his initiative by rebelling. More than 100 rebels were arrested and punished with kürek cezası (penal servitude) for ten to 15 years.84 It is interesting that most of the rebels were older than the age group eligible for military service. This, I think, indicates that what they were reacting against was not the nature of conscription, but the process of centralization and de-tribalization, of which conscription by ballot was a significant part. In the end, the conscription procedure for Baghdad and its environs was completed in the first six months of Midhat Pasha’s governorship.85 Midhat Pasha used the provincial newspaper, Zewra, to break down people’s prejudices against conscription. It was initially believed that military service was obligatory for every young man, but Zewra explained in detail that it was a mere lottery and the chance of not being conscripted was much higher than the opposite.86 Another strategy of Zewra was to use patriotic and religious rhetoric, which idealized military service. For this end, the editor of the newspaper used verses from Holy Quran and examples from the tradition (hadith) of the Prophet concerning martyrs and veterans. Moreover, the newspaper made references to European nationalism and patriotism and underlined that ‘we are sons of soldier ancestors’.87

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The length of military service was five to six years. However, Zewra emphasized the possibility for promotion through the military ranks. After being enlisted, one could rise from the rank of an ordinary soldier to the rank of müşîr (marshal).88 In time, there appeared soldiers who wanted to continue their careers in the army. Midhat Pasha also modernized and bureaucratized the process of enlistment. Earlier, the medical examination had been done before the lottery. He changed the process so that only the men selected in the lottery had to undergo a medical examination.

Reinforcement of the Provincial army After the introduction of kur‘a-i şer‘iyye the Sixth Army was supplemented with conscripts and the necessary battalions and regiments were formed. A shortage of soldiers had plagued the Sixth Army right from its establishment in 1847. In the late 1840s it had four infantry regiments, four tâli‘a (nişancı) battalions, two cavalry regiments and an artillery regiment. However, these military units were far below their normal capacity. Especially during the periods of discharge (terhîs), the need for extra soldiers became obvious.89 It was not unusual for more than 2,000 soldiers to be discharged at one time. The Sixth Army was, from time to time, reinforced in terms of ammunition, but it was still not up to strength.90 Because of the difficulties in enlisting men from the tribes, Ottoman officials tried alternative ways of increasing the number of soldiers in the Sixth Army. A considerable part of the correspondence between the Sublime Porte and Baghdad during the third quarter of the century concentrates on the dispatch of soldiers from the Anatolian and Arabian armies to the Sixth Army. The tribal uprisings brought the insufficiency of the provincial army to the forefront. In 1850, the provincial army could not cope with two concurrent revolts in the province, one in Sulaimaniyah and the other in Hindiyyah.91 Until the consolidation of the Sixth Army, it had to be supported by the armies of Anatolia and Arabia. However, it was not always possible for these armies to back up Baghdad, because they often had their own problems to deal with. For example, in 1851

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when military intervention was required to deal with problems among the Anaza tribal confederation in Kurdistan, the armies of Anatolia and Arabia were unable to help because the Anatolian Army had some of its units on the Persian border and the Arabian Army was dealing with problems in its own region. As a result of this, the encounter with the Anaza tribal confederation was delayed. It was decided to organize a special military campaign to deal with the Anaza tribe when the armies were not occupied elsewhere.92 If a tribal uprising was not too serious, it was dealt with locally. A considerable part of the army was sent to suppress the uprising, and very few soldiers remained in Baghdad. This, however, posed a risk to the general security of the provincial center. The need to put down tribal uprisings led the officials in Baghdad to favor the development of the cavalry, and in time cavalry forces were expanded. In 1851 the total number of soldiers in hıtta-i Irakiye was 7,680. In a letter to the Porte Vecihi Pasha demanded 4,500 soldiers from the Anatolian Army; however, his demand was only partly met.93 Four months later, İstanbul sent two battalions consisting of 1,500 soldiers from the Anatolian Army to Baghdad.94 Two more battalions were sent during the governorship of Namık Pasha. Even as late as 1871–72, Midhat Pasha was able to carry out a military campaign in Najd with the help of soldiers from the Anatolian Army. While these soldiers were positioned in the provincial center of Baghdad, the remaining battalions went to Najd. It should be noted that the strong personalities of Namık and Midhat Pasha as the head (müşîr) of the Sixth Army and governor of the province were quite influential in the growth of that army. With the coming of the new soldiers, the Sixth Army was not only reinforced, but its nature also began to change. The number of başıbozuks was reduced, and they were gradually replaced by nizâmiye soldiers.95 Although this change meant extra costs for the government, this policy was followed for the rest of the century. Namık Pasha re-organized the regiments of the Sixth Army96 and paid the salaries of the soldiers (both nizâmiye and başıbozuk) that had gone unpaid for up to 20 months. Not surprisingly the payment of their salary increased the enthusiasm of the soldiers in military campaigns. Namık Pasha

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Infantry barracks of the Sixth Army in Baghdad

also started the population survey of Baghdad, which was essential for identifying individuals of the appropriate age groups to be enlisted in the provincial army.97 Earlier, the ammunition for the military forces of Baghdad was sent from İstanbul, but due to its remoteness from the imperial center, the cost of transportation was much higher than that of the ammunition itself. Hence, Namık Pasha was given authority to produce the necessary ammunition locally.98 This enabled the local government to store ammunition so that it would be on hand when the need arose. Ammunition had previously been stored in old houses, but they were not suitable for large stores. Namık Pasha built a new arsenal in Baghdad, as well as a police station (karakol) to protect the arsenal. The Pasha constructed a military barracks in Baghdad and established a permanent military base in Ammarah.99 Furthermore, the provincial prison, which was too small for its purpose, was enlarged

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by Namık Pasha. Later, during the governorship of Mustafa Nuri Pasha (1860–61) a second prison was built within the city walls of Baghdad.100 The outbreak of the Crimean War in 1853 was another development affecting the provincial army in Baghdad. The Sublime Porte asked for supplementary soldiers from the provinces, including Baghdad. It is understood that Reşid Pasha, then governor of Baghdad, and Yazıcı Hasan Agha together sent an army of 4,000 soldiers.101 Rassam noted that provincial security was negatively affected by the Crimean War between 1853 and 1856.102 Another factor that necessitated the strengthening of the Sixth Army was the alarming developments on the Ottoman–Iranian border. Occasionally Persia violated the border,103 and from time to time Persian armies massed along it. On such occasions the Sixth Army responded by sending soldiers to the border. One such incident took place in the autumn of 1852. Derviş Pasha, who had been sent by the Sublime Porte to fix the Ottoman–Iranian border, warned the central government about the military activities of Persia. As a result, the necessary military measures were taken by the local government in Baghdad.104 The border-crossing nomadic tribes also posed a considerable threat to the security of the province. They not only plundered property, but damaged the telegraph lines and consequently cut the communication for weeks.105 Zewra newspaper narrated many incidents in which the border-crossing tribes looted villages and killed local people. However, in most cases they were pursued by Ottoman forces; in the conflicts the gang-leaders were sometimes caught, and the stolen property taken back.106 An important aspect of the provincial army was the lack of military discipline. For example, Namık Pasha mentioned that most of the soldiers in Sulaimaniyah had been recruited from among the local people and they had almost nothing in common with the imperial army.107 Moreover, most of them had their own occupations, engaging in grocery or agriculture. They lived in their own villages and were brought together when the need arose (icâbı takdirinde toplanıp askere benzetilmekte).108 However, in the course of time,

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the soldiers improved greatly in terms of military discipline. The governorship of Midhat Pasha was especially significant in raising standards in this regard. Although the nomads were, to a certain extent, inferior to the regular troops in military equipment and training, they were lighter and more mobile than the regulars. Moreover, they had the most valuable asset: an intimate knowledge of the country in which they were fighting. In spite of such advantages, the nomads normally avoided clashing openly with the regular forces of the local government. The use of modern arms after the 1850s became a deterrent factor for the Bedouin tribes of Iraq and hence it contributed to the improvement of provincial security. In terms of military technology the Bedouin tribes lacked the firearms the Ottomans had. However, they usually compensated for this weakness with their mobility and ‘hit-and-run’ tactics. This tactic was frequently resorted to by Bedouin tribes crossing the Persian border and plundering villages there. Towards the end of the 1870s, the Baghdad governorship became more effective against these border-crossing and plundering tribes. The introduction

PHOTO 6

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Ottoman soldiers in Baghdad

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THE OTTOMAN ORIGINS OF MODERN IRAQ

of modern arms was very significant in this sense. The Ottoman officials tried to ensure that the tribes had no modern arms. In August 1860, the acquisition of artillery and military outposts by the Albu Muhammad tribe was one of the leading reasons for a military campaign against this tribe.109 Midhat Pasha took many measures to improve security in Baghdad. When he arrived in Baghdad, the zabtiye forces, which numbered more than 8,000, were irregular and undisciplined (başıbozuk, nizâmsız ve kâidesiz). There were even cases where members of the zabtiye forces joined the bandits in the mountains.110 One of the most important targets of the new Provincial Law, which will be explained in detail below, was the provision of security to the provinces. In this context, every sancak was to have a battalion (tabur) and they would be under the command of the alaybeyi at the center of the province. Midhat Pasha established military strongholds along the river quays and in places where the tribes concentrated.111 In Dagharah, after the suppression of the Jubur and Khazâ‘il tribes, he established a stronghold with a considerable number of soldiers.112 He also constructed a new barracks in Baghdad.113 With the abolition of the başıbozuk zabtiyes, Midhat Pasha established a new zabtiye force, of which 2,400 were cavalry and 4,000 were infantry.114 These new forces were given a standard uniform and their military training (ta‘lîm) improved considerably. There were regular inspections by high-ranking officials and the governor himself, and in the 1870s real bullets were sometimes used in training.115 Midhat Pasha’s expedition to Najd was certainly the most significant military event of the early 1870s. While Ottoman control expanded to al-Ahsa with this military campaign, it also brought the shortage of soldiers in the Sixth Army to the surface.116 Midhat Pasha sent five battalions to Najd from the Sixth Army, which had 7,500–8,000 soldiers at the time. Of these five battalions, at least two or three were to remain in Najd in order to keep order and security. Consequently, the Sublime Porte confirmed the creation of a fifth regiment within the Sixth Army, which had been planned several years previously.117 In short, the measures taken by provincial governors resulted in the relative improvement of order and security. There was even considerable

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voluntary participation in the zabtiye forces.118 Moreover, some of the tribes that had fled to Iran returned once they saw the improvement in the security and development of the country.119 This improvement in security was closely related to the introduction of Tanzimat reforms in Iraq, to which we turn in the following chapters.

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CHAPTER 3

OTTOMAN PROVINCIAL ADMINISTRATION IN BAGHDAD

The Tanzimat period witnessed an overall restructuring of the provincial administration, and the strengthening of the center’s control over the periphery was perhaps the most important aspect of this restructuring. It was thought that maladministration in the provinces had been very much related to the autonomous governors and lack of central supervision.1 In the pre-Tanzimat era, many provinces were ruled by governors who considered their posts not as something entrusted to them in order to achieve a special task, but as personal assets. This view, which Gerber identifies as ‘atomization of Ottoman provincial administration’ continued until the mid-nineteenth century.2 Furthermore, the rulers in the pre-Tanzimat period tried to augment their power and autonomy, rather than to seek promotion by way of receiving a more important position in another province.3 Since Baghdad was one of the most important provinces of the empire, its governors had been selected from among high-ranking officials. This policy was followed for the whole of Ottoman rule in Baghdad. As the number of viziers increased in the Ottoman central bureaucracy in the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the provincial governorships, such as those of Baghdad, Damascus and Egypt were given to viziers.4 However, as mentioned above, during

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the Mamluk period in Baghdad Ottoman central administration was almost ineffective in the appointments of governors to Baghdad. Although the Sublime Porte re-asserted its control through Ali Rıza Pasha in 1831, the consolidation of provincial affairs took at least two decades. The governors in Baghdad had considerable authority, but the implementation of the Tanzimat in the provinces meant a contraction in this authority. The Tanzimat policies pertaining to the administrative structure were aimed at reducing the great power of the provincial governors. The limitation on the formerly autocratic powers of the provincial governors was accomplished by subdividing the provinces into subordinate units of authority, which were made autonomous of the governors and dependent directly on the central government and its agents, to varying degrees and at different times during the nineteenth century.5 The lower officials in the provincial hierarchy also had a direct responsibility to the central government, independent of his immediate superiors. With Tanzimat not only did the provinces become smaller, but the central government also aimed to prevent the provincial rulers from becoming too strong and independent. Only matters of security were to remain in their hands, and financial affairs in the provinces were left to the muhassıl-ı emvâl, who had wide-ranging powers and was accountable only to the ministry of finance in İstanbul.6 These policies aimed to strengthen the central administration and to tie the provincial governor more closely to the center. The Sublime Porte vested great authority in the muhassıls sent to sancaks where Tanzimat reforms were applied. In the sancaks, which was the basic administrative unit of the eyâlet system, the muhassıls were in charge of not only administrative but also financial affairs. They were also accompanied by several scribes from İstanbul to help them survey the population, land and property. Shaw argued that the introduction of muhassıl collectors to control the finances of the districts was the basic criterion of the provincial reform and where this had actually taken place, the Tanzimat was considered to be in force.7 However, Baghdad was not among the provinces to which a muhassıl was appointed, as the Tanzimat reforms were inaugurated only with the governorship of Necip Pasha (1842–1849). Baghdad was not among

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the places where the muhassıllık was instituted.8 Therefore, unlike many other provinces, the governor of Baghdad was not restrained in the financial affairs of the province. Nevertheless, the Tanzimat Edict curbed the great authority of the governor in Baghdad, as elsewhere. The centralist policies of Tanzimat soon resulted in an unbearable bureaucracy. The provincial governors had to seek the approval of the Sublime Porte even in small and unimportant affairs and needless to say this situation paralyzed the provincial administration. Hence, the authorities and powers of the provincial rulers were broadened with an imperial firmân dated 1852.9 This firmân gave the governor more power over his subordinate officials and over the political subdivisions of the province. The governor was now empowered to appoint and dismiss any subordinate civil officials within his jurisdiction. Accordingly, defterdâr, mal müdürü, members of the councils, kaymakams and müdürs were put under the command of the provincial governor. As Ma’oz has pointed out, with this firmân the provincial governor was entitled to inspect the financial accounts and to nominate or remove members of the council.10 This firmân sought to provide unity of authority in the province. The powers of provincial governors were further increased with a decree in 1858 and the governor was re-instituted as the viceroy (saltanat vekili); in other words, the local representative of all competent offices of the central government in the province. The new regulation gave the governor further responsibility for the hierarchy of provincial officials below him.11 Parallel to this development, the smaller eyâlets and neighboring sancaks were united under larger eyâlets. As far as the effects of these arrangements on provincial administration in Baghdad were concerned, it can be said that it was only with the re-institution of authority of the provincial governors in the 1850s that governors like Mehmed Reşid Pasha, Mehmed Namık Pasha and Midhat Pasha were able to rule over the far-flung hıtta-i Irakiyye with great powers. When we consider the eleven different governors (one governor ruled twice) who served in Baghdad between 1831 and 1872, those who served after the 1850s came to the forefront in that they had more influence and imprint in the history of Baghdad. The greatness of these governors lies in their holding of greater authorities and powers (ruhsat-ı kâmile ve me’zûniyet-i şâmile). These governors had

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greater power to dismiss provincial officials guilty of corruption and misdeeds.12 As Ma’oz rightly pointed out, the measure of authority the governor could exercise in his jurisdiction depended mainly on his personality, his intimacy and relations with the inner circles of the Sublime Porte; that is to say, the degree of support he possessed in İstanbul. A firm and vigorous governor with strong patronage in İstanbul was in a position to counterbalance his opponents, to make them cooperate with him, or even to overshadow them.13 However, the 1852 and 1858 regulations were sometimes abused by provincial governors in chaotic times. As Davison noted, Ömer Lütfi Pasha’s governorship in Baghdad (1857–58) bears instructive illustrations in this sense. Ömer Lütfi Pasha, after commanding the Ottoman armies in the Crimean War, was appointed to Baghdad, but he had trouble with corrupt subordinates. Ömer Lütfi Pasha’s tax policy caused a tribal revolt, which led him to take arbitrary actions.14 The execution of seven rebellious tribesmen without trial and without orders from the Sublime Porte paved the way for his dismissal from office. Such arbitrary actions were strongly against Tanzimat principles and considered to be intolerable.

Rulers of the provincial periphery: Governors of Baghdad (Laz) Ali Rıza Pasha’s term of office (1831–42) is highly significant in terms of the re-assertion of Ottoman direct rule and the overall control of the province. To this end, Pasha had to struggle with the leading tribes of the Iraq, among which were the Muntafiq, Ka‘b, and Shammar.15 Perhaps it is for this reason that he is sometimes referred to as the ‘cruel’ Pasha.16 The struggles with Ka‘b in the south (Muhammarah) and Kurdish emirates in the northeast led to border disputes with Iran. Nevertheless, Ali Rıza Pasha owed much of his fame to his destruction of Mamluk rule in Baghdad and some branches of the Kurdish emirates; hence, he is considered to be a successful military commander. Already a vizier, he was also referred to as halîfe (caliph), reminiscent of the rulers of the Abbasid period.17 He was the

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governor of Baghdad, but upon Muhammed Ali’s advance against the imperial forces, Jeddah was additionally tied to his command, but this was a temporary situation.18 There had been almost no co-ordination and dialogue among the Iraqi provinces before Ali Rıza Pasha’s governorship, and one of his primary aims was to remedy this problem. To this end he tried to strengthen Baghdad’s pivotal role by appointing mütesellims to the neighboring sub-provinces, but his attempts were not very fruitful.19 Perhaps his only administrative success was the creation of advisory councils in Baghdad, which will be discussed in the next chapter. As Ali Rıza Pasha consolidated his position in the province, there appeared a relaxation in the provincial administration. The Pasha married Selma Hatun, daughter of Süleyman the Little, Mamluk governor between 1807 and 1810. His success in his early years did not continue in his later years, however. On the one hand, the soldiers were no longer disciplined, and their salaries were not paid for 10–15 months or more.20 On the other hand, his financial measures, especially concerning the coins in the province, were not successful. Far from improving the provincial treasury the measures caused it to deteriorate further, and the Pasha is often criticized for his nepotism and corruption. Despite the fact that he was the governor with the longest term of office in Baghdad, he is perceived to be an unsuccessful ruler. Neccar argues that Ali Rıza Pasha is remembered as doing more damage to Baghdad than the Mamluks.21 Consequently, allegations of corruption led the Sublime Porte to replace him with Necip Pasha of Damascus in 1842.22 Necip Pasha’s appointment to Baghdad was welcomed with great joy, because, as Ali Rıza Pasha ruled for no fewer than 11 years, the local people had begun to think that Baghdad had been given to Ali Rıza Pasha for life in return for his successful campaign against the Mamluks. Besides, the Pasha’s men, especially Molla Ali al-Hassı, Es‘ad bin Nâib, Ali Agha Al-Yesirci (tüfenkci başı ve cürüm ağası), and Abdülkadir Agha (customs officer) were notorious for their oppression and cruelty. Therefore, Necip Pasha was regarded as ‘a light of justice upon the people of Baghdad’.23 Necip Pasha was of kalemiyye origin and his appointment to Baghdad was interpreted as an indicator of İstanbul’s closer interest in

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the province, because the Pasha belonged to the inner circle of the sultan and had considerable backing in the capital.24 The first thing that Necip Pasha did was to carry out an assessment of the provincial situation and investigate the allegations about Ali Rıza Pasha’s deeds. In order to avoid any disturbances, the Sublime Porte decided to start the investigation after Ali Rıza Pasha’s appointment to Damascus. Upset by his removal to Damascus and the developments in Baghdad, Ali Rıza Pasha provoked the local people by writing petitions in his favor, but his actions did not alter the Sublime Porte’s decision.25 During his governorships in Damascus and Baghdad, Necip Pasha came to realize the need for greater centralization.26 He was the governor who incorporated not only Damascus but also Baghdad into the range of Tanzimat provinces. The Baban dynasty in Kurdistan and the Iranian-dominated Karbala were now the targets of Tanzimat centralization, because the autonomous structures of these regions were not compatible with the politics of centralization. Besides, Necip Pasha’s centralization in Iraq meant confrontation with tribes. He strengthened state control in the province and improved the provincial treasury.27 His governorship was renewed in 1847 and he ruled for a relatively long period in Baghdad.28 Several reasons played a role in his removal from office: The Pasha was considered to have abused the grain monopoly system financially, and manipulated the grain market in the province.29 Secondly, the Pasha is alleged to have treated some of the (French) Christian millet badly and the complaints of the (French) consul to the Sublime Porte were said to have been influential in his recall to İstanbul.30 Necip Pasha was replaced in June 1849 by Abdülkerim Nadir Pasha, who was then müşîr of the Hijaz and Iraq Army. Abdülkerim Nadir Pasha, nicknamed Abdi Pasha, was a poet and an able soldier, and had been partly educated in Vienna. Along with Mütercim Rüşdi Pasha, he was commissioned in the re-arrangement of the Ottoman Army (tensîkât-ı askeriyye) in 1843 and 1844 with which the creation of the Sixth Army in Baghdad was decided.31 And in February 1848, he was appointed as the müşîr of the Sixth Army, where he served approximately 14 months, until his appointment in June 1849 to the governorship of Baghdad. Although he was of askerî origin, his humble

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and meek character was shown to be unsuitable for the conditions in Iraq, which required resolute, hard-working and industrious rulers.32 Moreover, there were also allegations of corruption against Abdi Pasha. Therefore, after serving for a year and a half he was dismissed at the end of 1850. Vecihi Pasha, who was the governor of Ankara, replaced Abdi Pasha. Vecihi Pasha was one of the least effective rulers of Baghdad. Although he was the governor who implemented Tanzimat reforms in Mosul (especially the formation of local councils), his term of office in Baghdad was of less importance.33 During Vecihi Pasha’s governorship Namık Pasha was the müşîr of the Sixth Army and it was Namık Pasha, rather than the governor, who dominated provincial politics. Unlike Vecihi Pasha, Namık Pasha was well aware of the province’s problems, but the two pashas had different opinions on the policy to be followed towards the tribes. Namık Pasha, playing the hawk, advocated

PHOTO 7 Provincial government house and the mosque attached to it

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a military solution, while Vecihi Pasha favored a peaceful solution. The disagreement, known as vak‘a-i verdiyye,34 ended when Namık Pasha was able to gain the support of the Sublime Porte and promised to solve the tribal problems. Vecihi Pasha resigned and was replaced by Namık Pasha, who became certainly one of the two outstanding rulers of Baghdad during the Tanzimat period.35 Namık Pasha served twice in the governorship of Baghdad. Before his governorship, he suppressed the rebellion of Hindiyyah in 1850. Later, as Namık Pasha began to act both as müşîr and governor, he was able to deal with the Muntafiq problem in the south confidently. When his ‘politics of tribes’ conflicted with that of the governor in Basra, Maşuk Pasha, he was called back to İstanbul.36 His first term of office was quite short and he was replaced by Mehmed Reşid Pasha. The general disorder in the province was influential in his appointment to Tophane müşîrliği. Azzawi, quoting from contemporary sources, asserts that influential ministers in İstanbul worked to get him dismissed from Baghdad.37 (Gözlüklü) Mehmed Reşid Pasha is often referred to as one of the reforming governors of Baghdad. In his youth he was sent to France for his education, where he stayed for a relatively long period. During his term of office Baghdad witnessed considerable improvement; hence, he had a good reputation in the province. The people of Baghdad referred to him as ‘Eba menâzır’ (the glassed).38 Reşid Pasha appears to have benefited from the regulations of 1852, which extended the governor’s authority, and worked well in Baghdad.39 He increased some of the taxes such as ağnâm tax and successfully enriched the provincial treasury through an increase in the mukâta‘a revenues. During the years of the Crimean War, on the orders of the Sublime Porte, he collected donations for the Ottoman army.40 His death (of natural causes) in 1857 was considered to be an unfortunate loss for Baghdad. Upon Reşid Pasha’s death, the Sublime Porte was looking for a proper governor. Serdâr-ı Ekrem Ömer Lütfü Pasha had been willing to be the governor of Baghdad since the Crimean War, but he did not have a good reputation at the Sublime Porte. He was a competent and able soldier, and his military career had culminated in his commandership during the Crimean War.41 However, he could not show the same performance in administrative affairs so the central administration was

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reluctant to give him an administrative post. Therefore, the governorship of Baghdad was first offered to Mehmed Namık Pasha. It was only after Namık Pasha’s rejection that this post was finally given to Ömer Lütfü Pasha.42 The Pasha is said to have abused the wide authorities given to provincial governors in 1852 and 1858. Azzawi mentions that he was authorized to rule not only over Baghdad, Basra, Mosul and Kirkuk, but also Diyarbakır.43 As a high-ranking soldier, the most striking action of the Pasha was his attempt to instil order and discipline in the military forces within the province. To do this, he tried to expel the irregular soldiers known as hayta or başıbozuk from the army. Instead, he attempted to conscript soldiers not only from among townsmen but also tribesmen. Although he was able to conscript from Hillah, Najaf and Karbala, he was unable to prevent a tribal rebellion. He participated personally in military campaigns against the tribes of Hindiyyah and Shamiyah to suppress the rebellion. However, the arbitrary actions of the Pasha, which culminated in his execution of rebellious Hamavend tribesmen without trial and without permission from the Sublime Porte, resulted in his dismissal in September 1859.44 (Sırkâtibi) Mustafa Nuri Pasha, who served 16 months in Baghdad between 1859 and 1861, was one of the least distinguished governors of Baghdad. He was accused of being corrupt, but was acquitted after interrogation.45 His kethüdâ (and also his son-in-law), mîr-i mîrân Mehmed Pasha, is reported to have played a key role in his corruption.46 Besides the allegations of corruption, a rebellion in Ammarah led by the Albu Muhammad tribe was the leading incident of his short governorship. Mustafa Nuri Pasha defeated the rebels and stationed soldiers there. It is for this reason that the place (Ammarah) was also known as al-Ordî.47 Another nondescript ruler was Ahmed Tevfik Pasha, who served only six months in 1861. His early days were spent investigating the allegations of corruption against Mustafa Nuri Pasha. No event of considerable importance took place during his short term of office and he was followed by Namık Pasha. Namık Pasha’s second term in Baghdad (1861–67) was very important as the first step towards radical change in the province. In this sense, his governorship can be considered to be the harbinger of Midhat

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Pasha’s reforms, because he prepared the necessary ground for the extension of Tanzimat reforms. It is for this reason that Arab sources give him the nickname ‘al-kabîr’, the Great.48 Namık Pasha was one of the most enlightened rulers of nineteenth-century Baghdad. He was well educated and knew at least four languages.49 His appointment for the second time in 1861 gave him greater authority.50 With these wide-ranging powers he suppressed tribal uprisings, improved the provincial treasury, built irrigation canals, roads, bridges, military barracks, schools, etc. Due to his successful rule in the province, he was honoured not only by the sultan but also by the Persian Shah; consequently, the Sublime Porte kept him in his post for a relatively long time. When, in March 1868, Namık Pasha was promoted to the post of seraskerlik in İstanbul, Takiyüddin Pasha succeeded to the governorship in Baghdad. Before his appointment as governor Takiyüddin Pasha had served as deputy governor in Baghdad, mutasarrıf of Shahrizor. His distinct feature was that he was the only governor in Baghdad who came from ilmiye origins. His nickname was müderris-zade. His short governorship ended when he had diplomatic problems with the French consul in Baghdad.51 When Midhat Pasha replaced him in 1869, a new period started in the history of Iraq.

Midhat Pasha in the historiography of Iraq It goes without saying that Midhat Pasha52 was one of the most outstanding figures among the second-generation Tanzimat intellectuals. He was one of the most able bureaucrats that the nineteenth-century Ottoman bureaucracy produced. Despite his quite short and unlucky terms of office as grand vizier, Midhat Pasha’s governorships are exceptional in terms of provincial administration.53 His service in the provinces of the empire was marked by many important achievements, which later became a source of inspiration so that his actions were imitated by other governors in the empire. Midhat Pasha served in the most difficult provinces of the Ottoman Empire: Nish, Tuna (Danube), Baghdad, Salonica, Syria and Aydın (İzmir). There is no doubt that his successful provincial administration

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Mehmet Namık Pasha Mehmet Reşid (Gözlüklü) Pasha

Abdülkerim Nadir (Abdi) Pasha Vecihi Pasha

Vizier, Anadolu müşiri, Tophane-i âmire müşiri

Governor of Bosnia, Konya Diyarbakır, Aleppo, Belgrad, Mosul, and Ankara, Kurdistan Müşir of Sixth Army

Müşir of Sixth Army

Governor of Aleppo and Diyarbakır Governor of Damascus

(Laz) Ali Rıza Pasha

Mehmet Necip Pasha

Previous office(s)

Governors

Askerî

Askerî

Tophane müşiri

November 1851– August 1852 August 1852–1857

Died

Mülkiye

Askerî

Mülkiye

Mülkiye

Origin

Governor of Ankara

Died two years after his dismissal Governor of Diyarbakır

Governor of Damascus

Next Office(s)

December 1850–1851

April1842– June 1849 June 1849– December 1850

1831–1842

Term of office in Baghdad

Table 4 Governors of Baghdad between 1831 and 1872

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Chair of Dâr-ı Şûrâ-yı Askerî and serasker mutasarrıf of Shahrizor, Bağdad vali kaymakamı Chair of Şûrâ-yı Devlet

Ahmed Tevfik Pasha

Mehmet Namık Pasha Takiyüddin Pasha Midhat Pasha

Mustafa Nuri Pasha

Chief commander in Crimean War, member of mecâlis-i aliyye Governor of Salonica, member of mecâlis-i aliyye Müşir of Sixth Army

Ömer Lütfi Pasha

September 1861– March 1868 March 1868– March 1869 March 1869– May 1872

February 1861– September 1861

September 1859– February 1861

1857–September 1859

Governor of Ankara, Konya, Syria, and Diyarbakır Tophane müşirliği inzimamiyle serasker Governor of Adana, Konya, Edirne, Sivas Grand Vizier

Âyân in 1877

Rumeli müşiri

Mülkiye

İlmiye

Askerî

Askerî

Askerî

Askerî

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in different vilâyets played a very important role in the modernization of the Ottoman provinces and the Ottoman Empire in general. The case of Midhat Pasha throws an interesting light on the whole question of the role of the provincial governments in the process of modernization.54 It is not an exaggeration to state that Midhat Pasha has a special place in the process of Ottoman modernization. Owing to his successful governorship in Nish, Danube, Baghdad and Syria he is also known as the ‘Father of Reform’ in these provinces. Due to his extraordinary administrative talents Midhat Pasha enjoyed British support; to the British, Midhat was synonymous with reform and enlightened government.55 According to Midhat Pasha, reform had to be carried out in different areas simultaneously, because each area influenced the others. For example, improvements in public security influenced reforms in civil administration and finance. The strengthening of local government, protection of local interests, participation of the local population in the provincial administration, and cooperation with local elites were among the principles Midhat Pasha followed during his governorships in different provinces. Baghdad was difficult to govern, not only because of its vast extent, from Mosul to Basra, but because of the independent-minded Kurdish and Arab tribes. As far as Midhat Pasha’s governorship in Baghdad is concerned, like other Tanzimat valis in Baghdad he belonged to the upper echelons of the Ottoman state bureaucracy, rather than having local roots. Despite this, Midhat Pasha has a distinctive place in the history of Iraq. He was certainly the most famous governor of the province and historians distinguished him clearly from former governors. A European traveler stated that: There is little to tell of the local political history of Iraq during the remainder of nineteenth century [after 1831]. ... Almost the only attempt at serious reform was made by Midhat Pasha at the end of the sixties.56 In many studies, the political history of Baghdad before 1869 is either omitted or summarized very briefly. However, Midhat Pasha’s term is given greater attention and he has frequently been portrayed as the ‘true

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PHOTO 8 Midhat Pasha, governor of Baghdad, 1869–1872

reformer’,57 modernizer or ‘first vali’58 of Baghdad. Abbas Azzawi, the famous Iraqi historian, referred to the governorship of Midhat Pasha as a new era (Ahd-i cadîd aw abu’l-ahrâr Midhat Bâshâ fî Bağdâd) in his history of Iraq.59 In a similar fashion, Neccar considers Midhat Pasha’s

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governorship as a distinct period (ahdan mutamayyizan).60 Even today the people of Iraq remember Midhat Pasha with appreciation, because his tenure was regarded as a miraculous period.61 Moreover, as the year 1869 (the beginning of Midhat Pasha’s governorship) is considered as the pivotal year of the ‘new’ nineteenth-century, it became an important turning point in many studies dealing with nineteenth and early twentieth-century Baghdad.62 Some sources make a clear distinction between Ottoman rule in Iraq and the governorship of Midhat Pasha. While Ottoman rule is disparaged, Midhat Pasha’s governorship is narrated approvingly, as if he was not an Ottoman governor. This is evident in Dawn Kotapish’s Daily Life in Ancient and Modern Baghdad. The narrative of this book is important, because it was written in order to teach Iraqi history to children in a very simple way. Kotapish depicts the picture of Ottoman rule as follows: The sultan taxed people heavily. Tenants had to pay their landlords large sums, which were handed over to the empire. But the taxes were not invested in the city’s industry or used to keep the ancient irrigation system functioning. Instead the Ottoman rulers used the money in other parts of their large empire. Starvation and disease became rampant in Baghdad. The population shrank as some people left the city to begin new lives as nomads. ... Mahmud II banned traditional Arabic clothing, including long robes, turbans and headgear. Baghdad’s male residents were forced to wear coats and Turkish fezzes – flattopped, round hats with tassels.63 The book allocates only two pages to Ottoman rule in Iraq, but when it comes to Midhat Pasha’s governorship, the author generously assigns two pages to the three-year service of the Pasha and the pattern of narration changes strikingly. Midhat made many reforms that improved the lives of Baghdad’s people. He ordered the city’s debris-filled canals to be cleaned and re-opened. Farmers whose land had been dried out or flooded

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as the canal system disintegrated were once again able to grow food. Midhat established land reform laws that enabled people to purchase property. This encouraged the nomadic leaders to opt for a more settled existence. Many exchanged their camelhair tents for brick houses and replaced their dependence on the camel with a new reliance on commercial trade. Some became powerful landowners. The balance of power shifted from family authority to urban government. Midhat re-organized the government to give people more representation and develop a system of criminal and commercial law. He founded schools, creating secular school system that expanded the existing Islam-based system. European languages began to be taught. Modernization soon arrived in Baghdad. In 1836 Baghdad saw its first steamboat and in 1861 its first telegraph. As a result, Baghdad’s commercial trade improved. Landowners began to export cash crops. Imported goods began flowing into the city in 1869, when the Suez Canal linked the Mediterranean and the Red seas. Under the leadership of this Turkish governor, Baghdad began to move from having a subsistence economy toward being part of an international marketplace. These major economic changes began to raise the standard of living for Baghdad’s people and to change its social and cultural norms as well. Social status had been traditionally linked to one’s noble lineage, fighting prowess, and religious training. A good education and property ownership became new ways for people to climb the social ladder and to acquire wealth.64 Although there were many accounts depicting Midhat Pasha as the modernizer of Ottoman Baghdad, some authors questioned the historiography on Midhat Pasha. Scholars like Roger Owen considered his merits to be exaggerated: While it is true that he [Midhat Pasha] instituted a more comprehensive series of reforms than any of his predecessors, it is equally true that he failed in almost everything he tried. ... Another way

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in which the importance of Midhat’s policies is usually exaggerated is to contrast them with the lackluster performance of earlier provincial governors.65 It is true that much of the credit for the modernization of Baghdad is given to Midhat Pasha. What is misleading in the picture depicted by authors like Dawn Kotapish is that the governors before Midhat Pasha, especially Reşid Pasha and Namık Pasha, were treated as if they were non-existent. Unfortunately, Iraqi historiography has to a great extent ignored the provincial governors before 1869 and focused on Midhat Pasha’s term of office. It is my contention that the governorship of Midhat Pasha was the culmination of reform in Baghdad; therefore, it should be read as a whole with its harbingers in previous governorships. Despite the difficulties, Midhat Pasha strove for the establishment of a pattern of administration in which the ruled participated in the administration. In this sense, he signified the participation of the local population in the administration and this was mainly institutionalized through the local councils (meclises). *

*

*

It is evident from studying the careers of the governors in Baghdad that many of them served in the neighboring provinces, such as Shahrizor, Mosul and Hakkari, before their appointment to Baghdad.66 Some of them, like Namık and Ahmet Tevfik Pashas, served first as the müşîr of the Sixth Army and were then promoted to the governorship of Baghdad.67 Among the Baghdad governors, Ali Rıza Pasha, Vecihi Pasha, (Gözlüklü) Mehmet Reşit and Takiyüddin had served in Aleppo, Diyarbakır, Hakkari and Shahrizor respectively. That these governors were familiar with the region played a significant role in their appointment. However, there were some exceptions too. For example, Ömer Lütfi Pasha and Midhat Pasha had not previously served in the region. Ömer Lütfi Pasha’s experience as serdâr-ı ekrem in the Crimean War of 1854 must have played a crucial role in his appointment. Midhat Pasha’s report on the development of Baghdad province was key to his appointment, as it was considered to be a good

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chance to apply the recommendations of the report.68 However, the Sublime Porte did not opt to appoint someone from the locality, as was the case during the Mamluk era. The multi-ethnic structure of the local population, Baghdad’s importance as a buffer zone on the Persian frontier, its status as a center of religious (Sunni and Shi‘i, as well as Christian) sects, were the leading factors that played an important role in assigning this province to viziers from İstanbul rather than to those from the locality.69 The remoteness of Baghdad from the center was also influential in the policy of appointing governors from İstanbul. It was feared that if they were appointed from the locality, the Sublime Porte might not have complete control over the province and this might pave the way for a second Muhammad Ali affair. Due to its peripheral position, in the classical period Baghdad was regarded as a place of banishment. However, as communication and transportation facilities developed in the nineteenth century, this negative connotation gradually disappeared. The peripheral status and remoteness of Baghdad also played an important role in the greater powers enjoyed by its governors. The governors complained about the time-wasting and lengthy bureaucratic correspondence between Baghdad and the Sublime Porte, which resulted mainly from the great distance between the two centers. If they needed to authorize payment of a large amount of money, the governors had to report to and wait for permission from the Sublime Porte, which usually took a very long time, hence delaying any work that needed to be done. If the governors carried out the work without permission then they might be accused of acting irresponsibly.70 However, in the case of small sums of money, and for the punishment of major crimes such as murder the governor of Baghdad did not have to seek permission from the Sublime Porte.71 The demand for greater authority was acknowledged, but the Sublime Porte was careful to restrict the limits of permission to repairs and reform projects only. In addition, this greater authority was given only to outstanding governors like Namık Pasha and Midhat Pasha for their terms of office in Baghdad. Indeed, the geopolitics of Ottoman Iraq required strong and courageous governors with considerable authority. They had to consider the balance between implementing

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the orders of the central administration and respecting the sentiments and requirements of the locality. Many of the weak governors found it difficult to carry out the new Tanzimat policies, which frequently clashed with the tribal structure of the region.72 Also it was quite common for improvements achieved by an able governor to be reversed when his successor was not as competent. This was particularly evident after the resignation of Midhat Pasha. The improvements brought by Midhat Pasha could not be sustained by his successors. There were also cases in which the Porte declined to give greater authority to governors of Baghdad. For example, in 1852 Reşid Pasha wanted the authority to dismiss and exchange officers without waiting for permission from the Porte. He further wanted the province of Shahrizor to be tied to Baghdad and its governor to consult him on every matter.73 However, the Porte rejected his demand for greater authority. When compared with the Mamluk governors, the Tanzimat pashas remained in office for shorter periods. While Mamluk rule in Baghdad lasted 82 years (1749–1831) under 9 different governors, with an average of 9.1 years each, the Tanzimat pashas ruled for 45 years (1831–76) under 14 different governors, with an average of 3.2 years each. The first two governors after 1831, namely Ali Rıza Pasha and Necip Pasha, ruled for relatively long periods: 11 and 7 years respectively. This was to some extent due to the fact that the governors appointed to Baghdad were granted the office in return for the payment of an agreed amount to the central government as a substitute (badal) for the revenue they were expected to raise from the province. For example, Necip Pasha purchased the office of governorship for an annual payment of 50,000 kîse.74 This was a well-known practice in the pre-Tanzimat period, but it is difficult to argue that this policy continued after the promulgation of Tanzimat (in Baghdad in 1844). We know with certainty that Midhat Pasha did not pay a badal or advance payment when appointed.75 The relatively short terms of office after the implementation of Tanzimat in 1844 are noteworthy. Many of the Tanzimat governors in Baghdad served just one year or 18 months. An explanation for the short terms of the governors is advanced by some scholars. Albertine

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Jwaideh, for instance, argues that ‘since Baghdad was considered a place of exile, the governors were usually men who were out of favor, and whose tenure of office was deliberately kept short’.76 However, this account must be corrected in several respects. First of all, for the nineteenth century one can hardly consider Baghdad as a place of exile. This assertion might be true for the classical period, because not only were long overland journeys dangerous and grueling, but also the means of communication, such as stable highways, steamers, telegrams and railroad, were non-existent. Uzunçarşılı’s view of Baghdad as a place of banishment was reiterated by some other scholars, without taking into account that Uzunçarşılı’s concern was for the classical period. Hence, for the Tanzimat period Baghdad cannot be regarded as a place of exile. Secondly, also related to the first point, hardly any governors who were appointed to Baghdad had fallen out of favor. It is quite difficult to argue that governors like Namık Pasha, Reşid Pasha and especially Midhat Pasha were not in favor. On the contrary, when investigated carefully, one can see that some of the governors were promoted to quite significant posts after their services in Baghdad. To give an example Namık Pasha, Ömer Lütfi Pasha and Midhat Pasha were promoted to offices of Tophane müşîrliği, Rumeli müşîrliği, and Grand Vizierate respectively.77 The idea that a posting to Baghdad was a kind of banishment might to some extent be valid for low-ranking officials/officers.78 Finally, the concept of exile and banishment was quite relative and changed from one person to another. The homeland and personal background of the individual in question was quite important in this regard. Therefore, cities like Kastamonu and İzmir were also among the places of exile for high officials. When we turn to Arab provinces, although it was closer and more incorporated in the central administration, Syria was more often considered as a place of exile.79 Furthermore, the rotation policy of the central government surely contributed to the general experience of the governors, because by serving in different places they came to know more about the larger picture of imperial administration. However, there were other factors that led to changes in provincial governorship. The inability to suppress tribal rebellions and to provide security also played a crucial role for the lack

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of continuity in provincial administration. In Iraq, where tribal rebellions were not infrequent, this problem caused the dismissal of several governors. We should also note that the struggle between the political factions of the ‘Men of Tanzimat’ was also reflected in the dismissal of provincial governors. For instance, the dismissal of Ömer Lütfi Pasha and the resignation of Midhat Pasha were the result of political stringpulling by rivals in the capital. A final factor that accounts for the short terms in office of provincial rulers was that, especially in the first decades of the Tanzimat era, failure in the application of the Tanzimat reforms was a common cause for the dismissal of the governors.80 Arbitrary actions, especially those contradicting the Tanzimat principles, were not tolerated by the central administration. For example, Ömer Lütfi Pasha’s use of excessive force and execution of rebels without trial were among the factors that led to his dismissal. Last but not least, corruption in local affairs was another factor that paved the way for the frequent change of provincial governors. It seems that there is a close correlation between the length of the term of the provincial governor and the development and improvements they made to the province. It is no coincidence that it was the relatively long-ruling Reşid Pasha, Namık Pasha and Midhat Pasha who are remembered as the governors who contributed most to the provincial development.

Müşîr-Pashas: Politics and military affairs in Baghdad Until 1847, the Ottoman Army was divided into five parts. It was only with the enactment of a new law on conscription (kur‘â nizâmnâmesi) in 1847 that the Sixth Army was first created and Baghdad became the center for this army.81 The Sixth Army, which was referred to as the ‘Iraq and Hijaz Army’, had four infantry regiments, four tâli‘a battalions, two cavalry regiments and one artillery regiment.82 From this time onwards, almost all governors who served in Baghdad in the period under survey acted both as the governor of the province and müşîr, military commander of the Iraq and Hijaz Army.83

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The Tanzimat reforms envisaged the separation of civil administration and military authority, which can be regarded as a step towards a modern bureaucracy. Accordingly, all security and disciplinary matters were commissioned to müşîrs in the provinces and ferîks in the sub-provinces.84 The Tanzimat policy in this sense was the continuation of the policies followed by Mahmud II. In 1826 the Ottoman sultan re-organized the provinces as müşîriyyet giving the müşîrs (military commanders) considerable powers in military as well as financial affairs with a view to organizing the new army.85 As a corollary of this, during the Tanzimat period müşîrs were appointed to the provinces and these müşîrs further appointed rulers in the rank of ferîk and mîrlivâ to the sub-provinces.86 This re-organization was significant in that the provincial governor was now deprived of his former military authority, which meant he was relegated to the holder of administrative power only.87 The division of administrative and military powers was soon to result in a duality in provincial administration. In a frontier province like Baghdad, this duality could cause great problems, because in Baghdad political and military affairs were quite interdependent. It became almost impossible for a governor who was unable to control the provincial army to deal with the tribal upheavals. This situation required either good co-ordination between the müşîr and the governor (as in the case of governor Abdi Pasha and müşîr Namık Pasha) or the unification of these offices under the command of the latter. It seems that from time to time, governors and müşîrs were reminded of the need for cooperation.88 Two cases from the 1840s provide good examples of serious divisions between the governor and the müşîr. The first one, vak‘a-i verdiyye between Vecihi Pasha and Namık Pasha, has already been mentioned. The second took place during the governorship of Necip Pasha. The tribal leaders who were disaffected by Necip Pasha’s ‘politics of grain monopoly’ made a common cause with the serasker of Baghdad, who was already engaged in a struggle for power with the governor-general.89 The serasker even delivered honorary robes to the tribal leaders who answered his call. No doubt such cases made it clear that for the sake of harmony among the provincial officials the Sublime Porte needed to find a solution to this duality.

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Starting from the early 1850s, the governors began to hold both administrative and military powers under their command. As far as Baghdad is concerned, this began with Namık Pasha who combined the commandership and governorship in Baghdad. However, even before the merger of the two offices, it is known that Abdi Pasha as the governor and Namık Pasha as the müşîr of the Sixth Army worked well in collaboration. Therefore, it is hard to say that the Tanzimat principle on the separation of administrative and military powers was applied in Baghdad. The governors in Baghdad continued to hold administrative and financial, as well as military powers. The fact that Baghdad was a frontier province played a significant role, and for the sake of provincial security almost all of the governors had the Sixth Army under their command. The office of the müşîr in Baghdad was extremely important, not only because of the proximity of the border between Baghdad and Persia but also because of the frequent tribal rebellions. Furthermore, the governors had to make the tribes feel their military might, because there was a direct relationship between the military capacity of the provincial administration and the amount of tax collected. A weak administration meant the refusal by the tribes to pay tax and, hence, less revenue for the local government. That is to say, since the relations between tribes and provincial government were to some extent a mixture of ‘carrot and stick’, military power played a vital role in the smooth running of provincial politics. In order to ensure provincial security and collect regular taxes, the governors did not hesitate to use force when necessary. Consequently, the geopolitics of the province necessitated the submission of the müşîrlik under the command of the governor. Therefore, when appointing a governor to Baghdad the close relationship between the office of the governor and that of the müşîr was usually taken into account by the Sublime Porte.90 Even before the merger of the two offices in 1851, there were cases in which the müşîr was appointed as the governor of Baghdad province.91 A natural consequence of this situation was that almost all governors after 1851, had an askerî background.92 To go further, both serdâr-ı ekrems (chief commander) of the nineteenth century served in Baghdad.93 In the

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provinces that had army centers, there was no civil governor in the pre-Tanzimat period. However, after 1843, military officers were no longer allowed to undertake civil administrative responsibilities.94 Nevertheless, this principle was hardly applied in the provinces with army centers, such as Baghdad and Damascus. In 1851 the offices of the müşîr and the governor were amalgamated under the command of Namık Pasha. The strong personality of Namık Pasha played a great role in this merger. Even before 1851, Namık Pasha, as müşîr, acted as deputy governor to the neighboring province of Shahrizor.95 From 1851 to 1877, all the governors in Baghdad were in charge of both offices. However, we should also note that the governors who served in Baghdad between 1831 and 1847 (the date of the creation of the Sixth Army) had significant military duties too. For example Ali Rıza Pasha was referred to as serasker. Necip Pasha’s last two years coincided with the early years of the Sixth Army. Though his name is not cited in the list of commanders of the Sixth Army,96 he was also referred to as müşîr.97 The title ‘müşîr’ here probably had an administrative, rather than military, connotation, however. Vecihi Pasha’s situation was perhaps an exception in that he seems to be the only governor who did not have any military powers at all. His governorship was followed by that of Namık Pasha, under whom the commandership and governorship were united. The case of Takiyüddin Pasha is very interesting. Desite his ilmiye origins he became heyet-i ordu-yu hümâyûn nâzırı, head of the Sixth Army.98 In view of the geography of Iraq, if the ruler lacked the authority to use military power it was almost impossible to rule the province effectively. Midhat Pasha, for example, was appointed in 1869 as both the governor of Baghdad and the müşîr of the Sixth Army. He considered the merger of the two offices to be essential, in view of the conditions pertaining in Baghdad. When the Sublime Porte, then led by Midhat Pasha’s rivals, attempted to separate the two offices, he wanted to resign from the post, because he was well aware of the fact that the duality in the administration (vali as the head of provincial politics and administration, and müşîr as the commander of military power) was an obstacle to solving the problems of the region.99 Upon Midhat Pasha’s short resignation, the Sublime Porte withdrew the initiative.100

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The usual practice was to subordinate the office of the müşîr to that of governor, so that the governor was not only in charge of administrative and political affairs but military affairs as well.101 For example, in 1851 the müşîr of the Sixth Army wanted the Baghdad governorship placed under his control, but the reply of the Sublime Porte was negative.102 The amalgamation of the two offices was not something unique to Baghdad or to the Tanzimat period. Examples of these kinds of governors can even be seen in the classical period. What makes the case of Baghdad distinctive is that unlike the case in similar provinces, in Baghdad the two offices overlapped intensively. A short comparison with the Fifth Army of Damascus would be beneficial in assessing the significance of the müşîr’s office in Baghdad as a frontier province. When we compare Damascus and Baghdad, it becomes clear that the amalgamation of the two offices was less frequent in Damascus, which was the center of the Fifth Army.103 Until 1853 the offices of müşîr of the Fifth Army and the governor of Damascus were separate. This was the result of the above-mentioned Tanzimat policy, which kept the offices of müşîr and provincial governor separate and deprived the provincial governor of military power. But this resulted in frequent conflicts between the müşîr and the governors of the Syrian provinces, namely Damascus, Aleppo and Sidon. In 1853 the Sublime Porte decided to amalgamate the offices of müşîr of the Fifth Army and governor of Damascus; this change was probably the result of the recent extension of the powers of the provincial governors in 1852.104 Unlike the case with Baghdad, in 1850s Damascus the two offices were frequently amalgamated and separated pragmatically according to the personal abilities of the governor: strong and able governors were given greater freedom to control military affairs, while weak governors were denied such opportunities. Therefore, the situation in Damascus did not show a stable development. Furthermore, after 1853 the command of the müşîr of the Fifth Army was limited to Damascus, and he had no authority over Aleppo and Sidon. This was regarded as a decline in the position of müşîr. However, the governor in Baghdad, who was at the same time the müşîr of the Sixth Army, had authority over farflung Iraqi provinces.

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As the müşîr of the Sixth Army, the governor in Baghdad was in charge of 8,000–10,000 soldiers. Davud Pasha, the last Mamluk governor, had in 1821 a total of 8,000 soldiers at his disposal.105 He made considerable efforts to modernize and develop the army, but the plague of 1831 claimed many soldiers. Even without the plague, however, the number of soldiers in Baghdad was never sufficient. Therefore, on many occasions the Sixth Army’s capacity to act against the rebellions outside Baghdad was very limited.106 Almost every governor in Baghdad complained about the inadequacy of soldiers stationed in the province. This was despite the fact that the Kurdistan region was considered to be suitable for the recruitment of soldiers, because they were not only accustomed to the geographical conditions but were also regarded as relatively more loyal to the state.107 One important factor in the reluctance to send soldiers to the region was the fear that the Anatolian Army might not adapt to Iraq’s unbearably hot summers and this might cause serious damage to the army. The movement of the Anatolian Army to Iraq during the harvest period might also affect agricultural production. Nevertheless, despite these anxieties, the Kurdish card could not be played for the most part, because, firstly, the region was not fully incorporated into the direct control of the Ottoman state until the mid-nineteenth century. For example, the Sublime Porte advised Ali Rıza Pasha to establish good relations with the Muntafiq tribal confederation and to use them as military forces.108 Secondly, the recruitment of Kurdish people was not as easy as had been assumed. Consequently, the Sixth Army was usually reinforced by the Anatolian Army.

Provincial bureaucracy: The low-ranking officials The rule of the Mamluks came to an end in 1831, but there were numerous Mamluk officials still residing in Baghdad and outlying regions of the province. It is also argued that even before the removal of the last Mamluk governor (Davud Pasha), Ali Rıza Pasha negotiated with the Mamluks and promised them appointments and estates.109 However, it is well known that after his entry into Baghdad, Ali Rıza Pasha invited all, including the Mamluks, to the formal reading of his

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Table 5 Governors of Baghdad and Müşîrs of the Sixth Army Müşirs of the Sixth Army

Governors Ali Rıza Pasha M. Necip Pasha A. Nadir Pasha M. Vecihi Pasha

1831 April 1842

M. Namık Pasha M. Reşid Pasha Ömer Lütfü Pasha Mustafa Nuri Pasha Ahmed Tevfik Pasha M. Namık Pasha M. Takiyüddin Pasha Midhat Pasha Mehmet Rauf Pasha

November 1851

June 1849 December 1850

A. Nadir Pasha M. Namık Pasha M. Namık Pasha

M. Namık Pasha August 1852 M. Reşid Pasha August 1857 Ömer Lütfü Pasha September 1859 Mustafa Nuri Pasha January 1861 Ahmed Tevfik Pasha August 1861 M. Namık Pasha May 1868 M. Takiyüddin Pasha March 1869 Midhat Pasha May 1872 Mehmet Rauf Pasha

February 1848 June 1849 (continued) (continued) August 1852 August 1857 September 1859 January 1861 September 1861 April 1868 March 1869 May 1872

appointment firmân. After the reading of the firmân, in the words of Longrigg, A party of Albanians turned suddenly on the Mamluk Aghas, shot the most part with their muskets, smote and slew the rest

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to the last men. A few were arrested and dispatched elsewhere in the city. ... Thereafter, every Mamluk was sought from within and without the city. ... A mere handful contrived by prolonged hiding in distant parts of the Pashaliq to gain a belated pardon.110 Despite this sad incident, remnants of the Mamluks remained in the province. Some of them continued to serve the local government, but they could not rise up the bureaucratic ladder. Most of the remaining Mamluks joined gangs. The vacancies opened by the murder of the Mamluks were filled by people under the patronage of Ali Rıza Pasha. The cadre of Ali Rıza Pasha naturally included many officials from Aleppo, the former governorship of the Pasha. His new kethüdâ was a notable of Aleppo, a certain Hacı Yusuf Agha. Similarly, the mütesellim of Basra, Muhammed Agha as-Sayyâf, came with his patronage.111 Ali Rıza Pasha summoned Abdulgani Cemil and appointed him to the office of müfti of the Hanafi school of Islam.112 It was in 1831 that the Sublime Porte sent Arif Efendi to serve as the director of finance (defterdâr) in the province.113 Mahmud Alûsî (nakîbü’l-eşrâf), Osman Seyfi (clerk in the provincial council) and Abdülkadir Agha (customs officer) were other prominent figures in the provincial bureaucracy during the 1830s.114 An official known as the kahyâ served the Pasha as his chief assistant. The office of kahyâ had its zenith during the Mamluk period. To indicate the importance of the kahyâ’s office in the province, this office was sometimes compared to the office of Grand Vizierate in İstanbul. However, after the Mamluk period the office of kahyâ was replaced with that of the kethüdâ. The post-Mamluk period witnessed both the decline of some offices and the concomitant rise of others. For instance, the office of Bâbü’l-Arab, which dealt mainly with tribal affairs, especially mediation and compromise among tribes, lost its former prominence.115 On the other hand, the office of defterdârlık gained in importance. Although this office was abrogated in the mid1840s,116 with the establishment of meclis-i kebîr it reached its zenith. The defterdâr not only became the chairperson of the provincial council, but he could also act as deputy governor in the governor’s absence.117

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The proclamation of Tanzimat in Baghdad was also reflected in the increase in the number of officials in the provinces. As the Tanzimat reforms, especially the Vilâyet Law and Land Code, were implemented in Baghdad, the number of provincial officials gradually increased. The lists of officials, which the provincial yearbooks and archival documents provide us with for the period under survey, reflect the considerable expansion and diversification that occurred in government activities during the Tanzimat period.118 The increase was not only in the number of the officials but also in their ranks and salaries. The improvement in the conditions of the officials was a matter underlined in the Tanzimat Edict. In a dispatch to the Sublime Porte Necip Pasha discussed in detail the advancement in rank and salary of some of the provincial officials. The governor believed that the promotions would motivate the officials and make the provincial administration more efficient. Most of the officials listed by Necip Pasha were promoted. Not surprisingly, the promoted officials included Necip Pasha’s son, Ahmed Şükrü Bey, and his relative Sadık Bey, mal müdürü of the province.119 The list included not only administrative and military officials, but also tribal sheikhs.120 Necip Pasha got his share of promotion, too. An imperial decree dated 3 Ca 1264 (7 April 1848) is quite interesting in that the official title of the governor in Baghdad was exalted and in the official correspondence between the Porte and the province, the title devletlu, instead of atufetlu, began to be used.121 Although very much related to the re-arrangement of imperial titulature, this change was an indicator of the significance of the Baghdad governorship, which was assigned to leading viziers.122 The imperial decree also distinguished Baghdad from other governorships by stating that Baghdad could not be compared with other provinces (Bağdad eyâleti sâ’ir yerlere kıyâsı kabûl etmeyip ...). As a corollary of this, the governor of Baghdad, Necip Pasha, was presented with an imperial medal, nişan-i âlî, which was peculiar to leading ministers (vükelâ-yı fehâm).123 In order to further increase the prestige and dignity of the governor, the imperial medal was given with an imperial firmân. Promotions in the ranks naturally meant an increase in salaries, but the Sublime Porte was reluctant to approve extra expenditure.

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Since the revenues of Baghdad were farmed out at the beginning of the financial year (March), an extra payment that was not cited in the list of provincial expenditures would mean a deficit in the provincial budget. Nevertheless, Necip Pasha’s suggestion for new arrangements in the customs tariff on dried and fresh fruit as a source of new revenue to meet the salary expenditures was accepted by the Sublime Porte. Further promotions were made in September 1847.124 The governors of Baghdad were occasionally warned by the Sublime Porte to ensure the unity in the administration (usûl-ı ittihâd ve itttifâk). The Sublime Porte even made the high-ranking officials responsible for any disunity in this matter. During the governorship of Abdi Pasha the officials of the province were required to take an oath relating to the prevention of bribery and corruption.125 Later, in accordance with the regulations in 1858, officials were admonished to be honest, to protect the people from misrule, to treat local people well and respect their rights, to take special care of the notables and the council members, to treat everyone equally regardless of religion or race, and to avoid misrule of all kinds.126 Apart from Muslim (mainly Arab and Turkish) bureaucrats, the province of Baghdad had many officials who belonged to other religions and nationalities. Ömer Lütfi Pasha used officials of Polish (Lehistan) origin, of whom İskender Pasha was the most well-known.127 The fact that Ömer Lütfi Pasha was a converted Austrian Croat may have played a significant role in this. As explained below, the number of such officials increased with the governorship of Midhat Pasha in 1869. As noted earlier, due to its remoteness from the center Baghdad was sometimes perceived as a place of banishment. Many provincial officials resigned from their offices and left Baghdad. The fact that they could not get used to the water and weather in Baghdad was the common pretext for resignation. Therefore, it was difficult to get talented bureaucrats to move to Baghdad. After all, in İstanbul itself there was always a need for qualified personnel. There was no professional cadre to be recruited for the implementation of reform in Baghdad, let alone the wider province. The Tanzimat reforms increased the number of provincial officials significantly. Following the implementation of the Provincial Law, new

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officials were appointed from the center to replace tribal rulers. Also, as in other provinces, officials such as hükkâm-ı şer‘iyye and merkez kâtibi were sent to Baghdad.128 Similarly, the province of Baghdad had many clerks with language talents, because the geographical/demographic conditions of the province required officials who spoke languages such as Persian and Arabic. However, even long after the proclamation of Tanzimat, the provincial governors were short of staff for the conduct of ordinary affairs. The patronage of governors was the most widely used method in recruiting officials for the provincial bureaucracy. Despite these difficulties, however, Midhat Pasha had an established cadre, which he brought to provinces he served in. After his appointment to Baghdad, Midhat Pasha summoned his cadre to meet in İstanbul. The group that accompanied Midhat Pasha to Baghdad comprised 104 people, including leading bureaucrats and intellectuals like Ahmed Midhat, later the editor of Zewra newspaper, and Osman

PHOTO 9 Provincial administrative offices on the left bank of the Tigris

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Hamdi Bey.129 Ahmed Midhat mentions others who came after this first group, including his older brother Şakir Bey.130 The process of appointing qualified officials went on for a long time. Almost six months after the appointment of Midhat Pasha to Baghdad, Ahmed Edib, the former teftîş reisi in Tuna, was appointed as assistant mutasarrıf in Baghdad sancak. Similarly, Nuri Efendi, the former chief scribe in the criminal council of Ruscuk, was appointed as the chair of the criminal council of Baghdad.131 Among Midhat Pasha’s established cadre, Odian Efendi, Kılıç Vasıf Efendi, Ahmet Midhat Efendi, İsmail Kemal Bey, (Ahmed) Şakir Bey, and Karol Brzozowski were the closest to him.132 Karol Brzozowski was of Polish origin and after participating in the Polish-Hungarian revolution of 1849 he took refuge in the Ottoman Empire. Then he worked with Midhat Pasha in Danube (Tuna) province as an engineer and followed him to Baghdad, acting as counselor to the Pasha here.133 Ahmet Midhat, who worked with the Pasha in Rusçuk, the provincial center of Tuna, also came with Midhat Pasha to Baghdad.134 Ahmed Midhat stayed in Baghdad for almost two years. When his older brother Şakir Bey, then mutasarrıf of Basra, died, he sent his family to İstanbul and remained in Baghdad for eight more months. When he tried to leave Baghdad for İstanbul, his resignation was not accepted by Midhat Pasha, but later he reluctantly allowed him to go. Similarly, Osman Hamdi Bey was invited by Midhat Pasha from Paris and began to work in the office of foreign affairs.135 The high caliber of provincial bureaucrats meant that from time to time they engaged in intellectual discussions. When Midhat Pasha arrived in Baghdad as the governor of the city, he was accompanied by Şakir Bey, lieutenant governor (mutasarrıf) of Baghdad, Raif Bey, secretary (muavin), Hamdi Bey attaché (müdür) for foreign affairs, together with several subordinate officers of different grades.136 Later, the Pasha also appointed his nephew as kaymakam of Hillah district.137 One of the important characteristics of this cadre was that they were dedicated to provincial service. Ahmed Midhat narrates that there was no room around Midhat Pasha for profit-minded officers who flitted from province to province to make more money.138 The Pasha treated the local population equally, regardless of their religion,

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ethnicity and language. Babanzade Mustafa Zihni, who was clearly of Kurdish origin, worked as Midhat Pasha’s mühürdar.139 Pasha also recruited non-Muslim people, including those of Armenian, Croat and Polish origins, to his close circle. His son, Ali Haydar Midhat, informs us that Midhat Pasha recruited Jews too for posts relating to security affairs.140 Furthermore, Midhat Pasha recruited members of the local population to the provincial administration. He also tried to find the most responsible and qualified personnel he could find, to raise the standard of responsibility in public offices. According to the Vilâyet Law the provincial officers such as defterdâr, qadi, and müşîr were supposed to be appointed by the relevant ministers in İstanbul. However, due to the aforementioned difficulties in recruiting talented bureaucrats, the Sublime Porte allowed Midhat Pasha to do his own recruiting, and his appointments of high-ranking officers were generally approved by the Porte.

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CHAPTER 4

TANZIMAT AS APPLIED IN OTTOMAN BAGHDAD

It is clear that the reform attempts and restructuring of the empire made the nineteenth century not only the ‘longest century’, but at the same time the most important century in Ottoman history. There is no doubt that the Tanzimat era (1839–76) was crucial for the modernization of the Ottoman Empire, because the administrative, financial, social and legal reforms enacted during this time affected both the center and the periphery of the empire. Most of the studies focusing on the implementation of the Tanzimat reforms concentrated either on the Balkan or the Anatolian provinces.1 As Ochsenwald has pointed out, while most students of nineteenthcentury Ottoman political history have concentrated on the central provinces of the empire, students of Arab political history of the same period have concentrated on anti-Ottoman nationalism centered on Cairo and Beirut.2 Therefore, with regard to Tanzimat reforms the Arab provinces were neglected for a long time. The fact that the Tanzimat reforms were naturally less attractive in the Arab provinces of the empire than the Balkan provinces might have played a role in this. In addition, considerable work has recently appeared concerning provinces such as Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Jordan.3 The gap for the Iraqi provinces remains largely unfilled. In this sense this chapter attempts to contribute in filling this gap. I will first focus on the proclamation of the Tanzimat in the province of Baghdad. The answers

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to the questions of ‘What brought Tanzimat to the province, and what were the novelties in provincial administration?’ will be sought in this chapter. Since the chapter will mainly dwell upon administrative reforms in the province of Baghdad, emphasis will be placed on the establishment of provincial councils and the implementation of the Provincial Law of 1864. The introduction of both the Provincial Law of 1864 and the Land Code of 1858 in Ottoman Iraq were crucial in that they had a lasting influence on the subsequent history of Baghdad. The newly introduced provincial system not only survived the withdrawal of the empire from Iraq during the First World War, but it also remained substantially the same afterwards, under British rule and then in the independent State of Iraq. On the other hand, the Ottoman Land Code had farreaching results for the tribal structure of Iraq. However, as the tribal structure of the country and the relationship with the people to the land are explored in the next chapter, I found it more appropriate to explain the implementation of the Land Code of 1858 there. *

*

*

After its proclamation in Gülhâne in 1839, the Tanzimat Edict was published in the Takvim-i Vekâyi and copies were sent to every province and district. The edict was sent to Baghdad with kapucular kethüdâsı Osman Efendi at the beginning of 1840. Upon the arrival of the edict, a crowd of people was summoned in the presence of the governor Ali Rıza Pasha. The qadi, the müfti, the ulemâ, eimme-i hutebâ, the notables, and the people of the locality, including groups of merchants, manufacturers, artisans and tradesmen, participated in the meeting and the edict was read in public. To ensure that it was widely understood the edict was read in both Turkish and Arabic and it was celebrated with the firing of rifles and cannons.4 Then it was sent out to the districts and sub-districts of Baghdad. Similarly, in Mosul, people gathered in the saray meydânı (court square), and the same public ceremony was held there.5 The arrival of the Tanzimat Edict did not, however, mean the start of a new period for Baghdad, because it did not go beyond a formal

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ceremony. Therefore, nothing changed until the genuine incorporation of the province into the range of Tanzimat reforms in March 1260/1844. It seems that in the early years, the central government limited Tanzimat reforms to certain provinces, which were closer to the imperial center and therefore had no security problems. It was only with the second wave of 1844–45 that outer provinces such as Erzurum, Diyarbakır,6 Harput,7 Malatya, Bosnia and Baghdad were put under Tanzimat reforms. It is also of considerable importance that the provinces that were brought into the range of Tanzimat in this second wave show significant overlap with the provinces to which no muhassıls were appointed. Necip Pasha is often referred to as the governor who started the Tanzimat reforms in Baghdad in 1844. Nevertheless, Necip Pasha noted that due to Iraq’s special geopolitical conditions the Tanzimat reforms were implemented only gradually.8 In Mosul, it was Vecihi Pasha who inaugurated the Tanzimat reforms in 1848. Though Mosul was geographically closer to İstanbul, it was incorporated into the range of Tanzimat four years after Baghdad. Similarly, Shahrizor (Kirkuk) was brought into the range of Tanzimat in 1847. The relatively late incorporation of these places was due to the fact that these regions were part of Ottoman Iraq (hıtta-i Irakiyye), whose center was Baghdad. It seems that from time to time the political and military supremacy of Baghdad over the Iraqi provinces was one of the main reasons for the delay in the application of the Tanzimat reforms in Mosul and Shahrizor. As will be discussed below, usually these places welcomed Tanzimat institutions after they were put into effect in Baghdad. This was in fact a reflection of the Ottoman centralization and modernization process, which followed a certain hierarchy and ran from the provincial center to the periphery. What the Tanzimat reforms meant for the Iraqi people is a matter of debate, but several issues come to the forefront. First of all, the pre-Tanzimat arbitrariness in provincial rule was to be abolished. This arbitrariness included, among other things, oppression, injustice, execution without trial and extortion of money from the local people either through the mültezims or unjust taxes. It is known that in many provinces rulers levied arbitrary taxes under various names

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such as ‘ikramiye’, ‘mübaşiriye’, ‘devriye’, ‘hediye baha’, ‘masarif ’, and ‘cerime’. Arbitrary levies imposed by provincial officials were now to be abolished. Previously, when provincial officials traveled between sub-provinces they levied for their needs on the people of the locality. However, after the proclamation of Tanzimat, the Iraqi people were instructed not to give anything unless they were paid for it (ahâlîden meccânen bir şey alınmaması), and to report those who did not act accordingly.9 Similarly, Necip Pasha instructed provincial officials not to accept gifts; an order that was met by surprise among the local people. Such measures were put into effect to prevent bribery in the provincial administration. However, as the European travel accounts suggest, provincial officials continued to accept gifts, because acceptance of presents by men in office was not considered to be dishonorable; rather they held it to be part of their salary.10 Despite strict measures, as emphasized in the text of the Tanzimat Edict, the state was unable to overcome the problem of bribery. During the governorship of Abdi Pasha the officials of the province were required to take an oath regarding the prevention of bribery and corruption.11 However, despite such measures, corruption could not be prevented. There were serious allegations of corruption not only against low-level officials but also against the governors. Ali Rıza Pasha, Necip Pasha, Ömer Lütfü Pasha, Mustafa Nuri Pasha and Takiyüddin Pasha were considered to be corrupt.12 The cases of Necip Pasha and Mustafa Nuri Pasha were investigated by the central government, but both governors were acquitted.13 Midhat Pasha, too, had to struggle with the arbitrariness in provincial bureaucracy, which was deeply rooted in the general political and social state of affairs and to a great extent intertwined with the interests of the local notables. For Midhat Pasha, bureaucratic reform should be based on more control, supervision and better pay.14 One of his central aims was to gain full control over the provincial officials. One of the striking problems in Baghdad was that the interests of the notables were deeply rooted in the administrative units. Bribery and special treatment were commonplace for these notables. Christoph Herzog, who stresses that corruption was one of the important factors

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in the failure of Ottoman modernization, summarizes the situation clearly: What were the most frequent acts of corruption reported in connection with upper level administrators in Baghdad? By far the most profitable and easy one seems to have been to charge an extra ‘gift’ for farming out the right to collect taxes. Another seems to have been to blackmail tribal sheikhs for large amounts in cash and kind (especially valuable horses). If the sheikh did not comply, the vali threatened to support a rival. This practice tended to be especially harmful as it easily led to tribal unrest with potentially disastrous economic consequences.15 Being aware of this situation, Midhat Pasha prohibited the practice by which the sheikhs, when visiting the headquarters of the local administration, were accustomed to give presents of money, horses etc., to the authorities, which was an instrument used by the sheikhs to extort massive contributions from their people.16 He thought that better salaries were required in order to prevent bribes. Herzog, examining 11 Tanzimat governors of Baghdad in terms of acts of corruption, states that there is no information on corruption concerning Midhat Pasha himself; however, he indicates that there were instances of corruption among high-level officials during his tenure.17 Midhat Pasha did not tolerate corruption and maladministration; he dismissed many people accused of these misdemeanors and had them tried in the courts.18 Secondly, it was also announced that the lives, properties and honors of all citizens were put under imperial protection, and there would no longer be any unjust oppression, coercion, and payment of cerime. The people would no longer be exposed to beating and swearing. As an indication of the sincerity of his intention to treat all Ottoman subjects equally, Vecihi Pasha announced that his elders and juniors were his fathers and sons respectively, and his door would be open to everyone in the province.19 With these premises, the proclamation of the Tanzimat in Ottoman Iraq was certainly welcomed not only by the ordinary people but also by the consuls of the European states, especially Britain and France.20

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The governor also stated that the tithe tax (öşr) would be one-tenth, as it is literally pronounced. However, for almost two decades, local people continued to pay tithe tax as high as one-half or even two-thirds of the total produce.21 It was not until the governorship of Midhat Pasha that the tithe tax was applied partially for certain (industrial) agricultural products. At first it was feared that the reduction of the agricultural taxes from two-thirds to one-tenth would have negative consequences for the provincial treasury, but Midhat Pasha believed otherwise. As will be explained in detail in the following chapter, the land tenure system was not encouraging local people to cultivate their land to its fullest extent. By granting title deeds, Midhat Pasha expected an increase in agricultural products up to tenfold. Thus, the one-tenth taxation of production that had increased tenfold was bigger than two-thirds of the old amount of agricultural products.22 For instance, Midhat Pasha reduced the taxation for rice cultivation to onetenth and in just one year rice production doubled, almost meeting the needs of provincial markets. And it was thought that with this increase, export of rice would be possible for 1871–72.23 Furthermore, by denouncing the misdeeds of the past (mezâlim ve te‘addiyât-ı sâlife) and putting emphasis on just rule, the local administration tried to make the local people feel that a new period had dawned. Unlike the autocratic rule of the previous provincial governors, the rule of law came to be articulated more frequently (kâffe-i husûsât şer‘-i şerîf ve kânûn-ı münîfe tatbîkan ve usûl-i hakkâniyete tevfîkan tanzîm ve rü’yet olunmalıdır).24 The abolition of tribal law was another means of decreasing tribal dominance and emphasizing the rule of law. In the late 1860s Midhat Pasha strived for the abolition of tribal law and the implementation of imperial law and order.25 Earlier, tribal law rather than imperial law had been implemented in practice and the sheikh was the only source of authority. The sheikh could even confiscate the properties of those who opposed his authority. Furthermore, cases of murder and adultery in tribal areas were not brought to the court; rather there were formally specified fines for each case, like 500 şâmî for adultery and 1,000 şâmî for murder to be paid to the sheikh.26 In this context, the implementation of the Provincial Law led to the dissolution of the tribal structure of the province.

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The introduction of Tanzimat principles also had implications in farming out the revenues of the province. In 1840s the provincial revenues were farmed out to Necip Pasha for a period of four years.27 It is understood that Necip Pasha had produced two powerful moneylenders to act as guarantors. When Necip Pasha was recalled to İstanbul, his term of farming (maktû‘iyet) had not been completed and the new governor, Reşid Pasha, was unsure how to manage the provincial revenues. The Sublime Porte ordered the local government to find a solution that would not make a loss for either the provincial treasury or Necip Pasha. For Reşid Pasha, there were two alternatives: the provincial revenues were either to be farmed out as (maktû‘iyet usûlü) or emânet usûlü.28 Of the two alternatives, Reşid Pasha favored the first, as it had been applied during Necip Pasha’s governorship. However, the Sublime Porte rejected his demand on the grounds that this policy (maktû‘iyet usûlü) was not compatible with Tanzimât principles. Consequently, the provincial revenues were to be managed with emânet usûlü.29 There were many provinces in which the Tanzimat reforms were not welcomed. While some of the resentment resulted from the principle of equality of all subjects, whether Muslim or non-Muslim, some others were related to taxation or corvée.30 During my research I have not come across any rebellious activity caused by religious sensibilities in Baghdad, which, apart from many Christian subjects, had the second biggest Jewish population of the empire. The non-Muslims were quite enthusiastic about the modernity brought by the Tanzimat reforms. The Jews of Baghdad began to don the fez and wore European-style clothing long before their Muslim neighbors as a demonstration of their approval of the new order.31 In the mid-1840s Henry Layard reported minor incidents against British citizens, instigated by the local qadi in Mosul; however, such incidents were not against the Tanzimat principles or the non-Muslim presence in the province. Rather, they were reactions to the archeological excavations carried out by foreign travelers.32 Mutinous activities were only directed at reforms that restricted the former tribal life, such as conscription by ballot, application of the Land Reform of 1858 and the settlement of the tribes.

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Moreover, the relations between Muslims and non-Muslims were reported to be exceptionally good. Despite the multi-religious and multi-ethnic characteristic of the region, the people of the province co-existed peacefully. In the words of James Felix Jones, who visited Baghdad in mid the 1850s: Nor, perhaps, can we witness such toleration among the masses as Baghdad exhibits. The Jew and the Christian could always be seen here on horseback; while, in other places, their co-religionists were compelled either to pace on foot, or to bestride an ass, as a mark of inferior condition. They enjoy indeed a rare freedom here, in comparison with other Mahomedan towns.33 The Tanzimat reforms brought new arrangements concerning the daily lives of non-Muslims. The newly constructed millet hierarchies were also reflected in the province of Baghdad. As a corollary of this, the office of chief rabbi (hahambaşı) was imported to Baghdad. As the rabbis in Baghdad re-asserted their authority to govern the Jewish community under the Tanzimat reforms, the office of nasi, which remained central in the administrative life of Baghdad’s Jews, disappeared. This was significant in that earlier this office could be occupied by Jewish bankers without the consent of those whom they governed.34 The non-Muslims could practice their beliefs freely and they could even build new places of worship, especially churches.35 Though the non-Muslims did not previously encounter any problems in Baghdad, their lebensraum seems to have been enlarged after the proclamation of Imperial Edict of 1856 (Islahât Fermânı), because the imperial decrees that allowed the construction and repair of places of worship date from after 1856. As regards the obligations of non-Muslims in the province, there is evidence indicating the payment of the poll tax, cizye. However, occasional problems concerning which authority was to collect the poll tax of a certain area were matters of disagreement between the rulers of Mosul and Baghdad.36 Another problem pertaining to the payment of poll tax was that some of the non-Muslims, especially Jews, were unwilling to pay the tax on the grounds that they owned land and therefore were Ottoman subjects (tebe‘a-i Osmaniye).37 However, the

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government rejected the assertions of these Jews, who were originally Persian. On the one hand the acquisition of land and other properties did not alter the citizenship (teba‘iyet) of a certain group within the Ottoman Empire. On the other hand, the poll tax was to be paid by all non-Muslims whether they were Ottoman subjects or not.38 One of the first things that Necip Pasha did in the context of the application of Tanzimat was to ask for the copies of laws and regulations concerning the land, taxation, and provincial councils, etc., to be sent to Baghdad. He demanded new regulations concerning the sale of land to foreigners, the ihtisab tax, the peasants and the provincial councils.39 By looking the imperial regulations and the application of these regulations in other provinces, the Pasha tried to implement them in Baghdad. The governorship of Namık Pasha witnessed the extension of Tanzimat in the province of Baghdad. He strived to expand administrative control to the tribal areas. Though Tanzimat was announced in the province, the tribally dominant areas were almost untouched. For instance, Namık Pasha wanted to incorporate the Muntafiq region into the range of Tanzimat.40 To this end, he converted some of the tribal areas, including Albu Muhammad and Muntafiq, into kaymakamlıks. Though his attempts in this regard were not totally successful, he prepared the necessary ground for his successors, particularly Midhat Pasha. The Tanzimat Edict also notified the people to be ready for further orders and regulations, of which the establishment of local councils, the Provincial Law of 1864 in Baghdad and the Land Code of 1858 were perhaps the most significant. Leaving the application of the Land Code to the next chapter, I will now attempt to explain the establishment of the provincial councils and the implementation of the Provincial Law of 1864.

Establishment of provincial councils in Ottoman Iraq Although the Tanzimat Edict contained nothing about representative government, the participation of people in provincial politics came to be one of the main principles of the Tanzimat period. There has been a general tendency to date the start of representative government from

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the first Ottoman parliament and constitution of 1876. Though it is true that this was the first well-developed national scheme of representation, the provincial councils provided the necessary background and preparation for it.41 As Gerber pointed out, while the pre-Tanzimat administration was characterized by, among other things, very few contacts with the ordinary citizens, the provincial councils in the Tanzimat era came to fill the gap between the ruler and the ruled.42 In fact, representative government entered the nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire as part of the process by which the Men of Tanzimat sought to extend the power of the central government and to limit the powers of provincial governors.43 As part of the Tanzimat centralization, the creation of new administrative bodies aimed to strengthen the central control of the state. The provincial councils, which were created in accordance with an imperial firmân dated 3 Za 1255 (7 February 1840), were the leading units of provincial administration established by the central government; however, before these councils many provinces had local divans which met infrequently upon the governor’s call. The firmân of 1840 ordered the establishment of local councils in places where muhassıls were appointed from the center.44 The purpose of creating these local councils was not to form representative bodies, but to help the muhassıls, who replaced the mültezims, in collecting taxes. Hence, the primary motive behind them was to improve tax collection. However, as the institution of muhassıllık was abolished in 1842, the council of the muhassıl became a provincial council named Memleket Meclisleri, but no radical change was made during this transformation.45 In a nutshell, in provinces where muhassıllık was instituted, the provincial councils appeared as a metamorphosis of muhassıl councils.

Advisory councils in Baghdad As in many provinces, Baghdad had a provincial divân before the establishment of Tanzimat councils. This divan comprised administrative officials such as the defterdâr (secretary of the divân and chief tax collector), court chamberlain, scribe and Bâbü’l-Arab.46 Since no muhassıl had ever been sent to Ottoman Iraq, no muhassıl council existed at all. But

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this was compensated for by the advisory councils (şûra meclisleri) in Baghdad. The advisory councils can be traced back to the pre-Tanzimat period and the main concern of the state in creating these councils was to assist state officials in military, civil and religious (şer‘î) matters. This policy was implemented in many provinces, but Baghdad did not have such an advisory council until 1841. Consequently, in Iraq, the provincial advisory council was not the continuation of the muhassıl council, but the old institution of advisory councils. In 1841, the dispatch of Ali Rıza Pasha, then the governor of the farflung Baghdad province, to the Sublime Porte indicates that a provincial council in Baghdad had already been created by 12 June of the same year (12 R 1257).47 In his dispatch Ali Rıza Pasha asked the Sublime Porte to send the regulations (nizâmnâme) concerning the provincial councils that had been sent earlier to other provinces. Accordingly, the council in Baghdad was made up of provincial civil and military officials and notables, as well as representatives of the Jewish and Christian communities. The Sublime Porte ratified the list of the members of the provincial council, but it put one condition forward: since Baghdad was a place of exception; it was required to send detailed monthly reports to İstanbul regarding security and provincial affairs. The advisory council gathered in Ali Rıza Pasha’s residence three days a week, namely Sundays, Tuesdays and Thursdays. Each day was allocated for the discussion of specific themes: on Sundays, mîrî, financial, matters relating to the Grand Vizierate and other important affairs; on Tuesdays, religious, administrative and all other legal (both örfî and şer‘î) issues; and on Thursday military issues. For each of these issues specific commissions were set up. The members who met on Sunday were the actual permanent members of the provincial council. These nine members were joined by supplementary competent members on Tuesdays and Thursdays, depending on the topics discussed. The permanent members of the council who met on Sundays were: Osman Seyfi Bey (chair of the commission) Mîr-i mîrân Osman Pasha Süvâri Mîrlivâ İsmail Pasha

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Piyâde Mîrlivâ İbrahim Fethi Pasha Abdülkadir Ağa (Customs official of Baghdad) Ali Yaver Bey İsmail Hakkı Bey Hurşid Bey (stamp official, Mühürdâr-ı senâveri) İbrahim Besim Efendi (expenditure official) The Tuesday commission was noteworthy in that the non-permanent members of the commission were mostly religious learned men. This was naturally the result of the topics to be discussed; that is religious, administrative and all other legal (both örfî and şer‘î) issues. The Tuesday commission comprised the following personalities: All permanent members of the council The provincial judge (qadı) Seyyid Mahmud Efendi, müfti of Baghdad Muhammed Said Efendi, ex-müfti Abdullah Efendi, müfti of Shafi sect Seyyid Mahmud Efendi, nakîb of Baghdad İbrahim Pasha-zade Abdülkadir Bey, an emîr of Kurdistan Ahmed Ağa, ex-mütesellim of Basra Zehîr-zâde Abdüllatif Çelebi, merchant Butros, son of İskender, Christian merchant Yasef Serkız, Christian merchant Yasef Gale, from the Jewish community Finally, the Thursday commission was dominated by military personalities. The task of this commission was to discuss military affairs and it included the following personalities: All permanent members of the council The provincial judge (qadı) Seyyid Mahmud Efendi, müfti of Baghdad Muhammed Said Efendi, ex-müfti Behram Bey, commander of cavalry regiment İsmail Bey, commander of timariot cavalry

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Osman Bey, commander of 1st infantry regiment İsmail Bey, commander of 2nd infantry regiment Hüseyin Bey, artillery commander Hasan Bey, kaymakam of 2nd infantry regiment Seyyid Mahmud Efendi, official of the provincial army All the meetings of the council were recorded by two scribes, namely Efendi and Mehmed Efendi, of whom the latter attended only on Thursdays. The absence of the governor from these lists implies that the council functioned independent of Ali Rıza Pasha. After the dismissal of Ali Rıza Pasha the council began to meet twice a week. Şemsi

The reform of the provincial councils The failure of the muhassıls in collecting provincial taxes and the decrease in the provincial revenues led the Sublime Porte in 1841 to overhaul the provincial administration and draw up new regulations. The sancaks were the basic unit for the muhassıl councils. When the muhassıllık institution was abolished in March 1842, the muhassıl councils in the sancaks continued to exist, but they were re-named küçük meclisler (small councils). The councils in the provincial centers, on the other hand, were now called büyük meclis or meclis-i kebîr (great council).48 And the term memleket meclisleri referred to both large and small councils. According to the new regulations, which were put into effect in late 1842 and 1843, the provincial governors were ordered to establish provincial administrative councils (eyâlet idâre meclisleri) as soon as possible.49 This regulation was further strengthened by another one in September 1844, which made the administrative council on all levels obligatory for all governors. Moreover, in 1845, the Sublime Porte sent inspection teams to the provinces, which were considered to be critical. The Sublime Porte, again in 1845, summoned two representatives from each eyâlet, with the aim of learning more about the problems of the provincial administrations.50 However, it seems that no representative from Baghdad province came to the capital for this meeting. The list of the provincial representatives contains information concerning

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the accommodation and expenditures of the provincial representatives, but nothing regarding the province of Baghdad.51 The meetings in İstanbul resulted in the creation of administrative councils, meclis-i idâre-i eyâlet. These councils were first to be applied in five pilot (three European and two Asian) provinces.52 The archival documents indicate that an inspection team led by Ragıp Pasha was sent to Baghdad in 1847.53 Later, a special council was held in İstanbul to discuss the affairs of the province of Baghdad. The following figures participated in the meeting: the chief of staff (Serasker Pasha), governor of Baghdad, head of the Tanzimat Council (Meclis-i Âlî-i Tanzîmât reisi), head of the Meclis-i Vâlâ, Minister of Finance, and Mümtaz Efendi (member of Meclis-i Vâlâ). The council prepared a detailed instruction that focused on the financial affairs of the province.54 It seems that the implementation of the regulations of the 1840s could only be extended to the provincial periphery in the early 1850s. As far as the implications of these regulations for Baghdad were concerned, we see that Necip Pasha (1842–49) re-organized the old provincial advisory council as part of the Tanzimat reform program. The previous advisory council was an ad hoc body controlled by the governor, while the new council appeared to be a check on his authority. Although it was created nominally to assist the local administrations in provincial affairs, the purpose of the central government was to limit the powers of the provincial governors. In Baghdad the council, at first, met twice a week, but as the people showed an interest and began to bring their cases to the council, it started to meet five days a week. Fridays and Tuesdays were days off.55 As the highest appeal court, the council settled ordinary personal disputes, commercial disputes and shari‘a court cases. Of great importance was the farming out of provincial mukâtaas by public auction. As in the previous advisory council, the meetings were held in the residence of the governor and members of the non-Muslim communities were also given room in the council. Accordingly, in 1846 the council consisted of the following persons:56 Ferîk Pasha, military commander Evkâf müdürü, head of pious foundations

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Mal müdürü Mal katibi, accountant scribe Qadi Efendi, Judge Müfti Mahmud Efendi Ex-müfti Abdülgani Efendi Sıbgatullah Efendi, müfti for Shafi sect Nakîbü’l-Eşraf Ali Efendi Seyyid Ahmed Efendi, of Bursa müderrisîn Mustafa Bey, dergâh-ı âli kapucubaşısı Abdülbaki Efendi, dergâh-ı âlî kapucubaşısı Hacı Ahmed Beyzade Lutfullah Bey Defterî-zâde İbrahim Efendi Râvîzade İsmail Çelebi Kürdî-zâde Kasım Agha Molla Ali Efendi Toma, from Assyrian (Süryâni) community Naum, from Armenian Catholic community Yusuf Cibre, from Chaldean (Keldâni) Catholic community Mıgırdiç, from Armenian community Yusuf Rahmîn, from Jewish community Although the firmân of 1840 envisaged 13 members (seven exofficio and six elected members) for provincial councils, Baghdad’s council had 23 members. The existence of considerably different millets in Baghdad certainly played a role. As Ortaylı noted, in places where there were many non-Muslim community leaders, there appeared some exceptions with regard to the number of council members.57 The firmân of 1840 mentioned only the leader of the Greek Orthodox community as an ex officio member of the provincial councils;58 however, as there was not a sizeable Greek Orthodox community in Baghdad, this seat was filled by members of Assyrian (Süryâni), Armenian, Armenian Catholic, Chaldean (Keldâni) Catholic and Jewish communities. Nevertheless, when the proportion of non-Muslims in the total population of Ottoman Iraq is taken into account, five non-Muslim members out of 23 seem to be an over-representation.

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The qadi who represented the local ilmiye class was one of the ex officio members. The Muslim community was represented by two müftis: one for the Hanafi and the other for the Shafi sect. However, in Baghdad we see other persons from the ilmiye class, like Nakîbü’lEşrâf Ali Efendi (representative of the Prophet Mohammad’s descendants), Seyyid Ahmed Efendi, who was from among the Bursa scholars (müderrisîn), and Molla Ali Efendi. At least seven members were of ilmiye origin and it is also understood that the governors ensured that sufficient numbers of scholars (ulemâ) were selected for membership.59 All the members were certainly notables from the military, ilmiye and merchant classes. At first ferîk pasha was the chairperson of the council; however, in time there appeared changes in the chairmanship, and civil bureaucrats, rather than military, were appointed to this post.60 The regulations in 1843 already prevented military officers filling the civil and administrative posts. The military officers became ordinary members of the council, but the military forces under their command were put at the disposal of the council.61 However, we should note that these regulations and re-arrangements could only be implemented in the outer provinces several years later. In parallel with the regulations made in the mid-1840s, provincial governors were made chairmen of the provincial councils. Again in the administrative council the governor had the right to appoint a deputy chair, but usually the chair was selected from among relatively high-ranking and experienced provincial bureaucrats. With the amendments in 1849 the chair of the provincial councils was to be appointed by the central administration.62 Though this further decreased the role of the governor, we see that the chair for Baghdad’s council was also appointed from the center. It is argued that contrary to pre-Tanzimat traditions, local qadis were not given chairmanship in the provincial councils, which is regarded as a step towards secularization and modernization in government.63 Though they were not brought to chairmanship, in Baghdad the qadi had a leading role in the council. As was the case in Damascus, the opinion of these senior religious and learned men was sought and highly valued.64 Cabîzâde Mehmed Efendi, ex-qadi of Baghdad and former member of the provincial council of Damascus, was appointed in 1851

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as council member on a monthly salary of 4,000 kuruş.65 However, Cabîzâde Mehmed Efendi was not a competent person in the eyes of the Sublime Porte and he was dismissed from the post.66 İstanbul asked Baghdad to provide a name suitable for the membership. Usually the process in Baghdad was that the governor nominated a person for the post and informed İstanbul about the person in question. Then the Sublime Porte either ratified the nominee or appointed someone else. Earlier the Sublime Porte had paid regular salaries to the members of the muhassıl councils. Besides the appointed members, the elected members were also paid and there was a hierarchy among the members. Among the elected members, while müfti received the highest salary, heads of the non-Muslim communities received the lowest.67 In a similar manner, the small councils in the sancaks were also made up of salaried members. However the small councils in the counties were abolished in September 1841 because they were costing too much.68 When the muhassıllık institution was abolished in 1842, the payment of salaries also ceased. The council members continued to work without monthly salaries. The Sublime Porte adopted the policy that no salaries should be paid for the ex officio positions in provincial councils, because this was considered to be a part of their regular administrative duties. Instead, the council members were, from time to time, given special gifts and payments. For example, in 1858, as a reward for their work, members of the provincial council in Baghdad were rewarded with a considerable amount of money (atiyye-i seniyye) that had been obtained from the rebellious Anaza tribe.69 It is interesting that the distribution of money was also in accordance with the hierarchy within the council: while the qadi and müfti were paid the most, the non-Muslim representatives were paid the least. The members of the provincial councils continued to work without salary until 1869. According to the British consulate reports, it seems that Midhat Pasha began to pay council members.70

The provincial regulations of 1849 Between 1840 and 1849 there were many amendments in the laws concerning the provincial administration and councils. Of these

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amendments, the regulation of 1849 was perhaps the most outstanding, because it was in force for 15 years, until the promulgation of the 1864 Vilâyet Law. With the new amendments in 1849, memleket meclisleri were re-named as eyâlet meclisleri (provincial councils).71 The new regulations also required the re-institution of small councils in every sub-province.72 As noted earlier, this amendment suggested that the council chair be appointed from İstanbul. The regulation of 1849 also revitalized the role of the defterdâr in the province. The defterdâr was appointed directly by the Sublime Porte and he was responsible for all provincial revenues and expenditures.73 Moreover, he came to assume a very significant role in the provincial council, as will be noted below. The new regulations were put into effect in the provincial council of Baghdad in 1851.74 Accordingly, two years after the issuance of related regulation, eyâlet meclisi or meclis-i kebîr was formed in Baghdad in 1851.75 During his visit to İstanbul in the autumn of 1850, the defterdâr of Baghdad had already articulated the need for the establishment of a meclis-i kebîr in Baghdad. The correspondence between the Sublime Porte and the province had started at the end of 1850 and it was stressed that regardless of the salary to be paid, an able and honest person should be selected for the chairmanship of the council.76 The monthly expenditure of a meclis-i kebîr was calculated to be between 20,000 and 30,000 kuruş.77 The new regulations also coincided with the dismissal of Abdi Pasha and the appointment of Vecihi Pasha; and during the governorship of Vecihi Pasha the meclis-i kebîr was formed.78 As the central administration began to place greater emphasis on local councils, the chairs of the provincial councils, especially of leading provinces like Bursa, Trabzon and Baghdad, were appointed by İstanbul.79 Upon Baghdad’s insistence on the appointment of an able person for the council’s chairmanship, Salik Efendi, who had resigned from defterdârlık of Trabzon, was appointed to this post. Although Baghdad, due to its remoteness and relatively high prices, demanded a salary of 25,000 kuruş for this post, the Sublime Porte gave Salik Efendi only 17,500 kuruş per month.80 The salary of the chairman was to be paid by the provincial treasury. In 1851 the Sublime Porte made a change: In provinces such as

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Hüdavendigar, Trabzon, Yanya, Aleppo and Damascus, where the extra expenditure for the salary of the chairman could be met, the chairmanship was united with the office of mâl müdürlüğü/defterdârlık.81 The purpose of such a policy was clear: saving money for the provincial treasury. Although this arrangement excluded Baghdad due to its special circumstances, one year later, in February 1852, the post of defterdâr in Baghdad and that of council chairman were amalgamated and defterdâr Arif Efendi replaced Salik Efendi.82 However, in time, the responsibilities of the defterdârlık in Baghdad greatly increased, because the financial affairs of Mosul and Shahrizor, which were connected to Baghdad as sub-provinces, began to be administered from Baghdad. Hence, in 1862 Ferid Efendi, who was then both defterdâr and chair of the council, was given permission not to attend the meetings of the council. Instead, a post of deputy chair (meclis-i kebîr reis-i sânîliği) was created and Kurbî Efendi, then kaymakam of Karbala, was appointed to this post.83 Like the previous advisory councils, the meclis-i kebîr included the high-ranking officials and the notables of the province. For a short period of time in 1863 the sheikh of the Muntafiq tribal confederation, Mansur as-Sa’dun, was also given a seat on the council.84 Such appointments of tribal leaders, which were repeated later, were very much related to the political situation within the province. The incorporation of the tribal leaders, as local intermediaries, into the political mechanism was one of the leading purposes of Tanzimat centralization. As far as the functioning of the council was concerned, there is a common contention that it did not function in the way it was intended. Azzawi has argued that the council members were ignorant, indiscreet and selfish, advancing their personal interests rather than those of the community as a whole.85 There were cases in which members of councils in the sub-provinces collaborated with the local notables and sheikhs and embezzled local revenues.86 Also, the council members were said to have signed the meeting minutes without knowing what they were about.87 Neccar further argues that the local people could participate the council meetings; however, this should have been only in legal cases (şer‘î and/or örfî), as the council acted as an authorized

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recourse for such issues. Otherwise, the local people were not allowed to attend council meetings. Kiyotaki asserts that the political importance of the council in Baghdad declined over time, as the power of the governor gradually increased.88 However, I am not of the same opinion, because the correspondence between the provincial periphery and the imperial center shows growing emphasis on the provincial council. It is evident that the councils in Baghdad were only able to achieve their ideal form during the governorship of Midhat Pasha, with small councils in most sancaks and kazâs. Also there is no doubt that Midhat Pasha’s introduction of the Vilâyet Law in 1869 brought seriousness and order to the functioning of the provincial council. Midhat Pasha began to lead the council meetings. When compared to earlier governors, we have far more council minutes for Midhat Pasha’s term of office, which, I think, indicates the regular and orderly functioning of the council.

Small councils of the sub-provinces It is unfortunate that no complete collection of records of provincial and/or sub-provincial councils exists. The sealed council minutes (mazbata) appear in BOA only as supplements in the correspondence between the province and the center. The inadequate number of such council records prevents us from making generalizations. For this reason, our information concerning the details of the activities in the council is very limited. Whether the members of the council defended the public interest against those of the government (as was the case in Damascus) or whether it had bargaining power with the central government and how effective it was in provincial politics remain open to question. As far as the small councils (küçük meclises) in the sancaks were concerned, the data derived from the archival documents are quite scanty and prevent us from reaching many conclusions. It is not clear when and how many of the sub-provinces had local councils. The governorship of Namık Pasha is important in this regard, because we know that by the early 1860s, counties (kazâs) such as Khanaqin, Hindiyyah and Samava had their own local councils.89 The list in İrâde-i Meclis-i

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Mahsûs, No. 1664, enables us to discover the situation by March 1871, as will be explained below. The councils in the counties (kazâs) had four or five appointed members and it seems that members of the small councils in the subprovinces were not paid, for reasons mentioned above. For instance, when, in 1858, a request was made to appoint a member to the local council in Hillah at a salary of 3,000 kuruş, it was rejected by the Sublime Porte.90 However, when the Vilâyet Law was implemented in Baghdad, the council members both in the sancaks and kazâs were allocated certain salaries. In the county/kazâ level, the salaries ranged between 600 and 1,000 kuruş, while the chair received 2,000 kuruş. The council members in the sancak headquarters also received 2,000 kuruş. Among the Iraqi provinces, Mosul had its provincial council established at the beginning of 1848. Here, Vecihi Pasha formed the council and asked the heads of the non-Muslim communities to suggest trustworthy representatives. Accordingly, Chaldean, Jacobite and Catholic communities were represented at the local council of Mosul.91 When the list of council members was drawn up, the stamps of the council members were sent to the Sublime Porte for approval. At its first meeting Vecihi Pasha addressed the members, emphasizing the need for unity among them, and the law as the sole source of reference in all matters.92 He also warned the members against favoritism/nepotism and special treatment for particular people, and asked them to act in accordance with the principles of justice.93 It is also understood that in 1850 there were demands for the establishment of a meclis-i kebîr in Shahrizor. However, the Sublime Porte’s response to this demand was quite significant in that the Porte found it improper to establish a council in Shahrizor before it was instituted in Baghdad. The reason for this was that although Shahrizor was a separate province at that time it was considered to be part of Ottoman Iraq (hıtta-i Irakiyyenin bir kıt‘a-i müfrezesi).94 This fact also indicates that in the application of the reforms the administrative hierarchy between Iraqi provinces had been taken into consideration. However, Shahrizor could have had its own council at least by 1860.95

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In time, the councils began to specialize in certain fields. Besides the administrative council, there appeared several other councils, such as the council of the Sixth Army,96 meclis-i tahkîk (council of investigation), meclis-i imâr (council for public works), temyîz-i hukuk meclisi (court of appeal), cinâyet meclisi (criminal council), and meclis-i de‘âvî (claims tribunal). While the temyiz-i hukuk meclisi and meclis-i cinâyet were in the sancak headquarters, meclis-i de‘âvî was set up in the kazâ level. The sequence of events in judicial cases was as follows: the case was brought to meclis-i de‘âvî in the county (kazâ); if not resolved it could be brought to the temyîz-i hukûk meclisi in the sub-province (sancak). Dîvân-ı temyîz was the final resort for judicial cases that could not be resolved in the sub-provinces. Similarly, cases relating to provincial officials, property and state (mal ve mîrî) affairs were first dealt within the administrative council of the county. If not resolved they were brought to the administrative councils in the sub-province and provincial administrative council respectively.97 Ordinary cases, such as robbery, assault and wounding, were managed by the zabtiyes. There were frequent transfers of officials between these councils. The existence of a cinâyet meclisi implies that issues/cases that included murder were dealt with in a specialized council, not in the administrative council. As in other provinces, the meclis-i tahkîk was established in Baghdad in October 1858.98 A council for public works (meclis-i imâr) was also established, but it will be discussed in the following chapter.

The introduction of the Provincial (Vilâyet) Law in Baghdad The Provincial (Vilâyet) Law of 1864 can be considered as the culmination of the provincial reforms that were implemented as a result of the Tanzimat Edict.99 Despite previous regulations, the Vilâyet Law of 1864 was the first general law on provincial administration. The law replaced the old regulations on provincial administration, and the term vilâyet, instead of eyâlet, was used to describe the provinces of the empire. The new vilâyets were somewhat larger than the eyâlets, and they were hierarchically superior to the sancaks. While there was

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a general tendency in the first half of the nineteenth century (before and after the Tanzimat Edict) to reduce the provincial territories in size so as to limit the authority of the governors,100 this trend was reversed with the Provincial Law of 1864. This actually meant the widening of the territory over which the governor was to rule. In 1867 the law was applied with a few modifications in a number of provinces, but it was only with the amendments of 1871 that all parts of the empire were brought under the vilâyet system. The literature on Ottoman rule in Baghdad usually credits Midhat Pasha for the introduction of the new Provincial Law. Despite Midhat Pasha’s indisputable achievements in this regard, the first attempts actually started during Namık Pasha’s governorship. Çetinsaya has noted that Namık Pasha tried to apply the new Provincial Law in 1867; however, he was not very successful and the law was eventually applied by Midhat Pasha.101 First of all, Namık Pasha united the villages (karyes), nâhiyes and counties, which had small populations and insignificant geopolitical positions, under counties that were geographically close to them. In so doing, he established the close relations between population, geopolitical position and the administrative status of an area. During his governorship Namık Pasha tried to recruit graduates of mülkiye schools in an effort to increase the quality and efficiency of provincial officials. These arrangements, which were referred to as usûl-i cedîde, also envisioned a hierarchy among the counties. Accordingly, the counties were divided into three. There were several criteria for this division: the size of the county, the geopolitics of the county (whether it was mountainous or derbent), its position along the frontier, and the existence of a quay and port. These factors determined the importance of the county and the kaymakam received his salary according to this hierarchy of importance.102 The new Provincial Law was fully introduced to the province of Baghdad by Midhat Pasha in early 1869. Although Baghdad had been part of the Ottoman Empire for centuries, the provincial administrative reforms that were applied in the heartland of the empire came to Baghdad relatively late. When the vilâyet system was extended to many provinces in 1867, Baghdad was regarded as vilâyet; that is to

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say, it was formally included within the new system. However, no radical change was made to its administrative and financial structure until the governorship of Midhat Pasha. Midhat Pasha was one of the founders of the Vilâyet Law in 1864, and the new law was first applied under his governorship in the Danube province, as the pilot region. Midhat Pasha’s successful governorship in Danube was very influential in the extension of the law in 1867 and 1871. The implementation of the new Provincial Law was one of the first things Midhat Pasha began in Baghdad in 1869; that is, two years before the final extension of the law throughout the empire. There is no doubt that the presence of Midhat Pasha in Baghdad accelerated the implementation of the law and some of the institutions such as municipality and municipal council came relatively earlier when compared to other Arab provinces. Midhat Pasha considered the Provincial Law of 1864 complementary to the Tanzimat reforms.103 One of the pillars of the law was the re-drawing of the jurisdictional lines. According to the law, each vilâyet was subdivided into a number of sub-provinces (sancaks or livâs), each sancak into counties (kazâs), and each kazâ into sub-counties and villages (nâhiyes and kariyes). Vali, mutasarrıf, kaymakam, müdür and muhtâr were the rulers of these administrative units respectively. The vilâyet law also set up a hierarchy of councils attached to these officials. Upon Midhat Pasha’s decision to implement the new Provincial Law, the mutasarrıfs were called to Baghdad and given instructions on the new provincial administration, especially the divisions and the re-arrangements of the kazâs and nâhiyes.104 There were changes in the borders of sancaks, kazâs and nâhiyes, but the law did not change the provincial borders and Baghdad retained its control over Mosul, Shahrizor and Basra. By July 1869, just a few months after the appointment of Midhat Pasha, Baghdad, Shahrizor, Mosul, Basra, Karbala and Divaniyah (Hillah) were placed wholly under the new system.105 In accordance with the law, the province of Baghdad was divided into ten sub-provinces: Baghdad, Mosul, Shahrizor, Sulaimaniyah, Dulaim, Karbala, Hillah, Basra, Ammarah and Muntafiq.106 The new administrative units are listed in Table 6.

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Map 3

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Baghdad, (1331/1913)

According to the law, the governor had a direct supervisory authority over the mutasarrıfs, kaymakams and müdürs. The law also required the establishment of administrative tools in every level of provincial administration, which Midhat Pasha successfully applied. It was with the amendment of the Vilâyet Law in 1871 that nâhiyes were incorporated into the provincial administration for the first time.107 So, civil administration expanded in an unprecedented way into areas with which it had never dealt before, giving the central government and its representatives in the provinces a whole range of new duties and activities.

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Table 6 Administrative divisions of Ottoman Iraq by 1871 Sub-provinces

Counties

Baghdad

Horasan, Halis, Khanaqin Samarra, Kut, Mandali, Aziziyah, Kazımiyah Mosul, İmadiyah, Sinjar, Zakho, Akra, Dohuk Basra, Qurna, Abu’l-Haslab Shahrizor, Zangabâd, Rawanduz, Rabnah, Arbil, Köysancak, Bradost, Salahiyah Muntafiq108 Ammarah, Shatrah, Ala ash Sharkî Sulaimaniyah, Karadagh, Baziyan, Markah, Gülanber, Shahr-i Bazar, Karbala, Hindiyyah, Najaf, Musayyib Hillah, Divaniyah, Samawa, Shamiyah, Midhatiyah Dulaim, Hît, Anah, Hadyanah

Mosul Basra Shahrizor Muntafiq Ammarah Sulaimaniyah Karbala Hillah Dulaim

Source: BOA, İ. MMAH. 1664, 19 Z 1287 (12 March 1871).

The Ottoman archives appear to have many documents relating to the application of the Vilâyet Law in Baghdad, but only a few of them are forthcoming when requested for research. The 16-page document in İrâde-i Meclis-i Mahsûs catalogue (No. 1664) provides significant data about the administrative network in the province and the salaries of the provincial officials. Furthermore, British consulate reports have considerable information on this subject. Midhat Pasha sent the British Consul-general in Baghdad a letter explaining the application of the law in Baghdad.109 In accordance with the law, Baghdad became the headquarters of the vilâyet, and the separate offices of secretariat (muavinlik) and agency (müdürlük) for foreign affairs were established for conducting the provincial administration. Normally, the department for foreign affairs did not exist in all provinces. It was especially for provinces such as

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Danube and Bosnia, where there were many foreign nationals and, therefore, where relations with the Great Powers were intensive.110 Likewise, the province of Baghdad had numerous foreign nationals and many European consuls. Hence, an official was commissioned to deal with the affairs of the European nationals in Baghdad. Between the lines of Midhat Pasha’s letter to the British consul in Baghdad, one can read the very principle of the Provincial Law that the administrative authority of the governor was shared by the rulers of sub-provinces and counties. A similar explanation concerning the provincial administrative hierarchy was given in Zewra newspaper and the local people were asked to follow the hierarchy in their dealings with the local government.111 Besides the governor and defterdâr, there were an assistant governor (vali muavini), and a müdür for foreign affairs in Baghdad. Unlike in previous years, the correspondence office seemed to be well organized. There were scribes not only in the sub-provinces but in the counties too. Apart from the correspondence office, offices for provincial archives (vilâyet/livâ evrâk odası) were set up. Each sub-province, Baghdad being one of them, was to be ruled by a lieutenant governor (mutasarrıf). It would house a mutasarrıf, his assistant (mutasarrıf muavini), a treasurer (mal müdürü), a shari‘a court judge (na‘ib), a doctor, a prison guard, a court of appeal (temyiz-i hukûk) and an administrative council (meclis-i idâre). At the county level, each kaymakam had a treasurer, an account officer (sandık emîni), a naib, a meclis-i idâre, an Arabic, and, if necessary, a Turkish secretary (tahrîrât kâtibi), and a meclis-i de‘âvî.112 The nâhiye institution was also implemented and the nâhiye müdürs were paid from the provincial treasury. Moreover, the provincial government was divided into six departments, namely umûr-ı dâhiliye (domestic affairs), umûr-ı mâliye (financial affairs), umûr-ı şer‘iyye (religious affairs), umûr-ı ticâret (commercial affairs), umûr-ı ma‘ârif (education) and umûr-ı nâfi‘a (public works). The heads of these departments were appointed from İstanbul by related ministries, but they were directly supervised by the provincial governor.113 While Baghdad and Shahrizor sancaks had all six departments, other sancaks had between three and five departments. For instance, the department of education was instituted only in three sancaks that

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had rüşdiye schools.114 These departments also make it clear that the scope of provincial administration included areas such as population and land registration, communications, economic development, public works (construction of roads, telegraph, irrigation canals, bridges etc.), education, public health (quarantine) and more. The administration of Ottoman Iraq was further improved and extended throughout the province. The tribally dominant areas such as Muntafiq and Najd in particular were incorporated into the vilâyet order during Midhat Pasha’s last months. Towards the end of his governorship Midhat Pasha extended Ottoman sovereignty over Kuwait and Najd (al-Ahsa). Traditionally Kuwait had been a district dependent on Basra; however, due to administrative incompetence its control had passed into the hands of local sheikhs.115 Among these local sheikhs Abdullah Al-Sabah was appointed as the kaymakam of Kuwait and given an Ottoman flag to fly from his residence in order to affirm Kuwait’s ties to the empire. Anscombe states that Midhat Pasha proposed 100 gendarmes (zabtiye) be stationed in Kuwait as a symbol of authority. But the gendarmes were never assigned to Kuwait. Furthermore, Midhat Pasha gave an imperial document, berât-ı şerîf, to the leaders (imams) of five Friday mosques and Muhammed bin Abdullah al-Adesânî was appointed as local judge, naib.116 Midhat Pasha did not stop with the establishment of an Ottoman claim in Kuwait; he further extended the vilâyet reform into the Najd region, especially al-Ahsa. The Pasha created four counties centered on al-Ahsa (Hufuf), Qatif, Mubarraz and Qatar. These places constituted the new sub-province (sancak) of Najd, of which Hufuf would be the administrative seat.117 The Vilâyet Law of 1871 also required the establishment of the general assembly of the province (meclis-i umûmî) and the extension of administrative councils in every sub-province and county. According to articles 25–27 of the law, the general assembly of the province was to consist of two Muslim and two non-Muslim members elected from each sub-province. The assembly was to meet once a year in the provincial capital for not more than 40 days. As for Baghdad, however, there is no hint implying the meeting of a general assembly.118

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Though the provincial council was renamed in the Vilâyet Law of 1864 as meclis-i idâre (administrative council), its functions and tasks did not change. As far as councils in the lower administrative units were concerned, among the sub-provinces of Baghdad only Dulaim lacked an administrative council by 1871. At the county level, however, there were many counties that had not formed a council by 1871. The reason for this was that the extension of such administrative reforms to tribal areas took longer than in other areas. According to the law, in addition to the appointed members, the administrative council was to have four elected members. Only the council of Shahrizor had five elected members. The salaries paid to these council members ranged between 600 and 4,000 kuruş; while those in the provincial administrative council received the most, those in the counties received the least, in accordance with the hierarchy of administrative echelons.119 According to the regulation concerning administrative councils in the provinces, the ex officio members were made up of ‘müfettiş-i hükkâmı vilâyet’ (inspector from the qadi’s office), defterdâr, mektubcu and umûr-ı ecnebiye müdürü (official for foreign affairs). However, in Baghdad, in view of the special conditions of the province, the permanent members differed somewhat. As a corollary of this, the ex officio members in Baghdad council consisted of qadi, müfti, nakîbü’l-eşrâf, defterdâr and mektubcu.120 Occasionally the evkâf dâiresi muhâsibi (accountant for the office of pious foundations) and mutasarrıf of Baghdad city became permanent members in the council. The presence of the head of pious foundations (evkâf müdürü) among the council members implies that the council also had some control over the pious foundations. It is also understood from the minutes of the council that while until 1870 the council was led by defterdâr as chairperson (or in his absence by the deputy chair), after 1870 the provincial governor (Midhat Pasha) personally led the council meetings as chairperson. For the pre-1870 period, I have not found any hint implying the attendance of the governor in the provincial council. In this respect, the Baghdad council in the pre-1870 period resembled the Syrian case, where the governor rarely attended. However, Midhat Pasha’s term of office is more reminiscent of the Egyptian case, where the governor had tight control over the council.121

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Midhat Pasha paid considerable attention to holding proper elections in sancaks, kazâs and even villages, because he believed that if local people participated in the administration the general security and welfare of the province would improve.122 Before the introduction of the Vilâyet Law there were 18 members of the council, but after the law they were reduced to 14. For instance, after 1870 we no longer see deputy chair (reis-i sânî-i meclis, Yusuf Mazhar) in the council meetings. The müfti for the Shafi sect (Abdulgafur el-Haydârî) was also absent from the council meetings. From the perspective of provincial bureaucracy, it seems that the council minutes were signed by the members and then sealed with the council seal, and a separate number was given for each minute.123 By 1872, the administrative council in Baghdad included the following members:124 Vali-i vilâyet-i Bağdad, Midhat Pasha Müfettiş-i hükkâm-i vilâyet, Abdullah Zeynel Abidin Muavin, Raif Efendi Defterdâr, Abdi Efendi Müfti, Muhammed Feyzi Nakîb, Es-seyyid Ali el-Kâdirî Mektûbî, Saib Efendi Müdîr-i umûr-ı ecnebiye, Hamdi Müdîr-i Evkâf, Muhammed Derviş el-Haydârî Azâ, Mansur as-Sa’dun Azâ, Fahd es-Sa‘dun Azâ, Mehmed Sa‘îd Azâ, Abdurrezzâk el-Kâdirî Azâ, Fethullah *

*

*

The Tanzimat period was in many respects a period of transition. Centuries-old institutions could not be replaced in a short period of time and the reforms reforms were introduced in a ‘trial and error’ method. There is a general contention that the Tanzimat reforms in

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their first decade were unsuccessful. Similarly, though Baghdad was taken into the range of Tanzimat reforms in 1844, true reforms could only be introduced in the 1850s. By the early 1850s, after the imperial center had put an end to the autonomous dynasties, the province was tied more closely to the central administration and a substantial improvement in provincial security was achieved. This was essential, because the issue of security was heavily emphasized in the Tanzimat Edict and the absence of security had long been the foremost reason for the backwardness of Baghdad province. Attempts were made to correct inadequacies in the regulations with amendments. Likewise, the regulations pertaining to provincial councils were strengthened over time and these efforts culminated in the Provincial Laws of 1864 and 1871. As noted by Neumann, the Tanzimat reforms integrated local notables (both Muslim and non-Muslim) in regional and local administration.125 The institution created to this end was that of the meclis. The provincial council, which was one of the most typical reforms of the Tanzimat era, was re-organized in the early 1850s and in the course of time the quality of its functioning was also improved. The creation of new administrative units and the extension of the hierarchical administrative organization throughout the Iraqi territories indicate the development of a more modernized working of the administration. There is no doubt that like other reform projects, the vilâyet system was inherited and maintained by the state of modern Iraq. Moreover, this system with its local councils and elected members was the first step in the development of representative government in the region. The reform process carried out by Ottoman governors was certainly gradual and the high point of this process was Midhat Pasha’s governorship in Baghdad between 1869 and 1872. Midhat Pasha’s service in Baghdad is very important, and it will be discussed in greater detail in the following chapters.

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CHAPTER 5

THE LAND AND THE TRIBES

The political and socio-economic structure of nineteenth-century Iraq was dominated by the tribalism that existed in the country. Most of the Arab tribes of Iraq were migrant tribes and the Bedouins made up approximately half of the total population. The migrations from the Arabian Peninsula had started during the Muslim conquest of the country and continued until the early nineteenth century. However, it is quite clear that the Bedouin tribes of Iraq underwent quite significant societal transformation during the nineteenth century. The tribal structure in Iraq had a specific hierarchy. In descending order, these were: the qabîla or confederation (under the leadership of a paramount sheikh in Arab areas, or a bey or beg in Kurdish areas), the ‘ashîra or tribe (under a sheikh or agha), the fakhd or clan, and the bayt or âila house/family. Due to the lack of security and intertribal conflicts the Iraqi tribes lived in the form of confederation, which referred to a group of tribes united through kinship or proximity led by one paramount tribal sheikh. The tribal confederations of Muntafiq (in the south), Khazâ‘il (in Middle Euphrates/Hillah-Divaniyah), Albu Muhammad and Bani Lâm (in Ammarah) were the largest tribal organizations. Differences among the tribesmen were quite important. Within the tribal confederation, being either from superior or inferior lineage played a very significant role. The superiority and honor of a tribe was

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strongly related to the length of its traceable lineage. As will be noted below, part of the distinction among the tribal confederations was that the true Bedouins bred camels, rode horses and ruled the tribes, whereas the lesser Bedouins bred sheep or cows, rode donkeys and worked as cultivators.1 In the province of Baghdad there were hundreds of tribes, ranging from very small to very large in size.2 These tribes were divided into filih, peasants; ma‘dan, marsh-dwellers; shawiyah, people of the sheep; and ahl-il-ibl, people of the camel. While the latter formed, in effect, the tribal aristocracy, agriculturalist tribes and city dwellers were looked down on by nomadic tribes.3 As noted by Salman, tribal power impinged on the settled areas by virtue of the fact that farmers (fellâhîn) were often related to the tribes by blood or clientage and thus were themselves, in many areas, part of the tribal system.4 Military strength and political power was quite important in the hierarchical ranking of the Bedouin tribes. The powerful Bedouin tribes collected brotherhood money (khuwwah) from weaker tribes. In return for a specified annual payment the stronger tribe promised not to attack a particular village or weaker tribe, as well as protecting them against raids from other tribes. Commercial caravans that passed through the dirah of a tribe had to pay the khuwwah as well. Evidently, the payment of khuwwah was little more than extortion, because the tribe hardly ever offered effective protection. Each ashîrah had a tribal sheikh and it was these tribal sheikhs who chose the paramount sheikh (şeyhü’l-meşâyih). In many cases the paramount sheikh was chosen from a particular family. However, as will be detailed below, from time to time the Ottoman governors were directly involved in the process of tribal succession and appointed one of the tribal sheikhs as paramount sheikh. Needless to say, the paramount sheikh usually had a highly esteemed ancestor, because a long-traceable lineage and tribal charisma were quite important in controlling the tribes. Otherwise, the task of the paramount sheikh would be very difficult. The rivalry for the paramount sheikhship of Shammar Jarba tells us much about the general nature of tribal concerns for leadership. When Sufuk, paramount sheikh of Shammar Jarba was assassinated in 1847

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by the Ottoman governor in Baghdad, Farhan and Abdülkerim came to the fore for the post of meşîhat. However, from the perspectives of tribesmen there were at least two questions: which sheikh could provide the greatest opportunity for profitable raiding and which leader could prevent the central government from intervening in tribal affairs.5 Besides these questions, bravery on the battlefield and eloquence and mastery of Arabic language were also very significant for tribal leadership. Taking these concerns into account, Abdülkerim seemed to be a better prospect for the meşîhat, because it was he who could realize the tribesmen’s expectations. His rival, Farhan, was believed to have acquired ‘a taste for certain aspects of Ottoman culture’, because he had spent several years in his youth in İstanbul. This certainly alienated some of his tribesmen. Farhan’s mother, contrary to Bedouin custom, was from Baghdad. However, despite the expectations of tribesmen Namık Pasha appointed Farhan as paramount sheikh, because he was more likely to cooperate with the local government.

Politics of tribe: Carrot or stick? Ottoman centralization in Iraq aimed to deconstruct the tribal structure of the country, because the strong tribal organization was seen as the most significant obstacle to the implementation of the reforms. However, the issue of how to control the disruptive tribes plagued every governor in Baghdad. While small tribes were relatively easy to manage, the control of tribal confederations such as the Shammar, Khazâ‘il and Muntafiq was far more complicated. Ottoman governors were frequently criticized for having ambivalent and unsystematic policies towards the Iraqi tribes. Midhat Pasha, however, was exempt from such criticism. During his governorship he started a new, more consistent and effective tribal policy. However, to put all governors before Midhat Pasha into the same basket would not be fair; governors such as Reşid Pasha and Namık Pasha at least should be given some credit for their actions in this regard. In Ottoman Iraq there had been a tradition that when a new governor was appointed to the province of Baghdad, the heads of the tribes

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or their representatives visited him. Some of them sent only gifts without making a visit. All these actions signified the allegiance of the tribe to the local government. If a specific tribe did not visit and welcome the new governor, this was interpreted as a sign of uneasy relations with that tribe. The paramount sheiks or begs usually served as mediators between tribes and the government. They were usually appointed or recognized by the government, in accordance with tribal customs; however, in appointing them, the government usually sought certain assurances as to their loyalty, guarantees for the full payment of tax revenues, and for the maintenance of law and order within their tribal areas.6 The harmony of interest between the local government and the tribes was very important and it was this harmony which determined the Ottoman approach to a particular tribe. For example, Sufuk’s raid on the camp of Muhammad Ali Mirza, son of Kirmanshah governor Fath Ali Pasha, was very significant in the Ottomans’ recognition of his sheikhship in the Shammar tribal confederation.7 The policies followed by Ottoman governors against the Iraqi tribes can be summarized as ‘carrot and stick’, and they varied considerably from granting favors to certain tribes, creating inter-tribal frictions, recognizing a rival chieftain within a given tribe, the use of military force, incorporation of the tribal structures into the provincial political mechanism, and settlement of the tribal confederations.8 Taking a close relative (usually the son) of a sheikh into custody in the provincial center was also a policy applied frequently for managing a particular tribe. The stick, in other words the use of military force, was usually applied when all other methods of ‘politics of tribe’ failed. Playing off one tribe against another During the early decades of Ottoman centralization the central policy of breaking the power of the tribal confederations was impeded by the lack of a powerful army. The shortage of soldiers in the provincial

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army prevented the local government from challenging the tribal confederations militarily. Therefore, as Çetinsaya rightly pointed out: Ottoman tribal policy mainly relied on the principle of ‘divide and rule’, fostering or using rivalries within the ruling families of the confederations, or between shaikhs of constituent tribes, or between the latter and the ruling families, or, ignoring the shaikhs altogether and dealing directly with the chiefs of tribal sections.9 The method of ‘playing off one tribe against another’, and the principle of ‘divide and rule’, constituted the major criticism of Ottoman governors in Baghdad. Before the restoration of Ottoman authority in 1831, the Mamluk Pashas had earlier resorted to this method. For instance, Davud Pasha is well known to have set the Kurdish emirates against the Baban emirate.10 Sometimes these conflicts took on the character of racial strife, when Arab forces were used against the Kurds. The notorious governor in this sense was Ali Rıza Pasha, whose tribal policy is narrated by Longrigg as follows: Ali Rıza was content to see the ancient methods continued. He frequently changed the Shaikh of Muntafiq, set up a rival to Sufuk [of Shammar], employed Wadi as lieutenant and tax-gatherer. His mishandling of the tribal elements brought Baghdad more than once to a state of blockade. Anizah, Shammar, and Zubaid ranged outside its walls, disgusted at the Pasha’s inconsistency and eager for all that his weakness might yield them.11 Playing off a particular tribe against another tribe had certain advantages for the local government. This practice was quite instrumental in keeping the tribes obedient to the local government. It could also be influential for the defense of the countryside against nomad raids from the desert. And finally, the local government could set the Bedouin tribes against one another, thus weakening all of them.12 However, it is fairly questionable to what extent these aims were realized.

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The politics of tribe was also very much influenced by the rivalry between the rulers of Iraqi provinces. For instance, in 1833 the tense relations and rivalry between Ali Rıza Pasha of Baghdad and Yahya Pasha of Mosul led the former to play the Anaza off against Shammar, which was supporting the Pasha of Mosul.13 On the other hand, the use of tribal mercenaries had a long tradition in Baghdad. The Uqayl tribe especially was famous for its military support to Baghdad governors. Mamluks used Uqayli forces in numerous encounters against dissident tribesmen. The nomadic as well as semi-nomadic tribes were quite significant as sources of auxiliary force. They were also effective, because of their preoccupation with acquiring booty. The military support of the tribes, Arab and Kurdish, was very salient, but it was not always guaranteed. Government subsidies, robes and honorary titles Though the destruction of Mamluk rule in Baghdad was eased with the support of the Shammar Jarba of Sufuk and Uqayl of Süleyman Ganam,14 the increasing central control after the 1830s in Ottoman Iraq upset some of the leading tribes. While some of them opted to cooperate with the local government, others, such as the Shammar Jarba, reacted bitterly. As Williamson has pointed out, there were practical considerations in the cooperative attitudes of the paramount sheikhs. First of all, the paramount sheikh received a monthly government subsidy, which helped retain the loyalty of various clans. The government subsidy was usually accompanied by some grain and foodstuffs (ta‘yînât), and the robe of investiture (hil‘at), which further strengthened his prestige among his tribesmen. Secondly, the paramount sheikh could use his prestigious position to augment his rather limited leadership appeal.15 There is no doubt that the grant of official support and honorific titles stemmed from inherent military weakness. The governmental subsidies were also given to the local notables who contributed to the struggles against raiding Bedouins. Although the Ottoman policy of managing the tribes through government subsidies and robes of investiture ceased in many parts of the

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empire, it continued in Baghdad. When, in 1851, the central government asked Baghdad whether it would be proper to stop government subsidies to the Iraqi tribes, Vecihi Pasha emphasized the need to continue this policy due to the ongoing tribal uprisings.16 The Sublime Porte complied with the local requirements, but asked the provincial defterdâr to keep adequate records of these subsidies. Later, probably due to financial concerns, the Sublime Porte tried to limit such government subsidies as much as possible. Some of the governors in Baghdad behaved very generously in the delivery of salaries and subsidies. Ömer Lütfi Pasha is often cited as trying to control the province by delivering salaries to the notables.17 Financing the tribal notables had a certain cost. For instance, the governors of Baghdad, when the need arose, placed some of the tribal leaders or their relatives under custody in Baghdad. This was an old policy used not infrequently during the Mamluk period. Members of different tribes resided in Baghdad, as hostages or to represent their tribe’s interests there.18 The tribal notables who were under custody were not only accompanied by attendants and horses, etc., but also they were paid in cash and in kind. Hence, the economic burden of this custom was not insignificant. The delivery of monthly salaries and robes of investiture was used for two main purposes. Firstly, as mentioned above, this policy was used in managing the tribal sheikhs. Secondly, there was a tradition that during the changes of officials such as mutasarrıf and vali, or after the appointment of new officials, the tribal notables would give the officials gifts such as horses. In return, the officials would give shawl or robes of investiture (hil‘at ve şal).19 The bill for these shawls and robes was met by the Sublime Porte. However, sometimes the officials tried to supplement this by selling the horses and mares given by the tribal sheikhs.20 Several calls were made to restrict this policy during the 1850s; however, despite these efforts governmental subsidies, especially of the first kind, continued for decades, because it was an effective method in managing the tribes. It seems clear that the delivery of robes and monthly subsidies were very much related to the general security affairs in the province. While during periods of turmoil the local government

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opted to continue delivering robes and subsidies in order to control and pacify the tribes, in periods of relative security it was freer to ignore the policy. Another policy of the local government concerning the Iraqi tribes was the granting of certain honorary titles and imperial medals (mecidiye nişanı) to tribal sheikhs. Titles and ranks such as kaymakam, mîralay and pasha were bestowed to the tribal notables.21 A significant turning point in tribal politics came with Reşid Pasha, when he signed an agreement with the Shammar Jarba in 1857. The Pasha got Farhan, the paramount sheikh of the Shammar Jarba, to sign a written agreement which included reciprocal responsibilities between the tribal confederation and the local government: This agreement called for a force of five hundred matchlock riflemen to be placed under the control of the paramount Shammar chieftain. These troops although paid and supplied by the Ottomans would reside with the Shammar. In exchange for government troops Farhan agreed to control indiscriminate Shammar raiding. The new responsibility meant that Farhan had to stop collecting khuwah, forego village tribute and begin recovering plundered property. Realizing that the cessation of khuwah collection and ghazw [Bedouin raiding] would result in an abatement in Shammar revenue, Reshid Pasha increased the monthly salary of sheikh Farhan.22 It is also understood that with this agreement the Shammar Jarba also became responsible for ensuring the security of the Mosul’s desert area.23 Initially 100 government soldiers were allocated, but they proved to be insufficient so the number was gradually increased.24 These soldiers were quite effective in recovering property that had been looted by tribes. When the paramount sheikhs tried to take advantage of the military weakness of the local government and demanded further concessions, the relations between paramount sheikhs and the governor deteriorated. When the sheikhs were uncooperative the governors looked for ways of weakening the tribal unity. This was usually done by withdrawing official recognition of the paramount sheikh and then

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by appointing a rival as tribal chieftain. If the provincial army was strong enough to chasten the uncompromising sheikh, military action was sometimes also taken. The ‘stick’ was used on at least two occasions. When the sheikhs refused to pay the promised amount of taxes and when they plundered the caravans and settled population, the governors usually responded with military action. These two factors were the main reasons for the battle against the Albu Muhammed tribe in summer of 1860.25 Military action was also taken when the sheikhs carried out arbitrary crimes such as killing or persecuting innocent people. To take an example, in September 1864 the sheikh of the Khazâ‘il tribal confederation, named Mutlak, committed serious crimes, including murder and torture (adam katl etmek ve göz ve kulak kesmek). When Hafız Pasha, head of the provincial soldiers, and Şibli Pasha, kaymakam of Divaniyah, marched against him, the sheikh of Khazâ‘il fled. Namık Pasha decided to appoint someone else to the meşîhat of Khazâ‘il, but Mutlak apologized and agreed to act obediently in future.26 The properties of disobedient sheikhs were usually confiscated by military force and they were sometimes sold by auction. For instance, in 1855/56 Reşid Pasha sold 600 camels belonging to Nasır, sheikh of Muntafiq, and the money obtained was used to build boats for the security forces on the Euphrates.27 Similarly, in March 1863, after the Shammar tribe had plundered some livestock, Namık Pasha took property of a corresponding value from the tribe. The stolen camels and the sheeps were given back to their owners, but the horses and mares were given to provincial cavalry units.28 There were also cases where the properties taken from the tribes were recorded by the provincial treasury as revenue.29 Occasionally, as stated above, such revenues were also distributed among the members of the provincial council. It should also be noted that as the number of soldiers in the Sixth Army increased, it became a greater deterrent to illegal action by the Iraqi tribes. The cases of Sufuk and Abdülkerim in the Shammar tribal confederation were perhaps among the more ruthless examples of ‘stick’. Sufuk’s popularity had long been in decline and he was in open rivalry with Najris, who was supported by the governor in Baghdad, Necip

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Pasha. In 1847 Sufuk tried to get the post of meşîhat by killing Najris while entertaining him in his tent as a guest. This murder ended the hospitality of the Shammar’s tent and this was considered to be a great embarrassment for the tribe. The despicable murder further weakened Sufuk’s situation within the tribe and soon afterwards he was killed by provincial soldiers.30 Abdülkerim’s case, approximately 30 years later, was more ruthlessly resolved. Abdülkerim, the paramount sheikh of the Shammar tribal confederation in the early 1870s, had long been in a state of overt rebellion. He wanted to benefit from Midhat Pasha’s military mobilization towards Najd, and marched towards the outskirts of Baghdad. Thanks to Nasır Pasha, who was then both the sheikh and mutasarrıf of Nasıriyah, Abdülkerim was arrested. After his trial in the council of appeal (meclis-i temyîz) in Baghdad, he was decapitated with the confirmation of the Sublime Porte.31 While relations between the local government and the Shammar tribal confederation remained for the most part uneasy, the relations with Muntafiq turned into collaboration and cordial alliance, especially after the latter’s incorporation into the provincial political apparatus and the establishment of the city of Nasıriyah.32 By the beginning of the 1870s, and especially during the governorship of Midhat Pasha, relations with the Muntafiq sheikh, Nasır, were quite positive and cooperative. Incorporation into the provincial political apparatus Another significant way of managing the tribes was to incorporate them into the provincial political system. This was done in several ways. First of all, tribal sheikhs were frequently appointed as mültezim and/or kaymakam. Another method was to employ them as members of the provincial councils. As mentioned in the previous chapter, sheikhs of leading tribal confederations such as Fahd and Mansur as-Sa’dun became members in the council of Baghdad. The principal purpose of the local government in Baghdad was to expand the government territories at the expense of tribal areas. Therefore, the local government used a policy of dividing the tribal

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areas into a number of tax-farming units. This policy not only served the process of de-tribalization but also drastically increased the tax revenues paid by the tribal sheikh tax-farmers.33 While military forces were, occasionally, used for the incorporation of tribal areas, changes in tribal leadership/paramount sheikhship were golden opportunities for this end. For example, during the rivalry for the meşîhat of Muntafiq in the early 1850s, the governor of Baghdad was able to obtain, among other things, a small piece of tribal land for the local government.34 A second, perhaps more important, way of co-opting tribal sheikhs was to make them rulers of their own region. In this way, they became representatives of the local government. This method was part of the de-tribalization policy and the office of kaymakamlık was the post used for this end. Parallel to improvements in the Provincial Law, tribal areas in Iraq were gradually transformed into kaymakamlıks, which meant the extension of the Ottoman administrative presence and the contraction of tribal areas. For instance, in order to cope with problems relating to security in the south of Mosul, Midhat Pasha combined the nahiyes of Jabal Sincar and Talafar so as to create a new kaymakamlık.35 In some areas the mechanism of kaymakamlık was instituted in order to reduce the powers of the tribes, and in other areas the tribal sheikhs were appointed as kaymakam. The creation of Darband kaymakamlığı was an example of the first kind. The local populace of Darband in Shahrizor was frequently exposed to oppression by the Shammar tribal confederation. To prevent the Shammar threat, Darband was turned into a kaymakamlık.36 The introduction of the Provincial (Vilâyet) Law of 1864 in Baghdad was salient in extending the Ottoman administrative presence at the expense of tribal dominions. The creation of new administrative units, such as kaymakamlıks and sancaks, in tribal areas was quite crucial for the process of de-tribalization and sedentarization of the Iraqi tribes. However, the appointment of tribal sheikhs as kaymakam was not new. Necip Pasha had, for the first time, implemented a policy of appointing tribal sheikhs and military commanders as kaymakam-mültezim.37 The case of Muntafiq provides a good example of the transformation of a tribal confederation into a kaymakamlık. During the early 1850s, the turmoil that resulted from the rivalry for the meşîhat of Muntafiq made

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Namık Pasha think about alternative solutions. Namık Pasha suggested the management of the Muntafiq tribal confederation through a kaymakam appointed by the governor in Baghdad.38 Although the kaymakamlık of Muntafiq was abolished for a short period,39 it was later restored by Ahmed Tevfik Pasha and Sheikh Bender was appointed as kaymakam. In the late 1850s Ömer Lütfi Pasha dismissed almost all military commanders and tribal sheikhs as district rulers because of their incompetence and corruption in collecting taxes from tribal areas.40 Ömer Pasha replaced them with civil officials as kaymakams and müdürs. As Kiyotaki explained: The district governor was prohibited from acquiring the right of tax-farming, while the tribal sheikh was in charge of collecting taxes in his domain. Appointing the district governor and his administrative staff from among government officials, Ömer Pasha attempted to exercise direct political control of the tribesmen and make the tribal sheiks directly subordinate to the Baghdad government.41 For example, Ömer Pasha tried to incorporate the tribes into the administrative system through the re-organization of the Divaniyah district: [He] appointed the colonel of the troops stationed in the district, Şibli Pasha, as the new governor, with a salary paid by the Baghdad treasury. The tribal areas in the Middle Euphrates – Diwaniya, Ufak, Dughara, Shamiya, Khazâ‘il and Haska – were re-organized into new administrative units (müdürlük) and placed under the larger unit of administration, the sancak of Diwaniya, with its center in Diwaniya.42 It appears that similar re-organizations were carried out in other districts such as Bani Lam and Muntafiq. In Muntafiq, there were frequent changes in the office of kaymakamlık. The fact that the Muntafiq kaymakams were at the same time mültezim was quite effective in this.

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The dismissed kaymakams had usually fallen from favor because of irregularities relating to tax. To take an example, Sheikh Bender was brought to trial because he was accused of hiding and embezzling tax revenues. It was for this reason that Sheikh Bender was replaced by Sheikh Mansur.43 Similarly, in 1864, the kaymakamlık of Muntafiq experienced significant reform. Twenty-two mukâta‘as from the tribal lands of Muntafiq were appropriated on behalf of the state and were tied to Basra and Aziziyah. The remaining mukâtaas formed a separate kaymakamlık for which Mansur Bey was appointed as kaymakam on a salary of 30,000 kuruş. When a new kaymakamlık was created, certain officials were also appointed to that place. Accordingly, a muhasebeci (accountant), mal kâtibi, Arabic and Turkish clerks and sandık emini were appointed.44 The introduction of a modern state apparatus meant the strengthening of the Ottoman hold in these regions. Consequently, as Charles Tripp rightly observed, the co-optation of the sheikhs into provincial administration, either through kaymakamlık/mutasarrıflık or membership in the provincial councils, ensured a remarkable absence of rural disturbance in the province of Baghdad during the latter half of the nineteenth century.45 Appointing and dismissing the paramount sheikh The process of tribal succession was closely watched by Ottoman officials, because the death of a paramount sheikh could easily result in conflict among the possible candidates for the vacant position, and such conflict tended to have a negative effect on provincial security. The process of sheikhly succession was also important in that the local government could benefit if the right candidate was successful. If the relations between a particular tribe and the government were problematic, then the government could opt to weaken the tribe by playing off the rival sheikhs against each other. However, if the aim was not to weaken a particular tribe, then the Ottomans usually followed certain criteria for the election of a paramount sheikh. The events following the death of Fahd, paramount sheikh of the Muntafiq tribal confederation, tell us about what these

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criteria were.46 When Fahd died in 1848, Sheikhs Faris and Mansur began to struggle for the meşîhat. It seems that the local officials were quite influential in the sheikhly succession, because it was Maşuk Pasha, mutasarrıf of Basra, who first appointed Faris for the meşîhat. Since the Muntafiq tribe dominated the tribal area around Basra, Maşuk Pasha was the first official to handle the problem. When the problem of succession was not solved, then the provincial governor and müşîr of the Sixth Army intervened. Faris agreed to pay the unpaid compound taxes and also to increase the amount of tax levied on Muntafiq; hence, he was brought by Maşuk Pasha to the meşîhat.47 Discontented with the appointment of Faris, Mansur gained the support of several tribes, notably the Zafîr and Zubaid tribes. Then, Mansur marched against Faris and after a short conflict he was able to depose him from meşîhat and proclaim himself paramount sheikh.48 This time Faris began to secure the support of the leading tribal confederations of Iraq, such as the Anaza and Shammar tribal confederations. The conflict was about to turn into a battle among the leading tribal confederations of the country. Abdi Pasha (1849–50) believed that such an inter-tribal conflict would mean the devastation of the local people by the Bedouins. As the result of correspondence between the Sublime Porte, the mutasarrıf of Basra (Maşuk Pasha) and Abdi Pasha, it was decided that Faris was to be called to Baghdad and arrested on his arrival. Although at the beginning Faris was declared to be the paramount sheikh, his unruly and disobedient behavior made it clear that he would not fulfill his promises. Opting for Mansur, as Abdi Pasha suggested, seemed a wiser option for the Sublime Porte. However, Mansur was not a reliable candidate either. When he arrived at Suq ash Shuyukh, the political and commercial center of the Muntafiq, Mansur demanded that Maşuk Pasha send him a robe of investiture (hil‘at), which would mean the official confirmation of his paramount sheikhship.49 Not only this but Mansur’s brother, Nasır, gathered 5,000 tribesmen and stayed approximately 50 days in Basra, forcing Maşuk Pasha to confirm his paramount sheikhship. During this period the tribesmen pillaged local and foreign merchants and the route between Baghdad and Basra was almost cut.

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Maşuk Pasha told Nasır that it was not the mutasarrıf of Basra, but the governor in Baghdad who would confirm the meşîhat. However, for the sake of halting the growing unrest, Maşuk Pasha appointed Mansur reluctantly (and probably temporarily) as paramount sheikh. In the meantime, while the struggle between Faris and Mansur continued, Salih al-İyâ, who was one of the sheikhs of the tribe, was called to Baghdad by Namık Pasha. Surprisingly, Namık Pasha appointed Salih as paramount sheikh to Muntafiq and sent him to his tribe. The sheikh was accompanied by provincial soldiers and soldiers from the Uqayl tribe. In order to reinforce the paramount sheikhship of Salih, the governor also sent two ships to Basra. Upon Salih’s arrival at Suq ash Shuyukh, Maşuk announced that since Mansur had obtained the meşîhat by illegal means (by force), his sheikhship was not valid. Maşuk Pasha added that the paramount sheikhship of Salih al-İya had been confirmed by the governor in Baghdad.50 Seeing the arrival of Salih with provincial soldiers, Mansur had no choice other than to escape to the desert. Nevertheless, Salih’s meşîhat lasted for little more than a year, because he was dismissed and replaced by Mansur again.51 The reason for Salih’s dismissal was that he had failed to pay the whole of the agreed annual payment. Salih was arrested and kept under custody in Baghdad. Mansur was given a sword and a robe of investiture. The dispute over the meşîhat of Muntafiq was eventually resolved, but the whole struggle, which continued almost four years, gives considerable insight into the Ottoman politics of tribe. There were several points which Ottoman officials took into consideration during the appointment and dismissal of paramount sheikhs. First of all, military strength was quite vital both in dismissing and reinforcing a sheikh. Secondly, the period of harvest was taken into consideration. Even if the sheikh was recalcitrant, no military action was taken during this period to allow the harvest to be collected. In 1851 Namık Pasha considered dismissing Faris, but he did not dare, because he owed two years’ unpaid taxes.52 Furthermore, when the Sublime Porte could not determine which side to support in the rivalry between the candidates, Abdi Pasha underlined the important criteria for appointing a paramount sheikh

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in Muntafiq. He drew attention to the responsibilities of the sheikh, rather than his personal characteristics. Accordingly, the focus was not on personalities, but who could fulfill the responsibilities towards the local government in Muntafiq. In general, the paramount sheikh should be someone who would cooperate with the local government and assure the reform (ıslâhât) of the region. The Sublime Porte emphasized the continuity of earlier responsibilities and promises of the tribe. In particular, the sheikh should repair and renovate the river walls without resorting to the Ottoman subsidy.53 The paramount sheikh was recognized by the provincial government under the term of fixed tributes (called mal-ı mîrî) determined upon the acknowledgement of his sheikhship.54 The candidate sheikh should also assure an increase in the payment of this tribute to the local government. In this context, the rivalry for meşîhat gave the Ottoman Empire the golden opportunity to increase the taxes levied on the tribe. During the above-mentioned rivalry between Faris and Mansur the annual tax levied on the Muntafiq tribal confederation was increased to 250,000 şâmî (2,107,000 kuruş). It appears that the meşîhat of the tribe was tax-farmed by auction for a certain period, usually three years. The change in the tribal leadership of Muntafiq at the beginning of 1868 gives an illustrative example. Upon the termination of Fahd al-Alî’s meşîhat, Fahd and Nasır as-Sa’dun, who was among the tribal notables, were brought to Baghdad for the auction. When Nasır increased the annual tribal tax by one-third, Fahd gave up the auction and the meşîhat was given to Nasır.55 However, it should also be noted that the highest bid was not enough to gain the meşîhat; the sheikh was also required to guarantee the general security of the region. Settling of the tribes Getting the tribes to settle down was probably the most important phase of Ottoman politics of tribe. This process was closely associated with the incorporation of the tribal notables into the provincial political mechanism. Settling the tribe was essential in restraining Bedouins and incorporating them into the provincial political system.

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It was in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries that the Ottoman central administration attempted to clarify the legal status of tribes and put emphasis on the settlement of the nomadic or semi-nomadic tribes, because only then would the tribesmen be incorporated into the established regime of the Ottoman state.56 The settlement policy was further strengthened during the nineteenth century and it became one of the targets of Tanzimat policies.57 Shortly after the proclamation of Tanzimat, the imperial center ordered a statistical survey of the tribes and their taxable properties. The Fırka-i Islahiye, which was established in 1865, was quite successful in persuading the tribes in southeast Anatolia to settle down. As far as the Arab provinces were considered, at first there was no central policy of settling the nomadic tribes in Syria or Iraq.58 In Iraq the settlement policy came to be felt more overtly in the early 1850s, more specifically after Namık Pasha’s governorship, and continued until the end of Ottoman rule. As a transition to settled life, the central government at first restricted tribal mobility to movements between the mountain pastures and winter base. Later, the imperial policy required the allocation of certain parts of the country for the nomadic tribes to settle, build houses and form new villages. The tools required to carry out settled agriculture were sometimes provided by the local government in Baghdad. Tribesmen have been known throughout history to shift occasionally from nomadic to sedentary or semi-sedentary life and vice versa, and the interconnection between agricultural communities and the desert societies adjacent to them can therefore be quite close.59 In this context, it can be said that the level of nomadism increased with distance from the urban centers. Accordingly, the immediate surroundings of the cities were populated by semi-nomads and agriculturalists. In Ottoman Iraq, the central and southern parts of the country, which were dominated by Arabs, were more nomadic when compared to the Kurdish-dominated north. Though the Kurds were not as mobile as the southern Arabs, the existing insecurity (not only in the region but also within the Kurdish emirates) prevented their conversion into mere cultivators.60 Despite this insecurity the solution of the

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British officials was to deprive the ‘restless and turbulent’ Kurds of their arms and take away their tents: Perhaps the surest way to convert these restless and turbulent Koords into peaceable cultivators of soil would be to deprive them of their arms and to take away entirely their tents. The first measure would prevent their being otherwise than peaceable, and the last would check effectually their wandering and oblige them to inhabit villages ... The sultan’s government would then be doubly strengthened by the increase of revenue and by the conversion of a rebellious unproductive population into an orderly and productive class of subjects.61 The case of the Jaf tribe in Sulaimaniyah was an important example of the settlement of a Kurdish tribe. The Jaf tribe was a bordercrossing tribe which spent the summers in Iran and the winters in Sulaimaniyah. In 1869, the mutasarrıf of Sulaimaniyah concluded an agreement with Muhammad Bey, the sheikh of the tribe. According to the agreement, a copy of which was sent to the provincial center, Muhammad Bey was to be appointed as the kaymakam of Gülanber with a monthly salary of 5,000 kuruş and a muavin (assistant) was to accompany him. Muhammad Bey, with his entourage, would settle and engage with the affairs of the kaymakamlık and cease to migrate to Iran. In return, the tribesmen would be engaged in agriculture and exempted from öşür (tithe) taxation for five years. The sheikh also agreed to hand over 30 tribesmen during the enlistment period.62 The agreement was approved by the provincial administrative council and upon the request of Muhammad Bey, the sheikh and his son were honored with the titles of mîru’l-umerâ and kapıcıbaşı respectively. Yet, as one shifts from Kurdish north to Arab south, it can be seen that the politics of settling the nomadic tribes was far more extensive in southern Iraq. The procedure was usually as follows: first the governor allocated a particular region for the settlement of a certain tribe. Depending on the size of the tribe, the region was usually transformed into a kaymakamlık or sancak. For instance, in 1862 Namık Pasha was able to settle the Albu Muhammad tribe. Even before then, in 1859,

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as a result of the de-tribalization process and the ‘divide and rule’ method, the Albu Muhammad tribe had been separated from Bani Lâm district.63 Therefore, the tribe was already weakened and Namık Pasha merely made the final move in 1862. He created a new sancak and built a military barracks, a government house and a mosque.64 Namık Pasha had also tried to settle the Muntafiq tribal confederation in a sancak. When he was opposed by the tribe, he divided the northern and southern parts of the sheikhdom, and tied the northern part to Divaniyah in the sancak of Hillah while the southern part was centered on Basra.65 Then in 1863, Namık Pasha tried to deconstruct and turn the sheikhdom into an administrative sancak, centered on Suq ash Shuyukh. He had appointed the paramount sheikh, Mansur as-Sa’dun, who had been a member of the administrative council of Baghdad for two years, as mutasarrıf of Suq ash Shuyukh. Namık Pasha also sent several administrative officials, including clerks and an accountant.66 However, his attempts in Muntafiq lasted only two months, because some of the sheikhs/tribes refused to submit to the Ottoman central authority. Consequently, the status quo in Muntafiq was retained until the governorship of Midhat Pasha. Though Namık Pasha’s efforts were a break from the former politics of tribe, his efforts to solve tribal issues were not as successful as Midhat Pasha’s. In attempting to introduce the vilâyet system, Midhat Pasha paid considerable attention to the settlement of nomadic tribes. The new approach towards Iraqi tribes under Namık Pasha and Midhat Pasha differed from former policies in that these governors deliberately sought an alternative to previous policies and put greater emphasis on the settlement of tribes in a particular region to cultivate the land. Midhat Pasha started where Namık Pasha left off. He took steps to convert the Muntafiq territory into a sancak, inducing the tribe to settle down in one spot.67 The Muntafiq region had formerly been given as a tax-farm to the sheikh of the tribe, but this was not appropriate under the new vilâyet system. Midhat Pasha called Nasır Pasha, sheikh of the Muntafiq, to Baghdad for consultation. Under a compromise between the Muntafiq sheikh and the governor, a new town was established and made a sancak.68 Midhat Pasha settled the Muntafiq

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in this new town, called Nasıriyah after the name of the sheikh of the tribe. Nasır, who was also given the honorary title ‘pasha’, became the mutasarrıf of the sancak and the tax-farming system in Muntafiq was abolished. On his return to his tribe, Nasır Pasha was accompanied by three Turkish officials to assist him in introducing the proposed reforms and 200 foot of the newly organized police, as a model force.69 It was proposed that the Muntafiq paramount sheikh should be encouraged to persuade his tribesmen to build a city on the banks of the Tigris. To this end, he was supplied with a plan of the proposed town, and Midhat Pasha announced that those who built and occupied houses would be exempted in perpetuity from the capitation tax of 50 piasters per annum, while it would continue to be levied on those dwelling in tents. The British consulate reports indicate that no objection was raised to the settlement project and that all went smoothly in Muntafiq.70 Similarly, because of their unruly behavior and frequent plundering, Midhat Pasha wanted to settle the Shammar tribal confederation gradually along the Tigris River, between Tikrit and Mosul. He encouraged the tribe to adopt settled agriculture and promised to take nothing except the tithe tax. He also announced his intention to grant title deeds (tapu) to the members of the tribe. In a letter to the Sublime Porte Midhat Pasha stated that if the pilot settlement was successful, then he wanted to settle the whole Shammar tribal confederation under a new sancak, called Shammar, like that of the Muntafiq in Nasıriyah. The sheikh of the tribe, Farhan Pasha, had no alternative but to accept Midhat Pasha’s offer for settlement, because due to a famine the year before, many of the tribe’s animals had perished and the tribesmen were facing rising prices. Upon his acceptance Farhan Pasha was given a buyruldu that made him the mutasarrıf of the new sancak of Shammar.71 It seems that Midhat Pasha, after a long period of persuasion and attempts to achieve a consensus, used some kind of threat to persuade the Shammar leader.72 Midhat Pasha’s efforts were not limited to Muntafiq and Shammar. The Pasha established the town of Ramadi to encourage the settlement of the Upper Euphrates tribes. There is no doubt

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that the establishment of new towns had visible effects not only on the sedentarization of neighboring nomads, but also on the urbanization of Ottoman Iraq. Consequently, in his relatively short period of tenure Midhat Pasha made considerable progress in settling the nomadic tribes. This was crucial in dissolving the tribal structure of the province. The settlement of nomadic and semi-nomadic tribes contributed greatly to the security of the province. The Land Code of 1858, the implementation of which will be explained below, also aimed to curb the power of the sheikhs and notables and to bring the individual fellahs to the forefront. It stressed the individual rights of the fellahs as opposed to the tribal authority of the sheikh. Despite the side effects of the implementation of the Land Code, Midhat Pasha was successful in drawing the tribal sheikhs into a political game. There is no doubt that the late nineteenth century witnessed the decline of great tribal confederations and this was reflected in the general welfare, prosperity and security of the province. For instance, the marshlands of southern Iraq, and date-palm culture, became more prosperous with pacification and settlement. It is crystal clear that the tendency in the second half of the nineteenth century was sedentarization of the nomadic tribes in Baghdad. The percentage of nomadic groups in Iraq’s population declined from 35% in the late 1860s to 17% in 1905.73 This trend was also confirmed by the European travelers and residents, who reported a notable increase in the level of settlement and security after 1865.74 The settlement of the nomadic tribes gave them a closer connection with the land, a subject to which we shall now turn.

Land-holding patterns in Baghdad and the implementation of land reforms The land system of Iraq was the most important aspect of provincial life that needed to be reformed. Most of the problems, especially those related to security issues, originated from the corrupt nature of the land system, because the tribal structure of the region was based on the land. In this regard, the modernization of Baghdad was very much

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related to the land problems of the province; therefore, the implementation of the Ottoman Land Code of 1858 was of great importance. The Land Code of 1858 was certainly one of the most important Tanzimat reforms. It was with the proclamation of the Tanzimat that the iltizam (tax-farming) system, as the land system of the empire for centuries, was abolished and tax-farmers were replaced by regular officials (muhassıls) to collect the provincial taxes, including land taxes. Although the institution of muhassıllık did not survive long, the Tanzimat period witnessed significant regulations concerning the land regime of the empire. In this context, the land reform of 1858 was a revolutionary step in the Ottoman Empire, which was basically agrarian in nature. The Land Code, which was made up of 132 articles, divided Ottoman land into five main categories: 1) Mülk75 Land, 2) Mîrî76 Land, 3) Vakıf Land, 4) Metrûka77 Land, 5) Mevât78 Land. However, mîrî and mülk lands were the most significant of these five categories, because the others were in some way included under these two types of land. For instance, mevât land could be included within the mîrî category.79 If someone brought mevât land into cultivation, s/he obtained the usufructory rights (tasarruf hakkı), transforming the land into mîrî status.80 Under Ottoman agrarian laws, land ownership comprised two rights: the raqaba, the right of absolute ownership, and the tasarruf, the usufruct right of the land. In mülk land both of these rights belonged to the individual, whereas in the mîrî land the absolute ownership belonged to the state, but the usufruct belonged to the individual. In the mîrî land, the raqaba was always vested in the state, which meant in practice that it was the state that had the right to tax the occupier of the land or exact labor from them.81 However, this did not imply any control over the use of land, or any degree of responsibility for its cultivation. In this context, the basic premise of the code was the re-assertion of the state’s right of raqaba and its right to grant tasarruf to the lessees.82 Many scholars regard the Land Code of 1858 as a revolutionary reform in the empire, sometimes overemphasizing the article concerning private property (Article 38). Thus, it is argued that the Land Code heralded the start of a new period in the Ottoman Empire. However, the Code should

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be put in its proper historical perspective and considered as the codification of the overall Ottoman land system. As Gerber remarked: The law was no more and no less than a re-enactment of classical fifteenth and sixteenth-century Ottoman kanuns relating to agrarian matters, with some minor modifications ... Thus, there was historical and legal continuity between the old agrarian laws and the 1858 land law.83 To show the legal continuity in the agrarian reforms, the following examples will be useful. The application of delivery of title deed (tapu senedi), which was the most important feature of the 1858 Land Code, was implemented a decade previously. In accordance with the Tapu Law of 1847, it was announced that a document issued by the government authorities would be required for all changes of land tenure.84 Last but not least, just a few months before the announcement of the Land Code of 1858, an amendment concerning the extension of hereditary rights from the son to other kin was accepted. This meant that the central authority recognized larger and larger rights of use, and the mîrî lands assumed a de facto quasi-mülk nature.85 It is evident that the most important novelty that the Land Code introduced was the obligation for every landowner to register his/her (mîrî) land and receive a title deed. According to Article 78, the peasants who occupied certain land for ten consecutive years could register the land without any payment.86 On the other hand, unclaimed vacant lands could now be registered on payment of a certain sum of money. Moreover, the Code re-emphasized continuity in agriculture: should the land be left uncultivated for three or more years, the government had the right to transfer it to third parties. Article 38 of the Code, which is interpreted by many scholars as paving the way for private property in the Ottoman Empire for the first time, states that ‘a possessor by title-deed of State land can ... transfer it to another, by way of gift, or for a fixed price’.87 In fact, two terms of the land code have sometimes been misinterpreted, namely title deed (tapu) and purchase (satış).88 These terms have been interpreted in such a way as to imply private ownership. However, one should

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not forget that the delivery of the title deed does not mean that the land for which title was given was absolutely a private land; on the contrary, it is very well known that the central government delivered title deeds not for absolute ownership, but for the usufructory right of state (mîrî) lands. As a corollary of this, what was being sold was not the absolute ownership (raqaba) of the land, but only the usufruct right (tasarruf) of it. That the state retained the ownership of the land prevented the development of private property rights in the Ottoman Empire. Until 1926, the state kept the absolute ownership of the state land in its hands. It would be more proper to interpret the extension of the usufructory rights in the mid-nineteenth century as leading to ‘quasi-ownership’, rather than absolute private property rights.89

Between the tribes and the local government: The land in Ottoman Iraq The land of Ottoman Iraq comprised mainly harâcî and öşrî lands.90 During the caliphate of Omar after the conquest of Iraq, the land there was considered to be arâzi-i harâciye and accordingly Caliph Omar made it an inalienable common property of the Islamic state, rather than distributing it among the Muslim soldiers. Therefore, the status of Iraqi land took its institutional form in the first century of Islam. Unlike the mîrî lands, the harâcî lands were supervised under the şer‘i law and were exempted from tithe (öşr) payment; instead, there was a land tax known as harâc. Another limitation of Islamic law upon harâcî lands was that their sale was forbidden.91 While the harâcî land dominated the central and the southern part of the province, the northern region was mainly öşriye lands. The legal status of the land, however, changed in the course of time and the concept of harâc in effect disappeared and the land was put into the status of mîrî land.92 Despite its new status as mîrî land; however, the Ottoman claim of ownership was not effective. Even the government’s right to a share of the produce, as rent or tax, was not enjoyed directly by the government. The central government was not able to determine the choice of tenants, to control the regime of cultivation, or to weaken the domination of tribal custom.93 Kiyotaki, quoting

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from British consular reports, pointed out that the distribution of land tenure as of 1861 was as follows: 82% state (mîrî) land (including vakıf land), 12% mülk land, and 6% temlik land.94 The land of Iraq was different from other lands in terms of legal and practical aspects. Unlike the usual practice throughout the empire, in Baghdad the usufructory right of the land belonged to the state, as was the case in state farms (çiftlikât-ı mîriyye). There were very few lands that were considered to be private (mülk) lands: these were small orchards and some date gardens.95 Furthermore, the fertile land was divided into pieces known as mukâta‘a, which was the unit of area irrigated by a major irrigation canal. The farmers worked as sharecroppers or tenants at will. The mukâta‘as were auctioned as tax-farms to taxfarmers. The seeds were provided by the state and two-thirds of the harvest was taken by the government, with the remaining one-third given to the peasants.96 The patterns of land tenure in Baghdad differed from place to place. For instance, the government share of winter grain crops differed in dry farming and irrigated areas: While it was one-tenth of the produce in the former, the share taken for irrigated fields was one-fifth.97 Besides, as the peasants could not afford to pay for seeds and irrigation, the taxfarmer provided the seeds as agricultural partner and made the peasant cultivate summer crops from which he took a share varying between five-sixths and eight-ninths of the produce.98 That is to say, because of the expenses of seeds, irrigation and land reclamation, the government share in the south was higher than the north. But this high government share was compensated for by the high fertility of the southern lands. As the peasants in the northern areas were more attached to the land and therefore had more control of the land and its produce, the agricultural partnership was a good way for the tax-farmer to increase his profits.99 As Moosa pointed out, while the share of Kurdish aghas from the crop was 10 or 20%, the sheikh’s or the sarkal’s share was one-half to two-thirds.100 Unlike the northern region, in the central and southern region, Agriculture was performed by semi-settled tribesmen and other agrarian workers using the seeds of the tax farmer, so that the

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crops were divided among the tax farmer, tribesmen, agrarian workers and other people entitled in the land, by the proportion of shares determined by local custom ... The relationship of the tax farmer with the peasant tribesmen in the central and southern districts was determined by a system of crop-sharing in the field, because the peasant tribesmen did not have have the right of possession of the land nor any control over crops other than their own shares. The tax farmer was the key man in this system, because he not only provided the seeds for cultivation but also shared political control over the cultivating peasant tribesmen with the government.101

Causes of the decline of Iraqi agriculture Though the land of Ottoman Iraq was vast and its population very large, the region was unable to achieve peace and prosperity for a long time. Despite the high fertility of Mesopotamia, most land was left vacant and useless. Many travelers and governors drew attention to the dichotomy between the agricultural potential and former prosperity of the land and its current unproductiveness. This dichotomy was mainly due to the prevailing land regime in the province and the inability of the peasants to use the land properly and to benefit from its produce. The unproductiveness and idleness of the land dated back to the second half of the seventeenth century and, as many of the governors in Baghdad emphasized, it was the land regime that led to frequent rebellions and eventually resulted in the social and economic decline of the province.102 The most outstanding problem resulting from the land regime was that since both the absolute ownership and the usufructory right belonged to the state, the peasants could not develop a sense of belonging to the land on which they were working. For a long time they worked the land without any title deeds, which was against the law on title deeds (tapu nizâmnâmesi). They were unable to plant trees, or construct houses on the land. Hence, there were no ties between the cultivator and the land. Since they had nothing (for instance farms, trees, etc.) to lose, it was easier for the local population to give

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up cultivation and participate in the rebellions. The peasants had to be contented with a small share of the produce (hisse-i fellâhiye), but it was highly probable that even this small share would be further apportioned by the tax-farmer or sheikh.103 Therefore, as Mustafa Nuri Pasha, governor of Baghdad (1858–60) remarked in a report to the Sublime Porte, ‘the fellâhîn did not consider any piece of land as their homeland (vatan) and hence, they did not have an inclination and affection for agriculture’.104 Midhat Pasha, in 1870, complained about the same problem: Apart from other natural conditions, the improvement and vivification of the land is contingent upon the usufructory rights of its cultivator. Despite this, most of Iraq’s land was administered by tax-farming and it was not committed to the charge of any person. Therefore, the tax-farmers were aiming at increasing their revenues given the limited time of tax-farm, rather than improving the land. Consequently, the desired development in agriculture and peasantry had not been realized.105 Therefore, the fertile soil of Mesopotamia became, in time, infertile and fallow. Mustafa Nuri Pasha explained the peasants’ disaffection and reluctance to till the land, and thus the decline of agriculture by giving the following example: for a mukâta‘a whose value is 100,000 kuruş, the needed amount of expenditure was twice its value (200,000 kuruş). Since the tax-farmer does not want such a high expenditure for the control of that mukâta‘a only for one year, he does not attempt to clear the river (canal) basin flowing to his mukâta‘a and he does not till the land properly.106 Moreover, during times of natural disasters like flood and drought, or tribal uprisings against the government, there was considerable risk that the tax-farmer would not be able to collect his share. Mustafa Nuri Pasha noted: As a consequence, the value of the mukâta‘a naturally diminishes and the land is left in ruins. For the next year, there appears no one desiring that mukâta‘a; even powerful and wealthy people

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show no demand for that piece of land. Therefore, this land had to be administered by the state itself, and this means that the state had to spent a lot of money on it. However, the money was not forthcoming and with the passing of time the canal is filled with mud, making the clearance of the canal more difficult.107 There were also cases where tax-farmers could not pay the promised amount of tax. In such cases, the guarantor of the tax-farmer was required to pay his debt. If the guarantor was unable to do so, the tax-farmer could be imprisoned and the mukâta‘a was given to another tax-farmer.108 However, sometimes the local government, in order to raise extra revenue, could cancel the contract and give it to those who offered higher prices. The tribal structure in the province had its share in the prevailing patterns of land tenure. Tribalism, which was stronger in the countryside, was certainly the most striking obstacle to proper land use before the Ottoman reforms in the region. Hence, in the first half of the nineteenth century the authority of the central administration hardly extended to the tribal countryside. The people in the tribal areas were almost outside the sphere of provincial administration. As a corollary of this, the government was able to collect very little tax from these areas.

Communal ownership of the land Owing to the strong tribal ties, the land in Baghdad was owned communally. The land was controlled neither by the small landholders nor the large landholders, but by the tribe as a whole. Each tribe of the confederation had its Dirah,109 which included not only the land actually tilled, but also non-cultivated land and marshlands. Dirah was the land over which the tribe exercised sovereign rights rather than that of exclusive ownership. The tribal Dirah was commonly owned and comprised mostly land used for grazing, with small cultivated areas.110 Within the tribal dira individual prescriptive rights to land were known (lazma, nagsha etc.) but these were restricted to a small class in the tribe, in areas permanently cultivated. For the most

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part there was no individual ownership, since occupancy of a fixed plot of land for a long period was not usual. The cultivators were mobile, cultivation was not their only occupation, and livestock grazing remained the most important alternative.111 [italics added] According to the tribal customs, the land was divided into shares with the sheikh taking from one-sixth to one-half and the remainder apportioned equitably among the sections of the tribe.112 The actual cultivators were individual families or household units who worked on separate parcels. In fact, communal ownership was not unique to Baghdad. At the time when the Ottoman Land Code of 1858 was promulgated, most of the lands in the Middle East were under collective ownership, either in the form of the mush’a system as in Palestine, or in the form of tribal ownership, as in Baghdad province.113 The Land Code, however, prohibited the recognition of any form of collective ownership. Indeed, abrogation of communal ownership was one of the purposes of the Code: The whole land of a village or a town cannot be granted in its entirety to all of the inhabitants nor to one or two persons chosen from amongst them. Separate pieces are granted to each inhabitant and a title is given to each showing this right of possession.114 Furthermore, the Code recognized a prescriptive right only to individual cultivators who could prove actual possession and cultivation of a particular piece of land for at least ten years. These people had the right to take the tapu without any payment. In Baghdad, however, it was almost impossible for any claimant to title whether peasant, lazma (prescriptive rights) holder, or sheikh ‘to prove that the origin of his claim was derived from one of the three roots of title recognized in Ottoman law, namely devolution by inheritance (intikâl), purchase from the previous owner and grant by competent authority’.115 Therefore, the Code directly conflicted with the tribal custom in

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Ottoman Iraq. It is argued that this was mainly due to the fact that the Code was designed to fit the conditions in Anatolia and Balkans, where peasant proprietors actually existed. However, here one should not forget the Code’s aim of ending tribal ownership. The use of serkârs as the agent of powerful sheikhs and the share of ukr (‫ )ﻋﻗﺮ‬were other important characteristics of tribal land tenure in Baghdad. It was through the serkârs that the sheikhs leased the lands to share-tenants. Matti Moosa summarizes the role of the serkâr as follows: These serkals played the role of agents and landlords at the same time. Never a cultivator himself, the serkal usually took part of the crop from both the cultivator and the sheikh. His share from the fellâh was greater than that from the sheikh, reaching in some cases one tenth of the net crop. The fellâh leased the land directly from the sheikh or from the serkal, for which he paid rent of half of his crop or more. The fellâh sometimes provided his labor only, the sheikh providing the seed and tools. The fellâh then received a very small share of the crop, called hissat al maghbun (the loser’s share). In some cases the fellâh worked on the land as a laborer and got his wages in cash or as a meager part of the crop. The fellâh who cultivated the land under the burden of debt was always loser.116 The serkâr was usually the chief of the cultivating peasant tribesmen, but occasionally the village headman could act as serkâr as well.117 The serkârs gained further importance towards the end of the century.

Changes in the status quo and the implementation of the Land Code in Baghdad As the local government began to extend its authority towards the tribal areas, it started to implement tax-farming and control agriculture in these areas. By appointing the tribal sheikh as tax-farmer, the government could collect taxes from the tribesmen. There were many tribal sheikhs who gained the control of mukâta‘as by means

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of auctions. However, the close circle of the governors, the ulema, and the urban notables also received their share of the pie. For example, during Ali Rıza Pasha’s governorship (1831–42), the right to tax-farm was given to relatives of the governor, senior bureaucrats, commanders and local notables in the province. This nepotism/favoritism was not unique to Ali Rıza Pasha, because his successor, Necip Pasha, also farmed out mukâta‘as, especially the district of Hindiyyah, to his son Ahmed Pasha.118 Such acts of nepotism usually resulted in corruption and the dismissal of the governor, as in the case of Necip Pasha. Necip Pasha’s term of office (1842–49) witnessed a novelty concerning the role of the tribal sheikhs in tax-farming. The tribal sheikhs were for the first time appointed as district governor (kaymakam) and tax-farmer at the same time.119 Though the agricultural revenue of the province increased significantly, the tax collection was very troublesome. The inexperience of tribal sheikhs at tax-farming and coercion on the part of tax collectors to increase the amount collected, motivated by Necip Pasha’s desire to raise more revenue than his annual badal payment, paved the way for coercive applications in the province.120 All these developments triggered a tribal uprising that soon spread throughout the Middle Euphrates and ended with the dismissal of Necip Pasha in June 1849.121 He was replaced by the commander in chief (müşîr) of Sixth Army, Abdülkerim Nadir (Abdi) Pasha. It seems that when compared with Baghdad, the land reforms were implemented earlier in Mosul. The sale of the usufructory right of vacant lands started just after the enactment of the Tapu Law of 1847. In 1848 Vecihi Pasha, then governor of Mosul, was allowed to grant the usufructory right of vacant lands to peasants with title deeds.122 He was well aware that the people in the province were not accustomed to the practice of holding title deeds; therefore, he preferred to explain the benefits of land registration and then encourage people to gain ownership of land. He also foresaw that if some peasants owned land, then the remaining peasants would see the benefits of land ownership and would also want to gain ownership of their land. Vecihi Pasha must have been successful in persuading the people of Mosul, because due to the increase in tapu transactions in Mosul, an additional land official was appointed in 1856.123

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Although there were several tapu officials in Mosul, the Ottoman archival documents indicate that even by 1862 there were none in Shahrizor (Kirkuk). In the same year, one of the tapu officials in Mosul was replaced by Abdurrahman Vasfi Bey and his area of responsibility was extended to include Shahrizor; that is to say, the tapu offices of Mosul and Shahrizor were combined.124 Abdurrahman Vasfi’s familiarity with the tribal structure of the area played an important role in his appointment to the combined office. The tapu officials were sometimes criticized for their lack of knowledge of the land issues of the region and for not inspecting the land for which they issued title deeds.125 However, the same archival document reveals that before his appointment, the candidate was given an exam so that he had to prove his knowledge and experience concerning the area in question and the land issues.126 Furthermore, for his early months in the office, he was given a relatively high salary, 1,500 kuruş, to enable him to travel and gain further proficiency concerning land issues. One of the leading governors who contributed to the agricultural development of Baghdad was Reşid Pasha (1852–57). It was during his term of office that the practice of land tenure, which had been governed by tribal custom, regional practices and Ottoman and Islamic laws, began to change, becoming more subject to the Ottoman land laws.127 He continued Necip Pasha’s policy of appointing tribal sheikhs and military commanders as kaymakam-mültezim. Reşid Pasha is frequently referred to as the governor in whose term agricultural production increased drastically. As Kiyotaki noted, Reşid Pasha attempted to increase agricultural production by selling the usufructory right of vacant land to private persons. The peasant who bought the land was expected to carry out irrigation and land reclamation in his fields.128 In farming out deserted land to the tax-farmer Reşid Pasha provided financial supports such as ‘a grant-in-aid for the cost of seeds and the cleaning of irrigation canals and a reduction in the tax owned or in some cases, a tax exemption for several years’.129 The Pasha also encouraged the tribes to take up agriculture. In this context, he gave vast lands to tribes. Kiyotaki further mentions that Reşid Pasha attempted to give title deeds to tribal sheikhs for their cultivated lands upon their payment of land’s tapu value, similar to the way that Vecihi Pasha

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attempted to sell the land to the Jaf tribe in its winter dwelling places. However, Reşid Pasha’s endeavor failed because the tapu was sold by the tribal sheikhs to others, especially Persians and non-Muslims.130 The provincial notables were the primary beneficiaries of the ‘politics of grain’. The local merchants, moneylenders, the tribal sheikhs and non-Muslims (especially the Jewish community) were among the ‘favored dealers’ of the provincial governors.131 The Jews, who held a number of monopolies, improved their wealth and prosperity during the governorship of Reşid Pasha.132 They accumulated wealth by hoarding grain and then selling it at exorbitant prices. The capital they accumulated also enabled them to act as guarantors for the mültezims.133 Besides the Jews, Vadi (sheikh of Zubaid) and Mansur (sheikh of Muntafiq) were other prominent dealers in the politics of the grain trade.134 The provincial government of Baghdad usually opted not to interfere in the relationship between the tribal sheikh and the tribesmen. Earlier, the tribal sheikhs had been appointed as kaymakam/mültezim; that is to say, they were both district governors and tax-farmers. However, as the tribal sheikhs proved to be corrupt, Ömer Lütfi Pasha dismissed and replaced them with civil officials. As discussed in the previous chapter, while the civil officials took the administrative responsibility as kaymakam or müdürs, the tribal sheikhs retained the right to collect taxes in their domains. So, the tribal sheikhs came to be tax-farmers without administrative responsibility in their domains. The intervention of the administration in the relations between the tribal sheikh and the tribesmen, and closer control over the tribesmen, resulted in a considerable increase in the tax revenue collected by way of tax-farming.135 The increase in tax revenue led the provincial government to rely on the tribal sheikh as tax-farmer for fiscal and political control of the tribesmen in his domain.136 Ahmed Tevfik Pasha, governor of Baghdad in 1860–61, established a committee comprising specialists from the central government and local officials of Baghdad, including the director of agriculture, the director of the treasury and treasury officials.137 This committee was ordered to survey the agricultural situation in Baghdad and it prepared a report that included, among other things, suggestions on the

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transfer of usufructory rights. The report was sent to the Supreme Council (Meclis-i Vâlâ) in İstanbul, but due to Ahmed Tevfik Pasha’s short stay in office, (just 6 months and 22 days)138 no effective agricultural policy could be established. Midhat Pasha, who served in Baghdad as governor between 1869 and 1872, is often referred to as the first governor who implemented the Land Code in Baghdad.139 However, the archival documents indicate that the land policies had already begun to be introduced before his term in Baghdad. Recent studies that are based on Ottoman archival documents have similarly revealed that the implementation of the Land Code of 1858 began during the governorship of Namık Pasha.140 The fact that many title deeds were delivered during the governorship of Midhat Pasha led many scholars to date the enactment of the law from his governorship. This error was repeated by later scholars who based their research on secondary sources rather than consulting the Ottoman archives. Namık Pasha’s contribution to the agricultural developments in the province is an undeniable fact. He tried to solve the land problems by taking into account the reports prepared by previous governors. In 1865, another commission was formed to investigate the land situation and to identify the vacant land in the province. The purpose of the committee was to ‘take over the ownership of private (mülk; harâc) land, which was not cultivated and vacant’.141 The commission prepared a report and suggested, among other things, the delivery of title deed to those who obtained the usufructory right at auction.142 Later, the report was also ratified by the Supreme Council, and then returned to the province for implementation. Accordingly, the Sublime Porte confirmed that for the land plots to be sold in Baghdad, the provincial government was to grant temporary title deeds, which were to be renewed by the Defterhâne-i Âmire in İstanbul once the details concerning the land’s borders and its agricultural capacity/fertility had been sent to İstanbul.143 Namık Pasha’s governorship not only witnessed the reclamation of large tracts of land, but in 1866 he also appointed tapu officials in Baghdad. One of Namık Pasha’s reforming acts was to change the system of land tenure, because according to Islamic law the harâcî lands could not be sold. Hence, Namık Pasha changed the deserted private land to mîrî

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land by ‘providing a legal basis for determining ownership over deserted private land’; that is to say, the deserted private lands came to be considered as state land.144 However, when someone could prove his ownership of deserted private land with a valid title deed, he was officially granted the right of ukr and received an ukr share of the produce.145 This change in land tenure brought the ukr share to the forefront. The ukr lands were the lands, originally private, that were for some reason uncultivated and vacant so that the landowner could not pay the required tax. The reasons for the desertion of the land varied from high expenses (such as tax or irrigation costs) and tribal raids to extinction of ownership in default of inheritance. To prevent land being deserted and to raise further revenues, these lands (with both ownership and usufructory rights) were taken from their private owners with their consent and administered by the local government.146 As the government transferred the usufructory right of these lands to third persons, who could perform the land reclamation and cultivate the land, the landowner (the third person) was given an ukr share ranging from one-twentieth to one-thirtieth of the total produce, depending on local custom. However, when the ukr holder died in default of inheritance, the ukr arrangement was dissolved by the government.147 It was by means of this change in land tenure that governors in Baghdad could control deserted land and put it under the operation of the Land Code and other related laws.148 Accordingly, if the land was not cultivated for three years, the government could give it to others willing to cultivate it. The land could only be transferred to Ottoman subjects and not to foreign nationals, and was first offered to neighbors of the land. These changes in the land tenure were accompanied by the further extension of the Ottoman control in the tribal areas. Not only were the tribal areas divided so as to deconstruct the tribal structures, but also the tribal sheikhs were incorporated into the Ottoman administrative system.

Midhat Pasha and the Land Code The Land Code began to be introduced during Namık Pasha’s governorship; however, one cannot deny the role played by Midhat

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Pasha in the ultimate application of the land reform in the province. In the course of time, the transfer of ukr lands became more complicated, a situation that Midhat Pasha attempted to solve. It was only during his term of office that the land registration was intensively applied. Many scholars assert that Midhat Pasha was the first governor who fully understood the conditions of the Iraqi land tenure system and made this the basis of his policy.149 For Midhat Pasha, two factors were behind all the problems faced by Baghdad: the lack of an export outlet and the land problems of the province. All other difficulties were derivatives of these two.150 Indeed, the land policy he was pursuing was clearly inspired by the spirit of the Tanzimat.151 His endeavors pertaining to the land problems of the province should not be separated from the rest of his reform schemes. Midhat Pasha criticized the old practice of land tenure in Baghdad in which the usufructory right of the land was not given to the peasant cultivators. In this system the peasants could only get one-quarter, one-fifth or even less of the total agricultural production; therefore, the land-holding patterns were discouraging the peasants and it was almost impossible for them to accumulate wealth.152 Furthermore, the practice of farming out the right to collect the taxes had resulted in the creation of a privileged group who enjoyed considerable wealth while actual cultivators were impoverished.153 Midhat Pasha believed that this system might have had benefits in the past; however, in a system under which the interests of governments are based on the welfare of its population, this form of land tenure will produce no fruits. Since in Baghdad trade and artisanship were not highly developed, it was only through agriculture that the peasants could improve their conditions. Therefore, he enthusiastically encouraged the registration and the sale of the land to actual cultivators, a process that had commenced some time previously. Hence, the implementation and extension of the Land Code of 1858 was one of the main concerns of Midhat Pasha. By enforcing the law he also hoped to diminish the influence of the class of wealthy intermediaries. Midhat Pasha’s attempts to reform the land regime and military service caused resistance amongst the tribal structure of the region. Despite this tribal resistance, he was keen on extending the Land

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Code. He was authorized by the central government to proceed with the principles of the Land Code in Baghdad.154 In order to make the public aware of the new land regulations, he promulgated them in the official newspaper of the province, Zewra.155 The Sublime Porte sent Midhat Pasha a copy of the imperial decree (irâde) that had earlier been sent to Namık Pasha and asked him to act in accordance with that decree. Midhat Pasha appointed a number of officials responsible for specific tasks, the most important of which relating to land policies was the director for the land registry (defter-i hâkânî müdürü).156 The Pasha also got the necessary permit to issue title deeds in Baghdad. He thought that due to the remoteness of Baghdad, the issuance of title deeds in İstanbul and their dispatch to Baghdad would take long enough to delay and slow the registration process, and therefore negate the interest shown in land registration. Normally the tapu law required title deeds to be prepared and sent by the Defterhâne-i Âmire in İstanbul. The central administration had previously rejected similar demands by Baghdad governors.157 Instead the Porte sent temporary title deeds, which were to be replaced by genuine printed deeds once the details of the land had been conveyed to İstanbul.158 In his second year in Baghdad, when the drive for land registration was intensified and there were not enough provincial officials to do the work, the Pasha demanded extra officials from the Porte.159 One of Midhat Pasha’s main provisions was related to the ukr share. Until Midhat Pasha’s governorship, private land was generally taken from its owners and administered by the government in the name of ukr. The problem with the ukr lands was that the rights of usufruct and ukr were managed separately. The holder of the ukr right did not hold the usufructory right and obtained only his ukr share. Despite this, some ukr holders made claims to the ownership of the land.160 Furthermore, though the ukr holder was not responsible for the expenses incurred by the land and difficulties relating to it, he could transfer his ukr right to whoever he wanted, even without informing the person who had the usufructory right. Upon Midhat Pasha’s recommendation, the Supreme Council in İstanbul took legal steps aimed at combining the ukr right and the usufructory right of the land. The main purpose of this arrangement was to improve the

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land and increase agricultural production. To this end, Midhat Pasha introduced the principle of priority (hakk-ı rüchân). Accordingly, when the holder of the ukr wanted to transfer his share, he first had to offer it to the sâhib-i arz, the person who held the usufructory right of the land.161 If the sâhib-i arz did not want to buy it, then the ukr holder had to offer it to the owners of neighboring land before selling it to someone else. Similarly, if the sâhib-i arz wanted to transfer his usufructory right, he first had to offer it to the ukr holder and the peasants in the vicinity (village or town) respectively. If the land was not sold by then, it could be transferred via public auction. In the transfer of both the land and the ukr, Midhat Pasha laid down a sequence to be followed. This was done especially to prevent the land being taken over by wealthy people and the tribal sheikhs and to make the transfer to those who actually tilled the land. Apart from the ukr lands, Midhat Pasha turned his attention to the date groves in order to award ownership to those who actually owned the trees.162 In Basra, where date cultivation dominated, he revived the jarîb system that had been in use in earlier times. Under this system the tax from date groves was determined according to the number of date trees owned. The harrâs, the officials who did the tax estimates, decided the value of the whole date grove and then determined the amount of tax to be paid. However, these officials were notorious for being corrupt; therefore, the system of estimation was usually at the expense of both the producer and the provincial treasury. The cultivation of dates was different from that of cereals in that the latter can usually be harvested all at once, but the former cannot. During his visit to Basra Midhat Pasha met with people who were competent in date cultivation. Instead of the system of estimation, Midhat Pasha revitalized the old jarîb system that was based on the size of the date farm, rather than the number of date trees. The advantage of the jarîb system was that the peasants began to make use of vacant space on the farms by planting more date trees. Consequently, the annual revenue of Basra increased from 48 yük kuruş to 70 yük kuruş in two years163 and this jarîb system continued until the British occupation in the First World War. Midhat Pasha introduced the Land Code in Hindiyyah, HillahDivaniyya, Samawa, Basra and Muntafiq regions. In Muntafiq he

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suggested to Nasır Pasha, the paramount sheikh of Muntafiq tribal confederation, that if the tribesmen would supply the labor force and part of the capital for the construction of a levée (bend) across the Jazâir marshes in order to restrain the flow of the river to its channel, the hundreds of fertile acres that would thereby be reclaimed should be given gratuitously by tapu to the tribes assisting in the project.164 As Jwaideh pointed out, although Midhat Pasha’s short term in Baghdad did not allow him to see the completion of the project, he made tapu grants in Muntafiq during his governorship.165 The transfer of the usufructory right of the land was limited, and it was more common in some areas than others. It concentrated mainly in areas surrounding the cities, and in areas where irrigation was less costly. Where irrigation was expensive the transfer was delayed.166 Although there was no exception for any specific region or type of land in both Land Code and Tapu Law, taking the tribal structure of the region into consideration, priority was given to deserted and vacant lands, rather than cultivated areas. Nevertheless, Şevket Bey, then mal müdürü in Baghdad, advised the opposite: to sell first the state lands (mukâta‘ât-ı mîrîyye) and then deserted and vacant land, because he thought that if the latter was sold first, then the people would be inclined to buy the deserted and vacant land which would impede the sale of the other lands.167 The priority given to deserted and vacant land was significant in the transition to the new land regime, because it made for a smooth implementation of the Code and avoided tribal resistance. And similarly, Because of the customary way of farming, land tenure in irrigated and cultivated areas developed differently from the one for which the land code was enforceable ... [And] because of the presence of serkâr and various share claimants who were concurrently entitled to take possession of the land and its use, the land code of 1858 was hardly applicable to cultivated state lands.168

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In fact, the governors hoped that as the benefits of the implementation of the Land Code in deserted and vacant land became apparent, the peasants in the irrigated and cultivated areas would also be inclined to register their land. In line with expectations, as the government extended its control throughout the province agricultural production increased drastically. The settlement of the nomadic tribes was one of the most important purposes of the Land Code and it was at this point that the implementation of the Code bore the most remarkable fruits. The nomadic tribes were expected to settle on land as they realized the benefits of having title deeds and the fruits of agriculture.169 The implementation of the Land Code was not far from an interest to increase revenue for the provincial as well as central treasury. More than 200,000 kese akçe was expected from the implementation of the code in Baghdad. When we consider that the annual agricultural revenue was approximately 30,000 kese akçe, this amount was six or seven times greater than annual agricultural revenue.170 Azzawi has pointed out that the government received more than 100,000 liras as a result of the sale of lands by tapu, mainly in the Muntafiq area.171 Apart from this, the peasant was to continue to pay the öşr, and the revenue obtained from öşr was estimated to double in the short term, as the people of the province grasped the benefits of agriculture. A further 40,000–50,000 kese akçe was estimated as tapu revenue.172 In short, considerable revenue resulted from the implementation of the Land Code. Some scholars accused Midhat Pasha of trying to implement the Land Code without understanding the prevailing tribal system in the region. However, as Moosa noted, they missed the central theme and purpose of Midhat Pasha, which was, first and foremost, to modify the tribal system through land reform. In other words, land reform was the means for achieving the final goal – settlement of the tribes on the land and the deconstruction of the tribal system.173 The process of de-tribalization was to be achieved after the land had been sold to the cultivator who would then abandon his nomadic life and remain on the land. Sedentarization was something that Midhat Pasha had been trying to achieve for a long time. He frequently made concessions to this end

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by reducing the tax burden. In addition, in order to make the sedentarization attractive to the peasants, Midhat Pasha obtained permission from the Sublime Porte to disregard the clause in the Land Code that prohibited the construction of buildings on mîrî land. As this small modification in the Code indicated, Midhat Pasha’s intention was to induce the semi-nomadic cultivators to settle, and this involved them building houses to live in.174 Midhat Pasha also promised that if those who had built houses and cultivated the land were prepared to take tenancies on their land under the new Land Code, he would reduce the mîrî share on such lands to one-fifth of the yield and made promises of a further reduction if the people fulfilled certain conditions.175 To take an example, in Hindiyyah, where the government share of the produce was twothirds, he reduced it to one-half, and promised further reductions to two-fifths and one-third respectively, if the people of Hindiyyah continued to live honestly and declined to participate in rebellion.176 These reductions in taxes did not mean a loss for the provincial treasury, because as the number of people engaged in agriculture increased the treasury actually earned greater revenues.

Consequences of the Land Code The implementation of the Land Code in Baghdad contributed considerably to the development of agricultural lands and a rise in the agricultural production. For the first time the peasants came to consider the land they were working on as their lands and in a few years they had constructed buildings on it and planted trees.177 This development also had implications for provincial security. As the peasants began to acquire immovable estates and to see the benefits of agriculture, they avoided participating in rebellious activities. For instance, the refusal of the people of Hindiyyah to help the rebels was explained by Midhat Pasha as resulting from their engagement in agriculture.178 This is not to imply, however, that the implementation of the Land Code was perfect or there were no problems. There is no doubt that to implement a land code that was basically designed for the conditions in the heartland of the empire, in an area dominated by tribes, involved

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great challenges and difficulties. In this context, the introduction of the Land Code should be evaluated as a transition to a new system. Despite the tribal structure and differing land-holding patterns, by the last quarter of the nineteenth century the process of de-tribalization had already started and the Land Code was implemented relatively successfully. The implementation of the Land Code meant strengthening the Ottoman central administration in Baghdad at the expense of sheikhly tribal powers. However, this brought unexpected results too. While the main intention of the Code was the registration of land under the name of the actual cultivators, a few provisions of the Code undermined relations between the state and small cultivators and opened the way for large landholders. As Quataert has pointed out, the Ottoman center generally preferred small cultivators to the potentially dangerous great landholder, but permitted land aggregation to maintain agricultural production and tax levels, if no alternative means were available.179 Though the governors in Baghdad tried to create from among the tribesmen a large number of small landowners, things turned out differently in practice and the tribal sheikhs emerged as big landowners. There is no doubt that Midhat Pasha, as the governor of Baghdad province, tried his best to introduce the individual registration of land at the expense of communal ownership, but he achieved little, because at the end of his tenure most of the lands were registered in the name of tribal sheikhs. Besides the tribal sheikhs, the city merchants, who had the necessary capital, benefited from the reluctance or fear of tribesmen.180 As these people understood the advantages of having title deeds, most of the lands ended up being registered under their names, rather than the actual cultivators. The Saduns of Muntafiq district in the south were the most outstanding example of this. Here, the Sadun family realized that in the title deed system those who held the land controlled the destiny of the region; therefore, they showed great interest in registering the land under their names. However, as the Saduns began to control most of the lands in the district, the tribesmen became increasingly hostile towards them.181 The export-oriented agricultural production made the lands more valuable than ever before so that land increasingly became the crux

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of the sheikhship. The commercialization of agriculture led the tribal sheikhs to give priority to amassing rich estates. Land replaced manliness, courage, superior strength and prowess as a warrior as the central ideal of sheikhly culture. In the words of Hanna Batatu: In the river valleys a sheikh without land came to mean in effect a sheikh without tribe: a landless sheikh ended by commanding neither the respect nor the obedience of his tribesmen. ... Possession of more and more land became, consequently, the highest social value of the tribal chief. Hence, [this led to] his transformation of the communal tribal land into his own property by the simple exertion of his will.182 The result was the emergence of large landholding patterns in Ottoman Iraq. As Gerber pointed out, landholding could be said to be individualistic only in the vicinity of the main towns and in the areas irrigated by lift or perennial canals where the tribes had disintegrated.183 In other words, small-scale landownership developed on the Middle Euphrates between Hît and Haditha, in the Khalis and Lower Diyala valleys, around Basra and on the Hindiyyah and Shamiyah rivers.184 However, in general, the fear of enlistment and taxation was the most important obstacle to individual registration. The fact that Midhat Pasha did not stay long enough in Baghdad to make the system operate fully was an important factor in its limited success. More significant than this, the succeeding governors did not work towards individual registration. As a result of this unintended result and other abuses, in the late 1870s and early 1880s the Ottoman Sultan became active in the land issues in the province of Baghdad. Abdülhamid II gave special importance to the fertile lands in Iraq and purchased considerable areas of land for his personal treasury. Eventually, administrative procedures were tightened to such an extent that further registration became extremely difficult; the Sultan restricted the authority of the Land Commission in Baghdad and took the initiative for the delivery of title deeds in 1881.185 However, despite bureaucratic difficulties, land registration continued until the 1890s.186

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It is again in this period that the provincial councils started to discuss not only current affairs and problems, but also measures that would ‘improve the state and benefit the security of the people’.3 Thenceforth, public works, umûr-ı nâfi‘â, came to be one of the significant activities of provincial administrations. Improving the public infrastructure became a subject that was stressed in the appointments of the provincial governors. When we look at the imperial firmân that appointed Namık Pasha as the governor of Baghdad province, we see that the improvement of trade and agriculture, reinforcement of the dockyard in Basra, an increase in the number of the vessels in the Euphrates and Tigris and the construction of bridges were among the issues underlined.4 The provincial laws of 1864 and 1871 also emphasized the need to improve public works. Accordingly, the general assembly of the province (vilâyet umûm meclisi) was commissioned to construct and repair the roads between the villages, sub-provinces and the provincial center, to negotiate matters relating to public construction within the province, and to take necessary measures for the improvement of trade and agriculture.5 The improvement of the public works was an urgent matter for the province of Baghdad and in 1861 a separate council for public works (meclis-i imâr) was formed. It included several provincial officials, including the mutasarrıf of Basra, Münib Pasha and Ata Bey, the former being the head of the council.6 In addition to a clerk, the council had a sandık emîni and an engineer, who, among other things, surveyed the land in question. The task of the council was mainly to keep the rivers open for navigation, repair the river walls, construct new bridges and barracks, and to dig new canals for irrigation.7 The council’s expenses were met by the Sublime Porte, and it was to start its work by repairing the Hindiyyah river walls.8

The governors and provincial modernization Ottoman modernization concentrated heavily in the western regions of the empire that were incorporated into the (European) world-system. Therefore, there is a generally accepted contention

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that the further one traveled from the center, the smaller the degree of modernization. Geography in this sense played a role in the modernization of the Arab provinces of the empire. The port cities (like Beirut and Alexandria) and regions with good communication/transport networks began to experience the impacts of modernization earlier. In this regard, Baghdad, which was relatively isolated until the 1860s, lagged behind. The following pages illustrate how Baghdad was connected to the international networks through not only telegraph and steamship but also modern schools and newspapers. It goes without saying that there was a close relationship between the process of modernization and politics of centralization in the Ottoman Empire. Instruments of centralization such as the establishment of the Sixth Army, the provincial councils, the telegraph network, the penetration of state apparatus through the introduction of Vilâyet Law and the Land Code, certainly imposed the Ottoman central authority in Baghdad. Hence, it should be underlined that the fall of Mamluk rule in 1831 and the centralization that came afterwards accelerated the modernization of the province. With the centralist policies of Mahmud II, Baghdad was tightly tied to the Ottoman central administration, and the Tanzimat era (1839–76) witnessed not only the modernization of the empire in general but also of Ottoman Baghdad. However, due to its peripheral position, the modernization of Baghdad clearly intensified in the last decades of the Tanzimat era. It is quite clear that the modernization of Baghdad bore the imprints of Ottoman patterns of modernization in general. In the province of Baghdad the process of modernization followed a path from provincial center to the tribal areas. Even among the Iraqi provinces there was a certain hierarchy. Baghdad as the provincial capital had priority over other provincial cities. We noted earlier, for example, that Shahrizor was not allowed by the Sublime Porte to have a local council before one was established in Baghdad. The same hierarchy can even be seen in the city of Baghdad. It is for this reason that the provincial center benefited much more from the fruits of modernization than the rural countryside. In this sense the process of modernization was

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uneven: while certain sectors of society underwent significant changes, others were left out completely. Finally, Ottoman/Turkish modernization had a top-down character and the bureaucrats, namely the ‘Men of Tanzimat’, were the leading actors in this process. This feature of Turkish modernization did not change in the Arab provinces. It was these Tanzimat intellectuals and statesmen who contributed to the modernization of Ottoman Iraq. The reform-minded governors and provincial bureaucrats played quite significant roles in persuading local people of the benefits of modernization. It was the governors who served in the 1850s and 1860s, namely Reşid Pasha, Namık Pasha and Midhat Pasha, who made considerable efforts to modernize the province. While it is clear that Midhat Pasha surpassed his predecessors in this regard, it is not correct to establish a direct relationship between Midhat Pasha and almost every successful project that was implemented in Baghdad; such an approach obviously relegates previous successful governors. It is quite interesting that all of these three governors had experience of Europe; they were either educated in Europe or spent a number of years there. As noted earlier, Midhat Pasha has a distinct place in the modernization of Ottoman Baghdad. In his first public speech in Baghdad the Pasha emphasized the need for the development and modernization of Baghdad. He drew attention to the striking dichotomy between the glorious past and the current backwardness of the region.9 To close the gap between past and present, Midhat Pasha fervently stressed the need to catch up with the civilized world.10 After stating his desire to benefit the country and enrich the people, he mentioned his wish to introduce many changes and reforms, which at first might not be welcomed by the people. However, he believed that the people would appreciate these changes when they had experienced the advantages that would accrue to them.11 Midhat Pasha used the provincial newspaper, Zewra, effectively in preaching the need for modernization. One of the frequently emphasized issues was the permanent change in the world affairs and the need to catch up and adapt to these changes. It is also clear that the members of the foreign consulates were very influential in the modernization of Ottoman Baghdad. Evidently, the provincial modernization was also to the benefit of the foreign

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consulates in Baghdad, because it facilitated the political and economic activities of the European powers. The European powers especially assisted in this modernization by providing the necessary goods and materials. The British Consul General in Baghdad was particularly active in this regard. It is, for example, well known that he mediated in the purchase of telegraph machines and tramlines. These materials were mainly imported from European capitals, especially London, and British colonies such as India.12 Midhat Pasha’s reforms in Ottoman Iraq were very effective, but they lacked the necessary support from his successors and the Sublime Porte in İstanbul. It was unfortunate for Baghdad that the tenure of Midhat Pasha did not last long. The political conflict and hostility between Midhat Pasha and the new grand vizier, Mahmud Nedim Pasha, led to his resignation from the governorship and the successors of Midhat Pasha tried to wipe out the repercussions of his reforms. Mahmud Nedim Pasha clearly ordered the new governor in Baghdad to destroy what Midhat Pasha had achieved.13 There is no doubt that political rivalry among the Men of Tanzimat had negative impacts for Ottoman modernization, both in the imperial center and the provincial periphery. It should be noted, however, that the achievements of Midhat Pasha in provincial reform became a source of inspiration for Sultan Abdülhamit II. Both rulers instituted similar types of reforms; that is to say, newspapers, modern schools, vocational training, tramlines, clock towers etc., were among the leading reforms instituted by both rulers.14 The governors of Baghdad, especially Midhat Pasha, built many schools, public buildings, prisons, reformatories (ıslahhânes), barracks, tramlines, harbor works, transportation facilities on rivers, hospitals, communications infrastructure (telegraph lines and postal services) and so on. Obviously, it is impossible to cite here all the works done by these governors, but some of these public works are described in detail below.

Rebuilding Basra on the river bank One of the most important improvements of the 1850s was the movement of Basra city to the banks of the Tigris and the construction of

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new buildings there. Frequent flooding of irrigation canals, combined with the bad weather and the resulting sanitary problems were the main reasons why the city was moved. The irrigation canals were a longstanding feature of life in Basra. Although local rulers had built river walls to prevent the floods, the walls were frequently destroyed by natural causes (especially by strong floods) and many small lakes appeared. Small irrigation canals (hark) permitted the river water to be channeled into the inner parts of the city, but it was quite difficult to keep these canals open and clean all the time. Soil and dust often blocked them, and the lack of a sewerage system and the actions of the tides exacerbated the situation. When the water withdrew the canals began to reek in the hot weather, not least because of the number of dead animals that ended up in them. Though the officials tried to keep the canals clean and clear, they could not cope with the problem. On request of the kaymakam of Basra, Reşid Pasha, and with the support of the local gentry, Namık Pasha brought this issue to the attention of the Sublime Porte.15 Apart from sanitary relief, the movement of the city to the banks of the Tigris was to provide several advantages. First of all, Basra’s city center was far from the quay so that commercial goods had to be carried into the city center in small boats. But this transfer of goods sometimes took so long that the goods perished in the meantime. It was assumed that when the city was moved to the banks of the Tigris, not only would such losses be prevented, but also the customs revenues would increase. Secondly, it was believed that a city on the river bank would attract merchants. And finally, it was also expected that the new town would attract nomadic tribes to settle there. Plans for the new city center included the construction of a mosque, a customs house, a government house for the kaymakam, many shops and a bath, the income from which would belong to the mosque as vakıf. The cost of the project amounted to 3,000 kese akçes, which became an obstacle to its realization. At the end of the same year (1850) Maşuk Pasha, kaymakam of Basra, prepared a report that suggested the problems be overcome by, among other measures, repairing the river walls and keeping the canals clean, instead of moving the city to the river bank. The Sublime Porte suggested a midway solution: accordingly,

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the imperial treasury met only the cost of custom house and quarantine house, and the shops were to be built by the local people.16 This offer also implied the gradual movement of the people towards the bank of the river. It is understood that the process continued slowly. A government house (hükûmet konağı) was built and this was followed by civil buildings constructed by local merchants.17 The movement of the city was significant in that Basra became a ‘port city’ in the true sense. The city, especially in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, had become an indispensable part of the regional network. It was crucial not only for commercial activities between the Iraqi provinces and the Indian subcontinent, but also for the traffic of steamships which ran to Aden, Suez, Alexandria, İstanbul and London.

The foundation of provincial municipality in Baghdad Municipalities were one of the new institutions introduced by the Tanzimat reforms. There is no doubt that Baghdad was one of the earliest provinces to establish municipal institutions. In the Arab provinces of the empire, the development of municipal institutions seems to have begun promptly in Jerusalem, where municipal organization existed as early as the 1860s.18 The municipalities and the municipal councils were regulated by the laws of 1864, 1871 and finally 1877 with the promulgation of the Law of Municipality. There is no doubt that the municipal institutions became indispensable parts of the provincial administration in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. In this respect, the establishment of the municipality in the province of Baghdad can be considered as the final stage in the development of a tradition of public works. Histories on Ottoman Iraq usually date the founding of the municipal organization to the governorship of Midhat Pasha;19 however, it is apparent that in 1868, during the governorship of Takiyüddin Pasha, there was a municipal council in the province.20 There is no doubt, however, that Baghdad’s municipal council was made more efficient by the new arrangements introduced by Midhat Pasha. Perhaps the most salient task of the municipality in Baghdad was the provision of public

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services; therefore, it contributed greatly to provincial modernization. Gerber considers the establishment of the municipalities as a revolution in the traditional Ottoman administrative system, because earlier it was the qadi who was, among other things, in charge of some of the municipal activities. Nonetheless, despite the extension of the municipal sphere of influence, the municipality was only effective in the center of the province and outer parts of the province were, to a great extent, deprived of municipal activities. The municipality of Baghdad had an independent, though small, budget, which was to be approved by the provincial administrative council. They had also the right to levy taxes on the city inhabitants. For instance, in January 1869 Takiyüddin Pasha introduced a small municipal tax for the purpose of raising funds for the cleaning of the streets in Baghdad.21 There is no doubt that such applications were important sources for the municipal budget. It is also understood that the British Consul General in Baghdad gave considerable support to the activities of the municipality. He was quite willing to pay this tax, although foreign consuls were exempt from paying such taxes. By paying the tax, the British Consul wanted to give a good example to the local inhabitants, who were inclined to oppose such reforms.

Urban life and infrastructural development Infrastructural improvements comprised a significant part of the public works in Baghdad. It is clear that the public works in the province of Baghdad gained in intensity during Midhat Pasha’s governorship. The construction of bridges and wide roads (especially in the city center) were among the improvements he carried out in every province he served.22 The poor land transport infrastructure was one of the greatest problems of the empire in the nineteenth century. The rulers of the period put great pressure on provincial governors to improve and extend the road network.23 In Baghdad, the roads between sub-provinces, the Sulaimaniyah–Kirkuk and Kirkuk– Mosul–Baghdad roads, were among the first to be improved. To this end, engineers were appointed and dynamiting carried out to level the routes.24

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One of the issues that travelers, both European and Ottoman, frequently complained about was Baghdad’s narrow and unhealthy streets which had no sidewalk and varied in width from 1.5-3 arşın.25 The streets were not even wide enough to permit the passage of horse carts, so people had to use animals for transport. As the streets were full of dust in hot weather and mud in rainy weather, they were very difficult to traverse. As noted earlier, Takiyüddin Pasha began to apply a municipal tax for street cleaning in Baghdad. Midhat Pasha was also concerned with this problem, but the buildings that were constructed from brick were a major obstacle to the widening of the streets. Moreover, since stone was scarce and therefore expensive in the region, Midhat Pasha began to use a mixture of pitch and sand for the construction of sidewalks.26 Furthermore, during Necip Pasha’s term of office a public park was built near the Azamiyah gate of Baghdad. It was named Necibiyya, after the governor himself.27 The park was later improved by Midhat Pasha, who leveled the route to the park and built a road about 400–500 m long.28 Since it was impossible to expand the city within the city walls, Midhat Pasha opted to take a radical step. One of the most striking, and frequently criticized, urban activities of the Pasha was his decision to pull down the city walls to facilitate modernization. Like other Middle Eastern cities, Baghdad was encircled by city walls. When the city was founded as the capital of Abbasid Empire by Caliph Al-Mansur, it had been given a round shape with city walls. However, as the city grew the walls began to be perceived as an obstacle to urban growth. By pulling down the city walls Midhat Pasha hoped to enlarge the city outward.29 Earlier, the Persian threat to the Iraqi provinces led the provincial governors to repair and renovate the city walls constantly.30 The city walls and its environs had been protected by soldiers, but later this duty was farmed out to local notables. The governors gave the task to the tribal sheikhs in return for their payment of mal-ı mîrî.31 As the provincial security improved in the second half of the century, the work of renovation became redundant. Midhat Pasha wanted to get rid of the walls and turn the site into a handsome boulevard.32 It has been argued that Midhat Pasha destroyed them for the sake of obtaining

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PHOTO 10

An inner view of Bab-ı Azam, Baghdad

extra revenue for the provincial administration.33 According to this allegation, when the provincial treasury was exhausted by his reforming schemes, Midhat Pasha destroyed the ancient walls and sold the bricks for building.34 Whatever the reasons behind it, this act indeed reflects how some provincial governors differed in their approaches/ programs for provincial urbanization. Settlement in the outer quarters of the city was strongly encouraged, but Midhat Pasha was unable to achieve much in this regard.

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The most commonly used method of getting people to move was to establish new administrative institutions outside the old cities. In Karbala, for instance, the city center was quite small when compared with its population. In consequence, a new quarter was founded outside the city of Karbala and the income obtained from the sale of real estate in the new quarter was spent on the modernization of Karbala itself.35 Likewise, through the efforts of mutasarrıf Murad Efendi, Ammarah experienced similar urbanization. Most of the houses in Ammarah were made of mud, brick and rush mat. A considerable proportion of its population lived in shanties and occasional fires caused severe damage. Instead, nearly 500 new houses (some of them made of concrete), three grain depots, a bath, a mosque and 200 shops were built.36 The nâhiye of Alâ Garbî also benefited from this drive to urbanization. A grain house, twenty shops and a coffee house were constructed in three or four months, converting it to a small town. These developments encouraged the neighboring nomadic tribes to settle in the area.37 As there were no public fountains in Baghdad, so that the inhabitants of the city had to meet their water needs from the Tigris by means of sakas, Midhat Pasha introduced water pumps operated with steam.38 This innovation was a great service to the city inhabitants. A considerable part of the public work was related to religious shrines and tombs. Needless to say, the province of Baghdad was very rich in terms of both Sunni and Shi‘i visiting places. The repair and renovations of these places was very important for the social life in Baghdad. The tombs of Hussain (Meşhed-i Hüseyn) and Imam Azam were the most venerated ones. The Porte sent regular gifts for the maintenance of these places.39 One of the main changes in the urban character of Baghdad was the lighting of the streets with gas. Instead of the sesame oil that was used in the provincial offices and streets, gas from Mandali gas mine began to be used. With this locally produced gas, the Pasha stopped the import of American gas. As this source of gas was cheaper, every sub-province was soon decorated with gas lamps.40

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Midhat Pasha is credited with building the only modern bridge the city of Baghdad possessed before the twentieth century.41 Although there was a bridge over the Tigris joining the two halves of Baghdad, it was too old and dangerous for passage. A weak bridge was also an important obstacle to the mobilization of military troops. As a result, a new bridge, 264 meters in length and 16 zirâ‘ wide, was opened in November 1870 to a fanfare from a military band. During the opening ceremony high-ranking officials crossed the bridge on horseback, followed by a military troop and local people. The new bridge was a floating bridge made up of 24 pontoons, and it could be opened to allow the passage of keleks and small boats. To prevent damage, the bridge was opened during the strong floods. The old bridge, on the other hand, was dismantled and it was planned to re-assemble it on another part of the Tigris. The Porte met the cost of the construction on the condition that the revenue received from the passage of people and goods would be sent to the central treasury. It was calculated that the cost of the bridge would be recovered in a few years. Before the erection of this bridge, only the bridge in Musayyib produced revenue, as passage over other bridges in Mosul, Divaniyah and Hillah was free of charge. However, due to the increasing cost of repair and renovations, it was decided to levy a nominal passage tax for these bridges as well.42 Midhat Pasha also completed the construction of a government house (saray, hükûmet konağı), started by Namık Pasha.43 The saray building was further improved with the erection of a clock tower. The construction of a clock tower in Baghdad is significant, because Midhat Pasha had frequently complained about the ignorance of the people in Baghdad and the amount of time they wasted. The abundance of coffee houses in Baghdad, and the time wasted there, are recurrent themes narrated in traveler accounts. The Pasha built the clock tower as a means of emphasizing to local people the importance of time. The clock towers were among the visible signs of late Tanzimat administration and many cities had clock towers in the city headquarters. It is known that Najaf and Karbala had public clocks; however, Baghdad had to wait until 1870. The tower had a square shape and was approximately 23 metres high.44

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The clock tower and the military training area

Telegraph and railway It is known that the first telegraph communications in the Ottoman Empire were introduced during the Crimean War.45 Obviously, means of communication, especially telegraph, were great instruments in imposing central authority and penetrating the periphery. After the Crimean War, a telegraph line between İstanbul and Basra was planned and in order to increase the pace of the work, it was divided into three parts: İzmit–Sivas, Sivas–Baghdad and Baghdad–Basra. The last stretch was to be built under the supervision of the governor in Baghdad46 and by December 1860 the line had reached the Zab River, which was considered to be the border of Shahrizor.47 The telegraph line between İstanbul and Baghdad had been completed by 1861. However, it was not until the end of 1863 that the gap in the telegraph network between Baghdad and Basra was closed, and

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a direct line between İstanbul and Basra was opened. The Sublime Porte made a point of not subcontracting the construction of telegraph lines between Üsküdar and Basra to foreign companies.48 However, in spite of this, the line between Baghdad and Basra was placed under the charge of a British engineer,49 because at the beginning it was intended to be run under the Tigris River, which required European technology. The British engineers were competent in constructing underwater telegraph lines, because they were also constructing a similar line between Alexandria and Crete and were planning another one between India and Basra. The idea of constructing a sub-fluvial line between Baghdad and Basra (under the Tigris River) was the result of security concerns. In a region that was dominated by tribes, keeping telegraph lines intact was a major problem.50 The Porte planned to resolve the problem by running the line under the Tigris; however, it later emerged that such a sub-fluvial line would be too expensive, and difficult to repair in case of damage. Moreover, the repair of the sub-fluvial line would last for weeks, which would impede communication. Consequently, the overland route was chosen.51 After the construction of a direct line between Baghdad and Basra, considerable effort was made to extend the telegraph network to other places in the province. The main route was extended in many directions, to Hillah, Fav, Divaniyah, Ammarah and Khanaqin.52 Telegraph stations were established in these and many other places. Needless to say, the technical and political arrangements were made under the auspices of the British. British engineers and workers were provided through the British Consulate General in Baghdad. However, it should also be kept in mind that the construction and extension of telegraph lines was also important for British interests, because these lines enabled Britain to have easier and faster communication with her greatest colony, namely India. The British and Indian governments were also given the concession to use one of the two wires of the telegraph line.53 Thanks to British engineers, direct communication between Europe and India via Fav, Baghdad and İstanbul was provided by the mid-1860s.54 The Indian line was run under the Indian Ocean and

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connected with the Anatolian line in Basra. As all telegraph communication between India and Europe was to be carried out through these combined lines, it increased the importance of Basra. Therefore, the Porte sent some of its telegraph officials with language skills to Basra.55 Although telegraph was an earlier inception, it did not spread as quickly as steam navigation in Ottoman Iraq. The attacks of the tribes and their cutting of the telegraph lines probably delayed its widespread use. Despite his earlier opposition, Namık Pasha agreed to pay subsidies to tribes in return for protecting the telegraph lines. As Shahvar has pointed out, in southern Iraq, the people in areas through which the telegraph line passed were employed in its construction, maintenance and protection.56 By employing the tribes and local people, rather than alienating them, the provincial administration aimed to avoid confrontation with the tribes and secure the safety of the lines. Besides, Ottoman officials, keen to extend and benefit from the telegraph lines, stationed security forces (çavuş and başçavuş) along the telegraph lines.57 As we know from the Zewra newspaper, at the end of Midhat Pasha’s three-year service in Baghdad, the city had a complete telegraph network.58 It is also interesting that Midhat Pasha paid for much of this work with donations from his bureaucrats and the local inhabitants. The act of donation was encouraged and promoted by publicizing donors in the Zewra newspaper.59 By donating to such a popular cause the officers might have wanted to win Midhat Pasha’s favor. However, it is also not impossible that Midhat Pasha covertly made them donate.60

River steamers and naval communication The first attempts to utilize the rivers of Mesopotamia as a steamer route were made for the sake of improving and easing the way to British India, because these rivers were to provide the shortest route to India. The motives behind the British attempts were both economic and political. J.B. Fraser was commissioned by the British government to investigate general conditions in Ottoman Iraq, and he prepared a report in 1834.61 It was again in this year that the British government

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was given a firmân which allowed them to explore the possibility of navigation on the Euphrates. Colonel Chesney’s expedition (1835–37), the first of its kind, was carried out to investigate whether communication between Europe and India could be facilitated by means of steamers on the Euphrates. Sponsored by the British government and the East India Company, the experiment also had official permission from the Ottoman government. Two steamers, named Tigris and Euphrates, were launched upon the upper Euphrates in the course of 1835–36, but the former sank in a storm within a few weeks.62 Therefore, the expedition was halted and the Euphrates was transferred to the East India Company. Consequently, the first British expedition ended with disappointing results. Nevertheless, British attempts to explore the Euphrates and Tigris continued with great energy. In the following years Commander Lynch (1837–43), Lieutenant Campbell (1841–42), Commander Felix Jones (1843–54) and Commander Selby (1841–42 and 1855–61) carried out further exploration of the rivers of Mesopotamia and the Persian Gulf.63 The early exploration had shown that the Euphrates was unnavigable for practical purposes by river vessels. Yet, the first steam navigation on the Euphrates started in 1842 under the Lynch Company. As private (British) entrepreneurs began to get involved in commercial navigation, an imperial permission (berât) was given in 1846 to navigate the Tigris and Euphrates under the British national flag. As a result the ‘Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company’ was established by the Lynch Company and the first steamer for commercial purposes, City of London, began to ply the Tigris in 1861. Until 1862, mails from Baghdad to India followed the route of Syria, Egypt, Red Sea and India, but in 1862 a mail steamer service, with terminal ports in Basra and Bombay, was organized by the British India Steam Navigation Company. One year later, in 1863, a mail steamer service between Baghdad and Basra was also initiated.64 The British interest in the rivers of Mesopotamia prompted the Ottoman Empire to pay attention to these rivers. When we look at the Ottoman side of the coin, it is obvious that the governors in Baghdad, especially Ali Rıza, Namık and Necip pashas, did not welcome the

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British endeavors on the rivers of Mesopotamia. While the British officials argued that steam navigation on the twin rivers of Mesopotamia would strengthen the Ottoman Empire and Persia against Russia, Ottoman officials thought that such improvements under the British flag would reinforce the British presence in the region and increase British influence over the Iraqi tribes. Notwithstanding the objections of the governors, the Sublime Porte felt obliged to give concessions to Britain. Occasionally, the attitudes of the governors in Baghdad became a matter of resentment for British merchants. For instance, Necip Pasha opposed the passage of British commercial ships under the British flag. However, since the commercial activities of British subjects were eased by the Anglo–Ottoman Commercial Treaty of 1838, the governors were admonished by the Sublime Porte. The ships were allowed passage on condition that they paid the required taxes.65 Furthermore, the role of river steamers in the provision of security against the recalcitrant tribes and the collection of taxes were also taken into account. At first the steamers served between Baghdad and Basra and the service was expected to pacify the Muntafiq tribe in southern Iraq.66 Besides, steamers could be used, when needed, for military and civil services. They not only carried soldiers and munitions, but also commercial cargos and mails. Therefore, the steamer service not only contributed to provincial security, but it also paved the way for the increase in the volume of trade and provincial income.67 Reşid Pasha, one of the most foresighted rulers of Baghdad, was the first governor to order steamships that would operate between Baghdad and Basra. After consulting with the notables of the province, he established a company for the transportation of goods and local people on the rivers of Mesopotamia by steamship. The role of the provincial notables seems to have been quite important, because they discussed the issue several times with the governor and they collected donations amounting to 2,000 kese. This sum was two-thirds of the money required for the purchase of two steamers. The remaining 1,000 kese was provided from the provincial treasury.68 The two steamships, which were ordered from Belgium, were named Baghdad and Basra. However, as Reşid Pasha died in mid-1857, he did not

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witness their arrival in Baghdad.69 Reşid Pasha also established a factory in Baghdad for the repair and maintenance of the steamers. His efforts were continued by his successor, Ömer Lütfi Pasha, who ordered two steamers and one larger vessel. The latter was to operate between Basra and Jeddah and carry grain to Jeddah, among other things.70 İdâre-i

Ummân-ı Osmâniye

From the early 1860s onwards, the local government of Baghdad possessed steamers on both rivers, and after 1867 they were mainly managed for commercial purposes under the command of the Ottoman officials, in rivalry with the British company. It was during Namık Pasha’s term that by ordering three more steamers (Musul, Fırat and Rasâfa) and establishing İdâre-i Ummân-ı Osmâniye, his initiative became, in a short period of time, a rival for the English Lynch Corporation.71 It is understood that the merchants of Baghdad and Basra were pleased with the establishment of İdâre-i Ummân-ı Osmâniye and ready to buy its shares.72 Normally, the privilege of steam service was under the monopoly of Aziziye kumpanyası, which operated in the Red Sea. However, the Sublime Porte decided to establish a separate company and the Iraqi river steamers began to ply under the name of the İdâre-i Ummân-ı Osmâniye. The three steamers that were ordered by Namık Pasha arrived during the governorship of Takiyüddin Pasha (1867–69). Two of these steamers arrived in Iraq in pieces and they were assembled in Baghdad, but they could not be put into service until Midhat Pasha’s governorship. Midhat Pasha had the third steamer assembled in Baghdad and the river steamers, now numbering five, started serving between Baghdad and Basra.73 Midhat Pasha’s contribution to the steamer service The importance given by Midhat Pasha to navigation needs special emphasis, because his three-year service between 1869 and 1872 was the apex of the river transportation in the province of Baghdad. Concerning the transportation on rivers, he made considerable efforts

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to promote the navigability of the Euphrates and Tigris rivers. An important incentive for Midhat Pasha was that his term of office in Baghdad corresponded with the opening of the Suez Canal. The news in Zewra newspaper indicates that the Pasha was well aware of the developments in the region.74 There is no doubt that with the opening of the Suez Canal the trade of the Indian Ocean moved from the Gulf to the Red Sea; therefore, the importance of Basra and Baghdad as centers of trade and commerce declined.75 However, the Suez Canal could not be fully used by merchants and entrepreneurs for several years. During this time, Midhat Pasha wanted to compensate for the disadvantage created by the new trade routes. He was aware of the fact that Iraq transported the bulk of its goods by river and the lack of transportation meant that producers were unable to get their goods to the port cities.76 Similarly, importation into remote parts of the province was either not financially viable or too difficult from a logistical point of view. Hence, the improvement of the navigation system was essential for the development of Ottoman Iraq. By improving the transportation facilities, Midhat Pasha endeavored to open the province and introduce Iraqi products to the world market. He knew that there were two ways to open Iraq to the world: the Basra–Persian Gulf route and the Euphrates River.77 Although the Gulf option was easier, it was far from the Mediterranean Sea and the opening of Ottoman Iraq through Basra and the Gulf would only benefit lower Iraq. But Midhat Pasha thought that the Euphrates Project, if it was extended to Birecik (Urfa) and then connected by railway to the Mediterranean, would be shorter and beneficial for the whole population. With the latter project, the Pasha also hoped to increase the agricultural potential of the areas along the banks of the Euphrates River that had been ignored for so long and had been given over to the desert. So, due to its comparable advantages, the Euphrates project was given greater emphasis. The Euphrates Project The upper Euphrates was not as suitable as the southern part for steamer navigation. The buildings along the banks of the Euphrates

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The custom house of Baghdad and the steamers operating between Baghdad and Basra

had been destroyed by frequent floods and debris from them reduced the depth of the river and impeded proper navigation. Hence, Midhat Pasha sent an inspection team led by Şakir Pasha, then nâfi‘a müdürü, to investigate whether the section from Baghdad to Maskanah was suitable for navigation. Upon the reports of Şakir Bey, Midhat Pasha ordered the cleaning of the riverbed. Since the flow of the Euphrates was strong, the Pasha ordered a steamer (with four wheels) that was convenient for strong currents.78 In the meantime, the Pasha decided to take necessary measures to prevent the Euphrates from flooding. Although former governors had built walls to hold the river back,79 due to a lack of maintenance and flood damage these walls had been broken and needed repair. Therefore, Midhat Pasha built the Cezayir walls to prevent the rivers overflowing.

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Midhat Pasha was keen to deepen the actual riverbed of the Euphrates and to clear it regularly. To this end, a ship was deputed for Euphrates survey work and a dredger was ordered. At the beginning the dredgers that opened the Suez Canal were considered for this work, but later Midhat Pasha decided to order a dredger from Europe.80 The river route toward Mosul was dredged until November 1869.81 Şakir Bey sent regular letters from places he had investigated reporting on the condition of the Euphrates and these letters were published in Zewra.82 These letters were not only significant in terms of the data concerning the navigability of the Euphrates, but also they included important data concerning tribes and settlements along the river route.83 The inspection had shown that the route from Baghdad to Maskanah was impeded in some places by the ruins of old bridges, large rocks and nâ‘ûrs, which were water-wheels diverting river water onto farms. These nâ‘ûrs were affecting the flow of the river and abrading its banks, filling the riverbed with soil and rocks. However, Şakir Bey reported that these obstacles were not difficult to remove. When the inspection and dredging was completed, Midhat Pasha inaugurated the opening of a steamship route by passing safely from Tigris to Euphrates (through the Saklawiyya Canal) and traveling some 800 kilometers north along the Euphrates as far as Maskanah.84 The local people welcomed these accomplishments with great joy.85 Longrigg regarded this enterprise as the apex of river navigation in Turkish Iraq.86 Apart from clearing the riverbed, Midhat Pasha’s efforts were also reflected in the increase in the number of steamboats serving on the Euphrates and Tigris. Midhat Pasha found the İdâre-i Ummân-ı Osmâniye inefficient and therefore appointed a more competent director. In his three-year service, the Pasha tripled the number of steamers and made the İdâre-i Ummân-ı Osmâniye the leading company of the region.87 The company enjoyed its heyday during his term of service. While some of the steamers (such as Babil, Necid and Asur) were larger in terms of their engine capacity, some of them had a medium capacity (12–30 horsepower), and the remainder were of small capacity. The steamers with high engine capacities were used for long-distance shipping. While the medium ones served in the rivers, the smaller ones

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were used for the mail service, security patrols and the exploration of the river basin.88 Improvement of Basra dockyard and harbor The Ottomans had given priority to river steamers rather than larger ships to be used in Basra, because the river steamers were expected to contribute to the provision of security in Iraq and the increase in provincial revenues.89 However, the introduction and the improvement of the steamer service were accompanied with new developments in the Basra– Gulf region. The first development was the extension of the steamer service beyond Iraq. Even before the opening of the Canal, the rulers, both in İstanbul and in Baghdad, realized that the Suez Canal would bring profound changes to the region. In preparation for future developments, the Ottomans felt the need to reinforce the dockyard in Basra. The benefits of this reinforcement would not be limited to the Red Sea, but also extend toward Ceziretü’l Arab as well.90 Even though the corvettes in Basra were carrying passengers and cargos to Bombay before the 1860s, a lack of maintenance decreased the efficiency of these corvettes.91 In the course of time, the Basra fleet became idle; while some of its ships began to rust, some others were taking on water that had to be emptied by soldiers taking turns both day and night.92 Moreover, some ships were beyond repair so they were destroyed and used for other purposes. In the mid-1860s the Basra dockyard saw considerable changes. Namık Pasha ordered two new corvettes (named İzmir and Bursa), for which the provincial treasury paid 8,000 kese akçe.93 The corvettes, under the command of Binbaşı Ahmed, arrived in Baghdad via the Cape of Good Hope.94 After serving several years in Basra, İzmir was moved in 1868 to Jeddah and remained there. On the other hand, Bursa’s condition deteriorated in time and this was an important factor in the dismissal of Ahmed Bey during Midhat Pasha’s governorship. The need for qualified staff was obvious in the Basra dockyard. As noted earlier, the bad weather of southern Iraq was a major problem in recruiting competent officials to the area. To remedy this, the Sublime Porte tried, for a while, to limit the period of service for the officers

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in the dockyard to one or two years. Furthermore, to fill the gap, one of the corvettes in the fleet was converted to a school to train students from the local populace. Besides enabling the students to get practical experience, being on a ship helped them escape the oppressive weather in Basra.95 The purpose was to increase the level of education and mastery of crafts and to create the needed qualified officers for the dockyard. More than 20 students were enrolled and they began training in the production of rope and fabric for sailing boats. The necessary tools and furnishings were brought from the imperial dockyard (tersâne-i âmire) in İstanbul. Thanks to Midhat Pasha’s efforts, Basra harbor experienced a considerable revival. The casting house (dökümhâne) was upgraded to a factory, because while there was a factory in Baghdad, a need arose for a separate one in Basra. The old casting house became a blacksmith’s forge. Until Midhat Pasha’s governorship, the Basra dockyard did not have a pool for the repair of ships. The Pasha notified the Sublime Porte about the need for a pool, maçuna (mechanical crane), barracks etc. The ebb tide (med-cezir) facilitated the construction of the pool and the dockyard experienced a considerable renewal. The spatial improvement of Basra harbor and its reinforcement in terms of the number of soldiers and ships were of great significance. By 1871 the Basra dockyard had more than 800 soldiers; however, there were still problems concerning unqualified officers.96 During Midhat Pasha’s term five more corvettes were ordered for Basra dockyard. Until this time, Jeddah was the naval base in the Arabian Peninsula; however, with the extension of the steamer service outside Iraq and the reinforcement of the Basra dockyard, Basra became the leading naval base in the region.97 There is no doubt that the reinforcement of Ottoman naval presence was quite influential in incorporating and strengthening Ottoman hold not only over Kuwait and al-Ahsa but the wider region. The second development was the extension of the steamer service beyond Iraq. Thanks to the improvement of the steamer service, regular services from Baghdad to Basra, İstanbul and even to Britain through the Suez Canal were organized. The revenues obtained from the steamer service were considerable and the ships carried not only

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ordinary passengers, cargos and imperial military equipment, but also pilgrims and grain to Hijaz. Some of the steamers that were bought from Britain paid for their cost on their first voyage. For instance, the steamer Babil was bought for 33,000 lira, but on its first service it carried pilgrims and raised 35,000 lira.98 The carriage of pilgrims was an important source of revenue for these steamers. For pilgrimage the steamers pursued the following route: Basra – Bandar Bushir – Bandar Abbas – Muscat – Aden – Hadidah and Jeddah. While people were practicing their prayers in the Holy Cities during the pilgrimage season, the steamer shuttled between Jeddah and Suez.99 When the pilgrimage season ended, it took the pilgrims back to Basra. It is also known that the operation of the steamships diverted the pilgrims and trade from traditional caravan routes (which used to gather at Damascus) to port cities. Only steamers with high engine capacities (such as Babil, Ninova and Asur) did long-distance voyages. Apart from pilgrim voyages, the same steamers sailed to İstanbul and London. The route towards İstanbul included cities such as Jeddah, Suez, Jaffa, Beirut, Mersin and İzmir. In return, the same steamer could take pilgrims from İstanbul to Jeddah. The voyage to London differed only in calling at Alexandria (Egypt) and Marseille. Apart from the economic contribution of these steamers, they also contributed to the Ottoman political presence in the Gulf region, because they operated under the Ottoman flag. The British, French and Dutch (Felemenk) flags were already flying from the Persian Gulf to Suez Canal. The issue of political presence in the waters of the region was important, because in the absence of a Ottoman naval presence many of the Gulf sheikhdoms used either their own flags or European flags. The European flags and patronage enabled them to sail freely and securely. There is no doubt that such practices weakened the political ties between these sheikhdoms and the Ottoman Empire. The governors were also aware that the lack of Ottoman political presence in the Persian Gulf was related to the stagnation of the Ottoman dockyard in Basra. Hence, flying the Ottoman flag had great symbolic importance and governors like Namık Pasha and Midhat Pasha strived fervently to increase the Ottoman political presence.

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In this context, Midhat Pasha’s naval expedition with two corvettes to Najd and Bahrain had a profound influence on the local sheikhs. Midhat Pasha reports that for two centuries, not a single ship under the Ottoman flag had visited Bahrain. His visit to Bahrain with two large corvettes delighted the local people. The emîr of Bahrain, Sheikh İsa, showed great esteem and respect to the Ottoman officials and allocated berths in the harbor (needed for maintenance and coal storage) without charge.100 The improvement of Basra’s dockyard and harbor was closely related to the increasing British presence in the region. Foreign intervention in regional politics played a big part in Basra’s elevation to the leading naval base of the region. In order to strengthen the Ottoman presence in the region, the Porte ordered the local governors to build basins, coal stores and other necessary buildings in Jeddah, Yemen and Suez for the repair and maintenance of the ships. The central government also ordered the construction of forts opposite Yerm Island, which was then under British control.101 The governors were also warned about the transfer and sale of lands from sheikhs to foreigners, especially to Persians and the British. Midhat Pasha’s governorship also witnessed the re-activation of the dockyard at Baghdad, so that the repairs and other needs of the river steamers could be met there. In a nutshell, by means of steamers and corvettes the closed economy of Baghdad was opened; and public mobilization from Basra and Baghdad to the Indian Ocean increased significantly. The improvements in the steamer services and the development of dockyards certainly contributed to the conversion of Basra into a port city. These developments certainly contributed to the opening of Iraq to regional markets and its gradual incorporation into the networks of the ‘civilized’ world. Before the accomplishment of these works, Midhat Pasha likened Baghdad to a box of jewels that was locked and inaccessible. Thanks to the steamer services and the Suez Canal, which linked East and West, the province of Baghdad emerged from its former seclusion and moved closer to the ‘centers of civilization’.102 Irrigation and canal projects The clearance and maintenance of canals was vital not only for agriculture and trade but also for navigation. Starting with Necip Pasha,

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the governors tried to get the local people involved in this endeavor. Accordingly, those who cleared the canals were exempted from taxes for two to five years.103 The Pasha also repaired the Hindiyyah barrage in Musayyib for flood control of the Euphrates River, cleared the Abbasiyah canal for irrigation and land reclamation, and carried out a number of irrigation projects in Hindiyyah, Abu Guraib, Mahmudiyah, Rıdwaniyah and İskandariyah.104 Reşid Pasha’s contribution to the improvement of rivers, irrigation canals and river navigation was outstanding. The improvement of irrigation facilities was reflected in the opening of new areas to cultivation and therefore a considerable rise in agricultural production. Towards the end of 1853 he personally went to Saklawiyya and ordered the strengthening of the river walls. In 1854 he opened new canals, called Haruniyah (in Diyalah), Dujail (in Samarra), Müşiriyyah and Vaziriyyah.105 Perhaps Reşid Pasha’s most important contribution was the opening of the Kananiyah canal between Fallujah and the outskirts of Baghdad, Kazımiyah. The purpose of this canal was to create a channel of communication between the Euphrates and Tigris and thus make Baghdad accessible to direct river transport from Anatolia. The canal therefore played very significant role in facilitating the movement of people and goods. It was named after Kenan Agha, who had opened the canal. The Pasha also ordered the planting of mulberry trees on both banks of the canal for the purpose of producing silk.106 However, in the course of time, as the mouth of the canal enlarged from natural causes, most of the Euphrates water went towards the Tigris and Baghdad, rather than flowing south. While this new situation resulted in floods in Baghdad, it also brought drought to the lands of Hillah and Hindiyyah. Hence, Gözlüklü Reşid Pasha filled in the canal at considerable cost.107 The Euphrates overflowed frequently in the Saklawiyya region and many governors had dealt with the issue either by constructing river walls or repairing them.108 It was during Midhat Pasha’s term that for the sake of enhancing river transport the Pasha decided to re-open the Saklawiyya or Kananiyah Canal. As Murphey has pointed out, Saklawiyya’s close proximity to the Baghdad market made this project an extremely attractive prospect. Therefore, Midhat Pasha decided to revive the old Saklawiyya Canal and estimated that the opening of the

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canal would provide an additional 20,000 hectares of irrigated land for farming.109 Midhat Pasha commissioned Sırrı Pasha to carry out the project. The work was relatively easy since the builders could make use of the dried-out riverbed and the old Kananiyah canal.110 When it was completed, Midhat Pasha personally opened it and passed to the Euphrates through the Saklawiyya canal. Though the canal revived the Euphrates coastline and even increased the value of land there, it was unable to overcome all the shortcomings of the old Saklawiyya canal.111 The Pasha also built a bridge at Saklawiyya for which the local population paid a toll fee. The Porte financed the construction expenses on condition that the fee received for crossing the bridge would return to the imperial treasury. A sum of 30,000 to 40,000 kuruş was expected annually from these fees, which would cover the construction expenses in three to four years.112 The bridge also came in useful for transporting troops.

Transportation and railroads Midhat Pasha placed special emphasis on public transport in Baghdad. He encouraged the use of horse carts as a means of transport; but

PHOTO 13

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Opening of a canal in Baghdad

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his contribution to the railways was more radical.113 The province of Baghdad was very rich in terms of holy shrines. The Shi‘i shrines particularly had a special place in the social history of the province. Therefore, 40,000 to 50,000 pilgrims came annually to Baghdad from Iran, India and other countries with Shi‘i populations, because according to Shi‘i belief a visit to the shrines in Najaf, Karbala and Kazımiyah was obligatory (vâcib) for every Shi‘i individual, at least once in his lifetime. This resulted in an enormous influx of people during the 10th of Muharram and other significant religious days. Hence, the tramlines were of considerable help in transporting these large numbers of visitors. Just two and a half years after the advent of tramlines in İstanbul, Midhat Pasha built a tramline between Baghdad and Kazımiyah, where the shrines of the seventh and ninth imams of Twelver Shia lie. Kazımiyah was an important place for Shi‘i pilgrims and with the tramway units, the two cities were united. Most of the inhabitants of Kazımiyah were tradesmen in Baghdad and so every day they shuttled between the two cities, undertaking a 1.5 hour journey by mule. Realizing the need to improve the transport links between the two cities, Midhat Pasha started feasibility works and commissioned an official to count the people going back and forth daily between Kazımiyah and Baghdad. He found that there were 4,000 people doing so. To remedy this, Midhat Pasha planned a tramline project, which seems to have been the first joint-stock company in Baghdad. The total expenditure, which was estimated at 15,000 lira, was divided into 6,000 shares. Each share was sold for 250 kuruş and a provincial official was charged with managing the sale of the shares.114 Only 2,000 shares could be sold before the beginning of the shuttle; however, as people realized the service was a success, sales rose and they were announced in Zewra. The remaining shares were paid for by the revenue obtained from the service. As the project began to make a profit, the shareholders were also given a 3% share of its revenue. The tramline could carry several thousand people a day. During the month of Muharram and other religiously significant occasions where there were many pilgrims in the area the trams carried more than their

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A horse tramlime operating between Baghdad and Kazımiyah

usual number of passengers.115 The tram, which had a capacity of 50 passengers at most, had two decks: the first being first class and costing 40 para, the second deck standard fare at 20 para. The tram was pulled by horses and at first the route was planned to be 6 km, but later, as the project proved its success, it was lengthened by another kilometer. This tramway was in service for 60 years, until the establishment of Municipal Bus Management in 1938.116 The Shi‘ism played, directly or indirectly, a very significant role in the development of public works/buildings in Iraq. For instance, a wide road was constructed between Baghdad and Karbala.117 Either the governors improved the public works on the way to holy shrines, because of the number of visiting Shi‘i pilgrims; or the Shi‘is themselves invested in pious works in the holy cities such as Najaf, Karbala and Samarra. With the aforementioned Kazımiyah tramline the Shi‘is contributed indirectly to the enhancement of the transport facilities.

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However, the construction of irrigation canals and madrasas were examples of the second kind.118 There was considerable convergence between the routes of the telegraph lines and the railways. Although railroads came to Ottoman Iraq much later than telegraphs, they played a very significant role in the province of Baghdad. A few years after the completion of the Üsküdar–Basra telegraph line, plans concerning a railroad on the same route began to be discussed in the Sublime Porte.119 Apart from the tramline between Baghdad and Kazımiyah, Midhat Pasha also planned the construction of a railroad in Kananiyah to link the Tigris and Euphrates rivers.120 Earlier the Pasha had planned to build the railroad between Tikrit and Râve (approximately 160 km) to join the Euphrates and Tigris; however, when it was realized how much the project would cost, it was delayed.121 Instead, he decided to join the two rivers by a railroad running between Baghdad and Mukaddam. This railroad was supposed to increase the number of pilgrims to Karbala; hence, Midhat Pasha decided to extend it to this city. Perhaps more important was the railroad project between Baghdad and İskenderun. Midhat Pasha saw the Maskanah–Aleppo and Aleppo–İskandarun routes as outlets reaching to international transport networks. He introduced a steam service up to Maskanah. As the roads from Maskanah to Aleppo and İskenderun were improved, the volume of trade between Baghdad and these places increased considerably.122 The railroad project between İskenderun and Baghdad was ratified by the Sublime Porte, but it is not clear whether it was finished during Midhat Pasha’s governorship.123

Education The general contention concerning the history of education in Ottoman Iraq is that with the exception of a few French missionary schools confined to the Christian population, there were no modern schools before the governorship of Midhat Pasha.124 Until the midnineteenth century, education was provided in the elementary (kuttâb or mullah) schools or in the more advanced madrasas attached to leading mosques.125 Education was basically religious in character.

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However, in the madrasas both transmitted sciences (ulûm-ı nakliyyah) and rational sciences (ulûm-ı aqliyyah) were taught. While the former consisted of theology, jurisprudence, mysticism, Quranic exegesis, the prophetic traditions and knowledge of the accepted readings of the Quran, the latter included grammar, syntax, logic, geometry and astronomy.126 Although the leading cities of Iraq had madrasas, they were mostly concentrated in Baghdad. The madrasas were supported by the religious endowments (vakıfs) and at least some of the students received a daily allowance from these endowments.127 The basic problem in education within the province was that there were no intermediary educational institutions between the kuttâb schools and the madrasas. On the one hand, the kuttâb schools admitted children at the age of four or five for a period of two to four years. The madrasas on the other hand were too advanced and specialized for the graduates of kuttâb schools. In this regard, in order to fill the gap the second half of the nineteenth century witnessed the opening of many modern schools in Iraq.

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Students of İdadi School in Baghdad

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The kuttâb schools were part of the traditional system of education in Iraq. The ibtidâiyye (primary) schools, most of which were opened during the governorship of Namık Pasha, accepted children over the age of six.128 Therefore, it would not be wrong to say that the ibtidâiyye schools were modern versions of the traditional kuttâb schools. However, as in many other Tanzimat institutions, both schools continued to exist side by side. After four years of study in the ibtidâiyye school, the student could go to the rüşdiye schools, which were considered to be the first step for the spread of modern culture in Iraq. Seventeen years after its first opening in İstanbul in 1847, Ottoman Iraq had its own rüşdiye schools during the governorship of Namık Pasha.129 As in many other fields, Namık Pasha acted as the precursor of modernization in education. Despite Namık Pasha’s significant initiatives in this area, secondary sources usually credit Midhat Pasha for the introduction of rüşdiye schools to Ottoman Iraq. This is mainly due to the fact that these authors did not use Ottoman archives and thus lack an in-depth analysis. Secondly, the fact that Midhat Pasha’s term witnessed the extension of modern educational institutions was used retrospectively. It would however not be wrong to argue that with the governorship of Midhat Pasha education in Iraq experienced a considerable boost. In 1869, rüşdiye schools were being built not only in Baghdad but also in other sub-provinces.130 Midhat Pasha placed special emphasis on modernization and the spread of education, because he wholeheartedly believed that education was the solution for every problem in the province. He saw education as the most important tool for modernization and development. To this end, he built many schools for different purposes. This was done through the efforts of benevolent societies that were initiated by Midhat himself. He tried hard to persuade the local people to send their sons to the modern schools, because at first they were reluctant to do so for fear that their sons would become degenerate.131 However, in a very short period of time the Pasha had won the hearts of the people and the schools could not meet the demand for enrolment. By 1871 there were at least four rüşdiye schools in the province, one in Baghdad, one in Sulaimaniyah, one in Mosul and one in Kirkuk.132

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The rüşdiye school in Mosul was probably opened in 1864. By 1865 it was headed by a muallim-i sânî and muavins (assistant teachers), because the muallim-i evvel (senior teacher) could only be appointed in the second year after establishment.133 It is also understood that there were many pupils in the new school. Thanks to the generous donations of the local people, the rüşdiye of Kirkuk was opened in the spring of 1870. In its first year, the school could enrol only 80 students out of 300 applicants.134 When opening a new school, special conditions relating to the climate and geography of the province were taken into account. The site of the school was carefully selected to be climatically favorable and near a good water source. The banks of the Tigris were considered to be an ideal site for schools. Likewise, according to local tradition, a serdâb was designed in the basement to provide an escape from unbearably hot weather.135 Later, with the promulgation of the Maârif-i Umûmiye Nizâmnâmesi in 1869, the Sublime Porte had more say over the schools and school buildings began to be constructed in accordance with plans sent from İstanbul. The rüşdiye schools admitted only the graduates of ibtidâiyye schools and during their three years’ attendance the students were taught the following courses: Mathematics, Engineering, Accounting, Geography, History, Basic Health Information, İlm-i hâl, language, and Calligraphy. It was quite probable that the quality of education and the range of courses offered varied from region to region. At first teachers were recruited mainly from among the Turks, and there were not enough of them, but later Iraqi teachers outnumbered their Turkish colleagues.136 The rüşdiye schools were accorded a high importance by the local government and because of this provincial officials closely supervised the students’ examinations.137 By 1876 the number of rüşdiye schools in Iraq reached nine.138 In time, these rüşdiye schools produced distinguished graduates. For example, Baban-zâde Ahmed Naim was a graduate of the Baghdad rüşdiye school, and after his graduation he served in significant positions in İstanbul. The Law of Education (Maârif-i Umûmiye Nizâmnâmesi), which was promulgated in 1869, envisioned the establishment of education

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İdadi

School on the bank of the Tigris River

councils in the provincial capitals. It is significant that by 1872 only two provinces of the Ottoman Empire had education councils, namely Tuna and Baghdad, where Midhat Pasha had provided the necessary infrastructure.139 The development of a modern education system in Baghdad was also associated with the re-organization of the armed forces. Baghdad was one of the earliest places in which military rüşdiye and idadiye schools were opened. Needless to say, Baghdad’s role as the base of the Sixth Army was influential in this, because the provinces with military bases had priority in this regard. In 1849 an attempt was made to establish a mekteb-i idâdî for the Sixth Army.140 However, the central administration was put off by the cost of the school, which was 100,000 kuruş. As the Sublime Porte advised the governor of Baghdad to find new sources of revenue for the expenditure, it is understood that the project was put on the shelf.

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Again it was during Midhat Pasha’s term of office that a military junior high school (rüşdiye) was established in Baghdad in 1870. Students who were accepted by the military rüşdiye were graduates of kuttâb schools. It provided students with a four-year course of study consisting of Turkish, Arabic, Persian, French, Islamic history, Ottoman geography, composition, religion, arithmetic, an introduction to engineering, basic health information, gymnastics and calligraphy.141 The instructors were Ottoman officers of the Sixth Army of Iraq who taught their subjects in Turkish. Some of the students in this school were supported financially by the government. Later a second military rüşdiye was opened in Sulaimaniyah, which admitted students of the locality.142 The aim of these military rüşdiyes was to prepare the students for the military senior high school (askerî idâdi), which was instituted for the Sixth Army of Baghdad in 1871. There is no doubt that the graduates of these military schools played a significant role in the creation of the modern Iraqi state. Jafar al-Askari and Nuri al-Said present good examples in this regard. After his primary education in Mosul, al-Askari attended the military school in Baghdad. In 1901 he went to the İstanbul Military Academy (Harbiye). When he graduated at the age of 19 as mülâzım-i sânî (lieutenant), he was appointed to the Sixth Army in Baghdad. After a while, he became instructor in military senior school, where he served for one and half years.143 Al-Askari was not only a competent soldier whose military career culminated with his foundation of the modern Iraqi army, but also a prominent bureaucrat serving in Iraq as minister and prime minister several times. Nuri al-Said, who was at the same time Jafar al-Askari’s brotherin-law, had a similar career. He shared considerable parts of his life with Jafar al-Askari and served long years during the British Mandate and Kingdom of Iraq. Nuri al-Said, who served seven times as prime minister, was obviously a major political figure in twentieth-century Iraq. Likewise, Yasin al-Hashimi, Jamil Midfai, Naji Shawkat, Mawlud Mukhlis and Ali Jawdat were prominent figures in the politics, both civilian and military, during the mandate period and Iraqi monarchy.144

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Two future prime ministers of modern Iraq: Jafar Al-Askari (second from right) and Nuri Al-Said (second from left).

Commander (Binbaşı) Mehmed Vasfi Efendi was the director of the military senior high school (askerî idadî), which admitted graduates of the junior high school.145 As noted by Al-Qaysi, This [school] was a boarding school with all expenses paid by the government and offering a three-year course consisting of the following subjects in addition to military strategy: Turkish language and literature, French, history, geography, Algebra, trigonometry, geometry, physics, drawing, calligraphy, and religion. Except for the subject of religion, which was taught by an imam, instruction was given in Turkish by army officers. The young men who finished their studies obtained a certificate and were admitted to the Military College in İstanbul.146

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In terms of the numbers of students graduating from the military senior school, Ottoman Iraq had the first ranking among the Arab provinces of the empire.147 Earlier, officers of the Sixth Army had been recruited from among graduates of the military academy in İstanbul.148 However, Midhat Pasha’s purpose in establishing these schools and enrolling Iraqi pupils was to prepare the local officers for taking over leadership from the non-Iraqi elements in the army and generally to expand Ottoman armed forces in the country.149 The industrial schools have a special role in the history of education in Iraq. Though Midhat Pasha had a distinct place in the opening and spread of these schools, Namık Pasha’s inauguration of a school of ship-making can be regarded as the first attempt in this regard. As the Basra dockyard expanded considerably during the governorship of Namık Pasha, he saw the necessity for a school teaching shipbuilding skills. As explained above, the students were to be trained on one of the warships. Midhat Pasha, who was the founder of the first industrial school in İstanbul, had also established several industrial schools in Ottoman Iraq. In Baghdad, he modernized one of the old madrasas of Baghdad, namely madrasa al-aliyya, which had been founded by Davud Pasha, the last Mamluk governor. The school, which offered a four-year course, had 160 students in 1870.150 Those who donated (Muslim and non-Muslim) for this industrial school were publicly thanked in the provincial newspaper.151 It is known that Ahmed Midhat wrote his Hâce-i Evvel for the students of this school.152 The curriculum included courses on ironmongery, printing, carpentry, tailoring and shoemaking. For the practical training of the students, master craftsmen in these vocations were appointed. The necessary equipment for these courses was imported from abroad. The graduates of this school were recruited to work in the Baghdad dockyard, printing house and so on.153 At the very beginning the industrial schools (mekteb-i sanâyi‘) acted as reformatory schools (ıslâhhâne), because the main purpose of these schools was to teach orphan and homeless children a profession so that they could earn their own living. The basic driving force behind these schools was the fact that one-third of the children in Iraq were either

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orphans or homeless.154 Hence, Midhat Pasha put great emphasis on these schools, which were initially dominated by orphans and the poorer strata of the local population, but later as the schools gained renown, other families began to send their children for training as well.155 Midhat Pasha’s governorship also witnessed the opening of a second industrial school in Kirkuk in 1871.156 The school was funded by donations from the local people. A building with 16 rooms, a bath house and large garden was purchased for this end. The graduates of this school could also go to the rüşdiye schools. Among the Iraqi subprovinces, Basra was surely the most backward, as it had no primary (ibtidâiyye) schools until 1883, let alone rüşdiye and idâdi schools. The ‘Alliance Israelite Universelle’ school formed a very important aspect of education in Baghdad. Founded in the late 1860s by the Jewish community of Baghdad, the school excelled in its instruction and training.157 The representatives of foreign missions in the province had high praise for the way the school was managed and the standard of instruction there. Here, the students were taught French, English, Turkish, history, geography, arithmetic, physics, etc. The school was funded by generous donations of the Jewish community.158 For instance, Abdullah David Sassoon, one of the leading figures of Baghdad Jewry, donated £2,000 to the school in 1872.159 It is also known that a Christian school was opened in Baghdad in 1870. Zewra published the names of the provincial gentry who provided donations for this school.160 It is interesting to note that the Muslim provincial officials/notables contributed to this Christian school too. Needless to say, the governor, Midhat Pasha and other high-ranking bureaucrats took the lead. The encouragement of education regardless of religious differences, in fact, shows the enthusiasm of provincial rulers for the improvement of education in the province. A final mention should be made of the Shi‘i attempts to build madrasas in the province of Baghdad. Several times during the Tanzimat era, Shi‘i notables, whether of Iranian or Indian origin, applied to Ottoman officials in Baghdad and İstanbul for permission to build madrasas, especially in the Holy Cities of Najaf and Karbala. While some of these requests were allowed, those in the second half of the century were usually denied. The main reasons for this were as follows: first,

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the Iranians had already acquired considerable land in the province, to the alarm of the local government.161 Secondly, in view of the Shi‘i rebellions of the 1840s, the Shi‘is were perceived as a potential fifth column. And lastly, such buildings were constructed for ulterior purposes, especially tax exemption and claims of being an Ottoman subject (tebe‘a). Though the Hamidian Era (1876–1909) witnessed more centralized and systematic efforts at preventing the spread of Shi‘ism in Iraq, the seeds of this policy can increasingly be found in the second half of the nineteenth century.162 However, perhaps the most significant reason for the rejection of Shi‘i madrasas was that the Tanzimat reforms in the field of education aimed to modernize the educational institutions and raise the quality of education. Therefore, rather than reviving the old traditional institutions (madrasas), they aimed to institute modern schools that followed a Sunni curriculum, aiming at the ‘Hanefization’ of the population.163 ‘Hanefization’ was part of the centralization / Ottomanization policy of the government, but it was also a matter for resentment among the Shi‘i population of the country. There is no doubt that by the end of the Tanzimat era, in the words of Timothy Mitchell, a ‘discipline of schooling’ was created in the province of Baghdad.164 The discipline was not only in the curriculum of the schools, but also a certain hierarchy was introduced among the schools within the province. The provincial administration in the late 1860s and early 1870s created a social awareness throughout the province of the role of the new modern schools in improving the cultural and economic life of the people.165 Although education was not given sufficient attention after Midhat Pasha’s governorship, the support of the Sublime Porte continued with fluctuating enthusiasm.

Printing houses and provincial newspapers Davud Pasha is credited with establishing the first lithographic press in Baghdad, and he printed a newspaper called Jurnâl al-Iraq. The purpose of the newspaper was to circulate his announcements and regulations. However, the date for this first printing house is not very clear. While some Arab historians suggest it was founded in 1816, Michael

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W. Albin has proved that this date is incorrect. Since Davud Pasha was engaged in a power struggle with Said Pasha, he did not enter Baghdad until February 1817. Therefore, both the date of 1816 and the publication of Jurnâl al-Iraq were clearly incorrect.166 According to Albin, Rasul Havi’s Dawhatü‘l-Vüzerâ was the first book printed in Iraq, in 1830–31.167 Although Davud Pasha introduced the first lithographic press around 1830, it disappeared in the cataclysmic events which struck Baghdad in 1831–32. However, printing was continued both by European missionaries and Muslims in the province. The city of Karbala had the first Muslim printing press in Iraq in 1856. It was a lithographic press founded by a Persian, Mirza Abbas.168 The same Persian is said to have opened a second printing house in Baghdad in 1861. These presses were used to print prayer booklets and several literary works. Maqamat of Mahmud Ibn Abdullah al-Alusî (Abu alThana) was among the works of importance published in 1856–57 by the private press of Mirza Abbas.169 The Dominicans contributed to the printing efforts in the province of Baghdad in the late 1850s. Again, producing textbooks for the missionary schools was the main driving force for their efforts. It was Father Besson of the Dominican Fathers who introduced lithography to Mosul in 1856. With the financial aid of another missionary society, l’oeuvre d’Orient, Msgr. Amantion, the Apostolic Delegate to Mesopotamia, was able to purchase a modern printing press in Mosul in 1860.170 Thanks to this missionary society, Mosul had its modern printing press ten years earlier than Baghdad. With the introduction of modern (typographic) printing press, the lithographic printers lost their importance, because they could not compete commercially. On the other hand, the first Hebrew (lithographic) printing house in Baghdad was established in 1863 by Barukh Moseh Mizrahi. The first product of this Hebrew press was the periodical Ha-Dover / Dover Mesharim, which was published in 1862–63.171 It was a bi-weekly periodical, but Midhat Pasha encouraged the Jews of Baghdad to publish the newspaper more frequently, because he believed that the publication of newspapers was an important sign of civilization.172 For a short period, the publication of Ha-Dover stopped on the grounds

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that the periodical lacked an imperial license from the Porte, but later it resumed publication.173 Thanks to the efforts of Rahamin Ruben Mordecai and his partners Moshe and Aaron Ben Yesh‘ah Fetaya, the Jews of Baghdad brought in the first Hebrew typographic press in 1865–66.174 Aside from the Jewish newspaper, Midhat Pasha also encouraged the Armenian inhabitants of Baghdad to publish a newspaper because they already had a good printing house.175 After the destruction of Davud Pasha’s printing house, the first Ottoman printing house was founded by Midhat Pasha. Before his arrival in Baghdad, Ahmed Midhat was tasked by Midhat Pasha with purchasing in İstanbul the necessary equipment for the printing house. And in his early days in Baghdad Ahmed Midhat strove to establish and organize the printing house. Here, the first semi-official provincial newspaper of Baghdad, Zewra, was published.176 Claims that Jurnâl al-Iraq was the first Iraqi periodical have been discredited and Zewra is now considered to be ‘the first progeny of Iraqi journalism’.177 Zewra was very important for the enlightenment of the local population. At the beginning it was published weekly, but later it came to be a bi-weekly newspaper. It was a four-page publication: two pages in Ottoman Turkish and two pages in Arabic.178 People could subscribe to the newspaper and it was posted even to remote sancaks.179 As mentioned earlier, Zewra was edited by Ahmed Midhat.180 It would not, therefore, be wrong to say that both the print house and the Zewra newspaper were the product of Ahmed Midhat’s endeavors.181 In the beginning the printing press was housed in poor conditions, the lithography being in the cellar, serdâb. However, by October 1870 it moved to a more suitable place, which had nearly ten rooms. The print house not only changed its premises but also renewed its machinery.182 This meant it could expand its activities and besides Zewra and governmental papers, it began to print pamphlets and books for commercial purposes. A detailed price tariff for private publications was announced in Zewra.183 Tanzimat envisioned each province having a printing press and an official bulletin. Among the Iraqi provinces, Mosul was the second after Baghdad to have its own provincial newspaper. In 1882, long after Zewra’s publication, the weekly Musul was published by the

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The semi-official newspaper of the province of Baghdad, Zewra

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provincial print house in Mosul.184 Similarly, the first issue of al-Basra was published in 1889. Apart from the provincial newspaper, the printing house published official documents, of which the provincial yearbooks (Vilâyet Sâlnâmesi) were of great importance. The first provincial yearbooks published in Baghdad appeared in 1875.185 It is also known that the printing house published books for educational and commercial purposes. In 1870, Ahmed Midhat’s 221-page Hâce-i Evvel, which included sections on history, geography, mathematics, natural sciences and theology, was published.186 It also had a short chapter on agriculture, artisanship and commerce. As mentioned earlier, this book was intended to be a textbook for the students of the industrial school in Baghdad, but it was sold to ordinary people as well. Apart from textbooks for the new modern schools, books on religion, history and law were published as well. A selection of stories from Fenelon’s Telemaque was even published and offered for sale.187 Military books and regulations were printed by a special intaglio process that was also imported by Midhat Pasha.188 Since the Zewra is an invaluable source for the study of the second half of the nineteenth century, it needs further emphasis. In parallel with the newspapers of the Tanzimat period, the main objective of Zewra was to inform and illuminate the people about local, national and international news. As declared in its 47th issue, the primary purpose of the newspaper was the publication of provincial affairs and guidance for the local people on the path to civilization. The editor, Ahmed Midhat, likened the newspaper to a teacher who explains difficult matters in an understandable manner.189 He further believed in the need for simplifying the process of education; therefore, the language and the style he used in Zewra were very simple and inclusive. As intended, the newspaper had a strong ‘civilizing’ role. It played a significant part in educating the people of Baghdad. Midhat Pasha, like Ahmed Midhat, considered the role of newspapers as that of a ‘true trainer’.190 This was particularly evident when it came to agricultural issues, as Zewra taught the people how to cultivate efficiently. Another objective of Zewra was to shape public opinion on certain issues. Especially on issues relating to agricultural productivity and

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military conscription Zewra tried to win the hearts of local population. To this end, the newspaper occasionally used the ‘question and answer’ method. For example, for the project of extending the railway to Karbala, the editor first asked questions as if they were articulated by an opponent to the scheme, and then gave persuasive answers to these questions.191 In doing so, the newspaper aimed to influence the local people and win their support for certain issues. Furthermore, imperial decrees, laws, texts of treaties, regulations, official announcements and provincial auctions were published in Zewra.192 It is for this reason that it was considered to be a semiofficial newspaper. However, this did not prevent the newspaper from including literary, cultural and social articles along with occasional readers’ letters.193 The people of Baghdad were required to familiarize themselves with laws and official announcements. Hence, they were indirectly forced to follow the news either in Turkish or Arabic. And finally it was one of the aims of the governor to encourage the participation of the local population in municipal affairs. In this sense Zewra became a means of communication between the ruler and the ruled. Despite the obvious benefits of the Zewra for the people of Baghdad some regarded it as the personal diary of Midhat Pasha at least for the period of 1869–1872. There is no doubt that Zewra was a means for the modernization of Ottoman Baghdad from above. It was published both in Arabic and Ottoman Turkish. One of the main characteristics of this newspaper was that it included news regarding not only the internal affairs of the empire but also foreign affairs. With these features, Zewra was ranked one of the best provincial newspapers throughout the empire.194

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CONCLUSION

Baghdad, as the provincial center of Ottoman Iraq, had a very important place in the Ottoman imperial mind. Its significance stemmed not only from its being an old capital of Islamic civilization, but also from its frontier characteristics. When the abundance of ethnic and religious elements within the province is considered, it can be said that nineteenth-century Ottoman Iraq preserved its status as the ‘microcosm of the Middle East’. Being on the periphery of the empire, the province of Baghdad was constantly on guard against the Persian threat, which, together with the tribal structure of the country, required political unity in the provincial administration and this meant the subordination of other Iraqi provinces (Mosul, Shahrizor and Basra) to Baghdad. After the second half of the nineteenth century, the governors began to govern over a far-flung province that corresponded to present-day Iraq. In this period, Baghdad strengthened its position with the amalgamation of the hıtta-ı Irakiyye as a single province. While this regional unity in administration began to change in the last quarter of the century, Baghdad had always been the provincial center of Ottoman Iraq, even when the Iraqi provinces were separate/independent provinces. The concern over provincial security explains the need for strong governors, namely müşîr-valis. It was quite important that almost all governors in Baghdad acted as the head of both the administrative and military units, which enabled them to cope with tribal uprisings effectively and implement policies concerning provincial security. Conscription by ballot was among the regular tasks of provincial governors. With the reinforcement of the Sixth Army, provincial forces

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became more of a deterrent to the rebellious tribes and it is safe to argue that thanks to increasing security measures such as the establishment of new karakols and steamboat patrols on the rivers, provincial security improved considerably when compared to the first half of the century. Eleven governors (one of them twice) served in the province of Baghdad between 1831 and 1872, but several of them came to the forefront. These governors were not only given wider authority by the Sublime Porte, but they were also powerful in their personal characters, decision-making processes and enthusiasms. It was again during the governorships of these Tanzimat pashas that the province of Baghdad witnessed real improvement. So far the literature on the subject has overemphasized Midhat Pasha, leaving other skilful governors in the shadows. As underlined earlier, Midhat Pasha’s successes can be better understood when the contributions of Reşid Pasha and Namık Pasha are taken into account. These ‘Men of Tanzimat’ had common denominators: all of them had European experience and spent considerable time in Europe, either for their education or to widen their horizons. Reşid Pasha, for example, completed his education in France and remained there for an extended period. He was regarded as a genius in administrative science.1 On the other hand, Namık Pasha served many years in Europe in diplomatic missions; besides Arabic, he knew French and English. Similarly, Midhat Pasha had a clear European vision. His distinctive personality, strong will and reform mindedness carried the reforms to their apex. There was a clear continuity in the deeds of these governors and this was quite significant for the accomplishment of provincial reforms. The centralist policies of the 1830s required the re-integration of the Iraqi provinces into the Ottoman center. The concomitant growth of Ottoman military forces made it difficult for decentralist forces to defend their domains. The Ottoman military and administrative centralization brought an end to the ‘five pillars of old order in Iraq’, namely the Mamluks in Baghdad, the Jalilis in Mosul, the Kurdish emîrs in northern Iraq, Shi‘is of Najaf and Karbala, and the tribal aristocracy.

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It was only with the second wave of Tanzimat that Ottoman Iraq was incorporated into the range of Tanzimat reforms in 1844. The reforms aimed at strengthening the ties between the province and the center, deconstructing the tribal structures and improving the agricultural and commercial potential of the province. The period covered in this study witnessed many developments in this regard. As the authority of the provincial rulers increased in the 1850s, governors like Reşid Pasha, Namık Pasha and Midhat Pasha came to the forefront with their service in Baghdad. Almost all of the governors were in charge of both political and military affairs, and this enabled them to implement reforms in administrative as well as military areas. In the military field, the establishment of the Sixth Army in Baghdad and the introduction of conscription by ballot were the first radical steps, which resulted in a notable improvement in provincial security. The first signs of the new period were seen in the provincial administration. The administrative councils were reformed in accordance with the new regulations issued in the late 1840s and early 1850s. The administrative councils reached their maturity with the introduction of the Provincial Law of 1864 (with amendments in 1867 and 1871). The establishment of these councils from provincial center down to the kazâ level not only enabled the local people to participate in the political apparatus of the province, but also extended Ottoman central authority at the expense of tribal dominions. In this context, leading tribal sheikhs were employed in the provincial administrative council. By the early 1870s, not only the sub-provinces but also most of the kazâs had administrative councils. Moreover, the establishment of a municipality in Baghdad was also the result of this Provincial Law. The fact that Baghdad was one of the first Ottoman Arab lands to have a municipal organization, was an important sign of the success of provincial reforms. The nineteenth century witnessed a considerable extension of provincial administrative units in the province of Baghdad. Many tribal areas were converted into kaymakamlıks or mutasarrıflıks; therefore, the tribally dominated areas contracted in the course of time. In many places tribal sheikhs were given administrative positions so as to coopt them into the political structure, rather than alienating them.

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Perhaps the case of Muntafiq was the most striking example in this context. The paramount sheikh of the Muntafiq tribal confederation became not only the mutasarrıf of Nasıriyah, but also a prominent ally of Midhat Pasha. The newly created kaymakamlıks or mutasarrıflıks, such as Muntafiq, Shammar and Ramadi, certainly meant further urbanization of Ottoman Iraq. Among the Tanzimat reforms, the implementation of the Provincial (Vilâyet) Law of 1864 and the Land Code of 1858 in Baghdad were of great significance. While the former aimed at extending the provincial administrative mechanisms towards the tribal areas, the latter targeted the tribal sheikhdoms and the improvement of land tenure. The implementation of land reform in Ottoman Iraq was quite important, because it contradicted the very nature of tribal customs of the country. Hence, the governors first made necessary changes in the legal status of the land, and then started to sell the usufructory right of vacant lands with title deeds. When compared to other provinces of the empire, the implementation of the Land Code was slightly different in Baghdad, the ukr application being the most obvious difference. While the Code aimed at creating a class of small landowners through individual registration of the land, things turned out differently in practice. Fear of military conscription and taxation led to the land being registered in the name of tribal sheikhs and consequently, contrary to the initial intent of the Code, the tribal sheikhs emerged as big landowners. Obviously, this development had significant ramifications for the tribal structure of the province, as land became more and more important for the sheikly structures. It is clear that the problems of tribalism were nowhere as pervasive as in Ottoman Baghdad. Despite the side effects of the Land Code, the policies followed in Iraq during the Tanzimat era resulted in the cooptation of sheikhly powers that dominated the country for centuries. The question of bedeviyyet vs medeniyyet in Arab provinces has become the theme of many studies. It is commonly accepted that the modernization process in the Arab provinces, especially in Baghdad, had elements of both the carrot and the stick. When provincial policies were supported by the local population, they were rewarded in some way; but when they were opposed, the reforms were enforced upon them,

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even sometimes by means of military force. Nevertheless, during the nineteenth century the tribal structures in Iraq fragmented significantly. While some of the tribal aristocracies were broken, some others were incorporated into the provincial political mechanism. This study has shown that when compared to the Mamluk period, the ‘politics of tribe’ followed in this period was much wiser and more cooperative. It is clear that the policy of Ottomanism and centralization in Baghdad meant the modernization of the province as well. In fact, the two went hand in hand. The approach toward urbanization/ modernization of public places underwent significant changes during the Tanzimat era. The course of modernization in Baghdad bore the imprints of Ottoman patterns of modernization in general and the results were most visible in the public works in the province of Baghdad. Besides the infrastructural developments, improvements in the communication and transport facilities (steam navigation, railroad projects and the telegraph network) enabled the province to connect to the international network. Furthermore, the introduction of modern schools, the print house and the publication of the provincial newspaper (Zewra), textbooks and other books/booklets contributed substantially to the intellectual life of the province. Finally, significant improvements and developments along with provincial modernization that had been experienced in almost every sphere of life made late nineteenth-century Baghdad a very different city from the early 1800s. It is clear that by the early 1870s, Ottoman Baghdad had reached a significant stage of provincial reform and modernization. It is well known that many of these public works survived the British Mandate and after. The political and military system (with new legal codes, modern educational and judicial institutions, modern army, communication networks, public works etc.) that was laid down during the nineteenth century became the infrastructure for the modern Iraqi state in the twentieth century. Similarly, the graduates of the modern schools became prominent figures of twentieth-century Iraqi history. In fact, many members of the elites that became effective in the post-Ottoman geographies were trained in the Ottoman schools and served in their new states as politicians, military commanders and

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bureaucrats. Most of them could speak Turkish. Despite their different ethnic background and worldviews, one can easily find the common legacy of Ottoman modernization in their attitudes and approaches to certain events and developments. No doubt, they benefited from their Ottoman experiences and all this paved the way for the emergence, in the newly created Middle Eastern states, of political, military and social structures that bear Ottoman imprints. In this context, this study underlines the fact that the origins of modern Iraq have to be looked for in the nineteenth-century Ottoman rule in Iraqi provinces, not elsewhere. It also attempts to act as corrective to recent arguments that consider Iraq as an artificial political entity and ‘a new-old nation-state that was cobbled together after the World War I from different provinces of Ottoman Empire’.2 These political analyses do not take history into consideration and assert the artificiality of the country, thereby delegitimizing Iraq. What is also flawed is the assessment of the nineteenth-century Ottoman Iraq through the lens of the nation-state. Instead, this study underlines the Ottoman background of modern Iraq and explores the centralizing and modernizing reforms in the frontier province of Baghdad during the Tanzimat Era, shedding light on the extent to which Baghdad, and more generally Iraq, was connected to the imperial center of the Ottoman Empire.

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ENDNOTES

Introduction 1. For the significance of Baghdad in oral culture see Michael Cooperson, ‘Baghdad in Rhetoric and Narrative’, Muqarnas, Vol. XIII, Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1996, pp. 99–113 and Kerem Kayi, Bagdad, 1831–1869: Untersuchungern zur Entwicklung einer Osmanischen Provinzhauptstadt im 19. Jahrhundert (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2007), pp. 17–19. 2. More than 100 Ottoman poets were of Iraqi origin. Hatibî cites 75 Turkish poets for the late eighteenth and early ninetheenth centuries. For the biographies and poems of these poets see Hatîbî, Tezkere-i Şuarâ-yı Bağdad (trans. Mehmet Akkuş) (İstanbul: Marmara Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Yayınları), 2008. 3. Cemil Musa Neccar, Al-İdâra al-Osmânî fî Vilâyeti Baghdâd, 1869–1917 (Cairo: Madbouli Bookshop, 1991), p. 68. 4. Stephen Hemsley Longrigg, Four Centuries of Modern Iraq (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1925), p. 279. 5. Kamal Abd al-Rahman Salman, ‘The Ottoman and British Policies Toward Iraqi Tribes: 1831 to 1921’ (Unpublished PhD Thesis, The University of Utah, 1992), p. 1. 6. Hourani divided Ottoman history roughly into four phases, of which the period from 1760 to 1860 was the third phase. Albert Hourani, ‘Ottoman Reform and Politics of Notables’, in William R. Polk and Richard L. Chambers (eds), Beginnings of Modernization in the Middle East (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1968), p. 42. 7. Albert Hourani mentions that when he asked a well-known historian of the Middle East the reason why he left the period 1516–1918 out in his studies, he replied that it was because there was really no Arab history during these centuries, implying Arab subordination to Ottoman rule. See Albert Hourani, ‘The Ottoman Background of the Modern Middle East’, in Kemal Karpat (ed.) The Ottoman State and Its Place in World History (Leiden: E.J. Brill,

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8.

9.

10. 11.

12. 13.

14.

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1974), p. 61. For the attitude of Arab scholarship towards the Ottoman State, see Abou-el-Haj, Rifaat Ali. ‘The Social Uses of the Past: Recent Arab Historiography of Ottoman Rule’, IJMES, Vol. 14, No. 2, May 1982, pp. 185–201. André Raymond has clearly shown the relationship between colonialism and the historiography of the Ottoman Arab provinces; see his ‘French Studies of the Ottoman Empire’s Arab Provinces’, Mediterranean Historical Review, Vol. 19, No. 1, June 2004, pp. 54–72. See Jane Hathaway, ‘Rewriting Eighteenth-Century Ottoman History’, Mediterranean Historical Review, Vol. 19, No. 1, June 2004, p. 47; Edhem Eldem, Daniel Goffman and Bruce Masters (eds), The Ottoman City Between East and West: Aleppo, İzmir and İstanbul (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 8. Ehud R. Toledano, ‘What Ottoman History and Ottomanist Historiography Are – Or, Rather Are Not’, MES, Vol. 38 No. 3, 2002, p. 205. See, for instance, Henry A. Foster, The Making of Modern Iraq (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press), 1935 and Geoff Simons, Iraq: From Sumer to Saddam (2nd edn) (London: MacMillan Press, 1996). Toledano: ‘What Ottoman History and Ottomanist Historiography Are’, p. 205. There is no doubt that no area in the world has archeological remains richer than Baghdad. Antiquity, and the desire to visit the places named in the Holy Books, were almost the only attractions for visitors from the West to Iraq. This fact is reflected in the number of travelers who visited the region. It is also no surprise that several of the British consuls in Baghdad, among whom Claudius James Rich and Austen Henry Layard are the best-known, had archeological concerns. Layard’s Nineveh and Its Remains is perhaps the most outstanding work in this sense. The travelers were necessarily transient and discontinuous; therefore, the majority of their writing helps and verifies details rather than constituting a sound basis for research. The traveler accounts also bear the danger of having orientalist approaches. Despite this jeopardy, they usually have significant data that cannot otherwise be found in archival documents. In this respect, the works of J.B. Fraser, H.B. Lynch, A.H. Layard, James Felix Jones and Lady Anne Blunt are among those that first come to mind. For a complete list of travelers, see the appendices in Longrigg’s Four Centuries and Neccar’s Al-İdâra al-Osmânî. See also Shawn Malley, ‘Layard Enterprise: Victorian Archaeology and Informal Imperialism in Mesopotamia’, IJMES, Vol. 0, No. 1, 2008, pp. 623–646. Steward Perowne, ‘Life in Baghdad: Anniversary Lecture’, Asian Affairs, Vol. 34, No. 3–4, 1947, p. 251.

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15. Despite the wide range of sources, however, Longrigg could not go beyond a mere chronological narration and he is criticized for dwelling upon political history and ignoring social history. He did not used several important archival sources, which are particularly crucial for the history of Ottoman Iraq, namely Ottoman archives, the consulate reports in the National Archives in London, and the Zewra newspaper published in 1869 in Baghdad. 16. It is evident that the social and intellectual history of Iraq has received scant attention. Mystic orders (such as Naqshibandiyya and Khalidiyya), religious movements (like Wahhabism) and notables (especially ulema and nakîbs) have been among the few topics touched upon by scholars. See Butrus Abu-Manneh, ‘Salafiyya and the Rise of the Khalidiyya in Baghdad in Early Nineteenth Century’, Die Welt des Islams, Vol. 43, No. 3, 2003, pp. 349–372; Butrus Abu-Manneh, ‘The Naqshbandiyya-Mujaddidiyya in the Ottoman Lands in the Early 19th Century’, Die Welt des Islams, Vol. 22, No. ¼, 1982, pp. 1–36; Hala Fattah, ‘Representations of the Self and the Other in Two Iraqi Travelogues of the Ottoman Period’, IJMES, Vol. 30, No. 1, 1998, pp. 51–76 and Basheer M. Nafi, ‘Abu Al-Thana’ Al-‘Alusi: An Alim, Ottoman Mufti, and Exegete of the Qur’an’, IJMES, Vol. 34, No. 3, 2002, pp. 465–494. 17. With regard to studies concerning the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula, two scholars’ works are prominent, namely Frederick Anscombe and Zekeriya Kurşun. In his The Ottoman Gulf: The Creation of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Qatar Anscombe presents valuable insights on the incorporation of Kuwait into the province of Baghdad and Midhat Pasha’s absorption of Al-Ahsa. Focusing more on the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the author emphasizes the resurrection of Ottoman role in the Gulf, Ottoman–British rivalry in the region and the relations between the regional powers and the local notables – whether tribal sheikhs or political entrepreneurs. Kurşun’s studies on Najd, Al-Ahsa and Qatar are well supported by archival sources and provide regional analysis in the light of the formation of two states, namely Saudi Arabia and Qatar. In this sense, the Wahhabi ideology and its effects on the region is presented in detail. See Zekeriya Kurşun’s Necid ve Ahsa’da Osmanlı Hakimiyeti: Vehhabi Hareketi ve Suud Devletinin Ortaya Çıkışı (Ankara: TTK, 1998) and The Ottomans in Qatar: A History of Anglo–Ottoman Conflicts in the Persian Gulf (İstanbul: Isis Yayımcılık, 2002). 18. The sixth volume of TALID, devoted to Turkish urban history, reviews the literature on urban studies in the Ottoman lands ranging from the Balkans to Arabian Peninsula. See TALID, Vol. 6, 2005. For a comprehensive study of the literature on the urban history of the Ottoman Arab provinces see, Nelly Hanna, ‘Survey of Urban History of Arab Cities in the Ottoman Period’, TALID, Vol. 6, 2005, pp. 89–102.

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19. See André Raymond, Grandes villes Arabes a l‘epoque Ottoman (Paris: Editions Sindbad, 1985). French scholars studied mostly the Maghreb provinces and, to some extent, Cairo and Aleppo. Iraq had been one of the Arab provinces that was regarded by French scholars as Britain’s ‘private hunting grounds’; and therefore it attracted very few French researchers. Raymond: ‘French Studies’, p. 60. 20. See Michael E. Bonine et al., The Middle Eastern City and Islamic Urbanism: An Annotated Bibliography of Western Literature (Bonn: Ferd. Dümmlers Verlag, 1994); Eldem, Goffman and Masters, The Ottoman City; I. Biermann et al. The Ottoman City and Its Parts: Urban Structure and Social Order (New York, 1991). 21. For a treatment of Basra as a port city see İlber Ortaylı, ‘Port Cities in the Arab Countries – A Study of the Disintegration of the Arab World in the 19th Century with special Reference to Basra’, Türk Arap İlişkileri 1. Konferansı (Ankara: Hacettepe Üniversitesi, 1979), pp. 221–232, and Hala Fattah, ‘Islamic Universalism and the Construction of Regional Identity in Turnof-the Century Basra: Sheikh Ibrahim al-Haidari’s Book Revisited’, in Leila T. Fawaz and C.A. Bayly (eds), Modernity and Culture: From Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), pp. 112–129. See also in the same book, Michel Tuchscherer’s ‘Trade and Port Cities in the Red Sea – Gulf of Aden Region in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries’, pp. 28–45. 22. See Hourani: ‘Ottoman Reform’, p. 42. Hourani’s work paved the way for new studies on local Arab actors. Karl K. Barbir has shown that the notables in eighteenth-century Damascus seem to have been less powerful than their counterparts in the Balkans. See Karl. K. Barbir, Ottoman Rule in Damascus, 1700–1758 (Princeton: Princeton University Press), 1980, pp. 71–74. In a similar fashion, Philip Khoury’s Urban Notables and Arab Nationalism bears the influences of Hourani’s framework. Philip S. Khoury, Urban Notables and Arab Nationalism: The Politics of Damascus 1860–1920 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 1983. In a later article, Khoury put forward his reservations about ‘politics of notables’ as an explanatory framework. See ‘The Urban Notables Paradigm Revisited’, Revue des Etudes du Monde Musulman et Méditerranéen, Vol. 55–56, 1990, pp. 215–228. For the criticisms addressed to Hourani’s ‘politics of notables’, see Eldem, Goffman and Masters (eds), The Ottoman City, pp. 4–6. 23. Hourani: ‘Ottoman Reform’, p. 50. 24. Jane Hathaway draws attention to the pivotal roles of the Georgian Mamluks not only in Iraqi provinces but also in Egypt and Syria. See her The Arab Lands Under Ottoman Rule, 1516–1800 (London: Pearson, 2008), pp. 94–99.

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25. Hourani: ‘Ottoman Reform’, p. 51. 26. Ibid., p. 63. 27. The case of Damascus presents an opposite perspective. For a comparison see Elizabeth Thompson, ‘Ottoman Political Reform in the Provinces: The Damascus Advisory Council in 1844–45’, IJMES, Vol. 25, No. 3, 1993. 28. Albert Hourani, ‘How Should We Write the History of the Middle East’, IJMES, Vol. 23, No. 2, 1991, p. 129. 29. See Charles Issawi, The Economic History of the Middle East: 1800–1914 (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1966); The Fertile Crescent, 1800–1914 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988); and Phebe Marr, The Modern History of Iraq (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985). For a critique of this approach see Dror Zeevi, ‘Back to Napoleon? Thoughts of the Beginning of Modern Era in the Middle East’, Mediterranean Historical Review, Vol. 19, No. 1, June 2004, pp. 73–94. 30. Samira Haj, The Making of Iraq, 1900–1963: Capital, Power and Ideology (New York: SUNY Press, 1997), p. 2. 31. For the modernization of the Mamluk army see M.E. Yapp, ‘The Establishment of the East India Company Residency in Baghdad, 1798– 1806’, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, Vol. 30, No. 2, 1967, p. 329. 32. Imad Abd as-Salam Rauf has written an article on the sijills of Baghdad, but he gives only a brief introduction to the themes of each sijill and provides data on the volumes and years of the sijills. See ‘Sijillat al-mahkama as-shar‘iyya bi-Baghdad va ahammiyatuha fi dirasat tarikh al-Iraq alijtima‘i wa al-iqtisadi fi asr al-Osmani’, Al-Mawrid, Vol. 12, No. 3, 1983, pp. 339–346. Rauf’s book on the urban places (such as districts, mosques and madrasas) of Baghdad seems to have used local sources, especially vakıf registers (vakfiyes), but the book has no reference system or bibliography at ̣ ʼ al-waqfiyat all. See Ma‘alim Baghdad fi al-qurun al-mutaʼakhkhirah: fi daw wa-al-i‘lamat wa-al-hujaj al-sharʻiyah al-mahfuzah fi Arshif Wizarat al-Awqaf bi-Baghdad (Baghdad: Bayt al-Hikmah, 2000). See also Mustafa Kazim Madamgha, Nusus min watha’iq al-‘Uthmaniya ‘an tarikh al-Basra fi sijillat mahkamat al-shar‘iyya fi al-Basra, (Basra: Basra University Press, 1982). 33. Hala Fattah, The Politics of Regional Trade in Iraq, Arabia and the Gulf 1745– 1900 (New York: SUNY Press, 1997), p. 19. 34. For reflections of this theory on Ottoman studies, see Ebubekir Ceylan, ‘Dünya-Sistemi Teorisinin Osmanlı Tarihi Çalışmalarına Yansımaları’, TALID, Vol. 1, 2003, pp. 81–95. 35. For instance, Sarah Shields, dwelling upon the case of Mosul, emphasized that the grand narratives such as modernization and world-system theories

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36.

37.

38.

39.

40. 41.

42.

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should take local variations into consideration before reaching all-embracing conclusions. Sarah D. Shields, Mosul Before Iraq: Like Bees Making Five-Sided Cells (New York: SUNY Press, 2000), pp. 6–7, and ‘Regional Trade and 19th Century Mosul: Revising the Role of Europe in the Middle East Economy’, IJMES, Vol. 23, No. 1, February 1991, pp. 19–37. For the effect of the Suez Canal on the expansion of the Iraqi market, see Roger Owen, The Middle East in the World Economy (London: I.B. Tauris, 1993), pp. 182–183. For example, see Ussame Makdisi, ‘Ottoman Orientalism’, American Historical Review, Vol. 107, No. 3, June 2002, pp. 768–796; Ussame Makdisi, ‘Rethinking Ottoman Imperialism’, in Jens Hanssen, Stefan Weber and Thomas Philipp (eds), The Empire in the City: Arab Provincial Capitals in the Late Ottoman Empire, Würzburg: Ergon in Kommission, 2002, pp. 29–48; also in the same volume Christoph Herzog, ‘Nineteenth-Century Baghdad Through Ottoman Eyes’, pp. 311–328; Christoph Herzog, ‘Orientalism Alla Turca: Late 19th/Early 20th Century Ottoman Voyages into the Muslim Outback’, Die Welt des Islams, Vol. 40 No. 2, 2000, pp. 139–195. For example, Samira Haj argued that the Ottoman Empire, which was already on the way to financial bankruptcy, aimed for greater exactions from the Arab provinces. See Samira Haj, ‘The Problems of Tribalism: The Case of Nineteenth-Century Iraqi History’, Social History, Vol. 16, No. 1, 1991, p. 54. The imperial discourse is well documented in the works of Selim Deringil and Edhem Eldem. See Selim Deringil, ‘They Live in a State of Nomadism and Savagery: The Late Ottoman Empire and the Post-Colonial Debate’, Comparative Studies in Society and History, July 2003, pp. 311–342. Herzog, Orientalism, pp. 151–153. The well-known expression ‘etrâk-ı bî idrâk’ was used for nomadic Turks. An evaluation of provincial budgets of Baghdad during the Tanzimat period reveals that the provincial treasury in Baghdad had an annual surplus of between 11,000 and 15,000 kîse, which was to be sent to the imperial treasury. The surplus was usually transferred in three or four instalments, but there were also years when Baghdad sent nothing to İstanbul. There were many instances that the surplus was, with the permission of the Sublime Porte, used for imperial investments and modernization projects in the province. I have earlier presented a paper on ‘Tanzimat Dönemi Bir Osmanlı Vilayetinin Gelir ve Giderleri: Bağdat Örneği’, at Birinci İktisat Tarihi Kongresi (İstanbul: Marmara Üniversitesi, 7–8 Eylül 2007), which is forthcoming soon. Halil İnalcık, ‘Centralization and Decentralization in Ottoman Administration’, in Thomas Naff and Roger Owen (eds), Studies in Eighteenth

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43.

44.

45. 46. 47. 48.

49. 50.

51. 52.

53.

54.

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Century Islamic History (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1977), p. 51. See Bruce McGowan, ‘The Age of the Ayan, 1699–1812’, in Halil İnalcık and Donald Quataert (eds), An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994) and Yücel Özkaya, Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Ayanlık (Ankara: TTK, 1994). Besides Halil İnalcık, Şerif Mardin and Metin Heper are the first ones to be remembered. See Şerif Mardin, ‘Center–Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?’, Daedalus, Vol. 102, No. 1, Winter 1973, pp. 169–190, and Metin Heper, ‘Center and Periphery in the Ottoman Empire: With Special References to the Nineteenth Century’, International Political Science Review, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1980, pp. 81–105. Hathaway: ‘Rewriting’, p. 46. Ibid. Between 1534 and 1917, Baghdad remained under Ottoman control for all except 15 years (1623–38). The uncooperative attitude of the local population, the unpaid Janissaries and the Iraqi tribes were effective in this. See John R. Perry, ‘The Mamluk Pashalık of Baghdad and Ottoman–Iranian Relations in the Late Eighteenth Century’, in Sinan Kuneralp (ed.) Studies on Ottoman Diplomatic History I (İstanbul: Isis Press, 1987), p. 60. Tom Nieuwenhuis, Politics and Society in Early Modern Iraq (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1981), p. 97. Dina Rizk Khoury, State and Provincial Society in the Ottoman Empire: Mosul, 1540–1834 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 209. Nieuwenhuis: Politics and Society, p.VII. The term had also been used for provinces like Bosnia, Syria and Palestine. See Moshe Ma‘oz, Ottoman Reform in Syria and Palestine, 1840 –1861 (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 31. In the classical period, the timar/salyaneli division was quite complex. While some of the sancaks of Baghdad were under the timar system, others were ruled as salyaneli. However, in the nineteenth century this division was clearer. See Halil Sahillioğlu, ‘Osmanlı Döneminde Irak’ın İdari Taksimatı’, Belleten, Vol. LIV, No. 211, Aralık 1990, pp. 1236, 1248 and 1249. For tax-farming and the malikane system see Mehmet Genç, ‘Osmanlı Maliyesinde Malikane Sistemi’ in O. Okyar and Ü. Nalbantoğlu (eds), Türkiye İktisat Tarihi Semineri (Ankara, 1975); Ariel Salzman, ‘An Ancien Régime Revisited: “Privatization” and Political Economy in the 18th

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55.

56.

57. 58.

59. 60.

61. 62.

63.

64. 65.

66.

67. 68.

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Century Ottoman Empire’, Politics and Society, Vol. 21, 1993, pp. 393–423. See also Halil İnalcık, ‘Eyâlet’, in El2. Keiko Kiyotaki, ‘The Practice of Tax Farming in the Province of Baghdad in the 1830s’, in Colin Imber, Rhoads Murphey and Keiko Kiyotaki (eds), The Frontiers of Ottoman Studies (London: I.B. Tauris, 2005), p. 91. Mehdi Jawad Habib Al-Bustanî, Bağdattaki Kölemen Hakimiyetinin Tesisi ve Kaldırılması ile Ali Rıza Paşa’nın Valiliği (1749 –1842) (İstanbul: Unpublished PhD Thesis, İstanbul Üniversitesi, 1979), p. 370. Ma’oz: Ottoman Reform, p. 30. Christoph K. Neumann, ‘Ottoman Provincial Towns from the Eighteenth to the Nineteenth Century: A Re-Assessment of their Place in the Transformation of the Empire’, in Jens Hanssen, Thomas Philipp and Stefan Weber (eds), The Empire in the City, p. 143. Neccar: Al-İdâra al-Osmânî, p. 26. See Hasan Kayalı, Arabs and Young Turks: Ottomanism, Arabism and Islamism in the Ottoman Empire (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), pp. 18–24. Heper: ‘Center and Periphery’, p. 93. Jens Hanssen has earlier pointed out that the center–periphery relationship does not have to be in a zero-sum game framework. See Jens Hanssen, ‘Practices of Integration: Center–Periphery Relations in the Ottoman Empire’, in Jens Hanssen, Stefan Weber and Thomas Philipp (eds), The Empire in the City, pp. 50–51. Stanford J. Shaw, ‘The Origins of Representative Government in the Ottoman Empire: An Introduction to the Provincial Councils, 1839–1876’, in R. Bayly Winder (ed.), Near Eastern Round Table 1967–68 (New York: New York University Press, 1969), p. 90. W. Hardy Wickwar, The Modernization of Administration in the Middle East (Beirut: Khayats, 1962), p. 17. İlber Ortaylı, Tanzimat Devrinde Osmanlı Mahalli İdareleri (Ankara: TTK, 2000), p. 17. See Chapter 6 for the extension of the functions of provincial governments within the framework of provincial public works and modernization. Ebubekir Ceylan, ‘Bağdat Eyalet Meclisleri, 1840–1872’, in Erol Özvar and Arif Bilgin (eds), Selçuklulardan Cumhuriyete Şehir Yönetimi (İstanbul, 2008), pp. 337–354. Heper: ‘Center and Periphery’, p. 95 and Shaw: ‘The Origins of Representative Government’, p. 96. For the centralist aspects of the Provincial Laws of 1864 and 1871 see Carter V. Findley, ‘The Evolution of the System of Provincial Administration as

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ENDNOTES

69.

70. 71. 72.

73. 74.

75. 76. 77. 78. 79.

233

Viewed from the Center’ in David Kushner (ed.) Palestine in the Late Ottoman Period (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1986), pp. 8–9. Ortaylı: Tanzimat Devrinde, p. 63. Later, during the Grand Vizierate of Mahmud Nedim Pasha, who was known for his decentralist leanings, there was an attempt to abolish the Provincial Law of 1864 because of its emphasis on centralization. See Abdülhamit Kırmızı, Abdülhamid’in Valileri: Osmanlı Vilayet İdaresi, 1895–1908 (İstanbul: Klasik, 2007). Haim Gerber, The Social Origins of the Modern Middle East (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1987), p. 68. Hanssen: ‘Practices of Integration’, p. 51. For a similar interpretation on Ankara and Edirne during the Tanzimat period, see Yonca Köksal, ‘Imperial Center and Local Groups: Tanzimat Reforms in the Provinces of Edirne and Ankara’, New Perspectives on Turkey, No. 27, Fall 2002, p. 116. A.M. Hamilton, Kürdistan‘dan Geçen Yol (trans. Zeki Yaş) (İstanbul: Avesta Yayınları, 2001), pp. 69–70. Abdul Wahhab Abbas Al-Qaysi, ‘The Impact of Modernization on Iraqi Society during the Ottoman Era: A Study of Intellectual Development in Iraq, 1869–1917’ (Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Michigan, 1958), p. 55. Selim Deringil, Well-Protected Domains: Ideology and Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman Empire, 1876–1909 (London: I.B. Tauris, 1998), pp. 16–43. BOA, İ. DAH. 31876, 22 M 1278. For descriptions of such celebrations see Zewra (Bağdad: Bağdad Vilayet Matbaası), No. 3, 6, 55 and 94. BOA, İ. DAH, 34407, 13 L 1279. In 1871 the birthday of the Sultan coincided with the berât night and the two were celebrated together. Zewra, No. 94. Zewra provides detailed descriptions of the preparations made for the visit of Nasıreddin Shah. See Zewra, No. 95–100.

Chapter 1 Ottoman Iraq: Geography, People and History 1. Here, I was inspired by Fernand Braudel’s phrase ‘mountains come first’. Fernand Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II, Vol. 1 (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), p. 25. 2. For a map of rainfall and irrigation zones, see Nieuwenhuis: Politics and Society, p. XVI. 3. Issawi The Economic History, p. 129. 4. Robert A. Fernea, Shaykh and Effendi: Changing Patterns of Authority among the El Shabana of Southern Iraq (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970), p. 8.

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5. Issawi The Economic History, p. 129. 6. Lady Anne Blunt mentioned Hît as the place where Noah constructed his ark. See her Bedouin Tribes of the Euphrates, Vol. 1 (London: Frank Cass, 1968), p. 166; also see Hamilton: Kürdistan, p. 35. 7. Nieuwenhuis: Politics and Society, pp. 4–5. 8. Normally the term signifies essentially an island and secondarily a peninsula; however, by extension, this same term is applied to territories situated between great rivers or separated from the rest of a continent by an expanse of desert. See M. Canard, ‘Al-Djazirah’, EI2. 9. Literally, the term ‘Shatt’ originally meant one side of a camel’s hump, and ‘Shatt al-Wadi’ meant the bank or side of a canyon, valley, or stream, or the rising ground next to such a feature. Eventually, ‘Shatt’ became most commonly used to describe a riverbank. In modern Mesopotamia–Iraq it was also often used to describe a stream. See Y. Callot, ‘Shatt’, El2. Dijle was also commonly used in Ottoman documents in referring to the Tigris River; however, when ‘Shatt’ was used separately, it referred to the Tigris River. 10. Caliph Mansur’s famous city of Baghdad was originally built on the western bank of the Tigris. However, in the course of time, it was ruined as a result of frequent floods. Therefore, the eastern bank of the Tigris was preferred as the administrative center (makarr-ı hükûmet). The old center of Baghdad came to be referred to as Karşıyaka. See Hurşid: Seyâhatnâme-i Hudûd (İstanbul: Simurg Yayınları, 1997), pp. 49–50. 11. Hurşid: Seyâhatnâme-i Hudûd, p. 7. 12. Nieuwenhuis: Politics and Society, pp. 7, 73. 13. See Zewra, No. 20. 14. Zewra, No. 20. 15. Nieuwenhuis: Politics and Society, p. 160. 16. Ibid., p. 179. 17. Ibid., p. 6. 18. The same proverb is also used in relation to honey: ‘You need only to have ayran (or honey), then the flies come from Baghdad’. 19. As Christoph Herzog noted, there are 14 Turkish proverbs that mention Baghdad, which is more than any other city, including holy cities like Mecca. See Herzog: ‘Nineteenth Century’, p. 313. 20. Yusuf Halaçoğlu, Osmanlılarda Ulaşım ve Haberleşme (Menziller) (Ankara: PTT Genel Müdürlüğü, 2002), p. 39. 21. There were many factors that might lengthen the duration of the journey. To give an example, Vecihi Pasha, then governor of Mosul, arrived in Mosul after no fewer than 56 days. The bad weather conditions on the sea route and

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22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27.

28. 29.

30.

31.

32.

33. 34.

35.

235

the quarantine application in Birecik were the main reasons for the delay. BOA, İ. MVL. 2981, 29 Ra 1264. Ahmed Lütfi Efendi, Vakanüvis Ahmed Lütfi Efendi Tarihi, Vol. 4–5 (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı-Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 1999), p. 786. Perowne: ‘Life in Baghdad’, p. 252. Nieuwenhuis: Politics and Society, p. 76. This was the usual route, especially after the advent of the steamer service on the Black Sea. Stephen Hemsley Longrigg and Frank Stoakes, Iraq (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1958), p. 13. Bağle, Bot, Ş üvey‘î and Belem were the types of craft used for commercial and military purposes. See Hur şid: Seyâhatnâme-i Hudûd, p. 7. The kelek was commonly used by ordinary people. It was made of goat skins. See Ali Bey, Dicle’de Kelek ile Bir Yolculuk (İ stanbul: Büke Yayınları, 2003). Ahmed Midhat, Menfa: Sürgün Hatıraları (İstanbul: Arma yayınları, 2002), p. 148. For instance, for the role of the Tigris in the life of Tikritîs, see Ronen Zeidel, Tikrit and the Tikritis: A Provincial Town, Regional Community and the State in 20th Century Iraq (Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Haifa, 2004). For the influence of change in the flow of the Euphrates on the conversions to Shi‘ism, see Yitzhak Nakash, ‘The Conversion of Iraq’s Tribes to Shi‘ism’, IJMES, Vol. 26, No. 3, 1994, pp. 443–463. Uzunçarşılı is one of those who cited Baghdad as a place of banishment. İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, Osmanlı Tarihi, Vol. 4/1, 5th print (Ankara: TTK, 1995), p. 44. ‘... Basra mutasarrıflığı hakkında dahi çünkü oranın vehâmeti havâsı cihetiyle buradan münâsib ve muktedir birinin intihâb ve irsâli emsâli vilâyetle bir emr-i müşkil olarak ...’, BOA, İ. DAH. 23612, 22 S 1273. For example, Maşuk Pasha, mutasarrıf of Basra, came as the result of his banishment. ‘Basra eyâleti mutasarrıfı sa‘âdetlü Maşuk Paşa bendeleri oranın derkâr olan vehâmet-i havasına mebnî gelirken menfâya geldiği misillü ...’, BOA, İ. DAH. 15488, dahiliye lef 1, 19 Ca 1268. For an example see BOA, İ. DAH. 12575, 23 B 1266. Justin McCarthy argued that the Ottomans were the only ones in a position to count their own population. That Vital Cuinet based most of his statistics on Ottoman sources played an important role in the accuracy of his estimates. Justin McCarthy, ‘The Population of Ottoman Syria and Iraq’, Asian and African Studies, Vol. 15, No. 1, 1981, pp. 4 and 35. Ibid., pp. 3, 7.

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36. Fazıla Akbal, ‘1831 Tarihinde Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda İdari Taksimat ve Nüfus’, Belleten, Vol. 15, No. 60, 1951, p. 618. 37. McCarthy: ‘The Population of Ottoman’, p. 42. 38. For example, the population estimate done by British Consul-General Sir A. B. Kemball in 1866–1867 excludes the districts of Mosul and Sulaimaniyah. M. S. Hasan, ‘Growth and Structure of Iraq’s Population’, Bulletin of the Oxford University Institute of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 20, 1958, p. 351. 39. The population survey resulted in uprisings in several districts of Baghdad, which were soon suppressed by the provincial soldiers. See Edhem Eldem, ‘Osman Hamdi Bey’, in Bağdat Vilayetindeki Görevi Sırasında Babası Edhem Paşa’ya Mektupları’, Osman Hamdi Bey Kongresi Bildirileri (İstanbul: Mimar Sinan Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1992), p. 83. Since the population survey had not been completed by 1875, the data given in this sâlnâme were far from being perfect, and this fact was already noted in the sâlnâme. ‘Bağdad vilâyetinde mutasavver tahrîr kâ‘idesi icrâ olunamamış olduğundan bi’l-cümle elviyede kâin cevâmi‘ ve buyût ve dekâkîn ve sâirenin sıhhati vechle mahallerinden defteri alınamadığı gibi mevcûd hayvânât ve nebâtâtın kemmiyetine dâir istatistik cedveline dahi destres olunamadığından mündericâtında zarûrî görünen noksân şeylerin ikmâli sene-i âtiye sâlnâmesine bırakılmıştır’, 1292 senesi Bağdad Sâlnâmesi. On the other hand, it is quite interesting that the sâlnâme of 1301/1884 confirms the population estimates of 1292/1875: ‘Vilayetin yalnız şehir ve kasabaları nüfusu tahrir edilip 2. ve 3. kısım ahalinin ve hatta 1. kısımdan madud birçok mahallerin nüfusu henüz tahrir olunmadığından nüfusun mikdar-ı aslîsi bilinmiyor ise de hesap ve tahminimize göre vilayetin umum nüfusu iki milyon nisbetindedir’, see 1301 Senesi Bağdad Sâlnâmesi (Bağdad: Bağdad Vilayet Matbaası). 40. This is evident because the total numbers were arranged in such a way that the round number of two million was reached. Likewise, the number of households was miscalculated. Although the households numbered 405,000, the number 400,000 is given. The inconsistencies also confirm that Iraqi population estimates have had serious problems. Despite its imperfection, however, the same sâlnâme certainly gives considerable data concerning the Iraqi population. See 1292 senesi Bağdad Sâlnâmesi and Kemal Karpat, Osmanlı Devletinde Nüfus (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2002), p. 189. 41. Zewra, No. 18. See also Zekeriya Kurşun, ‘Osmanlıdan Amerika’ya Tanımlanamayan Ülke: Irak’, in Ali Ahmetbeyoğlu, Hayrullah Cengiz and Yahya Başkan (eds), Irak Dosyası, Vol. 1 (İstanbul: Tarih ve Tabiat Vakfı yayınları, 2003), p. 1. Zewra reports that the majority of the population was Bedouin. Nieuwenhuis: Politics and Society, p. 179.

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42. Rhoads Murphey, ‘Some Features of Nomadism in the Ottoman Empire: A Survey Based on Tribal Census and Judical Appeal Documentation from Archives in İstanbul and Damascus’, Journal of Turkish Studies, Vol. 8, 1984, p. 192; Hasan: ‘Growth and Structure’, p. 352. 43. Karpat Osmanlı Devletinde, p. 189. 44. Hasan: ‘Growth and Structure’, p. 340. Although these data are for the period 1867–1947, they intersect with at least one decade during the period of this study. Comparing the regional population increase for the periods 1867–1919 and 1919–1947, Hasan stated that the differential growth in the regional populations tends to increase over time. However, this does not deny the existence of different regional population growth rates before 1867. 45. Ibid., p. 341. 46. Hasan considers the number of nomads to be one-third of the total population. During the nineteenth century the general trend was towards the sedentarization of the nomads, and the nomadic population declined over the century. Therefore, it would not be wrong to argue that the ratio of nomads was higher in the first half of the century. That the Ottoman sources showed the number of nomads to be not less than the settled population should be evaluated in this light. Ibid., p. 341. 47. Zewra, No. 11. Women were also taken into account in this estimate. ‘Bağdâd vilâyeti dâhilinde kâin aşâyirin en cesîmi ve cem‘iyyetlisi Müntefik aşîreti olduğu ma‘lûmdur. Aşîret-i mezkûre müte‘addid kabâile münkasem olarak zukûr ve inâs tahmînen bir milyon nufûsu hâvî olup ...’. 48. Hasan: ‘Growth and Structure’, p. 351. 49. Zewra, No. 9. Here, the number of households also conforms to the data given by Halil Sahillioğlu. He based his study on the report of Abdurrahman Pasha, who served in Baghdad from 1876 to 1879. See Sahillioğlu: ‘Osmanlı Döneminde’, pp. 1255–1257. 50. Hurşid: Seyâhatnâme-i Hudûd, pp. 80, 91. 51. Zewra, No. 12. In a region like Baghdad it was almost impossible to count the women during any population survey. For instance, even as late as 1906, an attempt to include women in the population survey was not welcomed and led to tension among local people. Shields: Mosul Before, p. 40. 52. Stanford J. Shaw has earlier shown that among the Tanzimat bureaucrats, Midhat Pasha had the broadest view of the nature of census system and its uses in the process of modernizing government. Before his governorship in Baghdad, he used the census figures as bases for educational, economic and social reforms. It seems that he had the same purposes in mind when he ordered a population survey in Baghdad. See Stanford J. Shaw, ‘The

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53.

54. 55. 56.

57.

58. 59.

60.

61.

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Ottoman Census System and Population, 1831–1914’, IJMES, Vol. 9, 1978, pp. 325–338. Although Muslim in origin, the Yezidîs are considered to have deviated to the extent that they could no longer be regarded as Muslims. For information on Yezidîs see John S. Guest, The Yezidîs, A Study in Survival (London: KPI, 1987) and Nelida Fuccaro, ‘Communalism and the State in Iraq: Yezidi Kurds 1869–1940’, MES, Vol. 35, No. 2, 1999, pp. 1–26. Nestorians, Armenians and Jacobites were the leading Christian heterodox groups in (northern) Iraq. Bruce Masters, Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Arab World: The Roots of Sectarianism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 59. Nieuwenhuis: Politics and Society, p. 73. In the city center of Mosul they numbered some 6,000 of a total population of about 43,000 in 1845. To compare, the Jewish population numbered 1,456. Ibid, p. 73 and fn 212. Among the Christian sects, in Baghdad there were Chaldeans (who were Nestorians converted to Catholicism), Syrian Orthodox, Syrian Catholics (fewer), Greek Orthodox and Greek Catholics and very few Protestants. See Longrigg and Frank Stoakes, Iraq, p. 24. Nakash points out the factors that played a role in these mass conversions as follows: the rise of Najaf and Karbala as the two strongholds of Shi‘ism from the mid-eighteenth century, the Wahhabi attacks on the two cities, the functioning of Najaf and Karbala as Iraq’s major desert market towns, the change in the water flow of the Euphrates and, most importantly, the Ottoman policy of tribal settlement beginning in 1831. In the early twentieth century the number of Shi‘is was considered to be approximately 1.5 million. Nakash: ‘The Conversion’, pp. 443–463; The rise of the Shi‘i population in the province made the central government take necessary precautions in the late nineteenth century, especially during the reign of Abdulhamid II. See Selim Deringil, ‘The Struggle against Shi‘ism in the Hamidian Iraq: A Study in Ottoman Counter Propaganda’, Die Welt des Islams, Vol. 30, 1990, pp. 45–62. On missionary activities in Mesopotamia see The Times, 2 December 1844. Cem Behar, Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun ve Türkiyenin Nüfusu, 1500–1927 (Ankara: T.C. Başbakanlık Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü Tarihi İstatistikler Dizisi 2, 1996), p. 52. The Zewra newspaper, for example, was published in Turkish and Arabic. The people of Baghdad, whether they spoke these languages or not, were required to follow the news and the announcements in this newspaper. For more information on Zewra see Chapter 6. McCarthy shows that very few women, especially those who were selfsupporting heads of households (bive), appeared in the censuses. Therefore,

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62.

63. 64. 65. 66. 67.

68. 69. 70.

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the number given for women obviously does not represent the actual female population in the province of Baghdad. See McCarthy: ‘The Population of Ottoman’, pp. 39–40. There is a lively discussion on this issue in Zewra. The editor of the newspaper, Ahmet Midhat, denies the contingency between nomadism and geography and gives examples from the settled population of Baghdad. See Zewra, No. 10. Nieuwenhuis: Politics and Society, p. 7. Mehmet Hurşid Paşa’s Seyâhatnâme-i Hudûd provides maps that show the tribal areas of influence. See Hurşid: Seyâhatnâme-i Hudûd, p. 63. Yusuf Halaçoğlu, ‘Bağdat’ – Osmanlı Dönemi –’, DİA, p. 434. Al-Bustanî: ‘Bağdattaki Kölemen’, p. 5. There were almost 200 sıbyâns and they were taught not only general science courses, but also courses on riding and weaponry. See Sabit, Bağdadda Kölemen Hükûmetinin Teşkîliyle İnkirâzına Dâir Risâledir (İstanbul: Vakit Matbaası, 1292), pp. 6–13; Erdinç Gülcü, ‘Bağdat Kölemenler Hükümeti (1749–1831)’, in Ali Ahmetbeyoğlu, Hayrullah Cengiz and Yahya Başkan (eds), Irak Dosyası, p. 219. Uzunçarşılı, Osmanlı Tarihi, Cilt: IV/ I, pp. 180–181. Ibid., pp. 181–182. For the Mamluk period of Iraq (1749–1831), there are several leading studies. Tom Nieuwenhuis’ Politics and Society in Early Modern Iraq sketches out the societal picture of Iraq in the period preceding the one this book focuses on. After a chapter on the structure of Mamluk power, an extended chapter on ‘the rural world’ treats the politics and society of villagers in sedentary areas and of tribesmen who led a nomadic or semi-nomadic existence. Unfortunately, the author of this book only used the French archival sources, ignoring the Ottoman and British ones. The archival shortcoming of Nieuwenhuis’ book was compensated for in Mehdi Jawad Habib al-Bustanî’s PhD dissertation, which concentrates not only on Mamluk rule in Iraq, but also on the re-assertion of Ottoman rule under the governorship of Ali Rıza Pasha (1831–42). It makes extensive use of Ottoman and British archives, and in fact the narrative is much too dependent on archival documents, resulting in ‘document fetishism’, which makes the thesis more descriptive and less analytic. Two recent books focus on eighteenth-century Iraq. While Thomas Lier examines the social and economic roles of the Mamluk household and other social groups in the province, Thabit A.J. Abdullah focuses more on the political economy of trade in Basra during Mamluk rule in the region. See Thomas Lier, Haushalte und Haushaltspolitik in Baghdad 1704– 1831 (Würzburg: Ergon Verlag, 2004); Thabit A.J. Abdullah, Merchants,

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71. 72. 73. 74. 75.

76.

77. 78.

79. 80. 81.

THE OTTOMAN ORIGINS OF MODERN IRAQ

Mamluks and Murder: The Political Economy of Trade in 18th Century Basra (New York: SUNY Press, 2001). Yekçeşm Ahmed Pasha, Kesriyeli Ahmed Pasha, Tiryaki Mehmed Pasha were respectively appointed after the death of Ahmed Pasha in 1747. Nieuwenhuis: Politics and Society, p. 25. Ibid., p. 25. Ibid. Ex-Grand Vizier Yusuf Pasha was sent to Baghdad as governor in 1807; however, he soon had to recognize Süleyman the Little’s governorship. Nieuwenhuis: Politics and Society, p. 77. Basra was at that time a springboard for the Baghdad governorship. The nickname Abu Laila was given to Süleyman Pasha after his midnight campaigns against the rebellious tribes. The defterdâr was also accountable only to the Porte. Nieuwenhuis: Politics and Society, pp. 25, 169. In 1762 Sadeddin Pasha was appointed as governor, but he died before he reached Baghdad. In order to prevent a struggle for provincial power among the Mamluk Aghas, İstanbul appointed Ali Agha, who was mütesellim in Basra, as the new governor of the province. See Al-Bustanî: ‘Bağdattaki Kölemen’, p. 9. See Mustafa Nuri Paşa, Netâyicü’l-Vukû‘ât, Vol. III-IV (Ankara: TTK, 1992), p. 269. See Nieuwenhuis: Politics and Society, p. 182. Al-Bustanî: ‘Bağdattaki Kölemen’, pp. 60–62 .

Chapter 2 ‘Bringing the State Back In’: The Re-assertion of Ottoman Direct Rule in Iraq 1. Gülcü: ‘Bağdat Kölemenler’, p. 222. 2. Nieuwenhuis: Politics and Society, p. 43. 3. Ibid., pp. 170–171. See also Robert W. Olson, The Siege of Mosul and the Ottoman Persian Relations 1718–1743 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1975). 4. BOA, HH, No. 37560-J. The Persian offers were also quoted in Şehabeddin Akalın, ‘Mehmed Namık Pasha’, İÜEF Tarih Dergisi, Vol. 4, No. 7, September 1952, p. 132. 5. Abbas Azzawi, Târîkh al-Iraq Baynal İhtilalayn (1258–1917), Vol. 7 (Baghdad: The Trading and Printing Compony, Ltd., 1935–1956), p. 107. 6. Ali Rıza Pasha had earlier suppressed a rebellion in Ayıntab in 1246/1830 for which he had gained the sultan’s appreciation. He was very interested

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7.

8.

9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15.

16. 17. 18.

19. 20.

241

in Baghdad and it was he who informed the Porte about the murder of Defterdâr Sadık Pasha by Davud Pasha. Al-Bustanî: ‘Bağdattaki Kölemen’, pp. 168, 90. The murder of a high-ranking bureaucrat who was sent to Baghdad on a special mission was a serious crime against the Porte. After this incident the people in Baghdad waited for the Porte to take decisive action. The foreigners left the city, and the tribes withdrew their support for Davud Pasha. The situation was ripe for the dismissal of Davud Pasha. Ibid., pp. 90, 97. The Ottoman Empire was defeated by the Russians in 1827 and it had to pay compensation to Russia. The burden of compensation was divided among the provinces and Baghdad had its share of 6,000 kese akçe. The National Archives (hereafter TNA), FO 195 / 113, ‘Memorandum Regarding the Koords’ (no date). For the journal of events at Baghdad during the siege, see India Office Records (IOR), F/4, 57333. The imperial decree was also published in the newspapers in İstanbul. BOA, HH, No. 22645. Also Ahmed Lütfi Efendi: Vakanüvis Ahmed, Vol. 2–3, p. 632. Davud was later caught by the local people and submitted to the local qadi. He was kept in custody until the arrival of Ali Rıza Pasha. Ibid., p. 631. Davud himself fell ill at the beginning, but soon recovered. Ibid., pp. 630–631. Although there was an expectation that Davud would be executed, his life was spared and after his banishment to Bursa he continued to serve in the central administration. Khoury: State and Provincial, p. 57. Al-Bustanî: ‘Bağdattaki Kölemen’, p. 74; Khoury: State and Provincial, p. 57. The first serious, but unsuccessful, initiative to end Jalili rule was attempted by Süleyman the Little in 1809. Later, Davud Pasha intervened in Mosuli politics to the extent that the Mosuli governor, Jalili-zade Ahmed Pasha, was dismissed when he complained to the Sublime Porte. He tried to appoint his son as governor of Mosul. BOA, HH, No. 20857; Nieuwenhuis: Politics and Society, p. 106; and Al-Bustanî: ‘Bağdattaki Kölemen’, p. 221. Ibid., p. 74, 221. The Jalilis served the interests of the Ottoman central administration well and regularly. Unlike the Mamluks, the Jalilis supported the Sublime Porte even outside the provincial borders of Mosul. In the words of Nieuwenhuis, Mosul’s relations with the sultan had more of the characteristics of vassalage. Nieuwenhuis: Politics and Society, pp. 102, 170.

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21. The Umaris, descending from the second caliph Umar, acted as the religious aristocracy in Mosul. They were given significant positions in the Mosuli administration, but the rise of the Jalili star meant the concomitant decline of the Umaris. See Khoury: State and Provincial, pp. 90, 120–129. 22. Ibid., pp. 71–72, 209. 23. In 1833, Sofuk, sheikh of Shammar, fled from Ali Rıza Pasha’s military forces and entered the Mosuli territory. While following the forces of Shammar Ali Rıza Pasha found, among the properties of the tribe, a letter from Yahya Pasha to sheikh Sofuk, which evidenced the relations between the two. See Azzawi: Târîkh al-Iraq, p. 27. 24. BOA, HH, No. 49164. 25. BOA, HH, No. 20782. 26. Hakan Özoğlu, Kurdish Notables and the Ottoman State (New York: SUNY Press, 2004), p. 71. 27. Rousseau narrates that the Kurdish overlords even had their own flag and a band of musicians accompanying them when on march. J.B.L. Jack Baron Rousseau, Bağdat’tan Halep’e Arabistan Seyahati (İstanbul: Türk Matbaası, 1321), p. 81. 28. BOA, HH, No. 22346. 29. B. Nikitine [C.E. Bosworth], ‘Rawandız’, El2, see also Ahmed Lütfi Efendi: Vakanüvis Ahmed, Vol. 4–5, p. 743. 30. Wadie Jwaideh, Kürt Milliyetçiliğinin Tarihi (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1999), pp. 109–113. 31. Ibid., p. 117. 32. Shortly after his appointment to Shahrizor, Mehmet Pasha (İncebayraktar) was sent to Mosul and became the governor of Mosul. Upon the banishment of Mehmed Said Pasha, then governor of Mosul, Incebayraktar Mehmed Pasha replaced him. See BOA, HH, No. 22346. 33. Longrigg: Four Centuries, p. 285. 34. Jwaideh: Kürt Milliyetçiliğinin, pp. 116–119; Martin Van Bruinessen, Agha, Shaikh, and State: The Social and Political Structures of Kurdistan (London: Zed Books, 1992), pp. 176–177. Later with the mediation of British Consul Rawlinson, Rasul Bey was accommodated in Baghdad under custody. Al-Bustanî: ‘Bağdattaki Kölemen’, p. 236. 35. Longrigg: Four Centuries, p. 286. 36. D.N. Mackenzie, ‘Bahdinan’, El2. 37. Ibid. 38. Jwaideh: Kürt Milliyetçiliğinin, p. 116. 39. Azzawi: Târîkh al-Iraq, pp. 35–36.

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40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47.

48. 49. 50. 51.

52. 53. 54. 55.

56. 57. 58.

59. 60. 61. 62.

243

Al-Bustanî: ‘Bağdattaki Kölemen’, p. 236. Bruinessen: Agha, Shaikh, p. 171. Nieuwenhuis: Politics and Society, pp. 42–43. Ibid., p. 43. Ahmed Lütfi Efendi: Vakanüvis Ahmed, p. 37. Özoğlu: Kurdish Notables, p. 71. Ibid. In the light of the archival documents, recent studies have shown that the Bedirhan revolt was not aimed at Kurdish nationalism, but was a reaction to Ottoman centralizing reforms. For a detailed account of this issue see Özoğlu: Kurdish Notables, and Mehmet Alagöz, Old Habits Die Hard: Bedirhan Rebellion against the Implementation of the Tanzimat (İstanbul: Unpublished MA Thesis, Boğaziçi University, 2004). Musa Çadırcı, Tanzimat Döneminde Anadolu Kentleri‘nin Sosyal ve Ekonomik Yapıları (Ankara: TTK, 1991), p. 194. TNA has a number of documents on this issue. On Necip Pasha’s letter to the Sublime Porte concerning the end of the Baban question in Kurdistan, see BOA, İ. DAH. 8165 lef 2, 13 N 1263. Juan R. I. Cole and Moojan Momen, ‘Mafia, Mob and Shiism in Iraq: The Rebellion of Ottoman Karbala 1824–1843’, Past and Present, No. 112, August 1986, pp. 115, 128. Ibid., p. 113. Ibid., p. 124. Neccar: Al-İdâra al-Osmânî, p. 40. BOA, İ. DAH. 8165, lef 2 and 3, 13 N 1263 and 5 L 1263 respectively, mention an incident in which a volunteer from Najaf entered the military, but he was taken back by the people of the locality. After this incident the security measures were tightened and additional police stations (karakol) were opened. Entrance to the city was also checked at the gates. Longrigg: Four Centuries, p. 288. Abou-el-Haj: The Social Uses, p. 195. TNA, FO 78/538, Wood to Bidwell, No. 1, Damascus, 28 February 1843 and FO 78/1388, Brant to Alison, No. 8, encl. in Brant to Clarendon, No. 10, Damascus, 29 January, 1858. BOA, İ. MVL, 5829, 27 M 1267. Longrigg: Four Centuries, p. 251. Ibid., p. 260. For recruitment to the new army in the Arab provinces see, Hakan Erdem, ‘Recruitment for the “Victorious Soldiers of Muhammad” in the Arab

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63.

64. 65.

66. 67. 68.

69. 70. 71. 72.

73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78.

79. 80. 81. 82.

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Provinces, 1826–1828’, in Israel Gershoni, Hakan Erdem and Ursula Woköck (eds), Histories of the Modern Middle East (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), pp. 189–206. In Ottoman archival sources and Zewra neswpaper, there are many cases of such incidents. For example see BOA, İ. DAH. 41300; Zewra, No. 8. The Anaza, Shammar and Hamawand tribes were the most notorious ones in this respect. See Sinan Marufoğlu, Osmanlı Döneminde Kuzey Irak, 1831–1914 (İstanbul: Eren yayıncılık, 1998), pp. 68, 74. BOA, İ. MVL, 6719, 27 C 1267. On the construction of a citadel in Samava see BOA, İ. MVL, 17924, 10 C 1275. For those in Hindiyyah and Suq ash Shuyukh, see Azzawi: Târîkh al-Iraq, p. 119. BOA, İ. MVL, 15266, 4 B 1272. BOA, İ. DAH. 33867, 5 Ca 1279. This kur‘a-i şer‘iyye was done in the districts of Kanber Ali, Mehdiyya, Bani Said, Haytaviler, Cedid Hasan Paşa, Haydarhane, Kırkol, Kazgancı, Ağakkapusu, Revvak and Karye başı. See Zewra, No. 15. BOA, İ. MVL. 4071, 21 Ra 1265. BOA, İ. MVL. 5632, 27 Z 1266 and İ. MVL. 18288, 22 L 1275. BOA, İ. DAH. 10504, 13 Ra 1265, and İ. DAH. 35459, 7 Ş 1280. Sinan Marufoğlu, ‘Osmanlı Döneminde Kuzey Irak Kürtlerinin Sosyal ve Siyasi Konumları’, Türkiye Günlüğü, No. 42, September-October 1996, fn. 24. Azzawi: Târîkh al-Iraq, pp. 120–123. BOA, İ. DAH. 27166, askerî lef 1, 3 M 1275. Ibid. Ahmed Nuri Sinaplı, Şeyhül Vüzera, Serasker Mehmet Namık Paşa (İstanbul: Yenilik Basımevi, 1987), p. 193. For example, see Zewra, No. 11. İbnülemin Mahmut Kemal, Son Sadrazamlar (İstanbul: Dergah Yayınları, 1982), p. 323; See also Roderic H. Davison, ‘Midhat Pasha’, EI2, Vol. 6, p. 1033. Midhat Pasha, Tabsıra-i İbret (İstanbul: Temel Yayınları, 1997), Vol. 1, pp. 91–94. Before Midhat, Namık Pasha was also given the same authority in 1851. The Sublime Porte, for a while, wanted to withdraw the military powers of Midhat Pasha; however, by threatening to resign Midhat Pasha retained his authority. Midhat Pasha: Tabsıra-i İbret, p. 89. See Zewra, No. 11. See Zewra, No. 9. Ali Haydar Midhat, The Life of Midhat Pasha (London: John Murray Publishers, 1903), p. 47.

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83. When the need arose, Turkish elements within the Sixth Army changed places. The vacant positions were often filled from among the local people, even sometimes by prisoners. This, of course, did nothing for the discipline of the army. Therefore, it became necessary to recruit nearly 300 people from the Baghdad population. See Midhat Paşa: Tabsıra-i İbret, pp. 89–94. 84. Zewra, No. 12. Interestingly, only 10–15 rebels were at the age of military service. Most of them were between 35 and 50. 85. See Zewra, No. 23 and 24. 86. Approximately 1/200–250 of the total population was conscripted by ballot. This corresponded to the 1/13–25 of the people at the age of military service. Naturally, this ratio changed from place to place in accordance with the demographic characteristics of the region in question. See Zewra, No. 11, 53, 57 and 60. 87. ‘Biz ol babaların evlâdı ve o millet-i mu‘azzamanın efrâdıyız ki dînen ve i‘tikâden halken ve hilkaten asker oğlu asker olup ...’, Zewra, No. 53. 88. Zewra, No. 16. 89. See BOA, İ. DAH. 33410, 20 M 1279, for Namık Pasha’s demand for extra soldiers upon the discharge of soldiers in Mosul. 90. For the dispatch of artillery and other munitions in 1850, see BOA, İ. MVL. 5632, 27 Z 1266. 91. BOA, İ. MVL, 6511, lef 2, 2 Za 1266. 92. BOA, İ. MVL. 6119, 17 Ra 1267. 93. BOA, İ. HRC. 3915, hâriciye lef 3, 9 S 1267, and İ. DAH. 13696, dahiliye lef 2, 14 R 1267. 94. BOA, İ. DAH. 13943, 11 C 1267. ‘Anadolu ordu-yı hümâyûnundan Bağdad’a gönderilecek iki tabur asâkir-i hazret-i şâhâne ile 1,500 neferât-ı cedîdenin sürat-i irsâli vesâyâsına dâir..’. 95. BOA, İ. MMH. 2059, 21 Ra 1263. 96. Sinaplı: Şeyhül Vüzera, p. 121. 97. BOA, İ. DAH. 12311, 5 Ca 1266, also Sinaplı: Şeyhül Vüzera, p. 127. 98. BOA, İ. MVL. 21996, 21 Z 1279. 99. Neccar: Al-İdâra al-Osmânî, p. 57. 100. BOA, İ. MVL. 19487, dâhiliye lef 1, gurre-i Ca, 1277 and 22571, 22 B 1280. 101. BOA, İ. DAH. 18013, 4 Ra 1270. The contribution of an army of 4,000 soldiers was quite significant, because it amounted to more than half the strength of the Sixth Army. 102. Hormuzd Rassam, Asshur and the Land of Nimrod (New York, 1897), p. 42.

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103. BOA, İ. HRC, 4374, hariciye lef 1, 28 Za 1268 and İ. HRC, 2911, 21 S 1266. 104. BOA, İ. HRC, 4374, 28 Za 1268. 105. For such an incident involving Persian Sincâbî tribes see Zewra, No. 23. 106. See Zewra, No. 13, 38, 51, 59, 64 and 79. 107. Sinaplı: Şeyhül Vüzera, p. 124. 108. Ibid., p. 125. 109. BOA, İ. DAH. 30706, dâhiliye lef 2, 13 M 1277. 110. See Zewra, No.8. 111. Zewra, No. 47. 112. See Zewra, No. 22. 113. BOA, İ. DAH. 43045, 9 C 1287. 114. Zewra, No. 3 and 6. 115. Zewra, No. 91. 116. Yusuf Halaçoğlu, ‘Midhat Paşa’nın Necid ve Havalisi ile ilgili birkaç Layihası’, İÜEF Tarih Enstitüsü Dergisi, Vol. 3, 1972, pp: 149–76; Frederick Fallowfield Anscombe, The Ottoman Gulf and the Creation of Kuwait: S. Arabia and Gulf, 1871–1914 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997) (especially Chapter 3); Kurşun: Necid ve Ahsa’da (especially Chapter 2). 117. BOA, İ. MMAH. 1672, 16 M 1288. A battalion (tabur) and a regiment (alay) had approximately 700–725 and 2,200–2,300 soldiers respectively. 118. Zewra, No. 9. 119. Zewra, No. 8.

Chapter 3 Ottoman Provincial Administration in Baghdad 1. Gökhan Çetinsaya, Ottoman Administration of Iraq, 1890–1908 (New York: Routledge, 2005), p. 22. 2. Haim Gerber, ‘A New Look at the Tanzimat: The case of the Province of Jerusalem’, in David Kushner (ed.) Palestine in the Late Ottoman Period (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1986), p. 35. 3. Ibid., p. 36. 4. Mustafa Nuri Paşa: Netâyicü’l-Vukû‘ât, vol. III–IV, p. 293. 5. Shaw: ‘The Origins of Representative Government’, p. 58. 6. İnalcık: ‘Application of the Tanzimat’, p.5. 7. Shaw: ‘The Origins of Representative Government’, p. 59. 8. For a list of muhassıllıks see Coşkun Çakır, Tanzimat Dönemi Osmanlı Maliyesi (İstanbul: Küre Yayınları, 2001), pp. 239–247. None of the Arab provinces of the empire was cited in the list of muhassıllıks.

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9. Roderic H. Davison, Reform in the Ottoman Empire 1856–1876 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 137. 10. Ma’oz: Ottoman Reform, p. 36. 11. Ibid., p. 137; also Bilal Eryılmaz, Tanzimat ve Yönetimde Modernleşme (İstanbul: İşaret Yayınları, 1992), pp. 194–195. 12. BOA, İ. MMAH. 209, 6 S 1272. 13. Ma’oz: Ottoman Reform, p. 37. 14. Davison: Reform in the Ottoman Empire, p. 137. 15. For Ali Rıza Pasha’s term of office in Baghdad see Kayı: Bagdad: 1831–1869, pp. 131–153. 16. Hurşid: Seyâhatnâme-i Hudûd, pp. 90–91. 17. Kayı: Bagdad: 1831–1869, p. 138. 18. Reşat Kaynar, Mustafa Reşit Paşa ve Tanzimat (Ankara: TTK, 1991), pp. 339, 355. 19. Al-Bustanî: ‘Bağdattaki Kölemen’, p. 375. 20. BOA, İ. DAH. 3464, lef 6 and 11, 19 Z 1258 and 15 Ş 1258 respectively. 21. Neccar: Al-İdâra al-Osmânî, p. 28. 22. BOA, İ. DAH. 2749 and 2958, 24 S 1258, 17 R 1258 respectively. 23. Azzawi: Târîh el-Iraq, pp. 63–64. 24. Neccar: Al-İdâra al-Osmânî, p. 38. 25. Necip Pasha’s appointment not only upset Ali Rıza Pasha but also İncebayraktar Mehmed Pasha of Mosul who expected the governorship of Baghdad as a means of promotion. BOA, İ. DAH. 3110, lef 2, 23 Ca 1258. 26. The intervention of the European consuls on domestic affairs were effective in this; see C.E. Farah, ‘Necip Paşa and the British in Syria’, Archivum Ottomanicum, Vol. II, 1970, p. 115. 27. On Müşîr Namık Pasha’s report regarding Necip Pasha’s term, see BOA, İ. DAH. 13041, 21 Za 1266. 28. BOA, İ. DAH. 7444, 18 Ca 1263. 29. Hala Fattah, ‘The Politics of Grain Trade in Iraq 1840–1917’, New Perspectives on Turkey, No. 5–6, Fall 1991, p. 158. 30. Azzawi: Târîh el-Iraq, pp. 98–99. 31. Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, Tezakir, Vol. 1 (Ankara: TTK, 1986), pp. 9–10; Neccar: Al-İdâra al-Osmânî, p. 41. 32. BOA, İ. DAH. 13448, 14 S 1267. 33. Vecihi Pasha had earlier served in Aleppo, Ankara and Kurdistan. For Vecihi Pasha’s efforts towards the implementation of Tanzimat reforms in Mosul, see BOA, İ. MVL. 2981, 29 Ra 1264. 34. It was named after the region known as mukâta‘a-i verdiyye, where the rebellious tribes gathered. See Azzawi: Târîh el-Iraq, pp. 88–89.

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35. The second ruler being Midhat Pasha. 36. Financial issues, especially the problem of counterfeiting in Mosul, Baghdad and Shahrizor played a significant role in his dismissal. See Akalın: ‘Mehmed Namık Paşa’, pp. 142–143. 37. Azzawi: Târîkh al-Iraq, p. 100. 38. Ibid., p. 102. 39. Çetinsaya: Ottoman Administration, p. 25. 40. Azzawi: Târîkh al-Iraq, p. 111. 41. Ahmed Cevdet Pasha casts some doubts on Ömer Lütfü Pasha’s military career and performance. See Ahmed Cevdet Paşa: Tezakir, Vol. 2, pp. 34–35, 275. 42. BOA, A. MKT.NZD, 236/23, 23 M 1274; A.DVN, 126/50, 23 M 1274. Lütfi Efendi also mentions that before Ömer Lütfi Pasha’s appointment to Baghdad, the Sublime Porte sought the opinion of leading figures as to whether Ömer Lütfi Pasha was a proper governor or not. Ahmed Lütfi Efendi: Vakanüvis Ahmed, Vol. 9, p. 140. 43. Azzawi: Târîkh al-Iraq, p. 116. 44. The executions were investigated in detail by the Sublime Porte. See BOA, İ. DAH. 29737, 16 C 1276; İ. MMAH, 675 and 732, 12 R 1276 and 14 B 1276 respectively. After his dismissal from Baghdad, Ömer Lütfü Pasha was appointed as the müşîr of the Rumeli Army. Mehmed Süreyya, Sicill-i Osmanî, Vol 4 (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1996), pp. 1322–23. 45. BOA, İ. MMAH, 1174, 29 M 1280. 46. Azzawi: Târîkh al-Iraq, pp. 128, 132. 47. Ibid., p. 129. 48. Ibid., pp. 89, 134. 49. On the biography of Namık Pasha, see Akalın: ‘Mehmed Namık Paşa’, pp. 127–146; Sinaplı: Şeyhül Vüzera and Enver Ziya Karal, ‘Mehmed Namık Paşa’nın Hal Tercümesi’, Tarih Vesikaları, Vol. II, 1942, pp. 220–227. See also Ebubekir Ceylan, ‘Namık Paşanın Bağdat Valilikleri’, Toplumsal Tarih, June 2009, No. 183, pp. 60–68. 50. BOA, Mühimme Defterleri, No. 261, pp. 87, 93. 51. Azzawi: Târîkh al-Iraq, pp. 155–156. 52. Actually, Midhat was not his real name. His name was Ahmed Şefik. Having memorized the Quran at the age of 10, he was called Hafız Şefik. Later, because of his employment in the secretariat of the Imperial Council (Divan), he was given the name of Midhat and in the course of time it replaced his real name. See M. Tayyib Gökbilgin, ‘Midhat Paşa’, İA, Vol. 8, p. 270. 53. Although he served twice as Grand Vizier, his terms of office were very short. His first period of service as Grand Vizier under Sultan Abdülaziz

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54.

55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62.

63. 64. 65.

66. 67.

249

lasted two months and 21 days, the other under Sultan Abdülhamid II lasted just 49 days. Shimon Shamir, ‘The Modernization of Syria: Problems and Solutions in the Early Period of Abdülhamid’, in William R. Polk and Richard L. Chambers (eds), Beginnings of Modernization in the Middle East (Chicago, Chicago University Press, 1968), p. 352. Shimon Shamir, ‘Midhat Pasha and Anti-Turkish Agitation’, MES, Vol. X, No. 2, May 1974, p. 124 Seton Lloyd, Twin Rivers: A Brief History of Iraq from the Earliest Times to the Present Day (Bombay: Oxford University Press, 1943), p.190. Richard F. Nyrop (ed.), Iraq: A Country Study (Washington, The American University, 1979), p. 31. J.G. Lorimer, Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, Oman and Central Arabia, Vol. 1 (London: Archives Editions, 1986), p. 242. Azzawi: Târîkh al-Iraq, pp. 159–160. Neccar: Al-İdâra al-Osmânî, pp. 9–10. Abdurrazzak Al-Hasenî, Tarîhu’l-Iraq es-Siyasî el-Hadîs, Vol.1 (7th edition) (Baghdad: Dâru’ş-Şu’ûn es-Sakafiyye el-‘Âmm, 1989), p. 41. As Fattah noted, detailing the history of Midhat Pasha’s reforms has become a systematic endeavor for a whole school of Iraqi scholars. See Fattah: The Politics of Regional Trade in Iraq, p. 228. See also Mohammad Salman Hasan, ‘Foreign Trade in the Economic Development of Modern Iraq: 1869–1939’ (Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Oxford St. Antony’s College, 1958); Albertine Jwaideh, Municipal Government in Baghdad and Basra from 1869 to 1914’, (Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Oxford St. Antony’s College, 1953; Nawwar, Abd al-Azīz Sulayman, Tarikh al-Iraq al-hadith min nihayat hukm Dawud Basha ila nihayat hukm Midhat Basha (al-Qahirah: Dar al-Katib al-Arabi, 1968); Neccar: Al-İdâra al-Osmânî; Fuccaro: ‘Communalism and the State’, pp. 1–26. Dawn Kotapish, Daily Life in Ancient and Modern Baghdad (Minnesota: Runestone Press, 2000), pp. 40–41. Ibid., pp. 48–49. Owen: The Middle East, pp. 185–86. Lady Anne Blunt is among the few exceptions who criticized Midhat Pasha’s administration in Baghdad. See Blunt: Bedoin Tribes, pp.194–97. For example, Ali Rıza Pasha, Reşid Pasha and Takiyüddin Pasha were earlier governors in Aleppo, Hakkari and Shahrizor respectively. Namık Pasha is an excellent example for such governors. See Akalın: p. 141. For the previous administrative offices of Baghdad governors, see Table 4.

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68. Mahmud Kemal İnal, Son Sadrazamlar, Vol 1 (4th edn) (İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1969), p. 321 and Midhat Paşa: Tabsıra-i İbret, p. 22. 69. BOA, HH, No. 20896; Mühimme Defteri, No. 153, p. 353. 70. BOA, İ. MVL, 8406, 9 Şaban 1268. 71. See BOA, İ. MVL, 8406, 9 Şaban 1268, ‘Bağdadın mesâfe-i ba‘îdesinden dolayı mesârif-i cüz’iyyenin bilâ istîzân icrâsı me’zûniyetine dâir’ and BOA, İ. MVL, 4052, 10 B 1265. ‘Bağdad ve Sayda gibi mesâfe-i ba‘îdede katl-i nufûs misillü kabahat-ı cesîme ashâbının mahallerinde icrâ-yı mücâzâtına dair’. However, it is understood from Ömer Lütfü Pasha’s dismissal that this permission was later withdrawn. 72. Shields: Mosul Before, p. 38. 73. BOA, İ. MVL, 8892, 20 Za 1268. 74. 1 kîse is equal to 500 kuruş. On the practice of payment of badal see Fattah: The Politics of Regional Trade in Iraq, pp. 99–100. 75. Albertine Jwaideh, ‘Midhat Pasha and the Land System of Lower Iraq’, St Antony’s Papers, Vol. 16, 1963, p. 114. 76. Ibid., p. 111. 77. Namık Pasha was further promoted with an imperial medal (Mecidiye Nişanı) and then appointed as Minister of Commerce. Akalın: ‘Mehmed Namık Paşa’, pp. 142–143. 78. For example, the shipyard in Basra had many banished soldiers (zabıtân) serving there. See BOA, İ. MMAH, 1611, bahriye lef 3, 28 Z 1287. 79. See Abdülhamit Kırmızı, Abdülhamid’in Valileri: Osmanlı Vilayet İdaresi, 1895–1908 (İstanbul: Klasik, 2007). 80. In the first years of the Tanzimat, the Sublime Porte was determined to dismiss the provincial governors who did not comply with the Tanzimat principles. In a sense, they were considered to be the scapegoat for failures in implementing Tanzimat reforms. See Çadırcı: Tanzimat Döneminde Anadolu, p. 192. 81. The division of the Ottoman Army was as follows: 1st Army (Hassa Ordusu) in Istanbul, 2nd Army (Dersaadet Ordusu) in Üsküdar, 3rd Army (Rumeli Ordusu) in Manastır, 4th Army (Anadolu Ordusu) in Harput, and 5th Army (Arabistan Ordusu) in Damascus. See Ahmed Cevdet Paşa: Tezâkir, Vol. 1, pp. 9–10; Necati Tacan, ‘Tanzimat ve Ordu’, in Tanzimat I (İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1999), p. 183. 82. Later the number of infantry regiments was increased to five. Ibid., p. 135. For the organization of the Sixth Army see also Kayı: Bagdad, 1831–1869, pp. 201–202. 83. For the lists of governor-commanders in Baghdad, see Table 5. 84. İnalcık: ‘Application of the Tanzimat’, p. 5. 85. Ahmet Lütfi Efendi: Vakanüvis Ahmed, Vol. 5, pp. 107, 172; İnalcık: ‘Centralization and Decentralization’, p. 51.

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86. Çadırcı: Tanzimat Döneminde Anadolu, p. 191. 87. Ortaylı: ‘Tanzimat Devri İdari Yapı’, p. 309. 88. For such a warning see, BOA, İ.MVL. 7043, 24 Ş 1267. It should be noted that in this period the offices of müşîr and governor (Namık Pasha and Vecihi Pasha respectively) had not yet been united and the Sublime Porte drew attention to the necessity for collaboration in provincial affairs. 89. TNA, FO 195 / 334 (1849) and Fattah: ‘The Politics of Grain’, pp. 157–158. 90. BOA, İ. MMAH, 918, 13 B 1277. 91. This was the case especially for the governorships of Mehmed Namık Pasha and Ahmed Tevfik Pasha. See, Ibid., and BOA, İ. DAH, 15120, 7 Ra 1268. 92. The case of Takiyüddin Pasha was an exception. He came from the learned class (ilmiye) and became governor of Baghdad in 1867. 93. These serdâr-ı ekrems were Abdülkerim Nadir (Abdi) Pasha and Ömer Lütfi Pasha. For these commanders see İnönü (Türkler) Ansiklopedisi (Ankara: Maarif Matbaası, 1943). 94. The following is an excerpt from a law on conscription, promulgated on 6 September 1843 and published in Edouard Philippe Engelhardt, Türkiye ve Tanzimat (İstanbul: Kaknüs yayınları, 1999), p. 69: ‘Ba‘dezîn zâbıtan-ı askeriyenin uhdelerine mülkî me’mûriyet ictimâ‘ edemeyeceği’; See also Kırmızı: Abdülhamid’in Valileri, p. 77. 95. BOA, İ. DAH, 13320, 21 M 1267. 96. Sinan Kuneralp, Son Dönem Osmanlı Erkânı ve Ricali (İstanbul: Isis Yayınları, 1999), p. 17. 97. BOA, İ. MVL. 2330, 15 L 1263. 98. Mehmed Takiyüddin Pasha was the son of Abdurrahman Efendi, who was a learned man (âlim) among the ulema of Kilis. After completing his education he became müfti of Aleppo. See Mehmed Süreyya, Sicill-i Osmanî, Vol. 5, p. 1622; For his commandership see Kuneralp: Son Dönem Osmanlı, p. 17. 99. BOA, İ. DAH, 41503, 28 R 1286. 100. Midhat Paşa: Tabsıra-i İbret, pp. 91–93. 101. BOA, İ. MMAH, 659, 26 S 1276 and BOA, İ. DAH, 45442, 25 Ca 1289. 102. BOA, İ. DAH, 14561, 25 Za 1267. 103. See Ma‘oz: Ottoman Reform, pp. 38–43. 104. Ibid., pp. 49–51. 105. Nieuwenhuis: Politics and Society, p. 40. 106. For instance, in 1850 a rebellion occurred in Sulaimaniyah. There were also other security problems in the Hindiyyah, Hillah and Muntafiq regions. Namık Pasha sent the Sixth Army to Sulaimaniyah, putting the security

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107.

108. 109. 110. 111. 112. 113. 114.

115.

116. 117. 118. 119. 120.

121.

122. 123.

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of central and southern Iraq at risk. Therefore, the Sublime Porte was informed that the restoration of the security was dependent on the reinforcement of the Sixth Army with soldiers from Anatolian Army. See BOA, İ. DAH. 13448, 14 S 1267. Nieuwenhuis, quoting from Rousseau, narrates that during the Mamluk era Kurdistan was a major resource for Baghdad, which got most of its ammunition from this area. The Kurds produced excellent cavalrymen. They often participated in the military campaigns against Arab tribes. Nieuwenhuis: Politics and Society, p. 41. Al-Bustanî: ‘Bağdattaki Kölemen’, pp. 265–267. See Longrigg: Four Centuries, p. 275. Ibid., p. 275. Azzawi: Târîkh al-Iraq, p. 12. He was later appointed to the madrasa al-Kadiriyya as müderris. Ibid., p. 15. Abdurrahman Urfalı and Esad Naib were the predecessors of Arif Efendi see Azzawi: Târîkh al-Iraq, p. 17. Abdülkadir (bin Ziyade al-Mosulî) Agha came also from Aleppo. Many of the Pasha’s men, especially Molla Ali el-Hassı, Es‘ad bin Nâib, Ali Agha El-Yesirci (tüfenkci başı ve cürüm ağası), and Abdülkadir Agha were notorious for their oppression and cruelty. Bâbü’l-Arab was the title given to the member of the Pasha’s advisory council chosen to represent tribal views and did not denote an administrative department of government. The holder of the post was very important in the mediation between the tribes. BOA, A. MKT. 2/20, 29/8/1262. Azzawi: Târîkh al-Iraq, p. 116. For example, BOA, İ. MMAH. 1664, 19 Z 1287 is a good indicator of the provincial division of labor. BOA, İ. MMH. 2059, 21 Ra 1263. Necip Pasha’s wish to promote Vadi Bey and the sheikh of the Muntafiq tribe to the rank of mîralây (commander of a regiment) was not fully granted; because of previous problems in similar cases, the Porte only went as far as promoting them to the rank of ıstabl-ı âmire. Ibid. ‘Necip Paşa hazretlerinin sair vülat-ı izamdan imtiyazları zımnında kendülerine bundan böyle yazılacak tahriratta atıfetlu yerine devletlu tahrir olunarak ...’, BOA, İ. DAH, 9046, 3 Ca 1264. Ali Akyıldız, Osmanlı Bürokrasisi ve Modernleşme (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2004), pp. 115–116. BOA, İ. DAH, 9087, 20 Ca 1264. This irâde also includes the draft of the imperial decree in its supplement (lef 1).

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124. 125. 126. 127. 128. 129. 130.

131.

132.

133. 134. 135. 136. 137. 138. 139. 140.

253

BOA, İ. MVL, 2330, 15 L 1263. BOA, AMKT. UM, 12/46, 27 Ca 1266. Shaw: ‘The Origins of Representative Government’, p. 90. Azzawi: Târîkh al-Iraq, p. 117. BOA, İ. DAH. 39494, 4 C 1284 and İ. DAH. 41397, 8 Ra 1286. Ahmed Midhat: Menfa, p. 139. Ibid., p. 139. Şakir Bey was the future Yâver-i Ekrem of Sultan Abdülhamid II. For the appointment of Şakir Bey to merkez mutasarrıflığı and Raif Efendi to vilâyet muavinliği see BOA, İ. DAH. 40912, Lef 1, 13 Za 1285. Zewra, No. 26. Similarly, Nuri Efendi, the former chief scribe in the criminal council of Ruscuk, was appointed as the chair of criminal council of Baghdad. Odian and Vasıf Efendis were of Armenian and Croatian origin respectively. İlber Ortaylı, ‘Midhat Paşa’nın Vilayet Yönetimindeki Kadroları’, in Uluslararası Midhat Pasha Semineri: Bildiriler ve Tartışmalar (8–10 Mayıs 1984) (Ankara: TTK, 1986), pp. 227–228. Ortaylı: Tanzimat Devrinde, p. 57. See Ahmed Midhat: Menfa, pp. 147–148, 151. For Osman Hamdi’s service in Baghdad see, Eldem: ‘Osman Hamdi’. TNA FO 195; 949, 26 May 1869, From Herbert to Constantinople. Jwaideh: ‘Midhat Pasha’, p. 116. Ahmed Midhat: Menfa, p. 148. İsmail Hakkı Babanzade, Beyrut’tan Kuveyt’e Irak Mektupları (İstanbul: Büke yayınları, 2002), p. 10. Ali Haydar Midhat, Hatıralarım (1872–1946), İstanbul: Midhat Akçin Yayını, 1946, p.73.

Chapter 4 Tanzimat as applied in Ottoman Baghdad 1. Halil İnalcık, Tanzimat ve Bulgar Meselesi (Ankara: TTK, 1943); Çadırcı: Tanzimat Döneminde Anadolu; Meropi Anastassiadou, Salonique, 1830–1912: Une Ville Ottomane à l’âge des Réformes (Leiden: Brill, 1997); Bülent Özdemir, Ottoman Reforms and Social Life: Reflections from Salonica, 1830–1850 (Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Birmingham, 2000); Köksal: ‘Imperial Center’, pp. 107–138 and Yonca Köksal, ‘Tanzimat döneminde Bulgaristan: Osmanlı’da merkezî devletin oluşumu, 1839–1878’, Toplum ve Bilim, Vol. 83, Winter 2000, pp. 241–266. 2. William L. Ochsenwald, ‘Ottoman Subsidies to the Hijaz, 1877–1886’, IJMES, Vol. 6, No. 3, 1975, p. 300.

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3. For example, see Ma‘oz: Ottoman Reform; Eugene Rogan, Frontiers of the State in the Late Ottoman Empire: Transjordan, 1850–1921 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Engin Deniz Akarlı, The Long Peace: Ottoman Lebanon, 1861–1920 (London: I.B.Tauris, 1993); Butrus Abu Manneh, ‘Jerusalem in the Tanzimat Period: The New Ottoman Administration and the Notables’, Die Welt des Islams, Vol. 30, No. 1–4, 1990, pp. 1–44; Gabriel Baer, ‘Tanzimat in Egypt: The Penal Code’, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, Vol. 26, No. 1, 1963, pp. 29–49 and Yasemin Avcı, ‘The Application of Tanzimat in the Desert: The Bedouins and the Creation of a New Town in Southern Palestine’, MES, Vol. 45, No. 6, November 2009, pp. 969–983. 4. BOA, İ. DAH, 705, lef 5, 9 R 1256 and İ. MVL., 2981, 29 Ra 1264. 5. BOA, İ. DAH, 705, lef 1, 15 S 1256. 6. For the application of Tanzimat reforms in Diyarbakır, see İbrahim Yılmazçelik, XIX. Yüzyılın İlk Yarısında Diyarbakır (Ankara: TTK, 1995). 7. For the application of Tanzimat reforms in Harput, see Ahmet Aksın, ‘Tanzimatın Harput Eyaletinde Uygulanması ve Karşılaşılan Güçlükler’, Belleten, Vol. LXII, No. 235, 1998, pp. 851–861. 8. BOA, İ. MMH, 2046, 10 Ş 1262. 9. BOA, İ. MVL. 2981, 29 Ra 1264. 10. Blunt: Bedouin Tribes, p. 203. 11. BOA, AMKT. UM, 12/46, 27 Ca 1266. 12. Christoph Herzog, ‘Corruption and Limit of the State in the Ottoman Province of Baghdad During the Tanzimat’, MIT-EJMES, Vol. 3, Spring 2003, p. 39. 13. The allegations against Ali Rıza Pasha were investigated during his governorship in Damascus, but it is not clear whether this investigation covered the allegations regarding his governorship in Baghdad. For these allegations see Al-Bustanî: ‘Bağdattaki Kölemen’, pp. 356–368. For the investigation against Necip Pasha BOA, İ. DAH. 13041, 21 Za 1266; İ. MMAH. 4890, Gurre-i C 1266; 5488, 20 Za 1266; 12183, 11 C 1270. For the investigation against Mustafa Nuri Pasha see BOA, İ. MMAH. 986, 29 M 1278; 1174, 29 M 1280. 14. Davison, ‘Midhat Pasha’, EI, p. 1032. 15. Cristoph Herzog, Corruption and Limits of the State in the Ottoman Province of Baghdad during the Tanzimat, MIT-EJMES, Vol. 3, Spring, 2003, pp. 40–41. http://web.mit.edu/cis/www/mitejmes/ 16. TNA, FO 195; 949. From Herbert to Constantinople, 15 September 1869. 17. Herzog: ‘Corruption’, p. 39.

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18. For instance, high-ranking local officials such as the mutasarrıf of Basra, Süleyman Bey, were dismissed and judged in the local court. See Zewra, No. 35. 19. BOA, İ. MVL. 2981, 29 Ra 1264. 20. ‘Necip Paşa merhûmun oralarda Tanzîmât-ı Hayriyye usûl-ı ma‘delet-şumûlünü neşretmesi ve fukarâdan cevr ü ezâyı ber-tarâf eylemesi münâsebetiyle sâye-i şâhânede sekenesinin mazhar oldukları asâyiş-i hâl dîde-i sa‘y-i kûşişlerini açup bu kere de kendüleri efvâc-ı harâbiyeti pây-mâl etmeğe başladılar’, Hurşid: Seyâhatnâme-i Hudûd, pp. 70, 90. 21. Issues relating to land and agricultural taxes will be dealt with in the next chapter. 22. For a detailed calculation of this see Zewra, No. 61. 23. Ibid. 24. BOA, İ. MVL. 2981, 29 Ra 1264. 25. For a review of the literature on tribal law see Frank H. Stewart, ‘Tribal Law in the Arab World: A Review of the Literature’, IJMES, Vol. 19, No. 4, 1987, pp. 473–490. 26. Zewra, No. 11. 27. BOA, İ. DAH. 7122, 25 Ra 1263 and İ. DAH. 11168, 5 Ş 1265. 28. BOA, İ. MMAH. 209, 6 S 1272. 29. Ibid. 30. For several examples in this regard see Musa Çadırcı, Tanzimatın Uygulanması ve Karşılaşılan Güçlükler (1840–56), in Mustafa Reşid Paşa ve Dönemi Semineri: Bildiriler (Ankara: TTK, 1985), p. 97. 31. Masters: Christians and Jews, p. 137. 32. Austen Henry Layard, Ninova ve Kalıntıları (İstanbul: Avesta Yayınları, 2000), pp. 38 and 61. 33. James Felix Jones, Memoirs of Baghdad, Kurdistan and Turkish Arabia, 1857 (London: Archive Editions, 1998), p. 339. 34. Masters: Christians and Jews, p. 63. 35. On the construction of Armenian and Assyrian (Catholic) churches in Mosul see BOA, İ. HRC. 7563, 14 N 1273 and İ. HRC. 9046, 4 Za 1275. 36. BOA, A. MKT. 73/14, 3 R 1263 gave the right to collect the poll tax of Kirkuk and Arbil to Baghdad, rather than Mosul. 37. BOA, İ. HRC. 2205, 18 Ş 1264. 38. It is interesting that contrary to common practice the Persian non-Muslims, who resided temporarily in Baghdad, were required to pay poll tax. The status of Persian Jews was actually ambiguous; they were neither Ottoman citizen nor visitors residing temporarily. 39. BOA, İ. MMH. 2059, lef 4, 21 Ra 1263 and İ. MMH. 2046, 10 Ş 1262.

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40. ‘... eyâletin her bir mahallinde Tanzimât-ı hayriyye icrâ olunub da bu yerin [Muntafiq] bu hâlde bırakılmasına yüce eşitlik râzı olmayacağı bedîi olduğundan ...’, Sinaplı: Şeyhül Vüzera, p. 204. 41. Roderic H. Davison, ‘The Advent of the Principle of Representation in the Government of the Ottoman Empire’, in William R. Polk and Richard L. Chambers (eds), Beginnings of Modernization in the Middle East (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press), 1968, p. 96. 42. Gerber: ‘A New Look at the Tanzimat’, p. 35. 43. Shaw: ‘The Origins of Representative Government’, p. 56. 44. Çadırcı: Tanzimat Döneminde Anadolu, p. 212. 45. Ibid., p. 215. 46. Longrigg: Four Centuries, pp. 250–251. 47. BOA, İ. DAH. 2133, 21 R 1257. 48. Musa Çadırcı, ‘Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Eyalet ve Sancaklarda Meclislerin Oluşturulması’, in Ord. Prof. Yusuf Hikmet Bayur’a Armağan (Ankara: TTK, 1985), p. 268. 49. Shaw: ‘The Origins of Representative Government’, p. 78. 50. Bernard Lewis, Emergence of Modern Turkey (Oxford: Oxford University Press (2nd edn), 1993), p. 112. 51. The list of the provincial representatives can be seen in BOA, Kamil Kepeci Tasnifi, No. 7684. 52. Enver Ziya Karal, Osmanlı Tarihi, Vol. 5, 7th print (Ankara: TTK, 1999), p. 192; Davison: Reform, p. 48. 53. Archival documents concerning Ragıp Pasha’s visit to Baghdad can be found in BOA, İ. MVL. 6855, 6947, 6985, 7061, 7068, 7336. Another commission of inspection was sent to Baghdad in 1862, see Neccar: Al-İdâra al-Osmânî, p. 55. 54. See BOA, İ. DAH. 25484, 29 M 1274. 55. In the same period the Damascus Advisory Council was meeting three times a week. This might mean that the council in Baghdad had a more intensive agenda. See Thompson: ‘Ottoman Political Reform in the Provinces’, p. 461. 56. BOA, İ.MMH. 2046, lef 3, 10 Ş 1262. These members were to sign the documents of the council. 57. Ortaylı: Tanzimat Devrinde, p. 34. 58. Shaw: ‘The Origins of Representative Government’, p. 61. 59. ‘orada bir meclis-i kebîr teşkîliyle ona daha rütbeli ve dirâyetli bir reîs ve ulemâdan bir azâ tayîn kılınması ...’, see BOA, İ. DAH. 13448, 14 S 1267. 60. In the muhassıllık meclises the muhassıl and his vekil were supposed to be the chairman. But in practice, the regulation was not obeyed and the council

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61. 62. 63. 64. 65.

66. 67. 68. 69. 70.

71. 72. 73.

74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80.

257

selected their presidents sometimes from among their own members and sometimes even from the outside. Military commanders such as ferîk pashas and müşîr pashas were also appointed for his post. See Shaw: ‘The Origins of Representative Government’, p. 71; Thompson: ‘Ottoman Political Reform in the Provinces’, p. 461. Shaw: ‘The Origins of Representative Government’, p. 87. BOA, A. MKT. MHM, 34/91, 29 N 1267. Davison: ‘The Advent’, p. 96 and İnalcık: ‘Application of the Tanzimat’, pp. 13–14. For the ulemâ’s role in Damascus see Ma‘oz: Ottoman Reform, p. 88 and Thompson: ‘Ottoman Political Reform in the Provinces’, p. 463. BOA, İ. MVL. 7239, 13 L 1267 and A. MKT. MVL, 44/55 13 L 1267. Neccar argues that the qadi signed the decisions of the council right after the governor. Neccar: Al-İdâra al-Osmânî, p. 227. BOA, A. MKT. NZD, 45/87 15 M 1268. Shaw: ‘The Origins of Representative Government’, p. 70. Çadırcı: ‘Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda’, p. 262. BOA, İ. DAH. 27324, 11 S 1275. ‘His Excellency [Midhat Pasha] is organizing new councils (meclises) of which the members are to be paid, instead of, as heretofore, working gratuitously with the opportunity of making what they could, a source of corruption and trouble...’, TNA FO 195/949, No. 7, 26 May 1869, From Herbert to H. Eliot. Çadırcı: ‘Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda’, p. 268. Çadırcı: Tanzimat Döneminde Anadolu, p. 215. Musa Çadırcı, ‘Tanzimat Döneminde Osmanlı Ülke Yönetimi (1839–76)’, IX. Türk Tarih Kongresi Bildirileri (21–25 September 1981), Vol. 2 (Ankara: TTK, 1988), p. 1157. For the regulations of 1849 see Çadırcı: Tanzimat Döneminde Anadolu, pp. 215–219. BOA, A. MKT. UM, 64/49, 23 Ş 1267. BOA, İ. DAH. 13448, 14 S 1267. BOA, AMKT. UM, 38/60, 6 M 1267 (11 November 1850). Azzawi: Târîkh al-Iraq, p. 94, Neccar: Al-İdâra al-Osmânî, p. 77 and Kayı: Bagdad, 1831–1869, p 165. Çadırcı, ‘Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda, p. 276. BOA, İ. DAH. 14192, 9 Ş 1267 and İ. MVL. 7472, 23 L 1267. The Sublime Porte determined the salary by comparing it with that of an official in a similar position. At that time the council chair in Damascus (who was probably superior in rank) had a salary of 20,000 kuruş. Therefore, taking the

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258

81. 82.

83. 84. 85. 86.

87.

88.

89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97.

98.

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saving measures into account, Salik Efendi’s salary was determined to be 17,500 kuruş per month. BOA, İ. MVL. 5854, S 1267 and İ. MVL. 7501, 24 Z 1267. BOA, İ. DAH. 15125, 16 R 1268 and A. MKT. MVL, 46/48, 20 Z 1267. In the same year, such an amalgamation was also seen in Damascus; see Maoz, Ottoman Reform in Syria and Palestine, pp. 36–37. On the resignation of Nafi‘ Efendi, chairperson of the Baghdad council in 1868–69 and appointment of Yahya Efendi, BOA, İ. DAH. 40023, 4 M 1285. BOA, İ. MVL. 21566, 29 Ca 1279. Neccar: Al-İdâra al-Osmânî, p. 77. Azzawi: Târîkh al-Iraq, p.131. For such an embezzlement in Divaniyah see, BOA, İ. MMAH. 1591, 19 Z 1286. For a bribery case in which a member of the Mosul council was involved, see BOA, İ. MVL. 16277, 4 N 1273. Neccar: Al-İdâra al-Osmânî, p. 77. It is even argued that Henry Rawlinson, British Consul General in Baghdad (1840–52) had occasionally participated in the council meetings with his secretary and listened to the discussions. However, I could not confirm this information from Ottoman and British archives. Keiko Kiyotaki, Ottoman Land Policies in the Province of Baghdad, 1831–1881 (Madison: Unpublished PhD Thesis, The University of Wisconsin, 1997), p. 57. BOA, İ. MVL. 20390, 14 R 1278, İ. MVL. 20550, 28 Ca 1278, İ. MVL. 21098, 9 Za 1278. BOA, İ. MVL. 17719, dâhiliye lef 1, 14 R 1275. BOA, İ. MVL. 2981, 29 Ra 1264. Ibid., For the members of Mosul and Basra councils see respectively, BOA, İ. DAH. 38023, 20 L 1282 and İ. MVL. 22368, mâliye lef 3, 26 Ra 1280. BOA, AMKT. UM, 38/60, 6 M 1267. For a council minute of Shahrizor see BOA, İ. DAH. 31091, 6 C 1277. For an example document on the council of Sixth Army see BOA, İ. DAH. 32174, 12 Ra 1278. Likewise, the commercial cases were first brought to the council of commerce. If one of the parties involved was not satisfied, the case could be referred to Divân-ı Istînâf. Zewra, No. 58. Beside this council of commerce, there were special courts for commercial disputes (mahkeme-i ticâret). See BOA, İ. MVL, 21129, 25 Ca 1278. BOA, İ. MVL. 17609, dahiliye lef 2, 4 RA1275 and İ. MVL. 19068, dahiliye lef 1, 26 Za 1276.

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99. Here, the Vilâyet Laws of 1864 and 1871 were considered to be complementary to each other. 100. In 1836 the eyâlets were redefined and decreased in size. See Carter V. Findley, ‘The Evolution of the System of Provincial Administration as Viewed From the Center’ in David Kushner (ed.) Palestine in the Late Ottoman Period (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1986), p. 5. 101. See Çetinsaya: Ottoman Administration, p. 9. 102. Sinaplı: Şeyhül Vüzera, p. 199. 103. ‘Vilâyet usûlu Tanzîmât-ı hayriyenin mükemmilidir’, see, Zewra, No. 11. 104. Zewra, No. 5. 105. Ibid., Later the mutasarrıf of Sulaimaniyah was also given instructions about the new provincial law. 106. Midhat Pasha: Tabsıra-i İbret, p. 90. 107. Findley: ‘The Evolution’, p. 7. 108. Although Muntafiq had more than one kazâ, they were not listed in the document. This was probably due to the fact that Muntafiq, which had been a tribally dominant area, was made a mutasarrıflık by Midhat Pasha. Therefore, it had no administrative background. For the conversion of Muntafiq into mutasarrıflık see Chapter 5. 109. See TNA, FO 195; 949, 26 May 1869, pp. 59–60, From Herbert to Constantinople. 110. Ortaylı: Tanzimat Devrinde, p. 31. 111. Zewra, No. 58. 112. Anscombe: The Ottoman Gulf, p. 49. 113. Keiko Kiyotaki, ‘The Implementation of the Administrative Law of 1864 in the Province of Baghdad’, paper presented at CIEPO 1998, p. 215. 114. BOA, İ. MMAH. 1664, 19 Z 1287. 115. Zewra, No. 35. 116. Anscombe: The Ottoman Gulf, p. 22, and Zewra, No. 35. 117. BOA, İ. DAH, 44930, 29 L 1288; Zekeriya Kurşun, Basra Körfezinde Osmanlı İngiliz Çekişmesi: Katar’da Osmanlılar (Ankara: TTK, 2004), pp. 58–59; Anscombe: The Ottoman Gulf, p. 49. 118. Findley: The Evolution, p. 12. 119. BOA, İ. MMAH. 1664, 19 Z 1287. 120. Neccar: Al-İdâra al-Osmânî, p. 227. After the creation of vali muavinliği the assistant governor also became a member of the council. 121. Thompson: ‘Ottoman Political Reform in the Provinces’, p. 473 and fn. 24. 122. Ortaylı: ‘Midhat Paşa’nın’, p. 230.

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123. The seal of the council reads as follows: ‘Meclis-i Kebîr-i Eyâlet-i Bağdad’. But not all of the council minutes were sealed. For an example of sealed and numbered council minutes see BOA, İ. MVL, 24933, adliye lef 4 and 5 dated 19 N 1286 and 19 Z 1281 respectively. 124. BOA, İ. DAH, 43534, lef 3, 5 R 1287. 125. Neumann: ‘Ottoman Provincial Towns’, p. 143.

Chapter 5 The Land and the Tribes 1. Salman, ‘The Ottoman and British Policies’, p. 23. 2. The most outstanding study on the Iraqi tribes is obviously Azzawi’s Aşair al-Iraq (Baghdad: İntişarat-ı Şerif er-Radi, 1937). 3. See Hanna Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movement in Iraq (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), p. 16. Cubur, Albu Hamad and Albu Abbas were among the leading agriculturalist tribes. 4. Salman, ‘The Ottoman and British Policies’, p.3. 5. John Frederick Williamson, ‘A Political History of Shammar Jarba Tribe of Al-Jazirah: 1800–1975’ (Unpublished PhD Thesis, Indiana University, 1975), p. 81. 6. Çetinsaya: Ottoman Administration, pp. 167–168. 7. Layard: Ninova ve Kalıntıları, p. 80. 8. The Mamluk Pashas, unlike the Tanzimat governors, used the threat of starvation as a means of subduing disobedient tribes. As the nomadic tribes had to purchase grain for their survival, the Mamluk Pashas tried to subdue them by closing the grain markets at Mosul, Baghdad, Tikrit and Basra. See Williamson: ‘A Political History’, p. 46. 9. Çetinsaya: Ottoman Administration, p. 73. 10. Al-Bustanî: ‘Bağdattaki Kölemen’, p. 232. 11. Longrigg: Four Centuries, p. 290; Neccar: Al-İdâra al-Osmânî, p. 28. 12. Ma’oz: Ottoman Reform, p. 136. 13. Al-Bustanî: ‘Bağdattaki Kölemen’, p. 225. 14. Ibid., pp. 93–94. 15. Williamson: ‘A Political History’, p. 89. 16. BOA, İ. MVL, 7094, 4 N 1267, BOA, İ. MVL, 12215, 16 C 1270 and İ. DAH, 23701, 15 S 1273. 17. Azzawi: Târîkh al-Iraq, p. 119. 18. See Nieuwenhuis: Politics and Society, p.41. 19. BOA, İ. MVL. 16338, 9 L 1273.

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261

20. For instance the cost of hil‘ats delivered to the sheikhs of Muntafiq, Beni Lam, Anaza and Rebî‘a for the period of one and a half years was 84,255.5 kuruş. The amount received from the sale of the animals was approximately 65,000 kuruş, and the remaining 19,000 kuruş was paid by the Sublime Porte. See BOA, İ. MVL. 24401, dâhiliye lef 1, 25 C 1282. 21. For the delivery of the mecîdiye nişânı and the rank of mîralaylık to Muntafiq sheikh Nasır see BOA, İ. DAH. 44294, telfîfât lef 1, gurre-i Ca 1287 and İ. DAH. 38942, 22 L 1283. 22. Williamson: ‘A Political History’, p. 94. 23. BOA, İ. MVL, 16279, 5 N 1273. 24. For instance, in 1859 the number of Uqayl soldiers was increased to 400. BOA, İ. DAH. 25 Za 1275. 25. BOA, İ. DAH. 30706, dâhiliye lef 2, 13 M 1277. 26. BOA, İ. DAH. 36587, 19 R 1281 and BOA, İ. DAH. 36605, 28 R 1281. 27. BOA, İ. MVL, 15266, 4 B 1272. 28. BOA, İ. MVL, 21886, 4 L 1279. 29. BOA, İ. DAH. 27461, 2 Ra 1275. 30. TNA, FO 195/272, Baghdad, Rawlinson to Canning, No. 19, 27/10/1847. The incident was also narrated by Layard in detail, see Layard: Ninova ve Kalıntıları, pp. 90–92. 31. Midhat Paşa: Tabsıra-i İbret, pp. 133–135. 32. Despite occasional disobedient attitudes on the part of Muntafiq, there were positive factors that facilitated the alliance. Muntafiq’s march in 1795 and 1797 against the Wahhabi threat played an important role in this. Williamson: ‘A Political History’, p. 31. 33. Kiyotaki: ‘Ottoman Land Policies’, p. 84. 34. ‘meşîhate râci’ olan mukâta‘âttan bir de küçük mukâta‘a cânib-i mîrîye terk ettirilip ...’ BOA, İ. DAH. 15714, dâhiliye lef 1, 13 B 1268. 35. BOA, İ. DAH. 41492, lef 1, 25 R 1286. 36. BOA, İ. MVL. 23471, 5 B 1281. 37. Kiyotaki: ‘Ottoman Land Policies’, p. 85. 38. BOA, İ .DAH. 15339, 8 C 1268. 39. ‘1274 senesinden i‘tibâren lağv olunan Müntefik aşîreti kaymakamlığı ve mâl kâtibi ...’, BOA, İ. MVL. 18268, 22 L 1275. 40. Kiyotaki: ‘Ottoman Land Policies’, p. 78. 41. Ibid., pp. 78–80. 42. Ibid., p. 80. 43. BOA, İ. MVL. 20409, 21 R 1278. 44. BOA, İ. MVL, 22666, 22 Ş 1280.

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45. Charles Tripp, A History of Iraq (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 2002, p. 18. 46. The events that followed the death of Fahd are narrated in BOA, İ. MVL, 6511, 22 Ca 1267. 47. BOA, İ. DAH. 14399, 19 L 1267. 48. BOA, İ. DAH. 13592, 15 Ra 1267. 49. BOA, İ. DAH. 15714, dâhiliye lef 1, 13 B 1268. 50. Ibid. 51. BOA. İ. DAH. 17606, 4 Ca 1269 and İ. MVL. 11635, 25 S 1270. 52. BOA, İ. DAH. 14508, askeri lef 3, gurre-i L 1267 and İ. DAH. 15714, dâhiliye lef 1, 13 B 1268. 53. BOA, İ. MVL. 6511, lef 2, 8 Ca 1265. 54. Kiyotaki: ‘Ottoman Land Policies’, p. 62. 55. BOA, İ. DAH. 38942, lef 1, 3 N 1283. 56. BOA. İ. MVL. 2981, 29 Ra 1264. For the Ottoman policy concerning the settlement of the tribes in the pre-Tanzimat period, see Cengiz Orhunlu, Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Aşiretlerin İskanı (İstanbul: Eren Yayıncılık, 1987); Yusuf Halaçoğlu, XVIII. Yüzyılda Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun İskan Siyaseti ve Aşiretlerin Yerleştirilmesi (Ankara: TTK, 1991). 57. BOA. İ. MVL. 2981, 29 Ra 1264. 58. See Ma‘oz: Ottoman Reform, p. 142. 59. Salman, The Ottoman and British Policies, p. 3. 60. Bruinessen: Agha, Shaikh, p. 173. 61. TNA FO. 195 / 113, ‘Memorandum Regarding the Koords’ (no date). 62. BOA. İ. DAH. 41931, 9 Ş 1286. 63. Kiyotaki: ‘Ottoman Land Policies’, p. 81. After this separation the provincial government could receive larger amounts of tax revenues from the Albu Muhammad tribe. 64. Namık Pasha also honored those who contributed to the construction and improvement of the sancak. See BOA. İ. DAH. 33727, 21 Ra 1279. 65. Neccar: Al-İdâra al-Osmânî, p. 56. 66. BOA, İ. MVL, 22666, 22 Ş 1280. 67. See Zewra, No. 11. 68. Zewra, No. 11. 69. TNA FO 195/949. From Herbert to Constantinople, 15 September 1869. 70. Ibid. 71. The Arabic buyruldı is available in the supplements of BOA, İ. DAH, 41930. 72. ‘Bu yolu kendülere kabul ettirmek için biraz da icbâr edilmeleri zamanı gelmiş olduğundan ...’ BOA, İ. DAH, 43847, 29 M 1288.

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73. 74. 75. 76.

77. 78. 79. 80.

81. 82.

83. 84. 85. 86.

87.

88.

263

Hasan ‘Growth and Structure’, p. 352. Longrigg: Four Centuries, p. 305. Land in absolute freehold. The word mîrî actually comes from emîriyye, meaning ‘princely’. Mîrî land is commonly translated as state land. But as Gerber pointed out, it does not correspond to state land in the modern sense. State land is land that the state wishes to keep out of individual use, such as forest land. However, such a legal category did not exist in the Ottoman Empire. See Gerber: The Social Origins, p. 68. The land reserved for the public use, which includes roads, rivers, market places, public buildings or village threshing floors, etc. State lands such as desert or empty lands. See Ömer Lütfi Barkan, Türkiye‘de Toprak Meselesi (İstanbul: Gözlem Yayınları, 1980), p. 335. For further details on the transformation of mevât land into mîrî lands, see Halil İnalcık, ‘The Emergence of Big Farms, Çiftliks: State, Landlord and Tenants’, in Çağlar Keyder and Faruk Tabak (eds), Landholding and Commercial Agriculture in the Middle East (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991). Doreen Warriner, Land Reform and Development in the Middle East (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 67. Marion Farouk-Sluglett and Peter Sluglett, ‘The Transformation of Land Tenure and Rural Social Structure in Central and Southern Iraq, 1870– 1958’, IJMES, Vol. 15, No. 4, 1983, p. 493. Gerber: The Social Origins, pp. 68–69. Halil İnalcık, ‘Land Problems in Turkish History’, The Muslim World, Vol. 45, 1955, p. 225. For detailed information on the extension of hereditary rights to other kin see Barkan: Türkiye‘de Toprak, pp. 328–30. Gerber argues that the condition of a ten-year possession period was rarely met. As Doreen Warriner has remarked, the cultivators were mobile, because cultivation was not their only occupation and livestock grazing remained an important alternative. See Warriner: Land Reform, p. 67. See Gerber: The Social Origins, pp. 74–75. For the text of the Land Code of 1858, see Kanunnâme-i Arâzî, Düstur (I. tertib), Vol. 1 (Dersaadet: Matbaa-i Osmaniye, 1330), pp. 165–200 and Stanley Fisher, Ottoman Land Laws (London, 1919). See Macit Kenanoğlu, ‘1858 Arazi Kanunnamesinin Osmanlı Siyasal ve Toplumsal Yapısı Üzerindeki Etkileri (1858–1876)’ (Unpublished PhD Thesis, Ankara University, 2002).

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89. Kiyotaki: ‘Ottoman Land Policies’, p. 17. 90. ‘Hıtta-i Irakiyye arâzîsi harâciye ve öşriye olmak üzere iki kısma münkasem olduğu ...’, BOA, İ. MVL. 1641, 10 Teşrîn-i Evvel 1286. 91. ‘Bağdad arâzîsinin arâzi-i harâciyeden olmasıyla bey‘i şer’an câiz olmadığı ...’, BOA, İ. MMAH. 943, lef 9, 23 Z 1276; See also Halil İnalcık and Donald Quataert (eds), An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, p. 111. 92. BOA, İ. MMAH. 1641, 10 Teşrîn-i Evvel 1286. ‘Hıtta-i Irakiyye arâzîsi ... takallübât-ı kevniyye ile ahkâmı kadîmîsi mütegayyer ve münkalib ve mutasarrıfları munkariz olmağla ekserîsi arâzî-i emîriyye hükmünü iktisâb eylediğinden bunlar cânib-i mîrîden maktû‘an mültezimlerine ihâle veya emâneten idâre olunmakta ise de ...’; Also BOA, İ. MMAH., 943, lef 9, 23 Z 1276, İ. MMAH. 943, lef 9, 23 Z 1276. 93. Jwaideh: ‘Midhat Pasha’, p. 118. 94. Kiyotaki: ‘Ottoman Land Policies’, p. 94, quoted from TNA, FO 78/1633, Enclosure No. 4 of dispatch No. 41, 29 August 1861. 95. Zewra, No. 50. 96. Midhat Pasha: Tabsıra-i İbret, p.102. 97. Kiyotaki: ‘Ottoman Land Policies’, p. 95. 98. As Kiyotaki pointed out, ‘when the tax farmer provided crop seeds to the peasants, he obtained both the government share and partner’s share, that is (%10+%45=) %55 of the total produce in dry farming field, and (%20 +40=) %60 of the total produce in irrigated field. See Ibid., p. 95 and 102. 99. Ibid., p. 103. 100. Matti I. Moosa, ‘The Land Policy of Midhat Pasha in Iraq, 1869–1872’, The Islamic Quarterly, Vol. 12, No. 3, 1968, p. 147. 101. Kiyotaki: ‘Ottoman Land Policies’, p. 104. 102. BOA, İ. MMAH., 1641, 27 Ş 1287. 103. Midhat Pasha, Tabsıra-i İbret, p. 103. 104. ‘... fellâhânın dahi hiçbir mahalle vatan nazarıyla bakamadıklarına mebnî zirâ‘at ve hirâsete meyl ü muhabbet görülemediği cihetle vâridât-ı eyâlet sene be sene tenezzül eylemekten nâşî ...’, BOA, İ. MMAH. 943, lef 6, 18 Za 1276. 105. BOA, İ. MMAH. 1641, 10 Teşrîn-i Evvel 1286. 106. BOA, İ. MMAH. 943, lef 6, 23 Z 1276. 107. Ibid., 108. BOA, İ. MVL. 17719, 14 R 1275. 109. As Jwaideh pointed out, tribal lands were sometimes referred to as alsakaniye (dwelling) and al-nuzul (habitat), but the term most commonly used was tribal lazma (holding or that which is held or grasped). See Albertine Jwaideh, ‘Aspects of Land Tenure and Social Change in Lower Iraq During the Late Ottoman Times’, in Tarif Khalidi (ed.) Land Tenure

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110. 111. 112. 113.

114. 115. 116. 117. 118. 119. 120. 121.

122. 123. 124. 125. 126. 127. 128. 129. 130. 131. 132. 133. 134. 135.

265

and Social Transformation in the Middle East, Lebanon: Press of American University of Beirut, 1984, p. 334. Sluglett: ‘The Transformation’, p. 492. Warriner: Land Reform, p. 136. Jwaideh: ‘Aspects of Land’, p. 336. Gerber, The Social Origins, pp. 73–78. For mush‘a see Martha Mundy, ‘Village Land and Individual Title: Mush‘a and Ottoman Land Registration in the Ajlun District’, in Eugene Rogen and Tariq Tell (eds), Village, Steppe and State: The Social Origins of Modern Jordan, London: British Academic Press, 1994, pp. 58–79. Article 8 of the Code, quoted from Warriner: Land Reform, p. 69. Sluglett: ‘The Transformation’, p. 494. Moosa: ‘The Land Policy’, p. 147. The correct spelling of the term is serkâr, rather than serkal. Kiyotaki: ‘Ottoman Land Policies’, p. 112. Ibid., p. 66. Ibid., p. 85. Ibid., p. 67. Necip Pasha was also accused for extortion and bribery. The central government set up a commission investigating the allegation and as the result of the investigation he was dismissed. See BOA, İ. DAH, 13041, 21 Za 1266; İ. MVL. 4890, Gurre-i C 1266; and İ. MVL. 5488, 20 Za 1266. BOA, İ. MVL. 3069, 13 Ca 1264. BOA, İ. MVL. 15709, 7 M 1273. BOA, İ. MVL. 21299, selh-i M 1279. See for example, Ernest Dowson, An Inquiry into Land Tenure and Related Questions (Letchworth, 1931), p. 18. ‘... icrâ kılınan imtihânda kendisinin ehliyeti tebeyyün etmiş ...’, BOA, İ. MVL. 21299, selh-i M 1279. Kiyotaki: ‘Ottoman Land Policies’, p. 147. Ibid., p. 132. Ibid., p. 109. Ibid., pp. 150–151. Fattah: ‘The Politics of Grain Trade’, p. 154. Azzawi: Târîkh al-Iraq, pp. 112–113. Salih Daniel and his brothers were the leading figures of these Jewish monopolists. Ibid., p. 114. Fattah: ‘The Politics of Grain Trade’, p. 154, Kiyotaki clearly pointed out the increase in the amount of taxes. See Kiyotaki: ‘Ottoman Land Policies’, pp. 82–83.

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266 136. 137. 138. 139.

140. 141. 142. 143. 144.

145. 146. 147. 148. 149.

150. 151. 152. 153. 154. 155.

156. 157. 158. 159. 160. 161. 162.

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Ibid., p. 86. Ibid., p. 90 and 151. Sâlnâme-i Vilâyet-i Bağdad (Baghdad Yearbook, 1292/1875), p. 46. Albertine Jwaideh and Marion Farouk-Sluglett and Peter Sluglett are the leading scholars who brought Midhat Pasha to the forefront for the application of the new land policies in the province. For the implementation of the Land Code of 1858 in the province of Baghdad, Kiyotaki: ‘Ottoman Land Policies’. Ibid., p. 89. BOA, İ. MMAH. 1531, lef 1, 8 Za 1285. BOA, İ. MVL. 24815, 6 M 1283. Kiyotaki: ‘Ottoman Land Policies’, p. 157. It seems that in this legal change the case in Egypt was a source of inspiration (... Bağdad arâzîsinin arâzî-i harâciyeden olmasıyla bey‘i şer‘an câiz olmadığı gibi mülken dahi mahzûrlu göründüğünden bu sûretten sarf-ı nazarla istihsâl-i esbâb-ı imârı zımnında yeni bir tarika gidilmek ve bu dahi Mısır arâzîsi ahvaline tatbik edilmek sureti olduğundan ...), BOA, İ. MVL. 943, lef 1, 10 N 1277. Kiyotaki: ‘Ottoman Land Policies’, p. 157. Moosa: ‘The Land Policy’, p. 154. Kiyotaki: ‘Ottoman Land Policies’, p. 162. Moosa: ‘The Land Policy’, p. 157. Ibid., pp. 146–159 and Jwaideh: ‘Midhat Pasha’, p. 113. Salih Mahdi Haider and Ernest Dowson are among the exceptional few who belittled Midhat Pasha’s efforts on Baghdad’s land problems. BOA, İ. MMAH. 1531, 8 S 1285. Jwaideh: ‘Midhat Pasha’, p. 106. Zewra, No. 50. Jwaideh: ‘Midhat Pasha’, p. 119. BOA. İ. MMAH. 1531, 13 S 1286. For instance, in Zewra No. 5, Midhat Pasha promulgated the extension of the transfer of the lands with title deeds to relatives other than the son of the tapu holder. BOA. İ. MMAH. 1531, 13 S 1286. BOA. İ. MVL. 3069, Gurre-i B 1264. Ibid., and BOA. İ. MVL. 24815, 6 M 1283. BOA, İ. DAH, 42557, 28 M 1287. BOA, İ. MMAH. 1641, 27 Ş 1287. BOA, İ. MMAH. 1641, 27 Ş 1287. The value of the ukr share is calculated by multiplying the annual average in the last three years with 15. Owen: The Middle East, p.186.

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163. 164. 165. 166. 167. 168. 169. 170. 171. 172. 173. 174. 175. 176. 177. 178. 179. 180. 181. 182. 183. 184. 185.

186.

267

Midhat Pasha: Tabsıra-i İbret, pp. 121–122. Jwaideh: ‘Midhat Pasha’, p. 121. Ibid., p. 121. Kiyotaki: ‘Ottoman Land Policies’, pp. 132–134. BOA, İ. MMAH. 943, lef 9, 23 Z 1276. Kiyotaki: ‘Ottoman Land Policies’, pp. 141 and 145. BOA, İ. MMAH. 1641, 10 Teşrîn-i Evvel 1286. BOA, İ. MMAH. 943, lef 9, 23 Z 1276. Azzawi: Târîkh al-Iraq, p. 252. BOA, İ. MMAH. 943, lef 9, 23 Z 1276. Moosa: ‘The Land Policy’, p. 155. Jwaideh: ‘Midhat Pasha’, pp. 119–20. Ibid., pp. 119–20. Midhat Pasha: Tabsıra-i İbret, p. 107. Ibid., p. 106. Ibid., p. 107. İnalcık and Quataert (eds), An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, p. 857. BOA, Şûrâ-yı Devlet, 1472, 29 Rebîu‘l Evvel 1293. Jwaideh: ‘Midhat Pasha’, pp. 131–132. Batatu: The Old Social Classes, p. 110. Gerber: The Social Origins, p. 74. Batatu: The Old Social Classes, p. 55. See Albertine Jwaideh, ‘The Sanniya Lands of Sultan Abdul Hamid II in Iraq’, in George Makdisi (ed.), Arabic and Islamic Studies in Honor of H.A.R. Gibb (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965), pp. 326–336. Jwaideh: ‘Midhat Pasha’, p. 126.

Chapter 6 Public Works (Umûr-ı Nâfi‘a) and Modernization in Baghdad 1. Fattah: ‘Representations’, p. 65 and Nafi: ‘Abu Al-Thana Al-Alusi’, p. 480. 2. Sinaplı: Şeyhül Vüzera, p. 129. 3. Shaw: ‘The Origins of Representative Government’, p. 83. 4. Sinaplı: Şeyhül Vüzera, p. 189. 5. Çadırcı: ‘Tanzimat Döneminde Osmanlı’, p. 1160. 6. BOA, İ. DAH. 32588, 2 B 1278. Also see Azzawi: Târîkh al-Iraq, p. 139.

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7. ‘Esbâb-ı ma‘mûriyet denilen şey Şat ve Fırat nehirlerinin bozulmuş olan sed ve bendleri ta‘mîr ve icâb eden mahallere kal‘a ve köprü inşâ olunmak ve dolmuş olan harkler hafr ve tathîr kılınmak gibi mahallince bilinecek ve yapılacak mevâdd olmasıyla ...’, BOA, İ. MMAH. 1011, 15 R 1278. 8. BOA, AMKT. UM, 508/75, 16 R 1278. 9. Zewra, No. 1. See also Rhoads Murphey, ‘The Ottoman Centuries of Iraq: Legacy or Aftermath? A Survey Study of Mesopotamian Hydrology and Ottoman Irrigation Projects’, Journal of Turkish Studies, Vol. 11, 1987, p. 25. 10. ‘Zamân gözetilmezse maksad-ı aslî olan terakkiyât ve felâh ve necât mümkün olamayıp cemiyetin emsâlinden geri kalacağında iştibâh yoktur. ... Hükm-i zamâna teb‘iyet ve istihsâl-i esbâbına tevessül etmeyenler ni‘met-i terakkî ve servetten geri kalırlar. ... Zenginlik nakit akçe biriktirmek ve nukûdu sandıkta saklayıp habs etmek olmayup akçe ve meskûkât mu‘amelât-ı halk için bir alet ve vâsıtadır. Asıl zenginlik asrın ve zamânın icâbına muvâfık ma‘lûmât ile zirâat ve ticâretin ve sanat ve hirfetin esâs-ı sahîh üzerine cereyân etmesidir’, Zewra, No:1. 11. TNA, FO 195; 949, 26 May 1869, From Herbert to Constantinople. 12. BOA, İ. DAH, 43610, 16 Za 1287 mentions the telegram machines that were imported from India. Midhat Pasha also reports in his memoriam that the horse cars and the lines of the Kazımiyah tramline were imported from London. See Midhat Pasha: Tabsıra-i İbret, p. 115. However, one should also note the British refrained giving support for Ottoman initiatives in establishing steamers on the rivers. Assuming that the Ottomans could never assemble steamers on their own and organize a steam establishment independent of British-Indian supervision, the British consul in Baghdad tried to impede rather encourage Ottoman plans for steamers. See Fattah: The Politics of Regional Trade in Iraq, pp. 115–116. 13. Rauf Pasha, for instance, had taken the title deeds delivered by Midhat Pasha back by force. See Jwaideh: ‘Midhat Pasha’, p. 128. 14. For instance, the similarity between Midhat Pasha’s reforms and Abdülhamid’s project for the modernization of Ottoman Libya is striking. See Deringil: ‘They Live in a State’ pp. 319–322. 15. For Reşid Pasha’s report see BOA, İ. DAH, 10434, 7 Ra 1265. 16. BOA, İ. MVL. 5500, 22 Za 1266. 17. Midhat Pasha: Tabsıra-i İbret, p. 123. 18. Ortaylı: Tanzimat Devrinde, p. 31 and 171. Ruth Kark, ‘The Jerusalem Municipality at the End of Ottoman Rule’, Asian and African Studies, Vol. 14, 1981, pp. 117–141. 19. For instance see Lloyd: Twin Rivers, p. 191. 20. TNA, FO 195, 949 No. 1 of 1869, Enclosures 1 and 2, From Herbert to Constantinople.

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21. Ibid. 22. For Midhat Pasha’s governorships in different provinces see Tufan Buzpınar, ‘Abdulhamid II, Islam and the Arabs: The Cases of Syria and the Hijaz 1878–1882’ (Unpublished PhD Thesis, Manchester University, 1991); Zeki Arıkan, ‘Midhat Paşa’nın Aydın Valiliği’, in Uluslararası Midhat Paşa Semineri: Bildiriler ve Tartışmalar (Ankara: TTK, 1986); Nejat Göyünç, ‘Midhat Paşa’nın Niş Valiliği Hakkında Notlar ve Belgeler’, İÜEF Tarih Enstitüsü Dergisi, Vol. XII, 1981–2; Najib E. Saliba, ‘The Achievements of Midhat Pasha as Governor of the Province of Syria’, IJMES, Vol. 9, No. 3, Oct. 1978, pp. 307–323; Yaşar Yücel, ‘Midhat Paşa’nın Bağdat Vilayetindeki Altyapı Yatırımları’, Uluslararası Midhat Paşa Semineri: Bildiriler ve Tartışmalar (Ankara: TTK, 1986). 23. See Ortaylı: Tanzimat Devrinde Osmanlı, p. 29. 24. Zewra, No. 9. 25. Zewra, No. 4. The number of streets with 5–6 arşın length was very few. 26. Zewra, No. 4. Although there was enough stone in Mosul and Hît, it was not feasible to bring it to Baghdad for the construction of sidewalks. 27. The park was later named Mecidiyye; see Azzawi: Târîkh al-Iraq, p. 84. 28. Zewra, No. 43. 29. Davison, ‘Midhat Pasha’, EI2. Ali Bey however reported that the inhabitants of Baghdad preferred to stay within the (old) city walls. The destruction of the city walls also brought some disadvantages. People began to fear a possible tribal attack or even a flood, because the city walls were an important obstacle not only to tribal attacks but also for natural disasters like floods. Ali Bey, visiting Baghdad in 1885, noted that after the destruction of the walls only the foundation stones and two gates of the Baghdad citadel were left. See Ali Bey: Dicle’de Kelek, p. 76. 30. Raymond: Osmanlı Döneminde, p. 17. 31. BOA, İ. MVL. 20459, 2 Ca 1278. 32. Lloyd: Twin Rivers, p.190. However, Lloyd, criticizing Midhat Pasha’s act, states that Baghdad lost her walls, and got in return, not a boulevard, but a surrounding ring of enormous ruins. 33. E.S. Stevens, By Tigris and Euphrates (London: Hurst & Blackett Ltd. 1923), p. 128. 34. Ibid., p. 128. This narrative also confirms the fact that the bricks and stones were very scarce and expensive. 35. Zewra, No. 2. 36. Zewra, No. 61. 37. Ibid. 38. Midhat Pasha: Tabsıra-i İbret, p. 114.

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39. BOA, A. MKT, 76/83, 26 R 1263. There were also instances where some shrewd people tried to obtain tax exemption through the construction of new tombs or shrines. 40. Midhat Pasha: Tabsıra-i İbret, p. 114. Zewra newspaper reports that during the anniversary of the imperial enthronement the state offices were decorated with gas-lamps and the celebration continued till midnight. See Zewra, No. 3. 41. Davison, ‘Midhat Pasha’, EI2, p. 1033. There were of course other bridges in other cities of the province, such as Mosul, Divaniyah and Hillah. 42. See BOA, İ. MVL, 21405, 8 Ra 1279. 43. Duri, Baghdad, El, p. 906. 44. Zewra, No. 77. Also see Süleymen Faruk Göncüoğlu, ‘Bağdattaki Türk Eserleri’, in Ali Ahmetbeyoğlu, Hayrullah Cengiz and Yahya Başkan (eds), Irak Dosyası (İstanbul: Tarih ve Tabiat Vakfı Yayınları, 2003), p. 272. 45. For the introduction of electric telegraph into the Ottoman Empire see Soli Shahvar, ‘Concession Hunting in the Age of Reform: British Companies and the Search for Government Guarantees; Telegraph Concessions through Ottoman Territories, 1855–59’, MES, Vol. 38, No. 4, October 2002, pp. 169–193. 46. BOA, İ. HRC. 8385, 3 Z 1274 and İ. HRC. 8297, 11 Za 1274. 47. BOA, İ. DAH. 31091, 6 C 1277. 48. BOA, İ. MMAH. 718, selh-i C 1276. 49. BOA, İ. HRC. 8999, 14 L 1275. This document has in its enclosure the contract between the British engineer and the Ottoman officials. 50. For the destruction of telegraph lines between Hillah and Divaniyah see BOA, İ. DAH. 42055, 8 N 1286. 51. BOA, İ. HRC. 9766, 24 M 1277 and İ. HRC. 9894, 2 B 1277. 52. BOA, İ. DAH. 35516, 28 Ş 1280. This document also contains the text of the first telegraph from Hillah sent by governor Namık Pasha to the Sublime Porte. 53. Shahvar: ‘Tribes and Telegraphs’, p. 94. 54. Lorimer: Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, p. 239. 55. BOA, İ. HRC. 11920, 27 Za 1280 and İ. HRC. 12045, 6 R 1281. It is also interesting that some of the telegraph officials, especially those with higher ranks, were given swords and hil‘ats in addition to regular salaries. See BOA, İ. MVL. 23807, lef 1, 19 Z 1281. 56. Shahvar: ‘Tribes and Telegraphs’, p. 99. 57. Between the outskirts of Baghdad and Mosul more than thirty security officers (çavuş) were employed. BOA, İ. HRC. 10769, 19 L 1278. For the security forces and their salaries in the Hillah-Divaniyah route see BOA, İ. HRC. 11861, 14 L 1280.

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58. Yücel: ‘Midhat Paşa’nın’, p.182. 59. For example the list of donors for the construction of a hospital, Dârü’ş-şifâ, was given in Zewra, No. 14, 24, and 34. 60. Midhat Pasha’s return from Basra might be a good example of this kind. Midhat Pasha returned from Basra with a considerable amount of donations which were later listed in Zewra, No. 34. 61. Lorimer: Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, p.212. 62. Ibid., p. 212. 63. William Patrick Andrew, Memoir on the Euphrates Valley Route to India, (London: W. H. Allen & Co., 1857). 64. It is understood that a French company, asking for equal treatment with the British, had also applied to the Sublime Porte in 1864 for navigation facilities on the Euphrates and Tigris. See Lorimer: Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, p. 247. 65. BOA, İ. HRC, 1555, 27 Ra 1262. 66. BOA, İ. DAH. 36943, 9 Ş 1281. 67. BOA, İ. DAH. 34861, bahriye lef 3 (no exact date, but 1863). 68. BOA, İ. MVL. 15658, 21 Za 1272, İ. DAH. 16932, 21 N 1269 and İ. DAH. 24232, dâhiliye lef 3, gurre-i S 1273. 69. BOA, İ. DAH. 28675, 24 N 1275 and İ. DAH. 30427, 24 Z 1276. 70. BOA, İ. MVL. 16755, bahriye lef 3, 29 Ra 1274 and İ.HRC. 8104, hâriciye lef 1, 14 C 1274. 71. Yücel: ‘Midhat Paşa’nın’, pp. 176–7. 72. BOA, İ. MVL, 23361, 16 Ca 1281. 73. Midhat Pasha: Tabsıra-i İbret, p. 109. 74. Zewra, No. 4. 75. Çetinsaya: Ottoman Administration, p. 18. 76. Charles Issawi, ‘Economic Structure and Growth’, in Cyril E. Black and L. Carl Brown (eds), Modernization in the Middle East: The Ottoman Empire and its Afro-Asian Successors (Princeton: The Darwin Press, Inc. 1992), p. 88. Also Midhat Pasha: Tabsıra-i İbret, p. 108. 77. Zewra, No. 3. 78. Midhat Pasha: Tabsıra-i İbret, p. 111. This ship was named Maskanah. It was assembled in Baghdad. However, Midhat Pasha, due to his departure from office, did not see it come into service. 79. For instance, in 1849 Abdülkerim Nadir Pasha built walls near the Euphrates river. BOA, İ.MVL. 4393, 24 Z 1265. 80. Zewra, No. 55. 81. Zewra, No. 22 and 25. 82. See Zewra, No. 41, 42, and 43.

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83. See Michael Ursinus, ‘The Ruins of Dura-Europos in the Columns of Zevrâ: Ahmed Şakir Beğ’s Travels Along Euphrates, Published and Annotated by the Ottoman Provincial Gazette of Baghdad’, in Horst Unbehaun (ed.) The Middle Eastern Press as a Forum for Literature (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2004), pp. 167–180. 84. Midhat Pasha: Tabsıra-i İbret, pp. 112, 146. 85. For the bewilderment of a local person see Zewra, No. 47. 86. Longrigg: Four Centuries, p. 318. 87. Yücel gives the details of these steamers, see Yücel: ‘Midhat Paşa’nın’, pp. 178–179. It also seems clear that Midhat Pasha’s initiatives relating to the steam service on the Euphrates and Tigris worried the British Consul General at Baghdad. In order to prevent a reduction in the profit margin of the service, the consul suggested a compromise with Midhat Pasha, so that the steamers of both nationalities could navigate. See also TNA, FO 195; 949, 21 April 1869, From Herbert to Constantinople. 88. Yücel: ‘Midhat Paşa’nın’, p. 179. 89. For example, in 1864, upon the notification of Namık Pasha, the Sublime Porte decided to buy two river steamers instead of one bigger ship for the same price. BOA, İ. DAH. 36724, 6 C 1281. 90. BOA, İ. DAH. 36943, 9 Ş 1281. 91. BOA, İ. DAH. 30530, 17 M 1277. 92. BOA, İ. MMAH, 1611, bahriye lef 3, 28 Z 1287. 93. BOA, İ. DAH. 36943, 9 Ş 1281. 94. BOA, İ. DAH. 38144, 6 Z 1282. 95. BOA, İ. DAH. 34861, 2 Ra 1280. 96. BOA, İ. MMAH, 1611, bahriye lef 3, 28 Z 1287. 97. BOA, İ. MMAH, 1611, 2 Ca 1287. 98. Midhat Pasha: Tabsıra-i İbret, p. 109–110. 99. Zewra, No. 67. 100. Midhat Pasha: Tabsıra-i İbret, p.141. 101. BOA, İ. MMAH, 1611, 2 Ca 1287. 102. Zewra, No. 40. 103. BOA, A. MKT, 75/20, 18 R 1263 and Sinaplı: Şeyhül Vüzera, p. 122. 104. Kiyotaki: ‘Ottoman Land Policies’, p. 66. 105. Azzawi: Târîkh al-Iraq, p. 109. 106. Ibid., p. 106. 107. Midhat Pasha: Tabsıra-i İbret, p. 146. 108. For some examples of these floods in Saklawiyya and the repairs see BOA, İ. DAH, 10571, 14896, 26974 and İ.MVL. 5637, 12578, 19346 and 19762. 109. Murphey: ‘The Ottoman Centuries’, p.25.

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110. Ibid., p. 25. The width of the Saklawiyya canal was 10 m and it was 4 m in depth. See Midhat Pasha: Tabsıra-i İbret, p. 146. TNA, FO 195; 949, No.7, From Herbert to Constantinople, 26 May 1869. 111. For the positive consequences of the canal see Zewra, No. 79; for a critique of the canal see Jwaideh: ‘Midhat Pasha’, p. 127. 112. BOA, İ. ŞD, 987, 16 Z 1288. 113. Zewra, No. 3. 114. Zewra, No. 44. 115. Stevens: By Tigris and Euphrates, p. 128. The reports written by the British General Consul at Baghdad also indicate that there were more than 5,000 visitors coming into Baghdad for the Kurban Bayram and more were expected for the 10th Muharram ceremonies. See TNA, FO 195: 949, 31 March 1869, From Herbert to Constantinople. 116. Davison: Reform, p.161. The reason for the abolition of this tramline was quite ironic: It did not have a license. 117. Zewra, No. 96. 118. For an example of this kind, see Hurşid: Seyâhatnâme-i Hudûd, pp. 136 and 138. ‘Ali Rıza Paşa’nın eyyâm-ı hükûmetinde hayrât olarak Acem’den bir çok akçe gelüb ânınla Kerbela’da sâkin Acâm Seyyid Ali el-Kâzım-ür-Rüşdî nâm kimesne ki ol vakit müçtehidleri idi, ânın ma‘rifetiyle Musayyib karyesinin üst tarafından bede’ ile Kerbela-yı Muallâ kasabasının iki saat mesâfe ötesine kadar sekiz sâat imtidâdında mücedded bir hark hafr etdirüb el-ân bu harkın yemîn ve yesârında ziraât olunur.’ 119. BOA, İ. MMAH. 1444, 9 Ş 1284. 120. Midhat Pasha himself visited the planned route of the railroad. See Zewra, No. 25. 121. Zewra, No. 48. 122. Zewra, No. 54, 58 and 67. 123. For this railroad project see BOA, İ. MMAH, 1137, 14 Ş 1279. 124. Al-Qaysi: ‘The Impact of Modernization’, p. 45. 125. For a list of places where traditional education was given in Baghdad see Abd al-Razzaq Al-Hilâlî, Tarih al-Ta‘lim fi’l-Iraq fi Ahd al-Uthmânî, 1638– 1917 (Baghdad: The National Printing and Publishing Company, 1959), pp. 55–56, 60–61. 126. Al-Qaysi: ‘The Impact of Modernization’, p. 15. 127. Al-Qaysi has already pointed out that the support given to the students fluctuated, and this affected the number of students coming to the madrasas. Ibid., pp. 15–16. 128. For instance the ibtidâiyye school in Mosul was opened in 1861. See Al-Hilâlî: Tarih al-Ta‘lim, p. 153 and 177. 129. BOA, İ. MVL. 23072 and 23790, 8 S 1281 and 7 Z 1281 respectively.

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274 130. 131. 132. 133. 134.

135. 136.

137. 138.

139. 140.

141. 142. 143. 144. 145. 146. 147. 148. 149. 150. 151. 152.

153. 154.

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BOA, A.MKT.MHM, 431/69, 28 N 1285. Al-Hilâlî, Tarih al-Ta‘lim, p. 152. BOA, İ. MMAH. 1664, 19 Z 1287. BOA, İ. MVL. 23072 and 23790, 8 S 1281 and 7 Z 1281 respectively. The rüşdiye of Kirkuk had a locally elected muallim-i sani (Maruf Efendi) and a bevvâb (caretaker). It has a budget of 1,000 kuruş. See BOA, İ. DAH, 42695, 5 Ra 1287; also Zewra, No. 61. BOA, İ. MVL. 3941, 25 Ra 1265. Arab sources criticize the teaching methodology of these schools in that even the Arabic course was taught by Turkish instructors. See Al-Hilâlî: Tarih al-Ta‘lim, p. 155. Zewra, No. 64. During the Hamidian era 13 more rüşdiyes were opened (7 in Baghdad, 3 in Mosul, and 3 in Basra). See Bayram Kodaman, Abdülhamid Devri Eğitim Sistemi (3rd edn) (Ankara: TTK, 1999), pp. 95, 103. Ibid., p. 44. However, we should note that here the term ‘idâdî’ refers to a prep school rather than to a senior high school, because even İstanbul had no idâdî school by this time. For the use of the term see Kodaman: Abdülhamid Devri Eğitim Sistemi, p. 114. Al-Hilâlî: Tarih al-Ta‘lim, p. 162 and Al-Qaysi: ‘The Impact of Modernization’, p. 46. Al-Hilâlî: Tarih al-Ta‘lim, p. 162. Jafar Askari, A Soldier’s Story: From Ottoman rule to Independent Iraq (London: Arabian Publishing, 2003). Marion Farouk-Sluglett and Peter Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958: From Revolution to Dictatorship (London: KPI, 1987), p. 7. BOA, İ. DAH. 44618, 6 N 1288. Al-Qaysi, ‘The Impact of Modernization’, p. 46. Al-Hilâlî, Tarih al-Ta‘lim, p. 165. For example, in July 1869, six graduates of the military academy in İstanbul were appointed to the Sixth Army. See Zewra, No. 7. Al-Qaysi, ‘The Impact of Modernization’, p. 45. Zewra, No. 55. Zewra, No. 8 and 9. Ahmed Midhat: Menfa, p. 149. Ahmed Midhat wrote some of his books in Baghdad, such as Kıssadan Hisse and Letâif-i Rivâyât, but they were published in İstanbul. Zewra, No. 4. Zewra, No. 87.

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155. Al-Qaysi, ‘The Impact of Modernization’, p. 47. 156. Zewra, No. 87 and Al-Hilâlî: Tarih al-Ta‘lim, p. 165. 157. Derek Angus Frenette, ‘L’Alliance Israélite Universelle and the Politics of Modern Jewish Education in Baghdad, 1864–1914’ (Unpublished MA Thesis, Simon Fraser University, 2005). 158. The Times, 25 May 1872. 159. Ibid. 160. Zewra, No. 56. 161. BOA, İ. HRC. 3847, 12 L 1267. This document includes the plans of the proposed madrasa as well. Also see İ. MMAH. 859, 10 S 1277. 162. For the imperial policy on the prevention of Shiism in Iraq see BOA, İ. MVL. 21587, 22 Ca 1279 and Sinaplı: Şeyhül Vüzera, p. 196; for the continuation of this policy in the Hamidian Era see Deringil: ‘The Struggle Against Shiism’, pp. 45–62. 163. Deringil: Well-Protected Domains, p. 48. 164. Timothy Mitchell, Colonizing Egypt (Oxford: University of California Press, 1991), p. xi. 165. Al-Qaysi ‘The Impact of Modernization’, p. 52. 166. Michael W. Albin, ‘Iraq’s First Printed Book’, International Library Review (Libri, Copenhagen), Vol. 31, No. 2, 1981, p. 168. 167. Ibid., p. 173. 168. Ibid., p. 172. 169. Ibid., p. 172. 170. Al-Qaysi, ‘The Impact of Modernization’, p. 108. 171. In Arabic script the title of the Jewish newspaper is written (‫)ﺩﻭﺒﺭ ﻣﻳﺸﺎﺭﻳﻣ‬ (Hâkî’s-Sıdk), which means ‘Narrator of Truth’. See Zewra No. 22 and 33. 172. Zewra, No. 12. 173. Zewra, No. 34. 174. Albin: ‘Iraq’s First Printed Book’, p. 168. 175. Zewra, No. 33. 176. Zewra is one of the names of Baghdad. 177. Albin: ‘Iraq’s First Printed Book’, p. 168. 178. Between 1908 and 1912 the Young Turk regime dropped the Arabic language edition and Zewra became a Turkish paper. However, due to protests the Arabic edition was resumed in 1913. See Al-Qaysi, ‘The Impact of Modernization’, p. 115. 179. Zewra, No. 47. 180. Although the articles in Zewra did not bear any name at all, the pattern of narration makes it clear that they were written by Ahmed Midhat. The news, especially concerning international affairs, must have required the

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276

181.

182. 183. 184.

185. 186. 187. 188. 189.

190.

191. 192. 193. 194.

THE OTTOMAN ORIGINS OF MODERN IRAQ

examination of many Ottoman and foreign newspapers which could hardly have been done by anyone besides Ahmed Midhat. Besides, Ahmed Midhat had earlier worked for the Tuna newspaper, the first provincial newspaper published by Midhat Pasha during his governorship in that province and did the same work. He later mentioned that each edition of the Tuna newspaper took less than three hours to put together. See Ahmed Midhat: Menfa, pp. 128, 138. Ahmed Midhat also mentions that he recruited Can Muattar, a local in the printing house, for translation and editing. Can Muattar was not only an intellectual but also a multilingual person, speaking Arabic, Persian, Hebrew, English and Indian. See Ibid., pp. 142–145. Zewra, No. 84. Zewra, No. 84. ‘Musul vilâyetin haftalık cerîde-i resmiyesidir. Çıkaran Musul vilâyeti, Musul Vilâyet Matbaası’. Hasan Duman, İstanbul Kütüphaneleri Arap Harfli Süreli Yayınlar Toplu Kataloğu, 1828–1928 (İstanbul : IRCICA, 1986), p. 192. See Bağdad Vilâyeti Sâlnâmesi, 1292 (1875), defa 1. Zewra, No. 54. Zewra, No. 62. Al-Qaysi, ‘The Impact of Modernization’, p. 110. When Ahmed Midhat saw the first newspapers like Takvîm-i Vekâyi‘, Rûznâmçe-i Cerîde-i Havâdis, Tercümân-ı Ahvâl and Tasvîr-i Efkâr, he could not grasp the nature and the purpose of a newspaper. However, later he perceived the functions of newspapers as a teaching activity and wanted to take part in this activity. Ahmed Midhat: Menfa, p. 156. ‘Evrâk-ı Havâdis ... insanın âdetâ mürebbi-i hakîkîsidir ... Gazateleri âdetâ insanın hâdi-i suveri ve ma‘nevîsidir. ... Gazeteler dahi ... umuma nâsıh olmak için ...’. See Zewra, 23. See Zewra, No. 50. Zewra, No. 14. For instance, in its 55th issue the newpaper narrates a love story from France. This ranking was done by the Asır Gazetesi in İstanbul and it was quoted in Zewra. See Zewra, No. 92.

Conclusion 1. Azzawi: Târîkh al-Iraq, p. 112. 2. Hala Fattah, ‘The Question of the “Artificiality” of Iraq as a Nation-State’, in Shams C. Inati (ed), Iraq: Its History, People and Politics (New York: Humanity Books, 2003), pp. 49–50.

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INDEX

Numbers in bold denote photographs or maps Numbers in italics denote tables Abbasid Empire 5, 83 Abdi Pasha see Abdülkerim Nadir Pasha Abdulgani Cemil 95 Abdülhamid II (Ottoman sultan) 174, 179 Abdul Jalil 45 Abdulkadir Geylânî 2 Abdülkadir Agha 72, 95, 112 Abdülkerim (Shammar sheikh) 134, 140, 141 Abdülkerim Nadir Pasha (Governor of Baghdad 1849–1850) 73, 104, 162 Abdullah David Sassoon 212 Abdurrahman Pasha 51, 52 Abdurrahman Vasfi Bey 163 Abu Laila see Süleyman Pasha advisory councils (şûra meclisleri), Baghdad 110–113 Agah Efendi 27 agriculture, reform of 155–174 see also irrigation projects; Land Code Ahmad al-Jazzâr 17 Ahmed Midhat 98–99, 211, 215, 217 Ahmed Şükrü Bey 96 Ahmed Tevfik Pasha (Governor of Baghdad January–August 1861) 76, 143, 164–165

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Ahmed Vâsıf 2 Ahmet Haşim 2 al-Basra 217 Albu Muhammad tribal confederation 66, 76, 109, 132, 140, 149, 150 Aleppo–Baghdad trade route 56–57, 57 Ali Baba 1 Ali Rıza Pasha (Governor of Baghdad 1831–42) 13, 15, 40, 44–45, 47, 51, 54, 71–73, 86, 93–95, 111, 136–137, 162 Al-Jazîrah region 24, 32 Alliance Israelite Universelle (school) 212 al-Yakubi 1 Amadiya 50–51 American Protestant mission 36 Ammarah 63, 76, 124, 126, 185 Anaza tribal confederation 62, 117, 137, 145 Anglo–Ottoman Commercial Treaty (1838) 10, 191 Arab capitals under Ottoman rule 7–12 Arif Efendi 95, 119 Armenians 2, 35, 36 arsenal (Baghdad) 63 Assyrians 2, 35

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ayans (local notables) 12, 13, 15, 16 Azamiyah 33, 34 Azms 13, 16 Bâbü’l-Arab 95, 111 Baban emirate 51–52, 733, 136 Babanzâde Ahmet Naim 2, 207 Bab-ı Azam 184 Babil (steamer) 195, 198 Baghdad Arab historiography of 5–6 city site 24 customs house 194 geography of province 22–26, 125 governors 94 history of 1–7, 4 languages 36 in literature 1–2 modernization of 183–184, 184 nomads 31–32, 37, 55 as place of exile 86–88 population of 29–37, 30, 31 religions in 34, 34 religious significance of 1, 185 remoteness from Istanbul 26Tanzimat reforms in 101–131 Western influence 35–36 Bahdinan emirate 50–51 Bahrain, naval visit to 199 Bani Lâm tribal confederation 37, 143, 150 Barukh Moseh Mizrahi 214 Basra 25, 126, 179–181, 196–199 Basra–Persian Gulf route 193, 196, 198 Bedirhan 52–53 Bedirhan Pasha 52 Bedouins see Baghdad, nomads in; sedentarization; tribes Bender see Sheikh Bender Botan emirate 48, 52–53 bribery, prevention of 97, 105–106 Britain 15, 179, 182, 189–191, 199

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British India Steam Navigation Company 190 Cabîzâde Mehmed Efendi 116–117 Cairo 8, 101 Caliph Ali 1 Caliph Mansur 1, 5, 234 n. 10 canal projects 199–201, 201 center–periphery relations (in Ottoman Empire) 13, 15, 16, 85, 176–177, 219 Chaldeans 2, 36, 238 n. 56 Chesney, Colonel 190 Christians, Baghdad 34, 35, 108 Christian school (Baghdad) 212 City of London (steamer) 190 clock tower (Baghdad) 186, 187 communal land ownership 159–161 communications, modernization of 18, 40, 182–183 conscription by ballot (Kur‘a-i şer‘iyye) 58–60, 219–220 councils see advisory councils; provincial councils; sub-provincial councils Crimean War 43, 64, 71, 75, 84, 187 Cuinet, Vital 29 Dar al-Hikmah 5 Darband 142 date cultivation 169 Davud Pasha (Governor of Baghdad 1817–31) 40–41, 44, 45, 58, 93, 211, 213–214 Dawhatü‘l-Vüzerâ 214 defterdâr 70, 95, 110, 118, 119, 127 Defterdâr Sadık Efendi 44 defterdârlık 95, 119 Derviş Pasha 64 Dirah 37, 159–160 Divaniyah 59, 60, 124, 143, 150 Diyarbakır 53, 76 Dominicans 214 Dulaim 124, 126, 129

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INDEX

East India Company 10, 190 Education, Law of see Maârif-i Umûmiye Nizâmnâmesi education, modernization of 18, 19–20, 27, 204–213, 205, 208 emânet usûlü tax system 107 Es‘ad bin Nâib 72 Euphrates Project 193–196 Euphrates river 22–24, 28, 193–196 see also river steamers Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company 190 see also river steamers Erzurum Treaty (1823) 42–43 Fahd (Muntafiq sheikh) 141, 144–145, 147 Farhan (Shammar sheikh) 134, 139, 151 Fraser, J.B. 189 Fuzûlî 2 gas lighting, Baghdad 185 general assembly 128, 176 Greek Orthodox (in Baghdad) 115, 238 n. 56 Gülhane Edict see Tanzimat Edict Hâce-i Evvel (textbook) 217 Hacı Yusuf Agha 95 Ha-Dover / Dover Mesharim 214–215 Hamdi Bey see Osman Hamdi Bey Harun Al-Rashid 1, 5 hâne (household unit) 33 Hanefization 213 Hasan Pasha (Governor of Baghdad 1702–) 38 Hebrew press 214–215 hevrs (marshes) 26 Hillah 30, 59, 121, 124, 126, 200 Hindiyyah 61, 75, 76, 120, 172, 200 hıtta-ı Irakiyye (Ottoman greater Iraq) 103, 121, 219 horse tramline see tramline

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Hussain Pasha al-Jalili 45 Hourani, Albert 3, 8–9, 225 nn. 6, 7 Hussain (grandson of Prophet Muhammad) 1, 185 ibtidâiyye schools 206 İdâre-i Ummân-ı Osmâniye (steamship company) 192, 195 iltizam see tax farming Imam Azam 1, 185 imperial ceremonies, Baghdad 20–21 Imperial Edict of 1856 108 industrial schools (mekteb-i sanâyi) 211–212, 217 infrastructure, improvement of see communications, modernization of; public works Iraq climate 22–24 ethnic makeup 2 flooding in 23 geography 22–26 historical and cultural background 1–7 Iraq and Hijaz army see Sixth Army irrigation projects 199–201 İskenderun–Baghdad route 27, 204 İskender Pasha 97 ‘Islamic City’ concept 8 İsmail Pasha Bahdinian emir 50–51 (Mosul governor) 45 Jacobites 2, 238 n. 53 Jaf tribe 149, 164 Jafar al-Askari 209, 210 Jalilis 8, 13, 14, 16, 45–47, 220 Janissaries 42, 47, 56 jarîb system 169 Jews, Baghdad 34, 35,107, 108, 164, 212, 214–215 Jurnâl al-Iraq 213, 214, 215

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THE OTTOMAN ORIGINS OF MODERN IRAQ

Ka‘b 45, 71 Kananiyah canal 200–201 see also Saklawiyya canal karakols (police stations) 63, 220 Karamanids 13, 16 Karbala 53–54, 124, 126, 185, 186, 202, 203, 214 Karol Brzozowski 99 Kasım Bey 59 kaymakamlıks, formation of 109, 142, 144, 149, 221, 222 Kazımiyah 32, 200, 202, 204 keleks (traditional rafts) 28, 28, 186, 235 n. 27 Khazâ‘il tribal confederation 66, 134, 140, 143 Kirkuk see Shahrizor Kör Mir see Muhammad Kör Kur‘a-i şer‘iyye see conscription by ballot Kurds 22, 35, 36, 44–45, 48–53, 148–149 see also Shahrizor kuttâb (elementary) schools 204, 205–206, 209 Kuwait 30, 128, 197 land, categories of 153 Land Code (1858) 2, 5, 17, 96, 107, 102, 109, 152–155, 160–174, 222 land reform see Land Code lithographic press see printing houses Lynch Company 190, 192 Maârif-i Umûmiye Nizâmnâmesi (Law of Education) 207–208 madrasas 204–205, 211, 212, 213 Mahmud II (Ottoman Sultan) 13, 16, 56, 82, 177 Mahmud Alûsî 95 Mahmud Nedim Pasha 179, 233 n. 69 mail service 190

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malikanes (life tenure tax farms) 15 see also tax farming Mamluks (1749–1831) 3, 8–9, 13–14, 15, 16, 37–41, 42–46, 53, 86, 93–95 Mansur as-Sa’dun (Muntafiq sheikh) 119, 141, 150 Maskanah 194, 195, 204 Maşuk Pasha (mutasarrıf of Basra) 75, 145–146, 180 meclis-i imâr (council for public works) 122, 176 meclis-i kebîr (great council) 95, 113, 118, 119, 121 see also advisory councils meclis-i umûmî (provincial general assembly) 128 Mehmed Bey 45 Mehmed Reşid Pasha see Reşid Pasha Mehmed Said Pasha 47, 51 Mehmed Pasha (İncebayraktar) 47, 49, 51, 59 Mehmed Vasfi Efendi 210 Midhat Pasha (Governor of Baghdad, 1869–72) Basra, development of 196–201 bureaucratic reforms 104–106, 120–125, 130 cadre 98–100 educational reforms 204–213 Euphrates project 193–196 extension of authority to Kuwait and Najd (al-Ahsa) 128 in Iraqi historiography 77, 80–88, 81 land reforms 165, 166–172 military reforms 59–62, 66–67 printing, advancement of 178, 189, 213–218 public works 182–186 transport reforms 192–193, 202–205 tribal policy 134, 150–152

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military power, modernization of 18, 55–56, 64–66, 73, 208–211 mîrî tax system 15 Mir Kör see Muhammad Kör Mirza Abbas 214 Molla Ali al-Hassı 72, 116 Mosul 46–47, 47, 59, 121, 124, 214, 215 Muhammad Ali 3, 43 Muhammed Agha as-Sayyâf 95 Muhammed Ali Pasha 49 Muhammed Kör 48–49, 50–51 muhassıls (tax officials) 56, 69–70, 110, 113, 117, 153 mullah schools see kuttâb schools mültezims (tax farmers) 103, 110, 141 municipality, Baghdad 181–182 Muntafiq tribal confederation 32, 37, 75, 93, 109, 119, 124, 128, 132, 134, 140–147, 150–151, 169–170, 222 Murat IV 1 Musayyib 186, 200 müşîrs 88, 89, 91–91, 100, 145 Müşîr-Pashas, the 88–93 Mustafa Nuri Pasha (Governor of Baghdad 1859–61) 64, 76, 104, 158–159 Musul (paper) 215, 217 Mütercim Rüşdi Pasha 73 Nadir Shah 45 Najaf 53–54, 186, 202, 212 Najd 30, 66, 128 Namık Pasha (Governor of Baghdad 1851) 18, 59, 62, 63–64, 74–77, 84, 85, 90–91, 109, 123, 143, 149–50, 165, 206, 211, 220 Nasır as-Sa’dun 147 Nasıreddin (Shah of Iran) visit to Baghdad 21 Nasıriyah 141, 151 Nasır Pasha 141, 150, 151, 170 naval modernization 196–197

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Necip Pasha (Governor of Baghdad 1842–49) 50, 54, 69, 72–73, 86, 89, 91, 96–97, 103–104, 107, 109, 114, 142, 162, 183 notables, politics of see ‘politics of notables’ Nuri al-Said 209, 210 ocean steamers 197–199 Ömer Lütfü Pasha (Governor of Baghdad 1857–1859) 43, 59, 71, 75–76, 97, 104 Osman Hamdi Bey 98–99 Osman Seyfi 95 öşr (tithe tax) 106, 155, 171 Ottoman imperialism 12 Ottoman Land Code see Land Code Ottoman–Persian border agreements 52 Pashalik of Baghdad 14–15, 40, 46 see also Mamluks Persia, threat to Baghdad 40, 42, 43, 45, 48, 52, 54, 64, 183, 219 pilgrimage 198, 202–203, 204 plague (1831) effects of 14, 40, 45, 93 population surveys 58 see also Baghdad, population of ‘politics of notables’ 8, 9 ‘politics of tribe’ 134–152, 222–223 poll tax (cizye) 108–109 printing houses 213–218 prison (Baghdad) 63–64 provincial councils (eyâlet meclisleri) 109–110, 113–117, 129, 131, 221 Provincial Law (1864) see Vilâyet Law (1864) provincial regulations 1849 117–120 public works, modernization 18–19, 175–218

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THE OTTOMAN ORIGINS OF MODERN IRAQ

railway, Baghdad 36, 192, 202–204, 218 see also telegraph Ramadi 151, 222 Rasul Bey 50 Rawanduz 48–50 Reşid Pasha (Governor of Baghdad 1852–57) 43, 49, 57, 64, 70, 75, 84, 86, 107, 139–140, 163, 178, 191–192, 200, 220 river navigation see river steamers river steamers (on Euphrates and Tigris) 189–196, 194, 220 roads see communications Ruhî 2 rüşdiye schools 128, 206–207, 209 Sadık Bey 96 Saduns 173 Safavids 3, 38 Şakir Bey 99, 194, 195 Saklawiyya canal 195, 200–201 Salik Efendi 118, 119 sâlnâmes (provincial yearbooks) 7, 30, 217 sedentarization (of nomads) 11, 31, 147–152, 171–172 see also Land Code (1858) Selim I 1 Selma Hatun 72 serdâbs (cellars) 24, 207, 215 serkâr 161, 170 Shah İsmail 1 Shahrizor (Kirkuk) administrative divisions 126 councils in 121, 124, 129, 177 industrial school 212 Kurdish emirates in 48–53, 58, 60, 103, 163, 183, 206, 207, 212 Shammar Jarba (tribal confederation) 47, 55, 71, 133–137, 139–141, 151, 222 Sheikh Bender (Muntafiq sheikh) 143, 144

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Sheikh Faris (Muntafiq sheikh) 27, 145, 146, 147 Sheikh Mansur (Muntafiq sheikh) 144, 150 Shi‘i shrines 185, 202–203 see also pilgrimage Shi‘is 2, 34, 35, 202–203, 213, 238 n. 52 shipbuilding, Basra 197, 211 sijills (court registers) 10, 229 n. 32 Sixth Army 18, 59–60, 61–64, 63, 66, 73, 88, 90–93, 140, 208, 209, 219, 221, 245 n. 83 see also military power, modernization of Soran emirate see Rawanduz steamers see river steamers; ocean steamers sub-provincial councils 120–122 Suez Canal 11, 83, 193, 196, 197, 199 Sufuk (Shammar sheikh) 133–134, 135, 136, 137, 140–141 Sufuk al-Faris 27 Suhrawardi 2 Sulaimaniyah 51, 52, 61, 64, 124, 126, 149 Süleyman Pasha (Governor of Baghdad 1749–62) 39, 42, 240 n. 76 Süleyman the Great 40, 42, 56 Süleyman the Lawgiver (Kanuni) 1, 3 Süleyman the Little (Governor of Baghdad 1807–10) 72 Sunnis 2, 35 Takiyüddin Pasha (Governor of Baghdad, 1867–69) 77, 84, 91, 104, 181, 182, 192 Talafar 60, 143 Tanzimat Edict (1839) 13, 16, 70, 102–103, 109, 122, 96, 131 see also Tanzimat reforms

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Tanzimat reforms (1839–76) 2–21, 68–71, 101–131 see also Land Code; Vilâyet Law Tapu Law (1847) 154, 162, 168, 170 tax farmers see mültezims tax farming (iltizam) 7, 15, 141–142, 147, 153, 158, 161–163, 164 telegraph, development of 19, 187–189 Tigris river 22–25, 25, 28, 28, 33 see also river steamers Timur 1 title deed (tapu), introduction of 154–155 tramline (Baghdad–Kazımiyah) 202–203, 203 tribes 132–174 see also Albu Muhammad tribal confederation; Baghdad, nomads in; Bani Lâm tribal confederation; Khazâ‘il tribal confederation; Muntafiq tribal confederation; sedentarization; Shammar Jarba (tribal confederation) Tughrul Bey 1

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ukr land 161, 166, 168–169, 222 Umaris 8, 46, 242 n. 21 umûr-ı nâfi‘â see public works Uqayl tribe 137, 146 vak‘a-i verdiyye 75, 89 vakıfs (religious foundations) 18, 175 Vecihi Pasha 62, 74–75, 84, 91, 103, 105, 118, 121, 138, 162 Vilâyet Law (1864) (also known as Provincial Law) 5, 17, 33, 66, 96, 100, 102, 106, 121 122–131, 142, 221, 222 Wahhabis 7, 15, 42 Yahya Pasha 47, 137 Yerm Island 199 Yezidîs 34, 49, 238 n. 53 Zewra (Baghdad provincial newspaper) 20, 32, 60–61, 64, 178, 189, 195, 215, 216, 217–218, 223

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